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Webster was quoted in Taipei Times on nuclear development in Taiwan

lbowen — Mon, 29 Jul 2024 19:53:08 +0000

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The US is banning the import of Russian nuclear fuel. Here’s why that matters.

Jennifer T. Gordon — Thu, 16 May 2024 21:47:41 +0000

On May 13, US President Joe Biden signed into law a ban on imports of uranium from Russia. This news has flown under the radar amid a barrage of other news about Russia, but the new law has big implications for US nuclear power.

The legislation had been a long time coming. It was first introduced in the US House of Representatives in February 2023, with US lawmakers caught between the need to cut off a significant source of revenue for Russia on the one hand, and demand for enriched nuclear fuel to keep the US reactor fleet running on the other.

The United States can import the uranium that is required for nuclear fuel from several countries other than Russia. The top two exporters of uranium to the United States, for instance, are Canada and Kazakhstan, with the United States importing 27 percent of its uranium purchases from Canada and 25 percent from Kazakstan. However, Russia, which was in third place at 12 percent of US purchases in 2022, plays a crucial role in the nuclear fuel supply chain, both through conversion and enrichment of uranium. Russia supplies about 20 percent of the US reactor fleet’s nuclear fuel, at a cost of about one billion dollars each year. This is why the new legislation allows for waivers to import from Russia through 2027 if the Department of Energy determines that no alternative source of fuel for a US reactor is available.

One of the big questions that the US nuclear energy industry has grappled with is whether it can enrich enough uranium (or procure enough enriched uranium from other sources) on its own to compensate for the loss of Russian-enriched uranium. Earlier this year, three uranium mines began production in the United States, the first domestic uranium mines to operate in eight years. But uranium extraction and uranium enrichment are two separate issues, and—until recently—the only enrichment capability in the United States had existed at a facility in New Mexico owned by Urenco, a multinational company owned in equal parts by the British government, the Dutch government, and German utilities. Outside of Russia, the commercially relevant sources of enrichment are European facilities owned by Urenco and Orano, a French company. China also operates enrichment capacity, which has historically been used to fuel Chinese reactors. Together, the Urenco and Orano capacity is not sufficient to fuel all the reactors outside Russia and China.

Last October, Centrus—a US-owned nuclear fuel company—began enrichment operations in Piketon, Ohio. However, production at this facility is small and is geared toward the high-assay low-enriched uranium fuel required by new advanced reactors expected to become operational in the next several years. That means the fuel cannot be used in many of the older reactors currently operating.

Crucially, the new legislation unlocks $2.7 billion to support domestic enrichment. That money had been included in previous legislation, but it was contingent on passing sanctions against Russia’s state-owned nuclear company Rosatom. These funds will be required as the US nuclear energy industry moves away from dependence on Russian fuel supply. The money will be available through competitive processes to support fuel production for both existing and future advanced reactor designs. These steps are part of the United States’ commitments as part of the Sapporo 5, a partnership with Canada, France, Japan, and the United Kingdom founded in April 2023 to secure a reliable nuclear fuel supply chain.

The US Congress has taken what many see as a crucial step in sanctioning Russia and moving away from dependence on Russian nuclear fuel. However, a strong commitment—on the part of the US government and industry—to domestic enrichment is necessary in order to ensure that the US domestic fleet continues to operate and to ensure that the next generation of nuclear reactors can be demonstrated and deployed.

Jennifer T. Gordon is the director for the Nuclear Energy Policy Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Global Energy Center.

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Ukrainian nuclear energy can fuel country’s recovery and power Europe

Suriya Evans-Pritchard Jayanti — Tue, 16 Apr 2024 13:42:13 +0000

Even while recent Russian attacks on energy infrastructure have once again thrust Ukraine’s besieged energy sector into the headlines, the country’s energy potential remains undiminished. Ukraine’s competitive advantage in clean power including wind, solar, and especially nuclear, is extraordinary. This capacity can play a leading role in funding the country’s reconstruction and could also help carve out a future place for Ukraine in Europe.

The cost of rebuilding Ukraine is currently estimated by the World Bank at $486 billion. Some of this, hopefully, will be paid for by Western governments and with seized Russian assets, but private investment and Ukrainian ingenuity will have to foot a large portion of the bill. However, with no end in sight to hostilities, global investors are more likely to put their money into longer term projects, of which large energy infrastructure is a prime example. Nuclear power is among the most promising options.

Ukraine has been a nuclear energy country since 1977. With the very high-profile exception of the 1986 Chornobyl nuclear disaster, which was much more a failure of Soviet bureaucracy and politics than of Ukrainian nuclear energy management, the country actually boasts a strong record of nuclear power success. Before Russia’s full-scale invasion forced the shutdown of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant in 2022, Ukraine had 15 reactors running, constituting approximately 54% of its baseload power generation.

Ukraine has a well developed nuclear energy industry including a national regulator and a large nuclear workforce. It also has a bilateral civilian nuclear power agreement with the US, known as a 123 Agreement, which means it is authorized to receive most US civilian nuclear technology. With US and European nuclear ambitions bogged down by over-regulation, spiraling construction and commodity costs, a limited nuclear labor force, underdeveloped supply chains, and a near irrational fear of nuclear accidents, Ukraine’s nuclear sector has a number of clear advantages.

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Ukraine’s nuclear agility is unparalleled. Now that it is a fully integrated member of ENTSO-E, the potential for the country to export nuclear-generated clean power to Europe is huge. While building new nuclear power plants in Ukraine is hardly a quick option, once full commercial power exports are authorized, Ukraine could make many billions per year on electricity sales to the rest of Europe.

With its preexisting nuclear industry, Ukraine could also potentially expand its nuclear capacity much faster than any newcomer to nuclear power generation. In the West, nuclear power plants can take 8-15 years to build, depending on regulatory approval times. They can cost approximately $2-3 billion for a single small modular reactor and as much as $15 billion for a large plant. In the past, Ukraine has been able to build nuclear power plants with significantly lower costs and in shorter time frames.

By purchasing Ukrainian power, Europe could save billions and reinforce its energy security. The EU’s energy transition plan is mostly focused on renewables, but a baseload is required to make renewable power sources usable as peak load. With war in the Middle East shutting down the Red Sea and Suez Canal shipping routes, new EU sanctions under consideration targeting Russian liquified natural gas (LNG), Russia bombing Ukrainian gas storage facilities holding European gas supplies, and the end of the Gazprom-Naftogaz transit contract in December 2024, nuclear power is the only scalable baseload available that is secure and zero emission.

Ukraine can also offer much cheaper power than other European countries. Although current Ukrainian prices are regulated according to wartime restrictions, and while Russian devastation of Ukrainian power generation capacity in March and April 2024 has affected markets, Ukraine will remain extremely competitive with the rest of Europe even once controls are lifted.

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Ukraine’s advance in Kursk: What’s next and implications

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The path forward will not be straightforward. In addition to the obvious challenges presented by Russia’s ongoing invasion, the biggest obstacles Ukraine faces in expanding its nuclear power capacity are investor fears and the need for reform at the country’s state-owned nuclear power company, Energoatom.

The possibility of private nuclear power plants is a huge opportunity for Ukraine’s economy and thus reconstruction, because the private sector almost invariably moves faster and more efficiently than the public sector. Many countries have privately owned and operated nuclear power plants, including the US and UK. This model makes it possible to raise funds quickly. It also brings security and rule of law benefits, along with operational benefits and the anti-corruption protections of Western business standards. Moreover, private companies can get started now, potentially years before state-owned entities.

As to public nuclear development, meaning with and through Energoatom, success will depend on achieving de-monopolization and reform of the state-owned company. Despite its nuclear power prowess and ownership and operation of all four of Ukraine’s nuclear plants, Energoatom is hampered in its nuclear expansion plans by a legacy Soviet corporate culture based on monopoly status. Its monopoly position in Ukraine has eliminated any internal incentive to adopt Western corporate standards, including anti-corruption norms.

In recognition of this, Ukraine’s parliament enacted a law in February 2023 requiring the corporatization of Energoatom in order to “open up additional opportunities for attracting significant investments in the industry and development of domestic nuclear energy, which is the key generation in the country,” according to Ukraine’s Minister of Energy German Galushchenko. This corporatization process is currently underway.

Intended to bring the nuclear behemoth into line with international corporate governance and structure standards, the reform of Energoatom requires the selection of an independent international supervisory board and the implementation of numerous internal policies and standards. It is seen as so important that its completion is a requirement for Ukraine to receive up to $100 million in financial support from the US under the recently signed Ukraine-US Memorandum of Understanding regarding Collaboration on Ukrainian Energy System Resilience.

Once the reform of Energoatom advances and possibilities for private nuclear power open up, Ukraine could lead the rest of Europe in constructing new nuclear power plants. Energy is one of Ukraine’s great strengths, as are an educated labor force and technological skills. Taken together, these assets can help fuel Ukraine’s reconstruction and power Europe’s energy transition through new nuclear development.

Suriya Jayanti is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

The United States and the European Union are taking different approaches to the development of clean hydrogen, a critical technology to decarbonize hard-to-abate sectors, from industry to maritime and aviation, among others. Divergent hydrogen policies can limit the emergence of the competitive, transatlantic marketplace necessary to accelerate the deployment of clean molecules and eventually facilitate regional and global trade. Consequently, US and EU policymakers must coordinate hydrogen rules to the maximum extent possible while ensuring that hydrogen uptake reduces carbon emissions. The following analysis identifies key distinctions between the transatlantic partners’ hydrogen strategies.

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Common pillars for clean hydrogen—with different rules

In December 2023, the United States published draft guidance on hydrogen standards, used to determine eligibility for tax credits under the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA). The guidance, called 45V, is built around what is termed the “the three pillars” of hydrogen: temporal matching, additionality, and deliverability. These three general requirements are also tacked in the EU Delegated Act, which defines renewable hydrogen for compliance with EU targets as renewable fuels of non-biological origin (RFNBOs). While in the US framework, tax credits go toward clean hydrogen that is produced using any clean electricity source, including nuclear energy, and in the EU, compliance with EU RFNBO targets requires that hydrogen be generated with renewables only, the three pillars can be generally understood as:

Temporal matching: These rules aim to ensure hydrogen is produced when clean electricity is available. This means that any amount of electricity used in hydrogen production must be matched with the same amount of zero-carbon electricity produced within a given time period. Shorter time intervals reduce electrolyzer capacity factors, increasing the levelized cost of hydrogen but achieving greater emissions reductions. Temporal matching periods are typically conducted on an hourly, daily, monthly, or annual basis.

Additionality/incrementality: Rules around this pillar aim to ensure hydrogen production goes hand in hand with new clean electricity generation capacity, making hydrogen producers add renewable electricity to the grid, rather than repurpose existing clean energy already on the grid.

Deliverability: This set of rules aims to ensure hydrogen is produced using clean electricity in the same region where that electricity is produced. There must be a direct physical interconnection between the clean energy source and the electrolyzers producing green hydrogen.

The chart below features a comparison between the EU and the US approaches to hydrogen across the three pillars, as well as other key areas of clean hydrogen policy. While US regulations are a proposed draft, the EU framework is considered final despite tweaks that may take place during its scheduled revision period in 2028.

Table 1. US and EU approaches to green hydrogen

While certain elements of the US rules might suggest they are stricter than the EU approach, this would be an oversimplification, as each contains elements that could be considered stricter—or looser—than the other in certain areas. While both approaches ultimately mandate hourly temporal correlation and strict additionality rules, the EU does not switch to hourly correlation until 2030—whereas the United States switches in 2028. Also, the EU allows for grandfathering of additionality, which is not permitted in the US proposed guidelines. Nonetheless, the draft US framework allows for the use of subsidized clean electricity for hydrogen production, takes a technology-neutral approach to clean electricity, and accepts energy attribute certificates to comply with hydrogen rules, diverging from the EU framework and allowing for greater flexibility for hydrogen producers. Importantly, differences in approach mean qualifying for the US 45V credit does not automatically qualify a facility as producing EU RFNBO-compliant renewable hydrogen.

Beyond these significant technical variations, US and EU strategies for developing clean hydrogen markets differ in their economic approach: the United States follows a supply-incentive model, while the EU is predominantly relying on a market-pull mechanism. The United States incentivizes production of hydrogen with uncapped tax credits that give lower or higher support depending on emissions thresholds but does not mandate clean molecule uptake. In this sense, it rewards greater wholesale emissions reductions without requiring it. In contrast, the EU employs a demand-side mechanism: regulation imposes the consumption of renewable hydrogen (i.e., 42 percent of hydrogen used in industry must be renewable by 2030), and strictly defines which hydrogen (RFNBOs) is available to meet legally binding targets. This mechanism prioritizes the use, rather than production, of hydrogen, and thus the decarbonization of end users. While the EU has put in place a Hydrogen Bank to support production, support is capped and auction based, whereas the United States’ effort is uncapped and direct. The Hydrogen Bank’s results are yet to be seen.

To maximize clean hydrogen’s potential to contribute to energy security and decarbonization, the EU and the United States will need to balance environmental, economic, and security concerns—and they must coordinate these efforts together. While the two markets have different resource endowments, legal regimes, and more, the EU and the United States should ensure the maximal harmonization and interoperability of hydrogen regulatory frameworks, as this will simplify investment and trade. The two sides should also plan carefully to ensure that their respective approaches to hydrogen development reduce carbon emissions. The next Trade and Technology Council in Belgium is an opportunity for both sides to learn from each other’s best practices and develop common approaches to hydrogen development.

Joseph Webster is a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council Global Energy Center.

Pau Ruiz Guix is Officer on Trade and International Relations at Hydrogen Europe.

This article reflects their own personal opinions.

EnergySource

EnergySource Oct 19, 2023

Quick takeaways on the United States’ historic investment in clean hydrogen hubs

By Joseph Webster, William Tobin

The US DOE announced $7 billion in funding for clean hydrogen hubs across the US, the single largest public investment in US hydrogen to date.

Climate Change & Climate Action Energy & Environment

EnergySource Oct 16, 2023

Policy Memo: How to deepen transatlantic energy and climate cooperation at the US-EU summit

By George Frampton, Olga Khakova, Joseph Webster, Paddy Ryan, Maia Sparkman, William Tobin

With the European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and European Council President Charles Michel visiting Washington on October 20, 2023, all eyes will be on the Rose Garden to see how the US and EU can chart a course on energy security and climate action.

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EnergySource Oct 13, 2023

COP28 and the growing Europe-MENA hydrogen connection

By Giampaolo Cantini

A key piece of the COP28 plan to double global hydrogen production by 2030 will be connecting hydrogen-hungry Europe to the potential green hydrogen powerhouse of the MENA region.

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Gordon and Derentz in the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies: United States nuclear policy, small modular reactors, and global energy security

smeadows — Mon, 05 Feb 2024 14:48:27 +0000

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The takeaway from COP28: Gas and nuclear are part of the energy transition

Ana Palacio — Fri, 15 Dec 2023 17:58:08 +0000

Standing at the epicenter of the United Nations Climate Conference in Dubai, also known as COP28, it was clear that this year’s event was qualitatively different from previous ones. What started in Berlin in 1995—convened by Angela Merkel, then the German environmental minister, as a private meeting of experts seeking to draw the attention of leaders and the media to the increase in global average temperatures—has become a prominent and massive gathering. Over the course of two weeks, more than 150 heads of state and government walked the halls of Expo City Dubai, compared to 112 who attended COP27 last year in Sharm El Sheikh, Egypt. There were also reportedly more than 90,000 participants at COP28, compared to less than 50,000 at COP27.

With the increase in size, COP’s center of gravity shifted away from the formal management structure of the convention. Instead, the focus was on disparate and scattered initiatives in which nonstate actors—including from the private sector—play a prominent role. There are several ways to interpret this conference: a holy pilgrimage for those who are devoutly green, a new Davos attended by executives of the same corporate giants who frequent the World Economic Forum gathering in Switzerland, a photocall of politicians from around the world, a theater with armies of lobbyists, a mix of consultants and media. “Inclusion” was an oft-repeated theme this year. And although it may seem provocative, the meeting’s most notable decision may have been to include the oil and gas sector, which had been previously sidelined—a decision that spotlighted a larger confrontation at COP28 between ideology and pragmatism.

A new energy era

Strategic ambitions have historically revolved around energy, a substantive battle in international relations. The nineteenth century can be understood as the era of coal, driving the development of the manufacturing industry and rail transportation. World War I marked the beginning of the era of oil. (Controversy surrounded Winston Churchill’s decision, as the civilian head of the British Royal Navy, to switch the fleet to this fuel in 1913.) The current century will witness an “energy transition” intended to move the world toward a sustainable future. However, as “green” ideologies have come to dominate public discourse, the concept of a “transition” is too often lost: specifically, the idea that it will extend over time and require overlap. Countries must invest in renewables while continuing to rely on fossil fuels, which currently represent around 80 percent of the global energy mix (a figure that has stubbornly persisted since the world began to monitor the consequences of anthropogenic greenhouse gases).

The expectation of continued growth in demand through 2050 further complicates the global trilemma—ensuring a reliable energy supply at an affordable price while also accounting for the environmental dimension. Considering today’s technological framework, any solution to the equation likely involves replacing coal with gas—along with the return of nuclear—which is the most effective way to reduce emissions in situations where alternative sources are not conducive. Provided, of course, that “inclusive” and “equitable” are not just formulaic terms, and that “leaving no one behind” is more than a stylistic clause. In other words, Europe and other wealthy countries can afford to do away with coal or nuclear, or even to bet completely on renewables. But in the rest of the world, if a choice needs to be made between prosperity and the environment, the former will likely win out.

Today there is growing awareness of the urgency of the climate crisis. Far from being a technical dialogue among scholars, the climate conversation has permeated society; ordinary citizens around the world feel involved. Education has become not only positive but essential. Given that development, it is necessary to review the messages being sent; to reconsider the apparent dichotomy between renewable energies (presented as unquestionably good) and coal, oil, natural gas, and nuclear. These have been collectively condemned without considering their different contributions to what should be our only goal: combating the accumulation of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere.

The challenge ahead

The historic language enshrined in the final—although nonbinding—deal of the summit urging countries toward “transitioning away from fossil fuels” reflects a collective commitment to the energy transition that is taking shape. At the same time, there was progress in efforts to align hydrocarbons, and particularly gas, with sustainability goals, in recognition of their continued importance. Two initiatives stand out: a push to abate methane emissions, in particular from venting, flaring, and leaks; and a sharpening focus on the capture, storage, and eventual use of carbon dioxide throughout the gas value chain, starting with extraction.

Equally transformative is the return of interest in nuclear power, following a long period of rejection that occurred despite it being one of the most efficient and reliable energy sources (even with the challenge of waste from current reactors). The deal reached two weeks ago has opened a horizon that, a year ago, would have been unimaginable: Twenty-two countries have committed to tripling their nuclear capacity by 2050. US climate envoy John Kerry has even emphasized that the world cannot achieve net zero by 2050 without some nuclear energy.

An initiative announced by European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen is also worth mentioning: More than a hundred countries have joined the Global Commitment on Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency. It sets two goals: tripling installed renewable capacity and doubling the rate of improvements in energy efficiency, both by 2030. This effort must be accompanied by widespread electrification, a transformation that will require the rare earths and other critical minerals that have become indispensable in new energy technologies. Their concentration in certain areas presents a series of challenges, as does the almost monopolistic control of China over their extraction and processing. Currently, there is an effort to replace these minerals with more common, more abundant elements—although the necessary technology is still being developed.

The challenge coming out of COP28 is to consolidate a pragmatic vision, a global objective that values all three components of the energy trilemma. The vision must take into account the heightened energy demand that will accompany the global population growth expected in the next thirty years—an anticipated increase of two billion people—and must understand that for now fossil fuels inevitably will continue to play a significant role in meeting that demand.

The most pressing challenges of our century are clear: The world needs to multiply installed renewable capacity and advance electrification, along with its corollary of a constant supply of necessary critical minerals and rare earths. What’s also needed are efforts to develop a natural gas that is increasingly less polluting. And finally, nuclear skeptics need to make peace with nuclear energy.

A version of this article originally appeared in El Mundo. It has been translated from Spanish by the staff of Palacio y Asociados and is reprinted here with the author’s and publisher’s permission.

Ana Palacio is a former minister of foreign affairs of Spain and former senior vice president and general counsel of the World Bank Group. She is also a visiting professor at the Edmund E. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University and a member of the Atlantic Council’s Board of Directors.

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Technology leaders warn that 2030 climate aims are at risk without accelerated support for innovation

Nick Fouriezos — Fri, 08 Dec 2023 11:20:18 +0000

Global policymakers and leaders will have to act quickly to pave the way for innovation if they want any chance of meeting their lofty 2030 decarbonization goals, industry leaders warned on Thursday at the Atlantic Council’s Global Energy Forum in Dubai, which is currently hosting the United Nations climate change conference known as COP28.

“The stark contrast to me is that energy companies are actually here, and two COPs ago at Glasgow, there were CEOs of oil companies who were told they were not permitted to attend,” said HIF Global Executive Director Meg Gentle, adding that energy company executives’ voices are sorely needed in these conversations about fighting climate change.

“It’s getting better, but policymakers don’t really listen to industry leaders,” said Gentle, whose company makes synthetic fuels from renewable energy. “And they underestimate how long it takes to build these projects. We’re futzing around with getting things perfect, rather than getting things moving.”

That urgency was felt across the panel. Gentle was joined by Jon Mitchell, chief sustainability officer at Canadian energy company Suncor; Naser Al Hajri, deputy chief operating officer of Abu Dhabi-based Mubadala Energy; and Fareed Yasseen, climate envoy and advisor to the prime minister of the Republic of Iraq.

See more highlights below from their discussion, which was moderated by Cody Combs, future editor for the National.

Energy innovation at work

Gentle said that e-fuels, which are made from green fuel and recycled molecules of carbon dioxide, already have significant promise in addressing the climate challenge. While they are still more expensive than producing fossil fuels, they are chemically identical to what’s being put in car and jet fuel: “What we need to do is create the policy and the market mechanisms that can extend and accept e-fuels into the market and use it in existing infrastructure,” she said, describing it as a public policy and economic challenge more than a technological one.
In Chile, HIF Global is producing an e-methanol that can be used for the shipping sector and synthesized into gasoline. Chile can start reducing fossil fuel dependence by blending that e-methanol with other fuels, which adds only “a couple cents’ increase in the cost,” Gentle said, proving that the world can start creating “different market mechanisms where pricing can be spread over large markets.”

Mitchell said that Suncor has started taking more of a focus on the demand side of the energy technology equation. “We’re in a situation where we need significantly more energy with significantly less emissions. And so how are we going to do that?” Mitchell said. “Demand’s been a bit absent from the conversation. And I think we need to spend a little bit more time on that.”
There are numerous questions about whether noncombustible uses of fossil fuels and hydrocarbons can provide an alternative product mix for energy companies. Al Hajri gave the example of a geothermal project that Mubadala Energy recently conducted with Chevron to provide sustainable energy to a town in Indonesia. “All forms of energy will be required,” he said.
Yasseen argued that nuclear technology needs to get more attention. “We can’t have just one arrow in our quiver. We really have to broaden what we do,” he said. “There are significant developments that make nuclear reasonable and achievable and safe within our lifetimes,” he added. Those developments include novel ways to yield nuclear ashes with one hundred-year lifetimes instead of one thousand-year ones, making it possible to solve the challenge of nuclear waste, and fusion advances that have made commercial solutions a possibility by 2035 or 2040.

Changing the clean energy conversation

Many on the panel observed a marked shift in the conversations at COP28 compared to past years. “For years we’ve been pushing a rock up a hill trying to get people to understand, notice, pay attention to this issue,” Mitchell said. “It feels to me like we’ve crested that hill. The rock is now rolling down the other side, and now we have to harness the momentum on where we want to take it,” he said, noting that there were almost one hundred thousand people in attendance this year, more than double last year’s attendance. “I think COP28 can do, for the energy sector, what Glasgow did for the financial sector,” he said.
In order to reach 2030 sustainable development goals, the multi-year projects required to build novel energy technology facilities need to get started now, Naser argued. “In my industry, it can take five, six, seven years sometimes to get the projects ongoing,” he said. “Everyone is talking about the long target, but I think what we need is a short-term and medium target.”
Gentle described an e-fuels facility HIF Global is building in Texas, where the construction process will take at least four years.“ So the longer we wait on policy to allow these projects to start,” she said, “the lower probability we have of delivering solutions before 2030.”

New technologies confront new realities

Yasseen said that taking action should put ethics first. “The driver to everything that we do should be equity,” he said. “You can’t, for example, force people to switch to new technologies if it’s very costly to them. You have to take circumstances into account,” he said. “So the focus now, for example, in Iraq, is not on carbon capture and storage, but on stopping flaring.” It’s not about hydrogen, he said, “but it’s about taking account of methane.”
Asked about whether Iraq had the political will to resolve some of these issues, Yasseen said that the prime minister recently told a friend in a private conversation that the biggest thing that kept him up at night was flaring. “In Iraq, it is a health hazard to people,” he said. “Frankly, it’s money that we’re wasting, huge amounts. And it’s bad for the planet.”
The Global Methane Pledge, Al Hajri said, will “provide us a dynamic to work with vendors, to work with partners, operators, different sectors, and to try to see what kind of technology that we can implement in our facilities.” Globally, there are lots of opportunities to use existing facilities to help in the long term too, Mitchell added, noting that the same storage infrastructure used to decarbonize oil production can be used to store carbon dioxide with carbon capture and storage technologies as they advance.

Nick Fouriezos is a writer with more than a decade of journalism experience around the globe.

Note: Mubadala Energy and HIF Global are sponsors of the Atlantic Council’s Global Energy Forum. More information on Forum sponsors can be found here.

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John Kerry unveils a ‘critical’ new US strategy to expand fusion energy

Katherine Walla — Wed, 06 Dec 2023 07:03:51 +0000

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The eighth Forum will be held in Dubai as energy and climate decision-makers converge for COP28.

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US Special Presidential Envoy for Climate John Kerry on Tuesday announced a new strategy for international cooperation on the development of nuclear fusion, which he said would be—alongside other energy sources, such as wind, solar, and nuclear fission—”a critical piece of our energy future.” The strategy, Kerry explained at the Atlantic Council’s Global Energy Forum at COP28, focuses on research and development, supply-chain improvements, regulation, workforce development, and education.

If “all of our countries are threatened, and they are, [and if] all life is threatened, and it is, then we need to pull ourselves together with every strength we have,” Kerry said. “We cannot realize this grand ambition—perhaps not at all, but certainly not at the pace we need to—doing it alone.”

The need for alternative fuels such as fusion is apparent because “science clearly tells us, without any question whatsoever, that the cause of this crisis… [is] emissions. It’s the way we burn fossil fuels,” Kerry said.

Kerry noted that “we’ve had a little debate in the last few days about what the evidence shows or doesn’t show,” a reference to controversies during the United Nations Climate Change Conference in Dubai over what role oil and gas will play in the global energy future.

“We have two options,” Kerry explained. “Either capture the emissions or don’t burn [fossil fuels].”

Kerry explained that the evidence of warming across the planet makes it “clear” that the world needs to “move faster” to limit global temperature rise. “We need to figure out what we’re going to do at a critical pace,” Kerry warned.

Below are more highlights from Kerry’s remarks and the panel that followed, which touched upon the role fusion can play and how best to foster international collaboration on it.

The huge potential

Kerry recounted having heard, as a senator for Massachusetts, that nuclear fusion—which joins two atoms together, producing energy—would be thirty years away, only to talk with scientists a decade later and be told that it was still thirty years away. But “the cadence of new and exciting fusion announcements has obviously increased over time,” he added.

Now, he said, “there is potential in fusion to revolutionize our world and to change all of the options that are in front of us” for providing abundant clean energy to the world.

Former US Secretary of Energy Ernest Moniz, who moderated the panel that followed Kerry’s remarks, said that “in this decade, there is a very high probability that… the conditions for sustained fusion will be demonstrated.” This, he added, “is truly a game changer—assuming this all comes to pass.”

Designer Gabriela Hearst, former creative director of fashion house Chloé, noted the environmental impact caused by the garment industry. “We really need to focus on moving away from the fossil fuel addiction that we have,” she said. At Chloé, she explained, she had designed a collection inspired by visits to fusion labs. Fusion, she said, could help “the survival of our species.”

The accelerating pace

Several speakers pointed out how new technologies and materials are helping realize the commercialization of fusion at a faster pace than expected. Bob Mumgaard, chief executive officer of the commercial startup Commonwealth Fusion Systems, explained that new technologies are “accelerating innovation.”

“It’s just going faster and faster” with the help of technologies such as artificial intelligence and machine learning, Mumgaard explained. “In the last five years, it’s unrecognizable.”

Six decades of government research and development has helped too, explained the White House’s Costa Samaras. “Now,” he added, “the challenge here is [that] energy technologies have long taken decades to get from the starting place to the market; and we do not have decades.”

“International collaboration,” Samaras argued, will “supercharge” fusion energy development and quicken the pace toward establishing a commercial fusion plant. “That enables the advancement of fusion power… along the timeline that we need to deal with climate change.”

The remaining challenges

Michelle Patron, senior director of global sustainability policy at Microsoft, noted that in order to meet growing energy demand, and to do it in a decarbonized way, “we need a multi-technology approach” that includes fusion and other renewable energy sources, including wind, solar, and geothermal. She added that electricity grids are local, so the mix of energy sources that countries deploy will depend on local political, economic, and social circumstances.

Youth Survival Organization Chairman Humphrey Mrema, who is from Tanzania, said that if he were an African leader approached about supporting fusion development, he would “say no.” That’s because fusion is “hard to start” and “difficult to maintain” with the financial architecture across the continent, which has invested heavily in fossil fuels, he explained.

In Africa, “we have to change the investment and channel it to renewables,” Mrema said. In addition, for Africa to pursue fusion, he explained, it will need technology, capacity building, and more financial resources.

For Hearst, part of the challenge is awareness. “We live in a silo community,” she explained. “The science community has this information” about fusion’s potential, “but not the fashion community or other communities. So it’s time to cross-pollinate information to bring more hope.”

Katherine Walla is an assistant director on the editorial team at the Atlantic Council.

Watch the full event

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A new generation of nuclear reactors is poised to set the United States—and the world—on the path to net zero

John Wagner — Tue, 05 Dec 2023 06:26:14 +0000

global energy agenda

global energy forum

John Wagner is the director of Idaho National Laboratory, the US Department of Energy’s center for nuclear-energy research and development. This essay is part of the Global Energy Agenda.

Nearly seventy-five years ago, the US Atomic Energy Commission set out to prove that nuclear power could be harnessed to produce electricity for peaceful applications. To do so, it created the National Reactor Testing Station in Idaho. The station, now known as Idaho National Laboratory (INL), fulfilled the commission’s promise. With public and private sector partners, the initiative achieved many firsts, including the first nuclear electricity, the first city powered by nuclear, the first demonstration of the principle of breeding (producing more fuel than is consumed in a reactor), the first submarine reactor, and the first mobile nuclear power plant. Fifty-two unique test reactors were designed, built, and operated, giving birth to the US Nuclear Navy and the global, commercial nuclear energy industry. This rich legacy of achievement has made the world safer, cleaner, more prosperous, secure, and resilient.

And yet, it might surprise some to learn that although there are four remaining test reactors operating at INL, the US Department of Energy’s laboratory for nuclear energy research and development, it has been fifty years since a new, unique reactor began operations on the site. That’s about to change.

Over the next decade, more than a dozen advanced reactor concepts will be demonstrated in the United States, including microreactors, small modular reactors, and university test reactors.

Ten years ago, this timeline would have been unthinkable. What has changed is a growing awareness about climate change and the imperative to combat its devastating impacts by producing clean, secure, flexible, and resilient energy.

This requires more nuclear energy—a lot more. Earlier this year, a DOE “Liftoff” report identified the potential for nuclear to scale to 300 gigawatts (GW) by 2050 to address the broader need in the United States for approximately 550–770 GW of additional clean, firm capacity to reach net-zero emissions.

Over the next decade, more than a dozen advanced reactor concepts will be demonstrated in the United States, including microreactors, small modular reactors, and university test reactors.

This is consistent with what the US-based Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) found when it polled member utilities. NEI utilities see a role for nearly 100 GW of new nuclear electricity by 2050 to support their decarbonization goals—more than double the current US nuclear electricity capacity. Analyses from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change points toward the need to materially increase global nuclear capacity by 2050.

This represents a profound challenge, but also an opportunity for nuclear power to address the global need for clean, firm, secure, and flexible energy in the next few decades.

INL’s strategy—coordinated with numerous partners—is to start small. This means making systems that are simple and inexpensive as compared to current generation power reactors. To do this and to enable the successful scale-up in size, complexity, and capacity of nuclear power, the United States needs to do the following: build supply chains for advanced nuclear technologies, including a domestic supply of fuel; develop a knowledgeable and capable workforce; and revamp its regulatory system to enable timely deployment of advanced technologies.

At INL, that strategy (see figure below) begins with MARVEL, an 85-kilowatt thermal DOE test reactor that will provide a research-and-development platform for researchers and industry to understand the use of microreactors for a wide variety of potential applications, while providing information to support licensing, environmental assessments, improved performance, and deployment. MARVEL will also advance US capabilities to support subsequent reactor projects.

Source: Idaho National Laboratory

Next up will be Project Pele, a partnership between DOE, INL, the US Department of Defense, and BWXT that will help US armed forces reduce their dependence on diesel fuel. Pele will pave the way for small, advanced reactors for other military applications, as well as private sector applications.

Following Pele, INL, working with Southern Company and TerraPower, will conduct the Molten Chloride Reactor Experiment (MCRE), which will be the world’s first fast-spectrum salt system to achieve criticality—meaning it will be able to sustain a fission chain reaction. Additionally, the Oklo Aurora microreactor could be demonstrated on the INL site as early as 2027.

A key aspect of INL’s strategy is to use decommissioned reactor facilities as test beds, via the National Reactor Innovation Center. The decommissioned Experimental Breeder Reactor-II, which is being repurposed for Demonstration and Operation of Microreactor Experiments (DOME), is scheduled to be completed by 2025. Another test bed, LOTUS, which will host MCRE, is scheduled to be operational by 2027. These test beds will streamline testing of advanced reactor technologies, strengthening the relationship between the national labs and the private sector, and supporting the ultimate objective of deploying advanced reactors into the global market.

As shown in the figure, many reactor projects are planned to follow, demonstrating technologies for a variety of applications. These include the TerraPower Natrium reactor in Wyoming, which will repower a coal generation site and the X-Energy reactor in Texas, which will support decarbonization of the energy-intensive industrial sector. Note that the figure is not all-inclusive, as the situation is dynamic and numerous additional reactor demonstration projects in the United States and beyond are working toward demonstration.

Over seven decades, the nation has made incredible progress advancing nuclear energy to its current state. It’s time to take the next step. With the combined efforts of government, industry, and academic partners, it’s time for the United States to honor its rich legacy of achievement by providing the research foundation to deploy the advanced nuclear technologies the world desperately needs to power a clean and prosperous future.

At INL, we approach each day as though the world depends on our success. Failure is not an option. Not this time. Not if we want to offer our children, grandchildren, and future generations their best opportunity for security, prosperity, and environmental sustainability.

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The post A new generation of nuclear reactors is poised to set the United States—and the world—on the path to net zero appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Evans-Pritchard Jayanti in Time: Nuclear power is the only solution

Atlantic Council — Mon, 04 Dec 2023 20:37:00 +0000

The post Evans-Pritchard Jayanti in Time: Nuclear power is the only solution appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Gordon featured in SunStar Cebu on participation in the APEC Philippines and ABAC Canada roundtable to discuss financing the nuclear energy transition

bmathews — Thu, 26 Oct 2023 13:08:15 +0000

The post Gordon featured in SunStar Cebu on participation in the APEC Philippines and ABAC Canada roundtable to discuss financing the nuclear energy transition appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Atoms for Peace 2.0: The case for a stronger US-Japan nuclear power alliance

Julia Nesheiwat and Shoichi Itoh — Mon, 23 Oct 2023 13:34:35 +0000

Since US President Dwight Eisenhower’s “Atoms for Peace” speech at the UN General Assembly in 1953, the nuclear energy landscape has changed dramatically. Eisenhower envisaged atomic energy as a way to build bridges between nations. Yet today, as an increasing number of countries in the Global South show interest in the carbon-free technology and view its adoption as a sign of geopolitical strength, Russia has capitalized on this opportunity to entrench itself in worldwide nuclear markets, while China waits in the wings to do the same.

The world currently has sixty nuclear reactors under construction, of which more than one-third are Russian-designed. Combined with projects under planning or negotiation, Russia currently enjoys more than 40 percent of the global nuclear reactor export market in various forms, including power plant construction, investments, provision of enriched uranium, and disposal of spent fuel. Russia has also weaponized nuclear power by occupying and refusing to operate the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant in Ukraine and is jeopardizing global security by threatening to use tactical nuclear weapons, in spite of its status as a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council and founding member of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

Russia’s actions compel a thorough review of the geopolitics of nuclear energy. The United States must play a forceful role in ensuring that nuclear technologies contribute to the global order rather than be weaponized against it. In that endeavor, Japan can be an invaluable ally. Facing new challenges for peaceful use of atomic energy against the backdrop of Russian and Chinese-induced geopolitical instability, Tokyo and Washington should redouble their commitment to competing in the international nuclear energy market.

For Russia, nuclear power represents another geopolitical weapon, similar to oil and gas. Its state nuclear company, Rosatom, works analogously to Gazprom in leveraging energy trade for political ends. Rosatom has provided loans for strategic nuclear power projects abroad, including Astravyets in Belarus, Akkuyu in Turkey, El Dabaa in Egypt, and Rooppur in Bangladesh.

China has also identified the nuclear industry as a strategic sector and is gathering market share with its relatively cheap nuclear reactors, including the introduction of its Hualong One reactors in Pakistan and Argentina. Saudi Arabia is also reportedly interested in the Chinese reactor design.

A nuclear reactor race has begun between democracies and authoritarian states, and the latter are currently ahead.

Nuclear projects are capital-intensive with lengthy time horizons, and authoritarian powers’ intention to distribute nuclear reactors in developing countries is motivated by more than commerce. Russian and Chinese state-backed nuclear entities accrue geopolitical influence beyond mere commercial interests. The risk is that a short-sighted approach may inexorably lead to a diminished role for democracies in the growing international nuclear industry.

By contrast, nuclear vendors from democratic states, including the United States and Japan, have engaged the civilian nuclear market with business principles as opposed to geopolitical influence. That approach risks pushing the NPT regime toward collapse if the nuclear industry of the democratic world forfeits market share to authoritarian rivals.

With its hostage-taking of the Zaporizhzhia plant, Russia has eschewed strict compliance with the NPT principle of peaceful atomic energy use. Given such recklessness, it cannot be ruled out that Moscow is helping non-democratic states develop reactors in contravention of internationally accepted rules regarding management of nuclear fuels, related technologies, and fissile materials. Meanwhile, amid tensions with the West, China is leaning on Russia’s increasing provision of highly enriched uranium to scale up its military and civilian nuclear aspirations.

The United States and Japan should counter these actions in support of a norms-based nuclear energy trade. The United States is the world’s single-largest operator of nuclear reactors with a fleet of ninety-three in operation. Japan—with whom the United States has consolidated one of the strongest bilateral civilian nuclear partnerships—has the fifth-largest fleet in the world with thirty-three reactors.

Such experience and expertise in operating atomic energy assets should be put to use internationally as the global nuclear energy market expands in response to energy security and climate challenges.

Over the past six decades, Japan has become a key US partner with regard to the development of nuclear technologies and facilities. A nuclear partnership between the United States and Japan that promotes research and development and accelerates commercialization of next-generation nuclear reactor innovations—including small modular reactors (SMRs)—could address energy insecurity globally and spread best practices in nuclear safety.

The US-Japan strategic collaboration on supporting deployment of SMRs in Ghana, announced in October 2022, is an example of such a partnership. Following this example, the two allies should pursue commitments to the other countries in agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency’s standards of nuclear safety, security and nonproliferation for the sake of sustaining the NPT regime.

Re-establishing a visionary nuclear energy strategy should be an economic and geopolitical priority for the democratic world. The US-Japan alliance should assume the leadership in peaceful atomic energy collaboration, along with the International Atomic Energy Agency, lest deeper Russian and Chinese penetration of the global nuclear market erode NPT safeguards.

Shoichi Itoh is a senior fellow at the Institute of Energy Economics, Japan (IEEJ)

Dr. Julia Nesheiwat is a distinguished fellow at the Atlantic Council Global Energy Center

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Learn more about the Global Energy Center

Executive summary
Introduction
The war in Ukraine: A new dimension to the nuclear debate in Europe
What does a peace pact on nuclear energy look like?
Conclusion

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How to strike a grand bargain on EU nuclear energy policy

Ben Judah, Rachel Rizzo, Théophile Pouget-Abadie, Jonah Allen, Francis Shin — Mon, 16 Oct 2023 16:10:57 +0000

Executive summary

Nuclear energy was once a source of European integration beginning with the creation of Euratom, the European Atomic Energy Community, in 1958. However, it has become in the contemporary European Union a source of division, with France and Germany leading rival blocs regarding its future. As a result the EU does not meaningfully fund nuclear energy and member states have engaged in political interference trying to block other member states’ attempts to launch nuclear projects. Nuclear energy is today a source of European disunion. This acrimony has come at a terrible time for the EU, when it urgently needs to decouple from weaponized Russian energy supplies and decarbonize due to the worsening climate emergency. This paper proposes that the EU reduce Russia’s presence in European nuclear markets and sign a “peace pact” allowing each country to pursue its own energy mix without political interference as part of a grand bargain. This bargain would recognize that nuclear energy is a crucial part of Europe’s energy mix, ensure the EU adoptsa technology-neutral approach in the Green Deal Industrial Plan and Net Zero Industrial Act while ramping up support for nuclear skills, research, and development, in exchange for further integration of electricity markets and agreement on its reform, higher renewable targets and renewed work and research on the management of nuclear waste. Only such a peace pact recapturing the spirit of technological optimism and geopolitical commitment behind the launch of Euratom can help Europe overcome the deep nuclear divisions which are holding it back.

Paul-Henri Spaak and Jean-Charles Snov et d’Oppuers at the signature of the Treaty establishing European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) 25.03.1957

Introduction

The history of European nuclear energy: From integrative to divisive force

Once upon a time, nuclear energy united postwar Europe in excitement. About eight kilometers from the center of Brussels, Belgium, sits an eye-catching tourist attraction that garners almost 600,000 visitors per year. The 335-foot tall Atomium, described on the eponymous website as “a monumental structure halfway between sculpture and architecture and where the cube flirts with the sphere,” is a sight to see. Unveiled as the flagship construction for the 1958 Brussels World Fair, the Atomium was meant to represent the faith people put in science—especially nuclear science—and what that could mean for human progress. To this day, the nine glimmering spherical atoms that make up the Atomium are a physical representation that nuclear energy has not always been seen as a source of European division.

Today, political Brussels faces an unprecedented energy puzzle. European policymakers, still grappling with the consequences of the energy crisis caused by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, have scrambled to reaffirm the continent’s position as a global climate leader. The bloc must adapt to the Russian gas supply shock, all while accelerating an energy transition that provides sufficient and cost-competitive energy in a way that does not transfer Europe’s dependency from Russian gas to Chinese-controlled critical raw materials. At the same time, the US Inflation Reduction Act (IRA), which provides generous incentives for green industries to localize production in the United States, could threaten the viability of industries in Europe, all while the transatlantic community pushes to move green supply chains away from China. In this context, European policymakers are fiercely deliberating the future of nuclear energy: is it a critical enabler of Europe’s energy transformation, as a stable source of low-carbon energy, or a dangerous blocking point that diverts funding from renewable energy deployment? This has drawn sharp divisions between France and Germany. And in stark contrast to the optimistic days of the Atomium, nuclear energy is now far from being at the center of European integration: when the European Commission first presented the RePowerEU plan in March 2022 with the aim of reducing EU reliance on Russian gas, nuclear power was not even mentioned. It has become a source of European disunion.

France-Germany divide: From pro-nuclear geopolitics to anti-nuclear protests

The Atomium is testament to the fact nuclear energy was not always a toxic subject in Brussels. To understand the nuclear debate in Europe today, one must go back almost seventy years to see how Europe approached energy access and economic integration in parallel with post-WWII reconstruction. Nuclear energy, now the most divisive topic in Europe’s energy transition, was once a central pillar of European integration. That is not to say the path there was clear cut or simple. After World War II, European leaders knew that successful reconstruction would require secure and reliable access to electricity and that overdependence on foreign energy sources could create major problems with reconstruction efforts.¹ This is why the bloc began, essentially, with energy. In 1951, Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and West Germany signed the Treaty of Paris, which created the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), the precursor to the European Economic Community (ECC) and eventually the European Union. The primary role of the ECSC was to develop a common market of coal and steel within Western Europe, ensuring that Western Europe would have guaranteed access to these materials.“² According to Robert Schuman, one of the fathers of European integration, the point of this common market was to make another war between France and Germany “materially impossible,” as coal and steel were the primary resources required to build armaments at an industrial scale up until the Second World War.“³

Looking to further deepen cooperation, the Foreign Ministers of the ECSC states gathered for the Messina Conference in 1955. Among other developments, the ministers agreed upon both the need to further develop the technology for nuclear energy generation and the establishment of a common European institution that would oversee this development. This decision eventually led to the creation of the European Atomic Energy Community—Euratom. The Suez Crisis in 1956 starkly highlighted Europe’s problem with importing most of its energy sources, and the ECSC’s foreign ministers decided to appoint “three wise men”⁴ to set targets for European nuclear energy. At the height of the Suez Crisis, it was decided that European coal, water, and natural gas would be unlikely to meet more than a third of projected increase in electricity demand: another major argument in favor of nuclear energy.

It was in this spirit that the idea of pan-European nuclear energy efforts really began to gain traction. And finally, in 1958—the year the Atomium opened in Brussels—the six original members of the ECSC signed the Euratom Treaty. The treaty pooled core aspects of the nuclear industries of member states, ensured standards for nuclear safety and security, and promoted cooperation in research and development into nuclear energy. R&D was critical: at the time, American players dominated nuclear technology, which they licensed out to European energy providers. Building out European nuclear capacity was, beyond a project to work together toward the peaceful use of nuclear energy, also seen as an instrument for Europe to eventually achieve energy independence. Nuclear energy was seen as key to European integration—not division.

During this time, a set of narratives predominated in Europe that helped leaders gain support and acceptance from the public to develop nuclear energy capabilities: there were huge reconstruction needs, notably in steel (and correspondingly in coal); a desire for peaceful cooperation with neighbors; a recognition that Europe was still excessively dependent on nonindigenous energy sources, especially oil from the Middle East; concerns that coal would eventually run out; and the threat that high energy prices would pose to economic recovery and growth. This brought the six together into Euratom in a spirit of geopolitical purpose and technological optimism symbolized by the Atomium at the 1958 World’s Fair.

Nuclear power continued to gain traction over the following decade. After France’s failure to maintain control over colonial Algeria, there was a deep desire in Paris to reduce reliance on energy imports from the Arab League. However, it was the 1973 energy crisis that again highlighted Europe’s collective continued vulnerability on foreign sources of energy and propelled Europe into becoming the most nuclearized region in the world. That year, Arab members of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) placed an embargo on the United States and allies that supported Israel in the 1973 Yom Kippur War. At the time, Western Europe and Japan relied on OPEC states for between 45 percent and 50 percent of their oil, and when market prices climbed by 300 percent as a result of the embargo, import-dependent countries became acutely aware of their vulnerability.⁵ Could nuclear power potentially reduce those vulnerabilities? Given its longstanding geopolitical concerns—post-Algerian independence in 1962—and concerns about Arab-energy supplies, France led the charge across Europe, via the “Messmer Plan,” to invest in nuclear and to affirm the power source as it is relied upon today.⁶ In fact, plants built or planned immediately following the 1973 oil shock still represent 40 percent of today’s nuclear capacity worldwide.⁷

Political suspicions and ambitions shaped this first nuclear age. France has always been the most advanced country in Europe when it comes to nuclear energy. It created the CEA (national atomic agency) in 1945, which had 1 percent of the total government budget by 1955 and dwarfed all other European nuclear energy budgets at the time. This meant seeking technological alliances overseas. Framatome, a French-led nuclear company, was formed in 1958, under President de Gaulle to acquire the license of the US company Westinghouse’s pressurized water reactor designs for use in France. This acute dependence meant France was nervous about US domination of the nuclear energy space and was in favor of deeper European integration from the get-go to counterbalance it. This spirit was summed up by the French National Assembly in 1956 by Louis Armand, one of the “wise men” and first president of Euratom: “Everything moves so fast that if we do not speed things up, we will never catch up. Without Euratom, it’s simple: all European countries will have to turn to the [nuclear] giants,” referring primarily to the United States and Russia. Armand was indeed worried about European states building century-long dependencies on the two superpowers for nuclear material and technology.

However, over the Rhine, there was as much suspicion of France as with the United States. Initially, West Germany lacked nuclear expertise, but had expertise in chemical and other industrial sectors, and wanted to import cheap supplies of enriched uranium from the United States to underpin a reviving and export-led national industry. In short, many in Germany viewed France’s offer of cooperation as a ploy to control this new industry. These differences also played out when trying to negotiate the Euratom Treaty: France wanted a strong dirigiste framework, whereas West Germany’s approach was more business-friendly.

However, these early optimistic narratives surrounding nuclear energy soon flipped. Excitement for secure and reliable nuclear power gave way to disenchantment and concern for the potential immense destruction caused by disaster and improper waste management. Following the 1979 Three Mile Island incident, the 1986 Chernobyl nuclear power plant disaster, and social justice impacts of improper waste management and uranium mining, public perception of nuclear energy quickly deteriorated throughout Europe.⁸ Through public pressure campaigns, governments soon scaled back investment in new reactors. Crucially for the future of Europe’s collective approach to nuclear energy, France’s first nuclear reactor at Fessenheim on the Rhine, the country’s border with Germany, proved a catalyst for the emergence of the anti-nuclear protest movements in that country and a deep sore in relations between both partners, despite it being at the onset a Franco-German project.⁹ These accidents, crises, and protests built up the fault lines between Germany and France on nuclear energy that continue to this day.

These eventually stark differences between Germany and France over their respective nuclear energy policies can be traced to the late 1970s. The rise of the Green Party in Germany became synonymous with the push for environmental protections, and, alongside it, the desire to phase out nuclear energy.¹⁰

This led to very different political contexts in France and Germany by the early twenty-first century. Across the Rhine, the Greens succeeded in their anti-nuclear pressure so dramatically that no new nuclear reactors have been built in the country since 1989. This was just the beginning. Furthermore, following the Fukushima accident in 2011, Angela Merkel’s government (a coalition between the Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union and the Free Democratic Party) introduced the Energiewende policy, which aimed to shut down Germany’s seventeen nuclear power stations by 2022 and phase out coal power by 2038 (now 2030) through aggressive renewable energy expansion, industrial decarbonization, and efficiency targets. France, as a gesture to Germany following the Fukushima disaster, agreed to close the plant in Fessenheim on the Rhine.¹¹ This is the political environment that led to Germany shutting down its last three nuclear plants in April 2023—despite widespread international criticism given Europe’s energy needs in the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

However, it is crucial to understand Europe’s current predicament that Germany’s Energiewende should not be mistaken for leading to uniquely green results. As a result of pushing for denuclearization, Germany and other EU states became increasingly reliant on cheap imported fossil fuels from Russia—especially natural gas. These fundamental differences between France and Germany form the heart of the divided approach that Europe takes to nuclear energy today. What is more important: a nonnuclear approach to energy tomorrow or a decarbonized approach to energy today?

Nuclear energy today: A critical but divisive source of energy for Europe

Notwithstanding these political differences, nuclear energy is critically important to Europe. Today, more than one hundred nuclear power plants produce about a quarter of electricity generation in the European Union and nearly half of all carbon-free electricity in the EU.¹² Nuclear electricity generation almost perfectly splits the European Union in two. France’s fifty-six reactors (the second largest fleet in the world, behind the United States) produce almost half of Europe’s nuclear electricity. Spain, Sweden, Belgium, and eight other EU countries (Czechia, Finland, Bulgaria, Slovakia, Romania, Hungary, Slovenia, and the Netherlands) make up the rest.

While some member states, such as Belgium, have sharply decreased their nuclear production over the past few years, others have progressively ramped up, as in Romania, whose nuclear power plants came online as recently as 1996, or Hungary, which is expanding its Paks nuclear power plant. At least twenty-five new nuclear reactors are planned in other member states, including six in Poland and two in the Netherlands. Italy, which shut its nuclear reactors down after Chernobyl, making it the only G8 country without its own nuclear power plants up until Germany’s own closures, has now launched a new government initiative to contemplate reintroducing nuclear power.¹³

Figure 1. Stances on nuclear energy in the EU

Source: Atlantic Council with data from World Nuclear Association.

The European Union can therefore be divided into six groups: decommissioners, expanders, extenders, entrants, status-quo players, and nonnuclear energy players. Decommissioners, such as Spain, currently operate reactors but have active plans to phase them out. Expanders, like France and Slovakia, currently have existing power plants and plans to build new ones. Extenders, like Hungary, Slovenia, Bulgaria, Belgium, and the Netherlands, have plans to build new reactors or other measures to extend the operational lifespan of existing reactors. Entrants, like Poland, are countries that have never developed nuclear energy before but wish to do so. Those at a standstill, like Sweden, are countries that have operational power plants but lack official plans to either build more plants and/or units, or decommission existing plants. Finally, nonnuclear members, such as Germany, Denmark, and Austria, are states that have either fully decommissioned or never adopted the use of nuclear energy.¹⁴ Prior to Brexit, the United Kingdom and its nine nuclear reactors tipped the political balance in favor of the pro-nuclear camp. With the British exit from the European Union, the pro-nuclear camp lost one critical ally. This sense of flux and indeterminacy has been a driver of such bitter disputes over the EU nuclear future.

Figure 2. Share of nuclear in domestic electricity production (Europe, 2021)

Source: Atlantic Council with data from Statista.

Not only the question of nuclear power per se but also the question of Russia and the uranium that enables it divides Europeans. To power its nuclear power plants, the EU sources uranium from a limited set of partners, notably Russia, but also Niger, Kazakhstan, Australia and Canada. But the ties between Europe’s nuclear industry and Russia extend beyond uranium. Rosatom, a Russian state-owned nuclear power company, has built reactors in five European countries (Bulgaria, Czechia, Finland, Hungary, and Slovakia), and is currently building two in Slovakia and two in Hungary. What’s more, Rosatom has deep ties with the French nuclear industry, both as a client and as a partner: as late as 2021, EDF (a French state-owned electric utility company) and Rosatom signed a strategic cooperation agreement and a joint declaration on research.¹⁵ This is not simply a French matter as Germany’s Siemens also remains a partner of Rosatom.¹⁶ Unsurprisingly, France has come under increasing pressure, especially from Ukraine, to cut ties with Rosatom. As of yet, the European Union has not sanctioned Rosatom or any associated personnel and companies, unlike the United Kingdom and United States.¹⁷ However, the latter still receives imports of Russian uranium.¹⁸ In fact, Ukraine wants every European country with ties to Russia’s nuclear industry to cut them. The pressure seems to be working: efforts are underway in various European capitals to wean European nuclear industries from Russian dependence: Poland, Slovakia, and Bulgaria have all recently signed agreements with Western players (notably Westinghouse and EDF).

Uranium imports free of Kremlin-influence pose a challenge for all Western countries. Meanwhile, France in particular has concerns given the recent coup d’état in Niger, which may lead to the state falling under Russian influence; as of 2020, 34.7 percent of French uranium imports came from the country. This is alongside 28.9 percent from Kazakhstan and 26.4 percent from Uzbekistan, two other states where Russia has limited influence.¹⁹ The United States, meanwhile, imported 35 percent of its uranium from Kazakhstan and 15 percent from Russia directly as of 2021.²⁰ This is a collective problem for Western allies, though not an unsolvable one, should the situation degrade, given the extensive uranium deposits in allies such as Australia and Canada. So far, uranium, unlike oil and gas, has not been weaponized by Russia. Again, European countries are divided on what is more important: decoupling from Russian resources totally, as the first priority, or only decoupling from weaponized Russian hydrocarbons.

Nuclear as part of the Green Energy Transition

Many of Europe’s green politicians may suggest otherwise, but any fair analysis of the continent’s energy situation and trajectory shows that Europe will not be able to achieve its net-zero goals without nuclear energy being part of the mix. Long before the urgency injected by the Russian invasion of Ukraine, it was already evident that nuclear energy in Europe is critical when it comes to providing the three-pronged benefits of energy security, sovereignty, and a reduction in emissions as part of a wider net-zero strategy. With EU member states now needing to find alternate energy sources even faster, nuclear energy will have to continue to play a critical role, albeit one that might look very different than in the past.

Nuclear energy is critical to decarbonization

Europe cannot achieve its existing emissions targets without a partial diversification toward expanded use of nuclear energy. Nuclear energy should be seen as complementary with renewable energy toward lowering carbon emissions.
EU members are not on track to cut 55 percent of 1990s carbon-emission levels by 2030, as envisioned by the European Green Deal.
Multiple EU members, especially in Eastern Europe, remain reliant on coal, are landlocked and cannot benefit directly from offshore wind, and lack solar resources.
Nuclear energy can help address supply shortages and assist with grid stability in a renewables era. Battery storage and demand management can offset short-term energy supply shortages but alternative solutions are needed for long-term seasonal shortages in wind and light.
Nuclear energy generation, when paired with renewables, brings down the costs of the transition, notably in terms of infrastructure.
There is further potential regarding the adoption of small modular reactors (SMRs).

Nuclear energy as a key enabler of Europe’s decarbonization goals

Nuclear energy is crucial in helping to meet ambitious emissions targets that are likely out of reach at the current pace of transition.²¹ This is especially true in Eastern Europe, which is still overly reliant on coal, and lacks coastlines for offshore wind and appropriate solar resources.²²Nuclear reactors already provide about half of the low-carbon electricity generation in the EU, and the countries with the lowest carbon intensity of total electricity production in 2021—Sweden and France—achieved this by utilizing both nuclear and renewable energy production.²³

Beyond the low-carbon electricity that nuclear technology already provides, this energy source can accompany and enable the deployment of renewable energy. Rather than being seen as antagonistic, the two should be seen as complementary. The ability of nuclear energy to supply secure and reliable low-carbon power—that can be ramped up and down to meet needs—at a competitive price provides solutions to a suite of shortcomings that result from large-scale renewable energy deployment.

Renewable energy generation is uncertain across hours, days, and seasons and balancing supply and demand becomes increasingly difficult as the grid is characterized by a larger share of renewables. Solutions like battery storage and demand management can help grid operators balance supply and demand across hours or days, but variation across weeks or months requires different solutions. For example, multiweek periods of almost no wind and limited solar power can occur in the winter in Germany—stretches of time that are nicknamed Dunkelflaute, or dark doldrums.²⁴The lull in generation is currently met by burning fossil fuels, but meeting gaps like these in Germany or elsewhere with nuclear power would be emissions-free. Nuclear energy is already seen as a “baseload” supply (the minimum amount of electricity needed to meet the constant and essential demand) that can be relied upon in the face of variable generation, and is largely used for this purpose.²⁵

Nuclear energy can also help maintain grid stability, a service that can be even more valuable than power generation. Healthy electric grids must balance supply and demand, but also maintain safe frequency to avoid failures or accidents. This becomes more complex with renewable energy generation, in which renewables utilize inverters instead of turbines to convert energy into electricity; turbines maintain frequency free of charge.²⁶ Nuclear electricity utilizes turbines and can thus deliver “ancillary services,” (balance frequency) across a renewable-dominant grid. For example, an analysis of a carbon neutral power system in China projected that in 2060, nuclear energy would supply only 10 percent of total electricity production, but almost half of the ancillary services.²⁷

Finally, an effective energy transition may simply be unrealistic without nuclear energy. The International Energy Agency (IEA) projects that the EU will fall short of its ambitious renewable energy targets, and recent research makes it clear that the coal phaseout is not happening fast enough.²⁸ In Austria, an outspoken nuclear opponent in the European Union, a recent internal government report highlights that the country is not currently on track to reach its climate targets.²⁹ Additionally, the 2022 energy crisis has caused Germany, Poland, and a handful of other European countries to consider delaying plans for coal phaseouts.

It’s worth digging a bit deeper into Germany specifically: combined with gas shortages, the decision to follow through with its plans to phaseout nuclear power has actually increased reliance on coal and other fossil fuels in the short term.³⁰ Unsurprisingly, the decision to follow through with these phaseout plans has drawn increasing controversy and shows that the Greens’ vision for the energy future may no longer be a shared one.³¹ A recent survey by YouGov in Germany revealed that only 26 percent of Germans fully support a complete phaseout of nuclear power today, with clear divisions across political and regional lines.³² In Bavaria, Minister-President Marcus Söder recently appealed to keep regional nuclear plants on despite the federal phaseout plans.³³ His pleas were ultimately rejected—despite the clear climatic and security benefits of keeping the plants running.

A cost-competitive solution to the energy transition

Economic necessity means nuclear energy is not something that Europe can continue to remain divided over. Simply put, including nuclear power in the EU energy supply will bring down the costs of the green energy transition. It will continue to be the least costly low-carbon technology that is dispatchable (meaning readily adjustable to meet fluctuating demand) after hydropower through at least 2025, according to the IEA.³⁴ Achieving net-zero targets globally without investing in nuclear energy would require $500 billion more investment and raise consumer electricity bills on average by $20 billion a year by 2050, the IEA found.³⁵

That storyline exists within France. RTE’s landmark study, Energy Pathways to 2050, found that the most cost-effective pathways to a carbon-neutral French grid by 2050 require both extending existing reactor life and investing in new reactors alongside renewable energy development.³⁶ Crucially, the IEA has found that the ability to invest in and extend nuclear reactor life well past initial lifetimes, or long-term operation (LTO), is even competitive with renewable energy generation, which now enjoys famously low costs.³⁷ Ambitious targets for emissions reduction in 2030 and carbon-neutral electricity generation in 2050 may already be unrealistic.³⁸ Phasing out nuclear and meeting those targets will be prohibitively expensive, if not impossible, in nuclear-dependent member states. The evidence is clear: there is no path to net-zero for the European Union without a prominent role for nuclear energy.

Advanced reactor designs show potential for new applications

Given the push to renewable sources of energy and the benefits nuclear power plants provide, nuclear energy is likely to be an important component of the net-zero transitions in Europe and abroad. But nuclear in the net-zero age could look somewhat different from the late twentieth century. This gives reason to think that its politics—characterized by division—can change too.

While some countries are hesitant to invest in conventional large-scale reactors for the transition, they are enthusiastic about the potential of advanced reactor designs to enable decarbonization. Belgium and Italy have joined the pro-nuclear alliance as observers due to their intent to only pursue advanced reactor designs, and the Netherlands’ new climate budget pushes for the construction of smaller nuclear reactors.³⁹

There are, however, reasons for skepticism. This is not an approach shared by all: Poland, for instance, currently plans to build large reactors, while other countries (e.g., Romania) are refurbishing and investing in existing reactors. Further, countries that are investing in large-scale nuclear, including France and the United States, have made sure to earmark funds for advanced reactor designs, such as evolutions of existing designs of small modular reactors (SMRs).⁴⁰

Despite the many benefits of such SMRs, they have not yet been commercialized to replace large reactors in the power mix. For one, designs are in various stages of development and license applications, and commercial viability remains uncertain. And while they address cost concerns, commercial SMRs as conceived of today might, according to one study, end up producing twofold to thirtyfold more waste than conventional atomic power plants in operation.⁴¹ Additionally, existing infrastructure and regulation has been designed for large reactors and adapting for SMRs will require grid investments and policy changes.

Overall, SMRs and advanced reactor designs have potential and require additional research and development. Investment should continue to address shortcomings, and designers/policymakers should think critically about how to take advantage of the benefits of nuclear power in the decarbonized energy mix. We should expect such reactors to play a different but important role in the energy transition, as there will be specific applications where the use case for large reactors is less clear. This might be the case for industrial sectors with hard-to-abate emissions, including hydrogen production, mineral extraction necessary for the clean transition, and other industrial processes. These reactors will not, however, replace the need for large-scale reactors—and they won’t short-circuit the politics and long-standing opposition to nuclear power.

Warning signs are seen inside the controlled area of reactor block two at German energy giant EnBw’s nuclear power plant which was shut down earlier this year in Neckarwestheim, Germany, May 22, 2023. REUTERS/Kai Pfaffenbach

The war in Ukraine: A new dimension to the nuclear debate in Europe

Nuclear has divided Europe at a time when unity is required

Just as in the crises of 1956 and 1973, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 once again exposed Europe’s heavy reliance on imported fossil fuel supplies. It also forced policymakers to reassess their understanding of both energy security and energy independence. In the span of a decade, Europe witnessed Libya, a key oil supplier to its south, engulfed in a devastating civil war, and more recently, Russia, once perceived as a reliable gas supplier to the East, invading Ukraine and shutting down gas supplies. Whereas the nuclear-versus-renewables debate hinged on its environmental impacts, the war in Europe has placed energy sovereignty as the number one priority, shifting the terms of the debate.

Figure 3. Share of gas supply from Russia in Europe (2021)

Source: Atlantic Council with data from “Dependence on Russian Gas by European Country 2021,⁴²” and Andrea Gazzani and Fabrizio Ferriani, “The Impact of the War in Ukraine on Energy Prices: Consequences for Firms’ Financial Performance.”⁴³

For member states that first invested in nuclear energy to provide energy security, the war in Ukraine has validated the need to invest in a new age of nuclear energy. Proponents argue that nuclear power has clear benefits to deliver security and independence, along with the decarbonization benefits described above. Nuclear energy can provide locally produced electricity and heat, with relatively few inputs, anywhere in Europe.⁴⁴ Nuclear fuel is extremely energy dense—one uranium pellet, which is around one inch tall, is equivalent to one ton of coal or 120 gallons of oil.⁴⁵ As a result, reactors have a relatively small geographic footprint and waste is minimal relative to power output. Uranium—the most common fuel used for nuclear power—is abundant and geographically diverse, even though Russia remains one of Europe’s largest suppliers of enriched uranium.⁴⁶ Operating costs remain low once reactors are built and the levelized costs of energy (LCOE) are consistently lower than fossil fuel alternatives—especially where supply is scarce.⁴⁷

Instead of a joint European approach, a new division has embedded itself between pro- and anti- nuclear camps: the question becomes, does Europe leave nuclear behind and seek other options for secure, low-carbon dispatchable energy, or reinvest in established and new nuclear technologies and fully recognize the role they can play in the green energy transition?

Figure 4. EU electricity generation by fuel (2021)

Source: Atlantic Council with data from Statista.

Europe’s politics surrounding nuclear energy are now so acrimonious that there was no mention of nuclear energy in the bloc’s RePowerEU plan to decouple from Russian energy sources, as previously mentioned. Germany has also been engaging in political interference to block other member states from developing nuclear energy. In February 2022, Germany’s energy minister, Steffi Lemke, of the Green Party, visited Poland and claimed that Germany would use “the appropriate legal instruments at the European level” to prevent Poland from launching a nuclear program.⁴⁸ Political acrimony between France and Germany over Berlin’s refusal to allow meaningful EU funds to be allowed to support nuclear energy has led to a suspicion in the French cabinet that Germany’s policy may not in fact be ideological but commercial, with a desire to undercut a French energy advantage.⁴⁹

Divisions have calcified. At a meeting in Stockholm in February 2023, eleven member states agreed to deepen cooperation on nuclear energy. This pro-nuclear alliance, with France at its helm, includes Bulgaria, Croatia, Czechia, Finland, Hungary, the Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia, with Belgium and Italy joining as observers. At the core, these member states envision the electricity source as central to the energy transition and want it placed “on an equal footing” with renewables as a low-carbon source of energy. In October, they submitted a proposal to the European Commission to ensure plans for electricity market reforms do no harm to their existing nuclear fleet.⁵⁰ On the other side of the table, a group dubbed the Friends of Renewables was formed in response to oppose measures to accommodate nuclear power and is “ready to fight” against future concessions. Austria has formed the opposition with Estonia, Spain, Denmark, Ireland, Luxembourg, Portugal, Latvia, Lithuania, and Germany.⁵¹

The formation of these two blocs impedes consensus building in Europe on crucial energy policy initiatives now and in the future. The two increasingly entrenched sides lobby hard to gain allies for their cause, and the consequences of this extend beyond the legislatives efforts themselves. The nuclear debate has, in the words of an attendee of the Atlantic Council’s decarbonization Paris policy workshop in March, escalated the energy crisis into “a political crisis, a crisis of trust” that has “wasted political capital” and threatens the conventional consensus-building process for EU energy policy“⁵² In this vein, the French National Assembly recently published a report on “the loss of French sovereignty in energy,”⁵³ pointing to European energy rules and its impacts on the French nuclear industry over the past twenty years as the main culprit. Nuclear energy has become—at the worst possible time—a source of European disunion.

Making matters worse is the poor state of the French nuclear industry. The French Senate recently published a report on French nuclear energy, noting that, “due to a lack of coherent policy and investment this energy is in structural decline.”⁵⁴ By late 2022, a record twenty-six of its fifty-six reactors were offline for maintenance or repairs after the worrying discovery of cracks and corrosion in some pipes used to cool reactor cores.⁵⁵ This crisis sent French nuclear generation to a thirty year low turning the country into a net energy importer for 2022, importing even from Germany. Lack of skills and capacity domestically meant France was required to bring in American and Canadian experts and contractors. This is part of a series of deep problems that have faced EDF, which the French government fully nationalized in 2022. Therefore, despite strategic and climatic vitality, European nuclear power faces a double bind: that of supranational German-led political opposition and French-led domestic underperformance. To truly unlock nuclear energy’s potential, both will have to eventually be overcome at the EU level: removing German hostility to countries wishing to develop their own industries and providing support to overcome French failures.

Nuclear divisions hinder Europe’s efforts to build a truly climate-neutral economy

This row is impacting core EU policymaking. The nuclear debate inevitably emerges in every energy-related discussion in Brussels, including the negotiations for the Renewable Energy Directive and related emissions reductions targets, discussions around standards for hydrogen production, decisions surrounding funding guidelines for that production, and plans for electricity market reforms. Ongoing clashes between EU member states therefore significantly delay agreements at a time when Europe needs to present a unified agenda and accelerate its efforts if it is to meet its climate neutrality goals. The worse the Franco-German “motor,” the worse the functioning of the EU.

Disagreements on nuclear energy also bog down efforts to invest in the infrastructure required for a net-zero European economy. France, Spain, and Germany are unable to find consensus on how to allocate EU financial resources toward the integration of European energy infrastructure like hydrogen pipelines. This dispute has already had political consequences, such as when President Emmanuel Macron threatened to delay the construction of BarMar, a hydrogen pipeline that would run from Spain through France to Germany.

The nuclear dispute also impacts Europe’s green industrial strategy. Ambiguous language in the recent Net Zero Industry Act (NZIA) proposal from the Commission is aimed more at quieting both factions than bridging the gaps between them.⁵⁶. The NZIA, the bloc’s response to the US IRA, is part of the EU’s broader Green Industrial Plan, which European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen declared is meant to “to scale up manufacturing of clean technologies in the EU and make sure the Union is well-equipped for the clean-energy transition.”⁵⁷ It defines which net-zero technologies are strategic for both Europe’s industry and decarbonization, which, in turn, determines which technologies will get access to a wide range of benefits, potentially including fast-tracked permitting, simplified regulatory oversight, and European funding. The main body of the act includes “advanced technologies to produce energy from nuclear processes with minimal waste from the fuel cycle” and “small modular reactors” as two of the technologies that will benefit from the policy initiatives—but this excludes the current reactors essential to Europe’s energy mix and technologies such as the second-generation pressurized water reactors that France plans to develop.⁵⁸

Additionally, the annex to the policy defining those technologies, which “will receive particular support” and are subject to the “40 percent domestic production benchmark,” does not mention any type of nuclear technology, nor does a separate document identifying investment needs and funding availability.⁵⁹President von der Leyen has said that “nuclear can play a role in our decarbonization effort,” but is not deemed “strategic for the future.”⁶⁰ Similarly, the Commission working paper on “strategic” green industries does not once mention nuclear power.⁶¹

The European Union does not meaningfully fund nuclear energy

The EU does not meaningfully fund nuclear energy despite its strategic and climatic importance and core importance to multiple member states. While there are already funding initiatives for nuclear energy in the EU, the majority of these relatively small resources are set aside for safety and decommissioning programs aimed at “improving the safety standards of nuclear power stations and ensuring that nuclear waste is safely handled and disposed of,” while leaving it up to member states to “choose whether to include nuclear power in their energy mix.”⁶² This leaves a gap in the securing of resources needed for nuclear fuel (primarily uranium), as well as deficits in vital investments in technical skills training for the development and operation of nuclear energy equipment and encouraging technological innovation in the field.

The current energy crisis, political disputes, and the new wave of industrial economic initiatives further prove that this approach needs updating. For perspective, the €132 million package announced in March that directs funding from Horizon Europe (see Table 1) for research in small modular reactors is a drop in the ocean compared to recent measures in the United States.⁶³ The $6.85 billion in direct funding and additional generous US tax credits are clearly aimed at continuing and enhancing the domestic nuclear industry through support to existing reactors, supply chain enhancement, and technology-agnostic funding for research and development. There is a clear opportunity to reframe the NZIA and additional EU policy initiatives in a way that finds a reasonable middle ground for nuclear energy’s role in the transition.

Sources: European Commission, Directorate-General for Research and Innovation, “Horizon Europe, Budget: Horizon Europe-the Most Ambitious EU Research & Innovation Programme ever,” Office of the European Union, 2021, 3, https://data.europa.eu/doi/10.2777/202859; “Annex: European Instrument for International Nuclear Safety Cooperation, Multi-annual Indicative Programme 2021-2027,” September 2022, 2, 12, https://international-partnerships.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2022-09/insc-mip-2021-2027_en.pdf; and “About the Program,” Nuclear Safety and Decommissioning, accessed July 31, 2022, https://commission.europa.eu/funding-tenders/find-funding/eu-funding-programmes/nuclear-safety-and-decommissioning_en.

Nuclear disputes stand in the way of deepening European electricity markets via infrastructure and reform

There is a further issue holding back Europe. The EU is already the world’s largest interconnected electricity market, ensuring that power flows from where it is produced to where it is needed. But the energy crisis and the challenges posed by increasing shares of renewables calls for more integration, an objective that Europe has so far failed to meet. In January 2023, the European Court of Auditor released a report pointing to the lack of progress made in recent years, notably on interconnectors.⁶⁴ In 2002, the European Council had set a target of 10 percent of electricity interconnection as a proportion of generation capacity for each member state. The target has yet to be reached, three years past the 2020 deadline.

France’s geography places it at the heart of European energy systems—between Northern wind and southern sunshine. And yet, French policymakers have been slow to build out interconnectors, to the dismay of their Spanish neighbor.⁶⁵The last high voltage interconnector to come online across the Pyrenees was in 2015, despite the rapid deployment of renewable generation capacity in Spain.⁶⁶ More recently, the BarMar spat was the latest iteration of French obstruction.

Many factors could explain France’s reluctance to become a European energy platform: the pressure it would place on France’s domestic grid,⁶⁷ or shielding its nuclear electricity exports to Germany and Italy from Spanish competition.⁶⁸ But France also heavily subsidizes its nuclear industry, making French nuclear electricity historically among the cheapest sources of energy across the EU.⁶⁹ These subsidies led EDF to the brink of default and subsequent nationalization by the French government last year.⁷⁰ In this context, this reason explains French policymakers’ reluctance to build out more connections: France cannot afford to subsidize nuclear-derived electricity for Europe at large. This is how France and not only Germany contributes to the blockage at the heart of European nuclear energy politics.

No wonder then, that Europeans have struggled to agree on electricity market reforms this year. In March 2023, the European Commission proposed various revisions to regulations governing Europe’s electricity market design. While leaving market fundamentals unchanged, the Commission’s proposals included consumer protection measures, supporting long-term power purchase agreements and, more controversially, two way contracts for differences (CfDs), whereby governments top up energy producers when prices drop below a minimum threshold, and vice versa when a maximum threshold is reached.⁷¹

This last point sparked intense debate between the pro and anti-nuclear camps.⁷² France wants CfDs to cover existing assets, namely its nuclear fleet, while Germany views this as unfair support that would distort markets. In late July and ahead of summer recess, the European Parliament voted on a watered-down version of the Commission’s proposal, making only newly-built plants eligible for CfD funding.⁷³ Negotiations between the European Council, the European Parliament and the European Commission will accelerate towards the end of the year, under the supervision of the Spanish Council presidency.

Sven Giegold, German state secretary for economy and climate, recently told the Financial Times that France and Germany needed a “grand bargain” on energy.⁷⁴ Indeed, the need for a political grand bargain on nuclear energy in the EU is clear: to resolve divisive disputes and reestablish trust in the consensus-building process, to streamline broader energy policy that depends on nuclear strategy, and to meet the objective of supporting low-carbon technology essential to the European economy. Given the centrality of energy it remains—as it was in 1958 with the launch of Euroatom—a geopolitical necessity. Otherwise, a deep source of disunion will continue to drive European member states apart. Above all else, ambitious targets for EU-wide decarbonization are simply unrealistic without nuclear energy—but its use must be defined by a new strategy that would guarantee Europe’s energy security and resilience against energy-based extortion from foreign producers.

What does a peace pact on nuclear energy look like?

It is time to resolve divisive disputes on nuclear energy and find a compromise that defines the role of the power source in the energy transition. This will require a political—not a technocratic or a technical —decision. As a quarter of all electricity supply and about half of the low-carbon generation in the EU, nuclear energy is essential, strategic, and will complement the deployment of renewables and ensure energy security and independence.⁷⁵ Member states, principally Germany, should respect individual decisions to develop their energy mix as they see fit, as long as emission reductions are reached. Member states, principally France, also need to drop their hostility to the deeper integration of European electricity markets. Together they should look to a long-term solution on electricity pricing that can square the various circles holding Europe back. The EU should do this in ways which can help the strategically important sector overcome the politics of both German-led supranational opposition and French-led domestic underperformance.

First, European member states, in particular France and Germany, should sign a peace pact on nuclear energy. This should take the form of a political neutrality agreement on the topic of nuclear energy that affirms that each state is free to choose its own energy mix, as is defined by the treaties, stops interference in these policies, and affirms there is no right to block member states wishing to launch, expand, or simply conserve their nuclear capacity. Both sides should acknowledge that nuclear and renewable energy will both play a vital role in reaching emission reduction targets. As a continent facing a rapid rise in temperatures, Europe has no time to lose to decarbonize its energy mix. But as a compromise this pact would recognize that nuclear energy generation is a complement, not a substitute, to renewable energy targets. Therefore, nuclear generating countries should commit—in exchange for the peace pact—to deeper integration of European electricity markets, new targets for the deployment of renewables, while supporting reforms to simplify and accelerate permitting, and investing in additional cross-border grid connections, with the support of EU money, via existing funding instruments and the European Investment Bank, whilst looking for a long term solution on electricity pricing. In practice, this means that France must abandon plans to subsidize all of its nuclear electricity production, including its requirement that CfDs cover existing assets. Not only would this contribute to a subsidies race on both sides of the Rhine, it would fundamentally undermine the workings of an integrated European electricity market, notably by making it impossible for France to agree to build the interconnectors Europe needs. Indeed, France would then be subsidizing electricity prices for all of its neighbors.

Second, the Green Deal Industrial Plan (GDIP) and the Net Zero Industrial Act must be revamped. The European Commission should adopt a technology-neutral approach, focusing on emission reduction targets rather than defining a list of strategic sectors. This approach would include placing renewable energy and nuclear energy on the same footing. This method, recently pushed by the Bruegel think tank, is more in line with the treaties enshrining the right of member states to design their energy mix.⁷⁶ This means that the nuclear industry should not be discriminated against, whether in access to European funding for research & development, nuclear waste treatment, or for nuclear-derived hydrogen.

Third, the benefits of nuclear energy are only fully reaped when strong supply chains exist, supported by skilled workers. The European Commission should ramp up efforts to support nuclear skill development, as well as research and development efforts. Europe, as recent problems in the French nuclear sector show, lacks crucial skills. Pursuing nuclear energy independence only works if a strong domestic industry can support and share markets for labor and materials that are not overly reliant on Russia. A critical policy objective should be to improve access to training and enhancing existing skills for operating nuclear energy equipment. Investing in skilled labor and materials across the nuclear supply chains will reduce capital and operating costs, address construction delays, and reestablish efficiency across the value chain. Fostering technological innovation should be another goal of EU energy policy. The majority of large European nuclear power plants are regarded as nearing the end of their operational lives, need better fuel efficiency, and face issues with water shortages. Member states will need to identify opportunities to address these deficiencies as part of their overall decarbonization strategies. Currently, there is an acute lack of resources across the board, as France’s problems illustrate.

Fourth, the concerns of the anti-nuclear camp must be addressed with a focus on nuclear waste. While the benefits are clear, critiques against nuclear energy use—as voiced by Germany and its anti-nuclear allies—must be addressed. Even though safety precautions with nuclear power plants have dramatically increased since the Chernobyl disaster, the more-recent Fukushima incident convinced many—including the Green Party, which holds the crucial economic affairs and climate action portfolios in Germany’s cabinet—that the risks of nuclear power are too high. This must be addressed with a new focus on research into waste, safety, and nuclear management in any grand bargain.

Finally, in the same way that Europe has made drastic (and successful) efforts to reduce Russian gas dependencies, the European Union should be reducing the Russian presence in European nuclear markets, notably for Russian uranium.⁷⁷ This will require the continued authorization of new fuel sources to replace Russia’s supply, which has already begun. One recent case: Orano Mining, which is partially owned by the French state, concluded a memorandum of understanding with Kazakhstan to help the EU recognize the potential of the world’s largest uranium exporter.⁷⁸ On this point, France will need to pay heed to other member states’ concerns on the outsized influence that Rosatom has, especially in terms of enrichment capacities. This is an area where deepened cooperation between Europe and its Western allies can bring significant benefits. Indeed, spare capacity exists, notably in France, Canada, and the United States, across the different steps of the nuclear fuel value chain: from mining to conversion, enrichment, and fuel fabrication.⁷⁹

Conclusion

The February 2022 invasion of Ukraine exposed the fragility of Europe’s dependence on Russian hydrocarbons for its energy needs. EU policymakers have acted impressively to mitigate the effects of short-term energy shocks, but measures for long-term resilience are losing momentum and are threatened by unresolved conflict around the role of nuclear energy in the energy transition, as demonstrated by the failure to even mention nuclear energy in the RePowerEU response plan. Failing to reach a European consensus on nuclear energy will further degrade political capital and trust, and additionally jeopardize ambitious targets for decarbonization that already seem out of sight. Nuclear energy, with its low-carbon and reliable electricity generation, can play a significant role in ensuring energy security and meeting decarbonization targets. However, it is currently stymied by both the politics of German-led supranational obstruction and French-led domestic underperformance. A “peace pact” on nuclear energy in Europe and a package to allow the nuclear energy sector to compete has the potential to accelerate broader energy transition policies, restore trust in consensus building, and reestablish the EU as a climate leader. This will be a political—not a technocratic or a technical—decision and requires European leaders to recapture the spirit of technological optimism and geopolitical purpose that first birthed Euroatom. In short, the spirit of the Atomium.

Policy recommendations

To resolve deep divisions, EU members should sign a peace pact on nuclear energy. This should take the form of a political neutrality agreement on the topic of nuclear energy that affirms that each state is free to choose its own energy mix, stops interference in these policies, and also affirms there is no right to block member states wishing to launch, expand, or simply conserve their nuclear capacity.
To do so, subsidy schemes targeted at existing nuclear assets should be dropped, as they undermine the functioning of European electricity markets and its further integration via interconnectors.
To make this viable,EU members should agree to place renewable and nuclear sources of power on the same footing under the GDIP and NZIA. This would implement a technology-neutral approach to lowering carbon emissions.
In exchange, nuclear generating EU members should commit to deeper integration of European electricity markets, new targets for the deployment of renewables, while supporting reforms to simplify and accelerate permitting, and investing in additional cross-border grid connections, with the support of EU money, via existing funding instruments and the European Investment Bank, whilst looking for a long term solution on electricity pricing.
To strengthen such an effort, the European Commission should support nuclear engineering skills development, along with research and development capabilities.
To address concerns, EU members should redouble efforts to research, address, and manage nuclear waste disposal.
Finally, EU members with Western allies should reduce their reliance on Russian sources of uranium. While fully decoupling from Russian uranium imports will likely be infeasible in the short to medium term, the EU should diversify its sources of uranium to avoid having the Kremlin keep its existing advantageous position in the EU uranium supply.

About the authors

Ben Judah is director of the Transform Europe Initiative and a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center. He is the author most recently of This Is Europe and his research interests focus on the geopolitics of decarbonization, Britain and the European Union.

Rachel Rizzo is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center. Her research focuses on European security and the transatlantic relationship.

Théophile Pouget-Abadie is a nonresident fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Transform Europe Initiative and policy fellow at the Jain Family Institute.

Jonah Allen is a nonresident fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center and a research fellow at the Jain Family Institute.

Francis Shin is a research assistant at the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center.

Acknowledgements

The authors would like to thank Dr. Jennifer Gordon, Dr. Matthew Bowen, Shahin Vallée and Cécile Maisonneuve for their invaluable insights and feedback in the writing of this report.

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2 Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel Community, ECSC Treaty,” EUR-Lex, updated December 11, 2017, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/EN/legal-content/summary/treaty-establishing-the-european-coal-and-steel-community-ecsc-treaty.html.

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4 Louis Armand, chairman of French Railways (SNCF), Franz Etzel, vice-president of the ECSC High Authority, and Francesco Giordani, the former chairman of the Italian National Committee for Nuclear Research (CNRN).

5 G. Les Gros, “The Beginning of Nuclear Energy in France: Messmer’s Plan,” Revue Generale Nucleaire 5 (2020): 56-59; and Gregory L. Schneider, The 1973 Oil Crisis and Its Economic Consequences, The Bill of Rights Institute, July 31, 2023, https://billofrightsinstitute.org/essays/the-1973-oil-crisis-and-its-economic-consequences.

6 Author’s note: The Messmer Plan notably entailed the construction of 13 reactors, doubling France’s generation capacity.

7 Peter Fraseret al., Nuclear Power and Secure Energy Transitions, International Energy Agency (IEA), September 2022, 8, https://iea.blob.core.windows.net/assets/016228e1-42bd-4ca7-bad9-a227c4a40b04/NuclearPowerandSecureEnergyTransitions.pdf.

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11 Sarah White, “France’s Oldest Nuclear Reactor to Finally Shut Down,” The Guardian, June 28, 2020, https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2020/jun/28/frances-oldest-nuclear-reactor-to-finally-shut-down.

12 “Nuclear Power in the European Union,” World Nuclear Association, updated May 2023, https://www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/country-profiles/others/european-union.aspx.

13 Federica Pascale, “Italian government begins discussions on clean nuclear power”, Euractiv, 22 September 2023, https://www.euractiv.com/section/politics/news/italian-government-begins-discussions-on-clean-nuclear-power/

14 Cécile Maisonneuve and Benjamin Fremaux, European Energy Sovereignty: Putting an End to the Stigma of Nuclear Power, April 11, 2022, Institut Montaigne, https://www.institutmontaigne.org/en/expressions/european-energy-sovereignty-putting-end-stigma-nuclear-power.

15 Victor Jack, “French-Russian Nuclear Relations Turn Radioactive,” Politico, April 20, 2023, https://www.politico.eu/article/french-russian-nuclear-relations-radioactive-rosatom-sanctions/.

16 Reuters Staff, “Germany ‘Blocking’ Equipment for Paks Reactors, Hungarian Minister Says,” Reuters, February 14, 2023, https://www.reuters.com/article/hungary-nuclear-siemens/update-1-germany-blocking-equipment-for-paks-reactors-hungarian-minister-says-idINL1N34U1M2.

17 Max Lin, “US and UK Sanction Dozens of Russia-linked Energy, Shipping Firms,” S&P Global, May 19, 2023, https://www.spglobal.com/commodityinsights/en/market-insights/latest-news/agriculture/051923-us-and-uk-sanction-dozens-of-russia-linked-energy-shipping-firms.

18 Ari Natter, “Russia Still Top US Uranium Supplier Despite Efforts to Wean Off,” Bloomberg, June 15, 2023, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-06-15/russia-still-top-us-uranium-supplier-despite-efforts-to-wean-off.

19 Marie Thimonnier, “L’uranium importé en Europe et en France provient-il ‘très largement’ de Russie comme l’affirme Yannick Jadot? [Does the Uranium Imported into Europe and France come ‘Very Largely’ from Russia, as Yannick Jadot Claims?],” La Libération, July 5, 2022, https://www.liberation.fr/checknews/luranium-importe-en-europe-et-en-france-provient-il-tres-largement-de-russie-comme-laffirme-yannick-jadot-20220705_LIIEMU2QIRFKZMB46IPBWKFJZQ/.

20 “Nuclear Explained: Where Our Uranium Comes From,” US Energy Information Administration (website), July 7, 2022, https://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/nuclear/where-our-uranium-comes-from.php.

21 “Low-emissions Sources Are Set to Cover Almost All the Growth in Global Electricity Demand in the Next Three Years,” IEA, February 8, 2023, https://www.iea.org/news/low-emissions-sources-are-set-to-cover-almost-all-the-growth-in-global-electricity-demand-in-the-next-three-years.

22 Kira Taylor, “Poland’s Power Grid Needs €25 Billion Upgrade for Renewables: Report,” Euractiv, October 27, 2022, https://www.euractiv.com/section/electricity/news/polands-power-grid-needs-e25-billion-upgrade-for-renewables-report/.

23 “Is the European Union on Track to Meet its REPowerEU Goals?,” IEA, December 2022, https://www.iea.org/reports/is-the-european-union-on-track-to-meet-its-repowereu-goals; “Nuclear Power in the European Union,” World Nuclear Association; and “Greenhouse Gas Emission Intensity of Electricity Generation in Europe,” European Environment Agency, June 2, 2023, https://www.eea.europa.eu/ims/greenhouse-gas-emission-intensity-of-1.

24 “It Is Harder for New Electric Grids to Balance Supply and Demand,” Economist, April 5, 2023, https://www.economist.com/technology-quarterly/2023/04/05/it-is-harder-for-new-electric-grids-to-balance-supply-and-demand.

25 “Nuclear Power in the European Union,” World Nuclear Association, May, 2023. https://www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/country-profiles/others/european-union.aspx.

26 “The Physics of Rotating Masses Can No Longer Define the Electric Grid,” Economist, April 5, 2023, https://www.economist.com/technology-quarterly/2023/04/05/the-physics-of-rotating-masses-can-no-longer-define-the-electric-grid.

27 Fraser et al., Nuclear Power and Secure Energy Transitions, 10.

28 “Is the European Union on Track,” IEA; Vadim Vinichenko et al., and “Phasing Out Coal for 2°C Target Requires Worldwide Replication of Most Ambitious National Plans Despite Security and Fairness Concerns,” Environmental Research Letters 18, no. 1, January 11, 2023, https://iopscience.iop.org/article/10.1088/1748-9326/acadf6.

29 Chiara Swaton, “Austria Will Miss Climate Targets despite Green Government Involvement,” Euractiv, April 26, 2023, https://www.euractiv.com/section/politics/news/austria-will-miss-climate-targets-despite-green-government-involvement/.

30 Frank Jordans, “Over and Out: Germany Switches Off Its Last Nuclear Plants,” AP News, April 15, 2023, https://apnews.com/article/germany-nuclear-power-plants-shut-energy-376dfaa223f88fedff138b9a63a6f0da.

31 Benjamin Wehrmann, “Nuclear Controversy Flares Up as Germany Shuts Down Last Reactors,” Clean Energy Wire, April 14, 2023, https://www.cleanenergywire.org/news/nuclear-controversy-flares-germany-shuts-down-last-reactors.

32 “Has Germany’s Era Of Nuclear Energy Come To An End?”, Yahoo Finance, April 18, 2023. https://finance.yahoo.com/news/germany-era-nuclear-energy-come-220000927.html.

33 Julia Dahm, “Bavaria Wants to Keep Nuclear Plants Running despite Federal Phase-out Plans, Euractiv, April 17, 2023, https://www.euractiv.com/section/politics/news/bavaria-wants-to-keep-nuclear-plants-running-despite-federal-phase-out-plans.

34 Fraser et al., Nuclear Power and Secure Energy Transitions, 7; and “Low-emissions Sources,” IEA.

35 Authors’ note: The IEA’s low-nuclear case includes no new nuclear projects in advanced economies, and nuclear construction kept at a historical average in emerging economies.

36 “Energy Pathways 2050—Key Results of the Study,” RTE, June 24, 2022, https://www.rte-france.com/en/home.

37 “Projected Costs of Generating Electricity 2020,” IEA, December 2020, https://www.iea.org/reports/projected-costs-of-generating-electricity-2020.

38 Lars Nitter Havro, “Explainer: Examining Options for the EU as It Competes for Clean Tech Sovereignty,” Rystad Energy, February 5, 2023, https://www.rystadenergy.com/news/explainer-examining-options-for-the-eu-as-it-competes-for-clean-tech-sovereignty.

39 Paul Messad, “Nuclear vs Renewables: Two Camps Clash in Brussels,” Euractiv, March 29, 2023, https://www.euractiv.com/section/energy-environment/news/nuclear-vs-renewables-two-camps-clash-in-brussels/; and Benedikt Stöckl, “Dutch Government to Invest €28 Billion into New Climate Package,” Euractiv, April 27, 2023, https://www.euractiv.com/section/politics/news/dutch-government-to-invest-e28-billion-into-new-climate-package/.

40 Liz Alderman, “France Announces a Big Buildup of Its Nuclear Power Program,” New York Times, February 10, 2022, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/02/10/world/europe/france-macron-nuclear-power.html.

41 Mark Schwartz, “Stanford-led Research Finds Small Modular Reactors Will Exacerbate Challenges of Highly Radioactive Nuclear Waste,” Stanford University News, May 30, 2022, https://news.stanford.edu/2022/05/30/small-modular-reactors-produce-high-levels-nuclear-waste/.

42 Statista, October 7, 2022, https://www.statista.com/statistics/1201743/russian-gas-dependence-in-europe-by-country/;

43 Centre for Economic Policy Research, October 7, 2022. In total, 43 percent of natural gas in Europe came from Russia.

44 “Nuclear Process Heat for Industry,” World Nuclear Association, updated September 2021, https://world-nuclear.org/information-library/non-power-nuclear-applications/industry/nuclear-process-heat-for-industry.aspx.

45 “3 Reasons Why Nuclear Is Clean and Sustainable,” US Office of Nuclear Energy, March 31, 2021, https://www.energy.gov/ne/articles/3-reasons-why-nuclear-clean-and-sustainable.

46 “Supply of Uranium,” World Nuclear Association, updated May 2023, https://world-nuclear.org/information-library/nuclear-fuel-cycle/uranium-resources/supply-of-uranium.aspx; and Dyfed Loesche, “Where the Uranium Comes From,” Statista, December 15, 2017, https://www.statista.com/chart/12304/countries-with-the-biggest-production-volume-of-uranium/.

47 “Economics of Nuclear Power,” World Nuclear Association, updated August 2022, https://world-nuclear.org/information-library/economic-aspects/economics-of-nuclear-power.aspx; and “Projected Costs,” IEA.

48 Daniel Tilles, “Germany to Use “Legal Instruments” in Response to Poland’s Nuclear Power Plants”, Notes from Poland, February 23, 2023. “https://notesfrompoland.com/2022/02/23/germany-to-use-legal-instruments-in-response-to-polands-nuclear-power-plans/

49 Interview with a French senior official, March 20, 2023.

50 John Ainger, “France Pitches Plan to End EU Nuclear-Energy Deadlock With Germany”, Bloomberg, 3 October 2023, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-10-03/france-pitches-plan-to-end-nuclear-energy-deadlock-with-germany?srnd=premium-europe&sref=SamVlrGx&embedded-checkout=true

51 “Onze Etats membres de l’Union européenne appellent à un renforcement de la coopération européenne en matière d’énergie nucléaire [Eleven EU Member States Call for Enhanced European Cooperation on Nuclear Energy],” French Ministry of Ecological Transition and Territorial Cohesion, and Ministry of Energy Transition, February 28, 2023, https://www.ecologie.gouv.fr/onze-etats-membres-lunion-europeenne-appellent-renforcement-cooperation-europeenne-en-matiere; Kate Abnett, “France Seeks Pro-nuclear Alliance for EU Energy Talks,” Reuters, February 27, 2023, https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/france-seeks-pro-nuclear-alliance-eu-energy-talks-2023-02-27/; and Messad, “Nuclear vs Renewables.”

52 Decarbonization Solutions for Addressing Europe’s Green Industrial Policy Challenge,” Event Recap, Transform Europe Initiative, Atlantic Council, April 18, 2023, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/commentary/event-recap/decarbonization-solutions-for-addressing-europes-green-industrial-policy-challenge-2/.

53 “Commission d’enquête visant à établir les raisons de la perte de souveraineté et d’indépendance énergétique de la France [Commission of Inquiry to Establish the Reasons for the Loss of Sovereignty and Energy Independence of France],” National Assembly of France, October 11, 2022, https://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/dyn/16/organes/autres-commissions/commissions-enquete/ce-independance-energetique.

54 Daniel Gremillet, Jean-Pierre Moga, and Jean-Jaques Michau, “Nucléaire et hydrogène: l’urgence d’agir [Nuclear and Hydrogen: The Urgency to Act,” Rapport d’information n° 801, Senate of France, July 20, 2022, https://www.senat.fr/rap/r21-801/r21-8010.html.

55 Liz Alderman, “Half of France’s Nuclear Plants Are Off-Line,” New York Times, November 15, 2022, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/11/15/business/nuclear-power-france.html.

56 “Net-Zero Industry Act: Making the EU the Home of Clean Technologies Manufacturing and Green Jobs,” European Commission, March 16, 2023, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_23_1665

57 “The Green Industrial Plan,” European Commission, February 1, 2023, https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/priorities-2019-2024/european-green-deal/green-deal-industrial-plan_en.

58 Paul Messad, “EU’s Net-Zero Industry Act Sends ‘Positive Signal’ for Nuclear, Advocates Say,” Euractiv, March 17, 2023, https://www.euractiv.com/section/energy-environment/news/eus-net-zero-industry-act-sends-positive-signal-for-nuclear-advocates-say/.

59 Messad, “EU’s Net-Zero Industry”; and “ANNEXES to the Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on Establishing a Framework of Measures for Strengthening Europe’s Net-zero Technology Products Manufacturing Ecosystem (Net Zero Industry Act),” European Commission, March 16, 2023, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/resource.html?uri=cellar:6448c360-c4dd-11ed-a05c-01aa75ed71a1.0001.02/DOC_2&format=PDF.

60 Frédéric Simon, “Von der Leyen: Nuclear not ‘Strategic’ for EU Decarbonisation,” Euractiv, March 24, 2023, https://www.euractiv.com/section/energy-environment/news/von-der-leyen-nuclear-not-strategic-for-eu-decarbonisation/.

61 “Commission Staff Working Document: Investment Needs Assessment and Funding Availabilities to Strengthen EU’s Net-Zero Technology Manufacturing Capacity,” European Commission, March 23, 2023, https://single-market-economy.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2023-03/SWD_2023_68_F1_STAFF_WORKING_PAPER_EN_V4_P1_2629849.PDF.

62 Corinne Cordina, “Nuclear Energy,” European Parliament: Fact Sheets of the European Union, April 2023, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/factsheets/en/sheet/62/nuclear-energy.

63 Directorate-General for Research and Innovation, “Researchers to Receive €132 million through the new Euratom Research and Training Work Programme 2023-2025 for Investments in Nuclear Innovation and Technology,” European Commission, March 17, 2023, https://research-and-innovation.ec.europa.eu/news/all-research-and-innovation-news/researchers-receive-eu132-million-through-new-euratom-research-and-training-work-programme-2023-2025-2023-03-17_en.

64 Special Report 03/2023: Internal electricity market integration, European Court of Auditors, March 2023, https://www.eca.europa.eu/en/publications?did=63214.

65 “France, Spain to Ease Pyrenees Power Bottleneck,” Reuters, February 14, 2015, https://www.reuters.com/article/france-spain-electricity-idUSL6N0VG3V020150213.

66 “Grid Bottlenecks Could Derail Europe’s Renewable Energy Boom”, Rystad Energy, December 2022, oilprice.com/Alternative-Energy/Renewable-Energy/Grid-Bottlenecks-Could-Derail-Europes-Renewable-Energy-Boom.html.

67 Sam Morgan, “View from Brussels: The Curious Case of the Channel Cable”, E&T, February 8, 2023, https://eandt.theiet.org/content/articles/2023/02/view-from-brussels-the-curious-case-of-the-channel-cable/.

68 Xavier Grau del Cerro, “Why is France not Interested in the Midcat Pipeline?”, Ara, August 19, 2022, https://en.ara.cat/business/why-is-france-not-interested-in-midcat_1_4465828.html

69 Eurostat, Electricity Prices for Household Consumers, https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/nrg_pc_204/default/table?lang=en

70 Sarah White, “EDF Warns of €26bn Hit from Output Curbs and Energy Price Caps”, Financial Times, March 14, 2022, https://www.ft.com/content/58e31e69-3089-4383-a49e-87d96dd2f233.

71 European Commission, “Electricity Market Design revision: Proposal to amend the Electricity Market Design rules”, https://energy.ec.europa.eu/publications/electricity-market-reform-consumers-and-annex_en.

72 Kira Taylor, “EU countries fail to agree position on electricity market reform”, Euractiv, June 20, 2023, https://www.euractiv.com/section/electricity/news/eu-countries-fail-to-agree-position-on-electricity-market-reform/.

73 Nikolas Kurmayer, “European Parliament votes for minimal electricity market reform”, Euractiv, July 20, 2023, https://www.euractiv.com/section/electricity/news/european-parliament-votes-for-minimal-electricity-market-reform.

74 Alice Hancock, “Germany seeks ‘grand bargain’ with France over energy”, Financial Times, 4 October 2023 https://www.ft.com/content/8a57f1be-20cb-4632-aecd-1a68f5211057

75 “Nuclear Power in the European Union,” World Nuclear Association.

76 Simone Tagliapietra, Reinhilde Veugelers, and Jeromin Zettelmeyer, Policy Brief: Rebooting the European Union’s Net Zero Industry Act, Bruegel, June 22, 2023, https://www.bruegel.org/policy-brief/rebooting-european-unions-net-zero-industry-act.

77 Victor Jack, “French-Russian Nuclear Relations Turn Radioactive,” Politico, April 20, 2023, https://www.politico.eu/article/french-russian-nuclear-relations-radioactive-rosatom-sanctions/.

78 “Orano Has Signed a Memorandum of Cooperation in the Uranium Industry with Kazatomprom,” Orano, December 5, 2022, https://www.orano.group/en/news/news-group/2022/december/orano-has-signed-a-memorandum-of-cooperation-in-the-uranium-industry-with-kazatomprom.

79 Matt Bowen and Paul M. Dabbar, Reducing Russian Involvement in Western Nuclear Power Markets, Center on Global Energy Center, Columbia University, https://www.energypolicy.columbia.edu/publications/reducing-russian-involvement-western-nuclear-power-markets/.

The post How to strike a grand bargain on EU nuclear energy policy appeared first on Atlantic Council.

What’s next in the two-front war against climate change and energy insecurity?

Robert F. Ichord, Jr. — Wed, 04 Oct 2023 14:14:31 +0000

Disruptions to global energy markets from Russia’s war in Ukraine have heightened energy security concerns and stimulated large-scale European gas diversification efforts, including through US liquified natural gas (LNG) supplies. Meanwhile, record high global temperatures and increasingly frequent extreme heat-related events in the United States and Europe have underscored another threat to the energy system, as power grids struggle under severe weather.

Both the United States and the European Union (EU)—which together account for 22 percent of global energy-related carbon emissions—have sought to stay on the path to net-zero emissions by 2050 as their economies feel the strain of both energy inflation and climate impact. This two-front war—against Russia’s disruption of energy supplies on the one hand and climate change on the other—are increasingly intertwined.

Electrification remains a powerful weapon in these battles, one in which the United States and European Union need to work together. To improve overall system reliability and resilience, both partners must decarbonize, meet new consumer and industrial demands, and expand transmission capacity.

The challenges are significant, with electricity-related emissions rising in 2022 and fossil fuels’ share of electricity generation remaining stubbornly high at 60 percent in the United States and 40 percent in the EU. The launch of the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) in the United States and REPowerEU in the European Union represent historic government initiatives to spur clean electricity development and advance progress toward lofty targets of 100 percent carbon-free electricity by 2035 in the United States and reducing emissions 55 percent below 1990 levels by 2030 in the EU. Now these initiatives must be implemented with the utmost urgency.

Electricity sector developments in 2022

Last year, the United States and European Union continued their recoveries from the pandemic, albeit at slower rates of economic growth than in 2021. US end-use electricity consumption grew by 2.6 percent in 2022 to reach an all-time high of 4.05 trillion kilowatt-hours. In the EU, high electricity prices led to a decline of 3 percent in electricity consumption.

Strong growth in renewables was common to both sides of the Atlantic. Despite lower hydroelectric output, renewables accounted for the largest share of EU electricity generation at 39.4 percent, and solar and wind growth offset emergency increases in coal generation due to gas shortages. EU solar generation grew by 29 percent, with 20 member states achieving record shares.

In the United States, natural gas remained the largest source of utility-generated electricity at 39.8 percent, with an increase of 7 percent in 2022 due to hot weather and lower coal output. However, renewable generation grew faster, increasing by 12.6 percent. The share of renewables (21.5 percent) exceeded coal (19.5 percent) for the first time, courtesy of a doubling of solar capacity.

Despite growing renewable generation, electricity-related emissions increased in both the United States and the EU. US emissions from electricity grew slightly from 2021 but remain almost 40 percent down from their 2007 peak. The electricity sector contributed 31 percent of total US energy-related carbon dioxide emissions. Coal was the largest source of power sector emissions, comprising 55 percent.

While the share of fossil fuel generation declined by 1 percent in the United States due to falling coal use, it increased by 3 percent in the EU due to increased coal consumption, notably in Germany. Higher gas generation, especially in France, Italy, and Spain, also increased power-sector emissions.

The role of natural gas in supporting the electricity system remains contentious as the EU seeks to phase out of Russian gas by 2027, in part through imports of US LNG. For its part, US natural gas generation is expected to increase, but its share in the overall power mix will decline as renewable energy surges.

The essential role of nuclear power

The energy security and climate crises have changed attitudes toward nuclear power, as the essential role this zero-carbon source has to play in meeting future baseload electricity and heating needs becomes increasingly evident. Nuclear power contributed 46.3 percent and 37.7 percent of carbon-free power in the United States and the EU in 2022.

The closure of the Palisades plant in Michigan decreased US nuclear generation slightly in 2022 in both absolute and relative terms. Meanwhile in Europe, technical problems in France and closures in Germany led to falling output in 2022.

Despite last year’s dip, the prospect for a nuclear energy resurgence appears promising. One of two new Vogtle AP-1000 units in Georgia has finally entered operation. New third generation light-water reactors and advanced nuclear reactor projects are underway in both the United States and the EU. The US Congress has approved with bipartisan support billions of dollars in funding for maintaining existing plants and providing investment and production credits for new builds and commercial demonstrations.

Both utilities and industry are showing strong interest in small modular reactors (SMRs), which boast improved passive safety, standardized manufacturing, and operational flexibility. SMRs hold significant potential for producing electricity, high-temperature industrial heat, and clean hydrogen.

Most of these initial SMR projects will not be coming online before 2030 and their cost-competitiveness remains unclear. But just as the scale-up of solar photovoltaics has rapidly reduced costs and revolutionized the electricity industry, the potential for advanced manufacturing of small nuclear reactors to drive down prices, reduce construction times, and expand the scope of both centralized and distributed applications is substantial.

Infrastructure investment requirements

Renewable energy will continue to dominate new capacity additions as the United States and the EU implement ambitious clean energy programs. The impact of these initiatives is already apparent. US solar capacity is expected to grow by 32 gigawatts (GW) in 2023 and 31GW in 2024, overtaking US wind capacity around 2030. In Europe, solar capacity is expected to double by 2026 in line with REPowerEU’s target of 400GW by 2025. Both areas envision large expansion of offshore wind generation, with the US Department of Energy aiming for 20GW by 2030 and European leaders targeting 120GW in the North Sea by 2030.

To support this new renewable capacity, major investments are needed in transmission, distribution, and storage. Moreover, accommodating increased intermittency in the system while integrating electric vehicles, heat pumps, data centers, and microgrids will require measures to improve reliability and resilience.

As much as $90 billion in investment is needed in the United States by 2030 to support transmission. The $2.5 billion Transmission Investment Loan Fund and other measures included in the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law and the IRA will help, but utilities must also ramp up their own investments. Eurelectric, an industry group, suggests up to €425 billion may be needed for distribution alone in the EU by 2030, concluding that 70 percent of renewables are likely to be directly connected to distribution networks.

The financing requirements of the transition in the US and EU electricity sectors are substantial. Yet the costs of severe climate events are increasing daily. Over the past eight years, the United States has experienced ten climate events that have each caused $10 billion or more in damage. Costs from storm damage are estimated at $165 billion in 2022 alone, and over $1.1 trillion over the past decade. These impacts are becoming worse; even with 2023 not yet over, the United States through September 11 has experienced 23 extreme weather events costing over $1 billion each.

Looking ahead

Last year marked an important milestone in the energy transition in the United States and European Union with the passage of landmark energy and climate legislation. The focus now should be to implement these policies effectively and equitably to preserve momentum. Both the United States and the European Union face major political and economic challenges in achieving these goals.

The war in Ukraine and its energy implications will test Western resolve and require a continued focus on helping allies diversify energy supplies. The election season and confrontations over budgets and policy directions will preoccupy US decisionmakers and likely affect energy programs and project support.

Nevertheless, industry and financial institutions in both regions are embracing the clean energy transition. But workforce constraints are proving to be a considerable impediment to implementation, and an internal industrial policy focus on US and European markets may limit pursuing global clean energy opportunities.

Governments and the private sector in the United States and Europe must realize the importance of global sustainable development and climate mitigation efforts, especially in coal-dependent Asia. As US special presidential envoy for climate John Kerry and executive director of the International Energy Agency Fatih Birol recently warned in a Washington Post editorial, efforts to triple renewable electricity generation must be accompanied by a shared, intense commitment to stop the growth of unabated coal use.

Finally, the extreme global heat and flooding experienced in 2022 and 2023 demand greater global investment in clean energy alternatives. The upcoming COP28 climate summit in Dubai presents another opportunity to galvanize and mobilize global action and resources. The United States and Europe must seize this opportunity to persist in their twin struggles against climate change and the weaponization of energy supply.

Dr. Robert F. Ichord, Jr. is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council Global Energy Center

EnergySource

Meet the author

Fellow

Robert F. Ichord, Jr.

Nuclear Energy Energy Transitions

EnergySource Jan 31, 2023

Africa and the global LNG crunch: Balancing energy security, development, and decarbonization

By Robert F. Ichord, Jr.

As Europe looks to replace Russian gas and Asia looks to switch off coal, African LNG could play a central role. Gas development in Africa could unlock new revenues and, in turn, drive development across the continent.

Africa Energy & Environment

EnergySource Oct 12, 2022

Nuclear energy and global energy security in the new tripolar world order

By Robert F. Ichord, Jr.

China Energy & Environment

EnergySource Oct 31, 2022

COP27 and financing for sustainable energy development

By Robert F. Ichord, Jr.

COP27 will place the issue of climate finance front and center. The need to provide adequate support for developing nations beset by climate-related hardship and pursuing transition policies cannot be overstated.

Climate Change & Climate Action Energy & Environment

Learn more about the Global Energy Center

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The Nuclear Energy Policy Summit was recognized by Emirates News Agency

bmathews — Fri, 22 Sep 2023 13:49:47 +0000

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The Nuclear Energy Policy Summit was recognized by Power Engineering International

bmathews — Thu, 21 Sep 2023 13:53:12 +0000

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The Nuclear Energy Policy Summit was recognized by Gulf Business

bmathews — Wed, 20 Sep 2023 13:42:41 +0000

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Hinata-Yamaguchi quoted in South China Morning Post

kyusko — Wed, 30 Aug 2023 20:10:00 +0000

ORIGINAL SOURCE

On August 29, IPSI nonresident senior fellow Ryo Hinata-Yamaguchi was quoted in South China Morning Post. He discusses the delicate political challenges of Japan’s recent decision to discharge wastewater from its Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant, arguing that “going forward, Japan has to ensure that it upholds the transparency that it is showing.”

Fellow

Ryo Hinata-Yamaguchi

Indo-Pacific Security Initiative Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Defense Policy Indo-Pacific

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Workshop on the role of Central and Eastern Europe in European decarbonization

Transform Europe Initiative — Fri, 25 Aug 2023 15:14:31 +0000

As part of the 2023 Bratislava Forum, the Atlantic Council co-hosted with GLOBSEC a high-level workshop on role of Central and Eastern Europe in European decarbonization on May 31. The event was the third in a series to bring together policymakers, analysts and the private sector, after events in Berlin and Paris in January and March, respectively.

Distinguished speakers at the workshop included H.E. Peter Dovhun, minister of economy of the Slovak Republic; Ms. Ditte Juul Jørgensen, director-general for energy of the European Commission; and Dr. Julije Domac, special advisor on energy and climate of the Republic of Croatia, among others.

Participants acknowledged the importance of solidarity and cooperation in the success of the REPowerEU plan, which aims to reduce reliance on Russian energy sources—especially gas—and has been credited with lowering Europe’s Russian gas dependence by cutting imports from Russia by two-thirds by the end of 2022. The European gas supply needs to be diversified. In this context, tripling the LNG supplies from the US is a positive development.

Similarities and differences between IRA and the Green Deal were discussed. Both the EU and the US have common objectives – to invest more in clean energy supply chains, technologies, and innovation. At the same time, a positive development is that the differences are being addressed not by retaliatory measures but through direct dialogue to find solutions.

Like much of Central Europe, Slovakia is heavily reliant on Russian oil and gas for its energy supply and has faced difficulties with diversification following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. To that end, as it continues to support Ukraine with military and humanitarian aid, Slovakia and other Central European member states are key contributors to EU efforts to reduce reliance on Russian fossil fuels and reduce carbon emissions.

Slovakia is seeking to rapidly electrify its economy to address its dependence on Russian fossil fuels. The government describes its efforts as focused on solving the “energy trilemma” – maintaining the balance between the security of supply, sustainability, and affordability. Another priority of the current government is addressing energy security and affordability ahead of the 2023 election.

Panelists praised Slovakia’s move towards building a gas interconnector with Poland, in addition to prioritizing ongoing gas supply talks with Lithuania, Germany, and Italy.

While Russia has weaponized the European Union’s dependence on Russian energy, the EU showed that its systems are more resilient than the Kremlin expected. However, the EU needs to avoid creating new dependencies while cutting the old ones. Panelists argued that EU member states need to seriously engage in implementing the REPowerEU plan’s objectives to reinforce Europe’s energy sovereignty in addition to ensuring decarbonization occurs at an expedited rate. The participants agreed that outlining EU aid plans to states previously more reliant on Russian hydrocarbons would be vital to get the implementation of REPowerEU objectives back on track.

Participants also discussed how nuclear power could help in reducing Europe’s dependence on Russian oil and gas while lowering emissions. Discussants emphasized the need to consolidate and harmonize the regulatory frameworks and safety standards needed to support the use of nuclear energy. The consensus that emerged among participants was that, in addition to Europe’s ongoing search to secure critical minerals abroad, Europe needs to reduce its dependence on Russian uranium if nuclear energy is to play a role in Europe’s decarbonization and diversification. The potential for small modular reactors (SMRs) and the high capital costs associated with nuclear energy were also a subject of the debate. The overall conclusion was that bringing SMRs to market at scale needs to be a central part of a transatlantic energy and climate partnership.

Nevertheless, participants noted the potential importance of nuclear energy as a long-term measure towards decarbonization. Some senior policymakers present argued that nuclear energy should be seen as a carbon neutral and sustainable form of electricity production, and that EU member states that have prioritized nuclear energy technology development should consider developing partnerships with likeminded EU countries on the matter as well.

Therefore, the overall picture that emerged from the workshop was of enduring European solidarity on achieving decarbonization. EU member states have largely retained their commitment towards decarbonization despite pressure from the Kremlin, albeit not on track to reach the targets set by REPowerEU. Participants further emphasized that US and European policymakers should be less concerned about the impact of “Ukraine fatigue,” the alleged decline in support for aiding Ukraine, and more on ensuring that EU members accelerate their efforts towards diversifying their energy supplies away from Russia. Finally, while nuclear energy remains a hotly debated topic among European policymakers, disagreements were more on the lack of construction, manufacturing, design, and operational expertise capabilities present in Europe as a whole.

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The global future of nuclear energy

Matt Bowen — Thu, 24 Aug 2023 13:00:00 +0000

Energy supply is an integral and essential part of modern society. Since nuclear energy provides low-carbon, baseload power, it could play a larger global role in addressing growing energy demands while reducing the risks of climate change and air pollution. Russia’s unprovoked invasion of Ukraine has also highlighted energy security as a national imperative that nuclear power could help countries to achieve.

Both preserving the existing fleet of reactors and building new advanced nuclear power plants could play a role in achieving deep decarbonization of electricity supply systems by mid-century. Public support, designs with greater inherent safety, licensing advanced reactors, and reasonable costs and schedules will be integral parts of this strategy. Nuclear power’s future would also benefit from national governments putting renewed emphasis on spent nuclear fuel disposition.

This report by Matt Bowen discusses a number of actions that the United States, Japan, and other civil nuclear allies could pursue so that nuclear energy can play a larger role in overcoming the challenges related to energy demand, energy security, and associated environmental and public health risks.

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Webster in The Diplomat: Russia, China, and the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant

cakers — Tue, 18 Jul 2023 20:54:31 +0000

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Cohen in Forbes: Putin’s threats to Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power plant endangers energy transition

Atlantic Council — Sun, 16 Jul 2023 17:24:00 +0000

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Russian War Report: Russian conspiracy alleges false flag at Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant

Digital Forensic Research Lab — Fri, 07 Jul 2023 18:02:29 +0000

As Russia continues its assault on Ukraine, the Atlantic Council’s Digital Forensic Research Lab (DFRLab) is keeping a close eye on Russia’s movements across the military, cyber, and information domains. With more than seven years of experience monitoring the situation in Ukraine—as well as Russia’s use of propaganda and disinformation to undermine the United States, NATO, and the European Union—the DFRLab’s global team presents the latest installment of the Russian War Report.

Russian missile strike in Lviv kills ten civilians, injures dozens

At least ten people were killed and thirty-seven injured in Russia’s July 6 attack on Lviv, in western Ukraine. Regional Governor Maksym Kozytskyy said that a Russian missile struck a residential building in the city, destroying more than fifty apartments.

Meanwhile, Russian forces continue to launch offensive actions in Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts. Ukrainian forces reported thirty-eight combat engagements against Russian troops near Novoselivske, Novohryhorivka, Berkhivka, Bohdanivka, Bakhmut, Avdiivka, and Marinka. In the direction of Lyman, Russian forces shelled Nevske, Bilohorivka, Torske, Verkhnokamyanske, and Rozdolivka in Donetsk. Russian aviation conducted an airstrike in Bilohorivka. Russia also attacked villages in Zaporizhzhia and Kherson oblasts, including Levadne, Olhivske, Malynivka, Huliaipole, and Bilohirka. On July 6, Russian troops shelled Chervonohryhorivka and Nikopol, damaging civilian infrastructure.

On July 5, reports from Russian military bloggers suggested that Ukrainian forces had advanced southwest of Berkhivka, west of Yahidne, and southwest of Bakhmut. The Ukrainian army said it conducted offensive operations south and north of Bakhmut and is moving on Bakhmut’s southern flank. The Russian Ministry of Defense claimed that the Ukrainian army conducted offensive operations near Lyman, Bakhmut, along the Avdiivka front, on the border between Zaporizhzhia and Donetsk, and in western Zaporizhzhia.

The Ukrainian army appears to have launched a coordinated attack on Russian army logistical and communications hubs. On July 4, Ukrainian forces reportedly struck an ammunition depot in occupied Makiivka, Donetsk. Russian sources claimed without evidence that Ukraine had struck a hospital. Former Russian army commander Igor Strelkov, also known as Igor Girkin, said the attack demonstrates how Ukraine regularly launches missile strikes against Russian rear targets. Other unconfirmed reports from July 5 indicate Ukraine may have struck Russian positions near Debaltseve. Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces hit Russian positions near Yakymivka in the Melitopol area and attempted to strike Berdyansk in the Zaporizhzhia region.

—Ruslan Trad, resident fellow for security research, Sofia, Bulgaria

New narrative accuses US and Ukraine of planning false flag attack on Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant

Ahead of next week’s NATO Summit in Vilnius, Lithuania, allegations that the United States and Ukraine will launch a false flag operation on the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant are spreading on various platforms, including Twitter, 4chan, and Instagram. The allegations seemingly aim to create panic and, in the event of a future attack on the plant, establish a narrative the West and Ukraine are to blame.

On July 3, a post appeared on 4chan from an anonymous user who introduced himself as a US Marine Corps veteran now working for the government in electronic espionage. The user claimed that the Ukrainian and US governments are working together to bomb the Zaporizhzhia power plant. According to the conspiracy theory, after the false flag operation, the United States will be able to use “nuclear warheads” against Russia. At the time of writing, the post had been deleted from 4chan. However, similar posts remain on the platform.

Screencap of an anonymous 4chan post claiming the US and Ukraine are planning a false flag attack. (Source: 4chan)

However, the false flag claims did not originate on 4chan. Russian Twitter accounts posted similar claims building the false flag narrative. After the 4chan post, the claim circulated again on Twitter.

A similar narrative was also shared by Renat Karchaa, an adviser to Rosenergoatom, a subsidiary of the Russian state nuclear agency Rosatom. Karchaa claimed on Russian state television channel Russia-24 that on the night of July 5, the Ukrainian army would attempt an attack on the Zaporizhzhia plant. Without evidence, he accused the United States and the West of planning a false flag incident to damage Russia’s reputation. The claims were further amplified by Russian state media outlets.

The allegations escalated on social media after July 4, when Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy repeated Ukraine’s concerns about the status of the nuclear power plant. In an address, Zelenskyy restated that Russia plans to attack the plant and that Russian troops have placed explosive-like objects on the building’s roof. In June, Ukrainian military intelligence made similar claims when it reported that the plant’s cooling pond had been mined by Russian troops.

On July 5, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) said that it was aware of reports that mines and other explosives had been placed around the plant. The IAEA said their experts inspected parts of the facility and did not observe any visible indications of mines or explosives. IAEA Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi added, “The IAEA experts requested additional access that is necessary to confirm the absence of mines or explosives at the site.” On July 7, the IAEA announced that Russia had granted its experts further access, “without – so far – observing any visible indications of mines or explosives.”

—Sayyara Mammadova, research assistant, Warsaw, Poland

Former employees share details about Prigozhin’s media group and troll farms

Several independent Russian media outlets published stories this week interviewing former employees of Yevgeny Prigozhin’s Patriot Media Group, which dissolved on June 30.

In a video published on Telegram, Yevgeny Zubarev, director of Patriot Media Group’s RIA FAN, said the goal was to “work against the opposition, such as Alexei Navalny and others who wanted to destroy our country.” Zubarev confirmed key details previously reported by independent Russian journalists at Novaya Gazeta in 2013 and the now-Kremlin-controlled RBC in 2017 about the existence of paid commentators and the creation of Prigozhin-affiliated media outlets. Zubarev added that, after Russian President Vladimir Putin’s 2018 re-election, the group hired “foreign affairs observers.” The timing corresponds with attempts by Prigozhin’s Internet Research Agency to meddle in the 2020 US presidential election.

Further, independent Russian media outlets Sever.Realii, Bumaga, and Novaya Gazeta interviewed former employees of Prigozhin’s media group. Speaking on the condition of anonymity, the former employees confirmed that Prigozhin’s “troll factory” and “media factory” conducted coordinated information attacks on opposition leaders, published fabricated or purchased news “exclusives,” praised Putin, and deliberately ignored particular individuals who criticized Wagner Group. Bumaga and Sever.Realii described a smear campaign against Saint Petersburg Governor Alexander Beglov. In 2019, Prigozhin’s media group supported and promoted Beglov, but in 2021, Prigozhin reportedly launched a smear campaign, as Beglov allegedly prevented him from developing a waste collection business in the city. Novaya Gazeta’s report also provided evidence that Prigozhin’s troll farm activities extended beyond Russia, with employees portraying skinheads and fascists in the Baltic region, specifically in Lithuania.

In recent years, additional revelations about Prigozhin’s media group have come to light. For example, Bumaga reported that prospective hires had to pass a “lie detector test” in which “security service specialists” asked candidates about their attitudes toward the opposition and Alexei Navalny in particular. Once hired, employees were closely surveilled. One former employee Bumaga interviewed characterized the atmosphere as being in a “closed military company.” Both Bumaga and Novaya Gazeta’s interviewees said that most of the employees did not believe in the mission. In one example, an employee left after refusing to launch a smear campaign against Ivan Golunov, a journalist at the independent news outlet Meduza who was detained in 2019 under false pretenses. Bumaga, citing an unnamed former employee, also reported that at one point an employee had hacked the system, erased a database, and fled to Poland. The same interviewee claimed they employed two Telegram administrators who also administered pro-Ukraine channels.

—Nika Aleksejeva, resident fellow, Riga, Latvia

Kremlin-owned RT offers jobs to former employees of Prigozhin’s troll factory

RT Editor-in-Chief Margarita Simonyan offered to hire employees of Yevgeny Prigozhin’s Patriot Media Group, which reportedly housed his troll factories. In the latest episode of the program Keosayan Daily, Simonyan praised the work of “Wagner’s media empire.” She said their work “was super professional” and that anyone left without a job can join “them,” referring to Russian propaganda outlets. She added, “We know you as professional colleagues of ours.”

The fate of Patriot’s former employees is being actively discussed in Russia. According to Russian outlet Novie Izverstia, Pavel Gusev, editor-in-chief of the pro-Kremlin outlet MK.ru, volunteered to help find jobs for former employees of Patriot. In addition, the chairman of the Saint Petersburg branch of the Union of Journalists of Russia stated that the union would contact the heads of media outlets to help find opportunities for dismissed employees and would provide additional informational support.

—Eto Buziashvili, research associate, Tbilisi, Georgia

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Putin’s nuclear threats will escalate as Ukraine’s counteroffensive unfolds

Diane Francis — Thu, 22 Jun 2023 00:15:34 +0000

Ukraine’s counteroffensive is still in its early stages but concerns are already mounting that Russia may eventually resort to desperate measures in order to stave off defeat. At present, fears are focused primarily on Vladimir Putin’s nuclear saber-rattling, which is expected to escalate as the counteroffensive unfolds.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has recently warned that Moscow may intend to blow up the Russian-occupied Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant in southern Ukraine. Meanwhile, US President Joe Biden acknowledged on June 19 that the threat of Putin using nuclear weapons is “real.” Days later, Ukrainian military intelligence chief Kyrylo Budanov accused Russia of mining the cooling pond used to control temperatures at the Zaporizhzhia plant’s reactors. Clearly, an occupied nuclear plant that is blown up becomes a nuclear weapon.

Preventing this from happening should be an international priority. The fallout from a detonation at the plant would spread across many countries in a matter of hours. In addition to Ukraine itself, Belarus, Moldova, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Poland, Romania, Serbia, Hungary, Slovakia, the Czech Republic, and Russia would all be at serious risk, according to analysis by Ukraine’s Hydrometerological Institute.

Russia has occupied Ukraine’s Zaporizhzhia plant since the first weeks of the invasion. Last summer, the Kremlin allowed the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to monitor its operational safety remotely. But in April 2023, IAEA officials began warning of growing risks and calling for additional measures to protect the plant. With Ukraine’s long-awaited counteroffensive now underway, alarm is mounting.

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Zelenskyy’s claims that the Kremlin is planning to orchestrate a nuclear disaster in Ukraine are not at all far-fetched, given how Putin’s forces have been purposely laying waste to the country for the past sixteen months. The invading Russian army has planted landmines across an area the size of Switzerland, displaced more than ten million people, and destroyed dozens of Ukrainian towns and cities. Countless residential apartment buildings, schools, and hospitals have been reduced to ruins. A comprehensive and methodical nationwide bombing campaign has targeted the country’s civilian infrastructure.

In recent weeks, Russia is suspected of having blown up the Khakovka dam in southern Ukraine, causing an ecological catastrophe. However, even this unprecedented act of ecocide failed to stop Ukraine’s counteroffensive. With Russia’s military predicament expected to become increasingly grim in the weeks and months ahead, the likelihood of further extreme measures will grow. “They constantly need destabilization here. They want the world to put pressure on Ukraine to stop the war,” commented Zelenskyy.

Putin has been making nuclear threats since the very first days of Russia’s full-scale invasion. During the initial stages of the war, he very publicly placed his nuclear forces on high alert. With the invasion in danger of unravelling in September 2022, he again hinted at a possible nuclear response while warning, “I’m not bluffing.”

Not everyone is convinced. Former Russian diplomat Boris Bondarev, who resigned after last year’s invasion, told Newsweek in early 2023: “today [Putin is] bluffing and we know that he has bluffed about nuclear threats. Ukrainians recovered some parts of their territory, and there was no nuclear retaliation. If you’re afraid of Putin using nukes, then you already lose the war against him and he wins.”

Others warn against possible complacency. The recent destruction of Kakhovka dam has caused many observers to reassess their earlier skepticism over Russia’s readiness to go nuclear in Ukraine. Putin has also crossed another red line by vowing to place nukes in Belarus. The Russian dictator is currently holding all Europeans hostage with the threat of a deadly explosion at the continent’s largest nuclear plant, and is moving nuclear weapons closer to the heart of Europe.

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The world must heed Ukraine’s warnings before it is too late. Zelenskyy first raised the alarm about the Kakhovka dam in October 2022 but the international community failed to react. Since the destruction of the dam, the relatively weak and ineffective international response has fuelled fears that Russia will read this as a green light to go further.

For now, most international attention appears to be focused on Putin’s placement of nukes in Belarus. “I absolutely believe that moving weapons to Belarus demands an unequivocal response from NATO,” Polish President Andrzej Duda said recently before meeting with French President Emmanuel Macron and German Chancellor Olaf Scholz. Significantly, Russia’s decision to deploy nukes to Belarus even drew a critical response from Chinese officials, who renewed calls for de-escalation and reminded Russia that its leaders had reaffirmed their opposition to nuclear war at their March 2023 summit with China in Moscow.

Ultimately, there is no way of knowing whether Russia’s nuclear threats are genuine or not, but Western leaders cannot afford to let Putin’s nuclear blackmail tactics succeed. If the Russian dictator’s nuclear saber-rattling enables him to rescue the faltering invasion of Ukraine, he will do it again and others will follow. To prevent this nightmare scenario, the West must respond forcefully by escalating support for Ukraine militarily, diplomatically, and economically. The only sensible answer to Russia’s reckless nuclear intimidation is a heightened international commitment to Ukrainian victory.

In parallel to increased support for Ukraine, international watchdogs must be dispatched to monitor the situation at the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant and other Ukrainian infrastructure sites that Russia could potentially target. Strong pressure must also be placed on China and India to condemn Russia’s nuclear threats. The invasion of Ukraine has already transformed the international security climate; Putin must not be allowed to normalize nuclear blackmail.

Diane Francis is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center, editor-at-large with the National Post in Canada, author of ten books, and author of a newsletter on America.

There are additional concerns over a potential nuclear disaster as the reservoir behind the collapsed dam supplies the cooling water for the nearby Zaporizhia Nuclear Power Plant, the largest in Europe. Floodwaters are also thought to have dislodged significant numbers of mines, creating further potential for civilian casualties.

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While the Kremlin has denied blowing up the dam and has instead accused Ukraine, initial analysis strongly suggests Russian responsibility. A New York Times article citing engineering and munitions experts concluded that a “deliberate explosion” inside the Russian-controlled dam “most likely caused it to collapse.” Only Russian forces could have carried out such an explosion.

Many have also questioned the credibility of Moscow’s counterclaims suggesting the dam was destroyed by Ukrainian missile or artillery fire. Independent experts have confirmed that the Cold War era dam, which was built to withstand a nuclear attack, would be extremely difficult to destroy via external bombardment, according to The Times.

Russia also has a clear military motive and a long record of attacks on Ukraine’s civilian infrastructure. At the time of the dam collapse, Russian forces were preparing to face a long anticipated Ukrainian summer counteroffensive. The widespread flooding produced by the disaster effectively ruled out the possibility of Ukrainian troops attempting a river crossing along an entire section of the 1000-kilometer front. Meanwhile, Russia spent much of the winter and spring seasons conducting a methodical nationwide bombing campaign designed to destroy Ukraine’s energy infrastructure and freeze the country into submission. While the destruction of a major dam would mark an escalation in this campaign, it would clearly not be unprecedented.

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Despite the likelihood that Russia is responsible for the dam collapse, in legal terms it is still too early to hold anyone directly accountable. First, there would need to be incontrovertible proof that this was actually an attack rather than some kind of horrible accident, miscommunication, or mistake made amid the “fog of war.” Then, the issue of attribution would have to be dealt with. This means that Russia’s responsibility for the attack would need to proven beyond doubt.

If it can be established that Russia intentionally carried out an attack on the dam, there are many potential pathways to justice. For example, Ukraine could pursue accountability through its own domestic courts; international actors could establish a regional tribunal; the International Criminal Court could investigate and potentially indict a responsible individual; or countries could choose to exercise universal jurisdiction in order to prosecute Russia for its actions.

Unfortunately, there are many obstacles to overcome in pursuing accountability through these mechanisms. History has shown that the wheels of justice are excruciatingly slow in international war crimes cases. Prosecutors and Ukrainians alike would have to show extraordinary patience in waiting for these approaches to pay dividends. It would also be difficult to prove who ordered the attack and get that person in the dock, barring unlikely regime change within Russia itself. These are neither fair nor easy circumstances for Ukrainians to accept in the face of such trauma.

Furthermore, there are still huge information gaps. There would need to be a committed fact-finding effort, starting in the immediate present, to fill these gaps for a case that might not be prosecuted for many years or even decades. Ukrainians have shown an unprecedented ability to document abuses in real time throughout the current war. The onus would be on them to identify the individual Russian units and commanders responsible for blowing up the dam.

The challenges are even greater if Ukraine or the international community wants to pursue specific accountability for ecocide. Although there has been a lot of momentum in this direction, ecocide is not yet codified as a crime under international law (although it is under Ukrainian law). Even if this were to be accomplished in the near future and ecocide came to fall under the Rome Statute that established the ICC, there would still be enough ambiguity and lack of legal precedent to potentially deter prosecutors from pursuing the charge of ecocide in the Kakhovka dam case. There would also need to be an extensive investigation, which would not be easy given bureaucratic and financial barriers along with the fact that many affected areas remain under Russian control or are heavily mined.

In light of these obstacles, what can be done in the short-term to help hold Russia accountable for the destruction of the Kakhovka dam and its devastating consequences? First, the international community needs to broaden its view of what might constitute justice beyond the courtroom. This means listening to and supporting local civil society in Ukraine. It also means investing in Ukraine not only in the short-term, but in sustainable ways that bolster the country’s longer-term recovery and reconstruction, quite possibly by using frozen Russian assets to finance it. This requires helping the Ukrainian authorities combat corruption and build the capacity of the country’s own judicial system to pursue accountability.

In the pursuit of justice for Ukraine, the most meaningful steps are those that ensure Russia’s decisive defeat. Accountability will be much more difficult to achieve if the conflict becomes protracted or frozen. In such circumstances, it is highly unlikely that anyone will ever face prosecution over the destruction of Kakhovka dam. Ultimately, the only way to achieve a just and durable peace is through Ukrainian victory.

Danielle Johnson holds a PhD in Politics from Oxford University and is currently a Senior Ukraine Analyst at ACAPS.

Since then, Russia has repeatedly struck the transmission lines that power the plant’s cooling systems, necessitating the use of back-up generators to keep the cooling system operational. Despite regular alarms over the close proximity of combat operations and the deployment of Russian troops at the plant, the risk of a nuclear disaster has been seen as present but never pressing due to numerous residual safety features. For example, the plant can run on its own power for short periods of time if power grid access and generators simultaneously fail. So far, this hasn’t happened.

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The Kakhovka dam collapse has now increased the risk of disaster. In addition to electricity, the plant needs large quantities of water to run its cooling system. The plant was built in the 1980s, decades after the Kakhovka dam was constructed, and features a design that relies on reservoir water for its cooling system. And although the plant’s six reactors have been turned off for more than eight months to reduce the likelihood of wartime nuclear accidents, it will still be a decade before the reactor fuel rods are cool enough to be moved into dry storage.

Water levels in the reservoir have plummeted since the blast on Tuesday morning. At this stage, nobody can say with any certainty how far the water levels will eventually drop before leveling out. The IAEA commented on June 7 that if water levels fall below 12.7 meters, the lowest level at which water can be pumped upstream to the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant, there are alternative options that can be used to source cooling system water. One day later, this point was reportedly reached. With the Kakhovka dam beyond repair and no clear way to stop it hemorrhaging water from the reservoir, it seems likely that external water sources will be necessary.

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At present, IAEA officials say there is “no immediate risk” to the plant, while officials from Ukraine’s nuclear operator Energoatom have stated that water supplies stored close to the facility are sufficient for the next few months. However, others have noted that summer heat could speed evaporation and exhaust existing reserves far sooner.

The destruction of Kakhovka dam is widely viewed as the latest and most reckless in a series of attacks on Ukrainian civilian infrastructure carried out by Russia since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine began almost sixteen months ago. While Moscow has officially denied destroying the dam, initial analysis points to Russian responsibility. A New York Times article citing engineering and munitions experts concluded that a “deliberate explosion” inside the Russian-controlled dam “most likely caused its collapse.” Meanwhile, independent experts have confirmed that the Cold War era dam, which was built to withstand a nuclear attack, would be extremely difficult to destroy via external bombardment, according to The Times.

In addition to the heightened risk to the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant, the destruction of the dam has also unleashed an ecological disaster throughout the region. Tens of thousands of local residents whose homes have been flooded are in urgent need of care and shelter. Significant quantities of oil and chemicals have poured into the Dnipro River and must be contained, along with munitions. These are the most immediate challenges facing the Ukrainian authorities.

The risks posed to Europe’s largest nuclear power plant by the loss of access to reservoir water must also be addressed without delay before the situation becomes critical. Beyond this pressing logistical issue, the blowing up of the Kakhovka dam is also fueling speculation over whether Russia may be prepared to adopt similarly drastic measures at the Zaporizhzhia plant itself. With this in mind, the international community must send a clear message to Moscow that it will be held accountable for any further attempts to intimidate the world with the threat of nuclear disaster.

Suriya Jayanti is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council.

Three questions (and expert answers) about the dam collapse in Ukraine

Atlantic Council experts — Tue, 06 Jun 2023 21:15:26 +0000

It’s set off a cascade of problems.

Early Tuesday, large sections of the Nova Kakhovka dam and hydroelectric power plant in southern Ukraine gave way. Since 1956, the dam has pinched the Dnipro River, creating a massive reservoir upstream as far as Zaporizhzhia and, downstream, a succession of towns and villages along the river terminating in Kherson, all of which could now be flooded.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has accused Russian forces of blowing up the dam–a claim US intelligence reportedly appears to support. The Kremlin, which currently controls the area around the dam, has blamed Ukrainian forces.

Below, Atlantic Council experts answer our most pressing questions about what the damaged dam means for the ongoing war.

1. If Russia is behind the dam collapse, what would it reveal about Russian strategy and tactics at this stage in the war?

That they have no red lines that can’t be crossed and that they have no regard for human lives or ecology. I’m afraid that if the Russians are capable of blowing up such a large piece of critical infrastructure, they’re also capable of striking at the occupied Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant—the consequences of which would be horrific. There is little left in the West’s toolbox to restrain Russia, but a tightening of the noose of sanctions and providing Kyiv with all the fighting kit it is asking for would be a logical starting point.

—Michael Bociurkiw is a Ukraine-based nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

It would reveal nothing new compared with what we have already known about Vladimir Putin’s Russia and its efforts to destroy the Ukrainian state and the Ukrainian people. Putin’s regime has already systematically committed crimes against humanity and pursues a policy of genocide, showing total disregard for human lives. Destruction of the Nova Kakhovka dam appears to be one more piece of evidence of the dark nature of Putin’s regime—a terrible and extremely dangerous act aimed at inflicting maximum suffering on people and maximum damage on the environment. Putin is still trying to escalate and terrorize Ukraine and its partners. It’s long overdue that we deny him this possibility.

—Oleh Shamshur is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center and a former Ukrainian ambassador to the United States.

2. What are the implications for the environment and other parts of Ukraine such as Kherson and Crimea?

Ukrainian officials are already reporting the deaths of zoo animals near the dam. Some eighty settlements are at risk of substantial flooding and countless hectares of land are in the path of floodwaters. What is more, the flooding could trigger another wave of displaced people or asylum seekers. If people in the West feel they won’t be impacted, they should think again and brace themselves for higher food prices and a fresh wave of refugees.

—Michael Bociurkiw

Since last fall, Ukraine has implored the international community to prevent a Russian terrorist attack on the Nova Kakhovka dam. The immeasurable suffering today should be a wakeup call regarding how Ukraine’s critical energy infrastructure must be protected in the future and the importance of trusting Ukraine’s experts on risk assessment and mitigation strategies, in particular regarding nuclear power plants. While there are no evident immediate risks to the Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant, which relies on water from the reservoir for cooling and operations, its continued safety is anything but guaranteed. The international community should be treating Russia’s apparent escalation as a ramp-up for broader genocide and ecocide in Ukraine. Western allies, including multilateral bodies such as the International Atomic Energy Agency, cannot entrust Zaporizhzhia’s safety and that of other massive energy installations to the Russians.

—Olga Khakova is the deputy director for European energy security at the Atlantic Council’s Global Energy Center.

The destruction of Ukraine’s Nova Kakhovka dam will result in short- and long-term environmental, humanitarian, military, and economic consequences. Given the global impacts, especially for Global South food security, Russia, if it was behind the destruction, has cemented its reputation as one of the world’s largest orchestrators of civilian suffering.

Damage is still unfolding, but there are fears that hundreds of thousands among Ukraine’s already-battered civilian population may be left without their homes, water, electricity, or other access to vital infrastructure in the Kherson region, Crimea, and beyond. Known disaster-related flood risks—like mold-caused health impacts and downed power lines in the water—are exacerbated by reports of Russian troops shelling evacuations, floating mines, and more than a hundred tons of engine oil polluting the Dnipro River.

Europe’s largest steppe, Askania Nova, is endangered, along with the native zebras, buffaloes, and wildebeests that call the steppe their home. Untold ecosystem damage may unfold. Springtime births make animal populations and the ecosystems they support especially vulnerable. In light of the economic damage to Ukraine’s agribusiness and metallurgy industries, which require extensive water supplies, Western governments will need to take decisive action to redirect frozen Russian assets for Ukraine’s recovery. Concerns about the long-term cooling of the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant will rise.

—Kristina Hook is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center specializing in genocide and mass atrocity prevention, emerging technologies, and post-conflict reconstruction.

3. Could the dam destruction constitute a war crime?

As more details are clarified, the legal implications potentially could be vast, with prohibitions of attacks on such facilities inscribed in the Geneva Conventions. Concrete steps on accountability for war crimes are needed, and global humanitarian aid must surge. None of the ecological crimes unfolding over the past sixteen months were inevitable, given Ukraine’s robust environmental management and monitoring prior to 2014. All trace back to Russia’s nearly decade-long war against Ukraine. The ensuing damage to Ukraine and the global economy lies squarely at Russia’s feet.

Given months of Ukrainian and international warnings about the possibility of Russia attacking the dam, global condemnation is not sufficient. Anything less than a tangible response alerts the Kremlin that it can get away with the environmental equivalent of a weapon of mass destruction, encouraging Russia to climb further up an escalation ladder aimed directly at Ukraine’s civilians. This day offers a painful snapshot of Ukrainian life under Russia’s terror: nine months of violent occupation in Kherson, with torture camps, rape, and summary executions, followed by relentless shelling, and now, apparently, flooding—losing everything in a day.

—Kristina Hook

Destruction of the dam absolutely violates the Geneva Conventions and fits the definition of a crime against humanity as described in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. So it should be recognized as such and its perpetrators should be held accountable. We’re seeing a developing humanitarian disaster, primarily due to the massive displacement of the population of flooded areas and a sharp drop in the supply of drinking water. If Russia committed the destruction, it would be one more reason to see Putin and company in The Hague, hopefully in the near future.

—Oleh Shamshur

The post Three questions (and expert answers) about the dam collapse in Ukraine appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The imperative of the Versatile Test Reactor for nuclear innovation

Jackie Toth, Khalil Ryan — Mon, 24 Apr 2023 15:21:32 +0000

In 2018, Congress passed legislation with bipartisan support to investigate the need for a domestic fast neutron irradiation testing capability, based on the argument that the existing test reactors in the United States would be insufficient to meet new demand for materials and fuels testing from the next generation of advanced reactors. However, in 2021, Congress zeroed out the budget for the Versatile Test Reactor (VTR), leaving the United States without plans to build a domestic advanced test reactor.

In this report, “The Imperative of the Versatile Test Reactor for Nuclear Innovation,” authors Jackie Toth and Khalil Ryan argue that the United States will lose its competitive edge against adversaries (especially Russia) if it lacks a fully realized nuclear energy innovation ecosystem, of which the VTR is a crucial component.

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Nuclear Energy Policy Initiative

The Atlantic Council’s dedicated home for the exploration of nuclear energy’s future.

AUTHORS

Jackie Toth is deputy director of Good Energy Collective, a research organization making the progressive case for nuclear energy to contribute toward a climate-constrained, equitable energy future. A former journalist, from 2015-2019 Jackie reported on federal energy and environmental law and regulations for CQ Roll Call and Morning Consult. Afterward, she led public opinion research and developed policy and communications strategies on nuclear energy and other technologies for the Climate and Energy Program at Third Way, a D.C.-based think tank. Jackie holds a B.A. in international studies and a minor in linguistics from American University.

Khalil Ryan is a policy analyst with the Good Energy Collective, focusing on a project concerning nuclear diplomacy to aid in the gradual decarbonization of global energy sources. Khalil’s main area of work is introducing civil nuclear energy to nations seeking to move away from the traditional carbon-based energy infrastructure through partnerships with the United States civil nuclear export regime. Besides his main focus of work, Khalil is also working on several short papers concerning the global fuel supply chain and the current leading global nuclear export regimes.

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Nesheiwat in Real Clear Energy: Twelve years after Fukushima, more US nuclear energy is a national security imperative

mzandi — Sun, 12 Mar 2023 18:18:46 +0000

The post Nesheiwat in Real Clear Energy: Twelve years after Fukushima, more US nuclear energy is a national security imperative appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Warrick on the Lawfare Podcast

Atlantic Council — Fri, 27 Jan 2023 20:05:07 +0000

Nonresident Senior Fellow, Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative

On January 19, Forward Defense Nonresident Senior Fellow Tom Warrick appeared on a panel in the Lawfare Podcast to discuss the history and effectiveness of the Department of Homeland Security’s Fusion Centers.

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Thomas S. Warrick

Forward Defense Rafik Hariri Center & Middle East programs

National Security Terrorism

Forward Defense, housed within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, generates ideas and connects stakeholders in the defense ecosystem to promote an enduring military advantage for the United States, its allies, and partners. Our work identifies the defense strategies, capabilities, and resources the United States needs to deter and, if necessary, prevail in future conflict.

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Dispatch from Abu Dhabi: How to reduce carbon emissions without blocking progress

Frederick Kempe — Sat, 14 Jan 2023 18:01:29 +0000

This article was updated on January 16 to reflect the fact that the Abu Dhabi National Oil Company and Masdar, where Sultan Al Jaber serves as CEO and chairman, respectively, are sponsors of the Atlantic Council’s Global Energy Forum.

If the world gets lucky, this could be the year fossil fuel producers and climate activists bury their hatchets and join hands to reduce emissions and ensure our planet’s future.

If that sounds hopelessly utopian, take that up with the leaders of this resource-rich, renewables-generating Middle Eastern monarchy. The United Arab Emirates is determined to inject specificity, urgency, and pragmatism into a process that often has lacked all three: the twenty-eighth convening of the United Nations Climate Change Conference, known as COP28, from November 30 to December 12.

To kick off 2023, the oil and gas and climate communities gathered this weekend for the Atlantic Council Global Energy Forum, launching the annual Abu Dhabi Sustainability Week. After decades of mutual mistrust, there is a growing recognition that they can’t live without each other.

Thank Russian President Vladimir Putin’s criminal war in Ukraine, and his ongoing weaponization of energy, for injecting a new dose of hard-headed reality into climate conversations. It’s seldom been so clear that energy security and cleaner energy are indivisible. The guiding principle is “the energy sustainability trilemma,” defined as the need to balance energy reliability, affordability, and sustainability.

What’s contributing to this new pragmatism is a recognition by much of the climate community that the energy transition to renewables can’t be achieved without fossil fuels, so they must be made cleaner. They have come to accept that natural gas, in particular liquified natural gas (LNG), with half the emissions footprint of coal, provides a powerful bridging fuel.

Once derided by green activists, nuclear power is also winning over new fans—particularly when it comes to the small, modular plants where there are fewer concerns over safety and weapons proliferation.

For their part, almost all major oil and gas producers, who once viewed climate activists with disdain, now embrace the reality of climate science and are investing billions of dollars in renewables and efforts to make their fossil fuels cleaner.

“Every serious hydrocarbon producer knows the future, in a world of declining use of fossil fuels, is to be low cost, low risk, and low carbon,” said David Goldwyn, the former State Department special envoy for energy. “The only way to ensure we do this is to have industry at the table.”

Nowhere is this shift among climate activists more evident than in Germany, where Vice Chancellor Robert Habeck, the Green Party leader, is serving as the pragmatist-in-chief.

Habeck, who serves as federal minister for economic affairs and climate action, has been the driving force behind extending the life of the country’s three nuclear plants through April and in launching Germany’s first LNG import terminal in December, with as many as five more to follow.

“I am ultimately responsible for the security of the German energy system,” Habeck told Financial Times reporter Guy Chazan in a sweeping profile of the German politician. “So, the buck stops with me. … I became minister to make tough decisions, not to be Germany’s most popular politician.”

Some climate activists were aghast this Thursday when the UAE named Sultan Al Jaber, the CEO of the Abu Dhabi National Oil Company (ADNOC), as president of this year’s COP28.

“This appointment goes beyond putting the fox in charge of the henhouse,” said Teresa Anderson of ActionAid, a development charity. “Like last year’s summit, we’re increasingly seeing fossil fuel interests taking control of the process and shaping it to meet their own needs.”

What that overlooks is that Al Jaber’s rich background in both renewables and fossil fuels makes him an ideal choice at a time when efforts to address climate change have been far too slow, lacking the inclusivity to produce more transformative results.

Full disclosure: Al Jaber’s companies ADNOC and the clean-energy innovator Masdar (where he was founding CEO in 2005 and is now chairman) are sponsors of the annual Atlantic Council Global Energy Forum in Abu Dhabi, a fact that has given me a close-up look at his years-long commitment to reducing emissions and promoting renewables.

Al Jaber also represents a country that despite its resource riches has become a major nuclear power producer, was the first Middle East country to join the Paris Climate Agreement, and was the first Middle East country to set out a roadmap to net-zero emissions by 2050.

Over the past fifteen years, the UAE has invested forty billion dollars in renewable energy and clean tech globally. In November it signed a partnership with the United States to invest an additional one hundred billion dollars in clean energy. Some 70 percent of the UAE economy is generated outside the oil and gas sector, making it an exception among major producing countries in its diversification.

Sheikh Mohamed bin Zayed al Nahyan, president of the United Arab Emirates, has explained his country’s approach this way: “There will be a time, fifty years from now, when we load the last barrel of oil aboard the ship. The question is… are we going to feel sad? If our investment today is right, I think—dear brothers and sisters—we will celebrate that moment.”

Al Jaber, speaking to the Global Energy Forum, captured his ambition to drive faster and more transformative results at COP28.

“We are way off track,” said Al Jaber.

“The world is playing catch-up when it comes to the key Paris goal of holding global temperatures down to 1.5 degrees,” he said. “And the hard reality is that in order to achieve this goal, global emissions must fall 43 percent by 2030. To add to that challenge, we must decrease emissions at a time of continued economic uncertainty, heightened geopolitical tensions, and increasing pressure on energy.”

He called for “transformational progress… through game-changing partnerships, solutions, and outcomes.” He said the world must triple renewable energy generation from eight terawatt hours to twenty-three and more than double low-carbon hydrogen production to 180 million tons for industrial sectors, which have the hardest carbon footprint to abate.

“We will work with the energy industry on accelerating the decarbonization, reducing methane, and expanding hydrogen,” said Al Jaber. “Let’s keep our focus on holding back emissions, not progress.”

If that sounds utopian, let’s have more of it.

This article originally appeared on CNBC.com.

Frederick Kempe is president and chief executive officer of the Atlantic Council. You can follow him on Twitter @FredKempe.

THE WEEK’S TOP READS

#1 A new world energy order is taking shape
Rana Foroohar | FINANCIAL TIMES

In this smart piece, the FT’s Rana Foroohar warns of a China-led energy order and how that could shift the global balance of power.

“What does that mean in practice?” Foroohar asks. “For starters, a lot more oil trade will be done in renminbi. [Chinese leader] Xi [Jinping] announced that, over the next three to five years, China would not only dramatically increase imports from [Gulf] countries, but work towards all-dimensional energy co-operation.”

“This could potentially involve joint exploration and production in places such as the South China Sea, as well as investments in refineries, chemicals, and plastics. Beijing’s hope is that all of it will be paid for in renminbi, on the Shanghai Petroleum and Natural Gas Exchange, as early as 2025.”

This is something any serious thinker on energy should bear in mind. Read more →

#2 Ships going dark: Russia’s grain smuggling in the Black Sea
ECONOMIST

In this thought-provoking narrative, the Economist highlights the growing economic potential of the North Sea, particularly as a producer of wind power.

While the Economist acknowledges significant hurdles, from the vagaries of weather to the threat of cheaper competition in Southern Europe, it also writes that if “these problems can be overcome, the new North Sea economy’s impact on the continent will be momentous.

“As Europe’s economic epicentre moves north, so will its political one, predicts Frank Peter of Agora Energiewende, a German think-tank. Coastal Bremen, one of Germany’s poorest states, could gain clout at the expense of rich but landlocked Bavaria. At the European level, France and Germany, whose industrial might underpinned the European Coal and Steel Community, the EU’s forebear, may lose some influence to a new bloc led by Denmark, the Netherlands and, outside the EU, Britain and Norway.” Read more →

#3 Time is not on Ukraine’s side
Condoleezza Rice and Robert Gates | WASHINGTON POST

Former Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, two of the most perceptive international strategists out there, deliver a compelling argument for how President Joe Biden’s administration should do more for Ukraine now.

The only way to avoid Russian domination of Ukraine, they write, “is for the United States and its allies to urgently provide Ukraine with a dramatic increase in military supplies and capability — sufficient to deter a renewed Russian offensive and to enable Ukraine to push back Russian forces in the east and south. Congress has provided enough money to pay for such reinforcement; what is needed now are decisions by the United States and its allies to provide the Ukrainians the additional military equipment they need — above all, mobile armor.”

“Because there are serious logistical challenges associated with sending American Abrams heavy tanks, Germany and other allies should fill this need,” they write. “NATO members also should provide the Ukrainians with longer-range missiles, advanced drones, significant ammunition stocks (including artillery shells), more reconnaissance and surveillance capability, and other equipment. These capabilities are needed in weeks, not months.”

One hopes Biden is reading. Read more →

#4 Robert Habeck was Germany’s most popular politician. Then he took office
Guy Chazan | FINANCIAL TIMEs

Don’t miss Guy Chazan’s brilliant, sweeping profile of German Vice Chancellor Robert Habeck, who oversees his country’s energy and economic policies, and his struggle as a Green politician to diversify resources away from Russia.

“As the energy crisis continued, traits that distinguished Habeck from other politicians came to the fore,” Chazan writes, reporting on Habeck’s willingness to make tough decisions. “On the day of the invasion last February, amid rounds of emergency meetings, he found time to visit Andrij Melnyk, Ukraine’s ambassador to Berlin. ‘That was the most important meeting I had since the war began,’ Melnyk told Der Spiegel, ‘because he offered real human sympathy.’ Habeck also spoke openly about the uncertainties the government faced.”

Read this for a profile of the type of leader who, understanding the importance of compromise and pragmatism, will be vital in making the energy transition a success. Read more →

#5 American Democracy is Still In Danger
Erin Baggot Carter, Brett L. Carter, and Larry Diamond | FOREIGN AFFAIRS

This week’s must-read is a clarion call on the importance of US democracy and the dangers it faces, from Erin Baggot Carter, Brett L. Carter, and Larry Diamond.

“The health of American democracy,” they write, “is both a domestic and a national security concern. China and Russia—the United States’ principal authoritarian adversaries—have been using (and exacerbating) America’s democratic divisions and travails to gain advantage in the competition for global leadership. To regain the advantage, the United States must both repair its own democracy and reinvigorate its voice for democracy in the global arena. Democracy must go on the offensive.”

To do this, they argue, “Washington must rejoin the battle for global soft power, in a manner that reflects American values. It must transmit the truth, and in ways that engage and persuade global audiences. The goal must be not only to counter disinformation persuasively with the truth but to promote democratic values, ideas, and movements. In order to counter disinformation and report the truth that autocracies suppress, multiple credible streams of information are needed. Furthermore, they must be independent; while the US government may provide material support, these outlets must operate free of editorial control. That way, they will be seen to be independent because they are.” Read more →

Atlantic Council top reads

Global Energy Forum Jan 14, 2023

COP28 president-designate: With the world ‘way off track’ on Paris goals, ‘transformational progress’ is needed

By Daniel Malloy

In his first remarks since being named the incoming president of COP28, Sultan Al Jaber spoke on Saturday morning at the Atlantic Council’s Global Energy Forum in Abu Dhabi.

Climate Change & Climate Action Energy & Environment

Fast Thinking Jan 9, 2023

How Brazil can respond to its democracy stress test

By Atlantic Council

Now that authorities have cleared the protests and launched an investigation into security failures, our experts break down what’s to come.

Brazil Democratic Transitions

New Atlanticist Jan 13, 2023

Russian War Report: Russian hacker wanted by the FBI reportedly wins Wagner hackathon prize

By Digital Forensic Research Lab

In December 2022, Wagner Group organized a hackathon that was won by a man wanted by the FBI for his connection to computer malware.

Conflict Cybersecurity

The post Dispatch from Abu Dhabi: How to reduce carbon emissions without blocking progress appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Nuclear energy in a low-carbon future: Implications for the United States and Japan

Stephen S. Greene — Mon, 28 Nov 2022 18:28:02 +0000

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Nuclear power has received renewed global interest as a secure source of carbon-free energy. In the context of worsening climate change and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and resultant energy market constrictions, many countries are actively pursuing conventional and advanced nuclear development, while others are canceling or postponing scheduled shutdowns. As climate change continues to impact both energy supply and demand, nuclear energy is poised to play a major role in the reliability of the future clean energy mix.

Challenges to nuclear rollout will require solutions. Construction timelines remain extended, as do licensing processes. Social constraints also hinder development prospects. These potential stumbling blocks require steadfast coordination between allies like the United States and Japan, especially as other nuclear energy heavyweights like Russia and China avoid many of those same bottlenecks in their pursuit of domestic buildout and export.

Despite those issues, though, nuclear energy is forecasted to play a major role in the later stages of the energy transition, in which countries look to decarbonize the more difficult parts of their economies. The advent of advanced technologies and the completion of large-scale projects portends the arrival of nuclear energy’s reliability and versatility just as the global energy sector needs it.

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Energy & Environment

EnergySource Oct 12, 2022

Nuclear energy and global energy security in the new tripolar world order

By Robert F. Ichord, Jr.

China Energy & Environment

EnergySource Aug 31, 2022

Closing nuclear generation amounts to running in place on climate

By Stephen S. Greene

Retiring nuclear plants is the wrong climate move. It jeopardizes energy security, makes grids less reliable, and forces clean energy that could be better used displacing fossil fuel generation to make up for the shortfall.

Energy & Environment Energy Transitions

EnergySource Aug 10, 2022

The Inflation Reduction Act reinforces nuclear energy’s role as a climate solution

By Stephen S. Greene

The IRA provides much-needed support to the US nuclear energy sector. Its provisions will allow the continued operation of existing reactors along with the development of next-generation projects.

Energy & Environment Nuclear Energy

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The post Nuclear energy in a low-carbon future: Implications for the United States and Japan appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Europe must make this the last winter of weaponized Russian energy exports

Arseniy Yatsenyuk — Tue, 25 Oct 2022 20:54:29 +0000

Ukrainians are currently preparing for what is likely to be the most difficult winter in the country’s modern history. With Russia losing on the battlefield, the Kremlin has resorted to the tactics of total war and is attempting to destroy Ukraine’s civilian energy infrastructure. Tens of millions face the prospect of prolonged blackouts along with potentially deadly disruption to essential water and heating services.

This is the latest and most extreme escalation in Vladimir Putin’s long-running energy war against the West. For years, the Russian dictator has used energy as a weapon in his efforts to subjugate Ukraine and divide Europe. He now hopes to freeze Ukrainians into submission while also using supply cuts to pressure European leaders into abandoning their support for Ukraine.

The coming months will determine the outcome of Putin’s energy aggression. If he succeeds in his objectives, Ukraine will face the horrors of prolonged Russian occupation while the Kremlin will gain unprecedented political and economic influence over Europe that could last for decades to come. Alternatively, if Russia suffers a decisive defeat, the threat from Moscow will rapidly recede and Europe will be greatly strengthened. Winning the energy war will set the stage for future European security and prosperity.

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Europe’s reliance on Russian energy resources predates Putin and can be traced all the way back to the height of the Cold War. In 1972, Soviet deliveries accounted for around 4% of European gas consumption. By 2021, Russia was providing almost 40% of Europe’s gas. As Moscow’s market share has gradually risen, Russia’s ability to manipulate prices and trigger crises has also increased. Most Europeans now acknowledge that this reliance on Russia represents a major strategic blunder. Thankfully, it is not irreversible.

Ukraine’s experience over the past eight years may offer some valuable pointers. In 2014-16, the Ukrainian authorities achieved considerable success in reducing their country’s energy sector reliance on Moscow. By implementing transparent market tariffs and targeted subsidies, Kyiv was able to support the most vulnerable segments of the population. The Ukrainian government also encouraged energy efficiency by introducing discounted rates on limited volumes and offering funding support for efficiency measures. Within two years, Ukraine was able to reduce consumption by 20%.

Ukraine also ended multi-billion dollar corrupt energy sector practices that had long served to enrich Ukrainian oligarchs with ties to the Kremlin. Prior to the 2014 Revolution of Dignity, Ukraine had been one of the biggest importers of Russian gas. By November 2015, direct Russian gas imports to Ukraine had ceased entirely. These steps allowed Ukraine to reduce Russian leverage and partially disarm Putin’s energy weapon. Europe must now look to implement similarly sweeping measures.

First and foremost, Europe must put plans in place for possible energy rationing and mutual assistance to address looming energy supply shortfalls. European leaders need to agree on a united response to the short-term energy challenges facing the continent; all EU members should be ready to help each other via reciprocal cross-flows as necessary.

Strategic measures are also called for in order to tackle structural weaknesses. Europe’s Green Energy Transition features one major flaw: it relies too heavily on Russian gas imports. In order to adapt to the present energy sector realities, industrial de-carbonization requirements should be relaxed for the time being with oil, gas, and coal production reopened. This is already happening in Germany, the Netherlands, and France. Others should follow suit.

Tax incentives should be implemented, especially for the development of deep wells. A similar approach allowed Ukraine to significantly increase domestic gas production in 2015-19. The EU will also have to resume operation, at least temporarily, of coal-fired thermal power plants. Austria and Germany stand ready to do so.

Before the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022, nuclear power stations produced some 55-60% of Ukraine’s electricity. Since 1991, these nuclear plants have operated without incident. The EU needs to recognize that nuclear power is safe, inexpensive, and environmentally friendly. Another key task is the development of renewable energy resources. Here, Germany leads the way with the share of renewable energy in national consumption set to reach 80% before 2030 and with 2% of land resources reserved for solar and wind farms.

Eurasia Center events

Ukraine’s advance in Kursk: What’s next and implications

Conflict Russia Security & Defense Ukraine

In addition to securing alternative sources of gas, Europe must also enhance energy diversification by increasing the continent’s ability to accommodate liquefied gas deliveries. This process is already well underway and now benefits from additional momentum due to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the Kremlin’s increasingly open weaponization of gas exports to the EU.

The construction of LNG terminals in Poland has already made it possible for the country to step away from Russian gas. Two LNG terminals will enter operation in Germany this winter. Meanwhile, Spain has six LNG terminals that provide a maximum capacity far in excess of the country’s domestic needs, with negotiations underway for the construction of a possible pipeline to Germany.

Europe’s top energy priority remains preventing an energy collapse in Ukraine and therefore avoiding a range of negative consequences such as a massive influx of refugees. Ukraine needs urgent European help in order to repair the country’s energy infrastructure following Russian airstrikes. This is just as important as the provision of enhanced air defense capabilities and should take place in parallel. It is also crucial that steps are taken to ensure adequate border crossing capacity to accommodate deliveries of coal that cannot pass through Ukraine’s partially blockaded seaports.

This will be a difficult winter for all Europeans, whether they face blackouts and bombs or heating issues and sky-high energy bills. Putin hopes to weaponize winter and force Europe to surrender, but giving in to the Kremlin would be disastrous for both Ukraine and the EU. Instead, Europe must accept the challenge of overhauling its entire energy system. This is the only way to break the continent’s debilitating dependence on Russian energy and make sure Putin’s energy war ends in decisive defeat.

Arseniy Yatsenyuk is the former Prime Minister of Ukraine (2014-16). He currently serves as Chairman of the Kyiv Security Forum.

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As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

The Russian attacks on Ukraine’s energy infrastructure have exacerbated an already precarious fuel and power situation in the war-torn country. Over the course of September, Russian troops shelled the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (NPP), bombarded areas close to the Ukraine’s Southern NPP, and struck the Zmiivska TPP. Russia launched 14 rockets on September 10 at the Kakhovka hydroelectric power plant, which supplies power to the entire Kakhovka district. Russian forces also attacked the Kharkiv CHPP, Ukraine’s second largest. Other rockets took out multiple high-voltage substations, leaving at least 40 substations without power and several major overhead power lines disconnected.

Ukrainians have responded to these attacks with characteristic resilience. The country’s electrical grid operator, Ukrenergo, reported that repairs would take less than a day or two in most cases. Ukrainian Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal stated that Ukraine does not currently need to import electricity from Europe. Nevertheless, measures have been introduced to address the looming energy crisis. Ukrenergo has imposed emergency brownouts, the Ministry of Energy has banned power exports in order to ensure adequate power to stabilize the Ukrainian grid, and the government has implored citizens to reduce their electricity usage during peak hours.

The Ukrainian response belies the energy insecurity Ukraine finds itself in as winter approaches. DTEK had to increase generation by 16% in September to prevent grid instability and blackouts nationwide because around 45% of Ukraine’s power generation capacity is offline. Only eight of Ukraine’s 15 nuclear reactors are operational, with the seven not running accounting for over 25% of the country’s power generation capacity. None of Zaporizhzhia NPP’s six reactors are online due to Russian shelling in August, and only three of Rivne NPP’s four reactors are currently operational. Ukraine’s renewable energy resources, which accounted for approximately 12% of generation before the invasion, are presently offline in Russian-held territory or frontline regions. At least two hydroelectric plants are also offline.

Ukraine has 14 TPPs that run on coal or natural gas. Eight are owned by the country’s largest private power company DTEK, three are owned by state-owned Centrenego, and the remainder are owned by smaller public or private entities. Only one of Centrenergo’s TPPs, Trypilska, is currently operational. Only six DTEK TPPs were operational before October 10. Two were subsequently damaged by Russian airstrikes.

Eurasia Center events

Ukraine’s advance in Kursk: What’s next and implications

Conflict Russia Security & Defense Ukraine

With so much generation capacity offline, the only reason Ukraine has not suffered a severe grid failure is low demand. Around 20% of Ukrainian territory is still held by Russia, approximately seven million Ukrainians have fled the country, and a huge number of buildings have been reduced to rubble and do not therefore consume electricity. This has collectively reduced power consumption nationwide by about 35%, so the current supply crisis has not yet crippled the grid. However, Russia’s airstrike campaign has further weakened the power sector just as the cold weather is beginning.

The natural gas situation is not much better, with gas serving as Ukraine’s principal fuel for heating. Naftogaz, Ukraine’s state-owned energy giant, says it has just under 14 billion cubic meters (bcm) stored for winter. That is well below the 18-19 bcm needed for a full season of heating, and disastrously short of the 21-22 bcm needed for a particularly cold winter. While the anticipated consumption of gas this winter is down relative to a normal year for the same reasons electricity use is down, gas-fueled municipal heating systems do not allow for individual reductions in use. Municipal heating is citywide and is either on or off, so any consumption decreases are likely to be far less significant than for electricity. Instead of conserving gas now, some parts of Ukraine including Kyiv have already begun the heating season and turned on the furnaces, despite relatively warm weather persisting.

Ukraine urgently needs technical support and financial aid to secure energy sources for the winter. The announced freeze in limited electricity exports to Europe will cost Ukraine $150 million per month, making it harder for Ukraine to repair its systems and continue buying gas to store. President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has asked foreign donors for $55 billion to cover the budget deficit, plus another $17 billion to help with energy infrastructure repairs. Ukrainians will need to do their part by reducing consumption, while the Ukrainian government must delay the heating season, turn off or turn down municipal heating, and conserve energy supplies when they start to run low. New energy efficient technologies will need to be deployed as quickly as possible throughout Ukraine.

If Ukraine’s partners wish to prevent Vladimir Putin from freezing the country into surrender, they must provide the technical support and funding that will allow Ukraine to make it through the winter season. Some help is already forthcoming. The European Investment Bank (EIB) gave Ukraine €550 million (currently $535 million) on October 12 specifically to pay for the repair and rebuilding of Ukraine’s energy infrastructure. These funds will be used to help Ukraine maintain electrical grid stability, restore power service, and fix some of the recent infrastructure damage. But much more is needed to keep Ukrainians warm in their homes as their army continues to liberate Russian-occupied regions of the country.

Suriya Jayanti is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council.

Robert F. Ichord, Jr. — Wed, 12 Oct 2022 13:30:00 +0000

The Russian invasion of sovereign Ukraine, along with Chinese military buildup and threats against Taiwan, seem to portend the emergence of a new tripolar world order and a shifting paradigm from great power competition to great power confrontation. And despite the apparent concerns raised by President Xi in his recent meeting with President Putin in Uzbekistan over the war in Ukraine, the meeting confirmed the continuing alliance of these authoritarian states against the United States and NATO. It is a dangerous time, and concerns have heightened over not only the potential for escalating military conflict, but also over energy security and the vulnerability and high prices of energy supplies.

On May 2, G7 leaders stated their commitment to: (1) “phase out our dependency on Russian energy”; (2) work with partners to “ensure stable and sustainable global energy supplies and affordable prices for consumers”; and (3) accelerate ”reduction of overall reliance on fossil fuels and our transition to clean energy in accordance with our climate objectives.”

These commitments—informed by high global energy prices, the OPEC+ decision to cut oil production, European concerns over tight energy supplies this winter, the broader energy security environment, and ever-present climate concerns—have underpinned renewed interest in the potential for nuclear energy to help meet them. US leadership in nuclear energy development in close cooperation with Western allies will be essential for enhancing global energy security and meeting international nuclear energy market, and related military and economic, competition from Russia and China.

Energy geopolitics and great power relations

Energy is an important facet of an overall assessment of the resources, capabilities, and international influence of these three nuclear powers. The United States is an energy superpower, having turned around its position from a net importer of oil and gas to a net exporter of oil, gas, and coal. Meanwhile, Russia has massive fossil fuel resources; it was the largest exporter of oil, gas, and coal to Europe, accounting in 2021 for 30 percent and 38 percent of Europe’s crude oil and petroleum product imports, 54 percent of its natural gas imports, and 50 percent of its coal imports.

In sharp contrast to the United States and Russia, China in 2021 was the world’s largest importer of oil, liquefied natural gas (LNG), and coal. While Europe is reducing its dependence on Russian oil and gas—with EU gas imports from Russia falling to about 7.5 percent of total in October—and has pursued diversification through measures such as increased LNG imports from the United States, China has increased its imports of Russian oil and gas. Russia was the second-largest supplier of oil to China in 2021, right behind Saudi Arabia. Despite its growing dependence on fossil fuel imports, China has continued its drive to develop renewable energy and is the largest generator of solar and wind power. It is also the largest exporter of renewable technologies, with solar PV exports doubling to $25.9 billion in the first half of 2022 and wind turbine exports jumping $2 billion in 2021 to $7.2 billion. This position and the dependency of countries on China, particularly for solar PV and critical minerals, poses its own energy security concerns.

The role of nuclear energy

Russia and China are strongly committed to nuclear energy and are investing in both new plants and research, development, and demonstration of advanced nuclear systems. Nuclear accounts for about 19 percent of Russia’s electricity generation, and Russia, with its substantial state funding, has been the largest exporter of nuclear reactors to the world market, kicking off major projects in Turkey, India, Bangladesh, China, Iran, Egypt, Belarus, and Hungary. How the economic impact of the war in Ukraine will affect both Russia’s ability to finance and implement these projects as well as the receptivity of countries to future nuclear cooperation with Russia remains to be seen.

Nuclear energy’s contribution to electricity generation is smaller in China at 5 percent of the total, but China has overtaken France as the second-largest nuclear generator in absolute terms and has the most plants under construction – twenty. It has built two new Hualong One HPR-1000 units in Pakistan and is planning to finance similar units in Argentina. Security concerns have led Finland to cancel its VVER-1200 project with Russia, and Poland, Czech Republic, and Romania to exclude Russian and Chinese companies from new nuclear project opportunities, even though the Hungarian Nuclear Energy Regular in August 2022 approved the license for the construction of the two Paks 2 units with Russia.

The United States has remained the world’s largest generator of nuclear energy and, despite closures, has been able to increase slightly its total installed capacity to 95,492 megawatts (MW) at the end of 2021. Nuclear power generation provided a critical 18.6 percent of total US electricity output in 2021 and about 48 percent of carbon-free generation. Recent US federal and state changes in policy and legislation; increased Congressional funding (i.e., $36 billion in nuclear production tax and investment tax credits in the Inflation Reduction and Bipartisan Infrastructure Bills); and greater receptivity to nuclear power have helped keep some plants from closing and ramped up support for the development of new advanced reactors.

Heightened international interest in nuclear power is evident in both large third-generation systems (i.e., the US-made AP-1000; the South Korean APR-1400; the European EPR; the Russian VVER-1200; and the Chinese Hualong One HPR-1000) and in small modular (SMR) and micro nuclear reactors (MNR) for both civilian and military applications. These applications include powering submarines and aircraft carriers, remote bases, mini-grids, directed energy weapons, and space vehicles and outposts.

The United States and western allies, Russia, and China are all engaged in developing SMRs of different types. Russia has deployed two icebreaker-designed KLT-40S on a ship moored at Chukotka in the Arctic and is constructing four floating RITM-200M reactors for an Arctic copper mining complex; China has built the first high temperature gas-cooled reactor (HTGR) and has a small 100-MW ACP-100 SMR under construction at the Changjiang nuclear power plant on the island of Hainan; and the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom are supporting over a dozen major private efforts, often with partners from Japan and South Korea, to demonstrate advanced SMR light water reactors, HTGRs, molten-salt and sodium-cooled systems, and fast breeder designs. Some of these projects will likely be operational by 2030 and companies are looking to domestic and export markets and developing agreements with both other governments (e.g., Romania’s Nuclearelectrica) and foreign industrial partners (e.g., the Poland mining company KGHM Polska Miedź SA) for initial units.

US nuclear energy leadership and nuclear energy technology competition

In this context of the growing tensions and confrontation among the major powers, the race is on to commercialize the new generation of SMRs and MNRs for civilian and military use. After the Arab oil embargo and oil price shocks in the 1970s, there was a drive to build nuclear plants in the United States and other Western countries. With current energy security and climate concerns and the recent OPEC+ decision to cut oil production, there is an urgency for the United States and its allies to usher in a new wave of nuclear power plant construction and to lead in the competition to build and demonstrate the viability of these new nuclear technologies.

A key challenge is to achieve the economies of scale and competitiveness that have been achieved by solar PV and wind over the last decade and attain broad social acceptance. Another is to maintain US and Western leadership in shaping international regulatory frameworks to accommodate and ensure the safety and security of these new technologies. The United States and its European and Asian allies need to progress rapidly beyond research, development, and demonstration efforts into effective manufacturing, financing, and implementation strategies to lead this global effort and successfully confront the emerging competition from China and Russia.

Dr. Robert F. Ichord, Jr. is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council Global Energy Center.

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Arslan joins TRT World to discuss the themes of the Atlantic Council’s Regional Clean Energy Outlook Conference

Grady Wilson — Tue, 11 Oct 2022 20:06:00 +0000

Former Assistant Director

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What to know about fusion

Ameya Hadap — Tue, 04 Oct 2022 15:18:52 +0000

For several decades, fusion has been touted as the paragon of energy. It would provide an essentially unbounded supply of secure, carbon-free power and heat for non-electricity applications, while the lack of long-lived waste and the impossibility of a runaway fusion reaction only add to its value proposition. But though fusion technology has advanced radically since the first lab-based demonstration in 1932, a reaction that produces more energy than it consumes—known as a net energy gain reaction—has remained out of reach.

That could change soon. Over the past several years, fusion has leapt out of the academic domain and into the commercial, with fusion companies pushing towards net energy production, attracting nearly $5 billion in private capital, and prompting the US government to map out a “bold decadal vision” for fusion energy. With more than thirty private fusion businesses making strides towards commercial deployment on a timeline consistent with the demands of the energy transition, the time to get familiar with the industry’s internal variations, multi-sector potential, and policy needs is now.

The fusion technology landscape

Fusion involves the nuclei of two light elements overcoming the forces between them under extreme temperatures and pressures and joining, creating the nucleus of a new, heavier atom and releasing massive amounts of energy in the process. It is the phenomenon that powers the stars. In pursuit of the same self-sustaining energy production, fusion organizations are pursuing exceptionally diverse methods to get there.

The most common approach is magnetic confinement fusion, implemented by several private sector organizations along with major international fusion projects like ITER and the Joint European Torus. In fusion, the fuel takes the form of a superheated plasma, too hot to be in direct contact with any materials. Magnetic confinement fusion solves this problem by suspending the electrically conductive plasma in magnetic fields and steering it around a vacuum chamber. In 2021, Commonwealth Fusion Systems successfully demonstrated its high-temperature superconductor (HTS) magnets, setting the stage for magnetic confinement fusion to be conducted in facilities close in size to an average coal- or gas-fired power plant, rather than the gargantuan compounds in which experiments had previously been run.

The other major approach is inertial confinement fusion. This method involves heating a very small fuel “pellet” using a laser or particle beam to compress the pellet so intensely that a fusion reaction occurs, creating a small explosion and generating energy. Inertial confinement fusion follows the same principles as the fusion reactions that take place when thermonuclear weapons are detonated, but on a much smaller, nondestructive scale. In an inertial confinement fusion power plant, a steady series of these explosions would produce consistent energy output.

The biggest names in the inertial confinement space are state-run research facilities including the US-based National Ignition Facility (NIF) and the French Laser Mégajoule, but those facilities have historically been focused on nuclear weapons research. NIF, however, achieved a major milestone last year by reaching a “burning plasma regime,” in which the fusion reactions generate most of the heat in the system rather than the lasers themselves. Companies like Marvel Fusion, Focused Energy, and Xcimer Energy are vying to build off this progress and bring inertial confinement fusion to market as a reliable energy source.

Most other approaches draw from one or both of these core methods but incorporate key innovations. First Light Fusion, for example, also uses a fuel pellet, but instead of reaching critical temperatures using lasers, it fires a projectile at the pellet at an incredible velocity—with a goal of 20 kilometers per second—causing the pellet to implode and undergo fusion. Helion Energy injects and accelerates two plasmas in field-reversed configurations towards each other until they collide and fusion conditions are reached, with the aim of directly capturing the subsequent energy rather than using the heat to drive turbines. General Fusion has opted for magnetized target fusion, which uses a magnetic field to confine and compress a plasma to extreme densities but surrounds it with a liquid metal liner. HB11 Energy’s non-thermal laser-driven fusion process, supported by experimental results, would avoid the need for high temperatures entirely, while Avalanche Energy’s unique “orbitron” configuration would theoretically allow its system to fit in a backpack.

Raw materials and supply chains

In the sun, fusion involves two protons (the nuclei of hydrogen atoms) that go through a complex series of reactions called the proton-proton chain, producing energy, a helium nucleus, and various other subatomic particles along the way. For a number of reasons, though, recreating solar fusion would be infeasible on Earth, so scientists have widened their scope, pursuing fusion with other raw materials.

Most projects rely on the fusion of a deuterium and a tritium atom—isotopes of hydrogen with one and two neutrons, respectively—due to its relative ease of execution and its high experimental energy yields. Others make use of proton-boron fusion, while still others would fuse deuterium and helium-3, an isotope of helium with only one neutron instead of the usual two.

And as with all other energy sources, differences in input materials lead to differences in supply chain considerations. Deuterium makes up just under one in 5,000 hydrogen atoms in the ocean, offering a virtually inexhaustible supply. Tritium is in more limited reserve, with only 25 kilograms stockpiled globally and decaying quickly. There are paltry helium-3 resources on Earth, and attempts to mine the Moon’s natural helium-3 deposits carry doubts. Meanwhile, boron production, though set to surge considerably due to boron’s use in several clean energy applications, is currently highly concentrated, with almost two-thirds of global boron output coming from just four mines in Turkey.

But innovative solutions in varying stages of development could fill in these supply chain gaps. Deuterium-tritium (D-T) power plants are exploring the use of “breeding blankets” that contain lithium and are designed to react with the free neutrons generated by the fusion reaction, producing tritium to sustain the reaction without refueling. Some breeding blankets under development may use enriched lithium to increase reactivity, employing novel methods such as crown-ether enrichment and the ICOMAX process. Various research institutions, including the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and Oak Ridge National Laboratory, are running experiments to assess the ability of low- or no-enrichment lithium blankets to breed an adequate supply of tritium, with results expected in 2023.

To meet helium-3 supply needs, one fusion company, Helion Energy, has ventured to keep its helium-3 production planet-side, fusing deuterium atoms in a proprietary process. Those sourcing boron for fusion purposes are looking to piggyback on broader energy sector demand, with emphasis on variety, redundancy, and technological self-sufficiency.

Regulatory frameworks and approaches

Fusion is not explicitly mentioned in the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, which governs all civilian use of nuclear power and radioactive materials. The act defines atomic energy as “all forms of energy released in the course of nuclear fission or nuclear transformation.” But in 2009, upon the recommendation of its staff, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) extended its jurisdiction to commercial fusion energy devices.

In the same decision, though, the NRC kicked the regulatory can down the road, choosing instead to wait for fusion technologies to become more mature before settling on a specific approach, or until it was compelled to by Congress. That time came in 2019, when the Nuclear Energy Innovation and Modernization Act became law and mandated the development of a technology-inclusive regulatory framework for “advanced nuclear reactors”—a category in which the statute included fusion—by the end of 2027.

To that end, the NRC has a few options, which it laid out in a recent white paper. One of them is to regulate fusion energy devices under Parts 30 through 37 of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations. These provisions govern the use of “byproduct material,” which is defined in the code as all radioactive material that is not itself fissile nor fertile (meaning material that can absorb neutrons and decay into fissile material) but is instead created from fission reactions. Given the predominance of tritium in fusion reactions, the NRC has thus far regulated fusion research and development (R&D) projects under the Part 30 regulatory framework. The byproduct material framework has allowed early-stage fusion endeavors to move from milestone to milestone without overly onerous regulation. However, the approach focuses on the material used or produced within a fusion device and whether that fusion device would be considered an accelerator, so there may be some disconnects under this framework between existing regulations and the commercial-scale facilities that emerge. Limited updates or extensions to this framework, which NRC staff have explicitly indicated as their preferred route and would mirror policies currently being rolled into legislation in the United Kingdom, could make it more fit for purpose.

Another approach would be to classify fusion energy devices as “utilization facilities,” which, under the Atomic Energy Act, are facilities that use atomic energy in a way that has a bearing on national security or public wellbeing. Under NRC regulations, a utilization facility is primarily defined to be a fission reactor. Still, as the NRC noted in its 2009 paper, the NRC could expand the definition set forth in its regulations to include fusion within its utilization regulations if the NRC determined that “such devices are of significance to the common defense and security, or could affect the health and safety of the public.” But doing so would subject fusion projects to the same highly stringent set of regulations as fission reactors, which present a completely different risk profile. And it would impose additional requirements for capitalization, licensing and permitting, and workforce development.

The third regulatory option would be to create a hybrid framework, melding aspects of both byproduct material and utilization facility statutes. This would require the identification of decision criteria that could sufficiently separate different fusion designs in order to regulate each of them properly. After assessing designs based on these criteria, the NRC would then move them individually into the byproduct material or utilization facility categories. While this would ostensibly offer a level of tailored control over the regulation of commercial fusion facilities, it could also foment uncertainty among developers and investors, who would be in the dark about the requirements their project must meet until well after significant capital expenditure.

The NRC now has a little over five years to chart a regulatory course, existing or bespoke, that addresses fusion’s safety concerns yet allows the industry to grow at the necessary pace to play a sizable role in decarbonization efforts by 2050. Hearings in the next few months and an expected decision date in 2023 could move that timeline even closer.

Opportunities for policy intervention

In both allies like the United Kingdom and rivals like China, policymakers and planners are putting the pieces in place to enable commercial fusion development. For the United States to keep up, US policymakers will need to play their role in the continued growth of the industry.

One way they can do so is through public-private fusion partnership models, like a newly announced Department of Energy initiative; milestone-based, technology-neutral approaches would drive the entire industry towards maturity without bailing out companies that fail to hit targets. As fusion’s market size and companies’ investment needs grow, these programs will need to scale accordingly.

Consistent support for US national labs, universities, and government-led fusion R&D, with an express directive to assist commercialization efforts, is another key lever for policymakers. This includes ITER, NIF, the Princeton Plasma Physics Laboratory, and Advanced Research Projects Agency-Energy (ARPA-E) projects. Strong levels of annual funding for commercially-oriented projects would enable these institutions to develop a skilled workforce and find solutions to the science and materials problems that commercial fusion companies still face on their way to a net energy gain reaction.

This support should be meted out with the understanding that a net energy gain fusion reaction is not the same as a net energy gain fusion power plant. A fusion power plant will likely need colossal amounts of energy for its magnets, lasers, and other equipment, and heat-to-electricity transfer always entails some energy loss. To that end, smart public support for fusion energy would impel progress towards a deployable net energy gain fusion reaction, but it would also fund R&D for less energy-intensive facilities and more efficient capture of electricity in parallel.

Federal procurement support and coordination with international partners would help secure availability and production capacity for both primary inputs and highly complex end products like HTS magnets and lasers. And legislation strengthening and formally extending the NRC’s statutory authority could eliminate regulatory ambiguity if unforeseen issues arise during the rulemaking process.

Fusion energy could eventually underpin the entire US energy system, but it cannot do so without solid policy backing and regulatory clarity. The private capital-fueled fusion boom and international policy headway proves that the time to engender that support is now. If not, fusion ventures that prove technological maturity and reach net energy gain will run out of runway before they can turn deployable fusion energy from a quixotic idea into a staple on the grid.

Ameya Hadap is a program assistant at the Atlantic Council Global Energy Center.

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Kroenig on IAEA inspection of the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant

Atlantic Council — Wed, 28 Sep 2022 15:14:45 +0000

Vice President and Senior Director, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

On September 1, Scowcroft Center acting director Matthew Kroenig appeared on CNN to comment on the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspection of the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant.

[The IAEA] want to check the safety of the reactor. They want to make sure its operating appropriately, that it’s not at risk of melting down like we saw at Fukushima ten years ago.

Matthew Kroenig

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Kroenig on BBC World News on the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant

Atlantic Council — Wed, 28 Sep 2022 14:53:36 +0000

Vice President and Senior Director, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

On August 25, Scowcroft Center acting director Matthew Kroenig appeared on BBC World News to comment on the potential threat posed by the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant

[The IAEA] want to check the safety of the reactor. They want to make sure its operating appropriately, that it’s not at risk of melting down like we saw at Fukushima ten years ago.

Matthew Kroenig

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The post Kroenig on BBC World News on the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The impact of merging climate and trade policy on global demand for nuclear energy

George David Banks — Thu, 15 Sep 2022 19:34:18 +0000

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As countries around the world embrace an increasingly ambitious climate agenda, the importance of trade policy tools that prevent leakage to economies whose climate regulations are less stringent is becoming evident. Mechanisms that charge a fee at the border for more emissions-intensive imports from other countries and thus increase their price in the domestic market have gained traction. These tools, if used by the G7, would likely have enough heft to set a de facto international price on carbon.

Trade policy like this would increase the attractiveness of low-carbon technologies, like nuclear energy, in countries looking to maintain their export competitiveness in a carbon-constrained market. This presents an opportunity for G7 countries to drive investment into these technologies in developing, export-oriented countries as they look for ways to maintain market share. Such policy would also incentivize developed countries that are planning to shut down nuclear reactors to consider the detrimental impact of replacing the ensuing generation shortfall with unabated fossil fuels, and it would push policymakers to assess the risks of new nuclear demand to proliferation standards, particularly if China and Russia continue to build the vast majority of new international nuclear projects.

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The 2022 Global Energy Agenda

By Randolph Bell, Jennifer T. Gordon, Ameya Hadap, and Paul Kielstra (Editors)

The second edition of the Global Energy Agenda provides context for the year that has passed. It features a survey of thought leaders in the energy sector, as well as a series of essays by the leading figures in energy, to set the energy agenda for 2022.

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The complex reality behind Vladimir Putin’s nuclear blackmail in Ukraine

Suriya Evans-Pritchard Jayanti — Wed, 14 Sep 2022 15:27:36 +0000

The decision by Ukrainian state-owned atomic energy agency Energoatom to shut down the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) on September 11 averted much of the risk of a nuclear disaster in Ukraine from Russian shelling of the plant, but it also stripped both Russia and Ukraine of a powerful instrument with which to pursue their broader political and strategic goals. The battle of narratives over the Zaporizhzhia NPP, which Russian troops have held since March 4 but which is operated by Energoatom, has been a microcosm of each country’s broader strategy; Russia uses fear and energy to coerce, while Ukraine uses anything it can to call for more support.

On a technical level, the fear of a nuclear disaster that has engulfed much of Europe was always considerably overblown. The Zaporizhzhia NPP is a resolute achievement of engineering, with three-meter concrete walls that already withstood at least one direct rocket hit in March.

Comparisons with the Chornobyl disaster are inapt because what burned for days in 1986 was graphite in the Chornobyl NPP core, whereas the Zaporizhzhia NPP cores are water-filled and thus cannot burn. Nor does the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) September 6 report identify damage to the Zaporizhzhia NPP’s reactor structures, although it does note damage nearby and to new and spent fuel facilities.

A more appropriate comparison is to the Fukushima nuclear disaster, where cooling systems failed due to damage from a tsunami. A complete loss of power to the Zaporizhzhia NPP could have resulted in a similar cooling system failure there, but when Russian strikes severed the plant’s connection to the Ukrainian power grid repeatedly in the last few weeks of shelling, it ran first on diesel generators and then remained powered only by itself. The lone operating reactor number six was used to generate its own electricity to power its own cooling systems, also known as island mode.

This was not a safe situation in the long run. Indeed, the IAEA called it “unsustainable.” But even with the Fukushima disaster, the fallout was fairly localized. Given the strength of the Zaporizhzhia NPP’s nuclear reactor core vessels to contain any release of radioactive material, a similar nuclear cooling system accident there would be unlikely to pose as much of a threat to the Ukrainian civilian population as Russia’s ongoing war crimes.

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The hysteria about a potential meltdown was fueled by more complicated dynamics than the magnitude of the risk itself. As a threshold matter, nuclear accidents remain the apex of fear-inducing nightmares, so even balanced media coverage has tended to ignite worst-case scenario thinking. This natural human reaction makes the Zaporizhzhia NPP a powerful tool for both Russia and Ukraine.

On September 5, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy used his nightly address to proclaim that, regarding the Zaporizhzhia NPP, “Russia is only interested in keeping the situation at its worst for the longest time.” That seems to be true. Leaving Ukraine and Europe in a state of panic over a possible nuclear disaster certainly gave Russia additional leverage in the form of terror with which it could attempt to press its goals.

There is no evidence that this tactic worked. Nevertheless, Russia’s attempts to leverage fears of a possible nuclear catastrophe were part of broader efforts to drive a wedge between Europe and Ukraine, presumably with an eye to getting Europe to help force Ukraine into concessions in exchange for nuclear security. This is why Russia refused to give the IAEA access to the plant immediately and then limited both media coverage of the visit and access during the visit itself.

Ukraine also accused Russia of trying to steal the Zaporizhzhia NPP. The Ukrainian claim was that Russia was trying to divert the electricity from the plant to power Russian-occupied Crimea or the Donbas. This would amount to utilities annexation. Although technically possible, it is in practice a very complex and difficult undertaking. Given Russia’s inability to do much right during its military campaign, it is hard to imagine in the current situation the cloud of ineptitude clearing for such a highly sensitive and technical electrical grid operation.

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It appears most likely that this is another example of Russia using energy as a weapon against Ukraine and Europe. Forcing the Zaporizhzhia NPP offline by shelling the facility removes over 22% of Ukraine’s electricity generation capacity. Coupled with thermal power plants being shelled, the seizure of a hydroelectric plant, the taking offline of Ukraine’s 12% renewables generation, and dozens of strikes on power lines and electrical substations, Russia’s willful recklessness at the Zaporizhzhia NPP appears part of a broader strategy to cut Ukraine off from energy sources.

With Ukrainian consumption down 35% due to wartime population, territory, and infrastructure losses, the country does not yet face a power crisis, but the situation has the potential to become a crisis once reconstruction starts. Furthermore, the loss of over 30% of its baseload generation capacity makes Ukraine’s grid less stable, which could encourage the countries of Europe to delay allowing Ukraine the right to export power commercially to European markets.

Few credible observers take Kremlin claims seriously that Ukrainian troops are themselves shelling the Zaporizhzhia NPP. But Ukraine is not entirely innocent of using the Zaporizhzhia NPP standoff to provoke and entreat. The threat of a nuclear disaster at Russia’s hands has allowed Kyiv to demonstrate the barbarity of Putin and his invading army. It has also given the war an urgency for some countries and international agencies that might otherwise have continued to view the assault on Ukraine as a distant tragedy.

Most importantly, the risk of a nuclear accident at the Zaporizhzhia NPP makes for unparalleled emotional fodder for appeals and fundraising campaigns. Foreign military and financial support for Ukraine has kept the lights on in Kyiv and helped Ukraine hold back and maybe even turn the tide of Russian aggression on the battlefield. However, after more than 200 days of war, signs of Ukraine fatigue are growing. Foreign governments now have mounting domestic economic and energy crises to address. Populations globally are experiencing inflation and high energy costs. They can be forgiven for shifting their focus from the suffering of Ukrainians. Ukrainians can also be forgiven for trying to keep the attention of the world on their country’s plight, using whatever means available.

Suriya Jayanti is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council.

A recent Stanford and Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) study evaluating a possible extension of Diablo Canyon’s operations makes this point concretely. According to that study, continuing operation of the plant from 2025 to 2035 would reduce California power-sector CO₂ emissions by more than 10 percent and reduce natural-gas-generated power by over 20 percent, therefore reducing consumption of natural gas whose attainment has recently become much more competitive. The study concluded that retaining the plant in the generation mix through 2045 would save the power system over $15 billion, a figure that has likely risen since its publications due to the subsequent spike in gas prices.

Other retirements have shown the cost of prematurely shutting down nuclear generation. The Indian Point units in New York were shut down in 2020 and 2021 as the result of a settlement agreement, with a resulting increase in gas-fired generation and GHG emissions.

In 2011, Germany implemented a plan to phase out nuclear power and immediately shut most of its nuclear generation. As a consequence, despite extensive investment in renewable generation, Germany has had to continue to burn lignite, coal, and natural gas. GHG emissions remained relatively flat for most of the following decade despite the enormous investment in renewables. Germany chose to continue with retirements of half its remaining plants at the end of 2021, despite record-high power prices and a looming energy crisis. The remaining three plants are scheduled to be retired at the end of 2022; there has been some discussion of deferring their retirement in light of the current energy crisis, but no agreement.

Several countries have reconsidered the value of existing nuclear generation in light of rapidly increasing energy prices and a greater focus on energy security following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Belgium decided to extend the operation of two reactors for another ten years. In Japan, where existing nuclear power plants have struggled to restart since a 2011 tsunami led the failure of the Fukushima nuclear plant, the prime minister is seeking to accelerate reactor restarts before winter hits, and to develop and construct new advanced nuclear plants. South Korea’s new administration has reversed its previous policy, which aimed to exit nuclear power, and is now seeking to increase nuclear generation.

In the US, energy policy has begun to incorporate the value of existing nuclear generation that is carbon-free, has high availability that is independent of weather conditions, and enhances our energy security. The Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) includes a nuclear power production tax credit to preserve existing nuclear generation and address a wave of retirements that were driven in part by a lack of recognition of the plants’ zero-carbon and other attributes.

Time is short for the decisions regarding Diablo Canyon, and the evaluation required to consider extending operations is complex both technically and in terms of impact. The governor’s proposal would defer the plant’s compliance deadline on the water use issue to 2035, while requiring payment of a “mitigation fee.” That is an environmental consequence that needs to be reasonably weighed against the reduced GHG emissions and improved reliability the extended operations would provide. The practical course may be to take the initial steps to make longer operation possible, including beginning the relicensing process, in parallel with a more detailed evaluation of the costs and challenges associated with extended operation—like maintenance and workforce retention—and the options to address water use.

The principle, however, remains the same: in the context of mitigating climate change and addressing energy security, the world cannot keep running in place. It does not make sense to prematurely shut operating carbon-free nuclear generation, even if the plan is to replace it with renewable generation. Instead, policymakers should keep existing carbon-free generation online and build more, and shut GHG-emitting fossil generation instead.

Stephen S. Greene is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council Global Energy Center and the former chief financial officer of Centrus Energy.

Nuclear Energy Policy Initiative

The Atlantic Council’s dedicated home for the exploration of nuclear energy’s future.

Meet the author

Fellow

Stephen S. Greene

Energy & Environment

EnergySource Aug 10, 2022

The Inflation Reduction Act reinforces nuclear energy’s role as a climate solution

By Stephen S. Greene

The IRA provides much-needed support to the US nuclear energy sector. Its provisions will allow the continued operation of existing reactors along with the development of next-generation projects.

Energy & Environment Nuclear Energy

EnergySource Feb 11, 2022

Building on US advanced reactor demonstration momentum: Federal power purchase agreements

By Matt Bowen

Energy Transitions Nuclear Energy

EnergySource Nov 10, 2021

Nuclear power and the energy transition in non-OECD countries

By Robert F. Ichord, Jr.

In non-OECD countries, nuclear power’s role in immediate emissions reductions appears to be minimal, due to long lead times and other mitigating factors. But after 2030, rapid innovation could mean that nuclear energy will have a much more important part to play. OECD countries should partner with non-OECD countries to lay the groundwork now.

Energy & Environment Energy Transitions

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Russia and Ukraine warn Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant facing imminent threat

The post Closing nuclear generation amounts to running in place on climate appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Russian War Report: Russia and Ukraine warn Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant facing imminent threat

Eto Buziashvili, Ruslan Trad, Nika Aleksejeva, Givi Gigitashvili — Fri, 19 Aug 2022 16:06:49 +0000

Security

Tracking narratives

Forged Kuleba letter asks Poland to name street after Stepan Bandera

Media Policy

Russia announces plans to build online system to detect prohibited content

War crimes and human rights abuses

Russian occupation administration conducts campaign of arrests in Kherson

International response

Russia and Turkey spar over alleged weapons contract

Ukrainians crowdfund Finnish satellite for armed forces

Russia and Ukraine warn Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant facing imminent threat

The Russian occupation of Ukraine’s Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant continues to provoke fear among the international community in light of renewed shelling around the plant. Russian command in the area employs the facility for housing troops and military equipment, effectively using the plant as a shield against any possible Ukrainian attempt to retake the area. Ukraine and Russia have exchanged accusations about who is behind the shelling, both issuing warnings that the opposing side might attack the plant.

Earlier this month, independent Russia-focused publication The Insider published a video in which Russian military trucks enter the territory of the nuclear power plant and unload cargo. The column of trucks reportedly arrived on August 2. According to the video, Russian forces are mining the territory around the nuclear power plant. The Insider also reported that about 500 Russian soldiers are stationed at the Zaporizhzhia plant, alongside military equipment, including armored vehicles, anti-aircraft installations, and equipment for radiochemical detection. New footage also emerged on August 18 showing military trucks inside the plant.

Russia has accused Ukraine of preparing a “provocation at the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant” during UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres’s visit to Ukraine this week. The Russian Ministry of Defense also claimed that the Ukrainian 44th Artillery Brigade from Nikopol would strike the Zaporizhzhia plant on August 19. No evidence was provided to support either accusation. Ukraine’s Energoatom, which oversees the country’s nuclear plants, has established a crisis headquarters to handle any possible incidents at the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant. Meanwhile, Ukrainian military intelligence issued a statement on Facebook on August 18 warning against a false-flag operation by Russia on August 19.

Located in the city of Enerhodar, Zaporizhzhia is the largest nuclear power plant in Europe. Since March 2022, it has been under the control of Russian troops. The UN has urged Russia to withdraw troops from the nuclear power plant and to establish a safe perimeter. The pro-Russian administration of the Zaporizhzhia region has been silent on the subject.

Meanwhile, the Ukrainian army continues to attack Russian forces along frontlines and occupied territories. A Russian base was reportedly destroyed in Amvrosiivka, Donetsk region, on August 17. On the same day, a Russian base in Lysychansk was also attacked. The Ukrainian government also admitted that it was behind recent explosions in Crimea. On August 16, reports arose of thick smoke and multiple explosions at Gvardeyskoe airbase in Crimea. On the evening of August 18, Russian air defenses stopped a Ukrainian drone attack in the Kerch area.

In Kherson, the occupying Russian administration the telecommunication company Norma-4, which could signal an attempt to cut off residents of the region from the outside world. After Russian forces took control of Kherson’s internet in May, several service providers went dark as Russia rerouted internet traffic from Kherson through Russian networks.

—Ruslan Trad, Resident Fellow for Security Research, Sofia, Bulgaria

Forged Kuleba letter asks Poland to name street after Stepan Bandera

On August 16, the Russian Telegram channel Джокер ДНР (“Joker DNR”) published a forged letter falsely attributed to Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba. In the letter, Kuleba is portrayed as asking Polish authorities to rename Belwederska Street in Warsaw, where the Russian Embassy is located, to Stepan Bandera Street, after the controversial far-right leader of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army in World War II. The forged letter claims that changing the street name to Stepan Bandera street would be seen as a gesture of support for Ukrainians. The letter highlights that Russia changed the names of the streets in Moscow where the embassies of the United States and the United Kingdom are located. The letter is not dated, and Dmytro Kuleba’s signature appears to be copied from a publicly available letter signed by him in 2021.

On August 17, the Telegram channel published another forged document, allegedly signed by Marcin Przydacz, Poland’s Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs. The document contains several orders allegedly issued by Przydacz, including an order for the president of the Polish Institute of National Remembrance to provide a written expert opinion on the possibility of changing the name of the street in Warsaw “to honor the national hero of Ukraine Stepan Bandera.” It also proposes a campaign to increase the popularity of Stepan Bandera among Polish citizens.

Marcin Przydac confirmed on Twitter that the document was a forgery. “The linguistic errors clearly point to the potential authors of this provocation,” he said.

The forged letter on the left was allegedly written by Dmytro Kuleba and the forged document on the right was allegedly issued by Marcin Przydacz. (Source: Telegram/archive, left; Telegram/archive, right)

The Joker DNR Telegram channel also published a post that contained screenshots of Facebook posts from the accounts of Polish nationals Piotr Górka, an expert in the history of the Polish Air Force, and Dariusz Walusiak, a Polish historian and documentarian. Górka has previously written a book that was published by the Institute of National Remembrance, the organization mentioned in Przydacz’s forged document. Górka’s Facebook post claims that he fully supports the Polish government’s decision to change the name of Belwederska Street to Stepan Bandera Street. At the time of writing, Górka’s Facebook account was no longer available.

Dariusz Walusiak shared Górka’s Facebook post on the timeline of more than twenty Facebook users, including Adam Kalita, who works at the Krakow branch of the Institute of National Remembrance; Jan Kasprzyk, head of the Office for War Veterans and Victims of Oppression; and Alicja Kondraciuk, a Polish public figure living in Krakow. He also shared the post on Facebook groups. At the time of writing, Walusiak’s Facebook account was no longer available, but the DFRLab was able to archive Facebook posts before they disappeared.

Screenshot of post published by Piotr Górka’s Facebook account (left), screenshot of post published by Dariush Walusiak’s Facebook account (middle), and screenshots of Walusiak sharing Górka’s post on Facebook timelines. (Source: Facebook)

The Joker DNR Telegram channel frequently publishes documents that it alleges are “leaked.” Some of these documents contain personal information about Ukrainian soldiers. According to cybersecurity firm Mandiant, the Telegram account is a Russia-aligned hacktivist group with connections to another threat actor, Ghostwriter. The tactic of taking over social media accounts to push false or leaked documents is quite similar to Ghostwriter’s tactics. The DFRLab has previously reported on an information operation attributed to Ghostwriter in which social media accounts of Polish nationals were hacked to plant false information.

The possibility exists that the owners of the Joker DNR Telegram account hacked the accounts of Górka and Walusiak, but the DFRLab is unable to confirm this. The selection of people the Walusiak account shared Górka’s post with indicates there may have been an effort to alert people who would have strongly opposed the “plan” to change the street name.

—Givi Gigitashvili, Research Associate, Warsaw, Poland

Russia announces plans to build online system to detect prohibited content

Russian censor Roskomnadzor has allocated 57.7 million rubles (nearly USD $1 million) to launch the Oculus internet surveillance system for detecting “prohibited data” by mid-December, Russian outlet Kommersant.ru reported.

According to the report, the surveillance system will be built on neural networks and will “analyze photos, videos and texts on websites, social networks and messengers for prohibited information, including homosexual propaganda and the manufacture of drugs and weapons,” Kommersant stated.

The system is expected to have a capacity of analyzing 200,000 images per day, meaning that Oculus could be able to analyze two frames per second, Russian outlet RBC reported. Prohibited content that would be a subject to Oculus monitoring includes extremism and terrorism materials, calls for “illegal” mass gatherings, expressions of “clear disrespect” for the state and official symbols, and the “promotion of non-traditional sexual relations.”

An unnamed source from “a large IT company” told Kommersant that the implementation of such a project under the suggested budget and timeline is “almost impossible.”

The development of the Oculus system appears to the next step in Russia’s domestic internet surveillance and censorship toolbox.

—Eto Buziashvili, Research Associate, Washington DC

Russian occupation administration conducts campaign of arrests in Kherson

Reports of abuse and arrests are increasing in southern Ukraine territory occupied by Russia. Recently published reports and witness testimonies from the city of Kherson document Russian troops going door-to-door to search belongings, mobile phones, and documents. The Russian occupation administration arrests anyone it suspects of assisting Ukraine against the Russian forces in the region.

Witness testimonies also show that the Russian administration holds civilians and members of the Ukrainian administration in basements, including the mayor of Kherson.

—Ruslan Trad, Resident Fellow for Security Research, Sofia, Bulgaria

Russia and Turkey spar over alleged weapons contract

Dmitry Shugaev, head of Russia’s federal service for military-technical cooperation, announced on August 16 that Turkey had signed a new contract to purchase a “second batch” of Russian S-400 anti-aircraft missile systems. Ismail Demir, president of Turkey’s Defense Industry Agency, which is responsible for procurement, was quick to deny the allegation. “There is no new development. According to the agreement made on the first day, the process continues, ” Demir said. The initial deal between Russia and Turkey was struck in 2017.

An unnamed Turkish defense official also told Reuters that there were no new agreements. “The original contract that was signed with Russia for the purchase of S-400s already included two batches. The purchase of a second batch was included in the original plan and the related contract.”

Kremlin-controlled media outlets such as RIA Novosti, RBC, and Izvestiya reported on August 18 that Russia had started fulfilling the contract with Turkey by delivering the second batch of S-400 anti-aircraft missile systems.

One day before Shugaev’s announcement, the Russian Minister of Industry and Trade, Denis Manturov, told Kremlin-controlled news agency Interfax that negotiations about the delivery of a “new batch” of S-400 anti-aircraft missile systems were “continuing.”

Turkey, a NATO member state, purchased Russian S-400 anti-aircraft missile systems in December 2017. In response, the US prohibited the transfer of F-35 fighter aircraft to Turkey in 2019. Most recently, the US approved the sale of F-16 fighter jets to Turkey, after Turkey dropped objections to Sweden and Finland joining NATO. Kremlin’s media campaign about the “new” S-400 deal with Turkey may be an attempt to sow divisions among NATO member states.

—Nika Aleksejeva, Lead Researcher, Riga, Latvia

Ukrainians crowdfund Finnish satellite for armed forces

A Ukrainian foundation launched by popular TV host Serhiy Prytula announced on Thursday that it had signed a deal with Finnish satellite company ICEYE to purchase a radar satellite for the Ukrainian Armed Forces.

A crowdfunding effort launched by the Serhiy Prytula Charity Foundation raised USD $20 million in June to buy Bayraktar drones for the Ukrainian military. However, Turkish defense firm Baykar refused to accept the money and donated three military drones to Ukraine instead. Prytula said that after consulting with Ukraine’s Ministry of Defense, the charity foundation purchased a satellite with the money that had been raised for the Bayraktar drones.

—Eto Buziashvili, Research Associate, Washington DC

The post Russian War Report: Russia and Ukraine warn Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant facing imminent threat appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Putin is running out of excuses as Ukraine expands the war to Crimea

Peter Dickinson — Thu, 11 Aug 2022 01:37:43 +0000

Ukraine appears to have struck deep inside Russian-occupied Crimea for the first time on August 9 with an audacious attack on a heavily defended military base. The explosions at western Crimea’s Saki airbase rattled nerves in Moscow and sparked panic throughout the Russian-occupied Ukrainian peninsula, with traffic jams reported on routes leading to the Crimean Bridge as Russian holidaymakers scrambled to cut short their vacations.

The exact nature of the suspected Ukrainian attack is still unclear. The Washington Post cited unnamed Ukrainian officials calling it a Special Forces operation. Other international media reports confirmed Ukrainian responsibility without providing specific details. In the hours following the blasts, much of the debate among military analysts centered on whether the damage was caused by missiles, airstrikes, or combat drones. Satellite images have since revealed large-scale destruction at the site.

Speaking on Tuesday evening, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy stopped short of confirming the involvement of the Ukrainian military. However, in an apparent nod to the airbase attack, he did note that Russia’s war against Ukraine had begun with the occupation of Crimea and would end with its liberation.

In Moscow, the response to the airbase attack was one of characteristic denial. Rather than accusing Ukraine, Russian officials attempted to downplay the incident and insisted instead that the multiple explosions were caused by an accidental detonation of aviation ammunition. This dubious claim is entirely in line with a number of equally implausible excuses presented by Russia over the past six months as the Kremlin has sought to explain away a series of similarly embarrassing setbacks in the country’s faltering invasion of Ukraine.

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Moscow’s record of absurd excuses began in late March, when Kremlin officials attempted to rebrand the Russian retreat from northern Ukraine as a “goodwill gesture” despite the fact that it came in the immediate wake of the country’s defeat in the Battle of Kyiv.

Russia employed the same “goodwill gesture” terminology once again at the end of June to describe the equally ignominious Russian retreat from Snake Island. Unsurprisingly, the entire concept of Russian “goodwill gestures” has now become fodder for social media memes as Ukrainians poke fun at the often farcical alternative reality created by Kremlin propaganda.

When Ukraine sank the flagship of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet during the early months of the war, the Kremlin was predictably quick to offer up face-saving excuses. The Mosvka sank in the Black Sea on April 14 after reportedly being struck by two Ukrainian anti-ship missiles. However, according to the version of events promoted by Russia, Putin’s prized flagship actually sank while being towed in stormy seas following an accidental fire onboard. This unconvincing explanation raised eyebrows, not least as weather reports gave little indication of choppy seas at the time of the sinking.

Moscow’s excuse-making has sometimes verged on the surreal. In an apparent bid to explain why the much-vaunted Russian military has so far failed to overcome Ukrainian resistance, members of a Russian parliamentary commission declared in mid-July that Ukraine was using mutant soldiers who had been transformed into superhuman killing machines by American scientists. Commission co-chairs and serving Russian MPs Konstantin Kosachev and Irina Yarovaya were quoted in Russian newspaper Kommersant claiming to have uncovered evidence that Ukrainian servicemen were being transformed into “deadly monsters” in laboratories under US supervision.

Eurasia Center events

Ukraine’s advance in Kursk: What’s next and implications

Conflict Russia Security & Defense Ukraine

Russia’s reluctance to publicly recognize Ukrainian battlefield successes is hardly unprecedented, of course. Deception has always played a key role in armed conflict and Moscow has long been known as an information warfare innovator. Russia also has a number of very good military reasons to downplay its setbacks in Ukraine. Any public acknowledgement of the Ukrainian military’s ability to strike high-value targets deep inside Kremlin-controlled territory would confirm the ineffectiveness of Russia’s air defense systems and would further undermine fighting spirit within the ranks of an invasion force that is already suffering from demoralization due to high losses.

At the same time, there is something obsessive about Vladimir Putin’s apparent readiness to embrace even the most damaging of disinformation rather than admit Ukrainian victories. The Russian dictator has repeatedly preferred to portray his own troops as incompetent and has invited ridicule over nonsense tales of voluntary withdrawals rather than acknowledge the humiliating truth of defeat at the hands of a country he insists does not exist.

As his invasion approaches the half-year mark, Putin is now fast running out of excuses. Initial expectations of a quick and victorious war have long since given way to the reality of a brutal conflict against a determined and capable foe backed by the might of the democratic world. Despite deploying a large part of the Russian military’s available manpower, his armies have been fought to a virtual standstill while paying a terrible price in both men and machines. This poor performance has proved devastating for Moscow’s superpower pretensions. Indeed, it is safe to say that anyone still referring to Russia as the world’s number two army is almost certainly being sarcastic.

The impact of this collapse in military prestige is already becoming apparent in Moscow’s old imperial backyard. Kazakhstan is now in open confrontation with the Kremlin and Azerbaijan no longer feels constrained by the presence of Russian peacekeepers in the South Caucasus. Tiny Lithuania recently defied Russia for weeks over the transit of goods to Kaliningrad, while even loyal Belarus has so far resisted intense Kremlin pressure to join the invasion of Ukraine.

Unless Russia is able to transform its military fortunes in Ukraine, these negative trends will only intensify. More countries will lose their fear of the toothless Russian bear, while potential allies will begin to question the value of such a geopolitically and militarily compromised partner. Already resigned to an extended period of isolation from the Western world, Russia may find itself increasingly excluded from the top table of world affairs and reduced to a junior role in its unequal partnership with China.

Putin’s perilous predicament means we could now be facing one of the most dangerous periods in modern European history as the Russo-Ukrainian War enters a potentially decisive phase. In the coming months, we should expect everything from desperate offensives and escalating terror tactics to energy cut-offs and nuclear blackmail. Nevertheless, as long as Ukraine’s Western allies can remain united in their support for the country, there is good reason to believe these efforts will ultimately fail. Putin’s criminal invasion has exposed the diminished reality behind the myth of Russian military might. Farcical talk of “goodwill gestures” and “accidental fires” merely serves to underline the point.

Peter Dickinson is Editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert Service.

Second, the IRA would transition from the current technology-specific tax credits for renewable energy into technology-neutral credits that place advanced nuclear energy on a level playing field with other zero-carbon generation. The credits would be available beginning in 2025 as either production tax credits or investment tax credits. The availability of these tax credits will likely improve access to financing for advanced nuclear projects, in the same way that such credits have for renewable projects. The rapid development of renewable projects, driven in part by tax credits, has helped create dramatic reductions in cost for renewable technologies.

Additional tax incentives are available for projects located in “energy communities,” including those with high employment in fossil fuel extraction, brownfield sites, or where coal mines or coal-fired power plants have closed. Retired coal generation sites, such as the Wyoming site for TerraPower’s Natrium demonstration project, may be particularly suitable for advanced nuclear projects, which are compact enough to locate on the site; in addition, the projects can benefit from existing transmission and water supply infrastructure. However, the tax credits begin to phase out no later than 2032, which will be early in the deployment cycle for advanced nuclear technologies. Policymakers should anticipate extending the phaseout for advanced nuclear energy, given that the technology is just on the cusp of deployment.

Finally, the IRA would fund actions to support the availability of the fuel that will be needed for many advanced reactor designs (high-assay low-enriched uranium, or HALEU). Using HALEU enables advanced reactors to be more compact, to refuel less often, and potentially to produce less waste. But there are currently no commercial-scale facilities capable of producing HALEU outside Russia. Producing this fuel will require capital investments by uranium enrichers, but advanced reactor developers and project sponsors are not yet able to make the long-term, sizeable contract commitments necessary to support those investments. Resolving this stalemate and obtaining access to HALEU has been a key concern of reactor developers for some time. That concern has been exacerbated in the aftermath of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, which has precluded the procurement of initial supplies from Russia while other sources are being developed.

The Energy Act of 2020 required the Department of Energy to establish a program to make HALEU available, but did not provide funding. The IRA would provide $600 million to fund the HALEU program, for use in acquiring HALEU produced through enrichment or obtaining it by processing enriched uranium in Department of Energy stockpiles (which likely can supply only small quantities at best). It would also provide $100 million to develop suitable transportation capabilities.

The IRA’s support for existing nuclear generators, advanced nuclear energy projects, and development of advanced nuclear fuel will enable nuclear energy to contribute significantly to US climate goals, and in doing so, will establish capabilities that can be exported to enhance climate efforts worldwide.

Stephen S. Greene is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council Global Energy Center and the former chief financial officer of Centrus Energy.

Global Energy Center experts respond to the Inflation Reduction Act

The IRA of 2022 marks the biggest climate investment in US history, and it will likely send reverberations around the world. Our experts offer their thoughts on its provisions and its consequences.

Meet the author

Fellow

Stephen S. Greene

Energy & Environment

EnergySource Aug 10, 2022

Does the Inflation Reduction Act take the right approach to shoring up clean energy supply chains?

By William Tobin, Daniel Helmeci, and Selin Kumbaraci

The IRA houses two distinct approaches to building up domestic and friendly clean energy supply chains. The approach based on incentives is likely to be more effective than the one based on penalties.

Energy & Environment Energy Markets & Governance

EnergySource Aug 8, 2022

How to build on the Inflation Reduction Act and incentivize truly clean electricity

By Ameya Hadap

Energy & Environment Energy Transitions

EnergySource Aug 8, 2022

The Inflation Reduction Act places a big bet on alternative mineral supply chains

By Reed Blakemore, Paddy Ryan

The Inflation Reduction Act’s consumer electric vehicle tax credit will create strong demand for alternative minerals, sourced and processed outside of existing supply chains. The ability for these alternative supplies to meaningfully diversify mineral value chains hinges on further investment and policymaking effort.

Energy & Environment Energy Markets & Governance

Learn more about the Global Energy Center

The post The Inflation Reduction Act reinforces nuclear energy’s role as a climate solution appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Bell quoted in Newsweek on Biden’s compromise with Saudi Arabia, Venezuela

lbowen — Tue, 07 Jun 2022 18:00:00 +0000

The post Bell quoted in Newsweek on Biden’s compromise with Saudi Arabia, Venezuela appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Azodi quoted in Al-Monitor on Iran’s diplomatic options in the case of nuclear talk failure

Atlantic Council — Sat, 14 May 2022 20:53:00 +0000

The post Azodi quoted in Al-Monitor on Iran’s diplomatic options in the case of nuclear talk failure appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Slavin quoted in Al Jazeera on the diplomatic implications of US blacklisting of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps on US-Iran nuclear talks

Atlantic Council — Fri, 13 May 2022 13:35:00 +0000

The post Slavin quoted in Al Jazeera on the diplomatic implications of US blacklisting of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps on US-Iran nuclear talks appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Slavin quoted in Al Monitor on developing Iran-Saudi relations and it’s impact on nuclear talks

Atlantic Council — Tue, 10 May 2022 14:28:42 +0000

The post Slavin quoted in Al Monitor on developing Iran-Saudi relations and it’s impact on nuclear talks appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Bell quoted in Boston Globe on nuclear energy

jgomez — Fri, 22 Apr 2022 18:33:00 +0000

The post Bell quoted in Boston Globe on nuclear energy appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Sales in Fox News: Iran nuclear talks: Biden shouldn’t turn a blind eye to terrorism to secure deal

Atlantic Council — Tue, 29 Mar 2022 19:02:00 +0000

The post Sales in Fox News: Iran nuclear talks: Biden shouldn’t turn a blind eye to terrorism to secure deal appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Meet the global leaders powering the world’s energy transition

Atlantic Council — Mon, 28 Mar 2022 04:06:12 +0000

The return of pre-pandemic energy consumption. Threats of cyberattacks on critical infrastructure. And a generation-defining war in Europe with global repercussions.

All have dampened hopes for a swift energy transition—but none have discouraged the world’s movers and shakers in the energy industry from finding solutions. The Atlantic Council’s sixth annual Global Energy Forum, which took place March 28 and 29 in Dubai, is where they discussed the tools, policies, and models essential to responding to these and other major trends in the sector.

Here, you’ll find the highlights from the event, which was hosted by the Atlantic Council’s Global Energy Center in partnership with the United Arab Emirates’ Ministry of Energy and Infrastructure and in conjunction with the 2022 World Government Summit.

Here’s the latest news from GEF:

Getting off Russian gas: Practical steps for Europe
South, Southeast Asia consider decarbonization
After the war in Ukraine: New energy for a new Europe?
Where does environmental, social, and corporate governance go from here?
Resilience and reliability in the face of evolving threats
Big problems for small island nations
How nuclear energy can power a Just Transition
Is there a future for natural gas in the Eastern Mediterranean?
Think ‘transformation,’ not transition
How helpful could hydrogen be?
This is how the United Arab Emirates does it
Don’t count out Iraqi Kurdistan
Meet the Green Builders of Tomorrow
Why natural gas is staying—not going
Will energy security derail the transition? (Part two)
In Europe, ‘the writing has been on the wall’
Leading oil and gas into a net-zero world
Will energy security derail the transition? (Part one)
Urgency and reality collide as GEF kicks off
Pakistan: The next great infrastructure connector
The United States, Canada, and the minerals challenge
Unearthing potential: The value of geothermal energy to US decarbonization
The 2022 Global Energy Agenda
In the wake of the pandemic, new thinking on the way to net zero
Catch up on last year’s Global Energy Forum

MARCH 29, 2022 | 11:37 AM WASHINGTON, 7:37 PM DUBAI

Getting off Russian gas: Practical steps for Europe

The war in Ukraine has sparked serious discussion about how Europe can quit Russian fossil fuels. But what can it do right now to reduce its dependence on Russian natural gas?

In a Tuesday GEF panel, Richard Morningstar, founding chairman of the Atlantic Council’s Global Energy Center, emphatically argued that the United States must clearly assert the role of natural gas in a decarbonized world. This message must be relayed to Europe, to the finance community, and to the oil and gas industry and exporter companies, he said. But in the near term, Morningstar suggested a strategy that focuses on critical interconnectors around the Balkans and existing pipelines.

Charles Hendry, a professor at the University of Edinburgh, offered a similar view—recommending that Europe carefully review new potential sources of supply, such as Turkmenistan, Kurdistan and others. He also argued for using existing infrastructure to its fullest capacity, and that the EU Commission should consider rapidly approving projects already in consideration to improve the energy security situation quicker.

In the longer term, Michał Kurtyka, the president of COP24, argued that Poland’s efforts to diversify its energy options have shown the way forward, adding that the EU Commission must show leadership in moving away from Russian natural gas even if the near-term economic pain proves significant.

Ana Birchall, special envoy for strategic and international affairs for Nuclearelectricak, argued from the Romanian perspective: that acknowledging the role of natural gas and nuclear energy in the new European Taxonomy for Sustainable Finance is a key step to supporting European energy security.

All agreed that the challenge ahead remains enormous—with a difficult winter likely ahead for Europe, even in an ideal scenario.

—Andrea Clabough is a nonresident fellow at the Global Energy Center.

MARCH 29, 2022 | 10:51 AM WASHINGTON, 6:51 PM DUBAI

South, Southeast Asia consider decarbonization

The rapidly developing economies of South and Southeast Asia are ripe for decarbonization—but require a nuanced understanding of the region’s unique needs, according to a GEF panel of think tank, government, and private sector experts.

Desiree Tung, deputy director of external relations at the Energy Market Authority of Singapore and Kavita Gandhi, executive director of the Sustainable Energy Association of Singapore, used the island nation as an example of what can be achieved when sound policy design meets robust, clear government signals.

Tung pointed to the Singapore Green Plan, which set out new targets for decarbonizing the economy; she and Gandhi both highlighted the pivotal role this document played in catalyzing key investments in that country’s clean energy sector. Both also noted the challenges facing Singapore and other countries in this region—particularly around availability of renewable resources and land use constraints (though thoughtful Singaporean leadership has managed these challenges, they said). Regional trading of renewable electricity, for example, is one concept that’s being actively explored.

Another key theme of the panel was the role of natural gas. Robert Fee, vice president of international affairs and commercial development at Cheniere Energy, and Derek Wong, senior director of government and public affairs at Excelerate Energy, highlighted the importance of gas to balance and support a wide expansion of renewable energy in the region while also achieving significant emissions reductions.

More broadly, the panelists all agreed with a key theme of the Global Energy Forum: Strength in energy security lies in energy diversity. They felt confident that the South and Southeast Asia region is very capable of achieving diversity of energy supply while also meeting its climate objectives.

—Andrea Clabough is a nonresident fellow at the Global Energy Center.

MARCH 29, 2022 | 9:45 AM WASHINGTON, 5:45 PM DUBAI

After the war in Ukraine: New energy for a new Europe?

Despite Russia’s brutal assault against his country, DTEK CEO Maxim Timchenko predicted a brighter energy future for Ukraine, grounded in deeper integration with western Europe. More specifically, he pointed to the existing gas transit infrastructure, the capacity of Ukraine to supply Europe with its own natural gas, as well as the considerable potential for renewable energy—especially wind—as particular assets. Ukraine, he added, could also be at the cutting edge of advanced nuclear energy deployment.

But above all, Timchenko stressed that countries and companies should end their purchases of Russian energy (and other commodities) as soon as possible to help end the violence.

Other panelists focused on steps Europe should take in the eventual aftermath of the war. Paula Dobriansky, senior fellow at the Harvard Kennedy School of Government, said the United States and European Union should build upon a new spirit of collaboration and unity in the face of Russia’s weaponization of energy.

Charles Hendry, a professor at the University of Edinburgh, added that the West should develop a “Marshall Plan” for Ukraine with an emphasis on rebuilding Ukrainian energy infrastructure.

Finally, Ana Palacio, a former Spanish foreign minister, noted that ending Europe’s dependence on Russian natural gas is far easier said than done, and the continent has a great deal of work left—particularly on energy storage—to shore up its energy security.

—Andrea Clabough is a nonresident fellow at the Global Energy Center.

MARCH 29, 2022 | 8:25 AM WASHINGTON, 4:25 PM DUBAI

Where does environmental, social, and corporate governance go from here?

From being just another buzzword around the energy transition to a fundamental component of how all companies operate—that’s where environmental, social, and corporate governance (ESG) should head next, according to a GEF panel representing corporate voices throughout the financial, investing, and consumer-goods sectors.

Neil Brown, managing director of the KKR Global Institute and KKR Infrastructure, argued that every company can do its part by integrating ESG into its business in meaningful ways—and improve their overall asset performance along the way. In his view, the future of ESG will focus on bringing the principles into high-emissions (or otherwise challenging) sectors that are still essential to the modern economy.

But the panel also highlighted transparency and verifiability as key aspects of making ESG effective in every business environment. Alain Bejjani, chief executive officer at Majid Al Futtaim Holding, noted that transparency is a strength, not a liability, for his company, while Kristen Siemen, chief sustainability officer at General Motors, added that ESG is now so integrated into her company’s culture that it’s part of every employee’s job.

There was also discussion around the importance of a global framework for ESG that would put all companies on a level playing field to reassure investors. Such a component—combined with independent verification of companies’ ESG metrics and achievements—could facilitate a much deeper understanding of ESG by all stakeholders.

—Andrea Clabough is a nonresident fellow at the Global Energy Center.

MARCH 29, 2022 | 7:31 AM WASHINGTON, 3:31 PM DUBAI

Resilience and reliability in the face of evolving threats

Cyberthreats are among the key challenges to an increasingly digitalized, decentralized, and electrified energy system as the world moves toward a transition from conventional energy, another GEF expert panel agreed Tuesday.

André Pienaar, founder and chief executive officer of C5 Capital, said cybersecurity is increasingly at the heart of a new notion of “collective defense,” while Leo Simonovich, vice president and global head of industrial cyber & digital security at Siemens Energy, agreed. Simonovich added that the billions of new devices coming online in the next few years each represent a critical vulnerability, and argued that climate change and security should go hand in hand. “Very often, security seems to be an afterthought,” he said. “It is not built in—it is bolted on.” That, Simonovich added, prevents users from perceiving risk and being ready to stop it.

He pointed to Siemens’ new partnership with the New York Power Authority to create a school, monitoring center, and lab that would bring new cybertechologies to the market at scale quickly.

Other panelists noted that the flexibility and reliability of the power system are key to security. Abdurrahman Khalidi, chief technology officer at GE Gas Power EMEA, argued that the world must fund and incentivize many options to power the grid—not just renewables—to ensure future grid stability.

Kara Mangone, managing director and global head of climate strategy at Goldman Sachs, added that carbon capture, utilization, and storage, as well as the mining and steel sectors, among others, are “under-owned” sectors. It’s also crucial, Mangone argued, to move beyond the binary idea of “good” and “bad” sectors when considering where to invest.

In sum, the panelists’ remarks suggested that an “all of the above” approach is the key to a truly secure energy system.

—Andrea Clabough is a nonresident fellow at the Global Energy Center.

MARCH 29, 2022 | 7:02 AM WASHINGTON, 3:02 PM DUBAI

Big problems for small island nations

Dignitaries from small island nations on Tuesday expressed their frustration with the state of the current global action—or lack thereof—on addressing climate change. Moderated by CNN anchor and correspondent Eleni Giokos, the session included Wavel Ramkalawan, president of the Seychelles, Gaston Browne, prime minister of Antigua and Barbuda, and Aminith Shauna, the Maldives’ minister of environment, climate change & technology.

“With all the loud speeches…when you compare [with] the reality, it is a totally different story,” said Ramkalawan. Browne, meanwhile, suggested that many countries make pledges they don’t intend to honor, and Shauna detailed the exhaustion of small island countries watching climate change up close.

Browne called for “an all-of-society approach” and added that the world must commit to prioritizing the lives of islanders over the profits of a fossil-fuels driven economy. Ramkalawan argued that there should be legal liability for the high-energy-emitting large countries that are fueling the crisis the most.

Still, all the panelists agreed that the people of island states will continue to do all they can themselves to prepare for the impacts of climate change.

—Andrea Clabough is a nonresident fellow at the Global Energy Center.

MARCH 29, 2022 | 6:28 AM WASHINGTON, 2:28 PM DUBAI

How nuclear energy can power a Just Transition

A featured GEF breakout session Tuesday considered whether a shift to nuclear energy can keep people (and their rights) at the forefront of decarbonization.

Christopher Levesque, president and chief executive officer of TerraPower, believes it’s possible—and said his company is doing exactly that right now. He described how TerraPower will build the first of its new reactors in Wyoming on an existing coal-fired plant site while repurposing the facility’s existing 200 workers. Levesque also described his hope for the mountainous region of the western United States to become a “hub for advanced nuclear technology.”

Amy Roma, partner and global energy practice leader with Hogan Lovells, added that there are benefits to working at a brownfield site which allows a developer to dovetail into a preexisting environmental analysis, thereby reducing costs and increasing project certainty. She emphasized that community engagement on the benefits of nuclear energy—especially the socio-economic benefits for those who previously relied on coal-fired power plants for jobs—is essential.

But regulatory and policy support are crucial to the future of advanced and conventional nuclear deployment.

Rumina Velshi, president and chief executive officer of the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission, noted that an effective regulatory framework must promote certainty and predictability while also minimizing risks. George Agafitei, state counselor of the Romanian government, noted that Eastern Europe carries vast potential for nuclear power, but that, at least in Romania’s case, its infrastructure’s inclusion in the EU Sustainable Finance Taxonomy is crucial to the country’s plans to implement its own pro-nuclear policies.

Meanwhile, Zbigniew Kubacki, senior policy advisor at the Polish Ministry of Climate and Environment, said his country has similar goals and hopes to pursue a range of nuclear technologies (including large, conventional nuclear, and small modular reactors), but that Just Transition principles must be at the forefront of policy choices.

—Andrea Clabough is a nonresident fellow at the Global Energy Center.

MARCH 29, 2022 | 3:33 AM WASHINGTON, 11:33 AM DUBAI

Is there a future for natural gas in the Eastern Mediterranean?

A Tuesday GEF expert panel believes there is—but only if regional leaders can overcome their governments’ longstanding differences. Political challenges, they said, continue to undermine energy development in the region.

Defne Arslan, senior director of Turkey & Turkey Programs at the Atlantic Council, argued that Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has a genuine desire to improve his country’s relationships with its neighbors, notably Cyprus and Greece, with potential benefits for regional natural gas development. But she cautioned that Ankara demands equitable development of the resources it shares with them.

Arslan also added that Washington’s method of resolving the development rights issue, its involvement in the 3+1 scheme, and its equivocating position on the Eastern Mediterranean pipeline, aren’t constructive enough. “It is not realistic to keep Turkey out of the solution in the Eastern Med, whatever it is,” she said.

Meanwhile, the panel pointed to another problem: mixed messaging when it comes to potential natural-gas customers in Europe.

Charles Ellinas, chief executive officer of EC Natural Hydrocarbons, said the Eastern Mediterranean has struggled to adopt a cohesive energy development approach because future demand for natural gas in Europe is utterly unclear. He argued that Europe’s twin messages—that it wants to reduce Russian gas consumption, but will also dramatically slash its overall gas consumption by 2030—makes long-term investment in regional energy infrastructure extremely difficult.

Arslan pointed to the Trans Adriatic Pipeline as an example which demonstrates that key gas infrastructure from the region to Europe can be built if there is clear, concerted political support. She added that the currently uncertain outlook for the Eastern Mediterranean pipeline could improve if Europe clearly signals that it needs the pipeline and its gas.

Ellinas added that Egypt, Lebanon, and others will also become long-term customers if the region can focus on collaboration and effective cooperation.

—Andrea Clabough is a nonresident fellow at the Global Energy Center.

Don’t miss the Atlantic Council’s recent report on the issue:

Report

Feb 16, 2022

Energy and geopolitics in the Eastern Mediterranean

By Charles Ellinas

Fossil fuel development in the Eastern Mediterranean is both laden with promise and fraught with tension. Member states of the East Mediterranean Gas Forum (EMGF) have established joint ventures for exploration and drilling, pipeline building, and LNG export across the region, creating an international web of proposed infrastructure to tap its abundant reserves. But Turkey […]

Energy & Environment Energy Markets & Governance

MARCH 28, 2022 | 1:23 PM WASHINGTON, 9:23 PM DUBAI

Think ‘transformation,’ not ‘transition’

How does the world move forward from the energy-supply crisis as a result of the war in Ukraine? That’s what panelists in Monday’s final session grappled with, agreeing that Western policymakers must now adjust their thinking around the energy transition to account for the new reality.

Regina Mayor, KPMG’s global head of energy and natural resources, recommended thinking in terms of energy “transformation” (rather than “transition”) to describe how the global energy system is likely to evolve. Joseph McMonigle, secretary general of the International Energy Forum, lamented that the world has gone from “lower for longer” oil and gas prices to “higher and volatile” in the space of just two short years—suggesting that the role of fossil fuels in the transition has been poorly understood. Both believe low-cost hydrocarbons would play a prominent role in the future.

Meanwhile, former government officials on the panel agreed that a new framework is necessary for navigating the energy transition. Neil Chatterjee, former chairman of the US Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, recommended that policymakers in the United States focus on managing the twin threats to electricity reliability in extreme weather events (caused by climate change) and growing levels of intermittent renewables on the grid (as a response to climate change).

Likewise, Charles Hendry, former British minister of state for energy, argued that Europe must be more alert to (and prepared for) the dangers of reliance on single suppliers for any fuel or resource. He argued that Europe has belatedly learned that security of supply still matters.

That said, he and other panelists said they’re hopeful for the future of low-carbon innovation at a time of tremendous enthusiasm for climate-positive innovation.

—Andrea Clabough is a nonresident fellow at the Global Energy Center.

MARCH 28, 2022 | 12:40 PM WASHINGTON, 8:40 PM DUBAI

How helpful could hydrogen be?

Few emerging fuels have generated as much interest—or controversy—as hydrogen in recent years. An expert GEF panel tackled the challenges facing hydrogen economies of scale and explored what a scaling of hydrogen supply and demand would require.

David Livingston, senior advisor to US Special Presidential Envoy for Climate John Kerry, argued that it’s the role of government to “cut the Gordian knot” by both catalyzing the demand signals for low-carbon hydrogen today, and also preparing the regulatory framework to support stable markets for hydrogen in the future. He pointed to the Biden administration’s key initiative, the First Movers Coalition, as an example of government actively working to secure credible demand-side signals for decarbonized hydrogen. Other panelists pointed to the importance of standardization throughout the hydrogen industry, verifiable metrics, and carbon accounting processes.

They also focused on the need to reduce costs for low-carbon hydrogen while also setting the foundations for future hydrogen trading networks. Meg Gentle, executive director of Highly Innovative Fuels USA, pointed to the established global trade of natural gas via pipelines and liquefaction as a model for hydrogen fuels, such as methanol and e-fuels.

For Germany, said Tim Holt, member of the executive board of Siemens Energy AG, hydrogen trade will be crucial for its security of hydrogen supply, arguing that the country “will never be able to produce enough green hydrogen for consumption.” But he added that there are tremendous trading opportunities with potential low-cost green hydrogen producers in Latin America and the Middle East.

Broadly, the panel felt strongly that hydrogen’s moment has finally arrived—but also that numerous pieces of the market puzzle have yet to be solved before the hydrogen economy emerges as a major decarbonizing force.

—Andrea Clabough is a nonresident fellow at the Global Energy Center.

MARCH 28, 2022 | 12:24 PM WASHINGTON, 8:24 PM DUBAI

This is how the United Arab Emirates does it

In a fireside chat with Atlantic Council President and CEO Fred Kempe, Musabbeh Al Kaabi, CEO of UAE investments at the Mubadala Investment Company, highlighted his country’s unique approach to economic diversification and sustainable development, which was crafted through decades of thoughtful, forward-looking investment.

He noted that his company, which is involved in a range of sectors ranging from energy to healthcare, is a prime example of that approach—particularly given both the challenges and opportunities presented to the Middle East by global decarbonization. Al Kaabi emphasized his optimism for the UAE to be a provider of all types of energy: conventional, new, and emerging. He argued, for example, that the UAE’s exceptionally cheap solar power positions it to be a major green-hydrogen supplier, while the country’s robust oil industry is already pursuing blue hydrogen.

When asked about volatility in the region, Al Kaabi pointed to the recent Abraham Accords as an example of what can be achieved by the UAE’s forward-thinking approaches to economic diversification and societal transformation. He cited a new gas hub with UAE investment support, which will supply both Jordan and Israel with natural gas, as part of a trend he hopes will continue.

But he cautioned that the world must not wed itself to one particular energy solution, and that it will need all available technologies—including hydrogen, carbon capture utilization and storage, renewables, natural gas, and more—to make the current 2050 targets possible.

—Andrea Clabough is a nonresident fellow at the Global Energy Center.

MARCH 28, 2022 | 11:36 AM WASHINGTON, 7:36 PM DUBAI

Don’t count out Iraqi Kurdistan

That was the message delivered by Masrour Barzani, prime minister of the Kurdistan Regional Government, in a keynote message during a special session moderated by Eithne Treanor, managing director at E. Treanor Media.

He offered an emphatic vision of Kurdistan’s future as a major regional oil and gas supplier—one that is capable of meeting both the needs of its own people and supporting the natural-gas demand of Turkey, and perhaps even Europe. Barzani applauded the efforts of the United States and other countries and private-sector players to invest in the region’s ongoing revitalization of its hydrocarbons industry. He concluded: “A strong, independent Kurdistan is no threat to its neighbors…in fact, it is the opposite.”

An expert panel including several oil and gas industry representatives active in Kurdistan largely agreed. Bill Higgs, chief executive officer of Genel Energy, said his company strongly believes in Kurdistan, while Jon Harris, chief executive officer of Gulf Keystone Petroleum, pointed to his company’s plans to double its current oil production in the region.

Crescent Petroleum CEO Majid Jafar, meanwhile, focused on Kurdistan’s natural-gas potential, saying the “importance of the region is becoming increasingly recognized.”

All expressed strong support for sustainability and the economical usage of natural gas to displace other local fuel sources (especially diesel) by capturing gas to provide electricity to local communities.

—Andrea Clabough is a nonresident fellow at the Global Energy Center.

MARCH 28, 2022 | 10:34 AM WASHINGTON, 6:34 PM DUBAI

Meet the Green Builders of Tomorrow

Winners of the United Kingdom’s Green Builders of Tomorrow competition—aimed at supporting companies at the intersection of sustainability and entrepreneurship—showcased their innovative approaches to achieving net-zero in a GEF session Monday afternoon. Each chief executive officer presented their company’s unique approach to disrupting a carbon-intensive industry, providing a new option for emissions mitigation, or supporting renewable, clean energy economies.

Taken together, each unique proposal demonstrated the growing and robust market interest in emerging technologies and business opportunities in the clean economy.

Julie Chen, of The Cheeky Panda, explained how her company’s tissue and hygiene products are disrupting deforestation through the use of sustainable bamboo paper products.

Ian Mackenzie, of Trojan Energy, showcased his company’s electric car charging point—which is embedded into the pavement to make EV ownership easier for both drivers and cities.

Ernst Van Orsouw, of Roslin Technologies, discussed his company’s approach to stem cells in the production of cultivated meat, which has the potential to bring nutritious non-farm-based meats to new customers all over the world without the considerable emissions associated with traditional farming.

Jo Parker-Swift, of Solivus, described how her company is using thin-film solar panels on conventional buildings, such as stadiums and shopping malls, which cannot take the weight of solar panels made from conventional materials.

And finally, Ben Turner, of Origen Power Limited, described the potential for his company to disrupt the emissions-intensive lime industry by producing a carbon-neutral lime product.

—Andrea Clabough is a nonresident fellow at the Global Energy Center.

MARCH 28, 2022 | 9:37 AM WASHINGTON, 5:37 PM DUBAI

Why natural gas is staying—not going

Natural gas—and particularly its role in the transition—stole the show in a GEF panel about oil and gas in a net-zero world. The panelists, who represented a range of private and national oil companies, suggested that much of the narrative around it has lacked nuance, or proven problematic.

Sharif Al Olama, undersecretary for energy and petroleum affairs at the United Arab Emirates’ Ministry of Energy and Infrastructure, said natural gas is critical in his country’s energy strategy alongside renewables, and that it plans to supply both its domestic population and growing global demand for natural gas.

Dan Brouillette, president of Sempra Infrastructure and a former US secretary of energy, added that transitions usually involve using more—not less—energy, and that dense types of energy (such as fossil fuels) will be used for many years to come as a complement to renewables. He also suggested that an “all of the above” energy policy is a fundamental US one that is unlikely to change soon.

Hunter Hunt, chief executive officer and president of Hunt Consolidated Energy, LLC agreed—adding that some proposals for decarbonization through 2050 are simply not sensible.

Just Transition was also a focus. Mele Kyari, group managing director of the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation, emphasized that the specific energy-access and poverty issues in Sub-Saharan Africa must be carefully considered in transition strategies—and that investments in natural gas and liquid natural gas are crucial to the continent’s future growth and economic success and its ability to support fuel supply to Europe.

Helima Croft, managing director and head of global commodity strategy at RBC Capital Markets, similarly noted that the world cannot expect the energy transition to be cost-effective or “geopolitically benign,” and that lessons learned from the current crisis must be applied in order to ensure as minimally volatile a transition as possible.

—Andrea Clabough is a nonresident fellow at the Global Energy Center.

MARCH 28, 2022 | 8:58 AM WASHINGTON, 4:58 PM DUBAI

Will energy security derail the transition? (Part two)

The new US-EU Task Force for Energy Security is well-positioned to play a key role in US national and international-security policy. That’s what Amos J. Hochstein, US presidential coordinator for Build Back Better World, told moderator Helima Croft, managing director and head of global commodity strategy at RBC Capital Markets, during a one-on-one chat about the challenges of the energy transition Monday.

He emphasized that the United States must supply Europe with additional gas supplies immediately and in the future, as well as speed up the transition to reduce dependency on natural-gas supplies in the long term. That’s why Washington is working to ensure that all available liquid natural gas (LNG) terminals in and around Europe are importing at maximum capacity, that piped capacity is full, and that available gas storage is being optimized, he said.

Hochstein also noted that the war in Ukraine has fundamentally transformed the European view on the need to diversify away from Russian oil and gas supplies.

On domestic oil and gas production, Hochstein said “we need to make sure that our system and our economy is well-supplied to sustain growth and avoid inflationary action.” He added that US oil production could rise by 1 million barrels per day this year and suggested that investor and fiscal pressures are the key issue holding back rapid US production growth in the short term. He noted, for example, that the Biden administration has allowed significant oil and gas permitting, particularly in LNG infrastructure. Hochstein also indicated growing European support for more long-term contracts, which will ease financing for US LNG export projects.

In the long-term, he added, the energy-security challenge is as much about finding new fuels and supply chains—such as those around critical minerals—as it is about cutting back on conventional fuels, and that the Biden administration is keenly aware of these issues.

—Andrea Clabough is a nonresident fellow at the Global Energy Center.

MARCH 28, 2022 | 8:24 AM WASHINGTON, 4:24 PM DUBAI

In Europe, ‘the writing has been on the wall’

In a discussion about Europe’s energy security, Maxim Timchenko, chief executive officer of Ukrainian private energy giant DTEK, was among those who made impassioned pleas for leaders to finally confront the reality of Russia’s weaponization of energy supplies in Europe, and to cut their purchases of Russian hydrocarbons. He painted a grave picture of millions of Ukrainians struggling with no electricity or natural gas for weeks amid the Kremlin’s invasion of that country, and also argued that all money which goes to Russia from its oil and gas sales is converted directly into bullets to murder civilians.

Multiple panelists concurred. Alexander Nikolov, Bulgaria’s energy minister, noted that “the writing has been on the wall” not for months, but for years. He added that a laser focus on “green” energy solutions in Europe—at the expense of natural gas and nuclear power—facilitated this crisis.

Wolfgang Ischinger, president of the Foundation Council of the Munich Security Conference Foundation, said the prevailing view in Germany continues to be that sanctioning Russian oil and gas now takes a crucial tool off the table if Russia chooses to escalate further—a view he believes is short-sighted.

Atlantic Council President and CEO Fred Kempe agreed with what he described as Ischinger’s “minority view,” adding that the conflict is increasingly about who is going to shape global order. He concluded that “sanctions have to be toughened” and that strong energy-sector sanctions will need to be ultimately rolled out in Europe. He suggested that the global narrative around this war is changing, and that citizens are becoming increasingly determined to prevent Russian President Vladimir Putin from winning the war.

—Andrea Clabough is a nonresident fellow at the Global Energy Center.

MARCH 28, 2022 | 8:06 AM WASHINGTON, 4:06 PM DUBAI

Leading oil and gas into a net-zero world

The urgency of climate action has clouded the future of oil and gas in the energy transition. Pressure on oil and gas producers to adapt their operations to fit into a net-zero world has grown, from both policymakers and the investment community. But a supply crisis and price spikes have illustrated the danger of moving away from these fuels without a sufficient corresponding uptake of cleaner alternatives. Most models of the energy transition also suggest that continued petrochemical demand and use in transportation will ensure a considerable level of oil and gas demand, even in a net-zero scenario.

Oil and gas will thus continue to play a key role in the energy transition. It will be incumbent on the industry, policymakers, and investors to walk a precarious tightrope, keeping markets stable through sufficient continued oil and gas production while pursuing ambitious decarbonization targets. Technologies like clean hydrogen and carbon capture, utilization, and storage, with the potential to lessen oil and gas’s traditionally emissions-intensive footprint, could help. So could carbon offsetting. But clarity is needed, and without it, supply-demand mismatches could rage on without any meaningful emissions reductions to speak of. For the transition to be both smooth and comprehensive, oil and gas will require both rigorous accountability and support for the practices and technologies that can help make them compatible with a net-zero world.

Report

Mar 27, 2022

Leading oil and gas into a net-zero world

By Alex Dewar, Randolph Bell, Reed Blakemore, and David W. Yellen

Oil and gas may have an important role to play in a net-zero world. This report examines the best ways to use policy and investment levers to set the sector up for success.

Energy & Environment Oil and Gas

MARCH 28, 2022 | 7:06 AM WASHINGTON, 3:06 PM DUBAI

Will energy security derail the transition? (Part one)

A move to clean energy is crucial, but securing today’s supply and investing wisely are also key. That was the conclusion of a GEF panel featuring Tim Holt, member of the executive board at Siemens Energy AG, Anna Shpitsberg, deputy assistant secretary for energy transformation at the US State Department, Majid Jafar, CEO of Crescent Petroleum, and Claudio Descalzi, CEO of Eni.

Holt highlighted how the current moment in energy geopolitics has “accelerate[d] the transition,” and that the world faces a crucial test of reducing natural gas in Europe while pushing harder to achieve the energy transition as quickly as possible. He added that while the world has “a lot of the ingredients, it’s just the implementation” when it comes to following through on the transition. Shpitsberg largely concurred, adding that the United States is pouring billions of dollars into energy diversification through hydrogen and also carbon capture, utilization, and storage. She also argued that compromising on one goal to the detriment of another shouldn’t be an option.

Meanwhile, Jafar and Descalzi agreed—but also argued for a more nuanced perspective, given the level of energy poverty throughout the world (for example, billions still lack access to clean cooking). They viewed the push to divest from oil and gas as deeply problematic and counterproductive; oil, for example, is still used in a wide range of products while natural gas has massive decarbonization potential in various parts of the world still reliant on coal. That’s why underinvestment in conventional energy—especially hydrocarbons—could actually undermine energy security, they said.

—Andrea Clabough is a nonresident fellow at the Global Energy Center.

MARCH 28, 2022 | 4:15 AM WASHINGTON, 12:15 PM DUBAI

Urgency and reality collide as GEF kicks off

Atlantic Council President and CEO Frederick Kempe, UAE Special Envoy for Climate Change and Minister of Industry and Advanced Technology Sultan Al Jaber (also managing director of Abu Dhabi National Oil Company), and UAE Minister of Energy and Infrastructure Suhail Al Mazrouei opened this year’s Global Energy Forum by acknowledging the urgency of the moment in global energy security—but also the need to balance a long-term transition with immediate, near-term energy security needs.

Kempe noted the challenges of 2022—the ongoing pandemic, inflation and, most recently, the Russian invasion of Ukraine—and said energy is central to the global drama. The current crisis in European energy security is clear evidence of this reality, he added, proving that the energy transition “is not a light switch” but will take years to navigate. Rising energy prices are putting the transition at risk by threatening the global cohesion that is necessary to realize a net-zero emissions world. Kempe added that the choice between climate action and energy security is a false one.

Al Jaber (who noted the achievements of Dubai Expo 2020) argued that long-term underinvestment in oil and gas has left markets exposed to these challenges—with those markets tightening amid rising global demand year-on-year. While the world must embrace the transition, he said, policies must be tailored to “real world scenarios,” and that “if we fail to plan, our plan will definitely fail.” Al Jaber also said many in Europe and the United States are beginning to accept that the transition will take time, which has resulted in a belated pivot to reconsider near-term energy security, and added that the United Arab Emirates is taking leadership on both near-term energy security and the long-term energy transition with long-term sustainable economic growth at the forefront of its strategy. He argued for a clear, global roadmap with strong foundations—but without defunding the current energy system before a new one can replace it.

Al Mazrouei argued that the current global crisis was predicted years ago, particularly the need for more investment in hydrocarbons and supply diversity, and emphasized that the geopolitical situation is negatively affecting all aspects of energy and human security. He added that diversifying the global natural gas supply is especially important, and that failure to invest and develop resources in this area will lead to even tighter markets. He noted that the United Arab Emirates will continue to work with the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) to ensure stable global markets, and will also aim to produce the lowest carbon barrels in the world. Al Mazrouei also discussed his commitment to bringing affordable hydrogen to market—first blue, then green—and highlighted three pillars of a realistic energy strategy: secure, affordable, and sustainable supply.

Speaking with Kempe at the end of the opening session, Al Mazrouei reiterated the importance of OPEC in stabilizing global energy markets and argued that politics around sanctioned countries (such as Russia) must not interfere with the organization’s broader mission. On raising oil and gas production immediately, he noted significant production declines in recent years and that at least 5-8 million barrels need to be replaced each year through investment. He added that pressure on the international oil companies from their shareholders to leave hydrocarbons has, in turn, pressured national oil companies, and he highlighted the need for a viable long-term perspective on energy now. In particular, financial and analytical institutions, such as the International Energy Agency, must adopt realistic perspectives on long-term investment in oil and gas and recognize the needs of global consumers who need affordable energy and commodities.

—Andrea Clabough is a nonresident fellow at the Global Energy Center.

MARCH 28, 2022 | 3:11 AM WASHINGTON, 11:11 PM DUBAI

Pakistan: The next great infrastructure connector

Pakistan sits at the crossroads of the abundant resources of Central Asia and the Middle East, and the lucrative markets of China and India. It, therefore, has the potential to play a significant connecting role.

But Pakistan’s network, though rapidly advancing, is not yet ready to take on these responsibilities. However, there are considerable opportunities; from energy transportation and roadbuilding to digital connectivity and rail access, if Pakistan pursues significant infrastructure improvements, it has a chance to assume the mantle of the region’s great connector.

Issue Brief

Mar 28, 2022

Pakistan: The next great infrastructure connector

By Ali Jehangir Siddiqui

Pakistan sits at the crossroads of the abundant resources of Central Asia and the Middle East, and the lucrative markets of China and India. It therefore has the potential to play a significant connecting role, one that enables broader regional interdependency while boosting domestic economic prospects.

Energy & Environment Energy Transitions

MARCH 27, 2022 | 2:00 PM WASHINGTON, 10:00 PM DUBAI

The United States, Canada, and the minerals challenge

An energy mix enabled by clean technologies will be far more mineral-intensive than its hydrocarbon-based predecessor. Demand for minerals like lithium, nickel, and cobalt is projected to skyrocket over the coming years, with supply chains largely unprepared to scale up accordingly. And procurement of these minerals has been plagued by concerns over environmental impact, human rights violations, and state monopoly over specific parts of the value chain, posing both moral and strategic issues.

The onus now falls on policymakers in the United States and Canada to develop resilient, sustainable, and transparent mineral supply chains. As two of the world’s most advanced economies, the US and Canada have the opportunity to take the lead in preempting the emergence of some of the hazards that characterize the oil and gas-based system. It will not be easy; value chains are full of chokepoints, and mining operations have not always followed best practices. But to both enable a smooth energy transition and ensure that procurement does not negate minerals’ carbon-reducing benefits, the US and Canada must act now.

Report

Mar 27, 2022

The United States, Canada, and the minerals challenge

By Reed Blakemore, Paddy Ryan, Randolph Bell

Americas Energy & Environment

MARCH 17, 2022 | 1:13 PM WASHINGTON, 9:13 PM DUBAI

Unearthing potential: The value of geothermal energy to US decarbonization

Achieving US climate goals requires the development and widespread deployment of all available clean energy solutions. Geothermal energy, while currently only a marginal component of the US energy economy, can contribute significantly to the climate action effort. It has the potential to support deep decarbonization through clean baseload generation, efficient heating and cooling, lithium co-production, and a host of other applications.

However, current policy towards geothermal energy has, thus far, prevented the emergence of a vibrant market that would stimulate sector growth. To realize the potential of geothermal energy, public- and private-sector leaders must support policies that encourage geothermal industries and address regulatory, technical, and economic barriers. This report and accompanying two-pager make several recommendations with the potential to optimize US geothermal policy to set the sector up for a central role in the fight against climate change.

Report

Mar 17, 2022

Unearthing potential: The value of geothermal energy to US decarbonization

By Zachary Strauss

Energy & Environment Energy Transitions

JANUARY 19, 2022 | 12:23 AM WASHINGTON, 8:23 PM DUBAI

The 2022 Global Energy Agenda

The year 2021 began with high hopes for climate action, as many members of the international community—including, once again, the US—rededicated themselves to the effort and looked to deploy resources accordingly. But as global economic demand roared back from its pandemic-dampened level in 2020, energy supply failed to keep up, inflating hydrocarbon prices, driving countries back to dirty coal generation, and underscoring the challenges of the “transition” part of the energy transition. It became clear that countries will need to thread the needle between pushing for ambitious emissions reductions and keeping prices down and the lights on in the interim, all against an ever more precarious geopolitical backdrop.

Our experts offer ways forward for the energy transition in the face of hazards like Russian aggression, supply-demand mismatch, and a transition that threatens to leave the global poor behind.

Global Energy Agenda

Jan 19, 2022

The 2022 Global Energy Agenda

By Randolph Bell, Jennifer T. Gordon, Ameya Hadap, and Paul Kielstra (Editors)

Energy & Environment Geopolitics & Energy Security

JANUARY 18, 2022 | 11:15 AM WASHINGTON, 7:15 PM DUBAI

In the wake of the pandemic, new thinking on the way to net zero

In January, the Global Energy Forum made its way to Abu Dhabi Sustainability Week to address the outcomes of COP26 and discuss opportunities to move forward on climate goals.

Global Energy Forum virtual programming at ADSW

The Atlantic Council Global Energy Center hosted a series of virtual events to complement ADSW programming, bringing together government, civil society, and the private sector to discuss the pathways to net-zero.

Catch up on last year’s Global Energy Forum

Last year our Global Energy Center gathered leaders, officials, and experts to focus on the post-pandemic energy system, net-zero carbon goals, the Middle East’s role in the energy transition, and the Biden administration’s energy priorities.

Top UAE officials assess renewables, peak oil, and the post-COVID energy market

The world is about to embark on a big energy transition. Here’s what it could look like.

What China’s march to net-zero emissions means for the world

Why Iran could top Biden’s Middle East agenda

How climate change can become a bipartisan issue in the Biden era

Online Event Thu, March 17, 2022 • 10:00 am ET

How to design an energy transition that includes everyone—including the most vulnerable

The post Meet the global leaders powering the world’s energy transition appeared first on Atlantic Council.

AC Selects: Ukraine’s energy security and US-Mexico growth opportunities

rcasberg — Fri, 18 Mar 2022 19:30:00 +0000

Week of March 18, 2022

Last week, the Eurasia Center and Latin America Center hosted experts to discuss the consequences of Russia’s war on European energy security, the US-Mexico bilateral relationship, and strategies to sustain green and equitable economic growth across the Americas.

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I think the whole world realized the seriousness of this request (no-fly zone) because it will be a disaster not only for Ukraine but the whole continent if they attacked another nuclear power station.
Maxim Timchenko, Chief Executive Officer, DTEK

The consequences of Russia’s war on energy security

Russia’s war in Ukraine is throwing into question Europe’s entire energy policy, with countries scrambling to find replacements for Russian hydrocarbons.

Geopolitics & Energy Security Nuclear Energy Oil and Gas Russia

There is such great human suffering that’s going on and one person, one dictator can do what is being done… the unity of the world, the Western world is really important.
Ken Salazar, US Ambassador to Mexico

Online Event Thu, March 17, 2022 • 8:15 am ET

Ambassadors Salazar & Moctezuma on US-Mexico priorities: Migration, energy, security & beyond

Where do the United States and Mexico currently stand on consensus around top issues for the bilateral agenda? What are key advancements in priority issues, and what may be new opportunities for working together?

Americas Energy & Environment Latin America Mexico

The toughest challenges that cross borders from immigration, gender equity, and climate change in this pandemic, we have a better shot of addressing those if we don’t wait only for national governments to solve them.
Eric Garcetti, Mayor, Los Angeles, California

Public Event Thu, March 17, 2022 • 12:00 pm ET

Road to the Summit: A green and equitable future for the Americas

A conversation to generate strategies for green and equitable economic growth across the Americas.

Americas Climate Change & Climate Action Economy & Business Inclusive Growth

The Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center broadens understanding of regional transformations and delivers constructive, results-oriented solutions to inform how the public and private sectors can advance hemispheric prosperity.

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Slavin quoted in L’Oreient Le Jour on Iran’s demands regarding sanctions during JCPOA talks

Atlantic Council — Fri, 18 Mar 2022 16:17:00 +0000

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Slavin quoted in the Italian Institute for International Political Studies on how JCPOA talks may be impacted by Russian aggression in Ukraine

Atlantic Council — Fri, 18 Mar 2022 16:07:00 +0000

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Slavin quoted in Tehran Times on potential economic opportunities for Iran through the JCPOA

Atlantic Council — Mon, 14 Mar 2022 17:36:00 +0000

Explore the #BritainDebrief series

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#BritainDebrief – Can Decarbonization Disarm Putin’s War Machine? A Debrief from Laurie Laybourn

Ben Judah — Sat, 12 Mar 2022 19:32:12 +0000

Can decarbonization disarm Putin’s war machine?

As European countries have reluctantly started to announce programs to be less reliant on Russian oil and gas, Senior Fellow Ben Judah interviewed Laurie Laybourn, Visiting Fellow at the Chatham House Sustainability Accelerator for #BritainDebrief. What have the UK and Europe announced so far in addressing their reliance on Russian oil and gas? How can the UK and Europe face the new “petro-aggression” from Russia? What long-term steps must be taken in encouraging sustainability to prevent more petro-aggression in the future?

You can watch #BritainDebrief on YouTube and as a podcast on Apple Podcasts and Spotify.

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Economy & Business European Union

The Europe Center promotes leadership, strategies, and analysis to ensure a strong, ambitious, and forward-looking transatlantic relationship.

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Slavin joins Voice of America to discuss the status of Iran nuclear talks and Russia’s role in recent drawbacks

Atlantic Council — Fri, 11 Mar 2022 20:54:00 +0000

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Wald quoted in National Review on an Iran nuclear deal

jgomez — Thu, 03 Mar 2022 18:25:00 +0000

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Building on US advanced reactor demonstration momentum: Federal power purchase agreements

Matt Bowen — Fri, 11 Feb 2022 15:50:37 +0000

The Tennessee Valley Authority’s announcement regarding a possible new build at the Clinch River site added another bit of momentum to the US effort to demonstrate advanced reactors. Specifically, TVA announced that it would be investing $200 million towards a license application to submit to the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission to potentially deploy a light-water small modular reactor, and that it was in discussions with GE-Hitachi to support their BWRX-300 design.

The TVA announcement brings the number of possible US advanced reactor demonstrations planned for the 2020s to five: (potentially) GE’s BWRX-300 in Tennessee; Kairos Power’s Hermes reactor, also in Tennessee; TerraPower’s Natrium reactor in Wyoming; X-energy’s Xe-100 reactor plant in the state of Washington; and NuScale’s VOYGR reactor plant in Idaho.

Perhaps the table is now largely set at this point for US advanced reactor demonstration efforts over the next decade, though its overall success is by no means assured. To add further support, the federal government could decide to make use of another policy lever: federal power purchase agreements.

The idea has been studied in the past by DOE contractors, including case studies for reactor deployments on or near DOE sites in Idaho and Tennessee. In 2018, DOE had even announced a Memorandum of Understanding that stated an intent to draw on commercial power modules at the Idaho National Laboratory (INL) site, and an intention to work with the local utility regarding supply of power to INL. Along these lines, in the 117^th Congress, a bipartisan group of lawmakers introduced the Nuclear Power Purchase Agreements Act, which would require DOE to enter into a power purchase agreement with an advanced reactor project.

The concept could get a boost from a December 2021 Executive Order from the Biden White House that directs the federal government to use its procurement power to achieve “100 percent carbon pollution-free electricity on a net annual basis by 2030, including 50 percent 24/7 carbon pollution-free electricity.” Energy from advanced reactor projects could certainly help to meet this requirement for 24/7 carbon free power, and federal action in this direction would in turn help to support reactor demonstration in time to assist with decarbonization endeavors to mid-century.

The success of the US initiative to demonstrate advanced reactors will depend on a variety of factors, including effective project management of their construction, future state and federal policies focused on reducing US carbon emissions, and other policies to assist with first-of-a-kind deployment of low-carbon technologies, such as small modular reactors (e.g., the bipartisan Energy Sector Innovation Credit). Executive Branch procurement of power from first-of-a-kind reactor projects could be one helpful—and achievable—near-term component of the US effort.

Matt Bowen is a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council Global Energy Center.

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The Atlantic Council’s dedicated home for the exploration of nuclear energy’s future.

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Slavin quoted in Le Point on challenges of US-Iran nuclear negotiations in Vienna

Atlantic Council — Tue, 08 Feb 2022 15:35:00 +0000

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Slavin quoted in Al Jazeera on US-Iran nuclear talks in Vienna and future negotiations

Atlantic Council — Tue, 08 Feb 2022 15:32:00 +0000

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Slavin quoted in USA Today on US-Iran negotiations amidst Ukraine crisis

Atlantic Council — Mon, 07 Feb 2022 14:44:00 +0000

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Sullivan in Arab News: Nuclear power is needed for net zero and more

jgomez — Thu, 27 Jan 2022 16:57:00 +0000

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Slavin quoted by the Italian Institute for International Political Studies (ISPI) on Biden’s Middle East Policy

Atlantic Council — Thu, 20 Jan 2022 20:06:00 +0000

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Nia quoted in DawnMENA on the fate of the Iranian nuclear deal

Atlantic Council — Wed, 22 Dec 2021 16:44:00 +0000

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Dagres quoted in DawnMENA on the fate of the Iranian nuclear deal

Atlantic Council — Wed, 22 Dec 2021 16:42:00 +0000

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Slavin quoted in DawnMENA on the fate of the Iranian nuclear deal

Atlantic Council — Wed, 22 Dec 2021 16:40:00 +0000

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Slavin in The Washington Post: We should work more on ‘Plan A’ with Iran before moving to ‘Plan B’

Atlantic Council — Wed, 22 Dec 2021 16:34:00 +0000

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Dagres quoted in Monocle on the final round of pre-holiday nuclear talks with Iran in Vienna

Atlantic Council — Mon, 20 Dec 2021 16:15:00 +0000

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Slavin joins i24 to discuss Iran allowing IAEA cameras in nuclear sites

Atlantic Council — Wed, 15 Dec 2021 15:31:00 +0000

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Dagres joins Monocle to discuss the latest on the Iran nuclear talks

Atlantic Council — Thu, 09 Dec 2021 14:47:00 +0000

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Azodi joins BBC Persian to discuss the economic implications of reviving the JCPOA

Atlantic Council — Sun, 05 Dec 2021 21:13:00 +0000

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Azodi quoted in Al Jazeera on the US strategy towards Iran’s revival of nuclear talks in Vienna

Atlantic Council — Thu, 02 Dec 2021 21:26:00 +0000

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Azodi quoted in Al Jazeera on US’ plan B if the Iran nuclear talks in Vienna fail

Atlantic Council — Thu, 02 Dec 2021 21:18:00 +0000

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The EU contributed to its own energy crisis, but diversification can solve it

Ellen Wald — Wed, 24 Nov 2021 14:35:34 +0000

Power shortages and sky-high natural gas prices are raising very real fears that millions of European households could see blackouts or be unable to afford to stay warm this winter. However, the European Union (EU) has concrete measures at its disposal that would help alleviate this crisis and prevent future crises. The EU can and must diversify its fuel sources to ensure that there will always be enough affordable, clean energy available.

The most immediate cause of the energy crisis is a lack of natural gas, which accounted for 22 percent of power generation in the EU in 2019. The EU receives natural gas directly from Russia through the Nord Stream pipeline, but Russia recently decreased shipments, causing prices to soar and stoking fears of shortages. Russia claims the decreased supply is a seasonal change to divert more natural gas into storage caverns to prepare for higher domestic demand during the winter. However, the cut in supply also coincides with the completion of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline and Russia’s efforts to bully the EU Commission into supporting the pipeline’s final approval.

EU member states must act to diversify their sources of natural gas, because Russia is clearly not a reliable partner. Even though liquefied natural gas (LNG) is more expensive than natural gas via pipeline, member states should turn to American and Middle Eastern LNG providers to diversify their sources of natural gas. This will help avoid the necessity of turning to higher carbon-emitting sources of power like coal and oil in order to keep electricity flowing.

The EU has been implementing a major transition to renewable energies for two decades, but it has found only minimal success. In 2020, less than 20 percent of the EU’s electricity came from wind and solar, and only 13 percent came from hydropower. Though percentages are rising, there simply is not enough renewable power in the bloc at present, and it is unreliable when available. Solar power shuts down at night; wind power fails when the wind stops blowing. There is an important place for renewables in the energy landscape, but they must be adopted with a realistic view to the current abilities of the technologies. The EU should continue to increase its renewable energy generation, but not as a replacement for stable, reliable sources of clean energy.

Similarly, government regulation and political choices concerning nuclear technology are stymieing solutions for current and future energy crises. After the Fukushima nuclear accident in Japan, German Chancellor Angela Merkel pledged to shut down nuclear plants. As a result, Germany, which is the EU’s largest economy and was once an electricity exporter, has become an importer. Nuclear plants are the epitome of reliable power generation, providing stable electricity at all hours of the day, throughout the year. Nuclear plants are expensive and politically challenging to build, but Britain, France and Germany, in particular, should halt planned closures of nuclear plants and maintain those that are safe and functioning.

Even though some of the EU’s largest economies shunned nuclear power for the past decade, other EU countries are actively pursuing new nuclear power sources. These include traditional light-water reactors and next-generation nuclear technologies. These policies should be encouraged, as adding more nuclear baseload capacity in the EU will help moderate electricity price spikes associated with natural gas availability. France’s recent announcement that it will now support building new nuclear power plants is an encouraging sign, as are recent agreements between the United States and Romania and between the United States and Ukraine.

Beyond nuclear power, alternative energy technologies like biofuels have been insufficient to replace old fuels in the EU market. The Renewable Energy Directive, which governs biofuels in the EU market, is hurting the bloc’s energy security. Specifically, this directive places regulatory barriers on imported biofuels, with the clear intent to push the EU towards homegrown biofuels. The European continent’s moderate climate works for cultivating rapeseed oil and soybeans but not palm oil-based fuel, which presents several environmental advantages. Palm oil requires less than 15 percent of the fertilizer and pesticides than rapeseed and soybeans require, and it produces eleven times more fuel per hectare than soybean oil, ten times more than sunflower oil, and seven times more than rapeseed oil.

The Renewable Energy Directive, though, has imposed a de facto ban on palm oil as a biofuel, to prop up domestic producers. The EU wants to be a responsible participant in protecting the environment while also assisting its own economy. It can do both by revoking the restrictive biofuel provisions of the Renewable Energy Directive and re-committing to the future of biofuels by opening to imports of palm oil, with an eye towards sustainability and responsible stewardship.

Of course, the EU wants to preserve the environment and maintain the lifestyles of its 450 million citizens. To power its economy and the lifestyles of its people, it must diversify its energy sources, not restrict them. Otherwise, this crisis will not be the last.

Ellen Wald is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council Global Energy Center and the president of Transversal Consulting.

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EnergySource Nov 18, 2021

Following COP26, cybersecurity must be a central piece of the energy transition

By Leo Simonovich

The backbone of advanced energy systems is increasingly digital. That means that cybersecurity is essential to a secure energy transition. Private and public sector leaders should work to ensure its hardiness.

Energy & Environment Energy Transitions

EnergySource Oct 25, 2021

IEA World Energy Outlook 2021: All eyes on net zero

By Ameya Hadap

With COP26 rapidly approaching and the challenge of net zero on everyone’s minds, climate negotiators need tools. The IEA’s World Energy Outlook 2021 is the perfect one.

Energy & Environment Energy Transitions

EnergySource Oct 23, 2021

Rapid Response: The energy crisis

By Global Energy Center

Global Energy Center experts comment on the energy crisis, energy security, and the future of the transition.

Energy & Environment Energy Markets & Governance

Learn more about the Global Energy Center

Global Energy Center

The Global Energy Center promotes energy security by working alongside government, industry, civil society, and public stakeholders to devise pragmatic solutions to the geopolitical, sustainability, and economic challenges of the changing global energy landscape.

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Nasr with NPR Capradio News: Iran and U.S. are trying to renegotiate nuclear deal

Atlantic Council — Sun, 21 Nov 2021 00:42:00 +0000

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Nasr with NPR Illinois FM 91.9: Iran and U.S. are trying to renegotiate nuclear deal

Atlantic Council — Sun, 21 Nov 2021 00:35:00 +0000

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Gordon quoted in Reuters on VTR and the US Budget

jbekenstein — Fri, 19 Nov 2021 20:55:45 +0000

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COP26 is coming to a close. Here are the wins and losses.

Dan Peleschuk — Fri, 12 Nov 2021 19:01:21 +0000

The United Nations Conference of the Parties (COP26) concluded Saturday in Glasgow, Scotland, as nearly two hundred nations signed on to a deal that called on governments to enact stricter emissions reductions and for wealthy nations to double funding to protect countries most at risk—though the language about coal was watered down at the last minute.

Throughout the twelve-day event, our team on the ground at COP26 and elsewhere kept tabs on the range of relevant issues—from nuclear energy to climate finance—as they developed, while also bringing together high-level figures to hash out solutions.

The progress and pitfalls went far beyond Saturday’s carefully negotiated final agreement. Here’s a selection of our experts’ commentary that dug deeper to explain what really mattered at COP26 (and what didn’t):

What the energy transition still needs: a price on carbon

Global Energy Center Deputy Director Reed Blakemore weighed in with his big takeaways as the summit wrapped up.

“COP26 observers will leave Glasgow with a number of positive (and tangible!) takeaways from the past two weeks—a global methane pledge, an apparent opportunity for the United States and China to more directly collaborate on climate action, and a resounding commitment from private finance to put a huge sum of money on the table in the pursuit of climate action, just to name a few.

Though looking beyond the headlines, here are a few interesting threads emerging out of COP26 that will be worth watching in the coming year, based on my observations of the discourse, speeches, meetings, and pull-asides:

In completely separate discussions about mineral supply chains, sustainable aviation fuels, and small modular nuclear reactors, business leaders all concluded that a price on carbon is key to taking their business to the next level. That shows us that continued inaction from policymakers to establish a market for carbon is becoming the biggest obstacle to unlocking the next phase of energy transition.
There’s fast-growing interest from NGOs, policymakers, and business leaders alike in stimulating behavioral change by energy consumers to reduce their consumption. This isn’t necessarily a new idea, but it now has an angle that’s similar to an oft-referenced challenge from the fossil-fuel industry: Forcing production of undesired energy sources out of the energy mix without corresponding changes in demand will just shift management of those fossil-fuel assets to other, possibly less accountable parties, rather than eliminate it outright.
The current energy crisis has forced a reckoning as to the role of oil and gas in the energy transition, though there is still significant daylight between the clean-energy and oil-and-gas policy camps as to what that role looks like, particularly in relation to the role of climate finance in cleaning up emissions from existing oil and gas infrastructure.
Not nearly enough attention is being paid by clean-energy technologists to clean-energy supply chains—especially regarding the scale of minerals and materials that will be required to meet clean-energy deployment goals. If not taken seriously by business leaders and policymakers alike, insufficient supplies of transition minerals such as lithium, copper, and rare-earth elements will foment the next crisis in the energy transition.”

The United States got more serious about nuclear power….

Jennifer T. Gordon, managing editor and senior fellow at the Council’s Global Energy Center, broke down why the US Nuclear Futures Initiative, which was announced in Glasgow on November 3, is so important:

“The US Department of State’s announcement of the $25 million Nuclear Futures Package—aimed at helping a wide array of countries acquire nuclear energy technologies—at COP26 … was a major milestone, and an implicit argument for the role of nuclear energy as a necessary tool in the fight against climate change. The coordination on this issue of several US government entities—including State and the Departments of Commerce and Energy, among others—also shows the importance of a whole-of-government approach to civil nuclear exports.

That the Nuclear Futures Package was announced by Ambassador Bonnie Jenkins, Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security, demonstrates the intrinsic relationship between US civil nuclear export leadership and global safety and nonproliferation. Countries interested in purchasing nuclear energy technologies from the United States must adhere to the highest standards of safety and nonproliferation.

The funding is intended to build capacity for nuclear energy programs around the world, but not the reactors themselves. It will cover areas such as equipment, feasibility studies, and technical collaboration. While the eventual reactors will almost certainly carry much larger price tags, financing questions can be solved as long as the foundations of civil nuclear cooperation are built—which is exactly what this new initiative will do.”

…but it also gave up moral ground.

Matthew Bryza, a nonresident senior fellow at the Global Energy Center, believes the United States was wrong in failing to join the multinational pledge to move off coal, which included dozens of countries:

“Underlying the fundamental goal of COP26—to implement the Paris Climate Accord—is a moral argument: Because we all share this planet, all countries are obligated to make national sacrifices to achieve net-zero carbon emissions by 2050. Persuading the Global South to ditch the carbon-rich energy on which the Global North grew wealthy requires strong moral leadership.

COP26 provides the United States a crucial chance to help move the world from parochialism to collective self-preservation—but it risks squandering this monumental opportunity.

Given President Joe Biden’s goal of a carbon-free electricity system in the United States by 2035, it seemed natural the United States would join this week’s multinational pledge to move away from coal. Instead, it joined China and other heavy coal users, such as India and Australia, in refusing to join the agreement.

The timing seems politically suspicious, coinciding with final deliberations in the Congress on Biden’s historic spending packages for infrastructure and economic recovery. Perhaps understandably, the president’s team wants to avoid risking the crucial vote of Democratic Sen. Joe Manchin—who hails from West Virginia, where coal is king. Without Manchin’s vote, Biden’s historic spending packages will be doomed (maybe along with his presidency).

Succumbing to parochial interests is the opposite of moral leadership. The US browbeating of developing countries such as South Africa to ditch the coal on which its economic future heavily depends will now ring hollow. Similarly, pressing other countries of the Global South to sign on to the landmark agreement to fight deforestation (which may be COP 26’s biggest achievement so far) will seem selfish and unfair. That may be why Indonesia appears set to back out of that agreement.

Refreshingly, Biden ‘talked the talk’ when he claimed during his first presidential visit to Europe in June that “America is back.” Now, at COP 26, it’s essential to ‘walk the walk.'”

Why that coal pledge is complicated…

Ellen Wald, a nonresident fellow at the Council’s Global Energy Center, wasn’t exactly celebrating the agreement:

“These commitments are being hailed as historic—but how meaningful can we expect them to be?

A quick look at what’s happening today with coal suggests they won’t make much of an impact in reducing global emissions. In the United Kingdom, for instance, power generators have now been forced to fire up dormant coal plants as the amount of electricity being generated from wind fell to very low levels during periods of peak demand. In China, meanwhile, the government has been pressing coal mines to boost production because the high cost of natural gas has recently caused widespread power cuts. (China’s daily coal production hit 11.2 million tons yesterday— an increase of 1 million from early October.)

And in the United States, coal consumption has declined significantly over the past fifteen years as natural gas replaced coal as a key fossil fuel for electricity generation. But the country is now facing an unprecedented dislocation in energy prices, with the potential for consumers across the country to face record high prices this winter. The culprit is likely natural gas, which is more expensive now than it has been for years, and in much greater demand than ever before, because of this turn away from coal. According to the Energy Information Agency, US coal production rose during the second quarter of 2021, while exports increased by 6.9 percent in the second quarter of 2021. This is not a true pivot away from coal.

Notably, neither China nor the United States nor India—all major coal producers and consumers—signed on. Without these nations, this week’s pledges lack enforcement measures. Given how quickly nations have stepped up coal production to meet electricity demand which is unmet by natural gas, and to relieve high electricity prices, it doesn’t seem like coal is going away anytime soon. It cannot be the alternative when the wind doesn’t blow, the sun isn’t shining, and when natural gas supplies are disrupted.”

…and what the methane agreement means.

George Frampton, a distinguished senior fellow and the director of the Transatlantic Climate Policy Initiative at the Global Energy Center, weighs in on the pledge by world leaders on November 2 to cut methane emissions 30 percent by 2030:

“First announced in September, the Global Methane Pledge now includes almost ninety countries—sixty of which have signed up in just the past few weeks—which comprise half of the world’s top thirty methane emitters. They account for two-thirds of the global economy. Brazil, a top-five emitter, just joined this week. So the Kerry team has been doing a lot of successful work on this issue.

The less interesting thing about the announcement is that Biden had already made a commitment to reduce methane, and the Environmental Protection Agency is effectively just reinstating—and slightly expanding—a rule it released at the end of the Obama administration, developed as a joint pledge with Canada to reduce methane 30 percent by 2030. (The Obama rule was cancelled by Congress through the Congressional Review Act during the Trump administration.)

More interesting is not only the large number of countries that signed on to methane reduction targets at COP26, but also those that didn’t—some of the world’s largest producers. For the European Union, Japan, South Korea, and others that don’t generate much methane, developing policy is about slowly limiting, or disfavoring, gas and oil from countries that don’t do a good job in reducing methane leakage.

Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates were among those who signed up, although they are not (as some might suspect) among the very biggest emitters because their oil and gas systems are relatively modern and control leaks. But some of the biggest emitters who do not do such a good job—including Russia, China, and India—are not yet ready to make the commitment.”

Women are central to a climate solution.

During a Global Environment Facility panel on adaptation innovation on November 8, Jorge Gastelumendi, director of global policy for the Council’s Adrienne Arsht-Rockefeller Foundation Resilience Center, explained the critical role of women in boosting climate resilience:

“Women and children are way more affected than men by climate change, and we need women working in [climate] finance and micro-finance. We need them—not because it’s a nice thing to have, but without social resilience, without social justice, it’s impossible to have climate resilience and climate justice.”

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Nuclear power and the energy transition in non-OECD countries

Robert F. Ichord, Jr. — Wed, 10 Nov 2021 16:38:56 +0000

As the COP26 participants in Glasgow discuss emissions reduction commitments, financing requirements, and the pathways to achieving net zero carbon, the challenge of the energy transition in non-OECD countries is of central importance. There are at least four reasons for a focus on these countries: (1) they accounted for about 60 percent of global primary energy and electricity consumption in 2020; (2) with their high dependence on fossil fuels (86 percent) and consumption of 82 percent of the world’s coal, they produced about two-thirds of global energy-related CO₂ emissions; (3) their energy requirements are expected to grow faster than those in OECD countries over the next 30 years due to increases in population, incomes, and urbanization, thus increasing further their share of global primary energy and greenhouse gas emissions; (4) these countries need financing and technical support from OECD countries, which pledged in Paris to provide $100 billion per year to support developing countries in their climate mitigation and adaptation efforts. Though a consensus has solidified on the importance of investment in renewables, nuclear power’s place in the menu of zero-emission options is more uncertain but potentially quite significant. In non-OECD countries, the long development timelines and high costs associated with large reactor construction will prevent nuclear power from increasing its share of electricity production (currently 5 percent of electricity generation and 16 percent of carbon-free electricity). But the emerging generation of small modular reactors (SMRs) and other advanced nuclear technology may increase its viability as a more important source of clean power in the 2030-to-2050 timeframe.

At the G20 meeting preceding COP26, leaders agreed to end overseas financing of coal power plants by the end of the year. Another pledge followed soon after at COP26, with 23 countries—including key non-OECD coal consumers Indonesia and Vietnam—pledging to phase out coal. These policies will push some non-OECD countries, especially in coal-intensive South and Southeast Asia, to look to other sources of energy to meet their growing power needs. They have already begun to diversify away from coal towards natural gas and imported liquefied natural gas (LNG) as well as renewables and, in some cases, nuclear.

Nuclear power plants are currently operating in fifteen non-OECD countries and provide a firm, zero-emission, and baseload substitute for coal. It does not appear, however, that nuclear power—outside of China, India, Russia, and UAE, four countries actively engaged in new nuclear projects at home—will make much of a contribution by 2030 in the major non-OECD emitters given the status of plans and the long lead times involved in completing conventional, large nuclear units. Even in China and India, which have made new pledges to reach net zero by 2060 and 2070 respectively and are currently building 25 of the 35 nuclear units under construction in non-OECD countries, nuclear power’s role in reducing coal generation will be modest by 2030, comprising under 6% of total generation.

In the post-2030 timeframe, the story may be quite different given the accelerating innovation in the nuclear sector and the advent of SMR technologies that are now entering the demonstration phase in the US, Canada, and the United Kingdom, in some instances in cooperation with Japanese and South Korean companies. China has also started construction of a SMR demonstration project for a 125 megawatt (MW) land-based pressurized water reactor, and Russia is working on a modification of a 50MW icebreaker reactor for remote sites. SMRs of 300MWs or less create new opportunities for nuclear power deployment in non-OECD countries, including those with smaller electricity systems and without the resources to pay for $5-to-10 billion large, third-generation reactors. These modular systems can be built more quickly and can provide grid flexibility to complement intermittent renewables. They can also provide heat for industry and communities, energy for desalination plants, and hydrogen to replace natural gas and petroleum in various sectors. It will require sufficient economies of scale and cash injections from a variety of sources—private, public, and multilateral—to get SMRs on their feet, but their potential to make clean energy stable and affordable should not be ignored.

The International Energy Agency, in its Roadmap to Net Zero by 2050, stressed the importance of innovation and development of technologies not yet in commercial operation. COP26 provides an opportunity to highlight the emergence of new nuclear technologies that could substantially contribute to the clean energy transition in non-OECD countries in the 2030-to-2050 period. The announcement by the US State Department at COP26 of a $25 million “Nuclear Futures Package” to work with partner countries, such as Poland, Kenya, Ukraine, Brazil, Romania, and Indonesia, on a range of technical and capacity building projects, is a good first step. However, the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom—currently leading in SMR innovation—along with France, Japan, South Korea, and other OECD countries, should continue to pursue additional efforts to work with non-OECD countries to prepare for SMR commercialization and help ensure that these technologies will be safely, securely, and economically adopted and operated.

Dr. Robert F. Ichord, Jr. is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council Global Energy Center.

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Nuclear Energy Energy Transitions

EnergySource Sep 28, 2021

The VTR will play a key role in the nuclear energy innovation ecosystem

By Suzanne Baker, Jennifer T. Gordon, Judi Greenwald, and Jackie Toth

Next-generation nuclear technologies hold the potential to bring US-led zero-carbon energy to international markets. But their development will be stymied without government support for the Versatile Test Reactor (VTR), whose budget was recently zeroed out. Congress still has opportunities to provide sufficient funding, and it must act on them.

Energy & Environment Energy Transitions

EnergySource Jul 22, 2021

Expanding nuclear energy to the Arctic: The potential of small modular reactors

By Julia Nesheiwat

Energy & Environment Energy Transitions

EnergySource Jun 28, 2021

Climate change, energy security, and international nuclear energy: Competition in the Czech Republic

By Robert F. Ichord, Jr.

Recent reports of Russian intelligence operations in the Czech Republic in 2014 have escalated tensions between the two countries, directly affecting the Czech government’s plans for the future development of its nuclear sector. In light of this changing dynamic, President Biden should work to support Czech energy security and act to weaken Russia’s position in Central and Eastern European nuclear power markets.

Central Europe Energy & Environment

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Slavin quoted in BNR on Chinas growing influence on Iran

Atlantic Council — Sat, 16 Oct 2021 18:46:00 +0000

The post Slavin quoted in BNR on Chinas growing influence on Iran appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Slavin joins Sky News to discuss the future of the JCPOA negotiations

Atlantic Council — Fri, 15 Oct 2021 14:42:00 +0000

The post Slavin joins Sky News to discuss the future of the JCPOA negotiations appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Azodi joins Aljazeera to discuss latest developments regarding JCPOA

Atlantic Council — Wed, 13 Oct 2021 14:16:00 +0000

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The VTR will play a key role in the nuclear energy innovation ecosystem

Suzanne Baker, Jennifer T. Gordon, Judi Greenwald, and Jackie Toth — Tue, 28 Sep 2021 21:23:08 +0000

The next generation of civil nuclear technologies holds the promise of bringing zero-carbon energy to an expanding international market. However, in order for the US nuclear energy industry to take the lead in manufacturing advanced nuclear energy technologies, the US government must support a broad nuclear innovation ecosystem, which rests on three pillars: the demonstration and commercialization of new reactor designs; funding for high assay low-enriched uranium (HALEU) fuel, which will power most of the advanced reactors; and the building of the Versatile Test Reactor (VTR). Although the VTR has a crucial role to play in our ability to test the fuels and materials that will be used in the next generation of reactors, its funding was recently zeroed out by appropriators in both the House and the Senate. This exclusion is a grave error that will have far-reaching ramifications for US nuclear energy leadership. However, there are upcoming legislative opportunities to rectify this error.

The VTR will enable researchers—in the US or from allied countries with nuclear research programs—to simulate the conditions of different types of commercial reactors. It will accelerate the testing of radiation impacts on fuels and materials; one year of testing reactor materials in the VTR will show the equivalent amount of radiation damage as ten years in a commercial reactor. The VTR will also be able to test accident-tolerant fuels, which can help modernize the existing nuclear reactor fleet by making it more impervious to accidents and by lowering the cost of electricity. Existing reactors (and their fuel types) are worth the investment, since they currently provide the US with 20 percent of its total electricity generation and more than half of its carbon-free electricity.

The advanced reactor designs slated for demonstration in the next several years and the advanced fuel that will power those designs require a testing facility so that they can continue to innovate. At the moment, Russia is the only country that has a test reactor with comparable capabilities. However, geopolitical tensions between the US and Russia have made it increasingly difficult for US companies to test their nuclear fuel and materials in Russia. Russia’s test reactor gives its state-owned nuclear enterprises an edge over the US nuclear energy industry. If the US is to compete effectively with Russian nuclear energy technologies in the years ahead, then the US needs its own testing facility.

Domestically, the VTR would also benefit the US economy by enabling the continued development of new nuclear power plant projects. Nuclear construction projects will employ US workers, creating union jobs and restoring the domestic nuclear supply chain, a necessity for the rapid deployment of advanced reactors for climate mitigation.

While some detractors have argued that Congress should no longer fund the program due to its cost, the estimated price tag (between $3 billion and $6 billion over several years) pales in comparison to the DOE’s annual budget. For the current fiscal year alone, lawmakers have appropriated over $39 billion to the DOE. Expert predictions of the annual cost of climate change and the failure to decarbonize the global further dwarf the estimated cost of the VTR. In addition, opportunities exist to defray the VTR’s costs, most notably through international cooperation and funding from civil nuclear allies who wish to test their own nuclear fuel and materials. Although some US advanced nuclear reactors may be demonstrated before the VTR is completed, the VTR will enable nearly all nuclear energy technologies to innovate well into the future.

Congress still has opportunities to support the VTR, especially through the reconciliation process and—looking ahead—through Fiscal Year 2022 spending. As part of reconciliation, the House Committee on Science, Space and Technology has proposed $95 million for the VTR. The VTR should be recognized as a crucial tool for the widespread deployment of advanced nuclear energy technologies, and it should be supported by climate and innovation advocates alike.

Each of the three requisites of US nuclear innovation—the demonstration of new reactors, support for new fuels, and a domestic testing capacity—plays a different role in the nuclear ecosystem. All three support the development of the next generation of nuclear energy technologies. The VTR will ensure that advanced nuclear technologies can continue to adapt to a changing world and meet the growing global demand for clean electricity. Without the VTR, the next generation of nuclear energy technologies in the US could be its last.

Suzanne Baker is the co-founder of Good Energy Collective.

Jennifer T. Gordon is the managing editor and a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council Global Energy Center.

Judi Greenwald is the executive director of the Nuclear Innovation Alliance.

Jackie Toth is the senior advocacy director of Good Energy Collective.

EnergySource

EnergySource Jul 22, 2021

Expanding nuclear energy to the Arctic: The potential of small modular reactors

By Julia Nesheiwat

Energy & Environment Energy Transitions

EnergySource Jun 28, 2021

Climate change, energy security, and international nuclear energy: Competition in the Czech Republic

By Robert F. Ichord, Jr.

Recent reports of Russian intelligence operations in the Czech Republic in 2014 have escalated tensions between the two countries, directly affecting the Czech government’s plans for the future development of its nuclear sector. In light of this changing dynamic, President Biden should work to support Czech energy security and act to weaken Russia’s position in Central and Eastern European nuclear power markets.

Central Europe Energy & Environment

EnergySource Feb 19, 2021

How a HALEU bank could work

By Stephen S. Greene

Lack of a long-term, reliable source of high-assay low-enriched uranium (HALEU) fuel represents a critical risk to the deployment of advanced reactors, which could be a key source of carbon-free electricity in the future. However, a HALEU fuel bank could resolve the conundrum facing advanced reactor developers and potential HALEU fuel suppliers by supporting the production of HALEU for advanced reactors and resolving the uncertainty faced by reactor developers and their potential customers and sources of financing.

Energy & Environment Nuclear Energy

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The Raisi administration must answer the IAEA enquires. Otherwise, Vienna talks risk derailment.

Kelsey Davenport — Mon, 16 Aug 2021 10:11:50 +0000

All eyes will be on newly inaugurated Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi’s negotiating team when they return to Vienna to resume talks on restoring the 2015 nuclear deal. However, Raisi faces another challenge in Vienna—the country’s increasingly tenuous relationship with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Tehran’s failure to fully cooperate with the IAEA’s investigation into past possible undeclared nuclear materials and activities risks derailing progress on the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action’s (JCPOA) restoration and undermining confidence that Iran’s current nuclear program is peaceful.

Along with the Vienna talks, Raisi inherited the IAEA’s ongoing investigation into Iran’s pre-2003 nuclear program—an investigation that Tehran has stalled and drawn out over the past three years to the growing frustration of the nuclear watchdog. While Raisi has indicated that Tehran will return to talks on restoring the 2015 nuclear deal, he has not given any hint as to whether he will also prioritize cooperating with the IAEA. Momentum in the Vienna talks may spur Iran to address the IAEA’s questions, but progress during the first six rounds of negotiations earlier this year did not lead to greater cooperation with the agency. If Iran continues in this vein and stonewalls the IAEA’s inquiries, the investigation could disrupt the process to restore and sustain the deal.

While Iran’s failure to provide full and timely cooperation with the IAEA’s investigation is troubling and must be addressed, there is no indication in the IAEA’s public reports that the agency suspects such pre-2003 activities to be ongoing. Furthermore, the past work does not pose a near-term proliferation risk. Iran, however, as a member of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) is legally obligated to implement a safeguards agreement with the IAEA to provide assurance that its nuclear program is peaceful, irrespective of the JCPOA’s status.

The evidence presented by the IAEA to date suggests that Tehran failed to declare certain nuclear materials and activities from its pre-2003 program to the agency, as required by its safeguards agreement. Specifically, the IAEA identified four locations not part of Iran’s declared nuclear program where inspectors have evidence of uranium activities. After significant delays and initial denials, Iran granted inspectors access to one site in 2019 and three others in 2020. Environmental samples from three of the sites indicated the presence of processed uranium. The agency’s questions to Iran about the locations and uranium in 2020 and 2021 have gone unanswered since or deemed “not technically credible” by the agency, according to its most recent report on the investigation in May. The presence of uranium and Tehran’s failure to account for it makes it highly likely that Iran violated its safeguards obligations.

Tehran has argued that the IAEA’s investigation into its pre-2003 nuclear program was closed as part of the JCPOA and that the current line of questioning is politically motivated. Then Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif said in August 2020 after meeting with the IAEA that the inquiry was driven by those who want to “torpedo” Iran’s transparency by reopening “closed matters.”

Zarif was likely referring to one of the sources of the IAEA’s evidence, documents that Israeli intelligence agency Mossad stole from Iran in 2018. But this line of argument—that the IAEA cannot revisit Iran’s past activities and that its current efforts are politically motivated—does not hold water.

Under the JCPOA, Tehran was required to respond to IAEA inquiries about the illicit nuclear activities that violated its safeguards and NPT commitment to a peaceful nuclear program. The agency published a report in December 2015 concluding that Tehran had an organized nuclear weapons program through 2003 and that some activities continued until 2009, but that there was no evidence of nuclear weapons work since that time.

The 2015 report closed the IAEA’s open investigation, but the agency is still required to follow up on information suggesting that a country is not in compliance with its safeguards agreement. New information made available to the IAEA—partly from the stolen documents—pointed to the existence of nuclear materials that Tehran should have declared to the agency. The IAEA is obligated to evaluate that information and, if the evidence is credible, investigate whether Iran’s nuclear materials are accounted for and for peaceful purposes. This is also necessary to preserve the integrity of the safeguards system. Failure to follow up would have cast doubt on the agency’s ability to do its job. It is also in Iran’s interest for the IAEA to investigate. Stonewalling the agency only fuels speculation that Tehran has something to hide.

While this investigation is about past activities that ended long before the JCPOA was negotiated, it could still threaten efforts to restore the nuclear deal. The IAEA is clearly growing impatient with Tehran’s continued refusal to provide adequate answers to the agency’s investigation. IAEA Director General Rafeal Mariano Grossi warned at the last agency board meeting in June that the lack of progress toward resolving these issues “seriously affects the ability of the agency to provide assurance of the peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear program.”

Grossi’s concern over the stalled process may spur IAEA member states to act at the agency’s upcoming Board of Governors meeting in September and push forth a resolution calling on Tehran to cooperate with the agency’s investigation. The thirty-five-member board, which comprises of IAEA member states, took similar action last year and appeared to produce results. In June 2020, the Board of Governors passed a resolution calling on Iran to “fully cooperate” with the IAEA “without any further delay” by providing access to locations specified by the agency. Two months later, Iran and the IAEA negotiated access to the three locations mentioned above so that inspectors could test for traces of uranium.

Earlier this year, ahead of the February Board of Governors meeting, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom considered introducing another resolution on Iran that included language calling on Tehran to cooperate with the agency’s investigation fully. They ultimately decided not to pursue a resolution to preserve space for talks restoring the JCPOA, but voiced concern over Iran’s failure to fully cooperate.

The Board of Governors may hold off on such a resolution at the September board meeting to give Raisi’s new administration time to engage with the IAEA, but time is not on Tehran’s side. If there is no progress, it would not be surprising if the states press forward with a resolution calling on Iran to cooperate before the end of the year. If a resolution does not produce results, the board could refer Iran to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), as it did in 2006 when Tehran repeatedly refused to comply with IAEA requests for information about undeclared nuclear activities.

It is unclear whether the UNSC would act in the event of a board referral. When the IAEA reported Iran to the UNSC in 2006, it ultimately led to resolutions requiring Tehran to halt nuclear activities and imposed sanctions on the country. However, a single veto would block any Security Council action and Russia and China may be unwilling to subject Tehran to sanctions at this point. However, other states may reconsider sanctions against Iran and, politically, restoration of the JCPOA may be more challenging if Tehran was referred to the UNSC for failing to comply with its NPT safeguards obligations.

These implications for the JCPOA and the importance of preserving the broader integrity of the safeguards regime demonstrate the critical importance of Iran’s timely and full cooperation with the IAEA’s investigation. If the Raisi government can get off on the right foot and make progress with the IAEA, it could also help garner momentum in talks to restoring the JCPOA and quell speculation that Tehran is hiding something. It behooves the newly inaugurated Raisi government to prioritize setting a date to resume talks with the IAEA over the agency’s investigation. Agreeing on a timeframe to fully respond to the IAEA’s questions and following through in a timely fashion will send a message to the IAEA, the United States, and P4+1—Britain, China, France, Germany, Russia—negotiators that Tehran is serious is about meeting its international nuclear obligations.

If the issue is not resolved bilaterally between the IAEA and Iran, the US, P4+1, and Tehran should consider folding a timeframe for Iran to address the agency’s questions into any plan to restore the JCPOA. If the deal is restored without the IAEA’s investigation being addressed and Iran continues to stymie the agency’s inquiries, it risks undermining the accord and fueling speculation about the nature of Tehran’s nuclear program.

Kelsey Davenport is the director for nonproliferation policy at the Arms Control Association. Follow her on Twitter: @KelseyDav.

IranSource Dec 8, 2020

A history of continuity in Iran’s long nuclear program

By Sina Azodi

Iran’s interest in developing a nuclear deterrent is often attributed to the Islamic Republic. However, in reality, this interest predates the 1979 revolution and reflects a deep-seated desire for national prestige and development, as well as a need to deter regional rivals.

Iran Middle East

IranSource Apr 23, 2021

‘Poison pill sanctions’ are hard for Vienna negotiators to swallow

By Brian O’Toole

“Poison pill sanctions,” a large list of sanctions that would have been allowed under the 2015 nuclear accord, are clearly the sticking point in the ongoing negotiations and the focus of the technical working groups in Vienna.

Economic Sanctions Iran

Blog Post Jun 22, 2020

IAEA mildly reprimands Iran over suspect nuclear sites

By Mark Fitzpatrick

The board on June 19 issued a mild rebuke, echoing IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi’s expression of “serious concern” that Iran has not provided access to two locations where unreported nuclear activity allegedly took place nearly two decades ago.

Politics & Diplomacy

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Expanding nuclear energy to the Arctic: The potential of small modular reactors

Julia Nesheiwat — Thu, 22 Jul 2021 15:02:59 +0000

With increased emphasis on achieving political and technological solutions to climate change, many experts in the global community are turning their focus to the virtually emissions-free power produced by nuclear reactors. The continued development of small modular reactors (SMRs) offers a potential opportunity to overcome many of the hindrances presented by larger nuclear power plants, including high costs, complex supply chains, large physical infrastructure, and unsuitability in harsh environments, such as the Arctic. The Biden Administration and UK Prime Minister Boris Johnson have both signaled that SMRs have a key role in combatting carbon emissions and meeting increased energy demand. More recently, several Canadian provincial governments have joined forces with private corporations to conduct feasibility studies for the deployment of SMRs in the far north. SMRs present a vital opportunity for energy production in the Arctic, where energy needs are more demanding and difficult to meet due to the region’s low temperatures, low population density, and inaccessibility. While other energy sources such as natural gas and oil are abundant in the Arctic, their exploitation is not sustainable and often comes at a high cost to local communities and the environment. While nuclear energy is not a new technology, recent advancements like SMRs present a promising solution to challenges associated with traditional nuclear power and fossil fuels, as well as along with high-polluting diesel generators used in the Arctic.

Arctic nations have explored the viability of nuclear energy production in the region for years. Despite high electricity production capabilities, traditional nuclear power plants entail complicated waste disposal operations and have more recently come under increased scrutiny over safety concerns and broader public perception issues, especially in Europe. In contrast, SMRs are smaller, easily deployed in almost any environment, and feature extensive passive safety features. They also use a set design framework and have extended fuel cycles, which reduces challenges associated with spent nuclear fuel and lowers the likelihood of radiation escaping containment.

The Arctic currently suffers from a dearth of renewable electricity generation, despite copious opportunities. Roughly half of the Arctic’s populations live in remote locations, requiring off-grid systems; consequently, approximately 80 percent of Arctic communities depend exclusively on diesel generators for electricity. Despite the region’s abundance of natural resources, most diesel fuel is imported, threatening energy security with both increased costs and the likelihood of shortages. While wind, solar, and hydropower are also viable green alternatives to fossil fuels, each comes with its own disadvantages in comparison to SMRs. Wind turbines are not yet adapted to the harsh Arctic conditions with persistent temperatures below – forty degrees Celsius. They likewise carry an environmental impact related to land use and interference with wildlife, especially migratory birds. Solar energy systems also require extensive land to reach higher levels of production, and their effectiveness is limited in the Arctic winter. Hydropower requires large initial investments and may have severe environmental impacts, especially if a large storage lake is necessary. SMRs can overcome all these challenges given their low start-up costs, use of uranium (which is abundant in the Arctic), and minor environmental footprint.

Nevertheless, installing SMRs in the Arctic comes with its own set of unique challenges. SMRs for commercial use are currently restricted by regulatory regimes that are far more accustomed to licensing conventional nuclear power plants. SMRs also generate less power than conventional nuclear plants and require a connection to the electrical grid to transport electricity from the reactor to the end-user. However, they can be deployed on the sites of retiring coal or diesel-fired power plants. For example, in the Canadian North, diesel plants serve many communities in Nunavut. Yet thirteen out of seventeen are at the end of their usable lives. Closing these plants and installing SMRs that can take advantage of existing switchyards and turbines have the potential to reduce initial costs, which could in turn be used to expand the electrical grid to more remote settlements.

As a result of the 2019 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), the Pentagon initiated Project Pele which commissioned two companies to design SMRs for its remote operating bases. The research and development project required the companies design and build a one to five megawatt reactor that can last at least three years and be rapidly redeployed and removed. The project—under which BWXT Advanced Technologies and X-Energy will develop prototypes to be evaluated by the Pentagon—has the potential to pave the way toward the adoption of transportable microreactors critical to supplying clean, affordable power to remote communities with limited access to an electrical grid. The Pentagon plans to make a full evaluation in 2022 to determine whether to proceed to limited production.

While SMR technology is still in the early stages of development, increased attention to future advances in this area of nuclear technology is expected to result in a viable, functioning, and deployed SMR before the end of the decade. Expanding research in the nuclear domain will have many positive knock-on effects as well, especially in combatting climate change. The Arctic is the most suitable location for SMR pilot tests due to its remoteness and high-energy needs. To ensure the development and successful long-term deployment of SMRs in the region, governments, private companies, and civil society organizations need to continue to fund, pursue, and encourage further investment in nuclear energy production technologies, with a particular focus on SMRs and their viability in the far north.

Dr. Julia Nesheiwat is a Distinguished Fellow at the Atlantic Council Global Energy Center, and since December 2020, has served as Commissioner on the US Arctic Research Commission reporting to the White House and Congress on domestic and international Arctic issues.

EnergySource

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The post Expanding nuclear energy to the Arctic: The potential of small modular reactors appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Climate change, energy security, and international nuclear energy: Competition in the Czech Republic

Robert F. Ichord, Jr. — Mon, 28 Jun 2021 15:41:15 +0000

Recent reports of Russian intelligence operations in the Czech Republic in 2014 have escalated tensions between the two countries, directly affecting the Czech government’s plans for the future development of its nuclear sector. After previously announcing the inclusion of Russia’s state-owned nuclear company Rosatom on its short list of potential bidders for a new nuclear unit at its Dukovany site, the Czech government, on April 19, issued a resolution removing Rosatom and prohibiting it and Russian contractors from participating in consortia. With the earlier exclusion of China General Nuclear (CGN) from the pre-qualification list, the remaining suppliers include EDF of France, KHNP of South Korea, and Westinghouse of the United States.

This significant action by the Czech government can be seen within the broader geopolitical context of new, threatening Russian military action towards Ukraine and increasing cybersecurity threats, new US sanctions on Russia, Congressional opposition to Gazprom’s Nord Stream II gas pipeline, growing competition between the West and Russian and Chinese state-owned nuclear companies, and ongoing debate in the European Union (EU) over the future of nuclear power in the European Green Deal climate program and sustainable finance taxonomy.

The Czech Republic is one of eight EU countries that obtains over 30 percent of its electricity from nuclear power generation, and the Czech government foresees nuclear increasing to as much as 50 percent of the country’s electricity by 2050. The Czech republic has four Soviet-designed VVER-440-v213 reactors at Dukovany and two VVER-1000-v320 units at Temelin, which are operated by utility CEZ (70 percent owned by the Czech government). Although the Czech electricity system disconnected from the Soviet IPS/UPS system in 1993 and is now integrated with the Continental ENTSO-E system, it still depends on nuclear fuel from Russia as well as Russian-piped natural gas under long-term contracts with Gazprom for a considerable portion of its 8.3 billion cubic meter (bcm) domestic gas consumption.

For several years, there has been a debate over the costs and benefits of building new reactors at both Dukovany and Temelin. With tightening EU emissions policies and domestic environmental protests, the Czech government has been under pressure to close its lignite and hard coal plants, which provide 50 percent of the country’s electricity. A National Coal Commission recommended phasing out coal by 2038 but no political agreement has been reached on a date. But in this context, a decision to construct a new nuclear plant has gained increasing urgency as the government, under its 2020 National Energy and Climate Plan, also moves to increase renewables and energy efficiency to achieve its target of reducing greenhouse gas emissions by 30 percent by 2030 compared to 2005.

The Czech government gave preliminary approval to build a new unit at Dukovany in 2019, and in May 2020, Czech Prime Minister Andrej Babiš indicated that the government would provide a loan to CEZ covering 70 percent of the estimated €6 billion per-unit cost, with CEZ to finance the remaining 30 percent. On March 8, 2021, the Czech State Office for Nuclear Safety approved the site license for up to two new reactors at the Dukovany site. The removal of both Rosatom and CGN from the pre-qualification process is significant, given that both Russia and China have considerable experience operating third generation reactors and are vying for markets in Europe. Rosatom has been operating its third generation VVER-1200 design since 2017, is building several reactors of this type overseas in Finland, Bangladesh, Turkey, and Hungary, and has long-standing business and technical relationships with CEZ.

Having first been an importer of nuclear energy technologies from EDF and Westinghouse, China is now seeking to build its own Hualong One (HPR1000) reactor at Bradwell, England in a venture with EDF. The Hualong One has been certified by the European Utility Requirements Organization, and it has also undergone a Generic Design Assessment conducted by the UK Nuclear Regulator, which is now in the final stage of evaluation. The first Hualong One reactor went into commercial operation in Fuqing, China on January 31, 2021, and others are being built in China and Pakistan. EPR and AP1000 units in France (Flamanville), Finland (Olkiluoto), and the United States (Vogtle) have suffered major delays but appear close to commissioning. Westinghouse also has a history of cooperation with CEZ, having supplied—with funding from the US Export-Import Bank—the instrumentation and control technology for upgrading the Temelin plant in 2000. South Korea’s KHNP is a significant competitor as well. It operates two third generation APR1400 units in South Korea, and the first of four South Korean APR1400 units recently began generating power at the Barakah plant in the United Arab Emirates.

The tender for the Czech Dukovany unit is not expected until 2022 or 2023, after the October 2021 national elections. These elections could possibly change the current policy on excluding Rosatom from the tender, although the longer-term ramifications of such exclusion for relations with Russia remain uncertain at this point. The Czech Ministry of Industry and Trade previously announced a timetable calling for finalization of a contract with the selected supplier by 2024, start of construction by 2029, and commissioning of the unit by 2039. Dukovany plant management sent a letter to EDF, Westinghouse, and KHNP on June 21 initiating “a security assessment” process, a report of which is expected to be submitted to the government by the end of November 2021.

From an EU perspective, nuclear power was not included in the EU taxonomy for sustainable activities released on April 21, 2021, although a complementary Delegated Act on nuclear energy will be prepared following further analysis. In December 2020, the EU submitted its updated and enhanced National Determined Contribution (NDC) for the November 2021 Glasgow Climate Summit. The submission confirms the EU target of “a net domestic reduction of at least 55 percent in greenhouse gas emissions by 2030 compared to 1990.” Although nuclear energy is being phased out in several EU countries, there is growing recognition that nuclear, which provides 40 percent of the EU’s carbon-free electricity generation, will continue to be an important component of a 2050 net-zero strategy.

The previous US administration, in its Restoring America’s Competitive Nuclear Advantage report, called for strong US efforts to facilitate nuclear energy technology exports and financing to restore US nuclear energy leadership vis-à-vis Russia and China. President Biden should continue this policy, support Czech energy security, and work to weaken Russia’s position in Central and Eastern European nuclear power markets. The competitive nuclear challenge in the Czech Republic will be a test of the Biden-Harris administration’s will and capacity to work with allies on climate change and clean energy transition, and to develop concrete commercial support packages to integrate these interests into the administration’s national security strategy.

Dr. Robert F. Ichord, Jr. is a Non-Resident Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council Global Energy Center.

EnergySource

The 6th Annual Central and Eastern European Energy Security Conference

For the sixth edition of the conference, government and private sector leaders discuss transatlantic cooperation on Central and Eastern European energy transition and post COVID-19 economic recovery, with a special focus on regional energy security.

Central Europe Eastern Europe Energy & Environment Energy Markets & Governance

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The post Climate change, energy security, and international nuclear energy: Competition in the Czech Republic appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Why the Arctic matters

Julia Nesheiwat — Fri, 18 Jun 2021 03:07:30 +0000

Recently, panic struck the southeastern United States as the Colonial Pipeline, the country’s largest fuel pipeline network, shut down after a cyberattack. With 2.5 million barrels per day of gasoline, diesel, and jet fuel suddenly gone, mass panic buying ensued, sending prices into a spiral of volatility. The incident reminded the nation of its continuing vast dependency on a steady supply of fossil fuels despite significant gains in recent years towards a more diverse energy supply. Given this stark reminder, it should be no surprise that the Arctic region is increasingly coveted for its natural resources and strategic location. The melting of the Arctic ice cover has made the area more accessible to shipping as well as oil and gas extraction, making it increasingly sought after by bordering and distant countries, including China. It is no secret Russia has made the development of the region’s natural resources a priority, while Norway estimates that the Barents Sea holds more than 60 percent of the country’s untapped oil reserves.

Leading edge of climate change

The Arctic is on the frontlines of a changing climate and is fundamentally essential to the regulation of the Earth’s fragile ecosystem. It even provides researchers with the means to almost predict the effects of climate change through polar amplification—the phenomenon where changes to our climate tend to produce more extensive changes near the poles than the planetary average—showing what the future will hold. The increased melting of Arctic sea ice and snow allows the darker ocean and land surface to be increasingly exposed, making it less reflective of the sun’s light, causing the Earth to warm further and faster. The continued loss of ice from Arctic landmasses compounds sea level rise and could affect the currents of the oceans and atmosphere on a global scale, with potentially devastating consequences, even to populations living far away from the Arctic.

Significant reserves of oil and gas

With the continued loss of sea ice and the melting of the Greenland ice sheet, the Arctic is also becoming more accessible, allowing states to reach the abundance of natural resources in the region, including large deposits of valuable minerals and fossil fuels, the mining and use of which could further contribute to global warming. The Arctic presents the world’s new “El Dorado” of still attainable natural resources, with an estimated 90 billion barrels of oil (16 percent of global total), 1,669 trillion cubic feet of gas (30 percent), and 44 billion barrels of natural gas liquids (38 percent). But the Arctic’s importance goes beyond just a pool of natural resources creating intense global competition between Arctic powers and near-Arctic powers to have access to these resources.

New frontier for renewables

In addition to new sources of fossil fuels, the Arctic matters because it is a new energy frontier, for clean energy. From wind, solar, and marine turbines, to advances in battery efficiency, the Arctic is the perfect incubator for clean energy. In the fight against climate change, the international community should take every advantage it can to make progress on clean energy technology, and this also includes nuclear. With increasing energy demand, small modular reactors could be deployed in the Arctic. If it can work in the Arctic, powering remote communities in harsh conditions, why not expand it to the rest of the world?

New shipping routes

The effects of climate change are also exposing new shipping routes, such as the Northern Sea Route and the Northwest Passage, previously almost impassable due to Arctic ice. The new routes can cause seismic shifts in the global economy due to reduced shipping times and radically altered routes that no longer depend on global choke points such as the Suez and Panama Canals. Protecting, and potentially controlling, these routes and the resources beneath them has led Arctic nations to solidify their presence and secure their territorial claims in the region. Minimizing international competition through the Arctic Council is crucial to safely accessing the opportunities within the Arctic and to preserving regional stability, given the many competing claims and policies in the region. These may lead to conflict both within and beyond the area if not resolved through the acceptance and rule of international law or by diplomatic means.

Threatened Indigenous Peoples and ecosystems

The Arctic is also home to many different cultures and peoples across the region, many of whom have lived there for millennia. From the Chukchi people along the Bering Sea’s Russian shores to the Sami across Northern Scandinavia, circumpolar populations represent a wide array of human cultures, languages, histories, and religions. The high north also supports hundreds of thousands of species, many of which are endemic to the region, and several are near extinction. The value of this diversity to humanity is inherent in its existence as a part of its common past, present, and future. However, people, plants, and animals are all threatened by the loss of their natural habitats and drastically diminished hunting ranges as sea ice continues to recede at alarming rates.

While the Arctic might seem a faraway place with little significance to most societies, its safety and security are vital to the entire planet. Its unique yet fragile ecosystem, abundance of resources and opportunities, and wealth of human history and cultures make it essential.

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Julia Nesheiwat

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Arabic Climate Change & Climate Action

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Nasr in New York Times: The clock is ticking for Biden on Iran

Atlantic Council — Wed, 21 Apr 2021 18:42:58 +0000

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EPRI Vice President and CNO Rita Baranwal joins the Atlantic Council Nuclear Energy and National Security Coalition

Nicole Meir — Thu, 01 Apr 2021 13:53:29 +0000

Former Assistant Secretary for the US Department of Energy’s Office of Nuclear Energy brings deep public and private sector experience on nuclear policy and technology

WASHINGTON, DC – April 1, 2021 – The Atlantic Council announced today that Dr. Rita Baranwal, vice president of nuclear and chief nuclear officer at Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI), has joined the Atlantic Council Nuclear Energy and National Security Coalition. Baranwal, who previously served as assistant secretary for the US Department of Energy’s Office of Nuclear Energy, brings a wealth of public and private sector experience advancing nuclear policy and technology in the United States and abroad.

“We are delighted that Dr. Rita Baranwal is joining the Nuclear Energy and National Security Coalition,” said Jennifer Gordon, managing editor and senior fellow at the Atlantic Council Global Energy Center. “Dr. Baranwal has transformed the state of US nuclear energy policy, and we look forward to working together to advance awareness of the link between nuclear energy and national security.”

Dr. Baranwal has transformed the state of US nuclear energy policy, and we look forward to working together to advance awareness of the link between nuclear energy and national security.

Jennifer Gordon, managing editor and senior fellow at the Atlantic Council Global Energy Center

As the assistant secretary of DOE’s Office of Nuclear Energy, Baranwal advanced research and development on existing and advanced nuclear technologies, enabled the deployment of advanced nuclear energy systems, and enhanced US global commercial nuclear energy competitiveness. She has held a number of public and private sector positions focused on nuclear energy, including director of the Gateway for Accelerated Innovation in Nuclear initiative at Idaho National Laboratory, director of technology development and application at Westinghouse, and manager in materials technology at Bechtel Bettis, Inc.

“I look forward to furthering awareness of and learning from the Coalition through the lens of EPRI’s global perspective,” said Rita Baranwal. “My career experience and ongoing engagement with the Atlantic Council lead me to believe that there is much to contribute from my new role in the areas of robust operation of the existing fleet, R&D, and innovating advanced technologies.”

The Nuclear Energy and National Security Coalition, housed within the Atlantic Council Global Energy Center, works to address challenges present at the intersection of nuclear energy, national security, and climate change. The coalition and its members support bipartisan programming to increase awareness, interest, and thought leadership around the maintenance of the current nuclear fleet, US nuclear exports abroad, and research and development into advanced reactor and fuel technology.

For media inquiries, please contact press@atlanticcouncil.org.

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Nasr joins the Quincy Institute to discuss if time is running out for the JCPOA?

Atlantic Council — Thu, 25 Mar 2021 18:20:27 +0000

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Gordon and Greene in The National Interest: Why the U.S.-South Korea Nuclear Partnership Matters

jbekenstein — Fri, 05 Mar 2021 21:16:00 +0000

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Shaffer in Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists: Armenia’s nuclear power plant is dangerous. Time to close it.

jbekenstein — Fri, 05 Mar 2021 19:58:00 +0000

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Nasr in Foreign Affairs: Biden’s narrow window of opportunity on Iran

Atlantic Council — Thu, 04 Mar 2021 19:25:38 +0000

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Advancing US-ROK cooperation on nuclear energy

Stephen S. Greene — Tue, 02 Mar 2021 05:41:56 +0000

The United States and the Republic of Korea (ROK) are longstanding civil nuclear partners. Although nuclear power is a key component of each country’s electricity generation, the nuclear energy industries in both countries are struggling. The new Atlantic Council report, Advancing US-ROK Cooperation on Nuclear Energy, by Stephen S. Greene, examines how both countries can work together to revitalize the nuclear energy industry in each country. A robust domestic nuclear industry and civil nuclear export program are each crucial elements of the fight against climate change and in international diplomacy. This new report argues that research and development, bilateral trade, and the sale of nuclear energy technologies to third countries represent opportunities for bilateral cooperation that will strengthen each country’s nuclear energy industry.

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Stephen S. Greene

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Nuclear Energy

Globally, increasing demand for low-carbon electricity sources and diverse generation portfolios have made nuclear energy an attractive and reliable baseload power source. Amidst a declining US nuclear industry, new nuclear energy stakeholders, including China, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey are pursuing robust nuclear energy programs to improve energy security, meet environmental goals, and demonstrate international leadership. New nuclear technologies promise to transform the energy landscape, but require regulatory updates and global cooperation to reach their potential.

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How a HALEU bank could work

Stephen S. Greene — Fri, 19 Feb 2021 18:40:23 +0000

Advanced nuclear power generation technologies that focus on modular construction, factory fabrication, shorter construction times, and passive safety could work in concert with renewable energy to deliver carbon-free electricity that will help meet energy demand while addressing the risk of climate change. There are currently over seventy projects to develop advanced nuclear technologies being pursued in the United States and Canada.

Most of these new nuclear technologies are designed to use a more energy-dense fuel than that used by traditional light-water reactors, enabling them to deliver energy out of a smaller facility and operate for longer times between refueling. However, there are no existing facilities to produce this fuel, called high-assay low-enriched uranium or HALEU, in the quantities required to support advanced reactor deployment, which is expected to triple by the middle of this century. The lack of a reliable, long-term source of HALEU is the top concern of advanced reactor developers, and the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2021 requires the Secretary of Energy to establish a program to support HALEU availability.

The conundrum

To make sales, reactor developers need to be able to show potential buyers that they will have access to a reliable source of fuel for the life of a new power plant. In addition, building a new plant will require capital to finance construction, and the lack of a demonstrated fuel supply makes the path to adequate financing almost impossible.

The US Department of Energy (DOE) has funded an initial demonstration of HALEU production, but that project will only last until 2022 and will produce only a tiny quantity of the fuel. There is no market yet to support the buildout of HALEU production sufficient to fuel even a small number of commercially deployed advanced reactors.

Potential producers of HALEU need firm offtake commitments to raise the capital required to support the construction and operation of new, specialized production capacity. Individual reactor developers are, at best, in the early stages of deploying demonstration or first-of-a-kind units, and are limited in the commitments they can make to potential HALEU producers. In any case, those commitments would be in question, because the prospects for any particular reactor developer are uncertain, even if the prospects for the class of advanced reactors is promising. Furthermore, the initial commitments of one or a handful of reactor developers would likely not reach the volume that would facilitate an economically attractive buildout of fuel production capacity.

Although reactor developers are desperate to point to an assured supply of HALEU, potential producers do not have an assured source of demand that would enable them to raise capital and deploy it with acceptable risk, a conundrum that threatens the future of advanced nuclear power.

How a HALEU bank could resolve the conundrum

A HALEU reserve—or, more accurately, a HALEU bank—could provide a mechanism to meet the needs of reactor developers for an assured source of fuel, while addressing the needs of potential fuel producers for a commitment sufficient to support capital investment in production. A bank could commit to purchase a quantity of HALEU over time that would be targeted to meet reasonable potential requirements of an advanced reactor fleet and adequate to satisfy the economics of a HALEU supply chain. The commitments could be made on the basis of a request for proposal—or other solicitation process—designed to provide price discipline to the acquisition. Payments to the HALEU producers would be made on delivery of the output to the bank—limiting the bank’s exposure to cost and operational risks the producers should control—but allowing producers to be paid based on their production timeline and reducing their exposure to timing risk associated with the uncertain deployment of new reactor technologies.

Once the volume and price targets are known, the bank could offer subscriptions for the available HALEU to reactor developers, which would provide the assurance of fuel availability at a known price to support potential reactor sales and financing. The bank would likely want a deposit and purchase commitment, or some form of security, to ensure that developers and their customers have a reasonable degree of confidence in their volume and timing requirements; however, full payment for the HALEU fuel would occur at the time of delivery, avoiding further demands on the financial resources of reactor projects. The bank, with a low cost of capital, would manage the timing differences between production and the delivery to operating reactors.

The bank could be designed to self-extinguish after its initial quantities are sold off, or it could remain in operation for a designated period of time to preserve liquidity in the HALEU supply. In either case, the funds used for the initial capitalization of the bank would ultimately be returned to the US government.

The public interest would be protected

It is likely that a HALEU bank would need to be funded initially by the US government, perhaps through the Department of Energy, to catalyze the production of HALEU and support the development of advanced reactors. Such funding would be consistent with DOE’s other support for advanced nuclear energy technologies, including the Advanced Reactor Development Program. But the government’s risks associated with capitalizing the bank would be limited.

Funding for the bank would not be in the form of a grant. The bank’s funds would not be committed until fuel was delivered, limiting the risk of acquisition. The initial outlay would be recovered through future sales of HALEU. While some of the subscriptions ultimately might not convert into purchases by reactor operators, the bank would be reasonably protected from being left with HALEU that it could be unable to sell.

First, even if the specific developers entering into initial subscriptions do not make purchases, the bank would have the flexibility to sell the unclaimed quantities to any advanced reactor operators. There are many developers pursuing designs that require HALEU, so even if a small number are ultimately successful, it is likely there will be plenty of demand for fuel that the bank would own. At government costs of capital, the additional cost of selling the HALEU on a longer-than-planned schedule is low, and some contingency for extended timing could be factored into the purchase price.

Second, there is ongoing demand for HALEU to fuel research reactors. That demand is currently being satisfied by short-term solutions, but there is not an existing long-term solution. Even if demand from advanced reactors never develops—which would be a surprising scenario—the HALEU in the bank could be used for research reactor requirements over time.

Conclusion

Lack of a long-term, reliable source of HALEU fuel represents a critical risk to the deployment of advanced reactors, which could be a key source of carbon-free electricity in the future. However, a HALEU fuel bank could resolve the conundrum facing advanced reactor developers and potential HALEU fuel suppliers by supporting the production of HALEU for advanced reactors and resolving the uncertainty faced by reactor developers and their potential customers and sources of financing. A bank would require initial capitalization, likely from the US government, but would ultimately return the funds. The risk to the initial capital would be limited since demand for the fuel would develop if any of the relevant reactor technologies is successful, and even if none of them comes to fruition, demand for HALEU could be supported by future requirements from research reactors. Such a bank merits serious consideration as part of the Department of Energy’s overall effort to support the development of advanced nuclear power.

Stephen S. Greene is a Nonresident Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council Global Energy Center and the former Chief Financial Officer at Centrus Energy.

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Stephen S. Greene