• Executive summary
• History of attacks on shipping
• Threats to commercial vessels in the Black Sea, the Taiwan Strait, and the South China Sea
• Houthi attacks on merchant vessels: A new form of aggression
• International response to the Houthis’ attacks
• The shipping industry’s response
• Improving strategies to counter attacks on shipping
• Preemptive diversion of shipping
• Intra-industry risk updates
• Use of directed-energy weapons
• Selective protection dependent on flag registration
• Freedom-of-navigation operations
• Disrupting the delivery of weapons
• Armed guards on board
• Conclusion

Executive summary

For as long as shipping has existed, merchant vessels have been vulnerable to attacks, especially in wartime. Starting in the beginning of the twentieth century, when international trade expanded rapidly, nations signed a string of treaties to protect merchant vessels from attacks by hostile states. With a few notable exceptions, most importantly the Iran-Iraq “Tanker War” in the 1980s, countries have complied with these rules.

Since the late 2010s, however, there has been a radical increase in state-linked attacks and harassment of merchant vessels. Around that time, Iran and, to a lesser extent, Israel began attacking vessels linked to the other side, primarily in the Strait of Hormuz, a situation that persists. China, for its part, has taken to harassing merchant vessels in the South China Sea in a strategy to enforce its unilateral territorial claims. The harm imposed on merchant vessels further increased in November 2023, when the Iran-linked Houthi rebels launched geopolitically linked attacks on shipping in the Red Sea. Eight months later—despite interventions by the US Navy, the United Kingdom’s (UK) Royal Navy, European Union (EU) navies, and other Western navies—the attacks continue and have caused large-scale rerouting to the Cape of Good Hope.

The increasing attacks on merchant vessels pose an acute threat not just to seafarers and shipping companies, but also to the global maritime order on which modern economies are based. This report discusses the history of attacks on shipping, the rules implemented to keep shipping safe, and the new and serious threats posed by the Houthis and other actors. It also discusses steps Western governments and the shipping industry can take to reduce the harm posed by such attacks. These steps include:

• collective threats of rerouting away from risky waters;
• directed-energy weapons on naval vessels protecting merchant shipping; and
• increased focus on disrupting militias’ supply chains.

History of attacks on shipping

“Japan’s dependence on international economic ties for its survival is well recognized…In recent years, however, another source of vulnerability has assumed importance-the threat of international shipping disruptions in the Middle East.” Thus begins an article in the academic journal Pacific Affairs—not from 2023, but from 1986. In the Persian Gulf, Iraq had taken to attacking merchant ships linked to Iran as part of its war against the Islamic Republic.

The attacks began in 1981, the war’s second year, when Iraq attacked five merchant vessels, “largely to reduce Iran’s oil exports, which go entirely by sea and which help finance Iran’s war effort.”¹ The following year, Iraq attacked sixteen vessels carrying Iranian oil; the next year, it was twenty-two. In 1984, Iran began responding in kind. That year, Iraq attacked fifty-three tankers linked to Iran, while Iran attacked sixteen tankers linked to Iraq. By 1987, the numbers had risen to eighty-eight attacks by Iraq and ninety-one by Iran. The systematic attacks on the other side’s merchant vessels became known as the Tanker War, and it alarmed the outside world, which by that point was dependent on the supply of oil through the Persian Gulf. “Mizuo Kuroda, Japanese ambassador to the United Nations, in the Security Council debate on the gulf conflict in May 1984, made an appeal that Iran and Iraq and all other states exercise the utmost restraint, and asked that both countries respect the right of safe navigation. (However, attacks on neutral shipping have continued.),” the Pacific Affairs article noted. In the summer of 1987, after neutral Kuwait had concluded that Kuwaiti-flagged tankers could no longer travel through the Gulf and asked for permission to have them reflagged as American, the tankers were reflagged and the United States launched Operation Earnest Will, which saw US Navy vessels escort the US-flagged Kuwaiti vessels between the Gulf of Oman and their home ports.²

When the Iran-Iraq war ended the following year, more than 320 merchant mariners had been killed, injured, or were missing. Three hundred and forty merchant vessels had been damaged, some more than once. Some 30 million tons of cargo had been damaged, while eleven ships had been sunk and three dozen declared total losses.³

The Tanker War became infamous because it was a blatant case of aggression against merchant shipping as a tool of war, and it took place during a period in which countries’ economies were beginning to globalize. The Warsaw Pact countries largely operated in parallel with Western market economies and China was still a mostly closed economy, but Japan and South Korea were trading heavily with Western economies,Latin American economies had also begun opening up, and Middle Eastern oil fueled many countries’ growing economies. It was against this background that the Tanker War was such a shock. It demonstrated to increasingly commercially linked countries that global shipping—the most important tool of global trade—could easily be targeted by interested nations and that there was little other countries could do to stop the attacks.

However, geopolitically motivated attacks on shipping are nearly as old as shipping itself.⁴ Indeed, merchant vessels have been regularly attacked during wars. As H. B. Robertson, Jr. notes

• During the Napoleonic era, both France and England utilized their differing strengths in an attempt to curtail the other’s logistic and commercial capabilities. In the American Civil War, the blockade of the Confederacy was a principal component of the Union’s war strategy. The indispensable condition for victory by Japan in its 1905 war with Russia was control of the seas. Without this advantage, Russia could have resupplied its superior land armies from the sea. During the progress of both WorId Wars, success of the maritime resupply effort of the Allied Powers, particularly Great Britain, was the sine qua non of victory.⁵

Until the nineteenth century, “privateers” also attacked merchant vessels on behalf of a country’s armed forces in exchange for bounties from the vessels.⁶

The reason merchant vessels have so systematically been attacked during wars is, of course, that they carry vital supplies to the adversary. “If it is true that merchant shipping can be critical to a nation’s ability to prosecute a war effort, it is equally true that the opposing power will seek to interdict that supply effort,” Robertson notes. “Tactics, weapons systems and geography are variables that will affect any interdiction effort but the interdiction effort fits nearly with the general principles of war.”⁷

Yet, by the time World War I erupted, nations realized that unrestricted warfare against merchant shipping was unsustainable and sought to restrict it. Traditional (or customary) international law had established a distinction between enemy naval ships and enemy merchant vessels, with the latter granted protection from attacks. The Hague Conventions, to which forty-four countries agreed in 1907, included an article on the status of merchant ships following the outbreak of hostilities. It stipulated that “the belligerent may only detain it, without payment of compensation, but subject to the obligation of restoring it after the war, or requisition it on payment of compensation” and that “enemy merchant ships which left their last port of departure before the commencement of the war, and are encountered on the high seas while still ignorant of the outbreak of hostilities cannot be confiscated.”⁸

The Hague Convention became international customary law, the de facto legal baseline governing merchant shipping during armed conflict. This meant that “merchant ships, even those sailing under the flag of the enemy, are considered as civilian objects and manned by civilian crews, and so long as they maintain their proper role, are subject only to seizure as prize and subsequent condemnation in prize courts of the capturing belligerent. Only in special circumstances is the capturing power allowed to destroy the prize, and then only after removing the passengers, crew and ship’s papers to a place of safety.”⁹ Germany had, however, developed a submarine fleet. During World War I, these submarines set about attacking merchant vessels supplying the Allies. In the first months of 1917, following German submarine attacks on several US merchant ships, the United States declared war on Germany.¹⁰

In the years after World War I, states sought to further codify merchant vessels’ rights, which resulted in the London Protocol of 1936. By 1939, all of World War I’s combatant countries except Romania had joined the protocol, which stipulated

• A warship, whether surface vessel or submarine, may not sink or render incapable of navigation a merchant vessel without having first placed passengers, crew and ship’s papers in a place of safety. For this purpose the ship’s boats are not regarded as a place of safety unless the safety of the passengers and crew is assured, in the existing sea and weather conditions, by the proximity of land, or the presence of another vessel which is in a position to take them on board.¹¹

Even so, World War II saw regular attacks on merchant vessels. International customary law was simply ignored. As a result, some vessels sought to reduce the risk of attack by sailing under neutral countries’ flags (including the increasingly popular flag of Panama). As Robertson notes, both the Allies and the Axis powers attacked enemy merchant vessels—and sometimes even neutral merchant ships—and did so without ensuring the safety of the passengers, the crews, or the ships themselves, even though the protocol obliges warring parties to take such action.

• Both sides justified these practices either on the basis of reprisal (which in itself is an admission that absent the first violation by the other side, the practice is illegal under international law) or on assertions that the other side had incorporated its merchant fleet into the combatant force by mounting offensive weapons on the ships, convoying them, requiring them to report enemy submarine sightings, and ordering them to take offensive action against surfaced submarines.¹²

Toward and after the end of World War II, the world’s nations attempted to create a global system of rules and institutions, with the United Nations (UN) at its center. In addition to the United Nations itself, nations created the International Civil Aviation Organization, the Food and Agriculture Organization, the World Health Organization (WHO), and a string of other bodies. In 1948, they adopted the Convention on the International Maritime Organization and agreed to form the Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative Organization (IMCO). The name was later changed to the International Maritime Organization (IMO) and came into force ten years after its adoption. The organization’s statutes placed little emphasis on maritime security, focusing instead on promoting economic action in support of freedom and reducing discrimination in some countries.¹³ Article C, for example, states an IMCO aim “to provide for the consideration by the Organization of matters concerning unfair restrictive practices by shipping concerns.”¹⁴

Indeed, such was the desire for safe shipping among the world’s nations that a focus on security in the IMCO’s founding statute seemed unnecessary. Harm caused by pirates and criminals posed a problem, but even the most ideologically opposed governments agreed that shipping needed to be kept safe. Countries deliberately harming merchant vessels was no longer acceptable.

Even with the IMCO’s rules in place, ships continued to face considerable threats, but such threats came from criminals, terrorists, and malcontents. In 1961, a group led by Captain Henrique Galvao hijacked the Portuguese passenger ship Santa Maria in protest against the regime of Antonio de Salazar. In subsequent years, Cuban exile groups attacked Russian and Cuban merchant vessels, though they sometimes got the wrong ship, and the Palestinian terrorist group PLFP attacked vessels bound for Israeli ports. Groups with other causes similarly found shipping a convenient target. RAND researchers summarized the problem.

• Besides guerrillas and terrorists, attacks have been carried out by modern day pirates, ordinary criminals, fanatic environmentalists, mutinous crews, hostile workers, and foreign agents. The spectrum of actions is equally broad: ships hijacked, destroyed by mines and bombs, attacks with bazookas, sunk under mysterious circumstances; cargos removed; crews taken hostage; extortion plots against ocean liners and offshore platforms; raids on port facilities; attempts to board oil rigs; sabotage at shipyards and terminal facilities; even a plot to steal a nuclear submarine.¹⁵

The Tanker War received such global attention because it was an extremely rare example of nation-states targeting merchant vessels. The attacks created considerable risks for vessels beyond those linked to the two respective countries. “Like the Houthis today, the Iraqi and Iranian armed forces at that time weren’t always that accurate in their targeting,” noted Svein Ringbakken, a maritime executive with several decades in the business who now serves as managing director of the Norway-based maritime war insurer DNK.¹⁶ Of the vessels attacked, sixty-one sailed under the Liberian flag, forty-one under the flag of Panama, thirty-nine under the flag of Cyprus, and twenty-six under the flag of Greece. A number of other Western countries similarly saw vessels sailing under their flag attacked. Forty-six were Iranian flagged. Ringbakken added that “the ships that were going back and forth to [in the Gulf] were often attacked several times each, so the number of attacks were much higher than the 340 ships that were listed as having been attacked.” Had the merchant vessels carrying oil and other supplies through the Gulf been less sturdy, the human and material losses caused by the Tanker War would have been even more dramatic.

But not even during the height of the Cold War, in the 1960s and 1970s, did NATO or Warsaw Pact member states systematically seek to harm merchant vessels linked to the other side. NATO and Warsaw Pact countries indisputably acted unethically in other ways, but in the maritime domain they respected rules, conventions, and the neutrality of merchant shipping. They did so not least because they also depended on ships carrying goods to and from their countries being able to travel safely.

Indeed, when the attacks by terrorists and other non-state entities continued, the world’s nations convened to negotiate and adopt the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), the fifth version of global shipping’s cornerstone safety treaty, which governs the safety of the vessels themselves. (Previous versions had been adopted in 1914—in response to the Titanic disaster—and then in 1929, 1948, and 1960.)¹⁷ Five years later, in 1979, nations adopted the International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue (SAR), which entered into force in 1985. SAR governs the responsibilities of coastal states in maritime search and rescue; the 1979 version divided the world’s oceans into thirteen search-and-rescue regions and introduced the obligation for countries to operate rescue co-ordination centers on a twenty-four-hour basis with trained, English-speaking, staff.¹⁸

The crowning achievement of Cold War maritime agreements took place in 1982, when negotiators representing 160 nations adopted the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), the “constitution of the oceans.”¹⁹ UNCLOS covers crucial areas including exploitation of ocean and seabed resources, as well as maritime transit rights. Crucially, coastal states are given territorial rights over waters extending twelve nautical miles from their coastlines; foreign vessels have the right to sail through these waters under UNCLOS’s “innocent passage” provision. Coastal states are also given limited rights in the Exclusive Economic Zones extending another two hundred nautical miles beyond their territorial waters.²⁰

A rare case of apparently state-linked attacks on merchant shipping took place in 1984, when nearly twenty vessels transiting the Red Sea were struck by mines. Egyptian and Western authorities subsequently identified the Ghat, a Libyan-flagged merchant vessel, as the culprit. Libya’s motivation for the attacks appears to have been ruler Muammar al-Qaddafi’s desire to demonstrate what he punish other Arab regimes’ misguided policy of maintaining close relations with the West.²¹

From the early 1990s, the end of the Cold War and the beginning of more harmonious relations between crucial groupings of countries decreased geopolitically linked risk everywhere, including in shipping. Crucially, the end of the Cold War delivered an extraordinary rise in commercial relations between previously hostile countries. In addition, China had begun opening up its closed economy in the 1980s and was quickly becoming a manufacturing hub for Western companies. The rapidly growing trade and resulting globalization were facilitated by global shipping. Between 1990 and 2019, global shipping grew nearly threefold, from 4,008 million tons loaded to 11,076 million tons loaded.²²

During the 1990s and 2000s, and until the late 2010s, shipping had to contend with spikes in piracy attacks, but geopolitically linked attacks remained minimal. The few attacks that took place, most prominently an explosion on the French-flagged oil tanker Limburg off the coast of Yemen, were carried out by terrorists.²³ In Nigeria in the early 2000s, the Movement for the Development of the Niger Delta—a local militant group—kidnapped oil workers and attacked oil facilities and pipelines, though this was done in protest against inequalities in Nigeria.

The mostly peaceful period ended around 2019, when a proxy war targeting merchant vessels unfolded in the Strait of Hormuz, an indispensable body of water through which more than 20 percent of global petroleum travels.²⁴ In 2018, Donald Trump’s administration took the United States out of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), also known as the “Iran nuclear deal.” Soon after that, Iran began to regularly harass merchant vessels in the Strait of Hormuz. In a particularly high-profile incident, Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) seized the Swedish-owned, UK-flagged oil tanker Stena Impero passing through the Strait of Hormuz on July 19, 2019, and took the crew hostage.²⁵ Though the IRGC alleged that the tanker had struck a fishing boat and failed to obey IRGC instructions, there was no evidence of this. Since then, attacks on merchant vessels have continued. Merchant vessels sailing under flags ranging from those of Norway to the United Arab Emirates have been struck by mines, magnetic mines, and torpedoes.²⁶ In August 2023, the United States dispatched a naval and Marine force to the strait to “support deterrence efforts.”²⁷ By that point, there had been twenty attacks on merchant shipping in the strait since the beginning of 2021, including two on July 5, 2023, when Iranian naval vessels attempted to seize two oil tankers.²⁸ The US Navy and Marine presence appears to have succeeded in deterring the aggression, which subsided after the force’s arrival. As with all deterrence measures, though, it’s impossible to know whether the attackers had already been planning to reduce their aggression or whether the deterrence measures changed their cost-benefit calculus.

Threats to commercial vessels in the Black Sea, the Taiwan Strait, and the South China Sea

In early 2022, another threat to global shipping emerged when Russia deployed close to two hundred thousand troops to its border with Ukraine. It was clear that any invasion by Russia would also involve attacks on Ukraine’s Black Sea ports and on shipping in the Black Sea. In the weeks immediately following the invasion, several merchant vessels in Ukrainian waters and ports were struck in suspected Russian attacks. On February 25, for example, a tanker was struck by missiles. Two crew members were injured, and the crew was forced to abandon ship.²⁹ On March 2, a Bangladeshi seafarer was killed when a shell hit his vessel in the Ukrainian port of Olvia.³⁰ In addition, when Russia invaded, ships crewed by some 800–1,000 seafarers were docked in seven Ukrainian ports and, in practice, unable to leave. Being stuck in Ukrainian ports, of course, made them an easy target for Russian attacks and also raised the risk of their becoming collateral damage of attacks against other targets.³¹ “There were more than 90 vessels [stuck in Ukrainian ports] to start with, and during the [UN-negotiated grain] Corridor [between Russia and Ukraine that allowed ships carrying grain to leave Ukrainian ports, traveling through a Black Sea corridor on to international destinations], about 30 got out. We ended up with around 65 claims for total loss,” said Neil Roberts, the secretary of the maritime insurance industry’s Joint War Committee, which lists international waters according to risk level.³²

Shipping in the Taiwan Strait has been similarly threatened, but has not yet been attacked. When, in April 2023, President Tsai Ing-wen of Taiwan met with US Speaker of the House Kevin McCarthy in California, Beijing registered its displeasure by launching an offensive military exercise targeting Taiwan and sending a coast guard “inspection flotilla” to the Taiwan Strait. The strait is the main passage for cargo moving between Southeast Asia and Japan, South Korea, and northern China, which makes it one of the world’s busiest maritime thoroughfares; some 240–500 ships per day, including nearly nine in ten of the world’s largest container vessels, pass through the strait on an average day.³³ Beijing, which considers Taiwan a region of China, argues it has “sovereignty and jurisdiction” over the strait, while Taiwan and countries including the United States consider it international waters divided along the strait’s unofficial median line.

By threatening to inspect ships passing through the strait, on the basis of legal powers not recognized by Taiwan and large parts of the international community, China would be able to severely disrupt shipping in the strait and, thus, cause considerable problems for shipping globally. Yet, the deployment of an inspection flotilla—whether or not it carries out any inspections—hardly reaches the threshold where the US Navy or another navy would consider it necessary to intervene. In its law-enforcement scope of inspections of merchant vessels (albeit on Taiwan’s side of the median line), China’s inspection flotilla differs from the overtly aggressive actions China’s coast guard, maritime militia, long-distance fishing fleet, and other maritime entities take. All, though, constitute a risk to civilian vessels. Roberts noted

• China has long been “leaning in” via its fishing fleet, and it’s been building all these little islands in the South China Sea. The Chinese government issues white papers to float their ideas, for example saying they’ll allow their Coast Guard to fire on all vessels in their territorial waters. And if nobody reacts, then they make it policy. Whilst the littoral states do not agree, they’re up against a huge nation and there’s no one in the area who’s in a position to react. That comparative disparity is what China has leveraged in deploying the inspection flotilla to the Taiwan Strait.³⁴

In addition, China’s maritime militia, coast guard, and long-distance fishing fleet habitually harass vessels, including civilian ones. These activities are of particular concern in the South China Sea, through which approximately one-third of global trade travels, as China claims some 90 percent of these waters under its “nine-dash line” policy.³⁵ These practices, which will be analyzed in a subsequent report as part of the Atlantic Council’s Maritime Threats project, are not specifically targeted against shipping but instead target a wide range of vessels, including civilian ones. Survey vessels sailing under the flags of Norway and Vietnam, for example, have been harassed by a combination of Chinese vessels.³⁶ Since the beginning of the 2020s, the harassment has increased significantly, creating an environment of heightened uncertainty and risk for merchant vessels. This uncertainty is heightened because it’s entirely unclear how coastal states and de facto protectors of the global maritime order, most notably the US Navy, can deter such activities. As Ringbakken noted

• China has its Navy, it has its Coast Guard and it has the militia and the fishing boats and this kind of crossover between the fishing boats and the militia, which is a strange construct. And China has a long-term perspective. These small skirmishes and the small transgressions are not viewed as an attempt to undercut the global maritime regime, but that’s what they are. It’s what you might call the Chinese water torture method. Any kind of countermeasure from the Americans or others would seem disproportionate. The activity is just merely little bit out of normal and not like what the Houthis are doing in the Red Sea, and that makes responding even harder. You don’t send a naval group to try to stop this kind of behavior because it seems too minor. So it goes on.³⁷

The US military has come to much the same conclusion. “It’s getting more aggressive, they’re getting more bold and it’s getting more dangerous,” Admiral John Aquilino told media in late April 2024, shortly before handing over command of the US Indo-Pacific Command. He added that China was increasing its aggression through a “boiling the frog” strategy. “There needs to be a continual description of China’s bad behavior that is outside legal international norms,” he noted. “And that story has to be told by all the nations in the region.”³⁸

Indeed, China’s maritime harassment can easily be expanded to target many more cargo ships, in addition to the fishing vessels and supply vessels that have until now been the most frequently targeted categories. In the area of unilateral inspection flotillas , if the flotilla that was dispatched during Tsai’s visit to California were to be followed by similar measures, shipping companies and their insurers would need to assess whether it’s worth sending vessels through the Taiwan Strait. “Even if the US Navy wanted to intervene, it would be seen a gross intrusion, and it could spark something far worse. The merchant ships are on their own,” Roberts noted.³⁹ Ships don’t need to go through the strait to reach destinations other than Taiwan; they can simply travel along Taiwan’s eastern coast. That route, however, would render them unable to call at Taiwan’s main port—the massive Port of Kaohsiung—or the Port of Taipei. This is what makes a blockade of Taiwan, whether executed by the China Coast Guard, the People’s Liberation Army Navy, China’s maritime militia, or a combination of the three, possibly with other entities also involved, such a troubling scenario.⁴⁰ “What would happen to Taiwan if ships don’t call at its ports? Well, ultimately the people of Taiwan will starve ,” Roberts said. “But shipowners have to focus on crew welfare and they’d just go around [east of Taiwan] and take a bit more fuel. It’s really difficult.”⁴¹

Houthi attacks on merchant vessels: A new form of aggression

On November 19, 2023, armed commandos belonging to the Yemeni Houthi militia stormed the Galaxy Leader, a Bahamas-flagged roll-on, roll-off (RORO) carrier traveling through the Red Sea near the Yemeni port of Hodeida. The commandos, who filmed themselves arriving in a helicopter, took the twenty-five-strong crew hostage and directed the Galaxy Leader to Hodeida and then the port of Al Saleef, which is also controlled by the Houthis.⁴² The Galaxy Leader had apparently been targeted because it is part-owned by Israeli national Abraham “Rami” Ungar, though his firm is registered in the United Kingdom.

“The Yemeni Naval Forces managed to capture an Israeli ship in the depths of the Red Sea taking it to the Yemeni coast. The Yemeni armed forces deal with the ship’s crew in accordance with the principle and values of our Islamic religion,” Houthi spokesman Yahya Sare’e declared on X on the same day.

• The Yemeni armed forces reiterate their warning to all ships belonging to or dealing with the Israeli enemy that they will become a legitimate target for armed forces. […] Yemeni armed forces confirm that they will continue to carry out military operations against the Israeli enemy until the aggression against Gaza stops and the heinous acts against our Palestinian brothers in Gaza and the West Bank stop…If the international community is concerned about regional security and stability, rather than expanding the conflict, it should put an end to Israel’s aggression against Gaza.⁴³

“All ships belonging to the Israeli enemy or that deal with it will become legitimate targets,” the Houthis added in a statement after the hijack.⁴⁴ The opportunistic labeling of the attacks as being an act of support for the people of Gaza was a clever move by the Houthis, gaining the attacks attention far beyond the global maritime community and gaining the Houthis sympathy for their actions among the public in countries troubled by Gazans’ plight. It also made any response by the United States and other Western countries geopolitically fraught. A few days later, assailants identified as Houthis attacked the Israel-linked tanker Central Park in the Gulf of Aden, the body of water that leads into the Red Sea.⁴⁵ On December 3, the Houthis attacked three additional vessels.⁴⁶

The attacks continued, though the targeted vessels’ alleged Israeli links were not always clear or even existent. On December 9, the militia expanded its scope, saying it would also target ships headed for Israeli ports. Two days later, it hit the Strinda, a tanker owned, managed, and flagged in Norway and crewed by Indians, which the Houthis said was headed for Israel, though the owner said the tanker was bound for Italy.⁴⁷

On December 15, a Houthi drone struck the Liberian-flagged Al Jasrah and two Houthi missiles struck the MSC Palatium III, which was also sailing under Liberian flag; both were thought to be headed for Israeli ports. On the same day, the Houthis threatened another Liberian-flagged vessel, the MSC Alanya, and told it to turn around.⁴⁸ “The Houthis’ targeting mechanism wasn’t that good, or their intelligence wasn’t entirely up to speed,” Ringbakken said. “And we don’t know for sure whether that was by chance or whether they didn’t mind a little bit of collateral damage because that got them more attention.”⁴⁹

Indeed, the Houthis appear to have decided to make necessity into an extraordinary virtue. Instead of having to conduct painstaking research into vessels’ complex ownership and management structure, and their cargo’s provenance and destination, the Houthis—while declaring that they were targeting Israeli-linked vessels—attacked a range of merchant vessels in the Red Sea, the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, and the Gulf of Aden. That, of course, has made the waters unsafe for vessels form all countries, though the Houthis appear to consistently have exempted vessels linked to Russia and China. Retired Rear Admiral Nils Wang, a former chief of the Danish Navy, noted the following.

• It’s instructive to compare the Houthis’ attacks to the piracy of the Horn of Africa [that was particularly frequent in the early 2010s]. With the pirates off the Horn of Africa, the intimidation of international shipping was the same. That made launching a counter-piracy operation straightforward. Everybody, including China, Pakistan, Iran, everybody was of the opinion that this piracy had to be stopped. Indeed, the military operations against piracy at that time were probably the biggest multinational military operation that has ever taken place, if you count on how many countries, regions, and continents were involved. Everyone agreed that the piracy had to be stopped. If you then compare that to the situation now in the Red Sea, the Houthis only seem to be targeting ships linked to the West, not to Russia and China. And it’s only the Western world that is intervening to protect the ships there.⁵⁰

By pure coincidence, the IMO Assembly—the IMO’s governing body—was scheduled to hold its biannual meeting in late November and December 2023. Various items had been submitted for consideration by the assembly, including measures to prevent the growing dark fleet.⁵¹Unsurprisingly, the Houthis’ attacks received urgent attention. The Bahamas, the world’s eighth-largest flag state, criticized the Houthis’ attacks on merchant vessel as a “violation of all of the norms relating to innocent passage of ships.”⁵² And, referring to the Houthis, the country added, “Here we have non-state actors so who do you hold responsible?”

That is the dilemma posed by the Houthis’ novel campaign against shipping. The militia attacks ships ostensibly for geopolitical reasons, and it’s backed by a nation-state, but it’s not an official government. The militia is also linked to Iran but doesn’t officially represent this country either. “That makes it difficult to make this a matter between a hostile country and other countries, but at the same time, the Houthis are a completely different category from pirates and other opportunistic attackers without government links,” Wang said.⁵³

It should, therefore, come as no surprise that Western governments have struggled to formulate strategies to deter the attacks.

International response to the Houthis’ attacks

On December 18, the United States announced the establishment of Operation Prosperity Guardian, a naval task force comprising the United States, the United Kingdom, Bahrain, Canada, Denmark, France, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, the Seychelles, Spain, and several other nations, amounting to a total of twenty countries.⁵⁴ Some opted not to divulge their participation out of concern that doing so could increase the risks for their countries. “The recent escalation in reckless Houthi attacks originating from Yemen threatens the free flow of commerce, endangers innocent mariners, and violates international law,” US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin said in the press release announcing the task force. “The Red Sea is a critical waterway that has been essential to freedom of navigation and a major commercial corridor that facilitates international trade. Countries that seek to uphold the foundational principle of freedom of navigation must come together to tackle the challenge posed by this non-state actor launching ballistic missiles and uncrewed aerial vehicles (UAVs) at merchant vessels from many nations lawfully transiting international waters.”⁵⁵

Operation Prosperity Guardian is set up as “highway patrol in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden” with the task of averting attacks on merchant vessels, not punishing the Houthis.⁵⁶ It will “respond to and assist as necessary commercial vessels that are transiting this vital international waterway,” Pentagon spokesman Major General Pat Ryder said in a briefing on December 21.⁵⁷ “It’s a defensive coalition meant to reassure global shipping and mariners that the international community is there to help with safe passage.”⁵⁸

Prosperity Guardian is a fitting name for a naval coalition tasked with thwarting the attacks on merchant vessels in the Red Sea and the adjacent Bab el-Mandeb Strait and Gulf of Aden. The water forms a crucial thoroughfare in the globalized economy; under normal circumstances, some 15 percent of global maritime trade passes through it.⁵⁹ Indeed, in deciding to attack shipping, the Houthis have opted for the form of aggression that would yield by far the most global disruption and attention.

Since December 19, Prosperity Guardian’s members have escorted merchant vessels with links to a wide range of countries (not just the countries involved in the operation). They have also regularly thwarted attacks. This is deterrence by denial: by denying the attackers the gain they seek, the defenders are changing the attackers’ cost-benefit calculus. “You always have the right to self-defense,” Wang noted. “So if you are shot at, you or your defenders can shoot back. That’s mandate for all the ships participating in Prosperity Guardian: they can shoot as soon as they see any threat emerging.”⁶⁰

Retired Vice Admiral Andrew Lewis, who until 2021 commanded the US Navy’s Second Fleet and in an earlier posting commanded the US Navy’s Carrier Strike Group 12, described the situation as follows.

• The Houthis’ attacks are essentially a culmination of the threats we’ve seen over the past 15 years. At the beginning of that period, we broadly saw terrorist and piracy threats. As things progressed, we saw the Houthis become more active. As recently as nine years ago, when I was a carrier strike group commander, we were intercepting Iranian convoys of dhows that were transiting to either Oman or Yemen to go to Yemen with the weaponry the Houthis are now using to target vessels in the Red Sea and Bab el-Mandeb Strait. For a period of time, we intercepted these convoys and forced them to turn around, so the equipment wasn’t flowing through, but they continued to build up that capability, and that is the result we’re seeing now.⁶¹

The fact that there was no global body policing Iran’s shipments of weapons through the Red Sea thus became the source of the dramatic threats to shipping in the Red Sea once the Houthis acquired enough weaponry to launch their attacks.

Indeed, despite the launch of Prosperity Guardian, the Houthis’ attacks accelerated. On December 26, for example, US naval vessels and aircraft in the Red Sea shot down twelve one-way attack drones, three anti-ship ballistic missiles, and two land-attack cruise missiles within a period of ten hours.⁶² Such lack of success would convince a conventional adversary to give up. But the novel aspect of the Houthis’ campaign against shipping is not just their comparatively modern weaponry (including the fact that they’re the first non-state group to have fired anti-ship ballistic missiles) but also that the ability to harm merchant vessels is secondary in their cost-benefit calculus. “The difference between piracy and the Houthis is that piracy is criminality. It’s to make money,” said retired Vice Admiral Duncan Potts, who until 2018 was the UK armed forces’ director general of joint force development and previously commanded the EU’s ATALANTA counter-piracy mission. “And like any other business model, if the cost and the risk gets too high, you just move elsewhere. But for the Houthis the attacks are not about money.”⁶³ The Houthis’ priority is not even to sink vessels, which is what a traditional adversary attacking vessels would intend. Instead, their top priority has turned out to be to gain global attention and to cause fear among shipping companies, their insurers, and their customers, and thus to gain a global platform.

The Houthis’ cost-benefit calculus also differs from that of the West’s traditional adversaries, as they primarily use cheap drones and missiles. An often-quoted cost per Houthi missile is $2,000. Simon Lockwood, head of shipowners at Willis Towers Watson, noted that it is these weapons’ relative lack of sophistication that—together with the Houthis’ sloppy research—causes the most fear in the shipping industry. “How do you cause a massive amount of disruption? You just create that level of uncertainty that causes companies in the maritime industry to say, ‘we can’t go into the Red Sea,’” he said. “If I were that way inclined, I would laud the Houthis’ ability to create absolute mayhem with relatively unsophisticated weapons, just to scare off merchant vessels.”⁶⁴

However, the Houthis’ current weapons are a significant improvement from the weaponry used by militias in the early 2000s. The Limburg was attacked by a suicide bomber driving an explosive-laden small boat into the vessel’s hull. Today, by contrast, the Houthis have sophisticated missiles as well as relatively simple drones. “Improvements in technology are a key reason these attacks are happening,” Ringbakken noted. “When I started in this job and even ten years into the job, my experts were telling me that for groups of terrorists and others to hit a moving target like a vessel is extremely difficult. Now the Houthis have proved that it’s quite easy. There’s technological development in targeting technology that has made it possible for groups like the Houthis to drag their equipment around on a lorry and then target and hit a ship far away out in the sea. That was not possible a decade ago.”⁶⁵ Even the best of these missiles and drones don’t reach the technological sophistication of those used by first-rate armed forces, and the Houthis’ drones only hit ships randomly. But the combination is powerful. “The Houthis’ weapons are a mix of very, very advanced missiles and very, very cheap drones. It’s dangerous cocktail,” Wang said.⁶⁶ The fact that a non-state group that has signed no maritime conventions and feels bound by no maritime rules has access to this dangerous cocktail is a serious threat to global shipping.

Indeed, the drones and missiles cause fear among shipping companies, and thwarting them requires far more sophisticated—and far more expensive—technology. Offensive missiles don’t need to be very precise, at least if the attacker’s objective is not to harm specific targets. By contrast, defensive missiles—whose task is to shoot down the offensive missiles—must be extremely precise. US Navy defensive missiles cost, on average, between $1.5 million and $2.5 million each.⁶⁷ For the Houthis, $2,000-a-piece missiles supplied by Iran are a bargain, especially because the missiles spread fear in the shipping industry, regardless of whether they hit their intended target.

Despite Operation Prosperity Guardian’s efforts, the Red Sea has become too risky for many shipping lines and their insurers. By late December 2023, shipping traffic through the Red Sea had decreased by nearly 20 percent.⁶⁸ On January 3, the United States, UK, Germany, Italy, South Korea, and several other Western countries (and, again, Bahrain) issued a stern statement, warning the Houthis of consequences should the attacks continue:

• Ongoing Houthi attacks in the Red Sea are illegal, unacceptable, and profoundly destabilizing. There is no lawful justification for intentionally targeting civilian shipping and naval vessels. Attacks on vessels, including commercial vessels, using unmanned aerial vehicles, small boats, and missiles, including the first use of anti-ship ballistic missiles against such vessels, are a direct threat to the freedom of navigation that serves as the bedrock of global trade in one of the world’s most critical waterways. These attacks threaten innocent lives from all over the world and constitute a significant international problem that demands collective action.⁶⁹

The Houthis—logically, according to their cost-benefit calculus—responded with a highly complex attack comprising Iranian-designed one-way attack drones, anti-ship cruise missiles, and an anti-ship ballistic missile.⁷⁰ Shooting them down required the efforts of F/A-18s from USS Dwight D. Eisenhower, USS Gravely (DDG 107), USS Laboon (DDG 58), USS Mason (DDG 87), and the Royal Navy’s HMS Diamond (D34).⁷¹ The fact that Iran supplies the drones and missiles and, in some cases, intelligence to the Houthis, is well-known both to maritime executives and to Western militaries. It would, however, be legally dubious and highly risky for Western armed forces to militarily punish Iran for the Houthis’ attacks. “The maritime domain is unfortunately a welcome arena for escalation without making it state to state,” Ringbakken said.⁷²

Indeed, the Houthis have demonstrated that they can keep escalating because the United States and other Western allies are loath to retaliate against Iran. On January 11, the United States and UK, supported by Australia, Bahrain, Canada, and the Netherlands—operating as part of a new coalition operating in parallel with Prosperity Guardian—launched strikes against Houthi targets in Yemen. “These strikes are in direct response to unprecedented Houthi attacks against international maritime vessels in the Red Sea—including the use of anti-ship ballistic missiles for the first time in history,” President Joe Biden said in a statement. “These attacks have endangered US personnel, civilian mariners, and our partners, jeopardized trade, and threatened freedom of navigation.”⁷³ Further strikes have followed; by the end of February, the United States and the UK had carried out strikes on an almost daily basis.⁷⁴

Not even this punishment has convinced the Houthis to end their attacks. In early 2024, they instead expanded the scope of their attacks, targeting vessels linked to the United States and the UK in addition to those linked to Israel. On January 18, for example, they launched two anti-ship ballistic missiles against a Marshall Islands-flagged, US-owned, Greek-operated tanker.⁷⁵ Since then, the United States and the Prosperity Guardian allies have thwarted Houthi drones, missiles, and anti-ship missile attacks on an almost daily basis, while the US- and UK-led strike coalition has continued its strikes against strategic installations in Houthi-held Yemeni territory.⁷⁶

As before, the Houthis decide what constitutes links to the countries concerned, which puts every vessel at risk of attack. “We can disagree with them and argue that a ship they’ve attacked is not linked to one of these three countries, but once the rocket has hit your ship, it’s too late,” Ringbakken noted.⁷⁷ Lockwood added, “US links, UK links, Israeli links: that’s rubbish. The attacks are about targeting shipping for effect, and it’s crippling shipping.”⁷⁸ By April 2024, sixty-five countries’ interests had been affected by the campaign, according to the US Defense Intelligence Agency.⁷⁹ Only ships linked to Russia and China have appeared safe. Indeed, in an effort to keep their vessels safe, by the beginning of 2024 some captains had adopted a strategy of incorrectly communicating to the Houthis that they had an all-Chinese crew. On February 19, the EU announced the formation of another naval mission in the Red Sea. Operation Aspides, comprising France, Germany, Italy, and Belgium, would protect merchant vessels alongside Prosperity Guardian and the strike coalition.⁸⁰ The Houthis, meanwhile, appeared to continue sparing any vessels linked to Russia and China.⁸¹

By March 2024, forty merchant vessels had been successfully attacked, thirty-four of which had sustained damage.⁸² A few weeks later, the rate of Houthi attacks appeared to have slowed. “Their pace of operations is not what it was,” US Air Force Lieutenant General Alexus Grynkewich, the top US Air Force commander for the Middle East, told a press conference.⁸³ Grynkewich attributed the slowdown to the effect of the US strikes, which had curtailed the Houthis’ arsenal of drones and missiles.⁸⁴ Crucially, despite a reduced arsenal, the Houthis appeared undeterred and kept up their missile and drone strikes. The US Central Command, communicating through its Twitter (X), reported Houthi attacks on a near-daily basis.⁸⁵ Yet the United States seemed to have little confidence the strikes would fundamentally improve security for Red Sea shipping. Grynkewich told reporters that Iran’s continued supply of weapons was a “complicating factor.”

Indeed, in the second half of April, the attacks increased again. On April 26, for example, the Houthis launched three anti-ship ballistic missiles from Yemen into the Red Sea, where they nearly hit one vessel and struck another, an apparently erroneously targeted suspected shadow vessel.⁸⁶ By the end of the month, the US Navy and allies had shot down Houthi drones and missiles or struck Houthi installations around 130 times, according to publicly known numbers.⁸⁷ An exact figure of how many vessels have been targeted by the Houthis is impossible to establish, precisely because the Houthi attacks are vague and may not always hit a vessel, though the attacks are always successful in spreading fear.⁸⁸ Without Prosperity Guardian’s defense of merchant vessels, the harm to vessels would, of course, be far more extensive. The number of vessels available to attack had also dropped significantly as Western-linked vessels’ owners were diverting them to the Cape of Good Hope route. By the end of February, traffic in the Suez Canal (and thus the Red Sea) had dropped by 50 percent.⁸⁹ By contrast, Red Sea traffic by Chinese merchant vessels rose by 73 percent between October 2023 and March 2024, compared to the same period one year earlier.⁹⁰ “The fact that you’ve got so many ships now avoiding the area tells you everything,” said Guy Platten, secretary general of the International Chamber of Shipping. “We absolutely welcome Operation Prosperity Guardian and the EU naval forces, because their presence does provide some sort of protection, but you can’t get every ship. But what does this mean for seafarers? These ships have crews, they’re not just inanimate objects. Nobody wants to risk their lives, and owners also have a responsibility and a duty of care for the seafarers on their ships.”⁹¹

The attacks have an effect on seafarers far beyond the ones working on vessels that have been struck by the Houthis—and, thus, on the globalized economy. “Shipping depends absolutely on its crew,” Roberts noted. “People have compared being a member of crew to being in prison, but with worse internet. It’s just not a great life. They don’t get many breaks, they get criminalized at the drop of a hat. It’s really not very attractive. And then on top of that, now you’ve got attacks on vessels. If you haven’t got crew and you haven’t got security, then the supply chain isn’t going to work for you. There’s got to be some serious thought given to this. If the crews don’t want to go, then nothing happens.”⁹²

Indeed, the global shortage of seafarers is becoming so severe that, if not enough of them are willing to crew ships having to pass through perilous waters, ships risk being unable to leave port. “There’s a limited number of people in our navies who could be drafted in to help on commercial ships,” Roberts said. “And would they be willing or able or allowed to do that? Governments would have to set priorities and start with the oil tankers and absolutely vital food. Luxury goods traveling on container ships, not so much. What is the appetite for consumer goods when you’ve got a threatened environment?”⁹³

The Houthis have continued their attacks despite paying a significantly higher price, measured in damaged or destroyed infrastructure in Houthi-held Yemeni territory. By April 2024, the militia appeared to have expanded its campaign into the Indian Ocean, to which the Gulf of Aden’s eastern end is connected but which is located several hundred nautical miles from the Red Sea. On April 26, the militia struck the MSC Orion, a container ship sailing under the flag of Madeira, off the coast of Somalia.⁹⁴

Then, on May 2, the militia announced it was expanding its attacks to the eastern Mediterranean. “We will target any ships heading to Israeli ports in the Mediterranean Sea in any area we are able to reach,” Houthi military spokesman General Yahya Saree said. He added that the decision would be implemented “immediately, and from the moment this statement is announced.”⁹⁵ By the end of June, no such attacks had occurred, but the Houthis kept up their attacks in the Red Sea and surrounding waters and expanded their arsenal. On May 13, EUNAVFOR Aspides reported that it had escorted 100 vessels since its inception less than three months earlier.⁹⁶ On May 28, the Marshall Islands-flagged bulk carrier Laax was hit—twice.⁹⁷ In June, the Antigua and Barbuda-flagged cargo ship Norderney was hit.⁹⁸ Five days later, a Liberia-flagged, Greek-owned coal carrier was hit so badly that its crew had to be evacuated, with one member unaccounted for.⁹⁹ Two days after that, another vessel reported two explosions nearby—apparent failed attempts to hit it.¹⁰⁰ As the attacks continued, the Houthis expanded their arsenal. On June 23, the militia reported having attacked a Liberia-flagged bulk carrier, this time using not flying drones or missiles but an uncrewed boat (which can also be referred to as a waterborne drone).¹⁰¹ Four days later, another Houthi uncrewed boat attacked a vessel, this time a Malta-flagged bunker.¹⁰² The Houthis’ use of uncrewed boats continued in July. On July 20, for example, an uncrewed boat appearing to be loaded with explosives approached a Liberian-flagged vessel the Houthis subsequently described as American. Armed guards onboard the merchant vessel managed to repel the attack.¹⁰³ In the subsequent 24 hours, US forces destroyed four such boats.¹⁰⁴ DNK and other maritime companies had been predicting this expansion, especially because the Houthis were already using airborne drones. The expansion also continued along the path of ever more sophistication. On June 26, the Houthis claimed to have struck another vessel with a hypersonic missile, a highly sophisticated weapon heretofore not used by militias.¹⁰⁵

Because modern merchant vessels are sturdy, even the successful attacks caused mostly minor material damage. They did, however, have a human toll. At the time of writing, the attacks have cost four seafarers their lives, and many seafarers whose ships were attacked have been left traumatized.¹⁰⁶ On June 25, the Philippines—the world’s leading provider of seafarers—announced it was considering banning its nationals from serving on vessels transiting the Red Sea.¹⁰⁷ While such plans are hardly surprising, they will further harm Western ships, as Philippine seafarers overwhelmingly crew Western-linked vessels, while Russian and Chinese vessels are primarily crewed by Russian and Chinese nationals.

The attacks have also continued to illustrate the Houthis’ inaccuracy in targeting (and their faulty due diligence). On April 26, for example, they struck the Andromeda Star, a vessel owned in the UK, flagged in Panama, and operated in the Seychelles.¹⁰⁸ On May 18, they struck the M/T Wind, a Greek-owned, Panamanian-flagged oil tanker. The two were, however, hardly Western vessels; they’re part of the dark fleet carrying Russian oil. In another illustrative turn of events, Western coalition ships in the Red Sea came to their aid.¹⁰⁹

Measured in the cost-benefit term of vessels hit by strikes compared to losses and damage to the attacker side, the Houthis’ campaign has, as we have seen, largely been a failure. Indeed, traditional armed forces would likely have ceased their attacks after such an increase on the cost side of the cost-benefit calculus. Yet the Houthis have not only kept up their campaign but expanded it. This again illustrates how the Yemeni militia reacts differently than traditional armed forces because it uses a different cost-benefit calculus. From the Houthis’ perspective, the benefit is not the number of vessels destroyed or severely damaged, but the inordinate global attention and power the attacks generate. The militia appears to measure cost purely in monetary expenses for its weaponry, and that cost is modest. In the Houthis’ calculus, the cost in number of targets missed, environmental damage in Yemeni waters, and infrastructure destroyed by US-UK airstrikes appears to be marginal. Attacks on shipping “are a great weapon that can be used, for want of a better expression, to prevent or effect change in a particular area or cause damage to other nations and to shift the order of the world,” Lockwood said. “That’s the real danger that we face with the Houthis.¹¹⁰” Captain (Navy) Niels Markussen, the director of NATO’s Shipping Center, added

• The Houthis’ capability appears to have been reduced to around 50 percent as we speak [in March 2024], but they still have the will to continue as long as we’re not taking over their territory with land forces, which we’d have to do to prevent them from using their coastline to launch attacks. Western and allied navies can do what they’re doing right now, they can lie outside the coast and they can protect ships, they can shoot down the drones and the missiles that are coming out, but some of these drones and missiles will get through, meaning that the Red Sea is not safe for shipping. We cannot guarantee safe passage through the Red Sea. And it’s that uncertainty that they will keep using against us.¹¹¹

The Houthis are so illustrative because they’re not a one-off campaign but represent a triply new threat to shipping. The militia is not an officially recognized state and doesn’t operate according to the same calculus as traditional armed forces. At the same time, it’s linked to a government that supplies it with a range of weaponry, including highly sophisticated kinds. Because the Houthis’ objective is to wreak havoc on Western-linked merchant shipping, it matters little how successful their strikes are. What’s more, because global trade is so intense, they can wreak havoc on not just shipping, but on the globalized economy. Wang summarized the predicament facing Western nations, the default protectors of global shipping.

• Is the Western defense against incoming missiles sustainable? When you’re using two-million-dollar missiles to shoot down a drone worth a few hundred dollars, there’s a long-term problem. Of course, if you are attacked by a ballistic missile, you need to engage it with a very advanced missile. That’s the only way you can counter it. But the combination of advanced missiles and very, very cheap weapons is basically drawing resources from the Western coalition at a pace that’s not sustainable in the long run. When it comes to drones, it takes a lot of courage to wait and to engage a drone when it comes into gun range, which would be the cheap way of doing it. But if you have a warship worth a billion dollars, you need to engage the drone or missile as soon as you can in order to cope with the threat as far out as possible. So you will have to waste expensive missiles on drones in order to be safe on board. And that raises, you could say, a technological challenge that you have on warships today because all warships are filled with advanced missiles. That has been the rule of the game because to engage a peer adversary you need advanced missiles and you also need to have precision deep strike capability to engage the enemy ashore from the sea. So that part is still valid. But you need another way of dealing with cheap drones that is coming towards you.¹¹²

Indeed, as Wang had predicted, the Biden administration appeared to conclude that the Houthis—with their fundamentally different cost-benefit calculus—could not be defeated militarily. In April, the US government appeared to be trying to find a diplomatic solution with the Houthis. One such solution involved removing the designation as a terrorist group, which the United States had imposed in January 2024, in a quid pro quo that would see the Houthis cease their attacks. “We would certainly study that but not assume it’s an automatic thing,” Tim Lenderking, President Biden’s special envoy for Yemen, told news media.¹¹³

The shipping industry’s response

The shipping industry (including shipping lines and insurers) possesses centuries-long experience assessing new and growing threats. Lloyd’s Market Association, a large marketplace for underwriters, traces its origins to Edward Lloyd’s coffeehouse in central London, where from 1688 seafarers, bankers, and underwriters met to discuss business. Today the insurance industry maintains bodies like the Joint War Committee (JWC), which operates a list of so-called listed areas. In regular meetings and emergency sessions, the JWC’s members assess risky waters. The most dangerous ones are “listed,” which means that shipping operators must clear passage with their insurers before sending their vessels through them. About a week before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the JWC listed Russia’s and Ukraine’s parts of the Black Sea, as well as the Sea of Azov. In mid-December, the JWC expanded its listed parts of the Red Sea.¹¹⁴

Red-flagging bodies of water is a logical measure for the shipping industry: it creates a common basis on which a critical mass of the industry can act. The JWC’s listing of Black Sea waters and the Sea of Azov was followed by Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine , which left no doubt that sailing through these waters was inadvisable.¹¹⁵ In cases short of war, where the case for not sailing may be less obvious, the listed designation prompts shipping companies and insurers to approach perilous waters with caution, which creates a somewhat unified industry response.

This is what has taken place since the Houthis’ hijacking of the Galaxy Leader. Some shipping companies have diverted all their ships away from the Red Sea to the route around the Cape of Good Hope, which adds some 10–12 days to a vessel’s journey and added logistical complexity involving the reception and delivery of cargo and arrival and departure of crews. Other shipping lines have diverted some of their vessels. In late March 2023, the Bab el-Mandeb Strait had a seven-day moving average of thirty-one vessels; one year earlier, the seven-day moving average was seventy-six vessels.¹¹⁶ In early April 2023, the Cape of Good Hope had a seven-day moving average of forty-three vessels; by early March 2024, the seven-day moving average was seventy-eight vessels.¹¹⁷

Avoiding risky waters is a feasible strategy in the short term, but it doesn’t solve the problem of the Houthis and other state-linked outfits targeting shipping. “If you just look at these rebels, whether their actions are backed by Iran or not, the impact they’re having on not just shipping in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, but on global trade generally, is substantial,” Lockwood said. “It will lead to shortages, and it will have an inflationary impact on trade. It will also lead to opportunism among people who see an opportunity to push prices.”¹¹⁸

Indeed, the attacks will create a contentious debate across the shipping sector (and its clients) about what added costs are acceptable—the alternative being to stop shipping goods altogether—and who should pay for them. “You have commercial pressures,” Ringbakken noted. “You have cars on the way from China to be launched in the European market and [the client] saying, ‘you have to get the cars to the market.’ But as insurers, we have to assess the risk, and if the risk increases we increase the premiums, which increases the costs.”¹¹⁹ The costs haven’t become prohibitive, meaning they are not so high that customers opt not to ship their goods.

• It’s quite expensive to go around the Cape, and the Egyptians are pretty good at calculating what the cost is to go through the Suez Canal. As an example, if you have a 65-million-dollar tanker [a tanker insured for a value of $65 million], that’s our average ship going through [the Red Sea and the Suez Canal]. She will pay one million dollars to go through the canal and it would pay $650,000 in war risk premium to go through. That makes it slightly cheaper to go around the Cape, but it’s also 16 days more.¹²⁰

By contrast, Chinese-owned and Chinese-flagged vessels, which are under no threat of attack, don’t face additional premiums in the Red Sea.

Indeed, it may only be when the number of total losses—vessels sunk or rendered unusable—begins accumulating that the Western shipping industry and maritime insurers will collectively opt out of the Red Sea route. By May 2024, there had been two total losses resulting from the Houthis’ attacks. Had modern vessels not been so sturdy, the total losses would have been significantly higher. And, added Ringbakken, “there’s of course a duty of care for the crew, and at some point most operators will have realized that there is a chance if not of being targeted at least of being subject to collateral damage.”¹²¹ Rerouting to the Cape of Good Hope, however, also brings additional expense. By April 2024, ports along the cape route had also reached, and in many cases surpassed, capacity as a result of the sudden influx of ships. As a result, vessels calling at these ports frequently need to wait for a berth, and storage yards struggle to handle the cargo.¹²²

The Houthis’ campaign against shipping is, in fact, brilliantly executed gray zone aggression (sometimes referred to as hybrid aggression). It causes real harm to the entities, people, and countries targeted, but—because it’s not a military aggression by a government—the targeted countries struggle to respond. The peril posed by the Houthis is not just that shipping in the Red Sea will continue to be dangerous. Their campaign also sends the message that the global maritime order is crumbling and those violating its rules can do so with impunity.

The lesson other militias and hostile states are likely to draw from the Houthi campaign is that a militia or hostile state can cause immense and immediate harm to countries through similar campaigns by groups that are not officially or technically armed forces. Wang notes that

• in global maritime strategy, there has always been a strong focus on choke points—a narrow strategic important strait, like the Malacca Strait, the Strait of Hormuz, the Great Belt in Denmark, the channel area between Europe the UK, the Strait of Gibraltar and so on. And you also have choke points in the Northern Sea route [the route that leads from the Barents Sea near Russia’s border with Norway, along Russia’s Arctic coast and on to the Bering Strait]. And those chokepoints will always potentially be subjects for aggression against global shipping because it’s so easy to inflict the sea waves from the shore thanks to the short distance from the shore.¹²³

In the early 2000s, the Strait of Malacca—a crucial shipping lane located between Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand—experienced a spike in piracy, which subsided dramatically when Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, and Thailand began jointly patrolling the strait.¹²⁴ It and similar narrow, strategic bodies of water may see the emergence of militias backed by a state in the region, perhaps even ad hoc militias created to attack shipping for geopolitical purposes. The Strait of Gibraltar, the English Channel, and the Great Belt, all located between nations that maintain friendly relations, are less at risk of geopolitically motivated attacks on shipping. The Great Belt, however, is a crucial thoroughfare for “shadow vessels” going to and from Russia.¹²⁵ Such vessels could be used to harm regular shipping in the Great Belt and the neighboring Baltic Sea.

In each case, the attackers’ objective would not be to sink merchant ships but to frighten the shipping industry for geopolitical reasons—for example, to gain global attention or, in the case of separatist groups, to gain some kind of legal recognition. The Baltic Sea could, for example, see the emergence of a maritime-style Wagner Group that might officially simply operate merchant vessels but unofficially frighten other merchant vessels by its mere presence.

As with the Houthis, such groups’ cost-benefit calculus is likely to fundamentally differ from that of traditional armed forces. Indeed, states with hostile intentions could create proxy groups to harm merchant vessels associated with other countries. Similarly, China could expand its use of maritime harassment by making it more frequent, using it in more areas, or both, and other countries could decide to similarly send geopolitical signals by dispatching inspection flotillas or initiate maritime harassment. Indeed, from China’s perspective, the Philippines engages in maritime harassment in parts of the South China Sea that Beijing considers Chinese waters, though the Philippines and other governments consider the waters Philippine.¹²⁶

As we have seen, the Houthis’ attacks are just the most dramatic example of geopolitically linked forms of aggression currently facing global shipping. If these forms of aggression are not deterred, they will continue to grow in quantity and will be joined by new forms. In the immediate term, such aggression will pose a threat to shipping operations in affected waters. In the longer term, it will also threaten functioning of the global maritime order, which depends on a critical mass of countries and other entities—whether they be militias or shipping companies—respecting maritime rules. If such compliance with maritime rules can’t be taken for granted, shipping lines and other companies involved in global shipping will be wary of sailing through certain bodies of water. This would harm not only countries located adjacent to such bodies of water but the entire conduct of global shipping.

Improving strategies to counter attacks on shipping

When the Houthis attacked the Central Park, it was clear that the countries trying to protect the global maritime order were facing a new type of adversary. This recognition among Western governments and maritime companies, though, was only marginally helpful, because it was entirely unclear what strategies Western governments could use against such an adversary. As we have seen, Western governments have struggled to establish an effective response to the Houthis’ attacks precisely because the Houthis are a new kind of adversary, whose logic differs from that of nation-states and traditional armed forces. Lewis notes:

• If the Houthis were not an enemy, I would have an admiration for their strategy, but as it is I just have a distaste for their whole approach. They’re putting military forces, nation states, and industry at risk because they’re playing by different rules. How do you defend against this thing, how do you prepare to nullify it? It’s very costly for industry, and it’s very costly for militaries trying to enforce maritime rules. When it comes to the Houthis, we know who their backer is, Iran, so an extreme solution would be to hit it and all the military targets associated with it. But that would be too risky.¹²⁷

Indeed, hitting the state sponsor of every kind of aggression against merchant shipping would not only be highly risky, but would also quickly overextend the capacity of Western navies. The Russian and Chinese navies have not intervened against the Houthis’ attacks. This is regrettable from a maritime-order protection perspective but hardly surprising, given that both countries violate maritime rules in other ways.¹²⁸ They also seem to tolerate the Houthis’ attacks, which have—with the exception of a few cases of apparently misdirected attacks—spared vessels linked to Russia and China.

However, there are several steps Western governments and the shipping industry can take to at least partly blunt the impact of state-linked aggression against merchant vessels. They include the following.

Preemptive diversion of shipping

A yet-untried way to defang the Houthis and prospective similar attackers would be for a core group of governments and Western-based shipping companies and maritime insurers to declare that all merchant shipping linked (by flag, ship ownership, or cargo) to a core group of countries will be diverted. “As soon as you are away from the coasts, on the oceans, it’s much more difficult for paramilitary organizations to attack,” Wang noted. “The solution to the Red Sea attacks may be to collectively put everything on the southern route around the Cape of Good Hope.”¹²⁹

This kind of collective action would involve an extraordinary diplomatic effort to bring together enough countries—including flag-of-convenience states—as well as shipping companies and underwriters. But success in assembling such a coalition would produce significant power. The threat of shipping diverting to the Cape of Good Hope—not out of fear, but as part of a collective decision by a wide-ranging group of governments and companies in the shipping industry—would, in the case of the Houthis, turn the Yemeni militia from a self-proclaimed anti-Western fighting force into a force driving business away from the Red Sea, the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, the Gulf of Aden, and the Suez Canal. Such an undertaking would have to be led by the US State Department, the Egyptian government, or, given the number of EU-linked vessels affected, the European Commission. If the lead entity were to succeed in getting enough governments and companies to commit to the plan, it could present the plan as an ultimatum. In the case of the Houthis, given that the plan would leave the militia and its sponsor Iran isolated, Iran may well conclude that the Houthis’ campaign has achieved its objectives and force the Houthis to end it.

Intra-industry risk updates

Vessels would be helped by risk updates not just when sailing in waters such as the Red Sea that are known to be home to attacks, but also in waters where new attacks are being orchestrated. The International Chamber of Commerce operates a Kuala Lumpur-based organization called the ICC International Maritime Bureau (IMB), which is meant to function as a hub for maritime threat updates. But Peter Broadhurst, head of Inmarsat Maritime Safety, noted that updates logged with the IMB are often forwarded slowly and may not reach vessels at all.

• The information is there. If you’ve got a ship that’s just been hit by a rocket, it’s got a crew on board, and they’ll want to abandon it. The nearest rescue is another vessel, either a military vessel that’s shadowing it or another commercial ship. Somebody needs to go and help these guys, and if you don’t tell them they’re not going to know.¹³⁰

Shipping companies and related firms could, he suggested, form an industry-funded outfit that would function as the hub for such updates.

Such a hub could be further aided by artificial intelligence (AI)-aided risk updates. Mature AI companies and AI startups could train artificial intelligence to detect anomalies in maritime thoroughfares and other strategic bodies of water and forward any anomalies—such as the accumulation of hardware or personnel in locations from which attacks could be launched—to the hub. After assessing whether the anomalies posed a risk to merchant vessels, the hub would alert shipping companies.

Use of directed-energy weapons

Directed-energy weapons use concentrated electromagnetic energy to “incapacitate, damage, disable, or destroy enemy equipment, facilities, and/or personnel.”¹³¹ The Congressional Research Service (CRS) notes that these weapons include high-energy lasers, which are used by “ground forces in short-range air defense, counter-unmanned aircraft systems, or counter-rocket, artillery, and mortar missions [and] could theoretically provide options for boost-phase missile intercept.”¹³² That makes these weapons—if they can easily be produced and used—an extremely cost-effective alternative to defensive missiles and, indeed, more cost-effective than missiles of the kind the Houthis use.¹³³ “If you can engage the enemy with laser weapons, you don’t have the logistics problem anymore because you can reload while you are at sea. It’s just a matter of having enough energy,” Wang said. “And that development of energy weapons is likely to be accelerated now as a result of the war in Ukraine, but definitely also as a result of the situation in the Red Sea.”¹³⁴ These defensive capabilities could also be developed as exportable, commercially procurable, standalone systems that commercial shipowners can procure and install on their fleets, which would enhance vessels’ defensive capability and, thus, lower risk and insurance premiums. For military customers, manufacturers could modify and enhance the weapons to meet military requirements such as increased power output and integration with other weapons.

For fiscal year 2024, the US Department of Defense has requested around $1 billion for unclassified directed-energy weapons. In a speech in January 2024, Vice Admiral Brendan McLane, the commander of the US Pacific Fleet’s Naval Surface Force, “called for a directed energy weapon to be deployed on every Navy ship.”¹³⁵ Such large-scale development, though, is likely to take some time. At the time of writing, only nineteen directed-energy weapons are installed on US naval vessels.¹³⁶

Selective protection dependent on flag registration

Countries sending naval forces to the Red Sea (and prospective future flashpoints) to defend merchant vessels could also announce that they will only protect vessels sailing under their flags. “To a certain extent, you can send naval vessels to the Red Sea in order to protect shipping,” Wang noted.” But it’s the same ships that are needed in the Indo-Pacific and in the North Atlantic and in the Baltic Sea and off the coast of Norway. When it comes to Western naval resources, it’s a zero-sum game.”¹³⁷ During the Tanker War, when the government of Kuwait asked the US government to allow Kuwaiti-flagged tankers—which were coming under attack—to be reflagged under US flag, Washington complied and provided the tankers with naval protection.¹³⁸

Western governments could declare that they will only seek to protect ships flagged in their countries, on the basis that shipowners that don’t commit to the rules of Western countries also can’t expect their protection. China and Russia, for example, have a history of only protecting merchant vessels sailing under their flags. Restricting protection would, however, do little for the general protection of the global maritime order, especially because the past several decades have seen the trend toward flags of convenience accelerate. In 2022, more than 70 percent of global ship capacity, as measured in deadweight tons, was registered under a foreign flag with beneficial owners and registries being in different countries, UN Trade and Development (UNCTAD) reports.¹³⁹ Only 0.9 percent of merchant vessels (measured in deadweight tons) sail under US flag, 0.5 percent sail under UK flag, and 0.3 percent sail under German flag. The three largest flag states are Panama and Liberia, with more than 16 percent each, and the Marshall Islands with 13.2 percent.¹⁴⁰

Indeed, trying to reverse the shipping industry’s pervasive use of flags of convenience while, at the same time, trying to protect shipping against state-linked attacks would likely be impossible. “If you look at all our economies in the West, irrespective of where the vessels are flagged, the goods they are transporting are fundamental to our economy,” said Potts, who has commanded the US-led Coalition Task Group in the northern Gulf and has also commanded NATO’s High Readiness Force (Maritime).¹⁴¹ He added:

• In the Red Sea, Persian Gulf, and Strait of Hormuz region, historically we used to say we’re absolutely flag blind about who we’re protecting. Because the West, all our economies, rely on freedom of navigation for global trade and the well-being of our economy. Whether you’re Marshall Island-flagged or US-flagged or UK-flagged or Greek-flagged or anything else, we would treat them exactly the same because it’s only when the whole system works that the shipping works.¹⁴²

And, Potts noted, “Often the cargo is more valuable than the ship. Who owns the cargo? Where’s it going? Who’s insuring it? Who owns the ship? With many ships, you can identify several different countries who have a stake in the ship and should take responsibility.”¹⁴³

Freedom-of-navigation operations

In freedom-of-navigation operations (FONOPs, also known as FON operations or FON assertions), a country’s naval vessels underline the importance of innocent passage by sailing through waters over which another country wrongfully claims jurisdiction or otherwise tries to interfere with civilian traffic. FONOPs are regularly conducted by the Royal Navy, and especially the US Navy, as a constabulary measure to protect the global maritime order.

In the South China Sea, the US Navy now regularly undertakes FONOPs through waters that are internationally recognized as belonging to the Philippines or other countries but are claimed by China under its “nine-dash line” policy. Noted retired Rear Admiral David Manero, a former US defense attaché to Russia and the UK, respectively, said, “In order to be successful doing freedom and navigation operations, you have to be consistent, and your messaging has to be on, and it has to always be refined. Imagine taking that whole message among several nations and coordinate it. This is why we’re doing it, citing the law of the sea. But it involves a great deal of coordination.”¹⁴⁴

To date, FONOPs have rarely been conducted in response to state-linked attacks on merchant vessels, simply because such attacks have been so rare. The US Navy has, however, conducted FON-related operations in the Strait of Hormuz and in the Bab el-Mandeb. The latter challenge Yemen’s requirement for foreign warships and nuclear-powered vessels to obtain Yemen’s permission prior to transiting its territorial waters. The United States also regularly conducts FONOPs in the South China Sea.¹⁴⁵ There would be little point conducting FONOPs against attackers like the Houthis because they don’t represent nation-states and have such a different cost-benefit calculus. FONOPs would, however, be useful against inspection flotillas, should China or other countries begin to regularly deploy such flotillas in internationally disputed waters. In practice, such FONOPs would need to involve the US Navy or the Royal Navy, as other Western governments would be hesitant to lead such operations.

Yet it would be illusory to think that the US and UK navies could conduct simultaneous FONOPs around the world and, in essence, provide a global maritime constabulary. This would stretch the two navies’ resources beyond the breaking point. In the Taiwan Strait, FONOPs would also involve the risk of confrontation with the world’s largest navy, that of China, “with a battle force of over 370 platforms, including major surface combatants, submarines, ocean-going amphibious ships, mine warfare ships, aircraft carriers, and fleet auxiliaries.”¹⁴⁶

Indeed, the attacks against, and harassment of, merchant vessels have reached a quantity that key Western navies would struggle to tackle. The Royal Navy, for example, has some eighty vessels, but only twelve of them are frigates, while eight are offshore patrol vessels and six are destroyers.¹⁴⁷

Disrupting the delivery of weapons

As previously noted, the US Navy has long tried to interdict weapons supplies being shipped to the Houthis. Indeed, it began doing so long before it was evident that the militia would use the weapons to attack shipping. Now that it’s clear the weapons are being used not just in Yemen’s civil war but also to harm global shipping, the United States and its allies could ramp up these efforts. They could also announce they’re expanding such efforts to other weapons-smuggling operations. Until now, the smuggling has primarily harmed civilians in countries affected by civil war. But with the Houthis likely to inspire copycat attacks on shipping, disrupting the supplies of weapons and weapons components has gained additional urgency. “We need to really understand the Houthis’ supply chains and how the components for weapons that they then assemble get into the country,” Potts said. “It will be complex to map this, but it’s a practical step we can take.”¹⁴⁸ To map these supply chains, governments could also confer with the private sector, as some companies are likely to have information that could help governments establish a clearer picture.

They could also confer with AI companies that can track and trace movements of suspected arms components to Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen. Indeed, governments could establish cooperation with AI companies, especially with startups seeking to prove their technologies, to receive early indications of patterns suggesting potentially worrying developments involving other groups and states. Such collaboration would add to observations already provided by intelligence services.

Armed guards on board

When piracy increased heavily off the coast of Somalia in the early 2000s, many shipping companies responded by hiring armed guards. The Houthis’ seizure of the Galaxy Leader quickly prompted suggestions of armed guards onboard merchant vessels in the Red Sea. Guards on merchant vessels are, however, relatively lightly armed and would not be able to protect a vessel against trained militias like the Houthis. Indeed, because ship guards are not soldiers, they’re legally prevented from operating military equipment and would thus not be able to protect ships from missile and (most) drone attacks. They would likely also struggle to thwart a professionally executed hijacking of the kind the Houthis mounted against the Galaxy Leader. This is illustrated by the fact that, even though ships in the Red Sea have increased “armed guards on board” signals since the Houthis began their attacks, the attacks have continued.¹⁴⁹ In addition, armed resistance against a seizure attempt by a militia would risk escalating into a situation in which navies would feel compelled to intervene.

Western countries could, however, offer vessels protection by law-enforcement officers. Such officers’ task could be defined as defending the cargo rather than the ship. That would mean the exporting or importing country could offer embarked law enforcement that would be able to employ military or quasi-military defensive capabilities. The United States has tried this concept: the Navy and Marine task force that was deployed to the Strait of Hormuz in August 2023 included the offer of servicemembers embarking on merchant vessels if the vessels’ owners and managers requested such protection.

Conclusion

Since the beginning of the nineteenth century, the world’s nations have gradually built a set of rules and agreements that allows merchant shipping to operate without constant fear of attacks by hostile states. They have done so because nations’ economies—at least since the Industrial Revolution—rely on global shipping.

The Houthis’ attacks in the Red Sea, however, have introduced a new threat to merchant shipping: geopolitically connected attacks that are linked to a hostile state but not carried out by it. The Yemeni militia has, in fact, demonstrated that building up a capacity to act in the maritime domain is possible for a non-state actor with no maritime tradition. The fact that the Houthis are not the armed forces of an internationally recognized country and operate with a completely different cost-benefit calculus than traditional armed forces make them such a fierce threat to global shipping. So does the fact that they use more sophisticated weapons than previous generations’ militias have had at their disposal, and that the weapons are inexpensive and attractive to use. Other militias (including ones yet to be formed) will likely want to copy the Houthis’ successful concept in other maritime chokepoints and heavily trafficked waters.

For the global shipping industry (except vessels linked to Russia and China, which the Houthis exempt from their attacks), this means that a neutral sector can be severely harmed and disrupted, at great expense to the shipping industry. The Houthis’ different cost-benefit calculus means retaliating against their strikes has little effect on their motivation. The harm to seafarers as a result of the Houthi attacks now presents an additional problem for Western shipping companies and, thus, global supply chains. So far, the shipping industry has managed to recruit seafarers—these days, predominantly from India, the Philippines, and Indonesia.¹⁵⁰ If attacks continue, shipping’s already precarious recruitment situation will worsen significantly. “Who wants to work in a war zone?” Broadhurst asked. “Unless we can protect seafarers, how can global trade continue?”¹⁵¹ At the end of June 2024, the Philippine government banned Philippine seafarers from working on ships that had been attacked in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden.¹⁵²

Instead, Western governments and the shipping industry will need to use means other than traditional military force to reduce the pain caused by the Houthis (and prospective future attackers of a similar kind). These efforts—including the preemptive threat of collective rerouting away from perilous waters and the use of direct-energy weapons—will require public-private collaboration. Western governments and shipping companies could start by announcing that they are increasing their collaboration beyond the immediate needs in the Red Sea. This would signal to prospective attackers that Western governments and companies are prepared for new maritime gray zone aggression and will have a better strategy to thwart it than has been the case in the Red Sea.

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• Introduction
• Establish a comprehensive security strategy
• Cybersecurity and critical infrastructure resilience
• Energy
• Food and water resiliency
• Enhancing defense resilience
• Conclusion
• About the authors
• Acknowledgments

Introduction

This report recommends actions for the new leadership of Taiwan to take to enhance its societal resilience against Chinese aggression in the context of both “gray zone” conflict and wartime attacks. The report focuses on establishing a comprehensive security strategy and analyzes three key areas particularly important for effective resilience: enhancing cybersecurity for critical infrastructures; improving energy security; and accelerating defense transformation.

The new administration of Lai Ching-te faces both existing resilience challenges and the potential for significantly greater problems if the People’s Republic of China (PRC) pursues expanded gray zone activities or if actual conflict occurs.¹ The ongoing challenges include substantial disinformation campaigns, cyberattacks, military incursions, and periodic economic coercion. Potential future challenges could involve expansion of one or more of these ongoing Chinese activities. In the context of a more contested environment such as a quarantine,² blockade, or a kinetic conflict, Chinese actions could seek to cause leadership failures and loss of social cohesion; undertake cyberattacks to target critical infrastructures; generate energy shortages; and seek to defeat Taiwan militarily before the United States could provide effective support. The potential for such harms substantially increases the importance of resilient responses by Taiwan.

The report recommends four major sets of actions to enhance Taiwan’s resilience:

1. Establish a comprehensive security strategy that engages government, the private sector, and individuals in cooperative efforts to ensure all facets of resilience including:
   1. Risk analyses and priority requirements.
   2. Organization of data relevant to responding to challenges from the PRC.
   3. Development of expertise in key areas required for response.
   4. Provision of governmental leadership and activation of the whole nation as part of a comprehensive approach.
2. Enhance cybersecurity by establishing:
   1. Off-island, cloud-based capabilities to duplicate governmental and other critical functions.
   2. Working arrangements with high-end, private-sector cybersecurity providers.
   3. A surge capability of cybersecurity experts.
   4. Regular engagement with US Cyber Command’s Hunt Forward program.
   5. Alternatives to undersea cables through low-earth orbit (LEO) communications satellites.
3. Bolster energy security resilience by:
   1. Rationalizing—that is, increasing—energy prices, especially for electricity.
   2. Supporting indigenous supply, including nuclear energy.
   3. Prioritizing energy needs.
   4. Dispersing and hardening energy storage facilities.
   5. Preparing comprehensive rationing plans for energy.
4. Enhance defense resilience by:
   1. Continuing the trend of higher defense spending to at least 3 percent of gross domestic product (GDP).
   2. Leveraging Taiwan’s strength in high tech manufacturing and shipbuilding to accelerate the development of a Ukraine-style, public-private “capability accelerator”³ for emerging technologies.
   3. Fielding low-cost, high-effectiveness capabilities including unmanned surface vessels, unmanned aerial vehicles, and naval mines.
   4. Incorporating training in emerging technologies and unconventional tactics for conscripts and reserves.
   5. Investing in East Coast port infrastructure as counterblockade strongholds.
   6. Raising the All-out Defense Mobilization Agency (ADMA) to the national level and implementing a larger civil defense force that fully integrates civilian agencies and local governments.

Establish a comprehensive security strategy

Resilience is not a new theme in Taiwan. Former President Tsai Ing-wen, who completed two terms in office on May 20, entitled her 2022 National Day Address “Island of Resilience,”⁴ and similarly identified resilience as a key factor for Taiwan in her two subsequent National Day addresses.⁵ “The work of making the Republic of China (Taiwan) a more resilient country is now our most important national development priority,” she stated in that 2022 speech, in which she articulated four key areas of  resilience: economy and industry, social safety net, free and democratic government system, and national defense. What is left undone, however, is aligning these and other resilience elements into a comprehensive security strategy similar to those undertaken by Finland⁶ and Sweden,⁷ which utilize a whole-of society approach to enhance resilience.

Resilience is a nation’s ability to understand, address, respond to, and recover from any type of national security risk. Given the scale of risk Taiwan faces from China, domestic resilience should be front and center in Taiwan’s national security strategy.⁸ Comparable comprehensive national security approaches, such as the Finnish model, aim to foster and enable an engaged national ecosystem of partners, each with a clear understanding of their roles and responsibilities. Finland’s model is instructive, underscoring the importance of engagement by the entire society:

• The Security Strategy for Society lays out the general principles governing preparedness in Finnish society. The preparedness is based on the principle of comprehensive security in which the vital functions of society are jointly safeguarded by the authorities, business operators, organisations and citizens.⁹

Comprehensive security thus is far more than just government activities:

• Comprehensive security has evolved into a cooperation model in which actors share and analyse security information, prepare joint plans, as well as train and work together. The cooperation model covers all relevant actors, from citizens to the authorities. The cooperation is based on statutory tasks, cooperation agreements and the Security Strategy for Society.¹⁰

The Finnish strategy identifies seven “vital functions” as key areas: leadership; international and European Union activities; defense capability; internal security; economy, infrastructure, and security of supply; functional capacity of the population and services; and psychological resilience.¹¹

Taiwan has taken a variety of actions to enhance resilience including the establishment in 2022 of the All-out Defense Mobilization Agency.¹² That agency has a useful but limited scope with its mandate of “comprehensive management of ‘planning for mobilization, management, service, civil defense, [and] building reserve capacity.’ ”¹³ But while defense is important (and further discussed below), as the Finnish and Swedish strategies underscore, Taiwan should expand its approach to resilience to include the full spectrum of governmental, private sector, and individual tasks—and the necessary cooperative efforts to make them most effective.

President Lai’s recent election ushered in an unprecedented third consecutive term for the Democratic Progressive Party.¹⁴ This outcome not only provides continuity in the agenda set by the island’s duly elected leader, but also presents an opportunity to sharpen the focus areas for resilience. As Taiwan transitions to a Lai presidency, the challenge of shoring up the island’s resilience should be at the forefront.

As a valuable starting point for establishing such an expanded resilience strategy, the Lai government should undertake extensive consultations with both Finland and Sweden—which could be facilitated as necessary by the United States. Taiwan should also seek to engage with the Hybrid Center of Excellence, based in Finland, which is an “autonomous, network-based international organization countering hybrid threats.”¹⁵

The discussion below describes several important elements of a comprehensive resilience strategy, and it will be a crucial task for the Lai administration to expand Taiwan’s current efforts to the full scope of such an approach. Resilience is a team game with the whole of society playing a role. But only Taiwan’s central government can act as the team captain, setting expectations, establishing priorities, formulating and communicating national strategy, and coordinating activities. Only leaders in national-level government can oversee the critical work of developing institutional effectiveness in key areas of risk management and resilience.

As a starting point, Taiwan should undertake a comprehensive audit now to uncover any gaps in the country’s ability to understand, respond to, and recover from both the chronic risks it currently faces and any more acute manifestations of PRC aggression in the future. Taiwan’s government should examine the following areas to pursue greater resilience:

1. Activating the whole nation: Working with the private sector and local government, and communicating to households are essential to develop a truly comprehensive approach to Taiwan’s resilience.
2. Understanding risk: Developing a set of scenarios that will help prioritize activities across government and beyond. Prioritizing is critical where resources are limited—as is identifying areas of cross-cutting work that can help to reduce risk in multiple scenarios.
3. Building data capacity: Laying a foundation for data exploitation needs will be critical for Taiwan, which will need this capacity both ahead of and during any crisis response. Preparing for and providing this capacity is not just the preserve of government, as commercially available and industry data sources will provide critical insights. Planning to access, receive, store, and process this data needs to start early, as the foundations for technical infrastructure, capabilities, data-sharing policies, and data expertise in government all require time and cannot just be activated on the cusp of crisis. Part of this work entails developing scenarios to help analysts map out gaps in information sources (intelligence, open source, commercial, and from allies) that Taiwan will likely need in each circumstance to build situational awareness. Ahead of and during crisis, risk assessment and effective decision-making will be highly dependent on the availability, quality, and usability of intelligence, information, and data.
4. Expanding its network of professional skills and resources: Assessing the range of skills and the levels of resourcing needed in government to manage a long-term crisis posture should start well ahead of any crisis. It would be helpful to look now at the gaps in key areas of professional expertise: analysts, data experts, crisis-response professionals, and operational planners will all be needed in larger numbers to sustain an effective response. Taiwan will also need professionally administered and well-exercised crisis facilities, resilient technical infrastructure, and business continuity approaches in place.
5. Preparedness and planning: Thinking through potential impacts of crisis scenarios in advance and working up potential policy and operational responses will bolster the quality of adaptability, which is an essential component of resilience. The process of exercising and refining plans is also helpful to build the professional connections and networks that will be activated during a live response.

Working with countries that are already developing vanguard resilience capabilities could help Taiwan quickly establish a workable model. For example, the United Kingdom’s National Situation Centre¹⁶—built in less than a year during the COVID-19 pandemic—is a model of developing access to critical data in peacetime and lessons learned from previous crisis scenarios about the practical challenges a nation could face in a variety of scenarios. Many commercial providers offer competent ways of displaying data insights on dashboards, and while this is helpful, it is only part of what can be achieved.

As a model for its broader resilience requirements, Taiwan will have the benefit of its existing efforts including in the counterdisinformation arena, where it has programs as effective as any in the world, despite the fact that Taiwan consistently faces the world’s highest volume of targeted disinformation campaigns.¹⁷ The saturation of PRC information manipulation across Taiwan’s traditional and social media platforms is strategically designed to undermine social cohesion, erode trust in government institutions, and soften resistance to Beijing’s forced unification agenda, while sowing doubts about America’s commitment to peace and stability in the region. 

Taiwan has developed a multifaceted strategy to combat this onslaught, eschewing heavy-handed censorship in favor of promoting free speech and empowering civil society. This approach serves as a beacon for other democracies, demonstrating how to effectively counter disinformation through rapid-response mechanisms, independent fact-checking, along with widespread media literacy initiatives. Collaborative efforts such as the Taiwan FactCheck Center, Cofacts, and MyGoPen have proven instrumental in swiftly identifying and debunking false rumors, notably during the closely watched presidential election on January 13.¹⁸

Taiwan’s Minister of Digital Affairs (MoDA) attributes the island’s success in combating this “infodemic” to its sophisticated civil-sector efforts, which avoids reliance on reactive takedowns of malicious content akin to a game of whack-a-mole. Much like its handling of the pandemic—where Taiwan achieved one of the world’s lowest COVID-19 fatality rates without resorting to draconian lockdowns—it has demonstrated resilience and innovation in the digital sphere.¹⁹

Taiwan’s response to disinformation demonstrates that it is well-positioned to establish a comprehensive approach to societal resilience. The discussion below describes several important elements of a comprehensive resilience strategy, but it will be a crucial task for the Lai administration to expand Taiwan’s current efforts to the full scope of such an approach.

Cybersecurity and critical infrastructure resilience

Cyber risks to critical infrastructures

Like all advanced economies, Taiwan depends on its critical infrastructures. Critical infrastructures have been described as “sectors whose assets, systems, and networks, whether physical or virtual, are considered so vital . . .  that their incapacitation or destruction would have a debilitating effect on security, national economic security, national public health or safety.”²⁰ Since several critical infrastructures are interlinked, it is important in evaluating resilience to “capture cross-cutting risks and associated dependencies that may have cascading impacts within and across sectors.”²¹ Among those interlinked critical infrastructures are energy, communications, transportation, and water. Each of these are critical to society as a whole and each are dependent on digital technology for their operations.

In Taiwan, the Administration for Cyber Security has identified critical infrastructures “by their feature types into the following eight fields: energy, water resource, telecommunications, transportation, banking and finance, emergency aid and hospitals, central and local governments, and high-tech parks.”²² It is worth underscoring that several of Taiwan’s critical infrastructures, such as the electric grid²³ and the water system,²⁴ are significantly centralized or have other notable vulnerabilities such as the dependency on undersea cables for international communications²⁵ that increase the potential consequences from a successful cyberattack.

The Taiwan government has fully recognized the significant risks from cyberattacks. As described by Taiwan’s Administration for Cyber Security, “Due to Taiwan’s unique political and economic situation, the country faces not only a complex global cyber security environment but also severe cyber security threats, making the continuous implementation and improvement of cyber security measures a necessity.”²⁶

The number of cyberattacks against Taiwan is notable.²⁷ Published estimates range from five million cyberattacks per day against Taiwanese government agencies²⁸ to the detection of 15,000 cyberattacks per second, including attempted intrusions, in Taiwan during the first half of 2023.²⁹

The attacks often focus on key societal infrastructures. A recent Voice of America report noted that just prior to the January 2024 elections:

• Most of the attacks appeared to focus on government offices, police departments, and financial institutions, with the attackers focused on internal communications, police reports, bank statements and insurance information.³⁰

Google researchers have likewise described the cyber threat to key critical infrastructures, revealing that it is “tracking close to 100 hacking groups out of China [and that these] malicious groups are attacking a wide spectrum of organizations, including the government, private industry players and defense organizations.”³¹

The attacks themselves are often relatively sophisticated. Trellix, a cybersecurity firm, described multiple techniques utilized by attackers that “focused on defense evasion, discovery, and command and control . . . to subvert system defenses to gather information about accounts, systems, and networks.” Among them are “living-off-the-land” techniques, which allow attackers to maintain their intrusions over time with smaller chances of detection.³²

While no one can say with certainty what actions the PRC would take in the context of a blockade of or outright conflict with Taiwan, the United States is clear-eyed about the potential for attacks on its own critical infrastructures if engaged in conflict with China. The February 2023 Annual Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community notes the likelihood of such PRC cyberattacks in that context:

• If Beijing feared that a major conflict with the United States were imminent, it almost certainly would consider undertaking aggressive cyber operations against U.S. homeland critical infrastructure and military assets worldwide . . .  China almost certainly is capable of launching cyber attacks that could disrupt critical infrastructure services within the United States, including against oil and gas pipelines, and rail systems.³³

The ongoing Russian cyberattacks against Ukraine in the Russia-Ukraine war further underscore the reality of critical infrastructures as a target in a conflict. It seems reasonable to assume that comparable actions (and perhaps even more) would be undertaken against Taiwan in the event of a blockade or kinetic conflict. “Probable targets,” according to James A. Lewis, would include critical infrastructures such as electrical power facilities, information and communications systems, and pipelines.³⁴

Actions to enhance Taiwan’s cyber resilience

Taiwan can enhance its cyber resilience through its own actions and in collaborative activities with private-sector companies and with the United States. While cyberattacks can be highly disruptive, one of the important lessons of the Ukraine-Russia conflict is that the effects on operations can be mitigated, as described in a CyberScoop analysis that underscores a shift in expectations:

• The war has inspired a defensive effort that government officials and technology executives describe as unprecedented—challenging the adage in cybersecurity that if you give a well-resourced attacker enough time, they will pretty much always succeed. The relative success of the defensive effort in Ukraine is beginning to change the calculation about what a robust cyber defense might look like going forward.³⁵

According to the analysis, the critical element for such success has been significant multinational and public-private collaboration:

• This high level of defense capability is a consequence of a combination of Ukraine’s own effectiveness, significant support from other nations including the United States and the United Kingdom, and a key role for private sector companies.
• The defensive cyber strategy in Ukraine has been an international effort, bringing together some of the biggest technology companies in the world such as Google and Microsoft, Western allies such as the U.S. and Britain and social media giants such as Meta who have worked together against Russia’s digital aggression.³⁶

Actions by Taiwan

Taiwan should utilize the Ukraine model of cyber resilience—backed in part by private-sector companies—and take comparable actions to enhance its cybersecurity. Taiwan has a substantial existing cybersecurity framework on which to build such mitigating actions. Since 2022, the Ministry of Digital Affairs, through its Administration for Cyber Security, is responsible for “implementing cyber security management and defense mechanisms for national critical infrastructures” including “evaluating and auditing cyber security works at government agencies and public entities.”³⁷ Utilizing that framework, Taiwan should undertake the following four actions that would significantly enhance the island’s cybersecurity resilience.

First, Taiwan should utilize cloud-based capabilities to establish a duplicative set of cyber-enabled governmental functions outside of Taiwan. Ukraine undertook such actions, thereby rendering Russian cyberattacks in Ukraine unable to disrupt ongoing governmental activities. Taiwan’s Ministry of Digital Affairs has been evaluating the use of public clouds including the possibility of  “digital embassies” abroad to hold data.³⁸ Taiwan should organize such actions with key cloud providers such as Amazon Web Services, which provided support to Ukraine.³⁹ The United States should work with Taiwan and appropriate cloud providers to help effectuate such a result.

Second, Taiwan should establish arrangements with private-sector cybersecurity providers to undertake defensive operations against PRC cyberattacks in the context of a blockade or kinetic conflict. As noted above, such private-sector actions have been instrumental to Ukraine, and would similarly be invaluable for Taiwan. The United States should also help facilitate such private-sector defensive cyber operations for Taiwan.

Third, Taiwan should organize a surge capability of individual cybersecurity experts who can be called upon to complement governmental resources. Both Estonia and the United Kingdom have very effective cyber-reserve approaches, and Taiwan should engage with each country, seeking lessons learned as part of establishing its own reserve corps.

Fourth, Taiwan needs to accelerate its low-earth orbit satellite communications program. The Ministry of Digital Affairs’ two-year, US$18 million plan to strengthen the resilience of government communications entails building more than 700 satellite receiver stations. The impetus: ships from mainland China have repeatedly severed submarine internet cables in what Taiwan perceived as “a trial of methods” that the PRC could use to prepare for a military invasion.⁴⁰

The existing program involves satellites as well as ground-based receivers. The Taiwan Space Agency disclosed its plan for a “dedicated” LEO satellite communications project in late 2022,⁴¹ as a public-private partnership: 

• Distinct from traditional government programs, this groundbreaking project is structured as a privately operated venture, wherein the Taiwanese government would retain a substantial minority ownership. . . . This project intends to enhance the Taiwan Space Agency’s initial proposal for two government-built LEO satellites by evolving it into a “2+4” configuration. This will involve constructing four additional satellites through collaborative efforts between the public and private sectors.⁴²

Actions with the United States

In accord with the Taiwan Relations Act,⁴³ and as a matter of long-standing policy, the United States strongly supports Taiwan’s defensive capabilities including for cybersecurity. The Integrated Country Strategy of the American Institute in Taiwan (essentially the unofficial US embassy) specifically provides that “bolster[ing] Taiwan’s cybersecurity resilience” is one of the United States’ strategic priorities for the island.⁴⁴ To support that objective, the United States can enhance Taiwan cybersecurity through cooperative defensive activities.

First, US Cyber Command regularly supports the network resilience of allied countries and partners through its “Hunt Forward” operations, which are “strictly defensive” joint ventures, undertaken following an invitation from the ally or partner, to “observe and detect malicious cyber activity” on these networks, together searching out “vulnerabilities, malware, and adversary presence.”⁴⁵

While Taiwan has not been specifically identified as a Hunt Forward participant, Anne Neuberger, who is the US deputy national security advisor for cyber and emerging technology, said at a Politico Tech Summit in 2023 that in the event of a major cyberattack on Taiwan, the United States would “send its best teams to help hunt down the attackers, the same approach typically used to help global allies in cyberspace.”⁴⁶ She described the typical approach as:

• Putting our best teams to hunt on their most sensitive networks to help identify any current intrusions and to help remediate and make those networks as strong as possible.”⁴⁷

Neuberger also highlighted US work with Taiwan to carry out military tabletop games and exercises to prepare for potential cyberattack.⁴⁸

More recently, the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2024 explicitly authorized the Defense Department to cooperate on:

• Defensive military cybersecurity activities with the military forces of Taiwan to (1) defend military networks, infrastructure, and systems; (2) counter malicious cyber activity that has compromised such military networks, infrastructure, and systems; (3) leverage United States commercial and military cybersecurity technology and services to harden and defend such military networks, infrastructure, and systems; and (4) conduct combined cybersecurity training activities and exercises.⁴⁹

Going forward, those authorities authorize not only Hunt Forward actions but also actions to  leverage commercial and military technology to harden such networks (which would seem to resolve any export control issues) and to conduct combined training and exercises, all of which underscores clear congressional approval for enhanced cybersecurity activities with Taiwan.⁵⁰

Second, the United States should undertake to enhance Taiwan’s communications resilience by making available access to US commercial and military LEO networks. The important role of the commercial provider Starlink in assuring communications in the context of the Ukraine-Russia war is well-known.⁵¹ Starlink’s parent company, SpaceX, is, however, controlled by Elon Musk, whose Tesla company has major investments in China. That linkage has raised the question of whether Taiwan could rely on any commercial arrangements it might make on its own with Starlink—particularly since Starlink did impose some limitations on Ukraine’s use of the network.⁵² However, as previously described by one of the authors of this report, the US government has sway on such matters:

• The Defense Production Act authorizes the [US] government to require the prioritized provision of services—which would include services from space companies—and exempts any company receiving such an order from liabilities such as inability to support other customers.⁵³

Accordingly, the US should rely on this authority to organize appropriate arrangements with Starlink—and other space companies that provide like capabilities—to ensure access that would support Taiwan communications. One way to do this would be to incorporate appropriate terms into the commercial augmentation space reserve (CASR) program arrangements that US Space Force is currently negotiating with civil space providers,⁵⁴ as part of the Department of Defense’s overall commercial space strategy.⁵⁵

Additionally, the DOD is developing its own LEO capability through a variety of constellations being put in place by Space Force.⁵⁶ Pursuant to the recent NDAA authorization noted above, DOD should work with the Taiwan military to ensure that those constellations will be available to support Taiwan as necessary.

Longer term, the United States should also undertake to enhance the resilience of Taiwan’s undersea cables. As previously proposed by one of the authors, the United States should lead in establishing an international undersea infrastructure protection corps. It should:

• Combine governmental and private activities to support the resilience of undersea cables and pipelines. Membership should include the United States, allied nations with undersea maritime capabilities, and key private-sector cable and pipeline companies.⁵⁷

Such an activity would include focus on cybersecurity for undersea cable networks, hardening and other protection for cable landing points, and capabilities and resources to ensure expeditious repair of cables as needed.⁵⁸ To be sure, getting such an activity up and running will necessarily be a multiyear effort. However, Taiwan’s vulnerability underscores the importance of beginning promptly and working as expeditiously as possible.

Cybersecurity recommendations for Taiwan

• Utilize cloud-based capabilities to establish a duplicative set of cyber-enabled governmental functions outside of Taiwan.
• Establish arrangements with private-sector cybersecurity providers to undertake defensive operations against PRC cyberattacks.
• Organize a surge capability of individual cybersecurity experts who can be called upon to complement governmental resources.
• Accelerate the low-earth orbit satellite communications program.
• Actively engage with Cyber Command’s Hunt Forward activities.
• Enhance Taiwan’s communications resilience by making available access to US commercial and military LEO networks.
• Undertake on a longer-term basis enhanced resilience of Taiwan’s undersea cables.

Energy

As part of its efforts to enhance resilience, Taiwan must mitigate its energy vulnerabilities, as its reliance on maritime imports for about 97 percent⁵⁹ of its energy needs creates acute risks. To lessen its dependency on maritime imports and strengthen its resiliency in the face of potential PRC coercion, Taiwan should curb energy and electricity demand, bolster indigenous supply, overhaul its inventory management, and prepare rationing plans. A resilient energy security approach would credibly signal to the PRC that Taiwan could hold out for long durations without maritime resupply.

Curbing demand by rationalizing prices 

Taiwan’s ultra-low electricity prices are a security risk (and a black eye for its climate targets). Reliance on seaborne energy shipments presents straightforward security problems, and Taiwan’s low electricity prices subsidize consumption that is being met by imports of hydrocarbons, especially coal. The new Lai administration should make haste prudently, increasing electricity prices more frequently and significantly, without exceeding the limits of the politically possible.

Taiwan’s electricity price quandary is illustrated by Taipower, the state-owned monopoly utility. In 2022 and 2023, Taipower lost 227.2 billion New Taiwan dollars (NTD) and 198.5 billion NTD, respectively, as its per kilowatt hour cost of electricity sold substantially exceeded per unit prices.⁶⁰ Taipower’s prices failed to offset the steep rise in electricity input costs amid Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the post-COVID-19 unsnarling of supply chains.

Taiwan’s electricity costs remain too low, diminishing the island’s resiliency, although policymakers have now taken some steps in light of the problem. The Ministry of Economic Affairs’ latest electricity price review, in March 2024, raised average prices by about 11 percent, with the new tariff reaching about 3.4518 NTD, or approximately $0.11 USD/kWh.⁶¹ This rationalization of prices, while welcome, is insufficient. In the United States, the rolling twelve-month ending price in January 2024 for all sectors totaled $0.127/kWh.⁶² Taiwan’s heavily subsidized electricity consumers therefore enjoy a discount in excess of 13 percent compared to their US counterparts, despite US access to low-cost, abundant, and indigenously produced energy.

Taiwan’s heavily subsidized electricity prices incentivize maritime imports, especially coal. Astonishingly, Taiwan was the world’s largest per capita user of coal generation for electricity in 2022, higher than even Australia, a major coal exporter.

Taiwan’s low electricity prices and use of coal expose the island to PRC economic coercion. Taiwan’s dependency on imported coal heightens its vulnerability in the summer, when the island’s electricity-generation needs peak. Concerningly, Taiwan has already experienced electricity shortfalls in summer peacetime conditions, including a wave of outages⁶³ between July and August 2022. With the island’s future summer cooling needs set to rise even further due to climate change and hotter temperatures, Taiwan’s electricity needs pose a vulnerability that the PRC may attempt to exploit.

Curbing Taiwan’s electricity demand during summer months is critical, necessitating a rise in prices. While this reduction is a principal energy security challenge, the island must also do more to secure supply, especially for nuclear energy.

Supply: Support indigenous production

Taiwan’s resiliency will be strengthened by producing as much indigenous energy as possible, especially during the critical summer months. Taiwan, which has virtually no hydrocarbon resources, can therefore indigenously produce only four different forms of energy at scale: nuclear energy, offshore wind, onshore wind, and solar. Taiwan should pursue each of these indigenous energy sources. Taiwan should apply “carrots” by strengthening incentives and payments for indigenous production. At the same time, applying the “stick” of higher prices to energy consumption, especially for energy imports, would bolster the island’s resiliency.

Taiwan’s renewable resources are significant and often economically viable, but they cannot secure adequate levels of resiliency by themselves. Taiwan’s wind speeds slow in the summer,⁶⁴ limiting onshore and offshore wind’s effectiveness in bolstering energy security. Additionally, Taiwan’s stringent localization requirements for offshore appropriately minimize PRC components and sensors in Taiwan’s offshore wind turbines, but also raise the costs of this technology. Taiwan’s solar potential⁶⁵ is also limited⁶⁶ by cloudy skies, frequent rainfall, and land scarcity.

Accordingly, nuclear energy is the most viable way for Taiwan to address its summer electricity needs without turning to maritime imports. While Taiwan’s nuclear reactors must acquire fuel from abroad, this fuel can be used for approximately eighteen to twenty-four months.⁶⁷ Taiwan should maintain its existing nuclear energy capacity; restart retired capacity as soon as politically and technically feasible; and seek new, incremental capacity over time.⁶⁸

Unpacking Taiwan’s storage complexities: Dispersal and hardening is critical

To cope with various contingencies, including the possibility of a prolonged summertime blockade, Taiwan should increase its stockpiles of energy, disperse inventory around the island, and harden facilities.

While Taiwan’s ability to hold out against a blockade involves by many factors, energy inventories are a critical element. Taiwan’s electricity reserves are limited: it reported fifty-six days of supply of coal inventories in February 2023,⁶⁹ and aims to raise its natural gas inventories from eleven days to more than twenty days by 2030.⁷⁰ These inventory levels should be expanded, in part because “days of supply” fail to encapsulate uncertainty. Demand fluctuates depending on temperature and other variables, while Taiwan’s access to energy storage inventories faces the risk of sabotage and, in certain scenarios, kinetic strikes.

Taiwan’s management of petroleum reserves is a matter of great importance, given the use of these fuels, especially diesel, for military matters. Taiwan’s Energy Administration, in the Ministry of Economic Affairs, reported in April 2024 that its total oil inventories stood at 167 days of supply.⁷¹ This topline figure presents an overly optimistic portrait of Taiwan’s petroleum security, however. For instance, Taiwan’s government-controlled inventories in April 2024⁷² included 2.6 million kiloliters of crude oil and refined products; private stocks added another 6.5 million kiloliters. Accordingly, Taiwan reports forty-seven days of supply from government stockpiles, with an additional 120 days from private inventories.⁷³ Given that domestic sales and consumption equated to about 54,200 kiloliters per day from prior comparable periods,⁷⁴ Taiwan calculated it had about 167 days of supply.

There may, however, be insufficient monitoring of private inventories. Marek Jestrab observed:

• A concerning—and possibly significant—loophole exists in these laws, where the criteria and computation formulas for the actual on-hand security stockpiles will be determined by the central competent authority, and are not required to be disclosed. This presents the opportunity for energy that is loaded onboard merchant shipping while in transit to Taiwan to count toward these figures.⁷⁵

While Taiwan should ensure that stockpiles are actually on the island, and not at sea, it also needs to carefully examine the inventory split between crude oil and crude products, such as diesel, gasoline, jet fuel, etc. Additionally, Taiwan’s policymakers should not expect to rely on its crude inventories, which only have a latent potential: crude oil cannot be used until it is refined into a crude product. Therefore, if the PRC disrupted Taiwan’s refineries via cyber or even kinetic means, Taiwan would not be able to access the totality of its crude oil reserves.

Taiwan’s military requirements for fuel would likely surge during a confrontation or conflict with the PRC, reducing the “days of supply.” Since Taiwan’s military vehicles largely run on diesel, the island should pay careful attention to this product.

Taiwan should disperse and harden its energy assets, especially diesel storage, as concentrated objects would present inviting targets for the PRC. Beijing is studying Russia’s invasion of Ukraine closely and will not fail to notice that Moscow attacked about 30 percent of Ukrainian infrastructure in a single day.⁷⁶ As one author witnessed during his recent visit to Kyiv, Ukraine’s dispersal of electricity assets is achieving a reasonable degree of success. Indeed, Russia’s more recent campaign⁷⁷ attacking large-scale thermal and hydroelectric power plants illustrates the utility of dispersed energy infrastructure. Like Ukraine, Taiwan should disperse and harden its energy storage inventories to the maximal feasible extent.

Rationing plans

While both Taiwan’s electricity supply and demand will be very hard to predict in a state of emergency, rationing plans must be considered—especially for the island’s manufacturing and semiconductor industries.

Taiwan’s economy is uniquely⁷⁸ tied to electricity-intensive manufacturing, as industrial consumers accounted for more than 55 percent of Taiwan’s electricity consumption in 2023.⁷⁹ Most of these industrial producers (such as chipmaker Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company) service export markets—not Taiwan. While the PRC might attempt to disrupt the island’s energy and electricity supply via cyber and kinetic means, Taiwan’s electricity consumption would fall dramatically during a crisis if Taiwan’s industries were forced to shut down. Although the closure of Taiwan’s industry would prove economically ruinous, it would also make the island’s electricity and energy issues much more manageable. Adding an additional layer of complication, many of Taiwan’s most valuable exports – such as chips – are shipped via civilian airliners, not on seaborne vessels, and would consequently be more difficult to interdict in circumstances short of war.⁸⁰ Taiwan should prepare rationing plans for a variety of contingencies, adapting to a range of scenarios, including a quarantine, siege, or even kinetic conflict. Taiwan must be ready. 

Energy recommendations for Taiwan 

• Gradually raise electricity and energy prices, communicating that price hikes will persist and require significant adjustments over the medium term.
• Expand the frequency of electricity price reviews from twice a year to a quarterly basis. More frequent price adjustments will allow smaller incremental increases while also enabling Taiwan to respond more quickly to potential contingencies.
• Expand fiscal support for indigenous forms of energy. Demand-side management programs could include virtual power plants, building efficiency measures, two-way air conditioning units, and more. On the supply side, Taiwan should incentivize indigenous energy production, including nuclear energy, onshore wind, offshore wind, and solar.
• Extend the life of Taiwan’s nuclear energy power plants and consider expanding capacity. Nuclear energy is not only Taiwan’s best option for meeting its summer generation needs but also extremely safe and reliable. In the event of a conflict, the PRC is extremely unlikely to launch highly escalatory and provocative attacks against nuclear facilities on territory it seeks to occupy.
• Bolster domestic energy supplies and decarbonization objectives including by considering easing localization requirements for offshore wind projects—while ensuring that PRC components and sensors are not incorporated.
• Disperse and, where possible, harden energy and electricity assets and volumes across the island for both military and civil defense needs.
• Examine potential alternatives to diesel, as diesel inventories can begin to degrade after several weeks, including “long-duration diesel” solutions that, while more polluting, could extend the shelf life of its inventories, enhancing the durability of Taiwan’s military and civil defense efforts.
• Deepen liquified natural gas (LNG) ties with the United States. Contracting with US LNG producers would moderately bolster Taiwan’s energy security, as the PRC would be more reluctant to interdict US cargoes than vessels from other nations.
• Conduct comprehensive studies into energy contingency planning, examining how energy and electricity would be prioritized and rationed during various scenarios.

Enhancing defense resilience

Ever since Beijing leveraged then-Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s August 2022 visit to Taiwan as an excuse to launch large-scale joint blockade military exercises, pundits have labeled the residual military situation around Taiwan as a “new normal.” Yet there is really nothing normal about a permanent presence of People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Navy warships menacingly surrounding the island along its twenty-four nautical mile contiguous zone, and nothing usual about increasing numbers of manned and unmanned military aircraft crossing the tacit median line in the Taiwan Strait—a line that held significance for seven decades as a symbol of cross-strait stability. Nor should it be viewed as normal that a steady stream of high-altitude surveillance balloons—which are suspected of collecting military intelligence—violate Taiwan’s airspace.⁸¹ Some have better described this “new normal” as a strategy akin to an anaconda noticeably tightening its grip around the island, drawing close enough to reduce warning time and provocative enough to raise the risk of inadvertent clashes. In other words, the PRC has unilaterally dialed up a military cost-imposition campaign meant to chip away at peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait, wear down Taiwan’s military, and erode confidence and social cohesion in Taiwan society. 

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 was an additional wake-up call for the citizens of Taiwan, following mainland China’s 2019 crackdown on Hong Kong freedoms, heightening recognition of the risks presented by the PRC and, in particular, that the long-standing status quo in cross-strait relations is no longer acceptable to Beijing. Taiwan thus finds itself in the unenviable position of simultaneously countering PLA gray zone intrusions and cognitive warfare—what NATO calls affecting attitudes and behaviors to gain advantage⁸²—while beefing itself up militarily to deter the growing threat of a blockade or assault.

With this backdrop, Taipei authorities have since embarked on long-overdue reforms in defense affairs, marked by several developments aimed at bolstering the island democracy’s military capabilities and readiness in the face of growing threats from Beijing.

First, Taiwan’s overall defense spending has undergone seven consecutive year-on-year increases, reaching 2.5 percent of gross domestic product.⁸³ While this is commendable, Taiwan’s defense requirements are very substantial, and its budget in US dollars is only $19.1 billion.⁸⁴ Accordingly, it will be important for Taiwan to continue the trend of higher defense spending to at least 3 percent of GDP both to bolster Taiwan’s military capabilities and as a deterrent signal to Beijing—and also to garner international community recognition that Taiwan is serious about its own defense. A key element will be to ensure that Taiwan has sufficient stocks of ammunition and other weapons capabilities to fight effectively until the United States could fully engage and in the event of a longer war. One area that deserves a high degree of attention is defense against ballistic and cruise missiles and unmanned vehicles. Especially in light of the recent coalition success in defeating such Iranian attacks against Israel, planning should be undertaken to assure comparable success for Taiwan against PRC attacks. Adding mobile, short-range air defenses to the high-priority list of military investments for Taiwan—such as the highly mobile National Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile System (NASAMS)⁸⁵—will make it harder for the PLA to find and destroy Taiwan defenses, especially if combined with passive means for target detection and missile guidance.

Second, the new president can kick-start an enhanced approach to defense by embracing full integration of public-private innovation and adopting Ukraine’s model of grass-roots innovation for defense, which has served it well through a decade of war against a much larger Russia. Recognizing that innovation is itself a form of resilience, Taiwan can draw valuable lessons from Ukraine, particularly in leveraging private-sector expertise. By implementing what some Ukrainian defense experts term a “capability accelerator” to integrate emerging technologies into mission-focused capabilities, Taiwan can enhance its resilience and swiftly adapt to evolving security challenges, including rapidly fielding a high volume of unmanned systems to achieve distributed surveillance, redundant command and control, and higher survivability.⁸⁶ This comprehensive approach, which recognizes the private sector as the greatest source of innovation in today’s complex security environment, holds significant potential for enhancing Taiwan’s defense capabilities through the utilization of disruptive technologies. The island’s overall resilience would significantly benefit by drawing the private sector in as a direct stakeholder in national defense matters. 

Ukraine’s grass-roots model of defense innovation, spearheaded by volunteers, nongovernment organizations, and international partners, is a worthy and timely model for Taiwan. Ukraine’s approach has yielded significant advancements in drone warfare, as well as sophisticated capabilities like the Delta battlefield management system—a user-friendly cloud-based situational awareness tool that provides real-time information on enemy and friendly forces through the integration of data from sources such as drones, satellites, and even civilian reports.⁸⁷ This collaborative model, reliant on cooperation between civilian developers and military end users, has propelled Ukraine’s military technological revolution by integrating intelligence and surveillance tasks, while enhancing decision-making and kill-chain target acquisition. Taiwan will benefit from a comparable approach.

Third, as suggested above, Taiwan should focus a large portion of its defense budget on low-cost, highly effective systems. In terms of force structure, it appears that Taiwan has settled on a design that blends large legacy platforms of a twentieth-century military with the introduction of more survivable and distributable low-end asymmetric capabilities. The latter are best exemplified by Taiwan’s indigenously produced Ta Chiang-class of high-speed, guided-missile corvettes (PGG) and Min Jiang-class fast mine laying boats (FMLB).⁸⁸ But much more must be done to bolster Taiwan’s overall defense capabilities by focusing on less expensive, but nonetheless highly effective systems.

In Ukraine’s battle against Russian Federation invaders, drones have provided Ukrainian forces with important tactical capabilities by enabling them to gather intelligence, monitor enemy movements, and conduct precision strikes on high-value targets. Taiwan can comparably utilize low-cost UAVs to establish mesh networks that connect devices for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance and for targeting that would be invaluable in countering a PRC amphibious assault. Lessons from Ukraine further highlight the importance of having the right mix of drone types and capabilities in substantial stockpiles, capable of a variety of missions. Notably, Ukrainian officials have called for the production of more than one million domestically produced drones in 2024.⁸⁹ Then-President Tsai’s formation of a civilian-led “drone national team” program is a commendable step in this direction and underscores the power of collaborative innovation in joint efforts between  users.⁹⁰ Encouraging cooperation between Taiwan drone makers and US private industry will accelerate the development of a combat-ready unmanned systems fleet with sufficient range, endurance, and payload to enhance situational awareness and battlefield effects. 

Concurrent with those efforts utilizing unmanned systems, Taiwan should bolster its naval mining capabilities as a strategic measure against PRC aggression. Naval mines represent one of the most cost-effective and immediately impactful layers of defense.⁹¹ In this regard, Taiwan’s new Min Jiang class of FMLB represents the right type of investments in capabilities which could prove pivotal in thwarting potential invasion attempts.

Even more significantly for a Taiwan audience, Ukraine broke a blockade of its Black Sea ports using a combination of naval drones and coastal defense missiles—and repelled the once-mighty Russian Black Sea Fleet—all without a traditional navy of its own.⁹² Faced with clear intent by a PLA Navy practicing daily to isolate the island, the time is past due for Taiwanese authorities to hone their own counterblockade skills including a heavy reliance on unmanned surface vehicles. 

Taiwan should also make rapid investments in port infrastructure and defenses along Taiwan’s eastern seaboard in places such as Su’ao and Hualien harbors, which can serve as deepwater ports that are accessible, strategic, antiblockade strongpoints, and where any conceivable PLA blockade would be at its weakest and most vulnerable point logistically. Su’ao harbor, as a potential future homeport for Taiwan’s new indigenous Hai Kun-class diesel submarines, could also serve a dual purpose as an experimentation and development zone for public-private collaboration on unmanned-systems employment and operations. Infrastructure investments in East Coast ports could enhance the island’s ability to attain emergency resupply of energy, food, humanitarian supplies, and munitions under all conditions, broadening options for international community aid and complicating PLA efforts.

Fourth, every new capability needs trained operators who are empowered to employ and engage.  This year Taiwan began implementation of a new, one-year conscript training system for male adults born after January 1, 2005 (up from a wholly inadequate four months of conscription in the past decade).⁹³ Taiwan’s “all-out defense” plan realigns into a frontline main battle force consisting of all-volunteer career military personnel, backed up by a standing garrison force composed mainly of conscripted military personnel guarding infrastructure, along with a civil defense system integrated with local governments and private-sector resources. Upon mobilization, there would also be a reserve force to supplement the main battle and garrison forces. 

According to details laid out in its 2023 National Defense Report, Taiwan’s revamped one-year conscript system and reorganized reserve mobilization system place significant emphasis on traditional military combat skills, such as rifle marksmanship and operation of mortars.⁹⁴ However, in response to evolving security challenges and the changing nature of warfare, Taiwan’s military should incorporate greater training in emerging technologies and unconventional tactics, along with decentralized command and control, especially in the areas of drone warfare, where unmanned aerial vehicles and surface vessels play a crucial role in reconnaissance, surveillance, and targeted strikes. By integrating drone warfare training into the conscript system as well as in annual reserve call-up training, Taiwan can better prepare its military personnel to adapt to modern battlefield environments and effectively counter emerging threats.

Integrating drone operations into military operations down to the conscript and reservist level offers a cost-effective means to enhance battlefield situational awareness and operational capabilities, and also has the added benefit of enhancing the attractiveness and value of a mandatory conscription system emerging from years of low morale and characterized by Taiwan’s outgoing president as “insufficient” and “full of outmoded training.”⁹⁵ Recognizing the imperative to modernize military training to face up to a rapidly expanding PLA threat, Taiwan’s military force realignment plan came with a promise to “include training in the use of Stinger missiles, Javelin missiles, Kestrel rockets, drones, and other new types of weapons . . . in accordance with mission requirements to meet the needs of modern warfare.”⁹⁶ Looking at the example of Ukraine, where drones have been utilized, underscores the importance of incorporating drone warfare training into its asymmetric strategy.

The Taiwan Enhanced Resilience Act “prioritize[d] realistic training” by the United States, with Taiwan authorizing “an enduring rotational United States military presence that assists Taiwan in maintaining force readiness.”⁹⁷ There have been numerous reports of US special forces in Taiwan,⁹⁸ and those forces could provide training in tactical air control, dynamic targeting, urban warfare, and comparable capabilities.⁹⁹ Likewise, parts of an Army Security Force Assistance Brigade could do similar work on a rotational basis, on- or off-island.

To facilitate a comprehensive and integrated approach to defense planning and preparedness between the military, government agencies, and civilian organizations, Taiwan has also established the All-out Defense Mobilization Agency, which (as noted above) is a centralized body subordinate to the Ministry of National Defense that is tasked with coordinating efforts across various sectors, down to the local level, to enhance national defense readiness. That agency would be significantly more effective if raised to the national level with a broadened mandate as part of a comprehensive approach.

The Taiwanese leadership also should consider elevating their efforts to create a large-scale civil defense force, offering practical skills training which would appeal to Taiwanese willing to dedicate time and effort toward defense of their communities and localities. These skills could include emergency medical training, casualty evacuation, additive manufacturing, drone flying, and open-source intelligence. Private, nonprofit civil defense organizations such as Taiwan’s Kuma Academy hold widespread appeal to citizens seeking to enhance basic preparedness skills.¹⁰⁰ With a curriculum that covers topics ranging from basic first aid to cognitive warfare, Kuma Academy’s popular classes typically sell out within minutes of going online. According to a recent survey of domestic Taiwan opinions sponsored by Spirit of America, “When facing external threats, 75.3% of the people agree that Taiwanese citizens have an obligation to defend Taiwan.”¹⁰¹ A well-trained civil defense force and other whole-of-society resilience measures provide an additional layer of defense and enhance social cohesion to better deny Beijing’s ultimate political objective of subjugating the will of the people.

Defense resilience recommendations for Taiwan

• Raise defense spending to at least 3 percent of GDP.
• Adopt Ukraine’s model of grass-roots innovation in defense.
• Focus a large portion of its defense budget on low-cost, highly effective systems including unmanned vehicles and naval mines.
• Incorporate greater training in emerging technologies and unconventional tactics for conscripts and reserves.
• Invest in East Coast port infrastructure as counterblockade strongholds.
• Elevate the All-out Defense Mobilization Agency to the national level and implement a larger civil defense force that fully integrates civilian agencies and local governments.

Conclusion

On April 3, 2024, Taiwan was struck by the strongest earthquake in twenty-five years. In the face of this magnitude 7.4 quake, Taiwan’s response highlights the effectiveness of robust investment in stricter building codes, earthquake alert systems, and resilience policies, resulting in minimal casualties and low infrastructure damage.¹⁰² Taiwan’s precarious position on the seismically vulnerable Ring of Fire, a belt of volcanoes around the Pacific Ocean, mirrors its vulnerability under constant threat of military and gray zone aggression from a mainland China seeking seismic changes in geopolitical power. Drawing from its success in preparing for and mitigating the impact of natural disasters, Taiwan can apply a similarly proactive approach in its defense preparedness. Safeguarding Taiwan’s sovereignty and security requires investments in a comprehensive security strategy for resilience across society—including cybersecurity for critical infrastructures, bolstering energy security, and enhanced defense resilience. Such an approach would provide Taiwan the greatest likelihood of deterring or, if necessary, defeating PRC aggression including through blockade or kinetic conflict. 

About the authors

Franklin D. Kramer is a distinguished fellow at the Atlantic Council and a member of its board. He is a former US assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs.

Philip Yu is a nonresident senior fellow in the Indo-Pacific Security Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, and a retired US Navy rear admiral. 

Joseph Webster is a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Global Energy Center, a nonresident senior fellow in the Indo-Pacific Security Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, and editor of the independent China-Russia Report.

Elizabeth “Beth” Sizeland is a nonresident senior fellow at the Scowcroft Strategy Initiative of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. Earlier, she served in the United Kingdom’s government including as deputy national security adviser and as adviser to the UK prime minister on intelligence, security, and resilience issues.

This analysis reflects the personal opinions of the authors.

Acknowledgments

The authors would like to thank the following individuals for their helpful comments and feedback: Amber Lin, Elsie Hung, Kwangyin Liu, and Alison O’Neil.

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In May, NATO published a thirty-three-page report by a group of experts on the Alliance’s “southern neighborhood,” which includes North Africa, the Sahel, the Middle East, and the Mediterranean Sea. The experts’ report highlights how instability from these regions has a direct impact on allies and suggests several important considerations as the Alliance finalizes its southern flank strategy in Washington. The report is a great start and should be read carefully, but NATO needs to take four additional measures if it genuinely wants to improve the situation on the Alliance’s southern flank.

Why look south?

Why should NATO spend time and energy on a southern flank strategy when it faces such a clear and present threat to the east? NATO’s 2022 strategic concept, adopted at the Madrid summit, outlines two fundamental threats the Alliance faces. The strategic concept declares that Russia is the “most significant and direct threat” to allies’ security and that terrorism is the “most direct asymmetric threat” to the security of citizens, international peace, and prosperity. As US Ambassador to NATO Julianne Smith recently noted, Russia and terrorist groups benefit from and contribute to instability in NATO’s southern neighborhoods and provide the central reason why the Alliance needs a southern flank strategy.

Russia’s Africa Corps (the successor to the Wagner Group in Africa) has taken advantage of instability in these neighborhoods, providing fighters, trainers, and materiel in Libya, Mali, Sudan, and Burkina Faso. Russia has a naval base in Tartus, Syria, and uses it to sail its vessels in the Mediterranean, posing a threat to naval security and maritime commerce. Instability in the Middle East, North Africa, and the Sahel has also provided an environment where radical Islamic terrorist groups expanded in recent decades. Instability in Iraq and Syria allowed the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) to establish a large territorial footprint across those countries. Recent research suggests that the Sahel region has become the global epicenter of Islamic radical terrorism. Left unchecked, instability in NATO’s southern neighborhood translates into opportunities for Russian intervention and metastasized terrorist groups. This instability also drives other important problems for NATO’s southern flank allies: irregular migration, drug smuggling, piracy, and organized crime, which, in turn, threaten energy security (especially as European countries have moved away from Russian oil and gas) and maritime commerce.

Getting concrete with the recommendations

At NATO’s 2023 Vilnius summit, the allies agreed to engage in a “comprehensive and deep reflection on existing and emerging threats and challenges” emanating from the southern neighborhoods. In October 2023, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg appointed a group of eleven experts to provide “concrete recommendations to shape NATO’s future approach.”

Released on May 7, the report includes recommendations that can be grouped in four basic categories.

First, it makes several overarching organizational suggestions. These include the appointment of a special envoy for the southern neighborhoods, periodic review of NATO’s relationship with the southern neighborhoods, and a better integration of NATO’s Strategic Direction-South Hub in Naples within the NATO structure to strengthen the link between the hub and the Alliance’s political leadership.

Second, the report suggests strengthening dialogue with and about the southern neighborhoods, as well as enhancing cooperation with relevant regional and international organizations. Specifically, it recommends a special summit of all NATO’s southern partners (members of the Mediterranean Dialogue and Istanbul Cooperation Initiative), the creation of a high-level regional security and stability dialogue, and improved consultation with the European Union and representation from the African Union.

Third, the report suggests several important strategic communications measures, recognizing that NATO’s image in the region—in part due to Russian misinformation campaigns—needs improvement. The report proposes a permanent “Facts for Peace” initiative to fight disinformation in the southern neighborhoods and the establishment of a center with the same mission.  

Fourth, the report discusses areas where NATO should expand its capacity to act. For example, NATO could set up a standing mission dedicated to training and capacity building for partners. NATO might also enhance cooperation with partners on resilience, which would include information and advice on resilience planning, including on disaster response. The report also suggests that NATO build on recent successes in counterpiracy and “identify further areas for maritime security cooperation” with partners.

This group of experts’ recommendations are detailed and thoughtful. Leaders of NATO’s member states would do well to implement most if not all of them. But four additional steps should be added to form an effective southern flank strategy.

Four steps forward

In releasing his fiscal 2024 budget, US President Joe Biden shared a quote that he attributed to his father. “Don’t tell me what you value,” he said. “Show me your budget—and I’ll tell you what you value.”

If NATO truly cares about addressing the challenges in its southern neighborhoods, then it should be willing to incur the costs to do so. If NATO adopts a southern flank strategy at the Washington summit that entails real increases in spending on the Alliance’s activities in the region, it will signal to Russia and to the leaders of terrorist groups that it cares enough about the southern neighborhoods to invest resources there. In agreeing to increased spending, NATO would also signal to southern flank member governments and their publics that the Alliance is willing to incur the costs for something other than defense of its eastern flank.

Moreover, the Alliance’s additional spending should focus on four specific areas:  

First, NATO members should commit significantly more resources to Operation Sea Guardian and its three tasks, which are to contribute to maritime capacity building with regional partners, maintain maritime situational awareness, and support maritime counterterrorism. All three tasks are means to directly address the threats from Russia and terrorism in the southern neighborhoods.

Second, NATO should commit to an amply resourced training and capacity-building mission for the southern neighborhoods, and it should look for local partners interested in receiving such assistance.

Third, NATO should commit the resources to stand up a multinational division for the southern flank, which would be available for deployment to a crisis in the region if necessary and appropriate.

Fourth, at the Washington summit, allies should commit to increase funding for the Defense Against Terrorism Programme of Work, which aims to protect against and prevent nonconventional attacks, such as attacks on critical infrastructure and terrorist attacks using emerging and disruptive technologies.

If allies agree to these four recommendations as well as to the group of experts’ recommendations, they will demonstrate to all parties that the southern neighborhoods are of great interest and they will be engaging in meaningful steps to improve stability there.

Jason Davidson is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Transatlantic Security Initiative in the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. He is also professor of political science and international affairs and director of the Security and Conflict Studies Program at the University of Mary Washington in Fredericksburg, Virginia.

NATO’s seventy-fifth anniversary is a milestone in a remarkable story of reinvention, adaptation, and unity. However, as the Alliance seeks to secure its future for the next seventy-five years, it faces the revanchism of old rivals, escalating strategic competition, and uncertainties over the future of the rules-based international order.

With partners and allies turning attention from celebrations to challenges, the Atlantic Council’s Transatlantic Security Initiative invited contributors to engage with the most pressing concerns ahead of the historic Washington summit and chart a path for the Alliance’s future. This series will feature seven essays focused on concrete issues that NATO must address at the Washington summit and five essays that examine longer-term challenges the Alliance must confront to ensure transatlantic security.

The post Four steps that NATO’s southern flank strategy needs to succeed appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On May 20, Forward Defense nonresident senior fellow Marc Polymeropoulos spoke on a Cipher Brief podcast titled “Is Russia Attacking U.S. Government Employees Using High-Energy Weapons?” about Havana Syndrome.

Fellow

Marc Polymeropoulos

Nonresident Senior Fellow

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Afghanistan Europe & Eurasia

Forward Defense, housed within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, generates ideas and connects stakeholders in the defense ecosystem to promote an enduring military advantage for the United States, its allies, and partners. Our work identifies the defense strategies, capabilities, and resources the United States needs to deter and, if necessary, prevail in future conflict.

Learn more

The post Polymeropoulos on a Cipher Brief podcast about Havana Syndrome appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On May 5, Forward Defense nonresident senior fellow Marc Polymeropoulos was cited in a Spectator article by John Foreman about Havana Syndrome.

Fellow

Marc Polymeropoulos

Nonresident Senior Fellow

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Afghanistan Europe & Eurasia

Forward Defense, housed within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, generates ideas and connects stakeholders in the defense ecosystem to promote an enduring military advantage for the United States, its allies, and partners. Our work identifies the defense strategies, capabilities, and resources the United States needs to deter and, if necessary, prevail in future conflict.

Learn more

The post Polymeropoulos cited in The Spectator “Is Havana Syndrome real?” appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On May 5, Forward Defense Director Clementine Starling and Atlantic Council Board Director General James E. Cartwright, USMC (Ret.), published commentary in Defense One about the value that special operations forces (SOF) have in today’s great power competition.

They argued that SOF should reinforce not only their direct-action capabilities, but also the indirect competencies—special reconnaissance, unconventional warfare, foreign internal defense, civil affairs operations, military information support operations, and security force assistance—that can be employed both before, during, and after different phases of conflict. Starling and Cartwright emphasized that enhancing the role special operations forces in strategic competition requires the national security enterprise to support a new image of special operators as valuable enablers and a not just a last-minute force for avoiding escalation.

Staff

Clementine G. Starling-Daniels

Director, Forward Defense

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Security & Defense NATO

Forward Defense, housed within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, generates ideas and connects stakeholders in the defense ecosystem to promote an enduring military advantage for the United States, its allies, and partners. Our work identifies the defense strategies, capabilities, and resources the United States needs to deter and, if necessary, prevail in future conflict.

Learn more

Report

Mar 7, 2024

Stealth, speed, and adaptability: The role of special operations forces in strategic competition

By Clementine G. Starling and Alyxandra Marine

Clementine G. Starling and Alyxandra Marine discuss how special operations forces enhance US readiness in an era of strategic competition.

Conflict Defense Policy

New Atlanticist

Apr 19, 2024

Great power competition is back. What does that mean for US special operations forces?

By Alyxandra Marine

With their wide array of capabilities, US special operations forces can play a central role in strategic competition.

China Conflict

The post Starling and Gen. Cartwright publish in Defense One emphasizing the value of a new image for special operations forces appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On May 1, Forward Defense nonresident senior fellow Marc Polymeropoulos spoke to CNN about his frustration with the Trump administration’s handling of Havana Syndrome as a victim and outspoken advocate.

Fellow

Marc Polymeropoulos

Nonresident Senior Fellow

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Afghanistan Europe & Eurasia

Forward Defense, housed within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, generates ideas and connects stakeholders in the defense ecosystem to promote an enduring military advantage for the United States, its allies, and partners. Our work identifies the defense strategies, capabilities, and resources the United States needs to deter and, if necessary, prevail in future conflict.

Learn more

The post Polymeropoulos quoted by CNN about growing frustration with Havana Syndrome recognition for victims appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On April 28, Forward Defense nonresident senior fellow Marc Polymeropoulos was cited on 60 minutes Australia and nine.com about his struggles with Havana Syndrome symptoms.

Forward Defense, housed within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, generates ideas and connects stakeholders in the defense ecosystem to promote an enduring military advantage for the United States, its allies, and partners. Our work identifies the defense strategies, capabilities, and resources the United States needs to deter and, if necessary, prevail in future conflict.

Learn more

The post Polymeropoulos cited in 60 minutes Australia and nine.com about Havana Syndrome appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On April 18, Forward Defense Nonresident Senior Fellow Thomas X. Hammes was referenced in a Georgetown Security Studies Review piece titled “From Sling and Stone to Autonomous Drone? Key Questions for Determining Whether Autonomy Favors Davids or Goliaths,” about autonomous military systems (AMS) favoring conventionally “weaker” or poorer actors.

Fellow

Thomas X. Hammes

Nonresident Senior Fellow

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Conflict Defense Industry

Forward Defense, housed within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, generates ideas and connects stakeholders in the defense ecosystem to promote an enduring military advantage for the United States, its allies, and partners. Our work identifies the defense strategies, capabilities, and resources the United States needs to deter and, if necessary, prevail in future conflict.

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The post Idlbi quoted in Arabi 21 on new US captagon law appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On April 10, Forward Defense Nonresident Senior Fellow Michael Groen spoke at the 2024 US Cyber Command Legal Conference about implementing AI and balancing risk with defense innovation.

Fellow

Michael Groen

Nonresident Senior Fellow

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Defense Policy Defense Technologies

Forward Defense, housed within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, generates ideas and connects stakeholders in the defense ecosystem to promote an enduring military advantage for the United States, its allies, and partners. Our work identifies the defense strategies, capabilities, and resources the United States needs to deter and, if necessary, prevail in future conflict.

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The post Groen at 2024 US Cyber Command Legal Conference on AI risks and innovation appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On February 1, Transatlantic Security Initiative nonresident senior fellow Valbona Zeneli was quoted by Voice of America on Russia’s and China’s influence in the Western Balkans. 

Fellow

Valbona Zeneli

Nonresident Senior Fellow

Europe Center Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Albanian Corruption

The Transatlantic Security Initiative, in the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, shapes and influences the debate on the greatest security challenges facing the North Atlantic Alliance and its key partners.

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The post Zeneli quoted by Voice of America on Russian and Chinese influence in the Western Balkans appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Table of contents

I. Introduction

Economic sanctions are designed to throttle the sanctioned country’s business activities and make daily life so cumbersome that its citizens and eventually its rulers begin questioning the country’s policies. That’s also what Western governments are trying to achieve through their sanctions against Russia, including the oil price cap introduced in December 2022 by a coalition including the Group of Seven countries and the European Union.¹ They and other Western countries already promised to phase out Russian crude oil from their own markets. The price cap, which barred Western shipping and insurance companies from involvement in Russian crude exports above $60 per barrel, was intended to significantly reduce Russia’s oil exports and thus its revenues. They and other Western countries already promised to phase out Russian crude oil from their own markets. The price cap, which barred Western shipping and insurance companies from involvement in Russian crude exports above $60 per barrel, was intended to significantly reduce Russia’s oil exports and thus its revenues.

But Russia has been successful in circumventing these sanctions, especially through its extensive use of so-called shadow vessels, which are old and lack proper insurance. These vessels play a role in the gray zone, state-linked aggression below the threshold of armed military violence.² That results in considerable expense for vessels they damage and the countries in whose waters the accidents occur. The dark fleet has already begun causing incidents—from the Bay of Gibraltar to the waters of China, Cuba, and Indonesia, to name a few—and the calamities will quickly mount, not just because the shadow fleet is growing rapidly but also because it is aging, making the vessels increasingly susceptible to malfunction.

II. Background

The shadow fleet, also known as the dark fleet, comprises mostly aging ships that sail without the industry’s standard Western insurance, have opaque ownership, frequently change their names and flag registrations, and generally operate outside maritime regulations. Because the world lacks a maritime police, vessels have operated in this manner for practically as long as there has been an organized maritime industry. However, in recent decades, as Western governments have imposed economic sanctions on Iran, North Korea, and Venezuela, the fleet has become an established phenomenon. Indeed, the three countries have perfected the use of such ships, which transport all manner of goods. The fleets thus ensure a tolerable existence for the sanctioned countries’ citizens in addition to generating revenues for hostile activities such as Iran’s nuclear program. (Regular shipping lines don’t transport sanctioned goods as Western insurance would not insure such cargo.)

In the months since Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, vessels have joined the shadow fleet at an extraordinary rate. Twelve months into the war, the fleet had grown to some 600 tankers and other types of vessels. According to the commodity trading firm Trafigura, some 400 crude-oil tankers were among the vessels that had gone dark—some 20 percent of the world’s total crude-oil fleet.³ In a subsequent report, the analytics firms Vortexa and Windward estimated the number of dark vessels at 1,100. The firms also noted that the Russia’s war on Ukraine had triggered the emergence of a smaller category of noncompliant vessels, the “gray fleet,” which haven’t gone completely dark but whose ownership and sanctions compliance are difficult to ascertain: the gray fleet encompasses some 900 vessels, they estimated. That meant that the dark fleet made up ten percent of the global wet cargo fleet (i.e., carrying liquids), while the gray fleet accounted for eight percent.⁴ And the fleet kept growing rapidly: by October 2023, Windward raised its estimate of the dark fleet to 1,400 vessels, up from 1,100.⁵ But in reality, nobody knows for certain how many shadow vessels there are. In December 2023, Vortexa calculated that 1,649 vessels have operated in the opaque market since January 2021, including 1,089 tankers transporting Russian crude.⁶

The existence of the shadow fleet matters greatly, not just because the vessels are old but also because they don’t comply with the rules that govern maritime operations. Several aspects are of particular significance:

• Shadow vessels lack Western protection and indemnity insurance. P&I insurance is the industry standard; other types of insurance—such as the alternative schemes offered by the Russian and Iranian governments—are highly insufficient.⁷ By October 2023, two thirds of tankers carrying Russian crude oil were insured by “unknown.”⁸
• Shadow vessels’ owners are based in non-Western countries and disguise their identities through complex arrangements. In many cases, they are entirely new outfits that even lack an address.
• Because new vessels are too valuable to use in the risky shadow fleet, dark vessels are old. Indeed, the rise of the shadow fleet has kept old vessels in traffic. Before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, vessels more than twenty years old made up three percent of the global tanker fleet. Their share is now expected to rise to 11 percent by 2025.⁹
• Since they operate outside established maritime regulations, shadow vessels don’t undergo regular maintenance.
• Shadow vessels engage in risky ship-to-ship transfers of sanctioned cargo.
• To disguise their activity, shadow vessels frequently turn off automatic identification systems (AIS).¹⁰

III. Changes in tanker traffic from Russia

IV. Shadow fleet incidents and accidents

The nature of the shadow fleet’s aging and poorly maintained vessels makes incidents and accidents far more likely than is the case in regular shipping. Incidents are also made more likely by the fact that the vessels turn off their AIS, which means authorities and other vessels don’t know their location. The fact that the vessels frequently engage in risky ship-to-ship transfers further adds to the risk of incidents.

These risks matter because the shadow vessels lack proper insurance. In case of an incident involving a legally operating vessel, that vessel (through its insurer) is likely to have to pay. “The little piece of paper a dark ship may have that says it’s insured is not worth the paper it’s written on,” Simon Lockwood, a maritime executive with the insurance broker WTW, said in conversation with the author for a Politico Europe article in October 2023; incidents involving a legally operating vessel and a dark one are “like having a crash with an uninsured driver,” he added.¹³ If the incident involves only the dark vessel, the country in whose territorial waters or exclusive economic zone the incident occurs faces having to handle it without financial contribution from an insurer. With P&I, Lockwood noted, “there’s protection if there’s an incident. If a shadow fleet tanker breaks up in the English Channel, who pays? The UK and French taxpayers will have to pay.”¹⁴

That makes it extremely important to track dark fleet incidents. Such monitoring provides insight into the vessels involved and the type of incidents caused, which can be used for forward planning. It is, indeed, vital for governments and legally operating shipping companies to have a clear picture of vessels and accidents involving the shadow fleet, and it’s equally important for environmental organizations and seafarer welfare organizations to have a comprehensive understanding of the accidents.

Within just a few hours on February 20, 2023, for example, two shadow fleet tankers got into difficulty in the Bay of Gibraltar and had to be aided by tugs and a salvage ship. Both tankers had recently changed names and flag registrations, one to Palau, the other to Gabon.¹⁵ Without the vessels having proper insurance, taxpayers faced having to pick up the tab. A few months before that, the Cuban-flagged tanker Petion, carrying sanctioned Venezuelan oil, collided with another vessel off the coast of Cuba.¹⁶ In March 2022, the Panama-flagged tanker Arzoyi ran aground off the Chinese port of Qingdao.¹⁷ In May 2023, the Gabon-flagged tanker Pablo caught fire off the coast off Malaysia. Malaysian authorities responded to the incident, rescued the crew (though three could not be located) and extinguished the fire.¹⁸ In October 2023, the twenty-six-year-old Cameroon-flagged tanker Turba, which had its last inspection in 2017, lost engine power some 300 kilometers off the coast of Indonesia.¹⁹ And in December, Indonesian salvage teams had to rescue a twenty-three-year-old Cameroon-flagged shadow vessel carrying Venezuelan oil.²⁰

Worldwide maritime salvage operations are conducted using the Lloyd’s Open Form, under which a vessel’s owner accepts an offer from a salvage company to recover a vessel that is no longer operational.²¹ The salvage company conducts the recovery in exchange for a reward, typically part of the proceeds from the sale of the vessel or what remains of it. But the Lloyd’s Open Form depends on a vessel having a bona fide owner that can be located in case of an incident. As we have seen, shadow vessels typically don’t. At the time of writing, the charred skeleton of the Pablo remains off the coast of Malaysia.²²

If no salvage company is willing to remove the Pablo (either because no owner can be located or because the owner won’t agree to signing a Lloyd’s Open Form), the Malaysian taxpayer is likely to have to fund her removal. This expense would join those already incurred as Malaysian authorities responded to the explosion. The Malaysian taxpayer also faces footing the bill for the removal of the oil leaked by the Pablo; fortunately the vessel only carried a small amount of crude as she had just made a delivery. Although the International Oil Pollution Compensation Funds (IOPC Funds) provide financial compensation for oil tanker spills in its member states, it’s not yet clear whether it will compensate coastal states for spills by shadow tankers.

V. Can countries block the dark fleet?

According to my figures, some four dozen incidents involving suspected shadow vessels have already taken place. The incidents feature the same types of calamities: fires, engine failures, collisions, loss of steerage, and oil spills. Each time such an accident occurs, another vessel’s insurer or a government has had to cover most of the expenses involved. As the shadow fleet continues to grow, age, and cause more incidents, these expenses will grow rapidly. For the authorities of the countries in whose waters the incidents occur, the burden of carrying out many more incident responses will continue to climb.

In an interview, Wang outlined the vast scope of the burden for coastal nations, citing the International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue:

• If you have a ship in distress, the coastal state has obligations according to the search and rescue convention. The entire globe is divided into thirteen search and rescue zones. Australia and New Zealand, for example, have search and rescue obligations pretty much all the way down to the Antarctic. No matter where you are, if you’re in distress a specific coastal state will have Search and Rescue responsibility. That means that as a coastal state you’re obliged to save persons distress if the vessel is within your geographic area of responsibility. You can’t start speculating whether it has insurance.²⁸

For the environment, the likely growth in shadow vessel incidents poses a similarly large burden. Because most of the shadow vessels carry oil, the risk of oil spills is concrete. The Pablo oil spill was relatively minor because she had just made a delivery, but other shadow vessels are likely to catch fire, explode, or collide carrying significant amounts of oil. Countries’ authorities may also be reluctant to ban entry under the “Intervention Convention, since the vessel’s owner can demand compensation on the basis that an entry ban is too harsh.²⁹ The country in whose waters the accident occurs thus faces the burden and expense of cleaning the spill up, and its maritime environment will face the harm caused even by a cleaned-up oil spill. Even if IOPC decides to provide compensation for oil spills caused by dark vessels, it’s unlikely to be able to sustain the regular oil spills that are likely to be caused by the fleet.³⁰

VI. The shadow fleet and sanctions: Harm and gray zone aggression

The shadow fleet poses mounting risks to other vessels, to coastal countries, and to countries in whose search and rescue areas of responsibility the vessels may have incidents. Already a risk when the fleet was relatively small and primarily serviced Iran and Venezuela, its explosive growth since early 2022 means it’s likely to cause far more extensive harm to other ships (and their owners and insurers) and to countries in whose waters it sails.

The incidents and accidents caused by shadow vessels are, one might argue, a by-product of sanctioned countries’ efforts to keep their economies afloat. Seen from that perspective, fires, explosions, collisions, mechanical failures, and oil spills involving dark vessels are accidental harm.

But Russia is also instrumentalizing the dark fleet, using it especially as a primary conveyor of oil exports. If it acted in good faith, the Russian government could issue insurance covering all the damage dark vessels are likely to cause and introduce mandatory maintenance for the vessels. It could, in other words, ensure that the shadow fleet operates on safety and insurance standards similar to those of the legal fleet.

Russian authorities, though, have done no such thing. Instead they (like the governments of Iran, North Korea, and Venezuela) build the country’s economic well-being on a fleet that causes financial and environmental harm wherever the vessels go. The countries and companies facing the bills, meanwhile, can do little to prevent the vessels from traversing territorial waters, EEZs, and especially the high seas: there is no official list of dark vessels and governments would be loath to risk escalation with Russia.

The shadow fleet, in fact, seems intended not just to transport goods to and from Russia but to cause harm to other countries. The countries that have chosen to trade with Russia by means of shadow vessels clearly do so in the knowledge that such vessels can cause incidents in their waters, but they evidently calculate that the benefits of sanctions-busting trade with Russia outweigh the costs of potential shadow-vessel incidents.

Countries that don’t utilize the shadow fleet but whose waters the vessels use are the real victims of the shadow activities. Denmark and Norway, located on the shadow vessels’ routes to and from Russia, are prime examples—one maritime insurer calculates that twelve shadow vessels pass through Norwegian waters on an average day³¹–but so are the random countries in whose waters the vessels perform ship-to-ship (STS) transfers.

The Norwegian Coastal Administration told me it has seen significant changes in traffic with crude oil tankers from Russia through the Baltic Sea.³² This route originates in Russia’s Baltic ports of Saint Petersburg, Primorsk, and Kaliningrad and ends in the North Sea, from where the vessels travel to their final destinations. It goes through the Baltic Sea, which includes Swedish, Finnish, Estonian, Latvian, Lithuanian, and Polish waters, but primarily Danish waters, as the route continues through the Great Belt and Skagerrak, and on to the waters north of Denmark and south of Norway and then the North Sea. (The Great Belt is considered an international strait, though it’s administered by Denmark, which also provides optional pilotage.) Vessels departing Russia’s Arctic ports can also sail around Norway’s North Cape and south along the Norwegian coast. According to analysis by the Norwegian Coastal Administration, most crude oil tankers use the Baltic Sea route, which puts Denmark in particular at risk of oil spills and other incidents.³³ Since 2022, the tankers traveling the Baltic Sea route have grown in both size and length.³⁴

In particular, the Norwegian Coastal Administration found that within a few months of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the sailing pattern of the tanker fleet from Russian Baltic Sea ports had changed. Transport of crude oil had increased, and the oil was being transported over longer distances. The Norwegian Coastal Administration considers it likely that part of the oil leaving Russia’s Baltic ports is being transshipped—delivered to other tankers through STS transfers—several times before reaching a final destination. Some of the tankers monitored by the Norwegian Coastal Administration show unexplained stops in the Mediterranean and the Arabian Seas, which suggests likely ship-to-ship activities.³⁵

The US government has sought to remind countries and ports that receive shadow vessels of the costs and environmental harm that could result, but this has not led to any significant change in behavior. In October 2023, the US Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), which administers US economic sanctions, sanctioned one shadow vessel operator based in the United Arab Emirates and another one based in Turkey, along with two vessels operated by them.³⁶ In early December OFAC sanctioned another three operators and three vessels, while the United Kingdom sanctioned twenty-one vessels.³⁷ That, though, still leaves virtually all dark ships in operation, and as long as Western sanctions against Russia remain, more ships will enter the dark fleet. A few days after the December sanctions were imposed, one of the vessels sanctioned by OFAC—which flies the Liberian flag and whose owner owns no other vessels—was found loitering in international waters off Malta.³⁸

The International Maritime Organization (IMO) also has tried to address the problems caused by the parallel fleet. Ahead of the IMO Assembly’s semiannual meeting in November-December 2023, a group of IMO member states submitted a draft IMO Assembly resolution that would oblige member states to take action. Iran, however, objected to the resolution, especially the use of terms like “dark ship” or “illicit,” which Iran noted are not defined in international law. The country—which has an obvious interest in allowing the dark fleet to continue to operate—instead proposed that the IMO improve the standards for ship-to-ship transfers.³⁹ In the end, the IMO Assembly adopted a resolution calling on flag states to “adhere to measures which lawfully prohibit or regulate” ship-to-ship transfers. The resolution also stipulated that ships update their operation plans for STS transfers, “especially if engaged in a mid-ocean transfer with another vessel,” and recommended that port states conduct enhanced inspections on suspected shadow vessels.⁴⁰

But even though the resolution is hardly burdensome, countries and ships can choose to ignore it. “Maybe the solution is to pass regulation on ship acquisitions. But ship ownership has been difficult to monitor, because the demand for transport contraband will always be there,” Wang observed.⁴¹ In November 2023, the European Commission proposed banning the sale of crude oil tankers to Russia. Under the proposal, the sale of tankers by EU-based entities to third countries could include a clause that bans the buyer from selling the vessel on to a Russian buyer.⁴² It is, however, unlikely that the authorities in such countries would enforce such a ban, and as shown above, shadow vessels transporting Russian cargo are typically owned by obscure entities typically not registered in Russia.

The potential harm to coastal states is tangible, but since the aggression doesn’t involve military means it’s virtually impossible for a country to avenge harm caused to it by a shadow vessel, even if it can prove the ship is transporting Russian cargo. The EU has proposed that Denmark could conduct insurance inspections on suspected shadow-fleet vessels passing the Great Belt.⁴³ But if the Danish Navy (which, again, is also responsible for most coast guard functions) tried to block a confirmed dark vessel from entering Danish waters on the grounds that it lacked the necessary insurance and maintenance record, Russia could retaliate, either by sending navy vessels to the dark vessel’s aid or through completely different measures of its choosing. In an era of gray zone aggression, the plot lines of Okkupert (Occupied), a Norwegian television thriller involving a Russian invasion to restart oil and gas production,⁴⁴ may no longer be purely a matter of fiction.

Indeed, the shadow fleet forms a clear example of gray-zone aggression. As long as Russia remains under sanctions, it will continue to use the shadow fleet for trade—and for subliminal aggression against other countries. Though tackling the shadow fleet is extremely challenging, countries should start by recognizing that the fleet is not just a tool for maritime transportation.

VII. About the author

Fellow

Elisabeth Braw

Senior Fellow

Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security Transatlantic Security Initiative

NATO Resilience & Society

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The post Russia’s growing dark fleet: Risks for the global maritime order appeared first on Atlantic Council.

STRATEGY PAPER LAUNCH

The United States faces an increasingly challenging international security environment with ongoing conflicts in Europe and the Middle East. Tensions are also rising across the Taiwan Strait. With Xi Jinping charging his military to give him the ability to invade Taiwan by 2027, US and allied defense strategists are rightly concerned about a military contingency in the Taiwan Strait. Yet, while an invasion poses the greatest threat to Taiwan’s sovereignty, a naval blockade might be the most viable option for China.

In this installment of the Atlantic Council Strategy Papers Series, 2022-2023 Senior US Navy Fellow Marek Jestrab articulates a vision to prevent and, if needed, defeat a maritime blockade of Taiwan by China. This strategy paper demonstrates that a maritime blockade is the most strategically viable action for the PRC, that Taiwan is uniquely vulnerable to a blockade, and that a blockade is both a present and enduring challenge. The author presents specific actions for Taiwan, the United States, and like-minded nations with the goal of deterring and, if deterrence fails, defeating a PRC blockade of Taiwan.  

The only predictable element of warfare is that it is inherently unpredictable; a near-singular focus on a Chinese invasion by force risks catching the Taiwanese, US, and likeminded militaries unprepared in the event of a non-kinetic naval blockade.

Stephen J. Hadley, 20th National Security Advisor

Executive summary

Blockade: The most strategically viable option for the PRC 

The People’s Republic of China’s intention to unify Taiwan with the mainland is clear. Leveraging decades of sustained military modernization, the PRC possesses the capability and regional overmatch of maritime capacity required to execute a blockade of Taiwan. The specific actions that the PRC could execute will be discussed as part of this paper, but the term “blockade” in the context of this strategy refers to the PRC using coercive actions to prevent merchant shipping from having freedom of navigation in the waters surrounding Taiwan, and sealing off Taiwan’s seaports to prevent merchant shipping from being able to enter or exit the island.

A blockade is the most likely and dangerous scenario, due to Taiwan’s reliance on maritime trade to sustain its economic prosperity. Moreover, a nonkinetic blockade is appealing to the PRC, as it is the lowest level of coercive action that could remain below the threshold of open hostilities and still achieve its national objectives. The PRC’s maritime threat would be a coercive act, designed to instill fear in the Taiwanese population and the merchant shipping industry.  

The PRC views the existence of Taiwan as a direct threat to its national sovereignty. Because of these perceived threats, the strategic plans of the PRC call for resolution of the “Taiwan question” before China is able to achieve its desired “national rejuvenation” by 2049. To accomplish this goal, the PRC refuses to renounce the use of force to compel unification of Taiwan with the mainland. 

Additionally, the Russia-Ukraine war has made clear that unprovoked invasions of neighboring countries are simple for the world population to understand, and for leaders to rally against. Unlike an invasion, a blockade does not present the same strategic-messaging flaws. Moreover, the PRC’s military strategy indicates an openness to blockades and other uses of “restraint warfare,” which the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) defines as seeking to avoid war first through military preparedness and powerful conventional and strategic forces that act in concert with political and diplomatic efforts to “subdue enemy’s forces without fighting.”¹

All these factors point to a maritime blockade of Taiwan as the PRC’s most strategically viable option. Therefore, what is required is a strategy specifically tailored to deterring and, if deterrence fails, defeating a PRC maritime blockade of Taiwan. The major elements of this strategy include Taiwan investing in capabilities that help demonstrate the resilience to resist, the United States maintaining the capability to sustain Taiwan in the face of a blockade, and like-minded nations providing enabling capabilities and additional maritime capacity.

The focus of this paper is on a nonkinetic blockade, but it is worth noting that there are multiple scenarios in which the PRC could utilize maritime advantages in its attempt to unify Taiwan with the mainland. A fundamental challenge of these actions is that the PRC can dynamically scale the operations based on evolving conditions.  

While there is no consensus on a perfect term to describe the possible coercive actions that the PRC could employ in the maritime domain, “blockade” is utilized in this paper as it is the best available and most wildly understood term.²

This paper puts forth a strategy to prevent and, if needed, defeat a PRC blockade of Taiwan. This is consistent with the US government’s existing One China Policy, with a legal basis grounded in the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979, the US-PRC Joint Communiques of 1972, 1978, and 1982, and President Ronald Reagan’s Six Assurances to Taiwan of 1982.³

What is required is a strategy specifically tailored to deterring and, if deterrence fails, defeating a PRC maritime blockade of Taiwan.

Commander Marek Jestrab, Academic Year 2022-23 Senior US Navy Fellow

Taiwan’s unique vulnerability to blockade

The PRC today possesses the maritime force structure needed for regional overmatch in a blockade scenario. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) commands the world’s largest navy, the world’s largest coast guard, and a massive government-subsidized maritime militia. From 2005 to 2022, the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) has added 135 ships to its inventory, while in the same period the US Navy added just two.⁴ 

Located only one hundred nautical miles from mainland China, Taiwan is uniquely vulnerable to a blockade. Taiwan’s dependence on maritime trade is evidenced by the imbalance of its gross domestic product (GDP) in relation to its port activity: Taiwan is the world’s twenty-first largest economy by GDP, yet requires the world’s sixth greatest number of port calls by container ships to sustain this level of economic activity. Taiwan’s largest vulnerability is its energy sector, as it relies on maritime trade to import nearly 98 percent of its energy. 

Actions to defeat the fear and coercion of a PRC Blockade  

Deterring the PRC from even attempting a blockade requires a strategy that communicates to the PRC that its attempted coercive act would fail and prove to be a grave miscalculation. To communicate this message, an international coalition is required that can demonstrate the capability, ability, and will to sustain Taiwan’s economy indefinitely if it were confronted with a blockade. Implementing this strategy would require that:

• Taiwan demonstrate the resilience to resist;
• The United States demonstrate the capability to respond; and
• Like-minded nations demonstrate enabling capabilities and maritime capacity. 

To read the full strategy paper, download the PDF.

Strategy Paper Editorial board

Executive editors

Frederick Kempe
Alexander V. Mirtchev

Editor-in-chief

Matthew Kroenig

Managing Editor

Andrew A. Michta

Editorial board members

James L. Jones
Odeh Aburdene
Paula Dobriansky
Stephen J. Hadley
Jane Holl Lute
Ginny Mulberger
Stephanie Murphy
Dan Poneman
Arnold Punaro

Lead author

Fellow

Marek Jestrab

2022-23 Senior US Navy Fellow

Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Defense Industry Indo-Pacific

This strategy paper contains the author’s personal views, and do not represent official positions of the US Navy or Department of Defense.  

The author would like to thank Matthew Kroenig, Clementine Starling, Markus Garlauskas, Joseph Webster, and Kitsch Liao for their review and feedback. The author would also like to thank Julia Siegel and Shreya Lad for their editing and administrative support.

With a Foreword by

Board director

Stephen J. Hadley

Chairman, International Advisory Board

Forward Defense, housed within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, generates ideas and connects stakeholders in the defense ecosystem to promote an enduring military advantage for the United States, its allies, and partners. Our work identifies the defense strategies, capabilities, and resources the United States needs to deter and, if necessary, prevail in future conflict.

Learn more

The post A maritime blockade of Taiwan by the People’s Republic of China: A strategy to defeat fear and coercion appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On November 29, IPSI/GCH nonresident fellow Parker Novak published a piece via the Lowy Institute, titled “Timor-Leste’s uncertain future.” He wrote that “Timor-Leste has accomplished a great deal over the past two decades but faces headwinds that, if left unaddressed, could undo much of what it has achieved.”

On November 30, Novak also published an article titled “Timor-Leste faces uncertainty in every direction” in the Jakarta Post. In his piece, he explained that despite its status as “one of Southeast Asia’s most vibrant and resilient democracies,” Timor-Leste currently faces a number of serious economic, environmental, geopolitical, transnational, and domestic political challenges.

Fellow

Parker Novak

Nonresident Fellow

Global China Hub Indo-Pacific Security Initiative

Australia Democratic Transitions

The post Novak published on Timor-Leste through the Lowy Institute and Jakarta Post appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On November 13, IPSI nonresident senior fellow Peter Dean was quoted in Reuters on a recent Australian security guarantee to Tuvalu. On November 11, Dean’s comments on the new Australia-Tuvalu pact were also featured in the Sydney Morning Herald. He explained that the agreement, which also offers permanent residency to 280 Tuvalu citizens per year, “serves as a model for the region,” offering something that China cannot and undermining PRC influence in the region. 

Fellow

Peter J. Dean

Nonresident Senior Fellow

Indo-Pacific Security Initiative Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Australia Conflict

The post Dean quoted in Reuters and Sydney Morning Herald on new Australia-Tuvalu pact appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Colombia’s response to this booming illicit industry is forcing an important discussion on the future of US-Colombia cooperation. Washington and Bogotá must decide whether their shared security priorities will pave the way for a revitalized counternarcotics approach or risk the unraveling of decades of bilateral coordination.

On November 3, Colombian President Gustavo Petro visited Washington for the Americas Partnership for Economic Prosperity Leaders’ Summit, marking his second visit this year to the White House, after a meeting with US President Joe Biden in April. While the April meeting saw both presidents commit to bolstering anti-drug efforts through increased intelligence and interdiction cooperation, uncertainty has grown in the seven months since about the future of security and counternarcotics coordination between the two countries.

Amid questions over its counterdrug strategy, the Colombian government unveiled a new ten-year drug strategy in September, attempting to break from a half-century of policies that have failed to curb coca production. A hallmark of Petro’s new counternarcotics strategy is putting into action his 2022 campaign promise to better consult with the long-neglected rural communities that are most affected by the drug trade. In developing the new strategy, the Colombian Ministry of Justice carried out twenty-seven community dialogues from January to July of this year in sixteen Colombian provinces and Bogotá. Each of these dialogues was organized in partnership with the UNODC, which facilitated the participation of local residents as well as organizations of rural farmers, Afro-Colombians, and indigenous Colombians. Atlantic Council staff were invited to observe one of the meetings in June in Corinto, Cauca.

The forum in Corinto and the other community dialogues consisted of structured breakout conversations in small groups followed by an assembly in which Colombian authorities listened to input from participants. Attendees in Corinto, many of whom were growers of illicit crops such as coca, cannabis, and poppy, broadly expressed a willingness to transition to legal crop cultivation. They highlighted the lack of state presence, basic infrastructure, and few opportunities in their communities as barriers to connecting to the formal economy. After decades of various administrations failing to deliver on promises of rural development, communities such as Corinto are pushing the government to address their needs in order to transition. These needs include building basic infrastructure, such as bridges and roads, and increasing access to non-military state presence, such as social service resources. It remains to be seen whether the Petro administration will meet these requests to help rural communities break their dependence on cultivating illicit crops.

The government’s decision to carry out these community dialogues reflects the importance of connecting any counternarcotics strategy with a strategy to address the needs of those most affected by the drug trade. However, to truly be successful in diminishing the supply of drugs, Colombia and the United States must ramp up their coordination on this strategy.

On the surface, both governments have expressed an interest in continued cooperation. Following the launch of Petro’s new approach, the US and Colombian governments agreed to continue developing a comprehensive counternarcotics approach that promotes public health and human security. They committed to increasing interdiction efforts through joint training, capacity building, and intelligence sharing, as well as combatting money laundering, protecting the environment, increasing state presence in rural areas, and mitigating drug consumption. The biggest question, however, lies at the root of the plant. What strategy should be adopted to provide opportunities to those who are currently dependent on illicit coca crops as a livelihood?

While previous Colombian governments have favored forced eradication, the Petro administration is leaning into crop substitution. The ten-year drug strategy aims to enable roughly 50,000 out of 115,000 families economically dependent on coca cultivation to transition to legal means of income. This is part of an ambitious plan that seeks to cut both cocaine and coca production by 40 percent in the next decade. The plan is structured around two strategies, dubbed “oxygen” and “asphyxiation.” The “oxygen” pillar aims to provide relief to vulnerable communities affected by the drug trade, including subsistence growers and individual consumers. This includes investing in public health, environmental protection, and transitions to legal crops for small-scale coca growers. The “asphyxiation” pillar targets key actors in the organized crime and transnational drug trafficking networks to mitigate market proliferation and violence precipitated by criminal groups in coca-growing regions. The government plans to increase interdiction and strategic coca eradication of industrial-scale plantations. 

Both forced eradication and crop substitution are imperfect strategies. Aerial fumigation has been banned by Colombia’s supreme court for its effects on public health and environmental degradation, and coca cultivation has continued to skyrocket under national policies centered on forced eradication by ground troops, who sometimes face opposition from local communities. 

Meanwhile, thousands of families are still waiting for compensation and technical support after enrolling in the national crop substitution program (PNIS) that was created following the 2016 peace accords. The program has experienced years of delay due to a slow rollout and a lack of financial and infrastructural support. While 94 percent of families enrolled in the PNIS voluntarily eradicated their coca without replanting, the government has failed to fulfill its subsidy promises. 

Forced and voluntary eradication find commonality in the loss of human life: More than 1,500 social leaders in communities that agreed to crop substitution reportedly have been killed since the 2016 accords. Security forces have been targeted in forced eradication operations. Armed drug trafficking organizations dominate remote areas where coca is grown and have developed sophisticated processes for transportation and processing.

What the United States and Colombia can do together

It is natural that Colombia and the United States view this issue somewhat differently, given the different ways the drug industry has impacted each country. Colombia’s leaders are foremost concerned with investing in communities that are currently under the control of drug trafficking groups and need help shifting away from the illicit trade. They are also seeking alternatives to the harmful public health and environmental effects of chemical crop eradication. At the same time, there are questions over how the Petro administration will leverage the necessary infrastructure to conduct large-scale crop substitution, both in terms of funding and implementation capacity. Cocaine markets and criminal groups are rapidly evolving, increasing pressure for forceful and direct action.

Clearly, funding will be a challenge. Colombian Minister of Justice Néstor Osuna has indicated that crop substitution alone would require five billion dollars in investments. This does not account for the drug strategy’s other initiatives in security, public health, environmental conservation, and infrastructure. Yet if the funding materializes, it may provide an important opportunity to address issues such as environmental protection and increasing the visibility of marginalized groups.

For the United States, what is most important is that a prolonged influx of drugs from Colombia has devastated US communities and created a public health crisis. The cocaine industry also brings with it a number of transnational criminal organizations that have consistently found ways to evolve, break into new markets, and exploit ground, sea, and air routes to avoid security forces. Many US policymakers view security-centered policies, particularly eradication, as essential to curbing the increase in coca leaf and cocaine production.

With Congress currently debating how much to set aside for economic and security assistance to Colombia in 2024, and even whether to set aside funding, there is likely to be turbulence ahead for the US-Colombia relationship. But in spite of differences between and within the US and Colombian governments on how to address the coca issue, there are a number of areas where the two countries’ interests overlap. Both countries understand the changing nature of transnational trafficking networks and have committed to strengthening interdiction efforts. There is also consensus on the need to increase state presence in rural communities in Colombia to provide the necessary security conditions for families to transition to the legal economy. Further, both countries understand the link between demand and consumption and have underscored the necessity of addressing the narcotics issue from both ends. And in the April 2023 meeting between Biden and Petro, both leaders displayed a shared commitment to combatting climate change and preserving the Amazon, which could aid in counternarcotics discussions linked to environmental conservation.

Going forward, for example, the United States and Colombia could focus more on resource allocation to protect critical forest areas and restore those damaged by illicit crop cultivation. They could also support the efforts of Afro-Colombian and indigenous communities in promoting leadership and community participation, which has been shown to be an effective deterrent to the expansion of illegal coca crops. These and other policies are opportunities to reinvigorate US-Colombia coordination to take on this scourge that has caused so much pain and suffering in both countries.

Lucie Kneip is a project assistant at the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center.

Geoff Ramsey is a senior fellow at the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center.

The post What Colombia’s ambitious new anti-drug plan means for US relations appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Hamas has long ceased to be a lone militant organization. Since 2018, the group has officially operated as a first among equals of the twelve-member “Joint Operations Room of the Palestinian Resistance Factions,” an entity whose technical genesis stretches back to 2006. Indeed, judging from the headbands worn by some of the assailants who infiltrated southern Israel, these other factions were well represented among the attackers. More broadly, since the 1990s Hamas has been gradually integrated into the Iranian-led “Resistance Axis,” a regional network of anti-Israel political parties and militant groups. Among Tehran’s constellation of forces, Hezbollah has taken point on coordinating the Khomeinist regime’s relationship with its Palestinian proxies, and the Shia group’s fingerprints can be detected all over this week’s attack on Israel.

For years, Hezbollah has been promising to “liberate the Galilee” in a future war with Israel. Hezbollah’s secretary-general, Hassan Nasrallah, stated this objective in a February 2011 speech, and the group has conducted exercises simulating the execution of this promise since then. At different times, Hezbollah threatened that it would launch a traditional invasion, meant to seize and permanently hold territory. But such a conventional military maneuver was then, and remains, beyond the group’s capabilities. Such an action would require Hezbollah to establish static supply lines and expose massive numbers of its fighters on Israeli territory, where the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) would possess the numerical and qualitative advantage, in addition to armor, artillery, and air power. In other words, Hezbollah would be discarding the advantages conferred by its hybrid-guerilla warfare methods, without developing the conventional methods or doctrine necessary to match or neutralize the IDF’s vast superiority in conventional warfare.

What, then, would the intended invasion of the Galilee have looked like? Precisely how Hamas’s October 7 attack, dubbed Operation Al-Aqsa Flood, unfolded: a territorially limited surprise incursion, focused on murdering and kidnapping as many Israelis as possible, and capturing the attack on video to maximize the psychological impact on Israeli society and to boost the morale of the supporters of the “resistance.” It would appear, then, that Hezbollah imparted its plans, and the training to execute them, to its Resistance Axis partners in the Gaza Strip. In fact, Hezbollah appears to have shared this knowledge with Hamas and other Gaza-based militant groups at least a decade ago: Israeli security sources noted that the IDF launched 2014’s Operation Protective Edge to preempt exactly such a mass casualty scenario that had been planned by Hamas for that year’s Rosh Hashanah. 

Hezbollah appears to have contributed more to the execution of Al-Aqsa Flood than the operational blueprint. The Shia group—constrained in its direct ability to attack Israel by Lebanon’s economic collapse, and not wanting to be seen as compounding Lebanese misery with a security conflagration—has effectively exported its attacks against Israel to Palestinian actors, both within Israel and Israeli-held territories, and from inside Lebanon. Either working directly with Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) or separately at its behest, Hezbollah has spent considerable efforts recruiting assets inside Israel—from among Arab Israelis and Palestinians—to gather intelligence and establish sleeper cells within Israel to plan terror attacks. Here, Hezbollah’s ties to Lebanese and Arab Israeli criminal networks have proven invaluable.

The Shia organization has also spent the past eighteen years building up the warfighting capabilities of militant groups in the Gaza Strip. This effort began in earnest after Israel’s 2005 withdrawal from the Gaza Strip, when Hezbollah’s then-military commander Imad Mughniyeh spent months training Palestinian militants in a coastal enclave. This training included producing rockets and launching pads, as well as tunnel and rocket warfare. Credible reporting—and the admissions of Hamas spokesmen—also reveals that the inception of this particular attack occurred months ago in Beirut, in coordination with the IRGC, but also doubtlessly under the watchful eye and with the input of Hezbollah.

The genesis of Operation Al-Aqsa Flood appears to originate with Hezbollah, at least in part. The pressing question now is what will Hezbollah do next?

So far, Hezbollah’s actions have differed little from the group’s prior behavior during fighting between Gaza-based militants and the IDF, particularly since the October 17, 2019, economic crisis further complicated its ability to act openly or aggressively against Israel. The group has voiced its now customary support for Hamas, stressing the attack on Israel was a message “to the Arab and Islamic world . . . especially those seeking normalization” with the Jewish state (and thus signaling that Hamas’s attack was intended to derail ongoing Saudi-Israeli normalization talks). One of its ad-hoc formations, named after Imad Mughniyeh, conducted a largely symbolic solidarity mortar strike in Shebaa Farms—in other words, in a territory understood by both Hezbollah and Israel as within the red lines governing their conflict. Likely by design, the strike caused no casualties. Israeli forces have exchanged fire with Hezbollah every day since October 7.

But otherwise, Hezbollah has so far sat out the fight. It was quick to deny involvement in a Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) infiltration into northern Israel on October 9. The group’s response to Israel killing three Hezbollah fighters while retaliating for that incursion was also limited and measured. Hezbollah’s promise that this reprisal was only its “preliminary response,” and other belligerent statements, should be taken in the context of similar previously unfulfilled vows to avenge fallen fighters—either to say it will delay avenging them until a time more suitable to Hezbollah or, as happened on October 10, carrying out a limited attack meant to convey the message to the Israelis that the matter is now considered closed. 

Furthermore, it should also be understood in the context of its other statements—a promise to Lebanese Foreign Minister Abdullah Bou Habib to abstain from getting involved in the Gaza conflict unless Israel “harasses” Lebanon. Hezbollah spokesman and Lebanese Member of Parliament Ibrahim al-Mousaoui said on Tuesday that Hamas’s operation was a “preview of what the resistance factions will execute in the future.”

The likeliest scenario, therefore, is that Hezbollah will continue to allow Palestinian militants to engage in limited harassment against Israel from Lebanon, thus contributing to Gaza-based militant war efforts by keeping the IDF partially focused on the northern border but without sparking a major conflagration. Hezbollah’s calculus could change, however, as the IDF’s battle against Hamas and the remaining Resistance Axis factions in Gaza progresses. If Hamas and its allies find themselves in dire straits against an expected Israeli ground incursion, Iran could deem it necessary to activate Hezbollah. Alternatively, the Shia organization may already have its orders to enter the war. Its direct and indirect harassment on the northern border may be intended to goad the IDF into a serious enough retaliation that Hezbollah could then use it to justify attacking Israel to its supporters and the broader Lebanese public as an act of self-defense against so-called “Zionist aggression.”

David Daoud is the director of Israel, Lebanon, and Syria Research at United Against Nuclear Iran (UANI) and is a nonresident fellow at the Atlantic Council.

A version of this article originally appeared in United Against Nuclear Iran. It is reprinted here with the author’s and publisher’s permission.

The post Hamas’s attack on Israel was straight out of Hezbollah’s playbook appeared first on Atlantic Council.

For the American think tanker, there are a number of questions — from the future of the Strip to new fronts, from regional integration to domestic politics — that Israel is asking itself in deciding the timing and methods of the counter-offensive against Hamas

The post Wechsler mentioned in Formiche on the Israel-Hamas war appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On September 21, Forward Defense nonresident senior fellow Thomas Warrick was quoted in Bloomberg Government. He expressed concern about congressional gridlock and its subsequent effects on the expected expiration of several DHS protection measures. Warrick warns that these safeguards are integral to US national security.

Fellow

Thomas S. Warrick

Nonresident Senior Fellow, Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative

Forward Defense Rafik Hariri Center & Middle East programs

National Security Terrorism

Forward Defense, housed within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, generates ideas and connects stakeholders in the defense ecosystem to promote an enduring military advantage for the United States, its allies, and partners. Our work identifies the defense strategies, capabilities, and resources the United States needs to deter and, if necessary, prevail in future conflict.

Learn more

The post Warrick quoted in Bloomberg Government appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On September 3, Forward Defense nonresident senior fellow Thomas S. Warrick published an article in The Hill on the importance of renewing section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act.

Fellow

Thomas S. Warrick

Nonresident Senior Fellow, Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative

Forward Defense Rafik Hariri Center & Middle East programs

National Security Terrorism

Forward Defense, housed within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, generates ideas and connects stakeholders in the defense ecosystem to promote an enduring military advantage for the United States, its allies, and partners. Our work identifies the defense strategies, capabilities, and resources the United States needs to deter and, if necessary, prevail in future conflict.

Learn more

The post Warrick in The Hill on the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act appeared first on Atlantic Council.

This week’s Pokrovsk bombing shared many similarities with a June 2023 attack in nearby Kramatorsk, which struck civilian targets in the city center including a restaurant used by visiting journalists and international aid workers. Victims included prominent Ukrainian writer and journalist Victoria Amelina.

Allegations regarding the deliberate targeting of journalists are not new and first surfaced in the early months of the Russian invasion. In April 2022, the Institute for War & Peace Reporting published a dispatch entitled Ukraine: Journalists “Are Russia’s First Target,” which detailed the deaths of journalists in Ukraine during the first weeks of the war.

In February 2023, International media watchdog Reporters Without Borders and the Institute of Mass Information found that at least 26 journalists were deliberately targeted with rifle or artillery fire during the first year of the war. Reporters Without Borders has since filed multiple war crimes complaints against Russia with the International Criminal Court concerning 44 alleged acts of abuse and violence involving over 100 journalists and journalistic infrastructure.

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

The targeting of international journalists in Ukraine would certainly be in line with the hard line media policies adopted by the Kremlin within Russia itself. One of Vladimir Putin’s first major steps during the early years of his reign was to assert Kremlin control over the Russian mainstream media. For the past two decades, dissenting voices inside Russia have been steadily silenced, while independent media outlets have been taken over by loyalists or forced to close down. Meanwhile, a number of individual journalists have suffered violent or otherwise suspicious deaths.

The Putin regime’s efforts to suppress free speech have intensified over the past eighteen months following the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. In today’s Russia, merely referring to the invasion as a “war” is a criminal offense, with media outlets instead obliged to use the Kremlin’s preferred euphemism of “Special Military Operation.”

Critics allege the Putin regime’s efforts to muzzle the media also extend to deliberate attacks on international journalists attempting to report on the invasion from Ukraine. “For the Russians, the press is the enemy. They do not want their crimes to be recorded and known to the whole world,” commented Oksana Romanyuk, executive director of the Kyiv-based Mass Media Institute.

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In response to Monday’s Russian attack in Pokrovsk, the International Federation of Journalists tweeted out a statement condemning “in the strongest terms the targeting of facilities frequented by journalists. Enough is enough.”

Many international correspondents covering the war in Ukraine have also suggested that the Pokrovsk airstrike deliberately targeted journalists. Financial Times reporter Christopher Miller underlined the popularity of the Pokrovsk hotel and restaurant among correspondents. “I and so many others stayed at Druzhba, conducted interviews at Corleone, and filed stories from both countless times over the years. They are among the few places operating near the front line. No doubt they were targeted by Russia because journalists and military have frequented them,” he tweeted.

Numerous other international reporters expressed similar opinions. The chief international correspondent of Britain’s Independent newspaper, Bel Trew, noted that the hotel and restaurant targeted in Monday’s bombing were well known for hosting journalists and humanitarian aid workers, and claimed the attack “looks like a pattern.” Meanwhile, senior Guardian correspondent Peter Beaumont declared the strikes “very much not a coincidence.”

While it will be extremely difficult to prove conclusively that Russia is engaged in the deliberate targeting of journalists in Ukraine, this is certainly the impression shared by international media watchdog organizations and many of the correspondents working on the front lines of the war. Moscow has an obvious motive for seeking to intimidate international reporters; over the past eighteen months, courageous on-the-spot coverage has frequently highlighted the brutality of Russia’s invasion and exposed the war crimes being committed by the Russian military in Ukraine.

Attempts to prevent reporters from chronicling Russia’s invasion cannot be allowed to succeed. The war unleashed by Vladimir Putin in February 2022 is already widely recognized as a major milestone in the evolution of war reporting, with correspondents able to share updates on a minute-by-minute basis via social media. In this new information reality, it is vital to demonstrate that authoritarian regimes can no longer hope to silence the international media.

Mercedes Sapuppo is a program assistant at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

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Russia’s Unholy War: Russian Orthodox Church leader Patriarch Kirill has provided the ideological justification for Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine and Russian efforts to eliminate Ukrainian national identity.

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Ukrainian presidential advisor Mykhailo Podolyak says the Wagner mutiny has exposed Russia’s internal weakness and predicts battlefield defeats in Ukraine will spark the collapse of the Putin regime, writes Peter Dickinson.

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Ukraine’s lack of counteroffensive progress over the past two months should serve as a wake-up call for Western leaders. Their response will shape the geopolitical landscape for decades to come, writes Maksym Skrypchenko.

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The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

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The NATO summit in Vilnius, Lithuania, in July is an opportunity for leaders to mitigate geoeconomic risk within the Alliance and in southeastern Europe in particular. Specifically, all allies should commit in the communiqué to the prompt adoption of investment screening legislation—particularly the Balkan nations of Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Montenegro, and North Macedonia, where legislation is largely absent. While the European Union (EU) is Europe’s lead institution on investment and trade issues, its technocratic approach has up to now failed to generate the necessary political will with all members of the Alliance to take investment security issues seriously. Putting the issue of investment screening on the wider transatlantic agenda will increase pressure on lagging allies to elevate investment security and accountability on NATO’s southeastern flank. The Alliance can look to how 5G security was put on the agenda a few years ago as a case study of how it can generate political will among allies to address gaps in national security that are notionally economic in nature.

Because the implementation of economic security regulations carries risks of abuse and corruption, NATO, the EU, and key member states from both organizations should support those nations in the development of inclusive and effective legislation that mitigates against economic risk while protecting the democratic process.

Economic security underpins military security

Members of the EU and NATO face a number of threats from authoritarian corrosive capital and critical economic dependencies. Whether originating from private or state-owned enterprises, unaccountable investments lack transparency, accountability, and market orientation. Corrosive capital largely originates from authoritarian states and exaggerates governance gaps to influence economic, political, and social developments in recipient countries. For example, authoritarian regimes, particularly China, use subsidies and other uncompetitive practices to invest in critical or other digital infrastructure that can have a dual military-civilian purpose, such as in port infrastructure in southeast Europe which could be used to transit military gear in support of NATO operations. Nontransparent investment flows, particularly in Bulgaria and the Western Balkans, undermine transparency and abet corruption. In the higher value-added sectors of the economy such as the thriving information and communications technology sectors in Bulgaria, unaccountable investments threaten the valuable intellectual property of Europe’s established firms and emerging start-ups alike. Last year, China weaponized Europe’s critical trade and supply chain dependency on the huge Chinese market to block Lithuanian imports to China, seeking to punish Vilnius for its foreign policy choices. Europe’s urgent transition in the last year away from Russian natural gas to renewable resources such as solar and wind power, which are dominated by China, risks replacing one set of strategic energy dependencies for another. 

To address these challenges, many European countries have developed new EU-wide investment screening regulations and the European Union has proposed legislation to counter economic coercion. Since 2020, EU member states are required to have an investment screening mechanism in place as part of the EU-wide investment screening coordination framework—but the details are left up to the individual countries, which are responsible for their own national security. 

NATO’s southeastern flank is the most vulnerable and least-prepared region to protect its economies from authoritarian corrosive capital. Montenegro has become famous for its “white elephant” Chinese-funded infrastructure projects. Croatia is host to the Chinese Southeast European Business Association and has actively courted Chinese investments in critical infrastructure, including ports and the EU-funded and China-built Peljesac bridge, the first example of subsidized Chinese firms beating out European firms for EU-funded projects in Europe. Bulgaria and North Macedonia have more pronounced links to unaccountable flows of Russian capital, including in the energy sector. 

Among these countries, only Croatia is in the early stages of exploring the development of an investment screening law, and it is doing so at a leisurely pace. Bulgaria is in an even earlier stage than Croatia, but has an opportunity with its new government to make progress. North Macedonia, Albania, and Montenegro also lack an investment screening mechanism, leaving NATO’s most vulnerable members and economies open to the risk of corrosive capital and unaccountable investment. These governments have largely failed to put investment security legislation and processes on the table because of a lack of political will. An initiative by key allies to put this issue on the table at NATO would help push lagging governments in southeast Europe to prioritize this issue. Yet, a push by NATO allies to close the investment security gap in southeast Europe should also be coupled with practical assistance to help those allies develop inclusive, transparent legislation on investment screening.

The risks of regulating economic activity in fragile democracies

Emerging markets in NATO’s southeastern flank, including Albania, Bulgaria, North Macedonia, and Croatia, face some of the greatest challenges to equipping themselves with the tools to protect their economies from national security threats. These allies face capacity and governance challenges that will require coordinated support from NATO, the EU, and key bilateral allies to help implement effective investment screening legislation.

First, the economies of southeastern Europe are among the least developed within NATO. As a result, most business leaders in these countries are desperate for any investment they can attract and are instinctively hostile to the idea of screening any investment. Coaxing the private sector into compliance with any relevant legislation will require an intentional and transparent process of policy dialogue between government and business to reassure business that legislation will not meaningfully harm the economy.

Second, these countries largely lack governmental capacity to effectively screen foreign investments, a highly technical process requiring competent bureaucrats armed with both economic and national security data and expertise. A related challenge is the need for the bureaucracy to maintain the confidentiality of proprietary corporate data during the screening process; leaks of government deliberations to tabloids are a pervasive problem in southeast European policymaking.

Third, the democracies of southeastern Europe are by and large low-trust societies with weak public-private dialogue and an often fragile rule of law, making effective and informed policy formulation a challenge. To ensure economic fairness and guard against regulatory abuse, any new tools allowing governments to regulate economic activity will need proper transparency, checks and balances, and oversight.

NATO and the EU face a conundrum in dealing with the geoeconomic challenges to southeastern Europe’s market, particularly in Bulgaria and Croatia, which are already in the European common market. On the one hand, failure to develop screening mechanisms and other tools in these economies leaves both the EU and NATO vulnerable to economic risk that could impact the wider single market. On the other hand, given the governance and capacity challenges in these countries, a rushed or opaque policy process could result in lack of awareness and compliance by the private sector or the emergence of unintended consequences such as barriers to legitimate competition.

What the EU, NATO, and Three Seas Initiative can do

To address these challenges, NATO, the European Union, and individual allies can play complementary roles.

Through its regulatory role, the EU should take the lead in supporting these countries in developing economic security legislation. The European Commission can provide technical support to help governments align their investment screening legislation with EU standards, particularly countries that are candidates for accession, such as Albania and North Macedonia. Meanwhile, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development can provide technical support to member governments such as Croatia to help them understand the likely impact an investment screening law will have on its economy and competitiveness as an investment destination.

Because the EU leads on economic and trade issues, NATO’s role will involve helping allies assess national security implications of investment risk in dual-use economic assets that can have a military or other national security purpose. Here, planning groups within NATO’s Resilience Committee can provide guidance on how to ensure that screening mechanisms meet compliance with NATO’s baseline requirements for national resilience. In the interest of building political will, the NATO summit communiqué at Vilnius could set a deadline to have investment screening legislation in place by the seventy-fifth anniversary Washington summit next year.

Finally, select allies can provide bilateral mentorship and support for these southeast European nations on best practices for securing business buy-in and compliance with screening mechanisms. A system modeled after the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States may not align with the needs, economic structure, or capacities of smaller countries in southeast Europe. Smaller allies such as the Czech Republic can advise southeastern European governments on the lessons learned from their experience, perhaps bringing in chambers of commerce and business associations to share their experiences on compliance with the law. 

The Three Seas Initiative, an informal gathering supported by the Atlantic Council and including twelve Central and Eastern European member states focused on north-south infrastructure development, could also help. It could serve as a venue for members to coordinate economic-security regulations to ensure wider harmonization of economic policy. Differences in investment security regulations across countries complicate the kind of cross-border investments that the Three Seas Initiative is designed to attract and finance. The Three Seas business forums in particular can serve as a channel for business associations and chambers from within the Three Seas region and neighboring countries in the Western Balkans. The forums offer a place for parties to share their experiences, challenges, and concerns about complexities caused by differences in screening legislation within the region and to formulate recommendations on how to minimize the impact on the investment environment.

Ultimately, the national governments of Croatia, Bulgaria, Albania, North Macedonia, and Montenegro will have to do the hard work themselves to adopt these best practices and craft successful legislation. Governments will need to consult with the business sector before legislation is drafted to help promote understanding of these processes, incorporate recommendations to streamline red tape, and raise awareness in the business community of critical threats that can allow them to adapt their internal due diligence. But this will require a balance to ensure that economic security is not traded away for the sake of economic development. Including civil society is also essential to ensure effective transparency and monitoring of review processes to make sure they are not used for corrupt purposes or overlook key threats.

As NATO heads into its seventy-fifth year, its member states and partner institutions need to adapt to new challenges. Robust investment screening across the whole of the Alliance will help strengthen NATO against economic weapons that are increasingly central to today’s conflicts.

Jeffrey Lightfoot is a nonresident senior fellow at the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security and is the Bratislava-based program director for Europe at the Center for International Private Enterprise.

John Kay is a program manager at the Center for International Private Enterprise and worked previously in the Balkans with the US Agency for International Development.

The post Authoritarian investment in southeastern Europe is a security threat. Here’s what NATO can do. appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Table of contents

• Introduction: Why the United States needs a new targeting model better suited for cooperation
• Expanding the joint force’s competitive mindset
• Operationalizing integrated deterrence: A new model for targeting and effects
• Explaining the model of a modified targeting and effects process
• I. Placement and access
• II. Focused understanding
• III. Options
• Targeting throughout the competition continuum
• Harnessing data to improve the targeting and effects process
• Data
• Sense
• Make sense
• Act
• Using the competition space to prepare for high-end armed conflict
• Shaping the environment
• Shaping across the physical and virtual domains
• Capability development
• The way forward
• Culture: Adapting the joint force’s mindset to global problems across the competition continuum
• Incorporating all instruments of power
• Embracing the global nature of problem sets
• Technology and data: Building a resilient and holistic data architecture
• Authorities, rules of engagement, and risk: Updating DOD guidelines and standards
• Conclusion
• About the authors

Introduction: Why the United States needs a new targeting model better suited for competition

Traditional joint force deterrence is no longer sufficient: a near-singular focus on armed conflict and platform-based capability development fails to deter strategic adversaries like China and Russia from their pursuit of strategic objectives while simultaneously increasing the risk of war. Simply owning the most advanced weaponry, while ceding ground in the competitive space left of conflict, is not enough to meet US deterrence needs, nor is it sufficient to ensure the joint force prevails in conflict. Expanding the joint force’s construct for targeting and effects generation will enable the Department of Defense (DOD) to more effectively deter future conflict while simultaneously shaping the environment to the joint force’s advantage in conflict should deterrence fail.

Why the twenty-first century security environment merits an updated approach

Today’s security threats span the competition continuum, cut across theaters and domains, and are intensified through the application of emerging technologies. The joint force faces challenges spanning the full competition continuum from high-end conflict to gray zone competition, including cyber threats and economic coercion, to cooperation. Technological advancements have changed the character of threats, the types of activities that the DOD can conduct, the speed at which it can act, and expanded its notion of physical and non-physical tools and effects. Specifically, the evolution of the cyber domain has enabled the joint force to gain access to non-physical spaces and generate options to achieve effects in a matter of milliseconds. The realities of twenty-first century competition drive the need to confront adversaries across a global contact layer to counter malign activities and proactively advance US strategic objectives. In other words, actions in one theater or domain can generate options and lead to outcomes in distant corners of the globe.

Moreover, the joint force faces a far more sophisticated adversary in China—qualitatively and quantitatively—than it did in countering violent extremist organizations over the past two decades. Strategic competition requires a significant mindset shift to effectively harness the effects of multiple instruments of power in a global, multi-domain, and coherent manner. DOD doctrine acknowledges this, but the department and joint force have yet to fully operationalize it.

While many activities executed along the competition continuum can enable success in conflict, specific operations, activities, and investments are necessary to ensure joint force superiority in direct combat, especially considering the criticality of combined arms warfare with allies and partners, as well as the seamless integration of multi-domain fires and effects. joint force activities must continually pursue positional advantage across the competition continuum to achieve the necessary balance between deterrence and conflict preparation. Yet, currently, the level of attention to and investment in preparation for armed conflict inhibits the joint force from leveraging the vast data, tools, and authorities at its disposal to prevent such conflict from occurring in the first place.

How joint force operations can meet an evolving threat landscape

The joint force must update its approach to targeting and effects generation to respond to the range of security challenges at hand, else it risks losing without going to war. Success across the full competition continuum will be enabled by the joint force’s ability to effectively harness data and a wide spectrum of tools and authorities with speed, precision, and lethality. This necessitates a deeper and more informed understanding of adversary capabilities, the operating environment, the interconnected nature of the physical and virtual domains, and the range of data sources available to operators. By “expanding its competitive mindset and competitive approach”¹ —to include and integrate tools, information, and actions that span the competition continuum—the joint force can exploit this understanding to apply the right effects to the right problems at the right times, advancing strategic objectives and maintaining informational, decisional, and combat dominance. An expanded competitive mindset will allow the joint force to view competition not as an inevitable march toward future conflict, but rather as a persistent effort to gain and maintain positional advantage across all domains.

The joint force is designed to excel at crisis response; it must make a deliberate mindset shift to plan prior to impending crisis (and prevent such scenarios from occurring in the first place). However, while the urgency of evolving the joint force’s targeting framework is evident across doctrine and policy,² the joint force has not yet taken to scale an assertive approach to dominating across the competitive space. Doctrine included in the DOD’s 2022 National Defense Strategy (NDS) and the Joint Concept for Competing, for instance, make clear that the department and joint force are thinking about strategic competition more broadly, yet operationally—through authorities, combatant commands, and collaboration with different agencies and allies—DOD and the joint force have yet to fully realize integrated deterrence.

What this report sets out to achieve

Operationally, the joint force has not adapted to an era of strategic competition, which requires targeting across theaters and domains, the entire competition continuum, and leveraging the range of data sources at its disposal. Doing so requires the joint force to stitch together the data, tools, and authorities needed to achieve global objectives—rather than viewing missions as constrained to a singular region or ends, as has been the status quo.

This report outlines a framework to leverage existing targeting models to more assertively and deliberately compete by: 1) incorporating an expanded use of military and interagency capabilities; 2) leveraging expansive public and private data and harnessing it for effect through emerging technologies; and 3) smartly balancing priorities and weight of effort related to competition and conflict preparation. The authors offer key action areas for implementation at scale.

Expanding the joint force’s competitive mindset

While the Pentagon recognizes it must adopt a new mindset to prevail across the competition continuum, it continues to approach targeting and fires through a lens of armed conflict. Traditional approaches to targeting and fires still prevail across the joint force despite the recognition of a need to expand them. Traditionally, the joint force aligns “sensors to shooters” (i.e., targeting) to inflict damage on enemy personnel, materiel, or infrastructure (i.e., fires or effects generation). This sentiment is expressed through variations of the targeting cycle, whether it be the dynamic targeting kill chain (Find, Fix, Target, Track, Engage, Assess) or the Special Operations Forces-preferred cycle (Find, Fix, Finish, Exploit, Analyze, Disseminate). These processes lend well to a temporal and kinetic approach to targeting and fires—exemplified by strikes on violent extremist organization (VEO) leadership networks or disabling mobile surface-to-air threats as part of a layered suppression of enemy air defenses effort—yet they are insufficient for generating the nonlethal and continuous effects necessary in today’s expansive security environment. This traditional approach to targeting and fires is incongruent with current DOD realities, given “most joint force activities occur in the context of cooperation and competition below armed conflict.”⁴

As the DOD recognizes through its integrated deterrence concept, the joint force’s tool kit expands beyond the military arsenal, and solely relying on traditional approaches for targeting and effects is limiting. As articulated in the NDS, integrated deterrence campaigning calls for the joint force—in alignment with and often in a supporting role to other instruments of power found across the interagency—to execute “logically linked” activities to advance “strategy-aligned priorities over time” in order to counter or complicate competitors’ coercion across the globe.⁵ Linking activities across global campaigns require a high level of understanding of competitors’ intent and capabilities and their underlying geopolitical realities, enabled by prolonged access across multiple domains, which creates options to leverage multiple effects in achieving desired ends. For example, developing an understanding of how China’s coercive economic activities in Africa and Latin America support its broader global ambitions can inform the breadth (and complexity) of US response options. While the joint force typically excels at responding to crises, single-purpose platforms and the constant rotation of forces often prohibit the long-duration stare that integrated deterrence requires for proactive campaigning left of crisis.

Operationalizing integrated deterrence: A new model for targeting and effects

To achieve integrated deterrence, this paper outlines a model for operationalizing it. The joint force must meld the existing framework for joint targeting with a model that places a premium on gaining placement and access in a domain or region, enabling a focused understanding of an entity of interest, to facilitate a range of options for the joint force to execute in concert with other instruments of power, whether in a supported or supporting role. Each layer includes the concepts of persistence, local distinction, and global relevance, and can be in a near-constant state of change based on the sensing environment. For example, security cooperation with a partner in Southeast Asia requires access, understanding, and options that are: 1) persistent, to ensure ongoing understanding and to achieve effects over the long term; 2) locally distinct based on regional and local considerations; and 3) globally relevant, acknowledging that awareness and action related to one country affects global dynamics and goals. This layered model is represented in Figures 1 and 2 and further described below.

Integrated Deterrence Targeting. The figures above convey the elements of the joint targeting cycle and the dynamic targeting process (figure 1), with a philosophical and nonlinear pyramid approach to developing options for complex problems (figure 2). These two frameworks must be fused together to operationalize integrated deterrence. The joint force’s traditional targeting cycle must be informed by a foundation of situational awareness. Data, tools, and authorities are all necessary mechanisms to establish situational awareness.

Explaining the model of a modified targeting and effects process

Adopting this layered model is critical for two reasons. First, the complex, global, and multi-domain problem sets the DOD faces today necessitate options that are similarly sophisticated in nature and cut across the competition continuum. By prioritizing a deeper and more comprehensive understanding of problem sets, the joint force is presented with a wider array of options to address key challenges. Such focused understanding is possible when the near-infinite amount of data available across the public and private sectors is transformed into usable information and, ultimately, intelligence.

Second, a new competitive mindset requires broadening the joint force’s tool kit beyond traditional military effects. The joint force has the authority to, and does, execute non-kinetic targeting, albeit insufficiently, yet it prioritizes kinetic fires as part of the traditional targeting cycle. Fusing kinetic and non-kinetic fires is critical not only from a deterrence perspective but also, more significantly, to enable victory in armed conflict. Yet, alone, the military instrument of power is insufficient for the problem sets germane to integrated deterrence. While the joint force has significantly advanced its organic non-kinetic capabilities, it primarily leverages kinetic effects, which neglects other instruments of power, disincentivizes creative thinking, and leads to poor integration with interagency partners.⁶ A high degree of awareness of the capabilities and authorities that other instruments of power bring to the table is critical such that they can be synchronized with, or amplified by, joint force activities at all echelons.

The process of generating placement and access, focused understanding, and options is not linear, and each stage can and should inform the others over time. Specific placement and access may be generated to understand a particular problem in a sophisticated manner such that novel options can be developed. Similarly, focused understanding may drive the need for additional or alternative access to close critical intelligence gaps and inform options. Likewise, commanders may demand options to address a particular problem, which in turn will inform the planning process to generate the necessary access and understanding. Below is an overview of the three foundational elements of the pyramid.

I. Placement and access

To develop the focused understanding required for integrated deterrence, the joint force cannot stare at problems from afar. Placement and access are foundational to developing an enhanced understanding of the problem sets facing the United States. Placement and access, however, does not necessarily mean physical proximity of the military to a particular interest area—it also encompasses virtual presence and can be developed by the joint force, interagency partners, and allied counterparts. It also implies some degree of usability, sustainability, and repeatability; simply visiting a location or gaining virtual access to a network does not equate to true placement and access. Rather, that access must be repeatable if it is temporal in nature, sustainable over operationally relevant time periods, and usable for alternate purposes such as data collection, security cooperation, or reception, staging, onward movement, and integration. Placement and access can be enhanced by leveraging data from a multitude of sources to enable the joint force insight into digital networks of value to access, or the nature of key partnerships required for physical access. Additionally, enhancing existing authorities and making them more flexible would allow units pursuing a mission set in one area to adapt and undertake additional mission sets that may be valuable for a broader or global mission set.

Evolving the joint force approach to placement and access will open a range of opportunities given the interconnected nature of global problem sets. For example, France’s historical security cooperation and counterterrorism activities in the Sahel region of West Africa, during the 2010s, could have also served as an access vector to increasing understanding of the growing threat of Russian private military corporations (PMC) like Wagner Group in the region. This physical proximity can enable a deeper understanding of Wagner’s activities in the region, potentially driving requirements for further physical or virtual access or informing options in line with global campaign plans to counter Russian malign influence. Critically, the joint force must explore means to creatively exploit access when mission convergences exist—units or platforms deployed for one purpose, such as countering VEO, may enable access vectors to support another mission, such as strategic competition, and vice versa. While clarity of primary and secondary objectives of missions would need to remain, the makeup of units and task forces, and the requisite authorities given to them, should be meaningfully considered to capitalize on mission convergences. Not only does this approach create efficiencies with respect to endeavors like security cooperation, but it also offers the opportunity to obfuscate strategic intentions.

II. Focused understanding

Focused understanding of an actor, environment, or relationship is required to solve complex problems, not only due to the sophisticated capabilities of strategic adversaries but also because integrated deterrence campaigns are global in nature. Transregional, multi-domain problems cannot be thoroughly addressed in compartmentalized and only localized ways. Rather, the joint force must stitch together regional understandings based on local access and conditions with broader knowledge informed by other global touch points. The roles of partners, both interagency and international, are critical in developing focused understanding. Not only do they enable multi-domain access, but they also provide unique perspectives. The vast amounts of commercial and government data can and should be harnessed and fused to improve focused understanding of actors and problem sets. While data from traditional sources is immensely valuable, open-source information—organized into actionable information—can drastically improve understanding of patterns and behavior. For example, social media data may help inform US forces of the presence of an adversarial force’s covert presence in a country that may be hard to identify or find evidence for using other means. Ultimately, the fusing of different data sources more consistently can help understanding across the competition continuum.

Building on the previous example, to address Wagner Group’s activities in the Sahel, the joint force should first understand how those activities tie into Russia’s global campaign to secure influence and create instability through expeditionary PMC activities. A holistic understanding of Wagner’s activities across the Sahel, Central Africa, Latin America, Syria, and Eastern Europe presents a more informed picture of the totality of the problem, as well as the associated pressure points, vulnerabilities, and opportunities. Moreover, the local US country team, elements of the intelligence community, French forces, and host-nation partners will all view the Wagner problem in different lights, which can enhance the joint force’s perspective and is necessary in developing viable options leveraging all instruments of power.

This combination of regional and global understanding, enabled by joint force and partner access and capabilities, ultimately informs a far greater range of options than is achieved strictly through a regional military lens, which has been the status quo. Critically, focused understanding better informs risk assessments at echelon, abating risk aversion frequently seen at higher levels of command authority that are farthest removed from the tactical edge.

III. Options

Senior leaders and commanders typically request a range of options to address problems, both to allow flexibility and enable sound decision-making in light of strategic priorities and risks. The Joint Concept for Competing calls for the joint force to:

While doctrinally this is clear, today’s traditional approach to targeting and competition limits the most effective suite of options from being generated. More-nuanced options may place the joint force in a supporting role to other departments and agencies: for example, conducting traditional manhunting activities (via military authorities) to enable a diplomatic action such as a démarche (via Department of State authorities). The level of sophistication required to achieve what the Joint Concept calls for, especially across activities below armed conflict, makes both risk and efficacy assessments challenging. It is far more difficult to quantify the effectiveness of a campaign to counter Chinese regional influence—for example, assessing long-duration efforts to obstruct effort by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) to secure access, basing, and overflight—than it was to measure the success of kinetic drone strikes during the Global War on Terrorism. This challenge is met not only by prioritizing focused understanding but also by parlaying that understanding into a range of options that may be locally distinct but support global campaign plan objectives.

Ultimately, options for senior decision-makers are developed to achieve outcomes that are in service of more-aspirational objectives. Again, examining Wagner activity, a desired outcome of an operation could be to deny Wagner’s ability to securely communicate between several outstations across the Sahel. The aspirational objective is to critically degrade Wagner’s ability to conduct and sustain expeditionary activities globally.

Targeting throughout the competition continuum

This model for the generation of options for complex problems must be melded with an adaptation in the application of traditional joint force targeting processes. Joint targeting is not solely reliant on joint force tools, capabilities, and authorities; it can and should incorporate other instruments of power—by collaborating across departments and agencies—to bolster data and inform understanding, as well as “identify, develop, and affect targets to meet commander objectives.”⁸

Take, for example, a PRC network in Latin America that facilitates command and control of dual-use infrastructure. Here, data could be harnessed from the intelligence (e.g., National Security Agency) and diplomatic (e.g., Department of State Regional Security Office) instruments of power to identify a particular local criminal network that facilitates relevant PRC contracting activities. Host-nation law enforcement can then apply pressure on the criminal network to share information about the PRC actors with whom it engages routinely. Over time, this information can help generate several options to gain access to the objective network through Special Operations Forces-enabled cyber activities. Throughout, the military (e.g., Military Information Support Operations) and diplomatic (e.g., Department of State Global Engagement Center) instruments of power can expose malign PRC practices through information operations to positively shape narratives in line with strategic objectives. The joint targeting cycle could be leveraged multiple times for:

• Employing traditional manhunting techniques to find and fix specific local criminal actors of interest, develop their pattern of life, then using non-kinetic fires to register their phones with specific networks that enable intelligence access to key digital data.
• Leveraging data obtained through financial (e.g., Treasury Department Office of Foreign Assets Control) instruments of power to target specific institutions that enable transactions between local criminal networks and the PRC. This data can be correlated with intelligence derived from the activities above, as well as populated to other portions of the joint force focused on countering PRC dual-use activities to further global understanding of their tactics, techniques, and procedures.
• Conducting intelligence preparation of the cyber environment to find and fix key nodes that are vulnerable to offensive cyber fires (e.g., US Cyber Command), as well as to bolster and amplify information operations that counter local PRC propaganda strategies.

The myriad of joint targeting activities outlined above not only enable specific tactical actions but also inform or further placement and access that continuously matures the collective understanding of the operating environment. Given the nature of strategic competitors, much of this understanding can be exported to other locations to bolster awareness and enable the linking of activities in a logical way as outlined in the NDS. At the center of this process is data, and as stated by former Deputy Secretary of Defense David L. Norquist, “our ability to fight and win wars requires that we become world leaders in operationalizing and protecting our data resources at speed and scale.”⁹

Harnessing data to improve the targeting and effects process

The joint force’s ability to leverage data at speed and scale, predicated on its adoption of emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence (AI), enables this framework for targeting and effects generation. Data informs the nature of required access, feeds the focused understanding process, and enables the development of well-informed options that artfully balance desired outcomes with strategic risk. However, raw and unstructured data in isolation does not create a decisive advantage. Rather, it must be harnessed for effect, transforming data into both information and intelligence that is usable and accessible at the speed of relevance.

While the importance of data is nothing new, the joint force must grapple with the explosion of available data spanning all domains, sectors, and sources. Technologies such as AI and machine learning (ML) present meaningful ways to navigate this near-infinite amount of data. The 2020 DOD Data Strategy envisions the department as a “data-centric organization that uses data at speed and scale for operational advantage and increased efficiency,” with particular focus on enabling all-domain operations, more rapid and informed decision-making, and organizational business analytics.¹¹ Moreover, AI makes determinations and finds data connections in ways humans alone cannot, encapsulating everything from making obvious connections more rapidly (e.g., using satellite data to geolocate battlefield equipment) to identifying valuable datasets overlooked by humans (e.g., how commercial shipping telemetry data can enable deeper understanding of the PRC’s fifth-generation [5G] infrastructure development in Africa).

Data

Data is obtained by a variety of automated or manual and physical or virtual means. Any entity that can obtain data is considered a sensor. Data becomes information once put into context prescribed with meaning by the observer. Often, the meaning prescribed by the observer can be adapted as understanding of the environment grows, making particular datasets more or less useful. The process by which information is transformed into intelligence is complex and combines both art and science as described in JP 2-0 Joint Intelligence:

• Intelligence fuses and evaluates information from multiple sources to provide the most accurate assessment possible of the current state of the operating environment.
• From current assessments, intelligence draws predictive estimates of the full range of potential alternative future states of the operating environment.
• To inform decisions, intelligence illuminates how the operating environment may react to different friendly options under consideration.¹²

The flow from data to intelligence—known as the processing, exploitation, and dissemination (PED) cycle—is illustrated in Figure 3, overlaid with the targeting framework from Figure 2.

The nature of today’s security environment necessitates the execution of PED at greater speed and scale than is achievable by humans alone. Particularly, the operating environment below armed conflict—which encompasses most joint force activities—places a premium on scale. To effectively compete globally and deter China and Russia, large quantities of data must be triaged and transformed into intelligence to inform transregional and multi-domain activities that are logically linked. In contrast, armed conflict—the highest-risk joint force activity—places a premium on speed. Rapidly processing and disseminating targeting data, effectively integrating kinetic and non-kinetic fires against mobile targets, and incorporating virtual capabilities that can affect adversary nodes within milliseconds would be impossible without AI/ML and human-machine teaming. The Joint All-Domain Command and Control (JADC2) concept describes the importance of this flow from data to intelligence based on the requirement for “joint force commanders to ‘sense,’ ‘make sense,’ and ‘act’ in the operational environment.”¹³ While this paper is not focused on the JADC2 and Joint All-Domain Operations (JADO) concepts, the employment of this paper’s updated targeting and effects process would support the more rapid implementation of JADO/JADC2 across the joint force.

The process of sensing, making sense, and acting is continuous. The speed by which this process plays out is variable based on the nature of the domain, location along the continuum, commander’s intent, and both local and global risk considerations. Deliberate planning and preparation of the operating environment, to include the establishment of relationships and infrastructure, deployment of sensors, and data architecture, and other such activities are necessary to enable this process to occur with speed downstream. In particular, active conflict places a premium on achieving maximum speed for this process, which simultaneously necessitates extensive preparation and autonomy.

Using the competition space to prepare for high-end armed conflict

Conflict preparation is the persistent, locally distinct, and global sensing of the target ecosystem. It is a dynamic process that constantly generates and updates the integrated targeting planning and execution decisions. Prevailing in armed conflict is the ultimate basis for the existence of the joint force, and places a significant premium on preparation to maintain a position of advantage, inform capability development, and hold adversaries at risk. Armed conflict exists on the far-right side of the competition continuum and represents the most consequential activity the joint force must prepare for and, when called upon, execute. While often referred to in sterilized terminology, a clear description of armed conflict—the application of violence to destroy an enemy’s will and means to resist—serves to highlight the care and attention that preparation for conflict requires. While any type of conflict requires serious attention, high-end armed conflict against a peer adversary represents the most potentially dangerous scenario for which the joint force must prepare. While the objective of integrated deterrence is to deter conflict from occurring in the first place, it is equally about shaping the environment to ensure joint force dominance should deterrence fail. As outlined in Joint Publication 3-0, “while commanders conduct activities of cooperation and adversarial competition, they are still preparing for armed conflict.”¹⁵

Conflict preparation is a balancing act. The joint force must weigh concerns of strategic risk and escalation management: “Tilting the competitive balance too far in one’s own favor will affect an adversary’s decision-making and behavior, but the effect may be vertical or horizontal escalation, not compliance.”¹⁶ Smartly preparing for conflict to create and maintain advantage over an adversary can be a campaign in its own right and must involve shaping activities as well as capability development. These activities will often nest within an overarching integrated deterrence campaign, but at times these endeavors may diverge, at which point the balance of priority and weight of effort must be considered. For example, winning a conflict to defend the Panama Canal would be a clear priority of the United States. However, preparation for such a conflict is not assigned the same weight of effort as, for example, the defense of Taiwan, which is being treated as a high-likelihood event by the Pentagon today.

The United States will not achieve a decisive warfighting advantage against a near-peer competitor through sheer mass or weapon systems alone—rather, the victor will be the military that stacks the deck in its advantage before conflict erupts. Russia’s current war in Ukraine highlights the severity of high-end armed conflict involving near-peer competitors. While great wartime effort is aimed at bolstering sustainment through industrial base and supply chain modernization, operational activities will eventually be curtailed to whatever pace can be sustained through resupply. The joint force’s future advantage will hinge on its ability to: 1) advantageously shape the environment and 2) field capabilities with greater speed, precision, and lethality than its adversary.

Shaping the environment

Shaping the environment is crucial to securing a position of advantage across multiple domains left of conflict. In the context of targeting and effects generation, activities to shape the environment must center around closing critical operational and intelligence gaps associated with a prioritized target list tied to operational plans. These activities are intended to enhance precision and lethality of engagement and shorten the kill chain once armed conflict begins. In line with the framework espoused in this report, focused understanding of the enemy’s order of battle, critical infrastructure, battle management tactics, techniques and procedures, and standard operating procedures is key to establishing and maintaining a prioritized target list. In this way, portions of the joint targeting cycle are accomplished prior to conflict, informing weaponeering recommendations across kinetic and non-kinetic effects, as well as the requirements necessary to develop new capabilities to counter enemy systems for which the joint force does not yet possess a solution.

Moreover, shaping activities can be geared toward increasing resiliency in the joint targeting process. Much attention is given to the challenges of contested, degraded, and operationally limited (CDO) environments and how they complicate traditional means by which the joint force projects combat power. Peer adversaries can contest environments in a multitude of ways such as anti-access/area denial capabilities, electromagnetic interference, countering space situational awareness, and defensive cyber operations. Shaping activities must prioritize alternate means of accomplishing warfighting functions given the potential for primary means to become denied or degraded. Ironically, the CDO nature of Russia’s war in Ukraine has led to a much more conventional and analogue fight than anticipated. This highlights the importance of bolstering resiliency through shaping operations, as peer adversary denial capabilities may effectively cancel out one another’s high-end platforms.

Shaping across the physical and virtual domains

As is the case throughout the competition continuum, the contact layer for armed conflict is both physical and virtual. Traditional physical targets include surface-to-air missile systems, radars, maritime vessels, and command posts, and they exist in quantities of hundreds or thousands; virtual targets include network nodes tied to communication systems, power infrastructure, situational awareness, and early warning, and they are quantified in the millions. When expanding the battlefield to the virtual domain, synchronization of kinetic and non-kinetic effects can lead to significant advantages across the joint warfighting functions¹⁷ and with regard to the principle of mass.

Gaining a competitive advantage traditionally depends on availability and posture: the forces available, and on what timeline, are determined by their current posture. In the physical world, this construct presents challenging time-distance problems when considering global conflicts, raising questions for both escalation management as well as force preservation. The virtual world can alter this paradigm by enabling virtual mass, leveraging cyber operations to hold adversary networks and capabilities at risk at unprecedented speed and scale. Even modest impact on adversary capabilities executed on this scale of mass and speed can complicate the enemy’s risk calculus and mitigate some risk associated with physical force flow into theater. Given the challenges of logistics and sustainment, efficiencies gained through the employment of virtual capabilities provide a significant advantage during a protracted conflict. Saying this, virtual capabilities are not a silver bullet and effects delivered through cyberspace are insufficient in isolation during armed conflict, and often require large up-front investment in time and resources.

The evolution of virtual targeting and effects, to include the integration with physical targeting and fires, drives a greater premium on shaping the environment prior to conflict. To hold millions of virtual targets at risk instantaneously necessitates significant preparation of the environment. Indeed, a multiyear campaign built around access and understanding—by, with, and through regional allies and partners—may be necessary to simply gain access to the right adversary networks. Development and installation of cyber capabilities would be executed in parallel, with the associated development and intelligence gaps feeding back into the overall campaign approach. Shaping campaigns can provide the decisive advantage once armed conflict begins, all while informing the joint force of its own potential vulnerabilities and thus allowing for continued defensive hardening in stride.

Capability development

While fielding innovative and advanced technologies is critical to maintaining a decisive battlefield advantage, technology (whether platform or software-based) does not on its own equate to capability.¹⁸ Rather, it is the combination of technology, tactics, and training that creates a true capability—for instance, the United States sells fifth-generation fighter jets to other nations, but those nations do not instantly gain the capability to execute low-observable deep strike operations. Technology development must be informed by an understanding of the operating environment, the capabilities of adversaries, and the nature by which the joint force executes operations. To that end, furthering capability development is an objective for the campaigning framework outlined in this paper.

Training AI/ML algorithms often emulates or requires real-world data, further underscoring the need for capability development to harness data for effect. While great strides have been made in emulation for training, the real world offers the most significant data, which is accessible through robust campaigning activities across the joint force in concert with interagency and international partners. The integration of emerging weapon system technology such as hypersonics, lasers, and space-based fires is equally critical. Capabilities such as JADC2 seek to establish the necessary datacentric architecture for seamless integration of information and effects, which span employment times from milliseconds to hours. However, without AI/ML-driven predictive capabilities in the loop, joint force commanders will be challenged to make appropriate targeting and weaponeering decisions amid a large-scale conflict, creating significant risk with respect to sustainment, logistics, and force protection. Without a similar distribution of situational awareness, authority, and capability to the tactical edge, the joint force will not be able to field a credible combat force in a CDO environment where being disconnected from higher headquarters is the norm.

Lastly, while security cooperation is a foundational activity underlying integrated deterrence, the execution of high-end combined arms warfare with allies and partners requires a great deal of specific investment. This includes years of combined training, exercises, and rehearsals to create a dependable capability, especially when factoring in the complexity of integrating emerging technology. Incorporating allies and partners into the joint force-led scheme of maneuver will be critical to maintaining an advantage in targeting and effects generation. However, information-sharing hurdles, disparate rules of engagement, authorities, and cultural considerations must be ironed out in advance of conflict such that the full force of allied firepower can be realized. Ensuring that key allies are fielding capabilities that are JADC2 compatible will be critical to achieving the shared situational awareness required for a common operating picture. Making strides of this nature and fielding a combat-credible combined force will not be accomplished through sporadic exercises, key leader engagements, or exchanges; the joint force must train with allies and partners in the same manner with which it trains internally.

In sum, high-end conflict with a peer adversary presents the most difficult and high-risk challenge, and it requires specific attention given the gravity of its nature. When adequately prioritized, preparation for armed conflict prescribes a unique set of requirements for the joint force and its partners to execute during cooperation and competition and across multiple domains and instruments of power, which at times may overlap or diverge from deterrence. Shaping activities of this nature fall expressly within the proposed proactive targeting and effects framework given that, in the event of war, “these capabilities will shape the environment to ensure combat dominance and our ability to end any conflict on our terms.”¹⁹

The way forward

Implementing change is no easy task, especially when considering the massive scale of the joint force. Nonetheless, a tidal wave of contemporary strategies, guidance and policy documents, and service visions all speak to the urgent need for change. Culture—coupled with procedural and technological changes—will be key to enabling sustainable adoption of a new approach.

Culture: Adapting the joint force’s mindset to global problems across the competition continuum

First, to deter armed conflict the joint force must adopt and operationalize the competitive mindset shift outlined in recent strategic doctrine. While armed conflict is never desirable, regardless of scale, high-end warfare between nuclear-armed peer competitors is of such gravity that deterring it from ever occurring is crucial. General Mark A. Milley’s assertion that “traditional joint force deterrence” is “less effective,” alludes to the notion that owning the most sophisticated or greatest quantity of weaponry is inadequate on its own as a deterrent.²¹ Moreover, while an adversary’s belief in the joint force’s will to act is critical to deterrence, it cannot solely revolve around direct military force given escalation concerns. Rather, adopting a more proactive and creative approach to strategic competition can simultaneously deter malign behavior while complicating, confusing, and frustrating adversary decision-making. The spectrum of views on Russia’s war in Ukraine are informative in this regard: Some highlight US and NATO success in arming Ukraine in its valiant campaign to oppose Russia’s invasion, whereas others view the ongoing war as “a direct result of the West’s lack of resolve and failure to credibly deter Russia” from waging war on the European continent more broadly, regardless of NATO borders.²² This latter sentiment pushes the force to adopt cultural change in order to deter future conflicts. Of course, the United States cannot deter all conflicts from occurring. However, well-informed global campaign plans can and should inform the prioritization of operational activities tied to certain potential conflicts the joint force deliberately seeks to deter.

Incorporating all instruments of power

The joint force need not abandon its traditional strengths; rather, it ought to smartly evolve its approaches to incorporate all instruments of power to expand access, fuel understanding, and generate a range of options regardless of location within the competition continuum. Increased training and education on the nature of authorities and tools that the various instruments of power can bring to the fight is critical for joint leaders. In this way, entities like the State Department or Intelligence Community do not simply represent “concurrence” boxes that must be checked to get military operations approved. Rather, they can be incorporated as partners that offer unique access vectors, diverse understanding, and a variety of tools to support or be supported by military actions, whether at the tactical, operational, or strategic levels. As described in this framework, adopting this change bolsters the joint force’s capability to target within any domain, and similarly expands the nature of effects, fires, and actions available to achieve desired outcomes.

Joint Interagency Task Forces (JIATFs) exemplify this approach and could be scaled to enable joint targeting and effects generation. Scaling a similar approach to that of the JIATF, however, requires cultural adaptation. JIATFs are tailor-built to address singular problems and combine multiple instruments of power—and their accompanying authorities and capabilities—under a single chain of command to create unity of effort. However, unity of effort does not necessitate unity of command: The joint force can lead the integrated deterrence effort without being in charge, and it often does play a supporting role to its interagency counterparts. This requires senior leaders to establish a culture that moves beyond “coordination” and “deconfliction” and toward “collaboration.” Increased organizational trust, built upon real-world operational experiences, will increase trust both across departments and in the disparate datasets produced across the instruments of power, ultimately amplifying the predictive capabilities of the AI architecture this framework is reliant upon. Moving toward collaboration is similarly critical as it pertains to enhancing the aggregate power among allies and partners.

Embracing the global nature of problem sets

The joint force must also embrace the concept of a global, multi-domain contact layer. When viewing the world solely through the lens of armed conflict, the joint force focuses narrowly on Russia in Europe and the PRC in the Indo-Pacific. Targeting and effects generation in Latin America, Africa, or the Arctic are then insufficiently regarded as supporting, complementary, or niche efforts rather than as potential key components of integrated deterrence. Many operational efforts—such as security force assistance, building a partner’s combat capability, gaining access, and illuminating vulnerabilities of an adversary’s capabilities—require significant time and resource investments. Senior leaders must understand why, for example, a multiyear effort to gain placement and access in Equatorial Guinea fits within the global campaign to counter PRC malign influence; otherwise they will be less likely to resource it (in this case, Equatorial Guinea is a candidate for the establishment of what would be the PRC’s first Atlantic naval base).²³ As such, combatant commanders who lead global campaign plans, such as the global campaign plan for China, should prioritize regularly communicating their priorities to other combatant commands when activities take place in another geographic area of command. This is especially important when activity falls under the authority of a different combatant command.

Generating senior leader understanding is a by-product of cultivating a joint force that thinks with a competitive mindset. As former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Joseph F. Dunford recognized, the United States “think[s] of being at peace or war…our adversaries don’t think that way.”²⁴ Altering the “peace or war” mentality to a deeper understanding of activities across the competition continuum—and adopting a strategy of proactive targeting harnessing all instruments of power—is necessary to simultaneously deter aggression and effectively prepare for conflict. Combatant command force structure changes; intergovernmental professional training, education, and exercises; and in-garrison and deployed intergovernmental cross-pollination are beyond the scope of this paper but are among concepts worth exploring to enable cultural changes at scale.

Technology and data: Building a resilient and holistic data architecture

The DOD must build a robust and extensive data architecture, fusing private sector data with government data, and build frameworks and standards to harness it into actionable information. Data fuels everything from access and understanding, to options, targeting, and analysis, to predictions and recommendations. For data to be usable, however, it must first be accessible. Accessibility must occur at echelon given the nature of CDO environments and the expectation that severed links between the tactical edge and higher headquarters elements will be the norm, not the exception.

The joint force needs a data architecture in line with, and as a central component of, the JADC2 concept that aggregates data from all sensors across all domains to enable a proactive framework for targeting and effect. The architecture must encompass the tactical edge, fusing commercial and government-procured data across a spectrum of classification levels. In line with the DoD Data Strategy, such an architecture must make data visible, accessible, understandable, linked, trustworthy, interoperable, and secure.²⁵ The DOD must involve the private sector in the process of building this architecture and consider how interoperability standards and technologies can be integrated and kept up to date. Not only will this help the joint force accelerate the PED cycle and act on intelligence, but it will also allow the joint force to operate across the scale of attribution to mitigate the operational and counterintelligence risks inherent to strategic competition.

Moreover, the joint force must explore how classified intelligence can safely be used to facilitate AI/ML algorithmic training. Otherwise, it may inadvertently incur risk to sources, methods, or exquisite platforms. Alternatively, with the appropriate mechanisms, AI/ML algorithms can be trained to reach similar conclusions as classified analysis using only open-source data. This will greatly enhance the joint force’s ability to export capabilities to allies and partners without concern for security-sharing agreements or classification obstacles.

Authorities, rules of engagement, and risk: Updating DOD guidelines and standards

DOD guidelines and standards must be updated to harness all tools of national power and to enable combatant commands to prioritize global issues alongside their regional areas of responsibility. For distribution of data to achieve the desired effect, the joint force must explore changes in the distribution of authorities, rules of engagement, and the nature of assessing risk. While a lack of authorities is frequently cited as a barrier to accomplishing operational activities, it is often the cumbersome means by which to access existing authorities that stands in the way. If a joint force commander (JFC) can exercise kinetic strike authority at their level but require permission from several echelons higher to execute information operations, the JFC will increasingly rely on kinetic effects. Authorities often lack clear processes by which subordinate commanders can quickly access them. Similarly, when authorities are reserved at the highest echelons, the approval authority is farthest removed from the problem, lacks adequate understanding, and often leads to excessive risk aversion. This plays out with the array of authorities germane to the joint force and will only become more complex and burdensome when expanding the aperture to include other instruments of power. At a minimum, when the National Command Authority delegates authorities to combatant commanders, there ought to be a standardized and coherent process by which subordinate echelons of command can access them efficiently. Additionally, an effective JADO/JADC2 operating environment that collects, disseminates, and harnesses data requires more effective coordination across the US services and manufacturers. The development of standards must be pursued to advance capabilities that are interoperable across the joint force and with US allies. Doing so will help improve the speed and precision of the targeting cycle.

Second, streamlining the approach to accessing authorities goes hand in hand with updating the joint force’s rules of engagement. These concepts help mitigate the concerns around disparate joint force elements operating with degraded or nonexistent contact with higher headquarters elements. Rules of engagement allow for commanders to lead through intent instead of specific guidance, facilitating more rapid and creative localized targeting and effects generation. Distribution of authorities and associated rules of engagement could transform a unit’s guidance from “employ electronic warfare (EW) effects against Russian ORLAN-10s” to “disrupt Russian ISR below 5,000 feet AGL.” The former is prescriptive and limiting; the latter is intent based, provides greater flexibility, and informs the necessary capabilities for the tactical edge to operate autonomously for longer periods of time.

Finally, the department must rethink the way it assesses risk in light of integrated deterrence and a global contact layer. Making informed decisions on risk management is a key underpinning of this framework. Yet, risk assessments are traditionally conducted in a temporal manner: the risk associated with a particular activity, in a particular location, with a particular target. Risks associated with strategic competition are not, however, suited to traditional ways of thinking. Competing with adversaries across a global contact layer requires considering how local risk ties into strategic risk, whether that be transregional or trans-domain. This is further complicated by the imperative to effectively prepare the joint force for combat. If, for example, a particular PRC capability presented a significant problem for the joint force’s ability to execute a contingency response plan, significant investment may be required to mitigate the threat. This may lead to a scenario in which the joint force assumes greater risk elsewhere in the globe to gain access to locations where the PRC has proliferated similar capabilities to increase understanding and develop options for use during crisis. A similar situation could arise where the joint force makes the decision to reveal a capability it would otherwise hold in reserve to complicate an adversary’s decision-making and risk calculus, thus enhancing deterrence. Maturing the joint force’s ability to assess risk in this manner must begin with data-informed understanding, shared consciousness, and unity of effort across all instruments of power.

Conclusion

Cultivating a joint force that enables and supports a whole-of-government approach to integrated deterrence is a daunting yet achievable vision, requiring transformational leadership to achieve. “Humans are more important than hardware,” and how leaders harness the joint force’s enduring strategic advantage of human capital will dictate whether success is achieved.²⁶ This paper has outlined a vision to update the way the joint force conducts targeting and effects generation for an era of strategic competition. Evolving the joint force’s model for targeting and effects will require adopting a mindset shift that sees competition as key to setting the conditions for, and ideally avoiding, armed conflict. To truly operationalize integrated deterrence, the joint force must embrace targeting and effects across the competition continuum, leveraging the range of tools at its disposal across its domestic and international counterparts, and avoiding a solely military or kinetic lens. Moreover, through the power of AI, the DOD can harness data for effect and fuel the proactive, continuous, and global campaigning required for integrated deterrence.

Sponsored By

This report was generously sponsored by Lockheed Martin Corporation. The report is written and published in accordance with the Atlantic Council Policy on Intellectual Independence. The authors are solely responsible for its analysis and recommendations. The Atlantic Council and its donors do not determine, nor do they necessarily endorse or advocate for, any of this report’s conclusions.

About the authors

Gen James E. Cartwright, USMC (ret.)

Former Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, US Department of Defense

Fellow

Justin M. Conelli

2022-23 Senior US Air Force Fellow

Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Afghanistan National Security

Staff

Clementine G. Starling-Daniels

Director, Forward Defense

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Security & Defense NATO

Former staff

Julia Siegel

Former Associate Director

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Security & Defense

The views expressed in this academic research paper are those of the author(s) and do not reflect the official policy or position of the US government or the Department of Defense. In accordance with Air Force Instruction 51-303, Intellectual Property—Patents, Patent Related Matters, Trademarks and Copyrights, 1 September 1998, this research paper is not copyrighted but is the property of the United States government.

Forward Defense, housed within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, generates ideas and connects stakeholders in the defense ecosystem to promote an enduring military advantage for the United States, its allies, and partners. Our work identifies the defense strategies, capabilities, and resources the United States needs to deter and, if necessary, prevail in future conflict.

Learn more

The post Operationalizing integrated deterrence: Applying joint force targeting across the competition continuum appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On May 19, Forward Defense director Clementine G. Starling was featured on an episode of the Irregular Warfare Initiative’s podcast to discuss gray zone conflict. She was joined by David Van, who is a member of the Australian Senate for Victoria.

Starling discussed Forward Defense’s report “Seizing the advantage: A vision for the next US national defense strategy” which laid out an approach for the US address challenges across the competition continuum. She also described how policymakers think about the gray zone as a space between cooperation and armed conflict.

Staff

Clementine G. Starling-Daniels

Director, Forward Defense

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Security & Defense NATO

Forward Defense, housed within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, generates ideas and connects stakeholders in the defense ecosystem to promote an enduring military advantage for the United States, its allies, and partners. Our work identifies the defense strategies, capabilities, and resources the United States needs to deter and, if necessary, prevail in future conflict.

Learn more

The post Starling joins Irregular Warfare Initiative podcast to discuss gray zone conflict appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Moscow has led its coercion campaign ever since pro-European Union (EU) candidate Maia Sandu won the presidential election in a landslide in November 2020—much to the Kremlin’s displeasure. Then, Sandu’s Party of Action and Solidarity won the 2021 parliamentary elections, paving the way for Sandu to officially apply to join the EU. A sustained effort by the Kremlin to undermine the Moldovan government’s credibility followed, and with the February 2022 invasion of Ukraine, this intimidation campaign moved into high gear, notably through airspace violations, energy-supply manipulation, and official comments about Moldova being “the next Ukraine.” In the most recent example of this campaign, Russian armored forces conducted unannounced military maneuvers in the pro-Russian breakaway region of Transnistria last week.

On February 10 this year, Moldovan Prime Minister Natalia Gavrilita resigned following months of protests over inflation and high energy prices, resulting from Moscow’s decision to limit gas exports to Moldova, which is almost completely dependent on Russian energy. Then on February 21, Russian President Vladimir Putin abrogated a 2012 decree that acknowledged Moldovan sovereignty in resolving questions over the future of Transnistria. That cancelation, viewed in Moldova as a hostile act, de facto signaled Putin’s willingness to use force to achieve his aims, as Russian troops in the region lost their status as “peacekeepers” and instead became more like occupation forces. It also shows the lengths to which the Kremlin will go to open a new front in its invasion of Ukraine and to advance its interests in the Black Sea.

Moldova’s gross domestic product (GDP) per capita is roughly $5,200 a year (one of the lowest in Europe), and its inflation rate peaked at 34 percent after Russia invaded Ukraine and reduced fuel supplies. Yet many Moldovans blame their own government, not the Kremlin, an indication of Russia’s disinformation efforts that inflame the already tense domestic political divide.

While it is landlocked, Moldovan territory includes the Prut, the Dniester, and the Danube rivers, which empty into the Black Sea. Moreover, because it borders Ukraine and is only fifty kilometers from Odesa (Ukraine’s largest seaport), instability in Moldova—especially in Transnistria, which is effectively controlled by Moscow—could directly impact its neighbor’s security. A Russian-dominated Moldova could effectively become a southern Kaliningrad, and in conjunction with Crimea, it could provide Moscow with more control over the northern Black Sea and also possibly the ability to hamper Ukraine’s maritime activities. And, should Russia gain access to more Moldovan territory and flip Chisinau in its favor, Moscow’s expanded presence would also threaten Romania’s security and put even greater pressure on NATO’s southeastern flank.

Moldova has maintained its neutrality, which it had enshrined in its constitution. Despite this sentiment, Moldova is a member of the Partnership for Peace, which allows cooperation with NATO on a variety of activities. Yet Moldova has starved its security sector for decades, hoping its neutrality and Ukraine would protect it. Since Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine last year, Chisinau has sought to reverse this neglect of its military; for example, it expanded its 2024 defense budget by 68 percent compared to its budget in 2022—but that’s still only an increase of approximately eighty million dollars, or 0.55 percent of its GDP.

On paper, Moldova can field a security contingent of 45,000 personnel; however, this force is poorly trained and equipped with virtually no air support. In Transnistria, Russia has 1,500 troops, mainly comprising local recruits. While Moscow might seek to augment these forces, that would be logistically difficult given its failure to take Odesa. Moscow does, however, have significant agents of influence in Moldova who could work more forcefully against the government.

Keeping Moldova out of the Kremlin’s grasp is vital to Eastern European security and NATO’s Black Sea mission. Moldova, NATO, and the West must send clear, unmistakable signals to the Kremlin:

1. The EU should approve the fast-tracking of Moldova’s EU accession, a plan for which Poland recently made the case.
2. While it would be problematic to offer Moldova a fast track to NATO membership—as the Alliance is viewed unfavorably in Moldova, and leaving the policy of neutrality is unpopular there—NATO or its members can take other actions. For example, the promise of air defense and heavy weapons and training in the case of conflict with Russia/Transnistria would be a deterrent.
3. Moldova and the West should provide Moldova’s armed forces with more training and modern equipment, ultimately to improve capabilities and interoperability. Ukraine demonstrated how a Western-oriented training program can give a smaller country’s military an edge over Russia’s armed forces. This could be accomplished without violating Moldova’s neutrality as it would not require deploying foreign forces on Moldovan territory.
4. Moldova should institute a robust strategic-communications and cyber-defense platform to counter Russian malign influence—and the West should help. A platform designed to counter misinformation and disinformation could help galvanize domestic support for greater alignment with NATO and the West.
5. Finally, Moldova is one of the world’s least energy-self-sufficient countries. While Chisinau, with the West’s support, has made progress in source diversification and sector reform, it should continue to wean itself off of Russian oil and gas and electricity from Transnistria. Moldova must build a more resilient energy infrastructure that is not dependent on Russia.

Through its energy manipulation, military intimidation, and official threats, the Kremlin is conducting a classic hybrid warfare campaign against Moldova. In comparison to early 2014—when the world stood stunned in the wake of ‘little green men’ and the effective dismemberment of Ukraine—NATO and Western allies have become more sophisticated in detecting and combating hybrid warfare tactics. Additionally, NATO members’ support to Ukraine, while belated and arguably still inadequate, has been instrumental in Kyiv’s successful defense against Russia’s full-scale invasion. The lessons in Ukraine are unmistakable and should not be lost on Western and Moldovan leadership. Strong leadership, a determined population, and NATO support are indispensable in halting Russian aggression.

Arnold C. Dupuy is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council IN TURKEY, a faculty member of the US Naval Postgraduate School, and chair of the NATO Science and Technology Organization’s SAS-183, “Energy Security Capabilities, Resilience and Interoperability.”

The post To secure the Black Sea, the West must help Moldova stand up to Russian aggression appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The general consensus is that private military companies (PMCs) like Wagner Group must be countered because they advance Kremlin interests and help the Putin regime to project Russian power internationally. But a closer look suggests the Wagner Group and other Russian mercenary organizations may ultimately be liabilities and not assets for Putin.

For Wagner chief Yevgeny Prigozhin, 2023 already looks to be a tumultuous year. He has accused senior Russian military leaders of “treason” for allegedly holding up logistical and material support to Wagner mercenaries battling for control of Bakhmut in eastern Ukraine, and recently complained of being cut off altogether from the Kremlin.

Some commentators believe Prigozhin’s frequent jabs at members of the Russian elite could presage a contest for political power that may reach the heights of the Kremlin towers. Indeed, Prigozhin now says that he plans to remold Wagner into “an army with an ideology,” suggesting that he seeks to officially re-brand himself as an out-and-out political operator.

For all the speculation regarding the potential threat Prigozhin poses to the stability of the Putin regime, few have explored the Wagner leader’s relationship to the power structures that Putin himself depends upon for the perpetuation of his rule. In reality, the Wagner Group is as much a product of this system as it is a tool of Kremlin foreign and military policy. Western policymakers seeking to understand the role of Russian private paramilitaries should treat them as a symptom of the institutionalized corruption at the heart of Putin’s regime and not as just another instrument in Russia’s hybrid warfare toolbox.

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

Prigozhin has managed to carve a niche for himself by leveraging opaque corporate networks to facilitate Russian hard and soft power projection in Ukraine, Syria, and various conflict zones across Africa. This appears to be profitable work; his companies have reportedly raked in hundreds of millions of dollars from mineral extraction alone. White House officials have even claimed in recent months that Prigozhin directed Wagner fighters to capture the Ukrainian town of Soledar in order to secure access to nearby salt and gypsum mines. The notion that Prigozhin personally benefits from enabling the Kremlin’s foreign policy adventures appears to be a feature rather than a bug of Putin’s particular approach to governance.

Political scientists generally characterize Putin’s rule as a corrupt patron-client system in which elites are compensated for their allegiance with access to resources. Vladimir Gel’man of the University of Helsinki contends that Putin accepts bad governance by trusted elites to cultivate a loyal, informal power base separate from those formal institutions which might challenge his authority. Russia analyst Mark Galeotti likens this arrangement to a public-private “adhocracy” in which informal networks of enterprising business and political elites, rather than formal institutions, end up taking the initiative in divining and executing official policy.

The Wagner phenomenon reflects a political ecosystem that rewards the stewards of government policy with official as well as illicit perks in exchange for loyalty. Wagner benefits Putin by providing deniable cover for a wide range of military operations outside of Russia. In exchange, Prigozhin is allowed to pursue commercial ventures in the countries where his forces are active.

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Prigozhin’s trajectory is an indication that the Russian state’s claim to a monopoly on violence may be the next frontier to be challenged by Kremlin elites. The Wagner Group’s example appears to have encouraged everyone from Chechen strongman Ramzan Kadyrov to Russian natural gas giant Gazprom to organize PMCs of their own, a trend that some analysts argue could portend a “descent into warlordism.” Recent reports of a company owned by longtime Putin associate Gennadiy Timchenko hiring another PMC outfit not affiliated with Wagner to secure oil and gas infrastructure in Syria further suggest that Prigozhin is not the only person vying to supply PMC services to regime insiders.

International efforts to counter the Wagner network will require many of the same mechanisms used to combat corruption more generally. This will require governments to reflect on how their own institutions play into the interests of figures like Prigozhin, who has pursued journalists through the British courts despite being the subject of UK sanctions. Critics claim transnational imbalances in financial transparency that allow offshore jurisdictions to provide a veil of corporate secrecy to American and European nationals also help to obscure the Wagner network’s operations.

Efforts by the US Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control to target Wagner-linked shell companies registered in tax havens are a step in the right direction. But Western governments should also aim to hold accountable those individuals responsible for managing the network of corporate entities behind Wagner’s more mundane business operations.

One may reasonably question why Ukraine and its allies should go after Russian PMCs at all if their continued presence has the potential to undo Putin. Why not let them multiply and further weaken the foundations of the Putin regime? While potentially tempting, such an approach would involve considerable risks. If and when Putin leaves office, this is likely to create a power vacuum in which Russia’s nascent PMC class would flourish. Such an outcome could return Russia to a state of lawlessness reminiscent of the “wild nineties,” a period characterized by a proliferation of organized crime groups whose mercenary enforcers were often veterans of military campaigns in Afghanistan and Chechnya.

Putin often invokes the chaos of the 1990s to justify his authoritarian rule. Tolerating the presence of PMCs like the Wagner Group in the hope that they could unseat Putin risks reducing Russia to new depths of disorder and thereby facilitating the rise of aspiring autocrats in the years to come. Combating Russia’s private paramilitaries is essential not just in order to contain Putin, but to preempt the empowerment of future Russian leaders molded in his likeness.

Allen Maggard is a Russia analyst and specialist in the intersection of Russian political economy and the defense industry at C4ADS.

Further reading

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‘You cannot outlast us’: Biden’s Kyiv visit sends strong message to Moscow

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US President Joe Biden’s bold surprise visit to wartime Kyiv sent a strong message to Moscow that time is not on Putin’s side and Russia should not pin its hopes on a weakening of Western resolve to stand with Ukraine.

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Putin the Pariah: War crimes arrest warrant deepens Russia’s isolation

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The ICC decision to indict Putin for war crimes is a highly consequential step that will deepen Russia’s international isolation while weakening Putin’s personal position both at home and abroad, writes Anders Åslund.

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Ukrainians will never surrender. How long can they count on the West?

By Serhiy Prytula

Ukraine’s remarkable resistance during the first days of the Russian invasion convinced the democratic world to back the country but with Putin now preparing for a long war, continued Western resolve is vital writes Serhiy Prytula.

Civil Society Conflict

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

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There are 150 million US users of TikTok, and the contrast between the creative and often viral nature of clips produced on the platform—including those defending Chew—and the stodgy nature of C-SPAN’s fixed camera positions, pre-planned talking points, and members demanding “yes” or “no” answers to their questions, made for an unfavorable contrast for committee members. US policymakers considering a ban on TikTok need to think about the very serious ramifications to people and small businesses whose livelihoods do, at least in part, rely on the app. Those Americans who use the app for professional and business purposes should have their legitimate concerns addressed by policymakers in a meaningful manner alongside any sort of ban.

But TikTok users’ usage of the social media app, even if only to generate business, does not mitigate the potential threats to US national security associated with it. In December, Director of National Intelligence Avril Haines warned about the potential uses of TikTok by Beijing stemming from the data the app collects and the possibility of using it to influence public opinion. TikTok’s algorithm, for example—which experts view as more advanced than that of Facebook parent company Meta—could be used by China to create propaganda that seeks to influence or manipulate elections and the broader information environment.

TikTok’s connections to China’s government stem from it being a wholly owned subsidiary of the Beijing-based company ByteDance. Chew testified that “ByteDance is not owned or controlled by the Chinese government.” However, Article VII of China’s National Intelligence Law of 2017 makes clear the mandated responsibility for private sector companies (and any Chinese organization) to “support, assist, and cooperate” with China’s intelligence community. ByteDance, therefore, has an absolute obligation to turn over to China’s intelligence apparatus any data it requests.

There are significant reasons to be skeptical of Chew’s claims that “Project Texas”—TikTok’s effort to wall off US user data from Chinese authorities by solely storing it in the United States—will prevent China from having access to US user data in the future. Worse, even if one takes Chew at his word that “Project Texas” will accomplish this feat, it defies logic to believe that ByteDance would not—independently or compelled by China’s intelligence agencies—retain a copy of all 150 million current US users’ data.

At the same time, TikTok is just a symptom of a much bigger problem. The United States and its allies have a more fundamental issue when it comes to their citizens using China-based apps, programs, or any technology that collects their data. All China-based companies have the same obligations to provide data information to China’s intelligence services whenever requested.

What the US government can do

TikTok’s ban would mitigate the immediate threat posed by the ByteDance subsidiary, but there’s far more work that needs to be done. The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) has, up until now, been the most prominent tool used to prevent foreign governments, or individuals associated with them, from making investments in the United States that could be used to ultimately undermine US national security. CFIUS has a specific and meaningful role focused on investments, but nowadays it has too often become the default instrument for reconciling an increasingly broad swath of national security challenges. This is in part because it has a track record of success, but also because it’s one of the only meaningful tools available to policymakers. But it is not an ideal tool for every situation, something best demonstrated by CFIUS’s challenge in resolving TikTok’s ongoing review that has stretched on for more than two years now.

The bipartisan RESTRICT Act—which would give the Department of Commerce the right to review foreign technologies and ban them in the United States or force their sale—is a thoughtful place from which to begin discussions about additional ways to mitigate the US national security challenges related to information and communications platforms available for mass use. But that act alone would not solve the broader data challenges as they exist today.

The lack of federal regulation related to commercial data brokers, which today can and do legally collect and resell the data of millions of Americans, is a glaring gap that needs to be filled immediately. A ban on TikTok, for example, would do nothing to prevent data brokers from aggregating the same consumer data from other apps and re-selling it to commercial entities, including those in China. 

The threat posed by China to US national security, and to Americans’ individual data, is acute. The good news is the United States can deal with these challenges, but it will take more than just banning TikTok.

Jonathan Panikoff is a senior fellow in the Atlantic Council’s GeoEconomics Center and the former director of the Investment Security Group, overseeing the intelligence community’s CFIUS efforts, at the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.

The views expressed in this publication are the author’s and do not imply endorsement by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, the intelligence community, or any other US government agency.

The post Banning TikTok alone will not solve the problem of US data security appeared first on Atlantic Council.

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Executive summary

In the year since the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the conventional assault and advances into Ukrainian territory have been paralleled by a simultaneous invasion of the Ukrainian information environment. This environment, composed of cyber infrastructure, both digital and physical, and the data, networks, and ideas that flow through and across it, is more than a domain through which the combatants engage or a set of tools by which combatants interact—it is a parallel territory that Russia is intent on severing from the global environment and claiming for itself.

Russian assaults on the Ukrainian information environment are conducted against, and through, largely privately owned infrastructure, and Ukrainian defense in this space is likewise bound up in cooperative efforts with those infrastructure owners and other technology companies providing aid and assistance. The role of private companies in this conflict seems likely to grow, along with the scale, complexity, and criticality of the information infrastructure they operate.

Examining and mitigating the risks related to the involvement of private technology companies in the war in Ukraine is crucial and looking forward, the United States government must also examine the same questions with regard to its own security and defense:

1. What is the complete incentive structure behind a company’s decision to provide products or services to a state at war?
2. How dependent are states on the privately held portions of the information environment, including infrastructure, tools, knowledge, data, skills, and more, for their own national security and defense?
3. How can the public and private sectors work together better as partners to understand and prepare these areas of reliance during peace and across the continuum of conflict in a sustained, rather than ad hoc, nature?

Russia’s war against Ukraine is not over and similar aggressions are likely to occur in new contexts and with new actors in the future. By learning these lessons now and strengthening the government’s ability to work cooperatively with the private sector in and through the information space, the United States will be more effective and resilient against future threats.

Introduction

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022 held none of the illusory cover of its 2014 operation; instead of “little green men” unclaimed by Moscow, Putin built up his forces on Ukraine’s border for the entire international community to see. His ambitions were clear: To remove and replace the elected government of Ukraine with a figurehead who would pull the country back under Russia’s hold, whether through literal absorption of the state or by subsuming the entire Ukrainian population under Russia’s political and information control. In the year since the Russian invasion, Ukraine’s defense has held back the Russian war machine with far greater strength than many thought possible in the early months of 2022. President Zelenskyy, the Ukrainian government, and the Ukrainian people have repeatedly repelled Russian attempts to topple the state, buttressed in part by the outpouring of assistance from not just allied states, but also local and transnational private sector companies.

Amidst the largest conventional land war in Europe since the fall of the Third Reich, both Russia and Ukraine have directed considerable effort toward the conflict’s information environment, defined as the physical and digital infrastructure over and through which information moves, the tools used to interact with that information, and information itself. This is not only a domain through which combatants engage, but a parallel territory that the Kremlin seeks to contest and claim. Russian efforts in this realm, to destroy or replace Ukraine’s underpinning infrastructure and inhibit the accessibility and reach of infrastructure and tools within the environment, are countered by a Ukrainian defense that prioritizes openness and accessibility.

The information environment, and all the components therein, is not a state or military dominated environment; it is largely owned, operated, and populated by private organizations and individuals around the globe. The Ukrainian information environment, referring to Ukrainian infrastructure operators, service providers, and users, is linked to and part of a global environment of state and non-state actors where the infrastructure and the terrain is largely private. Russian operations within the Ukrainian information environment are conducted against, and through, this privately owned infrastructure, and the Ukrainian defense is likewise bound up in cooperative efforts with those infrastructure owners and other technology companies that are providing aid and assistance. These efforts have contributed materially, and in some cases uniquely, to Ukraine’s defense.

The centrality of this environment to the conduct of this war, raises important questions about the degree to which states and societies are dependent on information infrastructure and functionalities owned and operated by private actors, and especially transnational private actors. Although private sector involvement in the war in Ukraine has generally been positive, the fact that the conduct of war and other responsibilities in the realm of statehood are reliant on private actors leads to new challenges for these companies, for the Ukrainian government, and for the United States and allies.

The United States government must improve its understanding of, and facility for, joint public-private action to contest over and through the information environment. The recommendations in this report are intended to facilitate the ability of US technology companies to send necessary aid to Ukraine, ensure that the US government has a complete picture of US private-sector involvement in the war in Ukraine, and contribute more effectively to the resilience of the Ukrainian information environment. First, the US government should issue a directive providing assurance and clarification as to the legality of private sector cyber, information, capacity building, and technical aid to Ukraine. Second, a task force pulling from agencies and offices across government should coordinate to track past, current, and future aid from the private sector in these areas to create a better map of US collaboration with Ukraine across the public and private sectors. Third, the US government should increase its facilitation of private technology aid by providing logistical and financial support.

These recommendations, focused on Ukraine’s defense, are borne of and provoke larger questions that will only become more important to tackle. The information environment and attempts to control it have long been a facet of conflict, but the centrality of privately owned and operated technology—and the primacy of some private sector security capabilities in relation to all but a handful of states—pose increasingly novel challenges to the United States and allied policymaking communities. Especially in future conflicts, the risks associated with private sector action in defense of, or directly against, a combatant could be significantly greater and multifaceted, rendering existing cooperative models insufficient.

The Russian information offensive

The Russian Federation Ministry of Foreign Affairs defines information space—of which cyberspace is a part—as “the sphere of activity connected with the formation, creation, conversion, transfer, use, and storage of information and which has an effect on individual and social consciousness, the information infrastructure, and information itself.¹ Isolating the Ukrainian information space is key to both the short- and long-term plans of the Russian government. In the short term, the Kremlin pursues efforts to control both the flow and content of communications across the occupied areas.² In the longer term, occupation of the information environment represents an integral step in Russian plans to occupy and claim control over the Ukrainian population.

In distinct opposition to the global nature of the information environment, over the past decade or so, the Kremlin has produced successive legislation “to impose ‘sovereignty’ over the infrastructure, content, and data traversing Russia’s ‘information space,’” creating a sectioned-off portion of the internet now known as RuNet.³ Within this space, the Russian government has greater control over what information Russian citizens see and a greater ability to monitor what Russian citizens do online.⁴ This exclusionary interpretation is an exercise in regime security against what the Kremlin perceives as constant Western information warfare against it.⁵ As Gavin Wilde, senior fellow with the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, writes, the Russian government views the information environment “as an ecosystem to be decisively dominated.”⁶

To the Kremlin, domination of the information environment in Ukraine is an essential step toward pulling the nation into its fold and under its control. Just as Putin views information domination as critical to his regime’s exercise of power within Russia, in Ukraine, Russian forces systematically conduct offensives against the Ukrainian information environment in an attempt to create a similar model of influence and control that would further enable physical domination. This strategy is evident across the Kremlin’s efforts to weaken the Ukrainian state for the last decade at least. In the 2014 and 2022 invasions, occupied, annexed, and newly “independent” regions of Ukraine were variously cut off from the wider information space and pulled into the restricted Russian information space.  

The Crimean precedent – 2014 

The Russian invasion of Ukraine did not begin in 2022, but in 2014. Examining this earlier Russian incursion illustrates the pattern of Russian offensive behavior in and through the information environment going back nearly a decade—a combination of physical, cyber, financial, and informational maneuvers that largely target or move through private information infrastructure. In 2014, although obfuscated behind a carefully constructed veil of legitimacy, Russian forces specifically targeted Ukrainian information infrastructure to separate the Crimean population from the Ukrainian information environment, and thereby the global information environment, and filled that vacuum with Russian infrastructure and information. 

The Russian invasion of eastern Ukraine in 2014 was a direct response to the year-long Euromaidan Revolution, which took place across Ukraine in protest of then-President Viktor Yanukovych’s decision to spurn closer relations with the European Union and ignore growing calls to counter Russian influence and corruption within the Ukrainian government. These protests were organized, mobilized, and sustained partially through coordination, information exchange, and message amplification over social media sites like Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, and Ustream—as well as traditional media.⁷ In February 2014, after Yanukovych fled to Russia, the Ukrainian parliament established a new acting government and announced that elections for a new president would be held in May. Tensions immediately heightened, as Russian forces began operating in Crimea with the approval of Federal Assembly of Russia at the request of “President” Yanukovych, although Putin denied that they were anything other than “local self-defense forces.”⁸ On March 21, Putin signed the annexation of Crimea.⁹

During the February 2014 invasion of Crimea, the seizure and co-option of Ukrainian physical information infrastructure was a priority. Reportedly, among the first targets of Russian special forces was the Simferopol Internet Exchange Point (IXP), a network facility that enables internet traffic exchange.¹⁰ Ukraine’s state-owned telecommunications company Ukrtelecom reported that armed men seized its offices in Crimea and tampered with fiber-optic internet and telephone cables.¹¹ Following the raid, the company lost the “technical capacity to provide connection between the peninsula and the rest of Ukraine and probably across the peninsula, too.”¹² Around the same time, the head of the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU), Valentyn Nalivaichenko, reported that the mobile phones of Ukrainian parliament members, including his own, were blocked from connecting through Ukrtelecom networks in Crimea.¹³

Over the next three years, and through the “progressive centralization of routing paths and monopolization of Internet Service market in Crimea … the topology of Crimean networks has evolved to a singular state where paths bound to the peninsula converge to two ISPs (Rosetelecom and Fiord),” owned and operated by Russia.¹⁴ Russian forces manipulated the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP)—the system that helps connects user traffic flowing from ISPs to the wider internet—modifying routes to force Crimean internet traffic through Russian systems, “drawing a kind of ‘digital frontline’ consistent with the military one.”¹⁵ Residents of Crimea found their choices increasingly limited, until their internet service could only route through Russia, instead of Ukraine, subject to the same level of censorship and internet controls as in Russia. The Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) monitored communications from residents of Crimea, both within the peninsula and with people in Ukraine and beyond.¹⁶ Collaboration between ISPs operating in Crimea through Russian servers and the FSB appears to be a crucial piece of this wider monitoring effort. This claim was partially confirmed by a 2018 Russian decree that forbade internet providers from publicly sharing any information regarding their cooperation with “the authorized state bodies carrying out search and investigative activities to ensure the security of the Russian Federation.”¹⁷

From March to June 2014, Russian state-owned telecom company Rostelcom began and completed construction of the Kerch Strait cable, measuring 46 kilometers (about 28.5 miles) and costing somewhere between $11 and $25 million, to connect the Crimean internet with the Russian RuNet.¹⁸ Rostelcom, using a local agent in Crimea called Miranda Media, became the main transit network for several Crimean internet service providers (ISPs), including KCT, ACS-Group, CrimeaCom, and CRELCOM in a short period of time.¹⁹ There was a slower transition of customers from the Ukrainian company Datagroup to Russian ISPs, but nonetheless, the number of Datagroup customers in Crimea greatly decreased throughout 2014. According to one ISP interviewed by Romain Fontugne, Ksenia Ermoshina, and Emile Aben, “the Kerch Strait cable was used first of all for voice communication … The traffic capacity of this cable was rather weak for commercial communications.”²⁰ But by the end of 2017, remnant usage of Ukrainian ISPs had virtually disappeared, following the completion of a second, better internet cable through the Kerch Strait and a series of restrictions placed on Russian social media platforms, news outlets, and a major search engine by Ukrainian President Poroshenko.²¹ The combination of the new restrictions, and the improved service of Russian ISPs encouraged more Crimeans to move away from Ukrainian ISPs. 

Russia’s efforts to control the information environment within Crimea, and the Russian government’s ability to monitor communications and restrict access to non-Russian approved servers, severely curtailed freedom of expression and belief—earning the region zero out of four in this category from Freedom House.²² Through physical, and formerly private, information infrastructure, Russia was able to largely take control of the information environment within Crimea. 

A parallel occupation – 2022 

Digital information infrastructure 

Just as in 2014, one of the first priorities of invading Russian forces in 2022 was the assault of key Ukrainian information infrastructure, including digital infrastructure. Before, during, and following the invasion, Russian and Russian-aligned forces targeted Ukrainian digital infrastructure through cyber operations, ranging in type, target, and sophistication. Through some combination of Ukrainian preparedness, partner intervention, and Russian planning shortfalls, among other factors, large-scale cyber operations disrupting Ukrainian critical infrastructure, such as those seen previously in 2015 with BlackEnergy and NotPetya, did not materialize.²³ This could be because such cyber operations require significant time and resources, and similar ends can be more cheaply achieved through direct, physical means. Russian cyber operators, however, have not been idle.  

Preceding the physical invasion, there was a spate of activity attributed to both Russian and Russian-aligned organizations targeting a combination of state and private organizations.²⁴ From January 13 to 14, for example, hackers briefly took control of seventy Ukrainian government websites, including the Ministries of Defense and Foreign Affairs, adding threatening messages to the top of these official sites.²⁵ The following day, January 15, Microsoft’s Threat Intelligence Center reported the discovery of wiper malware, disguised as ransomware, in dozens of Ukrainian government systems, including agencies which “provide critical executive branch or emergency response function,” and an information technology firm that services those agencies.²⁶ A month later, on February 15, Russian hackers targeted several websites with distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks, forcing Ukrainian defense ministry and armed forces websites, as well as those of PrivatBank and Oschadbank, offline.²⁷  Around the same time, according to Microsoft’s special report on Ukraine, “likely” Russian actors were discovered in the networks of unidentified critical infrastructure in Odessa and Sumy.²⁸ The day before the invasion, cybersecurity companies ESET and Symantec reported that a new destructive wiper was spreading across Ukrainian, Latvian, and Lithuanian networks, as a second round of DDoS attacks again took down a spate of government and financial institution websites.“²⁹ This activity centered around information—with defacements sending a clear threat to the Ukrainian government and population, DDoS attacks impairing accurate communication, and wiper malware degrading Ukrainian data—and gaining access to Ukrainian data for Russia. Although many of these operations targeted Ukrainian government networks, the attacks moved through or against privately operated infrastructure and, notably, the first public notification and detailing of several of these operations was undertaken by transnational technology companies.  

After February 24, Russian cyber activity continued and the targets included a number of private information infrastructure operators. A March hack of Ukrtelecom—Ukraine’s largest landline operator, which also provides internet and mobile services to civilians and the Ukrainian government and military—resulted in a collapse of the company’s network to just 13 percent capacity, the most severe disruption in service the firm recorded since the invasion began.³⁰ Another such operation targeted Triolan—a Ukrainian telecommunications provider—on February 24 in tandem with the physical offensive and a second time on March 9. These incursions on the Triolan network took down key nodes and caused widespread service outages. Following the March 9 attack, the company was able to restore service, but these efforts were complicated by the need to physically access some of the equipment located in active conflict zones.³¹ These attacks against Ukraine-based information infrastructure companies caused service outages that were concurrent with the physical invasion and afterwards, restricted communications among Ukrainians and impeded the population’s ability to respond to current and truthful information. 

The effectiveness of the operation is debated, although the logic of the attack is straightforward. Russia wanted to constrain, or preferably eliminate, an important channel of communication for the Ukrainian military during the initial stages of the invasion. Traditional, land-based radios, which the Ukrainian military relies on for most of their communications, only work over a limited geographic range, therefore making it more difficult to use advanced, long-range weapons systems.⁴¹ It should be expected that landline and conventional telephony would suffer outages during the opening phases of the war and struggle to keep up with rapidly moving forces.

Initially, it was widely reported that the Russian strike on ViaSat was effective. On March 15, a senior Ukrainian cybersecurity official, Viktor Zhora, was quoted saying that the attack on ViaSat caused “a really huge loss in communications in the very beginning of the war.⁴² When asked follow-up questions about his quote, Zhora said at the time that he was unable to elaborate, leading journalists and industry experts to believe that the attack had impacted the Ukrainian military’s ability to communicate.⁴³ However, several months later, on September 26, Zhora revised his initial comments, stating that the hack would have impacted military communications if satellite communications had been the Ukrainian military’s principal medium of communication. However, Zhora stated that the Ukrainian military instead relies on landlines for communication, with satellites as a back-up method. He went on to say that “in the case land lines were destroyed, that could be a serious issue in the first hours of war.”⁴⁴ The tension, and potential contradictions, in Zhora’s comments underlines the inherent complications in analyzing cyber operations during war: long-term consequences can be difficult to infer from short-term effects, and countries seek to actively control the narratives surrounding conflict.  

The effectiveness of the ViaSat hack boils down to how the Ukrainian military communicates, and how adaptable it was in the early hours of the invasion. However, it is apparent how such a hack could impact military effectiveness. If Russia, or any other belligerent, was able to simultaneously disrupt satellite communications while also jamming or destroying landlines, forces on the frontlines would be at best poorly connected with their superiors. In such a scenario, an army would be cut off from commanders in other locations and would not be able to report back or receive new directives; they would be stranded until communications could be restored.  

The ViaSat hack had a military objective: to disrupt Ukrainian military access to satellite communications. But the effects were not limited to this objective. The operation had spillover effects that rippled across Europe. In Germany, nearly 6,000 wind turbines were taken offline, with roughly 2,000 of those turbines remaining offline for nearly a month after the initial hack due to the loss of remote connectivity.⁴⁵ In France, modems used by emergency services vehicles, including firetrucks and ambulances, were also affected.⁴⁶

ViaSat is not a purely military target. It is a civilian firm that counts the Ukrainian military as a customer. The targeting of civilian infrastructure with dual civilian and military capability and use has occurred throughout history and has been the center of debate in international law, especially when there are cross-border spillover effects in non-combatant countries. Both the principle of proportionality and international humanitarian law require the aggressor to target only military objects, defined as objects “whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage” in a manner proportional to the military gain foreseen by the operation. ⁴⁷ What this means in practice, however, is that the aggressor determines whether they deem a target to be a military object and a beneficial target and, therefore, what is legitimate. Konstantin Vorontsov, the Head of the Russian Delegation to the United Nations, attempted to justify Russian actions in October 2022 by saying that the use of civilian space infrastructure to aid the Ukrainian war effort may be a violation of the Outer Space Treaty, thereby rendering this infrastructure a legitimate military target.⁴⁸ Similar operations like that against ViaSat are likely to be the new norm in modern warfare. As Mauro Vignati, the adviser on new digital technologies of warfare at the Red Cross, said in November 2022, insofar as private companies own and operate the information infrastructure of the domain, including infrastructure acting as military assets, “when war start[s], those companies, they are inside the battlefield.”⁴⁹

Physical information infrastructure 

In February 2022, as Russian forces moved to seize airfields and key physical assets in Ukraine, they simultaneously assaulted the physical information infrastructure operating within and beneath the Ukrainian information environment. Russian forces targeted this infrastructure, largely privately operated, by taking control of assets where possible and destroying them where not, including through a series of Russian air strikes targeting Ukrainian servers, cables, and cell phone towers.⁵⁰ As of June 2022, about 15 percent of Ukrainian information infrastructure had been damaged or destroyed; by July, 12.2 percent of homes had lost access to mobile communication services, 11 percent of base stations for mobile operators were out of service, and approximately 20 percent of the country’s telecommunications infrastructure was damaged or destroyed.⁵¹ By August “the number of users connecting to the Internet in Ukraine [had] shrunk by at least 16 percent nationwide.”⁵²

In some areas of Ukraine, digital blackouts were enforced by Russian troops to cut the local population off from the highly contested information space. In Mariupol, the last cell tower connecting the city with the outside world was tirelessly tended by two Kyivstar engineers, who kept it alive with backup generators that they manually refilled with gasoline. Once the Russians entered the city, however, the Ukrainian soldiers who had been protecting the cell tower location left to engage with the enemy, leaving the Kyivstar engineers alone to tend to their charge. For three days the engineers withstood the bombing of the city until March 21, when Russian troops disconnected the tower and it went silent.⁵³

Russian forces coerced Ukrainian occupied territories onto Russian ISPs, once again through Rostelcom’s local agent Miranda Media, and onto Russian mobile service providers.⁵⁴ Information infrastructure in Ukraine is made up of overlapping networks of mobile service and ISPs, a legacy of the country’s complicated post-Soviet modernization process. This complexity may have been a boon for its resilience. Russian forces, observed digital-rights researcher Samuel Woodhams, “couldn’t go into one office and take down a whole region … There were hundreds of these offices and the actual hardware was quite geographically separated.⁵⁵ Across eastern Ukraine, including Kherson, Mlitopol, and Mariupol, the Russians aimed to subjugate the physical territory, constituent populations, and Ukrainian information space. In Kherson, Russian forces entered the offices of a Ukrainian ISP and at gunpoint, forced staff to transfer control to them.⁵⁶

Routing the internet and communications access of occupied territories through Russia meant that Moscow could suppress communications to and from these occupied areas, especially through social media and Ukrainian news sites, sever access to essential services in Ukraine, and flood the populations with its own propaganda, as was proved in Crimea in 2014. Moving forward, Russia could use this dependency to “disconnect, throttle, or restrict access to the internet” in occupied territories, cutting off the occupied population from the Ukrainian government and the wider Ukrainian and international community.⁵⁷

The Kremlin’s primary purpose in the invasion of Ukraine was and is to remove the Ukrainian government and, likely, install a pro-Russian puppet government to bring to an end an independent Ukraine.⁵⁸ Therefore, isolating the information environment of occupied populations, in concert with anti-Ukrainian government disinformation, such as the multiple false allegations that President Zelenskyy had fled the country and abandoned the Ukrainian people,⁵⁹ were a means to sway the allegiances, or at least dilute the active resistance, of the Ukrainian people.⁶⁰ Without connectivity to alternative outlets, the occupying Russians could promote false and largely uncontested claims about the progress of the war. In early May 2022 for example, when Kherson lost connectivity for three days, the deputy of the Kherson Regional Council, Serhiy Khlan, reported that the Russians “began to spread propaganda that they were in fact winning and had captured almost all of Mykolaiv.”⁶¹ 

Russia used its assault on the information environment to undermine the legitimacy of the Ukrainian government and its ability to fulfill its governmental duties to the Ukrainian people. Whether through complete connectivity blackouts or through the restrictions imposed by Russian networks, the Russians blocked any communications from the Ukrainian government to occupied populations—not least President Zelenskyy’s June 13, 2022 address, intended most for those very populations, in which he promised to liberate all occupied Ukrainian land and reassured those populations that they had not been forgotten. Zelenskyy acknowledged the Russian barrier between himself and Ukrainians in occupied territories, saying, “They are trying to make people not just know nothing about Ukraine… They are trying to make them stop even thinking about returning to normal life, forcing them to reconcile.”⁶²

Isolating occupied populations from the Ukrainian information space is intended, in large part, said Stas Prybytko, the head of mobile broadband development within the Ukrainian Ministry of Digital Transformation, to “block them from communicating with their families in other cities and keep them from receiving truthful information.”⁶³ Throughout 2022, so much of what the international community knew about the war came—through Twitter, TikTok, Telegram, and more—from Ukrainians themselves. From videos of the indiscriminate Russian shelling of civilian neighborhoods to recordings tracking Russian troop movements, Ukrainians used their personal devices to capture and communicate the progress of the war directly to living rooms, board rooms, and government offices around the world.⁶⁴The power of this distributed information collection and open-source intelligence relies upon mobile and internet access. The accounts that were shared after Ukrainian towns and cities were liberated from Russian occupation lay bare just how much suffering, arrest, torture, and murder was kept hidden from international view by the purposeful isolation of the information environment and the constant surveillance of Ukrainians’ personal devices.⁶⁵ The war in Ukraine has highlighted the growing impact of distributed open source intelligence during the conduct of war that is carried out by civilians in Ukraine and by the wider open source research community though various social media and messaging platforms.⁶⁶ 

Narrative Warfare: How the Kremlin and Russian news outlets justified a war of aggression against Ukraine

Undermining Ukraine: How the Kremlin employs information operations to erode global confidence in Ukraine

Russian operations against, especially transnational, digital infrastructure companies can mostly be categorized as disruption, degradation, and information gathering, which saw Russian or Russian-aligned hackers moving in and through the Ukrainian information environment. The attacks against Ukrainian physical infrastructure, however, are of a slightly different character. Invading forces employed physically mediated cyberattacks, a method defined by Herb Lin as “attacks that compromise cyber functionality through the use of or the threat of physical force” to pursue the complete destruction or seizure and occupation of this infrastructure.⁶⁷ Both ends begin with the same purpose: to create a vacuum of information between the Ukrainian government, the Ukrainian people, and the global population, effectively ending the connection between the Ukrainian information environment and the global environment. But the seizure of this infrastructure takes things a step beyond: to occupy the Ukrainian information environment and pull its infrastructure and its people into an isolated, controlled Russian information space. 

Reclaiming the Ukrainian information environment 

Preparation of the environment 

The Russian assault on the Ukrainian information environment is far from unanswered. Russian efforts have been countered by the Ukrainian government in concert with allied states and with technology companies located both within and outside Ukraine. Russia’s aim to pull occupied Ukrainian territory onto Russian networks to be controlled and monitored has been well understood, and Ukraine has been hardening its information infrastructure since the initial 2014 invasion. Ukraine released its Cyber Security Strategy in 2016, which laid out the government’s priorities in this space, including the defense against the range of active cyber threats they face, with an emphasis on the “cyber protection of information infrastructure.”⁶⁸ The government initially focused on centralizing its networks in Kyiv to make it more difficult “for Russian hackers to penetrate computers that store critical data and provide services such as pension benefits, or to use formerly government-run networks in the occupied territories to launch cyberattacks on Kyiv.”⁶⁹

As part of its digitalization and security efforts, the Ukrainian government also sought out new partners, both public and private, to build and bolster its threat detection and response capabilities. Before and since the 2022 invasion, the Ukrainian government has worked with partner governments and an array of technology companies around the world to create resilience through increased connectivity and digitalization. 

Bolstering Ukrainian connectivity 

Since the 2014 invasion and annexation of Crimea, Ukraine-serving telecommunications operators have developed plans to prepare for future Russian aggression. Lifecell, the third largest Ukrainian mobile telephone operator, prepared its network for an anticipated Russian attack. The company shifted their office archives, documentation, and critical network equipment from eastern to western Ukraine, where it would be better insulated from violence, added additional network redundancy, and increased the coordination and response capabilities of their staff.⁷⁰ Similarly, Kyivstar and Vodafone Ukraine increased their network bandwidth to withstand extreme demand. In October 2021, these three companies initiated an infrastructure sharing agreement to expand LTE (Long Term Evolution) networks into rural Ukraine and, in cooperation with the Ukrainian government, expanded the 4G telecommunications network to bring “mobile network coverage to an estimated 91.6 per cent of the population.”⁷¹ 

The expansion and improvement of Ukrainian telecommunications continued through international partnerships as well. Datagroup, for example, announced a $20 million partnership in 2021 with Cisco, a US-based digital communications company, to modernize and expand the bandwidth of its extensive networks.⁷² Since the February 2022 invasion, Cisco has also worked with the French government to provide over $5 million of secure, wireless networking equipment and software, including firewalls, for free to the Ukrainian government.⁷³

This network expansion is an integral part of the Ukrainian government’s digitalization plans for the country, championed by President Zelenskyy. Rather than the invasion putting an end to these efforts, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Digital Transformation Mykhailo Fedorov claimed that during the war “digitalization became the foundation of all our life. The economy continues to work … due to digitalization.⁷⁴ The digital provision of government services has created an alternate pathway for Ukrainians to engage in the economy and with their government. The flagship government initiative Diia, launched in February 2020, is a digital portal through which the 21.7 million Ukrainian users can access legal identification, make social services payments, register a business, and even register property damage from Russian missile strikes.⁷⁵ The Russian advance and consequent physical destruction that displaced Ukrainians means that the ability to provide government services through alternate and resilient means is more essential than ever, placing an additional premium on defending Ukrainian information infrastructure. 

Backing up a government 

As Russian forces built up along Ukraine’s borders, Ukrainian network centralization may have increased risk, despite the country’s improved defense capabilities. In preparation for the cyber and physical attacks against the country’s information infrastructure, Fedorov moved to amend Ukrainian data protection laws to allow the government to store and process data in the cloud and worked closely with several technology companies, including Microsoft, Amazon Web Services, and Google, to effect the transfer of critical government data to infrastructure hosted outside the country.⁷⁶ Cloud computing describes “a collection of technologies and organizational processes which enable ubiquitous, on-demand access to a shared pool of configurable computing resources.”⁷⁷ Cloud computing is dominated by the four hyperscalers—Amazon, Microsoft, Google, and Alibaba—that provide computing and storage at enterprise scale and are responsible for the operation and security of data centers all around the world, any of which could host customer data according to local laws and regulations.⁷⁸ 

According to its April 2022 Ukraine war report, Microsoft “committed at no charge a total of $107 million of technology services to support this effort” and renewed the relationship in November, promising to ensure that “government agencies, critical infrastructure and other sectors in Ukraine can continue to run their digital infrastructure and serve citizens through the Microsoft Cloud” at a value of about $100 million.⁷⁹ Amazon and Google have also committed to supporting cloud services for the Ukrainian government, for select companies, and for humanitarian organizations focused on aiding Ukraine.⁸⁰ In accordance with the Ukrainian government’s concerns, Russian missile attacks targeted the Ukrainian government’s main data center in Kyiv soon after the invasion, partially destroying the facility, and cyberattacks aggressively tested Ukrainian networks.⁸¹    

Unlike other lines of aid provided by the international community to strengthen the defense of the Ukrainian information environment, cloud services are provided only by the private sector.⁸² While this aid has had a transformative effect on Ukrainian defense, that transformative quality has also raised concerns. Microsoft, in its special report on Ukraine, several times cites its cloud services as one of the determining factors that limited the effect of Russian cyber and kinetic attacks on Ukrainian government data centers, and details how their services, in particular, were instrumental in this defense.⁸³ In this same report, Microsoft claims to be most worried about those states and organizations that do not use cloud services, and provides corroborating data.⁸⁴ Microsoft and other technology companies offering their services at a reduced rate, or for free, are acting—at least in part—out of a belief in the rightness of the Ukrainian cause. However, they are still private companies with responsibilities to shareholders or board members, and they still must seek profit. Services provided, especially establishing information infrastructure like Cloud services, are likely to establish long-term business relationships with the Ukrainian government and potentially with other governments and clients, who see the effectiveness of those services illustrated through the defense of Ukraine. 

Mounting an elastic defense  

Working for wireless 

Alongside and parallel to the Ukrainian efforts to defend and reclaim occupied physical territory is the fight for Ukrainian connectivity. Ukrainian telecommunications companies have been integral to preserving connectivity to the extent possible. In March 2022, Ukrainian telecom operators Kyivstar, Vodafone Ukraine, and Lifecell made the decision to provide free national mobile roaming services across mobile provider networks, creating redundancy and resilience in the mobile network to combat frequent service outages.⁸⁵ The free mobile service provided by these companies is valued at more than UAH 980 million (USD 26.8 million).⁸⁶ In addition, Kyivstar in July 2022 committed to the allocation of UAH 300 million (about USD 8.2 mil) for the modernization of Ukraine’s information infrastructure in cooperation with the Ukrainian Ministry of Digital transformation.⁸⁷ The statements that accompanied the commitments from Kyivstar and Lifecell—both headquartered in Ukraine—emphasized each company’s dedication to Ukrainian defense and their role in it, regardless of the short-term financial impact.⁸⁸ These are Ukrainian companies with Ukrainian infrastructure and Ukrainian customers, and their fate is tied inextricably to the outcome of this war. 

As Russian forces advanced and attempted to seize control of information infrastructure, in at least one instance, Ukrainian internet and mobile service employees sabotaged their own equipment first. Facing threats of imprisonment and death from occupying Russians, employees in several Ukrtelecom facilities withstood pressure to share technical network details and instead deleted key files from the systems. According to Ukrtelecom Chief Executive Officer Yuriy Kurmaz, “The Russians tried to connect their control boards and some equipment to our networks, but they were not able to reconfigure it because we completely destroyed the software.”⁸⁹ Without functional infrastructure, Russian forces struggled to pull those areas onto Russian networks.  

The destruction of telecommunications infrastructure has meant that these areas and many others along the war front are, in some areas, without reliable information infrastructure, either wireless or wired. While the Ukrainian government and a bevy of local and international private sector companies battle for control of on-the-ground internet and communications infrastructure, they also pursued new pathways to connectivity.

Searching for satellite 

Two days after the invasion, Deputy Prime Minister Fedorov tweeted at Elon Musk, the Chief Executive Officer of SpaceX, that “while you try to colonize Mars — Russia try [sic] to occupy Ukraine! While your rockets successfully land from space — Russian rockets attack Ukrainian civil people! We ask you to provide Ukraine with Starlink stations and to address sane Russians to stand.”⁹⁰ Just another two days later, Fedorov confirmed the arrival of the first shipment of Starlink stations.⁹¹  

Starlink, a network of low-orbit satellites working in constellations operated by SpaceX, relies on satellite receivers no larger than a backpack that are easily installed and transported. Because Russian targeting of cellular towers made communications coverage unreliable, says Fedorov, the government “made a decision to use satellite communication for such emergencies” from American companies like SpaceX.⁹² Starlink has proven more resilient than any other alternative throughout the war. Due to the low orbit of Starlink satellites, they can broadcast to their receivers at relatively higher power than satellites in higher orbits. There has been little reporting on successful Russian efforts to jam Starlink transmissions, and the Starlink base stations—the physical, earthbound infrastructure that communicates directly with the satellites—are located on NATO territory, ensuring any direct attack on them would be a significant escalation in the war.⁹³

Starlink has been employed across sectors almost since the war began. President Zelenskyy has used the devices himself when delivering addresses to the Ukrainian people, as well as to foreign governments and populations.⁹⁴ Fedorov has said that sustained missile strikes against energy and communication infrastructure have been effectively countered through the deployment of Starlink devices that can restore connection where it is most needed. He even called the system “an essential part of critical infrastructure.”⁹⁵   

Starlink has also found direct military applications. The portability of these devices means that Ukrainian troops can often, though not always, stay connected to command elements and peer units while deployed.⁹⁶ Ukrainian soldiers have also used internet connections to coordinate attacks on Russian targets with artillery-battery commanders.⁹⁷ The Aerorozvidka, a specialist air reconnaissance unit within the Ukrainian military that conducts hundreds of information gathering missions every day, has used Starlink devices in areas of Ukraine without functional communications infrastructure to “monitor and coordinate unmanned aerial vehicles, enabling soldiers to fire anti-tank weapons with targeted precision.”⁹⁸ Reports have also suggested that a Starlink device was integrated into an unmanned surface vehicle discovered near Sevastopol, potentially used by the Ukrainian military for reconnaissance or even to carry and deliver munitions.⁹⁹ According to one Ukrainian soldier, “Starlink is our oxygen,” and were it to disappear, “our army would collapse into chaos.”¹⁰⁰

The initial package of Starlink devices included 3,667 terminals donated by SpaceX and 1,333 terminals purchased by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID).¹⁰¹ SpaceX initially offered free Starlink service for all the devices, although the offer has already been walked back by Musk, and then reversed again. CNN obtained proof of a letter sent by Musk to the Pentagon in September 2022 stating that SpaceX would be unable to continue funding Starlink service in Ukraine. The letter requested that the Pentagon pay what would amount to “more than $120 million for the rest of the year and could cost close to $400 million for the next 12 months.” It also clarified that the vast majority of the 20,000 Starlink devices sent to Ukraine were financed at least in part by outside funders like the United States, United Kingdom, and Polish governments.¹⁰²

After the letter was sent, but before it became public, Musk got into a Twitter spat with Ukrainian diplomat Adrij Melnyk after the former wrote a tweet on October 3 proposing terms of peace between Russia and Ukraine. Musk’s proposal included Ukraine renouncing its claims to Crimea and pledging to remain neutral, with the only apparent concession from Russia a promise to ensure water supply in Crimea. The plan was rejected by the public poll Musk included in the tweet, and Melnyk replied and tagged Musk, saying “Fuck off is my very diplomatic reply to you @elonmusk.”¹⁰³ After CNN released the SpaceX letter to the Pentagon, Musk seemingly doubled down on his decision to reduce SpaceX funding at first. He responded on October 14 to a tweet summarizing the incident, justifying possible reduced SpaceX assistance stating, “We’re just following his [Melnyk’s] recommendation,” even though the letter was sent before the Twitter exchange. Musk then tweeted the following day, “The hell with it … even though Starlink is still losing money & other companies are getting billions of taxpayer $, we’ll just keep funding Ukraine govt for free.”¹⁰⁴ Two days later, in response to a Politico tweet reporting that the Pentagon was considering covering the Starlink service costs, Musk stated that “SpaceX has already withdrawn its request for funding.”¹⁰⁵ Musk’s characterization of SpaceX’s contribution to the war effort has sparked confusion and reprimand, with his public remarks often implying that his company is entirely footing the bill when in fact, tens of millions of dollars’ worth of terminals and service are being covered by several governments every month.  

The Starlink saga, however, was not over yet. Several weeks later in late October, 1,300 Starlink terminals in Ukraine, purchased in March 2020 by a British company for use in Ukrainian combat-related operations, were disconnected, allegedly due to lack of funding, causing a communications outage for the Ukrainian military.¹⁰⁶ Although operation was restored, the entire narrative eroded confidence in SpaceX as a guarantor of flexible connectivity in Ukraine. In November 2022, Federov noted that while Ukraine has no intention of breaking off its relationship with Starlink, the government is exploring working with other satellite communications operators.¹⁰⁷ Starlink is not the only satellite communications network of its kind, but its competitors have not yet reached the same level of operation. Satellite communications company OneWeb, based in London with ties to the British military, is just now launching its satellite constellation, after the Russian invasion of Ukraine required the company to change its launch partner from Roscosmos to SpaceX.¹⁰⁸ The US Space Development Agency, within the United States Space Force, will launch the first low earth orbit satellites of the new National Defense Space Architecture in March 2023. Other more traditional satellite companies cannot provide the same flexibility as Starlink’s small, transportable receivers.

With the market effectively cornered for the moment, SpaceX can dictate the terms, including the physical bounds, of Starlink’s operations, thereby wielding immense influence on the battlefield. Starlink devices used by advancing Ukrainian forces near the front, for example, have reported inconsistent reliability.¹⁰⁹ Indeed CNN reported on February 9^th that this bounding was a deliberate attempt to separate the devices from direct military use, as SpaceX President Gwynne Shotwell explained “our intent was never to have them use it for offensive purposes.”¹¹⁰ The bounding decision, similar to the rationale behind the company’s decision to refuse to activate Starlink service in Crimea, was likely made to contain escalation, especially escalation by means of SpaceX devices.¹¹¹

But SpaceX is not the only satellite company making decisions to bound the area of operation of their products to avoid playing—or being perceived to play—a role in potential escalation. On March 16, 2022, Minister Fedorov tweeted at DJI, a Chinese drone producer, “@DJIGlobal are you sure you want to be a partner in these murders? Block your products that are helping russia to kill the Ukrainians!”¹¹² DJI responded directly to the tweet the same day, saying “If the Ukrainian government formally requests that DJI set up geofencing throughout Ukraine, we will arrange it,” but pointed out that such geofencing would inhibit all users of their product in Ukraine, not just Russians.¹¹³

While Russia continues to bombard the Ukrainian electrical grid, Starlink terminals have grown more expensive for new Ukrainian consumers, increasing from $385 earlier this year to $700, although it is unclear if this price increase also affected government purchasers.¹¹⁴ According to Andrew Cavalier, a technology industry analyst with ABI Research, the indispensability of the devices gives “Musk and Starlink a major head start [against its competitors] that its use in the Russia–Ukraine war will only consolidate.”¹¹⁵ Indeed, the valuation of SpaceX was $127 million in May 2022, and the company raised $2 billion in the first seven months of 2022.¹¹⁶ For SpaceX, the war in Ukraine has been an impressive showcase of Starlink’s capabilities and has proven the worth of its services to future customers. The company recently launched a new initiative, Starshield, intended to leverage “SpaceX’s Starlink technology and launch capability to support national security efforts. While Starlink is designed for consumer and commercial use, Starshield is designed for government use.”¹¹⁷ It is clear that SpaceX intends to capitalize on the very public success of its Starlink network in Ukraine.

Reclaiming Territory 

The Russian assault is not over, but Ukraine has reclaimed “54 percent of the land Russia has captured since the beginning of the war” and the front line has remained relatively stable since November 2022.¹¹⁸ Videos and reports from reclaimed territory show the exultation of the liberated population. As Ukrainian military forces reclaim formerly occupied areas, the parallel reclamation of the information environment, by or with Ukrainian and transnational information infrastructure operators, follows quickly. 

In newly liberated areas, Starlink terminals are often the first tool for establishing connectivity. In Kherson, the first regional capital that fell to the Russian invasion and reclaimed by Ukrainian troops on November 11, 2022, residents lined up in public spaces to connect to the internet through Starlink.¹¹⁹ The Ministry of Digital Transformation provided Starlink devices to the largest service providers, Vodaphone and Kyivstar, to facilitate communication while their engineers repaired the necessary infrastructure for reestablishing mobile and internet service.¹²⁰ A week after Kherson was recaptured, five Kyivstar base stations were made operational and Vodaphone had reestablished coverage over most of the city.¹²¹

Due to the importance of reclaiming the information space, operators are working just behind Ukrainian soldiers to reconnect populations in reclaimed territories to the Ukrainian and global information environment as quickly as possible, which means working in very dangerous conditions. In the Sumy region, a Ukrtelecom vehicle pulling up to a television tower drove over a land mine, injuring three of the passengers and killing the driver.¹²² Stanislav Prybytko, the head of the mobile broadband department in the Ukrainian Ministry of Digital Transformation, says “It’s still very dangerous to do this work, but we can’t wait to do this, because there are a lot of citizens in liberated villages who urgently need to connect.”¹²³ Prybytko and his eleven-person team have been central to the Ukrainian effort to stitch Ukrainian connectivity back together. The team works across a public-private collaborative, coordinating with various government officials and mobile service providers to repair critical nodes in the network and to reestablish communications and connectivity.¹²⁴ According to Ukrainian government figures, 80 percent of liberated settlements have partially restored internet connection, and more than 1,400 base stations have been rebuilt by Ukrainian mobile operators since April 2022.¹²⁵

Key Takeaways 

The information environment is a key domain through which this war is being contested. The Russian government has demonstrated for over a decade the importance it places on control of the information environment, both domestically and as part of campaigns to expand the Russian sphere of influence abroad. Yet, despite this Russian focus, the Ukrainian government has demonstrated incredible resilience against physical assaults, cyberattacks, and disinformation campaigns against and within the Ukrainian information environment and has committed to further interlacing government services and digital platforms.  

The centrality of this environment to the conduct of this war means that private actors are necessarily enmeshed in the conflict. As providers of products and services used for Ukrainian defense, these companies are an important part of the buttressing structure of that defense. The centrality of private companies in the conduct of the war in Ukraine brings to light new and increasingly important questions about what it means for companies to act as information infrastructure during wartime, including:  

1. What is the complete incentive structure behind a company’s decision to provide products or services to a state at war? 
2. How dependent are states on the privately held portions of the information environment, including infrastructure, tools, knowledge, data, skills, and more, for their own national security and defense?  
3. How can the public and private sectors work together better as partners to understand and prepare these areas of reliance during peace and across the continuum of conflict in a sustained, rather than ad hoc, nature? 

Incentives 

The war in Ukraine spurred an exceptional degree of cooperation and aid from private companies within Ukraine and from around the globe. Much of public messaging around the private sector’s assistance of Ukrainian defense centers around the conviction of company leadership and staff that they were compelled by a responsibility to act. This is certainly one factor in their decision. But the depth of private actor involvement in this conflict demands a more nuanced understanding of the full picture of incentives and disincentives that drive a company’s decision to enter into new, or expand upon existing, business relationships with and in a country at war. What risks, for example, do companies undertake in a war in which Russia has already demonstrated its conviction that private companies are viable military targets? The ViaSat hack was a reminder of the uncertainty that surrounds the designation of dual-use technology, and the impact that such designations have in practice. What role did public recognition play in companies’ decisions to provide products and services, and how might this recognition influence future earnings potential? For example, while their remarks differed in tone, both Elon Musk on Twitter and Microsoft in its special report on Ukraine publicly claimed partial credit for the defense of Ukraine.  

As the war continues into its second year, these questions are important to maintaining Ukraine’s cooperation with these entities. With a better understanding of existing and potential incentives, the companies, the United States, and its allies can make the decision to responsibly aid Ukraine much easier.  

Dependencies 

Private companies play an important role in armed conflict, operating much of the infrastructure that supports the information environment through which both state and non-state actors compete for control. The war in Ukraine has illustrated the willingness of private actors, from Ukrainian telecommunications companies to transnational cloud and satellite companies, to participate as partners in the defense of Ukraine. State dependence on privately held physical infrastructure is not unique to the information environment, but state dependence on infrastructure that is headquartered and operated extraterritorially is a particular feature. 

Prior to and throughout the war, the Ukrainian government has coordinated successfully with local telecommunication companies to expand, preserve, and restore mobile, radio, and internet connectivity to its population. This connectivity preserved what Russia was attempting to dismantle—a free and open Ukrainian information environment through which the Ukrainian government and population can communicate and coordinate. The Ukrainian government has relied on these companies to provide service and connectivity, working alongside them before and during the war to improve infrastructure and to communicate priorities. These companies are truly engaging as partners in Ukrainian defense, especially because this information infrastructure is not just a medium through which Russia launches attacks but an environment that Russia is attempting to seize control of. This dependence has not been unidirectional—the companies themselves are inextricably linked to this conflict through their infrastructure, employees, and customers in Ukraine. Each is dependent to some degree on the other and during times of crisis, their incentives create a dynamic of mutual need. 

The Ukrainian government has also relied on a variety of transnational companies though the provision of technology products or services and information infrastructure. As examined in this report, two areas where the involvement of these companies has been especially impactful are cloud services and satellite internet services. Cloud services have preserved data integrity and security by moving information to data centers distributed around the world, outside of Ukrainian territory and under the cyber-protection of those cloud service companies. Satellite services have enabled flexible and resilient connectivity, once again located and run primarily outside of Ukraine. These companies can provide essential services within the information environment and the physical environment of Ukraine, but are not fundamentally reliant on the integrity of the country. This dynamic is heightened by the fact that cloud service providers like Microsoft, Amazon Web Services, Google, and satellite internet service providers like Space X’s Starlink are operating within a market with global reach and very few competitors. While these companies and others have made the laudable decision to contribute to Ukrainian defense, the fact is that had they not, there are only a few, if any, other companies with comparable capabilities and infrastructure at scale. Additionally, there’s very little Ukraine or even the US government could have done to directly provide the same capabilities and infrastructure.  

Coordination 

Built into the discussions around dependency and incentives is the need for government and the private companies who own and operate information infrastructure to coordinate with each other from a more extensive foundation. While coordination with Ukrainian companies and some transnational companies emerged from sustained effort, many instances of private sector involvement were forged on an ad hoc basis and therefore could not be planned on in advance. The ad hoc approach can produce rapid results, as seen by Minister Fedorov’s tweet at Elon Musk and receipt of Starlink devices just days later. While this approach has been wielded by the Ukrainian government, and the Ministry for Digital Transformation in particular, to great effect, this very same example illustrates the complexity of transforming ad hoc aid into sustainable partnerships. Sustainability is especially important when states are facing threats outside of open war, across the continuum of insecurity and conflict where many of these capabilities and infrastructures will continue to be relied upon. Security and defense in the information environment requires states to work in coordination with a diverse range of local and transnational private actors. 

Recommendations 

Key recommendations from this paper ask the US government, in coordination with the Ukrainian government, to better understand the incentives that surround private sector involvement, to delineate states’ dependency on private information infrastructure, and to improve long-term public-private coordination through three pathways: 

• Define support parameters. Clarify how private technology companies can and should provide aid 
• Track support. Create a living database to track the patterns of technological aid to Ukraine from US private companies 
• Facilitate support requests. Add to the resilience of the Ukrainian information environment by facilitating US private aid.  

Define support parameters 

Private information infrastructure companies will continue to play a key role in this war. However, there are a number of unresolved questions regarding the decisions these companies are making about if, and how, to provide support to the Ukrainian government to sustain its defense. A significant barrier may be the lack of clarity about the risks of partnership in wartime, which may disincentivize action or may alter existing partnerships. Recent SpaceX statements surrounding the bounding of Starlink use is an example, at least in part, of just such a risk calculous in action. The US government and its allies should release a public directive clarifying how companies can ensure that their involvement is in line with US and international law—especially for dual-use technologies. Reaffirming, with consistent guidelines, how the United States defines civilian participation in times of war will be crucial for ensuring that such actions do not unintentionally legitimize private entities as belligerents and legitimate targets in wartime. At the direction of the National Security Advisor, the US Attorney General and Secretary of State, working through the Office of the Legal Advisor at the State Department, should issue public guidance on how US companies can provide essential aid to Ukraine while avoiding the designation of legitimate military target or combatant under the best available interpretation of prevailing law. 

Track support 

While a large amount of support for Ukraine has been given directly by or coordinated through governments, many private companies have started providing technological support directly to the Ukrainian government. Some private companies, especially those with offices or customers in Ukraine, got in touch directly with, or were contacted by, various Ukrainian government offices, often with specific requests depending on the company’s products and services.¹²⁶ 

However, the US government does not have a full and complete picture of this assistance, which limits the ability of US policymakers to track the implications of changing types of support or the nature of the conflict. Policymakers should have access to not only what kind of support is being provided by private US companies, but also the projected period of involvement, what types of support are being requested and denied by companies (in which case, where the US government may be able to act as an alternative provider), and what types of support are being supplied by private sector actors without a significant government equity or involvement. A more fulsome mapping of this assistance and its dependency structure would make it possible for policymakers and others to assess its impact and effectiveness. This data, were it or some version of it publicly available, would also help private companies providing the support to better understand how their contributions fit within the wider context of US assistance and to communicate the effect their products or services are having to stakeholders and shareholders. Such information may play a role in a company’s decision to partner or abstain in the future.

The US government should create a collaborative task force to track US-based private sector support to Ukraine. Because of the wide equities across the US government in this area, this team should be led by the State Department’s Bureau of Cyberspace and Digital Policy and include representatives from USAID, the Department of Defense’s Cyber Policy Office, the National Security Agency’s Collaboration Center, and the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security’s Joint Cyber Defense Collaborative. This task force should initially focus on creating a picture of public-private support to Ukraine from entities within the United States, but its remit could extend to work with allies and partners, creating a fulsome picture of international public-private support.

Facilitate support requests 

Tracking the technical support that is requested, promised, and delivered to the Ukrainian government is an important first step toward gaining a better understanding of the evolving shape of the critical role that the private sector is increasingly playing in conflict. But closer tracking, perhaps by an associated body, could go further by acting as a process facilitator. Government offices and agencies have long been facilitators of private aid, but now states are increasingly able to interact with, and request support from, private companies directly, especially for smaller quantities or more specific products and services. While this pathway can be more direct and efficient, it also requires a near constant churn of request, provision, and renewal actions from private companies and Ukrainian government officials.  

Private organizations have stepped into this breach, including the Cyber Defense Assistance Collaboration (CDAC), founded by Greg Rattray and Matthew Murray, now a part of the US-based non-profit CRDF Global. CDAC works with a number of US private technology companies, as well as the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine and the Ukrainian think tank Global Cyber Cooperative Center, to match the specific needs of Ukrainian government and state-owned enterprises with needed products and services offered by companies working in coordination.¹²⁷

The growth and reach of this effort demonstrate the potential impact that a government-housed, or even a government-sponsored mechanism, could have in increasing the capacity to facilitate requests from the Ukrainian government, decreasing the number of bureaucratic steps required by Ukrainian government officials while increasing the amount and quality of support they receive. In addition, government facilitation would ease progress toward the previously stated recommendations by building in clarity around what kind of support can be provided and putting facilitation and aid tracking within a single process. As discussed above, this facilitation should start with a focus on US public-private support, but can grow to work alongside similar allied efforts. This could include, for example, coordination with the United Kingdom’s Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO) program, which “enables Ukrainian agencies to access the services of commercial cybersecurity companies.”¹²⁸ Crucially, this task force, helmed by the State Department’s Bureau of Cyberspace and Digital Policy, would act as a facilitator, not as a restricting body. Its mission in this task would be to make connections and provide information.  

In line with tracking, US government facilitation would enable government entities to communicate where assistance can be most useful, such as shoring up key vulnerabilities or ensuring that essential defense activities are not dependent on a single private sector entity, and ideally, avoiding dependency on a single source of private sector assistance. A company’s financial situation or philanthropic priorities are always subject to change, and the US government should be aware of such risks and create resilience through redundancy.  

Central to this resilience will be the provision of support to bolster key nodes in the Ukrainian telecommunications infrastructure network against not just cyber attacks but also against physical assault, including things like firewalls, mine clearing equipment, and power generators. Aiding the Ukrainian government in the search for another reliable partner for satellite communication devices that offer similar flexibility as Starlink is also necessary, and a representative from the Pentagon has confirmed that such a process is underway, following Musk’s various and contradictory statements regarding the future of SpaceX’s aid to Ukraine back in October.¹²⁹ Regardless, the entire SpaceX experience illustrates the need to address single dependencies in advance whenever possible. 

A roadblock to ensuring assistance redundancy is the financial ability of companies to provide products and services to the Ukrainian government without charge or to the degree necessary. While the US government does provide funding for private technological assistance (as in the Starlink example), creating a pool of funding that is tied to the aforementioned task force and overseen by the State Department’s Bureau of Cyberspace and Digital Policy, would enable increased flexibility for companies to cover areas of single dependence, even in instances that would require piecemeal rather than one-to-one redundancy. As previously discussed, many companies are providing support out of a belief that it is the right thing to do, both for their customers and as members of a global society. However, depending on whether that support is paid or provided for free, or publicly or privately given, a mechanism that provides government clarity on private sector support, tracks the landscape of US private support to Ukraine, and facilitates support requests would make it easier for companies to make the decision to start or continue to provide support when weighed against the costs and potential risks of offering assistance.

Looking forward and inward 

The questions that have emerged from Ukraine’s experience of defense in and through the information environment are not limited to this context. Private companies have a role in armed conflict and that role seems likely to grow, along with the scale, complexity, and criticality of the information infrastructures they own and operate. Companies will, in some capacity, be participants in the battlespace. This is being demonstrated in real time, exposing gaps that the United States and its allies and partners must address in advance of future conflicts.

Russia’s war on Ukraine has created an environment in which both public and private assistance in support of Ukrainian information infrastructure is motivated by a common aversion toward Russian aggression, as well as a commitment to the stability and protection of the Ukrainian government and people. This war is not over and despite any hopes to the contrary, similar aggressions will occur in new contexts, and with new actors in the future. It is crucial that in conjunction with examining and mitigating the risks related to the involvement of private technology companies in the war in Ukraine, the US government also examines these questions regarding its own national security and defense.

The information environment is increasingly central to not just warfighting but also to the practice of governance and the daily life of populations around the world. Governments and populations live in part within that environment and therefore atop infrastructure that is owned and operated by the private sector. As adversaries seek to reshape the information environment to their own advantage, US and allied public and private sectors must confront the challenges of their existing interdependence. This includes defining in what form national security and defense plans in and through the information environment are dependent upon private companies, developing a better understanding of the differing incentive structures that guide private sector decision-making, and working in coordination with private companies to create a more resilient information infrastructure network through redundancy and diversification. It is difficult to know what forms future conflict and future adversaries will take, or the incentives that may exist for companies in those new contexts, but by better understanding the key role that private information and technology companies already play in this domain, the United States and allies can better prepare for future threats.

About the Authors 

Emma Schroeder is an associate director with the Atlantic Council’s Cyber Statecraft Initiative, within the Digital Forensic Research Lab, and leads the team’s work studying conflict in and through cyberspace. Her focus in this role is on developing statecraft and strategy for cyberspace that is useful for both policymakers and practitioners. Schroeder holds an MA in History of War from King’s College London’s War Studies Department and also attained her BA in International Relations & History from the George Washington University’s Elliott School of International Affairs. 

Sean Dack was a Young Global Professional with the Cyber Statecraft Initiative during the fall of 2022. He is now a Researcher at the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, where he focuses on the long-term strategic and economic implications of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Dack graduated from Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies in December 2022 with his MA in Strategic Studies and International Economics. 

Acknowledgements 

The authors thank Justin Sherman, Gregory Rattray, and Gavin Wilde for their comments on earlier drafts of this document, and Trey Herr and the Cyber Statecraft team for their support. The authors also thank all the participants, who shall remain anonymous, in multiple Chatham House Rule discussions and one-on-one conversations about the issue.

The Atlantic Council’s Cyber Statecraft Initiative, under the Digital Forensic Research Lab (DFRLab), works at the nexus of geopolitics and cybersecurity to craft strategies to help shape the conduct of statecraft and to better inform and secure users of technology.

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Tracking narratives

Animation depicts Wagner forces fighting French “zombies” in West Africa

Flurry of conflicting theories circulate among pro-Kremlin sources following deadly helicopter crash

Belarusian state TV accuses Ukrainian embassy of recruiting foreign fighters

Russian media amplify and exploit Wagner story about French Foreign Legion deserter killed in Ukraine

International response

Serbian president accuses Wagner of recruiting Serbian citizens

Ukraine’s allies continue to send military aid, including heavy equipment

Reports emerge of internal power struggles between Wagner and Russian defense ministry

On January 13, the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed its forces had taken control of Soledar and could encircle Bakhmut, threatening Ukrainian supply lines. In the statement, the MoD praised the efforts of aviation, artillery, and airborne troops, but did not mention the notable role Wagner played in securing Soledar.

Moscow’s announcement highlighted a long-simmering tension between Wagner and the official structure of the Russian MoD. On January 17, an old letter written by Valery Gerasimov, commander of Russian forces in Ukraine, re-circulated online. The letter, dated December 29, 2022, stated that Wagner is not included in the structure of the Russian armed forces. Gerasimov wrote the letter in response to an inquiry to the Russian MoD made by Evgeny Stupin, a lawyer for the Moscow City Duma. On January 15, President Vladimir Putin also attributed the Soledar success to the MoD.

On the day that Russia claimed Soledar, military bloggers affiliated with the Kremlin claimed there was an ongoing conflict between the MoD and Wagner founder Yevgeny Prigozhin. On January 15, Prigozhin awarded medals to Wagner soldiers for the capture of Soledar. On January 16, Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov dispelled reports of an ongoing conflict between Prigozhin and Russian army command, claiming the reports are “products of information manipulation.” Later in the day, when asked about Peskov’s comments, Prigozhin also dispelled the reports, saying, “I see no reason not to trust Peskov.”

On January 19, Prigozhin said that Wagner soldiers were concentrating on taking the suburban city of Klishchiivka, south of Bakhmut. This information has yet to be confirmed by the Russian MoD.

Elsewhere, on January 14, Ukrainian officials reported that Russia conducted fifty missile and three air strikes against Kyiv, Kharkiv, Odesa, Kryvyi Rih, Dnipro, Vinnytsia, and other settlements in West Ukraine. Ukrainian forces said that Russia used S-300 and S-400 systems against ground targets in Kyiv in the morning and later launched high-precision weapons, including twenty-eight cruise missile strikes using Kh-101, Kh-555, and Kh-59 guided air missiles and the sea-based 3M-14 Kalibr.

In Marinka, the Ukrainian army repelled renewed Russian attacks on January 17 and 18. Russian forces have been storming the settlement since last March, resulting in widespread destruction. The Russian forces also conducted raids in the area of Bilohorivka in Luhansk oblast and Krasna Hora, Bakhmut, Klischiyivka, Vodyane, Nevelske, and Pobieda in Donetsk oblast.

Chechen volunteer forces have become increasingly active in the fight around Bakhmut. There are at least two battalions of Chechens—the Sheikh Mansur Battalion and Dzhokhar Dudayev Battalion—fighting for the Ukrainian army on the Bakhmut frontline. On a tactical level, the Chechen battalions are working together in some areas, like in Opytne, where they attacked Russian positions. The Dzhokhar Dudayev Battalion also maintains a reconnaissance unit, “Adam,” currently located in Donetsk oblast.

On January 16, a Russian rocket struck a civilian building in Dnipro, killing at least forty-five people, including six children, marking the single deadliest civilian attack since the war began. Ukraine said it does not have air-defense systems that can intercept Russian KH-22 missiles; to ward off future missiles would require Western partners to donate advanced air defenses such as the US MIM-104 Patriot missile system.  

—Ruslan Trad, resident fellow for security research, Sofia, Bulgaria

—Valentin Châtelet, research associate, Brussels, Belgium

Russian forces allegedly use incendiary munitions in Kherson, youth center burns

On January 18, Russian shelling intensified on the southern frontline in Ukraine, which stretches from Kamianske in the Zaporizhzhia region to Vuhledar in the south of Donetsk oblast. After a night of heavy shelling, videos and photos emerged online showing that the Russian army had used what appears to incendiary ammunition in city of Kherson and nearby Beryslav.

The morning after the strike, videos and photos shared online showed the resulting damage. A local Kherson newspaper reported that a religious youth center had burned down as a result of the shelling. The DFRLab geolocated the youth center and confirmed that it was along the pathway of the airstrike but cannot confirm whether incendiary munitions were involved.

—Valentin Châtelet, research associate, Brussels, Belgium

Missile fragments, rocket warhead fall on Moldovan territory

Fragments of a Russian missile targeting Ukraine fell on Moldova territory on January 14 in the town of Larga, Briceni district. According to Moldova’s Ministry of Internal Affairs, a warhead fueled with approximately eighty kilograms of explosive material was also discovered among the debris. The next day, authorities reported that specialist teams had carried out controlled detonations of the remaining explosives. The Ministry of Defense noted that the army’s aerial surveillance system did not record a violation of Moldovan airspace, however.

Authorities in Chisinau have strongly condemned the attacks on neighboring Ukraine. “This is the reality of war, imposed by the aggressor, right here in our region,” stressed Moldovan President Maia Sandu. “The missiles reach Moldova as well—the fragments discovered yesterday in the Briceni district testify to this. We strongly condemn Russia’s aggression against Ukraine. Attacks on urban infrastructure and the killing of civilians are war crimes; they have no justification.”

Prime Minister Natalia Gavrilita also condemned Russia’s January 14 missile attacks on Ukrainian cities. “There is no political, historical, and even more so moral justification for killing civilians and attacking the infrastructure that ensures the survival of the population,” she said. “I express my deep indignation at the new massive attack on Ukraine. I express my support for the heroic Ukrainian people and our support for the victims of Russia’s barbaric attacks.”

This is the third time missile fragments have landed in Moldova, which is not a member of the European Union or NATO. On December 5, Moldovan border police discovered a missile in an orchard, also in the Briceni district. In October 2022, a Russian missile shot down by a Ukrainian anti-aircraft system fell in the village of Naslavcea, located along the border with Ukraine, shattering windows of several residences as a result of the explosion.

—Victoria Olari, research assistant, Chisinau, Moldova

Animation depicts Wagner forces fighting French “zombies” in West Africa

An animated video showing a Wagner operative helping West African countries defeat zombie French soldiers began circulating on social media and pro-Kremlin Telegram channels this week. While the origin of the video is currently unknown, it appears to have first shown up on Twitter on January 14th, then migrated to alternative video platforms before being shared across pro-Russian Telegram channels.

By depicting Wagner forces as heroes, the video promotes a pro-Russian, anti-French narrative that has spread in recent years across West African social media. The animation depicts Wagner soldiers assisting local militaries in Mali and Burkina Faso in removing French forces, represented in the animation as hordes of zombies and a giant cobra. In Mali, a Wagner operative parachutes into the zombie horde and provides ammunition to a Malian soldier who is subsequently able to defeat the undead, while in Burkina Faso, Wagner provides a rocket-propelled grenade to kill the French cobra.

Russia’s involvement in West Africa does not come in the form of simple weapons deliveries, however. Recent reports indicate that since Russia’s deployment in Mali more than one year ago, violence against civilians has significantly increased, and extremist forces have grown stronger.

The video ends with Wagner forces heading towards Côte d’Ivoire, where French zombies overwhelm an Ivorian soldier. The imagery implies that Wagner aims to send forces to the coastal country.

This is not the first time Wagner has created animated propaganda. In another animation, France was represented as a rat killed by Wagner. And in a comic strip spread in Central African Republic (CAR), Wagner operatives are again depicted fighting zombies, however in the case of CAR the zombies do not represent the French.

Support for France has declined significantly in Francophone Africa, while calls for Russian assistance to fight jihadists has increased.

—Tessa Knight, research associate, London, United Kingdom

Flurry of conflicting theories circulate among pro-Kremlin sources following deadly helicopter crash

On January 18, a helicopter crash in Brovary, near Kyiv, killed sixteen people, including three children, Ukraine’s interior minister, his deputy, and the ministry secretary. The helicopter crashed near a kindergarten. Ukrainian security services investigating the crash are considering three possible scenarios, including a violation of flight rules, a technical malfunction, or intentional sabotage. In the meantime, pro-Kremlin sources are already sharing conflicting narratives about the incident.

One of the first narratives to emerge suggested that Ukraine’s air-defense systems shot down the helicopter. The claim was amplified by pro-Kremlin TV host Olga Skabeyeva on her Telegram channel. Another pro-Kremlin Telegram channel added more details to the claim, saying that “unofficial Ukrainian sources” said the aircraft was shot down by the Stinger or Igla air-defense systems. The claim was also shared on Twitter by a pro-Kremlin account, spreading the narrative to English-speaking audiences. At the time of writing, the English tweet had more than one million views.

Other sources took the claim further. The pro-Kremlin Russian outlet Regnum hypothesized that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy was behind the crash, publishing a story with the headline, “The crash of the helicopter of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine in Brovary – executed by Zelenskyy?”

Meanwhile, pro-Kremlin reporter Sasha Kots reported that European countries had suspended the helicopter model, either a Eurocopter EC225 Super Puma or a H225M, after a 2016 crash in Norway. While it is true that the European Aviation Safety Agency grounded both aircraft type after the Norway crash, it allowed flights to resume roughly six months later. Helicopters of this type are used by both military and civilian operators in France, Brazil, Vietnam, and many other countries. Kots also claimed that after the two models were grounded, France sold its supply to Ukraine, implying that France is also responsible for the tragedy.

In December 2021, Romania and Ukraine entered into an agreement to upgrade five of these helicopter models.

—Roman Osadchuk, research associate

Belarusian state TV accuses Ukrainian embassy of recruiting foreign fighters

On January 16, the state-controlled TV channel Belarus 1 reported that Belarusian security services had arrested Georgian citizen Giorgi Zirakishvili for allegedly trying to enter Ukraine via Belarus to fight against Russia. Belarus 1 reported that the Ukrainian Embassy in Georgia had advised Zirakishvili to travel from Georgia to Ukraine through Belarus. The broadcaster also claimed that Zirakishvili had planned to meet Igor Kizim, Ukraine’s ambassador to Belarus, upon arrival to receive instructions on how to reach Ukraine and join the Georgian Legion, a paramilitary unit mostly comprised of ethnically Georgian volunteers who fight for Ukraine. Belarus 1 also broadcast an alleged recording of a phone conversation in which Zirakishvili believes he is speaking to representatives from the Ukrainian embassy in Belarus. However, Belarus 1 reported that Zirakishvili was actually speaking to representatives from Belarusian security services, who discovered Zirakishvili’s alleged intentions and connected with him by impersonating Ukrainian embassy staff. The report also contains a video recording of Zirakishvili’s meeting with representatives from Belarusian security services, who he apparently believed were representatives of the Ukrainian embassy.

Belarus 1 did not provide any concrete evidence that Zirakishvili had communicated with anyone from the Ukrainian embassy in Belarus. Despite this, the report claims that Kizim is actively recruiting foreign fighters to send to Ukraine. The ambassador responded to the allegations, saying the Belarus 1 story was “nonsense” and “lies, manipulation, and hypocrisy.” He added that the Ukrainian embassy was in contact with the Belarusian foreign affairs ministry regarding the matter.

—Givi Gigitashvili, research associate, Warsaw, Poland

Russian media amplify and exploit Wagner story about French Foreign Legion deserter killed in Ukraine

A January 17 Telegram post published on Yevgeny Prigozhin’s press channel claimed that Wagner forces tracked down and killed a Ukrainian member of the French Foreign Legion in Donetsk. The channel also shared identity cards belonging to a YevheniiKoulyk, including a Ukrainian driver’s license, a French military card, and a French train card.

The post was reshared by the Telegram channel WarDonbass and the pro-Russian news outlet DonbassInsider. The Russian press agency TASS also reported on the claim. Several Russian-owned media outlets and Telegram channels shared the post, garnering at least 647,000 views at the time of writing.

The story was then picked up by the Russian news outlet Argumenty I fakty (Arguments and facts), which claimed Koulyk was a NATO agent. One VK post suggested Koulyk was a foreign mercenary and accused Ukraine of not disclosing the number of foreign soldiers killed in the war. The author compared Koulyk’s death to that of Hryhorii Tsekhmystrenko, a Ukrainian-born Canadian volunteer reported killed in Ukraine this week.

According to French journalist and military expert Philippe Chapeleau, the French Foreign Legion allowed its Ukrainian-born fighters a period of leave so they could safely resettle their families in neighboring countries. Those who did not return would be considered deserters. According to that same source, Koulyk had been missing since August 2022 and was therefore considered a deserter.

Koulyk’s death was previously reported as early as January 12. As of January 19, there were a total of 189 posts across news outlets and social media discussing Koulyk.

—Valentin Châtelet, research associate, Brussels, Belgium

Serbian president accuses Wagner of recruiting Serbian citizens

In a TV interview on January 16, Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic criticized Wagner Group for its attempts to recruit Serbian citizens to participate in the Ukraine war. Vucic slammed Wagner, saying, “Why do you do that to Serbia? Why do you, from Wagner, call anyone from Serbia when you know that it is against our regulations?” He also noted that Serbian legislation prohibits its citizens from participating in foreign armed conflicts and denied recent allegations that Wagner has a presence in Serbia. On January 17, Yevgeny Prigozhin stated that there are no Serbian citizens active in Wagner and that Wagner has never been active in Serbia. The DFRLab previously reported on claims made by Wagner that it was establishing a presence in Serbia.

Vucic also condemned a Wagner advertisement published by the newly established Serbian arm of RT. On January 5, RT Balkan reportedly published an article with the headline, “Wagner published an ad for volunteers, the conditions are more than tempting.” The article, which is no longer available on RT Balkan’s website, allegedly said that Wagner was looking for volunteers ages twenty-two to fifty who are not citizens of Ukraine or any EU or NATO member states. Volunteers were required to be physically healthy, interested in learning, patriots, and strong in spirit; in turn, “everything else will be taught by Wagner members.”

A Google search for the original headline, “Vagnerovci objavili oglas za dobrovoljce, uslovi više nego primamljivi,” retrieved an article with the same title, but the original URL now leads to a different article about Russian prisoners who joined Wagner, fought in Ukraine, and peacefully returned to Russia, where all charges against them were dropped.

—Givi Gigitashvili, research associate, Warsaw, Poland

Ukraine’s allies continue to send military aid, including heavy equipment

Ukraine will receive an unspecified number of Archer systems from Sweden, with Swedish media reporting that Kyiv will receive twelve units. Stockholm will also send fifty CV90 vehicles. Latvia will deliver another military aid package to Ukraine that includes Stinger anti-aircraft missiles, helicopters, small arms, and drones.

Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau announced on January 10 that the country would donate more NASAMS air-defense systems to Ukraine. These systems will enable Ukrainian forces to enhance ground protection around troop deployments and civilian infrastructure. Canada will also transfer another two hundred armored LAV ACSV Super Bison vehicles to Ukraine.

According to the New York Times, the Pentagon is tapping into a stockpile of US ammunition in Israel to help meet Ukraine’s need for artillery shells. The arms and ammunition stockpile is typically reserved for the Pentagon to use in the Middle East. Meanwhile, on January 19, the Pentagon announced a $2.5 billion security package for Ukraine, including for the first time ninety Stryker armored personnel carriers. These mine-resistant ambush-protected vehicles could help infantry advance further into the frontlines. Additionally, the US will provide energy equipment to help Ukraine deal with energy shortages. The $125 million support pack would include turbines, backup power banks, and high-voltage transformers.

On January 14, British Prime Minister Rishi Sunak spoke to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and announced that the United Kingdom will send Ukraine fourteen Challenger 2 battle tanks and artillery systems. As of 2021, the British army possessed 227 battle tanks. Sending additional tanks is likely to increase pressure on Germany to send its own Leopard 2 tanks to Ukraine, though Germany’s defense minister said Friday that Berlin has not yet decided on the Leopard 2.

Russian citizens living in Bulgaria donated three pickup trucks to the Ukrainian army. They will be used by the Freedom of Russia Legion, a battalion made up of Russian citizens who defected to fight for Ukraine’s Foreign Legion.

—Ruslan Trad, resident fellow for security research, Sofia, Bulgaria

—Valentin Châtelet, research associate, Brussels, Belgium

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TO: US National Security Community

FROM: Atlantic Council’s Gray Zone Task Force

DATE: December 22, 2022

SUBJECT: Scoping the gray zone: Defining terms and policy priorities for engaging competitors below the threshold of conflict

In October, the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security’s Forward Defense practice convened current and former practitioners and other experts for a private workshop under its Adding Color to the Gray Zone project, which seeks to advance a US and allied strategic framework for hybrid conflict. Participants discussed what actions should and should not be encompassed by the term “gray zone,” the value in defining the gray zone and hybrid conflict, and the most pressing issues for the United States to address in this realm.

Strategic context

Through hybrid conflict or warfare, US adversaries are blurring the lines between peace and war, in a space often referred to as the gray zone. Without firing a single bullet, US adversaries are striking at the fibers of US and allied societies, economies, and governments to test confidence in systems that underwrite both the US constitutional republic and the US-led, rules-based international order. Gray zone competition is a critical and practical element of twenty-first-century security. The ability of the United States to defend against gray zone threats and leverage its advantages for national imperatives will affect its competitive edge in the coming years. There is much debate, however, around what the gray zone and hybrid conflict or warfare signify. While reaching agreement on this terminology is a critical first step for any strategy, it serves only as the early pages of any strategy, and US adversaries are chapters ahead in their respective playbooks.

The value of defining key terms

While definitions for the gray zone and hybrid conflict or warfare are critical for stakeholder synchronization and coordination, reaching consensus on such terminology is neither practical nor worth the effort beyond a common critical mass accomplished through working definitions versus absolute ones. This analysis adopts the following working definitions:

• The gray zone is the space in which defensive and offensive activity occurs above the level of cooperation and below the threshold of armed conflict. Gray zone operations, activities, and actions (OAA) are often, but not always, clandestine, covert, unofficial, or outside accepted norms of behavior. Gray zone OAA are aimed at undermining the security of the target entity or projecting the national or organizational interest of the initiator but without triggering active armed conflict. While the gray zone can be thought of chronologically (i.e., after peace, before active hostilities), it is referred to spatially to reflect that this is not necessarily the case. In fact, gray zone activity can occur during active armed conflict between actors.
• Hybrid conflict (also referred to as hybrid warfare) is a subset of statecraft that uses the diplomatic, informational, military, and economic (DIME) levers of national power across the competition continuum, including cooperation, competition (including gray zone OAA), deterrence, and armed conflict for the purposes of achieving national security objective(s) against a state or non-state actor(s). DIME has expanded to include financial, intelligence, law, and development levers, with acronyms such as MIDFIELD and DIMEFIL created to account for this. The continued use of DIME bridges the gap between past and present generations of practitioners and remains consistent with the security community’s default verbiage.

These working definitions are meant to offer a meeting point for further discussion, as the task force recognizes and welcomes debate about what is and is not considered gray zone OAA or hybrid conflict. Providing an 80 percent solution allows us to go beyond definitions and begin tackling the tougher and more substantive question of how the United States and its allies and partners act and respond in the gray zone.

According to these definitions, one might argue that few methods do not fall under the gray zone; everything from political speeches and economic policies to legal agreements and information operations, all the way up to arms sales and active armed conflict, may fall under the umbrella of hybrid conflict. This broad lens, however, deliberately offers a strategic shift in the way in which security threats are viewed. Given that security today is shaped by conventional military threats as well as unconventional military and nonmilitary threats, it compels us to redefine what is meant by conflict and consider it as a spectrum persisting well beyond the physical battlefield, threatening not just the lives of American warfighters but also the American way of life. In a sense, the gray zone can be viewed as a distinct (and limitless) domain, with hybrid conflict the activity that falls within this realm. This does not indicate a novelty in the nature of warfare so much as how war is characterized.

This characterization is another area where a strategic competitor like China is ahead of the United States. Chinese doctrinal literature like Unrestricted Warfare and concepts such as the “Three Warfares” have characterized conflict with the United States in this way for nearly thirty years. It is also consistent with theater campaign plans, which provide guidance to US geographic combatant commanders for coordinating Phase Zero activities shaping the battlespace, and ironically, with Sun Tzu’s quote that “every battle is won before it is ever fought.”

Putting definitions into context

What falls within the gray zone? Put simply, it depends. Gray zone activity persists in a delta of norms, wherein the United States, its allies, and its adversaries are all playing by distinct sets of rules and thus work under different thresholds for conflict.

Beyond lexicon, policymakers need to consider the real-world applications of the gray zone terminology, recognizing that target (who or what is being targeted) and intent (what end state the actor is aiming to accomplish) are two key variables in the gray zone equation, and they affect whether actions are characterized as gray zone activity or ordinary statecraft. Identical policy actions might be classified differently depending on whether they intentionally coerce or deter a specific target. For example, when is policy categorized as purely economic versus coercive? While US government investment requires promise of at least breaking even, China subsidizes its private sector even when a deal is projected to lose money—the former policy satisfies economic interests, whereas the latter points to an ulterior motive.

Furthermore, whether an act is classified as hybrid often depends on where one sits: The US government commonly views its own actions as statecraft while cataloging the same or similar actions conducted by adversaries as hybrid conflict. For example, the 2022 National Defense Strategy characterizes only competitor approaches as falling within the gray zone, even while referencing comparable US and allied methods. Similarly, the enemy always gets a vote, and while the United States may consider certain actions as operational preparation of the environment, competitors may view them as acts of aggression, hostility, or even war. In parallel, the way in which the United States defines and acts in the gray zone affects whether allies and partners follow suit. Definitional and values-driven consensus can ensure like-minded nations and organizations are on the same page when it comes to hybrid conflict.

Key priorities in the gray zone

Countering Chinese and Russian malign activities and deterring aggression. Specific priorities in the gray zone should be framed around the broader strategic goal of preventing and responding to Chinese and Russian hybrid threats. China and Russia are the United States’ key strategic competitors, and nowhere is this more evident than in the gray zone. China leverages hybrid activity to protect its brand of authoritarianism (for example, power projection through its Belt and Road Initiative infrastructure projects), whereas Russia aims to weaken NATO and command its near abroad (e.g., the use of unmarked “Little Green Men” to seize Crimea in 2014). Both China and Russia have long leveraged gray zone activity to inflict significant information, influence, intelligence, and technical losses on the United States and allies. How they manifest hybrid conflict, however, differs: Russia fuses military and nonmilitary methods to sow chaos, while China’s approach is far more pervasive and employs continuous nonmilitary operations to offset US military superiority. The United States’ recognition of a broadening paradigm from legacy traditional deterrence of its adversaries to increased focus on information and influence is central to the integrated deterrence mandated by the US National Security Strategy and National Defense Strategy.

Adapting to the information age. Emerging technologies continue to revolutionize how people and nations receive and consume information, necessarily changing the way in which information activity is conducted in the gray zone. Technological advancements are transforming both the hybrid threats facing the United States and the tools at its disposal. For example, for all its good, technological innovation has also caused supply chain sensitivities vulnerable to adversarial exploitation including through industrial espionage, intellectual property theft, and cyberattacks. US entities need to become more creative in anticipating such threats and solving for them, such as through obfuscating data and reducing an adversary’s confidence. Another example is found in open-source intelligence (OSINT). With the proliferation of social media, OSINT can be just as critical as classified sources and methods of intelligence—yet the US government’s traditional bias toward classified intelligence is hindering its ability to stay ahead in the information domain. This space is ripe for public-private partnership, as vulnerabilities are not necessarily housed in US government entities but rather in assets and infrastructure not traditionally or organically protected by the government or military (e.g., social media platforms).

Involving economic policies and institutions. Any discussion of the gray zone is incomplete without adequate consideration of economic policies and their key stakeholders. Economic strategy is a key component of strategic competition, with industrial policy, debt financing, and sovereign debt policy being among the policies leveraged by China and Russia to meet their own strategic ends. Furthermore, US adversaries are targeting the commercial sector, shifting much of the impetus for action on economic and private sector actors that should play a leading role in the gray zone. Civil and commercial partnerships will be a cornerstone of a US response in the gray zone, and the private sector must be strengthened against economic coercion and intellectual property theft or risk weakening the US strategic approach.

The way forward

Gray zone threats are a whole-of-nation problem and should prompt a whole-of-nation response. While the United States currently views the gray zone largely through a military or intelligence framework, and a defensive one at that, other US departments and agencies, commercial stakeholders, and international entities have a major—in some cases leading—role to play.[1] A cohesive US strategy, perhaps coordinated by an entity independent of practitioner equities, is necessary to synchronize and optimize US government and commercial actors and their efforts in this space.

Such a strategy must be well resourced and well articulated. The United States should look past traditional military personnel to build out its hybrid response, creating new paradigms that do not necessarily adhere to the legacy system(s) but involve relevant stakeholders who can view the adversary without political and/or military bias. Moreover, the United States should update the training of its diplomatic corps to ensure its cadre understands the inner workings of key institutions central to their job description. Additionally, communicating with and educating a public audience will be a foundational requirement for gray zone efforts, as society at large must recognize that the United States is routinely fighting in the gray zone and citizens must understand the ways in which they play a role. This approach has precedence in World Wars I and II, and even the Cold War. Consistent and synchronized messaging across the government will help maintain the effectiveness and credibility of the messaging needed to deter adversaries from using hybrid methods.

The Atlantic Council’s Gray Zone Task Force consists of technical and policy experts, former government officials, and private sector executives. These individuals leverage their deep knowledge and extensive experience in impacted and impactful industries to examine adversarial acts in the gray zone and determine how the United States and its allies and partners can leverage hybrid tactics to meet their own strategic ends.

Explore Adding Color to the Gray Zone

Adding color to the gray zone: Establishing a strategic framework for hybrid conflict

Investigating nontraditional and hybrid threats across the competition continuum, proposing a US and allied approach to acting, reacting, and prevailing in the gray zone throughout an era of strategic competition.

Forward Defense, housed within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, generates ideas and connects stakeholders in the defense ecosystem to promote an enduring military advantage for the United States, its allies, and partners. Our work identifies the defense strategies, capabilities, and resources the United States needs to deter and, if necessary, prevail in future conflict.

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Fellow

Anca Agachi

Nonresident Fellow

Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security Transatlantic Security Initiative

Africa Conflict

The Transatlantic Security Initiative, in the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, shapes and influences the debate on the greatest security challenges facing the North Atlantic Alliance and its key partners.

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1. What exactly does the Pentagon mean by activities in the gray zone?

The NDS defines gray zone methods as “coercive approaches that may fall below perceived thresholds for US military action and across areas of responsibility of different parts of the US government.” That definition acknowledges that strategic competitors are increasingly taking the fight off the physical battlefield and using unconventional and nonmilitary means to undermine US and allied security. Adversaries such as China and Russia are not solely—or even primarily—targeting military assets, but rather they are fueling societal and cultural fissures, shaping the information domain, and disrupting economic markets and trade. This is not a new concept: China’s and Russia’s use of nonmilitary means of warfare dates back to Operation Desert Storm, wherein the United States walked away celebrating a decisive battlefield victory while US adversaries began visualizing a future fight in which they could compensate for unparalleled US conventional power through hybrid means.

The DOD’s definition of gray zone activities can be interpreted as purposefully broad, implying that a discussion of modern warfare today is incomplete without discussing threats permeating from the gray zone. However, it is notable that the NDS opted to characterize only competitor or adversary methods as falling within the gray zone, even while mentioning comparable US and allied capabilities and approaches.

Overall, this NDS’s definition of gray zone methods broadens the US defense community’s understanding of who is being targeted in the gray zone and thus who should be implicated in the DOD’s response—and more significant than the definition itself is the prioritization placed on the gray zone. However, this is only one step in the right direction, as different US agencies and departments are currently working under different understandings of what does and does not fall within the gray zone. This lack of consensus or coordination, coupled with an overall lack of direction as to whether and how the United States should fight in the gray zone, hinders an effective whole-of-nation response to a whole-of-nation problem.

—Julia Siegel is an assistant director with the Scowcroft Center’s Forward Defense practice.

2. How do gray zone activities fit into the DOD’s integrated deterrence concept?

Integrated deterrence is, at its heart, about shaping behavior to “convince potential adversaries that the costs of their hostile activities far outweigh any possible benefits,” as Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin explained. Integrated deterrence ultimately relies on a full spectrum of incentives, disincentives, messaging, and negotiation, underwritten by credible deterrents of conventional and/or strategic military action. Unsurprisingly, a good amount of the spectrum below the threshold of active armed conflict will reside in the gray zone.

The United States must react to adversarial activity in the gray zone, especially in areas that adversaries perceive as important, to reduce their efficacy; that will require responses that are appropriate, proportionate, and effective. Equally important, the United States must engage proactively in the gray zone to shape competitors’ behavior. Some of the capabilities needed for engaging in the gray zone exist within the DOD, with many housed within US Special Operations Forces core activities, as well as theater security cooperation activities and those at a national level that transcend a single geographic combatant command such as coordination with Five Eyes partners (Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom) across the globe. Other capabilities, while not organic to the department, are at its disposal through effective partnerships with the intelligence community, other departments (e.g. State, Treasury, and Commerce), and alliances and partnerships. Improving the way the DOD leverages partnerships can potentially result in better outcomes than replicating the partners’ capabilities.

A critical part of integrated deterrence will be how the United States articulates its so-called “red lines,” or adversarial actions that trigger a US military response. In order to effectively shape behavior that supports US and allied interests, US strategy and execution must erase any doubt that such limits and consequences do exist, while simultaneously reducing adversary confidence about their knowledge of precisely where those red lines lie. That deliberate ambiguity keeps adversaries from thinking that everything up to the red line would be “fair game,” and avoids inviting lower-level malign activity. It also avoids the optics of a United States’ “bluff” being called, in part, to avoid walking back on pronounced lines. Lastly, engaging in the gray zone will buy the maneuver time and space required to maintain its competitive edge and deter aggression in the future—the United States cannot waste this advantage with denial, handwringing, and partisanship—especially when it comes to China.

—Arun Iyer is a nonresident senior fellow with the Scowcroft Center’s Forward Defense practice and leads its project Adding Color to the Gray Zone. 

3. The NDS differentiates between China as the pacing threat and Russia as an acute threat. What does that look like in the gray zone?

The NDS correctly notes that China and Russia pose unique challenges to the United States. The two countries differ in how they impact the United States and in how long their threats last. China’s advances in technology, access to third-country governments and resources, and role as a key global manufacturer means that the United States and allied countries face a strategic, long-term competition against China. All-out war against China would devastate the global economy and cripple US-owned multinational businesses. In contrast, Russia lacks the reach of its Soviet Union days and its impacts on global markets are mostly limited to petrochemicals. As highlighted in its efforts in Ukraine, the Russian military’s decline has been noticed in the waning professionalism of its forces, reliability of material, and overall investment and research and development. Russia would struggle to project traditional military power much outside its border areas.

China, despite recent economic troubles, is a nation on the rise and one that feels it deserves a place at the top of the world order. Although its population is forecasted to decline in the coming years, China will be a global force for decades to come—and its network of businesses, investments, and expatriates provide the country unique access to capabilities that it can leverage both in the gray zone and to meet traditional military goals. For example, TikTok may offer China the ability to push specific anti-US government content to users of the app in North America or in locations where there are ongoing US or NATO military operations. China’s continued investment in technology, education, and international relationships means that the country will continue to build this access in business, academia, and local politics in countries around the world—levers that can be pulled to meet China’s goals without the use of traditional military operations.

In contrast, Russia’s gray-zone capabilities are limited outside of its use of the paramilitary Wagner Group, information manipulation in the digital space, and traditional diplomatic efforts which include foreign intelligence operations to project power and contribute to paramilitary, influence, and harassment operations. As the political elite focuses on ways to make the domestic Russian audience feel powerful during a period of population and economic decline, gray-zone efforts will likely focus on meeting specific needs such as port access or supporting international political leaders. The Kremlin will aim to look strong to domestic and regional audiences, especially in Eastern Europe and South Asia, where Russia typically has influence. Moscow’s overarching threat to global interests will be its use of information operations to sow discord, clearing entry ways for Russian intelligence and business leaders to access locations of interest and providing localized support to fighting parties where political interests align.

—Jennifer A. Counter is a nonresident senior fellow within the Scowcroft Center’s Forward Defense practice and is a member of its Adding Color to the Gray Zone Task Force.

4. Deterrence is inherently a messaging game. What does this NDS say about the DOD’s approach to information operations?

Deterrence depends on the adversary’s perception of the United States’ capabilities and intent to use them. It also depends on an impression that if the adversary were to present a challenge, the United States would be able to cause enough damage to outweigh any gain for the adversary and its interests. Gauging an adversary’s perception, therefore, is necessary to understand the current deterrent threshold. Moving the threshold, if necessary, is dictated by how well a military manages the information domain. If a deterrent threshold is evaporating or degrading over time, then adjustments must be made to capabilities and perceived intentions, and then adequately conveyed to the adversary to restore the value of the deterrent. The NDS highlights the Pentagon’s aim to enhance its ability to operate in the information domain as a necessary component of this strategy.

Yet questions remain. The NDS highlights several new features with significant information elements to help organize and subsequently execute military activities across the entire conflict spectrum. First, the NDS’s focus on integrated deterrence calls for improvements across domains, agencies, and countries to better manage conflict in the information domain. Second, campaigns that cover the entire conflict spectrum—overlayed with the increased demands of implementing integrated deterrence—will require significant additional resources for all information components of the DOD. Who will manage a global information campaign in which all departmental information resources must be coherent, synchronized, and operationally relevant? Will the president’s budget for fiscal year 2024 reflect the need for additional resources to adequately coordinate campaigns that are overlapping and will run simultaneously across agencies, partners, and allies? Finally, is the department adequately organized to elevate information operations as a preeminent component of national power needed to implement integrated deterrence? The NDS is a good step forward, but organization and resourcing leading up to fiscal year 2024 will determine whether it can be implemented.

 —Robert J. Giesler is a nonresident senior fellow with the Scowcroft Center’s Forward Defense practice and is a member of its Adding Color to the Gray Zone Task Force.

5. How can the US government and private sector complement traditional military efforts?

In roughly eighty pages, the 2022 NDS references economic tools fewer than a dozen times. While not surprising given that the document sets forth the DOD’s strategy, which consists primarily of non-economic tools, this underscores the importance of relying on other government agencies and departments to address what the NDS refers to as “economic coercion” carried out by the China against the United States and its allies and partners. China’s Belt and Road Initiative is the shining example of this coercion, as it forces recipient nations to forfeit direct or indirect control over key strategic assets (such as a ports, airports, rail lines, and highways) if they fail to pay commercial loans. However, myriad other examples of economic coercion exist, including currency manipulation, technology transfer requirements (i.e., China requiring foreign firms to transfer technology to local firms in exchange for market access), and punitive tariffs.

So how can the United States combat economic hybrid warfare? The NDS acknowledges that DOD ought to rely on other agencies to take the lead on economic matters in the gray zone, stating that in many cases, tools such as economic measures “conducted by other US departments and agencies may prove more effective” than DOD’s military tools. This is where the panoply of US trade agencies—in conjunction with the Treasury and Commerce departments—can play a key role by establishing consistent, cross-agency policies regarding foreign investment, credit finance, trade policy, and sanctions to protect US defense interests and regain economic advantage. Still, DOD plays a significant role in advising these agencies on how to prioritize geographic focus areas and in evaluating where the greatest economic threats to US national security exist.

—David Fogel is a nonresident senior fellow with the Scowcroft Center’s Forward Defense practice and is a member of its Adding Color to the Gray Zone Task Force.

6. How should the DOD change its approach to counterintelligence (CI) under the integrated deterrence framework?

Integrated deterrence ought to include the use of CI capabilities resident within DOD’s authorities via Title 10 of the US Code, which outlines the DOD’s role in conducting military activities; Title 50 of the US Code, which grants the DOD and the intelligence community the authority to conduct intelligence and CI activities; and Executive Order 12333, which initially laid out the DOD’s intelligence and CI responsibilities. As the NDS notes, the United States can strengthen deterrence by conducting actions that raise an adversary’s cost with respect to the “perceived benefits of aggression.” One of the ways this can be accomplished is through synchronized messaging, complemented by real-world open activities and actions that utilize offensive CI operations in concert with the DOD planning community. For example, the DOD might use CI assets to pass information about a policy intent that complements a stated White House or State Department decision, all while moving DOD personnel and material into the theater to reinforce the United States’ overall intent.

Similarly, leveraging CI capabilities can help improve the resiliency of the vital networks and critical infrastructure supporting the cyber and space domains, as they utilize the same personnel, equipment, networks, and supply chains feeding into CI. The first order of business should be securing US supply chains in line with the Pentagon’s vision of delivering uncompromised, which is a DOD program aiming to bolster security across the entire defense enterprise by ensuring that foreign intelligence entities haven’t compromised technology (for example with insider threats or compromised chips) in the manufacturing process, which would assist with building enduring advantages throughout the defense ecosystem. To do so, the United States must move the manufacture of critical components back onshore to the United States and then use the tools and tradecraft of CI to ensure that the personnel, networks, intellectual property, and manufacturing processes associated with these “can’t lose” technologies are both vetted and protected.

—Thomas Ferguson was a member of Forward Defense’s Adding Color to the Gray Zone Task Force before assuming a position in government.

7. How can the Pentagon better leverage domestic and international partners, and the capabilities they own across domains, to fortify its integrated deterrence?

The NDS mandate to leverage every capability and advantage at DOD’s disposal, particularly to use advantages that DOD does not organically own, is astute and could not come at a better time for the United States. The two-decade war on terror provides a strong precedent for cross-government cooperation, which is potentially still applicable even as the US government shifts its focus from counterterrorism to strategic competition with China and Russia.

As a former Central Intelligence Agency leader, I saw first-hand the development, implementation, and impact of what was nicknamed “Title 60”—the portmanteau of titles 10 and 50 of US code—wherein the DOD and intelligence community (IC) worked seamlessly on the counterterrorism mission. This integrated cooperation between exquisite capabilities is the textbook example of what the NDS calls for, particularly in addressing competition in the gray zone. For example, both the IC and Special Operations Forces worked together to become experts at man-hunting in the war on terror, fusing signals intelligence, human intelligence, and overhead capabilities to ensure few places globally were out of reach in conducting “find, fix, finish” missions against terrorist targets. Such capabilities can similarly be used against today’s strategic competitors—why not merge joint talents to find hostile foreign intelligence officers working against US interests across the globe?

In sum, successes in the US war on terror were critically dependent on bilateral and multilateral partnerships. Both the IC and DOD deeply understand the value of partners, justifying integration on many levels such as intelligence sharing and (at times) cross-training. To meet the NDS remit to address gray zone threats, the DOD must build on these relationships and lessons and not let a new issue set cause formerly integrated capabilities to atrophy.

—Marc Polymeropoulos is a nonresident senior fellow with the Scowcroft Center’s Forward Defense practice and is a member of its Adding Color to the Gray Zone Task Force.

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On September 21, the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security’s Nonresident Senior Fellow William Evanina testified before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. In his testimony, Evanina discussed the growing cyber threat posed to US business and academic institutions.

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Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

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While the document’s strategic prioritization is clear, what remains uncertain is how this strategy will ultimately be implemented across DOD. Defense leadership recognizes this, as the document states that “this strategy will not be successful if we fail to resource its major initiatives or fail to make the hard choices to align available resources with the strategy’s level of ambition.”

How can DOD meet the strategic priorities laid out in the 2022 NDS? The Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security’s military fellows—active-duty officers who are serving a one-year rotation at the Atlantic Council—weighed in, addressing potential gaps between budgets and strategy, force employment mechanisms, sustainment and logistics, and security partnerships. The opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied here are solely those of the authors and do not represent the views of DOD or any other US government agency.

Investing in security partnerships: The US should take larger risks to bolster Taiwan’s defense

Security cooperation has long played an essential role in US defense policy, but this NDS amplifies its role in competition for the next decade. The 2022 NDS states that “mutually beneficial Alliances and partnerships are our greatest global strategic advantage—and they are a center of gravity for this strategy.” The decisions to defend treaty allies have already been adjudicated, but the decision to support security partners such as Ukraine and Taiwan remains foggy. Overall, this NDS implies that DOD will likely need to take more significant risks to support Taiwan and to prevent a Chinese invasion. 

The current war in Ukraine provides a case for security cooperation. Had the United States and NATO invested more heavily in Ukraine before Russia’s February 2022 invasion, they may have deterred Russia from attacking in the first place. In the past several months, the United States has invested approximately $17.6 billion in security assistance for Ukraine. In comparison, it only invested $2.7 billion from 2014 until February. The United States’ concerns about escalation with Russia were pervasive early in the Ukraine crisis, but along with NATO it has since taken much greater risks to help Ukraine survive and to contain Russia. US and NATO leaders are now likely pondering whether it may have been smarter and cheaper to invest earlier to prevent the war than to help Ukraine fight it.

When the United States invests in alliances and partnerships, it invests directly and indirectly to prevent (and, if necessary, respond to) any potential crisis. For instance, Operation Desert Storm (1990-91) included a coalition of thirty-nine countries worldwide. Desert Storm’s success relied heavily on a NATO alliance that was built for the Cold War threat but trained and ready for a crisis in the Middle East. US leadership in NATO has helped deepen the capability and willingness of European countries to cooperate in support of Ukraine. After Russia invaded, the speed and unity of the US, NATO, and European Union response were exemplary. The rate of armament shipments, funding supplied to Ukraine, sanctions on Russia, and the response to the humanitarian crisis should all serve as blueprints for coordination among allies and partners in the future. Enhancing US investments in Indo-Pacific alliances and partners will improve resilience for a potential conflict scenario in Taiwan or elsewhere.

The United States should implement an audacious strategy to help build Taiwan’s self-defenses and strengthen other Indo-Pacific allies and partners to help surge in a crisis. According to the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), Taiwan is a security partner. The TRA places Taiwan a tier above Ukraine in terms of US commitment to its security. The additional ten billion dollars over four years in Foreign Military Financing for Taiwan proposed in the 2023 NDAA could further solidify US commitment to the partnership. Ideally, a US funding increase would spur other Taiwan security partners to increase their support and potentially create a NATO-like framework for deterrence.

The West will likely never know for certain whether heavily arming Ukraine pre-invasion would have caused Russian escalation or prevented the invasion entirely. However, given that Russia has repeatedly threatened red lines since invading and the West has routinely surpassed them, the United States and NATO likely could have been more aggressive without triggering a broader war. US defense leaders should use the lesson of Ukraine to push the limits of investment in Taiwan—along with other Indo-Pacific allies and partners—to prevent an invasion.

—COL Benjamin Johnson is the 2022-2023 senior US Army fellow at the Scowcroft Center.

Follow the money: DOD is betting on research but not sending the right signals to industry

At every opportunity, DOD leadership has sought to highlight the linkages between the 2022 NDS and the president’s fiscal year 2023 (FY23) budget request. Yet, while this strategy and budget were developed concurrently, fiscal constraints lead to necessary tradeoffs across programs.

Consistent with the NDS, DOD cut costs from the current force structure to make significant investments in building enduring advantages. The Defense-Wide funding request increased significantly when compared to projections in the Trump administration’s final budget request (9 percent compared to an overall DOD increase of 5 percent), with these accounts containing the offices of the undersecretaries of defense for research and engineering, and for acquisition and sustainment. Notably, these two offices will execute the increases to building enduring advantages programs, to include $3.3 billion for microelectronics, $1.1 billion for artificial intelligence, and $700 million for submarine industrial-base resiliency. Such investments were partially funded by reductions to current force structure, including the retirement of sixteen Navy battle force ships before their estimated service life, a reduction of twelve thousand regular Army troops, and 102 Air Force aircraft early retirements. 

Moreover, the FY23 budget contains the largest research, development, testing, and evaluation (RDTE) request in DOD history, with funding requests of $130 billion for RDTE and $146 billion for procurement. Focusing too much on RDTE at the expense of procurement contributes to the “valley of death”—or the arduous journey commercial companies take to win DOD contracts—further underscoring that DOD does not have an innovation problem, but rather an innovation adoption problem. To field cutting-edge technologies, more funds ought to shift toward procurement over future budget cycles.

However, while all eyes are on the current budget year, the out-year funding projections in the Future Years Defense Program are concerning, as they result in real growth of -1.2 percent in FY25, -0.6 percent in FY26, and -1.4 percent in FY27 (using a projected 2.2 percent inflation rate, which is far below what we’ve seen lately). This demonstrates that additional force structure reductions may be required in future budget cycles, and that heavy RDTE investments may not necessarily lead to transformational technologies in the field—if there won’t be enough money for production. The NDS prioritizes a resilient defense ecosystem and healthy industrial base, but out-year projections do not send a demand signal to industry for sustained investment and will impact NDS implementation in the long term.

Now, Congress has the next move: Work remains ongoing to finalize the FY23 National Defense Authorization Act and appropriations bills. Throughout committee mark-ups, there has been strong bipartisan support for additional FY23 defense funding.

—LCDR Marek Jestrab is the 2022-2023 senior US Navy fellow at the Scowcroft Center.

Something old and something new: Force employment modernization must match an ambitious strategy

As outlined in the NDS, the “principal approach to advancing these priorities is integrated deterrence,” which is a whole-of-government approach to deter aggressive and malign actions by US adversaries, gain and maintain advantage throughout the competition continuum, and mitigate risk in advance of potential conflicts. 

As discussed above and articulated by others, there appears to be a gap between NDS objectives and budgetary realities. However, much of what is discussed as new within the NDS bears strong resemblance to strategy and guidance that has existed for several years. It can be argued that the 2018 NDS, 2018 Joint Concept for Integrated Campaigning, and the 2020 Irregular Warfare Annex to the NDS already created the necessary strategy framework to drive the department toward the strategic ends outlined in the 2022 NDS. What has remained constant, however, are the mechanisms by which joint force employment is planned and executed. The new points of emphasis—in particular the reliance on campaigning, as well addressing gray-zone activities simultaneously with conflict preparation—require a modernization of joint force employment concepts. 

The NDS explicitly states that “campaigning is not business as usual,” but rather a more sophisticated approach to “aggregate focus and resources” to ensure that operations, activities, and investments are linked to the stated priorities, while critically incorporating “feedback loops” ostensibly to course correct in the midst of dynamic long-term campaigns. Devising a long-term strategy to deter Chinese and Russian malign influence globally is decidedly more complex than a campaign to dismantle a violent extremist organization in a single theater. Integrated deterrence campaigns require a high degree of focused understanding about US adversaries, the effects of military operations in concert with other instruments of power, and mitigation of strategic and escalatory risks. 

However, current force employment mechanisms are more conventionally rigid, generally tying expeditionary forces to operating locations and adjudicating objectives years in advance of action, making it difficult to incorporate feedback loops and adjust to adaptive adversaries. Similarly, the rotational model employed by the military often caps the amount of time a particular problem can be focused on by expeditionary units or joint task forces, which can limit understanding and ultimately the options presented to commanders. As opposed to executive branch organizations that often focus on specific problems for decades, military units may shift from divergent problem sets over several years. Given the premium the NDS places on coordination and collaboration with not only the executive branch but also allies and partners, DOD must allow more flexibility in how it aligns multi-domain capabilities against priority operational problems.

The Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS) is critical to the ways and means in which force employment supports the strategic objectives outlined in the NDS. The military speaks in the language of requirements, which are specific and tangible activities that capability owners can use to develop operational concepts. Requirements and intermediate military objectives are defined in campaign plans, and the JSPS directs the development of Global Campaign Plans (GCP), Functional Campaign Plans, and Combatant Command Campaign Plans. In particular, GCPs “address the most pressing transregional and multi-functional strategic challenges across all domains… are global in scope and focus on integrating activities oriented against specific problems designed to achieve unity of effort for day-to-day activities,” according to the JSPS. Each GCP has a designated Coordinating Authority (CA) who has overall responsibility for the planning and execution of their associated GCP, and it is in this area where modernization is needed. Competing with Russia and China is a global endeavor, thus CAs must be armed with a global understanding of the problems sets to ensure that their campaign plans logically connect with each other and can be resourced and adjusted dynamically. The department should look to devise cross-functional teams from across the executive branch as well as key allies to provide CAs with holistic understanding of these global problem sets to better inform the development and modernization of the GCPs. 

The NDS makes it clear that the United States should not look at Russia as solely a problem in the European theater, nor China as solely an Indo-Pacific issue. Nonetheless, the force employment modernization to foster global deterrence campaigning must also account for the necessary preparations for regional conflict. Creative leadership is the key, as the NDS states that “we must not over-exert, reallocate, or redesign our forces for regional crises that cross the threshold of risk to preparedness for our highest strategic priorities.” This means that the department and CAs should encourage operational activities that satisfy requirements related to conflict preparation, as well as the ability to fight in the gray zone. Often referred to as “two-fers,” these types of operations can allow for a more efficient force employment model that can be scaled as required depending on prioritization. 

—Lt. Col. Justin Conelli is the 2022-2023 senior US Air Force fellow at the Scowcroft Center.

The Iron Triangle: Tradeoffs and challenges in building a sustainable, survivable logistics infrastructure

The 2022 NDS prioritizes a future force logistics capability able to operate in a contested environment and withstand attack from an adversary. Sustainability and survivability are key elements of effective logistics support, but current US sustainment, throughput, and distribution information technology (IT) systems are optimized toward neither. The pace at which the United States addresses these gaps, and the resources put toward closing them, will have an outsized impact on the nation’s ability to execute campaigns as outlined in the NDS.

Referred to as the “Iron Triangle,” the “good, fast, and cheap rule” encapsulates the tension between quality, speed, and investment in meeting stated priorities. Better understanding the tough choices confronting modernization of sustainment systems better informs the risk calculus of tradeoffs between effectiveness, speed, and cost, potentially closing the gap between possibility and probability.

The 2018 NDS made mention of logistics only insofar as to state a need for resiliency and agility “while under persistent multi-domain attack.” In contrast, the 2022 NDS’s call-out for a modernized sustainment and logistics capability is a step in the right direction in confronting changes within the operating environment. Investing big (or not) is a critical choice if the United States’ intent is to operationalize DOD’s role in strategic deterrence, maintain the edge within a campaigning construct, or buy decision space in order to maintain strategic options. Doing any of these things without aggressively resourced, suitably reinforced logistics IT systems will result in an inability to deliver effective sustainment as a means to generate combat power during enemy disruption or attack, or to credibly enforce strategic deterrence.

However, US IT logistics systems are unclassified, lacking interoperability, and multi-domain incapable, making them ill-suited to effectively support the joint force in a contested environment. While these capability gaps are nothing new, they are increasingly prime for exploitation within a competitive environment as vast as the Indo-Pacific theater. Numerous upgrade options exist across the commercial sector—to name a few, Amazon, Walmart, Maersk, and FedEx all leverage artificial intelligence, predictive algorithms, and myriad tech advancements in support of throughput/distribution models. These commercial systems capitalize on speed and quality in terms of delivering products on time and on target, possessing the elements of flexibility and resiliency long sought by DOD. Sure, ordering and receiving a personalized beer koozie within twenty-four hours is wildly different from large-scale sustainment operations in a maritime campaign—and these commercial systems are not yet wartime tested—but they are available now, offering a starting point from which to build.

Done right, the logistics systems modernization called for in the 2022 NDS will not come cheap, and developing and integrating commercially available systems will incur risk in areas that are left without funding as a result. Historically, logistics and sustainment do not compete well with high-end, exquisite tech capabilities. While a necessary function, logistics is often considered mundane and does not capture the imagination in the same way as the high-end technological advancements set out in the NDS. For now, the services are responding to the realities of logistics system limitations by experimenting with how to leverage current resources and new methods of employment. As an example, the Marine Corps, in concert with our naval counterparts, continues to develop and implement expeditionary advanced base operations (EABO), a form of expeditionary warfare involving mobile, low-signature naval expeditionary forces whose express purpose is to conduct sea denial, support sea control, or enable fleet sustainment in an austere, contested maritime environment. In sum, the United States will get what it is willing to pay for in logistics and sustainment, and its urgency in mitigating the gaps will reflect the choice to (or not to) invest heavily.

Sustainment is indeed a warfighting function, but it is often resourced as a supporting effort. The results are as one would expect when the investment is “cheap.” Setting the force specifically for operational plans looks different than multi-domain logistics when operating in the gray zone. Adapting a proactive approach to sustainment as a warfighting function, similar to intelligence and more recently communications and information in the targeting cycle, will enable effective campaigning, allowing the US to preserve strategic options and decision space in the changing security and operational environment.

—Lt. Col. Michelle Melendez is the 2022-2023 senior US Marine Corps fellow at the Scowcroft Center.

This article is part of the 21st Century Security Project by the Scowcroft Center’s Forward Defense practice with financial support from Lockheed Martin.

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Advancing the dialogue on how the United States and its allies and partners can deter, fight, and win future wars.

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Flagship Event Sat, November 12, 2022 • 12:00 am ET

Highlights from the Global Food Security Forum

A gathering of leaders across government, industry, and civil society to assess food security as a global challenge and offer bold solutions for strengthening food systems, securing supply chains, and fighting world hunger. This Forum is co-hosted with the Gaurav and Sharon Srivastava Family Foundation, the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Indonesia, and the Coordinating Ministry of Maritime Affairs and Investment of the Republic of Indonesia and takes place on the sidelines of the G20 summit in Bali.

Economy & Business Resilience & Society

Event transcript

Uncorrected transcript: Check against delivery

FREDERICK KEMPE: Some of you in the audience know me: This is not only the first day in my life I’ve worn batik; it is the first time that any president of the Atlantic Council in our sixty-year history has worn batik, and so we do that in your country and in honor of you.  

Starting as a businessman and mayor in your home city, Surakarta in 2005, President Jokowi entered politics with the aim to work for the people. He devoted himself to eradicating poverty, reducing crime, paying spontaneous visits to poor neighborhoods and marketplaces, always ready to hear people’s voices from up close. Your refusal to accept salary for public work and your competence in transforming the city into a vibrant tourist destination won the population of Surakarta’s heart, and you were re-elected as mayor in 2010 with more than 90 percent of the vote.  

Your determination to serve continued throughout your career, and you became the governor of Jakarta, and then the president of Indonesia in 2014. You were the first Indonesian president without a military or elite political background, and your victory symbolized the victory of democracy—the victory of democracy in this country of over 17,000 islands, 300 ethnic groups, and 273 million people and counting.  

We will all witness your leadership here at the G20, as you bring countries together at a particularly difficult moment in the world community, in solving the most pressing challenges today in health, climate change, economic recessions, and geopolitical tensions that have us all on edge—to recover together and to recover stronger.  

To make this G20 summit a success, it needs a chair of extraordinary talent and capability and heart; and someone who enjoys the trust of all parties involved. And you started becoming chair of the G20 far before you came here and launched this week; We’ve been watching your travels, we’ve been watching your meetings.  

President Widodo is not just a man of the people of Indonesia, he’s also become a global citizen who embodies the spirit of global cooperation, a catalyst for collective prosperity and peace, and that is why the Atlantic Council and its jury voted to honor you with our highest honor. It’s now my pleasure to present the [2022] Atlantic Council Distinguished Global Citizen Award. President Joko Widodo of Indonesia, a man of the people, a global leader, a global citizen president. 

PRESIDENT JOKO WIDODO: First of all, I would like to extend my highest appreciation for this award, the Global Citizen Award, from the Atlantic Council. I have never thought earlier that I would receive this award. So far what I’ve done… I’m doing my best. I’m working and doing my best with full responsibility, to uphold the values of humanity. Living in Indonesia, consisting of more than 17,000 islands, hundreds of ethnic groups, 162 local languages, Indonesia upholds the values of tolerance, peace, unity, and cooperation.

As a leader, I love visiting villages, I love visiting rural areas, and I also love visiting traditional markets. And since I was a child, I was taught being humble, to live modestly. And I’ve seen some people living in village or rural areas living in difficult situations, and therefore, I keep trying to do my best for the interests of common people and also for the interest of the state. The world should be built with tolerance, respect toward each other. The presidency of Indonesia in [the] G20 this year, and also we have [received] the [chairmanship] of ASEAN starting from next year. Ladies and gentlemen, once again, I would like to thank you for this Global Citizen Award that has been awarded to me. This will continually motivate me and also the government of the Republic of Indonesia to hold our responsibilities as part of the solution for the global world. 

Watch the remarks

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Flagship Event Sat, November 12, 2022 • 12:00 am ET

Highlights from the Global Food Security Forum

A gathering of leaders across government, industry, and civil society to assess food security as a global challenge and offer bold solutions for strengthening food systems, securing supply chains, and fighting world hunger. This Forum is co-hosted with the Gaurav and Sharon Srivastava Family Foundation, the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Indonesia, and the Coordinating Ministry of Maritime Affairs and Investment of the Republic of Indonesia and takes place on the sidelines of the G20 summit in Bali.

Economy & Business Resilience & Society

Event transcript

Uncorrected transcript: Check against delivery

GENERAL WESLEY CLARK: Thank you, ladies and gentlemen. Let’s see, I want to make sure you can hear me OK. So, look, we’re going to have a panel that’s—this is going to be a pragmatic panel. We’re going to talk about what has to be done, what has to be done now, and what we’re going to as best we can demand that the G20 address.

So, without further ado, I would like to bring in the other members of the panel.

We’ll start with His Excellency the Minister of Agriculture, Republic of Indonesia, Mr.—or, His Excellency Syahrul Yasin Limpo. Mr. Minister, welcome. Please.

Next will be Ambassador David Merrill, former US ambassador to Indonesia. Long career in the US Agency of International Development. Next, please.

Next will be the Honorable Kira Rudik, who is the vice president of the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe, people’s deputy of Ukraine. Welcome, Kira.

And on the screen with us we should have—yes, we have—Dr. Seth Meyer, the chief economist, the—probably one of the most—foremost experts in the world on agricultural economics and technology. And, Seth, we’re delighted to have you with us. Thank you. I’m sorry you’re not here in person. And we’re looking at you continuously, but don’t let that make you nervous. We’re going to watch you the whole time.

OK, let’s get right to it. So I want to start with the deputy from Ukraine. And, Kira, I want to ask you this. You know, we were talking about this being a crisis. So we’re in a crisis. This war is not over. Of course, we’re happy that Ukraine has recovered Kherson, but we don’t know what’s going to happen next. So the odds are that we’re going to have another disrupted planting season in Ukraine, and Ukraine’s one of the breadbaskets. What can you tell us that we should ask the world to do for the farmers of Ukraine right now to give us the greatest output of grain for the world?

KIRA RUDIK: Hello. Thank you so much for having me. It’s a pleasure being here.

So when we are talking about the next harvest season and how to make sure that we prepare for it the best and most effective way, we should look at it with a business approach. So in business, when you are in crisis, the first thing is you need to fixate the losses. So right now we need to make sure that there is no more destruction or at least it’s minimized. So, for that, we need air force protection systems. And we are asking our allies—United States, European countries, United Kingdom, all countries from all over the world—to provide us with air force protection systems to protect infrastructure from further destruction. This is the first one.

Second one is, of course, de-mining. The de-mining efforts need to happen right now. They are happening, but at a very small scale because, basically, all the lands that are supposed to be agricultural lands right now partially or fully are mined. And they are not going to be able to be used to plant the harvest.

Third thing, of course, we need to fix infrastructure and use these five months before the next planting season to fix the infrastructure. As of right now, 40 percent of energy infrastructure in Ukraine is destroyed. So when the cities are experiencing electrical outages, when there is no running water, it will be very hard to continue on the commitment that we have in terms of the agriculture. So we need from the international community support on going through the winter and also fixing the infrastructure.

Fourth thing is commitment on the fuel. We understand that right now Ukraine is purchasing fuel and this, of course, has an impact on the price of the harvest on the grains, on all the products. So we need to make plans and commitments for the next year for the fuel and for the price of it. And of course, it’s a painful subject for everybody.

And the last but not the least, and a critically important point, is the grain deal. The grain deal is a temporary agreement between the United Nations, Ukraine, Russia, and Turkey that the ports where the grains are exported from are being not neutral, but the ships can go in and out easily. So the price of the harvest depends on the price of the insurance that the companies have to put on the ships that are going in and out of the warzone, basically. So having a written commitment or the general commitment so it will seem safely or look safely or be more safe for the companies to ship the grains in and out of Ukraine would decrease the price of insurance and the price of transportation.

As of—as for Ukrainian people, we want the war to be over. We are a technological and agricultural country. We want to make sure that we continue being a breadbasket for the whole world. This is one of our missions. This is what we want to do. And I can tell you part of my family are farmers. It’s sacred. It’s almost religious for us to be able to provide life, to create life instead of death. And this is critically important, and this is why we are fighting so hard to win the war, to end the war, and to make sure that we return to the safe operation where we are able to build prosperity for everyone and contradict all the crises.

GENERAL WESLEY CLARK: Kira, thank you very much. You’ve given us some very clear guidelines, and we’ll make sure those get reflected in what we pass on to the White House and also to the—to the G20 here.

And I’d like to turn next to Minister Limpo. Minister, General Prabowo gave us this incredible presentation today that shows this progress that’s been made in Indonesia. There must be many countries all over the world who look at the example of Indonesia and say: We could do this. We would like to do this. I know we have representatives here from several African countries, and I’m sure they will be anxious to listen to your experience and your guidelines on how was this accomplished. The rice, the palm oil, the technology with cassava, how was this done? What is Indonesia doing that’s bringing it to the forefront in this way?

MINISTER SYAHRUL YASIN LIMPO: Yeah. Thank you, General.

Distinguished resource persons, ladies and gentlemen, from discussions which we have had and for the last one year, we have heard the huge challenges and issues that we are facing concerning climate change, wars, and also the impact of COVID-19 pandemic. We have talked about this in many forums.

And talking about food, food is the most strategic issue. And this issue requires the attention of states, nations, and the global citizens, as well as peace and public order. We might be able to delay other issues, but we can’t delay the issue of food. Food issue is the most essential, the most fundamental, and it has multidimensional aspects. Therefore, our president, Mr. Joko Widodo, has determined that food is a top priority, and it shall be discussed in detail.

In our countries, we look at our provinces, regencies, and sub-regencies, and also the states. And then we look at the regions. And we divide our areas in Indonesia into production regions. In two, three areas, we are dividing our areas in Indonesia into areas that have surplus in stocks, regions which have limited stocks, and which may get in trouble in a crisis if a crisis strikes. And there are also areas which have shortages. Likewise, in the global level there are countries facing shortages of food, and there are also countries having limited stocks, and there are also countries having abundant stocks. Therefore, in facing this global crisis, the food crisis, what we may do, among others, like what we do in Indonesia under the leadership of our president, is mitigate and adapt ourselves with issues including climate change, including the global supply chain, and food logistic aspects. This should be anticipated, and proper adaptation should be made by all food producers as well.

Second of all, subnational cooperation. Subnational cooperation should be promoted and regulated by the state. No subnational region should restrict its trade, fulfilling its own need only, or even close itself because it may affect the trade ecosystem as a whole. And this pattern is the same with the global pattern. We need to look at the flow of food to where it needs. We should look at the flow of supply chain, from which area does it flow.

And in Indonesia, we have dealt with food crisis. For the past three years, we have had a surplus in food reserve, especially rice, which we have used to deal with shortages in wheat because there is a problem with supply from India, Russia, and Ukraine. Therefore, we must prepare measures to substitute the wheat in the event of wheat shortage issues. So we prepare our sago, our cassava, and our sorghum to prepare for any shortages. Currently, there is no problem. This year, we are OK. We don’t have issues with wheat. But what about next year? What about the regulation? And will the regular shipping of this commodity return to normal? And what if the stocks are concentrated in a particular area? If this happens, what we need to do is to substitute such commodities.

We also have issues with cattle, which we have imported 1.2 million cattle. Therefore, in the event of shortage, what we need to do is to prepare our land, chicken, and ax supply. What I meant is handling this food crisis is a must. And there is no single country that has an ability to restrict itself because this will result in a global issue.

And as for cooperation, in the G20 agricultural ministerial meeting last time in Bali there were three points.

First, promoting the agricultural and food system that is resilient and sustainable, which includes the incorporation of technology, food variety, cooperation, and collaboration in science.

Second, promoting open, just, predictable, transparent, non-discriminative trade to ensure affordability and availability of food. Food is human rights, and therefore there shall be no country in G20 itself to restrict its trade or to protect its internal interests only because we are part of the global community of G20. And this is what we have agreed upon in the G20 agricultural ministerial meeting.

Third of all, we have had an agreement that for all countries with the agreement in Washington with G20 finance ministers and agricultural ministers, all countries should put food on the top priority. It should be on top. Therefore, we are talking about the global context—or the countries that have issues of food shortages. We need to take measures. We have to know the issues and also the target and also the methodology that we are using in dealing with and helping those nations that are facing food shortages.

We are having a surplus of 10.2 million tons of rice. Our president has prepared an adequate reserve for certain countries to help them, including African countries. The point is whenever a country has a surplus or has been able to exceed the national needs, they should plan for using the excess they have for global interests. Therefore, to me, the global cooperation should be enhanced [to include] how to monitor follow-up actions in the level of implementation in fulfilling the needs. Therefore, our strategy in Indonesia, we need to look at regions having emergency needs, including countries having conflicts, yeah, like happening between Russia and Ukraine.

What is our step? Are there any temporary measures? In Indonesia, we have prepared two years, yeah, to prepare ourselves in the event of issues. We are the fourth-largest country after China, India, and the US, followed by Pakistan. Therefore, we need to ensure that in, for example, the past two years, we didn’t have any acute food shortage issues. Then cooperation for a permanent system indicates that food security becomes important and there shall be no countries harming the trade ecosystem which we have built so far.

I think that’s all. Thank you.

GENERAL WESLEY CLARK: Well, thank you. Thank you very much, Mr. Minister. I know that there will be many countries studying what Indonesia’s doing, and we’re going to come back with some follow-up questions on that shortly.

Now I’d like to turn to Dr. Meyer, who’s with us on the screen. And Dr. Meyer, I’ve been bragging at this conference about some of the US innovations in agriculture and especially about improvements in things like bushels per acre of corn, and also talking about the role of agricultural extension services that the various states have and the Department of Agriculture. So when you look at the food security issue in the world, how do you see—what do you see as the right things for the United States to do? What would you be recommending right now if we could put you in front of the G20 in person and have all those heads of state lined up and you’d be able to tell them, one two, three, I want this done? What would you tell them?

SETH MEYER: Yeah. So I think the first place to start is in the US we’ve been incredibly productive in terms of growth in US agricultural production. You know, when I look to say, you know, what should we be doing around the world, when we look at the application of technology in the United States and what we’ve done to improve productivity, I think we did this, you know, from a three-point approach in the United States now. Which is, you know, we want not just to execute and pull every single bushel out of every acre if that’s not environmentally sustainable; or, we don’t want to apply technologies or activities which don’t make producers money.

So, again, you know, we think about this in terms of sustainable productivity growth in the United States. It’s got to make money for the farmer. It’s got to produce food that is affordable for consumers. It’s got to be environmentally sustainable. This isn’t something that you can produce for a few years and then you do damage to your system or the climate and you can’t continue to produce. So, you know, I think the US sees itself as being a reliable producer on the global market.

One of my other hats that I’ll put on here quick is the G20 has an initiative, the Ag Market Information System, and one of the—AMIS. One of the principles of AMIS is, you know, providing market information and avoiding unnecessary disruptions in the global market. So when I say the US being a reliable supplier, part of that is not putting export controls on. Part of that’s not putting export controls on, being a reliable supplier, and providing it to the rest of the world.

And in the US, you know, when we take our look at technology and sustainable productivity gains in the United States, there’s also a big interest in the United States in sharing that technology, sharing the adaptation practices from our climate hubs in the United States and taking that internationally. The secretary of agriculture mentioned that at COP27 today. So taking the lessons we’ve learned.

You’re right about our domestic Extension Service, but we’re pushing that to the next level. We’re pushing that into our Climate-Smart Commodities programs, where we’re going to—you know, we’ve put in $3 billion to experiment how to produce commodities in an environmentally friendly way, that producers can extract money and income from and yet meets the demands that the consumers want for these sustainable goods.

So, you know, what’s our principle in the United States? I think it’s to be—continue to be productive, to be productive in a sustainable way, and to share all those experiences about how we’ve done it with the rest of the world, as well, too. Because we can do lots of things in the United States, but we’re not going to achieve this goal of global food security without sharing this information which is very specific to countries’ own situations. So we’ll share our experiences with the rest of the world. I think that’s how we do it.

GENERAL WESLEY CLARK: Well, thank you very much, Dr. Meyer. And we got a couple follow-up questions for you here if we’ve got time on some of the specific technologies we’re doing on carbon sequestration and other things, and maybe even on intellectual property.

So at this point I’d like to turn to Ambassador David Merrill, former ambassador here in Indonesia. And David, you must be really impressed by the progress Indonesia has made—it’s remarkable—in your time and experience here.

DAVID MERRILL: There’s no question about it.

GENERAL WESLEY CLARK: But I want to ask you, we haven’t talked that much about international institutions.

DAVID MERRILL: That’s right.

GENERAL WESLEY CLARK: So when you think about, as we’re looking at the G20 here, and we’ve got the minister’s experience in Indonesia—

DAVID MERRILL: Sure.

GENERAL WESLEY CLARK:—we’ve got the immediate guidance from the member of parliament in Ukraine, we’ve got the willingness of the United States to share, but what about these international organizations like FAO and World Food Programme? Are they really tuned up to help us move forward?

DAVID MERRILL: Yes.

GENERAL WESLEY CLARK: Or do we need to do more with them?

DAVID MERRILL: Yes. General Clark, thanks for that question.

I just am struck by the poignancy of this moment. I mean, here we are sitting in Bali just ahead of the G20. We are mainly NGOs. We are some government officials. We don’t know what form the G20 communique or statement or any other document on food security will take, at least I don’t know. I don’t think any of us know. But we have an obligation to use the NGO channel to address the G20 and give them our ideas.

Now, one of them is on what international institutions can do. There are the MDBs, the World Food Programme, the FAO, even the WTO. USAID has done a lot of work over the years. Other government aid agencies have done a lot. So they can work on national and local distribution schemes. They can work on internationally coordinated food emergency reserves, which I haven’t heard being done yet. They can work with NGOs and private charities.

The idea is, as you have said, to coordinate the mobilization of adequate finance, repurpose—there’s about $800 billion a year of agricultural support going through multilateral and bilateral agencies, maybe just multilateral alone. That can be taken a look at. It could be repurposed for the needs of this particular food crisis. Balance of payments and budget support. Debt relief. Adequate IFI financing, even expanded. Emergency food reserves. So that’s one.

And we want to refrain from trade restrictions on fertilizer trade that would make things worse.

We want to guarantee the affordable supplies of staple foods—physical supplies, access via trade, access via income and livelihood support, social protection programs.

And I’ll wind up with later a possible G20 forum for food security dialogue that would continue after the current G20. It doesn’t have to be another international institution. It can be a place for things related to food security to be discussed under the aegis, perhaps, of Indonesia.

The improving supplies and distribution of fertilizers is key. There are trade barriers. There are subsidy schemes that have to be revisited; redoubled efforts to improve the efficiency of fertilizer use to help farmers do more with less, to save costs, to reduce nutrient loss to the environment. There needs to be improved productivity of smallholders growing staple food crops, closing the yield gaps. There’s a gentleman from Israel here who’s using micro water injections to improve food productivity. It doesn’t even have to be fertilizer; it could be fertilizer plus no-fertilizer technology. So the resilience and sustainability of food production, there’s a lot that can be done.

And as General Prabowo said and as the Chinese say, out of crisis comes opportunity. So here’s a dilly of a crisis, but it’s also a big opportunity. And we can even change the—make at least some changes in the world’s system for dealing with this as a result of this crisis: improving the nutritional quality of diets, progress for women and children, increased use of micronutrients.

What about agricultural research? We’ve been doing that for 40 years. Taking a look at the agricultural research that’s being done, see what improvements can be made, make crops more resilient to climate change, more sustainable, higher yields on less land.

Now, it wasn’t too long ago—it was only in April or maybe March—that the G20 itself was grappling with did it even need to be concerned with the Ukraine food crisis. They said, hey, this is a political crisis. This is for other agencies of the UN. And most of us went around saying, no, this is an economic crisis. OK, it started with politics. It started with war. But if people are starving to death, isn’t that a concern of the G20? Fortunately, it took only about two, three weeks for the G20 to say that’s exactly right. So the G20 can make equally impressive leaps in the next couple weeks and years.

Now, the one thing that we have talked about is the creation of a G20 forum for food security, trying to bypass the resistance that we would encounter for setting up yet another international institution. Don’t need to. Indonesia’s in a great position because of its posture on the world stage and because it’s leading the G20 to serve as a I don’t want to say clearinghouse necessarily, but a forum for discussion of ideas on food security.

And Indonesia has a very good track record on food security. If you go back to 2008, there was a severe rice crisis and Indonesia was one of the primary—probably the primary leader on solving the regional and global rice crisis in 2008. Indonesia’s going to be chairing ASEAN. So let’s let Indonesia within ASEAN at least deal with the rice part of food security, which it’s already shown it can do a good job.

So, in sum, I think we should write up the recommendations of this conference in some form with some people designated and get them post haste to the people in the G20 that are deciding whether to have some kind of statement and what that statement should be. It’s the least we can do to make our input. That’s my suggestion.

GENERAL WESLEY CLARK: Well, thank you very much, Ambassador. Those are some really great ideas and we’ll try to incorporate them.

OK. So we’ve got about 10 minutes. I’m going to try to do a couple of let’s call them lightning rounds and then I’m going to come back to the minister to ask another follow-up question. So the first lightning round I want to ask each of our panelists this question. When we look at classical economics, we talk about land, labor, and capital. And in agriculture, of course, there’s agricultural land, there’s the farm labor, there’s the mechanization of labor which has helped us tremendously, but capital—the world is awash in capital. We had no idea 50 years ago that capital would be so plentiful in the world. What can capital do—financial firms, investment firms, firms that want to talk about how to improve mankind? I deal with these firms in London all the time. I hear it in New York. What is our specific ask of the financial community in dealing with this world food crisis?

And I’d like to start and ask—I mean, you don’t—you may not have an answer to this, but if you do I’d like—I’d like you to come up and tell me what you think about it. And let’s talk about the Ukraine crisis first. What can the international capital leaders do? They’ve got billions of dollars of resources. What are they going to do with it to help us right now in Ukraine?

KIRA RUDIK: First of all, to secure the investments into agriculture for the next year. I think all of us, we realize that generally there has been a huge flow back of the investment into Ukraine, and this is understandable because of the war. So we need that to come back.

On all the investment forums with all the investors/bankers, we are saying we all remember the lessons of the war: The one who is coming first will get the big—the big buck. And so this is why it’s time to invest right now. The risks are high, but the output will also be extremely high. This is how fortunes are made. So this is why, if the argument of the risks and the output would not work, we will just ask saying do it as a humanitarian way, invest into Ukraine right now into agricultural sector.

Then we are coming back again to cleaning up the mines because this is—the de-mining efforts are critical right now and will require tremendous investment. Just for everyone to understand, de-mining is basically going through every field and checking and processing the certain level of the ground. So it’s just like another agricultural work, basically, and it’s an incredibly important and hard and complicated process that needs to happen. But the output of it will be extremely productive because it will give us back the very fertile land.

GENERAL WESLEY CLARK: OK. So I’m going to—I’m going to jump in. I’m going to say I’ve got two suggestions, OK, and you tell me if you like them, you take them back to Ukraine, we’ll go to Dr. Meyer and he’ll push them through US Department of Agriculture and get them up there.

One is farmers in Iowa have done amazing things with putting tile underneath their farmland. They have rich, deep, dark earth just like Ukraine does. It promotes drainage so you can get into the land sooner, you can take out the pockets that hold water, you can have uniform crop. Suppose we gave Ukrainian farmers no-interest loans to improve their land in that way so that they would get more productivity per hectare?

Number two, there’s been a lot of destruction and theft of agricultural equipment in Ukraine. Suppose Ukrainian farmers got no-interest loans to replace that agricultural equipment. Would that be helpful? If you like that—

KIRA RUDIK: Yeah, I do like that.

GENERAL WESLEY CLARK: OK, good.

KIRA RUDIK: It’s a fantastic suggestion.

GENERAL WESLEY CLARK: Dr. Meyer, can we do that?

SETH MEYER: Well, and we’re already doing some of that—

GENERAL WESLEY CLARK: All right.

SETH MEYER:—when it comes to the US government support for farmers.

So I’ll even take a step back. My Iranian—my Ukrainian colleague’s talking about infrastructure and delivery of grain. I’ll even take a step back and say we’re figuring out ways to try and help the agricultural producers to be able to afford simple things like cash flow, getting that crop planted, getting the crop stored as they work on their infrastructure. So things like temporary storage, the big silo bag. So instead of having a large barn, you have a very long, long, long plastic tube, essentially, where you’re storing grain temporarily. I think there are things that need to be done on the ground in Ukraine now for these producers to cash flow for this next crop, put that winter wheat in the ground or plant spring crop.

GENERAL WESLEY CLARK: That sounds good. Remember, I’m focusing on finance. Put the money in. Get the farmers the money they need at no-interest loans. They can improve productivity.

Now let me turn to the minister. Sir, I want to ask you this question. I know you’ve had a lot of foreign direct investment in agriculture in Indonesia, these palm-oil plantations and other things. But what more can the international financial community do to promote sustainable agriculture in Indonesia? What could we do to—what do we need to advertise?

And you’re the pacesetter for so many tropical environments. What do we need the bankers in London and New York to know about your needs for finance?

MINISTER SYAHRUL YASIN LIMPO:Agriculture does not only concern food. It also involves employment and a fundamental economic system to support industries, including pharmaceuticals industry. So, when it comes to agriculture, there are opportunities for investment in the agricultural cultivation stage as well as post-harvest, and there are also opportunities in agricultural industries. And the third one is the marketing of agricultural products. So there are three agendas, three segments which can be tapped into in investment. And we, on the order of our president, are working on this.

Agriculture must be the answer. And this year, after three years since Indonesia’s agriculture has been the mainstay of the Indonesian economy, other sectors have been hit hard by COVID-19, but our agriculture went up by 16.42 percent. Our global exports rose to 38.2 percent. And this is a sign that agriculture has not been much affected by the conditions and weather, except for war because we need fertilizers. Sodium and phosphate fertilizers are in Ukraine and Russia, and this is a challenge for the whole world.

Therefore, where is the investment? The investment can be made in the three areas, General. And talking about agriculture, we are a tropical country consisting of 17,000 islands. There are areas which can be invested for this in coastal and marine areas. And there are already investments that can be made. We produce a lot of tuna, up to 18 million tons a year. We can grow crops on the coastal areas, as well, with the technology that was presented by our American colleague. We have crops that are resilient against water-related challenges, can survive in swamps and can survive in salty seawater. Indonesia has many hills and mountains, and we still have enough land available to invest.

Currently, the president of Indonesia, Mr. Joko Widodo, is trying to focus several areas to be made into Food Estates called integrated farms where the large land consists of plantations, animal husbandry, and even freshwater fish cultivation, as well as horticulture. All of this requires technology, requires experts, and requires machines in order to become a product that the world needs. Therefore, agricultural products, after reaching the industrial stage, will be part that we are waiting for.

We have enough land for sugar factories. We have sugar in Indonesia in large quantities, but we still import some of it. So which bank is willing to invest?

Finally, agriculture needs capital, and this is one of President Joko’s successes in preparing a large enough budget to be accessed by small farmers in the form of people’s business loans. Its value is approximately a hundred trillion. Our farmers two years ago used these funds, around 55 trillion. The NPL was only 0.03 percent. Our farmers are honest and don’t want to be in debt.

Last year, we used 85 trillion people’s business credit funds based on government policies. It is not a subsidy, but a loan with low interest. With low interest, this can be good working capital to use. And the NPL is 0.6 percent, and that is in agricultural cultivation stage. Now, in post-harvest it’s on how micro, small, and medium enterprises can access agriculture loans.

Therefore, finally, there are five points that has become our focus from these investment funds.

First, they encourage the opening and creation of agricultural businesses, both small, medium, and large investments. I have given the example of sugar. We have sago palms in an area of 5 million hectares, and this can be used as flour, which can substitute wheat. If there is a bank that wants to invest, we will show you the place.

Second, we support young entrepreneurs to become Millennial farmers in agriculture. We focus on giving access to young farmers who want to try. We have trained more than 300 farmers using people’s business credit funds of approximately 2 trillion rupiahs. The acceleration is very fast because the younger ones have a faster network, strong motivation, and WhatsApp groups. And this works quite well.

Third, provide assistance for agricultural businesses for export. For exports, we assist them. Therefore, we bridge between buyers from one country and buyers from other countries. And the G20 must be able to bridge the assistance from the United States and what we can facilitate with the current conditions. Conducting training and assistance in the development of agricultural businesses requires experts. Even an entrepreneurial system is needed for our agriculture because our agriculture involves global matters. Our oil production is large. But does everything have to be with big industries? No, the president wants this to be done by people’s industry, and this requires capital to be facilitated so that the products can be exported to the global market at a lower price. Then, of course, we enhance our national products so that they are competitive compared to those of other countries.

I think agriculture is the answer to the global crisis and the world economic crisis in the future. If we can maintain our agriculture properly, it will be very much helpful, as everyone needs agriculture.

Thank you.

GENERAL WESLEY CLARK: Great lessons. Great lessons. That’s great.

So, look, we’re trying to do a lightning round here and I’m going to get struck by lightning if I don’t move this thing alone. So I’d like to open up this next question to anybody who wants to do it. But in the military, we always have dreams about what technology we might have in the future. You know, we’ve always thought better communications, higher resolution imagery, those kinds of things. If you’re in the—thinking about the food problem in the world, what do we need to think about in the way of technology? What’s the—what’s the opportunity that we just need to put the resources on to really move us forward to the next level? How do we do it? Anybody. Who wants to take it? David? Seth, want to take it here from the—what do you say from the United States about it?

DAVID MERRILL: It’s a combination of international institutions and the private sector. I believe there still is an international institute on wheat research. I think it’s called CIMMYT. I have no idea what it’s been doing, but it better be doing something right now. So that’s one.

The other was the idea that Minister Prabowo said about getting private investment started. He’s doing a good job. So are others. And I think that’s equally worthy, if not more worthy, than the government programs.

GENERAL WESLEY CLARK: Dr. Meyer, what do you say? If you could have your silver bullet here to fix this, what would it be?

SETH MEYER: I think it would be two very different things.

So, on the pure science and technology side, we’re making huge advancements in things like gene editing. So taking genes within the plant—not introducing new genes; just turning things off and on or letting the plant express genes which are already there. So impressive technology to help us do more with less, you know, ways to avoid putting—you know, rationalize better things like fertilizer use, which is both good for producers in terms of lowering cost and good for the environment.

But then I think that there are some other, you know, not cutting-edge science that really has potential for food security. And that is translating a lot of this technology and practices—some of them used by US producers—into smallholder farms or even let’s talk about the ability of women to gain capital and their productivity gaps. And even steps here where we could bring, you know, women, make them as productive. And it’s not because they’re not productive; it’s access to capital and technology. There is a huge gap that could help us close in productivity. Simply providing technology and capital to women farmers would do a tremendous amount for food security. So I think we’ve got amazing science we can apply, but we got to bring that science down to producers to fix those productivity gaps around the world.

GENERAL WESLEY CLARK: Well, thank you.

Now, look, here’s what we’ve done in the last 35 or 40 minutes up here. We’ve looked at the immediate crisis in Ukraine. We’ve come up with some concrete suggestions that have to be done right away. We’ve taken Indonesia as the example of a tropical country that has done marvelous work and has so many lessons to share with the world, and we congratulate Indonesia for this. We’ve listed the international institutions and a number of changes that can be made. We’ve talked about international finance. We’ve talked about the future of technology and the role of the United States still as a leading agricultural country to develop that technology, share it, and push it out. I think it’s—this is a time to come out of the crisis and look to the future with hope.

Thank you all. Let’s give our panel a big hand here. Thank you.

Watch the panel

MATTHEW KROENIG: Well, thank you, General Clark and our panelists, for a really rich discussion. I enjoyed that. I hope you did as well.

My name is Matthew Kroenig. I’m the acting director of the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security at the Atlantic Council. We’re leading the Atlantic Council’s food security work as part of our mission of developing sustainable nonpartisan strategies for addressing the most important security challenges facing the United States and its allies, including food security.

So we’ve had a terrific discussion this morning. As you’ve probably noticed, we’re running a little bit behind on our schedule. And so my team and I have updated the schedule. We’re on track to finish on time at three p.m.

What we’re going to do now is go ahead and take a break for lunch. I know some of you have been out there already, but now we’ll take a break, 30 minutes. So be back here at 1:30 and we’ll continue our discussion at that time.

And as you’re going away to lunch, it’s my pleasure to introduce a video from Congressman Pat Ryan of New York’s 19^th District. So as you’re going to lunch, enjoying your lunch, you can listen to this message from Congressman Ryan. Ryan is on the House Armed Services Committee, so he understands very well the links between food security and national security. So enjoy the video, enjoy your lunch, and we’ll see you back here in 30 minutes. Thank you.

REPRESENTATIVE PATRICK RYAN (D-NY): Good morning, everyone. Congressman Pat Ryan here. I want to start with a thank you to the Atlantic Council for organizing this forum, and a special thank you to Gaurav and your family foundation for hosting and convening such a timely and important conversation.

This is a topic that doesn’t always get its due, but I will say it plainly to begin: Food security is important not only for its humanitarian consequences, but also because it is inextricably connected to national security. We’ve seen this in Russia’s illegal and reprehensible war in Ukraine, but also in conflicts around the world from Nigeria and Syria to where I served in Iraq. And there is a direct linkage between food insecurity and these hostilities. In the former example, food security was a literal weapon of war used to inflict economic and human casualties. And of course, in the latter examples it deteriorates civil situations within countries and fosters environments ripe for extremism, for terrorism.

And this is a topic where I have direct frontline experience, having served two combat tours in Iraq as an Army intelligence officer. What I saw and what I really remember was a people driven to war with their own neighbors really by a lack of access to the basic necessities of everyday life: food, water, shelter—and what may come as a surprise to many of you, oil. People often overlook the complex but critical interdependence of global food systems with energy markets, even in countries like Iraq that sit on huge crude oil deposits. Proper refining capacity, shipping routes, supply lines are just as important as farming itself, and we have to make sure our solutions address this dynamic.

Right now I have the honor of serving the eighth-most rural—of 435, the eighth-most rural district in the United States; also the region that raised FDR, who tried to put the world on a path to food security almost 80 years ago. And even here we struggle with access to modern agricultural techniques. We have our own supply-line struggles.

So with both of those experiences in mind—both combat and my own community—I’ve come to Congress with an immediate focus on food security. We have to ensure that the United States is a strong voice and a strong leader in strengthening food systems, improving agricultural productivity. And we cannot underestimate the importance of energy markets in this puzzle.

What’s encouraging to me, what I’m happy to report, is that this is one of the last remaining bipartisan endeavors. Look no further than the recent Global Food Security Reauthorization Act, providing billions of dollars every year for the federal government to partner with food-insecure countries to get on a path to self-sustainability. Because of this legislation’s Feed the Future program, 5.2 million more families no longer suffer from hunger. And this is a bill that’s been led by my Democratic and Republican colleagues in both houses in true bipartisan fashion. I see this as an issue that can and should transcend a lot of the traditional economic and military alliances. It’s an opportunity for real cooperation that brings everyone to the table.

Ultimately, I am so excited to work with everyone gathered here today as we combat world hunger, as we bolster our supply chains, and increase security and safety across the globe. Thank you so much.

Watch the keynote

The post Global Food Security Forum day two: How countries should address the food crisis in the short term appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Flagship Event Sat, November 12, 2022 • 12:00 am ET

Highlights from the Global Food Security Forum

A gathering of leaders across government, industry, and civil society to assess food security as a global challenge and offer bold solutions for strengthening food systems, securing supply chains, and fighting world hunger. This Forum is co-hosted with the Gaurav and Sharon Srivastava Family Foundation, the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Indonesia, and the Coordinating Ministry of Maritime Affairs and Investment of the Republic of Indonesia and takes place on the sidelines of the G20 summit in Bali.

Economy & Business Resilience & Society

Event transcript

Uncorrected transcript: Check against delivery

AMADEUS DRIANDO AHNAN-WINARNO: Greetings. How many of you know tempe? How many of you like tempe? How many of you believe that tempe could be a potential solution to global food security problems?

I’m Driando, co-founder of the Indonesian Tempe Movement. Please allow me to walk you through why I absolutely believe that that is the case as a food scientist and technologist. I’ll make three points: why we should look into tempe in the first place, what the science says about tempe, and what the future holds for tempe.

I look into science of tempe because of three personal emotional reasons.

Cancer is running in my family. My grandpa had to perform a surgery to remove the breast cancer tumor of his own mom at his own garage. That’s why he switched to food science.

And looking into cancer is deeply related to malnutrition/overnutrition. But there’s also this other side of malnutrition, which is undernutrition, that unfortunately hits very hard to the eastern part of Indonesia, including my friends.

But not only health concern; environmental concern also hit me quite hard. I live not too far away from, unfortunately, the world’s number-one most polluted river in the world, Citarum. It got me thinking: What could we do to preserve and conserve the environment? And could we even make high-quality food if you don’t take care of the environment?

And that’s why, with the mission of the Indonesian Tempe Movement that my grandpa, my mom, and I created eight years ago as food scientists, we want to give people more access to nutritious, sustainable, and affordable food. We believe that people don’t have to be rich to live, like, a healthy and more sustainable life. And what makes us truly believe that this is the case is because of science.

So, scientifically, compared to beef in terms of nutrition, tempe contains similar amounts of energy, protein, and iron; significantly higher levels of fiber and calcium; and significantly lower levels of salt and saturated fat. Sustainability-wise, tempe could produce the same amount of protein compared to beef with four times less energy and 12 times less emission to be emitted to the atmosphere. In terms of affordability, tempe could be eight times cheaper than beef for the same amount of protein in Indonesia.

But what many people don’t know yet is that tempe is not just this food made using fermented soybean originated in Indonesia 300 years ago. Tempe is a fermentation process that we can apply to so many—almost every grain not legume bean around the world. Here I have mombin tempe, kidney bean tempe, black bean tempe, almond bean tempe. It’s a process. And not only these raw ingredients; my grandpa used to eat tempe made using tofu industry byproduct, okara, in the form of tempe gembus because he couldn’t afford the whole bean tempe. It was fancy.

And I wonder, like, how many of you wonder how the tempe fermentation works. For today, I have this tempe fermenting necklace to show you how easy tempe fermentation is. So the idea is that you want to make the baby mushroom rise up as happy. You want to serve them with tender and warm foods. You want to mate them with a food and to get them into the bedrooms. The bedrooms could be leaves, could be plastic bags, could be petri dish if you work in the lab. And in just two days you’ve got your own naturally nutritious food.

So if you look at this simple but sophisticated process, we’re just looking at the tip of the iceberg of the whole movement. After eight years of running the movement, I’ve seen beautiful, beautiful new kinds of tempe from all around the world. We’re talking about white bean tempe burger from Brazil, buckwheat tempe soba noodle from Japan, fava bean tempe wat in Ethiopia, bambara nut tempe fries from Tanzania, vegan meat made using lupin bean tempe in Europe.

Now, to end my talk, one thing that I learned from the movement is that the naturally nutritious foods that we have now were not just inventions of the past. The naturally nutritious food revolution is happening now, and I believe the tempe fermentation is a big part of it. But also, tempe is just one out of so many foods in which the R&D process has done by our ancestors years ago that are waiting for us to dig into as treasures, as the future foods that we need to feed the people, to feed us, to feed the planet in most sustainable ways possible. Thank you very much.

Watch the keynote

ANNOUNCER: Please welcome to the stage Professor in Faculty of Agricultural Technology, University of Jember, Dr. Achmad Subagio.

ACHMAD SUBAGIO: Thank you. First of all, I would like to thank the committee to provide time for me for presentations, small presentations.

What I would like to introduce is about cassava. Maybe you know about these papers. You know also about toilet papers. You know also about biodegradable plastics. You know also about our fabric. All of these thing contain of cassava. Maybe we don’t know about that one.

But we believe that cassava right now is in our living time. All of our goods contain of cassava. That’s why I always promote cassava, because of that plant actually is very, very effective photosynthesis, two time more corn and also better than the other crops, including wheat.

And as you know, that right now, Indonesia, we have populations, as Mr. Prabowo said before, that about 273 million of people. That’s a lot of mouth and they need food. And of course, when we calculate, we need about 32 million ton of rice—that is only rice, not carbohydrate. When we calculate the carbohydrate, it’s about 45 million ton. That’s a huge amount of carbohydrate.

So when we calculate that one, of course our land is not enough when we only plant rice, because rice need a lot of waters, need a lot of fertilizers, and other thing. Not so many land can be planted by using rice, but cassava, we can grow cassava very well in sub-optimal land. We can grow cassava only if the water is about three or four months. That’s more than enough.

So, ladies and gentlemen, what I think is that we have to try to increase the cassava, the use of cassava, and of course the production of cassava. And for the consumptions, there is some problem that always people say that cassava is food for the poor people, always like that. But through our technology right now, we can provide very, very good materials from cassava. We can mix with many kind of ingredient and to be very, very good food. And this is the reality.

I think for 10 years more we need to grow about 5 million hectares of cassava because to that one we can provide a lot of food for the peoples and also feed, and also we can grow something like—we can develop something like we call bioindustries, including monosodium glutamate, sorbitols, lecithin, everything is come from cassava, because cassava can provide stats, and from stats we can provide sugar, and from sugar we can provide energies for a lot of function of bioindustries.

So this my point. And again, I encourage all peoples let’s do cassava. Thanks a lot.

Watch the keynote

ANNOUNCER: Please welcome back to the stage Gaurav Srivastava.

GAURAV SRIVASTAVA: Thank you. It’s been a long day.

Excellencies, members, sponsors, supporters, and my dear friends, the incomparable author, poet, civil right activist Maya Angelou remained a beacon of enduring hope even in her darkest of days, her eloquent voice and practical truths as relevant today as the moment she first shared them. Angelou said: “During bad circumstances, which is the human inheritance, you must decide not to be reduced. You have your humanity, and you must not allow anything to reduce that. We are obliged to know we are global citizens. Disasters remind us we are world citizens, whether we like it or not.”

It is really important to remember that while it is important to think about global issues, it is also important to address issues at home. It is important to worry about issues that are happening in Indonesia. It is important to remember that there is still a family at home. In the morning, during the speech of the minister of defense, he had poignantly mentioned that he needs to feed 5 million newborn Indonesians. This is a really important subject. But it is also important to remember that there is a hungry child at home, and for a mother and father it is most important to feed that child.

The issues that we talk about today, these are political issues. They are not only—but they are issues that require collaboration between industry, between business and policymakers. And that is important to keep in mind as we leave this room today.

As citizens of this Earth we are more interconnected than ever before, linked as social beings, innovators, artisans, and dreamers bound by a birthright as old as time: an inherent claim to inviolable human rights to freedom, dignity, and equality. As members prepare for this week’s and arguably the most critical G20 summit, they will consider the grave complications of our times. They will reflect on the important strides we have made, the disappointment and setbacks we have endured. They will commit themselves and their colleagues to an even greater investment in universal responsibility and to the safety and sanctity of our one human family. It is important to remember that it is one human family, but at the end of the day it is about the children at home. It is a legacy that we all have to preserve. It is important to think about issues on a global scale, but important to remember that it starts at your home.

As always, the United States of America stands ready to lead this charge both at home and abroad, delivering aid, promoting economic growth, enacting comprehensive health and food security initiatives. We will continue to fight hunger, malnutrition, and the senseless atrocities that have stolen the innocent lives of so many. We will heed Mother Nature’s warning, abating her tears with strong and steady push towards a timely transition to clean and renewable energy while responsibly acknowledging the interwoven, intricate, and dependent relationship between modern agriculture and oil, working diligently on a stopgap measure that will feed hungry, reward our collaborators discourage our detractors, and most importantly maintain national security.

I am so incredibly heartened by the invaluable insight and generous support conceived at and throughout this forum over the last two days. I share these blessings with my incomparable wife, Sharon, and with the brightest guiding lights of my heart and soul, my children. I implore you all to continue the quest for more answers and better solutions toward realizing global food security. We know all successes begin on the smallest of levels. The best ideas are cultivated when foundation and governments build partnership with the neighborhoods that need assistance, embracing community leaders as an irreplaceable pillar of this endeavor.

After my conversation with Fred from the Atlantic Council, I am also pleased to announce that we plan to hold our second security conference on the sidelines of the G20 in India, hopefully. I hope you will join us all again as we gather to reflect on the strides that have been made, the humanistic grounds that have been gained with your support and the implementation of actions gleaned from the dialogue we have shared at this forum. I have the greatest confidence that the momentum we have earned will be plentiful. Remember, there is nothing more human than morality.

Now, ladies and gentlemen, class is dismissed. We all have some very important homework to do. I would remember to keep one thing in mind, that we started this event with let there be bread.

Now I would like to invite the president of the Atlantic Council, Mr. Fred Kempe. Thank you for coming. God bless.

FREDERICK KEMPE: What a wonderful day. What a wonderful two days. And I have a few people to thank and a couple of things to say, but I will be brief.

So Bakur Kvezereli, the CEO of Ztractor, talked about two loud wakeup calls, COVID and the war, that have made us pay attention to food security in a way that we hadn’t. We do face the greatest food security crisis in modern history, says the World Food Programme. My own view is we should never let a crisis go to waste, so we are at work here not letting that crisis go to waste.

And then Max Peterson on the last panel talked about how, with food security, failure is—Max Peterson from AWS, a great strategic partner of the Atlantic Council, talked about how when it comes to food security failure is not an option.

So thank you, Gaurav, for your powerful final remarks, and to Gaurav and Sharon so much for being not just co-hosts of this forum but really giving it the vision, lending your friendship, and your generosity. So thank you so much. And please, everybody, thank them.

To speakers and audience members who joined us throughout the course of the conference, thank you for your valued insight and ideas.

I want to thank General Clark, Minister Prabowo, and his ministry; Minister Luhut and his ministry.

Pak Hashim, thank you so much for all your partnership through this.

We’ve heard from so many important global voices—perspectives from the Global North, the Global South, government, industry, civil society, brilliant students, seasoned experts.

I also want to thank people who are a little bit more behind the scenes and you didn’t see them as much on the stage: Matt Kroenig and his Scowcroft Center team; Iveta Kruma and her production team; Vicente, overseeing so much—or, Vicente Garcia, one of the great brilliant leaders of the Atlantic Council overseeing so much of the entire project, bringing it all together; our friends from Nouvelle Productions, and you’re going to see more from them tonight at the concert; from Edelman; from Viva Creative. Other sponsors: EMP, Unity, Harvest Commodities, Abt Associates, Arsari Group. Our media partners: CNN Indonesia, Kompas TV.

What’s clear for me from the last two days is how many of us in this room and joining online stand united in our commitment to combating food insecurity and hunger and serving as catalysts for change of the G20 and beyond. But too often, the private sector, the public sector, people all over the world don’t galvanize in this kind of setting, and I’m glad we were able to do that.

As we’ve seen and heard, food security remains a complex and multisectoral political, economic, scientific, and security challenge. Peter Engelke, who with Jeff Cimmino was leading the intellectual work that was behind this conference, will distill what we’ve learned over the last two days, put it in recommendations to the G20 and beyond, and you’ll be able to read that on our website tomorrow or the next day, Peter? Pretty soon? We’ll turn it around as quickly as we can.

What we know and what we heard from Gaurav is that the—at its core, the food security crisis and issue is a humanitarian one. It’s about that basic need for sustenance, food and water, and how they are met with dignity. We saw that powerful chart in the powerful keynote address of Minister Prabowo. And I’ll just remember FWE—food, water, energy—and the interlinkages of the three.

This is about building more sustainable food systems to better protect the planet we live on, the planet that nourishes us all. It’s about taking care of one another across communities and countries while we still have the chance. And as I said this morning, this inaugural edition—and Gaurav and I are able to reach decisions relatively quickly, and so we are going to go ahead and we’re planning on going ahead in India next year. But this inaugural edition of the Atlantic Council Global Food Security Forum marks the beginning of what we hope will be the Atlantic Council’s leadership in the global food security space alongside the Srivastava Foundation. And I look forward to continuing to convene similar forums along the G20 each year starting from India next year. That would be our hope and our plan.

I also look forward to engaging with our Indonesian partners and you all on our shared goals. This is our first major convening in Indonesia. It will not be our last. And we look forward to working with your country of 273 million people, the third-largest democracy, fourth-largest population. Just an incredible country where the US bilateral relationship will grow deeper and deeper. And as we heard from your minister this morning, this link right back to the days of your independence needs to be refreshed, deepened, and expanded.

I do want to thank again the Indonesian Ministry of Defense and Coordinating Ministry of Maritime Affairs and Investment once again for co-hosting this forum for us. To show up with that kind of partners on the margins as an official sideline event of the G20, what a wonderful way to enter this wonderful country.

Watch the closing remarks

The post Global Food Security day two: The role of tempe and cassava in a food-secure future appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Flagship Event Sat, November 12, 2022 • 12:00 am ET

Highlights from the Global Food Security Forum

A gathering of leaders across government, industry, and civil society to assess food security as a global challenge and offer bold solutions for strengthening food systems, securing supply chains, and fighting world hunger. This Forum is co-hosted with the Gaurav and Sharon Srivastava Family Foundation, the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Indonesia, and the Coordinating Ministry of Maritime Affairs and Investment of the Republic of Indonesia and takes place on the sidelines of the G20 summit in Bali.

Economy & Business Resilience & Society

Event transcript

Uncorrected transcript: Check against delivery

GENERAL WESLEY CLARK: And welcome back from lunch. Now we’re going to have some more information here and some more greetings from our friends in the United States, so I’m here to present them to you.

So first you’re going to hear from Dr. Cary Fowler. Cary is the special envoy for global food security at the US Department of State. He is right now at COP27, so he’s going to join us this way. Now, he’s been a food security leader both in government and in the nonprofit space as former executive director of the Global Crop Diversity Trust. In his current role with State Department, he coordinates regional, bilateral, and multilateral US diplomatic engagement on food security systems and nutrition. So he’s our top guy in State Department in the United States looking at this food security issue. We’re going to hear from Cary Fowler.

And then you’re going to hear from Ambassador Cindy McCain. Cindy is the US permanent representative to the US Mission to the UN Agencies in Rome. In her role, Ambassador McCain represents the US at Rome-based United Nations food agencies and around the world, really, all the effort that the UN is making to combat global hunger and expand food access to those in need.

So I hope you’ll enjoy their presentations, and we’ll be following that, then, with another panel. We want to fold their ideas into what we’re taking to the G20. OK, let’s roll it. Let’s hear from Cary Fowler

CARY FOWLER: Thank you for this opportunity to visit with you for a few minutes today.

I know all of you are aware of the frighteningly high numbers of food-insecure people in the world—that’s 828 million—of the 50 million who are facing starvation in 45 countries around the world.

And we all know that this food crisis that we’re in the midst of is caused by multiple factors. It’s caused by climate change. We’re having a severe drought in the Horn of Africa as we speak. It’s caused by COVID, which is disrupting supply chains. And also by conflict. Most of the people in the world that are food-insecure today are living in zones and countries that are experiencing conflict.

But we’re also finding that fertilizer prices are high, fuel prices are high. There have been trade restrictions that some countries have imposed. All of these factors are contributing to the kind of crisis that we have today, and that makes this particular world food crisis a unique one.

In the past, such global crises have typically been caused by one or two major drivers. This one has four or five; just count. And that means a couple of things. It means that it’s going to be difficult to come to grips with and to solve this particular crisis because we can’t just fix one aspect, one problem; we’re going to have to address all of them. And that’s a complicated business, as you well know. And it doesn’t come easily, doesn’t come cheaply, and it doesn’t come quickly.

And that’s the other point that I want to make, and that is that this food crisis, I’m sorry to say, is going to persist for some time. We’re looking at 2023 being a pretty difficult year. And I think we all should be aware of that and we should all be planning for it.

So the message that I want to leave you with today is a pretty simple one: Let’s hunker down and realize that we need to be in—that we are in this for the long haul. We need to be, of course, looking at meeting immediate humanitarian needs, but we also need to be addressing the long-term drivers of this particular crisis so that we don’t face this year after year after year.

That’s where I believe the G20 comes in and has an important role to play. The major countries of the world really need to be coming together now to collaborate and coordinate their actions, and ensure that we start to build the kind of food systems that we want for the future to ensure that all countries in the world and all people are, indeed, food secure.

Thank you very much.

AMBASSADOR CINDY MCCAIN: Hello, everyone. I’m so glad you are here today to discuss the most important issue of our time, food security. Thank you to the Atlantic Council for hosting this important conversation.

We find ourselves in urgent times: ongoing armed conflict, especially Russia’s war of aggression in Ukraine; COVID-19 and climate change continue to strain global food systems; rising costs for food and agriculture inputs impact everyone, especially the poorest and most vulnerable around the globe. As always, America is answering the call to help, and I’m extremely proud of our response. Congress moved quickly to allocate billions of dollars in emergency food assistance. This is on top of the roughly $4 billion the US taxpayer regularly provides each year to the three UN food and agriculture agencies to provide lifesaving humanitarian aid and invest in medium- and long-term resilience.

Throughout my travels, I’ve seen the effects of conflict, increasing water scarcity, and extreme weather conditions from Kenya and Madagascar to Guatemala, Honduras, and Sri Lanka. Building resilience makes our food systems more sustainable, producing more with fewer resources. This is the challenge before us and it demands a united global front. As global leaders look for climate solutions in Egypt right now, it is clear to me that we must leverage science, technology, and innovation in agriculture to feed a growing population in a sustainable manner while generating economic opportunity.

Forums such as this are important occasions to discuss the top global concern of our time, food security. We must continue this discussion. And together, we can give a voice to the voiceless and achieve a world where no one goes to bed hungry.

Thank you.

Watch the keynote

The post US special envoy for global food security: Time to ‘hunker down’ because this crisis ‘is going to persist for some time’ appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Flagship Event Sat, November 12, 2022 • 12:00 am ET

Highlights from the Global Food Security Forum

A gathering of leaders across government, industry, and civil society to assess food security as a global challenge and offer bold solutions for strengthening food systems, securing supply chains, and fighting world hunger. This Forum is co-hosted with the Gaurav and Sharon Srivastava Family Foundation, the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Indonesia, and the Coordinating Ministry of Maritime Affairs and Investment of the Republic of Indonesia and takes place on the sidelines of the G20 summit in Bali.

Economy & Business Resilience & Society

Event transcript

Uncorrected transcript: Check against delivery

ANNOUNCER: Please welcome to the stage founder of the Srivastava Family Foundation Sharon Srivastava.

SHARON SRIVASTAVA: Hi. Our world is riddled with inconsistency. Why do some go hungry and others have more than enough is something that I’ve thought about for as long as I can remember. Many circumstances beyond one’s control play a critical role: your postal code, your ability to get an education, your support system, your gender, your race, your economic status.

I’m Sharon Srivastava, and my husband, Gaurav, and I founded the Gaurav and Sharon Srivastava Family Foundation. It is because of my husband’s unwavering commitment and service that we’re here today. And we’re honored to have partnered with the Atlantic Council, Fred Kempe, the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Indonesia, and the Coordinating Ministry of Maritime Affairs and Investment of the Republic of Indonesia, my dear friend Anie and her husband, Pak Hashim, on this most important forum about the state of global food security. Thank you for attending and for being part of the conversation with us.

As an American, I live in part of the world which thrives on abundance. We pride ourselves on equality and on philanthropy. But sadly, we do still have millions who go hungry every single day.

In Los Angeles, where I live with my husband and our children, we have astronomical rates of hunger. Neighborhoods have become food swamps with people unable to find accessible, affordable, and nutritious food choices. And we’re talking about one of the wealthiest cities in the wealthiest country in the world.

Nearly 30 million American children rely on their school lunch as their sole nutrient-rich meal of the day, and while great programs have been implemented to ensure that they get fed at school, one meal a day is not enough for a developing child.

When my children come home from school each day and make a dash to the fridge, I know it’s stocked with healthy options for them. But I know that for far too many mothers that’s not the case. So many mothers and fathers are forced to make the impossible choice every day of buying food or letting their kids go hungry so that they can afford other basic necessities—food or health care, food or transportation to work—and it shouldn’t be an either/or scenario.

Food insecurity is everywhere, and regardless of location, the impact on a child and a family can’t be overstated. I have seen children unable to attend school or to get an education that could help lift them and their families up out of poverty simply because they don’t have enough food to fuel their bodies and their brains. Far too many children and adults don’t know when their next meal will come.

Nearly a hundred years ago a covenant was created. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948 established food as a basic human right. It was intended to ensure that our nations protect people from hunger, from starvation. And that’s nearly 80 years ago that our nations united to speak in one voice and say food is a human right.

Yet still these impossible choices between food or other necessities are being made by parents around the world each and every day. So what are we going to do about this?

Today we are called upon to have these difficult conversations, and I implore you, as you are doing through these panels and conversations, to reflect on what we have done to help achieve food security and on what we, as a collective, must do to move forward.

And with that, it’s my distinct pleasure to now introduce Christopher MacLennan, Canada’s deputy minister of International Development, and personal representative of the prime minister for the G20 summit to the stage to offer his insights as to how Canada has been stepping up as a global food security leader and where its food and humanitarian priorities lie ahead of the G20 summit and beyond. Thank you.

Watch the remarks

CHRISTOPHER MACLENNAN: Thank you. Thank you very much, and thank you very much to the foundation, to the Atlantic Council for inviting—actually you didn’t invite me; you invited the prime minister. My deepest apologies. I am a very poor stand-in, but the prime minister will be arriving a little bit later as we all know, in advance of the G20, the leaders summit which begins in two days.

So, as all of you know, we are facing an unprecedented global food crisis. Global food prices are at historic highs, and hunger and malnutrition have been on the rise since at least 2015. It is estimated—and I’m sure you’ve heard lots of numbers today and you will hear many more—it is estimated that 828 million people were facing hunger in 2021. A heartbreaking 345 million people now live with acute food insecurity, and 50 million are on the brink of famine.

A number of factors have led to this increase in the rate of hunger; notably conflicts, climate change, and COVID-19. All these factors have been inducing more and more vulnerability into already strained food systems and are reducing the likelihood of achieving the sustainable development goal of reaching zero hunger by 2030.

Russia’s unjustified and unprovoked invasion of Ukraine has exacerbated this crisis. The invasion has driven the cost of food, fuel, and fertilizer to record highs, which the United Nations Global Crisis Response Group is calling the largest cost-of-living crisis of the 21st century.

High food prices are affecting everyone in the world, but it’s the poorest and most vulnerable who are disproportionately affected as they spend most of their income already on food and other basic needs. This is especially true in Sub-Saharan Africa where the numbers of hungry and malnourished are growing faster than anywhere else. This food crisis is expected to worsen in the next year as agricultural productivity declines, driven largely by reduced fertilizer affordability alongside climate and conflict.

In these challenging times, we are also deeply concerned by Russia’s continued disinformation over the causes of global food insecurity and their use of energy, food, and fuel as weapons of war. It is unacceptable that Russia prevents food from reaching markets and then spreads disinformation that sanctions are to blame while, in fact, no sanctions address food, fertilizers, or foodstuffs.

As one of the breadbaskets of the world, Canada has a long history of being on the forefront of solutions to world hunger and is committed to doing its part to address the global food crisis. Today, in 2022, Canada has allocated a record amount of more than 615 million for humanitarian food and nutrition assistance. This funding is essential for saving lives and alleviating the suffering.

However, humanitarian assistance is not designed to address the root causes of hunger and malnutrition. This immediate support must be accompanied by critical investments to strengthen the resilience of global food systems in the longer term. This is why Canada provides support for agricultural development and food system transformation to developing countries, disbursing over 600 million in 2021.

Now in 2020, the Series 230 Initiative estimated that governments and donors would need to double their levels of investment in development assistance for agriculture and food systems, and spend an additional 33 billion US per year to achieve zero hunger by 2030.

As we step up to address the global food crisis, I would like to highlight a few priority areas for the government of Canada in our efforts globally. First, we need to ensure sufficient nutritious food is produced in a climate-smart way; sustainably increasing domestic production in countries where agricultural productivity has been underrealized; ensuring farmers, particularly women, have access to land, seeds, and essential inputs is fundamental to these efforts. Fertilizer—and we’ve heard a great deal about fertilizer already; I enjoyed the panel—is a vital input to many agricultural systems, and it’s at its least affordable levels since the 2008 food crisis. High prices can reduce use and undermine future harvests. We heard General Wesley Clark mention just the increases in Iowa alone on corn. Improving access to and sustainable use of fertilizers alongside sustainable soil health choices must be a priority.

Second, we need greater diversification and a better flow of goods along agrifood value chains. In the past, food systems and value chains have been designed primarily for economic efficiency. However, given all of the disruptions we are seeing—unforeseen, foreseen and increasing—they must be redesigned for resilience. This can mean diversifying import sources; diversifying the staple crops that are grown; having strong local, regional, and export-oriented value chains, or diversifying diets through expanding nutritious food options.

When shocks do arise—and they will—and we know there will be more shocks, implementing effective and coordinated responses to maintain the flow of goods is key. We’ve seen the importance of efforts like the Black Sea Grain Initiative to get grain moving out of Ukraine following Russia’s invasion. We saw these efforts reduce global food prices for all, as well as to ensure humanitarian shipments get to the poorest and the most vulnerable.

Third, we must listen to and work with our partners in the Global South. We must prioritize country-led, locally-owned, and participatory approaches to ensure that actions are informed by local realities and needs, and contribute to strengthening local capacities. I was very happy to hear General Clark, as well, mention the importance of not undercutting local markets with food—with food exports. This includes working with women, indigenous peoples, and other marginalized groups in the decision-making processes on food.

Fourth, we should do more to help directly poor and marginalized farmers maintain their operations in the face of shocks through risk-sharing tools like credit and crop insurance.

Finally, as a fundamental priority across all of these actions, we underscore the need to take gender-transformative approaches if we are to build resilience in our food systems at all. Women and girls are disproportionately affected by food insecurity and malnutrition. In fact, 60 percent of the world’s malnutrition are—malnourished are women. At the same time, women are key players as both consumers and producers of food, making up nearly half of all the world’s smallholder farmers. Canada recognizes that women are powerful agents of change and can actively contribute to advanced, climate-smart agriculture and improve food security and nutrition. This is why our Feminist International Assistance Policy aims to recognize and address the barriers that limit women’s success in agriculture and food production.

As we help build more resilient food systems, we need to take a gender-transformative approach that disrupts the current ways of working and puts those most impacted in the driver’s seat. Only then can we hope to reach zero hunger by 2030.

On a final note, I would like to thank you again for the opportunity to speak today and to share how Canada is focusing our efforts in response to the crisis. I look forward to the continuing discussions that are taking place today. I think, quite honestly, a year ago food security was not on the G20 agenda, not at all. I was at last year’s G20 in Rome. It is a fantastic sign that groups like the Atlantic Council are pulling together—with the help of the foundation, pulling together conversations like this because these types of conversations are what underpin the policy and political discussions that need to take place to respond so critically and so quickly as we’ve needed in responding to the food crisis. So thank you very much.

Watch the keynote

ANNOUNCER: Please welcome the Coordinating Minister of Maritime and Investment Affairs of Indonesia Luhut Binsar Pandjaitan.

MINISTER LUHUT BINSAR PANDJAITAN: Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. Welcome to Bali and welcome to Global Food Security Forum. I’m glad we can gather here in Bali to discuss how can—how we can solve food security problems and create a solution to achieve food security and resilience.

Amid the current worsening condition with the pandemic, the peak of global inflation, Ukraine-Russia conflict, it affect the significant increase of food and energy prices. Crude oil prices are expected to be above $120 a barrel in the remainder of 2022. Previously, only $42 a barrel in 2020 and $70.42 a barrel in 2021. On average, in July 2022, compared to January 2022, energy like coal prices increased by 91.26 percent, natural gas by 40.5 percent, and crude oil by 25 percent. On average, in July 2022 compared to January 2022 food prices, such as corn, increased by 1.5 percent, soybean by 14.75 percent, and wheat by 7.26 percent.

[There are] several challenges in the agriculture sectors. First, global warming make the climate even more unpredictable and cause crop failure. To mitigate future courses, Indonesia enhanced national determined contribution target, national policy in departments, climate change adaption policies, and transparency frameworks in the agriculture sector. This way, it leads Indonesia back toward net-zero emission by 2060 or sooner and is able to reduce greenhouse emission from a business-as-usual scenario by 31.89 percent unconditionally and 43.20 percent by 2030.

Second, insufficient of supply chains due to the highly fragmented industry with many intermediaries producing supply-demand mismatches. Also, infrastructure has not yet been established evenly throughout the remote areas. Processing facility is also far from the farming areas.

Third, the low interest of younger generation farmers due to the cost of farming in Indonesia and the low yield. The fertilizer price is high due to an interrupted supply chain. Farming technologies and machinery are expensive compare, so Indonesia farmers still do the operation manually.

To this matter, the government of Indonesia is formulating a presidential resolution for national food security… top priority commodities such as rice, corn, soybean, shallot, tea leaf, garlic, and sugarcane. The government of Indonesia also continuously improving several key factors. First, increase the land area for these commodities. Pursuing cultivation research and development in superior seed. Forming innovation in technology and food processing. Improving the supply chain through an integrated Food Estate program and necessary infrastructure so we can cut costs and deliver a better product. Boosting the interest in farming in the younger generation and continuously enhancing formal and informal training.

In addition, we have established a Food Estate program where there will be an integrated ecosystem and a good collaboration between the government, farmer, investors… The government will provide essential infrastructure surfaces, machinery, mechanization equipment, permit, and farmer partnership with investors…. Investor will provide the working capital for the farmers based on the agreed-upon cost analysis between farmers and investors. And there will be a profit-sharing scheme between investor and farmers.

As a pilot project, we have established Food Estate in Humbang Hasundutan, North Sumatra, where approximately 12,000 hectare cultivate horticultural plants starting from potato, shallot, and garlic. We also integrate the project with science and technology park for herbal and horticulture. There will be genomic sequencing research… produce superior seed cultivation and understand herbal and horticulture profiles in Indonesia. This project is an integrated hub with the collaboration between private and international experts and companies, local and government universities, and local farmers. We hope this project can also contribute to economic development to ensure economic equality in the surrounding area as it provides a new employment opportunity and a vocation for local people. Next, we will build Food Estate in Central Sulawesi and Central Kalimantan focusing on crops such as corn, sugarcane, cocoa, and cassava.

Ladies and gentlemen, we can indeed participate in securing global food security. Start from you contributing to your community. It contributes to your country and the world. I’m sure that today all Global Food Security Forum participants will have a fruitful and productive event.

I would also like to thank to the Atlantic Council and Ministry of Defense for co-hosting this event, and I hope through this forum we can create a solution to achieve Sustainable Development Goal to end hunger, achieve food security, and improve nutrition and promote sustainable agriculture. Thank you and enjoy Bali.

Watch the remarks

The post Global Food Security Forum day two: How Canada is taking on world hunger appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Flagship Event Sat, November 12, 2022 • 12:00 am ET

Highlights from the Global Food Security Forum

A gathering of leaders across government, industry, and civil society to assess food security as a global challenge and offer bold solutions for strengthening food systems, securing supply chains, and fighting world hunger. This Forum is co-hosted with the Gaurav and Sharon Srivastava Family Foundation, the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Indonesia, and the Coordinating Ministry of Maritime Affairs and Investment of the Republic of Indonesia and takes place on the sidelines of the G20 summit in Bali.

Economy & Business Resilience & Society

Event transcript

Uncorrected transcript: Check against delivery

FREDERICK KEMPE: Good morning to everyone. It’s so wonderful to see such a full crowd. And good morning to all of you, ladies and gentlemen, honorable guests. It’s such a pleasure to be with you all today.

Mr. Minister, it’s great to have you here. Thanks to you, Minister Prabowo. Thank you to the Defense Ministry. And thank you to the Indonesian government.

This is a multilateral gathering, this is a multinational gathering, but we decided to start in this fashion to honor our bilateral relationship within this multilateral relationship—to honor our host country and to all—with the US Air Force Band honor the country that’s visiting. But with the presidential band here, that’s a special treat for us to start in this manner.

Thank you for those joining us in person and for the thousands tuning in virtually as we kick off day two of the Atlantic Council inaugural Global Food Security Forum in Bali, Indonesia, an official sideline event of the G20 summit which is, of course, coming in just a couple of days. What a stunning venue this is, surrounded by Bali’s natural beauty, rich cultural life, and traditions, and friends and partners from across Indonesia and the world. I was able to travel a little bit around this beautiful Bali area to get to know your culture a little bit better, to visit with your people a little bit more. And it’s just been a rich experience being here, a few days ahead of this forum, so that I could acquaint myself even more closely with this extraordinary country and culture.

I want to start by extending by thanks officially to the Indonesian government. Thank you, again, to Minister Prabowo, and the Ministry of Defense. Thanks, as well, to Minister Luhut and the Coordinating Ministry of Maritime Affairs and Investment for your collaboration and for your hospitality in the lead-up to and throughout the forum.

Congratulations to Indonesia for assuming the G20 presidency this year. We wish you good luck as the summit approaches. I most profoundly want to thank Gaurav and Sharon Srivastava Foundation. Thank you, Gaurav and Sharon.

Without the two of you, without your foundation, we quite literally would not be here and be able to do this work. Gaurav and Sharon, your steadfast commitment to combatting world hunger and food insecurity rests at the heart of this forum’s mission. I can’t stress enough how much I appreciate your vision, your leadership, and your friendship.

Thank you also to our sponsors, Abt Associates, Arsari Group, EMP, and Harvest Commodities, and our media partners, CNN Indonesia and Compass Group. And finally, I want to acknowledge The Atlantic Council Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security—so capably led by Matt Kroenig and his team—for spearheading this weekend’s programming—of course, the rest of The Atlantic Council team that’s traveled so far to make this work.

We gather today at a critical juncture for global food security. It might have taken Putin’s war in Ukraine to highlight it for us, but it was sitting there in front of us in any case. Later this week, world leaders will convene here in Bali for the G20 Summit bringing together major developed countries and emerging economies to discuss the international economic and financial landscape and identify areas ripe for multilateral engagement.

Food security is becoming a bigger and bigger one of those areas, and it cannot be separated from energy security. It can’t be separated from military security. It can’t be separated from national or international security, and that’s the point of doing this.

The United States is a food security champion. The United States is the largest international food assistance donor in the world, providing hunger relief and support to those most in need, including in response to COVID-19 pandemic and the war in Ukraine.

In September, the US convened a Global Food Security Summit with world leaders to mobilize global food security action. This is all for good reason. Threats to global food production, supply chains—distribution and access—are mounting by the day.

Near-term shocks like COVID-19 pandemic have—and the war in Ukraine have rattled global food supply chains in some of the most critical regions of the world. Ukraine, Europe’s breadbasket, earlier this year faced a Russian blockade of its Black Sea ports that halted grain exports to global detriment, and we’re lucky that that blockade is not there any longer because one third of the world’s wheat supply—one third of the wheat supply comes from Russia and Ukraine together.

In recent months, fertilizer prices have skyrocketed as the cost of raw materials and gas have gone up, and Russian fertilizer exports face serious disruptions. Food prices have continued to soar. Long-term risks of climate change, extreme weather, rising seas, and a sustained conflict pose further destabilizing threats, as acute food insecurity escalates, and hunger hotspots intensify.

The United Nations estimates that 800 million new people in the world face food insecurity coming out of the ripples from the war in Ukraine, and 300 million are in severe distress of food insecurity and hunger—300 million new.

But amid these challenges opportunities abound for progress and solutions, and that’s what we’re here for. Yesterday, as part of our first day of programming, we convened a series of closed door sessions with global food security experts from across government, business, and civil society to explore immediate and future food security trends and solutions—most of all, solutions.

We discussed the nexus between food security, energy security, and hard security, and how solutions are needed to address the overlapping vulnerabilities on these fronts. Energy crises become food crises. Conflict drives food insecurity. Food, then, becomes a weapon of war.

We stressed how important it was for the global community to recognize that food cannot be weaponized the way it has been—the way it has been recently. We discussed leveraging technologies as a critical tool for agricultural modernization and resilience, from investing in climate smart tech enterprises to educating and empowering young tech savvy farmers to make farming cool, paying particular attention to including women, who are often the backbone of farming communities.

The future of food security and sustainability requires innovation, and we spoke of streamlining access and accountability to food finance to ensure lines of credit flow to countries and people in need. Food security requires financial security at both the community and at the global level.

As the G20 showcases, there is potential for enhanced international cooperation. But governments and on these critical sets of issues cannot do it alone. Achieving food security and ending world hunger will also require robust public-private partnerships—robust public-private partnerships and wide-ranging innovation across the agricultural sector, technology, finance, and policy.

So, from identifying root causes of food insecurity and malnourishment around the world to envisioning more resilient food chains—food supply chains and agricultural technologies of tomorrow, we gather today to take this multifaceted challenge head on and, as you can hear, we got—we made some progress yesterday. We’re going to hope to make even more progress today.

Indonesia, with its dynamism, with its growing prosperity, and its food security interests is a promising place to launch our efforts. I hope you find today’s programming productive and that it will serve to inform and supplement the upcoming G20 summit agenda and sustained food security initiatives to follow.

At the end of this form we will be distilling insights from our sessions and collecting them into a memo with concrete recommendations for G20 leaders and, of course, for far beyond.

We’ll stick with this issue, galvanized by this moment, to continue working on it over the years. Our challenge to all of you—to all of you here in the room is to help us identify solutions that, together, can turn our ideas into policy action.

So now I would like to turn to a set of video keynote remarks from the Honorable Chuck Schumer, United States senator from New York, and Senate majority leader. It’s an honor that Senator Schumer took time for this. Having the Senate majority leader speak to this conference is an apt way to kick us off.

SENATOR CHARLES SCHUMER (D-NY): Hi, everyone. It’s Senator Chuck Schumer, and thank you all so much for the chance to join you at this year’s Atlantic Council Global Food Security Forum.

Now, as we all know, the past two and a half years have been some of the most disruptive in modern history—a global pandemic, a warming planet, and on top of it all the tragic bloody war in Ukraine.

These crises have produced terrible consequences around the world and, above all, it’s made an awful food shortage even worse for tens of millions of people—the poor, the elderly, far too many children.

This global food crisis is unacceptable, it’s immoral, and it is on all of us to work together to find solutions for the hungry and the food insecure. As Senate majority leader, I believe Congress has to play a role in fighting this crisis, and the issue should transcend partisan politics because it’s about basic justice for all human beings.

So we need government leaders, the private sector, and advocates working together. I pledge to you to do all I can to make sure Congress stands with you as allies in this effort.

Thanks for leading this crucial conversation because no issue is more important than making sure everyone has enough to eat so each person can grow and thrive in the 21st century.

Thank you all, thanks for what you’re doing, and my very best.

FREDERICK KEMPE: The fact that Senator Schumer sent that special message to you in the middle of our midterm elections where it was unclear whether he would remain Senate majority leader, and right now it’s still in play and we’ll know in a few days but it looks better for him than it did a couple of weeks ago. So, Senator Schumer, from here we thank you for doing this.

Now I’d like to turn over to Gaurav Srivastava, the founder of the Gaurav and Sharon Srivastava Family Foundation for his remarks. Gaurav, over to you.

Watch the welcome remarks

GAURAV SRIVASTAVA: Excellencies, honorable members, and representatives, ladies and gentlemen, esteemed colleagues and guests, it my great honor and privilege to stand before this distinguished assembly of brilliant minds and renowned policymakers at a time when our global community is at its most urgent need for unity, cooperation, and common purpose.

This extraordinary forum, live-streamed around the world, represents the exhilarating realization of a longstanding vision of my wife, Sharon, and I have shared passionately for many, many years. We are everlasting partners in a devoted enterprise of international hope and inspiration, co-conspirators in a fervent advocacy of comprehensive social change and universal accountability, and doting parents committed to the brightest future imaginable for our children, for your children, and for all of humanity.

Together we offer our deepest gratitude to our gracious Indonesian hosts and friends; to the minister of defense, Republic of Indonesia, Prabowo Subianto. Thank you. Coordinating minister for maritime and investment, Luhut Pandjaitan. Thank you. To Anie and Hashim Djojohadikusumo, thank you very much. You all have been instrumental in the realization of this global food security summit. Thank you and God bless.

Our sincerest appreciation is extended to Fred Kempe, Matthew Kroenig of the Atlantic Council, and the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. Thank you very much. To our American policymakers and their international counterparts, and we thank the people of the world for their faith and fortitude as we reaffirm our solemn pledge to deliver both equity and equality to those who have been so woefully deprived.

A recognition of food as a human right was established nearly 80 years ago. President Roosevelt, as well as leaders of 48 other nations, convened in Hot Springs, Virginia, for the United Nations Conference of Food and Agriculture. This conference was particularly unlike the ones we are all participating in today. The outcome: a universal declaration of human rights. Within that declaration, not only is the right to food proclaimed, the right to adequate food as an essential facet to an individual and family standard of living is stated.

In the near century, since this crucial mandate and cornerstone of the FAO, 192 member nations and organizations have stood side by side, linked in a tireless battle against the insidious plague of food insecurity and all forms of malnutrition, guided by the enduring motto, Fiat Panis—Let There be Bread. Towards that moral imperative there have been meaningful strides made, critical lessons learned, transformative policy enacted, cutting-edge technology developed, and a salient goal set to end hunger by 2030.

But as history has proven time and again, we exist in a rapidly changing and unpredictable world. The processes established to successfully transport food to where it needs to go before the COVID-19 and before the invasion of Ukraine no longer work. Over the last three years, these concerted efforts and best intentions to stem the tide of global undernourishment have stalled. They continue to grow stagnant against the prevalence and extremes of climate change, the spread of protracted regional conflict, and the economic impact of the pandemic, and the carnage and chaos currently ravaging parts of Eastern Europe. The harsh truths and painful realities of these calamitous setbacks are glaring. And 828 million people worldwide will go to bed hungry tonight.

How can it be that in the United States, the wealthiest nation in the world, one in every eight children still go to bed hungry every single night? In my own home city of Los Angeles every one in five people experience food insecurity, unsure of when or from where their next meal will be. Globally, 45 million children under the age of five are suffering. They are suffering from acute malnutrition, their small bodies chronically deprived of essential nutrients stunting physical, cognitive, and social development, and making them especially vulnerable to infectious disease and drastically elevated mortality rates. They face educational limitations, behavioral problems, lifetime earnings reductions, and a perpetuation of the same vicious malnutrition cycle passed on to their own children.

The numbers are staggering, the trends and projections alarming, and the insidious endurance of this most pervasive and devastating human affliction—of which no country or region is immune—remains wholly and unconscious—consciously and utterly indefensible. Socioeconomic detriments of health explain the cycle. Poverty, race, ethnicity, gender, employment status, education, immigration status are all notable factors. The direct link between these factors and food security is undeniable. Try as some might, there can be no reasonable debate over the breadth of this humanitarian crisis, no credible arguments to be made against the merits of immediate action, no partisan interpretations, conflicting ideologies, or wavering convictions. We must all agree that no man, no woman, and no child should ever suffer through or die from hunger again.

Yet, as we all know, there is no quick fix. There is no one-size-fits-all solution. Food security is a complex puzzle of mismatched and missing pieces. The complete picture is an interconnected web of contributing factors explained by the socioeconomic determinants of health, each fraught with significant issues of their own.

Currently, the greatest world crisis hindering food security is the war in Ukraine. It has affected and impacted the globalized agricultural and energy markets at a time when supply chains were already reeling from the COVID-19 pandemic. Every day I track and appraise the innumerable impacts this war has had business of global exports. Exports of vital nutrients have been interrupted, future harvests been put in jeopardy, the energy markets sent reeling, fertilizer prices sent soaring, and the cost of wheat continuing to skyrocket. Russia and Ukraine, two world breadbaskets, major producers and exporters of vital commodities in energy, engaged in a conflict that threatens to push many millions and more into poverty and food insecurity.

Establishing food and energy security is an urgent issue affecting us now, but the future forecasts are sobering. At this rate, the dire ramification will continue to grow exponentially. The systems that we put in place and the choices we make now will determine the security of our children and our grandchildren will inherit.

Like many of you in the audience, I have tasted the horrors of war, choked on the repugnant stench of violent death and destruction. My work through my company, Unity Resources Group, has taken me to hotspots around the world where I have borne sad witness to the heroism and self-sacrifice of young men and women slaughtered in the blink of an eye before their earthly journeys had ever begun. I have seen whole families erased, three generations decimated in the wake of a contemptible missile strike on civilian targets. And I have watched helplessly as tormented mothers weep over the broken bodies of their murdered children, soaked in their blood, praying for merciful relief from a living nightmare that will never come.

I stand by you—before you today as a proud American devoted to the venerated principles of my country, valuable and human in an imperfect world. I am humbled by the education I have received, the experiences I have had, and the many blessings God has given me. I count each one with eternal gratitude, none more absolute than my ability to consistently put food on my table, to ensure the health and well-being of my beloved family, a luxury of which countless parents around the world are so cruelly deprived. I appeal and relate to you as an anxious father deeply troubled and guilt-ridden over an inexcusable legacy of widespread confusion, conflict, and chaos all of our children will likely be forced to inherit. I implore you as a member of the human race mortified by the unnecessary suffering of even a single brother or sister, furious over the goals we have missed, the priorities we have misplaced, the opportunities we have squandered, but still greatly emboldened by the prospect of providing my children, your children, and the children of the world—children of the world with the well-deserved birthright of dignity, security, and essential rights to work together collectively to propose solutions to this long-lasting issue we are facing.

To accomplish this mission to bring food and comfort to those most in need, we must delay the procrastinations, abandon the rhetoric, and accept unpopular truths as a call to action and not an excuse to passivity. In an ideal world where socioeconomic factors existed in harmony void of biases, inequities would be reduced and chronic illnesses caused by malnutrition’s many forms would be mitigated. But that beautiful dream still stands as a tall order.

At the Gaurav and Sharon Srivastava Family Foundation, we will assist in the creation of a new paradigm between food and fuel to the body and energy as the fuel to the food production system, a new perspective that will drive a propulsive shift to a nutritionally nourished world. We must understand and embrace the symbiotic relationship between food and energy, an unavoidable reality we must bear is that our current food systems are even more reliant on energy than ever before. As a foundation, we are doing our concerted part to illuminate the intersection of food and energy, adding a voice to a crucial conversation about the necessity of energy production to deliver the food to those in need.

While we all dream of a near future in which clean and renewable energy is not just a lofty ambition, about the everlasting law of the land, I implore you today to entreat to welcome the notion that lines of food production cannot exist isolated from the energy that propels the productivity. It is our human obligation to focus our efforts on the problems we are facing here and now. It is our universal imperative to take immediate action to relieve the men, women, and children who are suffering today—not tomorrow, not next week, and not in 50 years.

While our days of fossil-fuel dependence are numbered, we also agree that the immediate and complete eradication of oil reliance is still beyond our grasp. Modern agriculture runs on oil. Commercial farmers need tractors, irrigation pumps, harvesters. The fertilizers that feed the crops, the pesticides that preserve them, the packaging that protects their quality are all produced using oil. From seed to harvest, packaging to storage, containers to ship, trucks to roads, these supply chains lead to food, the focus of conservation today—food that cannot be brought to the homes of hungry families so that the mothers and fathers never have to ration their children’s food and hear the cries of their hungry child or give up their own meal so their child doesn’t have to experience the pangs of hunger. These are harsh realities.

As we diligently march towards a gradual decarbonization, fossil fuels remain our most realistic and expeditious improvisation to addressing the most advanced food system lines to ensure food security. This is the physical, literal realistic change to be able to deliver on the promise established 80 years ago on the right to adequate food.

The United States has always been looked as a shining beacon of hope, a gateway to humanity’s future founded on the unimpeachable virtues of liberty, equality, and steadfast in the ethical imperatives of welfare, justice, and dignity, and driven boldly to lead by example. By expanding the scope of our Feed the Future Initiative, our President Biden has reaffirmed our unfaltering commitment.

It is a time for all of us, as we collectively represent the world’s 20 largest economies, to work together and build on the progress we have already made. We must fearlessly continue the copious work that still lies ahead of us. It’s time to show our citizens, our foreign neighbors, our fellow man and woman that our promises are not empty, that our outrage is real and conviction is unwavering, just like the superheroes our children imagine us to be.

This forum, these conversations, and the discourse to follow today, I mark this as a compelling watershed in our struggles. But we cannot forget that at this very moment across America single parents are shopping for groceries forced by insufficient budgets to choose between fresh vegetables and lean proteins that will feed their children for two days, or boxes of far less nutritious pasta that provide for an entire week—a heartbreaking plight nobody should face—not in 2022, not ever.

These are difficult choices to be made, sobering concessions to digest, and a pragmatic roadmap to be plotted, that prioritize grace and humanity over politics and caustic saber-rattling. These are discussions we need to have today to influence that parent’s ability to not to choose between aiding short-term hunger or choosing long-term health for their family. It’s very basic.

We must devise alternative plans to keep the energy flowing, to stabilize market shocks, to mitigate a deepening energy crisis, and re-open the plentiful grain gates of Russia and Ukraine to the world. Plans conceived with redundant safety nets, oversight and adaptability, born with a spirit of pragmatic neutrality, intended as a less aggressive, non-interventionist proxy, to the imposition of price gaps that do not work.

We need a program that can be managed and maintained through clear and transparent reporting mechanisms with banking support from trustworthy institutions and multifaceted administrative superiors—a program that needs to be crystalized, that in short order will adequately feed the hungry, comfort the afflicted, and dramatically rebuke the all too comfortable warmongers and profiteers, who pose the greatest threat to peace and security on a global scale. And most importantly, we need a confident first step in the right direction—a bridge towards progress and resolution, a gleam of contagious hope that every living soul on this planet is urgently in need of.

My wife, Sharon, and I are blessed with two young children, our divine inspiration. We watch them play in wonderment, interacting harmoniously with all other children—the ones that look and speak like them, and the ones that don’t.

They are the future, our legacy, and our source of tremendous clarity and reflection. Their unconditional love and universal acceptance humbles me, and sometimes makes me embarrassed to be a grown-up.

Sharon and I firmly believe that the answers we seek are simple and infinitely achievable, we just have a history of making the journey unexplainably complex. All of us in this room and on this planet must commit to a solemn covenant, impervious to race, gender, social economic, geographical divides, an unbreakable promise to all generations that have and will come to be—that every human citizen on this Earth will soon be guaranteed the dignity and respect they inherently deserve.

On the question, where do we go from here, the inspirational leader and civil rights visionary Martin Luther King declared: our world is bruised and battered by a universal blight that knows no boundaries, an epidemic that does not discriminate, an abomination that won’t be solved without compromise, compassion, and undivided resolve.

We must steel of conviction, draw our strength from a higher power, and learn from our children that we must from now on until the very end of time. It is our only hope. Thank you. Thank you.

Now it is my distinct pleasure to introduce a true champion of defense and security, an Indonesian patriot, an emissary of global peace and unity, a bridge builder towards the abolishing of all food insecurity, and a brave line front warrior in the battle against the grave threats that undermine health, prosperity, and wreak havoc on the very fabric of society, the minister of defense, Republic of Indonesia, and my dear friend, Prabowo Subianto.

MINISTER PRABOWO SUBIANTO: Good morning, ladies and gentlemen, distinguished participants of the Global Food Security Conference organized by the Atlantic Council.

I would like to thank the organizers for inviting me to speak to give some remarks on this topic.

Since yesterday, I took note that a lot of participants coming from many parts of the world with their impressive background and expertise in the field of agriculture, food security, and, I’m sure, by the brief moments I was here, I am very confident that all the contributions, all the remarks, all the comments, the suggestions, recommendation will, of course, I understand, be compiled. And I think this will be a very valuable contribution to finding solutions for the threat of global food insecurity that is facing our planet.

Actually, I would like to thank and commend the initiators of this conference, Mr. Fred Kempe and Atlantic Council General Wesley Clark, Mr. Gaurav—I call him Mr. G. because sometimes a bit difficult to pronounce your surname. It’s also difficult to pronounce my surname.  I think my surname is longer than your surname.

I would like to thank the initiators for this effort. In fact, in my opinion, the main topic of the whole G20 summit should be about food security.

In my opinion, food security or, shall we say, the threat of food insecurity is an existential threat to humankind because without food there is no civilization. There is no humankind.

Because of the experts standing here, I do not pretend or aspire to give an expert’s perspective. I will give overview—an overview of the Indonesian perspective on this issue and, perhaps, this can help contribute to our general understanding.

First of all, food, energy, and water actually is one cycle that is interrelated. To secure food we need water. Water is the essence of life, and to secure food the speakers before me have emphasized the importance of energy.

In this cycle, which in front of us has proven to be a threat—a threat of scarcity—this is compounded by more threats that compound this existential threat.

First, whether we like it or not, there is a population explosion. Maybe this is sensitive. There are part of the global elite, still very influential, still very powerful in—even in my country that do not like for us to talk about population explosion.

But if we are a real leader sometimes leaders must say unpleasant things. This is a dilemma. It’s a paradox, especially for politicians. Especially for politicians who want to get elected.

Fortunately, the Indonesian general election and the presidential election is still rather in the future.

This is the dilemma of people in leadership position. If we warn about a danger coming they accuse us of being pessimistic. My president, President [Joko Widodo] this year alone, I think, has spoken maybe 25 times more in public, warning the Indonesian people that we are facing difficult times.

Next year will be very difficult, and there are people who accuse him of spreading pessimism. And I understand maybe some people cannot accept the necessities of how do we face this population explosion.

For instance, Indonesia, our increase in population every year is 1.9 percent. That is 5 million new babies every year, 5 million new mouths—5 million, the size of Singapore. Every year in Indonesia, there is a new Singapore. You see, Indonesians, when they face adversity, they laugh. Indonesians are happy people. Sometimes we don’t know what’s ahead of us. Maybe we will—we will go somewhere happily.

What I’m saying is this: Every 10 years, a new Malaysia. What government in the world, what expert in the world can consider feeding five more—5 million more mouths a normal and an easy challenge? My friend Mr. G has said he’s very proud of feeding his family. A leader of Indonesia must think of feeding 5 million babies every year—every year. Anybody who wants to run for president of Indonesia I think should consult his psychoanalyst, I think.

The challenges in front of our government is not an easy challenge, but this is not something that we must be afraid of. As a former soldier, you know, they say former soldiers—old soldiers never die. They just fade away. General Clark has faded away today. He’s supposed to be here in front of me. But you know, many old soldiers, like myself, like General Clark, you know, old soldiers never die, they just fade away, that is somewhere. But in Indonesia, old soldiers never die and they never fade away. Until the Almighty God calls us. Then not only do we fade away; we are called away very fast.

So this population explosion is something in front of us—5 million jobs, 5 million new spaces in schools, in hospitals. This is the dimension of our challenge.

Climate change, we feel it. Jakarta is—the sea level is increasing 5 centimeters every year. And during one of my visits to the coastal area of Tanjung Priok, families, the water is in their living room. They are sleeping in their bedroom with the seawater in their bedroom. Climate change is not some theory; it is in front of us.

In Karawang—which is maybe, what, one hour from here—the sea has come in maybe already at least three, four kilometers—three, four kilometers, maybe more. Karawang—you are from Karawang, are you? (Speaks to audience member)

So climate change for Indonesia is real. Can you imagine four kilometers times 200 kilometers long, 300 square kilometers? How many hectares have we lost from productive land, from arable land, from our rice bowl? Karawang is the rice bowl of Indonesia.

And of course, in front of us, geopolitical conflict. I just would like to reiterate, you know, Indonesia, our traditional foreign policy is one of friendship to all countries. We respect all countries. We respect all great powers. We are free and active in our relationship. We always try to maintain equal—equal in our respect and relationship. We call ourselves—we consider ourselves by history—Indonesia was one of the founders of the Non-Aligned Movement. I would like to reiterate this because, although we consider United States as a very good friend and strategic partner of Indonesia, the United States having many times assisted Indonesia in our darkest moments—the United States have supported our war of independence. So we acknowledge this friendship. But as a good friend, sometimes we have to be courageous enough to remind our friends, remind our close friend who we admire, who we want to emulate—I think the top Indonesian intellectuals, educated leaders, most of them are educated in Western countries. I think many of our leaders understand and have read your Declaration of Independence. We also aspire to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. That is our goal also for our people. But this is important: In any geopolitical conflict, there are always two sides to a story. And each side is convinced they are right. Each side is willing to die for what they consider to be right. I have to remind everybody there is always two sides to a conflict.

The important thing is, do we want to resolve the conflict or not? If we do not want to resolve the conflict, we are entering a very dangerous region and a dangerous zone of time. A few days ago, I was listening to a remark by a very senior former United States military leader, Admiral Mullen. I think three days ago. I think Admiral Mullen was the former chairman of the US Joints Chiefs of Staff, if I’m not mistaken. Is that correct? Please correct me if I’m—he was the former chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff. He reminded everybody—it’s on the YouTube—we are in danger of a nuclear war. We are in danger of a nuclear war. We hope, we pray that the leaders of the world will be wise and enlightened.

But we have seen in history many great conflict, many great explosion/conflagration happen out of accident. Wars happen because of accident. Sometimes wars happen because of one lieutenant or one captain who start firing because he was afraid. Therefore, what we talk about is compounded by these threats. Geopolitical conflict on all matters, in our opinion, the situation of the world, the fact that our planet is getting smaller, we need wisdom. We need compromise. We need patience. We need the courage to go halfway.

Zero-sum game victories I don’t think is feasible in the current state of the world. We can be right, but are we doing it in the long-term interest of our people? Without food, energy, and water, economic crisis, social unrest, civil war, failed state. Therefore, food, energy, and water is existential.

Indonesia, we are—we have been blessed the last three, four years with very consistent and very big rainfall. However, now we have to be prepared. After the phenomenon called La Nina, we have to be prepared for El Nino, and when El Nino comes, we have to be prepared for several years of dry weather.

Therefore, it’s also part of our initiative, the Indonesian defense community, we are working very hard to secure water. We are exploring for water in the dry parts of our country. I think over the last two, three years our military we have—we have drilled and we have made pumps, energy in something like 700 sites, and within this month, our defense university—we have sent survey teams, and we drill, I think, another 120 water pumps.

And also, what is very interesting is there is a new geological phenomenon, actually. The experts tell us there are underwater rivers flowing to the coasts of many of our islands, and this is very, very, very prevalent in volcanic islands. And we are, I think, the largest island—island groups with volcanoes.

There are many underwater rivers flowing every day to the coast. And now, our mission is to find where it goes out, and then to trap them in flexible pipes, and bring by pumps this freshwater to the land, inland to the villages. So, actually, the existential threat, there are solutions in front of us, and solutions which are not technologically very difficult for us.

It flows every day, every hour. We have also big rivers that are flowing to the sea, and with water management, with water engineering, we can make very, very good use of the water that’s available. The key is the will to find solutions.

When we talk about food security, there’s some things, again, that’s unpalatable to be spoken of, but I will say it anyway… How do we deal with food insecurity? To be very frank, if the political elites of all countries have cohesion, are united, do not fight amongst their lead—who wants to be what—and the elite are informed, want to learn, want to study, and the elite will not be swayed, will not be influenced by traders.

I want to make it clear. I am not against traders. I was—before going into politics, I was a trader myself. Trade—that is what fuels human growth and human enterprise. But in this matter of food security, sometimes the traders think short term. The political leaders must think long term. The traders think of annual profit. It’s not their fault; they are traders. They think of annual profit; political leaders must think five years, 10 years, 25 years ahead.

But sadly many countries, including my own country, sometimes our elites are near-sighted, uninformed, sometime do not want to be informed. I have been talking about food security in Indonesia I think for the last—I don’t know—20 years. When I retired from the military, I was elected as a chairman of the farmers association, and after that I was elected also as the chairman of the small market traders association. Maybe many of them come here to listen to me.

We have, what, now something like 16,000 traditional markets—16,000—and always the challenge is between the big supermarkets and the small, traditional markets. How do we reconcile that they live together, not killing—the big guys absorb all the profit and the small guys die because of lack of oxygen. This is the challenge again.

And many of our elites also—now after we see the conflict in other parts of the world, after the FAO, the WHO remind us, then now everybody talk about food security. But let me say very frankly, maybe three years ago many of our elite do not even want to address the matter of food insecurity. So I think this is something that we must take note of, and therefore, events like this is very important as part of the educating the elite. Solving hunger, solving food insecurity, yes, is about seeds, about technology, about this and that, and yes, but more important is the unity, the cohesion, the ability amongst national elites and international elites to work together. To cooperate—to cooperate, and this is easier said than done. I do understand that.

So our goal must be, as all the experts say, feeding 8 billion people. The problem is availability and affordability. The problem is some of the countries have secure supply of calories and secure supply of protein. And that is the challenge how we can reach zero hunger, which is SDG number two, the Sustainable Development Goal that we must all aspire to.

Here we see the dark green; those countries, secure calorie supply. And the dark blue, secure protein supply.

Food security, the essential thing is also trade, food trade. We see many countries that are reliant on calorie imports. We thank the Almighty God that Indonesia, actually, we need not be reliant on calorie import. We are now self-sufficient in rice. We are also able to produce maize on our own and we have alternatives to wheat.

The other essential element of food security, as everybody has mentioned, of course, is synthetic fertilizer. Half of the world is reliant on synthetic fertilizer. Also, the reserves of potash and phosphate is also not distributed equally around the world. It’s concentrated in Canada, Russia, some parts of the world. This will affect global food production.

And therefore, once again let us not be morally upset about the use of food as weapon. Food has always been a weapon throughout the history of mankind, thousands of years. Wars have erupted to secure food, to secure land, to secure water. So let us be very realistic, ladies and gentlemen. That’s why leaders must always calculate the entire spectrum of the threat.

As a former military officer, we learned that war is not just the beginning or the war start with the firing of a shot. No, war is already a spectrum. Trade competition is war. Financial war, we can destroy a nation by destroying their currency. So, once again, leaders must always think the entire spectrum.

Because, as I said, a conflict has two sides. One side may be strong in this area. The other side may be strong in the other area. And two conflict sides, they want to win. They want to survive. Therefore, they will use all weapons at their disposal. That is the lesson of history.

Fertilizer will be strategic because of the source of fertilizers, source of the ingredients of fertilizer. We must be prepared for daunting challenges ahead.

We all know everybody’s talked about the vicious—the cycles that are emerging: food price increasing, oil very high. The price of natural gas is already 10 times higher than two years ago in Europe. Cost of maritime trade, three times pre-pandemic average. Interest rates rising. Price of fertilizers increase. And this results in cost-of-living increase, real incomes falling down, the ability of to cope small families farmers decreasing. The financial power of several countries decreasing. What is the result? We have to be prepared for social and political unrest in many parts of the globe.

Some more figures. Wheat price have risen 200 percent in two years, palm oil nearly 200 percent in two years. Indonesia, very fortunate, we are the largest producer of palm oil. And at one time we were embargoed by Europe, our palm oil, but it turned out perhaps to be a blessing in disguise. Because we could not go to the European market, we are forced to use our palm oil for biofuel, for biodiesel. And now we have bio-gasoline. Sometimes threat, sometimes adversity result in opportunity.

So we… maize, sugar, soybean. We understand also the components of food, that energy very strong component. A lot of people have spoken about this. Corn, high component. Soybean, what, I think nearly 40 percent—38 percent components energy. Rice, not so—not so high. Peanuts, not so high.

Protein, protein crisis. In the next 25 years, the demand for protein will rise quite significantly, from now around 324 tons—324 million tons of a year to nearly 600 million tons, 80 percent increase in the next 25 years. And like it or not, I think we have to reassess the propensity or our habit of eating a lot of meat from cattle, from chicken, from pork because the input for one kilogram of body weight meat we need for cattle is 31 kilograms of input. For pork, it’s 10 kilograms. For chicken, it’s four kilograms. The most efficient is fish, two kilograms and some even 1.7 kilograms. So the future is actually aquaculture to provide our protein needs. This is force of nature.

Those who adapt, those who want to learn, those who want to invest will survive. And actually, the resources are in front of us. Once again, Indonesia is blessed by the Almighty God. We have many challenges, but we have a lot of sea. I think we have one of the largest—the longest coastline in the world. I think maybe Canada and Chile more than us. But Indonesia is—maybe we are second to Canada, I think, the longest coast.

Can you imagine how many hectares of aqua farms we can have on the coast and off the coast? We have now 23 million hectares of arable land. But we have also 120 million hectares of forest. Sad to say, about 80 million hectares of our forests are degraded—are already degraded.

So what is our vision? What is my strategy which I propose to my president that the degraded forest we convert to productive land to create food and energy?

They are already degraded, but before they supported forests. That means the land is fertile. By the greed of many short-term—how can I say that in an audience that’s a lot of Americans here, you know? Because, right.

But I would say that many capitalists are very greedy. Even some capitalists they are proud. They say greed is good. That is the essence, I think, of neoliberalism, right. There are capitalists that say greed is good. Let me be richer and richer, and I don’t care what happened to the poor and the hungry, you know.

Once again, I do not criticize capitalism, per se. But I’m saying we have suffered. It’s not anybody’s fault. It’s our collective fault. Whenever God has given so much blessings to people, sometimes the people become complacent and the people become negligent in protecting their resources and their future.

So, can you imagine if the 80 million hectares or 88 million—I think the data is there—if we convert only 16 million—16 million of those 80 million degraded. If we convert this to food production, we can be the breadbasket of the world.

So this existential threat and this, let us say, ecological or environmental disaster, we can turn around to be environmental and food opportunity for the world. It does not—we do not need too much technology. We do not need—the nature has given us this, let us say, comparative advantage.

Sixteen million hectares. Let us say 8 million for food and 8 million for energy. We can produce renewable energy, clean energy. Buy your energy from a lot of plants, from palm oil, from Iran, palm sugar, from cassava.

We also—we are in a tropical climate. We can have three crops a year. Three crops a year with good management, good technology. Good management—can you imagine the increase in production?

We also have 225 million hectares of marine territory. We also—within that area there’s 23 million hectares of marine protected area. This is the breeding ground where our fish—the fish of the world come to Indonesia to breed and to lay their eggs.

The fish of the world breathe in Indonesian waters, lay their eggs in Indonesian waters.

So Indonesia’s current role, we are now number-one grower of palm oil. We are now number-five grower of cassava, without the additional 16 million hectares of land.

We are now the number-two producer of captured fisheries. But we have a vacuum. We have a need for 40,000 fishing boats, of 300 grow stand to 500 grow stand. We have a need of 40,000 fishing boats. This is not including the aqua farm that we plan to build.

By the way, if any of the participants are still here on the 15th or on the 16th, I will be visiting fish aqua farm. If any of you would like to join me, I will be very honored if you would like to see that this is not a dream. In the future, we already—some of our entrepreneurs are already cutting this out and, by the way, making a lot of money.

But that is the risk. High risk high gain. To be the pioneer is always very courageous, need courage. We are the number-one grower of seaweed. Healthy, protein, antioxidant, is against cancer. And we are now already—self-sufficient in rice production.

So I think joining Jokowi in this government, I think, was the correct decision on my part. I’m proud that I joined much too many opposition from my own party.

But, as I said, that’s the challenge of leaders, right. Sometimes we have to have the guts to choose unpopular positions. At that time, it was popular, it was—at that time it was unpopular in my own party. But now they come to realize, oh, yeah—that guy is not that stupid.

You know, sometimes soldiers, we have the reputation of having no brains, especially infantry. I was in the infantry, you know. The smart guys in the army they always go to the engineers and the artillery. Those of us who are average they send to the infantry.

But now the developments in a certain part of the world where there is now open conflict—I will not say where. It’s somewhere in Europe. The development of war tactics now they say it is the return of the poor bloody infantry.

One infantry man can destroy a bank with a rocket which costs only maybe $100,000 can destroy a bank which costs $5 million. So I think I made the correct decision also at that time when I was young joining the infantry. And as a former soldier, I realize the importance of food.

I come now to a topic—my favorite topic, actually, is cassava, but this is also Bill Gates’ favorite crop. I think cassava will prove to be the savior crop of the world.

Indonesia, I think, can become the foremost producer of cassava, and cassava is the most efficient in the need for input, for water, et cetera, et cetera. If you see here, the input for cassava is quite efficient. It produces 250,000 calorie, but only need 65—what’s that—cubic meter of water per metric ton… the rice 1,139; wheat 954; maize 815. Very efficient.

Cassava is now a strategic food crop. It can produce the replacement for wheat, for pasta and noodles, et cetera, bread. Here I’ve examples.

This is already in production by our entrepreneurs. We are producing pasta from cassava; instant noodles, cassava. This Korean beef mushroom, cassava. We can produce bioethanol. We can produce alcohol, vitamin, other products, bioplastics, glue, explosives, feed for cattle. Cassava, very efficient. We have seen that. Health benefits—100 percent gluten-free, low glycemic index, high in iron and calcium.

I continue. I think I’ve taken a lot of time. Cassava products already in the Indonesian market. Here, we also see we already have the patents for modified cassava. We call it mocaf. We also have the intellectual property rights for the industrial processes. There’s already a factory producing cassava.

I hope the inventor of mocaf, Professor Subagio, please stand up. He’s the cassava professor—I think the foremost in the world—working many years in Nigeria in many parts of the world, and we see they’re producing processes. There’s also Mr. Fidriento, an entrepreneur—a courageous entrepreneur who pioneered the industrial production of mocaf. So we also now starting producing our logistics strategic reserve.

So let me conclude by how I see Indonesia’s future role. I think we will be the number one exporter of wheat flour equivalent—mocaf from cassava. We will also be the number one exporter of sustainable marine ecoculture production.

We are also—we will be the number one exporter of sustainable shrimp, aquaculture production. We do not want to deplete the natural fish. We have to preserve it because we are the breeding ground for many of the fish of the world.

We will also be the number one exporter of sustainable lobster aquaculture production. So we will be in the forefront to produce protein and calorie in the world. We want to be a factor in solving global insecurity threat. And we invite partners from all over the world to join in. Can you imagine 16 million hectares how many combined harvesters, how many tractors, how many silos, how many railroads, how many harbors, how many technologies, how many scientists, how many water engineers that we can accept and we can absorb?

So we are open. We invite all partners from around the world—that I think we can be a factor for growth. Indonesia can perhaps be an additional factor in the growth of the world economy, and in really providing solutions to overcome world hunger.

In conclusion—you see, they do not give coffee here for me. If they give coffee, maybe I speak for another two hours.

It is my opinion that I hold very strong to successfully handle the challenge. We need global peace, and we need global partnership. We have to work together. If we can come to this, if we can reach out to our adversaries, if we can overcome past mistakes, if we can admit to ourselves that perhaps we have made some mistakes, and we can work in a global partnership, I think we can solve the problem.

But, as I mentioned, in any country without the cohesion, without the unity, without compromise, without cooperation amongst the national elite, there can be no national prosperity. To have prosperity, we need peace. That is the lesson of mankind history. I was a former soldier. I know the ravages of conflict. There is no benefit to war and conflict.

Sometimes we are forced to, but as a former soldier, I realize we must avoid conflict. That doesn’t mean that we must be defenseless. No. Apparently humans as a species are very prone to domination and to take what is in front of them that is not protected and defended. That’s the human nature.

I think that concludes my remarks. Let us work together to achieve understanding, compromise.

Hopefully in this G20 in Bali—Bali—the name of Bali, of the Balinese people is pulau dewata, the island of the Gods.

So we hope that there will be magic and miracles in the island of the Gods. Let us work for peace and prosperity. Thank you very much.

FREDERICK KEMPE: Mr. Minister, that was a tour de force. That was just amazing. In a moment you’ll hear the minister on a panel with General Clark and with Gaurav.

For the moment, I just wanted to make one announcement. We want you all back here this evening 7:30/8:00 for our concert. We have John Legend, the great singer. We have Sandhy Sondoro. And we have the US Air Force Band back with us again.

We’re not going to take—because we’re a little bit over time, we’re not going to take the coffee break. So if you need a break, please take your break as you can grab it.

And with that, I want to turn your eyes to the screen to see Senator Stabenow, another message from the United States, the chairwoman of the Agriculture Committee.

Watch the keynote

SENATOR DEBBIE STABENOW (D-MI): Hello to everyone taking part in the Global Food Security Forum. Whether you’re in Bali or joining remotely from home, thank you for being here to discuss the incredibly important issue of global food security.

As chairwoman of the United States Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition and Forestry, food security at home and abroad is a top priority for me. And we’re facing a truly unprecedented hunger crisis, as we know. Many factors have caused the rates of food insecurity to skyrocket, including the COVID-19 pandemic, the climate crisis, and Putin’s war in Ukraine. Some countries are experiencing historic drought, while others are faced with record levels of flooding. These extreme weather events harm farm and livestock production, and displace people from their homes and communities, as we know.

The World Food Programme estimates that as many as 828 million people go to bed hungry every night. And about 50 million people are at risk of famine. This should be completely unacceptable to all of us. Farmers play a critical role in providing US-grown food for those in need, in the form of commodities and ready-to-use food that can save a child’s life. But it’s also critical to help build local markets and invest in development projects so that local communities and economies can be more resilient and withstand shocks. It’s important that we use all of the tools in the toolbox to respond, because each situation throughout the world is unique.

In Congress, we’re staring consideration of the five-year farm bill, a process to reauthorize the food and farm programs in the United States. This includes programs like Food for Peace, the McGovern-Dole Program, and the Bill Emerson Humanitarian Trust, which are critical to address global hunger. The Senate Agriculture Committee has a long history of bipartisanship, particularly in supporting international food aid. I’m working with Senator John Boozman, the top Republican on the committee, to advance a strong bill that protects and enhances these programs.

Congress acted this year to provide additional resources to respond to the extraordinary levels of food insecurity we’re facing, but we know that more must be done. Thank you for joining in the fight to ensure that we tackle global food security in a way that benefits all of those we represent around the world. I look forward to working with you as we tackle this important issue.

ANNOUNCER: Please welcome to the stage senior anchor of CNN Indonesia Desi Anwar.

Watch the keynote

DESI ANWAR: Hi, everybody. OK. Well, welcome to the next session, which is hopefully a fireside with three very distinguished speakers, two of whom you’ve actually heard today. But if everybody can please settle down. And I know that we’re very, very late this morning. OK. If everybody would please find their seat, we do have three very distinguished speakers coming up and including our minister of defense, Prabowo Subianto, and also General Wesley Clark, and also Gaurav.

I mean, we’ve—wow. What can I say? I mean, Fred, Atlantic Council, I’m speechless. I mean, what an amazing lecture we’ve just heard there. And I’m just, you know—it’s incredible, the breadth and the substance. And I think we can all agree that we learned a lot from Minister Prabowo’s lecture and I think his only Atlantic Council forum. I mean, this has encapsulated everything about food security. And you know, what can I—well, let’s—I hope he’s coming back to join the session.

And I’ve been asked to stall for time here, so forgive me. Things have been very weird, somewhat, this morning.

Anyway, food security. We’ve listened to the keynotes this morning and we know that food security—global food security is very much present-day challenges. And of course, our food supply system, our global—the entire global food system rests on the premise of global security. If there is a disruption in the global security, it will affect food security. And the reason being is that we are now such a globalized world. We’re so interdependent with one another, particularly for our food supply, there’s not one single country in the world that can actually feed their own people without importing food, without getting food supply from other countries. And then once this supply chain is disrupted, obviously, this is a real threat. And we have had terrible, terrible global shocks recently, what with the pandemic, which actually brought the world to a halt. We’ve had—you know, we are in the middle of a war in the Ukraine which is, obviously, affecting food supply and also trade. And we are also in the middle of an economic—global economic crisis: rising food prices, inflation, energy crisis.

And of course, this must—these are something, global challenges, that need to be resolved on a global basis. Global problems need global solutions. And I think this G20 forum, this G20 summit is a very, very good opportunity for world leaders to actually gather together and find solutions for these problems.

Now, I would now like to invite my three panelists to the stage.

I’ll start with General Wesley Clark, chairman and CEO of Wesley K. Clark and Associates. It’s a consulting firm. And General Clark is—big hands, please. How are you, sir? Please take a seat. And, General Clark, welcome to Bali. Welcome to Indonesia. General Wesley Clark is a former NATO supreme allied commander of Europe and a retired four-star general. And it’s interesting when we talk about food security we are turning to our military experts to help solve some of the problems. Once again, welcome, sir.

And our next speaker, Minister of Defense of the Republic of Indonesia, the man of the moment, Minister Prabowo Subianto. Hello, sir. How are you? I just want to say, very impressive. Like I said, I was telling Fred and our friends from the Atlantic Council, I mean, I’m speechless. That was an excellent—that was a really good, long lecture. But I also would like to remind you, 2024 is still, what, two years away. OK.

Last but not least our—well, we’ve listened to his keynote speech before, very impassioned speech—Gaurav Srivastava, founder of Gaurav and Sharon Srivastava Family Foundation—also chairman of various groups, such as Harvest Commodities, Apraava Energy and Commodities, and Unity Resources Group. Gaurav, thank you for joining us again.

And let’s have a big hand for everybody, for our speakers.

DESI ANWAR: Ok, let’s start with you. If you don’t mind, Minister, let me start with General Clark. After hearing your incredible lecture—we learned a lot, obviously—just your thought on food security. I mean, General Clark, you were the former, you know, NATO allied commander for Europe. And there’s, obviously, some of the things that was mentioned, the idea of food security is very much tied with global security, with hard security. And just your thoughts on our minister’s speech. And also, how do these two interlink in your perspective?

GENERAL WESLEY CLARK: So, first of all, I thought—I think Indonesia’s really setting a very, very high standard for approaching the issue of food security. And I’m very impressed by the technology, by the work on cassava especially. And you know, this is the way we have to move forward. Just like we discovered fish farming about 30 or 40 years ago and it spread around the world, cassava may be the miracle—it may be the miracle carb of the 21^st century. And I think Indonesia’s got a leading role in this, so I think that’s really impressive.

I think when you look at food security, I agree with what Minister Prabowo has said. It is about more than food; it’s about water, it is about energy. I do think we have to be sure we’ve got the right balance. When we talk about food security, it’s about availability, it’s about affordability, those things. But it’s also about taste. Everybody grows up with a comfort food and tastes change over time.

Now, my wife, her comfort food is a baked potato. I don’t care that much for baked potatoes, but she likes it. I like spaghetti and meatballs. That’s my comfort food. People have these—it’s partly what you grow up with. It’s partly changing tastes as you mature. But we have to take account of expectations that people have.

And the protein map that you showed, Minister Prabowo, was really interesting to me, because when you look at people in Africa and you look at the amount of protein they can get, the amount of calories they can get, of course, that’s the first thing you go with. But when these people come to London sometimes or Paris, they might be looking for McDonald’s. And so it is about expectations. It’s about availability. It’s about affordability.

I think we have to harness the best of government leadership and private-sector leadership in this space. I think—what I’ve learned in my—I studied economics of underdevelopment at Oxford. I looked at it in Vietnam. I worked it in—as best I could in Bosnia and looked at how they could recover. And for the last 22 years, I’ve traveled around the world and looked at countries. Look, you have to use the profit motive.

It’s just like what the minister mentioned about cassava, this man who has engineered the best way to do it. Has to be profit in it. So it’s the balance between government leadership and vision and the private sector picking up the step, having the right incentives and signals to unleash creativity and technology.

DESI ANWAR: OK. So the partnership is, obviously, very, very important between government and the private sector.

But let me just put it back to, you know, food nutrition, obviously, is very, very important, but let’s frame it back to food security. As we know with, you know, what’s happening in the war in the Ukraine, I mean, even Indonesia, we were affected, you know, because we still import a lot of wheat, for example, and fertilizers. General Clark, what would you see as the—as the biggest challenge? What is the state of our food security at the moment with what’s going on in the world and your own definition of food security? Because we are completely interdependent when it comes to, you know, the food system is very global. And then once you have these blockages and once you—you know, the supply side is disrupted, I mean, how can we mitigate that? And where do you see, you know, the challenges of food security—

GENERAL WESLEY CLARK: Well, I think we have—

DESI ANWAR:—as a global security?

GENERAL WESLEY CLARK: Look, we have to elevate consideration of food security. It’s grown in importance each year over—and each decade, really.

But in order to import things that countries need, they have to export. And governments have to help set the incentives for this. So if Indonesia wants to import, let’s say, cellphones and electronics from China or the United States or someplace, then how does it get paid for? And all of this has created in the area of food this incredibly complex network, and so it becomes something that—what COVID has taught us, what the Ukraine war has taught us is this must be a higher priority in all international discussions. We’ve got to strengthen these supply chains, listen to what our people need all over the world, and then governments have to work together to meet those needs.

DESI ANWAR: And on the global security side of it, I mean, obviously, if we have global security problems, it would impact food security, vice versa. And we have, for example, you know, climate change issues. And sometime in the future, if not already, fight for resources and diminishing resources will be a big problem as the world is trying to feed, you know, over 8 billion people.

And the other thing is that we have a very unequal world. In some areas of the world like you mentioned, Gaurav, we have oversupply of food. And in some parts of the world, you know, people go to bed hungry. How much of a threat do you think is food security to global security, especially seeing that what we need is global stability in order to get food security?

GENERAL WESLEY CLARK: Well, I think what we are experiencing is one of these moments in history where mankind—humankind goes up or down. We have 8 billion people. We’re in an incredibly complicated world. We still have old aspirations, old ideas like some people think of the world as a chessboard. You know, this is my country, that’s your country, I want your country. We have to get rid of these old ideas of nationalism and move together toward a new understanding of our responsibilities for humanity. It’s a step-by-step process. It’s a generational process. And along the way, we’ve got to let go of some of the anger and hurt from previous generations. This is true in Europe. It’s true in Africa. It’s true in Asia. And it’s true in my country. We’ve got to look toward the future. There’s incredible technology opportunities. So it’s a make-it-or-break-it time for humanity.

DESI ANWAR: But do you think—is food security a real threat to global security?

GENERAL WESLEY CLARK: Right. Well, food security has been brought to the fore by the war in Ukraine. So this is the moment, as Fred Kempe was saying yesterday, we’ve got a crisis. Use it. Make something different out of the way the world is structured today.

You know, we’ve had the Food and Agricultural Organization for 70 years. It’s great. We have the World Food Programme. It’s fine. Now, look at the current situation and let’s move forward. What’s the next step we need? How do we harness the strengths of government, the vision of government with the initiative and technologies of the private sector? This should be a principal issue at the—as Fred was saying earlier—at the G20, and we hope they’ll really tackle it.

DESI ANWAR: Gaurav, I mean, let’s pick up on that—you know, your idea, what is food security, the definition of food security. Where are we now? Are we at the critical, you know, junction when food security is threatening our global security? And also—like you also mentioned—you know, very impassioned in your keynote speech about, you know, putting—every child should not go hungry anywhere around the world. So how do you see this?

GAURAV SRIVASTAVA: I think it’s one thing to talk about these global ideas, but at the end of the day what matters is what we are doing back home. And being in conflict areas you start understanding that food, and energy, and oil, and water—these are national security issues. For far too long they have been considered not to be, and I think that narrative has to change.

Given today the conflict in Ukraine, given today the COVID-19 pandemic, given where we just came from, I think this thing has been [thrown] in our face. Indonesia, which has several hundred million people… there are so many people, and the choices are they need food to eat, they need to fill their cars with gas. And the choices they are being asked to make is should they—to take sides in a conflict.

And I think it goes back to what the minister said, is this policy of remaining as a nation that is neutral and cares about Indonesia first I think is important. And I think while it really important on global issues, it is also important to understand that the issues are local because if there is lack of food, then it is cause for serious security issues. And the conversations that are now being had back home in the United States, I think a lot of those conversations have to be in that direction.

It is also important to remember that the government is not the one who is buying and selling oil or buying and selling food. It is traders. It is private businesses, and I think it requires industry, requires talk leaders, requires government to work together in conjunction with traders to see what works; not impose policies that ultimately do not work. And that’s—that is the—that’s what I think.

DESI ANWAR: So it’s very important, you know, the partnership between the government and the private—public-private partnership.

GAURAV SRIVASTAVA: Public-private partnership.

DESI ANWAR: I think the important point is also, because we are so globalized, we are so interdependent for our food supply, our whole global food system is so entwined. So how do you see this going forward for countries to actually not only just increase their resilience, but within the countries themselves, there’s inequality when it comes to access to affordable, you know, nutritious food. What is the best way to address it because it’s not just an international or global issue, but it’s also—within the national itself, there is great inequality when it comes to food security.

GAURAV SRIVASTAVA: There is a short-term issue and then there are long-term issues. I think the short-term issues which need to be addressed is how do you deal with this imbalance. And yesterday we were talking at a roundtable, and we discussed ways of setting up special licensing programs to be able to work together and allow trade to flow.

And the other point is, at the end of the day, country needs to be self-sustainable. And in several conversations with the minister, his key idea of making Indonesia independent, taking issues that are security—whether it is defense, whether it is food, or whether it is energy—and making sure they are independent is key.

And that’s—so I think there is a short-term objective, which we—which we can—which we look working on this program, and then the long-term objective is creating self-sustainability. That’s what I think.

DESI ANWAR: OK. Minister Prabowo, actually, Indonesia, for the last couple of years, we didn’t import rice. We actually got an award from the International Rice Research institution for rice self-sufficiency. But we do still import other things like, for example, wheat and fertilizer.

Just, you know—just very quickly, I mean, we know what the—you talked about the strategy of Indonesia, creating a food resilience, national resilience, self-sufficiency. But given that Indonesia has the G20 presidency, now what would you actually like to see, the concrete outcomes from this summit when it comes to food security and creating global food security for everybody?

MINISTER PRABOWO SUBIANTO: I think when you notice the remarks of the speakers before me, also my remarks, I mentioned that there is food insecurity problem, but this problem has been compounded by—as I mentioned—population explosion, climate change, and geopolitical conflict. Climate change needs political wisdom and leadership from all countries. Population explosion needs wisdom, leadership, courage from the national elites. But geopolitical conflict, as I mentioned, needs statesmanship, needs leaders with a historical vision and a realistic—a realistic approach. I think this is what we hope from the G20. Here we are very happy, we hear that President Xi Jinping of China and President Biden of the United States will meet. This is—this is a—I think a very optimistic event. By meeting, by communication, by interaction, these two global powers must show global leadership, global statesmanship, global wisdom. So this is our hope from the G20.

So the problems of food security, hunger, is current a clear and present danger because we understand 300 million people are already starving basically; another 500 million on the verge of starvation, but this is all related to geopolitical reality. We understand 30 percent of wheat comes from Ukraine and Russia. We understand potash, phosphate is a resource very scarce. Fertilizer dependent on potash, dependent on phosphate, so yes, you ask me what we hope from the G20. We hope statesmanship with wisdom to overcome this.

DESI ANWAR: OK, the G20 itself, we’ve come in in a very, very challenging sort of environment, not just because it’s post-pandemic, but there’s a war in the Ukraine, a global economic crisis, and inflation. And of course, you know, tension between China and the US for example. So it’s, you know—and of course there is the Russia situation, but are you—how optimistic are you that, you know, world leaders can actually sit down, you know, with that wisdom and statesmanship that you are talking about?

And the other thing is Indonesia—this is our presidency. You know, what can we offer as a country to address and also to maybe, you know, facilitate the path to global food security as well as global security?

MINISTER PRABOWO SUBIANTO: OK. In my opinion, there are, let us say, optimistic goals, yeah. Idealistic goals. There are also realistic and modest goals.

I prefer to have realistic and modest goals. Indonesia, in my opinion, our contribution to the international geopolitical situation is that we succeed in making or taking care of our own house. We must keep our house—our own house in order.

We need—Indonesia needs peace, stability. And with peace, stability, we can provide solutions.

As I said in my presentation that with a little bit of investment, with a little bit of rearranging some of priorities, we can be the breadbasket of the world. This is not something impossible.

This is mathematics. We have already 80 million degraded forest. We must take care of this with our planning agency calculating 60 million hectares. If we convert this, this can be the breadbasket of the world.

So we can be a solution to the world.

Number two, energy. We have to go to renewable clean energy, green energy, to cut down global warming. That’s number two. This is, in my opinion, realistic.

We take care of our own house. We are peace, prosperity, smart investment. We can be the source of protein through the world, source of calories to the world. That is our contribution.

In the real sense, we are nonaligned. We are friendly with all the major powers. So we can be the intermediary. We can promote dialogue and friendship.

So I think, in my opinion, that is our, let us say, modest goals and idealistic goals.

DESI ANWAR: Yeah. And this is also an opportunity for Indonesia to showcase what we have and what we’re doing is very well displayed in this morning’s lecture.

Now, General Clark, your thoughts, please? You know, do you agree? What kind of leadership can Indonesia, you know, give in this circumstances? And also, for the US as being the global security power, what can the US do in order to promote global food security and make sure that, you know, everything’s—

GENERAL WESLEY CLARK: Well, I think the United States can do several things.

Now, we’re going to hear later from some American experts on this and so I don’t want to say that I’m an expert on this.

But I have looked at it and I think, you know, there’s—first, there’s the role of the American dollar. And so we have to be very aware in the United States that when we use interest rates to deal with domestic American inflation, it has worldwide consequences.

I know we are sensitive to that, but we just have to remain sensitive to it because countries all over the world rise and fall based on how the Federal Reserve system responds to, in some cases, US domestic economic concerns.

So that’s the first thing.

Secondly, I think the United States has done a remarkable job with the technology of agriculture for things like row crops. So I’ve done a lot of work with the corn farmers in the United States, and you look at the productivity of corn. Now, I’m going to use the term acre instead of hectare. There’s about two and a half acres to a hectare.

But back when I was growing up, if you got maybe 60, 80 bushels of corn per acre, you were a great farmer in Iowa. In the 1990s, we were up to 90 bushels. Now the average in recent years has been 170, 180 bushels of corn per acre. And some—in some cases, we’re getting 350 bushels of corn per acre.

Why is this? A combination of factors. It’s private sector, farmer ingenuity, government leadership in terms of agricultural extension. So I think if we look at these principles and try to help countries all over the world with technology, some financing to get it started, sharing our systems on how we look at farmland, how we evaluate its need for nutrition, how we use what’s called precision agriculture, taking advantage of GPS to know for each meter of land what exactly are the nutrients that are needed for each crop. If we look at some of the Israeli technologies on drip irrigation, for example, we can do amazing things.

And so I think the United States has to lead. But I think the United States has to be very careful in doing this because we have a spirit of generosity in America, but we have something called Public Law 480 which enables us to take surplus US agricultural commodities and ship them abroad in times of need as a measure of relief. Sometimes in doing that we’ve actually undercut domestic agriculture in those countries that have been the beneficiaries, so I think we have to be careful.

You know, it’s what—the old joke is if you are in bed with an elephant and it turns over, you can be crushed. And so the United States, for—starting really a hundred years ago, became the elephant in world finance in so many areas and in food. And we have to be very careful about this because, as Minister Prabowo was saying, there’s so much potential in Indonesia, in Nigeria, in DRC, elsewhere in the world. We don’t have to rely on row crops in the United States. So we’ve got to use our leadership wisely.

DESI ANWAR: OK. Well, just very quickly, what would you like to see the outcome of this G20? What concrete results, maybe what, you know, maybe agreement? Or, you know, what kind of things would you like?

GENERAL WESLEY CLARK: Well, I think what we’ll see is—already in President Biden’s talking points he’s elevated the issue of food security. And one of the things we’re going to do from this conference, I hope, is give talking points to the White House so we’ll get further intensification of this focus on food security. It really is a fundamental, and I think the White House is coming to understand this.

It’s not something about getting farmers to vote for a particular political party so, therefore, you’ve got to be nice in Iowa. It’s much bigger than this. And in the United States, we’re fortunate because we don’t really have to import food. We do like shrimp, get some of it from here, but—and tuna. But we don’t have to. It’s a matter of taste. So in the American discussions, we’ve misunderstood and underestimated the issue of food security. We have to change our appreciation of priorities.

DESI ANWAR: And, OK, Gaurav, I mean, the general mentioned about innovation and technology. Obviously, you know, food—it’s important to have innovation as well as technology. And more importantly, actually, is to energize people to care about food production. What are your solutions to, you know, achieving greater food security by strengthening, for example, the farmers or involving the young people, women and, you know, all sectors of society to focus on this?

GAURAV SRIVASTAVA: Now, I was talking to one of my friends from Africa and they mentioned that the US is kind of the head of the kite. And once there is tailwinds at the head of the kite, the effect is felt all the way at the back and there is a big lag that happens.

It is important to understand that for the reasons that we have been the elephant that turned left or right, the reasons are we need to be really careful and work together and understand that working with our partners like Indonesia and with other nations is the way to build alliances. By providing maybe financing through institutions like DFC, working with policymakers—and we have had several conversations—General Clark and I had several conversations with folks at the White House, folks in Congress, in the Senate on these critical issues as to the role that the US can play. And it’s important to understand that we cannot—cannot—put countries like Indonesia in that impossible spot to make a choice, because the realities of what we are facing back in the US and the realities here in Indonesia or other countries are too separate, and the basic sustenance needs of working together is essential.

The war in Ukraine is an essential—is an essential conversation to talk about. And I was in New York right around the time when we had the Citizens Award, October 19, and I had conversations with one of the members from the U.N. And they showed—and she told me of this large discrepancy between the support that goes to the issue of Ukraine and what’s happening in Africa, what’s happening in Asia. The value of human life is the same, whether it is a child in Ukraine or whether it is a child in America, child in Africa, or child here. It’s all the same. And the conversation that behooves us today is how do you create a program that prioritizes food security, energy security, and national security as one issue. And hopefully, we will be able to achieve that with—

DESI ANWAR: This is what you’d like to see come out from this G20 summit, OK.

We’ve run out of time, but let me just ask a final question to Minister Prabowo, or maybe you’d like to read your notes first. All right. In your presentation, I mean, there was a lot of gloom and doom about, you know, the threat of nuclear war. I just want to ask how, you know, the—how critical is a—I mean, do you think there will be soon at some point wars due to climate change and when food supply gets disrupted and when, you know, people are fighting for diminished food resources, energy resources, water resources? Is this something that, you know, in your—do you visualize, do you foresee this as something that is the threat that keeps you awake at night?

MINISTER PRABOWO SUBIANTO: Well, you know, I—of course, you know, I—basically, deep down in me I am an optimist. Yeah. But as someone who has to deal with security/defense, we have to deal with reality. And of course, our reference are to the players, the big players. So when I hear very senior US former military leaders saying they’re worried about nuclear war, when I hear many strategic thinkers like Professor Kissinger—Henry Kissinger, when I hear very important academics who are—whose life is about studying geopolitical conflict like Professor Mearsheimer or Professor Jeffrey Sachs or many of the leaders of this—of the world powers, when they talk that they’re worried about nuclear conflict, that—I’m worried, you know, because we are basically—we are—we don’t see the logic of a major world conflict in this time and age. Ideology-wise, every country can choose their own way to prosperity.

Every country has their own right, you know? The West have been very successful in democracy, but some other countries have succeeded. You cannot—you cannot deny that China has succeeded in their economic growth. They have succeeded in eliminating extreme poverty. We cannot hide this. We cannot denigrate this. So the success of the West, yes. But we have to see the success of China and the aspirations of other countries—Brazil, Nigeria, South Africa.

So what I’m saying is that I base my assessment on the assessments of the big powers—of the strategic thinkers of the big powers. When they say they are worried, well, I think it’s also logical that I’m worried.

DESI ANWAR: OK. Not to end on a pessimistic note. Thank you very much. Minister Prabowo, for that remark.

Well, let’s hope this G20 summit will be, you know, the path to global collaboration, will the way to world peace, because this is what we all want, right? OK, big hands, please. General Clark, Minister Prabowo, and also Gaurav, thank you very much for an interesting fire chat side. And I would now like to give the program back to the next session. Thank you.

Watch the fireside

The post Indonesia’s minister of defense: ‘the threat of food insecurity is an existential threat to humankind’ appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Flagship Event Sat, November 12, 2022 • 12:00 am ET

Highlights from the Global Food Security Forum

A gathering of leaders across government, industry, and civil society to assess food security as a global challenge and offer bold solutions for strengthening food systems, securing supply chains, and fighting world hunger. This Forum is co-hosted with the Gaurav and Sharon Srivastava Family Foundation, the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Indonesia, and the Coordinating Ministry of Maritime Affairs and Investment of the Republic of Indonesia and takes place on the sidelines of the G20 summit in Bali.

Economy & Business Resilience & Society

Event transcript

Uncorrected transcript: Check against delivery

PETER ENGELKE: Well, good morning, everyone. I hope we’ve all had a productive and enjoyable conversation this morning. I know I’ve learned a lot myself.

As stated, my name is Peter Engelke. I’m with the Atlantic Council, and we’re going to be exploring on this panel for the next 45 minutes the state of global food security—not a small—not a small topic, but really looking into what we consider to be the primary challenges facing the world when it comes to the question of food security and beginning to explore some of the solution sets as well.

So joining me on the stage I have an illustrious panel, and—of experts and officials who really run a gamut, I think, both geographically and in terms of their areas of expertise, and I’d like to introduce them for you.

So to my left is Ambassador Vasyl Hamianin, who is the ambassador of Ukraine to the Republic of Indonesia. Welcome, sir.

AMBASSADOR VASYL HAMIANIN: Thank you.

PETER ENGELKE: To his left is Bo Holmgreen, who is the founder and CEO of Scholars of Sustenance, which is an organization focused on food waste in Southeast Asia and also here in Indonesia.

Then we have—then we have Dr. Michał Kurtyka, who is the former minister of Climate and Environment for Poland, and I believe you are also a brand-new non-resident senior fellow at the Global Energy Center, which is a sister center here at the Atlantic Council. And I would like personally to welcome you to the Atlantic Council family.

MICHAŁ KURTYKA: Thank you.

PETER ENGELKE: And then to his left we have Guy Margalith, who is the principal deputy foreign policy advisor at US Indo-Pacific Command.

And then at the end today we have Laksmi Prasvita—I hope I did that correctly—who is the head of Communications, Public Affairs, Science, and Sustainability, for Bayer Indonesia. Welcome.

LAKSMI PRASVITA: Thank you.

PETER ENGELKE: And then I see that we do in fact have on screen, joining us virtually, is Maria Teresa Nogales, who is the founder and executive director of Fundacion Alternativas, which is located in Bolivia. And so there she is right there, yes. M.T., can you hear us?

MARIA TERESA NOGALES: I can. Good morning.

PETER ENGELKE: Welcome. Well, welcome to you all.

So as I said before, we only have—unfortunately—45 minutes for this incredibly important conversation, and really a diverse set of perspectives we’re going to be hearing from this morning. So let’s get into the—into the questions.

So really what I want to do first is ask all of you to answer the same question if you will, which is basically—specifically I should say—what do you see as the most pressing current challenges to global food security? A big question, and if you can all find a way to squeeze your answer into a couple of minutes if you can.

So, Ambassador, to you first, please.

AMBASSADOR VASYL HAMIANIN: Thank you very much. It’s a great honor to be here and to speak to the gathering. Thank you.

Well, it will be a difficult task to answer it within two minutes, but I’ll try.

PETER ENGELKE: Sure.

AMBASSADOR VASYL HAMIANIN: So I would not be repeating what is going on in the food security globally but because we had a lot of speakers, we know what happens actually. But I would say that the biggest challenge in food security issue is that we should watch it and receive it as a complex. That’s very important because food security is not just about a grain going from somewhere to somewhere. It’s not just one link; it’s a complex of problems that—coming from the seeds and then, you know, diesel fuel, and then chemicals, and then fertilizers, then labor force, et cetera, et cetera. And after that is trade and logistics.

So now when one link is undermined, then everything else is undermined, too, and now food security is in grave danger, so we—main thing I would say that we have to view this as a complex problem. And to deal with this problem it’s very important to go through a few stages like first thing is to see the roots—what is the root of the problem?

Now—when we are talking about Ukraine, right, because there are many other factors, but Ukraine—as people used to say, war in Ukraine, we identify the root as war in Ukraine. Next stage is to recognize it and on this stage of recognition, I think we have to speak very bravely. It takes a lot of courage to identify this, to acknowledge that this is Russian aggression against Ukraine, so we are not dealing with the war in Ukraine; we’re not dealing with Ukraine basically. The subject is Russia.

Third, we have to identify the instruments how to deal with this, how—basically how to deal with Russia, with Russian aggression, with the regime that made it possible. And the last one, to take action. So basically this is the algorithm, and I think the world is stuck on the—well, globally, stuck on this second stage of acknowledgement that, you know, it’s not a conflict in Ukraine; it’s a Ukrainian crisis. It’s not like war in Ukraine, like nameless war in Ukraine. But it’s Russian aggression against Ukraine. See the roots, cut the roots, cure the disease.

Second one, this problem is accumulative. What I mean is that it’s like a traffic jam. It takes ten minutes to get a jam, and then it takes like one hour to get it, you know, resolved.

So to mitigate the consequences of the food crisis, it will take maybe months, maybe years after what happens. And every day, every week of the aggression will get one month, two month, maybe years to get it resolved. So we have to look at it globally, we have to be responsible, and we have to be very much courageous and brave to acknowledge—to say, A—what is A? A. What is B? B. So a very important thing is that the world should unite to face it.

It’s not a good thing to deal with 50 crises at the same time. It’s like, you know, pouring the water from the spoon onto the fire when you can use the fire extinguisher and just extinguish the fire in a couple of minutes. So rather than to deal with 50 different problems—food security, logistics security, energy security, whatever it is—we would rather deal with one problem, and the name we know. It’s a Moscow fascist regime.

So basically I would say that if we are united we are stronger. If we are united we can resolve everything, and I would say that in this situation we can—like a global community, be a global community, be leaders, and use the rule of law rather than rule of force.

Last one—just last one. I personally don’t understand why and how it happened that a little man confronts the 10 billion of the global population, and everybody is trying to say that, well, everybody is afraid of this man. I mean, he is one, and we are the global community.

Thank you very much.

PETER ENGELKE: Thank you, Ambassador.

So Bo, same question to you.

BO HOLMGREEN: Yes.

PETER ENGELKE: You work in this region of the world. From your perspective here, how do you see sort of the—what do you think is the most important or most pressing challenge related to food security from the perspective of your work?

BO HOLMGREEN: Well, I come at it from a different way. We have spent a lot of time—I’m an engineer, so I use a lot of statistics to focus us. And basically in 2016 we analyzed the entire farm-to-fork concept, and we decided the best place we could have the biggest impact on food security right now—and fastest—was by going—when it falls off the fork—food waste, right? And in fact, we cannot rescue what’s on the fork, so it’s right before—it’s everything that doesn’t go on the fork, from supermarkets, and hotels, and so on. We rescue that, inspect it, get it safely in our cool chain technology to people.

But what we found then and what focused us so much was stunning. There were two facts that made us go, why we do this and where we did it. And the first one was—we back then called it 10-7-1, but now it’s 10-8-1 that tells you how fast it goes, and I totally admired General Clark yesterday for the observation on going from two billion to eight billion people, and we can still make food. But the best part of it is we are indeed almost eight billion people in the world, but today this fantastic food supply chain makes more than enough food—actually more than enough food for 10-plus billion people.

So you would think with all that extra food that everything would be good. Yet eight billion people, more than 10 billion food, one billion of us goes to bed hungry every night. So we simply have a distribution problem, and that is best seen in the old adage—you have heard this a million times—don’t give people fish; teach them how to fish.

Well, our slant on that is that’s true, but until then, let’s at least eat the fish that’s already out of the ocean. And that’s where we come from. So we need to simply fix this distribution problem, right? We have a very high level—we call it food equity where we hope one day to change access to good nutrition to not be based on just money in your hand, but also based on desperation and need. So we have to go to a better way of looking at our food supply chain because there is enough of it.

The other reason why we are now doing it in Southeast Asia is that more people in Southeast Asia than anywhere else in the world is coming out of poverty into middle class, and what happens then? Then they will start throwing the same amount of food away. And sadly, that food waste is just going to explode.

So we came to Asia for that purpose, and if we can rescue all that food waste from those who are now in the middle class and get it to the still poor people, then we are getting the nutrition cycle around. And the whole reason for doing it is not just for food and getting food to people, and so on, but it is the circular economy, and get the circular economy going, especially in countries like here, and Thailand, and Philippines. It’s immensely exciting because the populations are so huge, and if you can get the circular economy to work, we can go very far.

And then, of course, the final thing is that every kilo of food that would have been thrown away—because we are focused only on surplus food—every kilo of surplus food that doesn’t go to the landfill will not create methane gases, and will not hurt the environment so, you know, again, being an engineer, we measure everything down to the CO2 kilos that we save the world for, and so on—and emissions.

PETER ENGELKE: Wonderful. Thank you so much, Bo.

Michal.

Same question—easy question to ask; hard one to answer. But do you have a top-line answer to the question what are the—how do you see the most pressing challenge facing the world when it comes to food?

MICHAŁ KURTYKA: Thank you very much.

And let me get a little bit earlier in our history. In 1709, 600,000 French people died out of starvation. Eighteenth century; it’s basically a climate change but the other way around. The temperatures actually declined, and so there was less and less food available. And in 1783—to be more exact, the 6th of June 1783, a volcano erupted in Iceland. Twenty percent of people died of starvation in the following year, and then all hunger spread over Europe, and many historians right now consider that one of the main element, trigger of French Revolution, was this problem.

But interestingly, on the 5th of October 1789, when people in Paris ran to Versailles, it was not because they lacked food, but because they have learned that the day before in Versailles there was a sumptuous banquet, and so what was the problem? It was inequalities.

And so we are right now facing a world which is entering into a period of chaos, and inequalities will be playing a very—difficult tricks to us. And we must foresee a world in which—there could be a domino effect, you know—starvation, social disorder, political problems.

And let me right now take my hat off—COP24 president—so I was presiding over climate summit in Katowice in 2018, operationalizing the Paris Agreement. And I right now come back from Sharm El Sheikh where COP27 is happening. And so let me put my environment and energy hat and add to that, that in today’s intertwined world—and thank you very much, ambassador from Ukraine for reminding us that Russian aggression against Ukraine is sending tectonic waves on the world in terms of energy prices, gas prices, food prices, inflation, insecurity. That’s an important element.

But the other important element is the equivalent of volcano erupting in Iceland in 1783—today’s energy technologies. They are polluting, they are not preserving water, pesticide, plastics—all that is making us living in an intertwined world, and what is going on in Ukraine is impacting Indonesia; what is going on in Indonesia is impacting the US.

So we must tackle this problem together, and that’s the challenge: how to tackle insecurities of today’s world all together, and then how to build a world in which we will be having a different set of values. The growth will not be based only on the push of—if I may say profits and productivity which is bringing a lot of benefits out of globalization, but also out of respect for our planet and out of engagement of people.

PETER ENGELKE: Thank you. Thank you so much, wonderful comments.

So, Guy—so you are with US Indo-Pacific Command. From your perspective, how do you see the challenge? I suspect your perspective is unique but very important.

GUY MARGALITH: Thank you very much, and it’s an honor to share the stage with this distinguished panel.

Specifically I want to echo something that the ambassador said about Russia’s brutal and unprovoked invasion of Ukraine has led to substantial food insecurity. It has led to disruptions in food, fuel, and fertilizer, as the ambassador mentioned, as other individuals at this forum have mentioned. And this is something that we focus on very clearly because it sends a very important lesson. The lesson is that conflict, that war has severe impacts on global food security, and that’s why a major focus of the US Indo-Pacific Command—Admiral Aquilino, every single day, says his number one focus is to deter conflict. It’s to practice what the secretary of defense calls integrated deterrence, to use all forms of national power in collaboration with our allies and our partners in a multilateral, whole-of-government approach to deter conflict.

But one thing I want to emphasize is that when we think about security and deterrence, it’s not just about the absence of war. It’s not just about deterrence—deterring conflict. It is about the prosperity and the livelihood of people. That’s what it comes down to at the end.

And I think we need to expand our focus of what we define security as, and that’s something that we think about every day at INDOPACOM. It’s about how do we promote a human-centered approach to security because that is ultimately the way that we are going to promote a free and open Indo-Pacific that respects the rules-based international order.

If I could just highlight a few key statistics. In the US Indo-Pacific Command area of responsibility there are 36 countries. Thirty-two of them are either island countries, archipelagic countries, such as Indonesia, or countries that have a coastline. Those countries rely extensively on maritime trade for their food security. A lot of countries, specifically in Oceania—20 to 30 percent of their imports are food imports. It is absolutely critical that the rules-based international order be respected because it is the lifeblood of these countries. In Fiji it’s 20 percent, in Timor-Leste it’s 30 percent, so just a few examples.

And at INDOPACOM we have a few key lines of effort that we are focused on to promote the rules-based international order. If I could, I’d like to highlight just three of them. One is our Women, Peace, and Security programs. We collaborate on a gender-focused approach because we recognize that a gender-focused approach is a key way to promote resilience, and resilience is a key part of food security.

Two, as we collaborate with our allies and partners to fight illegal, unregulated, and unreported fishing—IUU fishing—this is a key area of focus because so many countries in Oceania and the region rely on fishing for their livelihood.

And lastly, climate change has a huge impact when it comes to food security or food insecurity. Our Center for Excellence, Disaster Management partners with our allies and our partners to include Indonesia, to include our other allies and partners in the region, to look at the impacts of global climate change, and to see how we can partner and work together to deter some of the biggest impacts.

So again, bottom line, we need to deter conflict, we need to promote the rules-based international order, and that’s how we’re going to achieve food security.

Thank you.

PETER ENGELKE: All right, thank you so much.

And Laksmi, so same question: how do you see the challenges facing us in the world today when it comes to food?

LAKSMI PRASVITA: Yeah, OK. Thank you.

And I would like to greet my minister, minister of agriculture. And we have also the secretary-general of the minister of agriculture.

Please allow me to sit here and talk about the food security, and I will talk about the food security in Indonesia. So if we take a look—have a look at the global food security index in 2022, actually Indonesia is improving. Yeah, we are green in the food security, so congratulations to us. We can weather the storm of this global supply chain disruption.

But if we zoom in detail into the global food security index, the highest score is in the food affordability. So it is affordable. The government is doing really good in managing the inflation in Indonesia. However, if we take a look in more detail at the lowest point is the food availability, so that is the lowest point in the index of food security in Indonesia. The food availability, having the lowest score is because of—due to the supply chain—the global supply chain disruption, the access to the farming technology, the access to the farming R&D, and those are the things that we need to put our attention if we want to improve the food security index of Indonesia, yeah—so the importance of the access to the technology to the farmer, the availability of the input, and the access to the global supply chain infrastructure.

So I stop there. Maybe we discuss more about what’s the solution then from the private sector view on this global—on this pressing issue of security.

PETER ENGELKE: OK, thank you so much.

And M.T., I hope you can still hear me.

MARIA TERESA NOGALES: I can.

PETER ENGELKE: Wonderful. And it’s so nice to see you virtually.

Same question over to you. You are working in Bolivia, and you see the world from that perspective and from other perspectives. From that geographic region as well as from your own experience, how do you see this equation?

MARIA TERESA NOGALES: Sure, I mean, I think we can all agree that we’re facing a set of compounding factors: climate change, the loss of biodiversity, degraded and contaminated natural resources, economic insecurity, energy insecurity, rising inflation, urbanization—I think is a subject that’s not touched upon sufficiently, which is definitely changing not only our production, but also our diets. Certainly war and conflict, which has been put on the table on several occasions throughout this forum, high food prices, the high cost of fertilizer, food export bans—all of this is, you know, presenting a very challenging scenario in terms of being able to guarantee people’s right to food.

But in addition to all of this, I would like to highlight two factors: one, the invisibility of all those people who work and are part of our food systems. So the people who are producing our food, or transporting our food, or commercializing our food are often not really taken into account in decision making processes. And I think that that influences our ability to really come up with effective solutions because if the actors whose livelihoods are involved in our food systems on a daily basis are not a part of the conversation, then we additionally are not able to understand the challenges that they face in order to ensure that we can have enough food and that that food is available to all.

So in this regard, I think one of the great weaknesses that we’re facing are governance challenges within our food system. And I’ll stop there so that we can delve into some additional questions.

PETER ENGELKE: All right, well, thank you so much, M.T.

So I see that we have roughly 19 minutes left, and we’ve gone through the first set of questions, and so I think that leaves us time for one more round robin. I’ve heard a lot of themes put on the table, and they are all enormous and all important. And we talked about war and conflict and the importance of unity. Urbanization is another one that we just heard about. We’ve heard about food waste. So there’s a lot to cover here.

And what I’d like to do maybe is to go to each of you and have you talk maybe a little bit more about your own—your own area of expertise as well as how you see, if you will, the solution sets. And so because we have—we have so many panelists and so limited time, it’s always unfair to the people who go last in the sequence, so I want to make sure that I balance that out a little bit. And let me start by going last to first for this round.

So M.T., you said—your last word was probably governance, I think was what I heard. So let me turn to you first and ask you how do you see the governance piece as a critical—maybe even the critical piece when it comes to solving the problems that you focus on?

MARIA TERESA NOGALES: Sure. Thank you.

And, yeah, I mean, I think at the end of the day governance is what sets the rules on how things are going to function. And so in this light, you know, in terms of food system governance, we’re talking about an absence of a normative framework country-to-country, region-to-region. Additionally, as I was mentioning, most of the actors that are involved in our food systems and that make, you know, food available in our households and in our communities are actually operating in the informal sector. They are very vulnerable to system shocks, and they do not participate in decision making processes.

So certainly, in terms of finding solutions to the challenges to food security, they need to be part of decision making processes, which means that our processes need to be very participatory. They need to be transparent, they need to be inclusive. And in addition—and this was put on the table earlier by one of my colleagues—is this concept of the rule of law. We need to make sure that our countries are strengthening the mechanisms that ensure that the rule of law is sustained, and that’s especially important when we are talking about generating guarantees for private sector investment because if our countries cannot guarantee, you know, private sector investment, then those are not going to come into fruition.

And finally—and I would say this is a huge problem in Latin America—is the absence of data. And without data, we cannot make informed decisions. And so I think there’s a lot of work that needs to be done in terms of governance and decision making processes, and ensuring that we have sufficient data to make appropriate decisions to make wise investments that can actually help us improve infrastructure, and logistical systems, and supply chains, and production.

PETER ENGELKE: Wonderful. Thank you so much.

Laksmi, maybe I can turn to you next because you were—yes, you—you were fifth on the list and I want to make sure we come to you sooner rather than later so that we’re fair.

LAKSMI PRASVITA: Thank you.

PETER ENGELKE: You said something in your remarks about, you know, the private sector, and obviously that’s the sector you are in and you come from. So I wonder if you might speak a bit to this sort of business model or models that might be applicable to solving some of the problems that you are focused on.

LAKSMI PRASVITA: Yeah, thank you for the questions, yeah.

So what is the private sector view on this food security challenge, and how do we sort it out? So at the heart of the agriculture or the food production—at the heart of it is the farmers, and we know exactly that most of the producers of the food in this world is smallholder farmers, yeah. About 80 percent of the food production in the world is produced by the smallholder farmers; 70 to 80 of the agriculture land is in the process by them.

So it’s very important that we empower them—we empower the smallholder farmers, we give them the access of technology, the most—if possible, the most advanced technology as fast as possible to the smallholder farmers so that they can get all the opportunity, the best opportunity they can have to produce more food, yeah?

So the government of Indonesia has been very open with this access to technology by allowing the latest technology of the biotech to enter Indonesia and to be used by the smallholder farmers to improve their productivity.

However, it’s not enough, I mean, the training to the smallholder farmers and equip them with the technology itself is not enough because when they produce lots of foods, where do they sell these—the harvest. This is very important.

So not only we empower the smallholder farmers, which is very important at the center of the food security, but also how to get the farmers into the supply chain of agriculture, into the business supply chain. And this is where it gets more complex, yeah, because we need to create an ecosystem of business on rural level, not only involving the smallholder farmers, but also the local, the rural entrepreneurs, so that the ecosystem of agriculture in that rural, you know, can have a viable business model. And only with this viable business model we can then sustain the food production, yeah, to weather all of the disruption in the supply chain.

And so what we do as the private sector is we develop a public-private partnership approach to develop the business model, what we call as the close-look business model where we lined up—lined up all of the actors along the supply chain from the smallholder farmers, the bank, the insurance, the agro input providers, and then the off-taker itself.

So that—the risk of the business is distributed evenly along the supply chain and all of the—everyone in the supply chain bear the risk. And this model will be very—it is—for the bank to give a safety—for the bank and financial institution to pour the money into the supply chain. So it is, I think, an effective model that we can try to scale up to make it bigger and also to replicate in the other area.

So with the empowerment to the smallholder farmers, with the most advanced technology, include them in the supply chain of the agriculture, and also include—being inclusive as well to the local entrepreneur, yeah, the small agriculture kiosk in the village, for example, into the supply chain. And it will zoom out more macro to the more global level to include this as MSM—either micro, small, or medium enterprise into the local supply chain, regional supply chain, and then global supply chain with—by creating this business model all together—all of the public and the private sector together, I think we can have a bright future in the food security.

PETER ENGELKE: Wonderful. Thank you so much for that answer.

Guy, you are next on the list. So you spoke about—among other things, right—the roles and responsibilities that your organization has in sort of the area of freedom of navigation—in the current challenges, of course. But over the longer run, what do you think the keys are to sustaining a world wherein we have freedom of navigation in most if not all places that count, including places in this part of the world? Yeah, if you could just maybe give us your thoughts on that piece.

GUY MARGALITH: Sure. Thank you, Peter.

I think it’s not just freedom of navigation, but freedom writ large—a free and open Indo-Pacific, freedom of commerce, freedom of aviation—all the freedoms that we rely on as part of the rules-based international order. So freedom of navigation of course is critical because so many of the countries in this area rely on maritime trade specifically. But it’s not just that.

And it’s not just the United States either. We need to act together with our allies and partners, with all of the agencies of our governments, and that’s a key focus that we have over at INDOPACOM.

I just want to highlight perhaps just two initiatives that the United States has focused on, and first, Indonesia, as part of its G20 presidency, just last month convened the finance and agricultural ministers for the first time in the G20 to focus on issues regarding food security, which I think emphasizes the fact that this requires a multilateral approach.

Two, APEC—Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation—will be hosted by the United States next year, and APEC is the premiere forum to discuss issues such as these because free and fair and open trade underpin our rules-based international order. It underpins our food security. So just a couple of the things that we are focused on at INDOPACOM and the things that we are looking forward to, to work with our allies and partners as part of our defense of the rules-based international order. Thanks.

PETER ENGELKE: Wonderful. Thanks—thanks so much for that answer.

And I guess I want to turn next to Michal, and you—there are few things that struck me besides I’m also, by the way, a historian so I love the references to the 18th century and 19th century and so forth.

But among other things, you talked about the importance of developing unity, right, in our responses to various crises—climate crisis, food crisis, other crises—as well as formulating a different set of values. And I wonder if you might—if you would be interested in deepening and extending those remarks, and particularly when it comes to the piece of how unity is associated with values and what that might mean practically for solving the climate crisis as well as the food crisis—again, a very simple question with a complex answer, and you have about 2-1/2 minutes.

MICHAŁ KURTYKA: Thank you very much. That’s an excellent question, and that’s a very difficult one because we are entering into a very fragmented world. So it’s much more difficult to develop practical ways of translating this unity into something tangible.

But my answer would be at two levels: global and local. At the global level, I believe that we need to develop new sets of clean and water-saving technologies because you remember what minister of defense referred to, the three elements—energy, food, and water security. So I believe that we should develop a level of global community, and that’s an effort of science, that’s an effort of enough scale for these technologies to develop. We need to develop water savings, pollution-free, emission-free technologies.

But then how to link this with what you spoke about—local families—because that’s the challenge. Yes, the change is happening locally, so how to provide these global technologies at local—at the level of local communities.

And I believe that in today’s world it will be extremely complicated to develop financial tools. Why? Rich North is basically out of money; South is disillusioned after COVID for any support of Western countries. So we need to develop new forms of solidarity, and I believe that if we, let’s say, go for a global fund of technology where you locate IPs, then you can also provide these technologies at local level.

Now let me take an example of Indonesia. I like very much because Indonesia is champion in geothermal energy. World’s biggest resources of geothermal lies here in Indonesia because of volcanos, et cetera. But this is extremely water-consuming technology, yes? You need to extract the heat with water from deep of the ground.

But there are right now research in California—an example for our American friends of solidarity—of deep water-free geothermal. So why not to put the disposition of Indonesia this water-free geothermal technology so that local communities can develop their own energy sources, and they can become resilient in terms of their ability to produce not only energy, but also out of this cheap energy also food and safe water.

PETER ENGELKE: Thank you. Thank you so much.

So Bo, the problem of food waste is enormous globally, right?

BO HOLMGREEN: Yes.

PETER ENGELKE: But you’ve been running a very successful non-profit here in the region that has made, I think it’s fair to say, significant inroads into addressing this problem. I wonder if you might draw from that experience and talk about how scalable this solution set you found is to the rest of the world.

BO HOLMGREEN: Right. Well, it’s certainly scalable and that’s why it’s so important that we do the right research, and we get lots of people on board to create a lot of little SOSs around the world, and so on, right?

But we looked at the supply chain, right, and we’ve heard these two days about everything from fertilizer to not having war, and so on, right? So I’m going to go back to my walk in Kyiv, of all places, right. And I was creating SOS at the time, and I had never heard of the Ukrainian holocaust before. I must admit I was uneducated on that, right? But I went down to those big rocks where they have the carved letters, and I was standing there reading for an hour. It was cold, but I was so fascinated because this was when Stalin simply took all the food away from Ukraine and brought it to Russia. And I don’t know how many millions of people died from starvation, right?

So we can optimize society—that’s what we’re doing with circular economy. We’re optimizing everything we can to make it the best possible world for all of us. But if you have crazy people that just do things like that, as you talked to, there is little we can do. So government has to come into it. Government needs to work together, but governments also need to do their own thing.

The first thing that happened in America, which was great, was something called the Good Samaritan law. You know, everybody sues each other in America, right, but the Good Samaritan law is that I can give you food, and if I don’t have any reason to believe it’s bad, even if it was bad and somebody gets sick from it, you cannot sue me, right?

The other good thing that comes now from America is this focus on not having an expiration—no, a best-by date, right? A real expiration date, that’s OK, but a best-by date—so many people look at that and throw it away far too early, right, and that’s where we have to come with the… chain trucks and pick all this stuff up, and recycle it same day out, right?

And there are just some things where government can do, and the last thing governments really need to do—and I love the fact—if we are actually going to send a strong message to the G20 leadership, it has to do with the environment, right? Like I said, for every kilo of food we can save, the world is a better place in the emissions and so on. So tax benefits, financial motivation to have carbon reduction is essential.

If I could, you know, issue a certificate to all the hotels and whatever we pick up food from, and they could have a tax benefit, now we would have them lining up, right, so government really needs to step up in all these countries. And I will say it is happening. I mean, we now work with a prime minister in Thailand, and they are very excited about our food banks up there, and Cloud Food Bank, and whatever we call it. But we have to show the vision and then get the support from the governments, and that’s fortunately happening, so it will be better but still a long ways to go.

PETER ENGELKE: A ways to go, but a hopeful message.

BO HOLMGREEN: Yes.

PETER ENGELKE: And I think that’s fitting to end this panel with the ambassador. We began with you, and your country is going through some—obviously, some very difficult times this year. But your message was also hopeful. You were one of the panelists who stressed the theme of unity, and I’d like maybe to have you discuss—I think it would be remiss of me not to have you, as the ambassador, to talk about how you are working with our host country, Indonesia—how Ukraine is working with Indonesia in the area of food security. And maybe you can leave us with some hopeful words about the constructive relationships that exist in this part of the world and your part of the world that will move us forward on this really critical topic that we’ve been spending two days now talking about.

AMBASSADOR VASYL HAMIANIN: Yeah, thanks. Well, good question again—not for five minutes, but I’ll try.

PETER ENGELKE: OK.

AMBASSADOR VASYL HAMIANIN: Well, in a nutshell, this is a very challenging market, and in terms of it’s a big country with big consumption. And, you know, I guess the—all the exporters of the world are fighting for this market like they fight for like say for Chinese or Indian markets. That’s why it’s challenging for me, but I’m very optimistic. I’m always an optimist so after we defeat the enemy in the nearest future and everything will gradually get back to normal, we’ll have a plan about developing the agricultural business and the trading business between Ukraine and Indonesia, and at large with the region of ASEAN because, well, good news is that two days ago my minister signed the agreement—TAC agreement, so we became partners with ASEAN so there will be a bigger market and integrated market. We’d like to integrate more on that.

Then, well, optimistic news is that, you know, we are talking about farm to fork, right, and it’s not about just make people eat enough; it make people eat quality food and diverse food, right, so I think Ukraine is not about just a wheat bucket, as we also talk about.

PETER ENGELKE: Right.

AMB: HAMIANIN: It’s also about the diversity, food technologies, processing technology, et cetera.

So my goals will be three, and I hope the businesspeople here will listen, and—I will be very open for communication on that. I will be concentrating on three things. First is the diversity. It will be not just wheat or corn or something; it will be—it will be all sorts of things. Actually I’ve explored the market—it’s fruits and vegetables and everything, and the products.

Second is added value. It must be—it must be like processed food.

And third is, you know, following the trends because the market is always changing so we can follow the trends, follow the technologies, stick with the technologies and like, you know, create joint venture or whatever.

So it will be a challenging business, but I’m confident—looking confidently. Thank you.

PETER ENGELKE: Thank you.

So I am going to bring the panel to a close. Could you all please join me in applauding our panelists here today?

And once again, thank you all for attending this conference. As a representative of the Atlantic Council, we are delighted that every one of you is here, and we look forward to a robust afternoon of conversations.

Thank you so much.

Watch the panel

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Flagship Event Sat, November 12, 2022 • 12:00 am ET

Highlights from the Global Food Security Forum

A gathering of leaders across government, industry, and civil society to assess food security as a global challenge and offer bold solutions for strengthening food systems, securing supply chains, and fighting world hunger. This Forum is co-hosted with the Gaurav and Sharon Srivastava Family Foundation, the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Indonesia, and the Coordinating Ministry of Maritime Affairs and Investment of the Republic of Indonesia and takes place on the sidelines of the G20 summit in Bali.

Economy & Business Resilience & Society

Event transcript

Uncorrected transcript: Check against delivery

ANNOUNCER: Please welcome to the stage Global Head, Inclusive Economic Growth, Abt Associates and Nonresident Senior Fellow, GeoEconomics Center, Atlantic Council Dr. Nicole Goldin.

NICOLE GOLDIN: Great. Well, thank you. It’s such a pleasure to see you all. This has been a really deep and tremendous couple of days of conversation, and our job is not an easy one. We want to take what we’ve heard, especially on solutions, and try to unpack that just a little more, add a little bit more concreteness and specificity, and really, I think, make it practical so that we can inform the G20 agenda and take some of these great ideas and solutions forward. We’ve been hearing about technology. We’ve been hearing about finance. We’ve been hearing about the food-water-energy intersection, if you will. We’ve been hearing about supply and demand, which, as an economist, is of course music to my ears. So we’ve got a lot of talk to talk about.

And I’ve got a great panel here to help me do that.

Immediately on my left is Qingfeng Zhang. He is the chief of rural development and food security at the Asian Development Bank.

To his left we have Bakur Kvezereli. He is the CEO of Ztractor, which I’m sure you’re all excited to learn more about.

Then we have Max Peterson. He is the—he is the vice president of worldwide public services at Amazon Web Services—excuse me, Amazon public sector.

And then we have Mr. Erez Fait, the co-founder and president of Agrinoze.

And I believe we have—yes, we have Dr. Arif Husain, chief economist at the World Food Programme.

And we’re lucky to be joined by His Excellency Oleksandr Kubrakov, minister of infrastructure in Ukraine.

So welcome. Thank you.

I’d like to get right to it. We’ve heard and we’ve been talking about how conflict, COVID-19, and climate change have exacerbated the situation and the food security crisis. So let me go first to your excellency the minister to ask: How has the food security situation in Ukraine changed since the war began? And maybe you can speak a little bit more about the grain deal and what that has done to the situation.

MINISTER OLEKSANDR KUBRAKOV: OK. Thank you very much for this opportunity.

And from the first days of full-scale mobilization, Ukraine infrastructure become one of the main targets for the enemy. And according to the World Bank report, the damage caused to the transport sector of Ukraine, it’s about 30 billion US dollars and losses reach 26 billion of US dollar. Since the beginning of Russian mobilization, all Ukrainian ports in the Black Sea and Azov have been forcibly closed to the entire—to the entry and exit of ships. The seaports of Berdiansk, Mariupol, and Skadovsk are under occupation and they’re closed until control is to be resolved. And before the full-scale mobilization, Ukraine supplied more than 15 percent of world’s corn export, more than 10 percent of wheat, and more than 50 percent of sunflower oil, and many other products of agriculture and industry. About 70 percent of Ukrainian products [are shipped] by sea, mostly by Ukrainian seaports on Black Sea.

So after just due to military mobilization, traditional supply chains were lost and at least 70 million people around the world are at risk of starvation for the moment. And it was very important for us to start Black Sea Grain Initiative because in peril we started—I mean, at the beginning of the war we started development of alternative channels of export of our product. It was, first of all, our seaports on Dnieper River, our railway lines in direction to European Union, and a lot of activities were performed where realized in cooperation with European Union with increased capacity of existing border cross checkpoints. We did—we did a lot of projects with our neighboring countries and solidarity lanes. It was important step in direction to fight food crisis and economic crisis as well. Thanks.

Important step was Black Sea Grain Initiative. It was signed on 22 of July. From that moment, from the first of August, we already exported about 10.3 million tons of agricultural products. Mostly, it’s Africa and Asia. European countries as well, but again, key regions historically was Asia and Africa, especially during the last years. More than 20,000—200,000 tons of agricultural export—of agricultural products were exported in cooperation with United Nations World Food Programme. And again, Black Sea Grain Initiative thanks to our allies, thanks to United Nations, Turkey, I think we know very well, I mean, how it’s important, how this initiative influence on global food prices. Each crisis during working of the initiative, we see how prices is growing 5, 7, 8 percent and then again, while initiative started working, prices became lower and lower, so—on the same 5, 7, and 10 percent. So on our side, we are doing our best in order to prolong.

NICOLE GOLDIN: Thank you very much, Mr. Minister. Hopefully we’ll be able to get you back momentarily.

But it’s a good segue. We’ve heard from other Ukrainian colleagues as well as a number of experts that have spoken in our panels that the food crisis and the compounding conflict, climate change, COVID has had a disproportionate impact on women, on children, in some regions on indigenous communities. So I wanted to turn to—first to you, Qingfeng, to talk about what are some of the strategies and how are you thinking about addressing those most at risk.

QINGFENG ZHANG: Thank you so much, Nicole. And thanks for the Council invite Asian Development Bank attend this very important session immediately before the G20.

Again, I just follow the conversation by our Ukraine minster of the infrastructure. After the Ukraine—the Russian invasion of the Ukraine, you can see the so many countries suffering in the Asia-Pacific. At least 13 countries relying one of the three key essential commodities from the Russia or the Ukraine. But you know, the—in addition to the supply chain disruptions by the COVID and also this war, climate change was severely effect the Asia-Pacific. Just thinking about this year, the floods in the Pakistan and heat wave in India, and also the droughts in the Yangtze River, basically involved 4 billion, you know, populations, over 40 percent of this world populations.

So with this severe challengings, Asian Development Bank, as one of the key efforts in the region, we formulate 14 billion US dollars from the 2022 to 2025 to address the food insecurity, covering both the immediate responses and also the long-term measures to build up the resilience. This year, we’re going to deliver 3 billion US dollars immediate in response, provide the working capital to the small SMEs, mitigate the fertilizer shortage, and more importantly also try to supply financing facility to address supply chain disruptions.

And as for the long-term measures like the three years 2023-2025, we are already programming about 10.7 billion US dollars focused on three key areas. One is small agriculture. Very much it supports the participation of the women and also the small farmers. Second highlights digitalization of agricultural value chain, highlights financial inclusion, find out the way to reach out to the small farmers and also to help this microfinance, to help the—our process quickly lead to our farmers. Lastly, you know, these two days we discuss about the fertilizer, natural-based solutions. We are going to introduce innovative financing facility to scale up capital investment, nature-based solutions, including the payment for ecological services…

Probably let me just pause here and then we can come back, discuss about the concrete, you know, measures. Thank you.

NICOLE GOLDIN: Fantastic. Thank you so much.

Arif, I’d like to come to you on a similar question. Qingfeng, you know, talked a bit about using or working through small- and medium-sized enterprises as one strategy to get at those that are often marginalized who also kind of dominate the landscape, right, of the economy in the market systems. In your work with the World Food Programme, how are you thinking about addressing and meeting the needs of those most at risk?

ARIF HUSAIN: Thank you. Thank you for the opportunity. Really happy to be here and I think this is an excellent question. I can tell you that I’ve been in this work for about 20 years now and what we are seeing this year, it’s, in fact, terrible.

You know, one thing which we talk about is that, you know, when the World Food Programme is setting records, it’s not necessarily a good thing for the world, right? And what we have been doing is we have been setting records since 2020. We fed 115 million people in 2020, 128 million people in 2021, and this year we plan to feed 150—more than 150 million people. So you can see that this is a, you know, gradual increase in the number of people who need assistance.

And coming to your question, the vast majority of the people we work with, they are essentially in rural areas. They are women and children. They are in agriculture. So on one side it is critically important to save lives, right? In 21^st century, if you are talking about 50 million plus people a step away from famine in hunger emergencies in upwards of 45 countries, I mean, that’s telling. That should be unacceptable.

And if we are going to deal with this, obviously, we need to deal with the root causes. First and foremost, still it’s the wars. It’s the conflict. Then, obviously, it’s the climate. And then it is economic marginalization, right? And these are not just words; this is what we are seeing out there.

So, first and foremost, we need to save lives. And after that, we need to start talking about changing lives. And that is where we are focusing a lot.

What is also very different is that we have learned very quickly that extreme points, they don’t work. So if you’re pure humanitarian, it doesn’t work. If you’re pure development, it still doesn’t work. And we are seeing that there is this recognition of this fact. And when you now look at IMF or you look at World Bank, they are coming into the space of where people FCV—fragility, conflict, and violence. At the same time agencies like mine, who is mainly humanitarian, they’re moving towards enabling people, changing lives, and trying to meet them in the middle. And if we can do that, and if we can bring the private sector into this, maybe we get out of this.

One other thing I wanted to mention following the Ukrainian minister, this Black Sea Initiative. This has saved a lot of lives. But you know, this is—initial deal was for 120 days, which is going to come to an end on November 19, essentially a week from now. This needs to continue. This needs to continue beyond till this war is done and trade comes back to normal. And if that happens, we at least dampen—slightly dampen the impact which we are seeing around the world, and that’s—that must happen going forward.

NICOLE GOLDIN: Thank you very much. We are going to come back on some of those governance points that you raised.

And I’m glad you mentioned the private sector. We’ve got three great representatives from the private sector. So let me turn to you, Bakur, to Matt, and to Erez and ask each of you to just tell us about, again, as concretely as you can how your product or the application of your product is disrupting the food security system—positively disrupting, I would say, or helping communities to adapt to climate change or to some of these situations. Bakur, why don’t we start with you.

BAKUR KVEZERELI: Thank you. Thank you.

I think we had great speakers these two days and great messages which should be carry over the G20 discussions. I think there has been a consensus in this room, in this forum that, you know, next three decades we will need to produce 70 percent more food with less water available for farming, with less soil available for farming, with less labor force available for farming. And I believe that—and unpredictable weather is contributing to all this. I don’t want to sound very Silicon Valleyish kind of approach that technology can fix everything.

Of course, we will need the policies, we will need financing, and everything. But I believe—it’s my personal position, not our company, in this case—that automation and autonomy, which will allow us to farm with less labor force, indoor farming or vertical farming where one acre of the facility we can produce the vegetables of the, I don’t know 20, 30, 40 acres.

Of course, electrification will play its role in machinery electrification, which is our message which we work on, to electrify agriculture in general. But with agricultural machinery will play its role on dependence on energy, obviously.

And alternative proteins. We cannot ignore the alternative proteins are nice to have. We are relying on very few protein sources. We talked about that yesterday, today. And we need to increase—diverse the proteins which we can use for food processing or production and so on.

I think that’s our perspective of a startup or technologies on that perspective, is to introduce more tech and, on top of that, digitalize agriculture as much as possible, which will bring transparency, which will bring predictability, and we can plan better. And our partner in this game is Amazon with their beautiful products in AWS, which supports a lot of robotics companies in our field, I think, that all synergy between very established corporations which have a great experience of digitalizing other sectors can be brought to agriculture and we can fix significant portion of the problems.

NICOLE GOLDIN: Fantastic.

And very quickly, for those that may not have heard you talk about Ztractor, just, you know, how does that fit in and what exactly is for those that might not be aware?

BAKUR KVEZERELI: We are manufacturing autonomous electric tractor. It’s completely unmanned. There is no seat for a driver on it. And we did it by purpose. We did some research before we started to design this tractor. Our belief is that with many, many tractors around the world we can connect them on one cloud and do the real-time data gathering from the machines, which will improve efficiency and give us better predictability of which crop is produced where—what will be the yield of almonds in California and Spain—and then the traders—we’ve met a few commodity traders here—can do better deals on futures. And—

NICOLE GOLDIN: So that’s a great segue to Max—

BAKUR KVEZERELI: Exactly.

NICOLE GOLDIN:—to talk about not only with Ztractor, but in general how is cloud computing changing and disrupting positively—

MAX PETERSON: Well, I’m super excited just listening right here to what one company is doing to reimagine how they deliver scale to farming. And I listened both to Qingfeng, who talked about the importance of small farmers, a really interesting example of how you approach automation. At Amazon, we believe that our responsibility is to be able to provide the sort of enabling technology that lets all of these solutions come to life.

I also agree with the gentleman from the World Food Programme. It’s not one thing. It’s not development activities in isolation. It’s not humanitarian aid in isolation. It’s not technology in isolation. We’ve got to find the ways to make all of these things work together and be used in the appropriate areas around the world because it’s—there’s going to be different solutions that are based locally.

I’ll give you one specific example because you—Nicole, you wanted specific examples. In India, we work with a company called Cropin who deployed something called SmartFarm. And India is an economy with a lot of small farmers, and so it was not important only just to focus on the food-production piece but also on the economic viability of all of these small farmers. And what Cropin used was they used a combination of technology running on Amazon. They integrated satellites. They integrated overhead Earth observation. They integrated Internet of Things types of sensors. They integrated open public datasets like the Amazon Sustainability Data Initiative. And they’re able to bring precise insights to the farmers on the ground, over 7 million farmers covering about 16 million acres of land, and they can help them understand precisely how to apply, you know, different technologies to—you know, to produce the crops in the most effective way for them, providing both food and livelihood.

NICOLE GOLDIN: What a fantastic example. And we’re going to carry on with the specifics, and that’s great.

We’ve heard a lot, Erez, of conversation around water and that linkage between water, food security, the impact of drought and of climate change and reducing water. So tell us how autonomous irrigation and Agrinoze is positively disrupting and bringing new solutions to the table.

EREZ FAIT: So, first of all, we are Indonesian. And before the food security became topic, the minister of defense was already thinking about it—before COVID, before the Ukraine war. So he gave us challenge to bring here the technology and to implement it in Indonesia. And we made the plan to send people to do the training. Apparently, two weeks after we started COVID came and block everything. So we manage with two people—which one is Wija, one is Yuza, that they were one of the project management—everything through Zoom to train and to make the system up and running until today. And this system shows that technology can overcome barriers.

So we are using the technology how to, I would say, fix or help the challenges that were discussed here. Because in all the discussions here, I heard about problems—water, finance, fertilizers, knowledge, scale-up, all those things that are challenges for the humans—but we are coming from technology solution, so we know how to take technology and to solve problems.

So, first of all, so we have to think—to know that the minister had this vision long ago, before it became topic. And that reason, in Indonesia we are most prepared compared to other place in the world. Although now we work in California and other countries, but still we have a base of people locally that know how to use the technology and they grow things that they never think can be grown in sea level.

Now, how we do it? We do it by automation and autonomous and taking all the data into algorithm with machine learning, which actually nursing the plant like baby in incubator. Because baby in incubator, it doesn’t cry. The sensors knows in advance what he needs, not like outside. So we develop a solution that is on the roots zone and manage the zones 24/7, even not exist in nature. You can take, like, hydroponic in the soil. So the roots are always efficient and produce.

In countries like Indonesia, which is the Equator, 24/7 means because the temperature is always correct. And we eliminate the depend on rain and climate. So once we have the soil and we have the ability to cultivate, everything is possible.

So the other thing that I want to mention—because the minister is the vision—is to think about what we call mobile farming, because we create kind of Ikea kit that could connect all the needs in one system. So, because Indonesia is big, we said let’s make a system that we can ship on a truck, put in a place, put the hose or the dripline, and start to work. This is counter of another problem.

The other thing is local production. In Indonesia, one of the thing is how to—it’s a big country. Logistic is big. Shipping the hose or the dripline, it’s very expensive because it’s mostly air. So we have a plan. And will discuss with agencies they are looking to contribute, like the DFC, because they want to enable the food security and the health and women and youth. So, actually, in our activity in Indonesia, we have young people that do crowdfunding in order to start this kind of initiative. And this shows that there is a need and it make people interesting and make people excited.

And then what we think is how to expand small villages. So because the technology is kind of centralized, we enable small farmers that have one, two hectares that one system can irrigate their plots and they just do the cultivation. So this is in general what we do.

Sitting next to me, the Amazon. Amazon is a big cloud, but we need to make the cloud give rain and the right rain. So I challenge him: How do we take this cloud and make it available to the people to make it useable? So this discussion between us later on.

NICOLE GOLDIN: It’s a great point and it speaks to kind of a quick follow-up for the—for the three of you in particular before we come back on some governance, which is: Where does partnerships come in, right? We’ve been talking about, we’ve heard about the scale. The scale of this challenge requires urgent action and it requires long-term thinking as well. So you mentioned partnerships. You mentioned sort of B2B. What are the challenges of scale? And when you think about partnerships—at Abt Associates, you know, we found in our work implementing projects for Feed the Future in Cambodia and Egypt of the US government that partnering with government, with local private sector, with the small- and medium-sized enterprises, and with civil society is really critical, especially for that inclusion aspect.

So, Bakur, maybe we’ll come to you first, and then we’ll go to Erez and then Max for your thoughts on scaling and partnerships.

BAKUR KVEZERELI: Thank you. I think, to go back to what was discussed for two days here, I think we received two loud, long wakeup calls, which are COVID and the war. And it’s not only food community; it’s everyone, logistics, all businesses, and society in general. And I think this will force collaboration because we need to find fast solutions yesterday. It’s already past due to solve basic issues in, let’s say—I don’t want to point to any particular problem, but there are issues where we can collaborate with government, with corporations, with other industries which are never been involved in agriculture like aviation. Aviation has the best sensors. We use two sensors on our tractor from aviation. They’re expensive, but they are fixing the issues no one have applied to agriculture before, right? And I think because of the circumstances, which are unfortunate, but we need to learn from this and make it—make the decisions now.

NICOLE GOLDIN: I love that example of cross-industry and thinking outside the box, and it goes back to the data point that both you and Erez mentioned and how you’re bringing data into it. And I’m going to come back to you, Erez, on this kind of scalability and partnerships. And then, Max, we’ll come to you.

EREZ FAIT: So first of all, scale means knowledge and team. So we have now in Indonesia about six project that we are planning already to start using the crowd finance and local entrepreneur. And although some of them are approaching a huge area—five 1,000 hectare—we start only with one because part of it is education, to build a local capacity. So this is the way that we can easily expand in each area, putting the seed. Later on, it’s only expansion.

So, again, it’s important to understand the people that help us are not farmers. They’re coming from defense and the economy, but they understand how to scale up because, in the end of the day, the issue is scale up. And it means how to educate the people, make the technology available.

So part of our solution now is mobile application where the farmer can, in a way, have direct relation with the plant through our system. So it’s not anywhere—any more blind because today they are blind. They don’t know, there is a disease, what to do. There is something happen, they don’t know what to do. So part of our solution, because it’s online using cloud, we enable to close the circle. Like today in Jakarta there is a problem, we know the problem before they know because when they sleep and there is a leak we get alarm. So all these things are available today.

So the issue, how to connect all the dots of the agencies that has the money, the agencies they have the needs. So, actually, the model that we have in Indonesia we are now copying to Uzbekistan, to Vietnam, to all those countries we have discussion with. And I’m going from here to UAE, and over there they don’t have employees. So I’m going to make people train here to work over there. So you can see that we are looking at the global problem as one problem and solving it the same way.

NICOLE GOLDIN: So, Max, I’m sure Amazon Web Services has some interesting thoughts on scale and scalability. I’d love to hear them.

MAX PETERSON: Well, actually, yeah. Good call. Amazon actually created a new leadership principle just about a year and a half ago called success and scale bring broad responsibility.

And I want to shift, though, from talking about the technology partnerships to talk about people partnerships, because part of the way that we’re going to all improve is to innovate out of this. And there is—I mean, I’m sitting next to two people who I just got the opportunity and met who are driving incredible innovation. At AWS, we recognize that we need a place to bring these sorts of innovations together. You need to include universities and research organizations and government and nonprofits and NGOs and industry.

And so we created something called cloud innovation centers. We do these in combination with universities around the world. We’ve currently got a dozen of these cloud innovation centers in operation around the world and they do exactly that. They serve as a place to bring together all of the people with incredible innovative ideas with the data that they need to make good data-driven decisions and with some technology from Amazon to be able to come up with these ideas.

And by the way, those 12 cloud innovation centers just so far in 2022 have done over a hundred innovation projects. And so we create these innovation challenges. They could be food security. They could be health. They could be anything that’s relevant to the local community. And it’s a phenomenal way to build the partnerships that you talked about.

NICOLE GOLDIN: That’s such a great example, and I don’t think we hear enough or talk enough about the importance of the academic community and that research piece. And it’s great to see you bringing that innovation and that academics.

We talked about sort of technology as an enabling factor, and another aspect of the conversation these last couple days has been about governance and the importance of governance, both at the national and in the multilateral context, to support aligning incentives, to support innovation, investment, and inclusion as well. And so I want to come back to you, Qingfeng, to ask you to kind of speak briefly about multilateral governance. You mentioned some models in particular on the financing side. We haven’t gotten at that. What are some specific aspects of models of multilateral governance that you can—that you could speak to?

QINGFENG ZHANG: Thank you so much, Nicole. Again, I—you know, if we’re talking about the difference between this crisis and also 2008 crisis, you know, good news is that—our colleagues in this panel already mentioned about it—we know the crisis much better than before and we have a good tools in our hand—you know, the technology, digital technology, you know, remote sensing and many other tools in our hand—to address the crisis. But at same time, we also know that the scale and also the complexity of the crisis much bigger than the 2008 crisis, so it requires cooperations between the international organizations and also the governments.

So this time we learned the lessons from the 2008 crisis, so immediately after the Russia invasion of the Ukraine and then in May all of the IFIs—international financial institutions; ADB, World Bank, African Development Bank, IFA—all of them get together, formulate, and they launch action plan to address food insecurity. Basically, we agree to adopt coherent strategy focused on five key areas.

Number one is the support the vulnerable people.

Two, promote the open trade.

Three, mitigate the fertilizer shortage.

Four is support the small farmers and also productions.

Finally, focus on long-term resilience…

So after that, of course, is the G7 hosted by Germany where we are—you know, establish sort of the global alliance on the food security. Just a few days ago, under the COP27, we jointly launch what we call is a food security dodgeball. So that means we’re going to watch what happening in agricultural market information, but at the same time also track our financial… and how to address the most vulnerable people.

Again, I’m not saying this is perfect. So many things need to be addressed. But again, compared to the 2008 crisis, I think the international community responded much quicker, much more, you know, coordinated, you know. And then they—I think going to be also effective.

Let me just pause here.

NICOLE GOLDIN: Thank you. It’s a good example and it’s one I will bring back to my colleagues at the Atlantic Council GeoEconomics Center as we’re thinking about reforming and what the Bretton Woods 2.0 will look like as we think about World Bank and IMF reforms.

And I want to come to you—back to you, Arif. Again, thinking about multilateral, you’re operating in—within the UN system. What are some of the aspects of the work? And what have you seen work well at the multilateral level in terms of multilateral governance and also in the financing aspect?

ARIF HUSAIN: Right. So excellent question.

First and foremost, I mean, you know, what we are seeing is that there is a consensus on the problem statements. You have IMF, World Bank, WTO, World Food Programme, FAO doing joint statements on what’s at stake. And on that side, essentially three things come to mind as the problem statements.

First one is that, as bad as it is right now, you can call this affordability crisis, meaning food is available but it may not be at the right place or it might not be at the right cost. But it is available. But if we don’t sort out the fertilizer issue and sort it out now, today’s affordability crisis will turn into tomorrow’s availability crisis, which means even higher prices. And I don’t think we can afford that in 2023. That’s one side.

The second one where we are coming together is basically about which countries are in trouble. What are the characteristics of countries which are in trouble? And what I can say is that if you’re a poor country, if you have high debt, if you happen to import your food, your fuel, and your fertilizer, you are in trouble. So what is the solution on that side? We need to start talking about debt relief or hunger relief, meaning instead of poor countries making their debt payments they could use the same resources to import their food and their fertilizer. This is something which needs to be considered. There is a precedent in the sense of there is debt relief for climate. Why not debt relief for hunger relief?

The third thing where there is consensus building is about, you know, our export bases for our staple commodities are extremely, extremely thin. What I mean by that is that less than 10 countries make up 70, 80 percent of our export base for wheat, corn, rice, soybean, even fertilizer. And, worse yet, less than five countries hold stocks of these commodities at 90 percent level. That kind of situation means that whenever a shock happens to any one of these countries you feel the pain all around the world, and war in Ukraine is just the latest example of that. So we need to sort of sort out the diversification problem going forward.

Now, very last thing on that is that, frankly, we have the money, we have the technology, we have the—it’s not about those things. At the end of the day, it is about staying the course because many of these things, if we are going to solve them, it’s going to take time. That requires political will and staying with the problem till it’s done, and that’s something which we have been missing. We missed it in 2008. We missed it in 2011. Hopefully, this time around we stick with the problem till it is resolved.

NICOLE GOLDIN: Thank you. I’m glad you reiterated and brought the debt issue back into the conversation. That’s something that we talked a little bit about earlier and yesterday as well. And it really is critical to keep that in context, especially to your point about as we go into the G20 and the finance ministers are meeting, and that is something that I know is on the agenda, and there is certainly a clear linkage, especially right now.

Believe it or not, we only have a few minutes left. Time has flown by. So I’m going to ask you all one last question. We talked about our successes and what is working, but sometimes we can learn as much if not more from talking about what hasn’t worked or what we haven’t tried yet and why. So in just about a minute, I’ll ask you all for a kind of final thought what you are excited to see moving forward, a key lesson learned within your own company, within your own product, or just something you’ve seen in the community that you think we can do better. And I will start with Bakur because you just raised your hand. And we’ll have just one minute each. Thank you.

BAKUR KVEZERELI: Thank you. Thank you.

So the—my thoughts—all this, again, going back to the discussions—is that there is—there are different agreements like Madrid agreement on one topic, there is the Paris agreement on climate. We don’t have a food agreement so far. There are multiple, but not as global and as powerful as—we don’t have targets. We don’t know what our target as a globe in food. And I think that Bali, Indonesia agreement in the next two days or three days will be a good start, good base for a future moving forward, just to agree on target what we need to achieve in grain production, in meat production, and so on and so on, right? I think that’s where we failed and now we need to do that type of agreement so everyone knows what’s our vision and what we want to achieve in what time period.

NICOLE GOLDIN: Great. Excellent suggestion. Thank you.

Erez, coming to you.

EREZ FAIT: So, first of all, I would like to refer to Ukraine because it’s on the cloud, Ukraine. So because of our experience of doing things remotely, we are working now with some Ukraine farmers that moved the agriculture from the area that was captured by Russia into the other side of Ukraine in order to provide food. So the ability to send a system remotely and just explain what to do, it’s part of our activity here. So this is the advantage of technology.

The other thing is how to make a small move in order to make a bigger move, because everybody speak about the problems and the thing is how to start to open this dam to bring the results to everybody now. Because, as you said, the availability is now and the issue of challenges is now, and we cannot delay food delivery. That’s the problem. We can delay things like luxury, but not food. So these are the challenges now.

NICOLE GOLDIN: Very inspirational. Thank you.

Arif, coming to you for a final thought, an inspired failure, or something that we can all take forward or do differently.

ARIF HUSAIN: Look, I mean, you know, there is a lot of hope. And frankly, this is—hunger is a solvable problem. It’s not just saying that; it really is when you look at it.

My final thought just is that, you know, we are always talking about whenever there is a project offered or something is offered, you know, we always talk about, you know, how much is it going to cost to do that. Maybe we need to turn this question on its head and start asking: What if we don’t do it, what is the cost? What is the cost of inaction? And if that answer scares you, you better do it. And if it doesn’t, it’s fine.

Right now, the cost of inaction of not dealing with food security in terms of destabilization, in terms of terrorism, in terms of migration out of destitution is huge. It’s just that we don’t pay it right away; we pay it a few months or a few years later. And I think we need to start thinking about that very, very seriously when we are making financial decisions and political will about solving many of these problems because they come to our doorsteps as well. Thank you.

NICOLE GOLDIN: Thank you. It’s such an important point. The counterfactual can be really powerful, and I think that also speaks to the importance of research and data. And maybe that’s something, as well, that we as a community haven’t been doing as good a job as we need to. And it comes back to that inclusion point.

Qingfeng, final thought? And then we’ll come to you, Max, to wrap this up.

QINGFENG ZHANG: Thank you so much.

Again, I stay hopeful. I also say G20 is a great platform to really enforce in term of the governance… That very, very effective to really reduce risk of the food insecurity. Now is the time for us to think how we introduce innovations in the G20, reinforce the declarations. Again, you know, since March of this year, at least 20 countries in this area is introduce trade restrictions, really make the market as very panic. So I think this G20 is an opportunity to review what works, what doesn’t, and then they incorporate the lessons and they release new declaration. I think that is our hope.

Thank you.

NICOLE GOLDIN: Thank you.

Max?

MAX PETERSON: I will quickly wrap it up, just say I’m incredibly inspired by all of the people on the panel here and the sharing that they had. And one thing that we try and do is encourage people to think big. And there’s a lot of really big thinking here. The challenge with thinking big, however, is if you’re thinking big enough you’re going to fail. But what you need to do is you need to realize that food security is—failure is not an option. And so we just look at ways that we can help people fail, learn, improve, and move faster, and I’m very encouraged by all of my panelists here that we can—that this is solvable and that we can solve it. We just have to think big and take action.

NICOLE GOLDIN: And fail, fail, fail. So thank you and learn from it. Please join me in thanking this fantastic panel. We could have talked all day. Thank you very much.

Watch the keynote

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Flagship Event Sat, November 12, 2022 • 12:00 am ET

Highlights from the Global Food Security Forum

A gathering of leaders across government, industry, and civil society to assess food security as a global challenge and offer bold solutions for strengthening food systems, securing supply chains, and fighting world hunger. This Forum is co-hosted with the Gaurav and Sharon Srivastava Family Foundation, the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Indonesia, and the Coordinating Ministry of Maritime Affairs and Investment of the Republic of Indonesia and takes place on the sidelines of the G20 summit in Bali.

Economy & Business Resilience & Society

Event transcript

Uncorrected transcript: Check against delivery

MICHAEL VATIKIOTIS: Please take your seats so we can begin. It’s pretty much a follow-on from the session that my friend and former colleague Adam Schwarz just moderated. He ended up talking about a few solutions. What I’d like to do today—and first of all, let me just introduce myself. My name is Michael Vatikiotis. I’m reasonably well-known in Indonesia because I lived here before as a journalist. I now work for the Center for Humanitarian Dialogue. It’s a Geneva-based conflict-resolution and mediation organization. We’ve become involved in food security in quite a big way with the outbreak of the war in Ukraine.

But I’d also like to use this opportunity—and I firmly believe that, as has been said already in the room today, the G20 conference meeting of leaders is an excellent opportunity to focus global attention not just on the problem, but also on action and solutions. And so what I’d like to do with the session today—because we will continue this discussion tomorrow—is to kind of draw up a list of ideas where they can be outline or in detail that we can perhaps hope to get the attention of the participants in the G20, and in particular I believe the Indonesian government, which is the host of the conference, if only because I know that President Jokowi himself has a real interest in the issue of food security. And I think it would be a real opportunity for him to say something meaningful and for us to be able to contribute to, at least in a small way, a couple of initiatives that could be put on the table for discussion and end up being agreed upon. So that’s an ambitious goal.

But I would like to start by highlighting one of the things that I think has now become much more evident in terms of food security. And before I open the discussion, I’ll just make this point because, as we’ve heard already today, there’s a lot of discussion about the supply of wheat and grain. But now I think what’s become very evident is that fertilizers are a key issue. According to figures that I’ve seen, even in a conservative scenario the high cost of nitrogen fertilizers is threatening the global production losses of up to 66 million tons of staple crops such as maize, rice, and wheat. And this will affect at least 50 of the most food-insecure countries, reducing the amount of crops they’re able to grow—including here in Indonesia, not necessarily food-insecure but definitely reliant on fertilizers. So that’s, I think, one issues that we should really try to bring to the attention of people here at the G20.

In addition to that, we’ve heard earlier today the importance of trying to draw a closer link between water, food, and energy. I was recently in Jordan, a country that is now increasingly facing water stress. Syria, a country already in conflict, severe water stress that’s generated huge numbers of cholera cases, it’s linked to water but also to food and to energy. And so I think one of the other things we might try to do is talk about how to strength—or, define and strengthen that nexus.

And in that connection, also, we might also want to look at, as we’ve already begun to, the two other issues that are floating around and hovering around food security, which is pandemic preparedness—because in the COVID pandemic there was this move, as we’ve heard already in the room, to impose export restrictions as a sort of knee-jerk reaction. And there perhaps needs to be a mechanism to address that in the future. And then, finally, climate security, which everyone tends to see as a sort of medium- to long-term problem which is already upon us, especially in the African continent.

So, with that, can I begin, please, with fertilizers, since it is an issue that has not been given a lot of airing? And I think it’s an opportunity here at the G20 to really put that on the table. So I would like to first turn to my old friend, Hashim Djojohadikusumo, because he’s into organic fertilizers, which of course is one solution. But I would like him to perhaps help us frame the issue and maybe look at some of the solutions. Hashim.

HASHIM DJOJOHADIKUSUMO: Thank you, Michael. It so happens that I had an interesting conversation with our colleague Pak Kasdi, who earlier addressed us with his remarks. And Pak Kasdi is the secretary general of the Ministry of Agriculture. And he just gave, you know, some tidbits—interesting tidbits about our fertilizer situation. I think Pak Kasdi said that Indonesia actually requires 25 million tons of chemical fertilizer, but we only have an allocation in our budget for 9 million tons, Pak Kasdi. So we actually have a budget shortfall for 60 million tons for chemical fertilizers.

I was aware of this problem about 10 years ago and I got very interested in actually starting some green sustainable solutions, and one of them is actually the production of organic fertilizer. And organic fertilizer from degraded forests, Michael, from biomass, from woody biomass. Actually, my colleague Dr. Willie Smits is the one who got me interested in this. But there are other solutions, as well. And one of the other solutions is the production of fertilizer from maggots. You know, this—maggots, from black soldier flies feeding on waste—and feeding on waste, feeding on garbage, but also feeding on the residue from, let’s say—well, General Clark mentioned about the production of cassava. You know, only 35 percent or 28 percent, I think, of cassava actually becomes tapioca, and the balance 70 percent is waste, General Clark. That waste can actually be the feedstock, Michael, for black soldier flies, which in turn produce maggots, which in turn produce very lucrative, high-quality liquid fertilizer from, dare I say, the urine from the maggots, OK? I know I was a bit squeamish as well thinking about this, but actually, there are many nature-based solutions, as Willie and Pak Kasdi actually mentioned—nature-based solutions to the problem.

Yes, we have a major problem, but there are solutions. And I am optimistic. I am optimistic because there are the greatest force all over the world—not only in Indonesia, but elsewhere; and we’re talking about Africa, we have friends from our African colleagues who were here earlier from the African Ex-Im Bank. There is room for optimism, I think, ma’am. And that is that nature-based solutions, I am convinced, is the wave of the future.

Michael.

MICHAEL VATIKIOTIS: Thank you, Pak Hashim. So perhaps one of the things to perhaps sort of put on the radar of leaders is to start to explore those solutions immediately.

I’m conscious, also, that the immediate problem, of course, is the supply of particularly natural gas and ammonia nitrate, which is actually causing the production of fertilizers to decline drastically and for the price to go up. So I’d like to once again turn to Kira Rudik from Ukraine to talk about—because one of the keys to the supply and reduction of the price would be for a pipeline that actually runs from Russia to Ukraine and out to the—to the Black Sea. So perhaps, Kira, if you could give us a bit more detail on that.

KIRA RUDIK: So I would like to make a general comment and support my colleague, Vasyl, Mr. Ambassador, in terms of us tackling certain problems.

When we are talking about the pipeline and about the fertilizers, we are talking about a small part of the potential solution to the problem that would not fix itself. When we are talking about the issues that will arise in Africa, in all over the world, we for some reason omitting inevitable statement. There is war in Ukraine that was started by Russia, and it would not end by itself. It will just not. It will continue creating more and more issues for the whole world. And, yes, there would be sanctions and we will insist on them being stronger because these are people who are coming to my land to kill my people. And, yes, we will be working against all the transportation of ammonium through our land because we want to weaken Russia, because we want them to stop coming and killing our people, our children, raping our women, and destroying everything that is there to survive.

We are right now in this grain deal, which is a temporary very virtual agreement between many parties—it’s United Nations, Turkey, Ukraine, and Russia—that the transportation of the grains through Ukrainian ports and transportation of the fertilizers through Ukrainian pipeline continue. This is as fragile, as I have already spoken to you before, for so many reasons. Just two weeks ago, Russia decided that they will exit the grain deal, just by the one side, just—early in the morning they said, well, we are exiting.

And as of right now, same as was the general question of the security, we are facing one question that we do not have answer to, is: Who or what in the whole world is organization or a leader that can make Russia stick to their words? It goes same with Ukraine and war in Ukraine. It goes same with keeping up with the energy supplies. It was—it’s going same way with the food supplies. And because there is nobody right now, there are no resolution. There are no security guarantees that could be put in place so there could be a peace deal. There is no way for the grain deal to be put in place and be signed by all—by all the parties. You know why? Because neither U.N. nor Turkey nor anybody else can force Russia to execute to the word that they have given. And this is why inside Ukraine the deal is perceived as very virtual and something that would not last long.

I think everybody at these tables understand how essential for the world food security this ability is. And I want to stress again how fragile every single path of every single ship now is. It depends on the emotion, on the word, on unreliability of the country that is an aggressor and has been acknowledged a terrorist state by so many other countries. So when we are talking about resolving food security crisis, we must not close our eyes on the point that we must resolve security crisis first, because everything else that we will be doing—all the plans that we will be putting together—will be dropped by this one question: What or who will pressure Russia to keep their part of the bargain?

MICHAEL VATIKIOTIS: Thank you, Kira. And do you think that—and let me just follow up with a question. Do you think that actually comes down to, as—because it’s, obviously, in Russia’s economic interest—to payments to—I mean, in order to—this issue of how to keep their word—to essentially assuring and ensuring the payments?

MS. RUDIK: For the last eight years—and I want to again inform everybody that war in Ukraine started eight years ago. Right now is just a full-scale escalation. For the last eight years, the strategy of the leaders of the world was let’s have economic ties with Russia the way that they would be happy, that they would be satisfied, that they would be fed up, and then they would not have any intention or any logical reasons to attack. And they—then we will just make it too expensive for them to fight.

Unfortunately, this strategy failed. So the economic ties with Europe and the reliance of European countries on Russians’ energy and the billions of dollars that every single day are being paid by European countries to Russia did not stop them from attacking. Same way having money flowing in and having payments being on time and open to them would not stop them from anything. And again, I’m talking from the history and I have proofs to that. Every single day right now is a proof to that. Two weeks ago, when they dropped out of the grain deal, is a proof to that. But nobody can give me the proof of otherwise, that if they will have this assurance that they will continue going on and on on this deal.

We should not be emotional here, but be very logical and act with the historic facts. So, as of right now, all the historic facts I’m using as arguments to prove my point. Economic feeding the tiger and having the economic ties with it does not help and stop the empire of fulfilling on its imperialistic mission, expanding and destroying other nations.

MICHAEL VATIKIOTIS: Thank you, Kira. And I think that actually encapsulates what the challenge will be for the G20 leaders because there will be this argument on the table. But it still leaves the problem, which is of course the price of inputs is rising and is going to cause severe problems for food production in the coming year.

So I’d actually like to turn now and get a perspective on this from Rahmad Pribadi, who is involved in the fertilizer industry, and you know, to give it some perspective on exactly what is likely to happen, if he’s—if he’s here. Yes, he’s over there. Sorry.

RAHMAD PRIBADI: Thank you, Michael. First of all, let me introduce myself. My name is Rahmad Pribadi. I’m the CEO of Pupuk Kaltim, which is the fifth-largest urea producers in Asia-Pacific.

So let me speak—allow me to speak from the perspective of fertilizer producers. The issue in fertilizers is more on affordability rather than availability. Of course, availability is still an issue that we have to carefully watch what’s going on with some export restriction from some countries, but I think the key is affordability.

The affordability of fertilizer has worsened in 2022 because some issues in geopolitics and many other things.

Just to give you a perspective, in—if you prepare pre-crisis and 2022, the urea price has increased about 250 percent, whereas rice—the price of rice remained stable. Price before crisis and after crisis remained the same. So we are seeing now fertilizer becoming more and more expensive for farmer to purchase. And for that reasons, we’ve seen the decline of fertilizer consumptions. Globally, it is about 5 percent. But if you look at Asia, East Asia and South Asia, that number is even higher. That is 6 to 7 percent. That, I think, something that we—everybody has to be concerned about, like what, Michael, you have mentioned. The decrease in consumption of nitrogen fertilizer will immediately impacting food production.

So I guess, to that perspective, I would like to probably propose, if there is any initiatives that this forum can take, I think we all have to work together to make sure that fertilizer price remain affordable for the farmer, especially in Asia where most of the farmer are small farmers. That can be done, I think, through subsidy, which Kasdi has mentioned. But again, Hashim mentioned that the amount that is needed and the fiscal capacity of the government does not match, so that is something that we have to look for the solution.

For a country that—an agricultural country like Indonesia, who is at the same time also gas producers, probably we have to also look at reducing the feedstock price. Natural gas price for fertilizer industry has to be maintained low so that the price of fertilizer, especially for small farmers, can be maintained at a level where it is more affordable. And I think when we are talking about export restrictions on agricultural product, which Mr. Kasdi has mentioned in the previous sessions, I think that also has to include into fertilizers. I think the forum should push for removal of any export restrictions on fertilizer. Hopefully, by doing so fertilizer will be more affordable and the availability can be maintained.

Thank you, Michael.

MICHAEL VATIKIOTIS: So, if I read you correctly, a price-support mechanism for fertilizer. Given the political obstacles to ensuring a more natural supply, then perhaps this is something that requires special attention here at the G20.

And I want now to actually turn to Ambassador Dave Merrill because, you know, earlier today—earlier, in the first session, he talked about the need for the G20 to actually consider mechanisms to provide these kinds of solutions on a collective basis in ways that perhaps have not happened before. And I’m remined that, of course, in one of the earlier G20 meetings, during an economic crisis of 2008, there was a fund established, you know, to address the economic crisis. And I’m wondering if we might want to look at ways in which the G20 could agree to special mechanisms or forums in which these kinds of things could be done.

But, Dave, over to you.

DAVID MERRILL: Well, thank you—is it on? Yeah. Thank you, Michael. You’ve asked me to elaborate a little bit more, and I want to elaborate even more tomorrow so I want to save a little bit for tomorrow. But here are some specific things that we think can be done.

We had an in-depth session on this at the US-Indonesia Society—USINDO—September 9. We had experts from around the world.

Now, one is, of course, the financing of emergency food reserves and distribution. There was something done on that in some G20 meeting that took place this summer. I think it was among the finance ministers. And they, as you would expect, agreed that the multilateral development banks, WFP, FAO, WTO, et cetera should do more. There are some kinds of facilities that they have in mind and we’d like to hear more about what they intend to do. If there were a communique, which we don’t know, we would think that would be part of it, building on what they did this summer with the finance ministers.

There need to be national and local distribution schemes, internationally-coordinated food emergency reserves. I don’t know what they did about that, but you would think that something would be done about that.

And of course, encouraging NGOs and private charities. We’re going to be talking about that tomorrow afternoon. Now, the NGOs and private charities can only do what they can do with what they’ve got, but if the world can get them a little more to work with then they can do more.

It’s been mentioned about fertilizers several times. The fertilizer use is a problem. The fertilizer prices are a problem. We need to minimize trade barriers on fertilizer. We need to improve the liquidity of small and medium enterprises and national fertilizer value chains in lower middle income countries. We need to revisit security schemes for fertilizer—subsidy schemes, sorry—subsidy schemes for fertilizer to make them financially more viable, increase their impact, and improve the efficiency of fertilizer use to assist farmers to do more with less. There’s a lot of technology going around to achieve more with less fertilizer, more efficiency of fertilizer. In fact, there’s even one technology going around—I think there’s a representative here – that does—from Israel—who does productivity increases with no fertilizer—with no fertilizer, just through selective application of water at the right time. So there’s all kinds of technology—increased fertilizer, no fertilizer, the need to be redoubled, retripled, everything else.

Improving the productivity of smallholders growing staple food crops, that more or less goes without saying. But what should be done about that? What should be done to increase the yield—close the yield gaps for smallholders with sustainability? If you can’t have more wheat, you can increase the nutritional quality of diets—programs for women and children, micronutrients, and so on that can make what foods you do have go further. These are fairly obvious prescriptions, but I don’t think they’ve been written down.

Promoting agricultural research. A lot of us has been involved for decades in agricultural research—crops that would be resistant to climate change, higher yields on less land, and so forth.

Now, guaranteeing affordable supplies of staple foods would have to be looked at either by the G20 or by someone else. Physical supplies—make sure that there’s access via trade, and what we think there should be is some kind of G20 forum for food security dialogue. We’re not saying that Indonesia has to be the automatic chair of it, but Indonesia is in a good position to chair a forum. It’s not meant to be a new international agency but a place to discuss these things going forward. And we think Indonesia, with its more or less neutral position internationally has found itself in a great position to exert moral suasion and position itself to get the most out of the international community.

The other thing that Indonesia has done in the past is rice. There was a rice crisis in 2008, I believe, and Indonesia acquitted itself well in the rice crisis. And so countries that eat rice—I know it sounds uncharitable—but if they ate more rice and less wheat, then the demand for wheat would be less, and then the price of wheat could ease up.

And it shouldn’t be impossible for, let’s say, the Filipinos and the Indonesians to eat more rice. It’s not objectionable to them. Of course there are some that want wheat in their noodles, and maybe they have to pay more for the wheat in their noodles if they want the noodles that badly. But if countries who eat rice—I’m not sure where China comes out on this because they eat rice and wheat—but if countries who eat rice traditionally can be encouraged to eat more rice, at least temporarily, it would ease the international demand for wheat and the price of wheat, in addition to whatever can be done with getting the ships out of Ukraine and everything on that front.

So these are some of the ideas that we think should be encouraged by the G20. Now in the form of it, I don’t know. It’s opaque to us. It may be opaque to everybody, maybe it’s not opaque to some of you. But how the G20 can do this, whether through moral suasion, whether it’s through a communique—it doesn’t have to be a communique. If they can’t have a communique, they can have something. They can have a speech. They can have a declaration of principles, or all kinds of things can—there are plenty of minds in this room that can devise the title of the document.

MICHAEL VATIKIOTIS: Thank you. Thank you, David.

Hashim, go ahead. And let’s keep the discussion—and then Gaurav afterwards, yeah.

HASHIM DJOJOHADIKUSUMO: I do want to say I’m a good friend of David, and just a devil’s advocate, David—I mean, just to illustrate how complex the situation is—I don’t want to diverge too much from the theme, which is food security, but I think we have a problem if you are asking people to eat more rice. There are two implications. One aspect is the health aspect—diabetes. Me, I love eating rice. I eat—in fact, I had Nasi Goreng this morning. You know, it’s—but I think we have to admit that eating more rice, with its glucose in the rice, is a major driver of diabetes in China, India, and Indonesia. I mean, we’re—so that’s one.

Now another—the second one is the climate change aspect. I’ve been told by experts—maybe Pak Kasdi and others can enlighten us all—is that actually rice paddy cultivation is a major producer of methane into the atmosphere. And it’s a contributor—a net contributor of emissions to the atmosphere.

So, you know, it’s very—the whole thing is very complex, you know, and I just wanted to say that because I don’t know whether increased rice consumption is the answer, frankly. Thank you.

MICHAEL VATIKIOTIS: Thank you. Gaurav.

GAURAV SRIVASTAVA: Thank you, David, and thank you, Hashim.

You know, it’s important to remember. You know, my wife and I—she is Japanese-American, I am Indian-American. Culturally we are coming from multiple cultures, and that’s the beauty of the United States, is that you can come from anywhere and still be American.

I think we’re here to acknowledge the cultures and be able to work together, and as we are having this conversation, the more pressing question is people are hungry right now. They’re not going to go to bed tonight with a full meal. We’re going to have a coffee break with a couple of watermelons and decide whether we want some more cantaloupes in it. It’s a bit of a misnomer.

So the question is what do we do today, what do we do right now, and yes, the conversation today is Russia, and Ukraine, and the invasion. And it’s a pertinent topic to be discussed. But Indonesia’s philosophy, which David mentioned, of being neutral is because Indonesia has a population that is—that they have to feed. They have to run their cars, they have to run their bikes. They require oil, they require food, and how do you regulate that?

I think, as we have—as we convene here, the question is the mechanisms that are being put in place by the government today, do they regulate with what is needed in Africa, as the lady from the African EXIM Bank said before, and does suggestions like the price gap that we have today—does it work? I think that’s the more imperative question because it is OK to sit and pontificate on what’s going to happen in 50 years, but the question is I’m hungry right now. And I know—and I think Sharon can say if I get hungry this is—it becomes—even for me it becomes very difficult.

Imagine a kid who hasn’t eaten. So we have to really think about what do we do as top leaders as we convene here to work from a policy point of view and from a business point of view. I think that’s my—that’s what I think.

MICHAEL VATIKIOTIS: Absolutely. I mean, one statistic that grabbed me was that, just in September, food prices in Kenya increased 15 percent. And that’s already translated into insecurity and rising criminality. So it’s the impact on human security—not just stomachs but also, you know, physical violence.

GAURAV SRIVASTAVA: I mean, it is important to remember, you know, as we are sitting here, if the population is hungry, that is what gives rise to violence—violence that can destabilize whole nations.

So how do we work together with the two bread baskets of the world; that is Ukraine and Russia, in a program that is regulated whereby which the flow continues but it is better monitored under a system. I think it’s something to think about.

MICHAEL VATIKIOTIS: Yes, and, you know, we’ve already got two nice ideas that are on the table that could immediately make some impact: one is the idea of financing for emergency food reserves—of emergency food reserves, and then also this idea of a food-security-focused dialogue at the high level, between governments because that actually drives to the immediate needs for action.

I’d like to come back actually, if possible, to our friend from the African EXIM Bank because I thought she gave a very good perspective on the practical, you know, challenges of ensuring supply and affordability. So if you could come back again and give us some idea of what you think is needed and what could be—and what could be put on the table in this meeting over the next few days.

Q: Thank you. The name is Gwen Mwaba. Yeah. So, I mean, one of the things that we are doing for the African continent beyond the statements that I made around the immediate solutions is we’ve developed an Africa Trade Exchange whose purpose is really to aggregate the needs of Africa for grains and fertilizers so that we can approach supplies on a pooled procurement basis. We did the same for COVID-19 vaccines during the time when there was scarcity for vaccines, so adopting the same model, we believe that we can bring the cost of logistics down through aggregation, and also the supply, because of the volume, will be higher than individual African countries importing by themselves.

So this exchange is up and running. Now the exchange primarily is meant to support the implementation of the AfCFTA, and so the idea is that African producers of fertilizer would be supplying African buyers. And our statistics show that there is adequate production of the key fertilizers and their derivatives on the African continent; however, the supply doesn’t always end up in Africa, and part of that reason is because the supply is being purchased by countries outside of the continent.

So when we spoke to some of the larger suppliers in Morocco, in Egypt, and other African countries, one of the things they said is yes, we have production, but we’re tied into contracts of a year to 18 months. So one of the things we need is for some of those contracts to be released so that that fertilizer can be redirected to Africa so that, for the next farming season, they can be, you know, adequate at production and increased production if we can’t get fertilizers from the Black Sea region where Africa is a big importer.

In addition to that, obviously our institution will finance a lot of that production and supply of fertilizer, and we already have—we initially had $4 billion, which has already been consumed, so we need other international DFIs to come to the table to provide the financing that is needed to make these supplies available to the African continent.

And I think the other points were made in my earlier intervention around what we might be able to do around sanctions immediately. But basically so any support to the Africa trade exchange is very welcome.

And finally, even though this exchange was set up primarily to facilitate the implementation of AfCFTA, during the crisis that we’re facing because of the Russia-driven war, we are also reaching out to international suppliers globally—Western countries included—to participate on the Africa Trade Exchange where there are supplies available for both greens and fertilizers which can then be supplied onto the African continent. Thank you.

MICHAEL VATIKIOTIS: Thank you very much.

Actually, I’d like to come back to the ADB on this because, you know, it might be something that could be—if you could follow up on that discussion on trade exchange and what could be done multilaterally in this region. Thank you.

Qingfeng. Yeah.

QINGFENG ZHANG: Yes, thank you so much, Michael.

Again, I—after the Russian invasion of the Ukraine war, actually this in May, while the international financial institutions we generally formulate the action plan to try to address this food insecurity, one of the key action is mitigating fertilizer shortage… and also the variability issues. That is a key issue because the last three years fertilizer price triple already, so the price will be high.

So I—one of the immediate actions, while helping Sri Lanka, the country or the crops in terms of the financial stability, so while we did these, we said… together we are quickly provide the social protection measures and also the budget support to help them to produce the fertilizer as quickly as possible. Of course, we also provide to those SMEs to help them to procure the fertilizer.

I think a second measure is very, very critical to how to translate this challenge into the opportunity to say—because of, you know, we too much rely on the chemicals. Probably in the future translated you know, this policy change to the more subsidy to encourage the efficient utilization of fertilizer.

And the same time, our colleague from Indonesia was mentioning about the nature-based solutions.

Finally, I have to say we’re also talking about in the future probably not necessarily relying too much on the natural gas as a raw material of the fertilizer. We need to use probably hydrogen as a source of fertilizer as a way out.

So we have a number of the solutions. So again I want to emphasize the smooth supply of fertilizer probably is a defining factor for the length, also, the—of this food crisis. So it’s very critical for the G20 have an agreement to ensure this smooth and the free trade of the fertilizer. That is very critical.

Let me just pause here. Thank you.

MICHAEL VATIKIOTIS: Thank you. Just as a—General, go ahead—because I want to then go back to innovation and technology, but go ahead.

GENERAL WESLEY CLARK (RET.): Well, I’d like to offer three specific suggestions starting on the technology side. Ten years ago the United States Agency for International Development was in Africa, in South Sudan, and Tanzania, and pushing two technologies. One was a cassava that did not have to be cooked to be eaten. Normal cassava was 20 years’ supply in the ground; this only lasts a couple of years, but now you don’t have to cook it. So it made it much more accessible.

Secondly, the introduction to Africa of yellow sweet potatoes as opposed to white sweet potatoes—now USAID was pushing this. What I don’t know and what I haven’t—maybe there are experts here who know this. Did it result in anything? Is there widespread, worldwide understanding that there’s cassava that doesn’t have to be cooked to be consumed, and that there should be no more white sweet potatoes in Africa? You need yellow sweet potatoes for Vitamin A.

So I don’t know whether these—I don’t know if we’re propagating agriculture advancements correctly, and this takes me to the idea of agricultural extension services. In Angola, the Israelis brought their agricultural extension service to bear on a project in an abandoned Portuguese valley, and brought in Israeli experts to talk about drip irrigation, to talk about how to price and develop for the markets, and it produced some exceptional results.

But that system is not in place in many African countries is what I’m afraid of. So I’m wondering whether one of the suggestions we can make to the G20 is that there should be a lot more emphasis on agricultural extension services. This is what has really produced America’s innovation in agriculture. It’s done by all the universities, land grant institutions do it.

Now the second thing, though, about it is some innovations are protected by intellectual property. There was a lawsuit a few years ago against a farmer in Indiana—you may have seen this—where he kept the grain from the previous harvest and replanted it. And then it turns out, no, he can’t do that because he has to buy fresh seed each year, and this was upheld by the US court system.

Obviously, there is some concern about if you take away intellectual property protections you undercut innovation. But do we have the balance right? What’s happened in the agricultural innovation market is firms have consolidated, and so Monsanto, for example, has a huge impact on corn and other grain innovation. Is there too much consolidation in this market at the expense of what’s good for the public?

And the third thing is the idea of strengthening the financial support for the World Food Programme so World Food Programme can provide reinsurance coverage for the kinds of grain deliveries to countries at risk or in cases of conflict zone so they can get in there and assure the owners of the vessels and the factors that they can be protected.

So those are three ideas. I just throw them out on the table. I’m not an expert in it, but I’ve worked in the system enough to know I think there’s something here and I would invite the group to tailor this or accept it, reject it, or refine it in some way specifically. OK.

MICHAEL VATIKIOTIS: Thank you, General.

Can I come back? Let me take two of these, at least, and maybe expand on them—the first on agricultural extension services.

I mean, I was going to ask Erez Fait because, you know, one of the things about nature-based solutions and technology related to that is the speed with which things can be conveyed to the farmers on the ground, and I see that as a problem because in many parts of the world it’s actually quite difficult to convince people to abandon their traditional practices.

So, please, could you—

EREZ FAIT: OK. First of all, you’re right. It’s like almost changing religious, almost, because farming, going from experience of their ancestors, and actually farming doesn’t change almost 10,000 years. Only technology improve. We have people, drip lines, but the practice is the same. So we apply the same amount of water and same amount of fertilizer.

We came—and, thank you, General, for mentioning some of the technologies, but we are coming from a different approach as a company of education the farmer because technology without education improving doesn’t work. People need to adapt.

So we started in Thailand. The minister of agriculture invited us to take one hectare of abandoned paddy that was meant to grow only rice and we managed to grow almost seven to 10 type of crops.

Next to me sitting Widja, that he is a local partner that actually managed a project that started by minister of defense three years ago. And the minister was practical, make decision, let’s do—let’s not talk and to move forward, and we established a five-hectare project where we grow more than 30 type of crops indoor/outdoor and we prove locally the new practice of growing rice only with 20 percent amount of water. No swamp, no methane, no weeds, and no germination replanting. And we did the same for corn and other crops.

And the beauty is that everything was run by a local team that was trained remotely because of the COVID, and we have the same in California, the same in New York, the same in Morocco now.

So when we speak about government, like, government provide health and provide education, and education/health doesn’t have ROI on the other side because it’s usually obvious that government need to provide health and education and security.

So I think—I’ve seen it also in Vietnam. I recently have meeting with Vietnam and they provide the farmers with the infrastructure because they understand that if they will build the greenhouses and provide the water and electricity, education, the farmers grow more and they pay tax, and by paying tax this become instead of vicious circle it’s become a positive circle.

And we can continue and I would like to give Widja, that he is coming from different field. He is coming from defense, from other background, and now we join together to change this ecosystem for good by doing it available.

And, again, it’s not more expensive. It’s less expensive because we are talking also with DFC and the US government to build locally the technology. If it’s a drip line, if it’s the facility, and then the logistic is much easier.

So government can finance the infrastructure to the farmers and then from the tax that they’ll pay you can deduct it.

Widja?

MICHAEL VATIKIOTIS: Please go ahead.

WIDJAJANTO: OK. Thank you, Erez. Thank you, Michael.

I would like to resonate three things, Michael, if I may speak on behalf of this G20 discussion.

Let’s promote our G20 communiqué and global food security solution by having—one is about technical proficient. I learned a lot from Israeli company from my colleague here, Mr. Erez, from the project initiated by Mr. Prabowo, my minister of defense.

But the problem is this technology is only available in his country whereas our country doesn’t have diplomatic relations. So I have to go around third country, fourth country, fifth country. You know the result? Transshipment more costs.

So we need to find a solution…

Number two, for the TikTok generation and also about the farming practices that you mentioned, in our area, I’m the oldest. I am 52. The rest is young people. They do the farming with their phone. They do the farming—the control—with internet. So we make it sexy. We make it more hype for the TikTok generation. You’re right. So if you come to my farm, you will no longer see an old farmer, Michael, but young people, I promise you.

The third is financial inclusion. I would like to promote also because the problem is when I went tocentral Java, most of the farmer doesn’t have big land part. Small portion—0.5, 0.2. How do we incorporate this?

The nice guy here from ADP, they must have learned from some type of municipal here in Indonesia to promote also this kind of initiative, having strong support from a financial institution like ADP. G20, I believe, is a good opportunity by Michael to talk about this.

Last, but not least, about incentive, or I call it less import restriction. In my experience, to import agriculture technology stuffs the bank is crazy, let alone the fertilizer. So we need to tell the government: Don’t only impose tax for us. You can grab another revenue from the selling of the harvest, as Mr. Erez just mentioned, in other countries.

So this four angle I would like to propose to be discussed further tomorrow. I believe Erez has his session tomorrow. Be more than happy to do the testimony. Thank you, Michael.

MICHAEL VATIKIOTIS: Thank you, Pak. That is very useful input.

Now, I mean, we have two—in a way, we have the technology side and my concern there is the speed with which technology can be used to alleviate the problem.

But then we have, as we just heard from—earlier about the question of financial support for WFP, and on the question—I mean, finance, it seems, is the short-term solution. and I’d like to ask Niels again to comment on this because you have a very practical experience.

And then, Gaurav, I’ll come back to you.

NIELS TROST: Yeah. Thank you, Adam.

I think it’s important to take the discussion back a little bit to what we can do immediately, and I think it’s great hearing possible solutions in the field of innovation, which is all great. But I think that will bring solutions in five years from now, 10 years from now.

But, today, we have people starving—literally starving—in Africa. And I think Kira made an interesting comment about Russia pulling out of the grain deal and one has to wonder why did Russia pull out of the grain deal.

My understanding was that they were unhappy with the fact that many of those shipments did not end up in the country—in the continent that needs it most, which is Africa. So then we have to ask the question why do these shipments not go to Africa and the reason is that the grain prices—it’s affordability again. The prices are too high for Africa to be able to pay it and Europe can pay those high prices.

And the second issue is that financial institutions are not willing to finance these shipments from Russia because of self-sanctioning reasons, and I think if we want to look at an immediate solution we have to take this discussion beyond geopolitics and really look at practical solutions.

Even though it may be difficult to accept morally, I think we may have to come to the conclusion that we have to cooperate with the largest food producer in the world—the largest food and energy producer in the world, which is Russia.

Now, that may be morally a very difficult decision to take. But I do think as world citizens we have that responsibility and look at how can we practically help, for example, the African continent.

And I think, for me, one of the practical solutions is to look at self-sanctioning. You know, why are we self-sanctioning and should we be self-sanctioning? Do we not have a moral obligation to help those in need?