NATO has established its place among the most successful political and military alliances in history—despite facing very challenging circumstances since its founding—by dint of solidarity, unity of purpose, and resolve.

Today, allies are presented with challenges such as increasing global systemic rivalry and a complex, interconnected, and unstable security landscape, which threaten Euro-Atlantic security. Russia, as the most significant and direct threat for NATO, has been undermining Euro-Atlantic security since its invasion of Georgia in 2008, and its aggression has since expanded in the form of its invasion of Ukraine. In addition, terrorism—in all forms and manifestations—persists. The topic has been on NATO’s agenda since the adoption of the Alliance’s 1991 Strategic Concept and it (specifically, the 9/11 terror attacks on the United States) was the reason the Alliance decided to invoke Article 5 for the first and only time in history. Since 2001, nonstate actors have continued to lodge a series of terror attacks on a number of allies such as the United Kingdom, Spain, France, and Belgium as well as Turkey, which still grapples with terror attacks from the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), as well as the latter’s Syrian leg.

NATO allies must maintain their resolve and remain vigilant and ready to face challenges from any direction. Defense is not cheap, and it requires constant attention, care, and investment.

Since joining the Alliance seventy-two years ago, Turkey has contributed to NATO’s security in various theaters of instability and conflicts. Turkey was a bulwark against the Soviet threat in the Cold War period, and it continued to spend significantly on defense, sacrificing the opportunity to spend more elsewhere. For example, Turkey dedicated a level of forces and capabilities NATO in that period that was significant for the Alliance’s security and reduced pressure on allies in Central and Eastern Europe.

Turkey, because it continued to spend on defense, did not benefit from the post-Cold War “peace dividend” to the extent that European NATO allies enjoyed during the early 1990s when the unifying vision to establish a belt of security, stability, and prosperity that included Russia (extending from Vancouver to Vladivostok) was first launched by the United States. During this period, Turkey spent around or above 4 percent of its gross domestic product on defense, while most other allies saw their commitments wane over time.

In the immediate post-Cold War era, Turkey faced challenges from nearby regional conflicts in the Gulf, the Balkans, and the South Caucasus. Yet this conflictual period did not stop Turkey from contributing to NATO efforts designed to protect peace and stability throughout the Euro-Atlantic area and beyond. Turkey actively took part in NATO operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo, and it also made significant contributions to the International Security Assistance Forces in Afghanistan, which was followed by the Resolute Support Mission.

Today, Turkey has similarly consistently supported NATO efforts to enhance peace, stability, and prosperity in the Euro-Atlantic area, even despite divergent perceptions in allied capitals about Turkey’s approach to recent global challenges such as Russia’s war in Ukraine and the war in Gaza.

For example, Turkey did join its NATO allies in approving the most recent NATO Strategic Concept, adopted at Madrid in 2022, that identified Russia and terrorism (along with other regional and global challenges) as threats for the Alliance. Turkey is also set to play a pivotal role in the implementation of regional plans launched at the Vilnius summit last year which are dedicated to the defense of Southern Europe against the pervasive challenges in its immediate vicinity.

Turkey’s role in Washington summit outcomes

With the Russian threat looming over European security, it is high time to strengthen the European pillar of NATO. Allies at the NATO summit acknowledged the need to close the gaps between Europe’s defense needs and its capabilities. This includes, as highlighted at the Washington summit, expanding European allies’ defense manufacturing capacity in a coherent, complementary, and interoperable manner. To achieve interoperability will also require Turkey and NATO to find a lasting solution to the spat over the current Turkish administration’s decision in 2017 to procure the S-400 Russian missile system. While expanding capacity, the allies must take into account both the Alliance’s defense priorities and Ukraine’s needs as it continues to face up against Russian aggression.

Turkey can play a crucial role in helping expand the Alliance’s defense capacity through its contributions to collective deterrence and defense. Capabilities being produced by the growing Turkish defense industry cannot be sidelined in the Alliance’s endeavor to enhance deterrence and defense and maintain a technological edge against both state and nonstate adversaries. This will require result-oriented consultations within NATO and especially between European allies and Turkey, conducted with renewed vigor and mutual resolve. To this end, it is high time for the European Union (EU) to revisit its policies that engage only EU members in enhancing Europe’s defense capacity. Today’s challenges require collaboration with non-EU countries, such as Turkey, to the fullest extent.

With terrorism plaguing Turkey’s neighborhood, and with the issue remaining high on Turkey’s agenda, Ankara likely welcomed allies’ commitment (as outlined in the Washington Summit Declaration) to “counter, deter, defend, and respond to threats and challenges posed by terrorists and terrorist organizations based on a combination of prevention, protection, and denial measures with determination, resolve, and in solidarity.” If allies align their perceptions of the threat to Turkey posed by the PKK and its affiliates by including, for instance, deterrence and defensive measures against the threat in the regional defense plan for Southern Europe, this would help ease the friction on this major issue and help erase the Turkish society’s negative perceptions of NATO allies.

The Washington Summit Declaration also included a reference to the 1936 Montreux Convention. While some Turkish observers have oddly argued the reference is ill-intentioned, it is actually a major outcome for Turkey, as the allies reaffirmed their commitments to “regional efforts aimed at upholding security, safety, stability, and freedom of navigation in the Black Sea region.” The communiqué also welcomed the joint endeavor of three littoral allies (Turkey, Bulgaria, and Romania) to launch the Black Sea Mine Countermeasures Task Group.

Finally, with the global order at stake—due to Russia’s aggression, China’s growing global influence, and threats to security including terrorism—it has become vitally important to maintain and increase cooperation with southern neighborhood countries. The Alliance recognized this importance at the Washington summit, when it committed to taking a new approach toward its “southern neighborhood.” As part of that approach, the NATO secretary general appointed a new special representative for the southern neighborhood to coordinate NATO’s efforts in that neighborhood. Turkey could play a positive role in improving ties between the Alliance and the southern neighborhood by leveraging the linguistic, kinship, religious, and cultural ties it has with other countries. Turkey could also mobilize opportunities that it has in being part of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation and Organization of Turkic States, and in working with the Gulf Cooperation Council and African Union.

The Alliance has once again proven its relevance and value in protecting and defending the Euro-Atlantic area. As it continues to work to keep the Euro-Atlantic area safe, secure, and stable, Turkey has an important role to play.

Mehmet Fatih Ceylan is a retired career ambassador with forty years of experience in international security and defense affairs. Formerly, he served in the Turkish Foreign Ministry and served as Turkey’s ambassador to NATO from 2013 to 2018.

The views expressed in TURKEYSource are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

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In May, NATO published a thirty-three-page report by a group of experts on the Alliance’s “southern neighborhood,” which includes North Africa, the Sahel, the Middle East, and the Mediterranean Sea. The experts’ report highlights how instability from these regions has a direct impact on allies and suggests several important considerations as the Alliance finalizes its southern flank strategy in Washington. The report is a great start and should be read carefully, but NATO needs to take four additional measures if it genuinely wants to improve the situation on the Alliance’s southern flank.

Why look south?

Why should NATO spend time and energy on a southern flank strategy when it faces such a clear and present threat to the east? NATO’s 2022 strategic concept, adopted at the Madrid summit, outlines two fundamental threats the Alliance faces. The strategic concept declares that Russia is the “most significant and direct threat” to allies’ security and that terrorism is the “most direct asymmetric threat” to the security of citizens, international peace, and prosperity. As US Ambassador to NATO Julianne Smith recently noted, Russia and terrorist groups benefit from and contribute to instability in NATO’s southern neighborhoods and provide the central reason why the Alliance needs a southern flank strategy.

Russia’s Africa Corps (the successor to the Wagner Group in Africa) has taken advantage of instability in these neighborhoods, providing fighters, trainers, and materiel in Libya, Mali, Sudan, and Burkina Faso. Russia has a naval base in Tartus, Syria, and uses it to sail its vessels in the Mediterranean, posing a threat to naval security and maritime commerce. Instability in the Middle East, North Africa, and the Sahel has also provided an environment where radical Islamic terrorist groups expanded in recent decades. Instability in Iraq and Syria allowed the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) to establish a large territorial footprint across those countries. Recent research suggests that the Sahel region has become the global epicenter of Islamic radical terrorism. Left unchecked, instability in NATO’s southern neighborhood translates into opportunities for Russian intervention and metastasized terrorist groups. This instability also drives other important problems for NATO’s southern flank allies: irregular migration, drug smuggling, piracy, and organized crime, which, in turn, threaten energy security (especially as European countries have moved away from Russian oil and gas) and maritime commerce.

Getting concrete with the recommendations

At NATO’s 2023 Vilnius summit, the allies agreed to engage in a “comprehensive and deep reflection on existing and emerging threats and challenges” emanating from the southern neighborhoods. In October 2023, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg appointed a group of eleven experts to provide “concrete recommendations to shape NATO’s future approach.”

Released on May 7, the report includes recommendations that can be grouped in four basic categories.

First, it makes several overarching organizational suggestions. These include the appointment of a special envoy for the southern neighborhoods, periodic review of NATO’s relationship with the southern neighborhoods, and a better integration of NATO’s Strategic Direction-South Hub in Naples within the NATO structure to strengthen the link between the hub and the Alliance’s political leadership.

Second, the report suggests strengthening dialogue with and about the southern neighborhoods, as well as enhancing cooperation with relevant regional and international organizations. Specifically, it recommends a special summit of all NATO’s southern partners (members of the Mediterranean Dialogue and Istanbul Cooperation Initiative), the creation of a high-level regional security and stability dialogue, and improved consultation with the European Union and representation from the African Union.

Third, the report suggests several important strategic communications measures, recognizing that NATO’s image in the region—in part due to Russian misinformation campaigns—needs improvement. The report proposes a permanent “Facts for Peace” initiative to fight disinformation in the southern neighborhoods and the establishment of a center with the same mission.  

Fourth, the report discusses areas where NATO should expand its capacity to act. For example, NATO could set up a standing mission dedicated to training and capacity building for partners. NATO might also enhance cooperation with partners on resilience, which would include information and advice on resilience planning, including on disaster response. The report also suggests that NATO build on recent successes in counterpiracy and “identify further areas for maritime security cooperation” with partners.

This group of experts’ recommendations are detailed and thoughtful. Leaders of NATO’s member states would do well to implement most if not all of them. But four additional steps should be added to form an effective southern flank strategy.

Four steps forward

In releasing his fiscal 2024 budget, US President Joe Biden shared a quote that he attributed to his father. “Don’t tell me what you value,” he said. “Show me your budget—and I’ll tell you what you value.”

If NATO truly cares about addressing the challenges in its southern neighborhoods, then it should be willing to incur the costs to do so. If NATO adopts a southern flank strategy at the Washington summit that entails real increases in spending on the Alliance’s activities in the region, it will signal to Russia and to the leaders of terrorist groups that it cares enough about the southern neighborhoods to invest resources there. In agreeing to increased spending, NATO would also signal to southern flank member governments and their publics that the Alliance is willing to incur the costs for something other than defense of its eastern flank.

Moreover, the Alliance’s additional spending should focus on four specific areas:  

First, NATO members should commit significantly more resources to Operation Sea Guardian and its three tasks, which are to contribute to maritime capacity building with regional partners, maintain maritime situational awareness, and support maritime counterterrorism. All three tasks are means to directly address the threats from Russia and terrorism in the southern neighborhoods.

Second, NATO should commit to an amply resourced training and capacity-building mission for the southern neighborhoods, and it should look for local partners interested in receiving such assistance.

Third, NATO should commit the resources to stand up a multinational division for the southern flank, which would be available for deployment to a crisis in the region if necessary and appropriate.

Fourth, at the Washington summit, allies should commit to increase funding for the Defense Against Terrorism Programme of Work, which aims to protect against and prevent nonconventional attacks, such as attacks on critical infrastructure and terrorist attacks using emerging and disruptive technologies.

If allies agree to these four recommendations as well as to the group of experts’ recommendations, they will demonstrate to all parties that the southern neighborhoods are of great interest and they will be engaging in meaningful steps to improve stability there.

Jason Davidson is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Transatlantic Security Initiative in the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. He is also professor of political science and international affairs and director of the Security and Conflict Studies Program at the University of Mary Washington in Fredericksburg, Virginia.

NATO’s seventy-fifth anniversary is a milestone in a remarkable story of reinvention, adaptation, and unity. However, as the Alliance seeks to secure its future for the next seventy-five years, it faces the revanchism of old rivals, escalating strategic competition, and uncertainties over the future of the rules-based international order.

With partners and allies turning attention from celebrations to challenges, the Atlantic Council’s Transatlantic Security Initiative invited contributors to engage with the most pressing concerns ahead of the historic Washington summit and chart a path for the Alliance’s future. This series will feature seven essays focused on concrete issues that NATO must address at the Washington summit and five essays that examine longer-term challenges the Alliance must confront to ensure transatlantic security.

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These agreements have drawn attention to Ankara’s presence in the Horn of Africa and build upon a long history of Turkish engagement in the region. They hold great potential for expanding the security and economic benefits of Turkey-Somalia cooperation, but implementing them will not be easy. Great-power competition over influence in Mogadishu, regional rivalries, security challenges, and a fractured Somali government will all pose significant challenges to these agreements and Turkey’s bid for a greater role in the Horn of Africa.

What’s the big deal?

On February 22, Ankara and Mogadishu signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) establishing the Turkish Armed Forces as a partner in Somalia’s maritime security and law enforcement for the next ten years. Per reports about the MOU, Turkey will reconstruct, equip, and train the Somali Navy while receiving 30 percent of the revenue from Somalia’s exclusive economic zone. Proponents say that the stability and security brought to Somalia’s seas outweigh the costs. Somalia loses $500 million dollars annually to illegal fishing, for example to Iranian and Chinese fishermen, while Somalia’s oil and gas reserves of up to thirty billion barrels remain largely untapped since civil war broke out in 1991. A brief period of stability has led oil and gas companies to cautiously return to Somalia. In 2019, ExxonMobil and Shell indicated a potential return to the country, and in 2022, Coastline Exploration struck a seven-block exploration deal, though an increase in fighting once again prevented any major steps forward. Shortly following this agreement with Turkey, Liberty Petroleum announced that it had secured three offshore blocks for exploration.

Shortly after reaching the maritime defense and security deal, Ankara and Mogadishu announced another MOU, establishing Turkey as a partner in Somalia’s exploration, appraisal, and extraction of petroleum blocks, with the possibility of Turkey taking over sales and distribution. Though the first agreement of its kind for Turkey, Ankara is increasingly factoring hydrocarbons into its diplomatic efforts, including in Libya.

Guns and roses

Turkey’s reaching out to Somalia has been in the making for nearly two decades, though then Turkish Prime Minister (and current president) Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s visit to Somalia during a devastating famine in 2011 was the watershed moment. The first non-African head of state to visit Somalia in twenty years, Erdoğan toured refugee camps and hospitals, pledging aid and drawing international attention to the crisis. His visit was warmly received by the Somali people, many of whom felt abandoned by the global community.

In the years since Erdoğan’s visit, Turkey has integrated deeply into Somali affairs, in everything from its security to its garbage collection and wastewater treatment to its management of seaports and airports. According to Erdoğan, Turkey provided more than one billion dollars in aid to Somalia between 2011 and 2022. Though Turkey’s presence has not been entirely without controversy, evidence of its popularity is widespread, whether through popular fundraising efforts for Turkish earthquake relief in 2023 or in day-to-day life—“Istanbul” is now a common girl’s name in Somalia.  

Turkey receives major attention for the aid it provides, especially considering that it is in the middle on the list of providers of official direct aid to Somalia. This is likely because of Turkey’s tendency to heavily brand its projects, its willingness to operate in dangerous areas of the country, and the close political ties between the two countries. The Turks often capitalize on shared cultural and religious ties to legitimize and optimize their operations, while the Turkish Directorate of Religious Affairs (also known as the Diyanet) facilitates some projects.

At the heart of the Turkey-Somalia relationship is military cooperation, which began in 2015. In 2017, Turkey established its first African military base, Camp TURKSOM in Mogadishu, and it has reportedly trained up to sixteen thousand troops. Alongside the United States, Turkey has conducted drone strikes against the terrorist group al-Shabaab, with at least nineteen confirmed strikes since 2022. In April 2023, Ankara sold Bayraktar TB2 drones to Mogadishu as part of counterterrorism efforts (a sale for which the United Nations accused Ankara of violating an arms embargo). Turkey also plays an important role in training and arming the Haramcad paramilitary unit and Gorgor commando brigade— one of two major elite units in the Somali National Army (SNA), with the other being the Danab brigade, which is trained by the United States. In collaboration with the Danab brigade, the Gorgor has played an important role in combatting al-Shabaab, particularly in renewed fighting in 2021 and 2022.

Turkey turns southward

Ankara’s presence in Somalia is part of a Turkish push toward Africa that started in 1998, with the creation of the Africa Action Plan. By 2008, Turkey had been declared a strategic partner of the African Union and opened at least a dozen embassies across the continent. When Turkey made its successful bid to become a nonpermanent member of the United Nations Security Council in 2009, it was supported by fifty-one of the fifty-three African states. In 2013, Turkey became a member of the African Development Bank Group. Turkey has varying interests in Africa, including ideological motivations, economic and trade priorities, and a desire to build up Ankara’s own defense industries and capabilities. Now, Turkey has a large presence in the region in the areas of humanitarian aid and military cooperation. As of 2022, some thirty African states had signed security cooperation agreements with Turkey, nineteen of which included troop training.

The Horn of Africa is critical for Turkish interests because of its its geographical position, rich mineral resources, and development potential. The region has seen increasing great-power competition involving a diverse cast of characters including Iran, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Russia, China, and the United States. Since 2001, at least eighteen foreign military bases have been constructed in the region, primarily for counterterrorism and counterpiracy operations.

Over the past two decades, Ankara has developed a complex web of economic and military ties with the region, including by leasing the Sudanese island of Suakin, selling drones to Ethiopia, and participating in a decades-long anti-piracy mission off the Horn of Africa under NATO’s Combined Task Force 151. In 2017, Djiboutian officials invited Turkey to establish a military base near the critical Bab el-Mandeb Strait in an effort to promote freedom of navigation and regional stability. On February 20 this year, Djibouti and Turkey signed a military training cooperation agreement.

The Emirati angle

Turkey is far from the only power involved in Somalia. As recently as mid-February, Mogadishu signed an MOU with Washington to open five new military bases in the country and increase training for its Danab brigade. Qatar and the United Kingdom are also players in Somalia. Turkey’s primary competitor in Somalia, however, is the UAE, which has historically seen the region as critical to its strategic interests.

Flush with cash, the Emiratis have embarked on a campaign of infrastructure projects and security agreements across the region, including building major ports in Somaliland (an unrecognized republic in the north of Somalia that self-declared independence in 1991), Eritrea, and Djibouti. It also armed the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) of Sudan and the Ethiopian government during conflicts in those countries. In November 2022, according to Middle East Eye, Somalia reportedly signed a secretive deal with the UAE to train ten thousand Somali troops and police officers in Egypt. However, frustration among officials with the terms of the agreement, as well as continued Emirati projects in Somaliland, have complicated the UAE-Somalia relationship. On January 1, Ethiopia (also close with the UAE) announced it had reached an MOU with Somaliland exchanging recognition for sea access and the lease of a military base. Following the two major Turkey-Somalia agreements of 2024, the Emiratis severely cut their support for the SNA, which included providing an additional $256 in monthly salary for the 14,400 soldiers trained by the UAE.

The Emirati factor carries two major risks for Turkish ambitions in Somalia. First, Abu Dhabi has played a critical role in the fight against al-Shabaab, including through air strikes. Manpower shortages have plagued the SNA for decades, an issue that Emirati coffers have helped alleviate. The withdrawal or reduction of Emirati support in the fight against terrorism will have a compounding effect as the African Union’s Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS), abiding by a request from Somalia, plans to withdraw its forces by the end of 2024. The withdrawal of both ATMIS and the UAE risks Turkey becoming further burdened by the region’s fight against terrorist groups. Second, the UAE has faced several setbacks across the region as the number of players continues to grow, and its attempts to reinforce its position will create effects that will impact Turkey. The UAE is entering increasing competition with China in Djibouti, especially now that Djibouti’s government nationalized the Doraleh Deep Water Port, which was previously owned by an Emirati company; meanwhile, in Sudan, the Emirati-backed RSF has seen its first major setbacks in months with the loss of Omdurman to the Sudanese Armed Forces, who have purchased weapons from Iran. As the UAE seeks to reassert itself and reinforce its position in the region, it will likely double down on its already substantial investments in Puntland, Somaliland, and Ethiopia. Whether the emboldening of Somalia’s rivals and the geopolitical balancing in the Horn will have a stabilizing or destabilizing effect remains to be seen, but it will likely be closely watched by Turkey.

Known unknowns

Though Somali and Turkish officials maintain that the recent agreements are unrelated to the major deal between Somaliland and Ethiopia, the timing is difficult to ignore. The Somali cabinet labeled the Somaliland-Ethiopia MOU as a “blatant assault” on its sovereignty and said it was an example of Ethiopian “interference against the sovereignty of [Somalia].” Unsurprisingly, Somalilanders reacted similarly to the Turkey-Somalia agreements that followed. Though the regional backlash to the MOU may in part steer Ethiopia and Somalia to dissolve it, this is far from certain. It remains unknown if Turkey’s enforcement of Somali maritime security will extend to Somaliland waters, which Ankara recognizes as part of Somalia. In May, Somaliland’s foreign minister explicitly stated that Turkish naval vessels would not be welcome in its territorial waters. This issue will be particularly important if Ethiopia proceeds with its plans to build a naval facility in Somaliland. Despite a strong Turkish-Ethiopian relationship, the Turkish Navy supported joint Somalia-Egypt naval exercises days after the January 1 agreement was signed. It is also unclear how the Turkish Navy will interact with the Puntland Maritime Police Force, which has received funding support from the UAE. Though the semi-autonomous Somali region of Puntland does not claim total independence, it pulled recognition of the Somali federal government in March.

Equally uncertain is how Ankara will react should the Houthis attack a ship transiting through the Somali waters that it will be charged with protecting. Handcuffed by the group’s connection to the war in Gaza, Turkey has balanced a precarious relationship with the extremist group, quietly opposing them over the last seven years while refusing to label them a terrorist organization and shying away from joining the US-led Operation Prosperity Guardian.

A winding path forward

It is uncertain how Turkey and Somalia will deliver on the major agreements and continue the upward trajectory in their bilateral relations. Turkey faces a complex and challenging Somali political landscape. Both MOUs were quickly ratified by the Somali parliament (members perhaps had little choice in the matter, according to one Somaliland-based researcher), though the deal is not without detractors. Beyond concerns over sovereignty, Mohamud is in need of an influential patron as he faces allegations of consolidating power. For Mohamud, Turkey may be the answer, as Turkey largely disregards Somalia’s domestic politics and offers near unconditional support for Villa Somalia, which has led some analysts to describe Turkey as an “all-weather friend.” Mohamud recently proposed a series of constitutional changes, including transitioning to a presidential system, arguing that it would combat clan politics and unite the country. The reforms have prompted protests and polarized the parliament. The Puntland region declared on March 31 that it would be withdrawing from the federal government until a new constitution was put in place. Days later, the Daily Somalia reported that Puntland President Said Abdullahi Deni traveled to the UAE and Ethiopia.

Furthermore, Mohamud’s government lacks unity. The same day that the Liberty Petroleum deal was signed by Somali Minister of Petroleum and Mineral Resources Abdirizak Omar Mohamed, Somali Prime Minister Hamza Abdi Barre expressed concerns and called for revoking the deal. Similarly, the Somali government lacks a clear strategy toward al-Shabaab. Following a successful first phase of “total war” in 2022, both battlefield and political gains have slowed, and al-Shabaab has struck back with a series of horrific attacks. Barre declared his support for peace talks with al-Shabaab in direct opposition to Mohamud, garnering public and private support from within a fractured cabinet.

Moreover, the recent battlefield gains by al-Shabaab undermine the legitimacy of Turkey’s military presence in the country. The concessions required for a peaceful settlement with the terrorist group may include ejecting Turkey’s military, the presence of which al-Shabaab has condemned harshly.

As Turkish officials and lawmakers consider ratification and implementation, they will no doubt look to the past decades of Turkish engagement with Somalia—but also the challenges that lay ahead. The difficulties posed by external influences, great-power competition, tumultuous domestic politics, widespread corruption, high costs, and continued conflict in Somalia will make Turkey’s enormous promises extremely difficult to fulfill. The future of these agreements and thus the future of Turkey’s relations with Somalia and position in the Horn of Africa, though built upon a strong foundation, remains to be seen.

Kiran Baez is a young global professional at the Atlantic Council Turkey program. Add him on LinkedIn.

The views expressed in TURKEYSource are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

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What does the UN secretary-general need to know? Our “memo to…” series has the answer with briefings on the world’s most pressing issues from our experts, drawing on their experience advising the highest levels of government.

Bottom line up front: The risk of interstate conflict between Afghanistan and its neighbors has been rising since the Taliban returned to power in 2021, and is now at a critical point. The Taliban’s rule has created new tensions and exacerbated longstanding problems, such as conflicts over water use across the semi-arid region. Existing efforts to prevent conflict in the war-torn neighborhood are ad hoc, reactive, and ineffectual. The United Nations should urgently establish a standing conflict-prevention mechanism for the Afghanistan region, led by a UN special envoy with a mandate to prevent cross-border and regional disputes from becoming violent, prevent escalation if violence breaks out, and re-establish stability.

Background

This memo describes the cross-border tensions and security threats in the Afghanistan region, discusses recent efforts to address these tensions, and makes proposals for a conflict prevention mechanism led by the UN.

When he took office in 2016, UN Secretary-General António Guterres declared that the international community’s “most serious shortcoming” is “our inability to prevent crises.”¹ In A New Agenda for Peace of 2023, the secretary-general recommended that preventive diplomacy in an “era of divisions” should be strengthened as follows:

Repair regional security architectures where they are in danger of collapsing; build them where they do not exist; and enhance them where they can be further developed. The UN can work to further such regional efforts in a convening and supporting role.”²

This memo proposes the formation of a standing UN conflict prevention mechanism for the Afghanistan region. The region is insecure and volatile and subject to cross-border violence. Experiences from other parts of the world suggest that standing conflict prevention mechanisms are more likely to be effective than ad-hoc and sporadic responses to regional crises.

More specifically, the conflict prevention mechanism for Afghanistan should comprise a UN special envoy, a UN Center for Preventive Diplomacy for the Afghanistan Region, and a regional consultative forum bringing together Afghanistan’s contiguous neighbors: Pakistan, Iran, China, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. An essential step towards the formation of the mechanism would entail consultation with these states.

These proposals build on the report of the Independent Assessment on Afghanistan, written at the behest of the Security Council, which mandated the assessment in UN Resolution 2679 as the first step toward a coherent approach to post-2021 Afghanistan. The assessment, drafted by Turkish diplomat Feridun Sinirlioğlu, was presented to the Security Council in November 2023.³ The report highlighted concerns about Afghanistan’s potential to generate destabilizing regional effects relating to illegal narcotics, transnational terrorism, and extremist ideologies. It recommended “international attention to and cooperation on issues that impact regional and global security and stability.” It also recommended the appointment of a UN special envoy whose mandate would include diplomacy between Afghanistan and international stakeholders. In December 2023 the Security Council requested that the secretary-general appoint a special envoy for Afghanistan to promote implementation of the recommendations.⁴

This memo proposes specific mechanisms to give effect to the Independent Assessment’s call for greater coordination and cooperation between international stakeholders and the de facto authorities in Afghanistan with respect to regional security issues.

A dangerous neighborhood

Since taking power in Afghanistan in 2021, the Taliban’s relations with several neighboring countries have reached a critical juncture. By way of illustration:

• According to a 2023 UN report, a range of terrorist groups have greater freedom of maneuver under the Taliban.⁵ There are indications that al-Qaeda is rebuilding operational capability, Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) is launching attacks into Pakistan with support from the Taliban, groups of foreign terrorist fighters are projecting threats across Afghanistan’s borders, and the operations of the Islamic State group’s local affiliate are becoming more sophisticated and lethal. Links between the Taliban and both al-Qaeda and TTP remain strong and symbiotic.⁶
• In April 2023 Pakistan warned the Taliban that it would strike terrorist hideouts inside Afghanistan if the Taliban was unable to rein in anti-Pakistan militants.⁷
• Russia has similarly said that the Taliban’s return to power has bolstered terrorist organizations operating in Afghanistan. Russia warned that increased terrorist risks from Afghanistan were threatening Central Asian neighbors where Russian troops were stationed.⁸
• In 2021 Tajikistan warned that “various terrorist groups are actively using the unstable military-political situation in Afghanistan in order to strengthen their positions.”⁹ Taliban officials responded by condemning the Tajik government for meddling in Afghan affairs.
• Militants from the Islamic State Khorasan Province group (ISIS-K) based in Afghanistan fired rockets at Uzbekistan in 2022. More broadly, ISIS-K and other Islamic State groups seek to destabilize Afghanistan and some of its neighbors, raising the risk of terror threats to Central Asia.¹⁰
• In April 2023 the Fourth Meeting of Foreign Ministers of Afghanistan’s Neighboring States listed the following terrorist groups as based in Afghanistan: the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, Al-Qaeda, the Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement, the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, the Balochistan Liberation Army, Jundallah, Jaish al-Adl, Jamaat Ansarullah, and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan.¹¹ The ministerial meeting also highlighted the problem of drug production and trafficking.
• There are longstanding and growing water tensions in the region. In May 2023 tensions led to an exchange of fire between Afghanistan and Iran.¹²
• In November 2023 the report of the Independent Assessment on Afghanistan, requested by the UN Security Council, warned that the country “has the potential to generate destabilizing effects – as an origin country for illegal narcotics, as a base for transnational terrorism and extremist ideologies, and as a potential source of mass migration and displacement.”¹³ The report highlights “counterterrorism, counternarcotics and regional security” as priority issues for international attention.¹⁴

Previous efforts to address regional security

To date, there have been no effective international responses to the security problems of the Afghanistan region.

• The Moscow Format Consultations on Afghanistan, launched in 2017, is a regional platform on Afghanistan that has brought together representatives from Russia, China, India, Pakistan, Kazakhstan, Iran, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. The founding mandate was to ensure regional security and facilitate political reconciliation between the Taliban and the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan under then-President Ashraf Ghani, whose government the international community backed. Moscow assumed the lead in this process because of its concerns about the regional spread of instability, violence, and extremism, as well as the growing inflow of Afghan heroin to the Russian market.¹⁵
• The Meeting of Foreign Ministers of Afghanistan’s Neighboring States, which focuses on regional security, held its fourth meeting in April 2023.¹⁶ It does not appear to have developed ongoing programs. This also appears to be true of the annual gathering of the national security advisers of Afghanistan’s neighbors.¹⁷
• The multilateral bodies that cover the Afghanistan region—the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization—have proven to be ineffectual mechanisms for regional security because of the mistrust among their respective member states.¹⁸

Most of the regional meetings have been one-off events, failing to delve deeply into the underlying crises and tensions between Afghanistan and its neighbors and failing to develop concrete plans for collective problems such as the water crisis, territorial disputes, identity conflicts, and narcotics networks. Complicating matters further, some of the regional countries are economically and militarily weak, leading to dependence on stronger nations and to reduced autonomy to engage in meaningful regional cooperation. The complex web of insurgencies with cross-border affiliations has posed a severe challenge, with certain states covertly or overtly aligning with the nonstate armed actors.

The bottom line is that Afghanistan’s neighbors evidently believe there is a clear and strong need to address regional security issues relating to Afghanistan, but they have failed to meet this need.

Recommendations

Regional conflict prevention mechanisms (CPMs) take various forms and can be categorized as follows:

• Multilateral forums. In many regions, states have established multilateral bodies whose aims include the maintenance of regional peace, security, and stability. These bodies include the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, the African Union, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, the Southern African Development Community, and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Some of them have developed protocols for conflict prevention, management, and resolution. Their effectiveness varies greatly.¹⁹
• UN political missions. The UN has established over a dozen field-based political missions in regions wracked by destabilizing conflict, including regional offices in Central Africa, West Africa, and Central Asia. These missions serve as platforms for preventive diplomacy, support the work of peace envoys, and strengthen the capacity of states and regional actors to manage tensions peacefully.²⁰
• UN peacekeeping missions. Certain UN peacekeeping missions and special representatives of the UN secretary-general perform conflict early-warning and early-action functions intended to prevent escalation and stabilize the situation when there are violent incidents. These missions include the UN Interim Force in Lebanon and the UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara.

On the basis of our research on these mechanisms,²¹ the following proposals should guide the establishment and design of a standing CPM for the Afghanistan region.

1. Why a CPM? Standing CPMs are preferable to ad hoc and sporadic responses to regional crises. This is because they encompass pre-established systems, procedures, and forums for conflict prevention. This leads to greater certainty and predictability regarding preventive diplomacy initiatives and methods. These methods can be fine-tuned over time and can respond quickly to crises because they are already in place. Consultations with regional states in setting up the mechanism make these states less resistant to prevention initiatives in tense situations, and even small achievements can build incremental regional confidence.

2. How should the CPM be structured? The CPM should include the following officials and structures:

• a UN special envoy;
• a UN Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for the Afghanistan Region, led by the special envoy; and
• a Regional Consultative Forum comprising Afghanistan’s contiguous neighbors, namely China, Iran, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. Other countries, as well as regional bodies and initiatives, could be invited to join the forum where this would be advantageous.

UN leadership and coordination would have the benefit of drawing on the UN’s extensive expertise in conflict early warning and preventive diplomacy. It would also mitigate and bridge mistrust between the members of the Consultative Forum.

The Consultative Forum would have the following benefits: It would ensure that the states in the region have direct participation in the CPM and view it as legitimate; it would facilitate interstate cooperation; and, over time, it could lead to confidence-building and collective problem-solving on security issues.

The member states of the Consultative Forum would be represented primarily by their ministries responsible for foreign affairs and security. The forum could comprise technical committees, ministerial committees, and a committee of permanent ambassadors. The UN Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for the Afghanistan Region would serve as the secretariat.

3. What should the CPM focus on? There is a distinction between structural prevention of conflict and operational prevention of conflict.²² 

The former seeks to address the underlying structural and systemic causes of conflict. It is a long-term endeavor that typically has political, security, economic, and social dimensions. Operational prevention, on the other hand, relies mainly on preventive diplomacy to prevent disputes from becoming violent, prevent escalation if violence breaks out, and re-establish stability.

The CPM for the Afghanistan region should prioritize operational prevention, which would include a major focus on the problems of cross-border terrorism and violence. It could also develop structural prevention programs around a limited number of issues (e.g., water use and alternatives to narcotics production).

4. Goal and functions. The goal of the CPM would be to promote regional peace, security, and stability in the Afghanistan region. To this end, the CPM would have the following functions:

• identify, analyze, and monitor threats to regional security;
• set up preventive systems and protocols;
• take preventive action, as and when required, to minimize threats and resolve interstate disputes;
• identify opportunities for collective action to address causes of tension; and
• collaborate as appropriate with other regional organizations and initiatives.

5. Next steps. If there is interest in pursuing these ideas further, the UN could undertake informal consultations, including with relevant member states. The secretary-general could also mandate the special envoy, once appointed in light of UN Security Council Resolution 2721 (2023), to undertake consultations.

In conclusion, there is widespread awareness of regional security problems and risks in the Afghanistan region. Efforts to address these problems and risks have thus far been ineffectual. The establishment of a standing CPM—headed by a UN special envoy and involving Afghanistan’s contiguous neighbors and other relevant actors—would be a more enduring, constructive and productive mechanism for conflict prevention and regional security.

Laurie Nathan is director of the Mediation Program of the Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, University of Notre Dame. He has participated in high-level peacemaking efforts in Africa and helped design the mediation units of the African Union. He has been a consultant on mediation and related issues to the African Union, the Economic Community of West African States, the European Union, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the Southern African Development Community (SADC), and the United Nations, as well as with the governments of Germany, Mozambique, South Africa, Swaziland, Switzerland, The Netherlands, and the United Kingdom.

Nilofar Sakhi is a professorial lecturer of international affairs at the Elliott School of George Washington University and serves as the president of the Andiana Foundation, an organization focused on security and peace. Additionally, she holds the position of nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council. With expertise in regional security and Afghanistan and its region, she has authored numerous publications covering traditional and nontraditional security, regional security complexity, and the geopolitics of peacemaking.

The South Asia Center is the hub for the Atlantic Council’s analysis of the political, social, geographical, and cultural diversity of the region. ​At the intersection of South Asia and its geopolitics, SAC cultivates dialogue to shape policy and forge ties between the region and the global community.

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In Season 2, Episode 1 of the Guns for Hire podcast, host Alia Brahimi is joined by the award-winning BBC investigative journalist Nawal Al-Maghafi to talk about her film on American mercenaries in Yemen. One of the few journalists to report from Yemen first-hand, Nawal discusses the Delaware-registered private military company (PMC) contracted by the UAE to kill “terrorists”, her meetings with two of the Americans involved, and the PMC’s training of Yemeni units to conduct targeted assassinations. She also describes how so many of those killed have been activists, teachers, and cultural figures, and the terror that has now gripped the population of southern Yemen. 

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The strike was in line with Israel’s efforts to kill Iranian officials whom it views as posing a direct threat to Israel because of their position and responsibilities. Since the Israel-Hamas conflict broke out six months ago, Israel is reported to have killed eighteen IRGC officials. But while Israel might view the strike on Zahedi as being consistent with its shadow war strategy, it comes amid the conflict in Gaza, hostilities on the Israel-Lebanon border, and threats from the Houthis and Shia militants in Iraq and Syria. Taken together, it creates a context in which Israeli adversaries almost certainly viewed the killing of Zahedi as escalatory.

Tehran’s policy of “strategic patience” might still sway Iranian officials, and ultimately Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamanei, to respond in a measured way. But some response—unlike with the deaths of previous IRGC officials—is almost certain to occur, or Tehran would be risking its credibility given how loudly it has been saber-rattling about retaliation. Iran’s ambassador to the United Nations said last Thursday that he would give interviews to US news outlets “after Iran’s response to Israel.”

The type of action will directly determine whether the response is the conclusion of this incident or just the prologue to something much bigger—like a broader regional war.

Four pathways of retaliation

The big question is: Does Iran want to retaliate in a manner that is equivalent to the loss of Zahedi? Or does Tehran want the appearance of retaliation, sufficient to claim it responded appropriately but with a goal of avoiding an Israeli counter-response that could lead to a regional war? 

The answer to that question will determine what happens next. Four broad scenarios are most realistic—with others, such as Iran using this episode as an excuse to race for a nuclear weapon, plausible but unlikely. Each scenario has value for Iran and risks associated with it. The decision will reveal whether Iran’s true priority is to create meaningful deterrence against Israel or to avoid regional escalation—because Tehran probably cannot do both. 

1. Iran’s response is asymmetric and not in the region. Iran has a history of seeking to organize terrorist attacks against Israeli interests throughout the world. Just last month, Peruvian police arrested a Quds Force officer alleged to have been plotting to kill an Israeli official during the upcoming Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum. In June 2022, then Israeli Foreign Minister Yair Lapid urged Israelis to leave Turkey immediately, claiming they may be targets, weeks after IRGC Col. Sayyad Khodai was shot dead outside of his home in Tehran. Less than two weeks later, Turkey arrested members of an Iranian terror cell. This time, Iranian officials are already threatening Israeli embassies and consulates as a likely target.

• Value: A successful terrorist attack would probably provide Iranian leaders a sufficient basis to publicly claim that Tehran retaliated. But it would minimize the risks of escalating the current conflict into a regional war by keeping the response to an isolated event both in scope and geography. 

• Risk: Tehran may not be convinced that such an act will sufficiently deter Israel from continuing its efforts to kill senior Iranian officials and experts, and may therefore conclude that it is insufficient as a response to Zahedi’s death.

2. Iran leverages its partners or proxies, such as Hezbollah, to undertake an attack or strike targets inside Israel. Hezbollah has its own independent decision-making calculus when it comes to hostile engagement with Israel. But if Iran insists that Hezbollah take action to retaliate for the death of the Quds Force official closest to the group, Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah might struggle to decline that request. If he carried it out, he would probably undertake a response that he could claim is a successful retaliation but that would not be seen by Israel as particularly escalatory or more threatening than the back-and-forth strikes of the last few months.

• Value: Iran would turn to its most trusted partner, optimistic that by not undertaking the attack itself it decreases the risk of an Israeli military response on the Iranian homeland. Avoiding a homeland attack is almost certainly an Iranian priority, as Tehran’s number one objective is always regime stability, and Iranian leaders might worry that the public will blame them for such an attack. 

• Risk: This scenario would risk the worst of all outcomes for Iran: It may be perceived as too weak to restore deterrence against Israel. And, at a time when tensions between Israel and Hezbollah are already high, Israel could use the retaliation as an excuse to undertake a broader war against the group, which could both degrade Iran’s most important ally in the region and quickly escalate into the regional war Iran doesn’t want. 

3. Iran leverages its Shia proxies in Iraq or Syria to strike US targets. Iranian proxies haven’t attacked US forces in Iraq or Syria since late January when three US soldiers in Jordan were killed and Iran immediately sought to distance itself from the attack to avoid risking a conflict with the United States and a broader regional war. Among those in Tehran last week for the annual Quds Day rally in support of the Palestinians was Abu Fadak al-Muhammadawi, the leader of the Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), the umbrella organization for various Iraqi Shia militia groups supported by Iran. PMF leaders are reported to be waiting for instructions from Tehran on responding to Zahedi’s death.

• Value: In Iran’s view, this option could increase deterrence by highlighting that the United States will not be absolved from Israel’s actions; this would be the inverse, perhaps, of Washington’s view that Iran was accountable for the 10/7 Hamas terrorist attack even if it did not specifically order the attack. Iran probably would believe that any US response would not be overly large, needing to be sufficiently calibrated to meet the consistent US priority of avoiding a broader regional war. 

• Risk: The United States went out of its way last week after the strike to publicly highlight that it had not played a role and wasn’t aware Israel was planning the strike. If Iranian proxies nevertheless attack US personnel and interests in the region, the Biden administration might, and should, view it necessary to respond swiftly in a manner that far exceeds what Iran thinks is likely and goes beyond Washington’s response in early February to the attack that killed three US service members.

4. Iran militarily attacks the Israeli homeland and/or kills senior Israeli officials. A kinetic attack using ballistic missiles or drones against Israeli homeland targets would be the most impactful, and risky, option available to Tehran. While Iran might seek to prevent escalation to a full-scale war—for example, by striking military or intelligence targets only, as opposed to civilian ones—this is still a risky step given that Iran has been trying to avoid a wider conflict for which it is likely ill-prepared.

• Value: Tehran is likely to view such an attack as having the best opportunity to restore its deterrence and demonstrate that Israel cannot strike Iranian leaders with impunity. Tehran might also believe such an attack could lead the United States to increase pressure on Israel not to retaliate again and risk sparking a broader war. Such a view, however, risks overestimating both the US ability to influence Israel in such a situation and President Joe Biden’s willingness to do so.
• Risk: Israel would almost certainly respond robustly to a loss of civilian or military personnel in Israel or to the assassination of senior officials. This option has a high potential to trigger a full-scale, region-wide war. 

Jonathan Panikoff is the director of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative. He is a former deputy national intelligence officer for the Near East at the US National Intelligence Council.

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On April 8, Forward Defense nonresident senior fellow Samantha Vinograd appeared on CBS discussing Iran’s vow to retaliate after an Israeli attack on the Iranian embassy in Syria and the implications for regional, global, and US national security.

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On April 2, Forward Defense nonresident senior fellow Marc Polymeropoulous coauthored “The Surprising Intelligence Community Outreach to Russia” for Politico about combatting the threat posed by transnational terrorist groups like ISIS-K.

He warns that the United States must be careful when engaging with other nations for intelligence sharing and basic counterterrorism exchanges, as such outreach can sometimes morph into more issues that intelligence professionals must face.

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This attack is a reminder that Ukraine is not the only entity Russia is at war against. Although Moscow’s war against the Muslim breakaway region of Chechnya officially ended in 2009, Russia has experienced a number of jihadist attacks. This one is just the latest.

The Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS), it should be recalled, was what al-Qaeda in Iraq was renamed when it broke away from al-Qaeda central over leadership quarrels and policy issues. Although ISIS quickly came to control a large amount of territory in both eastern Syria and western Iraq, it was largely crushed by several forces, including the US military, Syrian Kurdish forces, Iraqi government troops, Iran-backed Iraqi Shia militias, and Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC). Although Iran and its allies did not do so in cooperation with the United States, the fact that Tehran and Washington both regarded ISIS as an opponent is indicative of the depth of the rivalry between Shia and Sunni Islamists. But while the activities of the original ISIS became severely constrained, those of its affiliates—including ISIS-K—have expanded.

This attack by ISIS-K, which operates primarily in Afghanistan and Pakistan, may have been motivated by several grievances, including retaliation for the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. With ISIS-K now fighting against the ruling Taliban regime in Afghanistan, which has relatively good relations with Russia, the Moscow attack may have been intended to draw a distinction between how ISIS-K fights against a Russia that oppresses Muslims while the Taliban cooperates with it. Assuming that the four Tajiks Moscow arrested and accused of perpetrating the attack actually did so, they may have launched it in response to what they see as the oppression of the Russian-backed Tajik government. ISIS-K’s grievances against Russia, as well as those of many other jihadist groups, include Russian support for the Bashar al-Assad regime in Syria, as well as Russian cooperation with Iran and other Middle Eastern governments that Sunni jihadists regard as enemies. What does not seem to have motivated ISIS-K’s attack in Russia is any particular concern about Ukraine.

ISIS-K and other ISIS affiliates, of course, have launched attacks not just against Western and pro-Western governments but also against anti-Western governments, including Iran (whose Shia regime ISIS-K and other Sunni jihadists consider anathema) and the Taliban. It is not surprising that ISIS-K has also attacked Russia. Indeed, it would have been more surprising if it did not do so.

This attack is a reminder that the Ukraine war is not the only conflict Moscow is fighting; its “war on terror” is not over and could even revive. In fact, ISIS-K and similar groups might see Moscow’s war against Ukraine as making Russia less vigilant against, and more vulnerable to, jihadist attacks.

Some might see this jihadist attack at the concert hall as raising the possibility of some degree of cooperation between Russia and the West against a common threat. Putin, however, seems to have put paid to this notion. He rejected US warnings beforehand that a jihadist attack might take place. And even after finally admitting that “radical Islamists” were behind the attack, he still linked it to Western-backed Ukraine. This suggests that Putin is in no mood to rein in his hostility to Kyiv and the West, much less cooperate with them.

Indeed, Putin’s reaction to the March ISIS-K attack in Moscow is eerily similar to his response to the September 2004 jihadist attack in Beslan. Even then, Putin claimed that the West supported—and even sought to benefit from—the attack.

This suggests that Putin may be a “worst case” thinker, believing that if the West and Ukraine are opposed to Russia, and if jihadists are opposed to Russia, then the West, Ukraine, and the jihadists must all be working together. On the other hand, Putin may not care so much whether this is true, but believes that linking ISIS-K to Ukraine and the West will resonate with the Russian public. Opposition to his war in Ukraine can then be equated not just to support for Russia’s Western enemies, but its Muslim ones as well.

Russia’s conflict with Ukraine and its conflict with jihadist groups like ISIS-K, though, are separate. And as horrific as it was, the ISIS-K attack on a Moscow theater is not nearly as much of a challenge to Putin as the war in Ukraine, in which hundreds of thousands of Russians have been killed or wounded. But the potential for an expanded Russian conflict with Sunni jihadists exists as long as Russia supports those such jihadists oppose—such as the Assad regime in Syria, oppressive rulers in the former Soviet Muslim republics and the Muslim “autonomous” regions inside Russia itself, Shia Iran, and the Taliban. Putin may have not just one war on his hands, but two.

Mark N. Katz is a professor of government and politics at the George Mason University Schar School of Policy and Government and a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council.

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This opportunistic attempt to blame Ukraine is fueling widespread speculation that the attack will lead to an escalation in Russia’s ongoing invasion. Based on past experience throughout Vladimir Putin’s 24-year reign, many also anticipate that the Russian dictator will use the atrocity to launch a further domestic crackdown.

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

Putin first emerged on Russia’s political stage against a backdrop of terrorist attacks. When he was appointed Prime Minister in August 1999, Putin was largely unknown to the wider Russian public. Weeks later, the country was rocked by a series of apartment bombings in Moscow and southern Russia.

Putin’s hard-line response to these attacks saw him rise to national prominence. This paved the way for his presidential election win in early 2000, while also serving as justification for the Second Chechen War. Putin’s use of macho street slang was welcomed by many, including his famous pledge to flush terrorists “down the toilet.”

In October 2002, armed militants seized a theater in the center of Moscow and held almost one thousand audience members hostage. The ensuing standoff ended in tragedy when a botched intervention by Russian security forces led to the deaths of more than 100 hostages. This incident was to become another key turning point in the Putin era.

In the wake of the theater siege, Putin passed a series of anti-terrorism laws restricting civil liberties. He also significantly strengthened Kremlin control over the Russian media, making it far more difficult for journalists to report critically on the authorities. Crucially, Putin sought to frame the theater attack as an act of “international terrorism.” This played an important role in transforming international perceptions of Russia’s fight against Chechen separatism by equating it with the US-led “War on Terror.”

The largest terrorist attack of the Putin era came in September 2004, when militants stormed a school in Beslan during traditional ceremonies to mark the first day of the new academic year. This high-profile crisis ended in carnage and the deaths of more than 300 hostages. The Beslan massacre transformed the political landscape in Russia. In the wake of the tragedy, Putin moved to end the direct election of regional governors and return to a system of appointment by the Kremlin. This reversed what was widely regarded as one of the main democratic achievements of the Yeltsin era.

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Throughout the 2010s, Russia experienced sporadic suicide bombings across the country. In 2017, an attack on the St. Petersburg metro system led to new restrictions imposed on the popular Telegram messaging app, after an investigation concluded that the platform had been used by terrorists to coordinate their activities.

With today’s Russia already an increasingly authoritarian state, it is not clear what measures remain available to the Kremlin in response to the recent Moscow attack. Following the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the last vestiges of an independent press and civil society have been largely extinguished, while draconian legislation has criminalized any criticism of the war.

Some fear that the Moscow attack may spark a backlash against Russia’s large community of labor migrants, many of whom are Muslims from Central Asia. Meanwhile, some officials are already calling for the reintroduction of the death penalty. Given the scale of the attack and the rhetoric currently coming out of the Kremlin, most expect the response to be severe.

The March 22 attack in Moscow has seriously damaged Putin’s carefully crafted public image as a strongman ruler who offers his subjects security in exchange for restrictions on their personal freedoms. In order to reestablish his credentials, Putin is likely to target his enemies in Ukraine and the West. In line with past practice, he will also look to tighten his grip inside Russia itself.

Olivia Yanchik is a program assistant at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

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Despite overwhelming evidence pointing to Islamic State terrorists, Vladimir Putin seems intent on blaming Ukraine. While the Russian dictator has acknowledged the atrocity was carried out by Islamist militants, he has repeatedly indicated that Ukraine and the country’s Western partners are the real culprits.

The first clear sign that Putin would seek to implicate Ukraine came on the day after the attack. In an official address to the nation, Putin announced that four suspects had been caught while attempting to reach Ukraine, before accusing the Ukrainian authorities of “preparing a window” for them to cross the border.

This version of events made little sense, given the massive military presence along Russia’s wartime border with Ukraine and the intense security spotlight on the wider region. Putin’s far-fetched story of a Ukrainian escape plan has subsequently been further undermined by his closest ally, Belarusian dictator Alyaksandr Lukashenka, who has stated that the terror suspects initially attempted to flee across the border into Belarus and not Ukraine.

None of this has deterred Putin. On the contrary, the campaign to blame Ukraine has continued to gain momentum in the wake of the Moscow massacre. The Kremlin-controlled Russian state media has openly questioned the claims of responsibility made by Islamic State, and has directly accused Ukraine of being behind the terror attack.

Russian officials have followed suit, with Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev stating that Ukraine was “of course” responsible for the attack and Russian Parliamentary Speaker Vyacheslav Volodin naming “the bloody regime of Ukraine” along with Washington and Brussels as the organizers of the atrocity. Meanwhile, Putin himself has doubled down on his earlier accusations, and has attempted to position the Moscow terrorist attack as part of a ten-year conflict between Russia and Ukraine.

Ukrainian officials have rejected Russia’s groundless accusations, suggesting instead that Putin is seeking to exploit the tragedy in order to provide further false justification for the invasion of Ukraine. “Do not let Putin and his henchmen dupe you,” commented Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba. “Their only goal is to motivate more Russians to die in their senseless and criminal war against Ukraine, as well as to instill even more hatred for other nations, not just Ukrainians, but the entire West.”

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

Russia has yet to produce any credible evidence supporting its claims of a Ukrainian role in the Moscow terror attack. Instead, the Kremlin appears content to rely on a combination of unfounded allegations, conspiracy theories, and innuendo. This is entirely in keeping with the cynical information strategy that has accompanied the Russian invasion of Ukraine, which has been based on deceit and distraction from the very beginning.

When Putin first launched the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2014, he did so with a lie so large and so transparent that in retrospect it is difficult to believe it actually happened. As his troops methodically seized control of Ukraine’s Crimean peninsula, the Kremlin dictator appeared before global audiences and repeatedly denied any Russian military involvement whatsoever. Instead, he insisted that the thousands of well-armed and disciplined troops involved in the operation were actually local militias.

This astonishing duplicity set the tone for the following eight years as Putin expanded the war by occupying much of eastern Ukraine’s Donbas region. Throughout this period, the Kremlin refused to acknowledge any direct role in hostilities and maintained an official policy of blanket denials, despite the fact that the presence of the Russian army in eastern Ukraine was the world’s worst kept secret. In addition to denying Russia’s obvious involvement, the Kremlin also waged an unprecedented information war to discredit and dehumanize Ukrainians.

For the past decade, the most consistent element of Russia’s anti-Ukrainian disinformation offensive has been the depiction of modern Ukraine as a “Nazi” state. This has been a Kremlin propaganda trope for many decades and was a prominent element of Soviet attempts to demonize Ukraine’s statehood ambitions during the Cold War. Putin has enthusiastically revived this tradition and has used it to justify his quest to extinguish Ukrainian independence. Few were surprised in February 2022 when he cited “de-Nazification” as the main goal of Russia’s full-scale invasion.

Putin’s “Nazi Ukraine” propaganda resonates well with Russian audiences drenched in the Kremlin’s World War II mythology, but has been significantly less effective internationally. It is not hard to see why. After all, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy is Jewish, while support for far-right political parties in Ukraine is lower than in most other European countries, with a coalition of Ukrainian nationalist parties receiving just 2% of the vote in the country’s most recent parliamentary election in 2019. Indeed, the entire “Nazi Ukraine” narrative is so ridiculous that even US media personality Tucker Carlson, who can usually be relied upon to echo Kremlin talking points, recently admitted it was “one of the dumbest things I’d ever heard.”

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The Kremlin’s attempts to blame the war on NATO expansion have proved far more persuasive among international audiences, but even this seemingly rational explanation has been undermined by Russia’s own recent actions. Putin has frequently stated that NATO enlargement since 1991 poses an intolerable security threat to Russia, but when neighboring Finland and nearby Sweden responded to the invasion of Ukraine by joining the alliance, he reacted with almost complete indifference and made no effort to obstruct the process.

The contrast between Putin’s evident lack of interest in NATO’s Nordic enlargement and his bellicose denunciations of Ukraine’s far flimsier ties to the alliance could hardly be starker. Far from threatening a military response, the Russian ruler actually downplayed the entire issue of Finnish and Swedish membership, and even withdrew the bulk of his troops from the border with Finland. Clearly, Putin understands perfectly well that NATO poses no security threat to Russia itself, and only objects to the alliance if it prevents Russia from bullying its neighbors.

In addition to imaginary NATO threats and phantom fascists, Putin has now added Islamist terrorism to the expanding list of absurd excuses for the invasion of Ukraine. This relentless flood of disinformation is designed to cloud perceptions and disguise the naked imperialism driving Russia’s war in Ukraine.

As the invasion has unfolded, Putin has become increasingly frank about his true motivations, especially when addressing domestic audiences. In summer 2022, he compared his invasion to the imperial conquests of eighteenth century Russian Czar Peter the Great. Months later, he announced the annexation of four partially occupied Ukrainian provinces while claiming they would now be part of Russia “forever.” With increasing frequency, Putin denies Ukraine’s right to exist and characterizes the war as a crusade to reclaim “historically Russian lands.”

Ukrainians are painfully aware of Russia’s genocidal goals and have long since grown used to the shameless disinformation being pushed by the Kremlin to justify the invasion of their country. In recent days, many Ukrainians have responded to allegations of their alleged involvement in the Moscow terror attack with typical gallows humor, quipping that according to Putin, “Ukraine is a Nazi Islamist state headed by a Jewish President.”

The Kremlin’s ludicrous conspiracy theories certainly deserve to be ridiculed, but the implications for millions of Ukrainians are no laughing matter. As Russian dissident Garry Kasparov noted this week, “mocking the absurdities of authoritarians is a worthy endeavor, as long as we never lose sight of how dictatorships like Russia use their laughable lies to justify oppression and murder.”

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

Further reading

UkraineAlert Mar 26, 2024

Ukraine paves way for green energy future amid Russia’s escalating attacks

By Aura Sabadus

Ukraine has lifted restrictions on the export of biomethane in a move that could make the country one of Europe’s biggest green energy suppliers, writes Aura Sabadus.

Energy Markets & Governance Energy Transitions

UkraineAlert Mar 25, 2024

The mood in wartime Ukraine: Weariness, resolve, and exasperation

By Steven Pifer, John Herbst

Ukrainians are war-weary but remain resolved to continue the fight despite growing exasperation with the country’s most important partner, the United States, write Steven Pifer and John Herbst.

Conflict Drones

UkraineAlert Mar 21, 2024

Russian victory in Ukraine would leave Europe at Putin’s mercy

By Mykola Bielieskov

A Russian victory in Ukraine would reinvigorate Putin’s war machine and leave much of Europe at the mercy of the Kremlin, writes Mykola Bielieskov.

Conflict Defense Industry

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

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The post Putin adds Islamist terror to the list of absurd excuses for Ukraine invasion appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On March 26, Forward Defense Nonresident Senior Fellow Michael Groen coauthored an article for The Cipher Brief titled “Preparing for a Digital Battlefield: National Security and Cryptocurrency” about combatting illicit actors and nation states with blockchain intelligence. He emphasized that sanctions enforcement and counterterrorism success must include digital tools and techniques to investigate, seize, and disrupt transactions in evolving domains to protect national security.

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Michael Groen

Nonresident Senior Fellow

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Defense Policy Defense Technologies

Forward Defense, housed within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, generates ideas and connects stakeholders in the defense ecosystem to promote an enduring military advantage for the United States, its allies, and partners. Our work identifies the defense strategies, capabilities, and resources the United States needs to deter and, if necessary, prevail in future conflict.

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The post Groen writes in The Cipher Brief about cryptocurrency and national security appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The second victimization, which started just as the fire was being put out, comes in how the Russian people will be denied the truth from Russian President Vladimir Putin’s government. The attack strikes at Putin’s claim to legitimacy as a strongman—so someone else has to be found to blame: Ukraine, which the Ukrainian government, the US government, and others have said was not involved. Even ISIS-K’s quick claim of responsibility was obscured from the Russian people. On Monday, Putin finally acknowledged that “radical Islamists” were responsible—but he still falsely claimed Ukraine was somehow ultimately responsible.

This deception has consequences, most notably in the road not taken by Russia after Friday’s terrorist attack. Consider what a truly responsible Russian government would have done: It would have taken better precautions after the early March warning from US intelligence that an attack was imminent. It appears senior Russian officials, including Putin, downplayed the intelligence warning, perhaps thinking it part of a US plot to disrupt Putin’s reelection. Even if the attack could not have been prevented, a responsible Russian government would now call for international solidarity and joint action against a deadly terrorist group responsible for thousands of deaths in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran, Russia, and elsewhere. A responsible Russian government would convene an honest accounting of its security failure to detect the plot and disrupt it.

And, of course, a responsible Russian government would not be embroiled in a destructive war in Ukraine that may have left Moscow distracted, overstretched, and therefore vulnerable. Nor would a responsible Russian government have embarked on the security crackdown (largely unnoticed in the Western media, with some exceptions) against Central Asian workers that fueled grievances that may have allowed ISIS-K to recruit terrorist killers among people already in Russia—though the details at this time remain unclear.

But Putin’s government is not a responsible government, and the Russian people are likely to be denied all these reasonable steps. This means the Russian people will continue to be vulnerable to future ISIS-K attacks, even after the security crackdown that is no doubt coming inside Russia. Nor is there likely to be a change of Russian support for the Taliban in Afghanistan, the Assad regime in Syria, or the regime in Iran—all of which factor into anti-Russian animus among Muslims in Central Asia and the Caucasus that ISIS-K uses for terrorist recruiting.

Russia’s aggression against Ukraine and the return of great power competition to the world stage have not ended the threat of terrorism from ISIS-K and other terrorist groups. The fact that they get less attention in the Western press does not mean those threats have vanished. Terrorism is still a threat that deserves international cooperation, as the Biden administration showed by warning Russia of the threat in early March.

Russia’s intelligence failure that made March 22 possible shows that terrorism’s danger is not past, even while Russia’s irresponsibility makes the world and its own citizens less secure.

Thomas S. Warrick is a senior fellow and director of the Future of DHS Project at the Atlantic Council. He served in the Department of State from 1997-2007 and as deputy assistant secretary for counterterrorism policy at the US Department of Homeland Security from 2008 to 2019.

The post The Russian people have been victimized twice—by ISIS-K terrorists, then by the Kremlin’s deception appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On March 25, Transatlantic Security Initiative senior fellow Elisabeth Braw was interviewed by Times Radio on the terrorist attack in Russia.

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Elisabeth Braw

Senior Fellow

Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security Transatlantic Security Initiative

NATO Resilience & Society

The Transatlantic Security Initiative, in the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, shapes and influences the debate on the greatest security challenges facing the North Atlantic Alliance and its key partners.

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The post Braw in Times Radio on the terrorist attack in Russia appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On March 24, Transatlantic Security Initiative distinguished fellow Ambassador Alexander Vershbow was quoted in Radio Free Europe discussing the terrorist attack in Russia.

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Alexander Vershbow

Distinguished Fellow

Eurasia Center Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Europe & Eurasia NATO

The Transatlantic Security Initiative, in the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, shapes and influences the debate on the greatest security challenges facing the North Atlantic Alliance and its key partners.

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The post Vershbow in Radio Free Europe on the terrorist attack in Russia. appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On March 24, Forward Defense Nonresident Senior Fellow Samantha Vinograd appeared on CBS “Face the Nation” with Margaret Brennan discussing the recent terrorist attack carried out by ISIS-K in Moscow and southern US border security. She also spoke about the criticality of supplying resources for vetting architecture, intelligence sharing, and enhancing information arrangements with international partners.

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Samantha Vinograd

Nonresident Senior Fellow

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Arabic Defense Policy

Forward Defense, housed within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, generates ideas and connects stakeholders in the defense ecosystem to promote an enduring military advantage for the United States, its allies, and partners. Our work identifies the defense strategies, capabilities, and resources the United States needs to deter and, if necessary, prevail in future conflict.

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The post Vinograd on CBS “Face the Nation” about the recent ISIS terrorist attack in Moscow, US border security, and more appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The post Lichfield quoted by Bloomberg on Russian reaction to Moscow theater attack appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Executive summary

Today, the US Joint Force grapples with an array of security challenges that transcend traditional boundaries and cut across theaters and domains. US competitors—China and Russia—conduct military, information, economic, cyber, and diplomatic activities across the globe, from the Indo-Pacific and Europe to Africa, Latin America, Central Asia, and the Arctic. Managing strategic competition necessitates the United States taking proactive measures to counter malign activities and advance US strategic objectives across multiple theaters and domains.

US Special Operations Forces (USSOF) possess distinct abilities and expertise that can greatly aid in addressing the complexities of strategic competition, yet these assets are often overlooked or misunderstood. USSOF is too often seen as the direct-action, finishing force of the Global War on Terror era. Yet, the special operator of 2024 is not just the physically imposing “trigger puller,” but also the young man or woman who is an expert at coding. USSOF has a unique position that allows it to elevate the Joint Force’s capacity to navigate the entire spectrum of competition. Its activities prior to conflict, such as operational preparation of the environment (OPE), can shape the strategic environment with US competitors. This report contends that, when leveraged effectively, USSOF has the potential to play a pivotal role in promoting US global interests, particularly in addressing vulnerabilities across the competition continuum.

To fully harness USSOF’s role in strategic competition, the authors of this report propose recommendations to United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict (ASD(SO/LIC)), the Joint Force, the Department of Defense (DOD), and policymakers within the defense ecosystem. The recommendations are aimed at enhancing USSOF’s capabilities that already have utility in strategic competition, while shifting USSOF’s mindset toward this role. By implementing these measures, USSOF can better support the US interagency and promote US global interests in strategic competition. The recommendations are summarized below.

First, USSOF must adapt its mindset to play a larger role in strategic competition, expanding its non-kinetic activities and irregular-warfare concepts to counter the sophisticated capabilities of near-peer US adversaries like China and Russia. To do this, USSOF must balance its traditional tasks like countering violent extremist organizations (VEO) and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) operations, which will remain critical, with new challenges posed by strategic competitors. The latter necessitates the global synchronization of Joint Force planning to fully leverage USSOF’s capabilities across seven geographic combatant commands. Effective communication between ASD(SO/LIC) and USSOCOM is essential for articulating SOF’s strategic role across the DOD enterprise, but USSOF must be empowered by the Joint Force to proactively support competition below the threshold of conflict.

Second, USSOF’s capacity to synchronize the efforts of interagency partners, allied and partner militaries, and the Joint Force serves as a linchpin in addressing the complexities of strategic competition. There is nevertheless a gap in understanding regarding USSOF’s pre-conflict role among decision-makers. Many of USSOF’s activities can be leveraged more strategically to shape the competition environment, such as its aptitudes in special reconnaissance, foreign internal defense, civil-affairs operations, military information-support operations, unconventional warfare, security-force assistance, and foreign humanitarian assistance. By recognizing USSOF’s integral role in the competition continuum and integrating it more effectively into strategic planning, the DOD can leverage USSOF’s capabilities to their fullest extent, ensuring a proactive and comprehensive approach to strategic competition.

Third, USSOF can adapt its strengths to new challenges by enhancing capabilities in cyber, space, and undersea warfare, bolstering civil-affairs expertise for extreme environments like the Arctic, and investing in technological advancements like artificial intelligence (AI) to achieve cognitive overmatch in complex operating environments. Empowering USSOF to succeed in 2024 and beyond will require USSOF and the broader DOD enterprise to recognize that the special operator of the future includes a diverse cadre of cyber operators, culturally immersed experts, specialists in space, AI, engineering, or physics support operations, and gender-diverse teams.

Fourth, USSOF must find ways to measure its success in an unclassified setting by internally defining clear mission objectives for strategic competition and establishing tracking mechanisms to assess progress. Articulating success through deliberate campaigns to disrupt adversaries’ strategies can help communicate USSOF’s contributions and impact while safeguarding classified information.

Fifth, enhancing integration between USSOF and the US military services necessitates a better understanding of USSOF’s current capabilities and roles, improved communication, and synchronized global campaign planning to leverage USSOF’s strategic advantages effectively across multiple combatant commands and interagency partners. Clarifying USSOF’s presence and activities in regions pre-conflict, and facilitating collaboration between commands, can enhance intelligence sharing and support strategic-competition efforts.

Sixth, it is critical to leverage USSOF’s agility in identifying innovations from nontraditional defense-industrial partners. USSOF is a leader in identifying, testing, fielding, and evolving new, cutting-edge technologies that have utility across the Joint Force, DOD, and the Intelligence Community (IC). Enhancing USSOF and defense-industrial base relations involves improving collaboration between USSOF and leading-edge defense industries. Initiatives like SOFWERX and recommendations from the Atlantic Council’s Commission on Innovation Adoption can facilitate this collaboration, ensuring a culture of operational experimentation and incentivizing private-sector engagement to support USSOF’s mission success. Appropriately resourced, USSOF can continue to advance innovation adoption for the Joint Force at a time when doing so is essential for strategic competition.

Finally, USSOF must maintain effective cooperation with its allied counterparts while communicating its current and future plans, particularly regarding areas of focus, investments, and adaptations. The US interagency and DOD can learn from the experiences and models put forward by allies—such as the United Kingdom, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, and Norway—that have highly integrated special operations into their plans to compete with strategic challengers like Russia and China. In so doing, the United States should continue to recognize the importance of prioritizing special-forces capabilities, investing in small, specialized teams, and aligning with allies on shared priorities to facilitate multilateral operations.

These recommendations not only ensure USSOF’s relevance and effectiveness, but also reinforce its pivotal role in safeguarding US interests and promoting global stability. The US interagency and DOD should invest in USSOF’s many strengths for strategic competition. In so doing, USSOF will stand ready to navigate the complexities of the modern conflict and to serve as a formidable force in advancing US strategic objectives on the global stage.

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Introduction

The United States and its allies and partners face an increasingly complex security environment in the twenty-first century, with competitors China and Russia leveraging all elements of their national power—diplomatic, information, military, and economic—to undermine US and allied security and prosperity. Considering strategic competition, the US Joint Force must adapt how it operates, recognizing that today’s security threats stretch well beyond the physical battlefield, and that competition and deterrence must be shaped prior to conflict. Both China and Russia view competition with the United States as taking place on a continuum, while the United States too often draws a bright line between peace and war while underinvesting in the competitive space between, leaving the United States at a disadvantage. 

USSOF offers unique skills, competencies, capabilities, and experiences that can significantly support US goals and outcomes in strategic competition—but these tools are poorly understood. USSOF is often thought about through the lens of its past successes over the last two decades, notably in counterterrorism. But who special operators are today, where and how they operate, and the significant role they play in shaping the environment and creating successful outcomes for strategic competition remain underappreciated. 

The 2018 and 2022 National Defense Strategies—and the integrated deterrence concept—acknowledge that today’s security threats will only be deterred through “employing every tool at the Department [of Defense]’s disposal.” USSOF is uniquely positioned to model, support, and enhance the Joint Force’s ability to do this. This report argues that, if harnessed correctly, USSOF can play a central role in advancing global US interests—especially across the seams and gaps of national power and artificial geographic boundaries that US adversaries exploit. 

Some defense leaders are considering cuts to USSOF, which could dramatically alter its ability to contribute to strategic competition with China and leave an operational gap in current capabilities and future joint planning. How does USSOF support US and allied security imperatives, and how would a degradation of USSOF impact US competitive advantage in the 2020s and beyond? 

This paper examines how the US government can best employ USSOF and apply its past successes and unique and joint operational approach to the challenges present in today’s era of strategic competition. The authors examine USSOF’s background and history, how USSOF enhances the US ability to outcompete China, and areas in which USSOF can be more effectively employed. The paper benefited from consultations with and peer review from many experts and practitioners across the national security community. 

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Background: What makes special operations forces “special”?

Special operators are ubiquitous across the US military services and combatant commands, yet their organization, operations, and missions are distinct from their counterparts across the Joint Force. USSOF comprises the active, guard, and reserve elements of each service component of the US Armed Forces that are designed, trained, and equipped to conduct and support special operations—“activities or actions requiring unique modes of employment, tactical techniques, equipment, and training often conducted in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive environments.” USSOF is unique from other parts of the military in its light footprint, specialized and inherently joint operations, and stealth approach. SOF typically deploys as tailored units based on an operation’s requirements, risk, and capabilities to sensitive regions of the world—often to places that conventional forces otherwise cannot access—and, in doing so, it can generate outsized strategic effects. 

Globally positioned and readily deployed, USSOF provides decision-makers with low-visibility, small-footprint, and often low-cost options to secure US interests. It does this either by directly addressing threats or by indirectly engaging by, with, and through international allies and partners, thus allowing the United States to leverage partners’ capabilities and geographical familiarity and providing unique placement and access to partners that might be otherwise unavailable across the interagency. Accounting for just 3 percent of the US DOD’s budget, USSOF expands the response options available to the United States and its allies and partners, buying decision space for US and allied leaders. This is especially important in enabling US forces to shape the environment and conditions of competition well before conflict arises. 

How are US Special Operations Forces organized today?

The ASD(SO/LIC) “oversees and advocates for Special Operations and Irregular Warfare throughout the Department of Defense to ensure these capabilities are resourced, ready, and properly employed in accordance with the National Defense Strategy.” USSOF is consolidated under the United States Special Operations Command, the unified combatant command headquartered at MacDill Air Force Base in Tampa, Florida. USSOCOM oversees the US Army Special Operations Command (USASOC), US Naval Special Warfare Command (WARCOM), US Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC), and US Marine Forces Special Operations Command (MARSOC). Within USSOCOM, the interoperability planning and equipment standardization of the various service SOF commands is overseen by the Joint Special Operations Commander (JSOC). To support the Geographic Combatant Commands (GCCs), SOCOM offers a sub-unified command per region aligned with the GCC in the form of Theater Special Operations Commands (TSOCs). 

The five SOF truths

USSOF is guided by its Five Truths—key tenets that define both USSOF and special operators. 

• Humans are more important than hardware.
• Quality is better than quantity.
• Special Operations Forces cannot be mass-produced.
• Competent Special Operations Forces cannot be created after emergencies occur.
• Most Special Operations require non-SOF assistance.

These truths echo the fact that a small number of SOF operators—carefully selected, well-trained, and exceptionally led—offer an unorthodox or specialized approach to security challenges that cannot be replicated at a larger scale across the conventional military force. 

The special operator’s experience is distinctive—marked by high levels of adaptability, cultural understanding, and exceptional physical prowess that reflect years of specialized training, as well as global and joint experience that other servicemembers may not obtain. Special operations are joint in nature and involve liaising across the Joint Force and US government interagency organizations. As such, special operators gain unique exposure and understanding of how to execute joint operations with interagency partners during competition, and in preparation for crisis and conflict. Special operators are highly educated and uniquely trained for different environments and locales, and they possess the capability to employ unconventional thinking to achieve success.¹ Furthermore, they are highly specialized, and their operational approach is characterized by cultural awareness, flexibility, and a tolerance for ambiguity, which allows them to function in complex and ever-changing conditions—a critical component when the presence of overt conventional forces may escalate tensions in any given region. These characteristics and capabilities mean that USSOF can be harnessed in creative ways to respond to strategic competitors whenever and wherever they are operating across the globe. 

USSOF’s twelve core activities

USSOF is known for its role in US counterterrorism missions of the past two decades. Special operators played a central role in the twenty-year Global War on Terror (GWOT) via counterterrorism and counterinsurgency missions. However, USSOF executes twelve core activities (both before and during conflicts or crises) that are lesser known and crucial to strategic competition. These activities often overlap and rarely take place in isolation. Many of these activities are highly relevant to combatting China’s and Russia’s malign activity or altering their decision calculus and popular perceptions across the globe.

1. Direct Action: Executing short-duration strikes and small-scale offensive actions to seize, destroy, capture, exploit, recover, or damage designated targets.
2. Special Reconnaissance: Actions conducted in sensitive environments to collect or verify information of strategic or operational significance.
3. Unconventional Warfare: Executing actions to enable a resistance movement or insurgency that is aiming to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a government or occupying power.
4. Foreign Internal Defense (FID): Activities geared toward supporting the host nation’s internal defense and development, including safeguarding against subversion, terrorism, insurgency, or other threats to stability and internal security.
5. Civil Affairs Operations (CAO): Enhancing the relationship between US and allied and partner military forces and civilian authorities in areas where military forces are present.
6. Counterterrorism (CT): Actions taken directly against terrorist networks, as well as actions to influence or render global and regional environments inhospitable to terrorist networks.
7. Military Information Support Operations (MISO): Planned activities aimed at conveying specific, pre-selected information to foreign audiences. Such information is often aimed at influencing the emotions, motives, objective reasoning, or behavior of foreign audiences, groups, individuals, or sometimes governments in a manner favorable to US or host-nation objectives.
8. Counter-proliferation of WMD: Activities to support US government efforts to curtain the development, possession, proliferation, and use of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) weapons by governments and non-state actors.
9. Security Force Assistance: Organizing, training, equipping, rebuilding, or advising various components of foreign security forces.
10. Counterinsurgency (COIN): The amalgamation of civilian and military efforts designed to end insurgent violence and facilitate a return to peaceful political processes.
11. Hostage Rescue and Recovery: Offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, preempt, and respond to hostage incidents, which may include the recapture of US facilities, installations, sensitive materials, or personnel in areas hostile to the United States.
12. Foreign Humanitarian Assistance: A range of Department of Defense humanitarian activities conducted outside the United States and its territories, and alongside other humanitarian entities, to relieve and reduce human suffering.

These twelve activities form a robust, interconnected, and mutually supportive framework that allows USSOF to navigate different phases of competition and conflict across the competition continuum. Rarely does a special operation occur without involving or impacting one or more core activities. For instance, an unconventional-warfare campaign might seamlessly incorporate direct action and special reconnaissance elements, highlighting the fluidity and adaptability inherent in special operations. Some special operations are carried out by USSOF’s cross-functional teams (CFTs), which combine the unique capabilities of Civil Affairs, psychological operations (PSYOP) forces, special forces, and enablers. USSOF was the first to execute and operate multi-domain command and control, and helped define what is now doctrine in multi-domain operations.

Special operations are multifaceted by design, and each service may bring distinctive skills and missions.² Employing different specialties and tools, USSOF takes a holistic approach to threats across the competition continuum. Such an approach is critical to compete with US strategic rivals that operate in spaces beyond the military domain, including the information, diplomatic, economic, and legal realms. As such, USSOF has, and can continue to have, a tremendously valuable role in strategic competition.

USSOF’s role prior to and during conflict

Special operators are adept at shaping outcomes in response to evolving challenges, performing their core activities years before conflict breaks out and remaining on the ground in the aftermath of a crisis. For example, during pre-conflict phases, USSOF’s reconnaissance missions can provide information to the IC in key regions. USSOF can operate behind enemy lines and sometimes have access to sources and information that members of the IC do not, contributing vast amounts of intelligence to the United States.

Meanwhile, USSOF’s security cooperation programs are dedicated to enhancing partner capability and capacity while increasing US regional access and influence. Key aspects of this relationship include fostering partner resilience against subversion and coercion—and, when necessary, resistance to occupation. A prime example of this is the significant role that USSOF played in helping Ukraine build and train a professional and capable military force after the illegal Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014. At that time, Ukrainian military forces lacked command and control and were not well-trained in operating key capabilities. Following 2014, US, United Kingdom (UK), and other allied SOF trained the Ukrainian military, supporting its evolution into the professional and capable military force we see today, which has been much better positioned to respond to and tenaciously fight Russia’s ongoing war against Ukraine.

USSOF provides a critical leg of integrated deterrence, alongside conventional and nuclear military capabilities, by executing irregular aspects of competition that remain below the threshold of armed conflict. This includes undertaking specialized reconnaissance, irregular warfare, medical support, clandestine logistics, data collection, and human intelligence (HUMINT) analysis—or military information-support operations, known as MISO—against potential adversaries before a conflict arises. SOF also bolsters deterrence by denial and punishment, demonstrating to allies and partners how to stand up to coercion from Russia, China, and other adversaries.

In the event of a crisis, USSOF is strategically positioned at the forefront, offering support across the Joint Force and US government interagency organizations in critical areas. For example, USSOF supports the development of US Embassy Emergency Action Plans, provides humanitarian assistance, and generates intelligence to establish conditions for large-scale combat operations. In essence, USSOF’s role is proactive. Instead of waiting for the onset of conflict, special operators are engaged in a region for an extended period before such a conflict ever emerges, and they set the environment for future engagement and interoperability with other military forces.

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History of USSOF: SOF’s evolving purpose and how its history lends to competition today

The creation of USSOF and its role in the twentieth century

The inception of USSOF dates back to 1942. Born out of necessity during the Second World War (WWII), the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) was created by President Franklin D. Roosevelt, establishing air, ground, and maritime SOF to meet the particular needs of warfighting theaters. These OSS forces, led by Bill Donovan, became critical to the global operations of the Allied forces in World War II, acting as elite raiding forces in Europe, enablers of Nazi- and fascist-resistance movements in the Mediterranean and Middle East, and the executors of an unconventional-warfare campaign in China and East Asia. The OSS forces were dissolved by President Harry Truman following the end of WWII, and all the special intelligence and warfare functions were then transferred to the War Department. By the time the Korean War began in 1953, there were no remaining official standing special-operations units, but their noticeable absence resulted in an accelerated effort to rebuild such capabilities during that decade.

During the Cold War, the Department of Defense recognized the value of irregular warfare to enable resistance groups in Warsaw Pact countries. This led to the 1952 establishment of the Army’s Psychological Warfare Center at Fort Bragg—later renamed the Special Warfare Center. As their capability was rebuilt, USSOF forces deployed troops throughout the Cold War, supporting covert Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) operations in Tibet, Iran, Eastern Europe, and Cuba; supporting and training south Vietnamese troops; and evacuating missionaries and other personnel from unstable regions of the Congo, among other missions.

The true value of USSOF during the Cold War was realized when President John F. Kennedy stressed the need for the armed services to invest more heavily in guerrilla and counter-guerrilla operations as an effort to combat Soviet influence operations worldwide. As it expanded to create new units and training centers across the services, USSOF emerged as “pioneers in interagency cooperation,” collaborating with entities such as the CIA by conducting long-range reconnaissance missions and medical support missions to Vietnam.³ During this time, special operations became one of the US military’s key enablers to counter coercion below the threshold of armed conflict.

In the aftermath of Vietnam, USSOF’s capabilities—like those of other services and commands—were reduced because of budget cuts and downsizing. The failed Iranian rescue mission of 1980, known as Operation Eagle Claw, led to a flurry of reorganization efforts in Congress, culminating in the permanent establishment of USSOCOM in 1987 and the creation of an office devoted to special operations and low-intensity conflict (SO/LIC) within the Office of the Secretary of Defense, all of which resulted in the current organization of USSOF.

USSOF in the GWOT and the twenty-first century

USSOF is perhaps best known for its work throughout the GWOT. USSOF carried out a diverse range of missions worldwide, serving as the primary tool in the US fight to counter VEOs. Beyond engaging in combat operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria, and the Philippines, USSOF played a crucial role in executing theater campaign plans and implementing national strategy on a global scale.

During this time, USSOF doubled in force size and more than tripled in budget to meet the growing threat environment; during some periods, its presence overseas more than quadrupled. SOF was vital in building partner capacity, providing low-cost, low-footprint options to understand and impose costs on malign adversary activity and expand US influence and access with key partners and allies. Importantly, USSOF established linkages to conceive and implement a true Joint Interagency Intergovernmental Multinational (JIIM) strategy in multiple locations—especially in areas in which the Department of Defense could not be the lead active player, such as in Africa. The value of SOF’s authorities and culture of moving quickly against a problem was clearly demonstrated during GWOT.  This entailed applying resources and focus against a challenge, but it also meant the research and development (R&D), experimentation, fielding, and application of novel—and potentially game-changing technology—tactics, techniques, and procedures.

While USSOF conducted a diverse range of operations during this time, the bulk of US public and policymaker attention was focused on the direct-action campaigns—such as the one that killed Osama Bin Laden, Operation Neptune Spear—that made USSOF better known. In some ways, USSOF suffers from its own success. USSOF faces the challenge of its media-molded image versus the reality of it being a highly expert and quiet force. As such, some still perceive USSOF’s role as confined to direct action despite the range of indirect action and other operations it conducts, ranging from training and equipping components of foreign security forces to enhancing relationships between US forces and foreign civilian authorities.

Public perceptions of USSOF

Perhaps due to its success in the GWOT, USSOF is too often viewed only as the finish force, closing the kill chain for its conventional service counterparts.⁴Instead, modern special operators should be understood as playing a role much earlier in the management of competition, prior to conflict. USSOF operates globally, across the entire competition continuum, and rapidly tests and employs novel or critical capabilities to enhance security operations.⁵ USSOF will continue to conduct CT and COIN operations, when necessary, but today’s security environment requires USSOF to prioritize its role in strategic competition—this may more closely mirror the role it played below active armed conflict in the Cold War era.⁶

USSOF has continued to play this role in some capacity over the past twenty years, albeit less visibly than some of its actions during the GWOT. Furthermore, if called upon, USSOF has the competencies and authorities to employ irregular-warfare concepts and gray-zone tactics in strategic competition. Nevertheless, few decision-makers think of it that way. It is time that policymakers update their understanding of USSOF and enhance the valuable role it can play in strategic competition.

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USSOF today in the context of strategic competition

USSOF’s strengths applied to strategic competition

Today, the US Joint Force confronts a pacing threat in China and an acute threat in Russia—far more sophisticated adversaries than it faced in VEOs throughout the GWOT.⁷ Prevailing in this era of strategic competition requires the Joint Force to shift its competitive mindset in order to effectively respond to threats spanning the competition continuum and cutting across theaters and domains. Within this three-dimensional approach to competition, USSOF is a critical operator, complementing conventional-force readiness and military dominance with a unique blend of competencies and capabilities that can be leveraged to deter, prepare for, and respond to armed conflict.

The 2023 Joint Concept for Competing defines strategic competition as “a persistent and long-term struggle that occurs between two or more adversaries seeking to pursue incompatible interests without necessarily engaging in armed conflict with each other.”⁸ In addition, the concept of the “competition continuum” was introduced as a Joint Concept in 2019, and describes a world of enduring competition conducted through a mixture of cooperation, competition below armed conflict, and armed conflict—a description that allows for simultaneous interaction with the same actor across different situations.⁹ These two concepts acknowledge that US adversaries have circumvented US conventional military dominance by competing below the threshold of armed conflict for some time. Following Operation Desert Storm in 1991, the United States celebrated a decisive battlefield win, while US competitors learned they must devise ways to compensate for unrivaled US conventional power and win without fighting through non-conventional means. USSOF is accustomed to operating across the competition continuum and cooperating with allies and partners to support US objectives, while simultaneously creating dilemmas for adversaries in an evolving threat environment. These factors make USSOF a versatile and critical instrument in strategic competition not only in the military domain, but also operating in support of diplomatic and economic objectives.

The following section outlines four key competencies USSOF brings to bear to support US strategic competition: its engagement with allies and partners, its global footprint, its ability to achieve effects across the competition continuum, and its cutting-edge use of technology.

I. Global and persistent engagement with allies and partners

The first major competency of USSOF is its proactive and sustained engagement of allies and adversaries globally.

USSOF is global by nature, confronting adversaries across every domain and every part of the world where China and Russia are undermining US and allied interests. Beijing leverages its influence, military, and predatory economic practices to bully its neighbors and project power far beyond the Indo-Pacific. Russia simultaneously wages a war of aggression against Ukraine, challenges national sovereignty across Europe, and undermines the security of nations globally through its cyberattacks, intimidation, and information operations. USSOF’s global role enables it to respond to China and Russia internationally.

USSOF builds and maintains authentic and multigenerational connections with allies and partners by training, advising, and assisting various countries in their security. This global presence and these relationships also enable USSOF to observe and counter Chinese and Russian influence in key regions while simultaneously engaging with and building trust with key partners. US partners may have greater access to observe Chinese or Russian activity. As such, USSOF engagement internationally not only supports partners but also creates greater options for the United States to counter adversarial influence.

USSOF approaches its relationships with allies and partners through persistent (rather than episodic) engagement, which generates a comprehensive understanding of host nations, threats to their security, and the second- and third-order effects of decisions and operations in those local contexts. USSOF’s enduring partnerships allow the United States to engage with nations in areas of strategic competition by assisting them with the problems they care about most. This is especially important for certain partners that may not view China or Russia as a threat, leaving USSOF as one of the only viable and trusted partners to discreetly engage on US foreign policy matters in certain areas.

USSOF spearheaded the by, with, and through approach for the US military, in which “operations are led by [US] partners, state or nonstate, with enabling support from the United States or US-led coalitions, and through US authorities and partner agreements.” USSOF’s approach centers allies and partners in the defense of their own nations, often leading to more successful results. This approach is better for the partner nation and also for the United States.

USSOCOM also has a USSOF Civil Affairs element, which works “by, with, and through unified action partners to shape conditions and influence indigenous populations and institutions” in support of DOD and US embassy strategies.¹⁰In this capacity, USSOF supports other parts of allied governments to leverage non-military instruments of power. In so doing, USSOF is able to gain “placement and access”—proximity to or the ability to approach an individual, facility, or information that enables one to carry out an intended mission—in geographic areas where US embassies otherwise do not have a presence. This expands the options available to US decision-makers to respond to activities by China and Russia in areas where the United States may not have much of a diplomatic or conventional military presence.

While physical presence remains important, USSOF can also support nations from a distance or virtually, which helps reduce costs and provides operators with greater flexibility by avoiding direct confrontation or escalation that may come from physical presence. Throughout the war in Ukraine, USSOF has advised and assisted Kyiv from a distance. Following the 2014 invasion, the US military brought together conventional and special-operations troops to create the Joint Multinational Training Group-Ukraine, including a “Q course.” This Army Special Forces qualification course (formally called the Special Forces Qualification Course) teaches everything from combat competencies and survival, evasion, resistance, and escape (SERE) to how to navigate in an unconventional-warfare environment. Even without a large physical footprint in Ukraine, USSOF has been able to effectively assist Ukrainians with training and logistics.¹¹This demonstrates a valuable competency, and can serve as a model for training and supporting other countries relevant to strategic competition that may otherwise be difficult to physically operate within.

USSOF’s relationships can be multigenerational. By operating in the same regions for decades, USSOF builds relationships that can breed mutual trust and understanding. These relationships (and the inherent trust with allies and partners that follows) are sustained through USSOF and allied counterparts participating in joint training exercises, attending each other’s training courses, and sharing tactical and strategic experience. Through such exchanges and training, US allies and partners enhance their warfighting capabilities and improve their interoperability with the United States. In turn, the United States gains a deeper understanding of the security cultures and threat perceptions of other countries. This information improves US activities and operations, and further guides decision-making by opening avenues for the United States to engage new stakeholders abroad. US engagement with regional stakeholders can complicate an adversary’s risk calculus, as it is forced to consider the potential consequences of aggression against regional actors to which the United States is tied.

USSOF’s tailored approach to its regional relationships generally produces special operators with more global and joint experience earlier in their careers when compared to their service counterparts. Through their deployments, special operators exchange tactics, techniques, and procedures with partner nations. Their cultural adeptness and multi-domain backgrounds empower USSOF to plug in quickly, adjust to varying cultural, geographic, and political contexts, and build new connections for the Joint Force for years to come.

II. Gaining placement and access across the globe 

Secondly, USSOF’s deep alliances and partnerships offer an asymmetric advantage over China, Russia, and other competitors. USSOF collaborates with allies and partners to create global impact in a way that may be outsized to its presence. Even a small USSOF unit can take localized actions that might compel adversaries to contend with widespread repercussions. For example, USSOF may work with an Indo-Pacific nation to gain increased access for the United States Air Force to operate in the region, signaling to China increased US capacity and maneuverability that could alter China’s risk calculus as it conducts maritime activities in the Indo-Pacific. Or USSOF may work with an African partner to counter Chinese or Russian local information operations that adversely affect its influence in multiple countries across the region and beyond.

USSOF’s partnerships and presence in host nations build US regional placement and access, in turn providing virtual and/or physical proximity to an entity of interest. This placement and access support the Intelligence Community by providing insights in normally inaccessible locations while also enhancing the Joint Force’s ability to compete across the globe’s farthest corners, enabling it to support allies and partners in identifying and responding to adversarial and illicit behavior. For USSOF, in particular, this proximity forms the foundation for responding to coercive or subversive activity below the threshold of armed conflict. For example, China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) gives it placement and access in a range of countries across the Indo-Pacific, Africa, Europe, and Latin America. Through subversive economic practices, China has capitalized on key industries, accessed new markets, and coercively influenced local decisions in developing countries by leveraging its economic power. This all-of-nation approach buys China influence and could enable an expanded military presence—for instance, through the acquisition of ports and waterways that serve as potential maritime chokepoints. China’s BRI activities have taken place in some countries where the United States lacks a large presence or access, but USSOF can and does operate in areas where other US entities do not.

If harnessed effectively, USSOF can be leveraged in key strategic regions to educate local governments, conduct reconnaissance of local activity, employ information operations, collect intelligence, and collaborate with interagency partners. As such, USSOF can be used to mitigate or respond to Chinese and Russian attempts to expand their influence in regions that are lesser priorities for US conventional force presence. USSOF’s global access is particularly important when crises or conflicts erupt. For instance, as the Israel-Hamas conflict continues, USSOF could surge on its CT, COIN, and hostage-rescue mission sets in the Middle East, allowing the Joint Force at large to remain focused on the pacing challenge of China. Overall, USSOF global presence enables the United States to maintain strategic ground in other, less-prioritized regions, while preserving a relatively light and inexpensive footprint.

The light and relatively affordable nature of USSOF’s global presence furthers US interests in parts of the globe where the United States may not have a strong foothold, providing outsized value.

III. Operations across the competition continuum 

USSOF is adept and experienced in operating below the threshold of conflict. This “gray zone” of competition can be defined as “the space in which defensive and offensive activity occurs above the level of cooperation and below the threshold of armed conflict.” Dating back to the Cold War era, special operations were one of the few military capabilities that challenged coercion below the threshold of armed conflict. This space and time prior to armed conflict is increasingly central in modern competition, especially when adversaries employ a “win without fighting” strategy. China and Russia rely on cyber, economic, information, and other asymmetric capabilities to advance their interests, especially when they cannot outmatch US conventional military superiority or when unconventional activities achieve their objectives just as well.

The United States has recognized the need to operate more strategically along this competition continuum in order to better compete with China and Russia. The 2022 National Defense Strategy recognized the need to “campaign across domains and the spectrum of conflict” to improve the US understanding of its operating environment and to shape the perceptions and risk calculi of US adversaries.¹² Through the United States’ own gray-zone activities—such as the development of partner nations’ resistance and resilience capabilities, and information and cognitive operations—USSOF can help mitigate strategic risk, support US national objectives, and buy “decision space” for US and allied leaders, while limiting exposure to political and economic risks that may come from a larger military presence or more overt action.¹³ 

“Integrated deterrence” campaigning should rely upon USSOF activities, including (but not limited to) its ability to establish resistance mechanisms, conduct information operations, engage in Civil Affairs, and collect intelligence. Such activities impact adversaries by tying up or forcing them to reposition their resources, thus creating disruptions and dilemmas that benefit the United States.¹⁴ USSOF’s role in executing integrated deterrence is perhaps best articulated through its irregular-warfare capabilities, which offer a “critical tool to campaign across the spectrum of conflict, enhance interoperability and access, and disrupt competitor warfighting advantages while reinforcing our own.” USSOF deters adversaries’ actions across the continuum by illuminating and confronting acts of proxy aggression, information warfare, economic warfare, and subversion. This enhances the options available to US decision-makers while simultaneously sowing chaos that disrupts adversarial decision-making.

USSOF’s competencies across the competition continuum are as follows.

Information Warfare

USSOF actively engages in the information domain by exposing and countering adversary propaganda and disinformation, as well as campaigning—that is, conducting “logically linked military initiatives”—to achieve US defense priorities over time.¹⁵ In 2019, then commander of US Special Operations Command General Richard Clarke stated that 60 percent of the special-operations community’s focus was “working in the information space,” as opposed to a 90-percent focus on “the kinetic fight” just a decade earlier. USSOF’s MISO activities have more than tripled in the past three years, with special operations contributing 60 percent of MISO activities conducted worldwide in fiscal year 2022. This trend will likely intensify in future conflict as the information domain remains a key arena for strategic competition, as China and Russia use information or “informatized” warfare to counter US strategic objectives and further their own.¹⁶ Information operations can be used to great effect. For example, Ukraine has successfully leveraged information operations to rally support for its armed forces and—tactically and operationally—to “[erode] the will of individual [Russian] soldiers,” which has partially contributed to seventeen thousand Russians deserting the military.

Recognizing the prominence of information and cognitive warfare, USSOCOM established the Information Warfare Center (IWC) in 2021. The IWC aims to enhance and consolidate USSOCOM’s psychological-operations capabilities, in conjunction with information-related capabilities in the cyber and space domains, specializing in “influence artillery rounds”—detecting adversarial activity across the globe and pushing that information to operators, who then must identify tailored informational “munitions” to match the target confronting them.

Space and cyber warfare

USSOF similarly recognizes the significance of the cyber and space domains, with the US Army spearheading the concept of a “modern triad” consisting of space, cyber, and special operations to “provide options to commanders to deter activity below the threshold of conflict.” While cyber, space, and special-operations capabilities are powerful on their own, melded together they generate vast options and opportunities for the Joint Force to rapidly influence outcomes across the competition continuum.

The triad might manifest as follows.

• Special Operations Command “provides unique access at the tip of the spear for both space enabling infrastructure and cyber access”; 
• Space and Missile Defense Command “provides missile defeat and other unique space capabilities”; and 
• Cyber Command “provides cyber capabilities as well as data analytics to better inform operations of the other two legs.” 

For example, USSOF could use its unique placement and access to enable a US Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM) operation into a remote adversary downlink site, holding its ability to conduct space domain awareness at risk and giving USSPACECOM an option during crisis or conflict. This triad, which combines intelligence threads and capabilities, offers commensurate responses to low-intensity and hybrid threats.

Cyber, space, and special operations are distinct from other military instruments in their multi-domain “global reach.” Each of these tools is not confined to operations in a traditional domain or geographic theater; rather, their application extends across all the military services and combatant commands.¹⁷ USSOF’s ability to effectively employ the triad, in turn, will integrate this response option into Joint Force campaigning and contingency response plans to fill operational gaps across domains and regions. Still today, this idea remains largely conceptual at the joint level—the space component is less natural to bring in, given USSOF has long utilized cyber and signals intelligence capabilities to track targets.

Supporting the Joint Force and interagency

The primary objectives of operating in the gray zone are to counter malign actions below the threshold of armed conflict and to ensure competition does not escalate into full-blown conflict. Should conflict break out, however, USSOF’s OPE activities will prove critical for supporting large-scale combat operations. During combat, USSOF is equally critical as an enabler for the Joint Force. USSOF is well-positioned to provide a firsthand assessment of the situation and response options given its persistent presence and engagement in key regions. For example, USSOF could play a pivotal role in capturing key terrain and securing ground lines of communication—both actions that would set the conditions for Joint Force success while disrupting adversarial military planning. During conflict, USSOF can help mitigate strategic risk for the Joint Force through supporting operations. This was demonstrated during Operation Inherent Resolve, during which small numbers of special operators, in concert with regional partners, took back territory held by the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS), constrained Iranian aggression, pushed back against Russian encroachment, and limited escalation between Kurdish and Turkish forces.

Furthermore, USSOF teams can serve as a focal point for synchronizing the effects of interagency partners, allied and partner militaries, and the Joint Force. This collaborative approach is evident in the fifth “SOF Truth,” which states that “most special operations require non-SOF assistance.”¹⁸ USSOF’s effectiveness is enhanced by its integration with other DOD components and interagency partners, merging military expertise with diplomatic, economic, and informational tools. At the same time, USSOF augments joint and interagency operations, thus enabling a comprehensive approach to address strategic competition by aligning diverse capabilities toward common objectives. Decision-makers across the interagency and in the DOD may not appreciate the full role USSOF plays prior to conflict. Not only is it impossible to build USSOF capabilities overnight in the event of a conflict, but also, if USSOF capabilities are employed only at the onset of a conflict, they will not have been employed to their full effect.

With the proper authorities, special operations can extend the scope, scale, and reach of interagency deterrent tools by both providing US government partners with the inputs required to execute operations (e.g., placement and access) and amplifying the desired output or effect (e.g., bringing together various instruments of power). This is particularly important given that USSOF has formal operational-planning experience that is not inherently a function of other government departments and agencies. For example, USSOF works with the Department of Treasury’s Office of Foreign Asset Controls to enhance sanctions support capability on the ground; it leverages MISO and Civil Affairs to amplify Department of State public diplomacy; and it convenes various stakeholders for cross-cutting human security issues such as illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing, and mitigating harm to civilians. JIIM partnerships are required to compete against China and Russia, and USSOF is well-positioned to support and enable them.

USSOF includes specialized teams that can bolster US security advantages below the threshold of conflict. While much of USSOF’s activity falls within the classified realm, USSOF’s cross-functional teams execute numerous SOF operations. Building upon the definitions of USSOF’s core activities provided above, this holistic approach addresses threats across the competition continuum in the following ways.

• Civil Affairs forces “conduct preparation of the environment, support to unconventional warfare, foreign internal defense, and civil network development and engagement across the competition continuum”; 
• Psychological Operations forces “conduct Military Information Support Operations (MISO) in permissive, uncertain, and hostile environments to change the behavior of foreign audiences—both friendly and adversarial—in support of US objectives”; and 
• Special Forces “discretely shapes the operating environment in both peace and complex uncertainty,” with two primary missions of unconventional warfare and foreign internal defense.¹⁹

These three elements comprise a comprehensive intelligence picture and can support the Joint Force’s creation and execution of plans to counter Chinese, Russian, and other adversaries’ gray-zone activities in key regions.

IV. At the cutting edge of capability development and employment 

USSOF is creative about harnessing and experimenting with emerging technology and capabilities. USSOCOM “continues to serve as a pathfinder” for integrating data-driven technologies, such as artificial intelligence and machine learning, into the Joint Force by serving as early adopters of new technology.²⁰USSOF have a proven track record of engaging with the US defense-industrial base and testing novel capabilities in combat effectively. Such experimentation is valuable as emerging technology enables the Joint Force to compete with an increasingly technologically advanced China. USSOF is adept at proactively identifying promising early technology from the private sector and reaching out to companies to adapt technology to suit the forces’ needs.

Due to USSOF’s smaller size, proactivity, and service-like acquisition authorities, it is often able to acquire technology more rapidly than other parts of the DOD. USSOF’s external innovation unit, SOFWERX, collaborates with various nontraditional participants in the defense innovation ecosystem through events and Small Business Innovation Research programs (SBIRs), rapidly enhancing the equipment and capabilities of special operators.²¹ SOFWERX, in turn, became the beta model and launch point for all the subsequent “WERX” across the services, such as AFWERX, SPACEWERX, etc. From transmitting and seeing in dark tunnels to flying unmanned aerial vehicles in denied airspace, USSOF often serves as a technological testbed for capabilities that have utility across the Joint Force and, in many cases, advances capabilities to ensure battlefield superiority. USSOF is a leader in identifying, testing, fielding, and evolving new, cutting-edge technologies across the Department of Defense and the IC. Appropriately resourced, USSOF can continue to advance innovation adoption for the Joint Force at a time when doing so is essential for strategic competition.

USSOF is a particularly impressive model for innovation because it can “turn the crank of force design, force development, and force employment faster than any other part of DoD,” which “lend[s] it an inherent advantage in generating innovative capabilities.” Able to rapidly develop, test, and implement emerging technologies at earlier points of relevance, USSOF tends to live at the cutting edge of defense innovation. For example, the Global Positioning System (GPS) was largely untested in combat until Operation Desert Storm, during which special operations forces used GPS to conduct special reconnaissance deep in enemy territory. USSOF informed GPS techniques and equipment for the entire Joint Force. This form of combat testing can help the larger military identify, transition, and adopt promising technologies for future conflicts.

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What’s next? Enhancing USSOF in the 2020s and beyond

This report has established the invaluable role that USSOF can and does play in enabling the United States to achieve its strategic objectives, including adapting to and outpacing China, the pacing threat. USSOF should be harnessed more effectively by the US policymaking community and the DOD to help achieve US strategic-competition goals. USSOF is uniquely able to operate in early phases of the competition continuum (prior to conflict) and in austere locations, while using specialized tools and methods that the rest of the Joint Force cannot. Specifically, USSOF can help realize US deterrence goals without the need for escalation to conflict, and can provide the Joint Force with preconditioned advantages if crisis erupts.

Looking forward, as the whole Joint Force adapts to meet an era of strategic competition, USSOF must also continue to evolve. USSOF should consider the following recommendations to ensure it can best support US goals in strategic competition.

Revamping USSOF’s mindset for strategic competition 

First, USSOF must continue to adapt its competitive mindset to play a larger role in strategic competition. In addition to the important role it plays in direct action, USSOF should expand its disruptive non-kinetic activities and irregular-warfare concepts with the goal of chipping away at US adversaries’ diplomatic, economic, and military strength. Those who weave USSOF capabilities into regional and global campaign plans should consider the significant utility of SOF’s indirect action. China and Russia pose vastly different challenges from VEOs, with which USSOF became well-acquainted over the past two decades. Near-peer competitors deploy sophisticated military, intelligence, diplomatic, and economic capabilities to secure their interests, and strategic competition thus creates a threat environment that is quantitatively and qualitatively distinct from the GWOT. Direct action—such as countering VEOs—will continue to be a task for USSOF, enabling the rest of the DOD to focus on other strategic priorities. However, as USSOF recommends to decision-makers how best to harness its capabilities, it should emphasize its in-depth understanding of complex problems, rather than a predisposition for immediate action.

Second, it is important that USSOF—and the Joint Force at large—recognize that the US military should most often play a “supporting,” rather than “supported,” role in conducting foreign affairs, in support of the State Department as lead.²² This necessitates flexibility and adaptability, which USSOF showcases with its ability to quickly plug into new contexts and work with interagency counterparts and country teams. However, even then, much of today’s existing USSOF-interagency cooperation is built around the GWOT era, during which non-military instruments of power primarily supported USSOF-led operations (rather than the other way around) and partnerships were based largely around information sharing. USSOF’s role as a supporting entity will be most evident below the threshold of conflict, where non-DOD levers of power are often better suited than the military arsenal. USSOF must be empowered to play a supporting role by policymakers, who should see USSOF as playing a proactive—rather than reactive—role in the management of competition, employed preemptively to avoid escalation, rather than as a last resort when nothing else works.

Third, this shift in USSOF’s role must be similarly reflected in its alliances and partnerships. While USSOF fosters partner-nation resilience against Russia and China through foreign internal defense (FID), there is more it could do. For example, USSOF could expand its support for implementing the Global Fragility Act with focus countries, applying those principles in partnership with Taiwan and European nations to further develop their reserve force capabilities and whole-of-society resilience, both of which would be crucial to inhibit China from taking over Taiwan or respond to a potential Russian invasion. Policymakers should consider revising legislation such as the foreign security force capacity-building authority in Section 333 to support USSOF’s evolving role in strategic competition and stabilization activities.

Finally, as USSOF evolves its actions and attitudes toward strategic competition, it will face hurdles in overcoming orthodox DOD culture, bureaucratic morass, budget constraints, and recruitment and retention issues, including as other services request billets back. The office of ASD(SO/LIC) offers an important voice for USSOF in Washington, DC, to help USSOCOM navigate and advocate for its mission requirements within the Pentagon and wider interagency.

“Walk and chew gum at the same time” 

Operating in an era of strategic competition does not mean that threats prioritized during GWOT have disappeared—USSOF must be able to manage its more traditional tasks and its coordinating authority for countering VEO and WMD operations while executing its new ones.²³

USSOF partially does this through its activities across seven geographic combatant commands; thus, globally synchronizing Joint Force planning is key to fully recognizing and enabling the value of special operations. USSOF can compete with both China and Russia in traditional and less-traditional theaters. For example, USSOF’s pre-conflict capabilities can and should be employed more extensively in China’s near abroad—the Indo-Pacific—through maritime and undersea operations, sensitive activities, and partnership building. At the same time, USSOF can play a central role by competing with China and Russia in their far-abroads, particularly in US Southern Command and US Africa Command, while other parts of the Joint Force are focused elsewhere. Both of these combatant commands are “deeply immersed in peer-competition with China” in ways that have direct implications for the United States’ overall security posture. For example, China’s base in Djibouti allows it to project power further abroad than it would otherwise be able, and China’s space ground station in Argentina enables it to monitor US space assets. In these two regions, USSOF could leverage its OPE, special reconnaissance, intelligence capabilities, and partnerships to gain competitive advantages over near-peer adversaries. Altogether, USSOF’s global footprint enables the Joint Force to target and track near-peer adversaries globally and coordinate approaches to them regionally.

USSOF is challenged to balance both future operations, such as campaigning in the information and cognitive domains, while also managing ongoing threats from VEOs, hostage rescue, and proxy wars, which simultaneously place operational demands on USSOF. While CT and COIN operations may not be as relevant for strategic competition today, SOF’s crisis response and CVEO will remain key competencies. To fit within this complex and taxing operating landscape, USSOF’s mission and priorities must be integrated across the DOD, and special operations must be viewed as an offering falling within each respective service, rather than as a separate entity. This need is complicated by the reality that USSOF components are distinctive across the military, filling disparate roles and viewed differently by their parent services.

Applying SOF’s strengths in new ways 

USSOF must play to its strengths, applying its operational approaches from the GWOT to new problem sets in the context of strategic competition. This includes operating in new domains, applying and accelerating emerging technologies, and building upon core activities that were de-prioritized over the past two decades. USSOF excels at operating in denied and niche environments. For instance, USSOF is uniquely trained to operate in underground tunnels and facilities, which otherwise pose a threat to situational awareness and target execution. The salience of this environment is illustrated by the current conflict in Gaza, where underground tunnels serve as a strategic vantage point for Hamas and complicate Israeli operations and US efforts to rescue US hostages held by terrorists. The ability to operate underground is just one example of how USSOF can fill an operational gap for the US military, as USSOF is the only component that has the highly specialized tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) for operating in those environments.  

How can SOF’s strengths be applied in new ways? First, USSOF’s ability to quickly adapt to new environments could be further leveraged in strategic competition. For example, USSOF should enhance its capabilities in cyber, space, and undersea warfare—all with a foundation of flexible doctrine and tactical innovations—in order to compete with China’s approach to “informatized warfare” and its rapid technology development.²⁴ Additionally, WARCOM (the naval component of USSOCOM) is undergoing a modernization effort in two key underwater systems—namely the shallow-water combat submersible and the dry-combat submersible, which are both critical to moving SEALS through oceans. These modernizations provide enhanced situational awareness to operators, improved range, increased payload, better speed and loitering time, and a modernized command-and-control architecture—all of which will enable USSOF to leverage undersea capabilities for strategic competition.

Another example exists in the Arctic, where MARSOC is uniquely positioned to operate in extreme weather conditions and address burgeoning security challenges that continue to arise as polar ice melts. However, to effectively operate there, MARSOC’s Civil Affairs expertise must be bolstered to fully enhance its role in support of Arctic security. USAF SOF trains in Alaska and with European Arctic countries to support extreme weather operations like search and rescue. As Chinese and Russian activity and presence above the Arctic Circle increase—including under the auspices of science, energy, and environmental missions—USSOF intelligence and access will be invaluable.

Second, USSOF’s Civil Affairs and PSYOPs components require further attention to be fully harnessed in strategic competition. Civil Affairs is a tightly stretched, low-density function, with just one brigade of USSOF Civil Affairs force structure in the entire military. That brigade houses capabilities such as economic analysis, special collections, observations and advanced intelligence gathering, penetrations of transnational criminal organizations (TCO), training and cultural immersion, and placement and access into adversarial commercial and government networks. If resourced effectively, Civil Affairs can take on more tasks, such as building civil-military reconnaissance in politically sensitive areas, helping legitimize local governing powers in contested regions, or helping respond to natural disasters and humanitarian crises (which will only become more prevalent with climate change). Additionally, MARSOC’s Civil Affairs strength is in its language and cultural skills. For instance, MARSOC has been very active in the Philippines for many years, and the expanded partnership between the United States and the Philippines is evidence of this investment paying off. Such Civil Affairs activities are worth increased investment, particularly with key partners in the Indo-Pacific.

Finally, the technological and cognitive performance solutions required for USSOF’s—and the Joint Force’s—success will continue to evolve in response to the growing arsenals of US adversaries like China. On today’s battlefield, USSOF will need to achieve cognitive overmatch—the “ability to dominate the situation by making informed decisions faster than the opponent”—which can be dramatically enhanced with the aid of advanced technologies like artificial intelligence. The hyper-enabled operator of the future must be “empowered by technologies that enhance the operator’s cognition at the edge by increasing situational awareness, reducing cognitive load, and accelerating decision making.” As such, special operators will need to operate with the support of an interconnected network of sensors, a robust communications architecture, and human-machine interfaces. Through its Preservation of the Force and Family (POTFF) program, USSOF has placed increased attention on cognitive performance and brain health, which it sees as necessary “to operate in an increasingly complex, information-rich environment.” These investments have led to demonstrated improvements in “self-regulation, cognitive processing speed, and sustained attention” for participants. At the same time, USSOF has partnered with DOD Health Affairs to improve its traumatic brain injury (TBI)-prevention efforts. Investing in the cognitive domain is critical to ensure special operators are well-prepared for, and avoid accepting undue risk in, a complex operating environment.²⁵

Knowing what success looks like 

One of USSOF’s biggest challenges in a transforming security environment is constructing its identity in 2024 and beyond. This requires USSOF and DOD leadership to ask and respond to ambitious questions regarding the requirements of future warfare and the role of USSOF.

Who is the special operator in 2024 and beyond? 

As USSOF’s role in strategic competition evolves, so does the face of the special operator. The special operator of 2024 may be a cyber operator gaining virtual placement and access, rather than the Hollywood depiction of the frontline operator deployed in the kinetic, physical battle. The SOF operator who is culturally immersed in a region or area that holds strategic value plays a key role in enabling US activities and intelligence. So do the SOF experts in space, AI, engineering, or physics support operations, who bring invaluable cognitive power and technological know-how. Although enablers are frequently perceived as secondary to operators, their work is often high-end and critical to mission success, making them a focal point for current investment needs. Additionally, as USSOF continues to adapt, gender may play a valuable role in military competition, education, negotiations, and training. For instance, an all-female special-operations team (Operational Detachment Alpha, or ODA), can engage with women in local populations, like Afghanistan, in different and valuable ways than an all-male team. Gender diversity allows SOF to operate in varied roles, opening up new opportunities where gender may lead to favorable outcomes. 

How can USSOF measure its own success?

Landing on clear metrics or conducting a net assessment to quantify the success of special operations is nearly impossible, as it is difficult to measure the effectiveness of preventing something from occurring over time. Despite this difficulty, USSOF must internally define a clear mission for strategic competition and establish a tracking mechanism to assess whether it is making progress toward its goals. In particular, the DOD should place emphasis on developing MISO/influence campaigns with measurable criteria that focus on output, not just input, to ensure that such activities are truly changing behavior and perceptions of the target audience. Moreover, USSOF must be able to effectively articulate its value and successes to the public, Congress, the DOD at large, and the wider interagency, while protecting some of its more unique contributions that should remain classified. For example, while the taglines of “creating dilemmas” and “imposing costs” are useful in their simplicity for describing USSOF, they do not give policymakers a clear framework to understand how USSOF achieves a desired impact. USSOF could instead articulate its success by citing deliberate campaigns to disrupt and frustrate an adversary’s strategy or operations, with the ultimate goal of undermining an adversary’s confidence that its military can win decisively. Such an articulation could mirror RAND’s 2023 “Strategic Disruption” framework for five pillars of disruption (resist, support, influence, understand, target), which helps communicate the role USSOF plays in achieving strategic effects as defined by measurable results.

How should USSOF prioritize its core activities for strategic competition?

Joint Force decision-makers should consider the myriad ways USSOF can increasingly support strategic competition and work with ASD SO/LIC and USSOCOM to re-prioritize some of USSOF’s core activities to match the needs of strategic competition. This prioritization could see an increased role for USSOF pre-conflict in China and Russia’s near-abroad—the Indo-Pacific and Europe—and a deeper role for USSOF during conflict in China and Russia’s far-abroad, such as AFRICOM, SOUTHCOM, and other areas of responsibility.

USSOF cannot establish its own priorities in a vacuum—it will prioritize what the Joint Force needs. But ASD SO/LIC and USSOCOM can align to effectively communicate their vision for SOF’s role in strategic competition within the Pentagon. This will likely include identifying where USSOF is insufficiently prepared for strategic competition and developing methodologies to test and measure the performance of various activities in the context of competing with China and Russia.

As discussed, rebalancing to strategic competition must be done in balance—crisis response (CR) will remain a top priority for USSOF, in which countering VEOs remains key as they frequently cause crises that require response. CT and COIN missions have value, and USSOF’s ability to counter VEOs allows the broader force to stay focused on near-peer competitors. With that being said, USSOF should outwardly view its CT, COIN, counternarcotic (CN), and partner capacity-building activities in a new light, as contributing factors to competition by maintaining influence and trust with partners.

USSOF should also preemptively invest in Civil Affairs, MISO, and intelligence, which are actively engaged prior to conflict. A good example of USSOF’s leadership approach within the Pentagon is its centralization and special interest-item designation of MISO funding, which demonstrates congressional and civilian leadership exercising oversight, control, and authority over the military. The role of ASD(SO/LIC) in advocating for and prioritizing MISO efforts is important to ensure this function remains funded.

How can USSOF and the services find new opportunities for better integration? 

USSOF and the US military services need to better integrate, understanding how they can work together to achieve missions. Part of this requires the Pentagon at large and military services to better understand what USSOF looks like today and the different missions and roles it can play. It is the authors’ hope that this report helps elucidate this for decision-makers. In addition, USSOF and the military services can improve their communication to further understand the presence and activities that USSOF conducts in regions pre-conflict. USSOF’s placement and access can be a significant advantage from an intelligence perspective, but too often US military operations globally are not synchronized as part of global campaign plans. Missions conducted by USSOF in one Combatant Command’s area of responsibility could have utility and reinforce the goals of another. Improving awareness to support more synchronized global campaign planning would help USSOF to be better harnessed for strategic competition. For example, a SOF team present in USAFRICOM may be able to conduct one or two additional tasks as part of an existing mission, which could help support or supply information to another Combatant Command or interagency partner to support its intelligence and missions. In other words, USSOF teams can support linkages between geographic combatant commands, wherein strategic competition spans geographic seams.

How can USSOF and defense-industrial base relations be enhanced?  

Given the strength of USSOF as a leader in innovation and experimentation, there are opportunities to improve collaboration between USSOF and the leading edge of the US defense-industrial ecosystem. USSOF can often identify new innovations from nontraditional partners for the DOD with more agility than the department at large. However, given the specialized nature of USSOF, the traditional defense-industrial base and newer defense entrants must continue to consider partnering with the special-operations community at a much smaller scale than they might for other parts of the military services. SOFWERX has a good model for engaging with the defense-industrial base, but as the DOD strives to work with newer entrants into the defense market, including technology companies that do not have large contracting teams, SOFWERX must continue to find new ways to reach out to the private sector and inform it of its operational needs. The Atlantic Council’s Commission on Innovation Adoption provides a range of recommendations for improving the DOD’s process of absorbing innovative technology from the leading edge of the private sector. Continuing to cultivate a culture of operational experimentation and incentivizing and rewarding private-sector engagement will help USSOF remain an effective testing ground for new capabilities in support of USSOF’s mission success.

How can USSOF continue to effectively cooperate with its allied counterparts?  

Similarly critical is the need to communicate to US allies and partners where USSOF is today and where it plans to go in terms of future areas of focus, investments, and adaptations. In some cases, US allies and partners are steps ahead in realizing the critical role that their special-operations forces play in strategic competition—US decision-makers should take lessons from this. In Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia, for example, the special forces are considered and understood to be a priority capability, as SOF allow the geographically small Baltic countries to do more in relation to their deterrence and defense against Russia with fewer troops. Norway, for its part, is a leader in developing close coordination between the Norwegian SOF, NATO SOF Headquarters, and the international SOF liaison division at USSOCOM.83 The UK, which has some of the oldest and most entrenched special forces in the world, has recognized that the nature of strategic competition necessitates investing in small, specialized teams that can operate globally, maintaining concurrent points of presence and access while also countering state disinformation campaigns, disrupting terrorist groups, protecting military deployments overseas, and countering adversaries’ cyber capabilities in the virtual domain. To learn from allied special-operations forces and integrate with them, the United States must continue to align with them on shared priorities and seek opportunities for multilateral operations.

Picture this

As we consider USSOF’s role over the last twenty years, it is helpful to see the interconnected parts that collectively comprise its unparalleled capability, which takes highly specialized selection, training, and resourcing to remain agile, innovative, and exceptional.  

Figure 1: USSOF’s four major tasks.

• Bubble 1:  Counter-terrorism (CT)/countering violent extremist organizations (CVEO)   
• Bubble 2:  Conflict  
• Bubble 3:  Crisis response  
• Bubble 4:  Competition with near-peers  

These mission areas are inextricably linked, requiring USSOF to constantly evolve and improve in an agile and efficient way by shifting resources as the threat environment changes. In the past twenty years, Bubble 1 has been the largest USSOF role, as that is what the United States has needed. But it has come at a cost to the rest of the bubbles (particularly Bubbles 2 and 4). As the Office of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE) and congressional discussions around budgets ensue, discussions should not focus on saving money by shaving forces historically associated with Bubble 1. Rather, budget discussions should be oriented around how to repurpose and refocus SOF as a dynamic, nimble, and culturally focused force against new priorities the United States faces. Just as SOF was refocused on CT and CVEO after 9/11, it is time to refocus USSOF on its other bubbles without overemphasizing one bubble at the cost of the others.  

In addition to a continued need for predicting, assessing, and providing the indications and warning and response capability for VEOs around the world, there are other things USSOF must continue to do.   

• USSOF should continue to build influence and capability with allies and partners, because this cannot be surged. 
• USSOF should be placed physically or virtually forward to understand adversary activities and create options to affect them below the level of armed conflict. 
• USSOF should prepare the environment for major combat operations; this cannot be surged. 

Much of state-actor and near-peer activity will be expressed through surrogates and proxies. Surrogate and proxy activity is not deterred only by conventional activity of aircraft carriers or fighter squadrons. Rather, deterrence can be supported by USSOF that can create asymmetric effects and provide policymakers options up and down the escalatory ladder.   

Finally, the policy community must understand how these bubbles converge, and find ways that the United States can gain advantages and mitigate risks in certain areas by taking advantage of the work in other areas. For example, USSOF must continue its CT/VEO work, as VEOs are likely to cause regional crises. Maintaining a robust crisis-response capability helps mitigate the risk of strategic distraction as it pertains to strategic competition, allowing other areas of the DOD and the interagency to focus on mitigating risks from Russia and China.

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Conclusion

Conventional force is a blunt instrument—USSOF can be dialed up or down and tailored in response to competition and aggression. Looking to USSOF as the last resort or finish force diminishes the critical and unique role that USSOF plays prior to conflict, shaping competition and supporting deterrence. USSOF should continue to adapt its approach to meet the demands of strategic competition, all while maintaining its ability to meticulously train a cadre of specialized professionals who can undermine the malign influence and operations of China, Russia, and other adversaries globally. USSOF offers an unparalleled return on investment—if the national security community fails to empower and resource special-operations forces in strategic competition, it misses a significant opportunity and leaves operational gaps that play right into the goals of strategic competitors China and Russia.

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About the authors

Clementine G. Starling is the director of the Atlantic Council’s Forward Defense program and a resident fellow within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. In her role, she shapes the Center’s US defense research agenda, leads Forward Defense’s team of nine staff and forty fellows, and produces thought leadership on US security strategies and the evolving character of warfare. Her research focuses on long-term US thinking on issues like China’s and Russia’s defense strategies, space security, defense industry, and emerging technology.

Prior to launching the Forward Defense program at the Atlantic Council, Starling served as the deputy director of the Atlantic Council’s Transatlantic Security team, specializing in European security policy and NATO. From 2016, she supported NATO’s Public Diplomacy Division at two NATO summits (Brussels and London) and organized and managed three senior Atlantic Council Task Forces on US force posture in Europe, military mobility, and US defense innovation adoption.

During her time at the Atlantic Council, Starling has written numerous reports and commentary on US space strategy, deterrence, operational concepts, coalition warfare, and US-Europe relations. Starling regularly serves as a panelist and moderator at public conferences, and her analysis and commentary have been featured in Defense One, Defense News, Real Clear Defense, the National Interest, Space News, NATO’s Joint Air & Space Power Conference, the BBC, National Public Radio, ABC News, and Government Matters, among others.

Starling was named the 2022 Herbert Roback scholar by the US National Academy of Public Administration. She also served as the 2020 Security and Defense fellow at Young Professionals in Foreign Policy.

Originally from the United Kingdom, Starling previously worked in the UK Parliament focusing on technology, defense, Middle East security, and Ukraine. She also supported the Britain Stronger in Europe campaign, championing for the United Kingdom to remain within the European Union.

She graduated with honors from the London School of Economics with a Bachelor of Science in international relations and history and is a Master of Security Studies candidate at Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service.

Alyxandra Marine is an assistant director in the Forward Defense practice at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. Marine contributes to Forward Defense programs and research on nuclear security, strategic studies, and defense strategy and policy. Prior to her work at the Atlantic Council, Marine worked as a researcher for a New York-based nonprofit aimed at bringing truth to political advertising, where she conducted research on foreign election interference. She also previously worked for the US Senate, where she provided research support on foreign relations and US fisheries policy.

Marine graduated with distinction from a dual degree program in international history, receiving an MA from Columbia University and an MSc from the London School of Economics and Political Science. Her thesis focused on the forward deployment of intermediate-range Jupiter ballistic missiles in Turkey, exploring the non-military and unconventional value of nuclear deployments within NATO and in a bilateral diplomatic context. While completing her graduate degrees, she conducted extensive research on the comparative nuclear policies during the global Cold War, US global economic and trade policy, and Cold War crises and inflection points, with a particular focus on de-escalation at moments with the potential for kinetic or nuclear warfare. She earned her BA with honors from New York University, where she dual-majored in history and political science, focusing on international environmental politics and the effects of the Cold War in the Middle East and East Asia.

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Acknowledgments

The Atlantic Council is grateful to the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict for its support of this research project.

The authors would like to acknowledge the critical research contributions made by Julia Siegel, who contributed her thought leadership to this paper during her time at the Atlantic Council—thank you. The authors are very grateful to the many experts and practitioners who made themselves available for consultations to inform this report and to those who provided invaluable peer review.

Forward Defense, housed within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, generates ideas and connects stakeholders in the defense ecosystem to promote an enduring military advantage for the United States, its allies, and partners. Our work identifies the defense strategies, capabilities, and resources the United States needs to deter and, if necessary, prevail in future conflict.

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Arab-Israelis, Arab citizens of Israel living within the country’s official borders, have struggled relative to Jewish communities for decades. The causes are many. Discrimination against minorities is hardly unique to Israel and occurs against the incommensurable security challenges faced by the Jewish state. But much of the crisis is caused by demography and the ineffective retail political strategies pursued by Israel’s Arab minority. There is low-hanging fruit here that provides an opportunity to ameliorate the crisis and spark further progress.

Year after year, crime rates—specifically violent crime rates—rise at an unprecedented rate. In 2023, 244 Arab-Israelis were killed in crime-related events. From 2018-2022, 70 percent of those killed in crime-related incidents were Arab despite making up only 21 percent of Israel’s population. By and large, these are intra-community crimes.

According to a study by the Taub Center for Social Policy Studies in Israel, the rising Arab-sector murder rate correlates to a few demographic factors. There is a population bulge of young Arabs from their late teens to mid-twenties. Arabs aged eighteen to twenty-two comprise the highest percentage of Arabs in any age demographic category: 29 percent compared to the overall 21 percent. The study observed “a positive and statistically significant correlation” between “the rate of growth in the number of Arab men aged 18-22 and both the murder rate and self-reported feelings of a lack of security.” Simultaneously, as the number of young Arab-Israeli men grows, so too has their unemployment rate. Even before the COVID-19 pandemic, the unemployment rate rose 7 percent in two years, reportedly due to disparate skills and demands of the labor market.

The study points to the lack of higher education among Israeli-Arab men as another factor driving the crime rate. Only 18 percent of men in their thirties hold bachelor’s degrees compared to 47 percent of non-Haredi Jewish men and 35 percent of Arab-Israeli women of the same age group. Not only does this impact their employability in Israel’s modern economy, but it has shifted gender attitudes and marriage norms. In the past decade, the number of Arab-Israeli women earning college degrees has doubled, affording them higher employment rates and greater independence. As a result, divorce rates in Arab communities have grown, and Arab-Israeli women are increasingly marrying non-Arab-Israeli men. Arab-Israeli men seeking marriage will face even greater challenges moving forward. Currently, the average age difference for intra-marriages within the Arab-Israeli community is six years. This will become increasingly problematic as, in coming years, there will be 5-10 percent more eligible men for marriage than women. These compounding factors of demographics, education, and marriage are pushing young Arab-Israeli men to the margins of their communities despite comprising a significant portion of the population. 

High poverty rates and underfunding of education further exacerbate the issues facing Israeli-Arab communities. In 2015, they received approximately $4,110 per primary student compared to about $5,150 per primary student in the Hebrew system (no other study exists to date). The reasons behind this discrepancy are complicated. The Israeli education system offers students the choice between primarily Hebrew and primarily Arabic instruction, with further options between secular schools and a variety of religious ones. In practicality, geography is a significant determinant of school choice. In Arab-Israeli towns, it is unlikely to find a predominantly Hebrew school. 

Israeli schools also have multiple sources of funding. The central government provides most schools’ budgets. Ninety-five percent of its resources are distributed equally between students, with the remaining 5 percent allocated based on socioeconomic conditions. In 2018, 45.3 percent of Arab-Israeli families fell below the poverty line compared to just 13.4 percent of Jewish families. The disparity in funding, therefore, does not come from the central government but from the ability of localities to provide their schools with additional funding. Considering that in 2023, 53 percent of Arab-Israeli households were living in poverty, Arab-Israeli communities are limited in the support they can provide. The effects of this discrepancy are detrimental to the success and well-being of Arab-Israelis. There is a direct correlation between school budgets and scores on Israeli university matriculation exams. The lack of a college degree, especially for men, impacts their job prospects, leaving them far more likely to remain in the cycle of unemployment, poverty, and crime, keeping schools underfunded for the next generation.

The Israeli government is aware of the challenges present in Arab-Israeli communities. At the end of 2015, the Knesset adopted a five-year plan to improve Arab sector economic development, integrate it into broader Israeli society, and narrow the socio-economic gap between Arab and Jewish communities. The plan allocated $2.6 billion to education, transportation, healthcare, and employment—an amount meant to be proportional to the Arab share of the population. A second five-year plan with a budget of almost $10.8 billion was passed in 2021 by the Naftali Bennet and Yair Lapid government. Significantly, this was the first governing coalition in Israel’s history to include an Arab party. 

When the current government came to power in December 2022, Bezalel Smotrich, the controversial far-right Religious Zionist leader, was appointed as finance minister. In subsequent months, he froze the release of $54 million designated by the five-year plan for Arab municipal authorities, citing an insufficient “supervisory mechanism” to prevent the funds from falling into the hands of criminals. This action was followed by calls from other ministers to review or even reallocate the funds. After a stalemate followed by the outbreak of the Israel-Hamas war, Interior Minister Moshe Arbel overrode Smotrich’s decision on November 1, 2023, sending the frozen funds, as well as an additional $62 million of emergency funds, to the Arab municipalities.

Why Israel should care

While the current war between Israel and Hamas presents many domestic challenges, it also displays to Jewish Israelis why they must care about the country’s Arab citizens. Eighty percent of Arab-Israelis oppose the October 7, 2023 attacks carried out by Hamas, and 66 percent support Israel’s right to defend itself against the terrorist group, according to a poll by the Agam Institute and Hebrew University. Similarly, another poll by the Center for Democratic Values and Institutions (Arab Society in Israel Program) noted that 56 percent believe the attacks “do not reflect Arab society, the Palestinian people, and the Islamic nation.”

Though this support is likely to wane as Israel carries out its counter-offensive in Gaza, the initial numbers show that Arab-Israelis have a sense of camaraderie with their fellow citizens. These are perhaps the most “pro-Israel” numbers to be found in the Arab world. Arab-Israelis were among those killed and kidnapped on October 7, 2023, and they were also among those saving Israeli lives. And there are numerous Arab-Israeli soldiers in the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) fighting against the country’s enemies.

Israel also has much to gain from properly addressing the issues facing the Arab sector. Israel’s always-prevalent security concerns regarding domestic and West Bank terrorism have heightened during the war. The more that Arab citizens identify with their fellow Israelis, the less support extreme factions of Arab-Israeli society will receive, and the more secure all Israelis will be and feel. Economically, the cost of investing in the growth and development of Arab-Israelis now will be far less than the cumulative cost of indefinitely providing large amounts of welfare and managing the effects of poverty. The economic success of Arab-Israelis will help integrate them into Israeli society, aid in improving the crime rate, and bolster Israel’s economy. Arab-Israelis should feel as though their fate is tied to the fate of their fellow citizens and vice versa. When Israel prospers, all its citizens prosper; when Israel suffers, all its citizens suffer. 

Opportunities for social and policy changes

In order to solve the Arab sector crisis, both Jewish and Arab leadership need to commit to change. Jewish political leaders must recognize the role of Arab society in Israel and the importance of helping it prosper. The five-year plans were a step in the right direction. The crisis cannot be rectified without purposeful and sufficient funding, and the whims of politicians should never condition this funding. However, funding alone is inadequate. The money must reach the sectors where it is most needed and effective. This will require the input and expertise of local Arab-Israeli leaders familiar with the crisis and affected communities. 

Additional avenues for integration and development should also be explored. Israel and the international community have long invested in people-to-people interactions between Jews and Arabs, but these experiences should be the norm and not the exception. Schools are a prime environment to house these programs. Geographic constraints and religious education complicate the integration of such programs into the regular school day, but after-school and extra-curricular activities could be effective. Not only would these programs create more face-to-face time between Jewish and Arab youth, but they also would emphasize the relevance and importance of school.

Tackling the crisis cannot solely focus on the next generation, though. Continuing adult education and skill acquisition programs can both help change the economic realities of Arab-Israeli families in the present moment and enable parents to emphasize the importance of education through their actions. But however ideal, it is unrealistic to expect Jewish politicians to pursue these policies on their own. Securing the necessary funding and support requires partnership and concessions from Arab leaders as well. 

The political behavior of Arab-Israeli citizens and politicians must change if they want to see greater government engagement with the crisis. Over the past few decades, Arab voter turnout has waned from 75 percent to 44 percent. To gain political influence, Arab citizens must increase their political involvement and vote in greater numbers. In turn, it is the responsibility of Arab parties to harness the potential of this support. As the 2021 elections proved, Arab parties are most effective when they put aside their political differences and run together in elections. This way, no representation is lost to the 3.25 percent threshold to make it into the Knesset, and Arab parties maintain greater bargaining power.

Another way Arab parties can grow influence in the Knesset is by mimicking the behavior of ultra-orthodox Jewish parties. For much of Israel’s history, ultra-orthodox parties would largely ignore rights versus left politics and join governments based on securing funds and specific, advantageous policies for their communities. Although de-prioritizing other political beliefs in favor of ensuring funding for education and development may not address all communal goals, it can unlock the resources required to address some of them.

However, government action can only go so far. Hopefully, the impact of these policies will promote social values of education and national unity—without which the crisis will continue. On October 7, 2023, Hamas viewed their victims’ religion and ethnicity as secondary to their nationality. Israeli Jews and Israeli Arabs would be wise to do the same.

Rachel Friedman is an Iran research intern at the American Enterprise Institute‘s Critical Threats Project and a former Young Global Professional at the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs.

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While the threat of US strikes may have KH scrambling, no purely military operation the United States undertakes will “restore deterrence” with Iran. Tehran believes there is no chance the United States will go to war with Iran, not least because the United States keeps saying so. As long as that belief is held, Tehran will continue to cultivate proxies to test the edge of US resolve.

Sunday’s deadly attack hit a nerve in Washington. It is the first time a drone has killed a member of the US military and appears to be the first time a member of the Army or Marines was killed by enemy air power since 1953. 

Meanwhile, Iran likely perceived this attack by one of its proxy militias as simply a tit-for-tat retaliation for the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) operators killed by the United States’ partner Israel in Damascus a week ago. (From what I’ve heard, Iran believes that it already crossed the rumored US redline about killing Americans in March 2023, when a proxy drone strike in Syria killed a US contractor.) 

Add to this the following cruel irony: The US soldiers killed in the attack were in the region supporting the fight against the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS), the terrorist group that carried out an attack on Iranian soil on January 3. The United States warned Iran of ISIS attack plans, using intelligence collected only because US soldiers are still living in the region and fighting the group. The lives saved with that information were members of Iran’s IRGC, which funds the KH militia that killed the US soldiers. 

How will Biden respond to this attack? According to close Iran watchers, Tehran’s decisionmakers feel certain the Biden administration is loath to risk escalation in an election year. They are correct insomuch as American voters do not want the United States dragged into another war in the Middle East. But Tehran’s miscalculation is in projecting the Iranian public’s mindset about the loss of an IRGC member onto the American public’s mindset about the loss of US servicemembers. Americans care, and they will grant their president a greater writ as a result.

When surmising Biden’s likely response, let’s look at the goal—prevent Iran from harming US citizens, interests, and partners—then analyze the likely impact of each option vis-à-vis that goal.

Biden’s menu of options

Option 1: Conduct strikes inside Iran against its war machine. The United States could strike inside Iran and take out its conventional military (Artesh) capabilities, such as aircraft, air defenses, and tanks. But those are not the capabilities causing the US problems. Striking these would not prevent the continuation of the attacks Iran has backed against US forces in the Middle East thus far. And it would drag the Artesh into a beef with the paramilitary IRGC, an organization that competes with the Artesh for funding and authority. In other words, it would bring a large, professional fighting force into a dispute the United States actually has with one of its rivals.

Option 2: Conduct strikes inside Iran against IRGC bases and weapons stockpiles. By targeting IRGC bases and weapons stockpiles in Iran, the United States could test the mythical capabilities of the IRGC’s new Tactical Sayyad air-defense system, the latest brag of the five-year-old Islamic Republic of Iran Air Defense Force. The IRGC has not used its own significant missile arsenal against the United States yet. Strikes would reduce but not remove its ability to do so. But these kinds of strikes would not reduce the likelihood that the United States will continue to face the very same kinds of proxy attacks that US strikes are intended to stop: the kind that just killed US servicemembers. It is certain these would continue—and expand.

Option 3: Conduct strikes against facilities inside Iran that produce the proprietary components the regime smuggles to proxies. The United States could strike sites inside Iran that supply its proxies with weapons and parts. This could possibly slow or prevent attacks, but only after the proxies use up the munitions they have stockpiled for years. In the case of Lebanese Hezbollah alone, this includes more than one hundred thousand rockets.

Iran would not attempt to engage the United States in a war on Iran’s territory. It would choose to demonize the US aggression on its soil and hit the United States around the world on soft targets. It would gain a leg up just keeping the United States busy staying vigilant and pouring resources into hardening every US diplomatic outpost around the world.

Option 4: Conduct strikes against IRGC and proxy capabilities in neighboring states. Iranian proxies in Iraq, Syria, Yemen, and elsewhere in the region are another potential target. However, striking weaponry outside of Iran so far has not deterred Iran or its proxy attacks on US personnel and partners. Iranian assets outside of Iran, beyond proxy assets, could be added to this target list. Mirroring ongoing Houthi targeting, Iranian ships transiting the Red Sea could be included without being considered an escalation.

Perception matters

On Tuesday, Biden told reporters that he has decided on how to respond. As the administration moves forward, it should take steps to manage any reputational risk to the United States from its retaliation. One way to do this is to stick to military targets. Regardless of the breadth and depth of retaliation, if targets are solely military and not on Iran’s home soil, comparative analysis says they are a reflection of Iran’s tactics and therefore non-escalatory.

Another way to minimize reputational risk is to get Jordanian buy-in. Whatever the US chooses to do, Jordan’s backing will help with messaging. The United States does not want to look to the world like it is “overreacting.” Jordan will need to slam some tables more loudly in anger about the breach of sovereignty. This way the United States is cut more slack by other Arab states and other global monarchies if it wages a scorched-earth operation against every IRGC safe house and barn housing boxes of unmanned aerial vehicle propellers from Basra to Beirut.

Expectation management

This short list is not the full gamut of options open to the United States. It does not include, for example, tools such as cyber warfare, military deception, and putting the new Counter Terrorist Financing Taskforce-Israel on steroids. But the list does illustrate that most options fall short of achieving the objective of halting Iran-backed attacks on US personnel, friends, and interests. Success should be defined and expectations should be managed accordingly.

Make no mistake, striking inside Iran will not alter the regime’s course. The regime’s regional objectives—to push the United States out of the region, to eliminate Israel, and to become the dominant regional power in a new world order—do not include language about prosperity for its people or peace in the Middle East. Potential loss of Iranian life will not move them. In fact, striking inside Iran could do the regime a favor. 

The regime in Tehran needs an evil “other” right now. Iran will face a leadership transition at the top after its eighty-four-year-old supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, dies. This will create the biggest period of vulnerability the regime has faced. Iran will need to bring the population together in support of a regime policy long enough to minimize the risk of a challenge to its hold on power while the future of the theocracy is in flux. The regime may believe that US strikes will galvanize the Iranian street around a nationalist surge it can ride through the transition.

Neither will bringing an end to the Israel-Hamas war alter Tehran’s course. Despite their displays of support, Iran’s leaders are not concerned about the welfare of Palestinians. While Iranian benefactors sent hundreds of millions of dollars to Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad, they did not direct these groups to use any of these funds to build bomb shelters or stockpile food or fuel for civilians put at risk by their armed provocations of a hardline Israeli government, even before October 7, 2023. Some respected Iran watchers in Washington assess that Tehran was annoyed by the timing of the Hamas assault on Israel, that the decision to unilaterally stage the October 7 attack undermined Tehran’s plans for an eventual larger, multi-pronged proxy move against Israel. 

But bringing an end to the Israel-Hamas war will stymie Iran in two ways. One, it will remove the cover the regime is using to promote an appearance of strength domestically and suppress opposition before the period of leadership transition. Iran took advantage of the focus on Gaza and Yemen to attack anti-regime groups in Pakistan, Iraq, and Syria. Legislators in Tehran are pushing through a bill that would increase the powers of the IRGC and the thuggish Basij, the regime’s armed volunteer militia, and leaders have ordered the hanging of an alarming number of 2022 protest participants.

Two, it will remove justification for violent action by Iran’s proxies around the region, at least according to their own mission statements. Iran and its proxies will have to find a new evil “other.”

Kirsten Fontenrose is a nonresident fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative. She is president of the advisory firm Red Six International and a former senior director for the Gulf on the US National Security Council, where she led the development of US policy toward nations of the Gulf Cooperation Council, Yemen, Egypt, and Jordan.

The post The hard truth about Biden’s coming retaliation for the killing of US troops appeared first on Atlantic Council.

This post will be updated as the story evolves and more reactions come in.

Click to jump to an expert analysis:

William F. Wechsler: The US failed in believing it was managing Iran and its proxies

Kimberly Donovan: Target the financial institutions and jurisdictions enabling Iran’s financial activity

Jonathan Panikoff: It’s time to take on the threat from Iran—not just its proxies

Matt Kroenig: The US could hit back against Iran’s navy, top leadership, or nuclear program

Nathan Sales: Stop self-deterring and take the gloves off with Iran

Abbas Kadhim: The attack came as the US and Iraq are negotiating on US troop presence

Qutaiba Idlbi: The US should deliver a strategic blow to Iran’s capabilities in eastern Syria

Thomas S. Warrick: Iran doesn’t think of deterrence the same way the US does

Daniel E. Mouton: The US needs to step up its UAV defenses and hold Iran accountable

Matthew Zais: This attack is the result of the United States’ failed ‘one-Iraq’ policy

R. Clarke Cooper: Any response must be severe and credible—for the sake of the US and its Jordanian partners

Alex Plitsas: The US must thread the needle by responding forcefully without starting a wider war

Ömer Özkizilcik: The US doesn’t have a local partner in Syria that can do its bidding against Iran or Russia

The US failed in believing it was managing Iran and its proxies

For years, most Israeli policymakers believed that the threats from Hamas were being successfully managed, that the likelihood of significant Israeli casualties were low, and that when a military response was provoked, a relatively brief air campaign was only required. Of course, on October 7, 2023, this belief was proved false.

For years, and across multiple administrations, US policymakers similarly tended to believe that the threats from Iran and its proxies and partners were being successfully managed—especially the threats they posed to US forces in the region. Iranian-aligned forces would regularly probe for weaknesses, climb methodically up the escalation ladder, and seek to establish a new normal of de facto “acceptable” behavior. US forces would eventually respond when provoked through targeted air strikes, and US defenses would be enough to protect US soldiers—at least from bodily injury but not from brain trauma, which was downplayed by this administration and its immediate predecessor. With today’s deaths, this belief has also been proved false.

The United States should have responded with greater force earlier in the escalation cycle, and it will have to do so now. But it should keep in mind US strategic objectives for the region and understand Tehran’s.

Tehran’s overall goal is to drive US forces out of the region, and it likely sees 2024 as a year of critical opportunity. Anti-American and pro-Iran sentiments are rising in the context of the war in Gaza. Iranian-aligned parties have already pressured the Iraqi government to launch talks with the United States about a potential withdrawal of US troops. The Biden administration has reportedly considered withdrawing US forces from Syria, though denied it after the news broke. By attacking shipping in the Red Sea, the Houthis have attracted unprecedented support, and are now the target of a US air campaign. Tehran is likely gambling that increasing violence will, eventually, result in the United States either choosing to retreat from the region or being forced to do so by allies. And they undoubtedly recognize that the year may end with the election of Donald Trump, who has long advocated the withdrawal of US forces from much of the region.  

The Biden administration should not allow Tehran this victory. It will have to respond forcibly to this attack, but it should do so in places and in ways that minimize the risk of provoking a wider regional war or forcing the Iraqi government to formally demand the withdrawal of US troops. Instead, it would be wiser to consider options that include pursuing Iranian air and naval assets, forcibly interdicting Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) shipments to its allies, expanding the US air campaign against the Houthis to target their leadership, and comprehensively enforcing US sanctions against Iran. The White House could also consider targeting Iranian—not just proxy—personnel in Syria and eliminating individual IRGC leadership while traveling abroad, akin to what was done against IRGC commander Qasem Soleimani in early 2020. 

—William F. Wechsler is the senior director of Middle East Programs at the Atlantic Council. His most recent US government position was deputy assistant secretary of defense for special operations and combatting terrorism.

Target the financial institutions and jurisdictions enabling Iran’s financial activity

In addition to more targeted diplomatic and military measures, sanctions will likely be included in the US response to the drone strike over the weekend that killed three US servicemembers and wounded others. However, when considering additional sanctions targeting Iran and its partners and proxies, the United States may need to look beyond Iran to target the financial institutions and jurisdictions facilitating the financial activity that enables Tehran’s operations.

Iran is the most heavily sanctioned regime in the world. The United Nations, United States, United Kingdom, European Union, Canada, Australia, and partners have levied sanctions on Iran for a range of issues. These include nuclear proliferation, human rights abuses, cybercrime and espionage, destabilizing activity in the Middle East, “transnational repression” (i.e. assassination attempts), support to Russia’s war in Ukraine, and terrorism activity and support to designated terrorist organizations and Shia militant groups. Despite this array of sanctions, the Iranian regime continues to abuse the international financial system to raise, use, and move money to support its operations and prop up its partners and proxies in the region. Clearly, Iran is evading and circumventing these sanctions and the United States needs to get to the crux of the matter: the financial institutions and jurisdictions enabling Iran’s financial activity.

The United States has unique authorities it can use to target these financial facilitators. Specifically, secondary sanctions as they relate to Iran and Section 311 of the US PATRIOT Act. These are complex authorities, but simply put, secondary sanctions compel non-US financial institutions to comply with Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctions or risk being sanctioned themselves. Section 311 is a regulatory rulemaking issued by the US Treasury Department’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) and identifies jurisdictions, financial institutions, or classes of transactions as primary money laundering concerns. These tools are very different and have different legal and evidentiary thresholds that must be met before they can be employed, however they both in effect can cut off a bank’s access to the US financial system and US dollar.

The US Treasury’s January 29 FinCEN 311 action identifying al-Huda Bank in Iraq as an institution of primary money laundering concern, together with OFAC’s supporting designation of al-Huda’s owner, is an example of the type of action the Biden administration needs to take to target the financial institutions enabling Iran’s financial activity and operations. This is a step in the right direction and sends a clear message to banks and jurisdictions that the United States is willing to take necessary action to protect its financial system while disrupting Iran’s terrorist activity and support for terrorism. This needs to be the first step, not the last. US policymakers have the tools and authorities to combat Iran’s terrorist financing and to target the financial institutions and jurisdictions that are enabling it. Secondary sanctions and Section 311 tools need to be considered in the US response to the drone attacks that killed our troops.

—Kimberly Donovan is the director of the Economic Statecraft Initiative within the Atlantic Council’s GeoEconomics Center. She previously served in the federal government for fifteen years, most recently as the acting associate director of FinCEN’s Intelligence Division and its chief of staff and senior advisor to the director.

It’s time to take on the threat from Iran—not just its proxies

Tower 22, where three US servicemembers were killed and dozens injured in a drone attack, sits on the Jordanian side of the border with Syria and only a few kilometers from the Iraqi one. The attack almost certainly reflects an increased risk tolerance by Tehran in its effort for influence and control in the region. Unlike the Houthis, who have their own agenda and Iran lacks full control over, Syrian and Iraq-based Shia militants are largely responsive to Tehran and would be unlikely to carry out such an attack without at least the implicit support and approval of senior Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) leaders. Therefore, the broader challenge for the Biden administration is going to be how to address the Iranian threat, not just the Shia militant one emanating from Iraq and Syria.

Iran’s leadership probably calculates that the United States will be reticent to fulsomely respond in any manner that would risk escalation of tensions in the Middle East and spark the region-wide war the Biden administration has admirably tried to prevent over the past three months. But with the death of multiple US service members, the Biden administration will need to reconsider its stance and decide whether hostilities have now crossed the Rubicon and the United States is already in a regional conflict. 

The natural conclusion is that this will not be the last attack on US forces. There is strong evidence for such a determination. Consider the pattern so far: first, the plethora of recent Houthi attacks against US and allied targets—which led the United States, once it ran out of patience, to put together the counter-Houthi Operation Prosperity Guardian; second, attacks injuring US forces by Iraqi Shia militants as recently as last month; and now, third, an attack by Shia militants on US forces in Jordan. 

What’s different in this case, marking a further escalation, is that Jordan, unlike Iraq and Syria, is not host to Iran-backed Shia militant bases. Unless evidence is produced that the drone attack was a mistake or an accident, both highly unlikely, then this was an attack on not only US forces but also on the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, a critical US ally.

The determination that we’re now in a regional conflict, in which US troops are likely to continue to be under threat, would require US policymakers to undertake a more fulsome response to restore deterrence. Iran has shown time and again a willingness to put its Arab partners and proxies at risk, but not the same willingness for the country’s own forces and security to be in jeopardy. Israel and Iran have long been engaged in a shadow war. The United States needs to determine if it’s in one as well and respond accordingly.

—Jonathan Panikoff is the director of the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative. He is a former deputy national intelligence officer for the Near East at the US National Intelligence Council. The views expressed in this publication are the author’s and do not imply endorsement by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, the Intelligence Community, or any other US government agency.

The US could hit back against Iran’s navy, top leadership, or nuclear program

In recent weeks, Iran has waged a shadow war against the United States and its interests in the Middle East, and now three US service personnel are dead and dozens more injured. The United States has been cautious in its response to this point because it feared “escalation,” but this logic was misguided. Iran learned that it could attack with impunity, and US caution only invited more aggression. Deterrence works by convincing an adversary that the costs to attacking the United States and its allies and interests greatly outweighs any conceivable benefits. Deterrence has now failed, and the United States needs to execute its deterrent threat. It needs to follow through and impose a significant cost on Iran that outweighs the perceived benefits of aggression—as Tehran calculates it. It needs to convince Tehran that attacking the United States and its interests is too costly. This means the United States should hit Iran hard. 

Washington could sink the Iranian navy, like then President Ronald Reagan did in the 1980s. It could strike Iranian naval bases. It could target Iranian leadership, following in the footsteps of then President Donald Trump’s killing of Iranian General Qassem Soleimani. It could seize this opportunity to degrade Iran’s nuclear and missile program—which must be addressed soon regardless, as the Pentagon estimates its nuclear breakout timeline to be only twelve days. These actions would convey to Iran that it badly miscalculated and that attacking the United States was a foolish decision that should not be repeated. Only when this is made clear will the Islamic Republic restrain its desire to sow chaos throughout the region. Another surgical strike directly against the proxies involved would be a mistake. It would be read in Tehran as a sign of weakness and simply stoke a continued cycle of violence.

—Matthew Kroenig is vice president and senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security and the Council’s director of studies. He formerly worked on Iran policy in the US intelligence community and the US Department of Defense.

Stop self-deterring and take the gloves off with Iran

For months, the United States has stood by while the Iranian regime’s terror proxies have taken shot after shot at US servicemembers in the region, seemingly from a misplaced fear that a decisive response would provoke yet more violence from Tehran. Today, the bill for this failure to establish deterrence tragically came due. It is long past time to stop self-deterring and take the gloves off. The Biden administration needs to hold the Islamic Republic accountable for this outrage—not just the proxies it hides behind, but the Islamic Republic itself. Unless those responsible for this campaign of violence—above all, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps—are made to pay a steep price, Tehran will conclude that it can kill Americans with impunity and deadly attacks like these will continue. The way to avoid getting dragged into another war in the Middle East is not to signal caution and restraint, but to demonstrate our will to defend our people and our interests.

—Nathan Sales is a nonresident senior fellow with the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative and a former US ambassador-at-large and coordinator for counterterrorism.

The attack came as the US and Iraq are negotiating on US troop presence

The escalation of hostilities between the United States and Iraqi armed groups is reaching a perilous state. There are two differences between the January 28 drone attack and the previous hostilities: First, the recent attack claimed the lives of three US servicemembers and wounded more than thirty others, according to early reports. Second, it was carried out in Jordan, not in Iraq or Syria, where previous attacks have taken place. The killing of US personnel will put the Biden administration under considerable pressure to retaliate, particularly at this time when the administration is facing many domestic and international challenges. As to the choice of location, it represents a dangerous sign of the possibility of the conflict’s expansion to new parts of the Middle East.

There was a sense of optimism after the United States agreed to negotiate the presence of the military coalition in Iraq. The Iraqi government, which also faces domestic and regional pressures because of the presence of foreign troops, framed the news of the coming negotiations as a prelude to the withdrawal of all foreign troops. But the Pentagon denied any intent to withdraw the troops and affirmed that the upcoming negotiations will be to replace the international coalition with bilateral security agreements. In the words of Pentagon Deputy Press Secretary Sabrina Singh on January 25, “Let me be clear, the HMC [Higher Military Commission] meeting is not a negotiation about the withdrawal of US forces from Iraq.” The narratives of the Iraqi and the US governments on the nature of the upcoming talks are diametrically opposed, giving a pretext to armed groups in Iraq to use violent means for achieving their stated goal of forcing a US withdrawal from Iraq.

As we gather the facts about the recent drone attack, all eyes will be on the nature of the response the Biden administration will make, considering factors such as the target, time, and place. Biden’s track record in the Middle East, from the Israel-Hamas war to the Red Sea crisis, Syria, and Iraq, have yielded counterproductive results. Whether he will take some necessary corrective measures and seek fresh perspectives or double down on the current course may well decide the future of the United States’ standing in the Middle East.

—Abbas Kadhim is director of the Atlantic Council’s Iraq Initiative. Follow him on X: @DrAbbasKadhim.

The US should deliver a strategic blow to Iran’s capabilities in eastern Syria

The Iran-proxy drone attack on Tower 22, a US military installation on the Jordan-Syria border crossing servicing US forces at the Al-Tanf base in eastern Syria, comes after more than 150 similar attacks against US positions in Syria and Iraq since October 7, 2023. While the Islamic Resistance in Iraq, an umbrella for Iranian proxies in Iraq, claimed the attack was a response to Israel’s war on Gaza, it is undeniably also part of a larger escalation Iranian proxies have been leading against US positions in Syria and Iraq since late 2022. (The group did not specify whether it used Iraqi or Syrian territory to launch its attack.) It is also no coincidence that the attack came days after reports of internal deliberations within the Biden administration about US withdrawal from Syria, which would serve Iranian interests in Syria above all else. Tha attack also came ahead of the Arba’in (forty-day anniversary) of the killing of IRGC commander Qasem Soleimani, a religious tradition that Iran had utilized to mobilize support for its proxies across Shia communities.

The United States’ reluctance to pursue brinkmanship in response to Iranian proxy attacks has led to Iran’s escalations today. While the United States has likely engaged with Israel on its strategy of targeting Iranian assets in Syria, only a US-defined response can establish deterrence. With the United States reluctant to lead such deterrence, even the Israeli-led assassinations of senior IRGC leaders in Syria in the last few weeks proved ineffective in deterring Iran. 

In deliberating its response, the Biden administration must re-establish deterrence with Iran more forcefully and strategically than it previously did when the United States assassinated Soleimani in January 2020. Such deterrence should have an irreversible effect on Iran’s capabilities in the region, while ensuring it doesn’t escalate the situation into a direct war with Iran. The United States could deliver a strategic blow to Iran’s capabilities in eastern Syria, upending the strategic Iraq-Syria-Lebanon land corridor, that may prove beneficial to US positioning in the region, to regional allies, and to many of the region’s chronic conflicts in Syria and Lebanon.

—Qutaiba Idlbi is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center and Middle East Programs where he leads the Syria portfolio.

Iran doesn’t think of deterrence the same way the US does

This time, the United States will retaliate, but the question is against whom and how hard. One consideration US policymakers need to have in the front of mind is that the Iranian regime doesn’t believe in deterrence the way US policymakers and strategists do. Iran follows a peculiar sense of symmetry and it is quite willing to keep urging its proxies to attack US troops in order to drive the United States out of the Middle East. Carefully calibrated US attacks on proxy militias have not succeeded in stopping these attacks.

The United States needs to understand that it will have to take a carefully thought-out, precise shot at significantly reducing Iran’s strategic power. Attack options in Iraq are limited without political blowback that could hand Iran the strategic victory. Options outside of Iran proper are limited and would probably require committing ground troops that the Biden administration has been reluctant to commit. 

This leaves one option: attacking Iran itself, as previous US administrations have done. The Clinton administration’s June 26, 1993, cruise missile attack on the Iraqi Mukhabarat headquarters comes immediately to mind as an analogy. An attack on IRGC Quds Force headquarters in Iran would be comparable to that—even though, notably, the 1993 nighttime strike against the Iraqi intelligence service that was behind an assassination attempt of former US President George H.W. Bush was timed to occur when as few people as possible would be in the building.

The other obvious option is to clear out Iranian proxies and any IRGC personnel operating in southeastern Syria. Done right, Iranian proxies would not have the ability to launch further strikes from Syrian territory at least—although the strike against US forces in Jordan may have come from Iraq. Even so, these proxy freely cross the Iraq-Syria border. Clearing Iranian proxies out of southeastern Syria would take away one of Iran’s proxy capabilities. But while an air-only option is possible, it would probably take US ground forces to deliver a significant enough blow to Iranian capabilities.

Time and luck have run out for the United States. Neither of these options are good, and both risk keeping the United States embroiled in a regional conflict that the Biden administration was hoping to avoid.

—Thomas S. Warrick is the director of the Future of DHS project at the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security’s Forward Defense practice and a nonresident senior fellow and the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative at the Atlantic Council.

The US needs to step up its UAV defenses and hold Iran accountable

Today’s Iranian-linked militant attack that killed three US servicemembers and wounded at least twenty-five is as tragic as it was inevitable. Iran and its proxies have mounted attacks against the United States and its partners in the Middle East region for years. At times, this campaign took the form of a direct attack, such as Iran’s immediate response to the killing of Qassem Soleimani. But the majority of the attacks occurred through Iranian proxy channels, such as previous Houthi attacks against Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, Hamas and Lebanese Hezbollah attacks against Israel, and Shia militia groups’ strikes against US forces in Iraq and Syria.

The US response to these Iranian affiliated attacks has relied on three factors: First, the United States has responded with commensurate force. Second, the United States has warned Iran about the risks of escalation. Third, the United States improved its defenses on its various bases in the Middle East. Unfortunately, the US approach has two main drawbacks. The first is that Iran does not have full control over its various proxies in the region. In the case of smaller, dispersed militia groups, a lack of Iranian control also has the advantage of giving Iran a degree of deniability for an attack. The second problem with the US approach is that threats have multiplied and defenses against the full range of potential attacks will never be perfect. The Iranian-affiliated March 2023 unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) attack that killed a US contractor and wounded several servicemembers demonstrated that there are gaps in US base defenses. 

Although the US Department of Defense worked on improving its approach to countering UAVs since 2021, it’s clear that the department’s most recent strategy to counter UAVs has not yet resulted in a comprehensive material production, fielding, and training plan to protect US forces from UAV attack. Until the United States is able to both commit the resources to counter the sort of complex aerial attacks occurring in the Middle East (and Ukraine), and is willing to hold Iran accountable for Iranian material-origin attacks, be prepared to see attacks against US forces continue.

—Daniel E. Mouton is a nonresident senior fellow at the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative of the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs. He served on the National Security Council from 2021 to 2023 as the director for defense and political-military policy for the Middle East and North Africa for Coordinator Brett McGurk.

This attack is the result of the United States’ failed ‘one-Iraq’ policy

The tragic death of three US servicemembers at the hands of Iran-backed militias is a direct consequence of the United States’ failed “one-Iraq” policy, which has sought to keep power over a unified Iraq centered in Baghdad. Most of the more than 150 militia attacks in Iraq and Syria over the past several months have been conducted by members of Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), which receives official Iraqi government funding of more than $2.7 billion per year. However, the United States has been reluctant to deter Iran or the Iraqi government, which is backed by Iran-aligned parties. 

Through its “one-Iraq” policy, the administration is desperately trying to prop up an Iran-backed government in Baghdad that is slowly eroding US-designed federalism at the expense of Iraq’s marginalized Sunnis and Kurds. As a result, the Iraqi government has faced little public scrutiny, while being the financial hub of Iran’s most aggressive proxies in the region. Meanwhile, the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, a stalwart US security partner for more than thirty years, also faces these attacks and remains in the balance of the United States’ reluctance to deter Iran or reevaluate the reality of “one Iraq.”

—Matthew Zais is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative. He is also the vice president of government affairs for Hillwood and HKN Energy Ltd.

Any response must be severe and credible—for the sake of the US and its Jordanian partners

The heinous attack on US forces this weekend requires a kinetic and proportional response to reestablish deterrence and prevent further attacks against US troops. Belligerent states and their proxies will continue to test the commitment and security cooperation of US partners if the United States does not hold the Iranian regime accountable for its state-sponsored terrorism. For deterrence to work, two conditions should be present: severity and credibility. Severity entails threatening a prospective opponent with a retaliation that would outweigh any potential benefits they could hope to gain from attacking, and this has yet to be applied by the Biden administration.

The attack also affirms the need for the United States to continue its stalwart support for Jordanian security forces to be a fully capable counterterrorism partner. US security cooperation with Jordan bolsters the countries’ shared interests and enhances regional security and stability. The Jordanian military is one of the largest recipients of Washington’s foreign military financing, and for good reason. The kingdom has hundreds of US trainers and is one of the few regional partners that hold extensive exercises with US troops throughout the year.

Since the start of the Syrian conflict in 2011, the United States has provided significant security assistance and capacity-building resources for Jordan to protect its sovereignty and combat the transregional threats from Tehran-sponsored proxies in Syria and Iraq. Long-term security assistance to meet the shared adversity of terrorism must not be put at risk by the threatening posture posed against the United States and its security partner, Jordan.

—R. Clarke Cooper is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative. He previously served as the assistant secretary for political-military affairs at the US Department of State from 2019 to 2021.

The US must thread the needle by responding forcefully without starting a wider war

The latest attack on US forces in the Middle East at the hands of Iranian-backed militants is the 158th since Hamas’s October 7 terrorist attack in Israel and the subsequent war in Gaza. The significance of this attack is that for the first time, US troops have been killed, which is a serious escalation. Three US troops died, and dozens more have been wounded. Early reports indicate that an Iranian-backed militia in Iraq, Kataib Hezbollah, is responsible for the lethal drone attack.

All of the attacks to date have been designed to kill but have failed to succeed until now. These attacks appear to be part of a broader strategy that the Iranian regime is employing to put pressure on the United States to end the war in Gaza. Iranian Foreign Minister Hossein Amirabdollahian publicly stated in October 2023 that the United States would be made to feel pain if the war in Gaza continued.

Iran has helped to build, support, arm, fund, and/or direct proxy forces across the Middle East, together known as the “axis of resistance,” to carry out Iran’s objectives while giving the regime plausible deniability. The axis includes Hezbollah in southern Lebanon, Hamas in Gaza, Ansar Allah (Houthi rebels) in Yemen, and militias in Iraq and Syria. They have attacked US forces in the region, shut down international shipping in the Red Sea, and hit targets in Israel.

To date, US responses to these attacks have been limited to strikes against targets in Yemen and IRGC weapons depots for militias in Iraq and Syria. They have been insufficient to reestablish deterrence and prevent further attacks against US troops.

The United States will have to respond militarily to this lethal attack, but a proportional response targeting proxy forces is unlikely to deter additional attacks against US troops. Iran has been allowed to maintain plausible deniability, even though there is overwhelming evidence of its complicity in these attacks that at a minimum includes funding and arming, if not direction.

The question for Biden administration officials at this point is whether or not they are going to continue to allow Iran to maintain plausible deniability or if they will hold it directly accountable for its actions. A failure to do so to date has contributed to a lack of deterrence and emboldened hostile actors in the region.

The challenge for those crafting the US response is to ensure that it is significant enough to prevent additional attacks on US forces while also not starting another war in the region. This is why the United States and its allies must hold adversaries accountable at lower levels of deterrence to prevent movement up the escalation ladder that would bring the Middle East to the precipice of a regional war.

—Alex Plitsas is a nonresident senior fellow with the Middle East Programs’ N7 Initiative and former chief of sensitive activities for special operations and combating terrorism in the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

The US doesn’t have a local partner in Syria that can do its bidding against Iran or Russia

The US strategy in Syria is based on the partnership decision in 2014 that looked for an anti-ISIS local force that did not have a hostile relationship with Iran. Now, this decision shows its price. Usually, actors in Syria attack each other indirectly by attacking their Syrian partners or by responding via their proxy. This unwritten rule of engagement has helped the intervening third parties limit escalation costs. In the same spirit, Iran isn’t attacking the US military directly but via its Shia militias. The United States, on the other hand, is being directly attacked and has to respond itself. The United States doesn’t have a local partner in Syria that can do its bidding against Iran or Russia. Therefore, any escalation from Moscow or Tehran in Syria puts US soldiers directly in danger. The United States doesn’t support the Syrian rebels hostile to Iran since it stopped giving them covert aid in 2017.

Iran knows this simple reality, has employed a strategy of controlled escalation, and is testing the limits. Iran knows that any reaction from Washington may prompt a domestic response in the United States, especially before the upcoming elections. Slowly but steadily, Iran is stepping up the escalation. The Iranian strategy since the Gaza conflict is a spiral of violence in which Iran employs expendable militias at the forefront, but US servicemembers are the primary target. The absence of local US partners willing to fight Iran-backed Shia militias limits the options of the United States. Whether the United States does nothing or responds, some of the US electorate will question why US forces are deployed in Syria. And Iran bets on this domestic reaction to fulfill its goal: Push the United States out of Syria and Iraq and fill the void left.

—Ömer Özkizilcik is a nonresident fellow for the Syria Project in the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs.

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1. What is the difference between a “foreign terrorist organization” and a “specially designated global terrorist”?

Foreign terrorist organization (FTO) sanctions are the gold standard of terrorism sanctions. An FTO designation has three unique features that a specially designated global terrorist (SDGT) designation lacks. First, federal law makes it a crime to provide “material support or resources” to a designated FTO, making the group radioactive and causing global banks, insurers, and other companies to cut all ties with the group. Second, members of an FTO are automatically inadmissible to the United States. Third, victims of terrorist attacks and their survivors are able to file civil lawsuits against FTOs and the entities that support them, ensuring justice for victims and increasing financial pressure on the groups.

—Nathan A. Sales is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative and Middle East Program and a former US ambassador-at-large and coordinator for counterterrorism.

The two designations impose different penalties. Being an SDGT gives the US Treasury Department the ability to disrupt terrorists’ access to funds in the United States and elsewhere in the international financial system. Being designated an FTO by the US State Department makes it illegal for anyone to give the group “material support,” including fighting for the group, giving it money or in-kind support, or training. Members of FTOs who are not US citizens are almost always banned from entry into the United States, except where there is a rare, high-level decision otherwise. Most powerfully, anyone who provides material support to a designated FTO is considered a Tier III terrorist and is subject to sanctions and a travel ban. This makes it difficult and legally risky for others to have contact with a designated FTO.

After the Houthis began missile, drone, and small-boat attacks on international shipping, the Biden administration in December put together an international coalition, Operation Prosperity Guardian. As Houthi attacks continued, the Biden administration decided to designate the Houthis as an SDGT to disrupt their access to international financial markets. Designating the Houthis as an FTO would make it harder, though not impossible, to engage in diplomacy with the Houthis, but the Biden administration retains the option of designating the Houthis as an FTO.

—Thomas S. Warrick is the director of the Future of DHS project at the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security’s ForwardDefense practice and a nonresident senior fellow and the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative at the Atlantic Council. He previously served as deputy assistant secretary for counterterrorism policy in the US Department of Homeland Security.

2. Why are the Houthis involving themselves in the war between Israel and Hamas?

The Iranian regime for decades has provided the Houthis funding, weapons, training, and vital components for missiles and drones. Two US Navy SEALs recently had their lives put at risk intercepting Iranian missile warheads being sent to the Houthis. Since Hamas’s October 7 terrorist attack on Israel—Hamas also receives money, weapons, and training from the Iranian regime—Iran has been urging its proxies, including those in Yemen, Lebanon, and Iraq, to carry out attacks against the United States and Western interests. 

Iran’s stated strategic interest is a Hamas victory over Israel—Hamas expects to declare victory if it stays in power in Gaza when the shooting stops. The Houthis sit astride one of the world’s most strategic waterways: international shipping lanes between Europe and North America in the west and China and South Asia in the east. Attacks by Iranian proxies against US forces or Israel from Iraq or Syria are obviously of direct concern to the countries involved, but the Houthis’ attacks against international shipping in the Red Sea require an international response.

—Thomas S. Warrick

3. How is the Biden administration approaching this differently from the Trump administration?

In the waning hours of the Trump administration in January 2021, the Houthis were designated as both an SDGT and an FTO. The Biden administration rescinded this in February 2021 in part to allow diplomacy to resolve the ongoing civil war between the internationally recognized government of Yemen, run out of the southern port city of Aden, and the Houthis, whose capital is Sanaa. US partners Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates had backed the internationally recognized government, but fighting had stalled.

The Houthis’ repeated missile, drone, and small-boat attacks has caused the Biden administration to respond militarily and by re-imposing sanctions through the SDGT designation. 

—Thomas S. Warrick

Even though the Houthis ticked every box in the legal definition for applying an FTO designation, the Trump administration initially refrained from designating at the request of the UN World Food Program, which assessed that millions of civilians would die from a lack of access to aid if they were unable to work through the Houthis to deliver assistance in Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen. When waivers had been worked out, the designation was applied. When Biden undesignated the Houthis in 2021, he had two goals in mind. One, to enable aid groups to deliver assistance in Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen.

And two, to show an act of goodwill toward the Houthis that the new Biden administration hoped would incentivize them to participate in good faith in political talks. That was a political experiment. Now, after three years of the Houthis hemming and hawing in these talks, the Biden team thinks differently and now believes that re-designating them will not endanger the talks any more than the Houthis’ own intransigence regularly does.

—Kirsten Fontenrose is a nonresident fellow at the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative in the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs. She was previously the senior director for the Gulf at the National Security Council.

4. What will be the practical effect on the Houthi rebels from this designation?

The redesignation of the Houthis as an SDGT is somewhat unique in that the action will not take effect for another thirty days. This is to allow for humanitarian aid groups to adjust their operations or seek licenses to avoid exposure to sanctions. However, this also provides the Houthis and Iran time to adjust their own financial flows and mitigate the possible implications of sanctions.

—Kimberly Donovan is the director of the Economic Statecraft Initiative within the Atlantic Council’s GeoEconomics Center. She was previously the US Treasury Department’s acting associate director of the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network’s (FinCEN) Intelligence Division and FinCEN’s chief of staff and senior advisor to the director.

The more modest SDGT sanctions the Biden administration adopted—which lack the powerful criminal ban on third parties providing material support—will not isolate the Houthis from international commerce and the international financial system in the same way that the FTO sanctions would have (and did, during the Trump administration). Commercial entities that want to avoid criminal liability in the United States will not have the same strong interest to sever all ties with the Houthis.

—Nathan A. Sales

The Houthis have few if any assets in US financial institutions, but the SDGT designation will slow down and in some cases block their ability to do business through international financial institutions. This also signals the willingness of the Biden administration to use further measures if the Houthis continue their attacks.

—Thomas S. Warrick

There are two potential impacts on the Houthis. First, there could be an impact on the Houthis’ ability to conduct attacks against global shipping. While the Houthis don’t have US bank accounts to freeze, they do rely on the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ network of financiers and front companies to receive specialized components for their missiles and drones. The sources for these components are often commercial (and unwitting) and are part of the international financial system. So this designation could impact the Houthi weapons supply chain in the medium term. 

Second, there could be an impact on Biden’s ability to use the US military to reduce the severity of Houthi attacks against global shipping. Biden could need congressional buy-in to continue US-led strikes against the Houthis, according to the US War Powers Resolution. This SDGT designation helps Biden make the legal case to Congress that the Houthi threat merits continued military action. So this designation could extend US-led coalition strikes against Houthi materiel, more significantly degrading their war machine.

—Kirsten Fontenrose

5. What message does this send to Iran?

I fear that Tehran will see the SDGT sanctions as a half measure and conclude that the White House is not serious about using all the tools at its disposal to counter Iran-backed terrorism.  Above all, the Biden administration needs to send a clear message to the Iranian regime, through actions and not just words, that it will hold the regime itself accountable for the actions of its terror proxies (in Yemen, Gaza, Lebanon, Iraq, and elsewhere), and it will not indulge the fiction that these groups are acting on their own.

—Nathan A. Sales

Not much of one, unfortunately. But it is important for the United States to demonstrate that it is exercising all tools of statecraft, and not simply kinetic action, to make sure the international community sees clearly that the country is acting responsibly and in the global interest.

—Kirsten Fontenrose

6. How might this designation affect the broader Yemeni population?

International sanctions do not prohibit the import of humanitarian aid, but many international aid organizations are reluctant to work with a designated terrorist group. The US government and other governments try to provide workarounds by licensing certain transactions by recognized aid organizations, but this does not always lead to the free flow of humanitarian aid. Aid organizations try to get aid to those who most need it, but the Houthis, like other designated terrorist groups that control territory (for example, Hamas), have the physical ability to decide, if they want to, who gets aid in territories they control.

—Thomas S. Warrick

7. What other tools does the US have to pressure the Houthi rebels at this point?

The United States has several tools left in the economic statecraft toolbox to pressure the Houthis, including redesignating the group as an FTO and encouraging US partners and allies to take similar actions. Separate from the SDGT designation, the US Treasury Department took action last week targeting individuals and entities involved in the sale of Iranian commodities that generate funds for the Houthis. I expect the United States will continue to identify and target similar activity to cut off funding for the Houthis and other Iranian partners and proxies.

—Kimberly Donovan

In addition to economic statecraft, the United States has two arrows in its quiver: diplomacy and the option to continue military strikes against Houthi tools of war. 

Opposition to Houthi attacks on global shipping is one issue that sees the United Nations Security Council in rare near-alignment. While Russia abstained from the vote demanding the Houthis cease attacks, it did not veto. Neither did China. Like the United States, both nations have an interest in maintaining the flow of trade through shipping chokepoints in the Middle East. Combined pressure would be more likely to yield results than the United States acting alone, particularly when it comes to dealing with Tehran, where Russia and China have greater leverage. 

And the United States retains the option to increase or extend its coalition-supported strikes against Houthi targets. Tit for tat, with each attack that the Houthis conduct, they give the coalition that has formed in the Red Sea the justification to retaliate, little by little destroying the Houthis’ weapons stockpiles, launchers, and assembly factories.

—Kirsten Fontenrose

The United States and its allies can strike additional military targets, including drones in hangars, missiles in storage bunkers, and boats in port—though the Houthis make it harder by using small boats that look like civilian fishing or merchant boats. Most strikes until now have focused on targeting the Houthis’ ability to carry out further attacks, but obviously the Houthis can make more missiles and drones, at least as long as they have the necessary components.

If the Houthis continue to attack commercial shipping, the United States is likely to strike more strategic targets such as military vehicles, bases, missile manufacturing sites, and command-and-control facilities. The goal would be to get the Houthis to stop attacking shipping in the Red Sea. If the attacks continued, above that in the escalation ladder would be attacks on the Houthis’ political leaders or Iranian targets in the Indian Ocean or Iran itself. Iran has shown no indication it is urging the Houthis to stop their attacks.

—Thomas S. Warrick

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For years, the political elite of the clerical establishment have argued that ISIS was a creation of the United States and Israel. In 2014, Hossein Amir-Abdollahian, then a deputy foreign minister, charged (without evidence) that ISIS was a creation of Israel’s Mossad intelligence agency. That same year, former Intelligence Minister Heydar Moslehi called ISIS a “triangle of Mossad, MI6, and the CIA.” Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei himself maintained publicly that “wicked” Britain and the United States had created the terror organization.

This conspiratorial mindset, which starts at the top, reinforces the Islamic Republic’s need to maintain an enmity with the United States and Israel despite ISIS being a threat to not only Washington and Jerusalem but also Tehran. It was, therefore, unsurprising that, soon after the explosions in Kerman, some Iranian officials started to shift the blame to the US and Israeli governments. President Ebrahim Raisi’s deputy chief of staff tweeted, “Washington says USA and Israel had no role in terrorist attack in Kerman, Iran. Really? A fox smells its own lair first.” At the funeral of the victims of the terror attack, Commander-in-Chief of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), Hossein Salami, made sure to mention that ISIS jihadists “only act as mercenaries for US and Israeli interests.”

US intelligence later assessed that ISIS’s Afghanistan-based branch executed the Kerman bombings. Iranian leaders themselves likely believe that ISIS was behind the Kerman bombings. After all, Iran’s Intelligence Ministry on January 5 acknowledged as such, declaring that “in a short time after the fatal incident, the anonymous soldiers of Imam Zaman discovered the first traces of ISIS terrorist agents.”

But weaponizing the attack against the United States and Israel serves the interests of the Islamic Republic at this sensitive moment in the region. It seeks to capitalize on the slaughter to score propaganda points against the US and Israeli governments at a time when both are under international criticism for the Gaza war. It is also an attempt to bolster the perception of Israel and the United States as enemies of the nation at a time when Iranians have been expressing sympathy for Israel after the October 7, 2023 attack (waning support for the Palestinian cause in Iran is likewise a factor). Additionally, the Islamic Republic’s narrative further serves to fan the flames of hatred towards Israel around the world. This is a conscious decision. The New York Times, according to reporting sourced from IRGC internal deliberations, wrote that, even if a militant group took responsibility for the Kerman attack, Tehran would still publicly hold Israel responsible.

Despite Iran’s bombastic rhetoric, however, its response against ISIS assets will likely be limited. After the 2017 ISIS attack on the Islamic Republic’s parliament and the mausoleum of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the founder of the Islamic Republic, Salami—then a deputy commander-in-chief of the IRGC—claimed that “the joint Saudi-Israel-US project was aimed at striking a blow at Iran’s political and security power.” But days later, the IRGC launched missiles solely at ISIS positions in Syria in Operation Laylat al-Qadr.

Fast forward to 2018 and ISIS claimed credit for an attack on a military parade in Ahvaz. There were also regime suggestions that groups like the Arab Struggle Movement for the Liberation of Ahwaz were involved, but the group later denied any role. Then Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif tweeted that “terrorists recruited, trained, armed, and paid by a foreign regime have attacked Ahvaz. Children and journos among casualties. Iran holds regional terror sponsors and their US masters accountable for such attacks. Iran will respond swiftly and decisively in defense of Iranian lives.” However, despite Iranian charges that it would hold Washington and other governments accountable, the Iranian response was narrowly tailored and focused on ISIS. In Operation Strike of Muharram, the IRGC launched drones and missiles at ISIS targets in Syria.

In the current context, Iran can be expected to mount a similar mixture of fiery speeches—promising revenge against foreign government-sponsored operations in Iran for propaganda purposes—coupled with military action against ISIS targets in the region, potentially even in Afghanistan. If some Iranian decision-makers truly believe in American or Israeli complicity with ISIS, Tehran could also strike targets as it did in 2022 against what it said was a Mossad site in Erbil, putting forth rationales about the alleged existence of Israeli intelligence strategic centers there, which did not result in any costs for Iran. The continued Iranian proxy attacks against US and Israeli interests in the Middle East in the context of the war in Gaza also provide the Islamic Republic an outlet.

These would all be safe responses for Tehran to avoid a decisive American or Israeli retaliation while allowing for it to save face publicly after years of telling its support base that Washington and Jerusalem birthed ISIS. A number of voices in the clerical establishment have been arguing that deterrence has been eroded in recent years given the lack of sufficient responses to Israeli operations—real and imagined—and that a stronger one is required. However, given Khamenei’s modus operandi of carefully calibrated escalation to avoid reprisals on Iranian soil and triggering a direct war with the United States and Israel, which could destabilize his regime, he will likely proceed cautiously in the weeks ahead.

Jason M. Brodsky is the policy director of United Against Nuclear Iran (UANI) and a non-resident scholar at the Middle East Institute’s Iran Program. Follow him on X: @JasonMBrodsky.

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Watching global protests against Israel for the last ten weeks—and seeing hundreds of thousands, perhaps millions, give credence to these views—reflects a cognitive dissonance that is prompting some to innocently mistake, and others to willfully ignore, the primary motivation behind Hamas’s October 7 terrorist attack, which also happens to be the key driver behind Israel continuing its military operations.

Recently, I had lunch with a senior official from an Arab country who told me that there’s no excuse for the attack, but it should be understood as an “act of desperation.” Morocco’s largest political party, the Justice and Development Party, called the terrorist attack “a natural and legitimate reaction.” Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia’ al-Sudani referred to the attack as a “natural result” of Israeli policies. Hamas’s attack “didn’t happen in a vacuum,” United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres said two weeks after the attack. 

All of these sentiments mistake Hamas’s fundamental goals for those of the majority of Palestinians. Hamas does not want a two-state solution. Hamas does not want Israel to normalize relations and have peace with Arab states. Hamas does not want responsibility for its governance failures in Gaza. 

I support the creation of an independent and sovereign Palestinian state side-by-side with Israel. Hamas’s October 7 terrorist attack set back that cause for the Palestinian people; it didn’t advance it. 

Hamas’s own charter—and not the original 1988 explicitly anti-Semitic version, but the implicitly anti-Semitic 2017 document that, like the original, calls for the destruction of Israel—makes clear in the group’s own words that its goals are not compatible with that of a two-state solution. Those who think that Hamas would support such an accommodation misunderstand the primary reason for the October 7 massacre.

Superseding all of the aforementioned motivations, some of which account for the timing of the attack, is Hamas’s core driver: to obliterate Israel and kill Jews. Full stop. No context, addendums, or false moral equivalency should distract from that fundamental fact. 

There is a tendency among some prominent officials and followers of the region to condemn the October 7 attack but also claim that one has to understand the drivers that led to it, and not focus on the attack itself, which continues to traumatize Israelis. This tendency creates despair and fear for those connected to Israel and in the global Jewish community, which recognizes in Hamas’s ideology and founding documents the same genocidal intent as that of the Nazis.

And that is why Israel is not going to agree to a permanent cease fire now.

I join the many who have concerns about Israel’s lack of a long-term strategy and some of its tactics, given the horrific toll of death and destruction in Gaza. Israel should do everything possible to enable humanitarian corridors, and the opening of the Kerem Shalom crossing on December 15 is a positive step. And Israel should continue to negotiate for additional humanitarian pauses of military operations—even as Hamas rejects such offers—in order to allow more aid to flow into Gaza.

But calls for an immediate and permanent ceasefire, beyond humanitarian pauses, are implicitly advocating for a Hamas victory and demanding Israel accommodate the terrorists next door who just slaughtered its citizens and want to annihilate the state of Israel. No other country in the world would be expected to do that. 

Israel may not be able to completely destroy Hamas given that its ideology will survive to inspire some. But Israel can decimate Hamas’s military capabilities, leadership, and infrastructure to mitigate the immediate and medium-term threat of the terrorist organization to all Israelis, Jews, and Arabs.

There is no good solution to the current conflict; it is a question of survival. What is happening in Gaza to the civilian population is a tragedy, and innocent Palestinians are simply trying to survive. What happened in Israel on October 7 and the continuing destruction from rockets fired by Hamas and Hezbollah (and even the Houthis) is also a tragedy, and Israel’s military operations are about trying to ensure Israel’s own survival as well. 

The only thing not debatable: Both Israelis and Palestinians will be safer and far more likely to survive without Hamas’s tyrannical rule over Gaza.

Jonathan Panikoff is the director of the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative in the Middle East Program. He is a former deputy national intelligence officer for the Near East at the US National Intelligence Council. 

The views expressed in this publication are the author’s and do not imply endorsement by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, the Intelligence Community, or any other US government agency.

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Online Event Tue, December 19, 2023 • 2:00 pm ET

President Isaac Herzog discusses the Israel-Hamas war and its impact on domestic and foreign policy

AN #ACFRONTPAGE EVENT— President Isaac Herzog discussed the Israel-Hamas war, its humanitarian consequences, economic impact and influence on Israel’s regional and global relations.

Conflict Economy & Business Extremism Israel

Speaking at an Atlantic Council Front Page event on Tuesday, Israeli President Isaac Herzog outlined how his nation’s leaders view outside criticism of its war against Hamas and what a post-conflict Gaza could look like.

In Gaza, “it will have to probably be an amalgamation of forces,” Herzog said, with regional players coming together to decide its future. “I think it’s actually something that can create an optimistic vision for the future, because we have to turn the direction of this region into a different direction.”

Herzog warned that with the memory of the October 7 Hamas terrorist attack so fresh, talk of a two-state solution is “premature,” adding that he believes a key part of the solution will have to include “revamping of the Palestinian political system” away from the status quo.

“Right now, we are in such a national mental mood, that, for most Israelis, it’s not feasible to think about having a border five minutes from where I’m sitting,” Herzog said, joining the event remotely from Jerusalem. “The root of the discussion would be: ‘How could you give anybody the ability to create another Iranian-led platform in the center of the country?’”

Herzog also confirmed that Israel would be willing to pause fighting in Gaza again in exchange for hostages, adding that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu had met with families of hostages earlier Tuesday to inform them that Mossad leadership was initiating talks to try to broker a break in the conflict.

Here are more major takeaways from Herzog’s conversation with Mary Louise Kelly, the host of NPR’s All Things Considered.

The future of Israel and the Gaza Strip

• “We have to be reasonable about who exactly is going to send boots on the ground from the outside to take over Gaza,” Herzog said. “It’s a complicated question because, as long as there’s no answer to that, only Israel can make sure that terror will not emanate again and again and again from the area.”

• This was a major topic of discussion during US National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan’s meetings with Israeli leaders in Tel Aviv last week. Any outside forces must work “in a forceful manner,” Herzog said, with Israelis needing to be assured that other nations won’t “sit idly by” while enabling Hamas and other groups to operate free of consequences.

• “Remember, in the last two years, Israel opened up its borders and brought in well over twenty thousand employees a day to break bread and work in Israel. It turns out that many of them gathered information on Israeli employers, cities, towns, and villages that they all then went to attack,” Herzog said. “But the question is: ‘How do you create a real economy and a real future in Gaza without hate?’”

Addressing critics

• Israel is well aware of its external criticism, Herzog said. “I know what the world is saying. I see the onslaught of complaints on TikTok and other websites and digital platforms, and I see that the information coming out of Gaza usually is incorrect, to say the least,” Herzog said. “If you look at the social networks and digital platforms, you see a huge amount of hate against Israel, from people who did not delve into the basic facts and the root causes of this conflict.”
  
• Israel’s national security officials failed to anticipate the October 7 attack, which killed an estimated 1,200 Israelis and precipitated the war in Gaza, in part because of a mistaken assumption “that what Hamas wanted was simply more money and the ability to manage the affairs of Gaza,” Herzog said. “We [had seen] an increase in the standard of living, where there were more investments in Gaza and infrastructure. Things were moving in the right direction. There was an eruption every now and then, but then, after a few days, there was a ceasefire. And the assumption was that Hamas is deterred from any major attacks on Israel.”

• Herzog defended the Israeli military after three Israeli hostages were mistakenly shot while seeking help on Friday, calling their deaths a tragedy while saying that soldiers were at heightened alert from recent Hamas attacks in which terrorists would pretend to be Israeli hostages, with one such attack leading to the death of a battalion commander. “We are managing the war in civilian terrain, where you are in people’s homes, living rooms,” Herzog said, underscoring the difficulty Israel faces while trying to both fight Hamas and avoid civilian casualties.
  
• Herzog also rejected the idea that Israel has needlessly put civilian lives at risk through what critics have called indiscriminate bombing. “All our activities are followed very closely by legal counsel. I think we’re one of the [world’s] armies which has more lawyers in each unit, in proportion, than any other army. We check all targets. We alert people in advance. We send millions of leaflets. We send millions of text messages. We call people. We give them hours to prepare.”

Looking deeper into the conflict

• Herzog said there have been 121 hostages of various nationalities returned, and there remain 129 hostages being held by Hamas. Herzog said Israel will stay resilient against the “psychological warfare of Hamas,” referencing a video released by the terror group on Monday that shows three elderly captives pleading for support. “We will do whatever it takes, through various means, to bring them back home.”
  
• Herzog said that the goal of rescuing the remaining hostages had to act in “parallel” with Israel’s stated mission of eliminating Hamas in the region. Without entering Gaza, negotiations that led to the freeing of 121 hostages so far wouldn’t have happened, he said, adding that more work needed to be done to free the rest. However, Herzog said negotiations would remain difficult so long as Israel had to contend with Yahya Sinwar, the Hamas leader in Gaza, who he described as somebody whose psychology “is such that he will do whatever it takes to torture you, to make you suffer, to ache.”
  
• Herzog said he empathized with the innocent Palestinians affected by the conflict. “I don’t shy away from the fact that every Palestinian who was hurt—it aches and hurts me,” he said. Since the start of the war, the Hamas-run Gaza Health Ministry has reported that nearly twenty thousand people have died in Gaza.
  
• Herzog posited the two ideologies of Israel and Hamas as diametrically opposed and argued that defeating Hamas should be important for Europe and the United States as well. “The most peace-loving people in Israel, people who were the biggest supporters of peace with Gaza and the Palestinians, were butchered,” Herzog said. “In front of an empire of evil which emanated in front of our eyes—which operates not only in Gaza, it operates in Lebanon, and it now blocks the main trade route going to Europe through the Red Sea, which means this is a world affair—we have to go to war, unfortunately.”

Nick Fouriezos is a writer with more than a decade of experience reporting around the globe.

Watch the full event

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On December 15, Foreign Policy published its biweekly “It’s Debatable” column featuring the discussions between Matthew Kroenig, vice president and senior director of the Scowcroft Center, and Emma Ashford on the latest news in international affairs. In their latest column, they revisit the major events of 2023, including the wars in Ukraine and Gaza and the rocky road of US-China relations.

Staff

Matthew Kroenig

Vice President and Senior Director, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

China Defense Policy

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The Houthi rebels are funded and trained by Iran. As non-state proxies of the Islamic Republic, the Houthis remain a pernicious threat to regional stability, security, and global commerce. Through their Houthi proxies, Iran has purposefully targeted civilians across borders to project their power in the Middle East against Israel, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). The pattern of threats from the Iran-backed Houthis has even forced sanctions from the United Nations Security Council in response to the systematic targeting of civilians.

This Week in the Mideast Newsletter delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insights and analysis on the Middle East and North Africa directly to your inbox. Subscribe now.

Ever since the 2021 lifting of FTO status, the world has witnessed the increased threats emanating from Yemen, which include recent repeated attacks on commercial ships with drones and missiles, the seizure of a cargo ship in November, and the launching of missiles toward Israel. On December 3, the US Navy disabled and shot down three Houthi drones during a persistent drone and missile attack on several commercial vessels in the Red Sea. In response to the latest attacks, US officials have emphasized consideration of “appropriate actions” and declared that “the entire world needs to step up together.” 

When the Houthis fired at US Navy ships in 2016, the US aptly responded with a barrage of Tomahawk missiles, destroying three Houthi-controlled radar sites. Today, however, as President Biden and his top cabinet members are assessing the conditions of increasing risks to Americans in the Middle East, they are also factoring in the regional sensitivities associated with the increasingly unstable United Nations-mediated truce among the warring parties in Yemen. Such assessments will include a posture review of the Houthis’ threat capability to American interests since 2021 and how to counter their associated risks.

There are perennial US measures to disrupt terrorist facilitation, such as the targeted sanctions announced on December 7, but they are not enough to address the Iran-sponsored threats emanating from Yemen. Yes, further US and international diplomatic pressure, targeted sanctions, and precision counterterrorism operations can be applied, but more needs to be done. The immediate actions the Biden administration can take now—absent a US military response—include the FTO re-designation of the Houthis. 

Such an FTO re-designation will keep Houthis firmly accountable for their transregional attacks on civilian populations, infrastructure, and commercial shipping. Further, with the FTO designation applied, the president can be publicly steadfast in clarifying that the US will not fail to protect its interests and that it will aggressively support its partners in the defense of their sovereign territory from the Houthis’ terrorist attacks. Short of FTO designation, the president can also re-designate the Houthis as an SDGT entity. This would at least allow the Treasury Department to freeze any US-held assets of the Houthis and their backers and restrict Houthi backers’ access to US financial institutions. Biden can also implore the international community to support collective naval efforts to keep the Bab el-Mandeb Strait—linking the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden—open and navigable for commercial shipping.

The strong and decisive action of FTO designation is clearly not the only foreign policy tool available for the US to disrupt support to terrorist facilitation, but it is a timely one that can be immediately deployed concurrently to the considerations for other courses of action.

R. Clarke Cooper is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative and is the founder and president of Guard Hill House, LLC. He previously served as assistant secretary for political-military affairs at the US Department of State.

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What does the rest of the war look like? In part, it will build on the prior phase in northern Gaza. But it will also present new challenges and different missions for Israeli forces.

From October 7 to now

In the first few weeks following the terrorist attack, Israel successfully completed kinetic shaping operations in northern Gaza that were designed to soften the battlefield and reduce risk to Israeli ground forces. It did so by destroying as much of Hamas’s military capabilities and infrastructure from the air as possible. 

The Israeli defense forces also directed Palestinian civilians to clear the battlefield and relocate south of Wadi Gaza for their safety. However, many civilians failed to heed that direction and remain on the battlefield, complicating military operations and leading to civilian casualties.

Israeli forces then set up and launched a ground incursion into Gaza from the north and have established a southern line of advance to the south of Gaza City and north of Wadi Gaza, effectively cutting the Gaza Strip into two parts—north and south. The Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) then moved south into Gaza City from two avenues of approach: from the northeast and northwest of the city and from the south along the Mediterranean Sea.

With the border fence to the east and troops to the north, west, and south, the IDF has cordoned off Gaza City and its surrounding metropolitan area. IDF troops have begun conducting search operations to destroy Hamas military capabilities and fighters inside Gaza City, moving in from the west. However, a large portion of Gaza City, and northern Gaza as a whole, has yet to be searched due to the implementation of a temporary pause in fighting, brokered by Qatar, that was negotiated to return Israeli hostages from Hamas’s custody in exchange for Palestinian prisoners.

What’s next

It is possible that the pause in fighting could be renewed to exchange additional Israeli hostages for Palestinian prisoners, but that would only be temporary. The remainder of the ground operation in Gaza is likely to take several months, though the actual timeframe will be determined in part by how much resistance Hamas puts up. Neither Hamas nor the Hamas-run Gaza Health Ministry has provided statistics on the number of Hamas members who have been killed, so the group’s strength is unclear.

Some in the international community are clamoring for a permanent ceasefire in exchange for the release of the remaining hostages or for other conditions. That is unlikely and unrealistic given what Israel faces politically and militarily. A ceasefire would prevent Israel from achieving its stated objective of demilitarizing Hamas and preventing another attack, as Hamas still has sufficient capacity to conduct another attack if left to its own devices.

As the commander-in-chief of Israel’s armed forces, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu must ensure that a terrorist attack of this nature can never happen again. The brutal and savage nature of the October 7 attack, and the involvement of such a large number of Hamas terrorists, is evidence of an ideological problem that must be addressed through demilitarization and continuous degradation and destruction of Hamas’s military capabilities. Ideology cannot be killed with with bombs and bullets, but the organization can be demilitarized—of both men and materiel. This is similar to the approach taken in the campaign to counter the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) in Syria and Iraq.

Following the end of the temporary pause, Israel has restarted combat operations to complete the search-and-destroy mission in northern Gaza required to demilitarize Hamas in that area. To date, Hamas has not put up significant resistance, but it is possible that the group has used the temporary pause to prepare defensive positions throughout Gaza to fight against Israeli forces.

Israel has also not yet entered the tunnel system that exists under Gaza in a meaningful way, though this may be on purpose. There are hundreds of kilometers of tunnels and perhaps as many as a hundred tunnel complexes. Such a dangerous mission is going to take time. However, the return of more hostages would allow Israel to conduct operations to destroy the tunnel system without fear of killing as many Israeli civilians and foreign citizens held by Hamas.

Once northern Gaza has been cleared, Israel will move to initiate the southern ground campaign. Its objectives will be the same as those in northern Gaza: to demilitarize Hamas. Israeli ground forces will conduct search-and-destroy missions targeting Hamas military capabilities in southern Gaza, including the city of Khan Yunis, until the last building and tunnel has been searched. However, this campaign will be different and more difficult because of the large number of civilians who will be present on the battlefield.

Given Israel’s evacuation orders from the north, the population in southern Gaza has swelled to nearly double its pre-war numbers, some two million people, in an area where infrastructure was already stressed. This could limit Israel’s ability to use air power and may complicate ground operations. Both of these factors also increase the risk to Israeli forces that will operate in the area.

Israel has also proposed “humanitarian zones” in southern Gaza for civilians to relocate temporarily, but it will be difficult to move the large number of civilians quickly.

Once the southern campaign is complete, Israel, or an alternate security force comprised of troops from other countries, will have to provide security in Gaza to enable reconstruction and state-building activities. What will this look like? It is too soon to tell, and Israel runs the risk of having to conduct a counterinsurgency operation following the war. This will likely be the longest phase of the operation and one that is fraught with the most political risk.

Alex Plitsas is a nonresident senior fellow with the Middle East Programs’ N7 Initiative, a partnership between the Atlantic Council and Jeffrey M. Talpins Foundation working to strengthen and deepen Arab-Israeli normalization. He is also currently a principal and industry director for aerospace and defense and high-tech electronics at Providence Consulting Group. He previously served as chief of sensitive activities for special operations and combating terrorism in the US Office of the Secretary of Defense

The post What to expect in the next phase of Israel’s war against Hamas  appeared first on Atlantic Council.

There is an immediate need for moderate, modernizing Arab countries and Israel to quietly begin laying the groundwork for a NATO-like collective security organization and a European Union (EU)-like economic body. These institutions would unlock the region’s potential by countering its relentless cycles of violence.

Amid the horrors of Hamas’s terrorist attack of October 7 and Israel’s ongoing war in Gaza, such notions may sound like a naïve fantasy. However, some senior officials in the Middle East are already thinking in these terms, arguing to me that such an approach would be the most effective way to counter Iran’s proxy warfare and ideological extremism, without which the Hamas attacks don’t happen.

These officials, who requested anonymity to speak most candidly, point to Europe as their example. The continent had been wracked by centuries of inter-state and religious violence culminating in two catastrophic world wars. The EU and NATO have succeeded in bringing a period of unprecedented peace to the region. The only major European wars since their creation have occurred in countries outside these institutions—Ukraine, Georgia, and Yugoslavia.

Given the Middle East’s historical and geographic peculiarities, whatever its countries conjure up would evolve differently. Where the European lesson applies is that it’s best to begin with a small core of committed countries, and then expand from there. NATO was born in 1949 with just a dozen countries, including the United States and Canada from outside of Europe, and it now includes thirty-one members. The European Coal and Steel Community was founded in 1952 with six countries, serving as the precursor to the EU’s now twenty-seven members.

As was the case in Europe, moderate Arab states and Israel should begin with collective security, including the United States, Canada, and perhaps also India and select and willing European countries. One senior Arab official told me that the Abraham Accords countries plus Egypt and Jordan—all countries that have normalized relations with Israel with the support of the United States—would be the most obvious candidates in the first stage.

“I would be one of the first people that would endorse a Middle East NATO,” said Jordan’s King Abdullah II in a 2022 interview with CNBC. Jordan already works closely with NATO and has fought “shoulder-to-shoulder” with Alliance forces for decades, the king noted. While the current conflict makes such views sound remote, the danger of escalation makes the concept all the more urgently necessary.

One can only hope that it won’t take the expansion of the current conflict into a world war-like level of death and destruction, as it did in Europe, to galvanize common cause behind such an initiative. First and foremost, another senior Arab leader tells me, it will require Israel to recognize that it is “playing into Iran’s hands” through the nature of its Gaza invasion. “We all need to play the long game,” he said.

Israel has no choice but to conduct the war against Hamas and seek to destroy its ability to govern Gaza and conduct another 10/7 attack. That said, even if Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is able to “eradicate” Hamas’s military threat, that won’t address the source of regional instability: Iran, its extremist ideology, and its support for proxies—Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas in Gaza, and the Houthis in Yemen.

Without a lasting solution with the Palestinians, including the potential establishment of a Palestinian state, either Hamas will regenerate, or a similarly disruptive group will emerge. What’s needed isn’t just a smarter day-after approach toward and with responsible Palestinians, however, but also a day-after approach for the region.

Iran’s despotic rulers, with their goal of destroying Israel and defeating the United States and its like-minded partners, thrive in the chaos and violence that Hamas’s terrorist attacks and their aftermath have produced. It is in that atmosphere that Iranian rulers can best control their population and continue to build upon their greatly expanded influence across the Middle East, which over time has been born out of conflicts in Lebanon, in Yemen, in Syria, and between Palestinians and Israel.

The best way to counter this Iran-induced instability would be if the moderate Arab states of the Gulf and the region, building upon the Abraham Accords, deepen their security cooperation while simultaneously expanding their security, technological, economic, and investment cooperation to produce more stability, prosperity, and hope for their own people.

The outcome of increased regional cooperation over the next decade, the second Arab official says, would echo what happened in Europe. Iran’s rulers would confront the growing dissatisfaction of citizens paying attention to the progress of neighboring countries, much as the citizens of the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact countries were while confronting NATO and the EU during the Cold War.

To win this struggle, eradicating Hamas is necessary but insufficient, when the real need is to defeat Iran, which neither Israel, moderate Arab states, nor the United States is prepared to do militarily. When one looks at all the alternatives for countering Iran and building a modern, sustainable, prosperous Middle East, the option of constructing common security and economic architecture is the most attractive of them.

What that would require is a recognition by the parties involved that Iran has achieved its current standing in the region through their complacency and unwillingness to counter its revolutionary leadership at each stage of its expanded influence. Arab officials privately praise the Trump administration’s strike on one of the most heinous of Iran’s revolutionary masterminds, Iranian major general Qasem Soleimani, in 2020. If the strike had been followed by a more resolute US approach to Tehran, then it would have shown Iran the limits to its efforts at stoking regional mayhem, even as Tehran works to develop nuclear weapons.

The notion of a closer regional security system, working with the United States, isn’t an entirely new one. Efforts include Arab League members’ interventions in Yemen, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), and the Middle East Strategic Alliance of 2017. Operation Desert Storm, which liberated Kuwait in 1991, was the most successful instance of security collaboration and involved thirty-five states, among them seven Arab countries. There have also been efforts at greater economic integration through the GCC. Though it went largely unnoticed in the aftermath of October 7, the GCC recently announced a unified tourist visa that would allow travelers easy movement between Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates.

Yet all these measures and institutions have lacked sufficient ambition to bring about permanent change in the region that also embraced Israel. As difficult as it will be to create sufficient trust between Israel and Arab states, particularly now, previous efforts have also stumbled on distrust among Arab states. The process of building these new institutions and gaining agreement to their aims could help address this trust deficit in a more permanent, institutional, and treaty-bound manner.

Saudi officials still hope to find their way back to a normalization process with Israel, involving security guarantees from the United States, which had been far advanced before October 7. Such a step would be far more meaningful and lasting if it was embedded in a larger regional effort at security and economic integration.

For now, the ball is in Israel’s court to manage its war with Hamas in a manner that does not close the door to these possibilities. As soon as possible, Israeli leaders need to get back to working with the Arab states with whom they had so greatly improved relations. Only in this way can Israel turn the horrors of Hamas’s terrorist attacks into a more lasting peace that even a complete defeat of Hamas cannot deliver.

If Israel and moderate Arab states can ultimately leverage this crisis for generational good, they could put their region on a more positive and sustainable glide path. If the region fails to seize this opportunity, expect the ideological extremism and violence to spread, perhaps endangering the moderate Arab states themselves.

Though this may not seem the right time for this long-term thinking, it’s worth remembering that Franklin Delano Roosevelt and Winston Churchill signed the Atlantic Charter in August 1941, with World War II raging.

With the stakes this high and the dangers this extreme in the Middle East today, the vision needs to be commensurate to the historic moment.

Frederick Kempe is president and chief executive officer of the Atlantic Council. You can follow him on Twitter @FredKempe.

THE WEEK’S TOP READS

#1 America Is a Heartbeat Away From a War It Could Lose
A. Wess Mitchell | FOREIGN POLICY

Wess Mitchell’s provocative look at the growing dangers of world war is required reading for anyone interested in assessing the greatest threats to global order since the 1930s.

“The worst-case scenario is an escalating war in at least three far-flung theaters,” explains Mitchell, “fought by a thinly stretched U.S. military alongside ill-equipped allies that are mostly unable to defend themselves against large industrial powers with the resolve, resources, and ruthlessness to sustain a long conflict.”

Writes Mitchell, a former US assistant secretary of state for European and Eurasian affairs: “Waging this fight would require a scale of national unity, resource mobilization, and willingness to sacrifice that Americans and their allies have not seen in generations.” Read more →

#2 The West Must Defeat Russia
Anne Applebaum | THE ATLANTIC

Anne Applebaum begins on an optimistic note: “They planned to take Kyiv in three days, the rest of Ukraine in six weeks. More than 21 months later, Russian forces have withdrawn from half the territory they occupied in February of last year.”

Yet Applebaum worries that those gains could now be lost.

“If we abandon what we have achieved so far and we give up support for Ukraine, the result could still be the military or political conquest of Ukraine,” Applebaum writes. “The conquest of Ukraine could still empower Iran, Venezuela, Syria, and the rest of [Vladimir] Putin’s allies. It could still encourage China to invade Taiwan. It could still lead to a new kind of Europe, one in which Poland, the Baltic states, and even Germany are under constant physical threat, with all of the attendant consequences for trade and prosperity.”

With stakes this high, it’s disturbing that US legislators would hesitate even for a moment to provide the support necessary to bring Ukrainian victory. Read more →

#3 In Talks With Biden, Xi Seeks to Assure and Assert at the Same Time
Vivian Wang and David Pierson | THE NEW YORK TIMES

This brilliantly reported piece captures the duality of Xi’s visit to the United States.

“Mr. Xi wants to convince Washington, and the world, that he is willing to engage with the United States, in part to lure back foreign investment to bolster China’s ailing economy,” write Wang and Pierson in the New York Times. “But he also wants to demonstrate to the Chinese people that he strongly defended Beijing’s interests, and burnished its image as a world power on a par with the United States, not a secondary one making concessions.” Read more →

#4 Putin the Ideologue
Maria Snegovaya, Michael Kimmage, and Jade McGlynn | FOREIGN AFFAIRS

This fascinating Foreign Affairs piece is worth reading for anyone hoping to make sense of Putin’s staying power in Russia. Snegovaya, Kimmage, and McGlynn argue that it all comes down to ideology.

“The Kremlin has succeeded in crafting a worldview that explains why Russians must endure war-related challenges and allows them to make sense of their circumstances. This ideology has become an enduring feature of Putin’s regime,” they write.

The authors emphasize that the Kremlin’s latest push to codify state ideology is only its most recent endeavor to standardize how Russians conceptualize their reality: “Moscow has overhauled the country’s education system as part of that same ideological effort, standardizing modern history textbooks to fit the official propagandist line, requiring that every Russian school have a counselor to facilitate the civic and patriotic upbringing of students, instructing all schools to hold a flag-raising ceremony every week, and other such measures. These steps constitute a widespread effort to inculcate a top-down ideology, anchored by a vision of Russia as a distinct civilization.” Read more →

#5 Only the U.S. Can Restore World Order
Nadia Schadlow | WALL STREET JOURNAL

Nadia Schadlow’s recent Wall Street Journal piece is a must-read for this week and perhaps for years to come.

“Chaos is spreading throughout the world as a direct consequence of America’s failure to deter Russia, Iran and China,” writes Schadlow, a former US deputy national security adviser for strategy. “The balance of power in key regions is faltering, leading to instability and global disorder. Like it or not, the U.S. is the only force that can restore equilibrium.” Read more →

Atlantic Council top reads

New Atlanticist Nov 15, 2023

Experts react: What did Biden and Xi’s ‘candid’ meeting accomplish?

By Atlantic Council experts

Atlantic Council experts break down the US and Chinese leaders’ four-hour summit and what’s coming next.

China Economy & Business

UkraineAlert Nov 13, 2023

Ukraine braces for another winter of Russian attacks on power grid

By Aura Sabadus

While the Ukrainian authorities have had over half a year to prepare for a new wave of Russian air strikes, the country’s civilian energy infrastructure remains vulnerable, writes Aura Sabadus.

Conflict Drones

MENASource Nov 17, 2023

Iraq’s parliamentary speaker was removed. What’s next for the country?

By Abbas Kadhim

The current crisis dates back to May 2022, when Mohamed al-Halbousi removed one of his bloc’s members from parliament.

Elections Iraq

The post The best antidote to surging Mideast violence and Iranian extremism? Regional versions of NATO and the EU. appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On November 10, Forward Defense nonresident senior fellow Elliot Ackerman was featured on NPR’s podcast Fresh Air . He spoke about the psychological effects of war from his several tours in the Middle East and Southwest Asia.

Fellow

Elliot Ackerman

Nonresident Senior Fellow

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Afghanistan Defense Policy

Forward Defense, housed within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, generates ideas and connects stakeholders in the defense ecosystem to promote an enduring military advantage for the United States, its allies, and partners. Our work identifies the defense strategies, capabilities, and resources the United States needs to deter and, if necessary, prevail in future conflict.

Learn more

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Following the October 7 attack, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) tightened border security, increased its maritime interdiction of weapons flowing into Gaza, and began shaping operations in Gaza with air strikes, surface fires, and ground operations against targets in Gaza. The IDF has called up its reserves, and a force of at least 350,000 awaits its orders to begin a larger ground invasion. With Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s announcement on October 28 that a “second stage” in Israel’s war against Hamas has begun, it now seems a question of when, not if, the order for a large number of these troops to cross the border will come. When it does, the challenges the IDF will face will be intense. I have some sense of these challenges from firsthand experience doing urban close air support between 2001 and 2007 in Nasiriyah, Baghdad, Ramadi, Fallujah, Kandahar, and around al-Qaim.

First among the challenges will be the difficulty that a densely packed urban environment such as Gaza City poses to military operations. During military operations on urban terrain, or MOUT, every building is a potentially hardened bunker from which an enemy can launch an ambush. Patrols of infantrymen only a block apart will not be able to see or support each other with fire. Efforts to evacuate the wounded will be slowed by the lack of landing zones to support medical evacuations by helicopter. Though Hamas has no air assets, the verticality of the urban landscape will allow it to bring fire down on the IDF from above, necessitating the need for the Israeli Air Force to provide close air support, often at “danger close” range. Hamas can easily turn everyday items in the city, such as parked cars, garbage cans, or mailboxes, into improvised explosive devices. Hamas’s extensive network of tunnels adds a third subsurface element to the battlespace, akin to the challenge submarines pose to naval surface forces.

Israeli airstrikes since October 7 have caused civilian deaths in Gaza despite Israel’s best efforts to avoid them. A large ground invasion will undoubtedly result in more deaths of innocent Palestinians unconnected to Hamas. Wars exact high human costs, and there is no reason to expect ground operations in Gaza to deviate from the pattern. Unlike Hamas, Israeli forces operate under the order to minimize both civilian casualties and the destruction of infrastructure. This is the right approach, but it is also one that will make Israel’s mission to destroy Hamas more difficult. Israeli soldiers will advance slower as they clear buildings room by room and attempt to disarm improvised explosive devices, rather than level city blocks with overwhelming firepower. Over the course of its ground campaign, the IDF will plan to evacuate wounded soldiers, civilians, and terrorists, a position starkly in contrast to Hamas’s use of Palestinians and hostages as human shields.

Fortunately, the IDF is a well-trained military. It pioneered employing unmanned aircraft systems to assist in urban targeting and reconnaissance, including the use of small handheld systems that can look around corners for patrols and clear rooms before soldiers risk their lives. The IDF’s experience in years of urban warfare was of great benefit to the US military in Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom, and the IDF has incorporated lessons learned from US warfare into its tactics, techniques, and procedures.

If the challenge of urban warfare were all that Israel faced, it would be daunting enough. Unfortunately, Israeli forces also face an often hostile and ill-informed world press that holds Israel to a vastly different standard than they hold Hamas. For example, the phrases “proportionality” and the “law of war” are bandied about, with few seeming to understand what they mean fully. The principle of proportionality seeks to limit civilian casualties and collateral damage by ensuring the military force used is not disproportionate to meet legitimate military objectives. No reasonable person can fail to see the importance to Israel of protecting its citizens from mass murder, rape, and torture by Hamas. If Israel were to indiscriminately carpet bomb Gaza City, Hamas’s stronghold, then that would be a disproportionate use of force. Israel has not done that. It has instead called for civilian evacuations of northern Gaza and conducted airstrikes with precision weapons.

The ground offensive Israel is likely planning will place its soldiers at increased risk, but it will also ensure to a much greater extent that only Hamas’s terrorists, operations centers, and weapons depots are targeted. The Geneva Conventions protect hospitals and places of worship from attack when they serve their proper functions, and to ignore those protections would constitute a war crime. However, if protected places are used for offensive military purposes, they may forfeit their protected status. Even if, for example, a site is being used as both a hospital and for military purposes, it still represents a viable target (and not a war crime) provided the attacking force gives advance warning before its attack and takes other precautionary measures. In this case, it is the side that abuses the protected status of the sites that is the one guilty of war crimes and is legally and morally responsible for civilian deaths and damage. Hamas has repeatedly demonstrated its willingness to attack without regard for protected places in Israel and to use hospitals and schools in Gaza as cover for military operations.

As events in Gaza unfold, the United States and its allies should stand with its fellow democracy, Israel, as it defends itself against terrorism. It is equally vital that the United States help defend Israel against the moral relativism that tries to equate Hamas’s deliberate targeting of protected civilians and the IDF’s scrupulous efforts to avoid harming innocent noncombatants.

Col. John B. Barranco USMC (Ret.) was the 2021-22 US Marine Corps senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security and is currently executive vice president of Potomac International Partners and an adjunct professor at the Naval War College. 

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Click to jump to an expert analysis:

Carmiel Arbit: Israelis are ready for war and will resist calls for a ceasefire

Jonathan Panikoff: Is this the start of a full ground invasion or a smaller counterinsurgency operation?

Tuqa Nusairat: Israel risks creating a newly traumatized and radicalized generation of Palestinians

Alex Plitsas: The operation will likely take months to achieve its goal

Daniel E. Mouton: A ground invasion will directly affect Israel’s long-term security

R. Clarke Cooper: Israel and its allies must stay vigilant against threats throughout the region

Israelis are ready for war and will resist calls for a ceasefire

After a three-week delay, the Israeli government is now proceeding with its ground offensive in Gaza. The operation will focus heavily on the Hamas tunnels—known as the Gaza metro—and on other Hamas infrastructure.

The human toll will be staggering. Israel accuses Hamas of using civilians as human shields and must weigh strategic assets with the humanitarian costs, particularly as international pressure mounts. In the aftermath of the al-Ahli Baptist hospital scandal, all eyes will be on al-Shifa hospital—the largest hospital in Gaza—which is said to be sheltering 40,000 people but the Israeli military has maintained for decades is the main hub of Hamas operations in Israel. 

As the casualties and devastation grow, the international pressure on Israel will mount for a ceasefire—but the appetite in Israel for a full-scale operation is so far unwavering. Israelis have banded together in preparation for a full-scale war, volunteering across the nation to support soldiers, displaced families, and others. Voices on the left that would typically demand a ceasefire have been almost entirely muted. The families of hostages—whose fate grows more precarious with a ground operation—are among the few voicing concern, not for the operation but for its impact on their loved ones.  

Significant questions remain as to how far Israel will be willing to go in its stated determination to destroy Hamas. In past operations, Israel has limited its actions and deterred rather than destroyed Hamas. Many Israelis feel this approach represented a caving to pressure from the West to adhere to international humanitarian norms rather than protecting its own security—a decision that led to the October 7 attacks. It also reflected the reality that Israel had no plans for an alternative leadership in Gaza, a reality that remains unchanged. Israel has more leeway to operate in the aftermath of October 7, but it is already starting to face the same pressure again, and the war is still in its earliest days. How far Israel’s leaders will be willing to go—and what steps they will be willing to take to balance their humanitarian responsibilities with their military ambitions—remains an open question.

—Carmiel Arbit is a nonresident senior fellow with the Middle East Programs and the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative at the Atlantic Council.

Is this the start of a full ground invasion or a smaller counterinsurgency operation?

It was only a matter of time before Israel’s ground operation expanded in response to Hamas’s October 7 terrorist attack, but there remains an open question still as to what the size and scope will be. Does this mark the beginning of a full-scale ground invasion or is this preparation for a more focused, smaller-footprint counterinsurgency operation? The lull that preceded this expanded military operation reflects US efforts behind the scenes to cajole Israel to not rush and think through its strategic goals and potential end states before committing to a ground operation. In the coming days, Jerusalem’s decision as to what kind of operation to undertake may be revealed.

The delay gave the United States some time to build up its own deterrence posture in the region. With the USS Dwight D. Eisenhower and its strike group in the Mediterranean and the USS Gerald R. Ford moving into the Persian Gulf, the United States is prepared for the war to escalate beyond Gaza. US strikes on Friday against Iran-backed Syrian militia sites were a direct reaction by Washington to drone and missile attacks against US personnel and bases earlier in the week. But those sorts of provocations from Iran, which risk escalating this conflict beyond Gaza, pale in comparison to what has thus far been tit-for-tat attacks between Israel and Hezbollah in the north, which have the potential to result in an unintended escalatory spiral that leads to a full-scale war in northern Israel.

But the United States, while not dictating Israel’s response, would almost certainly prefer that Israel not engage in a full-scale ground invasion. Instead, the United States would likely prefer smaller, targeted ground operations that, combined with aerial attacks, would reduce the death toll of innocent Palestinian civilians, though the numbers should still be expected to be quite high. The United States is probably assessing that this course of action, combined with its own deterrence efforts in the region, is the best chance to limit the conflict from spreading beyond Israel and Gaza, a goal shared by European and Middle Eastern countries, too, not to mention China.

In either scenario, the timeline of Israel’s effort to decimate Hamas is likely to be long—measured in weeks or months, not days. And in both scenarios, overwhelming Israeli success at destroying Hamas could bring Hezbollah into the conflict as a means to try to save the group. But regardless of how Israel undertakes its ground operation, when it’s over, the more strategic question will still have to be answered: Who is responsible for Gaza now?

—Jonathan Panikoff is the director of the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Program.

Israel risks creating a newly traumatized and radicalized generation of Palestinians

Analysts will say that Israel needs to conduct a ground invasion in Gaza to eradicate Hamas and establish deterrence in the aftermath of the October 7 attack. Since Hamas was elected and began to govern Gaza in 2007, Israel has engaged in four major assaults on Gaza, none of which have resulted in eliminating the threat Hamas poses. Over the past twenty days, Israel has engaged in a cataclysmic bombardment of the Gaza Strip and its 2.2 million inhabitants, killing an average of 400 Palestinians per day as the death toll exceeds 7,000, according to figures from the Gaza Health Ministry, with perhaps hundreds more still waiting to be unearthed from under the rubble. If the situation in Gaza was a humanitarian crisis before October 7, what has happened in recent days is a catastrophe that will take decades to recover from and yet is unlikely to ensure Israel’s security. 

What will remain of Gaza’s population, and among Palestinians elsewhere in the occupied West Bank and East Jerusalem and inside Israel proper, will be a newly traumatized and radicalized generation of youth, none of whom were born or of voting age when Hamas was elected. If Israel decides to maintain its occupation of Gaza with ground troops indefinitely, it too will suffer significant losses that will quickly turn an already enraged Israeli public against this attempted military “solution.” 

As images of the destruction of Gaza have emerged through on-the-ground, first-hand accounts, international public opinion has moved in favor of a ceasefire, despite the glaring opposition among Western leaders. The imminent ground invasion and the ongoing decimation of Gaza by air—which has already resulted in significant loss of life, more than 600,000 Palestinians internally displaced, and 45 percent of homes destroyed or damaged—will lead to the largest humanitarian catastrophe the conflict has not seen since 1948. As a result, Hamas’s self-declared raison d’etre—“resisting the [Israeli] occupation with all means and methods”—will only grow in the minds of Palestinian youth. This will render unsuccessful Israel’s attempts to eliminate Hamas militarily.

As Gaza plummeted into darkness on Friday night, so too will the region continue to witness dark days ahead as Israel and its Western allies continue to seek military solutions for a decades-old conflict that can only be solved by addressing the legitimate grievances of the Palestinians and their cry for an end to the occupation and for an independent Palestine. 

—Tuqa Nusairat is the director for strategy, operations, and finance at Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center & Middle East Programs.

The operation will likely take months to achieve its goal

Israel has begun the conclusion of kinetic shaping operations designed to degrade and destroy as much of Hamas military capabilities in Gaza from the air as possible. These operations have been in support of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s stated goal of the demilitarization of Hamas and are in preparation for a ground incursion.

At the same time, Israel has begun the initial phase of a multi-phased ground incursion in which Israeli troops are likely to move into northern Gaza. There they will likely conduct a cordon and search operation in which they will go building-to-building to search for and destroy Hamas’ military capability, including command and control, weapons caches, key leaders, and Hamas fighters who decide to stay and fight. Civilians have been asked to leave the area north of Wadi Gaza, which amounts to approximately 1.1 million out of 2.2 million Palestinians in Gaza.

This operation will likely take months if Netanyahu’s goal is to be achieved and will be a bloody, difficult fight. It is estimated that Hamas has hundreds of miles of tunnels under Gaza in addition to its above-ground structures. The more than two hundred hostages taken by Hamas on October 7 could be in any of these sites.

The humanitarian situation in Gaza continues to deteriorate. A United Nations resolution overwhelmingly passed on Friday calling for a humanitarian ceasefire is a reflection of those conditions. The humanitarian situation remains a potential Achilles’ heel for the operation in Gaza.

For the past three weeks, Iranian proxy Hezbollah has engaged in cross-border fire and skirmishes from southern Lebanon with Israeli forces in northern Israel as fears of a second front remain real. It is unknown if Hezbollah will fully commit its arsenal of an estimated 150,000 rockets and missiles, many of which are capable of striking Jerusalem and Tel Aviv. If Hamas’s military capabilities are destroyed, Iran could activate Hezbollah, but in doing so Hezbollah and Iran run the risk of Hezbollah being severely degraded by Israel and potentially by the United States, if Israel were to become overwhelmed. In doing so, Iran would expend its largest proxy, limiting its ability to respond indirectly and avoid a direct confrontation.

Additionally, Iranian proxies in Iraq and Syria have struck US bases in those countries, wounding more than twenty US troops. The United States struck two Iranian-supplied weapons depots in Syria in response and publicly named Iran as being behind the attacks. 

The situation remains an unstable powder keg, and the threat for regional escalation remains real. Two factors to watch are the size and scale of a ground incursion into Gaza and the humanitarian conditions in Gaza. Those are the two things that the regional actors who may seek to escalate the conflict will seize on as justification for doing so.

—Alex Plitsas is a nonresident senior fellow with the Middle East Programs’ N7 Initiative, a partnership between the Atlantic Council and Jeffrey M. Talpins Foundation working to strengthen and deepen Arab-Israeli normalization. He is also currently a principal and industry director for aerospace and defense and high-tech electronics at Providence Consulting Group.

A ground invasion will directly affect Israel’s long-term security

Given the recent increase in airstrikes, the recent ground incursions, and cuts to internet service, it appears that the IDF is poised to begin its anticipated ground operation into Gaza. Whether the operation begins will be a political decision as there are countervailing pressures from the White House and elsewhere for additional hostage releases, the evacuation of foreign citizens, and the amelioration of the humanitarian situation. If an IDF ground operation were to begin, then the scale and conduct of the operation will have effects far beyond the Gaza Strip. This operation, even if it accomplishes the objective of eliminating Hamas, will directly affect Israel’s long-term security.

The first effect will be whether the IDF commits such a large force to Gaza that the size of this force might allow others, such Lebanese Hezbollah or other Iranian-affiliated militias, to believe they can conduct larger opportunistic attacks against Israel. Deterring this sort of attack is one of the reasons why the United States rushed additional forces to the region. The second effect will be a product of how the IDF conducts combat operations in Gaza. Hamas will have every incentive to operate among the civilian population and create dilemmas for the IDF. The IDF will have a near-impossible task in trying to eliminate Hamas without greatly adding to the toll of Gaza’s civilian casualties. Nonetheless, failing to account for the civilian population will make it impossible to establish suitable post-conflict conditions in Gaza. The White House has correctly highlighted the importance of Gaza’s civilian population as the ground operation could create barriers to Israel’s continued normalization with Saudi Arabia and elsewhere. Israel’s security not only requires the elimination of Hamas, but it also depends on Israel living in peace with Palestinians and on expanding its diplomatic relations in the region.

—Daniel E. Mouton is a nonresident senior fellow at the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative of the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs. He served on the National Security Council from 2021 to 2023 as the director for defense and political-military policy for the Middle East and North Africa for Coordinator Brett McGurk.

Israel and its allies must stay vigilant against threats throughout the region

Tonight, Israel’s allies and adversaries alike are closely observing and assessing the efficacy of the Israeli military offensive operations against Hamas. Beyond the immediate operational focus in Gaza, it is critical for Israel and allied states to remain diligent in their shared regional counterterrorism and security cooperation efforts. Since October 7, security threats throughout the Middle East have increased, emanating from the Israel-Hamas war. Tehran’s support to its proxies, along with Iranian production and proliferation of advanced weapon systems, such as cruise missiles, unmanned aerial systems, and ballistic missiles, require enhanced US security cooperation to counter such threats and promote an integrated air and missile defense concept of operation.

Israel’s sovereign defense may have been tested by the terrorist actions of Hamas, as well as by those who insist on drawing a moral equivalence between Hamas’s terrorist acts and the self-defense of Israel, but the ironclad strategic partnership between the United States and Israel remains.

Further, in this latest iteration of the fight against terrorism, the mutual commitment of the United States and Israel to advance support of regional security must not lose long-term strategic sight of the historic achievements and potential future opportunities of the transformative Abraham Accords.

—R. Clarke Cooper is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative and is the senior director of Guard Hill House, LLC. He previously served as assistant secretary for political-military affairs at the US Department of State.

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In its October 7 attack on Israel, Hamas and other terrorist groups killed more than 1,400 people and took at least 222 hostages. Among the dead are at least thirty-two Americans, making it the deadliest foreign terrorist attack against Americans since 9/11.

The United States must again learn from tragedy. The US government has an opportunity to use its robust financial authorities to disrupt Hamas’s tactical financial capabilities. To do so, it must implement structural changes to strengthen both US and partner capabilities to combat terrorism financing and other illicit finance threats in the Middle East and beyond. 

Below are six steps that the US government—Congress and the Justice, State, and Treasury departments—should take now to address terrorism financing risks.

1. Formalize and resource a Treasury Department foreign financial service

Congress should create and fund a foreign financial service (FFS) that builds on the existing financial attaché program codified under Section 6106 of the Anti-Money Laundering Act of 2020. Modeled on the State, Commerce, and Agriculture departments’ foreign services, this FFS would provide the Treasury Department with the institutional resources, personnel, and capabilities to more effectively represent US economic interests to allies, partners, and adversaries around the world, especially to counter illicit finance threats such as terrorism financing.­­ A formalized and funded FFS would allow the United States to expand its technical capabilities to more global and regional financial centers, as well as to economic crisis hot spots.

Congress made an important stride with Section 6106, but it only authorized a small expansion of the program to appoint six additional attachés and, critically, without appropriating a budget for those positions. Congress now needs to fund the program, including for dedicated headquarters personnel to sustain a professional program, which means providing the resources needed to recruit, train, retain, and promote a financial diplomatic corps. For instance, in part due to limited resources, the Treasury Department withdrew financial attachés from Ukraine and Turkey over the past several years, only recently to return personnel to Turkey on a temporary basis. Deploying financial attachés on a temporary basis has higher unit costs than permanent placements at a given embassy and should only be used in unforeseen crisis situations or to provide surge capabilities to existing embassy offices. The value of a financial attaché is in large part the continuity and relationship management with stakeholders that comes from a sustained in-country presence during periods of relative calm that can then be leveraged in times of crisis. In the Middle East, the Treasury Department has recently closed its office at the US embassy in Qatar. And a financial attaché was previously stationed in Jerusalem, but the department closed that office a decade ago.

2. Deploy Treasury Department financial attachés to Israel and Qatar 

Establishing a FFS will take time to design and launch. In the interim, to strengthen US support for allies and combat terrorism financing, sanctions evasion, and other forms of illicit finance in the region, the Treasury Department should deploy a financial attaché to work out of the US Embassy in Jerusalem with responsibilities at least for Israel and the Palestinian territories. Former Treasury Secretary Jacob Lew, the current nominee to serve as the US Ambassador to Israel, is intimately acquainted with the financial attaché program and the value of Treasury Department expertise at home and abroad, so the department’s capabilities can be immediately leveraged.

The Treasury Department should also work expeditiously to reopen its office at the US Embassy in Doha, which closed this year. A financial attaché stationed in Doha may not have prevented the roiling controversy over the six billion dollars in Iranian oil revenues that remain in limbo, but the absence of an in-country Treasury Department presence removed a critical expert interlocutor between the US and Qatari governments, likely exacerbating an already fragile diplomatic and economic issue. The Treasury Department should also make use of its existing network of financial attachés in the region, including through the Terrorist Financing Targeting Center (TFTC) platform based in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, to share information about terrorist financing networks, coordinate joint disruptive actions, and offer capacity-building training and assistance in countering the financing of terrorism. Treasury Department Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence Brian Nelson’s October 23-26 visit to Saudi Arabia to chair a TFTC meeting is an important step that will require sustained high-level engagement, including through regional financial attachés.

3. Strengthen the global regulatory framework on digital assets

Hamas’s terror attacks brought renewed attention on the organization’s use of digital assets to raise and move money. On October 18, the Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control sanctioned ten Hamas members, operatives, and financial facilitators. The designations package included a Gazan cryptocurrency company, Buy Cash Money and Money Transfer Company, representing the first targeting of a Gazan cryptocurrency exchange. The Treasury Department press release, a bipartisan, bicameral letter to Treasury and the White House, and public reporting demonstrated how Hamas exploits digital assets for raising and moving funds. On October 19, the Treasury Department’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN), its Financial Intelligence Unit, issued a Notice of Proposed Rule Making under Section 311 of the USA PATRIOT Act to enhance transparency of convertible virtual currency mixing and combat terrorist financing, including risks related to Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad.

According to the Treasury’s 2022 National Terrorist Financing Risk Assessment, certain digital assets “may also be vulnerable to abuse by terrorist financiers because they can enable anonymous cross-border peer-to-peer funds transfers, which can occur without the involvement of a [virtual asset service provider] with [anti-money laundering] obligations.” The Treasury Department should prioritize regional compliance with international standards through the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and its FATF-style regional body, the Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force.

4. Surge Joint Terrorism Task Forces to target financial networks 

Operating since 1980 and expanding in scope and importance after the 9/11 attacks, the Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs) have a nationwide footprint of two hundred task forces across all fifty-six Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) field offices. They are made up of law enforcement and intelligence professionals comprising hundreds of local, state, and federal agencies. Attorney General Merrick Garland announced important recent measures on October 12, including to help those Americans directly impacted by this horrific Hamas terror attack, but more elements of US justice enterprise can be used to address the threat in the current moment.

5. Convene public-private FinCEN Exchange meetings

The Treasury Department’s FinCEN should work with relevant law enforcement agencies, including through certain JTTFs, to convene a series of public-private FinCEN Exchange meetings on the current terrorist financing risk. Given ongoing concerns about the role of cryptocurrencies in fundraising for Hamas and other terrorist groups, FinCEN should consider including responsible cryptocurrency exchanges, blockchain analytics companies, and other technology companies. It should also work with foreign partners through their respective public-private information sharing platforms.

FinCEN has a demonstrated track record over several years of engaging with digital asset companies on other priority issues, such as ransomware and North Korean malign activities, as well as developing creative partnerships to combat the fentanyl crisis. FinCEN Director Andrea Gacki’s October 18 virtual meeting with her Israeli counterpart on financial intelligence information sharing is an important first step, but FinCEN can take further action in this area to counter terrorism financing. As an added measure, the Treasury Department should also consider targeted intelligence sharing with European and other key partners to strengthen their domestic regimes against Hamas financing.

6. Add Hamas hostage takers to the State Department Rewards for Justice program

The State Department’s Rewards for Justice program is a powerful initiative to incentivize whistleblowers around the world to support US national security and foreign policy interests. Adding hostage recovery authorities to the Rewards for Justice program would allow the State Department to pay whistleblowers who provide information that leads to the recovery of American hostages. While the Hamas terrorists responsible for the hostage taking of American citizens are not likely motivated by money, others within the Gaza Strip may have information to aid in returning US citizens. 

While these recommendations will not alone solve what is inherently a military and political conflict, they can support US foreign policy and national security efforts to counter terrorism financing by making it more costly, inefficient, and risky for terrorist financiers to raise, move, invest, and spend money.

After nearly forty years since Klinghoffer’s brutal murder at the hands of the Palestine Liberation Organization and less than a month since the worst foreign terrorist act committed against American citizens since 9/11, the US government should use all available tools of national power to protect the United States and its allies, work toward the recovery of American and partner hostages, and degrade terrorist groups’ financial capabilities.

Alex Zerden is the founder of Capitol Peak Strategies, a risk advisory firm, an adjunct senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security, and a former Treasury Department financial attaché. You can follow him on X at @AlexZerden.

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There are few doubts that Hamas used Iranian-supplied weapons, equipment, and training to conduct the October 7 attacks. Since 1992, Iran has overtly provided tens of millions of dollars annually in military assistance, trained combatants, and provided political support. However, regarding the October 7 attacks, reports of Iranian involvement are mixed. Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei denied Iran’s involvement but praised the attack. Other reports suggested more direct involvement. For example, senior Hamas and Hezbollah officials stated that not only did Tehran approve the attack in advance, but Iranian advisors also played a role in its planning. On the other hand, there were reports that some Iranian officials were surprised by the attack.

US officials have accused Iran of being “broadly complicit” in the attacks but stopped short of saying Tehran was directly involved. In response to Iran’s broad complicity, the United States and Qatar have limited Iran’s access to the six billion dollars recently released in exchange for US hostages. More sanctions are anticipated. While such sanctions are certainly warranted, sanctions, in general, have had little coercive impact on Tehran. If Iran’s interest was to disrupt the continued normalization of Israel’s relations with Saudi Arabia and other Arab states, Tehran might consider that money well spent. Israel normalizing ties with Saudi Arabia would significantly diminish its influence in the region and could lead to the creation of a joint air defense system that would undermine its ballistic missile threat.

So, from Iran’s perspective, proxy wars may not be so perilous. Exchanging support for Hamas for the loss of access to funds, which may only be temporary, plausibly seems like a reasonable exchange for maintaining influence and key pillars of its national security strategy. The fact that the international community cannot establish Iran’s direct involvement suggests there is little recourse besides armed escalation to hold Iran accountable. Legal options are limited because, under current international law, a state actor may only be responsible for the actions of a proxy if it directs the proxy to take those actions or knows that the provided material would be used to commit certain crimes.

Legal precedents on sponsoring proxies

From the perspective of international law, there are two standards to hold a sponsor accountable for proxy behavior. The first is “effective control” and the second is “overall control.” Effective control comes from the precedent set in Nicaragua’s case to the International Court of Justice regarding US support for Contra rebels in the 1980s. While the court found that the United States “financed, organized, trained, supplied, equipped and armed” the Contras, Washington was not ultimately responsible for Contra violations of international humanitarian law because there was no “direct link” between US support and direction from a US source for any particular operation. The court held this position even though, according to the case, the United States provided the Contras a manual advising them to “shoot civilians attempting to leave a town, neutralize local judges and officials, hire professional criminals to carry out ‘jobs,’ and provoke violence at mass demonstrations to create ‘martyrs.’” According to the court, for there to be effective control, any direction from the United States had to apply to a specific operation and include instructing the Contras to commit unlawful acts.

Another precedent is the judgment of the International Criminal Tribunal of Yugoslavia (ICTY) against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) Army’s support for the Serbian Republic’s Army (VRS) operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina, which established a standard for overall control. In the case, Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic ICTY applied a standard of overall  control that emphasized the relationship between the organizations. In this case, the court held that the FRY Army had effective control because it provided the VRS with officers, salaries, and logistical support. Thus, the FRY was responsible for VRS violations of international humanitarian law. The difficulty with either standard of effective control is that they establish perverse incentives that encourage state actors to employ proxies while discouraging them from moderating proxy behavior since any attempt at moderation could imply effective control. 

The UN-brokered Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) could be another mechanism by which to hold state actors responsible for proxies. The treaty prohibits weapons transfers if the transferring party knows these weapons will be used to commit genocide, crimes against humanity, grave breaches of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, or attacks against civilians. States are also obligated to conduct a risk assessment to evaluate the chances that transferred weapons might be used in ways that violate international humanitarian law or in acts of terrorism or transnational organized crime. Unfortunately, treaty implementation has not been effective. Iran, for example, is not a signatory. Nor is Russia, for that matter. Moreover, according to an Amnesty International report, many of those states that are, like China, often do not comply. The United States played a significant role in negotiating the treaty and signed it in 2013. However, the Senate did not ratify it, and the United States withdrew in 2019 and has yet to sign back on. Having said that, most, if not all, of the treaty’s provisions are already reflected in US law. 

It should be obvious from these precedents that unless Iran admits to directing the atrocities, commanding the attack, or having known about the attacks when it provided support, it would not be accountable for Hamas’s actions under international law. Even though it is known that Iran has provided Hamas with funding, weapons, and training, and even if it could be proven that those funds, weapons, and training were used in the October 7 attack, Iran would still not meet the standard of effective control. That standard requires further proof that an organ of the Iranian state directed Hamas to commit the atrocities that it did. 

It is also not clear that Iran would meet the standard of overall control. For that to be the case, we would have to prove that key Hamas leaders, at least, shared membership in the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps or some other Iranian security organization. Moreover, while Hamas undoubtedly used Iranian funding to pay at least some salaries, that mediation makes the Iran-Hamas situation different from the FRY-VRS relationship, where the FRY paid VRS salaries directly. If it is also the case that Iran did not have advisors on the ground or command Hamas operations, this standard would be even more difficult to prove. Since Iran is not a party to the ATT, that treaty would not likely be useful here, especially since the United States is also not a party. Not only does this accountability gap defy common sense, but it also encourages the proliferation of such relationships, which will arguably proliferate such tragedies.

There are informal and formal ways of filling this gap. Informally, the international community should build consensus to lower the bar for accountability. Norms for proxy accountability should require the sponsors to, at least, take action to curb proxy violations and hold perpetrators accountable. If they fail to act, the international community should be willing to impose penalties that include economic sanctions that reduce the monetary benefits of proxy relationships, political actions that isolate violators and prevent or limit their participation in international venues they find useful, and security measures that allow like-minded state actors to interdict the flow of support. 

More formally, the international community should work to codify the standard of accountability described above. It can do this through the United Nations, as it did with the ATT. The United Nations could also review and update the “Report on State Accountability” by inserting language establishing that providing military assistance to a proxy that then commits atrocities should trigger specific mitigating actions by the sponsor. Finally, the international community could also establish a separate convention on proxies. These measures will take time to establish and only be effective if major powers, like the United States, back it. 

Establishing stronger norms governing proxy relationships does not necessarily expose state actors to liability simply because they provide military assistance to another actor—state or nonstate. But it makes sense to impose a burden on supporting actors to moderate the behavior of those they support and hold them accountable for crimes they might commit. Perhaps Iran did not intend the atrocities Hamas committed; however, had it not been for Tehran’s support, those attacks may not have happened or achieved the scale they did. Moreover, Iran’s post-attack response has endorsed the outcome while distancing itself from it. Under these conditions, military force is among the few effective ways to discourage future atrocities. Given the suffering that escalation would undoubtedly bring, it makes sense to create more options. Thus, the international community should move urgently on finding ways to close this gap.

C. Anthony Pfaff is a nonresident senior fellow with the Iraq Initiative in the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs and the research professor for Strategy, the Military Profession, and Ethic at the Strategic Studies Institute (SSI), US Army War College in Carlisle, Pennsylvania.

The views expressed here are his and not necessarily those of the United States Government.

The post The legal challenges in holding Iran accountable for supporting Hamas appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Atlantic Council experts are keeping close watch on the ongoing Israel-Hamas war and on the reactions around the globe. As the conflict continues into its third week, find the latest updates below.

Click here to get caught up on last week’s expert analysis.

The latest updates

• Six steps to disrupt Hamas and other terrorist groups’ finances

• The kidnapping of a peace activist by Hamas reveals the cruel irony of the situation Israel faces

• The legal challenges in holding Iran accountable for supporting Hamas

• Smart in 60 Seconds: Iran shares responsibility for Hamas’s attack

• The Gaza war will be the final straw for Netanyahu’s long political career

• The US is cracking down on the kinds of crypto transactions that fund Hamas and other terrorist groups

• Biden’s inflection point and history’s sobering lessons

• The conflict in Gaza threatens Iraq’s stability, progress in US-Iraq relations

Six steps to disrupt Hamas and other terrorist groups’ finances

Just over thirty-eight years ago, on October 8, 1985, the modern American struggle against terrorism financing began. On that tragic day, terrorists from the Palestine Liberation Organization summarily executed an American hostage, Leon Klinghoffer, a sixty-nine-year-old, wheelchair-bound entrepreneur and World War II veteran on vacation celebrating his wedding anniversary with his wife. The terrorists subsequently dumped his corpse overboard on the hijacked Achille Lauro cruise ship. This horrific tragedy led to the eventual passage of the Anti-Terrorism Act of 1990, which for the first time provided a legal cause of action for American terrorism victims to seek justice for acts of international terrorism. Since then, the United States has continued to refine its financial toolkit to go after terrorist organizations and their financial enablers through a variety of civil and criminal legal tools.

In its October 7 attack on Israel, Hamas and other terrorist groups killed more than 1,400 people and took at least 222 hostages. Among the dead are at least thirty-two Americans, making it the deadliest foreign terrorist attack against Americans since 9/11.

The United States must again learn from tragedy. The US government has an opportunity to use its robust financial authorities to disrupt Hamas’s tactical financial capabilities. To do so, it must implement structural changes to strengthen both US and partner capabilities to combat terrorism financing and other illicit finance threats in the Middle East and beyond. 

Read more from Alex Zerden, founder of Capitol Peak Strategies, a risk advisory firm, an adjunct senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security, and a former Treasury Department financial attaché:

New Atlanticist

Oct 25, 2023

Six steps to disrupt Hamas and other terrorist groups’ finances

By Alex Zerden

After Hamas’s October 7 attack on Israel, the United States must strengthen its capabilities to combat terrorism financing and other illicit finance threats in the Middle East and beyond.

Economic Sanctions Economy & Business

The kidnapping of a peace activist by Hamas reveals the cruel irony of the situation Israel faces

Last April, my dad sent a Passover greeting to his longtime friend, Vivian Silver. He shared a small joke in the form of a traditional Passover saying: “in every generation, we must see ourselves in Egypt,” but replaced Egypt with “Kaplan Street.” He was referring to the hub of the protests that had broken out across Israel this past year, which were a response to the Israeli government’s divisive judicial reform proposals.

“My eldest grandson joined me on Kaplan,” she replied. “What a source of pride!” The friends then proceeded to exchange photos of their grandchildren and wished each other well.

At seventy-four years old, Silver—who was abducted by the militant group Hamas on October 7—is no ordinary grandmother; she is a titan of the peace movement. The international media has profiled Silver extensively. Throughout her life, Silver has worked as a tireless champion for Arabs, spending decades supporting and building friendships with her Bedouin and Gazan neighbors. She founded the Arab-Jewish Center for Empowerment, Equality, and Cooperation in the 1990s to promote a shared society.

Read more from Carmiel Arbit, nonresident senior fellow for Middle East Programs and the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative at the Atlantic Council:

MENASource

Oct 25, 2023

The kidnapping of a peace activist by Hamas reveals the cruel irony of the situation Israel faces

By Carmiel Arbit

The hostage crisis Israel is facing is unprecedented. Yet, there is some familiarity with the territory.

Human Rights Israel

The legal challenges in holding Iran accountable for supporting Hamas

On October 7, Hamas conducted a devastating attack on Israel, where its militants murdered civilians, took hostages, and committed other atrocities. Hamas, however, did not accomplish this attack alone. At a minimum, Iran provided funding, weapons, and training, enabling the group to achieve unprecedented scale and complexity. What is less clear is Iran’s involvement in the conduct of the attack and the accompanying atrocities. That uncertainty has limited the international community’s response. Limits in international law and consensus regarding state actor responsibility for proxy actions preclude imposing meaningful costs on Iran without expanding the conflict. Now may be the time to overcome these limits, develop consensus, and strengthen legal regimes to constrain Iran’s destabilizing support for its proxies.

There are few doubts that Hamas used Iranian-supplied weapons, equipment, and training to conduct the October 7 attacks. Since 1992, Iran has overtly provided tens of millions of dollars annually in military assistance, trained combatants, and provided political support. However, regarding the October 7 attacks, reports of Iranian involvement are mixed. Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei denied Iran’s involvement but praised the attack. Other reports suggested more direct involvement. For example, senior Hamas and Hezbollah officials stated that not only did Tehran approve the attack in advance, but Iranian advisors also played a role in its planning. On the other hand, there were reports that some Iranian officials were surprised by the attack.

US officials have accused Iran of being “broadly complicit” in the attacks but stopped short of saying Tehran was directly involved. In response to Iran’s broad complicity, the United States and Qatar have limited Iran’s access to the six billion dollars recently released in exchange for US hostages. More sanctions are anticipated. While such sanctions are certainly warranted, sanctions, in general, have had little coercive impact on Tehran. If Iran’s interest was to disrupt the continued normalization of Israel’s relations with Saudi Arabia and other Arab states, Tehran might consider that money well spent. Israel normalizing ties with Saudi Arabia would significantly diminish its influence in the region and could lead to the creation of a joint air defense system that would undermine its ballistic missile threat.

Read more from C. Anthony Pfaff, nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Iraq Initiative:

New Atlanticist

Oct 24, 2023

The legal challenges in holding Iran accountable for supporting Hamas

By C. Anthony Pfaff

Under current international law, a state actor may only be responsible for the actions of a proxy if it directs the proxy to take those actions or knows that the provided material would be used to commit certain crimes.

Iran Israel

Smart in 60 Seconds: Iran shares responsibility for Hamas’s attack

The Gaza war will be the final straw for Netanyahu’s long political career

Just a few weeks ago, it finally seemed that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu had played a winning card after a few difficult months since the inauguration of his sixth government. In the wake of being shunned by the Joe Biden administration and having visits to Arab capitals indefinitely delayed, Netanyahu hoped to secure a grand deal with Saudi Arabia—something that could not only quell the protests against the embattled prime minister but also win him a Nobel Prize and cement his reputation as the most talented statesman in Israel. Riyadh, it seemed, was almost within reach.

But then Hamas executed a massacre in the south of Israel on October 7. The Israeli army failed to prevent and protect, Israel’s intelligence agencies failed to predict, and the Netanyahu government was slow to react to the disaster. It was the 1973 Yom Kippur War all over again. However, this time, the civilians were the ones who largely paid the horrific price of negligence and arrogance.

“We are at war; the enemy will pay an enormous price. I ordered the army to clear the towns from terrorists, and that is being done right now. We are at war, and we will win,” Netanyahu said on October 7, confident as always. At that very hour, 11:00 am, hundreds of Israelis—civilians and soldiers—were already dead. Others were hiding from terrorists or fighting for their lives, not knowing that Hamas had conquered the entire Gaza Envelope, which is part of the Western Negev within roughly four miles of the Gaza Strip border.

By the end of the day, the whole nation watched the news silently; they were in disbelief that such a scenario could happen in Israel. After being told time after time by politicians and army chiefs that Hamas had suffered severe blows and that “what will be is not what we had,” many realized that these statements were no more than hot air.

Read more from Ksenia Svetlova, a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs and the director of the Israel-Middle East Relations Program at Mitvim:

MENASource

Oct 23, 2023

The Gaza war will be the final straw for Netanyahu’s long political career

By Ksenia Svetlova

Despite the public anger and the frequent calls for him to resign, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is still busy with petty politics.

Conflict Israel

The US is cracking down on the kinds of crypto transactions that fund Hamas and other terrorist groups

On October 19, the US Department of the Treasury’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) issued a Section 311 action and a Notice of Proposed Rule Making (NPRM) identifying international Convertible Virtual Currency Mixing (CVC mixing) as a class of transactions of primary money laundering concern. CVC mixing makes cryptocurrency transactions untraceable and anonymous, thereby making it an attractive option for illicit actors who are trying to avoid detection while receiving, transacting, and cashing out their cryptocurrency holdings into fiat currency.

Section 311 of the USA PATRIOT Act is one of the most powerful tools the Treasury Department has in its toolkit to combat financial crime, including terrorist financing. Section 311 authority is delegated to FinCEN, the primary regulator for the Bank Secrecy Act (BSA) and the Financial Intelligence Unit of the United States. Section 311 provides a range of measures to defend the US financial system from money laundering and terrorist financing risks from increased due diligence and reporting requirements to prohibiting the opening and maintaining of correspondent accounts.

This decision comes as the US government continues to craft a response to Hamas’s attack on Israel and the resulting war in Gaza. Based on recent Treasury Department designations and media reporting, Hamas has used cryptocurrency to raise money and CVC mixing to hide its involvement. FinCEN’s action aims to increase transparency into CVC mixing services so authorities can take the appropriate action to prevent and disrupt terrorist financing.

The use of FinCEN’s Section 311 authority to target a class of transactions is unprecedented. The proposed rule “would require covered financial institutions to report information about transactions when they know, suspect, or have reason to suspect the transaction involves CVC mixing within or involving jurisdictions outside the United States.”

With the NPRM, FinCEN is seeking comments from the private sector and the public to provide an even-handed approach to CVC mixers going forward. It is likely that privacy advocates will have strong disagreements to these developments.

Congress has also requested answers on how Hamas and other Palestinian terrorist groups could raise millions of dollars in cryptocurrency despite being sanctioned and designated as Foreign Terrorist Organizations. While terrorist financing and money laundering remain a challenge for the formal financial system, such as banks, Thursday’s action is a significant step in understanding how Hamas and other terrorist groups and illicit actors are evading sanctions to raise money and fund their operations through cryptocurrency and how they are converting those assets into the fiat currencies. Expect to see more Treasury Department actions targeting Hamas and other terrorist groups’ financing through cryptocurrency and the formal financial system, based on the information derived from the Section 311 reporting.

—Kimberly Donovan is the director of the Economic Statecraft Initiative within the Atlantic Council’s GeoEconomics Center. Donovan was previously acting associate director of the FinCEN Intelligence Division, as well as FinCEN’s chief of staff and senior advisor to the director.

Biden’s inflection point and history’s sobering lessons

Historians may come to know US President Joe Biden’s speech to the nation this week as his “Inflection Point Address,” and it was as eloquent and compelling as any he has delivered in his lifetime.

It has the potential to be the most significant of his presidency, and it was choreographed to be seen as such. It was only the second time he has chosen to speak from behind the Resolute Desk in the Oval Office, and he did it with the backdrop of wars in Ukraine and Israel and simmering tensions around Taiwan.

Beyond that, the eighty-year-old commander in chief, who had been in Israel just a day earlier, looked sharp and spoke with the vigor of a man who understands the historic moment and his role in it. He connected the dots between Russia’s criminal war in Ukraine and Hamas’s terrorist attack on Israel, assisted by Iran.

“We’re facing an inflection point in history,” he said, “one of those moments where the decisions we make today are going to determine the future for decades to come.”

He was also clear about what connects the two, seemingly disparate conflicts. “Hamas and Putin represent different threats, but they share this in common,” he said. “They both want to completely annihilate a neighboring democracy—completely annihilate it.”

Read more from Frederick Kempe, president and CEO of the Atlantic Council:

Inflection Points

Oct 21, 2023

Biden’s inflection point and history’s sobering lessons

By Frederick Kempe

Now that Biden has identified this inflection point and its actors, it’s worth reflecting on what the term means—and what it demands from the United States and its global partners.

Israel Middle East

The conflict in Gaza threatens Iraq’s stability, progress in US-Iraq relations

Militant group Hamas’s October 7 attack against Israel threatens to disrupt more than normalizing relations with Israel. Before the attack, the Middle East and North Africa were on a slow path to stabilization. Arab states and Israel were beginning to settle their differences, Saudi Arabia and Iran had established relations, and the Yemen conflict was slowly ending. In Iraq, economic prospects were slowly improving after its economy contracted due to the pandemic, exacerbated by ongoing anti-Iran protests and sectarian strife. Moreover, as the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute pointed out in March, Iraq was “enjoying its most stable period since 2003.” US-Iraq security relations even improved after the Iraqi Parliament  called for the withdrawal of US troops in 2020. In August, both countries reaffirmed their commitment to increasing security cooperation.

That period of relative stability may be coming to an end. After Israel responded to Hamas’s deadly October 7 attacks, Iraqis took to the streets in massive pro-Palestinian protests, burning Israeli flags and chanting anti-American slogans. Iraqi Prime Minister Muhammed al-Sudani expressed solidarity with the Palestinian cause and has described the Israeli response as “brutal Zionist aggression.” His predecessors, including Mustafa al-Kadhimi, Haidar al-Abadi, Adil Abdul-Mahdi, and Nouri al-Maliki, echoed Sudani’s solidarity, adding that the Hamas attacks were a “natural response” to “Israeli provocations and violations.” Iraq’s Iran-backed militias, such as the Badr Organization, Asa’ib Ahl al Haq, and Kataib Hezbollah, expressed their support for the attacks and declared their readiness to attack American targets should the US intervene. 

As Amir al-Kaabi and Michael Knights of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy point out, much of the Iraqi response is theater. Many militia threats were conditioned on unlikely events, such as direct US intervention or escalation. These threats also employ a little strategic ambiguity: what counts as direct or indirect intervention is up for interpretation. In fact, Kaabi and Knights describe the general response, even by Iraq’s most rabid militias, as “cautious” and, in some cases, “muted.” It should also be of little surprise that the Iraqi response is overwhelmingly pro-Hamas. As other Arab states were normalizing relations in 2022, Iraq enacted a law that made establishing relations with Israel punishable by death or life imprisonment. Anti-Israel sentiment runs deep, and the facts about the brutality of Hamas’s attack are not likely to resonate.

Read more from C. Anthony Pfaff, nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Iraq Initiative:

MENASource

Oct 20, 2023

The conflict in Gaza threatens Iraq’s stability, progress in US-Iraq relations

By C. Anthony Pfaff

After Israel responded to Hamas’s deadly October 7 attacks, Iraqis took to the streets in massive pro-Palestinian protests, burning Israeli flags and chanting anti-American slogans.

Conflict Crisis Management

The post Live expertise: The latest insight as the Israel-Hamas war intensifies appeared first on Atlantic Council.

It has the potential to be the most significant of his presidency, and it was choreographed to be seen as such. It was only the second time he has chosen to speak from behind the Resolute Desk in the Oval Office, and he did it with the backdrop of wars in Ukraine and Israel and simmering tensions around Taiwan.

Beyond that, the eighty-year-old commander in chief, who had been in Israel just a day earlier, looked sharp and spoke with the vigor of a man who understands the historic moment and his role in it. He connected the dots between Russia’s criminal war in Ukraine and Hamas’s terrorist attack on Israel, assisted by Iran.

“We’re facing an inflection point in history,” he said, “one of those moments where the decisions we make today are going to determine the future for decades to come.”

He was also clear about what connects the two, seemingly disparate conflicts. “Hamas and Putin represent different threats, but they share this in common,” he said. “They both want to completely annihilate a neighboring democracy—completely annihilate it.”

Importantly, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen was sending much the same message earlier the same evening, speaking in Washington at the Hudson Institute. She argued that Russia and Hamas, supported by Iran, want to “wipe from the map” both Ukraine and Israel, and that free countries could not allow that.

“Our democracies are under sustained and systemic attack by those who abhor freedom because it threatens their rule,” said von der Leyen. “For more than six hundred days, our friends in Ukraine have been fighting and dying for their freedom against Russian aggression. And now Israel has suffered the worst terrorist attack in its history, and the worst mass murder of Jews since the Holocaust. These two crises, however different, call on Europe and America to take a stand—and to stand together.”

As if scripted by a grand dramatist, Chinese leader Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin were meeting in China as Biden traveled to Israel, doubling down on their common cause to rewrite the rules of the global order.

Xi leveraged a gathering of representatives from nearly 150 developing countries, the Belt and Road Forum, to put forward China’s vision as an alternative to US leadership. “What we stand against are unilateral sanctions, economic coercion and decoupling and supply chain disruption,” he said, in advancing what he called a “fairer, multipolar world.”

Xi feted Putin as his guest of honor, meeting with him for three hours on Wednesday and making sure to be photographed frequently by his side. The two leaders neither condemned Hamas nor mourned Israeli losses.

Putin also connected the wars in Ukraine and Israel, saying that he had discussed both “in detail” with Xi. “All these external factors are common threats,” Putin said, “and they strengthen Russian-Chinese relations.”

At the same time that Putin was in Beijing, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov was in North Korea, hailing the “qualitatively new, strategic level of relations.” That builds on North Korean leader Kim Jong Un’s recent visit to see Putin at the Vostochny Cosmodrome, followed by the delivery of more than a thousand containers of military equipment and arms to support Russia’s war in Ukraine.

Add Iran to the mix, and you have a toxic brew of autocrats. As Biden told Americans this week, “Iran is supporting Russia in Ukraine, and it’s supporting Hamas and other terrorist groups in the region. And we’ll continue to hold them accountable.”

Now that Biden has identified this inflection point and its actors, it’s worth reflecting on what the term means—and what it demands from the United States and its global partners.

What inflection points have in common is that they are plastic moments in history where individuals and groups of leaders can have outsize influence in shaping the future, for good or ill.

I consider Biden’s inflection point to be the fourth since the early twentieth century. The previous ones set the stage for the periods after both world wars (1918-1945 and 1945-1990), the period after the Cold War (1990-2022), and now the period beginning with Russia’s war in Ukraine.

As was the case previously, expect this defining “moment” in history to open up an era that could stretch for three decades or more, perhaps until 2050.

It’s clear that the period after World War I was marked by failures, including the badly constructed Versailles Treaty ending the war and the ill-fated League of Nations that was meant to bring the world together to prevent future wars. What the world ended up with instead was the rise of fascism, the emergence of Hitler’s Third Reich, and then the Holocaust and World War II, leaving more than seventy million dead.

The period after World War II was a success, in no small part due to what leaders then had learned from their mistakes. The United States replaced its misguided isolationism with purposeful internationalism. Washington worked with European partners and others to construct what we now know as the international liberal order of rules and institutions, including the United Nations, the Bretton Woods institutions, NATO, and the European Coal and Steel Community.

The third inflection point ushered in the post-Cold War period, which proved not to be the “end of history,” a term that Francis Fukuyama coined. He argued that Western liberal democracy’s ascendency after Soviet collapse marked “the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government.”

What’s true is that NATO and the European Union both expanded democracy’s realm, joined by previously Soviet bloc countries that embraced pluralism and free markets. What the West didn’t anticipate was the staying power of autocratic China and its ruling Communist Party, despite globalization and economic growth, and the emergence of a revanchist Russia.

After the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the United States, NATO countries rallied around Washington with their Article 5 commitment to common defense. However, the long wars that followed in Afghanistan and Iraq failed to seize upon that galvanizing opportunity.

I launched this column and newsletter in 2018 under the title of Inflection Points, sensing that we were at one of those defining moments in history when US leadership alongside partners and allies would be decisive. My introduction to that term was as early as 2012, when the National Intelligence Council employed it in “Global Trends 2030.”

That report offered up four potential worlds, including one where the risk of interstate conflict increases and the United States retrenches and another, at the other extreme, involving “a newly rebalanced and fused world in which social, economic, technological and political progress is widespread.” The two other scenarios were a “Gini-Out-of-the-Bottle” world—one in which inequalities within states and between states dominate, and another, nonstate world in which nonstate actors, from multilateral corporations to terrorists, flourish both for good and bad.

“None of these outcomes is inevitable,” wrote Mathew Burrows, the author of the report. “The future world order will be shaped by human agency as much as unfolding trends and unanticipated events.”

Biden will find that identifying this period as an inflection point is easier than shaping the future. But his speech this past week is a good start, including its focus on our divisions at home. “We can’t let petty, partisan, angry politics get in the way of our responsibilities as a great nation,” the president declared. The other point that Biden made, true across all four inflection points, is that the costs of action are far less than those of inaction. “History has taught us that when terrorists don’t pay a price for their terror, when dictators don’t pay a price for their aggression, they cause more chaos and death and more destruction. They keep going, and the cost and the threats to America and to the world keep rising.”

In short, pay now or pay more later.

Perhaps Biden should have added: History’s sobering lesson about inflection points is that working together with partners and allies through constructive engagement can change the world for the better, as shown through the peaceful end of the Cold War. However, the costs of getting it wrong also escalate, where the price of miscalculation and isolationism in the 1930s resulted in world war.

Frederick Kempe is president and chief executive officer of the Atlantic Council. You can follow him on Twitter @FredKempe.

THE WEEK’S TOP READS

#1 Remarks by President Biden on the Unites States’ Response to Hamas’s Terrorist Attacks Against Israel and Russia’s Ongoing Brutal War Against Ukraine
THE WHITE HOUSE

Read Biden’s speech to see how he connected the dots between the crises in Israel and Ukraine. Harkening back to the internationalist rhetoric of presidents Franklin D. Roosevelt, John F. Kennedy, and Ronald Reagan, Biden makes the case for American unity and leadership as the global order reaches an inflection point.

“American leadership is what holds the world together. American alliances are what keep us, America, safe. American values are what make us a partner that other nations want to work with. To put all that at risk if we walk away from Ukraine, if we turn our backs on Israel, it’s just not worth it,” Biden said. “That’s why, tomorrow, I’m going to send to Congress an urgent budget request to fund America’s national security needs, to support our critical partners, including Israel and Ukraine.”

As his speech came to an end, Biden issued a plea for unity: “Tonight, there are innocent people all over the world who hope because of us, who believe in a better life because of us, who are desperate not be forgotten by us, and who are waiting for us. But time is of the essence. I know we have our divisions at home. We have to get past them. We can’t let petty, partisan, angry politics get in the way of our responsibilities as a great nation.” Read more →

#2 A World Without American Deterrence
Walter Russell Mead | WALL STREET JOURNAL  

In this important piece, Walter Russell Mead makes the case against “strategic passivity,” arguing that declining US “power to deter” encourages actors to challenge American power across the world.

“Mr. Biden has yet to grapple with the painful truth that America’s core problem in the Middle East is the march of an unappeasable Iran toward regional power regardless of moral or human cost,” Mead writes. “That is not the only thing Mr. Biden and his team don’t seem to have grasped. The Middle East firestorm is merely one hot spot in a world spinning out of control.”

Pointing to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Iran’s support for Hamas, and China’s increasing aggression in the South China Sea, Mead comes to the powerful conclusion that “if President Biden’s response to Hamas and its patron Iran fails to restore respect for American power, wisdom and will, our enemies everywhere will draw conclusions and take steps that we and our allies won’t like.” Read more →

#3 The Week When Biden Hugged Bibi
Susan B. Glasser | THE NEW YORKER

In the New Yorker, Susan Glasser dissects Biden’s busy week—from his wartime visit to Israel to his primetime address on Thursday night. She accurately characterized Biden’s speech as “a lecture from a family patriarch to a fractious brood that didn’t necessarily want to hear it: Grow up. The world is counting on us.”

“For years, Biden has warned about the current geopolitical moment as a brewing conflict between the democracies of the world and rising autocracies, such as Russia and China, calling this an ‘inflection point’ in apocalyptic language that suggests a new global conflict like the two World Wars of the twentieth century,” Glasser writes. “In the past, it might have been possible to dismiss some of that as hyperbole from a politician who grew up in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War. But events of the past year and a half—and especially during this trying past couple of weeks—have reinforced the urgency of Biden’s most consistent foreign-policy message.” Read more →

#4 Yes, the U.S. Can Afford to Help Its Allies
David Frum | THE ATLANTIC

After Biden’s budget request for Ukraine and Israel, David Frum preemptively addresses sticker shock and the coming debate about “whether the United States is doing too much.” Read this thoughtful piece to understand exactly what it takes to support allies and why the United States can’t afford not to.

“Thanks to its remarkable rebound from the coronavirus pandemic, the American economy will this year produce $27 trillion in goods and services,” Frum writes. “In the fiscal year that ended on September 30, the U.S. spent about $850 billion of that $27 trillion on national defense. That rounds out at a little more than 3 percent of GDP. That’s only about half of the burden of defense spending that the U.S. shouldered during the final decade of the Cold War.”

Frum argues that costs must be measured against benefits: “The money to Ukraine is buying a powerful reinforcement of peace in Europe and across the world. The money to Israel will buy a similar deterrent to rogue aggression in the Middle East.” Read more →

#5 America’s Middle East Imperative: Contain Iran
Reuel Marc Gerecht and Ray Takeyh | WALL STREET JOURNAL

This deep dive into Iran’s involvement in Hamas’s attack on Israel is a must-read for anyone hoping to understand the rising tensions throughout the Middle East and the role of the United States.

“The fact is that both Iran and Hamas wanted to abort a regional alignment that threatened to integrate Israel more into the Middle East,” Gerecht and Takeyh write. “American and Israeli diplomacy operated on the hubristic assumption that Iran didn’t have veto rights on this process. And regardless of Israeli-Saudi-U.S. diplomatic initiatives, the clerical regime and Hamas take pleasure in watching Israelis die.”

Gerecht and Takeyh argue that while “the shadow of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan hang uneasily over Washington,” the events of this week “ought to make it unmistakably clear that the U.S. cannot leave the Middle East and pivot to more promising pastures. The region has a way of dragging reluctant powers back into its morass.” Read more →

Atlantic Council top reads

New Atlanticist Oct 19, 2023

Experts react to Biden’s ‘inflection point’ address on Ukraine and Israel

By Atlantic Council experts

Biden tied together the conflicts in Israel and Ukraine as part of a larger struggle for democracy and freedom. Here’s what Atlantic Council experts had to say about the Oval Office address.

Conflict Europe & Eurasia

IranSource Oct 19, 2023

Israel misread Iran’s way of war. A proper understanding could help predict Hezbollah’s next moves.

By David Daoud

Iran—through Hezbollah—has spent almost two decades and considerable effort and funds building the Gaza Strip into the Axis of Resistance’s Southern Front against Israel.

Iran Israel

New Atlanticist Oct 18, 2023

Experts react: Will Venezuela now hold freer elections and get sanctions relief?

By Atlantic Council experts

On October 17, Venezuela’s government and members of the opposition signed a deal to work toward making next year’s presidential elections more free and fair. Sanctions relief could be next.

Democratic Transitions Economy & Business

The post Biden’s inflection point and history’s sobering lessons appeared first on Atlantic Council.

That period of relative stability may be coming to an end. After Israel responded to Hamas’s deadly October 7 attacks, Iraqis took to the streets in massive pro-Palestinian protests, burning Israeli flags and chanting anti-American slogans. Iraqi Prime Minister Muhammed al-Sudani expressed solidarity with the Palestinian cause and has described the Israeli response as “brutal Zionist aggression.” His predecessors, including Mustafa al-Kadhimi, Haidar al-Abadi, Adil Abdul-Mahdi, and Nouri al-Maliki, echoed Sudani’s solidarity, adding that the Hamas attacks were a “natural response” to “Israeli provocations and violations.” Iraq’s Iran-backed militias, such as the Badr Organization, Asa’ib Ahl al Haq, and Kataib Hezbollah, expressed their support for the attacks and declared their readiness to attack American targets should the US intervene. 

As Amir al-Kaabi and Michael Knights of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy point out, much of the Iraqi response is theater. Many militia threats were conditioned on unlikely events, such as direct US intervention or escalation. These threats also employ a little strategic ambiguity: what counts as direct or indirect intervention is up for interpretation. In fact, Kaabi and Knights describe the general response, even by Iraq’s most rabid militias, as “cautious” and, in some cases, “muted.” It should also be of little surprise that the Iraqi response is overwhelmingly pro-Hamas. As other Arab states were normalizing relations in 2022, Iraq enacted a law that made establishing relations with Israel punishable by death or life imprisonment. Anti-Israel sentiment runs deep, and the facts about the brutality of Hamas’s attack are not likely to resonate.

Still, the situation poses several difficulties for the United States. First, as Israel’s response continues and the conditions of the Palestinians in Gaza deteriorate, there will be increased pressure on the militias to act. For example, Abu Azrael, arguably Iraq’s most famous Iran-backed militant group, has reportedly gone to Lebanon and is awaiting any opportunity to enter Israel. Should such a “grassroots” intervention expand, the potential for escalation—and, thus, a greater US role—will increase. Second, strategic ambiguity can be a double-edged sword. Should Israel’s efforts to defeat Hamas succeed, militias may lower the standard for what counts as intervention, again setting conditions for escalation.

Perhaps more difficult for the United States is that it may not be in its interest, this time, to ignore this predictable, if muted, pro-Hamas response, given the brutality of the last Hamas attack. Indeed, it is in everyone’s interest to alleviate the suffering of the Palestinian people and it is reasonable to express concern—even outrage—over their worsening conditions. However, committing atrocity, even where there is a just cause, should not be tolerated.

As Daniel Henninger of the Wall Street Journal points out, direct attacks against civilians are becoming the “new normal.” While Hamas’s attacks were particularly shocking, Russia has also deliberately attacked civilians in its war against Ukraine, killing around ten thousand. To reverse this trend, there is little option other than finding ways to hold actors who engage in war crimes accountable. In the case of Russia, the United States has intervened on behalf of Ukraine and, along with its European allies, imposed sanctions on Russia. If the Iraqi militia reaction is to be taken seriously, a similar intervention in Gaza may lead to an escalation that undermines its larger relationship with Iraq.

For example, Kataib Hezbollah’s attacks against US forces in Iraq and Syria draw little support from the Iraqi people. However, US attempts to defend itself enable these militias to mobilize large protests when those defensive operations occur in Iraq. Still, Iraqi popular disinterest in what they view as an external conflict has provided something of an obstacle to escalation. However, given the largely anti-Israel-pro-Palestinian sentiment of the Iraqi people, militia attacks against US targets as part of a defense of the Palestinian people will likely draw support. Moreover, whatever little leverage the Iraqi government has to curb such attacks will have disappeared.

Making matters more complicated is the fact that escalation is not simply dependent on Israeli and US action. After the destruction of the Baptist Hospital in Gaza on October 17, Sudani immediately attributed it to Israeli action and called for a day of mourning. Shortly thereafter, unknown actors used drones to attack US troops. That the destruction of the hospital may be due to the actions of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad group will not likely impact Iraqi public opinion nor the Iraqi government’s position, which means the potential for escalation increases.

Thus, the way ahead for the United States is not clear. The simple message that innocent civilians should not be subject to murder, kidnap, and torture will get muted as Palestinian civilians flee their homes and their casualties climb, even if Israeli operations conform to the law of war. Still, the United States can chart a way forward by pressuring its regional partners, including Iraq, to condemn the brutality, if not the reason, for the Hamas attacks. Most may not, but even a superficial acknowledgment of the indefensible nature of responding to injustice with atrocity will reinforce norms against directly targeting civilians.

The United States should also act as a moderating influence on the conflict and find ways to avoid escalation while enabling Israel’s efforts to defend itself against Hamas and its allies. While doing so will be difficult, the United States can begin by mobilizing humanitarian relief for those affected by the conflict. It should also closely monitor the conflict for potential escalation on any side and condition assistance to any partner on cooperation to de-escalate the conflict. For the Iraqi government, its influence over the militias is limited, even if it did want to intervene. However, it can partner with the United States to ensure U.S. intentions are effectively communicated and misunderstandings kept to a minimum..

Taking these steps will not fundamentally change the dynamics of the conflict nor alleviate the pressure on Israel to destroy Hamas. But it may create opportunities to mitigate the damage the conflict may cause to Middle East stability and US influence.

Dr. C. Anthony Pfaff is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Iraq Initiative and the research professor for Strategy, the Military Profession, and Ethics at the Strategic Studies Institute (SSI), US Army War College in Carlisle, PA. The Opinions expressed here are his own and do not necessarily represent those of the US government.

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Atlantic Council experts are keeping close watch on the ongoing Israel-Hamas war and on the reactions around the globe. As the conflict continues into its second week, find the latest updates below.

Click here to get caught up on last week’s expert analysis.

The latest updates

• Experts react to Biden’s ‘inflection point’ address on Ukraine and Israel

• Smart in 60 Seconds: What to expect from Israel’s possible ground invasion of Gaza

• Israel misread Iran’s way of war. A proper understanding could help predict Hezbollah’s next moves.

• A welcome announcement on humanitarian aid for Gaza

• The Israel visit was just the start. Here’s what Biden needs to do next. 

• Experts react: What did Biden achieve in his visit to Israel?

• Peacemaking can follow the Israel-Hamas war. History shows it.

• Dispatch from Abu Dhabi: Do the Israelis know about the Basus War?

• Network of South Asian Twitter accounts spreading Israel-Palestine war disinfo

• Egypt, the United States, and Israel are in a stalemate over opening the Gaza-Egypt border

• Biden arrives at the very moment Israel needs its closest ally

• The cancellation of the Biden summit reveals Jordan’s juggling act

• More updates

Experts react to Biden’s ‘inflection point’ address on Ukraine and Israel

Biden’s second bravura presidential moment in two days is a legacy-builder

It has been a good week for Joe Biden. In a tour de force, he visited Israel and delivered a pitch-perfect message of support for its embattled people and some careful observations on how to deal with the challenges ahead. Then one day after that trip, he gave a powerful speech from the Oval Office laying out the major dangers presented to global order, vital US interests, and US leadership by Vladimir Putin’s aggression to subdue Ukraine and Hamas’s savage attack on Israel. US presidents are usually elected for reasons related to the economy and other domestic issues, but presidents often establish their legacy at moments of international peril.

Even before Putin launched his massive invasion of Ukraine in February of 2022, the Biden administration laid out a sensible policy to deter Russia and then to make sure it did not succeed: 1. major sanctions on Russia; 2. political isolation of Russia; 3. the provision of substantial military and economic support to Ukraine; and 4. strengthening NATO defenses in the east. It took great effort to implement this successfully. 

But one thing the White House had not done was to explain to the American people why the United States was leading this major effort. Biden checked that box tonight. He explained that if Putin wins in Ukraine, he might march west and attack our NATO allies, which the United States would be obliged to defend. He reminded the American public that Ukraine was only asking for the means to defend itself. Providing the military and economic assistance that Ukraine needs is therefore the smart and economical way to protect the United States and its allies. He pointed out that if Putin wins in Ukraine, it would also embolden aggressors elsewhere. That would erode American leadership. He noted too that Ukraine and Israel are democracies attacked by authoritarians bent on their destruction. Stopping them is consistent with our values as Americans. 

To help defend our interests, the president noted that he was sending a request to Congress for substantial aid to Ukraine and Israel, and he expected us to overcome our divisions in dealing with these challenges. That aid is essential to defend American interests, and his handling of it was a smart, statesmanlike way to address the disorder in the US House of Representatives. 

It was Biden’s second bravura presidential moment in two days. In its clarity, strategic focus, and sunny summons of American values and leadership, it recalled Ronald Reagan at his best. This is good for Biden and better for us.

—John E. Herbst is the senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center and a former US ambassador to Ukraine.

Biden rallies Americans as global defenders of democracy. Will it work?

Biden’s Oval Office address to the nation sought to answer one central question regarding the conflicts between Israel and Hamas and Russia and Ukraine: “Why should the American people care?” Against the domestic political backdrop of a speaker-less Republican Party, a barely avoided government shutdown, and a deeply divided nation, Biden sought to unify the American people as global defenders of democracy. 

The rhetoric was about more than drawing important parallels between the wars in Ukraine and Israel. Biden is hoping that his message will compel lawmakers—under pressure from their constituents—to pass the forthcoming package of direct military aid to both nations that he previewed tonight. An omnibus aid package could offer something for a spectrum of Israel supporters and Ukraine skeptics alike. Or, alternatively, some could weaponize its sticker shock to draw the nation inward. But this is where Biden’s appeal for support rightly extended beyond the theoretical: Just twelve days after Hamas’s terrorist attack on Israel, American Jews and Muslims have begun to face heightened threats to their safety as a result of anti-Semitic and Islamophobic violence across the nation—with deadly consequences already in Illinois, where a six-year-old Palestinian-American child was brutally murdered for his faith.

The big question is whether Biden’s case was strong enough to move Republican lawmakers reluctant to cede any perceived win to a president with just thirteen months to go in his quest for reelection. The unity that the United States experienced after the 9/11 attacks seems a distant memory. Can Biden, who has invoked 9/11 to describe the aftermath of Hamas’s terrorist attack in Israel, summon the same resolve that followed that national trauma? The forthcoming funding request will serve as a test, and US allies and foes alike will be watching to see if the United States passes it.

—Jenna Ben-Yehuda is the executive vice president of the Atlantic Council, and the former president and chief executive officer of the Truman National Security Project and the Truman Center for National Policy.

Read more expert reactions to the Oval Office address:

New Atlanticist

Oct 19, 2023

Experts react to Biden’s ‘inflection point’ address on Ukraine and Israel

By Atlantic Council experts

Biden tied together the conflicts in Israel and Ukraine as part of a larger struggle for democracy and freedom. Here’s what Atlantic Council experts had to say about the Oval Office address.

Conflict Europe & Eurasia

Smart in 60 Seconds: What to expect from Israel’s possible ground invasion of Gaza

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Israel misread Iran’s way of war. A proper understanding could help predict Hezbollah’s next moves.

In perhaps the Israeli political echelon’s first—and, to date, highest ranking—admission of failure to preempt the October 7 Hamas-led attack on southern Israel, National Security Council chairman Tzachi Hanegbi said misunderstanding the group’s intentions was “my mistake, first and foremost.” Hanegbi explained that Israel “believed Hamas internalized the lessons” of Operation Guardian of the Walls “when it was dealt a heavy blow” in 2021.

As proof, he pointed to Hamas’s seeming indifference to Palestinian Islamic Jihad’s (PIJ) “pleas for help”—as he put it—when PIJ clashed with Israel in August 2022 and May of this year. “Hamas decided to remain outside the battle,” Hanegbi said. Though accurate on a technical level, Israel’s analysis of Hamas’s intentions, as reflected in Hanegbi’s statement, demonstrates a fundamental failure in understanding how Iran and its proxy forces operate, cooperate, and make war.

Iran’s proxies have long ceased to work as geographically contained entities or in isolation. Particularly with the onset of the Syrian civil war, Tehran has worked on integrating its various extensions and proxies into a mutually reinforcing and symbiotic regional alliance—a true “Axis of Resistance.” This also applies to Hamas, both within the Palestinian Territories and outside them.

Read more from David Daoud, nonresident fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center and Middle East Programs and director of Israel, Lebanon, and Syria Research at United Against Nuclear Iran:

IranSource

Oct 19, 2023

Israel misread Iran’s way of war. A proper understanding could help predict Hezbollah’s next moves.

By David Daoud

Iran—through Hezbollah—has spent almost two decades and considerable effort and funds building the Gaza Strip into the Axis of Resistance’s Southern Front against Israel.

Iran Israel

A welcome announcement on humanitarian aid for Gaza

Today’s announcement that Israel will allow Egypt to deliver limited quantities of aid to Gaza was a positive step forward in what has otherwise been a bleak humanitarian situation during a ten-day siege on the territory. While the exact determination of what duties Israel has turn on a legal classification of the conflict, the laws of war are at least clear on the basics: there is at a minimum an obligation to allow humanitarian assistance to be delivered to the civilian population by an impartial and non-discriminatory humanitarian organization if refusal to do so would result in mass starvation. With the United Nations warning that water shortages in Gaza have now “become a matter of life and death,” and the conflict is exacerbating the already precarious nature of life in Gaza, where more than 60 percent of the population faced food insecurity, it is imperative that the new announcement stick. 

Given the clearly deteriorating situation in Gaza, and the extremely rare statement issued by the International Committee of the Red Cross that the denial of food, water, and electricity to civilians, crucial for their survival, is not compatible with international humanitarian law, it is evident that humanitarian assistance delivered by impartial and non-discriminatory humanitarian organizations must be allowed to enter Gaza. Israel’s approval of the entry of humanitarian aid to Gaza from Egypt, following Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s hour-long meeting with US President Joe Biden, is a step in the right direction. At the same time, it is also important to ensure that this life-saving aid actually makes it to the intended recipients—civilians—and that Hamas does not divert or seize aid. As the commentary to Article 23 of the Fourth Geneva Convention reminds us, “constant surveillance is necessary to ensure that the articles are in actual fact received by those for whom they are intended and that any illegal trafficking is made impossible.” But even that cannot be carried out if the aid is not allowed to enter as soon as possible. The survival of civilians depends on it.

Read more from Lisandra Novo, staff lawyer for the Strategic Litigation Project at the Atlantic Council:

MENASource

Oct 18, 2023

Humanitarian aid cannot be weaponized. Gazans are depending on it.

By Lisandra Novo

Despite urgent appeals for aid and multiple deliveries to Egypt, no outside aid appears to have made it into Gaza.

Civil Society Conflict

The Israel visit was just the start. Here’s what Biden needs to do next. 

Biden arrived in Tel Aviv far more popular among Israelis than Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, over whom he has significant leverage as a result. In the days following this visit, Biden should not hesitate to use this leverage, though he must do so wisely.

Given this context, the United States has core objectives that are public, military, political, and diplomatic. By his very presence, Biden clearly demonstrated US resolve and friendship to Israelis. His words reinforced this core message. He was willing to put the credibility of the United States on the line to support the Israeli narrative on the recent deadly explosion at the hospital in Gaza City, a critical action given the lack of Israeli credibility among many global audiences. Given the trend lines in the region and in Europe, this in and of itself made the trip worthwhile. But if this is all that emerges from the trip in the end, then it will have been largely a missed opportunity.

Outside observers don’t know the details of the military matters that were discussed when Biden met privately with the Israeli war cabinet—and let’s hope secrets can actually be kept on this subject. But here’s what I would have advised Biden to put on the table. First, in the weeks and months ahead, there must be no daylight between the United States and Israel when it comes to the specifics of the requests for US military assistance. It would be a mistake if the United States were to give Israel a proverbial blank check only for a narrative to develop, as has been the case with Ukraine, that the administration is reluctant to provide what is desired. And differences on this subject should be resolved behind closed doors.

Read more from William F. Wechsler, senior director of Middle East Programs at the Atlantic Council and former US deputy assistant secretary of defense for special operations and combatting terrorism.

New Atlanticist

Oct 18, 2023

The Israel visit was just the start. Here’s what Biden needs to do next. 

By William F. Wechsler

The US and Israel should develop and publicly issue a joint set of common principles that will guide the future of Gaza, once Israel’s full military objectives against Hamas are reached.

Conflict Israel

Experts react: What did Biden achieve in his visit to Israel?

Amid strong show of support, Biden delivers a tough but necessary message to Israel

Biden delivered yet another passionate, personal speech in Israel on Wednesday reaffirming his continued unwavering support for Israel and its grieving population as it confronts Hamas in Gaza. But he also showed that he can stand firmly behind Israel while simultaneously delivering difficult messages calling for caution and humanitarian support.  

Among an ambitious list of priorities—from deterrence to American hostages—Biden used the trip to secure an agreement for humanitarian measures that Israel must take as it wages war in Gaza, announcing a surprise one hundred million dollar assistance package to Gaza and the West Bank—small but symbolic in the context of the wider aid that will go to assisting Israel in its war with Hamas. Biden reminded Israel in no uncertain terms that it is both Jewish and a democracy and it must meet its responsibilities as such. Israel, he reminded the country, believes in fundamental human rights and must act accordingly.

Biden is uniquely positioned to pressure Israel on these issues. Through his incredible embrace of the country, Biden has secured the leverage and good will to deliver tough if necessary messages to Israel that it must act according to Western standards as it engages in war. And in so doing, no one in Israel can ever accuse the United States of abandoning the country or its security needs. To the contrary, Biden was met in Israel with a hero’s welcome: At a moment when Netanyahu faces abysmal approval ratings in Israel, Biden, the first US president to travel to Israel during a war, was welcomed by posters that read “Thank You, Mr. President.” Both the public and Israeli press has been overwhelmed—“verklempt”—with his support for the nation in what is arguably its darkest hour.  This is in direct contrast to his Democratic Party predecessor Barack Obama, whose cool and detached response to Israel during wartime was met with an equally chilly response from Israelis. Biden’s firm messages in Tel Aviv today about Israel’s rights and responsibilities may be a tougher pill to swallow than the message he delivered to the American people last week when the war broke out, but there is no better leader to deliver them credibly to the Israeli people.  

—Carmiel Arbit is a nonresident senior fellow for Middle East Programs and the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative at the Atlantic Council.

9/11 is the right analogy—for the wrong reasons 

At this morning’s joint news conference, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu described Hamas’s October massacre as “twenty 9/11s” relative to the population of Israel and the United States. He also spoke of a battle between “the forces of civilization and the forces of barbarism,” echoing the diagnosis made by the George W. Bush administration after the September 11 attacks. 

There are of course close parallels between the two traumas, not least the element of strategic surprise, the asymmetric balance of power, the deliberate mass murder of civilians, and the shattering of prevailing myths about dominance and omniscience.  

Unfortunately, the analogy risks running deeper than Netanyahu intends. The United States pursued a maximalist response after 9/11, invading Afghanistan and occupying Iraq, without a clear exit strategy or an (achievable) definition of success. This violence unleashed a tsunami of radicalization across the Middle East that continued to drive the threat, bringing the fringe ideology of the perpetrators into the mainstream of a newly destabilized region and inadvertently confirming some of its canons. The elements of dehumanization in the United States’ response to 9/11, both systematic and spontaneous, unraveled global faith in the US-led rules-based order, precipitated a moral crisis at home, and helped to reshape domestic politics in profound and unexpected ways.  

The Israeli armed forces have promised “hell” in Gaza, already dropping six thousand bombs in five days on the small territory, cutting off food, water, medicine, and electricity to the population, and amassing three hundred thousand Israeli troops for a probable ground invasion—with, seemingly, no plan for the day after it is all over. Its airstrikes have killed 3,300 Palestinians, one third of whom were children, a reality which will both devastate and radicalize, and perhaps fuel further savage attacks. Dehumanization is also at work in Israel’s response and is deeply ensconced within official narratives, with Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant observing that “we are fighting human animals and we will act accordingly,” a former prime minister protesting “are you seriously asking me about Palestinian civilians… we’re fighting Nazis,” and members of parliament calling for a second Nakba and the use of nuclear weapons against Gaza. This all may portend a moral crisis for Israel, as well as a deepening of international skepticism about the intentions of the West.   

Using a slightly smaller figure than Netanyahu, Biden agreed in his afternoon remarks that the Hamas attack was “like fifteen 9/11s,” but he also recognized that “we made mistakes after 9/11” and cautioned Israel not to be consumed by rage in its own decision making. Whether this much-needed corrective has come in time will be seen in the coming hours and days. But what is certain is that, for millions of people across the Middle East and beyond, 9/11 and its aftermath serve as a deeply troubling—and triggering—precedent.  

—Alia Brahimi is a nonresident senior fellow within the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs.

Read more expert reactions to Biden’s visit to Tel Aviv.

New Atlanticist

Oct 18, 2023

Experts react: What did Biden achieve in his visit to Israel?

By Atlantic Council experts

Atlantic Council experts share their insights on the implications of Biden’s visit for Israel and the wider region.

Conflict Crisis Management

Peacemaking can follow the Israel-Hamas war. History shows it.

The leaders of Israel, the Arab states, and the United States should take some critical lessons from past conflicts. True statesmen do not fight wars just to kill more adversaries than their own people lose through fighting. No one can doubt that Israel can kill many times more Palestinians than the number of Israelis that the militant group Hamas killed and took hostage on October 7. The United States has the military means to help Israel do that. However, the real test of leadership is to turn the tragedies of conflict into peacemaking.

Egyptian President Anwar Sadat understood that. When he launched a surprise attack in October 1973—along with Syria and eventually a coalition of other Arab states to recover territories lost to Israel after Israel’s own surprise attack in June 1967 wiped out most of the Egyptian air forces—I was part of the State Department team that helped Secretary Henry Kissinger’s diplomacy bring Egypt and Israel to a standoff and a ceasefire. Sadat did not accept that status quo, leaving Israel to occupy the Sinai Peninsula. Instead, the Egyptian president found innovative ways to reach out to both the United States and Israel, culminating with his historic visit to Jerusalem to address the Israeli Knesset. 

President Jimmy Carter took it from there. He brought Sadat and Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin to Camp David in September 1978 for twelve days of secret talks that led to the March 26, 1979 peace treaty between their two countries, known as the Camp David Accords. 

Read more from David Mack, nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs, former deputy assistant secretary of state for Near East affairs, and former US ambassador to the United Arab Emirates.

MENASource

Oct 18, 2023

Peacemaking can follow the Israel-Hamas war. History shows it.

By David Mack

The leaders of Israel, the Arab states, and the United States should take some critical lessons from past conflicts.

Israel Middle East

Dispatch from Abu Dhabi: Do the Israelis know about the Basus War?

The government of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) has great sympathy for the Palestinian people, but it is clear-eyed about Hamas, which it has long recognized to be a terrorist organization. Therefore, it was unsurprising that the UAE, joined by its Abraham Accords partner Bahrain, would issue the Arab world’s strongest condemnations of Hamas soon after October 7. They referred to Hamas’s escalation as “serious and grave” or “dangerous” for the region, and the UAE specifically noted that it was “appalled” by Hamas taking Israeli citizens as hostages, while Bahrain issued a “denunciation” of the kidnappings. In contrast, their neighbor Qatar declared “Israel alone is responsible for the current escalation”—a view that is sadly much more representative of the Arab street. And given how vocal the UAE has been in promoting the Abraham Accords over the last three years, the government feels especially exposed and vulnerable to shifts in Arab public opinion now.

A senior government official here told me that they were proud of that statement—the feeling I heard from many here was that it was the right thing to do. That said, they also knew in advance that the cost for positioning the UAE as “a voice of reason”—another phrase I heard repeated several times—would not be cheap. And in both domestic and pan-Arab social media the country is paying that price today. At the same time, UAE officials have also made clear that economic ties between Emiratis and Israelis would continue despite the coming war and that, as Emirati Minister of State for Foreign Trade Thani bin Ahmed Al Zeyoudi put it, “We don’t mix the economy and trade with politics.”

Read more from William F. Wechsler, senior director of Middle East Programs at the Atlantic Council and former US deputy assistant secretary of defense for special operations and combatting terrorism.

New Atlanticist

Oct 18, 2023

Dispatch from Abu Dhabi: Do the Israelis know about the Basus War?

By William F. Wechsler

Even if Israel prevails relatively rapidly against Hamas, UAE officials are concerned with what will happen in Gaza afterwards.

Conflict Israel

Network of South Asian Twitter accounts spreading Israel-Palestine war disinfo

The DFRLab identified at least twenty-five accounts on X, the platform formerly known as Twitter, that appear to be coordinating to spread copy-and-pasted messages about the ongoing Israel-Palestine conflict. Many of the accounts claim to be based in India, though their precise location cannot be determined. They previously focused on India-related topics before switching to posting false, misleading, and divisive content in support of both Israel and Palestine, sometimes jumping back and forth within a series of posts.

Israel declared war against Hamas after the militant group launched an unprecedented attack on Israel on October 7, 2023. At the time of writing, the war had resulted in the death of over 3,600 lives on both sides, and the displacement of approximately one million people – almost half of Gaza’s population. Social media content has circulated rapidly since the start of the conflict, and platforms have been flooded with disinformation and misinformation. X has faced criticism for concerns that the platform allows the spread of false information and graphically violent footage.

Fact-checking website BOOM recently reported on verified Indian accounts on X spreading false information and inflammatory content about the conflict, using similar tactics to the accounts found by the DFRLab.

Read more from the Atlantic Council’s Digital Forensic Research Lab.

Egypt, the United States, and Israel are in a stalemate over opening the Gaza-Egypt border

On October 16, Israeli aircraft reportedly bombed the Rafah border crossing between Gaza and Egypt, which Israeli forces appear to have done several times now since October 7. The attack sparked outrage in Egypt, with some activists tweeting that the bombardment of the only possible crossing out of Gaza would hamper relief efforts and stop humanitarian aid from reaching Palestinians who had fled to the south to escape the incessant shelling of northern Gaza and an expected ground offensive.

Before Israel’s latest bombardment of the crossing, expectations were high that the gateway would reopen to allow the evacuation of foreign nationals, including at least five hundred US citizens in Gaza. A reopening would also allow for food and medical supplies to enter southern Gaza, as had reportedly been agreed to in negotiations between the Egyptian and US sides during US Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s October 15 visit to Cairo. But the bombing of the sole exit point from Gaza into Egypt has dashed hopes of a breakthrough anytime soon. A source on Egypt’s side of the border who spoke to me on condition of anonymity, said that the bombing was certain to block—at least temporarily—the delivery of badly needed humanitarian assistance to entrapped Palestinians and may likely delay the evacuation of foreigners. 

US-Egyptian relations are already tense after Cairo refused to cave in to US pressure to allow one million Palestinians to enter Sinai. Egypt’s national security council convened on October 15 and declared that it categorically rejects the US and Israeli proposal to take in Palestinians fleeing the war, arguing that such a move would undermine national security. Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi had earlier stated that the Palestinian issue cannot be resolved at the expense of other parties and that negotiations were the only way forward. Speaking on condition of anonymity, a security source said to me that Egypt “will not play a part in the forced displacement of Palestinians.”

But with food, fuel, water, and other basic necessities quickly running out in Gaza, civilian deaths may likely surge in the coming days, piling even greater pressure on the Egyptian leadership. On October 16, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s office denied that an agreement had been reached for a ceasefire in southern Gaza and for the transfer of humanitarian assistance into Gaza in exchange for the evacuation of foreign nationals. Israel had earlier warned that trucks carrying relief supplies would be bombed if they tried to enter Gaza without coordination with the Israeli side. It seems that the situation is at a stalemate, with both Egypt and Israel standing their ground. 

Meanwhile, the death toll for Palestinians continues to rise each day, and the threat of other parties, such as Iran, opening a new front against Israel in the war on Hamas is also growing by the minute—compounding the risks of destabilizing the region.

—Shahira Amin is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative focusing on Egypt, economics, energy, water access, and women’s issues.

Biden arrives at the very moment Israel needs its closest ally

US President Joe Biden arrives on Wednesday in an Israel still reeling from Hamas’s brutal terrorist attack, but also in a broader Middle East irate over the tragic strike on the al-Ahli Baptist Hospital in Gaza City that reportedly killed hundreds. Biden’s trip was always designed to highlight, in the most direct manner possible, public support for Israel. But the trip took on additional symbolic significance after media reports and statements by Arab countries and Turkey condemned Israel for the attack—despite Israel’s denials of involvement in the explosion at the hospital.

Arab residents across the region took to the streets in protest against both Israel and the United States. Never mind that there was no factual confirmation that Israel was responsible for the blast at the hospital, regional press and social media declared it to be true. Against the backdrop of Arab states, even friendly ones, whose publics are far more hostile to Israel than their leaders are—and whose publics made clear Tuesday night that they will not allow their kings and presidents to be neutral toward, let alone supportive of, Israel over the coming weeks and months of the war—Biden’s visit highlights again the criticality of the US alliance. 

Biden was privately probably planning to use this trip to understand Israel’s strategic endgame in Gaza or push Jerusalem to figure out what it should be. Now, following the hospital’s destruction, there will be an additional goal. If Israel turns out to ultimately be responsible for the strike, then we should expect the private conversations to also be an early test of how much leverage and goodwill Biden truly has with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, as Biden may seek to coax Netanyahu to ease restrictions in Gaza and allow greater access to basic needs.

Conversely, if Israel verifies that it was a Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) rocket that destroyed the hospital, then Biden will have a level of greater moral authority—especially after Jordanian King Abdullah II, Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, and Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas canceled on him—to try to cajole those leaders to help the dire humanitarian situation in Gaza by opening up their borders at a time when it is the last thing they want to do, out of fear for their own countries’ security. It probably won’t work, but he has a greater chance if PIJ is responsible for the strike and not Israel.

But no matter who is responsible, the demonstrations across the Arab world showed that Israel is in for a long, hard battle not just on the ground in Gaza, but in the public eye of the Middle East. It encapsulates why Israel so often feels so alone in the world and why Biden’s decision to visit is even more important than it was when originally announced.

— Jonathan Panikoff is the director of the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative in the Middle East Programs and a former deputy national intelligence officer for the Near East at the US National Intelligence Council.

The cancellation of the Biden summit reveals Jordan’s juggling act

Today, Jordan’s longstanding position as a US ally and arbiter with the Palestinians in times of crisis faced its ultimate test. As images of the carnage in al-Ahli Baptist Hospital in Gaza began to circulate on the world’s screens, protests erupted in Arab and Muslim capitals. In Amman, protestors attacked the Israeli embassy late into the night, and videos on social media appeared to show Jordanian police trying to control the angry crowds with tear gas and rubber bullets. Within hours, the protests had spread to other parts of the country. As the strongest condemnations from Arab capitals began to emerge, Jordan was in an unenviable position as it was set to host a summit with US President Joe Biden, Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, and Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas on Wednesday. 

The Jordanian government’s response became progressively stronger as images of the horrors in the al-Ahli hospital were beamed across televisions and social media channels and the number of casualties rose well into the hundreds. A strongly worded condemnation from the foreign ministry was followed by a statement from King Abdullah II, who called it a “massacre” and “heinous war crime” and warned that the war will drag the whole region into a catastrophe. Less than an hour later, Jordan announced three days of official mourning for the Palestinian “martyrs,” followed soon after with an official announcement that Jordan will no longer host the planned summit.

Jordanian officials were quick to read the Arab street—images of protests from Tunisia to Istanbul were being projected alongside images of Gazans amidst the carnage in al-Ahli Baptist Hospital, which was initially reported widely in Arab and some Western outlets as the result of an Israeli attack. Claims from Israeli official sources denying responsibility and blaming Palestinian militant groups fell on deaf ears in the Arab street. 

Hosting Biden in the aftermath of what may be the deadliest attack on a hospital ever documented would have been disastrous for Jordan domestically, as the United States has taken the strongest position among global powers in siding with Israel in the aftermath of the October 7 Hamas attack. For the majority of the Arab world, the US position is seen as a double standard, as it failed to condemn at all Israel’s ongoing assault on Gaza’s civilian population and its displacement of hundreds of thousands of them.

For Jordan, it must juggle domestic anger and frustration over Israel’s actions against its Palestinian neighbors while maintaining its relationship with the United States and its nearly thirty-year peace agreement with Israel. Both Jordan and Egypt will find themselves in a difficult position as they try to untangle the most serious crisis to face the region since the Arab spring a decade ago. The implications for regional spillover, Jordan’s large border with Israel, and its furious population, including Palestinian refugees and citizens of Palestinian origin, present the biggest threat to the country’s stability and security in decades.     

 —Tuqa Nusairat is the director of strategy, operations, and finance for the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center & Middle East Programs.

More updates:

• This may be the single deadliest attack on a hospital ever documented

• Understanding Iron Dome and Israel’s need for layered defense

• Arabs and Muslims in the US braced for the worst. Then it happened in Chicago.

• Hamas’s actions are war crimes. Israel should not respond with further war crimes.

• Frozen Iranian assets pose a challenging policy question for the Biden administration

• What was Hamas thinking? And what is it thinking now?

• Israel’s information blockade on Gaza will challenge how we think about war

This may be the single deadliest attack on a hospital ever documented

Reports of a strike on al-Ahli Baptist Hospital in Gaza City that killed hundreds and destroyed the hospital, according to Gazan health officials, are devastating. This may be the single deadliest attack on a hospital ever documented, an appalling statistic considering the hundreds of hospital attacks in Syria and Ukraine in the past decade. Initial reports stated the bombing came from an Israeli airstrike, while Israel has since stated that militants with Islamic Jihad misfired a rocket that hit the hospital.

While it is too early to offer a legal determination on this specific attack, it is worth reinforcing the laws of war related to the protection of hospitals, which both the Israel Defense Forces and Hamas are bound by. 

In addition to the general protection accorded civilians, hospitals receive additional protection under the laws of war. In many cases, targeting a hospital is a war crime, according to the Geneva Conventions, the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, and customary international law.

There are extremely limited circumstances, with four strict requirements, when an attack directed at a hospital would not violate the laws of war: 

1. The hospital must be used outside of its medical purpose to commit acts harmful to the attacking force. Use of the hospital for a military purpose—for instance, sheltering able-bodied combatants or launching attacks—meets this requirement. Treating wounded or sick combatants, storing munitions taken from sick or wounded, or guarding a hospital does not. 
2. The attacking force must give advance warning of the attack. If feasible, the warning must set a reasonable time to cease the military operations in the hospital or evacuate civilians.  
3. Any attack must be proportional: the resulting harm to civilians—considering both near-term direct and longer-term indirect casualties—cannot be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.  
4. If the military advantage from the attack can be achieved through any other feasible means with decreased harm to civilians, the less harmful means must be pursued instead. 

It will take time to determine exactly what happened to al-Ahli Baptist Hospital. But current credible reporting indicates that the hospital is well-established with a readily identifiable location and was known to be providing essential medical services amid a siege resulting in shortages of medical care and conflict that has caused thousands of casualties. It is hard to imagine any facts that could justify the destruction of al-Ahli Hospital and reported killing of hundreds of people inside.

—Elise Baker is a staff lawyer for the Strategic Litigation Project and previously documented attacks on hospitals in Syria.

Understanding Iron Dome and Israel’s need for layered defense

Between October 7 and October 10, Hamas militants fired more than 4,500 rockets from Gaza into Israel, according to an estimate by the Israel Defense Forces (IDF). Early reports indicate that Hamas fired almost half of these rockets during the opening hours of the attack on October 7. Massed rocket launches of this nature can overwhelm ever the most formidable air defenses.

Looking back to the previous rounds of Hamas rocket fire from Gaza into Israel, Israel’s Iron Dome air defense systems achieved an estimated 90 percent intercept rate in 2021 and an estimated 97 percent intercept rate in 2022. On October 7, Hamas’s massed rocket fire made it impossible for Iron Dome to have the same level of success. The reason why is based on the nature of how all missile-based air defense system are limited by the number of their “loaded” interceptor-missiles. If the number of incoming rockets outnumber the Iron Dome’s loaded interceptors, then rockets can strike targets inside Israel. Notably, there is also a time delay to reload an Iron Dome battery that fired off all its interceptors. Thus, even the best air defense can be overcome.

Importantly, the United States provides funding and technical assistance to help Israel field one of the world’s most capable integrated air defense networks, of which Iron Dome is one layer. The layered defenses protecting Israeli airspace include the Iron Dome short-range system, David’s Sling medium-range system, Israeli purchased Patriot air defenses, and Arrow-2 and Arrow-3 long-range systems. With the threat that an expanded conflict poses to Israel, US funding and US-Israeli technical cooperation become even more important. With the IDF and Lebanese Hezbollah exchanging fire across the Blue Line demarcation between Israel and Lebanon, Hezbollah could cause significant harm to Israel if it were to wait for the IDF to begin its ground operation into Gaza and then unleash its stockpile of more than one hundred thousand rockets and missiles against Israel.

This threat was clearly on the mind of US President Joe Biden when he warned against Iran or its proxies intervening in the conflict and subsequently approved the first Carrier Strike Group to the eastern Mediterranean. Equally important, Israeli and US officials didn’t wait for this recent crisis to begin to work on an additional layer of protection for Israel’s air defense network. Israel has been in the process of finalizing the development of the Iron Beam, a high-energy laser weapons system that will allow Israel’s other air defense systems to preserve their limited quantities of interceptors. Importantly, Iron Beam development is occurring in partnership with the US defense industry and was something that Biden highlighted during his July 2022 visit to Israel.

—Daniel E. Mouton is a nonresident senior fellow at the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative of the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs.

Arabs and Muslims in the US braced for the worst. Then it happened in Chicago. 

When something happens in the Middle East, Arabs and Muslims in the United States brace for the worst. This time was no different. While still trying to absorb the shocking news of the latest devastation from the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, these communities were already preparing for the backlash. The pace of news emerging was unrelenting, and the graphic nature of the content and headlines was some of the worst we have seen in years. Still, Palestinian-, Arab-, and Muslim-American communities quickly warned that such rampant disinformation, misinformation, and racist rhetoric would undoubtedly lead to an increase in Islamophobic and hate-filled incidents across the country. One of the most disturbing examples of misinformation is the “beheaded babies” news, from which journalists and Israeli officials have now backtracked. The fact that such unverified information was publicly repeated by US President Joe Biden is an example of how far fake news can go. 

And it can have devastating and tragic consequences, as we witnessed Sunday with the news of the hateful stabbing of a six-year-old Palestinian-American child and his mother in Chicago. The news sent fear and shock through the Arab and Muslim community. The American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee and the Council on American-Islamic Relations, the largest civil rights organizations serving Arab and Muslim communities in the United States, have reported a nearly unprecedented increase in reports of intimidation, violent attacks, and hate speech reaching their offices across the country. It also appears that their early attempts to meet with the White House to share these concerns were rebuffed. Sunday night, the president issued a statement on the hate crime in Chicago, but many in the community felt the sentiment was too little, too late. In the coming weeks, politicians, journalists, and other public figures must understand that the way this conflict is reported on, the way some victims are dehumanized, and the spread of unverified information can lead to the radicalization of some individuals —with deadly consequences.

—Tuqa Nusairat is the director of strategy, operations, and finance for the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center & Middle East Programs.

Hamas’s actions are war crimes. Israel should not respond with further war crimes.

Hamas’s attacks in Israel on October 7 and Israel’s response in the Gaza Strip have been war crimes met with more apparent war crimes. International humanitarian law (IHL), or the law of war, is clear that targeting or indiscriminately attacking civilians is prohibited, and parties must take precautions to protect civilian life when pursuing legitimate military aims. There are clear indications that both Hamas and the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) have violated IHL, and some of their attacks constitute grave violations, amounting to war crimes and crimes against humanity.

This piece discusses provisions of IHL and international criminal law as they apply to the ongoing Israel-Hamas conflict. While events are developing rapidly, continued loss of civilian life looks all but guaranteed. Hamas and Israel must change their tactics to halt the continued commission of war crimes and crimes against humanity.

Read more from Elise Baker, a staff lawyer with the Atlantic Council’s Strategic Litigation Project.

MENASource

Oct 16, 2023

Hamas’s actions are war crimes. Israel should not respond with further war crimes.

By Elise Baker

There are clear indications that both Hamas and the IDF have violated international humanitarian law, and some of their attacks constitute grave violations.

Human Rights Israel

Frozen Iranian assets pose a challenging policy question for the Biden administration

The Biden administration’s move to restrict Iran’s access to the six billion dollars transferred from South Korea to Qatar in the wake of Hamas’s vicious assault on Israel was met with approval in Washington and reprobation in Tehran. The move followed substantial bipartisan pressure, but the publicity surrounding the announcement to Democratic legislators sets up a challenging policy question in the future. The Biden team has sought to engage Tehran in negotiations after the Trump administration withdrew from the Iran nuclear deal, and one reason such entreaties have failed is Iran’s mistrust of Washington’s follow-through on deals.

Given that backdrop, the Biden administration may want at some point to let these funds be used for their original purpose—humanitarian goods exchanged for American hostages in Iran—especially if it wants to revive negotiations over Iran’s nuclear program (or, if Iran takes more hostages). To do so, it will have to navigate the complex political issues surrounding the US relationship with Israel (which will likely be upset by any release of funds to Iran), potential bipartisan backlash, and a looming presidential election. All to say that should these funds be opened back up to Iran, it seems likely that the timing of that release will not be until after November 2024.

—Brian O’Toole is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s GeoEconomics Center. He is a former senior adviser to the director of the Office of Foreign Assets Control at the US Department of the Treasury.

What was Hamas thinking? And what is it thinking now?

The size, scale, and brutality of Hamas’s October 7 assault on Israel suggests that the group’s aim was to fundamentally change the strategic dynamic with Israel and the Palestinian Authority, and probably in the larger region, as well. 

Hamas may have believed Israel was weakened, distracted, and divided by its internal political turmoil over the past year, making this a good time to strike. Perhaps Hamas thought a surprise attack would widen political divisions in Israel, upend the Israeli government, and sap the resilience and determination of the Israeli people to prevail, rather than produce the unity and resolve the world is currently seeing. Hamas may also have calculated that it had an opportunity to deal a knockout blow to the Palestinian Authority. The popularity of President Mahmoud Abbas and the Authority itself had been plummeting, and hardline factions, including Hamas cells, had begun to gain traction in the West Bank by taking the fight to Israel. The October 7 attack appears to have been specifically timed to coincide with the fiftieth anniversary of the 1973 Yom Kippur war—in which Israel’s apparent invulnerability was called into question by successful surprise attacks from Egyptian and Syrian armies—to catch the Jewish state off guard and deal it a major blow.

It also appears that a key aim of the attack was to derail the ongoing Saudi-Israeli talks aimed at normalizing relations between the two countries. Hamas, Hezbollah, and Iranian officials have publicly condemned the Saudi-Israeli discussions, and Hamas and Hezbollah officials reportedly also have cited the talks—which they view as a sellout of resistance to Israel’s presence in Muslim lands and a betrayal of the Palestinians—as a major motivation for Hamas’s October 7 assault on Israel. These groups recognize that the establishment of normal relations between Saudi Arabia and Israel poses a strategic threat to their cause that would strengthen the pro-Western countries in the region and leave the Iran-led “Axis of Resistance” isolated. 

Read more from Alan Pino, a former US national intelligence officer for the Near East.

New Atlanticist

Oct 16, 2023

What was Hamas thinking? And what is it thinking now?

By Alan Pino

Ahead of the October 7 attacks, Hamas may have believed Israel was weakened, distracted, and divided by its internal political turmoil. But it also may have misjudged both the international support it will enjoy and Israeli determination to sustain the fight now.

Conflict Crisis Management

Israel’s information blockade on Gaza will challenge how we think about war

In a thread on X (formerly Twitter), Emerson T. Brooking, a resident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Digital Forensic Research Lab and co-author of LikeWar: The Weaponization of Social Media, analyzed the impact and implications of a possible Israeli blockade of the internet in Gaza.

New Atlanticist

Oct 10, 2023

Live expertise: Get the latest insight on the Israel-Hamas war

By Atlantic Council experts

Atlantic Council experts are analyzing the rapidly unfolding events in the Middle East as they happen. Find the latest here.

Conflict Extremism

The post Live expertise: The latest insight as Israel prepares for a ground invasion of Gaza appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Hamas may have believed Israel was weakened, distracted, and divided by its internal political turmoil over the past year, making this a good time to strike. Perhaps Hamas thought a surprise attack would widen political divisions in Israel, upend the Israeli government, and sap the resilience and determination of the Israeli people to prevail, rather than produce the unity and resolve the world is currently seeing. Hamas may also have calculated that it had an opportunity to deal a knockout blow to the Palestinian Authority. The popularity of President Mahmoud Abbas and the Authority itself had been plummeting, and hardline factions, including Hamas cells, had begun to gain traction in the West Bank by taking the fight to Israel. The October 7 attack appears to have been specifically timed to coincide with the fiftieth anniversary of the 1973 Yom Kippur war—in which Israel’s apparent invulnerability was called into question by successful surprise attacks from Egyptian and Syrian armies—to catch the Jewish state off guard and deal it a major blow.

It also appears that a key aim of the attack was to derail the ongoing Saudi-Israeli talks aimed at normalizing relations between the two countries. Hamas, Hezbollah, and Iranian officials have publicly condemned the Saudi-Israeli discussions, and Hamas and Hezbollah officials reportedly also have cited the talks—which they view as a sellout of resistance to Israel’s presence in Muslim lands and a betrayal of the Palestinians—as a major motivation for Hamas’s October 7 assault on Israel. These groups recognize that the establishment of normal relations between Saudi Arabia and Israel poses a strategic threat to their cause that would strengthen the pro-Western countries in the region and leave the Iran-led “Axis of Resistance” isolated. 

Concern over the apparent progress of the Saudi-Israeli talks appears to have prompted the Axis of Resistance to pursue greater unity of effort to combat the threat they believe it poses. According to media reporting, Hamas coordinated its attack plans with Iran and Hezbollah, and officials from all three organizations met in Beirut on several occasions in recent months to discuss the operation. Hamas probably had the final call on the specifics of its operational plan and the timing of its attacks, but Iranian funding, weapons, and training over many years have been key to Hamas’s increased military prowess. 

Hamas leaders probably recognize that their attack on Israel—undoubtedly supported and endorsed by their Iranian patron—will heighten Saudi fears of Iran and desire for an eventual alliance with Israel to counter the Iranian threat. However, Hamas probably also believes that the Arab public will be cheering its attack and will rally behind Hamas in the face of large-scale Palestinian civilian casualties from Israeli military operations. Hamas and its Axis of Resistance partners expect that rising pro-Hamas and anti-Israeli sentiment in the Arab world will prompt Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman to halt efforts to openly embrace Israel for the indefinite future.

After the October 7 attacks

Hamas probably calculated that Israel would respond with a major ground invasion to the horrific attacks the group has carried out, and most likely it has made preparations to bleed Israeli forces when they enter Gaza. Hamas probably also has placed its communications centers, fighters, and munitions among the civilian population, which will inevitably increase the number of civilian deaths. Hamas may have assessed that it can achieve a replay of previous wars with Israel, in which mounting Israeli military casualties and a rising death toll among civilians in Gaza resulted in domestic pressure in Israel and calls from the international community, including the United States, for Israel to accept a ceasefire. Hamas undoubtedly also plans to use the many hostages it has taken as leverage to get Israel to stop operations with Hamas still intact and able to claim victory. 

However, Hamas may have misjudged both the international support it will enjoy and Israeli determination to sustain the fight. First, the sickening news of women being raped and innocent men, women, children, and elderly people being kidnapped and murdered has undermined sympathy around the world for the group’s claims to be the defender of Palestinians against Israeli oppression. These acts have also bolstered support for Israel’s claim that it must respond with great force to the threat Hamas poses. Even so, to avoid losing international backing for its military response, especially as its ground invasion of Gaza unfolds, Israel will need to show continued concern to minimize casualties and help preserve adequate humanitarian conditions for Palestinian civilians in Gaza.

Second, unlike in the past, the Israeli government probably will not face domestic pressure in the near-to-medium term to halt its offensive. The Israeli public and all major Israeli political parties have united right now behind destroying Hamas, as is evident in the formation of a unity government that includes key centrist opposition leader, Benny Gantz, a former defense minister and chief of the general staff of the Israel Defense Forces. As a result, Israel is likely to approach this situation much as the United States did Afghanistan and Iraq, grinding it out over the long term to try to crush Hamas and remove it as a threat.

Alan Pino served as US national intelligence officer for the Near East for fifteen years, retiring in 2020.

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On October 11, Forward Defense nonresident senior fellow and retired Marine Corps Major General, Arnold Punaro was featured on Fox Business discussing the attacks on Israel by Hamas. Punaro stressed that it was important to identify the state actors associated with training and equipping terrorists in the region.

Advisory Council member

Arnold Punaro

Nonresident Senior Fellow

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Defense Industry Defense Policy

Forward Defense, housed within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, generates ideas and connects stakeholders in the defense ecosystem to promote an enduring military advantage for the United States, its allies, and partners. Our work identifies the defense strategies, capabilities, and resources the United States needs to deter and, if necessary, prevail in future conflict.

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On Monday, Washington was set abuzz when the Wall Street Journal published a story claiming that Iran helped Hamas plan this past weekend’s mass terrorist attack against Israel. Amwaj.media—a relatively new outfit focused on Iran, Iraq, and the Gulf—posted a competing story shortly afterward in which Iranian officials insisted they were not involved with the operation at all. The Washington Post added to the dialogue by concluding that Iran’s role is not clear. And the New York Times on Wednesday reported that Iran was surprised by the attack.  

Implicit in the ongoing debate about what role Iran played in helping Hamas prepare for these attacks is a belief that reaching a definitive answer will inform or alter the decision making and next steps by Israel, the United States, and other allies. But the premise is false. 

Iran’s confirmed participation in the planning would be unlikely to change the size and scale of Jerusalem’s air campaign that has already started. Nor would it alter the ground operation Israel is almost certain to launch in the coming days to degrade Hamas’s capabilities and eliminate those most responsible for the operation. It would not change how Israel will respond if Hezbollah opens a new front from the north or Palestinian militants attack from the West Bank. And Israel’s shadow war with Iran will continue regardless.

In the United States, President Joe Biden has moved repeatedly to highlight his support of Israel and to condemn in the harshest terms Hamas’s terrorist attack. And he has backed up words with deeds, moving the USS Gerald R. Ford carrier strike group closer to Israel—a surefire warning to Hezbollah not to open a new front in the north, or risk being attacked by the United States—and reportedly freezing the six billion dollars Iran was supposed to receive via Qatar in exchange for the US hostages released from Iran last month.

None of these steps would likely change if hard evidence had emerged to confirm—or refute—the notion that Iran directly helped Hamas plan the attack. What could have changed US and Israeli reactions to date and those to come? Tehran almost certainly recognizes that if its Quds Force—a branch of the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps that is broadly analogous to US special forces—had taken part directly in the attacks, it would change the reaction. An equally impactful alternative escalation would have been if Quds Force Chief Esmail Qaani had provided more advanced ballistic missile systems to Hamas, as he has to Hezbollah. But helping to plan the attack, or not, isn’t at that level.

Moreover, while having clarity on whether Iran was truly surprised by the attack is important to help analysts understand the amount of operational independence Hamas does or does not have for decision-making, Iran’s involvement (or lack thereof) in the terrorist attack planning should not change anyone’s view that Tehran is culpable for the attack. 

For years, Iran has provided Hamas the overwhelming majority of its funding, weapons, and training—all of which were leveraged for this attack. In doing so, Iran ensures that it holds an equal share of responsibility for the success of the attack and for all deaths, injuries, and kidnappings of Israelis and foreign nationals. Whether it helped in the planning, gave a direct order for the attack to happen, or didn’t know it was going to happen is largely irrelevant. 

Hamas and Iran are not ideologically sympatico. The prior is a Sunni Palestinian movement; the latter, the world’s most populous and prominent Shia country. What they have in common is not religious views but a hatred of Israel that manifests itself quite literally, for both Hamas and Iran, in a desire to see the cessation of its existence. The relationship may have strategic overtones, but at its core it is a transactional relationship—unlike that of Iran and Hezbollah, a Shia organization that has pledged fealty to Iran’s supreme leader. Iran provides Hamas with money, weapons, and training; the expectation is that it will use them, directly or indirectly, to fight Israel. 

The public may eventually learn a conclusive answer as to whether or not Iran helped plan the terrorist attack on Saturday. But the world already knows what matters most: Iran shares responsibility for it.

Jonathan Panikoff is the director of the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative in the Middle East Programs. He is a former deputy national intelligence officer for the Near East at the US National Intelligence Council.

The views expressed in this publication are the author’s and do not imply endorsement by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, the Intelligence Community, or any other US government agency.

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Hamas’s horrifying attack on Israel on October 7, resulting in Biden’s powerful and unambiguous statement of support for Israel this week, would appear to have put Ukraine on the back burner for the moment, replaced by a war that might appear more urgent.

But viewing these wars as entirely distinct from each other would be a mistake.

When Biden does get around to making his speech on Ukraine, he should expand his message and tell Americans, and at the same time our partners around the world, that together we face the greatest threat to global order since the 1930s.

What the wars in Ukraine and Israel have in common is that they are both the result of state-sponsored terrorism. In Ukraine’s case, Russia is acting brazenly and directly. In the case of Israel, Iran is acting through Hamas and others. National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan said Tuesday that although there is no direct evidence that Iran was involved in the planning or execution of the attack, it was “complicit.” Indeed, the alarming scale and competence of Hamas’s attacks couldn’t have happened without Iran’s funding, weaponry, training, and intelligence. And without its deepening partnership with Russia and China, Iran would be a far less potent actor.

Beyond that, Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese leader Xi Jinping declared a “no limits partnership” before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Then in March of this year, they spoke together in Moscow of their intention to replace the fraying global system of rules and institutions, established by the United States and its partners after World War II, with something more to their own liking.

Xi told Putin at the time, “Right now there are changes of the likes of which we haven’t seen for a hundred years. And we are the ones driving these changes together.”

“The strategic and political point is that the return of war against Israel isn’t an isolated event,” wrote the Wall Street Journal in a lead editorial on Monday, under the provocative headline “Wake Up, Washington.” “It’s the latest installment in the unraveling of global order as American political will and military primacy are called into question.”

Anne Applebaum wrote this week in the Atlantic, “The Russian invasion of Ukraine and Hamas surprise attack on Israeli citizens are both blatant rejections of [the] rules-based order, and they herald something new. Both aggressors have developed a sophisticated, militarized, modern form of terrorism, and they do not feel apologetic or embarrassed about this at all.”

With the global stakes in mind, a chorus of Democratic and Republican members of Congress had been calling for months for Biden to deliver a major address to Americans, ideally from the Oval Office, on why it is crucial to continue supporting Ukraine.

Administration officials have now said Biden’s speech on Ukraine might have to wait at least until after House Republicans elect their new speaker. Some argue that a Ukraine speech should wait even longer, not wanting it to be lost amid new concerns regarding Israel, where US commitment has longer and deeper historic roots.

Biden shouldn’t wait to deliver his Ukraine speech, and he should broaden it to connect the dots to Israel, making clear that in both cases international crimes are being committed by two countries that need to be held to account. He also needs to warn that China, which is supporting both Russia and Iran, may choose to exploit this moment of perceived US weakness in the Pacific, with a specific danger to Taiwan.

It also would be a good time to underscore the national security dangers posed by our toxic political divisions in Washington. A small minority of Republicans in Congress was almost able to shut down the government. A minority again—just eight Republicans voting with Democrats—ousted the speaker. A similar minority could threaten continued support for Ukraine, although majorities in both the House and the Senate and among the American people continue to back Ukraine.

Former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, writing in Foreign Affairs, provided the disturbing global context for this domestic dysfunction, which on current trajectory will grow only worse in our 2024 election year.

“The United States now confronts graver threats to its security that it has in decades, perhaps ever,” he writes. “Never before has it faced four allied antagonists at the same time—Russia, China, North Korea, and Iran—whose collective nuclear arsenal could within a few years be nearly double the size of its own.”

Gates worries “that at the very moment that events demand strong and coherent response from the United States, the country cannot provide one.”

There’s perhaps a silver lining in this tragic week. As Winston Churchill worked with the United States to create the United Nations after World War II, he famously said, “Never let a good crisis go to waste.”

The reality of war in Israel, with the terrifying images of Hamas’s atrocities, may make it more difficult for an extreme minority to block government spending packages, when it’s clear so many lives are at stake. House Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Michael McCaul (R-TX) has floated the idea of a package that would include aid for Israel, assistance for Ukraine, “maybe Taiwan funding and finally border security funding. To me that would be a good package.”

Sullivan has said the president will make request to Congress regarding Israel and would renew its request for Ukraine, though he didn’t link them.

Whatever Congress does, it’s time for US leaders to look at the threat to global order more comprehensively. Until last weekend, Israel’s domestic politics was even more toxically divided than that of the United States. It took the Hamas attack to pull Israelis together, at least temporarily.

One hopes the United States won’t require that sort of wake-up call before it recognizes the threats to Ukraine and Israel are related and that they require a coherent, coordinated, and sustained response.

Frederick Kempe is president and chief executive officer of the Atlantic Council. You can follow him on Twitter @FredKempe.

THE WEEK’S TOP READS

#1 Jake Sullivan’s Trial by Combat
Susan B. Glasser | THE NEW YORKER

Susan Glasser’s New Yorker opus is the smartest profile I’ve read anywhere on National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan and his role on Ukraine and elsewhere.

“As a child of the eighties and ‘Rocky’ and ‘Red Dawn,’ I believe in freedom fighters and I believe in righteous causes, and I believe the Ukrainians have one,” Sullivan told Glasser. “There are very few conflicts that I have seen—maybe none—in the post-Cold War era . . . where there’s such a clear good guy and bad guy. And we’re on the side of the good guy, and we have to do a lot for that person.”

Glasser writes that the task of leading the White House through the “treacherous politics” of the war in Ukraine has fallen to Sullivan, who, when he was appointed at the age of forty-four, was “the youngest national-security adviser since McGeorge Bundy held the job, during the Vietnam War.” Read more →

#2 There Are No Rules
Anne Applebaum | THE ATLANTIC  

Anne Applebaum also draws the crucial connection between Russia’s war on Ukraine and Hamas’s surprise attack on Israel: Both actions completely disregard the “rules-based world order,” whose origins and purpose she describes in rich detail.

“Both aggressors have deployed a sophisticated, militarized, modern form of terrorism, and they do not feel apologetic or embarrassed about this at all,” Applebaum writes. “Terrorists, by definition, are not fighting conventional wars and do not obey the laws of war. Instead, they deliberately create fear and chaos among civilian populations.” Read more →

#3 The Dysfunctional Superpower
Robert Gates | FOREIGN AFFAIRS

The recent ousting of Speaker Kevin McCarthy from his leadership role in the House of Representatives was only the latest act in the circus of US domestic politics. Former US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates argues that the bigger problem is that the United States’ internal divisions and the ensuing dysfunction have become a national security threat.

“The United States finds itself in a uniquely treacherous position: facing aggressive adversaries with a propensity to miscalculate yet incapable of mustering the unity and strength necessary to dissuade them,” Gates writes. “Successfully deterring leaders such as Xi and Putin depends on the certainty of commitments and constancy of response. Yet instead, dysfunction has made American power erratic and unreliable, practically inviting risk-prone autocrats to place dangerous bets—with potentially catastrophic effects.” Read more →

#4 Wake Up, Washington
The Editorial Board | WALL STREET JOURNAL

Following Hamas’s assault on Israel, the Wall Street Journal published a powerful lead editorial, arguing that Washington is in need of an alarm clock.

“The invasion, planned with an assist from Iran, ought to wake up both parties in Washington,” the Editorial Board writes. “The world is awash in threats that will inevitably wash up on our shore if America doesn’t get its act together.”

“The growing global disorder is a result in part of American retreat, not least Mr. Biden’s departure from Afghanistan that told the world’s rogues the United States was preoccupied with its internal divisions. But too many Republicans are also falling for the siren song of isolationism and floating a defense cut in the name of fiscal restraint. The Hamas invasion should blow up dreams the United States can ‘focus on China’ and write off other parts of the world.” Read more →

#5 Israel Has Never Needed to Be Smarter Than in This Moment
Thomas L. Friedman | NEW YORK TIMES

Tom Friedman draws on his rich, Pulitzer Prize-winning experience in the Middle East to provide some advice.

Friedman outlines how the United States can best help Israel: “First, I hope the president is asking Israel to ask itself this question as it considers what to do next in Gaza: What do my worst enemies want me to do—and how can I do just the opposite?”

“I hope Biden is telling Netanyahu that America will do everything it can to help democratic Israel defend itself from the theocratic fascists of Hamas—and their soul brothers of Hezbollah in Lebanon, should they enter the fight,” Friedman writes. Read more →

Atlantic Council top reads

New Atlanticist Oct 10, 2023

What will Hezbollah do next? Here’s how the Hamas-Israel conflict could engulf the region.

By Nicholas Blanford

Neither Israel nor Hezbollah appears to want an escalation, but the risks are high for a disastrous miscalculation. 

Conflict Crisis Management

New Atlanticist Oct 10, 2023

Live expertise: Get the latest insight on the Israel-Hamas war

By Atlantic Council experts

Atlantic Council experts are analyzing the rapidly unfolding events in the Middle East as they happen. Find the latest here.

Conflict Extremism

Report Oct 4, 2023

Running out of road: China Pathfinder 2023 annual scorecard

By Atlantic Council GeoEconomics Center and Rhodium Group

The China Pathfinder project examines whether China’s economy is converging or diverging with the world’s leading open market economies.

China Digital Policy

The post Israel, Ukraine, and how Biden should connect the dots appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The post Wechsler quoted in The Wall Street Journal on why political gridlock could hamper efforts to respond to the attack on Israel appeared first on Atlantic Council.

So far, the pattern of violence along the Blue Line, the United Nations­–delineated boundary that corresponds to Lebanon’s southern border, has been relatively predictable, consisting of shelling and minor incursions. There has been some talk in recent months about the “unification of the fronts,” meaning the closer coordination between anti-Israel groups such as Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas, and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), along with myriad other Iran-backed groups in Syria, Iraq, and Yemen. Therefore, it would have been difficult for Hezbollah to simply stand back and do nothing as Israel wages its massive offensive against Hamas in Gaza.

Lebanon’s caretaker Prime Minister Najib Mikati has said that his government’s priority is to maintain calm and stability in south Lebanon. Yet, given the weakness of the Lebanese government in the face of the powerful Hezbollah, there is little the state can do to maintain stability in the south.

Hezbollah has an array of options to put pressure on Israel along the Blue Line. It could ambush Israelis with improvised explosive devices or launch mortar or rocket attacks in the Shebaa Farms, a mountainside running along Lebanon’s southeastern border that has been occupied by Israel since 1967 and claimed by Beirut as Lebanese territory. It would likely claim those attacks as its own. But it could also initiate unclaimed, deniable operations, such as launching anonymous rocket attacks into Israel (as seen in past conflicts between Hamas and Israel in Gaza and usually blamed on Palestinian groups) or organizing infiltration attempts by Palestinian militants (like the October 9 attempt, which Hezbollah almost certainly facilitated). Israel could also face attacks from inside Syria in areas of the Golan Heights, where Hezbollah and other Iran-backed groups have a presence.

At this initial stage, it appears that Hezbollah wants to keep its actions (whether claimed or unclaimed) below a certain threshold so as not to force Israel into a more powerful retaliation. If Hezbollah were to overshoot, it could trigger an unintended escalatory cycle. It is, however, Iran that has the final say in whether Hezbollah goes to war with Israel. Iran recognizes Hezbollah as its most potent external asset and a key component of its deterrence architecture against a potential attack by Israel or the United States. It is unlikely that Tehran will want to waste Hezbollah in a futile full-scale war with Israel for the sake of supporting Hamas in Gaza. By the same token, it seems evident that Israel is not seeking the opening of a second front with Lebanon while it focuses on prosecuting its offensive against Hamas. The risk lies in Hezbollah possibly feeling compelled to raise its operational tempo closer to the threshold point as the war in Gaza intensifies and the destruction and loss of life mounts, especially in the event of a major ground incursion by the Israeli military. The closer Hezbollah moves to the threshold level, the higher the chance of miscalculation that leads to a war that neither side currently appears to desire.

Israel has long recognized that if war breaks out with Hezbollah, employing air power alone will be insufficient to defeat the organization. Israel would have to commit a sizeable number of ground forces for an incursion deep into Lebanon at the inevitable cost of high combat casualties. Waging major air and ground offensives in Gaza and Lebanon simultaneously would be a tough call for the Israeli government, especially as it would not be confined to just Lebanon and Israel. A war with Hezbollah would turn regional with the Syria front opening up and the possibility of attacks from Iraq, Yemen, and even Iran.

As for Hezbollah, if Iran’s calculus was to change and its leadership ordered its Lebanese proxy to attack Israel with full force, the organization would comply, such is the discipline inherent in the concept of the wilayat al-faqih, which is the hallmark of the Iranian system of governance. As a result, Hezbollah’s military capacity would face a mauling, Lebanon would be plunged into even further misery, and there would likely be a strong cross-sectarian backlash against Hezbollah, including from its Shia constituency.

Given the reluctance on both sides for a full-scale war, there is a possibility that clashes could escalate into several days of sustained fighting that remains localized to southern Lebanon and northern Israel but falls short of all-out war. In such a scenario, Hezbollah’s Radwan Brigade might mount its own cross-border raids—it has been training for such operations since at least 2007. In response, Israel might launch air strikes on Lebanese infrastructure targets and stage limited armored incursions across the Blue Line. Such a scenario raises the risk of miscalculation to a breaking point. 

For example, after, say, five days of fighting, Hezbollah’s military commanders might assess that Israel is on the brink of launching a major pre-emptive strike against the organization’s arsenal of long-range precision-guided missiles. They might then recommend to the group’s leadership that a mass missile attack must be launched against targets across Israel before the weapons can be destroyed, a case of “use them or lose them.” Such a move would guarantee all-out war. By the same token, the Israelis might conclude that, after five days of fighting, Hezbollah is about to launch its missiles toward Israeli cities and that Israel must launch a preemptive strike, thus guaranteeing a full war that neither side had sought.

With the unprecedented and deadly Hamas assault on southern Israel and Israel’s punishing response on Gaza, the Arab-Israeli conflict has entered uncharted, unpredictable, and extremely dangerous waters. The coming days will determine whether the region heads to a full-scale war.

Nicholas Blanford is a Beirut-based nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs, consultant, and defense and security correspondent for IHS/Janes.

The post What will Hezbollah do next? Here’s how the Hamas-Israel conflict could engulf the region. appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The latest updates

• Egypt cornered over Israel’s war on Hamas

• What do Iranians think of Israel? Their views might surprise you.

• It doesn’t matter whether Iran planned the Hamas attack—Tehran is still to blame

• What does the US deployment of a carrier strike group indicate?

• More updates

Egypt cornered over Israel’s war on Hamas

Cairo is watching with trepidation as Israel’s bombardment of the Gaza Strip on Egypt’s northern border continues unabated for a week. The Egyptian leadership fears that the violence on its doorstep may spill over into its territory and that Israeli airstrikes would result in a mass exodus of Gazans into the Sinai Peninsula. The fact that Israel has bombed the Rafah border crossing—the main gateway for Gazans to Sinai and the outside world—three times in twenty-four hours between October 9 and October 10 has only compounded Cairo’s fears.  …

Some Western leaders and officials are pinning their hopes on Cairo to negotiate the release of hostages abducted by Hamas, given the thaw in relations between Egypt and the militant group, which shares Muslim Brotherhood affiliations. Ursula von der Leyen, president of the European Commission, said she had a “valued exchange” with President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi and had shared her concerns about the fate of the hostages who must be released and returned home safely. In 2015, Egypt rescinded an earlier decision to designate Hamas as a terrorist organization because the court that had issued the ruling had no jurisdiction. The move paved the way for a marked improvement in relations between the two sides. 

Egypt, which has long been a key mediator between Israel and the Palestinians and between Palestinian factions, also has strong security ties with Israel. In this latest round of violence, it finds its hands tied as Israel has made clear it rejects any mediation or calls for self-restraint. 

Read more from Shahira Amin, a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative and an independent journalist based in Cairo:

MENASource

Oct 14, 2023

Egypt cornered over Israel’s war on Hamas

By Shahira Amin

Whether Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi will bow under US and Israeli pressure remains to be seen.

Israel Middle East

What do Iranians think of Israel? Their views might surprise you.

A public fireworks celebration at Tehran’s Palestine Square, home of the Palestinian embassy, was organized to celebrate the horrific attacks of October 7 by militant groups Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad, both of whom receive significant military and financial help from the Islamic Republic of Iran. A few dozen gathered, waving massive Palestinian flags and holding up portraits of assassinated Quds Force Commander Qassem Soleimani, who directed the regime’s help to Hamas and other proxies in the region before he was killed by a US drone strike in January 2020. Loudspeakers blasted propaganda songs in Persian and Arabic. One went, “Israel is my enemy; its wiping off the map will bring me a bright future.”

On that very day, Iranian officials took turns declaring open support for the attacks on Israel. Tehran’s Valiasr Square, used for years for in-your-face propaganda posters by the regime, soon featured a fading flag of Israel, supposedly representing the coming destruction of the Jewish State. But before long, on October 10, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei denied having had a direct operational role.

Ordinary Iranians are raised with this anti-Israel and antisemitic content, which fills television and radio broadcasts and even school textbooks. Yet, anyone familiar with Iranian society knows that anti-Israel attitudes have mostly failed to go beyond the most vociferous supporters of the regime despite years of attempted indoctrination.

Read more from Arash Azizi, author of The Shadow Commander: Soleimani, the US, and Iran’s Global Ambitions:

IranSource

Oct 13, 2023

What do Iranians think of Israel? Their views might surprise you

By Arash Azizi

Anyone familiar with Iranian society knows that anti-Israel attitudes have mostly failed to go beyond the most vociferous supporters of the regime despite years of attempted forced indoctrination.

Iran Israel

It doesn’t matter whether Iran planned the Hamas attack—Tehran is still to blame

Whether or not Iran helped plan Hamas’s terrorist attack that killed at least 1,300 Israelis is needlessly distracting analysts and the media from the far more important conclusion that we already know: Iran is culpable for the attack.

On Monday, Washington was set abuzz when the Wall Street Journal published a story claiming that Iran helped Hamas plan this past weekend’s mass terrorist attack against Israel. Amwaj.media—a relatively new outfit focused on Iran, Iraq, and the Gulf—posted a competing story shortly afterward in which Iranian officials insisted they were not involved with the operation at all. The Washington Post added to the dialogue by concluding that Iran’s role is not clear. And the New York Times on Wednesday reported that Iran was surprised by the attack.  

Implicit in the ongoing debate about what role Iran played in helping Hamas prepare for these attacks is a belief that reaching a definitive answer will inform or alter the decision making and next steps by Israel, the United States, and other allies. But the premise is false.

Iran’s confirmed participation in the planning would be unlikely to change the size and scale of Jerusalem’s air campaign that has already started. Nor would it alter the ground operation Israel is almost certain to launch in the coming days to degrade Hamas’s capabilities and eliminate those most responsible for the operation. It would not change how Israel will respond if Hezbollah opens a new front from the north or Palestinian militants attack from the West Bank. And Israel’s shadow war with Iran will continue regardless.

Read more from Jonathan Panikoff, the director of the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative in the Middle East Programs and a former deputy national intelligence officer for the Near East at the US National Intelligence Council:

New Atlanticist

Oct 13, 2023

It doesn’t matter whether Iran planned the Hamas attack—Tehran is still to blame

By Jonathan Panikoff

For years, Tehran has provided Hamas the overwhelming majority of its funding, weapons, and training—all of which were leveraged for this attack.

Conflict Iran

What does the US deployment of a carrier strike group indicate?

Americans should not be surprised by the rapid deployment of the USS Gerald R. Ford carrier strike group (CSG) to the eastern Mediterranean. This deployment provides significant military options for the United States to consider employing if Hamas’s brutal attacks on October 7 and Israel’s military response were to lead to a regional conflict. Furthermore, the decision to deploy the CSG is in line with other, recent Biden administration deployments to the region. When Houthi forces in Yemen attacked the United Arab Emirates (UAE) in January 2022, the Depart of Defense (DoD) immediately deployed an F-22 squadron to the UAE. When Iran began harassing and seizing merchant ships in the summer of 2023, the DoD deployed additional combat forces to the region. Based on US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin’s announcement of the CSG deployment, this move is clearly intended to deter Iran and its proxies from expanding the conflict beyond the current scope of Israel’s response to Hamas’s brutal attack. However, the deployment announcement does not provide a clear idea of what a CSG would do if deterrence efforts were to prove insufficient. 

Helpfully, the January 2023 Juniper Oak exercise between the United States and Israel gives an idea of how this recently arrived CSG might respond in the event of an expanded regional conflict. Juniper Oak included a similar grouping of warships, the USS George H.W. Bush CSG, that contributed to the combat aircraft and warships that participated in the exercise. General Michael “Erik” Kurilla, commander of US Central Command, described Juniper Oak as a combined, joint all-domain exercise that improved US-Israel combat interoperability on land, in the air, at sea, in space, and in cyberspace. 

Although not all the aircraft that participated in Juniper Oak came from the CSG, the practiced missions included everything that the USS Gerald R. Ford and its accompanying escort ships can perform. These missions included US-Israeli command and control of combat operations, maritime surface warfare, combat search and rescue, strike coordination and reconnaissance, and air interdiction. Since these missions are the same as those that the USS Gerald R. Ford can perform, the DoD’s Juniper Oak exercise video provides an idea as to the power of these combined missions. Consequently, the USS Gerald R. Ford CSG provides significant military options, including airstrikes and maritime security operations, for the United States to employ if military conflict were to expand beyond Gaza and include other regional actors. The unique capability to globally surge significant combat forces remains a unique strategic advantage of the United States and serves as a reminder to Iran and its proxies—as well as to Russian forces that have a history of escalatory behavior in Syria.

—Daniel E. Mouton is a nonresident senior fellow at the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative of the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs.

Updates from October 12

• Turkey balances work on prisoner exchanges with risks in playing mediator

• In Israel-Hamas conflict, social media become tools of propaganda and disinformation

• China’s tepid response to Hamas’s attack shows Beijing is not a leading actor in the Middle East

• Gaza under siege: A doctor recounts the humanitarian cost of war

• Hamas wants the world (and especially Iran) to watch it take Israelis hostage

• Israel, Ukraine, and how Biden should connect the dots

• More updates

Turkey balances work on prisoner exchanges with risks in playing mediator

Turkish foreign policy in the Middle East, as elsewhere, is a balancing act. Ankara has reasons to protect its normalization and re-convergence with Israel on energy, security, and regional geopolitics—but also sustains sympathy for the Palestinian people and a belief that Israel exercises too heavy a hand against them. Ironically, Turkish steps to reduce the activities of Hamas and other Palestinian militant groups on its territory as part of Turkey’s reconciliation with Israel have deepened those groups’ dependence on Iran, and strengthened the terror/military wings within those groups at the expense of their political wings. 

Turkish efforts to arrange a prisoner exchange between Hamas and Israel are welcome and another sign of the balanced approach they are trying to achieve.

While Ankara will press for an early de-escalation, there is a parallel between Israel’s response to Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad terror and Ankara’s response to Kurdistan Workers’ Party, or PKK, terror that will keep any Turkish protestations from becoming too strident. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and his AK Party have been far more sympathetic to Hamas than previous Turkish governments and are likely to struggle to maintain the position of an honest broker for any sort of mediating role. This may prove to be an exception to the activist foreign policy that Ankara has practiced effectively in the past half-decade—there is more to lose in an active role here than to be gained. 

—Rich Outzen is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council IN TURKEY and a geopolitical analyst and consultant currently serving private sector clients as Dragoman LLC.

In Israel-Hamas conflict, social media become tools of propaganda and disinformation

In the wake of renewed warfare between Hamas and Israel, false and unverified information, old footage, and graphic material have flooded social media platforms, in some cases amplified by journalists and media outlets. Misinformation is spreading alongside posts containing violent rhetoric, whether in the form of encouraging further bloodshed by Hamas or calling for collective punishment against Palestinians.

An already tense conflict is being inflamed by an information environment rife with false information, hate speech, and incitements of violence. The desire for up-to-date information is far outpacing the availability of verifiable information, leading many to buy into false or unsubstantiated reports that are difficult, if not impossible, to substantiate in real time.

The significant escalation of the Israel-Hamas conflict comes amid rising tensions and increased incidents of violence. Following an attack on a synagogue in Jerusalem that killed seven in January 2023, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu promised a “strong, swift and precise” response. Later that month, Gaza militants fired rockets into Israel in response to Israeli troops killing nine Palestinians. This year also witnessed a deadly escalation between Israeli security forces and Palestinian armed groups in Gaza, increased raids in the West Bank, and deployment of Israeli forces to Jenin. In August, Israeli government minister Amichai Eliyahu called for the annexation of West Bank “as quickly as possible,” describing the Green Line separating Israel and the Palestinian territories “fictitious.”

The DFRLab analyzed social media platforms popular in the region, including Telegram and X (formerly Twitter), where much of the content about the conflict is actively circulating.

Read more from Dina Sadek, Middle East research fellow, and Layla Mashkoor, associate editor, at the Atlantic Council’s Digital Forensic Research Lab:

China’s tepid response to Hamas’s attack shows Beijing is not a leading actor in the Middle East

It was only four months ago, still cresting the wave of the Saudi-Iran rapprochement in Beijing, that China hosted Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas in Beijing and its ambassador to Israel spoke of an upcoming visit from Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. Prior to the visit, Qin Gang, China’s former minister of foreign affairs, had offered to facilitate peace talks between the Israeli government and the Palestinian Authority. With a trio of summits in Riyadh last December, a state visit from Iranian President Ibrahim Raisi in February, and BRICS+ and Shanghai Cooperation Organization expansion into the Middle East, China was projecting itself as a major regional actor.

Yet its response to an actual crisis was a tepid call for restraint: “We call on relevant parties to remain calm, exercise restraint and immediately end the hostilities to protect civilians and avoid further deterioration of the situation.” Beijing’s quiet retreat was even more notable in that it did not even condemn the attack from Hamas until after a meeting between Chinese leader Xi Jinping and US Senator Chuck Schumer, during which Schumer “pointedly requested” that China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs “strengthen their statement.” 

This underscores a fundamental problem with the assumption that China will play a great power position in the Middle East. Its primary interests in the region are economic, not strategic, and while it is an important actor in political, diplomatic, and security affairs, it is nowhere near a leading actor, nor is it likely to become one for a long time, if ever. First and foremost, the Middle East is a region where China trades and builds. Its strategic interests are closer to home. 

For years, Chinese leaders have promoted “peace through development” as Beijing’s approach to security in the Global South. The idea is that insecurity is the result of underlying economic pressures. Remove those pressures through development, the thinking goes, and the result will be peace. Any number of countries in the developing world will gladly accept the assistance and the know-how; China’s transformation since the 1970s has lessons for governments everywhere. At the same time, Hamas’s attack last weekend demonstrates that there are times when security requires more than an economic agenda. Beijing’s response may have been so muted because its blueprint for Middle East peace appears remarkably hollow right now. 

That said, there is space for a positive Chinese role here. Everyone has to be concerned about Iranian involvement should the conflict escalate, and China is a great power with influence in Tehran. As noted above, China’s interests in the Middle East are primarily economic, and a wider conflict would have an adverse effect on those interests. People in Beijing are no doubt talking with people in Tehran and urging restraint, and we should all hope they are persuasive. 

—Jonathan Fulton is a nonresident senior fellow for Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs and the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative. 

Gaza under siege: A doctor recounts the humanitarian cost of war

“The bombing is so intense I haven’t been able to get to the hospital,” Dr. Ghassan Abu Sitta messaged me on WhatsApp on October 9. I’ve known him for nearly a decade. He’s a brusque bleeding heart who, like many, floats in and out of the spheres of war and disaster zones and has adopted a dark sense of humor to cope.

When Dr. G, as we call him, finally does get to the hospital, the situation is harrowing. Israel has been relentlessly bombing the Gaza Strip and its two million inhabitants since the militant group Hamas’ surprise attack on October 7. Dr. G can’t let himself ponder on the gravity of the calamity, and he certainly can’t let his mind wander into his own pain. It’s a coping mechanism born out of the necessity for self-preservation and, more importantly, to deal with the overwhelming scope of the task at hand.

“Unknown child no. six: Ten or eleven years old. Brought out from the rubble of his family home in Sheik Radwan neighborhood. Half [of his] face missing and a fist-sized defect in his left axilla. Total operative time three hours,” Dr. G posted on X, formerly known as Twitter.

I have to Google “axilla”—it’s the part of the body where the shoulder and arm connect. I know Dr. G well enough to know that he’s defaulting into medical terminology not just because that is what he speaks, but because it creates a wall. He’s sticking to the medical side of it, avoiding treading into the emotional space from which there will be no return. He can’t risk that now. If he does, he will not be able to breathe, stand, nor hold the scalpel.

“That is someone’s baby boy,” he wrote, closing the X thread.

Read more from Arwa Damon, a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East and president and founder of the International Network for Aid, Relief, and Assistance:

MENASource

Oct 12, 2023

Gaza under siege: A doctor recounts the humanitarian cost of war

By Arwa Damon

Dr. G is no stranger to war zones. He’s a plastic and reconstructive surgeon who often volunteers when bombs and disasters strike.

Civil Society Israel

Hamas wants the world (and especially Iran) to watch it take Israelis hostage

The indefensible violence and destruction that terrorist organizations commit can obscure an important reality: Whatever else they are, terrorist organizations are also organizations. They have to fundraise, justify their existence to supporters and donors, and provide results that move their stated mandate forward. For Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), attacks and operations that garner international attention against Israeli targets help to justify continued support from their primary sponsor, Iran. It also means that they must stay relevant in order to drive additional fundraising and increase their credibility. The bigger the attack or operation, the better the potential financial and material return.

In its brazen assault on Israel on October 7, Hamas and PIJ abducted around 150 Israeli and foreign hostages—many of them children and the elderly. On Tuesday, US President Joe Biden confirmed that Americans were among Hamas’s hostages. As Israel, the United States, and other countries decide what to do next, they will need to factor in the full complexity of the situation.  

Often hostage situations are about financial gain and are local in nature. The abductors seek to enter into a negotiation in which the abductees’ family or government trade something of value for their release. To some extent, this is true of the hostages in Gaza, but they are also an international play for Hamas and the PIJ, and that distinction makes a big difference.

Read more from Jennifer A. Counter, nonresident senior fellow in the Forward Defense program in the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security:

New Atlanticist

Oct 12, 2023

Hamas wants the world (and especially Iran) to watch it take Israelis hostage

By Jennifer A. Counter

For Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, high-profile attacks against Israeli targets help to justify continued support from Iran.

Conflict Crisis Management

Israel, Ukraine, and how Biden should connect the dots

It now seems like it was ages ago, but only last week US President Joe Biden said he would address the American people soon on why it was “overwhelmingly in the interest of the United States” that Ukraine prevails in Russia’s criminal war against it.

Hamas’s horrifying attack on Israel on October 7, resulting in Biden’s powerful and unambiguous statement of support for Israel this week, would appear to have put Ukraine on the back burner for the moment, replaced by a war that might appear more urgent.

But viewing these wars as entirely distinct from each other would be a mistake.

When Biden does get around to making his speech on Ukraine, he should expand his message and tell Americans, and at the same time our partners around the world, that together we face the greatest threat to global order since the 1930s.

What the wars in Ukraine and Israel have in common is that they are both the result of state-sponsored terrorism. In Ukraine’s case, Russia is acting brazenly and directly. In the case of Israel, Iran is acting through Hamas and others. National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan said Tuesday that although there is no direct evidence that Iran was involved in the planning or execution of the attack, it was “complicit.” Indeed, the alarming scale and competence of Hamas’s attacks couldn’t have happened without Iran’s funding, weaponry, training, and intelligence. And without its deepening partnership with Russia and China, Iran would be a far less potent actor.

Read more from Atlantic Council President and CEO Frederick Kempe:

Inflection Points

Oct 12, 2023

Israel, Ukraine, and how Biden should connect the dots

By Frederick Kempe

When Biden does get around to making his speech on Ukraine, he should discuss the attacks on Israel and how the US and its allies face the greatest threat to global order since the 1930s.

Israel Middle East

Updates from October 11

• Israel’s unity government is only valuable if it restores security and deterrence

• Scalise’s nomination for House speaker may hasten new US aid to Israel—and Ukraine

• The finance world braces for impact from the Israel-Hamas war

• Hamas’s attack on Israel was straight out of Hezbollah’s playbook

• What to expect from Israel’s ground invasion of Gaza

• More updates

Israel’s unity government is only valuable if it restores security and deterrence

Five days after the brutal killing of more than 1,200 Israelis—that provisional number keeps on climbing—at the hands of terrorists from Hamas and its sister groups in Gaza, Israel finally has the emergency government that the country desperately needs.

On the cusp of tough decisions concerning the prosecution of an almost-certain IDF counteroffensive in the Gaza Strip, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu found himself surrounded by a cohort of largely inexperienced ministers, who are being lambasted in public opinion as responsible for an intelligence and operational failure which Israelis are comparing to 9/11. The legitimacy deficit of his coalition—which engineered the judicial overhaul process that has brought hundreds of thousands of protestors into the streets for the last ten months—compelled Netanyahu now to join forces (at least temporarily) with former Alternate Prime Minister Benny Gantz, whose credibility will bolster the new government’s latitude to deploy troops while simultaneously working to achieve the release of at least 150 Israeli captives—among them, infants and senior citizens—being held in Gaza.

But the refurbishment of Israel’s leadership team is only a means to an end. A consensus of Israelis supported the formation of a unity government immediately after Saturday’s massacre. And after a protracted delay in achieving this milestone, which is being attributed widely to the prime minister’s political machinations, the burden of proof is on Netanyahu and Gantz to deliver the goods. If this merger proves incapable of restoring security and deterrence to Israel, it will have demonstrated little value, and public confidence in Israel’s decision makers will erode further. In that scenario, civil society, which has stepped up confidently to fill the vacuum left by evidently dysfunctional ministries, will be left to continue fending for itself.

—Shalom Lipner is a nonresident senior fellow for the Middle East Programs at the Atlantic Council. He previously served seven consecutive Israeli premiers in the Prime Minister’s Office.

Scalise’s nomination for House speaker may hasten new US aid to Israel—and Ukraine

The Republican conference’s decision Wednesday to nominate Rep. Steve Scalise (R-LA) for speaker of the House is a small but important forward step to allow Congress to address in a bipartisan way the assaults on the United States’ two democratic allies who are under attack, Israel and Ukraine. Scalise still needs to be elected speaker, and he could fall short of the needed majority of all House members present and voting.

The Biden administration has asked Congress for emergency funding to support Israel’s campaign against the Hamas terrorist group, which is responsible for more than a thousand Israelis, mostly civilians, being killed—not to mention Hamas’s plans to use Israeli, American, and other countries’ nationals as hostages. Hamas’s campaign even uses Gaza residents as human shields in an effort to make Israel’s campaign more difficult and costly in human lives. Russia, for its part, continues to target civilians in Ukraine and has used time bought by Chinese trench-digging equipment and delays in Western weapons reaching Ukrainian troops to prevent a breakthrough that could have threatened Russia’s hold on the Crimean peninsula. Both Israel and Ukraine need urgent replenishment of munitions and other military hardware.

The speaker of the House has the authority to guide legislation to the floor, but while the speaker has considerable influence, he does not control the agenda on the floor. That is the purview of the House Rules Committee, which has a diverse group of Republicans, including several staunch opponents of further aid to Ukraine. However, the choice of Scalise as the Republican conference’s nominee—if he is formally elected speaker, which is not a sure thing—is likely to have a significant effect on what comes before the House. Scalise earned a grade of “B” from Republicans for Ukraine, an advocacy group that looked at key House votes and public statements. In contrast, Scalise’s main challenger, Rep. Jim Jordan (R-OH), received an “F” from the same pro-Ukraine Republican group. Assistance for both Israel and Ukraine has strong, bipartisan support. The choice of Scalise as the Republican nominee for speaker makes it more likely that Congress will act quickly and favorably.

—Thomas S. Warrick is a senior fellow and director of the Future of DHS Project at the Atlantic Council. He served in the Department of State from 1997-2007 and as deputy assistant secretary for counterterrorism policy at the US Department of Homeland Security from 2008-2019.

The finance world braces for impact from the Israel-Hamas war

The shockwaves of the Israel-Hamas war have finally reached Marrakesh. It took several days—as it often does in the technocratic world of international economics—for financial leaders gathered here at the Meetings to grasp that the conflict could affect everyone.

Here on the ground, the full scale of the devastating human tragedy and military conflict unleashed by Hamas’s assault on Israel last Saturday is coming into focus—and with it a focus on the war’s economic ramifications. Several conversations are happening at once. 

First and foremost, there is growing horror as reports about the terrorist attacks and fallout in Israel and Gaza play on TV screens and phones inside and outside the official venue for the Meetings.

There is also discussion of the global economic fallout. Energy prices have understandably been a big focus, with memories of the 1973 Yom Kippur War and ensuing oil embargo front of mind for ministers. But as many of the economists milling about the pavilions have noted, the global energy market has shifted dramatically in the fifty years since that war. The world doesn’t solely rely on the Middle East for energy. And—for now—the conflict hasn’t spread through the region.

Then there’s the shekel and Israel’s economy. Israel’s central bank intervened to prop up the currency by selling thirty billion dollars in foreign reserves, but the shekel’s slump continues. There is wider concern that foreign investment in Israel will dry up and create a recession in the Israeli economy.

With regard to Gaza, the question is about reconstruction—whenever that time comes. Will the World Bank and other development banks play a role and step in with aid? A European commissioner initially signaled that the Commission would stop sending some aid to Palestinians, but that decision was quickly reversed by the European Union. There are open questions in Marrakesh right now about 1) what kind of aid will flow to Gaza in the near term and 2) what kind of money will be requested in the long term. Because these are questions for the development banks, the IMF has, so far, been able to sidestep the questions.

But don’t expect avoidance of these issues to continue. By the end of the week, the ministers and governors in Marrakesh will realize what many around the world already see clearly: What is unfolding in Israel and Gaza will have global political and economic impacts.

—Josh Lipsky is the senior director of the Atlantic Council’s GeoEconomics Center and a former IMF advisor.

Hamas’s attack on Israel was straight out of Hezbollah’s playbook

Hamas has long ceased to be a lone militant organization. Since 2018, the group has officially operated as a first among equals of the twelve-member “Joint Operations Room of the Palestinian Resistance Factions,” an entity whose technical genesis stretches back to 2006. Indeed, judging from the headbands worn by some of the assailants who infiltrated southern Israel, these other factions were well represented among the attackers. More broadly, since the 1990s Hamas has been gradually integrated into the Iranian-led “Resistance Axis,” a regional network of anti-Israel political parties and militant groups. Among Tehran’s constellation of forces, Hezbollah has taken point on coordinating the Khomeinist regime’s relationship with its Palestinian proxies, and the Shia group’s fingerprints can be detected all over this week’s attack on Israel.

For years, Hezbollah has been promising to “liberate the Galilee” in a future war with Israel. Hezbollah’s secretary-general, Hassan Nasrallah, stated this objective in a February 2011 speech, and the group has conducted exercises simulating the execution of this promise since then. At different times, Hezbollah threatened that it would launch a traditional invasion, meant to seize and permanently hold territory. But such a conventional military maneuver was then, and remains, beyond the group’s capabilities. Such an action would require Hezbollah to establish static supply lines and expose massive numbers of its fighters on Israeli territory, where the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) would possess the numerical and qualitative advantage, in addition to armor, artillery, and air power. In other words, Hezbollah would be discarding the advantages conferred by its hybrid-guerilla warfare methods, without developing the conventional methods or doctrine necessary to match or neutralize the IDF’s vast superiority in conventional warfare.

Read more from David Daoud, nonresident fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center and Middle East Programs and director of Israel, Lebanon, and Syria Research at United Against Nuclear Iran.

MENASource

Oct 11, 2023

Hamas’s attack on Israel was straight out of Hezbollah’s playbook

By David Daoud

The genesis of Operation Al-Aqsa Flood appears to originate with Hezbollah, at least in part. The pressing question now is what will Hezbollah do next?

Conflict Crisis Management

What to expect from Israel’s ground invasion of Gaza

The terrorist attacks launched by Hamas inside Israeli territory have left more than 1,200 Israelis dead, the most Jewish people murdered in one day since the Holocaust. In response to these heinous terrorist attacks, Israel has launched a major military campaign against Hamas in Gaza. It could be a long campaign, lasting months or more, but the first days and weeks matter a great deal to its ultimate success. 

So what is success? Israeli officials have stated that the goal of the operation is the complete destruction of Hamas’s military capabilities. A limited air campaign alone will not achieve this goal, and it is reasonable to expect a ground campaign into Gaza commencing soon. Indeed, already there are signs of what it will look like. …

Israel appears set to initiate a months-long ground campaign that is designed to completely eliminate the terrorist threat posed by Hamas and to prevent and deter a terrorist attack like this from ever happening again. The operation faces risks given hostages on the battlefield and the difficult nature of urban warfare that requires house-to-house clearing operations. Yet another significant risk to the success of the operation is regional and international condemnation of a humanitarian crisis that the operation is likely to cause. 

The threat of the war expanding into a regional conflict also looms. Iran-backed Hezbollah, which is reported to have around 150,000 rockets capable of striking Jerusalem and Tel Aviv, could get involved. Thus far, neither Hezbollah nor Palestinian factions in the West Bank have fully joined Hamas in its war against Israel, but that could change in this quickly evolving conflict. These risks and others that will surface in time must factor into military planning as Israel begins its ground operations in Gaza. 

Read more from Alex Plitsas, nonresident senior fellow with the Middle East Programs’ N7 Initiative:

New Atlanticist

Oct 11, 2023

What to expect from Israel’s ground invasion of Gaza

By Alex Plitsas

Israel appears set to initiate a months-long ground campaign that is designed to completely eliminate the terrorist threat posed by Hamas and to prevent and deter a attack like October 7 from ever happening again

Conflict Crisis Management

Updates from October 7-10

• What will Hezbollah do next? Here’s how the Hamas-Israel conflict could engulf the region.

• Israel and Ukraine may reveal the true cost of a defense industrial base in crisis

• Hamas’s attack underscores the need for US and Israeli policy to change course

• Two conflicting moods prevail as financial leaders gather

• Dispatch from Jerusalem: How does this end?

• Dispatch from Tel Aviv: A new kind of conflict has begun

• Video: What comes next after Hamas attack on Israel

• Experts react: Israel is ‘at war’ after Hamas militants launch major assault

What will Hezbollah do next? Here’s how the Hamas-Israel conflict could engulf the region.

As Israel prosecutes its offensive against Hamas in Gaza, eyes are nervously turning toward Lebanon, where a series of clashes along the border has raised fears of a second front breaking out, an outcome that could trigger a full regional war. Neither side appears to want an escalation, but the risks are high for a disastrous miscalculation. 

So far, the pattern of violence along the Blue Line, the United Nations­–delineated boundary that corresponds to Lebanon’s southern border, has been relatively predictable, consisting of shelling and minor incursions. There has been some talk in recent months about the “unification of the fronts,” meaning the closer coordination between anti-Israel groups such as Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas, and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), along with myriad other Iran-backed groups in Syria, Iraq, and Yemen. Therefore, it would have been difficult for Hezbollah to simply stand back and do nothing as Israel wages its massive offensive against Hamas in Gaza. …

At this initial stage, it appears that Hezbollah wants to keep its actions (whether claimed or unclaimed) below a certain threshold so as not to force Israel into a more powerful retaliation. If Hezbollah were to overshoot, it could trigger an unintended escalatory cycle. It is, however, Iran that has the final say in whether Hezbollah goes to war with Israel. Iran recognizes Hezbollah as its most potent external asset and a key component of its deterrence architecture against a potential attack by Israel or the United States. It is unlikely that Tehran will want to waste Hezbollah in a futile full-scale war with Israel for the sake of supporting Hamas in Gaza.

By the same token, it seems evident that Israel is not seeking the opening of a second front with Lebanon while it focuses on prosecuting its offensive against Hamas. The risk lies in Hezbollah possibly feeling compelled to raise its operational tempo closer to the threshold point as the war in Gaza intensifies and the destruction and loss of life mounts, especially in the event of a major ground incursion by the Israeli military. The closer Hezbollah moves to the threshold level, the higher the chance of miscalculation that leads to a war that neither side currently appears to desire.

Read more from Nicholas Blanford, a Beirut-based nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs, consultant, and defense and security correspondent for IHS/Janes.

New Atlanticist

Oct 10, 2023

What will Hezbollah do next? Here’s how the Hamas-Israel conflict could engulf the region.

By Nicholas Blanford

Neither Israel nor Hezbollah appears to want an escalation, but the risks are high for a disastrous miscalculation. 

Conflict Crisis Management

Israel and Ukraine may reveal the true cost of a defense industrial base in crisis

The health of the US defense industrial base has long been problematic, but it may be allies and partners who pay the price.

Upholding US commitments to supply Israel with the munitions and equipment necessary to fend off Hamas while simultaneously sustaining Ukraine’s fight against Russia is an expensive undertaking. Many are calling on Congress to provide emergency appropriations to the US Department of Defense in order to deliver on these promises, however funding is only the first hurdle. The next question is if the US industrial base has the infrastructure to adequately supply armaments to both nations.

The United States’ limited defense industrial production capacity has long been described as “just-in-time,” meaning the industry operates such that raw materials arrive as production is scheduled to begin to reduce warehousing costs. Inventories are practically nonexistent. This approach reduces the risk incurred by industry that would otherwise have to hedge astronomical bets on unpredictable forecasts, rather than respond accordingly to a steady demand signal from the Department of Defense. While deemed more efficient, this environment prevents industry from responding at scale to urgent and unforeseen requests to produce complex weapons that typically require two to three years to manufacture.

Workforce deficiencies in skilled labor and science, technology, engineering, and math (STEM) expertise have compounded this problem. This is in large part a result of the United States’ pivot toward a digital and services-based economy over the last thirty years. The impact of this transition is mirrored in the job market and shrinking manufacturing sector, which has lost nearly five million jobs in the last twenty-five years. A nationwide lack of skilled labor, and one that is insufficiently incentivized to support the US government and its industrial base, does not bode well for ramping up current or near-term capacity.  

While securing funding from Congress is crucial, it means little until the administration puts a premium back on national security and the industrial base that supports it. The US government can do this by streamlining the acquisition process, mitigating budgetary constraints posed by continuing resolutions and inflation, and matching and surpassing incentives offered by the other industries for skilled labor in a diminished job market—to start. Until then, the United States will struggle to keep well-intentioned commitments to arm Israel and Ukraine as they fight for sovereignty.

—Kathryn Levantovscaia is an associate director in the Forward Defense program of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.