Syrians voted in 8,151 polling stations that opened across the country, with the exception of areas not controlled by the Assad regime. To cater to residents displaced from opposition-held areas, the government established special polling stations scattered throughout the country. For example, stations were set up for Raqqa residents in the Hama, Damascus, Hasakah, Homs, Latakia, and Tartous governorates. For Quneitra residents, more than 111 out of 175 stations were located outside the governorate.

In northeastern Syria, the Kurdish-dominated Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) prevented elections by establishing a security cordon around the Qamishli “government quarter,” in which the Assad regime provides administrative services to the residents of the area. SDF-affiliated social media and news outlets broadcasted warnings that the election sites might be subject to unspecified terrorist attacks. In Idlib and northern Aleppo, areas controlled by the Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and the Syrian National Army (SNA), there were no electoral activities.

Of all the areas under governmental control, the most disruptions were reported in the southern areas of Sweida. Before the polls, and continuing into Election Day, demonstrators protesting against the elections entered several polling centers, took away ballot boxes, and set election materials on fire. The anti-election protests were a continuation of the anti-regime protests that have been regularly occurring for the past year. On Election Day, demonstrators in Sweida’s al-Karama Square came under fire by security forces, and a civilian was injured. It’s worth noting that protests were not limited to Sweida—violence and demonstrations were reported across the governorate, as well as in the towns of Qarya and Mazraa and the villages of Melh, Slim, and Koraya. In Daraa governorate, protests and threats of violence forced the government to relocate twenty-five polling stations. For example, stations in the town of Mahja were moved to the city of Izraa, stations from al-Karak were moved to al-Musayfrah, and those in the city of Jasem were relocated to a safer part of the city.

Where the polls were conducted without disruption, the process unfolded identically to the 2020 election. Because the election authorities neither register voters nor compile the voters list in advance of elections, the first step at the polling station was to register a voter using the blank forms used to write in voters. This way, the voters list was compiled on Election Day rather than being available to the committees before the elections.

Voters would then be handed a ballot and needed to choose to either use ballots pre-filled with the Baath Party-sponsored candidates on the National Unity (NU) list or, if they dared, a blank ballot. Those who opted for a blank ballot had to write in the names of the candidates by hand, ranging from five names in al-Quentra to thirty-two names in rural Aleppo, which is a burdensome process. In some areas, the non-NU candidates would also distribute pre-printed ballots, such as the “Sham” list in Damascus, which features the incumbent Mohamed Hamsho (sanctioned by the European Union and the United States). The practice is fully permitted by law.

To ensure high turnout, public institutions, companies, committees, factories, banks, and unions were instructed by the government not to give employees a day off, which prevented them from ignoring the polls, and to compel them to vote en masse, likely under supervision. Many polling stations were set up in or near their workplaces—like factories and universities—to boost turnout. However, in contrast with the previous elections, there was no information on turnout either during the day or immediately after the close of the polls. According to our research, the Supreme Judicial Election Committee (SJEC), governors, and heads of polling committees used vague language to describe the turnout in the media, with statements like “turnout was good,” “nice,” “high,” “not bad,” and “it got better in the afternoon” being used throughout the day. During a live interview on state television with the polling station committee in rural Damascus, the reporter abruptly changed the subject and asked the polling station president not to share any information about the number of voters or the station’s results.

There is little to be said about the credibility of the polling process itself. As described in a previous article on electoral administration, the process did not meet fundamental standards for impartial management of elections nor the standards of transparency. There were no independent national or international observers, and there were no systematic, evidence-based reports of the polling process. For what it is worth, there is plenty of anecdotal evidence of mass proxy voting, underage voting, voting without secrecy, and voting in military barracks without a chance for supervision.

The same lack of transparency shrouds the process for resolving election disputes. The president of the Supreme Constitutional Court, Jihad Lahham, announced on July 28 that all forty-seven appeals were rejected for “not meeting the conditions stipulated in the laws” and “not supported by any document or evidence.” Nothing is known about the nature of the appeals or those filing them.

The Syrian opposition was campaigning against the legitimacy of the elections. These efforts were led by the Syrian Negotiation Committee, several Syrian nongovernmental organizations, and the media. The key slogan of the campaign was “No to Assad and his elections” alongside “Resolution 2254,” which also appeared as hashtags on X (formerly Twitter). The campaign messages were of a general anti-elections character, pointing out that they were against the framework set by the United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSC) 2254. The campaign was launched late and was effectively active only on Election Day. It does not appear to have gained any significant traction.

The Baath Party endorsed NU lists that included 185 candidates across the country. As expected, the electoral system ensured that all of them were elected, making the partisan composition of the assembly identical to the previous one: 67 percent for the Baathists (a total of 74 percent for all the NU candidates) and 26 percent for those elected to seats not contested by the NU. The number of seats not contested by the NU candidates, a maximum of sixty-five, is not random; it is by design. It avoids the perception of single-party rule and allows for a semblance of diversity, but protects the regime by securing a two-thirds majority needed to fend off legislative challenges, enact constitutional amendments, or accuse the president of treason. This golden ratio has been the formula in place since the 2016 legislative elections held in the aftermath of the 2012 constitutional reforms.

Are there any other conclusions besides the predictable 100 percent victory for all of the NU candidates? Detailed analysis is difficult because of the lack of transparency; there is simply not enough data published for a granular view of the results. If elections were ever to be held under the framework of the UNSC Resolution 2254 and within international standards, the authorities would be obliged to publish the complete election results, including turnout with gender breakdown, numbers of invalid ballots, registered voters, and votes for all the candidates. Currently, the results published by the SJEC present only the votes of the winning candidates, not all the candidates. This makes election analysis impossible, as by how much the election losers lost will never be known.

Because the voting data are missing, and because the competition was, in practice, resolved before Election Day through internal elections and the primaries, the analysis is reduced to levels of participation. The SJEC only announced an overall number of voters in elections: 7,325,844 out of 19,200,325 claimed by the government to be eligible, which results in a turnout of 38.16 percent, about a 5 percent increase since the 2020 elections. This overall number says nothing about regional differences.

Voting patterns are even harder to analyze because of elections used a block vote system with multiple candidates. The workaround is to consider the top candidate on the list as representative of the support received by the list. Employing this method reveals a pattern of some voting shifts between the governorates and between the 2020 and 2024 elections. Countrywide, the NU lists received 5 percent fewer votes than in 2024. Some drops in the votes were dramatic, such as in Damascus, where NU lost 49 percent of the votes, followed by Hasaka with 43 percent. On the other hand, votes for NU in rural Aleppo, Deir ez-Zor, and Hama dramatically increased (42 percent, 51 percent, and 71 percent, respectively.)

It will take some time to understand the cause of these changes. They could be simply the result of the redeployment of the military and the return of internally displaced persons, especially to Damascus. The only solid conclusion at this point is that the actual increase in the total number of those who voted by 1.1 million has not resulted in increased support for the NU lists, as they lost two hundred thousand votes compared to the 2020 elections. And, when compared with the 2016 elections, the increase in 2.2 million voters led to a decrease in support for the NU by 1.2 million votes.

Shifts in support for the NU lists do not seem to be related to whether the candidates on the lists were incumbents. As in the previous elections, the rates of turnover were high. Out of the 250 elected to the new parliament, ninety-three are incumbents, which is only 37.2 percent of the total—and almost exactly the same as in the 2020 elections, when 37.6 percent of incumbents were re-elected.

However, turnover is not uniform across the country. The variations between the regions are significant. In Idlib, Tartous, Deir ez-Zor, Raqqa, and Damascus, more than 80 percent of representatives were replaced. On the other side of the spectrum is Sweida with only 33 percent, followed by Daraa at 40 percent, and Hassaka at 42 percent.

Besides analysis of the turnout and the turnover in the parliament, what are the election results saying about the structure and political dynamics of the newly elected assembly? On an individual level, it might be of interest that six of the eight members serving in the governmental delegation to the UN-sponsored Constitutional Committee were not re-elected, including Ahmed Kuzbari, the co-chair. In Damascus, the “Sham” list led by Hamsho, a sanctioned businessman closely affiliated with Maher al-Assad, the president’s brother, won twelve seats that were not contested by the National Unity list. One of the new independent members of parliament from Aleppo, Mohammed al-Ruslan, is a former leader of a militia faction reportedly affiliated with the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS). Madoul al-Aziz, a former leader of a militia affiliated to al-Nusra, was re-elected as an independent candidate for Deir ez-Zor.

But, as explained in the previous article on candidates, if there was any political competition, it played out in advance to general elections, in the intra-Baath Party elections and primaries. The conclusion from observing those processes is that the new parliament might be rejuvenated with significant turnover, but will likely remain in the service of the top Baath leadership.

Vladimir Pran advises electoral authorities, governments, and political leaders on transitional, electoral, and political processes.

Maroun Sfeir advises international and local civil society organizations, political groups, and electoral authorities on electoral and political processes.

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Orban’s intensive bout of shuttle diplomacy began with a visit to Kyiv on July 2, where he met with President Zelenskyy. This was the Hungarian leader’s first trip to neighboring Ukraine since 2015, and came just one day after his country took up the six-month rotating presidency of the Council of the European Union. The presidency, a position which rotates through all EU member states, is designed to coordinate the agenda and chair meetings of EU member state officials. It is limited in power, and the presidency carries no responsibility for representing the EU abroad.

A few days later, Orban was in Moscow for talks with Russian President Vladimir Putin, who he then lavished with praise in an interview with Germany’s WELT Documentary. On July 8, the Hungarian PM was in Beijing to meet with Xi Jinping. He subsequently flew to the US for the annual NATO Summit, before rounding off his diplomatic mission by meeting with US presidential candidate Donald Trump in Florida.

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While Orban’s globetrotting itinerary was certainly impressive, there is little indication that this diplomatic initiative achieved much beyond generating media buzz and upsetting Hungary’s EU partners. Orban pushed the idea that a ceasefire in Ukraine could “speed up peace talks” and has tried to pitch his peace plan in a letter to European Union leaders, but so far he has faced little enthusiasm and a significant backlash. Crucially, both Zelenskyy and Putin have ruled out an immediate ceasefire.

This lack of progress toward peace might not be a major issue for Orban. Indeed, some believe his recent diplomatic efforts may actually have been designed primarily to strengthen his own position, both domestically and on the international stage. Crucially, it has allowed the Hungarian leader to balance his country between the key global centers of Washington, Beijing, Moscow, and Brussels. It has also served as a welcome backdrop for the creation of the new Patriots for Europe grouping within the European Parliament, as part of Orban’s self-styled effort to “change European politics.”

This international outreach allows Orban to maintain the stability of his own domestic position via continued NATO security, EU funding and market access, cheap Russian energy imports, and Chinese investments. He has been pursuing a similar model since 2010, and has consistently attempted to make himself useful to all key players. In the current geopolitical context, this means playing the role of potential peacemaker in the broader geopolitical confrontation that has emerged as a result of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

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Orban’s current peacemaker posturing could prove particularly timely if Donald Trump wins this year’s US presidential election and returns to the White House in January 2025. This would set the stage for a likely increase in tensions between Washington and Beijing, with the Hungarian PM potentially positioned to serve as an intermediary on key issues such as Ukraine peace initiatives.

Critics have accused the Hungarian leader of handing Putin a significant PR victory. At a time when the Russian dictator is eager to demonstrate that he is not internationally isolated, their Moscow meeting was particularly welcome. This explains why Orban was careful to begin his world tour in Kyiv, allowing him to deflect accusations from the West that he is doing the Kremlin’s bidding. Instead, Orban sought to portray his outreach efforts as an example of the “third way” that the current crop of populist European politicians often seek to champion.

There can be little doubt that Orban’s tour was also an attempt to troll the entire EU leadership. By seizing the initiative and unilaterally embarking on high-profile visits to Moscow and Beijing while holding the EU presidency, Orban was hoping to contrast his own dynamic leadership with the perceived indecisiveness of the European Union’s more cautious diplomacy. In doing so, he succeeded in boosting his international profile while causing significant embarrassment in Brussels.

Despite generating much media interest and favorable headlines, it would be wrong to portray Viktor Orban’s peace mission as an unqualified success. At this stage, his peace proposals appear to have little genuine substance, and have so far gained virtually no traction. Nevertheless, the Hungarian leader will likely continue to view the invasion of Ukraine as an opportunity to advance his own balancing act between Russia, China, and the West.

Dmytro Tuzhanskyi is director of the Institute for Central European Strategy. This article is published in his capacity as an analyst of the Institute for Central European Strategy and does not reflect any other institution’s position.

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The roots of the current tension can be traced back to the Israeli Defense Forces’ (IDF) withdrawals from the Gaza Strip in 2005 and Lebanon in 2006. Since then, Hamas and Hezbollah have been allowed to grow their capabilities, largely unchecked by Israel. While Israel has had a policy of “mowing the grass” in Gaza—i.e., regularly launching attacks into the strip to degrade Hamas’s capabilities—this has not prevented the Palestinian group from building more than five hundred kilometers of tunnel, its greatest asset in its war against Israel. For context, Hamas has built an underground system roughly the size of the London Underground. Israel’s actions toward Hezbollah have been even more hands-off since 2006, largely limited to strikes against Hezbollah and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) in Syria. This has allowed Hezbollah to greatly expand its stockpile of missiles, giving the group the ability to escalate a conflict against Israel far beyond previous wars. The result is a volatile situation akin to a tinderbox.

While recent events, such as an Israeli airstrike on July 3 that killed Mohammad Naameh Nasser, a senior Hezbollah commander in southern Lebanon, have exacerbated tensions, they are merely symptoms of a much deeper, long-standing conflict. The ongoing exchange of fire across the Israel-Lebanon border is part of a series of tit-for-tat attacks that have characterized the relationship between these adversaries for years.

The specter of a full-scale war between Israel and Hezbollah looms large. Hezbollah’s extensive rocket arsenal, which has significantly expanded since 2006, poses a grave threat to Israeli civilians. Israeli estimates put Hezbollah’s arsenal at roughly 150,000 rockets and missiles, while an IRGC Quds Force official boasted a stockpile of more than 1 million. Whatever the figure, these are not rudimentary missiles like Hamas’s Qassam rockets; Hezbollah’s arsenal is more sophisticated and dangerous—ranging from the smaller unguided Fajr-5, with a range of 75 kilometers, to powerful ballistic missiles such as the Fateh-110 and Scud variants, which can hit anywhere in Israel. So far, this has forced a mass evacuation of around sixty thousand Israeli residents from the north of the country.

The range and payload of these missiles have also allowed Hezbollah to threaten countries like Cyprus against providing any assistance to the IDF, meaning that the group has the ability to drag third parties into a wider conflict. Furthermore, an Israeli military offensive in Lebanon could potentially trigger responses from Hezbollah’s allies across the region, including Yemen, Syria, Iraq, and Iran. The situation is complicated by the potential for direct conflict between Israel and Iran, which is no longer merely an academic concept after the retaliatory responses between the foes in April.

On the domestic front, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu faces a multitude of challenges. Beyond the pressure to secure the northern border, he grapples with the ongoing hostage crisis, the lack of a clear “day after” plan for Gaza, and internal political strife. Corruption charges loom over Netanyahu but are currently held at bay by his immunity as prime minister. Political rivalries and domestic crises, such as that regarding the Supreme Court, have been put aside due to the unity government formed after October 7, 2023. However, these underlying issues are only delayed by the existential need to defeat Hamas. Once the threat subsides or the Israeli population tires of war, these issues will resurface.

The northern front with Hezbollah may serve as a distraction from these pressing issues, allowing Netanyahu to double down on security concerns. Hezbollah, too, faces domestic pressures. Lebanon has remained without a head of state for two years, and various political factions are pushing for accommodation in the presidency. The lack of a functioning and unified executive authority has led to political inaction over the country’s growing banking crisis, threatening to create one of the worst economic crises since 1857. Real gross domestic product (GDP) growth contracted by 6.7 percent in 2019, followed by another contraction of more than 20 percent in 2020. Unemployment currently stands at more than 11 percent. Hezbollah must balance its ideological commitment to resistance against Israel with the complex realities of Lebanese politics and the potential consequences of escalation.

The Joe Biden administration also finds itself in a precarious position, with some officials raising the alarm over the evolving crisis and worries that Israel and Hezbollah might be underestimating the risks associated with their actions. The administration must navigate a delicate balance: showing unwavering support for Israel while simultaneously attempting to prevent a wider regional conflict. Domestic political considerations further complicate this balancing act, with the November US presidential election looming and the potential for criticism from both sides of the aisle. The diplomatic efforts to resolve this crisis face significant challenges. Even if a Gaza ceasefire were negotiated and Hezbollah ceased its rocket attacks, Israel is unlikely to sit quietly with the knowledge of such a big threat to its north. This places US diplomacy in a difficult position of finding incentives for Hezbollah to pull back from a position of strength while accommodating Israel’s security concerns.

Questions have been raised about the efficacy of current diplomatic channels, particularly the role of Amos Hochstein as the primary envoy. While Hochstein has experience in energy-related diplomacy between Lebanon and Israel, his background as a former IDF soldier and his lack of extensive experience in high-stakes geopolitical negotiations raise concerns about his suitability for mediating this potentially explosive situation.

The consequences of a war between Israel and Hezbollah would be catastrophic. Such a conflict would likely draw in the United States in a far more substantive way, potentially marking a return to the “forever wars” that recent administrations have sought to avoid. The potential for Iranian-backed fighters from across the region joining Hezbollah in a conflict against Israel adds another layer of complexity and risk to the situation. As the current state of affairs is assessed, it is clear that the situation in the Middle East remains extremely volatile and dangerous. This is not a fragile peace, but a combustible situation that threatens to escalate into what could be characterized as “a forever war on steroids.” The ongoing exchange of fire and the high risk of miscalculation make the prospect of a broader regional conflict a looming threat.

The international community, led by the United States, must double down on its diplomatic efforts and continue to urge restraint on all sides. However, these efforts must be led by experienced professionals with a deep understanding of the region’s complexities. The stakes are extraordinarily high, and the consequences of a full-scale war would be dire for both the region and global stability.

Daniel Elkins is the founder and president of the Special Operations Association of America. A former Green Beret and Special Operations combat veteran, he is also an Atlantic Council Counter-Terrorism Project member.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not represent the positions of the United States government or the Department of Defense.

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On June 15, Hamid Noury, an Iranian national who Swedish courts sentenced to life in prison for war crimes and murder, was released and returned to Iran. This marked the first and only universal jurisdiction case related to atrocity crimes in the Islamic Republic of Iran. Noury was arrested in November 2019 at Arlanda Airport in Sweden, and was subsequently tried by the Stockholm District Court over ninety sessions held in 2021–2022. He was found guilty for his role in the massacre of thousands of political prisoners in Iran in the summer of 1988, in what became known as the 1988 massacre, and the appeals court confirmed his sentence in December 2023. Noury’s release was arranged as part of a prisoner swap, during which Iranian authorities freed two Swedish nationals who had been held hostage, according to the unofficial admission of Iranian authorities.

There have been other incidents in which the foreign accused were returned to where they committed crimes for trial purposes.

Rwanda’s requests to European governments for the return of genocide suspects so they can be brought to justice are an example. There have also been numerous cases of foreign hostages being used as pawns to free individuals detained for or convicted of terrorism, narcotics, or other offenses. However, this was the first time someone convicted of core international crimes—genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and the crime of aggression—in a case of universal jurisdiction was transferred back to the same country where they previously enjoyed absolute impunity, only to enjoy it again.

This troubling move was a reaction by the Swedish government to the Islamic Republic’s policy of detaining foreign or Iranian dual nationals and using them as pawns to gain leverage in its dealings with Western countries. Not only was it a slap in the face to the victims, but it also created dangerous precedents that will have a long-lasting, damaging impact on the core purpose of the universal jurisdiction principle—and, more importantly, on the expansion and frequency of its application.

Rooted in the post-World War II trials and recognized by multiple treaties—including the 1949 Geneva Conventions and the 1984 Convention against Torture—the principle of universal jurisdiction is increasingly codified in national legislation. Given the horrific nature of these crimes, humanity as a whole cannot tolerate their remaining unadjudicated. The principle of universal jurisdiction enables national courts in third countries to address atrocity crimes committed abroad, holding perpetrators criminally liable and helping to prevent impunity. One of the most essential purposes of applying the principle of universal jurisdiction is to prosecute those who enjoy impunity in countries where the crimes occurred.

It should be noted that international crimes are often committed by state actors under state policies or plans, meaning that victims cannot expect proper accountability as long as the state in question remains in power. In other words, if the state where the crimes were committed is able or willing to exercise its jurisdiction, other countries generally do not invoke universal jurisdiction to prosecute perpetrators. Similarly, if a person is convicted under universal jurisdiction, and the country where the crime occurred later undergoes a democratic transition, that person can be extradited to the country where the crime was committed to continue serving their sentence. Noury’s return to Tehran was met with a warm welcome by officials, featuring a red carpet, numerous flowers, and a press conference—nothing similar to the reception typically given to a convicted individual who is supposed to serve life in prison.

Setting aside the question of why Sweden pursued universal jurisdiction in the first place if there was no confidence that it would not retreat after facing backlash, it appears Sweden utilized an article (Chapter 12, Article 9) in its constitution that allows the government, “by exercising clemency, to remit or reduce a penal sanction.” Many other countries have similar laws or legislation permitting the transfer of foreign convicted criminals to serve their sentences in their home countries. The Swedish authorities’ decision to use this legislation after a long and costly criminal proceeding, which resulted in a conviction for atrocity crimes, could set a precedent for future cases concerning crimes committed not only in Iran, but in other countries. This approach could jeopardize the very essence of universal jurisdiction and significantly demotivate prosecutors from investigating crimes committed in countries such as Iran, Russia, and China, which have active hostage policies. What would be the point of initiating criminal proceedings and investing millions of taxpayer money if the outcome could potentially leave citizens in dreadful custody situations for months or even years, result in a diplomatic catastrophe, and ultimately deliver an international criminal back to a state that welcomes them warmly?

The international community has correctly identified immunity as a significant obstacle in the fight against impunity, and has moved toward prohibiting or limiting its application in cases involving atrocity crimes. In the same vein, amnesty provisions are considered to “be interpreted as contrary to states’ commitments under international law” in relation to core international crimes. The practice of transferring foreign convicted criminals who have committed atrocity crimes to their home countries, knowing they will be granted some form of clemency or otherwise released from the remainder of their sentences, should also be recognized as a major barrier to accountability.

There is a significant risk that the transfer of convicted war criminal Hamid Noury could lead to similar cases unless the international community addresses its detonating effects on the universal jurisdiction project. The only way to prevent such a paralyzing, contagious impact is to prohibit the transfer of those convicted of atrocity crimes to governments that have previously failed to prosecute them and are unlikely to enforce the sentences properly.

Shadi Sadr is a human rights lawyer and a member of the panel of judges at the International People’s Tribunals on Indonesia, Myanmar, and China. She co-founded and directed Justice for Iran, one of the organizers of the Iran Atrocities’ (Aban) Tribunal. Follow her on X: @shadisadr.

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The proposed ceasefire and hostage exchange deal, recently championed by the Joe Biden administration on May 31, has failed to move forward. It faces opposition from a hesitant Hamas that is dragging its feet, and from an intransigent Netanyahu who just declared he is backing away from the proposal, saying that he’s okay with exchanging some hostages but wants to resume the war after a pause. While some “day-after” scenarios have been proposed for what follows the war’s end, no progress has been made in establishing real and viable plans for who governs Gaza after the war or for a meaningful exit strategy for all parties involved.

There appears to be an unspoken alignment between Netanyahu and Hamas’s leader in Gaza, Yahya Sinwar, to keep the war going in a manner that serves both parties’ divergent interests. Netanyahu is more likely to escape accountability for the shortcomings and grave miscalculations that resulted in the October 7, 2023 attack’s catastrophic success, arguably the worst single security failure on Israel’s territory. Furthermore, the chances of Netanyahu maintaining political power and avoiding early elections are greater with a protracted war in Gaza, a view that has become mainstream within Israeli society and politics. The Biden administration also seems to be aware of this reality, which is why the United States hosted opposition leader Benny Gantz and invited Defense Minister Yoav Gallant to Washington on June 23 to explore viable options beyond Netanyahu’s narrow interests.

Sinwar and the hardline military commanders of Hamas, on the other hand, may have realized that a perpetual war in Gaza, even a low-intensity one, would ensure Hamas’s political and geo-strategic relevance and survival as a resistance movement. Should the war persist without an end in sight, the Israeli military is likely to maintain some presence in Gaza, allowing the Islamist group to engage in a protracted insurgency that would afford Hamas credibility and clout within Palestinian politics and the broader Arab and Muslim worlds. Should this happen, Sinwar might rid Hamas of the headache associated with governing Gaza, which proved difficult for the group amid perpetual blockades, financial sanctions, and limited resources for fulfilling the strip’s vast needs. This scenario would also outsource care for Gaza’s displaced and suffering civilians to the international community, which is currently the only source of humanitarian and medical support for the battered coastal enclave.

Netanyahu and Sinwar’s calculus would be disastrous for Israel and the Palestinians alike. The longer the war goes on, the more likely it is that a severe escalation with Hezbollah on Israel’s northern front will occur and trigger a broader war that could severely harm Israel militarily and weaken it strategically. Hezbollah’s capabilities are widely discussed as being vast and advanced, with the potential for wreaking extreme damage on Israeli cities and targets. In fact, Sinwar is likely hoping that a protracted war in Gaza increases the likelihood of a miscalculation in the north that could trigger a full-fledged war, which would consume Israel’s focus and attention—and increase regional instability in line with what Sinwar had hoped for in the first place when launching the October 7, 2023, attack. A wider conflict in the north also risks increased militancy targeting the Golan Heights through Iranian proxies in Syria and Iraq. Furthermore, scenes of destruction, widespread devastation, and loss of life in Lebanon will inflame tensions in the Arab and Muslim world, possibly destabilizing the fragile Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, which has struggled with Islamist political forces seeking to exploit the war in Gaza to undermine the monarchy’s rule. The Arab League’s decision to drop Hezbollah’s terror classification foreshadows the likely setbacks in Arab-Israeli relations should the Israeli military destroy Lebanon in a war the way that it did the Gaza Strip.

A perpetual low-intensity conflict in Gaza—which appears to be the upcoming new phase that Netanyahu has recently described—is effectively a form of stalemate that keeps the war going at a limited scale, which fails to achieve strategic results while preventing the reconstruction of Gaza or the introduction of alternatives to Hamas’s rule. A protracted stalemate would be extraordinarily painful and challenging for the families of Israeli hostages and Gaza’s battered Palestinian civilians alike. Hamas has made it crystal clear that it will not agree to any hostage exchange deal absent a complete cessation of the war—a deal that hostage families and their allies are demanding to ensure the safe release of their loved ones. As for Gazans who have faced nine months of bombardment, displacement, and humanitarian crises, the continuation of the war in the manner envisioned by Netanyahu or Sinwar would become a disastrous new chapter in their suffering and elevate their level of hopelessness, which could trigger new waves of radicalization and unpredictability.

In the near term, it is difficult to envision a serious shift in Netanyahu and Sinwar’s attitudes toward the Biden ceasefire and hostage deal. Nevertheless, the administration should push for small steps that could plant seeds for transformation and sustainable stability in the Gaza Strip, even amid a potential stalemate. The United States, its regional allies, moderate Palestinian players, and the international community need a secure beachhead in Gaza that could serve as a measure of stability in a deeply unstable territory. 

This beachhead should start with a limited peacekeeping force that has an extremely narrow mandate: deploying along the Gaza Strip’s borders with Israel and Egypt. Critically, this would help separate the Palestinians from the Israelis, prevent the establishment of an Israeli-occupied buffer zone inside Gaza that would rob the Palestinians of precious territory, prevent infiltration and new cross-border attacks, and serve as an early-warning system to coordinate with Israeli authorities in case of future security incidents. Hamas’s incentives to agree to this mandate-limited force would stem from its serving as a separation shield that would cement the end of the war and prevent the permanent presence of Israeli occupation forces.

Additionally, this force would secure the Philadelphi Corridor to prevent future smuggling that would replenish Hamas’s stockpiles of munitions and illicit items. Limiting the force’s mandate to border security and protection would mean that participating troops, ideally from Arab and Muslim nations, would not need to carry out counterterrorism operations inside Gaza. The lower risks of harm to their soldiers would increase the likelihood that various nations would agree to be part of this effort.

On the Gaza side, a primary benefit of border security with such a limited force is that the area near the Rafah and Kerem Shalom crossings in Gaza’s southeastern territory could become a beachhead of stability. These two crossings, one of which is no longer functional, are critical for facilitating the entry and exit of humanitarian aid and people in the coastal enclave. The area by the Kerem Shalom crossing, where desperately needed aid comes in, is regularly targeted by bandits and looters who compromise the safety of aid delivery by seizing trucks immediately after they enter Gaza. The proposed peacekeeping force could stabilize the area, allowing for the establishment of makeshift medical, administrative, and other installations and facilities that could become headquarters for Gaza’s reconstruction and a new administrative entity.

Palestinians and Israelis would want separate assurances for such a limited force to work: Palestinians would need guarantees that it will not be a permanent “foreign occupation,” and Israelis would require assurance that this force will not become another version of the impotent United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) that hasn’t stopped Hezbollah from threatening Israeli territories in southern Lebanon.

Ending the war in Gaza—even through the Biden ceasefire and hostage deal and without introducing any executive foothold in Gaza that breaks Hamas’s monopoly on control—would risk a permanent stalemate with no progress toward political transformation in the coastal enclave. The limited scope, mandate, and deployment zone of this proposed peacekeeping force make it much more likely that an internationally binding agreement for its formation could be reached quickly.

Hamas remains present and relevant as a player in Gaza, and that cannot be changed anytime soon. While the group is significantly weakened and lacks the territorial and administrative control it once had, its continued existence in Gaza is all but assured. No viable immediate alternatives exist to challenge the group’s monopoly, due to both Israeli war-planning failures and the deep entrenchment of Hamas in Palestinian society.

Given the absence of ideal options and alternatives, the only way forward includes gradual political transformation, security arrangements that contain Hamas, and not giving Hamas an opportunity to engage in the kind of perpetual insurgency that a direct Israeli occupation would enable. The Biden administration and its regional allies are running out of time to insert a body other than Hamas, even in a limited capacity and scope, before the war in Gaza ends.

Ahmed Fouad Alkhatib is a nonresident senior fellow with the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs. Follow him on X: @afalkhatib.

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Apart from indifference to the US president’s political struggles, there are a number of reasons why Hamas is not jumping at Biden’s proposal. First and foremost, Hamas is an Islamist organization, and its resistance to Israel is riddled with rigid religious principles that permit no operational or strategic half-measures. Hamas’s 2017 charter characterizes Palestine—congruent with the mandate—as highly esteemed in Islam, probably due to its unique holy places. Hamas argues that Palestine is both the spirit and central cause of the ummah (Islamic community), and that Islam values standing up to aggression. In Hamas’s characterization, Israel is a colonial project imposed by force, and its settlement and Judaization of the country are illegitimate. Conversely, it sees all means to advance the struggle against Israel as legitimate. Escalating, de-escalating, or diversifying the means of the conflict are integral to the conduct of the fight. Much recent reporting reduces Hamas to its terrorist identity, rather than evaluating the group as a whole. Presenting an offer that Hamas would accept requires a full understanding of how the group perceives itself in the context of broader Islamic principles.

Second, Hamas clearly intended to alter the sclerotic state of the Palestinian pursuit of independence, much as former Egyptian President Anwar Sadat did when he initiated a military assault and subsequent diplomatic initiative to reclaim the Sinai Peninsula from Israeli occupation on October 6, 1973. With regard to Palestinian statehood, prior to the October 7, 2023 attack, the Israelis were unreceptive, the corrupt Palestinian Authority was ineffectual, and the United States was disinterested. By conducting the brutal attack, displacing Israelis, highlighting Israel’s intelligence and military shortcomings, and promoting regional instability—both directly and via its allies Hezbollah and Iran—Hamas has gained the United States’ focus, if not Israel’s, on resolving the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, although not on Hamas’s terms. As long as the Gaza war goes on, despite significant battlefield losses, Hamas is stoking Israeli anxiety by holding its hostages, displacing its civilians, engaging its troops in deadly battle—with more than three hundred Israeli troops killed in ground combat as of mid-June—and making the status quo ante more difficult to restore.

Third, Hamas leaders understood that Israel would, as it has countless other times, respond disproportionately to Hamas’s attack and inevitably lose the worldwide sympathy it gained on October 7, 2023. Apart from the latest Gaza Health Ministry numbers of some thirty-eight thousand killed and at least eighty-five thousand injured, the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, the World Health Organization, and the Palestinian government estimate that, as of June 30, Israeli attacks had damaged 80 percent of Gaza’s commercial facilities, 88 percent of school buildings, and 267 places of worship, while half of Gaza’s thirty-five hospitals were only partially functioning. Hamas’s use of civilian facilities for operational centers and weapons caches is bait to which Israel routinely rises with minimal regard for civilian casualties. So the longer the war continues, the more likely it is that Israel will continue to suffer worldwide approbation to Hamas’s and the Palestinians’ benefit, as was demonstrated by Norway, Ireland, and Spain recognizing Palestine as a state on May 22. As Yahya Sinwar, Hamas’s military leader in Gaza and the architect of the October 7 attack, recently said, “We have the Israelis right where we want them.” According to the Wall Street Journal, Sinwar also described Palestinian civilian deaths as “necessary sacrifices,” citing past high-casualty Arab independence conflicts like Algeria’s.

Fourth, Hamas understands that it has leverage over Israel due to the roughly 120 hostages it continues to hold, including those believed to be dead, and its readiness to continue the conflict. Conversely, the leverage Israel holds—its ability to kill Palestinians, both militants and civilians, and to destroy infrastructure—is a sacrifice Hamas and other groups are manifestly willing to accept. Though it desires an end to the war, Hamas is working to extract the maximum benefits it can, including denying Israel the “complete” victory Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu keeps vainly promising. Hamas leaders likely assess they can outlast the pressure on Israel’s government to secure the release of the hostages. They have set the price for the hostages’ release to be the complete end of the war, including Israeli withdrawal from Gaza and, by extension, Hamas’s continued involvement in Gazan affairs. On June 20, Israeli military spokesperson Daniel Hagari rejected the notion that completely eliminating Hamas was a realistic war aim, a statement that signaled growing tension between Netanyahu and Israel’s security establishment—a tension that Hamas has no doubt also noted. There was never a possibility of a Hamas military victory, but Sinwar and other leaders are fervently pursuing a political triumph that remains within reach.

For all these reasons, Hamas is unlikely to agree to any terms to end the Gaza conflict unless Sinwar assesses they represent the maximum “victory” he can extract. The recent Biden offer, designed to satisfy Israeli equities, continues to fall short. Sinwar spent decades in Israeli prison, learned Hebrew, studied Jewish history, and extensively examined Israeli media to better comprehend his adversary. Whether his decision-making regarding the conflict is sound or not, the Biden administration should not expect Sinwar’s acceptance of an offer Hamas assesses it can improve upon merely by holding out. Hamas views its resistance as religiously mandated, and nine months of military and political pressure have not altered its position.

Amir Asmar is an adjunct professor of Middle East issues at the National Intelligence University. He was previously a senior executive and Middle East and terrorism analyst in the US Department of Defense.

The post Hamas’s resistance doctrine is making it harder to broker a deal appeared first on Atlantic Council.

In a recent book, I examined why some wars are so difficult to end. I found that a fundamental problem causing wars to endure is belligerents’ deep distrust that the adversary will respect a war-ending peace deal. Even when a possible war-ending deal has acceptable terms, if a belligerent thinks that its adversary will break the deal the belligerent won’t take it, and the war will grind on. 

This deep lack of trust has fueled many long and bloody wars. In 1940, UK Prime Minister Winston Churchill sloughed off Germany’s peace feelers, knowing that the Nazis could not be trusted. More recently, the Syrian civil war has dragged on for more than a decade because rebel groups have no faith in the word of the Assad government. The shadow of what might happen after a peace deal is struck affects whether parties will accept a peace deal in the first place.

Of course, there is an ocean of suspicion between Moscow and Kyiv. Ukraine deeply distrusts Russia, as Russia’s 2014 seizure of Crimea, support for the Donbas insurgency, and 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine violate the 1994 Budapest Memorandum, in which Russia agreed to respect Ukraine’s borders and sovereignty. 

Worse, some possible peace terms, such as granting Russia permanent control of the economically valuable and militarily important Donbas region, would shift the balance of power in Russia’s favor. Ukraine would be especially unlikely to accept this kind of deal, because it would expand a strengthened Russia’s incentives to break the deal down the line. This was one reason why Churchill refused to negotiate, as he feared that Nazi leader Adolf Hitler would demand British colonies and naval disarmament in any peace deal, leaving Britain helpless to resist eventual German demands for total British capitulation.

Russia, judging by its official statements, distrusts Ukraine and the West. It claims that post–Cold War NATO expansion eastward broke a commitment to respect Russia’s sphere of interest. “Thus, an absolutely unacceptable threat to us was steadily being created right on our borders,” Russian President Vladimir Putin said in May 2022.

So, what options remain? How can the two sides find a way out, short of Russia grinding Ukraine to pieces, and leaving aside the unrealistic dream of Putin’s removal by a pro-peace faction in Russia?

History suggests what might and might not work. In conflicts between smaller belligerents, international peacekeepers can help ameliorate mistrust. But given Russia’s size and veto power on the United Nations Security Council, peacekeepers won’t be part of the solution. Russia cynically ignored monitors from the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe when they were sent to eastern Ukraine in the late 2010s.

The “Korea option” may also be politically challenging. Though the United States still deeply distrusted North Korea and China in 1953, Washington agreed to a ceasefire effectively ending the Korean War because South Korean security could still rest on three stout legs: an alliance between the United States and South Korea, the long-term deployment of a substantial number of US troops to the peninsula, and the US nuclear deterrent.

The Korea option for Ukraine would come with political challenges, at least in the near term. At the upcoming NATO Summit in July, the Alliance will likely outline the terms of a “bridge” to Ukraine’s accession, expanding on its 2008 soft commitment to eventual Ukrainian membership. But the politics of Ukraine actually joining NATO appear uncertain. NATO membership for the country would require the unanimous consent of allies, and one could envision Turkey, Hungary, or isolationists in the US Senate blocking this move. Indeed, it appears that in the spring of 2022, an obstacle to a possible path to ending the war emerged in part because Washington indicated that it was unwilling to consider Ukraine’s condition for a NATO-like security guarantee from the United States. 

But there is a possible way forward. Imagine that, after the war, the West were to agree not to NATO membership but rather to help Ukraine become sufficiently powerful on its own to deter future Russian attacks by providing military aid and training, as well as by helping Ukraine improve its arms industry. A recent RAND report described a variant of this approach as a “porcupine” strategy, making Ukraine a sufficiently prickly target that Russia would leave it alone.

This strategy would maintain the ability of NATO members to stay out of a future Russia-Ukraine war, making it politically palatable for the West. For Ukraine, it would represent a path to long-term security that does not rely on hopes of benign Russian intentions. And, if this promise was coupled with the sizeable carrot of Russian withdrawal from Ukrainian territory captured after the 2022 invasion, Ukraine could be brought on board.

For Russia, the principal attraction of this option would be a de facto, if not de jure, promise not to include Ukraine in NATO. Russia might be more likely to believe in an informal no-membership commitment if it received assurances that Turkey and Hungary would veto Ukrainian membership. Such a promise from Hungary is easy to imagine, given its recent efforts to block the European Union from even sending weapons to Ukraine. 

This kind of no-membership concession might help end the war in another way: It would be a fig leaf for Putin. Recent work reveals that Putin understood that the war was a mistake as early as March 2022. Today, he might remain open to finding a way to end the war, especially given that Russia has already suffered perhaps 150,000 military deaths and may run out of tanks and combat vehicles by summer 2025. However, without a fig-leaf concession, Putin risks being turned out of power by disaffected nationalist elites or military officers. Other dictators have sometimes lost power this way, as when Pakistan’s strongman leader Yahya Khan was overthrown after his country was vivisected in the 1971 Bangladesh War. Fig leaves can help buy the support of pro-war militaries for peace deals. In 1945, the United States’ agreement to leave the emperor alone was critical in helping the Japanese military accept otherwise unconditional surrender. 

Some might propose pursuing the porcupine strategy unilaterally, pouring aid into Ukraine without bothering to get Russian assent to a peace deal. However, the past year has shown that even if well-armed, Ukraine will find it difficult to recapture territory through offensive operations. The right kind of peace deal, agreed to by Russia, is the best means for Ukraine to recover important territory.

Critics would argue that this deal has something for everyone to hate: Ukraine gives up on its dream of NATO membership and perhaps de facto accepts the Russian occupation of Crimea, the West agrees to long-term military and economic aid to Ukraine, and Russia withdraws from post-2022 captured Ukrainian territory. But in politics and in business, parties are in the realm of a feasible deal when all of them find that deal to be painful.

Such a deal is becoming more possible because the war is a bloody stalemate for all sides. As the staggering costs of war continue to rise, all parties will become increasingly willing to strike a politically painful deal to end the war. Further, especially if Donald Trump does not win the November US presidential election and then withdraw US support for Ukraine, it is difficult for either Ukraine or Russia to imagine military victory anytime soon.

To reach peace, Ukraine and its Western partners must find a way to surmount mistrust. Doing so will not be easy. But to prevent tens if not hundreds of thousands more deaths, they must try.

Dan Reiter is the Samuel Candler Dobbs professor of political science at Emory University and author of the award-winning book, How Wars End (Princeton, 2009).

The post Ending the war in Ukraine requires something for everyone to hate appeared first on Atlantic Council.

While the event produced some encouraging signals and shone a light on how Russia’s invasion affects the broader international community, it did not produce any major diplomatic breakthroughs. Instead, the summit represented a small but significant step forward in what looks set to be a far longer peace process.

The absence of many leading nations from the Global South did much to weaken the summit’s potential impact, suggesting that Ukrainian diplomats still have much work to do at the bilateral level. Significantly, key participating countries including Brazil, India, South Africa, and Saudi Arabia chose not to sign the official summit communique supporting Ukraine’s territorial integrity. Since 2022, these countries have all been hesitant to back Ukraine or openly condemn Russia’s invasion.

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The event in Switzerland came during a period of intense diplomatic activity for Ukraine. On the eve of the peace summit, G7 leaders agreed to provide Ukraine with a $50 billion loan financed by interest on Russian assets that remain frozen in Europe and the US. On the sidelines of the G7 meeting, the US and Ukraine signed a landmark ten-year bilateral security agreement. During the peace summit itself, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy was also able to hold bilateral meetings with a number of leaders from Global South nations including Argentina, Chile, and Côte d’Ivoire.

Ukraine came to the summit hoping to galvanize international support for President Zelenskyy’s ten-point peace plan. In particular, Kyiv officials sought to emphasize the importance of advancing nuclear safety, protecting food security, releasing prisoners of war, and returning Ukrainian children abducted by Russia since the start of the full-scale invasion. In a broader sense, the event also aimed to keep ongoing Russian aggression against Ukraine in the international spotlight.

Ultimately, seventy-eight countries signed the final communique recognizing that respect for Ukraine’s territorial integrity and sovereignty must serve as the basis for any future peace agreement. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen sought to downplay expectations regarding the event, noting that peace could not be achieved in a single step. The summit was not a peace negotiation because Putin is not serious about ending the war, she commented. “He is insisting on capitulation. He is insisting on ceding Ukrainian territory, even territory that today is not occupied by him. He is insisting on disarming Ukraine, leaving it vulnerable to future aggression. No country would ever accept these outrageous terms,” stated von der Leyen in reference to a rival peace plan unveiled by Russian President Vladimir Putin on the eve of the Swiss summit.

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Russia did not receive an invitation to participate in the peace summit. Crucially, China also chose not to attend. US National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan suggested Putin had asked China to turn down Ukraine’s invitation. In the build-up to the event, President Zelenskyy also accused Beijing of working to discourage others from attending Ukraine’s peace initiative. Meanwhile, a number of participating countries from the Global South spoke in Switzerland of the need to involve Russia in any future peace process.

While the Kremlin’s apparent spoiling tactics failed to derail Ukraine’s peace initiative entirely, Russian influence did nevertheless loom large over the Swiss summit and is clearly still a significant factor. China’s decision not to back the event was arguably even more important, with many observers arguing that Beijing’s stance succeeded in preventing the emergence of a more global consensus on the path toward peace in Ukraine.

Nevertheless, the participation of numerous countries regarded as being on good terms with the Kremlin underlined the potential of this peace initiative, with the likes of Qatar, Hungary, and Serbia all signing the final communique. While some had hoped for a more meaningful outcome, this modest progress should be enough to convince Kyiv officials and the country’s partners that additional diplomatic efforts in this direction are worthwhile and may yet produce results.

Mercedes Sapuppo is a program assistant at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

Further reading

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Russia claims to have annexed five Ukrainian provinces but refuses to extend security red lines to these regions. This highlights the pragmatic political realities behind Putin’s talk of historic conquests, writes Peter Dickinson.

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By Hanna Hopko, Andrius Kubilius

Since 2022, Western policies of escalation management have failed to appease Putin and have only emboldened the Kremlin. If the West wants peace, it must help Ukraine win, write Hanna Hopko and Andrius Kubilius.

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The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

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The post Aboudouh quoted in The National News on Xi’s attempt to bring Macron into China’s peace efforts in the Middle East appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On Thursday, April 25, the Atlantic Council’s WIn Fellowship hosted a panel discussion on the vital role Arab women ambassadors play in shaping the field of diplomacy, both in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, and globally.

The conversation was moderated by Lynn Monzer, Deputy Director of the Atlantic Council’s WIn Fellowship and featured H.E. Sheikha Al-Zain Al-Sabah, Ambassador of the State of Kuwait to the United States of America; H.E. Hanene Tajouri Bessassi, Ambassador of the Republic of Tunisia to the United States of America; and H.E. Amal Mudallali, former Ambassador to the Permanent Mission of Lebanon to the United Nations (UN).  

Deciding on diplomacy

H.E. Sheikha Al-Zain Al-Sabah initiated the conversation by sharing insights from her background in journalism, where she encountered diverse mindsets through storytelling. This experience highlighted her natural diplomatic skills, as navigating complex systems and creating sustainable solutions in business mirrored key aspects of diplomacy. These experiences and insights logically paved the way for her career in diplomacy.

Similarly, H.E. Hanene Tajouri Bessassi transitioned from an initial aspiration to become a physician to recognizing the diplomatic field as another form of healing. In her view, diplomacy involves listening to those in distress, diagnosing societal issues, and crafting viable solutions, thus paralleling the healing processes in medicine.

Like Al-Sabah, H.E. Amal Mudallali started in journalism, with ambitions centered on reporting at the UN. After achieving this, she ventured deeper into politics, eventually serving under two Lebanese prime ministers and later as the Ambassador of Lebanon to the UN. She emphasized the critical role of male allies in politics, where men predominantly hold power but greatly benefit from women’s collaborative and problem-solving skills.

In addition to winding career paths, all three diplomats agreed on the importance of a robust support system for success in diplomacy. Bessassi thanked her parents and husband specifically for the strength, independence, and commitment necessary to work in the diplomatic field. Echoing the sentiment on support systems, Mudallali highlighted her grandmother’s empowering role during her upbringing. She also stressed the crucial need for political backing, citing the potential difficulties and injustices faced without such support. Al-Sabah, similarly, underscored the significance of a nurturing ecosystem for achieving success. For her, the focus is on contributing back to this ecosystem and the broader community, often through mentoring other women, providing support, advice, and honest guidance on their professional journeys.

Navigating the field’s challenges

Bessassi then turned to the challenges facing women in diplomacy. She noted that despite Tunisia’s rich history of influential women leaders, gender parity remains elusive. This disparity is underscored by prevailing gender stereotypes that still hinder women’s effectiveness in all fields, including diplomacy. Bessassi argued against the perception that empathy—a trait often associated with women—is a weakness. Instead, she illustrated how empathy enhances diplomatic efforts by fostering consensus and compromise, bringing more people into the fold while working toward peace and cooperation.

The underrepresentation of women in global diplomacy was further addressed by Al-Sabah, who pointed out that women make up only 21 percent of ambassadors worldwide. She emphasized the importance of improving representation and noted that the participation of women on the panel, along with other women ambassadors in the United States from Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Mauritania, represents significant progress in altering public perceptions about women in diplomacy.

Mudallali echoed these concerns with specific examples from the United Nations, where women’s representation has been backsliding; the number of women UN representatives decreased from 52 in 2020 to 46 today. She linked this trend to a global phenomenon such as Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, as countries have become more brazen in rejecting previously held norms such as equal gender representation. She also noted the decrease in women’s participation in peace negotiations. In 2020, women represented 23 percent of negotiators in active peace processes, dropping to 16 percent in 2023. Based on analysis of real-world peace processes, agreements between negotiators are much more likely to be reached when women have a strong influence on the negotiations.

Al-Sabah added that 2023 saw a 50 percent increase in war-induced violence against women, reinforcing the necessity for women’s voices in peace negotiations. This backslide in gender representation, Mudallali argued, demands urgent attention and action in line with UN Security Council Resolution 1325, which focuses on women, peace, and security.

Bessassi acknowledged these recent challenges nut also emphasized the power of collective effort among women ambassadors, which has the potential to catalyze global change. Mudallali shared this sentiment,expressing her feeling of responsibility to do everything possible to elevate women, believing that these challenges require structured, codified solutions. Al-Sabah concluded by underscoring the importance of integrating advocacy into diplomacy to empower women effectively. In Kuwait, for instance, the government established the Department of Human Rights within the country’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs in part to address women’s empowerment. Internationally, too, organizations with similar aims must work together to implement Resolution 1325 to ensure countries adhere to international principles of women’s empowerment. For young women in the MENA region and beyond, seeing women in these roles not only offers a glimpse of what is possible but also instills hope and inspiration.

The future of diplomacy

Building on the theme of hope, Al-Sabah discussed a significant shift toward civic diplomacy following Israel’s invasion of Gaza, with women taking on an increased role in this space. She highlighted the courageous efforts of journalists like Shireen Abu Akleh, Plestia Alaqad, and Hind Khoudary who have used their personal cameras and cellphones to broadcast their voices are around the world. Al-Sabah stressed the urgent need for greater protection of journalists in Gaza and around the world, who face harassment and life-threatening dangers in their line of work.

Continuing the conversation, Bessassi emphasized the increasing importance of multilateralism now more than ever in addressing global challenges. She called for consistency in the international community’s approach, as the international community’s engagement on issues like the war in Gaza must avoid “double standards” to effectively address challenges in diplomacy.

Mudallali echoed the sentiments of her colleagues, concluding the panel with a call for strong advocacy for peace. She pointed out that recent global tensions have shifted the focus from collaboration to competition. By supporting women in diplomatic roles, Mudallali argued, societies will not only lift but also enhance their prospects for achieving lasting peace.

The way forward

Over a century since the first appointment of a women ambassador in 1920, women remain severely underrepresented in the predominantly male diplomacy sector. As of 2023, women account for only 20.54 percent of ambassadors worldwide, a decrease from 23 percent in 2020. The disparity is even more pronounced in the MENA region, where women make up just 10 percent of ambassadors, the lowest regional rate globally, highlighting a significant challenge for women in MENA diplomacy.

Despite these daunting numbers in MENA, there have been some encouraging signs of progress. The United Arab Emirates, for instance, has increased its proportion of women ambassadors by 5.5 percent between 2018 and 2023, reaching 12.5 percent. Additionally, a recent Arab Barometer report has shown a marked decrease throughout the MENA region over the past decade in the belief that men are better political leaders than women, suggesting growing acceptance of women in political and diplomatic roles.

However, effectively capitalizing on these openings requires systematic and sustained support. Algeria serves as a cautionary tale where a 2011 gender quota led to increased opposition to women in political leadership due to the absence of systemic improvements or societal readiness for such changes. Conversely, Tunisia witnessed an increase in openness toward women political leadership after the implementation of a similar quota and was further bolstered by President Kais Saied’s appointment of Najla Bouden Romdhane as the first female prime minister in the MENA region. These moves demonstrate that political backing and continued support of women is a crucial component to increasing women’s representation at both the political and diplomatic levels.

In addition to national efforts, international initiatives are crucial. UN Security Council Resolution 1325, which calls for women’s equal participation in preventing violent conflicts, is particularly significant. Supporting this resolution could significantly legitimize women’s roles in conflict mediation. This is supported by data showing that peace negotiations involving women are 35 percent more likely to last for at least fifteen years. Therefore, in the midst of shifting attitudes, a global drive for greater women participation in diplomacy, and the myriad conflicts necessitating peace negotiations, reform toward gender parity in diplomacy is as pressing and timely as ever for the MENA region.

Charles Johnson is a Young Global professional in the Atlantic Council’s Middle East programs

Jun 14, 2023

The WIn Fellowship 2023-2024 cohort

Building on the success of its inaugural cohort, the Women Innovators Fellowship (WIn) is expanding to Bahrain and the UAE, in addition to Saudi Arabia, as it continues to empower more women entrepreneurs from the Middle East. The program is thrilled to announce this year’s eighty-six recipients of its 2023 WIn Fellowship. The participants will receive a year-long program of executive education, mentoring, and networking opportunities in collaboration with Georgetown McDonough School of Business and with the support of the United States embassies in the three target countries and PepsiCo.

May 3, 2024

2024 WIn Fellowship Roadshow

WIn Fellows participate in a fully sponsored trip to the United States for leadership training at Georgetown and meetings with US business and government leaders.

Feb 24, 2023

2023 WIn Fellowship Roadshow

The WIn Fellowship roadshow is led by the Atlantic Council’s empowerME Initiative in cooperation with Georgetown University’s McDonough School of Business with support from US Embassy Riyadh, UPS, and PepsiCo. The WIn Fellowship Roadshow participants, chosen from a highly competitive cohort of more than thirty applicants, receive a fully sponsored trip to the United States for leadership training at Georgetown and meetings with US business and government leaders.

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empowerME at the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East is shaping solutions to empower entrepreneurs, women, and youth and building coalitions of public and private partnerships to drive regional economic integration, prosperity, and job creation.

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In a 2012 interview with local magazine Mehrnameh, Rouhani recounted the 2004 talks with the foreign ministers of France, Germany, and the United Kingdom, and claimed that he told them that Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei “has issued a fatwa and declared it forbidden to acquire a bomb. This fatwa is more important for us than the NPT [Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty] and the additional protocol. It is more important to us than any law.”

Rouhani added that he was referencing comments made by the supreme leader ahead of Friday prayers in Tehran a week prior, when Khamenei said, “No, we aren’t thinking about nuclear weapons. I have said many times that our nuclear weapon is this nation. Our nuclear weapons are these youths. We don’t want nuclear weapons. A state that has so many young believers and this unified nation doesn’t need nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons, their production, storage, and use, each has a problem. We have also expressed our religious opinion, which is clear, and everyone knows it.”

However, Khamenei’s “religious opinion” about nuclear arms has always been a carefully crafted message concocted and repeated by him—never in writing but only in speeches—in which he has exclusively called the “use” of nuclear arms “haram” (forbidden).

The campaign of deceit was initiated when the Islamic Republic saw its survival at imminent risk. In a speech the day after the March 20, 2003 US invasion of Iraq, Khamenei said, “We don’t want a nuclear bomb. We are even opposed to having chemical weapons…These things don’t agree with our principles.”

Over the years, Khamenei and other high-ranking officials have repeated this line while Iranian scientists were busy developing “all necessary components” for the development of a nuclear weapon— and the supreme leader has consistently celebrated these scientists.

Tracking Khamenei’s comments over the past two decades demonstrates that he never issued a fatwa against building a nuclear weapon, and only tentatively and revocably spoke against the use of weapons of mass destruction.

The “fatwa”

What eventually became a staple talking point of Iranian diplomats was sold to world powers as the supreme leader’s “fatwa” prohibiting nuclear arms. In reality, it was the last paragraph of his message to the first iteration of the International Conference on Nuclear Disarmament and Non-Proliferation, which Tehran hosted in 2010.

The segment of the message marketed by the Iranian diplomatic missions as a “fatwa” reads, “We believe that adding to nuclear weapons and other types of weapons of mass destruction, such as chemical weapons and biological weapons, are a serious threat to humanity. The Iranian nation, which itself is a victim of the use of chemical weapons, feels more than other nations the danger of the production and accumulation of such weapons and is ready to put all its resources in the way of dealing with it. We consider the use of these weapons to be haram (forbidden), and the effort to protect mankind from this great disaster is everyone’s duty.”

The supreme leader’s official website includes several pages dedicated to explaining his stance on nuclear arms, with one listing all comments he has made about them. Among the eighty-five quotes, the word “haram” is used only three times and exclusively about the “use of nuclear weapons,” not their production or stockpiling. He has also twice called the “use” of weapons of mass destruction a “great sin.”

On the same page, the only quote that includes the term “fatwa” comes from a 2015 speech and reads, “We don’t want a nuclear weapon. Not because of what they say, but because of ourselves, because of our religion, because of our rational reasons. This is both our religious fatwa and our rational fatwa. Our rational fatwa is that we don’t need nuclear weapons today, tomorrow, or ever. Nuclear weapons are a source of trouble for a country like ours.”

In sharia law, all acts fall into five categories: wajib (obligatory), mustahab (recommended), mubah (neutral), makruh (disapproved), and haram (forbidden). In the case of nuclear weapons, the supreme leader clearly, and presumably intentionally, has avoided labeling the “production and storage” of nuclear arms with a religious label, leaving room for a nuclear weapons program.

In addition to beguiling world powers with a false narrative about the nonexistent fatwa, the double-speak commentary by the supreme leader gives powerful factions within the regime enough ammunition to pursue the development of a nuclear weapon.

Furthermore, a point of pride for Shia Muslims is that fatwas are not inherently permanent, and Islamic jurists can—and often do—reinterpret the scripture “in accord with the needs of time.” Throughout the history of political Islam, Shia ayatollahs have used fatwas as a political tool against adversaries. For example, in the 1890s, Ayatollah Mirza Shirazi issued a fatwa during nationwide protests after the ruling Qajar Dynasty granted a British merchant a monopoly on the growth, sale, and export of tobacco in Iran. This forced the king to revoke the monopoly; after it served its political purpose, the fatwa was also removed.

A “cornered cat”

Iranian officials have consistently warned that, if push comes to shove, they might openly seek nuclear weapons.

In 2021, then Intelligence Minister Mahmoud Alavi told state television, “The Supreme Leader has explicitly said in his fatwa that nuclear weapons are against sharia law and the Islamic Republic sees them as religiously forbidden and does not pursue them. But a cornered cat may behave differently from when the cat is free. And if [Western states] push Iran in that direction, then it’s no longer Iran’s fault.”

In June 2023, Khamenei warned world powers that they “cannot stop” his regime if it desires to build nuclear weapons—a threat echoed by Iran’s former nuclear chief, Ali Akbar Salehi. In February, Salehi boasted that the regime has “all components” necessary for building a bomb.

With heightened tensions in the Middle East, and amid the Islamic Republic’s four-decade war with Israel creeping out of the shadows and into the open, the clerical establishment has been testing the waters for openly announcing its nuclear aspirations.

In a March speech at a Quran exhibition, Hojatolislam Mohammad Fuker Meibodi said that the Muslim holy book orders believers to amass weapons that would “sow fear in the heart of the enemies.” He argued that weapons of the past—namely swords and cannons—will not achieve that aim and “therefore, maybe we should acquire nuclear weapons.”

Iranian nuclear scientist Mahmoud Reza Aghamiri—who has ties to the supreme leader’s office and currently serves as dean of Shahid Beheshti University—said on state television on April 7 that the supreme leader “can tomorrow change his stance” on building nuclear weapons and that his regime “has the capability” to make the leap because building the bomb is “not complicated.”

Aghamiri is among the top Iranian officials who have publicly endorsed the development of a nuclear bomb. In 2022, he said that Tehran can speed up uranium enrichment to 99 percent, build a nuclear warhead, and use it as both “deterrence” and a bargaining chip in interactions with the West “like North Korea,” which, according to him, gets away with “bullying” the world.

Such rhetoric has only intensified in Iran following the April 13 attack against Israel in retaliation for the April 1 killing of Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) commanders in Syria. Anticipating a response from Israel, which eventually arrived on April 19, Iranian officials warned against the targeting of nuclear facilities in the country.

On April 18, Ahmad Haghtalab, the IRGC commander in charge of nuclear security, said, “If the false Zionist regime decides to exploit the threat of attacking our country’s nuclear sites to pressure Iran, revision of Islamic Republic’s nuclear policies and doctrine and dropping of previously announced considerations in possible and perceivable.” Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting reported his comments, sharing a video of him pronouncing the nuclear threat.

Javan, an influential daily close to the IRGC, wrote on the same day that it was the “first time a senior IRGC official” issued such a threat, and noted that state media were forcefully highlighting the comments, signaling “coordination with top decision-making bodies.”

The daily argued that every state’s primary goal is “survival no matter the cost” and that, before launching the April 13 attack against the “nuclear armed” Israel, Tehran had “prepared itself for engagement at highest level or at least is seeking to establish a new equilibrium.”

Javan warned “Israel to take the warning serious” because “all technical hurdles have been removed and with a wave of the hand from Imam Khamenei” and the regime “can” build a nuclear bomb.

Pro-reform daily Hammihan wrote on April 20 that the Islamic Republic’s attack against Israel from Iranian soil has “created a new norm of confrontation” between the two nations. According to the daily, in this new context, proxy forces “cannot provide the deterrence Iran needs.” The daily argued that if “Iran is pushed towards acquiring a nuclear weapon or adopting nuclear ambiguity, it would benefit from increased deterrence.”

On April 22, a member of the National Security Commission of the parliament, Javad Karimi Ghodousi, wrote on X (formerly Twitter), “If [supreme leader] issues permission, we would be a week away from testing the first [nuclear bomb].”

As an officer of the IRGC, Ghodousi has high security clearance. Through his key position in the parliament, he is privy to military decisions made at the top of the food chain. This attracted much attention when, ahead of the April 13 strike against Israel, he tweeted that the attack was happening “in a matter of hours.”

In an apparent effort to soften heightened rhetoric, on April 22, the spokesperson of the Iranian Foreign Ministry, Naser Kanani said, “Nuclear weapons have no place in Iran’s defense and military strategy.”

Iran-based security analyst Alireza Taghavinia, a frequent guest of state television, reacted to the mixed signals out of Tehran, writing on X, “General Haghtalab has fulfilled his assigned duty. [MP] Karimi Qudousi has sent the necessary pulse. The Foreign Ministry’s spokesperson has also fulfilled his inherent duty. Politics has complexities and subtleties that not everyone can understand.”

Ghodousi doubled down on the comments on April 23, in a video saying that the International Atomic Energy Agency is aware that the Islamic Republic “needs half a day or maximum a week to build a nuclear warhead.”

The nuclear threat has been echoed by people privy to the supreme leader’s thinking as well. On May 9, Khamenei’s top foreign policy advisor Kamal Kharrazi warned that if Israel threatens the existence of the Islamic Republic, Tehran will change its nuclear doctrine. “We have no decision to build a nuclear bomb but should Iran’s existence be threatened, there will have no choice but to change our military doctrine,” Kharrazi told Al Jazeera Mubasher.

A Persian proverb advises that, before shouting an insult, it is best to first murmur it to test the waters. The crescendoing chorus of Iranian officials, from IRGC generals to members of parliament to scientists advocating for the development of a nuclear weapon as “deterrent” is another sign of how a nuclear weapons program may emerge from the shadows. Unsurprisingly, all Iranian officials signaling this possible change in policy have pointed to the so-called “fatwa” and its impermanent nature—another sign of the move being orchestrated by the upper echelons of the clerical establishment.

Eyeing tectonic shifts in global power dynamics, the eighty-five-year-old Khamenei, who has unchecked powers and delusions about divine intervention on his behalf, is besieged by crises at every corner. In response, he appears to be shedding his decades-old habit of being a cautious gambler. Now a “cornered cat,” the ailing ayatollah, in a rush to solidify his legacy, is more likely than ever to embark on a path toward a nuclear weapon to ensure the survival of the Islamic Republic.

Khosro Sayeh Isfahani is an advocate, journalist, and Internet researcher with years of experience working in Iran, including work related to the LGBTQI community. 

The post The nuclear fatwa that wasn’t—how Iran sold the world a false narrative appeared first on Atlantic Council.

“They’ve reduced us to the way the world wants to see us,” one of my Gazan companions comments to me. “Miserable, begging, and in tents.”

This is madness, I think to myself, staring out the car window. We’re barely moving every few minutes through this crush of people, donkey carts, and aid trucks. Ambulance sirens wail, drones buzz above head, and people yell and shout.

It’s the beginning of April, six months into the Gaza war. Rafah’s population has swelled from around 275,000 to, by some estimates, 1.4 million as Gazans were forced to flee their homes in other parts of the strip.

I lock eyes with those of a mother, her infant passed out on her shoulder. She gives me a weak smile. I see two teenage girls hanging off the back of a donkey cart, giggling at each other, and I am relieved—relieved that I caught that moment in the middle of this sea of human sorrow. People look like ghosts but are haunted by all those they have lost.

It’s nearing the end of the holy month of Ramadan, during which Muslims around the world fast from sunrise to sundown. Iftar meals traditionally bring families and friends together to break their fast.

All I can think about is the impending Rafah invasion, which Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has said he has set a date for. The possible invasion has been the largest bone of contention between Israel and its long-standing ally, the United States, which has been “urging” Israel not to proceed. It’s an alliance that no one here can understand. How can the United States continue to support and fund this?

I imagine a bomb falling on these souls, and a part of me wonders in horror if I’m just staring at the already condemned. My heart starts pounding when we’re stuck behind an ambulance—as ambulances have been targeted by the Israel Defense Forces (IDF).

There are no proper toilets, showers, or sanitation, and there is no proper access to clean water. I drive past a cluster of people—young and old—surrounding a water truck, carrying beaten-up gallon bottles, pots, and whatever they have managed to scrounge to fill up with water.

Some stalls in the street sell produce from aid parcels. I’ve seen this in other war zones as well. A family that needs baby powder will barter the lentils and canned beans from their food parcel. They don’t have a choice because their babies need diapers, women need sanitary pads, and people will scrimp on any volume of food to be able to supplement a meal with a couple of wilted vegetables. They don’t have money, and there is no way to make money, so they barter what they are given for a more pressing need.

There is neither enough aid getting through nor enough commercial trucks, and as a result, what is available on the market is grossly overpriced. As of April 12, according to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), around 20,500 trucks have made it into Gaza during the last six months. Pre-October 7, 2023, Gaza saw around 500 trucks a day enter, which means that Gazans needed roughly 90,000 trucks over the past six months.

Addressing this level of desperation is about so much more than just counting trucks that have made it across the border. Aid must get to a warehouse and then move to the needy population.

Humanitarian aid moves through a warzone in what’s known as “deconfliction,” whereby warring parties are informed of and, in theory, agree to specific routes and locations. It’s a process that has never really worked in this wretched battlespace. Convoys are regularly denied movement requests by the Israeli side, and even when those requests are granted, any movement is fraught with dangers.

The starkest and most recent reminder of that is the April 1 Israeli airstrike on a convoy from the World Central Kitchen (WCK), an organization that I would argue had the best lines of communication to the Israeli side, the best “deconfliction.” WCK has since suspended its operations, as did a handful of other organizations.

Two days after the WCK hit, I arrived in the Gaza Strip on a humanitarian mission for my charity, the International Network for Aid, Relief & Assistance (INARA). Fellow humanitarian workers and volunteers I chatted with on the way in were all anxious—myself included. If WCK could lose people like this, what did it mean for the rest of us?

INARA works with thirteen informal shelters and has a Gazan team. We discussed pausing our work and whether the team felt safe enough to continue.

“We can be hit at any time. It’s always a risk,” Mona, one of our lead team members, whose full name is being withheld for safety reasons, explains to me. “If we don’t do this for our people, our people’s children, then who will? We have to stay strong. We have to keep going.”

Our team arrives at one of the shelters we work with north of Rafah. The children swarm around Mona; she’s a familiar face here, and they know that this Gazan woman in her thirties brings a break from their monotonous existence. They all clamor to help her set up the speakers, hula-hoops, balls, and other games. I play and dance with the children. I even smile and laugh, but my heart breaks into a million pieces.

That evening, at the breaking of the fast meal known as iftar, we hand out hot meals INARA purchased from a local makeshift community kitchen set out of a former car repair shop. We splurged to provide Palestinian chicken mandi, a specially spiced dish that is cooked for hours in a pit underground. It’s a taste of the past, before October 7, a time when parents could afford to feed their children something like chicken. For months, one could rarely find chicken or meat on the market in Gaza. Over the last few weeks, supply has increased, but the vast majority of Gazans, with no income, still cannot afford it.

“Thank you. We used to get hot meals from WCK, but it’s been a few days, and nothing has arrived,” one of the older men says to me.

A few weeks ago, we managed to find solar panels locally and install them at one shelter. Now, children can play at night and go to the toilet—two for two hundred people—without being as afraid as they were before. There is no electricity in Gaza, and generator fuel is astronomically priced. Solar panels are a solid option, but trucks carrying them have been rejected entry since the war began.

A woman comes to plead with me, her daughter in tow: “We are thankful, but please, can you get her out? She had a scholarship to study in Turkey.”

Another mother begs, “Please help us! What has this government [Hamas] done for us? I don’t care; they just need to end this.”

But I can’t get them out, and I can’t end this. What I can do just feels so small, and my heart aches for every single one of them.

That night, I crashed at Mona’s place with her family. No one moves at night; it’s too risky, with Israel’s reported use of artificial intelligence to determine targets and the seeming randomness of what is being hit. Her elderly mother asks if I think the Rafah invasion will happen and where they are supposed to go. I don’t know how to answer that. She asks when I think it will end. I don’t know how to answer that, either.

“Stay with us,” Mona’s mother jokes. An explosion shakes the windows, drones buzz overhead, and she grips the armchair. I notice that her hands are trembling.

Mona and I “girl talk” in her room. I’m in a pair of borrowed sparkly pink pajamas, and she’s telling me about how, war or no war, she must be elegant when she goes out. Mona shows me some of her sister’s clothes that she wears all the time to feel closer to her.

Mona’s sister managed to get out to Egypt along with her young children early on in this war. She gave me a couple of bags of medicine, dried fruit, and other goodies to carry into Gaza for her family inside. The family wants to share what they have just received. I gently refuse, saying there is plenty for me when I go home, that I’m not hungry. But this level of generosity just hurts the soul.

If only the rest of the world could see this level of kindheartedness—could just be here in this moment, I think to myself. I wonder if I were subjected to such circumstances, would I be able to hold on to my humanity like this?

Just as I am about to fall asleep, another explosion jolts me off my mattress. I am here but don’t understand how anyone copes with this. This constant web of anxiety that settles in your chest. 

The next morning, Mona and I head to Mawasi, the southernmost part of Gaza’s beachfront. Here, families used to picnic, and children screamed and played. We drive past Mona’s favorite fish restaurant, where she used to walk and work out with friends.

“I can’t believe what I am seeing,” she turns to me. “I just can’t believe this. This can’t be real.”

We meet up with two doctors to set up medical points and address some of the basic medical needs of the population. Gaza’s medical infrastructure has been decimated; hospitals cannot handle the influx of the injured, never mind the ill. There is a massive spread of communicable diseases, from diarrhea to hepatitis A, and there are infected wounds. There is someone who needs medical attention in just about every tent.

With each step in one tent, my foot sends a swarm of flies in the air. A mother shoves her listless baby at one of the doctors accompanying us. He’s severely malnourished.

Mothers are not getting enough food and nutrients to produce breast milk, there isn’t enough baby formula to supplement, and finding clean water to mix it with is yet another challenge.

United Nations agencies have warned of the risk of famine since December 2023. In northern Gaza, where the humanitarian situation is significantly more catastrophic, more than two dozen children are reported to have died from malnutrition and dehydration.

We talk about the need for hygiene kits and sanitary reusable underwear, and the need to distribute those items at Rafah and Mawasi. We try to plan around the unknowns: whether Rafah will be bombed, where everyone will go, what will happen to all the aid warehouses, and what access people will have to aid if Rafah is invaded.

It’s utterly overwhelming. The sort of overwhelming that twists your guts and sits in your chest. Later that day, a mother—hearing that we work on mental health with children—comes up, grabbing my arm.

“Please, my son, every night he screams and convulses,” she tells me. “It started when he saw his sister’s head blown off in an explosion that hit our house.”

My mouth dries. I stare at this mother talking about her son and her daughter’s awful death. Her voice is even-keeled as if it was just a story she was telling nonchalantly. I wonder if it’s because she’s been through so much that she’s lost all ability to process it. But then again, how does one process that?

“May she rest in peace, may God give you strength,” I say, my voice a whisper, barely able to form the words. 

Arwa Damon is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East and president and founder of the International Network for Aid, Relief, and Assistance (INARA), a nonprofit organization that focuses on building a network of logistical support and medical care to help children who need life-saving or life-altering medical treatment in war-torn nations.

The post Dispatch from Gaza: ‘My son, every night he screams and convulses’ appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The Gaza war only added more stress on the Jordanian government. The Hashemite Kingdom witnessed a significant drop in tourism during the fall of 2023, further damaging a weak economy. Given that approximately 50–60 percent of the Hashemite Kingdom’s population—including Queen Rania—is of Palestinian origin, it is no surprise that Jordanians voiced their opposition to Israel’s military campaign in Gaza. A University of Jordan poll found that 66 percent of Jordanians supported the October 7, 2023, Hamas assault that killed about 1,200 Israelis. As the Gaza death toll spiked, Jordanians hit the streets to highlight their outrage. On October 20, 2023, Reuters reported that thousands of Jordanians chanted in Amman, “Oh Hamas, hit them with Qassam rockets…bring the suicide bombers to Tel Aviv.”

Jordanian authorities were not pleased with the large protests. Amnesty International noted that at least one thousand people were arrested in Amman during pro-Palestinian demonstrations in October and November 2023. Jordanian security forces said some of those arrested during the protests engaged in arson. At the same time, activists cited public criticism of the Hashemite Kingdom’s stance on Gaza as the genuine reason for the detentions. After Jordanian authorities cracked down on 2020 demonstrations in support of teachers’ pay, it was no surprise that the government felt certain protests about Gaza were also threatening.  

Public opinion pushes boundaries

Even as security forces detained activists in Amman, the royal family and Jordanian government understood the need to better align themselves with public opinion by intensifying their criticism of Israel. Queen Rania has given numerous interviews in which she assailed Western leaders for not condemning Israel’s killing of Palestinian civilians. Abdullah took the lead in voicing opposition to cutting funds for the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA). The king also participated in a February military airdrop of medical supplies to Gaza. Donning a military uniform, the Hashemite leader flew in a Jordanian Air Force helicopter and helped provide humanitarian goods for the besieged enclave. Jordan later collaborated with the US military to drop food packages to Gazans.

On November 1, 2023, Jordan withdrew its ambassador from Tel Aviv and instructed the Israeli ambassador to Amman not to return until the Gaza war ended. Then on November 16, 2023, after thousands of Palestinians had been killed in Gaza, Foreign Minister Ayman Safadi announced that the Hashemite Kingdom would not proceed with a water-for-energy deal with Israel and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). The country’s top diplomat insisted that Israel had no right to self-defense as an occupying power.  

In response, the Israeli foreign ministry expressed regret for the Hashemite Kingdom’s “inflammatory” remarks but emphasized that the neighboring countries’ ties are of “strategic importance.” That very month, Jordanian Prime Minister Bisher Khasawneh also warned that any Israeli attempt to transfer Palestinians in the West Bank to Jordan would be considered a “declaration of war.” Yet, some six months later, Jordan has avoided military clashes with Israel, in contrast to neighboring Lebanon and Syria.

Still, it’s worth noting that Jordanian-Israeli ties were chilly even before the Gaza war.

In January 2023, the Jordanian foreign ministry repeatedly summoned Israel’s ambassador to Amman for reprimands over Benjamin Netanyahu’s government policy at the al-Aqsa Mosque compound. When Netanyahu was out of office, Amman still refused to participate in the “Negev Summit,” a 2022 meeting between Israel, Egypt, Bahrain, Morocco, and the UAE. From 2000–2005, Jordan also left its ambassador post in Tel Aviv empty to protest Israeli military operations during the Second Intifada. Despite numerous instances of pushback since October 7, 2023, this was not enough for the Jordanian public.

Protestors deplore Jordan’s balancing act

Around six months into the war, many Jordanians have not been satisfied with their government’s response to the Gaza war. During late March, thousands of Jordanians demonstrated in Amman on a nightly basis, with some trying to storm the Israeli embassy. “Our protests will continue until the war on Gaza comes to an end,” asserted Jordanian activist Mohammed al-Abssi. The large resurgence of protestors demonstrated the increased disconnect between the public and government officials. Activists in Amman held signs with pictures of Hamas military spokesman Abu Obaida, even as Abdullah expelled Hamas officials from the kingdom after assuming power, with authorities later accusing the Palestinian militant group of illegally smuggling weapons into Jordanian territory.

Despite this pressure, King Abdullah has declined to take more drastic steps. While activists have demanded that Jordan sever all ties with Israel, the Hashemite leader refused to cancel the landmark 1994 peace treaty and has proceeded with the multibillion-dollar gas deal with Israel signed in 2016. In March, Jerusalem-based Kan 11 television reported that the Hashemite Kingdom asked Israel to extend a water agreement for an additional year as Amman continues to suffer from severe water shortages. The kingdom has also forcibly dispersed hundreds of Jordanians trying to march along the country’s border with the West Bank.

The king’s measured stance on the Gaza conflict also extended into Amman’s ties with Washington. In a rare move, the Jordanian government canceled President Joe Biden’s planned October 18, 2023, meeting in Amman, with Safadi saying that such a summit would be ill-advised while the United States would not agree to end the Gaza war. Nonetheless, Abdullah proceeded with a February visit to Washington even as the Biden administration continued to support Israel’s military campaign. The Hashemite monarch was the first Arab leader to sit with Biden at the White House after the Gaza war erupted and press for an immediate ceasefire. Abdullah understood that refusing to meet the US president was not a sustainable policy, and instead felt it would be more effective to promote a pro-Palestinian viewpoint directly with Israel’s top ally. While Jordanian protestors criticized the United States for its support of Israel, Washington pushed to keep bilateral ties with Amman on track. Biden praised the Hashemite leader for his “critical leadership” in increasing Gaza aid and pledged “unwavering” US support for Jordan.

Jordan’s delicate balancing act in response to the Gaza war stems from its need to maintain cordial ties with the United States. As Washington provides the cash-strapped Jordan with about $1.5 billion in annual aid, the Biden administration remains the Hashemite Kingdom’s largest donor. If Abdullah were to annul his peace accord with Israel as some protestors demand, he would likely face congressional threats of a cut in the kingdom’s massive annual assistance package. Washington has already demonstrated its willingness to suspend aid to UNRWA and the Palestinian Authority. Therefore, Jordan would be unwise to ignore the precedent by pro-Israel US lawmakers and risk losing such critical bilateral assistance.

Abdullah’s relatively moderate response to the Gaza war has only reinforced his importance to Washington. Whether Jordan’s cooperation on airdrops of Gaza humanitarian aid or its participation in the anti-Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) coalition, US officials can count on Amman to be a reliable partner during regional crises. By rebuffing protestors’ calls to support Hamas, the king demonstrated his willingness to sacrifice domestic popularity to cement his alliance with the Biden administration. Such flexibility helps ensure that Abdullah will continue to be a regular White House visitor, far beyond the current Middle East conflict.

Aaron Magid is the host of the podcast, On Jordan. A former Amman-based journalist, his articles on the Hashemite Kingdom have appeared in Foreign Affairs, Foreign Policy, and Al-Monitor. Follow him on X: @AaronMagid.

The post Jordan was already walking a tightrope. Then the Gaza war happened. appeared first on Atlantic Council.

With the Ukraine war underscoring security risks in the Western Balkans, the United Kingdom has doubled down on its commitment to the region’s stability. In this episode of #BalkansDebrief, Nonresident Senior Fellow Ilva Tare speaks with Lord Stuart Peach, the UK’s Special Envoy for the region.

Tare asks Lord Peach about the reasons for optimism and pessimism in the region. How do the old issues such as nationalism, Russian influence, and a media landscape rife with misinformation impact the lives of citizens, particularly the younger generation? Why is the UK prioritizing reconciliation efforts in the Balkans?

What are the UK’s expectations for the ongoing dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia? What concrete steps should the President of Serbia Aleksandar Vučić and Prime Minister of Kosovo Albin Kurti take to achieve progress? How concerned is the UK about calls for secession of the Republika Srpska by Milorad Dodik? Why are free and fair elections crucial for the EU aspirations of the Western Balkan countries?

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Ilva Tare

Resident Senior Fellow

Europe Center

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The Europe Center promotes leadership, strategies, and analysis to ensure a strong, ambitious, and forward-looking transatlantic relationship.

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The post #BalkansDebrief – Why is the UK focused on reconciliation in the Balkans? | A debrief with Lord Stuart Peach appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On March 18, 2024, the Atlantic Council’s Syria Project, the Middle East Institute’s Syria Program, the European Institute of Peace, and Madaniya Civil Society Network launched the Syria Strategy, an intensive process of engagement with subject matter experts and policymakers in the United States, Europe, and the Middle East to develop a holistic strategy to sustainably resolve the Syrian crisis. This process will incorporate Syrian experts, Syrian civil society, and Syrian stakeholders at every step. The launch event coincided with the anniversary of the Syrian uprising and included three panels, featuring Special Envoys for Syria from three governments, notable scholars working on the country, and the Syria Strategy project leadership.

Welcome remarks 

William Wechsler, senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center & Middle East Programs, kicked off the event with the opening remarks, noting that Syria does not receive enough attention given the country’s importance to the region and the continued suffering under President Bashar al-Assad’s regime. The partnership between the Atlantic Council, Middle East Institute, European Institute of Peace, and Madaniya therefore aims to produce a realistic, implementable strategy for the United States and its allies to address the country’s current crises, explained Wechsler. 

Ayman Asfari, chairman of Madaniya Civil Society Network, then discussed the network’s goals and the continued need for strategic engagement to promote a sustainable solution to Syria’s challenges. Madaniya seeks to harness the vibrant civil society developed during the initial uprising in 2011 by providing a platform for over 200 Syrian civil society organizations to reclaim political agency over the Syrian civic space, noted Asfari. In this way, he said, Syrian civil society is at the forefront of mitigating the impacts of the protracted conflict. The United States and its European partners must work with Syrians to pave the way for principled policy solutions along the lines of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2254, he added. 

Barbara Leaf, Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern Affairs at the US Department of State, concluded the opening remarks with a recorded address. The situation in Syria is deteriorating, as deadly bombardment campaigns continue in the country’s north, human rights abuses continue, and over 155,000 people remain arbitrarily detained or forcibly disappeared, according to Leaf. “With the war in Gaza, [the United States] is committed to ensuring Syria itself does not get pulled into a regional conflict that only increases human suffering,” Leaf said. Furthermore, “despite Russian and regime intransigence,” the United States still supports political solution along the lines of UNSCR 2254 as well as the work of the Constitutional Committee to achieve these goals for Syria. However, the Assistant secretary warned that the Arab League’s decision to normalize relations with Syria threatens any potential progress, as the United States hopes to use normalization as an incentive for credible steps toward protecting human rights and improving humanitarian conditions in the country. “The United States remains committed to expanding humanitarian access, ensuring the enduring defeat of ISIS, and promoting accountability for the Assad regime’s human rights abuses.” Leaf also emphasized that initiatives like the Syria Strategy Project are essential to these goals, informing the administration’s decision-making and policy direction while searching for a path toward peace. 

Panel one: High-level panel discussion 

The first panel focused on specific governmental approaches to engaging with Bashar al-Assad’s regime in pursuit of political and humanitarian solutions to Syria’s current crises. Elizabeth Hagedorn, State Department correspondent for Al-Monitor, moderated the discussion between Ethan Goldrich, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern Affairs with the US Department of State; Brigitte Curmi, Special Envoy for Syria with the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs; and Stefan Schneck, Special Envoy for Syria with the German Federal Foreign Office. 

A transactional approach to peace 

Goldrich began the conversation by discussing the status quo in Syria’s political landscape as well as the importance of a unified approach to pressuring the Assad regime to the negotiating table. Currently, the regime is looking to rehabilitate its image and normalize relations with Arab neighbors without engaging in any meaningful reform. Indeed, the Arab League’s decision to normalize with Syria complicates efforts to force concessions from Damascus, he stated. However, he explained that the United States remains committed to working with partners like France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the European Union to hold Assad’s regime accountable while reaching a path toward peace and stability. 

Curmi emphasized that this approach must include concrete steps toward reform in line with UNSCR 2254. She stressed the importance of directing the regime toward meaningful reform to ensure the international community’s ability to solve Syria’s political crisis. Schneck agreed on these points, adding that internal support for the regime is very weak, forcing Assad to rely on untrustworthy partners like Iran and Russia. The international community must be prepared for a sudden change to the status quo and any accompanying opportunity to enable political reform in Syria. 

While a sudden shift in events is always possible given Syria’s volatile history, a slower process toward political reform is much more likely. Goldrich explained that the United States has placed stock in such an approach, designing flexible sanctions and executive orders to accommodate any progress the Syrian government makes in addressing concerns over human rights abuses. Curmi and Schneck likewise noted that French and German opposition to the regime was not purely ideological. A step-for-step approach has been on the table for years, but substantive change will only come about after Syria legitimately alters its behavior, they concluded. Such changes are unfortunately less likely after the recent rapprochement between Syria and the Arab League. 

Roadblocks to reform 

Goldrich also pointed to Russian behavior as a challenge in making progress in Syria. Over the past two years, Russia has prevented the Constitutional Committee, which aims to make progress toward UNSCR 2254, from convening. Therefore, according to Schneck, the issue is not the peace process itself but rather the actors’ unwillingness to enter the negotiations. Curmi said this behavior should not discourage the parties from advocating for greater efforts to connect Syrians in different regions of the country as well as in the diaspora. 

While not a perfect solution, the panelists agreed that pursuing UNSCR 2254 is a better approach to improving the current humanitarian situation in Syria than normalization. Arab states opting to normalize relations have benefited little from the decision, and the situation has encouraged the Syrian government to maintain its strategy of extracting concessions while offering none in return, they added. 

Sanctions and humanitarian aid 

The panelists aligned on the need to maintain sanctions. They acknowledged that their sanctions programs are having negative effects on the people of Syria and reiterated the need for measures targeting only the regime and its enablers. The envoys affirmed that sanctions must avoid hampering humanitarian efforts. However, the delegates stressed that the regime will not likely change its treatment of Syrians without outside pressure. Furthermore, the regime’s frequent complaints about Western sanctions demonstrate that the measures are having an effect, explained the speakers.  

On humanitarian aid, the panelists did diverge slightly in their approaches to the crisis. According to UN estimates, 16.7 million people in Syria require humanitarian aid, due to both the Syrian civil war and the devastating earthquake that hit northwestern Syria in 2023. Goldrich highlighted the more than $1 billion in aid delivered to the region in response to the earthquake, in addition to the $16.8 billion spent by the United States since the onset of the political crisis. He also invoked the Office of Foreign Assets Control’s Syria General License 22, which authorized large amounts of aid to be delivered to liberated and non-regime-controlled areas of Syria, concomitantly bringing American investment to the region. 

Curmi noted a difference between the French and American approaches responding to Goldrich’s last point. France has a fixed annual budget for Syria, and this funding goes toward work in all areas of the country in contrast to the US focus on non-regime areas. Curmi explained that this approach is to ensure Syrians do not suffer unnecessarily for Assad’s actions. Similarly, Schneck affirmed the need to continue early recovery aid to lay the groundwork for sustainable solutions in the region. 

Panel two: 13 years of conflict: A regional and international perspective

The second panel contextualized the Syrian situation amid regional and global developments and explored why the crisis remains relevant today. Mona Yacoubian, Vice President of the Middle East and North Africa Center at the United States Institute of Peace, moderated the discussion between Natasha Hall, Senior Fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies; Brian Katulis, Senior Fellow at the Middle East Institute;and Vali Nasr, Nonresident Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council.

“A festering wound”

Hall led off by observing that Syria is routinely neglected by the international community at its own peril. She compared the crisis in the country to a festering wound that can become septic at any time, and stressed negative developments there rarely remain within Syrian borders. President Bashar al-Assad benefits from this chaos by perpetuating the narrative that he is the only one who can solve the problems at hand—problems for which he is also responsible. The regime now utilizes humanitarian aid and refugees as policy levers to negotiate with its neighbors and the West, all while collecting billions of dollars each year through the Captagon trade, according to the panelist. Hall asserted that Assad has created a successful playbook for other authoritarians, who have adopted the model of securing a great power protector and then shattering norms with impunity. The United States remains staunch in its use of aid and sanctions in lieu of a more robust strategy for addressing the regime. The situation remains volatile, but Washington should not miss its current chance to provide preventative care to the wound, she added.

Nasr followed by explaining Iran’s evolving role in the crisis and how the effects of the war in Gaza are reverberating in Syria. He affirmed that Iran continues to play a central role in the country’s set of interrelated conflicts and that Iranian involvement in the wider region also elevates Syria’s importance. Beyond protecting Assad, Tehran understands that Syria is an additional front to pressure the United States and Israel. Iran and Hezbollah have moved to fill the vacuum left by Russia as it focuses on Ukraine, and by gaining a foothold in Latakia they can now project influence into the Mediterranean, according to him. Nasr also highlighted that the risk of an Israeli-Iranian escalation would rise if Tehran’s succeeded in its efforts to dislodge the United States. Syria is also a theater for US-Turkey and US-Russia confrontations; the country is more integrated into global issues than is generally acknowledged. Consequently, Washington requires a strategy for navigating its engagement in Syria and preventing the country from becoming the epicenter of a regional war, he explained.

Katulis then spoke on the evolution of geostrategic threats surrounding Syria. He listed several global impacts that originated from the Syrian conflict: authoritarian leaders mimicking tactics used by the Assad regime; worsening violence against civilians in other conflicts; the weaponization of refugees; rampant use of disinformation; and growing disillusionment with proactive foreign policy among elements of the American left and right. Katulis noted that the current project pushes back on the indifference toward Syria that has settled over some policy circles, as well as the notion that the United States cannot constructively shape the situation any longer. He expressed hope that the project will generate new ideas to turn negative trends in a new direction.

Correcting course and deepening engagement

Hall then gave her thoughts on how policymakers and scholars in Washington can reframe discussions about Syria and develop new solutions. The United States and its partners are currently “treading water” rather than acting proactively and missing opportunities to negotiate with individual actors while the wider conflict is gridlocked. Other neglected areas that could benefit from more engagement include promoting resilience in non-regime areas and mitigating water insecurity in the northeast. Hall concluded by spotlighting regional efforts to advance negotiations on Gaza and predicted that a similarly unified attempt at step-for-step with Syria could bring about progress.

Nasr underscored the need for Washington to identify its interests in Syria and pinpoint why the outcome of the war matters; a pivot toward a new mission could redefine the US footprint there altogether. Meanwhile, if the United States continues to neglect the situation it could very well be pulled back in the future. Katulis suggested a more diplomacy-forward US strategy for the crisis to ameliorate regional frustration at American inaction. Deeper discussions are especially needed with countries bordering Syria. He cited US leadership on the Ukraine conflict as an example of how attentive engagement can build coalitions.

Hall agreed with her co-panelists on the need for more multilateral cooperation on Syria policy, pointing to energy and water as issues where the United States and its partners could do more. Nasr felt that the disproportionate US effort spent countering Iranian influence in Syria is evidence of a disconnect between Washington’s stated aims in countering ISIS and its priorities on the ground. He reiterated that there is a legitimate argument for an American presence in the Middle East but that it must be properly translated into action. Katulis added that as think tank analysts approach Syria with a fresh perspective, even touchy topics regime change or other forms of power transition should be reevaluated.

Panel three: The Syria Strategy: Outlining the way forward

The final panel served as an introduction to the mission and goals of the Syria Strategy Project. Sawsan Abou Zainedin, CEO of Madaniya Civil Society Network, moderated the conversation between Qutaiba Idlbi, Director of the Syria Project at Atlantic Council; Charles Lister, Director of the Syria and Counter-Terrorism Programs at the Middle East Institute; and Marie Forestier, Senior Advisor at the European Institute of Peace.

Building a new strategy

Idlbi recounted how the project arose from Western, regional, and Syrian stakeholders’ frequent inquiries about the US strategy for Syria, and a pervasive sentiment among American policymakers that they had tried everything they could. The Syria Strategy project seeks to form a realistic and implementable strategy to both improve conditions in Syria in the short term and shape a sustainable solution to the crisis in line with UNSCR 2254. He went on to explain how the project will bring together experts, policymakers, and stakeholders to work on a series of subproblems in hopes of producing a workable, holistic proposal by March 2025. Another goal is for the project to function as a sounding board for policymakers to test ideas and offer their own feedback, he explained.

Lister addressed the project’s emphasis on Washington as its intended audience. American buy-in is needed in order to make progress on the Syrian crisis; US involvement galvanizes European support and is a remedy to Arab states’ frustration with their own engagement efforts. There is currently no shortage of ideas on Syria, but the actors proposing them lack unity of purpose, or at least the perception of unity, according to him. Lister also explained that Syrian experts and activists form the core of the Syria Strategy and Washington will be just one of many governments involved in the project. The process is designed to be highly consultative and responsive to feedback, creating a “living” project.

Forestier underscored the need for European involvement as well. The project is necessarily transatlantic, as while US leadership on Syria remains critical, Washington cannot be expected to lead alone. Aligning Europe and the United States increases the chances of success of the wider project and will revitalize Syria policy in European foreign policy circles as well. The European Union (EU) remains a significant donor of humanitarian aid in Syria but has not updated its strategy since 2017, resulting in recent dissent among member states. A common strategy born from a Syrian-owned process could be the common ground needed for the EU to rebuild consensus, she said.

Lister then unpacked the duality of the project’s mission, under which Syrians must own and drive the process but ultimately produce a strategy that external actors will buy into. The project leadership realizes that any plan assembled by the international community but not agreeable to Syrians will be dead on arrival, creating an impetus to engage with de facto authorities throughout the country—including interlocutors from the regime. The leadership also recognizes that resolution will not come quickly and thus envision two timelines for the project: a shorter-term one predicated on improving day-to-day conditions across all of Syria, and a longer-term one producing a sustainable resolution to the crisis. Critical to both is the reestablishment of connectivity among the different parts of Syria, such as by official trade and transit.

Challenges and opportunities

Idlbi contextualized the project’s efforts within wider regional developments, such as Arab states’ normalization efforts with the regime. Diplomatic engagement remains one of the only remaining policy levers for regional states to work with Syria. However, the readmission of Syria to the Arab League is widely considered to be a failure owing to a lack of better behavior by Assad. He reiterated that US involvement on the Syria file is not only crucial to effecting change but also a necessity if Washington wants to avoid being dragged back into Syria on worse terms in the future. The United States spent billions of dollars to stop ISIS, and the investment needed to curb another crisis may well be even more. Working toward a solution to the conflict also requires treating its symptoms as well, such as restoring basic services and returning children to school, according to him.

Forestier differentiated the Syria Strategy from other consultative projects by the extremely wide scope of stakeholders it hopes to engage. Throughout the process, the project leads intend to solicit feedback from all major players in Syria, regional governments, and global powers, ensuring that policy recommendations are vetted by different actors. Lister acknowledged that not all issues lend themselves to consensus, with sanctions expected to be an especially contentious topic. However, the goal remains to take in a range of different perspectives and approach disparate ideas with an open mind.

Regarding the recent anti-normalization bill passed by the US House of Representatives, Idlbi stressed that the most impactful sanctions regime placed on Syria is the Syria Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty Restoration Act passed in 2003. Sanctions should comprise just one of many tools to form a strategy for shaping conditions in the country. He also recentered the importance of UN involvement and the project’s engagement with the UN Special Envoy for Syria. Lister then outlined the limitations of Syria’s allies and the opportunities they create to change the status quo. He asserted that while Assad could fall back on Russian and Iranian military support from the outset of the civil war, neither government is willing to bail Syria out of its worsening economic situation; a unified approach by the international community to engaging with Syria could thus leverage Damascus’s predicament to pressure it toward constructive reforms.

The post Launching the Syria Strategy Project appeared first on Atlantic Council.

This year, as part of International Women’s Day, three women from the Middle East, working toward a more equal world, have been recognized in Time magazine’s annual list of the most influential women. They include Nadia Murad, a Yazidi human rights activist, as well as two women who have formed a historic Israeli-Palestinian partnership: Yael Admi, a co-founder and leader of the Israeli movement Women Wage Peace; and Reem Hajajreh, founder and director of the Palestinian organization Women of the Sun. The one thing they have in common is that, despite their circumstances, they continue to push forward for equal rights.

Nadia Murad is a leading advocate for survivors of genocide and sexual violence. She was captured by the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) militants in 2014 and has been outspoken about the horrific abuse she suffered at their hands. In her 2017 memoir, The Last Girl: My Story of Captivity, and My Fight Against the Islamic State, Murad recounts her brutal experience and the heroic reclaiming of her life. She earned a Nobel Peace Prize in 2018 alongside Congolese physician Dr. Denis Mukwege for their efforts to end the use of sexual violence as a weapon of war. Murad is also the founder of Nadia’s Initiative, an organization dedicated to “helping women and children victimized by genocides, mass atrocities, and human trafficking to heal and rebuild their lives and communities.”

Despite heroes like Murad and Dr. Mukwege, and other international efforts to address these issues, the prevalence of violence against women in conflict remains a harsh reality. Women often bear the brunt of violence during times of conflict, becoming victims of war. That includes sexual violence, displacement, and targeted attacks. Their bodies become weaponized, and the expressions of their tormentors’ rage and dehumanization. The impact of war on women extends beyond direct physical harm, as displacement and breakdown of social structures further expose them to vulnerabilities. Disproportionate suffering is evident in the staggering number of female refugees and internally displaced persons, who often face increased risks of gender-based violence.

This tragic cycle repeated itself on October 7, 2023 with the “systematic, targeted sexual abuse of Israeli women during the Hamas-led assault on southern Israel” aimed at terrorizing and humiliating victims and their families. There is a growing body of evidence of acts of sexual torture—including rape and gang rape, as well as mutilations and gunshots to genital areas—the facts of which have been documented in the recent report of the Association of Rape Crisis Centers in Israel, which was submitted to decision-makers at the United Nations (UN).

Subsequently, there has been a disproportionate impact of war on Palestinian women in Gaza. According to the World Health Organization, women and newborns are bearing the brunt of the conflict, representing 67 percent of all casualties. UN Women has also pointed to gender inequality and the burden on women fleeing the fighting with their children, accounting for 63 percent of all deaths in Gaza. Recently, the UN has also noted credible allegations of both human rights violations and sexual violence against Palestinian women and girls in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank.

With cruel and almost prescient timing, just three days before the October 7, 2023 Hamas attack, some 1,500 Israeli and Palestinian representatives of Women Wage Peace and Women of the Sun descended on Jerusalem and the shores of the Dead Sea, calling for their governments to find a diplomatic solution to the ongoing situation, elevate the role of peacemaking, and stop further violence. The two distinct, yet fully aligned grassroots peace organizations gathered to demand an end to the “cycle of bloodshed” consuming their communities and for their respective leaders to return to the negotiating table to secure a nonviolent resolution to their decades-long conflict.

It was a jubilant affair, but the joy was short-lived. Just three days later, Hamas militants unleashed their massacre, killing some 1,200 people in Israel, including three members of Women Wage Peace, one of whom was co-founder and Canadian-born Vivian Silver. Since then, at least twenty-seven Women of the Sun members in Gaza have been killed.

Despite this horrific backdrop, both organizations continue to forge ahead. They are focused on their respective communities, and they are also dedicated to continuing working together. One of their primary achievements has been the Mothers’ Call, a joint declaration by Palestinian and Israeli women united for a peaceful resolution and a future of peace, freedom, equality, rights, and security for their children and future generations.

As the Israel-Hamas war rages on, their cause is gaining momentum. The two organizations have been jointly nominated for the 2024 Nobel Peace Prize, acknowledging not only that women are unjustly impacted by war, but that they are also part of the solution. According to data published by the Georgetown Institute for Women, Peace and Security, the more women are engaged in peacemaking, peacekeeping, and peacebuilding, the more peace there is in the world. Negotiations go better, peace is more enduring, and more members of society reap the benefits. 

Women make up 50 percent of the global population, though they are seriously under-represented in areas that have the greatest impact on all members of society. Data show that the more women are included in the economy, education, politics, and the legal system, the more prosperous, peaceful, just, and safe the world will be for children and future generations.

On International Women’s Day this year, the world needs more voices echoing the resounding calls for peace and justice in the face of ongoing conflicts. The international community must acknowledge and support those women who are fighting every day to make a difference. The recognition of Nadia Murad and the collaborative efforts of Yael Admi and Reem Hajajreh underscore the indispensable role women play in shaping a more harmonious world. Their resilience has been tested, but their unwavering commitment persists. As these women stand at the forefront of change, they serve as powerful reminders that women are more than victims of war; they are crucial architects of lasting, peaceful solutions.

Marcy Grossman is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center and Middle East Programs and former Canadian ambassador to the United Arab Emirates. 

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Iran re-opened its embassy in Riyadh, and Saudi Arabia resumed diplomatic operations in Tehran in June and August 2023, respectively. In September 2023, the new Iranian ambassador to Saudi Arabia, Alireza Enayati, arrived in Riyadh on the same day the kingdom’s new envoy to Iran, Abdullah Alanazi, began his diplomatic duties in Tehran. 

Given how hostile Iranian-Saudi relations were in the years leading up to the March 2023 agreement, such restoration of diplomatic ties was significant. Until a year ago, there were no diplomatic relations between the two countries since Riyadh severed ties with Tehran in January 2016, in response to attacks on Saudi diplomatic missions in Tehran and Mashhad following the execution of Shia cleric Nimr Baqir al-Nimr. The Saudi state’s killing of this cleric raised sectarian temperatures in the Middle East. It drastically heightened friction in Tehran-Riyadh relations, which had steadily deteriorated against the backdrop of armed conflicts and political crises in Bahrain, Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, and Yemen in the aftermath of the 2011 Arab Spring. 

The “Neighbors First” foreign policy strategy of the Ebrahim Raisi administration seeks to lessen the impact of Western pressure on Tehran by improving its relationships with surrounding countries. Within this context, Tehran’s leadership is focused on overcoming problems with some members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), including the United Arab Emirates (UAE). To show solidarity with Riyadh, the UAE downgraded its relations with Tehran amid the 2016 Iranian-Saudi crisis. But by 2019, Abu Dhabi began cautiously engaging Iran diplomatically due to the ways in which Iran’s “maximum resistance” to Washington’s maximum pressure policy left the UAE vulnerable due to “sabotage operations” off the Emirati coast. Then, in 2022, there was a formal restoration of ties after Abu Dhabi’s assessment that long-term peace and security in the Persian Gulf would require dialogue.

As Tehran sees it, better relations with GCC states—particularly a major player in the Arab and Islamic world, such as Saudi Arabia—could, to some extent, help Iran emerge from isolation. 

Reduced tensions with Iran offer Saudi Arabia opportunities to achieve the stability and security necessary for the kingdom to reach its internal development goals. Vision 2030, Saudi Arabia’s grandiose plan for economic diversification away from oil, requires massive levels of investment in various non-oil sectors such as tourism, logistics, ports, entertainment, culture, and defense.  

When Iran and Saudi Arabia had no diplomatic ties, economic relations between the two Persian Gulf countries were basically nonexistent. Yet, just five weeks after the recommencement of ties, a director at Iran’s Trade Promotion Organization expressed optimism about bilateral trade reaching $1 billion in the short term, and twice that much in the medium term, through Saudi and Iranian exports. As of April 2023, Iran had exported $14 million worth of steel to Saudi Arabia throughout the preceding three months. Realistically, however, US sanctions on Tehran will limit the potential for Iranian-Saudi bilateral trade to grow, even if both sides would like a fruitful economic relationship built on the détente.

The Saudi leadership understands that Iran and Tehran-backed non-state actors in the region can threaten the kingdom’s national security in ways that greatly reduce Vision 2030’s chances of success. For starters, there were drone and missile strikes against the Abqaiq and Khurais oil facilities in September 2019. Those attacks, which Riyadh blamed on Tehran, reduced Saudi Arabia’s oil production by 50 percent. Additionally, it’s difficult to forget the 2022 Houthi rebel missile strike against a fuel depot in Jeddah during the Formula One Grand Prix at a time that was important to Riyadh’s efforts to present Saudi Arabia to the world as a stable country with up-and-coming sports and entertainment industries.

The March 2023 agreement has reportedly led Tehran and Riyadh to make concessions. Iran apparently agreed to stop encouraging Houthi rebel attacks against Saudi Arabia though Tehran has not been able to control their decision-making in the war. Iran called on Saudi Arabia to cut off its alleged funding to Iran International. The London-based Persian-language television channel—which provided day-to-day news coverage of Iranian authorities’ human-rights violations following Mahsa Amini’s September 2022 death in police custody and the anti-establishment protests it prompted—became an issue in Iran-Saudi relations due to its ties to a Saudi businessman. Iran also asked Saudi Arabia to stop supporting militant Sunni groups operating in its Sistan and Baluchestan province, such as Jaish al-Adl, ethnic Arab separatist forces in Khuzestan, and the Mujahedin-e Khalq. By May 2023, Saudi Arabia renormalized diplomatic relations with the Bashar al-Assad government in Syria, a move that was possibly related to the diplomatic deal with Iran. 

The Gaza war factor

Pragmatism, not love, drove Iran and Saudi Arabia to recommence diplomatic relations a year ago. Tehran and Riyadh saw dialogue as the only viable way to reduce tensions, and realized that further escalating hostilities would not advance either’s national interest. 

Despite the March 2023 agreement, there is no denying that Tehran and Riyadh remain extremely suspicious of each other. The Islamic Republic still views the Saudi-US partnership as a grave threat to Iran. Meanwhile, the Iranian regime’s revolutionary ideology and Tehran’s ability to challenge the regional status quo through its networks of non-state actors across multiple Arab countries continue to concern Riyadh. Within this context, détente, not rapprochement, most accurately describes the current period in Iranian-Saudi relations. 

The five-month-old Gaza war has reverberations in Lebanon, Yemen, the Red Sea, and the Gulf of Aden, which subjects the Middle East to much danger. Nonetheless, this war’s regionalization has not derailed the Iranian-Saudi détente. On the contrary, Tehran and Riyadh have taken steps to ensure that their dialogue continues without the March 2023 diplomatic deal becoming another victim of the Gaza war. That the détente has weathered the Israel-Hamas conflict since October 7, 2023 suggests that there is far more depth to it than some analysts might have suspected a year ago. 

To some extent, the Gaza war has brought about a degree of Iranian-Saudi alignment while pushing the two countries toward deeper diplomatic engagement. Four days into the war, Iranian President Raisi and Saudi Crown Prince and Prime Minister Mohammed bin Salman had their first phone conversation since their countries restored diplomatic ties. In the call, they agreed on the “need to end war crimes against Palestine” and promote stronger Islamic unity. Then, on November 11, 2023, Raisi came to Riyadh to address the joint Arab League-Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) emergency summit on Gaza, making him the first Iranian president to visit Saudi Arabia since Mahmoud Ahmadinejad attended the 2012 OIC summit in Mecca.  

Opportunities that may be lost

For Iran, the region’s post-October 7, 2023 crises have represented opportunities to build on Tehran’s détente with Riyadh, convince the Saudis to end any consideration of joining the Abraham Accords, and advance a narrative about Iran possessing much influence throughout the Islamic world while aligning with its Arab neighbors against Israel. 

Saudi officials have been keen to avoid any actions amid the Gaza war and its regionalization that could harm the détente with Iran. This contributes to Riyadh’s absence from Operation Prosperity Guardian and its concerns about US-United Kingdom (UK) military strikes against the Houthis in Yemen. Saudi Arabia also appears to be among the Arab states that has reportedly started restricting the US military’s ability to wage operations against Iran-backed militias in the Middle East from its soil, according to Al-Monitor. 

Looking ahead into the Iranian-Saudi détente’s second year, Tehran and Riyadh will be keen to find ways to build on what is essentially a non-aggression pact. Although it is practically impossible to imagine Iranian-Saudi relations being free of deep-rooted suspicions and high levels of distrust, Tehran and Riyadh can find ways to responsibly “share” the neighborhood, as then President Barack Obama put it eight years ago. 

Nonetheless, as the Gaza war continues, Saudi officials will remain nervous about how Iran-backed groups in the region might act toward the kingdom. This risk adds to Riyadh’s unease about Israel continuing its war on Gaza and Saudi Arabia’s frustration with the United States for refusing to pressure Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s government into accepting a ceasefire. If regional tensions spiral further out of control, and Saudi Arabia becomes caught up in the crossfire, the nascent détente could come into question. 

Giorgio Cafiero is the chief executive officer of Gulf State Analytics, a Washington, DC-based geopolitical risk consultancy, and an adjunct assistant professor at Georgetown University.

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Just like then, the violence applied against the protestors had physical and verbal dimensions. The prime minister’s supporters online and in the media often attack the families of the hostages, blaming them and their supporters for “destroying Israel’s security” and even “working for the enemy.”

The question of the responsibility of Netanyahu and his government for the security breach that allowed for the Hamas massacre of mostly civilians in the Israeli south on October 7, 2023, as well as his ability to manage the war, was central to many Israelis from the very beginning. Today, when Israel is at a crossroads, this issue is more crucial than ever before. Apart from the immediate hostage deal that is currently being discussed in Cairo, Doha, and Paris, there is another grand deal on the table, which includes a vision for Gaza—the return of the Palestinian Authority to the Gaza Strip, security and financial assistance for Gaza from the Arab states and the United States, normalization between Israel and Saudi Arabia, and, possibly, a security pact between Saudi Arabia and the United States.

The deal is promoted by the United States and endorsed by the Arab world. Yet, Gaza and Jerusalem display zero interest in this deal. Hamas, as part of Iran’s Resistance Axis rejects the deal because the new security architecture in the Middle East is aimed at its eradication. Netanyahu is not interested because this deal is the antithesis of his view of Israeli and regional security, which allows for Hamas to exist but not an independent Palestinian state.

By denying any direct responsibility for the security breach on October 7, 2023—the worst in Israel’s history—Netanyahu is basically telling Israelis that his theory, which maintains the status quo and the impermissibility of the Palestinian state no matter what it takes, was correct and that the danger to the state of Israel would be even greater otherwise. If the prime minister believes that he did nothing wrong, and that the full weight of the blame lies on the shoulders of the security services (as Netanyahu and his supporters argued soon after the fateful events of October 7, 2023), then there is no need to change a thing—neither the coalition that includes extreme-right elements, nor the ideology that rejects a Palestinian state. In other words, no grand deal.

But what does Israeli society think today about Netanyahu, his responsibility for October 7, 2023, and his ideology of accommodating Hamas while denying the Palestinians statehood? Polls show that the Israeli public is torn on many issues, but trust in Netanyahu’s government is not one of them. Israelis repeatedly show a historically low level of confidence in the prime minister, while support for his Likud party keeps dwindling.

At the same time, it’s also clear that the general public in Israel supports Netanyahu’s policies. According to a poll conducted by the daily newspaper Israel Hayom, the public is almost equally divided about “which of the two goals of the war is more important”: 46.6 percent prioritized securing the release of hostages, while 44.8 percent said “victory in the war against Hamas” is more important. However, the respondents’ answers also show that a vast majority of the public is not ready to accept the Hamas terms for the release of the abductees.

In the same poll, respondents were asked, “What is the best way to obtain the release of the hostages?” and 81.5 percent answered that “military pressure should be applied to Hamas so that it agrees to acceptable conditions for the release of the abductees.” This is something that Netanyahu and his military chiefs repeat every day.

Another survey conducted by the Israel Democracy Institute (IDI) shows that about two-thirds (63 percent) of the Jewish public do not support Israel agreeing in principle to an independent and demilitarized Palestinian state. The gap between the political camps is large: on the left, the majority (77 percent) supports a statehood agreement in principle, while only 48 percent of the center and 22 percent of the right agree. In contrast, most of Israel’s Arab citizens (73 percent) support such an agreement in principle. A tiny minority of the Jewish respondents believe that terrorism will stop if a Palestinian state is established. On the contrary, 44 percent think that a Palestinian state is “a prize for terror” and will result in more attacks.

The polls also show a stern objection to the delivery of humanitarian aid to Gaza, even if the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) is replaced, and that Israelis have a somewhat pessimistic view about the chances for a “complete victory” against Hamas in Gaza. In recent months, the Israeli government accused UNRWA of ongoing cooperation with Hamas. At the same time, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) identified a few members of UNRWA staff who took part in the October 7, 2023 atrocities. (A few donor countries have withdrawn their support from UNRWA, and Israel has repeatedly demanded for the agency to be shut down.)

Even if the protests intensify soon—another outcome of IDI’s poll—and the country heads for elections sometime during 2024, there is a huge question mark in regard to the structural changes in Israeli political thinking and public support for unpopular moves. That includes support for the two-state solution—a consensus shared around the world, but a big no-no for almost all Israeli politicians from the extreme right to the center. To ignite a process that will allow for a realistic discussion about “the day after” in Gaza and the need to implement the two states solution, Israeli society first needs to acknowledge that the policies that Netanyahu has advanced since 2009 have failed, and to start searching for alternatives. October 7, 2023 might be the beginning of the end of Netanyahu’s era, but it will be truly finished only when his political legacy of maintaining the status quo is gone.

Ksenia Svetlova is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs, and is the director of the Israel-Middle East Relations Program at Mitvim. Follow her on X: @KseniaSvetlova.

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On February 26, Israel staged its deepest air raid into Lebanon in years, hitting targets just west of Baalbek, some 62 miles (100 kilometers) north of the border with Israel. They reportedly included two buildings—one affiliated with a Hezbollah civilian institution—and a convoy of trucks. Israel said it had hit part of Hezbollah’s air-defense network. The raid came hours after Hezbollah shot down an Israeli reconnaissance drone over south Lebanon. In response to the Baalbek air raid, Hezbollah fired some sixty rockets at an Israeli military base in the central Golan Heights and, on February 27, launched a rocket attack on the Mount Meron air-control center.

Fighting has steadily escalated since the beginning of the year, with attacks and counterattacks creeping deeper into Lebanon and Israel with each passing week. Judging from comments made by Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant, a ceasefire arrangement in the Gaza Strip may have no impact on the fighting along the Lebanon-Israel border. During a four-day lull in Gaza in November 2023, both Hezbollah and the Israeli military also ceased fighting. But on February 25, Gallant said that even if a ceasefire takes effect in Gaza, “We will continue the fire [against Hezbollah], and we will do so independently from [Gaza] until we achieve our goals… to withdraw Hezbollah to where it should be, either by a diplomatic agreement or we will do it by force.”

But diplomacy is moving slowly. Hezbollah has repeatedly said it refuses to participate in any negotiations until Israel ends its war in Gaza. Israel says it prefers a diplomatic solution but is prepared to launch a major operation against Hezbollah if diplomacy fails or takes too long. In a February 22 letter to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), Israeli Foreign Minister Israel Katz warned, “We will not be patient much longer for a diplomatic solution in the north.”

The Israeli government faces mounting pressure from some eighty thousand residents of northern Israel who have been evacuated to areas further south to escape the violence along the border. Mindful of the Hamas assault on October 7, 2023, that left some 1,200 Israelis dead, the residents of the north are collectively refusing to return to their homes until Hezbollah has been pushed back from the border. However, achieving that goal is no simple matter. Hezbollah is not a regular army deployed in various barracks that can be moved from one location to another. Hezbollah fighters live with their families and work in the villages and towns of the southern Lebanese border district.

International diplomatic efforts appear to focus on exploring generally practical, and potentially achievable, ideas. At the heart of these deliberations is finding ways to strengthen the commitment of both parties to UNSC Resolution 1701, which helped end the 2006 war between Israel and Hezbollah. Among the clauses in the resolution was for the area between the Litani River and the Blue Line—the UN name for the boundary corresponding to Lebanon’s southern border—to be free of all weapons except for those of the Lebanese state and the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) peacekeeping mission, which operates in the southern border region.

In practice, however, Hezbollah and Israel have paid little heed to the resolution’s demands. Israel breached Lebanese airspace on a nearly daily basis, using manned aircraft and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) for reconnaissance missions or to launch attacks into Syria. Since 2006, Hezbollah has maintained a military presence in the southern border district, which was all but invisible until three or four years ago. Around 2020, Hezbollah began emerging into the sunlight, establishing dozens of border observation posts nominally manned by personnel from Green Without Borders, an environmental nongovernmental organization affiliated with the group, as well as discreet military posts tucked into wooded valleys. Less discretely, Hezbollah constructed six 100-meter (328-foot) firing ranges, where local militants practiced shooting with an array of weapons from rifles to rocket-propelled grenades. The latest firing range, a bulldozed 100-meter (328-foot) strip, lies in a valley less than 5 kilometers (3 miles) from UNIFIL headquarters in the coastal village of Naqoura.

France and the United States have offered separate proposals to end the fighting. However, Hezbollah has remained dismissive of any negotiations before the war in Gaza ends, and the Lebanese government has yet to respond formally. The French offer, according to diplomats, would see a de-escalation in fighting over several days, an end to Israeli overflights, a pullback of Hezbollah fighters to a certain depth from the border, and the deployment of some fifteen thousand Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) troops in accordance with UNSCR 1701. The French proposal also mulls the possibility of establishing a monitoring group to adjudicate any complaints by either side—similar to the five-nation body that operated between 1996 and 2000 during the latter years of Israel’s occupation of south Lebanon. The US proposal is similar, but unfolds in three phases: first, Hezbollah pulling back by between 8–10 kilometers (5–6 miles) from the border; second, an increased presence of LAF troops south of the Litani River; third, a return of displaced Lebanese and Israeli civilians to their homes. The deal would include a commitment to reach agreements on delineating the Lebanon-Israel border, a possible cessation of Israeli overflights, and potential financial incentives for Lebanon.

If reports on details of the US proposal are correct, in its current configuration, the offer is unlikely to fly with Hezbollah and, therefore, the Lebanese government, which is not in a position to override the powerful group’s views. For Hezbollah, after months of fighting, deaths of dozens of cadres—including senior field commanders—and destruction of property in south Lebanon border communities, a withdrawal of the party’s fighting force from the border in exchange for a vague promise to discuss the path of the international boundary would be a non-starter.

For a sustainable cessation of hostilities to succeed, the Israeli government and Hezbollah will require “wins” they can sell to their respective domestic audiences to justify the bloodshed, destruction, and population displacement of Lebanese and Israeli civilians. That means both sides will need to give concessions. Neither side seeks a full-scale war, and after five months of fighting, Israel and Hezbollah are probably ready to be led to an off-ramp that leads to a cessation of hostilities. Sources in south Lebanon close to Hezbollah tell me that the organization is concerned at the growing vocal unhappiness of Lebanese Shias whose homes and livelihoods have been destroyed by Israeli shelling and air strikes. The fighting, they say, has lasted far longer than was originally expected.

So what concessions can be placed on the negotiating table for both sides to mull over? Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has repeatedly said that his government’s goal is to achieve “total victory” against Hamas and to return Israeli hostages to their families. But on the northern front, Israel’s priority is returning the evacuees safely to their homes. Therefore, it is looking for a tactical solution to achieve that goal, rather than necessarily effecting a decisive strategic win against Hezbollah. The group’s massive stockpile of rockets, precision-guided missiles, UAVs, and tens of thousands of fighters is a long-term problem for another day.

International diplomats tell me that the Israeli military is seeking an end to the threat posed to Israeli border communities by Hezbollah’s relatively short-range weapons systems, such as mortars and anti-tank missiles, as well as the ability of the group’s elite Radwan Brigade to cross the frontier en masse in an October 7-style assault. Ending those threats would require a weapons-free zone of a few kilometers from the border (the distance depending on factors such as topography), even if Hezbollah fighters are still living and working in border communities. In such a scenario, Hezbollah would agree to a cessation of hostilities with Israel and agree not to rebuild its Green Without Borders observation posts along the Blue Line. Similarly, it would agree to abandon the six firing ranges, along with the small military bases that have emerged since 2020, many of which have been destroyed since October 2023 in Israeli airstrikes. With enhanced international support and funding, the LAF would deploy in much greater strength along the Blue Line. These accommodations would allow the Israeli government to tell the eighty thousand evacuees that Hezbollah is no longer a threat along the border and that they can return to their homes and resume everyday life.

If Hezbollah accepted some or all of those conditions, it could sell the deal to its supporters on the basis that the LAF, as per its national duty and responsibilities, is to man the “frontline” against the Israeli “enemy.” At the same time, Hezbollah would assume the role of Lebanon’s “strategic reserve,” with its rocket and missile arsenals and army of trained fighters—a powerful deterrence factor. Such an argument would fall neatly within Hezbollah’s somewhat strained explanation to justify why it needs to keep its weapons—the so-called “golden triangle” formulation in which the “army,” the “resistance” (Hezbollah), and the “people” combined are the key elements of Lebanon’s defense strategy against Israel.

For Hezbollah to even contemplate accepting these conditions, Israel would also need to offer concessions. Simpler concessions could include Israel committing to ending its troop presence in the northern end of Ghajar, which lies on the Lebanese side of the Blue Line. Israeli troops have been present in northern Ghajar since the end of the 2006 war with Hezbollah in contravention of UNSCR 1701. Another simple concession is for Israel to knock down a wall it constructed four years ago on the Lebanese side of the Blue Line in a World War II-era railway tunnel that runs through the Ras Naqoura headland on the Mediterranean coast. In addition, Israel could quickly reach an agreement on thirteen locations where Lebanon and Israel disagree on the path of the border (this is part of the US proposal). Unwritten solutions regarding seven of those disputed locations were reached a few years ago and, given sufficient mutual goodwill, the remaining disputed areas could be resolved quickly through minor land swaps.

Among the more difficult concessions would be Israel agreeing to cease overflights in Lebanese airspace. Israel will likely oppose such a compromise, but there is wiggle room for negotiations. Israel could commit to cease using Lebanese airspace to launch attacks against targets in Syria. Or it could agree to end manned overflights in Lebanese skies, while continuing with UAVs and other intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets. Perception will play a role in reaching agreements. For example, Israeli jets are often visible from their contrails and audible. UAVs, on the other hand, usually fly too high to be seen or heard. If Israel were to agree to end manned overflights, the Lebanese public would see no Israeli aircraft in the skies above, creating a perception that Israel is no longer breaching Lebanese airspace.

Another thorny concession is an Israeli troop withdrawal from Shebaa Farms, an unpopulated mountainside running along Lebanon’s southeast border that the UN considers occupied Syrian territory but Beirut claims as Lebanese land. Syria has never officially declared in writing that the Shebaa Farms belong to Lebanon, rendering the sovereignty of the mountain ambiguous. If Israel agreed to pull out of Shebaa Farms, UNIFIL could deploy there in its place until Lebanon and Syria finally decide to whom the land belongs. A troop withdrawal from the Shebaa Farms would be the jewel in the crown for Hezbollah and a bitter pill for Israel to swallow. But Shebaa Farms, first and foremost, is a potential bargaining chip for Israel, and dangling the possibility of withdrawing from the area could help maximize concessions from Hezbollah. It’s all in the negotiations.

Still, even if both parties agree to make an equitable number of mutual concessions that lead to a prolonged cessation of hostilities, there remains the question of verifying that the deal is not breached by one or both parties. Trying to agree on a credible and unbiased verification mechanism that both parties would support could present a new set of headaches.

Gaza is key to the Lebanon-Israel front. If a temporary ceasefire is reached in the Gaza Strip but Israel continues attacking Hezbollah, the Lebanon-Israel border will remain on fire, with all the attendant risks of it spiraling into a broader conflagration. If, however, Hezbollah and Israel observe the Gaza ceasefire, that could allow a window for accelerated diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term cessation of hostilities along the Lebanon-Israel border. The chances of calming the Lebanon-Israel border will be that much greater if a temporary ceasefire in Gaza evolves into a permanent ceasefire.

After the trauma of October 7, 2023, and five months of fighting Hezbollah, Netanyahu’s hardline government may be in no mood to offer any concessions to its Lebanese adversary. However, without mutual concessions, it is unlikely that a diplomatic agreement will be reached—and if diplomacy fails, the only alternative is war.

Nicholas Blanford is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs.

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A month after President Joe Biden took office in 2021, the designation was revoked due to those very concerns. Nonetheless, these efforts to advance the path of peace in Yemen did not pay off, and the political, economic, and humanitarian situation deteriorated in an unprecedented manner in the three years since that revocation.

As a result of recent attacks by the Houthis on international shipping and trade lines in the Red Sea, the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, and the Gulf of Aden, the Biden administration reviewed its decision and redesignated the Houthis on January 17. The voices against this measure disappeared after it became clear that the Houthis present a danger not just to Yemen and the region, but also to the world. This danger exists on several levels.

First, the US decision to revoke the designation sent the wrong signals to the Houthis and was considered a green light to continue their escalation. At the same time, Iran saw it as permission to exercise more influence and dominance over the region. Nearly a month after the United States revoked the designation in 2021, the Houthis escalated by launching a series of attacks using ballistic missiles and drones manufactured in Iran against energy facilities in several Saudi cities.

More significantly, the Houthis continued to commit crimes and violations against civilians in the areas under their control, and hostilities extended to areas under government control. The group thwarted the extension of the United Nations (UN) truce in 2022 and, at the behest of Iran, it undermined de-escalation and peace efforts. The Houthis have also breached United Nations Security Council resolutions related to the Yemeni crisis. Taking advantage of the international community’s keenness to resolve the crisis peacefully, the Houthis regrouped, mobilized their fighters to the battle fronts, and accumulated weapons and military technology smuggled from Iran.

Additionally, the economic situation has deteriorated, and the humanitarian suffering has worsened throughout Yemen since the terrorist designation was revoked. The Houthis have since escalated their pressure on and extortion of international organizations.

In November 2023, the Houthis expelled the deputy representative of the High Commission for Human Rights (OHCHR), Safireddine Sayed. The expulsion is not unprecedented, coming three years after the Houthis denied entry to the commission’s representative in 2019.

They have also detained several employees of the United Nations and international organizations—including Prodigy Systems and the OHCHR—and forcibly disappeared them to prevent them from performing their mandate. In one instance, they even tortured to death an employee of Save the Children.

Houthis also continued to seize cash and food aid, divert funds and supplies to their members, sell relief materials, and use the money to attract and mobilize fighters and finance their wars. This prompted several organizations to suspend their operations and move their headquarters to the interim capital, Aden. The United Nations World Food Programme also announced in December 2023 that it would suspend programming in areas under Houthi control.

The Houthis also continue to obstruct all government initiatives and solutions, including the UN mechanism, to allocate revenues from the Hodeidah port to pay the salaries of public servants in areas under Houthi control. Houthis also continued the siege of Taiz.

The Houthis also imposed an economic war on the government by obstructing oil exports and the delivery of cooking gas shipments from Marib governorate. Additionally, they imposed levies on goods coming from the liberated areas to disrupt the port of Aden, which harmed the state’s budget, affected the government’s ability to fulfill its obligations in the liberated areas, and paralyzed its ability to pay the salaries of public servants.

Since the beginning of November 2023, the Houthi militia has launched a wave of maritime piracy and terrorist attacks on commercial ships and oil tankers in international shipping lanes, pressuring Israel to lift its blockade on the Gaza Strip.

The Houthis have ignored the disastrous repercussions of these attacks on the prices of shipping and insurance fees on ships entering Yemeni ports, as well as their effects on the prices of food and consumer goods. Their actions threaten to double the burden on Yemenis, who depend on imports to cover 90 percent of their needs.

The Biden administration’s decision to revoke the Houthi terrorist designation contributed to the complexity of the Yemeni crisis, prolonging the war, exacerbating human suffering, and pushing peace beyond the reach of the Yemenis. This decision was also a gift to Iran and helped strengthen its subversive policies and terrorist activities in both Yemen and the region.

To avoid replicating the same scenario, a new approach must be taken to counter the Houthis.

Forming alliances to protect international trade and launching limited strikes against the Houthis will not solve the problem. The international community must comprehensively review how it deals with the Yemeni issue to avoid making the same mistakes. Treating the symptoms is not enough. It must address the root causes of the problem: the Houthis.

It is the responsibility of the international community to coordinate a response to Houthi activities and to force them to abandon their terrorist tactics. Beyond designating the Houthis as a terrorist organization, governments must dry up the militia’s financial, political, and media resources. This includes restricting trade, imposing sanctions on Houthi leaders, freezing their assets, and banning travel. These measures will not jeopardize the channels of dialogue necessary for any future peaceful solution, but will still pressure the Houthis.

International partners must also support the Yemeni Presidential Leadership Council, led by President Rashad Muhammad al-Alimi. The Yemeni government requires political, humanitarian, and military support to restore the country. Failure to address the root causes of the conflict will lead to replicating historical mistakes that have been repeatedly committed. These recommended approaches can establish security and stability in all Yemeni territories and stop Houthi terrorist activities that threaten regional and international peace.

Moammar Al-Eryani is the minister of information, culture, and tourism of the Republic of Yemen.

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In early 2021, it was clear that the Joe Biden administration sought a normalization agreement between Israel and Saudi Arabia by the end of 2023 as a capstone to the Donald Trump administration’s 2020 Abraham Accords normalization agreements between Israel and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Bahrain, Morocco, and Sudan. The historic breakthrough of the Abraham Accords, which bolstered Israel’s sovereign right to exist, brought fresh hope for regional stability and economic growth. The heinous attacks by Hamas on October 7, 2023, sought to bury such hope of stability and were launched by those who refuse to accept any terms short of Israel’s destruction. It is the fault of Hamas and its Iranian sponsors that peaceful coexistence is now seemingly further off than ever. 

Among the now heightened normalization stakes in 2024, constants remain in the discourse as leaders in Riyadh, Jerusalem, and Washington continue to signal normalization remains on the table. As stakeholders continue to address the war in Gaza, negotiate the release of hostages, advocate for the movement of humanitarian assistance into the Gaza Strip, and seek to mitigate a regional conflagration, there is ongoing strategic consideration of normalization of relations between Saudi Arabia and Israel. Primary constants revolve around the pernicious threats from Iran and its proxies, and persistent interest in Palestinian statehood. Though not a new Saudi position, Palestinian statehood has become amplified during talks of Israeli ceasefires with Hamas and the post-conflict development of Gaza.

To varying degrees, Saudi officials—including royals—condemned the Hamas attacks on Israel, which required a deliberate Israeli kinetic response. Still, they also recognize that for any reconciliation to take root and normalization to occur, there must be a path toward Palestinian statehood. Before a panel of reporters at the 2024 World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland,  Princess Reema bint Bandar Al Saud, Saudi ambassador to the United States, noted, “While Saudi Arabia recognizes the need for Israel to feel safe, it cannot be at the expense of the Palestinian people.” 

Additionally, during the February 5 visit of US Secretary of State Antony Blinken, as part of his broader Middle East tour to seek de-escalation of regional tensions, his stop in Riyadh included talks with Saudi Crown Prince and Prime Minister Mohammed bin Salman (MBS). The consideration of normalization was among the critical issues discussed regarding the Gaza war and Yemen’s Houthis attacking shipping routes in the Red Sea. Parallel to Blinken’s tour, the release of an annual Arab public opinion survey likely read in Riyadh reported that a current majority of Arabs do not support official recognition of Israel, with 89 percent of respondents from sixteen Arab countries either outright hostile or deeply skeptical of the idea.

Following Secretary Blinken’s fifth regional visit since the war began, the Saudi foreign ministry clarified overtly what had been stated all along in bilateral communications with US officials in the Biden and Trump administrations: “The Kingdom has communicated its firm position to the US administration that there will be no diplomatic relations with Israel unless an independent Palestinian state is recognized on the 1967 border, with east Jerusalem as its capital.”

Secretary Blinken then confirmed Saudi Arabia had conveyed that advancing a two-state solution to solve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict remains a prerequisite for normalization. Still, as his colleagues at the State Department are well aware, the Abraham Accords—which the UAE, Bahrain, Morocco, and Sudan signed in 2020—did not require the condition of regional progress on creating a Palestinian state. 

The door for normalization discourse has been wide open since the 2020 Abraham Accords, and the desire remains. However, any credible movement to formalize bilateral relations between Riyadh and Jerusalem cannot ignore what the Saudis have consistently stated about the two-state solution. Looking back at the autumn of 2020, then US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo urged his counterpart, Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan, toward recognition of Israel, stating, “We hope Saudi Arabia will consider normalizing its relationships as well, and we want to thank them for the assistance they’ve had in the success of the Abraham Accords so far.” Pompeo added that he hoped Riyadh would encourage Palestinian leaders, including the Palestinian Authority led by Mahmoud Abbas, to return to negotiations with Israel. 

During the 2020 pinnacle of normalization, any US diplomat or official spending time in the Gulf, myself included, was met with sincere expressions of anticipation along with measured pragmatism over the Palestinian file. Fast forward to summer 2023, and the Saudi ambassador to the United States publicly shared the Saudi perspective on Israel-Palestine relations when she noted that Saudi Arabia aims for integration, rather than mere normalization, with Israel. Her remarks highlighted that Israeli-Palestinian peace aligns with Saudi Arabia’s ambitious social reform project, Vision 2030, and that Saudi Arabia envisions “a thriving Israel” alongside “a thriving Palestine.” 

The Saudi stance Princess Reema further articulated at Davos, inclusive of Vision 2030, is intended as a comprehensive approach in which prosperity and collaboration transcend the mere coexistence of neighboring states. This declaration, like MBS’s most recent engagement with Secretary Blinken, is an acknowledgment that there is a place in the normalization discourse for Saudi Arabia to use its regional political and economic influence to enable reform of the Palestinian Authority and deradicalize the Gaza Strip and West Bank.  

There is also the candid recognition of “statehood” in international affairs that is more consequential than simply recognizing the idea of a state. In treaties and international law, statehood has important sovereign characteristics, including having a defined territory and population and a capital city, and being able to implement government functions. To date, there is not an existent “Palestine” that is both de jure and de facto, in that it exists according to law and practice. If there is to be such a state, it will be incumbent upon existent states, particularly Saudi Arabia, to ensure such a state exists according to both law and practice. Any sort of two-state solution cannot allow for the development of a proto-state permissive to radicalization and terrorist facilitation to exist next to thriving neighboring countries. 

R. Clarke Cooper is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative and is the founder and president of Guard Hill House, LLC. He previously served as assistant secretary for political-military affairs at the US Department of State. 

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This policy has clearly failed. The Islamic Republic has become increasingly confident in its international behavior and domestic repression, bolstered by the belief that the West—especially the United States—is too weak to stop it. The result is that Iran today is a significant threat to stability, peace, and human rights in the Middle East. The October 7, 2023, attack by Iran’s client Hamas on Israel and subsequent attacks on shipping by the Iran-backed Houthi rebels of Yemen underscore two important realities: first, the crucial importance of Middle Eastern stability to global affairs; second, a dire need for the United States to overhaul its Iran policy. If the United States does not change its approach to Iran, the Islamic Republic’s behavior and regional stability will only worsen.

The time is ripe for policy change. Despite harsh international sanctions, the clerical establishment has not moderated its behavior and flouts those sanctions, such as when it sells oil to China. Limited US engagement with Iran has also failed to rein in Tehran’s worst impulses. Despite the successful signing of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), also known as the Iran nuclear deal, the unilateral US withdrawal from that agreement during the Donald Trump administration incentivized Iran to continue enriching uranium. The lack of consistency between US administrations makes a successful return to the negotiating table on nuclear issues unlikely. Meanwhile, Iran continues to engage in hostage diplomacy and flagrantly violates the human rights of its people. Its missile strikes against Iraq, Syria, and Pakistan on January 15 and January 16 also indicate the regime’s increasing willingness to use military force against its neighbors and project power outside its borders, which risks further destabilizing an already unstable region.

The world has changed since US policy on Iran was last set. An influential bloc of countries—led by Russia and China—has arisen to challenge the US-led international order. Iran has gained important allies by joining this bloc. Tehran’s growing partnerships with Moscow and Beijing provide it with diplomatic support, an economic lifeline, and increasing military prestige through its aid to Russia in the Ukraine war. Quite simply, the world today is far less united in its condemnation of Iran’s behavior—and its support for democracy, human rights, and the rule of law—than in previous decades. US policy must adapt to account for this geopolitical shift.

Yet Iran’s domestic situation has also changed dramatically in a way that could benefit US policy objectives. While Iran faced multiple waves of popular protest over the past two decades, the Woman, Life, Freedom uprising that began in September 2022 distinctly differs from earlier protests. While previous protests called for reform, many Iranians now declared that reforming the Islamic Republic is impossible. The current movement calls for nothing less than the end of the clerical establishment and the creation of a secular democracy. US policymakers should take note of this critical shift. Should a democratic Iran develop, it would solve most of the problems with Iran’s current behavior. A stable, democratic Iran would be greatly in the US national interest.

While the mass protests of 2022–2023 have died down, Iranian citizens, especially women, continue to defy the regime. The Iranian people are not likely to change their views on the theocracy, and the regime cannot survive in the long term in the face of such widespread domestic opposition. After four decades of an oppressive, corrupt, ineffective government, there is not much more for the Iranian people to lose but much to be gained by seeking radical change. However, the regime’s brutally violent crackdown on protesters and anyone who expresses the slightest hint of anti-regime sentiment indicates that mass protests alone will be insufficient to topple the government—the tactics of 1979 are not enough in the 2020s. Additional strategies are necessary, and international support will be critical to ensuring the success of any mass democratic movement in Iran.

The United States should, therefore, develop a new policy aimed at supporting the Iranian people in changing their government system. This must not be a policy of regime change in the traditional sense. While the United States has historically had success in overtly or covertly overthrowing foreign governments—including ousting Iranian Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddegh in 1953—it has been bad at managing the long-term consequences of such actions. The outcomes of the post-9/11 US wars in Afghanistan and Iraq are but the most recent examples.

Iranian history also proves that regime change cannot come from the outside. Any government imposed by a foreign power—or that even appears to be—will lack domestic legitimacy. Ever since Iran’s constitutional revolution in 1905–1911, ending foreign influence over Iran’s leaders has been a major reason why Iranians opposed—and toppled—previous governments, including the Pahlavi monarchy in 1979. Thus, any government that replaces the Islamic Republic must be understood by the Iranian people as entirely indigenous in origin. It can have foreign alliances, but cannot be installed by foreign intervention. The traditional US approach of using military intervention or a coup to accomplish regime change would irredeemably taint whichever government replaces the current theocracy.

Instead of traditional regime change, the United States should adopt a two-pronged approach to assist the Iranian people in their pursuit of democratic change. In the short term, US policymakers should continue to engage in difficult diplomacy and deterrence with the Islamic Republic to try to reduce Iran’s bad behavior as much as possible, while keeping in mind that genuine détente with the regime is not possible given its ideology, in which anti-Americanism is a core element.

In the long term, the United States should implement a policy of overtly and covertly helping the Iranian people create the conditions to build and sustain a successful mass movement to democratize Iran and align its behavior with global norms and the rule of law, especially regarding human rights. To achieve this long-term goal, US policymakers must resist the urge to take the lead; they must instead listen to anti-regime Iranians in the country, especially experienced women’s rights activists, and dissidents in exile, and help the Iranian people empower themselves to lead the change in their country.

Such a policy approach is rare in US history. Yet there are precedents when Americans supported positive change abroad by adopting a supportive role and genuine commitment to democracy and human rights that successfully secured US objectives and international security. Rather than direct intervention, subtle forms of US support for anti-communist movements in Eastern Europe during the late Cold War, especially the Solidarity Movement in Poland, helped those movements ultimately overthrow their communist governments on their own, build nascent democratic systems, and end the Cold War in 1989–1991. While the US government hesitated for decades to condemn the South African apartheid regime, the US public’s vocal support for the anti-apartheid movement and active participation in divestment helped the South African people end racial apartheid and build an inclusive democratic government led by Nelson Mandela in 1994. Updating these approaches for the twenty-first century could go a long way toward helping Iranians build an Iran that is no longer a threat to its own people or regional stability.

US policymakers could deploy various tools on multiple fronts to accomplish this objective, and the United States would need to do this in partnership with its democratic allies. Countries with no problematic history of dominating Iran—such as Ireland, South Africa, Mauritius, New Zealand, or Japan—would be best suited to this work. In essence, dissident Iranians need space, resources, meaningful international support, and a measure of protection to organize a powerful opposition movement. US policy would serve to support these suppressed voices in Iran.

To implement this policy, the United States would work covertly with Iranians and overtly to marshal international support for the Iranian people. In Iran, US policymakers should identify as many key in-country individuals with whom to work as possible. Ideally, these should be people with local or national influence who can get things done, show leadership potential, bring diverse perspectives to the table, and have clear ideas for what a post-Islamic Republic Iran should look like. Iran’s prisons are full of such leaders; many more are emerging across the country. The United States would work with this cohort to help create and run workshops for Iranians on democratic capacity building, strategic planning, governance best practices, and help with ideas for economic support for movement participants, as well as connect these Iranians with activists abroad with relevant experience. The United States should also find a way to provide reliable, safe internet access that is not easy for the regime to hack or trace, which will be essential for movement organizing and education efforts.

Along the way, US policymakers must resist the urge to anoint a particular opposition leader, avoiding another Ahmed Chalabi situation. The Iranian people will choose their leaders in a post-Islamic Republic future, which is as it should be.

The United States could, however, attempt to unify the Iranian diaspora. The unprecedented coming together of the diaspora in support of the Woman, Life, Freedom movement provided protesters on the ground with much-needed moral support and international amplification of their voices. When the coalition of diasporic leaders collapsed by late spring 2023, it was a major blow to the movement on the ground in Iran. Building solidarity and unity within the long-factionalized diaspora will be difficult. Still, a unified diasporic voice—and funding—supporting the opposition movement in Iran will be a key component in such a movement’s ultimate success.

At the international level, the United States and its allies must keep the world’s attention on Iran. There is already significant support for Iranians among the global public, as evidenced by the many worldwide solidarity protests during the Woman, Life, Freedom movement. Governments must align with this global public opinion. Just as the United States and its allies did with the Soviet Union during the Cold War, the international community must consistently and loudly condemn all human rights violations and political repression by the Islamic Republic. International condemnation of Iran’s behavior through unified statements by a coalition of anti-regime—preferably, democratic—governments, as well as unified rejection of Iran holding influential human rights-related positions in the United Nations or its representation at legitimizing international forums like the World Economic Forum in Davos, would help maintain international pressure on the Islamic Republic.

The regime is not immune to global pressure to moderate its behavior. US policymakers could also do much to encourage enhanced US public support for the people of Iran. International media, US policymakers, and democratic allies can use knowledge and truth as weapons; the Islamic Republic relies on lies and deception. Shining a harsh light on those lies and countering them with truth will be a valuable approach to combatting autocracy and oppression. Propaganda efforts to drive a wedge between Russia and Iran, as well as undermine its support by the rank-and-file within the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and military, would also help weaken the regime.

If, as President Joe Biden has insisted, the greatest global challenge today is the war between autocracy and democracy, then Iran is a major front in that war. The Woman, Life, Freedom uprising is the most consequential mass democratic movement in the world today. Supporting the growth, maturation, and ultimate success of this movement is not only morally right, but a strategically logical position for the United States to take. This policy will require years of commitment and a redefinition of what regime change policy looks like, but helping the Iranian people end the Islamic Republic’s bad behavior would be a major victory for democracy, human rights, and, ultimately, global stability. Iranians have the will and capacity to create a brighter future. Will US policymakers choose to help?

Dr. Kelly J. Shannon is a 2023–2024 W. Glenn Campbell and Rita Ricardo-Campbell national fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University and associate professor of history at Florida Atlantic University.

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Since 2014, when the Barack Obama administration searched for a local partner force in Syria to fight against the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) without opposing Iran, the relationship between Turkey and the United States has deteriorated. The US partnership with the People’s Defense Units (YPG), the Syrian branch of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK)—a designated foreign terrorist organization—was viewed by Ankara as a national security threat. However, in early October 2019, the situation got more complex when Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and former President Donald Trump agreed on a partial US withdrawal. Trump later ordered a full withdrawal, but it was prevented at the last minute by a decision to secure oil in Syria. Shortly after, in October 2019, the Turks launched Operation Peace Spring and entered parts of northern Syria. However, Russia secured the majority of the territory from which the Americans withdrew, following a deal between the YPG-dominated Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and Damascus. The Russians effectively protected the SDF against Turkish attempts to launch new cross-border military operations.

If a complete US withdrawal from Syria is going to occur, Turkish decision-makers would prefer the United States to coordinate with Ankara. This option would allow different scenarios and roadmaps to facilitate US and Turkish interests in Syria and the broader region. For Turkey, a US withdrawal is not significant; the crucial question for Turkey is how the United States will withdraw.

In the event of an abrupt US withdrawal similar to what happened in Afghanistan, the Turkish government may face difficult decisions and encounter new threats from Syria. One of the most notable threats would come from Iran.

Iran is the best positioned to fill the void

The US forces in Syria rely on a single point of entry from Iraq for their logistical supply line. As a result, they will have to withdraw from the south to the north and retreat into Iraq gradually. Due to insufficient infrastructure, an airlift is not a viable option. In this scenario, Iran’s network across the Syria-Iraq border region around Abu Kamal in Deir ez-Zour makes it well-positioned to fill the void left by the United States. This would allow Iran to expand its only land supply route from Tehran to Beirut. Iranian militias on the western side of the Euphrates River would likely cross to the eastern side and enter former US zones of influence.

At the same time, Russian presence in SDF-controlled areas would enable the Russian military to move further eastward and control the entire Turkey-Syria border up to Iraq. The YPG-dominated SDF would probably negotiate with Damascus and trade its control over parts of Syria for official recognition and legitimization by the state. A potential agreement may be founded on shared hostility toward Turkey and the Syrian opposition. As a result, Iran would gain control over the oil-rich regions of Syria and expand its influence across the Syria-Iraq border. Conversely, the YPG would gain official status in Syria and ally itself with Russia, Iran, and the Bashar al-Assad regime, which could be troubling for Turkey.

To address the threat posed by the YPG in Syria, Turkey would need to secure the Kurdish-populated areas along its border. This decision would involve a military operation, and could potentially escalate tensions with Russia and Iran. This risky move could help Turkey limit the threat posed by the YPG, but could also be a premature birth of a battle in Syria.

The Turkish Achilles heel: Hayat Tahrir al-Sham

Regardless of Turkey’s actions in northeastern Syria, it will face significant pressure in the northwest. The Syrian conflict would then transform from a three-axis conflict into a two-axis conflict. In this new scenario, Tehran, Moscow, Damascus, and the YPG would probably aim to expel Turkey from Syria and enforce a military resolution to the conflict by dispossessing the Syrian opposition from their territory. Turkey and the Syrian opposition would then need to confront a new alliance of these four actors, which could tip the balance of power against them.

It has been reported that negotiations between Ankara and Damascus were not resolved due to the Assad regime’s insistence on a complete withdrawal of Turkish forces. On the other hand, Ankara argues that a withdrawal would have negative consequences for the political process and could lead to a mass migration of up to four million Syrians into Turkey. This scenario would be detrimental to Syria and result in significant domestic repercussions for Turkey.

In 2020, Turkey risked a confrontation with Russia and Iran after witnessing a similar situation. After thirty-four Turkish soldiers lost their lives in a single night, Ankara conducted a drone campaign that caused great destruction to the Syrian regime forces and Iran-backed Shia militias. Despite being alone in Idlib governorate, Turkey managed to successfully defend Idlib. However, this new scenario would have no US military presence in the east. Iran would have expanded its influence and secured a more stable logistical line from Iraq into Syria. Emboldened by the US withdrawal, Iran would likely be more aggressive.

Turkey’s primary vulnerability is Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) in Idlib, where it faces mounting military pressure. The opposing alliance is likely to exploit the terrorist designation of HTS to launch a military operation in the name of counterterrorism. Such a step could lead to a new humanitarian disaster for more than three million people living in Idlib, as Iran and Russia are likely to exploit the HTS issue both militarily and diplomatically against Turkey.

The Russian invasion of Ukraine is likely to reduce the amount of Russian investment available for a military escalation in Idlib, leaving Iran and its proxies to drive the attacks against Idlib. The Russian limitation presents an opportunity for Turkey to leverage its new domestically produced drones and air-defense systems, which were not present in 2020, to counter Iran.

In that case, Iran may seek to enhance its ties with the YPG, which the United States previously supported. This could result in a wider escalation of tensions across Syria. Similar to the current Iranian attacks against US bases in Syria and Iraq, Iran would use the PKK and its Syrian branch, the YPG, to attack Turkish forces in Syria and Iraq.

Ankara may initially perceive a potential US withdrawal from Syria as a positive development; however, the outcome could vary significantly based on how the US withdraws. Turkey would prefer a well-coordinated and orderly withdrawal process in close collaboration with its NATO ally. If the United States decides to withdraw from Syria without any coordination, it may lead to the handover of the US partner forces and the US zone of influence to Iran. In such a scenario, Iran would likely prioritize removing Turkey from Syria, as Ankara would be the only obstacle to Syria becoming a puppet state of Iran.

Ömer Özkizilcik is a nonresident fellow for the Syria Project in the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs.

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In preparation for the anticipated full-scale assault on Gaza’s southernmost city—where approximately 1.4 million displaced Palestinians have sought refuge in cramped tent encampments from Israel’s intense shelling of the Strip’s northern and central cities—Egypt has reportedly deployed forty tanks and armored personnel carriers to northeastern Sinai in recent days. The deployment is meant to bolster security in the border area, where a concrete wall topped with barbed wire was earlier erected—including an underground structure—to hinder the ability of Hamas to smuggle weapons into the Gaza Strip.   

The recent security reinforcements are, meanwhile, meant to avert a possible mass influx of Palestinian refugees into northern Sinai; Cairo fears that Israel’s planned ground offensive of Rafah may prompt hundreds of thousands of desperate Palestinians—fleeing the violence—to storm the border and cross into Egyptian territory, never to return. The fears are not entirely unfounded: in the early days of the war, members of Netanyahu’s right-wing coalition had publicly called for the transfer of Palestinians to Egypt. 

Since November 1, 2023, Egypt has allowed more than 2,200 wounded Palestinians to enter through the Rafah border crossing for medical treatment at hospitals in northern Sinai. An unknown number of Palestinians have also managed to cross into Egypt by directly negotiating a price—ranging between $6,000 and $13,000—with “brokers” to escape from the conflict. 

Two elderly Gaza residents residing with relatives in Egypt, who asked that their names be withheld for fear of reprisals, told me they recently managed to flee the violence and make their way to safety through the Rafah crossing after paying the “exorbitant fees” requested by a local businessman “as a price for our safety.” I have heard similar accounts from other Palestinians. This option is reserved for a small number of affluent Gazans who have relatives outside the enclave and can afford to pay the high fee that guarantees their passage to safety.  

Still, Egypt’s leadership is adamant about not allowing a mass influx of Palestinian refugees into Egypt—despite having taken in refugees from Syria, Sudan, and Yemen who had sought to escape the conflicts in their countries. Officials argue that the expulsion of Palestinians into Egypt would end the possibility of a Palestinian state and risks transforming Sinai into a base for militant attacks against Israel—with profound security implications for Egypt. Moreover, Egypt would likely need to deal with a humanitarian crisis in the Sinai Peninsula, piling added pressure on a country already in the throes of a dire economic situation.  

Egyptian officials have reportedly warned that a mass displacement of Palestinians could cause Cairo to suspend the Camp David Accords signed in 1979, and would undermine security cooperation between the two countries, which has been strong since Abdel Fattah el-Sisi assumed power in 2013.   

This warning, allegedly reiterated during talks between Sisi and US Secretary of State Antony Blinken in Cairo on February 7, is Egypt’s sternest yet to Israel and comes amid rising tensions between the two neighboring states over Netanyahu’s plan for Israel to seize control of the Philadelphi Corridor—a fourteen-kilometer ( 8.7 miles) route along the border separating the Sinai Peninsula from Gaza. Nevertheless, during a press conference in Slovenia on February 12, Egyptian Foreign Minister Sameh Shoukry denied reports that Cairo intended to freeze the peace treaty with Israel and insisted that Egypt would uphold its accord with Israel. 

“A peace agreement between Egypt and Israel already exists and has been in effect for the last forty years,” Shoukry said. He added that the treaty will remain in place.   

Netanyahu had unveiled the plan for Israel to overtake the buffer zone during a press conference on December 31, 2023 saying that the Philadelphi Corridor must be placed under Israel’s control to stop weapons from being smuggled through the southern border and ensure that Gaza is demilitarized after the war. Egypt and the Palestinian Authority have controlled the narrow buffer zone since 2003, following Israel’s disengagement from the Gaza Strip, which allowed Egypt to station border guards along its side of the frontier to patrol the area and prevent smuggling and infiltration into its territory. 

After the overthrow of then-President Hosni Mubarak in February 2011, Egypt’s Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF)—the group that oversaw the transitional period leading up to Egypt’s first free and fair elections in 2012, which brought the Muslim Brotherhood to power—destroyed the vast majority of the underground tunnels leading into the Gaza Strip. Hamas had used the tunnels to smuggle commercial goods and weapons into the enclave. 

After Sisi took power in 2013, he continued destroying the tunnels. Some Israeli officials, however, believe that additional tunnels still exist between Rafah and Sinai. Sisi also declared a state of emergency in North Sinai, effectively banning independent reporting from the region: several journalists who covered events here have been prosecuted and imprisoned. Security forces have since carried out a military campaign to rid the area of Islamic State of Iraq and el-Sham (ISIS)-affiliated insurgents who had sought to establish an Islamic state in the Sinai Peninsula.  Egypt has since largely sealed its northern border, aiding Israel in enforcing a tight blockade around Gaza. The border crossing was only intermittently opened to allow Palestinians seeking medical treatment and students to enter Egypt.  

Netanyahu’s recent remarks about seizing control of the buffer zone, effectively cutting Gaza off from Egypt, have irked the Egyptian authorities and the public alike—drawing harsh rebukes from government supporters and analysts. 

Diaa Rashwan, head of the State Information Service, rebuffed the plan as an attempt by Israel to cover up its failure to achieve its stated goals of eliminating Hamas in the Gaza war. Mustafa Bakri, a pro-government member of parliament, called the plan “an attack on Egypt’s sovereignty” and “a violation of the peace treaty” between the two countries. He urged Cairo to prevent the scheme at any cost—even if Egypt had to resort to military options. Mustapha Kamel el-Sayed, a professor at Cairo University, told me it shows a lack of respect on the part of Israel for the peace treaties it signed with neighboring Arab countries. He noted that the Philadelphi Corridor is a demilitarized zone under the Camp David Accords and should remain as such.  

Tensions are also simmering in Cairo over US President Joe Biden’s remarks during a February 8 press conference that Egypt had initially been reluctant to open the border crossing to allow humanitarian aid into Gaza and that the US president had persuaded his Egyptian counterpart to open the border to allow the aid in. Cairo was quick to refute the allegations: 

“Egypt opened the border from the start of the war, allowing the passage of humanitarian aid into the Gaza Strip without restrictions,” according to a statement released by the presidency on February 9. The Egyptian leadership pointed the finger at Israel, accusing it of disrupting the flow of aid by shelling the border crossing several times in the early days of the war. The statement called for a ceasefire to avert “a humanitarian disaster” and “protect civilians from further bombings, starvation, and disease.”

One thing is clear: The Egyptian leadership is stuck between a rock and a hard place. If it opens the border crossing to allow Palestinian refugees into Egypt, it risks being accused of complicity in the mass displacement of Palestinians. Many Egyptians believe that Palestinian refugees who enter Egypt will likely never be permitted to return to their homeland, which will be seized by Israel. On the other hand, if Sisi refuses to allow Palestinian refugees to cross into Egypt, he may be held accountable for the deaths of thousands more civilians, including women and children. 

It’s worth noting that, according to a Wall Street Journal report published on February 15, Egypt has begun constructing an eight-square mile walled enclosure in the Sinai Desert near its border with the Gaza Strip to reportedly accommodate Palestinians should Israel’s imminent ground offensive prompt a mass exodus of refugees into the country. Egypt has denied any such contingency measures are taking place. However, the New York Times has also reported that satellite images have shown “a large patch of land being bulldozed and a wall being built in the buffer zone between Egypt and Rafah.”  

Opposition activists have in recent days, taken to social media to express their skepticism over Sisi’s refusal to allow Palestinian refugees into Egypt. They claim that Cairo will eventually let the refugees in, which makes Egypt complicit and gives Israel the green light for the “ethnic cleansing” of Palestinians. Government supporters, on the other hand, laud Sisi for standing his ground and refusing to bow to the immense pressure from Israel and some Western governments to open the border to refugees fleeing the carnage. 

Now that Israel has clarified its intent to undertake operations in Rafah, after evacuating the nearly 1.4 million displaced Palestinians who have sought a safe haven in the Gaza Strip’s southern city, it may only be a matter of time before Sisi’s true intentions are revealed. In either case, the Egyptian president will not emerge as a winner.

Shahira Amin is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative and an independent journalist based in Cairo. A former contributor to CNN’s Inside Africa, Amin has been covering the development in post-revolution Egypt for several outlets, including Index on Censorship and Al-Monitor. Follow her on X: @sherryamin13.

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“Tell me how this ends,” Ignatius asked, borrowing the question that General David Petraeus posed at the outset of the Iraq War.

Qatari Prime Minister Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdulrahman bin Jassim Al-Thani had just arrived in Washington from Paris, where he had spent the weekend with US Central Intelligence Agency Director Bill Burns and his Israeli and Egyptian counterparts.

He told Andrea Mitchell of NBC News, who was conducting the interview alongside Ignatius, that she was “well-informed” in saying that the parties had hammered out a framework through which the remaining hundred hostages would be released—women and children first—in exchange for a phased pause in the fighting. This would continue in phases, with aid flowing into Gaza as well.

What’s far from clear is whether Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar, apparently deep underground somewhere in Gaza, will accept the plan. Hamas previously demanded a permanent and immediate ceasefire for any of the hostages to be released.

Al-Thani sounded hopeful, saying Hamas had moved on from that absolutist demand and that he was relaying the proposal to them, hoping “to get them to a place where they engage positively and constructively in the process, because we think that in today’s world… that’s the only game in town now.”

It was a rare moment to hear the determined but soft-spoken Al-Thani on the record. He is known for his leadership in conflict mediation, including the release of more than a hundred hostages held by Hamas, a US-Iran prisoner exchange, the release of ten American hostages in Venezuela, and the freeing of Ukrainian children from Russia. (You can watch the full interview here or read the transcript here.)

Among those with the most at stake in Al-Thani’s success are the hostage families, a few of which joined our audience after being represented in a meeting earlier in the day with the prime minister. Their sons, among as many as six Americans being held hostage, include Edan Alexander, a twenty-year-old recent high school graduate from New Jersey; Omer Neutra, a twenty-two-year-old sports team captain from Long Island, New York; and Itay Chen, a nineteen-year-old former professional basketball player, whose family is also from New York.

As for Ignatius’s question of how this all ends, including how the Middle East might look in five years, Al-Thani conceded that there is a path that could lead to an even bigger war, but the opposite could also be true. The success of his mediation will be a leading indicator of what is possible.

“Just picture this,” he said. “If we can put an end [to] this conflict that’s been lasting for decades, the entire face of the region will change.”

Frederick Kempe is president and chief executive officer of the Atlantic Council. You can follow him on Twitter: @FredKempe.

This edition is part of Frederick Kempe’s Inflection Points Today newsletter, a column of quick-hit insights on a world in transition. To receive this newsletter throughout the week, sign up here.

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Kibbutz Nir Oz was founded in the mid-1950s. Its purpose was to help create Israel’s “bread basket.” A second goal was to serve as a barrier between Israel and the terror attacks from then Egyptian-controlled Gaza Strip.

In 2014, Israel built a supposedly unbreachable fence around Gaza. That did not stop Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad from frequently firing mortars, rockets, and anti-tank weapons into border towns or flying incendiary or explosive kites and balloons into farmlands and homes.

Having learned to live with these threats, the people of Kibbutz Nir Oz—nearly all peaceniks to the core—grew crops, orchards, livestock, and ran a successful factory. Most of these, along with our homes, have been destroyed. We have all lived in temporary housing since October 8, 2023, and have no idea when it might be safe to return.

Until the terrorist attack, I believed that the Israeli army would defend the kibbutz within minutes of any breach at the border fence, approximately one mile from our homes. On what has become known in Israel as “Black Saturday,” that entire system collapsed. Had I been home on that date, I, too, would surely be dead or held hostage.

Blurring the atrocities of October 7, 2023

The number of dead from October 7, 2023 constitutes for Israel—a small country of less than 10 million—the equivalent of approximately 44,500 American lives, or nearly fifteen times the deaths from the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. Since October 7, 2023, many voices have invoked memories and comparisons to the Holocaust and the many pogroms (anti-Jewish riots) that preceded it. These voices loudly rang every day for my son and the 135 other hostages still held in the Gaza Strip.

To my mind, October 7, 2023 was the worst security failure in Israel’s history. But framing it in the context of the Holocaust or pogroms, while perhaps natural, blurs what happened that day. On the one hand, these comparisons obscure the culpability of Hamas for its butchery. On the other, they muddle the inescapable accountability Israel’s government must bear for what happened and its lasting effects.

That date was indeed the deadliest single day for world Jewry since the Holocaust. But there was no sovereign Jewish state—Israel—or strong Jewish army—the Israel Defense Force (IDF)—in 1939. Hamas’ attack would not have happened and certainly would not have been so deadly if Israel’s government and army had done their jobs. By invoking the Holocaust when talking about October 7, 2023, the Israeli government is released from its accountability for the massacre that day and its sacred responsibility to return all the hostages alive.

Calling October 7, 2023 a pogrom is similarly unhelpful. Unlike the spontaneous anti-Jewish mob violence in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries in Eastern Europe, the recent massacre was formulated, organized, funded, and executed by Hamas, who controls the Gaza Strip. By invoking memories of pogroms, it risks obscuring the responsibility of Hamas and its leaders for the mass murders and kidnappings it directed on Israel’s border communities. Whatever the scale of civilian casualties inflicted by the IDF on Gaza’s civilians since that tragic day, Hamas’ brutality must never be brushed over. The Israeli victims and the people of Gaza deserve this truth.

Peace can only be secured if the hostages are freed

The release of approximately a hundred hostages (approximately forty were from my kibbutz) between November 24, 2023 and November 30, 2023 thrilled my community. However, worry continues to grow because males constitute more than a hundred of the remaining group, and their release may seem less urgent to some. A grave concern is that the fate of sons, brothers, fathers, and grandfathers held captive—including my own—will not be prioritized as the news cycle moves forward. Sagui and all the hostages are running out of time.

The Israeli government must live up to its obligation of protecting its citizens and never leaving anyone behind. It must not abandon these hostages like it abandoned the residents of my kibbutz on October 7, 2023 in its desire to destroy Hamas in the Gaza Strip. If Israel does not hold itself to account by getting back all the remaining hostages alive and the remains of those bodies taken by Hamas, the country will never heal the nationwide trauma from October 7, 2023. Invoking the Holocaust around the events of that day is neither historically accurate nor necessary to absorb the magnitude and consequences of the massacre.

The possibility of future peace in a troubled Middle East depends not just on the war ending, but also on all hostages returning home alive. The destruction and suffering wrought by Hamas on that horrible day stand alone. 

Jonathan Dekel-Chen is the Rabbi Edward Sandrow Chair in Soviet & East European Jewry at Hebrew University of Jerusalem and a member of Kibbutz Nir Oz. His son, Sagui, is currently held hostage by Hamas in Gaza.

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Evidence does suggest that Hamas has lost significant capabilities to sustain its armed resistance. The rockets being launched toward Israeli cities and targets have gone down significantly, and there are only small pockets of resistance in the northern Gaza Strip, where some rockets are still being launched. Estimates point to the remainder of Hamas’ forces being largely present in southern Gaza, particularly in Khan Younis and Rafah.

Nevertheless, almost daily, the group publishes videos of its fighters launching anti-tank projectiles at Israeli armor units and troops and documenting various attacks, resulting in Israeli casualties, including twenty-one Israeli soldiers on January 23. Most importantly, Hamas retains a significant number of its tunnels, including strategic ones that double up as shelter facilities and operational sustainment centers, even though the Israel Defense Force (IDF) has revealed the destruction of many of them. New Israeli estimates based on uncovered evidence point to the presence of up to 450 miles of tunnels under Gaza, far more than initially believed. The failure to retrieve the remaining Israeli hostages is further evidence that Hamas still has robust hidden networks and combat-effective cells.

As the humanitarian conditions throughout Gaza become catastrophic for the coastal enclave’s civilian population—particularly right now, given the seemingly inevitable onset of famine—growing diplomatic and political pressure on the Israeli government may force a significant change to the scope and objectives of the operation. The maximalist goals that Israeli officials stated at the beginning of the campaign may very well have to be tamed and reduced to more modestly achievable outcomes that do not bring about the total destruction of Hamas.

Most day-after models, scenarios, and plans for Gaza’s future have assumed the IDF’s ability to break and destroy the Islamist group entirely. Few have contemplated an end to the war that sees some of Hamas’ military and governance capabilities remaining in place. While Israeli planners have spoken of subsequent phases of the military operation that will go on for many more months, they represent low-intensity efforts that will likely be focused on the most serious of militant threats—not the eradication of every single Hamas member and government employee.

This poses an uncomfortable and pressing question: What do Israeli, US, Arab, and international decision-makers do with a devastated Gaza Strip, where militant infrastructure has been severely weakened but is still under some control by Hamas’ remaining presence?

There are three gradual and linked phases that may help in navigating such a scenario.

The first phase requires a negotiated settlement that includes the release of the hostages as part of a prisoner swap mediated by Qatar and Egypt; the initiation of a long-term ceasefire; and the beginning of a gradual transformation of Gaza’s political system. Most importantly, this would require options for senior Hamas leaders and members to depart Gaza under international guarantees, similar to the Yasser Arafat and Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) departure from Lebanon after the 1982 Siege of Beirut. What becomes of these individuals once they depart Gaza is between their host and Israel’s priorities. The main concern of this phase would be ending the presence of Hamas’ military leadership through political means. Given that almost none of the group’s political leaders are currently in Gaza, this would effectively leave Hamas’ remaining rank-and-file without any motivation to act on behalf of a leaderless organization.

The second phase requires establishing an interim provisional administration that would initially recycle most existing governance bodies responsible for administrative functions throughout Gaza’s various sectors. A mix of Palestinian Authority (PA)-paid employees—including those in the finance and water management sectors, along with Gaza government-employed teachers, doctors, and public safety officers—could quickly bring about some resemblance of a functioning administration. This phase is arguably the most crucial because it will necessitate retaining some of the public safety infrastructure in Gaza, and will help fight crime, chaos, and the disruption of humanitarian aid distribution. The provisional use of existing public safety employees is critical for rapidly facilitating the removal of rubble and unexploded munitions, as well as the establishment of a temporary port to receive aid and power-generating ships. This measure would also enable the formation of a new administrative body that can set up a capable and professional police force with Palestinian, Arab, and international involvement and support.

It is important to note that regardless of what a revitalized Palestinian Authority looks like and whether that conforms to the publicly stated expectations of the United States and international community, the weak, yet still functioning and existing PA frameworks, are sufficient for kickstarting a new reality in Gaza after the cessation of the IDF’s operation. This primarily entails representing Gaza’s interests in international arenas to ensure that Palestinians have a voice in all planning discussions. The PA will be vital in giving political and diplomatic legitimacy to post-war efforts aimed at aid provision, reconstruction, political reform, restoring public services and administrative functions, managing various financial transactions (e.g. paying worker salaries), and, more importantly, creating a new internal and outwardly facing security infrastructure. The situation in Gaza cannot afford to wait for a completely revitalized PA to emerge per US expectations; instead, working with what is present will, in fact, begin the path of rejuvenation that is needed for the desired effectiveness of the PA.

The limited presence of the PA in the Gaza Strip, by definition, means that its role in the coastal enclave will require new structures, systems, and processes, not just the importation of West Bank apparatuses or the activation of dormant Gaza staff and administrative structures. The success of the PA’s role will depend upon its ability to use intelligent and level-headed messaging and professionals to build foundations for a new, prosperous, and terror-free Gaza. It was the PA’s incompetence and corruption—real or perceived—that contributed to Hamas’ political and electoral rise in the first place. For the PA to play a meaningful role in reshaping Gaza’s future, it must learn from past mistakes to gain legitimacy with its battered, resentful, and traumatized population.

The third and most challenging phase calls for initiating the reconstruction effort along a parallel track to transform Gaza’s political system. The reintroduction of some elements of the Palestinian Authority, along with Arab and international monitors, would signal that a new political process is beginning to take shape. During this phase, existing day-after scenarios that have already been articulated for Gaza may have a chance at implementation. Additionally, at this stage, broader regional reorientations, particularly between Saudi Arabia and Israel, may provide a catalyst for reinvigorating the two-state solution and pragmatic steps toward implementing it.

Primary considerations should focus on the gradual pace of change amidst unprecedented destruction while ensuring that Gaza’s borders with Israel are secured and a repeat of October 7, 2023 can never take place. With its ground and surveillance assets, the IDF is more than capable of securing the border from the Israeli side and detecting militant threats.

The most troublesome open-ended question is what remains of thousands of Qassam Brigades fighters who will still have some of their weapons and military training? Can these fighters be rehabilitated, de-radicalized, and recycled into a new Gaza administration? Can contemporary examples, such as what happened with Columbia’s Revolutionary Armed Forces (FARC) rebels, the Irish Republican Army members in Northern Ireland, or the PLO fighters (who became the nucleus of the Palestinian Authority), serve as viable examples for political rehabilitation? If Hamas members who were not involved in egregious crimes against Israelis are willing to be part of a new administration, would Israel and the US support a rehabilitation program?

A combination of incentives, safety guarantees, and promising prospects could provide viable off-ramps for leaderless and commander-less Hamas fighters looking for a way out of a quagmire. Despite their ideological orientation, members of the Qassam Brigades are, in essence, employees of an organized outfit with monthly salaries, benefits, and incentives that reward their dangerous and deadly work. While a certain segment of these fighters are irredeemably radical and militant, serious thought should be given to programs, initiatives, and offers that could provide a safe and dignified way out for thousands of young Gaza men whose conditioning, circumstances, and sociopolitical resentments led them down the militancy path.

Creative approaches, such as weapons buy-back programs—especially those seeking to collect strategic gear like anti-aircraft missiles, long-range rocket systems, weapons manufacturing machinery and equipment, mines, rocket-propelled grenade launchers, and heavy munitions—could prove vital in shrinking the availability of weapons inside Gaza. This, coupled with continuous monitoring to prevent future smuggling, will reduce the ability of remaining Hamas fighters to sustain a post-war insurgency, particularly if most of their leaders are exiled or eliminated.

Another approach worthy of consideration is the successful experiment with the Awakening Councils in Iraq (also known as the Sons of Iraq), which sought to combat the atrocities of al-Qaeda during the height of the Iraqi insurgency. Sunni tribal leaders, former Iraqi military officers, and even former insurgents and militants were rehabilitated in a new security architecture to leverage their expertise and local know-how to combat ruthless insurgents. This approach proved invaluable in taming widespread violence in the Anbar province and the “Sunni Triangle,” ultimately supporting the success of General David Petraeus’ “surge” in stabilizing Iraq at that time. However, the success of the Awakening Councils was reversed due to the refusal of the Shia-dominated Iraqi government to integrate Sunni fighters into the Iraqi security forces, setting the stage for many of these Councils’ fighters to join the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) years later. Similarly, many Hamas fighters may abandon militancy if they are offered a long-term and sustainable path into a new system that incentivizes them to abandon violence or be part of a new security paradigm.

The disastrous de-Ba’athification program following the 2003 US invasion of Iraq is a cautionary tale of a zero-sum approach to reconstruction and political rehabilitation. While the policy may have been well-intentioned in wanting to root out remnants of Saddam Hussein’s regime from the new Iraqi political system, it contributed to the ensuing chaos and an insurgency by resentful public service workers without prospects in the new country. This is important to consider because there are many public service employees working under Hamas’ regime simply because it is the only employer in town. These employees, including those in the healthcare, education, and public safety systems, could prove vital if retained in a provisional administration to run Gaza’s affairs.

Destruction is easy, but building is hard. After Hamas’ criminality and horrendous conduct toward Israelis and even its own people, it might be tough to tolerate a scenario in which some of Hamas’ infrastructure is recycled into a future Palestinian political system. However, the realities on the ground and Israel’s inability to fully eradicate Hamas, coupled with a catastrophic humanitarian situation that will likely accelerate the end of the war, necessitate these uncomfortable discussions. Undoing decades of Hamas’ terror and administrative control will require convincing Palestinians to turn away from the Islamist group’s ideological and political subjugation of Gaza. Indeed, contemporary history has multiple examples of political actors and players who were involved in violent terror before getting rehabilitated as part of agreements and processes. What remains of Hamas in Gaza may be no different.

Ahmed Fouad Alkhatib is a naturalized American citizen from Gaza City and provides analysis and opinions on the Gaza Strip’s affairs and politics. Follow him on X: @afalkhatib.

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On January 14, IPSI Nonresident Senior Fellow Ryo Hinata-Yamaguchi was quoted in a South China Morning Post article on President Vladimir Putin’s promise to visit the disputed Kuril Islands. 

Fellow

Ryo Hinata-Yamaguchi

Nonresident Senior Fellow

Indo-Pacific Security Initiative Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Defense Policy Indo-Pacific

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The United States put teeth into its warnings by deploying naval vessels and assembling a coalition of mostly European nations to stand against the attacks. But the Houthis were undeterred. On January 9, the group launched what US National Security Council spokesman John Kirby described the next day as “a complex attack of one-way attack drones, anti-ship cruise missiles, and an anti-ship ballistic missile” toward US ships in the Red Sea.

The US-led barrage launched late on January 11 and a follow-up the next day struck positions in the capital, Sana’a, the port city of Hodeidah, and other cities, according to the Houthi’s al-Masirah news platform. The barrage hit radars, missile, and drone launch sites as well as weapons storage areas, said US Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin in a statement. The US and its allies studiously avoided targets that could create casualties—an attempt to prevent a further escalation while deterring the Houthis from their regular attacks.

The Houthis will remain defiant. Before the attacks, US Secretary of State Antony Blinken traveled around the region warning of consequences for Houthi leader Abdul-Malik Badr al-Din al-Houthi, who vowed that he would not halt its attacks on ships it believed were linked to Israel, regardless of what the United States and the United Kingdom did. Hours after the barrage, the Sana’a government’s Deputy Foreign Minister, Hussein Al-Ezzi, warned on social media that “America and Britain must prepare to pay a heavy price and bear all the dire consequences of this blatant aggression.”

Such bluster is unsurprising. After an initial face-saving response that will likely involve the Houthis’ arsenal of drones and Iran-supplied rockets, the US-led demonstration of firepower may prompt the Houthis to ease up their attacks for a period—a predictable pattern of behavior by Iran-backed groups and allies, including Lebanese Hezbollah, Iraqi Shia militias, the Bashar al-Assad regime in Syria, and even Tehran itself. Despite the dire headlines and reports on the Houthis’ al-Masirah channel, the elders within the Houthi camp, as well as the group’s backers in Iran and Lebanon, will likely detect a US reluctance to get more militarily involved in the Middle East’s various conflicts than it absolutely must.

But the airstrikes were relatively unprecedented. The United States has launched drone strikes against al-Qaeda affiliates in Yemen and struck Houthi coastal and marine forces in the past. However, the January 11-12 attacks amounted to only the second American action against a non-jihadi group on Yemeni soil and the first to hit Sana’a. Though it was measured, it amounted to yet another escalation in the Middle East since Hamas’ October 7 attack on southern Israel and the subsequent ongoing Israeli military campaign in Gaza. The attack will almost certainly stoke passions regardless of how political leaders interpret them. The Houthis called for thousands of protesters to gather for politically charged Friday prayers.

There have been other novel events in recent weeks. On New Year’s Day, Iran’s Alvand-class frigate, the Alborz, entered the Red Sea. Though upgraded several times over the decade, the British-made warship is fifty-five years old and was delivered to the late Shah of Iran. It has made previous sojourns to the Red Sea; doing so on one occasion to protect Iran’s ships from the scourge of piracy. It is no match for the United States and allied forces that have been deployed in the waters off Yemen. Yet the arrival raised alarm bells. While Iranians have surreptitiously provided the Houthis with weapons, training, and support, the voyage marked a rare instance when Iran overtly dispatched military hardware to the waters off Yemen.

Over the last three months, precedent-setting armed escalation has taken place in trouble spots all over the Middle East. It began with Hamas’ shocking attacks on southern Israel on October 7, 2023, and continued with the unceasing length of the Israeli response. The Houthis have attacked civilian ships in the past, but they have done so over the last few weeks with a particular intensity.

Steering the region toward a more stable path may be beyond the power of any world power. However, the White House and its allies could limit or slow the deterioration by addressing each crisis separately.

Though the Joe Biden White House has toned down some of the hyperbole of its predecessors, it continues to operate in the Middle East with a Cold War mentality; it still attempts to rally partners against perceived enemies while clinging to the notion that the region has good and bad guys. Instead, the US and its partners could work to resolve more manageable problems that contribute to the region’s toxicity.

Both Hamas’ attack and Israel’s lengthy offensive are rooted in intra-Palestinian and intra-Israeli politics and rivalries. Iraqi militias’ abuses and transgressions, including their attacks on US troops in Syria, are aimed at weakening the central government in the eyes of Iraqis and the world. Even Iran’s decision to avoid direct involvement in the Gaza conflict may be rooted in domestic ambivalence toward the Palestinian cause.

Local conditions—rather than broader geopolitical objectives—may also drive the Houthis’ aggression. Iran, Syria, Hezbollah, Iraq’s Shia militias, the Houthis, Hamas, and Palestinian Islamic Jihad make up a so-called “Resistance Axis.” Tehran may have influence over Houthi leadership as it offers guidance, material, and logistical support, and there is evidence that Yemeni fighters have taken part in the same military training programs Iran has provided to Iraqi, Syrian, Afghan, and Lebanese militiamen.

However, there is little evidence that Iran has much direct operational control over the increasingly sprawling network of coalitions and alliances that make up the Sana’a government. Neither Iran nor Hezbollah, for example, are systematically targeting foreign vessels believed to be traveling to or from Israel.

While there is a sense of triumphalism that the ten-year-old rebel movement has now surpassed all expectations for its survival, it may not be a coincidence that the attacks and the Houthis’ escalating aggression are coming on the heels of the ceasefire with Saudi Arabia. Increased military capacity may contribute to the Houthis’ action. However, sustaining a sense of crisis and unceasing war also plays a role in maintaining domestic control. As long as the Saudi-led war effort against the Houthis raged, the group could keep a siege mentality and paper over its incompetence, misgovernance, corruption, and repression. With the Saudi-led war all but over, the Houthis may be feeling vulnerable. The Gaza war and the Houthis’ direct involvement perpetuate the crisis atmosphere.

Striking targets engaged in attacks on foreign-flagged vessels is legitimate. Nevertheless, the United States and international response should remain otherwise measured so as not to play into the hands of the Houthis. Instead, the US would do well to point out the Houthi’s failures and press them on basic matters, with a focus on asking tough questions about when the group will begin the arduous work of capitalizing on the Saudi ceasefire, such as restarting the country’s economy and rebuilding from more than a decade of war and one of modern history’s worst humanitarian crises. Such an approach could put the Houthis on the defensive while showing solidarity with a Yemeni public chafing under Houthi control, perhaps pressing the group to address basic local needs instead of grandstanding over Israel.

No power in the world seems capable of cooling down a Middle East aflame. Nevertheless, if the United States tailors its messaging and actions around each crisis on its own terms, and takes local and regional dynamics seriously, it may be able to place modest limits on the escalatory actions of the various players in the Middle East.

Borzou Daragahi is a journalist who has covered the Middle East, North Africa, and Europe for US and UK news outlets since 2002. He is also a nonresident fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Security Initiative. Follow him on X: @borzou.

The post In Yemen and elsewhere, manageable local issues are driving an unmanageable regional crisis appeared first on Atlantic Council.

US government statements are very clear about the international legal justification for its military actions in the Red Sea defending freedom of navigation, an objective laid out on page forty-five of the Biden-Harris National Security Strategy and the national security strategies of US administrations since 1987. US spokespersons stress that each US action to intercept a missile or drone or to sink a boat has been an act of self-defense, per Article 51 of the United Nations (UN) Charter.

But statements about US thresholds for military action are more ambiguous. The Houthis believed that the US redline for offensive action would be the killing of an American. They also believed that Biden would be loath to engage in offensive military operations in an election year. Both were a misread in the current context. The Houthis assessed that the United States would strike only if a US asset were targeted, and then only with countermeasures.

However, the existence of an international coalition supportive of military intervention to disable the Houthi capability to endanger global shipping lanes shifted both the US redline for action and the willingness of the US president to act. A joint statement released on January 3 by Australia, Bahrain, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, South Korea, Singapore, and the United Kingdom warned the Houthis against further attacks on international shipping in the Red Sea but did not define consequences for ignoring this warning.  

This allowed the Houthis the interpretive space to believe staging a follow-on attack using munitions from a distance would result only in the targets being protected but would pose no risk to their lives or assets. The US Central Command statement issued January 9 after the latest barrage of Houthi missiles and drones simply repeated the warning. However, in this case, it was not a warning to Sana’a but rather as a statement of justification for what was about to happen. On January 11, the US military, backed by international partners, conducted limited strikes against Houthi ballistic missile, cruise missile, and drone storage, production facilities, and launch platforms.

Despite the gripes of some members of Congress, Biden was on firm legal ground to launch the strike. The Houthi spokesperson’s statement on January 9 that their just-completed missile and drone assault targeted a US ship providing support to Israel removed any ambiguity about grounds for a US response. Article II, Section 2 of the US Constitution allows Biden, as Commander in Chief of US Armed Forces, to direct action against immediate threats like the Houthi tools of assault without Congress deliberating and declaring war. In the case of both international and US domestic law, the ongoing imminent threat from the Houthis gives the US president authority to act when and if he feels it is wise.

Biden’s biggest pre-strike questions

Ahead of authorizing the strikes, Biden had to carefully consider arguments for and against conducting strikes to limit the Houthis’ capacity to continue waging war on international shipping. Here are the big questions to grapple with.

1. Will striking Houthi military assets result in further military escalation in the Red Sea and the region?

US strikes against Houthi military assets will not stop Houthi acts of war. On the surface, therefore, it appears to be a cut-and-dry argument against Biden taking military action. But would not striking Houthi military assets have resulted in otherwise avoidable escalation? Yes.

The Houthis do not need provocation for further escalation. In the absence of strikes against them, they continued to escalate their attacks on global shipping interests, as evidenced by January 9. Defensive action only has not deterred their escalation.

Will the US strikes against Houthi military assets stop Houthi attacks against Red Sea shipping? No. Will such strikes reduce the Houthis’ ability to continue the assault for as long or to inflict greater damage than without strikes? Probably. Would not reducing Houthi arsenals in response to their actions encourage further attacks on global shipping? Yes.

Tit-for-tat strikes against Houthi munitions and launchers will not end the Houthi involvement in the conflict. However, they could deplete Houthi capabilities to extend or intensify their military actions.

Hezbollah is considering a land buffer agreement in its exchange of fire with Israel. The group has nothing to gain from an all-out war with Israel. It could inflict serious damage, but ultimately, the United States would come to Israel’s aid, and Hezbollah would be outgunned. In the process, Hezbollah would expend its arsenal, much of Lebanon’s infrastructure would be destroyed with Hezbollah to blame, and the group would lose ground in terms of its objectives. Hezbollah can appease those in its base clamoring for the group to show off its renowned store of weaponry as well as Lebanese citizens who prefer that their country stay out of the war next door by signing the agreement senior White House adviser Amos Hochstein is shepherding while retaining the capability to reach into Israel despite the buffer created by the agreement.

2. Do the US-led strikes jeopardize the fragile UN-led Saudi Arabia-Houthi talks?

In early December, the United Nations was presented with a draft plan for a political settlement to the nearly ten-year war between the Houthis and neighboring Saudi Arabia. Houthi political leadership appears focused on these negotiations while its military leadership fires on global interests in the Red Sea. The Houthis assessed that the United States and international community are so desirous of a political solution for this land and air war that they would not risk reacting to reckless Houthi maritime militancy. 

Will the United States and the international community conducting strikes uniquely jeopardize the political negotiations? No—not any more than standard Houthi intransigence around these negotiations has for the past five years. Even as the recently proposed plan—approved by the Houthis as well as the Saudis—was presented to UN Special Envoy for Yemen Hans Grundberg, the Houthis were already registering that they would like additional concessions. Based on the Houthis’ past performance, it is safe to assume that if they acted as the spoiler to this plan, it was their predetermined intent.

3.  Will the US-led strikes strengthen the Houthis in Yemen or abroad?

The Houthis are gaining popularity among Yemenis for their pushback against Israeli operations in the Gaza Strip since the Hamas attack on October 7, 2023. Could this translate to greater Houthi political popularity inside Yemen at a time when critical future political power-sharing decisions are being discussed? It is unlikely. The Yemeni populace backs political actors based on local and community interests. Houthi action elsewhere does not translate to adopting Houthi goals domestically, goals which include implementing a fringe religious sect’s view on how they conduct their lives.

From a broader counterterrorism perspective, the Houthis are applauded throughout the Muslim world for challenging Israel more robustly than other groups backed by the same Iranian flag. But this is unlikely to lead to global recruitment to their cause. Unlike al-Qaeda or the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) in years past, the Houthis do not espouse a global vision and cannot pretend to belong to a mainstream religious group. Houthi ideology is comprised of a political agenda controversially tacked onto the Zaydi branch of Shia Islam and calls for absolute obedience to a descendant of the Prophet Mohammed who should rule the entire Arabian Peninsula. Their current popularity is linked very specifically to their opposition to Israel’s war in Gaza and not to mass affiliation with this ideology.  

4. Will the US-led strikes provoke Iran?

The answer is: no more than Iran is already encouraging such action. The January 3 joint statement warning the Houthis against further targeting of ships was extremely carefully worded: “The Houthis will bear the responsibility of the consequences should they continue to threaten lives, the global economy, and free flow of commerce in the region’s critical waterways.” 

Tehran will note that the Houthis are singularly held accountable in this statement—and in the subsequent US strikes. That means Iran is off the hook. The US focus on these strikes allowed Iran to quietly carry out their two-year goal of retaking their oil tanker, the Suez Rajan, in the Gulf of Oman on January 11. There is no motive for Iran to underscore its ties to the conflict or the Houthis at this juncture. Tehran is already achieving its strategic goals with the decline of US popularity around the world and the halt of Israeli influence expansion in the Arab world through the Abraham Accords. Meanwhile, the distraction in the Levant allows the regime to focus domestically on broadening its nuclear program for greater future political leverage and shoring up its control of the population in advance of the eventual supreme leader transition.

5. Will the US-led strikes create reputational risk for the US on the international stage?

US support for Israeli military operations against the terrorist group Hamas has inspired criticism from countries with no connection to the conflict. The effort to build Operation Prosperity Guardian (OPG) on December 18, 2023 to secure the Red Sea was a test of the United States’ ability to build a coalition. The US military action conducted in the Red Sea is with the backing of OPG partners—some of whom have been quite critical of Israel’s actions in Gaza. This multilateral approach to threat assessment and planning tamps down cries about US unilateral action that risks impacting its reputation.

6. Will the US-led strikes harm Biden’s domestic political standing?

Biden’s biggest hurdle is his political party and Congress. He now has to worry about discontent among primarily Democrats about the humanitarian crisis in Gaza being mirrored in Yemen and his poll numbers dipping further. He also has to worry about opposition to the strikes from members of Congress who will vehemently decry an expanded US role in any sort of conflict in Yemen. Additionally, the president has to worry about opposition from members who fear kinetic action would suck the United States into another expensive war in the region. But with multilateral consensus for using military action to free a global shipping chokepoint impacting the flow of free trade, each of these risks are now reduced.

In the ring

The goal of taking action against Houthi military resources is to reduce the group’s ability to destabilize the region, threaten global shipping, endanger Israel and surrounding countries with poorly planned strikes, and protect civilians on land and at sea.

The Biden team is reviewing whether treating the Houthis as a legitimate political actor and a minor threat has emboldened Houthi militancy instead of encouraging their positive political evolution, and if so, whether it is time to prioritize a different objective. The United States has not redesignated the Houthis as a foreign terrorist organization but has enacted sanctions on individuals who facilitate their operations. The Houthis may not have imagined that the Biden administration would take military action without first a redesignation, and that was probably the case before the turn of the new year. However, the formation of a multilateral coalition in OPG and attempted Houthi strikes against US aircraft and a ship have altered the scenario and given Biden legal justification for the January 11 action without a protracted debate in Washington about designation. The Houthis wittingly took Biden’s gloves off for him, and he threw a punch. 

Kirsten Fontenrose is anonresident senior fellow in the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative and former US National Security Council senior director for the Gulf.

The post Six big questions about US-led strikes against the Houthis, answered appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Tourism, one of Egypt’s primary sources of income, has been dealt a blow through a surge in trip cancellations—particularly to South Sinai which was reported in recent weeks by Egyptian tour operators. Suez Canal revenues have also plummeted as a result of the reduced shipping traffic, owing to recurring attacks on ships passing through the Red Sea by Iranian-backed Houthi militants.           

In recent days, several global shipping companies have suspended shipping through the Suez Canal “until further notice,” citing security concerns. A missile attack on the Maersk Hangzhou, a container ship, by Houthi militias on December 30, 2023, marked the twenty-third attack on ships crossing the Red Sea since the start of the war on October 7, 2023. The suspensions and the slump in tourism have added to the country’s economic woes—Egypt is grappling with an acute foreign currency shortage and a staggering foreign debt amounting to $164.73 billion by the end of June 2023—thus, requiring Cairo to do all it can to resolve the Israel-Gaza conflict and prevent it from escalating into a wider war.  

Growing calls by some ultra-nationalist Israeli officials to displace Palestinians into Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula—a suggestion that’s been categorically rejected by Egypt as “a red line” that would undermine its national security—have also given impetus to Cairo’s efforts to end the conflict and avert a possible standoff with Israel over the contentious issue. President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, who won a third term in office in the December 2023 elections (he secured a landslide victory against three little-known rival contestants), knows only too well that giving his nod of approval to the displacement of Palestinians would provoke the ire of Egyptians and may even threaten to destabilize the country.  

The majority of Egyptians—enraged by the scenes of Gaza’s destruction and corpses of children being pulled out from the rubble—have thrown their weight behind the Palestinians. Many Egyptians also back Hamas, perceiving the Palestinian militant group as a resistance movement fighting against a brutal occupation. While there is no love lost between Sisi and Hamas—the Egyptian president sees the Palestinian militant group as an affiliate of the Muslim Brotherhood, the Islamist group he helped overthrow in 2013, which has since been designated a terrorist group by Egypt—the Egyptian people’s solidarity with beleaguered Palestinians in the Gaza Strip has prompted Sisi to tread cautiously. As a result, he has been using one narrative with Israeli officials and another pacifying narrative at home.

The pressure from all sides has spurred Sisi into action, causing Cairo to intensify its efforts to broker a permanent ceasefire. Keen on regaining its traditional leadership role as chief mediator between Israel and the Palestinians, Cairo has put forward a three-stage plan to end the conflict. 

The Egyptian plan suggests an initial, temporary truce of one to two weeks that would be extended after each phase. The temporary halt in fighting would allow for the release of hostages in exchange for Palestinians held in Israeli prisons and for the delivery of humanitarian aid into Gaza. It would also enable displaced Palestinians, who were ordered by the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) to evacuate to the south, to return to northern Gaza, and for the hostages to be released in batches: first, women, children, and elderly citizens, then, women soldiers, and, finally, all remaining hostages in exchange for an unspecified number of Palestinian prisoners. In the second stage of the plan, corpses of Israeli hostages who died while in captivity would be exchanged for the bodies of Palestinians who have died in Israeli jails. The final stage of the plan would see the withdrawal of IDF troops from the Gaza Strip, paving the way for a permanent ceasefire that Diaa Rashwan, head of the State Information Service, told Al Sharq Al Awsat “would restore peace and stability to the region.”    

The proposal, which also suggests that Hamas relinquish power in a post-war Gaza Strip, was initially met with a frosty reception from the Palestinian militant group, according to an Egyptian security source who spoke to me on condition of anonymity. In recent days, however, it had appeared to be gaining traction with both Israel and Hamas.

“Hamas and [Palestinian] Islamic Jihad, which held talks with Egyptian mediators in Cairo in late December, remain unwavering in their position not to negotiate a prisoner exchange before there’s a cessation in hostilities and all IDF troops withdraw from Gaza,” Ghazi Fakhry Murrar, a member of the Palestinian National Council who resides in Cairo, told me. Hamas leaders also insist that the Palestinian people should elect their leaders.

Despite Hamas’ seeming intransigence, Al Sharq Al Awsat reported on January 1 that a breakthrough in mediation talks was imminent as the two sides moved closer to sealing a prisoner exchange deal mediated by Egypt and Qatar. The news site added that Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad—the two Palestinian factions that are at war with Israel—were “open” to the Egyptian proposal, which would be implemented after coordination with the concerned parties. Al Sharq Al Awsat quoted Israeli Public Radio as saying that Hamas had privately agreed to a month-long truce despite making public statements insisting on a complete cessation of hostilities to move forward with a new hostage exchange deal.

The Egyptian mediation efforts had appeared to be making headway up until the January 2 assassination of Arouri in a drone strike on a southern Beirut suburb, derailing talks between Egyptian intelligence officials and a visiting Israeli delegation to broker a new hostage release deal. Quoting Qatari sources, Sky News Arabia reported on January 3 that Egyptian officials had informed the Israeli government of their decision to halt mediation efforts in protest of Arouri’s assassination. This decision prompted the Israeli delegation to cut its visit short and return home without clinching a deal.

All signs now point to an escalation in the war that has dragged on since October 7, 2023,  leaving Egypt’s mediation talks in limbo and putting the Egyptian leadership under additional strain. Israel refuses to back down until it eliminates Hamas and dismantles the group’s military capabilities—goals that many analysts argue are unrealistic or close to impossible to achieve. Israel’s targeted assassinations of Hamas and Iranian-backed Hezbollah figures are only exacerbating the crisis,” Murrar told me. “Such provocations are widening the conflict and are threatening to destabilize the entire region.”

As Israel’s war looks set to expand to new fronts with Lebanon, Syria, and possibly even Iran in the coming weeks, Egypt’s mediation efforts have been left hanging in the balance. Even if Israel was willing at any point in time to hold a temporary truce to release the nearly 130 hostages still held captive by Hamas, it would be more likely to opt for Qatari mediation, said a political science professor who preferred to remain anonymous for fear of reprisal. On January 2, Qatar, which hosts the largest US military facility in the Middle East at its Al Udeid Air Base, struck a deal with the United States to extend US military presence at the base for another ten years. Doha has also been hosting Hamas’ leadership since 2012 and, thus, has greater leverage with the militant group, he explained. 

It looks like the Egyptian proposal may be shelved—at least for now.  

Shahira Amin is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative and an independent journalist based in Cairo. A former contributor to CNN’s Inside Africa, Amin has been covering the development in post-revolution Egypt for several outlets, including Index on Censorship and Al-Monitor. Follow her on X: @sherryamin13.

The post Egypt was mediating a deal to end the Gaza war. Then Saleh Al-Arouri was assassinated.  appeared first on Atlantic Council.

‘Vision or Mirage: Saudi Arabia at the Crossroads’ by David Rundell

Saudi Arabia is a mid-sized country with outsized influence due to the unique global role it has played in energy markets, within the Islamic community, and as a security partner to the United States. If you want to understand its history, its relationship with the United States, and its domestic ambitions and challenges, then you should pick up Vision or Mirage by David Rundell, who is an American diplomat who spent thirty years in the country. 

This book helps frame the most important question about the country today: is the bigger risk that Saudi Arabia is not reforming fast enough or that it is reforming too fast? The former is what I often hear from critics in Washington, but the latter is what people elsewhere in the region are worried about.  

—William F. Wechsler is the senior director of the Rafik Hariri Center and Middle East Programs at the Atlantic Council.

‘Black Wave: Saudi Arabia, Iran, and the Forty-Year Rivalry That Unraveled Culture, Religion, and Collective Memory in the Middle East’ by Kim Ghattas

Black Wave offers an excellent and well-researched account of the intricate developments of the Middle East in the wake of the 1979 Iranian revolution. It reflects not only historical facts and data but also inside stories and firsthand accounts that have not been presented before. The book delves into many of the root causes of the current geopolitical trends that affect not only the Middle East but the world. For instance, it covers the relationship and competition between Iran and Saudi Arabia, the rise of interstate or cross-border groups undermining state authorities, and sectarian conflicts. It’s very insightful. 

—Nadereh Chamlou is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s empowerME initiative and an international development advisor.

Russian-Arab Worlds: A Documentary History by Eileen Kane, Masha Kirasirova, and  Margaret Litvin 

One of the best books published in 2023 on Russia’s relations with the Middle East is one that policy-oriented audiences are likely to miss but really shouldn’t: Russian-Arab Worlds: A Documentary History. Edited by two history professors (Eileen Kane and Masha Kirasirova) and one Arabic/comparative literature professor (Margaret Litvin), the book is a compilation of thirty-four documents written between 1773 and 2019 by Russians and Middle Easterners (with expert introductions to each) on various aspects of their multifaceted relationship with each other.

Several of these documents show that the Middle East has not been a passive arena in which Russian governments have acted. Instead, various Middle Easterners have actively sought to interact with Russia. Other documents describe how the Imperial Orthodox Palestine Society, in particular, fostered Russian popular interest in Palestine and an affinity for Russia in the Levant.

Above all, this collection of documents provides a sense of the deep roots of Russian soft power in the Middle East. This is something Western foreign policymakers need to understand.

—Dr. Mark N. Katz is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs.

‘Prisoners of Geography: Ten Maps That Tell You Everything You Need to Know About Global Politics’ by Tim Marshall

Prisoners of Geography has been a staple on my bookshelf since 2015, when it was originally published, but I took the opportunity to review it after October 7.

The chapter on the Middle East explores how geography has shaped its history, politics, and conflicts. The region is divided by mountains, deserts, rivers, and seas, creating natural barriers and borders that have influenced the identities and alliances of its people. Its oil wealth, water scarcity, and religious diversity have further contributed to its instability and violence. The chapter covers topics such as the Arab-Israeli conflict, the rise and fall of the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS), the rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia, the Kurdish situation, and the challenges of Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon.

While time has passed since its initial publication, the themes stand the test of time. The Middle East is a complex and dynamic region often misunderstood and misrepresented by outsiders. However, the region’s geography is not destiny but rather a factor that must be considered when trying to understand and resolve its problems. If you are interested in the transformation of the Middle East, dig into the other two books in the Tim Marshall trilogy: The Power of Geography: Ten Maps That Reveal the Future of Our World and The Future of Geography: How the Competition in Space Will Change Our World.

—Marcy Grossman is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center and Middle East Programs and former Canadian ambassador to the United Arab Emirates. 

‘Syria’s Secret Library: Reading and Redemption in a Town Under Siege’ by Mike Thomson

Many of us agree that libraries possess a kind of charm that can captivate a visitor upon stepping in—whether it’s the smell of rustic shelves, the orderly display of books, or the soothing sound of silence embodying the space. If you can relate to this experience, then Syria’s Secret Library is for you.

In the government-besieged town of Daraya, a group of Syrian civilians find a glimmer of hope amid the horrors of death and destruction brought by the civil war in a small underground library that they secretly built from scratch. In a series of exchanged letters and phone calls with these librarians, BBC journalist Mike Thomson documents the journey of this library and that of its guardians, who find refuge through literature and purpose to be enlightened in the darkest of times.

—Nour Dabboussi is the program assistant to the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center and Middle East Programs.

‘Moroccan Other–Archives: History and Citizenship after State Violence’ by Brahim El Guabli

Moroccan Other-Archives investigates how histories of exclusion and silencing are written and rewritten in a postcolonial context that lacks organized and accessible archives. The book draws on cultural production concerning the “years of lead”―a period of authoritarianism and political violence between Morocco’s independence in 1956 and the death of King Hassan II in 1999―to examine the transformative roles memory and trauma play in reconstructing stories of three historically marginalized groups in Moroccan history: the Berbers/Imazighen, the Jews, and political prisoners.

—Sarah Zaaimi is the deputy director for communications at the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center & Middle East programs.

‘The Vanished Imam: Musa al Sadr and the Shia of Lebanon’ by Fouad Ajami

Written by the late scholar Fouad Ajami, The Vanished Imam offers a personal account of the charismatic religious and political leader Sayyid Musa al Sadr. The book details his life from the mid-twentieth century to his mysterious disappearance in the summer of 1978. Exploring the history of southern Lebanon, where a sizeable Lebanese Shia population resides, Ajami eloquently intertwines the narrative of the imam’s tireless efforts for reform and the countless struggles he faced; it is a tale of his commitment to his community and adopted country—all set against the backdrop of increasingly challenging circumstances.

For those watching the developments currently playing out across southern Lebanon, this is a highly recommended read, as it provides a valuable glimpse into the origins of the Amal Movement and Hezbollah.

—Masoud Mostajabi is a deputy director of the Middle East Programs at the Atlantic Council.

The post Need a book on the Middle East to read during the holidays? Here’s our recommendations appeared first on Atlantic Council.

2023 also produced moments of hope and diplomatic feats. MENA countries were included in development organizations and plans that aimed to bolster the region’s economic prosperity; Iran and Saudi Arabia restored diplomatic relations; and the Abraham Accords continued to prosper.

Learn about the region’s biggest moments:

January 1: Israeli Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir decisively visits Temple Mount (Haram al-Sharif)

The year had a rocky start as Israel’s controversial newly appointed minister of national security, Itamar Ben-Gvir, visited the Temple Mount, also known as Haram al-Sharif (Noble Sanctuary). Since Israel won the holy sites in the 1967 war, it granted the administrative authority of al-Aqsa Mosque, the Temple Mount, and the surrounding complex to the Jordanian Islamic Waqf. Under the status quo, the site is open to Muslim worshipers while Jewish visitors are allowed only at certain times and are not permitted to pray there.

“Ben Gvir, who is the leader of the extreme-right Otzma Yehudit party, has previously been convicted for supporting terrorism and inciting racism,” highlighted senior fellow Ksenia Svetlova. Given his background, Ben-Gvir’s January 1 visit—and subsequent visits later in the year—angered Palestinians, Arab-Israelis, and the wider Arab and Muslim world, as he has previously voiced discontent with the status quo, making his visit appear threatening to Muslim rights at the holy sites in Jerusalem.

MENASource

Jan 30, 2023

Ben-Gvir’s controversial new position angered the Arab world. But how will it impact a potential peace deal with Saudi Arabia?

By Ksenia Svetlova

Will PM Benjamin Netanyahu find the desired equilibrium between the radical politics of his coalition partner and diplomacy with Arab capitals?

Israel Middle East

January 5: Libya’s rival governments agree to develop a constitutional basis for elections 

Since the 2011 uprising against Libyan dictator Muammar Gaddafi, the country has faced violence, uncertainty, and division, resulting in two parallel governments. In January, after more than a decade of conflict and failed attempts at unity, the two governments of Libya—the Government of National Unity in the west and the Government of National Stability in the east—entered into negotiations to find a constitutional basis to end the conflict and hold elections for a single, unity government.

The talks took place in Cairo after Egypt volunteered to host. Aguila Saleh, the speaker of the Libyan House of Representatives, represented Tobruk and eastern Libya. In contrast, Tripoli and western Libya were represented by Khaled Al-Mishri, the head of Libya’s Higher Council of State. The representatives agreed to create a roadmap for the election process in the talks. The prime ministers of both governments also passed along the country’s constitutional document for approval from their respective legislatures.  

MENASource

Feb 1, 2023

Libya’s political impasse and the $6 billion question

By Alia Brahimi

On January 5, after months of talks brokered in Egypt, Libya’s rival legislative bodies finally agreed to begin discussions to develop the constitutional basis for elections.

Libya Middle East

February 6: Deadly 7.8 magnitude earthquake hits Turkey and Syria 

On February 6, a devastating 7.8 magnitude earthquake struck southern Turkey and northwest Syria, killing over 55,000 people and affecting 15.7 million more. The damage was widespread; homes, schools, and hospitals were destroyed as the earthquake left entire cities and villages in ruin. While it was known that war-torn Syria would not have the capacity to respond to disaster, the earthquake exposed the inadequacy of Turkey’s response system.

Despite international aid, rescue and rebuilding efforts in Turkey were insufficient, with help slow to reach many areas. The earthquake has also had detrimental economic effects. The rebuilding efforts are expected to cost upward of $130 billion—over one-eighth of Turkey’s GDP—while many industries and livelihoods have also been destroyed. But as one Syrian told senior fellow Arwa Damon hours after the earthquake struck: “It did what the Assad regime and Russians wanted to do to us all along.”

MENASource

Jun 12, 2023

I work in Syrian civil society. There were gaps in our performance after the February 6 earthquake.

By Kenda Hawasli

It is clear that humanitarian response planning in Syria requires a full review process that reconsiders existing approaches and involves local partners while listening to their experiences.

Civil Society Crisis Management

February 10: Georgetown Institute for Women, Peace, and Security leads Iranian opposition gathering 

An Iranian diaspora opposition coalition known as the Alliance for Freedom and Democracy in Iran (AFDI) officially came together at an event hosted by the Georgetown Institute for Women, Peace, and Security months after anti-establishment protests kicked off in September 2022.

Although the conference’s scope was limited and pushed important issues like the type and makeup of a future government down the road, it was a successful first gathering, resulting in the release of the Mahsa Charter a month later. Unfortunately, several months later, in May, the AFDI collapsed.

“The spirit of solidarity evident in the Women, Life, Freedom movement seems to be miles away from the acrimonious scene witnessed around the Iranian opposition abroad or on social media,” noted writer Arash Azizi.

IranSource

May 10, 2023

After a failed coalition effort, where is the Iranian opposition headed?

By Arash Azizi

Cracks within the Iranian opposition coalition were visible from the outset, with much of the division revolving around former Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi’s persona.

Civil Society Iran

February 13: ‘Manifesto for Minimum Demands of Independent Trade Union and Civil Organizations of Iran’ published 

As part of the ongoing anti-regime protests, twenty trade unions, activist groups, and student organizations signed and released a manifesto for fundamental change in Iran that was quickly endorsed by other parts of civil society. The revolutionary document covered several different issues ranging from the prohibition of torture to gender equality to the privatization of religion.

The manifesto “offer[s] an articulate and elaborate meaning to the slogan ‘woman, life, freedom,’ aiming to end the formation of any power from above and to establish a society free of oppression, discrimination, tyranny, and dictatorship,” said Shadi Sadr, a human rights lawyer. Read the manifesto text here.

IranSource

Feb 23, 2023

Iran’s ‘women, life, freedom’ revolution has a manifesto. Here are the next steps.

By Shadi Sadr

Signed by twenty organizations and released on February 13, the manifesto gathered the support of many civil society organizations in Iran.

Civil Society Iran

February 14 – 16: Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi goes to China 

President Ebrahim Raisi made a telling visit to Beijing, marking the first time an Iranian leader has made an official state visit to China in over twenty years. This visit was geopolitically significant, as it displayed the consolidation of the China-Russia-Iran axis, which could effectively counter US sanctions and diplomatic pressure.

During the three-day visit, President Raisi and his Chinese counterpart Xi Jinping signed twenty documents and agreements on topics ranging from trade to information technology to transportation. The projects and agreements could be worth billions of dollars. But as senior fellow Jonathan Fulton rightfully asked, “Does a visit from Iran’s president help with any of this? In material terms, probably not. China is a lifeline to Iran, while Tehran is of marginal importance to Beijing.”

IranSource

Feb 22, 2023

Iran’s economic future is uncertain. It’s no surprise why Raisi visited China.

By Jonathan Fulton

From February 14-16, Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi was in Beijing for his first foreign trip of the year and the first official visit to China for an Iranian leader in twenty years.

Iran Middle East

February 20: Iran acknowledges enriching uranium at 84 percent

Under the 2015 nuclear agreement known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), Iran was to eliminate its medium-enriched uranium, reduce its stockpile of low-enriched uranium by 98 percent, and, for the next fifteen years, only enrich uranium to 3.67 percent. After the United States pulled out of the JCPOA in 2018 and reimposed unilateral sanctions, Iran incrementally stopped following the terms of the agreement.

In February, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) revealed it had found uranium particles enriched at 84 percent—not far away from 90 percent, weapons-grade uranium. As Kelsey Davenport, director for nonproliferation policy at the Arms Control Association, spelled out, “Regardless of whether the 84 percent enriched particles were the accidental product of Iran reconfiguring its centrifuges or produced by design, this incident underscores the increased challenge in discerning Tehran’s nuclear intentions and the growing proliferation risk of Iran’s rapidly expanding nuclear program.”

IranSource

Mar 2, 2023

Iran’s nuclear program is advancing. So too should negotiations.

By Kelsey Davenport

Regardless of whether the 84 percent enriched particles were accidental, this incident underscores the increased challenge in discerning Tehran’s nuclear intentions and the growing proliferation risk of Iran’s rapidly expanding nuclear program.

Iran Middle East

March 1: Abrahamic Family House opens in Abu Dhabi, UAE 

On September 15, 2020, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) signed the Abraham Accords, becoming one of six Arab countries to normalize relations with Israel formally. Since then, the UAE and Israel have significantly benefited from their newfound cooperation in sectors from trade and tourism to security and diplomacy.

The opening of the Abrahamic Family House in Abu Dhabi—a place of worship for all the Abrahamic faiths, containing a synagogue, a mosque, and a church—symbolized the prosperity to be gained through peace and cooperation. The House represents the hopeful future of co-existence and respect between Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. As senior fellow Marcy Grossman wrote, “It is also a beacon of light at a time when western antisemitism is at an all-time high. Perhaps, most significantly, it is a beacon of peace in the Middle East.”

MENASource

Feb 27, 2023

What the opening of the Abrahamic Family House Synagogue in the UAE means for the Jewish community and the rest of the world

By Marcy Grossman

The Abrahamic Family House, a mosque, church, and synagogue all sharing a multi-faith campus in Abu Dhabi is about to make its worldwide debut, opening its doors to the general public on March 1.

Israel Middle East

March 10: China brokers deal between Saudi Arabia and Iran 

Seven years after severing diplomatic ties following the storming of Saudi missions in Iran in response to the execution of Shia cleric Nimr al-Nimr, Saudi Arabia and Iran restored relations in a deal brokered by China. This event was geopolitically significant on both a regional and global level.

Regionally, Saudi Arabia and Iran have been leaders of opposing sects of the Arab world, taking different sides in practically every war and conflict since 1979. Despite housing the holy cities and sites of Islam, in recent years, Saudi Arabia has increasingly secularized in contrast to Iran. Saudi Arabia has also been opposed to the expansion of Iranian regional influence, even exploring normalization with Israel. It has yet to be seen whether restoring diplomatic ties is more than an empty nicety.

Globally, China’s role as a mediator demonstrated its aspirations to challenge America’s role in the Middle East and to present itself as a serious player. However, as fellow Ahmed Aboudouh pointed out, the deal “is beset by Saudi-Iranian mutual distrust that runs deep in their strategic thinking and a wide range of regional conflicts—Yemen, Iraq, Lebanon, and Syria—that serve as a battleground for their competition.”

MENASource

Mar 21, 2023

China’s mediation between Saudi and Iran is no cause for panic in Washington

By Ahmed Aboudouh

The deal is a mere statement of intentions by both countries to improve relations, meaning reconciliation is not complete.

China East Asia

March 13: Megiddo bombing in northern Israel

On the morning of March 13, a roadside bomb went off in Megiddo, seriously injuring an Israeli Arab. The location of the bombing, the Megiddo Junction, was just thirty-seven miles from the Lebanese border. Based on shrapnel and remains of the bomb, Israeli officials did not believe the attack to be from a Palestinian group. According to the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), the suspected terrorist crossed into Israel from Lebanon and was found hitchhiking following the attack.

“If Hezbollah was behind the Megiddo bombing,” argued senior fellow Nicholas Blanford, “it likely came within the context of supporting the growing popular unrest in the West Bank.” 

For Israelis, the incident reinforced the necessity of the wall currently being built on the border with Lebanon to replace an ineffective fence.  

MENASource

Mar 22, 2023

Was Hezbollah behind the Megiddo bombing in Israel? If yes, it’s a new escalation.

By Nicholas Blanford

The suspect was shot dead when Israeli security forces intercepted him in a vehicle traveling close to the border with Lebanon.

Lebanon Middle East

March 18: Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu visits Cairo 

Following the 2013 coup d’etat in Egypt that ousted Islamist President Mohamed Morsi, current Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi banned the Muslim Brotherhood, a radical Islamist group that Turkey supported. The incident brought a rift in ties. Now that Ankara has abandoned its critical approach to Sisi, the two countries have tried to mend their relationship.

At the 2022 World Cup in Qatar, President Sisi and his Turkish counterpart Recep Tayyip Erdogan were photographed shaking hands. In March, Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu visited Egypt and met with his Egyptian counterpart Sameh Shoukry. This encounter led to the first official meeting of the two presidents in over a decade on the sidelines of the September G20 summit in New Delhi.

MENASource

Apr 12, 2023

Egypt-Turkey normalization: Ankara’s perspective 

By Ali Bakir

While Turkey would prefer to speed up the normalization process, Cairo might prefer to wait until the next elections before expediting it.

Europe & Eurasia Libya

MENASource

Apr 11, 2023

Egypt-Turkey normalization: Cairo’s perspective 

By Shahira Amin

After a decade of ruptured ties and simmering tensions, Egypt and Turkey are inching towards a rapprochement—a move thought unimaginable by some observers a couple of years prior.

Africa Europe & Eurasia

March 30: International Court of Justice issues judgment on Certain Iranian Assets case 

In the case of Certain Iranian Assets, Iran challenged its responsibility to issue payments to families of victims of Iranian state-sponsored terrorism based on the now-terminated 1955 Treaty of Amity. The United States had frozen $1.8 billion from the Central Bank of Iran (Bank Markazi) in 2012. Iran brought the case to the International Court of Justice in 2016, which issued a mixed ruling on March 30. Families of terror victims will receive compensation, but the funds and assets from which the compensation money may be obtained have been found to be narrower in scope than the United States had aimed.  

IranSource

Apr 24, 2023

What the ICJ ruling on the Central Bank of Iran means for the US and the Islamic Republic—and those seeking reparations for state-sponsored atrocities

By Celeste Kmiotek

On March 30, the International Court of Justice issued its final judgment on a case between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the United States on the fate of “Certain Iranian Assets.” The judgment contains wins and losses for both sides.

Iran Middle East

April 4: Iran cracks down on hijab law 

In the face of mass anti-regime protests across Iran following the death of Mahsa Jina Amini in September 2022, mandatory hijab laws were laxed. However, after announcements in March and April, Tehran reversed this trend with even harsher enforcement than before the protests began.

Punishments for evading the law and servicing women without mandatory hijab now include up to $60,000 in fines, deprivation of social and public services, revocation of documents, ban of internet access, and the confiscation of property and forced closing of businesses. The clerical establishment is enforcing the hijab law by installing cameras and facial recognition technology. However, as former Young Global Professional Mahnaz Vahdati argued, “Despite all these brutal actions by the clerical establishment, many Iranian women are taking a prominent role at the forefront of the non-violent opposition to the gender apartheid system in Iran by defying the mandatory hijab.” 

IranSource

Apr 20, 2023

The Islamic Republic is mobilizing all its forces against unveiled Iranian women, but they’re pushing back

By Mahnaz Vahdati

Despite all these brutal actions by the clerical establishment, many Iranian women are taking a prominent role at the forefront of the non-violent opposition to the gender apartheid system in Iran by defying the mandatory hijab.

Politics & Diplomacy

April 6: Rockets launched at Israel from Lebanon 

On April 5, Israeli police forces and Palestinians clashed at the al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem. Palestinian and Arab media and governments claimed Israel was “storming” the mosque and had assaulted worshippers. At the same time, Israeli police justified their force with reports of masked young people barricading themselves inside the al-Aqsa Mosque with fireworks, clubs, and rocks after evening prayers. Following reports of the clashes, rockets and projectiles were allegedly launched by Hamas from the Gaza Strip into Israel. Hamas reported that the IDF then struck targets in Gaza. The next day, on April 6, thirty-four rockets were shot at Israel from Lebanon, presumably launched by Hezbollah.

The escalation of violence in early April overlapped with Hamas Political Chief Ismael Haniyeh’s visit to Lebanon to discuss the Resistance Axis, which is made up of Hamas, Hezbollah, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). As program assistant Nour Dabboussi explained, it was a reminder of “how Hezbollah continues to act as a separate military and political entity in the country—considering itself entitled to maneuver partnerships that fall outside of the official realm of the Lebanese government—with external militia groups holding goals and ideologies that further Iran’s regional endeavors.” 

IranSource

Apr 12, 2023

The attacks on Israel should be a wake up call for the Lebanese people

By Nour Dabboussi

The rocket fire from Lebanon on April 6 highlights how Hezbollah continues to act as a separate military and political entity in the country, with external militia groups holding goals and ideologies that further Iran’s regional endeavors.

Iran Lebanon

April 15: Fighting breaks out in Sudan’s capital, Khartoum 

On April 15, another round of fighting broke out in Sudan’s capital, Khartoum, between the two factions that made up Sudan’s government. In 2021, the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) overthrew Sudan’s transitional government, which was created after the 2019 military coup. For the past two years, the SAF and RSF ruled Sudan together, but now the leader of each group wants to rule Sudan independently.

“As with previous civil wars in Sudan, the collapse of security and the displacement of the population will have broad transregional impacts beyond immediate neighboring states,” underscored senior fellow R. Clarke Cooper. 

The conflict has displaced over six million people and has created over 1.2 million refugees.  

MENASource

May 11, 2023

Experts react: Sudan at the crossroads—where the conflict goes from here

By Benjamin Mossberg, Alia Brahimi, Thomas S. Warrick, Shahira Amin, R. Clarke Cooper

Atlantic Council experts react to the conflict in Sudan and discuss how it will impact the region and beyond.

Africa East Africa

May 7: Arab League normalizes with the Bashar al-Assad regime 

In 2011, the Arab League voted to suspend Syria from its membership based on the Bashar al-Assad regime’s violent suppression of peaceful protests. The decision to readmit Syria in May also called for a resolution of the Syrian Civil War and its spillover effects, which have impacted its neighbors and the region through the refugee crisis and drug trade. The readmission of Syria to the Arab League was controversial. Some Arab countries already have relations with Syria while others still will not be persuaded to normalize.

“Not much will change in Syria or across the region for now, but keeping Assad isolated would not be as easy as before, especially as he eyes recognition from the West followed by the removal of sanctions and funding for reconstruction,” emphasized Qutaiba Idlibi, head of the Atlantic Council’s Syria Project.

MENASource

May 19, 2023

Experts react: Assad gets warm reception at Arab summit. Where does that leave the US and its allies?

By Qutaiba Idlbi, Gissou Nia, Michel Duclos, Emadeddin Badi

Atlantic Council experts react to Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad’s attendance at the Arab League summit in Jeddah and explain its significance below. 

Human Rights Middle East

May 9 – May 13: Israel conducts Operation Shield and Arrow against Palestinian Islamic Jihad in Gaza 

On May 2, a prominent member of the terrorist organization Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), Khader Adnan, died after an eighty-seven-day hunger strike while in Israeli prison. Following Adnan’s death, PIJ launched 102 rockets from the Gaza Strip into southern Israel, injuring seven people. The IDF responded to the rocket attack on May 9 with Operation Shield and Arrow. During the three-day operation, seven PIJ commanders were killed in targeted assassinations, approximately 938 rockets were fired into Israel by PIJ, and a total of thirty-four Palestinians (including the targeted commanders and members of PIJ) and one Israeli were killed. A ceasefire was signed on May 13, negotiated by the Egyptian government.

Operation Shield and Arrow was just one of the many escalations around the Israeli-Palestinian conflict this year. “It seems that the next Israeli operation in Gaza is inevitable,” predicted senior fellow Ksenia Svetlova. “Everyone in Israel, Gaza, and Egypt knows how it will look and how many days it might take. The only unknown factor is the operation’s future name.”

MENASource

Jun 2, 2023

In an endless series of Israeli operations, Operation Shield and Arrow in Gaza was yet another name on the list

By Ksenia Svetlova

The current Israeli government is just as unable as previous ones to produce a solution to stop PIJ and Hamas in Gaza and the West Bank.

Conflict Israel

May 27: Clashes between Iran and Afghanistan over Helmand River 

The Helmand River, a major water source for Iran and Afghanistan, has been a point of contention between the two countries for centuries. The river, which flows through Afghanistan and ends in eastern Iran, is essential for farmers in both countries. Since a 1973 treaty, Iran will receive 820 million cubic meters of the river each year.

On May 18, tensions over the river and water access flared up again when Iranian President Raisi warned the Taliban to respect Iran’s water rights. Then, on May 27, fighting broke out when alleged armed drug smugglers attempted to cross the border into Iran. Iranian security forces fired at the drug smugglers, but Afghan forces, unaware of the drug smugglers, believed that Iranian forces were shooting at them unprovoked. Afghan forces then attempted to attack Iranian border villages. Each side reported that the other began shooting first. But as the Middle East Institute’s Fatemeh Aman emphasized, “Several factors have contributed to the current situation, including the impact of climate change.”

IranSource

Jul 7, 2023

Iran and Afghanistan are feuding over the Helmand River. The water wars have no end in sight.

By Holly Dagres

Fatemeh Aman, a non-resident senior fellow at MEI, on why the Islamic Republic and Taliban are bumping heads on transboundary water issues.

Afghanistan Climate Change & Climate Action

June 23-June 24: The Wagner Group rebellion 

On June 23, the Wagner Group, a Russian-funded private paramilitary organization, staged a rebellion against the Russian military and defense ministry. Wagner forces attacked and took control of Rostov-on-Don and the headquarters of the Southern Military District before continuing their offensive towards the Russian capital, Moscow. Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko brokered a deal between Wagner and Russia before the rebellion reached the capital. Wagner’s leader, Yevgeny Prigozhin, claimed the uprising was in response to the defense ministry’s attacks on his forces and demanded Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu and Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov be turned over to the group. Russian President Vladimir Putin called the rebellion treasonous. Two months later, Prigozhin died in a plane crash. 

“It must be noted that the recent Wagner crisis affects not just those Middle Eastern countries with a Wagner presence, but all Middle Eastern countries cooperating with Russia—which is basically all Middle Eastern governments,” said senior fellow Mark Katz.

MENASource

Jun 28, 2023

The Wagner rebellion is over—for now. But how will the events reverberate in the Middle East and North Africa?

By Mark N. Katz

The June 23-24 rebellion led by Wagner Group leader Yevgeny Prigozhin—aimed, he claimed, at replacing the Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu and Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov (not Russian President Vladimir Putin)—has ended. However, reverberations from it are likely to continue being felt beyond Russia, such as in the Middle East and North […]

Conflict Europe & Eurasia

June 29: Biden administration announces inter-agency counter-captagon strategy

Though the issue of the illicit captagon trade has not been covered much, its impact threatens the stability of the Middle East and has the potential to propagate the drug crisis worldwide. On June 29, the Joe Biden administration announced an inter-agency plan to counter the captagon trade. The plan includes the provision of diplomatic and intelligence resources to law enforcement agencies; applying financial pressure and economic sanctions on the Assad regime and other groups involved in the illicit captagon trade; the provision of counternarcotics training to affected countries; and diplomatic engagement and strategies to hold Syria accountable. 

MENASource

Aug 24, 2023

No quick fixes for the Middle East’s captagon crisis

By Karam Shaar

Counter-captagon policies should look further ahead and deeper into the causes of the demand in the first place.

Middle East Politics & Diplomacy

July 4: Iran admitted as a member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization 

Since 2009, Iran has held observer status at the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), a group started in 1996 largely to manage territorial disputes that arose from the collapse of the Soviet Union. The SCO originally had just five members: China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and Tajikistan, adding Uzbekistan in 2001 and India and Pakistan in 2017. Iran was admitted as a full member in July. Although the group is largely ineffective, having been stalled by the rivalry between China and India, Tehran’s membership signals the failure of the United States to effectively isolate the country and the growth of an illiberal alliance. 

IranSource

Jul 13, 2023

Iran joining the SCO isn’t surprising. But Beijing’s promotion of illiberal norms in Eurasia should get more attention.

By Jonathan Fulton

Deeper coordination between Iran and other member states gives momentum to the China-centered illiberal order being promoted by Beijing.

China East Asia

July 10: Russia sides with the United Arab Emirates over Iran on territorial claims 

Iran and the UAE have had a decades-long territorial dispute over the islands of Abu Musa and the Greater and Lesser Tunbs in the Strait of Hormuz. Both countries claim historical ties to the islands, dating back centuries. For a large part of the twentieth century, the British controlled the islands. When they left in 1971, Iran immediately seized control of the islands and has effectively, if not legally, administered them ever since. The UAE’s efforts to diplomatically regain control of the islands have not ceased for the past fifty years. Most recently, Russia has surprised the world by voicing support for Abu Dhabi’s territorial claims despite the former’s strong relationship with Tehran.

As senior fellow Mark Katz explained, “The Russia-GCC joint statement does nothing to alter the fact that Iran remains in control of the three islands and is likely to remain so.”

MENASource

Jul 18, 2023

Is Russia really siding with the UAE against Iran?

By Mark N. Katz

For Russia to endorse the GCC’s position on three islands is especially surprising, considering how much Iran has done to support Moscow.

Iran Middle East

July 18: Israeli President Isaac Herzog visits the United States

Despite a decades-long friendship, the Joe Biden-Benjamin Netanyahu relationship has been strained by the current right-wing government in Israel—the most extreme in the country’s history. In July, Israeli President Isaac Herzog, whose role is largely ceremonial, was welcomed to the Oval Office. During the meeting, President Biden reaffirmed the “unbreakable” friendship between the United States and Israel and strengthened his commitment to preventing Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon. Biden also stated that a meeting between himself and Netanyahu in Washington was in the works for the coming months.

While in the United States, Herzog addressed Congress and met with American Jewish leaders. However, as senior fellow Shalom Lipner highlighted, “Israel and the United States have some tough decisions to make if they harbor any hopes of refreshing the trifecta—shared values, shared interests, and broad-based support—which has kept them famously on the same page.”

MENASource

Jul 17, 2023

At risk of separating, can Israel and the US renew their vows?

By Shalom Lipner

President Joe Biden is rolling out the red carpet for his Israeli counterpart, Isaac Herzog, who arrives in the United States on July 18.

Israel Middle East

August 10: United States reaches hostage deal with Iran 

After months of negotiations, the United States and Iran reached a deal to exchange prisoners. In September, five Iranian-Americans held hostage in Iran on unsubstantiated charges were released in exchange for five Iranians imprisoned in the United States on charges of sanction violations. “Many have criticized the deal as constituting a ransom payment, incentivizing Tehran’s hostage-taking model,” said staff lawyer Celeste Kmiotek. The United States also released $6 billion of frozen Iranian funds held in South Korean banks, which was transferred to Qatari banks for humanitarian purposes but may be re-frozen by Congress. After the American hostages returned home, the Biden administration introduced new sanctions against Iran. 

The Islamic Republic is holding at least three other hostages who may be considered nationals under the Levinson Act: Green Card holder Shahab Dalili; US permanent resident Afshin Sheikholeslami Vatani; and US resident Jamshid Sharmahd.

IranSource

Aug 17, 2023

The Levinson Act means all Americans must return home—not just citizens

By Celeste Kmiotek

Shahab Dalili, Afshin Sheikholeslami Vatani, and Jamshid Sharmahd are all considered US nationals under the Levinson Act.

Human Rights Iran

August 20: Protests and strikes in Sweida, Syria begin

In August, the pan-Syrian August 10 movement was founded by Syrian opposition leaders to end poor economic conditions, violence, and sectarianism in Syria. Simultaneously, the Free Alawite Officers published a declaration expressing demands of the Assad regime, including an end to Iranian influence in the country and the creation of accountability methods. Both groups appealed to the Alawite community of Syria. Just days later, small-scale protests began.

On August 17, a general strike was called in Sweida—a predominantly Druze area—and hundreds of protesters gathered near police headquarters and the governor’s office, chanting anti-Assad regime slogans. Protesters participated in mass demonstrations, causing road closures, boycotts, and destruction of Baath party property. As the protests continued throughout August and into September, the movement became more explicitly anti-government, calling out the crimes of the Assad regime and demanding his overthrow, and even spread to areas that traditionally supported the dictator. The government responded to the protests violently, killing many demonstrators.

Despite this, it seems the regime has been unable to stop the protests thus far. “It may be unexpected to witness this scene after all the suppression and war crimes committed by the Assad regime in Syria,” emphasized writer Rima Flihan. “However, it signifies that the desire for change in Syria still exists within the Syrian people.”

MENASource

Sep 5, 2023

The uprising in Sweida will continue until the regime changes in Syria

By Rima Flihan

These demonstrations call for a change in the Syrian regime and the full implementation of UNSC Resolution 2254.

Middle East Politics & Diplomacy

August 22-August 24: Middle Eastern countries admitted to BRICS 

During the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) summit in South Africa in August, the group—which is a geopolitical rival to the G7—announced the admittance of six new countries to the bloc, including four Middle Eastern countries: Egypt, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE. This move was made to give a greater voice to the Global South and to grow BRICS’s share of the global economy.

However, the divide that the G7 and BRICS represent between the Global North and Global South is unclear. BRICS contains important American strategic allies like India and Saudi Arabia, and there are significant geopolitical tensions between BRICS members India and China. Senior fellow Mark Katz pointed out that “For Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE in particular, joining BRICS is a statement that while they cooperate with the United States and the West, they also cooperate with Russia and China and that the West will just have to accept this.”

MENASource

Aug 25, 2023

The BRICS come to the Middle East and North Africa

By Mark N. Katz

For Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE in particular, joining BRICS is a statement that while they cooperate with the United States and the West, they also cooperate with Russia and China

International Financial Institutions International Markets

September 9: White House Announces India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor

In September, the Memorandum of Understanding for the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) was signed at the G20 summit in New Delhi. The project, seen as an American alternative to China’s Belt and Road Initiative, aims to promote economic development, integration, and connectivity throughout Asia, Europe, and the Middle East. The rail and shipping networks are to include many strategic American allies and will travel through India, Europe, Greece, Israel, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE.

“The project serves primarily as a US diplomatic tool to counter China’s influence in the Middle East. In fact, IMEC should be considered in the same light as Xi Jinping’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI): an ambitious foreign policy project that captures the world’s attention, even though it is unlikely to deliver on its lofty promises,” claimed senior fellow Jean-Loup Saman.

The IMEC is just the latest initiative in the growing global competition between the United States and China.

MENASource

Oct 6, 2023

The India-Middle East Corridor: a Biden Road Initiative?

By Jean-Loup Samaan

Economists and regional experts expressed their reservations on the feasibility—both politically and financially—of a corridor that would redraw the map of infrastructure across Eurasia.

Economy & Business Financial Regulation

September 10: Tragic floods strike Libyan city of Derna 

Tropical Storm Daniel hit Libya on September 10, becoming the deadliest storm recorded in the Mediterranean. The storm caused the failure of two dams in the city of Derna, releasing 30 million cubic meters of water, which flooded the city and resulted in an estimated 5,300-20,000 deaths. While Libyans were grieving and rescue efforts were still underway, it was revealed that the dams burst because of decades of neglect.

After Libyan dictator Muammar Gaddafi was overthrown in 2011, the city changed hands four times and was a battleground in the Libyan civil war. As North Africa director Karim Mezran explained, “the tragedy of the dam collapse results from neglected dam maintenance, city infrastructure, and civil services, such as inadequately trained and equipped firefighters and medical personnel, the absence of a warning system, and numerous other issues.”

MENASource

Sep 22, 2023

The Derna catastrophe is a sign that the international community needs to take action in Libya

By Karim Mezran

This narrow window of opportunity is unlikely to remain open for long.

Libya Middle East

September 16: First anniversary of Mahsa Amini’s death 

On September 16, 2022, twenty-two-year-old Kurdish-Iranian Mahsa Jina Amini died while in custody of the so-called morality police. Amini was arrested for “violating” mandatory hijab law. In the year since her murder, mass anti-regime protests erupted across Iran. #Mahsa_Amini reportedly broke the X (formerly known as Twitter) hashtag record, as the cause was taken up globally. Amini’s death also united the Iranian diaspora, which mirrored and amplified the voices of the people of Iran.

“I strongly believe that the Woman, Life, Freedom uprising is the beginning of the end for the Islamic Republic… By no means are we going to stand back and surrender. We will be victorious,” said one Gen Z Iranian protester on the anniversary of the protest movement.

IranSource

Sep 13, 2023

Letters from women protesters inside Iran: One year after #MahsaAmini’s death 

By Khosro Sayeh Isfahani

“The people of Iran want to overthrow this regime. If you believe in freedom, equality, and human rights, remember that this regime stands against these values.”

Human Rights Iran

September 22: Senator Bob Menendez indicted in corruption case with the Egyptian government 

United States Senator and Chair of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations Bob Menendez (D-NJ) was indicted on federal corruption charges. The charges allege that Menendez, his wife, and three New Jersey businessmen participated in a years-long bribery scheme where Menendez and his wife received hundreds of thousands of dollars in exchange for Menendez’s agreement to use his official position to benefit the businessmen and the Egyptian government. At least one of the businessmen had close connections with Egyptian government officials.

Menendez was introduced to Egyptian intelligence and military officials through the businessmen and provided them with sensitive, non-public US government information, including information on employees in the US Embassy in Cairo. Menendez also used his position to influence foreign military financing and sales of military equipment for the benefit of Egypt. Senior fellow Shahira Amin noted, “Despite the low-key coverage of the shocking corruption scheme by the mainstream Egyptian media, the bribery case stirred controversy on Egyptian social media platforms.”

MENASource

Oct 4, 2023

Menendez’s case coverage is relatively muted in Egypt. That might be intentional.

By Shahira Amin

Egypt’s predominantly pro-government media has chosen to either dismiss altogether or downplay the allegations against Senator Bob Menendez.

Corruption Democratic Transitions

October 7: Outbreak of the Israel-Hamas war 

On October 7, the fiftieth anniversary of the Yom Kippur war, Hamas carried out a brutal terror attack in southern Israel, killing between 1,200-1,400 people, injuring hundreds more, and kidnapping approximately 240 people (primarily civilians) before holding them hostage in the Gaza Strip. The attack, which saw the largest number of Jews killed in a single day since the Holocaust, included reports of torture, mutilation, decapitation, sexual violence, and immolation. Simultaneous to the ground attack, Hamas launched a rocket barrage at Israel consisting of at least three thousand rockets. Israel declared war on Hamas the same day, launching its offensive to destroy “the military and governmental capabilities of Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad.”

On October 27, Israel began its ground invasion, attempting to destroy Hamas’s infrastructure and tunnels and clear northern Gaza of its operatives. Since Israel began its bombardment of Gaza, a massive humanitarian crisis has erupted. Approximately 18,400 Gazans, primarily women and children, have been killed, according to the Hamas-run Gaza Health Ministry. 1.9 million Gazans have been internally displaced, and essential resources, such as food, water, and fuel, are scarce. After weeks of negotiations between Israel and Hamas, orchestrated by Qatar, Egypt, and the United States, the parties reached a ceasefire deal that lasted from November 24 to December 1. The deal saw the release of 105 hostages in exchange for over 230 Palestinian prisoners and up to two hundred trucks of aid delivered to Gaza daily.

The Israel-Hamas war also has the potential to expand into a regional war. Iran’s Resistance Axis has already been active. The border between Israel and Lebanon has seen an escalation of small-scale attacks, and the Houthis have launched missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles at Israel from Yemen. The war has also paused previous diplomatic efforts in the region, like the potential normalization between Israel and Saudi Arabia. The effects of the war will be widespread. 

Israel-Hamas war

Experts from across the Atlantic Council are providing insight and analysis at speed and in depth on the October 7, 2023 Hamas attack, Israel’s response, and how the emerging conflict is upending the Middle East and the world.

October 17: Iran-backed militia strikes in Iraq and Syria 

Since the outbreak of the Israel-Hamas war, US troops and military personnel in Iraq and Syria have endured drone and rocket attacks launched by various Iran-backed militias and terrorist organizations. 3,400 US troops are stationed in the two countries to assist local forces in preventing the resurgence of the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS). In the more than forty attacks in the last two months, forty-five US troops have been injured. The United States has responded to the attacks, carrying out a number of air strikes against military targets and strongholds of the militias and terror groups.

Iran’s proxies justify their attacks by asserting that the United States shares the blame for Israel’s declaration of war against Hamas. Since October 7, the United States has bolstered its military presence in the region, sending aircraft carriers and troops and increasing drone surveillance.

MENASource

Nov 22, 2023

Islamic Resistance in Iraq appears to be responsible for attacks in the country and there’s no end in sight 

By Lizzie Porter

Iraq is witnessing part of the regional fallout from the Israel-Hamas war, and Iraqi bases housing US troops are feeling that most forcefully.

Iran Iraq

November 14: Speaker of Iraq’s parliament ousted

In November, Iraq’s Federal Supreme Court revoked the parliamentary membership of its speaker, Mohammed al-Halbousi, along with member Laith al-Dulaimi. Although the court did not disclose its reasoning, the decision was released following an argument between Halbousi and Dulaimi over allegations that the speaker forged Dulaimi’s signature. In reaction to the ruling, members of the speaker’s party, Takadum, resigned from parliament. Critics of the decision say it has the potential to set a dangerous, anti-constitutional precedent, as decisions from the highest court cannot be appealed.

“The timing of this development is particularly crucial, given that Iraq, like the rest of the region, is entangled in the escalating Israel-Hamas war,” explained Abbas Kadhim, director of the Iraq Initiative. “Additionally, the country is in the midst of an election campaign to reinstate provincial councils.”

MENASource

Nov 17, 2023

Iraq’s parliamentary speaker was removed. What’s next for the country?

By Abbas Kadhim

The current crisis dates back to May 2022, when Mohamed al-Halbousi removed one of his bloc’s members from parliament.

Elections Iraq

November 30-December 12: COP28 in the United Arab Emirates

The United Nations Climate Change Conference, also known as COP, convened 197 member countries in Dubai to discuss progress and plan measures to combat climate change. The decision to host this year’s conference in the UAE has caused some controversy, as the country is a major oil producer.

Just days before the conference began, news leaked alleging that the UAE planned on using its proximity to the summit as a forum to discuss oil and gas deals. Major topics of COP28 included responses to the Global Stocktake synthesis report, which revealed the failure to reduce the rise in global temperatures, the shift away from fossil fuels, and the impacts of climate change on cities.  

MENASource

Nov 30, 2023

COP28 is here. These are the Global South’s demands and expectations.

By Lama El Hatow

The COP28 negotiations will prove to be challenging given all the demands and expectations on the table in this COP.

Civil Society Energy & Environment

December 10-December 12: Egyptian presidential elections 

As Egyptians headed to the polls for presidential elections, it was all but certain that President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi would serve a third term, but the election came at a challenging time: Egypt’s economy is suffering with inflation at an all-time high; its neighbors are fighting a brutal war that poses risks to Egypt’s border and security; and the country continues to experience international and domestic pressure regarding its human rights record. Despite these conditions, there was no question about Sisi’s victory.

Though there were three other candidates formally in the race, the only serious competitor, Ahmed El-Tantawy, was forced to end his campaign, and his supporters were harassed, intimidated, and arrested. The election formalized six more years of Sisi’s reign. “Be that as it may, Sisi still needs to win over the hearts and minds of disgruntled Egyptians, which may prove to be his biggest challenge during his third term in office,” highlighted senior fellow Shahira Amin.

MENASource

Dec 7, 2023

President Sisi’s third term will be his biggest challenge—not the upcoming Egyptian election 

By Shahira Amin

While it is certain that Abdel Fattah el-Sisi will win a third term, it is uncertain what will happen after the vote and when the Gaza war is over.

Elections Middle East

Rachel Friedman is a Young Global Professional with the Middle East Programs at the Atlantic Council. 

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Israel’s war in the neighboring Gaza Strip, meanwhile, has overshadowed the upcoming election. Pre-occupied with the developments unfolding next door, many Egyptians have put their domestic issues and economic woes on the back burner for the time being. Giant portraits of a smiling Sisi plastered on billboards and hanging from lampposts in the main squares as well as across the streets of the capital Cairo are the only reminders that an election is taking place.     

Learning from the mistakes of the last presidential election held in 2018—which at the time was denounced as “farcical” by Egyptian and international human rights organizations—Egyptian authorities are seeking to give some semblance of a democratic, multi-candidate election this time around. In the previous election, Sisi had run against a little-known challenger—Moussa Mostafa Moussa, an architect-turned-politician who had endorsed a Sisi candidacy. Moussa became the sole candidate against Sisi after several serious presidential hopefuls dropped out of the race or were arrested on what Amnesty International described as “trumped up” charges.

In the upcoming election, Sisi is competing against three rival candidates from various political parties. However, the fact that all three are non-military men has caused some Egyptians to doubt the election. The Egyptian military, the institution from which every modern Egyptian leader has emerged—save for the former Muslim Brotherhood President Mohamed Morsi, who was ousted by the army in 2013—has made clear it is unwilling to cede power to a civilian government.

Egyptians might have believed the elections were genuine if it had not been for the fact that one serious competitor—Ahmed el-Tantawy, a former member of parliament and former head of the leftist Karama (Dignity) Party—was forced to end his presidential bid just hours before the deadline for announcing candidacy on October 14. Tantawy had failed to collect the required number of endorsements to allow him to submit his bid formally. Many of Tantawy’s supporters cited harassment—and some even physical assault—by pro-government mobs at public notaries when supporters tried to register their support for his candidacy—allegations that have been denied by members of the National Elections Authority overseeing the elections.

Dozens of Tantawy’s supporters have been arrested in recent weeks and face charges of “falsifying” their endorsements for his candidacy. Several of Tantawy’s family members have also been arrested and detained. Meanwhile, Tantawy and twenty-two members of his campaign are facing trial on the accusation of “inciting others to influence the conduct of the electoral process.” However, Egyptian rights organizations have rebuffed the charge. In a joint statement released on November 12, the rights groups condemned “the escalating retaliatory practices” against the opposition politician, which they said were meant to stop Tantawy from exercising his legitimate right to run in the presidential race. 

Abdel Sanad Yamama, who heads Egypt’s oldest political party, Al Wafd, was the first to announce his candidacy. He has said in interviews that he was confident that his party’s mass appeal would win him votes.

In the early days after its establishment in the wake of the 1919 popular uprising against British rule, Al Wafd was a liberal opposition force with a massive following. Over the years, however, the party has lost its luster and clout and seen its popularity dwindle. In the current stifling political climate, it has been weakened even further and dismissed by some critics as “irrelevant.”

One analyst, who prefers to remain anonymous, told me that Yamama’s presidential bid was “little more than window dressing,” meant to create a more favorable impression of the elections.

“A Wafd candidate will stand little to no chance of winning the election against Sisi,” Hassan Nafaa, a political science professor at Cairo University, was quoted as saying by France24 in 2019.

Moreover, Yamama does not have the full backing of his party. Internal divisions persist within Al Wafd, with some members throwing their weight behind Fouad Badrawi, a former member of parliament and a member of Al Wafd Supreme Council who had sought to be the party’s presidential nominee.    

Farid Zahran, the head of the leftist Social Democratic Party, is another presidential hopeful and, perhaps, the best-known of the three rival candidates running against Sisi. He has gained recognition within intellectual circles for his political contributions, which have been published in various local newspapers and on news sites. Zahran was appointed by President Sisi as a member of the Egyptian Senate in 2021, possibly to reward him for backing the 2013 overthrow of the then-Muslim Brotherhood president by military-backed protests.

Dismissing criticism of the election as a theatrical farce, he recently told the independent Al Masry Al Youm website that “my credentials do not permit me to be part of a staged election,” insisting that his candidacy was based on his party’s decision to field a candidate that could unite opposition forces and garner their support.

Zahran advocates for a mixed system of governance that grants equal powers to parliament and the head of state and a free market economy as the only way to achieve social justice. He also promises to prioritize the release of political detainees and prisoners of conscience if he were to win the election and vows to diminish the role of the state in the economy by relinquishing ownership of strategic assets like the Suez Canal and the Iron and Steel Company. But his pledges have failed to entice even the young revolutionaries who led the 2011 uprising against former President Hosni Mubarak and have decried the arbitrary detentions of dissenters and the state monopoly over the economy. Many activists have dismissed Zahran’s campaign promises as “hollow” and tell me that his pledges are no more than “empty campaign talk.”

Hazem Omar, an engineer and member of the little-known People’s Republican Party, formed in 2012, meanwhile, vows to reform the education and healthcare systems. His campaign platform is again meant to appeal to Sisi’s opponents, who have criticized him for prioritizing infrastructure mega-projects with questionable economic benefits over education and healthcare.

During a televised interview on the talk show El Hekaya, broadcast on the Saudi-owned satellite channel MBC Masr on November 28, Omar sought to assure skeptical Egyptians that “your vote counts as it will determine who will become the president of Egypt.” He cautioned against voter apathy, telling viewers that boycotting the elections and calling them a sham is “inappropriate.”  

Voter turnout was markedly low at around 40 percent and 47.5 percent in the last two elections held in 2018 and 2014 respectively. Many Egyptians failed to show up at polling stations, believing that the results were pre-determined. A repeat of the voter apathy witnessed in the last two elections would undermine Sisi’s legitimacy. That is why the Sisi government has gone to great pains to place several competitors on the ballot and ensure that Sisi doesn’t run opposed—a large voter turnout would dispel doubts about Sisi’s popularity and speculations of potential unrest.   

Sisi himself has, so far, done little campaigning and has not given any television or newspaper interviews. That’s either because he is overwhelmed by multiple challenges not least of which is keeping the Gaza war from spilling over into Egypt or because he is confident that his victory in the election is assured.

Israel’s relentless bombardment of the besieged Gaza Strip has been both a blessing and a curse for Sisi. It has either dented his popularity or earned him greater support—depending on who you talk to. Some Egyptians are utterly dismayed with the government’s handling of the conflict raging on Egypt’s northern border and have called for the permanent opening of the Rafah border crossing to allow Palestinians to flee the violence. 

Critics see Sisi as “complicit” in Israel’s killings of civilians and feel helpless and ashamed that Egypt stood idly by and allowed it to happen. Others applaud him for standing firm and not allowing Egypt to be drawn into the conflict. They commend his role in overseeing the flow of humanitarian aid into Gaza and negotiating alongside Qatar and the United States to secure the release of hostages held captive by Hamas in exchange for Palestinian detainees. They also praise him for what they view as foiling an Israeli scheme to displace Palestinians into Egypt—despite this not having ever been Israeli policy.

The Gaza war has polarized the already divided country even further. While it is certain that Sisi will win a third term in the election, it is uncertain what will happen after the vote and when the war is over. Many Egyptians will once again shift their attention to their harsh everyday reality of grappling with soaring prices, double-digit inflation, and high unemployment. With talk of another devaluation of the Egyptian currency after the election, the situation may get even worse for many low-income families that can barely survive.

On the other hand, Sisi has managed to secure the backing of Western allies, including the United States, and is being promised handsome rewards for Cairo’s pivotal role in the conflict. The European Union has announced plans to support Egypt with $10 billion worth of investments in the coming months “to buffer the economy from the impact of Israel’s war on Gaza and the potential spike in refugee flows.” The International Monetary Fund is also mulling over expanding Egypt’s $3 billion loan program by an “unspecified amount” to help the country overcome economic difficulties resulting from the war, such as a drop in tourism and rising energy costs. 

Be that as it may, Sisi still needs to win over the hearts and minds of disgruntled Egyptians, which may prove to be his biggest challenge during his third term in office. 

Shahira Amin is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative and an independent journalist based in Cairo. A former contributor to CNN’s Inside Africa, Amin has been covering the development in post-revolution Egypt for several outlets, including Index on Censorship and Al-Monitor. Follow her on X: @sherryamin13.

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This movement was registered at the beginning of October in the aftermath of the October 7 terrorist attack and is connected to former Knesset Member Avichai Boaron of the Likud party and some activists in pro-settlement and extreme right-wing movements. Not surprisingly, its content on social media is liked and shared by prominent Likud activists, such as Orly Lev, one of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s staunch supporters.  

Uri Israel is not the only right-wing movement that speaks and acts against the PA and warns about the possible menace of its return to the Gaza Strip. 

“I have investigated terrorists, and I say clearly, money drives terrorism! It is forbidden to transfer money to the Palestinian Authority,” said Lieutenant Colonel Attorney Maurice Hirsch, former head of the military prosecution in the West Bank, on November 6.

On the same day when the anti-Abbas campaign was launched by Uri Israel, Prime Minister Netanyahu made a statement about the leader of the PA, too. Responding to the announcement of the PA Foreign Ministry that alleged the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) had killed the partygoers at the Nova music festival in Re’im on October 7, Netanyahu said on November 19: “He who denies the Holocaust denies the massacre. We will not allow him to rule Gaza.”

It seems that Netanyahu was also indirectly responding to the earlier statement of US President Joe Biden, who argued in a Washington Post op-ed on November 18 that the Palestinian Authority should ultimately govern the Gaza Strip and the West Bank following the Israel-Hamas war.

Two-state solution? 

A year ago, Netanyahu established a political alliance and formed a government with the most ultra right-wing political forces in Israel, including the Likud, which believes that a two-state solution is a doomsday scenario that should be prevented at any cost. Tellingly, Netanyahu objects to the PA ruling Gaza due to Abbas’s denial of the Holocaust and the PA’s denial of the October 7 massacre. However, he also believes the same PA should continue functioning in the West Bank.  

In his remarks at the Foreign Affairs and Security Committee at the Knesset this summer, Netanyahu referred to the future of the PA as a day after the era of 88-year-old Abbas: “We need the Palestinian Authority, we will help it financially—we have no interest in it falling.” Netanyahu also said that “the Palestinian aspiration for a state must be suppressed.”

In fact, this logic was always a significant part of “the conception”—that the PA should exist so that it will be able to govern the Palestinians in the West Bank but also remain weak so that it will be unable to fulfill any state-related ambitions. That’s why Hamas in Gaza was so instrumental in achieving this goal—it was a tactical ally in Netanyahu’s war against the PA.

On October 7, when Hamas terrorists crushed the fence and poured into Israeli towns and kibbutzim, slaughtered over 1,200, and kidnapped over 240 Israelis and foreigners, it became clear that this long-term strategy had exploded in Israel’s face and resulted in the most horrific terrorist attack and loss of human lives in Israel’s history.  

At that moment, when the heads of all security services, as well as some Likud ministers, assumed responsibility for the disaster, and the official death of the “conception” was proclaimed in Israeli media, it seemed that it was time to reinvent the original idea of the two-state solution: Palestinian self-rule in both the Gaza Strip and West Bank; the construction of state institutions; negotiations; and an eventual political solution that would result in the establishment of a Palestinian state. 

On October 19, Tzachi Hanegbi, Israel’s national security advisor, suggested that the Palestinian Authority will step in instead of Hamas in Gaza. A two-state solution or the creation of a Palestinian state wasn’t mentioned. Yet, Hanegbi was immediately attacked by Likud MKs; Tally Gotlib was one among them, writing on X (formerly known as Twitter) that Hanegbi’s idea was “delusional” before sending her condolences to those who believed that strengthening the PA would prevent terrorist attacks. Separately, Israeli Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich, who represents an extreme right-wing party, said that installing Abbas in Gaza instead of Hamas was like “changing a cow for a donkey,” whatever that might mean.

The other side of the political map wasn’t thrilled about Abbas’s return to Gaza either but seemed to consider it the lesser evil to the continuation of Hamas rule or a security vacuum. 

“Unfortunately, Abu Mazen [nickname for Abbas] is a well-known Holocaust denier, the Palestinian Authority’s statement denying the massacre on October 7 is a scoundrel, and the transfer of funds from the Palestinian Authority to the families of martyrs infuriates anyone with a heart. And, yet, the Palestinian Authority is better than the murderous Hamas, and if we could get it back into the Gaza Strip, we would do it. Between the lesser evil and the greater evil, the lesser evil is better,” former deputy chief of staff and ex-member of Knesset Yair Golan wrote on X.  

What’s next?

Weeks have passed since the horrific tragedy that shook every Israeli and led to the war against Hamas, which used to be considered a “strategic asset” in an attempt to prevent the creation of the Palestinian state. Currently, Netanyahu and the right-wing are back to their smear campaign against the PA and essentially back to the “conception” that any evil is better than the prospect of a Palestinian state.

Benny Gantz, the former defense minister in the Yair Lapid and Naftali Bennett government—who is now rising quickly in the polls and is considered a possible candidate to replace Netanyahu—is now part of the emergency government and is mostly keeping quiet in an attempt not to jeopardize his chances of premiership. In 2021, Gantz met PA Chairman Abbas in his house in Rosh HaAyin to explore “political horizons”—something many Israelis saw at the time as his readiness to negotiate with and accept the PA.

Now, it seems that the Israeli government intentionally chooses to delay the inevitable discussion about the day after in Gaza, which, given the international pressure, might come sooner than Israeli officials hope. Netanyahu still hopes to safeguard his political future; the extremists around him believe that the war in Gaza presents them with a unique opportunity to get rid of not only Hamas but Palestinians, too (Gila Gamliel, the minister of intelligence who doesn’t have any authority over any of the intelligence services, had penned an article in the Jerusalem Post about the possible “exodus” of Palestinians from Gaza). Meanwhile, more moderate Likud seniors, such as Nir Barkat, keep to themselves, fearing the notorious “poison machine” of Netanyahu’s loyalists.

According to a November survey conducted by Mitvim Institute for Regional Foreign Policies, 27 percent of the Israeli public supports the two-state solution. In comparison, 25 percent believe that Israel should opt for unilateral disengagement from the West Bank. Only 5 percent believe in the continuation of “conflict management” (Netanyahu’s strategy), while 28 percent support some form of annexation (19 percent of respondents didn’t have an answer), and 52 percent believe that Israel should disengage from the Palestinians, whether that be through some kind of agreement or unilaterally (in the way it was done in the Gaza Strip in 2005).  

With that in mind, several things need to happen very soon so that the Gaza Strip, West Bank, and Israel have a chance for peace and stability: elections in Israel, reforms in the Palestinian Authority, and a firm international position that puts the two-state solution on the table. Otherwise, the vacuum in Gaza will quickly fill with Hamas 2.0, the weak PA might collapse in the West Bank, and Israel will be trapped in an endless circle of hostilities in many of its frontiers. The “day after” discussion should start today before it’s too late. 

Ksenia Svetlova is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs, and is the director of the Israel-Middle East Relations Program at Mitvim. Follow her on X: @KseniaSvetlova.

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• Introduction
• Definitions, institutions, and norms
• Trends and uncertainties
• Scenarios
• Sahel regional analysis
• Questions for policymakers

I. Introduction

The multilateral system, defined as the set of rules, norms, and institutions that together constitute the world’s governance architecture, is not static. Rather, this system both evolves over time and, less frequently, is reconstituted by periodic upheavals. Such upheavals usually occur during or after a global crisis—for example, a major power war (1815, 1918, 1945)—or another extended period during which underlying drivers of change allow a reset of the global system. Such changes allow the new system to function for a time until dynamics again shift underneath it. Systems come under strain when they cannot adjust to new geopolitical, technological, sociopolitical, demographic, and (in the twenty-first century) environmental realities.

The current multilateral system, the core components of which were created in the first decade after World War II and then reshaped after the end of the Cold War, is now facing such a period because it bears little resemblance to the world that existed when it was created.

Several drivers of change threaten to erode hard-earned gains that the multilateral system has delivered since 1945. Today’s challenges include but are not limited to rising geopolitical tensions among nuclear-armed major powers, a seemingly inevitable climate catastrophe, technological changes that have the potential to remake every aspect of life, and the increasing powers and capabilities of non-state actors to reshape sub-national, national, and international affairs (for better and for worse). There is a flip side: within each challenge also lies an opportunity for positive transformational change.

These drivers have altered and continue to alter the dynamics of armed conflicts around the world. For example, the proliferation of increasingly capable armed nonstate actors (ANSAs) have reshaped the contours of conflict, furthering the fragmentation of international affairs, and altering how states and multilateral institutions such as the United Nations (UN) have approached conflict resolution and peacebuilding. Understanding the evolution and impact of these drivers on the conflict-prevention architecture should enable key state and nonstate actors within the multilateral system to anticipate change and reform governance approaches.

It is important to emphasize that the post-1945 multilateral system has delivered on two core points, i.e., the lack of systemic war among major powers (in other words, no third world war) and global economic growth—yet there are now, and have been since the creation of the system, many dissenters in the North and South. The postwar system never has eliminated wars and conflicts, which continue to this day (if admittedly not among and between the major powers, which must be counted as a significant benefit of the current system); not all countries and populations have benefited equally from the robust and unprecedented global economic growth since the 1950s; the major powers, including those most supportive of the system (the United States in particular) have not always acted consistently with the ideals that they claim the system embodies; and there is a misalignment of economic and demographic weight on the one hand with political power on the other (by which is meant the distribution of voting power within the system’s core multilateral institutions).

The world is in a critical period, given the system’s rising inability to tackle challenges related to the management of conflict—to its prevention, its outbreak, and its resolution. This problem is reflected in how the United Nations, the principal multilateral institution that is responsible for the management of conflict, assesses its own situation vis-à-vis conflict dynamics in the world today. In Our Common Agenda (2021), UN Secretary-General António Guterres argued that although “investments in prevention and preparedness pay for themselves many times over,” there has been “too little progress on adequate, predictable and sustained financing for peacebuilding” by UN member states. Guterres reiterated these points in a July 2023 policy brief, A New Agenda for Peace, written as a preparatory document for the UN’s 2024 Summit of the Future.¹

Building on this call for action, this report assesses the impacts of structural forces or drivers—otherwise known as global trends and uncertainties—on the future of global governance including the governance of conflict throughout the conflict cycle, meaning conflict prevention, peacekeeping, and peacebuilding. Those four core trends and uncertainties (often called “drivers” of change) are about geopolitics, the rise of new actors within the global system, the rapidly changing planet that we live on, and the speed and impacts of technological transformations. Atlantic Council staff utilized a strategic foresight methodology to assess how these global trends and uncertainties might reshape the world a decade into the future, until the mid-2030s. This assessment produced four alternative scenarios, which are stories about what the world in the mid-2030s might look like. Those four scenarios, presented in section IV of this paper, are designed to provoke the readers’ imaginations about what could plausibly occur over the coming decade given the dynamic interaction of the drivers of change identified in this report.

Over an eighteen-month time span, the project team conducted desk research, interviewed outside experts, and convened a series of workshops, all focused on assessing how the drivers of change might shape the future and what the world’s foremost governing bodies, including key multilateral institutions, national and subnational governments, and nonstate actors might do in response. Early drafts of this report were peer reviewed by external experts; their input has been incorporated into the final version.

This report contains the following sections. Section II provides an overview of the key terms, institutions, and norms that undergird the global conflict- prevention architecture. Section III provides a lengthy assessment of the four key drivers that are altering the world, and addresses their implications for the management of conflict across the conflict cycle. Section IV articulates the four scenarios that describe how these drivers of change might reshape the world in the 2030s, with impacts on global conflict and conflict prevention. These scenarios are complemented by a separate assessment of how they may play out in the Sahel region, which was chosen as this report’s regional case study.

The concluding section, section V, asks five big questions of the highest relevance about the future:

1. How should multilateral organizations such as the UN adapt to and manage a multipolar world?
2. How can multilateral organizations plan for and adapt to conflict-management challenges brought on by the evolution of Earth systems and emerging technologies?
3. What will the role of nonstate actors be in this space going forward and how can the UN and other multilateral institutions both leverage opportunities and manage threats posed by nonstate groups?
4. How can the UN support regional bodies in advancing their conflict-prevention and peace-building goals in line with global multilateralism?
5. How can the UN, and particularly the UN Security Council (UNSC), overcome concerns that it lacks legitimacy, especially in the Global South?

None of these five questions have simple answers. Rather, as with the scenarios, the questions (and their possible answers) are designed to prod policymakers, experts, and practitioners about the dynamics of global change in the coming years.

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II. A note on definitions, institutions, and norms

A. Conflict prevention and peacebuilding: Definitions

The definitions of conflict prevention and peacebuilding have long been debated within broader conflict studies fields. Their definitions have evolved over time. For example, the release of Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali’s 1992 Agenda for Peace asserted that conflict prevention consisted of four guiding principles: preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peacekeeping, and postconflict peacebuilding.² Further developments within the UN system included a 2001 report to the UNSC by then Secretary-General Kofi Annan, which highlighted the need for a “culture of prevention” that both prevented conflict in the near term while working to limit factors that may lead to the outbreak of conflict in the long term.³

Today, conflict prevention is defined by the United Nations Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs (DPPA) as “[involving] diplomatic measures to keep intra-state or inter-state tensions and disputes from escalating into violent conflict.”⁴ It encompasses structural, operational, and transnational components:

• Structural conflict prevention addresses the root causes of conflict over the longer term and often employs tools rooted in development and economic policy.⁵
• Operational conflict prevention or “direct prevention” refers to management of immediate crises in the short term and often employs diplomatic or military tools or both.⁶
• Transnational conflict prevention focuses on risks such as climate change or transnational organized crime (TOC) that undermine security and contribute to conflict.⁷

All types of prevention are dynamic rather than static; thus, global trends and uncertainties will shift the effectiveness of these three types of prevention. Greater multipolarity may limit transnational prevention if states are less able to agree on far-reaching global programs, for example, or it may accelerate the shift of operational conflict prevention from the UN Security Council to regional organizations.⁸

Peacebuilding consists of activities that build sustainable peace over time within a society or across them, often in postconflict settings.⁹ It is defined by the United Nations as follows:

“Peacebuilding aims to reduce the risk of lapsing or relapsing into conflict by strengthening national capacities at all levels for conflict management, and to lay the foundation for sustainable peace and development. It is a complex, long-term process of creating the necessary conditions for sustainable peace. Peacebuilding measures address core issues that effect the functioning of society and the State and seek to enhance the capacity of the State to effectively and legitimately carry out its core functions.”¹⁰

Several key United Nations reports have provided a definitional foundation, including the Agenda for Peace (1992), the UN Report of the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations on Uniting Our Strengths for Peace: Politics, Partnership and People (2015), and the Report[s] on Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace.¹¹ In 2016, the UN General Assembly and the UN Security Council passed twin resolutions, A/RES/70/262 and S/RES/2282, that focused on conflict resolution and peacebuilding, helping to codify the concept within the UN system.¹² These documents stressed the need for close coordination within the UN—among the Peacebuilding Support Office, the Department of Political Affairs, and the UN Development Programs, for example—and outside of it, for instance, with the World Bank.

In summary, the definitional debate concerning the terms conflict prevention and peacebuilding is robust in both academia and practice. This report recognizes that these terms are contested and varied in their definitions, but understands conflict prevention to consist of structural, operational, and transnational components while peacebuilding is seen as an encompassing process that seeks to build conflict-resilient nations at all stages of the conflict cycle (before, during, and afterward). The report therefore relies on the phrase “conflict management” to encapsulate the multiple dimensions of conflict prevention and peacebuilding.

B. Actors and institutions engaged in conflict prevention and peacebuilding activities

There are numerous actors at all levels of governance (supranational, regional, national, and local) that are involved in conflict prevention and peace-building processes. These actors span both state and nonstate institutions and organizations. While not exhaustive, this section focuses on several of the most important typologies and influential institutions.

The United Nations is by far the main actor at the global level. Its center is the United Nations Security Council, which is empowered to identify threats to peace, make recommendations regarding how best to restore peace, and authorize nonmilitary and military action to do so. UNSC decisions can take place at all stages of the conflict cycle and within a wide array of responses ranging from calling for dialogue to mandating military intervention.¹³ Despite the wide-ranging tools available to the Security Council, its ability to act depends on the willingness of its member states to engage, especially those of the five states holding veto power—the United States, France, Great Britain, Russia, and the People’s Republic of China. The UN General Assembly (UNGA) also can act on conflict prevention: it can hold special or emergency sessions on a wide range of issues and can adopt declarations on peace and disputes.¹⁴ Resolutions and decisions that are adopted at UNGA by a majority of states, however, are nonbinding on member states, in contrast to those of the UNSC.¹⁵

At the global level, the World Bank and International Monetary Fund also play critical roles in funding initiatives related to preventing the escalation of conflict, preserving institutions during and after crises, and developing opportunities for refugees within their host communities. The role of the World Bank is primarily focused on structural prevention, achieved through funding development-related projects such as those relating to climate change adaptation and mitigation and demographic change.¹⁶ In 2020, the World Bank released the World Bank Strategy for Fragility, Conflict, and Violence, which aligns the institution with making progress toward achieving the UNGA-adopted sustainable development goals (SDGs) while preventing the outbreak of violence.¹⁷ In 2021, it approved more than $30 billion for countries and territories affected by these problems.¹⁸

Whereas the World Bank focuses on funding projects that impact structural prevention, the IMF focuses on limiting the potential impact of economic shocks and mitigating their repercussions when they do occur. In 2022, the IMF released its own strategy for fragile and conflict-affected states (FCS), which calls for the advancement of several new policy tools and focuses on developing sustainable fiscal, monetary, and private-sector policy, all of which aim to grow economies and make them more resilient to the potential outbreak of conflict.¹⁹

There are numerous regional bodies that are critically important actors within specific geographic contexts. Within Africa, the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) emphasizes democracy promotion, early warning and conflict prevention, peace support operations, post-conflict reconstruction, and humanitarian action and disaster management.²⁰ The APSA’s fifteen members include the Peace and Security Council (PSC), which is the African Union’s decision-making body focused on conflict prevention and peacebuilding.²¹

The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) are examples of subregional organizations on the African continent that undertake multilateral conflict prevention and peace-building initiatives. ECOWAS maintains its own conflict-prevention framework, allowing its member states to discuss and cooperate on issues of conflict prevention and peacekeeping alongside international partners. The framework aims to mainstream conflict prevention across ECOWAS while building capacity to respond to conflict through the ECOWAS Standby Force.²² SADC consists of sixteen member states from across southern Africa. Though primarily focused on economic issues, SADC sees peace and security as vital to economic success for its members.²³ As such, it has invested in conflict prevention and in 2004, SADC set up the Mediation and Conflict Prevention and Preventative Diplomacy Structure that aims to foster political and security stability across member states.²⁴

Regional and subregional bodies like the AU, ECOWAS, and SADC differ in their political dynamics, resources, tools, and methodologies. While some groups have been able to forge a consensus among member states and make meaningful progress on advancing conflict-management goals, others are plagued by instability within and among member states, limiting their effectiveness. A positive example involves SADC, which has maintained a mission in Mozambique to address the ongoing crisis in the northern province of Cabo Delgado, contributing troops and developing capacity-building initiatives such as skill-development programs and enhancing police services.²⁵ ECOWAS, in contrast, is an example of a regional institution beset by instability among its West African member states, several of which have gone through one or more coups within the last several years.

Regional bodies within Africa have worked closely with the United Nations to advance conflict management. Collaboration has included coordination between the UN and the AU’s PSC, resulting in practical efforts as in Sudan, where the DPPA has supported AU-led peace efforts.²⁶

A bottom-line observation is that there is a larger trend in this space: the countries most impacted by conflict are taking a more active role in managing it through regional institutions, as the efforts of the AU, ECOWAS, and the SADC show.

Beyond Africa, other regional institutions have played important roles in conflict management including the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the European Union (EU), and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). In the post-Cold War era, NATO has provided stabilization operations in various theaters beyond the borders of its member states, notably in Afghanistan. It still maintains a presence in Kosovo, helping to maintain peace in the Western Balkans alongside the EU, and contributes to a capacity-building mission in Iraq, targeting the broader Iraqi security architecture. The EU maintains military missions across Africa, the Western Balkans, Eastern Europe, and the Middle East. It operates a mix of civilian- and military-led missions working to build partner military capacity to stabilize countries in conflict, maintain peace, and prevent the resurgence of conflict. The EU also funds international bodies such as the UN, giving approximately $1.1 million to the DPPA in 2022.²⁷ For its part, ASEAN has built a robust sense of trust among its member states, via numerous informal meetings and annual forums, which (arguably) has helped limit conflict within the region.²⁸

Outside of these multilateral and regional bodies, there are two important sets of actors that deserve attention. The first, obviously, are individual states, in particular the world’s major powers. Although the definition of a major power is a highly debated topic, this paper focuses most of its analytical attention on the two states that are widely viewed as the world’s foremost major powers, the United States and China. Russia and occasionally the European Union (as a supranational entity) and India are lumped into the major power category, but the inclusion of each of these entities as major powers is a contested topic among international relations scholars.²⁹

Major powers have important conflict-management functions. The United States, China, and Russia are three of the five permanent members (P5) of the UNSC, and as such hold veto power, which means they are critical to any determination (positive or negative) regarding creation of UN peacekeeping missions. Major powers provide financial, logistical, and occasional personnel (troops) support to peacekeeping operations and broader conflict-management operations.³⁰ Outside of the formal UN system, major powers also engage in bilateral conflict-management activities, including provision of development aid and investment funding that contribute to structural conflict prevention. Examples here are development aid provided through the United States Agency for International Development, and infrastructure development funding through China’s Belt and Road Initiative (though these institutions, their funding models, and their purposes admittedly are very different).³¹ Major powers also have intervened directly in conflict situations, with and without UN authorization. For example, after the 9/11 terror attacks, the United States invoked Article 51 of the UN Charter (right to self-defense) as justification for military operations in Afghanistan; later, its leadership of a NATO military coalition was viewed as justified by the UNSC’s authorization of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF).³² Major powers also act as spoilers. The Wagner Group, widely understood to be a Russian state-backed proxy organization, has routinely made peace harder to achieve across the Sahel and is suspected of being linked to several coups in the region.³³

Beyond the major powers, the world’s middle and emerging powers are important actors in conflict management. The definition of what constitutes a middle power also is contested, with some scholars defining middle powers as states that possess limited material capabilities and assume limited international tasks on the world stage.³⁴ Others define middle powers as states that actively pursue policies of mediation and conflict resolution, and advocate for multilateral solutions on the world stage.³⁵ This report views middle powers as countries with reasonable economic or military means, but which often punch above their weight diplomatically. Emerging powers have an analogous standing to middle powers, but generally are regarded as being on an upward trajectory (in demographic, economic, and military senses) toward becoming a major power. The dividing lines between middle and emerging powers are frequently unclear and ill defined. There are numerous countries that fit one or both definitions, and that are engaged in conflict management around the world. Turkey, as an example, played an instrumental and constructive role in brokering an essential grain deal between Russia and Ukraine in 2022, and for years has been involved in managing the ongoing Libyan crisis.³⁶ Such powers also sometimes are themselves engaged in conflict dynamics.

Finally, as discussed at length in section III, nonstate actors also play a large role in conflict prevention and peacebuilding. This includes two subtypes of actors, those that contribute positively to conflict management and those that do not. Examples of actors falling into the first camp include several major philanthropies such as the Gates Foundation, which has funded poverty-reduction programs in conflict-afflicted states around the world. Examples in the second camp include armed nonstate actors such as terror groups and transnational organized criminal groups that contribute to violence, undermining the sovereignty of the states in which they operate and harming civilians. Such groups also often carry out governance roles in the areas in which they operate, owing to weak or nonexistent state capacity. In Nigeria, the militant group Boko Haram collected taxes from the citizens who lived in the areas it controlled, while in Syria, ANSAs provide healthcare for their citizens.³⁷ These groups engage in such behavior to influence communities under their control.

There are several mechanisms that are used by different actors across the conflict cycle. These include early warning systems (EWS), preventive diplomacy and mediation, peace operations, development assistance, and post-conflict mediation reconstruction and recovery. EWS are systems that alert decision-makers to the potential of conflict and increased risks, relying on both qualitative and quantitative data. EWS are employed by governments, nongovernmental organizations, and multilateral bodies. Preventive diplomacy uses dialogue and mediation to prevent conflict from starting, escalating, or recurring. The UN secretary-general plays a pivotal role in preventive diplomacy through dialogue and leverage, and the deployment of special envoys. Conflict mediation is increasingly undertaken by a variety of bodies such as UN mediators, individual states, and nongovernmental organizations.

Development aid, targeted at conflict-affected and fragile states, is essential to reducing the potential outbreak of violent conflict and the possibility that conflict reemerges. Aid can be viewed as nonpolitical, but operating in conflict zones requires that aid and development organizations pay close additional attention to how their giving is perceived. Finally, in the post-conflict phase, activities include disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration programs, which may build domestic capacity to respond to criminal acts and reform the security sector, and which may develop institutions and bodies to work nationally to prevent the outbreak of conflict.

C. Norms within the conflict prevention and peacebuilding process

Two deeply held norms shape the conflict-prevention and peacebuilding fields, those of collective security and state sovereignty. Collective security, enshrined in the UN Charter (and within those of other institutions such as NATO), asserts that aggression can be prevented by collective action, including force, by other states, or at least responded to by collective action should aggression occur.³⁸ The UN developed the concept of peacekeeping operations as a collective security pillar starting in 1948 when a UN mediator asked for a small group of guards to monitor a truce between Israel and its neighbors, which was then formalized in 1956 during the Suez Crisis.³⁹ Peacekeeping is by no means the UN’s only role in collective security. Chapter VII of the UN Charter details how the UNSC will respond to threats to peace and acts of aggression, ranging from nonkinetic means (under Article 41, the UNSC may undertake “measures not involving the use of armed force”) to military intervention (under Article 42, the UNSC “may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security”).⁴⁰

Yet despite the benefits of the UN’s collective security apparatus, the concept has never fulfilled its original promise of preventing aggression. States only occasionally have confronted aggressors swiftly and decisively through collective security responses, via the UN and other multilateral bodies. (It is important to note that the reason for this shortcoming has less to do with the willingness of the UN as an institution to engage and more to do with political divisions among UN member states about whether and how to respond.)

State sovereignty asserts that no state should interfere in other states’ domestic affairs, a concept that can be traced at least back to the Peace of Westphalia in 1648. Although state sovereignty has remained a core principle of international affairs since then, there also has long been a debate regarding how to respond to human security concerns, including acts of genocide and other crimes against humanity that occur within states. The “responsibility to protect” (R2P) principle is the most famous and fairly recent attempt to blur the state sovereignty norm. Formulated in the 1990s and adopted in 2005 at the UN World Summit, the R2P principle asserts that if a state fails to protect its citizens from crimes against humanity, then other states (if authorized by multilateral bodies) have a right to intervene.⁴¹ R2P long has been controversial, even well before the 2011 UNSC-authorized no-fly zone to protect civilians in Libya, adopted via resolutions 1970 and 1973 and justified on R2P grounds.⁴² Although some saw the Libyan operation as the proper course of action under the R2P norm, others viewed it as justification for an imperialist act of aggression by a group of states, largely Western members of NATO, motivated by their own interests to use R2P as justification to remove Libyan leader Muammar al-Qaddafi.

Not all multilateral institutions that are engaged in collective security subscribe to the state sovereignty norm. For example, the AU was created in part as a reaction against its predecessor, the Organization of African Unity (OAU), which embraced the norm of noninterference in member states’ domestic affairs. This embrace was sufficient to see the OAU credibly accused of ignoring human security concerns. In contrast, early in its history, the AU embraced the norm of “non-indifference” to the suffering among member states’ citizens, signaling that the organization embraced a norm that acknowledged the centrality of human security considerations within its membership.⁴³

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III. Trends and uncertainties affecting the multilateral system and their hypothesized impacts

The multilateral system and conflict-prevention architectures are under pressure as novel developments and old fractures are reshaping how humanity lives, moves, cooperates, trades, and fights. Strategic foresight research long has insisted that there are multiple geopolitical, economic, social, environmental, and technological shifts underway that collectively are reshaping the global system, including the multilateral governance system. These trends and uncertainties, sometimes lumped together as “megatrends,” have significant implications for peace and security.⁴⁴

This report identifies four significant drivers of change that collectively are reshaping the global system now and will continue to do so into the future. These four are: geopolitical shifts, referring to power shifts among the world’s states; ongoing and rising significance of nonstate actors—groups and individuals—that collectively hold significant power within the global system, and therefore need to be accounted for and engaged with by the world’s states; Earth systems changes, including (prominently) climate change; and ongoing and significant technological disruption.

A. Contested multipolarity

Contested multipolarity refers to how shifts in the global balance of interstate power alter the ability of the multilateral system and its core institutions, norms, and processes to keep peace and resolve armed conflicts. These power shifts arguably pose the greatest challenge for multilateral conflict prevention and peacebuilding over the coming decade. Although states always have had competing interests at both global and regional levels, the power shifts described in this section reduce the incentives for cooperation among the world’s major and middle powers. In turn, the prevention of violent conflict will be negatively affected as it always has relied on convergence of those state interests, among other things, to be effective. As a result, these changing power dynamics threaten the effectiveness of multilateral institutions, including but not limited to the UNSC, and their approaches to conflict prevention and peacebuilding.

Increasing rivalry and tension among the major powers, in particular Russia and China on the one hand and the United States and its allies and partners on the other, is of utmost significance. So too is their willingness to support multilateralism and core multilateral institutions. At the same time, regional players such as India, Brazil, Turkey, South Africa, Gulf Cooperation Council states, and Nigeria are becoming more important in their regional contexts and globally, and in turn influencing multilateral norms including sovereignty, intervention, and cooperation.⁴⁵

Despite slowing growth, China might still overtake the United States as the largest economy in the world by 2035, with accompanying military and diplomatic significance.⁴⁶ Its emergence as a peer competitor to the United States is reshaping international affairs, including in the hard security domain. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022 was an affront to the UN’s core principles and has severely damaged relations between it and many of the world’s democratic states, while appearing to bring China and Russia closer together (though their relationship was becoming a closer one well before the war in Ukraine). For its part, the United States has been inconsistent in supporting the multilateral system and the UN: examples include initiating the 2003 Iraq War without explicit UNSC authorization; and the Trump administration’s withdrawing the United States from the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC), the UN-brokered Paris climate accord, and the World Health Organization (WHO)—though the Biden administration rejoined each of these

The rise of middle and emerging powers in the Global South is compounded by the relative demographic and economic decline of the world’s wealthy core.⁴⁷ Aging populations, slower economic growth, and domestic political dissatisfaction are disadvantaging North America and Europe relative to more youthful regions. Although many East and Southeast Asian countries face similar if not worse demographic headwinds, the shift of economic power to Asia already has reshaped global geopolitics, multilateralism, and multilateral institutions.⁴⁸

These shifts explain why the Global South’s middle and emerging powers are increasingly uneasy with the current multilateral system and the institutions that undergird it. Much frustration revolves around the exclusivity and perceived inadequacy of prominent multilateral economic institutions such as the UN Security Council, core Bretton Woods institutions (typically defined as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund), and the Group of Seven and Twenty groupings. Enlargement of the BRICS grouping, (referring to the emerging markets bloc that was created in 2009 by Brazil, Russia, India and China, with South Africa joining in 2010) is a prominent and recent example of how this frustration is manifesting itself on the world stage. Prior to the BRICS June 2023 annual summit in South Africa, a reported nineteen nations expressed formal or informal interest in joining the group (that number was later revised to forty countries expressing interest).⁴⁹ The bloc voted to admit six new members— Argentina, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates—to bring its total membership to eleven nations.⁵⁰

Such changes are opening avenues for contestation of the multilateral system, including its institutions, rules, and norms, and are creating novel frameworks of influence and power. A lack of agreement on a unitary alternative could hinder the system’s capacity to reform itself and deal proactively with conflict dynamics.

Implications for structural conflict prevention

China’s rise and its impact on multilateral conflict prevention. Although all the world’s major powers have demonstrated sporadic fidelity to the ideals of multilateralism, China’s rise is the most significant disrupter owing to the increasingly tense competition with the sole superpower, the United States, and China’s expression of its interests in the world.

This claim about the importance of the Sino-American bilateral relationship does not mean that their relationship is the sole driver of change within the interstate system. Nor does it deny other countries’ agency in these questions. Other countries, including several discussed in this section, also are interested in reforming the multilateral system for their own purposes and ends that, in turn, are separate from those of the two major powers. Rather, this claim asserts that the trajectory of the Sino-American relationship is the single most important bilateral relationship in international relations and, as such, has the most consequence for global governance among all such dyads in the world.

China has shown much interest in adapting the current multilateral system to its will and in creating new multilateral governance institutions.⁵¹ Beijing is contesting global governance norms and tenets while increasing its economic and diplomatic weight everywhere. It has created overseas economic investment vehicles such as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), and has invested in places of strategic interest such as the Sahel, a resource-rich region in petroleum, iron ore, uranium, and more.⁵² China often is accused of crafting so-called debt traps in recipient countries, indirectly limiting (although not eliminating) their political and economic options while increasing their dependency upon China.⁵³ China remains cautious about fundamentally reshaping the conflict prevention and peacekeeping architecture, though it is interested in securing senior political posts for its nominees within the UN system.⁵⁴

Implications for conflict prevention institutions

Great power gridlock in the UNSC. Gridlock within multilateral conflict-prevention institutions, especially the UNSC, is a serious institutional risk resulting from contested geopolitics. For decades, the UNSC’s five permanent members have used their veto powers to block decisions or political statements perceived as being against their interests.⁵⁵ More recently, the UNSC has been unable to condemn Syria’s use of chemical attacks against its own population, halt the conflict in Yemen, respond to either the 2014 Russian annexation of Crimea or its 2022 invasion of Ukraine, navigate China’s contested claims over the South China Sea, or address the Israeli/Palestinian conflict.⁵⁶ Veto patterns also have shifted: within the UNSC, China has sided more frequently with Russia over the past decade in exercising its veto.⁵⁷

UNSC gridlock risks the legitimacy and effectiveness of the institution, shrinking its ability to address key issues such as nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction or management of civil wars. The secretary-general (and many other parties around the world) have decried the UNSC’s inability to respond to threats to international peace and security, including to novel threats such as COVID-19, and has repeatedly called for UNSC reform.⁵⁸ As Russia’s war in Ukraine shows, the UNSC’s inability to address such crises has meant an elevated role for the UN General Assembly (UNGA), even if that role has been more symbolic than binding.⁵⁹

Growing representational gap. Calls for reform of multilateral institutions—especially the UNSC but also the Bretton Woods institutions—to make them more reflective of global power shifts have gone unheeded. Since the end of the Cold War at least, such calls have grown over time, yet the failure to do so appears to be risking the reputations and therefore power of these institutions, even possibly to the point of irrelevance. Such calls are bound to increase over the coming decade, given trends outlined in this section, with India, South Africa, Nigeria, and Germany, the largest states in their regions, currently not represented in the UNSC, likely at the forefront.

The Biden administration’s recent support for UNSC reform suggests at least some potential for change, limited as it may be.⁶⁰ Western countries, including the United States, feel pressure to improve relations with nonaligned countries such as India as (potential) important allies and balancers against China and Russia. For example, the September 2023 meeting between President Joe Biden and Prime Minister Narendra Modi generated a joint diplomatic statement that, among many other things, endorsed India’s bid for a permanent UNSC seat while reiterating the importance of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, or Quad, consisting of Australia, India, Japan, and the United States—which China views as a forum for these states to coordinate efforts against it.⁶¹ Western governments have been concerned by uneven condemnation within the Global South of Russia’s war in Ukraine, as discussed further below.⁶²

Evolving role of peace and security institutions and architectures outside the UN system. Partially as a result of the gridlock within global multilateral institutions, regional and alternative institutions such as the African Union and its African Peace and Security Architecture have expanded their roles and modalities of engagement in conflict management. So too have other subgroupings such as the G20 or ASEAN; while not holding peace and security mandates, they also have emerged as important actors in the conflict-management space (e.g., the G20 as a coordinator on the pandemic recovery).

This development holds promise for regional ownership (“African solutions for Africans”), but also poses challenges. The AU, for example, will have to tackle more conflict prevention and peacekeeping responsibilities even as it faces shortcomings in finances and institutional capacity.⁶³ There are opportunities for the UN and regional institutions to work more closely together, as was shown for example in 2014-15 by collaboration between the United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel (UNOWAS) and the Economic Community of West African States in Burkina Faso (these institutions deployed a joint early warning mission to the country in hopes of initiating a democratic transition).⁶⁴

Emergence of coalitions within and outside of the UN. A more complex global landscape is emerging, one that is coalition driven and requiring coalitions that shift according to issue area, both within the UN and outside of it. A more complex landscape will require deft diplomacy aimed at coalition building across different modalities. Western countries will need to engage actively and regularly with countries from the Global South.

A timely example involves voting at UNGA. In 2022, after Russia precluded UNSC condemnation of its actions in Ukraine, UNGA took up the mantle by passing several resolutions affirming the principles of the UN Charter and rejecting Russia’s invasion.⁶⁵ Yet the resolutions also witnessed multiple abstentions and negative votes by some Global South countries, which point toward how Russia and China have built their own alliances and partnerships through development cooperation, political exchanges, and more. This dynamic underscores the fact that the Global South is not a monolith—countries within the Global South have their own interests within the international system, including as they pertain to conflict management, which inform how they view their relationships with the major powers. A recent International Crisis Group analysis notes that Western countries “should look closely at how to mitigate the effects of the [Ukraine] war on countries outside Europe” if they expect to receive greater support among non-Western states within multilateral institutions.⁶⁶

Declining good offices role of the UN secretary-general. One of the most important roles of the UNSG is his deployment of good offices, meaning “steps taken publicly and privately, drawing upon their independence, impartiality and integrity, to prevent international disputes from arising, escalating or spreading.”⁶⁷ In an era of intensifying great power competition, the UNSG’s good offices are at risk of carrying even less weight than usual. Major powers like the United States and China as well as middle and emerging powers such as India or Turkey can exert influence over regional and even global events without operating within and through the UN system and the UNSG. Although this always has been true, it is arguable that the trend line is toward more rather than less of it, hence it is a diversion from the past. Indeed, over just the past few years, Guterres’s calls for a global cease-fire during the COVID-19 pandemic went unheeded, his role (and the UN’s more generally) in the war in Ukraine has been limited despite some milestones such as the Black Sea grain deal, and he and his representatives have had little influence on the current situation in Sudan.⁶⁸

Implications for conflict prevention norms

Demise of the standard treatment. The rise of a multipolar world order risks the end of the “standard treatment” of conflict management. The standard treatment consists of mediation to cease hostilities, leading to a unitary peace agreement or framework, enforceable through UN-sanctioned peacekeepers. Behind the treatment’s success, especially the high-level mediation of conflicts, lay the great powers. Great power cooperation was highest during the United States’ unipolar moment in the 1990s, allowing for important treatment successes in the Balkans, Liberia, and Timor-Leste.⁶⁹ However, since then the system has lost its capacity to deliver as the necessary underlying support has diminished.

It should be noted that not all states view the demise of the standard treatment approach as a problem. As has been discussed or inferred elsewhere in this report, states have viewed previous conflict-prevention efforts as violations of state sovereignty and therefore have embraced multilateral approaches that are less focused on direct intervention by UN-sanctioned peacekeepers.

Norms contestation. Contested multipolarity has weakened consensus surrounding key global norms. On human rights, China’s growing influence has allowed it to limit criticisms of its own practices at home.⁷⁰ Its growing weight outside the UN system, via the BRI or AIIB, allows China to promote a system of “rights-free development.”⁷¹ States with deep ties to Beijing may mute criticisms of China’s record on human rights or even support weakening international norms.⁷² Such developments impact the pursuit of rights-centric conflict-prevention and peacebuilding efforts. Middle powers also are actively involved in norm contestation and erosion. Iran’s efforts to gain a nuclear weapon are in direct contrast to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the norm of nonproliferation.⁷³ Russia’s 2014 invasion of Crimea, alongside its full invasion of Ukraine in 2022, show Moscow actively contesting the well-established norm of state sovereignty. The actions of both nations not only undermine well-established norms, but also lead to a more volatile and conflict-prone world.

Western states are not blameless: the United States’ 2003 non-UN sanctioned declaration of war on Iraq, for example, undermined the norm against violations of state sovereignty except in cases of clear self-defense. Although the United States presented its case for war in self-defense terms, this claim often rang hollow elsewhere.⁷⁴

Other relevant norms also have eroded including the R2P norm. Although NATO countries viewed the Libyan intervention as a successful implementation of R2P, others (Brazil and India, most notably) saw it more as justifying the use of NATO’s power.⁷⁵ Brazil proposed a replacement called “responsibility while protecting” (RwP) to limit R2P’s override of sovereignty claims.⁷⁶

Implications for operational conflict prevention

Restructuring of peacekeeping mandates and deployments. A contested geopolitical landscape may pose challenges for UN-mandated peacekeeping operations.⁷⁷ Three dimensions are in question: maintaining the political coherence of peacekeeping coalitions where multilateral, governmental (nation-state), and nonstate actors all have an important presence in a conflict setting; maintaining a minimum use of force standard (referring to the long-standing norm of how peacekeepers should use only the minimum amount of force necessary to achieve an outcome); and finally, limiting peacekeeping operations to core missions consisting of “protection, stability, and politics.”⁷⁸ Since the 1980s and 1990s, UN peacekeeping missions have had expanded mandates that include a variety of complex goals that run well beyond their original cease-fire monitoring function. These items include institution and capacity building, election monitoring, and peacebuilding roles, among others, even as their resources have remained the same. Peacekeeping operations have not had enough political support or the resources to accomplish the expanding and ambitious goals set for them, as shown by the recently announced withdrawal of the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) and the domestic contestation of UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, more widely known as MONUSCO.⁷⁹

B. State and non-state transformations

During the past couple decades, global economic growth, enhanced access to education, and increasingly ubiquitous technology drove widespread progress in human development including in poverty reduction, hunger and malnutrition reduction, child mortality, and other indicators.⁸⁰ (This claim holds true while acknowledging the uneven, spotty, and sometimes halting nature of progress around the world, as for example occurred during the 2008-2009 financial crisis and the 2020-2022 COVID-19 pandemic.)

During the early 2010s, foresight analysts utilized the phrase “individual empowerment” to describe how individuals were increasingly capable of shaping world events and outcomes.⁸¹ Individual empowerment was meant in two senses: one positive, in that individuals might become more engaged in solving problems, and one negative, in that individuals might become more destructive, for example through wider access to more lethal weapons. The positive side of this equation has meant, among other things, that aspirations and expectations rose along with fundamental economic and social indicators. However, since the onset of COVID-19, some human development gains have been lagging and even backsliding.⁸² Economic volatility, a slowdown in global poverty reduction, rising inequality, and ongoing gender gaps continue to frustrate the global sustainable development agenda.⁸³ This turbulence risks increasing popular dissatisfaction and distrust in state institutions, which can fray the social contract, increase the potential for violent conflicts within countries, and make structural conflict-prevention efforts more difficult.

The rise of nonstate groups complements that of individuals. Over the past decades, multinational corporations, nongovernmental organizations, community groups, and labor unions have proliferated globally. These have been enabled by the Internet, which also has created groups that exist entirely online, e.g., online gaming communities. This proliferation was not always positive: illicit and criminal networks; armed nonstate actors and paramilitary organizations; terrorist groups; private military contractors; domestic militia groups; and other malignant or misanthropic groups also increased in number. In 2022, according to the ACLED, “nonstate groups were involved in 64 percent of all armed, organized activities globally and perpetrated 76 percent of all violence targeting civilians.”⁸⁴

The ANSA phenomenon is problematic not just for its scale but also its heterogeneity and complexity. According to Michael von der Schulenburg, a former UN diplomat, ANSAs “are extremely diverse [and] include ideologically, religiously and ethnically motivated groups…; rent seeking groups such as warlords, rebel forces, pirates, clans and gangs; and outright criminal organizations such as transnational crime syndicates, drug and arms cartels and human traffickers.” For these reasons, he argues, “in the realities of most armed conflicts, political insurgents, criminal syndicates and state-sponsored paramilitary often become indistinguishable.”⁸⁵

Even as states remain the central actors within the international system, individuals and nonstate groups are altering relationships with state authorities, gaining more prominence, and thereby rebalancing the global power architecture. Their rise raises major questions about both the social contract within states and the Westphalian state model that (nominally) has been the premise of international relations for centuries. These questions carry significant implications for designing and implementing conflict prevention and peacebuilding strategies, identifying and engaging key actors, and maintaining common objectives over the longer run.

Implications for structural conflict prevention

(Likely) permanence and significance of ANSAs in conflict-management settings. A minimum of 195 million people live in ANSA-controlled areas, of which some sixty-five million are under the exclusive control of these groups.⁸⁶ In many cases, ANSAs provide paragovernance activities such as taxation or health services, as was or is the case in the territories controlled by the jihadist group; the terrorist group al-Shabaab; and ANSAs operating in the Sahel.⁸⁷

Globally, ANSAs are proliferating, posing challenges for multilateral institutions and states. The lack of sanctioned guidelines from the UN makes engagement with ANSAs difficult, including in situations where their involvement might assist peace and security outcomes.⁸⁸ The securitization of this subfield, a remnant of the counterterrorism agenda, precludes nonmilitary approaches such as dialogues and training with some ANSAs that might advance peace and security goals, including respect for international humanitarian laws and the safe passage of humanitarian aid.⁸⁹

Implications for conflict prevention institutions

Defining responsibilities becomes more challenging. As the role of individuals and nonstate groups expands, including by taking on governance roles especially where states are weak, there is a greater need to define operational guidelines for cooperation on the ground. For example, during the pandemic, the Iraqi government’s poor pandemic response gave informal militias, the Popular Mobilization Forces, an opening to furnish a pandemic response of their own, thereby helping them to increase their popular legitimacy.⁹⁰ More positively, some actors such as corporations or philanthropies can play some key roles, such as pandemic response or climate financing, also raising challenges for their inclusion, management, and coordination with state authorities.

Implications for conflict prevention norms

Inclusivity in conflict mediation and beyond. Elite mediation processes rarely work if they are not inclusive and representative of larger segments of a population. Individual and group empowerment means that the pressure on multilateral institutions to be inclusive of nonstate actors in their mediation and negotiation processes should continue to increase. Although broader participation means increased complexity and requires careful sequencing of efforts, the benefits are outsized. Women and youth are essential groups in civil society, whose early inclusion in mediation, negotiation, reconciliation, or other peacebuilding processes capitalizes on their unique knowledge and skills, increases the chances of success of the deals reached, and ensures more equitable outcomes.⁹¹ More generally, inclusion itself is a conflict prevention tool: inclusion of individuals and groups within all aspects of society (government, economy, etc.) is critical to defusing grievances against other groups and the government.⁹²

Not all nonstate actors are alike, of course, and not all are easily integrated into mediation and negotiation processes. By far the most complex and contested cases involve ANSAs, the groups that possess military and (often) political power in affected conflict zones (and hence cannot be ignored in conflict mediation processes) yet frequently act in bad faith and/or are unsavory actors on the battlefield and among civilian populations. Because of the proliferation of ANSAs in general (and proliferation of the number of conflicts where ANSAs are the central actors), to date there has been no single template for dealing with them in Track 1 or Track 1.5 processes.⁹³

Implications for operational conflict prevention

Challenges to exclusivity of UN mediation. High-level, elite peace agreements brokered through UN-sanctioned efforts are becoming more difficult to achieve in isolation, given more complex environments, the proliferation of conflicts, and the proliferation of ANSAs and other nonstate actor groups. There is both an increased demand for mediation and an increased supply of institutions (including nongovernmental organizations) to provide it. The AU, EU, “the European Institute of Peace (EIP), the Crisis Management Initiative (CMI), the Dialogue Advisory Group (DAG), the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (HD), and the Community of Sant’Egidio,”⁹⁴ are just some of the institutions that provide direct or indirect support to mediation efforts. HD, for example, has been involved in mediation efforts in Mali, albeit with limited impact.⁹⁵ There are many other positive examples of organizations, including non-Western organizations, that have been important mediators in conflicts around the world, such as Cambodia’s Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies, Colombia’s El Centro de Investigación y Educación Popular (CINEP), and Myanmar’s Euro-Burma Office (EBO).⁹⁶

A broader consequence of having nonstate actors involved in mediation is the volume of effort. Nonstate mediators, including regular citizens, can engage all parties, including ANSAs and insurgents, in ways that states cannot. Some agreements are arrived at entirely among armed groups. In Burkina Faso and Mali, local truces, formal and informal, among belligerents including ANSAs and violent extremist organizations have been reached, sometimes with little or no outside mediation.⁹⁷ Although often temporary, they can offer communities some stability. While such agreements do little to bolster the legitimacy of broader efforts aimed at national justice and peace, different kinds of agreements serve different purposes, which speak to the need to bolster complementary approaches to resolving conflicts. It should be noted that such peace agreements may have some downsides in that they can further fragmentation, decreasing cohesion and support for the state and entrenching rather than addressing the root causes of conflict dynamics.⁹⁸

These developments mean that the UN’s role will need to change.⁹⁹ UN envoys should be “conductors, not soloists,” according to one expert, coordinating roles within mediation efforts.¹⁰⁰

C. Climate and Earth systems

Climate change is arguably the most important driver of change shaping the long-term future of international affairs. If viewed solely in ecological terms, this trend has a high degree of certainty, meaning that the ongoing carbon loading of the atmosphere and oceans is certain to transform the planet’s ecosystems. For scientists, the uncertainties surround the pace and scale of those transformations, not whether they will occur. Much will depend on the speed with which the global economy decarbonizes. The climate’s transformative impacts on human systems will be far reaching, and if left unchecked, likely will alter the scale, location, and intensity of conflict globally, making planning and execution of global, national, and subnational conflict prevention efforts far more challenging.

Scenarios released by the UN indicate that temperatures will increase in the 2030s above the target of 1.5°C codified in the 2015 Paris Agreement, with the world on track for a 2.4°C to 2.6°C temperature increase.¹⁰¹ Scientists estimate that the world has less than a decade left to dramatically change emissions trajectories before irreversible damage sets in.¹⁰²

Climate change causes or worsens extreme weather events, heat waves, flooding, drought, ocean acidification, and more, which increase social and economic disasters, human fatalities, economic losses, societal fragility, and forced migration.¹⁰³ The extent of disruption varies regionally and increases with rising temperatures: for example, in the United States, for every degree Fahrenheit increase in temperature the gross domestic product will shrink by 0.7 percent.¹⁰⁴

The costs of adapting to a climate-changed world are staggering—estimates suggest that between $315 billion to $565 billion would have to be spent annually by 2050 on climate adaptation efforts.¹⁰⁵ As shown by debates at the recent annual Conference of Parties (COPs) under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), there have been terse global negotiations about who will pay for climate adaptation.

Climate change long has been regarded by the climate security community as a “threat multiplier” that if unchecked will exacerbate societal, economic, and political fragility, while worsening conflict dynamics.¹⁰⁶ For decades, this community labored to have its assertions about the climate-security-conflict nexus taken seriously within governments, multilateral institutions, and other policymaking settings. That effort has paid off in that this nexus now is widely regarded as an important (if tragic) feature of the global conflict landscape, with serious work done on the topic within multiple institutions around the world.¹⁰⁷ For poverty-stricken communities and those in conflict zones, adaptation problems are more acute owing to institutional and governance shortcomings.¹⁰⁸ Climate impacts also are expected to be greater for women and girls.¹⁰⁹

Implications for structural conflict prevention

Exacerbation of instability. Climate change disrupts economic systems and access to critical natural resources, in turn reshaping their governance and allocation in society. These effects undermine food and water security, especially in poor and vulnerable societies, and thereby induce out-migration and conflict. Climate change could exacerbate conflict dynamics and create new escalation ladders, especially in conflict-prone or fragile sociopolitical and socioeconomic contexts, and where institutions are unresponsive to changing conditions on the ground (for example, unable or unwilling to address rising water insecurity). Conflict prevention and peacebuilding institutions will have to develop an improved understanding of these climate drivers, how they map onto conflict dynamics, and how they will alter core processes.¹¹⁰ Across poor and wealthy societies alike, climate change might increase existing public dissatisfaction, fray societal trust, polarize citizens, and amplify social grievances.¹¹¹

Implications for conflict prevention institutions

Impact of climate change on institutional strategies and operations. Foreign and security policy institutions the world over are struggling to incorporate climate security into their strategic and operational portfolios. Institutions within the conflict management system, including the UN, are in the same situation in that they will have to account for the multiplicity of climate impacts on the peace and security problem set as well as their approaches to assessing the problem.

Much thinking is underway on this front. For example, the UN’s DPPA has attempted to include climate considerations within “analytical and planning mechanisms as well as . . . prevention, mediation and peace-building strategies” through new guidance in areas such as mediation.¹¹² Its work in this space is facilitated by the Climate Security Mechanism, a joint initiative of the DPPA, United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), and United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) that works across these programs to provide analysis.¹¹³

Emphasis on early warning systems. A climate-altered world will increase the need for robust and thorough early warning systems that provide analysts with timely and accurate information about where climate-induced changes might have the most impact on societies, particularly fragile societies, and on conflict. Such systems therefore can assist in providing analysts with information regarding where and when conflict prevention and peacebuilding activities are most likely to be needed. EWS can help identify how local and regional climates will change (meaning chronic and acute changes in precipitation and temperature, as examples), inform local populations about those changes, and help policymakers adapt planning and investments to help mitigate and adapt, all of which should increase transparency and trust and minimize loss of life and livelihoods. If EWS is applied properly in these contexts, such systems would assist with conflict prevention and its escalation.¹¹⁴

There are numerous databases, dashboards, and EWS systems that cover pieces of the climate security equation. The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the East African trade bloc, is an example. IGAD has developed multiple data tools and EWS dashboards that monitor and assess hydrological and climatological conditions in the region.¹¹⁵

Yet despite the existence of such tools, there remains a significant amount of work to be done in this space around the world. The complexity and difficulty in building these kinds of real-time EWS systems that track the multiplicity of Earth system changes, map those changes onto all world regions, and then link them to other drivers of conflict—all at a level of granularity that allows analysts to forecast when and where conflict is more likely to occur—is an enormous technical and bureaucratic challenge.

Implications for operational conflict prevention

Complexity of operating environment. Climate change adds an important layer of complexity to international relations, the global system, and governance. As a threat multiplier, climate change is “already increasing food insecurity, water scarcity, and resource competition, while disrupting livelihoods and spurring migration.”¹¹⁶ In places such as the Sahel, which contains many agricultural and pastoral subsistence economies, climate disruptions have enormous potential for disruption and deprivation, thus exacerbating tensions over scarce resources.¹¹⁷ Climate will drive more complex crises, which exist when multiple challenges occur simultaneously in the same place.¹¹⁸

As a result, conflict management institutions will be forced to adjust how they conduct their work. The greater frequency and severity of natural disasters will strain resources for conflict management efforts at domestic and international levels while adding yet another layer of political and socioeconomic complexity to the task. Further, the same trends will make it harder for such institutions to conduct their work, given climate disaster impacts on conditions on the ground.

D. Technological revolutions

Although technological change is an omnipresent feature of the modern world since the Industrial Revolution, the speed and significance of technologically driven change arguably is greater today than at any time in history.¹¹⁹ The technologies under development now have the potential to remake society in every way, owing to their unprecedented capabilities, in positive and negative senses.¹²⁰ The multilateral conflict-prevention architecture is not being spared from these developments.

The impacts of technological development are among the more difficult drivers to forecast for two big reasons. First, only rarely are technological breakthroughs predictable, which means that it is difficult to anticipate when, where, and who will produce a truly groundbreaking discovery. Second, it is almost as difficult to forecast what the second and third order impacts of any new technology are likely to be, for better and for worse.

These caveats aside, several of the key technologies that are likely to influence the future of international affairs and the multilateral system include:

• Artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning (ML).
• Information technologies (the internet, 5G, 6G).
• Automation and manufacturing technologies (e.g., 3D printing).
• Advanced computing technologies (e.g., quantum computing).
• Remote sensing and monitoring technologies (e.g., satellites and drones).
• Health technologies (biotechnologies).¹²¹

Some types of technological change can scale to near-universal levels, although scaling can take decades if not longer, as occurred historically with the railroad and automobile. The length of universal adoption underscores that technological progress is an uneven phenomenon. Advanced technologies are not uniformly available to all people immediately upon their creation. Quite the contrary: most often, new technologies take much time for universal adoption. The internet is an apt example. The International Telecommunication Union’s (ITU) seminal Global Connectivity Report 2022 reported that although two-thirds of humankind uses the internet, one-third remains offline even though the internet has existed for decades. The ITU report asserted that “multiple digital divides [now exist], across and within countries, between men and women, between youth and older persons, between cities and rural areas, between those who enjoy a fiber connection and those who struggle on a spotty 3G connection.”¹²² Access to reliable internet service is a critical component of social and economic development—its availability is so important that it is difficult to imagine how advanced societies now could function without it.

Technological change can be a double-edged sword. Social media, for example, enables nonviolent resistance, democratic protest, documentation of violence, and sharing of information among groups (state and nonstate alike) that are engaged in finding solutions to conflict. But social media also amplifies harmful narratives, facilitates the recruitment of at-risk youth into ANSAs, and further polarizes societies. In the United States, given that some 48 percent of adults get their news from social media at least occasionally, it becomes easy to understand how misinformation can spread quickly and contribute to societal division.¹²³ Technological change therefore presents new risks and opportunities for conflict prevention and peacebuilding.¹²⁴

Implications for structural conflict prevention

Cyber conflict. Cyber conflict is not new, but it is proliferating and scaling: cyber activities are commonly employed by state and nonstate actors alike to disrupt, divert, steal, and to achieve strategic impacts.¹²⁵ Cyberattacks and cybercrime are common and increasing throughout the world.¹²⁶ This trend will continue given the relatively low barriers to entry into cybercrime and cyberattacks for bad-faith actors such as authoritarian governments, criminal networks, and terrorist groups.

The UN has supported creation of the Open-Ended Working Group that focuses on developing rules for states and responsible behavior in cyberspace.¹²⁷ However, progress has been difficult given the transference of major power competition into the digital arena. For this reason, managing cyber conflict should remain a key priority area for the UN given the likelihood of increased cyber activity by state and nonstate actors alike.¹²⁸ To counter the risk of escalation to physical conflict, the UN can focus on norms development, cyber diplomacy, confidence-building measures, and innovative concepts such as “cyber peacekeepers.”¹²⁹

AI and social media are creating a more contested information environment. Newer technology tools such as AI/ML and older ones such as social media together will alter the information environment, making it both faster and more contested. The significant downside risk is that the pace and content of disinformation (through, for example, AI/ML-generated deepfake videos and other content) will negatively impact conflict dynamics as they will give bad-faith actors even more capabilities to alter and even define the information landscape. This problem has been much in evidence already with just social media on its own, which can be and has been used by various actors (state and nonstate) to create or amplify false narratives that have a direct bearing on conflict dynamics, often exacerbating existing polarization. Nonstate actors in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Mali, the Central African Republic (CAR), and elsewhere have proven themselves adept at using social media to amplify misleading narratives, contributing to distrust among local communities, insurgents, and the government.¹³⁰

Disinformation also can be manufactured by state actors. During the Wagner Group’s deployment in CAR and Mali, Russia pushed narratives that were “predominantly pro-regime, anti-French, and pro-Russian” via local proxies such as Radio Lengo Songo in CAR (although not an AI/ML or social media example per se, this case does underscore the importance of state actors using communication tools to spread information and disinformation).¹³¹

Communication runs in more than one direction. Hence, the same tools that are used for disinformation can be employed by good-faith actors to relay accurate information and to counter false and misleading narratives from elsewhere. Social media also can be used to counter disinformation. For example, in West Africa, ECOWAS used social media to conduct training sessions, run online campaigns, enable storytelling, and counter harmful narratives online.¹³² In Ukraine, social media is used to debunk Russian false narratives.¹³³

Implications for conflict prevention and conflict prevention norms

Automation changing the battlefield. Advanced automated systems, driven by AI/ML and remote-sensing capabilities, are beginning to change battlefields. Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs) have appeared in Ukraine and elsewhere, including in sub-Saharan Africa, either in interstate warfare or in asymmetric contexts (e.g., fighting insurgent or criminal networks.)¹³⁴ Given the pace of AI/ML development, by the mid-2030s automation could be ubiquitous on battlefields and across multiple warfighting domains.

Automated technologies might increase conflict and instability for several reasons. First, weapons and systems can be deployed without a full understanding of their battlefield impacts or rules for their use. For example, as UAV operators are far from the battlefield, they may become desensitized to their targets. Second, automated weapons could enable all conflict actors, including governments and ANSAs, to assault human rights, as has occurred with automated surveillance systems used by authoritarian countries to control their citizens.¹³⁵ On the battlefield, such systems might have insufficient capabilities to properly differentiate between civilians and combatants, risking poor decision-making about lawful targets.

Implications for conflict prevention institutions

Digital technologies for good. The list of applications of digital and emerging technologies in conflict prevention is extensive and includes the following:¹³⁶

• Improving early warning, for assessment of insights and trends as well as response processes to supplement offline engagement, as ECOWAS Early Warning and Response Network (ECOWARN) did in West Africa.¹³⁷ The applications are numerous, from the identification of patterns of violence through the use of AI, to improving satellite imaging capacity with the help of better space assets.
• Facilitating the coordination or deployment of humanitarian assistance, from using geolocation services to monitor Ebola outbreaks¹³⁸ to the use of drones to deliver critical medical aid,¹³⁹ or other assistance in the aftermath of a natural disaster.
• Assisting with reconciliation and postconflict peacebuilding efforts by “offering tools that foster collaboration, transform attitudes, and give a stronger voice to communities.”¹⁴⁰
• Enhancing performance, efficiency, and resource allocation within multilateral institutions, for instance in peacekeeping operations.¹⁴¹ Powerful AI/ML-based algorithms could improve the quality and speed of decision-making.¹⁴²

Institutions will need to assess the potential impact of such technologies on their processes and activities, develop normative frameworks for their use, and integrate them into operations. As with climate change, DPPA has made some initial forays into this space. In 2018, DPPA set up an innovation unit to “test new technologies for . . . conflict prevention, peace mediation and peacebuilding work [and to improve] analytical tools and practices” for more rapid and focused action.¹⁴³

Implications for operational conflict prevention

Digital diplomacy and activism on the rise. The COVID-19 pandemic required swift adaptation. Diplomacy moved online, which both limited engagement (i.e., reduced or eliminated face-to-face interaction) and expanded it, given the explosion of meetings online.¹⁴⁴ Women-led peacebuilding efforts adapted to the new digital world during COVID-19 using platforms such as Zoom, Signal, and WhatsApp.¹⁴⁵ Although the post-pandemic world is returning to more in-person engagement, the trends toward virtual engagement are unlikely to return to pre-pandemic levels.

Digital technologies are changing the face of mediation. Digital technologies can be helpful in conflict mediation, for example by providing better communication platforms to the negotiating parties, increasing inclusivity by helping identify and engage actors who should sit at the negotiating table, especially those coming from historically underrepresented groups such as women and youth, and helping with strategic communications via use of social media to promote positive outcomes and peaceful narratives.¹⁴⁶ As an example, in 2020, the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) conducted the “first-ever, large-scale digital dialogue online with Libyan youth . . . [to] inform the UNSMIL-facilitated intra-Libyan dialogue tracks about . . . outstanding security, political and economic issues.”¹⁴⁷ UNSMIL later engaged in additional similar digital dialogues with other Libyan stakeholders.¹⁴⁸

Convergence of peacekeeping and the digital world. In 2021, the UN secretary-general released a strategy for the digital transformation of UN peacekeeping, with a focus on mandate implementation and personnel safety.¹⁴⁹ Two complex matters should be prioritized concerning the nexus between peacekeeping and emerging technologies: protecting civilians from AI-related and other harm that can infringe upon their human rights; and building internal capacity and collaborations to ensure data integrity and internal network protection against activities that can undermine peacekeeping operations and with them, the credibility surrounding the UN mandate.¹⁵⁰

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IV. Scenarios

This section presents four scenarios based on the trends and uncertainties discussed in section III. Each scenario is a plausible story of how the drivers of change might combine to shape the world over the next ten to fifteen years. This section is not a prediction: none of the scenarios are offered as the most probable future outcome. The reader should regard all of the scenarios as equally plausible.

Directly following these global scenarios is an assessment of how the four scenarios in this section might play out in the Sahel, a region that illustrates many of the challenges resulting from the interplay of the driving forces outlined in this report. If the peoples and communities of the Sahel region are to have a positive future, then the various actors involved—multilateral organizations, national governments (within and outside of the Sahel), subnational governments, and nonstate actors—will have to come to grips with these forces, despite the many pressures that these drivers will bring. As a result, the Sahel region was chosen as a case study precisely because it offers a complex and important illustration of where conflict dynamics may be headed over the coming decade and where the possibilities might lie for finding solutions.

Scenario 1: Major power clash

The world in 2033 is dominated by the rivalry between two powerful countries, China and the United States. Throughout the late 2020s and into the early 2030s, China continued in its quest to displace the United States as the world’s hegemon. To date, it has not succeeded. China’s economic slowdown, which started in 2023, has continued (admittedly, it still grew at rates typical of a mature economy). Added to this problem has been China’s demographic winter, which has limited the country’s rise and prevented it from becoming a true global hegemon. China’s struggle to displace the United States did not mean smooth sailing for the formerly sole superpower, however. Through the 2020s, the United States struggled to lead given ongoing turbulence in its domestic politics, which hampered both its reputation abroad and its ability to act boldly economically or diplomatically when it most counted.

Locked into an increasingly adversarial relationship yet being unable to achieve economic or military superiority over the other power, both the United States and China pursued aggressive policies oriented around the recruitment of new allies and partners. China focused much of its effort on other authoritarian countries, conveying influence through the export of technologically infused goods and services and infrastructure investment (though the Belt and Road Initiative was pared back owing to domestic concern in China about its debt). The United States took a different route, focusing more on democratic states through diplomatic, political, and economic means. America remained committed to its partners but failed to mount a major effort to win over partners beyond its sphere of influence. Both nations were cognizant of the flawed optics of military support and stayed away from directly providing arms within their spheres.

In a fashion parallel to the Cold War, the United States and China eventually settled into a state where each had a defined grouping of countries that it considered within its own sphere of influence. And as occurred during the Cold War, both countries chose noninterference over confrontation within each other’s sphere of influence.

The strategic competition between the United States and China split the world’s nonaligned states into two groups. The first were states that were of strategic value to one or both countries, countries that both major powers saw as valuable for different reasons, for example as important trading partners, for key natural resources, or simple geography. In these countries, the United States and China aimed to limit the ability of the other nation to intervene. Key regions here included: the Great Lakes Region of Africa, the South Pacific, and parts of Latin America.

For states within this first group, the conflict prevention and peacekeeping equation proved to be a difficult one. These states were nonaligned, but at the same time they were also seen as strategically valuable to either major power (and sometimes both). Hence, UNSC resolutions for peacekeeping missions in these countries tended to be vetoed by either the United States or China, which were reluctant to watch the other power fiddle in what each saw as something it alone valued. Some affected states received peacekeeping and peacebuilding assistance from regional bodies such as ECOWAS. Many took bilateral aid—economic, military and otherwise—from wherever they could find it. In many cases, they leveraged the two major powers against one another, as had occurred during the Cold War.

The second group of nonaligned countries offered minimal strategic value to either the United States or China and were treated accordingly by the major powers. In these nations, the United States and China were less willing to invest, seeing efforts as unlikely to result in a major payoff. Yet these countries’ lack of perceived strategic value also had an upside. Both the United States and China showed a willingness to cooperate on peacekeeping missions in these countries, precisely because they were perceived as having a lower strategic status. Both countries had other motives too. The United States wanted to avoid the optics of a unilateral intervention and China remained committed to its principle of sovereignty promotion. This meant that despite the ongoing rivalry between two of the P5 states, the UNSC managed to continue to function in a core role, which was the authorization of peacekeeping missions, as occurred for example in the Sahel.

The world’s conflict zones were not only in those areas that were nonaligned with the major powers. Conflict occurred in areas of the world that were within the two powers’ spheres of influence. For states that the major powers deemed within their spheres of influence, in cases of intrastate or interstate conflict there was no possibility of both the United States or China authorizing a mission at the UNSC. This meant that the United States and China, plus whatever allies and partners they could muster, dealt with instances of conflict as they saw fit and on their terms. Not all of this was post hoc conflict resolution and peacekeeping. At least some of their actions focused on the prevention of conflict within or between states they viewed as partners, which meant employment of social and economic development tools and extended diplomatic overtures.

The clash between the major powers had other consequences. China continued its investment in alternative multilateral institutions, including the AIIB and the BRI (which, despite hiccups, survived as China found that the money it poured into the initiative paid diplomatic dividends around the world). These efforts were designed at least in part to advance China’s goals and priorities outside of the UN system. At a certain point, the AIIB and the BRI hit their limits and began transitioning from efforts to gain new partners to shoring up support among existing ones.

Yet China also regarded the UN as an important forum for maximizing its influence and legitimacy around the world. China acted within the UN when it could and where it saw opportunities, shaping the institution to its will as best it could. This included placing Chinese nationals in leadership positions within the UN, for example as envoy for the Great Lakes Region. There was some concern that Chinese nationals in these roles represented the interests of the Chinese state rather than working on behalf of the United Nations (unsurprisingly, this narrative was pressed hard by the United States). There was little proof that Chinese nationals did this any more than other UN executives.

China approached UN peacekeeping operations differently than it did in the 2020s. It shifted away from deploying specialized, highly skilled troops for support and logistical operations to supplying more soldiers on the front lines of peacekeeping mandates. China’s motivation for increasing its blue helmet presence was the same as for its other interests within the UN system, namely, to boost its profile within the institution and increase goodwill among affected states in conflict regions, and within the UNSC and UNGA.

The United States continued to be an important funder of UN peacekeeping operations and offered specialized assistance in myriad forms. However, as it always had, the United States shied away from sending foot soldiers, worried as ever of the optics of it losing troops in multilateral peacekeeping missions abroad.

Finally, and paradoxically, there was some halting progress on the provision of global public goods. Perhaps the most important was that both the United States and China saw making progress on climate mitigation goals as a means to boost their economies through technological innovation and show the world some diplomatic leadership in the process. As such, both countries find ways to cooperate within the UNFCCC. Cooperation around key emerging technologies, however, continued to prove difficult to manage as both the United States and China sought to isolate the other from first-mover development. Recognizing the large strategic value of technology, neither nation was willing to share or collaborate in this space. This competition had knock-on effects as both sought to restrict or eliminate the others’ firms from competing in foreign markets.

Scenario 2: Networks of power

In the mid-2020s, another global pandemic accelerated cooperation within the international system. Although this second global pandemic, coming so soon after COVID-19, portended public health, economic, social, and even political disaster, its impacts were far less severe than feared owing to the willingness of key actors, state and nonstate alike, to build networked approaches to solving the problem. Within a few years after the pandemic’s onset, this unprecedented global cooperation inspired action in other fields and toward other problems such as climate change and even conflict prevention and peacebuilding. Now in 2033, the world is in a different and better place than it was in 2023.

In the early 2020s, few would have argued that such a change was in the offing, given the myriad obstacles to effective global governance: rising tensions among nuclear-armed powers, including the major powers; the slow return to robust economic growth after the COVID-19 pandemic; the debt challenges overshadowing much of the world (rich and poor countries alike); conflicts in Ukraine, the Middle East, and the Sahel; the democratic world’s ongoing struggles; and swiftly changing Earth systems.

Underneath these real problems, however, there were some countervailing and promising signals. Although democratic deficits were real, reflecting disenchantment with government and fears of the erosion of the social contract from AI-driven unemployment, there was at the same time a growing willingness among citizens to engage on these problems through civil society and within their democratic systems. This spirit animated younger generations, especially Gen Z, who were just entering the workforce and politics. Their activism coincided with rising engagement from nonstate actors—NGOs, firms, and philanthropies—and even from some governments and multilateral institutions. This engagement was sporadic rather than systematic and extended only to a few policy arenas. But some leaders had come to realize that partnerships across and among different stakeholders had been successful in responding to public health challenges, including the COVID-19 pandemic. For example, the Global Vaccine Action Plan (GVAP) and GAVI, the Vaccine Alliance brought together research and technical health institutions, foundations, private-sector partners, individual states/governments, and multilateral institutions such as the World Bank and WHO.

This was the setting when, in 2026, another global pandemic arose, this one an easily transmissible version of a deadly avian flu. As this pandemic began to sweep around the world, leaders from the public, private, philanthropic, and nonprofit sectors all understood the need to act swiftly and in coordinated fashion. Much of this interest in a speedy and coordinated response was owed to experience from the COVID-19 pandemic, but much of it also was owed to the preexisting desire to engage in cooperative and networked action to address problems. The result was an upwelling of interest in leveraging resources and skills from wherever they could be found. Governments acted fast but not alone, finding willing partners in pharmaceutical companies to develop new vaccines, tech companies to employ their AI/ML capabilities for everything from contact tracing to big data analytics, social media companies to combat disinformation, and philanthropies to provide significant financial support. Citizens around the world also engaged, understanding the important roles they had to play in combating the disease and in maintaining social coherence and solidarity in the face of yet another crisis. The flu itself helped in one critical sense: it was a far deadlier version of a common communicable disease, and which had a much shorter incubation period than COVID-19, factors which dramatically reduced the impacts of disinformation surrounding it.

There was a critical international response to this latest transnational threat. Through its public health institutions, most critically the WHO, the UN played an important if traditional role as a leading research and convening organization. Yet the timing also appeared right for the UN to invest heavily in the secretary-general’s 2019 call for networked and inclusive multilateralism. As was the case with national governments around the world, the UN’s institutions rapidly augmented their engagement with state and nonstate actors of every kind, including national and subnational governments (e.g., municipalities and regions), philanthropies, the private sector, nonprofits, academics, and grassroots citizens’ groups. It worked on everything: humanitarian funding to mitigate the deadly pandemic’s impact; vaccine development and (eventual) distribution; and community engagement. Critically, in this fluid crisis, other international actors engaged in similar fashion. Regional multilateral institutions such as the African Union responded likewise, as did the various global groupings of states—the G20, G7, BRICS, and others.

As was true of the influenza epidemic of 1918-1919, the trajectory of this flu was swift, global, and deadly—but also mercifully short, ending by 2027. Although this pandemic left a grim trail of death in its wake, there was one silver lining. The demonstrable success from widespread collaboration not only left behind a new cooperative spirit—building upon pre-pandemic roots—it also demonstrated that inclusive and networked multilateralism could work in practice. This time, there was enough political, economic, and demographic heft to make a difference, with not only policymakers sensing a true shift but private firms, philanthropies, subnational governments, large nonprofits, grassroots groups, and ordinary citizens as well.

The UN continued to accelerate and invest in its convening, mediation, and consultative capabilities, deepening and extending its partnerships with institutions of all kinds at global, regional, national, and local levels. Moving to a more networked model becomes the central focus of UN reform.

The UN’s thematic aperture expanded as well, extending beyond public health and disease to the panoply of issues confronting the world, including conflict. Growing inclusivity and diversity of actors created flexibility in approaches to conflict prevention, conflict resolution, and peacebuilding. Localization of mediation efforts, for example, became more common, as did the development of frameworks for engaging with ANSAs, or at least those deemed legitimate and supportive of basic human rights.

By the mid-2030s, the world’s problems were far from being solved. Yet there were at least new approaches and a new willingness to experiment and cooperate, and that mattered enormously. Civil society groups formed and sprang into action around the world, some with great success, others far less so, some good, some not so good. In many places facing conflict or recovering from conflict, the state was more of a hybrid entity, sharing governance responsibilities with mixtures of citizen and paramilitary groups, private-sector firms and philanthropies, and nongovernmental organizations. In the Sahel, for example, coalitions emerged to address various crises. Solutions became more ad hoc, localized, and harder to scale. Yet the emergence of nonstate actor coalitions, which included good-faith actors that were empowered by the new conditions, was slowly reshaping power dynamics in the region, leading to new social contracts and, quite often, new hope for the people who lived there.

Scenario 3: Fragmentation

Looking back from the year 2033, it is clear that the world has been unable to grapple with the myriad problems that it has faced for a decade and even longer. Many of these problems were well known in 2023, when analysts were talking about a polycrisis, a term coined for the interplay of multiple crises that heightens the collective impact.¹⁵¹ Over the 2020s and into the 2030s, a combination of factors prevented the world from arriving at workable solutions to any of its major problems. Although hardly the only cause, a massive and worsening ecological crisis, still unfolding, has been a central and unpleasant driver of this change and an unwelcome part of the world in 2033. Unfortunately, there are few workable political mechanisms for dealing with this crisis and many others. The global system has fragmented.

The centrifugal forces that were at play in the early 2020s continued to erode the multilateral system through the middle of the decade. US-China tensions, always at the limit, never boiled over. Nor did tensions between Russia and the US-led NATO over Ukraine. Yet those relationships also did not get better, which hampered governance efforts across all manner of global challenges. This situation was worsened by ongoing strife within the US-led system of alliances revolving principally around geoeconomic policies. The Biden administration continued to press allies and partners to comply with its increasingly punitive measures aimed at China’s tech development, for example, targeting exports of semiconductors (chips) and chip-making equipment. Combined with unrelated US legislation that subsidized and even mandated some domestic manufacturing in areas such as chips and Greentech, the Biden administration found itself having to negotiate constantly with disaffected allies and partners. Reflecting a gloomy mood, The Economist magazine ran a New Year’s 2025 issue titled “Globalization is dead .”

Low global growth, combined with ongoing shockwaves from Russia’s war in Ukraine on global food security, for example, impacted poorer countries especially. Poverty and inequality within and among countries remained stubbornly high during the 2020s and into the 2030s. To make matters worse, tech transfers from the rich to the poor world also slowed down, the result of an increasingly zero-sum tech development environment. With it, the pacing of high-value-added service industries in the Global South was reduced. The upshot was that human development indexes faltered in the 2020s, and diplomats at the UN spoke in hushed tones about the sustainable development goals, deeming them all but unattainable.

Yet none of this was even the worst of it. In 2027, just as the world breached the 1.5°C threshold set by scientists as a climatological tipping point (and formally acknowledged in the Paris Agreement), a devastating El Niño event developed, worsening what had already been bad conditions around the world. This event, coupled with ongoing carbon loading of the atmosphere and reductions in aerosol pollutants (ironically, such pollutants had helped to slow atmospheric temperature rises), brought extreme conditions to much of the world, outweighing even the worst of the already-hot years of the early- and mid-2020s. New temperature records were set everywhere, from Alaska to the Indian subcontinent to South America, while the seemingly unending list of record drought and flooding got even longer. Fire became a default condition for much of the world, as forests began to dry out and even die back, as happened in the vast Amazon basin.

The predictions that the climate security community had offered for years, perhaps decades, began to come true around the world: swiftly rising food and water insecurity; public health crises from extreme heat and disease proliferation; disrupted supply chains; and fire and flooding. Famine struck in the Sahel and Pakistan, with millions at risk for their lives. Migrant crises arose around the world, for example Central American climate refugees poured north toward Mexico and the United States.

The multilateral system fragmented owing to the combined scale and complexity of overlapping and mutually reinforcing disasters. Although UN agencies and individual countries dedicated themselves to addressing the crises, they were overwhelmed and under resourced.

Wealthier nations invested heavily in domestic disaster management and resilience but had few remaining means, and almost no willingness, to direct funds toward the rest of the world. These governments did not honor their financial commitments to key funds such as the Green Climate Fund, with the $100 billion commitment for investments in climate adaptation expiring in 2025, even before the onset of the 2027 El Niño event.

Multilateral funding for and cooperation around conflict resolution and peacebuilding stagnated and then began to decline. Much of the funding that remained for peace and security efforts came from China, with significant strings attached, worsening debt traps and eroding lending standards related to human rights, for example.

Stripped of its conflict prevention and peacekeeping center, the UN became a technocratic institution that dispensed useful advice and provided valuable services, but otherwise could not secure peace and security.

Unfortunately, climate disruptions continued after 2027, which despite the El Niño event did not prove to be an unusual year after all. In 2033, the climate clearly has changed for the worse, disrupting entire ecosystems and creating permanent crises that fragile governments in particular are unable to deal with. Mass migration events, arising from agricultural implosions and natural disasters, have become a regular feature of the landscape, which has only caused wealthier nations to pull the drawbridges up even tighter.

The climate crisis is now, in 2033, a permanent feature of our world, worsening fragility, exacerbating polarization, causing mass hardship, discontent, and outrage, and undermining institutions. As states have proven unable to deal with the cascading problems, governance gaps are increasingly filled by bad-faith nonstate actors, often but not always in fragile states, that try to seize power wherever possible.

In regions such as the Sahel, all this is a disaster. The feeble multilateral interventions at the global level are insufficient to counter the region’s destructive dynamics, exacerbating food insecurity, growing social polarization, and emboldening ANSAs. Governance gaps widen in the Sahel as weak and corrupt governments are incapable of dealing with the climate crisis, leading to spiraling conflict and the largest forced out-migration from the region in history.

Scenario 4: Reinvigoration

In the early 2020s, the multilateral system was unable to address the world’s biggest problems, including interstate and intrastate conflict. This situation owed much to the intransigence of the world’s major powers, which were uninterested in cooperation within the UN Security Council and other key multilateral forums and, worse, had been antagonizing one another for years. In 2025, China and the United States got what both had been fearing yet also planning for, which was a showdown over Taiwan. The resulting crisis, which was worse even than the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 in bringing the world close to a nuclear Armageddon, reset not only their bilateral relationship but the multilateral system as well. The UNSC and other key multilateral instruments for resolving conflict were reinvigorated, the result of a newly found desire to have the major powers play much more constructive and cooperative roles in the global system.

Through 2023 and 2024, a gridlocked multilateral system had been incapable of managing peace and security matters around the world. Diplomatic successes were few and far between. Russia’s war in Ukraine, for example, was at a stalemate and risked becoming a true frozen conflict. Neither the US-led NATO nor Russia and its ally China seemed interested in making a decisive move in one direction or another to resolve the situation in Ukraine. Other conflicts around the world, for example in the Sahel, were given a low priority by the major powers and therefore by the UNSC.

All of this changed in 2025, when China under President Xi Jinping decided the time had come to make a play for Taiwan. Although long feared in Washington, Xi’s play was not the expected full-scale invasion but rather a blockade of the island, an unorthodox move that appeared to give China maneuvering room vis-à-vis the United States and its allies while maximizing pressure on Taiwan. As Washington and Moscow had in 1962, Washington and Beijing maneuvered for advantage within an ever-more dangerous and increasingly nuclear-hued crisis.

And for weeks, the world watched the escalations on television and via social media: first the sober announcements from both capitals, other states, and UN leadership, then the opening acts of intimidation at sea and in the air around Taiwan, and finally reports of the two countries’ armed forces shooting at one another—a step that the Soviet Union and the United States had managed to (almost) completely avoid in 1962. At each stage, rhetorical and bureaucratic escalation matched the physical acts, first at the UNSC where both countries accused the other of acting in bad faith, then to both countries announcing they had placed their nuclear forces on highest alert, and finally to leadership telling their citizens, as calmly as they could muster, to be prepared for a nuclear exchange.

For the public watching around the world, this showdown evolved from apathy to disbelief to deep worry and finally to mass panic. Rally-around-the-flag demonstrations in China, the United States, and their allies quickly faded as both powers began talking openly about the risk of nuclear escalation, including at UNSC emergency meetings, held daily throughout the crisis. Impromptu street marches and sit-ins focused on peace took the place of nationalistic rallies, including among publics in the Indo-Pacific and Eurasian regions that feared being targeted by nuclear warheads should the worst occur. These events occurred even in regions with little fear of direct targeting, such as Latin America and Africa, owing to the real risk of an apocalyptic nuclear winter that would occur should the United States and China exchange only a fraction of their nuclear arsenals. Toward the end, as shooting began around Taiwan, mass panic set in nearly everywhere. The situation was not helped by the social media environment, where bad-faith actors used AI tools to generate deepfakes showing realistic attacks on ships, aircraft, and even Taipei, most of which had yet to occur. Few could differentiate between reality and fiction, which helped sow confusion and mass panic.

It took several kinetic incidents, including the sinking of a few ships, for Presidents Xi and Biden (the US leader having been reelected) to find their way to a truce. Years later, as with the Cuban Missile Crisis, it came out that both sides had come within millimeters of escalating to conventional missile attacks on one another’s territory (the United States on bases in southern China, and China on bases in Guam and Hawaii). Fortunately, cooler heads indeed prevailed, as had occurred in 1962.

The crisis having subsided, the two leaders agreed to meet for an extraordinary bilateral summit. There, they signed a declaration reiterating the need for multilateral cooperation, including an announcement of arms control negotiations, and pledged their joint support for managing, containing, and reducing conflict around the world. The effect of this summit was so profound on elite and public opinion the world over that many compared it to the Reagan-Gorbachev summit at Reykjavík in 1986.

The two leaders appeared to be genuine in their convictions, which were buttressed by overwhelming sentiment in support of multilateralism from every corner of the world. Governments representing the two countries’ allies and partners as well as the world’s nonaligned states pressed hard for a return to multilateralism to ensure that such a near-death experience would never happen again.

With the United States and China in the lead, and with the support of most other countries, there was a recognition of the need to reinvigorate the UN system’s core functions, especially conflict resolution, which once again were seen as having failed in preventing this near catastrophe. The P5 agreed to UNSC reforms, which included the expansion of the number of elected seats and reforms to various processes that give elected seat holders more influence in setting the body’s agenda and in coalition building. Yet there was no veto reform, so concerns persisted that the world would return to gridlock within the UNSC. However, those concerns were temporarily assuaged given the willingness of the world’s two greatest powers to cooperate, which they did on more occasions than not from 2025 to the mid-2030s.

The severity of the Taiwan crisis ensured that the conflict prevention and peacebuilding architecture also would be subject to an overhaul. There was a marked increase in interest within the UNSC to revitalize engagement in conflict zones. Existing peacekeeping missions were reauthorized, and new ones deployed, including special missions to monitor situations among and between nuclear powers, for example India and Pakistan. There was some progress in managing interstate conflicts, where the bulk of the multilateral diplomatic and mediation efforts focused. In 2027, the war in Ukraine formally ended with a peace deal. Through the late 2020s and early 2030s, there was a reinvestment in the Sahel, which enjoyed broad material and financial support from the P5, including both the United States and China, in turn helping to stabilize the region and end much of the fighting there, if only temporarily.

Regarding arms control, China, the United States, and Russia started promising talks that were hoped would result in binding agreements, as had occurred during the Cold War. Under the auspices of the UNSC, promising talks on the Korean peninsula were started for normalizing relations with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (aka North Korea), and serious multilateral negotiations restarted concerning Iran’s nuclear program.

Although this reinvigoration of the historic tools of multilateral conflict prevention and peacebuilding was welcomed, peace activists around the world remained concerned that the system had not been overhauled sufficiently. Among other worries, they feared that intrastate conflicts had been given too little attention and imagination. Within the UNSC, they pushed for what they called a new Charter for Resilience that would push countries away from the post-Cold War model of military intervention and focus on an indirect model that would invest in partnerships with local populations within affected countries.

Regional case study: How the scenarios could play out in the Sahel

By Soda Lo

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V. Questions for policymakers

This report has assessed how core trends and uncertainties are reshaping the world, the contours of conflict, and the management of conflict. This section asks five questions that policymakers should consider as they assess how best to navigate the interaction of the trends and uncertainties over the coming decade. Some answers to these five questions are easier to implement and can be scaled relatively quickly. Others will require a broader shift in how institutions approach conflict management and the conflict cycle, requiring both more time and resources for successful implementation.

Some of the questions and potential responses presented in this section are consistent with topics discussed in UN Secretary-General Guterres’s A New Agenda for Peace. Where there is overlap, this work offers steps for the UN to build beyond its findings.

1. How should multilateral organizations such as the UN adapt to and manage a multipolar world?

As discussed at length in the trends and uncertainties section, the UN’s core security apparatus, the UNSC, today is marked by sustained disagreements among the P5 nations. Those disagreements mirror the ideological and geopolitical divergencies among (principally) China, Russia, and the United States. It is tempting to dismiss efforts to find mutual ground among these powers, given the unlikelihood of positive results. Our Common Agenda recognizes the risk of increasing tensions among the major powers and the need for diplomacy to take place during times of high tension. Indeed, conflict will not pause in an era of increased tensions among major powers.

The UN as an institution was never designed to be a cure-all for conflict, violence, and warfare, but rather as a forum wherein states could attempt to find collective solutions to such problems. Given the sensitivities among major powers to interventions that could impinge upon their sovereignty or interests, the UNSC was never meant to enable collective security responses to international crises through majoritarian decision-making processes. Hence the veto given to the P5 states. (At the time of the UN’s founding, the P5 were the world’s remaining major powers.) The UNSC’s system of permanent membership, including the veto, “was explicitly built to be unfair, giving the victors of World War II an outsized role in international peace and security . . . and it was explicitly structured to be easily deadlocked, with any of the P5 able to unilaterally grind its work to a halt,” as two United States Institute of Peace (USIP) analysts put it.¹⁵²

This means that although policymakers (and others) should temper their expectations for UNSC reform, and although the current state of play among the major powers is discouraging as reflected in the UNSC’s (frequent) deadlock regarding its peace and security agenda, cooperation remains possible despite it all. For example, in 2013 and 2014 the United States, China, and Russia all voted to approve the MINUSMA mission in Mali.¹⁵³ Though this mission has now fallen apart, the fact that all five of the P5 states agreed to its formation shows that common ground existed within the UNSC, at least at the time, regarding this area of the world.¹⁵⁴

A longer look back into history shows that sporadic cooperation among the major powers on peace and security matters did occur. During the Cold War, although the Soviet Union and United States infrequently cooperated, they did join on some important matters within the UN framework generally and on occasion within the UNSC. For example, they backed creation of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in 1957 and signed the UN-brokered Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in 1968.¹⁵⁵

There are analogous opportunities among the major powers today. For example, China’s interests might align with those of the United States in some parts of the world where both countries seek stability more than they do gaining an upper hand over their geopolitical rival. Here, some analysts point to Africa and the Middle East as examples of regions where such conditions hold.¹⁵⁶

Also like the Cold War, cooperation among great powers in an era of multipolarity will likely resemble more limited and targeted interventions in scope. MINUSMA’s renewal in 2022, before it was dissolved, offers a hint of what may come. At that time, although the mission was renewed, there was debate within the UNSC regarding the scope of MINUSMA’s human rights reporting mechanism. This dispute led to China and Russia abstaining in the vote and a declaration by Mali that they would not enforce the human rights provisions of MINUSMA’s mandate.¹⁵⁷ This event suggests that policymakers should be prepared for interventions, if they are to be approved by the UNSC, to have a tighter mandate compared with past missions.

It also suggests that policymakers should reconsider what success looks like within the confines of the UNSC. As Jean-Pierre Lacroix, the UN under-secretary-general for peacekeeping operations has stated, “the ultimate goal of peacekeeping” that encompasses the entirety of the peace process or the conflict cycle is unlikely to occur anytime soon. Rather, as the International Crisis Group rightly notes, missions should focus on other goals short of the ultimate one such as providing aid and protecting civilians.¹⁵⁸ Such goals are practical, useful, and achievable. For example, the UN mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, MONUSCO, has made aid delivery and infrastructure development across the DRC a focus of its work.¹⁵⁹

The implications of multipolarity extend well beyond the UN as an institution for addressing peace and conflict. Here it is well worth discussing minilateralism as a solution set to conflict management. Minilateral approaches to international governance problems refer to the formation of (often) small coalitions of actors—quite often, state actors but occasionally state and nonstate actors in tandem—that have a desire to address a specific type of problem in the world. Minilateral approaches often are utilized when the multilateral system has failed to address and solve a problem and/or when minilateral participants want to avoid the strictures (institutional, legal, or otherwise) that the multilateral system imposes.

Although the roots of minilateralism extend back centuries, this approach to international governance has been enjoying a renaissance owing to the difficulty of finding comprehensive solutions to the world’s myriad challenges within the multilateral system. Advocates of minilateralism insist that the format easily attracts both state and nonstate actors alike that are interested in addressing specific problems in (often) ad hoc diplomatic arrangements. Minilateralism’s virtues can include geographic and thematic flexibility, speed of formation and work modalities, convenience, nonideologically based groupings, and the power that comes from networked relationships. Minilateral arrangements have been increasing in number and significance across regional settings, including Asia and the Middle East, for example the Quad, AUKUS (Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States), and I2U2 (Israel, India, the United States, and the United Arab Emirates).¹⁶⁰

For the United Nations and other multilateral institutions that are responsible for maintaining the integrity of the global conflict-management system, minilateralism presents as much risk as opportunity. On the risk side, USIP’s Andrew Cheatham writes that minilateralism “cannot take the place of multilateral organizations” because those are “based on norms and laws” that reflect a set of universal democratic ideals.¹⁶¹ Minilateralism, he argues, has the potential to dilute the multilateral system’s global governance model and undermine its norms, laws, and standards. On the opportunity side, minilateralism’s virtues—nimbleness, ease of inclusion, and issue- and region-specific purpose—mean that the UN can find many ways to insert itself into such processes when doing so suits its purposes, if not as a formal participant then at least in an advisory or other role.

There is little to suggest a reversal in the minilateral trend, given its upsides for participants in a world characterized by messy and complex problems that no single global institution is equipped to solve on its own. According to Paul Heinbecker, a former Canadian diplomat, “peace, order and progress will increasingly demand shifting combinations of multilateral, minilateral and bilateral cooperation between governments . . . [and] require a wide variety of institutional responses—some evolutionary, others revolutionary, some inside the United Nations System and Breton Woods institutions and others outside of them. . . . No country or small group of countries can long dominate this complex, integrating, changing world or alone determine its future.”¹⁶²

2. How can multilateral organizations plan for and adapt to conflict management challenges brought on by the evolution of Earth systems and emerging technologies?

In a rapidly changing global environment, the UN needs to have a better sense of risks and opportunities that are on the longer-term horizon. Strategic foresight and futures thinking is a well-established and highly respected field that for decades has established its value in large public- and private-sector organizations the world over. Mainstreaming foresight and futures practices within the UN and other multilateral conflict resolution and peacebuilding bodies can make them nimbler in the face of emerging risks and opportunities that are arising within the global system.

A piece of good news here is that the UN secretary-general has embraced a future-oriented agenda, as outlined in Our Common Agenda, published in 2021, and the Summit of the Future, a high-level UN conference planned for September 2024.¹⁶³ Our Common Agenda called for strengthening “international foresight” capabilities within multilateral conflict resolution and peacebuilding bodies. UN agencies appear to be trending toward institutionalization of foresight and futures thinking.

Two bodies stand out in this regard. The first is the Climate Security Mechanism, a joint operation managed by multiple UN agencies. CSM works at the nexus of Earth systems change and conflict, and seeks to provide policymakers with a greater understanding of their intersection. While a good start, to be truly effective, the resources and mandate behind CSM need to be scaled. As CSM itself notes, the mechanism consists of a small, New York headquarters-based team that lacks the mandate and capacity to coordinate broader UN work on climate security. As a result, due to budgetary constraints and institutional capacity, much of CSM’s engagement takes place remotely through virtual relationships.¹⁶⁴ Scaling the CSM through an appropriate budgetary increase and an expanded mandate would allow it to work closely with more UN agencies, implement on-the-ground field work, and expand its remit to cover the entire world (its current focus areas are the Arab states, Latin America and the Caribbean, and sub-Saharan Africa.

Similarly, the rapid development and advancement of technology is also changing the world that policymakers will have to navigate as well as providing them with powerful tools to manage it. Mainstreaming foresight thinking is important to develop an understanding of the different possible trajectories that technological advancement may take, including their future impacts on conflict. The DPPA has created what is calls an Innovation Cell that is tasked with utilizing novel approaches to its work, including greater emphasis on “data-driven foresight [consistent] with its early warning role.”¹⁶⁵ A focus of the Innovation Cell is the Futuring Peace project, which studies how emerging technologies such as generative AI may alter the UN system in the future.¹⁶⁶ The work of the Innovation Cell is important and timely, but like the CSM its funding and mandate are limited. The Innovation Cell should be empowered to work with UN agencies beyond the DPPA by increasing its mandate or funding. One possibility might be to change where the Innovation Cell is located within the UN system. The UN should consider moving the Innovation Cell from the DPPA to the secretary-general’s office.

Beyond the UN, other multilateral organizations should seek to improve their foresight capabilities, including as they relate to Earth systems and technology. The World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and regional bodies such as the European Union, ECOWAS, SADC, NATO, and more should all seek to develop or build out their capabilities in this space through increases in financing or expansions of mandate. Where existing systems such as early warning mechanisms are in place, multilateral institutions should integrate foresight techniques to allow for their data analytics to be mapped onto decision-making processes that focus on longer time horizons.

Foresight is a practice that is designed to anticipate disruption and assist organizations to develop strategies that are resilient in the face of many possible futures. Indeed, foresight is the primary instrument and analytical lens behind this study. And as this study has endeavored to show, the UN will confront a rapidly changing world, marked by new opportunities and challenges resulting from alterations in the global balance of power, technological and ecological disruptions, and other drivers of change.

3. What will the role of nonstate actors be in this space going forward and how can the UN and other multilateral institutions both leverage opportunities and manage threats posed by nonstate groups?

As section III endeavored to show, nonstate groups are playing an important role in international affairs. This category includes both ANSAs such as terror groups and transnational organized criminal groups, as well as groups with a more positive intent including private philanthropies that fund vaccine development or nutrition assistance. The UN and other multilateral organizations will need to continue engaging with such groups, using their expertise to their advantage where they can, while limiting the negative impacts that they might have.

Minilateralism includes an assertion that states and international organizations should form partnerships with nonstate actors, at least on occasion, if their efforts are to succeed. Nonstate actors’ roles in the global system are important enough to warrant their own assessment. Private- and philanthropic-sector actors often provide resources for addressing global challenges in areas ranging from public health to climate change to hunger and conflict. For example, in response to COVID-19, the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation authorized up to $300 million in forgivable loans to support vaccine manufacturing in low- and middle-income countries and up to another $300 million for the procurement of vaccines and treatments in low- and middle-income countries.¹⁶⁷

Gavi, established in 1999, is perhaps the most apt and strongest example of a public-private model that was designed to attack a major global problem: access to immunization. Gavi marries significant financial assistance and technical expertise from dozens of corporate and philanthropic partners with those from multilateral institutions including the World Health Organization, World Bank, and the United Nations Children’s Fund, known widely as UNICEF.¹⁶⁸

Tapping into philanthropies and the private sector offers a way for multilateral institutions such as the UN DPPA not only to overcome funding shortfalls they may be facing to complete their work, but also to augment their own capabilities.¹⁶⁹ Given the scale of the conflict management problem, the DPPA should embrace a partnership model to secure donations from private and philanthropic actors and to find other pathways and capabilities for doing its work. The UN Population Fund (UNFPA), as another example, already does so, having secured a partnership with (once again) the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation. According to their press release announcing the partnership, the Gates Foundation “brings a global network of partners and expertise in technology and innovation, while UNFPA contributes country-level reach, experience working with governments and expertise in family planning and reproductive health.”¹⁷⁰

There are several considerations for DPPA and other multilateral organizations to successfully engage private and philanthropic partners in a common endeavor. First, partnerships will have to provide an attractive value proposition wherein they can provide tangible results in the real world (and with impacts that justify costs). They will need to demonstrate that such tangible results will occur only if all actors work in concert. Demonstrating this value proposition will incentivize external actors to invest in a UN-led or UN-managed partnership. Doing so also would discourage private donors from entering the conflict prevention and peacebuilding space unilaterally. Second, for private-sector and philanthropic actors who become partners, multilateral organizations such as DPPA must find ways to leverage their preexisting capabilities for maximum positive impact on the conflict prevention and peacebuilding spaces. Potential partners from the tech sector, as an example, offer valuable capabilities ranging from AI/ML processing to big data analytics to remote sensing and much more. Third, organizations such as DPPA will need to ensure that private and philanthropic partners understand that although their voices and participation are critical, only the public organizations have final decision-making responsibilities regarding core priorities and tasks.

Beyond private and philanthropic partners, multilateral organizations will need to manage the growth of ANSAs. Membership within the United Nations is confined to nation-states, which means that the UN is confronted with an awkward conflict-management challenge involving nonmember groups. ANSAs are playing an increasingly powerful role in conflicts, where they can sometimes claim more legitimacy than the state itself, in large part because states often have weak or even nonexistent governance capacities across parts of their territories. Across all UN peacekeeping and conflict prevention operations, the UN will have to contend with this complex of weakened state capacity on the one hand and heightened ANSA capabilities on the other. Minilateralism is unlikely to work when engaging ANSAs, as minilateral institutions tend to offer limited technical knowledge, have minimal financial backing, and do not possess the organizational infrastructure and know-how to engage as the UN can.

In adapting to the reality posed by nonstate actors, including ANSAs, the UN ideally should establish clear and concise guidelines about engaging such actors in all conflict phases (before, during, and after conflict). The established policies should include red lines that the UN should not cross, for example ensuring there is no engagement with ANSAs that commit human rights violations. Policies should include metrics to determine if ANSAs have enough popular legitimacy in areas they control to justify serious engagement with them.

These policy goals are relatively easy to state and more difficult to realize, owing to both political sensitivities within the UN (i.e., member states’ reluctance to have the UN acknowledge the legitimacy of ANSAs for political negotiation) and the difficulty of finding ANSAs that meet the above criteria. UN institutions, including the UNSC, for years have developed guidelines for engaging with ANSAs for humanitarian purposes, but have been extremely hesitant to do the same within conflict prevention and peacebuilding processes, owing largely to push back from states.¹⁷¹

A central challenge for any sort of operational guidance is that no two conflict situations are the same. While some of the main themes, causes, and even actors may transfer over between conflicts, each conflict is unique. As such, the above guidelines should be developed in a way that does not make them definitive, but rather allows them to be customized and applied to each conflict situation in a way that will result in the most positive possible outcome.

A key example of the need to define these guidelines can be seen following the Taliban’s takeover of Afghanistan. The UN has a clear mandate to protect civilians, including those living in territory controlled by ANSAs.¹⁷² There exists debate within the UN about how to approach and engage the Taliban, including within the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) regarding the government’s actions to exclude woman from public life and concerns over the harboring of terrorists, thus limiting the ability of the UN to even start to protect civilians.¹⁷³ The dire situation in Afghanistan demands that the international community find productive ways to engage and promote human and civil rights, despite lack of a clear international consensus on how to approach the situation in Afghanistan. Developing a set of guidelines to guide interactions with ANSAs could result in a more effective international response the next time a situation like the Taliban’s rise to power occurs.

The UN and other multilateral institutions are hardly the only public-sector actors struggling to come to grips with how to deal with ANSAs in conflict settings. Important states in the conflict management space, especially donor states such as the United States, also face the question of whether and how to engage such nonstate actors. Lauren Mooney and Patrick W. Quirk write that such groups “pose a thorny policy dilemma” for the US and other state actors for the reasons outlined above. Like the UN, these states have yet to devise clear guidelines for selecting which groups to engage and under what principles. They assert that those principles ought to prioritize democratic governance, local dialogue, and human rights.¹⁷⁴ However, as others rightly note, a lack of defined guidelines can be effective, allowing special envoys to operate under the radar without following a set of rules, a process that can sometimes result in success.¹⁷⁵

4. How can the UN support regional bodies in advancing their conflict prevention and peacebuilding goals in line with global multilateralism?

Assuming the UN continues to be plagued by major power competition, especially within the UNSC, regional organizations like the AU and ECOWAS likewise should continue to play an outsized role in conflict management.¹⁷⁶ These regional organizations are smaller (they have fewer member states), operate closer to the ground within specific regional geographies, and often possess high legitimacy and buy-in from their member states. Most often, these organizations are a step removed from the great power competition that plagues multilateral bodies like the UN and its decision-making organ, the UNSC.

The UN should continue to prioritize its engagement with and increase its financial and technical support of regional institutions (as practicable), given their importance in regional settings and as levers for the UN. Cooperative provision of institutional and expert knowledge, for instance, should be prioritized and strengthened. An example concerns UN engagement with the AU. Our Common Agenda notes that the UNSC should more systematically interact with the AU, rather than treating its recommendations in ad hoc fashion. The UN should revisit funding the AU; past proposals have called for the UN to fund 75 percent of AU-led peace operations, with the AU picking up the remaining 25 percent.

At the same time, the UN and the DPPA should expand its development and promotion of tailored strategies to manage conflict within individual states. This model would have the UN deepen its work with individual state governments to develop strategies for both preventing and responding to conflict within their borders. Such an approach would have the UN engage host states to build trust and capacity that would be sensitive to highly localized settings.

Beyond strategy development, the UN and other multilateral bodies should also invest in building institutions within nations that can carry out these strategies. The UNDP has already undertaken efforts to do this, creating local peace communities (LPCs) in Ghana, Kenya, Sierra Leone, Malawi, and South Africa, to name a few examples. (LPCs are broad-based community forums that “meet regularly to discuss emerging conflicts or tensions affecting a district, municipality, town or village.”)¹⁷⁷ These efforts utilize UNDP staff who are trained in peacebuilding to assist LPCs, local governments, and other stakeholders.¹⁷⁸ Further funding of these resources can be a helpful tool to ensure the effective implementation of locally developed strategies.

Although there are pitfalls to be avoided in this model—the UN would have to ensure that any coordination efforts were consistent with its mandate and ideals—the promotion of such localized approaches might have several benefits. These include their flexibility, sustained engagement with national and subnational leadership, and the possibility of greater buy-in from major powers owing to the approach’s respect for state sovereignty. China, for example, often used state sovereignty as a rationale not to support UN-sanctioned multilateral interventions.¹⁷⁹

5. How can the UN, and particularly the UNSC, overcome concerns that it lacks legitimacy, especially in the Global South?

A longstanding criticism of the UNSC is that power is held in the hands of the body’s permanent members, the P5, reflective of the global distribution of power at the end of World War II in 1945, when the UN was founded. A growing number of Global South states and outside observers increasingly see the UNSC and the UN as a whole as an organization lacking legitimacy. Reforming the UNSC, whether by function or by structure, would allow the body to overcome a perception that it is a (largely) Western-led body that is unrepresentative of the world and that, accordingly, fails to act in the interests of the UN’s member states. For this reason, and for years, countries in the Global South have called for permanent seats on the UNSC to rebalance the body geographically, economically, and demographically. According to this argument, the inclusion of one or more nations from Latin America and the Caribbean, Africa, the Middle East, Asia, and elsewhere would assist the UNSC and other institutions to be more responsive to conflicts in those regions.

Although decades old, calls for reform have become louder since US President Biden endorsed UNSC reform in an address to the UN General Assembly in 2022. “The United States supports increasing the number of both permanent and non-permanent representatives of the council,” he said, including “permanent seats for those nations we’ve long supported and permanent seats for countries in Africa [and] Latin America and the Caribbean.”¹⁸⁰ Since his address, the US proposal has called for the addition of six permanent seats on the UNSC, albeit none holding veto power.¹⁸¹ The Biden administration continues to work with partner nations to develop a plan for reform.¹⁸² Other states, such as India and Italy, have also tabled their own proposals for UNSC reform,¹⁸³ and states such as Brazil, Germany, India, Japan, Kenya, Mexico, Nigeria, and South Africa have all expressed an intent to join the UNSC.¹⁸⁴

UNSC reform, if defined narrowly as the addition of new permanent (veto-holding) seats, might be the least plausible policy recommendation on this list, in terms of the odds of coming to fruition. There are numerous serious obstacles standing in the way, including the resistance of P5 members to dilution of their power within the UNSC as well as the number of non-P5 states that have no interest in seeing other states become permanent members. The veto within the UNSC is designed to give the body a deliberative mechanism that will slow action and even prevent it, while protecting the interests of its permanent members.

Beyond major power alignment, there are concrete actions that might spur greater cooperation within the UNSC, including among the E10, which are the body’s ten elected (nonpermanent) members. One way to do so would be by expanding “pen holding” privileges, which refers to the current system that enables P5 countries to draft and circulate statements, declarations, and resolutions. Currently, the United States, United Kingdom, and France hold the pen on twenty-three out of thirty-three country-specific files at the UNSC, including eleven of twelve countries in peacekeeping contexts.¹⁸⁵ What this means is that a small number of P5 states have extraordinary power to shape the UNSC’s substantive and procedural work, which other members view as unacceptable. For example, France holds the pen on files related to Mali and the Central African Republic, despite both of those states’ opposition to its role, given France’s history and recent presence in West Africa.¹⁸⁶

Yet as the pen-holding example shows, even without P5 reform, it is possible to retain and even strengthen the institution’s ability to function. The E10 has had an important role here. Aside from insisting on changing the rules around pen holding, E10 members also have built new coalitions among one another and with P5 states, and have strategically utilized the rotating UNSC to shape the Council’s work where they can.¹⁸⁷

Outside of further developing pen-holding privileges, the UN should also explore expanding the UNSC beyond the E10. Currently, the ten elected members come from five different regional groupings: three from the Africa group, two from the Asia and Pacific group, one from the Eastern Europe group, two from the Latin America and the Caribbean group, and two from the Western European and Others group.¹⁸⁸ (Of the P5 members, China is in the Asia and the Pacific group, Russia is in the Eastern Europe group, and the UK, France, and the United States are all in the Western European and Others group.)¹⁸⁹ By offering more elected seats to Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean, and Asia, the UNSC can help to overcome some of the claims that it geographically concentrates power in the Global North.

Outside of Security Council reform, the nature of UN peacekeeping interventions will also need to be addressed. UN peacekeeping interventions are often faced with the criticism that they are led by foreign powers having little respect for the host country’s government and institutions.¹⁹⁰ UN peacekeeping operations are built around the principle that the host country consents to the mission, though there is no document that codifies this and there is no way to ensure consent for the mission is given at subnational government levels. Rather, consent is believed to have been granted at the start of the mission and is not negotiated until the mission mandate is up for renewal.

Creating a strengthened consent regime that incorporates and respects the wishes of host states will result in UN operations gaining legitimacy and support. To this end, the UN should define a standardized consent document (as the current system relies on documents that fall short of express consent). A new document process, to be developed and executed by DPPA and the host nation, would establish the boundaries of host nation consent, including the scope of operations and conditions under which a renewal would occur.

Although a revised consent document process could proceed based on an agreement solely with elites representing the host government, the challenge is to find consensus outside of that small circle of national elites. To build and sustain the baseline for the mission’s success, DPPA should devise ways in which it can canvas elites outside of a nation’s capital during the initial consent process and iteratively thereafter.

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About the authors

Staff

Peter Engelke

Senior Fellow, Scowcroft Strategy Initiative

Global Energy Center Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Technology & Innovation Europe & Eurasia

Fellow

Anca Agachi

Nonresident Fellow

Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security Transatlantic Security Initiative

Africa Conflict

Staff

Imran Bayoumi

Associate Director

Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security Scowcroft Strategy Initiative

Former staff

Soda Lo

Former Project Assistant

Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security Scowcroft Strategy Initiative

Politics & Diplomacy Resilience & Society

This body of work was generously supported by the United States Institute of Peace.

The Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security works to develop sustainable, nonpartisan strategies to address the most important security challenges facing the United States and the world.

Learn more

The post The future of multilateral peacebuilding and conflict prevention appeared first on Atlantic Council.

About the authors

Staff

Peter Engelke

Senior Fellow, Scowcroft Strategy Initiative

Global Energy Center Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Technology & Innovation Europe & Eurasia

Fellow

Anca Agachi

Nonresident Fellow

Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security Transatlantic Security Initiative

Africa Conflict

Staff

Imran Bayoumi

Associate Director

Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security Scowcroft Strategy Initiative

Former staff

Soda Lo

Former Project Assistant

Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security Scowcroft Strategy Initiative

Politics & Diplomacy Resilience & Society

This body of work was generously supported by the United States Institute of Peace.

The Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security works to develop sustainable, nonpartisan strategies to address the most important security challenges facing the United States and the world.

Learn more

The post Four scenarios for the future of multilateral peacebuilding and conflict prevention appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Israel has a long and fraught history of negotiating the return of Israelis in captivity. The unsuccessful lengths to which the country has gone to retrieve Israeli Air Force navigator Ron Arad, who disappeared after ejecting over Lebanon back in 1986, are legendary. In 2011, Israel also authorized the release of a staggering 1,027 prisoners—280 of whom were serving life sentences for their involvement in the perpetration of deadly terror attacks—to secure the freedom of Gilad Shalit, an enlisted member of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) who was abducted to Gaza from southern Israel. The fact that Yahya Sinwar, the Hamas chief who spearheaded the October 7 massacre, was among the cohort swapped for Shalit only underscores an inherent hazard of the current process.

Lack of faith in Hamas’s intentions to complete the exchange notwithstanding—the organization has resorted repeatedly to psychological warfare devices in exploiting Israel’s collective sensitivity to hostage-taking—ministers of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s cabinet voted overwhelmingly to approve the bargain. The component that has emerged, however, as the greatest source of concern from Israel’s perspective is the stipulated pause in fighting, which will accompany the release of the captives: a four-day suspension, with the possibility of extension, should Hamas produce the return of additional hostages.   

The precise framing of this topic by Israeli principals highlights their emphatic resistance to instituting a more permanent cessation of hostilities. Despite calls from some quarters of the global community for an actual ceasefire in Gaza and amid prevalent aspirations that the agreed-upon pause could generate momentum toward that outcome, Israel remains adamant in its resolve to continue the IDF ground offensive once the present arrangement expires. That position is putting Jerusalem at loggerheads with even some of its ostensible friends whose support for the effort to dismantle Hamas has become more equivocal as conditions in Gaza have worsened.

The rude awakening of October 7 sent Israeli decision-makers back to the drawing board, their previous strategy in tatters. Any hope that years of a tenuous equilibrium—where Hamas, a US-designated terrorist group, was sustained to administer the Gaza Strip—would generate robust security for Israel was shattered when 1,200 Israelis were murdered that Sabbath morning. Nobody, Hamas included, could claim credibly to be surprised by the IDF’s response to the atrocities of that day. “What was in Gaza, will no longer be,” Defense Minister Yoav Gallant said on October 10, telegraphing Israel’s intentions.

Operation Swords of Iron, initiated to “defend Israeli civilians against the combined attack launched against Israel by Hamas,” morphed quickly into a full-fledged war with the broader objectives, as articulated by Prime Minister Netanyahu, “to eliminate Hamas by destroying its military and governing abilities, and to do everything possible to bring our captives home.” The rhetoric employed by Israeli officials since the elucidation of those goals has offered no indication of any imminent course change.

Israeli spokesmen have vehemently eschewed any formal language of “ceasefire,” insisting instead that Israel would consent, at most, to only temporary breaks in pursuing the IDF’s mission to remove Hamas from power in Gaza. By their rationale, bringing the war to an immediate close would be premature. It would ensconce Hamas firmly in charge, still retaining numerous Israeli hostages and poised to commence rapid reconstruction of its infrastructure. Hamas could then leverage the introduction of international aid to devote resources to restoring its military capabilities and underground tunnel network, which—as Hamas leaders have pledged vociferously—would be turned again soon on Israel. Compounding their distrust of declared ceasefires with Hamas, Israelis remember exactly how Hamas disrespected such a declaration in 2014 when it abducted IDF Lieutenant Hadar Goldin hours after a ceasefire had come into effect. (Hamas still refuses to return Goldin, who was later pronounced dead, for burial in Israel.)

The policy establishment in Israel is apprehensive similarly about what or who would fill the vacuum in Gaza if and when the IDF should depart the area. The West Bank-based Palestinian Authority, often touted as the natural candidate for this role, is in severe disarray and uninspiring confidence in its abilities to assert dominion over the Gaza Strip, from which it was expelled forcibly by Hamas in 2007. Israel’s experience with multinational teams—supposing that countries can be found to volunteer for that task—raises cause for distress that foreign contingents would be similarly ineffective. Meanwhile, a ceasefire would impose constraints on Israeli measures against Hamas, heightening the vulnerability of Israel to renewed acts of terrorism.

There is no desire in Israel to play into Hamas’s hands by granting them the enduring ceasefire that they crave. Such a truce—as was in place effectively until Hamas decided to violate its terms unilaterally on October 7—would relieve pressure on the embattled organization and allow its forces to regroup. In this context, the preference of Hamas for dragging out the upcoming hostage release over four days—while also dangling the potential for subsequent exchanges—is perceived by Israel as extortion designed to complicate the resumption of full IDF operations in Gaza.

All told, the reality of a ceasefire, by Israel’s logic, would be critically unstable. It would be detrimental to Israeli deterrence and be destined inevitably to degrade into an even more lethal round of hostilities that could expand like wildfire to other neighboring theaters.

More in line with Israeli thinking is what Joe Biden administration officials have called “tactical humanitarian pauses” for the limited purposes of enabling non-combatants to exit battle zones, increasing the flow of aid provisions, and facilitating the release of hostages. (According to Netanyahu, it has been only through the application of “relentless military pressure” and supplementary “diplomatic pressure” that the latest releases were achieved.) In these circumstances, the IDF would stay deployed in forward field locations, from where it would continue to collect vital intelligence, expose and destroy Hamas arsenals, command posts, and launch sites, and stand by to quickly remobilize positioned assets for the next phase of its war on Hamas.

Motivation in Israel, where the trauma of October 7 is still palpable, remains high to persist until the eradication of Hamas and its capability to inflict harm on Israeli targets. Defense Minister Yoav Gallant has inferred openly that IDF troops will soon be operating in the southern Gaza Strip as well.

Although the White House has pushed back vigorously against critics and not wavered in its public support for Israel’s war aims—”as long as Hamas clings to its ideology of destruction, a cease-fire is not peace,” President Biden wrote in the Washington Post on November 18—prevailing uncertainties about Israel’s endgame are threatening to gnaw away at the legitimacy of a protracted campaign in Gaza. Israeli policymakers will certainly look to lock down as many tangible gains as possible before time might, eventually, run out.

Shalom Lipner is a nonresident senior fellow for Middle East Programs at the Atlantic Council. From 1990 to 2016, he served seven consecutive premiers at the Prime Minister’s Office in Jerusalem. Follow him on X: @ShalomLipner.

The post Why Israel has no imminent plans to wind down its war on Hamas appeared first on Atlantic Council.

“The visit of Antony Blinken, the son of a Jew, is not welcome in Iraq,” read a post circulated on social media by Abu Ali al-Askari, a pseudonym used by a senior official in Kataib Hezbollah, an Iran-backed armed group. The message also threatened to ban US citizens from Iraq and close the US embassy, adding that “we will achieve this in our own, non-peaceful way.”

While posting such threats, Kataib Hezbollah—which is designated by the US as a terrorist organization and is officially part of the Iraqi security forces—has not directly claimed responsibility for rocket and drone attacks that have taken place since October 7 against US personnel in Iraq.

Instead, a group called the Islamic Resistance in Iraq has named itself responsible for most of the attacks, posting claims on a Telegram channel called Iraq Flood (“Tufan al-Iraq” in Arabic), mimicking the name of Hamas’ al-Aqsa Flood (“Tufan al-Aqsa”) operation. The majority of these attacks have targeted the Ain al-Asad military base in Anbar province, the Harir airbase near Erbil in the semi-autonomous Kurdistan region, and the Conoco gas field and al-Tanf base in neighboring Syria. On November 9, militant groups likely carried out an Improvised Explosive Device (IED) attack on a ground convoy belonging to the US-led anti-Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) coalition near Ninewa province’s Mosul Dam, indicating a widening of tactics.

On November 17, a defense department official said that US forces in Iraq and Syria had been attacked sixty-one times since October 17, with the figure split roughly in half between the two countries. The Pentagon had previously blamed “Iranian-backed groups in Syria and Iraq” for these attacks.

There are around 2,500 US troops in Iraq at the invitation of the government in Baghdad and nine hundred in northeast Syria to support operations against remnants of ISIS. The US has responded to the attacks by carrying out at least three rounds of airstrikes in Syria on what it describes as facilities “used by Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and Iran-affiliated groups.”

On November 21, the Islamic Resistance in Iraq announced the death of Fadil al-Maksusi as a “martyr” in the “righteous battle against the falsehood incarnated by the American occupying forces in Iraq.” Later that same day, a defense department official told journalists that the United States and coalition forces were targeted at Ain al-Asad and US forces “responded in self-defense against those who carried out the strike.” The situation escalated the following day, when US Central Command confirmed that it carried out precision strikes on two facilities at a separate location, which it said were a “direct response to the attacks” on November 21 that “involved use of close-range ballistic missiles.” A post on a Kataib Hezbollah-affiliated Telegram channel said five of its men were killed in the strikes. 

What or who comprises the Islamic Resistance in Iraq is left deliberately vague; the brand’s opacity provides each armed group a level of plausible deniability. Nonetheless, leaders of individual armed groups have made public statements clearly linking attacks on US interests in Iraq to Washington’s support for Israel and its military operations in the Gaza Strip, which have killed more than thirteen thousand people and prompted outrage across the Middle East.

“There will be no end to the operations of the Islamic Resistance in Iraq unless the [Israeli] attacks on Gaza stop, and no ceasefire for the US occupation in Iraq unless there is a real and binding ceasefire for the enemy on our people in Gaza,” tweeted Abu Alaa al-Walaei, head of the Kataib Sayyid al-Shuhada group, which is part of the Iraqi state-backed Popular Mobilization Forces. Al-Walaei was added to the Office of Foreign Assets Control’s (OFAC) specially designated nationals list on November 17.

Despite the US issuing recent warnings to Israel over high civilian casualty numbers in Gaza, the overwhelming perception in Iraq regarding US support for Israel was already cemented in the days after Hamas’ October 7 assault, meaning that the attacks against US interests in Iraq and Syria will likely continue. 

“The attacks are going to increase day after day, and things are going to escalate,” said an Iraqi official in Mosul to me after the IED attack. 

This does not mean that the attacks and US counter-attacks will necessarily prompt an escalation to the level of Iraq or that state-supported militant groups will become directly involved in a broader conflict with Israel. In the Syrian civil war, Iraqi brigades easily crossed the long land border to fight on the side of Bashar al-Assad’s government. That is not an option in the case of Gaza. 

Iraqi military officials believe that the militant groups are likely taking action in order to defend their positions as vocal critics of Israel and self-proclaimed defenders of Palestinians, as well as to bolster local support over a highly emotive issue.

“They have talked so much about their hostility to America and how they want to liberate Jerusalem,” one Iraqi military official told me. “If they stay silent now, it will be really, really, really embarrassing for them.”

The Pentagon has described the recent attacks as “harassing.” Still, they have not caused the sort of destruction wrought by the IRGC ballistic missile attack on Ain al-Assad following the 2020 US assassination of Quds Force commander Qasem Soleimani and PMF commander Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis in Baghdad. To date, all of the roughly three dozen US personnel injured in the rocket and drone attacks—some with traumatic brain injuries—have returned to work. 

The attacks, while not amounting to nothing—the US and UK governments have both pulled out all non-essential diplomatic staff from their Baghdad embassies and Erbil consulates as a result of the precarious security situation—do not indicate that a full-blown conflict on Iraqi soil is on the cards. 

Instead, they are reminders that Iraq can be made a much more difficult place for the US and Americans to operate because of its policies towards Israel and the Gaza Strip. The attacks appear to be designed to up the ante without the intent of directly killing large numbers of US troops, which would likely attract a more forceful response from Washington. 

The current situation also presents opportunities that resistance groups in other countries can take advantage of. Beyond praising Iraqi actors, they can expand their opposition to the US’s stance on the Gaza war to include the latter’s military footprint across the entire region. 

“The Islamic Resistance in Iraq has decided to attack the US bases in Iraq and Syria because the US is the one leading the killing in Gaza,” said Lebanese Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah in a recent speech on November 3. “This is a wise and blessed and great decision by the leadership of the Islamic Resistance in Iraq.”

It is worth mentioning that this attack pattern is not new and this sort of activity occurs during periods of heightened regional and domestic tensions. There had been a period of calm prior to October 7, but in the past, US interests in Iraq have been repeatedly attacked by Iran-backed armed groups. One such period was during the Iraqi government formation process after the 2021 parliamentary elections, in which an Iran-backed alliance was pitted against others viewed more favorably by the West. 

The armed groups also have more to lose from further instability in Iraq than they have in the past, which likely acts as a deterrent from carrying out actions that could drag the country into a more intense conflict. The country pulls in around $9.5 billion monthly in revenues from oil sales, and the relative calm of recent years has allowed the opening of shops, restaurants, malls and the expansion of crude oil production that further enriches the political and business elite. The establishment of revenue streams is not something powerful Iraqis wish to disrupt. 

All the same, the persistence of the attacks highlights the inability of the governments in Baghdad and Erbil to prevent strikes on US interests in Iraq and the absence of a state monopoly on force.

An Iraqi military spokesperson released a statement in a WhatsApp group on October 23 describing the attacks as “unacceptable,” and said that Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani ordered security forces to pursue the elements responsible for these attacks. 

“[The foreign forces’] work is regulated by the Iraqi government and understandings that Iraqi diplomats have signed,” the statement said. “Therefore, the security and the safety of these facilities are a redline. Breaches to security and safety cannot be tolerated.”

But the attacks have clearly persisted since then. It may be the case that the Iraqi government cannot pinpoint exactly who is launching the attacks or where the attacks are coming from, making them harder to thwart. There is a security vacuum in large swathes of Iraqi territory because of long-standing territorial disputes between the central government in Baghdad and the Kurdistan Regional Government. This territory, stretching through Ninewa, Kirkuk, Salahaddin, and Diyala provinces, is not fully secured by either federal or Kurdish security forces and can be easily used by armed groups to plan and carry out attacks.

“The government and its security forces are working hard on the field to prevent these attacks and they have been successful in thwarting a score of them,” Farhad Alaadin, a foreign affairs advisor to the Iraqi prime minister, told me. 

Iraq’s armed groups have plenty of reasons not to want to ignite a conflict. Indeed, they would want to resist being dragged into one if they continue to hit the United States (as these armed groups say they will) and the US decides to respond more fulsomely—as it appears to be doing in its November 22 strikes on Jurf al-Sakhar, a known Kataib Hezbollah base. Tensions have risen much higher in Iraq in the past, such as after Soleimani’s January 2020 assassination. A period of grinding back and forth followed, including the killing of at least three US and coalition forces on March 11, 2020 in rocket attacks at an Iraqi military base, which also prompted US strikes on Jurf al-Sakhar two days later, without a wide-scale, multi-front conflict inside Iraq. Many Iraqi armed groups have a political presence in the Baghdad government; they likely favor maintaining influence in a state that is not distracted by a bigger conflict on home soil over escalating in response to more intense US attacks. 

Iraq is witnessing part of the regional fallout from the Israel-Hamas war, and Iraqi bases housing US troops are feeling that most forcefully. While the grinding back and forth of a militant attack and US counterattack may well continue for some months,  there is too much else at stake in Iraq for the actors involved to draw the country into full-blown conflict. 

Lizzie Porter is a Middle East correspondent based in Istanbul. Follow her on X: @lcmporter.

The post Islamic Resistance in Iraq appears to be responsible for attacks in the country and there’s no end in sight  appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Now, as I watch what’s unfolding in the Gaza Strip, there are important parallels to what I witnessed. However, lazy comparisons between Israel’s war in Gaza and the US campaign in Mosul miss some crucial differences. 

To understand Mosul and ISIS, one must turn back in history to Fallujah in November 2004. Back then, Fallujah had fallen into the grips of ISIS’s predecessor: al-Qaeda in Iraq. I was there embedded with US forces. It would end up being the bloodiest battle for US Marines since Vietnam. By the end of 2005, al-Qaeda in Iraq was declared defeated. However, it quickly re-emerged, working with other extremist Sunni organizations and rebranding itself as the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI). Fallujah fell back into its grips; Ramadi became better known as “Swiss cheese city” because so many of its central buildings were pockmarked with the wounds of war; and American troops and the Iraqi government lost control of Anbar province.

Then, in 2008, there was a US troop surge. But it was not the US boots on the ground that necessarily turned the tide of the battle. By that point, the United States had realized that they needed a fighting force from the Iraqi people. They were called the “Sons of Iraq”—a hodgepodge of former “nationalistic” insurgents and volunteers. It worked for a while.

By 2007-2008, ISI became more or less obsolete before resurging again around 2012—this time as the Islamic State of Iraq and el-Sham. Within two years, ISIS would take over vast swaths of Iraq and Syria.

From a military standpoint, what the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) are up against in the Gaza Strip will make what the Iraqi troops on the ground in Mosul faced seem like child’s play. ISIS had three years in Mosul to establish its underground network. Hamas has had thirty years to prepare itself for battle on its turf and dig and fortify its tunnels and underground systems.  

Mosul would end up being a battle largely won in the air, with the US and its allies pummeling the city to dust (knowing fully that just about every building had a family in it).

It was one of the most intense air campaigns I have witnessed, with a final death toll ranging from nine thousand to eleven thousand civilians. The United States justified this with its standard cut and paste response: “We take utmost care to avoid civilian casualties.”

In that sense, Gaza is similar to Mosul. It is all but guaranteed that civilians will die in each strike. But there are also big differences.

Civilians in Mosul were unable to flee. ISIS held around one million civilians hostage; in many cases literally holding them at gunpoint. This is known from the stories of those who survived, including families I met in Mosul after the dust settled. The only surviving adults told me that an airstrike that hit the house behind where we were holed up (alongside the wounded Iraqi soldiers) had also killed eleven civilians.

Gaza’s civilians are also unable to flee—not because they are being held at gunpoint, but because they cannot escape the battle zone.

Despite what the IDF is saying, in my years reporting from Gaza, I have never once heard—not even a whisper—of Hamas holding someone at gunpoint and preventing them from fleeing their homes. Gazans can go. Hundreds of thousands have followed the IDF’s directive to go south. But the south is being bombed.

The battle for Mosul lasted for around eighteen months. The death toll in the bombing campaign of Gaza has already surpassed eleven thousand in its sixth week.

In Mosul, there was a deliberate escape route left open for fighters. As ground forces pushed forward, ISIS fighters could either stay and fight or flee into the desert and other towns that ISIS had control of at the time. That is not an option that exists in the Gaza Strip. The IDF will have to continue to pulverize the strip and face a force that will not surrender and is unable to fall back.

Those bombing Mosul did not have to face the hostage dynamic present in Gaza. The dozens of families of hostages taken from Israel on October 7 are understandably beside themselves, increasingly anxious about the fate of their loved ones and acutely aware that the bombs falling on Gaza could also be claiming hostages’ lives.

Perhaps one of the most glaring differences between the two campaigns can be seen in the siege of Gaza. Israel has deliberately cut off water, food, electricity, medical supplies, and fuel from 2.3 million people. In my two decades reporting on war, I had never heard of a democratically elected nation-state taking such a measure against a civilian population. While aid has started to trickle in from Egypt, it’s barely at 10 percent of what Gaza used to receive daily—never mind that aid organizations need to scale up—not be handed crumbs—in order to meet the extreme needs of the present.

The battle for Mosul saw attacking Iraqi troops encircle the city, but it was never even close to causing this level of a humanitarian crisis. Water and electricity were not cut off. Those who survived the bombs and the ground war were able to reach humanitarian aid and shelter.

From the telling of those who survived and the images that emerged, Hamas’s October 7 attack does echo ISIS’s attacks. However, Hamas is not ISIS—not even close—and understanding the differences between them is crucial. Hamas rose and gained power, prestige, and popularity as a response to Israel’s occupation of Palestinian territories and its oppression of the Palestinian population. As such, Hamas’s relationship to the population of Gaza cannot be compared to that of ISIS and its relationship to the people over whom it ruled. True, Gazans have not had much of a choice as Hamas took control of Gaza in 2007 and has not had elections since.

In addition, some countries do have a relationship with Hamas, such as Egypt and Turkey. Hamas’s political headquarters is in Qatar—an office established in 2012 with the blessing of the US.

Other than the stated goal of wiping out Hamas, there is a frightening lack of post-war planning from Israel, which many military experts argue is just as important as the military operations themselves.

In Mosul, there was an Iraqi government with whom to coordinate; faulty and messy, yes, but it existed.

In the Gaza Strip, there is no local partner for the IDF, and Israel is not coordinating with the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank. There is no equivalent of the Iraqi army and there is no Palestinian force—let alone one to partner with or do a handover to secure “peace,” assuming that, at the end of this, there is anything left of Gaza to secure. The option that is being floated right now—that Israel would somehow “secure” the “peace” and “re-occupy” Gaza—is borderline ludicrous.

“Stability, however, requires policy attention to terrorist hotspots after the battles are over,” veteran journalist Thanassis Cambanis wrote in October 2021 in reference to Mosul. “A credible counterterrorism policy must revolve around good governance, rights, and human dignity.”

If there is any comparison to be drawn right now, it is that this war on Gaza does bear similarities to the 2003 US invasion of Iraq—a military campaign driven by a desire for revenge with disastrous consequences.

It is worth remembering that, while the majority of Iraqis did not support Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein, this did not mean that they supported an American invasion. History in Iraq teaches a basic lesson: the best way to ensure support for a militant organization is to kill civilians and destroy hope. A survey carried out by the Barometer on October 25 found that barely a quarter of Gazans would vote for Hamas if they had the opportunity, and that 67 percent have little or no confidence in the government led by Hamas.

But as the authors themselves point out, this relentless assault by Israel could alter that dynamic.

“Continued violence will not bring the future most Gazans hope for any closer, write authors Amaney Jamal and Michael Robbins. “Instead of stamping out sympathy for terrorism, past Israeli crackdowns that make life more difficult for ordinary Gazans have increased support for Hamas.”

America’s counterterrorism policy was a mediocre mess at best, failing over the years to take into account key drivers of what led people to pick up weapons and join the insurgency, al-Qaeda, and, later, ISIS. If there is something to be drawn from those lessons, it is that what Israel is doing right now will secure anything but peace and stability.

Arwa Damon is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East and president and founder of the International Network for Aid, Relief, and Assistance (INARA), a nonprofit organization that focuses on building a network of logistical support and medical care to help children who need life-saving or life-altering medical treatment in war-torn nations.

The post I covered the battle against ISIS in Mosul. Gaza’s challenges will make it look like child’s play. appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On November 10, IPSI nonresident fellow Parker Novak’s recent New Atlanticist article on the US-Indonesia summit was quoted in a Diplomat piece.  Novak’s piece was also mentioned in a BNN analysis of news updates in Indonesia.  

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The Ukrainian Foreign Minister’s outspoken rejection of negotiations with the Putin regime comes at a delicate moment for the coalition of countries opposing the Russian invasion of Ukraine. International concerns have been mounting since late summer over the slow progress of Ukraine’s much-hyped counteroffensive, with some commentators pointing to the lack of a decisive military breakthrough as evidence that earlier hopes of defeating Russia on the battlefield are now unrealistic. The mood darkened further in early November, when Ukrainian commander-in-chief Valery Zaluzhny acknowledged in an interview with Britain’s The Economist that the war with Russia had reached a stalemate.

Officials in Kyiv have denied recent reports that Ukraine’s allies are pushing the country to enter into peace talks with Russia. “No leader of the United States or European Union, our partners, nobody puts pressure on us to sit at the negotiation table with Russia and give something away,” Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy stated in early November. Zelenskyy himself has repeatedly ruled out any direct talks with Putin, insisting instead that the time for diplomacy will only come once Russian troops have retreated from Ukraine.

Kuleba has now elaborated further, listing a series of broken Russian promises to illustrate why Kyiv has no faith whatsoever in negotiations with Moscow. The Ukrainian Foreign Minister referenced a number of international agreements that were subsequently broken by Russia, beginning with the 1994 Budapest Memorandum and ending with the 2022 Black Sea Grain Initiative. On multiple occasions, he pointed out, Russia had committed to respecting Ukraine’s territorial integrity, but this did not prevent Putin from launching the largest European war of aggression since World War II. “Russia’s tactics have remained consistent in its many wars over the last three decades: Kill, grab, lie, and deny,” he wrote. “Why would anyone genuinely believe that Russia in 2023 is any different from Russia in 1994, 1997, 1999, 2008, 2014, 2015, and 2022?”

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

Ukraine’s leaders are not alone in questioning the sincerity of Russian diplomacy. Indeed, Moscow’s credibility on the international stage has been seriously undermined by almost a decade of aggression against Ukraine that has been accompanied by a relentless flood of often transparent disinformation. When Russian soldiers without insignia first seized control of Ukraine’s Crimean peninsula in February 2014, Putin initially denied any Russian involvement, only to later admit that he had in fact personally given the order to invade. This naked deceit set the tone for Russia’s escalating attack on Ukraine.

Weeks after the military takeover of Crimea, Putin made similarly implausible claims of innocence as the same so-called “little green men” sparked a war in eastern Ukraine’s Donbas region. For the next eight years, Moscow officials would continue to stubbornly insist Russia was not involved in eastern Ukraine, despite mountains of evidence clearly demonstrating the presence of the Russian military and the Kremlin’s direct control over the entire invasion. Russia’s policy of blanket denials made it virtually impossible to establish a viable ceasefire or move forward toward a sustainable settlement of the war in eastern Ukraine. Instead, Moscow made sure the conflict remained unresolved and continued to simmer, setting the stage for the full-scale invasion of February 2022.

The build-up to the current invasion was marked by a further increase in Russian disinformation. For months prior to the outbreak of hostilities, Putin and other leading Russian officials loudly proclaimed that they had no intention of invading Ukraine and accused the West of warmongering. Some senior Kremlin figures even mocked international alarm over the possibility of a major European war. “February 15, 2022 will go down in history as the day of the failure of Western war propaganda. Humiliated and destroyed without firing a shot,” commented Russian foreign ministry spokesperson Maria Zakharova just days before columns of Russian tanks crossed the border into Ukraine.

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Given Russia’s long record of broken treaties and barefaced lies, it is little wonder the Ukrainian authorities insist negotiations can only begin after the Russian army has been beaten on the battlefield and forced to withdraw from Ukraine. Nor is there any indication that Putin himself is ready to negotiate. On the contrary, the Russian dictator is openly preparing his country for a long war and appears to be more convinced than ever that time is on his side.

Putin faces no real anti-war movement at home and has largely weathered the economic storms created by imperfectly implemented Western sanctions. While Russian military losses in Ukraine have been exceptionally high, the Kremlin has been careful to recruit cannon fodder from perceived low-risk groups such as convicted criminals, members of Russia’s ethnic minorities, and military-age males conscripted from occupied regions of Ukraine. This has made it possible to insulate the Russian middle classes from the horrors of the conflict unfolding in neighboring Ukraine.

With international resolve to oppose the invasion now beginning to visibly weaken and Western leaders distracted by events in Israel, Putin is also confident of outlasting the democratic world in Ukraine. He has always believed the West ultimately lacks the stomach for a prolonged confrontation with Russia, and is prepared to wait as long as necessary until international support for Ukraine wanes.

In the present circumstances, any attempts to pressure Ukraine into negotiating a compromise peace with Russia would have disastrous consequences for the future of international security. Unless Russia is decisively defeated, there is almost no chance of the Kremlin honoring any commitments made during negotiations. Instead, a messy peace deal would reward Putin for his decision to invade Ukraine and fuel Russia’s sense of impunity, paving the way for the next phase of Moscow’s campaign to extinguish Ukrainian statehood and revive the Russian Empire.

The Ukrainians understand this perfectly well. They have learned from bitter experience that Putin’s Russia cannot be trusted, which is why they are now so adamantly opposed to premature peace talks and recognize that making concessions to the Kremlin will only prolong their country’s agony. Anyone calling for a return to the negotiating table needs to be similarly realistic about the true nature of the Putin regime. A ceasefire may seem like the quickest way to end the bloodshed, but this is wishful thinking. In order to secure a lasting peace, Ukraine must win.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

Further reading

UkraineAlert Nov 2, 2023

Putin will win unless the West finally commits to Ukrainian victory

By Ivan Verstyuk

Russian dictator Vladimir Putin is more confident than ever that time is on his side in Ukraine and believes the Western world ultimately lacks the political will to oppose him, writes Ivan Verstyuk.

Conflict Defense Industry

UkraineAlert Nov 7, 2023

Ukraine reports fresh success in the Battle of the Black Sea

By Peter Dickinson

Ukraine’s success in the Battle of the Black Sea should convince the country’s Western partners to finally abandon their cautious approach and provide the Ukrainian military with the weapons they need to defeat Russia, writes Peter Dickinson.

Conflict Defense Policy

UkraineAlert Nov 13, 2023

Ukraine’s top general believes technology can defeat Putin’s Russia

By Mykola Bielieskov

Ukrainian commander-in-chief Valery Zaluzhny believes technology holds the key to defeating Russia’s invasion and argues that drones and electronic warfare can help secure Ukrainian victory, writes Mykola Bielieskov.

Conflict Defense Policy

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

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Scholars have repeatedly emphasized the importance of a stable and forward-looking Southern shore—the countries of North Africa—for the peaceful evolution of Southern Europe’s polities. Unfortunately, that possibility is farther away than ever and the current situation can quickly get worse.

To begin with, the Morocco-Algeria rivalry, which has always been focused on the issue of the contested territory of the Western Sahara, has caused the two countries to engage in a decades-long arms race. This security issue, which is about both countries’ power and legitimacy more than anything, could very well lead to a military clash. This dispute over Western Sahara is an excuse to have an enemy at the border and justifies the power of the ruling classes in Algeria and Morocco.

Nevertheless, in recent years, efforts have been made to bring rapprochement between Morocco and Algeria, such as reopening the borders and establishing a direct diplomatic relationship. Much hope was raised by various Arab populations in the region during the 2011 Arab Spring period. In the same vein, Moroccans and Algerians shared a keen interest in fostering ties. With the onset of the democratization process in their respective countries, citizens aspired to exert pressure on their governments for rapprochement.

However, this wishful thinking was short-lived, and more reasons for confrontation have recently emerged. For starters, in 2020, the normalization of certain Arab states with Israel (including Morocco) went beyond creating strong tensions within Algeria, producing a radical reaction that prompted it to join states like Libya, Iraq, Iran, and Syria in opposing the accords at the time.

The consequences of the Algerian response are significant in the context of the ongoing Israel-Hamas war, particularly for Italy and other European nations that have come to rely on Algerian gas as a substitute for Russian gas. Irregular migration from Libya, Tunisia, and Algeria has plagued Italy for years and is likely to increase as tensions between these countries remain unresolved.

Separately, in Tunisia, the newly elected President Kais Saied has centralized all constitutional powers to himself, turning the country towards authoritarianism. However, what could be more dangerous is that Tunisia is falling into the arms of its powerful neighbor: Algeria. The more Tunisia plunged into its economic and political crisis, the more President Saied needed support for its political and economic development that was not conditional from Western countries.

This issue is raising concerns for Egypt, too, which has been striving to extend its military and political rule to its neighbor and civil war-ravaged Libya. Disorder and negative consequences at Egypt’s western borders have been partially avoided by supporting one of their proxies and the ruler of Libya’s eastern provinces: General Khalifa Haftar. The strongman, supported by Russian mercenaries, the Wagner Group, achieved a moderate level of order through a bloody war against all opposing clans and tribes—which he has lumped together as Islamist terrorists—as well as through establishing a reign of terror in the country.

However, this went undetected by most until the tragedy of the September 9 floods in Derna province, which killed about ten thousand people. Now, many are beginning to question Haftar’s and, more precisely, his six sons’ involvement in the military and economic realms of the province. Since then, clashes have occurred, and the possibility of a revolt by the tribes and urban population increases by the day.

Egyptian dictator Abdel Fattah el-Sisi may try to intervene directly to alleviate the bordering region. Still, there is little doubt that this would cause a strong reaction from Algeria, which would see an attempt to expand Egyptian power as tilting the balance of power in North Africa. Moreover, the power that controls the western part of Libya, Turkey, will not sit idly by and will most probably intervene directly while having Algeria in its corner. The idea of a Turkish-Algerian entente was challenging to conceive until the summer when Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan de facto joined the normalization refusal front headed by Algeria.

Given the current scenario, the situation of the Israel-Hamas war may force Egypt to face its contradictions, leading it to either a confrontation with Israel in defense of the Palestinians or against Hamas in support of its peace agreement with Israel. In either case, the consequences for Western countries would be unthinkable.

In light of these multifaceted challenges, Western countries should take into consideration the ongoing tensions in North Africa to make their decision-making process regarding the events in Gaza more precise and holistic. The only viable solution for a lasting peace—rather than a temporary fix—is to formulate a plan that facilitates the reconciliation of the Palestinians and Israelis and shapes their political and socio-economic progress in a manner that does not neglect the entirety of the Arab world. This is the only path forward.

Karim Mezran is director of the North Africa Program at the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs.

The post On a knife’s edge: How the conflict in Gaza could tip the scales in North Africa appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Iraq stands out as the sole Arab state that has steadfastly refused to sign an armistice agreement with Israel since the 1948 Arab-Israeli War. Technically, Iraq remains in a state of war with Israel—a historical enmity that significantly influences its stance in the present conflict. Iraq not only refuses to recognize Israel as a state but has also passed laws criminalizing any ties with the country. This long-standing antagonism forms the backdrop against which Iraq’s current position on the Hamas-Israel conflict is crafted.

Amid the surprising attack by Hamas on October 7, Iraq faced conflicting positions. The official stance of the Iraqi government is centered on diplomatic efforts to end the conflict, advocating for Palestinian statehood in the long term, and creating open humanitarian corridors for Gazans. Parliament Speaker Mohamed Al-Halbousi called for an Arab parliament summit in Baghdad, highlighting Iraq’s proactive approach to addressing regional conflicts.

On the day of Hamas’s attack, the Iraqi government issued a statement reaffirming Baghdad’s unwavering commitment to the Palestinian cause. It blamed Israel for the consequences of the attack as “a natural result of the systematic oppression they have been subjected to since ancient times at the hands of the Zionist [Israel] occupation authority.” It emphasized that Iraq stands with the Palestinian people in their pursuit of legitimate rights and unequivocally condemned any injustices and usurpations that obstruct the path to Palestinian statehood.

Furthermore, Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani engaged in a significant diplomatic move by initiating a phone call with Arab and regional leaders. He also received a call from US President Joe Biden on October 16, reflecting the United States’ realization of the Gaza conflict’s impact on the entire region and Iraq’s role. Their discussion primarily revolved around the situation in Gaza, with Sudani urging President Biden to support opening a humanitarian corridor in Gaza and emphasizing the need for international intervention in the face of escalating hostilities.

Challenges in Iraq-US relations

The United States has a history of tensions and confrontations with several Iraqi Shia armed groups that are integral to the Iraqi political process while operating independently from its military apparatus. These militias—many of them aligned with Iran—have been involved in multiple attacks on US interests in Iraq and Syria over the last seven years. However, since the inauguration of Prime Minister Sudani in October 2022, tensions between the United States and these groups in Iraq have significantly decreased. This reduction can be attributed partly to the majority of these armed groups aligning with Sudani’s coalition to form a government, necessitating a temporary truce with the United States.

However, the conflict in Gaza adds complexity to Iraq’s relationship with the United States, especially as various armed groups and political figures have already resumed rocket and drone attacks on US interests in Iraq since October 7. This threat is poised to intensify as long as the Hamas-Israel conflict continues. Several pro-Iranian Iraqi militia commanders, including prominent figures like Hadi al-Amiri of the Badr Brigade and groups like Kataib Hezbollah, have issued belligerent statements praising Hamas’s attack and made threats against US interests in Iraq should the United States intervene on Israel’s behalf.

Additionally, Muqtada al-Sadr, an influential Shia cleric and a significant political voice within Iraq, called on the Iraqi government to formally end the US mission in Iraq and close the embassy. However, he rejected violent methods to target US diplomats but warned that he would consider taking other measures if the Iraqi government did not respond to his request. This is partly related to the intra-Shia rivalry between Pro-Iranian camps and the Sadr bloc. However, the Palestinian issue remains a sensitive and popular topic in Iraq, garnering support from most Iraqi political figures.

Moreover, the US remains a crucial partner for Iraq in the fight against the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS). Iraq’s economy also highly depends on its relations with the United States and Iraq’s central bank heavily relies on US Federal Reserve policies and access to its $100 billion foreign currency reserve. Another element to consider is how, despite US sanctions on Iran, the United States granted Iraq certain sanctions waivers—such as for electricity—to conduct business with Tehran. These examples all highlight the importance of the US-Iraq relationship.

Iraq’s stability at stake

US Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s November 5 visit to Baghdad holds immense significance given that Iraq is and will continue to be impacted by the Gaza war. Iraq stands out as the only country in the region that accommodates thousands of US forces and historically anti-US, pro-Iranian armed groups, underscoring Iraq’s exceptional and precarious role in the broader geopolitical landscape. Consequently, Prime Minister Sudani faces an exceptionally challenging predicament: he must maintain a delicate balance between the interests of the United States and the armed groups that serve as partners within his government while having significant political leverage over it.

Therefore, inaction by Sudani to meet the demands of various actors within Iraq is not an option. That may lead to him being removed from office, causing political and security instability in the country and further complicating the fragile situation. This poses a risk to US-Iraq relations and the broader Middle East, as it becomes increasingly complex for the prime minister to balance the demands of influential militias while maintaining the relationship with the United States. This nuanced situation underscores the critical importance of Secretary Blinken’s visit in navigating these complex dynamics and promoting stability in the region.

Prime Minister Sudani knows the value of US ties and has shown support for continuous US troop presence in Iraq. However, as the Gaza war escalates, the prime minister may lose control and come under massive pressure from within his coalition and his rivals like Sadr. In this precarious environment, a peaceful diplomatic solution remains the most prudent method to avoid further instability and spillover of the conflict to the wider region.

Sarkawt Shamsulddin is a nonresident fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs and was a member of the Iraqi Parliament from 2018 to 2021.

The post Iraq is at a crossroads. Will it choose its Shia militias or relations with the US? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

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Careful observers of Hezbollah—particularly the terrorist group’s behavior since the onset of Lebanon’s economic collapse—will note that much of the content was entirely predictable. However, that predictability reveals much about Hezbollah’s current state and its constraints. It allows us—to the degree possible without powers of clairvoyance—to anticipate the group’s moves as the conflict between Israel and the coterie of Gaza-based terror organizations (operating as the Joint Operations Room of the Palestinian Resistance Factions) unfolds.

Nasrallah’s speech lasted one hour and twenty minutes—equally typical in format and content. He framed the Al-Aqsa Flood operation as defensive and claimed that the brutal rampage against southern Israel’s residents was a natural consequence of Israeli policies, such as the continued detention of entirely innocent Palestinian prisoners—or one would think, listening to Nasrallah—in Israeli jails; recent threats against Al-Aqsa Mosque that were “unprecedented since Jerusalem was occupied in 1967”; the Israeli blockade on Gaza nearing its twentieth anniversary; and the current Israeli government’s vociferous expansion of settlements in the West Bank.

“Palestine,” he said, had been abandoned by the world until the “heroic, great, and grand operation” [referring to the October 7 attack] restored it to its rightful and central place. Even the brutal murder of Israeli children in the Hamas-led onslaught did not deter the secretary-general from heaping effusive praise upon the attack. To dismiss any of his followers’ possible qualms about the morality of of the October 7 attack, he claimed that “So-called Israeli civilians” weren’t killed by the “brave, great, and genius” rampaging terrorists but by “the Israeli army… acting in fury, insanity, and confusion,” thereby simultaneously reemphasizing Hezbollah’s claims of Palestinian sinlessness and Israeli bloodlust.

Having absolved the Palestinian side of moral culpability, Nasrallah lauded Al-Aqsa Flood’s accomplishments. Here, too, there was little new in the way of his rhetoric. According to Nasrallah, Israel is a brutal and murderous entity whose behavior in Gaza “confirms everything we know about it,” and whose nature had once again been revealed to all Arabs and Muslims, including those who had normalized relations with Jerusalem.

Nevertheless, Nasrallah stressed that Israel is also weaker than a spider’s web, which even the Israelis know, and that it would be unable to survive without US military assistance, which was delivered in haste. That assistance, he claimed, also demonstrated ultimate and “complete” American responsibility for the ongoing war, where Israel was the mere executing tool. Meanwhile, he alleged that all of Israel’s retaliatory “brutality” and American assistance could not rewind the countdown to the Jewish state’s demise that began on October 7. He further asserted that this proved that Israel had not learned the lessons of its previous wars with Hezbollah and the Gazan militant factions.

Unsurprisingly, Nasrallah also claimed that Operation Al Aqsa Flood’s planning and execution were entirely the decision of the Palestinian factions from start to finish and had surprised even Hezbollah. This was his usual attempt to both stress the military prowess of the relevant Resistance Axis faction and absolve Iran of any consequences.

Nasrallah’s announcement of Hezbollah’s next steps was the most anticipated part of his speech. Since the group had hyped up the speech leading up to the moment of its delivery, it was doubtful that Nasrallah would declare war on Israel. His group and their Resistance Axis allies prefer to deliver surprise blows to their adversaries. Acting perfidiously allows the Resistance Axis factions to maximize the harm they can deal to their foes, with the October 7 attack being a prime example. Nasrallah stressed this in his speech, lauding Al-Aqsa Flood’s timing for catching the Israelis “lost, dazed, and confused” on “the Sabbath and a holiday.”

Rather than announce an escalation, Nasrallah declared that Hezbollah had already entered the conflict on October 8, with its low-level—albeit intensifying—harassment of Israel constituting the group’s contribution to the war. While Nasrallah left the possibility of escalation open, saying “all options are on the table”—a threat giving the impression that Hezbollah has the upper hand in the fight against Israel, but vague enough to give leeway for the group to content itself with attacks short of full-blown war.

The underwhelming nature of Nasrallah’s speech reflects that Hezbollah, despite its bellicose rhetoric, is unprepared for war. The group remains constrained by the effects of Lebanon’s economic collapse. It worries that inviting a foreign war upon the country—particularly when post-war reconstruction aid is unlikely to be forthcoming from Beirut’s traditional donors—could likely turn the Lebanese street against Hezbollah and many of the group’s own supporters.

To avoid appearing weak against Israel to its supporters—raising questions about its utility—Hezbollah is falling back on a pattern of using propaganda to cover its inaction against the Jewish state, particularly during—per Nasrallah’s admission—such a critical juncture for the Resistance Axis. As a result, Hezbollah can be expected to continue the low-level attacks that it and Lebanon-based franchises of Palestinian militias have been conducting against Israel. This would allow Hezbollah to appear powerful without escalating to a full war.

Nasrallah correctly claimed these attacks were impacting Israel’s war effort, but exaggerated their importance and Hezbollah’s contribution. He said Hezbollah was preventing the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) from devoting its full attention to the war in the Gaza Strip and also stressed that Hezbollah’s attacks had forced thousands of Israeli citizens to flee the country’s north, adding pressure on Israel’s economy and morale. This, he said, was “an accomplishment,” noting that “anyone looking at what is happening along the border objectively will find it very big, important, and impactful.” It was then that Nasrallah dangled the possibility of escalation.

Realistically, however, the group will likely only increase the frequency and destructiveness of its attacks in response to Israeli ground troops becoming more committed in the Gaza Strip. But, even then, Hezbollah will refrain from opening a full conflict from the Lebanese front. As the grueling nature of urban combat takes its toll on IDF troops, reserve mobilization impacts the Israeli economy, and the Palestinian death toll—and harrowing images from Gaza—erodes international support for Israel’s war effort, Hezbollah may feel more leeway to conduct attacks it might normally avoid against Israel. Nasrallah even noted that Israel was now tolerating attacks from Lebanon that it would not have in the past for “fear” of opening a second front.

This suggests that Hezbollah’s strategy for the duration of the war—undoubtedly adopted at Iran’s behest—may be to keep Israeli forces divided along two fronts, taxing the country’s economic, human, and military resources and slowing the IDF’s advance in Gaza. This, Hezbollah hopes, would allow time for a ceasefire to be imposed prematurely by the international community, enabling the Joint Operations Room of the Palestinian “resistance” factions to survive, rebuild, and fight another day.

Such an outcome would turn Israel’s current war in Gaza into another inconclusive conflict against the Resistance Axis, leaving behind a remnant of those groups that would have the time to grow again and pose a greater threat to the Jewish state. That explains why Nasrallah stressed that “no effort should be spared to stop the aggression on Gaza,” calling on “every free and honorable person” to engage “in the battle for public opinion” to turn international sentiment against Israel’s war effort and impose a ceasefire.

The strategy of ensuring that Gaza-based terrorist groups survive this war and fight on echoes a threat issued by Hamas Politburo member Ghazi Hamad: the group will repeat the October 7 attack repeatedly until Israel is finally destroyed because its mere existence “constitutes… a catastrophe to the Arab and Islamic nation.” This dovetailed with Nasrallah’s emphasis, two days later, that the Resistance Axis had yet to reach the point of “victory by fatal blow” against Israel. For that, he said, “We still need time… but we are winning in increments… our battle is one of resilience and patience.”

While this may indeed be Hezbollah’s objective, the question remains open regarding Israeli patience. When Hezbollah launched the July 12, 2006 attack that spiraled into the Second Lebanon War, Israel was engaged in Operation Summer Rains, which was aimed at suppressing rocket fire from the Gaza Strip into the Western Negev. But Hezbollah’s attack from the north was grievous enough to redirect Israeli ire and attention to Lebanon, prompting Nasrallah’s now-infamous admission that he would not have approved his group’s attack on July 12 if he had known that it would lead to a war of the magnitude of the Second Lebanon War.

Admittedly, Israel’s incursion into Gaza is much deeper today than it was in 2006. But the stakes for the Jewish state are much higher as well, and Nasrallah may once again be confronted with a situation where his group and Lebanon suffer the unintended consequences of Hezbollah’s continued brinksmanship across the Blue Line.

David Daoud is a senior fellow on Hezbollah at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD).

The post The mouth of Hezbollah chief Hassan Nasrallah hath spoken—and nothing useful came out appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Since the start of the war, which erupted in retaliation to Hamas’s October 7 attack on Israel, United States and Israel have demanded that Egypt open its border with Gaza to allow the evacuation of hundreds of thousands of Palestinians and their subsequent displacement in Sinai. But Cairo has categorically rejected the plan, insisting that its national security “is a red line” and that “the forced displacement of Palestinians would jeopardize the Palestinians’ right to statehood.” Cairo has, instead, called for a ceasefire and a return to negotiations that would lead to a just solution to the decades-old Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Cairo’s intransigence on Palestinian refugees has irked the United States, which had hoped it could use the $1.3 billion it gives to Egypt in annual military as leverage to influence the Egyptian leadership. However, the stakes of acquiescing to US and Israeli desires are high for Cairo.

For one, if the border was opened, a mass exodus of Palestinians would risk an infiltration of Hamas militants into the Sinai Peninsula. Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi has cautioned that attacks might be launched on Israel from Egypt’s side of the border, prompting Israel to respond with retaliatory attacks that would undermine Egypt’s peace treaty with Israel.

Egypt is also concerned about the potential threat to its security. The Egyptian leadership is wary of Hamas, which it perceives as an affiliate of the Muslim Brotherhood (branded a terrorist organization by Egypt in late 2013). Egypt’s ousted President Mohamed Morsi, who hailed from the Islamist group, was supported by Hamas and had promoted trade between Gaza and Egypt. At the time, Morsi had allowed humanitarian aid and fuel from Qatar to enter Gaza through the Rafah crossing on multiple occasions. This contrasts to Sisi who has helped Israel tighten the noose on the enclave by keeping the border closed to traffic. 

Before the latest flare-up, Sisi had only allowed Palestinians studying in Egypt and those seeking medical treatment to enter the country via the crossing, but only after they had obtained the necessary permits from Israel. Hamas also has close links with the jihadist groups based in Egypt, such as Wilayat Sinai (Sinai Province)—an Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham affiliate that has waged an insurgency against security forces in northern Sinai. Allowing thousands of Palestinians into the Sinai Peninsula—as a proposed plan by the Israeli Intelligence Ministry suggests, according to a leaked document published in the Israeli news outlet Sicha Mechomit—increases the risk of Hamas strengthening its ties with Wilayat Sinai and other extremist groups that the Egyptian military has been battling for more than a decade.

Furthermore, a massive influx of Palestinian refugees would pose significant economic and humanitarian challenges at a time when Egypt is grappling with a severe economic crisis. Egypt is host to nearly three hundred thousand refugees and asylum-seekers whose vulnerability has increased as a result of soaring inflation, according to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). Taking in more refugees would risk destabilizing the country, where an estimated sixty percent of the population lives near or below the poverty line, and where middle-class Egyptians are being driven into substandard living conditions as a result of the crisis.

Finally, Egypt knows only too well—from lessons learned from Lebanon and Jordan—that Palestinian refugees will settle permanently if admitted. 

Since the eruption of violence three weeks ago, Egypt has kept the Rafah border crossing—the main gateway for Palestinians into Egypt and the outside world—largely closed, opening it intermittently to allow humanitarian aid to trickle into southern Gaza.

Since October 21, when Israel finally agreed to allow humanitarian assistance to pass through, less than one hundred trucks of aid have crossed into southern Gaza—a mere drop in the ocean compared to the massive needs of the Palestinians amassed near the border. The assistance has included food, medical supplies, and water, but Israel has barred the entry of fuel—already in short supply in Gaza—for fear it would fall into the hands of Hamas. A medical team of ten foreign doctors was allowed entry into the Gaza Strip via the crossing on October 27—the first health team to enter since the war erupted.

Meanwhile, in a major breakthrough, hundreds of foreign nationals crossed to safety into Egypt through the Rafah crossing on November 1 after a Qatar-mediated deal was reached between Egypt, Israel, and Hamas. Dozens of injured Palestinians were also transferred to Egypt for medical treatment, according to an official who spoke to me on condition of anonymity.

But Egypt’s role in allowing humanitarian assistance into Gaza and admitting injured Palestinians into the country is seen as too little, too late by many Egyptians, who are enraged by the scenes of death and destruction on their television screens. On October 20, thousands of Egyptians took to the streets to express their solidarity with Palestinians after President Sisi gave the green light for the rare protest marches that were held at several locations in Cairo and other cities (demonstrations are illegal in Egypt and can only be staged with prior permission from security agencies.)

Protesters vented their anger and frustration at not only Israel—they chanted anti-Israeli slogans such as “Israel is the enemy”—but also at their government over its muted stance on the Gaza war. Dozens of protesters marched into Tahrir Square, where the 2011 anti-government protests were staged, defying a government order to hold the demonstrations only at pre-approved sites. Chants of “Bread, freedom, social justice     ”—the slogan from the 2011 uprising representing the unmet aspirations for basic rights, which was used against then-president Hosni Mubarak—echoed through the streets. Some protesters shouted, “We do not endorse anyone” in an apparent response to Sisi calling for Egyptians to endorse his rejection of Israel’s plan to displace Palestinians and relocate them in Sinai. More than one hundred protesters were arrested and detained in the days following the demonstrations—some of whom may face terrorism-related charges, according to their defense lawyers.

The recent protests signal growing public discontent over the government’s failure to address the plight of Palestinians and the country’s dire economic conditions. This public disgruntlement is a major source of concern for Sisi, given that presidential elections are only a few weeks away (slated for December 10). Egyptian social media platforms are flooded with criticism of the government for not doing enough to stop the “ethnic cleansing” of Palestinians. While many Egyptians—mainly government supporters—condemn Hamas for inflicting suffering on Gaza’s more than two million residents and for allegedly carrying out attacks against Egyptian soldiers in north Sinai, many others—Muslim Brotherhood sympathizers and some leftist activists—perceive Hamas as a resistance movement and condone what they believe is a legitimate struggle against occupation.   

But, while the majority of Egyptians are enraged by Israel’s brutal onslaught on the Gaza Strip, they oppose the scheme of relocating Palestinians to Egypt. If Sisi bows under international pressure and opens the door to the besieged Palestinians, he risks facing the wrath of millions of Egyptians and perhaps even dissent from within army ranks as some of the senior generals in the Egyptian Armed Forces have fought at least one war with Israel to reclaim Egyptian land captured by Israel in the 1967 war.

While it is hard to imagine that Sisi will succumb to Western demands, he may seek to turn the turmoil in Gaza to his advantage. He could do this by trying to secure debt relief and/or foreign aid in exchange for allowing foreign nationals to evacuate from Gaza through the Rafah crossing or for opening humanitarian corridors into Gaza. He may also seize the moment to make amends with the United States after the fracture in US-Egypt ties over recent accusations that Egyptian officials had bribed Senator Bob Menendez (D-NJ). Menendez was chair of the Foreign Relations Committee at that time and was allegedly supposed to help Egypt secure a bigger share of aid from the United States. US lawmakers were notably contemplating freezing a portion of the aid over Egypt’s poor human rights record.    

The Joe Biden administration may reciprocate by giving Sisi the support and acknowledgment he needs and may, once again, turn a blind eye to Egypt’s dismal human rights record, prioritizing US national security interests instead.

In so doing, the administration would only be disenfranchising the Egyptian people, many of whom have, in recent weeks, shifted their anger and resentment towards the United States, seeing it as complicit in the brutal massacre of Palestinians after Biden expressed his wholehearted support for Israel. In particular, Egypt’s leftists and pro-democracy activists who share the US values of freedom, equality, and justice feel dismayed and utterly let down. They accuse the US of double standards and hypocrisy for failing to condemn Israel’s violations of international humanitarian law.          

A marked shift in US policy vis-à-vis Egypt and the region is needed. The bitterness harbored by the Arab masses towards the United States may, in time, prove to be a red flag, threatening stability not just in their countries but also in the United States. 

Shahira Amin is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative and an independent journalist based in Cairo. A former contributor to CNN’s Inside Africa, Amin has been covering the development in post-revolution Egypt for several outlets, including Index on Censorship and Al-Monitor. Follow her on X: @sherryamin13.

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Israel believes it “disengaged” from Gaza in 2005 when it completely withdrew its military and civilians from the area. With this withdrawal, Israel and the United States—as well as many international legal, military, and foreign policy experts—argue that Israel ceded the effective control needed under the legal definition of occupation, therefore ending the occupation. Still, Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant recently stated that after the conflict, Israel would “no longer have ‘responsibility for life in the Gaza Strip,’” seemingly confirming a level of ongoing engagement.

In contrast, many prominent international institutions, organizations and bodies—including the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the United Nations Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Occupied Palestinian Territory, UN General Assembly (UNGA), European Union (EU), African Union, International Criminal Court (ICC) (both Pre-Trial Chamber I and the Office of the Prosecutor), Amnesty International, and Human Rights Watch—as well as international legal experts and other organizations, argue that Israel has occupied Palestinian territories including Gaza since 1967.¹ While they acknowledge that Israel no longer had the traditional marker of effective control after the disengagement—a military presence—they hold that with the help of technology, it has maintained the requisite control in other ways.

The status of Israel’s occupation is legally significant, as it determines the legal obligations Israel owes to Gaza. Occupying states have heightened responsibilities to protect local populations and have the basic health and safety supplies they need to survive. Given concerns about Israel’s actions in Gaza—such as possible war crimes, including starvation and the denial of humanitarian aid—Israel would likely be in breach of these obligations.

What is an occupation?

Occupation is defined in Article 42 of the Fourth Hague Convention:

“Territory is considered occupied when it is actually placed under the authority of the hostile army. The occupation extends only to the territory where such authority has been established and can be exercised.”

While Israel is not a party to the Fourth Hague Convention, this convention is considered customary international law and, therefore, still binds Israel. Whether a territory is occupied is a question of fact, meaning that it is solely governed by the facts on the ground, not whether the relevant governments perceive themselves as occupying or occupied.

Under this factual inquiry, a territory is considered occupied when it falls under “effective control of hostile foreign armed forces.” Traditionally, effective control requires three main components: the physical presence of a foreign military without consent; the inability of a local sovereign to exercise control because of foreign forces’ presence; and the imposition of occupying forces’ authority. However, some components of effective control are still debated, particularly whether military presence is an essential condition, whether it requires the ability to exert authority or the actual exertion of authority, and whether the occupying power must have exclusive authority. An occupation generally ends when the occupying power withdraws, retreats, or hands over authority to a local government.

Israel’s High Court of Justice found in 2008 that Israel’s effective control ceased in 2005. Specifically, it found that the “[m]ilitary rule that applied in the past in this territory came to an end by a decision of the government, and Israeli soldiers are no longer stationed in the territory permanently, nor are they in charge of what happens there.” It, therefore, determined that the occupation ended in 2005.

Other experts have similarly found that Israel no longer met the traditional effective control requirements in Gaza after 2005, ending the occupation. First, they note that no other occupation has been recognized without a physical military presence or a puppet regime, neither of which they view as present in Gaza. While they acknowledge that Israel has a level of control over Gaza, they find both that local authorities can exercise control and that Israel is not imposing sufficient authority. For example, they view a “concurrent control” rather than a “hierarchical relationship” between Israel and Hamas and find that Israel would need a “major ground offensive” that would be impossible to conduct “within a reasonable time” to “recapture” control of the area. They, likewise, argue that Israel does not have the required “degree of power over daily governance,” as evidenced by “Hamas often govern[ing] in a manner that is contrary to Israel’s interests and desires” and launching military operations against Israel. Finally, in response to arguments that Israel’s power over Gaza’s borders is evidence of effective control, they hold that while Israel retains control over the Israeli-Gaza border, Egypt controls Gaza’s border with Sinai. Based on these considerations, some experts have found that “siege” better describes the situation.

However, the Geneva Academy of International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights has said “the majority of international opinion” holds that Israel maintains effective control, even without armed forces present. While legal experts acknowledge that the lack of a military presence does not follow the “traditional approach” to analyzing effective control, they find that military presence is an “evidentiary test only.” They point to authorities such as the Israeli High Court, which have held that occupation status hinges on the exercise of effective control. They, therefore, find that technology has made it possible for Israel to use ongoing force to exercise effective control—imposing authority and preventing local authorities from exercising control—without a military presence.

Specifically, experts from the UN Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Occupied Palestinian Territory found “noting” positions held by the UN Security Council, UNGA, a 2014 declaration adopted by the Conference of High Contracting Parties to the Fourth Geneva Convention, the ICRC, and “positions of previous commissions of inquiry,” that Israel has “control exercised over, inter alia, [Gaza’s] airspace and territorial waters, land crossings at the borders, supply of civilian infrastructure, including water and electricity, and key governmental functions such as the management of the Palestinian population registry.” They also point to “other forms of force, such as military incursions and firing missiles.”

For the Gaza-Egypt border, they hold that while the Palestinian Authority operates the crossing under the supervision of EU monitors, Israel ultimately has control. Israeli security forces supervise the passenger lists—deciding who can cross—and monitor the operations and can withhold the “consent and cooperation” required to keep the crossing open. In that vein, experts note that Israel’s “coercive measures” have further “impeded efforts to build proper democratic institutions,” and that Israel still has not transferred sovereign powers and instead maintains control over “the [Palestinian Authority]’s ability to function effectively.” Based on the actual exercise of effective control, they, therefore, find that Israel has occupied Gaza since the broader occupation of Palestine began in 1967.

What international laws govern an occupation?

The Fourth Hague Convention and the Fourth Geneva Convention, along with customary international law and Additional Protocol I (to which the State of Palestine is a party, and most of the provisions of which are considered customary), govern the occupation itself.

Additionally, both jus ad bellum (the conditions under which states can initiate the use of force) and jus in bello (the law regulating conduct during an armed conflict) apply to situations of occupation.

For jus ad bellum, Chapter VII of the UN Charter lists acceptable uses of force, including authorization by the UN Security Council and self-defense. UN General Assembly Resolution 3314 (XXIX) then provides a definition of aggression that would form a violation of the UN Charter and the Friendly Relations Declaration. This includes “the invasion or attack by the armed forces of a State of the territory of another State, or any military occupation, however temporary, resulting from such invasion or attack, or any annexation by the use of force of the territory of another State or part thereof.”

For the current conflict, the status of the occupation affects whether and how Israel can justify its use of force in Gaza under the UN Charter in response to Hamas’s attacks. The US Ambassador to the UN, Linda Thomas-Greenfield, invoked Article 51 of the UN Charter on October 18 to argue that Israel has an inherent right to self-defense. However, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruled in its 2004 advisory opinion that Israel could not invoke Article 51 against a threat coming from an occupied territory over which it has control but that it has the right to respond with actions in conformity with applicable international law.

Even without occupation status, while some think Article 51 justification could apply, many experts and states do not think such a justification applies to defense against non-state armed groups or applies in limited situations. Relying on Article 51 in such a context raises concerns such as violations of a state’s territorial integrity to which the armed group’s actions may not be attributable. As acknowledged by President Biden and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, the attack on Israel was carried out by Hamas—a militant group that, as a political party, currently leads the government in Gaza but is not itself the Palestinian government. The attack is, therefore, distinct from an attack perpetrated by a state or territory. However, if Palestine were considered a state and Hamas’s actions were attributable to it, or if Palestine were found to be unable or unwilling to address the threat, some could view an Article 51 justification as applicable—though several states appear poised to oppose regardless.

If Article 51 applies, the action taken must still be necessary and proportional. Conversely, as noted by the ICJ, if it does not apply, Israel may still respond to Hamas’s attack according to the applicable international law.

Jus in bello applies to all parties of an armed conflict. For occupations, the Geneva Conventions—which form the “core of international humanitarian law” (IHL)—apply even when the occupation is not met with armed resistance and so is not considered an armed conflict. Additional Protocol I also “extends the definition of international armed conflicts” to situations where “people are fighting against… alien occupation… in the exercise of their right of self-determination.”

The ICJ also held that other bodies of law, such as international human rights law (IHRL), can apply to occupied territory. The ICJ ruled that the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), and the Convention on the Rights of the Child apply to Israel’s exercise of jurisdiction outside its territory and that Israel cannot raise obstacles to Palestinian authorities’ exercise of rights under the ICESCR where they have competence. However, there is still debate over the exact relationship of IHL, IHRL, and other legal schemes in the context of an occupation.

What are the occupying state’s obligations?

First, the occupation must be temporary and cannot serve as a “de facto annexation.” While there is debate about the concept of a “prolonged occupation,” “permanen[t]” occupations are generally considered unlawful. The Secretary-General of the UN, António Guterres, requested an Advisory Opinion from the ICJ on January 17 to weigh in on the issue of “the legal consequences arising from the ongoing violation by Israel of the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination, from its prolonged occupation, settlement and annexation of the Palestinian territory occupied since 1967.”

In keeping with IHL, the obligations around occupation understand that civilians may be affected but are generally designed to protect civilians to the extent possible. Occupying powers have an obligation to “maintain law and order and public life in the occupied territory.” While occupying states are not required to treat the population of the occupied state the same way they would their own population, they do have an obligation to promote the welfare of those in the occupied territory. This is meant to balance the occupying power’s security needs with the local population’s needs, with a presumption that the “status quo ante” will be preserved.

There are additional provisions requiring and prohibiting certain actions. Under the Geneva Conventions, “protected persons” include “civilian persons who because of a conflict or occupation are in the power of a Party whose nationality they do not possess.” They are protected under the Fourth Geneva Convention, which requires, inter alia:

• “To the fullest extent of the means available… ensuring the food and medical supplies of the population,” including bringing in “necessary foodstuffs, medical stores and other articles if the resources of the occupied territory are inadequate.”
• “To the fullest extent of the means available… ensuring and maintaining, with the co-operation of national and local authorities, the medical and hospital establishments and services, public health and hygiene.”
• In the case of inadequate supplies, even for part of the population, agreement to and facilitation of relief schemes.

Additional Protocol I further mandates ensuring “the provision of clothing, bedding, means of shelter, other supplies essential to the survival of the civilian population of the occupied territory and objects necessary for religious worship,” again “to the fullest extent of the means available.”

Some obligations overlap with basic principles of IHL, such as the prohibitions on hostage-taking and collective punishment. Others tailor IHL principles, such as prohibiting the deportation or forcible transfer of civilians of an occupied territory, barring concerns for civilians’ security or an “imperative military reason,” and respecting private property except in cases of  “imperative military necessity.”

While Israel has agreed to some relief measures, they have been heavily criticized as inadequate. For example, the reestablishment of water supplies was extremely limited, with only 14 percent of the Gaza Strip benefiting from the three-hour opening of the water line as of October 17. While fifty-four aid trucks have reportedly been delivered as of October 22, UN officials estimated that at least a hundred were needed daily to cover “urgent needs,” and an average of 450 were delivered daily before the outbreak. The UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNWRA) has reported dire conditions related to “fuel, food, water and medicines” and has counted around one million internally displaced people in the Gaza Strip. If Israel delivers on its plan to cease “responsibility for life in the Gaza Strip” without ceasing control over Gaza, this would be a further violation of obligations.

What liability could occupying states and their officials face for breaching these obligations?

The Occupied Palestinian Territories are an ICC member state; ICC Pre-Trial Chamber I (PTC-I) and the ICC Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) have clarified that they use “state” exclusively as it relates to the ICC and the Rome Statute’s procedures. Palestine acceded to the Rome Statute on January 2, 2015, but it lodged a declaration with the ICC on January 1, 2015, accepting the court’s jurisdiction since June 13, 2014. While not stated in the declaration, this date corresponds to the onset of the 2014 Gaza Conflict.

Palestine referred the situation to the ICC on May 22, 2018 to request an investigation, and on March 3, 2021, the OTP opened an investigation into the Situation in Palestine for crimes committed since June 13, 2014. PTC-I confirmed that the ICC has jurisdiction extending to Gaza. In doing so, PTC-I “recalled that the ICC is not constitutionally competent to determine matters of statehood that would bind the international community.” It said the sole purpose of its ruling was to define the ICC’s territorial jurisdiction, and it is “neither adjudicat[ing] a border dispute under international law nor prejudg[ing] the question of any future borders.”

Article 8(2)(b)(viii) of the Rome Statute considers a war crime “[t]he transfer, directly or indirectly, by the Occupying Power of parts of its own civilian population into the territory it occupies, or the deportation or transfer of all or parts of the population of the occupied territory within or outside this territory” when committed during an international armed conflict. Under international case law, including that of the ICC, deportation can be carried out by coercion such as “that caused by fear of violence, duress, detention, psychological oppression, or abuse of power,” and situations that prevent “genuine choice.”

Additionally, Article 8(2)(a) covers grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions against protected persons, which include civilians under occupation. While the crime of aggression also covers certain acts related to occupation, Israel is not a party to the Rome Statute and has not ratified the amendment adding aggression to the Rome Statute (though Palestine has). Because the ICC can only prosecute aggression when both the aggressor state and the victim state have ratified the amendment, the ICC does not have jurisdiction over that crime in this instance.

The ICJ has not yet ruled on the UN’s request for an advisory opinion on the rights of Palestinian people in the Occupied Palestinian Territories but is poised to offer concrete views on Israel’s status and obligations. While advisory opinions are not binding, they can help inform how other courts interpret Israel’s responsibilities. In that vein, some domestic jurisdictions contain provisions under war crimes legislation that criminalize certain violations related to occupation. Israeli officials could be tried in those jurisdictions, though that generally relies on them traveling to those countries.

If Israel is found not to be occupying Gaza, what are its obligations?

If Israel were found not to be occupying Gaza, then the obligations owed to an occupied territory under the Fourth Hague Convention and the Fourth Geneva Convention, customary international law, and Additional Protocol I would not apply.

However, Israel and Hamas are in at least a non-international armed conflict. As such, Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, Additional Protocol II (to which the State of Palestine is a party, and most of the provisions of which are considered customary), and customary international law apply. The conflict could also be considered an international armed conflict for reasons other than an occupation, such as if a second state were to join. In such case, the Geneva Conventions, including the Fourth Geneva Convention as it relates to civilians, and customary international law apply.

For a non-international and an international armed conflict, Israel and Hamas are bound to respect IHL’s fundamental principles of humanity, distinction, proportionality, and military necessity. Likewise, they are both required to abide by customary international law, including strict prohibitions of, inter alia, targeting civilians, violence primarily “aimed at spreading terror among the civilian population,” forcible transfer or displacement, “starvation as a method of warfare,” and targeting medical units.

To conclude, the laws of occupation codify a basic principle of humanity: those with effective control over a population have obligations to protect it. Regardless of whether Israel is currently occupying Gaza, the control it has over its population shows how great of an impact on the civilian population Israel’s power can wield. Even if the obligations required under an occupation do not apply, Israel still must respect the minimum duties required under IHL: allowing access to humanitarian relief and refraining from committing war crimes, including targeting, starving, and forcibly transferring civilians.

Celeste Kmiotek is a staff lawyer for the Strategic Litigation Project at the Atlantic Council. The Strategic Litigation Project works on prevention and accountability efforts for atrocity crimes, human rights violations, and corruption offenses around the world.

EDITOR’S NOTE: This piece was updated on November 3, 2023.

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Since the war began, Israel has been trying to avoid civilian targets with its artillery and air strikes as it responds to ongoing rocket fire from Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) and prepares for an imminent invasion of Gaza. But Palestinian civilian casualties are in the thousands and appear to be increasing rapidly in the densely-packed urban environment of Gaza; in part, because Hamas hides its weapons, fighters, and communication centers among the civilian population. As a result, innocent Palestinians have few options to find safety in the face of Israeli bombs. Israeli authorities have told Palestinians to move to southern Gaza, where Israel would establish “safe zones,” but Palestinians distrust the “word of the Israeli military.” Thus, hundreds of thousands are refusing to leave northern Gaza, fearing that they will never be able to return or won’t be able to escape Israeli bombs in the south, where Israel has targeted dozens of locations. An Israeli land attack aimed at destroying Hamas, even if carefully targeted, will only compound the misery being inflicted on more than two million Palestinians, who live with limited supplies of food, water, fuel, and medicine.

Moreover, the Rafah Crossing into Egypt will, in the best of circumstances, provide only partial relief and cannot address the pressing needs of Gaza’s residents. United Nations authorities report that one hundred trucks of supplies a day are required to provide adequate quantities of food and water for Gazans. The number of trucks currently allowed into Gaza each day constitutes only a small fraction of that requirement.

Neglected in the fog of war is the uncomfortable fact that almost half of Gaza’s population is under the age of eighteen and, therefore, below prime fighting age. Large numbers are too old or too infirm to pick up a gun. Additionally, half the population is female—again, not a likely source of Hamas cadres. Yet, today, women and children are most at risk from the sky assault that kills civilians and Hamas fighters alike in Gaza. Hospitals are running out of essential medicines, fuel, and operating facilities to meet the unfolding catastrophe.

Thus, options are limited for those seeking to flee the fighting. Egypt’s President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi has made it clear that Egypt won’t take them. Many would not want to go, having experienced flight from historic Palestine in the past—either directly or as children of refugees—and fear being unable to return. Egypt has its own problems and does not want an influx of Palestinians who would, in all likelihood, become permanent, uninvited guests in the Sinai.

There is, however, an option that Israeli and US leaders should consider as they seek to counter the growing anti-Israel sentiment around the world, including in the Middle East and North Africa, over Palestinian civilian casualties. It is embodied in the early Zionist slogan: “A land without people for people without a land.” The Israeli Negev is comparatively lightly populated and could temporarily accommodate women and children fleeing Gaza by providing a humanitarian corridor to vacant land in the south. We are not alone in this suggestion. Egypt’s President Sisi has floated the same idea. The situation in Gaza has become so dire that it needs to be considered. Israel would control their exit from the strip, vetting each one to ensure that no woman, child, nor elderly Gazan could possibly pose a threat. The international community could immediately provide the assistance—tents, food, fuel, medical supplies, and care—required to address the needs of hundreds of thousands of refugees.

Some would not leave Gaza because this would require women to abandon sons, husbands, and other male relatives—not to mention that they would worry about never being able to return home. Israelis will object to facilitating the entry of hundreds of thousands of Palestinians; the collective national revulsion at what Hamas perpetuated would make this suggestion politically fraught, though it would illuminate the Israeli people’s fundamental humanity to the world. Such an initiative could also help counter opposition to Israeli military operations against Hamas leaders, cadre, weaponry, and infrastructure. Israel will, of course, retain the capacity to return these refugees to Gaza when the war is over, and should experience benefits to clearing the looming battlefield of many civilians, who will be most at risk in the days ahead.

There is no perfect solution to alleviate the death and destruction that awaits in the Gaza Strip, but getting women, children, and the elderly out of harm’s way would be a positive step that would reinforce the Israeli commitment to minimize harm to civilians even as it rightly seeks to destroy the threat posed by Hamas. It could also underscore President Biden’s concern to protect innocent civilians while fully supporting Israel’s security needs.

Alan Pino served as US national intelligence officer for the Near East for fifteen years, retiring in 2020.

Casimir Yost directed the Strategic Futures Group at the National Intelligence Council from 2009 to 2013. He is an adjunct instructor at Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service.

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On the one hand, Russian President Vladimir Putin and Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov have blamed the conflict on what they consider to be America’s flawed Middle East policies. The duo have also advocated a ‘balanced’ approach to resolving the conflict, decrying civilian casualties on both sides, calling for a ceasefire and humanitarian assistance, and proposing the revival of diplomatic efforts via the Quad (Russia, the United States, European Union, and United Nations) to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian dispute via a two-state solution.

On the other hand, numerous high-profile Russian politicians and commentators have issued statements that have been highly critical of Israel, blaming it for the violence and castigating the West for its “double standards” in criticizing Russian military action against Ukraine while supporting Israeli military action against the Palestinians. Some commentators have claimed that Russian military actions in Ukraine are “moderate” compared to Israeli military actions in the Gaza Strip. The Russian media has also portrayed Israeli actions as being directed not just against Hamas but against Muslims in general. While a few Russian commenters have issued statements that have been supportive of Israel and critical of Hamas, the overwhelming thrust of Russian commentary has been anti-Israeli.

Some Russian commentators have even claimed that Ukraine has provided weapons to Israel, while Putin has suggested that Western arms intended for Ukraine have wound up in Israel via the black market. Statements such as this may be meant to persuade Arab audiences, in particular, not to sympathize with Ukraine because Western military support for Ukraine is being diverted to Israel for use against Palestinians.

The balanced approach to resolving the conflict articulated by top Russian leadership thus starkly contrasts with the harshly critical line toward Israel being advanced by numerous politicians and commentators, who presumably would not issue these statements if they thought the Kremlin opposed them. At the very least, this anti-Israeli tenor of Russian media commentary underlines Israeli concerns that Moscow can serve as a neutral mediator in the conflict. The angry response of the Israeli foreign ministry to the announcement that a Hamas delegation was received in Moscow on October 26 is an indication that Israel does not see Russia as a credible mediator.

Many Western commentators have argued that Moscow benefits from the current Israel-Hamas conflict, since it diverts the world’s attention from the war in Ukraine and may even result in America diverting arms supplies originally intended for Ukraine to Israel. Yet, while there is undoubtedly merit to this argument, this conflict also poses risks for Russia. The eruption of conflict between Israel and Hamas, which creates the potential for an even broader conflict—possibly involving Lebanese Hezbollah in the North and Iran—poses dangers for Moscow, too.

Ever since he came to power, Putin’s approach to the Middle East’s many conflicts has usually been to avoid supporting one side against the other (with Russia’s support for the Bashar al-Assad regime in Syria against its internal opposition being an exception). He has preferred to support or cooperate with opposing sides simultaneously. There are numerous examples where Putin has succeeded at this: Israel and Iran; both Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) on the one hand and Iran on the other; Turkey and Syria; and the internationally recognized government of Yemen and the Houthis. Even in Syria, where Moscow has strongly backed the Assad regime against its internal opponents, Moscow has good relations with the Syrian Kurds resisting Damascus’s control.

­­­Putin’s ability to cooperate with opposing sides simultaneously, though, works best when conflicts are just simmering. The outbreak, escalation, or revival of warfare that could result in one side severely weakening or defeating the other—like the one in Gaza right now—could present Moscow with difficult choices. Putin might have to quickly support one side and, thus, lose influence with the other, or decide to avoid involvement entirely and possibly lose influence with one side or even both.

Indeed, after years of supporting Armenia against Azerbaijan, Moscow’s recent acquiescence to the rapid Azeri takeover of Nagorno-Karabakh, which ­led to the flight of virtually its entire Armenian population to Armenia proper, suggests that Russia’s preoccupation with Ukraine has limited its ability to operate elsewhere, including in the former Soviet space. It is doubtful, then, that Russia will be willing or able to help Hamas against a determined Israeli attack. Nor is Israel likely to see Russia as a plausible mediator if the hot phase of its conflict with Hamas has an inconclusive result.

Israelis fear focusing their military resources on Hamas could encourage Iran-backed Hezbollah to attack from southern Lebanon. This possibility, however, could also pose serious problems for Russia. At a time when opposition to the Assad regime seems to be reviving, an Israeli-Hezbollah war could result in Hezbollah redeploying its fighters—who are now in Syria helping prop up the Assad regime—to Lebanon, thus, making Moscow’s job there more difficult. The escalating conflict between Iranian forces in Syria and Israel could mean a decline in Russian influence over both. While Western and Ukrainian observers worry that the Gaza conflict will divert American and European attention away from Ukraine, it can also be said that Russian involvement in Ukraine has diverted Moscow’s attention away from Syria.

Hence, Russia’s calls for a “swift and unconditional ceasefire” may not just reflect any “humanitarian” concerns that the Kremlin may have, but a desire to protect Russia’s interests in the region against the damage resulting from an escalating conflict that Moscow would not be in a position to control. However, the anti-Israeli rhetoric coming out of Russia that Putin has permitted makes it highly unlikely that Israel will regard Moscow as a credible mediator. What mediation does occur, then, may have to be undertaken by the United States in combination with Middle Eastern governments able to work with Israel and Hamas—possibly Egypt and/or Qatar.

Even if Russia can be said to benefit from the Israel-Hamas conflict serving as a distraction to the war in Ukraine, Moscow’s influence in the Middle East could decline regardless of whether the war escalates, spreads, or is contained via a ceasefire or other conflict resolution efforts. Moscow’s distraction with Ukraine may mean that it simply does not have the capability to manage whatever outcome that transpires.

Mark N. Katz is a professor of government and politics at the George Mason University Schar School of Policy and Government and a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council.

The post The Israel-Hamas war is a distraction from Ukraine, but Russia isn’t necessarily benefiting appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On October 25, IPSI nonresident senior fellow Ryo Hinata-Yamaguchi was quoted in a South China Morning Post article on Japan’s possible role in defusing the Israel-Hamas conflict in Gaza. Although Japan must be delicate with its public statements on the conflict due to its status as a US ally and its dependence on Middle Eastern oil, Hinata-Yamaguchi explained that Tokyo is playing an important role in developing diplomatic and humanitarian solutions. 

Fellow

Ryo Hinata-Yamaguchi

Nonresident Senior Fellow

Indo-Pacific Security Initiative Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Defense Policy Indo-Pacific

The post Hinata-Yamaguchi quoted in South China Morning Post on Japan’s role in the Israel-Hamas conflict appeared first on Atlantic Council.

“My eldest grandson joined me on Kaplan,” she replied. “What a source of pride!” The friends then proceeded to exchange photos of their grandchildren and wished each other well.

At seventy-four years old, Silver—who was abducted by the terrorist group Hamas on October 7—is no ordinary grandmother; she is a titan of the peace movement. The international media has profiled Silver extensively. Throughout her life, Silver has worked as a tireless champion for Arabs, spending decades supporting and building friendships with her Bedouin and Gazan neighbors. She founded the Arab-Jewish Center for Empowerment, Equality, and Cooperation in the 1990s to promote a shared society.

In the years before Israel unilaterally withdrew from Gaza in 2005, she traveled regularly to the Gaza Strip to support women. Later, she became active in Road to Recovery—an organization founded by the family of another victim of a Hamas attack—where she drove Palestinians in her car to receive medical treatment in Israel.

Silver and my dad go back decades. They were first introduced through the labor youth movement in 1974 and became part of a close-knit group of expats living on a kibbutz in the years that followed. Most of their cohort arrived at the table as “peaceniks,” but Silver was among the few who maintained their dovish outlook.

Years later, I came to know Silver from her activism. In retirement, she founded an inspiring grassroots movement, Women Wage Peace, convening Jewish, Arab, and Palestinian women to promote non-violence and involve women in efforts to end the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. She has sat on the boards of several prominent peace and human rights groups, including Alliance for Middle East Peace (ALLMEP) and B’Tselem, and has spoken around the world as an advocate for the cause. I eventually honored her at an event in 2018, recognizing the work of peace builders in Israel: leaders who, day after day, defied cynicism to fight tirelessly for peace.

Now, Silver is among the hundreds of victims torn from their homes by Hamas and held hostage in the Gaza Strip. It is still unclear whether she is among the living or dead.

The hostage crisis Israel is facing is unprecedented. Its complexity defies that of anything Israel—or the world—has ever faced before. Yet, there is some familiarity with the territory.

Israel has a well-documented history of securing hostage releases through search and rescue, but more often, negotiations. In recent years, Israel has paid exorbitant prices for hostages or their bodies. In 1985, Israel exchanged over a thousand prisoners for three Israeli soldiers caught in the Lebanon war. In 2008, they traded 199 remains and five prisoners for the remains of two soldiers: Eldad Regev and Ehud Goldwasser. Later, in 2011, Israel negotiated the release of Gilad Shalit—a captured soldier who remains a symbol of Israeli nationalism—in exchange for more than 1,027 prisoners (many of whom had blood on their hands).

When Gaza hostage takers called Israeli families in recent weeks using the phones of the hostages, they uttered four words repeatedly: “Kidnap. Gaza. Gilad Shalit.”

By some estimates, Israel has swapped roughly eight thousand prisoners for nineteen Israelis and the bodies of eight more over the past three decades. Israelis have generally accepted these widely disproportionate trades. “Redeeming a captive,” or pidyon shvuyim, as it is called in Hebrew, is considered a core Jewish value. It is one that resonates deeply in a country with compulsory military service, where the nation’s youth are likely to be sent to battlefields from which they may not return.

As a result, many of the past hostages—their names and stories—have been ingrained in the collective Israeli psyche. The campaign to get Shalit released was tremendously popular; 79 percent of Israelis favored the deal. Now, the campaign to bring home the two hundred hostages currently held in Gaza has taken on an unprecedented global dimension, with protesters around the world taking to the streets, plastering their photographs on buildings and social media, and demanding that the hostages be brought home. However, there has been little discussion so far on what price Israel should be willing to pay to do so.

Indeed, past negotiations have come at an incredible cost, chipping away at Israel’s deterrence over time. The one-for-one-thousand ratio sent a clear message to Hamas that holding onto Israeli bodies is critical for extracting concessions from Israel. Kidnapping became a targeted strategy for foreign terrorist organizations like Hamas in the Gaza Strip and Hezbollah in Lebanon; their leaders have repeatedly pledged to abduct Israeli soldiers until, in the words of Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah, “not a single prisoner” remains inside Israeli jails. Israel does not employ the death penalty, so any criminal sentence can be overturned through negotiations. As a result, the volume of threatened or intended kidnappings of Israelis has steadily grown with time; Israel frequently issues travel warnings to its citizens heading abroad.

In many ways, Hamas was founded on the back of prisoner exchanges, with most of its top leaders being re-released into Gaza in this manner. The group’s founder, Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, was released in the 1985 exchange. Additionally, Yahya Sinwar, the group’s current leader inside the Gaza Strip, was released alongside Ali Qahdi—who was said to have led the massacre in Israel and was one of the first to be assassinated in retaliatory strikes—as part of an exchange in 2011. At least six of the current top Hamas leaders have been released in prisoner exchanges with Israel.

For all its challenges, the alternative to negotiations—search and rescue—could come at an even higher cost. This approach and its associated risks are especially personal for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. His brother famously died in one of Israel’s few successful hostage rescue operations in Entebbe in 1976, where he rescued a hundred hostages from a plane in Uganda. While the same military unit deployed in that mission is now on standby to operate in Gaza, history offers little guidance. A hostage situation with a single barricade or contained facility, such as an airplane or a building, requires less expansive intelligence to analyze the whereabouts of captives. Nevertheless, even in those scenarios, there is no guarantee of success.

In 1995, a failed effort to recover Nachshon Wachsman, a kidnapped Israeli soldier, ended in his death as well as that of a soldier and three Hamas operatives. The story is permanently etched into Israeli minds (Hamas member Jihad Yarmur, who was convicted in the killing, was later released in the Shalit exchange).

Unlike these prior cases, the details of the current hostages in Gaza are very murky. For starters, not all are being held by Hamas—some are in the clutches of Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ). Additionally, the exact location of the more than two hundred hostages in Gaza are unknown and are likely spread throughout multiple locations. Most are presumed to be in Gaza’s complex network of underground tunnels. Some may be above ground; strewn all over a densely populated territory, with the potential to be used as human shields by Hamas operatives. With that in mind, each airstrike launched into Gaza decreases the likelihood that a hostage survives.

Israel is left with few good options. Unlike in past crises, it is not yet clear how heavy a price tag Israel is willing to pay for the current hostages. They must choose between retaliation against Hamas and recovering innocent civilians, and will likely prioritize the former over the latter. Meanwhile, hostages are running out of time. Every minute that bombing strikes continue, the hostages will be less and less likely to return home alive.

In a hopeful development, four American hostages were released in mid-October through two Qatar-brokered agreements. Hamas has stated that it will “endeavor” to release foreign nationals it describes as “under temporary custody,” though there has been little indication that negotiations for the remaining more than two hundred Israeli hostages are progressing either. Israel initially demanded humanitarian aid in exchange for hostages. Hamas, in return, demanded the release of all 5,200 Palestinian prisoners in exchange for Israeli hostages. Both sides are slow to indicate movement.

In these moments, it will be up to the United States, Europe, Canada—where Silver is originally from—and dozens of others in the international community to champion all the victims and their release as Israel navigates the complexities of its war. It is vital that Silver’s name—her life and her legacy—isn’t lost in the long list of casualties to come.

Carmiel Arbit is a nonresident senior fellow for Middle East Programs at the Atlantic Council. Her research focuses on US-Israel relations, the peace process, Israeli and Palestinian politics, Congress, and broader issues affecting the Middle East.

The post The kidnapping of a peace activist by Hamas reveals the cruel irony of the situation Israel faces appeared first on Atlantic Council.

I would argue that “casualty” is not merely an innocent byproduct of war but deliberately targeted.

As a twenty-year veteran of the journalism industry—two decades spent mainly covering war and violence—I can attest to that and how each “side” is trying to lure and manipulate with their messaging—what some might even call propaganda. I can attest to how each “side” will lie or try to cover up the truth, even when a “side” claims to have a higher moral standing.

I can also attest to just how hard it is to navigate through the many pieces of information hurling themselves in your direction, coming from sources on the ground, eyewitnesses, officials, and social media, which is a beast of its own with its trolls and state-sponsored cyber armies. Add to that journalists’ emotional reaction to the images the world sees and the words heard from survivors.

As the media, we need to realize the role we play in the trajectory of events. Our role can either inflame or educate and explain by building bridges of empathy and understanding.

Looking at the coverage of what is happening between Israel and the Gaza Strip since the October 7 attack by the militant group Hamas, it feels like we’re catapulting ourselves toward this abyss of sheer and utter inhumane madness.

The events take me back to the drums of the Iraq war after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks—a runaway train where many Western, especially American media, cheered this effort and the US narrative of “good versus evil.” Oversimplification is so dangerous.

I was in New York City on September 11 and not yet a journalist. My body trembled in fear and confusion as I witnessed the second World Trade Tower come down. I remember how the streets were so eerily deserted at first; the only people out were those looking to donate blood or somehow help. At the time, I thought, “This is how we should treat each other. This is the sort of kindness I want to be a part of.”

But then it all changed.

I remember the hatred and vitriol spewed towards Muslims and people of Middle Eastern and North African descent. It was something that I was spared being a direct target of, despite being an Arab-American of Syrian heritage, simply because I am blond with green eyes.

I also remember watching how, somehow, all Arabs and Muslims got painted with this terrorist brush; watching coverage that lacked nuance and understanding. It was what pushed me to become a journalist.

I remember how Arab rage at the Iraq war was somehow twisted by many in the media as Arab support for al-Qaeda, which could not be further from the truth. How the calls of the few compared to the entire population of the Arab world of “death to America” and “death to Israel”—for the two are magnetically connected in the minds of Arabs—somehow ended up being the loudest voice. The reality was that Arabs did not want an American war in Iraq; not because they supported al-Qaeda; not even because they supported Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein—for most did not—but because they did not support war. Back then, the Western media played a role. It aided and abetted the United States and its allies in their campaign to villainize and dehumanize Iraqis, Arabs, and Muslims.

Despite being so deeply reminded of the past, this present that we are living in is very different and arguably even more dangerous. Military commanders and even President Joe Biden are warning of the lessons of the past; of the point in time when “victory” will be declared and how there needs to be a plan for “peace.”

I fear that, in that planning, based on everything I am seeing and hearing now from heads of state to people on the street, the intense impact of the emotions generated now is not being planned for at all. Or even more disturbing, it is being planned for: a complete and total meltdown of humanity, which we will all be complicit in bringing around. 

For it is not quite the same as the post-9/11 era. This juncture we are in is potentially more divisive, dangerous, and destructive. There is a much deeper, darker history here with a deeply embedded generational trauma, all of which makes the emotional component of this even more intense. Make no mistake: emotions play such a big part in warfare. There is a reason why there’s an “information war.” It’s because a significant component of military strategy is not just troop movement on the ground nor striking strategic targets but psychological operations. These psychological operations target not just the population against whom war is being waged but all of us.

We need analysts to break down the information war and how it plays and preys on emotions and trauma. I am not talking about military or other analysts who talk about the mechanics of the information war or state that it’s a big aspect of war, but rather psychological analysts who can explain how that impacts our psyche and thinking towards each other. We need to show and analyze the human reaction to hearing words like “human animals,” “rats,” and “children of light versus children of darkness,” and break down how that can dehumanize an entire population and what the risk of that is.

No armed entity can gather support and power without being able to point to pain in the past and say, “Look what has been happening. Look at the pain you suffered. I am the only one who can protect you from your biggest fear.”

No nation can gather support for war within its borders or from its global allies without painting its enemy as “less than.” A life worth less than yours. A life that is not human; not human in the way that you are. A life that doesn’t love like you, laugh like you, hurt like you. This is how we end up, consciously or not, accepting the significant loss of civilian life.

We cannot allow this to happen again. As the media, we cannot let ourselves be a pawn in a dehumanization campaign.

As the media, we need to dive into the emotional aspect of all of this as part of the coverage. Every one of our actions is driven by an emotional reaction—a desire for revenge, anger, hatred, and fear. We need to include emotional analysis, experts who can talk about collective and generational trauma, and the impact that that has had on getting us to this point. It is one thing to analyze events that lead us to a certain point, and it is another, deeper, and necessary thing to talk about how emotions drove the actions that led us to that point.

The polarization that I see is frightening, whether it’s antisemitism on the rise or growing Islamophobia. It is utterly appalling to hear about a six-year-old Palestinian-American child being stabbed to death in a hate crime. It cuts me to listen to an Arab friend tell me about her relative living in the West spat on and told, “You should all be killed.” It is sad to see a Jewish mother post on social media that she is losing followers because she posted about her son’s Bar Mitzvah, a celebration of their faith. It is wrong to hear about some Jewish schools in London closing because of fear.

The Western media needs to give more space to Palestinians, and we all need to really listen and treat their words as if we are hearing them for the first time. There is this very wrong “normalization” of the “plight of the Palestinians”—perhaps because it has been going on for so long—for more than seven decades—and the media “spotlight,” being as limited as it is, kept moving on. Palestinians are right when they question why the outcry and the coverage of their pain is muted. To those networks who do think they are covering “both sides” because they have the one package out of the Gaza Strip and one guest, it’s not enough when the rest of your coverage is leaning so heavily into military operations or, even worse, consists of a lineup of mostly older white men who have not tasted, smelled, nor felt what war feels like on the other end of an American or an Israeli bomb. They are experts who have not lived or experienced, in this scenario, the “Arab” side of it.

On the flip side, non-Western media—especially Arab and Arab-owned media—should not continue to bypass the pain and trauma of the survivors of the Hamas attack and the parents, friends, and family of those taken hostage. I have watched a lot of different networks’ coverage of these events, and while I might have missed it, I did not once see the pain that the Hamas attack caused in Israel reported on. Space needs to be made for Jewish and Israeli voices on such outlets. Not all Israelis support their government’s policies, the illegal settlements, or the oppression or occupation of Palestine. And not all Jews across the world support Zionism or what Israel has done.

We cannot abdicate our fundamental responsibility as the press: to question, confront, and probe all sides; to call out lies and crimes no matter who is committing them. All media outlets need to rise above this notion that, if you cover a person’s pain, you somehow take a “side.” Pain is pain. We must be allowed to see the pain of our “enemy.” For some—and I do believe it is the few; I want to believe it is the few—it will bring them joy and a sense of vengeance to see the pain of the “enemy.” But, for the majority, perhaps, it will make them question and probe why they reacted a certain way, hopefully leading to more understanding.

We need to be allowed to see that the “enemy” is not monochrome. I believe that, for the majority, it will make them realize that perhaps what they have been conditioned to believe might not be the whole picture.

The media needs to realize and recognize the role we can play in fueling polarization and hate, whether that be through simply negating or disregarding a person or a population’s pain. We did play a role in fomenting the deep hatred post-9/11 that ultimately led to a more violent world. We need to be hyper-conscious not to play that role again.

I can see the trajectory we are on—this spiral of animosity and the growing monster that fuels a madness we will not be able to control. I can see a world filled with more hate and violence that will impact not just our generation but generations to come. And I can see the media’s role in preventing that. There are many aspects of this that we cannot alter, but we can ensure that we are not pushing divisions. We need to be stronger and better than the pressures on us—be it pressure from our government, our bosses, and even our own emotions.

We must build a world with more power in the truth than in the lie.

Arwa Damon is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East and president and founder of the International Network for Aid, Relief, and Assistance (INARA), a nonprofit organization that focuses on building a network of logistical support and medical care to help children who need life-saving or life-altering medical treatment in war-torn nations. She is also a former CNN senior correspondent with two decades of experience.

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But then Hamas executed a massacre in the south of Israel on October 7. The Israeli army failed to prevent and protect, Israel’s intelligence agencies failed to predict, and the Netanyahu government was slow to react to the disaster. It was the 1973 Yom Kippur War all over again. However, this time, the civilians were the ones who largely paid the horrific price of negligence and arrogance.

“We are at war; the enemy will pay an enormous price. I ordered the army to clear the towns from terrorists, and that is being done right now. We are at war, and we will win,” Netanyahu said on October 7, confident as always. At that very hour, 11:00 am, hundreds of Israelis—civilians and soldiers—were already dead. Others were hiding from terrorists or fighting for their lives, not knowing that Hamas had conquered the entire Gaza Envelope, which is part of the Western Negev within roughly four miles of the Gaza Strip border.

By the end of the day, the whole nation watched the news silently; they were in disbelief that such a scenario could happen in Israel. After being told time after time by politicians and army chiefs that Hamas had suffered severe blows and that “what will be is not what we had,” many realized that these statements were no more than hot air.

“Mr. prime minister, go to the media and apologize! These people were murdered under your watch,” cried Shirel Hogeg, whose family members were wounded during the Hamas attack in Kfar Aza.

In just a few days, a poll conducted by Dialog Center indicated that an overwhelming majority—86 percent of respondents, including almost 80 percent of coalition supporters—said that the attack by Hamas was a failure of the country’s leadership. Over 75 percent said the government bears “most of the responsibility.” By now, Chief of Staff Herzi Halevi, Chief of Israeli Military Intelligence Aharon Haliva, and Shin Bet Chief Ronen Bar have all claimed responsibility for the failure.

The only top figure that remained silent was Netanyahu, even though his ministers and Knesset members, such as Minister of Education Yoav Kisch and Member of Knesset Eliahu Revivo, had already made public statements. The only reference to the responsibility Netanyahu made so far was during the opening of Knesset’s winter session on October 16: “There are many questions about this catastrophe that happened ten days ago… We will investigate to the end, and we have already begun to utilize our lessons, but for now, we are focused on one goal—uniting the forces and storming on to victory.”

But, this time, Netanyahu will storm to victory with Benny Gantz, ex-chief of staff and minister of defense, with whom he—after great pains and delays—had formed an emergency government—a move that was supported by the vast majority of Israelis. A narrow war cabinet was established, which currently includes Netanyahu, Gantz, Defense Minister Gallant, former chief of staff and Member of Knesset, Gadi Eizenkot, and former Israeli ambassador to the United States and Minister of Strategic Affairs, Ron Dermer. The most extreme coalition members, Minister of Internal Security, Itamar Ben-Gvir, and Minister of Finance, Bezalel Smotrich—who used to have the upper hand in government until now—were sidelined. One Likud minister, the notorious Information Minister Galit Distel-Atbaryan, resigned, acknowledging that her office was “a waste of money.”

Yet, for now, despite the public anger and the frequent calls for him to resign by former ministers and bereaved parents, Netanyahu is still busy with petty politics. He held his only meeting with the representatives of the forum of kidnapped Israeli families on October 15. During it, his aides introduced some previously unknown families who allegedly expressed their willingness to sacrifice their children for the sake of a military victory.

The shocked families narrated the story and indicated that the prime minister and some circles around him still lived in the politics that existed before the terrorist attack on October 7. However, the situation has changed—probably for good. Israel continues to identify, bury, and mourn for its dead. There is a reasonable fear that, following the ground operation in Gaza that was already announced by leaders of the emergency government and the chief of staff, there will be many more funerals and much more grief.

Every day, Israelis are exposed to numerous heartbreaking stories and the unbelievable degree of failure of all that was deemed to be secure, flawless, and reliable. Prime Minister Netanyahu, who promised to “crush the Hamas” in his 2009 election campaign, is now evacuating cities like Sderot and Kiryat Shmona, while Tomer Glam, the mayor of Ashqelon, a 130,000-strong city situated just miles in proximity to Gaza, cries to evacuate those who lack access to shelters. While Glam directly accused the minister of finance, Bezalel Smotrich, of leaving Ashkelon with “nothing but a prayer for protection,” it is a known fact that consecutive Netanyahu governments failed to provide the residents of the southern city with shelters despite endless promises.

The anger in this city, as well as in many other communities, is mounting. Although Netanyahu’s voters have often been angry with him in the past, they generally came back home and supported him during the elections. It seems that things will not be as they were this time around.

The horrific failure of the state and the army to protect the civilians in the south brought the total collapse of the “conception” that Netanyahu eagerly promoted: divide and rule the Palestinians; cajole Hamas with money; weaken the Palestinian Authority; and keep the Palestinian state away. The unpreparedness of the state to deal with mass evacuation, as well as difficulties in transportation of the reserve soldiers, uncovered the inability and lack of strategy in government offices. The warm embrace President Biden provided to the families of the kidnapped American Israelis and the heroes who survived the massacre and fought the terrorists highlighted the detached and cold attitude of Netanyahu, who seems to be unable to talk to his own people. An explosive combination of all of these factors will determine the political fate of the longest-serving Israeli prime minister.

Right now, it’s still hard to imagine the first day after this war ends, since the conflict has just entered its first phase. Yet, when this day eventually comes, the Israeli political system will look very different from the present moment. Not only will Netanyahu pay the price for this failure, his share of the blame will be much larger than anyone else’s. For years, he used to sideline all of his ministers and aides and aggressively took most of the credit. After the Yom Kippur War, it took three years for the great shake-up of 1977, when the Likud whisked away the power from the Labor Party. After October 7, it will probably take much less time.

Ironically, the man who claimed that it was possible to promote peace with Arab countries without the Palestinians will have his career ended due to yet another war with the Palestinians. And, tragically, Netanyahu’s faulted policies have involved Israel in yet another brutal war that might leave many more families grieving for their loved ones.

Ksenia Svetlova is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs, and is the director of the Israel-Middle East Relations Program at Mitvim. Follow her on X: @KseniaSvetlova.

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That period of relative stability may be coming to an end. After Israel responded to Hamas’s deadly October 7 attacks, Iraqis took to the streets in massive pro-Palestinian protests, burning Israeli flags and chanting anti-American slogans. Iraqi Prime Minister Muhammed al-Sudani expressed solidarity with the Palestinian cause and has described the Israeli response as “brutal Zionist aggression.” His predecessors, including Mustafa al-Kadhimi, Haidar al-Abadi, Adil Abdul-Mahdi, and Nouri al-Maliki, echoed Sudani’s solidarity, adding that the Hamas attacks were a “natural response” to “Israeli provocations and violations.” Iraq’s Iran-backed militias, such as the Badr Organization, Asa’ib Ahl al Haq, and Kataib Hezbollah, expressed their support for the attacks and declared their readiness to attack American targets should the US intervene. 

As Amir al-Kaabi and Michael Knights of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy point out, much of the Iraqi response is theater. Many militia threats were conditioned on unlikely events, such as direct US intervention or escalation. These threats also employ a little strategic ambiguity: what counts as direct or indirect intervention is up for interpretation. In fact, Kaabi and Knights describe the general response, even by Iraq’s most rabid militias, as “cautious” and, in some cases, “muted.” It should also be of little surprise that the Iraqi response is overwhelmingly pro-Hamas. As other Arab states were normalizing relations in 2022, Iraq enacted a law that made establishing relations with Israel punishable by death or life imprisonment. Anti-Israel sentiment runs deep, and the facts about the brutality of Hamas’s attack are not likely to resonate.

Still, the situation poses several difficulties for the United States. First, as Israel’s response continues and the conditions of the Palestinians in Gaza deteriorate, there will be increased pressure on the militias to act. For example, Abu Azrael, arguably Iraq’s most famous Iran-backed militant group, has reportedly gone to Lebanon and is awaiting any opportunity to enter Israel. Should such a “grassroots” intervention expand, the potential for escalation—and, thus, a greater US role—will increase. Second, strategic ambiguity can be a double-edged sword. Should Israel’s efforts to defeat Hamas succeed, militias may lower the standard for what counts as intervention, again setting conditions for escalation.

Perhaps more difficult for the United States is that it may not be in its interest, this time, to ignore this predictable, if muted, pro-Hamas response, given the brutality of the last Hamas attack. Indeed, it is in everyone’s interest to alleviate the suffering of the Palestinian people and it is reasonable to express concern—even outrage—over their worsening conditions. However, committing atrocity, even where there is a just cause, should not be tolerated.

As Daniel Henninger of the Wall Street Journal points out, direct attacks against civilians are becoming the “new normal.” While Hamas’s attacks were particularly shocking, Russia has also deliberately attacked civilians in its war against Ukraine, killing around ten thousand. To reverse this trend, there is little option other than finding ways to hold actors who engage in war crimes accountable. In the case of Russia, the United States has intervened on behalf of Ukraine and, along with its European allies, imposed sanctions on Russia. If the Iraqi militia reaction is to be taken seriously, a similar intervention in Gaza may lead to an escalation that undermines its larger relationship with Iraq.

For example, Kataib Hezbollah’s attacks against US forces in Iraq and Syria draw little support from the Iraqi people. However, US attempts to defend itself enable these militias to mobilize large protests when those defensive operations occur in Iraq. Still, Iraqi popular disinterest in what they view as an external conflict has provided something of an obstacle to escalation. However, given the largely anti-Israel-pro-Palestinian sentiment of the Iraqi people, militia attacks against US targets as part of a defense of the Palestinian people will likely draw support. Moreover, whatever little leverage the Iraqi government has to curb such attacks will have disappeared.

Making matters more complicated is the fact that escalation is not simply dependent on Israeli and US action. After the destruction of the Baptist Hospital in Gaza on October 17, Sudani immediately attributed it to Israeli action and called for a day of mourning. Shortly thereafter, unknown actors used drones to attack US troops. That the destruction of the hospital may be due to the actions of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad group will not likely impact Iraqi public opinion nor the Iraqi government’s position, which means the potential for escalation increases.

Thus, the way ahead for the United States is not clear. The simple message that innocent civilians should not be subject to murder, kidnap, and torture will get muted as Palestinian civilians flee their homes and their casualties climb, even if Israeli operations conform to the law of war. Still, the United States can chart a way forward by pressuring its regional partners, including Iraq, to condemn the brutality, if not the reason, for the Hamas attacks. Most may not, but even a superficial acknowledgment of the indefensible nature of responding to injustice with atrocity will reinforce norms against directly targeting civilians.

The United States should also act as a moderating influence on the conflict and find ways to avoid escalation while enabling Israel’s efforts to defend itself against Hamas and its allies. While doing so will be difficult, the United States can begin by mobilizing humanitarian relief for those affected by the conflict. It should also closely monitor the conflict for potential escalation on any side and condition assistance to any partner on cooperation to de-escalate the conflict. For the Iraqi government, its influence over the militias is limited, even if it did want to intervene. However, it can partner with the United States to ensure U.S. intentions are effectively communicated and misunderstandings kept to a minimum..

Taking these steps will not fundamentally change the dynamics of the conflict nor alleviate the pressure on Israel to destroy Hamas. But it may create opportunities to mitigate the damage the conflict may cause to Middle East stability and US influence.

Dr. C. Anthony Pfaff is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Iraq Initiative and the research professor for Strategy, the Military Profession, and Ethics at the Strategic Studies Institute (SSI), US Army War College in Carlisle, PA. The Opinions expressed here are his own and do not necessarily represent those of the US government.

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Five days after the ICRC statement, the situation stands as follows: the last working seawater desalination plant in the Gaza Strip shut down on October 17 from lack of fuel. Hospitals in Gaza have entered a state of collapse, running out of fuel, basic supplies, and even painkillers. The United Nations (UN) warned that water shortages have now “become a matter of life and death,” with civilians in Gaza drinking contaminated water from the only aquifer that exists in the Gaza Strip. 

This dire situation exacerbates the precarity that already existed in Gaza, where more than sixty percent of the population faced food insecurity. The ICRC has mobilized sixty tons of humanitarian aid but says safe access is urgently needed. The UN World Food Programme said that 300 tons of food are either already at the Egyptian border in Rafah or on their way. Countries like Turkey, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates have already sent various planes with supplies to Egypt. Ursula von der Leyen, President of the European Commission, announced that the European Union (EU) is launching an EU Humanitarian Bridge operation with several flights to Egypt, beginning this week, to deliver supplies to verified humanitarian organizations on the ground.

Yet, despite urgent appeals for aid and multiple deliveries to Egypt, no outside aid appears to have made it into Gaza. Until October 18, Egyptian officials alleged that Israel was not cooperating with humanitarian assistance delivery efforts at the Rafah crossing and that air strikes nearby further stalled aid efforts. The Rafah crossing is located on the border between Gaza and Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula and is the only border crossing from Gaza not controlled by Israel and the only exit not leading into Israeli territory. 

Earlier, the head of Israel’s National Security Council, Tzachi Hanegbi, indicated that any aid efforts must broach the issue of the hostages taken by Hamas on October 7, saying that the “issue of returning the hostages… must be a central component of any humanitarian effort.” A senior adviser to Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu explained that Israel wants guarantees that humanitarian aid will not end up with Hamas. Secretary of State Antony Blinken noted that the US shares “Israel’s concern that Hamas may seize or destroy aid entering Gaza or otherwise preventing it from reaching the people who need it.”

On October 18, the Israeli military announced that humanitarian aid would be made available “if necessary” in Al-Mawasi, south of Gaza City, again urging residents of northern Gaza to evacuate. Following Biden’s visit to Israel on the same day, Netanyahu’s office said it would allow Egypt to deliver limited quantities of humanitarian aid to the Gaza Strip—the first concrete indication during a ten-day siege that aid would be allowed in. Once again, few details were shared. The statement only said that Israel would not “thwart” humanitarian assistance deliveries, limited to food, water, or medicine, but no mention of fuel, which is critical for hospitals and water treatment. Additionally, the aid will only be allowed into the southern part of Gaza, and the statement did not say when aid would begin to be allowed in. The statement also made clear that Israel would not allow any humanitarian assistance from its territory into Gaza “as long as our hostages are not returned.” President Biden indicated that the assistance would be subject to inspections and could only go to civilians. 

Given the ongoing humanitarian crisis and humanitarian aid piling up, it’s necessary to understand the legal obligations at issue. Specifically, international humanitarian law provisions regarding humanitarian assistance vary based on the classification of the conflict. This is a complicated question on which much disagreement exists, especially regarding Gaza and the conflict between Israel and Hamas. Many in the international community argue Israel’s role in the West Bank and Gaza Strip constitutes an occupation. Others instead view the current conflict with Hamas, a non-state actor, as a non-international armed conflict, arguing that Israel’s withdrawal of troops from Gaza in 2005 meant it was no longer in “effective control” of the territory such that even if it had been an occupying power before, it ceased to be one. Israel’s Foreign Ministry released a report in 2009 where it stated that the “Gaza Strip is neither a State nor a territory occupied or controlled by Israel” and that “as a matter of policy,” Israel “applies to its military operations in Gaza the rules of armed conflict governing both international and non-international armed conflicts.”

Regardless of the legal classification of the conflict, there is, at a minimum, an obligation to allow humanitarian assistance to be delivered to the civilian population by an impartial and non-discriminatory humanitarian organization if refusal to do so would result in mass starvation. The law of occupation, for example, imposes a positive obligation on the occupying party to provide humanitarian aid itself or, if unable, to facilitate its delivery to the occupied territory. 

Under Article 55 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, the occupying power “has the duty of ensuring the food and medical supplies of the population,” and “it should, in particular, bring in the necessary foodstuffs, medical stores and other articles if the resources of the occupied territory are inadequate.” Under Article 56, it also “has the duty of ensuring and maintaining, with the cooperation of national and local authorities, the medical and hospital establishments and services, public health and hygiene in the occupied territory.” Additionally, Article 59 establishes that if the “whole or part of the population of an occupied territory is inadequately supplied, the Occupying Power shall agree to relief schemes on behalf of the said population, and shall facilitate them by all the means at its disposal,” adding that all parties “shall permit the free passage” of humanitarian assistance provided by other states of impartial humanitarian organizations.

However, Israel does not consider itself the occupying power in the Gaza Strip. While its self-assessment does not determine whether it is an occupying power, it does govern Israel’s policy and conduct. A legal classification of the current conflict is beyond the scope of this post for the reasons mentioned above. And, ultimately, no matter how the conflict is classified, there is an obligation to allow humanitarian assistance for civilians in extreme situations where refusal to do so would result in mass starvation. In this sense, it is crucial to note that the obligations regarding humanitarian assistance apply to all parties to the conflict, that is, equally to Hamas and Israel. 

The ICRC notes that the rule is that, subject to the right of control, all parties to a conflict must allow humanitarian relief for civilians, impartial and conducted without adverse distinction. This is a norm of customary international law and applies in international and non-international armed conflicts. Customary international law norms apply universally, regardless of whether states have ratified certain treaties. Additionally, non-state armed groups, like Hamas, are bound by customary international law and certain treaty provisions.

But what does “subject to the right of control” mean? It means that the consent of the belligerent parties is required for impartial humanitarian organizations to deliver assistance to civilians in the territory under their control. However, consent cannot be arbitrarily denied or founded on unlawful reasons. 

Nevertheless, Article 23 of the Fourth Geneva Convention (governing international armed conflicts but instructive for the interpretation of the customary norm) subjects the free passage of humanitarian aid to the condition that the party allowing for it “is satisfied that there are no serious reasons for fearing… that the consignments may be diverted from their destination.” This speaks directly to the fears expressed by Israel and shared by the United States that Hamas may divert or seize the aid intended for civilians for its purposes. 

The commentary for Article 23, however, explains that a “doubt as to the destination of consignments would not be sufficient reason for refusing them free passage” and that, instead, “the fears of the Power imposing the blockade must be based on serious grounds, i.e. they must have been inspired by the knowledge of certain definite facts.” It adds that “supervision by a neutral intermediary,” like the ICRC, “should afford the blockading Power adequate assurances.” 

While concerns that Hamas may divert or seize aid are clearly relevant in assessing Israel’s obligation to allow entry of assistance, conditioning this entry on the release of hostages is not supported by the law. It is generally accepted that a party’s consent may be withheld for reasons of military necessity, however, the withholding cannot itself result in a violation of humanitarian law and must be necessary and proportionate. Ultimately, the ICRC has observed that if “a civilian population is threatened with starvation and a humanitarian organization which provides relief on an impartial and non-discriminatory basis is able to remedy the situation, a party is obliged to give consent.” Lastly, the ICRC has also clarified that a party conducting a siege must allow the free entry of food and other essential items for the civilian population. 

Given the clearly deteriorating situation in the Gaza Strip and the extremely rare statement issued by the ICRC that the denial of food, water, and electricity to civilians, crucial for their survival, is not compatible with international humanitarian law, it is evident that humanitarian assistance delivered by impartial and non-discriminatory humanitarian organizations must be allowed to enter Gaza. Israel’s October 18 approval of entry of humanitarian aid to Gaza from Egypt, following an hour-long meeting with President Biden, is a step in the right direction. At the same time, it is also essential to ensure that this life-saving aid makes it to the intended recipients: civilians. As the commentary to Article 23 notes, “constant surveillance is necessary to ensure that the articles are in actual fact received by those for whom they are intended and that any illegal trafficking is made impossible.” But even that cannot be done if the aid cannot enter as soon as possible. The survival of civilians depends on it.

Lisandra Novo is a staff lawyer for the Strategic Litigation Project at the Atlantic Council. She was previously a judicial fellow at the International Court of Justice, a Fulbright scholar in Spain researching post-conflict transitional justice, and a visiting professional at the Inter-American Court of Human Rights.

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Egyptian President Anwar Sadat understood that. When he launched a surprise attack in October 1973—along with Syria and eventually a coalition of other Arab states to recover territories lost to Israel after Israel’s own surprise attack in June 1967 wiped out most of the Egyptian air forces—I was part of the State Department team that helped Secretary Henry Kissinger’s diplomacy bring Egypt and Israel to a standoff and a ceasefire. Sadat did not accept that status quo, leaving Israel to occupy the Sinai Peninsula. Instead, the Egyptian president found innovative ways to reach out to both the United States and Israel, culminating with his historic visit to Jerusalem to address the Israeli Knesset. 

President Jimmy Carter took it from there. He brought Sadat and Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin to Camp David in September 1978 for twelve days of secret talks that led to the March 26, 1979 peace treaty between their two countries, known as the Camp David Accords. 

Another American president showed a similar instinct for turning military victory into peacemaking. Under the leadership of President George H.W. Bush, Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm during 1990-1991 led to the expulsion of the Iraqi armed forces in February 1991 that had occupied Kuwait and done horrendous damage. Some, including officials in his administration, called for US forces to march on to Baghdad and overthrow Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein. President Bush resisted those proposals, opting to keep Iraq contained within its borders. 

After being heavily involved in the efforts to muster near total global support to defeat the Iraqi aggression of 1990, I watched in awe as President Bush and Secretary of State James Baker capitalized on the immense prestige that the United States achieved in early 1991 to launch the Madrid Conference on October 30, 1991. They brought initially reluctant Arabs and Israelis together to address their decades-old conflict.

The skill shown in subsequent years of diplomacy included the Oslo Process of 1993-1995 between Israel and the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), which led to the establishing of the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank and an initially promising period of security cooperation between Israel and the PLO. There were still unrealized hopes for a peace process leading to a two-state solution. The Madrid Conference also set the stage for Jordan’s peace treaty with Israel on October 26, 1994. 

Together, these developments—plus the earlier Camp David Accords—were the prelude to what is now referred to as normalization. The Donald Trump administration jumped on that process in 2020 and 2021, mediating and offering inducements to the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Morocco, and Sudan to establish diplomatic relationships with Israel. The administration also came up with the catchy title of the Abraham Accords—a title that appeals to Christians, Muslims, and Jews. The Joe Biden administration has honored the agreements, which may lead to other participants, notably Saudi Arabia.  

Now, there is another war involving Israel and the Palestinians. Immediately following the tragic conflict set off by Hamas terrorism on October 7, the initial rhetoric of President Biden, Secretary Antony Blinken, and others in the administration was heavy on pledges of US military support for Israel’s already overwhelming military superiority in the region. The United States has moved a high level of military assets into the Eastern Mediterranean to deter other anti-Israel states or movements from joining in what is, so far, the latest and most destructive in a series of conflicts arising every few years between Israel and Hamas, whose political leadership and military wing have dominated Gaza ever since 2006 and opposes the Palestinian Authority headquartered in Ramallah in the West Bank.

One week after the initiation of terrorist actions by Hamas, after intensive and skillful diplomacy by Secretary Blinken, his lightening tour to the capitals of Arab partners in the region and back to Jerusalem is bearing fruit. The focus on saving the lives of Americans has now widened to saving the lives of innocent civilians of all nationalities, including Palestinians. Involvement in the armed conflict by others, including the Islamic Republic of Iran and the movements Tehran supports—such as Lebanese Hezbollah—seems less and less inevitable.

On October 15, Blinken’s remarks in Cairo offered strong hints that peacemaking could follow the end of the current fighting. The US secretary of state noted his “good conversations” with Crown Prince Mohamed Bin Salman of Saudi Arabia and Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi on the path forward, including a Cairo-led conference to defuse the situation and “help get assistance to Palestinians who need it” that “can look at ways to ensure that this conflict doesn’t spread.”

May it be so. 

David Mack is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs, a former deputy assistant secretary of state for Near East affairs, and a former US ambassador to the United Arab Emirates.

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Despite a long-term military counterterrorism effort, Nigeria still ranks as the eighth most-affected country on the Global Terrorism Index. Because of the persistence of the problem, Tinubu will need all the help he can get, including from the United States. Thus—especially at a time when the Sahel and coastal West Africa are embroiled in ever-worsening security crises—it may seem illogical for the US State Department to remove Boko Haram, once considered the world’s deadliest terrorist groups, from the list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTO).

However, this action is long overdue. To designate a group as an FTO, the State Department must demonstrate that 1) the group is a foreign organization, 2) the group is engaged in, or retains the capability and intent to engage in, terrorist activity and 3) this activity threatens US citizens, interests, or national security. The US secretary of state must revoke a listing if they find “that the circumstances that were the basis of the designation have changed in such a manner as to warrant a revocation.”

Sure, the circumstances have not changed. But the circumstances never met these criteria to begin with because Boko Haram, one of Africa’s most well-known terrorist organizations, does not exist at all. Ultimately, “unlearning” this term will yield more accurate and valuable insights into the reality of the threat. Revoking the designation will set the United States and its partners on a more productive path toward finally resolving the violence in Nigeria.

The source of the misnomer

Around 2005, a fundamentalist Islamist sect emerged in northern Nigeria under the direction of Mohammed Yusuf. He began preaching a specific interpretation of the Quran, and one of his core arguments was that Nigerian Muslims should reject Western education and schools that had been introduced under British colonial rule. Because of this message, locals began calling him and his followers “Boko Haram,” which translates to “Western education is forbidden” in the Hausa language. Outsiders used this phrase as a derisive term to refer to this secretive sect, their followers, and other suspected affiliates.

In 2009, Yusuf’s sect staged an uprising across several northern states following escalating tensions with the state police. Within a matter of days, the movement was essentially eliminated by security services in a brutal crackdown (killing approximately eight hundred members in just a few days) and Yusuf was taken into custody and then executed shortly after. Since then, several movements have emerged in the region. The most active group has been Jamāʿat Ahl al-Sunnah li-l-Daʿawah wa al-Jihād (JAS), which was founded around 2010 under the leadership of Abubakar Shekau. His organization is responsible for many of the murders and violent incidents in the country over the last decade. Several factions have split from JAS, including Ansaru in 2012, which later rejoined JAS and then splintered again. In 2016, a third group emerged that called itself Islamic State-West Africa Province. They have all, at various times, been active across the region.

What’s in a name?

“Boko Haram” doesn’t really fit into that history. From the first uses of the term to describe Yusuf’s sect, locals have repurposed the name to describe suspected fundamentalist and Islamist extremism in the region. All these operations and more, including a wide array of non-terrorist criminal and gang activity, have variously been attributed to “Boko Haram” by government officials, state security forces, journalists, and locals who lacked complete information about what they were describing.

In short, the use of the name survived even as the actual insurgent organizations in the region changed affiliations, splintered, or disbanded.

Thus, since the early years of the violence, many observers believed they were witnessing the rise of “Boko Haram,” but this perception did not correspond with the activity on the ground and the constellation of terrorist organizations (none of whom used the name) in the region. The ultimate challenge, therefore, isn’t just the use of the wrong name, but what it signifies: It gives an inaccurate impression that there is a singular operational group with a clear ideology and an organizational history. Researchers and experts have analyzed the activity in the region through this lens, bringing a host of largely unrelated activity under the umbrella of the supposed entity. In late 2013, when the State Department designated “Boko Haram” as an FTO, US decision makers seemed to be influenced by what the British anthropologist Ruben Andersson has called “the Timbuktu syndrome”—the mapping of the West’s jihadist fears onto the world’s less familiar peripheries.

Why delisting matters

The State Department’s FTO designation is essentially targeting a ghost. Delisting the organization would have several tangible benefits.

Most importantly, it would streamline the resources the United States dedicates to countering terrorist activity in northern Nigeria. An FTO designation unlocks new authorities for government agencies to target terrorists, but it also requires agencies to follow through and enforce these designations. Due to the host of violence and petty criminal activity that has mistakenly been attributed to “Boko Haram,” the United States is pouring resources into addressing unaffiliated crime and issues that fall solely under the jurisdiction of the Nigerian government without realizing any stabilizing counterterrorism benefits.

Removing “Boko Haram” and instead correctly listing JAS will also benefit the national research apparatus, including academic institutions, think tanks, and government agencies. Since the early years of the violence, independent researchers have helped shape the US approach toward “Boko Haram” and informed US counterterrorism strategies, including military involvement, intelligence collection, and humanitarian assistance. Researchers and academics have had no reason to question the existence of “Boko Haram” when conducting research on the region, which has allowed for persistent uncertainty to dominate the field. As a result, attempts to analyze the confusing array of activity and operations that have been linked to “Boko Haram” have yielded weak insights and less productive recommendations.

For example in 2021, two of the most influential and long-standing leaders in the region—Shekau and Abu Musab Al-Barnawi—were declared dead. For counterterrorism officials, whom Shekau had eluded for almost a decade, this development marked a welcome shift. With the en masse surrender of fighters formerly associated with JAS, some hoped that they had finally witnessed the end of “Boko Haram.” However, many scholars and experts believe that a fundamental aspect of the “group” is its perpetual adaptability, which in fact is largely driven by the loose application of the term to violent events in Nigeria. Thus media organizations, for example, are still publishing articles on new purported attacks by the “organization.” Absent a rejection of “Boko Haram,” the reliance on the term thus ultimately invites a perpetual motion of resurgence that leaves no real end to the violence in sight.

By delisting “Boko Haram,” the State Department will serve its own interests by setting new analyses and inquiries on the right track to accurately identifying terrorist activities and trends in the region. Without this change, there are two grim yet likely consequences. Counterterrorism research projects and resulting US strategies will continue to operate based on avoidable misconceptions and incomplete information on the violence. And more concerningly, without a real reckoning over the existence of the “group,” every new instance of violence in northern Nigeria risks becoming engulfed in the thickening fog of suspected “Boko Haram” activity.

The responsibility now lies with the global collective, and with these US State Department officials in particular, to consciously and deliberately unlearn the deep-seated belief in the “organization’s” very existence.

Alexandra Gorman is a young global professional with the Africa Center and is a masters’ candidate at Johns Hopkins University in the Global Security Studies program. As an undergraduate at Duke University, she received high honors on her senior thesis, “Nigeria’s Militant Jihadism in the Mirror of the Media: the Creation of ‘Boko Haram.’”

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It is admittedly difficult to make historic political decisions, but the price of not doing so is often horrendously high. In this case, the price is obvious: By failing to integrate Ukraine and bring the countries of Eastern Europe out of the geopolitical grey zone, Western leaders set the stage for the full-scale Russian invasion of 2022.

Further mistakes will be just as costly. Thankfully, there is now a growing consensus throughout the West that only Ukrainian victory can end the global security crisis sparked by Russia’s invasion. Nevertheless, there is still a need for greater clarity on what would constitute victory and how Europe can achieve a lasting peace. 

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

Defeating Russia and securing peace will require a series of interrelated measures that go far beyond the battlefield. I have identified five key elements to a sustainable settlement that will end the current carnage and prevent any repetitions in the years ahead.

The first element is arming Ukraine sufficiently for victory. This process is well underway, but serious issues remain in terms of both quantities and timing. Every single delay in military aid costs Ukrainian lives and emboldens Russia. Ukraine’s Western partners must overcome their misplaced fear of provoking Putin and should instead seek to streamline the delivery of weapons. After all, it is now widely recognized that Russia must be defeated on the battlefield.  

The second element is the strategic deterrence of Russia and creation of a new NATO-centered security architecture in Europe. There should now be no illusions: NATO alone can provide Europe with a credible and efficient security system. This means NATO membership for Ukraine. Nothing less will force Moscow to retreat. The upcoming NATO summit in Vilnius should conclude by inviting Ukraine to join the alliance. No bilateral guarantees or other compromise measures can hope to replace NATO’s Article Five or stop Russia. 

The third element is Ukrainian membership of the European Union and restoration of the Ukrainian economy in close unison with the wider European economy. There has been significant progress toward this objective since the outbreak of Russia’s full-scale invasion, but overall results remain disappointing and fall far short of the many political statements on the importance of Ukraine’s European integration.

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The fourth key task is undermining Russia’s potential to act aggressively. It is hard to assess how long Russia will remain capable of waging the current war, but financial issues will play an important role in any decision-making process. Last year, official Russian military expenditure amounted to approximately $85 billion. This year, the figure is set to reach at least $108 billion. Unofficially, the total sum spent on the war is likely to be far higher. Clearly, sanctions must continue and need to intensify. Additional steps could include the prevention of dual-purpose goods transit through Russia and the maximum implementation of secondary sanctions.

In parallel, it is also vital to protect and strengthen Ukraine’s economy. Further measures are necessary to facilitate Ukrainian exports. NATO-led naval convoys should break Russia’s Black Sea blockade and enable Ukraine to resume international exports throughout the country’s southern ports. Ukraine’s external debt should undergo restructuring.

The fifth element necessary for a sustainable peace in Eastern Europe is perhaps the most important and at the same time the most intangible. Genuine victory will only be possible when Russian imperialism is no longer a threat to the region.

Once Ukraine is liberated and secure under the collective umbrella of NATO membership, the top priority for the international community will be addressing the imperial ideology that encourages Russians to commit acts of international aggression with impunity and contempt for human life. Russia must bear full legal and financial responsibility for its aggression against Ukraine and for the genocide of the Ukrainian nation. The era of Russian impunity for war crimes must end.  

Unless the underlying issue of Russian imperialism is addressed at the international level, the liberation of Ukraine will provide little more than temporary relief. Confronting Russia’s imperial identity is the only way to achieve a lasting peace. This would pave the way for a new global security system and the much-needed reform of international bodies such as the UN Security Council. World peace will remain elusive until Russian imperialism is consigned to the dustbin of history.

Arseniy Yatsenyuk is Chairman of the Kyiv Security Forum and former Prime Minister of Ukraine (2014-16).

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1. How did we get here?

Based on all the information we received from our contacts in civil society, including both Kosovo Serbs and Albanians, the question was not so much “if” but rather “when” the long-lasting crisis would escalate. There were numerous potential triggers for escalation that were plainly evident to those willing to acknowledge them. Many of these triggers stemmed from a series of escalatory decisions made by political leaders on both sides. 

Just to highlight a few examples: the withdrawal of Kosovo Serbs from Kosovo institutions, particularly the police force; the deployment of Kosovo special police forces to the streets in the northern region; the expropriation of land in municipalities predominantly inhabited by Serbs; the refusal to participate in the elections; and ultimately, violent clashes between the Serbian minority and NATO soldiers this week triggered by four newly elected Kosovo Albanian mayors taking office in northern Kosovo after April elections that were boycotted by Kosovo Serbs.

—Maja Piscevic is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center and representative of the Center in the Western Balkans.

The Serb-majority municipalities in northern Kosovo have long been the flashpoint in the protracted dispute between Kosovo and Serbia. The escalation earlier this week followed a series of tit-for-tat actions on both sides after the most recent tense standoff over license plate enforcement on the Kosovo-Serbia border in late 2022.

What is different this time is the series of political miscalculations the government in Pristina seems to have made about its US and European allies’ postures. Having invested significant political capital into the Belgrade-Pristina Dialogue led by the European Union (EU) for normalizing relations between both sides, Washington and its allies from Brussels to Paris and Berlin warned Pristina not to escalate the situation further. Instead, US and EU partners wanted to focus on progress in the dialogue. The government’s decision to double down on enforcing the outcome of the April local elections, which the Serb majority boycotted and in which less than 3.5 percent of the population in northern Kosovo participated, added fuel to the fire. With this escalation, Kosovo now risks losing part of what used to be largely unqualified US and European support.

—Jörn Fleck is the senior director of the Europe Center at the Atlantic Council.

The situation in the north of Kosovo reached its current point due to a combination of factors and events. The lack of implementation of the Ohrid agreement to normalize relations and the failure to deliver on the establishment of the Association of Serb Municipalities created a growing frustration in the international community. One crucial factor is the lack of maturity displayed by leaders involved in the dialogue process and their challenges in engaging and moving forward through strong political will. It appears that the incentives for both sides to adhere to the agreements were not strong enough and therefore progress was hindered.

The catalyst for the situation in the north can be traced back to Kosovo Serbs’ deliberate withdrawal from local institutions, including by mayors and police officers. This helped create a vacuum which Kosovo’s government seized upon—by insisting on holding local elections and enforcing the mayors’ taking office to demonstrate that the north exists as a separate political reality outside Kosovo’s institutional framework.

—Ilva Tare is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center and was most recently a broadcaster with EuroNews Group.

2. What could tip this into a more serious conflict?

Even if it seems that all sides are trying to lower the temperature in recent days, a combination of factors could further escalate the situation. Russia has long been an opportunist meddler in the region with significant disinformation tools, especially among Serbian media and audiences. A rally-around-the-flag effect among Kosovo’s majority Albanian population could put government decisionmakers in Pristina on the spot. They repeatedly seem to have chosen standing on principle over politically constructive solutions and have doubled down on symbolic actions, despite warnings by Western allies to avoid escalation. That could make it harder for them to back down. And Serbia has influence over gangs that can inflame the situation if they choose—or are instructed—to.

—Jörn Fleck

There are any number of potential flashpoints, but it is important to focus on the region, to recognize what the citizens of the area see as their grievances, and seek, in good faith, long-term solutions. The recent events are clearly a setback to this process.

—Cameron Munter is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s South Asia Center and Europe Center. He spent three decades in the US Foreign Service, where he served as US ambassador to Serbia during the Kosovo independence crisis.

3. What should EU countries and the US do right now?

First of all, the United States and the EU should stop considering the Western Balkans as a peripheral issue, which they have for the last decade. Some progress has been made, but, for example, the five members of the EU that have not recognized Kosovo (Cyprus, Greece, Romania, Slovakia, and Spain) should not be allowed to simply pretend their actions do not make a difference. They, along with their fellow EU members, should make new efforts to seek resolution and not simply wait for someone else to address the issues.

—Cameron Munter

The current status quo in the north is unsustainable, as it is dominated by parallel structures, as the Kosovo government states. Addressing this issue and stopping the violent elements from the north should not distract from the broader political dialogue, which is brokered by the EU and supported by the United States. 

The escalation of events in the north of Kosovo in recent days was an unfortunate distraction for Kosovo and Serbia in their efforts to normalize relations through political dialogue. The situation is back to square one, with the same requests for both sides and the urge for the parties to demonstrate loyalty to their Western allies and show that they can be credible and trustworthy partners in their Euro-Atlantic aspirations—especially for Kosovo, which cannot afford to lose the support of the United States or of key members of the EU. 

—Ilva Tare

The United States and Europe should not reward spoilers of the progress made in the normalization process in recent months, following significant US and EU political investment. The current escalation is helping leaders in Pristina and Belgrade avoid executing on some tough steps toward normalization and dealing with domestic political challenges. Europe and the United States should make clear that the only way out of the current situation ultimately runs through the Belgrade-Pristina Dialogue.   

—Jörn Fleck

4. Will new elections defuse this situation?

In order to move toward a resolution, new elections should be held with preconditions such as the involvement of Kosovo Serbs, the establishment of working conditions for Kosovo police and mayors, and the complete withdrawal of special police units of the Kosovo government deployed in the north, which is one of Kosovo Serbs’ stated requirements to take part in local elections. Progress with the Association of Serb Municipalities by mid-November is now a concrete condition with a deadline for the Kosovo government to deliver.

—Ilva Tare

It’s worth discussing. Clearly, new elections would have to be conceived and implemented very carefully, to ensure their result would be recognized by all sides as legitimate. Thus, it’s not a guarantee of solving the problem, but it’s one possible way to address it.

—Cameron Munter

5. Are there any more creative solutions for Serbia and Kosovo to get to more stable relations?

In the current atmosphere of deep-seated distrust and personal animosity between the two political leaders, it is challenging, if not impossible, to envision any innovative solutions. This is a harsh reality that the West still appears hesitant to acknowledge, despite the events unfolding over the past two years involving Prime Minister Albin Kurti of Kosovo and President Aleksandar Vučić of Serbia. It is becoming increasingly clear that, at some point, the West will need to pause and reconsider its approach, asking itself a crucial question: Are the current political leaders genuinely willing and capable of achieving and ensuring a lasting normalization between the Serb and Albanian populations in Kosovo?

—Maja Piscevic

If the context is right, other initiatives, such as those described in the Berlin Process and discussed as part of Open Balkans, might make a difference. They would open the aperture, so to speak, going beyond the tense immediate points of contention to the larger, more substantive solutions to the local problems. But these more strategic and long-term solutions are hard to develop if the situation on the ground remains as tense as it now is.

—Cameron Munter

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Rather, international partners must increase financial pressure on the RSF, former Bashir-era government officials, and the SAF to change their political calculations at the negotiation table.

Sudan cannot be stable if there are two armies and if former regime elites/Islamists are allowed to sow discord. International partners need to put coordinated financial pressure on RSF leaders to commit to integrating rapidly into the army and on former regime leaders to stop inciting violence; international partners should also put SAF generals on notice that they must honor their pledges to hand over power.

Sudan’s long-ruling former dictator, Omar al-Bashir, was able to stay in power for thirty years by fragmenting the security services and deftly playing them against each other to prevent any one of them from becoming powerful enough to launch a successful coup. In return for their obedience, military and political leaders were allowed to gain control over large parts of the economy and accumulate great wealth. Sustained protests led to Bashir’s April 2019 ouster, a brief period of military rule, and eventually a civilian-military transitional government nominally headed by then Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok, who governed in “partnership” with SAF General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and RSF General Mohamed Hamdan “Hemedti” Dagalo, the chair and vice-chair respectively of the Transitional Sovereignty Council.

International partners acquiesced to the generals taking these positions of power, thinking that it would help prevent conflict from breaking out between the two rival forces—and that competition between the SAF and the RSF would keep either from dominating the country and would allow the heavily constrained Hamdok and his civilian ministers to implement at least some reforms. While the prime minister was able to introduce some difficult but necessary economic reforms, Burhan and Hemedti launched another coup on October 25, 2021, to block a planned transfer of the Transitional Sovereignty Council chair to a civilian.

The return of military rule was roundly rejected by the Sudanese people, who held frequent protests, and donors, who paused more than four billion dollars in planned economic assistance. The coup leaders came under enormous economic and diplomatic pressure to negotiate another transition, but they occupied irreconcilable positions on security-sector reform. Burhan and his hardline generals wanted the RSF to be rapidly subsumed into the SAF, while Hemedti (backed by his supporters from the periphery) wanted to keep his independent power base and played for time. As “negotiations” dragged on, the two leaders employed different tactics to try to strengthen their own position and weaken the other’s, including importing more weapons, arming communities, trying to splinter their rival’s forces, cutting off sources of funding, allying with civilian politicians, developing bonds with foreign leaders (including Russia), and—at least according to persistent chatter in Khartoum—planning coups in case these other efforts failed to change the balance of power. Tensions waxed and waned over the past one-and-a-half years, and external actors had to intercede a number of times to prevent combat from breaking out. Unfortunately this time, with the Islamists reportedly exacerbating strife and the political negotiations seemingly about to conclude, diplomats have been unable to avert a war.