Energy & Environment - Atlantic Council https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/issue/energy-environment/ Shaping the global future together Fri, 16 Aug 2024 14:46:55 +0000 en-US hourly 1 https://wordpress.org/?v=6.5.5 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/favicon-150x150.png Energy & Environment - Atlantic Council https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/issue/energy-environment/ 32 32 Donovan and Nikoladze cited by the National Interest on an alternative market of sanctioned oil in China, Iran, and Russia https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/insight-impact/in-the-news/donovan-and-nikoladze-cited-by-the-national-interest-on-an-alternative-market-of-sanctioned-oil-in-china-iran-and-russia/ Fri, 16 Aug 2024 14:46:53 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=785620 Read the full article here

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Critical minerals investment must avoid the mistakes of the past in African mining https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/africasource/critical-minerals-investment-must-avoid-the-mistakes-of-the-past-in-african-mining/ Wed, 14 Aug 2024 14:36:51 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=785189 By getting mining investment right, the United States can set a new precedent for its collaboration with African countries in other areas, such as health, security, and technology.

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According to the US Department of Energy, there are fifty minerals that are “critical”—in that they not only serve an essential function in the technologies of the future but are also at a high risk of supply-chain disruption.

That risk is due to a number of factors, but one glaring reason is the limited availability or mining of these minerals in the United States. That is increasingly problematic as demand for these minerals rises, considering the role they play in building a green economy globally.

In contrast, across the Atlantic, Africa is home to over 30 percent of the world’s known reserves of critical minerals. While international interest and investment in the African critical-minerals industry have been lagging, it is rapidly picking up; this is welcome news for resource-rich African nations.

But history shows that mining interest and investment—even if welcome—can have inadvertent negative effects. In recent years, mines in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Zambia, and South Africa have been found to be polluting waterways, contributing to acid rain, and poisoning residents. Thus, the US public and private sectors should develop strategies surrounding mining projects that ensure African workers’ health is protected, the environment is not damaged, and the opinions of local communities are sought out, heard, and respected.

Acknowledge the checkered history of mining in Africa

It is important for mining companies and foreign governments to be cognizant of the historical context that surrounds the African mining industry.

For example, in South Africa in the nineteenth century, the discovery of diamonds and gold brought Africans and Europeans alike to mining areas such as the Witwatersrand and mining towns such as Kimberley. After the initial boom, the South African government passed the Natives Land Act in 1913, which restricted Black Africans from buying or occupying land outside of specified areas, except as employees. This policy restricted many Africans from benefiting from the proceeds of mining minerals, and for these people, their main access to any financial gain from the mines came only from working as miners.

While the legislation was repealed in 1991—and others like it are firmly in Africa’s past—it created the conditions for a variety of socioeconomic challenges, including poverty, inequality, and landlessness. Thus, as the US public and private sectors look to get more involved on the continent with mining projects, they should integrate into their strategies a plan for increasing economic opportunity for local communities.

The US government seems to be headed in this direction already with its support for and investment in the Lobito Corridor project, which aims to update the infrastructure along an economic route stretching from the DRC and Zambia to an Angolan port in order to improve the flow of mining-related trade and also to create jobs for local communities. Concerns still remain, but this form of holistic engagement is essential to ensuring mutual prosperity in mining projects.

Don’t exacerbate the “resource curse”

Many African countries have been associated with a “resource curse,” a term that refers to the failure of many resource-rich countries to fully benefit from their natural resources.

For example, Cabo Delgado, a small province in Mozambique’s north, is one of the country’s poorest regions, despite the region’s many natural resources. This has led many in Cabo Delgado to feel marginalized and angry at the central government. A 2011 discovery of a massive natural gas field off the northeastern coast of Mozambique further exacerbated this dissatisfaction. Specifically, youth in the region felt sidelined as foreigners and Mozambicans from elsewhere in the country benefited from the jobs and wealth associated with the discovery.

As the government formalized the mining sector and centralized control of it, artisanal miners were displaced. A widely held sense of injustice gave rise to an Islamist militant group, Mozambique’s al-Shabaab, which took advantage of these grievances to gain popularity among youth in the region. The activities of various armed groups in Cabo Delgado have resulted in around five thousand deaths and the displacement of 582,000 people since 2017.  

In conducting mining projects on the continent, the US public and private sector should add to their strategies specific plans to ensure that the benefits of natural-resource endowment reach local communities.

Botswana provides a positive example. In recent years, the country—one of the world’s leading producers of diamonds and also among the least corrupt on the African continent—has developed a “pro-equity based extractive sector strategy,” taking revenues from extractive sectors and investing them in health and education infrastructure and also into long-term savings through an asset fund. There are also various mechanisms and institutions set up to prevent or catch corruption, such as a constitutionally independent body in charge of cases of corruption. Botswana shows that strong business and the fight against corruption are perfectly compatible.

As part of any strategy, US stakeholders should support African countries in their anti-corruption endeavors and empower human-rights organizations that risk much to protect the resources of these countries and ensure benefits from mining reach local communities. Doing so would encourage African countries to take corruption issues seriously and, in the long run, would create a more attractive environment for sustainable investments. That contradicts the naive belief of some people—such as Israeli businessman Dan Gertler, who was sanctioned by the Trump administration for what it called “corrupt mining and oil deals” in the DRC (he has denied wrongdoing)—that lifting sanctions would be a way to bring back foreign investors.

Strategize for stability

Over time, mismanaged mining projects have contributed to instability, violence, and conflict across Africa.

That dynamic can be seen not only in the Mozambique case but also in Kivu, a region in the DRC’s east. The DRC is central to the production of several critical minerals. For example, as much as 70 percent of global cobalt comes from the DRC. A conflict has gripped the region for almost three decades, and armed groups have wrestled control of mining areas to finance their operations. The DRC, Rwanda, Uganda, and China have often put their interests ahead of those of the residents, who are hoping to see their quality of life improve. Currently, six million people are internally displaced within the DRC, and since the start of the conflict in 1996, six million people have been killed.

With this history in mind, US mining companies with projects on the continent must strategize on how to limit the role mining plays in exacerbating conflicts and tensions. They can do that by bringing more of the supply chain—specifically, value-adding stages of critical-mineral processing—to the continent.

Industrializing the mineral sector in Africa

Historically, mining in Africa has been exploited by foreign partners. China, for example, controls 80 percent of the world’s raw mineral refining and owns fifteen of the seventeen cobalt mining operations in the DRC.

But the US public and private sector can change this status quo by bringing more of the value-adding stages of critical-mineral processing to the African continent, rather than extracting the minerals and bringing them immediately overseas for processing. Not only would this appeal to local populations—as it would encourage industrialization—but employing this different strategy would offer the United States a comparative advantage over China.

A strategy that brings value-adding steps of the value chain to the continent should promote local job creation, prioritize environmental protection in areas with high floral and animal biodiversity, and protect workers’ health. It should also prioritize the deployment of cleaner mining techniques (including those mobilizing artificial intelligence) and encourage countries to adopt a tax that allows for a more fair and just distribution of revenues from mining.

Economic communities—such as the Southern African Development Community—should also play a role in promoting regional value chains. Through such groupings, countries should take advantage of opportunities to share information and data, build capacities, and harmonize legal frameworks.

Stakeholders from the United States must remember that this is about more than curbing Chinese and Russian influence on the continent; rather, it is about avoiding past wrongdoings on the continent, by supporting local communities and preventing mining operations from contributing to various forms of instability and conflict.  

But there’s also a bigger picture to keep in mind: By getting mining investment right, the United States can set a new precedent for its collaboration with African countries in other areas, such as in health, security, and technology.


Rama Yade is senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center and senior fellow for the Europe Center. She is also a professor of African affairs at Mohammed VI Polytechnic University in Morocco and at Sciences Po Paris.

Sibi Nyaoga is a program assistant for the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center where he supports the center’s work on critical minerals and migration. 

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Busch and Mohseni-Cheraghlou and Amin cited in the UN’s International Maritime Organization’s March bulletin on climate-related trade disruptions https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/insight-impact/in-the-news/busch-and-mohseni-cheraghlou-and-amin-cited-in-the-uns-international-maritime-organizations-march-bulletin-on-climate-related-trade-disruptions/ Tue, 13 Aug 2024 13:26:32 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=784895 Read the full bulletin here

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Busch and Mohseni-Cheraghlou cited in the UK Parliament’s research briefing on climate-related trade disruptions https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/insight-impact/in-the-news/busch-and-mohseni-cheraghlou-cited-in-the-uk-parliaments-research-briefing-on-climate-related-trade-disruptions/ Tue, 13 Aug 2024 13:24:34 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=784893 Read the full briefing here

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Japan’s economic revitalization requires nuclear energy https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/energysource/japans-economic-revitalization-requires-nuclear-energy/ Sun, 11 Aug 2024 19:46:16 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=784913 Japan's economy is recovering, with government efforts to boost population growth and expand energy-intensive industries like AI and semiconductors. However, current energy policies may not meet rising demand. Restarting nuclear reactors under enhanced safety measures is key to Japan’s energy security and climate goals. To sustain growth, Japan must continue restarting its nuclear fleet and invest in next-generation reactors, addressing workforce and supply chain challenges.

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After decades of sluggish growth, Japan’s economy may be turning a corner. The government is pressing ahead with initiatives to promote population growth and expand energy-intensive industries, particularly artificial intelligence (AI) and semiconductors. But current energy policies are not accounting for increased demand driven by these growth efforts.   

However, Japan is taking positive steps in restarting its nuclear reactors under new security and safety measures established after the Fukushima Daiichi accident in 2011. The government recognizes nuclear energy as an important source of baseload electricity generation that can help achieve Japan’s climate targets and bolster energy security to hedge against the volatility of global fossil fuel import markets. To power its economic growth and competitiveness, Japan must continue restarting its existing fleet and commit to the eventual construction of next-generation advanced reactors.  

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Japan’s climate and energy security strategy

Japan’s energy system is transforming to decarbonize and ensure energy security. The government’s “S Plus 3E” strategy is based on the four pillars of safety, energy security, economic efficiency, and the environment. To advance these objectives, the government is targeting an electricity mix in which nuclear constitutes 20-22 percent of generation by 2030, alongside a 36-38 percent share for renewables, 20 percent liquefied natural gas, 19 percent coal, and 2 percent oil.  

Japan has some offshore wind capacity—currently 0.25 gigawatts (GW)—and ambitious goals of achieving 10 GW by 2030 and 30-40 GW by 2050 under its feed-in-tariff (FIT) scheme. The 2012 FIT significantly boosted solar generation, increasing installed capacity from 5.6 GW before 2012 to 70 GW by May 2023. However, solar deployment has slowed recently due to a shortage of land and grid congestion. 

In February 2023, the government announced its Basic Policy for the Realization of GX (Green Transformation), Japan’s vision for a virtuous cycle of emissions reductions and economic growth. The GX Promotion Strategy, adopted in July 2023, identifies support for nuclear power as one of several necessary policies to provide a steady supply of energy. Public approval of nuclear energy has steadily increased since the Russian invasion of Ukraine. In 2023, a majority in Japan favored restarting the existing reactor fleet. 

New momentum for nuclear

As of fiscal year (FY) 2022, nuclear energy constituted 5.6 percent of Japan’s electricity production, a significant decrease from 25 percent in FY 2010, the year before the Fukushima Daiichi accident. In the last few years, nuclear generation has recovered steadily, despite remaining well below pre-2011 levels. Nuclear also holds great promise for repowering retired coal-fired power plants, providing firm generation for data centers and semiconductor facilities, producing industrial heat and hydrogen, and powering Japanese industries participating in a growing export market.   

Japan operated over fifty nuclear reactors before the accident; as of May 2024, thirty-three reactors are classed as operable. However, only twelve reactors—of the twenty-seven that have applied—have met new regulatory requirements and received approval from the Nuclear Regulation Authority (NRA) to restart. Ten remain under the authority’s review and must obtain local government consent before restarting. Notably, Tsuruga Unit 2 could be the first to be denied restart approval under post-Fukushima regulations, due to its proximity to fault lines and failure to meet new seismic regulatory requirements. 

Two notable plants being queued for restart are at Onagawa and Shimane. The Onagawa Nuclear Power Station, which utilizes boiling-water reactors (BWRs), will likely be the first BWR to resume operation in Japan since the 2011 earthquake. This restart is a powerful step toward advancing Japan’s S Plus 3E objectives.  

Safety improvements learned from the Fukushima Daiichi accident, such as tsunami walls and earthquake reinforcements, have been implemented for the existing fleet. The restart process has taken over a decade, with continuous reviews and updates required by the NRA. Japan should glean lessons from Onagawa Unit 2’s upcoming reconnection process to refine technical, operational, and regulatory efficiencies for other pending BWR restarts. Improving the clarity and predictability of the regulator’s heightened post-Fukushima safety requirements will also be essential. 

Increasing or decreasing demand?

Japan’s government currently projects that energy demand will decrease as a result of a declining population and successful energy efficiency measures. However, these projections have yet to reflect the government’s plans to boost energy-intensive industries and reverse Japan’s population decline. 

Japan’s birth rate has been declining since the 1970s, reaching an all-time low in 2023 with only 727,277 births for a population of 125 million. Prime Minister Fumio Kishida has committed to doubling government spending on child-related programs and established the Children and Families Agency in an attempt to reverse this trend. If successful, the government will need to revise its expectations that falling birth rates will contribute to plummeting energy demand. 

Economic growth is also challenging those assumptions. The domestic semiconductor industry is growing, with Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC) investing $20 billion for two plants in southwest Japan, one of which opened in February 2024. Micron Technology intends to build a manufacturing facility in Hiroshima, and Tokyo-based Rapidus aims to build a facility in northern Japan, an effort reinforced by $6 billion in government support. 

Rapid adoption of new AI tools is boosting Japan’s economy and tech sector. Digitalization gained momentum during the pandemic, and tech giants like Microsoft—which is investing $2.9 billion in AI data centers over the next two years—and Oracle—which is planning to invest over $8 billion in cloud computing and AI within the next decade—underscore this AI boom. 

These factors are expected to increase power demand significantly. The International Energy Agency forecasts that data centers and data transmission services—and their insatiable appetite for electricity—could double their power consumption between 2022-26. This level of growth is already being seen in some markets. In the United States, a recent Energy Information Administration survey found that, because of large-scale computing facilities, commercial demand for electricity generation surged by 27 billion kilowatt-hours in Texas and Virginia from 2019-23, and increased by 40 percent in North Dakota over the same period.  

As a result, Japan’s Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) is supporting the restart of nuclear power plants to meet growing energy needs, particularly to backstop load growth from its expanding tech and AI industries. METI’s Advisory Committee for Natural Resources and Energy will no doubt capture these emerging dynamics in its forthcoming seventh Strategic Energy Plan, currently under discussion and expected later this year.  

Moving forward with nuclear energy

In August 2022, Kishida proclaimed that restarting idled nuclear power plants is a strategic imperative to avert crisis and secure Japan’s electricity supply, urging additional units approved by the NRA be brought online.  

Echoing this sentiment at the March 2024 Nuclear Energy Summit in Brussels, Kishida said, “Japan will work to push forward the restart of nuclear power plants, extend their operational periods, and foster the development and construction of next-generation advanced reactors.” 

Japan has moved to utilize its existing nuclear power units and restarted twelve reactors. It is imperative, however, to look to the future when the existing fleet will need to be replaced and new reactors built. To create a favorable business environment and enable utilities to construct next-generation advanced reactors, policies that promote large initial capital investments and improved business predictability are crucial. Additionally, the nuclear industry struggles with an aging workforce and an illiquid market for skilled labor, necessitating sustained investments in human capital and a strengthened talent pipeline. Japan must also work to bolster supply chains needed for eventual plant construction and operation. Moreover, if Japan is to compete in the global market—and team up with the United States and other like-minded countries on reactor export tenders—efforts such as the Nuclear Supply Chain Platform are essential and will enable the Japanese nuclear workforce to maintain expertise.  

To overcome these challenges, Japan must maintain positive momentum and implement robust measures to support the nuclear sector, ensuring it can meet growing electricity demand and secure its energy future. Nuclear power plants are not solely physical components of critical electrical infrastructure; they are long-term strategic assets that generate clean, firm power and can strengthen green growth strategies, as articulated in Japan’s GX policy. Japan can harness its existing fleet and leverage its technical prowess to secure and invest in a brighter economic future.  

Note: This blog post is based on the authors’ recent trip to Japan, having attended a workshop on advanced reactor technologies at Tohoku University in Sendai. The authors wish to thank Tohoku Electric Power Company for hosting a tour of Onagawa Nuclear Power Station in May 2024.

Lauren Hughes is the deputy director of the Nuclear Energy Policy Initiative at the Atlantic Council Global Energy Center.

Maia Sparkman is the former associate director for climate diplomacy at the Atlantic Council Global Energy Center.

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Ukraine continues to expand drone bombing campaign inside Russia https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/ukraine-continues-to-expand-drone-bombing-campaign-inside-russia/ Thu, 08 Aug 2024 21:03:30 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=784841 Ukraine’s long-range drone bombing campaign targeting military and industrial sites inside Russia has had a dramatic series of successes over the last few weeks, writes Marcel Plichta.

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Ukraine’s long-range drone bombing campaign targeting military and industrial sites inside Russia has had a dramatic series of successes over the last few weeks. The most eye-catching achievement was the attack on Russia’s Morozovsk airbase, which Ukrainian officials claim damaged Russian jets and destroyed stockpiles of munitions including glide bombs used to pummel Ukraine’s military and cities.

This progress has come as no surprise: Ukrainian military planners have been working to capitalize on Russia’s air defense vulnerabilities from the first year of the full-scale invasion. Ukraine’s attacks have escalated significantly since the beginning of 2024, with oil refineries and airfields emerging as the priority targets.

In a July interview with Britain’s Guardian newspaper, Ukrainian commander-in-chief Oleksandr Syrskyi confirmed that Ukrainian drones had hit around two hundred sites connected to Russia’s war machine. Meanwhile, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has vowed to continue increasing the quality and quantity of Ukraine’s long-range drone fleet. Underlining the importance of drones to the Ukrainian war effort, Ukraine recently became the first country in the world to launch a new branch of the military dedicated to drone warfare.

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Long-range attack drones are a good fit for Ukraine’s limited offensive capabilities. Kyiv needs to be able to strike military targets inside Russia, but is prevented from doing do with Western-supplied missiles due to restrictions imposed by the country’s partners. While Ukraine has some capacity to produce its own missiles domestically, this is insufficient for a sustained bombing campaign.

Drones are enabling Ukraine to overcome these obstacles. Ukrainian drone production has expanded dramatically over the past two-and-a-half years. The low cost of manufacturing a long-range drone relative to the damage it can cause to Russian military and industrial facilities makes it in many ways the ideal weapon for a cash-strapped but innovative nation like Ukraine.

Ukraine’s drone industry is a diverse ecosystem featuring hundreds of participating companies producing different models. The Ukrainian military has used a variety of drones with different characteristics for attacks inside Russia, making the campaign even more challenging for Russia’s air defenses.

The decentralized nature of Ukraine’s drone manufacturing sector also makes it difficult for Russia to target. Even if the Kremlin is able to identify and hit individual production sites located across Ukraine, this is unlikely to have a major impact on the country’s overall output.

Since 2022, Ukraine has taken a number of steps to reduce bureaucracy and streamline cooperation between drone makers and the military. The result is a sector capable of adapting to changing battlefield conditions and able to implement innovations quickly and effectively. This includes efforts to create AI-enabled drones capable of functioning without an operator, making it far more difficult for Russia to jam.

As it expands, Ukraine’s drone bombing campaign is exposing the weaknesses of Russia’s air defenses. Defending a territory as vast as Russia against air strikes would be problematic even in peacetime. With much of Russia’s existing air defense systems currently deployed along the front lines in Ukraine, there are now far fewer systems available to protect industrial and military targets inside Russia.

During the initial stages of the war, this shortage of air defense coverage was not a major issue. However, Ukraine’s broadening bombing offensive is now forcing Russia to make tough decisions regarding the distribution of its limited air defenses.

In addition to strategically important sites such as airbases, the Kremlin must also defend prestige targets from possible attack. In July, CNN reported that air defenses had been significantly strengthened around Russian President Vladimir Putin’s summer residence. Protecting Putin’s palace from attack is necessary to avoid embarrassment, but it means leaving other potential targets exposed.

Ukraine’s drone program is the biggest success story to emerge from the country’s vibrant defense tech sector, and is helping Ukraine to even out the odds against its far larger and wealthier adversary. The country’s partners clearly recognize the importance of drones for the Ukrainian military, and have formed a drone coalition to increase the supply of drones from abroad. This combination of international support and Ukrainian ingenuity spells trouble for Russia. It will likely lead to increasingly powerful and plentiful long-range strikes in the months ahead.

Marcel Plichta is a PhD candidate at the University of St Andrews and former analyst at the US Department of Defense. He has written on the use of drones in the Russian invasion of Ukraine for the Atlantic Council, the Telegraph, and the Spectator.

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How Armenia’s ‘Crossroads for Peace’ plan could transform the South Caucasus https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/how-armenias-crossroads-for-peace-plan-could-transform-the-south-caucasus/ Wed, 07 Aug 2024 13:36:17 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=782930 The initiative could economically benefit the region, reduce Armenia’s dependence on Russia, and promote peace throughout the South Caucasus.

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Armenia’s “Crossroads for Peace” initiative, unveiled by Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan at the Tbilisi Silk Road Forum in October 2023, is an ambitious regional transport proposal aimed at connecting Armenia with its neighboring countries—Turkey, Azerbaijan, Iran, and Georgia. The initiative seeks to revitalize and develop crucial infrastructure—roads, railways, pipelines, cables, and electricity lines—to facilitate the flow of goods, energy, and people across these nations, connecting the Caspian Sea to the Mediterranean Sea and the Persian Gulf to the Black Sea through easier and more efficient transportation links.

The initiative also represents a significant part of Armenia’s peace agenda in the South Caucasus amid negotiations with Azerbaijan. Armenian leaders envision these renovated and newly built routes as conduits for cultivating economic, political, and cultural ties between the countries involved, thus advancing long-term peace and stability in the region. With the potential to economically benefit the region, promote peace and cooperation in the South Caucasus, and reduce Armenia’s dependence on Russia, the West should support the Crossroads for Peace plan with more robust diplomatic backing and infrastructure investment.

Decades of instability

The South Caucasus, straddling the juncture between Europe and Asia, has long been a region of strategic importance plagued by persistent instability and conflict. Most notable has been the Karabakh conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan, which emerged in the early 1990s and led to the closure of the Armenia-Azerbaijan and Armenia-Turkey borders, severely restricting Armenia’s trade and hardening political divides.

The conflict experienced a significant turning point on September 27, 2020, when Azerbaijan launched a major offensive, triggering the worst escalation since 1994. After six weeks of intense fighting, a Russia-brokered ceasefire was signed on November 9, 2020, which stipulated concessions of Armenian-controlled territory within the internationally recognized borders of Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan blockaded Karabakh for nearly ten months starting on December 12, 2022, leading to a humanitarian crisis. On September 19, 2023, Azerbaijan launched a military assault that seized full control of Karabakh and forced more than one hundred thousand ethnic Armenians to flee to Armenia. The United Nations estimates that only about fifty Armenians remain in the region.

The Karabakh conflict ended on January 1, 2024, with the Karabakh authorities announcing that their unrecognized government ceased to exist. Consequently, the initial rationale behind the closure of the Armenia-Azerbaijan and Armenia-Turkey borders no longer holds. Despite this, both Azerbaijan and Turkey, with the latter often aligning with the former’s policies, continue to refuse to reopen their borders with Armenia. This refusal persists even in the face of Armenia’s Crossroads for Peace initiative—a proposal that would be beneficial for regional development.

Corridors and crossroads

The Trans-Caspian Corridor, also known as the “Middle Corridor,” is an increasingly important channel for transportation and cross-border trade connecting the Central Asian states with Europe. It primarily involves the transport of goods and resources across the Caspian Sea, bridging Central Asian countries such as Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan to Azerbaijan via maritime routes. From Azerbaijan, the goods are then transported through Georgia and Turkey, reaching European markets. Though trade volumes and capacity are still relatively low, the corridor holds immense strategic opportunities, as it offers a viable alternative to the traditional, longer routes through Russia or the southern maritime paths via the Suez Canal, significantly reducing transit time and avoiding geostrategic hotspots.

The Eurasian Northern Corridor, offering both road and rail options, is currently the primary route for transcontinental transport but largely traverses Russian territory. Western sanctions, investment deterrents, and financial restrictions tied to Russia’s war on Ukraine complicate this corridor’s use, and potential instability in Russia might eventually further weaken this route’s reliability. More direct routes through Central Asian and South Caucasus nations could diminish the value of the Eurasian Northern Corridor, aligning with US and European Union efforts to reduce dependencies on Russia. The development of the Trans-Caspian Corridor offers such a strategic alternative, diversifying energy supplies to Europe and enhancing trade connectivity between Asia and Europe, while bypassing Russian influence.

Armenia’s Crossroads for Peace initiative, therefore, would create a vital complementary set of routes, enhancing the strategic depth and utility of the Trans-Caspian Corridor. By developing infrastructure such as the Yeraskh-Julfa-Meghri-Horadiz railway, Armenia would offer new logistic pathways linking the Caspian region directly to the Mediterranean and Black seas through Armenian territory. This would not only shorten transit times and distances between Asia and Europe but would also introduce reliable alternative routes.

Additionally, the integration of Armenia into the Trans-Caspian Corridor could stimulate economic growth in the region by attracting foreign investment focused on logistics and infrastructure development. Armenia could become a central node in Eurasian trade, enhancing the corridor’s capacity and security. This strategic expansion would diversify the transport routes available to major trading powers and fortify the economic independence of Armenia and its neighboring countries by reducing their reliance on Russia.

Moreover, the Crossroads for Peace initiative is premised on the principles of sovereignty and jurisdiction, ensuring that infrastructure within each country’s borders remains under its control. The idea is to promote mutual respect and cooperation among its neighboring nations, facilitating equal and reciprocal management of border and customs controls. This ensures that each country would be able to safeguard its interests while promoting shared economic growth.

Obstacles in the path

However, Crossroads for Peace faces significant geopolitical hurdles. Azerbaijan has so far refused to support Armenia’s initiative, with analysts stating that neither Baku nor Ankara had been consulted. While the Armenian government should intensify its outreach on Crossroads for Peace, Armenia’s neighbors should judge the initiative in good faith on commercial viability, rather than on geopolitical grounds.

If realized, Crossroads for Peace could significantly benefit both Azerbaijan and Turkey by boosting regional trade and opening new markets. For Azerbaijan, it could provide a more direct route to European markets, while Turkey could see enhanced trade corridors that bypass less stable regions. Additionally, the project could serve as a diplomatic bridge, easing longstanding tensions and transforming a historical conflict into a hub of international commerce. For Turkey in particular, supporting this initiative could strategically position it as a peace broker in the region, which could strengthen its diplomatic relationships not only with its immediate neighbors but also across Europe and into Asia. 

Baku has instead called for the development of the “Zangezur Corridor,” which would connect mainland Azerbaijan directly with its exclave of Nakhchivan through Armenia’s southernmost Syunik province. Azerbaijan’s conception of Zangezur includes not only a railway link, but also a highway between the two parts of Azerbaijan, and demands that it would have extraterritorial status, which would require Armenia to cede control over a strip of its own territory. Crucially, Zangezur envisions opening a single transit route with Azerbaijan, whereas Crossroads for Peace aims to open several border crossings with both Azerbaijan and Turkey.

Armenia has firmly stated that any discussions involving the loss of sovereignty and territorial integrity or third-party control over its territory are nonnegotiable red lines. Indeed, Baku has insisted that a detachment from Russia’s Federal Security Service guard Zangezur; having just kicked Russian border guards out of the country, it’s understandable why Armenia would balk at the installation of more Russian agents on its territory.

Azerbaijan’s Zangezur plan is also detrimental to Western interests in several ways. First, it would hinder the broader Western strategic objective of stabilizing and economically developing the South Caucasus—critical for energy routes and geopolitical balance among Europe, Asia, and the Middle East. By stalling broader regional integration initiatives, Azerbaijan’s position perpetuates dependence on existing routes that run through Georgia, which face logistical and capacity hurdles, and which could be susceptible to disruptions by external geopolitical influences.

This ongoing tension and the resultant lack of comprehensive peace and cooperation in the South Caucasus allows Russia and Iran to exert their influence there. Armenia’s isolation forces it to maintain its reliance on Russia, countering Western efforts to promote democratic governance and market liberalization in the area. This situation becomes increasingly dangerous as autocratic Azerbaijan deepens its ties with Russia. Simultaneously, Iran benefits by positioning itself as a crucial partner for Armenia in energy and trade, while also providing diplomatic support by rejecting the Zangezur plan to maintain clout in the South Caucasus.

By keeping the Armenia-Azerbaijan and Armenia-Turkey borders closed, Azerbaijan impedes Armenia’s economic and connectivity opportunities, limiting the scope for Western engagement and investment in the region. This keeps Armenia overly dependent on trade with Russia. Baku has long complained about Armenia’s close ties with Russia and should welcome Yerevan’s desire to open trade with Azerbaijan and Turkey, as well as its commitment to leave the Moscow-led Collective Security Treaty Organization.

The Crossroads for Peace initiative, therefore, offers a more promising path. By opening up the region and paving the way for a new era of mutual economic growth and cooperation in the South Caucasus, Crossroads for Peace could serve as a catalyst for regional stability and prosperity. This initiative not only counters the restrictive nature of the Zangezur plan but also aligns economic incentives with geopolitical opportunities.

How the West can help

Armenia’s Crossroads for Peace initiative deserves more robust support and engagement from Western nations. By backing Armenia’s efforts to integrate into the Trans-Caspian Corridor and promote cooperation across the South Caucasus, Western countries can help ensure that the region develops into a vibrant economic hub that is less dependent on Russia. Increased investment in infrastructure, clear diplomatic backing, and strategic partnerships, such as the recent upgrade in US-Armenia relations, can solidify the West’s commitment to promoting a more balanced geopolitical landscape in this region.

This should start with applying diplomatic pressure on Turkey and Azerbaijan to engage constructively with the initiative and entering security pacts with Armenia that help deter aggression and maintain open and secure trade routes. Subsequently, Western countries should implement targeted funding and financial incentives along with technical assistance for the construction and modernization of infrastructure in the region. Potential new trade agreements and the promotion of private sector involvement encouraging Western businesses to invest in and partner with local firms within the framework of Crossroads for Peace would also help make the initiative more viable.

Enhanced Western support for Armenia could also serve as a catalyst for broader regional cooperation and prosperity, setting a precedent for peaceful conflict resolution and cooperative development efforts. Western policymakers should therefore help integrate Crossroads for Peace into regional connectivity plans that promote open, stable, and cooperative international systems and can make Armenia a key player in the diversification of transit routes across Eurasia.


Sheila Paylan is a human rights lawyer and senior legal consultant with the United Nations. The views expressed herein are her own and do not necessarily reflect those of the United Nations.

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Behind the market turmoil: Why a bad jobs report and the risk of war are shaking the financial world https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/behind-the-market-turmoil-why-a-bad-jobs-report-and-the-risk-of-war-are-shaking-the-financial-world/ Mon, 05 Aug 2024 20:12:21 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=783901 A geopolitical crisis and disappointing economic news at the same time create a haze that can make each situation appear more threatening than it actually is.

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“Double, double toil and trouble; Fire burn and caldron bubble.” So sing the three witches of Macbeth as they add ingredients into their toxic brew. But while the famous chant is what is remembered from the scene, William Shakespeare spends far more time detailing each ingredient that goes into the pot. So Monday, as markets experience the highest fear factor since the COVID-19 pandemic, it’s worth taking a moment to understand what is—and what isn’t—contributing to actual danger.

An instigating ingredient added this past weekend was the disappointing jobs report released on Friday. Analysts expected 180,000 jobs—which would signal a slowdown but still relatively healthy job growth. This was, it seems, what the Federal Reserve expected last Wednesday when it decided not to cut interest rates and its chair, Jerome Powell, said, “the labor market has come into better balance.”

Instead, 114,000 jobs were created in July. This was disappointing, and some believed it signaled that the United States is headed for slower growth than forecast and even—dare one say the dreaded word—a recession. But within a day or two, most market participants had taken a deep breath, recognizing that bad weather probably had an impact, remembering that unemployment was still near historic lows, and aware that US gross domestic product growth was far outpacing that of the rest of the Group of Seven (G7).

Then Japan happened. As several financial commentators have noted, a unique mix of problems is plaguing Japanese markets. The Bank of Japan had stuck to zero interest rates during the global cycle of rate hikes but was forced to intervene last week to avoid further yen depreciation. This now means that Japanese borrowing conditions are becoming tighter as recession risks grow, making it an outlier during the coming easing cycle—just as it was during the global cycle of rate hikes. The record Nikkei index rout on Monday can also be attributed to the export-oriented nature of Japanese firms, which had benefited from the weak yen, until now.

So why then did US markets react so violently Monday? It’s not just the jobs report and it’s not just Japan. Instead, it’s the x-factor ingredient—geopolitics. Specifically, Iran’s likely imminent attack on Israel, as retribution for the assassination of Hamas political leader Ismail Haniyeh in Iranian territory.

Pricing in geopolitics is almost always an impossible task for Wall Street. Speculation about equity markets is one thing. Speculation about Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s intentions is usually far outside traders’ field of expertise. With more uncertainty comes more fear—see the VIX index, which is essentially Wall Street’s fear gauge, below—surprisingly showing that the market is more concerned now than it was during Silicon Valley Bank’s collapse in March 2023. In fact, it’s the highest volatility reading since the COVID-19 pandemic, rivaling volatility during the global financial crisis.

What’s especially hard for markets is to navigate a geopolitical crisis intertwined with bad economic news. Individually, either one can be mitigated and hedged against. But together, the two developing at the same time create a haze that can make each situation appear more threatening than it actually is. How then do we find solid ground? Focus on the data.

The US economic data remains strong. The economy is slowing, but it is nowhere near a recession. And in fact, as the chart below shows, it could slow significantly before falling to the level of its G7 peers.

Moreover, data released Monday show that economic activity in the service sector grew more than expected. And remember that the United States is still creating new jobs, even if at a slower pace than before. Gas prices are significantly lower than two years ago at the outset of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. So even if a crisis widens in the Middle East, a slower global economy should keep price increases in check.

Meanwhile, inflation is finally coming back down to the Federal Reserve’s target range of 2 percent. All this signals an economy that is, as long forecast, coming off its breakneck pace. The Federal Reserve should probably have acted sooner by cutting rates last week, but to jump into an emergency session as some have called for is not supported by the data right now and risks creating more panic. The economic fundamentals remain stable.

Geopolitical tensions actually present the greater risk to markets. No one knows how and when Iran will retaliate and what the fallout will be. And as I wrote in February, the relative weakness of the region’s economies means any worsening of the situation could send multiple countries into debt distress and trigger more market failures.

Still, the overwhelming likelihood is that whatever develops in the Middle East this week will be contained to the Middle East. While that may impact energy prices, it is unlikely to trigger wider global economic fallout. To be sure, nothing is guaranteed. The situation could deteriorate and the worst fears could be realized. But it is not the most likely outcome.

So in the days ahead, it’s geopolitical tensions that will likely move the markets more than the macroeconomics. Watch carefully in the coming days (or as Macbeth would say, “tomorrow, and tomorrow, and tomorrow”) as markets recognize this reality and, hopefully, cooler heads prevail.


Josh Lipsky is the senior director of the Atlantic Council’s GeoEconomics Center and a former adviser at the International Monetary Fund.

Data visualizations created by Alisha Chhangani, Mrugank Bhusari, and Sophia Busch.

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Europe can do more to help Ukraine counter Russia’s energy attacks https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/europe-can-do-more-to-help-ukraine-counter-russias-energy-attacks/ Thu, 01 Aug 2024 20:54:59 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=783474 Russia has destroyed more than half of Ukraine's civilian energy infrastructure with a targeted bombed campaign, leaving Kyiv in desperate need of European support ahead of the coming winter season, writes Aura Sabadus.

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Russian bombing of Ukraine’s civilian energy infrastructure has forced millions of Ukrainians to spend the summer months adjusting to rolling power blackouts, with record high temperatures adding to the practical challenges of living without electricity. The Ukrainian response to this latest episode of wartime adversity has been marked by typical grit, resourcefulness, and good humor. Nevertheless, there is now widespread awareness that the country is facing what may be the toughest winter in modern Ukrainian history.

Since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022, Russia has destroyed, damaged, or occupied approximately eighty percent of Ukraine’s electricity infrastructure. The situation has deteriorated sharply since March 2024 following a wave of Russian attacks on Ukrainian power plants that have devastated the country’s thermal capacity.

Ukrainian energy sector officials believe that during the coming winter season, peak demand could be above eighteen gigawatts, with average consumption likely to hover around fifteen gigawatts. However, remaining capacity is just over ten gigawatts. Unless significant new sources can be secured, Ukrainians will have to deal with extended blackouts amid subzero temperatures. This could lead to a humanitarian catastrophe and create new waves of refugees fleeing to the EU.

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Looking ahead, there is no substitute for much needed air defenses to protect Ukraine’s remaining energy production capacity. However, additional steps from the Ukrainian authorities and Kyiv’s partners could help prepare the country for the coming winter season.

A July 2024 report funded by Germany’s Federal Ministry for Education and Research has identified a number of short-term measures that could be adopted swiftly to at least partially plug current shortfalls. Fast repairs of thermal and hydro plants together with the deployment of small-scale gas-fired turbines and solar panels could bring approximately 3.4GW of additional capacity online before temperatures start to drop. Donations of spare equipment are also absolutely vital, while Ukraine should intensify work with partners to establish stockpiles of components to rebuild generation capacity.

One of the most promising initiatives would involve increasing cross-border capacity with neighboring EU countries operating under the umbrella of the European Network of Transmission System Operators for Electricity (ENTSO-E). Ukraine synchronized with the ENTSO-E grid in March 2022. Since then, Kyiv has increased cross-border capacity significantly, but there is still scope for a further expansion of interconnection capacity by approximately 0.3GW ahead of the coming winter season. This may be easier said than done, however.

Hungary and Slovakia are key exporters of electricity to Ukraine but are currently threatening to cut flows after Kyiv introduced a partial ban on the transit of Russian oil to refineries in the two EU countries. Budapest and Bratislava have long benefitted from cheap Russian energy imports and have faced accusations of acting in the Kremlin’s interests by blocking EU financial and military support to Ukraine. Both countries could now undermine efforts to boost energy exports to Ukraine.

While there has not yet been any disruption to electricity flows from the EU into Ukraine, it is clearly in Kyiv’s interests to avoid disagreements where possible and to seek enhanced energy partnership with the country’s European neighbors. Closer cooperation with Slovakia and Romania in particular could pay major dividends. Indeed, recent research has found that transmission capacity could be more than doubled to five gigawatts. This could provide greater energy security, create jobs, and attract significant investments.

If completed, one existing power line project linking Slovakia and Ukraine could bring additional capacity of one gigawatt, enough to supply a million consumers. Work on this line began in 2013 and is seventy percent complete on the Ukrainian side, but nothing has yet been done on the Slovak side. Similarly, a proposed electricity power line linking Ukraine’s Pivdennoukrainska nuclear power plant to Romania would not only bring an additional one gigawatt of transfer capacity, but could also potentially end nearby Moldova’s dependence on electricity generated in the Kremlin-controlled Transnistria enclave.

Despite the numerous benefits offered by these projects, the Romanian and Slovakian governments remain unwilling to commit. This lack of political cooperation may contribute to a humanitarian crisis in Ukraine during the coming winter months that could spill over into neighboring countries. With the countdown to the cold season now already underway, there is no time to lose. Helping Ukraine to keep the lights on should be a priority for the whole of Europe.

Dr. Aura Sabadus is a senior energy journalist who writes about Eastern Europe, Turkey, and Ukraine for Independent Commodity Intelligence Services (ICIS), a London-based global energy and petrochemicals news and market data provider. Her views are her own.

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#AtlanticDebrief – Where does Europe stand on the green agenda? | A debrief from Niels Redeker https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/content-series/atlantic-debrief/atlanticdebrief-where-does-europe-stand-on-the-green-agenda-a-debrief-from-niels-redeker/ Thu, 01 Aug 2024 20:31:30 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=658052 Carol Schaeffer sits down with Nils Redeker to discuss European voter sentiment on climate policies and the future of the EU’s approach.

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IN THIS EPISODE

Where does Europe stand on the green agenda? Are concerns over a wide spread “greenlash” in Europe exaggerated? Why did climate policy not play as much of a significant role in the last European Parliament elections compared to the elections in 2019? Under her next Commission mandate, will Commission President von der Leyen bring continuity on climate change policy in the EU?

On this episode of #AtlanticDebrief, Carol Schaeffer sits down with Nils Redeker, Deputy Director Jacques Delors Centre, to discuss European voter sentiment on climate policies and the future of the EU’s approach.

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Pragmatism can improve Mexico’s energy outlook https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/energysource/pragmatism-can-improve-mexicos-energy-outlook/ Wed, 31 Jul 2024 21:17:59 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=783233 Claudia Sheinbaum's victory in Mexico's presidential election marks a crucial juncture for the country’s energy future. Sheinbaum's initial moves are a promising beginning to maximizing Mexico's economic potential, which requires significant clean energy investment.

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Claudia Sheinbaum’s seismic victory in Mexico’s presidential election is certain to have material impacts on energy and investment in Mexico. Much will depend on her predecessor, President Andrés Manuel López Obrador (AMLO), and his government’s final actions before Sheinbaum takes office, as well as the composition of her cabinet.

It is a crucial time in Mexican energy politics. While there are important challenges to address, Sheinbaum’s initial moves are a promising beginning to maximizing Mexico’s economic potential, which requires significant investment in clean energy.

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Uncertainties complicate investment in clean energy

Under Mexican law, the new Congress takes office on September 1, but the new president takes office on October 1. The current government intends to present constitutional reforms to the new Morena-dominated legislature—the ruling party that will now likely have a supermajority—in a manner that could challenge certain policy adjustments by the new government. To that end, AMLO has stated that electoral and judicial constitutional reforms are his legislative priorities—repealing the 2013 energy reforms, which enabled an influx of foreign and private investment in Mexico’s energy sector during the mid-2010s, is not.

The outgoing government introduced complexities to private investment, especially in clean energy. These include suspending auctions in oil, gas, and clean energy, giving priority to the state electricity system operator CFE’s established fossil-based generation over cleaner and cheaper alternatives, and suspending implementation of the clean energy certificate program, which incentivized conversion to less carbon intensive electricity. Several of these actions are now the subject of disputes under the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA), and have disincentivized foreign investment in manufacturing, due to companies’ strict carbon-emission reduction targets—for them to set up shop or expand in Mexico, they require access to clean energy.

The government has also taken steps to prioritize Mexico’s long-established fossil-based power sector, but production by national oil champion Pemex is at historic lows despite a consistent influx of federal spending to revive the flagging company, which faces a looming debt crisis. Meanwhile, CFE is struggling to power Mexico’s growing economy amid the burdens of extreme heat and other climate-exacerbated energy challenges.

The federal government is in a challenging fiscal position, as its budget deficit is forecast to grow this year.  In addition, there appear to be adverse market reactions to controversial, proposed judicial reforms, which include appointing judges by popular vote. Some foreign investors remain cautious, particularly in the energy sector.

Mexico’s golden economic opportunity requires clean energy to sustain it

Despite these investment challenges, Mexico holds vast potential as a nearshoring destination. For Mexico to capitalize on the USMCA and its proximity to the lucrative US export market, it will need to expand its energy supply not only for manufacturing, but also to power artificial intelligence use by data centers, which will increase demand for clean energy exponentially.

It will be in the interest of both US government and energy industry stakeholders to help Sheinbaum find a way to navigate among Morena’s different groups to develop a pragmatic policy approach that moves forward Mexico’s energy security and transition while maintaining a leading role for Pemex and CFE, which remains a central element of Morena’s policy platform. Public-private partnerships of many forms can be part of the solution.

It will be challenging but possible for Sheinbaum to retain the primacy of Pemex and CFE while also giving foreign and domestic investors full confidence that they will receive permits to build and obtain reasonable returns without fear that a popularly elected judiciary and weaker national regulators will undermine their projects.

Serious policymakers will be in charge

Sheinbaum wants to make her own mark on history as the first female president of Mexico, but faces a tough road ahead. The most important benchmarks will be her cabinet appointments, her commitment to a predictable and transparent policymaking process, and her engagement on the USMCA, which comes up for review in 2026.

The composition of Sheinbaum’s cabinet will be an indication of her intent to meaningfully address Mexico’s energy and fiscal challenges. So far, the news is positive, with serious policy professionals being tapped for high-level appointments. Current Finance Minister Rogelio Ramírez de la O, who is familiar with the overall fiscal challenge, including that posed by Pemex and CFE, is slated to remain in his post. Former Foreign Minister Marcelo Ebrard, a highly experienced and capable politician, was named economy minister and will play a steadying hand. Luz Elena González, an economist who until recently was finance secretary of Mexico City, will be the secretary of energy, demonstrating that the government understands the relevance of public finances for energy policy. Finally, current Foreign Minister Alicia Bárcena, who is experienced in environmental issues, will become environment minister and could be a relevant actor on energy transition.

The path forward

Sheinbaum’s commitment to clear, predictable policies will be an important marker of her style of governance. This can send positive signals to investors in areas such as energy import permits and infrastructure investment. Her approach to the 2026 USMCA review—which will be deeply impacted by whoever wins the US presidential election in November—will be another test of the Sheinbaum administration’s ability to navigate a delicate bilateral relationship. That review will be a top-line issue for both the US and Mexican governments, and early consultations are already underway. Energy will loom large in this review; both the US government and private stakeholders have a powerful motivation to ensure that energy disputes do not undermine the USMCA—they need it to remain strong enough to provide certainty for the wider cross-border relationship.

Sheinbaum has much to gain from reassuring investors, capitalizing on Mexico’s advantages in nearshoring, and addressing the country’s slow energy transition. She can creatively design a framework that respects Morena’s political stance on energy while increasing investor confidence. Sheinbaum will be looking for able and willing partners to craft solutions that maximize the potential of foreign investment and job creation in Mexico. Undoubtedly, the energy industry and civil society on both sides of the border all have a major interest in helping her succeed.

David L. Goldwyn served as special envoy for international energy under President Barack Obama and assistant secretary of energy for international relations under President Bill Clinton. He is chair of the Atlantic Council’s Energy Advisory Group.

Antonio Ortiz-Mena is a professor at the Center for Latin American Studies, Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University, and a partner at DGA Group.

The views expressed are the sole responsibility of the authors and not necessarily those of any institution with which they are affiliated.

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Dispatch from Rio: Can Brazil set the G20 leaders’ summit up for success? https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/dispatch-from-rio-can-brazil-set-the-g20-leaders-summit-up-for-success/ Tue, 30 Jul 2024 20:14:51 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=782996 Brasília has sought to acknowledge fundamental disagreements on geopolitics between some members, and then to sidestep them entirely at the ministerial level. How long can this approach last?

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RIO DE JANEIRO—As the Group of Twenty (G20) finance ministers and central bank governors gathered here last week, they were met with a dense haze rolling off the mountains that morphed into bright winter sunshine by day’s end. It was a fitting metaphor for the struggle, and for some of the success, of the Brazilian G20 presidency in trying to work through the complex geopolitical morass—especially the one caused by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine—that has hung over these ministers’ meetings for the past three years.

While previous G20 meetings have been noteworthy for their disagreements, Brazil has emphasized substance and consensus over geopolitics during its G20 presidency. Felipe Hees, the Brazilian diplomat and sous-sherpa of this year’s G20 presidency, explained this strategy on July 25 at an Atlantic Council conference on the sidelines of the meeting. Brasília, he said, has sought to acknowledge fundamental disagreements on geopolitics between some members, and then to sidestep them entirely at the ministerial level. The big question now is: How long can this approach last?

So far, Brazilian officials have chosen to focus on economic development issues that already enjoy widespread support. Last week, this approach resulted in one of the few joint G20 ministerial-level communiqués in the past two years. Released on July 26, this communiqué displays G20 members’ alignment on launching the Global Alliance against Hunger and Poverty under the Brazilian presidency. It’s an important topic for the host country, since Brazil is the world’s leading producer of soybeans, corn, and meat, and Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva has emphasized his country’s role in alleviating global food insecurity. At the same time, the issue has a wider resonance. At the Atlantic Council conference, Cindy McCain, executive director of the World Food Program, emphasized that “food security is a national security issue, and it should be labeled as one.”

Climate finance and the energy transition were at the forefront in Rio last week as well. Discussions focused on how to mobilize the public and private sector in achieving climate goals. At the Atlantic Council’s conference, Renata Amaral, the Brazilian secretary for international affairs and development in the Ministry of Planning and Budget, formally called for technical assistance from multilateral development banks for catastrophic weather events, such as the floods in southern Brazil this May. Immediately following the summit, US Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen headed to Belém, the capital city of the northern Brazilian province Pará. Located near the mouth of the Amazon River, Belém was a symbolic choice for the unveiling of the US Treasury’s Amazon Region Initiative Against Illicit Finance, which is intended to help combat nature crimes.

Another issue that garnered attention last week was wealth inequality, which the Brazilian president spotlighted in his speech on June 24. “The poor have been ignored by governments and by wealthy sectors of society,” he said. Despite disagreements on whether the G20 is the right forum for the issue, it issued the first ever ministerial declaration on taxation. While Brazil’s ambition was to move the needle on a 2 percent global wealth tax, the declaration simply said that ultra-high-net-worth individuals must pay their fair share in taxes. While this fell short of Brazil’s hopes on this issue, the meetings in Rio have done more on building consensus than the past two presidencies, which have been rife with outbursts over geopolitical issues between member states.

In 2022, the then G20 president, Indonesia, saw its plan to build international cooperation for the post-pandemic recovery paralyzed by Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February. When finance ministers and foreign ministers met in April and July of the year, officials from Russia and from the United States and Europe walked out of the room when their counterparts spoke. Ministers failed to agree on a communiqué, and negotiations on climate and education also broke down over criticisms of the war. Ahead of the leaders’ summit in November 2022, Western leaders balked at the thought of sharing a table with Russian President Vladimir Putin, who ultimately did not attend the summit. In the end, the leaders could only agree to a declaration that was a broad, noncommittal summary of approaches to addressing global challenges.

Last year, India focused its G20 presidency on depoliticizing the issue of the global supply of food, fertilizers, and fuels, as well as on addressing climate change and restoring the foundations of negotiations at the forum. Its strategy was to move geopolitics off center stage by highlighting perspectives from the “Global South,” including formally adding the African Union as a full member, and thus shaping the platform as an action and communication channel between advanced economies and emerging markets.

This was difficult. Shortly into India’s presidency, Russia and China withdrew their support for the text in the Bali statement on Ukraine. At the technical level, none of the ministerial meetings produced a joint communiqué, and New Delhi was forced to issue chairs’ statements instead. Since the leaders’ summit in New Delhi, the outbreak of war between Israel and Hamas in October 2023 has made the job of navigating geopolitical tensions all the more difficult for Brazil.

While the Russian and Chinese leaders did not attend last year’s leaders’ summit, the New Delhi Declaration was nevertheless bolder and more specific than its Bali predecessor. It set the agenda for the G20 for the years ahead but offered few specifics on how to achieve these goals.

Will Brazil’s strategy of sidestepping geopolitics work at the leaders’ summit scheduled for November 18-19 in Rio? Finance ministers and central bank governors can ignore geopolitics; presidents and prime ministers often cannot. If Brasília concludes technical negotiations on the various proposals ahead of the leaders’ summit, then consensus-building at the gathering will be easier, as geopolitics will remain just an elephant in the room.

If Brazil is successful, it can end the stalemate that the G20 has found itself in and remake it into a relevant economic coordination body—one that can adequately address the goals of its emerging market and advanced economy members. If Brazilian officials are not successful, however, the forum’s relevance may begin to wane.

It has been in the interest of the last few G20 presidencies to keep up the balancing act between the United States, China, and Russia. Moreover, it is likely that South Africa will follow this approach as it takes on its presidency in 2025. As many of the discussions in Rio noted, however, what happens in the US presidential elections this November could determine both the relevance and the tone of the G20 meetings going forward.


Ananya Kumar is the deputy director, future of money at the Atlantic Council’s GeoEconomics Center.

Mrugank Bhusari is assistant director at the Atlantic Council’s GeoEconomics Center.

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#BalkansDebrief – Does the new EU-Serbia lithium deal undermine democracy? A Debrief with Ivan Vejvoda https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/content-series/balkans-debrief/balkansdebrief-does-the-new-eu-serbia-lithium-deal-undermine-democracy-a-debrief-with-ivan-vejvoda/ Tue, 30 Jul 2024 16:30:00 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=782811 To discusss the EU's new lithium deal with Serbia, Ivan Vejvoda from the Institute for Human Sciences sits down with Ilva Tare, Nonresident Senior Fellow, for this episode of #BalkansDebrief.

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IN THIS EPISODE

Does the new EU-Serbia lithium deal undermine democracy? The European Union’s recent memorandum of understanding with Serbia on raw materials has sparked debate across the Balkans. Signed during German Chancellor Olaf Scholz’s visit, the MoU revives a controversial lithium mining project, drawing opposition from many Serbians.

In this episode, Nonresident Senior Fellow Ilva Tare is joined by Ivan Vejvoda, Permanent Fellow at the Institute for Human Sciences and Head of Europe’s Futures Project in Vienna, to dissect this complex issue.

Does Mr. Vejvoda share the criticism that the EU and Germany are prioritizing lithium access in Serbia over essential democratic principles like environmental protection, rule of law, and independent media?

With concerns about weak independent institutions and a critical public sphere in Serbia, can the country uphold high environmental and social standards?

How can the EU ensure that such agreements maintain rigorous environmental and social principles?

Could this agreement reduce Serbia’s reliance on China, and what might be the broader geopolitical implications?

Join #BalkansDebrief for an in-depth discussion on the potential impacts of this deal and the geoeconomic and geopolitical interests of the EU in the Western Balkans.

ABOUT #BALKANSDEBRIEF

#BalkansDebrief is an online interview series presented by the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center and hosted by journalist Ilva Tare. The program offers a fresh look at the Western Balkans and examines the region’s people, culture, challenges, and opportunities.

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Webster was quoted in Taipei Times on nuclear development in Taiwan https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/insight-impact/in-the-news/webster-was-quoted-in-taipei-times-on-nuclear-development-in-taiwan/ Mon, 29 Jul 2024 19:53:08 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=784568 The post Webster was quoted in Taipei Times on nuclear development in Taiwan appeared first on Atlantic Council.

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#AtlanticDebrief – What is Germany’s approach to climate policy? | A Debrief from Lukas Köhler MdB https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/content-series/atlantic-debrief/atlanticdebrief-what-is-germanys-approach-to-climate-policy-a-debrief-from-lukas-kohler-mdb/ Mon, 29 Jul 2024 17:06:03 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=658051 Carol Schaeffer sits down with Dr. Lukas Köhler, member of the German Bundestag, to discuss Germany’s approach to climate policy and green energy opportunities.

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IN THIS EPISODE

Climate change cost estimates by 2049 will be close to $40 trillion per year for countries such as Germany and the United States. How is Germany managing both the scale of the climate problem and related economic costs? What is the German government doing to get citizens onboard to support climate change policies? What is the role of technological innovation in Germany when it comes to combatting climate change? And what is Germany doing to decarbonize its industrial sector? What role can a post-war Ukraine play in the green energy sector in Europe, and what are the possibilities for bilateral energy trade between Ukraine and Germany?

On this episode of #AtlanticDebrief, Carol Schaeffer sits down with Dr. Lukas Köhler, member of the German Bundestag, to discuss Germany’s approach to climate policy and green energy opportunities.

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The world is sleepwalking into an era of extreme heat. The UN just issued a wake-up call.  https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/extreme-heat-un-wake-up-call/ Thu, 25 Jul 2024 18:08:33 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=782181 The UN secretary-general‘s Global Call to Action on Extreme Heat underscores the urgent need for actionable heat-related policies worldwide.

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“If there is one thing that unites our divided world, it is that we are all increasingly feeling the heat,” said United Nations (UN) Secretary-General António Guterres today as he issued a Global Call to Action on Extreme Heat. The first-of-its-kind report, which I contributed to in my capacity as global chief heat officer, emphasizes the urgent need for actionable heat-related measures and policies worldwide. 

In the Call to Action, the secretary-general makes clear that governments and policymakers must protect and care for the lives and livelihoods of frontline communities, protect workers, advance the evidence base to drive innovative resilience solutions, and limit global temperature rise to 1.5 degrees Celsius. 

This clear recognition from the Office of the Secretary-General is an important moment for us all. Extreme heat is often underestimated and ignored, but its impacts are unavoidable. The planet is heating up faster than we thought. We are outside scientific model predictions and extreme weather events are becoming more frequent and devastating. 

Rising heat affects our major critical systems—such as water, energy, food, transportation, and communications. It also feeds mega droughts, wildfires, and storms, creating cascading and compounding crises. It’s a global crisis. But we are not ready for any of it. We’re sleepwalking.

Policies to address extreme heat so far remain scattered, disjointed, and underfunded.

In my work as global chief heat officer and first chief heat officer for the city of Athens, I have worked directly with cities and have seen the impacts of heat firsthand. Cities are heating up at twice the rate of the global average. At 1.5 degrees Celsius of global warming, sixty-seven cities will experience 150 or more days per year of temperatures exceeding 35 degrees Celsius (95 degrees Fahrenheit). At 2 degrees Celsius, the number jumps to ninety-four cities. At just under 3 degrees Celsius of global warming, it soars to 197 cities.  

Policies to address extreme heat so far remain scattered, disjointed, and underfunded. But the rising temperatures mark a global crisis with local impacts. That’s why the global focus of the UN’s Call to Action is so crucial. Increasingly, our world is facing challenges that go beyond the capacity and limited mandate of single nation states. We’re facing crises, like climate change, that need international cooperation to support and facilitate equitable, multilevel, science-based decision making and solutions. The UN is the only legitimate multilateral governance structure able to address issues that need global mobilization and localized solutions. As cities take on climate change, they need support at every level.  

In 2022, globally, humanity spent a little over one trillion dollars on adapting to and mitigating the effects of climate change. For comparison, the world spent $11.7 trillion on COVID-19 emergency fiscal measures in 2020 alone. As temperatures rise, this funding gap is a dangerous threat. And there is another issue that needs to be urgently addressed: In 2022, about one trillion dollars went to financing emissions mitigation, while only one hundred billion dollars went to adaptation and resilience-building initiatives. We urgently need both climate adaptation and resilience financing

The UN’s Call to Action is an important milestone for climate resilience, but it is also only the beginning. As the document explains, the world urgently needs a Global Action Strategy to “mobilize governments, policy makers, and all stakeholders to act, prevent, and reduce heat risk.” A dedicated trust fund for urban heat resilience initiatives is also needed, because cities are on the frontlines of extreme heat, and they are where more than half of the world’s population lives—a share that is expected to rise to seven-in-ten people by midcentury. Finally, more dedicated heat champions, like the community of chief heat officers established by the Arsht-Rock Resilience Center, with heat resilience departments that can articulate the challenges and co-create the best solutions are needed. These champions are critical to ensuring that the dangers of—and the solutions to—extreme heat are understood widely.

Each of these essential efforts, as well as others, requires building an international consensus around the scope of the problem and its solutions. Here, the UN’s Call to Action on Extreme Heat can help shape conversations in positive directions at upcoming conferences such as Climate Week NYC and this year’s UN Climate Change Conference of the Parties, also known as COP29. Heat resilience must be at the top of the agenda at these and other international meetings, and work is needed at every level to ensure that cities have the support and finances they need to scale solutions.

As the Call to Action makes clear, everyone is at risk from extreme heat, and we must enable resilience at the local and international level, taking “bold decisions to change the way we live to avoid an even more scorched Earth in the future.” 


Eleni Myrivili is the world’s first global chief heat officer, a role jointly created and appointed by the Atlantic Council’s Arsht-Rock Resilience Center and the United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UN-Habitat).

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European energy security requires stronger power grids https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/energysource/european-energy-security-requires-stronger-power-grids/ Wed, 24 Jul 2024 20:47:50 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=781961 Russia's invasion of Ukraine has highlighted the urgency of strengthening Europe's power grid to meet the interrelated demands of energy security and decarbonization. Europe can build a resilient energy future by improving regional connectivity, increasing digitalization, investing in grid infrastructure, and reforming unwieldy regulations.

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In 2022, 63 percent of all energy consumed in the European Union (EU) was imported. Europe’s energy generation gap has come into focus amid the energy security challenges stemming from Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. But while Europe has weathered the storm, in part by deploying renewables and accelerating electrification, there is a pressing need to strengthen the backbone of a decarbonized energy system—Europe’s power grid.

A mismatch between supply security, climate ambition, and grid capacity

Upgrading electricity grids to enable decarbonization is a worldwide issue. The International Energy Agency (IEA) estimates that global grid investments must double to reach $600 billion per year by 2030 to meet nationally set climate objectives. In Europe, a recent study by Eurelectric suggests that the EU and Norway must invest €67 billion in grids per year to realize carbon neutrality by 2050.  

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As the EU aims to reach a 42.5 percent—ideally 45 percent—share for renewables in its total energy mix by 2030, grid capacity must keep pace with rapidly growing clean energy generation.

Europe overall, including the UK, is making progress on renewable deployment, but a mismatch in grid capacity is already causing significant challenges. In Britain, for example, the connection queue for generation, storage, or energy-consuming projects waiting to be connected to the grid is projected to reach 800 gigawatts by the end of 2024. Grid congestion is also a major problem in the Netherlands, with industry and households asked to reduce demand at peak times to avoid blackouts. In Romania, a boom in state-backed prosumers without adequate storage facilities is placing significant stress on the grid.

Building the grid of the future

Currently, cross-border interconnections within the EU limit the amount of electricity that can be imported or exported, creating significant price discrepancies between neighboring states. Expected increases in electricity demand due to electrification will only exacerbate these distortions.

Enabling greater cross-border electricity trade is a must for solidifying energy security and solidarity across Europe. New high-voltage transmission lines could convert intermittent renewable generation into more baseload-like output by quickly moving excess clean electricity to regions in deficit.

To this end, debate continues in Brussels over creating an EU-wide supergrid that would enable high volumes of electricity to be transported across the continent. This would help level energy prices across borders, reduce equity concerns, and improve supply security over the short and long term.

Furthermore, the difficulties in predicting renewable energy generation and adapting consumption accordingly requires the digital transformation of energy grids. Digitalization can further integrate renewable generation through smart meters and smart appliances that can accurately forecast output and match it with flexible electricity consumption. This can help minimize grid congestion and enhance resilience in the face of intermittency.

Additionally, new sensor and software platforms can enable predictive maintenance that reduces the time infrastructure is out of service. Digital twins—virtual representations of physical power grids—use data analytics to model various scenarios, leading to higher operational efficiency, increased asset lifespan, and optimized energy flow. While a highly digitalized energy grid may also increase cyber threats, other sectors have demonstrated over decades that these threats can be mitigated through strategies that include rapid incident reporting to limit malware spreading and investment in threats monitoring systems.

The unavoidable but necessary cost

Upgrading and extending the grid would translate into higher tariffs paid by European end-users, who have already struggled with energy affordability. A spike in network tariffs could lead to negative social, economic, and—eventually—political consequences, as was seen during EU-wide protests in 2022, triggered by increasing energy bills.

Although these investments will impose direct and indirect costs on consumers in the short term, they will unlock over the medium and long term increased electrification and pass decreasing renewable generation costs onto rate payers. Today, onshore wind and solar photovoltaic energy are cheaper than new fossil fuel plants almost everywhere. The average cost of variable renewable energy generation is expected to drop further, from a levelized cost of electricity of $155 per megawatt hour in 2010 to $60 in 2028.

To finance these upgrades while minimizing the negative impacts on rate payers, new earmarked EU funds could complement tariff-based network revenues. While this has not been done before in advanced economies with complex electricity systems, policy innovation is required to keep the EU’s ambitious 2030 targets alive. 

Not investing in transmission and distribution would jeopardize both European energy security and climate ambitions. By stalling deployment of renewable generation and thereby the electrification of heating and transport, failing to invest in the European grid would prolong high levels of fossil fuel imports. This would keep energy bills high, leave Europe exposed to fossil fuel supply insecurity, and place at risk Europe’s social and political fabric.

Bottlenecks to be addressed

Beyond financing challenges, building power infrastructure is notably slow. In Europe in particular, permitting procedures cause significant delays. The IEA highlights that the United States and EU have the longest deployment times for distribution—around three years—and transmission lines—between four and twelve years. The COVID-19 pandemic has made the problem worse, creating high demand while constricting supply for power grid components. 

Regulatory frameworks are also constraining grid development. While the regulation of these natural monopolies has evolved in Europe to liberalize and unbundle the sector, national regulatory authorities need to deal with greater uncertainty; for instance, the rate of electrification and improvements on energy efficiency are difficult to predict. They will need to manage increased investment while encouraging innovation and keeping tariffs in check. Energy regulators must learn from previous experience, respond to current challenges, and anticipate future trends—all at the same time. 

The overlooked factor in European energy security

Energy security in Europe hinges on the state of its power grids. As reliance on renewable energy and electrification grows, existing grid infrastructure is struggling to keep pace, causing congestion and delays. Substantial investments in grid upgrades and modernization are essential for integrating renewables, accelerating the electrification of heating and transportation, building technical redundancies to enhance resilience, combatting cyber threats, and protecting against extreme weather events.

While difficult to sell politically, investments in grid infrastructure will ultimately pay off in lower energy bills for consumers and industry, compared to a business-as-usual scenario. Failing to achieve these objectives will imperil Europe’s security of supply and its capacity to build a resilient energy future.

Andrei Covatariu is a Brussels-based energy expert. He is a senior research associate at Energy Policy Group (EPG) and a research fellow at the Centre on Regulation in Europe (CERRE). This article reflects his personal opinion. 


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Hinata-Yamaguchi quoted in Deutsche Welle on Japan’s efforts in the Pacific Islands https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/insight-impact/in-the-news/hinata-yamaguchi-quoted-in-deutsche-welle-on-japans-efforts-in-the-pacific-islands/ Tue, 23 Jul 2024 15:40:23 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=782396 On July 22, IPSI nonresident senior fellow Ryo Hinata-Yamaguchi was quoted in Deutsche Welle regarding Japan’s strategic competition with China in the Pacific Islands. He emphasized that Japan aims to be a reliable partner to Pacific nations through infrastructure development and climate change efforts, in contrast to China’s significant investments and security agreements.  

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On July 22, IPSI nonresident senior fellow Ryo Hinata-Yamaguchi was quoted in Deutsche Welle regarding Japan’s strategic competition with China in the Pacific Islands. He emphasized that Japan aims to be a reliable partner to Pacific nations through infrastructure development and climate change efforts, in contrast to China’s significant investments and security agreements.  

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Novak quoted in Petroleum Australia on strategic petroleum hubs in Timor-Leste https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/insight-impact/in-the-news/novak-quoted-in-petroleum-australia-on-strategic-petroleum-hubs-in-timor-leste/ Thu, 18 Jul 2024 20:24:16 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=781435 On July 17, GCH/IPSI nonresident fellow Parker Novak was quoted in Petroleum Australia regarding the development of petroleum hubs in Timor-Leste to support the Greater Sunrise gas project. Novak emphasized the strategic importance of these hubs in enhancing Timor-Leste’s capacity to handle large-scale energy projects and improving regional energy security.

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On July 17, GCH/IPSI nonresident fellow Parker Novak was quoted in Petroleum Australia regarding the development of petroleum hubs in Timor-Leste to support the Greater Sunrise gas project. Novak emphasized the strategic importance of these hubs in enhancing Timor-Leste’s capacity to handle large-scale energy projects and improving regional energy security.

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What to expect from Ursula von der Leyen’s second term https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/what-to-expect-from-ursula-von-der-leyens-second-term/ Thu, 18 Jul 2024 14:47:26 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=780801 The European Parliament has given European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen a second term, but it will be different from her first in several important ways.

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On Thursday, the European Parliament voted by a sizeable margin to confirm Ursula von der Leyen for another five-year term as president of the European Commission. Her confirmation is good news for Europe and the transatlantic relationship. This time around, however, she will have to confront a different set of challenges to her agenda than in her first term, and they will come both from within the European Union (EU) and without.

What can be expected from a von der Leyen 2.0? Ahead of her confirmation, she laid out a raft of proposals in her political guidelines for the next Commission term—a combined effort to outline her vision and win over votes. The guidelines prioritize:

  1. Building a more competitive Europe that balances regulation and innovation that facilitates Europe’s green transition, 
  2. Boosting the EU’s defense ambitions, 
  3. Pushing social and economic policies such as affordable housing, 
  4. Sustaining agriculture and environmental policies, 
  5. Protecting Europe’s democracy, and 
  6. Standing up for Europe’s global and geopolitical interests.

In practice, this means her next term will mean more of a central and active role for the Commission—and for von der Leyen. But there will also likely be more roadblocks from the European Council and Parliament.

Start with her leadership style. In her first term, von der Leyen turned the Commission into the most important arm inside the EU at a time when crises came new and often. She served as the EU’s chief decision maker and negotiator during the COVID-19 crisis, helped coordinate Europe’s response to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, and shaped the EU’s economic de-risking strategy and general hawkishness toward China, serving as Europe’s “bad cop” standing up to Beijing’s coercive and unfair trade practices. The grumblings of an overstepping and power-hungry Commission president from other arms of the EU and national capitals aside, European leaders still looked to the Commission and von der Leyen to take action.

The Commission’s role was boosted by its policy successes too. Her first term oversaw the adoption of major rules on the digital and green transitions. The EU pushed through world-leading digital regulations on artificial intelligence, online content moderation, and platform competition, and it incentivized semiconductor manufacturing. She also prioritized green policies to reduce emissions, including the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism and setting new emission reduction targets for cars, shipping, and factories.

The growing number and influence of far-right and hard-right groups will likely add extra complexity to the legislative process.

For her second term, von der Leyen will seek to pick up where she left off. The Commission will also look to build itself a stronger role in the traditional defense and the economic security agendas, with an eye to boosting Europe’s defense capabilities against Russia and de-risking from China. Von der Leyen’s focus on a competitiveness agenda will push for greater innovation and industrial support while furthering the green transition. On Thursday, von der Leyen promised a “European competitiveness fund” and a “clean industrial deal” within the first hundred days of the Commission’s next mandate, along with greater investment in energy infrastructure and technologies. This will all come with a price tag, and more responsibility for the Commission.

As a consequence of a busy 2019-2024 legislative cycle, von der Leyen and her Commission must now see through a raft of new rules. On digital policy alone, the to-do list is a tall order. The EU is standing up new offices and hiring a new army of competition lawyers, boosting the already massive size and scope of the Commission.

But there will be limits to von der Leyen’s ambition as member states and the parliament will look to exercise their own power.

Europe’s political center is not what it was in 2019, and EU members will want their influence felt. Von der Leyen will have to contend with a growing number of populist leaders around the table at Council meetings. More far-right governments may pop up over the next five years, including in major countries such as France as Marine Le Pen’s National Rally gets ever closer to power. And as the Commission tries to take on a bigger role in traditional member-state driven policies, such as security and defense, von der Leyen will need to deal with more engaged member states looking to exact concessions or carveouts, or to wield their own influence at the EU level.

Far- and hard-right groups in the European Parliament are also on the rise, and they are looking to make a mark. In a shift from her first term, emboldened hard-right politicians are more eager to influence EU policy rather than just play spoiler to it. The growing number and influence of far-right and hard-right groups will likely add extra complexity to the legislative process, and legislation may need to pass with ad hoc coalitions rather than the tradition of grand coalitions of parliaments past.

Greater influence on the right may hamper the Commission’s regulatory ambition. Von der Leyen promised she would continue the green transition, but the EU’s green rules have already become a political target. The platforms of the center-right European People’s Party (EPP), von der Leyen’s own group, and the further right European Conservatives and Reformists, both have peppered in objections to onerous new regulations, especially those associated with the green transition. And the competitiveness debate is in large part spurred on by this backlash to the Commission’s regulatory appetite. This may be difficult for the Commission. Institutionally, the Commission is designed to present new regulations and proposals. It is the only arm inside the EU that can. But that desire will be a point of friction with the aversion among member states and Parliament to new, seemingly onerous, rules.

Von der Leyen will face challenges from beyond Europe, too. “We have entered an age of geostrategic rivalries,” notes the policy guidelines. To the east, Beijing will continue to try to split Europe and poison the EU’s de-risking agenda just as it is starting to take off. And supporting Ukraine against Russia’s full-scale invasion will require sustained attention and funds.

To the west, von der Leyen cannot ignore the upcoming US elections. A transatlanticist at heart, she pushed the EU closer together with the United States in her first term—in large part benefiting from a new EU-friendly US administration. She will likely face an uphill battle in strengthening transatlantic ties in the event of a second Trump administration. “They treat us very badly,” former President Donald Trump said to Bloomberg News when asked about the European Union on June 25.

Von der Leyen’s confirmation this week goes a long way already to set up the EU for success and avoids an own goal for team Europe. Rejecting her would have forced the European Council back to the drawing board to pick a new—and likely weaker—appointee, wasting more time on internal bickering and politicking when predictability, not chaos, is critical. It’s not hard to picture the jubilee from Beijing, taunts from Moscow, and even snide comments from Washington about EU dysfunction in the face of a no vote. In the words of Greek Commissioner Margaritis Schinas (and von der Leyen ally) on her appointment, “There is no plan B.” It is a good thing plan A worked.


James Batchik is an associate director at the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center.

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Integrating artisanal mining into the formal economy would benefit African miners and economies alike https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/africasource/integrating-artisanal-mining-into-the-formal-economy-would-benefit-african-miners-and-economies-alike/ Fri, 12 Jul 2024 17:37:58 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=776478 Many artisanal and small-scale miners work informally and face harsh conditions. Here's how the international community can help.

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As the world pivots toward low-carbon energy, the demand for raw critical minerals—important inputs for innovations such as solar panels and electric vehicles—is continuing to soar.

The higher demand for critical minerals is expected to cause a significant expansion in the extraction and production of an array of mineral resources. For example, the World Economic Forum projects that the production of minerals including graphite, cobalt, and lithium could increase by nearly 500 percent by 2050 to meet the growing demand for clean-energy technologies. Estimated to hold approximately 30 percent of the volume of critical-mineral reserves, the African continent is situated at the very center of the energy transition.

A considerable amount of minerals—for example, 25 percent of tin and 26 percent of tantalum production—is sourced by artisanal and small-scale mining (ASM): low-tech, labor-intensive mining operations in which workers (largely unskilled labor) use rudimentary tools and techniques to access mineral ore. ASM is an important source of rural employment in Sub-Saharan Africa, with an estimated ten million people in the region working as artisanal and small-scale miners—sourcing critical minerals but also other minerals such as gold. These workers are often driven to the sector by poverty. At least sixty million other individuals facilitate these informal supply chains.

However, many of these artisanal and small-scale miners work informally and face harsh conditions. Before critical-mineral production ramps up even further, African communities, stakeholders, and governments must take steps to formalize these workers—and the international community, including the United States, should help.

What is the problem?

In contrast with ASM, large-scale mining (LSM) is industrial and long-term, utilizing heavy machinery to extract resources. Furthermore, LSM has more geological information available to it and better access to capital and finance. Most importantly, LSM generally operates within the rules of law and adheres to international standards and regulations. It is accompanied by many challenges, however, including causing ecological and habitat damage; polluting the water, air, and soil; and threatening human health. Even where mining operations are conducted legally and formally, they still pose significant environmental and socioeconomic problems.

Although vastly different types of mining, ASM and LSM often take place in overlapping spaces, with ASM operations appearing on the periphery of larger industrial sites. Artisanal miners frequently live and work in areas earmarked for large-scale mining projects, blurring the line between the two. This is exemplified by the presence of illicit or licit networks of middlemen who transport ore from ASM sites to LSM companies and processing facilities. Middlemen often aggregate minerals from various sources, including both ASM and LSM operations, making it especially difficult to trace the origin of the minerals. The fragmented and opaque nature of the mineral supply chain complicates the traceability of products from upstream suppliers to downstream companies.  

There are many challenges associated with artisanal mining. At least 90 percent of artisanal miners work informally, without the necessary licenses or permits required by law. Securing permits improves miners’ access to services they are unable to access in the informal economy—such as microfinance credit, grants, and government loan facilities, which, in turn, place the miners in a better position to accumulate wealth. In many cases, ASM activities are found in regions that are out of reach of regulators, where the institutional presence of the government is weak. By operating outside of state recognition, it becomes impossible for the government to establish and enforce health and safety standards and regulations.

With informal mining operations flying under the radar of the government, either by the design of mining site owners or willful ignorance on the part of the government, workers are routinely exposed to poor labor conditions and dangerous situations. Artisanal miners often work without proper tools and protective gear in unsupported and poorly ventilated underground shafts where, as Amnesty International points out, temperatures can be extremely high. Exposure to the dust and mineral waste generated from these mines can lead to potentially fatal diseases and health conditions, and the dust and waste also contributes to pollution and environmental degradation in the area surrounding the mine.

Across the African continent, artisanal mining has been linked to human-rights violations, forced labor, crime, and conflict. These issues, compounded with artisanal miners’ lack of legal rights, exacerbates their vulnerability and the cycles of poverty and exploitation they face.

More at stake

The problems in ASM often present a significant barrier to sustainable foreign investment in African critical minerals. The aforementioned problems in the artisanal sector have made Western business interests hesitant to invest in Africa’s critical minerals. Poor labor practices and human rights violations associated with ASM could expose global companies to reputational and regulatory risks. These concerns—combined with pressure from non-governmental and human-rights organizations—make investment in ASM a complicated and risky proposition.

This barrier is present in artisanal cobalt mining in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). Cobalt is a critical component of many lithium-ion batteries, including ones used to power electric vehicles, produce components for wind and solar energy technologies, and power portable electronic devices such as smartphones. The DRC accounts for more than 74 percent of global cobalt mining, and 20 to 30 percent of that is via ASM.

In some regions of the DRC, artisanal miners are exploited by armed groups that seek to control mining areas and siphon revenue to finance their operations, purchase weapons, and sustain conflicts. Militias have abducted and trafficked children to extract cobalt as well as copper, in a bid to fund their groups. In addition, some ASM cobalt operations employ children. It was once estimated that forty thousand children were mining for cobalt, working in life-threatening conditions and exposed to violence, extortion, and intimidation.

Such problems associated with informality, including the absence of regulatory standards and the occurrence of human-rights violations, make it difficult for potential investors to justify long-term investments. Without clear, enforceable laws, investors face a high-risk business environment and unpredictable changes in mining policies, which undermine investor confidence.

In addition to posing these immediate risks to artisanal miners and their communities, informal mining exacerbates economic and market instability on a macroeconomic level. Informal miners typically earn a meager and unstable income, which is subject to fluctuation based on the market prices and demand for cobalt. Miners’ economic instability translates into broader economic uncertainty for the sector and limits opportunities for community development. The presence of such substantial unregulated economic activity leads to significant tax revenue losses for the government, because these transactions primarily occur outside of official channels. This undermines the state’s capacity to invest money in necessary social programs, build infrastructure, and quell violence in other regions of the DRC. In spite of these challenging economic implications, African governments might resist formalization efforts, unwilling to disrupt the vital role ASM plays in the livelihoods of many individuals and communities across Africa.

While artisanal cobalt mining in the DRC provides a case study, some of these issues associated with informality are also prevalent in the mining of critical minerals in other African nations, such as lithium production in Zimbabwe and Namibia. Across the continent, the volatility of ASM creates a less attractive investment environment, given that investors seek dependable production to ensure stable supply chains and therefore profitability.

What might formalization look like?

Despite the complications associated with the informal production of many critical minerals, the solution is not to disengage from ASM; it employs 90 percent of the mining workforce. Rather, the solution lies in formalizing and legalizing ASM, which will help mitigate the risks inherent to these mining operations while fostering a more regulated and stable environment for international investment in Africa’s critical minerals.

Integrating the ASM sector into the formal economy would help improve local security, stabilize incomes, and ensure that safer and more environmentally sustainable practices are implemented. It would also help create national regulations and international standards, pressuring the ASM sector to improve practices to become compliant.

Formalization means that miners are registered with proper mining titles. Even in some countries where ASM is recognized by law, governments have not made it possible for miners to obtain the necessary permits and licenses. But in addition to these permits and licenses, formalization also includes—according to the Washington-based nonprofit Pact—efforts by the mining industry to enact chain of custody and supply chain transparency measures; health, safety, and environmental protections; security and human-rights protections; measures that improve access to finance; and requirements to use proper mining techniques. In addition, formalization includes sound industry policies, procedures, and due diligence systems, which should be in place throughout the life cycle of a mine. These components of formalization create a framework within which artisanal miners can operate safely and legally, contributing positively to community-wide and country-wide development goals and global supply chains.

Given the complexity of the informal economy, there is no simple, one-size-fits-all approach to formalization. We can, however, look for strategies that have been effective in other countries or industries and use them to guide the approach towards formalizing ASM. For example, Rwanda’s 2010 Land Tenure Reform Programme initiated a systematic registration effort to promote land access and address tenure insecurity. This program registered over ten million land parcels in less than five years and enabled landowners to use their property as collateral for loans, facilitating access to credit. The program has been widely regarded as successful in integrating the informal economy, particularly due to its simple registration process and involvement of community members and stakeholders in the reform. Transitioning ASM to the formal economy must also use an integrated whole-of-society approach, centering African communities, stakeholders, and governments. This might mean starting small at a grassroots level by engaging local communities in social dialogue, allowing informal miners to express their views and defend their interests. Their inclusion at an early stage of the formalization process will ensure that policies address informality efficiently and enhance the effectiveness of such measures.

There have been some efforts in recent years to support the formalization of ASM workers and improve social and environmental practices in the sector. For example, as the Intergovernmental Forum on Mining, Minerals, Metals and Sustainable Development (IGF) explains, international Fairtrade and Fairmined standards set minimum standards for responsible mining, which support formalization. Furthermore, chain of custody initiatives trace supply chains from mine to market to ensure that supply chains are not associated with any conflicts or human rights abuses and that they meet international regulations. These are certainly steps in the right direction but, as the IGF explains, there are concerns about the long-term sustainability of these initiatives and whether they are reaching the most marginalized communities.

Formalization is a very complex but necessary process that can improve the lives of miners and address issues in the critical-mineral supply chain—and therefore attract more sustainable investment to the sector, contributing to the broader development goals of African countries.

How the international community can help

As mineral extraction in Africa is only expected to increase in the foreseeable future, it would be strategically unwise for the international community, and in particular the United States, to sit idly by on the issue of formalizing artisanal mining.

Going forward, the United States can focus on capacity building and simplifying trade processes and market access to help formalize artisanal mining in Africa, which could lead to increased global investment in critical minerals. To build the foundation for policies and programs that provide legal protection for ASM miners, the United States could fund and support training programs for artisanal miners, local authorities, and government officials on sustainable mining practices, health and safety standards, regulatory compliance, and business skills. By strengthening local and national institutions responsible for overseeing the ASM sector, governments would be better able to enforce regulations, protect the rights of artisanal miners, and formalize the sector.

The United States could also work with African governments and international organizations—such as the African Union and the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development—to simplify trade procedures, enabling miners to participate legally and more fully in global supply chains. In December 2022, the United States signed a memorandum of understanding with the DRC and Zambia to develop a productive electric-battery supply chain—from the extraction of minerals to the assembly line. The agreement also serves as a commitment to respect international standards and to prevent, detect, and fight corruption and build a sustainable industry in Africa that benefits workers and local communities, as well as the US private sector. At this time, it is more political than actionable, although it creates a framework for future negotiations and strengthened partnerships. Deepening ties with African nations and collaborating with international organizations can help leverage the resources, expertise, and global networks to ensure a more conducive environment for investment and sustainable growth. Increasing institutional capacity would also allow governments to strengthen tenure security and clarify property rights for ASM, particularly reducing the incidence of ASM-LSM conflict.

The creation of more legal channels for miners to sell their products could enhance supply chain transparency and promote more sustainable market practices. Implementing an international certification mechanism, similar to the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (KPCS), offers the ASM sector an opportunity for empowerment and a pathway towards legitimacy. Originally established to remove conflict diamonds from the global supply chain, the KPCS mandates that member countries adhere to strict certification requirements, import and export controls, regular audits, and controlled trade. The principles of the Kimberly Process might be adapted to the extraction of critical minerals so as to increase the security of artisanal miners and their access to legal markets.

Not only would these policy actions benefit African countries in the context of the critical-minerals boom and improve the livelihoods of miners, but they would allow the United States to strengthen its economic and strategic partnerships with African countries. As critical minerals will continue to advance the clean-energy transition, decisive action is essential to make the future of mining a pathway for inclusive, sustainable development for the countries that supply minerals to the world.


Sarah Way is a graduate of the University of Colorado Boulder’s International Affairs Program with a specialization in Africa and the Middle East. Her research centers on the intersection of natural resources and development, with a specific focus on extractive minerals in Africa.

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Chevron deference is dead—and US climate action hangs in the balance https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/energysource/chevron-deference-is-dead-and-us-climate-action-hangs-in-the-balance/ Thu, 11 Jul 2024 18:56:36 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=779613 The US Supreme Court's seismic decision to overturn Chevron deference ends decades of federal agencies’ regulatory authority to interpret laws’ where there is ambiguity. While not specifically about climate or energy, the change is deeply consequential for the current—and next—administration’s ability to act on these issues according to its agenda.

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In a seismic ruling, the US Supreme Court overturned the long-standing “Chevron deference” in its decision for Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo. The ruling was not specifically concerned with energy or climate policy. But its consequences for US decarbonization are profound.

The ruling creates deep complications for the Joe Biden administration’s energy and climate agenda. But it also highlights their significance for the upcoming presidential election.

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The death of deference

The landmark 1984 ruling in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council centered on the prerogatives of federal agencies to interpret existing—and potentially decades-old—federal laws. Under the precedent enshrined as “Chevron deference,” agencies were allowed a wide berth to interpret federal laws where they were unclear or ambiguous on a specific issue. Chevron deference has proven valuable to administrations of every political inclination for forty years.

The end of deference represents a monumental shift in regulatory authority away from agencies and their technical experts—now merely accorded “respectful consideration”—and toward the hundreds of federal judges seated throughout the country.

Judges are empowered as arbiters if and when a given statute is ambiguous. They thus determine whether an agency’s interpretation of its authorities—as expressed in agency-delivered regulations—is valid. This outcome creates a more complex legal system surrounding every regulatory intervention, potentially creating a patchwork of interpretations across the ninety-four US federal judicial districts.

This development has implications for any future administration. Regardless of the outcome of the November election, both candidates must contend with the new realities of enacting their respective energy and climate visions without Chevron deference.

Overruling net zero?

For the Biden administration, the ruling undermines its sweeping regulatory efforts toward economy-wide decarbonization. Already, key agencies such as the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the Securities Exchange Commission have likely anticipated this court could end the Chevron deference, tailoring their recently finalized regulations accordingly.

But the Biden administration’s marquee regulations could now be challenged in whole or in part for straying too far from the letter of their foundational laws. If so, any federal judge could rule against that perceived overextension of an agency’s statutory authority.

The fate of the EPA’s regulation for fossil-fueled power plants will be a litmus test. Finalized last April, it’s expected to be extensively litigated and eventually reach the Supreme Court. Democratic leaders have anticipated this, confirming within the 2022 Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) that greenhouse gases, including carbon dioxide, are air pollutants, giving the EPA the explicit authority to regulate it.

However, this legislative amendment does not necessarily insulate the EPA from scrutiny of how it regulates the newly labeled air pollutant—for example, by encouraging changes in generation mix, implementing power plant-level regulations not explicit within the original Clean Air Act, or, most recently, mandating the adoption of carbon capture.

This Supreme Court’s string of recent rulings, from West Virginia v. EPA and the stay of the “good neighbor rule” to extending the timeline for a federal rule to be challenged, suggests that the bench views the EPA’s authority as far more limited than the Biden administration does.

Crucially, the Loper ruling has limitations of its own. Per the majority opinion, it will not apply retroactively, meaning that previously decided cases where agency deference was at play cannot be reopened. Perhaps even more importantly, the ruling applies specifically to the federal government and not to local, state, or regional administrations.

Even if the EPA and other agencies find themselves confined to strict readings of their statutory authorizations, state regulations—including clean energy and renewable portfolio standards—cannot be challenged on this basis. On the contrary, a state attorney general could instead leverage the end of Chevron deference as a new opportunity to litigate regulations from the federal government not aligned with their state’s climate and energy goals.

Beyond November, the end of agency deference could destabilize the Biden administration’s climate agenda in a re-election scenario. Implementation of the IRA is likely to be hampered by lawsuits, and agencies may see newly issued regulations and guidelines—such as the controversial hydrogen guidance pertaining to Section 45V—become fodder for litigation. The same could be true for federal permitting and siting procedures.

Federal agencies may find it less cumbersome to simply issue broad, performance-based regulations that set a widely applicable standard, such as to power plants. These could allow for a wide range of approaches to meet a given standard rather than prescriptive rules mandating specific technologies or fuels. Programmatic approaches that concern major statutes, such as the Endangered Species Act, Clean Water Act, and others, may also become the preferred means to simplify environmental reviews and preclude challenges.

Not so clear a victory

The extensive media coverage of the Loper decision has framed the outcome as an unequivocal boon to Donald Trump’s agenda, particularly in the energy and climate landscape. To some extent, this perspective is justified; a new Trump administration will leverage this ruling as justification to back away from addressing environmental or climate challenges beyond the bare minimum mandated by existing statutes.

However, agencies have long been criticized by stakeholder and environmental organizations for hiding behind Chevron deference for inadequate enforcement of environmental laws. A Trump administration, which aims for the floor, but can no longer rely on Chevron deference for protection, may discover that such lawsuits have become more numerous and disruptive.

Moreover, not every congressional statute on energy and environmental matters is ambiguous. A new Trump administration attorney general would struggle to argue that the IRA’s methane fee cannot or should not be enforced, as this requirement is explicit in the law.

There are other, more subtle, pathways to undermine the IRA and other major Biden-era climate achievements if a Trump administration were set on doing so—namely, by doing as little as possible.

The 45V credits are instructive. If a given Internal Revenue Service regulation for this section of the IRA were challenged in court as being outside the letter of the original law, it could be thrown out in a post-Loper world where agency deference is no longer assumed. A Trump administration, gifted this development, could simply refuse or delay issuing new guidance if it were uninterested in abetting the emergence of a US clean hydrogen industry.

This tactic would undermine investment certainty for large, expensive projects across technologies and fuel types while technically keeping the IRA on the books. This approach, however, assumes that federal courts will agree with sharply limited interpretations of ambiguity and not rule against thin regulations or force a Trump administration to issue guidance whether it wants to or not.

If agency deference is no longer axiomatic, then a conservative administration risks similar pushback in interpreting laws to suit ideological preference and policy goals. In a post-deference world, such an administration might face legal challenges in, for example, attempting to extend the lifetimes of operating coal plants, as much as a more liberal administration might face challenges for creative attempts to phase coal out of the US generation mix.

A volatile patchwork lies ahead

Fundamentally, the end of Chevron deference implies a new era of volatility in the legal and regulatory landscape for US energy and climate policy. Everyone from project developers and operators to investors and local stakeholders should prepare accordingly.

While federal judges are newly empowered to intervene, the Supreme Court cannot adjudicate every potential dispute in the handful of cases it reviews in a given year. As a result, it will take any suit years of litigation to reach that level—if at all—making the rulings of lower federal courts more important than ever before. Judicial opinions are likely to vary widely, making the location and timing of a suit paramount to its outcome.

For project developers, this uncertainty compounds an already serpentine US permitting landscape. Depending on which administration is in control after 2024, it is conceivable that environmental and social justice considerations around projects are given less weight than had Chevron deference been maintained. Going forward, an agency may be less inclined to propagate criteria or guidelines that would allow refusal of a permit on the basis of considerations not explicitly prescribed in existing laws. Confined to their statutory foundations, agencies may therefore be inclined to decide on leases and permits more quickly. But with fewer creative tools to mitigate project impacts authorized in their foundational statutes, agencies may simply lean toward faster denials.

Ultimately, however, the Supreme Court is the likely final stop for all major regulations going forward, implying greater uncertainty, circuitous timelines for judicial review, and whiplash aligned to the winds of political change in the executive branch. This could foster a scenario where climate action is largely blocked by the courts, and Congress is unable to meaningfully amend or write new laws to clarify the exact role of the federal government in addressing the climate crisis.

That prospect, and its implications, could exacerbate societal tensions at a time of deepening alarm over our global climate future.

David L. Goldwyn is chairman of the Atlantic Council’s energy advisory group and a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council Global Energy Center and the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center.

Andrea Clabough is a nonresident fellow at the Atlantic Council Global Energy Center and a senior associate at Goldwyn Global Strategies, LLC.

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State of the Order: In June, the world’s alliances strengthened—but concerning risks for the democratic order remain https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/june-2024-state-of-the-order/ Wed, 10 Jul 2024 14:37:58 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=779036 The State of the Order breaks down the month's most important events impacting the democratic world order.

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In June, much of the world saw not only rising temperatures, but also multiplying stresses on the world order. Israel and Hamas still did not agree on a cease-fire, despite hopes earlier in the month that both sides would sign onto a previously floated three-phase plan. Tensions between Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his military leadership over war aims magnified, as the Israeli army’s chief spokesman publicly questioned the government’s articulated goal of destroying Hamas. Meanwhile, the United States and its allies ramped up support for Ukraine, with new measures that allow Ukraine to use US-provided weapons to strike inside Russia and a new Group of Seven (G7) plan to use interest on immobilized Russian sovereign assets for a fifty-billion-dollar loan to Ukraine. European Union (EU) elections saw the far right make gains, especially in France, but the center largely held.

Read up on the events shaping the democratic world order.

Reshaping the order

This month’s topline events

Tensions mount within the Israeli government as conflict grinds on. As June ended, Israel and Hamas still had not agreed on a cease-fire, despite hopes earlier in the month that both sides would sign onto a previously floated three-phase plan. Although the United States assured that Israel accepted, it is unclear whether Israel declined the latest three phase. Yet Hamas requested some unworkable changes after all the parties alleged acceptance. Even as the two sides haggled over cease-fire terms, Israeli military operations in Gaza slowed due to operational tempo, but there remained an increase in intensity in the continued tit-for-tat exchanges between Israel and Iran-backed Hezbollah, driving global concern over a potential war between them that could evolve into a broader regional conflict. Netanyahu dissolved his war cabinet, the unit established to bring a unified approach to Israel’s fight against Hamas. The decision came following the resignation of former military chief Benny Gantz from the cabinet. Gantz resigned amidst protests over the continued lack of a strategic plan to defeat Hamas. Illustrating further divisions within the Israeli government over war aims, the Israeli army’s chief spokesman publicly questioned the government’s articulated goal of destroying Hamas, noting, “Hamas is an idea, Hamas is a party. It’s rooted in the hearts of the people—whoever thinks we can eliminate Hamas is wrong.” Tens of thousands of Israeli people protested in Tel Aviv to demand a cease-fire and the return of hostages.

  • Shaping the order. Tensions within the Israeli government, between Netanyahu and his military leadership, came to a head as the two sides seemed at odds over end goals for Israel’s military operations. There remains limited consensus on the way forward. In February, Netanyahu presented a post-war plan aiming for local officials to govern Gaza, with Israel preparing to test the experimental model with “humanitarian bubbles.” Allies have collectively strategized various pathways and there remains widespread skepticism of the plan. Yet the Israeli government continues to struggle to advance a post-conflict plan and receive sufficient buy-in from the United States, Arab states, and others, which remains a key priority for regional stability and US interests.
  • What to do. The Biden administration should continue to work with allies in Doha and Cairo to pursue a path to a temporary cease-fire and hostage-for-Palestinian-prisoners deal—that would also enable a flood of humanitarian relief in Gaza—despite the low probability of success.

The United States and its allies step up support for Ukraine. The United States expanded its policy to allow Ukraine to use US-provided weapons to strike “anywhere that Russian forces are coming across the border from the Russian side to the Ukrainian side to try to take additional Ukrainian territory,” according to US National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan. This builds on its May decision to allow Ukraine to use US-provided weapons to strike a limited set of targets, largely across the border from Kharkiv.

The Biden administration, following the G7 meeting in Italy, announced it would rush the delivery of air-defense interceptors to Ukraine by delaying the delivery of them to most other nations. The G7 also agreed to use interest on immobilized Russian sovereign assets to collateralize a fifty-billion-dollar loan to Ukraine. The United States added new and strong US sanctions against Russia and finalized a US-Ukraine ten-year memorandum of understanding on security cooperation.

As US munitions began to reach the front lines in Ukraine, the Russian offensive against Kharkiv lost momentum. Although Russian attacks on Ukrainian energy generation did considerable damage (taking down almost half of Ukrainian electric generation), the US decision to rush delivery of air-defense interceptors may help further mitigate such attacks, as will Romania’s decision to send to Ukraine one of its Patriot batteries. Meanwhile, Ukrainian attacks on Russian military infrastructure in Crimea were taking an increasing toll, and Russian President Vladimir Putin visited North Korea to shore up his relationship with dictator Kim Jong Un and ensure Pyongyang continues providing munitions and arms to Moscow for the war in Ukraine.

On the diplomatic front, Russia escalated its demands for a cease-fire in an unrealistic fashion, insisting that Ukraine must first abandon territory it currently holds in the four provinces partly occupied by Russia, land that Russia has been unable to take by force. Days after that, from June 15 to 16, ninety-three countries attended a peace conference in Switzerland to discuss Ukrainian terms (its ten-point plan) for a settlement and seventy-eight countries signed a document that called for the restoration of Ukraine’s territorial integrity, a key Ukrainian point (more countries have signed on since). China did not attend, however, and some key countries in the Global South such as South Africa, India, Brazil, and Mexico did not sign the conference document.

  • Shaping the order. The Biden administration’s decision to allow Ukraine to use US-provided weapons to strike inside Russia, beyond initial restrictions on targets near Kharkiv, is a significant, positive step in Western support for Ukraine. Using frozen Russian assets to collateralize a loan for Ukraine is another positive step, but the United States and its allies may find they need to go further, using said assets themselves rather than continuing to use their own funds exclusively.
  • Hitting home. Some US experts argue that Ukraine is a strategic liability and that US focus there diverts resources better used in the Indo-Pacific. Russian victory in the war, which is likely to result from a US withdrawal, would cause cascading security problems in Europe that would draw on even more US resources.
  • What to do. The United States and its allies must marshal continued military assistance for Ukraine, including air defense and weapons that support Kyiv’s attacks on Russian military targets in occupied Ukraine, especially Crimea. The United States has the means to intensify pressure on the Russian economy and should use such tools. Washington should consider enforcing sanctions to hit smugglers of technology subcomponents utilized for Russian weapons and evaders of the oil price cap (the latter missing from the otherwise strong June 12 US sanctions package). A successful Ukrainian land offensive may not be possible in the near term. 

The center holds, but the right makes gains, in European Parliament elections. Across the EU’s twenty-seven member states, voters cast ballots to select their representatives to the European parliament. The election saw gains for the center-right and right, but it was a disappointing showing for French President Emmanuel Macron’s centrist Renew party. The European People’s Party, the European Conservatives and Reformists Group (of Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni), and Identity and Democracy—the hard right—were the main beneficiaries of the elections. These results were overshadowed by Macron calling for a snap parliamentary election after his party’s incredibly poor performance in the European Parliament election (garnering less than half the votes of their far-right rivals, the National Rally): The snap election resulted in the left-wing New Popular Front on top, Macron’s  centrist alliance placed second, and  Marine Le Pen’s far-right National Rally, which finished third. Yet, the right did not do well in Scandinavia, Spain, and Romania, and had only a modest uptick in Poland, where the ruling Civic Platform came in first place. The parties in Germany’s ruling coalition—the Social Democrats, the Free Democrats, and the Greens—all lost ground in Germany, but the center-right alliance between the Christian Democratic Union and the Christian Social Union did well.

  • Shaping the order. Snap elections in France overshadowed the fact that the center mostly held its ground in the EU elections. The far right’s marginal gains will matter, however, if said forces can unite and if center-right parties are willing to engage with the far-right. Even so, the incoming parliament is likely to be more fragmented and polarized than its predecessor. And the French elections, the first round having wrapped, are pointing to a major defeat for Macron and a surge of the right, which is both nationalist and wary about the extent of French support to Ukraine.
  • Hitting home. Even though the center largely held in the European Parliament elections, the increased fragmentation will likely mean less clarity on policy issues that impact US companies.
  • What to do. The United States should constructively engage the European Parliament, encouraging it to hold firm to its moderate stances and not bend to the far right’s proposals.

Quote of the Month

The votes cast put the far-right forces at almost 40 percent and the extremes [on the right and left] at almost 50 percent. This is a political fact that cannot be ignored.
—French President Emmanuel Macron, speaking after the European Parliament elections.

State of the Order this month: Unchanged

Assessing the five core pillars of the democratic world order

Democracy (↔)

  • On June 30, the far-right National Rally won in the first round of the parliamentary elections, although it’s unclear whether they will get a majority with the second-round vote upcoming on July 7. Many French citizens have been protesting against the National Rally out of concern for women’s rights and minority rights, where thousands of women marched in dozens of French cities, including Paris, to protest against Marine Le Pen’s far-right National Rally.
  • Mexico elected Claudia Sheinbaum, its first female president, in the country’s largest election in history with 98 million registered voters. As Mexico City’s former mayor and the favored successor of outgoing President Andrés Manuel López Obrador, Sheinbaum was favored to win. Promising to continue López Obrador’s policies, she believes the government has a strong responsibility to address economic inequality and establish robust social security.
  • On balance, the democracy pillar was unchanged.

Security (↔)

  • Chinese forces seized Philippine small boats that were attempting to resupply a Philippine military outpost at Second Thomas Shoal. Multiple Philippine vessels were damaged, and sailors were injured in the incident. One US official called China’s actions “deeply destabilizing.”
  • Houthi rebels launched an aerial drone, striking and damaging the Transworld Navigator in the Red Sea, one of more than sixty attacks targeting specific vessels. The attack comes after United States recalled its USS Dwight D. Eisenhower after an eight-month deployment. Shipping in the corridor—crucial for connecting Europe, the Middle East, and Asia—has slowed significantly. The Houthis said they would continue the attacks as long as the Israel-Hamas war continues.
  • On balance, the democracy pillar was unchanged.

Trade (↔)

  • Amid the European Commission’s anti-subsidy investigations into electric vehicles (EVs) coming from China , the European Union announced additional tariffs on  imported Chinese EVs. The tariffs range from 17.4 to 38.1 percent—and that’s on top of the 10 percent duty already in place. As a result, Chinese car companies may consider raising prices or establishing factories in Europe, as the continent recently became China’s largest EV export market.
  • On balance, the democracy pillar was unchanged.

Commons ()

  • The United Nations conducted a worldwide poll that revealed 80 percent of people want governments to take more action on addressing climate change. The survey noted majority support for stronger climate action in twenty of the world’s biggest greenhouse gas emitters and majority support globally a quicker transition away from fossil fuels. Despite the increasing state of global conflict and rise of nationalism, the desire to set aside geopolitical differences and work together on climate change is expanding.
  • Record-breaking heat, fueled by climate change, affected millions around the globe, scorching four continents and surpassing last summer as the warmest in two thousand years. There were more than forty thousand suspected heat stroke cases in India between March 1 and June 18, and in Saudi Arabia, over one thousand people died participating in the Hajj pilgrimage amid soaring temperatures. Devastating forest fires spread in Europe and northern Africa, and a heat dome trapped large regions of the United States, preventing cool air from getting in.
  • On balance, the commons pillar was weakened.

Alliances (↑)

  • For the first time in twenty-four years, Russian President Vladimir Putin and dictator Kim Jong Un met in North Korea, reinforcing their commitment to cooperate and protect each other’s interests. As part of the meeting, they signed a mutual military-assistance treaty, with Putin announcing that Russia could provide weapons to North Korea—with potentially destabilizing effects for the democratic world order.
  • The leaders of the G7 convened in Apulia, Italy, for the 2024 G7 Summit to discuss supporting Ukraine, pushing back on unfair economic practices, combating climate change, addressing food and health insecurity, leveraging critical technologies, and partnering with like-minded countries around the globe.
  • On balance, the alliances pillar was strengthened.

Strengthened (↑)________Unchanged (↔)________Weakened ()

What is the democratic world order? Also known as the liberal order, the rules-based order, or simply the free world, the democratic world order encompasses the rules, norms, alliances, and institutions created and supported by leading democracies over the past seven decades to foster security, democracy, prosperity, and a healthy planet.

This month’s top reads

Three must-read commentaries on the democratic order

  • Michael Doyle, in Foreign Affairs, argues that democratic peace is back in vogue and great powers can prevent the tensions between democracies and autocracies from escalating into full-blown global cold war.
  • Robert C. O’Brien, in Foreign Affairs, outlines a Trump administration foreign policy centered on the return of peace through strength.
  • Célia Belin and Mathieu Droin explore in Foreign Policy what a far-right victory would mean for French foreign policy.

Action and analysis by the Atlantic Council

Our experts weight in on this month’s events

  • Niva Yau, in an  Atlantic Council report, shows how China is training future authoritarians overseas in order to secure its interests in Global South countries and beyond.
  • Matthew Kroenig and Dan Negrea, in Foreign Policy, explain that the United States’ competition with China should be focused on weakening and defeating the Chinese Communist Party regime.
  • Daniel Fried, in the New Atlanticist, offers seven ways to reboot G7 sanctions on Russia, stating that United States and its allies must commit to dedicating resources to identifying targets for taking economic steps against Russia.
  • Andrew Michta, in a piece for the German Council on Foreign Relations, contends that Germany must commit to significantly expanding its defense industrial base so that it will be well positioned to establish strong cooperation with whichever candidate wins the next US presidential election.

__________________________________________________

The Democratic Order Initiative is an Atlantic Council initiative aimed at reenergizing American global leadership and strengthening cooperation among the world’s democracies in support of a rules-based democratic order. Sign on to the Council’s Declaration of Principles for Freedom, Prosperity, and Peace by clicking here.

Patrick Quirk – Nonresident Senior Fellow
Dan Fried – Distinguished Fellow
Ginger Matchett – Project Assistant

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Donovan and Nikoladze cited by Washington Post on sanctions evasion https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/insight-impact/in-the-news/donovan-and-nikoladze-cited-by-washington-post-on-sanctions-evasion/ Wed, 10 Jul 2024 13:54:51 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=779577 Read the full article here.

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Read the full article here.

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NATO needs a strategy to address Russia’s Arctic expansion https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/nato-needs-a-strategy-to-address-russias-arctic-expansion/ Tue, 09 Jul 2024 17:07:40 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=778830 The Washington summit this week provides the perfect moment for the Alliance to forge an even more unified approach to the future of security in the High North. 

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This week, NATO will hold its landmark seventy-fifth anniversary summit. The Washington, DC, event is expected to focus on trade security, the war in Ukraine, and the organization’s greatest adversary, Russia. This comes on the heels of news that a record twenty-three out of thirty-two NATO countries will reach the Alliance’s defense spending target of 2 percent of gross domestic product this year, according to NATO statistics published on June 17. This increase in spending is in large part a direct response to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

At the same time, the danger Russia poses extends well beyond Eastern Europe. The Washington summit provides the Alliance an opportune moment to develop a strategy to address Russia’s growing, and unsettling, Arctic presence, which is connected with Moscow’s complex cooperation with China in the region and with new sea lanes opening due to accelerated ice melting in the region.

Russia has long viewed the Arctic as a crucial source of income, national pride, and strategic importance. The Russian military has continued to establish an outsized Arctic presence even during its war in Ukraine, now consisting of the Northern Fleet, nuclear submarines, radar stations, airfields, and missile facilities. A large share of this presence is concentrated in the Kola Peninsula, near NATO allies Finland, Sweden, and Norway. According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies, Russia operates one-third more military bases in the Arctic Circle than all NATO members put together. 

Moscow’s interest in securing its trade routes in the High North has been boosted by Russia’s alignment with Beijing.

NATO members should note that Russia has outpaced the Alliance in its establishment and usage of trade corridors in the Arctic region, funded heavily by Chinese investment. Transporting energy and mineral commodities via the Northern Sea Route (NSR) presents strong advantages to Russia: staying within its territory and circumventing the Suez Canal shortens Russian tankers’ trips to China by about ten days per journey. As climate change warms the Arctic at a pace far exceeding other parts of the world, the viability of the NSR will increase and the region’s strategic importance will continue to grow. Historically, Russian energy in the High North has been dispatched using ships specially built to navigate sea ice, but in September 2023, the first shipment was sent using a conventional, non-ice class oil tanker due to high levels of summer ice melt, an increasingly common phenomenon. 

“The energy crisis that has emerged from the Ukraine war has been building for decades,” Paul Sullivan, an energy and international relations professor at Johns Hopkins University, told us. “Russia’s development of Arctic LNG [liquefied natural gas] and usage of the NSR should be of top concern to NATO countries with concerns about the precarity of energy sources and trade routes, respectively.”

Russia’s economic dependence on exporting its extensive energy and mineral resources has led to strengthened cooperation with China, an imperfect relationship based on mutual need. Chinese state-owned energy enterprises have in the past five years invested billions of dollars in Russian oil and gas ventures and mineral projects in the Arctic. Since facing Western sanctions, Russian reallocation of its crude oil supply to a discounted Chinese market cemented the partnership between the two nations. Since then, this infrastructure investment for ports, pipelines, mines, and railways has surged. Moscow’s interest in securing its trade routes in the High North has been boosted by Russia’s alignment with Beijing, which has affirmed its own involvement in the region as a “near-Arctic state.” For example, Russian and Chinese vessels were spotted in August 2023 conducting joint military exercises near Alaska’s Aleutian Islands. That said, NATO members rethinking Arctic strategies should take a clear-eyed approach as to the extent of the “no limits” partnership between Moscow and Beijing. At the beginning of June, the Russian gas market announced a pause of the Power of Siberia 2 pipeline to China. The deal has reportedly stalled over monopsonistic Chinese demands to pay drastically lower prices for lower quantities of gas.

NATO’s Arctic member states—the United States, Canada, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Finland, and Iceland—remain intent on maintaining free and navigable Arctic shipping lanes and are exploring their own energy and mineral resource projects in the region. Jennifer Spence, the project director of the Arctic Initiative at the Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center, explained to us that “in these remote areas, military and economic infrastructure development go hand in hand—securitization of the Arctic can help facilitate investments in a more diversified economy for Arctic states.”

Recent European Parliament legislation to facilitate the construction of new mines to secure critical minerals has been a boon to Swedish mining companies, which have discovered mineral resources in the country’s north. In the United States, the ConocoPhillips Willow project is set to commence in northern Alaska’s National Petroleum Reserve, and in Canada, the federal government recently announced new investments in Arctic defense. Separately, the province of Alberta has worked with the state of Alaska to promote energy development ties. Per Spence, “commercial progress in the North American Arctic is comparatively more rhetoric than action, though signals of permanent infrastructure investment seem to be not too far behind.”

NATO’s Arctic member states have increasingly focused on the region as an important operational theater—and this trend should continue. Nordic countries have announced major NATO exercises in the High North as well as training events with the United States. Canada is procuring and deploying new Arctic-proof military aircraft and ships, and recently conducted joint exercises with the United States, demonstrating an independent investment in regional security. The United States has also increased its Arctic presence. This has included an initiative by the US Coast Guard and the US Navy, which built three Polar Security Cutters, upgraded versions of heavy-duty icebreakers replete with advanced sensors and equipment. 

As of now, Russia’s pause in its Arctic developments reflects the status of commercial investment progress in the region. International sanctions, most of which were initiated by countries that are also NATO members, have taken a major toll on Russian Arctic commercial expansion (for example, Russian energy behemoth Novatek suspended production at its Arctic LNG 2 project in the spring due to sanctions and a shortage of ice-class gas tankers). As for NATO progress, according to Sullivan, the Johns Hopkins expert, the accession of Sweden and Finland “increases NATO’s Arctic footprint massively and thereby significantly improves its position.” With a vastly larger Arctic footprint and record levels of military spending, the time is ripe for NATO to further address the looming security consequences of Russia’s Arctic expansion. The NATO Summit in Washington provides the perfect moment for the Alliance to forge an even more unified approach to the future of security in the High North. 


David Babikian is a graduate from Princeton University in economics. His research practice spans from work with policymakers, investment firms, and nongovernmental organizations, pertaining to climate resilience, commodities, and critical minerals. He is a fellow at Climate Cabinet.

Julia Nesheiwat is a distinguished fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Global Energy Center, a member of the Atlantic Council board of directors, vice president for policy at TC Energy, and the former US homeland security advisor.

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The UK sets a path for clean, affordable energy—and renewed climate leadership https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/energysource/the-uk-sets-a-path-for-clean-affordable-energy-and-renewed-climate-leadership/ Tue, 09 Jul 2024 16:24:21 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=779076 The new UK administration, under Prime Minister Keir Starmer, is committed to clean energy and the energy transition. With experienced ministers stepping back into familiar roles, the new Labour government aims to hit the ground running to drive renewable energy, new nuclear technologies, and carbon capture initiatives, repositioning the UK as a leader in international climate change discussions.

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The new United Kingdom administration is one that is passionate about clean energy and the energy transition. But first, to understand its approach to energy policy, it is important to understand how this new government will operate.

Prime Minister Keir Starmer’s pitch is that the government will be focused on “mission delivery” with mission delivery boards chaired by Starmer personally. He has said that his approach to all issues will be “country first—party second.”

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Almost all members of the Shadow Cabinet have been appointed to those same portfolios in government and, in addition, Starmer has also brought back some former ministers from the Tony Blair/Gordon Brown years. They are all therefore familiar with their portfolios, widely respected, and able to hit the ground running. It is also clear that the prime minister wants to work closely with the private sector in order to make early progress on the government’s priorities.

Ed Miliband has been appointed as secretary of state for energy security and net zero. This is broadly the role he held when Labour was last in government before 2010, so he knows the issues well and is a genuinely passionate advocate for tackling climate change and delivering net zero.

With the UK government now one the most secure among the large western nations (with a five-year mandate and a very large majority), the United Kingdom is expected to reassume a leading role in the international discussions on climate change. As the only country to have reduced its carbon emissions by over 50 percent since 1990, many will welcome that leadership once again.

In most areas, there will not be a huge difference in UK government energy policy under the new administration, but there will be a few distinct changes.

Labour has set a very challenging target to decarbonize the electricity grid by 2030. Until there is much more detail about how this can be done, industry will understandably be skeptical about the feasibility of such a goal, the costs involved, and how local communities will be brought on board. This will involve a significant further commitment to renewables, including a welcome early announcement to end the ban on onshore wind. The United Kingdom’s success in developing offshore wind will be continued.

There is evident government support for new nuclear, including next generation small modular reactors, and in the longer-term for fusion. The government wants to see a significant role for hydrogen and for tidal power, but these cannot deliver at scale in time for the 2030 target, so expect to see an acceleration of carbon capture utilization and storage programs. Starmer has spoken recently about the continuing role for gas in the mix, to deliver energy security, and this can only happen if its use can be decarbonized.

Labour is committed to ending the granting of new oil and gas licenses for the North Sea, while respecting the licenses that have already been issued. In reality, these would be for field developments that are many years off, so they would not make any significant difference to the United Kingdom’s energy security in the short-term. Of more immediate impact, there will be a new levy on companies operating in the North Sea oil and gas sector, and here the detail will be crucial—if not done carefully, companies may simply choose to leave the United Kingdom, as many have already done.

At the heart of its energy policy, there will be a new government organization, Great British Energy, and although its full details are still to be clarified, its purpose is to drive forward the clean energy sector and accelerate the transition. If done properly, it will help ensure the roll-out of the grid infrastructure needed to harness the wealth of renewable energy that the United Kingdom has in abundance.

Also of value will be greater attention on issues that have not had the attention they deserve, such as energy efficiency, decarbonizing heat, and an acceleration of demand-side response measures that are already starting to transform the electricity market. The government already knows that the success of its energy policy will be judged in large part by whether people can afford their bills.

Sadly, energy rarely seemed to be center-stage under the Conservative government (unless in response to a crisis), and that seems to be changing fast. There is already a sense that energy deeply matters to this administration—not just to deliver energy security but as an economic driver, helping to decarbonize homes and businesses, and creating a mass of new green jobs.

As a former Conservative energy minister, I wish this new administration well. If they can get these policies right, they stand a very good chance of delivering the holy grail in energy terms—clean, and secure energy, at a price people can afford.

Charles Hendry is a distinguished fellow with the Atlantic Council Global Energy Center, a former member of the UK Parliament, and former UK minister of state for energy.

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Why the EU needs US liquefied natural gas https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/issue-brief/why-the-eu-needs-us-liquefied-natural-gas/ Mon, 08 Jul 2024 13:00:00 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=778026 Europe is facing tough choices as it confronts Russia’s unexpected reentry into European gas markets. In this issue brief, the authors argue that Europe will need gas imports from non-Russian sources such as the United States for many years to come.

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In 2024, the gas market in Europe may seem calm, but the underlying threats are just as great. The continuing war in Ukraine, the Gaza conflict, and deep tensions throughout the Middle East mean the energy security environment is becoming increasingly volatile. 

Europe is facing tough choices as it confronts Russia’s unexpected reentry into European gas markets in the form of steadily increasing deliveries of liquefied natural gas (LNG). A fourteenth round of sanctions adopted in June are designed to help curb these supplies. At the same time, Europe risks gas shortages if there are no alternative LNG supplies on hand. 

To resolve Europe’s dilemma, it must have a clear alternative for immediate and long-term gas supplies from producers capable of outcompeting Russian gas. Surveying the possibilities points to a single source as the most promising reliable gas provider: the United States.

This fraught situation puts pressure on the Biden administration to resume issuing fresh permits for LNG projects intended for export to countries with which the United States does not have a free trade agreement (FTA). Currently, the United States has no FTA with any European country. And although a judge recently ordered the administration to resume permitting, it could appeal the decision, leaving the fate of additional projects in limbo.

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Feeling the heat? Biden’s proposed protections for workers are a welcome start. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/feeling-the-heat-bidens-proposed-protections-workers/ Wed, 03 Jul 2024 18:47:28 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=778038 The federal proposals are a step in the right direction, but state and local efforts are also needed to protect workers from extreme heat.

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As the United States enters what has been one of its hottest months of the year, the Biden administration on Tuesday took a significant step in protecting an estimated thirty-six million workers nationwide from extreme heat. This long-awaited move—for workers, companies, and advocates alike—was paired with the announcement of new research from the US Environmental Protection Agency and new investment through the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s Building Resilience Infrastructure and Communities program.

The Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) has proposed new federal regulations to protect workers. When the heat index reaches or exceeds 80 degrees Fahrenheit, employers would be required to monitor workers and provide water and rest areas. At 90 degrees Fahrenheit, more protections kick in, including mandatory fifteen-minute rest breaks every two hours and monitoring employees for signs of heat-related illnesses.

Heat-related illnesses have been recognized as occupational hazards for a decade, with an estimated 2,300 workers in the United States dying from extreme heat exposure last year alone. However, this number is likely an undercount and does not capture the many more who suffered nonlethal or chronic heat-related illnesses, as well as workers who injured themselves on the job due to the heat. For instance, researchers at the University of California, Los Angeles found that workers in California are up to 9 percent more likely to suffer a workplace injury on days with temperatures over 90 degrees Fahrenheit than on days that are between 50 to 60 degrees Fahrenheit. This is a problem that will only get worse. The summer is only a few weeks underway in the Northern Hemisphere, and already more than one hundred million US residents have been exposed to extreme heat.

What comes next?

Despite the need for action, OSHA’s proposal will have significant opponents. Industry groups are gearing up for battle, arguing that the rule will be both administratively cumbersome and costly. This is a sentiment that some political leaders have already embraced. Earlier this year, both Florida and Texas enacted state-wide bans to prevent localities from instituting their own worker-protection ordinances. Both state governments are unlikely to accept OSHA’s proposal without protest. In fact, despite the persistent threat of extreme heat, only five states have extreme heat worker protections: California, Colorado, Minnesota, Oregon, and Washington.  

The argument that extreme heat worker protections will come at a cost often ignores the very real cost of maintaining the status quo under dangerously high temperatures. Aside from the price that workers pay with their health, extreme heat in the workplace has significant economic impacts, from lost labor productivity to healthcare costs. The high and growing price of extreme heat on US residents’ lives and livelihoods illustrates not only that this new rule is necessary, but also that, on its own, it is not enough.

Since 2021, the Biden administration has worked to reestablish the role of the United States as a leader in the fight against climate change, both domestically and abroad. This new rule could help cement the United States’ leadership role on climate—but only if it is properly enforced and expanded upon. For the rule to be effective, the administration should continue significantly utilizing OSHA’s National Emphasis Program for Outdoor and Indoor Heat-Related Hazards, which gives it latitude to direct resources toward both employer education on heat safety protocols and inspections that will better ensure compliance.

The Biden administration should also leverage existing funds to ensure that workers remain safe even when they head home for the day. As temperatures rise across the United States and the world, workplace regulations alone will not be enough to adequately protect workers. Federal agencies should incentivize states to direct Low Income Home Energy Assistance Program (LIHEAP) funding toward cooling assistance in vulnerable households, and lawmakers should ensure that LIHEAP is funded adequately to cover energy needs during both the summer and winter months. Currently, only approximately 5 percent of LIHEAP’s four billion dollars in funding goes to cooling assistance (heating receives ten times as much), despite the accelerating demand for relief from high nighttime temperatures that place a significant burden on the human body, and which can lead to heat exhaustion while on the job.  

Ultimately however, this issue cannot be solved at the federal level alone. It also requires efforts at the state and local level to ensure that the most vulnerable communities and individuals are being identified and solutions tailored to local contexts are being implemented. The appointment of a Chief Heat Officer (CHO), at the city, county, or state level, is one tool that can address the local challenges of extreme heat. Local governments such as Miami-Dade County, Phoenix, and Los Angeles have already taken this approach. Local climate leaders—like CHOs—are well positioned to work closely with their communities to tailor solutions to meet their specific needs and to create a unified response to build resilience to extreme heat both during the workday and off the clock.


Catherine Wallace is the associate director of strategic partnerships and advocacy for the extreme heat resilience pillar of the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht–Rockefeller Foundation Resilience Center (Arsht-Rock).

Owen Gow is the deputy director for the extreme heat resilience pillar at the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht–Rockefeller Foundation Resilience Center (Arsht-Rock).

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Caspian contributions to energy security in Europe https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/issue-brief/caspian-contributions-to-energy-security-in-europe/ Wed, 03 Jul 2024 17:44:15 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=776562 This issue brief explores the potential for Caspian region fossil fuel developments to meet Europe's energy needs, considering regional factors and challenges.

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This issue brief examines the potential for new fossil fuel developments in the Caspian region to meet Europe’s energy needs. With increased regional interconnectivity, large fossil fuel resources, political support for fossil fuel development, and growth in domestic renewable energy generation, Caspian producers—namely Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, and Kazakhstan—have the potential to meet this need on the timeline required. To do so, they must act on stated plans to increase natural gas production and tap domestic renewable energy sources. 

This brief also examines the regional factors in Southeast Europe, including gas flows, infrastructure changes, and market demand, which would affect Caspian fossil fuel supplies’ availability in Europe. Georgia, Turkey, Italy, and Southeast and Central Europe stand to directly benefit from Caspian gas via the Southern Gas Corridor. They can also serve as conduits of these supplies further north and west.  

However, economic and geopolitical factors could hinder the rapid production and export of additional supplies from the Caspian region. Raising finance for oil and gas projects has become difficult as international financial institutions and the European Commission seek to reduce fossil fuel investment. Moreover, while proposals on both sides of the Caspian for large-scale hydrogen export projects targeted at European markets are ambitious, the complexity of delivery means they may take years to mature. Azerbaijan’s military actions in Nagorno-Karabakh may also impact European willingness to increase energy reliance on Azerbaijan. By successfully navigating these obstacles, Caspian producers can further contribute to European energy security.

AUTHOR

Julian Bowden
Senior Visiting Research Fellow
Oxford Institute for Energy Studies

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The authors are on the advisory board of a project to lay a forty-eight-mile connector pipeline between the Petronas-operated Magtymguly field in Turkmenistan and gas-gathering facilities operated by BP in Azerbaijan’s ACG oilfield.

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Hurricane Beryl spotlights the importance of climate adaptation in the Caribbean https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/hurricane-beryl-spotlights-the-importance-of-climate-adaptation-in-the-caribbean/ Wed, 03 Jul 2024 17:08:54 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=777928 The earliest category five Atlantic hurricane on record is a reminder that governments and the private sector must prioritize adapting to climate change. COP29 is a good place to start.

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Caribbean countries are grappling with the first hurricane of the 2024 season. Hurricane Beryl, which has made history as the earliest category five Atlantic hurricane on record, has damaged infrastructure and caused widespread power outages.

Unfortunately, this is a familiar scene for the region, which routinely battles the effects of extreme weather events and climate change. Hurricane Beryl once again spotlights why focusing on the mitigation of climate change, through such methods as cutting carbon emissions, alone is insufficient. Caribbean countries must prioritize climate adaptation as the primary mechanism to withstand hurricanes and other baked-in effects of climate change.

Climate adaptation is the answer to these extreme weather events, but it requires significant investment that governments in the Caribbean cannot afford. International support, including private finance, is needed. In five months, the United Nations Climate Change Conference of the Parties, also known as COP29, will take place in Baku, Azerbaijan. It has been dubbed the “finance COP,” and there governments and the private sector should come together and show the commercial utility of prioritizing climate adaptation. Doing so can unlock new financing and create project pipelines that are commercially attractive to global investors.

COP29 might well be the ideal forum to strengthen these initiatives and encourage commitments from governments and the business community.

The Caribbean is often categorized as the world’s most vulnerable region to climate change. Seventy percent of the region’s population lives or works on the coast, meaning that storm surges from hurricanes affect businesses, lifestyles, and government operations. Hurricanes and strong storms also bring the tourism industry to a halt, disproportionately affecting the region’s tourism-dependent economies and severely slowing economic growth. Hurricane Maria in 2017 cost Dominica an estimated 225 percent of its gross domestic product, while Hurricane Irma in the same year cost Antigua and Barbuda more than $136 million in damages, of which the tourism industry represented 44 percent.

Strong storms damage critical infrastructure. Downed power lines cause widespread power outages, while flooded roads and bridges can prevent rescue operations. Already, Hurricane Beryl has caused power outages in Saint Lucia, and homes in Saint Vincent and the Grenadines have lost their roofs. And stronger storms lead to longer recovery periods, which can increase governments’ public debt as they borrow at high interest rates from multilateral institutions to rebuild after the storm has passed. Six years after Hurricane Maria, for example, citizens in Dominica are still rebuilding.

Withstanding strong storms and other effects of climate change requires new climate adaptation projects. For hurricanes with high wind speeds (such as Beryl, which sustained wind speeds of 150 mph at its peak), it is necessary to retrofit infrastructure to be resilient. To achieve this, governments need to require building codes for new homes and infrastructure that ensure sufficient resilience across structures. To brace for storm surges, governments need to move water and energy infrastructure underground where possible to avoid damage. New sea walls and flood protection systems also need to be built.

In all, the region needs more than $100 billion dollars in investment to meet its climate adaptation goals, but it has only been approved for less than one billion dollars from various climate funds. Governments are often left to fend for themselves, taking high-interest loans (due to the classification of many Caribbean nations as middle- and high-income economies by the World Bank) since they often do not qualify for concessional financing. At the same time, governments have borne the brunt of the responsibility because these types of climate adaptation projects are not always attractive to the private sector. Retrofitting infrastructure and other climate adaptation projects, for example, have high upfront costs with little return on investment.

COP29 is an opportunity to bring the public and private sector together to unlock new financing and advance climate adaptation projects. The private sector—both in the region and around the world—has access to needed technologies and has the capacity to undertake climate adaptation projects, from providing drainage on roads and bridges to help ease flash flooding to building decentralized energy grid infrastructure to limit widespread blackouts. Climate adaptation is, after all, in the private sector’s interest. If the effects of hurricanes and climate change worsen and the region’s economies slow, then businesses’ profits will be affected.

What will it take to get the private sector more involved? Attracting private sector participation requires regulatory reforms and carve outs by governments to ensure that companies yield a return on projects. Governments can provide incentives, such as giving exclusive benefits to companies participating in projects and providing subsidies or tax exemptions on materials used. Equally important is access to low-cost finance and capital. Governments can work with institutions such as IDB Invest and global donors that provide grant finance to funnel capital to companies undertaking long-term developments while engaging with insurance agencies that can underwrite riskier projects. 

Caribbean leaders have begun to explore private sector participation in climate adaptation projects, notably through the Bridgetown Initiative and the Blue Green Investment Corporation, but there is still work to be done. COP29 might well be the ideal forum to strengthen these initiatives and encourage commitments from governments and the business community. Doing so requires flexibility from both sectors and a focus on projects that are investment-friendly and can attract global donors. 

In the lead-up to COP29, governments will need to begin laying the regulatory groundwork and soliciting the required technical assistance from development institutions to encourage private sector participation. Moreover, Caribbean governments should consider adding or increasing the size of the private sector groups to their delegations for COP29 to ensure they have a seat at the table and are bought into any signed agreements. Building these public-private relationships can go a long way toward showing global donors and companies the viability of investing in climate adaptation projects in the Caribbean and unlock needed capital that can save lives in the long run.


Wazim Mowla is the associate director and fellow of the Caribbean Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center.

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Doing as the Romans do: Recommendations for the infrastructure development agenda for Italy’s G7 presidency https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/issue-brief/doing-as-the-romans-do-recommendations-for-the-infrastructure-development-agenda-for-italys-g7-presidency/ Tue, 02 Jul 2024 13:00:00 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=774988 The West's plans for infrastructure development, if done effectively, could be a strategic, economic, and geopolitical feat. The G7 now must take forward meaningful action to increase coordination and cooperation to turn this ambition into reality.

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Table of contents

Introduction
The geopolitics of infrastructure
The economic realities
Coordination of project identification and implementation
Recommendations
Conclusion

Introduction

Infrastructure development is a central component of the West’s global engagement strategy. This effort, if done effectively, could be a strategic, economic, and geopolitical feat. The development of sustainable and secure infrastructure carries the potential to create economic prosperity for countries aspiring to move up the global value chain, support the world’s green transition, provide an alternative to China’s exploitative investments, and strengthen the Western-led order.

The Group of Seven (G7) countries have varying plans for infrastructure development in cooperation with various partners around the globe, with particular focus on the Global South. Launched in 2022, the G7’s Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (PGII) aims to mobilize $600 billion in capital for development projects by 2027.1 In Europe, the European Union’s (EU) Global Gateway will invest 300 billion euros by 2027 in global infrastructure projects on behalf of the bloc.2 Italy’s Mattei Plan, launched in January 2024, brings a direct focus on infrastructure development in Africa.3 Further abroad, the Group of Twenty (G20) partners signed the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) memorandum in 2023, which aims to directly counter China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and cut down transit time between India and Europe.4

These initiatives are a good start. However, all G7 members face various challenges that could ultimately hamper progress on these initiatives, most notably: geopolitical challenges, limited funds, skittishness from private sector investors, and lack of coordination. For these initiatives to have a lasting impact, the G7 and likeminded partners must closely coordinate to both avoid and overcome these pitfalls.

Some efforts to better coordinate development projects have already begun. Along with its investments and focus on leveraging private capital, the United States led in the creation of the Blue Dot Network, “a multilateral initiative aimed at advancing robust standards for global infrastructure and mobilizing investment for projects in developing countries.”5 In addition, the US-EU Trade and Technology Council (TTC) has launched coordinated connectivity projects between the United States and the EU in third countries including Kenya, Costa Rica, Jamaica, the Philippines, and Tunisia.6

Holding the G7 presidency for 2024, Italy has made infrastructure development and strengthening relations with the Global South, and in particular Africa, central to its priorities. The 2024 G7 Leaders’ Summit in Apulia, Italy, in June 2024 again reaffirmed the group’s commitment to PGII and investments across Africa, with announcements including the creation of a secretariat to coordinate investments and aid information sharing and a greater shared focus on unlocking investment for green infrastructure projects.7

Now, G7 countries must focus on transforming the summit’s conclusions into reality and making real progress on development coordination. This issue brief provides an actionable set of recommendations to advance the G7’s ambitions.8 It examines the geopolitical impetus for infrastructure development, the economic realities of infrastructure, and the state of coordination on project implementation before providing recommendations to take forward for the rest of Italy’s G7 presidency and beyond.

The geopolitics of infrastructure

The G7’s focus on development is rooted in the shared understanding that G7 countries must fundamentally reset relations with the Global South. Historically, countries in the Global South, particularly in Africa, have been on the receiving end of unfair and extractive relationships with the West.

The result has been growing mistrust and disillusionment, and many countries now view China as a better partner than Europe or the United States. A 2022 study conducted by the University of Cambridge noted that around seventy percent of people not living in liberal democracies held positive views of China, and those in the developing world held more favorable views of China than of the United States.9 Another 2023 survey saw China’s approval rating in Africa rise to its highest levels in a decade, with ten-point increases in some countries.10

On infrastructure development specifically, China has outcompeted the West for years. China’s outreach to the Global South has been generally successful, and the BRI has evolved into an established brand. For example, in 2021 China pledged $40 billion over three years to Africa (though this was a reduction from an earlier pledge of $60 billion), and Beijing has out-invested the United States in Africa every year since 2013.11 Though Chinese investments have yet to surpass their pre-pandemic heights, China’s rate of investment is again rising, and Africa was the largest recipient of BRI investment in 2023.12 In part, as a result, Beijing is also poised to overtake Europe’s total trade with Africa by 2030.13

There are downsides to partnering with China, however. Its values-ambivalent approach is not built for sustainability and comes with a well-documented debt trap. For example, Zambia, which had more than 50 percent of its foreign loans from China, went into default and was unable to afford interest payments on loans financing construction projects in the country including ports, mines, and power plants (though China and Zambia have agreed to a restructuring of Zambia’s debt).14 Similarly, in Kenya, the government held back paychecks to its civil-service workforce to save cash to pay foreign loans.15

G7 countries are making progress on closing this partnership gap with China. Leaders at the Apulia Summit reaffirmed their ambition to meet the spending target of $600 billion by 2027, and the summit’s conclusions have a clear focus on infrastructure development, including with an announcement of a secretariat to facilitate the coordination of development projects.16 Leaders made further announcements at a side event where Italy joined the US- and EU-led consortium on projects in the Lobito Corridor in southern Africa, and Western companies like Microsoft and Blackrock pledged more investments across Africa and beyond.17

The summit also saw the participation of countries including Algeria, Brazil, Kenya, and Tunisia, among others—something Prime Minister Georgia Meloni lauded as delivering on a pledge to make outreach to the Global South a cornerstone of Italy’s G7 presidency.18

The summit also highlighted that the West’s values-based approach can be a strategic asset to building sustainable global partnerships. A focus on good governance and environmental and labor standards allows for long-term success and, in turn, economic growth. The G7 recognizes the importance of engaging with Africa specifically, with the 2024 Communiqué positioning the PGII, the Global Gateway, and the Mattei Plan as frameworks to “promote [the West’s] vision of sustainable, resilient, and economically viable infrastructure in Africa underpinned by transparent project selection, procurement, and finance.”19

This is a good start, but there is still room for improvements. Some of the West’s recent outreach has received similar criticisms to previous efforts, for example, failing to consult the very countries these efforts are meant to engage. In particular, African leaders noted Italy failed to consult them before announcing the Mattei Plan.20 Moreover, the West’s tedious approach to infrastructure development can be perceived as an obstacle, not an asset, especially if it is not applied consistently.21

G7 countries should make greater efforts to convene with PGII partners in the region including the private sector, civil society, and government—to sustain debate and discussion about the West’s ambitions and the reasoning behind its values. At the same time, more regular and targeted engagements can, in turn, expose Western public and private financial institutions to the realities of partner markets and address the misconceptions of perceived risks. It’s a win-win for both sides. Where possible, the framing should be adapted to showcase the importance of the long-term sustainability of projects, especially compared to the non-durability of Chinese infrastructure. This engagement will also be a useful tool to address criticisms that Western initiatives are organized without the feedback and involvement of partner countries.

Finally, while competition with China will be a defining element of Western global infrastructure projects, geopolitics cannot eclipse all else. Recipient countries are looking for projects for their benefit to move up the global value chain and to spur domestic growth—not to be a pawn in other parties’ geopolitical rivalries. States can and have the option to accept projects from different sources, including from China. In response, policymakers should be cognizant that countries might be interested in partnering with both China and the West, and should not be forced into a binary, mutually exclusive choice of one or the other.

It will be important, then, for transatlantic policymakers to work out how to both compete against and partner with China. This will be critical specifically in the area of information and communications technology (ICT) development, where using “untrustworthy” vendors has been an area of focus. Policymakers should be clear about where and when non-G7 countries are involved in projects, and in what respects that will not preclude partnership.

The economic realities

Geopolitics may be a key impetus for development initiatives, but policymakers must also contend with economic realities that have long-plagued development projects. Economic stability in recipient countries is important for investments, but that stability is not always a luxury the West can expect. The International Monetary Fund’s regional economic outlook from spring 2024 for sub-Saharan Africa, for example, notes “the fiscal position of many sub-Saharan African countries has deteriorated, a trend exacerbated by repeated shocks and the ensuing demand for fiscal support,” which adds to political and economic uncertainty.22 The cost of borrowing for African states is also four to eight times higher than for Western countries, making raising capital prohibitive.23

The reality is that currencies can collapse and interest rates can rise, but the need and opportunities for investments will remain. The West, therefore, cannot wait to invest in projects until after implementing structural reforms to partner states’ finances and economies.

G7 countries, the United States in particular, have stressed the importance of the private sector to achieve its financing goals. The Apulia Summit placed additional emphasis on the necessity of private-sector capital for the success of PGII. Side events on the PGII have taken place at every G7 summit since the PGII was announced, and since 2023, have prominently featured participation from major investors and companies including Citi, Nokia, Global Infrastructure Partners, Blackrock, and Microsoft—usually with investment announcements in tow.24 Policymakers should appreciate and foster a bottom-up approach to project identification from the private sector and its appetite to invest.

However, leveraging private capital to help fund infrastructure projects comes with its own challenges. Investments into large-scale infrastructure projects are inherently risky, and shaky local markets only add to the unease felt by private-sector investors as currency devaluations risk erasing investments.

G7 members will therefore need to play a greater role, in some form, as guarantors of investments to help reduce the cost of borrowing and alleviate some of the risk. This comes with its own difficulties, as unlocking government-backed funds is not a straightforward process. Certain firms may not be eligible for funding depending on where they are located. And while it makes sense for European taxpayer funds to go to European firms, for instance, multinational firms can become caught up in the bureaucratic web, impeding their involvement with investment projects. Nevertheless, governments must figure out how to play a role here. The European Union, for instance, has a AAA credit rating, and can take on the role of a guarantor for private-sector investment.25 The US International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) has provided political-risk insurance up to $25 million for investments in Ukraine.26 The case of Ukraine is not a one-to-one comparison to investments in the Global South, but offers a useful example to consider. This is not meant to provide a blank check to the private sector for risky investments. However, investment projects cannot wait for long-term structural reforms that will impact geoeconomic changes like foreign-exchange rates. Instead, investors need to work within current economic realities.

Greater efforts are also needed to address change Western misconceptions of African markets and perceived risks that may not truly reflect realities on the ground. The metrics used by the West to measure projects, specifically environmental, social, and governance (ESG) standards, do not always have as strong a foothold in recipient countries, making investment look riskier or undesirable. Balancing the focus to communicate the impetus for these metrics—while maintaining a degree of flexibility and not completely sacrificing all ESG baselines—will be an important needle for policymakers and investors to thread.

Coordination of project identification and implementation 

Shared project standards are an opportunity for greater coordination. The 2023 Hiroshima G7 summit provided a starting point, highlighting forty projects of common interest.27 Italy’s G7 presidency looked to further this effort. As Meloni outlined at the G7 summit side event focusing on the PGII, Italy’s ambition was to create “structured synergies and coordinated activities to maximize efforts and investments” between G7 members’ various projects.28

The 2024 Apulia Summit specifically pledged greater effort at coordination through three prongs: establishing a secretariat “for effective implementation and investment coordination with partners,” supporting investment platforms to “enhance information sharing, transparency, and public policies on investments in Africa,” and working in particular on green investments in Africa.29 These efforts are all good starts, but they remain wide in their ambition and vague in actual substance.

Coordination on project identification should be an early priority for the PGII secretariat. As G7 countries and the private sector will necessarily look to identify more of these projects, it will be useful to have shared criteria for projects to meet quality and sustainability standards. A shared understanding of what projects G7 members are looking to support, and metrics to assess projects, would also help the private sector in more easily identifying projects in which to invest. The Blue Dot Network is a good starting point for this effort, but so far only a few European G7 countries are on its steering committee.

Additionally, coordination between the United States and the EU through the TTC to support connectivity projects provides another useful starting point for this effort. Established in 2021, the TTC has become the backbone of this US administration’s efforts to strengthen its relationship with Brussels. Despite its initially limited scope, it has morphed into a clearinghouse for discussions not only on transatlantic trade and technology coordination, but also on sanctions against Russia and support for projects in third countries to support internet connectivity.30 Supporting connectivity projects at the TTC is useful, but it is limited to smaller projects. Taking coordination from the TTC to the G7 level would allow participation and coordination with countries like the United Kingdom and Japan.

In terms of project selection and implementation, the G7 must also ensure money is available for maintenance, and enough staff is available to follow-up and to make projects sustainable. Ongoing efforts must leverage available funding not just to start projects, but to fund them through their full cycle, and staff them at a level that supports medium- to long-term maintenance. Often, this will include building relationships with on-the-ground in-country partners, and then training and subsequently employing local civilians to shoulder these responsibilities. It is simply not feasible for European, US, Japanese, British, or Canadian project managers to shoulder this burden. In this respect, it is equally important to get buy-in from national and local governments in recipient countries. Locals with knowledge about projects, communities, and factors on the ground will be critical to the maintenance and durability of such projects. The G7 conclusions rightly noted the importance of working with local partners. Now, a secretariat should take forward that effort in earnest.

Maintenance also means investing in skills. This is just as important for implementation and maintenance as investing in technology or brick-and-mortar buildings. Project identification must not look past the funds and time needed to train partners on the ground. For G7 members it will be important, especially on projects in which the United States and EU are involved, to standardize, de-duplicate, or divide training efforts.

Recommendations

At the 2024 Apulia summit, G7 countries made some progress on global infrastructure development in the context of the PGII. Implementation must now follow pronouncements. Italy should lead through the rest of its G7 presidency to see that real progress is made and to ensure this remains a priority in forthcoming summits (much like the role Japan played on artificial intelligence), and each G7 member must also work to meet its national commitments. To make greater coordination a reality, the G7 should undertake the following recommendations.

  • Expand the Blue Dot Network Steering Committee. The European Union and/or all EU member states that are part of the G7—Italy, Germany, and France—should join the Blue Dot Network. The Blue Dot Network’s steering committee is currently composed of Australia, Japan, Spain, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States (Canada, Czechia, and Peru are network members and do not contribute funds).31 All G7 members, and the EU, should become members of the steering committee. European membership in the Blue Dot Network should not be limited just to G7 EU members, and the EU could take on a role representing all EU member states.
  • Invest in the PGII secretariat and commit to the adequate staffing of development institutions. A PGII secretariat can serve as an important hub for coordination, but it must be staffed adequately. G7 countries should assign national-level envoys to the secretariat, or at least fold them into the offices responsible, such as IMEC. Much of the work to take forward the agreements at the G7 will also fall to domestic institutions and development finance institutions. However, staffing and financing shortages have limited their effectiveness. G7 members should pledge a benchmark for spending on development financing.
  • Establish regular convenings in or with partner countries. G7 members should commit to hosting regular meetings with partners and their private sectors, civil societies, and governments. The Hiroshima G7 meeting highlighting the PGII was a good start, but the initiative should now be further developed with a partner-first mindset. G7 member officials should host annual meetings in partner countries to make the case for the West’s efforts. This would signal a departure from the West’s historically paternalistic approach to engagements with African partners, and the Global South generally. Outreach and consistent engagement at the ambassadorial level would also be useful.
  • Identify which third countries can take part in which projects. Currently, there is no clear framework for which third countries can take part in specific development projects or what limits exist to partnering with third countries, including those like China. Where issues like human rights and national security come into play, G7 countries may differ in their strategies for engaging with third countries. At the same time, there should be clearer frameworks for private companies and governments in terms of in which projects each can take part.
  • Build in long-term maintenance and implementation of projects at the development stage. Projects should begin with the end in mind. If there is no way to measure success or to educate and employ local populations, these projects will turn into basic assistance with no longevity. G7 countries should agree that investment projects under the PGII umbrella should mandate a long-term implementation and maintenance plan with substantial involvement and buy-in from the partner country. Countries want economic success and want to move up the global value chain; they don’t want to be seen as mere development recipients. It is up to the G7 to ensure such upward movement happens.
  • Map and publish all PGII-related projects. The PGII secretariat should map out all investments under the PGII umbrella, along with projects of interest. This could serve as a clearing house, especially for the private sector to identify opportunities for investment. This would also create a strong public relations tools showcasing the West’s impact and investment footprint. This effort could also be utilized to facilitate the submission of new investment projects by the private sector and potentially lead to consolidated funding for joint investments promoted or pursued by G7 members.

Conclusion

Giorgia Meloni called the dialogue around the PGII “one of the most significant achievements of the G7” to deliver “concrete action” to Africa and the Global South.32 The G7 has made progress, but such a conclusion is premature. The G7 is well on its way to turning its ideas and visions for new partnerships with the Global South into action. Putting the resources and people behind those visions will ensure that they come to life.

About the authors

James Batchik is an associate director at the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center, where he supports programming on the European Union, the United Kingdom, Germany, Italy, and the center’s transatlantic digital and tech portfolio.

Rachel Rizzo is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center. Her research focuses on European security, NATO, and the transatlantic relationship.

Nick O’Connell is the deputy director for public sector partnerships at the Atlantic Council. He also contributes regularly to the Atlantic Council’s Italy project, a collaboration between the Europe Center and Middle East Programs.

Related content

The Europe Center promotes leadership, strategies, and analysis to ensure a strong, ambitious, and forward-looking transatlantic relationship.

1    “President Biden and G7 Leaders Formally Launch the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment,” White House, June 26, 2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/06/26/fact-sheet-president-biden-and-g7-leaders-formally-launch-the-partnership-for-global-infrastructure-and-investment/.
2    “Global Gateway: Up to €300 Billion for the European Union’s Strategy to Boost Sustainable Links around the World,” European Commission, December 1, 2021, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_21_6433.
3    Alissa Pavia, “Italy’s Mediterranean Pivot: What’s Driving Meloni’s Ambitious Plan with Africa,” Atlantic Council, February 5, 2024, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/italys-mediterranean-pivot-whats-driving-melonis-ambitious-plan-with-africa/.
4    “World Leaders Launch a Landmark India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor,” White House, September 9, 2023, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2023/09/09/fact-sheet-world-leaders-launch-a-landmark-india-middle-east-europe-economic-corridor.
5    “Blue Dot Network,” US Department of State, last visited May 29, 2024, https://www.state.gov/blue-dot-network/.
6    “U.S.-EU Joint Statement of the Trade and Technology Council,” White House, April 5, 2024, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2024/04/05/u-s-eu-joint-statement-of-the-trade-and-technology-council-3/.
7    “G7 Apulia Leaders’ Communiqué,” G7 Italia, June 14, 2024, https://www.g7italy.it/wp-content/uploads/Apulia-G7-Leaders-Communique.pdf.
8    This issue brief has been adapted from a policy memo drafted following a private workshop hosted by the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center, in partnership with Citi and the Centro Study Americani, in April 2024 in Rome to discuss G7 coordination on infrastructure development projects. This workshop convened government officials, private-sector representatives, and policy experts from Italy, Egypt, Nigeria, Brussels, and the United States to discuss how policymakers can align investment and development plans.
9    Roberto Stefan Foa, et al., “A World Divided: Russia, China and the West,” Bennett Institute for Public Policy, University of Cambridge, October 2022, 2, https://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/handle/1810/342901.
10    Benedict Vigers, “U.S. Loses Soft Power Edge in Africa,” Gallup, April 26, 2024, https://news.gallup.com/poll/644222/loses-soft-power-edge-africa.aspx.
11    David Pilling and Kathrin Hille, “China Cuts Finance Pledge to Africa amid Growing Debt Concerns,” Financial Times, November 30, 2021, https://www.ft.com/content/b7bd253a-766d-41b0-923e-9f6701176916; “Chinese FDI in Africa Data Overview,” China Africa Research Initiative, 2024, https://www.sais-cari.org/chinese-investment-in-africa.
12    Christoph Nedopil Wang, “China Belt Road Initiative BRI Investment Report 2023,” Griffith Asia Institute at Griffith University (Brisbane) and Green Finance & Development Center at FISF Fudan University (Shanghai), February 2024, https://greenfdc.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/Nedopil-2024_China-BRI-Investment-Report-2023.pdf.
13    “A New Horizon for Africa-China Relations: Why Co-Operation Will Be Essential,” Economist Intelligence Unit, 2022, 2, https://www.eiu.com/n/campaigns/a-new-horizon-for-africa-china-relations/.
14    Joseph Cotterill, “Zambia says it has signed debt restructuring deal with China and India,” Financial Times, February 24, 2024, https://www.ft.com/content/5d97562f-b7a0-430b-a9e0-beb695a54f27.
15    Bernard Condon, “China’s Loans Pushing World’s Poorest Countries to Brink of Collapse,” Associated Press, May 18, 2023, https://apnews.com/article/china-debt-banking-loans-financial-developing-countries-collapse-8df6f9fac3e1e758d0e6d8d5dfbd3ed6.
16    “G7 Apulia Leaders’ Communiqué.”
17    “Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment at the G7 Summit,” White House, June 13, 2024, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2024/06/13/fact-sheet-partnership-for-global-infrastructure-and-investment-at-the-g7-summit-2/.
18    “Press conference of the Italian G7 Presidency,” G7 Summit, 2024, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=q13U7uHMzU0; Federica Pascale, “Global South to Be at the Core of next Year’s G7 Summit in Italy,” Euracrtiv, May 22, 2023, https://www.euractiv.com/section/politics/news/global-south-to-be-at-the-core-of-next-years-g7-summit-in-italy/.
19    “G7 Apulia Leaders’ Communiqué.”
20    Nosmot Gbadamosi, “Italy’s Energy Deal Faces Backlash in Africa,” Foreign Policy, February 7, 2024, https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/02/07/italys-energy-deal-faces-backlash-in-africa/.
21    See, for example, criticism regarding the EU’s memorandum of understanding signed with Rwanda in February 2024 on the supply of critical raw materials. Despite the EU’s stated focus on ESG standards in the agreement, Rwanda is noted to have been benefitting from exporting materials trafficked from neighboring countries mired by conflict. Lorraine Mallinder, “‘Blood Minerals’: What Are the Hidden Costs of the EU-Rwanda Supply Deal?” Al Jazeera, May 2, 2024, https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2024/5/2/blood-minerals-what-are-the-hidden-costs-of-the-eu-rwanda-supply-deal.
22    “Regional Economic Outlook. Sub-Saharan Africa: A Tepid and Pricey Recovery,” International Monetary Fund, April 2024, https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/REO/SSA/Issues/2024/04/19/regional-economic-outlook-for-sub-saharan-africa-april-2024.
23    A World of Debt: A Growing Burden to Global Prosperity,” UN Global Crisis Response Group, July 2023, https://unctad.org/publication/world-of-debt#.
24    “Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment at the G7 Summit;” “Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment at the G7 Summit,” White House, May 20, 2023, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2023/05/20/fact-sheet-partnership-for-global-infrastructure-and-investment-at-the-g7-summit/.
26    Adva Saldinger, “US DFC Looks to Protect Risky Investments, Even in Ukraine,” Devex, April 9, 2024, https://www.devex.com/news/devex-invested-us-dfc-looks-to-protect-risky-investments-even-in-ukraine-107424.
27    “Factsheet on the G7 Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, May 2023, https://www.mofa.go.jp/files/100506918.pdf.
28    “Side Event on the G7 Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment,” 2024 G7 Summit, June 13, 2024, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=y3Po7AZ8Vf0.
29    “G7 Apulia Leaders’ Communiqué.”
30    Frances Burwell, “In This Year of Elections, the US-EU Trade and Technology Council Should Get Strategic,” Atlantic Council, March 26, 2024, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/in-this-year-of-elections-the-us-eu-trade-and-technology-council-should-get-strategic/.
31    “The Blue Dot Network Begins Global Certification Framework for Quality Infrastructure, Hosted by the OECD,” Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, April 9, 2024, https://www.oecd.org/newsroom/the-blue-dot-network-begins-global-certification-framework-for-quality-infrastructure-hosted-by-the-oecd.htm.
32    “Press conference of the Italian G7 Presidency.”

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Strengthening Taiwan’s resiliency https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/strengthening-taiwans-resiliency/ Tue, 02 Jul 2024 13:00:00 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=776535 Resilience is a nation’s ability to understand, address, respond to, and recover from any type of national security risk. Given the scale of risk Taiwan faces from mainland China, domestic resilience should be front and center in Taiwan’s national security strategy, encompassing areas such as cybersecurity, energy security, and defense resilience.

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Table of contents

Introduction

This report recommends actions for the new leadership of Taiwan to take to enhance its societal resilience against Chinese aggression in the context of both “gray zone” conflict and wartime attacks. The report focuses on establishing a comprehensive security strategy and analyzes three key areas particularly important for effective resilience: enhancing cybersecurity for critical infrastructures; improving energy security; and accelerating defense transformation.

The new administration of Lai Ching-te faces both existing resilience challenges and the potential for significantly greater problems if the People’s Republic of China (PRC) pursues expanded gray zone activities or if actual conflict occurs.1 The ongoing challenges include substantial disinformation campaigns, cyberattacks, military incursions, and periodic economic coercion. Potential future challenges could involve expansion of one or more of these ongoing Chinese activities. In the context of a more contested environment such as a quarantine,2 blockade, or a kinetic conflict, Chinese actions could seek to cause leadership failures and loss of social cohesion; undertake cyberattacks to target critical infrastructures; generate energy shortages; and seek to defeat Taiwan militarily before the United States could provide effective support. The potential for such harms substantially increases the importance of resilient responses by Taiwan.

The report recommends four major sets of actions to enhance Taiwan’s resilience:

  1. Establish a comprehensive security strategy that engages government, the private sector, and individuals in cooperative efforts to ensure all facets of resilience including:
    1. Risk analyses and priority requirements.
    2. Organization of data relevant to responding to challenges from the PRC.
    3. Development of expertise in key areas required for response.
    4. Provision of governmental leadership and activation of the whole nation as part of a comprehensive approach.
  2. Enhance cybersecurity by establishing:
    1. Off-island, cloud-based capabilities to duplicate governmental and other critical functions.
    2. Working arrangements with high-end, private-sector cybersecurity providers.
    3. A surge capability of cybersecurity experts.
    4. Regular engagement with US Cyber Command’s Hunt Forward program.
    5. Alternatives to undersea cables through low-earth orbit (LEO) communications satellites.
  3. Bolster energy security resilience by:
    1. Rationalizing—that is, increasing—energy prices, especially for electricity.
    2. Supporting indigenous supply, including nuclear energy.
    3. Prioritizing energy needs.
    4. Dispersing and hardening energy storage facilities.
    5. Preparing comprehensive rationing plans for energy.
  4. Enhance defense resilience by:
    1. Continuing the trend of higher defense spending to at least 3 percent of gross domestic product (GDP).
    2. Leveraging Taiwan’s strength in high tech manufacturing and shipbuilding to accelerate the development of a Ukraine-style, public-private “capability accelerator”3 for emerging technologies.
    3. Fielding low-cost, high-effectiveness capabilities including unmanned surface vessels, unmanned aerial vehicles, and naval mines.
    4. Incorporating training in emerging technologies and unconventional tactics for conscripts and reserves.
    5. Investing in East Coast port infrastructure as counterblockade strongholds.
    6. Raising the All-out Defense Mobilization Agency (ADMA) to the national level and implementing a larger civil defense force that fully integrates civilian agencies and local governments.

Establish a comprehensive security strategy

Resilience is not a new theme in Taiwan. Former President Tsai Ing-wen, who completed two terms in office on May 20, entitled her 2022 National Day Address “Island of Resilience,”4 and similarly identified resilience as a key factor for Taiwan in her two subsequent National Day addresses.5 “The work of making the Republic of China (Taiwan) a more resilient country is now our most important national development priority,” she stated in that 2022 speech, in which she articulated four key areas of  resilience: economy and industry, social safety net, free and democratic government system, and national defense. What is left undone, however, is aligning these and other resilience elements into a comprehensive security strategy similar to those undertaken by Finland6 and Sweden,7 which utilize a whole-of society approach to enhance resilience.

Resilience is a nation’s ability to understand, address, respond to, and recover from any type of national security risk. Given the scale of risk Taiwan faces from China, domestic resilience should be front and center in Taiwan’s national security strategy.8 Comparable comprehensive national security approaches, such as the Finnish model, aim to foster and enable an engaged national ecosystem of partners, each with a clear understanding of their roles and responsibilities. Finland’s model is instructive, underscoring the importance of engagement by the entire society:

  • The Security Strategy for Society lays out the general principles governing preparedness in Finnish society. The preparedness is based on the principle of comprehensive security in which the vital functions of society are jointly safeguarded by the authorities, business operators, organisations and citizens.9

Comprehensive security thus is far more than just government activities:

  • Comprehensive security has evolved into a cooperation model in which actors share and analyse security information, prepare joint plans, as well as train and work together. The cooperation model covers all relevant actors, from citizens to the authorities. The cooperation is based on statutory tasks, cooperation agreements and the Security Strategy for Society.10

The Finnish strategy identifies seven “vital functions” as key areas: leadership; international and European Union activities; defense capability; internal security; economy, infrastructure, and security of supply; functional capacity of the population and services; and psychological resilience.11

Taiwan has taken a variety of actions to enhance resilience including the establishment in 2022 of the All-out Defense Mobilization Agency.12 That agency has a useful but limited scope with its mandate of “comprehensive management of ‘planning for mobilization, management, service, civil defense, [and] building reserve capacity.’ ”13 But while defense is important (and further discussed below), as the Finnish and Swedish strategies underscore, Taiwan should expand its approach to resilience to include the full spectrum of governmental, private sector, and individual tasks—and the necessary cooperative efforts to make them most effective.

President Lai’s recent election ushered in an unprecedented third consecutive term for the Democratic Progressive Party.14 This outcome not only provides continuity in the agenda set by the island’s duly elected leader, but also presents an opportunity to sharpen the focus areas for resilience. As Taiwan transitions to a Lai presidency, the challenge of shoring up the island’s resilience should be at the forefront.

As a valuable starting point for establishing such an expanded resilience strategy, the Lai government should undertake extensive consultations with both Finland and Sweden—which could be facilitated as necessary by the United States. Taiwan should also seek to engage with the Hybrid Center of Excellence, based in Finland, which is an “autonomous, network-based international organization countering hybrid threats.”15

The discussion below describes several important elements of a comprehensive resilience strategy, and it will be a crucial task for the Lai administration to expand Taiwan’s current efforts to the full scope of such an approach. Resilience is a team game with the whole of society playing a role. But only Taiwan’s central government can act as the team captain, setting expectations, establishing priorities, formulating and communicating national strategy, and coordinating activities. Only leaders in national-level government can oversee the critical work of developing institutional effectiveness in key areas of risk management and resilience.

As a starting point, Taiwan should undertake a comprehensive audit now to uncover any gaps in the country’s ability to understand, respond to, and recover from both the chronic risks it currently faces and any more acute manifestations of PRC aggression in the future. Taiwan’s government should examine the following areas to pursue greater resilience:

  1. Activating the whole nation: Working with the private sector and local government, and communicating to households are essential to develop a truly comprehensive approach to Taiwan’s resilience.
  2. Understanding risk: Developing a set of scenarios that will help prioritize activities across government and beyond. Prioritizing is critical where resources are limited—as is identifying areas of cross-cutting work that can help to reduce risk in multiple scenarios.
  3. Building data capacity: Laying a foundation for data exploitation needs will be critical for Taiwan, which will need this capacity both ahead of and during any crisis response. Preparing for and providing this capacity is not just the preserve of government, as commercially available and industry data sources will provide critical insights. Planning to access, receive, store, and process this data needs to start early, as the foundations for technical infrastructure, capabilities, data-sharing policies, and data expertise in government all require time and cannot just be activated on the cusp of crisis. Part of this work entails developing scenarios to help analysts map out gaps in information sources (intelligence, open source, commercial, and from allies) that Taiwan will likely need in each circumstance to build situational awareness. Ahead of and during crisis, risk assessment and effective decision-making will be highly dependent on the availability, quality, and usability of intelligence, information, and data.
  4. Expanding its network of professional skills and resources: Assessing the range of skills and the levels of resourcing needed in government to manage a long-term crisis posture should start well ahead of any crisis. It would be helpful to look now at the gaps in key areas of professional expertise: analysts, data experts, crisis-response professionals, and operational planners will all be needed in larger numbers to sustain an effective response. Taiwan will also need professionally administered and well-exercised crisis facilities, resilient technical infrastructure, and business continuity approaches in place.
  5. Preparedness and planning: Thinking through potential impacts of crisis scenarios in advance and working up potential policy and operational responses will bolster the quality of adaptability, which is an essential component of resilience. The process of exercising and refining plans is also helpful to build the professional connections and networks that will be activated during a live response.

Working with countries that are already developing vanguard resilience capabilities could help Taiwan quickly establish a workable model. For example, the United Kingdom’s National Situation Centre16—built in less than a year during the COVID-19 pandemic—is a model of developing access to critical data in peacetime and lessons learned from previous crisis scenarios about the practical challenges a nation could face in a variety of scenarios. Many commercial providers offer competent ways of displaying data insights on dashboards, and while this is helpful, it is only part of what can be achieved.

As a model for its broader resilience requirements, Taiwan will have the benefit of its existing efforts including in the counterdisinformation arena, where it has programs as effective as any in the world, despite the fact that Taiwan consistently faces the world’s highest volume of targeted disinformation campaigns.17 The saturation of PRC information manipulation across Taiwan’s traditional and social media platforms is strategically designed to undermine social cohesion, erode trust in government institutions, and soften resistance to Beijing’s forced unification agenda, while sowing doubts about America’s commitment to peace and stability in the region. 

Taiwan has developed a multifaceted strategy to combat this onslaught, eschewing heavy-handed censorship in favor of promoting free speech and empowering civil society. This approach serves as a beacon for other democracies, demonstrating how to effectively counter disinformation through rapid-response mechanisms, independent fact-checking, along with widespread media literacy initiatives. Collaborative efforts such as the Taiwan FactCheck Center, Cofacts, and MyGoPen have proven instrumental in swiftly identifying and debunking false rumors, notably during the closely watched presidential election on January 13.18

Taiwan’s Minister of Digital Affairs (MoDA) attributes the island’s success in combating this “infodemic” to its sophisticated civil-sector efforts, which avoids reliance on reactive takedowns of malicious content akin to a game of whack-a-mole. Much like its handling of the pandemic—where Taiwan achieved one of the world’s lowest COVID-19 fatality rates without resorting to draconian lockdowns—it has demonstrated resilience and innovation in the digital sphere.19

Taiwan’s response to disinformation demonstrates that it is well-positioned to establish a comprehensive approach to societal resilience. The discussion below describes several important elements of a comprehensive resilience strategy, but it will be a crucial task for the Lai administration to expand Taiwan’s current efforts to the full scope of such an approach.

Cybersecurity and critical infrastructure resilience

Cyber risks to critical infrastructures

Like all advanced economies, Taiwan depends on its critical infrastructures. Critical infrastructures have been described as “sectors whose assets, systems, and networks, whether physical or virtual, are considered so vital . . .  that their incapacitation or destruction would have a debilitating effect on security, national economic security, national public health or safety.”20 Since several critical infrastructures are interlinked, it is important in evaluating resilience to “capture cross-cutting risks and associated dependencies that may have cascading impacts within and across sectors.”21 Among those interlinked critical infrastructures are energy, communications, transportation, and water. Each of these are critical to society as a whole and each are dependent on digital technology for their operations.

In Taiwan, the Administration for Cyber Security has identified critical infrastructures “by their feature types into the following eight fields: energy, water resource, telecommunications, transportation, banking and finance, emergency aid and hospitals, central and local governments, and high-tech parks.”22 It is worth underscoring that several of Taiwan’s critical infrastructures, such as the electric grid23 and the water system,24 are significantly centralized or have other notable vulnerabilities such as the dependency on undersea cables for international communications25 that increase the potential consequences from a successful cyberattack.

The Taiwan government has fully recognized the significant risks from cyberattacks. As described by Taiwan’s Administration for Cyber Security, “Due to Taiwan’s unique political and economic situation, the country faces not only a complex global cyber security environment but also severe cyber security threats, making the continuous implementation and improvement of cyber security measures a necessity.”26

The number of cyberattacks against Taiwan is notable.27 Published estimates range from five million cyberattacks per day against Taiwanese government agencies28 to the detection of 15,000 cyberattacks per second, including attempted intrusions, in Taiwan during the first half of 2023.29

The attacks often focus on key societal infrastructures. A recent Voice of America report noted that just prior to the January 2024 elections:

  • Most of the attacks appeared to focus on government offices, police departments, and financial institutions, with the attackers focused on internal communications, police reports, bank statements and insurance information.30

Google researchers have likewise described the cyber threat to key critical infrastructures, revealing that it is “tracking close to 100 hacking groups out of China [and that these] malicious groups are attacking a wide spectrum of organizations, including the government, private industry players and defense organizations.”31

The attacks themselves are often relatively sophisticated. Trellix, a cybersecurity firm, described multiple techniques utilized by attackers that “focused on defense evasion, discovery, and command and control . . . to subvert system defenses to gather information about accounts, systems, and networks.” Among them are “living-off-the-land” techniques, which allow attackers to maintain their intrusions over time with smaller chances of detection.32

While no one can say with certainty what actions the PRC would take in the context of a blockade of or outright conflict with Taiwan, the United States is clear-eyed about the potential for attacks on its own critical infrastructures if engaged in conflict with China. The February 2023 Annual Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community notes the likelihood of such PRC cyberattacks in that context:

  • If Beijing feared that a major conflict with the United States were imminent, it almost certainly would consider undertaking aggressive cyber operations against U.S. homeland critical infrastructure and military assets worldwide . . .  China almost certainly is capable of launching cyber attacks that could disrupt critical infrastructure services within the United States, including against oil and gas pipelines, and rail systems.33

The ongoing Russian cyberattacks against Ukraine in the Russia-Ukraine war further underscore the reality of critical infrastructures as a target in a conflict. It seems reasonable to assume that comparable actions (and perhaps even more) would be undertaken against Taiwan in the event of a blockade or kinetic conflict. “Probable targets,” according to James A. Lewis, would include critical infrastructures such as electrical power facilities, information and communications systems, and pipelines.34

Actions to enhance Taiwan’s cyber resilience

Taiwan can enhance its cyber resilience through its own actions and in collaborative activities with private-sector companies and with the United States. While cyberattacks can be highly disruptive, one of the important lessons of the Ukraine-Russia conflict is that the effects on operations can be mitigated, as described in a CyberScoop analysis that underscores a shift in expectations:

  • The war has inspired a defensive effort that government officials and technology executives describe as unprecedented—challenging the adage in cybersecurity that if you give a well-resourced attacker enough time, they will pretty much always succeed. The relative success of the defensive effort in Ukraine is beginning to change the calculation about what a robust cyber defense might look like going forward.35

According to the analysis, the critical element for such success has been significant multinational and public-private collaboration:

  • This high level of defense capability is a consequence of a combination of Ukraine’s own effectiveness, significant support from other nations including the United States and the United Kingdom, and a key role for private sector companies.
  • The defensive cyber strategy in Ukraine has been an international effort, bringing together some of the biggest technology companies in the world such as Google and Microsoft, Western allies such as the U.S. and Britain and social media giants such as Meta who have worked together against Russia’s digital aggression.36

Actions by Taiwan

Taiwan should utilize the Ukraine model of cyber resilience—backed in part by private-sector companies—and take comparable actions to enhance its cybersecurity. Taiwan has a substantial existing cybersecurity framework on which to build such mitigating actions. Since 2022, the Ministry of Digital Affairs, through its Administration for Cyber Security, is responsible for “implementing cyber security management and defense mechanisms for national critical infrastructures” including “evaluating and auditing cyber security works at government agencies and public entities.”37 Utilizing that framework, Taiwan should undertake the following four actions that would significantly enhance the island’s cybersecurity resilience.

First, Taiwan should utilize cloud-based capabilities to establish a duplicative set of cyber-enabled governmental functions outside of Taiwan. Ukraine undertook such actions, thereby rendering Russian cyberattacks in Ukraine unable to disrupt ongoing governmental activities. Taiwan’s Ministry of Digital Affairs has been evaluating the use of public clouds including the possibility of  “digital embassies” abroad to hold data.38 Taiwan should organize such actions with key cloud providers such as Amazon Web Services, which provided support to Ukraine.39 The United States should work with Taiwan and appropriate cloud providers to help effectuate such a result.

Second, Taiwan should establish arrangements with private-sector cybersecurity providers to undertake defensive operations against PRC cyberattacks in the context of a blockade or kinetic conflict. As noted above, such private-sector actions have been instrumental to Ukraine, and would similarly be invaluable for Taiwan. The United States should also help facilitate such private-sector defensive cyber operations for Taiwan.

Third, Taiwan should organize a surge capability of individual cybersecurity experts who can be called upon to complement governmental resources. Both Estonia and the United Kingdom have very effective cyber-reserve approaches, and Taiwan should engage with each country, seeking lessons learned as part of establishing its own reserve corps.

Fourth, Taiwan needs to accelerate its low-earth orbit satellite communications program. The Ministry of Digital Affairs’ two-year, US$18 million plan to strengthen the resilience of government communications entails building more than 700 satellite receiver stations. The impetus: ships from mainland China have repeatedly severed submarine internet cables in what Taiwan perceived as “a trial of methods” that the PRC could use to prepare for a military invasion.40

The existing program involves satellites as well as ground-based receivers. The Taiwan Space Agency disclosed its plan for a “dedicated” LEO satellite communications project in late 2022,41 as a public-private partnership: 

  • Distinct from traditional government programs, this groundbreaking project is structured as a privately operated venture, wherein the Taiwanese government would retain a substantial minority ownership. . . . This project intends to enhance the Taiwan Space Agency’s initial proposal for two government-built LEO satellites by evolving it into a “2+4” configuration. This will involve constructing four additional satellites through collaborative efforts between the public and private sectors.42

Actions with the United States

In accord with the Taiwan Relations Act,43 and as a matter of long-standing policy, the United States strongly supports Taiwan’s defensive capabilities including for cybersecurity. The Integrated Country Strategy of the American Institute in Taiwan (essentially the unofficial US embassy) specifically provides that “bolster[ing] Taiwan’s cybersecurity resilience” is one of the United States’ strategic priorities for the island.44 To support that objective, the United States can enhance Taiwan cybersecurity through cooperative defensive activities.

First, US Cyber Command regularly supports the network resilience of allied countries and partners through its “Hunt Forward” operations, which are “strictly defensive” joint ventures, undertaken following an invitation from the ally or partner, to “observe and detect malicious cyber activity” on these networks, together searching out “vulnerabilities, malware, and adversary presence.”45

While Taiwan has not been specifically identified as a Hunt Forward participant, Anne Neuberger, who is the US deputy national security advisor for cyber and emerging technology, said at a Politico Tech Summit in 2023 that in the event of a major cyberattack on Taiwan, the United States would “send its best teams to help hunt down the attackers, the same approach typically used to help global allies in cyberspace.”46 She described the typical approach as:

  • Putting our best teams to hunt on their most sensitive networks to help identify any current intrusions and to help remediate and make those networks as strong as possible.”47

Neuberger also highlighted US work with Taiwan to carry out military tabletop games and exercises to prepare for potential cyberattack.48

More recently, the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2024 explicitly authorized the Defense Department to cooperate on:

  • Defensive military cybersecurity activities with the military forces of Taiwan to (1) defend military networks, infrastructure, and systems; (2) counter malicious cyber activity that has compromised such military networks, infrastructure, and systems; (3) leverage United States commercial and military cybersecurity technology and services to harden and defend such military networks, infrastructure, and systems; and (4) conduct combined cybersecurity training activities and exercises.49

Going forward, those authorities authorize not only Hunt Forward actions but also actions to  leverage commercial and military technology to harden such networks (which would seem to resolve any export control issues) and to conduct combined training and exercises, all of which underscores clear congressional approval for enhanced cybersecurity activities with Taiwan.50

Second, the United States should undertake to enhance Taiwan’s communications resilience by making available access to US commercial and military LEO networks. The important role of the commercial provider Starlink in assuring communications in the context of the Ukraine-Russia war is well-known.51 Starlink’s parent company, SpaceX, is, however, controlled by Elon Musk, whose Tesla company has major investments in China. That linkage has raised the question of whether Taiwan could rely on any commercial arrangements it might make on its own with Starlink—particularly since Starlink did impose some limitations on Ukraine’s use of the network.52 However, as previously described by one of the authors of this report, the US government has sway on such matters:

  • The Defense Production Act authorizes the [US] government to require the prioritized provision of services—which would include services from space companies—and exempts any company receiving such an order from liabilities such as inability to support other customers.53

Accordingly, the US should rely on this authority to organize appropriate arrangements with Starlink—and other space companies that provide like capabilities—to ensure access that would support Taiwan communications. One way to do this would be to incorporate appropriate terms into the commercial augmentation space reserve (CASR) program arrangements that US Space Force is currently negotiating with civil space providers,54 as part of the Department of Defense’s overall commercial space strategy.55

Additionally, the DOD is developing its own LEO capability through a variety of constellations being put in place by Space Force.56 Pursuant to the recent NDAA authorization noted above, DOD should work with the Taiwan military to ensure that those constellations will be available to support Taiwan as necessary.

Longer term, the United States should also undertake to enhance the resilience of Taiwan’s undersea cables. As previously proposed by one of the authors, the United States should lead in establishing an international undersea infrastructure protection corps. It should:

  • Combine governmental and private activities to support the resilience of undersea cables and pipelines. Membership should include the United States, allied nations with undersea maritime capabilities, and key private-sector cable and pipeline companies.57

Such an activity would include focus on cybersecurity for undersea cable networks, hardening and other protection for cable landing points, and capabilities and resources to ensure expeditious repair of cables as needed.58 To be sure, getting such an activity up and running will necessarily be a multiyear effort. However, Taiwan’s vulnerability underscores the importance of beginning promptly and working as expeditiously as possible.

Cybersecurity recommendations for Taiwan

  • Utilize cloud-based capabilities to establish a duplicative set of cyber-enabled governmental functions outside of Taiwan.
  • Establish arrangements with private-sector cybersecurity providers to undertake defensive operations against PRC cyberattacks.
  • Organize a surge capability of individual cybersecurity experts who can be called upon to complement governmental resources.
  • Accelerate the low-earth orbit satellite communications program.
  • Actively engage with Cyber Command’s Hunt Forward activities.
  • Enhance Taiwan’s communications resilience by making available access to US commercial and military LEO networks.
  • Undertake on a longer-term basis enhanced resilience of Taiwan’s undersea cables.

Energy

As part of its efforts to enhance resilience, Taiwan must mitigate its energy vulnerabilities, as its reliance on maritime imports for about 97 percent59 of its energy needs creates acute risks. To lessen its dependency on maritime imports and strengthen its resiliency in the face of potential PRC coercion, Taiwan should curb energy and electricity demand, bolster indigenous supply, overhaul its inventory management, and prepare rationing plans. A resilient energy security approach would credibly signal to the PRC that Taiwan could hold out for long durations without maritime resupply.

Curbing demand by rationalizing prices 

Taiwan’s ultra-low electricity prices are a security risk (and a black eye for its climate targets). Reliance on seaborne energy shipments presents straightforward security problems, and Taiwan’s low electricity prices subsidize consumption that is being met by imports of hydrocarbons, especially coal. The new Lai administration should make haste prudently, increasing electricity prices more frequently and significantly, without exceeding the limits of the politically possible.

Taiwan’s electricity price quandary is illustrated by Taipower, the state-owned monopoly utility. In 2022 and 2023, Taipower lost 227.2 billion New Taiwan dollars (NTD) and 198.5 billion NTD, respectively, as its per kilowatt hour cost of electricity sold substantially exceeded per unit prices.60 Taipower’s prices failed to offset the steep rise in electricity input costs amid Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the post-COVID-19 unsnarling of supply chains.

Taiwan’s electricity costs remain too low, diminishing the island’s resiliency, although policymakers have now taken some steps in light of the problem. The Ministry of Economic Affairs’ latest electricity price review, in March 2024, raised average prices by about 11 percent, with the new tariff reaching about 3.4518 NTD, or approximately $0.11 USD/kWh.61 This rationalization of prices, while welcome, is insufficient. In the United States, the rolling twelve-month ending price in January 2024 for all sectors totaled $0.127/kWh.62 Taiwan’s heavily subsidized electricity consumers therefore enjoy a discount in excess of 13 percent compared to their US counterparts, despite US access to low-cost, abundant, and indigenously produced energy.

Taiwan’s heavily subsidized electricity prices incentivize maritime imports, especially coal. Astonishingly, Taiwan was the world’s largest per capita user of coal generation for electricity in 2022, higher than even Australia, a major coal exporter.

Taiwan’s low electricity prices and use of coal expose the island to PRC economic coercion. Taiwan’s dependency on imported coal heightens its vulnerability in the summer, when the island’s electricity-generation needs peak. Concerningly, Taiwan has already experienced electricity shortfalls in summer peacetime conditions, including a wave of outages63 between July and August 2022. With the island’s future summer cooling needs set to rise even further due to climate change and hotter temperatures, Taiwan’s electricity needs pose a vulnerability that the PRC may attempt to exploit.

Curbing Taiwan’s electricity demand during summer months is critical, necessitating a rise in prices. While this reduction is a principal energy security challenge, the island must also do more to secure supply, especially for nuclear energy.

Supply: Support indigenous production

Taiwan’s resiliency will be strengthened by producing as much indigenous energy as possible, especially during the critical summer months. Taiwan, which has virtually no hydrocarbon resources, can therefore indigenously produce only four different forms of energy at scale: nuclear energy, offshore wind, onshore wind, and solar. Taiwan should pursue each of these indigenous energy sources. Taiwan should apply “carrots” by strengthening incentives and payments for indigenous production. At the same time, applying the “stick” of higher prices to energy consumption, especially for energy imports, would bolster the island’s resiliency.

Taiwan’s renewable resources are significant and often economically viable, but they cannot secure adequate levels of resiliency by themselves. Taiwan’s wind speeds slow in the summer,64 limiting onshore and offshore wind’s effectiveness in bolstering energy security. Additionally, Taiwan’s stringent localization requirements for offshore appropriately minimize PRC components and sensors in Taiwan’s offshore wind turbines, but also raise the costs of this technology. Taiwan’s solar potential65 is also limited66 by cloudy skies, frequent rainfall, and land scarcity.

Accordingly, nuclear energy is the most viable way for Taiwan to address its summer electricity needs without turning to maritime imports. While Taiwan’s nuclear reactors must acquire fuel from abroad, this fuel can be used for approximately eighteen to twenty-four months.67 Taiwan should maintain its existing nuclear energy capacity; restart retired capacity as soon as politically and technically feasible; and seek new, incremental capacity over time.68

Unpacking Taiwan’s storage complexities: Dispersal and hardening is critical

To cope with various contingencies, including the possibility of a prolonged summertime blockade, Taiwan should increase its stockpiles of energy, disperse inventory around the island, and harden facilities.

While Taiwan’s ability to hold out against a blockade involves by many factors, energy inventories are a critical element. Taiwan’s electricity reserves are limited: it reported fifty-six days of supply of coal inventories in February 2023,69 and aims to raise its natural gas inventories from eleven days to more than twenty days by 2030.70 These inventory levels should be expanded, in part because “days of supply” fail to encapsulate uncertainty. Demand fluctuates depending on temperature and other variables, while Taiwan’s access to energy storage inventories faces the risk of sabotage and, in certain scenarios, kinetic strikes.

Taiwan’s management of petroleum reserves is a matter of great importance, given the use of these fuels, especially diesel, for military matters. Taiwan’s Energy Administration, in the Ministry of Economic Affairs, reported in April 2024 that its total oil inventories stood at 167 days of supply.71 This topline figure presents an overly optimistic portrait of Taiwan’s petroleum security, however. For instance, Taiwan’s government-controlled inventories in April 202472 included 2.6 million kiloliters of crude oil and refined products; private stocks added another 6.5 million kiloliters. Accordingly, Taiwan reports forty-seven days of supply from government stockpiles, with an additional 120 days from private inventories.73 Given that domestic sales and consumption equated to about 54,200 kiloliters per day from prior comparable periods,74 Taiwan calculated it had about 167 days of supply.

There may, however, be insufficient monitoring of private inventories. Marek Jestrab observed:

  • A concerning—and possibly significant—loophole exists in these laws, where the criteria and computation formulas for the actual on-hand security stockpiles will be determined by the central competent authority, and are not required to be disclosed. This presents the opportunity for energy that is loaded onboard merchant shipping while in transit to Taiwan to count toward these figures.75

While Taiwan should ensure that stockpiles are actually on the island, and not at sea, it also needs to carefully examine the inventory split between crude oil and crude products, such as diesel, gasoline, jet fuel, etc. Additionally, Taiwan’s policymakers should not expect to rely on its crude inventories, which only have a latent potential: crude oil cannot be used until it is refined into a crude product. Therefore, if the PRC disrupted Taiwan’s refineries via cyber or even kinetic means, Taiwan would not be able to access the totality of its crude oil reserves.

Taiwan’s military requirements for fuel would likely surge during a confrontation or conflict with the PRC, reducing the “days of supply.” Since Taiwan’s military vehicles largely run on diesel, the island should pay careful attention to this product.

Taiwan should disperse and harden its energy assets, especially diesel storage, as concentrated objects would present inviting targets for the PRC. Beijing is studying Russia’s invasion of Ukraine closely and will not fail to notice that Moscow attacked about 30 percent of Ukrainian infrastructure in a single day.76 As one author witnessed during his recent visit to Kyiv, Ukraine’s dispersal of electricity assets is achieving a reasonable degree of success. Indeed, Russia’s more recent campaign77 attacking large-scale thermal and hydroelectric power plants illustrates the utility of dispersed energy infrastructure. Like Ukraine, Taiwan should disperse and harden its energy storage inventories to the maximal feasible extent.

Rationing plans

While both Taiwan’s electricity supply and demand will be very hard to predict in a state of emergency, rationing plans must be considered—especially for the island’s manufacturing and semiconductor industries.

Taiwan’s economy is uniquely78 tied to electricity-intensive manufacturing, as industrial consumers accounted for more than 55 percent of Taiwan’s electricity consumption in 2023.79 Most of these industrial producers (such as chipmaker Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company) service export markets—not Taiwan. While the PRC might attempt to disrupt the island’s energy and electricity supply via cyber and kinetic means, Taiwan’s electricity consumption would fall dramatically during a crisis if Taiwan’s industries were forced to shut down. Although the closure of Taiwan’s industry would prove economically ruinous, it would also make the island’s electricity and energy issues much more manageable. Adding an additional layer of complication, many of Taiwan’s most valuable exports – such as chips – are shipped via civilian airliners, not on seaborne vessels, and would consequently be more difficult to interdict in circumstances short of war.80 Taiwan should prepare rationing plans for a variety of contingencies, adapting to a range of scenarios, including a quarantine, siege, or even kinetic conflict. Taiwan must be ready. 

Energy recommendations for Taiwan 

  • Gradually raise electricity and energy prices, communicating that price hikes will persist and require significant adjustments over the medium term.
  • Expand the frequency of electricity price reviews from twice a year to a quarterly basis. More frequent price adjustments will allow smaller incremental increases while also enabling Taiwan to respond more quickly to potential contingencies.
  • Expand fiscal support for indigenous forms of energy. Demand-side management programs could include virtual power plants, building efficiency measures, two-way air conditioning units, and more. On the supply side, Taiwan should incentivize indigenous energy production, including nuclear energy, onshore wind, offshore wind, and solar.
  • Extend the life of Taiwan’s nuclear energy power plants and consider expanding capacity. Nuclear energy is not only Taiwan’s best option for meeting its summer generation needs but also extremely safe and reliable. In the event of a conflict, the PRC is extremely unlikely to launch highly escalatory and provocative attacks against nuclear facilities on territory it seeks to occupy.
  • Bolster domestic energy supplies and decarbonization objectives including by considering easing localization requirements for offshore wind projects—while ensuring that PRC components and sensors are not incorporated.
  • Disperse and, where possible, harden energy and electricity assets and volumes across the island for both military and civil defense needs.
  • Examine potential alternatives to diesel, as diesel inventories can begin to degrade after several weeks, including “long-duration diesel” solutions that, while more polluting, could extend the shelf life of its inventories, enhancing the durability of Taiwan’s military and civil defense efforts.
  • Deepen liquified natural gas (LNG) ties with the United States. Contracting with US LNG producers would moderately bolster Taiwan’s energy security, as the PRC would be more reluctant to interdict US cargoes than vessels from other nations.
  • Conduct comprehensive studies into energy contingency planning, examining how energy and electricity would be prioritized and rationed during various scenarios.

Food and water resiliency

Taiwan’s food supply needs will be significant in the event of a contingency, but pale in comparison to its energy and water requirements. Taiwan’s water security is a serious concern, as it is already suffering from water access issues in noncrisis periods. Taiwan should prioritize scarce land for electricity generation, especially onshore wind and solar, which are much less water-intensive than coal and natural gas generation. Repurposing farmland for renewables would ease Taiwan’s electricity and water needs in peacetime and during any crisis.

Taiwan’s food security challenges are serious, but manageable. The island’s self-sufficiency ratio for food stands at about 40 percent, after rising somewhat in recent years. Unlike energy, however, Taiwan can both store food, especially rice, and replenish these inventories. Meals ready to eat (MREs) can store for more than eighteen months.

Additionally, the island would likely be able to resupply itself aerially in all situations short of conflict. The PRC might well be extremely reluctant to shoot down a civilian aircraft resupplying Taiwan with food. The PRC’s shootdown of a civilian aircraft would damage external perceptions of the PRC, and strengthen global support for sanctions. While there can be no certainty, the PRC’s self-interest in managing perceptions of a confrontation would increase the likelihood of the safe transit of aerial and perhaps even maritime food deliveries to the island.

Taiwan’s water access problems are serious. Water shortages have manifested even in peacetime, as Taiwan experienced a severe drought in 2021. During a contingency with the PRC, Beijing might attempt to exploit this vulnerability.

Luckily, Taiwan’s water resiliency can be strengthened by tackling agricultural consumption and, wherever politically and technically feasible, repurposing farmland for energy generation. From 2013 to 2022, 71 percent of Taiwan’s water consumption was attributable to agriculture. Meanwhile, Taiwan’s industries comprised only 10 percent of demand during that period, with domestic (i.e., residential and commercial) consumption accounting for the remainder. Taiwan’s water needs are growing, due to “thirsty” industrial customers, but the agricultural sector is primarily responsible for the majority of the island’s consumption, although consumption and supply sources vary across the island.

Taiwan’s policymakers recognize its water problems and have begun raising water prices,  especially for heavy users. Taiwan should continue to encourage efficiency by gradually but perceptibly increasing water prices. Concomitantly, it should further reduce demand by repurposing water-intensive farmland for electricity generation, when feasible. Repurposing farmland will undoubtedly prove politically difficult, but it will also improve Taiwan’s water and electricity resiliency.

Food and water security recommendations 

  • Prioritize energy and water security needs over food production.
  • Secure and disperse inventories of foodstuffs, such as MREs, medicines, and water, along with water purification tablets.
  • Bolster the island’s cold storage supply chains and overall foodstuff inventories.
  • Plan and work with partners to stage food supply if a Berlin airlift-style operation becomes necessary.
  • Continue to encourage water conservation by increasing water prices gradually but steadily.
  • Ensure redundancy of water supplies and systems, especially in the more populous northern part of the island.
  • Ensure that drinking water and sanitation systems can operate continuously, after accounting for any electricity needs.
Gustavo F. Ferreira and J. A. Critelli, “Taiwan’s Food Resiliency—or Not—in a Conflict with China,” US Army War College Quarterly: Parameters 53, no. 2 (2023), doi:10.55540/0031-1723.3222; Joseph Webster, “Does Taiwan’s Massive Reliance on Energy Imports Put Its Security at Risk?,” New Atlanticist, Atlantic Council blog, July 7, 2023, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/does-taiwans-massive-reliance-on-energy-imports-put-its-security-at-risk/; Amy Chang Chien, Mike Ives, and Billy H. C. Kwok,  “Taiwan Prays for Rain and Scrambles to Save Water,” New York Times, May 28, 2021, https://www.nytimes.com/2021/05/28/world/asia/taiwan-drought.html; “Water Resources Utilization,” Ministry of Economic Affairs (MOEA), Water Resources Agency, 2022, https://eng.wra.gov.tw/cp.aspx?n=5154&dn=5155; Meng-hsuan Yang, “Why Did Formosa Plastics Build Its Own Desalination Facility?,” CommonWealth Magazine, May 31, 2023, https://english.cw.com.tw/article/article.action?id=3440; and Chao Li-yen and Ko Lin, “Taiwan State-Owned Utility Evaluates Water Price Adjustments,” Focus Taiwan, January 26, 2024, https://focustaiwan.tw/society/202401260017#:~:text=As%20of%20Aug.
The Berlin airlift of 1948 and 1949 demonstrates the power of aerial food replenishment logistics in an uncontested environment. From June 26, 1948, to September 30, 1949, Allied forces delivered more than 2.3 million tons of food, fuel, and supplies to West Berlin in over 278,000 airdrops. While Taiwan’s population of more than twenty-three million is significantly larger than West Berlin’s population of 2.5 million, the world civilian air cargo fleet has expanded dramatically over the past seventy-five years. In all situations short of conflict, Taiwan would be able to restock food from the air. For more on the Berlin airlift, see Katie Lange, “The Berlin Airlift: What It Was, Its Importance in the Cold War,” DOD News, June 24, 2022, https://www.defense.gov/News/Feature-Stories/Story/Article/3072635/the-berlin-airlift-what-it-was-its-importance-in-the-cold-war/.

Enhancing defense resilience

Ever since Beijing leveraged then-Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s August 2022 visit to Taiwan as an excuse to launch large-scale joint blockade military exercises, pundits have labeled the residual military situation around Taiwan as a “new normal.” Yet there is really nothing normal about a permanent presence of People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Navy warships menacingly surrounding the island along its twenty-four nautical mile contiguous zone, and nothing usual about increasing numbers of manned and unmanned military aircraft crossing the tacit median line in the Taiwan Strait—a line that held significance for seven decades as a symbol of cross-strait stability. Nor should it be viewed as normal that a steady stream of high-altitude surveillance balloons—which are suspected of collecting military intelligence—violate Taiwan’s airspace.81 Some have better described this “new normal” as a strategy akin to an anaconda noticeably tightening its grip around the island, drawing close enough to reduce warning time and provocative enough to raise the risk of inadvertent clashes. In other words, the PRC has unilaterally dialed up a military cost-imposition campaign meant to chip away at peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait, wear down Taiwan’s military, and erode confidence and social cohesion in Taiwan society. 

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 was an additional wake-up call for the citizens of Taiwan, following mainland China’s 2019 crackdown on Hong Kong freedoms, heightening recognition of the risks presented by the PRC and, in particular, that the long-standing status quo in cross-strait relations is no longer acceptable to Beijing. Taiwan thus finds itself in the unenviable position of simultaneously countering PLA gray zone intrusions and cognitive warfare—what NATO calls affecting attitudes and behaviors to gain advantage82—while beefing itself up militarily to deter the growing threat of a blockade or assault.

With this backdrop, Taipei authorities have since embarked on long-overdue reforms in defense affairs, marked by several developments aimed at bolstering the island democracy’s military capabilities and readiness in the face of growing threats from Beijing.

First, Taiwan’s overall defense spending has undergone seven consecutive year-on-year increases, reaching 2.5 percent of gross domestic product.83 While this is commendable, Taiwan’s defense requirements are very substantial, and its budget in US dollars is only $19.1 billion.84 Accordingly, it will be important for Taiwan to continue the trend of higher defense spending to at least 3 percent of GDP both to bolster Taiwan’s military capabilities and as a deterrent signal to Beijing—and also to garner international community recognition that Taiwan is serious about its own defense. A key element will be to ensure that Taiwan has sufficient stocks of ammunition and other weapons capabilities to fight effectively until the United States could fully engage and in the event of a longer war. One area that deserves a high degree of attention is defense against ballistic and cruise missiles and unmanned vehicles. Especially in light of the recent coalition success in defeating such Iranian attacks against Israel, planning should be undertaken to assure comparable success for Taiwan against PRC attacks. Adding mobile, short-range air defenses to the high-priority list of military investments for Taiwan—such as the highly mobile National Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile System (NASAMS)85—will make it harder for the PLA to find and destroy Taiwan defenses, especially if combined with passive means for target detection and missile guidance.

Second, the new president can kick-start an enhanced approach to defense by embracing full integration of public-private innovation and adopting Ukraine’s model of grass-roots innovation for defense, which has served it well through a decade of war against a much larger Russia. Recognizing that innovation is itself a form of resilience, Taiwan can draw valuable lessons from Ukraine, particularly in leveraging private-sector expertise. By implementing what some Ukrainian defense experts term a “capability accelerator” to integrate emerging technologies into mission-focused capabilities, Taiwan can enhance its resilience and swiftly adapt to evolving security challenges, including rapidly fielding a high volume of unmanned systems to achieve distributed surveillance, redundant command and control, and higher survivability.86 This comprehensive approach, which recognizes the private sector as the greatest source of innovation in today’s complex security environment, holds significant potential for enhancing Taiwan’s defense capabilities through the utilization of disruptive technologies. The island’s overall resilience would significantly benefit by drawing the private sector in as a direct stakeholder in national defense matters. 

Ukraine’s grass-roots model of defense innovation, spearheaded by volunteers, nongovernment organizations, and international partners, is a worthy and timely model for Taiwan. Ukraine’s approach has yielded significant advancements in drone warfare, as well as sophisticated capabilities like the Delta battlefield management system—a user-friendly cloud-based situational awareness tool that provides real-time information on enemy and friendly forces through the integration of data from sources such as drones, satellites, and even civilian reports.87 This collaborative model, reliant on cooperation between civilian developers and military end users, has propelled Ukraine’s military technological revolution by integrating intelligence and surveillance tasks, while enhancing decision-making and kill-chain target acquisition. Taiwan will benefit from a comparable approach.

Third, as suggested above, Taiwan should focus a large portion of its defense budget on low-cost, highly effective systems. In terms of force structure, it appears that Taiwan has settled on a design that blends large legacy platforms of a twentieth-century military with the introduction of more survivable and distributable low-end asymmetric capabilities. The latter are best exemplified by Taiwan’s indigenously produced Ta Chiang-class of high-speed, guided-missile corvettes (PGG) and Min Jiang-class fast mine laying boats (FMLB).88 But much more must be done to bolster Taiwan’s overall defense capabilities by focusing on less expensive, but nonetheless highly effective systems.

In Ukraine’s battle against Russian Federation invaders, drones have provided Ukrainian forces with important tactical capabilities by enabling them to gather intelligence, monitor enemy movements, and conduct precision strikes on high-value targets. Taiwan can comparably utilize low-cost UAVs to establish mesh networks that connect devices for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance and for targeting that would be invaluable in countering a PRC amphibious assault. Lessons from Ukraine further highlight the importance of having the right mix of drone types and capabilities in substantial stockpiles, capable of a variety of missions. Notably, Ukrainian officials have called for the production of more than one million domestically produced drones in 2024.89 Then-President Tsai’s formation of a civilian-led “drone national team” program is a commendable step in this direction and underscores the power of collaborative innovation in joint efforts between  users.90 Encouraging cooperation between Taiwan drone makers and US private industry will accelerate the development of a combat-ready unmanned systems fleet with sufficient range, endurance, and payload to enhance situational awareness and battlefield effects. 

Concurrent with those efforts utilizing unmanned systems, Taiwan should bolster its naval mining capabilities as a strategic measure against PRC aggression. Naval mines represent one of the most cost-effective and immediately impactful layers of defense.91 In this regard, Taiwan’s new Min Jiang class of FMLB represents the right type of investments in capabilities which could prove pivotal in thwarting potential invasion attempts.

Even more significantly for a Taiwan audience, Ukraine broke a blockade of its Black Sea ports using a combination of naval drones and coastal defense missiles—and repelled the once-mighty Russian Black Sea Fleet—all without a traditional navy of its own.92 Faced with clear intent by a PLA Navy practicing daily to isolate the island, the time is past due for Taiwanese authorities to hone their own counterblockade skills including a heavy reliance on unmanned surface vehicles. 

Taiwan should also make rapid investments in port infrastructure and defenses along Taiwan’s eastern seaboard in places such as Su’ao and Hualien harbors, which can serve as deepwater ports that are accessible, strategic, antiblockade strongpoints, and where any conceivable PLA blockade would be at its weakest and most vulnerable point logistically. Su’ao harbor, as a potential future homeport for Taiwan’s new indigenous Hai Kun-class diesel submarines, could also serve a dual purpose as an experimentation and development zone for public-private collaboration on unmanned-systems employment and operations. Infrastructure investments in East Coast ports could enhance the island’s ability to attain emergency resupply of energy, food, humanitarian supplies, and munitions under all conditions, broadening options for international community aid and complicating PLA efforts.

Fourth, every new capability needs trained operators who are empowered to employ and engage.  This year Taiwan began implementation of a new, one-year conscript training system for male adults born after January 1, 2005 (up from a wholly inadequate four months of conscription in the past decade).93 Taiwan’s “all-out defense” plan realigns into a frontline main battle force consisting of all-volunteer career military personnel, backed up by a standing garrison force composed mainly of conscripted military personnel guarding infrastructure, along with a civil defense system integrated with local governments and private-sector resources. Upon mobilization, there would also be a reserve force to supplement the main battle and garrison forces. 

According to details laid out in its 2023 National Defense Report, Taiwan’s revamped one-year conscript system and reorganized reserve mobilization system place significant emphasis on traditional military combat skills, such as rifle marksmanship and operation of mortars.94 However, in response to evolving security challenges and the changing nature of warfare, Taiwan’s military should incorporate greater training in emerging technologies and unconventional tactics, along with decentralized command and control, especially in the areas of drone warfare, where unmanned aerial vehicles and surface vessels play a crucial role in reconnaissance, surveillance, and targeted strikes. By integrating drone warfare training into the conscript system as well as in annual reserve call-up training, Taiwan can better prepare its military personnel to adapt to modern battlefield environments and effectively counter emerging threats.

Integrating drone operations into military operations down to the conscript and reservist level offers a cost-effective means to enhance battlefield situational awareness and operational capabilities, and also has the added benefit of enhancing the attractiveness and value of a mandatory conscription system emerging from years of low morale and characterized by Taiwan’s outgoing president as “insufficient” and “full of outmoded training.”95 Recognizing the imperative to modernize military training to face up to a rapidly expanding PLA threat, Taiwan’s military force realignment plan came with a promise to “include training in the use of Stinger missiles, Javelin missiles, Kestrel rockets, drones, and other new types of weapons . . . in accordance with mission requirements to meet the needs of modern warfare.”96 Looking at the example of Ukraine, where drones have been utilized, underscores the importance of incorporating drone warfare training into its asymmetric strategy.

The Taiwan Enhanced Resilience Act “prioritize[d] realistic training” by the United States, with Taiwan authorizing “an enduring rotational United States military presence that assists Taiwan in maintaining force readiness.”97 There have been numerous reports of US special forces in Taiwan,98 and those forces could provide training in tactical air control, dynamic targeting, urban warfare, and comparable capabilities.99 Likewise, parts of an Army Security Force Assistance Brigade could do similar work on a rotational basis, on- or off-island.

To facilitate a comprehensive and integrated approach to defense planning and preparedness between the military, government agencies, and civilian organizations, Taiwan has also established the All-out Defense Mobilization Agency, which (as noted above) is a centralized body subordinate to the Ministry of National Defense that is tasked with coordinating efforts across various sectors, down to the local level, to enhance national defense readiness. That agency would be significantly more effective if raised to the national level with a broadened mandate as part of a comprehensive approach.

The Taiwanese leadership also should consider elevating their efforts to create a large-scale civil defense force, offering practical skills training which would appeal to Taiwanese willing to dedicate time and effort toward defense of their communities and localities. These skills could include emergency medical training, casualty evacuation, additive manufacturing, drone flying, and open-source intelligence. Private, nonprofit civil defense organizations such as Taiwan’s Kuma Academy hold widespread appeal to citizens seeking to enhance basic preparedness skills.100 With a curriculum that covers topics ranging from basic first aid to cognitive warfare, Kuma Academy’s popular classes typically sell out within minutes of going online. According to a recent survey of domestic Taiwan opinions sponsored by Spirit of America, “When facing external threats, 75.3% of the people agree that Taiwanese citizens have an obligation to defend Taiwan.”101 A well-trained civil defense force and other whole-of-society resilience measures provide an additional layer of defense and enhance social cohesion to better deny Beijing’s ultimate political objective of subjugating the will of the people.

Defense resilience recommendations for Taiwan

  • Raise defense spending to at least 3 percent of GDP.
  • Adopt Ukraine’s model of grass-roots innovation in defense.
  • Focus a large portion of its defense budget on low-cost, highly effective systems including unmanned vehicles and naval mines.
  • Incorporate greater training in emerging technologies and unconventional tactics for conscripts and reserves.
  • Invest in East Coast port infrastructure as counterblockade strongholds.
  • Elevate the All-out Defense Mobilization Agency to the national level and implement a larger civil defense force that fully integrates civilian agencies and local governments.

Conclusion

On April 3, 2024, Taiwan was struck by the strongest earthquake in twenty-five years. In the face of this magnitude 7.4 quake, Taiwan’s response highlights the effectiveness of robust investment in stricter building codes, earthquake alert systems, and resilience policies, resulting in minimal casualties and low infrastructure damage.102 Taiwan’s precarious position on the seismically vulnerable Ring of Fire, a belt of volcanoes around the Pacific Ocean, mirrors its vulnerability under constant threat of military and gray zone aggression from a mainland China seeking seismic changes in geopolitical power. Drawing from its success in preparing for and mitigating the impact of natural disasters, Taiwan can apply a similarly proactive approach in its defense preparedness. Safeguarding Taiwan’s sovereignty and security requires investments in a comprehensive security strategy for resilience across society—including cybersecurity for critical infrastructures, bolstering energy security, and enhanced defense resilience. Such an approach would provide Taiwan the greatest likelihood of deterring or, if necessary, defeating PRC aggression including through blockade or kinetic conflict. 

About the authors

Franklin D. Kramer is a distinguished fellow at the Atlantic Council and a member of its board. He is a former US assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs.

Philip Yu is a nonresident senior fellow in the Indo-Pacific Security Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, and a retired US Navy rear admiral. 

Joseph Webster is a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Global Energy Center, a nonresident senior fellow in the Indo-Pacific Security Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, and editor of the independent China-Russia Report.

Elizabeth “Beth” Sizeland is a nonresident senior fellow at the Scowcroft Strategy Initiative of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. Earlier, she served in the United Kingdom’s government including as deputy national security adviser and as adviser to the UK prime minister on intelligence, security, and resilience issues.

This analysis reflects the personal opinions of the authors.

Acknowledgments

The authors would like to thank the following individuals for their helpful comments and feedback: Amber Lin, Elsie Hung, Kwangyin Liu, and Alison O’Neil.

Related content

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2    In a quarantine of Taiwan, Beijing would interdict shipments but allow some supplies—potentially food and medicine—to pass through unimpeded. This measure would enable the PRC to assert greater sovereignty over Taiwan without formally committing to either a war or a blockade.
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68    For a more detailed discussion of Taiwan’s indigenous supply, see Joseph Webster, “Does Taiwan’s Massive Reliance on Energy Imports Put Its Security at Risk?,” New Atlanticist, Atlantic Council blog, July 7, 2023, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/does-taiwans-massive-reliance-on-energy-imports-put-its-security-at-risk/.
69    “The Current Situation and Future of [the] Country’s Energy Supply and Reserves (立法院),” Seventh Session of the Tenth Legislative Yuan, Sixth Plenary Meeting of the Economic Committee, accessed May 7, 2024, https://ppg.ly.gov.tw/ppg/SittingAttachment/download/2023030989/02291301002301567002.pdf.
70    Jeanny Kao and Yimou Lee, “Taiwan to Boost Energy Inventories amid China Threat,” ed. Gerry Doyle, Reuters, October 23, 2022, https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/taiwan-boost-energy-inventories-amid-china-threat-2022-10-24/.
71    Energy Administration, “Domestic Oil Reserves Monthly Data (國內石油安全存量月資料),” Ministry of Economic Affairs, accessed May 6, 2024, https://www.moeaea.gov.tw/ecw/populace/content/wfrmStatistics.aspx?type=4&menu_id=1302.
72    Energy Administration, Ministry of Economic Affairs.
73    Energy Administration, Ministry of Economic Affairs.
74    Energy Administration, Ministry of Economic Affairs.
75    Marek Jestrab, “A Maritime Blockade of Taiwan by the People’s Republic of China: A Strategy to Defeat Fear and Coercion,” Atlantic Council Strategy Paper, December 12, 2023, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/content-series/atlantic-council-strategy-paper-series/a-maritime-blockade-of-taiwan-by-the-peoples-republic-of-china-a-strategy-to-defeat-fear-and-coercion/.
76    Kathleen Magramo et al., “October 11, 2022 Russia-Ukraine News,” CNN, October 11, 2022, https://edition.cnn.com/europe/live-news/russia-ukraine-war-news-10-11-22/index.html.
77    Tom Balforth, “Major Russian Air Strikes Destroy Kyiv Power Plant, Damage Other Stations,” Reuters, November 2024, https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russian-missile-strike-targets-cities-across-ukraine-2024-04-11/#:~:text=KYIV%2C%20April%2011%20(Reuters),runs%20low%20on%20air%20defences.
78    Global Taiwan Institute, “Taiwan’s Electrical Grid and the Need for Greater System Resilience,” June 14, 2023, https://globaltaiwan.org/2023/06/taiwans-electrical-grid-and-the-need-for-greater-system-resilience/.
79    “3-04 Electricity Consumption (3-04 電力消費),” Taiwan Energy Statistics Monthly Report (能源統計月報), accessed May 6, 2024, https://www.esist.org.tw/newest/monthly?tab=%E9%9B%BB%E5%8A%9B.
80    Alperovitch, D. (2024, June 6). A Chinese economic blockade of Taiwan would fail or launch a war. War on the Rocks. https://warontherocks.com/2024/06/a-chinese-economic-blockade-of-taiwan-would-fail-or-launch-a-war/
81    “The Ministry of National Defense Issues a Press Release Explaining Reports That ‘Airborne Balloons by the CCP Had Continuously Flown over Taiwan,’ ” Taiwan Ministry of National Defense, January 6, 2024,  https://www.mnd.gov.tw/english/Publish.aspx?title=News%20Channel&SelectStyle=Defense%20News%20&p=82479.
83    “Taiwan Announces an Increased Defense Budget for 2024,” Global Taiwan Institute, September 20, 2023, https://globaltaiwan.org/2023/09/taiwan-announces-an-increased-defense-budget-for-2024/.
84    Yu Nakamura, “Taiwan Allots Record Defense Budget for 2024 to Meet China Threat,” Nikkei Asia, August 24, 2023, https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/Defense/Taiwan-allots-record-defense-budget-for-2024-to-meet-China-threat.
85    “NASAMS: National Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile System,” Raytheon, accessed May 12, 2024, https://www.rtx.com/raytheon/what-we-do/integrated-air-and-missile-defense/nasams.
86    Lopatin, “Bind Ukraine’s Military-Technology Revolution.”
87    Grace Jones, Janet Egan, and Eric Rosenbach, “Advancing in Adversity: Ukraine’s Battlefield Technologies and Lessons for the U.S.,” Policy Brief, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School, July 31, 2023, https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/advancing-adversity-ukraines-battlefield-technologies-and-lessons-us.
88    For more information, see, e.g., Peter Suciu, “Future of Taiwan’s Navy: Inside the Tuo Chiang-Class Missile Corvettes,” National Interest, March 27, 2024,  https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/future-taiwans-navy-inside-tuo-chiang-class-missile-corvettes-210269; and Xavier Vavasseur, “Taiwan Launches 1st Mine Laying Ship for ROC Navy,” Naval News, August 5, 2020, https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2020/08/taiwan-launches-1st-mine-laying-ship-for-roc-navy/.
89    Mykola Bielieskov, “Outgunned Ukraine Bets on Drones as Russian Invasion Enters Third Year,” Ukraine Alert, Atlantic Council blog, February 20, 2024, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/outgunned-ukraine-bets-on-drones-as-russian-invasion-enters-third-year/.
90    Yimou Lee, James Pomfret, and David Lague, “Inspired by Ukraine War, Taiwan Launches Drone Blitz to Counter China,” Reuters, July 21, 2023, https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/us-china-tech-taiwan/.
91    Franklin D. Kramer and Lt. Col. Matthew R. Crouch, Transformative Priorities for National Defense, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, Atlantic Council, 2021, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/Transformative-Priorities-Report-2021.pdf.
92    Peter Dickinson, “Ukraine’s Black Sea Success Exposes Folly of West’s ‘Don’t Escalate’ Mantra,” Ukraine Alert, Atlantic Council, January 22, 2024, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/ukraines-black-sea-success-provides-a-blueprint-for-victory-over-putin/.
93    Ministry of National Defense, ROC National Security Defense Report 2023, https://www.mnd.gov.tw/newupload/ndr/112/112ndreng.pdf.
94    Ministry of National Defense, ROC National Security Defense Report 2023.
95    “President Tsai Announces Military Force Realignment Plan,” Office of the President, December 27, 2022,  https://english.president.gov.tw/NEWS/6417.
96    “President Tsai Announces Military Force Realignment Plan.”
97    International Military Education and Training Cooperation with Taiwan, 22 U.S.C. § 3353 (2022), https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/22/3353.
98    Guy D. McCardl, “US Army Special Forces to Be Deployed on Taiwanese Island Six Miles from Mainland China,” SOFREP, March 8, 2024, https://sofrep.com/news/us-army-special-forces-to-be-deployed-on-taiwanese-island-six-miles-from-mainland-china/.
99    “Taiwan Defense Issues for Congress,” Congressional Research Service, CRS Report R48044, updated May 10, 2024, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R48044.
100    Jordyn Haime, “NGOs Try to Bridge Taiwan’s Civil Defense Gap,” China Project, August 4, 2023, https://thechinaproject.com/2023/08/04/ngos-try-to-bridge-taiwans-civil-defense-gap/.
101    Spirit of America, Taiwan Civic Engagement Survey, January 2024.
102    Amy Hawkins and Chi Hui Lin, “‘As Well Prepared as They Could Be’: How Taiwan Kept Death Toll Low in Massive Earthquake,” Observer, April 7, 2024, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/apr/07/as-well-prepared-as-they-could-be-how-taiwan-kept-death-toll-low-in-massive-earthquake.

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From greenfield projects to green supply chains: Critical minerals in Africa as an investment challenge https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/from-greenfield-projects-to-green-supply-chains-critical-minerals-in-africa-as-an-investment-challenge/ Mon, 01 Jul 2024 16:00:00 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=776494 This report provides a snapshot of Africa’s mineral wealth and mining industries, draws out the similarities between the mining and infrastructure investment attraction challenges, describes the competitive landscape African nations find themselves in, and makes innovative recommendations—namely to the US government—to rapidly accelerate investment in sustainable mining industries in African markets.

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Africa is central to the global energy transition. The necessary resources for a low-carbon economy are abundant in Africa, with the continent possessing 30 percent of the world’s known mineral reserves—many of which are critical for the manufacturing of batteries, solar panels, wind turbines, and other clean energy technologies. Africa’s untapped potential is greater yet, with research suggesting that the continent holds 85 percent of manganese reserves, 80 percent of platinum and chromium reserves, 47 percent of cobalt reserves, and 21 percent of graphite reserves, much of which is unexplored or underexplored. Demand for these resources is also on the rise, expected to more than double between now and 2030.

While Africa is rich in minerals and strategically located, it risks losing out on a historic investment opportunity. The infrastructure investment problems that have hindered non-Chinese capital flows into African markets for decades are front and center as investors and governments assess the strategic role the continent could and should play in the global shift to cleaner energy sources. While infrastructure investment has shown growth in recent decades, a significant financing gap persists, estimated to be around $100 billion each and every year.

To counterbalance China’s dominance in battery supply chains, the United States must leverage its strengths in technology, education, and capital markets. Initiatives such as Prosper Africa need to be dynamically scaled and optimized to provide meaningful support, ensuring that US investors can more easily and rapidly navigate the complex landscape of Washington.

With this urgency in mind, this report provides a snapshot of Africa’s mineral wealth and the state of mining industries, draws out the similarities between the mining and infrastructure investment attraction challenges, describes the competitive landscape African nations find themselves in, and makes innovative recommendations—namely to the US government—to rapidly accelerate investment in sustainable mining industries in African markets.

This report is the first in a series on the critical minerals sector in Africa, and is part of the Africa Center’s Critical Mineral Task Force.

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The Africa Center works to promote dynamic geopolitical partnerships with African states and to redirect US and European policy priorities toward strengthening security and bolstering economic growth and prosperity on the continent.

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Los Angeles and California: Environmental policy as a catalyst for cleantech ecosystems  https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/issue-brief/los-angeles-and-california-environmental-policy-as-a-catalyst-for-cleantech-ecosystems/ Fri, 28 Jun 2024 20:43:10 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=776548 California and Los Angeles have addressed climate change through innovative policymaking and technology, but face challenges which could undermine their success as leaders in tech and climate innovation.

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California and one of its most important tech-innovation ecosystems, Los Angeles, have combatted climate change and other environmental problems through innovation in both policymaking and technological invention and scaling. This paper first examines environmental and climate policymaking at the state level, actions that have been designed, in part, to spur tech-based innovation in California. Then it shifts its analytical focus to Los Angeles, one of the most important tech-innovation ecosystems in the state, especially when it comes to environmental technologies. Finally, this paper assesses the significant risks to California’s model and asks whether its tech ecosystems can transition to a fully decarbonized economy despite these risks. 

Although California’s story is mostly one of success, both the state of California and the city of Los Angeles face several significant challenges that could undermine their longstanding formulas. First, California’s economy is at some risk of losing its luster given its longstanding reputation as a high-cost state for workers and business. Second, California’s monumental plans to combat climate change—including the massive expansion of wind and solar infrastructure—are at odds with other elements of the state’s environmental legacy, such as habitat conservation. Third, climate change itself might derail decarbonization as extreme weather worsens, threatening communities, business, and the power grid. California’s continued success as a global technology and climate innovator depends on its ability to mitigate these risks.  

AUTHOR

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The Atlantic Council would like to thank Chevron for supporting our work on this project.

The author thanks Danielle Miller, Frank Willey, and Daniel Hel- meci for their research assistance.

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The Global Energy Center develops and promotes pragmatic and nonpartisan policy solutions designed to advance global energy security, enhance economic opportunity, and accelerate pathways to net-zero emissions.

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Accelerating the energy transition in the Eastern Caribbean https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/issue-brief/accelerating-the-energy-transition-in-the-eastern-caribbean/ Fri, 28 Jun 2024 16:00:00 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=771816 Countries in the Eastern Caribbean are among the world’s most energy insecure nations. These countries grapple with high electricity costs that undercut economic competitiveness and growth, are heavily dependent on petroleum products, and are uniquely vulnerable to the effects of climate change.

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Table of contents

Introduction

Countries in the Eastern Caribbean1 are among the world’s most energy insecure nations. These countries grapple with high electricity costs that undercut economic competitiveness and growth, are heavily dependent on petroleum products, and are uniquely vulnerable to the effects of climate change. At the same time, a World Bank designation as middle- or high-income economies significantly limits access to concessional financing. The result is a slow transition to renewable energy power generation, including attracting commercial interest for the relevant infrastructure and unbundling utility systems that often stymie regulatory changes and curtail needed investments in the energy sector.

The time may be ripe for accelerating the pace of the transition in the Eastern Caribbean. A broad consensus exists among regional governments, the business community, and multilateral partners to further usher in a transition to renewable energy, given the unique vulnerabilities facing Eastern Caribbean countries. Meanwhile, countries in the Southern Caribbean (Guyana, Trinidad and Tobago, and Suriname) are leaning into their hydrocarbon reserves as they balance their own energy transition, while other countries are either attracting commercial interest or are far along in their renewable energy development relative to the Eastern Caribbean. Though there is an abundance of solar and wind power potential in the Eastern Caribbean—along with significant geothermal reserves in Dominica, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, and Saint Kitts and Nevis—countries in this region are faced with defining how a realistic, affordable, and just energy transition can take place and unlocking new private sector and multilateral resources.

The Atlantic Council’s Caribbean Initiative engaged in a series of consultations with the Caribbean Energy Working Group (CEWG), whose members identified two main constraints to the region’s transition: the top-down vertically integrated nature of state-owned utility systems; and limited access to low-cost financing and credit to governments and clean energy developers. While recognizing that an energy transition requires a holistic approach, CEWG members propose that the starting points must be addressing utility constraints and access to finance to ensure a reliable and resilient energy system transformation that is sustainable and affordable for consumers, governments, and the private sector in the Eastern Caribbean. An energy transition in the Eastern Caribbean must ensure reliable power to combat price volatility for consumers while energy infrastructure should be resilient to the effects of climate change, hurricanes and strong tropical storms, and rising temperatures.

The CEWG brings together up to fifteen policy and technical experts from across the Caribbean, and was first convened in 2023 by the Atlantic Council. This publication builds off the CEWG’s first report, “A roadmap for the Caribbean’s energy transition,” which was published last year and outlined a five-step process that governments, developers, and regional partners can undertake to facilitate an energy transition in the Caribbean. The five-step process includes: conducting energy modeling and analysis; modernizing energy grids; diversifying utility structures; creating bankable projects; and scaling project investment to national and subregional levels. This publication focuses on applying steps three and four of the roadmap.

The CEWG met as part of two roundtable discussions, followed by five one-on-one consultation sessions across the group to identify barriers and solutions to accelerating a reliable and resilient energy transition in the Eastern Caribbean. This publication serves as a complement to existing initiatives and projects dedicated to facilitating an energy transition, with the aim of raising additional awareness of the reality and the urgency of the moment for the world’s most vulnerable countries.

Severe consequences for energy insecurity

Countries in the Eastern Caribbean are open facing, small market economies, vulnerable to ebbs and flows of the global financial system. The region’s import dependence means that supply chain constraints and rising global interest rates have a disproportionate effect on these economies. For example, when Russia’s war in Ukraine stemmed the flow of fertilizer to agriculture commodity exporters, food inflation in the Eastern Caribbean skyrocketed and remained high even as prices eventually declined in industrialized nations.2 And although the price of renewable energy, such as solar photovoltaic (PV) power, has declined dramatically over the past decade, capital and investment in this sector naturally gravitated to the bigger economies in the Global North.

Climate change wreaks havoc across Caribbean islands that do not have the available climate-resilient infrastructure to withstand strong wind speeds and heavy rainfall. September 19, 2022. REUTERS/Ricardo Rojas

Stronger storms, more outages
Climate change is a significant driver of the energy transition in the Eastern Caribbean. Hurricanes and strong tropical storms cause flash flooding and high wind speeds that damage energy infrastructure. Global warming, as a result of increasing greenhouse gas emissions (GHG), is fueling stronger and more frequent tropical storms. The result is lost power for days and weeks, as was the case in 2017 when Hurricane Irma hit Antigua and Bermuda, damaging transmission lines and generators. Similarity, in 2019, Hurricane Dorian caused widespread power outages in Dominica.3

The makeup of these economies has resulted in Eastern Caribbean countries paying some of the highest electricity prices in the Americas, including double and sometimes triple of what the average consumer pays in the United States ($0.109 per 1 kilowatt-hour (KW/h).4 On average, consumer costs in Antigua and Barbuda ($0.367 per 1 KW/h) and Saint Kitts and Nevis ($0.333 per 1 KW/h) rank on the higher end of the spectrum, with Saint Vincent and the Grenadines ($0.185 per 1 KW/h) on the lower end, and the rest of the countries falling in between. These high costs coincide with an import dependence on petroleum products, with Antigua and Barbuda (100 percent), Dominica (92 percent), Grenada (93 percent), Saint Lucia (98 percent), Saint Kitts and Nevis (87 percent), and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines (95 percent) all relying on fossil fuels to satisfy almost all of their energy demand.5 The cost of these imports account for almost 7 percent of the subregion’s gross domestic product, cutting into public expenditure needed to invest in climate adaptation projects and social sectors such as education and health services.6

High electricity prices and energy imports undercut the competitiveness of key economic sectors in the Eastern Caribbean—notably the hospitality sector—and limit the purchasing power of consumers. According to the Inter-American Development Bank, six of the countries prioritized in this publication rank in the global top ten of tourism-dependent economies.7 The tourism industry accounts for a significant share of energy demand in these countries, increasing the prices for hotel rooms due to high usage of air conditioning and lighting.8 Given that the tourism industry is an economic driver, high energy costs can make industries uncompetitive vis-à-vis other tourist hubs in the region such as Jamaica and the Dominican Republic. Beyond the tourism sector, more than a quarter of energy demand in the Eastern Caribbean is for residential use.9 High power bills can take up a large share of household income and decrease the purchasing power of individuals, leaving them unable to spend money on local products and services, like food and transportation, which help to stimulate economic growth.

Despite the challenges facing the Eastern Caribbean, bright spots exist. Renewable energy, such as solar, wind, and geothermal reserves, are abundant. Across the region, the sun shines more than 200 days annually,10 has an estimated potential of almost 70 gigawatts of available offshore wind (excluding Dominica), and (excluding Antigua and Barbuda) houses an estimated 6,290 megawatts (MW) of available geothermal reserves.11 But this potential has not been tapped. Current installed capacity of renewable energy (as a percentage) stands at: Antigua (4 percent), Dominica (25 percent including hydroelectric power), Grenada (4 percent), Saint Lucia (3 percent), Saint Kitts and Nevis (5 percent), and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines (17 percent including hydroelectric).

Geothermal development is a high priority in the Eastern Caribbean
Dominica has an estimated 1,390 MW of geothermal potential. The country’s small population and energy grid had not provided adequate incentive to develop that capacity, due to the high capital costs of exploring its geothermal reserves at scale- until recently. Commitment by the government in 2023 to develop its reserves and support this year from the World Bank have helped the country begin developing its geothermal potential. The World Bank is financing a new project at $38.5 million to support drilling of new geothermal wells and helping construct new transmission lines and substations to connect the future geothermal plants to consumers. Meanwhile, St. Kitts and Nevis is consistently looking for new partners to support its own geothermal ambitions for close to a decade, with a total project cost estimated at US $505 million. A mixture of bilateral and multilateral financing will be needed to bring this project closed to Dominica’s stage.12

Energy-transition barriers

The utility systems in the Eastern Caribbean are state-owned entities—excluding Saint Lucia, which has a public-private model—tasked with providing power to citizens. Tax revenues are used by governments to invest in critical and social services. These are top-down systems in vertically integrated structures, meaning that they single-handedly operate the generation, transmission, and distribution of power. This model can stifle innovation and competition, leaving customers without alternative choices and increasing the cost of electricity. Further, it means that introducing new clean energy technologies, when possible, must be financed and implemented by the utility, which is often devoid of the needed capital and technical assistance to act. Therefore, incorporating renewable energies into this model can be expensive—particularly since these technologies have high upfront costs. It is both a political and economic challenge that clean energy is not necessarily cheap energy.

However, unbundling utility systems is not a straightforward solution and not all state-owned entities are necessarily bad. Breaking these systems apart might divide consumer bases and may not lower the cost of electricity given the small size of Eastern Caribbean countries’ populations. Instead, as discussed below, the best-case scenario is to introduce innovation into the utility system, such as diversifying the utility structure across generation, distribution, and transmission by using public-private models. Maintaining an intact customer base is critical for utilities to keep the costs low for consumers while ensuring that utilities and the private-sector entities are still turning a profit. This does not mean that breaking up systems is the sole way to ensure low prices for renewable energy generation. Some markets, particularly in micro economies like in the Eastern Caribbean, might be too small to introduce competition and keep prices affordable. There is no one-size-fits-all solution, as changes in utility structures need to adapt to and be contextualized for each individual country.

Changing the business model of the utilities can help to create more incentives to incorporating renewable energy generation by factoring in the social cost externalities (the associated costs of fossil fuels on the broader public and society) of depending on fossil fuels as a realistic price comparison. Current models determine the price of electricity based on the cost of petroleum imports. But the emissions of fossil fuels—not just carbon dioxide but also other toxins that cause respiratory illnesses—increase cancer risks and, generally, overall poor health. The future healthcare costs for the consumer and the burden on governments to invest in adequate healthcare infrastructure are typically not added to the total cost of importing fossil fuels. If a full cost analysis and reformed business model are developed, then the price of importing fossil fuels might be higher than renewable power generation.

Utility-scale solar PV is a low-cost renewable energy option in the Eastern Caribbean, but it requires significant planning and project design work due to the unique landscapes of each country—all of which are costly. October 26, 2017. REUTERS/Alvin Baez

Commercial developers fund projects initially on their own before seeking to make projects bankable by obtaining loans that are backed by cash flow. Projects in the Eastern Caribbean take a long time to develop, given financing challenges due to unclear regulations and permitting, and a lack of investment-grade utility systems to guarantee payments under negotiated power purchasing agreements. Due to the long period of development, investors and governments look to derisk their projects by seeking full grants or convertible loan grants to help them clear these hurdles.

Commercial renewable energy projects also suffer from limited access to low cost and concessionary finance and capital. As discussed, state-owned utilities and governments are responsible for financing new renewable energy projects. These countries do not have the fiscal space or national budgets to self-finance these projects, leaving them to seek loans and grants from multilateral development banks (MDBs) and bilateral lenders. However, the World Bank classifies Eastern Caribbean countries as middle- and high-income economies, disqualifying them from accessing low-cost loans from the World Bank and those that also use this classification, such as the US Development Finance Corporation. This also applies to the business community and energy developers who need access to financing during the pre-project phase (prefeasibility studies, production of design drawings, and environmental social and impact assessments, among others).

Applying the CEWG roadmap

Addressing utility constraints and unlocking new access to finance and capital both are needed, but a well thought-out process that takes the context and nuances of each country into account is needed. To the international community, these countries are bound by their similarities (e.g., population and market size, and geographic location). Realistically, there are enough differences between them that suggest that no solution to the region’s energy transition challenges can be a one-size-fits-all approach. Each country’s context will determine how the below solutions are applied, from unbundling utility structures to attracting finance and capital based on renewable energy. While each country needs a transition that is contextualized to its own reality, technical assistance and transmission upgrades are at the core of the energy transition. Policy action and financial resources are both required, and Caribbean governments and regional institutions will need the assistance of partners like the US Trade and Development Agency and the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) to deploy the assistance throughout the transition process.

Based on the small consumer bases and state-owned nature of utility systems in the Eastern Caribbean, unbundling utilities might not actually lower electricity costs. Instead, the structure of the utility might be reformed to a public-private partnership (PPP) model that also accounts for price comparisons between fossil fuel imports with social cost externalities attached to a transition to renewable energies. In essence, PPPs are a collaborative model that leverages the strengths of both the public and private sectors, which can help accelerate the deployment of renewable energy infrastructure while ensuring cost-effectiveness and financing sustainability. For example, needed transmission upgrades can be undertaken by governments to help absorb costs and prevent them from being passed to consumers. And the private sector can take responsibility for generation projects, driving down costs and improving competitiveness. Governments and utilities are still able to benefit from the revenue to use for public-sector investments while private-sector entities can streamline innovation in the energy sector, helping to attract more commercial interest.

Renewable energy projects, like offshore wind, have high upfront costs and require significant technical assistance to design, build, and implement. September 4, 2023. REUTERS/Tom Little

Designing PPP models will be complex. Each country and its utility or utilities are unique. The challenge will be designing the appropriate model. Here, entities such as the IDB should work with the Caribbean Development Bank (CDB), and use input from private-sector companies in the region, to design a PPP model for utility structures. The IDB houses the experience and expertise in designing PPP models, and through its new One Caribbean program is already building a project preparation facility that can incorporate PPP designs into its model.13 The challenge is that Eastern Caribbean countries are not members of the IDB, though they are borrowing member countries of the CDB. In the past, the CDB and the IDB have worked together to streamline assistance to and analysis for the Eastern Caribbean. The same can be done here, with the added benefit of the CDB already understanding the nuances of each of the countries in the subregion.

However, designing and implementing a PPP model requires political will and government support. Governments might not be anxious to adopt renewables if the cost of the electricity does not lower prices—affecting key political constituents—and if accelerating an energy transition comes with increased public debt through high-interest loans. Simply put, a transition is only possible if governments are given assurances and feel comfortable that incorporating renewables will not affect their standing with their constituents, meaning that entities like the IDB, CDB, and partners, such as the United States, will have to secure government support before an energy transition can take place.

As utility systems are able to reform their models to ensure that renewable energy projects are affordable for governments and consumers, support to countries and investors is needed to finance projects through the project pipeline. As discussed in the CEWG’s first report, the projects in the Caribbean tend to fall in the “valley of death,” due to project delays ranging from limited site access to an inability to secure additional financing. Key to moving projects through the pipeline is to derisk them and ensure their bankability. Two steps are needed. First, Caribbean countries need access to the expertise and capacity to conduct feasibility studies, environmental social and impact assessments, and design power purchase agreements, among other things. Second, Eastern Caribbean countries need access to investment vehicles that prioritize grants or low-cost loans for the upfront costs of renewable energy projects. Entities like IDB Invest have pockets of financing that allows the institution to inject equity into projects, but the pool of funds is small relative to what is available for other countries or subregions in Latin America.

This is where regional partners like the United States and existing regional programs like the CARICOM Development Fund (CDF) and the Bridgetown Initiative14 should be utilized. The United States government, through the International Development Finance Corporation (DFC), should take advantage of the current DFC reauthorization process to create a carve out for clean energy projects in the region. The scale of investment is minimal compared to other DFC-financed projects and would have outsized effects in the small markets and grids in the Eastern Caribbean. This would take an act of the US Congress—particularly for a middle-income country exception—but there is precedent and increasing appetite to prioritize energy security in the Caribbean. Further, the United States should encourage the IDB and the CDB to work with the CDF and the Bridgetown Initiative to create a project pipeline (with attached equity investments available) to attract large-scale financing and grants from global donors. Capital and finance around the world are available if regional partners and entities are able to build mechanisms that streamline funding to energy projects in the Eastern Caribbean and build a project pipeline to attract commercial investors.

A global call to action

An energy transition in the Eastern Caribbean requires political will, regional coordination, and consistent technical assistance. Relative to the cost of the global energy transition, the needed capital in the Eastern Caribbean is minimal. But the tides are changing in the region, as more political actors and financial institutions are thinking creatively of how to accelerate an energy transition. Still, human capital and capacity limitations stifle the region’s ability to undertake this process alone. Partner governments like the United States and Canada have committed to the region’s energy security in the past few years, but these two countries do not have the funding or domestic political will to direct their attention consistently to the Eastern Caribbean. Addressing the climate crisis and facilitating a global energy transition is increasing in urgency each day, meaning that more actors across governments, international bodies, the business community, and foundations are unlocking new forms of support. Tapping into these resources will be critical. Regional governments and their partners need to continue raising the profile of the Eastern Caribbean and using regional and global platforms, from the Group of Twenty to the UN General Assembly to the COP29 climate talks in November to ensure that these countries are not left behind.

Acknowledgments

The Atlantic Council thanks board member Melanie Chen for her financial support of this publication and the corresponding working group. A thank you also goes to the CEWG members who joined the numerous one-on-one consultations and roundtables that informed this publication, including co-chairs David Goldwyn and Eugene Tiah. A special thank you goes to Jason Marczak, vice president and senior director of the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center, which houses the Caribbean Initiative, for his guidance and comments throughout the working group and during the drafting of this publication. Maite Gonzalez Latorre managed the production flow of this publication.

About the author

Wazim Mowla is the associate director and fellow of the Caribbean Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center. He leads the development and execution of the initiative’s programming, including the Financial Inclusion Task Force, the US-Caribbean Partnership to Address the Climate Crisis (PACC) 2030 Working Group, and the Caribbean Energy Working Group. Since joining the Council, Mowla has co-authored major publications on the strategic importance of sending US COVID-19 vaccines to the Caribbean, strategies to address financial derisking, and how the United States can advance new policies to support climate and energy resilience.

About the Caribbean Energy Working Group Co-chairs

David Goldwyn is president of Goldwyn Global Strategies, LLC (GGS), an international energy advisory consultancy, and chairman of the Atlantic Council Global Energy Center’s Energy Advisory Group. He is a globally recognized thought leader, educator, and policy innovator in energy security and extractive-industry transparency.

Eugene Tiah is a senior business executive with in-depth knowledge and more than forty years of experience in the oil and gas business within the United States and the Caribbean region. He is also the president and CEO of the Caribbean Energy Chamber.

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The Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center broadens understanding of regional transformations and delivers constructive, results-oriented solutions to inform how the public and private sectors can advance hemispheric prosperity.

1    Eastern Caribbean refers to Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica, Grenada, Saint Lucia, Saint Kitts and Nevis, and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines.
2    Diego Arias, Melissa Brown, and Eva Hasiner, “The Worrying Phenomenon of Food Insecurity in the Caribbean,” World Bank, January 3, 2024, https://blogs.worldbank.org/en/latinamerica/food-insecurity-caribbean.
3    Source: “Several Communities without Electricity Due to Passage of TS Dorian,” Dominica News Online, August 27, 2019, https://dominicanewsonline.com/news/homepage/news/several-communities-without-electricity-due-to-passage-of-ts-dorian/.
4    “The Price of Electricity per KWh in 230 Countries,” Cable.co.uk, accessed May 1, 2024, https://www.cable.co.uk/energy/worldwide-pricing/.
6    Anastasia Moloney, “Pandemic Derails Caribbean Islands’ Bid for Greener, Cheaper Energy,” Reuters, May 11, 2021, https://www.reuters.com/article/caribbean-energy-coronavirus/pandemic-derails-caribbean-islands-bid-for-greener-cheaper-energy-idUSL8N2MY64F/.
7    David Rosenblatt and Henry Mooney, “Caribbean Region Quarterly Bulletin: The Pandemic Saga Continues,” Inter-American Development Bank, accessed May 1, 2024, https://flagships.iadb.org/en/caribbean-region-quarterly-bulletin-2020-q2/the-pandemic-saga-continues.
8    Pepukaye Bardouille, “A Roadmap for Scaling Up Renewable Energy in Island Nations: Three Success Factors for the Eastern Caribbean’s Transition from Fossil Fuels,” NextBillion, June 22, 2022,  https://nextbillion.net/roadmap-scaling-up-renewable-energy-island-nations-eastern-caribbean-transition-from-fossil-fuels/.
9    Goldwyn, Tiah, and Mowla, “A Roadmap.”
10    Martin Vogt, “The Caribbean’s Untapped Renewable Energy Potential,” Renewable Energy World, February 6, 2019, https://www.renewableenergyworld.com/storage/the-caribbeans-untapped-renewable-energy-potential/#gref.
11    Goldwyn, Tiah, and Mowla, “A Roadmap.”
12    Source: “Dominica Commits to Transformative Geothermal Project Funding,”Carib Daily News, September 8, 2023, https://caribdaily.news/article/968edae7-da4d-4864-b2a6-e4d114b1766d; “The World Bank Supports Clean Energy Generation in Dominica,” Press Release, World Bank, January 26, 2024, https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2024/01/26/world-bank-supports-clean-energy-generation-dominica; and Eulana Weekes, “SKN Holds Further Geothermal Discussions with Saudi Fund for Development,” Caribbean Electric Utility Services Corporation, February 20, 2024, https://carilec.org/skn-holds-further-geothermal-discussions-with-saudi-fund-for-development/.
13    “IDB Group Launches One Caribbean Regional Program,” Loop News, March 11, 2024, https://caribbean.loopnews.com/content/idb-group-launches-one-caribbean-regional-program-4.
14    N.K Ezeobele, “Bridgetown Initiative: Rethinking Sustainable Economic Growth for the Developing World,” Business Council for Sustainable Energy, July 14, 2023, https://bcse.org/bridgetown-initiative-rethinking-sustainable-economic-growth-developing-world/#:~:text=The%20Bridgetown%20Initiative%20signifies%20a,climate%20action%20and%20infrastructure%20gaps.

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Electrification of the road transport sector in Europe and the case of Italy https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/electrification-of-the-road-transport-sector-in-europe-and-the-case-of-italy/ Thu, 27 Jun 2024 20:00:00 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=775013 A report exploring the the European Union and Italy's ongoing progress in electrifying the transport sector in pursuit of broader decarbonization goals.

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Executive summary

The European Union (EU) has increasingly raised its climate ambition, especially since the launch of the European Green Deal in 2019, which set a target of climate neutrality by 2050. The bloc’s achievement demands a contribution from all sectors: power, industry, buildings, and transport. The latter is sizable, accounting for almost a quarter of the total emissions of the twenty-seven EU members (EU-27) in 2021—with road transport responsible for more than 75 percent of the transport sector’s total emissions given its reliance on fossil fuels. Additional policies and measures are required since the sector’s emissions have substantially increased since 1990, unlike the other sectors.

While EVs are gaining relevance and are set to become an increasingly important factor in decarbonization, policymakers will need to address critical issues, especially relating to enabling infrastructure (i.e., charging stations) to have a sustainable and smooth transition. Italy, one of the largest car markets in Europe, has much to do to decarbonize road transport. It has developed alternative fuels, but electricity still accounts for less than 0.3 percent of vehicle fuels. It has set ambitious EV targets to achieve by 2030: 6.6 million cars including 4.3 million BEVs.

This article explores Europe’s rising ambition in electrifying this sector and the political and market drivers at work; presents the case of Italy, including its national objectives, trends, and challenges in the transition; and provides a summary of takeaways and policy recommendations to further support the electrification of the road transport sector, especially in Italy.

About the author

Pier Paolo Raimondi is a researcher in the Energy, Climate and Resources Program at the Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI) in Rome. His main research topics are related to energy markets, energy policy, energy geopolitics, and geoeconomics. He also is a PhD student in institutions and politics at the Catholic University of Milan. He holds a master of international relations and a bachelor degree in political science from the University of Milan.

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The Atlantic Council in Turkey, which is in charge of the Turkey program, aims to promote and strengthen transatlantic engagement with the region by providing a high-level forum and pursuing programming to address the most important issues on energy, economics, security, and defense.

The Europe Center promotes leadership, strategies, and analysis to ensure a strong, ambitious, and forward-looking transatlantic relationship.

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Green Deal fatigue? How the European Parliament elections could affect EU climate policies. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/how-the-european-parliament-elections-could-affect-eu-climate-policies/ Wed, 26 Jun 2024 18:50:03 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=775984 Ursula von der Leyen became European Commission president in 2019 promising a strong focus on climate action. Will that carry over into a second term?

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The European Union (EU) likes to present itself as a decarbonization pioneer. Its ambition to make Europe the first climate neutral continent by 2050 has been translated into bold measures that challenge the economic and social status quo. The European Green Deal, as the cornerstone climate project of the past European Commission approved in January 2020, set in motion key energy and environmental legislations and established strategies for different sectors.

But now, climate-skeptic voices and opposition to climate efforts are gaining political weight, as shown by recent trends in the European Parliament election results earlier this month. While Europeans still see climate change as a major challenge, discontent with financial developments and concerns about defense and security rank even higher in their priorities, according to the latest Eurobarometer polling.

With the changing composition of the European Parliament, some of the biggest implications will concern climate policy. A weakened EU climate agenda could result in the continent falling short of decarbonization targets. It could also influence partners abroad to mirror more lax climate policies. In the face of these shifts, Europe’s policymakers need a resilient environmental policy profile that endures political shifts and builds trust in the longevity of EU climate action among voters and international partners. 

The legacy of a climate consensus

In the 2019 European Parliament elections, climate change was a decisive topic for voters. Following the vote, the then nominee for European Commission president, Ursula von der Leyen, promptly pledged a strong focus on climate action as part of her eventually successful bid to secure the approval by the European Parliament. The Commission turned her pledge into action with the European Green Deal, which comprised numerous ambitious decarbonization policies. Von der Leyen called it Europe’s “man on the moon” moment.

To align EU legislation with the intermediate goal of reducing net greenhouse gas emissions by at least 55 percent by 2030, the Fit for 55 package expanded the EU emissions trading system, introduced the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism for carbon-intensive imports, and set new standards for the land use, transportation, and energy sectors, among other policies. Furthermore, at least 30 percent of the European recovery package funding was allocated for climate action.

Despite the initial progress, the wind in the sails of the EU’s green agenda now appears diminished. A sluggish economic recovery, stubbornly persistent inflation, and rising energy costs—in part, a downstream effect of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022—have resulted in the green agenda as a target for farmers’ protests and rallies.

Interest group pressure and conservative opposition to climate action have hampered green policies at the national level, too. A watered down German climate change law, climate-skepticism among Italian political leadership, and French President Emmanuel Macron calling in May of last year for a “pause” of EU environmental regulations exemplify the simultaneous nature of developments on the member state and the EU level.

Green parties lost in this year’s European Parliament elections, greatly diminishing their political weight in the body. Some commentators have already written the obituary of the bloc’s green agenda, arguing that “Europe’s green moment is over.” 

What’s next for the Green Deal?

The center-right European People’s Party (EPP), von der Leyen’s party group and the largest in the European Parliament, reaffirmed Europe’s leading role in global climate action in its 2024 party platform. At the same time, it advocates for technological neutral approaches and distances itself from the Greens and Socialists, whose position the EPP calls “ideological” in their manifesto. The rejection of a contentious bill on pesticide use in 2023 demonstrates the group’s ambiguous stance on environmental legislation as it restrained von der Leyen’s Green Deal objectives to foster sustainability in the agricultural sector. Newly and reelected EPP members are “completely divided on where to go with the Green Deal,” according to Greens/EFA co-president Terry Reintke, emphasizing the limbo in which the project currently hangs.

In the incoming European Parliament, support for the Green Deal will continue to come from the center-left Socialists and Democrats (S&D) group, which highlights the social aspects of a just climate transition, and the liberal Renew Europe group, which emphasizes the need for pragmatic implementation. While the Greens proposed an even more ambitious Green and Social Deal as a major investment plan, other left groups are more critical of the bloc’s approach to decarbonization.

Further to the right, the green backlash has become a rallying cry for conservative and far-right political groups, such as the European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) and the populist Identity and Democracy (ID), which oppose the Green Deal, advocate for local climate strategies, and call decarbonization targets unrealistic. A more prominent role of the ECR and ID in the European Parliament, following their gains in the European elections could slow down the already insufficient emissions reduction and impede the effective implementation of Green Deal policies.

However, it’s too soon to declare the death of the green agenda. It will, instead, likely be deprioritized, contending with competing policy interests. While the overlapping crises of climate change, pandemic recovery, the war in Ukraine, and the resulting inflationary trends have drawn away the electorate’s focus on climate issues, environmental concerns remained salient for voters. It is unlikely that the European Green Deal will be abandoned, especially if von der Leyen stays on as European Commission president.

The new distribution of the parliamentary seats opens possibilities for a more conservative majority but also for coalitions with center-left parties. While the three main centrist groups have reportedly reached an agreement on top European Union posts with von der Leyen as Commission president, it is not a given that she will gather enough votes in parliament. Given the new distribution of parliament seats, Green parties might therefore be the key to securing von der Leyen a second term and thus exert influence on climate protection to remain prioritized.

Regardless, even a weakened climate agenda would be a mistake. Both for political and strategic reasons, European policymakers cannot abandon the green transition. Other priorities may, rightly, deserve attention, but the climate crisis must not be ignored. Europe is, after all, the fastest-warming continent, according a recent report by the United Nations and EU. Temperatures there are rising at around twice the global average.

To ensure the viability and centrality of the Green Deal in the new European parliament, officials will need to link policy issues and make the case that the green transition can help the competitiveness agenda. A focus on implementation rather than new legislation is likely. In this consideration, a nonpartisan commitment to technologically sound and ecologically just climate action is necessary to accommodate voters’ demands and bridge party gaps. This will require political leadership, especially from von der Leyen and her EPP party group, which has yet to find a common line regarding the future of the European Green Deal.


Moritz Ludwig is a young global professional with the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center.

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The EU’s new tariffs are just the start of the EV trade saga with China https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/the-eus-new-tariffs-are-just-the-start-of-the-ev-trade-saga-with-china/ Wed, 26 Jun 2024 15:26:42 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=775065 New tariffs on Chinese-made electric vehicles signal greater alignment between Washington and Brussels on Beijing. But differences could widen over time.

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In May, the Biden administration took a big step forward in its trade saga with China by imposing large tariff increases on, among other goods, Chinese-made electric vehicles (EVs). Now Europe has joined the fray. Earlier this month, the European Commission announced that tariffs on some Chinese-made EVs from certain Chinese companies would rise up to 38.1 percent in the European Union (EU).

These new tariffs on both sides of the Atlantic signal greater alignment between Washington and Brussels on China. That is good news for the transatlantic partnership. But the technical differences in the latest salvos by the United States and Europe point to important differences in where Washington and Brussels are starting from and where they each might move next.

The Biden administration’s tariffs, announced on May 14, cover a wide range of strategic industries deemed critical to national security. These industries include steel, aluminum, microchips, EVs, and batteries. The most eye-grabbing figure was US tariffs on Chinese EVs quadrupling to 100 percent. The news from Brussels on June 12 delivered a similar but smaller effort, and one based less on a national-security framing. Moreover, Europe’s new tariffs are part of an ongoing investigation into Chinese practices, and therefore they are provisional.

Chinese-made EVs account for around 25 percent of the European market, with Beijing exporting 430,000 such vehicles to the continent in 2023.

The European Commission began its probe into Beijing’s massive subsidies of key sectors in October 2023. It has focused on the threat of cheap Chinese imports flooding the European market, driving down prices, and hurting Europe’s automotive sector. The investigation reflects a calculated approach, aligning with the EU’s new de-risking approach, but still, as is typical for the bloc, centering on adherence to World Trade Organization-complying trade defense regulations. 

Unlike Washington’s tariffs, which apply to the entire sector, the new European tariffs target specific Chinese companies. They do not, in the words of German Vice Chancellor Robert Habeck, amount to “punitive tariffs.” Europe’s tariffs on battery EVs will cover a wide umbrella of companies, including Western brands with production facilities and joint ventures in China. This leaves open the option for carmakers to relocate their production to Europe, thereby avoiding the tariffs.  

Much of the difference between Washington and Brussels is due to the different immediate market threats posed by Chinese EVs. The United States imported fewer than three thousand EVs from China last year, and the tariffs are in part intended to prevent Chinese market share from growing. In Europe, in contrast, China is already a major player. Chinese-made EVs account for around 25 percent of the European market, with Beijing exporting 430,000 such vehicles to the continent in 2023, a number that has quadrupled in the past five years. The EU decision therefore must be seen as an attempt to strike a balance between protecting Europe’s internal automobile industry and avoiding escalation into a trade war with Beijing.

Another factor is European unity—or lack thereof. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen has underscored that Europe “will not waver from making tough decisions needed to protect its economy and its security” and she has not shied away from directly confronting China’s leadership on Chinese overcapacity “flooding the European market.” But von der Leyen is well out in front of many of her European counterparts with her economic security agenda. Export-oriented members, such as Germany, Sweden, and Greece, have expressed reservations toward the increased tariffs, and the Commission’s announcement came only after an eleventh-hour push by Germany to lower the tariffs.

This hesitance from certain member states is spurred on by Beijing, which has fought the investigation since its inception and sought to sow division within the bloc. Even though Europe’s countervailing duties are likely insufficient to offset the advantage China holds in production, Beijing has warned that the EU’s moves could lead to a trade war. On June 17, Beijing opened a dumping probe into imports of pork from the EU in response to Brussels’ tariff announcement.

Prior to the news of the EV tariffs, China also threatened retaliatory tariffs targeting German carmakers, French luxury products, and the European aviation and agricultural sectors, highlighting the breadth of China’s appetite to hit back at sectors that will hurt specific EU countries.

Another difference between the US and EU tariffs is the finality of these announcements. The Biden administration can move relatively quickly and decisively, but the European Commission’s tariff announcement is provisional. The investigation is still ongoing, and final tariffs will come four months after the provisional tariffs’ imposition on July 4. The EU’s tariffs could realistically be lowered during this time if China continues to push back and if EU member states get skittish. The EU and China have already begun consultations on the tariffs, which may bring about some revisions to the EU’s actions.

Finally, there is the issue of leadership. The United States will hold an election in November, but Washington is generally united on its approach toward China. As the Biden administration’s extension of many of the Trump administration’s policies toward Beijing signal, tariffs and a hardline approach on China will likely feature in any next US administration. There is far less certainty of consistent support in Europe, however.

Over the summer, the European Commission leadership will turn over. If von der Leyen were to win a second term leading the next Commission, it would solidify the EU’s increasingly tough trade policy approach toward China, signaling continuity and alignment with Washington. But nothing is guaranteed. Von der Leyen has yet to be nominated by the EU’s member states or confirmed by the European Parliament. She will certainly defend her Commission’s decisions on China, but she may be forced to make concessions on future action to secure her post. This trade saga is far from over.


Jacopo Pastorelli is a program assistant with the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center.

James Batchik is an associate director at the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center.

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Climate change was a hidden force in India’s elections. Now Modi needs to deliver solutions. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/climate-change-india-elections-solutions/ Wed, 26 Jun 2024 13:46:56 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=775693 The coalition government must adopt long-term climate solutions that connect to the livelihoods of India’s youth and agricultural sector.

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Now that India’s April elections are over, with Narendra Modi winning a third term as prime minister but his Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) losing its sole majority in parliament, the inevitable unpacking of the results has begun. Some media outlets have concluded that climate change hardly figured into the elections, based on exit poll responses and the light usage of the term “climate change” in the manifestos of the BJP and Congress party.

But that assessment seems to be more of an issue of semantics than an accurate reflection of voter sentiment. Widespread discontent among Indian farmers and agricultural laborers (sectors that represent 43 percent of the country’s total workforce), persistent inflation, and a lack of jobs for India’s youth, have all been cited as reasons for the BJP’s slide. All of these problems, at least in part, are caused by climate change, whether post-election coverage acknowledges this or not. To maintain popular support, the coalition government will need to adopt long-term climate solutions that connect directly to the livelihoods and economic needs of India’s youth and agricultural sector.

Climate change is the hidden hand behind many of these worrying economic trends.

Farmers have been struggling with the impacts of extreme weather events on their crops for years (not to mention their anger over Modi’s attempts to disincentivize crop residue burning). The corresponding rise in agricultural product prices has stoked inflation. Additionally, disruptions in supply chains caused by flooding, cyclones, and droughts exacerbated already high costs for consumer products. Certainly, extreme heat impacted worker productivity in the agricultural and construction sectors, contributing to lackluster hiring of young workers, who often fill these jobs. Climate change is the hidden hand behind many of these worrying economic trends.

Notably, the BJP did take some significant actions on climate change prior to the elections: Modi made pledges that India would achieve energy independence by 2047, have five hundred gigawatts of renewable energy by 2030, and become central to the manufacture of green technologies. While these are laudable goals, it seems that they were not ambitious enough, or targeted for dates too far into the future, to quell voters’ concerns. Going forward, Modi and his coalition government will need to do more to connect climate change initiatives with kitchen table issues.

An example of a winning climate change solution already exists in Punjab. India’s largest bio-compressed natural gas (CNG) facility became operational in Lehragaga, Punjab, in 2022, with support from the BJP’s Sustainable Alternative Towards Affordable Transportation program, even though Punjab is not a BJP-controlled state. This facility converts paddy stubble (the leftover plant debris after a rice harvest) into bio-CNG, which significantly reduces the need for stubble burning, a major cause of air pollution throughout India. The stubble is collected directly by the facility, alleviating the cost and time that normally burdens farmers, thereby making the harvesting process more profitable. The byproduct of the facility’s process is biomanure, which can be used to enrich soil, further benefitting farmers. Ultimately, the plant produces cost-effective renewable CNG, which can be used for cooking, automotive fuel, and other applications. Duplicating this kind of facility throughout the agricultural regions of India could win over disgruntled farmers, provide new renewable energy jobs for young people, address the harms caused by climate change, and strengthen India’s energy security. The BJP’s Waste to Energy Programme under the Ministry of New and Renewable Energy could be expanded and more aggressively mobilized to facilitate this.

Likewise, the use of vetiver grasses to mitigate the impacts of flooding, which has markedly increased due to climate change, has a long history in India. Unfortunately, a byproduct of the industrialization of agriculture in the name of enhanced productivity has caused traditional, yet effective, practices like the use of vetiver grasses to be left behind. These hardy grasses, when planted along rivers and other sources of floodwaters, strengthen embankments and can largely prevent the soil erosion responsible for catastrophic landslides. These grasses also absorb carbon from the atmosphere and help recharge local groundwater. A new coalition government program that encourages vetiver use would help farmers avoid crop damage from flooding, while also reducing the cost of irrigating fields. The program could create vetiver planting jobs (suitable for youth and agricultural workers) and dovetail with national goals for planting more carbon-sequestering vegetation. This is a climate change solution with a direct connection to the issues that voters care about. Notably, vetiver can also be harvested for use in cosmetics, perfumes, and other personal care products. It can also be used as a feedstock for producing cellulosic ethanol, a renewable fuel. Producing these products domestically using vetiver would also give a boost to Modi’s “Make in India” initiative.

While Modi’s emphasis on building infrastructure for transportation, power, and sanitation has proven popular with the Indian public, more can be done to improve the country’s water management. Rainwater and floodwater retention systems have a long history in India, with the famous Rani Ki Vav stepwell and rainwater retention system (located in Modi’s native state of Gujarat) even being featured on the one-hundred-rupee note. A government coalition program that emphasizes such kinds of water catchment systems would help recharge local groundwater and reduce the impacts of flooding, creating value for the agricultural sector while also allowing Modi to lean into traditional practices that provide a source of national pride. 

There are many climate change programs that connect with kitchen table issues and resonate especially well with farmers and youth; Modi has an opportunity to strengthen support for the BJP by redirecting some of his energies to these programs. His prior use of short-term subsidies on grain and cooking gas temporarily obscured underlying problems without fixing them (which likely had the effect of inhibiting the development of long-term climate solutions). Similarly, export restrictions on rice and other agricultural commodities dampened market demand and farmers’ incomes in the name of marginally helping the common person. Instead of these approaches, Modi and his coalition government would be well served by promoting long-term, job-creating solutions, such as those involving bio-CNG, vetiver grasses, and water retention and detention.

Whether acknowledged or not, climate change influences the Indian electorate and underlies the discontent felt by many voters. Importantly, making progress on climate change in ways that are highly visible to the common person will help galvanize support from India’s youth, who currently have pessimistic views of humanity’s prospects of enduring climate change. They also happen to be the key to winning future elections.


Shék Jain is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s South Asia Center and chairman of the Pura Terra Foundation.

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Bangladesh’s air quality is among the world’s worst. What can be done? https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/energysource/bangladeshs-air-quality-is-among-the-worlds-worst-what-can-be-done/ Tue, 25 Jun 2024 22:53:39 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=775614 Bangladesh's severe air pollution takes an enormous toll on its people, economy, and environment. While anti-pollution measures can be costly, adopting cleaner fuels, introducing new regulations, and strengthening regional energy integration may benefit the country in the long run.

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Bangladesh is grappling with a severe air quality crisis. Recent reports highlight pollution’s impact on the nation’s health, economy, and environment. Bangladesh urgently needs to balance growth, sustainability, and energy access to enhance the well-being of its population. But the country faces profound challenges in moving toward a safer and more equitable energy system.

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Bangladesh’s air quality crisis

The air quality index (AQI) measures air pollution through levels of PM2.5, fine particulate matter small enough to penetrate the lungs and enter the bloodstream. This past decade, PM2.5 concentration in Bangladesh’s capital, Dhaka, came in at a yearly average of 77.1 micrograms per cubic meter (μg/m³), more than eight times higher than the US Environmental Protection Agency’s health-based PM2.5 standard of 9.0 μg/m³ per year.

Bangladesh’s alarming AQI has many causes, including vehicle emissions, industrial discharges, and the widespread use of kilns to make bricks. These are all exacerbated by the absence of stringent environmental regulations and enforcement.

This extreme level of air pollution exacts a severe human toll. Particulate pollution has reduced the average life expectancy in Bangladesh by 6.9 years. By contrast, the next-biggest health hazard in the country—tobacco use—reduces life expectancy by 1.6 years, while child and maternal malnutrition in Bangladesh are responsible for a 1.4-year decrease. Pollution in Bangladesh not only has a dire immediate health impact; it poses negative long-term consequences on the well-being and productivity of its population​​.

Rising incomes, rising emissions

Bangladesh’s level of carbon emissions are also rising, tied to increasing levels of development fueled by hydrocarbons. Between 2010 and 2022, Bangladesh’s annual per capita income rose by three-and-a-half times to reach nearly $2,700 in real terms. Over the same period, Bangladesh’s consumption of oil and coal rose by factors of three and six, respectively. Natural gas consumption also rose by 52 percent.

While greater economic growth has improved living standards in Bangladesh, air quality has worsened. A World Bank study found that average annual PM2.5 concentration levels in Dhaka rose from 84 μg/m³ in 2013 to 106 μg/m³ in 2021.

Bangladesh’s growing use of fossil fuels has not only worsened air pollution, it has also contributed to climate impacts, which will increasingly produce negative economic effects. The United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change says Bangladesh could lose 2 to 9 percent of its GDP from more frequent natural disasters like tropical cyclones and severe flooding.

It’s important to note, however, that Bangladesh’s use of coal pales in comparison to other regional actors. According to data from the Energy Institute, China’s consumption of commercial solid coal fuels exceeded Bangladesh’s by more than 325 times in 2023. So, while the world should seek to mitigate Bangladesh’s coal consumption, the country only contributes about 0.4 percent of all world emissions, even as China accounted for about 27 percent of greenhouse gas emissions in 2021, according to Climate Watch.

Nevertheless, if Bangladesh’s use and import of coal remains on its current trajectory, 2024 is poised to break national emissions records—and, more significantly—degrade its air quality and economic goals. Importantly, Bangladesh’s coal use could harm its export abilities as the European Union and other jurisdictions impose carbon border adjustments.

Bangladesh’s difficult transition to clean energy

Bangladesh’s poor air quality is disproportionately large compared to its overall carbon footprint. The country contributes less than 1 percent of global carbon emissions, yet its cities have some of the worst AQI scores in the world. Fifty-nine percent of the country’s energy derives from natural gas, 31 percent from oil, and 10 percent from coal. Renewables are a negligible part of Bangladesh’s energy mix, while coal use has ticked up sharply in both absolute and proportional terms.

Coal-versus-gas competition has great relevance for Bangladesh’s air quality. While natural gas emits carbon dioxide, it produces far fewer particulates than coal, with some studies showing that swapping coal for gas can reduce harmful emissions of sulfur dioxide by more than 90 percent, and of nitric oxide and nitrogen dioxide (NOX) by more than 60 percent.

Coal-to-gas switching is a quick and relatively easy fix for Bangladesh’s air quality concerns, given the country’s daunting challenges in switching to clean energy. Bangladesh’s solar and wind resources are limited, and it has weak hydropower potential. The country suffers an absence of summertime breezes, reducing wind’s usefulness in meeting peak demand during the hottest months.

The promise of nuclear energy

Given its constrained supply of indigenous renewables, Bangladesh is building two new nuclear power plants, for which Russia, China, and South Korea all provided bids. In 2009, Russia’s proposal was accepted. Bangladesh’s first reactor, which began construction in 2017, is set to begin operation this year.

While nuclear energy produces no emissions or pollutants, Bangladesh’s pursuit of the technology has not been cheap. Russia’s Rosatom is providing technical assistance, but Bangladesh is responsible for financing, for which it received a Russian loan. The Rosatom-led Rooppur project will cost $12.65 billion and is set to have a total capacity of 2.4 gigawatts. While nuclear energy is useful for decarbonization and improving air quality, expanding it further in the near term will prove difficult for Bangladesh. Capital financing costs have risen since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, while tie-ups with Rosatom are potentially fraught. Some US legislators have called for sanctions on the state-owned Russian nuclear power giant, although experts generally believe these measures would disrupt Western markets while providing few geopolitical benefits. 

How Bangladesh can improve its air quality

A nearer-term and more affordable option for reducing air pollution is liquefied natural gas (LNG). LNG is a fossil fuel, but it burns cleaner than coal and oil, which can help improve air quality.

Other measures to improve Bangladesh’s air quality could target vehicles, a major source of air pollutants. Bangladesh should look to models such as Mexico City’s hoy no circula or Beijing’s odd and even days to limit vehicle pollution.

In Mexico City, the last number of a vehicle’s license plate determines which days it can be driven, with only the lowest-emission vehicles allowed to operate seven days a week. In Beijing, a similar program dates back to 2008, when China hosted the Summer Olympics. Beijing’s restrictions limit which weekdays cars with license plates ending in certain digits are allowed on the road.

These measures come at a significant economic cost, which may be too high given Bangladesh’s lower level of economic development compared to Mexico and China. But Bangladesh’s cities may consider such tradeoffs as acceptable given the severity of the country’s air quality crisis.

Over the longer term, Bangladesh can access cleaner electricity and lower its air pollution by integrating its grid with other hydropower-rich countries in the region. In January 2024, India concluded an agreement with Nepal to import 10,000 megawatts of hydropower from the Himalayan country, showing that cross-border electricity deals are possible in the region.

While deeper integration of regional electricity markets will require substantially more political trust than exists today, cooperation is necessary to meet Bangladesh’s energy access and air quality needs.

Bangladesh’s air quality trilemma

There are no easy ways to mitigate Bangladesh’s air quality crisis. Bangladesh has little renewable energy potential and faces difficulties in expanding nuclear energy or adopting vehicular emissions programs given the country’s limited financial resources. Moreover, Bangladesh suffers from substantial energy poverty, making improved energy access a top priority.

It is extremely difficult to balance these concerns, particularly in the short term. But in the longer term, trade in low-emission fuels and clean electricity can help Bangladesh resolve its trilemma of ensuring clean air, economic growth, and sustainable energy access.

Joe Webster is a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council Global Energy Center.

Natalie Sinha is a former young global professional at the Atlantic Council Global Energy Center.

Sarah Meadows is a former young global professional at the Atlantic Council Global Energy Center.

This article reflects the authors’ personal opinions.

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Your presidential debate prep on the US economy, in charts https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/your-presidential-debate-prep-on-the-us-economy-in-charts/ Tue, 25 Jun 2024 21:20:26 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=775610 Ahead of this campaign season’s first presidential debate, these charts, graphs, and data illustrate the real state of the US economy.

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Expect a lot of back and forth about the state of the US economy when President Joe Biden and former President Donald Trump face off Thursday in the first presidential debate. But what’s the real story? Experts from across the Atlantic Council compiled the figures and context you need to gauge the true health of the US economy—from unemployment to inflation to energy production—and how it compares with economic conditions in allied and rival countries around the globe.


The United States is outperforming all of its advanced economy peers in post-COVID growth, and it is not particularly close. As we’ll surely hear from Biden on Thursday, fiscal policy has played a role. The major infrastructure investments through the Inflation Reduction Act and CHIPS and Science Act, have started to create new jobs in the manufacturing sector. The Federal Reserve also played a key role by keeping interest rates near zero for twenty-two months and pumping trillions in liquidity and backstops into the US economy after the crisis. But there are other factors at play as well, including the rise of homegrown artificial intelligence companies and producers such as NVIDIA that make those machines hum, boosting the United States ahead of its fellow Group of Seven (G7) countries. Combined with increased productivity growth, you have the recipe for an unexpected surge in the US economy. 

Josh Lipsky is the senior director of the Atlantic Council’s GeoEconomics Center and a former adviser at the International Monetary Fund.


How does inflation in the United States compare to the G7? It’s falling, but not as fast as in Europe. The tradeoff with higher growth has been somewhat sticky inflation in the United States and a struggle to get back to the Fed’s 2 percent target range for price growth. It’s the surge in inflation during the pandemic and the still-elevated price levels that have generated so much discontent domestically about the US economy. Voters can’t feel that they may be doing better than citizens in Japan or Germany—what they can feel is how much it costs them to go to the grocery store this year compared to last. 

—Josh Lipsky


One of the biggest points of contention during the debate will be about job creation. Biden will say Trump was the first president since Herbert Hoover to leave office with the United States having lost jobs during his presidency. If there’s one rule in US economic history, it’s to try not to be compared to Herbert Hoover. Of course, the reason for that fact was the COVID-19 pandemic. What’s most surprising, though, is what happened after. Unlike previous recoveries, the US labor market rebounded swiftly and within twenty-nine months had recovered all the jobs lost during the crisis. As of May 2024, over fifteen million jobs have been created during the Biden administration. The numbers are the numbers. The big debate that we will see play out Thursday is which factors drove which parts of the crash and recovery, and who gets the credit or blame. 

—Josh Lipsky


One issue on which both sides of the aisle seem to agree is taking a strong stance on economic competition with China. The question of how strong will be up for debate, with Trump suggesting a 60 percent tariff on Chinese goods and Biden following a more targeted approach in his recent tariff increases on electric vehicles, steel, and other goods. Biden likely won’t mention that most of the Trump-era tariffs remain in place, and Trump won’t want to admit that the share of US imports coming from China is lower now than at any point in the last decade. Two of the driving forces—China’s economic slowdown and zero-COVID policies—probably won’t be part of the discussion. But they should be. 

Sophia Busch is an assistant director at the GeoEconomics Center.


The US economy continues to show declining emissions intensity of gross domestic product (GDP), meaning the amount of carbon emissions per unit of GDP. Crucially, the United States is cutting emissions while continuing to grow the economy. The Rhodium Group projects that emissions fell 1.9 percent even as the economy expanded by 2.4 percent in 2023. Accordingly, US emissions intensity of real GDP continues to decline even though the US economy is larger than it has ever been. 

Joseph Webster is a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Global Energy Center.


US energy production stands at an all-time high because of the country’s higher output of oil, gas, and renewable energy sources such as solar and wind. Energy from oil production in 2023 rose by 5 percent compared to pre-COVID times in 2019, while natural gas output increased by 32 percent. Solar energy production has soared by a whopping 104 percent, as wind energy output grew by 44 percent. These developments have put pressure on coal output, which has fallen by 17 percent and is poised to decline further. Crucially, solar generation outpaced coal consumption for the first time in March 2024 in Texas, the country’s largest coal-consuming state. The US energy production mix is changing. Energy production—including for clean energy sources such as solar, wind, and nuclear energy—seems poised to surge if onerous permitting roadblocks, such as for siting transmission lines, are lifted. 

—Joseph Webster


While the United States outperforms other G7 nations in economic growth, it falls behind in broader measures of well-being. Over the past decade, the United States has seen a decline on the Atlantic Council’s Prosperity Index, the only G7 country to experience a decline. More striking is the fact that even in the prosperity components in which the country has experienced improvements, such as education, these gains have been smaller than its peers’. As a result, the United States’ ranking has fallen in virtually all categories of the Prosperity Index since 1995. Yet this decline must be put in perspective, as the United States remains well established among the top countries on the Prosperity Index—ranking thirty-sixth out of 164 countries.

Joseph Lemoine is the director of the Atlantic Council’s Freedom and Prosperity Center.


Life expectancy, an important health indicator, remains a challenge for the United States. Not only does it lag behind other G7 nations, but it also experienced the worst decline among G7 nations during the COVID-19 pandemic. Furthermore, the United States is one of only two G7 countries, alongside Germany, that hasn’t fully recovered from the pandemic’s impact on life expectancy.

—Joseph Lemoine


Income inequality has been a persistent problem in the United States for decades. While there might be temporary fluctuations, the overall trend shows minimal improvement. There has been some progress made in the last five years, but the United States remains worse off compared to 2010 when it comes to income inequality.

—Joseph Lemoine


Alisha Chhangani, Clara Falkenek, Gustavo Romero, and Konstantinos Mitsotakis of the GeoEconomics Center contributed to the data visualizations in this article.


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The sustainability questions policymakers should be asking about AI https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/geotech-cues/the-sustainability-questions-policymakers-should-be-asking-about-ai/ Fri, 21 Jun 2024 20:16:50 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=769177 Focusing on the sustainability of the AI industry offers an opportunity to steer entire industries toward contributing to a positive future.

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Advances in artificial intelligence (AI) promise to achieve efficiency and progress for a variety of applications, including cutting-edge research, business, and whole industries. However, a major gap has opened: the need for transparency around the sustainability of AI initiatives throughout their whole lifecycle.

“Sustainability” is not just an environmental concern. In a broader sense, such as that employed by the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), sustainability requires improving human health, prosperity, and economic growth. And in discussing sustainability in AI, following a framing described by the Sustainable AI Lab at University of Bonn, it is important to discuss not only AI applications for sustainability, but also the sustainability of the AI industry itself.

The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development pointed out in November 2022 that it is important to consider both the direct sustainability impacts of computing as well as the indirect impacts of AI applications. However, the sustainability of computing seems to rarely be mentioned in current conversations about the governance of AI development and deployment or in new legislation or guidance such as the European Union (EU) AI Act, United Nations resolution A/78/L.49, Canada’s C27 bill, the Australian government’s interim response report, the White House executive order on AI and follow-on actions, or requirements in various US states. Instead, these and many other conversations around the world focus primarily on the also-critical topics of trustworthy AI, data privacy, alignment, and ethics.

If policymakers close this gap and focus today on the sustainability of the AI industry, they will have the opportunity to steer entire industries toward contributing to a positive future for both people and the planet.

To develop and leverage AI at the scale imagined by researchers, businesses, and governments, significant physical resources will be required for the design and deployment of the requisite computing hardware and software. While all AI approaches merit attention regarding their sustainability, generative AI is particularly resource-intensive: One such AI-powered chatbot is reportedly consuming the energy equivalent of 33,000 homes. (Note that while it is complicated to estimate such equivalences—given variations in operational timescales and details, home location, user numbers, etc.—various calculations have yielded estimated energy use equivalent to that of tens to hundreds of thousands of US homes.)

In addition, new data centers are being designed and built with high demand and at a fast pace, new AI-critical hardware components are being designed and fabricated, and organizations large and small are experiencing urgency in setting their short-term tactics and long-term strategies for AI. Demands on data centers will only continue to grow as AI-powered applications spread through industries and around the world. For example, a recent International Energy Agency report projected an increase in data center energy consumption in 2026 equivalent to the energy consumption of Japan.

Sustainability-focused regulation of AI, if deployed in a timely manner, can incentivize further improvements in the efficiency of data center operation and even the efficiency of software itself. Unfortunately, in the past, similar opportunities to promote the sustainable development of emerging technologies across industries have been missed. Failure to act during the rise of cryptocurrency mining has led to concerns today about the industry’s electricity and water use and to tension—internationally and domestically—around regulation and resource accessibility. For example, blockchain advocates filed a lawsuit against the US Department of Energy after the agency attempted to conduct an emergency survey of energy use by crypto miners, with the advocates arguing that it forced businesses to divulge sensitive information.

More broadly, global digitization and its associated technologies have spurred crises in e-waste, supply-chain fragility, and human rights, to name a few. Early consideration and prioritization of these issues could have prevented harmful patterns from becoming embedded in today’s systems and processes. Crucially, the projected demands on data centers in the coming years due to the rise of AI—in terms of hardware, power, cooling, land and water use, and access to physical infrastructure and network bandwidth (a particular concern in growing urban areas)—are likely to far outstrip demands associated with other technologies. The potential cumulative impacts of the AI revolution, including resource consumption and byproduct production, underscore the urgency of acting today.

Questions for a sustainable industry

In order for policymakers to introduce measures that encourage AI initiatives (and the entire AI industry) to be more sustainable—and to enable consumers to choose sustainable AI tools—there needs to be more transparency around the sustainability of developing, training (including storing data), and deploying AI models, and into the lifecycle of attendant hardware and other infrastructure. Policymakers should require that any new AI initiative, early in planning, complete sustainability reporting that helps estimate a proposed AI initiative’s physical impact on the planet and people, both now and in the future. This transparency is not only necessary for guiding future regulation and consumer choice; it is also a crucial part of fostering a culture that prioritizes developing and regulating technology with the future in mind.

The questions that policymakers should require organizations developing and deploying AI initiatives to answer should, to use a metaphor, address the entire “iceberg.” In other words, these questions should inquire about visible sustainability issues (such as the production of carbon dioxide) as well as less-visible issues below the “waterline” (such as whether the land underlying physical infrastructure could have been used for food production). These questions should cover three overarching categories:

  1. The consumption of readily detectable resources,
  2. The production of byproducts, and
  3. The achievement of broader sustainability goals.

In developing the questions for reporting, policymakers should gather insights from regulators, AI technologists, environmental scientists, businesses, communities near AI infrastructure, and end users. The questions should be useful (easily interpretable and insights from them point to potential areas of improvement), be extensible (applicable across current AI models and for future models), and result in reliable answers (roughly repeatable using distinct tools). Framing questions in a way that results in the reporting of concrete and preferably quantitative answers can set the stage for organizations to implement internal, dashboard-style approaches to sustainable AI development and deployment.

Beyond the wording of such questions, the timing of asking organizations matters as well. Answers to these questions should be reported in the earliest stages of an AI initiative’s planning, as they will help organizations conduct cost/benefit analyses and assess their return on investment. Real-time insights gathered during the operational lifetime of an AI initiative would enable not only monitoring of the project’s sustainability, but also execution of in silico experiments that could reveal novel operational, budgetary, and sustainability benefits. The questions should apply equally to all organizations in the public and private sectors using AI. Finally, policymakers should revisit the questions regularly as AI technologies continue to develop and be deployed—and as user needs and geopolitics change.

To capture these broad considerations in a concise set of questions, policymakers should look to the following key sustainability questions as a starting point.

What resources (inputs) are being consumed, directly and indirectly, throughout the lifecycle of an AI initiative?

  • How much energy is required? What are the sources of this energy? What percentage of this energy is renewable? What is the Power Usage Effectiveness for the initiative?
  • How much water is required, for example for cooling? What are the sources of this water and, for example, is it recycled water? How much of this water could have been suitable for human consumption or agricultural use? What is the Water Usage Effectiveness for the initiative?
  • How much land is required, for example for physical infrastructure? How close is each land parcel to human habitation? How much of this land is appropriate for food production or human habitation? How has local biodiversity been impacted by the use of this land for AI initiatives?
  • What rare metals are used and what are their sources? What are the sources of all metals required for hardware (such as graphics processing units, also known as GPUs)—land, ocean, or recycled? How are local communities and workers, in areas where these metals are procured, engaged or affected?

What byproducts (outputs) are being produced, directly and indirectly, throughout the lifecycle of an AI initiative?

  • How much greenhouse gas (embodied carbon) is produced, in metric tons of carbon dioxide equivalent?
  • What is the projected functional lifetime of each of the top five most abundant hardware components (such as central processing units—also known as CPUs—or GPUs)?
  • How much hardware waste is generated each year? How much of this waste is recycled effectively? How much of this waste will go to the landfill? How much waste pollutes the air and water? How much of this waste is toxic to human health and to the environment?
  • How much wastewater is produced, where does it go, and what can it be used for? Does it require further treatment? Can it be released back into the environment, and how would its release impact the environment (e.g., changing the water temperature of an ecosystem)? Is it used as gray water for other applications?

What broader sustainability opportunities are being harnessed through each AI initiative, using the United Nations’ SDGs as a framework?

  • How resilient is the associated physical infrastructure to earthquakes, floods, droughts, fires, storms, and other disasters? (SDGs 9 and 11)
  • How much of the broader labor force is local to the land and community being used for an AI initiative? How competitive are wages relative to the industry? (SDGs 1 and 8; broader questions around AI and labor disruption are critical but go beyond the scope of the current discussion)
  • How safe and healthy are working conditions for all contributing employees and contractors, both local and remote to the physical infrastructure of the initiative? (SDG 3)
  • How many educational opportunities are being produced by, and contributing to, the AI initiative? (SDG 4)
  • Regarding gender equality and broader inclusivity, what percentage of the workforce, both full-time and contract, identifies as a member of a marginalized group? Are efforts being made to reduce inequality within and between countries that provide AI workforce? (SDGs 5, 10, and 11)

Sticking the landing

Any organization working with AI—whether the organization is using in-house compute resources or external (cloud) service providers to develop and deploy AI models—should report their answers to the above sustainability questions yearly. Several tools and frameworks for reporting and answering some sustainability questions already exist; adopting new policies such as required reporting will spur the development of further tools.

For the time being, transparency obligations should fall on the organizations that are developing and deploying AI models—not on consumers who are only end users of AI models. That may change if large numbers of end users themselves end up training and developing their own models, causing a rapid expansion in AI-associated resource consumption and byproduct production. However, the question about where transparency obligations fall must be revisited regularly as AI technologies continue to develop rapidly and increasingly resource-intensive queries by users become possible. Crucially, hypothetical future affordances of AI must not be factored into the answers to these sustainability questions. For example, if the goal of an AI initiative is to help an end user reduce their carbon emissions, then that hypothetical future reduction must not be factored into the organization’s assessment of the carbon emissions of this AI initiative this year.

Policymakers should promote the monitoring and reporting of accurate information, rather than define “good” answers to these questions and penalize companies that do not meet those benchmarks. The EU’s Sustainable Finance Disclosure Regulation framework, with its emphasis on the power of transparency to shape and amplify market forces, can serve as a model for such an approach. If reported data were gathered in a single, open-access database (perhaps analogous to the European Single Access Point), then regulators, investors, technology companies, nonprofits, and the general public would be able to reward progress toward sustainability goals, over various time horizons, through a variety of mechanisms. It will be important to have external auditors to ensure the credibility of reported data, as they have done for sustainable finance.

Authority to penalize nonreporting should be assigned to a designated agency. For example, for the United States, while the Securities and Exchange Commission and environmental protection agencies at the federal and state levels could be logical candidates for this authority, this environment-centered approach overlooks the larger definitions of sustainability that could be encompassed by regulation. The Office of Science and Technology Policy at the White House may be more appropriate as a centralizing point, given this entity’s mandate to pursue “bold visions” and “unified plans” for US science and technology, as well as its ability to engage with external partners in industry, government, academia, and civil society. The agencies selected to carry out this responsibility should have direct lines of communication with their counterparts in other countries, enabling an agile and coordinated international response to rapid advances in AI.

Critically, international regulators, researchers, businesses, and other developers and users of AI should maintain a collaborative—rather than adversarial—relationship, as doing so could position sustainability as an investment in the future that delivers returns in the near to medium term. Subsidies from federal, state, or local governments could be used to assist small and medium-sized enterprises with the administrative and other financial burdens of this reporting, as mentioned by the EU’s AI Act. To ease the burden on organizations as they comply with potential future reporting and auditing requirements about the sustainability of their AI operations, policymakers should identify metrics and processes that can be used for parallel disclosures. For example, this can be done by requiring data that a single company could use to fulfill their transparency obligations for sustainable AI, sustainable finance, and sustainable corporate reporting such as the EU’s Corporate Sustainability Reporting Directive. Policymakers should also strive to maintain consistency internationally, perhaps following the EU’s lead in sustainability policy to date. Ultimately, the International Organization for Standardization should expand its current AI offerings to include standards for the transparency of AI sustainability (such as the questions suggested above), in alignment with its current standards addressing environmental management, energy management, social responsibility, and more.

A unique moment

The sustainability of AI is an urgent and pressing issue with long-lasting, global impacts. Today, the world still dedicates a great deal of attention to AI; the technology has not yet faded into the background or become ubiquitous and invisible, much like electricity has. However, the current moment—of unprecedented demand for the extraction and deployment of AI-enabling physical resources—is a crucial turning point.

Current and future generations depend on policymakers to steward the world’s resources sustainably, especially as a wave of global resource expenditure—with an anticipated long tail—approaches. In light of this impending growth, the opportunity for action is brief and the need is immediate. Although the scale of the challenge is daunting, international responses to ozone depletion and Antarctic geopolitical tension showcase the power of international collaboration for rapid and high-impact action.

With the framing of key sustainability questions, policymakers can gather the insights they need to adequately build a regulatory framework that encourages responsible resource expenditure and adapts to the inevitable shifts in a nascent industry. Transparency can empower consumers and investors to incentivize sustainable AI development. International cooperation on this effort can foster transparency and inspire collaborative action to build a future that is sustainable in many senses of the word.


Tiffany J. Vora is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s GeoTech Center. She has a PhD in molecular biology from Princeton University.

Kathryn Thomas is the chief operating officer of Blue Lion. She has a PhD in water quality and monitoring from the University of Waterloo.

Anna Ferré-Mateu is a Ramón y Cajal fellow at the Instituto de Astrofísica de Canarias and an adjunct fellow at the Center of Astronomy and Supercomputing of the Swinburne University of Technology. She has a PhD in astrophysics from the Instituto de Astrofísica de Canarias.

Catherine Lopes is the chief data and AI strategist of Opsdo Analytics. She has a PhD in machine learning from Monash University.

Marissa Giustina is a research scientist and quantum electronics engineer. She has a PhD in physics from the University of Vienna. She conducted the research for this article outside of her employment with Google DeepMind and this article represents her own views and those of her coauthors.

The authors gratefully acknowledge David Rae of EY for fruitful discussions. The authors also acknowledge Homeward Bound Projects, which hosted the initial working session that led to the ideas in this article.

The GeoTech Center champions positive paths forward that societies can pursue to ensure new technologies and data empower people, prosperity, and peace.

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Russia’s flagship international forum showcases Putin’s pariah status https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/russias-flagship-international-forum-showcases-putins-pariah-status/ Fri, 21 Jun 2024 13:18:28 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=774774 The lack of international attendees at Russia's flagship economic forum in June highlighted Vladimir Putin's pariah status on the world stage, writes Edward Verona.

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Not so long ago, the annual St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF) was widely seen as one of the “be there or be square” events for the world’s business elites, political leaders, and global influencers. Often called Russia’s Davos, SPIEF takes place every June in Russia’s second city, which also happens to be Vladimir Putin’s hometown. Throughout Putin’s reign, it has served as a showcase for the country’s economic, scientific, and technological achievements.

For years, multinational corporations by the score would pay handsomely to be partners of the forum, and would invest heavily in state-of-the-art exhibition stands. Participation was by invitation only, with careful vetting of those who were to have, once inside the entrance gate, virtually unrestricted access to the senior Russian government officials, CEOs, and other notables in attendance. The evening social and entertainment agendas were replete with over-the-top extravaganzas featuring many of the luminaries of Russia’s cultural beau monde.

SPIEF was also seen as a measure of Russia’s standing in the world as an economic and geopolitical power, and a reflection of the esteem in which world leaders held Vladimir Putin. Typically, no less than half a dozen heads of state or government from the world’s most important industrial and emerging market economies would typically join Putin on stage during the keynote address.

Most VIP political guests at SPIEF were democratic leaders, reflecting a desire to embrace Russia as a new member of the democratic club, albeit one that did not yet fully abide by the rules. Some leaders of a more authoritarian hue would also attend, but diplomatic politesse ensured that everybody was well behaved. The long days and mild weather, combined with the undeniable beauty of St. Petersburg, created an upbeat atmosphere and friendly spirits. As one who attended five SPIEFs, I can attest to the enchantment of it all.

While the weather and the venue have remained the same, SPIEF has experienced a gradual and then abrupt decline in status over the past decade. This process first began in 2014 after the annexation of Crimea. It has accelerated dramatically following the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, and was all too evident in June 2024.

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Prior to 2014, SPIEF attendance had been regarded as more or less obligatory for the CEOs of all the largest international oil and gas companies. This year, however, the picture was strikingly different, with SPIEF attracting virtually no business leaders from G7 or EU member countries. Instead, there was only a relatively small contingent representing state-owned enterprises from other countries, mostly those that trade in sanctioned Russian oil and gas.

As far as can be gleaned from the official SPIEF website (personal attendance is now out of the question), the only partners and exhibitors at this year’s event were Russian companies, mostly state-owned or controlled. SPIEF claims to have attracted 21,200 participants, but this figure likely includes offsite events open to the public.

The most striking thing about the 2024 SPIEF program was the absence of high-level international political participation. Indeed, it must have been particularly painful for Vladimir Putin to share a stage with the presidents of Bolivia and Zimbabwe. Having lived in Bolivia, I do not mean to disparage that beautiful country; nor do I harbor any ill will toward Zimbabwe. Nevertheless, there is no escaping the fact that Putin most certainly does not see those leaders as peers. Nor do they compare to the global heavyweights who traditionally participated in previous SPIEFs.

The only other “heads of government” in attendance in St. Petersburg this June were the leader of Georgia’s Russian-occupied Abkhazia region, and the head of Republika Srpska, a sub-national entity in Bosnia-Herzegovina. This underwhelming international guest list at Russia’s flagship annual economic forum speaks volumes about Putin’s pariah status.

The reasons for the absence of democratic leaders at SPIEF are obvious and require no further explanation. At the same time, it is interesting to note that numerous putative allies of Russia also gave the event a miss. Perhaps Chinese President Xi’s recent visit to the Shangri-La Conference in Singapore was too close in timing. Significantly, Iran chose not to send any senior officials. The leaders of Venezuela, Nicaragua, and Cuba similarly stayed away.

The absence of Syria’s Bashar al-Assad came as no surprise as he rarely travels. But what about Russia’s BRICS partners Brazil, South Africa, and India? Meanwhile, the most glaring absence of all was Belarusian dictator Alyaksandr Lukashenka. No other head of state is as personally indebted to Putin, who saved Lukashenka in 2020 after anti-regime protests erupted across Belarus following a sham presidential election.

Russia’s remaining partners are clearly in no hurry to engage in public demonstrations of support for Moscow. Nor can the Kremlin necessarily count on Putin’s fellow pariahs. If SPIEF is Russia’s showcase, then the glass evidently needs a thorough cleaning.

Edward Verona is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center covering Russia, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe, with a particular focus on Ukrainian reconstruction aid.

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The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

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Global China Newsletter – Sharp words, sharper tools: Beijing hones its approach to the Global South https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/global-china/global-china-newsletter-sharp-words-sharper-tools-beijing-hones-its-approach-to-the-global-south/ Thu, 20 Jun 2024 14:07:30 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=774494 The fifth 2024 edition of the Global China Newsletter

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The statement released by G7 leaders after their summit last week garnered ample attention for its strong language on China’s unfair economic practices and ongoing support for Russia’s war on Ukraine, and triggered a predictably sharp Chinese response. The back-and-forth is another reminder of China’s worsened relations with developed democracies over the past few years.

Beijing is by no means abandoning those relationships – Premier Li Qiang’s visit to Australia and New Zealand this week, not to mention President Xi’s trip to Europe last month, underscore a drive to mend damaged ties. But the incident is another piece of evidence confirming that Beijing’s positions on global and economic issues receive a more welcoming reception in the developing world, where China’s economic and political ties are growing by the day.

China’s strategic shift toward greater focus on the so-called Global South is unmistakable. One need only look at where China is spending diplomatic attention and propaganda dollars.

As colleagues at the Digital Forensics Research Lab explore in a new report on China’s messaging in Africa, China is increasingly promoting pro-Russian narratives about Ukraine in sub-Saharan Africa using its media platforms, commentators, social media, and broadcasting infrastructure. The effort aims to portray China as a force for peace while the United States prolongs the war, in line with Beijing’s drive to enhance its reputation relative to Washington across the developing world.

Source: (Murtala Zhang; CGTN Hausa) Screenshot of a cartoon shared by a China Radio International (CRI) illustrator, depicting the US arms industry as profiting from the war in Ukraine. Also, a screenshot of the Facebook post of the article that written for CRI defending China’s amplification of the biolabs in Ukraine disinformation translated from Hausa.

This effort to shape perceptions of China’s responsible global role in contrast to the United States is now routinely reflected in the content of high-level diplomatic engagements with developing countries.

In his speech just last week at the BRICS Dialogue with Developing Countries in Russia, Foreign Minister Wang Yi not only underscored China’s leadership of the Global South as the “largest developing country” but also called for the convening of “a true international peace conference” on the Ukraine war that involves Russia – after Beijing pulled out all the stops to try to scuttle the Swiss-organized conference earlier this month – and threw in some choice words on US efforts to “maintain its unipolar hegemony” for good measure.

As I and the Global China Hub team discovered on a trip to Brazil, Colombia, and Honduras earlier this month, China is also ramping up diplomatic, economic, and technological engagement across Latin America, and pairing those efforts with a push to shape understanding of China across the region. Our editor-in-chief Tiff Roberts dives into that and much more in this issue of Global China – take it away, Tiff!

-David O. Shullman, Senior Director, Atlantic Council Global China Hub

China Spotlight

Latin American officials flood Beijing revealing China’s global priorities

Want to know one key region of the Global South China is now focusing on? Take a look at who visited Beijing in early June. Before the first week of the month was even over, Brazil’s Vice President Geraldo Alckmin, Venezuela’s Foreign Minister Yván Gil, and special envoy of Cuban President Miguel Díaz-Canel and Minister of Foreign Affairs Bruno Rodríguez Parrilla had all passed through China’s capital (the Brazilian vice president met with Xi Jinping and secured $4.49 billion in credit concessions. Brazil has been a key market for China too, as evidenced by an eighteen-fold surge in Chinese EV sales by value).

Latin America, with its rich resources, is a key target as China expands its global economic and political reach, and that’s a concern for the US. Testifying before the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission hearing “Key Economic Strategies for Leveling the U.S.-China Playing Field: Trade, Investment, and Technology,” Pepe Zhang of the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center called for a development-focused economic partnership with LAC that would make the Western Hemisphere more competitive, resilient, and better integrated with the US.

Economics used to bolster authoritarian power in Global South training

China’s commerce ministry isn’t just fretting about EU tariffs (see below). It has also spearheaded an effort to train officials in countries across the Global South. And perhaps not surprisingly, the instruction is about more than trade and economics: “This effort is integral to the PRC’s drive to transform a global order currently predicated on the centrality of democracy and individual rights to one more “values-agnostic” and thus suited to China’s rise under authoritarian CCP rule,” writes the Global China Hub’s Niva Yau in a June 12 report called “A Global South with Chinese Characteristics” (watch the launch event here). The 795 training descriptions reviewed by Yau show “how the PRC marries economics and politics in its trainings, revealing that Chinese economic achievements are used to support authoritarian ideals.”

The report certainly got the PRC’s attention. The Chinese Embassy responded, saying the report is “full of Cold War mentality and ideological prejudice,” with the Foreign Ministry adding that “China has always respected the peoples of all countries in independently choosing their development paths and social systems,” which is very reassuring.

A new, coordinated transatlantic response to China emerges on trade?

In a widely expected move, the European Union announced new tariffs on Chinese electric vehicles on June 12, up as much 38.1% on top of existing taxes of 10% before, affecting companies including BYD, SAIC, and NIO. Also to no surprise was the heated response from Beijing: the move by the EU “undermines the legitimate rights and interests of China’s EV industry,” and is “blatant protectionism,” Ministry of Commerce spokesperson He Yadong said in a press briefing. On June 17, Beijing officially launched an anti-dumping probe on imported pork and its by-products from the EU in response.

With the EU action coming just over a month after US President Joe Biden imposed tariffs on EVs of 100%, is a new, more coordinated transatlantic response to the Chinese trade juggernaut emerging? On June 3rd, in an ACFrontPage conversation with United States Trade Representative Katherine Tai, she did not mince words on how the US and the EU should adapt the transatlantic trade relationship to reflect the realities of China’s economic system, saying “Capitalism with Chinese characteristics… I haven’t heard that term used in many, many years. At this point, I think it’s less diplomatic than just sort of ahistorical. The China that we’re dealing with now, the PRC, is not a democracy. It’s not a capitalist, market-based economy.

In an Econographics article exploring a similar theme entitled “Biden’s electric vehicle tariff strategy needs a united front,” the GeoEconomics Center’s Sophia Busch and Josh Lipsky write, “tariffs, working in isolation, can’t fully achieve all the objectives—no matter how high they go. It’s only when tariffs are relatively aligned across countries… that the trajectory could change.”

And it’s not just EVs that pose a threat to global industries. Without tariffs, the EU faces a flood of Chinese imports of the “new three” clean tech exports—lithium-ion batteries, solar panels, and, of course, electric cars (along with the action against EVs, the White House also raised tariffs simultaneously on lithium-ion batteries and solar cells to 25%.) “Imports of the new-three cleantech export categories have skyrocketed in recent years. Over the course of 2023, China’s exports to the EU totaled $23.3 billion for lithium-ion batteries, $19.1 billion in solar panels, and $14.5 billion for electric vehicles,” the Global Energy Center’s Joseph Webster wrote in a piece for EnergySource.

ICYMI

  • Beginning on June 17, Atlantic Council President and CEO Fred Kempe and former President of Latvia Egils Levits have co-led the Atlantic Council’s annual delegation trip to Taiwan, hosted by the Taiwanese government. Joined by former Czech Minister of Foreign Affairs Tomáš Petříček, they will meet with Taiwan government leaders, including President Lai, think tanks, and business representatives to discuss security and economic issues facing Taiwan and the Indo-Pacific.
  • The Global China Hub hosted a public conversation on allied solutions to de-risking tech supply chains from Chinese investment to spur collective action between the United States and government and private sector partners in Europe and the Indo-Pacific. The event was a continuation of the Hub’s work on tech competition and China’s drive to dominate emerging technologies and relevant supply chains.
  • China’s trade with Russia has risen substantially since the Kremlin’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, significantly bolstering Moscow’s war aims, according to new research by the Global Energy Center’s Joseph Webster.
  • Xi Jinping’s recent visit to Europe was in part intended to divide it as the EU increasingly hardens its stance on China. The Global China Hub’s Zoltán Fehér explores the degree to which Xi was successful in these efforts in a New Atlanticist piece.

Global China Hub

The Global China Hub researches and devises allied solutions to the global challenges posed by China’s rise, leveraging and amplifying the Atlantic Council’s work on China across its 16 programs and centers.

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US-Mexico energy cooperation is vital to enable nearshoring https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/energysource/us-mexico-energy-cooperation-is-vital-to-enable-nearshoring/ Tue, 18 Jun 2024 18:57:00 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=773792 As the United States seeks to nearshore supply chains, Mexico's energy sector presents a valuable opportunity for collaboration. By easing regulations on the private sector, Mexico can facilitate US energy investment without impeding its own vision for growth.

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Claudia Sheinbaum’s historic election matters for Mexico’s relationship with the United States, particularly in trade and energy. While Sheinbaum has pledged continuity with the top-line agenda of outgoing president Andrés Manuel López Obrador (AMLO), subtle differences are emerging, opening new areas for cooperation. To make the most of those opportunities, the United States and Mexico must work together to enhance Mexico’s grid for a new industrial era.

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Mexico’s nearshoring opportunity

Mexico features prominently in US ambitions to “nearshore,” whereby companies move their production facilities closer to home and away from far-flung industrial hubs—mainly China. This shift is influenced by the United States’ drive to build more resilient supply chains in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic and heightened geopolitical competition with China.

Cross-border economic ties under the United States-Mexico-Canada (USMCA) free trade zone are growing. The United States and Mexico are now each other’s largest trading partner. This can be attributed to many factors, including a deteriorating trade relationship between the United States and China, which reinforces the argument for nearshoring.

Mexico presents a supply chain opportunity for the United States. But from the Mexican perspective, support for nearshoring is relatively subdued. The “national project” of AMLO and Sheinbaum’s Morena party emphasizes combatting inequality including by developing the country’s south and strengthening state-owned companies. By contrast, the bulk of nearshoring investments would be made by private companies and go toward Mexico’s industrialized north, along the US border. Perhaps as a result, nearshoring has not progressed as rapidly as many predicted. US investors will need to align with Sheinbaum’s agenda to build a Mexican energy system capable of turning nearshoring into a reality.

Is nearshoring even happening?

A closer look at investment data paints a mixed picture of nearshoring. On one hand, foreign direct investment (FDI) in Mexico—the only measure of whether investment in the country is rising—reached a record $20.3 billion in the first quarter (Q1) of 2024, a 9 percent increase over Q1 2023. Fifty-two percent of total FDI in Mexico originated from the United States. On the other hand, only 3 percent of this increase can be attributed to new investments, contradicting the narrative that large-scale nearshoring is occurring. Furthermore, manufacturing as a share of Mexico’s economy grew to only 21 percent in the first half of 2023, from a pre-pandemic level of 20 percent. Tesla, which in March 2023 announced one of the largest nearshoring projects, has yet to break ground on its facility in Nuevo León. Like other investors, Tesla has encountered rising costs and logistical challenges.

Grid constrains are stifling nearshoring

Nearshoring is being limited by structural issues faced by Mexico’s electricity sector. Mexico’s grid has struggled to keep up with rising demand. The country suffers an “energy deficit,” facing difficulty connecting new manufacturing plants to the grid and—by extension—to renewable energy sources. The latter is a potential sticking point for electric vehicle producers looking to relocate to Mexico such as Tesla, GM, and Ford. The Mexican Association of Private Industrial Parks notes that this issue has postponed some projects and has throttled nearshoring in the years since the pandemic.

Is Mexico’s electricity sector a constraint?

The fragility of Mexico’s grid presents another major nearshoring obstacle. This was made clear in early May 2024 when the electricity demand on the grid nearly exceeded the total available generating capacity, leading the national electric system operator, CENACE, to declare a state of emergency. It has been reported that much of this demand can be attributed to the rising use of air conditioning and electric cooling during a record-breaking, weeks-long heatwave. As Mexico gets hotter courtesy of climate change, demand for cooling technologies—particularly for industrial processes—is set to rise.

Mexico’s electricity sector needs to shape up to meet increased demand from nearshoring.

More competition is needed—US investors can help

Mexico’s electricity sector offers a promising path for the United States to align its nearshoring objectives with Sheinbaum’s agenda. But to do so, it must benefit state-owned companies and free up state funds for social programs aimed at reducing inequality.

Increased private sector participation in the electricity sector is a necessity for achieving greater capacity and connectivity to unlock nearshoring. One analysis from the National Autonomous University of Mexico argues that increasing private sector participation in the electricity sector would not displace the state-owned electricity company CFE, which controls 40 percent of Mexico’s electric generation capacity, produces 70 percent of its power with private partners, and controls the full transmission and distribution network of the national grid.

In fact, CFE could benefit from increased industrial demand driven by nearshoring. Increasing private sector involvement in power generation can even help CFE by freeing it to investment in other areas, such as upgrading its transmission and distribution network and strengthening its balance sheet in the long term.

New president, new opportunities

AMLO has tried to strengthen CFE by passing a measure in 2021 to discriminate against private sector electricity generation and negate the 2013 Electricity Industry Law, which was designed to promote competition in the sector. Although the measure has since been overturned by the Supreme Court, the administration has effectively halted new public auctions for independent power contracts, preventing growth in private sector investment. Despite this, the private sector drove the increase in solar and wind power from 2014-2020.

Reversing course on private investment will be critical to restoring and expanding the capacity of the electric system and lowering costs. In 2019, independent power producers generated electricity 35 percent cheaper than CFE.

Sheinbaum’s election may present an opportunity for greater private sector collaboration with the United States. Facilitating investment can both strengthen Mexico’s grid and bolster the Mexican state, outcomes that are in line with Morena’s socioeconomic justice goals. While Sheinbaum will likely continue to favor state-owned companies, the Wall Street Journal reports that she also aims to “attract billions of dollars in private investment for solar and wind farms, with the government keeping control and a majority share in the electricity market,” citing a close advisor to Sheinbaum.

How the US-Mexico partnership can boost nearshoring and the electricity sector

The United States should seize the opportunity to work with the incoming Sheinbaum administration to strengthen the Mexican energy sector, thereby enabling supply chain security gains through nearshoring. The relationship should uphold the mutually beneficial tenets of the USMCA, including its level playing field for private sector investment.

In addition, the United States should redouble its technical and regulatory cooperation efforts with Mexican electricity regulators as has been conducted through the U.S. National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL). The aim of this partnership should be to work toward goals which benefit the Mexican administration’s agenda while strengthening economic ties and boosting Mexico’s manufacturing potential.

US-Mexico cooperation on electricity sector regulation can facilitate private sector investment in generation that could decrease the burden on CFE as the sole entity responsible for expanding the grid. Ceding greater financing responsibility to the private sector—with CENACE retaining control of the national electric system—could enable CFE to expand its business alongside the private sector and permit the Mexican state to focus on investments that promote increased prosperity for all its citizens.

With higher private sector participation conducted in a manner that respects the central role state-owned companies play in Mexican society, the electricity sector in Mexico can be transformed into an enabler of the nearshoring trend.

William Tobin is an assistant director with the Atlantic Council Global Energy Center.

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Turkey signed two major deals with Somalia. Will it be able to implement them? https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/turkeysource/turkey-signed-two-major-deals-with-somalia-will-it-be-able-to-implement-them/ Tue, 18 Jun 2024 16:56:08 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=773832 Turkey will face major challenges from both external and domestic pressure in implementing its hydrocarbons and maritime security deals.

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On June 17, Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud met with Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan in Ankara. It was the fourth high-level meeting between the two countries this year, and the pace of dialogue between Somalia and Turkey is set to increase, following two major agreements between Turkey and Somalia signed earlier this year—a comprehensive maritime and defense agreement signed in February and an oil and gas cooperation deal reached in March.

These agreements have drawn attention to Ankara’s presence in the Horn of Africa and build upon a long history of Turkish engagement in the region. They hold great potential for expanding the security and economic benefits of Turkey-Somalia cooperation, but implementing them will not be easy. Great-power competition over influence in Mogadishu, regional rivalries, security challenges, and a fractured Somali government will all pose significant challenges to these agreements and Turkey’s bid for a greater role in the Horn of Africa.

What’s the big deal?

On February 22, Ankara and Mogadishu signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) establishing the Turkish Armed Forces as a partner in Somalia’s maritime security and law enforcement for the next ten years. Per reports about the MOU, Turkey will reconstruct, equip, and train the Somali Navy while receiving 30 percent of the revenue from Somalia’s exclusive economic zone. Proponents say that the stability and security brought to Somalia’s seas outweigh the costs. Somalia loses $500 million dollars annually to illegal fishing, for example to Iranian and Chinese fishermen, while Somalia’s oil and gas reserves of up to thirty billion barrels remain largely untapped since civil war broke out in 1991. A brief period of stability has led oil and gas companies to cautiously return to Somalia. In 2019, ExxonMobil and Shell indicated a potential return to the country, and in 2022, Coastline Exploration struck a seven-block exploration deal, though an increase in fighting once again prevented any major steps forward. Shortly following this agreement with Turkey, Liberty Petroleum announced that it had secured three offshore blocks for exploration.

Shortly after reaching the maritime defense and security deal, Ankara and Mogadishu announced another MOU, establishing Turkey as a partner in Somalia’s exploration, appraisal, and extraction of petroleum blocks, with the possibility of Turkey taking over sales and distribution. Though the first agreement of its kind for Turkey, Ankara is increasingly factoring hydrocarbons into its diplomatic efforts, including in Libya.

Guns and roses

Turkey’s reaching out to Somalia has been in the making for nearly two decades, though then Turkish Prime Minister (and current president) Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s visit to Somalia during a devastating famine in 2011 was the watershed moment. The first non-African head of state to visit Somalia in twenty years, Erdoğan toured refugee camps and hospitals, pledging aid and drawing international attention to the crisis. His visit was warmly received by the Somali people, many of whom felt abandoned by the global community.

In the years since Erdoğan’s visit, Turkey has integrated deeply into Somali affairs, in everything from its security to its garbage collection and wastewater treatment to its management of seaports and airports. According to Erdoğan, Turkey provided more than one billion dollars in aid to Somalia between 2011 and 2022. Though Turkey’s presence has not been entirely without controversy, evidence of its popularity is widespread, whether through popular fundraising efforts for Turkish earthquake relief in 2023 or in day-to-day life—“Istanbul” is now a common girl’s name in Somalia.  

Turkey receives major attention for the aid it provides, especially considering that it is in the middle on the list of providers of official direct aid to Somalia. This is likely because of Turkey’s tendency to heavily brand its projects, its willingness to operate in dangerous areas of the country, and the close political ties between the two countries. The Turks often capitalize on shared cultural and religious ties to legitimize and optimize their operations, while the Turkish Directorate of Religious Affairs (also known as the Diyanet) facilitates some projects.

At the heart of the Turkey-Somalia relationship is military cooperation, which began in 2015. In 2017, Turkey established its first African military base, Camp TURKSOM in Mogadishu, and it has reportedly trained up to sixteen thousand troops. Alongside the United States, Turkey has conducted drone strikes against the terrorist group al-Shabaab, with at least nineteen confirmed strikes since 2022. In April 2023, Ankara sold Bayraktar TB2 drones to Mogadishu as part of counterterrorism efforts (a sale for which the United Nations accused Ankara of violating an arms embargo). Turkey also plays an important role in training and arming the Haramcad paramilitary unit and Gorgor commando brigade— one of two major elite units in the Somali National Army (SNA), with the other being the Danab brigade, which is trained by the United States. In collaboration with the Danab brigade, the Gorgor has played an important role in combatting al-Shabaab, particularly in renewed fighting in 2021 and 2022.

Turkey turns southward

Ankara’s presence in Somalia is part of a Turkish push toward Africa that started in 1998, with the creation of the Africa Action Plan. By 2008, Turkey had been declared a strategic partner of the African Union and opened at least a dozen embassies across the continent. When Turkey made its successful bid to become a nonpermanent member of the United Nations Security Council in 2009, it was supported by fifty-one of the fifty-three African states. In 2013, Turkey became a member of the African Development Bank Group. Turkey has varying interests in Africa, including ideological motivations, economic and trade priorities, and a desire to build up Ankara’s own defense industries and capabilities. Now, Turkey has a large presence in the region in the areas of humanitarian aid and military cooperation. As of 2022, some thirty African states had signed security cooperation agreements with Turkey, nineteen of which included troop training.

The Horn of Africa is critical for Turkish interests because of its its geographical position, rich mineral resources, and development potential. The region has seen increasing great-power competition involving a diverse cast of characters including Iran, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Russia, China, and the United States. Since 2001, at least eighteen foreign military bases have been constructed in the region, primarily for counterterrorism and counterpiracy operations.

Over the past two decades, Ankara has developed a complex web of economic and military ties with the region, including by leasing the Sudanese island of Suakin, selling drones to Ethiopia, and participating in a decades-long anti-piracy mission off the Horn of Africa under NATO’s Combined Task Force 151. In 2017, Djiboutian officials invited Turkey to establish a military base near the critical Bab el-Mandeb Strait in an effort to promote freedom of navigation and regional stability. On February 20 this year, Djibouti and Turkey signed a military training cooperation agreement.

The Emirati angle

Turkey is far from the only power involved in Somalia. As recently as mid-February, Mogadishu signed an MOU with Washington to open five new military bases in the country and increase training for its Danab brigade. Qatar and the United Kingdom are also players in Somalia. Turkey’s primary competitor in Somalia, however, is the UAE, which has historically seen the region as critical to its strategic interests.

Flush with cash, the Emiratis have embarked on a campaign of infrastructure projects and security agreements across the region, including building major ports in Somaliland (an unrecognized republic in the north of Somalia that self-declared independence in 1991), Eritrea, and Djibouti. It also armed the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) of Sudan and the Ethiopian government during conflicts in those countries. In November 2022, according to Middle East Eye, Somalia reportedly signed a secretive deal with the UAE to train ten thousand Somali troops and police officers in Egypt. However, frustration among officials with the terms of the agreement, as well as continued Emirati projects in Somaliland, have complicated the UAE-Somalia relationship. On January 1, Ethiopia (also close with the UAE) announced it had reached an MOU with Somaliland exchanging recognition for sea access and the lease of a military base. Following the two major Turkey-Somalia agreements of 2024, the Emiratis severely cut their support for the SNA, which included providing an additional $256 in monthly salary for the 14,400 soldiers trained by the UAE.

The Emirati factor carries two major risks for Turkish ambitions in Somalia. First, Abu Dhabi has played a critical role in the fight against al-Shabaab, including through air strikes. Manpower shortages have plagued the SNA for decades, an issue that Emirati coffers have helped alleviate. The withdrawal or reduction of Emirati support in the fight against terrorism will have a compounding effect as the African Union’s Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS), abiding by a request from Somalia, plans to withdraw its forces by the end of 2024. The withdrawal of both ATMIS and the UAE risks Turkey becoming further burdened by the region’s fight against terrorist groups. Second, the UAE has faced several setbacks across the region as the number of players continues to grow, and its attempts to reinforce its position will create effects that will impact Turkey. The UAE is entering increasing competition with China in Djibouti, especially now that Djibouti’s government nationalized the Doraleh Deep Water Port, which was previously owned by an Emirati company; meanwhile, in Sudan, the Emirati-backed RSF has seen its first major setbacks in months with the loss of Omdurman to the Sudanese Armed Forces, who have purchased weapons from Iran. As the UAE seeks to reassert itself and reinforce its position in the region, it will likely double down on its already substantial investments in Puntland, Somaliland, and Ethiopia. Whether the emboldening of Somalia’s rivals and the geopolitical balancing in the Horn will have a stabilizing or destabilizing effect remains to be seen, but it will likely be closely watched by Turkey.

Known unknowns

Though Somali and Turkish officials maintain that the recent agreements are unrelated to the major deal between Somaliland and Ethiopia, the timing is difficult to ignore. The Somali cabinet labeled the Somaliland-Ethiopia MOU as a “blatant assault” on its sovereignty and said it was an example of Ethiopian “interference against the sovereignty of [Somalia].” Unsurprisingly, Somalilanders reacted similarly to the Turkey-Somalia agreements that followed. Though the regional backlash to the MOU may in part steer Ethiopia and Somalia to dissolve it, this is far from certain. It remains unknown if Turkey’s enforcement of Somali maritime security will extend to Somaliland waters, which Ankara recognizes as part of Somalia. In May, Somaliland’s foreign minister explicitly stated that Turkish naval vessels would not be welcome in its territorial waters. This issue will be particularly important if Ethiopia proceeds with its plans to build a naval facility in Somaliland. Despite a strong Turkish-Ethiopian relationship, the Turkish Navy supported joint Somalia-Egypt naval exercises days after the January 1 agreement was signed. It is also unclear how the Turkish Navy will interact with the Puntland Maritime Police Force, which has received funding support from the UAE. Though the semi-autonomous Somali region of Puntland does not claim total independence, it pulled recognition of the Somali federal government in March.

Equally uncertain is how Ankara will react should the Houthis attack a ship transiting through the Somali waters that it will be charged with protecting. Handcuffed by the group’s connection to the war in Gaza, Turkey has balanced a precarious relationship with the extremist group, quietly opposing them over the last seven years while refusing to label them a terrorist organization and shying away from joining the US-led Operation Prosperity Guardian.

A winding path forward

It is uncertain how Turkey and Somalia will deliver on the major agreements and continue the upward trajectory in their bilateral relations. Turkey faces a complex and challenging Somali political landscape. Both MOUs were quickly ratified by the Somali parliament (members perhaps had little choice in the matter, according to one Somaliland-based researcher), though the deal is not without detractors. Beyond concerns over sovereignty, Mohamud is in need of an influential patron as he faces allegations of consolidating power. For Mohamud, Turkey may be the answer, as Turkey largely disregards Somalia’s domestic politics and offers near unconditional support for Villa Somalia, which has led some analysts to describe Turkey as an “all-weather friend.” Mohamud recently proposed a series of constitutional changes, including transitioning to a presidential system, arguing that it would combat clan politics and unite the country. The reforms have prompted protests and polarized the parliament. The Puntland region declared on March 31 that it would be withdrawing from the federal government until a new constitution was put in place. Days later, the Daily Somalia reported that Puntland President Said Abdullahi Deni traveled to the UAE and Ethiopia.

Furthermore, Mohamud’s government lacks unity. The same day that the Liberty Petroleum deal was signed by Somali Minister of Petroleum and Mineral Resources Abdirizak Omar Mohamed, Somali Prime Minister Hamza Abdi Barre expressed concerns and called for revoking the deal. Similarly, the Somali government lacks a clear strategy toward al-Shabaab. Following a successful first phase of “total war” in 2022, both battlefield and political gains have slowed, and al-Shabaab has struck back with a series of horrific attacks. Barre declared his support for peace talks with al-Shabaab in direct opposition to Mohamud, garnering public and private support from within a fractured cabinet.

Moreover, the recent battlefield gains by al-Shabaab undermine the legitimacy of Turkey’s military presence in the country. The concessions required for a peaceful settlement with the terrorist group may include ejecting Turkey’s military, the presence of which al-Shabaab has condemned harshly.

As Turkish officials and lawmakers consider ratification and implementation, they will no doubt look to the past decades of Turkish engagement with Somalia—but also the challenges that lay ahead. The difficulties posed by external influences, great-power competition, tumultuous domestic politics, widespread corruption, high costs, and continued conflict in Somalia will make Turkey’s enormous promises extremely difficult to fulfill. The future of these agreements and thus the future of Turkey’s relations with Somalia and position in the Horn of Africa, though built upon a strong foundation, remains to be seen.


Kiran Baez is a young global professional at the Atlantic Council Turkey program. Add him on LinkedIn.

The views expressed in TURKEYSource are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

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Ukraine’s recovery cannot begin without enhanced air defenses https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/ukraines-recovery-cannot-begin-without-enhanced-air-defenses/ Tue, 18 Jun 2024 09:50:48 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=773941 The recent Ukraine Recovery Conference in Berlin underlined the importance of additional air defenses before the country can begin to rebuild, writes Edward Verona.

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“United in defense, united in recovery, stronger together,” was a key slogan at the 2024 Ukraine Recovery Conference (URC) held in Berlin on June 11-12. It is an apt summation of Ukraine’s aspirations as it copes with the unprecedented destruction of approximately half of the country’s electric power and district heating capacity by targeted Russian missile attacks. 

Without adequate air defenses it is futile to build new fixed capacity; without adequate power and heating, the prospects for Ukraine’s economic recovery are gloomy. While severe already, this problem will become critical in the coming winter months. 

From Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, who spoke at the opening session, to Ihor Terekhov, mayor of the beleaguered front line city of Kharkiv, the message was driven home: Air defense and electric power are inextricably intertwined, and both are desperately needed. 

Ukraine’s partners appear to recognize the urgency of the situation. German Chancellor Olaf Sholz used the conference to announce that Germany will provide Ukraine with additional IRIS-T and Gepard air defense batteries. Italy confirmed plans to deliver another SAMP/T anti-missile battery. Just hours after the conference, Washington announced that it will be sending another Patriot anti-missile system to Ukraine. 

This was certainly welcome news for Kyiv. However, the breadth and intensity of Russia’s attacks will require many more such deliverables to provide some assurance of the survivability of any new or rebuilt power plants.

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Another takeaway from the URC was the role of private sector investment in Ukraine’s recovery. Speaking at the conference, an IFC representative said the ratio of private sector investment to official funding for Ukraine’s reconstruction should be seven-to-one. As was acknowledged by many speakers, including US Special Representative for Ukraine Reconstruction Penny Pritzker, this will not be feasible without affordably priced political and war risk insurance, along with export credit guarantees backed by foreign governments. 

Here, too, the message seems to have reached Western capitals. The US Development Finance Corporation (DFC) announced a $300 million expansion of political risk coverage on top of the more than $1 billion of coverage already extended both prior to and since the full-scale invasion. The European Investment Bank (EIB) announced a new $1 billion lending facility, while the EBRD unveiled a planned $700 million credit for Ukrenergo on top of a total loan portfolio of $4.2 billion, and the IFC confirmed a total of $1.4 billion invested in Ukraine since the invasion. 

The export credit agencies of Denmark, Germany, Japan, and Poland all reported substantial coverage and very low default rates. Nevertheless, Rostislav Shurma, Energy Advisor to the President of Ukraine, cited continuing impediments to lending and insurance coverage. These include high pricing, short maturities, lending caps, and less than one hundred percent coverage. 

The Berlin conference addressed a wide range of additional topics related to the idea of Ukraine’s reconstruction. Representatives of local and regional governments, civil society, and the private sector were active participants in the many lively sessions. Attendance was more than 1500, with the plenary session standing room only for those who dawdled on the way in (this writer included). 

The atmosphere in the breakout sessions was akin to a revival meeting, with frequent applause and eager participation from audience members. The photographs and displays lining the corridors dramatically illustrated the human tragedy of Russia’s brutal invasion, the resilience of the Ukrainian people, and their determined defense of their country. 

Still, the question remains whether the measures announced in Berlin will be enough to launch a sustainable recovery. They are a good start, and show a steady increase since the 2022 and 2023 URC events, but significant challenges remain. 

Many speakers referred to frozen Russian Central Bank reserves and other Russian assets, with Ukrainians urging Western governments to allow these funds to be used for Ukraine’s reconstruction. The $300 billion plus this represents would go a long way toward rebuilding much of Ukraine’s damaged and destroyed infrastructure. Unfortunately, there was no sign from Western government officials at the Berlin URC that their governments are quite ready to take that step. However, the issue remains very much on the agenda, with progress possible before the 2025 URC, to be hosted by Italy.

Edward Verona is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center covering Russia, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe, with a particular focus on Ukrainian reconstruction aid.

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Unpacking Influence: China’s Impact on US Strategy in the Middle East https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/content-series/china-mena-podcast/unpacking-influence-chinas-impact-on-us-strategy-in-the-middle-east/ Mon, 17 Jun 2024 15:22:08 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=773008 Dana Stroul joins us to unpack China's impact on US strategy in the Middle East and North Africa, and delve into the strategic significance of 5G technology and cloud computing.

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SUBSCRIBE TO THE CHINA-MENA PODCAST ON THE APP OF YOUR CHOICE

Key takeaways

  • US vs. China in Regional Influence
  • Importance of International Order
  • US Strategic Partnerships
  • China’s Regional Impact


Chapters

00:00 – Introduction

03:51 – Navigating Biden’s China Challenge in the Middle East

08:46 – Safeguarding Strategic Partnerships Amidst China’s Rise

11:41 – Exploring China’s Economic Development

15:00 – Contrasting US and China Infrastructure Support

20:19 – Assessing China’s Trade Influence

22:23 – Impact of the International Order on Gulf Economies

24:30 – Insights from the China-Arab States Cooperation Forum

29:18 – China’s Prioritization of its Immediate Periphery

34:04 – Cooperation and Countering Iran’s Influence

38:19 – Iran’s Behavior Changes and China’s Role

39:51 – Evading Sanctions: Iran, Russia, and China

42:22 – Outro

In this episode

Dana Stroul
Director of Research and Senior Fellow
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy

Dana Stroul is Director of Research and Shelly and Michael Kassen Senior Fellow at The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, positions she assumed in February, 2024. She rejoined the Institute after serving from 2021-2023 as deputy assistant secretary of defense for the Middle East, the Pentagon’s top civilian official with responsibility for the region. In that capacity, she led the development and execution of U.S. defense policy in the region during an especially turbulent period that included accelerating integrated air and maritime defense, addressing Iran’s destabilizing activities, formulating the U.S. approach to strategic competition, sustaining the DEFEAT-ISIS coalition, and responding to the Israel-Hamas War. Previously, she served for five years as a senior professional staff member on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, where she covered the Middle East, North Africa, and Turkey, and also served in Middle East policy office of the Secretary of Defense.


About

In this episode of China-MENA, titled “Unpacking Influence: China’s Impact on US Strategy in the Middle East,” join our host Jonathan Fulton and guest Dana Stroul, director of research and senior fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy and former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (DASD) for the Middle East, as they explore China’s evolving role and its impact on US policy in the Middle East and North Africa. This episode delves into global partnerships like the US-UAE-G42-Microsoft collaboration, the strategic significance of 5G technology and cloud computing, and the role of China on Iran’s behavior changes. Among other themes, Dana also discusses:

• The China-Arab States Cooperation Forum
• How to safeguard strategic partnerships amidst China’s rise
• Contrast between China and US infrastructure support
• Evasion of sanctions: Iran, Russia and China

Join us for an insightful discussion on the future of the US and its strategic goals in the region.

Hosted by

The importance of the Rules-Based International Order lies in preventing unilateral changes or use of force to alter recognized boundaries

Dana Stroul

About the China-MENA podcast

The China-MENA podcast features conversations with academics, think-tankers, and regional specialists on Chinese Influence in the Middle East and informs US and MENA audiences in the policy and business communities about the nature of China’s outreach to the region.

At a time when China’s global footprint is getting deeper and deeper, it has never been more important to understand its foreign policy and the Middle East is one of the world’s most consequential regions: home to major religions, diverse cultural and social heritage, central to global energy markets, and of course, geopolitics, linking people and markets in Asia, Africa and Europe.  This show will help you understand what China is doing in the region, and how the region is engaging with China as an increasingly important external power.

Podcast series

Listen to the latest episode of the China-MENA podcast, featuring conversations with academics, government leaders, and the policy community on China’s role in the Middle East.

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This podcast was funded in part by a grant from the United States Department of State. The opinions, findings, and conclusions stated herein are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the United States Department of State.

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Khakova quoted in BBC The World at One on Ukraine’s energy infrastructure https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/insight-impact/in-the-news/khakova-quoted-in-bbc-the-world-at-one-on-ukraines-energy-infrastructure/ Sat, 15 Jun 2024 17:38:02 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=773730 The post Khakova quoted in BBC The World at One on Ukraine’s energy infrastructure appeared first on Atlantic Council.

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Will the new Parliament change Europe’s course on energy security and climate? https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/energysource/will-the-new-parliament-change-europes-course-on-energy-security-and-climate/ Fri, 14 Jun 2024 19:29:18 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=773308 The recent European Parliament elections signal a shift in EU energy policy toward energy security and competitiveness. To ensure that climate remains on the agenda, European policymakers must deliver on existing commitments and deepen global climate cooperation.

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The last European Parliament governed as Europe’s energy system withstood unprecedent shocks to global markets and the economy. The shocks were numerous and severe: from negative pricing during the COVID-19 pandemic to all time-high energy costs following Putin’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine; from tensions in the Middle East and cyber and kinetic attacks on energy infrastructure to extreme weather events made more severe by climate change.

While energy was not the driving issue for the majority of the 185 million European voters for this election, the newly elected Parliament will play an important role in determining how to defend the bloc’s energy security, reduce emissions, and boost competitiveness.

Our experts weigh in on the impact of Europe’s elections on these issues.

Click to jump to an expert analysis:

András Simonyi: Will the EU elections slow its energy transition?

Pau Ruiz Guix: How the EU can stay the course on clean energy goals

Andrei Covatariu: EU elections put climate, energy security, and political capital at risk

Elena Benaim: EU climate and energy agenda hangs in the balance

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Will the EU elections slow its energy transition?

Five years ago, the European Commission under President Ursula von der Leyen set out to make the green transition its top priority. What comes next for the EU’s climate and energy agenda is uncertain. The Parliament’s new composition, and, perhaps even more importantly, the final choice of Commission president (which is up in the air) and members of the Commission, along with the distribution of portfolios, will be reflective of but also critical to the future direction of the EU.

While the gains of the extreme right are mainly a result of the migration crisis, the huge losses suffered by the Greens, plus the economic and political costs of the energy transition, need to be taken into account. These indicate a strong push to “rebalance” green transition and energy security.

Europe’s competitiveness has thus been added to climate and security/energy security concerns—for some member states, it is the number-one priority. Besides the geopolitical realities, as we warned years ago, the “absorption” capacity of European societies increasingly determines the speed with which the green transition can move forward.

There is an overwhelming view that now the next Commission will have to focus on the implementation of previous decisions. There are clearly two competing political trends, however. One aims to speed up the green transition as a panacea to all the issues mentioned above. The other takes a more pragmatic and realistic position to continue the transition, while taking into account the security, cost, and social aspects of that transition.

No matter what, energy security will take center stage. This means that US liquefied natural gas (LNG) will continue to play a major role, particularly as the majority view in Europe is that it will not go back to the status quo ante with Russian energy supplies.

András Simonyi is the former Hungarian ambassador to the United States and a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council Global Energy Center.

How the EU can stay the course on clean energy goals

The European elections results reflect a sentiment that has already been increasingly apparent: a need to align ambitious climate policy with a competitiveness and resilience agenda that delivers growth and economic security. While the reality of European policymaking means that a clearer picture will only emerge when new leadership is at the helm of the European Commission, the next five years will be all about implementing already-adopted regulation to reduce European greenhouse gas emissions by 55 percent by 2030.

To deliver on deep decarbonization goals, EU countries will need to implement targets to decarbonize hydrogen production at a time when carbon pricing will be extended, and the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism will be implemented and potentially expanded.

To deliver on domestic clean technology manufacturing goals, the new European leadership may opt to accelerate a trend toward re-shoring and friend-shoring, requiring new instruments, partnerships, and relationships within the multilateral trade system.

To deliver on clean hydrogen deployment goals, a sector where final investment decisions (FIDs) are struggling to take off, the new mandate should finalize low-carbon hydrogen rules and revise clean hydrogen rules reflecting what works and what doesn’t.

Achieving these three broad goals, which inevitably tackle global and trade-exposed sectors, will require strong climate and energy diplomacy that strengthens global cooperation on increased decarbonization of hard-to-abate industries, supply chain security, and regulatory alignment and certification. The US position and transatlantic cooperation will play a key role in achieving these objectives, and, therefore, not only European elections but American ones in November will inform and influence the realm of possibilities.

All in all, a world of different speeds in the energy transition is a challenging place, and the European experience shows that only by working together is it possible to balance climate, economic, and security objectives to the benefit of the people and the planet.

Pau Ruiz Guix is a trade and international relations officer with Hydrogen Europe.

EU elections put climate, energy security, and political capital at risk

In 2022, after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the European Commission set ambitious energy and climate targets to a significant extent aimed at minimizing social unrest and maintaining political stability in the European Parliament for the 2024 elections. This strategy largely succeeded, with the 2019 political coalition still holding a majority—albeit a narrow one— while public protests have been managed over the last years.

However, overambitious targets may soon backfire. As Commission President Ursula von der Leyen works to secure a strong coalition (which could include the Greens), some of the energy and climate objectives are at risk. Revising the approved 2030 targets is complex and politically risky with a right-leaning European Parliament. This could slow the transition pace, possibly enhancing short-term energy security but undermining long-term climate goals and supply security.

An alternative would be to maintain the existing targets, but this approach would also risk leaving goals unmet. This outcome could hurt energy security and political credibility, especially as the deadline for meeting targets falls right after the five-year term of the newly elected European Commission. Failing to meet the targets could erode the credibility of the leaders who will be in power at the end of this decade.

Looking beyond 2030, negotiations over the unapproved 2040 EU energy and climate targets pose even greater challenges than before, thus creating yet another significant political risk. Additionally, the EU enlargement process may also become less ambitious, which will only continue to generate spillover effects. Prospective countries would remain easily targeted by Russia with physical attacks on critical infrastructure, cyberattacks, or energy supply cuts, which will continue to hurt EU member states.

Andrei Covatariu is senior research associate at Energy Policy Group (EPG) and a research fellow at the Centre on Regulation in Europe (CERRE). This article reflects his own personal opinion.

EU climate and energy agenda hangs in the balance

On June 6, 2024, when called upon to vote for the European Parliament, European voters kept the center-right European People’s Party (EPP) as the leading group with 190 seats—a slight increase compared to the previous elections. However, to hold the majority, which requires 361 seats out of 720, the EPP will need to find working coalitions with other groups to pass legislation.

As announced by the EPP, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen will again be their candidate for the presidency. With a second mandate, von der Leyen would be expected to protect the Commission’s legacy (including its key initiatives such as Fit for 55 and RePower EU) and to continue focusing on competitiveness, cleantech, innovation, global leadership, and energy resilience. However, coalitions in the European Parliament will heavily determine the direction of climate and energy policies.

With a majority formed by the EPP, Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats (S&D), Renew Europe, and the Greens, the European Green Deal could be safe in terms of ambitions and targets. The coalition would probably maintain a decarbonization agenda strongly focused on energy security and industrial competitiveness and a likely dominant conversation around the social dimension of the energy transition.

With a majority that includes the hard-right group European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR), there could be a serious risk of seeing climate ambition weakened. Right-wing parties in member states have openly criticized Europe’s climate ambition, and this could result in undermining the provisions of the Fit for 55 plan. It might also complicate the already challenging discussion on unlocking investments for the green transition at the EU level.

A move to the right by the EPP would have severe implications for the legacy that the previous Commission built and hinder the possibility for the EU to build a strong industrial competitiveness strategy that supports the energy transition and climate targets.

Elena Benaim is a nonresident fellow with the Atlantic Council Global Energy Center.

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Europe is gearing up to hit Chinese EVs with new tariffs. Here’s why. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/experts-react/europe-is-gearing-up-to-hit-chinese-evs-with-new-tariffs-heres-why/ Wed, 12 Jun 2024 14:55:56 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=772547 The European Commission just proposed new tariffs on China-made electric vehicles of up to 38 percent. Atlantic Council experts explain why—and what might happen next.

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The tariff race is picking up speed. On Wednesday, the European Commission proposed new tariffs on China-made electric vehicles (EVs) of up to 38.1 percent starting in July. An ongoing European Union (EU) investigation concluded that Chinese automakers such as BYD benefit from unfair subsidization that is “causing a threat of economic injury” to European companies. The news comes after US President Joe Biden announced tariffs of up to 100 percent on Chinese EVs in May. Below, Atlantic Council experts shift into high gear to explain what this all means.

By putting in place additional tariffs of up to 38.1 percent (much higher than the anticipated 15-30 percent), the Commission has shown its commitment to aggressively protecting the EU auto industry from a massive increase in Chinese EV imports. By setting these countervailing tariffs lower than the United States’ 100 percent and by applying rates differentially based on firm-specific levels of Chinese subsidization, production sites within the EU, and cooperation with the Commission, the EU is also communicating that its primary goal with these tariffs is to level the playing field rather than completely wall the single market off from Chinese EV imports.

The size of these tariffs indicate that the French have more influence than the Germans in EU trade policy, at least for now. French carmakers, in contrast to German auto brands, are less dependent on the Chinese market and more willing to use tariff policy to protect local production capacity. Indeed, the tariffs and their political fallout reflect a split between EU member states with deep ties to China’s car industry, such as Germany, Sweden, and Hungary, and member states that view China as more of a threat than an opportunity, such as France and Italy.

Sarah Bauerle Danzman is a resident senior fellow in the GeoEconomics Center’s Economic Statecraft Initiative.


The European Commission unveiled its higher-than-expected countervailing tariffs on some EVs imported from China. With this move, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen’s economic security agenda has won out against even a last-minute push by Germany to soften the decision. Concerns and disappointment have already echoed from German industry, criticizing the Commission’s “Trumpian protectionist” decision and denouncing detrimental economic consequences for Germany’s automotive industry. However, apart from the howls of opposition from some large German auto and chemical actors, almost 70 percent of German industries support protective measures against China’s unfair trade practices and market distortion. This fracture between Germany’s Mittelstand and major global players (such as Volkswagen, Siemens, BMW, Mercedes-Benz, BASF, and Bayer) reflects the underlying contrast between the EU’s need to protect its industries against Chinese overcapacity versus certain export-dependent sectors within the European bloc. 

With a strong chance of von der Leyen leading the Commission for the next five years and an increasingly protectionist-oriented global economy, it will be interesting to watch who catches up with whom. Will von der Leyen’s ambitious economic security agenda that echoes Washington’s tougher stance on China be reined in by export-dependent member states such as Germany? Or will Berlin come to a realization that the EU has to address key vulnerabilities vis-à-vis Beijing? This is only the opening salvo in a longer-term policy debate. 

Jörn Fleck is the senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center.

Jacopo Pastorelli is a program assistant in the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center.


In order to not affect the European Parliament election campaign, the European Commission waited to announce its decision to impose additional tariffs on Chinese EVs. But now that the election is over, it can finally move. It is indeed high time for the EU to react to China’s subsidized industrial overcapacities. The United States and other countries, such as Turkey, had already announced additional tariffs on Chinese EVs, thereby raising the pressure on the EU, because China could further divert its exports to Europe. 

But the decision by Brussels is not backed by all EU member states. While France is in favor, auto giant Germany has been wary of these tariffs and made an eleventh-hour bid to dilute and reduce the Commission’s planned tariff hike. In the corridors of the German chancellery and parts of the German economics ministry, there is great concern that the German automotive industry could bear the brunt of Chinese retaliatory action. And this remains a space to watch. So far, this is a provisional predisclosure by the European Commission. It now has four months to adopt definitive measures, which will require an implementing act with an examination procedure, which usually implies a qualified majority vote in a comitology procedure, meaning it is not final and set in stone, yet.

Roderick Kefferpütz is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center and the director of the Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung European Union office in Brussels. The opinions expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung.


The EU is undertaking tariffs on China-made EVs due to surging shipments to Europe. Additionally, the US imposition of tariffs on EVs and other products—especially batteries—forced the EU’s hand. 

The EU is of at least two minds regarding tariffs on China-produced EVs. Germany, Sweden, and Hungary all oppose the tariffs, which they feel will damage existing commercial ties with China. Germany fears retaliation against its own auto sales to China. Sweden’s Volvo brand is owned by the Chinese firm Geely. And Hungary has received substantial EV investments from Chinese EV and battery companies. Conversely, France, Italy, and several other EU actors advocated for additional tariffs, as these measures could protect EU automakers from subsidized competitors while attracting inward investments from China. 

Owing to a lack of internal consensus, as well as the rapidly changing nature of the EV landscape, the EU may well revisit its decision in the coming months. The EU’s decision is caveated at several points and could be reassessed if the European-US alliance weakens over the next year.

Joseph Webster is a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Global Energy Center, where he leads the center’s efforts on Chinese energy security.

Because the United States has very little Chinese EV market penetration as of now, its recent Section 301 tariffs on Chinese EVs are largely preventive. In contrast, the EU’s tariffs are responding to a rapid increase in Chinese EV imports. In this way, the EU tariffs are more in keeping with the manner in which antidumping/countervailing duty investigations are usually undertaken, and the EU announcement makes it clear that it is at least attempting to impose these duties in a World Trade Organization-compliant manner, including by offering to enter negotiations with the Chinese government.

The EU tariffs are both lower than the United States’ and more complicated. By choosing to apply tariffs on a company-by-company basis, the EU is trying to demonstrate that its actions are rooted in factual determinations about Chinese subsidies, which themselves are provided on a company-by-company basis. By ensuring SAIC cars are hit with the highest tariff rate, the EU is also differentiating between state-owned car companies (which SAIC is) and private firms (such as BYD and Geely). This also gives the EU tools to incentivize car companies on an individual basis to transfer more production to the EU in order to gain better market access. The message is clear—site production in the EU or be subject to a tariff designed to eliminate the subsidization benefits of building vehicles in China.

The differences between the US and EU tariffs further highlight how much more dependent major European car manufacturers are on China—as a market, a production site, and as a source of inward investment. US carmakers are much less reliant on China for revenue, largely because as Chinese automakers have grown, US brands have been pushed out. The sense that China is a declining market for US autos has also blunted organized industrial opposition to tariffs on Chinese vehicles. Across the Atlantic, European car manufacturers have been much more vocal and concerned about tariff action against Chinese EVs due to the potential for retaliation, and this shows in both the tariff level—which is much lower than the United States’—and the firm-specific carve-outs.

—Sarah Bauerle Danzman


The EU’s tariffs are vastly different from the US measures in several key aspects. The EU-announced tariff rates are substantially lower than comparable US measures; are differentiated on a company-by-company basis; and, unlike the United States’, indicate a receptiveness to inward investment. 

The European Commission’s investigation determined that Chinese automakers BYD and Geely will receive preferential tariff rates of 17.4 percent and 20 percent, which will be applied on top of the existing 10 percent tariff rate that Chinese EVs face. Other producers would face additional tariffs ranging from 21 percent to 38.1 percent. 

While the criteria for determining provisional countervailing duties is not transparent, it appears that the European Commission awarded lower rates to automakers investing into the European ecosystem. 

It is not clear how the Commission determined a level of subsidization on a company-by-company basis—or if this exercise is even possible. The Chinese system of subsidies is diverse, complex, and opaque. Chinese firms often receive direct or implicit support via preferential interest rates, directed credit, tax credits, and cross subsidies—such as in the steelmaking and shipbuilding sectors. Moreover, these subsidies take place at the national, provincial, and even local level. 

While it’s not clear how the European Union could determine the level of these subsidies, especially on a company-by-company basis, it can calculate which firms have the largest local footprint. Both BYD and Geely have substantial investments in Europe. BYD has already opened an EV plant in Hungary and plans to open another facility. Geely owns the Swedish brand Volvo and has begun to shift production of some vehicles from China to Belgium. 

Finally, China’s SAIC group received the maximum tariff rate of 38.1 percent. The automaker has a limited footprint on the continent, and it has yet to select a site for its first European production facility, despite nearly a year of consideration. Accordingly, Europe seems to be warning SAIC to site a facility within Europe or face tariffs.

—Joseph Webster

China will likely issue some corresponding tariffs on European-made goods, even if only for symbolic purposes. Yet, it may have no choice other than to accept that Europe will accept its investment, but not its exports. Beijing may also seek to re-engage with Europe on electric vehicles after the US presidential election, which will have significant implications for transatlantic ties. 

Beijing will closely watch Europe’s posture toward lithium-ion batteries, which can be used for grid storage or electric vehicles (and also have potential military implications). With US tariffs on lithium-ion batteries beginning in 2026, Europe will be flooded by these products unless it applies its own measures.

—Joseph Webster


China has already indicated it may retaliate with tariffs against internal combustion engine vehicles, aviation equipment, and agriculture. It remains to be seen whether China makes good on that threat, but it did send a letter to the Commission in the aftermath of the tariff announcements, asking for a negotiated settlement and threatening to start retaliatory measures in aviation and agriculture in the absence of a deal. Agriculture and aviation are both politically sensitive sectors, with exports to China representing more than 6 percent of the EU’s agricultural trade. It’s less clear how easily China could absorb the costs of aviation tariffs given that Airbus planes represent more than 50 percent of China’s commercial aviation fleet.

At some point, the usefulness of tariffs in changing governments’ behavior displays decreasing returns. This is especially true as rounds of protectionism reduce firms’ market share in each other’s markets. The lack of strong US industrial opposition to tariffs on Chinese EVs is a case in point. The lesson here is that governments are going to eventually have to sit down and work out their differences; trade wars might be on-trend at the moment, but eventually the downsides—including increased costs and reduced consumer choice—will become more apparent to citizens.

—Sarah Bauerle Danzman

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Seven ways to reboot G7 sanctions on Russia https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/seven-ways-to-reboot-g7-sanctions-on-russia/ Tue, 11 Jun 2024 13:17:17 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=771515 Russia is adapting to Western sanctions, but there are viable options to intensify the economic hit on its economy for its brutal war on Ukraine.

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At the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum on June 7, Russian President Vladimir Putin was defiant about the Russian economy. “Despite all the obstacles we are facing and the illegitimate sanctions imposed against us,” he declared, “Russia remains one of the key participants in global trade and is rapidly expanding the new logistics and geography of cooperation.” This is especially the case with non-Western countries, he indicated. Putin glossed over the difficulties, but the Russian economy has thus far been able to sustain his war of aggression in Ukraine.

At this dangerous moment, with air assaults continuing and a renewed land offensive likely in Ukraine, both sides of the Atlantic need to put their backs into support for Kyiv, whose success in its war of survival is critical to transatlantic security and remains possible. The most important part of that work is for the United States and European countries to provide more and better weapons with fewer caveats—a process that is already underway. But it also means exerting more economic pressure on Russia’s wartime economy. 

Sanctions and other forms of economic pressure alone are not going to force Putin to abandon his war objectives. But they can continue to weaken the Russian economy, lower Russian income, complicate production, and intensify the distortion of a rapidly militarized economy with an increasingly starved civilian sector. The Russian economy, like the Soviet economy, has little natural resilience. Nor does it allow space for entrepreneurship on a large scale. Under sustained pressure and extreme military spending, it will be prone to decay, like its Soviet predecessor. Group of Seven (G7) countries imposed sanctions against Russia after its initial invasion in 2014 and much stronger measures after Russia launched its full-scale war in 2022. Both sets of sanctions have had an impact. But as recent Russian economic statistics show, the impact of these efforts is plateauing as Russia gets better at evading and mitigating them. Sanctions are a dynamic game, and the United States and its G7 partners need to be as agile in addressing Russia’s responses to existing sanctions as Russia has been in adapting to the sanctions themselves. 

“Sanctions are like antibiotics: Repeat usage builds up resistance,” Deputy National Security Advisor Daleep Singh explained in remarks on May 28. The necessary and appropriate response, then, is to intensify them to produce the desired effect. Happily, there are viable options to intensify the economic hit on Russia. None is without some risk or complication—options that promise all gain and no pain don’t actually exist. But the United States and the European Union (EU) should follow and choke off the money, show they mean it when it comes to enforcement, and hold sanctions evaders accountable.

Steps to do this could include:

1. Give the Russian oil price cap more teeth

Oil remains Russia’s number one export earner. The Russian oil price cap sought to limit the price of Russian oil sold on world markets to sixty dollars per barrel while not limiting the quantity of sales. The price cap was designed to reduce Russian income without spiking world oil prices, which would have happened if sanctions took Russian oil off the markets. And it worked, especially in the first year, lowering Russian revenues from oil sales by about 40 percent in the first nine months of 2023. The enforcement occurred through banning Western services, such as insurance and shipping, to oil shipments above the price cap.

Over the past year, however, Russia has adapted to the sanctions, procuring a “ghost fleet” of tankers to transport oil at prices above the price cap and offering its own insurance and other services to buyers. This ghost fleet has enabled Russia to demand its buyers pay prices closer to market value—and above price cap prices—because buyers cannot cite the price cap as an impediment to their paying higher prices.

It is time for the G7 to adapt the price cap accordingly. The G7 should back the price cap with the threat of secondary sanctions on those companies engaged in or supporting sales of Russian oil above the price cap by, for example, purchasing Russian oil above the price cap or shipping it. These secondary sanctions could be announced with a grace period of, for example, four months. During this time, current customers of Russia that are buying above-cap oil could rework their purchasing agreements with Russian suppliers, and US and EU enforcers could gather material on potential targets should they not do so. It’s also time to curtail the ability of banks, wherever they are based, to support the sale of Russian oil above the price cap. This can be done by narrowing the scope of licenses intended to facilitate financing for oil trade.

Any steps to check Russian revenue through oil sales would have to be gamed out to lower the risk of unintended consequences, such as a spike in prices. The Biden administration has been sensitive to any such steps, going so far as to press the Ukrainians not to strike at Russian oil refineries. This was an ill-considered admonition and was badly received by the Ukrainians, who rightly regard Russian refineries as legitimate military targets and have conducted effective attacks on them.

But the principle that informed the initial price cap still applies: As long as the price cap is significantly above Russia’s cost of production, Russia will have an incentive to keep up exports and will suffer a major loss of revenue if it does not. Russia’s cost of production can be estimated in various ways, but generally is regarded at well under sixty dollars per barrel. The risk of spiking world oil prices by more aggressively enforcing a cap on Russian oil exports thus seems acceptable.

2. Cut off Russia’s energy future

Russia has also been adapting to the sanctions by developing new capacities to help export oil and gas that don’t rely on its traditional pipeline network. This includes liquefied natural gas (LNG), where the Biden administration late last year sanctioned Russia’s Arctic LNG 2 project as a particular target. While Russia is the world’s fourth-largest LNG exporter, global production (and US production in particular) is rising. LNG supply shortages seem unlikely in the near term.

Russian officials have also discussed building new pipelines in the country’s east, particularly to China. US sanctions should push back on these efforts to develop new energy export avenues. Measures could include forcing all LNG service companies out of the sector, using the threat of secondary sanctions, and imposing additional sanctions on new export flows. As with increases in oil sector sanctions, these might have to be phased in and accompanied by licenses to avoid unintended consequences—for example, with Japan’s interest in LNG kept in mind.

3. Push Western firms to crack down on diversion of their products to Russia

Many Western companies have fully withdrawn from the Russian market, and even those that remain have generally adopted programs to comply with Western sanctions. However, reporting continues to find Western component parts pervasive across Russia’s military machinery: One recent study found that 95 percent of the non-Russian components in Russian weapons recovered in Ukraine were from Western firms, with only 4 percent from Chinese firms. Many of these Western components were likely produced in China and other manufacturing hubs and then disappeared into a network of shadowy middlemen.

After the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the US government pushed global banks to overhaul the way they complied with sanctions, and the banks generally developed an extensive infrastructure to spot and stop terrorist and other rogue money moving through the financial system. The United States and its partners should undertake a similar effort with the manufacturing and tech sectors, working collaboratively to strengthen compliance and reduce the diversion of Western-made components flowing to Russia. Through warnings and public enforcement actions, such as civil and criminal penalties that make examples of selected companies that show flagrant irresponsibility, the United States and Europe could put pressure on firms to take seriously the “Know Your Customer” (and “Your Customer’s Customer”) principle.

4. Drop the hammer on third-country evaders

Reports abound of exports of banned technologies to Russia through third countries, including through Georgia, Central Asian countries, and Turkey. US officials have been traveling widely and urging greater cooperation, and the United States has for some time sanctioned third-country evaders. Beyond getting Western companies to strengthen their export controls compliance protocols, the United States should increase pressure on countries that serve as platforms for re-exports to Russia, including an aggressive campaign of secondary sanctions on firms that re-export prohibited goods to Russia.

5. Consider a shift to “embargo-minus” rather than “targeted sanctions-plus”

Since the initial Russian invasion in 2014, the United States and Europe have gradually imposed financial sanctions on Russia’s big state banks and some selected private banks, along with a large number of sectoral sanctions and sanctions on Russian companies. This creates a complex sanctions regime where a lot of trade is banned but a lot of other trade remains allowed, leaving gray areas and loopholes for Russia to exploit and complicating enforcement.

The United States and Europe should consider imposing a general embargo on both trade and financial transactions with Russia, except for defined categories of white-listed trade, such as medicine, permitted energy, and other transactions. Such a system—phased in with grace periods and perhaps starting with a general financial embargo—would have to be flexible enough to account for unanticipated problems by issuing supplemental licenses.

6. Face the China challenge

While apparently not directly sending weapons to Russia, China has emerged as Russia’s greatest economic backer since its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, providing general economic support and dual-use equipment and technology to support Rusia’s war effort. These efforts have weakened the impact of—and could undermine—US and European sanctions. Aware of this, the Biden administration has imposed sanctions on smaller Chinese companies engaged in sanctions violations, hoping for a change in Chinese policy but to little apparent avail. During his trip to Beijing in late April, US Secretary of State Antony Blinken reportedly pressed his Chinese interlocutors to back off their economic support for Russia, and the administration may hope that a frank warning will result in China changing course.

If not, the United States should take action, such as imposing sanctions on a larger Chinese bank or company involved in supporting Russia’s war machine. Chinese financial transactions with Russia are likely happening outside the reach of US sanctions, meaning outside of the US dollar and US financial system. Therefore, these sanctions would initially serve more as a messaging tool than a mechanism to immediately turn off the transactions.

But messaging is important, especially when dealing with China. Sanctions targeting a large Chinese financial institution or significant company facilitating material support to Russia would lead other countries and companies to de-risk from these sanctioned entities to reduce their sanctions exposure. It would mean US secondary sanctions in China. Such steps risk Chinese retaliation or unintended consequences. But a sanctions carve-out that allows China to back up Russia’s military machine, which is what a lack of action effectively amounts to, would pose a bigger risk: that of failure of US and European support for Ukraine and a message that the West is not serious about its own policy.

7. Take Russia’s money to pay for Russia’s war

In a bold move immediately after the full-scale invasion, the G7 immobilized around $300 billion of Russian sovereign assets. It has since debated what to do with the funds and has been slow to get beyond general agreement that they will remain immobilized. Many in the United States have advocated seizing all the immobilized funds and using them for Ukraine (the passage of the REPO Act gives the US legal backing to do so with the funds in its jurisdiction, which is reportedly at least five billion dollars). The EU, where the vast bulk of the Russian assets are located (in Belgium), had limited itself to using the interest on the immobilized Russian principal for Ukraine. While a welcome step, that interest comes to around three billion dollars per year, an inadequate amount given the scale of Ukraine’s needs in the face of Russia’s ongoing war.

The G7 now seems to be closing in on a compromise proposal to take the interest on the Russian assets for twenty years rather than just one year, a proposal that could provide a pot of $53 billion. Those funds could be used as collateral for a loan or grant to Ukraine from the United States or a group of willing countries. Meanwhile, efforts to capture agreement on using the entire principal would continue.

That seems to be a smart compromise that provides one way to have Russia rather than European or US taxpayers pay to help Ukraine. The upcoming G7 summit in Italy would be the time and place to reach agreement. That will not be easy: Some Europeans seem stuck in a mode of thinking that has not yet internalized Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and its ongoing aggression against other European countries through disinformation, assassination, and sabotage.

Seizing sovereign assets is a big step. But the G7 crossed the line of absolute immunity for sovereign assets when it immobilized the Russia’s assets more than two years ago. While other countries, such as China and Saudi Arabia, may have hated that step and may be privately warning of retaliation should Europe or the United States go further and take Russian assets or proceeds, they have not pulled funds out of US, European, or UK financial markets. The G7 needs to see through what it began in February 2022 and find a way to use Russian funds to pay for Russia’s war of aggression and national extermination against Ukraine.

Neither these nor any serious economic steps against Russia are risk-free or simple; if they were, they would have been introduced already. Each will require resources to identify targets, anticipate potential risks, and enforce. Manufacturers won’t like the scrutiny or demands that they monitor their products’ ultimate destinations. Third countries will not appreciate the pressure to cut down on diversion of exports to Russia. The United States and allied governments should consider their choices not as alternatives to a zero-risk ideal but against the backdrop of the considerable stakes and their own repeated and accurate statements of how important it is to help Ukraine defeat Russia in this war.


Daniel Fried is the Weiser Family distinguished fellow at the Atlantic Council. His last position in the US government was as sanctions coordinator at the Department of State. Peter Harrell, a former State Department and National Security Council senior director, contributed to this article, for which the author gives thanks.

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Generative AI provides a toolkit for decarbonization https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/energysource/generative-ai-provides-a-toolkit-for-decarbonization/ Mon, 10 Jun 2024 16:43:13 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=771543 Artificial intelligence models have long provided niche tools for energy a climate technologists. With the unique capabilities of generative AI, spanning applications in strategy, regulation, and finance, opportunities (and responsibilities) have emerged for all decarbonization stakeholders.

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Rapidly improving artificial intelligence (AI) capabilities will help accelerate the energy transition. Both established and emergent AI capabilities—such as large language models (LLMs)—can be applied to an array of strategic, technical, financial, and policy challenges posed by decarbonization. It is critical for energy transition stakeholders to monitor, understand, and carefully apply these capabilities to their unique decarbonization challenges, while also addressing the risks involved.

The most consequential new class of AI, generative AI, is able to analyze and create text, audio, code, and even molecular design—doing so faster and often with higher quality than human-created counterparts. Generative AI uses extraordinary volumes of training data and novel data-processing mechanisms which require unprecedented computational power. Data center load growth, driven by a range of factors, is forcing utilities across the United States and Europe to revisit system planning needs. Indeed, this added demand is—in some regions—delaying the retirement of coal-fired power plants. To ensure that climate targets are met, data center growth must coincide with transmission upgrades, energy efficiency improvements, and new low-carbon generation capacity. More broadly, policymakers must also consider how to harness the potential from generative AI while managing complex uncertainties, from inaccurate outputs and data leakage to AI-enabled cyberattacks on critical infrastructure. The deployment of generative AI will require rigorous human oversight, particularly in the early stages.

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Given the capabilities of generative AI, integration into organizational workflows can help energy stakeholders in multiple ways—for example, lower regulatory compliance costs, consider strategic planning options, and evaluate the financial risk around their low-carbon investments, among others.

1. Strategic planning

Recent demonstrations of generative AI capabilities are impressive. Generative AI can already outline, summarize, and draft documents cheaper and faster than many humans. It can also help humans conduct strategic tasks more effectively. A study by Harvard Business School examined the effects of GPT-4—the model behind ChatGPT—on knowledge workers’ productivity, finding that GPT-4 significantly improved workers’ abilities to generate effective ideas and develop implementation plans. Another study from University College London found that a collection of LLMs could give strategic recommendations at a comparable level to human experts. As strategic planning use cases are systemic and across industries, improvements in productivity would apply across the decarbonization value chain.

2. Regulatory compliance

Some generative AI use cases will directly enhance clean energy project developers’ ability to manage cumbersome regulatory processes. As generative AI capabilities are integrated into institutional workflows, they will assist on tasks ranging from simple emails to complex, costly, and time-consuming regulatory processes. The Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, as part of its PolicyAI, initiative, recently found that LLMs could streamline the public comment-review process under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), which is burdensome for many renewables firms.

Importantly, generative AI may aid regulators by accelerating reviews of a variety of environmental impact studies. For instance, after New York State attempted to ease traffic and pollution by passing traffic congestion pricing, an exhaustive environmental review took five years and more than 4,000 pages of analysis. By streamlining portions of these document-intensive regulatory tasks, generative AI can speed up environmental reviews, giving infrastructure projects a quicker go/no-go decision.

3. Decarbonization investment analytics

A range of AI tools, using both existing techniques and generative AI, are being developed to assist with financial and economic modeling, a critical but resource-intensive task for renewable energy projects. While still at the early stages, generative AI tools may be able to partially or even fully build financial models or propose complex scenario plans. In addition, AI is already being used to enhance corporate due diligence by detecting anomalies in financial statements, summarizing earnings call transcripts, or rapidly analyzing trade press. These capabilities will continue to assist both investors and corporate mergers-and-acquisitions teams in their decarbonization investments.

4. Energy asset management

Financial and economic modeling tools overlap with another essential aspect of decarbonization: advanced energy asset management. Currently, communications with energy asset field operators are typically executed via middle management and dashboards with both planned and ad hoc analytics. Generative AI may enable more simplified analytics and communication with the workers physically assessing and repairing assets. At the energy asset management level, generative AI tools could deliver improvements in compiling, summarizing, and communicating asset performance in a customized manner for financial managers. 

5. Wildfire risk assessment

In parallel to generative AI, another area of quiet yet significant advancement has been machine-learning (ML) models for weather forecasting, which have produced some extraordinary results. Further advances in weather forecasting could help mitigate the climate change-driven fire season. Wildfires themselves exacerbate the climate crisis—global fires produce emissions of about 2 gigatons of carbon dioxide equivalent per year, equal to 4 percent of total global emissions. These fires can also force large populations indoors for weeks due to health risks and poor air quality. Further investment in AI/ML-based modeling could help manage these risks by predicting the probable location and magnitude of potential wildfires and improving real-time surveillance of smoke, enabling firefighters to combat the over 80,000 wildfires that occur in the United States alone every year. 

Despite the current AI hype cycle and the early-stage risks around generative AI, improving the broad range of AI models will be integral to developing a low-carbon economy. The magnitude and pace will be difficult to predict, as models are integrated into institutional workflows. Human oversight, particularly around critical infrastructure, must remain comprehensive. If managed appropriately, these emergent capabilities will yield important advances in regulatory analysis, environmental management, strategic planning, and an array of challenges essential to achieving net-zero emissions.

Joseph Webster is a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council Global Energy Center.

Shaheer Hussam is a partner at Aetlan, an energy advisory and analytics firm.

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Wald quoted in AFP on foreign purchases of Saudi Aramco shares https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/insight-impact/in-the-news/wald-quoted-in-afp-on-foreign-purchases-of-saudi-aramco-shares/ Sun, 09 Jun 2024 18:55:00 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=774219 The post Wald quoted in AFP on foreign purchases of Saudi Aramco shares appeared first on Atlantic Council.

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Increasing investment in African mining should be a higher priority for the United States https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/africasource/increasing-investment-in-african-mining-should-be-a-higher-priority-for-the-united-states/ Fri, 07 Jun 2024 18:21:55 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=770748 If governments, investors, and development partners don’t make dramatic changes in the next five years, the United States will fail to counter Chinese influence in supply chains.

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This article has been adapted from the author’s Atlantic Council report, “From greenfield projects to green supply chains: Critical minerals in Africa as an investment challenge,” with financial support from the Aiteo Group.

The US elections are quickly approaching. But while there may be a shift in administrations, critical minerals are poised to remain a central theme in US policy: Deep bipartisan support for remaking global supply chains and reducing dependence on China’s current dominance in processing have virtually election-proofed focus on the issue.

Rich in minerals and with a strategic location, African countries should be benefiting from this growing US interest. But currently—due to the investment-intensive nature of greenfield projects, the United States’ and Europe’s increased focus on self-reliance, and competition from other countries with more established mining industries—African countries risk largely losing out on this historic opportunity to attract more investment in the minerals that will fuel future industries,

To ensure that supply chains are restructured to best advance both US and African strategic interests, the US government must accelerate an integrated approach that combines investment facilitation, technological innovation, and capacity building.

New mines take a long time and a large amount of capital to build. Such challenges have hindered non-Chinese capital flows into African markets for decades; but non-Chinese investors and governments are aware of the strategic role the continent could and should play in the global shift to cleaner energy sources. For example, 56 percent of global cobalt reserves, key to electrical vehicle manufacturing, can be found in African countries, particularly in the Democratic Republic of Congo. While investment in critical-mineral infrastructure has grown in recent decades, a significant financing gap persists, estimated to be up to $108 billion each year.

The United States and the European Union (EU) are unable to finance infrastructure projects through the government-to-government lending model that China typically employs; thus, the emphasis is put on the private sector to make large-scale investments that must be financed from the firms’ balance sheets or through the capital markets rather than from government coffers. Yet, many Western companies view Africa through a lens of risk, which could be attributed to persisting negative narratives about African markets and people and the heightened scrutiny of global brands by nongovernmental organizations. Western companies’ concerns about political risk and corruption often override their assessments of opportunities. This is in sharp contrast with companies, such as ones from China, the Middle East, or even Turkey, that seem to focus more steadily on the opportunity in African economies created by young populations, rapid digitalization, and wide diversification, motivating these companies to work to mitigate the risks as they encounter them.

Another challenge for African countries hoping to attract Western investment for mining is the growing onshoring focus of the United States and EU. Western countries have resurrected industrial policy in a big way in recent years, ramping up billions in financing and guarantees for mining projects as the strategic vulnerability posed by dependence on Chinese supply chains becomes clearer. African and Western governments are united in their goal to change the current supply chain.

In response to China’s approach to critical minerals, onshoring, nearshoring, and friendshoring have proven a bipartisan priority in the United States. And, on both sides of the Atlantic, hundreds of billions of dollars are being pumped into this effort. This can be seen in the US Inflation Reduction Act (IRA), the US CHIPS and Science Act, and both the EU’s Net-Zero Industry Act and its batteries regulation of 2023, which all seek to make progress toward net zero and reduce dependence on China’s role in critical-mineral supply chains. The expanded processing capacity that will result from IRA-incentivized investment in the United States will require more inputs and, therefore, a dramatic expansion in mining—over three hundred new mines will be needed to meet electric-vehicle battery demand alone by 2035.

African countries will be home to many of these new mines. Including them in US friendshoring efforts in the years ahead will require investment that is responsibly structured to overcome historical sins. The history of mining and colonialism in Africa—with its extractive, exploitative, and environmentally damaging legacy—has fostered a deeply emotional context for conversations about the future of the industry on the continent. But while mining was part of an ugly past, it is also a necessary part of a brighter and greener future. To advance this vision, Western governments, investors, and development partners must ensure that economic benefits are broadened to meaningfully include local communities, national companies, and environmental and academic groups.

Africa, as a region, has vast potential to build value-adding mining industry capabilities; but potential, if left untapped, won’t attain the economic growth African countries are searching for. Tangible economic progress will require billions of dollars of investment. Washington must invest in its partnership with African countries by derisking increased investment from the private sector and by encouraging the adoption of transparent, equitable, and sustainable practices.

If governments, investors, and development partners don’t make dramatic changes in the next five years (during this administration and the next one) African nations may miss this opportune moment to leverage historic levels of demand for critical minerals to fuel industrial growth, foreign-exchange generation, skills acquisition, and job creation—and the United States may fail to counter Chinese influence in the supply chains that are critical for sustained US global competitiveness and national security. 

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Report

Jul 1, 2024

From greenfield projects to green supply chains: Critical minerals in Africa as an investment challenge

By Aubrey Hruby

This report provides a snapshot of Africa’s mineral wealth and mining industries, draws out the similarities between the mining and infrastructure investment attraction challenges, describes the competitive landscape African nations find themselves in, and makes innovative recommendations—namely to the US government—to rapidly accelerate investment in sustainable mining industries in African markets.

Africa Economy & Business

Aubrey Hruby is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center and co-founder of Insider and Tofino Capital.

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Modi should make India’s energy transition his third-term legacy https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/modi-should-make-indias-energy-transition-his-third-term-legacy/ Fri, 07 Jun 2024 15:14:29 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=770920 There are three opportunities that the Modi government could take right away to further support and strengthen its clean energy agenda.

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India conducted the largest democratic election in world history while suffering from an intense and prolonged heat wave that has brought a significant part of the country to a standstill. On May 29, New Delhi registered an all-time high temperature of 127 degrees Fahrenheit. Public schools and government offices have been forced to close, and Indians have stayed home to avoid the deadly impact of the heat. The extreme heat likely depressed voter turnout in the elections that ended on June 1.

A recent survey by the Yale Program on Climate Change shows that Indians are highly aware of climate change and its impact on India’s future: A staggering 86 percent “favor the Indian government’s commitment to reduce India’s carbon pollution to nearly zero by 2070.” According to the survey, 85 percent agree that “transitioning from coal to wind and solar energy to produce electricity will reduce air pollution,” and 82 percent say “doing so would reduce global warming.” Surprisingly, the survey revealed that 84 percent “favor banning the construction of new coal power plants, closing existing ones, and replacing them with solar and wind energy.”

At the same time, Indians are concerned about the unintended consequences of climate change policies. The Yale survey showed that 61 percent say transitioning from coal to wind and solar energy to produce electricity “will increase unemployment in India,” 58 percent say “it will cause electricity outages,” and 57 percent say “it will increase electricity prices.” 

Indians are aware that they are among the world’s top emitters of greenhouse gases, including carbon dioxide (CO2). India’s CO2 emissions are relatively low per capita, ranking just sixteenth in Asia and ninety-ninth globally. But India’s burgeoning population, need for economic and job growth, and role in the global digital and technology ecosystem mean that India will need multiple power sources, including coal and other fossil fuels, for the near future. In fact, the International Energy Agency’s 2021 India Energy Outlook notes that the country needs to add a power system the size of the entire European Union grid to meet its energy requirements over the next twenty years. A blend of energy sources that moves swiftly toward green energy is the only viable option.

Indian leaders have committed to lowering their country’s dependence on coal and other fossil fuels, reduce its carbon intensity by 45 percent, and achieve 50 percent cumulative electric power from renewables by 2030. Equally ambitious, India would like to achieve net-zero carbon emissions by 2070. A 2023 report by the International Energy Agency stated that India is expected to produce over half of the world’s new capacity for renewable energy over the next three years. Much of this should be credited to India’s aggressive renewable energy policies.

Three opportunities for Modi to boost clean energy

But with Prime Minister Narendra Modi winning a historic third consecutive term, leading a coalition government, he has the mandate to go beyond issuing regulations and providing government financing. There are three opportunities that the Modi government could take right away to further support and strengthen its clean energy agenda.

First, businesses require certainty. Indian laws and regulations are not required to have sunset provisions and can be revoked or terminated at any time. This discourages large-scale private sector commitments and investments. Defined regulatory and legislative terms articulate the government’s commitment to its policies and allow businesses to accurately assess its financial commitments. Similar to the United States’ 2022 Inflation Reduction Act, the Modi government could commit to a ten-year sunset for its clean energy programs. After ten years, when the regulations need to be reauthorized, the laws can be updated to meet current demands.

Second, to help support clean energy businesses, the government needs to expand its institutional capacity at the state level and properly invest in education systems to produce a skilled workforce.

Third, with the increase in power generation, India must ensure that its electrical grids can receive and transmit the power to customers (the last mile). Failure to do so could cause India to miss its clean energy targets and lead to a slowdown in economic and job growth.

Over the past three decades, more than 3,500 climate policies have been announced by nations around the world, according to the World Economic Forum. From 2010 to 2015, China issued the highest number of climate policies. But from 2015 to 2022, India took the lead by issuing more than fifty climate change policies. These ranged from production-linked incentive schemes to policies that encourage the use of clean energy products such as rooftop solar energy. This multifaceted approach is backed with the objective of reducing India’s carbon intensity by 45 percent compared with 2005 levels and generating 50 percent of electric power from renewable sources by 2030.

What the private sector is already doing

The private sector has positively responded to India’s ambitious goals. For example, in 2022 the Adani Group* started developing the world’s largest renewable energy park. Through an ecosystem of manufacturing, generation, and transmission, the Khavda renewable energy park, located in the deserts of Gujarat, is combining wind and solar power to generate 30 gigawatts of energy for the national grid. When completed in 2029, the park will power 16.1 million homes and eliminate 58 million tons of CO2 emissions annually, the developers say. To put that in perspective, it is the equivalent of planting more than two billion trees or not burning 60,300 tons of coal each year. Another massive Indian conglomerate, Tata Group, recently completed India’s largest solar and battery energy storage system via its Tata Power Solar Systems subsidiary. Tata says that the facility, which is in Chhattisgarh, combines a 100 megawatt solar photovoltaic project combined with a 120 megawatt hour battery storage system. The developers expect the project to reduce India’s carbon footprint by 4.87 million tons of CO2 over twenty-five years.

However, more is needed. The Adani Group has the size and diversity of businesses to marshal the necessary resources to build something like Khavda. It was able to develop the basic infrastructure—including the roads and telecommunications systems, an airstrip, a self-sustaining ecosystem for a workforce of more than eight thousand, and the transmission lines—within twelve months of launching the project. But Adani, Tata, and other major Indian conglomerates are the exception more than the rule in terms of ability to marshal resources.

To encourage even more private capital and participation, public-private partnerships (PPPs) will be needed. For example, earlier this year, First Solar inaugurated India’s first fully vertically integrated solar manufacturing plant in Tamil Nadu. Buoyed by a $500 million loan from the US International Development Finance Corporation, the First Solar facility will produce its Series 7 photovoltaic solar modules supported by an annual capacity of 3.3 gigawatts while employing approximately one thousand people. This can be a model for future PPPs.

India’s emissions will continue to grow before they peak and fall. The question is, can a third Modi administration continue creative policies that fulfill India’s ambitious climate goals—and will the rest of the world meet India both where it is today and can be tomorrow?


Kapil Sharma is the acting senior director and a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s South Asia Center.

Note: The Adani Group is a donor to the Atlantic Council’s South Asia Center.

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Reconstructing Ukraine at war: The journey to prosperity starts now https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/reconstructing-ukraine-at-war-the-journey-to-prosperity-starts-now/ Fri, 07 Jun 2024 12:30:00 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=770793 Rebuilding the Ukrainian economy after Russia's full-scale invasion will be a monumental task. Reconstruction can’t wait for peace and must be a well-coordinated, inclusive process.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction
Section 1: Summary of damages and the economic and financial situation
Section 2: First steps toward building a reconstruction strategy
Section 3: Steps to create a reconstruction-friendly ecosystem
Section 4: The best opportunities for each economic sector
Summary of recommendations
Conclusion

WATCH THE LAUNCH

Introduction

Rebuilding the Ukrainian economy after years of war will be a monumental task that the country’s allies and partners know they must assist. Helping Ukraine to prosper should be just as big a priority for those who believe Ukraine’s victory is key to preventing further Russian aggression and sending a cautionary message to other autocrats around the world. While rarely dismissed out of hand, the reconstruction is intuitively seen by many in the West as secondary to the need to help Ukraine fight back against aggression. This is understandable, but neglects how reviving the Ukrainian economy—and the government’s cash flow—also helps the war effort through additional funds, resources, and motivation.

The Ukrainian government is staffed by clever, innovative experts capable of expressing a clear vision of how to reach prosperity. But when the Atlantic Council’s Global Energy Center and GeoEconomics Center embarked on a weeklong research trip in February 2024 to meet them, Kyiv faced cash-flow problems and high uncertainty over future macrofinancial assistance, especially from the United States.

The situation has since improved, not least thanks to the US supplemental spending law that includes $10 billion of budgetary support—but it’s imperative that the West does not create doubts about its support for Ukraine again in 2025. The macrofinancial assistance meant to keep Ukraine’s government functioning cannot finance the recovery as well. In addition to central government funds, a myriad of Western grants and loans need to be tied to individual projects. The innovative systems designed to implement this are up and running but not always used to their full potential.

This report provides a snapshot of the economic, societal, and energy-security situation on the ground, capturing key challenges and opportunities for supporting Ukraine’s survival and building a more prosperous future. It also explores how the country can meaningfully contribute to Europe’s economic growth and strategic autonomy at large through innovation, energy security, decarbonization, and diversified supply chains. While the situation is changing daily, these key takeaways will remain pertinent to reconstruction discussions for the foreseeable future.

Our research is based on more than thirty meetings in Kyiv in February 2024. These included meetings with the most senior levels of the ministries in charge of reconstruction, influential think tanks, Western embassies, legislators in the Rada, journalists, and business leaders. These meetings were conducted under the Chatham House Rule. Our trip was followed by additional visits to Ukraine by the Atlantic Council Eurasia Center in February and March. With further research and follow-up discussions with experts, we have summarized our analysis in this recommendations-focused Atlantic Council report.

Section 1: Summary of damages and the economic and financial situation

Taking stock of unexpected wins and measuring sobering losses

Moscow’s relentless assault has caused immeasurable humanitarian suffering and damage to Ukraine’s infrastructure and natural environment. Since the Russian Federation’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, more than 14.6 million Ukrainians, or a third or more of the population, have fled their homes at some point during the war, according to the International Organization for Migration (part of the United Nations system); 6.5 million refugees fled Ukraine, and 3.7 million are still displaced within the country. By February 2024, at least thirty-one thousand Ukrainian troops and tens of thousands of civilians have died for reasons related to the war. And while the Ukrainian army succeeded in pushing the Russian aggressor far back in 2022, physical damage is by no means limited to the front line. As of February 2024, 156,000 square kilometers (km) in liberated territories and along the active front have been contaminated with mines, which were rarely used before this full-scale invasion. The June 2023 destruction of the Kakhovka dam caused $14 billion in damage and loss, submerged at least 620 square km of territory under Ukrainian control, and damaged ecosystems even further afield. Russia’s air campaigns continue to target the whole country, undermining both the economic recovery and morale.

Targeting energy infrastructure has been one of Russia’s most pernicious and persistent tactics to cause harm to millions at once and multiply the cost of reconstruction. With over $10 billion in damage to date, these attacks have hindered access to basic human necessities, such as potable water and heating. The international donor community has consistently helped Ukraine with repairing the damage, which was mostly focused on energy generation capacity and transmission in the winter of 2022 and 2023. Thanks to robust international support and the courage and dedication of energy-sector employees, Ukraine survived these horrific months, restoring over 2.2 gigawatts (GW) of installed capacities. Unfortunately, worse was on the horizon. The Kremlin escalated its critical infrastructure destruction starting in March 2024 by bombing Ukraine’s biggest thermal power plants: the heart of generating capacity for the largest population hubs. Delays in military support hamstrung Kyiv’s high-precision defense capabilities, leaving million-dollar power plants exposed to Russia’s hybrid attacks. During the spring of 2024, Ukraine lost 9 GW of generation capacity, which is equivalent to 22 million photovoltaic (PV) panels, or power for 7 million households.

This leaves Ukraine with expensive solutions and a tough journey ahead. The country is left to purchase electricity imports from European neighbors, which are more costly than what it could have produced at home and leads to higher fees due to the oversubscribed transmission capacity. It costs around $0.20 per kilowatt-hour to produce electricity in Ukraine. Households paid a fraction of this after subsidies, which are being incrementally reduced in an effort to bring in additional funding to repair the damages, resulting in $0.107 per kilowatt-hour cost to consumers until April 30, 2025. At the same time, Ukraine and its allies are racing to secure gas turbines for energy generation and balancing needs, as well as parts to repair power plants. Cities are already experiencing blackouts, which will be more frequent when the heat-driven peak summer demand overloads the grids. Ukraine will need a mix of budgetary support, equipment transfers, and technical assistance to survive this winter, which promises to be the most challenging since the full-scale invasion.

Domestic energy availability in Ukraine: 2022-2024

Power plants destroyed in Ukraine as of April 2024

Source: Available data collected by DiXi Group through the following references; Atlantic Council mapping:

Efforts to quantify overall damages systematically are important in the pursuit of justice. The Register of Damage Caused by the Aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine (RD4U) will be a source of information. Established through a Council of Europe resolution, the register receives, processes, and records claims filed by individuals, entities, and the Ukraine government for damage, loss, and injury from wrongful Russian aggression against Ukraine. (Forty-three nations and the European Union have joined the Register.) A compensation mechanism is yet to be established, but the register is an essential step in the process of pursuing compensation from Russia. The catalog should aid in ensuring that compensation is provided to the right individuals and broader communities. Citizens can now make entries via the Diia app, the main platform for Ukrainian government services.

Three rounds of Rapid Damage and Need Assessments (RDNA) already provide evidence of the mounting toll of the war. The World Bank, the government of Ukraine, the European Commission, and the United Nations coordinate to provide a reliable tally of “total costs” imposed on the Ukrainian economy by Russia’s aggression, with the latest citing direct damage to buildings and infrastructure of up to $152 billion and an estimated recovery and reconstruction cost surpassing $486 billion—“approximately 2.8 times the estimated nominal GDP of Ukraine for 2023.” It is noteworthy that these include the direct cost of destroyed or damaged physical assets and infrastructure—which started increasing significantly as Russia has targeted energy infrastructure—and also economic losses from lost activity and increases in the number of citizens needing assistance. The estimated restoration cost does cause some double-counting alongside the accounting for destroyed physical assets. However, this does not mean the bar for funding the reconstruction is low. The RDNAs integrate the loss of domestic production and increasing dependence on state handouts, which have both reduced revenues and increased liabilities for the government.

Meanwhile, Ukraine has developed a digital platform to track reconstruction projects in the nation: the Digital Restoration EcoSystem for Accountable Management (DREAM). The platform can help the government and international financial institutions (IFIs) differentiate between large-scale reconstruction projects that are long-term endeavors and short-term urgent repairs, and then orient appropriately. In this regard, DREAM is a rare combination of polyvalence and transparency. Developed in tandem with Ukrainian civil society and with support from USAID and UK Aid Direct, the DREAM platform was launched in 2023 by the Ministry for Restoration (formerly the ministry for infrastructure). DREAM is both a “digital route” for and a “window” into projects repairing or replacing infrastructure damaged by the war. Citizens, firms, and municipalities can submit evidence of damage, receive provisional approval, submit invoices, and receive compensation straight to their bank accounts. The platform is transparent down to every individual project. By mapping their density by region, we can see that restoration projects cover most of the territory controlled by the Ukrainian government, whereas new construction projects remain focused on larger cities.

Status of rehabilitation projects logged in the DREAM portal

Data as of April 2024

Source: Dream.ua data and Atlantic Council mapping.

The large percentage of pending or unfinished projects may be due to improper documentation of requests and, in part, a legacy of the cash-flow issues Ukraine faced earlier this year, and has since improved following Japan’s earlier-than-planned donations, EU “bridge financing” (discussed below), Canadian assistance, and passage of a long-planned $61 billion US aid package. Incomplete or poorly prepared applications also account for some of the backlog: Local governments often input projects to ensure they’re noticed but lack the expertise to perfect their write-ups. Still, it is also noteworthy that projects can still be approved without working through DREAM. Direct commissions of large projects can still, as far as we know, bypass DREAM as well. Of the four major lending institutions, only the European Investment Bank (EIB) is using the system. The Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine had resolved in 2022 to make the use of the platform mandatory but the relevant law has not yet been adopted.

Finally, the work of civil society in connecting funders, firms, and communities in need remains important. The Kyiv School of Economics’ Recovery Lab and former Deputy Foreign Minister Lana Zerkal, who serves on the Coordinating Committee of the Ukraine Facility Platform, among others, are advancing this work.

The state of Ukraine’s economy and finances

Despite the onslaught of aggression and destruction, Ukraine’s economy is growing: 5 percent in 2023 and, based on the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) forecasts, another 3 percent in 2024. But this comes after a 29.1 percent drop in 2022 and a large loss in the workforce in 2022 due to the mobilization, but 4.5 million Ukrainians have returned home since then. Still, the IMF does not expect the economy to reach its prewar level of production until 2029, and that relies on an assumption of the war ending in the next year. It would also be wrong to think the domestic economy is truly growing. It is adapting to wartime conditions and new firms are being created, but the amount of budget assistance, recovery funding, and humanitarian aid being sent into the country is the dominant factor.

The resumption of shipping from ports provides a bright spot in terms of exports. Despite environmental damage, a perilous sea route, and protests by EU farmers at overland points of entry, Ukraine’s exports of grain and oilseed products are recovering, reaching a wartime high in February 2024—but have not yet reached preinvasion levels.

Firms with a presence in Ukraine have continued to invest. This is partly in repairs and upkeep, but they are also expanding into new fields to shore up their own supply chains or respond to demand. International firms with an established presence in Ukraine have found demand for their products increasing, especially without Russian competitors and with domestic production capacity damaged. The crucial problem is that greenfield investment (i.e., projects starting from the ground up) has been close to zero.

The following chart compares the different components of the national accounts in constant prices. Three clear phenomena are at play: a significant expansion of government spending, irregular gross capital formation as investment slows and firms run down inventories, and increasing reliance on imports. The overall size of the economy is still noticeably smaller—even in the much-depreciated hryvnia. Were data in the chart in current US dollars, the shrinking of the economy would be even more noticeable.

Ukraine national accounts, constant prices

Government revenue has been volatile, though adaptation to wartime conditions and the knock-on effects of inflation have allowed for an impressive recovery. Excluding grants, government revenues fell to $36 billion in 2022, a 32 percent drop from $53 billion in 2021—but recovered sharply in 2023 to $46 billion and are forecast by the Ministry of Finance to fall slightly to $43 billion this year.

The challenge is that the government is expected to fund the war effort while paying pensions, keeping services running, and contributing to repairs and replacements made necessary by war damage. The 2024 budget forecasts $82.3 billion in expenditures, over half of which will go to the war effort and domestic security. In the budget, spending on repairs and reconstruction will fall under the categories of interbudgetary transfers and economic activity, which make up less than 10 percent, but are not exclusively devoted to these goals, putting the ceiling for centrally organized spending on restoration at less than $8 billion. The numbers in Kyiv’s budget reflect only what goes through the Ministry of Finance, so do not include contributions in-kind or directly to the local governments.

Ukraine already faces a large foreign-currency debt burden which it is trying to honor. For now, an agreed holiday on interest payments and war uncertainty preclude it from borrowing more on international markets. So the budgetary deficit has to be filled with a combination of international assistance (both grants and loans) and domestic bonds. Since the beginning of the full-scale invasion, $25 billion in domestic bonds have been purchased; the Ukrainian government would rather not have to rely on bonds too much as domestic savings are finite and the financial system also needs liquidity. Ukraine received $42.5 billion in external financing last year and is on track to receive about $38.6 billion in financial assistance in 2024.

Kyiv has tried to stick to certain principles to remind donors that it is treating their support with care. Its tax revenues cover defense spending, excluding donated equipment and other logistical and intelligence support. Grants and loans from friendly governments and IFIs cover the rest of the government’s liabilities. Kyiv also likes to remind supporters that it is engaging heavily with its bondholders ahead of the end of the debt holiday, which is currently set to end in August 2024. Negotiations with a consortium of Eurobond holders are currently revolving around a resumption of regular payments in exchange for forgiveness of an unspecified chunk, whereas governments that have lent to Ukraine have agreed to holidays lasting until 2027. This is a delicate negotiation for Kyiv, which has avoided falling into “default” status thus far but may do so this year even if bondholders agree to a haircut. The government also has managed to satisfy the IMF that its fiscal consolidation efforts are genuine, as the National Revenue Increase Strategy, published in late 2023, unlocked an $880 million tranche of IMF loans, with an additional $2.2 billion expected in June.

The National Bank of Ukraine (NBU) deserves credit for stabilizing and running a fully functioning financial system, even at the very start of the full-scale invasion. High interest rates and strict controls have prevented capital flight and allowed exchange rates to stabilize following a planned devaluation in July 2022, which reflects lower growth potential and higher dependence on imports. On the other hand, remittances and charity donations—in addition to Western aid—have helped to keep hard currency flowing into Ukraine and prevent a balance-of-payments crisis. The NBU has managed to recover and even surpass the reserve position it had before February 2022. To encourage investments, the NBU has recently announced the relaxation of controls on the payment of dividends to foreign investors and the repayment of foreign currency loans, albeit under a monthly cap.

The goal of this first section was to show the extent of the damage to the Ukrainian economy and that, even with national resilience and competent management, Russian efforts to inflict further devastation continue and the economy still relies absolutely on external support. In the next section, we will look at how this external support is being organized and how this can be improved, both to accommodate bigger strategic decisions alongside day-to-day spending and to demonstrate to Russia that Kyiv won’t run out of money.

Section 2: First steps toward building a reconstruction strategy

Building a reliable flow of money

Ukrainians and the international donor community must be unified around the vision for and the approach to Ukraine’s reconstruction to ensure efficient resource utilization and impactful collaboration. Given the destruction of significant parts of its energy system, industrial base, and housing stock, the country will have to balance urgent basic humanitarian needs with large-scale economic transformation.

First and foremost, Ukraine needs financial and military assistance to be as reliable as possible for at least the next five years to demonstrate long-term resolve to its people and to the Russian leadership. Such steadiness would also provide a more predictable environment for investors, whose decisions to bet on Ukraine’s future will accomplish part of the reconstruction aims and reduce dependence on outside support. Postponements and delays, on the other hand, risk entrenching population displacement and investor reticence.

UK Foreign Secretary David Cameron recently promised that the United Kingdom would give £3 billion a year “for as long as it takes.” Other governments should consider communicating on their commitments in as simple and clear a way, though the political consensus on supporting Ukraine isn’t always as clear as it is in the UK, where the Labour Party has also pledged “ironclad” support for Ukraine in its battle against Russia. Other countries such as Canada, Spain, and Belgium have done the same on military aid, albeit with lower financial commitments.

Passed in early 2024, the European Union’s €50 billion Ukraine Facility is meant as an integrated strategy. The best-publicized part, pillar one, covers €17 billion in grants and €33 billion of loans from 2024 through 2027. The first disbursement—€4.5 billion of “bridge financing”—was sent on March 1. The facility’s innovation comes with pillars two and three. Pillar two provides derisking mechanisms for investors via a “Ukraine Guarantee” of €6.97 billion covering risks for loans and other credit instruments offered by IFIs such as the European Investment Bank (EIB) and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). Pillar three offers technical assistance to help Ukraine converge with EU rules and prepare for accession. The facility also is remarkable for including minimum targets of green projects and tasking the EIB with working with subsovereign entities like regions and municipalities.

Other governments have made an extra effort at decisive moments to help Ukraine. G7 finance ministers’ meetings are the main venue for where Kyiv’s macro financial assistance needs are discussed. For example, as Ukraine’s cash flow problems mounted early this year amid a delay in US assistance and the impact of farmers’ and truckers’ protests on Ukraine’s exports, Japan was able to accelerate a donation of just under half a billion dollars to February, allowing Kyiv to pay teachers’ and other civil servants’ salaries in March and April. This was coordinated through the G7. Canada also sent two billion Canadian dollars through a concessional loan in March, the same day that the third review of the IMF program was completed.

Recovery funding now benefits from its own coordinating body, the Multi-agency Donor Coordination Platform. Launched in January 2023, the body is supported by a Brussels- and Kyiv-based Secretariat. The permanent members of the Steering Committee are Ukraine, the EU, the United States, and the other Group of Seven countries. In February 2024, the roster expanded to include the Republic of Korea, Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden as temporary members, who either have contributed or are committed to contributing at least 0.1 percent of their country’s 2022 GDP and at least $1 billion. Six EU members have observer status: Denmark, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and Spain. IFIs participate in the meetings. 

Already, the Multi-agency Donor Coordination Platform is becoming more prominent. The most recent meeting took place in Kyiv and the US deputy national security advisor for international economics, Daleep Singh—one of the architects of the Russian sanctions regime—made the trip.

The expansion of participants in this coordinating body isn’t sufficient to secure the volume of assistance that Ukraine needs. At its current level of intensity, the war entails an active front that has to be manned, with frequent air raids on civilian infrastructure and valuable economic targets. The flow of aid to Ukraine needs to be sufficient to keep government services operating while funding appropriate repairs within a reasonable time frame. 

The two priorities are of course funded by different types of Western support: macro financial assistance funds the Ukrainian government and keeping services open while the recovery would ideally be funded through recovery loans but these haven’t been fully disbursed because they haven’t been matched with enough projects. To avoid delays and inefficiencies, Kyiv should continue building out trust and transparency mechanisms to showcase how international support is deployed. Large in-kind donations such as spare turbines and transformer equipment have been useful on occasion, but come with costs, from transportation to adaptation for the local infrastructure. Some urgent needs are best addressed with cash transfers, which donors are still uncomfortable providing to organizations in certain sectors, like energy.

Money is fungible and the lack of macro financial assistance earlier this year did force the Government of Ukraine to defer recovery projects, though these in theory are funded from a different source. An improvement the Multi-agency Donor Coordination Platform can make is to apply the coordinating prowess G7 finance ministers have demonstrated on macro financial assistance and do more to bring the flow of recovery funding closer to what the Government of Ukraine and the latest RDNA agree is the budget necessary to tackle recovery priorities—$15 billion this year—and should continue to do so in the years to come.

The Multi-agency Donor Coordination Platform may come across as a simple capital-to-capital device that will entrench centralization. However, its structure in no way precludes the sort of country-to-city or country-to-region donor engagement that has been very successful, albeit on a small scale so far. Led by the Danish Export and Investment Bank, the Denmark-Mykolaiv Partnership has earmarked more than $100 million for reconstruction across the city. Local engagement fosters a timely and needs-based pipeline for aid. In the case of Mykolaiv, Denmark rapidly responded to needs including water purification, wildfire containment, agriculture projects, schools, technical support, and energy infrastructure. Such a partnership enables a city- or region-level focus at times when most of the aid is moving through centralized channels in Kyiv (a necessary but imperfect method for addressing urgent needs in localities). Italy and France are exploring similar partnerships and can draw on vital best practices from the Denmark initiative, such as strong governance and robust stakeholder engagement.

If every European country adopted a Ukrainian city on its reconstruction journey, or at least the cities with the worst damages, it would help to ensure that no communities were left behind. This is not a small ask, but these partnerships can begin with small financial commitments and focus on highlighting local needs across Ukraine’s forgotten municipalities for the international donor community. EIB developed a unique solution to the difficulties of local governments’ creditworthiness and the fact that some needs may be too small for the major loan providers, which could be replicated by other major funders: financing guaranteed by the European Union in sovereign loans. In many cases, receiving aid comes down to how well the local leadership can energize international supporters. However, most mayors don’t have the capacity to advocate for their cities on the global stage—in some cases because of simple language barriers but also because of poor creditworthiness.

Large state-owned enterprises also require credit instruments tailored to Ukraine’s exceptional circumstances and needs. This implies intense coordination among those in development finance who are willing to take on the challenge. In June 2023, the EBRD—the largest institutional investor in Ukraine—and eighteen other development finance institutions signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) on a Co-investment Platform to support Ukraine’s SOEs and private sector. In practice, this means the institutions are meant to coordinate their activities so that funding is deployed strategically. Participants held their first meeting following the MoU in Norway in May 2024.

Where will next year’s money come from?

The outlook for financial assistance to Ukraine is now adequate—a reversal of fortune since the cash-flow challenges in February. It is crucial to avoid making the same mistakes that led to this crisis, which forced Ukraine’s government to slow the pace of even basic repairs.

The European Union and the United Kingdom have made multiyear commitments: £3 billion in the United Kingdom’s case and—assuming the European Union sends at least one-fourth of its four-year Ukraine Facility budget—€8 billion in loans and €4.25 billion in grants from the European Union. On the other hand, the IMF’s disbursements will slow from $5.3 billion to $1.8 billion and most other IFI commitments will go to infrastructure projects and private firms, not the central government. We also have seen that Ukraine’s private bondholders are pushing for interest payments to start again.

As the war draws on, it also seems likely that expenditure will have to be bigger than currently forecast—by about $12 billion above the current baseline deficit projection of $23 billion.

So what can be done?

Recent G7 discussions about using the future interest income from the approximately $300 billion of Russia’s reserves immobilized in the West to lend funds to Ukraine are showing more promise than they have before. The solution would offer a timely injection of cash, $50 billion or more, and this wouldn’t preclude any long-term policy involving the reserves.

The full amount won’t be transferred to the government of Ukraine in one go and it is highly likely some of it would be used to buy weapons on Ukraine’s behalf. Nonetheless, to finance a gap in the 2025 budget which could be the $10-12 billion normally financed by the United States, the instrument could be very useful indeed.

The details that still need to be ironed out for the loan to work include the risk sharing between Europe and North America.

Demining and air defenses should be more of a priority

The international community has not fully grasped the scale of demining that needs to take place in Ukraine, particularly in the liberated territories, to make them ready for reconstruction. Mine contamination and other explosive hazards riddle over a third of Ukraine (180,000 square km), according to the Ukraine government, endangering civilians, halting agricultural activities, and detracting from such areas’ investment prospects. It also complicates the return of civilians to the liberated territories. However, with the right resolve and the latest technologies, Ukraine’s allies can remove this large-scale obstacle to reconstruction.

Ukraine’s National Mine Action Authority, which was established under Ukraine’s 2018 Mine Action Law, oversees mine action activities, coordination, monitoring, and tasking and is in charge of approving national plans for mine action. The Mine Action Centre (under the Ministry of Defense) organizes and coordinates demining efforts in Ukraine, which are conducted by the State Emergency Service of Ukraine, and works with the Humanitarian Demining Center. The Ministry of Economy and the Ministry for Reintegration of the Temporarily Occupied Territories of Ukraine also lead land mine clearance efforts.

The United Nations Development Programme (with contributions from several Western nations) funds 80 percent of the demining operations and multiple nongovernmental organizations such as the HALO Trust are present on the ground. Direct bilateral donations, technical support, and equipment assistance also play crucial roles. The United States, the European Union, and South Korea, among others, have made important in-kind donations with innovative systems including MV-10 demining systems. External entities sometimes struggle or take a while to receive accreditations to assist in demining, but their role is essential. Streamlining the process also offers an opportunity to engage countries and organizations that have been unable to provide military support for Ukraine, like Ireland.

Compared to demining, the lack of air defenses receives relatively more coverage—precisely because the situation has become steadily worse since late 2023. Facing off against Russia’s inexpensive kamikaze drones, Ukraine’s rate of success with its air defenses remains high at 82 percent, but the frequency and sophistication of attacks—often starting with fleets of drones and followed by ballistic missiles—are designed to overwhelm systems. A lack of provision from allies has forced Ukraine to use its supplies sparingly so even valuable economic assets have to be knowingly sacrificed, like the Trypilska power plant in the supposedly well-protected Kyiv region.

The supplemental passed by the US Congress will restore some supplies—but other initiatives including a German-led effort to donate Patriot batteries have fizzled. Finding solutions is beyond the scope of this report, but we see the damage done to Ukraine’s energy network and economy and would welcome anything that can spare Ukraine the impossible dilemma of not being able to shoot down a cheap missile that wreaks extremely costly damage. Analysts have suggested that Poland, for instance, should protect its border areas by shooting down Russian missiles in Ukraine’s skies that are adjacent to its air space, which would free Kyiv to focus its resources further east. Others have suggested embracing Ukraine’s ability to target drone production facilities, storage, and launch units in Russia.

Empowering Ukraine’s leadership structure for success 

The chain of command for economic recovery and reconstruction is understandably split and subject to change. As the Office of the President reorganizes these authorities, the priorities should be easy engagement and transparency. Currently, the bodies in the executive branch that have a say over these issues include the Cabinet of Ministers as well as the Ministry of Economy, the Ministry of Energy, the Ministry of Strategic Industries, and last but not least, the Ministry for Communities, Territories and Infrastructure Development. Created by a merger of two ministries in December 2022, the latter oversees the State Agency for Restoration and Infrastructure Development. In the coming months, this key ministry is likely to be split again into separate ministries for regional development and infrastructure.

Meanwhile, the dismissal of the top team at the soon-to-be divided ministry met with some consternation. The team was known for its commitment to transparent decision-making and open data: The DREAM platform was one of its most recognizable achievements. At the June Recovery Conference in Berlin and over the second half of the year, it will therefore be fundamental for the government to show that the systems (and the principles behind them) remain central to decision-making on the allocation of funds to projects. The same should go for procurement. The ProZorro portal, Ukraine’s e-procurement system, is not being used for any military spending, although this represents half the government’s budget. It should be possible to set tenders on nonsensitive purchases through this system.

A second gap concerns the management of big-ticket investments that will drive Ukraine’s modernization and its integration into the EU single market. Ukraine needs an updated public investment management framework and also a fit-for-purpose vehicle for private-sector stakeholders—including those with little to no exposure to Ukraine—to interact and agree on joint ventures. One goal of the Berlin Recovery Conference is to create an online platform for this—which notably could provide access to insight on the relative war risk and mitigation strategies. For it to work, however, the methodology will have to be agreed at least between the government of Ukraine, the European Union, and the IMF, and discussions are ongoing. Once running, this platform should not be restricted to firms based in the participating countries of the Multi-agency Donor Coordination Platform. While these capitals may feel they deserve some recompense for their efforts, it would be foolish to exclude firms that are interested and have something to offer. The most obvious example: Turkish building contractors, who represent the second-biggest global force in this sector after China, provided they aren’t servicing the Russian market.

Section 3: Steps to create a reconstruction-friendly ecosystem

The pull of EU accession

It was the Euromaidan protests against the Ukrainian government’s failure to sign an Association Agreement with the European Union in 2013—as President Viktor Yanukovich pivoted toward Russia—that led to the 2014 fall of the government in Kyiv. Russia responded by invading Crimea and southeastern Ukraine, violating Ukraine’s territorial integrity. Ukrainians continue to desire EU membership, seeing in it the promise of a more prosperous and stable life, and are overwhelmingly in favor of moving in this direction.

The EU accession process is demanding—and provides a very useful framework for reform, with clear incentives, visible and embraced by the public, for making progress toward EU standards.

The thirty-five chapters of the acquis—the body of common rights and obligations that is binding on all EU member states—all come with dozens of reforms. Firms based within the EU’s current border represent an important driver of the move to higher standards in anticipation of membership. Invaluable transfers of know-how on EU law compliance can happen as long as there is a sense that the government and the parliament are stewarding the reforms through. 

Even with the uncertainty of the war, tapping into such virtuous cycles will be vital. Efforts made now to comply with environmental standards in the short term will shorten the wait for EU accession. All mid-term reconstruction planning should account for sustainability and green elements and, while there is a minimum threshold of 20 percent of these in the Ukraine Facility, it is worth identifying which will have the maximum impact on Ukraine’s carbon emissions.

Ukraine’s National Energy and Climate Plan (NECP) for 2025-2030 is in line with 2030 Energy Community Treaty energy and climate targets. However, there will be several areas where a long-term vision for Ukraine’s economic and societal prosperity must be carefully balanced with the most urgent wartime needs to keep the lights on, the government running, and the economy afloat. With the latest bombardment on Ukrainian energy generation, securing gas turbines and multiple co-generation facilities and fixing coal power plants must be prioritized in the immediate term. This does not amount to reducing the roles of renewable energy, efficiencies, and clean technologies deployment: Ukraine’s government drew from a clean energy road map produced for Kyiv by nine US agencies ahead of the UN COP 28 climate talks as it set its decarbonization goals, while finalizing its recovery and energy strategy. But a big concern is just what kind of price Ukraine could pay when the European Union’s Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) kicks in in 2026, with tariffs that penalize trade from countries with insufficiently rigorous environmental rules. The European Union should bear in mind Ukraine’s wartime context. A 2023 European Commission staff report notes Ukraine’s “good progress on environment, some progress on energy and Trans-European networks,” and limited progress on climate change and transport policy.

The European Union, recognizing how cumbersome accession can be, has identified sixty-nine priority reforms, most of which are tied to investment indicators. Some Ukraine Facility disbursements will be tied to progress on these, providing added incentives for progress along the way toward the long-term goal of EU accession.

At this early stage, we are concerned about the European Union’s ability to keep offering Ukraine advantageous market-access terms: They have helped generate much-needed cash for Kyiv and almost all regions, but the objections of European farmers and truck drivers can’t be ignored. As part of the association agreement, the EU-Ukraine Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area allows for tariff-rate quotas if a particular good is being exported in excessive amounts. Yet more elegant solutions exist, especially with fungible products like food. More grain entering the single market should also mean the EU has more capacity to export, and global demand remains high. EU and national leaders should be bolder in calling out and refuting Russian disinformation meant to exploit such issues.

Still, the Polish farmer border protests are symptomatic of a wider challenge that the European Union and Ukraine will have to face together. Ukraine remains much poorer than even the least well-off EU member states. In this European Parliament campaign season, low wages in Ukraine have frequently been invoked by some at the political extremes as a reason to delay or refuse Ukraine’s accession. And if the rules on cohesion funding were left unchanged, the EU Council estimates that €186 billion would be redirected to Ukraine over a seven-year budget cycle at the expense of “convergence” elsewhere in the bloc. The European Commission is already working on how it will have to change the rules, but the task is momentous—and will inevitably be costly. An underused argument which Kyiv and EU capitals should lean on more often is that, with the right reforms, Ukraine’s joining the single market can be a net contribution to Europe’s strategic autonomy. We shall see in the following section just how much Ukraine has to offer, from food and critical raw materials to battle-hardened know-how on defense and IT.

Decentralization and winning the fight against corruption

Ukraine has a successful track record on decentralization. Starting from a low bar in the aftermath of the Revolution of Dignity, Kyiv embarked on a three-year process to rebalance decision-making. A new status for amalgamated municipalities, or hromadas, was created and revenue for local authorities increased threefold through a combination of direct transfers and new tax-raising powers. The new hromadas have played a vital role in assisting citizens throughout the war, and they are mostly ready to help allocate funds to reconstruction projects in a way that best suits their citizens.

One area of reform that was incomplete before the 2022 invasion was providing hromadas with the ability to act as a “legal person.” This would provide them with the ability to borrow money more easily and make claims through the courts in a more reliable way. Completing this reform should clearly be a priority so that hromadas can take on a fuller role, including by actively raising funds.

On our research trip, we heard differing accounts of how the anticorruption apparatus was faring. On paper, the division of labor is straightforward and justified. The National Agency on Corruption Prevention (NACP) takes care of strategy and foreseeing legal bottlenecks in dealing with corruption. The Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office can launch investigations, and the High Anti-Corruption Court’s role is self-explanatory. The National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine (NABU) has a much broader role, and interlocutors ranging from elected legislators to business leaders suggested this may have become a little too wide-ranging and could do with more checks and balances. It is clear that Ukraine needs a transversal body that is independent and can withstand political pressure. NABU would do well to pursue this important work without television cameras in tow for showy raids and arrests, which only play into Russian propaganda on corruption in Ukraine.

The corpus of judges in Ukraine needs new recruits. The overhaul of the political class since 2014 has not been accompanied by the same replenishment in the judiciary and courts rank among the least trusted public institutions in the country. To the government’s credit, the war has not slowed longstanding plans to “liquidate” the most notoriously corrupt courts, like the District Administrative Court of Kyiv, but the new bodies being set up are often staffed by the same people.

Energy sector reforms

Energy sector reforms have a dedicated subsection in this brief due to their outsized impact on Ukraine’s broader economic recovery.

Tremendous progress has been made on governance and institutional reforms, anticorruption measures, rule of law, and human rights. However, the war has posed unique challenges and opened the door to backsliding, something that had made private equity stay away even before the full-scale invasion. When institutional investors and companies consider entering the Ukrainian market, war risks are not the only deterrents. In addition to concerns shared by other investors about judicial independence and capital controls, energy sector investors seek assurances against seizure and/or nationalization of their assets, whether their return on investment can be easily taken out of Ukraine without controls or restrictions, and whether board management is independent and fully functional.

It will remain challenging to convince foreign investors that Ukraine’s energy sector is worth the additional risks when similar returns could be secured elsewhere.

Good arguments exist. Entering Ukraine’s market now, before reconstruction picks up speed, would give companies competitive advantage and valuable market insight, while paving the way for other growth opportunities in the region. 

Ukraine has also conducted energy reforms. The Cabinet of Ministers adopted a resolution on the guarantees of origin for electricity generated from renewable energy sources. This legislative change will improve transparency and valuation of renewable energy production for accurate feed-in tariff payments and cross-border exports, particularly as the European Union works toward expanding the CBAM’s scope. Additionally, Ukraine adopted reforms to align its legislation with the EU Regulation on Energy Market Integrity and Transparency, which drives wholesale energy market integrity and transparency and combats market manipulation with help from an independent utility regulator, the National Energy and Utilities Regulatory Commission, adopted in May 2023.

Another huge milestone is Ukrenergo’s full membership in the European Network of Transmission System Operators for Electricity, as of January 2024, two years after Ukraine cut ties with Russia’s electric grid and pivoted to the European network in record time. Thanks to the updated EU Trans-European energy network regulation, Ukraine can apply for project funds through the Connecting Europe Facility (CEF) program’s calls for transport proposals to strengthen connectivity with EU member states; moreover, the status of the projects of mutual interest may unlock funding and streamlined permitting for energy infrastructure. Cross-border renewable energy projects offer yet another avenue for Ukraine to pursue CEF-Energy support.

Nonetheless, the energy sector has more work to do, particularly in moving toward liberalization of electricity prices. Although an extremely unpopular reform, charging market rates for the cost of electricity would reduce debt for Ukraine’s national energy companies, incentivize efficiency solutions, and attract foreign investment when developers can rely on receipt of payments for electricity generation and services. It’s important to note that ending the blanket fixed low electricity prices for households would be particularly challenging when households are barely getting by. However, with carefully targeted support for consumers in need and effective communication strategies with grassroots engagement, Ukraine can take this difficult step toward creating an attractive investment environment. Extra care must be taken to ensure that this reform does not affect energy security or access for the Ukrainian population, particularly the elderly and disabled, and those with financial hardships or other obstacles. Several waves of tariff increases have already taken place, driven by the financial strain of repairs needed across the system: Prices nearly doubled in June 2023 and again in June 2024. However, they are still below the market rate. Ukraine needs to develop a timetable for the careful phaseout of public service obligations, paired with robust strategic support for the most vulnerable consumers. In addition, Ukraine has opportunities to reduce consumption across district heating systems and integrate efficiency criteria into public procurement processes.

War risk and political risk: Insurance mechanisms

Ukraine was a very large market for “war insurance”—until the war. In February 2022, the risk of an insured asset being damaged became too high for private providers to be able to provide new insurance at a competitive price, and the market dried up. Laudable progress has since been made.

State backing was extremely helpful for insuring the first Black Sea convoys, under the UN-brokered grain initiative. Now, the risk is better spread between friendly governments and a nascent market. The World Bank Group’s Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) can issue trade finance guarantees giving exporters and logistics providers peace of mind that they will be compensated for shipments that don’t make their destination.

While the available insurance products are a big achievement, they only offer coverage for as long as the shipment lasts. Long-term insurance covering the private investments Ukraine needs is scarcely available. The World Bank’s MIGA has provided coverage for new warehouses and the Unites States Development Finance Corporation and Poland’s Development Fund offer guarantees against political and war-related risks as well. Still, Russia’s targeting of economic assets make an insurance market capable of covering high value-add installations a remote possibility for now. It is still important to prepare. Building robust data portals for evaluating risks and differentiating for every region can start to build an appetite for the private sector to reenter the market.

Human capital

Ukraine’s greatest reconstruction asset is its human capital—and also its most concerning shortage.

Ukraine’s labor markets have been through tremendous disruption since the onset of Russia’s full-scale invasion, with a massive loss of jobs followed by labor shortages in some sectors and high unemployment in others. As men get called to the front lines, women make up a larger percentage of the workforce. Automation and other efficiencies happen out of necessity.

Nonetheless, Ukraine needs to continue making progress on merit-based recruitment and reforming job classifications and salaries because transparency and human resource management feature among the sixty-nine priority reforms in the Ukraine Facility Plan, which calls for a “transparent procedure for selecting specialists for positions and digitalization of civil service and human resources management.” These are major issues for the public and private sectors.

Human capital will play a disproportionately large role in the success of the recovery efforts, which means that investments today will bring compounded economic benefits down the road. Creating a path for bringing people back to Ukraine now—through lucrative employment opportunities, secure schools, and robust air defense capabilities—will be vital for a successful economic recovery and, eventually, self-sufficiency. 

Reintegrating veterans into civil society and the workforce is both an economic and societal imperative for Ukraine, and there could be five million of them by the end of the war. Some have missed out on higher education due to the war and should be supported in advancing their studies, should they choose to do so. Others may seek upskilling or retraining. But their unique postservice needs must be prioritized first, with easy access to services including healthcare and financial support. 

Ukraine’s future workforce includes schoolchildren now living close to the front lines and who are losing years of schooling due to the insufficient number of shelters. This is the biggest impediment to continued education, as Russia targets kindergartens, schools, sporting facilities, and libraries in its ruthless campaign. Donors should prioritize building shelters to optimize children’s educational opportunities and future career prospects. Big City Lab, in collaboration with public and private stakeholders, is developing principles and testing out pilot projects on how to most effectively rebuild and remodel old Soviet school buildings into safe, social, multifunctional, and innovative spaces fit for tomorrow’s needs. Such pilot projects can be recreated in other sectors to develop best practices for reconstruction.

International organizations can expand support for strategic reskilling, upskilling, and specialty trade training. The technology sector can provide the mechanism for these trainings and is a growing sector in its own right, particularly in providing employment opportunities for veterans. Digital startups are at the front lines of innovations. Ukraine is already exporting solutions, such as the Diaa portal of digital services, to other countries.

Rail, roads, and ports

Efficient and frequent movement of goods will be a key metric for Ukraine’s economic recovery.

And to reinforce earlier points, none of these large-scale investments will be realized without sufficient and sustained air defense. Investing in Ukraine’s transportation system by the EBRD, EIB, and the World Bank must be scaled now through private sector engagement to maintain current trade volumes and prepare the system for large-scale reconstruction efforts, including the tonnage of materials coming in and burgeoning exports leaving Ukraine through ports, railways, roads, and air. 

Ukraine has already achieved important transportation reforms, such as decentralizing the state agency of roads, Ukravtodor, and reforms and greater transparency through ProZorro. However, Ukraine will need to adopt and implement the trans-European transport network (TEN-T) guidelines and prepare its transport system for decarbonization and digitalization.

Donors have an opportunity to support feasibility studies for priority projects identified under the Indicative TEN-T Investment Action Plan. Moreover, pairing ProZorro with additional transparency and verification measures in the transportation development area will contribute to weeding out corruption risks and instilling confidence for the donor community. Digitalizing, upgrading, and securing “soft infrastructure” like customs controls and port data systems would improve efficiency and ensure consistent adherence to process.

The US government deserves particular praise here. USAID’s contribution to upgrades to border crossing infrastructure and railway infrastructure leading to the European Union will help the integration of Ukraine’s economy into the single market; and while a prosperous Ukraine is clearly a US foreign policy goal, the projects will benefit the US economy much less directly.

Section 4: The best opportunities for each economic sector

Russia’s hybrid war is spreading at the rate of an aggressive cancer, penetrating all sectors of Ukraine’s economy to destroy Ukraine on the financial battlefield, as Russian President Vladimir Putin fails to win on the actual front lines. Every dollar Ukraine can produce through trade is a win against Moscow’s efforts to diminish Ukraine’s economic output, and vital tax revenue for the military budget. Support for Ukraine’s top sectors and trade is the smartest investment into the country’s future self-sufficiency and economic stability.

The European Council presidency, in consultation with parliament negotiators, provisionally extended the duty-free trade agreement with Ukraine until June 5, 2025, which is pending June steps for official adoption. The action—which includes an automatic safeguard mechanism to trigger “tariff-rate quotas” for poultry, eggs, sugar, oats, maize, groats, and honey as well as “enhanced monitoring” of wheat and cereal imports—underscores the importance of EU member nations’ domestic communication of the benefits of this economic lifeline for Europe.

Recovery Priority #1: Supporting Ukraine’s energy sector

The energy sector will be the engine of Ukraine’s reconstruction, but urgent support is needed now to keep it from collapsing. Moscow annihilated much of Ukraine’s energy generation—but not the country’s rich energy potential, nor its ingenuity and resolve. Ukraine urgently needs more air defense and a lifting of restrictions on how it deploys weapons furnished by its allies to prevent Russians from leveling more cities and driving civilians into a state of despair and displacement. As long as any prohibition to use US weapons for attacks on Russian soil is in place, Ukraine’s power plants are sitting ducks and prime targets for Moscow’s bombardment. These restrictions are slowly and incrementally being lifted, but Kyiv still faces difficult trade-offs on defending key economic assets.

Ukraine’s air defense and offensive capabilities should be complemented with passive protection (i.e., physical barriers for critical infrastructure) which is effective against drones and is currently being enhanced to withstand missiles when covering smaller critical structures such as a transformers, substations, and generators. Meanwhile, the large power plants must rely on air defense for protection. This multilayer strategy for defending critical energy infrastructure—grid, centralized power plants, transformers, gas storage systems—is crucial for future energy development and energy system transformation.

The latest wave of attacks aimed at destroying centralized energy production capacity and natural gas storage caused immeasurable harm and system imbalance, with Ukraine having to resort to scheduled blackouts and purchasing electricity from its neighbors instead of producing it at home at a fraction of the price. Preparations for the winter must start now as the system is already in critical condition months ahead of the heating season. Securing and financing gas turbines to ensure sufficient capacity and balancing the grid is a matter of life and death for the Ukrainian population this winter. The G7+ Energy Coordination mobilizes efforts to restore and protect Ukraine’s energy infrastruture through efforts such as equipment procurements and the Ukraine Energy Support Fund, managed by the Energy Community Secretariat, is intended to finance critical energy equipment for Ukraine, such as procuring gas turbines. All possible efforts must be made to expedite procurement while adhering to the Austrian Federal Public Procurement Law (given that the secretariat is based in Vienna). Capacity-driven delays must be addressed through proper staffing at the secretariat and timely communication with the Ukrainian stakeholders.

Decentralizing Ukraine’s energy production system requires a multipronged strategy, which Ukrenergo is leading with support from relevant ministries. Distributed generation would advance decarbonization, make for challenging targets for Moscow’s attacks, and could present an appealing investment opportunity for the private sector. Such a system will require smart and digital solutions and customer service, with strong cybersecurity measures. Storage installation could be owned by the distribution system operators to attract financing. Coordination with local communities, both to tap their capacities and get buy-in, will be foundational to the success of building out distributed networks. Ukraine can work towards establishing a decentralization ecosystem through regulatory changes (such as streamlining connectivity rules), feasibility studies for projects, and liberalization of electricity prices. 

Ukraine has tremendous clean energy resources (including wind, solar, hydropower, and geothermal potential); low-carbon gases including biomethane; critical minerals deposits; and unparalleled expertise in cybersecurity and system resilience and recovery from kinetic attacks. Conducive policies will be essential for encouraging investments. Ukraine’s National Energy and Climate Plan—an important condition for securing financing via the EU’s Ukraine Facility—will be presented at the Berlin Recovery Conference on June 11-12: This will signal which clean energy technologies will play the biggest roles in meeting climate targets for the country, the policy gaps to enable their deployment, and most importantly, private investment needs to reach scale.

There is untapped potential in energy efficiency for Ukraine. Soviet buildings were built without care for energy conservation. Determining which buildings to remodel and which to demolish will be an important part of the reconstruction process. Cost and building condition will play a major role. The industrial sector presents tremendous opportunity for cutting energy consumption and could lead to 12.5 million tonnes in CO2 reduction, and $3 billion in annual savings, with $13 billion in investments through 2030. Low energy costs are also a key driver in industrial competitiveness and would contribute to the revival of this important sector. In 2023, Ukraine launched the State Fund for Decarbonization and Energy Efficient Transformation, which could be an effective mechanism for attracting international loans and grants for the implementation of investment projects. However, Ukraine will need market mechanisms to properly account for the value of energy efficiency investments, which pay for themselves over time (particularly in a liberalized market), but may require a higher upfront cost compared to less-efficient construction and technologies. For scale, Ukraine will need market solutions which will enable the private sector to capitalize on efficiency investments. On paper, Ukraine’s energy efficiency rules are generally aligned with the European Union’s; however, opportunities exist for infusing energy efficiency criteria into both the public procurement process and strategy for building renovations. Ukraine should also seek to attract investment for making the transmission and distribution systems more efficient.

A number of Ukrainian state-owned enterprises, such as Energoatom and Ukrnafta (owned by Naftogaz), are integrating independent boards into their leadership structure to create additional layers of transparency and verification. These boards will have a unique opportunity to advance implementation of reforms and instill confidence through transparent operations and practices.

Nuclear energy is a critical low-carbon, balancing resource for Ukraine, which has a wealth of expertise in the sector. Ukraine should continue building partnerships with Western countries and companies to extend the life of existing reactors, build out new capacity, and diversify nuclear supply chains for future nuclear plants and uranium enrichment. To lay the foundation for an appealing investment environment, Ukraine needs to complete reforms at Energoatom (under the leadership of the new supervisory boards) and carve a path forward on transparent denationalization. Following debilitating capacity losses, Ukraine is looking to undertake nuclear build-out starting as early as 2024, utilizing existing equipment from Bulgaria. Most importantly, the international community must pressure Russia to leave the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant, a 6 GW facility, before an accident takes place.

Recovery of Ukraine’s energy sector will hinge on the support of a multitude of stakeholders, and multilateral development banks are poised to play a key role. When it comes to gas, however, some of these institutions have guidelines that prevent or make it challenging to finance such infrastructure, per climate commitments. This is a missed opportunity to support Ukraine in its time of need—especially since investment in gas turbines and piston installations would accelerate Ukraine’s shift away from coal.

Ukraine’s natural gas network could be redeployed to transport Ukraine’s indigenous gas production and low-carbon gases (with some adjustments), after the gas transit agreement with the Kremlin expires by the end of 2024. There is a chance that European traders may work out a short-term agreement with Gazprom on the flows and negotiate the transit fees with Ukraine separately. However, for any gas flows to continue moving through Ukraine, the country needs to invest in border-metering mechanisms for clarity on export volumes. Ukraine also needs a strategic vision for its robust pipelines network, most of which is not utilized at the moment, as the upkeep of the entire network weighs on the country’s expenditures at a critical time. With sufficient air defenses, European traders can continue to utilize Ukraine’s vast gas storage in the western part of the country—which they have done so far without war risk insurance. The storage system has demonstrated incredible resilience in light of the recent escalatory attacks. 

Large-scale investing in agriculture

Dodging bombs and navigating land mines are not standard farming practices, yet Ukrainian farmers have persisted. The resilience and bravery shown in this sector, which employs 14 percent of Ukraine’s population and yields 12 percent of country’s GDP, must not be taken for granted. The sector requires large-scale investments to continue and expand this level of production and prevent famine for the consumers reliant on Ukrainian crops, who number 400 million.

First and foremost, Ukraine’s farming communities must be demined (as discussed above), and secure and reliable transportation routes and storage must be established.

The full liberalization of the agriculture market in early 2024 unlocked a variety of financial mechanisms for farmers, such as the ability to borrow against their land. Notwithstanding, additional capital is needed for farms of all sizes to improve operations productivity and maintain export levels.

Avoiding deindustrialization and seeking a competitive edge in manufacturing

Ukraine’s manufacturing sector has been battered since Russia’s initial invasion in 2014, which led to illegal occupation of Ukraine’s industrial centers. COVID-19, inflation, the full-scale invasion, and workforce migration (mostly forced by the war’s atrocities) have placed more pressure on the neck of once a robust economic sector. Massive investments in modernizing, digitalizing, and efficiency measures are needed to keep Ukraine’s factories afloat. But the sector is also deeply interconnected to developments in air defense, secure and reliable transportation routes, transparent and functioning customs systems, and clear signals from the European market on how Ukraine can contribute to EU strategic autonomy through priority trade partnerships such as in the mining and processing of critical minerals.

Unleashing tech innovations

Ukraine is digitizing its economy at record speed. In some cases, this is happening out of necessity to provide vital, urgent services in a safe environment through platforms such as DREAM, Diaa, Prozorro, and United24. Digitalization also enables transparency and verification—top requests by Ukraine’s donors. This is also a space with top growth potential as new sectors integrate digitalization into their reforms and to create efficiencies and automation. Ukraine’s sophisticated IT sector offers some of the most desirable jobs in the country, with one opening attracting 150 applications. The sector already employs 300,000 professionals and has plenty of room to grow. Ukraine has a unique opportunity to unleash its digital space innovations while it prepares to synchronize its regulatory environment with EU legislation such as the Digital Services Act, AI Act, and the Digital Markets Act. 

Summary of recommendations

Measuring the damage

International stakeholders

  • Support Ukraine’s capacity to track damages, develop a verification mechanism, and connect to resources, particularly in areas that may lack capacity and capabilities with documenting destruction. Enlist AI and automation where feasible.
  • Develop a focused platform enabling the Ukrainian government and IFIs to differentiate among large-scale projects as either long-term or short-term/urgent repairs.

General reconstruction strategy

International stakeholders

  • Provide multiyear financial, recovery, and military assistance commitments (of five years at a minimum) to establish a reliable investment ecosystem.
  • Support reconstruction during wartime as a vital ingredient to Ukraine’s victory, morale, and future economic prosperity, treating this call for international investment with the urgency necessary for its success.
  • Unify around an allied vision and approach toward Ukraine’s reconstruction to ensure efficient resource utilization and impactful collaboration.
  • Prioritize support for the completion of demining Ukraine’s territories to avoid derailing reconstruction.
  • Enhance aid and reconstruction coordination efforts among donors via the special envoys for reconstruction.
  • Support municipalities and underserved communities in advocating for themselves through, for example, partnerships between European nations and Ukrainian cities, following the success of the Denmark-Mykolaiv example. 
  • Find creative financial solutions for local government authorities and SMEs which lack creditworthiness, using sovereign guarantees and workarounds provided by the EIB where possible.
  • Recognize the delicate balance between Ukraine’s urgent needs to fuel the economy and making progress toward a resilient, low-carbon future.
  • Make recovery convenings more impactful through an action-driven approach.
  • Continue decoupling from Russian infrastructure.
  • Encourage CEOs and boards to visit Ukraine to understand the challenges and opportunities. 

Ukraine government

  • Enhance the leadership structure of and coordination across Ukrainian ministries, streamlining decision-making and communication with external stakeholders.
  • Kyiv should continue building out trust and transparency mechanisms to showcase how international support is deployed.

Energy sector

International stakeholders

  • Assist Ukraine in bolstering protection of its energy infrastructure, which needs passive (physical barriers) and active (air defense) protection from Russian bombardment to minimize future damage and attract investment in the sector.
  • Expedite equipment procurement under the Energy Community Secretariat platform and other mechanisms.
  • Participate in public-private investments to advance decentralization of the energy network through distributed generation, batteries, and prosumers (i.e., those who both produce and consume energy), which is a massive undertaking necessary to secure, decarbonize, and liberalize Ukraine’s energy system.
  • Reduce barriers and restrictions for multilateral development banks to finance gas infrastructure in Ukraine to secure sufficient capacity and balancing services this winter.

Ukraine government

  • Devote vigor to the important work of decentralizing the energy network.
  • Make progress on liberalized energy market pricing while maintaining targeted subsidies for vulnerable populations.

Agriculture

International stakeholders

  • Invest in demining, transportation, and storage.
  • Ensure farms of all sizes have access to capital.

Workforce

International stakeholders

  • Prioritize building school shelters to optimize children’s educational opportunities and future career prospects.
  • Expand support for strategic reskilling, upskilling, and specialty trade training opportunities.

Ukraine government

  • Continue to make progress on merit-based recruitment and the reform of job classifications and salaries.
  • Support veterans in reintegrating into civil society with comprehensive services, continued education, and reskilling and upskilling opportunities. 

Finance

International stakeholders

  • Support Ukraine in absorbing aid in a timely manner through capacity building and streamlined procurement.
  • Promote Ukraine’s potential as a net contributor to Strategic Autonomy. EU citizens tend to be told about substantial cost of supporting Ukraine’s accession but know less about its supplies of critical minerals (especially titanium) and its innovative defense sector.
  • Unlock grants and incentives for Ukraine’s private sector, particularly in workforce development and creating efficiencies and automation. Provide support for small- and medium-sized enterprises through grants, loans, and risk mitigation, addressing the main barrier of war-related risks and the lack of related insurance products.

Ukraine government

  • Continue to modify strict capital controls imposed at the beginning of the full-scale invasion, which are a deterrent for new investors. A recent relaxation announced by the National Bank of Ukraine includes a provision for the payment of dividends to foreign investors and the repayment of foreign currency loans, albeit under a monthly cap, which should be gradually lifted as long as capital outflows do not undermine financial stability.

Stakeholders and the Ukraine government

  • Ensure that no communities are left behind during aid distribution through municipalities capacity building. 

General reforms

  • Complete the decentralization reforms, including granting hromadas “legal person” status.
  • Hire new judges and improve their salaries.
  • Harness investment by firms based in the EU as a driving force for convergence with EU rules and norms.

Conclusion

This report has avoided sugarcoating the reality of Ukraine’s economic and financial predicaments. We still believe it is a testament to unmatched resilience and innovation amidst the challenges of war. As we discuss recovery, two imperatives emerge: sustained multiyear military support, especially for air defenses; and clear, forward-looking funding commitments, in macro financial assistance and in recovery grants and loans. These are two distinct funding streams but, when we visited Kyiv, uncertainty over the former was affecting the government’s cash flow and preventing it from focusing on recovery projects which were already feasible.

Even amid conflict, reconstruction is necessary because of the destruction it has wrought.  By prioritizing viable projects in sectors such as energy, industry, agriculture, transport, and technology, and ensuring transparency, we can drive economic recovery and help Ukraine meet EU standards.

The upcoming conference in Berlin has broken the task ahead into four dimensions: business, the human dimension, regions, and EU accession. However, due to Russia’s ongoing attacks, the most urgent priorities are restoring energy capacity and bolstering air defenses to protect new and existing assets.

Now is the moment for Ukraine’s allies to take decisive action. By supporting Ukraine today, we invest not only in its survival but also in its future contributions to a stronger, more prosperous Europe. Together, we can help Ukraine rebuild and thrive, setting a powerful example of hope and resilience for the world.

ABOUT THE AUTHORS

The authors would especially like to thank Nicholas Pantazopoulos, who conducted critical graphing and cartography, and Lizi Bowen, who led web design, in this effort.

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Russia is winning the energy war and plunging Ukraine into darkness https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/russia-is-winning-the-energy-war-and-plunging-ukraine-into-darkness/ Thu, 06 Jun 2024 13:52:33 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=770878 Electricity blackouts are the new normal in Ukraine as the country struggles to cope with the consequences of a devastating Russian air offensive that has destroyed around half of Ukraine’s wartime power-generating capacity since the start of 2024, writes Elena Davlikanova.

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Electricity blackouts are the new normal in Ukraine as the country struggles to cope with the consequences of a devastating Russian air offensive that has destroyed around half of Ukraine’s wartime power-generating capacity since the start of 2024. Millions of Ukrainians are now adapting to the reality of regular power cuts, with electricity in many cases restricted to just a few hours per day and the buzz of generators becoming a routine feature of life throughout the country.

Russia’s first attempt to destroy the Ukrainian power grid, which began in October 2022 and continued until March 2023, ultimately failed to achieve its objective. However, the current campaign has so far proved much more successful. Russia has clearly learned important lessons from its earlier air offensive, and has also benefited from growing gaps in Ukraine’s air defenses caused by delays in Western military aid.

In the past five months, Russia has managed to damage or destroy all of Ukraine’s thermal and hydroelectric power plants. The latest large-scale wave of missile and drone strikes on June 1 resulted in damage to power-generating facilities in five different regions across Ukraine, leading to warnings from officials that extended periods without electricity are now inevitable and will likely remain a feature for many months to come.

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The Kremlin’s bombing campaign has a number of goals. Russia seeks to undermine the Ukrainian economy by reducing industrial capacity, including in the rapidly expanding Ukrainian defense sector. By forcing Ukrainians to live without regular access to electricity, Russia also aims to demoralize the civilian population and weaken the country’s resilience. Moscow hopes this will fuel public calls for an end to the war and set the stage for a future peace agreement on Russian terms.

Thanks to sunny summer weather and long hours of daylight, the regular power outages currently being experienced across Ukraine are highly disruptive but not yet disastrous. Once temperatures begin to drop and winter draws closer, the implications of Russia’s bombing campaign are expected to become far more serious. Experts predict it will take years to repair Ukraine’s power grid, but urgent steps are required now in order to prevent a potential humanitarian catastrophe from unfolding during the coming winter season.

The Ukrainian authorities have established a coordination center to address the mounting energy crisis in the country. Current measures to compensate for power shortages include the installation of gas-fired energy generation plants. Imports from neighboring EU countries represent another key source of additional electricity.

The loss of thermal and hydroelectric power generation means Ukraine is now increasingly reliant on the country’s nuclear power plants. The Ministry of Economy is investing in Energoatom to expand capacities, but constructing new plants is both extremely expensive and time consuming.

Renewable energy currently constitutes a significant portion of Ukraine’s remaining energy output, with much of this segment concentrated in the south of the country. While there is considerable room to expand renewable power generation, green energy options offer unstable power output, creating additional practical challenges for the Ukrainian energy grid.

One of the main focuses of the government’s strategy is the decentralization of the Ukrainian energy system. This is expected to involve smaller power plants that will be less vulnerable to Russian bombardment. To support this transition, efforts are underway to streamline procedures for the connection of small-scale power generation facilities to the national grid. A government program is also offering incentives for housing associations to install solar panels on residential buildings.

The biggest security challenge remains protecting the Ukrainian power grid from further Russian attack. In recent months, Ukrainian officials have consistently communicated that additional air defense systems are the country’s top priority. First and foremost, this means US-produced Patriot air defense systems.

So far, Ukraine’s pleas have largely gone unanswered. Although Ukrainian diplomats claim to have identified one hundred “available” Patriot systems worldwide, there has been no rush to supply Ukraine. Only Germany has committed to deliver one system, with talks continuing over possible delivery of Patriots from a number of other partner countries including Romania. Unless Ukraine’s air defense deficit is resolved, all other efforts to counter the Russian bombing campaign of the country’s energy sector may prove futile.

Dr. Elena Davlikanova is a Democracy Fellow at the Center for European Policy Analysis and an associate professor at Sumy State University in Ukraine.

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The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

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From the Red Sea to the Indo-Pacific: Expanding Cooperation Between the Gulf and Asia https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/content-series/china-mena-podcast/from-the-red-sea-to-the-indo-pacific-expanding-cooperation-between-the-gulf-and-asia/ Thu, 06 Jun 2024 04:30:00 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=770010 Dr. Hasan Alhasan, a senior fellow at the International Institute for Strategic Studies joins us to discuss the Gulf States' views on and expanding ties with the Indo-Pacific and the Indo-Pacific's impact on Gulf security

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Key takeaways

  • Chinese Involvement in the Gulf
  • Regional Geopolitical Tensions
  • Indo-Pacific and Global Power Dynamics


Chapters

00:00 – Introduction

01:53 – Exploring Gulf-Asia Economic Ties.

04:07 – Gulf States’ Quest for Global Indispensability.

07:41 – Saudi Arabia’s Drive for Economic Influence.

11:48 – India’s Leadership in the Global South.

14:49 – Gulf States’ Strategic Engagements with China, India.

18:28 – India’s Naval Strategy and Evacuations.

23:02 – Gulf States’ Distanced Relationship with Asia.

27:11 – Regional Competition and Strategic Shifts.

31:34- India Expands Indo-Pacific Framework.

35:43 – Assessing Indo-Pacific’s Impact on Gulf Security.

40:43 – Geoeconomics and Alliance Dynamics.

43:43 – Gulf States Prefer US AI, Diverse Partnerships.

45:58 – Outro

In this episode

Hasan Alhasan
Senior Fellow for Middle East Policy
International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS)

Dr Hasan Alhasan is a Senior Fellow for Middle East Policy at the IISS. He has over a decade of experience as a scholar and practitioner of foreign policy in the Gulf region. He specialises in the Arab Gulf states’ grand strategies, economic statecraft, and relations with the Asian powers. Prior to joining IISS in 2019, Hasan served on HRH the Crown Prince of Bahrain’s staff as a senior analyst on foreign policy and national security for five years.  Hasan is regularly consulted by governments, private corporations, and the media on strategic affairs in the Gulf and Middle East region. His latest project at IISS, entitled Gulf Bailout Diplomacy: Aid as Economic Statecraft in a Turbulent Region, is a groundbreaking study on the politics of Gulf rescue lending in the MENA region. He is the co-editor of India and the Gulf: Theoretical Perspectives and Policy Shifts (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2023).


Read more

  • Harsh V Pant and Hasan T Alhasan (eds), India and the Gulf: Theoretical Perspectives and Policy Shifts (New Delhi: Cambridge University Press, 2023).
  • Hasan Alhasan, India’s Defence Cooperation with the GCC States under Prime Minister Narendra Modi, in Sujan Chinoy and Prasanta Kumar Pradhan (eds), India’s Approach to West Asia: Trends, Challenges and Possibilities (New Delhi: Pentagon Press, 2024), pp. 30-55

About

In this episode of China-MENA, titled “From the Red Sea to the Indo-Pacific: Expanding Cooperation Between the Gulf and Asia,” host Jonathan Fulton engages in a compelling conversation with Dr. Hasan Alhasan, a senior fellow at the International Institute for Strategic Studies to discuss the Gulf States’ views on and expanding ties with the Indo-Pacific, the Indo-Pacific’s strategic importance for Gulf security, and the influence of the US, China, and India on Gulf alliances.

Join us to understand how Gulf-Asia cooperation addresses future challenges and opportunities, from the Red Sea to the Indo-Pacific and beyond.

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The Gulf States perceive the varied and vibrant Indo-Pacific through the distinct lens of their own interests, seizing each opportunity uniquely

Dr. Hasan Alhasan

About the China-MENA podcast

The China-MENA podcast features conversations with academics, think-tankers, and regional specialists on Chinese Influence in the Middle East and informs US and MENA audiences in the policy and business communities about the nature of China’s outreach to the region.

At a time when China’s global footprint is getting deeper and deeper, it has never been more important to understand its foreign policy and the Middle East is one of the world’s most consequential regions: home to major religions, diverse cultural and social heritage, central to global energy markets, and of course, geopolitics, linking people and markets in Asia, Africa and Europe.  This show will help you understand what China is doing in the region, and how the region is engaging with China as an increasingly important external power.

Podcast series

Listen to the latest episode of the China-MENA podcast, featuring conversations with academics, government leaders, and the policy community on China’s role in the Middle East.

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This podcast was funded in part by a grant from the United States Department of State. The opinions, findings, and conclusions stated herein are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the United States Department of State.

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Policy memo: What will it take to make the MENA region a renewable energy powerhouse? https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/issue-brief/policy-memo-what-will-it-take-to-make-the-mena-region-a-renewable-energy-powerhouse/ Wed, 05 Jun 2024 16:00:00 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=769162 The Middle East and North Africa region is well placed to become not just a major source of renewable energy, but also a central and indispensable player in the global energy transition, uniquely able to balance supply and demand for all types of energy, both hydrocarbons and renewables.

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Saudi Arabia and its Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) neighbors stand as a pivotal force in the global energy landscape. Beyond their stature as premier fossil fuel producers and exporters, these nations play a crucial role in effectively coordinating and regulating the production and sale of oil globally. Through strategic measures, they have endeavored for decades to stabilize prices and maintain a consistent oil supply to the international market. In doing so, they mitigate the risks of excessive price volatility that could undermine demand or deter essential investment in supply.

At a time of rapid growth in renewable energies such as solar and wind, it would be easy to write off the region (as some are doing) as a waning power, both in terms of energy and geopolitics. After all, how good can the outlook be for petrostates in a world focused on moving to net-zero emissions? In our view, the opposite is true: the region is well placed to become not just a major source of renewable energy, but also a central and indispensable player in the global energy transition, uniquely able to balance supply and demand for all types of energy, both hydrocarbons, and renewables.

Saudi Arabia and other GCC countries are already moving in this direction, perhaps faster than many outside the region realize, thanks to a powerful mix of investment, infrastructure, and political determination. They have a unique opportunity to take the lead in putting the world on a more sustainable energy footing while simultaneously diversifying and enriching their economies.

A critical question is whether and how the other countries in the region follow their lead. A new phase of cooperation within MENA will be needed if the potential for the region in a reconfigured energy setup is to be realized.

Natural and geographical advantages

GCC countries are in a strong starting position for the energy transition in large part because of their natural advantages. Thanks to abundant sunshine and wind, they can produce and export renewable energies at a consistently lower cost than any other region. For example, Saudi Arabia’s Al Shuaiba project is projected to generate solar energy at a levelized cost of electricity (LCOE) of 1.04 US cents per kilowatt hour, which is just one-fifth of the 2023 global average for solar photovoltaic (PV) energy. This is followed by the United Arab Emirates’ 2 gigawatt (GW) Al Dhafra Solar PV project, which can produce solar energy at a price as low as 1.35 US cents per kilowatt-hour.

The abundance of both fossil and renewable resources means that, at every point on the path from a hydrocarbon-based energy system to a fully decarbonized one, GCC countries can deliver the cheapest configuration for the desired CO2 emissions level without compromising on energy security. In other words, they are well placed to continue with their role of balancing supply and demand—not just with oil and gas, but in a new, green era with a full range of energy resources, both renewable and traditional.

Other advantages are the region’s central geographical location, which provides comparatively easy access to large import markets in both Europe and Asia, as well as to developing markets such as those within Africa, and a ready supply of capital to help finance the transition. Moreover, the closely regulated single-buyer market in GCC countries, which grants regulators greater control over the whole electricity system, enables them to efficiently enact state policy and ensure a choreographed deployment of supply and transmission investments.

A Saudi man walks on a street past a field of solar panels at the King Abdulaziz City of Sciences and Technology, Al-Oyeynah Research Station. REUTERS/Fahad Shadeed

Uneven prospects in the region

For the GCC alone, as we write in our recently published book, Arabian Gambit, these advantages provide the opportunity to become a global force in green hydrogen, recycled plastics, artificial proteins, and even some low-energy manufacturing, among other prospects. For instance, we estimate that every million tonnes of recycled plastics produced could create around 1,450 jobs and contribute US$650 million directly to the GCC’s gross domestic product. Furthermore, attracting 10 percent of global manufacturing in high-potential products could bring up to US$300 billion in foreign direct investment and create 150,000 new jobs, while also unlocking US$25 billion in nonoil exports and offsetting 75 million tonnes of CO2-equivalent emissions annually. Where does that leave other countries in MENA—a region that is particularly exposed to climate change as well as to global efforts to mitigate it?

It’s important to draw some distinctions between countries: MENA is not a monolith and can be distinguished into three groups based on national governmental budget and net energy exports. The first group consists of countries with a budget surplus and large net energy exporters, such as Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Kuwait, and Qatar. With their strong financial position, they can invest heavily in renewable energy infrastructure. The second group consists of countries with a budget deficit, but are net energy exporters, such as Oman, Libya, and Algeria. These countries might face challenges in transitioning to renewable sources of energy due to budget constraints. Egypt is a country in this category, but it has already made significant progress in the renewable transition despite similar constraints. The third group consists of countries with a budget deficit which are net energy importers such as Morocco, Jordan, and Lebanon. Morocco and Jordan focus heavily on renewable transition and have considerable potential to become significant hubs for renewable energies.

The push into renewables in many of these countries is impressive. The International Energy Agency (IEA) estimates that, over the past decade, North Africa has managed to increase its renewable energy production by 40 percent. Countries like Egypt and Morocco are leading in solar and wind energy production outside the GCC, according to the IEA. Egypt alone added 25.5 GW of new generating capacity between 2015 and 2019, including 1 GW of solar PV and nearly 840 megawatts (MW) of new wind capacity—and in the process, went from chronic power shortages to having a 25 percent surplus of electricity supply. Morocco, meanwhile, accounts for three-quarters of the region’s renewable electricity production growth. Home to one of the largest solar farms in the world, the Noor Ouarzazate complex, Morocco is on track to increase the share of renewables in electricity to 60 percent to 65 percent by 2030, according to IEA estimates. Jordan has also been developing substantial solar and wind projects.

Collaborative energy framework

Much more still needs to be done to press home the renewable energy advantages that the whole MENA region has—and help those countries still lagging accelerate their energy transition. Wind and solar energy are only the beginning: even when countries have renewable resources and land on which to build installations, they lack some of the other attributes that are needed, including long-term finance, trust of investors and other potential stakeholders, appropriate regulatory regimes, and the government offtake that will make these installations viable.

This is where the GCC countries can help, taking the lead to build a collaborative energy framework and network across the region. The GCC members have a natural edge through their access to capital and the stability that allows for long-term investments that some other countries in the region may lack—and they can be the prime movers and facilitators of such a network.

There are multiple opportunities for greater collaboration. These include opportunities to integrate more renewables overall: creating possibilities to balance loads by exchanging renewable energy with neighboring countries, building out renewable energy infrastructure, and, potentially, marketing jointly to other regions such as Europe. GCC countries could facilitate the transfer of technology and expertise to other MENA countries, focusing on training and capacity building in renewable technologies. They can do so by fostering joint ventures and public-private partnerships with local companies and government agencies in those countries.

Further, the GCC countries can lead in developing a harmonized regulatory framework for renewables that encourages investments across the region. Harmonization of renewable energy practices and standards among MENA countries would be a big step forward to greater cooperation. For financing, GCC countries could develop a foreign direct investment approach, stepping in to help, where useful. They can establish a MENA renewable fund to support projects in countries with budget deficits and high solar or wind potential and use this to drive demand for the export of components manufactured in the GCC. For manufacturing, for example, GCC countries could help finance and develop the capacity to produce solar and wind turbines elsewhere in the region. If the cooperation develops strongly, it could even give rise to the creation of a clean energy souk, or marketplace, that brings together all the different elements under a single umbrella.

Some of this is already starting to happen, particularly on the investment front. Saudi Arabia is heavily investing in the renewable transition of MENA countries. The Saudi firm ACWA Power is looking to ramp up investments in both Egypt and Morocco to further clean energy projects there. This includes setting up a 200 MW solar project in Kom Ombo, Egypt, and a 150 MW solar plant as part of the Noor Ouarzazate solar complex in Morocco. The UAE also is driving large investments in solar and wind projects in Egypt, Morocco, and Jordan. In Egypt, Abu Dhabi’s Masdar signed an agreement to build a US$10 billion wind farm, and AMEA Power completed a US$1.1 billion deal to deploy 1 GW of wind and solar energy. Further, AMEA Power has won a contract to build two solar power plants in Morocco, and Masdar is set to develop a 1 GW wind project in Jordan. Additionally, Arab Petroleum Investments Corporation has taken a 20 percent stake in a major Jordanian wind project.

This is just the beginning, and more can be done to promote ties and further cooperation in clean energy across the MENA region. Much is at stake and much can be gained: the energy transition amounts to a larger regional reset as a global clean energy powerhouse. For all their differences, MENA countries have the essential components required to step into the new role. Now they need to take decisive steps toward realizing that potential.


Dr. Shihab Elborai and Anthony Yammine are partners, and Pavel Popikov is a manager, at Strategy& Middle East, a strategy consultancy part of the PwC network.

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Brazil is buying lots of Chinese EVs. Will that continue? https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/energysource/brazil-is-buying-lots-of-chinese-evs-will-that-continue/ Tue, 04 Jun 2024 18:32:48 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=770330 Brazilian imports of Chinese battery electric vehicles (BEVs) surged in 2023 as Chinese automakers sought—and continue to seek— global markets for their BEV surpluses. However, increasing protectionism in Brazil may force China to find new welcoming markets in other Latin American and Asian countries.

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In anticipation of growing demand for zero-emission transportation, China has become the world’s largest exporter of electric vehicles (EVs). China’s battery electric vehicle (BEV) industry is at overcapacity, producing an excess of 5 to 10 million vehicles annually beyond domestic demand, forcing China to find new markets to fuel continued growth.

Brazil offers a useful case study of China’s strategy—and whether it’s sustainable.

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Over the course of 2023, the value of Chinese BEV exports to Brazil surged eighteen-fold as automakers like BYD expanded their presence in the country. Chinese BEVs accounted for 92 percent of Brazil’s total BEV imports in this period.

This trend has continued durably thus far. As of April 2024, Brazil has surpassed Belgium as the top export market for China’s EVs.

Those aren’t the only numbers pointing to Brazil’s growing prominence as a market for Chinese BEVs, which constitute 88 percent of China’s total exports of electric vehicles, a category which includes both battery and plug-in hybrid electric vehicles (PHEVs).

In fact, Brazil imported $735 million worth of Chinese BEVs in 2023, nearly three times the value of Mexico’s imports of these Chinese vehicles. Despite increasing attention on Mexico as a destination for exports of Chinese BEVs, 2023 marked the second straight year that Brazil has ranked as Latin America’s largest importer of Chinese BEVs.

Furthermore, growth in Chinese exports of BEVs to Brazil far exceeded the overall rate of increase in exports across China’s “new three” industries—electric vehicles, lithium-ion batteries, and solar photovoltaic cells—that are critical pillars of China’s export-driven manufacturing plans. In 2023, China’s worldwide exports of these three industries increased by 30 percent—a significant jump amid sluggish global GDP growth overall, suggesting limited ability for markets to absorb this export growth.  

Whether Brazil can continue to absorb China’s overproduction of BEVs, similarly, is increasingly in doubt.

Strong domestic sales, slacking foreign competition

In recent years, EV sales in China have been robust, with BEVs—which are almost entirely produced domestically—accounting for 25 percent of total car sales in 2023. It is worth noting that this includes foreign firms, however, such as Tesla and Volkswagen.

China’s manufacturing of BEVs has outpaced domestic demand. While this might have resulted in millions of cars sitting unsold in Chinese lots, the overproduction has coincided with Western automakers such as General Motors, Ford, and Volkswagen tempering their EV ambitions amid weakening demand growth in their core markets.

This confluence of trends created an opportunity for Chinese BEV makers to boost sales abroad, as demonstrated by the 70 percent jump in BEV exports during 2023. Chinese BEV firms, and BYD in particular,  are making a concerted effort to expand outside of mainland China, offering products that outcompete peers on price, and sometimes compete strongly with internal combustion engine vehicles.

China’s growth ambitions cause concern

Rather than incentivize consumption, China is doubling down on its investment-driven growth model with an upcoming manufacturing stimulus program. Investment, expressed in World Bank data as gross capital formation, already represents 40 percent of China’s GDP, far above the global average of 25 percent and exceeding the emerging market average of 30 to 34 percent, illustrating China’s reliance on sectors like manufacturing to fuel growth.

China’s decision to expand its export-driven manufacturing sector is causing handwringing in target markets. The Brazilian government has opened a number of probes into China’s alleged “dumping” of goods. The European Union has also opened investigations into potential “non-market practices and policies” adopted by China.

China’s exports of its record surplus of manufactured goods beyond current levels will depend on other countries’ willingness to let China take market share from domestic industry. In an increasingly protectionist era, that seems far-fetched.

Will Brazil absorb China’s manufacturing surplus?

The surge in imports of BEVs from China has been rapid, offering little time to react. However, for Brazil, the stakes for its industrial competitiveness are high, and its tolerance for China’s encroachment on its automotive industry may be limited.

For one, automobiles are a critical cog in Brazilian industry. As of 2020, 89 percent of vehicles sold in the country were domestically produced, although this may have decreased slightly amid a surge of Chinese BEV imports. The car sector accounts for about 20 percent of industrial GDP, an area of critical importance to Brazil, where value-added manufacturing’s share of GDP has declined from 26 percent in 1993 to 11 percent in 2022.

Second, Brazil does not want to deepen its reliance on imports of high-tech and value-added products. In 2021, Brazil’s imports of capital, consumer, and intermediate goods accounted for 93 percent of total goods imports, a symptom of the country’s increasing trade specialization in the export of raw materials, which represented 55.7 percent of Brazil’s exports of goods. The government has expressed its discontent with this status quo, seeking to avoid trade arrangements that “condemn our county to be an eternal exporter of raw materials,” in the words of President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva.

Furthermore, Brazil has made supporting the domestic auto sector a priority. In May 2023, the Lula administration unveiled a series of measures to promote domestic auto manufacturing via credit lines, tax breaks, and incentives for the use of domestic content.

A continued rise in cheap Chinese EV imports would not align with Lula’s top-down push for re-industrialization, designed to foster formal high-wage employment, innovation, and economic diversification. In fact, his administration has announced new tariffs on electric vehicles, which will ramp up to a 35 percent import tax by 2026.

As such, China will likely need to find more willing buyers of its surplus EVs. Although it is difficult to forecast where the next surge in imports will take place, South and Southeast Asian markets such as India, Indonesia, and Thailand could begin to exhibit stronger uptake, as could markets in Latin America such as Colombia and Mexico.

William Tobin is an assistant director at the Atlantic Council Global Energy Center.

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Three ways Mexico’s new president could transform Central America https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/three-ways-mexicos-new-president-could-transform-central-america/ Tue, 04 Jun 2024 14:56:13 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=770212 The first female president of Mexico has the opportunity to redefine her country’s role in Central America, address the root causes of migration, and promote a more stable and prosperous region.

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Mexico’s northern border with the United States has received a lot of attention, but its southern border—and, more broadly, its relations with Central American countries—deserves attention, too. For many years, the thinking went that Mexico was, in a way, Central America’s big brother. Dare we ask if the ascent of Claudia Sheinbaum, who on Sunday was elected as Mexico’s next president, will make her country Central America’s big sister? While she will likely focus mostly on domestic issues—including tackling the rising levels of violence and insecurity in the country—she also has an opportunity to positively reset ties with Mexico’s southern neighbors. Three areas to watch in this respect are climate change, nearshoring, and migration.

A former mayor of Mexico City, Sheinbaum has a strong foundation in addressing urban challenges, governance, and social policies. Like her predecessor, outgoing President Andrés Manuel López Obrador, Sheinbaum will likely coordinate her policies under a narrative of addressing social injustice and advocating for Mexico’s most vulnerable. But unlike her predecessor, Sheinbaum is an environmental engineer and climate scientist by training. She appears poised to place environmental issues, including climate-change mitigation and adaptation, high among her social justice concerns. This would likely include seeking to advance issues ranging from sustainable agriculture to renewable energy.

At first glance, this may sound odd. Mexico is a major oil producer—the second largest exporter in Latin America after Brazil—and Sheinbaum has all but guaranteed that she will continue funding the state-owned oil company PEMEX, which suffers from a range of inefficiencies and carries debt of more than one hundred billion dollars. However, her scientific background and previous initiatives indicate a potential for balancing economic development with environmental sustainability. For example, during her time as mayor of Mexico City, Sheinbaum spearheaded the installment of solar power panels on top of a major market. Furthermore, she campaigned for president on a promise to address, early on in her administration, the water issues affecting Mexico City. Already during her first speech since the election, and probably in an effort to differentiate herself from López Obrador, Sheinbaum spoke about an upcoming renewable energy program for Mexico. Calibrating this balance will be crucial, as will working with regional partners. After all, Mexico and its neighbor Guatemala, for instance, face similar challenges of environmental degradation and the impacts of climate change, from flooding to droughts and a lack of access to water.

Another way in which Sheinbaum could partner with her Central American neighbors is by working together to seize nearshoring opportunities. Specifically, she and her regional counterparts could promote a mechanism whereby Central American economies would be able to join the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA). Nearshoring, or bringing international supply chains and production closer to the US market, can provide significant economic benefits, creating jobs and fostering economic stability in Mexico and throughout Central America. Promoting economic integration through the USMCA could provide a structured framework for this cooperation. The idea has been floated for a couple of years now, first by Costa Rica in 2022. This move would enhance the competitive edge of Central American economies, which in many ways are too small to make a difference on their own but together could create economies of scale. Bringing other Central American countries into the USMCA would allow these nations to benefit from the same trade advantages enjoyed by Mexico. It could also reduce many of the economic pressures that drive migration, namely a lack of jobs and insufficient wages.

Furthermore, Sheinbaum’s administration could adopt a more humanitarian approach to migration, focusing on protecting migrant rights and providing humanitarian assistance. While López Obrador touted his tree-planting “Sembrando Vida” program, Sheinbaum could take the programs a step further. This approach aligns with her broader progressive values—she is a self-described humanistand can enhance Mexico’s role as a regional leader in addressing the migration crisis. During the campaign, Sheinbaum repeatedly mentioned increased investments in social and youth programs in Central America, which, if designed holistically and sustainably, could effectively curb migration from Mexico’s neighbors. This is particularly important now, as US President Joe Biden prepares to roll out an executive order that would allow the United States to temporarily close its southern border if a threshold of encounters with migrants at the border is reached—reportedly, an average of five thousand crossings in a week or 2,500 in a day.

Regional security is another area in which Sheinbaum could make a big difference. Almost three dozen candidates were assassinated during the current electoral campaign, and record-breaking violence in the country is resulting in more than thirty thousand homicides each year. Improved and increased intelligence-sharing between Mexico and Central American countries can help combat organized crime and violence, which are significant push factors for migration. This is also an area in which the United States and Mexico may look to double down on their cooperation. Sheinbaum has pledged to address the rampant impunity in Mexico—less than five percent of criminal investigations are solved and many crimes go unreported. While Sheinbaum is unlikely to approach the security issue in the severe manner of President Nayib Bukele in El Salvador, she has recognized the urgency of this issue for the livelihood of millions of Mexicans.

Sheinbaum’s presidency could bring about significant positive change in Mexico and its relations with Central America. Her administration’s policies on energy and environmental sustainability, economic integration, and migration will have an important impact on the future of the region. The first female president of Mexico has the opportunity to redefine her country’s role in Central America, address the root causes of migration, and promote a more stable and prosperous region. In this new chapter for Mexico and the region, the Aztec nation could very well be a strong and stable partner for Central American nations.


María Fernanda Bozmoski is deputy director, operations and finance at the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center, where she leads the center’s work on Mexico and Central America.

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Sheinbaum just won a massive mandate in Mexico. Here’s how she might use it. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/sheinbaum-just-won-a-massive-mandate-in-mexico/ Mon, 03 Jun 2024 21:43:38 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=770129 The president-elect will certainly continue with her predecessor’s policies, but she will also be her own president.

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The election of Claudia Sheinbaum as Mexico’s next president was no surprise. In poll after poll, she consistently held the lead throughout the campaign season, and her victory was assumed going into Sunday’s vote. What was not expected, however, was her wide margin of victory and the overall percentage of the vote she received. What does this mean for Mexico going forward?

The numbers show an incoming administration with a strong mandate. With 58.3 to 60.7 percent of the vote, according to the National Electoral Institute’s Quick Count, Sheinbaum will enter office on October 1 even surpassing the share obtained by the current president, Andrés Manuel López Obrador, who won in 2018 with 53.2 percent of the votes. Her margin of victory over the second-place finisher could range from 29.7 to 34.1 percentage points—on track to likely surpass López Obrador’s margin (30.9 percentage points) as well. 

Beyond the surprise in outperforming even some of the most generous polls, her party, MORENA, and its allies received a mandate in Congress that also surpassed expectations. In the Chamber of Deputies, the new Congress will convene in September with the MORENA coalition holding a supermajority (at least two-thirds of the seats), and it is within striking range to do the same in the Senate. Early signs indicate that the MORENA coalition will hold a minimum of 346 seats in the 500-person lower House and could hold anywhere from 76 to 88 seats in the 128-person Senate, with 85 seats required for a supermajority.

The significance here cannot be overstated. A supermajority allows for constitutional changes—from the direct election of judges to the independence of regulatory agencies—which could not be obtained thus far by the López Obrador administration. Explicit campaign pledges can now be advanced. This means a potential acceleration of the Fourth Transformation of the Mexican state as ushered in by López Obrador, especially if the outgoing president prioritizes constitutional changes once the new Congress convenes on September 1.

As López Obrador’s hand-picked successor, Sheinbaum will certainly continue with her predecessor’s policies, but she will also be her own president. A scientist by training and a former secretary of the environment, she will bring new technical expertise and pragmatism to the presidency. That was evident in her time as head of government of Mexico City, where she developed and then continuously followed up on the implementation status of her 220-page government plan.

Expect to see several of her priorities during her term running Mexico City to carry over to her presidential administration. For example, speaking with the Atlantic Council on the sidelines of the Cities Summit of the Americas last year, Sheinbaum showed an in-depth, technical perspective on sustainability—not simply as stewardship of natural resources, but also as an issue interconnected with education, social justice, healthcare, housing, and infrastructure. 

Sheinbaum mentioned throughout her campaign the need to move forward with the energy transition, comments that reflect her background in energy engineering. There will inevitably be a role for the private sector to play in this transition, but as with her broader perspectives, the view of the Sheinbaum camp is that the government should lead the charge. The public-private partnerships that Sheinbaum moved forward during her leadership in Mexico City could be a model she brings to her new administration to advance, for example, more renewable energy projects in Mexico.

Infrastructure will also likely be a priority for the incoming administration. In her acceptance speech early Monday morning, Sheinbaum spoke about the need for new highways, trains, airports, and ports. All of these strategic projects are critical for Mexico to take advantage of the investment opportunities related to nearshoring with the United States. But given the tight government budget conditions that the new government will face, completing these projects will not be easy. Here, too, watch to see if the new administration turns to public-private partnerships to move these projects forward.

Finally, Sheinbaum will assume office in October with not only a sizable domestic mandate, but also with an opportunity to deepen Mexico’s engagement beyond its borders. López Obrador rarely traveled abroad, and Sheinbaum followed suit as head of government in Mexico City. Even though she took office in 2018, her trip to Denver for the Cities Summit of the Americas last year was rarity. But if and when she goes abroad, she will generate much interest given the potentially transformative moment she will oversee in Mexico and her place in history as Mexico’s first female president.


Jason Marczak is vice president and senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center. He leads work on the economic and security impacts of greater efficiencies and reduced wait times at the US-Mexico border including presenting findings before the Mexican Congress.

Bosco Martí is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center and is the global director of institutional affairs and communications for Aleatica. He previously served as executive director for Mexico and the Dominican Republic at the Inter-American Development Bank.

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In a Congolese mining case, Biden can secure a win for US sanctions policy in Africa https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/africasource/in-a-congolese-mining-case-biden-can-secure-a-win-for-us-sanctions-policy-in-africa/ Mon, 03 Jun 2024 17:32:05 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=769839 Easing sanctions on Dan Gertler gives Washington the opportunity to show that its sanctions policy toward Africa can be effective.

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At the intersection of core US interests in accessing critical minerals, diversifying supply chains, improving human rights, and spurring economic growth sits the thorny case of Dan Gertler. The Biden administration has begun considering easing sanctions on Gertler, an Israeli billionaire businessman, with the offer on the table reportedly allowing the mining executive to sell his holdings in copper and cobalt mines in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). If it follows through on this move, Washington has the opportunity to show that its sanctions policy toward Africa can be effective.

In 2017, the Trump administration imposed sanctions on Gertler, accusing him of “opaque and corrupt mining and oil deals” that cost the DRC more than $1.36 billion in revenues from 2010 to 2012 alone. Gertler has repeatedly denied any wrongdoing and, through a representative, said that he would abide by sanctions. The news that the Biden administration may ease these sanctions should be viewed positively, as an indication that US sanctions can achieve both economic and geopolitical goals.

Eased sanctions, whether a formal delisting or the issuing of a general license to Gertler, would allow for the sale of currently sanctioned entities. Following the easing of sanctions in this case, US firms could gain access to new investment opportunities by investing in mining projects that currently have links to Gertler, leading to economic growth in the United States and the DRC. In addition, the DRC has an opportunity to showcase the improvements that the country is making in the fight against money laundering and terrorist financing. While some senior officials, human-rights defenders, and anticorruption fighters have valid concerns about easing sanctions on Gertler, the decision could be a win for the DRC and the United States.

The choice—and the history behind it

Both the Trump and Biden administrations have gone back and forth over the tightening and easing of sanctions on Gertler. That has drawn much attention, but what hasn’t is the fact that the United States has quietly used sanctions effectively in this case to get its way.

In 2019, The Sentry—an investigative organization that aims to hold to account predatory networks that benefit from violent conflict, repression, and kleptocracy—conducted a six-month-long study on the effectiveness of sanctions in Africa in the twenty-first century. The study found that better strategies for achieving identified goals in each sanctions program must be developed if sanctions effectiveness was to improve. The Sentry study set the stage for the Treasury 2021 Sanctions Review, which drew conclusions on how to modernize US sanctions and make them more effective. Treasury recommended a “structured policy framework” that “links sanctions to a clear policy objective.” The Biden administration has made no secret of its desire to improve access to critical minerals, diversify its supply chains, and work with US partners to achieve those goals. Since 80 percent of the DRC’s cobalt output is owned by Chinese companies, US policymakers should be seeking ways to reduce barriers to entry in the DRC’s mining sector and to actively promote investment there. 

As the United States seeks to gain greater access to critical minerals and diversify its supply chains away from Chinese influence, Biden administration officials hope that granting Gertler a general license to sell his holdings in the DRC would increase US or Western firms’ willingness to invest in the country. That’s because those firms have been largely boxed out as Gertler, according to the US Treasury, used his closeness with government officials to secure below-market rates for mining concessions for his companies. Beyond Gertler, the business environment of the DRC ranks 183 out of 190 on the World Bank’s Doing Business indicators. Easing sanctions, through a coordinated US government effort that seeks to maximize this move, could send an important signal to Western investors that the DRC is open for business. Western firms could lift their bottom lines while stimulating the DRC economy by paying market rates.

The potential delisting of Gertler and his companies is a good example of an instance in which sanctions—or, in this case, the easing of sanctions—are being used in support of a specific policy objective.

Delisting would be good—but more must be done

Building on a potential delisting, the Biden administration should work with Congress to expeditiously pass the bipartisan BRIDGE to DRC Act—which helps the United States secure access to critical-mineral supply chains and sets human-rights and democracy benchmarks for strengthening the US-DRC relationship. These moves could be further timed or calculated to magnify the impact of ongoing foreign assistance programs led by the United States Agency for International Development or other US government agencies.

The United States should coordinate additional moves to support the DRC. In October 2022, the Financial Action Task Force, the standard-setting international organization that seeks to strengthen the global financial system, placed the DRC on its list of jurisdictions under increased monitoring—also known as the “grey list”—for the country’s dismal record in fighting money laundering and terrorist financing. While many African countries are on the grey list, the impact is considerable, as it limits capital inflows, makes investors wary of doing business, and leads to reputational damage and a reduction of correspondent banking relationships, among other consequences. The US Treasury should look to bolster the DRC government’s approach to anti-money laundering and combating the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) by equipping the country with the knowledge, know-how, and capacity that it needs.  

Regardless of whether the delisting happens or whether the BRIDGE Act becomes law, the DRC must do more to help itself. News of a failed coup attempt in Kinshasa on May 19 certainly does not help, especially since—according to local reports—the assailants were linked to exiled DRC politician and US citizen Christian Malanga, who was killed by the country’s security forces in a firefight. Three US nationals were allegedly also involved in the attempt to overthrow the government of President Felix Tshisekedi.

The DRC must continue to take concrete steps to improve the business environment and reduce its political and economic risk factors. Since 2022, the DRC built on its high-level political commitments to improve its AML/CFT regime, finalize its three-year national AML/CFT strategy, and improve its macroeconomic performance—boosting its credit rating. The DRC has an opportunity to continue to make progress in its fight against corruption, money laundering, and terrorist financing that threaten the stability of the country from Matadi on the Atlantic seaboard to Goma in the Great Rift Valley.

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A win in the heart of Africa

Delisting Gertler would not only help the United States get its way, but it would show that its sanctions policy in Africa can be effective; its industrial and national security policies can be successfully implemented; and that all of this can be done in a manner that can help an African partner generate greater economic growth, jobs, and the foreign investment it seeks.

The United States can’t do it alone. It must also partner with the DRC in a serious manner to help strengthen the DRC’s framework to combat money laundering and terrorist financing, improve Kinshasa’s image, and reduce barriers to investment such as perceived political and economic risk.

The DRC occupies a central role on the African continent and with its economic potential could serve as a future hub for transportation, logistics, mineral processing, and more. If the DRC wins, all of Africa benefits—as do the United States and the West.


Benjamin Mossberg is the deputy director of the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center. He previously served in the US Treasury Department and US State Department with a focus on Africa policy.

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PACC 2030 objectives: The road to implementation https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/pacc-2030-objectives-the-road-to-implementation/ Fri, 31 May 2024 19:01:12 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=768813 The Atlantic Council organized a PACC 2030 Working Group and worked closely with governments, the business community, and civil society organizations to support the implementation of PACC 2030’s objectives.

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The fifth of a six-part series following up on the Ninth Summit of the Americas commitments.

This is a report from the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center in partnership with the US Department of State. This readout was informed by multi-stakeholder dialogues focused on facilitating greater, constructive exchange among multi-sectoral thought leaders and government leaders as they work to implement commitments made at the Ninth Summit of the Americas.

Executive summary

On March 14, the Atlantic Council’s Caribbean Initiative partnered with the US Department of State to organize the PACC 2030 Road to Implementation Summit on the sidelines of the Energy and Climate Partnership of the Americas Ministerial Meetings in the Dominican Republic. The summit built on the PACC 2030 Climate Resilient Clean Energy Summit, which took place on the sidelines of US Vice President Kamala Harris’s inaugural trip to the Caribbean in June 2023, and previous partnerships with the Department of State to advance commitments adopted at the Ninth Summit of the Americas in Los Angeles in 2022. Since then, the Atlantic Council has organized a PACC 2030 Working Group and has worked closely with governments, the business community, and civil society organizations to support the implementation of PACC 2030’s objectives.

5 recommendations for implementing PACC 2030’s commitments:

  1. Enhance partner coordination to streamline access to resources and technical assistance
  • Improve coordination among partners to create a standardized project application and approval process that alleviates administrative burdens on small governments with limited technical capacity. This can include creating templates and guidelines for project proposals, permitting procedures, and regulatory compliance.
  • Create regular networking forums and knowledge-sharing platforms where stakeholders from various sectors can exchange ideas and explore potential collaborations through workshops, conferences, and online platforms that promote dialogue and partnership building.
  1. Support capacity building to strengthen the regulatory environment to help scale up projects and welcome new investors
  • Enhance access to technical expertise and resources through partnerships with US national laboratories, academic institutions, and industry experts to create knowledge transfer programs or country mentorship initiatives to build local capacity and expertise in key areas, including renewable energy integration, grid stability, and project management.
  • Develop programs tailored to government officials, project developers, and community leaders to improve their understanding of financing options, investment structures, and risk management strategies.
  1. Build innovative financing mechanisms to mobilize new capital at affordable rates
  • Introduce risk mitigation instruments such as insurance protections and guarantees to address uncertainty and attract further private sector investment. These instruments would protect investors against market fluctuations, policy changes, and natural disasters, thus increasing confidence in climate resilience projects.
  • Align partnerships with multilateral institutions like the World Bank and Inter-American Development Bank (IDB)—for example, through the latter’s new “One Caribbean” program—to build a project pipeline to attract capital to the region and facilitate technical assistance to de-risk clean energy projects.
  1. Continue and expand engagement with new actors and partners
  • Encourage greater private sector involvement in financing, implementing, and scaling up climate resilience and clean energy projects through public-private partnerships.
  • Prioritize community engagement and empowerment strategies to ensure climate resilience and clean energy projects are inclusive, participatory, and responsive to local needs and priorities, particularly as the agenda takes shape for the next Summit of the Americas.
  • Expand connections between subnational and small-state leaders across the Summit of the Americas process, including before a second Cities Summit of the Americas.
  1. Continue progress at the Tenth Summit of the Americas
  • Utilize the Tenth Summit of the Americas’ CEO Summit—to be organized by the IDB—to engage business leaders to work with stakeholders in the Caribbean to ensure that the summit responds to the needs of the region and the wider Americas.
  • Reinforce regional cooperation on clean energy and climate-related challenges by building on commitments like “Our Sustainable Green Future” and “Accelerating the Clean Energy Transition” adopted at the Ninth Summit of the Americas in the next iteration.
  • Engage with the Joint Summit Working Group’s organizations and the Americas Business Dialogue to streamline financing and technical assistance to support implementation of the commitments made at the Ninth Summit of the Americas.

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Only enhanced air defenses can save Ukraine from winter energy collapse https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/only-enhanced-air-defenses-can-save-ukraine-from-winter-energy-collapse/ Tue, 28 May 2024 20:30:43 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=768610 Ukraine's power grid has been decimated in recent months by a major Russian bombing campaign. In order to avoid a humanitarian catastrophe this winter, the country urgently needs more air defenses, writes Aura Sabadus.

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Politicians, diplomats, and business leaders will gather in Berlin in early June to mobilize international support for the reconstruction of Ukraine. This latest postwar recovery conference is certainly a welcome initiative, but it is also painfully clear that today’s Ukraine has far more urgent needs.

As the summer season begins, millions of Ukrainians across the country are once again getting used to the idea of rolling electricity blackouts. These power shortages are a result of Russia’s latest air offensive, which has succeeded in destroying much of Ukraine’s power grid in the space of just a few months.

Ever since the start of the full-scale invasion in February 2022, Ukraine’s civilian energy structure has been a prime target for Russian missile and drone attacks. The situation has deteriorated sharply during the first five months of 2024, with Russia exploiting growing gaps in Ukrainian air defenses caused by delays in Western aid to conduct a series of devastating strikes on critical energy targets.

This has caused levels of damage far beyond anything witnessed during previous Russian air offensives. Ukraine’s largest private power producer, DTEK, confirmed in early May that more than ninety percent of its thermal power plants had been destroyed. Meanwhile, the news from state-owned power generator Centrenergo was even grimmer, with all coal-fired units wrecked by Russian bombardment.

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For the time being, the situation is not critical. With the days currently getting longer and Ukraine basking in glorious spring sunshine, power consumption remains relatively low and can mostly be covered by the country’s remaining nuclear and renewable generation. Nevertheless, when electricity demand spikes during evening hours or when the weather turns cloudy, Ukraine is already facing shortfalls that cannot be entirely met with imports from neighboring EU markets.

In order to balance the power grid, Ukraine’s transmission system operator, Ukrenergo, has introduced a schedule of rolling power cuts that leave households and industrial consumers without access to electricity for hours on end. This is impacting the production capacity of the Ukrainian defense industry, which is expanding rapidly in a bid to reduce the country’s reliance on faltering Western supplies of weapons.

Ukraine’s current electricity shortages are relatively straightforward compared to the far more serious challenges posed by the rapidly approaching winter season. While the sun is now shining in Ukraine, within five months the country will enter a half-year period of freezing temperatures and long, dark nights with much of its energy generation capacity wrecked and demand for electricity likely to double. This is a recipe for potential humanitarian catastrophe that requires urgent international attention.

Ukraine’s heroic energy engineers are currently hard at work mending torn transmission lines, rebuilding power plants, and attempting to fix damaged transformers. In many cases, these repairs need to be carried out from scratch. Power companies are appealing to EU countries to donate old kit from decommissioned stations or share spare stocks ahead of the coming winter season. Efforts are also underway to increase border capacity with EU countries by around one-third in the coming months.

If Ukrainian power producers succeed in restoring a large portion of damaged thermal capacity, the country will be relatively well equipped to cope with the seasonal surge in demand once winter arrives. Some small-scale generation capacity using natural gas may also be added to the system, helping to bring more flexibility during periods of peak consumption.

However, it is crucial to underline that this is a highly optimistic scenario. Without significantly enhanced air defenses, the danger of fresh Russian air strikes will remain. Any energy infrastructure repaired between now and October may well be destroyed once again on the eve of the first big winter chill.

A number of alternative solutions to Ukraine’s energy sector crisis have been pitched so far. These include building decentralized electricity clusters around urban areas that would be less vulnerable to Russian bombardment. Other proposals depend on the possibility of expanding interconnection capacity with EU countries and increasing production specifically for export to Ukraine. While such steps could play a vital role in enabling Ukraine to survive the coming winter season, they would likely require complex political negotiations.

The most immediate challenge facing Ukraine is defending the country’s remaining power grid and preventing Russia from destroying repaired facilities. This should be the top priority for all of Ukraine’s partners. While recovery and investment conferences offer hope for the future, Ukraine desperately needs additional air defenses to keep the lights on right now. If this does not happen, millions of Ukrainians will face the prospect of a rapidly deteriorating humanitarian situation as the winter season draws closer.

Dr. Aura Sabadus is a senior energy journalist who writes about Eastern Europe, Turkey, and Ukraine for Independent Commodity Intelligence Services (ICIS), a London-based global energy and petrochemicals news and market data provider. Her views are her own.

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Experts react: What to know about the latest G7 ‘progress’ on using blocked Russian assets to aid Ukraine https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/experts-react/experts-react-g7-progress-on-using-blocked-russian-assets-to-aid-ukraine/ Sat, 25 May 2024 14:15:12 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=768131 Group of Seven (G7) finance ministers just met in Stresa, Italy, to discuss what to do with blocked Russian assets. Atlantic Council experts follow the money.

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Interest in the interest is growing. Over the past three days, Group of Seven (G7) finance ministers met in Stresa, Italy, on the shore of Lake Maggiore, to discuss what to do with a major pile of money. Following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, G7 nations blocked around $300 billion in Russian assets in the West, the bulk of which are in Belgium, France, and Germany. Today, G7 finance ministers said they are making “progress” on a plan to use future interest generated by the assets to issue a loan to Ukraine. Reports say this loan could be as large as fifty billion dollars, and it could move forward as soon as the June 13-15 G7 leaders’ summit in southeastern Italy. Below, Atlantic Council experts follow the money.

Click to jump to an expert analysis:

Charles Lichfield: Past the point of no return on a sovereign loan to Ukraine

Daniel Fried: Take the best deal available now and keep pushing for the rest

Olga Khakova: Money generated by Russian assets can help save Ukraine from freezing this winter

John Herbst: The US is helpfully taking the lead on the sticky Russian asset problem


Past the point of no return on a sovereign loan to Ukraine

The G7 finance ministers’ statement isn’t as noncommittal as it sounds. It now privileges one approach to mobilizing Russia’s immobilized sovereign assets for Ukraine: bringing forward the value of interest income through a giant sovereign loan, worth more than half of Ukraine’s total expenditure this year.

Earlier this year, Germany, Italy, and France (the members of the G7 that use the euro), along with Japan, stood up to pressure from the United States and other countries to consider directly seizing the assets. It is a very significant achievement that—in a relatively short amount of time—the seven have converged around an approach that delivers a very large sum without crossing anyone’s red lines.

Given the speed at which the Europeans have swung behind the proposal, it’s safe to interpret that there is goodwill on all sides to resolve the outstanding technical details. The European Union (EU) sanctions legislation that keeps the assets blocked has to be renewed by consensus every six months. The European Council is unlikely to change this to an “unless-and-until” provision, although it has committed politically to keeping the assets blocked until Russia leaves Ukraine and pays compensation. The solution is for all sides to shoulder a share of the financial risk, and it appears the United States is willing to do so too.

We should expect more progress at the G7 leaders’ summit on June 13 and 14 in southeastern Italy. It may take a few months following that for the money to start flowing, but the G7 is clearly past the point of no return on this very constructive approach.

Charles Lichfield is the deputy director and C. Boyden Gray senior fellow of the Atlantic Council’s GeoEconomics Center.


Take the best deal available now and keep pushing for the rest

The G7 seems to be closing in on a deal to use a substantial amount of Russian money to pay for Russia’s war of national destruction against Ukraine. Though not enough, it’s a big step and needs to be nailed down fast.

Almost immediately after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the G7, working fast and in stealth, immobilized close to $300 billion of Russian sovereign assets. The G7 has since considered whether and, if so, how that money could be used to benefit Ukraine. After months of deliberation and indecision, G7 finance ministers seem to be drawing close to a consensus about using twenty years’ worth of interest on the immobilized assets, which could amount to about fifty billion dollars, as collateral for a loan (possibly no interest and forgivable) to Ukraine.

Many experts (such as former US diplomat Philip Zelikow) have made a strong case for using all of the Russian assets for Ukraine. But European resistance (especially from Germany and France) has held up agreement for months, while Ukraine’s needs have grown more urgent. Biden administration officials decided to push for the best deal at hand—the fifty-billion-dollar deal. In their place, I would have done the same: Take what you can get now and keep pushing for the rest.

Moving forward with this deal would be welcome. But the delay in advancing toward a decision—and the limited nature of the tentative deal—illustrates a problem: Russia is an aggressive and dangerous nation waging war against one neighbor, threatening others, and trying to intimidate Europe into allowing the Kremlin to reassemble the Russian Empire through violence. Peacetime norms must give way to norms suited to the harsher era that is upon us, whether we like it or not. Those European opponents of using Russia’s assets to pay for Russia’s war of aggression should reconsider. Today’s announcement of progress is not yet a step commensurate with what is required. 

Daniel Fried is the Weiser Family distinguished fellow at the Atlantic Council, former US ambassador to Poland, and former US assistant secretary of state for Europe.


Money generated by Russian assets can help save Ukraine from freezing this winter

While the West is debating the feasibility of confiscating Russian frozen assets, Ukraine needs a massive influx of funds now to prepare its energy system for a brutal winter ahead, minimize debilitating blackouts this summer, and defend the remaining infrastructure from Russian bombardment. The energy sector has been a prime target of Moscow’s genocidal campaign, and these strategic attacks have intensified this spring, with a focus on central energy generation—the largest thermal power plants providing Ukrainians with essential services and keeping industry and business running despite the war.

Before the G7 finance ministers met in Stresa, the EU agreed in principle to a fifty-billion-dollar bond proposal for the blocked assets, of which up to 90 percent would be earmarked for arms and military equipment. On the surface, this may appear irrelevant to the urgent needs in the energy sector, but it’s the most effective investment for keeping the remaining energy system protected and enabling reconstruction and repairs of lifesaving infrastructure. The remaining 10 percent would go to budgetary and humanitarian support under the EU facility and can contribute toward procuring gas turbines and other equipment. This money, which could begin to arrive as early as July if G7 leaders finalize a deal next month, could also help alleviate the additional expense of having to import electricity from Ukraine’s European neighbors, which would have been generated at a fraction of the price by Ukraine’s now-destroyed power plants.

Fifty billion dollars is nowhere close to the cost of Russia’s unprovoked horror and misery on Ukrainian citizens, the natural environment, critical infrastructure, and culture. However, channeling these windfall profits from the immobilized Russian assets toward Ukraine’s most dire needs is a small but decisive step toward setting the precedent that Russia will not escape from paying for its crimes. Moreover, as appropriation of the money changes to reflect Ukraine’s priorities, a significant percentage of profits could be directed toward reconstruction efforts.

Olga Khakova is the deputy director for European energy security at the Atlantic Council’s Global Energy Center.


The US is helpfully taking the lead on the sticky Russian asset problem

No white smoke emerged from the meeting of G7 finance ministers in Stresa, Italy, this week in their preparations for the G7 Summit next month. The key issue on their agenda was how to deal effectively on the financial side with the greatest current threat to global security and prosperity: Vladimir Putin’s determination to dominate Ukraine. The ministerial took small, sensible steps regarding additional sanctions on Russia in, for instance, the energy area. But the big item was, of course, the roughly $300 billion in Russian state assets frozen in the international financial system. The EU took a baby step recently, allowing the use of dividends from those assets to be transferred to Ukraine. That might provide Ukraine a few billion dollars a year. 

But to its credit, with White House Deputy National Security Advisor for International Economics Daleep Singh leading the charge, the United States for months has been looking for a more ambitious approach: to bundle multiple years of interest payments to allow a payment of fifty billion dollars up front. US Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen put her shoulder to this wheel in Stresa, and reports suggest that she made some progress. 

With three weeks to the G7 Summit, there is time to get this deal done. But while Canada and the United Kingdom are interested in the US proposal, the rest of the G7 members are concerned about possible Russian retaliation, and there has also been unhelpful lobbying from China and Saudi Arabia against transferring the assets to Ukraine. So success at the Italy summit cannot be taken for granted. But it is good to see the United States in the lead on a key issue related to the war and, if US President Joe Biden and Yellen deliver the goods in Apulia, the United States can then take up the proposal pushed brilliantly by Philip Zelikow, Bob Zoellick, and Larry Summers to come back for the remaining $250 billion in Russian state assets.

John E. Herbst is the senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center and a former US ambassador to Ukraine.

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Why the latest attempt at a Greece-Turkey reset, while positive, falls short https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/turkeysource/why-the-latest-attempt-at-a-greece-turkey-reset-while-positive-falls-short/ Thu, 23 May 2024 19:44:54 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=767492 The attempt to normalize ties between Athens and Ankara continues, but a breakthrough remains elusive.

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Earlier this month, Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis visited Ankara for talks with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.

But the mood heading into the meeting was difficult to gauge, as just days before the two leaders met, Turkey officially reopened a United Nations World Heritage Site as a mosque (the Kariye Camii)—a location that, before it was turned into a mosque during Ottoman rule and a museum in 1945, was originally a prominent Byzantine church (the Church of St. Saviour in Chora). In response, Greece lodged a démarche to the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO).

In the past, such embittered instances between Turkey and Greece had fed a repeating cycle of mutual suspicion and angry rhetoric. But the prime minister’s visit to Ankara went ahead as planned. Although the press conference revealed the leaders’ disagreements, their decision to highlight their different takes on the Hamas-Israel war instead of lingering on bilateral disputes demonstrates their desire to maintain a positive momentum.

This is remarkable, given that the two NATO allies almost came to the brink of conflict in the summer of 2020, averted through some shrewd diplomacy and cool-headed maneuvring. The list of bilateral disputes has gotten longer: the Cyprus problem remains——but in recent years, new disputes such as competing claims to energy resources in the Eastern Mediterranean have been added to the list of bilateral disputes. As Greece reinforced defense and energy cooperation with the United States, France, and Israel, Turkey accused Greece of a maximalist position in the Eastern Mediterranean, while calling on Athens to demilitarize the Aegean islands.

Tensions rose after Turkey sent a seismic research ship, accompanied by gunboats, to waters contested by Greece and Cyprus and signed a controversial maritime boundary treaty with the former Government of National Accord in Libya, angering nearby countries in the area. Moreover, Ankara’s decision to open Turkey’s border with Greece in February 2020 for migrant travel into Europe, and Greece’s refusal to allow passage into the country, added to the tension, as police from both countries fired tear gas at their shared border, eventually leading to the construction of a twenty-five-mile fence and surveillance system along the border. As these tensions built up over time, Greece’s official position remained that the two countries’ sole differences lie in delimiting the continental shelf and their respective exclusive economic zones, and that failure to agree bilaterally on these issues should lead the two nations to arbitration through the International Court of Justice in The Hague.

A rare opening

The devastating February 2023 earthquakes in Turkey and Syria paved the way for an attempt to reset relations. Greece was among the first countries to pledge support to Turkey, and the then Greek foreign minister rushed to visit his Turkish counterpart and tour the affected region, pledging support from the European Union (EU). A few months later, Mitsotakis and Erdoğan got a fresh mandate in their countries’ respective elections, effectively freeing them to act independent of electoral calculations. In that context in December 2023, a large Turkish delegation of ministers and businesspeople, headed by Erdoğan, traveled to Athens. The two sides signed a total of fifteen bilateral agreements including the Athens Declaration, a nonbinding political document committing the two sides to boosting their friendship and cultivating good neighborly relations.

Greece and Turkey pursue dialogue on three levels: first is the so-called “positive agenda” of cooperation on trade, education, research, and tourism among others. The two countries have pledged to double their bilateral trade volume to ten billion dollars and agreed to setting up a Greek-Turkish Business Forum. Greece’s decision to extend tourist visas to Turkish citizens to visit select eastern Aegean islands all year round aims at boosting people-to-people ties; it is also a recognition of Ankara’s intensified cooperation with Greek and EU authorities on migration, one of the many areas of common concern, as such an arrangement likely required EU approval.

The second level relates to confidence-building measures, for example to avoid tension over the Aegean Sea through agreements on the rules of military drills and training exercises and the creation of a hotline between the two countries’ military and civilian headquarters. Talks resumed in 2023 after a long hiatus and have so far led to calm over the Aegean. Such calm makes economic, as well as political, sense: Dogfights are expensive, and both sides would rather invest in health, education, and services that support busy tourist seasons.

The third level is the political dialogue to address the already thorny bilateral disputes that have been around for decades. Substantial progress on this front has not been achieved and will require solid preparation, political courage, and a desire to compromise on issues that both sides have grown accustomed to viewing as nonnegotiable.  

Will the positive momentum last?

While wars in Ukraine and Gaza rage on, both Greece and Turkey have a vested interest in being perceived as a stabilizing force in an unstable neighborhood. Ankara’s friendlier posture towards Greece suggests that it recognizes the elevated role Athens plays in the Eastern Mediterranean and that working alongside (rather than against) Greece is important in its wider attempts to rebuild its relationship with regional neighbors. Moreover, both Washington and Brussels support Greece and Turkey’s reconciliation efforts: Energy and defense cooperation are high on the agenda of Ankara and Washington as they attempt to set aside major differences over Israel, Russia, and Syria. For the EU, Ankara is a key player in its attempt to externalize the governance of its migration policy, and EU-Turkey cooperation on trade and energy matters is crucial too.  

Nonetheless, overt optimism about the prospects of Greece-Turkey ties is not warranted.

First, the two countries disagree on a range of issues, and they have not attempted to move away from their entrenched positions. On sovereignty and identity matters, not to speak of the Cyprus dispute, the political cost of attempting a genuine breakthrough could prove prohibitively high.

Second, even “second-order” issues carry the potential for derailing the positive atmosphere. Greece’s announcement of a second marine national park in the Aegean Sea, in the name of environmental protection and as part of the country’s EU-related obligations, has sparked a response from Ankara, in which the foreign ministry warned Greece that the park is located in a disputed area and said it suspected the move was politically motivated.

Third, this isn’t the first time the two countries are looking to improve ties: The Greek-Turkish rapprochement of the early 2000s was premised on the Europeanization of Greek foreign policy and Turkey’s reform efforts to enter the EU, spearheaded by what can be considered earthquake diplomacy 1.0. A Greece-Turkey Cooperation Council was set up in 2010, only to be forgotten amid rising tension and geopolitical rivalry.

It is therefore premature to speak of a new era in bilateral relations. As of now, all contentious political issues remain unresolved. However, the progress the two sides have made is genuine. Their economic relations have become stronger, and nonstate actors, such as businesses and civil-society organizations, are playing a bigger role in deepening ties.

Erdoğan and Mitsotakis are scheduled to meet again this year on the sidelines of the NATO summit in the summer and the UN General Assembly in September, after having met three times in 2023. This year will be telling about whether the two leaders can deepen their mutual understanding and build up reservoirs of trust that will eventually permit a breakthrough on high-level political items.


Dimitris Tsarouhas is head of the Turkey Research Program at the Center for European and Transatlantic Studies (CEUTS) at Virginia Tech, Adjunct Professor at Georgetown University’s Security Studies Program, and a Global fellow at the Wilson Center’s Global Europe Program. Follow him on LinkedIn.

The views expressed in TURKEYSource are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

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From Vilnius to Warsaw: How to Advance Three Seas Goals Between Summits https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/energysource/from-vilnius-to-warsaw-how-to-advance-three-seas-goals-between-summits/ Thu, 23 May 2024 19:30:27 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=767506 To define regional goals of digital, transport, and energy integration, the leaders of the Three Seas Initiative member states and partners meet annually. But to make real progress toward these goals, they must now create a secretariat to coordinate and act on challenges throughout the year.

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Leaders at the ninth Three Seas Summit and Business Forum, held in Vilnius in April, raised the need for creating a permanent body that would institutionalize regional cooperation on digital, transport, and energy integration. While there is little disagreement among participating countries that such an office is needed, their views diverge on the location of this coordinating body, reporting structure, and coverage of its operating costs.

Solving these administrative problems is one of the biggest impediments to formalizing a secretariat. To ensure that the Three Seas Initiative (3SI), which convenes at the annual summits, can effectively and quickly address the unique challenges facing its thirteen Southeastern, Central, and Eastern European member states, associate states, and strategic partners in reaching common goals, its leaders must now agree on a structure.

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More than 900 participants joined this year’s summit, which every year aims to explore ways to tap members’ vast economic potential while fortifying against mounting security threats. They discussed ways to advance connectivity, economic growth, and broader security by overcoming shared regional barriers via the 3SI mechanism. However, making progress between summits requires institutionalization of the 3SI through a permanent secretariat body to maintain momentum and focus between the annual events.

How a 3SI institution could work

The secretariat could be launched and housed in a neutral, non-3SI city in Europe, preferably a financial hub, like Brussels, with a small permanent team whose operating costs would be covered by the 3SI country hosting the summit that year. The 3SI team’s initial guidance could include exchange of information between 3SI stakeholders, outreach to private investors, and the promotion of cross-border digital, energy, and transportation projects in the region, with a particular focus on the project priority list. In a sense, the secretariat would serve as a library of projects for inquiring investors. The 3SI platform can play a meaningful role in helping resolve top priority issues in the region, which were raised repeatedly at the summit, ministerial, and in private events (including those jointly hosted by the Atlantic Council, Clean Air Task Force, and Amber Infrastructure Group). These issues include:

  • Access to finance
  • Fragmented market
  • Supply chains risks
  • Russian aggression in Ukraine and the broader region
  • Commercialization of new technologies and innovative solutions
  • Workforce shortages

By addressing these challenges throughout the year (through the work between the summits), the 3SI stakeholders would create compounding benefits, securities, and efficiencies for Europe, particularly through 3SI’s unique power to connect traditionally siloed sectors and geographies and its magnifying platform for bringing attention to the top challenges in the region.  

Leaning into the 3SI mission

Once a 3SI body is created, it can rapidly get to work on actualizing steps toward achieving its goals, including regional integration of resources, coordination of workforce development, optimization of external partnerships, and raising finance. Dialogue at the Three Seas summits has yielded broad consensus and support for these priorities.

Goal 1: Integrating the regions, markets, and innovation

Despite gigantic leaps in connectivity across Europe, regional integration is hampered by the lack of cross-border coordination, regulatory hurdles, supply chain risks, and market fragmentation. These gaps create diverging prices, inefficient routes, and lags in information sharing. 3SI would not be a one-fix-fits-all in resolving these issues, but the presidential-level platform has untapped potential to alleviate some of these challenges. 3SI is uniquely positioned to highlight the regional cost and security threats of insufficient energy interconnection, transportation routes, and digital integration. Priority-project lists should be frequently updated and expanded, something the secretariat can manage, to provide ample options for potential investors with projects’ bankability and other relevant details included.

Moreover, 3SI has a unique opportunity to embrace a technologically neutral approach while focusing on solutions-driven criteria: competitive pricing, carbon emissions, environmental impacts, and secure and diversified supply chains. To scale new technologies, the 3SI secretariat could support existing regional coordination on regulatory alignment to forge an easy-to-navigate investment environment. Cooperation on cyber security and kinetic threats across 3SI stakeholders can enhance protection for these technologies and infrastructure in the region.

Goal 2: Investing in a workforce that will transform the region

In addition to the work dismantling regulatory barriers, 3SI can contribute to forging an innovation ecosystem through building a talented workforce for the future. The Three Seas economies have a unique opportunity to exchange data around the current labor force and the anticipated talent gap in energy, digital, and transportation sectors. The region is already leading in science and technology education in Europe and can build on this competitive advantage by scaling the number of trained professionals through coordinating programs and forging an efficient education-to-workforce placement pipeline. The annual 3SI summits could include programming dedicated to student engagement, recruitment, and education on key opportunities in the growing sectors.

Goal 3: Optimizing collaboration with 3SI associated and strategic partners

Japan’s inclusion as a 3SI strategic partner this year is a testament to the value of global partnership on commercialization of new technologies and diversified supply chains. Several summit panels touched on driving Japanese companies’ investments in the region, particularly rail and communications sectors development.

3SI countries also have an opportunity to develop strategic priorities in support of associate members Ukraine and Moldova (complementary to the existing efforts), while exploring the potential to build additional energy and transport interconnections, as well as collaboration in the digital space.

Goal 4: Financing a secure, competitive, and low-carbon Three Seas region

An enormous barrier to achieving 3SI priorities is the trillion-dollar gap between where infrastructure stands today and where the region agrees it needs to be. National budgets are insufficient. EU funding is challenging to access and excludes some infrastructure and technologies. The Three Seas Fund, 3SI’s investment arm, can play an important role in leveraging private finance and helping match public and private capital to realize the projects. As the next round of the 3SI fund is established, attracting private equity will be crucial for reaching scale of impact. Cross-country coordination creates efficiency and minimizes risk for cross-border investments, particularly in addressing the grid infrastructure gaps and preparing roads for a safe, low-carbon transportation future.

Achieving a shared vision of the future

No similar coalition exists with focus on security and economic prosperity through integration. This shared vision of a secure, digitized, integrated, low-carbon, resilient economy is refined every year at the Three Seas Summit as new ideas are shared on stage, discussed during coffee breaks, and put to the test following the conference. With the formalization of a 3SI institution to build on the work between summits, 3SI could be an unstoppable platform for realizing the region’s rich potential and talent.

Olga Khakova is the deputy director for European energy security at the Atlantic Council Global Energy Center

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Without tariffs, the EU faces a flood of Chinese imports of the ‘new three’ https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/energysource/without-tariffs-the-eu-faces-a-flood-of-chinese-imports-of-the-new-three/ Thu, 23 May 2024 18:49:40 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=767310 Europe faces a surge in Chinese cleantech imports following recent US tariffs. This should prompt Brussels to selectively impose its own tariffs while also strengthening domestic industries to protect its economic and strategic interests.

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Washington’s recent tariffs against Chinese products all but ensure a flood of these exports to Europe, necessitating a response from Brussels. The products include China’s “new three” cleantech exports—lithium-ion batteries, electric vehicles (EVs), and solar panels—posing undeniable dilemmas for Brussels as it balances security, economic, and climate interests. To head off a deluge of Chinese products while also allowing some to support decarbonization goals, Brussels should selectively and thoughtfully apply greater tariffs and restrictions. Concurrently, European industrial policy should prioritize the development of indigenous battery and EV supply chains and manufacturing capacity.

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The European Union’s imports of the new-three cleantech export categories have skyrocketed in recent years. Over the course of 2023, China’s exports to the EU totaled $23.3 billion for lithium-ion batteries, $19.1 billion in solar panels, and $14.5 billion for electric vehicles.

Europe’s imports of these cleantech products have fallen in recent months, partly because of the global glut in solar panels and constraints on installations. The EU’s anti-subsidy investigation into electric vehicles, launched in October, has also cooled shipments.

Europe’s most consequential tariff decisions concern EVs and batteries, as these products hold economic and strategic relevance.

With the automotive sector indirectly providing 6.1 percent of total EU employment and 7 percent of GDP turnover, EVs and batteries are a key future driver for the EU’s economy. This sector is at risk due to China’s heavily subsidized auto exports.

While transitioning to EVs from internal combustion engines will necessitate disruptions, ceding Europe’s auto industry would deliver a “second China shock” of mass economic dislocations, all but ensuring a fierce political blowback with potentially calamitous implications for the European project.

Reasonable people could disagree about the wisdom of allowing cheap Chinese imports to undercut domestic industries in the 1990s and 2000s. At the time, many believed that greater economic linkages between the West and China would produce rising living standards across the board, reduce geopolitical frictions, and potentially even lead to constructive political changes within China itself.

That didn’t happen. While trade with China led to complicated, often ambiguous impacts for Western economies, Beijing threatens global democracy more than ever, and the Communist Party continues to rule mainland China with an iron fist.

Recognizing this dynamic, various European Union bodies have characterized the Chinese government as a “systemic rival”—as well as a partner.

While European threat perceptions of Chinese exports largely center around economic and political concerns, security dimensions shouldn’t be overlooked.

China’s exports of sensor-laden connected vehicles pose potential espionage and sabotage risks. Chinese security services could use these vehicles to monitor European military and political facilities, as well as collect real-time economic and mobility data. In a worst-case scenario, these vehicles’ software systems would be vulnerable to hacking.

China’s lithium-ion battery complex also has latent military potential, as batteries are critical components for diesel-electric submarines, unmanned maritime platforms, and aerial drones. Moreover, technological advances in solid-state batteries could offer significant, potentially game-changing performance improvements for military use cases.

Given the economic and security risks, Europe should impose tariffs on Chinese exports of EVs and lithium-ion batteries. To balance decarbonization goals with these other needs, however, Europe could follow the US approach by phasing in certain tariffs, such as on Lithium-ion non-electrical vehicle batteries. These batteries are useful for grid decarbonization but pose few direct security threats.

China is unsubtly hinting it will respond to any European tariffs with countermeasures, including against wine and dairy exports.

Yet Europe is better off accepting short-term pain than allowing the formation of a clean energy cartel overseen by a systemic rival.

In other cases, such as solar panels, Chinese clean tech exports pose few economic and security risks to Europe. This industry has left Europe and isn’t coming back, especially since European solar potential is limited. Although inverters should be monitored closely, there are no known security risks for solar panels, which cannot communicate with the grid. Consequently, Europe should accept Chinese solar imports while still ensuring that global supply chains are not held hostage to a single supplier.

Importantly, the West should continue to emphasize to Beijing that it seeks to de-risk rather than decouple supply chains. While Western trade with China has not fundamentally improved ties, commercial ties nevertheless can provide ballast for the relationship, mitigate security dilemmas, and provide economic benefits.

To stop political ties from deteriorating further while maximizing trade and climate benefits, Europe and its partners should identify products where commerce can be conducted with China without damaging economic or security interests.

Still, Europe should rapidly employ tariffs and fiscal support to bolster critical industries and technologies, including EVs and batteries. Balancing decarbonization objectives with economic and security needs is no easy task, but Brussels must find sure footing on this tightrope, and quickly.

Joseph Webster is a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council and editor of the independent China-Russia Report. This article represents his own personal opinion.

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Oil, gas, and war: The effect of sanctions on the Russian energy industry https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/content-series/russia-tomorrow/oil-gas-and-war/ Thu, 23 May 2024 13:00:00 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=763276 A new Atlantic Council report explores the effect of sanctions on Russia's energy industry. Are oil and gas still Putin's lifeline?

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Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 challenged much of the common Western understanding of Russia. How can the world better understand Russia? What are the steps forward for Western policy? The Eurasia Center’s new “Russia Tomorrow” series seeks to reevaluate conceptions of Russia today and better prepare for its future tomorrow.

Table of contents

VII. The Global South and the limits of cooperation

VIII. Russia’s diminished ability to use energy as a weapon

Chart 2: Russia’s share of EU energy imports

IX. What is to be done? Recommendations for policymakers

X. Conclusions

In the two-plus years since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the United States and its allies have imposed approximately two thousand sanctions on Russian corporations, financial institutions, and individuals. But while the sanctions have been broad, sweeping, and in some cases unprecedented, the discussion about their level of efficacy is still ongoing.

This is particularly true for the industries that comprise the lifeblood of the Russian economy—the oil and gas sectors. While Russia’s hydrocarbon revenues have been significantly affected by Western sanctions, this impact has varied significantly across sectors.

Assessing the real impact of sanctions on these vital industries, and calibrating them to have the maximum impact on Vladimir Putin’s ability to continue financing and waging his war of aggression, will require policymakers to understand these nuances—to understand what has worked, what has not, and why.

Primarily, this requires an understanding of how the effect of sanctions has varied between the oil and gas industries. It also requires an examination of other relevant factors, most notably the role of China, other Asian markets, and the Global South in mitigating the negative impact of sanctions. It also requires an understanding of the role liquified natural gas (LNG) has played in Putin’s efforts to evade sanctions.

The impact of sanctions: A brief overview

The impact of Western sanctions differs not only between the oil and gas industries, but also between natural gas and LNG. There is also a significant divergence between the negative impact of sanctions on the Russian oil and gas industries on one hand, and the impact on state budget revenues on the other.

It should be stressed that the decoupling of Gazprom from the European gas market was mostly caused not by the Western sanctions—the European Union (EU) did not introduce an embargo against Russian natural gas as such—but, rather, by Gazprom’s self-imposed cutoff of piped-gas supplies to most EU member states.1

The Russian natural-gas industry, primarily Gazprom, has struggled with the consequences of decoupling from the EU market, as it lacks a viable business model to compensate for the loss. The oil industry, on the other hand, has managed to weather the sanctions better, albeit with significant loss of revenue due to heavy price discounts in Asian gas markets and sharp increases in the cost of shipping oil to Asia.

The party that has suffered the most from Western sanctions, however, is Russia’s state budget, which saw its revenues from oil and gas decline 24 percent in 2023 compared to 2022.

This has forced the authorities to consider serious tax hikes on the oil and gas industry to compensate for the losses and enable Putin to finance the war in Ukraine. Such a move would hurt investment and could result in subsequent output decline.

While piped-gas exports to Europe have decreased dramatically, Russia continues to export significant amounts of LNG to the EU unabated, resulting in significant revenue. Unlike Gazprom’s piped-gas exports, however, LNG exports are largely untaxed, meaning the government does not receive direct revenues from them. But for reasons that will be discussed in greater detail below, the Russian state has other means to extract rents from LNG exports to finance the war—notably through windfall taxes.

Sanctions and decoupling from European oil and gas markets have also significantly reduced Russia’s ability to use energy as a tool of political pressure against Western democratic countries. However, as will be discussed in greater detail below, this capability has not been eliminated entirely.

In what follows, this report will discuss each of these trends in greater detail, beginning with Gazprom, which has suffered the most serious consequences from Russia’s standoff with the West and faces nothing short of a full reinvention of its entire business model.

Gazprom in limbo: No substitutes for the lost European market

Russia’s natural-gas giant Gazprom has suffered enormously from cutting ties with Europe, formerly its largest market. As noted earlier, the termination of gas supplies to Europe happened not because of sanctions, but due to voluntary actions by Russia. In mid-2022, Gazprom cut off gas supplies to Europe through most of the export-pipeline routes, clearly aiming at creating political and economic problems for EU countries ahead of the 2022–2023 winter season.

The Kremlin’s hopes didn’t materialize. Despite rising gas prices, the EU managed to successfully navigate the winter and, in the process, find alternative long-term sources of gas imports. This allowed Europe to free itself from most Russian piped-gas imports, without even imposing sanctions on Gazprom.

Gazprom’s lost revenue and profits turned out to be enormous.

According to the company’s own reporting, Gazprom’s revenue fell by 41 percent year-over-year in the first half of 2023, while sales profits fell by 71 percent and gas production by 25 percent. In the first quarter 2024, Gazprom reported a net loss of almost $7 billion in 2023, marking its first annual loss in more than 20 years. Moreover, Gazprom’s upstream gas-production base is now isolated because infrastructure connecting its main western Siberian fields with alternative Asian markets is lacking. Gazprom also failed to build any LNG plants in western Siberia, which, before the imposition of sanctions, would have enabled the company to reroute natural gas to alternative markets.

Gazprom does not disclose the estimated construction costs of new pipeline infrastructure to China, but it would probably require at least $100 billion given the company’s experience constructing the existing Power of Siberia pipeline. That pipeline, which connects western and eastern Siberia and also delivers gas supplies to China, is considerably shorter than a proposed new pipeline, known as Power of Siberia-2, which would pipe gas from western Siberia to China. That raises the fundamental question of whether Russian gas supplies to China will ever be profitable.

Gazprom refuses to publish any data on gas-supply prices to China via Power of Siberia, but data published by Reuters, citing obtained internal materials of the Russian government, suggests that the average annual price of piped gas supplied to China was $297.30 per thousand cubic meters (tcm) in 2023 and will be $271.60 in 2024. Prices for 2023 were also not published, but the officially disclosed volume of supply was 22.7 billion cubic meters (bcm), and the cost of Chinese imports of piped gas from Russia was $6.4 billion. Thus, the average 2023 gas-supply price from Russia to China was $282/tcm (in 2020–2022, the price was well below $300/tcm).

This means that Russia is, in fact, most likely selling gas to China at a significant loss. When the contract to deliver gas to China via the Power of Siberia pipeline was signed in 2014, the average gas-supply price was set in the range of $350–380 per tcm. Even at that price level, Gazprom had requested that the Russian government effectively zero out all major taxes for the Power of Siberia project—claiming that the project would not be profitable unless near-total tax exemptions were provided. The exemptions were granted and, as a result, the mineral-extraction and property taxes were forgiven for fifteen years until 2035. In reality, the price of gas supplies to China via Power of Siberia never even reached $300/tcm, and many analysts believe they do not generate any profits.

That suggests that Russian gas supplies to China may not become profitable for the foreseeable future. China is clearly not expected to need additional gas supply until after 2030, and that appears to explain why Beijing is not interested in granting Gazprom any kind of price premium for new gas-supply contracts. Moreover, China has alternatives: domestic Chinese gas production, LNG, and imports of piped gas from Central Asia.

Speaking at the Eastern Economic Forum in September 2022, Vladimir Putin admitted that “our Chinese friends are tough bargainers,” which is why agreeing with Beijing on gas-supply price parameters “is never so easy.” More than a year later, there is still no indication that an agreement on gas supplies via the proposed new Power of Siberia-2 pipeline project is imminent. This is despite Putin’s promise made in September 2022 (and reiterated in March 2023 during a summit with Xi Jinping in Moscow) that Russia and China are “close” to signing a gas contract for Power of Siberia-2.

The lack of agreement on Power of Siberia-2 reflects the fundamental dilemma Gazprom faces: China is just not ready to buy Russian gas at a price that will be profitable for Moscow.

Moreover, the shipment distance for gas produced in western Siberia and shipped via the proposed Power of Siberia-2 pipeline will be significantly lengthier than that of Power Siberia-1, which means that Gazprom would need a significantly higher sales price than even $350/tcm to make any money from gas exports to China. At the very least, gas exports to China will not deliver any notable revenues to the Russian state budget.

Gazprom’s overall business model has been shattered by its decoupling from the European gas market. Most of the company’s profits came from the EU and, with its significantly lower gas prices, Russia’s domestic gas market just can’t deliver comparable profits. Building new gas-pipeline infrastructure to China, as discussed above, would require enormous capital investments, without offering obvious profits. Building a pipeline to deliver gas to India and other South Asian countries doesn’t seem viable given the complicated mountainous terrain and geopolitical challenges with potential transit countries like Afghanistan. Moreover, Gazprom suspended the construction of planned new LNG projects due to lack of access to critical Western technology.

In this situation, Gazprom attempted various measures aimed at containing gas output, expanding domestic gas demand, and seeking customers elsewhere, but with marginal results. It is not difficult to cut gas production given that the bulk of output comes from matured western Siberian fields, with a significant share of low-pressure gas from depleted reservoirs that require booster measures to increase well productivity. In many cases, it is simply enough to cancel additional booster activities to minimize production.

But finding alternative gas markets with comparable profitability to that of the lost European market will inevitably prove challenging. Russian Deputy Prime Minister Aleksandr Novak has formulated an ambitious program aimed at boosting Russian domestic natural-gas demand, including an accelerated program of gasification for Russian regions, the expansion of small-scale LNG, and boosting natural-gas use as engine fuel for the transport sector.

At the same time, Gazprom, through its lobbyists in the State Duma, is actively lobbying for the full liberalization of natural gas prices for domestic Russian consumers, with an exemption for households. But even with such a policy change, Russia’s domestic gas market is not capable of delivering profits even remotely comparable to those Gazprom received from the EU in the past. Also, significant growth in domestic gas prices will impede Russia’s fragile economic recovery, which is why the government will most likely intervene and cap Gazprom’s domestic gas price if it goes too far.

Gazprom is also actively trying to find new export consumers or to boost exports through existing pipelines. But these efforts have also met with little success. For example, Gazprom has signed a new contract with Uzbekistan, but it amounts to just 3 bcm per year, with scant prospects for growth. Since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Gazprom has also been trying to set up a “gas hub” scheme with Turkey. This is effectively a “gas laundering” operation that involves mixing Russian gas with Azerbaijani or Iranian gas and then reselling the rebranded product to Europe via Turkey. But the project has been stalled due to wrangling between Moscow and Ankara over who would control the hub and trading schemes, as well as over concerns about the EU’s response.

All this leaves Gazprom in limbo for the foreseeable future. The domestic gas market and potential alternative piped-gas export markets will not be able to make up for those lost from the EU market, and the development of LNG exports so far remains blocked due to lack of access to critical Western technology.

This has ramifications for Russia’s budget, as Gazprom was a major source of tax revenue before the invasion of Ukraine. In 2021, the last year when Russia published detailed reporting on budget revenues, Gazprom’s share of federal budget revenues exceeded 7 percent, but it was estimated to be only about half of that share in 2023.2 These revenues are not recoverable in the foreseeable future, as Gazprom’s “super profits” from the European gas market were taxed heavily and LNG exports are largely exempt from taxation.

The oil industry: Surviving in difficult Asian markets

The Russian oil industry has weathered sanctions much better than Gazprom has, largely because it doesn’t suffer from the infrastructure limitations that exist in the gas industry. Russian oil can still be shipped via seaports to Asian markets, albeit with discounts and at a higher cost. Additionally, the industry is benefiting from a lighter tax burden that was introduced in response to falling oil prices. However, the government is planning to gradually raise taxes.

Oil output has contracted only slightly as compared to the pre-war period, by 1–2 percent. Russia currently produces about 10.5 million barrels per day (mbd) of crude oil, as opposed to just over 11 mbd before the war.

However, it should be noted that there are no verifiable and detailed public data on actual Russian oil output. We are therefore forced to rely on official aggregated figures. The general assumption among experts is that Russia has reduced its oil output in the past year by approximately 500,000 barrels per day (kbd) according to an agreement on oil-supply cuts within the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries Plus (OPEC+), which includes ten non-OPEC members including Russia. The exact figures remain unknown because the Russian government classified oil-production data following the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. But generally, in contrast to the gas industry, Russia has continued to produce oil more or less at pre-war levels.

The Russian oil industry has, however, suffered from significant revenue and profit losses due to the EU oil embargo. From December 2022 through March 2023, for example, Russia’s average monthly Urals crude-export prices have fallen to $48–50 per barrel due to the steep price discounts demanded by Asian consumers.

Russian oil exporters have managed to reduce these Asian discounts. In the second quarter of 2023, Urals oil prices rebounded to $55–58 per barrel. They exceeded $60 per barrel in July 2023 and reached $80 per barrel in September 2023. Overall, Asian price discounts for Urals oil have been reduced to $10–12 per barrel. Since November 2023, after the US Government has exerted some sanctions enforcement pressure on oil shippers and traders, discounts for Russian oil shipped to Asia grew again – they now stand at about $17 per barrel, but the average price of the Russian Urals oil export crude was around $68 per barrel in April 2024, well above the G7 oil price cap .

Oil-price level is not the only parameter influencing the profitability of Russian oil exports to Asia. Another is the significantly higher cost of shipping oil to Asian markets. For instance, there’s a reason why Russia barely exported any crude-oil volumes to India before the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. It takes approximately a month for an oil tanker to travel from Russia’s Black or Baltic Sea ports to India. In contrast, it takes just a few days to ship oil to Genoa or Rotterdam. Shipping oil to India also involves passing through additional bottlenecks, such as the Suez Canal or Bab al-Mandeb Strait, where tankers risk delays due to traffic and incur additional demurrage and insurance costs. Per the author’s estimates (as exact figures are unavailable), the extra costs of shipping Russian oil from Novorossiysk or Primorsk to India vary in the range of $10–15 per barrel, significantly reducing the efficacy of exports to India and other Asian destinations.

Russia has also established a so-called “shadow fleet” of oil tankers with obscure ownership and jurisdiction. It also sought to use third-country intermediaries and traders to sell oil to Asian destinations or even resell it to Europe, circumventing sanctions. But while such schemes may yield revenues for some Russian-affiliated shell companies, these revenues are not very large (just a few dollars per barrel). These profits also do not add revenues to the Russian state budget because oil exports are taxed according to officially available crude-oil price numbers and these shadow operations abroad are not visible to the Russian tax authorities.

A gasoline delivery of Russian energy company Rosneft in northernmost well of Russia. (Rosneft handout via EYEPRESS)

In 2023, Russia adopted a new mechanism of gradually increasing the oil-export price used for taxation, in an apparent effort to force oil companies to negotiate lower discounts with consumers. However, all these accounting tricks do not change the fundamentals of the situation, and paying too much attention to them is a distraction. Russian oil-export revenues throughout 2023 have largely been determined by the overall dynamics of the international market, and the declining discounts for Russian crude resulted from markets becoming significantly tighter due to the Saudi-led OPEC+ oil-output cuts announced in the spring of 2023.

Due to rebounding export prices, Russian oil revenues have normalized in the third quarter of 2023, following a sharp plunge early in the year. Nevertheless, it is also clear that rerouting oil exports to Asia has created additional cost burdens for Russian oil exporters. Another significant issue involves the relations between Russian oil majors and the Western oilfield-services companies working in oil-reservoir management, such as Baker Hughes, Halliburton, Weatherford, and SLB. Some of these announced they were leaving Russia following the full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

It is beyond the scope of this report to discuss which of these oilfield-services companies have kept their word and actually left Russia. What is important is that they possess unique technologies for oilfield-reservoir management and enhancing the productivity of oil wells, which can’t be substituted by Russian, Chinese, or other third-party technologies and know-how. Most of the oilfield stock of Russian oil companies is matured and depleted fields with difficult reservoirs in western Siberia, the Urals, and other regions. Therefore, using cutting-edge Western technology remains critical to maintaining the productivity of oil wells and overall levels of oil output.

At the end of the 1990s and the beginning of the 2000s, the massive outsourcing of Russian oilfield services to these Western companies led to dramatic increases in productivity. For example, the average Russian oil well increased production from approximately fifty-five barrels per day in 1995 to more than seventy-five barrels by the mid-2000s, a productivity growth of more than one-third. Should Western oilfield services completely depart Russia, this may result in comparable loss in average well productivity and, as a result, overall oil production. There are, however, strong indications that at least some of the Western oilfield-service companies continue to work with the Russian oil industry, reneging on their promises to leave.

The G-7 oil-price cap is not working

It is clear that the oil-price cap the Group of Seven (G7) imposed on Russia in September 2022 is not working. Russia has continued to easily sell oil exported via the Eastern Siberia-Pacific Ocean oil pipeline to China at a price well above the $60-per-barrel limit, effectively ignoring the price cap. Moreover, the Russian Finance Ministry reports that even the price of Urals crude shipped through Black and Baltic Sea ports has exceeded $60 per barrel. As said above, as of March 2024, Russia continued to export crude oil priced well above the $60 cap. When the oil-price cap was introduced, the G7 countries lacked sufficient capacity and legal authority to monitor the thousands of shipping, trading, and insurance transactions Russian oil-exporters use—particularly those outside the G7’s jurisdiction.

As a US Treasury Department press release put it, the Treasury Department simply hoped that “nonparticipating countries’ goal is to get the lowest price for buying oil, and the price cap will give them additional leverage in their negotiations with Russia.” However, this did not happen. When market prices went up, Russia was able to sell its crude above the price cap, switching mostly to traders, shippers, and insurers operating outside the G7 regulatory jurisdiction. Widespread price-cap evasion schemes are thriving due to a loose regulatory framework that does not require insurers and shipowners to know any pricing information about the oil shipped.

It is questionable whether the G7 will be able to enforce its oil-price cap at all, given these circumstances. At the very least, G7 countries will need to significantly beef up their sanctions-enforcement capacity. Hundreds of additional employees will be needed to monitor the thousands of transactions related to Russian crude-oil exports to ensure compliance with the oil-price cap. Unless these additional staffing measures are taken, and are accompanied by relevant legal action against companies involved in breaching the oil-price cap, enforcement will just not happen. It remains an open question whether the G7 countries will ever be able to do anything about Russia’s “shadow tanker fleet” or other shell companies engagement in trading, shipping, and insurance transactions, which are operating fully outside the G7 regulatory jurisdiction. It was the EU oil embargo, and not the price cap, that truly worked against Russian oil exports.

LNG: A lifeline for Putin

While the EU nearly stopped purchasing piped gas from Gazprom following the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Russia’s LNG exports to Europe in 2023 surged by about 38 percent as compared to the pre-war year of 2021; the EU imported about 22 bcm of Russian LNG in 2023. Remarkably, after the United States, Russia is Europe’s largest supplier of LNG.

Despite Russia’s increasing presence on the LNG market, Gazprom is not involved. The key Russian LNG exporter is Novatek, the country’s second-largest natural-gas producer. In 2022, Novatek exported more than 76 percent of the LNG produced by its Yamal LNG project to Europe. Overall, Russia currently exports more than 50 percent of its LNG to Europe, compared to just 39 percent in 2021.

These exports are not a major source of budget revenue for Russia as Novatek’s LNG production and exports are largely untaxed, enjoying a twelve-year exemption from mineral-extraction taxes and export duties. Nevertheless, such massive LNG exports to Europe are a major source of revenue for Russia, totaling up to 10 billion euros per year, and can be used by Putin to finance the war against Ukraine. For example, the Russian government has raised the profit tax on Novatek from 20 percent to 32 percent for 2023–2025. The draft budget for 2024 also contains hints that the authorities may impose certain one-time payments on oil and gas companies, including Novatek, in 2024. The European Union is not currently considering sanctioning Russian LNG, which means that the revenue flow will likely continue uninterrupted in 2024.

Novatek also managed to continue with a massive project called Arctic LNG-2 (ALNG-2), despite some initial difficulties accessing critical Western technology due to sanctions. Western companies such as Linde, Technip, and Baker Hughes left the project after February 2022, but Novatek managed to either assure the supply of previously contracted equipment or to find alternative Chinese suppliers. However, after sweeping US sanctions were introduced against the ALNG-2 project in November 2023, the project was effectively brought to a halt, which undermines Russia’s plans to expand LNG exports in the coming years and show the effectiveness of individual sanctions against specific oil and gas projects.

The Russian budget: No more super profits

Despite rebounding oil prices and the G7 oil-price cap not working, Russian oil and gas budget revenues were significantly down in 2023, contracting by 23.9 percent year-over-year. By comparing pre-war figures from 2021, the contraction of oil and gas revenues becomes even more visible. While the average oil price in 2021 and 2023 is comparable, oil and gas budget revenues have fallen precipitously. In 2021 they were 6.8 percent of GDP and accounted for 35.6 percent of total budget revenues; in 2023 they were just 5.3 percent of GDP and 30.9 percent of total budget revenues (see Table 1).

While oil-export revenues recovered in the second half of 2023, as discussed above, gas-export revenues appear lost for the foreseeable future. LNG revenue exports are not sufficient to compensate for the loss of piped-gas exports to the EU. Moreover, rerouting of oil shipments to Asia reduces the profitability of oil exports. It is, therefore, reasonable to expect that Russian oil and gas revenues will be significantly depressed due to Western sanctions and Gazprom’s decoupling from the European gas market. And barring a sharp rise in oil prices, these super profits will not return.

Russian budget revenues from oil and gas fell 55–58 percent in the first two quarters of 2023 as compared to the same period in 2022. In the third quarter of 2023 they recovered to nearly 2022 levels, although this is largely due to higher international prices resulting from output cuts announced by Saudi Arabia in the spring of 2023. Had Saudi Arabia maintained its previous levels of oil production, Russian revenue losses would have been significantly higher.

According to the 2024 federal budget projections, Russian government is nevertheless forecasting 29.8-percent year-over-year growth in oil and gas revenues in 2024, despite not projecting a significant rise in oil prices. The draft budget projects average oil prices for 2024 at $71.30 per barrel. The government has hinted that it may impose a one-time windfall tax on the oil and gas industry, although the nature of this tax remains unclear. Such a tax, combined with the increased cost of oil shipments to Asia and the loss of productivity due to the lack of access to Western technology, will have a negative impact on upstream capital investments, putting additional pressure on the industry.

The Global South and the limits of cooperation

After February 2022, Russia placed a lot of hope in developing energy cooperation with China, India, and the Global South. More than two years in, these hopes appear to be in vain. Investors do not appear interested in entering the Russian oil and gas sector, and the switch to Chinese technology and equipment has proven significantly more costly than working with Western companies.

Russia had high hopes that exiting Western oil and gas majors would be replaced by investors from the Global South. But thus far, there have been no significant oil and gas investments from China, India, or the Middle East since February 2022. This is largely due to fears of secondary sanctions and excessive wartime regulations, which increase the risks of investing in Russian assets.

Notably, Chinese and Indian companies were not rushing to invest in Russia even before the full-scale war. According to data from the Russian Central Bank, the total accumulated foreign direct investment (FDI) in Russia from all Chinese investors across all sectors totaled just over $3 billion at the end of 2021. For investors from India, the total was just $600 million. And no new FDI from the Global South has been recorded since.

Moreover, some Chinese companies even suspended certain operations in Russian oil and gas and related industries. The Chinese petroleum and chemicals firm Sinopec, for example, suspended talks with the Russian petrochemical company Sibur regarding a major investment and gas-marketing venture in the spring of 2022.

Switching to Chinese technologies and equipment to replace the departing Western technology companies has also proven costly. Novatek, for example, has reported a 17-percent (nearly $4-billion) increase in capital expenditures for the Arctic LNG-2 project due to switching from Baker Hughes turbines to Shanghai Electric equipment. Similar cost increases and losses in productivity can be reasonably expected across the Russian oil and gas industry.

China, India, and the countries of the Global South seem more interested in taking advantage of the current situation and buying Russian energy at a discount than they are in investing in Russia’s oil and gas industries.

Russia’s diminished ability to use energy as a weapon

Decoupling of Western markets from Russian oil and gas has seriously undermined Moscow’s ability to use energy as a weapon against Western democracies. According to the European Commission, the Russian share of EU imports of petroleum oils fell to 3.5 percent in the fourth quarter of 2023, down from 24.8 percent in the fourth quarter of 2021. The share of piped natural gas fell to 12.7 percent from 48.0 percent across the same period. This all significantly reduces Russia’s leverage over European countries through oil and gas supplies.

Some EU countries, most notably Hungary and Slovakia, continue to buy Russian oil and gas. Not surprisingly, these countries remain the least favorable to keeping sanctions against Russia and aiding Ukraine. In Slovakia, this became even more visible when the pro-Putin politician Robert Fico became prime minister after the October 2023 elections, but Hungary and Slovakia remain outliers in the EU.

Central Asian energy exporters, on the other hand, are much more vulnerable to Russia’s energy blackmail. Kazakhstan, which exports about 80 percent of its crude oil through Russian territory and seaports via the Caspian Pipeline Consortium, is particularly vulnerable. Establishing an alternative export route to Europe will be difficult for Kazakhstan, as it would require investing in and developing a tanker fleet in the Caspian Sea. In 2022, Russia threatened to shut down the Caspian Pipeline Consortium on regulatory grounds in an apparent effort to assure Kazakhstan’s loyalty amid the international backlash over Ukraine.

What is to be done? Recommendations for policymakers

How can Western policymakers make sanctions against Russia’s oil and gas industry more effective?

First, it is important to understand that Russian oil-export revenues have been rebounding recently not because the EU oil embargo is ineffective. In fact, the embargo is working. It has led to a sharp increase in costs of shipping Russian oil to consumer markets in Asia (more than $10 per barrel, according to the author’s estimate). It has also led to price discounts, which remain at levels above $10 per barrel. The key factor contributing to increasing Russian revenues from oil exports is the spring 2023 OPEC+ decision to cut oil output. Therefore, one key focus for Western policymakers should be to put diplomatic pressure on OPEC members and other oil-producing states to increase oil output.

The EU should also tighten sanctions against Russian oil transshipment through its territorial waters. This would further complicate the logistics of rerouting Russian oil to Asian markets. This matters, because the bulk of Russian oil is still exported via Baltic and Black Sea ports, as direct pipeline infrastructure to Asia is insufficient and its expansion requires huge investments.

The G7 oil-price cap on Russian oil is clearly not working. Several steps would, at least partially, increase the efficiency of the price cap, including

  • increasing the number of professional staff permanently dedicated to monitoring Russia’s export-oil shipments (currently, the job is mostly done by outside experts, journalists, and investigators, while the tens of thousands of transactions involved require regular monitoring and analysis to uncover price-cap evasion schemes);
  • introducing secondary sanctions against third-country insurers, traders, and shippers who are helping Russia evade the price cap; and
  • improving the mechanism of “attestation” of transactions ensuring compliance with the price cap. This involves assuring that shipowners and insurers are provided with sufficient pricing information by the buyers and sellers of the Russian crude to make sure that the oil is sold below the price cap.

Regarding piped-gas imports from Russia, the European Union should keep asking the EU member states that are still buying gas from Russia for specific plans to phase out Russian imports. Countries like Italy, which continue to receive certain volumes of Russian piped gas, are promising to end Russian gas imports quite soon, others, like Hungary and Austria, continue unrestricted imports of Russian gas, reaching and even exceeding pre-war import levels. At the same time, these countries have made little progress in renewable-energy production or reducing gas demand. EU unity on singling out Gazprom’s gas supplies is essential to continue minimizing Putin’s export revenues.

The EU should also unequivocally reject the import of natural gas from the so-called “energy hub in Turkey.” This project is nothing more than an attempt to launder Russian gas supplies by mixing them with gas from other producers like Azerbaijan and Iran. Turkey should be sent a clear message that laundering Russian gas will not be tolerated. Any contracts for gas supplies via Turkey to the EU should be concluded directly with suppliers, and not through opaque intermediary schemes that might assist Russia.

The EU also needs a comprehensive policy on LNG imports from Russia. These imports may be necessary in the short term to fill the gap left by the cessation of Russian pipeline-gas imports. Nevertheless, the surge of Russian LNG imports to the EU in 2022–2023 is not normal and generates significant revenues for Russia (which may also be used to finance the war through emergency windfall taxation). The EU needs a clear schedule to phase out Russian LNG imports. It should also accelerate its efforts to develop offshore natural-gas production, particularly in the Mediterranean and Black Seas, as an alternative to Russian gas in the medium and longer term.

The G7 countries should also conduct a comprehensive critical oil-and-gas technology review. Such a review would identify critical technologies Moscow still has access to that may assist Russia in sustaining its oil and gas exports and evading Western sanctions. It could also provide policy recommendations for additional sanctions, including secondary sanctions against third countries where appropriate.

Conclusions

It is reasonable to conclude that sanctions have had a significant impact on the Russian oil and gas industries and the budgetary revenues that come from them. And it is wrong to conclude that sanctions are not working—they are. However, much more work must be done to enhance the effectiveness of sanctions.

Also, for the purpose of setting realistic goals and expectations, it is important to understand that the Russian oil and gas industries and Russia’s public finances are too strong and resilient to simply collapse under the weight of sanctions. They haven’t collapsed yet, and probably won’t in the foreseeable future. But they are suffering enormous difficulties due to sanctions and decoupling from the Western energy markets. Over time, this is likely to result in further loss of investment, output, efficiency, and revenue.

About the author

Vladimir Milov is a Russian opposition politician, publicist, economist, and energy expert, and recently served as an economic and international affairs adviser to the late Russian opposition leader Alexey Navalny. He is also vice president of the Free Russia Foundation, an international organization supporting civil society and democratic development in Russia based in Washington, D.C. From 1997 to 2002, Milov had worked with the Russian Government, including as Deputy Energy Minister in 2002. He was the author of the concept of breaking up and unbundling Gazprom vetoed by Vladimir Putin. Later, Milov became one of the major public critics of Vladimir Putin, working closely with late opposition politician Boris Nemtsov, and later with Alexey Navalny. He is a research associate at the Wilfried Martens Centre for European Studies in Brussels, vice president of the Free Russia Foundation (Washington, D.C.). Milov is currently based in Vilnius, Lithuania.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to promote policies that strengthen stability, democratic values, and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe in the West to the Caucasus, Russia, and Central Asia in the East.

Related content

1    For simplicity, this report will not provide a separate disclaimer for this while assessing the overall impact of developments from the past two years on the Russian oil and gas industry. Most of the time, the report will refer generally to “sanctions” and “decoupling from European markets.”
2    Detailed data on this are classified since the beginning of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, but this estimate is based on known information about the decline of gas output and exports.

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There’s an alternative to Russian-based trade routes—but it needs support from the US, EU, and Turkey https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/turkeysource/theres-an-alternative-to-russian-based-trade-routes-but-it-needs-support-from-the-us-eu-and-turkey/ Wed, 22 May 2024 13:05:41 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=766545 The Middle Corridor can offer an alternative to the Russian-based Northern Corridor, as long as countries can surmount these remaining challenges.

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Leaders looking for an alternative to trade routes that flow through Russia may already have a potential solution available.

Currently, the primary land-based trade route between Europe and China is the Northern Corridor, a rail-freight system that runs through Russia with a cargo capacity of over one hundred million tons. But following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the Northern Corridor has become a political and financial liability, particularly for NATO allies and partners anxious to reduce dependence on Russia and countries in the West who are reluctant to support Russia and aiming to counter the Kremlin’s adventurism.

In searching for an alternative to the Northern Corridor, one option is the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (TITR), otherwise known as the Middle Corridor, a multimodal network of railways and ports that begins in China and runs across Central Asia, the Caucasus, and the Black Sea before reaching Europe.

Trade along the Middle Corridor grew from 530,000 tons in 2021 to 2.3 million tons in 2023. In the first six months of 2023, the TITR had reported a 77 percent increase in tonnage over the same time period in 2022, while Northern Corridor tonnage fell by 56 percent. The World Bank estimates with adequate infrastructure investment, TITR trade volume could be as high as eleven million tons by 2030. It is no coincidence that the dramatic increase in the Middle Corridor, along with the precipitous drop in Russian-based freight traffic, has occurred in the period following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

While the TITR may offer a reasonable solution for reducing trade along the Northern Corridor, there are many challenges.

Notably, the TITR’s infrastructure isn’t very modern or integrated across borders, meaning its ability to handle increased freight volume is limited. One source even reported that TITR has only 5 percent of the Northern Corridor’s capacity. Thus, it will be necessary to build out and expand the system. The TITR also suffers from long lead times, often exceeding fifty days. It also presents higher costs: The multimodal nature of the route (rail and seaborne) requires costly transfers of loads from one method of transportation to another, while the number of countries along the route increases administrative costs. These challenges also reduce efficiency and increase shipping time. In fact, these delays and higher costs have subsequently pushed shippers back to the Northern Corridor or to seek alternative maritime routes to the Middle Corridor.

Several countries along the route—notably Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, and Turkey—are stitching together an integrated rail and shipping network that transcends this politically volatile and geographically challenging region. On March 31, 2022, the governments of these countries signed a declaration to improve cooperation along the route. On May 11, 2022, rail executives from Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, and Turkey met in Ankara to discuss the Middle Corridor project. There, they approved an action plan that included measures to modernize the trade network, harmonize tariffs and trade policies, and make cross-border interactions more efficient.

Within a year after the 2021 reinvigoration of the Turkic Council (now called the Organization of Turkic States), Azerbaijan, Turkey, and Kazakhstan signed the Baku Declaration, which was designed to reinforce “existing coordination between the three countries and strengthen regional connectivity.” Kazakhstan provides the longest rail access, and its Caspian port city of Aktau will be expanded to meet demand. On the western side of the Caspian Sea, Azerbaijan’s Baku port—supported by an expansion and modernization program—will forward freight to Georgia and Turkey.  

The Baku-Tbilisi-Kars (BTK) railway, also called the “Iron Silk Road,” plays an important role in moving loads westward from the Caspian Sea. Opened in October 2017, BTK travels between Azerbaijan and Turkey via Georgia, a connection that had been closed since the early 1990s due to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Another critical component in the TITR is Georgia’s Black Sea coast, specifically the ports of Batumi, Kulevi, Poti, and Supsa, which provide the route’s final sea-based segment. There are modernization projects underway here, specifically in Poti’s port facilities, and Georgia is cooperating with Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan to develop a new shipping route between Poti and Romania’s Constanța Port. The fifth major port along Georgia’s Black Sea coast, Anaklia, is currently being revitalized, and at one point (according to plans) was slated to be the largest port in the Black Sea.

Western countries have shown interest in developing the Middle Corridor. The route would help provide the infrastructure necessary for the European Union’s economic diversification strategy. In 2022, Danish shipping firm Maersk and Finnish company Nurminen Logistics began increasing their presence along the route. Austria’s OBB Rail Cargo Group has also shown interest in expanding its contribution to east-west trade via the TITR. And at the October 2023 Germany-Central Asia Summit, Berlin announced it will help develop the Middle Corridor under the EU Global Gateway Initiative; the EU also announced that financial institutions have committed to investing ten billion euros in support. The Germany-Central Asia Summit is a sign that the transatlantic community is finally recognizing the region’s strategic importance; Washington has also begun to make such a recognition, in the 2024 National Defense Authorization Act’s Black Sea Security and Development Strategy and in the US Congress passing the most recent package of US support to Ukraine.

China has also shown interest in the Middle Corridor. For example, China had invested in an earlier Anaklia revitalization project when Mikheil Saakashvili was president of Georgia—although subsequent administrations shelved it. This has not lessened Anaklia’s appeal, as Beijing’s interest in the Middle Corridor complements its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Indeed, China contributed $1.5 billion for an industrial park at Alat, adjacent to the Port of Baku, in Azerbaijan. Investments to strengthen the Middle Corridor’s infrastructure provide Beijing with greater political and economic influence in Central Asia and the South Caucasus. Russia has tolerated this foray into its “near abroad” for now, likely because a chastened and dependent Kremlin is reluctant to disrupt its burgeoning partnership with Beijing. However, considering Russia’s sensitivity to great-power intrusions into what was once part of the Soviet Union, one can only speculate how long before there is some pushback from Moscow.

While Russia is viewed as the immediate threat to regional stability, the Middle Corridor’s stakeholders are also distrustful of Beijing because of the poor press about the BRI. Thus, there is an opportunity for the private and public sectors in the United States, EU, and Turkey to invest in building resilient supply chains with clear strategic benefits, notably a politically acceptable alternative to the Northern Corridor.

Further support for the TITR from Washington, Brussels, and Ankara would send a strong message to the stakeholder nations as well as to Beijing and Moscow. This would also demonstrate to the regional nations that long-term stability and economic growth can be achieved through closer cooperation with NATO countries and the EU. The United States and its allies have an opportunity to positively impact security and engender goodwill along the Middle Corridor through enhanced trade and infrastructure investment.


Arnold C. Dupuy is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council IN TURKEY, a faculty member of the US Naval Postgraduate School, and chair of the NATO Science and Technology Organization’s SAS-183, “Energy Security Capabilities, Resilience and Interoperability.” Follow him on LinkedIn.

The views expressed in TURKEYSource are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

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Webster quoted in the Guardian, Globe and Mail, and Die Zeit on the Xi-Putin meeting https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/insight-impact/in-the-news/webster-quoted-in-the-guardian-globe-and-mail-and-die-zeit-on-the-xi-putin-meeting/ Tue, 21 May 2024 15:05:59 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=766188 The post Webster quoted in the Guardian, Globe and Mail, and Die Zeit on the Xi-Putin meeting appeared first on Atlantic Council.

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Webster quoted in the Financial Times, CNN, AFP, and Yahoo News on US-China tariffs https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/insight-impact/in-the-news/webster-quoted-in-the-financial-times-cnn-afp-and-yahoo-news-on-us-china-tariffs/ Tue, 21 May 2024 15:04:58 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=766177 The post Webster quoted in the Financial Times, CNN, AFP, and Yahoo News on US-China tariffs appeared first on Atlantic Council.

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State of the Order: Global conflict is continuing to reshape the global order—and so is climate change https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/state-of-the-order-global-conflict-is-continuing-to-reshape-the-global-order-and-so-is-climate-change/ Fri, 17 May 2024 16:17:41 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=764212 The State of the Order breaks down the month's most important events impacting the democratic world order.

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In April, stresses on the world order continued apace. Israel and Iran traded direct attacks, which increased risks for a widened regional conflict. In Gaza, Israel continued military operations and a ceasefire remained out of reach, while students on campuses across the United States mounted large-scale anti-war protests. Meanwhile, the United States finally stepped up and delivered the long-awaited foreign aid package, including $61 billion for Ukraine, hopefully enabling Kyiv to hold its lines and build on its strategic attacks against Russian forces.

Read up on the events shaping the democratic world order.

Reshaping the order

This month’s topline events

Iran and Israel trade attacks, potential for regional war increases. The long-term tensions between Israel and Iran ramped up over the course of April. Israel reportedly launched an airstrike on the Iranian consulate in Syria that killed two generals, including a leader in Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps, and other officers of the Iranian military. Iran responded by launching more than three hundred drones and missiles into Israeli territory. The United States, Israel, United Kingdom, France, and Jordan intercepted nearly all of the missiles and drones, which minimized damage. In retaliation, Israel launched a missile and drone counterstrike on Iran that was reportedly more limited than initially planned. But the events do mark an escalation, as the first time that Iran and Israel have directly attacked each other’s territory. As the month closed, it was unclear whether the conflict had been mitigated or would continue to worsen, and experts worry that another confrontation is “just around the corner.”

  • Shaping the order. While Israel and Iran seem to have withdrawn from further escalation and retaliatory attacks in the near term, the precedent has now been set for direct overt military conflict between them, increasing the possibility of a broader regional war.
  • Hitting home. A regional war in the Middle East would have serious implications for the United States, forcing it to devote large amounts of its military assets and munitions stockpiles to protecting its partners in the Middle East and possibly spiking oil prices. With a US defense industrial base that is already not at the level that is needed, this would serve as a major stressor on the resources required to ensure the US military remains ready for contingencies in Europe and the Indo-Pacific.
  • What to do. The United States must continue to press Israel and Iran to forego further military attacks, while remaining firm in its support for Jerusalem to protect itself in the face of aggression by Tehran. Jordan’s participation in defending Israel from the Iranian attack is a significant development that the Biden administration can build on as it works with Israel and regional allies to ward off further Iranian aggression.

War in Gaza continues apace with cease-fire elusive. As April concluded, Israel had yet to launch its long-discussed military offensive into the southern city of Rafah; however, Israel and Egyptian officials met, as the month closed, to discuss the potential offensive, underlining regional concerns about the consequences of Israel entering the city. From the end of April and into the first days of May, US Secretary of State Antony Blinken traveled to Israel, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia to continue pushing for a ceasefire that secures the release of hostages and to pressure the Netanyahu government to forego moving into Rafah. The United States, noting the shortage of assistance and worsening famine, started constructing a floating pier on the coast of Gaza, which is set to begin enabling additional aid flows in early or mid-May. Meanwhile, protests against Israel spread across US campuses, with students decrying the war, questioning US support for Israel, and pushing for university administrators to divest from Israel-linked funds or companies.

  • Shaping the order. In Israel’s attempt to defeat Hamas and free the remaining hostages from the October 7 attack, the war has resulted in thousands of civilian casualties, which continues to alienate allies and worsen grievances that helped fuel Hamas. An Israeli military operation in Rafah, in particular one that results in more massive civilian casualties, would worsen these trends.
  • Hitting home. The war in Gaza and associated human suffering has sparked large-scale protests across US universities, most notably at Columbia University and the University of California, Los Angeles. University administrators and police have clashed with the protests. These protests, which broadly call for universities to divest from Israel-linked funds, and associated criticisms of US security support for Israel might pose challenges for US President Joe Biden’s reelection campaign, as some supporters on the political left threaten to withdraw support for the president.
  • What to do. The United States must continue pressing the Israeli government to limit civilian casualties and pursue a ceasefire that would pause suffering and release all hostages. The Biden administration should continue pressing the Netanyahu government to forego a military operation in Rafah. The United States must continue mobilizing regional allies to devise and fund a postwar vision for Gaza that includes a two-state solution.

The United States finally steps up and passes Ukraine aid. The US Congress, with strong bipartisan majorities, finally approved a long-awaited and delayed foreign aid package. Of the $61 billion allocated for support to Ukraine, $23 billion will replenish US stockpiles of weapons already sent, $14 billion will fund new weapons for Ukraine, and $8 billion will involve transfer of existing weapons. The package and deliveries of long-range ATACMS missiles offer reasonable hope that Ukraine can fend off further Russian advances and deepen its relatively successful strategic strikes deep in Russian-occupied territory, possibly cutting off supplies for Russian forces on the southern front and isolating Crimea. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, noting that Ukraine’s army needs more troops as well as arms to win, signed a law lowering the draft-eligible age of men to twenty-five. As the month ended, the United States—during Blinken’s visit to Beijing—stepped up calls for China to stop aiding Russia’s defense industry.

  • Shaping the order. The aid package sends a strong signal to Russian President Vladimir Putin and apprehensive US allies that neoisolationist opposition to supporting Ukraine within Congress can be overcome. However, the delay in assistance resulted in Ukraine losing territory and people; further delay would have risked catastrophe on the battlefield, Ukraine’s defeat, and emboldening Putin to continue his aggression—toward countries such as Moldova and even potentially against NATO countries.
  • Hitting home. Russian victory in the war would result in cascading security problems in Europe that would draw on even more US resources. With the new assistance, however, Ukraine has a credible chance of stopping the Russian advance and such an outcome would advance US national interests by weakening an adversary without risk to US soldiers.
  • What to do. With the war at a critical phase, the Biden administration must step up the flow of weapons and ammunition to Ukraine as soon as feasible and encourage European and other allies to undertake a similar surge of support. The US should intensify economic pressure on Russia—especially by pressing China to curtail its support for Russia’s war effort—and work with the Group of Seven on ways to use Russian frozen assets to support Ukraine.

Quote of the Month

“We don’t walk away from our allies; we stand with them. We don’t let tyrants win; we oppose them. We don’t merely watch global events unfold; we shape them.”
– US President Joe Biden on the passage of the aid package for Ukraine, Israel, Taiwan, and other allies and partners.

State of the Order this month: Weakened

Assessing the five core pillars of the democratic world order 

Democracy (↔)

  • In this monumental year of elections worldwide, where nearly half of the world’s population might cast ballots, India (the world’s most populous country) started its seven-phase election that will conclude June 1. The elections, in which 969 million registered voters will elect representatives to fill 543 seats in the Lok Sabha, mainly pit Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s Bharatiya Janata Party against the Indian National Congress. Campaign rhetoric has become more hostile. Meanwhile, temperatures have been hotter and voter turnout has been lower than expected.
  • Haiti’s prime minister, Ariel Henry, formally resigned his post and was succeeded by former Finance and Economy Minister Michel Patrick Boisvert. Days later, the transitional council quickly replaced Boisvert with former Sports Minister Fritz Bélizaire.
  • On balance, the democracy pillar was unchanged.

Security (↓)

  • China and the United States, during meetings between Chinese leader Xi Jinping and Blinken, agreed to hold a formal dialogue to exchange views on the future implications of artificial intelligence.
  • The United States agreed to the government of Niger’s request to withdraw roughly 1,100 US troops from the West African country, with uncertain implications for US counterterrorism operations in the region as well as the future of a six-year-old US military base in Niger. The request comes following a military coup last year. As May began, US officials reported that members of the Russian military have been placed at the base.
  • On balance, the security pillar was weakened.

Trade (↔

  • Facing drops in sales and increased competition in the electric vehicle market, Tesla laid off 10 percent of its staff across the globe.
  • The United States reinstated sanctions on Venezuela after the Nicolás Maduro’s regime failed to make promised progress toward holding free and fair elections and instead barred the leading opposition candidate from running.
  • On balance, the trade pillar was unchanged.

Commons ()

  • Countries in the Middle East saw massive rainstorms and flooding in April, with the United Arab Emirates experiencing its heaviest rainfall ever recorded. In Afghanistan and Pakistan, heavy rains and flooding killed least one hundred people.
  • The average temperature of most of the global sea surface surpassed the previous record every day for the last year, while Antarctic ice has continued to melt at a rapid rate. In addition, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration said, the amount of coral bleaching documented from February 2023 to April this year amounts to a global coral bleaching event, the fourth such event since the 1980s.
  • On balance, the commons pillar was weakened.

Alliances (↑)

  • NATO countries seemed poised to send additional air defense systems, including Patriot missiles, to Ukraine, in response to Kyiv’s call for additional such equipment. The United States announced its package of Patriot missiles at the end of the month.
  • The successful passage of US assistance for Ukraine eased concerns among European and Indo-Pacific allies that the United States was becoming an unreliable partner under the influence of neoisolationist political forces.
  • On balance, the alliances pillar was strengthened.

Strengthened (↑)________Unchanged (↔)________Weakened ()

What is the democratic world order? Also known as the liberal order, the rules-based order, or simply the free world, the democratic world order encompasses the rules, norms, alliances, and institutions created and supported by leading democracies over the past seven decades to foster security, democracy, prosperity, and a healthy planet.

This month’s top reads

Three must-read commentaries on the democratic order

  • Elizabeth Economy, in Foreign Affairs, lays out China’s alternative to the democratic world order.
  • Ravi Agrawal, in Foreign Policy, analyzes how Modi is shaping the country.
  • Eliot A. Cohen, in the Atlantic, argues Ukraine is at an inflection point in its war against Russia and explains that if Kyiv loses, it’ll mean a darker world.

Action and analysis by the Atlantic Council

Our experts weight in on this month’s events

  • Frederick Kempe, in Inflection Points Today, celebrates the US House of Representatives’ passage of the foreign aid package.
  • General Wesley K. Clark, in a Memo to the President, assesses that the United States must identify a better strategic approach for a new geopolitical era.
  • Matthew Kroenig and Dan Negrea, in Foreign Policy, assert that the Republican Party is more united on foreign policy issues than it appears on the surface.
  • Andrew Michta, in the New Atlanticist, contends that US policymakers must prepare to make a call on Ukraine policy by the NATO Summit.
  • Daniel Fried, in the New Atlanticist, argues that Washington and its European allies must “lean forward on” assistance for Ukraine after the war aid package passed.
  • US Permanent Representative to NATO Julianne Smith, at an Atlantic Council event, maps out three things to expect from the upcoming NATO Summit.
  • Kathryn Levantovscaia, in the New Atlanticist, explains why assisting Ukraine is an investment in US economic and national security.

__________________________________________________

The Democratic Order Initiative is an Atlantic Council initiative aimed at reenergizing American global leadership and strengthening cooperation among the world’s democracies in support of a rules-based democratic order. Sign on to the Council’s Declaration of Principles for Freedom, Prosperity, and Peace by clicking here.

Patrick Quirk – Nonresident Senior Fellow
Dan Fried – Distinguished Fellow
Sydney Sherry – Program Assistant

If you would like to be added to our email list for future publications and events, or to learn more about the Democratic Order Initiative, please email pquirk@atlanticcouncil.org.

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The US is banning the import of Russian nuclear fuel. Here’s why that matters. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/the-us-is-banning-the-import-of-russian-nuclear-fuel-heres-why-that-matters/ Thu, 16 May 2024 21:47:41 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=765652 The US Congress has taken a crucial step in moving away from dependence on Russian nuclear fuel, but more action is needed.

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On May 13, US President Joe Biden signed into law a ban on imports of uranium from Russia. This news has flown under the radar amid a barrage of other news about Russia, but the new law has big implications for US nuclear power.

The legislation had been a long time coming. It was first introduced in the US House of Representatives in February 2023, with US lawmakers caught between the need to cut off a significant source of revenue for Russia on the one hand, and demand for enriched nuclear fuel to keep the US reactor fleet running on the other.

The United States can import the uranium that is required for nuclear fuel from several countries other than Russia. The top two exporters of uranium to the United States, for instance, are Canada and Kazakhstan, with the United States importing 27 percent of its uranium purchases from Canada and 25 percent from Kazakstan. However, Russia, which was in third place at 12 percent of US purchases in 2022, plays a crucial role in the nuclear fuel supply chain, both through conversion and enrichment of uranium. Russia supplies about 20 percent of the US reactor fleet’s nuclear fuel, at a cost of about one billion dollars each year. This is why the new legislation allows for waivers to import from Russia through 2027 if the Department of Energy determines that no alternative source of fuel for a US reactor is available.

One of the big questions that the US nuclear energy industry has grappled with is whether it can enrich enough uranium (or procure enough enriched uranium from other sources) on its own to compensate for the loss of Russian-enriched uranium. Earlier this year, three uranium mines began production in the United States, the first domestic uranium mines to operate in eight years. But uranium extraction and uranium enrichment are two separate issues, and—until recently—the only enrichment capability in the United States had existed at a facility in New Mexico owned by Urenco, a multinational company owned in equal parts by the British government, the Dutch government, and German utilities. Outside of Russia, the commercially relevant sources of enrichment are European facilities owned by Urenco and Orano, a French company. China also operates enrichment capacity, which has historically been used to fuel Chinese reactors. Together, the Urenco and Orano capacity is not sufficient to fuel all the reactors outside Russia and China.

Last October, Centrus—a US-owned nuclear fuel company—began enrichment operations in Piketon, Ohio. However, production at this facility is small and is geared toward the high-assay low-enriched uranium fuel required by new advanced reactors expected to become operational in the next several years. That means the fuel cannot be used in many of the older reactors currently operating.

Crucially, the new legislation unlocks $2.7 billion to support domestic enrichment. That money had been included in previous legislation, but it was contingent on passing sanctions against Russia’s state-owned nuclear company Rosatom. These funds will be required as the US nuclear energy industry moves away from dependence on Russian fuel supply. The money will be available through competitive processes to support fuel production for both existing and future advanced reactor designs. These steps are part of the United States’ commitments as part of the Sapporo 5, a partnership with Canada, France, Japan, and the United Kingdom founded in April 2023 to secure a reliable nuclear fuel supply chain.

The US Congress has taken what many see as a crucial step in sanctioning Russia and moving away from dependence on Russian nuclear fuel. However, a strong commitment—on the part of the US government and industry—to domestic enrichment is necessary in order to ensure that the US domestic fleet continues to operate and to ensure that the next generation of nuclear reactors can be demonstrated and deployed.


Jennifer T. Gordon is the director for the Nuclear Energy Policy Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Global Energy Center.

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Experts react: What will Putin and Xi’s ‘new era’ of cooperation mean for the world? https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/experts-react-what-will-putin-and-xis-new-era-of-cooperation-mean-for-the-world/ Thu, 16 May 2024 17:31:28 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=765527 The Russian president and the Chinese leader just met in Beijing to celebrate their increasing cooperation to create a new global order.

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Keep your “friends” close. On Thursday, Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese leader Xi Jinping met in Beijing to celebrate a “new era” of cooperation in an increasingly “multipolar world.” Putin’s visit comes as Russian forces are ravaging Kharkiv, and just after the Russian president reshuffled his military leadership ahead of an expected summer offensive in Ukraine. Putin is relying on his “dear friend” in China to continue supporting his country’s wartime economy, including through oil purchases. At the same time, Xi is looking to lock in a junior partner for China as its economy faces de-risking by Europe and new tariffs from the United States. Below, Atlantic Council experts delve into what to make of the duo’s meeting and what to look for next.

Click to jump to an expert analysis:

John E. Herbst: Putin and Xi are drawn together by hostility to the United States

Michael Schuman: Xi is decoupling from the US and deepening ties to Russia. It’s a bad deal for China.

Matthew Kroenig: Putin and Xi are afraid the US will join an arms race they already started

Kimberly Donovan: China is the axis of sanctions evasion

Andrew A. Michta: The Putin-Xi meeting shows the ‘axis of dictatorships’ is getting stronger

Shelby Magid: Putin and Xi are masquerading as peacemakers 

Markus Garlauskas: Putin and Xi are allies. Their statement should be a wakeup call.


Putin and Xi are drawn together by hostility to the United States

The Putin-Xi bromance’s latest episode comes live from Beijing, where Putin arrived with a largish entourage hoping to persuade his elder brother to offer more support for his still-not-successful aggression in Ukraine. His visit proceeds as his forces continue to make incremental, if casualty-heavy, gains—facilitated by the six-month delay in approving new US aid for Ukraine, inspired by the populist right—and pound Kharkiv with an Aleppo-brutal air bombardment. But they still have achieved no battlefield breakthrough.

The two strongmen and their teams have conducted talks on the state of the international system and enhancing cooperation in their “no limits” partnership. The problem for Putin is that the “no limits” in their partnership appears confined mainly to the rhetorical sphere. The two leaders blasted the United States as a “hostile and destructive” hegemon, declining but still dangerous. They issued a joint statement that talks about a deepened strategic partnership and a “new era.” Yet as they talked about growing cooperation, and even as Russian-Chinese trade flows have grown substantially in recent years, Chinese exports to Russia have declined in recent months. This may well reflect the recent warnings from the United States about providing military aid to Moscow and flouting sanctions policy on Russia. It is well understood that Chinese oil and gas purchases from Russia have helped it weather Western sanctions, but perhaps the Chinese hosts did not want to unduly antagonize the West and, therefore, the head of Gazprom was not part of the Russian delegation to China.

It is noteworthy, too, that Putin praised China’s peace proposals for Ukraine. This is likely part of his bid to persuade China not to attend the mid-June Swiss conference on Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s peace formula. Moscow was unhappy when China attended the last conference in Saudi Arabia.

Bottom line: This summit is more of the same. Overall, the two countries are drawn together by hostility to the United States. In a difficult war, Putin is looking for greater Chinese help, both economic and military. China would like Russia to win, but is still wary of provoking the United States and the West with greater support.

John E. Herbst is the senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center and a former US ambassador to Ukraine.


Xi is decoupling from the US and deepening ties to Russia. It’s a bad deal for China.

We got a good look at the changing global order this week, and it’s not a pretty sight. Two days after US President Joe Biden announced steep new tariffs on a range of Chinese products, Xi welcomed Putin in Beijing, where the two leaders pledged to deepen their countries’ cooperation. A half century ago, China forged ties with the United States after decoupling from the Soviet Union. Now, as China decouples from the United States, it is reconnecting with Russia. Xi thinks this is a good trade for China. He’s exchanging a United States he can’t control with an isolated, declining Russia that he can. And he gets a partner who shares his authoritarian values and mission to create an alternative, illiberal bloc to roll back the dominance of the West. 

The problem is that Xi is exchanging ties to a twenty-five trillion dollar economy with the advanced technology China needs for a two trillion dollar economy that’s not much more than a gas station. It’s not a great bargain. That Xi is willing to make it shows how thoroughly he has replaced the pragmatic pursuit of economic development with an anti-Americanism that will potentially jeopardize that development.

Michael Schuman is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Global China Hub and a contributing writer for the Atlantic magazine.


Putin and Xi are afraid the US will join an arms race they already started

At the geopolitical level, the China-Russia “new era” partnership shows that the world is tightening into geopolitical blocs with growing ties among the revisionist autocrats against the United States and the rules-based order. The autocrats supported each other’s most important revanchist priorities. Putin backed Xi’s position on Taiwan. Xi made oblique statements in support of Russia’s war in Ukraine, endorsing Russia’s efforts to “ensure security” and opposing “outside interference in Russia’s internal affairs.”

They joined together in criticizing the United States for undermining the strategic balance, but we would need Freud to disentangle this level of projection. They accused the United States of deploying “global missile defense” even though China and Russia are building air and missile defenses against the United States, and even though Washington has no such defenses for China and Russia. They accused the United States of building weapons for “potential decapitation strikes,” but China’s fractional orbital bombardment weapon is the best weapon ever invented for this purpose—and is, again, a capability that Washington lacks. Finally, they criticized Washington for planning to deploy short- and intermediate-range missiles in Europe and the Indo-Pacific. Currently, Russia and China have thousands of these missiles, while the United States has deployed zero. Moscow and Beijing seem worried that Washington will decide to run the arms race that these dictators are thrusting upon it.

Matthew Kroenig is vice president and senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security


China is the axis of sanctions evasion

Putin and Xi’s latest meeting further confirms our assessments that China has become the economic lifeline for Russia in the wake of Western sanctions. Over the past two years, China has become Russia’s primary trading partner and continues to import Russian commodities, especially oil. The two countries are trading in Chinese yuan and Russian rubles, which allows them to circumvent Western sanctions because the transactions are taking place outside of the US dollar, euro, and other Group of Seven (G7) sanctions coalition currencies. We assess that China is moving this activity to its smaller regional banks to protect its largest financial institutions with Western ties from direct sanctions exposure and the threat of US secondary sanctions. However, these transactions are still taking place and providing the revenue Russia needs to continue its war in Ukraine.

It is becoming clearer that China is the axis of sanctions evasion. China continues to prop up Russia, Iran, and North Korea, among other adversarial regimes to challenge US leadership and the global order. Countering Russian aggression in Ukraine is no longer a strictly Russian problem. Policymakers must consider China, Russia, and even Iran and North Korea together—and specifically their financial linkages—when developing sanctions and other measures to address the range of nefarious and destructive activity these regimes are executing.

Kimberly Donovan is the director of the Economic Statecraft Initiative within the Atlantic Council’s GeoEconomics Center and a former senior official with the US Treasury Department’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network.


The Putin-Xi meeting shows the ‘axis of dictatorships’ is getting stronger

The Putin-Xi meeting is another indication that the Russia-China alliance, the core of the new “axis of dictatorships,” which also includes Iran and North Korea, is getting stronger. China has been instrumental in throwing Russia an economic lifeline in the aftermath of its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Xi’s recent visit to Europe underscored the two countries’ shared objective to fracture the Atlantic alliance and bring about a fundamental power realignment across the globe.

Xi will likely be briefed by Putin on Russia’s prospects for success of his spring/summer offensive in Ukraine. Russia’s need for continued supplies and further support from China will likely be high on the agenda as well. An important deliverable from the Sino-Russian summit will be the public message that the two states are closely aligned and are cooperating on a host of defense and economic issues in opposition to the United States and its allies.      

Andrew A. Michta is director of the Scowcroft Strategy Initiative and senior fellow at the Atlantic Council.


Putin and Xi are masquerading as peacemakers

As Russia continues a relentless campaign of aerial attacks pummeling Kharkiv, and its forces push into northeastern Ukraine, Putin and Xi used the Beijing summit to masquerade as peacemakers and discuss their alleged focus on resolving what they call, incorrectly, the “Ukrainian crisis.”

While Russia’s war in Ukraine persists largely due to China’s enabling, Beijing claims to have a neutral position in the conflict and seeks to paint itself as a good faith actor and potential mediator. Speaking alongside Putin, Xi said China will continue to play a constructive role toward the return of peace and stability in Europe. 

Last year, China presented its vision for peace—a Kremlin-friendly, twelve-point statement with broad principles for ending the war with a political settlement. It notably neglected to call for Russia’s withdrawal from occupied parts of Ukraine. The plan was widely rejected by Ukraine and the West, save for a few Russia-friendly leaders such as Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán.

One day before heading to China, Putin declared his support for China’s peace plan. This declaration also comes a month ahead of an alternate initiative working to pave a way to end the war—the high-level Global Peace Summit to be held by Ukraine and Switzerland. The summit aims to lay the groundwork for a comprehensive and lasting peace in Ukraine, on starkly different terms than the Russian-endorsed Chinese plan. 

The Ukrainian-Swiss summit is gaining momentum, with at least fifty countries confirmed to participate and 160 invited. While Russia has not been invited, Chinese participation is a key focus in the goal of getting a broad turnout, especially from the Global South. China has not yet agreed to attend, though in line with its stated focus on resolving the conflict, China’s ambassador to Switzerland previously said that Beijing may take part in the summit. 

Following the Xi-Putin summit’s declarations on peace, the question remains whether China will attend and try to play a part in any efforts for peace that aren’t just squarely on Russia’s terms.

Shelby Magid is the deputy director of the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.


Putin and Xi are allies. Their statement should be a wakeup call.

Today’s formal Putin-Xi statement describes a shared worldview and aims, along with specific strategic cooperation measures to support them. It is a comprehensive statement of a de facto alliance, and it does not even cover everything China and Russia are already doing to support each other. Beijing and Moscow are unlikely to sign a document as clear as Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy did with the “Pact of Steel” or the “Tripartite Pact” that added Imperial Japan—at least not anytime soon. They do not need to.

Russia is currently engaged in an active war of aggression against Ukraine that would have long since sputtered out into clear defeat without the tremendous diplomatic, informational, technological, and economic support China has provided. That Russian-, North Korean-, and Iranian-made weapons, rather than Chinese-made ones, are striking Ukraine is missing the forest for the trees. China has provided aid that is vital to Russia’s sustainment of its offensive against Ukraine, and China provided what was needed to enable Russia’s stubborn defense against Ukrainian counterattacks. Further, by enabling sanctions evasion, China has created the international conditions that make it possible for Iran and North Korea to provide such weapons to Russia with near-impunity. In practical terms, China has done far more to sustain Russia’s war effort against Ukraine than Imperial Japan ever did to sustain Nazi Germany’s, or vice versa. 

For years, we have been in a new strategic era where Xi’s China and Putin’s Russia are increasingly aligned and cooperating closely, and this has only been accelerated by Putin’s war against Ukraine. Observers should not be reassuring themselves that Putin and Xi are not really allies because they have not signed a formal mutual defense treaty or because Chinese weapons and forces have not joined Russia’s aggression against Ukraine. The actions are there; the formal statements are there. Let us call this relationship what it is: an alliance. 

Even if this Xi-Putin alliance is not built on foundations as strong as those of the US alliance system, Washington and its own allies and partners around the world should not fail to see this alliance for what it is—and they should adjust their plans, policies, and strategies accordingly.

Markus Garlauskas is the director of the Indo-Pacific Security Initiative at the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. He is a former senior US government official with two decades of experience as an intelligence officer and strategist.


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Brazil’s tragic floods should put climate adaptation at the top of the G20 and COP agendas https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/brazils-tragic-floods-should-put-climate-adaptation-at-the-top-of-the-g20-and-cop-agendas/ Tue, 14 May 2024 21:34:21 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=764879 The ongoing flooding in Rio Grande do Sul is an example of the urgent need for countries to focus on adapting to climate change.

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For the last two weeks, Rio Grande do Sul, Brazil’s southernmost state, has been the victim of the worst climate disaster in its recent history. Hit by torrential rain, five months’ worth of typical precipitation fell in a mere fifteen days in some areas. Cities and towns remain under water, and the rainfall continues. At least 147 people have died, another hundred are missing, and more than half a million are displaced, impacting more than two million people in the state. The ongoing flooding in Rio Grande do Sul is an unfortunate example of the urgent need for countries to focus on adaptation measures to climate change. Brazil has a unique opportunity to drive these commitments forward as it hosts the Group of Twenty (G20) Leaders’ Summit in November and the United Nations Climate Change Conference, also known as COP30, in 2025.

Severe weather is not a new phenomenon for the state, which has seen record-breaking rainfall in recent years. A foretold tragedy, the flooding in Rio Grande do Sul is the fourth weather-related crisis to hit the state in less than a year. At the end of 2023, Rio Grande do Sul saw a similar situation, when a heat wave exacerbated intense storms and major flooding.

The region is prone to weather-related disasters, and the current flooding has been linked to the periodic El Niño weather phenomenon. In the past few decades, the state’s capital city, Porto Alegre, has adapted to control the extent of the impact of torrential rains on the city. However, the infrastructure in place must be updated to the new reality of extreme weather events, which are more intense due to climate change. Designing suitable financial instruments for resilient infrastructure with support from international and domestic financial institutions will be crucial.

The extent of this disaster is immense. To put it into perspective, about 90 percent of the 497 municipalities in Rio Grande do Sul were impacted by the rain and flooding. Brazilians are bearing the immediate brunt of these floods, including on their economy. There will also be implications for global trade and food security in the weeks and months ahead.

Rio Grande do Sul is an important state for Brazil. It represents 6 percent of the country’s gross domestic product (GDP), the fifth largest state GDP in the country. A major agribusiness state, it accounts for 70 percent of Brazil’s rice production. It is a significant producer of soybeans—of which Brazil is a leading producer and exporter—and an important meat-producing state. And while in Rio Grande do Sul rain continues to fall, not too far from there, in other regions of Brazil, farmers are suffering through a winter drought.

The governor of Rio Grande do Sul, Eduardo Leite, estimates that a yearslong reconstruction plan costing some nineteen billion reais (around $3.7 billion) will be needed in his state. Private sector investments and insurance could play a crucial role in supporting the recovery of the region, implementing adaptation measures and building the resilience of the affected communities. This level of support now will be critical to reduce future losses and tap into the immense economic, social, and environmental benefits of investing in adaptation and resilience. According to one recent estimate, each dollar invested in resilience and adaptation could generate up to twelve dollars in economic benefits.

Local and federal governments must take on the responsibility to put climate adaptation at the core of their strategic plans and development efforts. Countries must prioritize adaptation and resilience investment plans that strategically crowd in private sector investments and ensure that subnational governments and local communities can access insurance and financing to adapt and build resilience. Brazil is in a unique position to do so. With Brazilian municipal elections in October, this is a crucial moment for Brazilians to institutionalize climate mitigation and adaption efforts as part of local governments’ agendas.

At the geopolitical level, the G20 Leaders’ Summit in Rio de Janeiro in November will be an opportunity for Brazil to drive the climate adaptation agenda forward and to obtain buy-in and financing from the largest economies in the world. COP30 in Belém, Brazil, in 2025 is another such opportunity. The site for COP30, located in the Amazon rainforest in Brazil’s north, was chosen in part to showcase the roles of biodiversity, sustainability, and conservation in climate action. The flooding in the country’s south will be a tragic reminder of the importance of adaptation being central to the climate agenda, as well.


Valentina Sader is a deputy director at the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center, where she leads the Center’s work on Brazil, gender equality and diversity, and manages the Center’s Advisory Council.

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Garlauskas, Webster, and Verges quoted in The Economist on article on China’s support for Russia https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/insight-impact/in-the-news/garlauskas-webster-and-verges-quoted-in-the-economist-on-article-on-chinas-support-for-russia/ Tue, 14 May 2024 18:53:29 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=766379 The post Garlauskas, Webster, and Verges quoted in The Economist on article on China’s support for Russia appeared first on Atlantic Council.

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The View from New Delhi: Can IMEC Rival China’s Belt and Road? https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/content-series/china-mena-podcast/the-view-from-new-delhi-can-imec-rival-chinas-belt-and-road/ Tue, 14 May 2024 14:58:21 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=763690 Ambassador Navdeep Suri and expert Kabir Taneja explore the India, Middle East, Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) and how it may rival China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).

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SUBSCRIBE TO THE CHINA-MENA PODCAST ON THE APP OF YOUR CHOICE

Key takeaways

  • India, Middle East, Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC)
  • India’s Strategic Interests in the Middle East
  • Regional Dynamics and Diplomatic Engagements


Chapters

00:00 – Introduction

01:39 – Geopolitical and Geoeconomic Considerations

03:16 – Challenges and Ongoing Interest

07:17 – IMEC’s Focus on Technology in Transportation

11:28 – Economic Growth in the Gulf Linked to India

14:11 – Growing Strategic Relationships in UAE, Saudi Arabia

17:55 – Exploring Potential Funding Sources

19:11 – Positive Momentum in the Region

25:12 – India’s Role in Global Supply Chains

29:51 – Risk Distribution and US-China Contest

31:11 – Outro

In this episode

Ambassador Navdeep Suri
Visiting Fellow
Observer Research Foundation

Ambassador Suri has had a 36-year career in the Indian Foreign Service. He served in India’s diplomatic missions in Cairo, Damascus, Washington, Dar es Salaam, and London. He was India’s Consul General in Johannesburg, High Commissioner to Australia, and Ambassador to Egypt and the UAE. He also headed the West Africa and Public Diplomacy departments in India’s Ministry of External Affairs.

Kabir Taneja
Fellow, Strategic Studies Programme
Observer Research Foundation

Kabir Taneja is a Fellow with the Strategic Studies programme. His research focuses on India’s relations with West Asia, specifically on the domestic political dynamics, terrorism, non-state militant actors, and the general security paradigm of the region.

About

In this episode of the China-MENA podcast titled “The View from New Delhi: Can IMEC rival China’s Belt and Road?”, our host Jonathan Fulton and guests Ambassador Navdeep Suri and expert Kabir Taneja explore the India, Middle East, Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) and how it may rival China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). We unravel India’s significant strategic interests in the Middle East and how the region perceives India’s expanded role in driving economic prosperity and enhancing regional security. Dive deeper into:

  • Beyond Ports: IMEC aims to establish an economic corridor focused on the future, not just connecting ports but also integrating renewable energy grids, green hydrogen, and secure data connectivity.
  • India’s Strategic Interests in the Middle East: India seeks to reinvigorate its historical ties with the region, capitalizing on its rapid economic growth and the perception of India as a future economic powerhouse. Additionally, India is increasingly seen as a security contributor in the region.
  • Regional Dynamics and Diplomatic Engagements: Despite challenges like the recent conflict in Gaza, there is continued interest from key players in IMEC. The project is seen as a way to move beyond regional tensions and promote prosperity through better connectivity.

Join us for an enlightening conversation that bridges continents and cultures on the China MENA podcast.

Read more: India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor: Towards a New Discourse in Global Connectivity

Hosted by

IMEC propels us towards future-proof economies, blending technology and energy integration

Navdeep Suri

The geopolitical dynamics of the Middle East offer both a landscape of opportunities and a complex set of challenges for India

Kabir Taneja

About the China-MENA podcast

The China-MENA podcast features conversations with academics, think-tankers, and regional specialists on Chinese Influence in the Middle East and informs US and MENA audiences in the policy and business communities about the nature of China’s outreach to the region.

At a time when China’s global footprint is getting deeper and deeper, it has never been more important to understand its foreign policy and the Middle East is one of the world’s most consequential regions: home to major religions, diverse cultural and social heritage, central to global energy markets, and of course, geopolitics, linking people and markets in Asia, Africa and Europe.  This show will help you understand what China is doing in the region, and how the region is engaging with China as an increasingly important external power.

Podcast series

Listen to the latest episode of the China-MENA podcast, featuring conversations with academics, government leaders, and the policy community on China’s role in the Middle East.

Recommended reading

This podcast was funded in part by a grant from the United States Department of State. The opinions, findings, and conclusions stated herein are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the United States Department of State.

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What to know about Biden’s new tariffs on Chinese EVs, solar cells, and more https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/experts-react/what-to-know-about-bidens-new-tariffs-on-chinese-evs-solar-cells-and-more/ Tue, 14 May 2024 14:29:27 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=764643 The Biden administration has imposed new tariffs on imports from China across a range of strategic industries. Atlantic Council experts dig into the details.

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It’s open season on seagulls. On Tuesday, the Biden administration announced sweeping tariff increases on China across a range of strategic industries, including quadrupling tariffs to 100 percent on electric vehicles (EVs), such as the low-priced Seagull EV from Chinese automaker BYD. Other industries that the new tariffs impact include lithium-ion batteries, semiconductors, aluminum and steel, solar panels, and medical products. The changes are designed to take aim at China’s nonmarket trade practices and overcapacity, while boosting US industries. To decipher what’s behind the move and what to expect next, we put five burning questions to our experts.

The Biden administration’s objectives are threefold. First, it seeks to foster the growth of the fledgling US clean energy complex against Chinese rivals, many of which have received vast subsidies from national, provincial, and local governments. 

Second, and relatedly, the tariffs aim to ensure that clean energy technologies are not dominated by a sole supplier. This action reduces the probability that a single entity can establish control over vital technologies such as EVs, lithium-ion batteries, and other products.

Third, the tariffs may slow China’s development of certain dual-use technologies that have latent military potential. Lithium-ion batteries, for instance, are used for not only EVs and electricity grid storage, but also for military applications such as diesel-electric submarines, aerial drones, and unmanned maritime platforms. 

The tariffs will, all else being equal, curb China’s industrial capacity, which could be repurposed for its defense industrial base. They will also reduce the probability that China will be the first to make technical or commercial breakthroughs in battery technologies, such as solid-state batteries, that could be military game-changers. 

Joseph Webster is a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Global Energy Center, where he leads the center’s efforts on Chinese energy security.


Fundamentally, Biden administration officials are trying to avoid repeating the mistakes of past decades when, they believe, the United States (and its allies) did not do enough to counter China’s unfair trade practices until it was too late and Chinese products flooded markets and cost jobs. Now they want to get ahead of the curve, especially on EVs with a staggering 100 percent tariff. It’s worth noting that only 1 percent of all US EV imports currently come from China—so this is about the future, not about now.

It’s not that China hasn’t been creating overcapacity for decades; it’s that the sectors China is now doing it in are considered critical for national security. That is what is driving so much of this reaction.

Josh Lipsky is senior director of the Atlantic Council’s GeoEconomics Center and a former adviser to the International Monetary Fund.


The Biden administration has made several large strategic bets in industrial policy around semiconductors, EVs, solar, and infrastructure investment. As the administration has sought to onshore productive capabilities throughout these supply chains, one looming concern has been overcapacity and the potential for gluts of cheap imports shuttering newly built US plants. In many respects, these tariffs are preventive measures to guard against that possibility. By taking preventive measures, rather than post hoc remedies, the administration may also be trying to signal to the private sector that any investments they make in onshored critical supply chains will be protected from wild price swings. In this regard, this slate of tariffs attempts to make the long-term math on supply chain resilience work.

Sarah Bauerle Danzman is a resident senior fellow in the GeoEconomics Center’s Economic Statecraft Initiative.


The Biden administration has two main goals. The first is protecting infant or currently undeveloped industries supported by the Inflation Reduction Act and other efforts. The second is protecting US critical supply chains, such as for personal protective equipment, the importance of which became clear during the COVID-19 pandemic.

Posing the announcement as the outcome of the long-running, multiyear investigation under Section 301 of the 1974 Trade Act, the Biden administration believes that its tariffs will be much more effective than Trump-era tariffs, which the Biden team believes inadvertently caught intermediate goods that hurt US producers. These tariffs will be more targeted to the two goals above. For example, semiconductor tariffs are expected to be on imports of chips themselves, not final products that include semiconductors.

David Hathaway is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Global China Hub and principal for China at the Asia Group.

In the short term, this will likely raise the price of key clean energy goods, or at least prevent these goods from decreasing as quickly in price as they otherwise would. However, emerging markets could very well be flooded with extremely cheap clean energy items from China, which could help them in their energy transition, but might also be seen as threatening from the perspective of the United States.

—Sarah Bauerle Danzman


Due to existing high tariffs, there is virtually no trade in EVs between the United States and China. But China is, by far, the largest exporter of lithium-ion batteries to the United States. Chinese imports are especially consequential for grid storage that complements intermittent solar power. Consequently, and depending on details of the tariffs, US efforts to decarbonize its grid could slow down. 

Certain critics of the tariffs will likely decry their impact on the US electricity grid. But the reality is it’s too soon to say how the tariffs will impact the global fight against climate change, in either the short term or the long term. In the short term, higher US tariffs will divert certain clean energy products to other markets, including China’s own domestic market. It’s possible that short-term trade diversion could actually deliver a higher environmental return on investment, given global carbon emission patterns. For instance, deploying solar and battery storage projects in certain coal-addicted Chinese provinces would deliver greater climate benefits than, say, installing more clean energy capacity in California. Over the long term, the tariffs could deliver climate benefits by preventing a single country from forming its own clean energy cartel. The Chinese government has a long history of using economic coercion to achieve its desired political ends. It is naïve to believe that Beijing would not exercise this same leverage in certain clean energy fields. 

—Joseph Webster


It’s worth noting that tariffs on several major ticket items, such as lithium-ion batteries, don’t kick in until 2026. This gives some adaptation time but also signals that the United States doesn’t think this policy will actually change China’s behavior.

—Josh Lipsky


There will likely be impacts to affected US industries, which could indeed complicate US efforts on climate change. The announcement included tariffs on some batteries, for example. For China, the tariffs, if effective, may blunt China’s ability to trade in products seeing heavy overcapacity, although Chinese producers will likely seek to shift to other markets, including in Europe. (See more below.)

—David Hathaway

Tariffs on Chinese EVs will have comparatively little impact since US consumers are not buying many Chinese EVs. Economic impacts are more likely in other sectors in which replacements for Chinese products are considerably more expensive. However, the administration likely believes that the tariffs are necessary to support its goals to protect key industries, increase capacity via friendshoring, and secure critical supply chains.

—David Hathaway


Tariffs do create deadweight loss, so we can expect them to exact some costs on the US economy. The Biden administration has insisted that this approach to tariffs is more targeted and less inflationary than the across-the-board tariffs that former President Donald Trump has proposed. The tariffs have a couple of years to set in, which may help with adjustment. And, as mentioned above, the certainty in price protection that these tariffs afford producers could induce new investments in the US supply chains for these items.

—Sarah Bauerle Danzman

China won’t be shocked—in fact, it’s likely that US Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen and US Secretary of State Antony Blinken previewed this announcement on their respective trips there in April. China will, as is typical, play a long game—and accelerate its own reshoring policies as it tries to expand production in a range of countries, including Mexico. The United States is aware of that strategy, and that’s why you’ll see a lot of shuttle diplomacy between Mexico City and Washington ahead of the United States–Mexico–Canada Agreement renewal in 2026.

—Josh Lipsky


China has likely already baked such actions by the United States into its thinking. It must already understand that actions on trade are to be expected in the run-up to the US presidential election in November. However, the Biden administration is certainly expecting some form of material retaliation, likely below a level that could be considered escalatory. There is an awareness that one Chinese industry response may be to shift production to places such as Southeast Asia and Mexico. I understand that the US government is working actively with partners to prevent this.

—David Hathaway


I expect the Chinese government to consider more export controls on raw and processed critical minerals. The problem is that this might create short-term supply constraints for the United States. But the Section 301 tariffs cover some of these minerals, and so such moves will only further help the administration achieve its goals of independence from Chinese supply.

As David mentioned, Chinese companies are likely to try to invest in third markets to serve the United States and other protected markets. Attempts to build EV battery plants in places with trade agreements with the United States, such as Mexico, will further push Washington to engage with partners to shore up their investment regulatory regime. The United States may also start thinking about how to address ownership and control issues in its supply chain, especially since rules of origin through which tariff rates are set are based on the location of production, rather than on who ultimately owns that productive capacity.

—Sarah Bauerle Danzman

That’s the million- or trillion-dollar question. If Europe and the Group of Seven (G7) countries match or mirror US policies at the summit in Italy in June, it may cause Beijing to realize that this time is different. On the other hand, if Europe hedges coming out of its own antidumping review, it could affirm China’s view that their challenge is primarily with the United States, not the rest of the advanced economies. The next few weeks will be telling.

At the same time, the United States is not only going to rely on the G7 here. Watch for coordination with countries that have been skeptical of the United States, including Brazil, because they also share a concern about Chinese overcapacity.

—Josh Lipsky


I really hope that the United States provided ample notice to Brussels about this move. The Europeans are currently undertaking their own anti-dumping review of Chinese EVs, and their market is far more vulnerable to Chinese EV imports than the United States’. 

Europe is a bit handicapped compared to the United States when it comes to a more forceful use of tariff policy. The Biden tariffs arising from this Section 301 review are quite prospective in nature; they are anticipating a problem and applying tariffs preventively, particularly with respect to EVs. Additionally, the United States is able to pass well-funded industrial policy measures to further aid domestic production. The European Union (EU) has traditionally been more attentive to World Trade Organization rules around when and how to apply tariffs, and generally needs evidence of actual, realized harm before it acts. This means that EU producers will have to be hit hard by Chinese imports before the EU is likely able to act to protect them. Additionally, the intra-EU politics of industrial policy is much more complicated than in the United States, which further limits its scope of action.

—Sarah Bauerle Danzman


The tariffs may force Brussels’ hand, since higher tariffs in the United States on Chinese goods could result in substantial trade diversion to Europe. Brussels will have to act quickly, either to put its own tariffs in place or to accept a flood of Chinese-made products. 

—Joseph Webster

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What US tariffs on Chinese batteries mean for decarbonization—and Taiwan https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/energysource/what-us-tariffs-on-chinese-batteries-mean-for-decarbonization-and-taiwan/ Mon, 13 May 2024 21:29:39 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=764062 In response to Beijing’s attempts to cement its dominant position across the “new three” technologies of solar photovoltaics (PVs), electric vehicles (EVs), and batteries, the Biden administration is poised to issue tariffs on key Chinese products. A look at China’s battery exports, and its associated battery complex, reveals both opportunities and risks for US and allied […]

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In response to Beijing’s attempts to cement its dominant position across the “new three” technologies of solar photovoltaics (PVs), electric vehicles (EVs), and batteries, the Biden administration is poised to issue tariffs on key Chinese products. A look at China’s battery exports, and its associated battery complex, reveals both opportunities and risks for US and allied comprehensive security interests.

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On one hand, lithium-ion (li-ion) batteries, including those made in China, the world’s largest li-ion manufacturer, are useful for decarbonizing the US grid, improving the economics of solar deployment, and providing a key input for electric vehicles. On the other hand, ceding a new and important clean tech industry could pose long-term economic damages. Allowing China to dominate this sector hollows out US manufacturing capacity and know-how, while giving China’s battery complex the opportunity to grow in capacity and provide synergies with its submarine and drone-making capabilities, which are increasingly important in modern warfare. This rise in industrial capacity could prove significant in military contingencies involving Taiwan.

Managing these battery dilemmas will be challenging, but not impossible. Most immediately, the United States and its allies, friends, and partners should rigorously investigate where Chinese-made batteries do—and, significantly, do not—pose security risks. Most importantly, however, they should accelerate development of their own battery supply chains. 

Chinese li-ion battery exports and US decarbonization objectives

China’s global lithium-ion battery exports reached $65 billion in 2023, up nearly 400 percent from pre-COVID levels in 2019. More than half of these 2023 exports were shipped to the European Union and the United States-Mexico-Canada (USMCA) free trade zone.

Chinese li-ion battery exports are largely bound for the European Union and North America.

Chinese battery exports to USMCA are highly correlated with EV manufacturing capacity and solar installed capacity, which are often paired with battery energy storage systems. In North America, these facilities are overwhelmingly concentrated in the United States, which accounts for the lion’s share of USMCA’s lithium-ion battery imports, according to Chinese trade statistics. (Note: the United States and China report slightly different total trade figures, due to reporting lags and the timing of international shipments.)

Chinese exports to USMCA are largely routed through the United States.

According to the US Census Bureau, in 2023, the United States directly imported $13.1 billion in lithium-ion batteries from China, accounting for 70 percent all US li-ion battery imports in 2023, as measured in value. US li-ion imports are split between storage and batteries for electric vehicles.

US lithium-ion batteries derive primarily from China, both directly and indirectly.

It’s worth noting that China’s share of all US li-ion batteries is understated in official statistics, in both absolute and relative terms. Chinese battery companies, as well as big battery players based in South Korea and Japan, often have manufacturing facilities in third-party countries that export to the United States.

In other words, China is currently an important player in US decarbonization, particularly when it comes to energy storage. China exported $10.8 billion of Li-ion storage batteries to the United States in 2023, accounting for 72 percent of all US imports of the product.

Chinese imports are particularly important in the storage market.

These li-ion storage batteries are useful for decarbonizing the US power sector and complementing solar generation. As recent research shows, California and other western states have significantly increased their uptake of storage batteries on the grid, enabling solar’s percentage share of all generation to rise, advancing state and national decarbonization objectives.

The security risks from China’s battery complex

While mainland China’s li-ion batteries are useful for decarbonization, its battery complex poses often-overlooked security risks, especially in the event of a contingency over Taiwan. Batteries figure increasingly prominently in military affairs, including for diesel-electric submarines and unmanned platforms. Critically, US restrictions on Chinese li-ion batteries or of electric vehicles, another end use of li-ion batteries, will limit China’s industrial capacity that could readily be repurposed from the civilian industry to its defense industrial base. Just as crucially, by diminishing China’s battery business, US tariffs could constrain Beijing’s ability to secure technological breakthroughs with military uses.

China’s battery complex complements its military capabilities in multiple ways. Take aerial drones, which often employ lithium-ion batteries for propulsion. These weapons are already a critical element in Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, as both sides are estimated to field at least 50,000 first-person-view suicide drones per month.

Drone technology could play an even larger role in any confrontation over Taiwan. Mainland China’s industrial capacity in aerial drones and batteries could loom large in any confrontation, as its manufacture of dual-use drones dwarfs production seen in both Ukraine and Russia. There are limitations to the role batteries could play in the aerial domain due to constraints in energy density and range. Still, advances in battery technology could increase the potency of aerial drones in a potential Taiwan contingency.

Batteries are also useful for unmanned underwater vessels, unmanned surface vessels and, critically, conventional (i.e. non-nuclear powered) submarines. Diesel-electric submarines are powered by batteries charged by onboard diesel generation. Those with li-ion batteries offer performance improvements over those with lead-acid batteries, including quieter operations, and higher speeds for sprinting and cruising. Japan’s Maritime Self-Defense Force is the only navy known to operate diesel-electric submarines with li-ion batteries.

But the possibility that China could also develop li-ion submarines is a concern. Its battery complex has made undeniable technical advances in recent years and is, in many ways, technologically ahead of advanced economies, including Japan and South Korea. It is likely only a matter of time before China’s navy develops advanced li-ion diesel-electric submarines—if it is not doing so already.

Another risk posed by China’s battery complex is its development of solid-state batteries (SSBs), which enjoy further performance advantages over li-ion batteries, including greater density, capacity, range, and no risk of fire. While SSBs have yet to be commercialized, their development could offer substantial performance improvements for both diesel-electric submarines and unmanned systems.

The massive industrial scale and growing technological sophistication of China’s battery complex could therefore not only enable Beijing to secure the commanding heights of a global industry, but also enhance its military capabilities in ways that threaten US interests.  

Finding a balanced approach

Because the Chinese battery complex presents decarbonization opportunities, but also security risks for the United States and other constitutional democracies, policymakers should adopt a balanced approach to batteries, working together with allies, friends, and partners to take risk mitigation steps when necessary.  

Similar to its investigation into connected vehicles, Washington should comprehensively study where batteries pose potential security risks and take countermeasures where appropriate. Given the need to decarbonize the electricity system, Washington should act against existing installations or near-term imports of Chinese batteries for grid storage only when there is a compelling reason. Despite concerns about the security of Chinese-made grid storage batteries, any efforts by China to destabilize the grid appear far more likely to emerge from offensive malware operations or China’s cryptocurrency mining assets. As an interim measure, however, the United States and its allies should increase resiliency against potential grid subversion by undertaking more spot checks of battery imports and by booting Chinese-made batteries from sensitive locations, such as military bases.  

The best way to mitigate battery-related risks, however, is to develop a US and “friend-shored” supply chain. Washington, Brussels, and other allies and partners should de-risk the entirety of the battery supply chain. The coalition should focus on potential supply chain chokepoints, especially graphite, as the United States has no existing production sites for this key battery material. Fortunately, the United States has already made substantial progress on developing its battery industry, as nearly $34 billion in actual investment into battery manufacturing has occurred in 2023 alone.

But more can be done. Washington should enact policies to speed up clean energy deployment to both reduce emissions and enhance national security. This includes permitting reform, which is critical for connecting clean energy to the grid. Also, deployment of more US-made batteries could provide synergies with key defense industrial capabilities, including for unmanned platforms and manned submarines. Similarly, the United States should continue to build out its domestic charging infrastructure for electric vehicles, which are an important use for lithium-ion batteries. Finally, the United States and its treaty allies—Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines—should explore siting battery manufacturing capabilities in areas relevant for contingences involving Taiwan and the South China Sea.

Striking a responsible balance between the competing imperatives of national security, economic interests, and decarbonization is challenging. Many actors fail to grasp that multiple things can be true at once: climate change poses a massive threat to our shared global future—but so does mounting clean energy dependence on the Chinese Communist Party. US tariffs on Chinese batteries aim to take a balanced approach to managing this complicated dilemma.

Joseph Webster is a senior fellow in the Global Energy Center and the editor of the independent China-Russia Report. This article reflects his own personal opinion.

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California’s battery boom is a case study for the energy transition https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/californias-battery-boom-is-a-case-study-for-the-energy-transition/ Mon, 13 May 2024 14:54:10 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=762013 The state’s large-scale deployment of lithium-ion storage batteries is leading to lower solar “curtailment,” or when electricity generation is suppressed due to price signals or physical oversupply.

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California is the country’s largest and most mature solar market, but it’s also changing in important ways. On April 25, California marked a major milestone, as it became the first state to deploy 10 gigawatts (GW) of battery storage capacity. This large-scale deployment of lithium-ion storage batteries is leading to lower solar “curtailment,” or when electricity generation is suppressed due to price signals or physical oversupply. Curtailment is a problem because it means solar power stations, for example, are producing less electricity than they could, contributing less to the overall energy mix than they otherwise might.

California’s experience shows that batteries will play an important role in lifting solar power’s share of all electricity generation. The Golden State is showing that it can ramp up solar generation and, thanks to batteries and greater transmission connectivity, that it can do so without a sharp rise in curtailment. On the leading edge of this transition, the state’s success or failure could inform how local and national governments worldwide go about greening their grids. 

Batteries rising

Batteries are helping improve the economics of Californian solar and decarbonize the grid of its California Independent System Operator (CAISO), which covers most of the state (and parts of Nevada). Batteries are succeeding in CAISO because they are helping mitigate its curtailment problems, which surged in the first part of 2023.

Solar curtailment in CAISO and elsewhere is determined by two main factors. In conditions of system oversupply, the grid does not have enough demand for renewable electricity generation. Local transmission constraints also produce curtailment. By shifting electrons into less-congested and higher-priced times of the day, storage batteries avoid saturating system demand or overwhelming local bottlenecks, improving the economics of solar and other clean energy sources and easing duck curve constraints.

California is mitigating curtailment via batteries. US battery storage installations are overwhelmingly concentrated in solar-rich areas of the country: California, Texas, and the “Mountain West battery states” of Arizona, Colorado, New Mexico, and Nevada.

California has traditionally been the United States’ leading solar market. In 2023, solar power’s share of all net generation in the Golden State stood at 19 percent; in Texas and the Mountain West battery states, conversely, its proportion reached only 5 percent and 9 percent, respectively, although solar notably accounted for 23 percent of Nevada’s net generation.

California is also, not coincidentally, the nation’s largest battery market. In addition to deploying nearly 19 GW of cumulative solar capacity, it currently has more than 10 GW of batteries, with its clean energy goals requiring more than 50 GW by 2045.

All these batteries are complementing solar generation and leading to lower curtailment. Battery capacity as a share of solar generation capacity in CAISO surged in the past twelve months, rising from 29 percent in January 2023 to 41 percent by December 2023. As new batteries have entered the grid, curtailment as a percentage of all solar generation has reversed its upward trend and even declined from recent highs, suggesting that more electrons are finding their way to the grid economically. While recent analyses catalogued that CAISO’s solar curtailment rose in early 2023, the newest data shows that batteries—and, crucially, new transmission lines—have reversed this trend, at least in relative terms.

Lower curtailment has lifted solar generation’s share of all electricity output. Solar’s twelve-month average of CAISO’s electricity load, or demand, totaled 18.6 percent in February 2024. That’s an all-time high—even as curtailment as a percentage of all solar generation has dropped.

Importantly, relative curtailment has decreased from recent highs despite the addition of significant new solar generation. While solar generation continues to rise as a percentage of the total load, curtailment’s percentage of all solar production has declined from recent highs. While CAISO’s overall curtailment rose by nearly 135 gigawatt hours (GWh) in the last six months of 2023 from prior year levels, it also generated 3,725 GWh more in solar electricity.

CAISO’s recent relative curtailment downtick could be due to several factors besides batteries, such as weather conditions and new transmission lines. Still, grid storage battery deployment has undeniably been an important element. CAISO’s addition of over 2.4 GW of battery storage capacity from June 2023 through the end of the year coincided with a sharp reduction in curtailment.

CAISO is set to continue deploying even more batteries in 2024. The US Energy Information Administration’s latest estimates suggest it will install nearly 5 GW of incremental battery storage capacity in 2024, along with 3.5 GW of new solar photovoltaic capacity. While not every project in queue will ultimately move forward, CAISO’s absolute increase in battery capacity and its relative rise as a percentage of solar capacity will mitigate curtailment.

More encouragingly, it’s early innings in the rise of batteries. While lithium-ion battery technologies are most prevalent on the grid today, other advances are possible. Most deployed batteries today, such as lithium-ion batteries, have storage of around four hours or less. New technologies, such as iron air batteries, could provide multiday storage solutions. As the quantity and quality of battery deployments improve, the grid will become more resilient and, all else being equal, solar generation’s share of the electricity grid will continue to grow.

Of course, solar and batteries face substantial challenges ahead: namely, geopolitics and economics. China’s massive role across clean energy supply chains raises thorny questions and difficult tradeoffs. China dominates solar supply chains and is deeply enmeshed in battery supply inputs, including for lithium. Political tensions with China could spike prices, especially if Beijing interferes with markets. Even without geopolitical disruptions, however, renewables could face growing costs and disruptions due to supply chain bottlenecks and the boom-bust cycle of commodities and inputs. With a prolonged period of high interest rates posing challenges to capital-intensive renewables, policymakers should alleviate inflation by accepting short-term increases in hydrocarbon output and accelerating housing construction. Meanwhile, managing illiquid commodities and inputs for solar and batteries could require creative policy mechanisms, such as financing hedging instruments or creating new benchmarks.

Increasing solar electricity’s share of generation via batteries would be good news for consumers and the environment. By some metrics, unsubsidized solar is the cheapest generation source, while solar photovoltaic plus storage is economically competitive with other, more polluting resources. Additionally, solar panels and lithium-ion batteries require virtually no water after entering service, unlike coal, for example. The increasing wave of solar and batteries hitting the grid could aid the economic and environmental goals of California and other states.


Joseph Webster is a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Global Energy Center. This article represents his own opinion.

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Wald joins Bloomberg Surveillance to discuss the oil slowdown https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/insight-impact/in-the-news/wald-joins-bloomberg-surveillance-to-discuss-the-oil-slowdown/ Fri, 10 May 2024 15:43:32 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=764321 The post Wald joins Bloomberg Surveillance to discuss the oil slowdown appeared first on Atlantic Council.

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Wald joins Bloomberg to discuss the relationship between the US and Saudi Arabia https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/insight-impact/in-the-news/wald-joins-bloomberg-to-discuss-the-relationship-between-the-us-and-saudi-arabia/ Fri, 10 May 2024 15:37:35 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=764313 The post Wald joins Bloomberg to discuss the relationship between the US and Saudi Arabia appeared first on Atlantic Council.

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China builds more utility-scale solar as competition with coal ramps up https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/energysource/china-builds-more-utility-scale-solar-as-competition-with-coal-ramps-up/ Thu, 09 May 2024 18:40:41 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=763622 China's transition to more utility-scale solar installations furthers its decarbonization efforts. However, regional resource limitations, limited interprovincial electricity transfers, and cheap coal present structural and economic headwinds.

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By virtually any metric, China is undeniably the world’s solar superpower. It deployed more solar capacity in 2023 than the United States has installed in its history; it also dominates the manufacturing supply chain, especially for wafers. These achievements are remarkable. Yet China’s track record on solar, a critical decarbonization tool, is hardly above criticism, including in its domestic market.

Owing to its deployment patterns and underlying resource constraints, China’s solar usage rates, known as capacity utilization factors, are among the lowest in the world. But this could be about to change. Recent data suggest that China may be shifting from distributed solar to utility-scale solar, which would, all things being equal, raise the overall efficiency of its electricity grid while aiding decarbonization. Given that China is by far both the world’s largest greenhouse gas emitter and coal consumer, its domestic solar deployments will have global consequences. However, several hurdles hindering the country from reaching its domestic solar potential have emerged.

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Utility-scale versus distributed solar

China’s domestic solar choices matter because distinct types of solar installations have vastly different generation potentials. Distributed solar, which is typically found on rooftops, lacks the capability to track the sun’s movements and optimize sunlight reception. It therefore has a lower capacity factor than utility-scale solar, which is generally ground-mounted with single- or dual-axis tracking.

Tracking systems typically entail securing bulky frames and motors, and drilling holes to hold the system in place. This type of solar installation is generally not suited for rooftops. Buildings can struggle to structurally bear the weight of tied-down panels, while high winds pose additional risks for rooftop panels. Consequently, rooftop panels typically do not have tracking, which limits their ability to receive optimal amounts of sunlight.

Case in point, in the United States, utility-scale capacity factors in the best locations and with the latest technology, including tracking capabilities, often exceed 30 percent; utilization factors for residential solar average nearly 16 percent. China doesn’t provide a comparable data breakout for its own utility-scale versus distributed solar. It does, however, provide information about its nationwide solar capacity factors. In 2023, China’s solar capacity factors stood at 14.7 percent, versus 23.3 percent in the United States.

China’s lower capacity factors are due, in large part, to its disproportionately high deployment of distributed solar generation relative to utility-scale deployment. There are several potential reasons for China’s tilt toward disturbed solar. China’s best solar resources are in the northern and western parts of the country, relatively distant from the coastal population centers to the south and east, where much of its solar is deployed. Additionally, China has limited interprovincial electricity transfers. These transmission-related factors, along with China’s higher electricity prices for coastal provinces, incentivize rooftop solar deployment in coastal areas, as seen in the chart below. 

China’s solar strategy may be shifting away from distributed solar, although the evidence is mixed. In the last quarter of 2023, China reported 58 gigawatts (GW) of utility-scale solar capacity installations, an all-time high and a massive increase from prior periods. In the first quarter of 2024, China once more installed greater amounts of distributed solar capacity than utility-scale solar.

China’s utility-scale breakout?

Some features of China’s potential turn to utility-scale deployments are worth examining. In both 2022 and 2023, China’s utility-scale installations surged in the final quarter, potentially to meet year-end construction deadlines and capacity targets set by national and provincial governments.

Additionally, some provincial-level trends are noteworthy. Hebei, for example, enjoys good solar irradiance, while its proximity to Beijing’s substantial electricity load limits transmission costs. And Yunnan, in southwest China, installation of major utility-scale capacity began at the end of 2023 and continued through the first quarter.

Xinjiang is a striking anomaly. It reports virtually no distributed solar capacity despite having good solar potential, moderate per-capita income, and 34 GW of installed utility-scale capacity (including solar that China attributes to the Xinjiang production corps). Xinjiang’s deployment patterns constitute a major outlier in a country where rooftop deployment has been encouraged through official policy.

The most plausible explanation for this anomaly emerged from a solar expert on China. In written comments to the author, the expert suggested that “If you live in a low rainfall area with dust storms then somebody must keep the panels clean or wipe them down every so often. With a multifamily dwelling a ’crisis of the commons’ issue is quick to emerge.”

While Xinjiang’s lack of distributed solar capacity may be related to several factors, it is also hard not to wonder if the Communist Party’s pervasive repression of the province’s Uyghur population weakens social trust and, consequently, disincentivizes rooftop solar deployments.

Finally, Inner Mongolia’s modest deployment of utility-scale solar has major climate consequences. The sun-soaked, windy province enjoys some of China’s best renewable energy resources, and it is also a coal bastion. In 2023, Inner Mongolia produced 1.21 billion tons of coal supply, of which 945 million tons were supplied to coal-fired power plants, as the renewables-rich province incongruently supplied over 25 percent of China’s coal production last year. Since Inner Mongolia’s thermal coal and solar production compete to provide electrons for the Chinese grid, this province will play an outsized role in shaping China’s climate trajectory.

It’s too soon to say if China is shifting solar deployment into a more efficient model: namely, utility-scale solar in the northern, more sun-soaked regions of the country. Encouraging signs include the planned construction of over 225 “renewable energy bases” across the Chinese interior, comprising total wind and solar capacity of 455 GWs, along with associated transmission lines. Some Chinese provinces are also siting solar panels on land repurposed from mining. These steps are constructive.

Yet there are also reasons to temper expectations. China’s solar utilization rates actually fell in 2023. That may be attributable to the type and regions of deployment, or bad luck from weather, but other factors are possible. With China exhibiting sudden year-end deployment surges to meet construction targets, the long-term performance and sustainment of its panels could degrade if maintenance needs rise. Finally, solar faces economic headwinds in Shanxi, Inner Mongolia, and Shaanxi—some of China’s most sun-soaked provinces. These regions also have an abundance of coal, some of which is used for steel production rather than electricity generation. Still, the fossil fuel keeps electricity prices low, disincentivizing solar.

China is showing signs of a shift toward more utility-scale solar in suitable regions, and it is making substantial progress in deploying massive volumes of solar capacity, but powerful structural hurdles to the technology’s domestic adoption are coming into focus.

Joe Webster is a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council Global Energy Center, and editor of the China-Russia Report. This article represents his own personal opinion.

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One hundred years of energy transitions https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/geotech-cues/one-hundred-years-of-energy-transitions/ Wed, 08 May 2024 12:09:08 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=762424 Thousands of energy leaders, technology developers, and climate advocates gathered in Rotterdam, Netherlands from April 22-25 along the 26th World Energy Congress. Looking back at the first Congress, then called the World Power Congress, in London in 1924, global energy systems looked very different. In 1924, global oil production was around 2.8 million barrels per […]

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Thousands of energy leaders, technology developers, and climate advocates gathered in Rotterdam, Netherlands from April 22-25 along the 26th World Energy Congress. Looking back at the first Congress, then called the World Power Congress, in London in 1924, global energy systems looked very different. In 1924, global oil production was around 2.8 million barrels per day, compared to almost 102 million barrels per day last year. In other words, a country like South Korea or Canada consumes today the same amount of oil that the whole world needed one hundred years ago.

In 1924, there was no nuclear energy in the global energy mix and renewables were probably beyond the imagination of policy makers. By 1975, there were 200 nuclear power reactors in 19 different countries, but solar and wind power were still practically nonexistent. It was not until the early 2000s that solar and wind began to gain traction and break records year after year, contributing 18 percent of the world’s total energy consumption.

Unlike previous energy transitions, the current energy transition is not mainly driven by a more superior technology in terms of energy density and efficiency alone. The current energy transition is mainly responding to the climate impacts related to energy generation and consumption over the last century, or what economists call “externalities”. However, this transition towards more sustainable sources of energy is constrained by the increasing energy demand globally, especially in emerging and less developed economies. This makes the global energy transition measured against three main criteria, commonly referred to as the “energy trilemma”: energy security, energy affordability, and environmental sustainability.

To address the energy trilemma, four critical discussion themes emerged during the centenary World Energy Congress in Rotterdam: 1. Accelerating the deployment of existing solutions, 2. Scaling innovative technologies, 3. The interaction of energy and artificial intelligence (AI), and 4. Humanizing the energy transition.

Accelerating the deployment of existing solutions

There has been great progress on deployment of clean energy technologies over the last 20 years that made most of these technologies cost-competitive with fossil fuels in today’s market even without financial support. However, these technologies are not deployed fast enough to get us on track to meet our climate targets. For example, utility-scale wind and solar projects in the United States can take 4.5 years on average to obtain the necessary permits and navigate necessary environmental reviews for siting and construction.

There is a need for regulatory reforms that can strike the right balance between timely decisions on clean energy and infrastructure projects while preserving thorough environmental reviews. This balance would not leave project developers concerned about fluctuations in equipment costs while they are waiting on permits. The recent delays in offshore wind projects along US coastlines show how the combination of uncertainty, public acceptance, and affordability can impact the pace of the energy transition.

Scaling innovative technologies

In their 2023 World Energy Transitions Outlook, the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA) estimated that accelerating the deployment of renewables, energy efficiency, and electrification could achieve 69 percent of global emissions reductions needed to reach net zero by 2050. This would leave almost a third of the needed abatement to innovative, disruptive technologies (e.g., long-duration energy storage, hydrogen, e-fuels, carbon capture utilization and storage (CCUS), carbon dioxide removal) that have not been deployed at a scale large enough to meet our climate targets.

Renewables need long-duration energy storage at scale to ensure that this clean power is available anytime, day or night. Hydrogen and e-fuels will also be needed to support transportation and industrial applications that require liquid fuels, especially when their high heat demands can’t be met with renewables. Although there has been some progress on production of these cleaner fuels with major hydrogen production and infrastructure projects in the United States, Europe, Asia, and the Middle East, there are still gaps around how policies can create large demand signals to scale this market.

After all these mitigation efforts are exhausted, there will still be carbon emissions in the air that need to be subtracted from our limited carbon budget, a clear and direct role for carbon management technologies. CCUS can capture emissions from unabated industrial resources or remaining fossil-based power generation units. Some industries, even if they were completely powered by clean energy, would still emit carbon. For example, almost 60 percent of the emissions from cement production are unavoidable process emissions from the calcination process (i.e., the decomposition of calcium carbonate into calcium oxide and carbon dioxide) rather than energy-related emissions. As the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change indicated, climate mitigation efforts to date have been insufficient and there is a need for scaling carbon dioxide removal technologies to reduce the risks of climate overshoot and complement emissions reduction efforts, especially from hard-to-abate sectors.

The interaction of energy and artificial intelligence (AI)

Over the last few years, AI has emerged as an enabler for the energy transition. Generative AI can play an important role in modernization of the electric grid by enabling grid operators to make better, faster decisions and optimize loads. Also, AI can be one of the most effective abatement tools for fugitive methane emissions by using satellite and aerial measurements to quantify, map, and predict methane leaks. This approach can revolutionize fugitive emissions abatement by moving from preventive measures to predictive and even descriptive measures.

A successful emissions abatement strategy relies heavily on accurate measurements which can be challenging for companies with complex operations and supply chains. However, the automation capabilities of AI can drastically reduce the margin of error from manual inputs and provide accurate, real-time data to help companies identify where to focus their emissions reduction activities.

Additionally, AI can be used to improve the performance and increase the output of solar photovoltaic (PV) and concentrated solar power (CSP) systems by predicting solar output, reducing corrective maintenance costs, and providing a more accurate forecast of the capacity available to the grid from electric loads that can be turned on or off depending on the balance between electric demand and generation.

With the increase in electric vehicles (EV) adoption, AI-enabled energy demand forecasts will be critical in avoiding peak charges and reducing the burden on the grid. Although AI has many advantages to enable the energy transition, its huge energy footprint remains a challenge as countries plan for future energy needs. The International Energy Agency (IEA) estimated that electricity consumption from data centers could double by 2026 to be roughly equivalent to the electricity consumption in Japan.

Humanizing the energy transition

Since this is the first energy transition in history that is not driven solely by technology metrics, it is critical to ensure that local communities are involved in climate action plans. With disproportionate impacts of climate change around the world, especially in the global South where most countries have historically contributed far less to global emissions, energy equity and climate justice should be at the center of the energy transition. There is a dire need for bridging the climate finance gap and facilitating the flow of funds to the Global South by de-risking investments and regulatory reforms in developing economies. This would also require institutional reforms in the finance sector to move towards new financing mechanisms (e.g., concessional finance, credit guarantee, grants) rather than the unfair, high-interest loans from multilateral banks that have been the main vehicle for energy infrastructure and development projects for decades.

The world has gone through many energy transitions before, but what probably differentiates the current energy transition is that it encompasses multiple energy transitions happening at the same time. There are transformations across the globe in energy generation processes, infrastructure development, energy policy frameworks, environmental laws, and financing mechanisms. While these transformations do not need to happen at the same pace in every region, countries should ensure that the collective energy transition efforts are sufficient to meet our global climate targets. We have enough tools today to shape the next hundred years of energy.

A hundred years ago, participants at the World Energy Congress were probably not as concerned about energy-related climate impacts. However, we know better today about these impacts and how we can meet global energy needs without compromising environmental integrity. In his masterpiece, One Hundred Years of Solitude, Gabriel Garcia Marquez showed us how it took five generations to decipher the prophecy of the Buendia family and their town of Macondo. We have deciphered the energy trilemma, but global action is imperative to navigate the storm and tackle the climate crisis. If we learned anything from Marquez’s magical realism and the fate of the city of Macondo, we should work together to accelerate the deployment of energy and climate solutions that can shape a brighter future for people and planet.

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Amid competing pressures, will Ukraine quit its transit of Russian gas? https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/energysource/amid-competing-pressures-will-ukraine-quit-its-transit-of-russian-gas/ Tue, 07 May 2024 18:58:09 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=763065 The Russia-Ukraine gas transit agreement inked in 2019 will expire in December 2024, but Russian gas transit through Ukraine will remain a possibility. This doesn’t have to be the case.

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Despite Russia’s ongoing war in Ukraine, Russian gas continues to transit Ukraine on its way to European buyers. By and large, both sides continue to adhere to the 2019 EU-brokered gas transit agreement. Under that agreement, Gazprom is obliged to ship a minimum volume of gas—65 billion cubic meters (bcm) in the first year and 40 bcm in subsequent years—under ship-or-pay conditions. But there has been much speculation about what happens to transit when the 2019 agreement expires at the end of December 2024.

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Ukraine’s gas transmission system has traditionally played a major role in delivery of Russian gas to Europe. As late as 2019, transit volume was about 90 bcm, accounting for one half of Russia’s total gas exports to Europe. After Moscow’s full-scale invasion, the continuation of Russian gas transit through Ukraine provided EU member states energy security while also buying them time to arrange for alternative natural gas supplies. And by 2023, the transit volume had fallen to less than 13 bcm, with most of the gas being delivered to Austria, Italy, Hungary, and Slovakia. Other major consumers, including Germany, Poland, and the Czech Republic, have managed to end their dependence on Russian pipeline gas and Russian gas in general, although Russian LNG exports to Europe have continued to rise. But since 2022 the United States has emerged as a main LNG supplier to Europe, accounting for nearly half of total EU LNG imports in 2023 and helping to blunt Europe’s need for Russian LNG.

Of the countries most likely to be directly affected by the expiration of the 2019 agreement, Slovakia and Hungary have been the most vocal in calling for the continuation of Ukraine transit. Italy already has been able to largely replace Ukraine transit gas with LNG and pipeline gas from other sources, including Azerbaijan, and has been silent on the future transit issue. Austria presents a mixed picture. Some Austrian politicians have expressed concerns over its growing dependence on Russian gas, while others have signified their reluctance to break existing supply contracts

For its part, the EU has expressed the view that there is no need to extend the current transit agreement, although it has not commented on the prospects for transit in the absence of an agreement. This could take the form of capacity bookings by European traders who would take delivery of Russian gas at Ukraine’s eastern border. This possibility has been discussed with little interest for many years until recently, presumably because European traders were not willing to take the attendant risk. 

Meanwhile, the view from Kyiv is muddled at best. The minister of energy has completely ruled out future transit, but the prime minister has nixed an extension of the current agreement, while suggesting that transit still might continue under the right circumstances. The head of the Ukrainian gas transit company has similarly expressed willingness to continue transit at least through 2027, the proposed target date for EU countries to phase out imports of Russian fossil fuels.

The arguments in favor of Ukraine continuing to offer transit are weak, premised on the revenue Ukraine earns from transit and concerns over the availability and price of replacement gas. The first concern is overblown. Although Ukraine currently collects about $800 million per year from transit, that does not account for the costs of operating the system. Given the (EU-style) tariff methodology employed by Ukraine, the actual financial benefit is much less, and in the context of Ukraine’s economy, relatively insignificant at 0.46 percent of GDP.

Concerns about replacing Ukraine transit gas are equally overblown. Countries now dependent on Ukraine transit can easily source replacement gas, particularly LNG. Increases in US and Canadian LNG production in 2025-2026 alone would more than replace Russian gas currently being transited via Ukraine.

Meanwhile, the EU has added around 50 bcm of LNG regasification capacity since 2022. Further capacity expected to come online by the end of 2024 will result in total capacity of about 235 bcm, able to meet over 55 percent of European annual gas demand based on the gas consumption average of the last five years.

The argument that the end of transit would lead to much higher gas prices in Europe is likewise questionable. The EU gas market has currently stabilized and returned to its pre-war price range, and Ukrainian transit accounts for only 4 percent of total European demand.

So why the pressure to continue transit once the agreement lapses if Ukraine transit gas can economically be replaced with gas that doesn’t originate in Russia? In the case of Slovakia, and to a lesser extent Austria, purely financial considerations may be at work. The end of Ukraine transit could hit Slovakia hard, since most of the Ukraine transit gas also transits Slovakia through the Eustream pipeline system. However, Eustream has a ship-or-pay contract with Gazprom extending to 2028, obligating payment by Gazprom even in the absence of transit (although force majeure might excuse non-performance). The economic damage to Austria is likely smaller, since it also earns revenue from non-Russian gas transiting its Baumgarten hub.

However, Russia’s continued aggression and the war’s potential to escalate into a NATO-Russia or EU-Russia conflict underline the need for European unity and solidarity, particularly in reducing the export revenues of the aggressor. Billions of dollars in gas revenues from NATO and EU members should not be used to fuel Russia’s military capabilities. In fact, the EU is now considering a complete ban on Russian LNG imports.

Moreover, the continued reliance on Russian pipeline gas gives Russia undue political leverage and creates disunity among EU member states, weakening the West’s overall response to Russian aggression. Ending transit via Ukraine after 2024 would enhance the region’s energy security and diminish Russia’s export income with minimal disruption in gas supplies.

The Ukrainian government may face political pressure from some EU member states to maintain gas transit, with or without an agreement. To counter this pressure, the United States should: (1) discourage its EU allies from continuing to import Russian gas via Ukraine and (2) urge Ukraine to resist this pressure, while also encouraging the EU to support Ukraine in its stance.

Sergiy Makogon is the former CEO of GasTSO of Ukraine (2019-2022).

Daniel D. Stein is a former senior advisor with the Bureau of Energy Resources at the US Department of State.

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A new US economic playbook to lead the world economy and counter China https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/a-new-us-economic-playbook-to-lead-the-world-economy-and-counter-china/ Tue, 07 May 2024 14:05:52 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=762342 The United States needs a new comprehensive economic strategy to advance US interests and deter China’s ability to do them harm.

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The United States and China, the world’s two leading economies, are engaged in an unprecedented competition to shape the norms and rules of the world economic and political order. US economic resilience and security is predicated on winning this competition. In service of this goal, the US House Select Committee on the Strategic Competition between the United States and the Chinese Communist Party has offered a valuable bipartisan blueprint.

The Select Committee’s report, published in December with minimal fanfare, proposes that the United States reset the terms of economic relations with the People’s Republic of China (PRC), prevent US capital and technology from aiding China’s military buildup and human rights violations, and build US technological leadership alongside allies and partners. This bipartisan blueprint, though not perfect, is a useful foundation for US policy toward the PRC for the next Congress and the next administration—regardless of who wins the November elections.  

The authors of this article come from different political perspectives, but we agree that it’s time for a comprehensive economic strategy to advance US interests and deter the PRC’s ability to do them harm. Building on the Select Committee’s work, here are eight principles to inform a comprehensive playbook.

1. Be affirmative, agile, and systemic

Defense alone is not enough to prevail in the United States’ strategic competition with the PRC. The economic playbook needs to be affirmative in its outlook, agile in its execution, and systemic in its analysis. Those qualities will be required to simultaneously strengthen the US industrial base, foster innovation and new technologies, and pursue a positive economic agenda with partners and allies while taking the necessary defensive actions.

2. Get industrial policy right

Policymakers should look to history and geopolitics to develop a prudent two-pronged approach to industrial policy that focuses on strengthening the US domestic manufacturing base in targeted sectors (e.g. semiconductors) and investing in innovation and broad industrial infrastructure and training. Investment in research and development and a favorable tax and regulatory environment may be more effective than direct subsidies, which, although potentially needed in narrow circumstances, are more susceptible to industry capture and extra-economic considerations.   

3. Arrest the PRC’s market distortions and manipulations

The PRC has not lived up to the commitments it made when it joined the World Trade Organization (WTO) in December 2001. Nowhere is this more obvious than with respect to the PRC’s brazen and persistent excess capacity in electric vehicles, solar panels, steel, semiconductors, and pharmaceuticals, just to name a few. It is imprudent for the United States to afford China the same tariff treatment as other WTO members. However, merely revoking the PRC’s permanent normal trade relations status and reverting to Smoot-Hawley tariffs would be inefficient, outdated, and counterproductive. The Select Committee report puts forth a more sophisticated and effective approach by creating a new tariff column for China and renewing certain WTO safeguard mechanisms. This offers a promising foundation for a more modern and modulated trading framework with the PRC and should be put in action in close coordination with Group of Seven (G7) and Quadrilateral Security Dialogue members.

4. Stop US capital and technical knowhow from aiding the adversary

Export control measures on semiconductors and other advanced technologies put forth by the Biden administration and Congress to thwart the PRC’s military modernization are an important start. Next should come screening of outbound investments to prevent US investors from unintentionally aiding China’s military and human rights violations. This calls for a modulated approach involving both specific entities and sectors. Additionally, the US government should work with domestic and allied academic and research institutions on a principled, pragmatic, and robust cross-border research protocol to preclude the PRC’s intellectual theft and unauthorized technology transfer. 

5. Pursue a positive economic agenda with partners and allies

Punitive measures such as tariffs, investment restrictions, and export controls are necessary but insufficient for winning the strategic competition. A positive economic agenda with partners and allies is needed to incentivize the private sector—both in the United States and overseas—to diversify important supply chains away from China. The Select Committee report promotes bilateral trade negotiations with Taiwan, the United Kingdom, and Japan based on the high standards set out in the US-Mexico-Canada trade agreement. If a new free trade agreement is practically or politically challenging, the report suggests targeted agreements with trusted trade partners in areas such as the medical sector or critical minerals. As part of this effort, a comprehensive review and modernization of the Bretton Woods institutions to better reflect geoeconomic realities is urgently needed. 

6. Win the transition to the green economy

The road to the green economy rests wholly within the geopolitical and geoeconomic contest between the United States and the PRC. The United States should leverage its substantial advantages over the PRC in traditional and renewable energy and technology to address the immediate energy security needs of its partner nations while also offering them a credible energy transition toward a greener economy.

To ensure that its energy supply chains remain secure and that it remains energy independent, the United States should aggressively pursue sectoral agreements and minerals security partnerships recommended by the Select Committee report. Furthermore, the United States should remain vigilant against climate engagement with the PRC without due reciprocity and must avoid unwittingly facilitating the PRC’s declared intent to monopolize and dominate future green industries.

As the world’s largest digital economy, the United States bears the responsibility to articulate the rules, norms, and practices of digital governance—including over artificial intelligence—that favor Western values over China’s model of censorship and control. The United States must lead on digital standards in order to keep its superiority in technology and financial markets. 

8. Modernize US policies, instruments, and institutions

Unlike defense and diplomacy, there is no identified lead US agency to engage and prevail in the economic competition with the PRC. The diverse and often discordant set of economic policies, instruments, and institutions engaged in the effort are frequently found wanting in both efficacy and efficiency. In short, US institutions are underprepared for the complexity of economic competition with the PRC. The United States has a long history of modernizing its government levers to address the challenges it confronts, from the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols legislation to reinforce the military chain of command after problems surfaced during military operations in Iran and Grenada, to post-9/11 reforms to federal intelligence and law enforcement agencies. A similar endeavor is needed to improve US economic diplomacy, coordination, and engagement.

Prevailing over the PRC in economic competition calls for total national commitment and engagement. It requires a comprehensive, nuanced, and tailored playbook utilizing not only the proverbial hammer and scalpel, but all the multipurpose tools in the toolbox. The Select Committee has done the nation a service by unequivocally identifying the PRC as an adversary and a rival, and it put forth a useful framework with pragmatic recommendations to bolster national economic security. Its report represents a useful transition from the initial chapter prioritizing industrial policy and tariff measures to the next chapter of working with allies and partners to prevail in the global marketplace.

Domestic prosperity depends on the United States leading the global economy. Now is the time to develop and execute a new US economic playbook to maintain that lead. 


Kaush Arha is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Global China Hub and previously served as the senior advisor for global strategic engagement at USAID and the G7 Sherpa for the Blue Dot Network during the Trump administration.

Peter Harrell is a nonresident senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and previously served as senior director for international economics with a joint appointment to the National Security Council and National Economic Council during the Biden administration.

Clete Willems is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s GeoEconomics Center and previously served as deputy assistant to the president for international economics and deputy director of the National Economic Council during the Trump administration.

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Webster quoted in El Espanol on Kyrgyzstan’s imports of military relevant trade https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/insight-impact/in-the-news/webster-quoted-in-el-espanol-on-kyrgyzstans-imports-of-military-relevant-trade/ Mon, 06 May 2024 15:31:04 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=764294 The post Webster quoted in El Espanol on Kyrgyzstan’s imports of military relevant trade appeared first on Atlantic Council.

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G7 pledges to end coal—but only inclusive action will make a real climate impact https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/energysource/g7-pledges-to-end-coal-but-only-inclusive-action-will-make-a-real-climate-impact/ Fri, 03 May 2024 20:13:34 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=762050 During the G7 energy ministerial in Turin, Italy, climate, energy, and environment ministers made a historic pledge to phase out coal power plants by 2035 among other agreements. But members ultimately need to turn pledges into action to blunt the impacts of climate change.

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Energy ministers from the Group of Seven (G7) met in Turin, Italy, on the 29th and 30th of April for the first time since the United Nation climate summit in Dubai. Two days of discussion at the Climate, Energy, and Environment Ministerial meeting resulted in a series of shared commitments to address climate change and energy security. The 35-page long joint communiqué includes a historic pledge to phase out coal power plants by 2035.

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The commitment of “phasing out coal by 2035 or on a timeline consistent with the 1.5 temperature limit” marks a further step in the direction indicated last year by the UN climate summit, known as COP28, to reduce the use of fossil fuels, of which coal is the most polluting. Mentioning the IEA’s Net-Zero Roadmap report, G7 countries say that “phase-out of unabated coal is needed by 2030s in advanced economies and by 2040 in all the other regions, and that no new unabated coal power plant should be built.” This represents the first agreement on a timeline for phasing out coal after the initiative had previously failed due to opposition by some members. However, it should be noted that, despite the positive step towards a common goal, by using the term “unabated” in the communication, members of the G7 leave open a potential path for the use of coal beyond the indicated timeline. 

In addition to the importance of ending coal reliance, it is now widely recognized that the success of the energy transition is linked to a technology-inclusive approach both for reaching climate neutrality and strengthening energy security. The communication of the G7 promotes members’ increasing use of diverse low-carbon energy technologies including renewable energy, energy efficiency, hydrogen, carbon management, storage, nuclear energy, and fusion.

Energy ministers fully committed to the “implementation of the global goal of tripling installation of renewable energy capacity by 2030 to at least 11 terawatts (TW)” and to “double the global average annual rate of energy efficiency improvements by 2030 to 4%,” signaling the intention to create a strong connection with COP28 pledges.

On energy storage, G7 members agreed to a global goal in the power sector of 1500 gigawatts (GW) in 2030, a more than six-fold increase from 2022. Introducing this target for storage is very important to support renewable implementation and ultimately reach the installation capacity target set in Dubai.

The communication highlights the importance for countries to reduce reliance on civil nuclear technologies from Russia and commits to strengthening the resilience of the nuclear supply chain. Countries opting for nuclear energy would work to deploy next generation nuclear reactors.

Fusion made it in the final text with a strong emphasis on the potential of this technology to provide a lasting solution to the global challenges of climate change and energy security in the future, marking an important addition to the G7 joint communication, since in the Hiroshima Communique, fusion was not mentioned.

In order to implement these targets and scale technologies, the G7 countries this year also reaffirmed their commitment to jointly mobilize $100 billion per year until 2025 and their intention to scale up public and private finance. “We stress the need to accelerate efforts to make finance flow consistent with a pathway towards low greenhouse gas emissions and climate-resilient development,” and “we acknowledge that such efforts involve the alignment of the domestic and international financial system.” Attention is now directed toward the upcoming G7 finance meeting, the G20 in Brazil, and the “finance COP” in Azerbaijan.

Finally, convergence and cooperation with countries outside the G7 will play a crucial role in the success of the transition. The joint communication acknowledges that developing countries represent “an important partner in the just energy transition” and recognizes “the great potential of the African continent in becoming a global powerhouse of the future.”

At this year’s energy ministerial meetings, Azerbaijan’s Deputy Minister on Energy Elnur Soltanov (representing the 2024 COP29 presidency), Brazil’s Minister of the Environment and Climate Change Marina Silva (representing the 2024 G20 presidency), and Kenya’s Principal Secretary on Energy Alex K. Wachira, participated along with the G7 partners. This approach shows recognition of the fundamental role that inclusivity plays in a successful transition and the willingness to create strong synergies with the upcoming multilateral forums.

It would be difficult to overstate just how critical pragmatism and convergence are to the energy transition. But this message, in addition to being successfully incorporated in the communication was further reinforced during the Future of Energy Summit, a half-day event hosted by the Atlantic Council Global Energy Center, Politecnico di Torino, and World Energy Council Italy as part of Planet Week on the sidelines of last weekend’s G7 ministerial meeting. Experts and speakers at the Summit emphasized the need to strengthen a technology-inclusive, not exclusive, approach and cooperation among countries.

The IEA’s Net Zero Emissions by 2050 Scenario (NZE) envisages that by 2030, advanced economies would end all power generation by unabated coal-fired plants, making the new G7 historic commitment unfit for purpose. However, the overall success of the transition will not be determined by pledges, but more so by the will of countries to transform pledges into action. Whether G7 countries will be able to succeed in the energy transition will depend on their capacity to create resilient clean energy supply chains, implement diversified energy mixes, promote collaboration with developing countries, scale up public and private finance, and it seems like many steps are being taken in the right direction. 

Elena Benaim is a nonresident fellow with the Atlantic Council Global Energy Center.

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Webster quoted in Recharge News on Chinese wind power dominance https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/insight-impact/in-the-news/webster-quoted-in-recharge-news-on-chinese-wind-power-dominance/ Thu, 02 May 2024 14:46:30 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=763019 The post Webster quoted in Recharge News on Chinese wind power dominance appeared first on Atlantic Council.

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#AtlanticDebrief – What lessons can the EU take from the US Green New Deal? | A Debrief from Professor Mark Z. Jacobson https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/content-series/atlantic-debrief/atlanticdebrief-what-lessons-can-the-eu-take-from-the-us-green-new-deal-a-debrief-from-professor-mark-z-jacobson/ Wed, 01 May 2024 15:53:45 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=640413 Carol Schaeffer sits down with Mark Z. Jacobson about what challenges policymakers need to consider in developing renewable energy infrastructure.

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IN THIS EPISODE

What can Europe learn about decarbonization from the US Green New Deal? How can climate action now save costs for healthcare later? Do we need more advanced renewable energy technologies to successfully reduce carbon emissions at the necessary rates?

On this episode of #AtlanticDebrief, Carol Schaeffer sits down with ark Z. Jacobson, Professor of Civil and Environmental Engineering and Director of the Atmosphere/Energy Program at Stanford University about what challenges policymakers need to consider in developing renewable energy infrastructure.

You can watch #AtlanticDebrief on YouTube and as a podcast.

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The Europe Center promotes leadership, strategies, and analysis to ensure a strong, ambitious, and forward-looking transatlantic relationship.

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The double costs of conflict-driven climate change in MENA and beyond https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/the-double-costs-of-conflict-driven-climate-change-in-mena-and-beyond/ Mon, 29 Apr 2024 15:49:27 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=760479 With the ongoing wars, it’s easy to dismiss the notions of climate change cooperation across borders as detached from reality. Unfortunately, the devastating impacts of climate change are not going away

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While much of the world’s attention was on the ongoing Gaza war, the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region was also dealing with unprecedented heavy rainfall in the United Arab Emirates and surrounding countries this month, coupled with record heat waves throughout the region. These events were stark reminders of the climate change challenges faced not just by the region but the world. 

With wars raging in Ukraine since 2022 and in Gaza since October 2023, not to mention other conflicts, one question that comes to mind is the cost in terms of climate change. First, direct conflict-related emissions from military equipment, damage to facilities that cause emissions—such as fuel reserves and chemical plants—or fires, and a reversion and reliance on carbon-heavy fuels, including coal. Most estimates quantify emissions from the Ukraine conflict, for example, as equivalent to Belgium’s annual emissions. The other is the opportunity cost of the lack of cooperation on climate issues across borders. (For more on this topic, see the author’s forthcoming report for the Atlantic Council to be released in summer 2024.) 

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As long as Israel and Lebanon, for example, cannot agree how to cooperate on optimizing exportation from the region and eventually transition out of natural gas reserves from any shared sources towards cleaner sources of energy, both countries and the wider region will lose. (It’s worth noting that under the important Lebanese-Israeli Maritime Agreement, brokered by the United States, there are some provisions for how the parties will exploit any said gas fields and any revenue therein, but as long as the parties are not in direct contact and dependent on mediation, any additional prospect for cooperation beyond exploitation and border demarcation likely will be limited.) The same principle applies to cooperation in mitigation of extreme weather impacts through exchange of meteorological data, for example. The first cost is more straightforward to quantify, but the consequences of the second cost will only be assessed by future generations. These are the “double costs” of conflict-driven climate change impacts.

With the ongoing wars, it’s easy to dismiss the notions of climate change cooperation across borders as detached from reality. Unfortunately, the devastating impacts of climate change are not going away because of the existential threats posed by conflict. Instead, they are being worsened because of conflict.

For most countries, climate change has become a national security issue as they face mounting challenges from its impacts. In the MENA region, the risk for conflicts increases as the region becomes dryer, with scarcer sources of water, food, and energy. As the region looks to undertake an effective energy transition—which entails sharing of emission-reduction technology such as carbon capture, interconnecting electricity grids that are also capable to include increasingly renewable energy-based electricity, etc.—cooperation across borders becomes critical. Unless countries in the region and beyond find ways to work to mitigate and adapt together, it will turn into a race to the bottom—a lose-lose situation. 

As long as the world has reckless and authoritarian leaders who are bent on continuing to rule by force and conflict, the rest of the world will suffer. Beyond the immediate loss of human life in conflict zones—including Ukraine, the Israel-Hamas war, Sudan, and Myanmar—other parts of the world will suffer the impacts of the “double cost” of climate change due to these events. 

The trouble is that most politicians think short-term due to election cycles. So, medium- to long-term climate impacts are often not prioritized. Democratic countries governed by policies endeavoring to tackle climate change impacts can play an important role, as has been demonstrated by governments in Europe and North America. However, the continued success of such policies only works as long as a new government isn’t sworn in with a change of policy towards climate change, which undermines the milestones achieved. This was evident when then US President Donald Trump withdrew from the Paris Climate Accord in 2020. If he returns to the White House, Trump may repeal the Inflation Reduction Act, a move that would take away incentives for companies to invest in cleaner energies and, rather worryingly, send a strong signal to other global players that the United States is not a reliable partner for dealing with climate change.

A successful energy transition will address developing and developed economies’ current real energy needs, including hydrocarbons, for a defined period. However, it will critically establish medium- to long-term plans to scale up green energies. Moreover, democratic systems of government with policies and agendas in place to adapt and mitigate the effects of climate change would be wise to consider establishing mechanisms that help ensure the longevity of these policies beyond a change of government. This is a tall order to ask democratic governments to do, especially as the tools they have to limit the ability to reverse such policies are restricted. Nonetheless, the more such policies are enshrined, for example, in international relations, and with clear economic incentives, the more difficult it is to undo them. 

While it is tempting to focus on the here and now, especially with respect to devastating live conflicts, it is critical to equally take steps to enable climate change mitigation and adaptation cooperation across borders—including across conflicting ones. Although nearly impossible to contemplate in the midst of conflict, this is precisely what needs to be done. Warmongering leaders in the region and beyond inflict not only direct losses today, but the impacts will be felt for generations to come. In the national security realm of climate change, this means that damage done to the planet is not just the direct emissions from conflict but also the opportunity cost of the lack of cooperation in dealing with the largest threat facing humanity. The “double costs” of conflict-driven climate change need to be understood and acted upon today in the MENA region and beyond.

Ariel Ezrahi is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs. Ezrahi currently serves as the director of climate strategy at a fintech fund. Ezrahi is also on the board of the MENA2050 Climate Action Committee and the chairman of its Energy Transition Subcommittee. He was the architect of the Gas for Gaza project, the inaugural director of energy at the Office of the Quartet, and the Energy Adviser to the Quartet Representative, former UK Prime Minister Tony Blair. 


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How the US is pitching a development finance ‘alternative’ to China’s initiatives, according to Scott Nathan https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/how-the-us-is-pitching-a-development-finance-alternative-to-chinas-initiatives-according-to-scott-nathan/ Thu, 25 Apr 2024 16:22:08 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=759969 “Good development is good foreign policy,” Nathan explained at an Atlantic Council Front Page event. “That’s in our national interest.”

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Watch the event

The US International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) isn’t “directly competing” with China, according to its chief executive officer Scott Nathan, but it is “offering an alternative.”

Nathan spoke at an Atlantic Council Front Page event hosted by the Council’s Global Energy Center on Wednesday, explaining that the DFC is different from Chinese development banks or Chinese investment initiatives (such as the Global Development Initiative and Belt and Road Initiative) because it supports the private sector directly. The DFC doesn’t lend money to governments for “big and also sometimes bloated” projects that aren’t “appropriate for local laws and conditions,” he said, alluding to China’s investments that have pushed countries into deep debt.

The DFC head recalled how foreign government officials have told him that “they don’t want to be dependent on one country for their source of finance.”

“Good development is good foreign policy,” he explained. “That’s in our national interest.”

Here are more highlights from the conversation, moderated by Amelia Lester, executive editor of Foreign Policy.

Standing out in the marketplace

  • How exactly does the DFC differ from China’s investment engines? Nathan said it’s in part because “we maintain the highest standards possible” when it comes to “environmental, social, [and] labor” practices. It is “critical,” he added, not only to support economic development but also to “promote . . . values.”
  • One important area is in internet connectivity—in which China is investing heavily, particularly in the Indo-Pacific. The DFC, meanwhile, is supporting projects that push forward secure equipment and networks that protect privacy, Nathan said, highlighting specific DFC-supported projects in Australia and Africa that are offering an alternative to China’s services. “This is critical for growth,” he said, adding that infrastructure is “not just energy, airports, and railways. You need the infrastructure of the twenty-first century for economic development.”
  • Nathan explained that the DFC was created by Congress in 2018 due to a “strong sense” among both Republicans and Democrats that the United States needed to improve its economic-diplomacy game. “We needed to show up in the developing world and offer an alternative to what was being offered by authoritarian governments and our strategic competitors,” he said.
  • The DFC is due to be reauthorized by Congress in 2025. “There is a strong demand signal for us to do more to show up,” Nathan said. “That requires us being reauthorized; it requires continuous funding.”

Showing up for Ukraine

  • Nathan explained that the DFC has provided nearly $500 million in financing to businesses in Ukraine and has offered political risk insurance—which includes coverage for war-related risks—that has catalyzed more investments in Ukraine’s private sector.
  • The most critical tool to support Ukraine’s private sector, however, is “solid air defense,” Nathan said. It’s “hard to make decisions around investment and capital expenditure in an environment of such high insecurity.”
  • Nathan explained that the United States has had a long history of providing political risk insurance. Since the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (DFC’s predecessor) started offering the insurance, he said, the United States has “done over $50 billion. . . of political risk insurance” and has had “just over a billion dollars of claims.” The institutions have covered 97 percent of those claims, he added. “So it’s not only been very important for economic activity. . . but it’s been very profitable.”
  • Working in Ukraine, Nathan said, has shown him how important it is for the DFC to work closely with its peers, including the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, International Finance Corporation, and European Investment Bank.

A diversified system

  • Earlier this year, the DFC provided a $500 million loan to US company First Solar to build a new solar panel manufacturing facility in Tamil Nadu, India. Nathan said that the plant, which will use cadmium telluride sourced from India instead of China, “fits into the [DFC’s] supply chain diversification goals. . . We need to make sure that we’re not dependent on one country or one company for the inputs of the industries of the future.”
  • “If we can do this kind of thing elsewhere in the world to make sure that supply chains are broadly diversified, that helps with resilience,” he argued, adding that the United States must not “replace dependency on oil” with dependency on “a couple of nations,” as that would bring “all sorts of strategic vulnerabilities.”
  • “Having countries be able to be self-reliant, to have the energy they need for economic development, that promotes stability. . . that’s good for our security,” he said.
  • On critical minerals, Nathan highlighted several projects underway in Africa, including one on graphite in Mozambique. And, he added, as the DFC invests in that project, it will also be working with the US Department of Energy, which has loaned a company in Louisiana funds to expand its capacity to produce graphite-based materials for batteries. “It’s critical to start with the sourcing of the minerals,” Nathan said. “But there’s a whole value chain” to support.

Katherine Walla is an associate director on the editorial team at the Atlantic Council.

Watch the event

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A decentralized power grid can help Ukraine survive Russian bombardment https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/a-decentralized-power-grid-can-help-ukraine-survive-russian-bombardment/ Thu, 25 Apr 2024 01:10:41 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=759865 Russia is attempting to depopulate large parts of Ukraine by bombing the country's power grid. Ukraine's best chance of survival may lie in a more decentralized energy sector, writes Yuri Kubrushko.

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In recent months, Russia has launched a major new bombing campaign targeting Ukraine’s civilian energy infrastructure. Building on key lessons learned from an earlier air offensive conducted during the first winter of the war, the current wave of Russian airstrikes has concentrated on Ukraine’s largest power plants with devastating results. Since the beginning of 2024, a large part of Ukraine’s thermal and hydro power generation capacity has been damaged or destroyed.

“Rather than continuing to focus their attacks on Ukraine’s transmission systems, from late March Russia began launching massive attacks on our energy generation infrastructure,” Maxim Timchenko, CEO of Ukrainian energy producer DTEK, told CNN. “Unfortunately, the enemy has evolved his tactics and is using high-precision weapons. The result is a huge increase in its destructive effectiveness compared to 2023.”

This is placing unprecedented pressure on Ukraine’s embattled power grid. Problems are arising not only due to a severe shortage of generation capacity, but also because the destroyed facilities played a vital role in ensuring the flexibility of the system. Fears are now growing that Ukraine will face rolling blackouts in the coming months, with potentially grave consequences for the wartime Ukrainian economy and the humanitarian situation in the country.

Ukrainian government officials and energy sector representatives anticipate that it could take years to repair the extensive damage done to power plants targeted in Russia’s recent attacks. Nor would this necessarily solve the problem. As numerous commentators have already pointed out, repaired facilities would remain vulnerable to future Russian airstrikes. Indeed, some of the plants struck since the beginning of 2024 had only recently been fixed following earlier bombardment.

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There are alternatives to simply repairing Ukraine’s old power grid and hoping for the best. Looking ahead, many industry experts and officials favor a more diverse and decentralized model for the Ukrainian energy sector. Volodymyr Kudrytskyi, CEO of Ukrainian electricity transmission system operator Ukrenergo, recently argued that instead of relying on 15 to 20 large electricity generation facilities dating back to the 1960s and 1970s, Ukraine should be aiming to construct a nationwide network featuring hundreds of far smaller power plants.

This national energy upgrade should incorporate the latest technologies and take maximum advantage of Ukraine’s considerable renewable electricity generation capabilities. From a military perspective, it would be significantly more challenging for Russia to inflict critical damage on such a decentralized Ukrainian power grid. With a large number of potential targets spread out across the country, the cost of doing so would also likely be prohibitive.

The Ukrainian private sector can play a critical role in the transformation of the country’s energy industry. For the past two years, Ukrainian companies have demonstrated remarkable resilience in the face of Europe’s largest invasion since World War II. They have successfully adapted to incredibly challenging conditions and have overcome a wide range of obstacles, including in the energy sector. But in order to lead the way in building a new generation of power plants, the country’s energy entrepreneurs require access to the necessary financial tools.

While Ukraine’s energy industry has received considerable financial support since 2022 from international donors and development institutions, most funding has gone to the public sector. This is understandable, given the need to keep state-run critical infrastructure functioning. However, in order to advance to the next stage, the Ukrainian authorities and the country’s international partners must look to make new projects economically viable for Ukraine’s private sector.

Without access to financing along with additional efforts to minimize the economic risks involved in new projects, the large-scale construction of decentralized energy facilities is unlikely to happen. Ukraine’s state-owned energy companies are already occupied with the restoration of their existing assets, and are not realistically in a position to embark on dozens of new projects in parallel. Providing access to financing could help spur competition within the Ukrainian private sector and pave the way for significant investment.

Much of the financial support for Ukrainian energy initiatives currently comes from international financial institutions. At present, many of Ukraine’s largest private sector players do not meet their criteria, while others are too small to appear on their radar. With little prospect of overcoming financial obstacles, some Ukrainian energy sector companies are already turning their attention to more economically viable projects outside Ukraine. Unless the situation changes, others may follow.

Financing the decentralization of Ukraine’s energy sector should be recognized as a strategic priority. Russia is clearly aiming to destroy the Ukrainian power grid and hopes this will break the country’s ability to resist. Withstanding the Russian attack on Ukraine’s energy infrastructure is therefore vital for the wider war effort. The Ukrainian private sector is a logical partner in this undertaking, but needs access to the financial tools that only the country’s international partners can provide. To paraphrase Winston Churchill, “Give Ukrainian entrepreneurs the financial tools, and they will finish the job.”

Yuri Kubrushko is co-founder of the Green Recovery Fund.

Further reading

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

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Shaffer quoted in S&P Global on US sanctions on Iran https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/insight-impact/in-the-news/shaffer-quoted-in-sp-global-on-us-sanctions-on-iran/ Wed, 24 Apr 2024 15:15:46 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=759960 The post Shaffer quoted in S&P Global on US sanctions on Iran appeared first on Atlantic Council.

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Natural gas and the energy transition: Security, equity, and achieving net zero https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/natural-gas-and-the-energy-transition-security-equity-and-achieving-net-zero/ Wed, 24 Apr 2024 13:00:00 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=757022 A new report on the future of natural gas in the energy mix and financing in the context of the energy transition and energy security prerogatives.

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Executive summary

Within the short span of three years, the global economy has needed to contend with the COVID-19 pandemic, subsequent inflation, the Russian invasion of Ukraine, and the impact of that conflict on commodity shortages, rising energy costs, and declining energy security. As a result, short-term reliance on fossil fuels has increased, fewer resources are available for the energy transition, and coordination among regional and global partners has become more complicated. In the longer term, the crisis underscored the dangers of reliance on fossil fuel imports and exposure to price volatility.

All of this augers broadly for accelerating the energy transition. But narrow approaches to the transition run the risk of curtailing existing energy sources before viable alternatives are sufficiently scaled and integrated.

In their crudest form, policies to incentivize investment into decarbonization are based on categorizing energy sources as either “clean” or “dirty”—despite a wide range of emissions implications depending on the particular energy source. In the case of natural gas, the reality is that there are gradations of “clean.”

Alternatives also matter. Gas replacing coal or upgrading older gas-fired turbines to highly efficient modern ones are major wins. But greenfield unabated gas-fired generation will not be sustainable and will often be more costly than the renewable alternative.

Even under a credible net-zero scenario, gas demand will likely persist, both for technical reasons and to create low-carbon fuels like blue hydrogen. In the medium term, natural gas can be part of a solution in which sustainable economic development is a corollary (or prerequisite) to climate action. In developing countries where industrial activities are a source of growth and are particularly effective at addressing poverty, such development can equip societies with the resources and space to address climate concerns.

About the author

Phillip Cornell is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Global Energy Center. He is a specialist on energy and foreign policy, global energy markets and regulatory issues, critical energy infrastructure protection, energy security strategy and policy, Saudi Arabian oil policy, Gulf energy economics, and sustainable energy transition policy. He currently leads the global practice for energy and sustainability at Economist Impact, part of the Economist Group.

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The Global Energy Center develops and promotes pragmatic and nonpartisan policy solutions designed to advance global energy security, enhance economic opportunity, and accelerate pathways to net-zero emissions.

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Webster in The Interpreter: The Kyrgyzstan route facilitating Russia’s invasion of Ukraine https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/insight-impact/in-the-news/webster-in-the-interpreter-the-kyrgyzstan-route-facilitating-russias-invasion-of-ukraine/ Tue, 23 Apr 2024 17:31:01 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=760912 The post Webster in The Interpreter: The Kyrgyzstan route facilitating Russia’s invasion of Ukraine appeared first on Atlantic Council.

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The flaws in project-based carbon credit trading and the need for jurisdictional alternatives https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/issue-brief/the-flaws-in-project-based-carbon-credit-trading-and-the-need-for-jurisdictional-alternatives/ Tue, 23 Apr 2024 16:17:16 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=758547 This issue brief highlights several significant, and at times unresolvable, problems with the project-based approach to carbon credit trading, the purpose of which is to reduce deforestation and sequester carbon.

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WATCH THE LAUNCH

This issue brief highlights several significant, and at times unresolvable, problems with the project-based approach to carbon credit trading, the purpose of which is to reduce deforestation and sequester carbon. Beginning with first-hand observations of the principal author during his experience with forest conservation efforts in the tropics, the brief describes the challenges that arise when this crediting model is implemented in the field, particularly in rainforests and other remote areas of the world. The publication then assesses the three critical structural problems with project-based credit trading that lead to a fundamental lack of integrity in such programs:

  • The intractable challenges of a project-based regulatory structure involving difficult-to-prove requirements of additionally and leakage prevention.
  • The major transaction and intermediary costs that can amount to half of project funding.
  • The credit duration that is far less than the life of the additional CO2 emissions that are consequently emitted.

The analysis also explains how economic forces and incentives exacerbate these problems, particularly with programs that are carried out by commercial credit traders as opposed to nonprofit entities. Finally, this brief discusses better alternatives, such as jurisdictional programs administered by governments or Indigenous associations, that could more effectively reduce emissions and strengthen the social fabric of communities required to assure credit integrity, accurate measurement, and adequate co-benefits.

AUTHOR

Byron Swift is an environmental lawyer and senior adviser for wildlands at Re:wild. He has devoted much of his career, over forty years, to conservation issues in Latin America, working in almost all countries with a focus on protected areas, natural resources management, and capacity building of local institutions. An environmental lawyer, he has served as president of Nature and Culture International, founder and president of Rainforest Trust, and head of the US office of the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN). He has also spent a decade working with the Environmental Law Institute on pollution control and trading issues, and has worked on carbon issues since 1996.

CONTRIBUTING AUTHORS

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This report was written and published in accordance with the Atlantic Council policy on intellectual independence. The authors are solely responsible for its analysis and recommendations. The Atlantic Council and its donors do not determine, nor do they necessarily endorse or advocate for, any of this report’s conclusions.

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Image: Conserving tropical forests can sequester carbon and help mitigate climate change. Unsplash/Ruben Ramirez

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