NATO - Atlantic Council

Ukraine’s advance in Kursk: What’s next and implications

Conflict Russia Security & Defense Ukraine

Beyond the military practicalities of the battlefield, the Kursk offensive is challenging some of the most fundamental assumptions about the war. Crucially, Ukraine’s invasion of Russia has demonstrated that Putin’s nuclear threats and his talk of red lines are in reality a big bluff designed to intimidate the West.

Ukrainians have long accused Western policymakers of being overly concerned about the dangers of provoking Putin. They argue that since 2022, the international response to Russian aggression has been hampered by a widespread fear of escalation that has led to regular delays in military aid and absurd restrictions on the use of Western weapons. Ukraine’s offensive has now made a mockery of this excessive caution. If the Kremlin does not view the actual invasion of Russia by a foreign army as worthy of a major escalation, it is hard to imagine what would qualify.

As the Kursk offensive unfolds, Ukraine is hoping the country’s allies will draw the logical conclusions. Initial indications are encouraging, with US and EU officials voicing their support for Ukraine’s cross-border incursion despite longstanding concerns over any military operations inside Russia. At the same time, restrictions on the use of certain categories of weapons remain in place. This is hindering the advance of Ukrainian troops in Kursk Oblast. It is also preventing Kyiv from striking back against the airbases used to bomb Ukrainian cities and the country’s civilian infrastructure.

Ukraine’s Kursk offensive represents a powerful signal to the country’s partners. It demonstrates that the Ukrainian military is a highly professional force capable of conducting complex offensive operations and worthy of greater international backing. It also confirms that Putin’s Russia is dangerously overstretched and is militarily far weaker than it pretends to be.

The muddled and unconvincing Russian response to Ukraine’s invasion speaks volumes about the relative powerlessness of the Putin regime. This should persuade Kyiv’s allies of the need for greater boldness and convince them that the time has come to commit to Ukrainian victory.

Oleksiy Goncharenko is a Ukrainian member of parliament with the European Solidarity party.

The senators joined a growing chorus of US lawmakers and experts calling on the Biden administration to lift restrictions on Ukraine’s use of US weapons against military targets in Russia. After months of pressure, the administration assented in May to allow limited strikes inside Russia, but only under specific conditions. Blumenthal and Graham see the folly in limiting when and how Ukraine can use US weapons and vowed to “urge the Biden administration to lift restrictions on weapons provided by the United States so they can strike the Russian invaders more effectively.”

Finally, and perhaps most interestingly, the senators offered the prospect of a strategic economic partnership between the United States and Ukraine centered on metals and rare earth elements development. Their press release hinted that their suggestion was a welcome surprise for Zelenskyy, whose government has expressed hopes of leveraging Ukraine’s vast mineral wealth to become a major exporter of lithium and rare earths, raw materials key to new technologies and the energy transition. In a veiled reference to China’s dominant position in the rare earths market, the senators noted that “an agreement with Ukraine in this area would make the US less dependent on foreign adversaries for rare earth minerals.”

Stay updated

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

After the House of Representatives belatedly passed the national security supplemental package that unlocked further US aid to Ukraine in April, experts and lawmakers alike began to wonder how Washington might continue to support Ukraine throughout the rest of 2024. The Blumenthal-Graham priorities outline what could be an ambitious, re-energized US policy on Ukraine through the end of the current year.

US President Joe Biden has been skittish at the last two NATO summits about pushing for Ukraine’s membership in the Alliance, largely for fear of escalating tensions with Russia. But with Biden now out of the 2024 presidential race, he may be thinking more about his foreign policy legacy. Having already helped usher Finland and Sweden into the Alliance, opening Ukraine’s accession bid in earnest would be the third in a hat-trick of transatlantic security wins for Biden. Meanwhile, the Kremlin’s underwhelming response to Ukraine’s offensive into Russia’s Kursk Oblast should certainly tamp down any misplaced fears of escalation.

Eurasia Center events

Ukraine’s advance in Kursk: What’s next and implications

Conflict Russia Security & Defense Ukraine

Blumenthal’s Stand With Ukraine Act will likely run up against latent partisanship and electoral jitters when he introduces it in September. Much of Congress will be campaigning this fall, avoiding difficult votes while trying to score political points against the other party. Senate Majority Leader Chuck Schumer could very well bring the bill to a floor vote, both to support Ukraine and to force a vote from anti-Ukraine Republicans, but Speaker of the House Mike Johnson may be loath to spend political capital to do the same. Even so, the bill may get the ball rolling on further Ukraine legislation, especially as some pro-Ukraine Republicans indicate they want funding to continue uninterrupted, even under the prospect of a Donald Trump presidency.

As for dropping restrictions on the use of US weapons, only the Biden administration can reverse this policy, something it has repeatedly declined to do. It may take further public and private calls from Democrats such as Blumenthal before the White House agrees to a change. In the meantime, Russian rockets will continue to kill Ukrainian civilians using launch systems that could have been taken out by US-provided Army Tactical Missile Systems (ATACMS) and other Western-supplied weapons.

The senators’ proposal for a US-Ukraine economic partnership has all the ingredients for bipartisan consensus in Washington: Support for Ukraine without US taxpayer dollars, reduced dependence on China, and the potential for economic gain by importing one of the few materials the United States can’t make itself. A formal agreement would likely be highly technical and take many months to negotiate, but all the incentives are there for a new element in US-Ukraine relations.

Congressional delegations can sometimes be high on style and discussion but low on action and deliverables. This time, Blumenthal and Graham delivered on all counts and laid out a road map outlining US support for Ukraine through the end of 2024. Their list is as ambitious as it is sounds, both in its support for US interests and in helping Ukraine move toward victory on the battlefield. That combination of vision and vigor is exactly why their initiatives deserve bipartisan support.

Andrew D’Anieri is a resident fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

NATO must recognize the potential of open-source intelligence

AM Sir Christopher Harper, KBE, RAF (Ret.), Robert Bassett Cross MC — Tue, 13 Aug 2024 19:02:28 +0000

Air Marshal Sir Christopher Harper is a former UK military representative to NATO and served as director general of the NATO International Military Staff from 2013 to 2016. He is a nonresident senior fellow with the Transatlantic Security Initiative in the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security and an adviser to companies, including Accenture and Adarga, which provide AI tools for processing open-source information, including for public-sector clients.

Robert Bassett Cross is a former British Army officer and the founder and CEO of the UK-headquartered AI software developer Adarga. He is a nonresident senior fellow at the Forward Defense practice of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security and an honorary research fellow at the University of Exeter’s Strategy and Security Institute.

Writing in 1946, just a few years before NATO was founded, Director of the US Office of Strategic Services Bill Donovan knew precisely how valuable publicly available information could be.

“[E]ven a regimented press,” he wrote, “will again and again betray the national interest to a painstaking observer . . . Pamphlets, periodicals, scientific journals are mines of intelligence.”

Today, seventy-five years after the Alliance was formed, such open-source intelligence (OSINT) is more important—and more powerful—than ever. However, underinvestment in OSINT capabilities and a culture favoring classified data currently hold back member states’ intelligence-collection potential. To fully utilize the available technology to detect threats from adversaries, NATO member states must overcome these barriers to embrace open-source intelligence enabled by artificial intelligence (AI).

Understanding the threat landscape

OSINT can help leaders get a fast, up-to-date understanding of their operating environment. If you want to know who’s doing what, where, and when, then an open-source specialist can quickly tell you.

If, for example, you want to find out who’s jamming GPS systems in the Baltic region, the relevant data isn’t hard to come by. Similarly, OSINT analysts can provide insights into issues ranging from the effectiveness of Iran’s attack on Israel (and the Israeli response) to China’s current role in fueling the Russian war machine.

In recent years, it has become increasingly clear that, in addition to insight into current and recent events, OSINT can help leaders forecast what an adversary might be planning to do weeks, months, or even years from now.

By exploiting OSINT more fully and by integrating it into the wider intelligence cycle, NATO can preempt, deter, and defeat its adversaries’ efforts to expand their influence and undermine the security of member states. Here are several ways that OSINT can be used:

Across the physical domains of land, air, sea, and space, NATO can exploit publicly and commercially available data to explore an adversary’s order of battle and—more importantly—monitor changes in the strength and disposition of its military units and formations to infer its intent.
In the cyber domain, NATO can leverage commercially available information to detect and counter the penetration of networks governing critical infrastructure, as well as those related to research organizations, academic institutions, and technology developers.
In the information space, OSINT can help NATO identify, understand, and counter influence campaigns, specifically when it comes to the detection and attribution of disinformation and misinformation.
NATO can draw on vast swaths of open-source data to infer long-term strategic intent. Every subtle change to a government’s policies, every adjustment to its economic positioning and investment strategy, every new law and regulation it enacts, every new treaty and trade agreement—all of these can help the Alliance reverse engineer an adversary’s confidential playbooks.

Given the vast quantity, complexity, and diversity of the data, it is vital that NATO employs AI to extract the maximum value from it—to enhance analysts’ abilities, accelerate the analysis cycle, and build a reliable, contextual understanding of what Donovan called “the strategy developing silently behind the mask.”

The barriers to OSINT adoption

While AI is, of course, an emerging technology, its utility is already being realized across industries and sectors outside defense. From corporate intelligence and advisory services to finance and media, more and more private-sector organizations are using AI to make sense of the information environment, drawing on an ever-expanding range of sources to manage risk, identify opportunities, and adapt to geopolitical volatility.

However, the barriers to its widespread adoption and effective exploitation in political and military circles remain considerable. A paper published in 2022 by the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), in collaboration with the Centre for Emerging Technology and Security and the Alan Turing Institute, identified three in particular.

First, there are tradecraft barriers relating to the methodologies governing everything from the analysis of publicly available information to the evaluation and dissemination of the resulting intelligence. Second, there are resourcing barriers stemming from underinvestment in the requisite tools, technologies, data sets, and training.

The third barrier identified by the RUSI authors—and the most daunting one—is cultural. Presented with so much open-source data, analysts and decision makers tend to favor classified information and internal data sets. These sources and insights are easier to trust and are imbued with what the authors call “the perceived power of the ‘secret’ label.”

Speaking at the Eurosatory exhibition in Paris in June, US Major General Matthew Van Wagenen, deputy chief of staff for operations at NATO, confirmed how great this cultural barrier is. Up to 90 percent of “what Western militaries are looking for,” he said, can be derived from open sources:

This is a revolution in how we look at information. The ways of discerning information through classical means and techniques, tactics, and procedures that militaries have been adapted to—that’s really an old model of doing business. The new open source that’s out there right now, and the speed of information and relevance of information is coming, this is how things need to be looked at.

It is reasonable to believe that the tradecraft and resourcing barriers can be overcome. Methodologies are evolving swiftly, as are the requisite technologies. In fact, many of the tools NATO needs to capitalize on OSINT already exist. New AI applications are coming online almost every week. But if NATO fails to overcome the cultural barrier, it risks going into the next conflict underinformed and ill-prepared.

How AI-enabled OSINT can earn NATO leaders’ confidence

The cultural barrier to AI-enabled OSINT cannot be surmounted simply by decree or directive. Nor can it be overcome by intelligence professionals alone. The technology—and the discipline—must earn the justified confidence of civilian leaders and military commanders across the international staff, the military committee, and the supporting agencies. This could happen if AI-enabled OSINT were applied first to the simplest intelligence-gathering tasks before being applied to the most complex. To borrow the terminology made famous by former US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, NATO should apply the discipline to corroborating “known knowns,” resolving “known unknowns,” and surfacing “unknown unknowns.”

Corroborating “known knowns”: NATO should start by recognizing where the skills of the human analyst currently outperform even the most sophisticated models, and where AI can best be applied to elevate these skills. This means asking the right kind of questions, and employing OSINT to corroborate what is already known and to triangulate insights gathered from well-established secret sources. In this way, NATO can begin to overcome the skepticism that’s too often associated with publicly available information and OSINT.

Resolving “known unknowns”: With so much data to draw on, it is essential that NATO uses AI to help collate, process, and (where necessary) translate that data so it is ready for analysts to interpret. If AI-enabled OSINT can prove useful to intelligence professionals in this capacity, those professionals may be more willing to apply it to the most complex and valuable intelligence tasks of all—surfacing risks and opportunities that civilian and military leaders would otherwise struggle to identify.

Surfacing “unknown unknowns”: Perhaps the greatest contribution that AI can make to the intelligence-gathering discipline is identifying patterns and connections that are invisible to the human eye. Dedicated, AI-powered information-intelligence applications that synthesize publicly available information with proprietary data can help analysts and decision makers tease out insights they would otherwise miss.

This combination of publicly available information with classified data will enable NATO analysts to give military and political leaders a uniquely rich, nuanced, and highly contextualized understanding of the operating environment. Decision makers at every level will be able to examine intelligence from every angle, and apply their experience and imagination to infer an adversary’s intentions based on the interplay of evidence.

The critical need for human-machine teaming

The necessary tools and methodologies exist. What’s missing is the determination to get these tools into users’ hands, to supply the requisite training, and to capitalize on the integrated output derived from all sources of intelligence, open-source and otherwise.

OSINT is becoming known among some intelligence professionals as “the intelligence of first resort.” Compared with clandestine methods of information gathering and analysis, OSINT is fast, low-cost, and low-risk. But if it can be combined with those same methods then NATO’s analysts and leadership will have an enduring competitive edge, with access to the kind of strategic information that would likely be, in Bill Donovan’s words, “of determining influence in modern war.”

NATO’s seventy-fifth anniversary is a milestone in a remarkable story of reinvention, adaptation, and unity. However, as the Alliance seeks to secure its future for the next seventy-five years, it faces the revanchism of old rivals, escalating strategic competition, and uncertainties over the future of the rules-based international order.

With partners and allies turning attention from celebrations to challenges, the Atlantic Council’s Transatlantic Security Initiative invited contributors to engage with the most pressing concerns ahead of the historic Washington summit and chart a path for the Alliance’s future. This series will feature seven essays focused on concrete issues that NATO must address at the Washington summit and five essays that examine longer-term challenges the Alliance must confront to ensure transatlantic security.

The post NATO must recognize the potential of open-source intelligence appeared first on Atlantic Council.

How NATO and its Indo-Pacific partners can work together in an era of strategic competition

Gorana Grgić — Wed, 07 Aug 2024 15:48:59 +0000

In its landmark 2010 Strategic Concept, NATO identified three essential core tasks: collective defense, crisis management, and cooperative security. The first two are rather self-explanatory, but the third was an important advancement. The notion of collective security as a core task starts with a recognition that NATO “is affected by, and can affect, political and security developments beyond its borders.” Because of this fact, the Alliance seeks out partnerships with other countries and organizations to enhance international security. The Alliance’s relationships with Indo-Pacific countries are prime examples, and for years after 2010, this task was seen primarily as supporting non-Article 5 crisis management operations.

These days, however, NATO is adapting its partnerships to respond to changed structural realities and the focus on strategic competition given the growing assertiveness and militarism of revisionist states such as Russia and China.

In that sense, there have been significant qualitative changes in the way NATO partnerships with the individual Indo-Pacific Four (IP4) countries—Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and South Korea—and the minilateral grouping operate today and challenges they face compared to when they were first created. Namely, both sides now see their respective partners as significant for their own defense and deterrence, rather than as interlocutors in the provision of security for third parties, as was the case in out-of-area missions, where crisis management and cooperative security were the central organizing principles of these partnerships.

NATO’s interest in the Indo-Pacific

Last month’s NATO Summit in Washington demonstrated that the IP4 countries occupy a pivotal place in the ecosystem of NATO’s partner states. This role began to emerge in its present form at the 2022 Madrid summit, which unveiled NATO’s current Strategic Concept. Substantive engagement between NATO and the IP4 countries has continued to develop since then. This year’s summit, for example, marked the third consecutive year that IP4 leaders attended, making it clear that this informal grouping is becoming a mainstay of NATO’s outreach to and strategic thinking about the Indo-Pacific.

The 2022 Strategic Concept referred to the Indo-Pacific as “important for NATO, given that developments in that region can directly affect Euro-Atlantic security.” Such a diagnosis of the international security environment converges with the general assessment of trends as seen from Canberra, Tokyo, Seoul, and Wellington, which have also witnessed firsthand how Russia’s war against Ukraine is reverberating in their region. Furthermore, the Strategic Concept characterized China’s ambitions and policies as major challenges to the Alliance’s security, interests, and values. It also raised concern over increased China-Russia cooperation, which threatens to undermine the rules-based international order. The Washington Summit Declaration, issued on July 10, also underscored how these trends have continued to grow in pace and magnitude as North Korea and Iran provide direct military support to Russia.

In response, coordination and engagement channels between NATO and the IP4 have become even more relevant to the security of both Europe and the Indo-Pacific, creating a strong common basis for cooperation. However, the intra-Alliance consensus for engagement has not been easy to reach due to some notable differences among the thirty-two allies.

At the Washington summit, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg noted the “strong and deepening cooperation” between the Alliance and the IP4. Emblematic of the greater ambition behind NATO-IP4 cooperation has been a move to the Individually Tailored Partnership Programme agreements, which replaced the Individual Partnership and Cooperation Programme, and which all of the IP4 countries signed over the past year.

Moreover, NATO has pursued engagement with these partners as a minilateral group rather than as a collection of four individual partnerships. This commitment has resulted in four joint projects, announced by US National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan in July, which will focus on assistance to Ukraine, artificial intelligence, combating disinformation, and cybersecurity.

At the same time, IP4 countries have continuously demonstrated their commitment to Euro-Atlantic security by providing military and economic aid to Ukraine, sanctioning Russia, and initiating a range of direct and indirect capacity-building initiatives. Some of the IP4 members’ leaders, such as Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida, have even urged US lawmakers to continue aiding Ukraine.

The future of NATO-IP4 cooperation

If managed well, NATO’s IP4 partnerships can be a vital tool to enhance the Alliance’s core tasks of cooperative security and crisis management. More importantly, these partnerships have the potential to contribute to NATO’s defense and deterrence, strengthen the Alliance’s competitive advantages, and shape the global security environment in ways that serve its interests and values.

To be successful, NATO must recognize and cater to the spectrum of ambition for cooperation among IP4 partners. The Alliance should tailor its approach and maximize the benefits of cooperation at various levels. For countries with lower levels of ambition, the benefits to cooperation with NATO come primarily from political consultations, and these talks should continue. These consultations foster a shared strategic domain awareness and enhance the understanding of how events in one region impact the security of others.

For those with greater ambitions for strengthening ties with NATO, there should be an emphasis on expanding cooperation in science and technology. This includes capacity building, which can have significant positive effects on the security of both NATO and its partners. With sufficient political will and consensus from both sides, individual IP4 partners can further develop their relationships with NATO. This cooperation could then lead to achieving, strengthening, and maintaining interoperability—that is, operating together according to agreed-upon rules and procedures, as well as using similar equipment. It also could mean working together on international standards-setting and the co-production and joint maintenance of military assets, expanding on existing cooperation between NATO and its partners in other initiatives.

The NATO-IP4 format has already proven useful for information sharing and presenting a unified front to promote common values vis-à-vis revisionist states. The Alliance should build on the significant groundwork that has already been laid for integrating the IP4 into various NATO structures and processes to continue the multiparty coordination and “regularize” these partnerships in a way that would shield them from domestic politics. However, considering that Chinese and Russian disinformation campaigns have propagated the narrative that NATO is attempting to expand into the Indo-Pacific, it is crucial for the Alliance to consistently emphasize that the partnerships with IP4 nations, or any future potential partners from the region, are not a prelude to full membership.

Finally, while it may seem self-evident, managing and reconciling expectations is crucial, as NATO operates on a consensus basis. Therefore, given the past episodes of disagreements among allies around NATO’s outreach to the Indo-Pacific, it is imperative to handle these relations carefully to avoid creating unnecessary intra-Alliance tensions and to demonstrate how nurturing ties with the IP4 serves the interests of both sides.

Gorana Grgić is a nonresident senior fellow at the Transatlantic Security Initiative of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

The post How NATO and its Indo-Pacific partners can work together in an era of strategic competition appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The role Turkey can play in NATO’s post-Washington summit aims

Mehmet Fatih Ceylan — Wed, 31 Jul 2024 15:21:00 +0000

The NATO Summit held earlier this month in Washington was a testament to the Alliance’s enduring relevance in upholding shared ideals, values, and common interests as enshrined in the 1949 Washington Treaty. But it also showed that there is still work for NATO and its members to do, particularly in enhancing the Alliance’s collective deterrence and defense in the face of challenges by state and nonstate actors.

NATO has established its place among the most successful political and military alliances in history—despite facing very challenging circumstances since its founding—by dint of solidarity, unity of purpose, and resolve.

Today, allies are presented with challenges such as increasing global systemic rivalry and a complex, interconnected, and unstable security landscape, which threaten Euro-Atlantic security. Russia, as the most significant and direct threat for NATO, has been undermining Euro-Atlantic security since its invasion of Georgia in 2008, and its aggression has since expanded in the form of its invasion of Ukraine. In addition, terrorism—in all forms and manifestations—persists. The topic has been on NATO’s agenda since the adoption of the Alliance’s 1991 Strategic Concept and it (specifically, the 9/11 terror attacks on the United States) was the reason the Alliance decided to invoke Article 5 for the first and only time in history. Since 2001, nonstate actors have continued to lodge a series of terror attacks on a number of allies such as the United Kingdom, Spain, France, and Belgium as well as Turkey, which still grapples with terror attacks from the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), as well as the latter’s Syrian leg.

NATO allies must maintain their resolve and remain vigilant and ready to face challenges from any direction. Defense is not cheap, and it requires constant attention, care, and investment.

Since joining the Alliance seventy-two years ago, Turkey has contributed to NATO’s security in various theaters of instability and conflicts. Turkey was a bulwark against the Soviet threat in the Cold War period, and it continued to spend significantly on defense, sacrificing the opportunity to spend more elsewhere. For example, Turkey dedicated a level of forces and capabilities NATO in that period that was significant for the Alliance’s security and reduced pressure on allies in Central and Eastern Europe.

Turkey, because it continued to spend on defense, did not benefit from the post-Cold War “peace dividend” to the extent that European NATO allies enjoyed during the early 1990s when the unifying vision to establish a belt of security, stability, and prosperity that included Russia (extending from Vancouver to Vladivostok) was first launched by the United States. During this period, Turkey spent around or above 4 percent of its gross domestic product on defense, while most other allies saw their commitments wane over time.

In the immediate post-Cold War era, Turkey faced challenges from nearby regional conflicts in the Gulf, the Balkans, and the South Caucasus. Yet this conflictual period did not stop Turkey from contributing to NATO efforts designed to protect peace and stability throughout the Euro-Atlantic area and beyond. Turkey actively took part in NATO operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo, and it also made significant contributions to the International Security Assistance Forces in Afghanistan, which was followed by the Resolute Support Mission.

Today, Turkey has similarly consistently supported NATO efforts to enhance peace, stability, and prosperity in the Euro-Atlantic area, even despite divergent perceptions in allied capitals about Turkey’s approach to recent global challenges such as Russia’s war in Ukraine and the war in Gaza.

For example, Turkey did join its NATO allies in approving the most recent NATO Strategic Concept, adopted at Madrid in 2022, that identified Russia and terrorism (along with other regional and global challenges) as threats for the Alliance. Turkey is also set to play a pivotal role in the implementation of regional plans launched at the Vilnius summit last year which are dedicated to the defense of Southern Europe against the pervasive challenges in its immediate vicinity.

Turkey’s role in Washington summit outcomes

With the Russian threat looming over European security, it is high time to strengthen the European pillar of NATO. Allies at the NATO summit acknowledged the need to close the gaps between Europe’s defense needs and its capabilities. This includes, as highlighted at the Washington summit, expanding European allies’ defense manufacturing capacity in a coherent, complementary, and interoperable manner. To achieve interoperability will also require Turkey and NATO to find a lasting solution to the spat over the current Turkish administration’s decision in 2017 to procure the S-400 Russian missile system. While expanding capacity, the allies must take into account both the Alliance’s defense priorities and Ukraine’s needs as it continues to face up against Russian aggression.

Turkey can play a crucial role in helping expand the Alliance’s defense capacity through its contributions to collective deterrence and defense. Capabilities being produced by the growing Turkish defense industry cannot be sidelined in the Alliance’s endeavor to enhance deterrence and defense and maintain a technological edge against both state and nonstate adversaries. This will require result-oriented consultations within NATO and especially between European allies and Turkey, conducted with renewed vigor and mutual resolve. To this end, it is high time for the European Union (EU) to revisit its policies that engage only EU members in enhancing Europe’s defense capacity. Today’s challenges require collaboration with non-EU countries, such as Turkey, to the fullest extent.

With terrorism plaguing Turkey’s neighborhood, and with the issue remaining high on Turkey’s agenda, Ankara likely welcomed allies’ commitment (as outlined in the Washington Summit Declaration) to “counter, deter, defend, and respond to threats and challenges posed by terrorists and terrorist organizations based on a combination of prevention, protection, and denial measures with determination, resolve, and in solidarity.” If allies align their perceptions of the threat to Turkey posed by the PKK and its affiliates by including, for instance, deterrence and defensive measures against the threat in the regional defense plan for Southern Europe, this would help ease the friction on this major issue and help erase the Turkish society’s negative perceptions of NATO allies.

The Washington Summit Declaration also included a reference to the 1936 Montreux Convention. While some Turkish observers have oddly argued the reference is ill-intentioned, it is actually a major outcome for Turkey, as the allies reaffirmed their commitments to “regional efforts aimed at upholding security, safety, stability, and freedom of navigation in the Black Sea region.” The communiqué also welcomed the joint endeavor of three littoral allies (Turkey, Bulgaria, and Romania) to launch the Black Sea Mine Countermeasures Task Group.

Finally, with the global order at stake—due to Russia’s aggression, China’s growing global influence, and threats to security including terrorism—it has become vitally important to maintain and increase cooperation with southern neighborhood countries. The Alliance recognized this importance at the Washington summit, when it committed to taking a new approach toward its “southern neighborhood.” As part of that approach, the NATO secretary general appointed a new special representative for the southern neighborhood to coordinate NATO’s efforts in that neighborhood. Turkey could play a positive role in improving ties between the Alliance and the southern neighborhood by leveraging the linguistic, kinship, religious, and cultural ties it has with other countries. Turkey could also mobilize opportunities that it has in being part of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation and Organization of Turkic States, and in working with the Gulf Cooperation Council and African Union.

The Alliance has once again proven its relevance and value in protecting and defending the Euro-Atlantic area. As it continues to work to keep the Euro-Atlantic area safe, secure, and stable, Turkey has an important role to play.

Mehmet Fatih Ceylan is a retired career ambassador with forty years of experience in international security and defense affairs. Formerly, he served in the Turkish Foreign Ministry and served as Turkey’s ambassador to NATO from 2013 to 2018.

The views expressed in TURKEYSource are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

The post The role Turkey can play in NATO’s post-Washington summit aims appeared first on Atlantic Council.

To deter Russia, NATO must adapt its nuclear sharing program

Michael John Williams — Tue, 30 Jul 2024 18:22:17 +0000

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine and the Kremlin’s frequent nuclear saber-rattling to deter allied assistance to Kyiv have revived discussions about NATO’s nuclear deterrence to a degree not seen in four decades. “Nuclear deterrence is the cornerstone of Alliance security,” NATO allies reaffirmed earlier this month in their Washington summit communiqué. But the Alliance’s nuclear deterrence posture, especially in Eastern Europe, remains inadequate.

To enhance the Alliance’s nuclear deterrence and counter Russia’s nuclear threats, the United States should expand nuclear sharing arrangements within NATO to allies such as Poland, Finland, and Romania. The United States should also expand the presence of medium-range US ground-based dual-capable missile systems in Europe. Connected to these changes, NATO should stop adhering to the NATO-Russia Founding Act, which is limiting the Alliance’s freedom and which Moscow has repeatedly violated. Only by expanding its approach to nuclear sharing can the Alliance adequately improve its deterrence posture and counter Russia’s nuclear blackmail.

The spread of nuclear weapons was a major concern at the dawn of the Cold War. In 1963, US President John F. Kennedy worried about “a world in which fifteen or twenty or twenty-five nations may have these weapons” within a decade. NATO’s current nuclear sharing program emerged in the 1960s as Washington sought to manage the proliferation of nuclear weapons and two other pressing challenges: bilateral relationships across Europe and the defense of Western European NATO allies. Of particular concern to the United States, its NATO allies, and the Soviet Union, was West Germany’s desire for some sort of access to the nuclear deterrent at the heart of NATO’s defense strategy.

US efforts originally focused on a “hardware” solution to this dilemma known as the Multilateral Force, which would have created a fleet carrying Polaris A-3 missiles under NATO command. But once Washington realized Soviet opposition to this arrangement would also kill the much-desired Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the Johnson administration switched to a “software” approach based on training and consultation with allies—what is now referred to as “nuclear sharing” within NATO. Under this arrangement US B-61 nuclear weapons are stored in secure locations in Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Turkey. The weapons are under US custody and control to maintain compliance with the NPT.

In the event of a nuclear war, a nuclear mission by NATO allies can only occur with explicit approval from NATO’s Nuclear Planning Group, along with authorization by the US president and UK prime minister. France remains outside the nuclear consultation mechanism with its own sovereign nuclear force.

NATO’s current nuclear sharing policy, which has been detailed in various publications, is based on layers encapsulated in the 2012 Deterrence and Defence Posture Review, the post-2012 NATO summit declarations, and the 2022 NATO Strategic Concept. The doctrine deliberately avoids specificity when it comes to qualifying circumstances for nuclear weapon use.

Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea and the war in the Donbas has prompted NATO to reconsider the Alliance’s previous inattention to its nuclear deterrent. The 2016 Warsaw Summit signaled this change, but despite the Alliance speaking more publicly about the nuclear issue and signaling more clearly about its nuclear exercise (Steadfast Noon), the bulk of the balancing efforts have focused on conventional forces. The problem with this, as Simond de Galbert and Jeffrey Rathke note, is that conventional parity is “unrealistic and costly” and perhaps even “escalatory.”

Making matters worse for NATO were Russia’s violations of the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) in 2019. Although disputed by the Kremlin, Russian President Vladimir Putin’s reportedly deployed missiles (9M729) with a range of 2,500 kilometers in Mozdok, North Ossetia, and near Moscow, which was a gross violation of the treaty, placing NATO’s eastern and northern allies under direct threat. In response, the United States withdrew from the INF treaty in 2019, a move that NATO allies supported.

Three years later, in 2022, the Alliance once again increased its signaling on the nuclear deterrent in its Strategic Concept, saying that it would “take all necessary steps to ensure the credibility, effectiveness, safety and security of the nuclear deterrent mission.” The following year, the Alliance announced further modernization of NATO’s nuclear capability at its Vilnius summit. This modernization of NATO nuclear capability is facilitated through the renewal of national forces in the United States, the United Kingdom, and France, as well as upgrades to European dual-capable aircraft. For current nuclear sharing allies, the old B-61 gravity bombs, which number around one hundred, will be replaced by the advanced B61-12. These are new weapons utilizing existing warheads and the replacement does not represent an increase in the overall number of US warheads.

To date, despite modernization and stronger signaling, NATO’s nuclear posture remains stagnant. To improve the Alliance’s deterrence posture, the United States and its allies should take two steps: expand current nuclear sharing arrangements eastward and deploy land-based US tactical nuclear weapons in Europe.

Expanding current nuclear sharing arrangements eastward will require fully breaking with the NATO-Russia Founding Act of 1997, which Moscow has torn to shreds. Several allies refuse to abandon under the mistaken notion that it somehow provides a road back to peace. In practice, this has meant that the Alliance has focused on rotating conventional forces in Eastern Europe to stay within the spirit of the Founding Act.

But it is Russia, not NATO, that has destabilized Europe. Time and again, the Kremlin has blatantly ignored the Founding Act. There should be no illusions that there is a road back, and heeding the spirit of the act while Russia wages a brutal, illegal war against Ukraine and engages in political warfare against NATO allies including the United States is foolish.

Balancing Russia with conventional forces in places such as the Baltics is simply an attempt at reassurance rather than an actual effective deterrence and defense strategy. Equally ineffectual would be relying just on F-35 combat aircraft in bases already storing US nuclear weapons in Europe.

The only adequate solution is to respond to Russian moves in a tit-for-tat manner that George Bunn and Rodger Payne call an iterated prisoner’s dilemma. Only in responding to the Kremlin in a manner that inflicts a real price can Washington bring about eventual cooperation from the Kremlin. The United States can do this by continually raising the stakes to a point where Russia views cooperation, rather than competition, as the best solution. Given the economic strength of the United States, and nuclear allies France and Britain, it would be logical for them to impose increasing costs on Russia through expanded nuclear sharing.

Moreover, the Pentagon recently announced that it would send Tomahawk, SM-6, and developmental hypersonic missiles to Germany in 2026. This is a good start, but again it does not impose a high enough price on Russian actions and a broader deployment should be considered for two reasons. First, Russia has deployed reciprocal technologies, and the current US deterrent is inadequate. Second, as noted above, the deployment of US ground-based dual-capable missile systems to NATO allies could be used as a bargaining chip to influence Russian behavior—in effect, escalating to deescalate. While this last point may not be appreciated by all advocates of expanding NATO’s deterrent, if it results in a decrease in Russian tactical nuclear deployments, it may be worth the trade if it elicits cooperation.

The United States should take a page out of the new Russian deterrent playbook, which sees little distinction between peacetime and wartime, instead favoring persistent engagement with the enemy across a range of capabilities as part of overall deterrence. Putin has time and again played Washington and its European allies, believing that they are too scared of the long shadow cast by nuclear weapons to push back against his threats. Only by responding in kind may Washington find the Kremlin perhaps willing to listen.

Michael John Williams is a nonresident senior fellow with the Transatlantic Security Initiative in the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security and associate professor of international affairs and director of the International Relations Program at the Maxwell School for Citizenship and Public Affairs at Syracuse University.

The post To deter Russia, NATO must adapt its nuclear sharing program appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Putin is convinced he can outlast the West and win in Ukraine

Mykola Bielieskov — Thu, 25 Jul 2024 18:16:56 +0000

The annual NATO summit in early July resulted in a range of encouraging statements and practical measures in support of Ukraine. However, this widely anticipated gathering in Washington DC failed to produce the kind of decisive steps that could convince Vladimir Putin to end his invasion.

It was already clear some time before the NATO summit that there would be no serious discussion of a membership invitation for Ukraine. Instead, the emphasis would be on improving the existing partnership, with alliance leaders preserving as much room to maneuver as possible when dealing with the Russo-Ukrainian War.

Post-summit coverage focused on the official communique declaring Ukraine’s “irreversible path” to future NATO membership, but not everyone saw the wording of the joint statement as a breakthrough. Indeed, some skeptics interpreted this latest rephrasing of NATO’s open door for Ukraine as an indication that the alliance is still no closer to agreeing on a specific time frame regarding Ukrainian membership.

The summit was not a complete anticlimax, of course. A number of countries pledged additional air defense systems to Ukraine, meeting one of Kyiv’s most urgent requests to help protect the country from Russian bombardment. There were announcements regarding the imminent arrival of the first F-16 fighter jets in Ukraine, while additional mechanisms to coordinate weapons deliveries and enhance cooperation were unveiled.

NATO members also agreed in Washington to allocate forty billion euros for Ukrainian military aid next year. While this figure is certainly significant, it falls far below the level of funding needed to ensure Ukrainian victory. This is not a new issue. While the collective GDP of the West dwarfs Russia’s, Western leaders have yet to mobilize their financial resources to provide Ukraine with an overwhelming military advantage. As a consequence, it is the much smaller Russian economy that is currently producing more artillery shells than the entire Western world.

Stay updated

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

The modest progress made at the NATO summit reflects a lack of urgency that has hampered the Western response ever since the onset of Russia’s full-scale invasion. There is little chance this hesitancy will provoke a change of heart in Moscow. On the contrary, Russian policymakers are far more likely to regard the West’s current posture as proof that the war is going according to plan.

Unlike the West, the Kremlin has a clear and coherent vision for a future Russian victory in Ukraine. This involves gradually wearing down Ukrainian battlefield resistance with relentless high intensity combat along the front lines of the war, while extensively bombing civilian infrastructure and population centers across the country.

In parallel to these military measures, Russia will also continue to conduct diverse influence operations targeting Ukrainian and Western audiences, with the goal of undermining morale and sowing division. This will leave Ukraine increasingly isolated and exhausted, leading eventually to collapse and capitulation.

The Russian authorities believe Ukraine will struggle to maintain the attention of its Western allies, and are encouraged by growing signs that many in the West now view the invasion as a stalemate. Putin himself appears to be more confident that ever that the West will lose interest in the war, and expects Western leaders to reluctantly pressure Kyiv into a negotiated settlement on Russian terms.

Eurasia Center events

Ukraine’s advance in Kursk: What’s next and implications

Conflict Russia Security & Defense Ukraine

Since the invasion began nearly two and a half years ago, Western leaders have failed to demonstrate the kind of resolve that would force Putin to revise his expectations. Instead of flooding Kyiv with the very latest tanks, jets, drones, and missiles, Ukraine’s partners have consistently slow-walked military aid while imposing absurd restrictions on the use of Western weapons.

The West’s messaging has been equally inadequate. Rather than publicly committing themselves to Ukrainian victory, Western leaders have spoken of preventing Ukrainian defeat and of standing with Ukraine “for as long as it takes.” This is not the language of strength that Putin understands.

Confronted by continued signs of Western indecisiveness, the Russian dictator is now escalating his demands. His most recent peace proposal envisaged Ukraine ceding all lands already occupied by Russia along with significant additional territory not currently under Kremlin control. There can be little doubt that he remains as committed as ever to the complete surrender and subjugation of Ukraine.

Putin knows he could not hope to match the collective might of the democratic world, but this does not discourage him. Instead, he fully expects continued Western weakness to hand Russia an historic victory in Ukraine. Unless the West is finally prepared to translate its vast financial, military, and technical potential into war-winning support for Ukraine, he may be proved right.

Mykola Bielieskov is a research fellow at the National Institute for Strategic Studies and a senior analyst at Ukrainian NGO “Come Back Alive.” The views expressed in this article are the author’s personal position and do not reflect the opinions or views of NISS or Come Back Alive.

Biden’s legacy depends most of all on Ukraine

Frederick Kempe — Tue, 23 Jul 2024 11:04:00 +0000

During his press conference at the NATO Summit in Washington earlier this month, Joe Biden said of his presidential campaign, “I’m not in this for my legacy.” Two weeks and one difficult decision to bow out of the race later, his legacy is suddenly front and center.

That legacy, however, depends importantly on something he can no longer control: Ukraine’s ability over time to prevail against Russia’s criminal war.

That includes the inextricably linked question of whether the US president has contributed decisively to the United States’ ability, alongside its allies, to counter an emerging “axis of resistance” consisting of China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea.

Those countries are determined to prevent Ukraine’s success. More to the point, they seem to view Russia’s subjugation of Ukraine as a crucial step in remaking the global system of rules and institutions that the United States and its partners forged after World War II.

Biden, who on Sunday announced his decision to abandon his presidential campaign, will likely be remembered by historians for defining the enormous stakes of the era we’re entering. He called it an “inflection point,” which I’ve been doing in this space since 2018, having previously been introduced to the term through the US intelligence community.

“We’re facing an inflection point in history—one of those moments where the decisions we make today are going to determine the future for decades to come,” Biden declared this past October, in only his second speech to the nation from behind the Resolute Desk in the Oval Office.

Significantly, in that speech he connected the dots between Russia’s war in Ukraine and Hamas’s terrorist attack on Israel, which was only possible with the support of Iran. “Hamas and Putin represent different threats, but they share this in common,” he said. “They both want to completely annihilate a neighboring democracy—completely annihilate it.”

Historians may praise Biden for defining the historic stakes in such unmistakable terms. However, the coming months and years will determine whether he fell short in delivering the remedies by too cautiously supporting Ukraine due to his fears of Russian nuclear escalation.

The result was self-deterrence, where the United States provided Kyiv the weaponry it most urgently requested too slowly and in insufficient numbers. The Biden administration also worsened the situation by restricting Kyiv’s freedom to use US weapons, particularly longer-range fires, against military targets in Russia, from which deadly attacks on Ukrainians were being launched. When the US Congress held up aid for Ukraine last year and into this one, it made Ukraine’s challenges far more dangerous.

Many Republican leaders agree that Biden was mistaken in holding back crucial support and permissions for Ukraine, but they weren’t the ones nominated for president or vice president at the Republican National Convention last week. For the moment, the gathering in Milwaukee indicated the party’s desire to do less for Ukraine.

Many Republicans have wanted to meld former President Donald Trump’s populism with former President Ronald Reagan’s larger global purpose, which contributed to the United States’ Cold War victory against the Soviet Union without a shot being fired. That seems to be the furthest thing from the intentions of the Trump-Vance ticket, though Trump has been known to change direction on a dime, as he did to free up congressional funding for Ukraine.

John Bolton, who was Trump’s national security advisor from 2018 to 2019, wrote in the Telegraph that both Trump and his running mate JD Vance “are disinterested, or openly disdainful, of assisting Kyiv’s defense against Russia’s unprovoked aggression. For Vance, the US lacks both the military assets and the defense-industrial base to be a global power, meaning it must concentrate its resources to defend against China.”

My own view is that the best way to “defend against China” would be to counter Beijing’s unflinching and even increasing support for Russia’s war in Ukraine. At their seventy-fifth anniversary summit in Washington, NATO leaders called China a “decisive enabler” of that war by providing the wherewithal without which Moscow could not continue to wage it.

If the Republican Party truly believes Democratic leaders have provided inadequate defense budgets to address emerging challenges, “Trump should work to correct these deficiencies, not treat them as excuses for further reductions, thereby abandoning even more international positions of strength,” writes Bolton.

Instead, in a recent interview with Bloomberg Businessweek, Trump signaled that he may not be willing to defend Taiwan, likely the first place to fall next if Ukraine falters. “Taiwan doesn’t give us anything,” Trump said, noting that the island is 9,500 miles away from the United States and less than a hundred miles from China. “Taiwan should pay us for defense. You know, we’re no different than an insurance company.”

Where the Trump administration better understood the dynamics of this emerging autocratic axis was in its “maximum pressure” approach to Iran. The Biden administration, by contrast, at first hoped to resume nuclear talks with Iran and work over time to manage its threats to the region. Tehran then demonstrated its determination to disrupt the Middle East and threaten Israel, not with nuclear weaponry but through its proxies, including Hamas, the Houthis, and Hezbollah.

Where the Trump administration fell short, and where the Trump campaign seems to be doing so again, is in its underestimation of the advantages provided to the United States through alliances and common cause at a moment of such significant and historic challenge.

At the NATO Summit in Washington, I had the chance to speak with officials from across the Alliance, as well as those from Indo-Pacific partner states Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and South Korea. I found that there is consensus about one matter: They miss the certainty of the Cold War years, from the end of World War II to the fall of the Berlin Wall, when US foreign policy remained relatively consistent through Republican and Democratic administrations. During that period, US leaders were resolute in the belief that they faced a long-term struggle against Soviet communism and its confederates.

Without US agreement in diagnosing the emerging autocratic challenge, which Biden has done well, and without US prescriptions for an allied and global response to address it, which he has done less well, the officials I spoke with expect a period of testing by US adversaries and hedging by US allies.

Biden defined the emerging geopolitical contest confronting the United States. He still has six months to give Ukraine the best chance of victory, including by removing restrictions on Ukrainian forces striking military targets in Russia. The outcome of the war and the larger contest, however, will increasingly be determined by forces that he can’t control, both within his own party and among Republicans, and among allies and adversaries around the world.

Frederick Kempe is president and chief executive officer of the Atlantic Council. You can follow him on Twitter @FredKempe.

This edition is part of Frederick Kempe’s Inflection Points newsletter, a column of dispatches from a world in transition. To receive this newsletter throughout the week, sign up here.

The post Biden’s legacy depends most of all on Ukraine appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Andriy Yermak: Ukraine and NATO are restoring Europe’s security architecture

Andriy Yermak — Mon, 22 Jul 2024 12:04:47 +0000

As I listened to world leaders announce the signing of the Ukraine Compact on the sidelines of NATO’s 75th anniversary summit at the Walter E. Washington Convention Center, my mind drifted back to September 13, 2022. On that cold, rainy day, Anders Fogh Rasmussen and I first unveiled the Kyiv Security Compact concept.

President Zelenskyy’s idea, which Anders and I began to implement together, was that allies should provide Ukraine with everything necessary to defeat Russia on the battlefield and to deter further aggression. The proposal outlined a set of measures designed to ensure that Ukraine could defend itself independently until it joins NATO.

Specifically, it included commitments from a group of guarantor states to provide weapons, conduct joint exercises under the EU and NATO flags, share intelligence, and assist in developing Ukraine’s defense industry. We claimed that security commitments were not an end in themselves, but a transitional phase towards Ukraine’s full-fledged membership in both the European Union and the NATO Alliance.

At the time, one journalist asked if I truly believed we could find even half a dozen countries willing to support this initiative. I responded with a line from John Lennon’s song: “You may say I’m a dreamer, but I’m not the only one.” This has proved to be an accurate forecast.

At the NATO Vilnius summit in July 2023, G7 leaders issued a Joint Declaration of Support for Ukraine, based on our initiative. Other countries began joining soon after. Before long, their number exceeded thirty. By that time, we already had several bilateral security agreements in place. This work is ongoing, with 23 bilateral agreements currently signed. Together with our allies, we set out on the path to restore the European security architecture. We are determined not to stray from it again.

The Ukraine Compact, open for others to join, became the final piece in creating an ecosystem of security guarantees for our country. It is designed to enhance Ukraine’s resilience and ability to defend itself in the future, and to serve as a bridge during the period when Article 5 does not yet apply. I’m pleased that this aligns perfectly with Anders’ and my original draft. The bridge metaphor is also enshrined in the NATO summit’s final declaration. This is a crucial detail. Since 2008, Ukraine has been hitting a glass wall trying to enter the Alliance’s supposedly “open doors,” and now it has been removed.

The summit declaration’s statement on Ukraine’s irreversible path to NATO is another strong step. Throughout the past year, Anders and I have emphasized again and again: NATO leaders need to make it clear to Vladimir Putin that his war is futile, that support for Ukraine will not waver, and that Ukraine will sooner rather than later become a NATO member. Finally, this signal has now been sent: Russia’s war of choice has been stripped of its stated pretext.

Stay updated

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

Currently, the Ukraine Compact bears 25 signatures. It has been supported by the United States and Canada, nineteen European countries, and the European Union. Japan is also among the signatories. This is very telling, as Ukraine is a cornerstone not only of European but also of global security.

The Washington summit demonstrated that the Alliance can no longer limit itself to the Euro-Atlantic space as it seeks to effectively counter global challenges and threats. Aggressive autocracies are increasingly collaborating and taking on the shape of a military-political alliance. For all democratic countries this means one thing: Russia is not alone in its aggression against Ukraine, and the possibility of new conflicts elsewhere depends on Moscow’s ability to succeed. It is therefore in our common interest to do everything to ensure that Ukraine emerges victorious from this war, and that this victory is convincing.

I note that the recent NATO summit’s decisions are aimed precisely at this. Three key points are worth mentioning here. First, the institutionalization of aid formats that have emerged ad hoc during the war. Second, building Ukraine’s defense capabilities and strengthening the potential of its defense-industrial base. And third, the course toward deepening Ukraine’s political and military interaction with NATO structures.

We are sincerely grateful for these steps and extend thanks to our allies, whose unwavering leadership has allowed us to successfully defend ourselves despite Russia’s often overwhelming advantages in terms of resources. Your dedication and your value-based choices strengthen the chances of our common victory over a lawless and cynical enemy.

Eurasia Center events

Ukraine’s advance in Kursk: What’s next and implications

Conflict Russia Security & Defense Ukraine

Looking ahead, I need to outline several critical points. The further strengthening of Ukraine’s air defense system is crucial. Russia intends to continue terrorizing our civilian population by destroying residential buildings, power grids, and other critical infrastructure. The recent strikes on the Okhmatdyt children’s hospital in Kyiv, as well as two additional health clinics, have once again clearly demonstrated that for the Russian military, there are no red lines in terms of international law and ethics. There is therefore no alternative to strengthening the air shield over Ukraine.

One of the key components of this air shield will be F-16 jets. Ukraine’s allies have committed to delivering the first batch this summer. However, I have to emphasize that this is not enough. The Russians boast about using three-ton guided bombs against Ukraine. Their bombers are based at airfields in Russia’s border regions. In order to neutralize this threat, we still need long-range capabilities. Simply put, if there is a hornet’s nest in your neighborhood, you can hunt them one by one with varying success, or you can destroy the nest itself. Currently, only the first option is available to us, and even that is quite limited.

Addressing this problem will not only reduce the number of casualties; it will also further enhance the operational compatibility of Ukrainian defense forces with NATO. We sincerely welcome steps in this direction, in particular the creation of the NSATU (NATO Security Assistance and Training for Ukraine) program.

We are also extremely grateful to member states for their specific commitments to aid Ukraine, and for implementing a system of proportional contributions that will provide base funding of forty billion euros over the next year. We expect these funds to be spent specifically on purchasing weapons, rather than alternative forms of support, which are undoubtedly important as well.

At the same time, it is worth noting that this burden could be reduced by fine-tuning mechanisms for transferring frozen Russian assets to Ukraine. A related issue is the further intensification of sanctions pressure on both Russia and the partners who enable Moscow to continue making weapons using microelectronics produced in the West. This has made it possible for Russia to manufacture the type of missile that hit the Okhmatdyt children’s hospital with Western components.

Our relationship with NATO has always been a two-way street, and we remain committed to this principle. We fully understand that one of the leading factors in Ukraine’s Euro-Atlantic integration is our capacity for transformation. President Zelenskyy and his team remain dedicated to reforms aimed at strengthening institutional resilience and democratic processes in the country.

Changes continue despite the war, and they are irreversible. We unhesitatingly and without reservations agree that the reforms mentioned in the summit’s final declaration are of utmost importance for Ukraine’s prospects. At the same time, common sense suggests that all these changes will only matter if Ukraine withstands this war. Withstands and wins. Only a strong, free, and successful Ukraine can be a reliable outpost of democracy in Eastern Europe. Comprehensive and long-term assistance to Ukraine is not charity. It’s an investment in a secure future for the entire Euro-Atlantic community.

Andriy Yermak is the head of Ukraine’s Office of the President.

Global China Newsletter—Russia’s ‘enabler’ punts again on economic reform

Dexter Tiff Roberts — Fri, 19 Jul 2024 19:35:20 +0000

Subscribe to the Global China Hub

Amidst the assertions of commitment to Ukraine’s defense and eventual membership in NATO, conversations at last week’s NATO summit here in sweltering Washington, DC featured another hot topic: China.

The final communiqué, approved by all thirty-two NATO members, took the unprecedented step of calling China “a decisive enabler” of Russia’s war against Ukraine, noting how this is undermining China’s interests and reputation in Europe. NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg underscored that China cannot have it both ways, sponsoring the largest war in Europe in recent memory while attempting to maintain productive relationships across the continent.

NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg speaks with Atlantic Council President and CEO Frederick Kempe at the NATO Public Forum on July 10, 2024.

These developments on the security front come as European countries with deep ties to the Chinese economy wrestle with how to protect industries from an onslaught of Chinese exports. This dynamic has been most notable in the EU’s recent provisional tariffs on Chinese electric vehicles. While far short of the 100 percent tariffs announced by the Biden administration, Brussels’ move indicates there is growing transatlantic symmetry on derisking relationships with China.

There is far more to be done—not to mention the potential impact of a change in US leadership next year—but a more united transatlantic approach on economic security regarding China does appear to be progressing alongside that on hard security issues.

Meanwhile, as your Global China Editor-in-Chief Tiff Roberts writes below, there is no indication from the Party’s just concluded Third Plenum of hoped-for economic reforms or reduced reliance on emerging and green technology industries—and their export—to spur lagging growth. That’s a recipe for growing confrontation with developed economies, highlighting again the need for continued transatlantic convergence. We cover all this and more below—take it away, Tiff!

-David O. Shullman, senior director, Atlantic Council Global China Hub

China Spotlight

Fellow

Dexter Tiff Roberts

Global China Hub Indo-Pacific Security Initiative

China Chinese

Third Plenum focused on ‘shiny new industries,’, neglected real reform

As Dave notes, many had been hoping China’s just-closed Third Plenum, a once-every-five-year party meeting that usually focuses on the economy, would deliver the reforms needed to jumpstart the country’s lackluster growth. That does not seem to have happened. “Instead of focusing on China’s current problems, the Third Plenum … will prepare China for a confrontation with the United States by building industries powered by massive investments in cutting-edge technologies,” GeoEconomics Center’s Jeremy Mark rightly predicted earlier this month. “China has clearly decided to direct all available resources to next-generation technologies while neglecting to support the vast majority of the population who scrape by outside the tech sector. That suggests Chinese leader Xi Jinping will end up with shiny new industries built on a weak economic foundation.”

As expected, the communiqué, released on July 18, highlighted high tech as well as reiterated Xi’s strident emphasis on the importance of security—something that has spooked both foreign and private investors before. China must achieve a “healthy interaction between high-quality development and a high level of security,” the document stated. And while it name-checked important areas like strengthening consumption and the need to improve “basic and bottom-up livelihood,” there were few specifics about the path ahead. A more detailed document will come later.

(Xi Jinping’s much-anticipated first Third Plenum in 2013 promised ground-breaking reforms to China’s economic system that many expected to see realized. I was far less optimistic, writing at the time of the “central paradox”: China needed major reforms to spark growth but “by pursuing these reforms the party is diluting its control.” That same dilemma remains today.)

The US and EU tariff war with China ramps up as the Global South welcomes Beijing’s embrace

Another big concern is China’s mercantilist trade practices, including subsidized exports undercutting global industries. But while the US and European Union (EU) have taken strong steps to retaliate, putting tariffs on Chinese electric vehicle imports as Dave noted above, Global South countries often welcome Beijing’s economic embrace.

Europe’s tariffs on Chinese EVs max out at 38.1 percent. But, as the Europe Center’s Jacopo Pastorelli and James Batchik write, while this “signal[s] greater alignment between Washington and Brussels on China,” there are differences. Washington’s tariffs will be implemented quickly and applied broadly, yet Europe’s tariffs targeted specific Chinese companies and were “provisional”—a final ruling on tariff levels won’t happen for another four months.

And while a tough approach to China has bipartisan support in the US, “another factor is European unity—or lack thereof,” particularly from export-oriented members, write the report authors. On July 15, Germany, Finland, and Sweden abstained in a non-binding vote on the tariffs, while Italy and Spain voted in favor, with a German economy ministry spokesperson saying “it is now crucial to seek a rapid and consensual solution with China.”

In marked contrast, many Global South countries are throwing their economic lot in with China. Take Peru, whose president Dina Boluarte visited Beijing on June 28. The state visit “follows a decade of increased Chinese economic influence in the Andean country. Between 2018 and 2023, Peru became the second highest recipient of Chinese foreign direct investment (FDI) in Latin America and the Caribbean,” writes the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center’s Martin Cassinelli. “In 2024, Peru’s relevance to China will be transformed, as Lima becomes a crucial partner in China’s economic engagement with Latin America. In November, Xi plans to inaugurate the Chancay port, a $3.6 billion deep-water mega-port forty-four miles north of Lima.” Other Global South leaders who have recently visited Beijing include top officials from Guinea-Bissau, Vanuatu, Bangladesh, and the Solomon Islands.

NATO says China presents “systemic challenges to Euro-Atlantic security”

As Dave notes above, the just-closed NATO meeting singled out China for criticism like never before. The thirty-two-nation organization declared that China presents “systemic challenges to Euro-Atlantic security,” citing the buildup of its nuclear arsenal, disinformation and cyberattacks. More than anything else, concern centered on China’s role as a “decisive enabler” of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. “We call on the People’s Republic of China (PRC) … to cease all material and political support to Russia’s war effort,” read the communiqué.

As the below chart shows, China’s trade with Russia is expanding. That trade is helping China to prop up Russia’s “war machine”, writes the Atlantic Council Global Energy Center’s Joe Webster. “While there is  no publicly available evidence that Beijing is providing lethal arms to Russian forces, its goods exports are nonetheless likely facilitating Moscow’s invasion,” the senior fellow notes, citing shipments of Chinese machinery, vehicles and parts, and dual-use technologies (In the communiqué, NATO singled out “weapons components, equipment, and raw materials that serve as inputs for Russia’s defense sector”). And it’s not just direct exports. There likely is significant indirect trade via Central Asia and Belarus, with dual-use goods exports more than doubling over the last year. “It is very prudent to examine if China’s shipments…are simply being re-exported on to Russia,” Webster writes.

Meanwhile Hungary, unlike other NATO members, showed strong support for China in recent weeks, continuing a trend that began a decade ago. “Under [far-right leader] Orbán’s leadership, Hungary has oriented its foreign policy around Russian and Chinese interests since 2014, doing the two powers’ bidding inside the European Union and NATO and becoming increasingly hostile to the leaders of the United States and the EU,” writes the Global China Hub’s Zoltán Fehér. Many EU leaders have not taken kindly to Orbán’s meeting with Xi Jinping in Beijing (and earlier with Vladimir Putin in Moscow) just before attending the NATO summit.

ICYMI

Next Wednesday, the Global China Hub will be co-hosting a public conversation on exposing and countering Chinese information operations in collaboration with the Atlantic Council’s Digital Forensic Research Lab (DFRLab), Radio Free Asia, and Freedom House.
Atlantic Council President and CEO Fred Kempe and Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security’s Indo-Pacific Security Initiative Director Markus Garlauskas reflected on their participation in the Atlantic Council’s annual delegation trip to Taiwan in June. The delegation was hosted by the Taiwanese government, and they met with Taiwan government leaders, including President Lai Ching-te, think tanks, and business representatives to discuss security and economic issues facing Taiwan and the Indo-Pacific.
The Scowcroft Center also published a report, “Strengthening Taiwan’s resiliency,” recommending actions for Taiwan’s new leadership to enhance its societal resilience against Chinese aggression in the context of both “gray zone” conflict and wartime attacks.
Two years after Elon Musk’s acquisition of Twitter and rebranding as X, the platform is far from winning the battle against spambots. DFRLab led an investigation into how spambots continue to suppress authentic posts in Chinese-language searches on X.

Global China Hub

The Global China Hub researches and devises allied solutions to the global challenges posed by China’s rise, leveraging and amplifying the Atlantic Council’s work on China across its 16 programs and centers.

Explore more

The post Global China Newsletter—Russia’s ‘enabler’ punts again on economic reform appeared first on Atlantic Council.

How to institutionalize NATO’s cooperation with its closest Pacific partners

Ira Straus, Francis Shin — Fri, 19 Jul 2024 17:24:17 +0000

For the third year in a row, Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and South Korea attended NATO’s annual summit. Speaking on the sidelines of the Washington summit last week, US Deputy Secretary of State Kurt Campbell declared that he “fully, 100 percent” supports NATO extending a standing invitation for future summits, going beyond its present ad hoc ones, to this grouping, known as the Indo-Pacific Four (IP4). This, he held, would place Atlantic-Pacific cooperation on a more solid footing and enable scaled-up joint planning. The United States, he has said before, should “weave” its Atlantic and Pacific alliances together.

There are two concrete steps NATO should take that will help achieve this goal.

First, NATO should upgrade its recent summit invitations to the IP4 by offering them a standing invitation. It is unwise to continue leaving this practice up in the air each year.

Second and more substantively, NATO and the IP4 should establish an Atlantic-Pacific Partnership Forum (APPF). This would be in the tradition of NATO’s Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and its Mediterranean Dialogue. Adding an APPF is the next step, arguably an overdue one.

The need for closer cooperation

The enduring threats from the revisionist autocracies show the need for closer Atlantic-Pacific cooperation among democracies, just as recent new channels for NATO-IP4 cooperation provide momentum for it. The increasingly aggressive alliance of autocracies is seen in China’s military exercises in Belarus near NATO’s border and in its de facto aid to Russia’s ongoing invasion of Ukraine. It is also present in North Korea’s military pact with Russia.

Despite the geographic distance, NATO strategists increasingly see Indo-Pacific security as a necessary and complementary part of Euro-Atlantic security. This reality was recognized in the 2022 Strategic Concept and reaffirmed at the Washington summit. Any deterioration in Indo-Pacific security, such as a mainland Chinese invasion of Taiwan or escalation of other territorial disputes in the region, would not just damage the world economy; it would challenge the larger international order as well. And China has consistently challenged NATO members directly with threats of economic coercion over Taiwan.

Making it official

So far, Atlantic-Pacific cooperation has occurred mostly in silos between NATO and the individual IP4 states, and much of it is unsecured from being disrupted by ordinary changes. For example, Japan’s ambassador in Brussels has met semi-regularly with NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg and other senior figures in the NATO secretariat to discuss progress on Japan’s Individually Tailored Partnership Programme. Its higher-level meetings regarding security cooperation have occurred mostly at the past three NATO summits, plus recent Group of Seven (G7) summits and one visit by Stoltenberg to the region in 2023.

The relatively slow pace of these summits’ convenings—as well as the conspicuous absence of Australia, New Zealand, and South Korea from the most recent G7 summit in Fasano, Italy, after their previous attendance at the G7 summit in Hiroshima, Japan—indicates that these channels, without institutionalization and supplementation, cannot be relied upon consistently.

The domestic political situations in the IP4 states also risk the continuity of this cooperation. This is normal; in fact, a prime motive for institutionalizing cooperation is to ensure that it won’t die out when domestic politics take their next turn. It has been overlooked how easily the intense transatlantic cooperation of 1946-1948 could have dissipated after Joseph Stalin’s death in 1953 if it had not been institutionalized in 1949 in NATO and already gathered momentum in the years after.

Today, South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol and Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida have low approval ratings in polls in their respective countries. A change in government in either country might well shift it away from its pro-NATO stances, and from their efforts to improve Japan-South Korea bilateral relations. This would be a major reversal of recent progress.

An APPF would address these structural shortcomings in Atlantic-Pacific Cooperation. Developing new institutionalized platforms would help ensure continuity across shifts in domestic politics. For example, the APPF could overcome existing deficits in NATO-IP4 meetings by committing to convene respective foreign and defense ministers at least twice a year—a wider version of the 2+2 ministerial consultative committees. NATO could likewise invite its APPF partners to be observers in NATO committees. There is a precedent for this move: The security and partnerships and the cooperative security committees are already open for participation from partner countries on an ad hoc basis.

Meanwhile, an APPF could open partnership offices in its two main regions, like the one NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue is opening in Jordan. This would fill in for NATO’s inability to reach agreement on the more daring step of opening a formal office of its own in the Indo-Pacific region.

The larger picture

The APPF could accelerate NATO members’ progress on developing Indo-Pacific policies and act as a consultative platform between NATO and the IP4 in times of crisis, such as in the event of conflict in the Taiwan Strait or the South China Sea.

An APPF goal would—to borrow a 1990s NATO phrase—be to develop “interlocking but not interblocking” institutions. One model for such an effort is the Australia, United Kingdom, and United States grouping, known as AUKUS, discussing the inclusion of Japan and South Korea under pillar two of the partnership. Another would be the forthcoming secretariat for the US-Japanese-South Korean entente. These could be briefed with the NATO members in the APPF, ensuring they remain informed on the policy trajectories of these minilateral groupings. The APPF could then facilitate further development of the minilateral structures; for example, its discussions could encourage the trilateral entente secretariat to invite NATO, UK, Australian, and New Zealander delegates as observers, keeping avenues of cooperation open between the entente, AUKUS, IP4, and NATO.

Thus, more than seventy-five years after NATO’s founding, establishing an APPF would demonstrate that the Alliance remains ready to adapt to the challenges throughout the world. It would provide NATO with much-needed channels to deepen the cooperation across the two theaters between its annual summits. Perhaps most important, it would further underline the Alliance’s role as a values-based organization, reconnecting it to its moral and intellectual roots.

The IP4 are NATO’s best democratic partners by far in the wider world. Already in 1939, American journalist Clarence Streit called for uniting the leading democracies of the world—mostly Atlantic but also Pacific—for their shared economic and security interests, and as a nucleus to rally other democracies around. The founders of NATO were greatly motivated by his call. As democracies face the threat of growing autocratic aggressiveness, they can benefit by harkening back to the NATO founders’ vision: building a wider and deeper unity on the basis of shared democratic values.

Ira Straus is a senior advisor at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

Francis Shin is a research analyst specializing in transatlantic institutions, anti-corruption, and clean energy policy. He has previously worked at the Atlantic Council, Royal United Services Institute, and Center for a New American Security.

The post How to institutionalize NATO’s cooperation with its closest Pacific partners appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Hungarian PM Orban poses as unlikely peacemaker for Russia’s Ukraine war

Dmytro Tuzhanskyi — Thu, 18 Jul 2024 21:03:06 +0000

As perhaps the most pro-Kremlin and anti-Western leader of any EU or NATO member state, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban makes for an unlikely mediator in efforts to end Russia’s war in Ukraine. This did not prevent the Hungarian leader from embarking on an ambitious series of international visits in early July that he dubbed as a “peace mission.” In the first ten days of July, Orban visited four different countries on three continents, during which he claimed to have held twelve hours of talks with world leaders.

Orban’s intensive bout of shuttle diplomacy began with a visit to Kyiv on July 2, where he met with President Zelenskyy. This was the Hungarian leader’s first trip to neighboring Ukraine since 2015, and came just one day after his country took up the six-month rotating presidency of the Council of the European Union. The presidency, a position which rotates through all EU member states, is designed to coordinate the agenda and chair meetings of EU member state officials. It is limited in power, and the presidency carries no responsibility for representing the EU abroad.

A few days later, Orban was in Moscow for talks with Russian President Vladimir Putin, who he then lavished with praise in an interview with Germany’s WELT Documentary. On July 8, the Hungarian PM was in Beijing to meet with Xi Jinping. He subsequently flew to the US for the annual NATO Summit, before rounding off his diplomatic mission by meeting with US presidential candidate Donald Trump in Florida.

Stay updated

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

While Orban’s globetrotting itinerary was certainly impressive, there is little indication that this diplomatic initiative achieved much beyond generating media buzz and upsetting Hungary’s EU partners. Orban pushed the idea that a ceasefire in Ukraine could “speed up peace talks” and has tried to pitch his peace plan in a letter to European Union leaders, but so far he has faced little enthusiasm and a significant backlash. Crucially, both Zelenskyy and Putin have ruled out an immediate ceasefire.

This lack of progress toward peace might not be a major issue for Orban. Indeed, some believe his recent diplomatic efforts may actually have been designed primarily to strengthen his own position, both domestically and on the international stage. Crucially, it has allowed the Hungarian leader to balance his country between the key global centers of Washington, Beijing, Moscow, and Brussels. It has also served as a welcome backdrop for the creation of the new Patriots for Europe grouping within the European Parliament, as part of Orban’s self-styled effort to “change European politics.”

This international outreach allows Orban to maintain the stability of his own domestic position via continued NATO security, EU funding and market access, cheap Russian energy imports, and Chinese investments. He has been pursuing a similar model since 2010, and has consistently attempted to make himself useful to all key players. In the current geopolitical context, this means playing the role of potential peacemaker in the broader geopolitical confrontation that has emerged as a result of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

Eurasia Center events

Ukraine’s advance in Kursk: What’s next and implications

Conflict Russia Security & Defense Ukraine

Orban’s current peacemaker posturing could prove particularly timely if Donald Trump wins this year’s US presidential election and returns to the White House in January 2025. This would set the stage for a likely increase in tensions between Washington and Beijing, with the Hungarian PM potentially positioned to serve as an intermediary on key issues such as Ukraine peace initiatives.

Critics have accused the Hungarian leader of handing Putin a significant PR victory. At a time when the Russian dictator is eager to demonstrate that he is not internationally isolated, their Moscow meeting was particularly welcome. This explains why Orban was careful to begin his world tour in Kyiv, allowing him to deflect accusations from the West that he is doing the Kremlin’s bidding. Instead, Orban sought to portray his outreach efforts as an example of the “third way” that the current crop of populist European politicians often seek to champion.

There can be little doubt that Orban’s tour was also an attempt to troll the entire EU leadership. By seizing the initiative and unilaterally embarking on high-profile visits to Moscow and Beijing while holding the EU presidency, Orban was hoping to contrast his own dynamic leadership with the perceived indecisiveness of the European Union’s more cautious diplomacy. In doing so, he succeeded in boosting his international profile while causing significant embarrassment in Brussels.

Despite generating much media interest and favorable headlines, it would be wrong to portray Viktor Orban’s peace mission as an unqualified success. At this stage, his peace proposals appear to have little genuine substance, and have so far gained virtually no traction. Nevertheless, the Hungarian leader will likely continue to view the invasion of Ukraine as an opportunity to advance his own balancing act between Russia, China, and the West.

Dmytro Tuzhanskyi is director of the Institute for Central European Strategy. This article is published in his capacity as an analyst of the Institute for Central European Strategy and does not reflect any other institution’s position.

These new concerns over the direction of the United States were made all the more urgent by the Alliance’s recognition that NATO now faces a new axis of authoritarians—with China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea in the lead—that are working more closely together on defense-industrial issues than any such grouping before them, including Germany, Italy, and Japan in the 1930s and the Soviet Union and China in the 1950s.

The NATO Summit was expected to focus on Russia’s brutal war on Ukraine, and so it did, in ways that were both encouraging and disappointing. What was encouraging was that the Alliance did well in providing Ukraine additional military and financial support and even a devoted Alliance command, based in Wiesbaden, Germany. It fell far short by dodging two issues crucial to Ukraine’s immediate and long-term security.

First, and for reasons increasingly difficult to defend—especially in a week when Putin greeted the NATO Summit by striking a Kyiv children’s hospital in a deadly missile barrage—the Biden administration stubbornly refuses to let Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy use US missiles to hit military targets in Russian territory that are killing his people. Second, Biden also continues to stand in the way of any language promising a more certain and time-defined path to NATO membership for Ukraine, even though membership is what will provide Ukraine lasting security.

The less anticipated development of this past week—and the one with the most historic importance—was the summit’s remarkable consensus that the world has fundamentally changed since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. NATO now acknowledges the need to better address an axis of autocrats bent on revising the global order: China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea.

As Stoltenberg wrote in Foreign Affairs ahead of the summit, foreshadowing its decisions, “Putin shows no intention of ending this war any time soon, and he is increasingly aligned with other authoritarian powers, including China, that wish to see the United States fail, Europe fracture, and NATO falter. This shows that in today’s world, security is not a regional matter but a global one. Europe’s security affects Asia, and Asia’s security affects Europe.”

That’s powerful stuff—and a significant rethink of the threats facing this transatlantic Alliance.

The bottom line, though not quite stated that way, was: Our autocratic adversaries have joined in common cause globally against us, and thus we must do more ourselves to address this gathering threat. The alternative is to live in denial until the threats advance past the point of being able to address them.

No more having it both ways

One of the more concise NATO Summit declarations I’ve read, which is worth reading to gain an overall feeling of the landscape, lambasted the People’s Republic of China (PRC) as a “decisive enabler” of Putin’s war. Beyond that, it focused on significantly deepening relations with the so-called Indo-Pacific Four (IP4): Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and South Korea, all of which were represented for the third consecutive NATO Summit.

Thirty-two allies met with their Indo-Pacific partners in encouraging harmony about the challenges China poses. The declaration’s tough, unprecedented language on the PRC is worth reading in full, but note the unusual clarity in its call to action, coming from a multilateral Alliance in which language negotiations can be stultifying: “We call on the PRC . . . to cease all political and military support to Russia’s war effort. This includes the transfer of dual-use materials, such as weapons components, equipment, and raw materials that serve as inputs for Russia’s defence sector.”

In my interview with Stoltenberg, he said that although Iran and North Korea were growing more important to Russia’s war effort, “China is the main enabler.” The PRC, he said, is “delivering the tools—the dual-use equipment, the microelectronics, everything Russia needs to build the missiles, the bombs, the aircraft, and all the other systems they use against Ukraine.”

The declaration said: “The PRC cannot enable the largest war in Europe in recent history without this negatively impacting its interests and reputation.” In his swan song summit as NATO leader, Stoltenberg told me that China “cannot have it both ways,” meaning it cannot maintain “a kind of normal relationship with NATO allies” while fueling the North Atlantic’s “biggest security challenge” since World War II.

It’s fair criticism that for all the growing recognition of China’s crucial enabling role in Russia’s war, around which there is now a welcome NATO consensus, there isn’t any agreement on what to do about it.

The sad truth, one worth saying out loud several times to recognize the gravity of the situation, is that for the moment the PRC is having it both ways. It is threatening Europe and profiting from Europe at the same time.

The world has changed much more dramatically in terms of autocratic common cause since February 2022 than Western leaders and voters have digested.

Still, this past week is a good beginning.

“I think it’s important that we recognize the reality [of China’s role], and that’s the first step toward any action,” Stoltenberg told me. “Let’s see how far we’re willing to go as allies.”

NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg speaks with Atlantic Council President and CEO Frederick Kempe at the NATO Public Forum on July 10, 2024.

Ukraine is the new West Berlin

Stoltenberg stressed that despite the presence in Washington this week of the IP4, “there will not be a global NATO. NATO will be for North America and Europe.” But, he added, the North Atlantic region faces global threats, from terrorism to cyber to space. “And, of course, the threats and challenges that China poses to our security [are] a global challenge.”

Perhaps Stoltenberg is right that there won’t be a global NATO, but this week marked the significant beginning of a NATO that understands that its global responsibilities and threats are inescapable. That realization might have started with international terrorism after 9/11, but the increasingly close China-Russia strategic relationship is now at the core of it.

Speaking to the NATO Public Forum, Senator James E. Risch, the ranking member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, guided the Alliance to a newly published report from the committee’s Republican staff, “Next Steps to Defend the Transatlantic Alliance from Chinese Aggression.”

It lays out a powerful list of recommendations for the transatlantic community, including increased national and local collaboration on countering malign influence and interference from China, as well as improving institutional knowledge about everything from the workings of the Chinese Communist Party to the operational capacity of the People’s Liberation Army.

In the spirit of NATO’s growing Indo-Pacific focus, the Atlantic Council’s Matthew Kroenig and Jeffrey Cimmino recently published a “Memo to NATO heads of state and government” on the importance of engaging with the region.

“Some analysts argue that the United States should disengage from Europe and pivot to the Indo-Pacific, while European countries take on greater responsibility in Europe,” they write. This is the “wrong answer,” Kroenig and Cimmino explain. “Instead, Washington should continue to lead in both theaters. European countries should take on greater responsibilities for defending Europe, but they should also assist Washington to counter China and address threats emanating from the Indo-Pacific.”

With all that as context, this week’s NATO Summit perhaps should have done even more to ensure that Ukraine prevails and Russia fails. But allies did at least more clearly recognize that Putin’s criminal war on Ukraine isn’t just a national or even primarily a European security matter. Ukraine is the front line of a global struggle, a role that West Berlin played during the Cold War and a fact that China and Russia long ago acknowledged in their “no limits” partnership on the eve of the 2022 invasion.

Now comes the hard part

This past week, the contours unfolded for what might be NATO’s greatest struggle yet, after seventy-five years of existence.

Republican Congressman Mike Turner, the chair of the House Intelligence Committee, told me on the sidelines of the summit this week that the burden allies share isn’t only a question of defense spending but also whether they still have the political will to defend democracy and freedom.

Having this week recognized the challenge as global and focused on Russia and China, having more closely embraced Indo-Pacific partners, now comes the hard part for the world’s most enduring and successful Alliance.

What does NATO do next?

Frederick Kempe is president and chief executive officer of the Atlantic Council. You can follow him on Twitter @FredKempe.

This edition is part of Frederick Kempe’s Inflection Points newsletter, a column of dispatches from a world in transition. To receive this newsletter throughout the week, sign up here.

The post This might be NATO’s greatest struggle yet—and it’s global appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Pınar Dost joins Al-Monitor to discuss Turkey and NATO

aozen — Sun, 14 Jul 2024 10:54:33 +0000

Online Event Fri, July 12, 2024 • 12:15 pm ET

The post Pınar Dost joins Al-Monitor to discuss Turkey and NATO appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Czech president: Don’t expect a ‘significant breakthrough’ in the war in Ukraine for the ‘foreseeable future’

Katherine Walla — Fri, 12 Jul 2024 22:20:13 +0000

Watch the event

The Czech president on next steps for transatlantic cooperation post-NATO Summit

AN #ACFRONTPAGE EVENT—President Petr Pavel discusses the future of US-EU collaboration on support for Ukraine and European security.

The support required to allow Ukrainians to fully reclaim their territory is “not realistic at this time,” Czech President Petr Pavel argued on Friday.

Pavel portrayed this sobering reality at an Atlantic Council Front Page event in Houston, Texas, following NATO’s Washington summit, where allies agreed to a “bridge” to membership in the Alliance for Ukraine.

“In the foreseeable future, we cannot expect any significant breakthrough on the front line,” he argued, later clarifying that if Ukraine holds the line and Russia doesn’t achieve any major successes, breakthroughs could happen late this year or early next. “We have to have in mind who is the opponent, and Russia definitely has much greater resources . . . than Ukraine.”

Following the NATO Summit, the Czech president said he was “positively surprised” by the Alliance’s response to Ukraine’s needs, with allies reaching bilateral security agreements with Ukraine and committing to send more financial and military support. “I believe that even [Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy] was assured, even though he didn’t receive an invitation to the Alliance.”

As for when that invitation might be extended, Pavel said Ukraine’s military already works “seamlessly” with NATO in a number of areas—but the war is an “obstacle.” “Once we have a ceasefire, once we start negotiating peace, then we should also, in parallel, proceed with the integration,” he said.

Below are more highlights from the conversation, moderated by Atlantic Council President and Chief Executive Officer Frederick Kempe, which touched upon the Czech Republic’s support for Ukraine, approach toward China, and hopes for European autonomy.

Czech President Petr Pavel speaks with Atlantic Council President and CEO Frederick Kempe on July 12, 2024 in Houston, Texas.

Holding the line

Pavel argued that Ukraine’s partners should strive at this moment to “convince” Russia that it “cannot achieve any significant successes on the battlefield.” That, he said, would “bring them to the negotiating table.”

“And then once the negotiation starts . . . our position shouldn’t be to legalize occupied territories as Russian,” he clarified, “but rather declare them as temporarily occupied territories.”

“To achieve that, we have to equip Ukraine with all they need to really hold the line,” he said.

The Czech Republic took a “special forces approach” to support Ukraine, the president explained: “Act first, ask questions later,” he said. Low on stocks of artillery to send to Ukraine, Prague instead has located artillery in other countries and pooled funds from NATO allies to purchase rounds for Ukraine.
“We have financial cover for about half of a million rounds,” he said, adding that “it will fully cover Ukrainian need” and even fill reserves. He said that he is looking to expand the model to other forms of equipment.

Unity on China

Allies should concurrently work to convey to China that “it’s not in their interest to be so closely aligned with Russia,” Pavel said.

With four Indo-Pacific partner countries having attended the NATO Summit, Pavel explained that allies need to be “concerned” about security in that region because Euro-Atlantic security “cannot be separated” from security in the Indo-Pacific and elsewhere.

A Russian victory “would [embolden] China and make it more assertive,” he said, adding that the Indo-Pacific countries and NATO “are together in this global security environment,” because they share the same values.

Pavel said that while China is in many ways a “superpower,” it is also somewhat “dependent” on the “democratic world,” for example for trade. But the West doesn’t have “a common policy towards China,” the president said, warning that China is using that to divide the West “for its own benefit.”

Friendly autonomy

Pavel said that while European countries including the Czech Republic have reduced their dependency on Russian oil and gas, there is “still room for more coordination.” This summer, the Czech Republic and Germany began to push the European Union (EU) to hold talks on how to officially end imports of energy from Russia.

With US elections approaching, and the possibility of another Donald Trump presidency raising concern about the US role in transatlantic defense, some European members of NATO have argued that they need to reduce their military reliance on the United States. The EU “loves the word autonomous” in defense, the economy, energy, and more, Pavel said. “But whenever Europe gets into trouble, we look over the ocean.”

Ideas such as creating an EU army, Pavel argued, “don’t make sense” because such efforts would “duplicate what already exists.” Rather, European countries should “work with what we have,” he said, by reinforcing the European pillar of NATO.

This effort to reduce military reliance shouldn’t be “aimed against” the United States but rather should be seen as building “along with” the United States, he said. “The United States will need an equal partner in Europe, not a dependent child.”

Katherine Walla is the associate director of editorial at the Atlantic Council.

Watch the full event

The post Czech president: Don’t expect a ‘significant breakthrough’ in the war in Ukraine for the ‘foreseeable future’ appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Hinata-Yamaguchi quoted in Channel News Asia on NATO’s Indo-Pacific partnerships

ylee — Fri, 12 Jul 2024 20:40:54 +0000

On July 11, IPSI nonresident senior fellow Ryo Hinata-Yamaguchi was referenced in Channel News Asia discussing NATO’s interest in expanding its partnerships in the Indo-Pacific region.

Fellow

Ryo Hinata-Yamaguchi

Indo-Pacific Security Initiative Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Defense Policy Indo-Pacific

The post Hinata-Yamaguchi quoted in Channel News Asia on NATO’s Indo-Pacific partnerships appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Experts react: What the NATO Summit did (and did not) deliver for Ukraine

Atlantic Council experts — Fri, 12 Jul 2024 15:16:05 +0000

There’s no going back. At the NATO Summit in Washington this week, heads of state and government from the Alliance’s thirty-two allies pledged to support Ukraine on an “irreversible path to full Euro-Atlantic integration, including NATO membership.” However, the allies left open when exactly that membership would come, instead noting simply that they “will be in a position to extend an invitation . . . when Allies agree and conditions are met.” Below, Atlantic Council experts are in a position now to take stock of what this pledge means, what Ukraine did get at the summit (including announcements about F-16 fighter jets and air defense systems), and what to expect next.

Click to jump to an expert reaction:

John Herbst: There was progress for Ukraine, but it was neither sufficient nor decisive

Alyona Getmanchuk: Ukraine was offered a bridge. It needs a highway.

Peter Dickinson: Additional aid is welcome, but language on membership is a disappointment for Kyiv

Shelby Magid: Despite some wins, the week ends with a bitter taste for Ukrainians

There was progress for Ukraine, but it was neither sufficient nor decisive

This year’s NATO Summit will not be remembered as a seminal event, nor will it be remembered as a failure.

It is the eleventh summit since Moscow’s aggression in Ukraine began in 2014 and the third annual summit since Russia’s large-scale invasion in 2022. Like its ten predecessors, this summit has taken incremental steps to deal with the challenge posed by the first large-scale war in Europe since Adolf Hitler was defeated. There was progress, sure, but it was neither sufficient nor decisive.

On the plus side, the communiqué states plainly that “Russia remains the most significant and direct threat to Allies’ security.” But the question is what steps NATO took this week to address that threat.

The answer came in two ways. The first was in its treatment of the NATO-Ukraine relationship. The hard fact is that neither Ukraine nor Europe will be secure until Ukraine joins NATO. Yes, the communiqué says the decision on Ukraine’s membership is “irreversible.” And it introduced steps to foster cooperation—putting a senior NATO representative in Kyiv, establishing a training program for Ukraine, and implementing a new venue for cooperation in the NATO-Ukraine Council.

But these steps are modest and contrast with the stronger interim advantages enjoyed by Sweden and Finland before they became members. For instance, why can’t the Ukrainian ambassador to NATO participate in the North Atlantic Council (NATO’s decision-making body)? And why can’t Ukrainian officials participate within the NATO apparatus? This might explain why Andriy Yermak, the head of the Ukrainian presidential office, exhibited unease at the NATO Public Forum regarding the question of how he would assess the summit, before acknowledging that Ukraine was “satisfied.”

In contrast to those modest steps, there were better results from the summit in the form of security agreements Ukraine signed with NATO members and partners. While these agreements are no substitute for the protections offered by NATO’s Article 5, in some cases—such as the agreement signed with Poland—they provide additional air defense capabilities to Ukraine. These agreements also pledge long-term security aid.

The picture is also positive when it comes to the actual weapons supplies—the most immediate need—that NATO allies committed to at and around the summit. The new packages include five Patriot batteries and other sophisticated defense systems, Abrams tanks and Bradley Fighting Vehicles, and F-16 fighter jets. Collectively, this will be a major addition to Ukraine’s defense capability—even if long overdue—and a strong signal to Russia of NATO’s support for Ukraine.

This positive story, unfortunately, has been marred by a well-timed provocation by Russian President Vladimir Putin: the egregious attack on Kyiv on Monday that struck a children’s hospital. This was designed to tweak NATO and underscore to Ukrainians how vulnerable they remain. The United States could have turned this incident back on Putin if it used the occasion to remove all restrictions on the use of US weapons against targets in Russia. (Such strikes are now limited to border areas against targets that are planning imminent attacks.) Instead, the White House announced publicly that its restrictions remain in place, a decision that is bad for the people of Ukraine and for US leadership.

—John E. Herbst is the senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center and a former US ambassador to Ukraine.

Ukraine was offered a bridge. It needs a highway.

The NATO Summit in Washington was a Biden summit, not a Ukraine summit. Even a statement on Ukraine’s “irreversible path” to NATO—clearly a step forward compared with the Vilnius summit last year—turned out to be not an easy gain, but rather a result of rounds of exhausting negotiations.

Ukraine was offered a bridge to membership when it needs a highway—with an invitation or decision to start accession talks without formal invitation. Not to mention that the symbol of a bridge has quite a negative connotation in Ukraine since the days years ago when opponents of Ukraine entering into NATO and the European Union—both inside and outside of Ukraine—stubbornly positioned Ukraine merely as a “bridge” between East and the West.

It’s a false claim that starting Ukraine’s accession process to NATO can and should happen only after the war ends. This process is needed not only after the victory, but in order to accelerate the victory. If you can’t change Putin’s calculus on the battlefield, it is important to do so by adopting political decisions that could encourage him to think about ending the war.

It’s good that some important decisions on enhancing Ukraine’s air defense capabilities were announced in Washington, even though there was no need to wait with those announcements until the summit. Also, for those who really care that Ukraine would be able to protect its people and kids’ hospitals, those decisions should be underpinned with a green light for a deep strike on Russian launchers on its territory and the creation of an air defense shield over the western and southern parts of Ukraine.

—Alyona Getmanchuk is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center and is the founder and director of the New Europe Center, a foreign policy-focused think tank based in Kyiv.

Additional aid is welcome, but language on membership is a disappointment for Kyiv

Few here in Ukraine expected this week’s NATO Summit to produce any major breakthroughs on the key issue of the country’s membership aspirations. Instead, attention was firmly focused on securing meaningful practical support for the fight against Russia. In that sense, the summit was a success, with NATO members promising to deliver much-needed air defense systems and pledging forty billion dollars in military aid over the coming year. Ukraine also used the Washington, DC, event to hold a series of useful bilateral meetings, which produced additional commitments.

At the same time, the Washington Summit Declaration’s rhetoric of Ukraine’s “irreversible” path toward NATO membership failed to elicit much excitement in Kyiv, where there is widespread cynicism over past failures to match grand proclamations with meaningful progress. A majority of Ukrainians have been calling for a clear roadmap toward NATO membership since Russia’s invasion first began ten years ago. A decade later, they are still waiting.

This mood of quiet frustration was evident during Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba’s Thursday interview with CNN. “We have heard reassuring messages that Ukraine will be in NATO,” he commented. “But we cannot wait another seventy-five years to celebrate Ukrainian accession. It has to happen sooner rather than later.”

—Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

Despite some wins, the week ends with a bitter taste for Ukrainians

NATO’s Washington summit was a mixed bag when it comes to deliverables for Ukraine. While the seventy-fifth anniversary summit had a celebratory tone for many in the Alliance, the week ends with a bitter taste for Ukrainians.

The summit served as another occasion for disjointed feelings for those focused on Ukraine’s security and future. The week started with Russian forces firing a cruise missile into a Ukrainian children’s hospital and ended with champagne toasts and celebrations in Washington.

As volunteers in Kyiv helped dig children’s bodies out of the hospital’s rubble, NATO allies applauded their efforts to support Ukraine. There is reason for praise—the summit’s communiqué had strong language on Ukraine’s “irreversible” path toward membership, and allies made commitments for political, military, and financial support along with efforts to enable further integration into NATO. Those allied commitments included much-needed decisions to enhance Ukraine’s air defense capabilities and the launch of the Ukraine Compact with commitments to Ukraine’s long-term defense and security largely made through bilateral agreements. The NATO-Ukraine relationship grew stronger, while the Alliance also rightfully acknowledged the threat Russia continues to pose and the significant assistance it gets from China in its war effort.

While these decisions are positive, Ukraine still needs more. There are a number of NATO allies who would like to have seen the summit go further on Ukraine’s membership in NATO and immediate military support. Strong words and nonbinding agreements are important, but they don’t provide timelines, nor do they prevent missiles from destroying more hospitals. Ukraine’s leaders hoped to use the summit to get all restrictions removed on the use of US and other Western weapons against military targets in Russia. Yet even after the heinous attack against the children’s hospital, the White House shamefully announced that it is not changing its policy. When asked about those limitations on Thursday, US President Joe Biden replied that it wouldn’t make sense to strike the Kremlin, despite this being far from Ukrainian intentions. As Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said, it is “crazy” that Ukrainian forces can’t attack the military bases firing missiles at them, including the military base that launched the attack on the hospital earlier this week.

NATO leaders can still be proud of the steps they took in the right direction for Ukraine, but they can’t stop here. The focus on tangible steps for support to Ukraine and work toward Kyiv’s membership must continue with an urgency and quick pace. Following the summit, NATO can’t go away for summer vacation. Ukraine doesn’t have the convenience of waiting for the fall, while Russia continues to unleash criminal attacks.

—Shelby Magid is the deputy director of the Eurasia Center.

The post Experts react: What the NATO Summit did (and did not) deliver for Ukraine appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Five reasons why Ukraine should be invited to join NATO

Paul Grod — Thu, 11 Jul 2024 20:33:21 +0000

NATO leaders have this week declared that Ukraine’s path to membership is “irreversible,” but once again stopped short of officially inviting the country to join the alliance. This represents another missed opportunity to end the ambiguity over Kyiv’s NATO aspirations and set the stage for a return to greater international stability.

The ongoing Russian invasion of Ukraine was high on the agenda as alliance leaders gathered in Washington DC for NATO’s three-day annual summit. This focus on Ukraine was hardly surprising. The war unleashed by Vladimir Putin in February 2022 is the largest European conflict since World War II, and poses substantial security challenges for all NATO members.

Since the invasion began almost two and a half years ago, Russia has strengthened cooperation with China, Iran, and North Korea, who all share Moscow’s commitment to undermining the existing rules-based world order. The emergence of this Authoritarian Axis has helped underline the need for a decisive NATO response to Russian aggression in Ukraine. Alliance members are acutely aware that China in particular is closely monitoring the NATO reaction to Moscow’s invasion, with any Russian success in Ukraine likely to fuel Beijing’s own expansionist ambitions in Taiwan and elsewhere.

While there is widespread recognition that the outcome of Russia’s war in Ukraine will shape the future of international relations, this week’s summit confirmed that there is still no consensus within NATO over Ukrainian membership. On the contrary, the alliance appears to be deeply divided on the issue.

Objections center around the potential for a further dangerous escalation in the current confrontation with the Kremlin. Opponents argue that by inviting Ukraine to join, NATO could soon find itself at war with Russia. Meanwhile, many supporters of Ukrainian NATO membership believe keeping the country in geopolitical limbo is a mistake that only serves to embolden Moscow and prolong the war.

Stay updated

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

There are five compelling reasons to invite Ukraine to join NATO. Firstly, it would end Russian imperial ambitions in Ukraine. By formally inviting Ukraine to join NATO and announcing the commencement of accession talks, the alliance would send a clear message to Moscow that its dreams of subjugating Ukraine and restoring the Russian Empire are futile. This would represent a watershed moment for modern Russia that would likely force the country to rethink its role in the wider world.

Secondly, Ukrainian membership would significantly strengthen NATO. Ukraine boasts one of Europe’s largest, most capable, and innovative armies. For almost two and a half years, Ukrainian troops have defied expectations and successfully resisted the Russian military, which is widely regarded as the world’s second most powerful army. As a member of the NATO alliance, Ukraine would bolster Europe’s security, contributing its unique combat experience and knowledge of the most advanced battlefield technologies.

Third, inviting Ukraine to join NATO would help deter Russia from engaging in aggression or malign actions in other parts of Europe. It would confirm the counter-productive nature of Russia’s revisionist agenda and the likelihood of further negative consequences if the Kremlin continues to pursue policies hostile to the West. The security of Ukraine, eventually guaranteed by Article Five of the Washington Treaty, would ensure stability and peace throughout the Euro-Atlantic space.

Eurasia Center events

Ukraine’s advance in Kursk: What’s next and implications

Conflict Russia Security & Defense Ukraine

Fourth, Ukraine would be a particularly committed member of the NATO alliance. Polls consistently indicate that around three-quarters of Ukrainians back NATO membership, representing a higher level of public support than in many existing alliance members.

Ukrainian officials and Ukrainian society as a whole have a very good understanding of the responsibilities that would come with joining NATO. Throughout the past decade, Ukraine has demonstrated a high level of financial discipline, complying with NATO’s defense spending guidelines stipulating two percent of GDP. The Ukrainian military has also made major progress toward interoperability and the adoption of NATO standards.

The fifth compelling argument for Ukrainian NATO membership is the signal this would send to the international community. Inviting Ukraine to join the alliance would demonstrate the unity and resolve of the collective West at a time when Russia and other autocracies are looking for signs of weakness.

Few expected this year’s NATO summit to produce any meaningful breakthroughs toward Ukrainian membership. Nevertheless, the lack of progress will be welcomed by Russia, and will inevitably fuel frustration in Ukraine. Once again, NATO leaders have offered strong words but been unable to back this up with decisive actions.

Despite this setback, it is important to continue the debate over Ukraine’s future accession in the months ahead. Crucially, Ukrainians are not asking to join NATO immediately, and do not expect to receive the benefits of the alliance’s collective security in the context of Russia’s current invasion. Instead, they seek an invitation that will create a realistic and practical road map toward future membership.

Most Ukrainians see NATO membership as the only way to guarantee the long-term security of their nation against Russia and create the conditions for a sustainable peace in Eastern Europe. Unless a firm invitation to join the alliance is forthcoming, they fear that any ceasefire agreement with Moscow will only provide a temporary pause before Russia’s next attack.

Paul Grod is President of the Ukrainian World Congress.

Sara Bjerg Moller

Indo-Pacific Security Initiative Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Danish Europe & Eurasia

The post Moller featured in Eurasia Review on NATO’s challenges in Russia-Ukraine war appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The future of Europe, Ukraine, and the world order is not yet written, says the US national security advisor

Atlantic Council — Thu, 11 Jul 2024 16:19:05 +0000

Watch the full event

NATO Public Forum

Allied leaders, senior officials, international security experts, and opinion-shapers discuss the Alliance’s agenda and what’s happening behind closed doors at the summit.

Event transcript

Uncorrected transcript: Check against delivery

Speaker

Jake Sullivan
National Security Advisor, United States

Introductory Remarks

Frederick Kempe
President and CEO, Atlantic Council

FREDERICK KEMPE: Good morning, everybody in the room. Good afternoon in Europe and all around the world joining us virtually.

Throughout its history, NATO has stood as a major force for good, advancing peace, prosperity and freedom across the Euro-Atlantic and beyond. US leadership has always been a central pillar in strengthening NATO’s collective defense, maintaining stability and security, and promoting peace since the alliance’s inception in 1949. What we’ve learned the last two days and what we all know is that the alliance faces new challenges, and we face a host of new challenges to the global order—maybe the biggest threat to the global system since the 1930s.

President Biden has called this an inflection point. The Atlantic Council has been using that language for some years, seeing it as the fourth inflection point—the period after World War I, period after World War II, period after the Cold War—and the fourth now will be the period after Ukraine prevails in its war—in Putin’s war of aggression against Ukraine.

What all those inflection points have in common is they have been shaped by US leadership alongside partners and allies in a less favorable way at the end of World War I, a more favorable way at the end of World War II, and this is history in motion. The post-Cold-War world is over, and we’re entering a new era that our next speaker, National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan, has defined as an era of strategic competition in an age of interdependence. Navigating this new era will again require US leadership—principled US leadership alongside partners and allies.

It’s in that spirit that it’s my distinct honor to introduce a US strategic thinker and actor whose insights and vision are crucial as we navigate the complex challenges of this century. His dedication to safeguarding international cooperation and advancing collective security has been unwavering.

Jake Sullivan’s career is marked by high integrity, intellectual rigor, a deep commitment to diplomacy, strategic thinking, and the pursuit of peace and stability. His leadership has been instrumental in strengthening our alliances, addressing global threats, and promoting a world order based on mutual respect and cooperation. He, like all of us, is navigating wars in Europe, the Middle East, tensions with China. Seldom has a national security advisor dealt with so many challenges simultaneously, as has the Biden administration.

Earlier this year at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Jake rightly contextualized this inflection point in which we find ourselves today. He said, and I quote, “Nothing in world politics is inevitable. We are in command of our own choices to shape the future for the benefit of our fellow citizens and future generations to come.” And that’s why we’re here today. That’s why we’re here all week, to make the right choices that shape that future.

So with that, ladies and gentlemen, please join me in welcoming the twenty-eighth assistant to the president for national security affairs, Jake Sullivan.

JAKE SULLIVAN: Well, good morning, everyone. It’s great to be here with all of you. And I really want to thank Fred for that unduly generous introduction. But I especially want to thank the entire team who made this forum possible, because this forum is a critical pillar of the summit. Every think tank, every sponsor, every NATO leader, every partner, every participant, and, frankly, every citizen who has participated in this forum, either live or virtually, over the course of this summit. I’m honored to have the chance to be here to just say a few words to such an impressive group.

I know that one thing that has been on all of our minds throughout this summit, and in the lead up to it, is Russia’s brutal war of conquest against Ukraine. Where are we and where are we headed? Just a few months ago, the situation looked extremely grim. Security funding for Ukraine was held up in our Congress here in Washington, and we all saw the consequences. Ukrainian soldiers on the front lines running out of artillery shells, literally rationing ammo. Ukrainian families worried that Russian forces would take town after town. And we did indeed see the Russians try to press their advantage, seizing that window of opportunity to take additional territory.

And back in April, just a few months ago, there were voices predicting that by the time of this summit here in Washington today, Ukraine’s lines would crack, Russia would be making a major breakthrough, and the backdrop of this summit would be Russia surging forward across the front. And to be frank, I imagine that many of the people actually in this room today thought that might be the case as well. But Ukrainian forces stood strong. And President Biden, with bipartisan support in Congress, moved heaven and earth to get the national security funding for Ukraine passed. And since then, the picture has changed considerably.

Russia’s Kharkiv offensive stalled out. Russia is continuing to throw wave after wave of men into the fight, taking little increments of territory but at astonishing cost. By and large, the front lines have stabilized. Ukrainian mobilization efforts have improved. Ukrainian units are building stronger fortifications and defensive lines. And, day by day, they’re pushing back. This is due to the people of Ukraine, to their sheer courage and commitment to their country and its freedom. But it’s also due to the support of the United States and nations around the world, including NATO allies here gathered at this summit. So this morning I want to speak a little bit about the picture as we see it in Ukraine, and the steps that we are taking to ensure that this war is a failure for Russia and a success for Ukraine.

I’ll start on the military side of things. The fundamentals of this conflict are artillery and air defense. And over the last few months, we’ve surged both to Ukraine, with the new resources authorized by the Congress, hundreds of thousands of rounds of 155 ammunition to the front lines to help Ukraine repel Russian attacks. And we’ve now provided Ukraine with long-range capabilities, ATACMS missiles, which the Ukrainians are employing with good effect in Russian-occupied areas of Ukraine, including in Crimea. And at this summit we’ve continued to make major moves.

First, allies have committed to collectively provide Ukraine with at least forty billion euros’ worth of security assistance over the next year. And that’s not just a dollar sign; that is equipment, tanks, armored fighting vehicles, artillery, missiles, the whole range of capabilities that Ukraine needs to be able to effectively fight and win.

Next, in partnership with our allies, we will provide Ukraine with five strategic air defense systems and dozens of tactical systems that are especially relevant to help protect Ukrainian forces on the frontlines. The strategic air systems will help Ukraine as it endures a continued pounding by Russia of its energy grid with Russian missiles and drones, and a continued assault on its frontlines by Russian planes. And we saw the horrific reality of Russia’s brutality with the attack on the children’s hospital in Kyiv just a few days ago, and we are working with the Ukrainians to deal with that attack and to respond with force and vigor.

From our own production, we’ll deliver hundreds of critical air defense missiles to Ukraine over the next year as well. There was a point earlier this year when it looked like Ukraine might run out of interceptors. But thanks to decisions President Biden has taken working with allies and partners, we will ensure that Ukraine remains supplied with the air defense missiles it needs for all of the batteries that we and our allies are now providing.

And together, the United States, Denmark, and the Netherlands have begun the transfer of F-16s to Ukrainian forces. And Ukrainian pilots will be operating in theater with those F-16s this summer. Like I said, major moves.

And we’re also steeled for the struggle ahead. President Putin thinks he can outlast Ukraine and its supporters, and he’s taken steps to put Russia’s industry—its defense industry, in fact its entire economy—on a wartime footing. And with help from Iran, from North Korea, and from the People’s Republic of China, he’s attempting to undertake Russia’s most significant defense expansion since the height of the Cold War. But make no mistake: This unsustainable war spending masks underlying weakness and fragility, and the economic costs for Russia are mounting and will compound over time.

Meanwhile, NATO allies have been making historic investments in our own defense industrial bases without distorting our national economies the way Russia has. Yesterday, for the first time ever, every ally pledged to develop plans to strengthen their defense industrial capacities at home. And like our defense spending commitment, these individual pledges are critical to our collective security. They’re going to help enable the alliance to prioritize production of the most vital defense equipment we need in the event of conflict and to produce the capabilities Ukraine needs as we speak to fight Russia on the battlefield. These pledges will also help forge new industry partnerships across the alliance, create jobs, and strengthen our economic competitiveness. And they will spur greater investment in NATO’s most significant advantage, our technology and innovation.

As the folks in this room know very well, Russia’s brutal war of conquest in Ukraine is evolving rapidly. The very shape of warfare is transforming before our eyes because of innovations—often deadly innovations—in technology and techniques and tactics. Ukraine’s continued success in this fight and our success in any future fight will depend on innovation, on creativity, on entrepreneurship, on adaptability. Ukraine and the Ukrainian people have that in spades, and they’ve demonstrated that since before the war began. But Ukraine will also have help from the collective innovation and entrepreneurship of its Western partners, and no one should bet against our collective advantage in this area. Already, we’re working with Ukraine to solve some of the key technological challenges of an evolving battlefield—electronic warfare, drones, demining—and more where that came from as the weeks and months unfold.

Now, taken all together the steps that I’ve laid out have put Ukraine in a stronger position on the battlefield, but the military side of this equation is only one part of the progress that we have seen over the course of 2024. Ukraine, with the support of the United States and other allies and partners, has made really remarkable diplomatic progress as well. Just look at the last month alone.

At the G7 summit in Italy, the United States and our partners reached a historic decision to make Russia pay for the damage they’ve caused by unlocking fifty billion from the Russian sovereign assets that we froze together. In Switzerland just a couple of days after that G7 summit, Vice President Harris and I had the honor to attend Ukraine’s peace conference to support President Zelenskyy’s vision for a just and lasting peace, in line with the UN Charter. That peace summit, attended by more than one hundred countries and international organizations, was a remarkable sign of Ukraine’s diplomatic strength and staying power—both because of the broad range of countries represented, and because those countries spoke with a single voice to say that any peace must be based on the principles of sovereignty, territorial integrity, and the basic maxim that we cannot allow one nation to take another nation’s territory by force.

In this same timeframe, around the G7 summit, President Biden and President Zelenskyy signed a bilateral security agreement reflecting a long-term commitment from the United States of America to provide Ukraine the means to ensure its future security. It was genuinely historic. And in a few hours, we’re going to make history again. President Biden will convene more than twenty world leaders, who have also signed their own bilateral security agreements with Ukraine, to launch the Ukraine Compact. This compact knits all of these countries together. And it makes clear that we will continue to support Ukraine in this fight, and we will also help build its force so it can credibly deter and defend against future aggression as well. And after this war is over, all of the countries in the compact will continue to have Ukraine’s back. just like we have it now.

Over the last couple of days, NATO has come together to announce new measures of long-term support for Ukraine. And the session this afternoon of the NATO Ukraine Council will put these on full display. This includes a new NATO military command in Germany led by a three-star general who will launch a training, equipping, and force development program for Ukrainian troops. Secretary General Stoltenberg will appoint a new NATO senior representative in Kyiv to deepen Ukraine’s institutional relationship with the alliance and engage with senior Ukrainian officials.

The alliance reaffirmed in its communique yesterday that Ukraine’s future is in NATO. This summit, the Washington Summit, is about building a bridge to NATO for Ukraine as they continue to implement important reforms. And the steps I’ve just laid out are the building blocks of that bridge. Together they make clear, Putin cannot divide us. He cannot outlast us. He cannot weaken us. And Ukraine, not Russia, will prevail in this war.

The landscape of this conflict today is far different than it was in April, when Ukraine was running out of supplies and equipment and Russia was on the move. Today on the battlefield, Russia is grinding away, but not breaking through. And Ukraine is exacting massive costs and attritting Russian strategic capabilities. Diplomatically, Ukraine has concluded a successful peace summit and signed new bilateral security agreements with more than twenty countries, as I mentioned before. And at this summit, Ukraine has secured a historic set of deliverables—air defense, F-16s, additional security assistance, a compact of nations committed to supporting Ukraine for the long term, and the concrete elements of a bridge to NATO.

It doesn’t mean the days ahead, the weeks ahead, the months ahead are not going to be difficult. They will be difficult. And no one knows that better than the people fighting on the front lines. None of the progress that we’ve seen so far was inevitable. None of it happened by accident. It took the Ukrainians stepping up, first and foremost. It also took NATO allies coming together to choose again and again to stand with them to defend the values that have always united us as democracies: freedom, security, sovereignty, territorial integrity. This is what our predecessors did for seventy-five years, and this is what we all must do in the years ahead, even when it’s tough—in fact, especially when it’s tough.

So, yes, the road ahead will be challenging. President Putin is determined to keep trying to take over Ukraine. And countries like Iran, North Korea, and China are cheerleading him. We’re clear-eyed about all of that. But we are also clear-eyed about Ukraine’s strengths and resilience and courage and commitment and effectiveness and capabilities. And we’re clear-eyed about our own, too. And we have confidence in Ukraine and confidence in ourselves. And with that, and with the actual work—the spadework that has gone into the results produced at this summit these last two days—we are demonstrating our commitment to stand with Ukraine in their current fight and into the future.

And what I would ask in closing is that as we look at the picture before us, and as we think about what we need to do to succeed and to help Ukraine succeed, that we recognize this war has been unpredictable from the start. People thought Kyiv would fall in less than a week; Kyiv still stands today. People thought earlier this year we’d be looking at a much different picture than we’re looking at today. The future, the history of Europe, of Ukraine, of the world order is not yet written. As Fred said in his opening comments, nothing is inevitable; it comes down to the choices that we make and the choices that we make together.

I believe we’ve taken some bold steps in the last few days and weeks. We will take more bold steps in the days and weeks to come. President Biden will have the chance to sit down with President Zelenskyy in a couple of hours to review all of this, and not to rest on our laurels by any stretch but to say now that we’ve come this far what more do we have to do to get the job done. And we will, together, get the job done.

So thank you for giving me the opportunity to be here today. And thank you for everything you do every day in service of our common vision for the transatlantic community and a better world for all. Thank you very much.

Watch the full event

The post The future of Europe, Ukraine, and the world order is not yet written, says the US national security advisor appeared first on Atlantic Council.

UK foreign secretary: Why NATO remains core to British security

David Lammy — Thu, 11 Jul 2024 15:06:07 +0000

Walking into King Charles Street for the first time as foreign secretary last Friday, I passed the bust of Ernest Bevin.

Bevin was an inspirational Labour foreign secretary—and is a personal hero of mine. He was proud of his working-class origins, firmly internationalist in outlook, and committed to realism, a politics based on respect for the facts.

Nowhere was this clearer than in his role helping to create the NATO alliance seventy-five years ago, which included signing the North Atlantic Treaty in April 1949 on behalf of the United Kingdom. As foreign secretary, he was equally committed to supporting the nascent United Nations. But he recognized that “naked and unashamed” power politics would limit its ambitions. Establishing NATO therefore became central to his strategy for how to protect Britain and its allies against future aggression.

Moscow protested that this new grouping targeted them. But while Bevin made every effort to engage the Soviet Union in dialogue, he dismissed such criticism. If that was how the Kremlin felt about a defensive alliance, that said much about its intentions.

Seventy-five years on, the wisdom of Bevin’s approach is as clear as ever.

Multilateral institutions such as the United Nations remain indispensable. But they are struggling under the strain of multiple challenges. With a return of war to our continent and security threats rising, strengthening Britain’s relationships with our closest allies is firmly in the national interest.

NATO is the cornerstone of the United Kingdom’s collective security. This week, I am joining the British prime minister and defense secretary at the NATO Summit in Washington, DC. Our commitment to NATO and Britain’s nuclear deterrent is unshakeable.

The United Kingdom and our allies must step up defense spending. Prime Minister Keir Starmer has confirmed that the British government will launch a Strategic Defence Review, putting a “NATO-first” policy at the heart of Britain’s defense plans and setting out a road map to spending 2.5 percent of gross domestic product on defense. At the summit, the United Kingdom has been arguing that all NATO allies should adopt this as a new defense target.

The war in Ukraine has only reinforced the enduring centrality of NATO. But as in Bevin’s time, Kremlin disinformation about NATO’s role is rife. I am as dismissive of this as Bevin was. If Russian President Vladimir Putin feels threatened by a purely defensive alliance, that says much about his own intentions. It is Russia that has ridden roughshod over its neighbors’ sovereignty and conducted assassinations on Europe’s streets. It is Russia that has walked away from its international commitments, leaving a trail of lies and broken promises.

The prime minister has recommitted to providing Ukraine with three billion pounds a year of military support for as long as needed. And Britain is contributing forty million pounds to NATO’s Comprehensive Assistance Package for Ukraine, making us the third-largest donor to the package. As the prime minister will tell NATO allies on Thursday, the frontline defense of the Euro-Atlantic region is the Ukrainian trenches.

As foreign secretary, I will do all that I can to build on the great legacy Bevin left us. At a time of rising insecurity, we join our allies in marking NATO’s immense contribution to our collective security and renew our determination to invest in the most successful defensive alliance the world has ever known.

David Lammy is the UK foreign secretary.

The post UK foreign secretary: Why NATO remains core to British security appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Rich Outzen joined WION News to discuss NATO Summit

aozen — Thu, 11 Jul 2024 12:35:17 +0000

Daniel Fried: In its support for Ukraine, the declaration ‘passed the test of seriousness’

The post Rich Outzen joined WION News to discuss NATO Summit appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Our experts read between the lines of NATO’s Washington summit communiqué

Atlantic Council experts — Wed, 10 Jul 2024 22:44:21 +0000

What can thirty-two allies accomplish in forty-four paragraphs? NATO leaders on Wednesday afternoon released the Washington Summit Declaration, a consensus document setting forth what the Alliance stands for. In the case of Ukraine, it lays out a “bridge” to membership and a long-term financial commitment, but stops short of declaring when the country will be formally invited into the Alliance, as it continues to battle Russia’s full-scale invasion. The document is also notably tough on China, which it describes as the “decisive enabler” of Russia’s war on Ukraine. Our experts dig into the fine print below to break down what’s in the communiqué—and what isn’t.

Click to jump to an expert reaction:

Rachel Rizzo: There’s much to celebrate, but major questions remain

Ann Marie Dailey: The communiqué contains few surprises and some missed opportunities

Luka Ignac: NATO targets the Russia-China partnership in a new way

Wayne Schroeder: NATO is right to look beyond the 2 percent of GDP defense target

Andrew D’Anieri: Specific, long-term funding commitments are designed to win over Ukraine skeptics

Christopher Harper: The language on Ukraine’s “irreversible” path to NATO is an important achievement

Robert Soofer: On nuclear deterrence, NATO grapples with topics once deemed off limits

Beniamino Irdi: NATO language on hybrid threats should be clearer and deeper

Joslyn Brodfuehrer: What NATO needs is a bridge from conceptualization to operationalization

Michael John Williams: Allies are rightly concerned about Russian hybrid threats, but light on specifics for countering them

In its support for Ukraine, the declaration ‘passed the test of seriousness’

Through its Washington Summit Declaration, NATO has strengthened its support for Ukraine’s security and its “irreversible path” to NATO membership. This language, contained in the declaration’s paragraph 16, is a step forward. More importantly, it was not a grudging compromise (as at the Vilnius NATO Summit in 2023), or a fraught showdown (as at the Bucharest NATO Summit in 2008). This time, the allies, especially the United States, seemed serious in asserting that, difficult as it may be to bring Ukraine into the Alliance, in the end, this may be the only way to provide long-term security to Europe in the face of Russia’s imperial ends and violent means.

NATO also set up long-term mechanisms to provide military support for Ukraine and issued a supplemental statement that lays out details of this support. This, combined with the announcements of air defense equipment and F-16s for Ukraine, demonstrate that NATO is continuing to face down Russian President Vladimir Putin.

The remaining US caveats on Ukraine’s authorization to use US-provided weapons to attack even legitimate military targets inside Russia remain a problem. The laws of war ought to be sufficient in restricting Ukraine’s military actions; going beyond them seems excessive.

Many will argue that NATO should have just extended an invitation to Ukraine or at least started accession negotiations. I have sympathy for these views. Nevertheless, NATO moved forward. It is easier to write an article than negotiate a communiqué with thirty-two governments.

The decisions the allies took at the Washington summit and the language on Ukraine in the declaration passed the test of seriousness in time of war.

—Daniel Fried is the Weiser Family distinguished fellow at the Atlantic Council, former US ambassador to Poland, and former US assistant secretary of state for Europe.

There’s much to celebrate, but major questions remain

One day into the summit, there is already much to celebrate (beyond the Alliance’s seventy-five years, which of course is no small feat).

The final communiqué calls Ukraine’s pathway toward NATO “irreversible.” For a consensus-based organization, that’s a big deal. On top of that, we can finally see Ukraine’s “bridge” to NATO membership taking form, with the Alliance vowing to station a senior civilian in Kyiv and to set up a command in Wiesbaden, Germany for coordinating security assistance and training—with allies agreeing to send the Ukrainians a package of new air defense systems, including four Patriot batteries.

But with allied leaders saying the bridge will be short and well-lit, major questions remain about the duration and lighting. And what happens between now and Ukraine’s eventual membership, which could still be decades away?

From my conversations around town, I’m gathering that there’s also a sense of frustration amid the celebrations. Thus far there have been no announcements that the United States is willing to loosen the restrictions on how the Ukrainians can use US-supplied weapons. People seem frustrated that Ukraine can’t strike deep inside Russia, and there’s a feeling that the United States is making Ukrainians fight with one hand tied behind their backs.

There is also a somewhat somber mood regarding the US election. US President Joe Biden’s speech last night at the summit kickoff was strong and presidential, but there’s still some doubt about whether he has what it takes to pull off a win in November. And a loss for Biden means a win for former US President Donald Trump, which further rattles already-nervous Europeans. What I’ve been saying to them here at the summit is this: Tell NATO’s story, because it’s a good one. Keep increasing defense spending; twenty-three out of thirty-two allies are now spending 2 percent of their gross domestic product on defense, an increase from nine allies when Biden took office. And keep shouldering more of the defense burden for the European continent. This is likely what Europeans will wind up needing to do anyway, so best to start now.

—Rachel Rizzo is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center.

The communiqué contains few surprises and some missed opportunities

This communiqué contains few surprises, with the biggest announcement—the creation of a mechanism for the NATO Security Assistance and Training for Ukraine—previewed weeks in advance. The other key Ukraine-related deliverable is the Pledge of Long-Term Security Assistance for Ukraine, which pledges forty billion euros in the coming year, with language loosely indicating that the support should continue in future years. While significant, this is a step down from some allies’ hope for a multiyear commitment of a percentage of each NATO nations’ GDP. With the Indo-Pacific partners on hand, the declaration missed an opportunity to note that Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is a threat to global security, not just Euro-Atlantic security. The bureaucratic, stilted language on a “bridge” to NATO for Ukraine belies ongoing disagreement within the Alliance on Ukrainian membership, but the language on Russia underscores a united NATO assessment that Russia is a long-term, strategic threat.

The declaration is also an acknowledgment that more needs to be done to operationalize the commitments made at Madrid and Vilnius, namely that in order for NATO’s new regional defense plans to be executable, NATO nations will have to spend more than 2 percent of their GDP on national defense. Allies also acknowledged that gaps remain in key areas, including munitions stockpiles, integrated air and missile defense, command and control, and sustainment. The NATO Defense Industrial Capacity Expansion Pledge aims to address some of these gaps. The declaration also acknowledges the need to partner with the European Union to counter emerging and hybrid threats, as well as the importance of working with like-minded partners in the Asia-Pacific, including on support for Ukraine, cyber, disinformation, and technology.

One major missed opportunity was the absence of Latin America in the section outlining a new action plan for NATO’s southern neighborhood. China and Russia are conducting active disinformation and malign investment campaigns in South America. But unlike Africa and the Middle East, Latin America remains relatively stable, and it has significant economic and political cooperation potential with NATO allies. Whoever assumes the newly created role of special representative for the southern neighborhood should ensure that they include Latin America in their dialogue, outreach, and visibility.

—Ann Marie Dailey is a nonresident senior fellow at the Transatlantic Security Initiative of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security and is currently serving as a policy researcher at the RAND Corporation.

NATO targets the Russia-China partnership in a new way

It is significant that NATO has highlighted the deepening strategic partnership between Russia and the People’s Republic of China (PRC). This acknowledgment underscores the Alliance’s unity and awareness of the evolving geopolitical landscape. By recognizing the mutually reinforcing attempts by Russia and the PRC to undercut and reshape the rules-based international order, NATO lays a crucial foundation for formulating strategies to address and counteract this burgeoning nexus.

This statement signals a collective commitment among member states to not only monitor but also actively engage in identifying and implementing measures to mitigate the influence of this partnership.

—Luka Ignac is an assistant director for the Atlantic Council’s Transatlantic Security Initiative within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

NATO is right to look beyond the 2 percent of GDP defense target

The Washington Summit Declaration correctly addresses the need to more urgently sustain national commitments to defense. It also correctly understands that expenditures beyond 2 percent of GDP will be needed to remedy existing shortfalls and improve the capabilities, capacity, and readiness of the thirty-two NATO allies in all five defense domains—land, air, sea, cyber, and space.

To achieve the 2 percent goal or even go higher, NATO allies will have to achieve real growth in their defense spending—growth beyond the rate of inflation—and stick to that goal for multiple years. Real growth in defense spending is how most NATO countries got to 2 percent, and it is how the remaining allies can get there.

—Wayne Schroeder is a nonresident senior fellow with the Transatlantic Security Initiative.

Specific, long-term funding commitments are designed to win over Ukraine skeptics

Buried at the bottom of the NATO communiqué are key details on the Alliance’s pledge to contribute a minimum of forty billion euros over the next twelve months to Ukraine for military purposes. While forty billion euros is no small change, the communiqué notes that this pledge is in fact not an increase in military aid to Ukraine, but an approximation of annual provisions by allies since Russia began its full-scale war of aggression in 2022.

In an effort to systematize and track military contributions to Ukraine by NATO member states, the “Pledge of Long-Term Security Assistance for Ukraine” pegs minimum funding to countries’ GDP as a share of the Alliance total. For example, 2024 US GDP is estimated to be around $28 trillion, more than half of the roughly $46 trillion GDP total of the Alliance, so Washington would contribute approximately $26 billion in military aid to Ukraine over the next twelve months. Notably, allies must report on their contributions every six months to make sure each country is pulling their weight—a welcome dose of transparency. The first reporting period back dates to the start of 2024, so the United States is already much of the way toward fulfilling its minimum obligation.

The level of detail outlined in the pledge is no doubt aimed to mollify Ukraine skeptics (in the Trump orbit or otherwise) that allies in Europe are taking support for Ukraine seriously. Those efforts could be strengthened by continuing to source and send air defense, artillery ammunition, and long-range missiles to Ukraine on time and in appropriate quantities.

—Andrew D’Anieri is a resident fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

The language on Ukraine’s ‘irreversible’ path to NATO is an important achievement

The word “irreversible” in the paragraph regarding Ukraine’s path to NATO membership is powerful and important. One should not underestimate how tricky it will have been to achieve consensus on this. The implication is that this path cannot be reversed during any negotiations that might occur with Russia.

—Sir Christopher Harper is a nonresident senior fellow at the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. As a Royal Air Force (RAF) pilot, he was involved in active operations over Iraq and in the Balkans and has commanded at all levels of the RAF. He also served in several positions at NATO, including director general of the HQ NATO International Military Staff.

On nuclear deterrence, NATO grapples with topics once deemed off limits

As expected, the communiqué reaffirms NATO’s commitment to modernize its nuclear capabilities, strengthen its nuclear planning capability, and adapt as necessary to changes in the security environment punctuated by Russia’s nuclear intimidation and ongoing modernization of its large stockpile of theater-range nuclear weapons.

As a former US representative to NATO’s High-Level Group (HLG) for nuclear planning, I recall how difficult it was just five years ago for the HLG to issue even a bland communiqué after each meeting—that’s how ambivalent some allies were about the nuclear mission. Today, NATO appears to be grappling with topics once considered off limits and is taking seriously the nuclear planning, exercises, and training necessary to demonstrate resolve.

Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg once said that “deterrence starts with resolve. It’s not enough to feel it. You also have to show it.” This communiqué, taken in conjunction with the 2022 Strategic Concept and 2023 Vilnius communiqué, sends a strong message to Russia that nuclear deterrence remains “the cornerstone of Alliance Security.”

—Robert Soofer is a senior fellow in the Forward Defense program of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, where he leads the Nuclear Strategy Project. He served as US deputy assistant secretary of defense for nuclear and missile defense policy from 2017 to 2021.

NATO language on hybrid threats should be clearer and deeper

As most NATO leaders have acknowledged in recent statements, Russia fights a nonmilitary war against the West alongside its effort on the battlefield in Ukraine.

The communiqué released today does reflect an awareness of this in the paragraphs dedicated to hybrid threats. For example, it notes that Russia has “intensified its aggressive hybrid actions against allies, including through proxies.” It also lists several hybrid actions, including sabotage, cyberattacks, electronic interference, and provocations at allies’ borders, such as by provoking irregular migration. In addition, the communiqué names China as engaging in “sustained malicious cyber and hybrid activities, including disinformation.”

However, the space and dignity reserved by the document to this challenge do not do justice to its profound strategic nature. The effort to undermine democratic societies by leveraging its freedoms is the common denominator among all of NATO’s systemic adversaries, first and foremost China, and it will remain such after Russia’s aggression against Ukraine has been repelled.

Perhaps distracted by the kinetic pace of war on the European continent, NATO language on hybrid threats is still somewhat unrefined, especially at the leadership level. A more explicit focus should be put on the multi-domain, or “DIMEFIL,” dimension of the challenge, especially by avoiding any confusion between the parts—such as cyberattacks, disinformation, and economic coercion—and the whole-of-society offensive coordinated campaigns they form.

Clearer and deeper language in top-level NATO communication on hybrid threats would achieve two key objectives.

First, it would emphasize the systemic aspect of these threats, which would be an implicit reminder that NATO is an alliance based on values, at a time when some allies need to be reminded of this message. A whole-of-government offensive will only be effective if it is directed from an authoritarian regime and addressed toward a democratic society, whose openness is not only its target but also the weapon used against it.

Second, it would inform a better counter-strategy to hybrid threats, one based on the whole picture and the adversaries’ strategic objectives rather than independent efforts in single domains.

—Beniamino Irdi is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Transatlantic Security Initiative within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

What NATO needs is a bridge from conceptualization to operationalization

As heads of state gather to take part in this milestone NATO Summit, we are reminded that today’s security environment differs significantly from the one that twelve nations faced when signing the Washington Treaty seventy-five years ago. War is raging in Europe. Russia has threatened to send troops to new ally Finland’s border and is rebuilding its land forces in preparation for a long-term conflict with NATO. But these conventional threats are situated within a broader spectrum of challenges ranging from nuclear saber rattling to the very real hybrid activities levied against frontline allies. The Washington Summit Declaration recognizes the complexity of the increasingly connected battlespace, with commitments to “enhance NATO’s deterrence and defense against all threats and challenges, in all domains, and in multiple strategic directions across the Euro-Atlantic area.”

Maintaining NATO’s edge will hinge upon the Alliance’s ability to operate across domains at speed and scale. Allies pledged to provide the necessary forces and capabilities to resource the new defense plans in preparation for “high-intensity and multi-domain collective defense” and integrate space—NATO’s newest operational domain—into the Defense Planning Process. While developments in this year’s declaration yet again reflect a push to accelerate the Alliance’s transformation into a multi-domain-operation-enabled warfighting machine, it remains unclear as to whether NATO Allied Command Operations and its military personnel are equipped with the tools and expertise they need to facilitate coordinated activities across the air, land, sea, space, and cyber domains—none of which are equal. Now is the time to move beyond NATO Allied Command Transformation’s 2023 concept by integrating capabilities across domains, increasing training on new domains, and ramping up NATO exercising. Without innovative, mutually reinforcing initiatives from allies in the short and medium term, Supreme Allied Commander Europe Christopher Cavoli will be constrained in his ability to leverage new domains to secure the advantage in a future fight.

—Joslyn Brodfuehrer is an associate director with the Transatlantic Security Initiative.

Allies are rightly concerned about Russian hybrid threats, but light on specifics for countering them

The Washington Summit Declaration covers all the familiar ground, from setting expectations for Ukraine to defense spending to Indo-Pacific strategy. But for me, the most interesting parts are sections 12-14, which are focused on collective resilience, hybrid threats, and disinformation. The inclusion of these three sections is critical, because it is highly probable that any Russian actions against a NATO ally will be specifically geared to avoid a direct violation of Article 5. It is far less probable that the Kremlin would launch a full-scale invasion against Poland or the Baltics.

The Kremlin has waged a broad campaign of “political warfare” against NATO allies for a solid decade—and this “war” shows no sign of abating. Evidence of this is found in Kremlin funding for far-right parties across Europe, cyber attacks against Estonia, assassinations in the United Kingdom, and election meddling in the United States, to name but a few of the most egregious examples.

These sections of the communiqué convey the high level of concern within NATO around these critical issues, but they also lack specificity. For example, NATO should lead efforts across the Alliance to change national legal frameworks to recognize state-supported cyber attacks. One hopes that sections 12-14 of the communiqué will be further developed in the coming year, not least because indirect political warfare is just as popular in Beijing as it is in Moscow.

—Michael John Williams is a nonresident senior fellow with the Transatlantic Security Initiative in the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security and associate professor of international affairs and director of the International Relations Program at the Maxwell School for Citizenship and Public Affairs at Syracuse University.

The post Our experts read between the lines of NATO’s Washington summit communiqué appeared first on Atlantic Council.

‘I’m an optimist for the future of this Alliance,’ says NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg

Atlantic Council — Wed, 10 Jul 2024 16:23:56 +0000

Watch the full event

NATO Public Forum

Allied leaders, senior officials, international security experts, and opinion-shapers discuss the Alliance’s agenda and what’s happening behind closed doors at the summit.

Event transcript

Uncorrected transcript: Check against delivery

Speaker

Jens Stoltenberg
Secretary General, NATO

Moderated by

Frederick Kempe
President and CEO, Atlantic Council

FREDERICK KEMPE: Good morning, if it still is the morning. It’s great to see you all here in person. It’s wonderful to have so many people here online from all over the world and, of course, across all of our allies in Europe as well.

So, it’s my honor to introduce someone I’ve known a long time now, the NATO secretary general, Jens Stoltenberg. And I’m going to moderate conversation with you at a moment—something you’ve called a pivotal moment for our Alliance. I was going to start by saluting you on something I didn’t know about, which is your great arm because you threw out the first pitch of the Nationals game. And it was an amazing. I was there in the heat, sweating while I was watching you. But it was—it was an amazing salute to NATO.

But having been at Mellon Auditorium yesterday evening, one of the most moving events I’ve been at, I’ll instead quote President Biden, what he said to you as he gave you the Presidential Medal of Freedom to a standing ovation—a really remarkable moment. He called you a man of integrity and intellectual rigor, a calm temperament in a moment—in moments of crisis, a consummate diplomat. And I think the consummate diplomat, a person who can engage with leaders across all spectrums and across all nationalities, and I just want to salute you on behalf of everyone in the audience for more than a decade of the most extraordinary leadership. So let’s start with that.

JENS STOLTENBERG: Thank you.

FREDERICK KEMPE: So we at the Atlantic Council gave you our highest honor, the Atlantic Council Distinguished Leadership Award, in 2017. And I consider that visionary. We knew you’d already accomplished a lot in your life, and I won’t go through it all—you know, prime minister of Norway, all the things you’ve done for NATO and at NATO in terms of strengthening its defense, strengthening the defense spending. And I think it would take too time—too long to go on that. And you’re a humble man, and I don’t think you would even want that. So I’m going to go right into the questions.

You laid out three goals for this summit—increasing support for Ukraine for the long haul, reinforcing collective defense, and deepening global partnerships. I’m sure they’re all important, but for this week what do you consider most crucial?

JENS STOLTENBERG: I will answer that in a moment, but let me first say that it’s great to be here, to be at the Public Forum. And many thanks to you, Fred. And also many thanks to all those who have organized and are making this event possible, because this is an important part of the summit, the public outreach which this Public Forum is a very important part of. Then thank you for your kind words. It has actually been a great privilege serving as secretary general of NATO for ten years. And I see around in the in the audience that there are many people who have helped me, supported me. And so many thanks to all of you for your advice, your help, and support throughout these years.

Then on throwing the first pitch, that is the most difficult task I ever committed as secretary general of NATO. Not least because I’ve never been at the baseball match ever before. The first time I touched a baseball, actually when I started to exercise for this, I thought it was a tennis ball. But it’s not the case. So it was a very steep learning curve. And I think my future is not in baseball. I think my future is in something else.

FREDERICK KEMPE: I was going to say in the introduction that it showed that NATO always sets lofty targets.

JENS STOLTENBERG: Yeah, yeah. And we have to adapt to the challenges. Then, of course, this summit. It’s, of course, a summit where we’re going to celebrate the seventy-fifth anniversary of the strongest, most successful alliance in history. But the only way to truly celebrate that achievement, the seventy-fifth anniversary, is, of course, to demonstrate that NATO is adapting, that we are changing when the world is changing. Because we are the most successful alliance in history because we have changed when the world is changing. And now we live in a more dangerous, more challenging security environment. And therefore, NATO is changing again.

And therefore, we will make important decisions at this summit for the future, not only celebrate the past. And there are three main issues. It’s deterrence and defense. It’s our partnership with our Asia-Pacific partners. But of course, the most urgent, the most critical task at this summit, will be everything we will do and decide on Ukraine. Because this is really the time where we are tested. If we want to stand up for democracy and freedom, it’s now. And the place is Ukraine.

And I expect that NATO leaders will agree a substantial package for Ukraine. There are, affirmatively, five elements in that package.

One is that we will establish a NATO command for Ukraine to facilitate and ensure training and delivery of security assistance to Ukraine. It will be seven-hundred personnel. It will take over much of what the US have done so far in leading the coordination of security assistance and training. It will be a command in Wiesbaden in Germany, but also with logistical nodes or hubs in the eastern part of the Alliance, to ensure that we have a more institutionalized framework for our support to Ukraine.

Then it will be a long-term pledge to support Ukraine, not least to send the message to President Putin that he cannot wait those out, because the paradox is that the stronger and the more we are committed for a long-term to support Ukraine, the sooner this war can end. So that’s the thing we have to do.

Then we will have—and we have already seen some of the announcements of military immediate support with the air defense systems, with F-16s, other things that allies have and will announce. We have the bilateral—that’s a third—the announcement on more military aid, and then we have the bilateral security agreements—twenty agreed between NATO allies and Ukraine.

And then the fifth element of the package for Ukraine will be more interoperability. We will have a new joint training and relations center in Bydgoszcz in Poland. We will have the comprehensive assistance package to help Ukraine implement reforms on their defense and security institutions to ensure that the armed forces are more and more interoperable with NATO.

And together, the NATO command, the pledge, the bilateral security agreements, the announcement of new military support, and interoperability—these five elements combined constitute the bridge to NATO membership for Ukraine. And later on today, you will see the language which we will agree, and the NATO declaration on how to ensure that Ukraine is moving closer to NATO membership. So these are the five important deliverables on Ukraine that I expect allies will agree later on today.

FREDERICK KEMPE: Not to press you on what’s actually going to be in the document because, of course, you can’t reveal that, but we saw at the Vilnius Summit—hearing it again in Washington—that allies closer to Russia were more eager to provide NATO membership sooner for Ukraine, and no doubt the bridge and all the elements of the bridge are pretty impressive, including the new command.

But are Ukraine’s NATO membership prospects sufficient? We did our own wargaming with our Estonian partners and the Estonian government, and we found almost under any scenario, Ukraine was safer in NATO, that Russia would respond in a way that would be less provocative within and outside. What’s your thinking on that, and have we gone far enough with Ukraine?

JENS STOLTENBERG: So first of all, the language you will see later on today in the NATO declaration or the declaration from the heads of state and government, of course that language is important because language matters. It sets an agenda. It points a direction. But, of course, action speaks louder than words. So, in addition to that language in the declaration on membership, which again is important, I think that what we actually do together with Ukraine is as important. And therefore the fact that we now have a NATO framework—will have a NATO framework around the support, the fact that we have a long-term NATO commitment when we agreed the pledge, and also the fact that we actually are delivering more weapon systems to Ukraine—all of that has helped Ukraine to become closer to NATO—come closer to NATO membership because we will now deliver F-16s. We don’t want to deliver F-16s; we deliver the training, the doctrines, the operational concepts that will actually move Ukraine closer to being fully interoperable with NATO on more and more areas.

So, again, language is important. But the elements in the package I mentioned, they are actually changing the reality, enabling Ukraine to be—to come closer to membership so we can then—when the time is right, when you have consensus and the political conditions are in place—so when an invitation then is issued, they can become members straightaway. I can’t give you a date because, as you know, there has to be consensus in this Alliance on membership.

But what I can say is that when the fighting stops in Ukraine, we need to ensure that that’s really the end. Because what you have seen is a pattern of aggression. First, Russia annexed Crimea. We said that was unacceptable. After some few months, they went to the eastern Donbas. We said that that was unacceptable. Then we had the Minsk I agreement, with the delimitation of the ceasefire line. That was violated. And Russia pushed the front lines further east—no, sorry—further west in Donbas in 2014. We had Minsk II, and the Russians waited then for seven years. And they had the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, because Minsk II was in 2015.

So, we have seen a pattern where they’ve taken slices of Ukraine. If there is now a new ceasefire, a new agreement, then we need to be 100 percent certain it stops there, regardless of where that line is. And therefore, I strongly believe that when the fighting stops we need to ensure that Ukraine has the capabilities to deter future aggression from Russia and they need security guarantees. And, of course, the best and strongest security guarantee will be Article Five. So therefore, I believe that a way to ensure that it stops is actually a NATO membership.

FREDERICK KEMPE: Thank you for that very clear answer. One more brief question on Ukraine, then we’ll move on to Indo-Pacific. In a press conference you had with President Macron a couple of weeks ago you noted recent gaps in delays in how they’ve led—in funding and weapons—and led to battlefield consequences. You said, quote, “We must give Ukraine the predictability and accountability it needs to defend itself.” So, two questions: Is everything you’ve talked about today that’s going to be agreed enough? And, secondarily, not just with uncertainties in US politics, which exist, but also uncertainties in European politics, do you worry at all about the sustainability of that support over time?

JENS STOLTENBERG: So, first of all, you are right that I have referred to—I also did that in Kyiv in a meeting with President Zelensky earlier this spring—to the fact that during this winter and the early spring allies didn’t deliver on their promises to Ukraine. We saw the delays in the US, months agreeing on a supplemental. But we also saw European allies not being able to deliver the ammunition and the support they have announced. So, of course, these gaps and these delays in military support to Ukraine, they created a very difficult situation for Ukrainians on the battlefield.

The good news in that difficult situation is that, despite all the delays in our support to Ukraine, Ukrainians have actually been able to hold the line, more or less. So the Russians have not been able to utilize these delays in really making any big advantage on the battlefield. Now we are providing more support, and I’m confident that allies will now actually deliver. And we see that, for instance, ammunition moving into Ukraine, been significant increase over the last weeks.

The purpose of a stronger NATO role in providing training and security assistance, the purpose of the command, and the purpose of the pledge is, of course, to minimize the risks for future delays and gaps. But of course, you don’t have guarantees, because at the end of the day it has to be support in all the individual allied capitals and parliaments to providing this support. At the end of the day, you have to go to the Congress, to the parliaments across Europe and Canada, to get support. But I believe that when we turn this into something which is more a NATO obligation, a NATO framework, it is—the threshold for not delivering will be higher than when it’s based on a more voluntary, ad hoc, national announcements.

So the purpose of creating a stronger NATO framework is to make the support more robust and more predictable. It’s also another part of this NATO framework for the support on the pledge and the command. And that is that it will visualize and ensure burden sharing, because my impression is that, especially in the United States, there is this perception that the United States is almost alone in delivering support to Ukraine. That’s not the case. When you look at military support, roughly 50 percent of the military support is provided by European allies and Canada. Ninety-nine percent of the support—the military support to Ukraine—comes from NATO allies, but 50 percent of that comes from European allies and Canada. If you add economic, macroeconomic support, humanitarian support, the European allies are providing much more than the United States.

So the point with the pledge to ensure that we have some kind of agreed formulas for burden sharing, that we have more transparency, and also that we have more accountability, because then we can use NATO to count, to measure, and to ensure that allies deliver. It’s not the same, but it’s a bit like the 2 percent pledge because the importance with the pledge made in Wales in 2014 was actually to give NATO a role to enforce and to ensure that allies delivered, and also that we agreed how to count and what to count. And that’s also what we now will do with the pledge, to agree how to count and what to count, and to give NATO a role to having also accountability.

So, again, there are no guarantees. But by giving NATO that role, I think the likelihood for allies delivering what they have promised will increase and the likelihood of new gaps will decrease. And that’s the purpose of giving NATO a stronger role.

FREDERICK KEMPE: Thank you, Mr. Secretary General. Let’s go to China. The 2022 Strategic Concept, NATO Strategic Concept, recognized China as a challenge for the first time in the broader rules-based system. You’ve noted that Russia imports 90 percent of its microelectronics from China, which goes into military. Secretary Blinken today talked about 70 percent of machine tools that helped the military coming from China. You’ve also said that this—if this doesn’t change, as they’re fueling the greatest armed conflict in Europe since World War II, allies need to impose a cost. Is it time for that? And what cost can NATO and NATO countries actually impose?

JENS STOLTENBERG: So first of all, I think it’s important that we recognize the reality, and that’s the first step towards any action. And that is that not only are Iran and North Korea important when it comes to enabling Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, but China is the main enabler because, as you referred to, they are delivering the tools—the dual-use equipment, the microelectronics, everything Russia needs to build the missiles, the bombs, the aircraft, and all the other systems they use against Ukraine.

Well, I have said that it remains to be seen how far allies are willing to go, but I strongly believe that it—if China continues, they cannot have it both ways. They cannot believe that they can have a kind of normal relationship with NATO allies in North America and Europe, and then continue to fuel the war in Europe that constitutes the biggest security challenge to—for our security since the Second World War. So this is a challenge for the Alliance. Let’s see how far we’re willing to go as allies.

FREDERICK KEMPE: So we’re getting close to the end of time, so just two other brief questions. First, the Indo-Pacific four—Australia, Japan, South Korea, New Zealand—are here. Third time taking part in a NATO summit, but it’s going to be the first NATO joint document with this group. Can you give us some insight into what might be in it? Any concrete outcomes?

JENS STOLTENBERG: Yeah. So, first I would just say that the fact that we now are engaging so closely with our Indo-Pacific partners—Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and South Korea—that reflects a change in NATO, because that was not the case a few years ago. And as many of you may know, the first time we mentioned China in an agreed negotiated document in NATO is at the NATO summit in London in 2019. And in the previous NATO Strategic Concept, China was not mentioned with a single word; now China has a prominent place in the Strategic Concept we agreed in Madrid. And the fact that we now are engaging so closely with our Indo-Pacific partners reflects, of course, the fact that we have to take China seriously when it comes to the challenges it poses for our security, and the war in Ukraine is perhaps the most obvious example. Or, as the Japanese prime minister said several times: What happens in Ukraine today can happen in Asia tomorrow.

We are now working with our Asia-Pacific partners how we can do more together with them. We will agree some flagship projects. That’s about technology. It’s about support to Ukraine. But we are also working, for instance, as part of our defense industrial pledge, how we can ramp up defense industrial production and cooperation with these countries. They are big, some of them, on defense industry. We can work closely with them to ramp up our combined defense industrial capacity. We can exchange more information.

And I also welcome the fact that more and more allies are now also conducting joint exercises. Recently, there was a big air exercise. Allies are also more and more actively also looking into how they can also have more naval exercises with our Asia-Pacific partners. Because NATO will remain an alliance of North America and Europe. There will not be a global NATO. NATO will be North America and Europe. But this region, the North Atlantic region, we face global threats. And the reality is, that’s nothing new. Global terrorism—international terrorism brought us to Afghanistan. Cyber is global. Space, which is becoming more and more important for our armed forces, is truly global. And, of course, the threats that—and challenges that China poses to our security is a global challenge.

So this region, the North Atlantic region, faces global challenges. We will remain a regional alliance, but we need to work with our global partners, the Asia-Pacific partners, to address these global challenges. That, I guess, will be a very important issue at the next NATO summit. I will not be there, but I’m certain it will be –

FREDERICK KEMPE: Well, and that brings—and that brings me to my final question. This is your swan song summit. And as you prepare to step down, I think everybody in the audience, everybody virtually, would love to hear what gives you the most hope stepping down from this, but also what gives you the most concern.

JENS STOLTENBERG: So, first of all, I’m an optimist. Because the reality is that we are very different in this Alliance. We are different countries with different histories, different cultures, from both sides of the Atlantic, and we have different parties. And we are always very concerned that when a new party comes into government they will make bad things for the Alliance. And if you read the history of NATO, we have been concerned about since—about that for from the beginning.

There were big concerns in NATO when you had a new—when actually you got the democratically elected government in Portugal in 1975. There were concerns whether or not they were going to be committed to NATO. There were concerns when you had some left-wing parties coming into government in some European countries in the ’70s. When I formed my government in—my second government—in 2005 there were big concerns that we had the Left Socialist Party there. It went quite well, to be honest. And now there are big concerns again.

But the reality is that despite all these differences, which are part of NATO, we have proven extremely resilient and strong. Because when we face the reality, all these different governments and politicians and parliamentarians, they realize that we are safer and stronger together. And that’s a very strong message. And that’s the reason why this Alliance prevails again and again.

As I said in my speech yesterday, we cannot take it for granted. It’s not a given. It was not a given in ’49. It’s not a given now. And it’s not a given in the future. But the reality is that we have a strong common interest in standing together. So therefore, I’m an optimist for the future of this Alliance. That was the first question. The second I’ve forgotten. I think I answered both of them.

But I will only say one thing about this. That I remember very well when I became prime minister in 2000. First of all, I attended my first NATO Summit in 2001. That was a very different guest list. It was—President Bush, newly elected. It was Gerhard Schröder, Tony Blair. And, yeah, very different people than now. As I think it’s time for me to leave. But second, also, I remember then my predecessor when I became prime minister in 2000, she told me—Gro Harlem Brundtland, Norwegian prime minister—she told me, Jens, you have to remember that most of your life you’ll be former prime minister.

And now I have to acknowledge that most of my life, I’ll be former secretary general NATO. But that’s not so bad. And I will hang around and see you, and I look forward to then perhaps being a part of this audience next time. Thank you so much. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you, Fred.

FREDERICK KEMPE: Mr. secretary general, nothing more need be said.

Watch the full event

The post ‘I’m an optimist for the future of this Alliance,’ says NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Any attempt to undermine NATO undermines US security, says Lloyd Austin

Atlantic Council — Wed, 10 Jul 2024 15:08:09 +0000

Watch the full event

NATO Public Forum

Allied leaders, senior officials, international security experts, and opinion-shapers discuss the Alliance’s agenda and what’s happening behind closed doors at the summit.

Vice President and Senior Director, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Event transcript

Uncorrected transcript: Check against delivery

Speaker

Lloyd Austin
US Secretary of Defense

Introductory Remarks

Frederick Kempe
President and CEO, Atlantic Council

FREDERICK KEMPE: What a great lineup to start the day—the secretary of state, the supreme allied commander Europe, secretary of defense. It’s really an honor to be here. And thanks to everyone in the room. Good morning to you all, and good afternoon to everyone joining from Europe, and hello to everyone joining from all over the world virtually.

Since its founding in 1949, since NATO’s founding, the United States has played a pivotal role in safeguarding transatlantic security. And the secretary of defense has always been at the center of that. As one of NATO’s founding members, the US has proven to be a critical part of the Alliance’s collective defense and its adaptability to deter evolving threats. And they have been evolving. America has always stood ready to defend and protect the Euro-Atlantic area and beyond, continuing its commitments to the principles of the Washington Treaty. US leadership was pivotal, particularly following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, mobilizing tremendous support—and you’ve heard more about that today, new Air Force batteries, F-16s—to bolster collective defenses on NATO’s eastern flank, fortifying the commitment to NATO allies, and extending that kind of critical assistance to Ukraine.

So it’s my privilege to introduce a leader who embodies this commitment to transatlantic and, indeed, global security—US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin. A graduate of West Point in 1975, Secretary Austin’s career in the US Army spanned more than forty years. Throughout his years of service, he has led the command at the corps, division, battalion, and brigade levels in the US armed forces. Secretary Austin was awarded the Silver Star for his leadership of the US Army’s Third Infantry Division during the invasion of Iraq in 2003.

Before he concluded his uniformed service, Secretary Austin was the commander of the US Central Command from 2013 to 2016, one of our most challenging positions where he was responsible for all the military operations in the Middle East and Afghanistan. Under his leadership, the US Department of Defense has adapted national defense strategies to address the greatest global challenges of our time. And it’s reaffirmed the US commitment to allies and its role as a champion of the rules-based order.

In particular, and this is really important, Secretary Austin’s leadership in the Ukraine defense contact group has proven invaluable in uniting over fifty nations to provide critical military support and security assistance to Ukraine. We saw Vladimir Putin’s message to the NATO summit on Monday this week, with a barrage of more than forty missiles on Ukraine including hitting a children’s hospital. We’ve seen an answer in more—in more air defenses. We’ve seen an answer in the F-16s. We’ve seen an answer in everything else that Secretary Austin and all the allies are doing.

As President Biden has said, the world is at an inflection point with wars in the Middle East, Europe, rising challenge posed to China, biggest defense buildup—peacetime defense buildup in history from China. The secretary of defense is facing more simultaneous challenges than perhaps any predecessor. And we’re lucky to have a man of his pedigree and capability at this historic moment. So with that, ladies and gentlemen, please join me in welcoming to the stage the twenty-eighth US Secretary of Defense, Lloyd Austin.

LLOYD AUSTIN: Well, good morning. It’s really good to be here with all of you and, Fred, thanks for that kind introduction and for all that you’ve done for the Atlantic Council and for bringing us together on a pretty big week.

It’s a huge honor for the United States and President Biden to host this historic summit in Washington, just down the road from the site where the original twelve NATO allies signed the North Atlantic Treaty seventy-five years ago, and together we’re marking one of the great success stories that the world has ever known.

On April 4, 1949, those twelve democracies came together in the wake of two world wars and at the dawn of a new Cold War and they all remembered, as President Truman put it, “the sickening blow of unprovoked aggression.”

And so they vowed to stand together for their collective defense and to safeguard freedom and democracy across Europe and North America. They made a solemn commitment, declaring that an armed attack against one ally would be considered an attack against them all.

Now, that commitment was enshrined in Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. It was the foundation of NATO and it still is.

And on that bedrock we have built the strongest and most successful defensive alliance in human history. Throughout the Cold War, NATO deterred Soviet aggression against Western Europe and prevented a third world war.

In the 1990s, NATO used air power to stop ethnic cleansing in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in Kosovo, and the day after September 11, 2001, when al-Qaeda terrorists attacked our country, including slamming a plane into the Pentagon, NATO invoked Article 5 for the first and only time in its history.

So NATO has always stood by us and we’re going to stand by NATO. Without NATO the past seventy-five years would have been far different and far more dangerous. You know, I’m proud of the ways that NATO continues to strengthen our shared security.

I’m proud of the way that NATO and other—NATO and America’s other alliances and partnerships have grown and strengthened under the leadership of President Biden and I’m especially proud of the way that our allies and partners, including our NATO allies, have met the challenge of Putin’s increasingly aggressive Russia.

In 2014, Putin made an illegal land grab against Ukraine’s Crimea region in eastern Ukraine and since then NATO has undertaken the largest reinforcement of our collective defense in a generation with more forces, more capabilities, and more investment.

Since 2014, our fellow allies have increased their defense spending by an average of 72 percent, accounting for inflation. In February 2022, the world again saw what President Truman called the sickening blow of unprovoked aggression as the Kremlin’s forces invaded the free and sovereign state of Ukraine.

As this administration has made very clear, we will not be dragged into Putin’s reckless war of choice but we will stand by Ukraine as it fights for its sovereignty and security. We will defend every inch of NATO and we will continue to strengthen NATO’s collective defense and deterrence.

In the wake of Putin’s imperial invasion of Ukraine, we bolstered NATO’s forward defense posture with more troops at high readiness, larger exercises, sharper vigilance, and multinational battle group—battle groups in eight countries. NATO is now larger than ever. And our new allies in Finland and Sweden have brought the alliance’s membership to thirty-two. And make no mistake, NATO’s—Putin’s war is not the result of NATO enlargement. Putin’s war is the cause of NATO enlargement.

Over the past three and a half years, we’ve also seen an historic increase in annual defense spending across the alliance by almost eighty billion dollars. All NATO allies have agreed to spend at least 2 percent of their GDP on defense. In 2014, only three allies hit that target. In 2021, only six allies did so. But this year, a record twenty-three NATO allies are meeting the 2 percent defense spending target. Now, our NATO allies are not just spending more on their own defense, they’re also spending more on America’s defense industrial base. That means platforms and munitions built in America. And that’s helping to revitalize production lines across our country and to create good jobs for American workers.

Now, all of that progress is a testament to US leadership and allied solidarity. But it’s also a testament to the leadership of our outgoing secretary general, my good friend Jens Stoltenberg. Throughout a decade of challenge, Jens has guided the Alliance with skill and steel, and we are all deeply, deeply grateful. Now we’re going to keep building on our progress, and we’ve got an ambitious agenda this week. First, we’ll continue to implement NATO’s new family of plans, the most robust since the Cold War. And that will significantly improve our ability to deter and defend against any new threat. Second, we’ll work to endorse a pledge to expand industrial capacity across the alliance. And this will help us scale up military production and send an important long-term signal to industry.

Third, we’ll deepen cooperation in support of Ukraine’s self-defense. We’ll launch a new military effort to help coordinate some aspects of security assistance and training for Ukraine and we’re poised to agree on a new financial pledge to Ukraine. As another sign of our deep commitment to Ukraine’s self-defense, a coalition of countries has been working tirelessly to provide F-16 fighter jets to Ukraine. And today, President Biden, alongside the Dutch and Danish prime ministers, is proud to announce the transfer of F-16s is officially underway, and Ukraine will be flying F-16s this summer.

And finally, we’ll continue to deepen ties with our global partners, especially in the Indo-Pacific. I know that we’re all troubled by China’s support for Putin’s war against Ukraine, but that just reminds us of the profound links between Euro-Atlantic security and Indo-Pacific security. And it sends a message to the world that we are united in our values. So we have a lot to tackle together. But we’re also here to mark this moment. We’re here to strengthen an Alliance that has kept millions of people safe for seventy-five years. And we’re here to reaffirm the ironclad commitment that those twelve leaders made on April 4, 1949: An armed attack against one ally is an attack against us all.

You know, as you heard Fred say, I had a brief forty-one-year career in uniform. I started working with NATO back in 1975, when I was Lieutenant Austin. And I’ve never seen NATO stronger or more united than it is today. And we are determined to keep it that way. You know, I learned a lesson early on in my Army career. And that lesson is that, as a soldier, the last thing that you want to do is to fight alone. So here’s the blunt military reality: America is stronger with our allies. America is safer with our allies. And America is more secure with our allies. And any attempt to undermine NATO only undermines American security.

So we are here this week to strengthen NATO and to strengthen American and allied security for the next seventy-five years. As President Biden has said, our foes and rivals have tried to shatter our unity, but our democracies have stood unwavering. Ladies and gentlemen, that is the legacy that we celebrate. That is the vow that we uphold. And that is the work that we will continue. Thank you very much.

Watch the full event

The post Any attempt to undermine NATO undermines US security, says Lloyd Austin appeared first on Atlantic Council.

How NATO can prove its enduring relevance at the Washington summit

Giedrimas Jeglinskas — Tue, 09 Jul 2024 21:32:53 +0000

In a dangerous world, NATO’s role has never been more important. Yet, to remain relevant, the Alliance needs to adapt to today’s security challenges at greater scale and speed. After Russia’s initial invasion of Ukraine in 2014, it took three years for NATO to deploy the enhanced Forward Presence battalions in Central and Eastern Europe. Now, two-and-a-half years into Russia’s full-scale invasion, the allies have neither defined Ukraine’s path to NATO membership nor delivered what Ukraine needs to win. This “too little, too late” approach from NATO neglects the security interests of member states and empowers the Alliance’s adversaries.

At the latest NATO foreign ministerial meeting in Prague, US Secretary of State Antony Blinken promised Ukraine a “bridge” to NATO. For a start, US President Joe Biden at the Group of Seven (G7) meeting in Italy delivered a three-pronged blow to Moscow—a new package of sanctions targeting Russia’s financial sector, a fifty billion dollar loan to Ukraine from several nations backed by payments from Russia’s immobilized assets, and a new bilateral US-Ukraine security pact to ensure long-term aid.

Additionally, NATO’s new report on defense spending shows that twenty-three out of thirty-two allies are on pace to meet the 2 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) benchmark for defense spending this year. As Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg noted, twenty-three allies is “more than twice as many as four years ago and demonstrates that European allies and Canada are really stepping up and taking their share of the common responsibility to protect all of us in the NATO alliance.”

These are positive steps, but they do not solve the lack of speed and scale that plagues NATO’s decision making. NATO should tackle three big sets of deliverables at the Washington summit that began today. At the summit, the Alliance should invite Ukraine to start accession talks, augment military support to Kyiv, and substantially elevate member states’ defense budgets to reach a collective 3 percent of GDP, with an allocation of 0.25 percent of GDP to Ukraine’s military assistance. Only then will NATO be operating at the appropriate speed and scale to address the Alliance’s security challenges and deter further threats from its adversaries.

First, NATO must provide Ukraine with a credible path to membership. Ukraine’s long-term security is impossible without membership in the world’s most powerful military alliance, while Europe’s security cannot be guaranteed without Ukraine in NATO. Statements from leaders of NATO member states that they will do “whatever it takes” to support Kyiv are no longer sufficient—real steps to absorb Ukraine into the NATO family are needed.

I had a chance to serve as a member of the International Task Force (ITF) on Ukraine’s Security and Euro-Atlantic Integration, co-chaired by former NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen and Head of the Office of the President of Ukraine Andriy Yermak. The ITF report released in May has proposed a clear path for Ukraine’s membership in NATO, which should start with NATO inviting Ukraine to start accession talks at the Washington summit this week. To empower the process, the NATO-Ukraine Council should define specific conditions for membership. The ITF also recommends setting a timeline for Ukrainian membership of no later than July 2028, provided specific conditions are met.

Second, NATO must commit to augmenting Ukraine’s warfighting capabilities to tip the balance on the battlefield. At ITF, we recommended five concrete initiatives on which NATO member states can agree at the Washington summit:

Lift all the caveats on the weapons delivered by allies to Ukraine;
Create an extended air defense shield in western Ukraine;
Deploy a freedom of navigation and demining mission in the Black Sea;
Ramp up the training of Ukrainian forces, including inside Ukraine;
Provide the so-called “fix forward” logistics support on the ground in Ukraine rather than transporting it back abroad, which wastes time and money.

The members of the ITF believe that “[t]aken together, these measures would help Ukraine deny Russia the possibility to escalate its conventional war. They would also constitute an enhanced commitment to Ukraine’s security in the interim period between an invitation and full membership.”

Third, NATO allies must increase military spending. To address the perennial resource question, the Alliance should set an ambitious multiyear trajectory for members’ defense budgets, committing every ally to spend 0.25 percent of their GDP on military assistance to Ukraine. When NATO defense ministers first proposed the 2 percent of GDP defense spending guideline in 2006, the target was not enforceable, and many allies did not take it seriously. Many NATO members failed to meet this target even after the Wales summit in 2014, where NATO leaders signed the Defense Investment Pledge. At the Vilnius summit in 2023, 2 percent of GDP became a “floor” rather than a goalpost. That year, total NATO defense spending, which stood at $1.3 trillion, accounted for around 2.5 percent of NATO’s collective GDP, thanks in large part to the United States’ massive defense expenditure. To reach a 3 percent of GDP spending target for NATO, the allies in 2023 would have been short $234 billion. In other words, an additional 18 percent increase in defense spending would have been required on top of the already steep 18 percent growth last year.

Adequate increases in spending will take time. At the Washington summit, NATO allies should commit to a multiyear plan of uninterrupted defense budget growth with an aim for all allies, but especially European countries and Canada, to contribute enough to breach the 3 percent spending threshold for the Alliance’s collective defense.

At the same time, allies should agree to allocate 0.25 percent of their GDP to military support for Ukraine, which would amount to around $125 billion per year. Such an agreement could directly institutionalize NATO’s security assistance and training to Ukraine. The planned NATO command in Wiesbaden, Germany, which will coordinate training and aid to Ukraine and is set to include more than seven hundred personnel, is an important preparatory step for Ukraine’s eventual membership in the Alliance. In addition, the Atlantic Council’s Ian Brzezinski is right to recommend that such arrangements that allow Ukrainian personnel to embed in NATO structures should be accompanied by a formal acknowledgment that Ukraine is ready to join the Alliance.

This week in Washington is an important test for the Alliance. Can NATO operate at the speed and scale of relevance? Progress on paving the way to Ukraine’s NATO membership, augmenting Ukraine’s warfighting capabilities, and unambiguously elevating defense budgets would serve as proof of the Alliance’s continued relevance in a time of uncertainty.

Giedrimas Jeglinskas is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security and a member of the International Task Force on Ukraine’s Security and Euro-Atlantic Integration. Previously, he served as NATO’s assistant secretary general for executive management and as Lithuania’s deputy defense minister.

The post How NATO can prove its enduring relevance at the Washington summit appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Putin, Xi, Orbán, and Modi provide a disturbing backdrop to the start of the NATO Summit

Frederick Kempe — Tue, 09 Jul 2024 16:49:08 +0000

The split screen was the devastating work of Vladimir Putin. On one side, a barrage of Russian missile strikes hit Ukraine, and rescue workers search for survivors at Kyiv’s finest children’s hospital. On the other side, heads of state and government arrive in Washington for NATO’s seventy-fifth anniversary summit, the world’s most powerful alliance being shown by Putin as unable to save Ukrainian children.

Another screen shows a NATO leader, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, paying homage to Chinese leader Xi Jinping in Beijing, following his visit with Putin in Moscow. The next screen shows the leader of the world’s most populous democracy, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, making his first visit to Moscow since Putin’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine began in February 2022. Yet another screen shows US President Joe Biden looking lost in his presidential debate, raising new concerns about what his health means for NATO’s future.

No one can convince me it was a coincidence that Putin chose Monday, the eve of the NATO Summit, to launch one of his largest recent barrages of missiles on Ukraine. The leaders of Hungary and India both knew the significance of the timing of their visits—one by the Alliance’s most rogue member and the other by a major power keen to underscore its autonomy of action.

It’s appropriate that today’s opening day for the NATO Summit will be marked by a Ukrainian day of mourning for the at least forty-one individuals who died and the more than 170 who were injured in Monday’s attack, not to mention the wrecked hospital infrastructure that would have saved countless other lives. It seems that Putin hasn’t read Article 18 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, ratified by the United Nations after World War II, which prohibits attacks on civilian hospitals.

Ukrainians’ shock and anger at the strike on the children’s hospital in Kyiv could give way to dismay as they watch NATO stand by in Washington. The United States has not yet fully freed up the Ukrainians to use the longer-range Army Tactical Missile Systems (ATACMS) that could hit the Russian sites from which deadly missiles are fired. NATO allies once again will likely put off a decision about when exactly Ukraine will join the Alliance, which is the only outcome that will provide the country the long-term security its neighbors in the Baltics, Poland, Romania, and Hungary enjoy.

Orbán’s rogue relations with Russia and China come as he takes over the rotating presidency of the Council of the European Union, something Xi acknowledged as an opportunity, just days after the European Union kicked off new tariffs on Chinese electric vehicles. Orbán stopped in Moscow before he flew on to Beijing.

During his visit to Moscow, Modi called Russia an “all-weather friend” and a “trusted ally.” Putin reciprocated the sentiment by welcoming his “dear friend” to his official residence.

Underpinning the Russia-India partnership is energy. India is the third-biggest crude oil importer in the world, and Russia is its single largest source of seaborne oil, accounting for around 40 percent of imports in recent months, up from just 2 percent in 2021.

Modi would have known that choosing to make the trip during the NATO anniversary summit would rub some US officials the wrong way. However, he, like Orbán, knew there will be little price to pay from Western partners after the trip.

NATO began its mission seventy-five years ago amid an inflection point in history, a story former US Secretary of State Dean Acheson chronicled in his memoir Present at the Creation. Putin and Xi would very much like to be present at the conclusion of NATO and the US-led international order. But they will only be successful if allies don’t respond and if partners go out of their way to back these revisionist autocrats.

Frederick Kempe is president and chief executive officer of the Atlantic Council. You can follow him on Twitter: @FredKempe.

This edition is part of Frederick Kempe’s Inflection Points Today newsletter, a column of quick-hit insights on a world in transition. To receive this newsletter throughout the week, sign up here.

The post Putin, Xi, Orbán, and Modi provide a disturbing backdrop to the start of the NATO Summit appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Kroenig appeared on BBC News to discuss the NATO Summit agenda

swallace — Tue, 09 Jul 2024 04:00:00 +0000

Watch Here

On July 9, Matthew Kroenig, Vice President and Senior Director of the Scowcroft Center, appeared on BBC News, where he spoke on the priorities for the Alliance amid the Washington Summit, noting the challenges in defense and deterrence, Ukraine’s bridge to NATO membership, and the dilemma of burden-sharing.

The big challenge is [if] we have the right defenses to deal with the threat from Russia and China. Working with Indo-Pacific partners is also going to be another priority for the Alliance at the Summit. […] The plans for Ukraine […] and then burden-sharing [are also] going to be discussed.

Matthew Kroenig

Staff

Matthew Kroenig

Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

China Defense Policy

The post Kroenig appeared on BBC News to discuss the NATO Summit agenda appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Turkey’s emerging and disruptive technologies capacity and NATO: Defense policy, prospects, and limitations

Can Kasapoğlu and Sine Özkaraşahin — Mon, 08 Jul 2024 21:00:00 +0000

Introduction

The NATO Parliamentary Assembly’s Science and Technology Committee considers emerging and disruptive technologies (EDTs) capable of transforming future military capabilities and warfare through advanced tech applications. Today, official documents indicate that NATO’s EDT-generation efforts focus on nine areas : artificial intelligence (AI), autonomous systems, quantum technologies, biotechnology and human enhancement technologies, space, hypersonic systems, novel materials and manufacturing, energy and propulsion, and next-generation communications networks.

This brief does not cover all of Turkey’s defense-technological capabilities but aims to outline Turkey’s growing focus on EDTs and high-tech advancements. Some signature programs reflect Turkey’s political-military approach and the trends in defense-technological and industrial policies. These programs hint at Ankara’s future military modernization efforts and smart assets. This paper highlights some of Turkey’s critical defense tech programs, focusing on AI, robotics, directed energy weapons, and future soldier/exoskeleton technologies to illustrate the comprehensive and integrated structure of the Turkish EDT ecosystem.

Emerging and disruptive technologies, the future of war, and NATO

Breakthroughs in EDTs are essential for NATO’s future military strength. They will significantly impact defense economics and help shape NATO’s defense-technological and industrial priorities. These efforts involve not just state policies but also public-private partnerships and transatlantic cooperation for sustainable and comprehensive EDT initiatives.

NATO supports these projects through initiatives like the Defence Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic and the NATO-Private Sector Dialogues, which explore collaboration between NATO and private companies on technology and defense.

According to Greg Ulmer, currently president of Lockheed Martin Aeronautics, “the decisive edge in today and tomorrow’s missions will be determined by combining technologies to bring forward new capabilities.” This view is shared by US Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin, demonstrating the importance of AI in Washington’s military modernization efforts to deter adversaries in a future confrontation. There seems to be a consensus in the Western policy community that integrating AI and machine learning into modern battle networks, perhaps the most critical contemporary EDT applications in defense, is essential to succeed in tomorrow’s wars. In an era of increasingly digital and transparent warfare, rapid technological adaptation is key to success.

Smart technologies are proliferating fast, and continuous innovation has become a strategic requirement in today’s geopolitical landscape. AI-augmented precision kill chains, hypersonic weapons within mixed-strike packages, and satellite internet-enabled command and control nodes are already changing warfare. The use of commercial satellite imagery and geospatial intelligence has revolutionized open-source intelligence. Facial recognition algorithms are now used in war crime investigations. Robotic warfare, drone-on-drone engagements, and manned-unmanned teaming are all changing the characteristics of war for better or worse.

Defense economics is also changing. Start-ups are becoming increasingly essential actors in military innovation. According to McKinsey & Company, the number of seed funding rounds in defense and dual-use technology (in the United States) almost doubled between 2011 and 2023, hinting at a rapid proliferation of start-ups in the high-tech defense industry. This trend is fostering new collaborations. NATO is leveraging the strengths of the start-up industry with a $1.1 billion Innovation Fund and is reportedly working with several European tech companies on robotic solutions, AI-driven systems, and semiconductors.

Keeping up with innovation is like boarding a fast-moving train, where getting a good seat ensures a strategic advantage over competitors. By investing in holistic, across-the-spectrum EDT-generation efforts, Turkish decision-makers seem to recognize this imperative.

Great expectations: Turkey in the high-technology battlespace

Turkey has faced challenges with industrial advancements, lagging behind in the Industrial Revolution. For instance, the country’s first main battle tank is still not in service. Despite ambitions to operate its fifth-generation combat aircraft, Kaan, within a decade, Turkey has not ever produced third- or fourth-generation tactical military aircraft. This situation is striking given that Turkey excels in producing and exporting state-of-the-art drones but has struggled with other key conventional military assets.

According to Haluk Bayraktar, CEO of the prominent Turkish unmanned aerial systems manufacturer Baykar, missing out on the Industrial Revolution has slowed Turkey’s military modernization. However, it also pushed the country to leverage digital age technologies, building new strengths in intelligent assets and EDTs.

In recent decades, Turkey’s military-industrial sector has focused heavily on innovation and increasing research and development, driven by a desire for self-sufficiency and operational sovereignty. The country’s National Artificial Intelligence Strategy 2021-2025 outlines these ambitions. Forming the central pillar of the government’s AI policy, the document “focuses on generating value on a global scale with an agile and sustainable AI ecosystem.” The strategy also lays out the strategic pillars of the effort, including strengthening international collaboration, encouraging innovation, and increasing the number of experts working on AI.

Similarly, the 2023-2027 Sectoral Strategy Document of the Turkish Presidency of Defense Industries outlines several focus areas for Turkey’s future EDT efforts. These include quantum computing, nanotechnology, and directed energy weapons. The document also highlights the importance of establishing a sustainable, resilient production and testing infrastructure for advanced aerial platforms and increasing the competitiveness of Turkey’s high-tech defense exports.

Selected military programs

Kemankeş loitering munitions baseline

Turkey’s aerial drone warfare capabilities first gained attention with medium-altitude long-endurance (MALE) and high-altitude long-endurance (HALE) platforms such as the Bayraktar TB-2 MALE drone, Akıncı HALE unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV), and TUSAS’ Anka MALE drone baseline. Recently, Turkey’s has advanced further in this field, developing smart aerial assets such as the Kemankeş family.

The Kemankeş, introduced by Baykar in 2023, is a “mini-intelligent cruise missile” that combines features of loitering munitions and cruise missiles. It can carry a 6-kilogram payload , and operates autonomously with an AI-supported autopilot system, one-hour endurance, and a jet engine. The Kemankeş is designed for both striking targets and conducting intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition, and reconnaissance missions. It can be integrated with other aerial drones, making it a versatile tool in modern warfare.

The Kemankeş system offers advanced datalinks and sensors, providing real-time battle updates while targeting adversaries. The upgraded version, Kemankeş-2, boasts a range of over 200 kilometers and an AI-supported autopilot system for precise, autonomous flight. Baykar announced that Kemankeş-2 passed its system verification tests in June 2024.

Kemankeş-2 can operate day and night, in various weather conditions, and in environments where GPS is jammed. Its AI-supported optical guidance system demonstrates Turkey’s rapid advancements in robotic aerial technology.

Naval and ground robotic warfare capabilities

Russia’s war on Ukraine and the ongoing turmoil in the Red Sea have highlighted the importance of kamikaze naval drones. In the Black Sea, Ukraine has used unmanned surface vehicles (USV) compensate for its lack of conventional naval capabilities. It has successfully eliminated about one-third of the Russian Black Sea Fleet with naval drones and other long-range capabilities such as the Storm Shadow/SCALP-EG air-launched cruise missiles and coastal defense missiles. Similarly, in the Red Sea, Iranian-backed Houthis have employed low-cost kamikaze USVs effective anti-access/area-denial assets, disrupting global maritime trade and limiting Western commercial activities in the region. Some assessments suggest that the United States should consider forming “hedge forces” consisting entirely of unmanned, low-cost systems to counter initial aggression from a peer opponent, such as in a scenario involving China invading Taiwan. This strategy would minimize harm to military personnel and the loss of valuable equipment.

Turkey has one of the largest USV programs within NATO, with about half a dozen ongoing projects. For example, Marlin, produced by the Turkish defense giant Aselsan and Sefine Shipyards, was the first Turkish naval drone to participate in NATO joint exercises, indicating potential for coalition warfare.

Turkey is also advancing its ground warfare capabilities, leveraging its expertise in robotics. Otokar’s Alpar is a recent example of an unmanned ground vehicle (UGV) that can map the battlefield in 2D and 3D, navigate without a global navigation satellite system, identify friend or foe, and has Advanced Driver Assistance Systems, low thermal and acoustic signature, and autonomous patrol capability. It can also serve as a “mother tank” for smaller UGVs, enhancing mission capability. Alpar has been showcased at major international defense exhibitions, including the Eurosatory 2024 event held in Paris in June.

In addition to developing new robotic systems, Turkey is focusing on innovative concepts like Havelsan’s “digital troops,” which integrate manned and unmanned teams to act as force multipliers on the battlefield. These efforts across multiple domains demonstrate Turkey’s vision of becoming a leading player in a “Mad Max”-like battlespace that combines conventional and smart assets.

Laser precision: Turkey’s drive in directed energy weapon projects

In Turkey’s expansion of EDTs, directed energy weapons and laser guns are gaining attention. The prominent Turkish arms maker Roketsan has introduced the Alka Directed Energy Weapon System, which has successfully completed live fire tests. The Alka system combines soft kill and hard kill capabilities, featuring both an electromagnetic jamming system and a laser destruction system.

Another key initiative is Aselsan’s Gökberk Mobile Laser Weapon System, first unveiled at the Turkish defense exhibition IDEF in 2023. Gökberk can search for, detect, and track UAVs using radar and electro-optical sensors, and then intercept these threats with an effective laser weapon. Additionally, Gökberk has soft kill capabilities, using its Kangal jammer subsystem to render UAVs dysfunctional. According to Aselsan, Gökberk can protect land and naval platforms, critical national infrastructure, and border outposts.

Turkish future soldier concepts

Turkey is also advancing future soldier technologies as part of its efforts in EDTs. The concept, pioneered by the United Kingdom within NATO, aims to create a modernized force by 2030. Shifting the focus of warfighting from close to deep battles, the British program seeks to transform the army into a resilient and versatile force that can find and attack enemy targets at a greater distance and with higher accuracy.

Ankara’s efforts in this segment are not new. A few years ago, BITES, a leading defense technology and intelligent systems manufacturer owned by Aselsan, developed the Military Tactical Operation Kit ATOK. Equipped with portable and wearable integrated technology, the solution in question was designed to enhance the situational awareness of Turkish troops in a rapidly changing battlefield and maximize personnel security. In line with the future soldier concept, BITES also produced several solutions based on virtual/augmented reality to provide realistic simulation environments.

Aselsan’s “Military Exoskeleton” is another visionary initiative designed to assist troops during demanding battlefield conditions. The exoskeleton provides over 400 watts of leg support. The support is adaptive and AI-supported, meaning that it understands and responds to the needs of the soldier wearing the smart suit. It has an 8-kilometer operation range on a single charge and transfers the soldier’s weight to the ground during long missions, reducing physical strain and improving combat performance.

The way forward: Opportunities and restraints

Keeping up with industrial trends in a competitive environment is challenging, and Turkey’s defense industry faces several obstacles that limit its full potential.

First, the Turkish defense industry is monopolized. There are structural gaps in the collaboration between the public and private sectors. Unlike other tech-driven nations like the United States, Turkey’s defense ecosystem is not very friendly to start-ups, with established companies dominating the field.

Second, Turkey has a shortage of skilled human capital, largely due to issues in higher education. According to 2022 OECD data, Turkey’s Program for International Student Assessment test scores fell below the OECD average in mathematics, science, and reading comprehension. In addition, evidence shows that in Turkey, the proportion of bachelor’s, master’s, and doctoral or equivalent graduates in the field of STEM (science, technology, engineering, and mathematics) is among the lowest among OECD and partner countries.

For sustainable and resilient defense innovation, R&D, business, and a well-educated workforce must go hand in hand. A good example is Baykar, whose chief technology lead was educated at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, one of the United States’ leading engineering universities.

Third, high-technology goods comprise a relatively low share of Turkish exports. Despite a focus on high-tech products, over half of the gross value generated in the Turkish defense industry comes from low- and medium-technology products. In 2022, Turkey’s high-tech exports were approximately $7.5 billion, and in 2023, this figure exceeded $9 billion.

While Turkey’s strategic plans and defense industrial goals are ambitious, the abovementioned challenges could jeopardize its position as a leading EDT producer in the medium and long term. Addressing these issues is crucial not only for enhancing Turkey’s EDT edge but also for meeting NATO’s strategic needs.

About the authors

Can Kasapoğlu is a nonresident senior fellow at Hudson Institute. Follow him on X @ckasapoglu1.

Sine Özkaraşahin is a freelance defense analyst and consultant. Follow her on X @sineozkarasahin.

The Atlantic Council in Turkey, which is in charge of the Turkey program, aims to promote and strengthen transatlantic engagement with the region by providing a high-level forum and pursuing programming to address the most important issues on energy, economics, security, and defense.

To receive our dispatches from the NATO Summit directly in your inbox, subscribe here.

From blueprints to battlefields: How to ensure NATO’s future readiness

Luka Ignac — Mon, 08 Jul 2024 19:45:58 +0000

During the Cold War, NATO relied on a “forward defense” strategy of amassing forces near the contact line to deter Soviet aggression. After the Cold War, however, the Alliance shifted its defense strategy to a “deterrence by punishment” approach, pulling back some forces but threatening severe retaliation in response to any attack. This change reflected the reduced immediacy of threats to the Alliance at the time. Now, amid Russia’s ongoing invasion of Ukraine and rising global instability, NATO is once again adapting its strategy.

This change in the Alliance’s strategy began at the Madrid summit in 2022, where allies agreed to a new Strategic Concept that acknowledged the evolving security landscape and committed them “to defend every inch of Allied territory.” The Vilnius summit in 2023 marked another crucial moment for NATO’s deterrence and defense posture. It introduced an ambitious “family of plans” comprising three regional defense strategies, covering the Atlantic and European Arctic, the Baltic region and Central Europe, and the Mediterranean and Black Sea. These three regional defense strategies are supported by subordinate strategic plans across seven functional domains, including cyber, space, special operations, and reinforcement.

This integrated approach aims to synchronize military operations across the Euro-Atlantic region and various domains, offering diverse responses to threats from adversaries such as Russia or terrorist groups. As part of these plans, allies will maintain up to three hundred thousand troops at high readiness (ready within thirty days), along with one hundred brigades, 1,400 fighter aircraft, and 250 ships and submarines. This initiative represents NATO’s most ambitious restructuring of its force posture since the end of the Cold War.

However, successfully executing these plans remains the ultimate challenge. At the Washington summit this week, NATO allies must address persistent issues, such as long-term capability gaps and the revitalization of arms production, to ensure these blueprints translate into actionable strategies. The Washington summit presents a critical opportunity for Allies to chart a clear path forward—not just to demonstrate that these plans exist, but also to provide a credible roadmap for effectively implementing them.

Bridging the capability gap

The fact that twenty-three allied nations are meeting the defense spending target of 2 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) is important progress. However, more needs to be done to ensure NATO’s ability to successfully deploy its regional plans. Under the new regional plans, the Alliance must be capable of defending every inch of allied territory across multiple domains. To accomplish this, allies must adhere to greater capability requirements and higher levels of defense spending.

While the capability requirements based on the regional plans are still being determined as part of the NATO Defence Planning Process, the new defense plans necessitate a three-fold increase to existing military capability targets and for each ally to spend 3 percent of its GDP on defense. The key question facing allied leaders is whether they are ready to commit these resources to ensure the credibility of these regional plans.

The Washington summit presents several opportunities to solidify the implementation of NATO’s family of plans:

Exercise at scale and frequency: Allies must reaffirm their commitment to fully resource and regularly exercise the family of plans. This includes conducting exercises at a scale not seen in decades to rehearse, refine, and validate the plans while enhancing readiness. Steadfast Defender 24, NATO’s largest military exercise since the Cold War with more than ninety thousand troops from all thirty-two allies, is a great example of the type of exercises that the Alliance needs to conduct more frequently.

Continue to develop regional plans: The executability of NATO’s family of plans hinges on the availability of readily accessible resources, the ability to move forces, and the fulfillment of capability requirements by the allies. To achieve this, allies must place significant emphasis on integrating national defense plans with NATO’s defense plans. This integration will enhance force mobility, foster greater cohesion and interoperability among allies, and strengthen NATO’s overall deterrence and defense posture.

Revitalize the transatlantic industrial base: Russia’s ongoing war on Ukraine has exposed the need for a revitalized defense industrial base. Allies must ramp up defense production to not only support Ukraine but also replenish their own stocks and meet the demands of modern warfare. The Washington summit needs to facilitate collaboration among allies to procure and develop capabilities jointly, leveraging economies of scale and expertise. NATO allies need to expand existing production facilities to meet the increased demand for military equipment, ensuring the timely delivery of critical capabilities. Moving forward with the NATO defense industrial pledge is a step into the right direction to help allies boost already existing industrial capabilities, standardize equipment, and inform their national production strategies.

The Washington summit represents a pivotal moment for NATO. While the family of plans offers a promising blueprint for collective defense, its success hinges on allies’ ability to verify readiness, overcome capability gaps, revitalize the transatlantic defense industrial base, and integrate national defense plans with NATO defense plans in the face of evolving security challenges. By seizing the opportunities presented at the summit, NATO can reaffirm its commitment to collective defense and ensure the credibility of its deterrence posture in an increasingly complex geopolitical landscape.

Luka Ignac is an assistant director for the Transatlantic Security Initiative within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security at the Atlantic Council.

The post From blueprints to battlefields: How to ensure NATO’s future readiness appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Live expertise and behind-the-scenes insight as NATO leaders gather at the Washington summit

Atlantic Council experts — Mon, 08 Jul 2024 19:16:50 +0000

Over the past seventy-five years, NATO has established its place among the most powerful military alliances in history. But how will it stay fit for the future?

NATO leaders gathered in Washington, DC from July 9 to 11 to grapple with that big question and many others, ranging from Ukraine’s path forward with NATO to the Alliance’s collective defense spending and coordination.

With the global stakes so high, we dispatched our experts to the center of the action at the summit and the NATO Public Forum. Below, find authoritative, up-to-the-minute analysis and insight from behind the scenes of these gatherings.

JULY 12

Jenna Ben-Yehuda’s main takeaways from the 2024 NATO Summit

Biden’s press conference showed how political drama overtook summit substance

Did the 2024 NATO Summit go far enough on Ukraine? The country’s former prime minister responds

Allies sign ‘Ice Pact’ to counter Russia and China in the Arctic

In a war of attrition, ammunition is critical, as Swedish Minister of Defence Pål Jonson underscored

The Washington summit showcased the growing ties between NATO and its Indo-Pacific partners

See our previous analysis

JULY 12, 2024 | 5:14 PM ET

Jenna Ben-Yehuda’s main takeaways from the 2024 NATO Summit

The Atlantic Council’s executive vice president breaks down the “strengthened approach” the allies took on Ukraine, the Alliance’s language toward China, and some of the other key topics discussed in Washington, DC this week.

JULY 12, 2024 | 11:55 AM ET

Biden’s press conference showed how political drama overtook summit substance

The substantive parts of US President Joe Biden’s press conference on Thursday, at the end of the NATO Summit, were overshadowed by questions about his health and him mixing up the names of world leaders. It was a microcosm of press coverage of this consequential past week.

This year’s NATO Summit made progress on many important issues. The Alliance recognized its global role, highlighting the threats posed by China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea while incorporating the IP-4 countries (Australia, Japan, South Korea, and New Zealand) into its planned response. It took meaningful steps toward strengthening deterrence and defense, including announcing the deployment of new, long-range conventional missiles in Germany. Although more work remains to be done, NATO made progress on burden-sharing, with twenty-three of the thirty-two Alliance members expected to meet or exceed the agreed-upon target of spending 2 percent of gross domestic product on defense. And the Alliance took concrete steps to help Ukraine defend itself, offering a “bridge” for Kyiv’s eventual NATO membership.

Still, much of the coverage focused on domestic political turbulence within NATO’s member states, particularly stemming from the recently concluded elections in France and the United Kingdom, as well as elections in the United States later this year. Some of that coverage questioned whether Biden will be forced off the Democratic ticket or whether a second Trump administration would weaken NATO.

These angles risk missing the bigger picture for the sake of an immediate news hook. NATO has been a successful alliance of democracies for more than seventy-years years. It has weathered more significant domestic political turmoil within its member states before, and it has almost always emerged stronger on the other end.

That will likely be the lasting conclusion when the dust settles on this week’s meetings. NATO is entering its third strategic age. It won the Cold War, expanded in the post-Cold War era, and is now gearing up for strategic competition in an age of interdependence. Despite, or maybe even because of, its members’ vibrant democratic politics, NATO is successfully adapting to meet the new and significant challenges it faces at this inflection point in world history.

JULY 12, 2024 | 11:36 AM ET

Did the 2024 NATO Summit go far enough on Ukraine? The country’s former prime minister responds

The Atlantic Council’s Philippe Dickinson spoke with former Ukrainian Prime Minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk on the Washington Summit Declaration and how Russian President Vladimir Putin may react to it.

JULY 12, 2024 | 10:24 AM ET

Allies sign ‘Ice Pact’ to counter Russia and China in the Arctic

It might be sweltering in Washington, but three NATO allies have ice in their veins. Yesterday, the United States, Canada, and Finland broke the ice on an Icebreaker Collaboration Effort, or “ICE Pact,” to bring as many as ninety icebreaker ships into production in the coming years—a number nearly as giant as the ships themselves compared to the United States’ current count of two. While Canada and Finland respectively have nine and twelve icebreakers, NATO lags behind Russian icebreaking capabilities in the Arctic.

As the 2024 NATO Summit winds down, the Ice Pact demonstrates how close cooperation among allies is a tremendous asset to US security. As revealed through congressional testimony, siloed US efforts to shore up the icebreaking fleet have faced budgeting complications and time delays. Icebreakers that were originally expected to be built by the summer of 2024 have been delayed to 2029, and will come at a 60 percent higher cost than anticipated. Additionally, the United States hasn’t built a heavy polar icebreaker in nearly fifty years, or a medium polar icebreaker in twenty-five years.

As authoritarian states band together to challenge the international world order, the United States and NATO stand to benefit from collaborative efforts to ensure a peaceful and stable Arctic region. The United States may be increasingly looking toward China, but China is looking north. China’s “near-Arctic” state ambitions, coupled with Russia’s desperate need for partners, are opening a historically peaceful and stable region to potential hybrid warfare and dual-use scientific research. To mitigate these challenges, the United States and NATO must ensure the ability to operate in the region. Shoring up allied icebreakers is a critical step in this direction.

JULY 12, 2024 | 10:05 AM ET

The Washington summit showcased the growing ties between NATO and its Indo-Pacific partners

Over the course of this week’s summit, there’s been much attention paid to the Indo-Pacific Four (IP4)—Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and South Korea—who are, for the third year in a row, attending the NATO Summit. The decision to extend invitations to these countries comes from a recognition, as explained in the Alliance’s summit communiqué, that the “Indo-Pacific is important for NATO, given that developments in that region directly affect Euro-Atlantic security.” The two “theaters cannot be decorrelated,” as US Deputy Secretary of State Kurt Campbell said during the NATO Public Forum on Thursday.

Cooperation and integration between countries in the IP4 and NATO outside of the Euro-Atlantic area is not new, as exemplified by Australia and New Zealand’s support for the Resolute Support Mission in Afghanistan between 2015 and 2021. However, there has been a significant evolution in this cooperation in recent years, reflecting shared support for Ukraine as well as mutual concern about China and its growing cooperation with Russia. NATO’s role in setting standards across the defense industry also interests the IP4 countries, especially those with a robust defense industrial base.

First, as reflected in the communiqué, NATO and the IP4 are launching tailored projects in the areas of “supporting Ukraine, cyber defense, countering disinformation, and technology.” These projects will rely on strengthened political and technical sharing of information, especially in the case of Japan, as highlighted by Prime Minister Fumio Kishida. Australia, unlike the other IP4 countries, is already well integrated since it has been an Enhanced Opportunity Partner since 2014, which allows it to partake in regular consultations and access interoperability programs, exercises, and information sharing. South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol said that the steps taken this week on airworthiness certification for Korean aircraft would help ensure “mutual military compatibility” with NATO.

Second, we could see more joint messaging and signaling going forward. Kishida and NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg issued a joint statement, saying that NATO and Japan are coordinating to potentially hold joint exercises in the Euro-Atlantic region this year. In an effort to jointly work on strategic communication, Japan will dispatch new personnel to the NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence in Latvia.

Finally, representatives from the European Union (EU) were also present at the meeting Thursday between NATO and the IP4. Their presence reflects the complementary efforts that the bloc might play in the Indo-Pacific and in response to the growing Russia-China nexus. Stoltenberg expressed it best when he said on Wednesday that China “cannot have it both ways” if it continues to play a role in Russia’s defense expansion. NATO this week warned China that continuing to do so will generate negative consequences for “its interests and reputation.”

The EU can leverage funding, know-how, and security capabilities other than in military domains—and it has tools to impose political, economic, and reputational costs to respond to malign actors impacting its interests, including by preventing the flow of dual-use or defense technologies. While there is no consensus on it, some allies have apparently discussed taking action to reclaim some Chinese-owned infrastructure projects in Europe should a wider conflict with Russia break out, a domain that would directly concern the EU. As Campbell aims to “institutionalize” the links between the Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific regions, building EU-NATO and US-EU consultation frameworks on China will be key in making sure the multidomain dimension of the threat is fully taken into consideration.

JULY 12, 2024 | 9:45 AM ET

In a war of attrition, ammunition is critical, as Swedish Minister of Defence Pål Jonson underscored

Against the backdrop of the war in Ukraine, the NATO Summit emphasizes the imperative of further strengthening the Alliance to defend democracy and protect Ukraine’s sovereignty. However, to secure victory, Ukraine’s forces require a consistent flow of weapons, ammunition, and critical equipment such as air defense systems and fighter jets. NATO allies and other partners have delivered ten long-range Multiple Launch Rocket Systems, roughly 250,000 anti-tank munitions, and 359 tanks, among other critical defense capabilities.

However, as Swedish Defense Minister Pål Jonson highlighted at the NATO Public Forum on Wednesday, the challenge will be for NATO members to maintain this support from a production standpoint in the months ahead.

In the panel, moderated by the Atlantic Council’s Matthew Kroenig, Jonson called attention to the fact that Europe’s defense industrial base is shaped for peacetime. But with the ongoing war in Ukraine, stockpiles are depleting and production is not keeping pace. The 1.3 million 155mm howitzer rounds that the United States and European allies are expected to produce this year fall dreadfully short of the roughly 4.3 million shells per year that then Ukrainian Defense Minister Oleksii Reznikov said last year that Ukraine would need. The inability to reconcile this production gap hinders Ukrainian defenses and detracts from NATO’s power of deterrence.

Although a historic twenty-three NATO members now meet the target of spending at least 2 percent of their gross domestic product on defense, NATO must collectively send a demand signal to the defense industry to adequately ramp up production. Lengthy lead times simply will not suffice. The solution? Jonson argues “Spending more and spending more together.”

JULY 11

Dispatch from the NATO Summit: The pluses and minuses for Ukraine

Inside the new NATO action plan for engaging with the Alliance’s neighbors to the south

Five reasons why Ukraine should be invited to join NATO

The Washington summit shows just how much the NATO-IP4 partnership has evolved

Jake Sullivan previews the Ukraine Compact and takes stock of allied support for Kyiv

UK foreign secretary: Why NATO remains core to British security

What to expect on day two: Focus on China and rallying behind Ukraine

See our previous analysis

JULY 11, 2024 | 7:45 PM ET

Dispatch from the NATO Summit: The pluses and minuses for Ukraine

This year’s NATO Summit will not be remembered as a seminal event, nor will it be remembered as a failure.

JULY 11, 2024 | 5:20 PM ET

Inside the new NATO action plan for engaging with the Alliance’s neighbors to the south

Yesterday at the NATO Public Forum, Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez announced that the Alliance has adopted a new action plan for its southern flank. The prime minister said NATO must do more in its southern neighborhood because instability there affects NATO allies and because adversaries—namely Russia—take advantage of that instability to pursue their interests and entrench their influence.

The action plan he outlined has three parts: First, NATO will engage in enhanced political dialogue with partners in the Middle East and Africa based on mutual respect and mutual interest. A new NATO special representative for the southern neighborhood will spearhead this effort. Second, the Alliance will enhance work with international organizations such as the African Union, the Gulf Cooperation Council, and the Arab League. It will also coordinate its efforts with the European Union, which already engages in development activities in the region. Finally, Sánchez said NATO is ready to work with southern partners to do more to combat terrorism, bolster maritime security, respond to climate change, and enhance resilience.

NATO’s new action plan for working with its neighbors to the south echoes the themes of a report released in May by a group of experts reviewing NATO’s approach to such engagement. Not all will be happy with it, however. Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni and leading members of her government had called for a more ambitious agreement. Expect calls for more to be done on NATO’s southern flank to come at the 2025 Hague summit.

JULY 11, 2024 | 4:33 PM ET

Five reasons why Ukraine should be invited to join NATO

UkraineAlert

Jul 11, 2024

Five reasons why Ukraine should be invited to join NATO

By Paul Grod

The 2024 NATO Summit in Washington failed to produce any progress toward Ukrainian membership but there are five compelling reasons why Ukraine should be invited to join the alliance, writes Paul Grod.

Conflict European Union

JULY 11, 2024 | 3:45 PM ET

The Washington summit shows just how much the NATO-IP4 partnership has evolved

Marking the third consecutive year of attendance by Indo-Pacific Four (IP4) leaders at the NATO Summit, it is evident that this informal grouping is becoming a regular fixture of summit activities. Beyond the symbolic family photos, the substantive engagement is also evolving. With each summit, NATO and IP4 countries are presenting increasingly ambitious agendas for cooperation.

On the final day of the summit, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg opened the North Atlantic Council meeting by emphasizing the “strong and deepening cooperation” between NATO and the IP4. This commitment translated into the launch of four new joint projects aimed at enhancing collaboration on assistance to Ukraine, artificial intelligence, disinformation, and cybersecurity.

Furthermore, addressing one of the central themes of the Washington summit—strengthening the transatlantic defense industrial base to tackle challenges posed by Russia, China, North Korea, and Iran—there has been significant discussion about the potential for IP4 countries to co-produce weapons and engage in joint maintenance of military assets.

As an observer of Australian politics, I was particularly struck by the limited international attention given to Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese’s absence from the meeting, with Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Defence Richard Marles attending in his place. In Australia, this decision faced criticism for overlooking important geopolitical discussions, especially given that the gathering was intended to demonstrate that the world’s leading democracies stand united in their commitment to preserve the rules-based order.

A key question surrounding the future of the IP4 is whether there will be efforts to institutionalize this grouping in the coming years (although Stoltenberg stressed yesterday that NATO would not add Indo-Pacific members) and, of course, to evaluate the tangible outcomes based on the current plans for cooperation.

JULY 11, 2024 | 2:20 PM ET

Jake Sullivan previews the Ukraine Compact and takes stock of allied support for Kyiv

According to US National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan, the landscape of the conflict in Ukraine is “far different” today than it was in April, thanks to Ukraine’s battlefield progress and the various steps allies have made in support; and there’s more on the way, Sullivan said today at the NATO Public Forum.

“In a few hours, we’re going to make history again,” he said in a speech where he was introduced by Atlantic Council President and CEO Frederick Kempe, explaining that over twenty allies will be joining together to launch the Ukraine Compact, a commitment to develop Ukraine’s forces and to strengthen them into the 2030s. It “makes clear that we will continue to support Ukraine in this fight,” Sullivan argued, “and we will also help build this force so it can credibly deter and defend against future aggression.”

Sullivan spoke ahead of the NATO-Ukraine Council gathering and US President Joe Biden’s meeting with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy later today, during which the presidents will discuss the additional assistance needed to “get the job done,” as Sullivan put it.

@jakejsullivan: “Putin thinks he can outlast Ukraine and its supporters.”

He’s taken steps to put Russia’s entire economy on a wartime footing, he adds.

“But make no mistake, this unsustainable war spending masks underlying weakness and fragility.” #NATOPublicForum pic.twitter.com/DGFNUGu60H
— Atlantic Council (@AtlanticCouncil) July 11, 2024

But getting the job done will require adjusting to “an evolving battlefield,” Sullivan warned, as warfare is “transforming before our eyes” due to Russia’s efforts to expand its defense capabilities—with help from Iran, North Korea, and China—and innovations in both tactics and technology. “Already we’re working with Ukraine to solve some of the key technological challenges,” he said. “No one should bet against our collective advantage.”

The national security advisor took stock of all that allies and partners have done to support Ukraine, both on the military side (providing artillery, air defense systems, long-range missiles, and F-16 fighter jets) and on the diplomatic side (with the Group of Seven’s decision to tap Russian sovereign assets and with NATO’s “bridge” to membership for Ukraine).

“None of the progress that we’ve seen so far was inevitable. None of it happened by accident,” he said. It took NATO allies “coming together,” he explained, “to choose again and again to stand with [Ukraine] to defend the values that have always united us as democracies: Freedom, security, sovereignty, territorial integrity.

“This is what our predecessors did for seventy-five years, and this is what we all must do in the years ahead, even when it’s tough—in fact, especially when it’s tough.”

Read the full transcript

Transcript

Jul 11, 2024

The future of Europe, Ukraine, and the world order is not yet written, says the US national security advisor

By Atlantic Council

Nothing is inevitable, National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan said at the NATO Public Forum. “It comes down to the choices that we make and the choices that we make together.”

Europe & Eurasia NATO

JULY 11, 2024 | 11:14 AM ET

UK foreign secretary: Why NATO remains core to British security

Walking into King Charles Street for the first time as foreign secretary last Friday, I passed the bust of Ernest Bevin.

Seventy-five years on, the wisdom of Bevin’s approach is as clear as ever.

New Atlanticist

Jul 11, 2024

UK foreign secretary: Why NATO remains core to British security

By David Lammy

With a return of war to Europe and security threats rising, strengthening Britain’s relationships with its closest allies is firmly in the national interest, writes UK Foreign Secretary David Lammy.

NATO Politics & Diplomacy

JULY 11, 2024 | 9:17 AM ET

What to expect on day two: Focus on China and rallying behind Ukraine

An eventful second day of the Washington summit is underway. Heads of state will meet with Indo-Pacific partners, the European Union, and the European Commission, followed by a session of the NATO-Ukraine Council. With yesterday’s communiqué labeling China a “decisive enabler” of Russia’s war in Ukraine, expect China to feature prominently on the agenda during the discussions with Indo-Pacific partners. NATO-EU cooperation also received significant attention in the communiqué, with emphasis on ensuring European defense efforts are complementary and interoperable with NATO, avoiding unnecessary duplication. That is reminiscent of former US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright’s three “D’s” (no diminution of NATO, no discrimination, and no duplication) regarding European defense ambitions. As the European Union gradually emerges from its election cycle, the new Commission’s defense ambitions will be under particular scrutiny.

Allied leaders will also meet with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy during the NATO-Ukraine Council. Following yesterday’s announcement of a minimum baseline funding of forty billion euros within the next year, more air defense systems, and F-16s for Ukraine, discussions will focus on reaffirming that Ukraine’s future lies in NATO. Expect talks on speeding up aid, allowing the use of allied weapons for striking targets deeper in Russia, and adopting a more forceful stance in support of Ukraine.

JULY 10

Dispatch from the NATO Summit: Celebration—with a tinge of frustration and worry

Our experts read between the lines of NATO’s Washington summit communiqué

An exclusive look behind the scenes, courtesy of Philippe Dickinson

How Russian aggression is transforming European security

Beyond the Beltway, Americans’ support for NATO remains strong

Stoltenberg: If China continues enabling Russia, it can’t expect a “normal relationship” with NATO allies

What is Poland’s role in Euro-Atlantic security?

US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin on the ‘blunt military reality’ about NATO

A fond (and substantive) farewell from Stoltenberg

Biden’s and Stoltenberg’s rousing kickoff speeches should linger in leaders’ heads

Allies launch new initiative to aid Ukrainian servicewomen

What will NATO leaders make of Orbán’s “peace missions”?

See our previous analysis

JULY 10, 2024 | 8:01 PM ET

Dispatch from the NATO Summit: Celebration—with a tinge of frustration and worry

One day into the summit, there is already much to celebrate (beyond the Alliance’s seventy-five years, which of course is no small feat).

To receive our dispatches from the NATO Summit directly in your inbox, subscribe here.

JULY 10, 2024 | 6:48 PM ET

Our experts read between the lines of NATO’s Washington summit communiqué

New Atlanticist

Jul 10, 2024

Our experts read between the lines of NATO’s Washington summit communiqué

By Atlantic Council experts

Atlantic Council experts offer their insights on NATO’s Washington Summit Declaration, released on Wednesday during the Alliance’s seventy-fifth-anniversary meeting in the US capital.

China Europe & Eurasia

Watch our experts give their takes

JULY 10, 2024 | 3:51 PM ET

An exclusive look behind the scenes, courtesy of Philippe Dickinson

Deputy Director of the Atlantic Council’s Transatlantic Security Initiative Philippe Dickinson takes viewers behind the scenes of the NATO Public Forum, where allied leaders are discussing the issues at the top of NATO’s agenda.

Take a quick look behind the scenes at the #NATOPublicForum with @ACScowcroft’s @PhilGDickinson. #NATOSummit #1NATO75Years

Follow our live coverage and in-depth analysis here: https://t.co/Vn5ZdCofXG pic.twitter.com/y9FO849qvd
— Atlantic Council (@AtlanticCouncil) July 10, 2024

JULY 10, 2024 | 3:23 PM ET

How Russian aggression is transforming European security

Amid ongoing discussions on the nature of the “bridge” to Ukraine’s NATO membership, what should be the criteria for a successful Washington summit in terms of the Alliance’s support for Kyiv?

“Success is that [Russian President Vladimir] Putin makes a call to his defense minister and tells him to get out of Ukraine,” said Polish Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski today at the NATO Public Forum, where he was joined by Lithuanian Foreign Minister Gabrielus Landsbergis and Micael Johansson, the president and CEO of Saab, for a panel moderated by Atlantic Council Executive Vice President Jenna Ben-Yehuda.

In the more immediate future, NATO needs to give Ukraine “a very clear commitment” that “we are serious about the invitation,” Landsbergis said. Ultimately, though, Landsbergis echoed Sikorski’s answer on what constitutes success for the Alliance. “If it’s not a victory,” for Ukraine “then it’s a loss. If it’s a loss, it’s our loss,” not just Ukraine’s, he said.

Both Sikorski and Landsbergis cited their countries’ history and geography when noting their increases in defense spending. Landsbergis highlighted that in the Baltic region, “there is no big debate whether we should be funding our defense,” touting Lithuania’s commitment to spend 3 percent of its gross domestic product on defense. Sikorski added, “We will do whatever it takes not to be a Russian colony again, irrespective of what anybody else does.”

When it comes to the private sector’s role in bolstering European security, Johansson called Russia’s invasion of Ukraine a “huge wake-up call” for industry. Johansson noted that the European defense industry is “there to support” Ukraine, but outlined some of the obstacles to a better defense investment climate on the continent. One solution to this, he noted, would be for NATO to more clearly outline its capability requirements over a ten-to-fifteen-year timeframe to justify longer-term investments. He also argued that greater European Union (EU) defense investment would help persuade the European defense industry, whose leadership was shaped by a “peace dividend period,” that defense spending will remain high into the future.

While the Washington summit is focused on European security, Sikorski sees an emerging threat from Russia taking shape in Africa. “This business of Russian mercenaries taking over African resources” and destabilizing African nations “has to end.” To counter this threat, Sikorski recommended using an EU rapid reaction force, which he hopes will be operational in a few years. “We don’t need to beg the United States to solve every problem for us,” he said.

At the same time, Landsbergis emphasized that in the event of major global conflicts, neither the United States nor Europe could act effectively alone. “We need these two pillars of the transatlantic alliance working together,” he said.

Note: Saab is a corporate partner for the NATO Public Forum. More information on forum sponsors can be found here.

JULY 10, 2024 | 2:45 PM ET

Beyond the Beltway, Americans’ support for NATO remains strong

NATO is all over Washington, DC, this week. Rows of blue banners adorn lampposts announcing the summit. Heads of state and government have been spotted weaving through the streets in motorcades. On Monday, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg even threw out the opening pitch at a Nationals baseball game.

It would be easy in all this DC-based activity to overlook an important fact: Americans’ support for NATO extends well beyond the US capital. According to the latest polling among a nationwide sample of the US public by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs, a strong majority—67 percent—of Americans say NATO remains “essential” to US security. Chicago Council polling from last year shows that an even larger share, 78 percent, say the United States should increase or maintain its current support of the Alliance. Moreover, this support is broadly bipartisan, with 92 percent of Democrats and 68 percent of Republicans saying the United States should increase or maintain support.

Americans’ support for NATO extends across generations as well as across the political aisle. As the Chicago Council’s June poll reveals, 70 percent of Baby Boomers view NATO as “essential” to US security—but so do 67 percent of Generation Z, all of whom were born after the end of the Cold War. Three-quarters or more or respondents across generations—Silent, Baby Boomer, Generation X, Millennial, and Generation Z— told the Chicago Council last year that they favor maintaining or increasing the US commitment to NATO.

Finally, on the important question of NATO’s Article 5 collective-defense guarantee, majorities of respondents across all generations (though only a slim majority of Millennials) said last year that they would support US troops defending NATO allies Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia if Russia invaded. Many Americans, it seems, agree with what US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin said this morning: “NATO has always stood by us, and we’re going to stand by NATO.”

JULY 10, 2024 | 1:36 PM

Stoltenberg: If China continues enabling Russia, it can’t expect a “normal relationship” with NATO allies

“The paradox is that the stronger and the more we are committed [to] long-term support to Ukraine, the sooner this war can end,” NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg said on Wednesday.

Stoltenberg spoke with Atlantic Council President and Chief Executive Officer Frederick Kempe at the NATO Public Forum, saying that he expected allies to, within hours, agree on a “bridge” to NATO membership that aims to bring Ukraine’s defense systems and infrastructure closer to those in the Alliance. With the bridge in place, the hope is that once NATO extends an invitation to Ukraine, “they can become members straight away,” Stoltenberg said.

Stoltenberg said that Ukraine’s membership in NATO would help stop Russia’s “pattern of aggression”—in which it has violated ceasefire agreements and continued to illegally annex portions of Ukraine. “When the fighting stops, we need to ensure that Ukraine has the capabilities to deter future aggression from Russia, and they need security guarantees,” he explained. “And, of course, the best and strongest security guarantee will be Article 5.”

“The most critical task of this summit will be everything we will do and decide on Ukraine,” @NATO Secretary General @jensstoltenberg tells the Atlantic Council’s @FredKempe at the #NATOPublicForum.

Watch live: https://t.co/avdnQgKnzF pic.twitter.com/zAZR5sDBQ5
— Atlantic Council (@AtlanticCouncil) July 10, 2024

Stoltenberg said that “China is the main enabler” of Russia’s war in Ukraine, with China continuing to sell Russia tools and technology that Moscow is using to produce its weaponry. “If China continues, they cannot have it both ways,” Stoltenberg warned. “They cannot believe that they can have a kind of normal relationship with NATO allies . . . and then continue to fuel the war in Europe.”

One of the major developments over Stoltenberg’s decade as secretary general is closer engagement with the Alliance’s Indo-Pacific partners. “The threats and challenges that China poses to our security is a global challenge,” Stoltenberg argued, adding that the Alliance is facing more and more global challenges—from cyberwarfare to space-security threats. During the Washington summit, Stoltenberg said, NATO and its global partners are working on flagship projects related to technology and supporting Ukraine. Still, he stressed that NATO will not add Indo-Pacific members. “We will remain a regional alliance, but we need to work with our global partners . . . to address these global challenges.”

With a potential change in administrations raising concern about the United States’ role in NATO, Stoltenberg said he is “an optimist,” reminding the audience that over the course of NATO’s seventy-five years, similar concerns have cropped up as elections took place in various allied countries. But, he said, “we have proven extremely resilient and strong . . . all these different governments and politicians and parliamentarians—they realize that we are safer and stronger together.”

Read the full transcript

Transcript

Jul 10, 2024

‘I’m an optimist for the future of this Alliance,’ says NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg

By Atlantic Council

The outgoing NATO secretary general spoke with Atlantic Council President and CEO Frederick Kempe at the NATO Public Forum on July 10.

Defense Policy Europe & Eurasia

JULY 10, 2024 | 1:04 PM ET

What is Poland’s role in Euro-Atlantic security?

Atlantic Council Fellow Rachel Rizzo sits down with Szymon Hołownia, marshal of Poland’s Sejm, to discuss the role of Poland in Europe, expectations for the NATO summit, and the implications of the US election for relations with Washington.

JULY 10, 2024 | 12:56 PM ET

US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin on the ‘blunt military reality’ about NATO

“I’ve never seen NATO stronger or more united than it is today,” US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin said at the NATO Public Forum this morning. “And we are determined to keep it that way.”

To help keep it that way, the US defense secretary outlined an “ambitious” agenda that heads of state and government from NATO’s thirty-two allies would tackle at the Washington summit this week.

America is stronger, safer, and more secure with our allies, says @SecDef Lloyd Austin at the #NATOPublicForum.

“Any attempt to undermine @NATO only undermines American security,” he adds

Watch more: https://t.co/avdnQgKnzF pic.twitter.com/EgVuWGL9Tt
— Atlantic Council (@AtlanticCouncil) July 10, 2024

First, Austin said, the Alliance will continue to implement its so-called “family of plans” to ensure the defense of “every inch” of NATO. This “family” includes (as the Atlantic Council’s Luka Ignac has explained) three regional defense strategies for the Alliance covering the Atlantic and European Arctic, the Baltic region and Central Europe, and the Mediterranean and Black seas. It also includes an array of subordinate plans covering areas such as cyber and space. Austin called this new defensive strategy for the Alliance the “most robust since the Cold War.”

Second, NATO allies will pledge this week to expand industrial capacity across the Alliance. This is intended to help scale up much-needed military production and to send signals to industry as it makes long-term decisions about where to focus its attention and resources.

Third, NATO this week aims to deepen its cooperation in support of Ukraine’s self-defense, Austin said. This includes a new effort by the Alliance to help coordinate some aspects of security assistance and training for Ukraine.

Austin was unequivocal in his condemnation of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s “imperial invasion” of Ukraine. He likened it to the “sickening blow of unprovoked aggression” that US President Harry S. Truman, referencing the first and second world wars, spoke about at the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty in 1949. “We will not be dragged into Putin’s reckless war of choice,” Austin said. “But we will stand by Ukraine as it fights for its sovereignty and security,” he added, noting that F-16 fighter aircraft were at that moment on their way to Ukrainian forces.

Fourth, Austin said that the Alliance will seek to deepen cooperation with partners in the Indo-Pacific and around the world. “I know that we’re all troubled by China’s support for Putin’s war against Ukraine,” Austin said. “That just reminds us of the profound links between Euro-Atlantic security and Indo-Pacific security.” This is the third year in a row that leaders of Japan and South Korea are attending the annual NATO Summit.

Austin’s speech underscored the wide-ranging nature of the challenges that the Alliance faces today. As Atlantic Council President and CEO Frederick Kempe said when introducing Austin, “The secretary of defense is facing more simultaneous challenges than perhaps any predecessor.”

The room was filled with visitors from across the Alliance and the world. But Austin saved his final words for an audience closer to home: Americans.

“Here’s the blunt military reality,” said a man who spent forty-one years in uniform before becoming US secretary of defense. “America is stronger with our allies. America is safer with our allies. And America is more secure with our allies.

“And any attempt to undermine NATO only undermines American security.”

Read the full transcript

Transcript

Jul 10, 2024

Any attempt to undermine NATO undermines US security, says Lloyd Austin

By Atlantic Council

At the Washington summit, Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin discussed NATO’s history and the Alliance’s plans to bolster support for Ukraine.

Defense Policy Europe & Eurasia

JULY 10, 2024 | 12:30 PM ET

A fond (and substantive) farewell from Stoltenberg

Outgoing NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg was first up after the coffee break at the NATO Public Forum this morning. Appearing in conversation with Atlantic Council President and CEO Frederick Kempe, Stoltenberg came on stage caffeinated and animated, sitting forward in his chair, joking about his first pitch at the Washington Nationals game earlier this week and reminiscing on his longevity in the role.

His main announcement was the (likely) five-pillared package of support for Ukraine that he expected to be announced at the summit, comprising of:

Institutionalized assistance to Ukraine, in the form of a new command in Wiesbaden, Germany, staffed with seven hundred NATO personnel to coordinate training and assistance to Ukraine;
A new “substantial” long-term aid package to Kyiv;
Additional military support, including air defense systems and F-16 fighter jets that US Secretary of State Antony Blinken announced were currently being transferred to Ukraine;
At least twenty bilateral security agreements between Ukraine and NATO members;
Enhanced interoperability between NATO and Ukraine.

Reflecting on his involvement with NATO summits dating back to 2001, the secretary general projected an optimistic tone for the future of the Alliance. He has made incredible contributions to NATO over those twenty-three years. And the mutual affection was evident in the room, with a warm and prolonged standing ovation to send him on his way back across the street to the summit.

JULY 10, 2024 | 10:35 AM ET

Biden’s and Stoltenberg’s rousing kickoff speeches should linger in leaders’ heads

Sitting in the auditorium where NATO was born for Tuesday night’s official opening for the NATO Summit, it was hard not to be inspired by the unity and symbolism on display. NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg gave one of the most forceful speeches of his career. “Everyone in this room has a responsibility, as political leaders, as experts, as citizens,” he said. “We must show the same courage and determination in the future, as was demonstrated in the past when NATO was founded and shaped.”

Stoltenberg was followed by an equally passionate address from US President Joe Biden, who announced a donation of new air defenses for Ukraine and awarded the Presidential Medal of Freedom to Stoltenberg. Biden also extolled the virtues of the Alliance, pointing out how polls show that Americans in both parties back NATO. “And the American people understand what would happen if there was no NATO: Another war in Europe, American troops fighting and dying, dictators spreading chaos, economic collapse, catastrophe,” Biden said. “Americans, they know we’re stronger with our friends. And we understand this is a sacred obligation.”

Both leaders gave it their all. Now that the celebration is over, the hard work begins. Friendship, as both leaders noted, takes work, but we are ultimately stronger for it. Defending our shared future requires Europe to step up and do more on deterrence and defense, alongside the United States. As the summit continues, Biden’s and Stoltenberg’s words should be ringing in their fellow leaders’ ears.

Humbled and honored to be in the Mellon Auditorium to watch POTUS and other Heads of State officially mark the 75th anniversary of @NATO #TheRoomWhereItHappened #NATOSummit pic.twitter.com/moSCgX0I8w
— Sara Bjerg Moller (@sb_moller) July 9, 2024

JULY 10, 2024 | 10:01 AM ET

Allies launch new initiative to aid Ukrainian servicewomen

Yesterday, the NATO Secretary General’s Special Representative for Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) Irene Fellin and the US State Department co-hosted a WPS roundtable, one of only two official side events at the Washington summit. A dedicated event focused on advancing WPS at NATO has become a fixture of the past three summits. But this WPS roundtable was different.

As Russia continues its war of aggression against Ukraine with no end in sight, allies reaffirmed their commitment to the WPS agenda. But this year, several allies put their words into action by funding ten thousand specialized gear sets for women in the Ukrainian armed forces. This initiative was supported by the United States with financial contributions through NATO’s comprehensive assistance package for Ukraine from Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, North Macedonia, and Norway. For allies that want to do more for WPS and Ukraine but have minimal resources to contribute, funding for women’s gear for the Ukrainian armed forces costs a small fraction of the forty billion euros in military aid that allies have pledged to Ukraine in the coming year. NATO should certainly celebrate this win, since ill-fitting gear has placed Ukrainian servicewomen at increased risk of injury on the battlefield.

As NATO launches its plan for Ukraine’s “bridge to membership” this week, funding gear for women in the Ukrainian armed forces will remain a low-cost, high-impact effort that puts allied commitments for both WPS and Ukraine into action. That said, allies must also remember that this is one of several options on the table for advancing WPS within their continued support to Ukraine. It will be interesting to see how committed allies will be to including WPS considerations within efforts to shore up Ukraine’s defense capabilities, institution building, and military interoperability over the next year.

JULY 10, 2024 | 8:31 AM ET

What will NATO leaders make of Orbán’s “peace missions”?

May you live in interesting times, the old saying goes, but what about living in the weirdest of times? Reflecting the strangeness of the current situation in international politics, one of the leaders of NATO arrived in Washington on Tuesday to attend the Alliance’s historic summit straight from visiting the capitals of NATO’s main adversaries, and just shortly after criticizing NATO and its leaders for being “pro-war” in a Newsweek op-ed.

Less than a week into holding the rotating presidency of the European Union (EU), Hungary’s prime minister, Viktor Orbán, has been jet-setting around the world to meet Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, Russian President Vladimir Putin, and Chinese leader Xi Jinping, purportedly on a “peace mission” to help negotiate the ending of the war in Ukraine. In Beijing, Orbán endorsed Xi’s twelve-point peace plan for Ukraine and highlighted that Hungary will use the EU presidency “as an opportunity to actively promote the sound development of EU-China relations,” i.e. to de-escalate EU-China trade tensions and to reverse the shift to de-risking.

EU, US, and NATO leaders have been quick to condemn Orbán for his visits to Moscow and Beijing, with the representatives of the European Union also fuming at the suggestion that the Hungarian leader negotiated as “the president of the EU.”

Orbán landed in Washington with NATO allies planning to give Ukraine the necessary help for its self-defense and a “bridge to NATO membership” by setting up a new NATO command in charge of supplying arms and military aid to Kyiv.

One of the big questions swirling around the Washington summit, then, is how much further allied leaders will go in responding to one of their own going completely rogue. Another is whether Orbán will sign off at the summit on more support for Ukraine in a war that has just seen some of its bloodiest days.

But it’s worth noting that none of this is terribly new. Since the breakout of Putin’s war, Hungary has opposed Western support for Ukraine and refused to provide weapons or allow other countries to transport weapons to Ukraine through Hungarian territory. Under Orbán’s leadership, Hungary has oriented its foreign policy around Russian and Chinese interests since 2014, doing the two powers’ bidding inside the European Union and NATO and becoming increasingly hostile to the leaders of the United States and the EU. For a NATO ally, Hungary’s behavior has been strange for quite a while, but these days we are seeing even stranger things.

JULY 9

Dispatch from the NATO Summit: Learn from front-line allies

How NATO can prove its enduring relevance at the Washington summit

A Nordic-Baltic message to Washington: Future-proofing NATO begins in Ukraine

So what’s the strategy for NATO?

NATO needs a strategy to address Russia’s arctic expansion

Inflection Points Today: The split screens haunting the NATO Summit

For NATO, this summit is more than an anniversary—it’s a homecoming

Dispatch from Madrid: For Spain’s contributions to NATO, look beyond its defense spending

The NSC’s Michael Carpenter details Ukraine’s “bridge to membership”

See our pre-summit analysis

JULY 9, 2024 | 6:31 PM ET

Dispatch from the NATO Summit: Learn from front-line allies

In my past job as a NATO official, I helped prepare for several of these summits, but none of them was quite like this one. This summit needs to deliver strong outcomes—not only because it’s the Alliance’s seventy-fifth anniversary, but also because we are in Washington (with the US presidential race heating up) and the world is proving more and more volatile, dangerous, and uncertain.

That’s probably weighing heavily on the allied leaders who are crowding Andrew W. Mellon Auditorium this evening for the official summit opening, hosted by US President Joe Biden. For several of those officials—specifically eight from Nordic and Baltic countries—their first stop today was Atlantic Council headquarters, to discuss cooperation in NATO’s northeast.

It is the easternmost and northernmost allies—including my home of Lithuania, where I served as deputy defense minister—that intimately understand the nature of the Russian threat. Because of that common understanding, these countries demand more from themselves: All of them (except Iceland, which doesn’t have a standing military) exceed the NATO target of spending 2 percent of gross domestic product on defense.

The Nordic-Baltic agenda for the summit rests primarily on making sure the rest of the Alliance feels that sense of urgency. I’ll be watching closely to see whether NATO increases its defense budget targets and produces clarity on Ukraine’s path to joining the Alliance. But the Nordic-Baltic agenda also includes committing capabilities to implement NATO’s defense plans that were agreed to last year in Vilnius, and reaffirming US leadership in NATO while “future-proofing”—not just “Trump-proofing,” as many are saying—the Alliance with strong commitments from Europe.

The communiqué released at the end of this summit will include dozens of carefully written paragraphs agreed to by consensus. Yet eloquent writing cannot make up for a lack of concrete decisions on capabilities, Ukraine, and investments.

To receive our dispatches from the NATO Summit directly in your inbox, subscribe here.

JULY 9, 2024 | 5:32 PM ET

How NATO can prove its enduring relevance at the Washington summit

New Atlanticist

Public Event Tue, July 9, 2024 • 9:30 am ET

How NATO can prove its enduring relevance at the Washington summit

By Giedrimas Jeglinskas

Allies must do more to augment Ukraine’s warfighting capabilities and bring it into the Alliance, as well as boost their own spending on defense.

Europe & Eurasia NATO

JULY 9, 2024 | 4:05 PM ET

A Nordic-Baltic message to Washington: Future-proofing NATO begins in Ukraine

The security environment has changed in the Nordic and Baltic regions, not only with Sweden and Finland joining NATO, but also with the rise of cyber and information threats and with Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

“In a sense, it’s the old mission coming back with a vengeance,” said Norway’s foreign minister, Espen Barth Eide, at an Atlantic Council event on Tuesday. “And if we didn’t have NATO, we’d have to invent it immediately.”

Each of the eight Nordic and Baltic foreign ministers and senior officials gathered for the event agreed that they now feel safer with Sweden and Finland having joined the Alliance. Sweden’s foreign minister, Tobias Billström, noted that it was like a “coming home” for them, as joining NATO capped off a thirty-year process of growing closer to the Alliance. Political State Secretary of Finland Pasi Rajala said that joining has been a “big mind shift” for Finns, who have come to realize that they are “no longer alone” in defense.

@MFAEstonia’s Kyllike Sillaste-Elling: What the war in Ukraine has done is highlight the need to step up.

“We don’t have the luxury of waiting anymore,” she tells @NPRKelly at the Atlantic Council.

“We need to build up @NATO’s defense posture.” pic.twitter.com/Y2EAxR8f7Z
— Atlantic Council (@AtlanticCouncil) July 9, 2024

As Russia’s war in Ukraine rages on, several speakers argued, continued coordination with each other—and the United States—will be important. “The policy of Russia is war. It’s not going to go away for the next few years,” said Latvia’s foreign minister, Baiba Braže. “So the actions that we take in that regard . . . we need the US to be with us on that.”

As the NATO Summit begins in Washington, Braže said that she would remind the United States that “they have reliable allies” in NATO. “I think that is something that is very important to internalize for any leading American politician on any side of the aisle,” she said.

Iceland’s foreign minister, Thórdís Kolbrún Reykfjörd Gylfadóttir, agreed, saying that the United States also “needs to know that they need true friends and allies.” Rajala added that “NATO is not charity; it’s a two-way street.”

The prospect of former President Donald Trump’s return to office has raised concerns in Europe about the White House’s prioritization of NATO and support for Ukraine after the November elections. Lars Løkke Rasmussen—Denmark’s foreign minister—said that “instead of discussing whether we can ‘Trump-proof’ things, we should discuss whether we could future-proof things.” Lithuania’s foreign minister, Gabrielius Landsbergis, warned that focusing on “just an election” doesn’t answer the question of how allies will “meet this inflection point” in history marked by Russia’s aggression.

The war in Ukraine has “highlighted the need to step up,” Estonian Undersecretary for Political Affairs Kyllike Sillaste-Elling added. “We don’t have the luxury of waiting anymore. We need to build up NATO’s defense posture.” That can be done by spending more on defense, she added, and ensuring that NATO’s defense plans are able to be implemented.

Barth Eide argued that the Nordic and Baltic countries have a “responsibility” for maintaining American public support for the idea that backing Ukraine is important for global security. “Because if you live in Europe, it’s hard not to notice what’s happening in Russia. It might not be that obvious in the Midwest or in the deep South of America, we understand that,” he said. “We should also be part of that conversation that this is a good investment for you.”

Watch the full event

The Nordic-Baltic region: Cooperation in NATO’s northeast

A virtual discussion on Nordic-Baltic priorities for the Washington Summit, their contributions to NATO security, and Northern Europe’s perspective on alliance challenges.

Europe & Eurasia NATO Northern Europe Security & Defense

JULY 9, 2024 | 1:56 PM ET

So what’s the strategy for NATO?

Host Matthew Kroenig dives into NATO’s effectiveness and strategic posture, with the help of Benedetta Berti, the head of policy planning in the Office of the Secretary General at NATO.

Watch the full episode on ACTV.

JULY 9, 2024 | 1:07 PM ET

NATO needs a strategy to address Russia’s Arctic expansion

This week, NATO is holding its landmark seventy-fifth anniversary summit. The Washington, DC, event is expected to focus on trade security, the war in Ukraine, and the organization’s greatest adversary, Russia. This comes on the heels of news that a record twenty-three out of thirty-two NATO countries will reach the Alliance’s defense spending target of 2 percent of gross domestic product this year, according to NATO statistics published on June 17. This increase in spending is in large part a direct response to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

At the same time, the danger Russia poses extends well beyond Eastern Europe. The Washington summit provides the Alliance an opportune moment to develop a strategy to address Russia’s growing, and unsettling, Arctic presence, which is connected with Moscow’s complex cooperation with China in the region and with new sea lanes opening due to accelerated ice melting in the region.

Russia has long viewed the Arctic as a crucial source of income, national pride, and strategic importance. The Russian military has continued to establish an outsized Arctic presence even during its war in Ukraine, now consisting of the Northern Fleet, nuclear submarines, radar stations, airfields, and missile facilities. A large share of this presence is concentrated in the Kola Peninsula, near NATO allies Finland, Sweden, and Norway. According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies, Russia operates one-third more military bases in the Arctic Circle than all NATO members put together.

New Atlanticist

NATO needs a strategy to address Russia’s Arctic expansion

By David Babikian and Julia Nesheiwat

The Washington summit this week provides the perfect moment for the Alliance to forge an even more unified approach to the future of security in the High North.

Geopolitics & Energy Security Maritime Security

JULY 9, 2024 | 12:49 PM ET

Inflection Points Today: The split screens haunting the NATO Summit

Inflection Points Today

Putin, Xi, Orbán, and Modi provide a disturbing backdrop to the start of the NATO Summit

By Frederick Kempe

The split screens haunting the NATO Summit include a deadly attack on a children’s hospital and meetings with autocrats in Moscow and Beijing.

China Europe & Eurasia

JULY 9, 2024 | 12:47 PM ET

For NATO, this summit is more than an anniversary—it’s a homecoming

This evening, US President Joe Biden will host heads of state and government, minister-level officials, and civil-society and private-sector representatives to officially open the NATO Summit. But it’s not only the attendees and the reason for gathering that give this event its monumental significance—it’s also the venue.

In recognition of NATO’s seventy-fifth anniversary, the White House selected the historic Andrew W. Mellon Auditorium as the location for tonight’s occasion. At that site seventy-five years ago (or more specifically, on April 4, 1949) then US President Harry S. Truman convened with eleven allies—Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, and the United Kingdom—in signing the historic North Atlantic Treaty, enshrining the principals of collective defense and transforming the global order in the aftermath of World War II.

Since then, the world has changed dramatically. In seventy-five years, NATO now includes thirty-two highly capable allies committed to transatlantic cooperation. Defense investments are at record-breaking highs with two-thirds of NATO member states now reaching the spending benchmark of 2 percent of their gross domestic product. The Alliance is deepening its ties with partners in the Indo-Pacific to protect the rules-based international order and counter rising cooperation between Russia and its allies.

In many ways, tonight will be a homecoming for the Alliance—one that marks an important milestone for NATO and offers allied leaders the opportunity to reflect on seventy-five years of expanding coordination on deterrence and defense.

JULY 9, 2024 | 12:03 PM ET

Dispatch from Madrid: For Spain’s contributions to NATO, look beyond its defense spending

NATO’s recent defense expenditure report was a cringeworthy moment in Madrid. Despite self-applauding recent years of defense spending growth, Spain had the unenviable distinction of ranking dead last among Alliance members for defense expenditures as a share of gross domestic product (GDP), clocking in at an estimated 1.28 percent for 2024. Although consistently investing in equipment expenditures at or above the NATO guideline of 20 percent of its defense budget, Spain’s inability to spend on defense at a rate agreed upon by allies will lend credence to naysayers who question its commitment to the Alliance.

However, while Spain unambiguously falls short of the 2 percent of GDP metric, a careful look at Madrid’s commitment to transatlantic security shows that Spain not only actively participates in the Alliance’s military operations, it also enthusiastically leads NATO missions and supports Ukraine while helping guard Europe’s southern flank.

New Atlanticist

Public Event Mon, July 8, 2024 • 2:30 pm ET

Dispatch from Madrid: For Spain’s contributions to NATO, look beyond its defense spending

By Andrew Bernard

While Spain still falls short of its defense spending goals, Madrid nevertheless leads NATO missions, supports Ukraine, and helps guard Europe’s southern flank.

Defense Industry Defense Policy

JULY 9, 2024 | 9:15 AM ET

The NSC’s Michael Carpenter details Ukraine’s “bridge to membership”

On the eve of the NATO Summit, US National Security Council’s Michael Carpenter broke down one of the summit’s biggest expected outcomes on Monday at the Atlantic Council: Ukraine’s “bridge to membership.”

“We have a meaty, solid deliverable for Ukraine” that includes support for training and force development, a new senior civilian representative in Kyiv, and bilateral financial pledges, Carpenter explained. “We want Ukraine to have the capabilities, the readiness, to be able to essentially plug and play with the rest of the Alliance on day one when they get the invitation.”

@mikercarpenter: We have a solid deliverable for Ukraine.

It’s called the NATO Security Assistance and Training for Ukraine, he tells @CMcBinDC at the Atlantic Council.

“This is not a substitute or quasi-membership action plan,” he explains. pic.twitter.com/u4fmQM6AMN
— Atlantic Council (@AtlanticCouncil) July 8, 2024

Carpenter appeared at a curtain-raiser event held by the Atlantic Council’s Transatlantic Security Initiative. He spoke alongside Benedetta Berti, head of policy planning at NATO, and Matthew Kroenig, vice president and senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has made clear that “spending in defense is not a luxury,” but rather it “is incredibly essential,” Berti said. In preparing for “resourcing our defense plans,” she explained, “a number of countries” will need to spend more than 2 percent of their gross domestic product on defense. But “the trajectory is positive,” she said; “they understand that 2 percent truly is the bottom, the bare minimum.”

Ahead of US elections in November, the prospect of a new administration is raising concerns about the United States’ role in NATO. Kroenig noted that while former President Donald Trump has had “some tough words” for NATO allies, so too did former Democratic administrations. He then pointed to a study that found broad support for NATO across the US political spectrum. “The support for NATO is bipartisan and strong,” he said, “stronger than some people might think looking at the headlines.”

Watch the full event

All eyes on Washington: What to expect at the 2024 NATO Summit

A discussion on the priorities, essential deliverables and the most important messages for the Washington Summit.

PRE-SUMMIT ANALYSIS

Dispatch from the NATO Summit: What to watch this week, beyond the political fireworks

Memo to NATO leaders: Why and how NATO countries should engage in the Indo-Pacific

Who’s at 2 percent? Look how NATO allies have increased their defense spending since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

The three items at the top of NATO’s summit agenda

What to expect at the NATO Summit in Washington

Inflection Points: The NATO Summit faces three simultaneous threats

The US and Europe would be safer with Ukraine in NATO. Our war games showed why.
See our earlier analysis and insight

JULY 8, 2024 | 5:32 PM ET

Dispatch from the NATO Summit: What to watch this week, beyond the political fireworks

Just last week, the roads in Washington were packed with fireworks-seeking Americans celebrating the Fourth of July. Now, several downtown roads are closed and NATO flags wave in the rare breeze. Thanks to the many workers who toiled in baking heat, this city is ready for the NATO Summit.

Washington is hosting the summit for the first time since 1999—a geopolitical lifetime ago. This year is NATO’s seventy-fifth anniversary, and there is a sense of anticipation that this could be a make-or-break summit for the Alliance.

There will be a lot of focus on politics—and not just because the summit is taking place in politics-obsessed Washington (where residents form long lines outside bars for presidential-debate watch parties). One of NATO’s major goals will be to project unity. On this front, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s unexpected trips to Moscow and Beijing in recent days haven’t helped.

Ukraine and the defining question of its future membership in NATO will test the display of unity. The White House has talked about building a “bridge to membership” for Ukraine. At Atlantic Council headquarters this afternoon, the US National Security Council’s Mike Carpenter hinted at what that bridge would be made of: financial pledges, numerous bilateral security agreements, and a new senior NATO civilian post in Kyiv.

But NATO is a military alliance as well as a political one. Tangible progress on military planning efforts might not get the headlines, but it will be consequential for NATO’s ability to deter aggression. NATO nerds will be keeping an eye out for how the Alliance operationalizes NATO’s regional plans, develops its multi-domain warfighting abilities, reforms its command-and-control structure, and refines how allied militaries quickly work together in a crisis.

As a co-host of the NATO Public Forum, the Atlantic Council will be at the heart of the action, guiding allied leaders and senior officials in conversations about the top issues on the agenda.

To receive our dispatches from the NATO Summit directly in your inbox, subscribe here.

JULY 8, 2024 | 2:37 PM ET

Memo to NATO leaders: Why and how NATO countries should engage in the Indo-Pacific

Though all eyes will be on Ukraine as NATO leaders gather in Washington this week, the Alliance cannot afford to ignore the Indo-Pacific. The United States and its allies face what is perhaps the most daunting international security environment since World War II. Revisionist autocracies—China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran—are working together to disrupt and displace the US-led, rules-based international system, including through military aggression and coercion. The challenge facing the free world, therefore, is how to simultaneously counter multiple adversaries in Europe and the Indo-Pacific.

Some analysts argue that the United States should disengage from Europe and pivot to the Indo-Pacific, while European countries take on greater responsibility in Europe, but this is the wrong answer. Instead, Washington should continue to lead in both theaters. European countries should take on greater responsibilities for defending Europe, but they should also assist Washington to counter China and address threats emanating from the Indo-Pacific . . .

We propose the following actions for NATO and its constituent members to bolster cooperation with Indo-Pacific partners and build around US efforts to secure the Indo-Pacific region. Some of these initiatives are already underway, but there is room to both intensify these activities and expand them to include fuller participation from additional transatlantic partners.

Read their recommendations

Memo to…

Jul 8, 2024

Memo to NATO leaders: Why and how NATO countries should engage in the Indo-Pacific

By Matthew Kroenig, Jeffrey Cimmino

NATO and its constituent members must bolster cooperation with Indo-Pacific partners and build around existing US efforts to secure the Indo-Pacific region.

Europe & Eurasia Indo-Pacific

JULY 8, 2024 | 12:55 PM ET

Who’s at 2 percent? Look how NATO allies have increased their defense spending since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

This week, NATO allies will gather in Washington DC, to mark the seventy-fifth anniversary of the Alliance. Many of those allies have historically failed to meet the NATO target, set in 2014, of allocating 2 percent of their gross domestic product (GDP) to defense, even as the United States in particular has pushed for more defense investment for the sake of burden sharing across the Alliance. However, this year, a record number of countries have stepped up. Out of the thirty-two NATO allies, twenty-three now meet the 2 percent target, up from just six countries in 2021.

This surge in defense spending follows Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. The war in Ukraine has prompted an unprecedented 18 percent increase in defense spending this year among NATO allies across Europe and Canada. In total, NATO countries now meet the 2 percent target, together spending 2.71 percent of their GDP on defense. This creates positive momentum and success to build on for the Washington summit, which is expected to highlight the Alliance’s collective strength and focus on deeper integration with Ukraine.

Poland stands out as the biggest spender, allocating 4.12 percent of its GDP to defense. Sweden has also increased its defense spending dramatically since the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine. The Washington summit will witness Sweden’s first participation in a NATO summit as an official NATO member, following its accession in March. 

As NATO celebrates its seventy-fifth anniversary, the large increase in defense spending can help renew the Alliance’s unity and strength to continue supporting Ukraine and be prepared for the future.

JULY 8, 2024 | 12:36 PM ET

The three items at the top of NATO’s summit agenda

What is expected to come out of the #NATOSummit?

“There are three big things on the agenda,” @FredKempe tells @CNBC:

1⃣Deterrence and defense
2⃣Ukraine
3⃣China and the Indo-Pacific pic.twitter.com/nCELKA6PSr
— Atlantic Council (@AtlanticCouncil) July 8, 2024

Atlantic Council President and CEO Frederick Kempe joins CNBC to outline what he expects allied leaders will tackle at the summit: deterrence and defense, Ukraine’s path forward with NATO, and the Alliance’s relationship with its Indo-Pacific partners.

JULY 8, 2024 | 12:18 PM ET

What to expect at the NATO Summit in Washington

Our experts Ian Brzezinski, Kristen Taylor, and Ryan Arick break down what to expect as allies gather this week: new defense plans, efforts to step up defense-industry production, support for Ukraine, and more.

JULY 8, 2024 | 7:05 AM ET

Inflection Points: The NATO Summit faces three simultaneous threats

Amid the noise accompanying NATO’s seventy-fifth anniversary summit in Washington this week—with the backdrop of growing concerns over US President Joe Biden’s health—you can be excused if you missed last week’s meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) in Kazakhstan.

The SCO’s ten member countries, led by China and Russia, reached twenty-five agreements on enhancing cooperation in energy, security, trade, finance, and information security, including the adoption of something expansively called the “Initiative on World Unity for Just Peace, Harmony, and Development.”

Western leaders often roll their eyes at the lofty language and empty agreements of the SCO, which was invented in 2001. However, it would be a mistake to ignore the intention behind the SCO’s ambition to be a counterweight to NATO and a piece of Chinese leader Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin’s larger goals to supplant the existing global order of rules and institutions with something more to their own liking . . .

Even if one sets the SCO meeting entirely to the side, NATO leaders this week confront three simultaneous but underestimated threats, none of them explicitly on their agenda.

These threats are: (1) considerably increased coordination, particularly in the defense-industrial realm, among adversarial autocracies; (2) continued and growing weaknesses among democracies (underscored in the Atlantic Council’s newest edition of its Freedom and Prosperity Indexes); and (3) insufficient recognition among NATO’s thirty-two members of the gravity of the historic moment, reflected in their still-inadequate backing for Ukraine.

“Like a lightning strike illuminating a dim landscape,” wrote Jonathan Rauch in the Atlantic last week, “the twin invasions of Israel and Ukraine have brought a sudden recognition: What appeared to be, until now, disparate and disorganized challenges to the United States and its allies is actually something broader, more integrated, more aggressive, and more dangerous.”

Inflection Points

Jul 8, 2024

The NATO Summit faces three simultaneous threats

By Frederick Kempe

Autocracies’ growing common cause, democracies’ continued weaknesses, and an insufficient recognition of the gravity of the historic moment confront the Alliance as it meets in Washington.

Central Asia China

JULY 7, 2024 | 10:13 PM ET

The US and Europe would be safer with Ukraine in NATO. Our war games showed why.

The NATO Summit will take place in Washington, DC, this week, marking the seventy-fifth anniversary of history’s most successful military alliance. A major topic of the summit will be Russia’s war in Ukraine and Ukraine’s future relationship to the Alliance. Some believe that it is risky to talk about Ukraine joining NATO any time soon, but, on the contrary, the free world would be much safer with Ukraine in the Alliance. Membership for Ukraine would be fundamental for lasting peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area, benefiting both Ukraine and NATO.

At the 2008 NATO Summit in Bucharest, Romania, NATO members declared that Ukraine would join the Alliance at some unspecified point in the future. At last year’s summit in Vilnius, Lithuania, following Russia’s brutal 2022 invasion of Ukraine, the allies reaffirmed their 2008 commitment, adding the tautological qualifier that they would only “extend an invitation to Ukraine to join the Alliance when Allies agree and conditions are met.”

This year, the Alliance is expected to offer Ukraine a “bridge to membership,” which will consist of a number of measures meant to strengthen Ukraine. These measures are expected to include NATO’s stepped-up role in coordinating military assistance and pledging long-term support, as well as individual Alliance members promising investments in Ukraine’s defense industrial base and further development of bilateral security agreements. However, these steps still fall well short of an invitation to join the Alliance.

Hesitancy to extend an invitation to join the Alliance stems mostly from a concern about what Ukrainian membership would mean for the security of existing NATO allies, including the United States. Would an invitation be provocative to Russia and set off a new cycle of escalation? What does it mean to extend a NATO Article 5 security guarantee to a country already in conflict, and would this be tantamount to a NATO declaration of war against Russia? Even if the current conflict dies down, creating space for Ukraine to join the Alliance, Russian President Vladimir Putin is unlikely to abandon his deep desire to reconquer Ukraine. Would not a future Russian attack on Ukraine set off a direct NATO-Russia war?

To help answer these questions, the Atlantic Council, in partnership with the Estonian foreign ministry, conducted a series of major tabletop exercises this spring that brought together dozens of leading experts, including current US and allied government officials, to examine future Russia-Ukraine conflict scenarios and their implications for Western security. Some exercises were set in the near future, after Ukraine had already joined NATO, while others gamed out the process of Ukraine joining NATO. The scenarios included variants in which Ukraine had succeeded in taking back all of its territory, and others in which parts of the country remained occupied by Russia.

The results of the exercises were unequivocal: Europe is more stable and secure with Ukraine in NATO.

New Atlanticist

Jul 7, 2024

The US and Europe would be safer with Ukraine in NATO. Our war games showed why.

By Matthew Kroenig and Kristjan Prikk

The Atlantic Council recently held a series of tabletop exercises to examine future Russia-Ukraine conflict scenarios and their implications for Western security. The results are clear.

Europe & Eurasia NATO

GEARING UP

NATO’s Irene Fellin: The inclusion of women, peace, and security in its plans may be the Alliance’s biggest achievement
Dispatch from Warsaw: Poland’s military and economic rise is coming just in time, as the West wobbles

Why Washington must take the opportunity of the NATO Summit to reengage with Turkey

This NATO Summit will be of historic importance

Smart in sixty seconds: Why NATO matters

JULY 5, 2024 | 4:21 PM ET

NATO’s Irene Fellin: The inclusion of women, peace, and security in its plans may be the Alliance’s biggest achievement

We sat down with Irene Fellin, NATO’s special representative for women, peace, and security (WPS), to talk about why implementing the WPS agenda is important for the Alliance’s goals and future.

JULY 5, 2024 | 3:51 PM ET

Dispatch from Warsaw: Poland’s military and economic rise is coming just in time, as the West wobbles

WARSAW, Poland—After ten days in Warsaw, I’m struck by Poland’s rise, politically and militarily—even amid the dangers the country faces from Russia and Poles’ intensified post-debate doubts about the steadiness of the United States.

Poland’s strategic consensus—in support of Ukraine, opposed to Russia’s aggression, pro-NATO, and committed to its alliance with the United States—is solid, notwithstanding second-order (and avoidable) sniping between the governing coalition and the rightist opposition that controls the presidency. That’s more than can be said for France or, for that matter, the United States.

Poland’s dark assessment of President Vladimir Putin’s Russia has been vindicated. But the Poles are not indulging in declinist pessimism or Ukraine fatigue. Poland’s best analysts, including those within Warsaw’s top-notch Center for Eastern Studies, are more optimistic about the course of the war in Ukraine than I have heard in a long time. They don’t foresee easy Ukrainian success, but their bottom line is that time is no longer necessarily on the Kremlin’s side—if the West keeps up the pressure. Relative success for Ukraine is possible, the analysts maintain, if—though only if—the West keeps backing Ukraine by delivering more weapons with fewer conditions, tightening economic pressure against Russia, and generally pushing back on Putin’s imperial ambitions. (I’d come to Poland for the Atlantic Council’s “Warsaw Week” events and a Warsaw University conference on how to deter Russia.)

In a good precedent for Germany, France, and the United Kingdom, Poland’s military spending started to rise sharply under the previous government, and that trend has continued under the current one. Newly purchased heavy equipment, tanks, and fighter aircraft are arriving to replace tanks and aircraft that Poland sent to Ukraine shortly after the full-scale Russian invasion in February 2022.

But the West, the key institutions of which Poland joined at great effort, is no longer looking as sure as Poland had counted on. The June 27 debate between President Joe Biden and former President Donald Trump came as a shock to the Poles, who, like many, had not expected such a poor showing from Biden. The next day, many Poles were more openly contemplating the increased possibility of a second Trump term and weighing Poland’s options if the former president were to return to the White House. Trump’s more critical statements about NATO and friendly statements about Putin alarm many in Warsaw. But Polish politicians on both sides of the country’s political divide have good relations with many US Republicans both inside and outside Trump world, including Trump himself. They are now considering how to use these relationships to advance Poland’s customary “free world first” strategy.

New Atlanticist

Jul 5, 2024

Dispatch from Warsaw: Poland’s military and economic rise is coming just in time, as the West wobbles

By Daniel Fried

Its rise at home and its strategic clarity about Russia have placed Poland in the first rank of European powers for the first time in centuries.

NATO Poland

JULY 5, 2024 | 1:19 PM ET

Why Washington must take the opportunity of the NATO Summit to reengage with Turkey

From July 9 to 11, the United States will host the NATO Summit in Washington, marking the seventy-fifth anniversary of what has been deemed by some as the world’s “most successful military alliance.” While the summit will mark an important milestone in NATO’s history, it will also provide an opportunity to discuss the future of the Alliance and for high-level officials to engage in discussions about boosting defense and deterrence in the most dangerous security environment since the Cold War.

Among those attending the summit will be Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. Turkey has been a major contributor to NATO’s operations around the world since it joined the Alliance in 1952 to defend itself and NATO’s southeastern flank against the Soviet threat. Today, as the Alliance’s second-largest military power and the gatekeeper of the straits connecting the Black Sea to the Mediterranean, Turkey plays a critical role in European stability and security. However, the complex nature of Ankara’s relationship with Washington and a lack of dialogue between the allies have often overshadowed the successes in the transatlantic partnership and limited opportunities for cooperation.

US Ambassador to Turkey Jeff Flake recently said that the NATO Summit provides an opportunity for a meeting between Erdoğan and US President Joe Biden, as “there is some desire on both sides” to do so. It remains unclear, however, whether this meeting will take place. Erdoğan’s previously scheduled visit to the White House in May was canceled due to scheduling problems, as cited by both sides, and Flake said it happened at a time when the crisis in Gaza cast a “difficult political backdrop.”

Despite that backdrop, Biden and Erdoğan shouldn’t let another opportunity to meet go to waste, as close cooperation would bring to bear several geopolitical, economic, and security benefits.

TURKEYSource

Jul 5, 2024

Why Washington must take the opportunity of the NATO Summit to reengage with Turkey

By Yevgeniya Gaber

Strengthening relations between the US and Turkey will be critical for the future of the Alliance’s regional defense strategies.

Conflict Eastern Europe

JULY 5, 2024 | 11:54 AM ET

This NATO Summit will be of historic importance

At this new time of global turmoil, NATO stands as a beacon of hope for freedom, democracy, and human rights, explains Atlantic Council President and CEO Frederick Kempe.

JULY 4, 2024 | 9:52 PM ET

Smart in sixty seconds: Why NATO matters

The Atlantic Council’s Ashley Semler breaks down new analysis from Richard D. Hooker Jr. explaining that NATO still matters because it has significant economic, political, and military benefits—and because it offers the United States a way to cope with China and Russia simultaneously.

Chart the Alliance’s future

Essays on the Alliance’s future

As the Alliance seeks to secure its future for the next seventy-five years, it faces revanchist old rivals, escalating strategic competition, and uncertainties over the future of the rules-based international order. This series features seven essays focused on concrete issues that NATO must address at the Washington summit and five essays that examine longer-term challenges the Alliance must confront to ensure transatlantic security.

The post Live expertise and behind-the-scenes insight as NATO leaders gather at the Washington summit appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Memo to NATO leaders: Why and how NATO countries should engage in the Indo-Pacific

Matthew Kroenig, Jeffrey Cimmino — Mon, 08 Jul 2024 18:37:04 +0000

TO: NATO heads of state and government
FROM: Matthew Kroenig and Jeffrey Cimmino
SUBJECT: Why and how NATO countries should engage in the Indo-Pacific

share memo by email

What do world leaders need to know? The Atlantic Council’s new “Memo to…” series has the answer with briefings on the world’s most pressing issues from our experts, drawing on their experience advising the highest levels of government.

Bottom line up front: NATO countries should step up their engagement in the Indo-Pacific in a number of ways, including by protecting their economies from excessive exposure to China’s, reiterating diplomatic statements calling for the maintenance of peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait, and conducting regular freedom-of-navigation operations. Transatlantic allies have self-interested reasons to engage in the Indo-Pacific; the United States cannot counter the challenges emanating from the region without European help; and transatlantic engagement in the region will help counter the reality and the perception that European allies are not contributing their fair share to NATO.

Background: Confronting multiple adversaries

This memo is directed to NATO leaders on the eve of the Washington Summit, but some of the below recommendations can also be pursued at the country level, or through other bodies, such as the European Union.

Why European countries should deepen engagement in the Indo-Pacific

Europe has many concrete interests in the Indo-Pacific. A major war between the United States and China, for example, would be devastating for the global economy and for the interests of European nations. The 2021 EU strategy for cooperation in the Indo-Pacific states that the security of South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait may have a direct impact on European security and prosperity.
The United States needs Europe’s help to effectively address the China challenge. The China threat is comprehensive and includes an economic and technological dimension. While Europe is not a military superpower, it is an economic, technological, and diplomatic superpower. European nations make up roughly 20 percent of global gross domestic product (GDP) and are technology leaders in many areas, including 5G. A US strategy of economic and technological de-risking from China, for example, will fail without European cooperation.
European engagement in the Indo-Pacific can contribute to Alliance burden sharing. By helping the United States address its most significant challenge, China, European nations can help to show that they are valuable allies meaningfully contributing to transatlantic security.
A European role in the Indo-Pacific can strengthen US domestic support for continued US engagement in Europe. Some Americans argue that the United States should pivot away from Europe to allocate more attention and resources to the bigger challenges posed by China and the Indo-Pacific. By helping the United States address the China challenge, Europe can demonstrate its continued value as an Alliance partner and strengthen US support for continued attention to European priorities.
The European and Indo-Pacific theaters are interconnected. China and Russia declared a “no limits” partnership in 2022 shortly before Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, and they are collaborating closely in many strategic and military matters. More recently, they reaffirmed this partnership as marking a “new era.” Countering China in the Indo-Pacific will directly improve the security environment in Europe.

How? Recommended actions for NATO leaders

Transatlantic allies should join the United States in systematically de-risking their economies from China. To be most effective, a de-risking strategy will need to include all free-world allies and partners. De-risking should proceed according to the following principles:
1. The United States and its allies should pursue a complete decoupling from China in areas sensitive to national security.
2. In domains where China has employed unfair trade practices, the United States and its allies should counter with a coordinated campaign of tariffs or other countervailing measures.
3. The United States and its allies should diversify their economic relationships away from China to minimize their exposure to Chinese economic coercion.
4. In sectors of minimal national security risk where China is abiding by free-market principles, free and fair trade can continue.
European allies should threaten to sanction China if it engages in an armed attack on US allies and partners in Asia. If China were to attack Taiwan or other regional neighbors, Washington would encourage European and Indo-Pacific allies to join the United States in punitive economic measures. Allies should develop a sanctions package in preparation for a crisis ahead of time and communicate it to Xi Jinping as a an element of a broader deterrent.
The United States and its transatlantic allies should coordinate to control the commanding heights of twenty-first-century technologies, such as artificial intelligence. If China, a hostile autocratic power, succeeds in its plans to dominate the twenty-first-century technological landscape, there will be profound and negative consequences for global security, economics, and democracy. Maintaining a tech advantage that favors freedom will require:
1. Promoting technological development and innovation ecosystems in the free world;
2. Protecting against China’s malign technology practices through investment screening, export controls, and countering intellectual property theft; and
3. Coordinating on regulations and standards to embed Alliance norms and values into twenty-first-century technology.
NATO allies should make it clear through diplomatic statements that any effort by China to disrupt peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait would trigger a break in relations with the free world. Beyond a Taiwan crisis, NATO allies can use diplomatic statements to call out human rights abuses and unfair trade practices, leveraging Europe’s moral authority in the face of China’s violations of international rules and norms. These statements should take place both collectively, in official alliance documents, and privately, in bilateral engagements between NATO members and Chinese officials.
The United States and Europe should work together to develop new frameworks to stitch together transatlantic and Asian allies. These frameworks can expand upon or be modeled on NATO’s relationship with the IP4 (Australia, Japan, South Korea, and New Zealand) and the Australia-UK-US agreement known as AUKUS.
NATO allies can help the United States in the Indo-Pacific by meeting their burden-sharing commitments. If Europe has a more robust ability to defend itself, deter Russia, and bolster Ukraine’s defense, this will free up resources for the United States to shift to deterring and, if necessary, defeating Chinese aggression in the Indo-Pacific.
European allies can serve as an arsenal of democracy for possible conflicts in the Indo-Pacific. In the event of a serious conflict in the Indo-Pacific, the United States will run out of high-end munitions quickly. Europe could play a vital support role by producing and replenishing US stocks of munitions and other weapons.
NATO countries should conduct freedom-of-navigation operations (FONOPs) in the Indo-Pacific. Several European allies, including Germany, the United Kingdom, and France, have executed FONOPs in the Indo-Pacific. More allies should do so, and on a more regular basis, to show China that in asserting its territorial claims, it is not just confronting its neighbors or the United States, but the entire free world.
NATO allies should participate in military exercises in the Indo-Pacific. Seven European nations are at RIMPAC 2024. Future participation by these countries and others could range from sending a ship, to a squadron of special operations forces, or even a single staff officer. These activities will improve Atlantic-Pacific cooperation and send a message to China that Europe is committed to maintaining peace and stability in the region.
European allies should prepare for an Article 5 scenario. If there is a major US-China war, it is possible that China would attack the continental United States, which would trigger Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. NATO allies should contemplate and plan for what actions they would take in the event of a major war in the Indo-Pacific. More capable allies might be able to send ships and aircraft. All allies could send personnel and munitions. Some allies could offer niche capabilities. Norway, for example, has a large merchant fleet that could be used in wartime for shipping and logistical support in the Indo-Pacific.

Jeffrey Cimmino is the deputy director of operations and a fellow of the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

Matthew Kroenig served in the Department of Defense and the intelligence community during the Bush, Obama, and Trump administrations. He is vice president and senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

This publication was supported in part by Airbus. The Atlantic Council maintains a strict intellectual independence policy, and the analysis and conclusions in this memo are the authors’ alone.

Issue Brief Jun 27, 2024

Production diplomacy for deterrence, readiness, and resilience in the Indo-Pacific

By Andrew Brown, John T. Watts, Markus Garlauskas

Production diplomacy provides opportunities to protect supply chains, strengthen alliances and partnerships, enhance deterrence, and build defense readiness, though it is not without risks and challenges.

Australia Defense Industry

Inflection Points Today Jun 20, 2024

The troubling significance of Putin’s Pyongyang deal

By Frederick Kempe

The Russian president was feted in North Korea this week, showing how a confederation of autocracies is emerging to support the Kremlin’s war in Ukraine and each other.

Conflict Korea

New Atlanticist Feb 6, 2023

NATO is entering a new phase in the Indo-Pacific

By Sara Bjerg Moller

NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg’s visit to Japan and South Korea trip was striking both for its timing and for its messaging shift on China.

China East Asia

The post Memo to NATO leaders: Why and how NATO countries should engage in the Indo-Pacific appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Who’s at 2 percent? Look how NATO allies have increased their defense spending since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

Clara Falkenek — Mon, 08 Jul 2024 16:55:07 +0000

Clara Falkenek is an intern with the GeoEconomics Center.

At the intersection of economics, finance, and foreign policy, the GeoEconomics Center is a translation hub with the goal of helping shape a better global economic future.

The post Who’s at 2 percent? Look how NATO allies have increased their defense spending since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The NATO Summit faces three simultaneous threats

Frederick Kempe — Mon, 08 Jul 2024 11:05:00 +0000

It’s no accident that the SCO meeting came a week ahead of the Alliance summit, but perhaps a coincidence that it was on the Fourth of July.

“SCO members should consolidate unity and jointly oppose external interference,” Xi said, warning against the West’s “Cold War mentality,” according to Xinhua, China’s state-run news agency.

In his address to the SCO, Putin called for “a new architecture of cooperation, indivisible security, and development in Eurasia, designed to replace the outdated Eurocentric and Euro-Atlantic models, which gave unilateral advantages only to certain states.”

Putin didn’t need to mention the United States, as the SCO’s members all knew which country he meant. The organization has expanded beyond its original five members—China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan—to include India, Iran, Pakistan, and Uzbekistan. Last week, Belarus joined as the tenth member, and there are another sixteen partners and observers.

Confronting a confluence of threats

Even if one sets the SCO meeting entirely to the side, NATO leaders this week confront three simultaneous but underestimated threats, none of them explicitly on their agenda.

China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea—working with others—haven’t formed “a NATO-like formal structure,” but instead what Rauch calls an “Axis of Resistance.” This axis, he explains, “relies on loose coordination and opportunistic cooperation among its member states and its network of militias, proxies, and syndicates.” Unable to match the United States and NATO directly, “it instead seeks to exhaust and demoralize the U.S. and its allies by harrying them relentlessly, much as hyenas harry and exhaust a lion.”

Meanwhile, writes Patrick Quirk, a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council: “The security of the United States, democratic partners and allies, and humanity’s future depends significantly on the state of democracy worldwide. Yet, over the past seventeen years, if we look at indices like those published by the Atlantic Council’s Freedom and Prosperity Center, authoritarianism has risen globally, while democracy shows alarming decline in regions of importance to the United States.”

Quirk, in a significant new report for the Atlantic Council, examines the challenges and offers solutions. They range from supercharging efforts to counter China’s malign influence to shoring up key democratic institutions in strategically important countries. He concludes with a compelling set of recommendations for the US Congress and whomever is elected US president in November—recommendations as difficult to execute as they are necessary.

Building the “bridge”

The most immediate issue for NATO this week is how best to deal with defending Ukraine and offering it a path to Alliance membership. These are decisions that will underscore whether NATO allies recognize the historic context and significance of the Ukraine challenge.

The Atlantic Council, in partnership with the Estonian foreign ministry, conducted a series of major tabletop exercises this spring to examine future Russia-Ukraine conflict scenarios and their implications for Western security.

“The results of the exercises were unequivocal,” write the Atlantic Council’s Matthew Kroenig and Estonian Ambassador to the United States Kristjan Prikk. “Europe is more stable and secure with Ukraine in NATO. Russia did not choose to escalate when Ukraine was offered NATO membership, and in all scenarios, Russia was much more cautious in its interactions with Ukraine once it was a member of NATO.”

The Alliance this week is expected to offer Ukraine a “bridge to membership,” but it will stop far short of a membership assurance. According to reports ahead of the summit, the bridge will be constructed out of increased coordination of military assistance, a pledge of long-term support, more investment in Ukraine’s defense industry, and bilateral security agreements—all measures intended to strengthen Ukraine.

Kroenig and Prikk say the lesson coming out of our exercises is clear: “[For] the sake of a better future for the entire Alliance, the bridge must be short, it must be made of steel, and it should end with a firm invitation for Ukraine to join NATO.”

That invitation is unlikely to be this week’s outcome, but a proper understanding of the historic moment requires nothing less.

Atlantic Council at the NATO Summit in Washington

Live commentary, authoritative analysis, and high-level events covering NATO’s Washington summit, courtesy of our experts.

Frederick Kempe is president and chief executive officer of the Atlantic Council. You can follow him on Twitter @FredKempe.

This edition is part of Frederick Kempe’s Inflection Points newsletter, a column of dispatches from a world in transition. To receive this newsletter throughout the week, sign up here.

The post The NATO Summit faces three simultaneous threats appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The US and Europe would be safer with Ukraine in NATO. Our war games showed why.

Matthew Kroenig and Kristjan Prikk — Mon, 08 Jul 2024 02:13:04 +0000

Even in scenarios that started with a visible and direct Russian military attack on Ukraine, the conflict quickly de-escalated.

The results of the exercises were unequivocal: Europe is more stable and secure with Ukraine in NATO. Russia did not choose to escalate when Ukraine was offered NATO membership, and in all scenarios, Russia was much more cautious in its interactions with Ukraine once it was a member of NATO. Even in scenarios that started with a visible and direct Russian military attack on Ukraine, the conflict quickly de-escalated. Both sides had strong incentives to avoid a direct NATO-Russia conflict—one that could result in nuclear war.

This finding corresponds with Russia’s behavior over the past decade and a half. Putin has been willing to use force against countries outside of NATO, including Georgia and Ukraine, but he has been deterred from attacking NATO countries.

Moreover, at present, some observers assume that only the West has an overriding incentive to avoid nuclear escalation in Ukraine. But with Ukraine in NATO, which is a nuclear-armed alliance, Putin would also have to fear the possibility of nuclear conflict, making him much more cautious in his relations with Ukraine.

The lesson coming out of these exercises is clear. This week, Western powers can offer Ukraine a bridge to NATO, but for the sake of a better future for the entire Alliance, the bridge must be short, it must be made of steel, and it should end with a firm invitation for Ukraine to join NATO.

Matthew Kroenig is vice president and senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

Kristjan Prikk is Estonia’s ambassador to the United States.

The post The US and Europe would be safer with Ukraine in NATO. Our war games showed why. appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Dispatch from Warsaw: Poland’s military and economic rise is coming just in time, as the West wobbles

Daniel Fried — Fri, 05 Jul 2024 17:51:55 +0000

The France-Germany-Poland ‘Weimar Triangle’ grouping . . . suddenly seems eclipsed by French and German domestic politics.

Polish President Andrzej Duda, associated with the rightist former government, has had good relations with Trump and met with him in New York shortly before the US Congress finally voted to resume assistance to Ukraine, reportedly encouraging Trump not to oppose it. Polish Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski, part of the centrist ruling coalition, has his own extensive ties with the US right and is also using them. Other leading Polish political figures, such as the Marshall (Speaker) of the Sejm Szymon Hołownia, are doing or preparing to do the same: reach out to Republicans in and around Trump world, especially during the July 9-11 NATO Summit in Washington, to urge a more Reaganite and less neo-isolationist US approach should Trump succeed Biden. How much they will succeed is not clear but, given that much of Trump world seems to regard the high-defense-spending Poles favorably, they will likely get a hearing, and it seems smart to try.

It’s not just across the Atlantic that Poland faces new challenges exacerbated by politics. The Poles had invested a lot in a newly rejuvenated relationship with French President Emmanuel Macron, who has become notably tougher on Russia in recent months. But France’s first-round snap parliamentary elections on June 30 and the possibility of a hard-right (and potentially soft on Putin) French government have weakened Macron and complicated this new alignment.

While Poles on both sides of the political divide had been frustrated by Germany’s long and fruitless courtship of Russia, the more centrist Polish government that came to power late last year has been more willing to work with Berlin, especially with the staunchly pro-Ukraine Green Party that controls the German foreign ministry. But June’s European parliamentary elections weakened the Greens and strengthened Germany’s Putin-friendly, far-right Alternative for Germany party. The France-Germany-Poland “Weimar Triangle” grouping, which some Poles had thought might emerge as a pillar of European strategic strength vis-à-vis Russia, much on Polish terms, suddenly seems to have been eclipsed by French and German domestic politics.

Between Russia’s war of aggression to the east and political storm clouds to the West, Poland has a lot to deal with. But its capabilities are far greater than they were. Since its peaceful overthrow of Moscow-backed communist rule in 1989, Poland has enjoyed a steady and remarkable rise in economic and now military terms. Its rise at home and its strategic clarity about Russia, now vindicated, have placed Poland in the first rank of European powers for the first time in centuries. And just in time, as it turns out.

Daniel Fried is the Weiser Family distinguished fellow at the Atlantic Council, former US ambassador to Poland, and former US assistant secretary of state for Europe.

The post Dispatch from Warsaw: Poland’s military and economic rise is coming just in time, as the West wobbles appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Why Washington must take the opportunity of the NATO Summit to reengage with Turkey

Yevgeniya Gaber — Fri, 05 Jul 2024 15:19:59 +0000

Despite that backdrop, Biden and Erdoğan shouldn’t let another opportunity to meet go to waste, as close cooperation would bring to bear several geopolitical, economic, and security benefits.

Why the timing matters

It is important that the meeting takes place this time. Biden has met Erdoğan in person only twice during his presidency, and both times on the sidelines of international summits. Erdoğan will travel to Washington for the NATO Summit shortly after his meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin at the Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit in Kazakhstan and just weeks after Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan’s statement in China about Turkey’s interest in joining the developing country grouping known as BRICS.

Russia has embraced its opportunities to widen the rifts between Turkey and other NATO allies, so it’s no wonder the Kremlin was quick to welcome Ankara’s desire to join BRICS. A cold shoulder from Biden, contrasted with warm welcomes from the leaders of Russia and China, would only reinforce Ankara’s quest for what it perceives as a fair multipolarity and Turkey’s feeling sidelined by both the European Union and the United States. The perception of Erdoğan as an unwanted guest in the West would become another brick in the wall of mistrust between Ankara and Washington.

Winds of positive change

Significant progress in the F-16 deal, the successful completion of Sweden’s and Finland’s NATO membership processes, and increasing US-Turkey cooperation on joint military production have had a positive impact on both regional security and Turkey’s relations with the West. For example, as the Pentagon set about revamping its munitions factories, several such factories in Texas worked with Turkish company Repkon for the design and installation of machinery. Flake estimated that around 30 percent of all 155 mm rounds produced in the United States will come from these factories, boosting military production and helping support Ukraine. In addition, the effort is strengthening US-Turkey strategic ties and demonstrating to Europe that increasing cooperation with Turkey can help bolster defense capabilities.

Both the United States and Turkey stand to gain significant geopolitical and economic benefits from a reinvigorated relationship. As Asli Aydintasbas of the European Council on Foreign Relations put it, “Turkey sits in the middle of too many global flashpoints for the United States to delay a new dialogue.” Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the war in Gaza, geopolitical realignments in the South Caucasus, and the emergence of the Russia-Iran-China axis add weight to Turkey’s already central role in NATO.

For its part, Turkey must understand that while it may gain immediate benefits from trade and energy cooperation with Russia, its economic and security interests are closely aligned with the West, not with autocratic regimes such as China and Russia. Doing business with sanctioned, unstable, and undemocratic countries is a major geopolitical risk and comes at a huge economic cost. Russia’s economy has become a war economy, and there is not much future in doing business with Moscow, especially with the prospect of secondary sanctions looming. For many years, Germany and the United States have maintained their leading positions as Turkey’s largest export partners, and while joining BRICS may help Turkey manage a balancing act between the West and the Global South, the bloc wouldn’t be likely to help sustain Turkey’s economic growth in the long run. This economic pragmatism, combined with new geopolitical realities, should provide a solid basis for revitalizing the transatlantic partnership.

To engage Turkey, make it part of the plan

The Black Sea can become a test case for Turkey’s reinvigorated cooperation with the West, as that is where core interests of NATO allies in the region—such as restoring Ukraine’s territorial integrity and freedom of navigation, deterring Russia, counterbalancing Russia-Iran ties, and promoting energy diversification—largely converge. While the region remains sensitive to fluctuations in the US-Turkey relationship, it also hosts an opportunity, particularly in maritime security, to improve transatlantic relations and collectively defend the region.

Turkey has developed close cooperation with Black Sea NATO members Romania and Bulgaria and has been a vocal supporter of NATO membership for Ukraine and Georgia. Ukraine’s recent successes in degrading Russia’s naval capabilities and shifting the balance of maritime power in Turkey’s favor have made Kyiv a natural ally for Ankara, as both countries seek to counter Russian superiority in the Black Sea. This strategic connection that runs via Kyiv could anchor Turkey’s tilt to the West.

Closer maritime cooperation between Turkey, Romania, and Bulgaria, potentially joined by Ukraine, would deny Russia the ability to conduct provocations and false flag operations in their territorial waters and exclusive economic zones and help protect assets deployed in the northwestern part of the Black Sea. This is particularly important as both Turkey and Romania are working to develop their offshore gas fields—Sakarya and Neptun Deep. Since the successful development of these reserves would help reduce the region’s dependence on Russian fossil fuels, and thus undermine Moscow’s energy strategy in the region, one could expect the Kremlin to employ a variety of hybrid tactics to prevent the implementation of these offshore energy projects.

Since Romania and Bulgaria do not have significant naval capabilities, increased cooperation with Turkey is necessary to protect their critical infrastructure. For example, now that the Black Sea Mine Countermeasures Task Force—launched in January 2024 as a trilateral initiative between Bulgaria, Romania, and Turkey to clear their territorial waters of floating mines—has become operational, it should become a permanent patrol mission to ensure the security of sea lines of communication and maritime trade and to curb Russia’s illegal activities in the Black Sea.

Turkey, Romania, Bulgaria, and Ukraine are working together to shore up defense and deterrence capabilities in the Black Sea region. At the NATO Summit, Biden and Erdoğan should discuss, among many topics, how the United States and other European allies can increase support for these efforts.

While the Montreux Convention limits the ability of non-littoral states to increase their Black Sea naval presence, the United States and European allies could strengthen NATO’s defense and deterrence capabilities in the region by enhancing the air defense and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities of littoral states; supporting defense industrial projects; and deploying more coastal-defense, anti-ship, anti-submarine, and electronic-warfare systems to NATO’s eastern flank. For its part, Turkey could play a central role in strengthening NATO’s sea-denial capabilities to secure Black Sea port infrastructure and sea lines of communication.

Key to enabling this cooperation with the United States and European allies is first engaging in dialogue.

As the United States works on its new Black Sea strategy and prepares the agenda for the NATO Summit—which will be dominated by regional security issues—it’s time to integrate Turkey, a regional leader, into its plans. Against the backdrop of continued Russian aggression in Ukraine and the growing involvement of Iran and China in the Black Sea, increased cooperation between Turkey, Ukraine, and Western partners is critical to both European security and the democratic resilience of these countries.

Yevgeniya Gaber is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council IN TURKEY and a professor at the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies. Follow her on X, formerly known as Twitter, at @GaberYevgeniya.

The opinions expressed here are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, the US Department of Defense, or the US government.

This blog is part of a joint research project of the Atlantic Council IN TURKEY and the Centre for Applied Turkey Studies entitled “A Sea of Opportunities: Can the West Benefit from Turkey’s Autonomous Foreign Policy in the Black Sea?” The research provides a lens into Turkey’s aspirations for regional leadership and identifies possible avenues of collaboration between Ankara and its Western allies in the Black Sea region in several areas, such as defense and military cooperation, political and diplomatic dialogue, and maritime and energy security.

The post Why Washington must take the opportunity of the NATO Summit to reengage with Turkey appeared first on Atlantic Council.

NATO allies need a better approach to industrial strategy

Kristen Taylor — Mon, 01 Jul 2024 20:40:34 +0000

Against the backdrop of Russia’s war in Ukraine and rising aggression across the globe, allies and partners are ramping up defense investment, but increased spending is only part of the equation. Both the United States and Europe are failing to match defense priorities with industrial output. US and European efforts to increase munition production fall drastically short of the needed quantity to both sustain Ukraine’s war effort and replenish allied stockpiles. Russia is producing nearly three times more artillery munitions than allied industries.

Allies are finding that scaling up industrial production is more difficult than expected. Decades of slashed defense budgets have left allied defense industrial bases vulnerable. As war rages in Europe and allies face increasingly depleted stocks, allies should use the NATO Summit next week in Washington as an opportunity to send clear demand signals to industry and develop more coordinated, effective industrial strategies.

In light of growing vulnerabilities, US and European policymakers alike are courting stronger relationships with industry—evidenced by the United States and European Union advancing their own, first-ever defense industrial strategies in 2024. However, these strategies do not fully address the critical vulnerabilities facing allied militaries. The European Defense Industrial Strategy (EDIS) is a positive step in strengthening Europe’s fragmented defense industrial bases, but this go-at-it-alone approach alienates Europe’s closest ally, the United States, and fails to tap into needed industrial capacity across the Alliance.

Instead, the United States and Europe should turn to NATO to bridge the gap and produce coordinated efforts toward defense production, in line with preexisting NATO policies and procedures designed to do just this, such as the Defense Production Action Plan. Current NATO efforts underscore the Alliance’s prioritization of defense industry issues, but due in part to insufficient buy-in from some allies, these plans fall short of orchestrating the cooperation necessary to address critical allied vulnerabilities.

Greater NATO involvement in allied industrial strategies could strike a balance between mitigating potential vulnerabilities in defense capacity, while improving defense industrial competency in the long term. This approach should:

Increase joint procurement efforts. NATO should orchestrate more allied defense cooperation agreements, such as the European Sky Shield Initiative, which seeks to coordinate European air defense purchases into one common approach. Such initiatives encourage greater interoperability and allow for specialization across allied defense industrial bases. For example, NATO could coordinate a broader joint procurement effort to produce more critical military equipment, such as unmanned aerial vehicles, across the Alliance.

Encourage multiyear procurement and acquisition contracts. The United States and European allies must match means to ends, convincing industry that rhetoric and spending pledges will manifest into long-term investments. Allies, under the direction of the NATO Defense Planning Process and the Conference of National Armaments Directors, should invest more heavily in multiyear procurement and acquisition contracts to increase demand signals needed to support the current shift in defense prioritization.

Enhance allied partnerships on defense production. Rather than focusing on economic competition, allies should look for ways to reduce bureaucratic hurdles to transatlantic defense industrial cooperation. NATO’s Defense Industrial Production Board should look for ways to match industrial synergies across the Alliance to maintain its warfighting edge. In order to achieve this aim, allies should seek to reduce national requirements that make it difficult for allied companies to break into national markets.

Eliminate onerous export controls between allies. The United States should seek to eliminate export controls and licensing requirements for exports and transfers on select defense equipment and technology for certain NATO allies. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024 shifted US policy on export controls and the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) regulatory regime to provide more flexibility for London and Canberra under the Australia-United Kingdom-United States partnership known as AUKUS. In line with this recent shift, the United States should also seek to expand exemptions to ITAR for NATO allies such as France, Germany, and Sweden.

Invest in next-generation technologies. The Alliance must invest in integrating new technologies into its military assets. Allies should look to foster deeper research and development partnerships that cut across the Atlantic. In the short term, allies should look to NATO’s Defence Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic and Innovation Fund to prioritize research partnerships that promulgate technological advancement and deepen industrial connections. In addition, allies should seek to deepen cooperation on military innovation projects to harness the unique skills of individual allies.

The United States and Europe should undoubtedly invest more in their own defense industrial bases in the long term. However, in the short term, allies and partners should prioritize integrating crucial efforts to address critical vulnerabilities, ramp up defense industrial capacity to speed and scale, and reduce bureaucratic hurdles and protectionist measures. As the United States and Europe court industry executives, allies and partners would do well to prioritize greater investment in NATO’s industrial policies and procedures as an important deliverable at the Washington summit to mitigate critical vulnerabilities that place the Alliance at a disadvantage to its adversaries.

Kristen Taylor is a program assistant with the Transatlantic Security Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

The post NATO allies need a better approach to industrial strategy appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Four steps that NATO’s southern flank strategy needs to succeed

Jason Davidson — Tue, 25 Jun 2024 20:11:44 +0000

At next month’s Washington summit, NATO’s response to the third year of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine will undoubtedly garner allies’ attention and headline news coverage. Much of the Alliance’s focus is understandably to the east and the threat from Moscow. But the Washington summit will also see NATO look in another direction: south. In Washington, the Alliance will adopt its first ever southern flank strategy. As to the east, Russia’s disruptive actions are a concern along NATO’s southern flank, too.

In May, NATO published a thirty-three-page report by a group of experts on the Alliance’s “southern neighborhood,” which includes North Africa, the Sahel, the Middle East, and the Mediterranean Sea. The experts’ report highlights how instability from these regions has a direct impact on allies and suggests several important considerations as the Alliance finalizes its southern flank strategy in Washington. The report is a great start and should be read carefully, but NATO needs to take four additional measures if it genuinely wants to improve the situation on the Alliance’s southern flank.

Why look south?

Why should NATO spend time and energy on a southern flank strategy when it faces such a clear and present threat to the east? NATO’s 2022 strategic concept, adopted at the Madrid summit, outlines two fundamental threats the Alliance faces. The strategic concept declares that Russia is the “most significant and direct threat” to allies’ security and that terrorism is the “most direct asymmetric threat” to the security of citizens, international peace, and prosperity. As US Ambassador to NATO Julianne Smith recently noted, Russia and terrorist groups benefit from and contribute to instability in NATO’s southern neighborhoods and provide the central reason why the Alliance needs a southern flank strategy.

Russia’s Africa Corps (the successor to the Wagner Group in Africa) has taken advantage of instability in these neighborhoods, providing fighters, trainers, and materiel in Libya, Mali, Sudan, and Burkina Faso. Russia has a naval base in Tartus, Syria, and uses it to sail its vessels in the Mediterranean, posing a threat to naval security and maritime commerce. Instability in the Middle East, North Africa, and the Sahel has also provided an environment where radical Islamic terrorist groups expanded in recent decades. Instability in Iraq and Syria allowed the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) to establish a large territorial footprint across those countries. Recent research suggests that the Sahel region has become the global epicenter of Islamic radical terrorism. Left unchecked, instability in NATO’s southern neighborhood translates into opportunities for Russian intervention and metastasized terrorist groups. This instability also drives other important problems for NATO’s southern flank allies: irregular migration, drug smuggling, piracy, and organized crime, which, in turn, threaten energy security (especially as European countries have moved away from Russian oil and gas) and maritime commerce.

Getting concrete with the recommendations

At NATO’s 2023 Vilnius summit, the allies agreed to engage in a “comprehensive and deep reflection on existing and emerging threats and challenges” emanating from the southern neighborhoods. In October 2023, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg appointed a group of eleven experts to provide “concrete recommendations to shape NATO’s future approach.”

Released on May 7, the report includes recommendations that can be grouped in four basic categories.

First, it makes several overarching organizational suggestions. These include the appointment of a special envoy for the southern neighborhoods, periodic review of NATO’s relationship with the southern neighborhoods, and a better integration of NATO’s Strategic Direction-South Hub in Naples within the NATO structure to strengthen the link between the hub and the Alliance’s political leadership.

Second, the report suggests strengthening dialogue with and about the southern neighborhoods, as well as enhancing cooperation with relevant regional and international organizations. Specifically, it recommends a special summit of all NATO’s southern partners (members of the Mediterranean Dialogue and Istanbul Cooperation Initiative), the creation of a high-level regional security and stability dialogue, and improved consultation with the European Union and representation from the African Union.

Third, the report suggests several important strategic communications measures, recognizing that NATO’s image in the region—in part due to Russian misinformation campaigns—needs improvement. The report proposes a permanent “Facts for Peace” initiative to fight disinformation in the southern neighborhoods and the establishment of a center with the same mission.

Fourth, the report discusses areas where NATO should expand its capacity to act. For example, NATO could set up a standing mission dedicated to training and capacity building for partners. NATO might also enhance cooperation with partners on resilience, which would include information and advice on resilience planning, including on disaster response. The report also suggests that NATO build on recent successes in counterpiracy and “identify further areas for maritime security cooperation” with partners.

This group of experts’ recommendations are detailed and thoughtful. Leaders of NATO’s member states would do well to implement most if not all of them. But four additional steps should be added to form an effective southern flank strategy.

Four steps forward

In releasing his fiscal 2024 budget, US President Joe Biden shared a quote that he attributed to his father. “Don’t tell me what you value,” he said. “Show me your budget—and I’ll tell you what you value.”

If NATO truly cares about addressing the challenges in its southern neighborhoods, then it should be willing to incur the costs to do so. If NATO adopts a southern flank strategy at the Washington summit that entails real increases in spending on the Alliance’s activities in the region, it will signal to Russia and to the leaders of terrorist groups that it cares enough about the southern neighborhoods to invest resources there. In agreeing to increased spending, NATO would also signal to southern flank member governments and their publics that the Alliance is willing to incur the costs for something other than defense of its eastern flank.

Moreover, the Alliance’s additional spending should focus on four specific areas:

First, NATO members should commit significantly more resources to Operation Sea Guardian and its three tasks, which are to contribute to maritime capacity building with regional partners, maintain maritime situational awareness, and support maritime counterterrorism. All three tasks are means to directly address the threats from Russia and terrorism in the southern neighborhoods.

Second, NATO should commit to an amply resourced training and capacity-building mission for the southern neighborhoods, and it should look for local partners interested in receiving such assistance.

Third, NATO should commit the resources to stand up a multinational division for the southern flank, which would be available for deployment to a crisis in the region if necessary and appropriate.

Fourth, at the Washington summit, allies should commit to increase funding for the Defense Against Terrorism Programme of Work, which aims to protect against and prevent nonconventional attacks, such as attacks on critical infrastructure and terrorist attacks using emerging and disruptive technologies.

If allies agree to these four recommendations as well as to the group of experts’ recommendations, they will demonstrate to all parties that the southern neighborhoods are of great interest and they will be engaging in meaningful steps to improve stability there.

Jason Davidson is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Transatlantic Security Initiative in the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. He is also professor of political science and international affairs and director of the Security and Conflict Studies Program at the University of Mary Washington in Fredericksburg, Virginia.

The post Four steps that NATO’s southern flank strategy needs to succeed appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The F-16 deal is as good for NATO as it is for Turkey

Andrew Bernard — Tue, 25 Jun 2024 00:00:00 +0000

The Biden administration’s January approval and June contract finalization of the sale of forty new F-16 fighter jets to Turkey and the upgrade of nearly eighty of its F-16 airframes was most certainly celebrated in Ankara. After years of acrimony following Turkey’s acquisition of the Russian S-400 air defense system and its subsequent expulsion from the US-led F-35 program, the inking of this deal represents a turn in the right direction in the US-Turkish relationship. NATO military planners in Europe also have reason to cheer Turkey’s commitment to upgrade its fighter aircraft fleet on a large scale, even though it is not a purchase of fifth-generation F-35s.

For the Turkish Air Force, this F-16 acquisition brings familiarity and precedence that will make the integration of these aircraft nearly seamless—or at least an order of magnitude easier than onboarding an unfamiliar airframe. Turkey explored the option of acquiring Eurofighter Typhoon aircraft as a hedge against the possibility of the US F-16 deal falling through and is publicly keeping this option alive. New weapon systems bring countless changes, and not all of them are better. Pilots, technicians, and support personnel would all be starting from square one to learn a different airframe such as the Typhoon and its associated systems. Aircraft maintenance procedures and logistics processes would involve a steep learning curve. With the next generation F-16, Turkish Air Force personnel would instead be evolving and adapting their current (and deep) knowledge of the weapon system, adjusting to particularities of the newest version. For NATO, such an ease of incorporating new and upgraded F-16s into the Turkish Air Force would be helpful, making the aircraft mission ready and available for NATO planning shortly after delivery. The scale of purchase that Turkey is pursuing should also please NATO air planners at Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) in Belgium and at NATO Air Command in Germany. With over 240 F-16s, the Turkish Air Force is already the largest NATO air arm—besides the United States—to employ the F-16. While the Turkish Air Force will likely retire some of their older jets upon obtaining the new F-16s, the rest of the fleet should remain in service for years to come.

Force offering with teeth

This is, however, about more than the number of airframes. It’s about Turkey upgrading such a large number to a high capability level, incorporating advanced active electronically scanned array radars, modern electronic warfare suites, and updated data links among other equipment. This shows that Turkey is willing to modernize its F-16 with improved capabilities to make them more lethal and survivable against modern air threats. Air forces failing to upgrade their fleets risk relegating their air arms to irrelevancy, and that is not the case with Turkey.

These F-16s are needed for NATO missions. NATO air leaders are most concerned about fighting anti-access, area denial (A2AD) campaigns at the beginning of any conflict with a near-peer adversary in an attempt to gain air superiority—and the F-35 is perfect for this role. Nonetheless, there will be plenty of other NATO missions beyond A2AD, and the Turkish F-16s will be in a prime position to conduct those missions at scale. While European air forces are forecast to have more than 600 fifth-generation F-35s on the continent by 2030, there will still be hundreds of aircraft of other generations at NATO’s disposal. As NATO air tacticians work to optimize the simultaneous integration of fourth- and fifth-generation aircraft in the same battlespace, Turkey’s upgraded F-16s will be better postured to implement that integration due to the advance avionics and sensors being included in the forty new F-16s and the nearly eighty receiving upgrades.

Just as important, if not more so, is the Turkish commitment to buy advanced weapons in large quantities for its F-16 fleet. The proposed sale includes nearly one thousand AIM-120 medium-range, radar-guided air-to-air missiles, over 400 AIM-9X short-range, infrared-guided air-to-air missiles, and a plethora of precision air-to-surface munitions to attack fixed and mobile targets. This is an important point for NATO planners, as it ensures that Turkey’s force offering comes with teeth. Some nations acquire major weapon systems (aircraft, tanks, ships), but underinvest in munitions needed to employ the weapons systems—a hollow force, effectively eroding deterrence potential. This is not the case with Turkey, whose air force will be ready from day one with a credible fleet upon completion of the contract, reinforcing NATO’s conventional air forces deterrent potential.

Beyond the equipment itself, Turkey is positioning itself to be the de facto leader of NATO F-16 users: a leadership role it should enthusiastically embrace with this new acquisition. Current and future NATO F-16 users in Europe include Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Greece, Turkey, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Bulgaria. Notably, the epicenter of NATO F-16 employment is shifting from northwest Europe to southeast Europe, as the nations of four of the five European Participating Air Forces (EPAF) have committed to the F-35 (Netherlands, Norway, Denmark, and Belgium). Portugal, the sole EPAF nation that has yet to commit to the F-35, intends to fly the F-16 for the foreseeable future while exploring a replacement aircraft.

For the next two decades, southeast Europe and the Black Sea region will be dominated by F-16 users. Romania acquired its first F-16s from Portugal, with more to come from Norway. Bulgaria’s first F-16 Block 70 should take flight this year, and Slovakia is purchasing fourteen Block 70 F-16s as well. (“Block 70” refers to new F-16s produced in Greenville, South Carolina, while the “Viper Upgrade Program” allows older F-16s to be modernized to Block 70 standards. ) And while not currently a member of NATO, Ukraine is poised to start employing the F-16 soon. Given Turkey’s long history of using the F-16, and the fact that this deal involves the same Block 70 version of F-16s that Slovakia and Bulgaria will have, the Turkish Air Force should step into this role and be a mentor among the NATO F-16 community. For example, the Turks should consider establishing an F-16 Block 70 Fighter Weapons Instructor Training course, the same way the Dutch hosted the program for the EPAF community. NATO air forces would benefit greatly from a new generation of top-tier F-16 instructors and tacticians.

Relationship renewal?

There are hurdles to overcome before all these advantages come to fruition. Lockheed Martin will need to clear its F-16 production backlog for Turkey to capitalize relatively quickly on this purchase, as will the various subcontractors and weapon producers. Nonetheless, should the United States and Turkey succeed in overcoming these challenges, this acquisition could open the way for a renewed defense-industrial relationship between the United States and Turkey at a strategic level.

It must be emphasized that Turkey’s eventual support for Sweden’s entry into the North Atlantic Alliance sealed the deal for this F-16 purchase, and it is in Ankara’s best interest to continue to make common-sense decisions like this. The continued insistence on maintaining the S-400 system in its inventory will likely ensure Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) implementation remains intact. The abandonment of the S-400 could start the process leading to a potential reentry into the F-35 program. There are other potential areas for defense industrial cooperation such as US participation in Turkish warship and submarine programs, or US subsystem co-development for some of Ankara’s ambitious organic defense production efforts.

Additionally, some skeptics argue that Turkey has no intention of using its F-16s to deter Russia, preferring to employ them in counterinsurgency operations or balance against neighbors. This argument ignores that Turkey actively participates in both the NATO Defense Planning Process and Supreme Allied Commander Europe’s (SACEUR) regional defense planning development as part of its Alliance commitments to defend NATO airspace. Turkey’s air power contributions reinforce NATO’s overall deterrence posture, leaving Moscow no choice but to look at NATO’s defensive capabilities as a whole and not its parts.

Some analysts suggest this purchase is a wasted effort, given Turkey will acquire F-16s and not F-35s. Clearly, newer and upgraded F-16s are not F-35s. Nonetheless, this type of analysis is blind to the realities of the relationships involved. No amount of wishful thinking will bring the F-35 to Turkey immediately, as sovereign decisions by both parties are now “water under a bridge.” Even if the US Congress approved F-35s for Turkey overnight (which is not going to happen soon), the process to get a single F-35 to Turkey is many, many years away. This new F-16 acquisition fills that gap, improving bilateral relations while providing quantifiable, fielded air power for national and NATO commitments on a realistic timeline. This is good for all parties involved. In the short term, finalizing the F-16 deal reestablishes trust between Washington and Ankara, and gives a boost to NATO planners who will need to rely on Turkish forces to meet deterrence plans for the decade to come.

Andrew Bernard is a retired US Air Force Colonel and a visiting fellow in the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center.

Explore other issues

The post The F-16 deal is as good for NATO as it is for Turkey appeared first on Atlantic Council.

US-Turkey relations in an era of geopolitical conflict

Atlantic Council Turkey Programs — Tue, 25 Jun 2024 00:00:00 +0000

Download PDF

Foreword

The first half of 2024 has brought new energy and dynamics to US-Turkish bilateral strategic ties, much—though not all—positive. The successful sequential approval of Swedish accession into NATO and Turkish acquisition of upgraded F16V air warfare deterrent restored a level of trust, albeit rooted in transactionalism, after nearly a decade of unarrested divergence and increasing mistrust. New hope in defense industrial cooperation has been embodied by new investments in the field including a significant new munitions collaboration in Texas. Turkish diplomatic reconciliations with a number of US regional allies—Egypt, Greece, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE—have removed an additional source of friction while the war in Gaza has led to new tensions, and very divergent policies. This issue of Defense Journal provides a snapshot of several current dynamics in the strategic relationship at a critical time, approaching the NATO Summit in Washington. Enjoy!

Dr. Rich Outzen & Dr. Can Kasapoglu, Defense Journal by Atlantic Council IN TURKEY Co-managing editors

Articles

Sweden’s NATO accession: A twenty-month square dance

By Rich Outzen

Drones and more: Turkish defense cooperation trends in the air

By Can Kasapoglu

Türkiye and the Russian military threat to NATO

By Gen. (ret.) Yavuz Türkgenci

The F-16 deal is as good for NATO as it is for Turkey

By Andrew Bernard

Small, smart, many and cheaper: Competitive adaptation in modern warfare

Interview with Thomas X. Hammes

Defense Journal by Atlantic Council in Turkey interview with Gregory Bloom

Interview with Gregory Bloom

Honorary advisory board

The Defense Journal by Atlantic Council IN TURKEY‘s honorary advisory board provides vision and direction for the journal. We are honored to have Atlantic Council board directors Gen. Wesley K. Clark, former commander of US European Command; Amb. Paula J. Dobriansky, former Under Secretary of State for Global Affairs; Gen. James L. Jones, former national security advisor to the President of the United States; Franklin D. Kramer, former Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs; Lt. Gen. Douglas E. Lute, former US Ambassador to NATO; and Dov S. Zakheim, former Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) and Chief Financial Officer for the Department of Defense.

Gen. Wesley K. Clark

Chairman and CEO of Wesley K. Clark & Associates & Board Director, Atlantic Council

Amb. Paula J. Dobriansky, Ph.D.

Senior Fellow at Harvard University JFK Belfer Center for Science & International Affairs; former Under Secretary of State for Global Affairs (2001-2009)

Gen. James L. Jones

President, Jones Group International; Former National Security Advisor to the President of the United States; Executive Chairman Emeritus, Atlantic Council

Franklin D. Kramer

Distinguished Fellow & Board Director, Atlantic Council

Lt. Gen. Douglas E. Lute

CEO, Cambridge Global Advisors & Board Director, Atlantic Council; Former Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs

Dov S. Zakheim

Senior Advisor, Center for Strategic and International Studies; Senior Fellow, CNA Corporation; & Board Director, Atlantic Council

Explore other issues

The post US-Turkey relations in an era of geopolitical conflict appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Türkiye and the Russian military threat to NATO

Yavuz Türkgenci — Tue, 25 Jun 2024 00:00:00 +0000

A wounded bear still has claws

Russia’s military troubles in the initial stages of its expanded war against Ukraine in 2022 prompted a wave of military analysis describing the Russian military as far weaker than had been previously thought, and asking how the West got it so wrong. Two years into the war, though, Western analysts have again been surprised by how quickly Russia was able to overcome massive losses and rebuild and retool its forces—again raising the specter of outright Russian military victory. By dramatically increasing defense budgets, adapting to the lessons of the battlefield, and drawing on a defense-industrial alliance with China and Iran, Russia reconstituted its forces in a manner that threatens to destabilize Ukrainian defenses—and might have recovered enough capability to cause real concern about NATO defenses elsewhere.

This should prompt leaders in NATO capitals to ask whether the Alliance is currently capable of deterring or defeating Russia on the battlefield. It is no simple question. War is a matter not just of aggregate economic output, but also of national will, alliance cohesion, geography, and combat readiness. Over the past two years, Russia has learned important lessons from the war and has managed to partially transform its armed forces to meet the operational requirements of the digital age. Through the invasion, the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation have developed a strong—though costly—conventional warfighting capability and an established command structure. When critical capabilities—such as mobilization, medical evacuation and treatment, and the development of the defense industry—are factored in, the experience the Kremlin has gained from the Ukrainian battlefield could have critical implications for NATO’s collective defense.

De facto alliances that have emerged alongside the war also carry important warning signs. Russia’s collaboration with Iran and the contributions of China and North Korea to the Russian war effort are important harbingers of a new global security landscape. Compared to the World War II Axis or the former Warsaw Pact of Soviet times, this axis could pose a more effective and powerful threat to the West in relative terms. The resources and global power of the coalition in question are much greater than those of the former Soviet Union. It will be no simple matter to establish a balance of power with such a grouping or deterrence against it. Among other things, it will require Alliance members to do more to leverage the growing strength of one of the Alliance’s heavy hitters in economic and military affairs—Türkiye*—than has been done to date.

Global echoes of conflict

Although the Russian war against Ukraine is being waged in Eastern Europe, important developments in other areas of the world, such as Africa and the Middle East, can be linked to it. Military coups on the African continent bear Russian fingerprints and have led to a reduction in US and French access and military cooperation. The war in Gaza, in addition to being a humanitarian disaster, has led to a rise in anti-Israel and anti-Western sentiment, especially in the Global South, taking pressure off of Russia and benefiting China.

The defense of Ukraine has revealed significant gaps in the defense-industrial capabilities of the NATO Alliance, raising questions about its ability to mobilize for extended conventional conflicts. Crises such as China-Taiwan tensions and North Korea’s missile tests cast a gloomy shadow over such conversations. Considering that some of the former security mechanisms, such as strategic arms-control agreements and the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE), are no longer in effect, the global threat environment for NATO is worsening at an alarming pace. NATO has noticed the shifting environment, and has taken steps toward strengthening deterrence and a reliable global security architecture. War planners understand what might not always be obvious to the broader public in NATO nations—that to be effective, NATO’s strategic and operational framework needs to fully integrate the evolving technical and military capabilities of all NATO members, including Türkiye. However, steps by NATO members that are also European Union (EU) members to keep non-EU members of the Alliance outside the EU Military and Defense Industry Structure indicates there might be a problem.

Reforging and refocusing NATO

NATO, which during the Cold War focused on defense against in-area threats, has increasingly taken on a broader, and more global, mission set. This stance manifested itself regionally first, with intervention in the Balkans, then globally with interventions in Afghanistan and Libya. However, NATO’s withdrawal from Afghanistan has created doubt about the organization’s effectiveness and its global credibility. It is critical that NATO learn important lessons from these past crises, and especially from Russia’s current war, and adapt its structure properly.

Following the strategic concept published in 2022, NATO is expected to review its command and force structures and defense planning system to adapt to the contemporary security situation. In this context, one of the most important issues NATO is working on is the effective use of digital-age technologies for defense purposes.

NATO’s permanent and internationally manned command structure is an important force multiplier. Reviewing the NATO command structure in the coming period, with an approach based on the space-land battle concept as well as the multidomain operation concept, will enable it to respond effectively to the needs of the age. In this digital era, big data (BD) and artificial intelligence (AI) have a significant impact on command-and-control (C2) activities. A C2 system based on the OODA (observe, orient, decide, act) loop approach and utilizing BD and AI has become an imminent necessity. Such a system will have significant impacts on software, hardware, and, more importantly, on the working procedures at headquarters. Staff officers and commanders should get used to working in a data-centric manner. Such an approach will have significant implications for NATO’s command structure, both physically and in terms of working procedures. Naturally, accelerating the military decision-making cycle will be an important force multiplier.

NATO gained an important capability by establishing high-readiness, corps-level headquarters in its force structure. NATO may also review these headquarters and come up with new doctrines to meet contemporary requirements. Combined with AI-augmented C2 capabilities, manned and unmanned units could increase the effectiveness of these headquarters. The realization of commonly funded unmanned units may increase the effectiveness of the NATO force structure.

Defense planning should be another area of focus for future posturing. In NATO defense planning, especially in determining operational requirements, shifting from a capability-based approach to a threat- and technology-based approach would be appropriate and useful in guiding allied countries in preparing their forces. Because of the Cold War era, NATO is no stranger to a threat-based approach, and a similar approach can be tailored to today’s security landscape. Additionally, more emphasis should be placed on harnessing technological resources to build military capabilities, integrating off-the-shelf products in this structure, and encouraging the design of future concepts and systems using digital engineering approaches. The defense planning system should also contribute to the establishment and maintenance of a decent Alliance-wide defense-technological industrial base (DTIB). NATO has taken important measures to enhance deterrence and increase combat readiness on its eastern border. These measures could be reconsidered to include critical regions such as Africa. Naturally, the measures taken will not be the same as those on the eastern border. The modifications should account for the conditions and security needs of the particular regions.

Türkiye’s past and potential contributions

In its seventy-two years of membership, Türkiye has duly fulfilled all its obligations to NATO. Türkiye was a cornerstone of Western deterrence of Soviet aggression throughout the decades of the Cold War, and provided robust military and political contributions to NATO operations in Bosnia and Kosovo. In Afghanistan, Türkiye agreed to operate the airport in Kabul, which was crucial to the Alliance’s mission. During the most critical period, it successfully assumed command of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and fulfilled its responsibilities as a framework nation. More recently, Ankara successfully evacuated NATO personnel, as well as political and military staff, from the airport under highly challenging conditions and in coordination with allies. On several occasions, Türkiye responded immediately to NATO’s requests for airborne warning, despite its own needs. Also, Türkiye’s important contributions to missile defense are well known within the Alliance.

The Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) of the 2020s are an experienced and successful warfighting organization. The TAF has conducted operations in various parts of the world, particularly in Syria and Iraq. These operations cover a wide spectrum, from classical operations to peacekeeping, and include specialized missions in mountainous regions. The planning and conduct of operations in Libya, Syria, and the Caucasus all required considerable capacity and professionalism. Almost all of the missions conducted have been at the large-scale, strategic, or operational levels. The planning, preparation, execution, and replanning of these operations within the framework of subsequent operations require considerable professionalism. These operations faced different types of adversaries, geographical conditions, logistical challenges, and casualty risks, further demonstrating the TAF’s flexibility and combat readiness.

The TAF is among the world’s leading armies in the use of unmanned systems, especially unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). The Turkish defense industry and military services have reached an important level in the preparation of combat concepts, and the design, production, and use of unmanned systems. The experience gained in the field of UAVs has also led to important developments for unmanned sea vehicles (USVs) and unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs). The Turkish Armed Forces continue their transition into the digital age. With a high level of combat readiness and significant defense-industry support, Ankara’s improving military capabilities will continue to make important contributions to global security and NATO. Turkish defense-technological advances—combined with recent combat experience, strategically valuable geography, and militarily-relevant resources (especially industrial capabilities and manpower)—mean that Türkiye’s potential future contributions to the Alliance are even more critical than those it has made in the past.

Stumbling blocks

Unfortunately, for several reasons, NATO has not been able to utilize Türkiye’s capacity sufficiently. One reason is the marginalization of Turkish threat perceptions by a number of Alliance members. This includes the attitude of certain members toward the Kurdish Workers’ Party (PKK) and its Syrian branch known as the PYD. Naturally, Turks see the PKK as an existential threat, and Ankara expects its allies to stand on its side—but a number of allies support the group tacitly or, more directly, via its Syrian affiliate. Secondly, Ankara’s stance on the Fethullah Terrorist Organization (FETO), which is blamed for the 2016 coup attempt against the Turkish government, is similarly met with a mixture of skepticism and disregard by some Alliance members. Even accounting for the fact that domestic views on the PKK and FETO in member countries vary significantly, the simple fact is that failing to respect an ally’s threat perceptions—or, in some cases, actually strengthening the hand of those threats—undermines one of the pillars of Alliance cohesion.

Domestic political sentiment in NATO member countries sometimes creates resistance to supporting the Alliance, and Turkish public opinion is frequently targeted, and easily inflamed, through provocations involving religion. For example, burnings of the Quran in Sweden and Finland, two countries in the process of becoming new NATO members, crossed the line of unacceptability for Türkiye’s predominantly Muslim population. From a military point of view, these incidents hold important lessons and deeply impact NATO’s cohesion and unity. They could cause significant damage to NATO’s center of gravity—cohesion—which, in turn, could hurt the Alliance’s overall operational readiness. It goes without saying that such events could cause much more significant results and leave NATO open to exploitation by an adversary during a crisis. Lastly, defense-industrial restrictions and bans by some allies have also negatively affected Turkish, and thus NATO, combat readiness. Most recently, the denial of Ankara’s desired F-35 fighter jets and difficulties over the procurement of air-defense systems have had both positive and negative consequences. While the F-16V deal recently went through, the continued denial of systems such as F-35 fighter jets and the imposition of embargoes caused the Turkish defense industry to stand more firmly on its own feet, and these denials continue to hurt NATO’s combat readiness level.

Conclusion

The Russian war on Ukraine and other unfolding developments in global security point to the need for NATO to take important measures for the future that make it capable of responding to the security threats of the digital age. In this sense, it is important to both solidify the cohesion of NATO and make modifications that will facilitate sufficient use of the combat experience of the Turkish Armed Forces. Under this effort, a review of the TAF’s role in NATO’s victorious emergence from the Cold War would give useful insights for NATO’s future posturing, combat readiness, and defense planning. It will not be enough for the Alliance’s military and civilian officials to recognize the need for a better “Türkiye strategy” moving forward—the national governments in member states need to review past restrictions and actions in light of this need.

Yavuz Türkgenci is a recently retired three-star general in the Turkish Armed Forces whose career spanned several offices, including western European Union and NATO posts and as the commandant of the Turkish Third Field Army. He holds a doctorate in security strategy design and management.

*This article refers to “Türkiye,” the country name that the Turkish government and United Nations officially adopted in 2022.

Explore other issues

The post Türkiye and the Russian military threat to NATO appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Drones and more: Turkish defense cooperation trends in the air

Can Kasapoglu — Tue, 25 Jun 2024 00:00:00 +0000

The Turkish defense technological and industrial base has reached a critical mass across certain segments. The successful trajectory of the unfolding projects manifests a new reality in the realm of air power. While the Bayraktar TB-2, aka the “flying Kalashnikov” by Baykar, has made most of the headlines, the Turkish drone program is not merely about that. Turkey has built a reputable edge in designing wide range of high-value assets.

In the drone warfare segment, Baykar’s unmanned combat aircraft Kizilelma and the company’s high-altitude drone equipped with high-end weapons, Akinci, as well as Turkish Aerospace Industries’ flying wing, stealthy unmanned combat aircraft Anka-3 loom large as some examples. Even more importantly, the Anka-3 and Kizilelma are designed to fly within the loyal wingman concept alongside manned aircraft, which is technically a sixth-generation tactical military aviation feature, presaging the future horizons of Turkish defense planning.

In the manned fighter jet segment, Kaan, formerly known as the Milli Muharip Uçak, presents interesting takeaways to grasp the Turkish defense industry’s international dynamics. In February 2024, Turkey’s indigenous, stealth combat aircraft, Kaan, conducted its maiden flight. Besides painting a shiny picture of the future of Turkish air power, Kaan also sheds light on some of the ongoing capability limitations of the nation’s defense technological and industrial base (DTIB). The first problem pertains to the jet’s power configuration. The initial batches, and the prototype of the aircraft, fly with the F-110 engines that power the F-16 fighter jet, illustrating a clear dependency.

With the rising trajectory and still-in-place limitations of the Turkish DTIB’s air power generation capacity, one has to answer two political-military questions pertaining to the nature of defense business: First, what kind of an arms exporter is Turkey to become considering its aerial assets? Will it follow a more reserved model, such as Germany? Or a more business-friendly one like France? Or, will it pursue more of a market disrupter role like China? Second, how will the nation’s foreign collaboration network take shape?

Turkey’s defense cooperation outlook

From a geopolitical standpoint, Turkey’s success in unmanned aerial technologies has positioned it as a burgeoning drone-exporting nation within the transatlantic Alliance.

Indeed, Turkey’s drone warfare success, at least in the headlines, started with the Bayraktar TB-2’s combat record in Syria and Libya. Still, to grasp the Turkish drone warfare’s defense diplomacy dimension, one has to know more about other operators of the drone.

Both in the second Nagorno-Karabakh War and the ongoing Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the Turkish Bayraktar TB-2 has helped the operating countries, Azerbaijan and Ukraine, in the hard turning points of their respective quests. Having proven its combat performance, the TB-2 paved the way for a fruitful strategic collaboration with these nations. A series of cooperative production deals between the Turkish drone manufacturer Baykar, and Ukraine and Azerbaijan, respectively, stand out as important examples of such defense industry collaborations. More importantly, having capitalized on the TB-2’s combat performance, Baykar established defense companies in Kyiv and Baku. But these are not one-way journeys. The engine collaboration for the Kizilelma drone with Kyiv, for example, has opened a new chapter in Ukrainian-Turkish military ties. At present, Ukraine also eyes engine deals for Turkey’s manned combat aircraft segment.

In the manned aircraft segment, a careful assessment of Kaan’s export portfolio would explain Turkey’s defense diplomacy outlook for its advanced solutions. To keep the unit costs at manageable levels, Turkey needs to find lucrative deals to market the aircraft. Yet Kaan will enter an international market characterized by fierce competition. Therefore, transforming the Kaan into an attractive platform for clients seeking either enhanced fourth- or the more advanced fifth-generation fighter jets will be a critical priority, especially at a time when the F-35 dominates the Euro-Atlantic market and when other alternatives, such as the Rafale by Dassault Aviation of France and soon the South Korean KF-21 Boramae by Korea Aerospace Industries, are seeking to capture the remainder of the pie globally. SAAB’s Gripen, on the other hand, is losing its market share. All in all, Paris and Seoul are aiming to increase their market share in critical arms industries, indicating that Turkey will also face heavy competition. The Kaan could function as a geopolitical ledger that opens the path for new international partnerships. The combat aircraft will likely offer an effective solution to countries that cannot procure F-35s such as Pakistan or the Gulf Arab nations, due to a series of sensitive political impediments; though the latter may impinge on Seoul’s interest in selling its new Boramae. Another natural target for Turkey’s multirole combat solution would be militaries that want to replace their Soviet era-remnant arsenals with a defense ecosystem that is in line with NATO standards, such as the non-NATO former Soviet space, which has traditionally been Russia’s markets. In this regard, Azerbaijan and Ukraine loom large as two particularly interesting potential operator nations as Kaan’s export market slowly takes shape in the coming years.

The geopolitical showdown ahead

From a defense economics standpoint, Turkey’s serious air power projects, such as high-end drones and advanced manned aircraft, will also help the West to counterbalance its great power competitors in the international arms market. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Moscow and Beijing constituted around 16 percent and 5.2 percent of the global arms exports between 2018 and 2022, respectively, although the former’s share decreased following its stumbling invasion in Ukraine. Yet China continues to pose a real risk to the NATO members’ overall weapons market presence in several regions.

China has already snatched up the Middle Eastern drone market amid a long absence of American solutions due to restrictions. Turkey’s drone sales to the Gulf, and recently Egypt, offered a critical comeback to tackle the Chinese share in the unmanned aerial systems segment. In the coming years, China’s potential presence in the Middle Eastern manned aircraft market will be among the highest priorities to track. The Kaan can offer some help in this respect.

Therefore, it is important to note that, unlike popular speculations in the Turkish press, the Kaan will not compete with the F-35 head-on. Instead, it will introduce an alternative, NATO-grade solution in the manned aircraft segment that can be delivered to the nations that cannot purchase the F-35. While it will directly compete with the combat aircraft of Russia and China, both Korea and France will join the contest. The million-dollar question, for now, is about who will dominate the Gulf manned aircraft market in the absence of F-35.

Extending technology transfers in the drone warfare realm

Along with market opportunities, Turkey’s limits in arms transfers and coproduction deals remain key to understanding how the nation’s defense business will play out in the near term.

The Akinci is an interesting example, as it illustrates how the Turkish DTIB is evolving around high-end platforms. Akinci’s weapon systems configuration, featuring Turkey’s first aeroballistic missile, TRG-230-İHA, and a stand-off missile (SOM) baseline of cruise missiles, transforms the platform into a deep strike asset. The high-altitude long endurance (HALE) drone can also fly up to 40,000 feet (out of the engagement envelope of short-to-medium air defense systems). Looming large as one of the most capable platforms in the Turkish export portfolio, Akinci has started to leave a footprint in the international weapons market. In the summer of 2023, Baykar signed a historic export and coproduction deal with the state-owned Saudi Arabian Military Industries for local production and technology transfer. Roketsan and Aselsan, the primary manufacturers of the platform’s critical weapon systems configuration and sensors, were also included in the deals.

Baykar’s deal with the United Arab Emirates’ Edge Group to arm the Bayraktar TB-2 with Emirati payloads in early 2024 is another notable example. The procurement package marked the first instance of a Turkish drone maker certifying foreign munitions to be integrated into its platforms.

Last, having monitored the Ukrainian military’s successful TB-2 employment at the outset of the conflict, the TB-2 is also expanding its footprint in NATO markets. Following Poland, Romania has purchased the drone in a lucrative deal.

Next up

During the Cold War, Turkey—a NATO nation standing up to more than twenty Soviet Red Army divisions—remained a decades-long net arms importer. Thus, perhaps the country’s transformation into a key arms exporter, especially in advanced technologies such as drone warfare assets, has marked one of the most important developments in the Euro-Atlantic security affairs in the twenty-first century.

The Turkish model comes with successes and limitations. Turkey’s shipyards are now capable of designing principal surface combatants, frigates, and corvettes. In the submarine segment, however, especially in air-independent propulsion systems, Turkey’s needs foreign collaboration. Likewise, the Turkish defense industry can produce most of the land warfare solutions, albeit, the national tank program, Altay, still awaits its entry into the army’s arsenal. The aerial systems segment in not a different one compared to the naval and land warfare segments. In the air, the Turkish aerial drone design and production prowess is one of the best in the international weapons market. The manned aircraft segment, nonetheless, is lagging behind. As to high-end systems, manned or unmanned, engine configuration will continue to be troublesome for years to come. Turkey’s calculus goes well beyond merely becoming an off-the-shelf arms supplier. Ankara aims to establish deep-rooted ties in the market nations while paving the way to bring those nations’ capabilities to Turkey’s DTIB when possible, as is the case with the Ukrainian industries. Drones are still pioneering the Turkish defense outreach in the air. The path of Kaan, as well as the unmanned combat aircraft/loyal wingman projects, Kizilelma and Anka-3, will determine the final trajectory of the nation’s defense business outlook in the air.

Can Kasapoglu is a non-resident senior fellow at Hudson Institute. Follow him on Twitter @ckasapoglu1.

Explore other issues

The post Drones and more: Turkish defense cooperation trends in the air appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Sweden’s NATO accession: A twenty-month square dance

Rich Outzen — Tue, 25 Jun 2024 00:00:00 +0000

Square dancing is a time-honored American folk tradition involving four couples, energetic movements with rotating partners, intricate footwork, and a good deal of hidden coordination. When done well, the outward effect is spirited and graceful, if subtly frantic. For the unskilled, there can be awkward collisions and slips, ending in a tumble. There is often a degree of muddling through, with flying elbows and a missed turn or two. The dance represents a multilateral coordination challenge, unlike, say, the passionate pairing of the tango or an exquisite variation by a solo ballerina.

NATO has just gone through something like a twenty-month square dance. Shortly after Russia’s February 2022 invasion of Ukraine, Sweden and Finland applied to join NATO. Turkey and Hungary delayed the Finns for nearly a year (March 2023), and the Swedes even longer (with Turkey approving accession in late January 2024 and Hungary approving ın late February 2024). The twenty-month process was complicated, involving bargaining among multiple partners with common direction but conflicting agendas and styles: applicants (Sweden and Finland), ratifiers (Turkey and Hungary), facilitators (NATO leadership and the Biden administration), and would-be spoilers (Russia and the US Congress). With the process only recently concluded, some analysts erroneously attribute its drawn-out nature to one man—Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan—and his domestic political needs, personal business interests, and/or supposed Russophilia. Given an explicit Turkish criterion has been lax Swedish policies regarding the anti-Turkish Partiya Karkaren Kurdistan (Kurdish Workers’ Party, or PKK), does this make sense? The real, if complicated, story of divergent interests nested within a mutually beneficial proposition—and the diplomatic choreography that ultimately reconciled them—deserves a more nuanced telling.

Partners on the square

Two partners in this dance, Finland and Sweden, functioned as leads. Their decision to apply stemmed from the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Abandoning traditions of armed neutrality centuries or decades in the making—Sweden and Finland, respectively—both sought security guarantees after Putin’s menace toward neighbors had been made clear. Sweden brings strategically significant territory, military forces, and defense industry into the Alliance. Finns have recent memory of fighting the Russians, and provide a strong anchor to limit Russian ambitions in the far north.

Turkey and Hungary dragged their feet, and NATO bylaws require unanimity. This caused significant grumbling in Washington and other Western capitals, where the Turkish rationale for nonapproval—toleration of PKK activities in both countries—was seen as exaggerated, and Hungary’s objections as a mere echo of Erdoğan’s. Whatever other motives Ankara and Budapest had—demanding defense industrial cooperation, muting human-rights criticism, and/or influencing Washington—the differential speed of accession for Finland and Sweden suggests the PKK factor at play for the latter (but really not the former) was no pretext. Turkish policy analysts, including Erdoğan’s opposition, saw PKK recruitment, propaganda, and fundraising in Sweden as the crux of the matter, and believe delaying accession led to positive remedial steps by Sweden. Turkish parliamentarians considered Swedish implementation of the June 2022 Trilateral Memorandum alongside incentives from Brussels and Washington as central criteria for approval.

For NATO and the White House, bringing applicants and approvers into line was no simple hop, skip, and jump. NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg conducted an intensive effort over the twenty months to reconcile Turkish concerns with those of the aspiring Nordic candidates. Stoltenberg praised Turkey after Finland’s admission, and pressed in positive terms for the addition of Sweden, coaxing and cajoling Erdoğan and Hungary’s Viktor Orbán at summits and in bilateral engagements. The Biden administration constructed a set of interlocking assurances that ended a de facto arms embargo on Turkey by the United States, Canada, and others; strengthened bilateral strategic dialogue; signaled intent to curtail a US partnership with a PKK-affiliated militia in Syria; and convinced Congress that F-16 sales to Turkey in exchange for Swedish accession was a sound deal.

Two parties on the periphery of the proverbial square made their presence felt too, each with incentive to trip the fancy footwork or stop the music altogether. One was Russia, which responded to the prospect of Finnish and Swedish NATO membership with threats of military escalation and the revival of dormant border disputes. Some commentators speculated that Erdoğan’s delays were less about supposedly exaggerated PKK concerns than about currying favor with Putin—with Orbán’s delay about pleasing both men. Moscow expressed its displeasure about NATO expansion early and often, undoubtedly doing what it could to exacerbate skepticism toward the Swedish bid, but failed in the end to stop accession. The US Congress nearly undid the Biden administration’s carefully constructed arrangement by hinting US arms sales to Turkey would not resume even if Ankara approved Sweden’s entry. Not only Senator Robert Menendez, well known as Ankara’s bête noire, but other key members of the House and Senate foreign affairs committees intimated that F-16s would only be approved after a broader set of behavioral modifications by the Turks. It took months of effort by the US ambassador to Turkey, Jeff Flake, and State Department officials to lobby Flake’s former congressional colleagues, and soften their resistance by linking Turkish F-16s to the sale of F-35 fighters to neighboring Greece. These efforts finally paid off in the January 2024 decisions by Turkish and American legislators to approve Sweden’s accession and Turkey’s aircraft, respectively.

Sweden and the PKK

Acknowledging the complexity of the Nordic accession story does not negate the role that Western policies toward the PKK played in Turkish calculus. Sweden has a complicated history regarding PKK presence and activities in the country. In the 1980s Sweden first banned, then tacitly accepted PKK presence. During the 1990s a significant number of Kurdish immigrants settled in Sweden, some with PKK sympathies, and took advantage of Sweden’s liberal criminal and terror laws to conduct recruitment, propaganda, and fundraising activities on behalf of the organization. PKK founder Abdullah Öcalan considered the role of Europe, and Sweden in particular, as a crucial rear support base—a role which did not change after the United States and the European Union designated the group as a terrorist organization.

Sweden’s tolerance—is it an affinity?—for the PKK movement deepened significantly with the rise of its Syrian affiliate, the People’s Protection Units (aka the YPG), as the Western-supported ground force battling the Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) in Syria. Social Democrat-led center-left coalitions in Sweden from 2014 to 2022 espoused “the Kurdish cause,” Swedish political leaders met with and feted YPG leaders, and the government provided funding for the group’s de facto administration in northeast Syria. These actions created growing dissatisfaction in Ankara—and coincided with shifting Swedish views about NATO membership based on the war in Ukraine. The tension between treating the PKK and its affiliates as Kurdish civil society groups and asking Turkey to approve Sweden’s NATO application was taken seriously by the conservative government that assumed office in 2022. Building on proposals initially considered by the previous Social Democrat government, legal reforms were enacted to criminalize terror support activities on Swedish soil, whereas previously, membership and support were not indictable so long as no violent terror acts were carried out within Sweden. Those reforms took full effect in mid-2023, but Swedish officials have recognized that the problem runs deep and substantive progress will take time. There has been growing concern in Sweden about criminal, gang, and terror activities in Swedish cities, of which PKK activities form but a part. It is hardly surprising that PKK protests targeted the legal reforms, while agitating against Sweden’s NATO bid itself.

Sweden changes tune

In addition to the aforementioned constitutional reforms, diplomatic sources indicated that Sweden posted permanent security liaison staff in Ankara and provided Turkish officials regular access to security ministries in Stockholm, long-standing requests from the Turks. The new laws, if vigorously implemented, might resolve most of Ankara’s concerns, though provocations blurring the line between incitement and free speech have convinced Swedish authorities that even more tightening is needed.

There has not been much in the way of actual arrests or deportations. PKK financier Yahya Gungor was convicted and ordered deported, but his expulsion was overturned on appeal. PKK sympathizer Mehmet Kokulu was extradited for drug offenses, largely because the Swedish court found little evidence of political activities. PKK activist Mahmut Tat was extradited in December 2022 for PKK membership, shortly after Swedish Foreign Minister Tobias Billström acknowledged the need to put distance between his country and the terror organization. Billström later described PKK activities in Sweden as “quite wide-ranging.” Swedish accession negotiator Oscar Stenström conceded in early 2023 that “a non-negligible part of the funding of the organization emanates from Sweden.” As European Police (EUROPOL) reports have noted, PKK continues to raise money in Sweden via kampanya, a fundraising campaign that targets the Kurdish diaspora community, is referred to as a tax, and is alleged to involve harassment and extortion. Europol separately points to group members allegedly involved in “organised crime activities such as money laundering, racketeering, extortion and drug trafficking.”

Lack of trust in Sweden’s ability to deliver helps explain why Ankara required inducements from Washington and Brussels. Ömer Özkizilcik, an Ankara-based analyst, assessed that as a stand-alone proposition, Sweden’s counter-PKK enforcement was insufficient:

Sweden has taken steps, but they are not enough. We still see PKK supporters marching in Sweden with PKK flags. Sweden—unlike Germany, for example—has not banned PKK symbols. More importantly, the PKK network is still active and the Swedish law enforcement has to take strong action and dismantle it. The PKK network operates in a quadrangle between France, Belgium, Germany, and Sweden. In this quadrangle, Sweden is the most progressive democracy. Turkey hopes that Sweden will become a positive example for other European nations. Turkey may bomb and eliminate the PKK in Iraq and Syria, but in Europe, the fight against the PKK is diplomatic.

Therein lies a central logic of ultimate Turkish approval: demonstrating to other European countries that enforcing counterterror laws against the PKK is compatible with democratic governance.

Soner Cagaptay of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy has argued that the PKK itself took steps to delay or derail accession:

Turkey was about to finalize and ratify in October, and the day the Parliament came back into session the PKK carried out a terror attack in Ankara, making it politically impossible to ratify. The PKK wanted to delay ratification, which would result in F-16s for Türkiye and a reset in the US-Turkish relations. The PKK dimension is easy for analysts working at a distance to dismiss as Erdoğan grandstanding. But one thing about Erdoğan is that he’s very good at making what is good for Türkiye good for him. He doesn’t make these conflicts or concerns up—but he is very good at using them to boost his image.

Squaring up anew

It can be tempting to oversimplify the accession affair or dismiss it as unnecessary, unseemly, or capricious—but to do so is to misread context, dynamics, and implications. Such a misread might also incline an observer to miss the significant potential openings the process has created for the Alliance, above and beyond the addition of two new members. Those members certainly are welcome in terms of the geographical and military dimensions of the Alliance. Successful negotiation of Swedish accession required patience and creativity, given the low-trust environment prevailing in recent years between two of the main actors, the United States and Turkey. This might create a virtuous cycle, where other positive developments take root as a more conducive tone emerges. One possibility is broader defense industrial cooperation on new projects, as the first major US-Turkish arms deal in a generation gets off the ground. Another might be a more sustainable, and less hypocritical, approach by European countries toward criminal and terror-related activities in their urban centers, with Sweden as a test case. As NATO does a more complete job of accounting for the security concerns of a cornerstone member (Turkey) beyond the singular threat of Russia, intra-Alliance frictions should attenuate significantly. As with most dances, a degree of theater was involved—but where the couples go after the music stops may be more interesting than the show.

Rich Outzen is a geopolitical consultant and nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council in Turkey with thirty-two years of government service both in uniform and as a civilian. Follow him on Twitter @RichOutzen.

Explore other issues

Philippe Dickinson: Rutte must keep the Alliance unified to finish his predecessor’s job

The post Sweden’s NATO accession: A twenty-month square dance appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Experts react: Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte will be NATO’s next secretary general. How will he lead the Alliance?

Atlantic Council experts — Thu, 20 Jun 2024 19:56:13 +0000

NATO’s Dutch tilt is official. After a seven-month campaign, outgoing Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte received unanimous approval from all thirty-two NATO member states to become the Alliance’s next secretary general. Rutte won his last remaining necessary endorsement from Romania on Thursday. A staunch advocate of military aid for Ukraine with a political reputation as a conservative consensus-builder, Rutte will take office in early October after current Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg steps down. How will Rutte navigate the war in Ukraine, efforts to bolster European security, and an upcoming US election with massive implications for the future of the Alliance? Below, our experts reveal the answers.

Click to jump to an expert analysis:

Rachel Rizzo: Rutte could be the key to ‘Trump-proofing’ the Alliance

Dominykas Kaminskas: Rutte has an outstanding track record, but he has ‘a mammoth task’ ahead of him

James J. Townsend Jr.: NATO’s adversaries can see it close ranks around a new leader at the Washington summit

Rutte must keep the Alliance unified to finish his predecessor’s job

History will look kindly on Stoltenberg’s stewardship of NATO. Throughout his ten years as secretary general, he has navigated major shifts in geopolitics to imbue NATO with renewed purpose and direction. But how NATO navigates the challenges of the next decade will determine the long-term future of the world’s most successful alliance.

The in-tray for Rutte, the Dutch prime minister since 2010, is daunting: reinforcing defense and deterrence across the Alliance in the face of a hostile and bellicose Russia, helping Ukraine to defeat Russia and welcoming Kyiv into the Alliance, and establishing NATO’s role in dealing with the rising challenge posed by China. And he must manage these priorities all while evolving the Alliance to keep up with fast-paced technological change and without neglecting NATO’s counterterrorism and crisis management responsibilities.

But the preeminent challenge is a political one. Rutte will take the reins of NATO at a time of significant political uncertainty across the Alliance. The new secretary general will have to manage whatever configuration of leaders the electorates in Europe and North America choose in the coming months. From his many years in Dutch politics and on the international stage, Rutte is an adroit balancer of political relationships. Much has been made about his role as a “Trump whisperer,” and it is this political savvy that helped him secure the job. This political savvy will be put to the test to an unprecedented extent in the years ahead. How he handles that test will determine whether he completes the good work of his laudable predecessor.

—Philippe Dickinson is the deputy director of the Transatlantic Security Initiative within the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security and a former career diplomat for the United Kingdom.

Rutte could be the key to ‘Trump-proofing’ the Alliance

At last, NATO allies are poised to agree on Rutte as the Alliance’s next secretary general. This decision has been a long time coming, as allies have extended Stoltenberg’s term four times by unanimous consent.

Rutte will bring a wealth of pragmatic governance experience to his role as the new secretary general. Nicknamed “the Trump whisperer,” Rutte’s leadership of NATO comes at a critical time, as he will assume the position less than a month before the US presidential election. Should Donald Trump, famously critical of NATO and European “free riders,” win a second term as US president, allies feel confident that Rutte is the key to Trump-proofing the alliance. He’s seen as cool, calm, and collected. He knows how to handle big egos, he’s worked with Trump before (even praising him at times), and he understands the need for European allies to increase their share of the burden of European security.

Finally, Rutte has demonstrated strong Dutch support for Ukraine, including by sending F-16 fighter jets to help Kyiv fend off Russia’s brutal assault. So will the Alliance look different under Rutte’s leadership? His predecessor, Stoltenberg, is known as a master of diplomacy, deftly handling the now thirty-two-strong Alliance so that it speaks with one voice, a crucial art given the complex geopolitics both within and beyond Europe’s borders. We should expect Rutte to be skilled at this as well. After all, he’s led his country as prime minister for the last fourteen years.

—Rachel Rizzo is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center.

Rutte has an outstanding track record, but he has ‘a mammoth task’ ahead of him

Rutte will take office at a decisive moment for NATO. With a lot of talk about unity surrounding the Alliance’s seventy-fifth anniversary and the upcoming summit in Washington, it’s important to not only project it, but to ensure it. It’s hard to think of anyone who would be better fit for this task than Rutte, his already-outstanding track record again confirmed by getting the thirty-two allies to sign off on his candidacy.

Make no mistake, this will still be a mammoth task, even for someone with his experience. Despite all the talk about NATO being the strongest, the largest, and the best in so many different ways, it is also the most diverse it has ever been. Rutte can be very pragmatic, but at a time when the rules-based order is under serious threat, NATO requires leadership that will have to go beyond what everyone can agree on. We know the Dutch prime minister can find consensus when it’s difficult, but whether he will be able to get allies to make sacrifices and decisions that they might not otherwise be comfortable making remains to be seen.

—Dominykas Kaminskas is a visiting fellow with the Transatlantic Security Initiative.

NATO’s adversaries will see it close ranks around a new leader at the Washington summit

Stoltenberg gave a master class in how to keep the Alliance together during both political turbulence and war. He will hand off this legacy to Rutte, the seasoned Dutch leader who must now carry it forward and make it his own. To keep NATO together in time of war takes a strength of character that Rutte has in abundance and a political savvy that will help him work over, around, and through obstacles most leaders never have to confront. In this year, Rutte needs the full support not just of the allies, but of the International Staff and the NATO military authorities as well.

Leadership change at NATO is hard, especially after a tenure as long as Stoltenberg’s. But the July summit is the time for NATO’s adversaries to see the Alliance closing ranks behind one of Europe’s most seasoned leaders as we also say farewell to one of NATO’s greatest secretaries general.

—James J. Townsend Jr. is a senior advisor in the Scowcroft Center’s Transatlantic Security Initiative.

The post Experts react: Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte will be NATO’s next secretary general. How will he lead the Alliance? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Rethinking the NATO burden-sharing debate

Valbona Zeneli, Philippe Dickinson — Thu, 20 Jun 2024 14:55:35 +0000

“The American well can run dry.” That was US President Dwight D. Eisenhower’s message to European allies in 1953, just four years after NATO was founded. With commitments in East Asia stretching US resources, the time had come for Europe to bear its share of the burden of collective defense.

In other words, the burden-sharing debate is nearly as old as NATO itself. Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, the US contribution to NATO’s total spending on defense was above 70 percent. Since then, most US administrations have urged European countries to do more for their security. In public and in private, US presidents and officials have pressed European governments not to neglect military spending—especially in the post–Cold War period, in which European governments scaled down defense budgets and instead prioritized social programs and tax cuts. In 2011, then US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates sounded the same alarm as Eisenhower, only changing the metaphor from water to wealth. Gates warned that

if current trends in the decline of European defense capabilities are not halted and reversed, future US political leaders—those for whom the Cold War was not the formative experience that it was for me—may not consider the return on America’s investment in NATO worth the cost.

At the same time, over the last decade this ongoing debate about burden-sharing has narrowed, unhelpfully, to focus on a single number. The guideline that NATO allies should each spend at least 2 percent of their gross domestic product (GDP) on defense, established in 2014 with the best of intentions, has since taken on an almost totemic quality as the main criterion of an ally’s worth. The search for a simple benchmark has distorted an important, wider debate in the Alliance. Instead, a fuller understanding of what each ally brings to collective defense is needed, and the upcoming Washington summit is where this process should begin.

Why ‘2 percent’ is reductive

Russia’s first invasion of Ukraine in 2014 began to change calculations. At that year’s NATO Summit in Wales, leaders promised to reach a defense spending target of 2 percent of GDP by 2024. Progress has been made toward that target, but it has been uneven. Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 provided yet another impetus for increased spending across European capitals. In German Chancellor Olaf Scholz’s famous Zeitenwende speech, given just days after Russian forces began their all-out assault on Ukraine, he promised that Berlin would finally get serious about meeting the target and allocate an additional one hundred billion euros to a special defense fund.

Last year at the Alliance’s summit in Vilnius, NATO allies renewed their 2 percent pledge and went further, endorsing a Defense Production Action Plan to “accelerate joint procurement, boost interoperability, and generate investment and production capacity.” In 2023, defense spending across European NATO members increased by 19 percent, with around $78 billion dollars of new defense spending, according to data from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). This week, NATO announced that twenty-three of the Alliance’s thirty-two member states are expected to meet the 2 percent target in 2024. This year will also be the first in which European allies’ aggregate spending will surpass 2 percent of their collective GDP.

While Europe is clearly headed in the right direction, the United States remains by far the largest single contributor. According to SIPRI’s database, total US defense spending reached $916 billion in 2023, or 3.36 percent of US GDP. In Europe, the three biggest defense spenders were the United Kingdom ($75 billion), Germany ($68 billion), and France ($61 billion) in 2023. Contrast this with China, which between 2000 and 2023 increased its military spending more than thirteen-fold (from $22 billion to $296 billion) and significantly upgraded its military capabilities. Russia has also increased its defense budget by twelve times (from $9 to $109 billion). Moreover, these estimates, based in part on educated guesswork, may undercount China’s and Russia’s actual defense and security spending.

The danger here is that focusing the burden-sharing debate around a mathematical equation is reductive. It fixes attention on inputs and not requirements. It does not translate into a full understanding of what the real military capabilities of allies are or how they are able to employ those capabilities to benefit NATO and enforce the international order.

What’s more, the 2 percent target is itself an inadequate metric. It is a goalpost that shifts depending on wider national economic fortunes. And it’s ill-defined. Allies have broad discretion to determine what is in the scope of the 2 percent target and to indulge in some creative accounting. For instance, generous pension payouts can inflate a country’s defense budget without contributing much to collective capabilities. Not all 2 percent commitments are the same. The 2014 NATO Summit that set the 2 percent target also included the target that by 2024, a minimum of 20 percent of national defense spending would go toward frontline capabilities, equipment, and research and development. All but two allies are above this mark, according to the most recent data, but these figures fluctuate each year.

How allies can move beyond ‘2 percent’

It is in the interest of individual European allies to demonstrate the tangible ways in which they are contributing to collective defense and deterrence. This includes strengthening conventional forces, including through contributions to multinational deployments on NATO’s eastern flank. It includes showing a proactive readiness to fill the gaps in strategic enablers that the United States currently supplies for Europe’s defense. This means building out airlift capabilities, air-to-air refueling, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance aircraft and platforms. It also means allies need a coherent plan to make smarter use of existing resources across Europe and to develop a strategy for partnering with defense manufacturers to ensure the continuity of critical supplies.

Perhaps most critically now, allies need to get the messaging right. This could start by ditching the notion of collective defense as a “burden” and adopt the language of “responsibility sharing” instead. Reframing the debate would help signal to the public a calm, mature, and committed resolve.

With the NATO Summit taking place in Washington, DC, in July, during a US presidential election campaign, European allies cannot ignore the political context. At the NATO Summit and beyond, they will need to carefully calibrate their messaging to the US public in a way that appeals to both sides of the political aisle. That means, for instance, giving concrete signals that European allies can be relied on as valuable and constructive partners globally, particularly in the Indo-Pacific.

Ultimately, considerations of messaging and politics bring the discussion back to the 2 percent target. It has assumed a particular symbolic potency. As NATO history demonstrates, this debate will remain in one form or another for a long time. Indeed, 2 percent is now spoken of as a “floor and not a ceiling,” with some allies, most vocally Poland, which advocates raising the target to 3 percent. Republican US Senator Roger Wicker recently argued that the United States should be spending as much as 5 percent of its GDP on defense.

As more and more allies cross the 2 percent threshold, and as spending accelerates, it’s time for the conversation to evolve. To consider not just how much is spent, but how it’s spent. To examine how that translates to each ally meaningfully and tangibly taking responsibility for collective defense. That’s a more nuanced message than a simple equation, but the time to start telling that story is now.

Valbona Zeneli is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center and at the Transatlantic Security Initiative of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

Philippe Dickinson is the deputy director of the Transatlantic Security Initiative and a former career diplomat for the United Kingdom.

The post Rethinking the NATO burden-sharing debate appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The view from Kyiv: Why Ukrainian NATO membership is in US interests

Alyona Getmanchuk — Sat, 15 Jun 2024 14:40:58 +0000

In his recent interview with TIME magazine, US President Joe Biden indicated that his skepticism about Ukrainian NATO membership is deep-rooted and goes far beyond any practical opposition to granting Kyiv an invitation to join the alliance while the current war with Russia is still ongoing. It would seem that President Biden does not regard Ukrainian NATO membership as a prerequisite for lasting peace in the region.

Unsurprisingly, the view in wartime Kyiv is strikingly different. Record numbers of Ukrainians now support NATO membership, which is widely seen as the best way to preserve the country’s sovereignty and prevent any future invasions. Crucially, many Ukrainians are also convinced that their country’s NATO accession would be in the national interests of the United States as well as Ukraine itself.

Stay updated

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

There are a number of reasons to believe Ukrainian NATO accession would also be beneficial for the US. These range from military practicalities to potential strategic advantages and geopolitical gains.

First, the United States has an obvious and immediate interest in ending the Russian invasion of Ukraine, as this would allow the US to focus on other pressing domestic and foreign policy priorities. But it is equally clear that the war unleashed by Vladimir Putin in February 2022 will never truly end as long as the issue of Ukraine’s NATO membership remains undecided.

Second, the apparent reluctance of the United States to make a clear commitment regarding future Ukrainian NATO membership sends a dangerous signal to Putin. It encourages him to believe his policy of invading and occupying neighboring countries to prevent them from joining NATO is successful and should be continued.

Eurasia Center events

Read the full article here.

Ukraine’s advance in Kursk: What’s next and implications

Conflict Russia Security & Defense Ukraine

Third, Ukrainian NATO membership is the best way to protect the considerable US investment in Ukrainian security. The United States has invested tens of billions of dollars in security assistance since Russia’s full-scale invasion began more than two years ago. This investment can only be regarded as successful if Ukraine is secure from further Russian attack. At this stage, the only credible way to guarantee Ukrainian security is by providing the country with a road map to NATO membership.

Some critics of military aid to Ukraine have complained about so-called “blank checks” in support of the Ukrainian war effort. While this characterization of aid is misleading, it is worth underlining that NATO accession would likely be a far more economical way of safeguarding Ukraine’s future security than the regular financial support packages the country’s partners currently provide.

Fourth, as a NATO member, Ukraine would be a considerable asset. The Ukrainian military is large, combat-hardened, highly skilled, and boasts unrivaled experience in the realities of modern warfare. In other words, Ukraine’s army is ideally suited to become the core of NATO’s eastern flank. This would significantly enhance European security while reducing the current military burden on the United States, potentially freeing up US forces for deployment elsewhere.

Lastly, Russia’s imperial ambitions did not begin with Vladimir Putin and do not end in Ukraine. Nevertheless, inviting Ukraine to join NATO would represent a powerful blow to the imperial identity cherished by many ordinary Russians and members of the Kremlin elite. Indeed, granting Ukraine membership of the alliance is perhaps the only way to fully convince Russian society that neither the Soviet Union nor the Russian Empire will ever be restored in any form. This would represent a huge gain for the US and for the future of international security.

Alyona Getmanchuk is the founder and director of New Europe Center and a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council Eurasia’s Center.

A Putin summer surprise for NATO? Worries are growing.

Frederick Kempe — Wed, 12 Jun 2024 11:03:00 +0000

Senior Biden administration officials are concerned that Russian President Vladimir Putin has more surprises in store for them regarding Ukraine, timed to disrupt and upstage NATO’s seventy-fifth anniversary summit in Washington from July 9 to 11.

“He wants nothing more than to rain on our parade,” one senior US official recently told me. Some administration officials are considering potential scenarios and possible responses, though giving Ukraine full focus is difficult with the Middle East war and so much else in play.

There is a broad range of possibilities. Putin might, for example, launch an even fiercer and wider summer military offensive in Ukraine than the one currently underway. He may unleash new weaponry, perhaps even a space-based weapon. At the same time, he may advance a more determined (but still disingenuous) peace proposal or ceasefire effort designed mainly to appeal to global opinion, even as NATO members are providing Ukraine more military heft.

Given Putin’s past behavior around major global events, a summer surprise would seem, well, not so surprising. Russia’s invasion of Georgia in 2008 was timed to coincide with the Beijing Summer Olympics; its invasion of Ukraine in 2014 took place during the Winter Olympics in Sochi, Russia; and its second invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 followed a meeting between Putin and Chinese leader Xi Jinping ahead of the Beijing Winter Olympics that year.

Beyond Putin’s fondness for the global spotlight at such moments, there are other reasons to be concerned that this could be a summer of maximum danger for Ukraine, and thus also for the NATO Alliance just days before the Republican and Democratic political conventions in the United States.

The best way to answer—even better, to preempt—any potential Putin summer surprise would be through a surprise of NATO’s own at its summit.

Putin appears determined, even though his position is not enviable. Over the space of several weeks, the US Congress finally approved its big aid package and several countries agreed that Ukraine could use their weapons to target military sites in Russia. France, meanwhile, is quickly developing an initiative to deploy soldiers as trainers in Ukraine. But there is no evidence that any of this has persuaded Putin to reconsider his aggressive plans for Ukraine. Instead, he seems to have decided that he should redouble his offensive this summer, before more US war materiel arrives. Ukraine’s air defenses will remain vulnerable for many weeks to come.

There has been no slowdown in Russia’s ongoing offensive around Kharkiv—even as there has been almost no forward movement for weeks—and Putin’s relentless attacks on Ukraine’s power sources and infrastructure continue to do substantial damage. The Kremlin still has substantial reserves that can be sent into the Kharkiv offensive, to expand the thus far unsuccessful campaign in the Donbas to take Chasiv Yar, or to start a new offensive in the north toward Sumy.

Besides these reserves, there are other factors that encourage Putin. Kyiv continues to face a manpower shortage due principally to a culture that believes young men should not be drafted before reaching their late twenties. The Zelenskyy administration and the Rada recently took a step to solve this problem by lowering the draft age by two years to twenty-five, but this politically difficult decision does not solve the problem of overused frontline troops.

Putin also takes comfort from his reelection in March and his two-day meeting with Xi in Beijing last month. At the same time, he must see the crisis in Gaza and the US election campaign as welcome distractions for US leadership. That’s why a senior US official told me that Putin feels a measure of confidence.

At age seventy-one, Putin has cemented his grip on Russian power, with official results showing that he took 87 percent of the vote in March, an outcome he is using to further justify his war on Ukraine. His new six-year term, should he complete it, would enable him to surpass Joseph Stalin as Russia’s longest-serving leader in two centuries. The subtext: The world will have to deal with an emboldened Russia for the foreseeable future.

Putin’s meeting with Xi in May underscored the Chinese leader’s determination to double down on his support of his Russian counterpart. Xi is doing so despite growing US and European criticism and increased leaks regarding the specifics of how China is enabling and empowering Russia’s continued war.

Speaking about the Ukraine war, Putin thanked Xi for “those initiatives it was putting forward to regulate this problem.” Said Putin, “This partnership is without a doubt exemplary for how the relationship between neighboring states should be.”

“The China-Russia relationship today is hard-earned, and the two sides need to cherish and nurture it,” said Xi.

US President Joe Biden’s recent measures to loosen the restrictions on Ukraine’s use of US weaponry to hit targets inside of Russia would have raised more concerns in Russia had it not been for the limited nature of the lifted restrictions, applying only to areas in Russia from which the eastern city of Kharkiv is being hit.

During his speech commemorating the eightieth anniversary of D-Day last week, Biden drew a direct connection between the fight against fascism in World War II and the Ukraine war. He said the United States would “not walk away” from the conflict. “Because if we do,” he explained, “Ukraine will be subjugated, and it will not end there. Ukraine’s neighbors will be threatened. All of Europe will be threatened.”

Yet Russia’s experience is that Biden’s rhetoric is tougher than his readiness to provide US arms in a manner that would increase Ukraine’s chance of not just survival but victory.

Putin can also be reassured by Biden’s continued reluctance to support Ukraine’s membership in NATO, articulated again in a recent interview with the US president in TIME magazine. Biden’s comments opposing, in his words, the “NATOization of Ukraine” were a preemptive move by the US president before the upcoming NATO Summit. Alliance members will likely provide “a bridge” to NATO for Ukraine but not a time-determined path toward full membership and, with it, the security guarantee that has proven its worth for allies that border Russia.

The same Biden administration officials who worry about a summer surprise are hoping that Ukrainian forces can hold their defensive lines against the Russians in 2024 and then launch a new military offensive in 2025 with replenished supplies of munitions and soldiers. Then Ukraine might regain enough territory to improve its negotiating position.

The best way to answer—even better, to preempt—any potential Putin summer surprise would be through a surprise of NATO’s own at its summit, one that demonstrates a level of unity and purposefulness that would force Putin to rethink his Ukraine ambitions. One such surprise could be a more sharply defined and delineated Ukrainian path to Alliance membership, making clear to Putin that he can’t block that outcome through continued war. Another would be to lift all restrictions on Ukraine’s use of US and other allied weapons, removing once and for all any safe haven for Russian aggressors.

It’s time for Ukraine’s friends, at this moment of maximum danger, to steal the initiative from Putin through policies and practices that shake his confidence and restore Ukrainian momentum.

Wishful thinking remains an inadequate strategy to defeat Putin.

Frederick Kempe is president and chief executive officer of the Atlantic Council. You can follow him on Twitter: @FredKempe.

The post A Putin summer surprise for NATO? Worries are growing. appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Norrlöf interviewed by Project Syndicate on international role of the US dollar

rmurphy — Tue, 11 Jun 2024 16:30:29 +0000

The post Norrlöf interviewed by Project Syndicate on international role of the US dollar appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Building the bridge: How to inject credibility into NATO’s promise of membership for Ukraine

Ian Brzezinski — Mon, 10 Jun 2024 15:23:30 +0000

At a press conference in Prague on May 31, US Secretary of State Antony Blinken promised that the upcoming NATO Summit in Washington will provide Ukraine with a “bridge to NATO membership.” It has already been a long road to get to this point. The Alliance first asserted back in 2008 that Ukraine will become a NATO member state. Sixteen years later, failure to fulfill that pledge has been disillusioning to Ukraine and has contributed to Russian President Vladimir Putin’s confidence that he can resubordinate the country. Another empty promise of membership or a bridge to nowhere would be counterproductive. To be credible, a bridge to NATO membership must be built in a way that institutionalizes Ukraine’s integration into the Alliance’s structures starting now.

It is an unfortunate reality that NATO lacks the consensus necessary to grant Ukraine membership today. At the 2023 NATO Summit in Vilnius, Lithuania, that consensus was narrowly missed when the United States and Germany blocked efforts led by a wide coalition of allies to issue a membership invitation to Kyiv. Nonetheless, the summit was notable for the unprecedented support across NATO allies for Ukraine’s aspirations for membership. Moreover, in the Vilnius Summit Communiqué, the Alliance’s members reaffirmed “the commitment we made at the 2008 Summit in Bucharest that Ukraine will become a member of NATO.”

There is already speculation among NATO watchers about what might be included in Blinken’s proposed bridge to NATO for Ukraine. One possibility is a more robust focus on accession in the NATO-Ukraine Council. Another is the Alliance taking responsibility for generating and coordinating security assistance to Ukraine. A third might even be an expanded NATO role in training Ukrainian soldiers.

While each of these elements would be constructive—especially those that focus on helping Ukraine defeat Russia’s invasion—none inspires great confidence in the Alliance’s pledge to one day grant Kyiv NATO membership. This is because all of those potential elements are engagements in which Ukraine and NATO member states remain on separate sides of the table. While they would help Ukraine, they do not mitigate the perception that Ukraine, after more than a decade and half, remains outside the NATO community.

A bridge to membership will only be credible if it includes elements that tangibly and institutionally further Ukraine’s integration into the Alliance’s structures. Reiterated or reworded promises are no longer sufficient. Institutional integration, not just additional engagement, is the key to making the bridge credible.

At the upcoming Washington summit, NATO can make three decisions that will make Blinken’s bridge to membership tangible and convincing:

First, the Alliance should formally recognize that Ukraine meets the requirements of NATO membership. Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty clearly and simply spells out the requirements of membership: “The Parties may, by unanimous agreement, invite any other European State in a position to further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area to accede to this Treaty.” Ukraine, of course, is situated in Europe. It is an established democracy with a vibrant civil society that has repeatedly conducted free and fair elections. Its democratic resilience was underscored when some of those elections had to withstand active Russian interference. No country is contributing more today—and sacrificing more blood—to defend the security of the North Atlantic area than Ukraine.

When NATO allies deny these realities and assert that Ukraine is not ready for membership, it is immensely disillusioning to Ukraine and undercuts the credibility of the Alliance’s promises of membership. It can only appear to Russia as weakness in the Alliance’s commitment to supporting Ukraine.

Some may argue that recognizing Ukraine’s readiness will reveal the real reason for the West’s failure to grant Ukraine membership—fear of being dragged directly into the war. But that hesitancy is hardly camouflaged by NATO’s refusal to recognize Ukraine’s qualifications. Rightly or wrongly, keeping out of the fight has been an openly stated objective for NATO leaders. Refusing to recognize and applaud Ukraine’s qualifications just foments distrust and frustration in Ukraine to Putin’s benefit.

Second, the Alliance should invite Ukraine to assign military and civilian personnel to take up positions in NATO’s headquarters, agencies, and military command structure. This would enable Ukraine to gain experience in NATO’s institutional culture and procedures and deepen its relationship with NATO and its member states. Ukrainian officials would bring to NATO invaluable—indeed, unmatched—experience, expertise, and insight into how to most effectively fight against Russia’s military forces. As for the security risk of bringing nonmember states into secret NATO deliberations and information, Ukraine is not an issue. No country is more determined than Ukraine when it comes to preventing intelligence from flowing to its adversaries. In fact, Ukraine is probably more reliable in this regard than a number of allies.

NATO defense ministers meet in Brussels, Belgium, October 12-13, 2022, with Finland and Sweden, then NATO invitees, represented by their ministers of defense. Source: NATO.

Third, NATO should grant Ukraine what was granted to other candidate countries invited to cross the bridge to NATO membership—an observer’s seat at the North Atlantic Council (NAC), the Alliance’s decision-making body. In this capacity, Ukraine would not have a vote or veto at the table but would be able to observe and contribute to NAC deliberations. Clearly, Ukrainian officials have perspectives and experiences that would be invaluable to these top-level NATO discussions on how to deter and defend against Russian aggression.

In the decades following the Cold War, Poland, the Baltic states, Romania, and most recently Finland and Sweden sat as observers on the NAC after they were invited to join NATO. A Ukrainian seat at the NAC would be a hugely symbolic demonstration of the Alliance’s determination to grant Ukraine membership. It would resonate powerfully across Ukraine and would chip away at Putin’s confidence in his ability to block Ukraine’s accession to the Alliance.

Since 2008, the mantra that “it is not a matter of if but when Ukraine joins NATO” has grown increasingly hollow, if not counterproductive. If an invitation to join NATO is not possible at the Washington summit, then the Alliance does have options to add needed credibility to its promise of membership to Ukraine. It should exercise them.

Ian Brzezinski is a resident senior fellow with the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security and is a member of the Atlantic Council’s Strategic Advisors Group. He is also a former US deputy assistant secretary of defense for Europe and NATO policy.

NATO’s seventy-fifth anniversary is a milestone in a remarkable story of reinvention, adaptation, and unity. However, as the Alliance seeks to secure its future for the next seventy-five years, it faces the revanchism of old rivals, escalating strategic competition, and uncertainties over the future of the rules-based international order.

The post Building the bridge: How to inject credibility into NATO’s promise of membership for Ukraine appeared first on Atlantic Council.

After honoring D-Day, Macron and Biden embark on a diplomatic sprint for Europe’s security

Léonie Allard — Wed, 05 Jun 2024 21:34:58 +0000

US President Joe Biden’s first state visit to France this week marks both the eightieth anniversary of D-Day and the beginning of a critical few weeks for European security. The commemoration in Normandy will be followed by the Group of Seven (G7) summit in Italy June 11-13, the Switzerland peace summit for Ukraine June 15-16, and the NATO Summit in Washington July 9-11. French President Emmanuel Macron hopes that what happens this week in France sets the tone for each of these subsequent events—and he will start by trying to secure more backing from Biden for a stronger and more independent European defense.

Both countries continue to have divergences on two major questions driving the institutional framework for European security: the way to factor the European Union (EU) in transatlantic relations and the nature of the NATO-Ukraine relationship. France has pushed for its vision of “strategic autonomy” and Ukrainian membership in NATO, while Biden has made clear that he was “not prepared to support the NATOization of Ukraine.”

Macron and Biden will be joined for the D-Day commemorations by German Chancellor Olaf Scholz and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, among others leaders, but notably no Russian representatives. This eightieth anniversary has taken on an even deeper historical weight as it will likely be among the last with living veterans in attendance. The US contribution to the liberation of France and Europe in World War II changed the fate of the continent, and leaders will likely draw lessons from that conflict that can be applied to the continent today regarding Ukraine.

Macron has sought to build momentum for his foreign and European policy in recent months, positioning France to take on greater initiative in supporting Ukraine. At the February 2024 conference on Ukraine in Paris, Macron aimed to build consensus to take new actions on Ukraine but has drawn a lot of criticism for placing the focus on France’s agenda. These actions include cyber-defense, co-production of armaments, enhancing Ukraine’s military capabilities, deepening France’s partnership with Moldova, and sending nonmilitary forces and demining support to Ukraine’s border with Belarus. In late April, he outlined a doctrine in a speech at the Sorbonne on how he would like to shape European security over the next five-year political cycle of the EU. Therefore, for Macron the state visit will also be an opportunity to rally Biden’s support for a strong European defense and closer EU-NATO institutional cooperation. “A sine qua non condition for our security,” Macron said, “is that Russia does not win the war of aggression it is waging on Ukraine. This is essential.”

In his speech, Macron also called for a more “sovereign” Europe, one that is prepared to weather the outcomes if the United States reduces its engagement on the continent. This call is in part a reaction to the Trump administration’s earlier criticism of NATO. There is, however, an unfortunate tendency in the United States and Germany, when French leaders and officials speak of greater European sovereignty, to interpret such statements as France seeking to reinforce its own influence at the expense of transatlantic relations. Such a view should address the real points of divergence and dispel any drawn-out tendency for Franco-American sparring on this point. Biden and Macron both have an opportunity to capitalize on recent momentum to coalesce Europe around longer-term goals for Euro-Atlantic security and a strategy toward Russia. But also, at the bilateral level between France and the United States, extending cooperation in interoperability and other critical domains in defense and security would send a strong signal of unity and resolve to Russia.

French posture toward Russia has hardened considerably since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, and Macron has sought to underscore this shift and dispel any lingering skepticism among European allies farther east. May 2023 was a turning point, when Macron said in Bratislava that Western Europe “missed opportunities to listen” to the warnings of Central and Eastern European countries about Russia. In doing so, Macron has sought to lay a foundation for France to act as a bridge between the United States and NATO’s eastern flank countries.

In continuation of the February 2024 conference on Ukraine in Paris, Macron has in recent weeks been at the forefront of two initiatives intended to increase the West’s “strategic ambiguity.” This means that as the battlefield constantly evolves, allies must show their adaptability, take the initiative, and create new strategic dilemmas for Russia, rather than draw red lines for themselves. Both initiatives will likely continue to be discussed among Ukraine’s partners in the weeks ahead.

First, Macron has pushed for Ukraine to be allowed to strike targets within Russia with Western weapons. This initiative includes the decision on May 28, during Macron’s visit to Berlin, to allow Ukraine to use weapons delivered by France to strike targets within Russia, including long-range missiles. A direct line can be drawn from the current decision to the proposal stemming from the February 2024 conference on Ukraine to establish a ninth “deep precision strike” coalition within the Ramstein Group (the fifty-six-nation group of supporters of Ukraine’s defense) for supplies of mid- and long-range missiles. The aim of the ninth working group was to mobilize states willing to send such equipment but to also work on operational concepts given how rare and expensive these weapons are. This approval is linked to the current necessity for the defense of Kharkiv and shows that allies are able to adapt quickly to the evolution in the front lines and play on “strategic ambiguity” rather than establish red lines for themselves. The aim is to allow Ukraine to attack the point from which the missiles are fired: to hit the archer instead of the arrow. It is not a blank check, however, and Ukrainian forces are not permitted to hit targets other than those from which the missiles hitting Kharkiv are fired.

Second, Macron has advanced the idea of sending Western military personnel into Ukraine to build up the operational capacity of the Ukrainian armed forces, which has been welcomed by Estonia, the Netherlands, and Lithuania, among others, but remains a very sensitive, divisive issue. France would certainly look to convince the United States and build a coalition of the willing on this initiative. These military personnel would be in supporting roles, such as logistics, maintenance, and training. They could also help in a number of noncombat roles, such as enhancing Ukraine’s resilience against electronic warfare. In return, Western countries would gain a better understanding of terrain and intelligence about Russian forces.

Biden has recently supported the first of these initiatives but not yet the second. Both leaders will have the opportunity to discuss these issues and more options to support Ukraine this week in France and in the weeks ahead. As Russian forces evolve their tactics, NATO’s ability to adapt to Russia’s war of aggression in Ukraine but also respond to Russia’s ability to use latent capabilities all over the eastern flank is paramount in the deterrence and defense of the Alliance.

Finally, it is important to note that Macron’s foreign policy ambitions for Europe, however critical to the continent’s defense, will need to have the support of French voters. Following the D-Day commemoration, Biden and Macron will meet on June 8. The next day, European Parliament elections will be held in France. While Macron has more than two years left in his presidency, the EU parliamentary elections will likely be interpreted by many France watchers as a referendum on the current national government and its policies, both domestic and foreign. With Macron’s party challenged by Marine Le Pen’s populist far-right National Rally, which is currently polling ahead, a setback at the ballot box this weekend could be a setback for the Élysée’s diplomatic efforts, too.

Léonie Allard is a visiting fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center, previously serving at the French Ministry of Armed Forces.

The post After honoring D-Day, Macron and Biden embark on a diplomatic sprint for Europe’s security appeared first on Atlantic Council.

A new NATO command structure

Richard D. Hooker, Jr. — Wed, 05 Jun 2024 14:00:00 +0000

DOWNLOAD PDF

The 2014 Russian annexation of Crimea and Russian aggression in the Donbas brought home to NATO the need for a relook of the NATO Command Structure (NCS), resulting in the creation of Joint Force Command Norfolk and the Joint Support and Enabling Command, both in 2018.¹ The Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 and the accession of Finland and Sweden to NATO have once again altered the security landscape in the North Atlantic treaty area. These dramatic events suggest an urgent need for a revised NATO Command Structure, better suited to the security needs of allies and better organized to deter and defend in light of these new realities.²

The current structure consists of two strategic military commands: Allied Command Operations (ACO) based in Mons, Belgium, and Allied Command Transformation (ACT) based in Norfolk, Virginia. These are supported by three “operational” commands: Joint Force Command Brunssum, oriented to the east; Joint Force Command Naples, oriented to NATO’s southern flank; and Joint Force Command Norfolk, oriented to the North Atlantic sea lanes of communication. In addition, there are three “tactical” commands: Allied Air Command, based in Ramstein, Germany; Allied Land Command, based in Izmir, Turkey; and Allied Maritime Command, based in Northwood in the United Kingdom.³ While suitable for peacetime requirements, these arrangements are not optimized for major theater war against Russia. What has changed, and why do these changes require new command structures?

The obvious answer is that Russian aggression in the European security space has brought the possibility of direct confrontation with Russia closer to NATO than at any time since the fall of the Soviet Union. For allies bordering Russia, in particular, the threat level is perceived as high, driving major changes in force structure, defense spending, operational planning, and foreign and security policy.⁴ For Finland and Sweden, accession to NATO even a decade ago was considered unlikely. Today it is a reality, accentuated by efforts to establish unified air forces and steep increases in defense spending.⁵ Poland has emerged as one of the strongest military powers in Europe, exceeding France, Germany, and even the United Kingdom in conventional capability and spending nearly 4 percent of GDP on defense.⁶ Romania has also embarked on a remarkable military buildup.⁷ The Baltic States have responded as well; all three spend at least 2 percent of GDP on defense. Latvia has reintroduced conscription, while Estonia transferred all its 155 mm howitzers to Ukraine and ordered more modern replacements. Lithuania is moving to equip an entire infantry division with tanks.⁸ For its part, NATO has moved to double the size of the four battle groups established in 2017 on the eastern flank, and added four more, matched by five air policing missions.⁹ The United States has added an additional brigade set of prepositioned equipment in Europe, forward-based two additional F-35 squadrons in Europe, and increased its presence on the eastern flank from brigade to division size, augmented by a corps forward headquarters with enablers.¹⁰

F-35 fighter jets taxi during a media day of NATO’s “Air Defender 23” military exercise at Spangdahlem US Air Base near the German-Belgian border in Spangdahlem, Germany June 14, 2023. Source: REUTERS/Jana Rodenbusch

These moves demonstrate that allies are deeply concerned about the prospect of further Russian aggression. Some argue that Russia’s losses in Ukraine have negated the threat,¹¹ but an increasingly likely frozen conflict in Ukraine suggests that “a wounded, vengeful Russia will remain a threat as long as Vladimir Putin, or like-minded successors, are in power.”¹² Two years into the conflict, the Russian economy is actually experiencing modest growth despite doubling its defense budget, while leaky international sanctions and support from China, Iran, and others continue to prop up Russian industry and economic performance.¹³ Putin’s ambitions to restore Russian imperial greatness and recover lost Russian territories are well documented. The threat of more Russian aggression is real and may well transpire unless deterred.¹⁴

How should the NATO Command Structure evolve? The first step should be to acknowledge a changed security environment and the importance and contributions of new members. (The current NCS dates to a time when Russia was viewed as a partner, and major theater war in the North Atlantic region was considered unlikely.) To achieve consensus for change, political realities must be taken into account; major NATO powers should occupy key posts that reflect their roles and influence in the Alliance. Existing infrastructure and staffs should be leveraged to avoid unnecessary expense. Finally, as much as possible, changes to the command structure should not add bloat or generate waste.

Lean, high-performing command arrangements are best suited to both peacetime economy and wartime stresses.”

With these concerns in mind, a revised NATO Command Structure should retain ACO and ACT as strategic headquarters, with some caveats. ACO should focus first and foremost on its responsibilities as a trained and ready battle staff, thoroughly exercised and ready to provide theater command and control of joint and multinational forces in time of war across the vast NATO area of responsibility. Historically, ACO planning and intelligence functions were subject to a degree of politicization in order not to “provoke” the Russian Federation.¹⁵ In recent years, these functions have been strengthened and those trends should continue. Its traditional leadership—a US four star as supreme commander with a UK deputy—is sound and should be retained.

Formally established in 2003, ACT is charged with contributing to “preserving the peace, security and territorial integrity of Alliance member states by leading the strategic warfare development of military structures, forces, capabilities and doctrines.” It executes this mission through four principal functions: strategic thinking; development of capabilities; education, training and exercises; and cooperation and engagement.¹⁶ ACT serves as the higher headquarters for NATO’s Joint Warfare Center in Stavanger, Norway; the Joint Analysis and Lessons Learned Center in Lisbon, Portugal; and the Joint Force Training Center in Bydgoszcz, Poland. ACT shares responsibility for NATO’s exercise program with ACO and is also responsible for the “establishment, accreditation, preparation of candidates for approval, and periodic assessments” of NATO’s twenty-nine Centers of Excellence.¹⁷

Though one of only two strategic commands in NATO, ACT has struggled to establish itself on an equal footing; according to some observers, ACT is not sufficiently staffed with “the best and brightest” and is held in less regard by the North Atlantic Council (NAC) than legacy units and commands. Struggling to make its voice heard in Brussels, it has been termed “the forgotten command.”¹⁸ Part of ACT’s “second class” status has to do with geography. Initially commanded by US Admiral Edmund Giambastiani, ACT was the successor to Allied Command Atlantic, located in Norfolk (Giambastiani was the last Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic, or SACLANT, disestablished in 2002). ACT is commanded by a French four star with a four-star German deputy and three-star UK chief of staff.¹⁹ The command would benefit by relocating to Paris or Washington, enhancing its prestige and enabling closer cooperation with the US Department of Defense and Joint Staff and defense industries as well as ACO and NATO headquarters. Given persistent challenges with interoperability and standardization across the Alliance, as well as the great potential of advanced technologies in the form of artificial intelligence, unmanned air and sea vehicles, robotics, quantum computing, ACT can only increase in importance for the Alliance. Accordingly, it should receive priority for staffing on a par with ACO.

National flags of the Alliance’s members flutter at the NATO headquarters in Brussels, Belgium, April 17, 2024. Source: REUTERS/Yves Herman

Relocating ACT to Paris or Washington is also advisable given the new Joint Force Command (JFC) headquarters, which is located in Norfolk.²⁰ Clearly established as a response to the reemergent Russian threat, JFC Norfolk is primarily a maritime headquarters that closely resembles the former Allied Command Atlantic in form and purpose. Currently commanded by a US vice admiral (dual-hatted as commander US 2d Fleet), its mission is to “protect the Strategic Lines of Communication across all domains, protect sea-lanes between Europe and North America, and enable the reinforcement of Europe.”²¹ In a revised NATO Command Structure, JFC Norfolk would be redesignated “JFC West,” with geographic responsibility for the North Atlantic up to the Greenland-Iceland-UK gap. Given its vast area of responsibility, and the fact that the commanders of the other JFCs are four stars, the JFC West commander should be a US four-star admiral, dual-hatted as commander US Fleet Forces command (the lineal successor to the former US Atlantic Fleet, also currently based in Norfolk), with three-star UK and French officers as deputy and chief of staff.²² JFC West should not be tasked with the conduct of land or air operations in the Nordic region.

The accession of Finland and Sweden to NATO this year suggests that establishing a new “JFC North” is both appropriate and opportune. The Nordic region is enormous, encompassing 3,425,804 kms, larger than the territory of all other European allies combined. With a total strength of more than 360,000 troops (active and reserve), 250 combat aircraft, 2,000 armored vehicles, and 290 naval combatants (including 11 submarines), the Nordic allies represent a formidable and modernized deterrent force.²³ Collectively, their size, population, geographic importance, and economic heft deserve a strong voice and senior representation inside NATO. Perhaps based at Bodo in Norway (the site of the current Norwegian Joint National Headquarters), or in Stockholm (the site of Sweden’s Joint Forces Command), JFC North should be commanded by a Swedish four star, with rotating Finnish and Norwegian three-star deputies and a Danish chief of staff.²⁴ Its geographic responsibilities would include the North, Norwegian, Barents, Greenland, and Baltic seas, as well as the airspace and land territories of NATO members Sweden, Finland, Norway, Denmark, and Iceland.²⁵

The most imminent threat lies along NATO’s eastern flank, presumably the province of JFC Brunssum in the Netherlands under an Italian or German four star.²⁶ Established in 2004, its stated mission is “to foster an open and active family of headquarters based on enduring relationships focusing on issues of common interest in order to enhance coordination, cooperation and situational awareness.”²⁷ The lack of a specific geographic area of responsibility and precise mission statement arguably do not focus the command on defense and deterrence, while Brunssum is very far from the most likely scenes of Russian aggression (it is some 2,200 kms from Brunssum to Narva in eastern Estonia, for example). The growing capabilities of Poland, the importance of geographic proximity, and the reality of large scale combat operations just across its border with Ukraine strongly suggest that JFC Brunssum should be replaced with a “JFC East,” possibly located at Szczecin near the German-Polish border.²⁸

As the preponderance of forces would likely come from Poland, JFC East should be commanded by a Polish four star with a Romanian deputy and Baltic chief of staff. Its geographic area of responsibility should include the Baltic States, Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria.”¹

NATO’s southern flank has traditionally been the responsibility of JFC Naples, commanded by a US four-star admiral dual-hatted as commander US Naval Forces Europe and Africa. This bifurcation pulls that officer and staff between NATO’s southern flank and maritime operations far to the north. The JFC Naples mission statement, like that of JFC Brunssum, is vague and imprecise and reads “to prepare for, plan and conduct military operations in order to preserve the peace, security and territorial integrity of Alliance member states throughout the Supreme Allied Commander’s Area of Responsibility (AOR) and beyond.”²⁹ In a revised NATO Command Structure, JFC Naples would be redesignated as “JFC South” under the command of an Italian four star, with a three-star Greek deputy and two-star Spanish or Portuguese chief of staff.³⁰ Its geographic AOR would include Spain, Portugal, Italy, Greece, and Turkey as well as NATO’s Balkan allies (Albania, North Macedonia, Croatia, Montenegro, and Slovenia). As described below, US Naval Forces Europe and Africa would relocate to the UK.

To ensure the right kind of mission focus, the mission statements of these four JFCs—North, East, West, and South—should be recast as “provide command and control of assigned joint and combined forces in order to deter and defend against aggression by opposing forces in the assigned geographic area of responsibilities; be prepared to execute other military tasks as assigned by SACEUR.” General and flag officers (GOFOs) assigned to these headquarters should come principally from the nations present in their geographic AORs.³¹ Given their missions, they are more properly referred to as “geographic” commands.

In response to Russian aggression in Ukraine in 2014, NATO established the Joint Support and Enabling Command (JSEC) in Ulm, Germany, in 2018. Commanded by a German three star, JSEC’s mission is “to contribute to enablement and help the Alliance set the theatre for reinforcement by forces, if and when required.”³² During crisis and conflict, JSEC will coordinate reinforcement by forces and their subsequent sustainment. Solving the problem of military mobility across national boundaries in wartime is a prime task, along with the reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (RSOI) of reinforcing forces and their theater-level support and sustainment. Theater-level, high-altitude air defense against ballistic and cruise missiles in central Europe may also fall to this command. To execute these tasks efficiently, the JSEC commander should have equal rank and status with the other JFC commanders. Accordingly, JSEC should be renamed “JFC Center” with a German four star as commander. Given the importance of prepositioned equipment storage sites in Eygelshoven, Netherlands, and Zutendaal, Belgium, those nations should rotate at the three-star level as deputy commanders, with a two-star French chief of staff.³³

NATO’s three “tactical level” commands—Allied Air Command (AIRCOM) in Ramstein, Germany; Allied Land Command (LANDCOM) in Izmir, Turkey; and Allied Maritime Command (MARCOM) in Northwood in the United Kingdom—have several responsibilities. The first is to serve as principal advisors to SACEUR for operations in the land, sea, and air domains. Next, these commands are tasked to monitor the readiness and interoperability of NATO’s land, sea, and air forces. They are also responsible for providing wartime component command headquarters. As they do not actually operate at the tactical level, they are more properly referred to as “functional” commands.

US Navy sailors operate onboard aircraft carrier USS Harry S. Truman, in the Adriatic Sea, February 2, 2022. The Truman strike group is operating under NATO command and control along with several other NATO allies for coordinated maritime maneuvers, anti-submarine warfare training and long-range training. Source: REUTERS/Yara Nardi

AIRCOM in Ramstein is tasked “to provide air and space power to the Alliance” and is commanded by a US four star, dual-hatted as commander US Air Forces Europe and Africa. That officer therefore commands the air component for both USEUCOM and ACO. The Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC) at Uedem in Germany manages air operations north of the Alps, while a second CAOC in Torrejón, Spain, covers NATO airspace south of the Alps. There is also a deployable or “flyaway” CAOC based in Poggio Renatico in northern Italy. All three report to AIRCOM, along with some fifty control and reporting centers. This organization is sound, well-resourced, and resilient and requires no significant reorganization.

LANDCOM in Izmir is commanded by a US four star, dual-hatted as commander US Army Europe. Its mission is “on order, serve as Land Component Command in support of Joint Force Commands and as a Combined Force Land Component Command to provide theater-wide domain expertise to SACEUR; as SACEUR’s principal land advisor, LANDCOM coordinates AOR-wide activities to effectively deter Russia and Terror Groups and ensure a trained, ready, and lethal land force for NATO.”³⁴ Reporting suggests that, while LANDCOM can effectively monitor and flag readiness and interoperability shortfalls, its ability to field a fully staffed and trained battlestaff as an effective land component command for SACEUR remains a work in progress.³⁵ One solution is to reactivate US Seventh Army as an operational field army headquarters, akin to US Central Command’s Third Army, on the backbone of US Army Europe and Africa.³⁶ This would provide a trained and ready Land Component Command able to command two or more NATO corps. LANDCOM would retain its current functions and location and be prepared, when augmented, to provide an additional land component command for lesser or alternate contingencies. Because the commander LANDCOM is often in Wiesbaden performing duties as commander USAREUR and AF, and also because of Turkey’s size and importance, the LANDCOM deputy commander should be a Turkish four-star general.

MARCOM in Northwood serves as “the central command of all NATO maritime forces” and the MARCOM commander is the primary maritime advisor to the Alliance.³⁷ Currently commanded by a UK vice admiral, MARCOM serves as the maritime headquarters for Standing NATO Maritime Groups 1 and 2 and Standing NATO Mine Countermeasures Groups 1 and 2.³⁸ Naval Striking and Support Forces NATO (STRIKEFORNATO), built around the US 6th Fleet, reports directly to SACEUR and is headquartered in Oeiras, Portugal.³⁹ MARCOM is also host to the NATO Shipping Centre (NSC), which links NATO and the merchant shipping community.⁴⁰ For challenging contingencies, such as maritime operations against the Russian Northern Fleet in the North Atlantic and Norwegian Sea, US naval forces would certainly predominate. As the Russian Northern and Baltic fleets represent the primary maritime threat, US Naval Forces Europe and Africa should accordingly relocate from Naples, Italy, to London (its former headquarters through 2005) as the naval component of USEUCOM.⁴¹ Its four-star commander could then be dual-hatted as commander MARCOM, placing MARCOM on a par with LANDCOM and AIRCOM.⁴² The MARCOM headquarters would remain in Northwood under a UK three-star deputy. For maritime operations north of the GIUK Gap, MARCOM should command, reporting directly to ACO, with JFC West exercising command of the sea lanes of communication in the North Atlantic.

Romanian helicopter Puma 330 is seen as Romanian, British and US maritime NATO forces carry out ‘Exercise Trojan Footprint’ exercises during a media tour of the special operations at sea off Constanta, Romania, May 9, 2022. Source: REUTERS/Remo Casilli

These recommended changes to NATO’s Command Structure offer several advantages. They acknowledge the importance of the US as leader of the Alliance but provide four-star representation for NATO’s largest and most important military contributors, both old and new (the US, UK, France, Germany, Italy, Sweden, Turkey, and Poland)—important for achieving consensus for any adaptations. They represent a more rationalized and practical geographic approach to command and control, recognizing the addition of important new members and far more territory to the Alliance. They provide flexible options for SACEUR, particularly for two or more campaigns that may occur simultaneously within NATO’s area of responsibility. They align component commanders between NATO and USEUCOM, simplifying SACEUR’s command arrangements in times of fast-moving crises and for sustained multi-domain warfare. Most importantly, they modify and adapt the command structure to more effectively address a changed security environment in the North Atlantic Treaty area, now facing its most serious military threat since 1945.

To be sure, change is hard—and nowhere more so than in NATO. Political sensitivities and equities will be hotly contested, and the gears of the NATO bureaucracy may wind slowly. But the need is urgent. Europe finds itself in the largest shooting war since 1945, and it is right on NATO’s doorstep. Russian aggression and imperialism are not going away.⁴³ As presently constituted, the NATO Command Structure is not fit for purpose in a post-2022 NATO. The time is therefore right to consider improvements—both to deter and, if necessary, to contain and defeat a dangerous adversary.

About the author

Fellow

Richard D. Hooker, Jr.

Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security Transatlantic Security Initiative

Europe & Eurasia National Security

Kroenig mentioned in Associated Press on the “new axis of authoritarians”

swallace — Sun, 02 Jun 2024 16:00:00 +0000

Vice President and Senior Director, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

On June 2, Matthew Kroenig, Vice President and Senior Director of the Scowcroft Center, was mentioned in Associated Press, where he spoke on the threat from the “new axis of authoritarians,” including Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea, as those states work more closely together with overlapping interests.

Moscow in particular, Kroenig said, will likely try to use the political turmoil in the U.S. to divide the NATO security alliance. It could try to turn the public in NATO states against the U.S. by encouraging them to question whether they have “shared values” with Americans, he said. If successful, that could lead to a fundamental reshaping of global security architecture — a goal of Russia and China — since the end of the Cold War.

Staff

Matthew Kroenig

Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

China Defense Policy

The post Kroenig mentioned in Associated Press on the “new axis of authoritarians” appeared first on Atlantic Council.

‘The time has come’: Calls grow to allow Ukrainian strikes inside Russia

Peter Dickinson — Tue, 28 May 2024 21:04:23 +0000

Since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion more than two years ago, most of Ukraine’s international allies have insisted that any weapons they provide be used exclusively within Ukrainian territory. These restrictions were initially imposed to prevent a broadening of the conflict, but a growing chorus of critics now say this approach is preventing Ukraine from defending itself and risks enabling Russian victory.

The debate over the use of Western weapons to attack targets inside Russia has rumbled on throughout the war, and has recently been thrust to the top of the agenda by the Russian army’s latest offensive. In early May, Russian troops crossed Ukraine’s northern border and began advancing toward the country’s second city, Kharkiv. This attack was no surprise; on the contrary, Ukrainian military officials had been monitoring preparations on the other side of the border for weeks, but were powerless to act.

Russia’s Kharkiv offensive has highlighted the military absurdity of current restrictions on the use of the Western weapons supplied to Ukraine. Russian commanders are well aware of Ukraine’s inability to strike back, and are actively exploiting the border zone as a safe haven to concentrate forces and launch bombardments. Understandably, this is fueling calls among Ukraine’s allies for a major rethink.

Stay updated

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

The NATO Parliamentary Assembly is the latest international organization to voice its support for an end to restrictions on Ukraine’s use of Western weapons. Lawmakers from all 32 NATO states adopted a declaration on May 27 urging alliance members to allow strikes on military targets inside Russia. “Ukraine can only defend itself if it can attack Russia’s supply lines and Russian bases of operation. It is time to recognize this reality and let Ukraine do what it must,” stated NATO Parliamentary Assembly President Michal Szczerba.

This declaration echoed NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenburg’s May 24 interview with Britain’s The Economist calling on NATO allies to end their prohibition on the use of Western weapons against Russian targets. “The time has come for allies to consider whether they should lift some of the restrictions they have put on the use of weapons they have donated to Ukraine,” commented Stoltenberg. “Especially now when a lot of the fighting is going on in Kharkiv, close to the border, to deny Ukraine the possibility of using these weapons against legitimate military targets on Russian territory makes it very hard for them to defend themselves.”

A number of senior Western officials have also recently backed an end to restrictions. During an early May visit to Kyiv, UK Foreign Secretary David Cameron announced that Ukraine had the “right” to use British-supplied weapons for attacks inside Russia. Speaking in Germany on May 27, French President Emmanuel Macron noted that Ukraine was being attacked from Russia. “We must allow them to take out the military sites the missiles are fired from,” he commented. The following day, Dutch Defense Minister Kajsa Ollongren said the present ban was forcing Ukraine to fight “with one hand tied behind its back” and argued that lifting restrictions “should not be subject to debate.”

Eurasia Center events

Director and Senior Fellow, Scowcroft Strategy Initiative

Ukraine’s advance in Kursk: What’s next and implications

Conflict Russia Security & Defense Ukraine

Not everyone is convinced. For now, the Biden administration remains unwilling to revise its position limiting the use of US weapons. Meanwhile, a number of European countries including Germany and Italy have also called for caution. This reluctance to escalate the existing confrontation with Russia was on display in Brussels on Tuesday, when Belgian Prime Minister Alexander De Croo announced plans to provide Ukraine with thirty F-16 fighter jets, but informed visiting Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy that the planes were not to be used inside Russia.

Russian President Vladimir Putin has responded to mounting talk of an end to Western restrictions on attacks inside Russia by warning of “serious consequences” and hinting at a possible nuclear response. “If these serious consequences occur in Europe, how will the United States behave, bearing in mind our parity in the field of strategic weapons,” he commented in Tashkent this week. “Do they want a global conflict?”

Putin’s nuclear threats are nothing new, of course. Since the start of the Ukraine invasion, he has made numerous thinly-veiled references to nuclear escalation as part of efforts to intimidate the West and reduce the flow of weapons to Ukraine. These nuclear blackmail tactics have proved highly effective, encouraging Western leaders to embrace policies of escalation management that have significantly undermined the international response to Russia’s invasion.

The Kremlin dictator is now clearly hoping the same approach can deter the US and other key allies from giving Ukraine the green light to strike Russia using Western weapons. If he succeeds in this latest act of nuclear intimidation, it will bring Russian victory in Ukraine closer and set a dangerous precedent for the future of international security.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

The US-Europe relationship is crucial to US prosperity. The EU and the United States, two of the three largest economies in the world, are each other’s largest trading partners in goods and services. The US-EU economic partnership is the largest bilateral trade relationship in the world, accounting for more than 4 percent of global gross domestic product (GDP), while US goods and services trade with the EU totaled an estimated $1.2 trillion in 2023, 25 percent more than US goods trade with China. The US-EU trade and investment relationship is the largest in the world, with four times more US foreign direct investment than with Asia-Pacific countries. According to the US Chamber of Commerce, “no two other regions in the world are as deeply integrated as the US and Europe.” The loss or disruption of these trade relations would have an immediate and drastic impact on the US and global economies.

The benefits of close transatlantic ties also play out politically. Nuclear powers France and the United Kingdom join the United States as permanent members of the United Nations (UN) Security Council to balance out China and Russia. And European support in the UN General Assembly and in international organizations, such as the Group of Seven (G7), the International Monetary Fund, and the World Bank, plays a critical role in advancing democracy and the rule of law. In the global competition between democratic and autocratic states, Europe is a vital player, often aligning with US interests and supporting US efforts to maintain a stable international system. As a community with a shared commitment to human rights, representative democracy, and the rule of law, the transatlantic region represents a bulwark against a rising tide of autocracy that threatens these ideals everywhere.

These shared values and close relationships have undergirded key European actors’ provision of materiel and assistance in numerous US-led operations, even when European interests were not directly affected. In the Gulf War in 1990, for example, NATO allies France, Italy, Canada, Turkey, and the United Kingdom each contributed in critical ways to the coalition. In humanitarian operations in Somalia in 1992 and 1993, initiated in the waning days of President George H. W. Bush’s administration, Italy, France, Belgium, and Canada provided large military contingents. The Afghanistan intervention following 9/11 was a NATO-led operation with the participation of nineteen NATO allies, which suffered more than one thousand troops killed in action. In Iraq beginning in 2003, seventeen NATO allies contributed troops and civilian aid workers, as well as financial assistance totaling in the billions of dollars. A total of twenty-three allies participated in the NATO Training Mission-Iraq from 2004 to 2011, while its successor, the NATO Mission Iraq, continues to this day. When the United States finds itself compelled to use force “out of area,” NATO allies often join in as important members of US-led coalitions.

Today, the Alliance includes thirty-one of the United States’ thirty-seven treaty allies (excluding Latin American states covered by the 1947 Rio Treaty). Japan, Australia, and South Korea are both NATO global partners and bilateral US allies. NATO allies and official partners together constitute almost 70 percent of the GDP and military power on the planet, far more than China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea combined. Although often criticized for lagging defense spending, European NATO allies are this year expected to spend $380 billion, or 2 percent of their collective GDP, on defense. (Even on a war footing, Russia spent $120 billion last year on defense). Since 2014, NATO’s European allies and Canada have spent more than six hundred billion dollars in increased defense spending over that year’s baseline military budgets. This includes an 11 percent increase in 2023 alone. While some readiness shortfalls persist, the “free rider” narrative has little basis in fact. The United States’ NATO allies are shouldering a fair share of the spending burden.

The ongoing conflict in Ukraine—the largest outbreak of major-theater war in Europe since 1945—also illustrates Europe’s actual and potential contributions to regional security and international stability. Since February 2022, the EU has contributed more than $101 billion in financial, military, humanitarian, and refugee assistance to Ukraine, with another $54 billion on the way. (Actual US assistance to date totals $107 billion). Non-EU members Britain and Norway added an additional $15.2 billion and $5.2 billion, respectively.

In the opening stages of the conflict, immediate assistance in the form of anti-tank and short-range air defense weapons, along with small arms and artillery ammunition, played a crucial role in helping Ukraine stave off the massive Russian invasion. Since then, European allies have provided main battle tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, howitzers, rocket artillery, high-altitude air defense, fighter aircraft, and secure communications systems to stiffen Ukraine’s defense against a much larger and stronger adversary. Intelligence sharing and “train the trainer” programs also represent major contributions. On a per capita basis, allies such as Poland, Norway, and the Baltic States have contributed significantly more than the United States, highlighting their resolve and commitment. NATO has been critical in coordinating allies’ aid to Ukraine.

The Alliance’s value as the principal security provider for the transatlantic community has only increased in recent months with the addition of Sweden and Finland. They bring with them effective and technologically advanced militaries, backed up by large reserve forces and comprehensive and resilient home defense. Both have increased defense spending dramatically in recent years: since 2020, Sweden has nearly doubled its defense budget, which will exceed 2 percent of its GDP this year. In the same time frame, Finnish defense spending has increased by 70 percent and is projected to reach 2.3 percent of its GDP in 2024. In geostrategic terms, NATO’s posture in the High North and in the Baltic Sea is materially enhanced by the accession of Sweden and Finland, which together with Norway and Denmark, constitute a strong regional bloc with a landmass larger than the rest of NATO’s European allies combined.

The US military is still indispensable to transatlantic security

Increases in European defense spending and new, powerful members encourage some critics to argue that Europe can stand alone without US presence and leadership. While European allies possess impressive capabilities in some categories, the US military remains indispensable to transatlantic security. Collective action across thirty-one parliaments and polities can be both fractious and ineffective without strong and consistent US leadership. In areas like strategic airlift and sealift, long-range fires, offensive cyber capacity, space-based communications and surveillance, amphibious assault platforms, tankers, nuclear-powered supercarriers and attack submarines, the United States remains by far the sole or dominant provider. Though the majority of US military power is focused away from Europe, in-place forces under US European Command or based on the eastern seaboard are formidable, contributing greatly to deterrence and defense.

The US contribution to European security is even greater in the nuclear realm. While US conventional capabilities are critical to transatlantic security, the US nuclear umbrella remains the most important guarantor of security and stability in the North Atlantic region. Should it be withdrawn, it is unlikely that European states could provide or develop credible alternatives. Russian nuclear forces dwarf those of France and the United Kingdom, which are unlikely to extend their limited nuclear assets to cover neighbors. Domestic opposition, long lead times, and the high costs involved, as well as Russian intimidation, suggest that developing nuclear weapons by nonnuclear states like Germany is also improbable. In short, without an assured US nuclear guarantee, a transatlantic security architecture is no longer viable and the prospects for renewed Russian aggression increase exponentially.

Russia is still a threat

Two years into its full-scale invasion of Ukraine and resulting Western sanctions, the Russian economy is actually expanding, while leaky international sanctions and support from China, Iran, and others continue to prop up Russian industry and economic performance. Despite heavy casualties, the Russian military continues to put growing numbers into uniform and into the field, while ramping up the production of military equipment and munitions. Russian President Vladimir Putin’s ambitions to restore Russian imperial greatness and recover lost Russian territories are well-documented, regularly communicated by his closest advisers, and apparently endorsed by a majority of Russians.

The threat of Russian aggression expanding to additional countries is real. As Mark Rutte, the current Dutch prime minister and likely next NATO secretary general, has said, “If we were to accept for one moment that Putin could be successful in Ukraine, that he would get Kyiv, that he would get the whole country, it won’t end there. History has taught us that.” Should the war in Ukraine subside into yet another frozen conflict, the Russian military will regroup and rebuild its forces. Across NATO, fear of a vengeful Russia, angry over Western support for Ukraine and determined to recover its former territories, is palpable—and with good reason. After Russian aggression in Georgia in 2008, in Crimea and the Donbas in 2014, and against all of Ukraine in 2022, the West cannot afford to assume that future Russian behavior will moderate.

Capable of coping with Russia and China

Important voices today also argue that the United States lacks the capacity to deal with both China and Russia and that Europe should therefore be left to itself. In fact, the US military presence in Europe in no way prevents the ability to deter or defend against Chinese aggression in the Indo-Pacific region. Only a small fraction of US forces is based in Europe, while the bulk of US military strength is available to deter or confront the threat from China. Should China seek to expand its territory through force, allies and partners such as India, South Korea, Vietnam, Japan, Australia, Thailand, and the Philippines together represent a powerful potential coalition to counter Chinese aggression. Wavering US commitment in Europe would send a worrying signal to these countries. There are few strategic outcomes from the Ukraine war that China would value more than the fracturing of transatlantic cohesion and the NATO Alliance. Working with allies and partners is the United States’ best route to coping with both China and Russia simultaneously.

In a challenging world, NATO provides real economic, political, and military strength that enables the United States to confront serious threats elsewhere, while still securing vital US interests in Europe. It does so at bargain rates, with only 5 percent of US defense spending going to Europe and NATO. These relationships confer a broad range of benefits on the United States, including basing and overflight rights; intelligence sharing, diplomatic, economic, and military support; and a united front in support of democratic values and the stability of the international system. The benefits to the United States are clear and unmistakable, while the risks of withdrawal are profound. And the US public agrees: A strong majority, 78 percent, of Americans said the United States should increase or maintain its commitment to NATO, according to a poll last year by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs.

The United States supports and leads NATO not out of altruism, but because it is manifestly in its interest to do so. US national security and economic prosperity depend on it. To pull out from NATO would mean the end of the most successful alliance in history, alarming allies around the world and destabilizing an international order already under attack. Europe is experiencing its largest armed conflict since 1945, a war that directly affects the United States and the world. Now is no time to retreat.

Richard D. Hooker Jr. is a nonresident senior fellow with the Transatlantic Security Initiative in the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

The post Why NATO matters appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Michta in DW News on potential NATO secretary general candidates

gmatchett — Fri, 24 May 2024 16:36:17 +0000

Original Source

On February 24, Andrew Michta, director and senior fellow in the Scowcroft Strategy Initiative, was quoted in DW News about the candidates to replace NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg. He assessed that a candidate from the Alliance’s eastern flank may be well-suited for the role, as they “understand the existential nature of the threat” from Russia.

Staff

Andrew A. Michta

Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security Scowcroft Strategy Initiative

Central Europe Eastern Europe

The post Michta in DW News on potential NATO secretary general candidates appeared first on Atlantic Council.

NATO must accelerate support and secure membership for Ukraine at its Washington summit, transatlantic leaders urge

Katherine Walla — Wed, 22 May 2024 19:36:06 +0000

Watch the full event

Public Event Tue, May 21, 2024 • 12:30 pm ET

The Washington NATO Summit: Ukraine and transatlantic security

Through two expert panels, this conference will convene former US national security and foreign policy officials as well as current European government members and top experts on Ukraine, the transatlantic relationship, and NATO to discuss the authoritarian challenge that Russia and its allies pose to the United States, NATO, and the West, and what should happen at the summit this summer to address the specifics of Putin’s revisionist agenda.

Conflict Europe & Eurasia National Security NATO

It’s time for the West to “wake up,” with regard to Russia’s war in Ukraine, former NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen said Tuesday. “The damage done by our hesitancy can be counted in Ukrainian lives.”

Rasmussen issued his call to accelerate military support to Ukraine at an Atlantic Council event hosted by the Eurasia Center. There, he joined US, European, and Ukrainian officials and experts in mapping out their recommendations for what the Alliance should achieve for Ukraine at July’s NATO Summit in Washington.

Over the past two years, “our soldiers had to buy time for the Western decision makers far too often,” Head of the Ukrainian President’s Office Andriy Yermak said. Ahead of the summit, Rasmussen and Yermak led a working group to consolidate recommendations from former leaders across the Alliance.

The call was echoed by Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell (R-KY), who urged Washington to “move at the speed of relevance, not the speed of bureaucracy” to support Ukraine.

Below are more highlights from the conference, during which several former and current officials and top experts laid out what they would like to see from the NATO Summit when it comes to Ukraine.

Ukraine’s NATO membership

“Transatlantic security is kind of a puzzle. It can never be perfect when some piece is missing. Today, the piece is Ukraine,” Yermak said, adding that the world is approaching a “point of no return”—one where the “puzzle” will either fracture, resulting in a divided Alliance, or will become complete.
Drawing from the working group’s findings, Rasmussen argued that NATO leaders should invite Ukraine to accession talks in Washington in July and also set a target date for Ukraine’s NATO membership for no later than July 2028.
“Opening accession talks does not mean that Ukraine will join NATO overnight, but it sends a critical message to Putin that Ukraine’s NATO membership is inevitable, that continuing his illegal war will not prevent it,” Rasmussen said.
Former UK Prime Minister Liz Truss also spoke virtually at the event, agreeing that she wants Ukraine to become a NATO member “as soon as possible” so that the Alliance is “able to collectively defend . . . against future threats from authoritarian regimes.”
Yermak argued that an invitation to NATO for Ukraine would not only be cost-effective in bolstering the Alliance’s defenses, but it would also be “an acknowledgement of Ukrainian bravery and their struggle for freedom.” He added that “if Ukraine stands, Europe stands. If Ukraine falls, the Kremlin will choose its next victim.”

New defense options

Rasmussen also argued that NATO leaders should “adopt measures to contain the war and bring it to a favorable conclusion for Ukraine.” That, he said, should include lifting the West’s restrictions on Ukraine striking Russian missile launchers, or other limits to how Ukraine uses the weapons it is provided. Two years in, Rasmussen said, “allies are still asking Ukraine to fight with one arm tied behind its back,” he warned.
Yermak said that Ukraine most needs air defenses from Europe. Rasmussen added that he hoped to see NATO launch a humanitarian air-defense shield over western Ukraine that could mimic the assistance the United States and others gave to Israel to intercept an Iranian attack last month.

Bolster the Alliance

McConnell said that he hoped to see allies in July “reach a greater shared understanding” that spending 2 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) on defense—and 20 percent of that on equipment—“cannot be an end goal. These targets have to be a baseline,” he said.
“Anyone who still sees the requirements of collective defense as a matter of special funds or emergency supplementals is . . . missing the point,” he warned.
Truss agreed, saying that “the West,” and particularly Europe, “hasn’t spent enough on defense.” She said that the United Kingdom’s recent 2.5 percent of GDP commitment was good, but that she’d like to see NATO countries spend “at least” 3 percent.
McConnell called on NATO countries to understand how Russia, Iran, and China “reinforce one another” with their actions, and “how the world’s autocrats are training, equipping, backfilling, and covering for one another’s aggressive gambles.” Truss added that securing the global order will require continued support for Ukraine but also a refusal to negotiate with Russia, a discouragement of China’s aims toward Taiwan, and efforts to stop Iran from developing a nuclear weapon.
With the summit nearing and the US presidential election on the way, Rasmussen highlighted two arguments he believes Ukraine’s supporters should make: First, if Vladimir Putin wins in Ukraine, the future US president—whoever it will be—will be portrayed as “a loser.” Second, ensuring Russian defeat in Ukraine can help the United States deal with the China challenge. “I don’t see any single argument against giving Ukraine everything [it needs] to win,” he said.

Katherine Walla is an associate director on the editorial team at the Atlantic Council.

Watch the event

The post NATO must accelerate support and secure membership for Ukraine at its Washington summit, transatlantic leaders urge appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Dispatch from Estonia and Romania: How NATO burden sharing works on the ground

Léonie Allard, Andrew Bernard, Rachel Rizzo, Lisa Homel — Fri, 17 May 2024 18:10:54 +0000

Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February of 2022, NATO’s credibility is most at stake on Europe’s eastern flank. Reinforcing NATO members in this region through increased military presence and bolstering defense and deterrence posture are the top priorities for most political and military leaders in Europe.

In April, a team from the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center took a research trip to Romania and Estonia, alongside the French military and saw firsthand how Western and Eastern European countries, along with US forces, are working together to adapt to the Russian threat just miles way.

We found that European commitments to the eastern flank are substantial and geared for the long term. However, using the force structure they have today to address the needs of conventional deterrence will require new adaptations. Even so, the advances in cooperation between Western and Eastern European troops on the eastern flank in the past two years represent tangible, significant European contributions to the Alliance that should move the debate around burden sharing past a singular focus on defense spending metrics.

A more united front

As Moscow reconstitutes its forces, there is a real possibility that Russia will test European and NATO resolve in the Alliance’s east. Each of those countries has specific geographic factors and threats, which the “tailored” approach to the eight battlegroups spread throughout the region are designed to defend. One of the major challenges is convincing Russia that the Alliance can operate as a united front from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea. The accession of Sweden and Finland better allows for such unity. Broadly speaking, however, the region is still in the process of becoming integrated militarily, and there is still competition for attention due to resource limitations and a lack of harmonization due to national specificities.

Located on the Black Sea and bordering Ukraine, Romania is but a few hundred kilometers from the war’s frontlines. The Russian military is operating in such close proximity to the country that Russian drones have repeatedly entered Romanian airspace and there have even been incidents of Russian drones landing in Romanian territory, most recently on Brăila Island in March 2024.

Looking north, Estonia sees itself in a critical window to improve its defensive positions while the Russian units normally garrisoned across its border are deployed to Ukraine, and before those units reconstitute, now battle-hardened from years of full-scale war. In the event Russia decides to seriously test NATO’s resolve, Estonia could be the first line of incursion. This is why at the 2023 Vilnius summit, NATO adopted new plans to “defend every inch” of the Alliance’s territory, including an enhanced presence in the Baltics meant to prevent an incursion in the region. This marked a shift away from a posture that was more focused on regaining territory that would likely be occupied in the initial stages of an invasion. It’s also why, beyond national resolve, the enduring presence of US, British, and French boots on the ground is crucial for Estonia: Each of those three nations has nuclear capabilities to back conventional forces, affecting Russia’s calculus.

Western Europe’s investment in the eastern flank is here to stay

After Russia’s invasion, Western Europeans turned their attention toward NATO’s eastern flank. For France, which is present in both countries we visited, the war in Ukraine is the first major test of the country’s concrete commitment to the Alliance since it reintegrated into NATO’s military command structure in 2009.

However, military ties between Western and Eastern Europe also rest on the strengthening of bilateral relationships among NATO members, especially between host countries and the framework nations for NATO’s multinational battalions—for instance, Britain is the framework nation in Estonia, Germany in Lithuania, and France in Romania. All have strengthened mutual ties since the start of the war in Ukraine. For example, France’s strategic partnership with Romania has deepened and intensified since it committed to becoming a framework nation in Romania in February 2022. These exchanges at the political and military level played a role in the growing convergence of views between the two countries on the nature of the threat Russia poses to the rest of Europe beyond Ukraine.

In the French-led Mission Aigle, European troops train and plan together in Cincu, Romania, ready to respond to potential threats on NATO’s eastern flank. Although US troops are present in other parts of Romania, they are not present in Cincu, giving Europeans a chance to build up their own efforts independent of US contributions. French troops rotate on a four-month basis, which allows a high number of soldiers to cycle through. The plan is to build Cincu into a brigade-sized (around four thousand troops) presence by 2025. Within the 117 square kilometers of Cincu, the French, Belgian, and Luxembourgian forces (soon to be joined by a company of Spanish troops) are a model for interoperability and commitment; They represent burden-sharing in action.

These troops are also presented with challenges. For decades, Western armies have been tailored for counterinsurgency warfare, such as in various African theaters and the NATO mission in Afghanistan. They simply aren’t prepared for the “what’s old is new” style of warfare that Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has reintroduced into the modern battlefield. As such, France and its partner nations are studying Russia’s playbook in Ukraine, which includes practicing trench warfare and referencing tactical manuals from World War I to help inform their strategy. One of the French forces’ aims in Romania is to demonstrate to Russia that they are ready to fight. French military leaders are working with their Romanian counterparts to navigate some of the challenges of conducting deterrence and defensive missions in the country, as local laws have not yet evolved to enable effective training due to stringent peacetime rules.

Similar developments are taking place in Estonia. Britain, France, and the United States have all committed forces to Estonia to match and complement Estonian investment in its own defense. The French commitment is built around one company within the British-led NATO battlegroup. Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Britain has doubled its presence in Estonia. Based on six-month deployments, more than ten thousand British soldiers have already rotated through Tapa, Estonia. The British Army continues to evolve its armored infantry presence in the NATO mission and has committed to have additional postured forces on high alert in the United Kingdom to be able to create a full brigade during a crisis.

Estonian, British, and French leaders recognize that the current arrangements also face challenges. There is a scarcity of some critical enablers in Estonia, with a strong desire to increase intelligence and surveillance capabilities, expand long-range fires, and embed army aviation units in Estonia. The deployment of follow-on forces has yet to be thoroughly tested, although exercises are planned in the coming years to stress test national and NATO military mobility capabilities.

What does this mean for the United States?

The increase of Western European states’ commitment to the eastern flank is not a panacea for enduring capability gaps in Alliance defenses. The United States continues to be the only nation able to supply key enablers at scale sufficient for effective deterrence for the foreseeable future. European land force leaders we spoke to worry that US key enablers based in Europe, such as long-range fires, air defense, and attack aviation, are likely postured to predominantly support US forces under US command. Without additional enablers brought in from the United States or provided by European nations, NATO land forces will be unlikely to train with and, if necessary, conduct combat operations with the full toolbox of capabilities.

To mitigate concerns among allies, the United States should consider increasing integration training opportunities within NATO, as well as battlegroups and associated higher echelons with those key enablers, to familiarize these units with key enabling capabilities while acquisition of long-term permanent solutions progresses. US stakeholders should be involved in national or European Union (EU) initiatives to improve mobility, interoperability, and command-and-control to ensure that proposed solutions benefit all Alliance members. This means investing in the development of EU-NATO cooperation as well as in the European pillar within NATO. Policymakers in Washington need to expand the conversation on burden sharing so that it accurately captures the steps Europeans are taking without the United States within and outside of NATO.

Western European commitments to NATO’s east represent tangible allied contributions to NATO deterrence and defense. Watching French soldiers in Romania practice trench warfare alongside their European counterparts might not seem like a major achievement to decision makers in Washington, but it’s precisely these types of side-by-side, long-term engagements, with soldiers from different countries, that makes the transatlantic partnership. Beyond big-picture questions like capabilities and acquisition and procurement, this kind of cooperation is where, in the event of a crisis, victory will be won.

Léonie Allard is a visiting fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center, previously serving at the French Ministry of Armed Forces.

Andrew Bernard is a retired US Air Force Colonel and a visiting fellow in the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center.

Rachel Rizzo is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center.

Lisa Homel is an associate director of the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center where she supports the center’s work on France, Germany, the Western Balkans, and Central and Eastern Europe.

Their trip to Romania and Estonia was supported by the French Ministry for Armed Forces.

The post Dispatch from Estonia and Romania: How NATO burden sharing works on the ground appeared first on Atlantic Council.

NATO must ‘win up front but be ready to win long’ in modern warfare, says General Christopher Cavoli

Katherine Walla — Fri, 17 May 2024 15:09:35 +0000

Watch the full event

Online Event Fri, May 17, 2024 • 10:00 am ET

Road to Washington: General Christopher Cavoli on the NATO Summit

An #ACFRONTPAGE EVENT—General Christopher G. Cavoli, Commander of US European Command and Supreme Allied Commander Europe, discusses the 2024 Washington NATO Summit, modernizing the Alliance’s military capabilities, and destabilizing Russia’s impact on Euro-Atlantic security.

Right now, NATO’s Steadfast Defender 2024 military exercise is taking place across Europe and at sea.

The effort, the largest the Alliance has undertaken since the Cold War, is not just a demonstration of the transatlantic bond; it is also NATO’s opportunity to “rigorously test” its defense and deterrence strategy, said General Christopher Cavoli, supreme allied commander Europe (SACEUR) and commander of US European Command.

Cavoli spoke at a May 7 Atlantic Council Front Page event, which was part of the Forward Defense program’s Commanders Series (in partnership with Saab) and of the Transatlantic Security Initiative’s programming organized in advance of the NATO Summit in Washington.

The general went on to say that NATO’s 2020 defense and deterrence strategy is part of an effort to conduct a “wholesale modernization” of NATO’s collective defense to respond to today’s security challenges.

“We had previously been optimized for a very different task,” he said. Cavoli explained that after the Cold War, NATO pivoted toward conducting crisis-management missions well beyond its borders that allowed the Alliance to participate in missions on its “own terms” and on a predictable schedule.

But “all that has changed,” Cavoli said, pointing to Russia’s war in Ukraine. “It is happening all the time, 24/7, [with] no respite for more than two years.”

The war has shown that today, “you either win up front, fast, and big, or you’re in a long fight. So . . . win up front but be ready to win long,” he said.

Below are more highlights from the event, where Cavoli touched upon NATO’s plans to modernize its defenses and the intensifying threats to the Alliance.

Defending in a new era

At last year’s NATO Summit in Vilnius, allies adopted regional defense plans, which spark three changes, as Cavoli explained: First, they bring a revamped expectation for NATO’s force structure, which outlines not only the forces required but also the spending needed to resource and maintain it. “You will find that 2 percent [of a country’s gross domestic product spent on the military] is certainly not a ceiling, but a floor,” he said, adding that the plans provide a “blueprint for burden sharing.”
Second, the new regional defense plans delegate authority for operational decision making. Cavoli said that when the Alliance was primarily focused on out-of-area operations, military authorities were limited to higher, political levels. “SACEUR requires basic military authorities,” Cavoli said. “These are working their way through the new, modernized alert system.”
Third, the new plans also change systems of command and control, Cavoli said. Before, NATO focused on cyclical deployments to regions and terrains that were unfamiliar to parts of the command chain. Now, regional plans are assigning specific geographic areas to each of the Alliance’s headquarters so that each one will know “exactly what terrain it’s required to defend” and the tactical units it has to defend with.
The modernization effort will also require a ramp-up in the defense industry. “I don’t think anybody is satisfied with current levels of production,” Cavoli said. Going forward, he added, the government and industry will need to work together to increase cooperation between Allies and industry partners. “I believe we’ll get there,” he said.
“This modernization of NATO’s collective defense will not be realized immediately,” Cavoli said. “It will require relentless focus and determination from across NATO and in all member nations . . . It will be difficult, but we are well on our way.”

The threats ahead

While Beijing is far from Brussels, NATO “does have China challenges inside it right now,” Cavoli said, related to strategic infrastructure, intellectual property, and private data.
“Russia will pose a long-term threat to the Alliance,” said Cavoli, adding that the West will have a “big Russia problem for years to come,” as Moscow works to expand the size of its military and reconstitute losses.
“The Russian army in Ukraine is bigger now than it was at the beginning of the fight,” he pointed out. “Many of the troops are not as high quality . . . a lot of the equipment fielded is older: It’s refurbished, but it’s based on an older model.”
Cavoli said the question at the top of Western leaders’ minds shouldn’t be about how fast Russia can reconstitute: It should be how fast can Russia rebuild its forces compared to the West. Maintaining an advantage in speed, he explained, is a matter of maintaining “political will” and developing the “elasticity” of the defense industrial base.
Many countries facing Russian influence “are looking westward right now” in search of new security partners, Cavoli said. While the Alliance was created to defend its members, “we don’t exist in a vacuum,” he said. “We need friends and partners.”

Katherine Walla is an associate director on the editorial team at the Atlantic Council.

Watch the event

The post NATO must ‘win up front but be ready to win long’ in modern warfare, says General Christopher Cavoli appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Yevgeniya Gaber joins Berlinsideout podcast for a discussion on Russia’s war in Ukraine

aozen — Fri, 17 May 2024 11:01:01 +0000

The post Yevgeniya Gaber joins Berlinsideout podcast for a discussion on Russia’s war in Ukraine appeared first on Atlantic Council.

UK gives Ukraine green light to use British weapons inside Russia

Peter Dickinson — Fri, 03 May 2024 21:23:35 +0000

Ukraine can use British-supplied weapons to strike targets inside Russia, UK Foreign Secretary David Cameron stated during a May 2 visit to Kyiv. “Ukraine has that right,” Cameron told Reuters. “Just as Russia is striking inside Ukraine, you can quite understand why Ukraine feels the need to make sure it’s defending itself.”

The British Foreign Secretary’s comments represent a departure from the cautious position adopted by most of Ukraine’s Western partners over the past two years. Since Russia’s full-scale invasion began in February 2022, the majority of countries backing Ukraine have insisted that Western weapons can only be used within Ukraine’s international borders and must not be deployed against targets inside the Russian Federation.

These restrictions reflect widespread concerns in Western capitals over a possible escalation of the current war into a far broader European conflict. Moscow has skillfully exploited the West’s fear of escalation, with Kremlin officials regularly warning of Russian red lines and Vladimir Putin making frequent thinly-veiled nuclear threats.

So far, Russia’s intimidation tactics have proved highly effective. By threatening to escalate the war, Moscow has been able to slow down the flow of military aid to Ukraine, while also deterring the delivery of certain weapons categories and limiting Kyiv’s ability to strike back against otherwise legitimate targets inside Russia.

This has placed Ukraine at a significant military disadvantage. Already massively outgunned and outnumbered by its much larger and wealthier Russian adversary, Ukraine has had to defend itself without the ability to deploy Western weapons against Russia’s military infrastructure. Critics of this approach claim the West is effectively making Ukraine fight against a far larger opponent with one hand tied behind its back.

Stay updated

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

With the existence of their country under threat, Ukrainians have bristled at Western restrictions and are using their own limited range of weapons to strike back. These attacks include a recent campaign of long-range drone strikes on Russian refineries that have hurt the Russian energy sector and divided opinion among Ukraine’s partners. While US officials have voiced their disapproval and urged Kyiv to focus on military targets, France has indicated its support.

The situation regarding the use of Western weapons on Russian territory has been further complicated by the Kremlin’s territorial claims inside Ukraine. In September 2022, Moscow declared the “annexation” of four Ukrainian regions and officially incorporated them into the Russian Constitution. Fighting has continued in all four of these partially occupied Ukrainian provinces, with the Ukrainian military free to deploy Western weapons despite the Kremlin’s insistence that these regions are now part of Russia.

In contrast to the caution displayed by Western leaders, Ukraine has repeatedly called Putin’s bluff and exposed the emptiness of Russia’s nuclear blackmail. Weeks after the Kremlin dictator ceremoniously announced the entry of Kherson into the Russian Federation, Ukrainian troops liberated the city. Rather than retaliating by deploying the might of Russia’s nuclear arsenal, Putin simply accepted this humiliating defeat and withdrew his beleaguered army across the Dnipro River.

The Kremlin’s reaction to mounting Ukrainian attacks on the Russian-occupied Crimean peninsula has been similarly underwhelming. Since first occupying Crimea in 2014, Putin has portrayed the peninsula in almost mystical terms as a symbol of Russia’s return to Great Power status. However, when Ukraine used a combination of locally developed naval drones and Western-supplied cruise missiles to sink or damage around one-third of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet, Putin quietly ordered the bulk of his remaining warships to retreat from Crimea and head for Russian ports. Despite the crucial role played by Western weapons in this Ukrainian success, there has been no sign of any escalation from Russia.

Eurasia Center events

Ukraine’s advance in Kursk: What’s next and implications

Conflict Russia Security & Defense Ukraine

With the Russian invasion now in its third year, there are indications that Western leaders may now finally be overcoming their self-defeating fear of escalation. In addition to David Cameron’s landmark comments regarding the use of British weapons inside Russia, the US has recently begun providing Ukraine with large quantities of long-range ATACMS missile systems capable of striking targets throughout occupied Ukrainian territory. Moscow had consistently warned against such deliveries, but has yet to provide any meaningful response to this highly conspicuous crossing of yet another Russian red line.

Meanwhile, French President Emmanuel Macron is actively attempting to reclaim the escalation initiative from Moscow by refusing to rule out the deployment of Western troops to Ukraine. This development has clearly riled the Kremlin. Putin has reacted to Macron’s newfound boldness by engaging in more nuclear blackmail, while the nuclear saber-rattling continued last weekend on Russia’s flagship current affairs TV show. None of this seems to have put Macron off. On the contrary, he remains adamant that direct Western military involvement in the defense of Ukraine must remain on the table.

This apparent strengthening of Western resolve comes at a pivotal moment in the war. With Ukrainian forces suffering from shortages in both ammunition and manpower, Russia has recently been able to regain the battlefield initiative and make significant advances for the first time in two years. Preparations are now underway for a major Russian summer offensive that could potentially break through Ukraine’s weakened front lines and deliver a knockout blow to the war weary country.

Removing restrictions on attacks inside Russia would enable Ukraine to disrupt preparations for the coming offensive. It would also limit Russia’s ability to bomb Ukrainian cities and destroy the country’s civilian infrastructure with impunity. This will not be enough to transform the course of the war, but it will go some way to evening out the odds.

By giving Kyiv the green light to use Western weapons in Russia, British Foreign Secretary David Cameron has established an important new precedent. This is in many ways fitting. After all, Britain has consistently set the tone for international aid since the eve of the Russian invasion, providing Ukrainians with anti-tank weapons, tanks, and cruise missiles in advance of other allies. Ukrainians will now be hoping the country’s other partners follow suit soon.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

Stay updated

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

Officials in Kyiv hope this new wave of weapons deliveries will arrive in time to help stabilize the front lines of the war and prevent further Russian advances. In recent months, Russia has taken advantage of the Ukrainian military’s mounting supply problems to edge forward at various points along the one thousand kilometer front line, often overwhelming Ukrainian defenses with sheer numbers and relentless bombardments.

During Stoltenberg’s Kyiv visit, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy urged NATO partners to send additional military aid as quickly as possible. The Ukrainian leader said the battlefield situation “directly depended” on the timely delivery of ammunition supplies to Ukraine. “Today, I don’t see any positive developments on this point yet. Some supplies have begun to arrive, but this process needs to speed up.”

The sense of urgency in Kyiv reflects widespread expectations that Vladimir Putin will launch a major summer offensive in late May or early June. Having already succeeded in regaining the battlefield initiative, Russian commanders now hope to smash through Ukraine’s weakened defensive lines and achieve major territorial gains for the first time since the initial stages of the invasion in spring 2022. Ukraine’s international partners currently find themselves in a race against the clock to strengthen the country’s defensive capabilities before Russia’s anticipated offensive can get fully underway.

Eurasia Center events

Public Event Mon, April 29, 2024 • 9:45 am ET

Ukraine’s advance in Kursk: What’s next and implications

Conflict Russia Security & Defense Ukraine

Ukraine’s recent supply issues and battlefield setbacks have highlighted the need for a more reliable long-term approach to arming the country against Russia. At present, Ukraine’s ability to defend itself depends heavily on the changing political winds in a number of Western capitals. This makes it difficult for Ukraine’s military and political leaders to plan future campaigns, while also encouraging the Kremlin to believe it can ultimately outlast the West in Ukraine.

In order to address this problem, Stoltenberg has proposed the creation of a $100 billion, five-year fund backed by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s 32 members. While in the Ukrainian capital, he reiterated his support for this initiative. “I believe we need a major, multi-year financial commitment to sustain our support. To demonstrate that our support to Ukraine is not short term and ad hoc, but long-term and predictable.”

Crucially, Stoltenberg believes a five-year fund would help convince the Kremlin that Ukraine’s NATO partners have the requisite resolve to maintain their support until Russia’s invasion is defeated. “Moscow must understand: They cannot win. And they cannot wait us out,” the NATO chief commented in Kyiv.

Stoltenberg’s message has never been more relevant. With the Russian invasion now in its third year, Putin is widely believed to be counting on a decline in Western support for Ukraine. Following the failure of his initial blitzkrieg attack in 2022, the Russian dictator has changed tactics and is now attempting to break Ukraine’s resistance in a long war of attrition. Given Russia’s vastly superior human and material resources, this approach has a good chance of succeeding, unless Ukraine’s Western partners remain committed to arming the country.

The issue of a long term military fund for Ukraine will likely be high on the agenda at the 2024 NATO Summit in Washington DC in July. With little hope of any meaningful progress on Ukraine’s NATO membership aspirations, a commitment to provide reliable long-term support may be the most realistic summit outcome for Kyiv. This would not solve the existential challenges posed by resurgent Russian imperialism, but it would bolster the Ukrainian war effort and dent morale in Moscow while sending a message to Putin that time is not on his side.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

Katherine Walla — Mon, 29 Apr 2024 20:37:39 +0000

Watch the event

A back-to-business birthday: Priorities for the 2024 NATO Summit in Washington

NATO turned seventy-five on April 4, 2024, but this year’s NATO Summit must be more than a birthday party. Heads of state and government descending upon Washington in July will face the imperative to reaffirm transatlantic unity and deliver on commitments to collective security.

Europe & Eurasia Politics & Diplomacy Security & Defense

When it comes to Ukraine’s NATO membership, the Alliance was “not prepared last summer to extend a proper invitation . . . and I am not expecting the Alliance to do that this summer,” said US permanent representative to NATO Julianne Smith.

“What I am expecting allies to do” at the 2024 NATO Summit in Washington this July, she said, “is to construct a bridge to membership by offering Ukraine a deliverable that will enable them to become even closer to this Alliance.”

Smith spoke at an Atlantic Council curtain-raiser event on Monday (held in partnership with the Lithuanian Ministry of National Defense) ahead of the NATO Summit. While she said she couldn’t offer details on what that “deliverable” for Ukraine would look like, she said to expect a measure to “institutionalize” the bilateral support to Ukraine that has expanded over the past two years.

In the meantime, she said, NATO has been continuing to support Ukraine, including by convening its NATO-Ukraine Council (created at the 2023 NATO Summit) and by inviting Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy to the Washington summit to “lock arms with him,” in a way that shows Russia that “NATO allies aren’t going anywhere.”

“We’re not looking away; we’re not growing impatient,” Smith said. “We will stand with Ukraine for as long as it takes.”

Below are more takeaways from the conversation, moderated by Punchbowl News Senior Congressional Reporter Andrew Desiderio.

A commitment to burden sharing

Smith said that by the time the Washington summit convenes, at least two-thirds of the countries in the Alliance (just over twenty of them) will be meeting their pledges to spend at least 2 percent of their gross domestic product (GDP) on defense. She pointed out that Germany and Norway have recently debuted plans to meet the pledge this year.
“The real celebration will come when we get to thirty-two [countries],” she said. “We are marching towards that day.”
The allies that have not hit the 2-percent mark currently have plans in place to reach it in about “two, three years,” Smith said. “We will push as hard as we can to ensure that all the allies get there.”
Recently, the United Kingdom argued that NATO should increase its defense spending target to 2.5 percent of GDP; Poland recently called for 3 percent. Smith said that 2 percent “is a floor” and “not a ceiling,” and that as NATO evaluates its new regional defense plans, the Alliance is “slowly reaching the conclusion that 2 percent will not be enough.”
But the discussions on “burden sharing” at the Washington summit won’t be limited to that 2 percent goal, Smith said. “We are also talking about what we are doing together to support our friends in Ukraine,” she said.

Seventy-five years of resilience and transformation

The Washington summit will be a “celebration” not only of the Alliance’s adaptability and resilience but also of the “over seven decades of every US president, irrespective of their political affiliations, supporting and leading this Alliance,” Smith said. “And we expect that to continue.”
Ahead of the summit, Smith explained, she and other officials from NATO countries are “working together to get a message out . . . about the importance of this Alliance” to help Americans and Europeans “understand how NATO is a different organization” today than when it was created.
“What was once an Alliance that focused primarily on conventional military threats now is an Alliance that copes with and addresses the full spectrum of security challenges as defined by the thirty-two allies,” Smith said. She added that NATO is preparing for “a variety of threats,” from climate change to cyber warfare, and is also looking to improve countries’ resilience and boost women’s involvement in peace and security solutions.
Over the past few years, NATO has worked more closely with its Indo-Pacific partners; for example, the Alliance invited Japan, South Korea, Australia, and New Zealand to the Vilnius summit last year. “They value the opportunity to exchange best practices and insights” on challenges that “know no geographic limits,” such as the rapid evolution of technology, cyberattacks, and disinformation campaigns stemming from China and Russia, Smith said.
“The Alliance is increasingly talking about what [China] is doing in and around the Euro-Atlantic area,” she said. “As we look to that challenge, we can no doubt learn from our friends in the Indo-Pacific.”

Katherine Walla is an associate director on the editorial team at the Atlantic Council.

Watch the conversation

The post Expect a new ‘bridge’ to NATO membership for Ukraine at the Washington summit, says Julianne Smith appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Michta in Politico on the imperative of Europe’s rearmament

gmatchett — Tue, 23 Apr 2024 18:30:00 +0000

Original SOurce

On April 22, Andrew Michta, director and senior fellow in the Scowcroft Strategy Initiative, published an op-ed entitled “Without European rearmament, NATO is setting itself up for failure” in Politico that discusses why Europe must rearm at speed and scale to prevent future threats to its security architecture.

Europe’s NATO allies need to move full speed ahead to resource their militaries. As long as the Russian imperial state exists in its current form, the threat it poses to Europe won’t go away.

Andrew Michta

The post Michta in Politico on the imperative of Europe’s rearmament appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The war in Ukraine could reach a decision point by the NATO Summit. Policymakers need to prepare now.

Andrew A. Michta — Tue, 23 Apr 2024 15:45:38 +0000

Russia has launched its third major mobilization wave in anticipation of its upcoming spring/summer campaign to take more land in Ukraine. On March 31, Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a decree to begin the next conscription drive, setting the target at 150,000 new inductees slated for military service. This came after a decision in July of last year by the Russian Duma to raise the maximum age of conscription from twenty-seven to thirty, significantly increasing the pool of available recruits. Ukrainian estimates put the number of new soldiers that could be inducted in the third Russian mobilization drive at as many as three hundred thousand by June.

There are various assessments about the extent to which the Russian land forces have been reconstituted since Russia’s initial losses, with some analysts arguing that the process is nearly complete. But regardless of these various assessments, the gap between Russia’s and Ukraine’s military capabilities—and the difference in sheer mass—continues to grow apace, even though Kyiv recently lowered the draft age for Ukrainian males from twenty-seven to twenty-five. Recent frontline gains by Russia, along with US aid to Ukraine moving forward in Congress only after months of delays, suggest that a major decision point in the war may be approaching in the coming months. While the US House of Representatives at last agreed on Saturday to send $60.8 billion in aid to Ukraine, which means the United States could soon be sending desperately needed ammunition and air defenses to the front lines, a Russian push already appears to be in its early stages. And it could well create a crisis for the NATO alliance much bigger than the current grumbling over who is spending more on Ukraine’s behalf.

Considering that Russian infantry may receive as little as a few months’ training before they are thrown into battle—and the fact that Moscow continues to build new training facilities—it is likely that the new offensive will coincide or overlap with the upcoming seventy-fifth anniversary NATO summit in Washington on July 9-11. In line with official Russian propaganda that this war is being fought not just against Ukraine but against NATO, and that it is a civilizational struggle against the “collective West,” Putin could seize the opportunity to launch a major offensive during the Washington summit, with the intention of humiliating the Alliance precisely as it celebrates three-quarters of a century of containing Moscow’s imperial ambitions. In such a scenario, the US presidential election could become a defining variable in how the war ends. (Increasingly extreme scenarios of how the war may end following the US presidential election have already emerged in the European press.)

Simply put, if Putin launches a major push during the summit, would the Biden administration be able to maintain its “as long as it takes” strategy of sustaining Ukraine while minimizing the risk of nuclear escalation? Or would a Russian breakthrough in Ukraine be seen by the president’s reelection team as an untenable liability just months before the vote, especially given that his likely Republican opponent would be certain to make the failure of US policy in Ukraine an issue in the campaign?

A shared vision of victory in Ukraine

The monthslong delay of approving additional US aid to Ukraine, and the fact that Kyiv got serious about building up its defenses only six months ago, increase the country’s vulnerabilities and the prospect that the latest Russian offensive may achieve a breakthrough, or at the very least widen the front. However, the biggest problem remains the Biden administration’s overall approach of providing just enough aid to Kyiv so that Ukraine can hold the line, while draining Russian warfighting capabilities and limiting the risk of nuclear escalation. This position taken by the Biden administration has, for example, allowed Chancellor Olaf Scholz of Germany, the largest power in Europe, to sustain his “Russia must not win, Ukraine must not lose” strategic ambiguity, which stays the course toward eventual negotiations with Moscow to end the conflict.

Given the perceived stalemate on land, and despite clear Ukrainian gains at sea, some analysts today are indeed coming to the view that the war in Ukraine is heading for a negotiated settlement. In such a hypothetical settlement, Ukraine would preserve its sovereignty and independence while Russia keeps its territorial gains in the east, plus Crimea. Setting aside the fact that such an outcome would be tantamount to a Russian victory, these predictions could be undone by developments on the ground, much as the prevailing view in early 2022 that Ukraine would fall fast and resort to guerrilla operations was invalidated by Kyiv’s staunch resolve to stand its ground and fight. So, rather than incessantly speculating about this or that territorial settlement or this or that negotiated deal, what Ukraine and the transatlantic community need most urgently is a shared vision of victory in Ukraine, one that Kyiv and its supporters can rally around. Next, the United States and its allies and partners need a strategy—with resources to match—that will allow Ukraine to achieve that victory. After all, to rephrase a cliché, visions without resources are merely hallucinations.

In the coming months, the Biden administration could change course on Ukraine. If the Russians advance in Ukraine, the administration would have two choices: stay the course and increase the risk of Ukrainian losses, or shift from a “for as long as it takes” policy to an approach of “whatever the Ukrainians need to beat the Russians back.” This would potentially increase the risk of escalation with Russia, but it would also deflect the electoral risk of being blamed for the failure of US policy in Ukraine, while giving Kyiv a fighting chance to reach a favorable position from which to negotiate.

If Ukraine is to have a shot at reversing the tide on the battlefield, it will need to receive a large quantity of long-range artillery to strike at rail links, fuel depots, ammunition depots, command posts, and airfields deep inside Russian territory. Absent those weapons and authorities, another Ukrainian frontal assault on the Russian defensive line is likely to lead to widespread casualties for the Ukrainian army once again.

At the strategic level, the Biden administration and US allies across Europe need a serious public conversation about a vision of victory that goes beyond the assertions that Russia cannot win in Ukraine and that the West’s enduring commitment to Ukraine remains unshakeable. The transatlantic community needs a forthright discussion of the end state it wants, in clearly defined geostrategic terms rather than open-ended general support, followed by a commitment of resources to achieve those goals.

This summer will likely bring a decision point when it comes to US Ukraine policy. Depending on what happens in the next several months, the conflict may move into uncharted territory.

Andrew A. Michta is senior fellow and director of the Scowcroft Strategy Initiative at the Atlantic Council. Views expressed here are his own.

The post The war in Ukraine could reach a decision point by the NATO Summit. Policymakers need to prepare now. appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Slovakia’s presidential choice reinforces its anti-Western leanings

Soňa Muzikárová — Tue, 16 Apr 2024 16:10:55 +0000

On April 6, Slovakia voted in a populist, Moscow-friendly president, potentially accelerating the erosion of the country’s democratic values and possibly increasing Russia’s influence over Bratislava.

In a closely watched second-round presidential race, Slovaks cast their ballots in what evolved into a tight face-off between Ivan Korčok, a career diplomat advocating pro-Western ideals and staunch support for Ukraine, and Peter Pellegrini, who has echoed pro-Kremlin rhetoric and is aligned with the current Slovak government led by Prime Minister Robert Fico. Fico, who took office last October, has caused alarm among NATO allies for opposing aid to Kyiv during his campaign, parroting Kremlin talking points on the war in Ukraine, and threatening his country’s independent judiciary.

While the presidency wields limited powers, the race earlier this month was broadly seen as a poignant battleground between political factions harboring opposing views on domestic rule-of-law issues and Russia’s war on Ukraine.

The election of a president who is unlikely to check the prime minister’s executive power leaves Fico’s administration in a new position.

The president has the authority to veto laws—albeit subject to potential override by parliament with a simple majority—and can dispute them at the constitutional court. The president also appoints constitutional court judges, selects the prime minister, swears in the new government after parliamentary elections, and can pardon convicts. With Pellegrini’s victory, Fico and his allies’ control extends not just over the legislative and executive branches, but also over these presidential authorities.

Initially expected to be a tight race, Pellegrini won with an unexpected 6 percent lead and 53 percent of the total vote. Despite Korčok’s commendable efforts to rally support against the incumbent administration’s policies, Pellegrini emerged victorious, leaving many pondering the implications for Slovakia’s future.

While each candidate garnered more than one million votes for the first time ever in a Slovak presidential race, Pellegrini’s success can be attributed to several key factors. He adeptly tapped into widespread anti-Western and anti-liberal sentiments across the nation, especially in areas where the ruling, populist coalition parties had previously performed well. Moreover, he consolidated support from voters who backed candidates eliminated in the initial round. A historic voter turnout in the second round exceeding 60 percent further bolstered his campaign, as he successfully mobilized new constituencies.

During the campaign, Pellegrini painted Korčok as a harbinger of war—asserting that Korčok’s victory would drag the country into a war with Russia—while he positioned himself as a proponent of peace. This narrative was bolstered by misleading social media posts, which were spread on the social media accounts of prominent government officials—including Slovakia’s ministers of economy, European Union (EU) funds, and regional development—which swayed public opinion and contributed to Korčok’s defeat.

Korčok did triumph in the capital region, Bratislava, which also boasted the highest election turnout nationwide with over 71 percent. He also won the support of younger voters, who were able to see through the disinformation campaign against him.

With Pellegrini’s victory, concerns have been mounting regarding the unchecked advancement of the government’s antidemocratic agenda and closer ties with Russia. The outgoing president, Zuzana Čaputová, habitually exercised her presidential powers to limit the executive arm, both with the current and previous administrations.

The election of a president who is unlikely to check the prime minister’s executive power leaves Fico’s administration in a new position. It might now feel emboldened to accelerate efforts to undermine judicial independence, media autonomy, and democratic oversight—unless it is restrained by external forces, notably Brussels.

The European Commission has warned Bratislava that it could face penalties over concerns that the Fico administration’s judicial reforms—particularly those shielding politicians from prosecution—were incompatible with the EU’s democratic standards. This would place Slovakia alongside Poland and Hungary, both of which have been embroiled in prolonged disputes with the EU over the rule of law. The potential withholding of EU funds constitutes significant leverage, particularly as Slovakia faces the eurozone’s biggest budget deficit, projected at over 6 percent of the country’s gross domestic product this year.

Slovakia’s geopolitical realignment is equally likely to reverberate on the international stage. Bratislava’s continued drift into the Russian orbit of influence is sure to pose fresh challenges for regional stability, European unity on support for Kyiv, and transatlantic relations.

Korčok’s defeat represents more than a missed opportunity for principled leadership in a geopolitically crucial region. It signifies a worrisome shift in Slovakia’s democratic trajectory away from Western norms, raising alarms not just about the country’s future course but also Europe’s internal stability, cohesion, and decision making.

Soňa Muzikárová is a political economist focused on Central and Eastern Europe and a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center.

The post Slovakia’s presidential choice reinforces its anti-Western leanings appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Organizing for victory

Ben Hodges — Mon, 15 Apr 2024 16:34:40 +0000

Ten years since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine began with the illegal annexation of Crimea, it is clear that a Russia containment strategy 2.0 is inevitable. I am convinced Ukraine will be our best partner for such a strategy in terms of intelligence, understanding of Russian psychology, and military defense. It will be a bulwark against Putin’s clearly articulated plans for further European conquest. Ukraine’s survival and the necessity of bringing it into NATO as soon as possible are paramount to a new European and global deterrence and containment strategy.

We are currently witnessing the continuing collapse of the USSR, which began in 1991. This process is not a straight-line decline, but it is unmistakable. Putin’s unprovoked war against Ukraine has undermined Russia’s economy and severed it from much of the West. His military has been exposed for its many shortcomings and corruption. Nearly all the former Soviet republics and Warsaw Pact members have turned their backs on Russia. Finland and Sweden have joined NATO.

We should not fear this Russian decline. In fact, we should seek to accelerate it by helping Ukraine defeat Russia and eject it back to its 1991 borders. Ukraine defeating Russia now is the best way to ensure NATO never has to fight directly against Russia. This is in our own strategic interest.

Does the West have the combined political will, industrial strength, and military capabilities to address the strategic challenges posed by Russia, Iran, North Korea, and China? These challenges are all linked and must be viewed as parts of a strategic whole, leading to the conclusion that it in the West’s interests to prioritize the defeat of Russia in Ukraine.

A “Russia first” approach would echo the example set by the allies during World War II. In 1942, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill and US President Franklin D. Roosevelt agreed on a “Germany first” strategy. One year later, they defined their war aim as the “unconditional surrender” of Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan. This provides a model for the kind of strategic clarity the current generation of Western leaders should be looking to emulate.

Stay updated

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

An assessment of today’s battlefield confirms that the Ukrainian military faces a very difficult situation. However, present narratives are overly gloomy and defeatist. After ten years of war, and despite holding every advantage, Russia still only controls just under twenty percent of Ukraine.

The Russian army has suffered hundreds of thousands of losses, while the weaknesses of the Russian navy and air force have been revealed. The Black Sea Fleet has lost around one-third of its ships and is in retreat from Sevastopol. The Russian Air Force has failed in its two main tasks of securing air superiority over Ukraine and cutting the supply lines bringing military equipment into Ukraine from the EU.

Much has been made of minor Russian victories such as the recent capture of Avdiivka, but these advances should be put in a proper geopolitical and operational context. Despite efforts by many of the doom-mongers to make it sound like Stalingrad, Avdiivka is in reality a small town located close to the 2022 front lines in eastern Ukraine. Indeed, it is currently far from clear whether the Russians have the operational capability to exploit even local tactical successes.

At this stage of the war, neither side appears capable of delivering a knockout blow. For Ukraine’s new military Commander-in-Chief Oleksandr Syrsky, the key task this year is to stabilize the situation in order to buy time, build combat power, and fix the country’s personnel system. Worn-out units need to be reconstituted and new units built. Training should include a focus on countering Russia’s advantages in electronic and drone warfare.

Eurasia Center events

II. Elements of innovation

Ukraine’s advance in Kursk: What’s next and implications

Conflict Russia Security & Defense Ukraine

What does Ukraine need in order to actually win? The Ukrainian military needs the capacity to make Crimea, the decisive terrain of this war, untenable for the Russian navy, air force, and logistics. Every square inch of Crimea is within ATACMS range. Ukraine has already proven the concept with a relatively small number of cruise missiles provided by Britain and France. This has made it possible to seriously damage the Black Sea Fleet HQ and naval maintenance capability in Sevastopol, forcing the fleet to partially withdraw to Russia. There are no good reasons for not providing Ukraine with ATACMS missiles, only excuses from an administration that is unwilling or unable to develop a strategy for Ukrainian victory.

The Ukrainian military also needs a long-range strike capability to neutralize the Russian army on land by destroying Russian troop concentrations, command posts, artillery, and logistics. Significantly enhanced air defense and counter-drone capabilities are essential, along with more naval drones and anti-ship missiles to allow Ukraine to build on the country’s remarkable success in the Battle of the Black Sea.

One of the most important steps toward securing Ukrainian victory is a clear declaration from the US and EU that it is in our own strategic interest to help Ukraine win. The failure of the current US administration to clearly explain this to the American people has led to incoherent and self-deterring policies along with incremental decision-making and a drip-feed approach to military aid for Ukraine. This has left the door open for disinformation and made it possible for a MAGA-led minority within the Republican Party to block aid despite majority support.

The current year is a year of industrial competition that the West can and must win. Western countries should collectively be dwarfing Russia’s output but there is currently a lack of urgency. Encouragingly, ammunition production is finally picking up some momentum in Europe and the US. We just need the US Congress to approve delivery. Meanwhile, EU nations must reassess their priorities and address the large percentage of ammunition production that is currently heading to customers outside Europe. Greater efforts are also required to source existing ample ammunition stockpiles globally.

The West needs a return to the clarity of Churchill and Roosevelt, who communicated clear strategic priorities to the public, industry, and the military. Identifying these priorities was a vital step, making it possible for the allies to organize the war effort and secure victory. The lessons of this approach should now be applied to the confrontation with Putin’s Russia, Iran, and China. At the end of the day, it’s all about political will and leaders speaking to their populations as adults.

Lieutenant General (Ret.) Ben Hodges is the former Commander of US Army Europe.

John T. Watts — Fri, 05 Apr 2024 15:00:00 +0000

DOWNLOAD PDF

I. Introduction

III. New concepts: Innovation in adoption and adaption

IV. New technologies: Exported concepts to returned capabilities

V. New attitudes: Niche innovations

VI. Conclusion

I. Introduction

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) warfighting edge has traditionally been anchored by the innovation and industrial capacity of the United States, but this will not be sufficient for the transatlantic community to weather today’s military and geopolitical realities. The return of true strategic competition, between nations that believe in the universal value of the free and open liberal international order and those that seek to remake it for their own benefit, has made every element of the international order a contested space—ranging from economics and information to seeking to redraw sovereign territorial borders through force. Strained by the return of industrial warfare on their borders and the need to ensure the security and territorial integrity of partners in the Middle East and Western Pacific, and faced with outdated acquisition systems and supply chains reliant on production in competitor nations, the United States and its NATO partners need new approaches, attitudes, and concepts for technology innovation and industrial production if they are to prevail on future battlefields.

Seen as the solution to every emerging military challenge, the call to innovate has been constant in recent years. Innovation is certainly going to be key to success, and some analysts have even defined the era of strategic competition in terms of an “innovation race.”¹ Too often, however, “innovation” is used as shorthand for “develop a new technology or widget.”

Innovation is as much about process, concepts, implementation, and execution as it is about the technology itself—and it is often in these enabling functions where innovation is needed most to gain significant improvements and advantages.

Society is also going through a transition phase from hardware led to software led, which impacts how we think about technology, its development, and its implementation. This is not new, and is evident across all aspects of modern life. But because the military is more heavily hardware defined than most other sectors, and often more cautious in its evolution, it has greater implications than might be immediately apparent. One key implication is the potential for easier collaboration between allies in capability development. But for this potential to be realized, there will need to be innovation not just in technology, but in the concepts, processes, and,
most importantly, attitudes that allow it to happen.

This is not to claim that hardware is no longer important. Anyone with a passing understanding of artificial intelligence (AI) and the possibilities it portends will also understand how critical the architecture of the silicon chips it runs on is, for instance. But to see how the importance between software and hardware has shifted, take the example of “network centric warfare.”² The term du jour in the early 2000s, this concept for how war would be fought has been proven right. Yet, most militaries attempted to implement it by forcing every partner military to use the same hardware and “network” systems. More recently, modern Western militaries have begun taking a more data-centric approach, which emphasizes shared data formats rather than shared systems, and has seen a rapid improvement in implementing the concepts network-centric warfare championed.³ The hardware is still important, but the software is the defining element.

If advanced technologies are a key pillar of winning the era of strategic competition, and allies are one of the United States’ great advantages, then surely tech collaboration with allies should be a center of gravity for the US to win. Defending the Euro-Atlantic area, and securing NATO’s advantage across operational domains in a moment of unprecedented strategic competition with near-peer adversaries, will require strengthened defense and technology cooperation between the United States and its allies and industry partners across the Atlantic. To achieve this, the United States will need innovative thinking and approaches—not just for the development of technologies, but for sharing and ultimately co-producing them.

II. Elements of innovation

The concept of innovation can be abstract, and there are few agreed rules or definitions for exactly how it can be achieved. Innovation can have many sources and take many forms, and occurs in every aspect of the human experience. In military terms, it has most often originated during times of conflict and out of necessity. Since the end of the Second World War and the start of the Cold War—a period of incredible innovation—technology development was driven by military and federal funding, and undertaken by a handful of centralized, traditional research organizations with a focus on government and military applications. The internet is the most commonly cited example of Department of Defense (DOD)-funded invention, having started as an Advanced Research Projects Agency project, but examples include the Global Positioning System (GPS), night vision, jet engines, and many others. This innovation was paired with experimentation of concepts and doctrine that often needed to occur in large, remote areas and involved significant infrastructure and forces.

Today, greater innovation is occurring in the commercial sector, led by a handful of technology behemoths and a vast number of decentralized start-ups funded by private capital.“⁴ As technology becomes increasingly software driven, there is greater scope for new entrants and broader collaboration as the development environments are less constrained by geography and infrastructure. Experimentation can happen virtually and through simulation, allowing for more input from a more diverse set of participants. This is critically important, as collaboration and cross-pollination of perspectives and ideas can be powerful drivers of innovation. And while national militaries still have a key role to play in innovation and technology development—for instance, through programs like the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) and NATO’s Defence Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic (DIANA)—many of the most important capabilities are dual use, with the rapid iteration and evolution in the commercial field outpacing those of government-driven programs.

Mobile phones are seen during the Locked Shields, cyber defence exercise organized by NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Exellence (CCDCOE) in Tallinn, Estonia April 10, 2019. REUTERS/Ints Kalnins

Technology will always play a key role in innovation, as it can enable us to do new things we couldn’t do before or provide new ways to complete existing tasks more efficiently. But innovation does not always require new technologies, and it is not always characterized by a sudden or high-profile shift. Even small improvements, new ways of doing things, or applying existing ideas in new contexts can generate significant innovation. In other cases, new processes or methods that enable something to occur, or encourage greater creativity in execution, can be considered innovative. And in the government sector, where departments of defense and militaries reside, these sometimes boring and arcane improvements can be the most significant.⁵ The problems and constraints created by the US International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) are an obvious area where even small changes could have a dramatic impact on cross-border innovation collaboration.⁶ An adaptation in attitude and mindset can be the most crucial, if it means that a new approach can be adopted where it would not previously have been.

Therefore, innovation can be defined as the successful implementation of new ideas, methods, or products that create value. It involves challenging the status quo, thinking creatively, and taking calculated risks to achieve positive outcomes. Fresh perspectives and unconventional thinking foster innovation by questioning existing assumptions and approaches. These new concepts can disrupt traditional methods and spark the creation of entirely new fields of study or application, in part by fusing seemingly unrelated fields. This is where open societies have an advantage, as they embrace diversity of experience and perspective. Leveraging niche expertise and many different cultural, geopolitical, educational, and experiential perspectives that exist within the United States’ robust network opens new opportunities. Closer cooperation across design, experimentation, and implementation of cutting-edge technologies and approaches help the United States not only strengthen connectivity with allies and industry partners, but share the burden of innovation investment while gaining insights and capabilities for its own forces.

Deeper transatlantic defense cooperation has the potential to unlock new advantages needed to ensure the United States and its allies retain their strategic edge over near-peer adversaries in a future conflict. But cashing in on these opportunities requires an understanding of the forms innovation takes, what is needed to best harness them, and a willingness within the traditional US defense establishment to reform procurement, contracting, and data-sharing mechanisms in ways that make it easier for trusted allies and industry partners to do business with the United States.⁷

Broadly, we can think of the forms of innovation as new concepts, new technologies, and new attitudes. New technologies become the tools to implement fresh concepts brought to life by a shift in attitudes. Fostering innovation requires more than just the latest technology. It necessitates a culture that embraces new ideas, encourages experimentation, and fosters collaboration—allowing all three ingredients to work together in a powerful synergy, shaping a more innovative and progressive future.

III. New concepts: Innovation in adoption and adaption

Experimentation is a vital component of innovation, and forces in active combat will always seek new ways to gain an advantage over enemy combatants. Their lives depend on it.

It is not surprising that we have seen a wide range of innovations emerge from brave Ukrainians defending themselves in the face of Russia’s war of aggression. As this is the first conventional conflict between two modern militaries in decades, there will be many attempts to extrapolate insights about the nature of modern and future warfare from successful technologies and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) implemented in Ukraine. But while the obvious lessons to learn might come from the extensive use of small commercial drones for precision strikes, this has been occurring at a smaller scale in Middle East since at least 2017, and is not particularly new or radical.⁸ What the Ukrainians have done, with great success, is integrate this drone capability effectively into combined-arms operations, and with the scale, sophistication, and diversity of platform capable of changing the nature of the battlespace.“⁹

A first-person view (FPV) drone is seen at a training location of the “Achilles” Attack Drone Battalion of the 92nd Separate Assault Brigade of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, amid Russia’s attack on Ukraine, at an undisclosed location in Donetsk region, Ukraine February 6, 2024. REUTERS/Alina Smutko

The more interesting lesson to learn, however, is the way Ukraine has leveraged the drones to amplify their effect through domestically created software. For years, analysts have predicted a transition from hardware-focused warfare to a software-defined ecosystem, mirroring similar transitions in civilian and commercial sectors. In the West, there is a slow process of moving from system- and platform-centric reference architectures for military systems to software products that enable larger platforms. Companies like Anduril and Palantir are transforming the traditional procurement pathways, but this will be a slow and iterative process. Ukraine is showing how it can be accelerated.¹⁰

Local software developers have created their own software solutions, like the Kropyva artillery targeting and blue-force tracking combat-control app; Delta, a cloud-based, comprehensive situational-awareness and battlefield-management system; and a chatbot, often integrated into the widely used Diia app, to crowdsource intelligence from the general population about enemy movements and military capabilities.¹¹

The development and deployment of these software-enabled capabilities share several key characteristics. They often include aspects of private-public partnership; integrate elements of crowdsourcing and support from the wider populations; automate key features; and mimic more sophisticated commercial services. Moreover, one of their key contributions is the ability to modernize and integrate old and outdated equipment with more modern systems and tactics, such as Ukraine’s legacy, Soviet-originated anti-aircraft systems.¹²

There are wider lessons to be learned from the development and deployment of such systems. A country facing an existential threat has an inherently different risk profile than a country in a state of peace, and a smaller nation will usually have less bureaucracy than a larger one. Nonetheless, private-public collaboration and the ability and willingness to quickly adapt, along with more flexible and streamlined procurement processes, show what can be possible. Moreover, this demonstrates how software can overcome the limitations of hardware—particularly dated, legacy systems—which will be vital as the United States seeks to modernize the forces of allies and partners around the world as efficiently as possible. The benefit cannot be understated. While all allies and partners strengthen the strategic value of the network, many may struggle to meaningfully contribute in a high-end contingency due to the capabilities of their legacy systems. Leveraging the expertise Ukraine has built in creating and effectively utilizing an ecosystem of partner security cooperation increases the second- and third-order value of past US security-cooperation investments, while increasing the deterrent value of its core strategic asset and increasing stability and security for all.

IV. New technologies: Exported concepts to returned capabilities

Alliances provide unique opportunities for innovation through the exportation and application of concepts—opening new doors for innovation in response to countries’ unique geopolitical needs and circumstances, with multiplying effects for others in the network. Australia’s Ghost Bat program is a fascinating example of this type of innovation across the alliance ecosystem. Boeing’s MQ-28 Ghost Bat is “a pathfinder for the integration of autonomous systems and artificial intelligence to create smart human-machine teams” that resulted from collaboration between the Australian Air Force and Boeing.¹³ The Ghost Bat represents a new way of conducting air-combat operations, in which human-flown aircraft like the F-35 will be able to seamlessly coordinate and cooperate with autonomous systems, in a concept known as the “loyal wingman.”¹⁴

A Boeing MQ-28 Ghost Bat fighter-like drone is kept on display at the Australian International Airshow, in Avalon, Australia February 28, 2023. REUTERS/Jamie Freed

The design of the Ghost Bat was so successful that it has been expanded by $250 million to build a Block 2 version, spawned an underwater unmanned-vehicle program called the Ghost Shark, and is now being exported to the United States for testing.¹⁵. What is more interesting is that the collaboration involves a US allied government, is led by a US defense manufacturer, and manifests a US-developed concept that, despite several conceptual iterations, is yet to be fully developed in the United States itself.¹⁶

A simplistic analysis of this case study could point to streamlined procurement processes and reduced bureaucracy in non-US governments, but this is not necessarily the case. The more useful framing for thinking about such a program is that every nation has a unique set of national circumstances—from geography and economy to national objectives and military approaches. As such, there will be varying requirements and incentives for military designs and programmatic commitments.

Rather than seeking to cover all possibilities, or even to replicate others’ experiences, streamlining the ability to leverage that experience and context to flow concepts, manufacturing, and techniques back and forth between nations means the United States can benefit from the diversity of its vast partner network, while sharing the burden of development costs.

It is the flow of concepts, skills, technology, and prototypes between partners in complex innovation ecosystems that reveals the possibilities for operationalizing ideas to capabilities. And while Ukraine demonstrates that makeshift and improvised solutions in real-time combat can provide paths to innovation, the Ghost Bat program was a long-term, planned procurement process, in which an ally’s pursuit of capabilities to meet its own needs (in Australia’s case, the need to amplify the effect of a small population across vast territory through high-end technology and capabilities) offers an opportunity to advance solutions the United States can leverage to achieve its own capabilities goals.

Partnerships such as the US National Technological and Industrial Base (NTIB) and AUKUS trilateral defense partnership have created vehicles for cooperation between the United States and some of its closest historical allies—which can drive collaboration like the Ghost Bat program. The NTIB, for example, supports security and defense objectives by “supplying military operations; conducting advanced R&D and systems development to ensure technological superiority of the US Armed Forces; securing reliable sources of critical materials; and developing industrial preparedness to support operations in wartime or during a national emergency.” ¹⁷ While effective, the NTIB and AUKUS only tap into a small subset of countries, excluding the advanced capabilities, platforms, and expertise spread across the United States’ twenty-nine other NATO allies. Bringing new partners into the US orbit via an AUKUS+ framework—or extending the NTIB to other close transatlantic allies with cutting-edge expertise and capabilities, like Sweden, Italy, and the Netherlands—would open new acquisition pathways and facilitate the enhanced cooperative development, experimentation, and industrial co-production needed for the United States to outpace competitors in today’s threat environment.¹⁸ Agreements like AUKUS should not be seen as ends in themselves, but pathfinders to create new and more streamlined channels for tech collaboration and cooperation.

V. New attitudes: Niche innovations

Another way to leverage allied innovation is through adapting and adopting niche capabilities that allies have naturally developed to meet their own needs, built on the native talents and expertise of their own populations. Some of the easiest and most critical of these tools are in the cyber and information domains, though across allied countries in NATO, for instance, there are numerous small drone, satellite communications, and ballistic-missile technologies that could be highly useful across the US-aligned alliance ecosystem. For instance, countries such as Estonia and the Netherlands are at the forefront in areas such as misinformation detection, cyber-threat intelligence, network security, and incident response. Co-production will also be vital for NATO to meet the challenges of this era of renewed strategic competition, and the value of it—particularly in niche advanced capabilities—can be seen through the ramping up of production for items such as first-person view (FPV) drones in support of Ukraine’s defense.¹⁹

The value of leveraging native conditions that can be leveraged by the wider alliance can be seen in countries like the Netherlands, where a high concentration of high-tech companies, knowledge economies, and widespread public-private collaborations has resulted in niche capabilities in ballistic-missile defense, sensor systems, and space, communications, and quantum technologies.²⁰ Its innovation hub at Brainport Eindhoven now also hosts a NATO DIANA accelerator cell to further leverage its successful investments and public-private collaborations, and its success in areas such as the launching of micro satellites has drawn attention from potential adversaries.²¹ More importantly, they are proactive in seeking to collaborate and disseminate natively developed insights, showing how important the attitude toward innovation must come from both sides of any collaboration.²²

US Secretary of State Antony Blinken speaks with Charles Marcus, professor at Niels Bohr Institute and principal researcher at Microsoft, as he tours the Quantum Materials Lab at the University of Copenhagen, in Copenhagen in Copenhagen, Denmark, May 17, 2021. Saul Loeb/Pool via REUTERS

In many cases, knowledge-based innovation should be easy to export and share. But it cannot occur without recognition of the expertise of the source country and a genuine desire to learn from and adopt the lessons being generated. This requires a shift in attitude toward the value of the innovation itself, and a willingness to learn from others’ experiences. At a more basic level, it requires appropriate information-sharing agreements to be in place, which also requires a degree of trust between parties and a dedication to reforming the bureaucratic processes needed to enable them. While initiatives like the NTIB have arguably failed to live up to their potential, their value in shaping attitudes and focusing attention on the need for collaboration and sharing of data and technologies could be as valuable as any other element.²³ For this reason alone, the United States should consider expanding the effort to more NATO nations, with the future intent of also bringing them into an expanded AUKUS+ framework.²⁴ Agreements of this type are a perfect example of the process innovation needed in addition to the development of technologies, because without process and regulatory reform—not to mention increased data sharing—and the attitude required to enable it, technological collaboration will not be able to occur in a meaningful way.

Successful innovation requires a shift in attitude across a number of issues, including willingness to experiment, increased risk appetite, open-mindedness, and an embracing of inevitable failures as a path to learning. But the need to recognize the value of diverse perspectives on addressing challenges—and have the willingness to enable the sharing of those perspectives and the data that support them—is vital to exploring untrodden paths and fostering a culture of continuous improvement. There are likely few across the US agencies, military, or defense industrial base who would disagree in principle. But for this attitude to have a material effect, there must be a shift from passive agreement to proactive measures to enable it.

VI. Conclusion

If advanced technologies are a key pillar of winning the era of strategic competition, and allies are one of the United States’ great advantages, then surely tech collaboration with allies should be a center of gravity of US means to win. In a race of innovation, harnessing the perspectives, experiences, and extant investment of a diverse network of partners is a huge strategic advantage for the United States and NATO. But it will be a squandered advantage if appropriate attitudes, concepts, and processes are not in place to amplify development and harness the resulting capabilities. There are already a number of programs that seek to do this, and they should be supported, studied, and replicated. But more should be done to harness the new concepts, technologies, and niche capabilities that the partner ecosystem is generating, particularly within NATO member states—either through expansion of programs such as the NTIB, AUKUS, and DIANA, or by using them as templates to reform and evolve other bilateral and multilateral frameworks. Doing so will be imperative if the transatlantic Alliance is not only to prevail in this era of strategic competition, but retain sufficient military advantage needed to ensure security and stability for a free and open international system.

About the author

Fellow

John T. Watts

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Conflict Crisis Management

Acknowledgement and disclaimer

This publication has been produced in cooperation with the Ministry of Defence of the Kingdom of the Netherlands under the auspices of a project on transatlantic defense innovation.

Fighting history’s ‘blind tides’

Frederick Kempe — Thu, 04 Apr 2024 14:50:32 +0000

NATO’s founders, who signed the world’s most enduring and successful alliance into being seventy-five years ago today, had an advantage that today’s leaders cannot replicate.

All of them had experienced the horrors of World War II, and a great many of them also personally knew the ravages of World War I. So they understood the urgency of their moment.

That deficit of memory is the greatest peril of 2024. It is one that has resulted in allied dithering and insufficient measures to counter Russian despot Vladimir Putin and his like-minded partners in China, Iran, North Korea, and elsewhere.

One cannot change the historical experience of today’s NATO leaders and their electorates. Even President Joe Biden, now age eighty-one, was only two years old when Germany surrendered in May 1945 and Japan followed in September. The best one can do today is ask them to listen to President Harry S. Truman’s address on the occasion of the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty on April 4, 1949, then hope they heed its warnings.

They can read it here, listen to it here in full, or watch an excerpt here.

“Twice in recent years, nations have felt the sickening blow of unprovoked aggression,” Truman said. “Our peoples, to whom our governments are responsible, demand that these things shall not happen again. We are determined that they shall not happen again.”

That founding treaty was signed by just twelve nations then, but it continues to be the north star document for NATO’s thirty-two members now, with Finland and Sweden the latest to join.

“This treaty is a simple document,” Truman said, likening it to a homeowners’ agreement to protect the neighborhood. Its signatories agreed to “maintain friendly relations and economic cooperation with one another, to consult together whenever the territory or independence of any of them is threatened, and to come to the aid of any one of them who may be attacked.”

Continued Truman, “It is a simple document, but if it had existed in 1914 and in 1939, supported by the nations who are represented here today, I believe it would have prevented the acts of aggression which led to two world wars.”

Apply that logic now. With the world facing the greatest threat to global order since the 1930s, the Alliance must do everything in its power to defend Ukraine and, as soon as the seventy-fifth anniversary NATO Summit in Washington this July, provide Ukraine an accelerated path to Alliance membership.

History has taught that the risks of inaction are greater than those of action. We have learned that appeased dictators grow more dangerous.

It was fitting that NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg and US Secretary of State Antony Blinken participated this week as an eight-foot bronze statue of Truman was unveiled in Brussels at the residence of the US ambassador to NATO.

Back in 1949, Truman said this, “We do not believe that there are blind tides of history which sweep men one way or another. In our own time, we have seen brave men overcome obstacles that seemed insurmountable and forces that seemed overwhelming. Men with courage and vision can still determine their own destiny.”

The Spanish-American philosopher George Santayana wrote, “Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it.” Biden and his allies can best mark this NATO anniversary by summoning memory, sustaining the Alliance, and countering today’s despots.

Frederick Kempe is president and chief executive officer of the Atlantic Council. You can follow him on Twitter: @FredKempe.

The post Fighting history’s ‘blind tides’ appeared first on Atlantic Council.

NATO at 75: The Alliance’s future lies in Ukraine’s victory against Russia

Ian Brzezinski — Wed, 03 Apr 2024 15:10:42 +0000

NATO will mark its seventy-fifth anniversary on April 4 as history’s most successful military alliance. However, its future as a credible deterrent to aggression now lies in the success or failure of Russia’s unjust and brutal invasion of Ukraine.

NATO’s past successes are unquestioned and impressive. It was NATO that enabled the transatlantic community to defeat the Soviet Union without firing a shot. NATO operations brought peace and stability to the Balkans following the flareup of violence and aggression there in the 1990s. Allied forces leveraged their interoperability fostered by NATO to fight courageously and effectively in Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere around the world.

NATO’s success is rooted not only in its development and deployment of highly capable integrated military forces, but also in the Alliance’s unquestioned political will and readiness to exercise those forces in combat. Nowhere was this more clearly demonstrated than during the Alliance’s defense of West Berlin, its Cold War enclave in East Germany. The Alliance’s robust force posture and unquestioned resoluteness is what kept West Berlin from being overtaken by Warsaw Pact forces during the most tense and volatile periods of that era.

How NATO contributes to Ukraine’s defense will significantly determine the outcome of Russia’s invasion.

Looking forward, can this NATO anniversary—which will also be marked by a summit hosted by US President Joe Biden in Washington, DC, in July—be one that inspires confidence about NATO’s future credibility? In particular, can it do so when Ukraine is at a stalemate or losing territory to Russia?

Ukraine’s loss of momentum in its defense against Russia’s full-scale invasion is deeply rooted in Moscow’s ability to deter the Alliance from providing more robust assistance to Ukraine. A key element of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s strategy has been the exercise of nuclear coercion to deter the West from intervening directly in the defense of Ukraine. The strategy has so far worked out better than he must have hoped. Putin’s threats of nuclear war caused the Alliance to pledge “no boots on the ground” and have intimidated allies into restricting their flow of military equipment to Ukraine.

Underscoring the effectiveness with which Russia has exercised nuclear coercion is the sheer imbalance of power between NATO and Russia. The combined gross domestic product (GDP) of NATO member states is some fifty-one trillion dollars, more than twenty times Russia’s GDP. NATO members spent $1.3 trillion on defense in 2023, around ten times that spent by Russia, and Russian military equipment and personnel are no match for the technology and professionalism deployed by the Alliance’s forces.

This imbalance begs the question: How is it that the Alliance is unable or unwilling to decisively defeat Russia’s invasion? That question will be unavoidable at the July summit. Allied leaders have unambiguously bound NATO’s security to this war. NATO summits have repeatedly condemned the invasion and demanded that Russia “completely and unconditionally withdraw all of its forces and equipment from the territory of Ukraine.”

And the rhetoric has escalated. French President Emmanuel Macron recently described the war as “existential” for Europe. “If Russia wins this war, Europe’s credibility would be reduced to zero,” Macron said, adding that war would then come to NATO’s eastern frontier. Biden, in his latest State of the Union address, said: “If anybody in this room thinks Putin will stop at Ukraine, I assure you, he will not.” Numerous allied leaders have said the same, if not in as urgent of terms.

NATO has a long and important agenda at its upcoming Washington summit: Alliance leaders will highlight NATO’s rejuvenated unity. They will deliver its updated concept for defense and deterrence. And they will roll out its refined war plans that are already being backed by increased defense spending and more intensive and larger-scale exercises. All true . . . but will the summit confirm that NATO can still draw upon the political will—the political grit—necessary to defeat its adversaries?

If the upcoming Washington summit is to inspire continued confidence in NATO’s credibility, and thus its future, then the Alliance must take action to place Ukraine onto a clear path to victory. That will require a strategy featuring five essential elements:

Allied leaders must unambiguously endorse Ukraine’s war objectives—that is, total territorial reconstitution back to the nation’s 1991 borders. Anything short of that is a disillusioning signal to Ukraine and encouragement to Putin to sustain his invasion.

NATO can no longer hesitate in providing Ukraine the weapons it so urgently needs—at the rate it needs, and without any restrictions on their use against legitimate military targets in Russia. That list includes fighter aircraft, long-range fires, mine-clearing equipment, additional tanks, and air and missile defense systems.

Truly comprehensive and effective sanctions must be imposed on Russia. Russia’s GDP grew by more than 3 percent last year, despite Western sanctions intended to impede Moscow’s war effort. That fact underscores the inadequacy of the West’s sanctions regime. Severe sanctions alone may not stop Putin’s invasion, but their imposition—and their enforcement—will weaken Russia’s war machine, undermine political stability in the country, and serve as a positive reflection of the Alliance’s resolve.

NATO allies must energetically engage the Russian people about the brutal realities of this war. The transatlantic community just doesn’t have an intensive information campaign in this regard for fear of creating the impression that the West is intent on regime change in Russia. In the meantime, Russia and its allies have steadily intensified their information campaigns against the West.

The Washington summit must grant Ukraine a clear path to NATO membership. NATO membership in Ukraine is not only necessary to secure a postwar peace. It is essential to an effective win strategy that enables Ukraine to achieve its war objectives quickly and decisively. Ukraine’s membership in NATO and the security guarantee that comes with it is the only way to convince Putin that Ukraine is irreversibly locked into the transatlantic community and no longer vulnerable to his subordination.

How NATO contributes to Ukraine’s defense will significantly determine the outcome of Russia’s invasion. It will also speak volumes about the strength of the Alliance’s political will and resoluteness. That resoluteness is the underpinning of NATO’s ability to deter aggression over the next seventy-five years as successfully as it has over the past seventy-five years.

Ian Brzezinski is a resident senior fellow with the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security and is a member of the Atlantic Council’s Strategic Advisors Group.

The post NATO at 75: The Alliance’s future lies in Ukraine’s victory against Russia appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Norrlöf op-ed re-published by The Japan Times on NATO anniversary and its role for US interests and leadership

amagazzino — Wed, 03 Apr 2024 14:01:48 +0000

Read the full op-ed here.

The post Norrlöf op-ed re-published by The Japan Times on NATO anniversary and its role for US interests and leadership appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Norrlöf op-ed re-published by Kyiv Independent on NATO anniversary and its role for US interests and leadership

amagazzino — Wed, 03 Apr 2024 14:01:19 +0000

Read the full op-ed here.

The post Norrlöf op-ed re-published by Kyiv Independent on NATO anniversary and its role for US interests and leadership appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Norrlöf op-ed published in Project Syndicate on NATO anniversary and its role for US interests and leadership

amagazzino — Tue, 02 Apr 2024 14:10:33 +0000

Read the full op-ed here.

The post Norrlöf op-ed published in Project Syndicate on NATO anniversary and its role for US interests and leadership appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Putin adds Islamist terror to the list of absurd excuses for Ukraine invasion

Peter Dickinson — Thu, 28 Mar 2024 21:09:13 +0000

Over the past week, representatives of the Islamic State have gone to considerable lengths to confirm they were behind the March 22 attack on a Moscow concert hall that left more than 140 people dead. In the immediate aftermath of the killings, the radical Islamist group issued a series of statements claiming responsibility. They then went even further, circulating visual proof including graphic bodycam video footage filmed by one of the assailants.

Despite overwhelming evidence pointing to Islamic State terrorists, Vladimir Putin seems intent on blaming Ukraine. While the Russian dictator has acknowledged the atrocity was carried out by Islamist militants, he has repeatedly indicated that Ukraine and the country’s Western partners are the real culprits.

The first clear sign that Putin would seek to implicate Ukraine came on the day after the attack. In an official address to the nation, Putin announced that four suspects had been caught while attempting to reach Ukraine, before accusing the Ukrainian authorities of “preparing a window” for them to cross the border.

This version of events made little sense, given the massive military presence along Russia’s wartime border with Ukraine and the intense security spotlight on the wider region. Putin’s far-fetched story of a Ukrainian escape plan has subsequently been further undermined by his closest ally, Belarusian dictator Alyaksandr Lukashenka, who has stated that the terror suspects initially attempted to flee across the border into Belarus and not Ukraine.

None of this has deterred Putin. On the contrary, the campaign to blame Ukraine has continued to gain momentum in the wake of the Moscow massacre. The Kremlin-controlled Russian state media has openly questioned the claims of responsibility made by Islamic State, and has directly accused Ukraine of being behind the terror attack.

Russian officials have followed suit, with Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev stating that Ukraine was “of course” responsible for the attack and Russian Parliamentary Speaker Vyacheslav Volodin naming “the bloody regime of Ukraine” along with Washington and Brussels as the organizers of the atrocity. Meanwhile, Putin himself has doubled down on his earlier accusations, and has attempted to position the Moscow terrorist attack as part of a ten-year conflict between Russia and Ukraine.

Ukrainian officials have rejected Russia’s groundless accusations, suggesting instead that Putin is seeking to exploit the tragedy in order to provide further false justification for the invasion of Ukraine. “Do not let Putin and his henchmen dupe you,” commented Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba. “Their only goal is to motivate more Russians to die in their senseless and criminal war against Ukraine, as well as to instill even more hatred for other nations, not just Ukrainians, but the entire West.”

Stay updated

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

Russia has yet to produce any credible evidence supporting its claims of a Ukrainian role in the Moscow terror attack. Instead, the Kremlin appears content to rely on a combination of unfounded allegations, conspiracy theories, and innuendo. This is entirely in keeping with the cynical information strategy that has accompanied the Russian invasion of Ukraine, which has been based on deceit and distraction from the very beginning.

When Putin first launched the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2014, he did so with a lie so large and so transparent that in retrospect it is difficult to believe it actually happened. As his troops methodically seized control of Ukraine’s Crimean peninsula, the Kremlin dictator appeared before global audiences and repeatedly denied any Russian military involvement whatsoever. Instead, he insisted that the thousands of well-armed and disciplined troops involved in the operation were actually local militias.

This astonishing duplicity set the tone for the following eight years as Putin expanded the war by occupying much of eastern Ukraine’s Donbas region. Throughout this period, the Kremlin refused to acknowledge any direct role in hostilities and maintained an official policy of blanket denials, despite the fact that the presence of the Russian army in eastern Ukraine was the world’s worst kept secret. In addition to denying Russia’s obvious involvement, the Kremlin also waged an unprecedented information war to discredit and dehumanize Ukrainians.

For the past decade, the most consistent element of Russia’s anti-Ukrainian disinformation offensive has been the depiction of modern Ukraine as a “Nazi” state. This has been a Kremlin propaganda trope for many decades and was a prominent element of Soviet attempts to demonize Ukraine’s statehood ambitions during the Cold War. Putin has enthusiastically revived this tradition and has used it to justify his quest to extinguish Ukrainian independence. Few were surprised in February 2022 when he cited “de-Nazification” as the main goal of Russia’s full-scale invasion.

Putin’s “Nazi Ukraine” propaganda resonates well with Russian audiences drenched in the Kremlin’s World War II mythology, but has been significantly less effective internationally. It is not hard to see why. After all, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy is Jewish, while support for far-right political parties in Ukraine is lower than in most other European countries, with a coalition of Ukrainian nationalist parties receiving just 2% of the vote in the country’s most recent parliamentary election in 2019. Indeed, the entire “Nazi Ukraine” narrative is so ridiculous that even US media personality Tucker Carlson, who can usually be relied upon to echo Kremlin talking points, recently admitted it was “one of the dumbest things I’d ever heard.”

Eurasia Center events

Ukraine’s advance in Kursk: What’s next and implications

Conflict Russia Security & Defense Ukraine

The Kremlin’s attempts to blame the war on NATO expansion have proved far more persuasive among international audiences, but even this seemingly rational explanation has been undermined by Russia’s own recent actions. Putin has frequently stated that NATO enlargement since 1991 poses an intolerable security threat to Russia, but when neighboring Finland and nearby Sweden responded to the invasion of Ukraine by joining the alliance, he reacted with almost complete indifference and made no effort to obstruct the process.

The contrast between Putin’s evident lack of interest in NATO’s Nordic enlargement and his bellicose denunciations of Ukraine’s far flimsier ties to the alliance could hardly be starker. Far from threatening a military response, the Russian ruler actually downplayed the entire issue of Finnish and Swedish membership, and even withdrew the bulk of his troops from the border with Finland. Clearly, Putin understands perfectly well that NATO poses no security threat to Russia itself, and only objects to the alliance if it prevents Russia from bullying its neighbors.

In addition to imaginary NATO threats and phantom fascists, Putin has now added Islamist terrorism to the expanding list of absurd excuses for the invasion of Ukraine. This relentless flood of disinformation is designed to cloud perceptions and disguise the naked imperialism driving Russia’s war in Ukraine.

As the invasion has unfolded, Putin has become increasingly frank about his true motivations, especially when addressing domestic audiences. In summer 2022, he compared his invasion to the imperial conquests of eighteenth century Russian Czar Peter the Great. Months later, he announced the annexation of four partially occupied Ukrainian provinces while claiming they would now be part of Russia “forever.” With increasing frequency, Putin denies Ukraine’s right to exist and characterizes the war as a crusade to reclaim “historically Russian lands.”

Ukrainians are painfully aware of Russia’s genocidal goals and have long since grown used to the shameless disinformation being pushed by the Kremlin to justify the invasion of their country. In recent days, many Ukrainians have responded to allegations of their alleged involvement in the Moscow terror attack with typical gallows humor, quipping that according to Putin, “Ukraine is a Nazi Islamist state headed by a Jewish President.”

The Kremlin’s ludicrous conspiracy theories certainly deserve to be ridiculed, but the implications for millions of Ukrainians are no laughing matter. As Russian dissident Garry Kasparov noted this week, “mocking the absurdities of authoritarians is a worthy endeavor, as long as we never lose sight of how dictatorships like Russia use their laughable lies to justify oppression and murder.”

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

Straus interviewed by IQ on NATO’s anniversary

Ira Straus — Thu, 28 Mar 2024 20:52:45 +0000

Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

On March 28, Transatlantic Security Initiative senior advisor Ira Straus was interviewed by IQ on the upcoming NATO anniversary and the strength of the transatlantic bond (source in Lithuanian).

Fellow

Ira Straus

Senior Advisor

The post Straus interviewed by IQ on NATO’s anniversary appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Russian victory in Ukraine would leave Europe at Putin’s mercy

Mykola Bielieskov — Thu, 21 Mar 2024 21:06:18 +0000

If Putin wins in Ukraine, will he go further? This is the question currently being asked with increasing urgency in capital cities throughout Europe.

Skeptics note that the failures of the past two years have exposed the limitations of the Russian military, and claim a triumphant Putin would be in no position to expand the war beyond the borders of Ukraine. This argument is comforting but short-sighted. It ignores the practical implications of a Russian victory, and underestimates the geopolitical importance of Ukraine for the security of Europe.

The re-emergence of an independent Ukraine in 1991 profoundly altered the European geopolitical landscape. For centuries prior to 1991, the Russian Empire and the USSR had exploited Ukraine’s geographical location, natural resources, and population to project power into the heart of Europe. Hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians had served in the Red Army, while the Soviet war machine had relied heavily on Ukraine’s industrial base to produce everything from warships and tanks to intercontinental missiles.

The collapse of the Soviet Union temporarily reduced the imperial threat facing the countries of Central Europe. Neighbors such as Poland and Hungary understood the strategic importance of Ukrainian statehood perfectly well and were among the first to recognize Ukraine’s independence. This new geopolitical reality shielded countries across the region from potential Russian aggression and helped pave the way for their NATO accession.

Vladimir Putin was also well aware that Ukrainian independence was a major obstacle to the revival of Russia’s great power status. From the very beginning of his reign, he made the subjugation of Ukraine a foreign policy priority. At first, he attempted to achieve this goal via political means; when this failed, he resorted to the same military methods employed by generations of his Czarist and Soviet predecessors.

Stay updated

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

The Russian army has suffered extremely heavy losses over the past two years in Ukraine, but this has not deterred Putin. On the contrary, with the future of Western military aid to Ukraine currently in doubt, the Russian dictator is growing visibly more confident of securing victory. If Putin is able to extinguish Ukrainian statehood, Russia’s military potential will be dramatically enhanced by the acquisition of Ukraine’s considerable resources.

Russia is already conscripting large numbers of men in occupied regions of Ukraine and using them as cannon fodder in brutal human wave offensives. If Ukraine falls, hundreds of thousands more would be forced to join the Russian military and deployed in similar fashion. As well as extra manpower, a conquered Ukraine would also provide Russia with vast natural resources, industrial strength, and agricultural wealth. Indeed, the occupation of Ukraine would allow Russia to dominate global agricultural markets.

The geographical implications of a Russian victory in Ukraine would be equally grave. Russia seized Crimea in 2014 then used the occupied Ukrainian peninsula as a springboard for the full-scale invasion of the country eight years later. As the Russian army continues to edge forward in eastern Ukraine, each advance brings Putin’s troops closer to the border with NATO.

Nobody is more conscious of the growing danger than Ukraine’s western neighbors. It is no surprise that Poland, the Czech Republic, and the Baltic states are among the biggest supporters of Ukraine and the most vocal when it comes to raising the alarm over the Russian threat. They know that if Ukraine is lost, they are next in line and will face a resurgent Russia emboldened by the success of the current invasion.

This is not to say that others are oblivious to the potentially disastrous consequences of a Russian victory in Ukraine. French President Emmanuel Macron has recently warned that European security is “at stake” in Ukraine, and has refused to rule out deploying Western troops to prevent Russia from overrunning the country.

Eurasia Center events

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Ukraine’s advance in Kursk: What’s next and implications

Conflict Russia Security & Defense Ukraine

Influential voices in America have long recognized the geopolitical importance of Ukrainian independence. In the 1990s, former US National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski highlighted the country’s crucial role in the geopolitics of the region. “It cannot be stressed strongly enough that without Ukraine, Russia ceases to be an empire, but with Ukraine suborned and then subordinated, Russia automatically becomes an empire,” he famously observed.

During the early decades of Ukrainian independence, successive US administrations appeared inclined to follow Brzezinski’s counsel. However, from the late 2000s onward, the focus of US foreign policy began to shift away from Ukraine and the wider Eastern European region toward Asia.

This coincided with the rise of a more assertive Russia. In 2008, Russian troops invaded Georgia. Six years later, the Kremlin occupied Crimea and sparked a war in eastern Ukraine. By 2022, an emboldened Putin felt strong enough to launch the biggest European invasion since World War II. This escalating Russian aggression should serve as a painful lesson for anyone tempted to take the continued existence of an independent Ukraine for granted.

Ukraine is currently facing the most challenging period since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion. Starved of supplies, Ukrainian troops find themselves forced to ration ammunition. In many cases, they are already unable to prevent Russia from edging forward. This is fuelling increasingly pessimistic forecasts as the spring campaigning season draws near.

The stakes could hardly be higher. If Russia’s invasion succeeds, the consequences will be felt far beyond the borders of Ukraine. The Russian military will be revitalized by the capture of Ukraine’s vast human and material resources, and will loom large on the eastern border of a NATO alliance demoralized and discredited by its failure to defend Ukrainian independence. At that point, many in the West may begin to ask why they didn’t arm Ukraine when they had the chance. By then, of course, it will be too late.

The post Wieslander quoted in the Wall Street Journal appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Even as war continues, NATO should open the door to defense integration with Ukraine

Karsten Friis — Tue, 19 Mar 2024 16:22:48 +0000

French President Emmanuel Macron created shockwaves in Europe (again) recently, when he stated that “nothing should be excluded” when discussing the possibility of NATO troops on the ground in Ukraine.

Unsurprisingly, Germany had a different message: “Once again, in a very good debate, it was discussed that what was agreed from the outset among ourselves and with each other also applies to the future, namely that there will be no ground troops, no soldiers on Ukrainian soil sent there by European countries or NATO states,” German Chancellor Olaf Scholz said.

The sentiment from Berlin—no Western troops on the ground in Ukraine—was echoed in statements from the White House, and from London, Rome, Madrid, and other capitals. Yet in an interview on March 14, Macron declined again to rule out sending troops to Ukraine.

Macron has a point: the deployment of troops from NATO members in Ukraine—in noncombatant positions—should not be categorically ruled out. A future mission to train Ukrainian soldiers in Ukraine conducted by, for example, British or German troops might be possible. In some scenarios, it would be more efficient to bring instructors to Ukraine than to send Ukrainian troops to Germany or the United Kingdom. Similarly, as the French Foreign Minister Stéphane Séjourné has stated, tasks such as assisting with mine clearance, production of weapons, and cyber defense are all possible to envisage being done with direct Western help in Ukraine in the near future.

But what these discussions illustrate is NATO’s internal discord when it comes to Ukraine. This discord was present in the run-up to the Vilnius NATO Summit last year, and the same tendencies are beginning to arise yet again. Some countries, most notably the Baltics, Poland, and France, want to provide Ukraine with a clear roadmap toward NATO membership. This will require more—and more direct—NATO involvement in Ukraine. Others, led by the United States and Germany, want to take a more cautious approach and do not wish to promise too much to Ukraine too early.

Ensuring Ukraine prevails on the battlefield will be imperative to securing the European continent.

The current front-runner to become the next NATO secretary general, Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte, stated at the Munich Security Conference in February that “as long as the war is raging, Ukraine cannot become a member of NATO.” This statement is just as unwise and short-sighted as Scholz’s denial of the possibility of a NATO presence in Ukraine. What Rutte is in effect saying to Russian President Vladimir Putin is that as long as Russia keeps the war warm, it will prevent Ukraine from becoming a NATO member. It provides Putin with an incentive to keep the war going, and in practice an indefinite veto power over NATO enlargement, just as he had in the years after Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014.

Ensuring Ukraine prevails on the battlefield will be imperative to securing the European continent. It is time for NATO to get smarter about its Ukraine strategy, including the messaging that articulates that strategy. At the moment, NATO and its constituent members are attempting to walk the line between reassuring Ukraine of NATO countries’ commitments to its security and seeking to avoid escalation into a nuclear confrontation with Russia. Avoiding such escalation is a legitimate concern, but it is not enough to constitute a strategy.

What NATO should do instead is steadily build defense and deterrence against Russian aggression in Ukraine by integrating it into its structures step by step. This will mean some degree of Ukrainian integration with NATO, even while Russia’s invasion is ongoing. This is where new and creative thinking is needed.

NATO can allow for functional integration, or, to repurpose a term from the European Union enlargement literature: differentiated integration. By beginning in certain sectors, such as cybersecurity, air defense, logistics, training, and future force design, NATO could engage with Ukraine without embarking yet on full integration. This is already happening to some extent, but often in a bilateral manner rather than from within a NATO framework. NATO can also take over several of the tasks which today are coordinated in the US-led Ukraine Defense Contact Group. Lastly, NATO can also begin to think in geographical terms. Maybe not all Ukrainian territory needs to be covered under Article 5 right away, but perhaps some of the westernmost regions?

It’s possible NATO could even commit forces to operating within Ukraine while still avoiding a direct fight with Russia. If, for instance, NATO declared a no-fly zone in parts of Ukraine and deployed air defense systems to assist Ukrainian defense in this region, then these systems could be limited to shooting down incoming missiles. They do not need to target the Russian planes firing the missiles from inside Russia. This is a much riskier step than providing training, of course, but it is not unimaginable.

Deterrence is sometimes most effective if it is ambiguous. When an adversary is uncertain about where the red lines are, then it might act more cautiously than if it knows the exact threshold it can escalate up to without crossing. Ambiguity also provides allies with a greater degree of flexibility about a response. NATO has, for example, declared that cyberattacks are covered by Article 5, but it has never stated exactly how serious such an attack must be for the allies to invoke the article. Going forward, if NATO allies wanted to create a greater degree of ambiguity about whether troops would be sent to Ukraine, amplifying Macron’s recent statement, then it might affect how far Russia carries out its invasion.

However, on the physical battlefield, where forces clash, deterrence cannot be ambiguous. A Russian tank crossing the Finnish border would be grounds to invoke the North Atlantic Treaty’s Article 5, which accords with Article 51 in the United Nations Charter permitting collective defense against an armed attack. The same applies if a Russian Iskander missile hits Warsaw. NATO’s future collective defense of Ukraine should be similarly explicit and clearly communicated to Moscow. There must be lines that Russia cannot cross. This is risky, but there is no risk-free way of bringing Ukraine into NATO.

Unlike the Alliance’s disjointed approach to the security and defense of Ukraine, differentiated integration is the strategy the Alliance needs to continue bringing Ukraine into its orbit while signaling unity in the lead-up to the milestone summit in July.

Whether intended or not, Macron may have set in motion an important conversation about Ukrainian defense integration. Western leaders and policymakers should continue and build on that conversation as the NATO Summit in Washington approaches. Ukraine needs a clear plan for differentiated integration—in terms of function and space—even as the war rages on.

The alternative hands Putin the power to veto the future of Ukraine as a free and sovereign state.

Karsten Friis is a research professor focusing on security and defense at the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs.

The post Even as war continues, NATO should open the door to defense integration with Ukraine appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Massa in iNews on Russian threats of nuclear weapons use

Atlantic Council — Mon, 18 Mar 2024 17:09:45 +0000

original source

On February 29, Forward Defense Deputy Director for Strategic Forces Policy Mark Massa was quoted in iNews about Russia’s history of nuclear threats and what the most recent threats from Russia mean for the war in Ukraine and for NATO. Massa was quoted as saying that “US and allied leaders continue to push back on ‘red lines’ set by the Kremlin for the kind of support to Kyiv that would lead to escalation while avoiding a direct clash with Moscow; that balancing act is likely to continue in spite of these most recent threats.”

Staff

Mark J. Massa

Deputy Director

Defense Policy National Security

Forward Defense, housed within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, generates ideas and connects stakeholders in the defense ecosystem to promote an enduring military advantage for the United States, its allies, and partners. Our work identifies the defense strategies, capabilities, and resources the United States needs to deter and, if necessary, prevail in future conflict.

The post Massa in iNews on Russian threats of nuclear weapons use appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Help Ukraine win—or risk kicking off a US losing streak

Tod D. Wolters, Ann Marie Dailey — Fri, 15 Mar 2024 14:13:37 +0000

More than two years into Russia’s war in Ukraine, the once solid wall of US public support for aid to Ukraine has become less vocal. Because of this decrease in discourse supporting Ukraine, a small number of loud detractors is seeking to sway public opinion by asserting that supporting Ukraine isn’t in the United States’ interest. These voices point to the twenty years of war in Iraq and Afghanistan and the tragic consequences of the US and NATO withdrawal from Afghanistan to argue that the United States should not become entangled in another “forever war,” and that instead it should focus on its southern border. These arguments are built on the false sense that US influence abroad, whether it starts or stops, is divorced from any noticeable consequence for most Americans. However, continued assistance to Ukraine is critical if the United States is to retain its position as the world’s indispensable nation and the many benefits Americans enjoy as a result. Failing to support Ukraine now might kick off an American losing streak that could take decades to overcome.

First, Ukraine is not Afghanistan. No US troops are fighting in Ukraine, whereas tens of thousands of US troops invaded Afghanistan to fight an insurgency in a mountainous, landlocked, and poor nation. In contrast, Ukraine borders and aspires to join NATO and the European Union. It has an educated population (with a nearly 100 percent adult literacy rate), and it is connected to the global economy as one of the world’s largest agricultural exporters. Though many Afghans ultimately supported the United States, that support never materialized into the national and political coherence that is already seen among Ukrainians fighting for their right to exist as a democratic nation. Ukraine is protecting its territory from a hostile invasion by Russia—an autocratic nation that supports and is supported by dictators in Syria, Iran, and North Korea.

Supporting Ukraine isn’t charity. It is a way for the United States to reassert itself at a time when its influence is faltering.

Second, while the war has been in an apparent stalemate in recent months, all but the briefest of wars play out in phases. Often, one of the causes of a stalemate is that both sides have run low enough on fresh troops and equipment that they need to reequip and train personnel before they are capable of further large-scale operations. In this sense, the current period of “stalemate” in Ukraine should be seen not as the end-state, but as a finite period to focus on rearming, reequipping, and—importantly—reassessing one’s theory of victory. In this sense, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s replacement earlier this year of Valery Zaluzhny with Oleksandr Syrsky as the head of Ukraine’s armed forces looks less like an indication that Ukraine is flailing, and more like a prudent move to set the foundation for a new approach to victory.

The consequences of this war will echo well beyond Europe. Supporting a Ukrainian victory would reassert US global preeminence for around 5 percent of the annual US defense budget, and without the cost of American lives. Continued US global leadership would help shape international issues such as governance of space, artificial intelligence, terrorism, and global migration patterns in the United States’ favor. Russia would be militarily defeated by a reinvigorated American defense industrial base and China would likely reconsider the ability and willingness of the United States to exert its will around the globe, including in defense of Taiwan.

If, however, the United States fails to support Ukraine, expect the opposite. An emboldened Russia is likely to expand its current policy of sowing global discord. Already it has muscled into countries in Africa in hope of capturing raw materials, supported Iranian-backed terrorists in the Middle East that threaten global shipping, and conducted anti-US information and covert operations in Central and South America. Europe would chart a more independent foreign policy and seek to decrease its reliance on the US defense industry and military cooperation. Some may think this is a positive, but the US defense industrial base relies on both US military sales and on sales to allies in NATO and elsewhere. Furthermore, the United States’ ability to defend its global interests—the same interests that give Americans their extraordinary standard of living—would be diminished by nations unwilling to cooperate with an unreliable partner.

Which brings us back to Ukraine. Some argue that the United States must first secure its own borders before supporting Ukraine, but that falsely assumes that the two issues are mutually exclusive or linked. It is possible to both support Ukraine and secure US borders; one does not preclude the other. Others say that Europe should be paying to support Ukraine, which it already is. More than a dozen European nations are spending more than the United States as a share of their gross domestic product, and the European Union as an institution is outspending the United States in terms of total commitments. Finally, some argue that funding Ukraine diverts funds for US capabilities in the Indo-Pacific. This ignores two critical facts: First, most of the funding “for Ukraine” actually goes to support the US defense industrial base. Second, all of the United States’ plans for United States Indo-Pacific Command involve an assumption of some support from European allies. US leaders and policymakers need to ask themselves how realistic that assumption is if they do not support those allies today.

Supporting Ukraine isn’t charity. It is a way for the United States to reassert itself at a time when its influence is faltering. It is a golden opportunity to cement the support of US allies and partners—its greatest advantage over Russia and China. Support to Ukraine isn’t just a good deed, it’s also a good deal. From January 2022 to January 2024, the United States gave roughly $46 billion in military assistance to Ukraine, according to the Kiel Institute for the World Economy. From 1941 to 1945, the United States sent the current equivalent of $831 billion to allies fighting fascist regimes in the Atlantic and Pacific and ultimately had to sacrifice 416,000 American men and women to the cause of freedom. Ukraine can still win without US troops.

In seventy-five years, the only time NATO has invoked its collective defense protocol was to defend the United States after 9/11. And NATO allies sent their troops thousands of miles away to fight an insurgency with the United States. Now, it is Europe that needs help from the United States. Russia has invaded a European nation in what NATO allies see as the greatest security threat to Europe since the Nazis. If the United States turns its back on Ukraine now, it would be abandoning its allies in their time of need. It would be kicking off an American losing streak that could last decades—if not longer.

General Tod D. Wolters (Ret.) is a distinguished fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. In 2022, Wolters completed a distinguished forty-year active-duty career in the US Air Force as the supreme allied commander Europe (SACEUR) and commander US European command (EUCOM).

Ann Marie Dailey is a nonresident senior fellow at the Transatlantic Security Initiative of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security and is currently serving as a policy researcher at the RAND Corporation. The views, opinions, findings, conclusions, and recommendations contained herein are the author’s alone and not those of RAND or its research sponsors, clients, or grantors.

The post Help Ukraine win—or risk kicking off a US losing streak appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Ukraine’s Security Council Secretary: The West is still in denial over Russia

Peter Dickinson — Thu, 14 Mar 2024 18:08:33 +0000

When the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine began in February 2022, Ukrainian Security and Defense Council Secretary Oleksiy Danilov found himself having to repeatedly reassure Ukraine’s doubting partners that the country was not about to collapse. “At the beginning of the war, nobody believed we would stand,” he recalls.

Danilov says the lack of faith he encountered among Ukraine’s allies during the first days of the invasion reflects the widespread disinformation that continues to cloud international perceptions of his country’s struggle against resurgent Russian imperialism. With the invasion now in its third year, Danilov warns that many in the West remain in denial over the scale of the threat posed by Putin’s Russia, and have yet to grasp the true international implications of the war in Ukraine.

Stay updated

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

Danilov has led Ukraine’s influential National Security and Defense Council since October 2019, and has been at the heart of Ukrainian attempts to galvanize international opposition to Russia’s invasion. He readily admits that these efforts have been consistently hampered by Russia’s sophisticated and highly effective disinformation strategies. Looking back at the past two years, Danilov says this experience has underlined the growing importance of information warfare in shaping today’s multidimensional battlefield. “We all make decisions based on the information we have. While there is now an unprecedented amount of information available, it is also apparent that this information can be easily manipulated and distorted.”

Today’s increasingly chaotic and overloaded information landscape is helping Russia conceal its true intentions in Ukraine and disguise its geopolitical ambitions, says Danilov. He frames the ongoing invasion of Ukraine as the central stage in a far broader global confrontation between the democratic world and the resurgent forces of autocracy led by Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea, but cautions that such clarity is often lacking during his interactions with Ukraine’s Western partners.

The 61-year-old Ukrainian Security Council Secretary bemoans the absence of a modern-day Reagan or Churchill with the necessary vision to see the Russian threat in its true historical context. Unless today’s generation of Western leaders urgently acknowledge the scale of the challenge, he predicts they will soon be confronted by a very different and more hostile international environment. “Too many countries remain stuck in an information fog and do not realize that World War III is already underway. The whole world is engaged in the current war in one way or another, even though Ukraine is the only country doing the actual fighting against Russia.”

Eurasia Center events

Ukraine’s advance in Kursk: What’s next and implications

Conflict Russia Security & Defense Ukraine

With no end in sight to Russia’s invasion, the diplomatic debate in many Western capitals currently revolves around the question of Vladimir Putin’s ultimate war aims and how far he is prepared to go. To Danilov, the answer is disarmingly simple: Putin wants to completely transform the geopolitical climate and will keep going until he is stopped. If Ukraine should fall, Danilov is convinced Russia will expand its aggression further. He believes the countries most immediately at risk will be the former member states of the Warsaw Pact. “Putin made his intentions perfectly clear in his December 2021 ultimatum to the West, when he called for NATO to withdraw from Central and Eastern Europe. Just look at the map; it’s all there.”

Returning to the status quo of the early 1990s is unlikely to satisfy the Russian dictator, Danilov says. He argues that Putin’s foreign policy objectives ultimately stretch far beyond the old Iron Curtain and include the breakup of the European Union itself. This would allow Putin to divide and conquer Europe. “One of Putin’s key goals is the destruction of the EU. It is very difficult for the Kremlin to deal with a united Europe; this puts Russia at a significant disadvantage. Putin would much prefer to splinter the EU and negotiate with each European country separately.”

This does not mean Russia is preparing to imminently invade Belgium or occupy Brussels, of course. On the contrary, the Kremlin is far more likely to employ the kind of hybrid warfare tactics honed in Ukraine between 2014 and 2022. Indeed, Danilov argues that Moscow has been engaged in an active campaign of hybrid hostilities inside the European Union for a number of years, and accuses European leaders of turning a blind eye to this unwelcome reality. “Russia’s hybrid war against the EU is already well underway, but some Western countries prefer not to acknowledge it. Putin constantly commits acts of hybrid aggression against Europe, but many Europeans are reluctant to draw the obvious conclusions as this would force them to recognize the threat and respond.”

Putin’s other great strategic priority is the dissolution of NATO. While skeptics argue that the Russian military is currently in no shape to take on NATO, Danilov believes Putin could potentially achieve his goal by discrediting the alliance rather than defeating it in a conventional war. With Western weakness increasingly evident in Ukraine, Putin may seek to test the shaky resolve of NATO leaders by staging some kind of border provocation. According to Danilov, if the alliance fails to produce an adequate response, there is a very real chance that member countries will quickly lose faith in collective security and seek alternative arrangements. NATO may be able to formally survive such a blow, but the damage to its credibility would be fatal. “When you have a maniac on the loose in your neighborhood, the task is to stop him as soon as possible and not engage in negotiations or other nonsense,” Danilov says.

Based on his own extensive interactions with NATO commanders over the past two years, Ukraine’s Security Council Secretary has full confidence in the alliance’s military leadership and believes they are under no illusions regarding both the nature of the Putin regime and urgency of the threat facing the West. However, he also stresses that the same cannot necessarily be said for Europe’s political leaders. This is a recipe for potential disaster, says Danilov. “Putin is the Hitler of our era. The current situation is strikingly similar to the 1930s, when military men warned of the mounting danger but were overruled by politicians who preferred to appease Hitler. If we make the same mistake again, it could mean the eclipse of the West.”

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

NATO should establish a Baltic Security Initiative at the Washington summit

Franklin D. Kramer, Hans Binnendijk — Wed, 13 Mar 2024 18:16:00 +0000

Russia’s recent battlefield successes in its illegal war against Ukraine have raised the level of concern in NATO’s Baltic nations over a future attack on their territory. Russia may come to view the current relative stalemate—with its control over the Donbas, the southern land bridge, and Crimea—as a type of victory, and eventually, as an impetus for further incursions into countries that were once governed from Moscow. While Russian forces have sustained significant losses in Ukraine, multiple estimates conclude that Russia could reconstitute its ground forces in three to five years, and that its air, cyber, and space capabilities are fully intact, as are the bulk of its naval forces (apart from several notable losses in the Black Sea).

That three-to-five-year window for reconstitution gives NATO time to enhance deterrence—and, if necessary, defense—by taking several critical actions focused on the Baltics. Those actions should be packaged as a new Baltic Security Initiative at the upcoming NATO Summit in Washington, DC.

Regional defense plans

First, NATO should announce each member state’s areas of responsibility under the Alliance’s newly developed regional defense plans. NATO has publicly described the new plans and announced that each member state will have certain areas of responsibility. It has not, however, stated publicly which nations will go where. Some of this might be inferred from the leadership and composition of the eight multinational battlegroups that NATO maintains on its eastern frontier from Estonia in the north through Bulgaria in the south. However, those battlegroups, which are generally composed of a brigade headquarters overseeing battalion-sized forces, are more valuable for the strong signals they send than for their actual warfighting capabilities.

Announcing which nations will provide full warfighting capabilities—including ground forces, air defenses, and logistics—would go far toward demonstrating the reality of the new plans to the Baltic nations and to other NATO member publics as well. It would help to deter Russia, and it would underscore the requirement for nations to provide the necessary resources to meet their obligations under the regional plans. As a result, it could encourage greater European defense spending.

Enhanced forward presence

Second, NATO’s enhanced forward presence (EFP) must be strengthened, and NATO should designate European lead nations for each Baltic country. These lead nations will bring both greater forward capabilities and the ability to provide significant reinforcements if required. Germany, which leads the EFP battlegroup in Lithuania, has already taken the first step, announcing in December 2023 that it will place a full-time brigade in Lithuania. Lithuania, meanwhile, will provide host nation support for the brigade, including training areas and family housing. The United Kingdom leads the multinational battlegroup for Estonia, which it provides with a brigade headquarters and battalion-level forces. The United Kingdom should regularly rotate one of its brigades now based in Britain as an ongoing presence in Estonia, with the Estonians providing required host nation support.

Canada has effectively led the multinational battlegroup in Latvia and is planning to increase the amount of its forces to approximately two battalions’ worth. But because of the small size of its military, Canada does not yet have the capability to meet necessary wartime reinforcement requirements. France would be a better choice to deploy a brigade-level EFP force to Latvia. It is true that France already leads the multinational battlegroup in Romania. Romania, however, is less likely to be a land war theater, and France is one of the few nations in NATO that has fully embraced the requirements of high-intensity warfare. With its decision to substantially increase its defense budget, France has the capacity to lead forces in two areas.

To complement European efforts to move the EFP in the region to the full brigade level, the United States should deploy more forward forces. A useful step in this direction was taken in December, when the United States and the Baltic states signed bilateral Roadmaps for Defense Cooperation, in which the United States agreed to “provide heel-to-toe persistent rotational presence of US forces in each Baltic State.” The United States already deploys armor and artillery in Lithuania on a persistent basis. Now, the United States must vigorously implement this pledge, including by deploying brigades in each country, complemented by air defense and longer-range fires.

Third, NATO needs to fully implement the decision at the 2023 Vilnius summit to move from the Baltic Air Policing mission’s relatively limited force of a dozen aircraft to an enhanced Baltic Air and Missile Defense mission with larger numbers of aircraft supported by ground-based air and missile defense. Recent NATO pledges to provide greater rotational air defenses for the region, in addition to Finnish and Swedish membership, provide the capabilities to undertake this transition. The war in Ukraine underlines the importance of having such capabilities in place as quickly as possible.

Enhancing mobility

Fourth, NATO needs to improve its ability to move large numbers of forces quickly. The NATO force model provides that NATO will have one hundred thousand highly ready forces within ten days and two hundred thousand in ten to thirty days. The key, of course, is placing those highly ready forces where they are needed. Local forces, of course, count toward meeting this requirement, as do forces in place on a persistent basis. While the force model is not clear on this point, air forces are presumably also counted. Nonetheless, even with all the current and planned forces described above for the Baltics, NATO would need significant mobility efforts to meet the numbers and speed called for by the force model. The current European Union mobility initiative seems to be losing steam, and NATO needs to do more.

To accelerate enhanced mobility, NATO’s Joint Support and Enabling Command (JSEC) supports NATO’s supreme allied commander in effectuating the Alliance’s mobility. JSEC should work with each nation focused on defense of the Baltics to ensure that they can meet their obligations under the regional plans. The ongoing Steadfast Defender exercise, for example, can provide useful lessons for the practical considerations of moving forces, including the crucial roles for rail and trucks. However, NATO should additionally evaluate whether Norway’s merchant marine fleet, which includes more than one hundred roll-on, roll-off ships, might also be engaged to move forces. The capability of Norway’s fleet, which would be additional to the more limited numbers provided through NATO’s Multinational Sealift Steering Committee, could be important for US and Canadian forces moving from North America, for French and UK forces moving to the Baltics, and even for ground forces from Finland and Sweden moving across the Baltic Sea to Estonia or Latvia.

Revising command and control

Finally, NATO needs to revise its command and control for effective warfighting against a Russian attack. The current command structures below the supreme allied commander Europe (SACEUR) were designed to support a forty-thousand-person force focused on out-of-area operations. Neither Joint Force Command in Brunssum, Netherlands and Naples, Italy, nor any of the subordinate headquarters are organized for the all-out fight necessary against a Russian attack. For that reason, NATO should establish multidomain headquarters that can meet the warfighting requirements of the regional plans for the northeast (the Baltics and Poland), southeast (the Black Sea), the Mediterranean, north and northwest (the United Kingdom, the North Sea, Norway), and the Atlantic. At the Washington summit, the SACEUR should be tasked to provide such an updated structure, which will have to come to grips with important issues such as command over and on the Baltic Sea.

For the Baltics and Poland, however, it should be clear that the lead command nation needs to be the United States. Washington will be providing the bulk of the ground and air capabilities, as well as key enablers including air defense, cyber, space, and multidomain communications. Announcing the requirement for a new command structure and making clear the role that the United States will play in the northeast at the Washington summit would be valuable steps toward enhancing deterrence for the Baltics.

Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine underscores its willingness to use force as a method to achieve its geopolitical aims. The Baltic nations are justifiably concerned that they could be the next targets of a reconstituted Russian military. NATO can, however, at its Washington summit, significantly increase its deterrent and defense posture by visibly taking steps to provide effective forces in and for the Baltics.

Franklin D. Kramer is a distinguished fellow and board director at the Atlantic Council and a former assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs.

Hans Binnendijk is a distinguished fellow at the Atlantic Council. He is a former National Security Council senior director for defense policy and vice president of the National Defense University.

The post NATO should establish a Baltic Security Initiative at the Washington summit appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Braw quoted in iNews on the threat posed by Russia

Elisabeth Braw — Tue, 12 Mar 2024 13:27:27 +0000

On March 12, Transatlantic Security Initiative senior fellow Elisabeth Braw was quoted in iNews discussing the threat of Russia and the potential Trump presidency.

Fellow

Elisabeth Braw

Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security Transatlantic Security Initiative

NATO Resilience & Society

The post Braw quoted in iNews on the threat posed by Russia appeared first on Atlantic Council.

NATO’s decision process has an Achilles’ heel

Eric S. Edelman, David Manning, and Franklin C. Miller — Tue, 12 Mar 2024 11:00:00 +0000

In Washington this July, the most successful political-military alliance in modern history will celebrate its seventy-fifth anniversary. NATO successfully deterred Soviet aggression for forty years during the Cold War and stanched the nasty Balkan wars that threatened Europe’s peace in the immediate aftermath of that “long, twilight struggle.” Now, the Alliance stands as a barrier to Russian President Vladimir Putin’s ambition to recreate a “Russian world,” bringing Russophone citizens back into something like the borders of the Soviet Union by reabsorbing Ukraine and possibly Moldova and the Baltic states. The Russian autocrat’s invasion of Ukraine has strengthened the Alliance by adding two very capable members (Finland and now, finally, Sweden), and by strengthening the will of member states to stand together against Russian aggression. It has also exposed some of the shortcomings of the US and European defense industrial bases, both of which require serious and urgent investment by all members of the Alliance to successfully and sustainably address their deficiencies.

The Alliance began with a manageable core group of twelve nations. But through nine separate rounds of expansion, it now includes previous Warsaw Pact members, which sought protection from their former occupier by moving under the Alliance’s nuclear umbrella. It has also welcomed former neutral and nonaligned states that see Russia’s current revanchism as an existential threat to their independence. These additional members have brought the Alliance to a membership of thirty-two states.

Under the terms of NATO’s founding document, the 1949 Washington Treaty, admission of new members to the Alliance is based on the unanimous consent of the existing members. This consensus principle has over time evolved into a norm governing how NATO makes decisions. As the NATO website notes: “Consensus decision-making is a fundamental principle. It has been accepted as the sole basis for decision-making in NATO since the creation of the Alliance in 1949.” The fact is, however, that the principle, except in the case of accession, is not enshrined or codified in any Alliance document. What worked for the Alliance earlier, when all of its members were like-minded states facing an overwhelming military challenge and the memories of World War II were fresh in the minds of both publics and leaders, may not be fit for purpose today with a broader and much more diverse membership. (While the possibility of Donald Trump returning to the White House has raised serious concerns about the transatlantic relationship and how NATO would operate without or with a diminished US role, that contingency is beyond the scope of this essay.)

This is not a purely hypothetical issue. The recent efforts of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán to extract benefits for allowing the accession process for Finland and Sweden to move forward demonstrates how easily the consensus rule can be abused by a leader who believes that he or she can derive political advantage from doing so. There are precedents. Erdoğan tried to block the selection of Anders Fogh Rasmussen as NATO secretary general in 2009; and Orbán tried recently to block the European Union consensus on aid to Ukraine. In a similar vein, Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico, who recently returned to power, made noises this past October about ending support for Ukraine, before reaffirming his support after a meeting with Ukrainian Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal, in Uzhgorod, Ukraine, in January. Nevertheless, Fico’s earlier comments raise concerns about the real strength of his commitment to Ukraine. As these examples show, NATO needs to find ways to diminish the scope for transactionalism within the Alliance at the cost of collective defense.

Consider the following scenario:

Late this decade, Russia sends several hundred “little green men” into a NATO country and positions major ground formations on that country’s border with Russia. The “little green men” seize control of a major city. Moscow demands a change of government, alleging that the existing government has pursued policies hostile to Russian-speaking citizens of said country. The NATO state refuses and invokes Article 5. At the NATO Council meeting, an Alliance member whose leader has close ties to the Russian president refuses to agree. Lacking a consensus, Article 5 cannot be adopted. The Alliance is paralyzed and fractured. The remaining NATO nations are left to try to organize a “coalition of the willing” to defend the threatened ally, but they cannot use NATO mechanisms or command arrangements to do so. Russia then sends major combat forces across the border . . .

While such a scenario is conjectural, it is not unrealistic. Indeed, in February 2003, Turkey’s request that NATO military authorities prepare plans to defend it against a potential Iraqi attack was blocked by three allies, a situation only resolved by deft diplomatic maneuvering by then Secretary General George Robertson.

The behavior and politics of Erdoğan and Orbán indicate that the time has come to revise the consensus model in critical Article 5 situations, particularly in light of the fact that Russia has withstood Western sanctions in better shape than many had anticipated. It has sought munitions and drones from North Korea and Iran and has reconstituted its domestic defense industry to a remarkable degree. Nearly 40 percent of the Russian government budget is now devoted to defense and law enforcement, and Russia will likely be able to replenish its losses in Ukraine more rapidly than many observers anticipated even a few months ago. Against that backdrop, it is no wonder that NATO military leaders have expressed their concern that Putin may attack one or more members of the Alliance within the next three to five years.

At the upcoming Washington summit, NATO members should therefore discuss how best to introduce a majority voting procedure. This would make it impossible for one member state to serve Russia’s interests by insisting on the consensus principle, thereby paralyzing the Alliance’s ability to defend an ally from Russian aggression. There are various ways of approaching the issue, and a variety of possible alternative solutions, some of which have already been explored.

Given the threatening international backdrop and the need to balance the cohesion of a larger Alliance with the ability to make rapid and resolute decisions, the time has come for the US administration and the UK government to foster a robust debate at the summit about such solutions. Allies need to decide how to eliminate the risk that, in a grave crisis, a spoiler state could prevent NATO from invoking Article 5. At stake is nothing less than the core Alliance commitment to collective defense.

Eric S. Edelman was US ambassador to Finland in the Clinton administration and to Turkey in the George W. Bush administration. He also served as undersecretary of defense for policy

David Manning is a retired British diplomat. Among his assignments, he was the British permanent representative (ambassador) to NATO.

Franklin C. Miller served for three decades as a senior nuclear policy and arms control official in the Pentagon and on the National Security Council staff.

The post NATO’s decision process has an Achilles’ heel appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Why Washington’s approach to Black Sea security may be about to change—for the better

Arnold C. Dupuy — Mon, 11 Mar 2024 19:32:33 +0000

Washington’s engagement with the Black Sea has ebbed and flowed in the post-Cold War era. The lack of consistent focus has contributed to relative insecurity in the littoral states and emboldened Russian aggression.

But as the region continues to be destabilized by Russia’s war on Ukraine, there is a sign that this period of US neglect may be ending. This sign comes in the form of Section 1247 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024 (NDAA), which US President Joe Biden signed on December 22 last year, authorizing a total national security budget of $886 billion.

Section 1247 instructs the National Security Council to develop a Black Sea security and development strategy across government agencies. But until that strategy is released, Section 1247 outlines five ways the United States will aim to support the region: “(1) to increase coordination with [NATO] and the [European Union (EU)]; (2) to deepen economic ties; (3) to strengthen energy security; (4) to support efforts to bolster their democratic resilience; and (5) to enhance security assistance with regional partners in accordance with the values and interests of the United States.”

These aims will require a whole-of-government approach in addition to participation from the private sector, for example through private investment in projects across Black Sea regional partners—which the NDAA lists as Bulgaria, Georgia, Moldova, Romania, Turkey, and Ukraine.

Some initial assessments can be made about the United States’ five aims.

US coordination with NATO and the EU

The Black Sea region’s most pressing concern is Ukraine, which is struggling to fend off Russia. Though Ukraine has already received considerable military and economic support from the West, this aid will continue in the form of the EU’s recently approved fifty-billion-euro package. The US Congress is still in gridlock over additional aid. Ultimately, Ukraine’s role as a bulwark against Russian aggression is too important for Washington and Brussels to ignore.

Over the long term, there is a need for greater military capability and interoperability, as well as a more resilient civil-military infrastructure, across the Black Sea region. While all the littoral states would benefit from a greater US presence, two nations will be particularly important for achieving the United States’ coordination goals. Turkey is not only home to the second-largest military in NATO; it is also the guardian of the straits that connect the Black Sea to the Mediterranean Sea (and beyond), so any US strategy must include Ankara. Therefore, rapprochement between Ankara, Washington, and Brussels will be necessary. Romania’s size, strategic location, and strong transatlantic ties have positioned it to become a military and economic hub for the region, particularly as more NATO assets are deployed there.

Deepening economic ties

Section 1247 calls for enhancing US business ties with Black Sea regional partners in part to reduce the impact of Russian and Chinese “economic coercion.” It is here where the various chambers of commerce—as well as the US Agency for International Development (USAID) and other US government development organs—can contribute by coordinating with stakeholders, lending institutions, and entrepreneurs.

Corruption and entrenched bureaucracies prevalent in the region inhibit growth and investment and undermine public confidence in national institutions. There have been improvements, though. Hopefully, increased attention from Washington will provide the impetus for the regional states to implement and enforce additional serious anticorruption measures.

Strengthening energy security

There is a need to strengthen the wider Black Sea region’s energy security by enhancing source diversification and reducing or eliminating dependence on Russia. Due to their geographical location and historical ties with Russia, most countries in the region are dependent on Russia for oil and gas imports. With the price cap placed on Russian oil—designed to reduce money flows to Moscow—these countries have worked on reducing their dependences. However, because of waivers, lax controls, or illegal trading activities, money from around the world still flows into the Kremlin’s coffers.

Moldova’s efforts to wean itself from Russian energy have had some success, with notable Romanian support. Ankara has worked to diversify its energy sources—although Turkey is proceeding with an agreement it signed with Russia that allows Russian state nuclear energy company Rosatom to build, own, and operate a nuclear power plant in Akkuyu, drawing criticism from experts in the West. Moreover, Russian energy still flows into Turkey. For example, Turkey has become the second-largest importer of Russian fossil fuels.

Finally, NATO’s lack of pipeline infrastructure in Eastern Europe is a potential vulnerability, meaning that it may not be able to rapidly move fuel to forward-deployed forces in the Black Sea region. Addressing that vulnerability will require a major effort that includes increasing oil and gas production by Black Sea states, exploiting renewable energy sources, and expanding the distribution network through expanded pipeline, road, rail, and barge infrastructure. This will be expensive, controversial, and time consuming, requiring funding, strong diplomacy, and patience.

Bolstering democratic resilience

Russia’s relentless malign influence campaigns are difficult to counter for small states without the vast resources to do so. A comprehensive, multinational response is needed to blunt Russian propaganda and disinformation in the Black Sea region. The NDAA advocates for an increase in independent media and US-supported media initiatives in the region, in addition to initiatives led by the State Department and USAID, to “combat foreign malign influence in the region.” This also presents the opportunity to leverage US-owned news network Voice of America and US-supported media organization Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. The United States could look to incorporate other resources, such as NATO’s strategic communications arm—including its Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence based in Riga, Latvia.

Enhancing security assistance with regional partners

The longstanding mistrust between the littoral states creates an indispensable role for the United States. Indeed, the United States has encouraged collaboration on Black Sea security among the region’s states. Such collaboration is on the rise, most recently seen in January when Turkey, Bulgaria, and Romania agreed to conduct demining operations in the Black Sea once Russia’s war in Ukraine comes to an end. Georgia is positioning itself as a key player in the middle corridor—promoting itself as a trusted partner in Eastern Europe’s trade system—by improving its port facilities and ancillary infrastructure. Georgia is also the proposed source for a potential undersea power and internet cable to Romania. Additionally, the strategy calls for assessments on “sustainable, long-term” food-security solutions. Cooperation between Ukraine and the countries along its Black Sea shipping corridor (Romania, Bulgaria, and Turkey) has allowed shipping, including millions of tons of agricultural goods such as grain, to continue along the Black Sea’s western coast within each state’s territorial waters. The United States’ aim to enhance security assistance with these regional partners is an opportunity for Washington to solidify its role as a trusted third party in such cooperation.

Section 1247 of the NDAA appears to be the beginning of an effort to bring stability to the United States’ traditionally unpredictable and uneven commitment to lend focus to the Black Sea region. However, Russia will continue to present a threat to the region. Thus, the United States must solidify its plans for engagement in order to change Russia’s perception of the political and economic costs of its activities and, ultimately, to deter the Kremlin.

Arnold C. Dupuy is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council IN TURKEY, a faculty member of the US Naval Postgraduate School, and chair of the NATO Science and Technology Organization’s SAS-183, “Energy Security Capabilities, Resilience and Interoperability.” Follow him on LinkedIn.

The post Why Washington’s approach to Black Sea security may be about to change—for the better appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Braw interviewed on The Dark State Podcast

Elisabeth Braw — Mon, 11 Mar 2024 16:38:21 +0000

On March 11, Transatlantic Security Initiative senior fellow Elisabeth Braw was invited on The Dark State Podcast to discuss modern espionage tactics.

Fellow

Elisabeth Braw

Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security Transatlantic Security Initiative

NATO Resilience & Society

The post Braw interviewed on The Dark State Podcast appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Braw featured in Times Radio on Macron’s role

Elisabeth Braw — Fri, 08 Mar 2024 17:23:55 +0000

On March 8, Transatlantic Security Initiative senior fellow Elisabeth Braw was featured on Times Radio discussing the comments made by French president Emmanuel Macron.

Fellow

Elisabeth Braw

Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security Transatlantic Security Initiative

NATO Resilience & Society

The post Braw featured in Times Radio on Macron’s role appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Braw featured in forces.net on Sweden joining NATO

Elisabeth Braw — Fri, 08 Mar 2024 17:15:00 +0000

On March 8, Transatlantic Security Initiative senior fellow Elisabeth Braw was quoted in forces.net discussing Sweden’s accession to NATO.

Fellow

Elisabeth Braw

Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security Transatlantic Security Initiative

NATO Resilience & Society

The post Braw featured in forces.net on Sweden joining NATO appeared first on Atlantic Council.

What kind of leader is required for the future of the NATO Alliance?

Timo S. Koster — Thu, 07 Mar 2024 22:35:22 +0000

After a decade of service and four extensions of his mandate, Jens Stoltenberg is scheduled to step down as NATO secretary general in October. He has been a charismatic leader who has successfully led the Alliance through a defining period. Stoltenberg presided over an Alliance that reinvented itself as an organization focused on territorial defense and expanded its membership to include almost the entirety of the European and North American continents. Both developments were very much driven by Russian aggression against Ukraine since 2014, as well as by Moscow’s increasingly belligerent rhetoric against the West.

Stoltenberg’s successor will have to deal with the political fallout of two decades of interventions across the globe, including the traumatic experiences of NATO’s involvement in wars in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya. These conflicts were not popular among all electorates throughout the Alliance, and they were felt in some countries in Europe, particularly among new NATO allies in the east, as campaigns that were not necessarily theirs. Many of these allies now would like NATO to concentrate on what they see as its core purpose—collective defense in Europe.

Restoring the deterrence and defense posture in Europe that NATO abandoned after the Cold War will certainly top the agenda of the next secretary general. The threat of conflict from Moscow and pressure from Washington on European allies to do more for their own defense will define this effort. But there is more . . . NATO still has two other core tasks: crisis management and cooperative security. The next leader of the Alliance must be able to unite thirty-two allies around all three core tasks, which might include, for example, a maritime mission to counter Houthi aggression against commercial and military vessels off the coast of Yemen. It could also include an intervention in increasingly fragile parts of the Western Balkans.

Allies will also rightly expect that counterterrorism, countering cyber threats, and addressing the impact of climate change on security are addressed with an equal sense of urgency. What’s more, NATO has acknowledged that an emerging China merits its attention. Although China does not pose a direct military threat to the Alliance, allies will at least encounter Chinese military presence across the global commons: the high seas, maritime choke points, space, cyber, and the North Pole. The next secretary general will have an opportunity to steer the debate inside the Alliance and to define the extent of its involvement in these issues. Finally, the next secretary general must make progress on cooperation with the European Union (EU), which, under Stoltenberg and his EU counterparts has not gone beyond well-intentioned statements.

The front-runner

Whereas Stoltenberg emerged as a surprise candidate with hardly any competition in 2014, this time there is a clear front-runner in Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte. Rutte has proven himself to be a Stoltenberg-like charismatic leader. While not necessarily a great visionary leader, he is one who knows everyone, is seen on the world stage as a seasoned politician able to make pragmatic deals, and would be able to keep an Alliance of thirty-two nations with differing priorities together.

Rutte seems to be the preferred candidate among most allies, including the “big four”—France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States. He has a solid track record as the second longest-serving current European leader, after Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán. He has also shown his political skills at bridging political divides in domestic politics by leading four governments of different compositions, mostly with a minority in the Dutch senate. On the EU side, he has helped broker immigration deals with Turkey and several North African nations, while on the NATO side he has shown a remarkable talent for dealing with former US President (and current candidate) Donald Trump. Rutte famously contradicted Trump during a press conference in the Oval Office, when the then president suggested it would be acceptable if the United States and EU failed to reach a deal on tariffs. And Rutte saved the day during the 2018 Brussels Summit. When Trump warned the United States might “go our own way” if allies didn’t increase defense spending, the Dutch prime minister suggested that the US president could claim credit for the recent increases in defense spending among NATO allies, which reportedly “rescued” the meeting.

Rutte himself, of course, has not always prioritized increasing his own country’s defense spending. Although he personally signed the Defense Investment Pledge twice (in 2014 and 2016), under his leadership, Dutch defense spending dipped close to the lowest among NATO members, hovering around one percent of gross domestic product in recent years. (It now, finally, approaches the 2 percent benchmark.) On the other hand, under his premiership Dutch support for Ukraine has been exemplary and a stimulus for other allies.

Another argument against Rutte’s candidacy is his nationality. The Dutch have had the secretary general post three times already for a total of twenty-one years. Moreover, during NATO’s seventy-five years of existence, most secretaries general have been from northwestern Europe, except for one leader from Spain (Javier Solana) and one from Italy (Manlio Brosio). The argument that NATO leaders should have a wider geographic distribution was heard when Romanian President Klaus Ioannis put his name forward in February. Estonian Prime Minister Kaja Kallas has also been named as a potential candidate. Although the current deputy secretary general, Mircea Geoană, is a Romanian, and the previous chairman of the Military Committee, Petr Pavel, is a Czech, this is a valid point. In addition, however, it is deemed important among some NATO members that the next secretary general is not perceived as too antagonistic toward Russia, to keep the option of dialogue with Russia on the table. This could diminish enthusiasm for some potential candidates from Central and Eastern Europe that have been among the most critical of Russia.

This contest, then, is apparently Rutte’s to lose. But his candidacy is not quite assured. The consensus rule requires that all allied leaders, including notoriously difficult ones such as Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Orbán, agree on the selection of the secretary general. Hungary, for instance, already this week voiced its initial opposition to Rutte. And satisfying the wish of equal representation of new and old allies may require some kind of package deal, possibly even involving high-level EU posts. Since there are no concrete rules or best practices for leadership selection like at the United Nations (continental rotation) or the European Union (taking into account European Parliament elections), the outcome remains uncertain. Yet, a leader with a resume like Rutte’s, from a nation with a solid transatlantic track record like the Netherlands, serving as the next secretary general of NATO should be an outcome that most everyone can live with.

A timely decision is in everyone’s interest. July’s summit in Washington, DC, which will mark NATO’s seventy-fifth anniversary, would be the ideal occasion to demonstrate the Alliance’s unity by announcing the new secretary general.

Timo S. Koster is a former career diplomat at the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs and NATO International Staff, and nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. From 2018 to 2021, he served as ambassador-at-large for security policy and cyber. Follow him on X at @tskos.

The post What kind of leader is required for the future of the NATO Alliance? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

NATO enlargement at twenty-five: How we got there and what it achieved

Jerzy Koźmiński and Daniel Fried — Wed, 06 Mar 2024 17:59:02 +0000

Two years ago, Russian President Vladimir Putin launched a full-scale war to force Ukraine back into Russia’s empire. Other European nations once under Kremlin control escaped that fate, arguably because they were already NATO members. This coming Tuesday, March 12, marks the twenty-fifth anniversary of NATO’s enlargement to include Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary, which paved the way for others in formally Kremlin-dominated Europe to do so and later to join the European Union (EU). NATO enlargement seems, then, to have been a big success. But critics have blamed NATO enlargement for alienating Russia or for encroaching on Russia’s natural “sphere of influence.”

Why did NATO decide to bring in countries that had just escaped Moscow’s control? What was the United States seeking? What were the Poles and others in Central and Eastern Europe after? Did the policy discount the risks or ignore Russian interests? The authors of this article, a Pole and an American, played roles in their respective governments in the 1990s and worked closely together on NATO enlargement. Given the persistent argument over the merits of NATO enlargement, the debates from that time are still relevant today.

Removing the Iron Curtain

The Poles, like many others in Central and Eastern Europe, had concluded in the early 1990s that their newly regained freedom would be at risk without membership in NATO. They thought that the West, the United States especially, had a window of opportunity to act. Lech Wałęsa and Václav Havel, leaders respectively of Poland’s and the Czech Republic’s successful efforts to overthrow communism in 1989 and then presidents of their countries, conveyed this message to US President Bill Clinton in the early months of his presidency.

The Clinton administration understood the Poles’ and others’ fears and aspirations but initially prioritized relations with Russia and opposed NATO enlargement. If post-Soviet Russia developed in a democratic and pro-Western direction, went the initial US logic, then European security, Central Europe’s included, would follow.

US administration thinking changed, however, after serious (and sometimes contentious) internal debate. National Security Advisor Anthony Lake especially grew uncomfortable with a policy that would lock Central Europeans outside Western institutions and leave them in a “gray zone.” Treating the Central Europeans as apart from the rest of Europe would, he and some others in the Clinton administration feared, effectively perpetuate the line of the Iron Curtain, leaving them subject to future Russian domination. Moreover, by 1993, free market democracy in Central Europe, especially in Poland, was advancing, producing what would become a generation of mostly rapid growth and political stability while in Russia, reforms were uneven and nationalist parties were rising as early as 1993. Given the reality on the ground, a design for post-Cold War European and transatlantic security based solely on hopes for Russia seemed shaky.

The Clinton administration concluded that achieving a Europe whole and free required erasing the line of the Iron Curtain. That meant opening the West’s key institutions, starting with NATO and the European Community (now the EU) to the Central Europeans if they met Western standards in key areas such as democracy, free markets, and good relations with their neighbors.

A two-track approach

The United States did not cast aside relations with Russia. NATO enlargement would be part of a two-track approach, proceeding in parallel with development of a NATO-Russia relationship that could become an “alliance with the Alliance.” NATO enlargement and NATO-Russia relations would not be linked. Each would proceed independent of progress on the other, meaning that Russia could not block NATO enlargement by stalling on NATO-Russia relations.

The Clinton administration also addressed Russian concerns about the military implications of NATO enlargement, including two key assurances in the 1997 Founding Act that formalized the new NATO-Russia relationship. First, the Founding Act affirmed that NATO had “no intention, no plan, and no reason to deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of new members.” Second, the Alliance declared that “in the current and foreseeable security environment,” NATO defense did not require the “additional permanent stationing of substantial combat forces.” NATO kept these pledges, even after Russia’s invasions of Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine in 2014. Moreover, the United States continued its post-Cold War drawdown of its forces in Europe.

The Poles remained skeptical about Russia’s post-Soviet development, but they accepted the Clinton administration’s two-track approach, especially given US assurances that NATO enlargement would be based on the ability of Poland and other aspirants to meet NATO’s standards, not on Russia’s permission. To support the Clinton administration’s case, the Poles even toned down their public skepticism about Russia, emphasizing that NATO enlargement aimed more at integrating and stabilizing Europe than warding off a potential Russian threat.

The Poles worried that NATO would offer only second-class membership, with caveats that would weaken the Article 5 collective defense commitment. But the United States informally consulted with the Poles about the wording of the Founding Act’s assurances to Russia about conventional force stationing, explaining what it did and did not mean, and took Polish concerns into account before finalizing the language.

In 1997, NATO advanced the NATO-Russia relationship by concluding the Founding Act and, later that year at the Madrid NATO Summit, extended an invitation to Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary. The US Senate ratified their accession to the Alliance in 1998 (by a strong vote of 80-19) and on March 12, 1999, NATO formally brought in the first countries that had been east of the Iron Curtain. The George W. Bush administration continued the two-track policy. NATO upgraded the NATO-Russia relationship in 2002 and, later that year, NATO extended invitations to seven more Central and Eastern European countries, including Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, all of which had been illegally annexed by the Soviet Union in 1940. In 2004, all of these new NATO members also joined the EU.

A NATO enlargement balance sheet

What is the net result of NATO enlargement twenty-five years after the accession of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic?

NATO enlargement met its objectives. Most Central European countries, comprising more than one hundred million people, enjoyed a generation of economic development, democracy, and security that few on either side of the Iron Curtain expected when the Berlin Wall fell in 1989.

The NATO-Russia track did not. Russian President Boris Yeltsin de facto accepted NATO enlargement in 1997 and Putin, who succeeded Yeltsin in 2000, did not object to enlargement, even to the Baltic states. But several years into his rule, Putin turned to authoritarianism at home and increased his ambitions abroad, trying, as later became apparent, to reassemble the Russian empire, including through war. He mistakenly saw a US hand in indigenous pro-democracy movements that backed pro-Western leaders in Georgia and Ukraine. By 2007, Putin had cast the West as a foe.

Nevertheless, NATO enlargement appears even better in hindsight. In 1993-94, Wałęsa and Havel cautioned Clinton that if NATO did not bring in new members when it could, Russia would return to claim as much of its former empire as its armies could reach. The war they warned about then is the war Ukraine now faces: a war of imperial reconquest. Putin has repeatedly made clear his support for Russia’s imperial ambitions as well as his contempt for Poland and his endorsement of false narratives about Poland’s history, including in his most recent interview with Tucker Carlson. If NATO enlargement had not taken place, then Europe might now be dealing with Russian domination of Ukraine, reoccupation of the Baltics, and the direct threat of an invasion of Poland.

What went wrong in relations with Russia was not NATO enlargement but Russian leadership’s own conception of their country and its needs. The United States sought to work with post-Soviet Russia as a country. Putin came to define Russia as an empire. Those imperial claims include Ukraine and potentially extend to the Baltic states, Poland, Finland, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and most of Central Asia. As a giant billboard in Russia, including at the border with Estonia, puts it, “Russia’s borders do not end.” NATO enlargement did not prevent Russia from launching imperial wars. It did make sure that those wars took place further east.

To mark the anniversary of Poland’s NATO membership, Polish President Andrzej Duda and Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk will meet with US President Joe Biden on March 12 in Washington. These Polish leaders come from different and competing ends of Poland’s political spectrum, but they are united in their support for NATO, for Ukraine, and for the free world. They have an opportunity on this anniversary to stress how much Europe and the United States gained over the past generation as freedom and security advanced and how critical it is to continue that process by supporting Ukraine in its fight for those same values.

Jerzy Koźmiński was director general and undersecretary of state in the Polish Prime Minister’s Office from 1989-1993, Poland’s deputy foreign minister from 1993 to 1994 and Poland’s ambassador to the United States from 1994 to 2000. Currently he is president of the Polish-American Freedom Foundation.

Daniel Fried is the Weiser Family distinguished fellow at the Atlantic Council and former US ambassador to Poland. 2000. He was a political counselor at the US Embassy in Warsaw from 1990 to 1993, national security director and later senior director for Central and Eastern Europe from 1993 to 2000, and US ambassador to Poland from 1997 to 2000.

The post NATO enlargement at twenty-five: How we got there and what it achieved appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The Ukraine-Turkey defense partnership with the potential to transform Black Sea and Euro-Atlantic security

Pınar Dost — Tue, 05 Mar 2024 18:49:21 +0000

The burgeoning defense partnership between Ukraine and Turkey has helped Kyiv in its fight to fend off Russia and shored up Ankara’s security while bolstering the two partners’ economies. But now, there’s an opportunity to expand that partnership—and in so doing, secure the Black Sea and Europe at large.

The benefits of that partnership have been made clearer over the past two years, with Bayraktar TB2 drones—manufactured by Turkish defense company Baykar—grabbing headlines for helping Ukraine by bolstering Kyiv’s air-strike capabilities in the beginning of Russia’s full-scale invasion.

Just weeks before Russian President Vladimir Putin launched the war, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan—during a visit to Kyiv—struck a deal with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy to allow Ukrainian factories to produce Turkish drones. That deal is now bearing fruit, with Baykar breaking ground on a drone factory near Kyiv in February. The factory, which will take twelve months to build, is expected to create five hundred jobs and produce 120 units a year. NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg pointed to the project, calling it an example of how NATO allies are supporting Ukraine not only “with direct deliveries of weapons and ammunition but also by investing in and ramping up their capacity to produce their own weapons.”

Turkey and Ukraine’s strategic partnership stretches further. For example, Baykar’s Akıncı combat drone (introduced in 2021) and its Kızılelma combat drone (expected to be introduced this year) use Ukrainian-made Ivchenko-Progress engines. The Kızılelma has even been called a “Turkish bird with a Ukrainian heart.” Kyiv and Ankara also cooperate in the maritime domain; since 2021, Turkey has been building two Ada-class anti-submarine corvettes for Ukraine’s naval forces, expected to be completed and delivered this year. The Ukrainian Armed Forces received Cobra II tactical vehicles—developed by Turkish company Otokar—and were seen deploying them last year. Also in 2023: Ukraine sent two engines to the Turkish Aerospace Industries (TAI) for the company’s T929 ATAK-II attack helicopter; Ukraine has committed to send twelve more by 2025.

While the flow of Turkish defense equipment northward to Ukraine has been strong, it has experienced headwinds. For example, European countries have been unable to come to a consensus on topping up the European Peace Facility, the mechanism with which the European Union (EU) funds weapons supplies for Ukraine. France, Greece, and Cyprus have blocked additional financing out of a desire to ensure that funds are spent on weapons, technologies, and ammunition from the EU. Greece said that it did not want the money to go to Turkish defense companies. The countries should let up on this demand—France recently has, for the procurement of artillery. Supplying Ukraine is not just about Kyiv’s security; it is also about Black Sea security and Euro-Atlantic security.

Nevertheless, the Ukraine-Turkey bilateral defense partnership has room to expand. On February 21, TAI announced that its KAAN fighter jet conducted its first flight. The jet was conceptualized and developed initially to replace the Turkish Air Force’s aging F-16 fleet and to bolster Turkey’s self-sufficiency—before the United States decided to sell Turkey forty new F-16s and equipment to upgrade dozens more. While the KAAN jet prototype is currently powered by General Electric F-110 engines (the engine that powers F-16s), Turkey is aiming to start using domestically produced engines produced by TAI Engine Industries by 2028. However, there may be a role for Ukraine in the project, as Ukrainian Ambassador to Turkey Vasyl Bodnar recently stated that not only is Ukraine looking to buy and use the KAAN jet, but “Ukrainian teams continue to work on the engine” and are “competing” to be a partner on the project.

A Ukraine-Turkey partnership on joint engine production for the KAAN jet would contribute to Ukraine’s economy and also provide Turkey a trustworthy and steady partner in bolstering its self-defense—political divides between Ankara and the West could potentially erupt into measures such as export license bans as was the case in 2019 with some European Union governments’ limiting arms exports following Turkey’s operation in northeast Syria and in 2020 with the United States imposing sanctions on Turkey following Ankara’s purchase of Russia’s S-400 missile defense system.

NATO countries have acknowledged the important role that fighter jets play in the region’s security. Ukraine has been offered sixty second-hand F-16 fighter jets by the Netherlands, Denmark, and Norway. Last year, Denmark, the United States, and the United Kingdom began training Ukrainian pilots. In November last year, Romania received three of the thirty-two F-16s it bought from Norway. By 2025, Romania is expected to own forty-nine F-16s. Bulgaria is also gearing up to receive the sixteen F-16 Block 70 fighter jets it bought from the United States; the first eight are expected to arrive by 2025.

Turkey plans to export some KAAN jets, which could offer countries an alternative to fighter aircraft manufactured and sold by Russia and China. And, once Turkey has more KAAN jets off the ground and more F-16 upgraded in its fleet, it could support Ukraine with second-hand F-16s or by serving as a repair and upgrade hub for the F-16s that Ukraine and other Black Sea countries own.

Benefits that ripple across the sea

An expanded Ukraine-Turkey security partnership would compound upon the beneficial effects of previous efforts to secure the region undertaken by NATO countries.

In both its 2022 Strategic Concept and its 2023 Vilnius Summit communiqué, NATO called Russia “the most significant and direct threat to Allies’ security and to peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area.” In both documents, the Alliance also reiterated the “strategic importance” of the Black Sea. The United States—the NATO member with the largest military—echoed this in its 2024 National Defense Authorization Act, where it emphasized the need to bolster defenses in the region and increase cooperation on Black Sea security, not only bilaterally with regional partners—specifically Ukraine, Romania, Bulgaria, Moldova, and Georgia—but also with NATO and the EU to minimize the risk of duplicating efforts and to improve interoperability.

Strengthening NATO’s deterrence and defense in the Black Sea region is even more important as the US presidential election looms. Former US President Donald Trump, a candidate again this year, has repeatedly argued that the United States is unfairly carrying the burden of financing NATO. Recently, he added that he would encourage Russia to do whatever it wants to any NATO country that doesn’t meet the Alliance’s defense spending guidelines. This kind of announcement unfortunately encourages an imperialist president such as Putin.

Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine began and threats to the Black Sea region increased, NATO and its members have worked to bolster the region’s defense and deterrence capabilities. NATO increased its forward presence in the region by establishing four new battlegroups in Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania, and Slovakia. The United States has developed close security cooperation with Romania and Bulgaria, providing them with important defense technology and weapons as well as Foreign Military Financing to support their military modernization efforts and regional defense capabilities. The United States is also leading a Black Sea Maritime Domain Awareness project, in which Bulgaria, Romania, Ukraine, and Georgia are participants.

Ukraine has disabled one-third of the Russian Black Sea Fleet. With Turkey being the guardian of the straits under the Montreux Convention, Russia will not easily be able to replace these losses. NATO allies should take advantage of the opportunity they now have to get the upper hand in the maritime domain against Russia. Montreux limits the passage of non-Black Sea countries’ naval forces through the straits and the amount of time these forces can spend in the Black Sea; but the United States and non-littoral European countries, seeking to bolster Black Sea allies’ defense capabilities, can lean more on Turkey. The erosion of Russia’s capabilities has shifted the balance of power in the Black Sea to Turkey’s advantage. Turkey could lead naval operations in the international waters in the Black Sea, further out from its coastline, with its TCG Anadolu assault ship without a NATO mandate. While there is no specific mention of Turkey in the US Black Sea strategy, the outline for which is reflected in the US National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024, the existing structure of the law is enough for the US to support—alone or in cooperation with other NATO allies—the Black Sea countries with additional capabilities and efforts to improve interoperability.

A Ukraine-Turkey partnership on the KAAN jet would add to these efforts and bolster security in the region.

What’s at stake

Gridlock in the US Congress over approving additional financial support to Ukraine and debate over whether the war is at a stalemate—in addition to Ukraine’s losses on the battleground and its ammunition shortage—have alarmed many European capitals.

After weeks of resistance from Hungary, the EU agreed to $54 billion in long-term aid to Ukraine. European countries, for their part, are also pitching in to shore up Ukraine’s and the Euro-Atlantic community’s security. Germany, which ranks second in military assistance committed to Ukraine, is—among other initiatives—building a new ammunition factory in response to Germany’s and Europe’s needs. German Chancellor Olaf Scholz also called on Europe to “move… towards large-scale production of defense equipment.” Good news also came out of Denmark, as the prime minister announced that she would pledge all of the country’s artillery arsenal to Ukraine. France has also recently concluded a security pact with Ukraine, pledging up to three billion euros in military aid—including cooperation on artillery—and the Netherlands has committed to providing 2.2 billion euros in military aid this year.

Turkey has also looked to boost Euro-Atlantic security. Turkey and the United States are already cooperating to replenish the United States’ munitions stockpiles, critical considering Washington’s role in supplying ammunition to Ukraine. According to the US ambassador to Turkey, by next year, 30 percent of all 155 mm rounds made in the United States will be manufactured by factories that are part of a partnership between the US Department of Defense and a Turkish defense company. Turkey, as well as Greece, recently joined the German-led European Sky Shield Initiative, which offers participating countries a platform through which they can jointly procure air defense capabilities, an important contribution to European security. All these efforts and initiatives are important, as the United States, NATO, and EU will need to prepare over the next eleven months for a potential Trump presidency.

Leaders in the West are putting into words how important it is for Ukraine to win. As French President Emmanuel Macron said, Russian defeat in Ukraine is vital for security in Europe; Scholz stressed that what happens in Ukraine will decide “if our [peaceful] order, our rules-based world has a future.” Ukraine’s defense-industrial know-how and Turkey’s experience in manufacturing combine into a win-win security partnership that can pay dividends for Black Sea security, Euro-Atlantic security, and—ultimately—the international rules-based order.

Pınar Dost is a nonresident fellow at Atlantic Council IN TURKEY and a historian of international relations. She is also the former deputy director of Atlantic Council IN TURKEY. She is an associated researcher with the French Institute for Anatolian Studies. Follow her on LinkedIn.

The post The Ukraine-Turkey defense partnership with the potential to transform Black Sea and Euro-Atlantic security appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Dahl quoted in Dagens Nyheter on NATO’s historical role

Ann-Sofie Dahl — Tue, 05 Mar 2024 15:00:48 +0000

On March 5, Transatlantic Security Initiative nonresident senior fellow Ann-Sofie Dahl was quoted in Dagens Nyheter on NATO’s historical importance to transatlantic security (source in Swedish).

Fellow

Ann-Sofie Dahl

Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security Transatlantic Security Initiative

Danish Europe & Eurasia

The post Dahl quoted in Dagens Nyheter on NATO’s historical role appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Putin is on an historic mission and will not stop until he is finally defeated

Peter Dickinson — Tue, 05 Mar 2024 11:34:27 +0000

There was no escaping the mounting sense of gloom in late February as the world marked the second anniversary of Russia’s full-scale Ukraine invasion. While a chorus of international leaders voiced their determination to continue standing with Ukraine, it is now evident that Russia holds the upper hand as the conflict evolves into a grinding war of attrition. Indeed, with the future of US military aid in doubt, the mood among Ukraine’s partners is visibly darkening as thoughts turn to the disastrous consequences of a potential Russian victory.

In recent weeks, more and more Western leaders have begun publicly warning that their countries may soon become targets of Russian aggression. The latest leader to sound the alarm was French President Emmanuel Macron, who stated on February 26 that Russia could attack NATO member states “in the next few years.” Macron also sparked a heated debate by refusing to rule out sending Western troops to Ukraine.

Not everyone believes a victorious Putin would inevitably go further. Many remain skeptical and claim the Russian dictator is only interested in Ukraine. Others point to the Russian army’s well-documented difficulties during the current invasion as evidence that any Russian attack on the NATO alliance would amount to military suicide. These arguments reflect a fundamental failure among many in the West to grasp the true motives behind Russia’s invasion and the nature of the threat posed by Vladimir Putin’s imperial ambitions.

When Putin first launched the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, he initially sought to portray it as a defensive measure against “Ukrainian Nazis” and NATO expansion. However, as the conflict has unfolded, it has become increasingly apparent that the Kremlin is waging an old-fashioned colonial war of imperial expansion.

In summer 2022, Putin directly compared his invasion to the eighteenth century imperial conquests of Russian Czar Peter the Great. Months later, he proclaimed the annexation of four Ukrainian provinces while declaring them to be “historically Russian lands.” He has since asserted that “no Ukraine ever existed in the history of mankind,” and has issued orders for all traces of Ukrainian national identity to eradicated from areas of Ukraine under Kremlin control.

Putin’s historical motivations were perhaps most immediately obvious during his recent interview with American media personality Tucker Carlson. While Carlson openly encouraged Putin to blame NATO and the US for the invasion, the Russian ruler preferred to embark on a half-hour history lecture that placed the origins of the current war firmly in the distant past. Rather than seeking to justify his invasion in terms of contemporary geopolitics, Putin chose to argue that Ukraine was historically Russian and therefore a legitimate target.

Putin’s chilling dream of reclaiming “historically Russian lands” puts a large number of countries at risk of suffering the same fate as Ukraine. The Kremlin strongman is notorious for lamenting the collapse of the Soviet Union, but his revisionist ambitions actually extend beyond the boundaries of the former USSR. On numerous occasions, Putin has expressed his belief that the Soviet Union was in fact a continuation of the Russian Empire, while the fall of the USSR was “the disintegration of historical Russia.” “What had been built up over 1000 years was largely lost,” he commented in December 2021.

Based on this twisted logic, the historical arguments used by Putin to justify the invasion of Ukraine could be equally applied to any country that was once part of the Russian Empire. This would result in a list of potential targets including Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Belarus, Poland, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and the whole of Central Asia, not to mention Alaska. Anyone tempted to dismiss the idea of Russia invading these countries should consider that just ten years ago, most Ukrainians were equally sure such things were impossible in the twenty-first century.

Nor is Putin solely motivated by his deep-seated desire to reverse Russia’s imperial decline. He also sees the invasion of Ukraine as a fight to end the era of Western dominance and establish a new multi-polar world order. After decades spent bristling at Russia’s reduced status and the perceived humiliations of the post-Soviet period, he is now attempting to frame the war in Ukraine as a battle against Pax Americana to shape the future of international relations. Putin believes victory over Ukraine would represent a decisive breakthrough that would undermine the entire post-1991 world order and reverse the verdict of the Cold War.

Stay updated

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

Doubters argue that the Russian army is currently in no shape to undertake any further invasions, never mind confronting the military might of NATO itself. This reasoning is superficially persuasive. After all, Putin’s army has seen its reputation as the world’s number two military take a severe battering in Ukraine. Russian commanders have lost a series of key battles and have suffered catastrophic losses in both men and equipment that have left them increasingly dependent on the brute force of primitive human wave tactics.

Despite these setbacks, it would be foolish to underestimate Russia’s military potential. In the past two years, Putin has placed the entire Russian economy on a war footing. Armaments factories are now working around the clock and are already comfortably outproducing the entire NATO alliance in terms of artillery shells and other key armaments. Russia may have lost hundreds of thousands killed and wounded in Ukraine, but the Kremlin still has vast untapped reserves of fighting age men who can be mobilized in time for the next big invasion.

Skeptics also tend to overlook the likely impact of victory in Ukraine on Russia’s military capabilities. In practical terms, the conquest of Ukraine would secure hundreds of thousands of additional conscript troops and a vast array of new weapons for the Russian army. Control over Ukraine would significantly enhance the Kremlin war machine by offering renewed access to a range of major Ukrainian enterprises that previously played key roles in the Soviet military industrial complex. It would make Russia the dominant force on global agricultural markets, handing Moscow enormous leverage that could be used to bribe allies and deter opponents.

Crucially, success in Ukraine would provide Putin with enormous additional momentum while simultaneously destabilizing and demoralizing the whole democratic world. Inside Russia, pro-war sentiment would be further strengthened and Putin’s messianic vision of a new Russian Empire would be vindicated. Internationally, Russia’s existing allies would feel free to increase their support, while the countries of the nonaligned Global South would rush to strengthen ties with the triumphant Kremlin. In such a favorable geopolitical climate, Putin would doubtless find it difficult to resist the temptation to escalate his confrontation with the West. Indeed, he would almost certainly see it as a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity to achieve his historic mission.

Eurasia Center events

Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security Transatlantic Security Initiative

Ukraine’s advance in Kursk: What’s next and implications

Conflict Russia Security & Defense Ukraine

This does not mean we should expect to see Russian tanks on the streets of NATO capitals any time soon. Putin knows he can reach his goals by discrediting NATO rather than actually defeating the alliance on the battlefield. With this in mind, the Kremlin would be far more likely to opt for the kind of hybrid tactics employed during the early stages of the Ukraine invasion in 2014. Indeed, it is all too easy to imagine unidentified Russian troops operating inside NATO territory behind a veil of barely plausible deniability.

An escalation of hybrid warfare against the NATO alliance would enable Moscow to exploit the lack of resolve and fear of escalation demonstrated by Western leaders over the past two years in Ukraine. Would the current generation of US, German, or French leaders be prepared to involve their countries in a war with Russia over an ambiguous “pro-Russian” uprising in an Estonian border town? If not, the absence of a decisive response could fatally undermine NATO’s core commitment to collective defense. The alliance might formally survive such a blow, but the loss of credibility would be catastrophic. It would not be long before individual NATO member countries started forming separate security arrangements of their own and began offering concessions to the Kremlin.

Even if Putin chooses not to test NATO directly, a Russian victory in Ukraine would transform the international security environment and dramatically increase the risk of a truly global war. European countries would be forced to rapidly rearm, with defense budgets soon ballooning to levels that far surpass the current costs of supporting the Ukrainian war effort. Those who begrudge today’s spending on Ukraine would find themselves confronted with security expenditure five or ten times higher.

Putin himself has provided ample evidence that his goals extend far beyond the reconquest of Ukraine. He makes no secret of his commitment to reclaiming what he regards as historically Russian lands, and believes he is fully justified in using military force to do so. Putin’s revisionist agenda is inextricably linked to his other great passion, namely the revival of Russia’s great power status as part of a post-Western world dominated by a handful of regional behemoths. These imperial ambitions led directly to the invasion of Ukraine and make further escalations virtually inevitable unless Russia is defeated.

Ultimately, it is impossible to predict exactly what Putin will do if he wins in Ukraine. He may initially choose to pursue low-hanging geopolitical fruit by seizing small neighborhood countries like Moldova or Georgia. Alternatively, he might seek to press home his advantage against a weakened West by embarking on far bolder military gambits targeting the Baltic states or the Suwałki Gap. Of the many possible post-Ukraine scenarios for Russia, the least likely of all is the idea that an emboldened and victorious Putin would simply stop.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

Christopher Skaluba

Former Director

NATO Security & Defense

The post Skaluba featured in The Dispatch on Sweden’s accession to NATO appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Braw quoted by forces.net on the Swedish military standing

Elisabeth Braw — Sun, 03 Mar 2024 16:34:24 +0000

On March 3, Transatlantic Security Initiative senior fellow Elisabeth Braw was quoted in forces.net discussing Swedish military capability and the future of Swedish forces after joining NATO.

Fellow

Elisabeth Braw

Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security Transatlantic Security Initiative

NATO Resilience & Society

The post Braw quoted by forces.net on the Swedish military standing appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Yevgeniya Gaber joins Voice of America to discuss the role of Turkey in the future de-occupation of Crimea, Ankara’s diplomatic efforts between Ukraine and Russia

aozen — Thu, 29 Feb 2024 11:16:52 +0000

The post Yevgeniya Gaber joins Voice of America to discuss the role of Turkey in the future de-occupation of Crimea, Ankara’s diplomatic efforts between Ukraine and Russia appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Braw featured on ABC Radio on Sweden’s accsession to NATO

Elisabeth Braw — Tue, 27 Feb 2024 17:09:30 +0000

On February 27, Transatlantic Security Initiative senior fellow Elisabeth Braw was intervied by ABC Radio on Sweden’s accession to NATO.

Fellow

Elisabeth Braw

Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security Transatlantic Security Initiative

NATO Resilience & Society