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Ukraine’s advance in Kursk: What’s next and implications

Conflict Russia Security & Defense Ukraine

Beyond the military practicalities of the battlefield, the Kursk offensive is challenging some of the most fundamental assumptions about the war. Crucially, Ukraine’s invasion of Russia has demonstrated that Putin’s nuclear threats and his talk of red lines are in reality a big bluff designed to intimidate the West.

Ukrainians have long accused Western policymakers of being overly concerned about the dangers of provoking Putin. They argue that since 2022, the international response to Russian aggression has been hampered by a widespread fear of escalation that has led to regular delays in military aid and absurd restrictions on the use of Western weapons. Ukraine’s offensive has now made a mockery of this excessive caution. If the Kremlin does not view the actual invasion of Russia by a foreign army as worthy of a major escalation, it is hard to imagine what would qualify.

As the Kursk offensive unfolds, Ukraine is hoping the country’s allies will draw the logical conclusions. Initial indications are encouraging, with US and EU officials voicing their support for Ukraine’s cross-border incursion despite longstanding concerns over any military operations inside Russia. At the same time, restrictions on the use of certain categories of weapons remain in place. This is hindering the advance of Ukrainian troops in Kursk Oblast. It is also preventing Kyiv from striking back against the airbases used to bomb Ukrainian cities and the country’s civilian infrastructure.

Ukraine’s Kursk offensive represents a powerful signal to the country’s partners. It demonstrates that the Ukrainian military is a highly professional force capable of conducting complex offensive operations and worthy of greater international backing. It also confirms that Putin’s Russia is dangerously overstretched and is militarily far weaker than it pretends to be.

The muddled and unconvincing Russian response to Ukraine’s invasion speaks volumes about the relative powerlessness of the Putin regime. This should persuade Kyiv’s allies of the need for greater boldness and convince them that the time has come to commit to Ukrainian victory.

Oleksiy Goncharenko is a Ukrainian member of parliament with the European Solidarity party.

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Ukraine’s political leaders have been unusually tight-lipped about the entire offensive, providing no hint in advance and saying very little during the first week of the campaign. This is in stark contrast to the approach adopted last year, when the country’s coming summer offensive was widely referenced by officials and previewed in the media. Ukraine’s efforts to enforce operational silence appear to have also extended to the military. According to The New York Times, even senior Ukrainian commanders only learned of the plan to invade Russia at the last moment.

Ukraine’s Kursk offensive appears to have been a major surprise for Ukraine’s Western partners. The Financial Times has reported that neither the US nor Germany were informed in advance of the planned Ukrainian operation. Given the West’s record of seeking to avoid any actions that might provoke Putin, it is certainly not difficult to understand why Kyiv might have chosen not to signal its intentions.

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Ukraine’s advance in Kursk: What’s next and implications

Conflict Russia Security & Defense Ukraine

It is also likely that Ukraine benefited from Russia’s own complacency and overconfidence. Despite suffering a series of defeats in Ukraine since 2022, the Kremlin remains almost pathologically dismissive of Ukrainian capabilities and does not appear to have seriously entertained the possibility of a large-scale Ukrainian invasion of the Russian Federation. The modest defenses established throughout the border zone confirm that Moscow anticipated minor border raids but had no plans to repel a major Ukrainian incursion.

Russia’s sense of confidence doubtless owed much to Western restrictions imposed on Ukraine since the start of the war that have prohibited the use of Western weapons inside Russia. These restrictions were partially relaxed in May 2024 following Russia’s own cross-border offensive into Ukraine’s Kharkiv Oblast, but the Kremlin clearly did not believe Kyiv would be bold enough to use this as the basis for offensive operations inside Russia. Vladimir Putin is now paying a steep price for underestimating his opponent.

It remains far too early to assess the impact of Ukraine’s surprise summer offensive. One of the most interesting questions will be whether Ukraine can force the Kremlin to divert military units from the fighting in eastern Ukraine in order to defend Russia itself. Much will depend on the amount of Russian land Ukraine is able to seize and hold. Putin must also decide whether his military should focus on merely stopping Ukraine’s advance or liberating occupied Russian territory.

Ukraine’s Kursk offensive has succeeded in demonstrating that surprise is still possible on the modern battlefield. This is a significant achievement that underlines the skill and competence of the Ukrainian military. The Ukrainian invasion has also confirmed once again that Putin’s talk of Russian red lines and his frequent threats of nuclear escalation are a bluff designed to intimidate the West. Taken together, these factors should be enough to convince Kyiv’s partners that now is the time to increase military support and provide Ukraine with the tools for victory.

Mykola Bielieskov is a research fellow at the National Institute for Strategic Studies and a senior analyst at Ukrainian NGO “Come Back Alive.” The views expressed in this article are the author’s personal position and do not reflect the opinions or views of NISS or Come Back Alive.

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Long-range attack drones are a good fit for Ukraine’s limited offensive capabilities. Kyiv needs to be able to strike military targets inside Russia, but is prevented from doing do with Western-supplied missiles due to restrictions imposed by the country’s partners. While Ukraine has some capacity to produce its own missiles domestically, this is insufficient for a sustained bombing campaign.

Drones are enabling Ukraine to overcome these obstacles. Ukrainian drone production has expanded dramatically over the past two-and-a-half years. The low cost of manufacturing a long-range drone relative to the damage it can cause to Russian military and industrial facilities makes it in many ways the ideal weapon for a cash-strapped but innovative nation like Ukraine.

Ukraine’s drone industry is a diverse ecosystem featuring hundreds of participating companies producing different models. The Ukrainian military has used a variety of drones with different characteristics for attacks inside Russia, making the campaign even more challenging for Russia’s air defenses.

The decentralized nature of Ukraine’s drone manufacturing sector also makes it difficult for Russia to target. Even if the Kremlin is able to identify and hit individual production sites located across Ukraine, this is unlikely to have a major impact on the country’s overall output.

Since 2022, Ukraine has taken a number of steps to reduce bureaucracy and streamline cooperation between drone makers and the military. The result is a sector capable of adapting to changing battlefield conditions and able to implement innovations quickly and effectively. This includes efforts to create AI-enabled drones capable of functioning without an operator, making it far more difficult for Russia to jam.

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Ukraine’s advance in Kursk: What’s next and implications

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As it expands, Ukraine’s drone bombing campaign is exposing the weaknesses of Russia’s air defenses. Defending a territory as vast as Russia against air strikes would be problematic even in peacetime. With much of Russia’s existing air defense systems currently deployed along the front lines in Ukraine, there are now far fewer systems available to protect industrial and military targets inside Russia.

During the initial stages of the war, this shortage of air defense coverage was not a major issue. However, Ukraine’s broadening bombing offensive is now forcing Russia to make tough decisions regarding the distribution of its limited air defenses.

In addition to strategically important sites such as airbases, the Kremlin must also defend prestige targets from possible attack. In July, CNN reported that air defenses had been significantly strengthened around Russian President Vladimir Putin’s summer residence. Protecting Putin’s palace from attack is necessary to avoid embarrassment, but it means leaving other potential targets exposed.

Ukraine’s drone program is the biggest success story to emerge from the country’s vibrant defense tech sector, and is helping Ukraine to even out the odds against its far larger and wealthier adversary. The country’s partners clearly recognize the importance of drones for the Ukrainian military, and have formed a drone coalition to increase the supply of drones from abroad. This combination of international support and Ukrainian ingenuity spells trouble for Russia. It will likely lead to increasingly powerful and plentiful long-range strikes in the months ahead.

Marcel Plichta is a PhD candidate at the University of St Andrews and former analyst at the US Department of Defense. He has written on the use of drones in the Russian invasion of Ukraine for the Atlantic Council, the Telegraph, and the Spectator.

US President Joe Biden finally gave the green light to supply Ukraine with F-16s in summer 2023. However, it would take another year before the the Ukrainian Air Force received the first batch of jets. Sadly, Pilschikov did not live to see this historic day. The pilot who did so much to secure F-16s for his country was killed in a mid-air collision during a training exercise in August 2023.

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Despite achieving a breakthrough in summer 2023, the process of preparing for the delivery of F-16s to Ukraine proved frustratingly slow. Ukrainian pilots spent many months training, with only a limited number of slots made available. As a result, Ukraine still has very few pilots able to fly F-16s. Identifying and upgrading Ukrainian airfields capable of accommodating F-16s also created challenges.

The planes that Ukraine has received from the country’s European partners are from the older generation, which is being phased out elsewhere as air forces transition to more modern models. This imposes some limitations on the functions Ukraine’s F-16 fleet can perform. Limited radar reach means that deployment of F-16s on the front lines of the war is seen as too risky, as they could be shot down by both Russian aircraft and Russian air defenses.

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Ukraine’s advance in Kursk: What’s next and implications

Conflict Russia Security & Defense Ukraine

With a combat role unlikely at this stage, Ukrainian F-16s will primarily be used to strengthen the country’s air defenses. The planes Kyiv has received are ideally suited to the task of shooting down the Russian missiles and drones that are regularly fired at Ukrainian cities and vital infrastructure.

Their effectiveness in this role will depend on the kinds of missiles they are armed with. F-16s can carry a range of armaments that are more advanced that the types of weapons used by the majority of planes in service with the Russian Air Force. Initial indications are encouraging, with the first F-16s arriving in Ukraine complete with weapons ideally suited to air defense. It is now vital for Ukrainian officials and members of civil society to focus their advocacy efforts on securing sufficient numbers of missiles from partner countries.

Ukraine should also prioritize the supply of long-range radar detection aircraft, such as the planes recently promised by Sweden. In May 2024, the Swedes announced plans to deliver two surveillance aircraft as part of the Scandinavian nation’s largest support package to date. These “eyes in the sky” can monitor airspace for hundreds of kilometers. Together with Ukraine’s growing F-16 fleet, they will significantly enhance the country’s air defenses.

As Ukraine acquires more F-16s in the coming months, and as the country’s limited pool of pilots grows in size and experience, we will likely see these jets used in more adventurous ways. This may include targeting Russian planes and helicopters operating close to the front lines with long-range strikes. For now, though, the main task of Ukraine’s F-16s will be to improve the country’s air defenses and protect the civilian population from Russian bombardment.

Olena Tregub is Executive Director of the Independent Anti-Corruption Commission (NAKO), a member of the Anti-Corruption Council under the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense.

Sailing through the spyglass: The strategic advantages of blue OSINT, ubiquitous sensor networks, and deception

Guido L. Torres and Austin Gray — Thu, 08 Aug 2024 10:43:41 +0000

In today’s technologically enabled world, the movements of every vessel—from nimble fishing boats to colossal aircraft carriers—can be meticulously tracked by a massive network of satellites and sensors. With every ripple on the ocean’s surface under scrutiny, surprise naval maneuvers will soon be relics of the past. The vast expanse of the world’s oceans will no longer be shrouded in mystery, but illuminated by data streams flowing from millions of eyes and ears aware of every movement from space to seabed.

Open-source intelligence (OSINT) refers to intelligence derived exclusively from publicly or commercially available information that addresses specific intelligence priorities, requirements, or gaps. OSINT encompasses a wide range of sources, including public records, news media, libraries, social media platforms, images, videos, websites, and even the dark web. Commercial technical collection and imagery satellites also provide valuable open-source data. The power of OSINT lies in its ability to provide meaningful, actionable intelligence from diverse and readily available sources.

Thanks to technological advances, OSINT can provide early warning signs of a conflict to come long before it actually breaks out. On land, the proliferation of inexpensive and ubiquitous sensor networks has rendered battlefields almost transparent, making surprise maneuvers more difficult. Through open-source data from smartphones and satellites, persistent OSINT provides early warning of mobilization and other key indicators of military maneuvers. This capability is further augmented by artificial intelligence (AI)-enhanced reconnaissance and real-time data analysis, which have proven remarkably effective in modern conflicts including in Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Gaza and Israel, and Sudan. As this paradigm extends to maritime operations, it brings unique challenges and characteristics compared to land operations.

As technology races forward, Blue OSINT stands out as a key tool in the arsenal of contemporary naval warfare during global great-power competition. Blue OSINT harnesses data from commercial satellites, social media, and other publicly available sources to specifically enhance maritime domain awareness, identify emerging threats, and inform strategic decisions.

The current state of Blue OSINT across the spectrum of conflict points to an accelerating technology-driven evolution enabling maritime security and sea-control missions. The US Navy (USN) can enhance Blue OSINT collection with its own commercially procured sensor networks and bespoke uncrewed systems to shape operational environments, prevent and resolve conflicts, and ensure accessibility of sea lines of communications.

Commercially procured sensors span a wide array of technologies, including sonar and acoustic sensors, as well as video and seismic devices that are utilized to detect activities in strategic locations. These sensors can function independently or operate from uncrewed systems, providing flexibility and adaptability in various maritime operations. For instance, uncrewed aerial systems (UAS) equipped with high-resolution cameras and radar can deliver persistent surveillance over expansive oceanic areas, while uncrewed underwater vehicles (UUVs) with sonar capabilities can monitor subsea activities, such as submarine movements and underwater installations. These uncrewed platforms enable the continuous collection of critical data, enhancing the Navy’s situational awareness and operational readiness without putting sailors at risk.

For the US Navy to best support the joint force and maintain its strategic edge, it must integrate ubiquitous sensor networks and Blue OSINT into naval strategies adapted for tomorrow’s increasingly complex maritime environment. The Navy’s multiyear Project Overmatch is a good start to developing its “network of networks” and contributing to the Joint All-Domain Command and Control (JADC2) program.

With escalating tensions in the South China Sea, conventional forces are stretched thin and face asymmetric threats such as the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN)’s undersea sensing arrays and China’s maritime militia forces. Integrating Blue OSINT and sensor networks into the Navy’s strategies complements traditional naval power, while allowing intelligence missions to be conducted at lower risk and cost. Moreover, the open-source nature of this information enhances the Navy’s ability to share information and collaborate with allies and partners while bypassing cumbersome security classification issues. By relying on easily shareable information, the Navy can better synchronize efforts with partner navies, making command of the sea a more coordinated and viable endeavor.

The impact of evolving open-source intelligence on warfare

Feature	OSINT	Traditional Intelligence
Source of data	Commercial satellites, social media, public sources	HUMINT, SIGINT, classified sources
Coverage	Global, real-time updates, highly accessible	Selective, based on specific operational requirements
Cost	Low cost, leveraging existing commercial infrastructure	High cost, involving extensive human and technical resources
Risk	Low risk, minimal direct exposure	Higher risk, involves clandestine operations
Data volume	Extremely high, necessitates AI and advanced analytics	Moderate to high, manageable with traditional methods
Ease of sharing	High, fewer classification issues	Low, often restricted by security classifications
Data warning	Effective, provides pre-conflict indicators	Effective, but often limited by operational scope
Deception tactics	Requires advanced techniques to counteract	Relies on traditional counterintelligence and technical methods
Collaboration	Enhances collaboration with allies using open data	Limited, restricted sharing due to classification
Operational impact	Supports continuous monitoring and quick response	Supports deep, targeted insights into adversaries

The table above provides a comparison between OSINT and traditional intelligence methods, highlighting the strengths and weaknesses of each approach. OSINT offers global, real-time updates at a lower cost by leveraging existing commercial infrastructure. This approach presents a lower risk, as it involves minimal direct exposure and facilitates easier information sharing due to fewer classification issues.

On the other hand, traditional intelligence methods such as human intelligence (HUMINT) and signals intelligence (SIGINT) provide selective, targeted insights based on specific operational requirements. These methods often involve higher costs and risks due to the need for extensive human and technical resources, as well as the nature of clandestine operations. While traditional intelligence can offer deep, targeted insights, it is often limited by operational scope and security classification issues, making information sharing more challenging.

In the maritime domain, these distinctions are particularly significant. The concept of Blue OSINT integrates these principles specifically for naval operations, emphasizing the need for continuous monitoring and rapid-response capabilities.

Blue OSINT and persistent maritime monitoring

In the pre-conflict stage, global satellite coverage and social media provide a wealth of data that can map maritime activity with unprecedented detail. Nonprofit organizations like Global Fishing Watch use commercial satellite constellations to track ships and monitor maritime activity. Increased affordability and accessibility of satellite technology have enabled nongovernmental and commercial entities to contribute to maritime domain awareness in new ways. For instance, maritime radar emissions—once the exclusive domain of military and intelligence satellites—are now easily observable and “tweetable,” allowing for vessel identification to be accomplished more easily when actors execute deceptive techniques. Similarly, platforms like X (formerly Twitter) host numerous “ship spotting” accounts, where enthusiasts post photos and updates of vessels passing through strategic chokepoints and major straits, further enriching the available data.

Through persistent monitoring and large-scale data analysis, Blue OSINT can be used to significantly mitigate the challenge of monitoring large exclusive economic zones (EEZs). It offers a cost-effective alternative to traditional patrols, allowing these navies to adopt a more targeted approach when deploying their limited resources. By embracing Blue OSINT, naval forces can enhance their surveillance and response capabilities without a heavy financial burden, ensuring that these forces remain agile and effective in their maritime operations. Additionally, data streams from ubiquitous sensor networks can be coupled with Blue OSINT collection to give naval intelligence experts near-endless amounts of data in support of complex reconnaissance operations, without placing sailors and special operators at increased risk to collect it.

In addition to myriad opportunities for intelligence collection, using Blue OSINT presents technological challenges for the US Navy. The sheer volume of data generated by ubiquitous sensor networks and Blue OSINT tools necessitate substantial investments in software and analytic tools to manage and interpret this information effectively. Intelligence professionals must sift through endless amounts of data to identify actionable insights. Even the most skilled analysts need software and computer processing that can help organize and parse raw data.

To address these challenges, the US Navy and other maritime forces are ramping up investments in commercially procured sensor networks and cutting-edge analytic tools. In June 2024, the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency issued its first-ever commercial solicitation for unclassified technology to help track illicit fishing in the Pacific. Such investments aim to access, exploit, and process the massive amounts of data generated, a key step to achieving comprehensive maritime domain awareness. Better software and analytic tools can help maximize the potential of Blue OSINT and sensor networks, ensuring that intelligence analysts can better inform decision-makers at the speed of relevance.

Strategic deployment of distributed sensors

While Blue OSINT provides valuable insights into chokepoints and shipping lanes, it does not yet offer comprehensive coverage of the open ocean. Its effectiveness is greater in populated and coastal areas, where the density of electronic devices and human activity is significantly higher than on the high seas. Moreover, OSINT data can often be easily manipulated, presenting challenges in ensuring the accuracy and reliability of the information gathered. For example, although ships emitting Automatic Identification System (AIS) signals can be tracked on the web, navies are aware that bad actors often tamper with their transponders in order to disguise their locations, ultimately limiting the signals’ reliability.

To bypass these limitations of open-source data, navies and intelligence agencies can enhance their Blue OSINT capabilities by augmenting them with strategically deployed clandestine sensor networks in key locations, such as harbors, straits, and other critical chokepoints. This combination of data flows allows for effective monitoring and data collection on vessel movements, communications, and adversary intentions. Additionally, other covert sensors can be hidden on the seabed or disguised on civilian vessels, like fishing boats, in regions such as the South China Sea. Using distributed sensors along with Blue OSINT data ensures continuous and comprehensive maritime situational awareness, even in areas less frequented by military assets.

However, fixed sensor networks alone are insufficient to cover the dynamic maritime environment. Deploying a mobile network of distributed sensors necessitates a diverse array of platforms and technologies. While military satellites, ships, and aircraft equipped with advanced sensors can offer intermittent coverage, they are costly and limited in number, and their findings are less easily shareable with partners and allies. To bridge these gaps, allied navies should invest in affordable and scalable solutions such as uncrewed surface vehicles (USVs), UUVs, and UASs. Outfitted with various sensors, these platforms can effectively detect and track adversary movements, ensuring that navies maintain situational awareness across the vast expanse of the Pacific Ocean and other critical regions.

Small UASs launched from naval ships can be used to rapidly surveil large swaths of sea, providing real-time data on both surface and subsurface activities. Recognizing the strategic advantage of uncrewed systems, China has taken a bold step to outpace the US Navy by developing an aircraft carrier specifically designed to launch and recover UASs, rather than sophisticated manned platforms like the J-20 fighter jet. This significant investment in a carrier solely for uncrewed vehicles by the PLAN should prompt the United States to reconsider, and potentially adjust, its future resourcing strategy. Similarly, USVs can conduct long-duration patrols at a fraction of the cost of manned ship operations, exemplified by Saildrone vessels patrolling the Indian Ocean, providing the USN a robust sensor network. UUVs, deployed from submarines or surface ships, can monitor subsea activities, such as the movement of submarines and other submersible assets.

By monitoring the air, sea, and underwater environments, uncrewed vehicles and their sensors can significantly enhance overall maritime situational awareness. However, these tools are only effective if they are integrated into a cohesive architecture that combines traditional intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) with Blue OSINT data and affordable long-term leave-behind sensors. Project Overmatch exemplifies how to achieve this integration by developing a network that links sensors, shooters, and command nodes across all domains. For instance, Project Overmatch aims to leverage advanced data analytics, artificial intelligence, and secure communications to create a unified maritime operational picture, enabling faster and more informed decision-making. By incorporating these elements, the US Navy can ensure that uncrewed vehicles and their sensors are effectively utilized to maintain operational superiority in the maritime domain.

Moreover, the low-signature nature of some of these sensors increases the odds that they can operate undetected by adversaries, providing a strategic advantage. By deploying sensors in unexpected locations, and disguising them as civilian assets in some cases, navies can gather intelligence without alerting potential threats to their presence.

Blue OSINT and sensor networks in conflict

While Blue OSINT collection and distributed sensor networks can easily collect data in uncontested waters, they have immediate applications to modern maritime conflict as well. For instance, in the event of a cross-strait invasion by the People’s Republic of China (PRC), the transparency provided by Blue OSINT would make it difficult for navies to maneuver undetected. Satellites and social media continuously monitor naval piers, strategic chokepoints, and even some open ocean areas, making it increasingly difficult to achieve tactical surprise. Historical instances—such as Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor, the D-Day invasion, or the successful surprise dash to transit the English Channel by the German fleet during World War II—would be much harder to achieve in the modern era due to the pervasive nature of Blue OSINT.

In the context of a potential Taiwan invasion, Blue OSINT would likely be used to detect and closely follow Chinese naval activities, including the movement of amphibious assault ships and submarines. OSINT analysts frequently examine satellite imagery of Chinese shipyards and military installations, which could provide early indications of mobilization.

However, relying solely on satellite imagery and AIS for Blue OSINT is insufficient. Multi-intelligence capabilities are essential to provide a comprehensive assessment. For instance, in 2020, two commercial firms collaborated to use radio frequency and synthetic aperture radar collection to detect Chinese illegal, unregulated, and unreported fishing near the Galapagos EEZ. This open-source technique revealed the ability to identify fishing vessels that turned off their AIS to cross into the EEZ. In a future conflict with China, the same methodology of combining multiple Blue OSINT sources could be used to identify and track vessels of the People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia (PAFMM). This would bypass the AIS vulnerabilities that the PAFMM traditionally exploits to avoid detection, while also revealing its intentions as directed by the PLAN.

The Russo-Ukraine conflict revealed how OSINT can thwart surprise maneuvers and provide crucial targeting data deep behind enemy lines. However, it also underscores the limitations of OSINT in sparsely populated environments, such as the open ocean. For example, in December 2023, as missiles flew over the Red Sea, 18 percent of global container-ship capacity was rerouted. While civilian mariners and commercial shipping significantly contribute to Blue OSINT during peacetime, their absence in a high-risk conflict scenario would shift the burden more heavily onto satellite and uncrewed systems.

Deception and stealth

While the US Navy can take advantage of these technologies, its adversaries can, and almost certainly will, do the same. The US Navy and its allies must develop countermeasures to mitigate the risks posed by sensor networks while also leveraging its benefits. One approach is to invest in advanced deception tactics designed to mislead adversaries. These include the use of decoys, electronic warfare, and signal spoofing to create false targets and confuse enemy sensors. The Navy has been quietly developing these tools to obscure its true movements and intentions, ultimately confounding adversaries and making it harder for them to accurately target US forces.

In addition to deception, the United States and its allies need to enhance their naval stealth capabilities to evade adversaries’ distributed sensor networks. This involves not only minimizing the electromagnetic signatures of their vessels, but also employing innovative designs and operational tactics to reduce their radar cross-sections and avoid detection.

Distributed sensors in conflict

The ability to complement Blue OSINT with distributed sensors will be a decisive factor in near-term conflict dynamics. Just as frontline units in Ukraine are detected and targeted by cheap drones and stationary sensors, naval forces can be identified and pinpointed by similar systems at sea. Distributed sensors can provide continuous monitoring and data collection, ensuring that navies can maintain situational awareness and respond swiftly to emerging threats.

Three pillars are necessary to distribute sensors effectively across the ocean.

First, large conventional fleets play a critical role in maritime strategy. These fleets must be capable of extended operations and diverse missions, providing the backbone of naval presence, power projection, sea lines of communication, and, ultimately, sea control. During the COVID-19 pandemic, the US Navy demonstrated its endurance with record-length deployments, showcasing an advantage that could be significant in future maritime campaigns.

Second, organic reconnaissance drones are essential. Each destroyer and aircraft carrier should be equipped with its own fleet of multi-domain drones to conduct surveillance and gather intelligence. Currently, US carrier strike groups rely on land-launched surveillance drones, which are vulnerable and limited in number. Integrating organic drones into each vessel would enhance situational awareness and operational flexibility, allowing for more effective and autonomous intelligence-gathering capabilities.

Third, large fleets of affordable USVs and UUVs can deploy sensors across the ocean, increasing sensor hours at sea and improving maritime domain awareness. The first Replicator tranche is equipping forces with thousands of attritable systems to turn the Taiwan Strait into “an unmanned hellscape,” demonstrating the strategic value of uncrewed systems in contested waters. Moreover, the Navy is experimenting with diverse types of uncrewed platforms, aiming to create a distributed fleet architecture that is even more lethal than today’s carrier-centric fleet. These unmanned systems provide a cost-effective means to enhance surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities across vast oceanic areas, ensuring that the Navy can maintain a strategic advantage in both peacetime and conflict scenarios.

Recommendations

To maximize the efficacy of maritime domain awareness, it is crucial to integrate data from both Blue OSINT and ubiquitous sensor networks. While these two systems of data collection are largely distinct, their combined use can significantly enhance the accuracy and comprehensiveness of intelligence assessments and naval warfare.

Leverage Blue OSINT. Significant investment in artificial intelligence and advanced analytics is necessary to manage and interpret the endless amounts of data generated by open-source intelligence. By fostering a coordinated approach to maritime security, Blue OSINT can facilitate easier information sharing with allies and partners, but only if its utilization is preplanned. Collaborative pathways for Blue OSINT data collection, processing, and analysis must take shape early in the concept and planning phases. This collaborative effort will significantly enhance collective situational awareness and operational effectiveness, making it easier for navies to synchronize their efforts. Additionally, complementing Blue OSINT with traditional intelligence collection such as HUMINT and SIGINT provides a comprehensive threat assessment. By integrating these capabilities, navies can more easily attain a well-rounded understanding of adversary actions.
Commercially procure distributed sensing capabilities and networks. The US Navy must invest in Replicator-style unmanned platforms that can affordably deploy sensors across maritime battlefields, similar to the use of small UAS for land reconnaissance. These commercially procured distributed sensing platforms will significantly enhance the Navy’s ability to continuously and comprehensively monitor vast areas, improving overall maritime domain awareness.
Recognize a new maritime operating environment. The US Navy must prepare for protracted missions away from easily monitored ports and chokepoints while penetrating adversary-controlled, denied waters. This mission set requires a robust logistical framework capable of supporting extended deployments in remote and contested waters. By developing sophisticated tactics to deceive and confuse distributed sensor networks, the Navy can minimize its visibility to adversaries and maintain strategic surprise. This necessitates investing in advanced deception technologies such as electronic warfare, signal spoofing, and decoys to create false targets and obscure true movements. Additionally, enhancing the stealth capabilities of vessels through innovative designs and operational practices will further ensure that naval forces can evade detection and operate effectively in a sensor-saturated environment. By embracing these realities, the Navy can sustain its operational effectiveness and strategic advantage across the competition continuum.

Conclusion

In an era of distributed sensing networks and Blue OSINT, adaptation is not just about leveraging technology but also about evolving operational doctrines to meet the challenges of contemporary maritime conflicts. By integrating Blue OSINT capabilities, deploying distributed sensors, and countering (and employing) deception, naval forces can maintain an asymmetric advantage in the increasingly visible and contested maritime domain.

The success of modern naval operations hinges on the ability to swiftly adapt to technological advancements and evolving threats. Navies must transcend beyond traditional methods and embrace innovative strategies to remain agile and effective. This demands a concerted effort from all levels of naval leadership, from policymakers to forward operators, to implement these changes.

On the unforgiving sea, only those who rapidly transform to the era of Blue OSINT will avoid the abyss, with the rest risk sinking into obsolescence as adversaries gain decisional advantage. Navies that fail to adjust to the realities of Blue OSINT and sensor networks risk ending up like the Russian Black Sea Fleet: at the bottom of the ocean.

Authors

Guido L. Torres is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Forward Defense Program and the executive director of the Irregular Warfare Initiative.

Austin Gray is co-founder and chief strategy officer of Blue Water Autonomy. He previously worked in a Ukrainian drone factory and served in US naval intelligence.

Ukraine’s new F-16 jets won’t defeat Russia but will enhance air defenses

Mykola Bielieskov — Thu, 01 Aug 2024 19:46:07 +0000

The first batch of F-16 jets finally arrived in Ukraine at the end of July, officials in Kyiv and partner countries have confirmed. The news comes after months of anticipation over the delivery of the fighter jets, which have long been high on Ukraine’s wish list as the country seeks the tools to defeat Russia’s ongoing invasion.

US President Joe Biden confirmed his support for the supply of F-16s in August 2023, but subsequent progress was slow. Training for Ukrainian pilots and ground crews has taken up to nine months, with an already technically complex and demanding process reportedly further complicated by language barriers. There have also been significant obstacles to identifying and preparing Ukrainian airbases with suitable facilities and adequate defenses.

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The F-16 models that Ukraine has now begun to receive are a clear step up from the Soviet-era jets inherited from the USSR, boasting superior radar capabilities and longer range. At the same time, Ukraine’s F-16s should not be viewed as a game-changing weapon in the war with Russia.

One obvious issue is quantity. Ukraine has so far only received a handful of F-16s, with a total of 24 jets expected to arrive by the end of 2024. To put this number into context, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has stated in recent weeks that in order to effectively counter Russian air power, his country would require a fleet of 128 F-16 jets. So far, Belgium, Denmark, Norway, and the Netherlands have committed to supply Ukraine with eighty F-16s, but there is no clear time frame for deliveries or for the training of additional pilots.

Ukraine’s fledgling F-16 fleet will likely have access to a limited selection of weapons, with partner countries currently pledging to provide a number of short-range munitions. It remains unclear whether Kyiv can count on longer range strike capabilities, despite recent reports that the US has agreed to arm Ukrainian F-16s with American-made missiles and other advanced weapons. The effectiveness of Ukraine’s new jets will also be constrained by restrictions on the use of Western weapons against targets inside Russia.

The limited number of F-16s in Ukraine means that these new arrivals will initially be deployed primarily to strengthen the country’s air defenses. The jets will considerably enhance Ukraine’s ability to prevent Russian pilots entering Ukrainian air space, and can also target Russian cruise missiles in flight. This is particularly important as Russia has recently demonstrated its growing ability to bypass existing surface-to-air defense systems and strike civilian infrastructure targets across Ukraine.

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Ukraine’s F-16s enter service in what is an extremely challenging operating environment, with Russia’s sophisticated battlefield air defenses likely to make any combat support roles extremely risky. Acknowledging these difficulties, Ukraine’s commander in chief Oleksandr Syrskiy recently stated that the country’s F-16s would operate at a distance of at least forty kilometers from the front.

Another key challenge will be protecting Ukrainian F-16s on the ground against Russian attempts to destroy them with ballistic missiles. The Kremlin has made no secret of the fact that the jets are priority targets that will be hunted with particular enthusiasm. The Ukrainian Air Force will have to adapt quickly in order to counter this threat, and must rely on a combination of Patriot air defenses, decoy F-16s, and frequent airfield changes.

While the long-awaited arrival of F-16s in Ukraine has sparked considerable excitement and provided Ukrainians with a welcome morale boost, these new jets are not a wonder weapon that can change the course of the war. Instead, Ukraine’s small fleet of F-16s will bolster the country’s air defenses, helping to protect Ukrainian cities and critical infrastructure from Russian bombardment.

Over the coming year, Ukraine will face the task of gradually integrating and expanding its F-16 fleet. Based on past experience of Western weapons deliveries, Kyiv can expect to receive additional munitions, and may also eventually be given the green light to strike some categories of military targets inside Russia. This would open up a range of offensive options that could change the battlefield dynamics of the war in Ukraine’s favor. For now, though, the biggest change is likely to be in terms of enhanced security for Ukraine’s civilian population.

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Speaking in summer 2023, Ukraine’s Minister of Digital Transformation Mykhailo Fedorov outlined the country’s drone strategy of bringing together drone manufacturers and military officials to address problems, approve designs, secure funding, and streamline collaboration. Thanks to this approach, he predicted a one hundred fold increase in output by the end of the year.

The Ukrainian drone production industry began as a volunteer project in the early days of the Russian invasion, and quickly became a nationwide movement. The initial goal was to provide the Ukrainian military with 10,000 FPV (first person view) drones along with ammunition. This was soon replaced by far more ambitious objectives. Since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion, more the one billion US dollars has been collected by Ukrainians via fundraising efforts for the purchase of drones. According to online polls, Ukrainians are more inclined to donate money for drones than any other cause.

Today, Ukrainian drone production has evolved from volunteer effort to national strategic priority. According to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, the country will produce more than one million drones in 2024. This includes various types of drone models, not just small FPV drones for targeting personnel and armored vehicles on the battlefield. By early 2024, Ukraine had reportedly caught up with Russia in the production of kamikaze drones similar in characteristics to the large Iranian Shahed drones used by Russia to attack Ukrainian energy infrastructure. This progress owes much to cooperation between state bodies and private manufacturers.

Marine drones are a separate Ukrainian success story. Since February 2022, Ukraine has used domestically developed marine drones to damage or sink around one third of the entire Russian Black Sea Fleet, forcing Putin to withdraw most of his remaining warships from occupied Crimea to the port of Novorossiysk in Russia. New Russian defensive measures are consistently met with upgraded Ukrainian marine drones.

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In May 2024, Ukraine became the first country in the world to create an entire branch of the armed forces dedicated to drone warfare. The commander of this new drone branch, Vadym Sukharevsky, has since identified the diversity of country’s drone production as a major asset. As end users, the Ukrainian military is interested in as wide a selection of manufacturers and products as possible. To date, contracts have been signed with more than 125 manufacturers.

The lessons learned from the successful development of Ukraine’s drone manufacturing ecosystem should now be applied to the country’s cybersecurity strategy. “Ukraine has the talent to develop cutting-edge cyber products, but lacks investment. Government support is crucial, as can be seen in the drone industry. Allocating budgets to buy local cybersecurity products will create a thriving market and attract investors. Importing technologies strengthens capabilities but this approach doesn’t build a robust national industry,” commented Oleh Derevianko, co-founder and chairman of Information Systems Security Partners.

The development of Ukraine’s domestic drone capabilities has been so striking because local manufacturers are able to test and refine their products in authentic combat conditions. This allows them to respond on a daily basis to new defensive measures employed by the Russians. The same principle is necessary in cybersecurity. Ukraine regularly faces fresh challenges from Russian cyber forces and hacker groups; the most effective approach would involve developing solutions on-site. Among other things, this would make it possible to conduct immediate tests in genuine wartime conditions, as is done with drones.

At present, Ukraine’s primary cybersecurity funding comes from the Ukrainian defense budget and international donors. These investments would be more effective if one of the conditions was the procurement of some solutions from local Ukrainian companies. Today, only a handful of Ukrainian IT companies supply the Ukrainian authorities with cybersecurity solutions. Increasing this number to at least dozens of companies would create a local industry capable of producing world-class products. As we have seen with the rapid growth of the Ukrainian drone industry, this strategy would likely strengthen Ukraine’s own cyber defenses while also boosting the cybersecurity of the wider Western world.

Anatoly Motkin is president of StrategEast, a non-profit organization with offices in the United States, Ukraine, Georgia, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan dedicated to developing knowledge-driven economies in the Eurasian region.

The results speak for themselves. When the full-scale invasion began, the Russian Black Sea Fleet had seventy four warships, most of which were based at ports in Russian-occupied Crimea. In a little over two years, Ukraine managed to sink or damage around one third of these ships. In the second half of 2023, reports were already emerging of Russian warships being hurriedly moved across the Black Sea from Crimea to the relative safety of Novorossiysk in Russia. By March 2024, the Russian Black Sea Fleet had become “functionally inactive,” according to the British Ministry of Defense.

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Ukraine’s remarkable success in the Battle of the Black Sea has had significant practical implications for the wider war. It has disrupted Russian logistics and hindered the resupply of Russian troops in southern Ukraine, while limiting Russia’s ability to bomb Ukrainian targets from warships armed with cruise missiles. Crucially, it has also enabled Ukraine to break the blockade the country’s Black Sea ports and resume commercial shipping via a new maritime corridor. As a result, Ukrainian agricultural exports are now close to prewar levels, providing Kyiv with a vital economic lifeline.

The Russian reaction to mounting setbacks in the Battle of the Black Sea has also been extremely revealing, and offers valuable lessons for the future conduct of the war. It has often been suggested that a cornered and beaten Vladimir Putin could potentially resort to the most extreme measures, including the use of nuclear weapons. In fact, he has responded to the humiliating defeat of the Black Sea Fleet by quietly ordering his remaining warships to retreat.

This underwhelming response is all the more telling given the symbolic significance of Crimea to the Putin regime. The Russian invasion of Ukraine first began in spring 2014 with the seizure of Crimea, which occupies an almost mystical position in Russian national folklore as the home of the country’s Black Sea Fleet. Throughout the past decade, the occupied Ukrainian peninsula has featured heavily in Kremlin propaganda trumpeting Russia’s return to Great Power status, and has come to symbolize Putin’s personal claim to a place in Russian history.

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Crimea’s elevated status was initially enough to make some of Ukraine’s international partners wary of sanctioning strikes on the occupied peninsula. However, the Ukrainians themselves had no such concerns. Instead, they simply disregarded the Kremlin’s talk of dire consequences and began attacking Russian military targets across Crimea and throughout the Black Sea. More than two years later, these attacks have now become a routine feature of the war and are taken for granted by all sides. Indeed, the Kremlin media plays down attacks on Crimea and largely ignores the frequent sinking of Russian warships, no doubt to save Putin’s blushes.

The Russian Navy’s readiness to retreat from its supposedly sacred home ports in Crimea has made a mockery of Moscow’s so-called red lines and exposed the emptiness of Putin’s nuclear threats. Nevertheless, Kyiv’s international allies remain reluctant to draw the obvious conclusions. Instead, Western support for Ukraine continues to be defined by self-defeating fears of escalation.

For almost two and a half years, Ukraine’s partners have allowed themselves to be intimidated into denying Ukraine certain categories of weapons and restricting attacks inside Russia. This is usually done while piously citing the need to prevent the current conflict from spreading any further. Western policymakers apparently prefer to ignore the overwhelming evidence from the Battle of the Black Sea, which confirms that when confronted by resolute opposition, Putin is far more likely to back down than escalate.

The West’s fear of escalation is Putin’s most effective weapon. It allows him to limit the military aid reaching Kyiv, while also preventing Ukraine from striking back against Russia. This is slowly but surely setting the stage for inevitable Russian victory in a long war of attrition. Western leaders claim to be motivated by a desire to avoid provoking a wider war, but that is exactly what will happen if they continue to pursue misguided policies of escalation management and fail to stop Putin in Ukraine.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

Abstract

US nuclear command, control, and communications (NC3) is a bedrock for nuclear deterrence and the US-led, rules-based international order that it supports. Like the rest of the US nuclear arsenal, NC3 is in the midst of a modernization overhaul. The space-based elements of NC3, however, face different geopolitical, technical, and bureaucratic challenges during this modernization. Geopolitically, the two-nuclear-peer challenge, China’s perception of NC3 and strategic stability, and the prospect of limited nuclear use call into question the sufficiency of existing and next-generation NC3. Technically, Russia and China are developing more sophisticated counterspace weapons, which hold at risk space-based US NC3. Bureaucratically, the US Department of Defense (DOD)’s shift to a proliferated space architecture may not be appropriately prioritizing requirements for systems that are essential for NC3 missions. To address these challenges, space-focused agencies in the DOD need to ensure that nuclear surety is not given short shrift in the future of space systems planning.

Introduction

The NC3 system is one of the most opaque, complex, hardened, least understood, and perhaps least appreciated foundations for nuclear deterrence and strategic stability. While each military service is busy developing and attempting to resource its instantiation of combined joint all domain command and control (CJADC2), NC3 has not yet enjoyed this same focus and attention. As security dynamics and technology developments continue to evolve, the United States must commit appropriate resources and focus to ensure the continuing effectiveness of NC3. In simple terms, NC3 is the protected and assured missile, air, and space warning and communication system enabling the command and control of US nuclear forces that must operate effectively under the most extreme and existentially challenging conditions—employment of nuclear weapons. The 2022 US Nuclear Posture Review explains the five essential functions of NC3: “detection, warning, and attack characterization; adaptive nuclear planning; decision-making conferencing; receiving and executing Presidential orders; and enabling the management and direction of forces.”¹

The NC3 system must never permit the use of nuclear weapons unless specifically authorized by the president, the only use-approval authority (negative control), while always enabling their use in the specific ways the president authorizes (positive control). Risk tolerance for NC3 systems is understandably nonexistent; there can be no uncertainty in the ability of the United States to positively command and control its nuclear forces at any given moment. The DOD and Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration use the term “nuclear surety” to describe their comprehensive programs for the safety, security, and control of nuclear weapons that leave no margin for error. The requirement for nuclear surety is constant, but it is becoming more difficult to deliver because threats to US NC3 systems are increasing, due to geopolitical, technical, and bureaucratic trends and developments.

The geopolitical environment has shifted in significant ways since current US NC3 systems were deployed. The space-based elements of NC3 are now threatened in unprecedented ways, due to Chinese and Russian testing and deployment of a range of counterspace capabilities that can hold space-based NC3 systems at risk. As demonstrated by the current war in Ukraine, even regional conflicts can manifest long-standing questions and concerns about NC3 in a multipolar and increasingly complex global security environment. Layer in China’s quantitative and qualitative rise in strategic nuclear weapons delivery systems and the unwillingness of China’s leadership to have basic discussions about strategic stability, and the 1960s architecture that is the foundation of US NC3 systems seems to be growing increasingly inadequate to deal with the geopolitical challenges of today and tomorrow. The reality is that the current NC3 system and architectures were predicated upon a bipolar nuclear geopolitical situation that no longer exists. Today, a multipolar, globally proliferated, and largely unconstrained nuclear weapons environment requires integrated deterrence across domains, sectors, and alliances.

The E-4B National Airborne Operations Center, which provides travel support for the Secretary of Defense and their staff to ensure command and control connectivity outside of the continental United States. Credit: US Air Force.

While the geopolitical environment has evolved, so too has the technology available to deliver NC3 capabilities. Many of the current NC3 systems were developed decades ago using analog technology but are now being updated to digital interfaces, switches, and underlying network topologies. This transition will enable enhanced capabilities, but it will also open more threat vectors that can be exploited via various cyber means through all segments of the system. As the space-based systems that are part of the NC3 system are being comprehensively upgraded, whether for missile warning (detecting and characterizing a missile), missile tracking, or delivering persistent assured communications, the DOD must work to eliminate exploitable cyber vulnerabilities and maintain distributed end-to-end network and supply chain security.

Additionally, almost all the DOD’s bureaucratic structures that acquired the current NC3 systems have changed, sometimes in radical ways. Primary responsibility for acquisition of important elements of the NC3 system are now divided between several organizations that are not focused on nuclear surety, making it a significant challenge to achieve effective integration and unity of command and effort across this structure. Moreover, the overall architecture for US space systems is transitioning toward a hybrid approach that uses commercial, international, and government systems and capabilities to enhance space mission assurance. The benefits of this hybrid approach seem clear for most mission areas, but it is not necessarily optimal for NC3. The DOD must ensure that nuclear surety remains a foundational and non-negotiable requirement for next-generation NC3 systems and cannot allow this requirement to be out-prioritized by other important considerations or become adrift in new bureaucratic structures.

Given the importance of the capabilities, evolving geopolitical and technical threats, and the diverse units planning modernization of the system, the United States must think carefully about the best ways to acquire the next-generation, and generation-after-next, of space-based NC3 to continue delivering nuclear surety in a new landscape that is characterized by a breathtaking degree and pace of change, troubling factors which seem likely to persist or even accelerate. The 2022 US Nuclear Posture Review reaffirms the US commitment to modernizing NC3 and lays out key challenges:

We will employ an optimized mix of resilience approaches to protect the next-generation NC3 architecture from threats posed by competitor capabilities. This includes, but is not limited to, enhanced protection from cyber, space-based, and electro-magnetic pulse threats; enhanced integrated tactical warning and attack assessment; improved command post and communication links; advanced decision support technology; and integrated planning and operations.”

2022 Nuclear Posture Review.

This paper characterizes the existing NC3 system and focuses on its space-based missions and elements. It describes how orbital dynamics shape space security and examines the emerging geopolitical, technical, and bureaucratic challenges to the extant NC3 system. Finally, it analyzes how ongoing modernization programs are addressing these challenges and offers some recommendations.

What is the NC3 system?

The nature of NC3

Department of the Air Force (DAF) doctrine defines the NC3 system as “the means through which Presidential authority is exercised and operational command control of nuclear operations is conducted. The NC3 system is part of the larger national leadership command capability (NLCC), which encompasses the three broad mission areas of: (1) Presidential and senior leader communications; (2) NC3; (3) and continuity of operations and government communications.”²

The current NC3 architecture is comprised of two separate but interrelated layers. The DOD’s 2020 Nuclear Matters Handbook describes it as follows:

The first layer is the day-to-day architecture which includes a variety of facilities and communications to provide robust command and control over nuclear and supporting government operations. The second layer provides the survivable, secure, and enduring architecture known as the “thin-line.”

Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear Matters, Nuclear Matters Handbook 2020 [Revised], https://www.acq.osd.mil/ncbdp/nm/NMHB2020rev/chapters/chapter2.html.

The thin-line uses several communication technologies and pathways to provide “assured, unbroken, redundant, survivable, secure, and enduring connectivity to and among the President, the Secretary of Defense, the CJCS [Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff], and designated commanders through all threat environments to perform all necessary command and control functions.”³ Assessments of space-based NC3 tend to focus most on the ways these systems support the thin-line; this assured connectivity is an essential foundation, but any comprehensive analysis must also consider the contributions of space systems to broader NC3 functions. Moreover, the highly integrated nature of modern command, control, communications, and battle management (C3BM) systems necessitates the integration of NC3 capabilities into a broader system-of-systems across the C3BM enterprise. For the DAF, this integrated system-of-systems is the DAF Battle Network and includes more than fifty-five programs and $21.5 billion in procurement as part of the broader DOD CJADC2 initiative.⁴

An Upgraded Early Warning Radar (UEWR), a dual-sided ballistic missile early warning radar, at US Space Force’s northernmost base in Greenland. Credit: US Space Force.

To instantiate a survivable communications network, the NC3 system is comprised of terrestrial, airborne, and space-based systems. Satellite terminals like the Family of Advanced Beyond Line-of-Sight Terminals (FAB-T) ensure that the satellite communications, cryptographic keys, and actual control functions of the network are available to the necessary decision-makers during nuclear conflict.⁵ Boeing was the original contractor for the FAB-T program, but a February 2023 report delivered to Congress from Frank Calvelli, the assistant secretary of the Air Force for space acquisition and integration, indicated that FAB-T had fallen more than a decade behind schedule under Boeing and that a new sole-source contract for FAB-T was awarded to Raytheon in 2014.⁶ Allowing FAB-T to fall more than a decade behind schedule is an indication of the DOD’s reduced emphasis on NC3 in the post-Cold War era.

Satellite command post terminals in airborne command centers like the E-4B National Airborne Operations Center and the E-6B Looking Glass Airborne Nuclear Command Post (ABNCP) on the Navy’s Take Charge and Move Out (TACAMO) aircraft ensure that national decision-makers can command and control nuclear forces even if key ground sites and decision-makers come under attack.⁷ TACAMO aircraft can link national decision-makers with “naval ballistic missile forces during times of crisis. The aircraft carries a Very Low Frequency communication system with dual trailing wire antennas” and can also perform the Looking Glass ABNCP mission, which facilitates the launch of US land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles using a robust and survivable airborne launch-control system.⁸

Current NC3 missions and space systems

Space systems provide three capabilities that are essential for the NC3 enterprise: missile warning/missile tracking (MW/MT), assured communications, and nuclear detonation detection. Space-based MW/MT uses infrared sensors to detect missile launches worldwide. This can be the first warning of an attack and, when combined with other attack indications from systems using different phenomenologies, provides high confidence that an actual attack is underway. This warning is essential for initiating other steps that may include moving the president, conferencing with senior leaders, and determining response options. Today, the space-based infrared system (SBIRS) provides MW/MT. SBIRS consists of the space segment of geostationary Earth orbit (GEO) satellites, highly elliptical orbit (HEO) sensors, legacy Defense Support Program (DSP) satellites, and the associated worldwide deployed ground systems. SBIRS satellites were first launched in 2011, and the sixth and final satellite was launched in August 2022.⁹ In 2017, then-Commander US Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) Gen. John Hyten famously described SBIRS satellites as “big, fat, juicy targets,” pledging that USSTRATCOM would no longer support acquisition of such NC3 systems and that “we are going to go down a different path. And we have to go down that path quickly.”¹⁰ The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) (and its predecessor organizations) has, since the 1980s, conducted several experiments and developed prototype capabilities supportive of MW/MT/missile defense and adaptive nuclear planning. MDA’s prior efforts include Delta 180, Midcourse Space Experiment/Space-Based Visible, and Space Tracking and Surveillance System.¹¹

Assured, survivable communications capabilities are essential for the president to conduct conferences with senior leaders and exercise command and control over nuclear forces. Space-basing enhances survivability and enables global communications. The Advanced Extremely High-Frequency (AEHF) system currently provides many communication links for nuclear command and control. AEHF provides “survivable, global, secure, protected, and jam-resistant communications for high-priority military ground, sea and air assets.”¹² AEHF replaced the Cold War-era Milstar system; the first AEHF satellite was launched in 2010, and the sixth and final satellite was launched in March 2020.

A rendition of the Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) System, a space-based communication system. Credit: US Space Force.

A final space capability providing important support to NC3 is data about the location of nuclear detonations worldwide. This information is essential for effective and adaptive planning in a nuclear conflict. The United States Nuclear Detonation Detection System (USNDS) currently provides this capability.¹³ As described by the DOD, “the USNDS is a worldwide system of space-based sensors and ground processing equipment designed to detect, locate, and report nuclear detonations in the earth’s atmosphere and in space. The USNDS space-based segment is hosted on a combination of global positioning system (GPS) satellites, DSP satellites, and other classified satellites.”¹⁴ The enhanced detection capabilities of the Space and Atmospheric Burst Reporting System (SABRS-2) payload were first deployed in 2016.

How the attributes of space and space systems shape space security

Comprehensive analysis about modernizing space-based NC3 cannot be complete without a baseline understanding of the attributes of space and space systems that shape the most appropriate modernization paths and trade-offs. NC3 systems were first moved to space in the 1960s because this domain provides unique speed and positional advantages, persistent emplacement, and a global perspective. These developments were highly effective and efficient, despite the considerable expense of developing reliable space hardware and the great energy required to move a satellite above the atmosphere at the bottom of Earth’s gravity well and to accelerate it so it can sustain the specific orbit for which it was designed. Orbital dynamics, along with the lack of traditional cover and concealment measures available on Earth, means satellites can be more easily detected, tracked, and targeted than terrestrial forces, which are routinely able to maneuver and hide.

Attributes of space launch and orbital dynamics also drive space technology and operations in significant ways. Traditional satellite architectures have been shaped by several factors, including the costs and dangers of space launch (still the most hazardous part of satellite operations), significant limitations on capability to service satellites, perceived economies from custom-building very small numbers of increasingly capable and large satellites, and the ability of just a few of these highly capable satellites to perform a variety of key missions very competently. Due to these factors, several countries, and the United States in particular, in the past chose to develop and operate a very small number of highly expensive, sophisticated, and exquisitely capable satellites. Each of these attributes adds to the vulnerability of legacy satellite architectures and exacerbates temptations for enemies to negate them because these orbital assets are so fragile, so few, increasingly important, operate in highly predictable ways, and cannot today be repaired, refueled, or upgraded on orbit.

Another important defining characteristic of most space systems is that they are dual use, meaning that they can be used for both civilian and military applications. This dual-use characteristic has been inherent since the earliest days of space technology development and is highlighted by a description of Wernher von Braun (the leading space technology pioneer) as a “dreamer of space, engineer of war.”¹⁵ The hybrid space architecture under development by the United States is an integrated system of both government (civil, national security, intelligence) and commercial (industry) elements that is also inherently dual use, particularly when the government procures commercial goods and services. This architecture can also be extended to international and institutional (interagency, academia) allies, coalition members, and partners. Dual-use considerations sometimes create difficult balancing and trade-off issues, as the United States and other countries attempt to promote space technologies and activities considered to be benign, while limiting similar capabilities or actions that may be threatening or destabilizing.

An implication of the dual-use nature of space systems is that any satellite that can transmit or maneuver could be sent toward a potential collision (known as a conjunction) with a nearby satellite or used to jam satellite transmissions, making it a simple anti-satellite (ASAT) weapon. Such use is not likely to be as effective as a purpose-built ASAT weapon, but increasing development of in-orbit servicing, assembly, and manufacturing (ISAM) and active debris removal (ADR) capabilities may blur and complicate distinctions between commercial, civil, and military applications and operations. Similarities between ASAT systems and some of the technologies and operations of ISAM and ADR systems are so great that analysts worry that widespread development of these beneficial commercial and civil capabilities would also create significant but latent ASAT potential.¹⁶ The dual-use characteristic of satellites or spacecraft is perhaps the single largest factor that complicates space security considerations, making it more difficult for analysts to determine ways to incentivize desired applications, constrain malign potential, and consider how these factors shape space superiority.

Dedicated or dual-use capabilities can strengthen capability, capacity, resilience, and security, but security is an ambiguous and relative concept. Analysts use the term “security dilemma” to describe the relative and interactive aspects of security and study them as a cause of war and one of the central problems of international relations.¹⁷ The characteristics of space and satellites exacerbate some of these issues and make their relative contributions to security more ambiguous and elusive. Accordingly, modernizing space-based NC3 in the context of these technical and political issues is a complex endeavor that may promote or inhibit cooperation under the security dilemma.¹⁸

On this subject, strategist Brad Townsend builds from earlier analysis and applies it directly to space, finding that the current space security situation is less dire than some originally predicted.¹⁹ CSO Saltzman acknowledges that the security dilemma is a concern but notes that weapons are not inherently offensive or defensive: “Weapons are just weapons. And the operations that you choose to undertake with those weapons makes them more offensive or defensive.”²⁰ As described in a 2023 New York Times Magazine profile of the US Space Force:

The important question, as [General Saltzman] saw it, was this: At what point does a buildup of defensive weapons in space constitute an ability to conduct offensive operations so that someone else feels threatened? “There is a balance here,” he said. “And this is about stability management. What actions can we take to protect ourselves before we start to cross the line and maybe create a security dilemma?” The line, he suggested—harder to find in space, no doubt, and at this point not clearly defined—had not yet been crossed.

Gertner, “What Does the US Space Force Actually Do?” Interior quotes are from General Saltzman.

A final attribute of space capabilities is rapidly evolving due to the burgeoning commercial space sector: the value of commercial space systems in supporting a wide range of military operations. These contributions have grown exponentially, as illustrated by the stunning successes of the Ukrainians in defending their country following the Russian invasion.²¹ Commercial space capabilities provide critical information that strengthens worldwide support for Ukraine, supply communications connectivity that is essential for coordinating many Ukrainian military operations, and demonstrate that states do not necessarily need to own and operate space systems to use them effectively.

US Vice President Kamala Harris announces a new US pledge to not destructively test direct-ascent anti-satellite weapons during a visit to Vandenberg Space Force Base in April 2022. US Space Force photo by Michael Peterson.

These characteristics of space and space systems are driving the United States toward a wholesale reorientation of its national security space enterprise that is focused on improving resilience and advancing better transparency- and confidence-building measures (TCBMs) for space governance. The current enterprise-wide modernization and recapitalization of government space systems provides resilient, robust, and responsive solutions, seeking to take advantage of new capabilities and technologies through approaches including highly proliferated constellations in multiple orbits; in-plane and multi-orbit, multi-node cross-links; and shorter development and deployment cycles. Helpful TCBM steps include the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space’s promulgation of twenty-one guidelines for the long-term sustainability of space activities, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s declaration that space is a fifth operational domain where attacks could invoke Article 5 defense obligations,the DOD’s tenets of responsible space behavior in space, and the pledge by the United States that it will no longer conduct destructive direct-ascent (DA)-ASAT tests that has now been joined by several other countries and adopted by the United Nations General Assembly.²² These steps and others seem to be generating momentum toward greater consensus and more specifics on what constitutes responsible behavior in space, which will facilitate the “naming and shaming” of parties that do not act in responsible ways. Nonetheless, these efforts also highlight just how far the space governance regime is from governance regimes in other domains that include much more specific obligations and robust verification mechanisms, rather than voluntary guidelines and pledges.

Geopolitical challenges to the current NC3 system

Two elements of the changing international security environment pose a challenge to the current NC3 system beyond what it was designed to face—principally, the nature and number of nuclear-armed countries which the United States seeks to deter using its nuclear arsenal and the increasing risk of limited nuclear use. The People’s Republic of China (PRC), the “pacing challenge” for the DOD, is currently engaged in a significant nuclear breakout. This has two key consequences for NC3. First, the increased focus on, and risk of nuclear conflict with, China raises the salience of Beijing’s possible lack of understanding of or appreciation for the principle of noninterference with space-based NC3 that Washington and Moscow arrived at during the Cold War. The second challenge posed by China’s nuclear breakout is the so-called two-nuclear-peer problem.²³ The United States may need to deter or, if deterrence fails, restore deterrence against two nuclear peers which may aggress against the United States or its allies in coordination, in sequence, or in overlapping timeframes. This development may raise the requirements for survivable NC3. Finally, US government documents evince a growing concern that Russia and China may be lowering the threshold for limited nuclear use to achieve their aims in a conflict with the United States or its allies, potentially requiring a graduated US nuclear response. These developments create a challenging environment for effective NC3 operations.

The NC3 system is arguably the most important communication system that the US maintains and is the bedrock of nuclear deterrence. As such, deliberate degradation or destruction of these capabilities is a “red line” (meaning an unacceptable action that could trigger a nuclear war) for senior US decision-makers. Disruption, degradation, or denial of NC3 capabilities could have strategically destabilizing effects for the United States, as well as the allies that depend on US extended deterrence commitments to ensure their security. Japan, the Republic of Korea, and NATO allies all tangibly benefit from US extended strategic deterrence commitments that are predicated on assured NC3; confidence in US extended deterrence commitments is undermined if states question whether NC3 will always work as needed.

The first key development in the international security environment posing challenges to NC3 is the changing nature and number of nuclear-armed states which the United States seeks to deter using its nuclear arsenal. China’s growing importance as a nuclear competitor presents a challenge to space-based NC3 because Washington and Beijing do not have a mutual understanding of red lines surrounding NC3 assets that is comparable to the understanding Washington developed with Moscow during the Cold War. The current NC3 system evolved based on important assumptions about strategic nuclear bipolarity between two superpowers with a shared understanding about red lines and at least a nominal commitment to reducing the risk of strategic miscalculation in decisions about using nuclear weapons.

China presents strategic challenges that cannot be met with the approaches used for Russia. The United States and China do not maintain regular strategic security dialogues designed to reach shared understanding about critical issues, such as red lines on disrupting NC3. Whereas Russia and the United States generally agree that degrading, denying, disrupting, or destroying systems associated with NC3 is destabilizing and potentially a precursor to nuclear exchange, there is no such understanding with China, and Chinese leaders may even see value in such uncertainty.²⁴ Additionally, China has chosen to remain outside of strategic arms control treaties and dialogues, ostensibly because it fails to see a strategic benefit to being bound to the terms of such agreements and is unwilling to submit to a stringent verification regime. Instead, China has been pursuing rapid quantitative and qualitative growth in its entire nuclear force structure and C3BM systems, while also concurrently developing and fielding counterspace and cyber weapons that could be employed against US space-based NC3 systems. Specifically, China’s first deployment of its own ballistic missile early warning satellites and putative move toward a nuclear launch-on-warning posture could be quite destabilizing.

The DF-41 land-mobile missile on parade. The DF-41 is one of China’s most advanced intercontinental ballistic missiles and a significant component of its nuclear breakout. Credit: Chinese People’s Liberation Army.

With China’s rapid nuclear modernization, the United States faces a possible two-nuclear-peer problem of deterring simultaneous, sequential, or overlapping aggression from both China and Russia. China has achieved a strategic breakout with its rapid expansion in scope, scale, and capabilities for strategic nuclear weapons, including their own nuclear triad in development and operations. China is expected to field a nuclear arsenal of at least one thousand deliverable warheads by 2030, a number which may continue to grow, and presents considerable challenges for effective NC3 in various two-nuclear-peer conflict scenarios.²⁵

An additional geopolitical challenge to NC3 is the increased likelihood of limited nuclear use by Russia or China. Limited nuclear use—that is, nuclear employment less than a full exchange against strategic targets in either party’s homeland—poses challenges to NC3 because NC3 elements may need to survive several limited exchanges while maintaining the ability to characterize attacks in detail to enable the National Command Authority to order responses that convey clear messages of resolve and restraint in a graduated manner. Recent world events and US government analysis demonstrates concern that both Russia and China are considering limited nuclear use strategies. President Vladimir Putin’s Russia has backslid toward destabilizing activity in which the employment of “tactical nuclear weapons” has been contemplated to an unprecedented extent. As reported by the BBC, “In February 2022, shortly before invading Ukraine, President Putin placed Russia’s nuclear forces at ‘special combat readiness’ and held high-profile nuclear drills.”²⁶ As the conflict in Ukraine continued, Putin made this statement: “If the territorial integrity of our country is threatened, we will, without a doubt, use all available means to protect Russia and our people. This is not a bluff.”²⁷ Even before the Russian re-invasion of Ukraine, scholars and analysts had grown concerned that Russia would consider using nuclear weapons in a limited way in Europe.²⁸

As will be described in more detail in the following section, the problem of limited nuclear use is particularly nettlesome when considering that the nuclear taboo since Nagasaki may be weakening. Uncertainty caused by the latest round of threatening rhetoric and dynamic saber-rattling over Ukraine clearly reemphasizes the need for a robust, assured NC3 system that can operate through all contemplated nuclear scenarios, including nuclear detonations in space and regional nuclear exchanges. These kinds of unprecedented scenarios highlight tangible architectural threats to the system as it currently exists, even with the strategic competitor with whom the United States has the most historical basis for reducing miscalculation.

Nuclear dynamics have moved far beyond the nuclear bipolarity of the Cold War; today’s world is robustly multipolar with the peer competitors or peer adversaries of the United States having an “unlimited partnership” that is further complicated by their alliances and relationships with other emerging nuclear powers. The NC3 architecture as designed in the 1960s surely did not contemplate India, Pakistan, North Korea, and others potentially using nuclear weapons which the United States would need to be able to detect, characterize, respond to, and operate through. The physical architecture, data throughput capacity links, and even geographic and temporal constraints of the NC3 system all require upgrading and expansion to address today’s far more complex and challenging geopolitical environment.

Counterspace threats to space-based NC3

Accelerating development, testing, and deployment of a range of Chinese and Russian counterspace capabilities significantly challenges the ability of space-based NC3 to continue delivering nuclear surety. Other states, including Iran and North Korea, also possess some limited counterspace capabilities, but these capabilities are considerably less worrisome than those of China and Russia and are not the focus of this paper.

The DOD recognizes significant threats to its space systems from Russia and China, including to space-based NC3. As one of the authors has argued:

By describing space as a warfighting domain, the 2018 National Defense Strategy marked a fundamental shift away from legacy perspectives on uncontested military space operations and aspirations for free access and peaceful purposes espoused in the Outer Space Treaty. America’s potential adversaries, particularly China and Russia, now view space—from launch, to on-orbit, the up- and downlinks, and the ground stations—as a weak link in US warfighting capabilities. Conversely, the United States for generations believed space to be a permissive environment and did not make major investments in defensive capabilities, even as almost all modern military operations became increasingly reliant on space capabilities. These facts, coupled with the reemergence of great power competition, have led adversaries to believe that by denying US space-enabled capabilities, they can gain strategic advantage over US response options—making those options less assured, less opportune, and less decisive.”

Peter L. Hays, “Is This the Space Force You’re Looking For? Opportunities and Challenges for the US Space Force,” in Benjamin Bahney, ed., Space Strategy at a Crossroads: Opportunities and Challenges for 21st Century Competition, Center for Global Security Research, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, May 2020, 20. The following five paragraphs draw substantially from Hays’ chapter cited here.

Most disturbingly, US adversaries, particularly China with its lack of interest in strategic arms control and seeming disregard for traditional norms surrounding stability and deterrence, may now perceive that undermining the efficacy of space-based NC3 may be one of its most attractive options for gaining strategic advantage. These are destabilizing conditions in that:

Adversaries may believe they can deter US entry into a conflict by threatening or attacking US space capabilities. This may even embolden adversaries to employ a space attack as a “first salvo” in anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) strategies. This is a potentially dangerous situation that has moved past an inflection point and is starting to create strategic disadvantages rather than the strategic advantages space traditionally provided the United States. From a Clausewitzian perspective, the Space Force must also consider whether current US space strategy may be approaching a culminating point where it becomes counterproductive to continue either offensive or defensive space operations in wartime [unless it has deployed a far more resilient architecture].

Hays, “Is This the Space Force You’re Looking For?,” 20. Internal citations omitted.

China has reformed its military and developed significant capabilities to hold at risk US space assets. As part of its 2015 military reforms, China established the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Strategic Support Force (SSF).²⁹ The SSF combines space and counterspace capabilities, electronic warfare, and cyber operations in one organization and enables the PLA to be more effective in its approach to space as a warfighting domain. “The PLA views space superiority, the ability to control the space-enabled information sphere and to deny adversaries their own space-based information gathering and communication capabilities, as critical components to conduct modern ‘informatized warfare.’”³⁰ In the words of a recent DOD report to Congress on protection of satellites:

The PRC views counterspace systems as a means to deter and counter outside intervention during a regional conflict. The PLA is developing, testing, and fielding capabilities intended to target US and allied satellites, including electronic warfare to suppress or deceive enemy equipment, ground-based laser systems that can disrupt, degrade, and damage satellite sensors, offensive cyberwarfare capabilities, and direct-ascent anti-satellite (DA-ASAT) missiles that can target satellites in low Earth orbit (LEO). The PRC has launched multiple experimental satellites to research space maintenance and debris cleanup with advanced capabilities, such as robotic arm technologies that could be used for grappling other satellites. In 2022, the PRC’s Shijian-21 satellite moved a derelict satellite to a graveyard orbit above geosynchronous Earth orbit (GEO).”

US Department of Defense, “Space Policy Review and Strategy on Protection of Satellites,” September 2023, 2-3, https://media.defense.gov/2023/Sep/14/2003301146/-1/-1/0/COMPREHENSIVE-REPORT-FOR-RELEASE.pdf.

The Shijian-21 demonstration was particularly threatening to US space-based NC3, as it indicated a potential capability to grapple and move or disable noncooperative satellites; many of the most important US NC3 systems are in GEO.

The PRC continues to seek new methods to hold US satellites at risk, probably intending to pursue DA-ASAT weapons capable of destroying satellites up to GEO. As the PRC has developed and fielded these counterspace weapons, it has simultaneously promoted false claims that it will not place weapons in space and, along with Russia, has proposed at the United Nations a draft of a flawed, legally-binding treaty on the nonweaponization of space that is inherently unverifiable and unenforceable.”

“Space Policy Review and Strategy on Protection of Satellites,” 3.

For decades, Russia has developed doctrine and pursued capabilities to target US satellites, including NC3 systems.

Russia reorganized its military in 2015 to create a separate space force because Russia sees achieving supremacy in space as a decisive factor in winning conflicts. Although Russia has a smaller fleet of satellites than China, Russia operates some of the world’s most capable individual ISR [intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance] satellites for optical imagery, radar imagery, signals intelligence, and missile warning. Russia increasingly integrates space services into its military, though it wants to avoid becoming overly dependent on space for its national defense missions because it views that as a potential vulnerability. Russia is developing, testing, and fielding a suite of reversible and irreversible counterspace systems to degrade or deny US space-based services as a means of offsetting a perceived US military advantage and deterring the United States from entering a regional conflict. These systems include jamming and cyberspace capabilities, directed energy weapons, on-orbit capabilities, and ground-based DA-ASAT missile capabilities. In November 2021, Russia tested a DA-ASAT missile against a defunct Russian satellite, which created more than 1,500 pieces of trackable space debris and tens of thousands of pieces of potentially lethal but non-trackable debris. The resulting debris continues to threaten spacecraft of all nations in LEO, astronauts and cosmonauts on the International Space Station, and taikonauts on China’s Tiangong space station.”

“Space Policy Review and Strategy on Protection of Satellites,” 3. Internal citations omitted.

Launch preparations for the Russian Nudol system, which serves as both an anti-ballistic missile interceptor as well as an anti-satellite weapon, 2021. Russian Ministry of Defense

In a most disturbing scenario, the efficacy of commercial LEO satellites in supporting Ukraine could lead the Russians (or the Chinese in a Taiwan invasion, for instance) to assess that the greatest military effectiveness from the limited use of nuclear weapons would be to detonate just one in LEO. A high-altitude nuclear detonation (HAND) would raise the peak radiation flux in parts of the Van Allen radiation belts by three to four orders of magnitude, cause the failure in weeks to months of most if not all LEO satellites not specifically hardened against this threat, result in direct financial damages probably approaching $500 billion and over $3 trillion in overall economic impact, and present daunting response challenges, since the attack would be outside of any state’s sovereign territory and not directly kill anyone.³¹

Modernization plans for space-based NC3

While the NC3 system currently appears to be sufficiently redundant, capable, and secure, it must be modernized to keep pace with the evolving geopolitical environment, technical developments, and planned modernization of the nuclear triad (submarines, bombers, and land-based missiles). As described by the DOD’s Nuclear Matters Handbook:

In July 2018, the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff formally appointed the USSTRATCOM Commander to be “the NC3 enterprise lead, with increased responsibilities for operations, requirements, and systems engineering and integration.” USSTRATCOM has created an NC3 Enterprise Center inside the command’s headquarters at Offutt Air Force Base, Nebraska. On November 5, 2018, Commander, USSTRATCOM stated, “It is imperative that the US government modernize its three-decade-old NC3 in a manner that accounts for current and future threats to its functionality and vulnerabilities.” The NC3 Enterprise Center is developing and evaluating NC3 architectures and approaches for modernization.”

Nuclear Matters Handbook 2020, 28.

In earlier congressional testimony, General Hyten had simply stated that “nuclear command and control and communications, NC3, is my biggest concern when I look out towards the future.”³²

US Navy VADM David Kriete, then-deputy commander of US Strategic Command, announced the initial operational capability of the Nuclear Command, Control, and Communications Enterprise Center in April 2019. USSTRATCOM photo.

No nuclear weapon delivery platform can execute its mission without NC3, but the NC3 system is so complex that a former commander of USSTRATCOM stated it includes over 204 individual systems.³³ While many space systems contribute ISR data that supports NC3, this analysis focuses just on the space systems that were designed for and dedicated to supporting NC3. Focusing on space systems in this way is, however, becoming increasingly difficult, as the DOD works to modernize both its overall space architecture and space-based NC3. Modernizing the ground- and air-based NC3 systems supporting the triad remains on a relatively straightforward path, but the path toward modernizing space-based NC3 is being reconsidered within the context of broader changes to deploy a more resilient hybrid space architecture overall. This requires consideration of different factors and trade-offs than those that shaped legacy US space-based NC3. Defense planners must now consider the value of disaggregated, diversified, and distributed systems supporting just NC3 versus entangled systems supporting many mission areas; the role of proliferation and protection; the proper timing and phasing of deployments; appropriate ways commercial systems and deception might support space-based NC3; and the many challenges associated with balancing and integrating across an increasingly complex NC3 enterprise. A recent detailed analysis of these complex factors and trade-offs from Wilson and Rumbaugh presented the troubling finding that “the US decision to disaggregate its nuclear-conventional satellite communications capabilities poses strategic consequences, but it may not have been a strategic decision.”³⁴ An even more detailed report analyzing just the sensor requirements and trade-offs for missile defense against hypersonic threats is over one hundred pages long.³⁵ As the DOD’s work to field a resilient, hybrid space architecture proceeds apace, it is not always clear that the requirement for nuclear surety in space-based NC3 has been analyzed and weighted appropriately.

The DOD has major programs and plans in place to modernize systems supporting the NC3 missions of assured communications and MW/MT. For assured communications, the plan is to augment and eventually replace AEHF with the Evolved Strategic Satcom (ESS) program by the 2030s.³⁶ ESS will operate in GEO and will provide a worldwide and Arctic protected, secure, and survivable satellite communications system supporting critical networks for strategic operations. The ESS system is being acquired by Space Systems Command (SSC); it “is the first DOD hybrid space program that is leveraging alternate acquisition pathways for each of its segments” under the adaptive acquisition framework that the DOD implemented in 2020.³⁷ ESS satellites are currently being acquired using a middle-tier acquisition (MTA) down-select rapid prototyping competition between Boeing and Northrop Grumman. SSC is expected to issue a request for proposals on ESS satellites in 2024, and the program is projected to cost about $8 billion.³⁸ In May 2024, SSC announced it is seeking proposals for the development and production of four ESS satellites through a competitive contract award; the program is projected to cost about $8 billion.³⁹ The ESS Program Office plans to transition from the MTA-rapid prototyping pathway to a tailored major capability acquisition (MCA) pathway beginning with the award of the ESS space segment production contract. The space segment is being designed to deliver an integrated system capability that is resilient, flexible, cyber secure, and utilizes a modular open system architecture to support NC3. The ground “segment is leveraging a series of Software Acquisition Pathway contracts for subsets of mission capability in agile software sprints”; in May 2023, Lockheed Martin and Raytheon each won $30 million contracts to develop prototypes of the ground system for ESS.⁴⁰ Use of alternate acquisition pathways and competing teams of contractors is designed to spur innovation and speed, “allowing development to stay ahead of changing strategic need.”⁴¹ The first prototype payloads are due to launch in 2024. Much depends on validating the performance of the prototypes and successful integration of the separate acquisition pathways for the space and ground segments.

Specific details regarding how MW/MT capabilities will be improved are complex and evolving. Efforts are now divided between three separate organizations: SSC, the Space Development Agency (SDA), and the MDA. MW/MT is “the first capability area to be redeveloped through a resilient-by-design approach.”⁴² As advocated by General Hyten and explained in a report to Congress: “This effort assessed architectures designed to meet future warfighting performance needs, establish resilience against modern military threats, and ensure cost parameters, resulting in recommendations on numbers of satellites and diversifying capabilities across orbital regimes.”⁴³ Using a Combined Program Office construct, SSC, SDA, and MDA are teaming to develop and implement a system-of-systems integration strategy for MW/MT and missile defense (MD) constellations of satellites in LEO, GEO, medium Earth orbit (MEO), and polar orbital regimes.

These efforts to develop next-generation overhead persistent infrared (NG-OPIR) capabilities are designed to provide MW/MT capabilities that can support MD for evolving intercontinental and theater ballistic missile threats using satellites in various orbits that are more survivable against emerging threats. “SSC’s Resilient MW/MT-MEO space and ground efforts pivot the Department of the Air Force’s legacy missile warning force design to a more resilient multi-orbit approach to counter advanced missiles, hypersonic glide vehicles, and fractional orbital bombardment threats.”⁴⁴ SCC’s NG-OPIR will be deployed in GEO (Next Generation OPIR GEO or NGG) and Polar (Next Generation OPIR Polar or NGP) orbits.⁴⁵ The original plan called for three NGG satellites and two NGP satellites; in its fiscal year 2024 request, the USSF cut the number of NGG satellites to two, and Congress has subsequently requested more information about the analysis underlying this change to the NGG program structure.⁴⁶ Lockheed Martin was awarded the contract to build NGG satellites and ground systems projected to cost $7.8 billion, and Northrop Grumman won a $1.9 billion definitized contract to build two NGP satellites; the first NGP is to be launched in 2028.⁴⁷ Both the NGG and NGP programs are expected to transition from the rapid prototype MTA pathway to the MCA pathway in early 2024. Additionally, SSC announced that, in November 2023, it “completed the critical design review for six [MW/MT/MD] satellites built by Millennium Space Systems that will go in MEO, clearing the way to start production ahead of a first scheduled launch by late 2026.”

The SDA, an independent space acquisition organization that was established in March 2019 and became part of the Space Force in October 2022, is leading parts of the effort to field resilient-by-design MW/MT capabilities via new proliferated space architectures. SDA’s business model values speed, simplicity, and resilience, while lowering costs by “harnessing commercial development to achieve a proliferated architecture and enhance resilience”; SDA plans to deliver a new layer (or tranche) of LEO satellites to support various missions every two years.⁴⁸ The first satellites in the Tranche 1 Tracking Layer are to begin launching in late 2024 and will include “28 satellites in Low Earth Orbit (LEO) optimized for use by Indo-Pacific Command to monitor Chinese and North Korean missile launches.”⁴⁹ In September 2023, SDA issued a solicitation for the Tranche 2 Tracking Layer that will provide MW/MT capabilities by using infrared sensors for near-global continuous stereoscopic coverage and incorporating missile defense fire-control-quality infrared sensors on a selected number of satellites.⁵⁰ The Tranche 2 Tracking Layer is being designed to have some capabilities against advanced missile threats, including hypersonic missile systems, and is scheduled for first launch in April 2027.

MDA’s current MW/MT/missile defense (MW/MT/MD) program is the HBTSS (Hypersonic and Ballistic Tracking Space Sensor), an experimental early warning mission to “demonstrate the sensitivity and fire-control quality of service necessary to support both the emerging hypersonic threat kill chain and dim upper stage ballistic missiles.”⁵¹ Two HBTSS satellites were launched on February 14, 2024; the system is intended to work with SDA’s Tracking Layer, track dim targets not visible with current sensors, and provide near-global coverage. A DOD press release about the HBTSS launch indicated:

MDA, the US Space Force and SDA are collaborating to develop HBTSS as a space sensor prototype demonstration providing fire-control quality data required to defeat advanced missile threats. Ultimately, this data is critical to enabling engagement by missile defense weapons, including engagement of hypersonic glide-phase weapons. This “birth-to-death” tracking by HBTSS will make it possible to maintain custody of missile threats from launch through intercept regardless of location.”

“MDA, SDA Announce Upcoming Launch of the Hypersonic and Ballistic Tracking Space Sensor and Tranche 0 Satellites,” DOD Press Release, February 14, 2024, https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/3676902/mda-sda-announce-upcoming-launch-of-the-hypersonic-and-ballistic-tracking-space/.

It is laudable that the DOD is moving in innovative ways so quickly and comprehensively to field MW/MT/MD capabilities designed to be more resilient and address evolving missile threats. However, it is not clear from unclassified sources how the various significantly different approaches will meet stringent nuclear surety requirements for MW/MT. Operationally, the new approach will require the USSF to transition from its decades of experience in interpreting high-fidelity infrared data from a few exquisite sensors toward developing improved understanding of new missile threats based on lower fidelity inputs from many more sensors. Effectively integrating across these proliferated sensors acquired by separate agencies to produce an MD “kill chain”⁵² is likely to be an even more significant challenge that will require focused attention and resources. In the words of one missile defense scholar:

It remains unclear, however, how many HBTSS or HBTSS-derived payloads will eventually be fitted to SDA’s Tracking Layer constellation. While MDA requested $68 million for the program in FY 2023, funding is expected to decline after demonstration activities conclude and responsibility for fire control transfers to SSC and SDA. Following this transition, SDA aims to launch four HBTSS-derived sensor payloads as part of its Tranche 1 activities and an additional six fire control sensors in Tranche 2. Further developmental spirals, the priority accorded to the hypersonic defense mission, and SDA’s responsibilities for supporting missile defense, however, have not yet been publicly defined.”

Dahlgren, Getting on Track, 73. Internal citations omitted.

It is difficult to manage acquisition programs to meet requirements for cost, schedule, and performance. Unfortunately, however, it can be far more difficult to integrate effectively across separate systems to achieve required performance for an enterprise such as NC3. Tensions can arise between acquisition and integration objectives, which are made more acute when separate systems are acquired by separate organizations (as is the case for space-based NC3), and present daunting challenges for achieving nuclear surety.

Hypersonic and Ballistic Tracking Space Sensor (HBTSS). Image courtesy US Missile Defense Agency.

Much of the work to integrate various MW/MT/MD efforts will be performed by the ground segment. The largest ground system effort is the USSF’s Future Operationally Resilient Ground Evolution (FORGE), a complex program to develop a new ground system for NG-OPIR that is projected to cost $2.4 billion.⁵³ SSC has divided the FORGE program into various thrusts that include FORGE command and control, Next-Gen Interim Operations, FORGE Mission Data Processing Application Framework, Relay Ground Stations, and E-FORGE. Integration across these various thrusts within FORGE to advance unity of effort and meet nuclear surety requirements will be a significant challenge. An additional challenge relates to Assistant Secretary Calvelli’s space acquisition tenet that calls for delivery of the ground segment before launch of the space segment, a goal that may be difficult for FORGE to meet.⁵⁴

There are modest programs to modernize elements of the USNDS.⁵⁵ It should be noted that, as a hosted payload, USNDS does not always enjoy a high priority, and the schedule for its fielding can slip, depending on the priority of its host satellite. Additionally, a former commander of USSTRATCOM has raised concerns about the ability of USNDS data to support NC3 in timely and effective ways.⁵⁶ Overall, even while modernization efforts are underway, the geopolitical and technical challenges to the system are increasing and will require generation-after-next space-based NC3.

Conclusion and recommendations

The modernization of space-based NC3 is of vital importance to US national security objectives. While maintaining constant responsibility for enabling the employment of the world’s most capable nuclear arsenal, NC3 must be modernized to meet the significant changes and challenges presented by the evolving geopolitical and technical environment. Adding to the complexity of this modernization effort is an evolution in national security space architectures and their relationship with commercial providers of dual-use space services. The DOD must maintain a focused and sustained commitment as well as adequate resources to meet the range of daunting challenges that are entailed in modernizing space-based NC3.

As the DOD instantiates CJADC2 programs that are working to integrate sensors and shooters on complex kill webs, the modernization of NC3 systems must continue to meet unique requirements for positive and negative control unlike any other command-and-control system. The recognition of these unique requirements drives special emphasis on understanding deterrence scenarios and objectives, technical capabilities, and potential commercial contributions.

Based on the preceding analysis, this paper presents the following recommendations:

The United States should continue to support the modernization of space-based NC3, with specific tailoring that enables adapting to changes in the geopolitical threat environment, harnessing hybrid architectures and the evolution of national security space architectures, and meeting deterrence objectives across a range of increasingly challenging potential scenarios.
1. Modernization efforts for space-based NC3 systems must adhere to the strict need for nuclear surety at all times, while also exploring areas where technological innovation should be embraced.
2. LEO satellites supporting NC3 should be hardened against residual radiation effects following a HAND to strengthen deterrence against this type of attack.
3. More study on the specific deterrence scenarios and objectives for space-based NC3 systems is needed. The variance in scenarios, objectives, and threats (nonkinetic and kinetic) should drive modernization priorities.
4. More study is needed on the nuclear surety implications for the current exploration of disaggregation as a means to ensure resiliency.
As one of the authors has argued previously, “A whole-of government approach is then needed to assess the commercial viability [and military utility] of those [space-based] services upon which the US government intends to rely, either wholly or in part, and the government must act to improve the commercial viability of these services.”⁵⁷
1. The government should act to improve the commercial viability of the services deemed necessary through flexible contracting mechanisms and/or procurement.
2. The DOD should maintain unity of effort for space-based NC3 acquisitions regardless of whether the specific effector or system is ground-, air-, or sea-based.
3. The United States should continue supporting and advancing international approaches to strengthen deterrence of attacks on commercial space capabilities and improve protection measures for these systems.
The DOD should recognize the significant challenges and potential incompatibilities it faces in rapidly and simultaneously developing modernized space-based NC3 and fielding an overall hybrid space architecture that is far more resilient.
1. Integrating systems developed by separate organizations with sometimes divergent priorities into a unified NC3 system-of-systems that meets nuclear surety requirements is a novel challenge for space-based NC3 and will require focused attention to overcome. Additionally, NC3 and CJADC2 systems-of-systems must be distinct, but also integrated for national unity of command and effort.
2. Acquisition approaches that emphasize speed, use of commercial-off-the-shelf components, and fielding of ground systems before satellite launch are highly appropriate for deploying a resilient hybrid space architecture but may present dangerous incompatibilities with nuclear surety requirements. The DOD must not rush to deploy space-based NC3 that is not well integrated, suffers from avoidable supply chain and cybersecurity vulnerabilities, and contains other weaknesses that hackers and adversaries can exploit during the decades the next generation of space-based NC3 is likely to be in operation.

About the authors

Peter L. Hays is an adjunct professor of space policy and international affairs at George Washington University’s Space Policy Institute, space chair at Marine Corps University, and a senior policy adviser with Falcon Research. He supports the space staff in the Pentagon and has been directly involved in helping to develop and implement major national security space policy and strategy initiatives since 2004. Dr. Hays serves on the Center for Strategic and International Studies Missile Defense Project advisory board, was a term member of the World Economic Forum’s Global Agenda Council on Space Security from 2010 to 2014, and is a member of the editorial board for Space and Defense and Astropolitics. He earned a PhD from the Fletcher School at Tufts University and was an honor graduate of the USAF Academy. Dr. Hays served as an Air Force officer from 1979 to 2004; transported nuclear weapons worldwide as a C-141 pilot; and previously taught international relations, defense policy, and space policy courses at the USAF Academy, School of Advanced Airpower Studies, and National Defense University.

Sarah Mineiro is the founder and CEO of Tanagra Enterprises, a defense, intelligence, space, science, and technology consulting firm. Over her career, Sarah has worked in venture capital-backed private industry and in the executive and legislative branches of government. Previously, she was the senior director of space strategy for Anduril Industries. Sarah was the staff lead for the Strategic Forces Subcommittee for the House Armed Service Committee, where she led the subcommittee’s activities of all Department of Defense and Military Intelligence Program space programs, US nuclear weapons, missile defense, directed energy, and hypersonic systems. Sarah was the senior legislative adviser to Chairman Mac Thornberry. In this role, she was the primary drafter and negotiator of the Space Force and Space Command legislation for the House Republicans.

The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors alone and do not represent the official position of any US government organization.

Acknowledgements

The authors would like to acknowledge Robert Soofer and Mark J. Massa for their comments on earlier drafts of this paper.

The Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security’s work on nuclear and strategic forces has been made possible by support from our partners, including Los Alamos National Laboratory, Northrop Grumman Corporation, the Norwegian Ministry of Defense, the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, the United States Department of Defense, the United States Department of Energy, the United States Department of State, as well as general support to the Scowcroft Center. The partners are not responsible for the content of this report, and the Scowcroft Center maintains a strict intellectual independence policy.

1 Department of Defense, “2022 Nuclear Posture Review,” October 2022, https://media.defense.gov/2022/Oct/27/2003103845/-1/-1/1/2022-NATIONAL-DEFENSE-STRATEGY-NPR-MDR.pdf, 22.

2 Air Force Doctrine Publication 3-72, “Nuclear Operations,” LeMay Center, December 18, 2020, https://www.doctrine.af.mil/Portals/61/documents/AFDP_3-72/3-72-AFDP-NUCLEAR-OPS.pdf, 17.

3 Nuclear Matters Handbook 2020.

4 Information provided by Maj. Gen. John Olsen, PhD, Space Force operations lead for CJADC2 and C3BM. For the past three years, General Olsen has served as the lead airborne emergency action officer and an instructor/evaluator on the Looking Glass Airborne Nuclear Command Post.

5 In “Air Force Awards Raytheon $625 Million Contract for Nuclear-Hardened Satcom Terminals,” Sandra Erwin indicates the US Air Force Nuclear Weapons Center awarded this contract to deliver an unspecified number of nuclear-hardened satellite communications force element terminals to connect B-52 and RC-135 aircraft with Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) military communications satellites. Space News, June 28, 2023, https://spacenews.com/air-force-awards-raytheon-625-million-contract-for-nuclear-hardened-satcom-terminals/.

6 “Air Force Awards Raytheon $625 Million Contract.” In 2020, Raytheon became part of the RTX Corporation.

7 Air Force Fact Sheet, “E-4B,” https://www.af.mil/About-Us/Fact-Sheets/Display/Article/104503/e-4b/; NAVAIR Fact Sheet, “E-6B Mercury,” https://www.navair.navy.mil/product/E-6B-Mercury.

8 NAVAIR Fact Sheet, “E-6B Mercury.”

9 The original plan for SBIRS called for eight satellites; the seventh and eighth satellites were cancelled in 2019 after work began on the next-generation system.

10 Sandra Erwin, “STRATCOM Chief Hyten: ‘I Will Not Support Buying Big Satellites That Make Juicy Targets,’” Space News, November 19, 2017, https://spacenews.com/stratcom-chief-hyten-i-will-not-support-buying-big-satellites-that-make-juicy-targets/.

11 Dwayne A. Day, “Smashing Satellites as Part of the Delta 180 Strategic Defense Initiative Mission,” Space Review, July 17, 2023, https://www.thespacereview.com/article/4622/1; Jayant Sharma, Andrew Wiseman, and George Zollinger, “Improving Space Surveillance with Space-Based Visible Sensor,” MIT Lincoln Laboratory, March 1, 2001, https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA400541.pdf; Missile Defense Agency Fact Sheet, “Space Tracking and Surveillance System,” August 23, 2022, https://www.mda.mil/global/documents/pdf/stss.pdf.

12 United States Space Force Fact Sheet, “Advanced Extremely High-Frequency System,” July 2020, https://www.spaceforce.mil/About-Us/Fact-Sheets/Fact-Sheet-Display/Article/2197713/advanced-extremely-high-frequency-system/.

13 United States Space Force Fact Sheet, “Space Based Infrared System,” March 2023, https://www.spaceforce.mil/About-Us/Fact-Sheets/Article/2197746/space-based-infrared-system/; National Nuclear Security Administration, “NNSA delivers enduring space-based nuclear detonation detection capability,” March 22, 2018, https://www.energy.gov/nnsa/articles/nnsa-delivers-enduring-space-based-nuclear-detonation-detection-capability.

14 Department of Defense Office of Inspector General, “Evaluation of the Space-Based Segment of the US Nuclear Detonation Detection System,” September 28, 2018, https://www.dodig.mil/FOIA/FOIA-Reading-Room/Article/2014314/evaluation-of-the-space-based-segment-of-the-us-nuclear-detonation-detection-sy/.

15 Michael J. Neufeld, Von Braun: Dreamer of Space, Engineer of War (New York: Vintage, 2008), is the authoritative assessment of von Braun’s contributions and legacy.

16 See, for example, Brian G. Chow, “Space Arms Control: A Hybrid Approach,” Strategic Studies Quarterly 12, no. 2 (Summer 2018): 107-32; and James Alver, Andrew Garza, and Christopher May, “An Analysis of the Potential Misuse of Active Debris Removal, On-Orbit Servicing, and Rendezvous & Proximity Operations Technologies” (capstone paper, George Washington University, 2019), https://swfound.org/media/206800/misuse_commercial_adr_oos_jul2019.pdf.

17 Some of the earliest and most influential analyses of the relative and ambiguous characteristics of security include John Herz, “Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma,” World Politics 2, no. 2 (January 1950): 157-80; and Arnold Wolfers, “‘National Security’ as an Ambiguous Symbol,” Political Science Quarterly 67, no. 4 (December 1952): 481-502.

18 Robert Jervis, “Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma,” World Politics 30, no. 2 (January 1978): 167-214. In this seminal article, Jervis applied game theory approaches to scenarios commonly used to analyze causes of war such as Stag Hunt and Prisoner’s Dilemma, positing that two variables are primary determinants of how likely or unlikely it is that states can achieve cooperation: 1) whether offensive or defensive capabilities have the advantage; and 2) whether analysts can distinguish between offensive and defensive capabilities. Applying this framework creates a 2 x 2 matrix in which Jervis labels situations where offense has the advantage, and analysts cannot distinguish between offensive and defensive capabilities as “doubly dangerous” and situations with the opposite conditions as “doubly stable.” Some disagree, but unfortunately, today most analysts perceive that the doubly dangerous situation corresponds most closely to the current characteristics of space. Jervis finds that this situation “is the worst for status-quo states. There is no way to get security without menacing others, and security through defense is terribly difficult to obtain.”

19 See Brad Townsend, “Strategic Choice and the Orbital Security Dilemma,” Strategic Studies Quarterly 14, no. 1 (Spring 2020): 64-90; and Brad Townsend, Security and Stability in the New Space Age: The Orbital Security Dilemma (Milton Park, UK: Routledge, 2020).

20 Gertner, “What Does the US Space Force Actually Do?”

21 See, for example, Benjamin Schmitt, “The Sky’s Not the Limit: Space Aid to Ukraine,” Center for European Policy Analysis, May 19, 2022, https://cepa.org/article/the-skys-not-the-limit-space-aid-to-ukraine/; David T. Burbach, “Early Lessons from the Russia-Ukraine War as a Space Conflict,” Atlantic Council, August 30, 2022, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/content-series/airpower-after-ukraine/early-lessons-from-the-russia-ukraine-war-as-a-space-conflict/; and Jonathan Beale, “Space, the Unseen Frontier in the War in Ukraine,” BBC News, October 5, 2022, https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-63109532.

22 Report of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Sixty-Second Session, June 2019, 54-69, https://www.unoosa.org/res/oosadoc/data/documents/2019/a/a7420_0_html/V1906077.pdf; NATO’s decision to consider space an operational domain like land, sea, air, and cyber is helpful, but it added caveats weakening Article 5 obligations for attacks in space: “A decision as to when such attacks would lead to the invocation of Article 5 would be taken by the North Atlantic Council on a case-by-case basis.” See NATO, “NATO’s Overarching Space Policy,” January 17, 2022, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_190862.htm?utm_source=linkedin&utm_medium=nato&utm_campaign=20220117_space; and Secretary of Defense, “Tenets of Responsible Behavior in Space,” July 7, 2021, https://www.spacecom.mil/Newsroom/Publications/Pub-Display/Article/3318236/tenets-of-responsible-behavior-in-space/. On April 18, 2022, Vice President Kamala Harris announced that the United States will no longer conduct destructive tests of DA-ASAT missiles (https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/04/18/fact-sheet-vice-president-harris-advances-national-security-norms-in-space/). Through October 2023, thirty-seven other countries including Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Japan, New Zealand, South Korea, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom have made similar pledges. On December 7, 2022, 155 countries in the United Nations General Assembly voted in favor of a resolution calling for a halt for this type of ASAT testing, while nine voted against the resolution (including China and Russia) and nine (including India) abstained. Ching Wei Soo, Direct-Ascent Anti-Satellite Missile Tests: State Positions on the Moratorium, UNGA Resolution, and Lessons for the Future, Secure World Foundation, October 2023, https://swfound.org/media/207711/direct-ascent-antisatellite-missile-tests_state-positions-on-the-moratorium-unga-resolution-and-lessons-for-the-future.pdf.

23 For more, see Madelyn Creedon, chair, and Jon Kyl, vice chair, The Final Report of the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States, October 2023, https://armedservices.house.gov/sites/republicans.armedservices.house.gov/files/Strategic-Posture-Committee-Report-Final.pdf.

24 Department of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2023, October 2023, 103-13, https://media.defense.gov/2023/Oct/19/2003323409/-1/-1/1/2023-MILITARY-AND-SECURITY-DEVELOPMENTS-INVOLVING-THE-PEOPLES-REPUBLIC-OF-CHINA.PDF.

25 Military and Security Developments Involving China 2023.

26 BBC, “Ukraine War: Could Russia Use Tactical Nuclear Weapons?” September 24, 2022, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-60664169.

27 Nina Tannenwald, “The Bomb in the Background: What the War in Ukraine Has Revealed About Nuclear Weapons,” Foreign Affairs, February 24, 2023, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/bomb-background-nuclear-weapons.

28 See, for instance, Matthew Kroenig, A Strategy for Deterring Russian Nuclear De-Escalation Strikes, Atlantic Council, April 24, 2018, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/a-strategy-for-deterring-russian-de-escalation-strikes/.

29 Military and Security Developments Involving China 2023, 70. In April 2024, the Strategic Support Force was dissolved and split into three independent units: the PLA Aerospace Force, the PLA Cyberspace Force, and the PLA Information Support Force. Namrata Goswami, “The Reorganization of China’s Space Force: Strategic and Organizational Implications — The rationale behind the new ‘Aerospace Force,’” The Diplomat, May 3, 2024, https://thediplomat.com/2024/05/the-reorganization-of-chinas-space-force-strategic-and-organizational-implications/.

30 Military and Security Developments Involving China 2023, vii.

31 Defense Threat Reduction Agency, Advanced Systems and Concepts Office, “High Altitude Nuclear Detonations (HAND) against Low Earth Orbit Satellites (‘HALEOS’),” April 2001, https://spp.fas.org/military/program/asat/haleos.pdf. No satellites are known to be hardened against these nuclear effects. Estimates on financial damages from General Olsen. For further details about the threat from HAND and a discussion on a potential licensing requirement for commercial LEO satellites to be hardened against residual radiation effects following a HAND, see Peter L. Hays, United States Military Space: Into the Twenty-First Century (Maxwell AFB: Air University Press, 2002), 101-03. National security communications adviser John Kirby told reporters at a White House news conference that Russia “is developing an anti-satellite weapon capability, describing it as a serious threat.” Sandra Erwin, “White House Confirms It Has Intelligence on Russia’s Anti-Satellite Weapon, But Says No Immediate Threat,” Space News, February 15, 2024, https://spacenews.com/white-house-confirms-it-has-intelligence-on-russians-anti-satellite-weapon-but-says-no-immediate-threat. On April 24, 2024, Russia vetoed a UN Security Council resolution that would have reaffirmed its obligation not to station nuclear weapons in space in any manner, as stipulated in Article IV of the OST. Jeff Foust, “Russia vetoes U.N. resolution on nuclear weapons in space,” Space News, April 25, 2024, https://spacenews.com/russia-vetoes-u-n-resolution-on-nuclear-weapons-in-space/.

32 “Military Assessment of Nuclear Deterrence Requirements,” House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, HASC Hearing No. 115-11, March 8, 2017, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-115hhrg24683/html/CHRG-115hhrg24683.htm.

33 Yasmin Tadjdeh, “JUST IN: Stratcom Revitalizing Nuclear Command, Control Systems,” National Defense, January 5, 2021, https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2021/1/5/work-underway-for-next-generation-nuclear-command-control-and-communications.

34 Robert Samuel Wilson and Russell Rumbaugh, “Reversal of Nuclear-Conventional Entanglement in Outer Space,” Journal of Strategic Studies 47, no. 1 (September 15, 2023): 3.

35 Masao Dahlgren, Getting on Track: Space and Airborne Sensors for Hypersonic Missile Defense, Center for Strategic and International Studies, December 2023, https://www.csis.org/analysis/getting-track-space-and-airborne-sensors-hypersonic-missile-defense.

36 Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2024 Budget Estimates, Air Force Justification Book Volume 1, Research, Development, Test & Evaluation, Space Force, March 2023, PE1206855SF, 263-76, https://www.saffm.hq.af.mil/Portals/84/documents/FY24/Research%20and%20Development%20Test%20and%20Evaluation/FY24%20Space%20Force%20Research%20and%20Development%20Test%20and%20Evaluation.pdf?ver=BQWN2ms9pfLNN_gvIz4mQQ%3D%3D.

37 Space Systems Command Media Release, “Evolved Strategic SATCOM Program Uses Innovative Competition to Drive Acquisition of Threat-Focused Software,” May 2, 2023, https://www.ssc.spaceforce.mil/Portals/3/Documents/PRESS%20RELEASES/Evolved%20Strategic%20SATCOM%20Program%20Uses%20Innovative%20Competition%20to%20Drive%20Acquisition%20of%20Threat-Focused%20Software.pdf?ver=9hYpAExEQifvYTYBilFG2g%3D%3D; Department of Defense Instruction 5000.02, “Operation of the Adaptive Acquisition Framework,” June 8, 2022, https://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/DD/issuances/dodi/500002p.PDF.

38 Sandra Erwin, “Space Force Planning $8 Billion Satellite Architecture for Nuclear Command and Control,” Space News, October 25, 2023, https://spacenews.com/space-force-planning-8-billion-satellite-architecture-for-nuclear-command-and-control/.

39 “Evolved Strategic Satellite Communications (ESS) Space Vehicle (SV) Development and Production,” GOVTRIBE, May 4, 2024, https://govtribe.com/opportunity/federal-contract-opportunity/evolved-strategic-satellite-communications-ess-space-vehicle-sv-development-and-production-fa880724rb004; Sandra Erwin, “Space Force Planning $8 Billion Satellite Architecture for Nuclear Command and Control,” Space News, October 25, 2023, https://spacenews.com/space-force-planning-8-billion-satellite-architecture-for-nuclear-command-and-control/.

40 “Evolved Strategic SATCOM Program”; Sandra Erwin, “Lockheed, Raytheon to Develop Ground Systems for Nuclear-Hardened Satellite Communications,” Space News, May 3, 2023, https://spacenews.com/lockheed-raytheon-to-develop-ground-systems-for-nuclear-hardened-satellite-communications/.

41 “Evolved Strategic SATCOM Program.”

42 “Space Policy Review and Strategy on Protection of Satellites,” 9.

43 “Space Policy Review and Strategy on Protection of Satellites,” 19.

44 Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2024 Budget Estimates.

45 Space Systems Command Media Release, “Next-Generation Overhead Persistent Infrared Program Selects Mission Payload Suppliers,” March 1, 2022, https://www.ssc.spaceforce.mil/Portals/3/Documents/PRESS%20RELEASES/Next-Generation%20Overhead%20Persistent%20Infrared%20Program%20Selects%20Mission%20Payload%20Suppliers%20v4.pdf; Northrop Grumman, “Next Gen OPIR Polar (NGP),” https://www.northropgrumman.com/space/next-gen-polar.

46 Courtney Albon, “Congress Queries Space Force Plan for Fewer Missile Warning Satellites,” Air Force Times, July 12, 2023, https://www.airforcetimes.com/battlefield-tech/space/2023/07/12/congress-queries-space-force-plan-for-fewer-missile-warning-satellites/.

47 Theresa Hitchens, “Space Force Polar-Orbiting Missile Warning Satellites Move Toward Production,” Breaking Defense, May 24, 2023, https://breakingdefense.com/2023/05/space-force-polar-orbiting-missile-warning-sats-move-toward-production/; Courtney Albon, “Northrop Missile-Warning Satellites Pass Early Design Review,” C4ISRNET, May 24, 2023, https://www.c4isrnet.com/battlefield-tech/space/2023/05/24/northrop-missile-warning-satellites-pass-early-design-review/.

48 Space Development Agency, “Who We Are,” https://www.sda.mil/home/who-we-are/.

49 Theresa Hitchens, “Budget roadblock delaying Pentagon satellite program to track hypersonic missiles,” Breaking Defense, March 1, 2022, https://breakingdefense.com/2022/03/budget-roadblock-delaying-pentagon-satellite-program-to-track-hypersonic-missiles/.

50 Space Development Agency, “Tracking,” https://www.sda.mil/tracking/.

51 “Hypersonic and Ballistic Tracking Space Sensor Phase IIb Awards,” MDA Press Release, January 22, 2021, https://www.mda.mil/news/21news0001.html.

52 “Kill chain” is a term commonly used by the DOD to describe the ISR and C3 capabilities and processes needed to find, fix, track, target, engage, and assess the effectiveness of strike operations.

53 Theresa Hitchens, “Space Force Taps 4 Firms to Vie for Missile Warning C2 Prototype,” Breaking Defense, November 9, 2023, https://breakingdefense.com/2023/11/space-force-taps-4-firms-to-vie-for-missile-warning-c2-prototype/.

54 Summer Myatt, “How Frank Calvelli’s 9 Space Acquisition Tenets Aim to Transform Space Procurement,” GovConWire, January 10, 2023, https://www.govconwire.com/2023/01/frank-calvellis-9-space-acquisition-tenets-aim-to-transform-space-procurement/.

55 Modernizations include the Integrated Correlation and Display System and the Space and Atmospheric Burst Reporting System-2 and -3. Space Systems Command Media Release, “Space Systems Command’s Next-Generation Nuclear Detonation Detection System Completes System Requirements Review,” June 8, 2023, https://www.ssc.spaceforce.mil/Portals/3/Documents/PRESS%20RELEASES/Space%20Systems%20Command%E2%80%99s%20Next-Generation%20Nuclear%20Detonation%20Detection%20System%20Completes%20System%20Requirements%20Review.pdf?ver=IOge6OkS_Rtl1saZF-nJLA%3D%3D.

56 Written communication to author.

57 Hays, “Is This the Space Force You’re Looking For?,” 21.

The post Modernizing space-based nuclear command, control, and communications appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Indo-Pacific production diplomacy event and report quoted by Aviation Week and Janes

ylee — Thu, 11 Jul 2024 20:13:00 +0000

Indo-Pacific Security Initiative Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

On July 1, IPSI’s recent public event and issue brief on production diplomacy in the Indo-Pacific were quoted in an Aviation Week article. On July 10, this work was also featured in a Janes report focusing on defense industrial resilience through production diplomacy.

Staff

Markus Garlauskas

Director

Crisis Management Indo-Pacific

Fellow

John T. Watts

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Conflict Crisis Management

Fellow

Andrew Brown

Nonresident Fellow

Indo-Pacific Security Initiative Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Indo-Pacific Intelligence

The post Indo-Pacific production diplomacy event and report quoted by Aviation Week and Janes appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Hinata-Yamaguchi quoted in NK News on Russia-North Korea relationship

ylee — Wed, 10 Jul 2024 20:27:20 +0000

On July 9, IPSI nonresident senior fellow Ryo Hinata-Yamaguchi was quoted in an NK News article regarding a Russian military jet’s visit to North Korea, the first since the two countries signed a mutual defense treaty. Hinata-Yamaguchi noted that Russia appears open about its military cooperation with North Korea, predicting more overt military engagements and the potential for North Korea to gain advanced military technologies.

Fellow

Ryo Hinata-Yamaguchi

Indo-Pacific Security Initiative Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Defense Policy Indo-Pacific

The post Hinata-Yamaguchi quoted in NK News on Russia-North Korea relationship appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Turkey’s emerging and disruptive technologies capacity and NATO: Defense policy, prospects, and limitations

Can Kasapoğlu and Sine Özkaraşahin — Mon, 08 Jul 2024 21:00:00 +0000

Introduction

The NATO Parliamentary Assembly’s Science and Technology Committee considers emerging and disruptive technologies (EDTs) capable of transforming future military capabilities and warfare through advanced tech applications. Today, official documents indicate that NATO’s EDT-generation efforts focus on nine areas : artificial intelligence (AI), autonomous systems, quantum technologies, biotechnology and human enhancement technologies, space, hypersonic systems, novel materials and manufacturing, energy and propulsion, and next-generation communications networks.

This brief does not cover all of Turkey’s defense-technological capabilities but aims to outline Turkey’s growing focus on EDTs and high-tech advancements. Some signature programs reflect Turkey’s political-military approach and the trends in defense-technological and industrial policies. These programs hint at Ankara’s future military modernization efforts and smart assets. This paper highlights some of Turkey’s critical defense tech programs, focusing on AI, robotics, directed energy weapons, and future soldier/exoskeleton technologies to illustrate the comprehensive and integrated structure of the Turkish EDT ecosystem.

Emerging and disruptive technologies, the future of war, and NATO

Breakthroughs in EDTs are essential for NATO’s future military strength. They will significantly impact defense economics and help shape NATO’s defense-technological and industrial priorities. These efforts involve not just state policies but also public-private partnerships and transatlantic cooperation for sustainable and comprehensive EDT initiatives.

NATO supports these projects through initiatives like the Defence Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic and the NATO-Private Sector Dialogues, which explore collaboration between NATO and private companies on technology and defense.

According to Greg Ulmer, currently president of Lockheed Martin Aeronautics, “the decisive edge in today and tomorrow’s missions will be determined by combining technologies to bring forward new capabilities.” This view is shared by US Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin, demonstrating the importance of AI in Washington’s military modernization efforts to deter adversaries in a future confrontation. There seems to be a consensus in the Western policy community that integrating AI and machine learning into modern battle networks, perhaps the most critical contemporary EDT applications in defense, is essential to succeed in tomorrow’s wars. In an era of increasingly digital and transparent warfare, rapid technological adaptation is key to success.

Smart technologies are proliferating fast, and continuous innovation has become a strategic requirement in today’s geopolitical landscape. AI-augmented precision kill chains, hypersonic weapons within mixed-strike packages, and satellite internet-enabled command and control nodes are already changing warfare. The use of commercial satellite imagery and geospatial intelligence has revolutionized open-source intelligence. Facial recognition algorithms are now used in war crime investigations. Robotic warfare, drone-on-drone engagements, and manned-unmanned teaming are all changing the characteristics of war for better or worse.

Defense economics is also changing. Start-ups are becoming increasingly essential actors in military innovation. According to McKinsey & Company, the number of seed funding rounds in defense and dual-use technology (in the United States) almost doubled between 2011 and 2023, hinting at a rapid proliferation of start-ups in the high-tech defense industry. This trend is fostering new collaborations. NATO is leveraging the strengths of the start-up industry with a $1.1 billion Innovation Fund and is reportedly working with several European tech companies on robotic solutions, AI-driven systems, and semiconductors.

Keeping up with innovation is like boarding a fast-moving train, where getting a good seat ensures a strategic advantage over competitors. By investing in holistic, across-the-spectrum EDT-generation efforts, Turkish decision-makers seem to recognize this imperative.

Great expectations: Turkey in the high-technology battlespace

Turkey has faced challenges with industrial advancements, lagging behind in the Industrial Revolution. For instance, the country’s first main battle tank is still not in service. Despite ambitions to operate its fifth-generation combat aircraft, Kaan, within a decade, Turkey has not ever produced third- or fourth-generation tactical military aircraft. This situation is striking given that Turkey excels in producing and exporting state-of-the-art drones but has struggled with other key conventional military assets.

According to Haluk Bayraktar, CEO of the prominent Turkish unmanned aerial systems manufacturer Baykar, missing out on the Industrial Revolution has slowed Turkey’s military modernization. However, it also pushed the country to leverage digital age technologies, building new strengths in intelligent assets and EDTs.

In recent decades, Turkey’s military-industrial sector has focused heavily on innovation and increasing research and development, driven by a desire for self-sufficiency and operational sovereignty. The country’s National Artificial Intelligence Strategy 2021-2025 outlines these ambitions. Forming the central pillar of the government’s AI policy, the document “focuses on generating value on a global scale with an agile and sustainable AI ecosystem.” The strategy also lays out the strategic pillars of the effort, including strengthening international collaboration, encouraging innovation, and increasing the number of experts working on AI.

Similarly, the 2023-2027 Sectoral Strategy Document of the Turkish Presidency of Defense Industries outlines several focus areas for Turkey’s future EDT efforts. These include quantum computing, nanotechnology, and directed energy weapons. The document also highlights the importance of establishing a sustainable, resilient production and testing infrastructure for advanced aerial platforms and increasing the competitiveness of Turkey’s high-tech defense exports.

Selected military programs

Kemankeş loitering munitions baseline

Turkey’s aerial drone warfare capabilities first gained attention with medium-altitude long-endurance (MALE) and high-altitude long-endurance (HALE) platforms such as the Bayraktar TB-2 MALE drone, Akıncı HALE unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV), and TUSAS’ Anka MALE drone baseline. Recently, Turkey’s has advanced further in this field, developing smart aerial assets such as the Kemankeş family.

The Kemankeş, introduced by Baykar in 2023, is a “mini-intelligent cruise missile” that combines features of loitering munitions and cruise missiles. It can carry a 6-kilogram payload , and operates autonomously with an AI-supported autopilot system, one-hour endurance, and a jet engine. The Kemankeş is designed for both striking targets and conducting intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition, and reconnaissance missions. It can be integrated with other aerial drones, making it a versatile tool in modern warfare.

The Kemankeş system offers advanced datalinks and sensors, providing real-time battle updates while targeting adversaries. The upgraded version, Kemankeş-2, boasts a range of over 200 kilometers and an AI-supported autopilot system for precise, autonomous flight. Baykar announced that Kemankeş-2 passed its system verification tests in June 2024.

Kemankeş-2 can operate day and night, in various weather conditions, and in environments where GPS is jammed. Its AI-supported optical guidance system demonstrates Turkey’s rapid advancements in robotic aerial technology.

Naval and ground robotic warfare capabilities

Russia’s war on Ukraine and the ongoing turmoil in the Red Sea have highlighted the importance of kamikaze naval drones. In the Black Sea, Ukraine has used unmanned surface vehicles (USV) compensate for its lack of conventional naval capabilities. It has successfully eliminated about one-third of the Russian Black Sea Fleet with naval drones and other long-range capabilities such as the Storm Shadow/SCALP-EG air-launched cruise missiles and coastal defense missiles. Similarly, in the Red Sea, Iranian-backed Houthis have employed low-cost kamikaze USVs effective anti-access/area-denial assets, disrupting global maritime trade and limiting Western commercial activities in the region. Some assessments suggest that the United States should consider forming “hedge forces” consisting entirely of unmanned, low-cost systems to counter initial aggression from a peer opponent, such as in a scenario involving China invading Taiwan. This strategy would minimize harm to military personnel and the loss of valuable equipment.

Turkey has one of the largest USV programs within NATO, with about half a dozen ongoing projects. For example, Marlin, produced by the Turkish defense giant Aselsan and Sefine Shipyards, was the first Turkish naval drone to participate in NATO joint exercises, indicating potential for coalition warfare.

Turkey is also advancing its ground warfare capabilities, leveraging its expertise in robotics. Otokar’s Alpar is a recent example of an unmanned ground vehicle (UGV) that can map the battlefield in 2D and 3D, navigate without a global navigation satellite system, identify friend or foe, and has Advanced Driver Assistance Systems, low thermal and acoustic signature, and autonomous patrol capability. It can also serve as a “mother tank” for smaller UGVs, enhancing mission capability. Alpar has been showcased at major international defense exhibitions, including the Eurosatory 2024 event held in Paris in June.

In addition to developing new robotic systems, Turkey is focusing on innovative concepts like Havelsan’s “digital troops,” which integrate manned and unmanned teams to act as force multipliers on the battlefield. These efforts across multiple domains demonstrate Turkey’s vision of becoming a leading player in a “Mad Max”-like battlespace that combines conventional and smart assets.

Laser precision: Turkey’s drive in directed energy weapon projects

In Turkey’s expansion of EDTs, directed energy weapons and laser guns are gaining attention. The prominent Turkish arms maker Roketsan has introduced the Alka Directed Energy Weapon System, which has successfully completed live fire tests. The Alka system combines soft kill and hard kill capabilities, featuring both an electromagnetic jamming system and a laser destruction system.

Another key initiative is Aselsan’s Gökberk Mobile Laser Weapon System, first unveiled at the Turkish defense exhibition IDEF in 2023. Gökberk can search for, detect, and track UAVs using radar and electro-optical sensors, and then intercept these threats with an effective laser weapon. Additionally, Gökberk has soft kill capabilities, using its Kangal jammer subsystem to render UAVs dysfunctional. According to Aselsan, Gökberk can protect land and naval platforms, critical national infrastructure, and border outposts.

Turkish future soldier concepts

Turkey is also advancing future soldier technologies as part of its efforts in EDTs. The concept, pioneered by the United Kingdom within NATO, aims to create a modernized force by 2030. Shifting the focus of warfighting from close to deep battles, the British program seeks to transform the army into a resilient and versatile force that can find and attack enemy targets at a greater distance and with higher accuracy.

Ankara’s efforts in this segment are not new. A few years ago, BITES, a leading defense technology and intelligent systems manufacturer owned by Aselsan, developed the Military Tactical Operation Kit ATOK. Equipped with portable and wearable integrated technology, the solution in question was designed to enhance the situational awareness of Turkish troops in a rapidly changing battlefield and maximize personnel security. In line with the future soldier concept, BITES also produced several solutions based on virtual/augmented reality to provide realistic simulation environments.

Aselsan’s “Military Exoskeleton” is another visionary initiative designed to assist troops during demanding battlefield conditions. The exoskeleton provides over 400 watts of leg support. The support is adaptive and AI-supported, meaning that it understands and responds to the needs of the soldier wearing the smart suit. It has an 8-kilometer operation range on a single charge and transfers the soldier’s weight to the ground during long missions, reducing physical strain and improving combat performance.

The way forward: Opportunities and restraints

Keeping up with industrial trends in a competitive environment is challenging, and Turkey’s defense industry faces several obstacles that limit its full potential.

First, the Turkish defense industry is monopolized. There are structural gaps in the collaboration between the public and private sectors. Unlike other tech-driven nations like the United States, Turkey’s defense ecosystem is not very friendly to start-ups, with established companies dominating the field.

Second, Turkey has a shortage of skilled human capital, largely due to issues in higher education. According to 2022 OECD data, Turkey’s Program for International Student Assessment test scores fell below the OECD average in mathematics, science, and reading comprehension. In addition, evidence shows that in Turkey, the proportion of bachelor’s, master’s, and doctoral or equivalent graduates in the field of STEM (science, technology, engineering, and mathematics) is among the lowest among OECD and partner countries.

For sustainable and resilient defense innovation, R&D, business, and a well-educated workforce must go hand in hand. A good example is Baykar, whose chief technology lead was educated at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, one of the United States’ leading engineering universities.

Third, high-technology goods comprise a relatively low share of Turkish exports. Despite a focus on high-tech products, over half of the gross value generated in the Turkish defense industry comes from low- and medium-technology products. In 2022, Turkey’s high-tech exports were approximately $7.5 billion, and in 2023, this figure exceeded $9 billion.

While Turkey’s strategic plans and defense industrial goals are ambitious, the abovementioned challenges could jeopardize its position as a leading EDT producer in the medium and long term. Addressing these issues is crucial not only for enhancing Turkey’s EDT edge but also for meeting NATO’s strategic needs.

About the authors

Can Kasapoğlu is a nonresident senior fellow at Hudson Institute. Follow him on X @ckasapoglu1.

Sine Özkaraşahin is a freelance defense analyst and consultant. Follow her on X @sineozkarasahin.

The Atlantic Council in Turkey, which is in charge of the Turkey program, aims to promote and strengthen transatlantic engagement with the region by providing a high-level forum and pursuing programming to address the most important issues on energy, economics, security, and defense.

Don’t cut corners on US nuclear deterrence

Matthew Kroenig, Mark J. Massa — Wed, 03 Jul 2024 13:42:12 +0000

The nuclear threats to the United States and its allies are growing. To deter these threats, the bipartisan Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States (a commission on which one of the authors, Matthew Kroenig, served) recently recommended that the United States plan for its first strategic forces buildup since the end of the Cold War.

In contrast to this bipartisan consensus, House Armed Services Committee Ranking Member Adam Smith (D-WA) argued in Newsweek in May for adjustments and cuts to the US intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) force. Smith’s argument that the United States should consider mobile basing for a portion of its ICBM force has merit, but his other arguments do not stand up to scrutiny. Rather, bipartisan support for modernizing and expanding the US nuclear arsenal will be essential for ensuring that the United States and its allies have the strategic forces they need to deter aggression in the face of hostile, nuclear-armed, autocratic rivals.

There are several problems with Smith’s arguments. First, he questions whether land-based nuclear forces are needed at all. Yet, every presidential administration since the 1950s has considered this question and concluded that ICBMs are necessary. Indeed, as we have argued at length elsewhere (see here and here), ICBMs contribute to the major goals of US nuclear strategy—they deter adversaries from launching a strategic attack, assure allies, and give the United States the ability to respond if deterrence fails.

There is simply no room to cut the number of ICBMs at this moment.

Second, Smith argues that an enemy nuclear attack on vulnerable ICBMs could force a US president into a use-them-or-lose-them situation and a “rushed” decision to launch a nuclear attack. But the president is not forced to launch nuclear weapons as soon as a possible enemy missile launch is detected. The president has the option to ride out the attack and retaliate with other, more survivable forces, if necessary. Moreover, it does not make sense to argue that ICBMs are, on the one hand, so important that the president would need to launch them if under attack and, on the other hand, the United States should slash their numbers. ICBMs are either important or they are not. If ICBMs are expendable, then there is no reason for the president to launch them if under attack. If they are important, as we believe they are, then it is unwise to curtail them.

Third, Smith argues that US ICBM silos are uniquely dangerous because they invite an adversary to target its nuclear weapons in the US heartland, and that such an attack could kill millions of people. But the purpose of nuclear weapons is, of course, to deter nuclear attack in the first place. If ICBMs continue to deter effectively, as they have for the past half century and more, then an attack will not come. Moreover, if the adversary did not need to target its nuclear weapons on missile silos in the isolated high plains of Montana and North Dakota, for example, then the attacker could reallocate those weapons toward major US cities, which would only result in more US deaths in the event of a nuclear war.

Fourth, Smith continues by arguing that, even if the United States does maintain some silo-based ICBMs, the Department of Defense should purchase fewer of them. But again, this argument does not stand up to scrutiny. The bipartisan Strategic Posture Commission argued that the current US nuclear modernization program of record—which includes the new Sentinel ICBMs,* new ballistic missile submarines, new strategic bombers, and new air-launched nuclear cruise missiles—is necessary but not sufficient to maintain strategic deterrence. There is simply no room to cut the number of ICBMs at this moment.

Fifth, Smith argues that, if the United States keeps the same number of nuclear weapons, then it should shift warheads from ICBMs to the submarine leg of the nuclear triad. But there is not much room to shift large numbers of warheads to the sea-based leg without increasing the total number of submarines, and the United States is already straining to produce the planned number of Columbia-class ballistic missile submarines on time. Moreover, if the United States were to build more submarines, that would be inconsistent with Smith’s stated concern about costs. Building and operating more submarines is much more expensive than modernizing ground-based missile silos.

Sixth, Smith worries that the Department of Defense does not have the resources to complete the US nuclear modernization program while making necessary investments in conventional forces. It is true that the Department of Defense must make tradeoffs in some areas, but not with nuclear deterrence, which is its highest priority. Congress should ensure that the United States has sufficient resources at its disposal to build and deploy the necessary nuclear and conventional forces.

Smith’s strongest argument is that the United States should consider putting some portion of its ICBM force on mobile launchers instead of in silos. In fact, the bipartisan congressional commission recommends this option to enhance the survivability of the ground-based leg. But this option would not result in cost savings, contrary to what Smith suggests. A mobile option would require building new missile garrisons and also result in higher operational and security costs. Given the worsening international security environment, land-mobile missiles should be a complement to, not a replacement for, the ICBM program of record.

Now is not the time to be making cuts to the US nuclear arsenal. As the bipartisan Strategic Posture Commission argued in its consensus report, the United States must urgently complete its nuclear modernization program of record and take actions today to enhance its strategic posture. The future of international peace and security depends on it.

Matthew Kroenig is vice president of the Atlantic Council and senior director of its Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. He is currently a commissioner on the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States and was a senior policy adviser in the Pentagon in support of the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review.

Mark J. Massa is the deputy director for strategic forces policy in the Forward Defense program within the Scowcroft Center.

Note: The Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security conducts work on nuclear and strategic forces that is sponsored by donors including Los Alamos National Laboratory, Northrop Grumman Corporation (which has the sole contract from the US Air Force to engineer and manufacture Sentinel ICBMs), the Norwegian Ministry of Defense, the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the United States Department of Defense, the United States Department of Energy, and the United States Department of State, as well as general support to the Scowcroft Center. This article did not involve any of these donors and reflects only the authors’ views.

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Putin is using Belarus to escalate his nuclear threats

Peter Dickinson — Tue, 02 Jul 2024 20:09:39 +0000

Belarus engaged in a bout of nuclear saber-rattling on June 30, with Chief of the Belarusian General Staff Pavel Muraveiko declaring that his country would not hesitate to use nuclear weapons if provoked. “We’ve learned how to handle these weapons. We know how to apply them confidently. And you can be sure that we will do it if the sovereignty and independence of our country is threatened,” Muraveiko stated.

The Belarusian army commander’s hawkish comments came just weeks after Belarus and Russia conducted joint nuclear drills that were widely interpreted as an attempt to intimidate the West. This followed on from Vladimir Putin’s spring 2023 announcement of plans to store Russian tactical nukes on Belarusian territory. By the end of the year, the weapons had reportedly arrived in Belarus.

Muraveiko’s recent statement illustrates how the Kremlin is using Belarus to escalate its campaign of nuclear blackmail against the West. Clearly, any Russian nuclear weapons deployed across the border in Belarus remain firmly under Moscow’s control. If Belarusian officials are now issuing nuclear threats of their own, they are doing so on behalf of Putin.

This is very much in line with the supporting role played by Belarus throughout Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. When hostilities first began in February 2022, Belarusian dictator Alyaksandr Lukashenka allowed the Russian military to use his country as a base for the invasion of northern Ukraine. Following Russia’s spring 2022 defeat in the Battle of Kyiv, Putin’s army then retreated back into Belarus to regroup.

While Lukashenka has so far been able to resist Kremlin pressure to enter the war directly, he has allowed Russia to conduct air strikes on targets across Ukraine from Belarusian territory. He has also been one of the few international leaders prepared to publicly align himself with Putin, meeting with the Russian dictator on multiple occasions.

Lukashenka’s slavish loyalty to his Russian patron comes as no surprise. The Belarusian ruler has been heavily dependent on the Kremlin since 2020, when Putin intervened to prevent the Lukashenka regime from collapse amid nationwide protests over a rigged presidential election. For the past four years, Russia has been steadily strengthening its grip on Belarus, a process some have likened to the creeping annexation of the country.

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With Russian influence in Belarus now at unprecedented levels, Lukashenka has had little choice but to back the invasion of Ukraine. Naturally, this support includes playing along with Putin’s nuclear intimidation tactics. Perhaps more surprising is Putin’s readiness to involve Russia’s small western neighbor in his incredibly reckless game of nuclear brinkmanship.

Since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine began almost two and a half years ago, Putin has become notorious for frequently issuing thinly-veiled nuclear threats. This trend was first evident during his initial address announcing the decision to invade, with Putin warning Western leaders that any attempts to intervene would lead to consequences “such as you have never seen in your entire history.” Four days later, he ordered Russia’s nuclear forces to be put on high alert.

Perhaps the most infamous example of Putin’s nuclear saber-rattling came six months later. With the Russian army retreating in disarray in eastern Ukraine, the Kremlin ruler referenced his country’s nuclear arsenal and vowed to use “all means at our disposal” to defend Russia. “This is not a bluff,” he declared.

With Western support for Ukraine regaining momentum in recent months, Putin has once again made regular references to a possible nuclear war. Western leaders “should keep in mind that theirs are small and densely populated countries,” he commented chillingly in late May.

Other Kremlin leaders have gone even further. Former Russian president Dmitry Medvedev, who currently serves as deputy chair of Russia’s Security Council, recently stated that it would be a “fatal mistake” for Western leaders to believe Russia was not ready to use nuclear weapons against Ukraine or NATO member states. “This is, alas, not an attempt at intimidation or a nuclear bluff,” he declared.

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While Ukraine has refused to be cowed by Russia’s repeated nuclear threats, many in the West have allowed themselves to be intimidated. Indeed, widespread alarm over the potential use of nuclear weapons is believed to be a key factor fueling the fear of escalation that has consistently hampered the international response to Russia’s invasion.

Putin is well aware of the low risk tolerance in many Western capitals and has used it to his advantage. He has skillfully exploited the West’s escalation phobia to reduce the flow of military aid to Kyiv, and has even managed to convince Ukraine’s partners to impose absurd restrictions on how the embattled country can defend itself.

Russia’s readiness to employ nuclear threats could have grave implications for international security that would be felt far beyond the battlefields of Ukraine. If nuclear blackmail enables Putin to succeed in Ukraine, he will inevitably use the same tactics again elsewhere. Other countries will then draw the logical conclusion and decide that they, too, must also possess nuclear weapons, sparking a scramble for nukes that will undo decades of nonproliferation efforts. The entire world will be plunged into an era of insecurity marked by a dramatically heightened risk of nuclear war.

If Western leaders wish to avoid this bleak future, they must finally stand up to Russia’s nuclear bullying. At this point, Putin evidently regards his nuclear bluster as an effective foreign policy tool. Far from being deterred, he appears determined to raise the stakes further by involving Belarus.

Putin will continue to pursue policies of nuclear intimidation until the costs outweigh the benefits. This can be achieved by increasing Western military support for Ukraine and lifting all remaining restrictions on Kyiv’s ability to strike back against Russia. Unless that happens, there is a very real danger that the international security climate of the coming decades will be defined by nuclear-backed expansionism and further wars of imperial aggression.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

Ukraine’s innovative drone industry helps counter Putin’s war machine

David Kirichenko — Wed, 26 Jun 2024 13:02:03 +0000

Since the outbreak of hostilities in February 2022, Ukraine’s domestic drone industry has emerged as an increasingly crucial element in the struggle to resist and outmaneuver the formidable Russian war machine. Ukraine’s innovative use of drones has allowed the country to counter Russia’s far greater resources and strike back at targets everywhere from the Black Sea to oil refineries deep inside Russia itself.

For more than two years, Ukrainian commanders have been adapting to rapidly evolving battlefield conditions shaped by the use of drones. In the initial weeks of the war, Turkish-made Bayraktar TB2 drones were instrumental in allowing Ukraine to strike over-stretched Russian lines as Putin’s invading army attempted to take Kyiv. A range of countermeasures, including increasingly sophisticated electronic warfare capabilities, have since created an environment where Russian and Ukrainian forces are constantly competing to gain an innovative edge over their adversaries. Many view this military tech contest as the decisive front of the war.

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As the front line stabilized during the first winter of Russia’s invasion, trench warfare became the defining feature of the conflict, with drones filling the skies and searching for targets. This has created unprecedented visibility on both sides of the front lines and made offensive operations increasingly challenging. A large proportion of the drones buzzing above the Ukrainian battlefield in winter 2022 were Chinese in origin, which placed Russia at a significant advantage due to Moscow’s close ties with Beijing.

Meanwhile, many of the Western drone models used in Ukraine have proved costly and ineffective, according to the Wall Street Journal. Additionally, delays in military aid have underlined the risks for Ukraine of relying too heavily on the country’s Western partners. These factors have helped convince policymakers in Kyiv to concentrate on the development of their own domestic drone industry. They have been able to call upon Ukraine’s vibrant tech sector to support these efforts.

With Ukraine typically losing thousands of drones per month, keeping production costs as low as possible is vital. Flexibility in drone operations is also essential, as drone units frequently use 3D printing to modify and adapt parts to meet specific needs. With this in mind, Ukraine has adopted a decentralized approach to drone development that allows for rapid testing and deployment.

Ukraine’s emphasis on agility contrasts with the more centralized military structure favored by the Kremlin. While Russia can produce vast quantities of military equipment, comparatively slower decision-making processes and bureaucratic inefficiencies often hinder the Kremlin’s ability to respond swiftly to new battlefield realities. Many analysts believe this was a factor behind the recent appointment of a technocrat economist as Russia’s new defense minister.

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The growth of Ukraine’s domestic drone industry over the past two years has been striking, with more than 200 drone-manufacturing companies created. The Ukrainian authorities have allocated $2 billion for the production of drones in 2024, with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy setting an annual production target of one million FPV drones.

Ukraine’s leaders hope more drones will mean less reliance on traditional munitions and fewer casualties. “We don’t have as many human resources as Russia. They fight, they die, they send more people, they don’t care, but that’s not how we see war,” commented Alex Bornyakov, Ukraine’s Deputy Minister of Digital Transformation.

A key element in Ukraine’s drone strategy is the BRAVE1 initiative, a government-led defense tech cluster established in spring 2023 to streamline cooperation between the public and private sectors. This cluster has helped numerous companies cut through red tape, speeding up the implementation of new technologies to support Ukraine’s defense.

The race to innovate is relentless, with Ukraine’s steadily improving drone capabilities mirrored by Russia’s own rapidly expanding electronic warfare arsenal. Ukrainian engineers are now attempting to overcome the Kremlin’s increasingly sophisticated jamming efforts by embedding artificial intelligence (AI) technologies into drones. This innovation has already played a part in Kyiv’s long-range drone strike campaign against Russia’s energy industry, with CNN reporting that Ukraine has employed AI-enabled drones to hit targets as far away as Russia’s Tatarstan region, well over one thousand kilometers from the Ukrainian border.

Ukraine’s partners certainly seem to recognize the importance of drones and have set up an international drone coalition to aid deliveries. In a further example of institutional innovation, Ukraine has this year become the first nation to establish a separate branch of its military dedicated to drone warfare.

Looking ahead, Ukraine’s drone warfare strategy will continue to focus on flexibility, innovation, and the daily challenge of maintaining a technological advantage over Russia. Ukraine’s leaders know they cannot hope to defeat Russia in a traditional war of attrition, and must instead make the most of the agility and technological ingenuity that the country has demonstrated since February 2022. As Ukraine’s understanding of drone warfare continues to evolve, the outside world will be watching and learning.

David Kirichenko is an Associate Research Fellow at the Henry Jackson Society.

A global strategy to secure UAS supply chains

Matthew Kroenig, Imran Bayoumi — Tue, 25 Jun 2024 21:09:37 +0000

Foreword: A US strategy for UAVs

The United States has long been one of the world’s leading innovators, allowing it to rapidly adopt emerging technology to strengthen US national defense. This has been especially true in the field of aviation. From the first powered flight at Kitty Hawk to twenty-first-century strategic competition, the United States has made the maintenance of air superiority a major priority.

Today, however, the People’s Republic of China has built a near-insurmountable lead in the development and use of small, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). Benefiting from the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) unfair trading practices, Chinese companies have come to dominate the global UAV market, which was valued at $31 billion in 2023.

Chinese dominance of the global UAV industry poses a number of national security challenges for the United States. On the battlefield, drones play a crucial role in intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), and in conducting strikes. Chinese leadership in UAVs provides the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) with potential battlefield advantages.

At home, these devices provide critical support to law-enforcement agencies and a variety of government departments, in everything from undertaking infrastructure inspections to fulfilling vital roles in scientific research. Chinese commercial drones operating in the United States and allied countries, therefore, provide the PLA with a potential source of intelligence about personal data and critical infrastructure that can be used to identify and exploit vulnerabilities in US and allied homelands.

Finally, Chinese UAVs raise human rights concerns, as Chinese drone companies surveil Chinese citizens and assist the CCP in its mistreatment of its Muslim Uyghur minority.

Washington has begun to wake up to the challenges presented by China’s dominance of the global UAV market. Federal agencies and some states have banned the use of Chinese drones. The federal government has enacted tariffs. Recognizing UAVs’ potential benefit to defense and deterrence, the Department of Defense created the Replicator initiative, a flagship effort to promote the development and fielding of autonomous systems. Congress has also introduced legislation with new measures to protect the US market from Chinese drones and to promote the production of US-made drones.

These are good initial steps, but, to date, they have been piecemeal in nature and lack an overarching strategic framework.

This issue brief proposes a comprehensive three-part “protect-promote-align” strategy for the United States and its allies to secure their national security interests in the global UAV market. It argues that the United States and its allies should introduce new restrictions on the use of Chinese drones in their markets. They should promote the development of alternative drone manufacturers in the United States and trusted allies. Finally, they should align their policies to advance a whole-of-free-world approach to the global drone competition.

If adopted, the strategy proposed here will go a long way toward ensuring that the United States and its allies can remain secure at home, deter their adversaries, and benefit from an emerging technology that is likely to play a critical role in twenty-first-century defense.

Deborah Lee James
Atlantic Council Board Director
Former Secretary of the Air Force

Executive summary

The United States has been the world’s innovation leader since the time of Thomas Edison, and this innovation edge has provided the United States and its allies with enormous economic, military, and geopolitical benefits. China, however, aims to usurp the US position as the world’s leader in the most important technologies of the twenty-first century, including artificial intelligence (AI), quantum computing, hypersonic missiles, and unmanned aerial systems (UAS), commonly known as drones. Using a variety of unfair trade practices, including massive intellectual-property theft, China has closed the gap, and even maintains the lead, in some of these critical technologies, including UAS.

While the United States has preserved its edge in large military drones, China dominates the market for smaller and commercially available drones with dual-use civilian and military applications. China controls 90 percent of the drone market in the United States and 80 percent globally.

China’s supremacy in the commercial UAS market creates a number of national security threats for the United States and its allies. First, Chinese drones operating in the United States and its democratic allies create an intelligence vulnerability, as these drones scoop up sensitive data that can be transferred back to Beijing for a variety of national security purposes, including aiding the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) in targeting critical infrastructure for cyber and kinetic military attacks.

Second, China’s drone-manufacturing prowess provides a military edge. Russia’s war in Ukraine demonstrates that inexpensive commercial drones will be critical to intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and strike in twenty-first-century warfare.

Third, and related, the free world has a supply-chain vulnerability problem, as it is dependent on an autocratic adversary for access to UAS for both civilian and military purposes, creating dangerous dependencies that China could exploit in crisis or peacetime. States increasingly utilize “drone diplomacy” to gain influence abroad. The act of selling a drone can be used to “extract concessions, exert influence, counter rivals, and strengthen military ties.” China’s artificially low prices for UAS, achieved through state subsidies, crowd out the development of a homegrown domestic drone industry in the United States and among US allies.

Fourth, Chinese-built drones threaten democratic values and human rights, as the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and other autocracies employ Chinese drones for surveilling their populations, including in the CCP’s genocide of the Uyghur minority.

To address these challenges, the United States and its allies need a new strategy to protect against the threats posed by Chinese drones, strengthen their position in the international UAS market, and assert global leadership in this key twenty-first-century technology. To help the United States and its allies win the new tech race, the Scowcroft Center previously published a three-part “promote, protect, and coordinate” strategy. This paper updates that framework, and applies it to the issue of dual-use drones.

First, the United States and its allies should protect their countries from the national security threat posed by Chinese-made drones by prohibiting their use in sensitive areas, such as by the government and in critical infrastructure.

Specific recommendations include the following.

The US Congress should pass the Countering CCP Drones Act and the Drone Infrastructure Inspection Grant (DIIG) Act.
The US Congress should pass legislation to make US state-level bans effective and actionable by offering federal-government support for their implementation, including through targeted grant programs accelerating the transition to secure and capable systems.
The US State Department should, in light of increasing global restrictions on People’s Republic of China (PRC)-made drones, launch an initiative to educate allies and partners on the risks associated with those systems, and support secure and capable alternatives.
The US State Department should encourage allies and partners to enact tariffs and sanctions on PRC-made UAS to counter China’s unfair trade practices.

Second, the United States and its allies should promote domestic drone manufacturing to provide a secure alternative to PRC-made drones.

Specific recommendations include the following.

The US federal government should provide targeted grants to accelerate the transition to secure drones in the government and critical-infrastructure sectors, and should consider funding to expand domestic drone manufacturing.
The US State Department should encourage allied governments to do the same, providing reasonable funding measures to accelerate the transition to secure US and allied solutions.
The US Congress and the Department of Defense (DOD) should ensure that the Replicator initiative has the proper funding and support to achieve the ambitious goals laid out in the program.
The US Departments of State and Defense should encourage key allies to adopt their own versions of the Replicator initiative to ensure the free world has UAS in mass necessary to deter and defeat aggression.
The US Congress should pass legislation, using a public-private partnership framework, to stimulate investment in research and development of autonomous drones, and scale existing UAS-manufacturing capabilities in the United States.

Third, and finally, the United States should align with its allies and partners to forge a coherent free-world approach to the setting of policies, regulations, and norms regarding commercial UAS.

Specific recommendations include the following.

The US State Department should elevate drones in technology and commercial diplomacy, starting by designating an individual to lead allied cooperation on drone policies, manufacturing, and supply-chain security.
The United States and its allies should work with existing multilateral frameworks including the US-EU Trade and Technology Council (TTC), Group of Seven (G7), Group of Twenty (G20), Quad, Department of Commerce, and World Trade Organization (WTO) to develop regulations and norms for the responsible use of drones and autonomous systems.
The United States should leverage NATO and AUKUS Pillar II to improve defense coordination related to UAS.

Pursuing this strategy now will help the United States and its allies maintain their innovation edge and prevail in a new era of strategic competition against revisionist autocracies.

The threat posed by China’s dominance of the global unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) industry

In 2023, the global UAS market was worth more than $30 billion, a number projected to increase to more than $55 billion by 2030. The market is dominated by firms based in China, with DJI controlling 80 percent of the commercial market within the United States and as much as 70 percent of the global market, and Autel, another PRC manufacturer, controlling 7 percent globally. As of 2021, estimates put Autel’s US market share at 15 percent. In comparison, Skydio, perhaps the most prominent US-based company, had only a 3 percent share of the global market, the same as Parrot, a French-based entity.

DroneAnalyst’s 2021 Drone Market Sector Report includes data from a survey of drone industry stakeholders in over 100 countries on the percentage of all new commercial drone purchases. The graph examines the percentage each company has of the global market share and sorts by the headquarter location of each company. DroneAnalyst

In 2020, 90 percent of UAS operated by US public-safety agencies were manufactured by DJI, though this number has since fallen due to a series of state and local bans. In Florida, before a recent ban was enacted, more than 1,800 of 3,000 UAS registered by the government and police departments were manufactured by DJI and Autel. However, in some states, DJI and Autel still hold a disproportionate market share among public-sector entities. In New Jersey, more than 500 of the 550 UAS registered by the state and local police departments were made by DJI or Autel.

US allies continue to rely heavily on PRC-made drones. In the United Kingdom (UK), for example, 230 out of the 337 drones operated by police forces across the country are DJI products. In Australia, a report revealed that federal agencies owned several thousand DJI drones, although the Australian military had grounded its systems and other agencies had begun to move away from them as well.

The global-market dominance of DJI and Autel has been supported by two national CCP policies, Made in China 2025 and Military-Civil Fusion, which are supported in part by industrial and corporate theft of foreign technology. The PRC has never been a market economy. Instead, it relies on a noncompetitive system of trade, bolstered by subsidies and other unfair practices.

Made in China 2025 was announced in 2015 and seeks to boost China’s manufacturing competitiveness across a variety of industries. The plan focuses on ten different sectors, including the development of UAS. Across each sector, the PRC aims to increase China’s domestic manufacturing capacity to have 70 percent of the core components and materials produced in China by 2025. To achieve this goal, the PRC uses a variety of tactics, such as creating financial and tax incentives to convince foreign-based firms to shift manufacturing and research and development (R&D) operations to China, intellectual-property theft, predatory procurement policies, and financing state-owned enterprises in their acquisitions of overseas companies.

Military-Civil Fusion (MCF) is central to Xi Jinping’s plan to allow China to modernize its military by 2035 and ensure that the PLA becomes “world-class” by 2049. At its core, MCF is a strategy that aims to break down barriers between commercial R&D and military products, allowing the PLA to rapidly identify, adopt, scale up, and leverage commercial technologies that also have a military application, such as UAS. The MCF system also encourages linkages between the state and dozens of private companies that can contribute to military projects and help meet procurement needs, including companies that develop unmanned systems. To achieve the goals of MCF, the PRC uses both licit and illicit means, including exploiting global academic exchanges, investment in foreign companies, forced military transfer, and, in some cases, blatant theft.

As a result of these strategies, DJI and Autel can sell their UAS at below-market cost to the United States and allied countries, a process known as dumping. A 2017 investigation by the US Department of Homeland Security found that, in 2015, DJI slashed its prices by 70 percent, leading to a problem highlighted in 2019 by then Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment Ellen Lord, who said, “We don’t have much of a UAS industrial base because DJI dumped so many low-price quadcopters on the market, and we then became dependent on them.” DJI has even clearer linkages to the CCP than just state support for illegal trade practices. A 2022 Washington Post investigation found four different CCP-owned or operated investment vehicles invested in DJI.

The US government recognizes the threat posed by PRC-made drones. In 2021, the Department of Defense released a statement indicating that DJI systems pose potential threats to national security. In 2022, the department identified DJI as a Chinese military company operating in the United States. Similarly, the Treasury Department added DJI to the Chinese Military-Industrial Complex (CMIC) companies list, which prevents US citizens from investing in or trading their stock, should DJI attempt to build a public company.

PRC-made UAS pose four direct national security concerns. The first concern relates to Chinese intelligence collection in the United States. In early 2024, the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) released an alert that stated, “The use of Chinese-manufactured UAS in critical infrastructure operations risks exposing sensitive information to PRC authorities, jeopardizing U.S. national security, economic security, and public health and safety.” These concerns represented by the joint CISA-FBI alert are compounded by China’s 2017 National Intelligence Law, which mandates that private companies work with the PRC’s intelligence services. Article 14 of the law states, “State intelligence work organs, when legally carrying forth intelligence work, may demand that concerned organs, organizations, or citizens provide needed support, assistance, and cooperation.” In practice, this may include Chinese drone companies sharing sensitive flight data, the personal information of users, geolocation data, images, and video collected in the United States with the CCP. The transfer of such information to the CCP would allow Beijing to identify and exploit US vulnerabilities and facilitate the sabotage, disruption, or destruction of US critical infrastructure in times of crisis or conflict. Indeed, in 2017, US Immigration and Customs Enforcement determined that DJI was likely providing information about critical US infrastructure sites to the PRC, which the PRC then used to target specific assets. At the strategic level, FBI Director Christopher Wray warns that the Chinese security services present a “broad and unrelenting threat” to US critical infrastructure and are prepared to “wreak havoc.” PRC-made UAS have also been located in restricted airspace, including over Washington, DC. This is despite DJI claiming to have geofencing restrictions, which, in theory, limit where its UAS can operate.

The second concern relates to military effectiveness. The war in Ukraine is a testbed for new military technologies, and small commercial UAS have been a game changer in the conflict. They allow troops on the ground to conduct more accurate, real-time intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) of adversary positions and troop movements, and to facilitate more effective fires. They have also proven to be an effective and economical strike option, as UAS can destroy much more expensive platforms by crashing into them or dropping inexpensive bombs. Indeed, Chinese drones are making Vladimir Putin’s war machine more lethal. As of March 2023, the PRC had sold more than $12 million in UAS and parts to Russia. The consistent supply of UAS has allowed Russia access to a cheap and plentiful way to carry out ISR and targeted attacks. DJI and Autel are the number one and two brands, respectively, that China exports to Russia. To maintain deterrence in Europe and the Indo-Pacific, the United States and its allies will need the ability to develop trusted drones, at scale, for military purposes and to counter adversaries’ drones. Recent news from China makes that reality more important. Last year, China enacted export controls on small commercial drones for the first time. Those controls threaten to choke Ukraine’s primary source of drones without affecting supplies to Russia. That development highlights the criticality of the United States and its allies developing alternative sources of supply.

An Autel Robotics Dragonfish Pro drone, with an 18-mile range, is displayed during CES 2022 at the Las Vegas Convention Center in Las Vegas, Nevada, U.S. January 5, 2022. REUTERS/Steve Marcus

A third concern relates to secure supply chains. In recent years, the United States and its allies have recognized they are economically vulnerable due to dependence on autocratic rivals—China and Russia—for critical supplies, including semiconductors, critical minerals, energy, and much else. As demonstrated by the recent Chinese efforts to strangle Ukraine’s source of supply, the PRC has the ability to restrict US and allied access to UAS, potentially limiting their access in wartime. Similarly, drone customers not subject to federal or state prohibitions on Chinese drones, such as commercial entities, remain vulnerable to the PRC’s ability to restrict their access to UAS for civil purposes in peacetime.

The fourth and final concern relates to human rights. China commits gross human rights violations, including genocide against its Uyghur minority population. Under the Uyghur Human Rights Act of 2020, Washington committed to sanctioning companies that participate in atrocities against the Uyghurs. The US Treasury Department stated, “SZ DJI has provided drones to the Xinjiang Public Security Bureau, which are used to surveil Uyghurs in Xinjiang. The Xinjiang Public Security Bureau was previously designated in July 2020, pursuant to the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act for connection to human rights abuses in Xinjiang.” DJI has already been added to the Commerce Department’s entity list, which restricts the ability of US companies to sell technology and component parts to DJI. DJI’s complicity in the human rights violations against the Uyghurs is indicative of the CCP’s support of authoritarianism globally. China and its authoritarian partners increasingly use UAS to suppress democracy and human rights globally. Countering DJI and other PRC UAS companies is critical to limiting the reach of autocrats and supporting democracy globally.

Ongoing efforts to counter PRC-made drones

The United States and its allies have already undertaken some efforts to challenge the dominance of Chinese UAS. At the federal level, the Donald Trump administration banned the sale of US technology to DJI without a license. The Department of Defense, Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and Department of the Interior stopped using Chinese drones in 2018, 2019, and 2020, respectively. Congress codified the Pentagon’s ban in 2019. The 2022 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) expanded those restrictions to prohibit DOD from buying UAS or components from Russia, Iran, and North Korea. This law was further expanded to ban defense contractors from using UAS and components manufactured in the PRC, Russia, Iran, and North Korea in execution of their DOD contracts starting in 2023. The American Security Drone Act, passed in the 2024 NDAA, bans federal government entities from buying and operating UAS from designated adversarial nations, including China, and prohibits the use of federal funds to purchase or operate these drones starting in December 2025.

At the state level, Arkansas, Florida, Hawaii, Mississippi, Nevada, Texas, Tennessee, and Utah have restricted the use of PRC-made UAS by state agencies, local agencies, or both. Those restrictions generally mirror federal laws, protecting government agencies from insecure products connected to adversarial nations. This first phase of state action focused on government end-user restrictions, but a second phase—focused on providing grants to accelerate the transition away from insecure drones—is under way. In 2023 Florida enacted a $25-million grant program to help local agencies reduce their dependency on insecure drones. In 2024, legislators in several states proposed similar grant programs.

There are additional efforts under way in the US Congress. Representatives Elise Stefanik and Mike Gallagher introduced the Countering CCP Drones Act to amend the Secure and Trusted Communications Networks Act of 2019. Their bill would add DJI to the list of equipment banned from operating on US telecommunications infrastructure, potentially impacting DJI’s ability to place new products on the market. The bill would not affect existing DJI drones.

In an effort to better equip the United States with UAS for military purposes, the DOD recently announced the Replicator initiative, which aims to directly counter PRC dominance in the domain of attritable autonomous systems. Replicator was motivated, in part, by the recognition that the PRC has a scale advantage, which allows Beijing to rapidly manufacture and field weapons systems, including attritable autonomous systems. With Replicator, DOD aims to deploy thousands of autonomous systems. Open questions remain as to what systems will be selected for Replicator, how the initiative will be funded, and how many systems will be procured. To be decisive in a near-peer conflict, Replicator will likely need to purchase tens of thousands of various systems to be used across all domains. For example, the UK-based Royal United Services Institute estimates that Ukraine is losing ten thousand drones per month in its fight against Russia, providing insight into the scale of the total number of UAS. To complement Replicator and make all-domain attritable autonomous systems decisive in near-peer conflict, the DOD should consider stockpiling drones. The stockpiling of these systems would be a hedge against supply-chain interruptions in times of conflict, and would allow for the quick delivery of drones to theaters of conflict as these systems are rapidly expended on the battlefield.

US allies have also started to act. In 2022, Lithuania banned the purchase of technology from countries deemed “untrustworthy” for applications in defense and security, including PRC-made UAS. India has gone further, banning both Chinese-made drones and their component parts. Australia’s military services and border force have grounded DJI drones, and other agencies appear to be transitioning to secure systems. In Japan, the coast guard stopped using DJI drones in 2020 due to cybersecurity concerns.

While the above actions are a good start, the United States and its allies need a whole-of-free-world strategic framework to mitigate the threat posed by PRC-made drones.

A free-world strategy for securing UAV supply chains

The United States and its allies should adopt a comprehensive strategy to address the threat posed by Chinese-made drones. The goal should be to reduce or eliminate the national security threats that come from an overreliance on PRC-made drones, and to develop an alternative drone market in trusted countries. To achieve these goals, the United States and its allies should pursue a three-part “protect, promote, and align” strategy.

1. Protect the United States and its allies from the national security threat posed by PRC-made drones.

The first element of a strategy for securing UAV supply chains is to protect US and allied markets from PRC-made drones that threaten national security or that violate international trade laws and norms. This begins by pursuing a hard decoupling from Chinese-made drones in areas of sensitive national security concern. The regulation of UAS can be modeled after the “small yard, high fence” approach that the United States is taking to the regulation of other critical technologies, such as semiconductors.

In the United States, the American Security Drone Act is a good first step, but it is insufficient to fully address the problem. In addition, Congress should pass the Countering CCP Drones Act to prohibit Chinese drones from operating on Federal Communications Commission (FCC) infrastructure, just as the United States did for Chinese telecommunication companies Huawei and ZTE. As identified by CISA and the FBI, the continued operation of Chinese UAS on US infrastructure raises the risk that the PRC will gain access to sensitive information and could use that information to conduct espionage on vulnerabilities in US critical infrastructure and public-safety response footprint, and to stage potential cyberattacks. Volt Typhoon, a recently disclosed Chinese threat activity discovered penetrating US critical infrastructure to prepare for future attacks, illustrates the stark nature of the threat. Currently, the American Security Drone Act would only ban DJI, but this should be amended to include all PRC-made drones, including those made by Autel.

Reasonable restrictions on PRC-made drones should be extended to state and local governments. Currently, the diverse range of legislation at the state and local levels has created a piecemeal approach that is confusing and leaves loopholes. Furthermore, the ban on Chinese drones operating in the United States should include the US private sector operating in sensitive national security areas, such as inspecting critical-infrastructure sites.

Next, the State Department should work with US allies and partners and encourage them to pass similar legislation restricting Chinese drones in sensitive sectors and to cooperate on common drone policies going forward. US global defense readiness and ability to project power in key regions could be compromised if China is able to gather sensitive intelligence and targeting information through drones operating in key allied countries. The United States and its allies already discuss critical and emerging technology cooperation through various forums, such as the US-EU Trade and Technology Council. The State Department should elevate drone cooperation as a key agenda item for discussion and cooperation in these forums. Additionally, the State Department should designate an individual who has the mandate to lead diplomatic efforts on drone cooperation.

In addition, the United States and its allies should seek coordinated tariffs and other countervailing measures to offset China’s unfair trade practices and level the playing field. The United States should maintain, if not increase, its 25-percent tariff on Chinese-made drones. There will, of course, be a cost to these measures, but they can be partially offset by the recommendations in the following “promote” element of the strategy. Should the United States increase tariffs on Chinese-made drones, the corresponding increased tariff revenue could be used to fund various grant programs to help existing Chinese drone customers—such as law-enforcement agencies—transition to US or allied drones.

When considering tariffs, it is critical to counter tariff evasion. In March 2024, bipartisan members of Congress wrote to the Joe Biden administration raising serious concerns that Chinese drone makers are evading the 25-percent tariffs by transshipping drones through Malaysia. The letter said, “[A]fter exporting virtually zero drones to the United States and being home to no major domestic drone manufacturers prior to 2022, Malaysia’s drone exports to the United States jumped inexplicably to 242,000 units that year.” In “the first eleven months of 2023 the United States imported more than 565,000 drones from Malaysia.” It is critically important to tackle transshipment, and to apply equivalent tariffs to—or categorical bans on—companies and products found to be complicit.

As part of this strategy to secure drone supply chains, the United States must be wary of efforts by DJI and other Chinese drone companies to avoid US sanctions. The New York Times reported earlier this year, for example, about a Texas-based company that licenses its drone designs from DJI and sources much of its parts from China. Legislative initiatives by Congress and other efforts by federal regulators to curb dependence on Chinese drones need to eliminate loopholes that would enable Chinese companies to evade punitive measures by distributing their products through US-based companies.

In preparation for a possible crisis or conflict with China, Washington and its allies should also be prepared to enact wide-reaching sanctions against Chinese companies critical for China’s military and intelligence activities, including DJI and Autel.¹ Washington must also be prepared to sanction companies involved in the overall procurement process for UAS, something that the Treasury Department has done in targeting companies that support Iran’s UAV industry. A response to the PRC in a time of crisis would also include enacting retaliatory export restrictions of US technology to China. To best prepare for these potential impacts, the Sanctions Economic Analysis Unit, established within the Department of the Treasury, should undertake research to understand the possible “collateral damage of sanctions before they’re imposed, and after they’ve been put in place to see if they should be adjusted.” A quick and easy win in this space would be adding Autel to the Department of Defense’s 1260H list, the Commerce Department’s entity list, and the Treasury Department’s Chinese Military-Industrial Complex Companies List, joining DJI. Additionally, the United States must work to develop robust and durable secure supply chains for all components of UAS, including through the development of a domestic industrial base.

To guide engagement with its allies, the United States should leverage the recently established Office of the Special Envoy for Critical and Emerging Technology (S/TECH). The S/TECH should make secure supply chains for drones a priority, along with other measures such as coordinating restrictions and safeguards against Chinese drones. Additionally, the DOD should elevate UAS as a priority agenda item for all bilateral and multilateral technology engagements carried out by US diplomats with allies and partners.

Taken together, these steps will offer significant protection for the United States and its allies from the threat of Chinese-made UAS.

U.S Secretary of State Antony Blinken, accompanied by the U.S. Ambassador to Nigeria Mary Beth Leonard, walks past a Zipline drone while touring an Innovation Exhibition at Innov8 Hub in Abuja, Nigeria November 19, 2021. Andrew Harnik/Pool via REUTERS

2. Promote the development of a robust drone-manufacturing capability in the United States and allied countries to provide a secure alternative to PRC-made drones.

The second major element of the strategy is to promote the development of a robust drone-manufacturing capability in the United States and allied countries. As outlined above, drones are critical for many purposes, and Chinese-made systems dominate all drone markets. As the United States and allied countries successfully de-risk from Chinese-made drones, they will need to replace this supply with drones produced by trusted sources.

Some of the steps identified in the “protect” element of the strategy will also stimulate domestic US and allied production. A selective ban on Chinese drones will naturally increase demand for drones produced elsewhere. Stiffer tariffs on Chinese-made drones will help to level the playing field and make non-PRC-made drones more competitive in the market.

To ensure these bans can be effectively enacted while being minimally disruptive, the federal government should provide funding incentives to facilitate the transition away from PRC-made UAS. As noted earlier, Florida’s ban on PRC-made UAS left local bodies, including fire departments and law-enforcement agencies, scrambling to find funding for alternatives. The provision of federal funds can help overcome the financial burden of buying alternatives to PRC UAS. The DIIG Act, for example, promises to provide funding for state and local agencies to purchase UAS for infrastructure inspections. Federal funding should be conditional, and only available to states that fully ban PRC-made UAS. For example, states that only ban DJI and not Autel, or that fail to ban the use of PRC-made UAS by contractors, would not be eligible for this funding.

The State Department should share these efforts, such as the DIIG Act, with allied countries and encourage the adoption of similar measures by allied governments. Its network of allies is the cornerstone of US national security. Therefore, the United States must encourage its allies to adopt similar policies that promote their own security as well.

In addition, the Pentagon’s Replicator initiative should be harnessed to stimulate a major leap forward in the development and deployment of US autonomous systems. In the short timeframe of 18–24 months, Replicator can help modernize the DOD’s warfighting capabilities and produce thousands of new drones. The US Congress and the DOD should prioritize significant, enduring funding for the Replicator initiative.

The efforts initially achieved through Replicator can be boosted by utilizing the Office of Strategic Capital (OSC). Established in 2022, OSC identifies critical technologies for the DOD and partners with private capital and other agencies to create investment vehicles. Given Replicator’s priority status for the department, the development of the autonomous UAS industry should be a prioritized area for OSC. However, OSC funding is designed to target small companies that would not be able to produce systems at scale in order to contribute to Replicator. Instead, OSC should consider boosting small, innovative companies that are in the UAS supply chain and help enable the critical domestic industrial base of advanced components for current and future UAS systems. By designating UAS as a priority area for OSC, the Department of Defense can help create a strong domestic manufacturing base for this technology.

There is potential for OSC funding to play an important role in strengthening the domestic UAS industry, with the White House requesting $144 million for the office in 2025. In addition to fully meeting the White House’s request for OSC funding, Congress should continue funding other accelerators and offices that strengthen the development of companies across the DOD’s fourteen critical technology areas.

In order to meet any potential funding gaps, the DOD should be prepared to provide additional funding for investment in small UAV systems outside of OSC, including by increasing related funding to the relevant task forces working inside of the Army, Navy, and Air Force. Furthermore, Congress should authorize additional funding for the Defense Production Act that will allow the Department of Defense to further invest in the defense industrial base, including the development of asymmetric capabilities such as the small drones that have played a critical role in Ukraine’s battlefield success.

The US Departments of State and Defense can encourage key allies to adopt their own versions of the Replicator program to ensure the free world has UAS in mass that will be necessary to deter and defeat aggression in the twenty-first century. Additionally, the Department of Defense should consider the potential to invite other allies and partners into the Replicator program, or establish a multinational, allied Replicator initiative. In doing so, the department would scale the allied drone industry, create interoperability among combined allied forces, and strengthen allied deterrence against great-power adversaries.

DOD is already working to integrate UAS and autonomous systems more broadly into its operations. The US Navy’s Task Force 59 aims to better integrate emerging technologies into warfighting, and is currently focused on robotics and autonomous systems. Task Force 59 operates a variety of uncrewed vehicles, including submersible and surface-level ships, alongside UAS.

The Air Force operates Task Force 99.² Based in Qatar, it has developed a 3D-printed UAV, dubbed the “kestrel,” which can be produced for $2,500 and can carry a payload of up to three kilograms.

The efforts of Task Forces 59 and 99 are a solid start, but they have been challenged by institutional hurdles and a lack of funding. Similar concerns have been raised about the ability of the private sector to meet the government’s demand for Replicator. Any successful long-term strategy in this area will require close coordination between the private and public sectors. Replicator offers a good starting point, allowing the DOD to establish trust with the defense-technology industry, break free from the antiquated Cold War procurement process, and establish the new defense industrial base required for twenty-first-century security.

Beyond Replicator, Congress should pass legislation modeled on the CHIPS and Science Act to produce autonomous unmanned aerial vehicles. Recognizing a similar challenge related to domestic semiconductor manufacturing, Congress passed the CHIPS and Science Act in 2022. The act provides billions of dollars in incentives for the research, development, and manufacturing of semiconductors. It has already stimulated the construction of new semiconductor-fabrication facilities in the United States. Similarly, the United States should provide a variety of incentives, including tax credits and investments, for the research, development, and manufacturing of autonomous vehicles. Stimulating US manufacture of autonomous vehicles will make drones available for DOD procurement, while also allowing US-made UAS to be sold globally for commercial applications.

Creating an equivalent piece of legislation for the manufacturing of UAS would have one major difference compared to the CHIPS Act—the price would be significantly lower. A manufacturing facility for the production of semiconductor chips costs a minimum of $10 billion while taking at least five years to build. Compare that to the US drone manufacturer Skydio, which raised $230 million in additional funding in 2023, part of which paid for the construction of a new UAV-manufacturing facility within the United States that expanded its production capacity ten times. For a fraction of the $54-billion CHIPS Act, the United States can successfully develop and support a variety of domestic UAV-manufacturing operations.

US allies and partners have taken note of the CHIPS Act and passed their own legislation to advance in this space. For example, the European Union enacted the European Chips Act into law in September 2023. As the US encouraged allies to invest in CHIPS, it can encourage key allies to stimulate domestic drone manufacturing in their countries.

Coordinating these actions will require a whole-of-free-world approach, among the White House, the Department of Defense, the Department of State, the Department of Commerce, and US allies and partners. To achieve these ambitious goals, the president should consider designating an individual within the State Department’s S/TECH office. This individual would be responsible for coordinating this slate of policy proposals, similar to how the White House coordinator for CHIPS implementation operates. The special envoy should set a date for achieving the above benchmarks to ensure accountability.

Taken together, these actions can help create an industrial base in the United States and allied countries to provide a secure supply for UAS.

3. Align with allies and partners to forge a coherent free-world approach to the setting of policies, regulations, and norms regarding commercial UAS.

The third major element of the strategy is to forge a coherent free-world approach to the setting of policies, regulations, and norms regarding commercial UAS. Among the United States’ greatest strengths in its competition with China is its network of allies and partners. Combined, the United States and its allies possess nearly 60 percent of global gross domestic product (GDP) and, when they work together, they retain a preponderance of power to shape global outcomes.

The G7, the G20, and the Quad are all multilateral groupings in which the United States has galvanized allies and partners alike to develop a series of secure supply chains for semiconductors. It should do the same with UAS.

The Scowcroft Center has previously argued that the United States and its allies should establish a new Democratic Technology Alliance to coordinate the free world’s approach on emerging technology, including UAS. Short of this, the United States and its allies should work through existing bilateral and multilateral channels.

The United States should continue to work with its allies to develop regulations and norms for the responsible use of new technology, including UAS, through bodies such as the US-EU TTC, NATO, G7, G20, and WTO. The United States would be well served to develop polices in coordination with its allies and partners through these forums. Doing so will help ensure a coordinated approach going forward. The United States should also raise concerns in these bodies about China’s unfair and illegal behavior. Though the WTO lacks teeth when coming after China, raising concerns about its behavior and trade disputes at the WTO can help build evidence of a pattern of unfair actions. The development of clear norms would help to demonstrate that the free world is not taking punitive measures against China or seeking to hold China down. Rather, it is taking prudent actions to protect itself from China’s unfair and threatening practices. If China were to reform its practices and its economic system, it could be welcomed back into US and allied markets.

Concurrently, the Department of Commerce and its International Trade Administration should play a central role in developing a trusted ecosystem—both in the United States and with its allies and partners—to secure critical components to strengthen domestic UAS manufacturing while promoting US-made drones around the world.

In addition, the United States should leverage the new trilateral defense pact, AUKUS. AUKUS Pillar II brings together Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States to improve defense coordination across critical-technology areas, including artificial intelligence and autonomy, innovation, and information sharing. The Pentagon should work with AUKUS partners to prioritize the development of advanced UAS.

Moreover, Washington should work with allies and partners to develop a secure supply chain for UAV components and manufacturing. DOD has already cleared two drones produced by Parrot, a French UAV manufacturer, as secure and reliable through its Blue UAS program. This will allow for the manufacturing of component parts through final assembly to take place in trusted countries.

NATO offers other opportunities for Washington to coordinate with allies on emerging technologies. The NATO Defence Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic (DIANA) is a venue for Alliance members to coordinate on the development of emerging technologies, bringing together researchers, industry, and government. In 2023, DIANA announced the first three areas in which it aims to encourage the development of dual-use technologies. One of these domains, sensing and surveillance, is a logical avenue for the allied development of UAS. Indeed, DIANA has already accepted a Czech UAV manufacturer into the program. Here, the United States should utilize DIANA as a means to further cooperation on UAS and enable reciprocal development and manufacturing relationships across Europe, creating the basis of a dual-use drone industry.

In addition, the United States should work with its allies to secure the key UAS component supply chain, including batteries and battery cells. Part of the solution concerns mineral access. Amid a global transition to low-carbon energy sources, China’s strong position in the global lithium market and Russia’s robust nickel-mining capacity present challenges to US efforts to secure access to minerals needed for batteries. As several colleagues in the Atlantic Council’s Global Energy Center have argued, one option to address these challenges is supporting research, development, and capacity building for alternative battery chemistries. This includes leveraging public capital from US and allied governments and using tax incentives to encourage diversification of battery inputs. In 2021, the Department of Energy announced that innovations related to advanced batteries, which were developed via taxpayer dollars through Department of Energy (DOE) funding, would need to be “substantially” manufactured in the United States. In 2023, as a result of the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law, DOE announced $3.5 billion “to boost domestic production of advanced batteries and battery materials nationwide.” At the same time, the federal government, as well state and local governments, will need to muster the political will to allow domestic mining and refining of these minerals to ensure truly secure access to batteries. Once regulatory red tape is reduced, private capital necessary for the development of this domestic capability will enter the battery market. This sort of public-private engagement is an important part of shoring up the US battery supply chain and mitigating vulnerabilities vis-à-vis China.

Taken together, these steps will help to ensure a successful and coordinated free-world approach to UAS.

Conclusion

This paper recommended a protect-promote-align strategy to help the United States and its allies secure a trusted UAS industry to compete against China. China’s dominance of the dual-use UAS sector presents an unacceptable national security risk to the United States and its allies. Following this strategy will allow the United States and its allies to counter the unfair CCP practices that have led to China’s ill-begotten dominance of the global UAS market. A dedicated strategy, one that limits the use of PRC-made UAS, creates incentives for domestic UAS production, aligns the United States and its likeminded allies, and will allow the free world to retain its innovation edge over the CCP and better position itself for victory in a new era of strategic competition.

About the authors

Matthew Kroenig is vice president and senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. In these roles, he manages the Scowcroft Center’s nonpartisan team of more than thirty resident staff and oversees the Council’s extensive network of nonresident fellows. His own research focuses on US national security strategy, strategic competition with China and Russia, and strategic deterrence and weapons nonproliferation.

Imran Bayoumi is an associate director with the Scowcroft Strategy Initiative in the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. He supports the Center’s work on foresight and strategy development, focusing on emerging technologies, conflict, and climate security. In addition, Bayoumi contributes to the development of the Center’s annual “Global Foresight” publication.

US-Turkey relations in an era of geopolitical conflict

Atlantic Council Turkey Programs — Tue, 25 Jun 2024 00:00:00 +0000

Foreword

The first half of 2024 has brought new energy and dynamics to US-Turkish bilateral strategic ties, much—though not all—positive. The successful sequential approval of Swedish accession into NATO and Turkish acquisition of upgraded F16V air warfare deterrent restored a level of trust, albeit rooted in transactionalism, after nearly a decade of unarrested divergence and increasing mistrust. New hope in defense industrial cooperation has been embodied by new investments in the field including a significant new munitions collaboration in Texas. Turkish diplomatic reconciliations with a number of US regional allies—Egypt, Greece, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE—have removed an additional source of friction while the war in Gaza has led to new tensions, and very divergent policies. This issue of Defense Journal provides a snapshot of several current dynamics in the strategic relationship at a critical time, approaching the NATO Summit in Washington. Enjoy!

Dr. Rich Outzen & Dr. Can Kasapoglu, Defense Journal by Atlantic Council IN TURKEY Co-managing editors

Articles

Sweden’s NATO accession: A twenty-month square dance

By Rich Outzen

Drones and more: Turkish defense cooperation trends in the air

By Can Kasapoglu

Türkiye and the Russian military threat to NATO

By Gen. (ret.) Yavuz Türkgenci

The F-16 deal is as good for NATO as it is for Turkey

By Andrew Bernard

Small, smart, many and cheaper: Competitive adaptation in modern warfare

Interview with Thomas X. Hammes

Defense Journal by Atlantic Council in Turkey interview with Gregory Bloom

Interview with Gregory Bloom

Honorary advisory board

The Defense Journal by Atlantic Council IN TURKEY‘s honorary advisory board provides vision and direction for the journal. We are honored to have Atlantic Council board directors Gen. Wesley K. Clark, former commander of US European Command; Amb. Paula J. Dobriansky, former Under Secretary of State for Global Affairs; Gen. James L. Jones, former national security advisor to the President of the United States; Franklin D. Kramer, former Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs; Lt. Gen. Douglas E. Lute, former US Ambassador to NATO; and Dov S. Zakheim, former Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) and Chief Financial Officer for the Department of Defense.

Gen. Wesley K. Clark

Chairman and CEO of Wesley K. Clark & Associates & Board Director, Atlantic Council

Amb. Paula J. Dobriansky, Ph.D.

Senior Fellow at Harvard University JFK Belfer Center for Science & International Affairs; former Under Secretary of State for Global Affairs (2001-2009)

Gen. James L. Jones

President, Jones Group International; Former National Security Advisor to the President of the United States; Executive Chairman Emeritus, Atlantic Council

Franklin D. Kramer

Distinguished Fellow & Board Director, Atlantic Council

Lt. Gen. Douglas E. Lute

CEO, Cambridge Global Advisors & Board Director, Atlantic Council; Former Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs

Dov S. Zakheim

Senior Advisor, Center for Strategic and International Studies; Senior Fellow, CNA Corporation; & Board Director, Atlantic Council

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Türkiye and the Russian military threat to NATO

Yavuz Türkgenci — Tue, 25 Jun 2024 00:00:00 +0000

A wounded bear still has claws

Russia’s military troubles in the initial stages of its expanded war against Ukraine in 2022 prompted a wave of military analysis describing the Russian military as far weaker than had been previously thought, and asking how the West got it so wrong. Two years into the war, though, Western analysts have again been surprised by how quickly Russia was able to overcome massive losses and rebuild and retool its forces—again raising the specter of outright Russian military victory. By dramatically increasing defense budgets, adapting to the lessons of the battlefield, and drawing on a defense-industrial alliance with China and Iran, Russia reconstituted its forces in a manner that threatens to destabilize Ukrainian defenses—and might have recovered enough capability to cause real concern about NATO defenses elsewhere.

This should prompt leaders in NATO capitals to ask whether the Alliance is currently capable of deterring or defeating Russia on the battlefield. It is no simple question. War is a matter not just of aggregate economic output, but also of national will, alliance cohesion, geography, and combat readiness. Over the past two years, Russia has learned important lessons from the war and has managed to partially transform its armed forces to meet the operational requirements of the digital age. Through the invasion, the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation have developed a strong—though costly—conventional warfighting capability and an established command structure. When critical capabilities—such as mobilization, medical evacuation and treatment, and the development of the defense industry—are factored in, the experience the Kremlin has gained from the Ukrainian battlefield could have critical implications for NATO’s collective defense.

De facto alliances that have emerged alongside the war also carry important warning signs. Russia’s collaboration with Iran and the contributions of China and North Korea to the Russian war effort are important harbingers of a new global security landscape. Compared to the World War II Axis or the former Warsaw Pact of Soviet times, this axis could pose a more effective and powerful threat to the West in relative terms. The resources and global power of the coalition in question are much greater than those of the former Soviet Union. It will be no simple matter to establish a balance of power with such a grouping or deterrence against it. Among other things, it will require Alliance members to do more to leverage the growing strength of one of the Alliance’s heavy hitters in economic and military affairs—Türkiye*—than has been done to date.

Global echoes of conflict

Although the Russian war against Ukraine is being waged in Eastern Europe, important developments in other areas of the world, such as Africa and the Middle East, can be linked to it. Military coups on the African continent bear Russian fingerprints and have led to a reduction in US and French access and military cooperation. The war in Gaza, in addition to being a humanitarian disaster, has led to a rise in anti-Israel and anti-Western sentiment, especially in the Global South, taking pressure off of Russia and benefiting China.

The defense of Ukraine has revealed significant gaps in the defense-industrial capabilities of the NATO Alliance, raising questions about its ability to mobilize for extended conventional conflicts. Crises such as China-Taiwan tensions and North Korea’s missile tests cast a gloomy shadow over such conversations. Considering that some of the former security mechanisms, such as strategic arms-control agreements and the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE), are no longer in effect, the global threat environment for NATO is worsening at an alarming pace. NATO has noticed the shifting environment, and has taken steps toward strengthening deterrence and a reliable global security architecture. War planners understand what might not always be obvious to the broader public in NATO nations—that to be effective, NATO’s strategic and operational framework needs to fully integrate the evolving technical and military capabilities of all NATO members, including Türkiye. However, steps by NATO members that are also European Union (EU) members to keep non-EU members of the Alliance outside the EU Military and Defense Industry Structure indicates there might be a problem.

Reforging and refocusing NATO

NATO, which during the Cold War focused on defense against in-area threats, has increasingly taken on a broader, and more global, mission set. This stance manifested itself regionally first, with intervention in the Balkans, then globally with interventions in Afghanistan and Libya. However, NATO’s withdrawal from Afghanistan has created doubt about the organization’s effectiveness and its global credibility. It is critical that NATO learn important lessons from these past crises, and especially from Russia’s current war, and adapt its structure properly.

Following the strategic concept published in 2022, NATO is expected to review its command and force structures and defense planning system to adapt to the contemporary security situation. In this context, one of the most important issues NATO is working on is the effective use of digital-age technologies for defense purposes.

NATO’s permanent and internationally manned command structure is an important force multiplier. Reviewing the NATO command structure in the coming period, with an approach based on the space-land battle concept as well as the multidomain operation concept, will enable it to respond effectively to the needs of the age. In this digital era, big data (BD) and artificial intelligence (AI) have a significant impact on command-and-control (C2) activities. A C2 system based on the OODA (observe, orient, decide, act) loop approach and utilizing BD and AI has become an imminent necessity. Such a system will have significant impacts on software, hardware, and, more importantly, on the working procedures at headquarters. Staff officers and commanders should get used to working in a data-centric manner. Such an approach will have significant implications for NATO’s command structure, both physically and in terms of working procedures. Naturally, accelerating the military decision-making cycle will be an important force multiplier.

NATO gained an important capability by establishing high-readiness, corps-level headquarters in its force structure. NATO may also review these headquarters and come up with new doctrines to meet contemporary requirements. Combined with AI-augmented C2 capabilities, manned and unmanned units could increase the effectiveness of these headquarters. The realization of commonly funded unmanned units may increase the effectiveness of the NATO force structure.

Defense planning should be another area of focus for future posturing. In NATO defense planning, especially in determining operational requirements, shifting from a capability-based approach to a threat- and technology-based approach would be appropriate and useful in guiding allied countries in preparing their forces. Because of the Cold War era, NATO is no stranger to a threat-based approach, and a similar approach can be tailored to today’s security landscape. Additionally, more emphasis should be placed on harnessing technological resources to build military capabilities, integrating off-the-shelf products in this structure, and encouraging the design of future concepts and systems using digital engineering approaches. The defense planning system should also contribute to the establishment and maintenance of a decent Alliance-wide defense-technological industrial base (DTIB). NATO has taken important measures to enhance deterrence and increase combat readiness on its eastern border. These measures could be reconsidered to include critical regions such as Africa. Naturally, the measures taken will not be the same as those on the eastern border. The modifications should account for the conditions and security needs of the particular regions.

Türkiye’s past and potential contributions

In its seventy-two years of membership, Türkiye has duly fulfilled all its obligations to NATO. Türkiye was a cornerstone of Western deterrence of Soviet aggression throughout the decades of the Cold War, and provided robust military and political contributions to NATO operations in Bosnia and Kosovo. In Afghanistan, Türkiye agreed to operate the airport in Kabul, which was crucial to the Alliance’s mission. During the most critical period, it successfully assumed command of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and fulfilled its responsibilities as a framework nation. More recently, Ankara successfully evacuated NATO personnel, as well as political and military staff, from the airport under highly challenging conditions and in coordination with allies. On several occasions, Türkiye responded immediately to NATO’s requests for airborne warning, despite its own needs. Also, Türkiye’s important contributions to missile defense are well known within the Alliance.

The Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) of the 2020s are an experienced and successful warfighting organization. The TAF has conducted operations in various parts of the world, particularly in Syria and Iraq. These operations cover a wide spectrum, from classical operations to peacekeeping, and include specialized missions in mountainous regions. The planning and conduct of operations in Libya, Syria, and the Caucasus all required considerable capacity and professionalism. Almost all of the missions conducted have been at the large-scale, strategic, or operational levels. The planning, preparation, execution, and replanning of these operations within the framework of subsequent operations require considerable professionalism. These operations faced different types of adversaries, geographical conditions, logistical challenges, and casualty risks, further demonstrating the TAF’s flexibility and combat readiness.

The TAF is among the world’s leading armies in the use of unmanned systems, especially unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). The Turkish defense industry and military services have reached an important level in the preparation of combat concepts, and the design, production, and use of unmanned systems. The experience gained in the field of UAVs has also led to important developments for unmanned sea vehicles (USVs) and unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs). The Turkish Armed Forces continue their transition into the digital age. With a high level of combat readiness and significant defense-industry support, Ankara’s improving military capabilities will continue to make important contributions to global security and NATO. Turkish defense-technological advances—combined with recent combat experience, strategically valuable geography, and militarily-relevant resources (especially industrial capabilities and manpower)—mean that Türkiye’s potential future contributions to the Alliance are even more critical than those it has made in the past.

Stumbling blocks

Unfortunately, for several reasons, NATO has not been able to utilize Türkiye’s capacity sufficiently. One reason is the marginalization of Turkish threat perceptions by a number of Alliance members. This includes the attitude of certain members toward the Kurdish Workers’ Party (PKK) and its Syrian branch known as the PYD. Naturally, Turks see the PKK as an existential threat, and Ankara expects its allies to stand on its side—but a number of allies support the group tacitly or, more directly, via its Syrian affiliate. Secondly, Ankara’s stance on the Fethullah Terrorist Organization (FETO), which is blamed for the 2016 coup attempt against the Turkish government, is similarly met with a mixture of skepticism and disregard by some Alliance members. Even accounting for the fact that domestic views on the PKK and FETO in member countries vary significantly, the simple fact is that failing to respect an ally’s threat perceptions—or, in some cases, actually strengthening the hand of those threats—undermines one of the pillars of Alliance cohesion.

Domestic political sentiment in NATO member countries sometimes creates resistance to supporting the Alliance, and Turkish public opinion is frequently targeted, and easily inflamed, through provocations involving religion. For example, burnings of the Quran in Sweden and Finland, two countries in the process of becoming new NATO members, crossed the line of unacceptability for Türkiye’s predominantly Muslim population. From a military point of view, these incidents hold important lessons and deeply impact NATO’s cohesion and unity. They could cause significant damage to NATO’s center of gravity—cohesion—which, in turn, could hurt the Alliance’s overall operational readiness. It goes without saying that such events could cause much more significant results and leave NATO open to exploitation by an adversary during a crisis. Lastly, defense-industrial restrictions and bans by some allies have also negatively affected Turkish, and thus NATO, combat readiness. Most recently, the denial of Ankara’s desired F-35 fighter jets and difficulties over the procurement of air-defense systems have had both positive and negative consequences. While the F-16V deal recently went through, the continued denial of systems such as F-35 fighter jets and the imposition of embargoes caused the Turkish defense industry to stand more firmly on its own feet, and these denials continue to hurt NATO’s combat readiness level.

Conclusion

The Russian war on Ukraine and other unfolding developments in global security point to the need for NATO to take important measures for the future that make it capable of responding to the security threats of the digital age. In this sense, it is important to both solidify the cohesion of NATO and make modifications that will facilitate sufficient use of the combat experience of the Turkish Armed Forces. Under this effort, a review of the TAF’s role in NATO’s victorious emergence from the Cold War would give useful insights for NATO’s future posturing, combat readiness, and defense planning. It will not be enough for the Alliance’s military and civilian officials to recognize the need for a better “Türkiye strategy” moving forward—the national governments in member states need to review past restrictions and actions in light of this need.

Yavuz Türkgenci is a recently retired three-star general in the Turkish Armed Forces whose career spanned several offices, including western European Union and NATO posts and as the commandant of the Turkish Third Field Army. He holds a doctorate in security strategy design and management.

*This article refers to “Türkiye,” the country name that the Turkish government and United Nations officially adopted in 2022.

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Small, smart, many and cheaper: Competitive adaptation in modern warfare

Atlantic Council Turkey Programs — Tue, 25 Jun 2024 00:00:00 +0000

Defense Journal’s Rich Outzen spoke with T. X. Hammes, a nonresident senior fellow in the Forward Defense program of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security and a distinguished research fellow in the Center for Strategic Research at the Institute of National Security Studies of the US National Defense University, on January 26, 2024. The conversation is lightly edited for style.

Defense Journal by Atlantic Council IN TURKEY (DJ): Dr. Hammes, you’ve been tracking and predicting developments in drones, unmanned systems, and the changing nature of combined arms warfare for over a decade now. Looking back, what has surprised you and what has confirmed your early surmises in recent years?

T. X. Hammes: From the beginning I expected that “small, smart, and many” could overcome “few and exquisite” by sheer numbers. The general trend has held, but what has surprised me—especially in Ukraine—has been how quickly users have adapted. For instance, Ukraine has employed carpenters to build drones made out of wood powered by outboard motors. It was undeterred by its lack of manufacturing facilities for advanced synthetic materials. These drones launch from a simple wheeled carriage but can achieve a range of 750 kilometers, and carry a fairly substantial payload. These very cheap systems are being used to attack oil facilities deep in Russia.

I suggested in 2016 that, in many cases, an unmanned aerial system (UAS) doesn’t necessarily have to deliver the explosive; it is enough to bring the detonator. Modern societies provide their own explosives and combustibles. Very small drones can do great damage by impacting with enough of a detonating charge to induce fuel, ammunition, or energy sources to explode. Large warheads are not required.

In 2016, the idea had little traction with senior [officers], but younger, field grade officers got it. Unfortunately, developing a concept and bending the procurement system are two very different things. We have the “iron triangle” of vested interests in procurement—defense contractors, the Pentagon, and Congress. Each is vested in keeping current systems and approaches for as long as possible. This is very difficult to change. Congressional reversal of the US Navy’s attempt to not refuel an aircraft carrier (the Harry S. Truman) in favor of devoting more resources to advanced strike capabilities is an example of this. There are thousands of jobs in congressional districts engaged in military production: the Joint Strike Fighter (F-35) involves production in forty-five of the fifty states. Couple these economic incentives with the fact that military officers are inherently conservative as a group, and you see resistance to real or rapid change.

As always, warfare will include the adaption, counteradaption and counter-counteradaption cycle. The Turkish Bayraktar drones were a shock early in the war in Ukraine, but the Russians gradually got an air defense system together and effectively neutralized the Bayraktar. Today, the Turks are developing jet stealth systems like the US Valkyrie XQ58A. I don’t know what the Turkish model will cost, but the Valkyrie is roughly $4 million apiece. The F-35 costs nearly $140 million each. With an expected operational lifespan of 8,000 hours, at $30,000 per flight hour, the lifetime operations and maintenance (O&M) cost can exceed $360 million per F-35. This gets to be real money over time. Further, with the current fleet-wide mission capable rate of just over 50 percent, you effectively need two aircraft (for $720 million) to ensure one mission-capable aircraft. Current full-mission capable rates on the F-35 are 28 percent, so we’re close to needing four to ensure one fully mission-capable aircraft. In essence you are spending $1.4 billion for each full mission-capable F-35. You can have hundreds of XQ58As at that price. And the world will know where the F-35s are (few in number, operating in a world with pervasive surveillance). Keep in mind, these figures cover only O&M costs for F-35s. They do not cover the cost of pilot or maintenance personnel and training pipelines. Nor do they cover the cost of large fixed air bases and air defense for the facilities required to operate F-35s. The Turks will likely develop an export version of their aircraft, and so we can see a world in which small, high-speed, deep-penetrating drones with a variety of onboard armaments and sensors will be available to almost anyone. Drones like these can operate up to 1,500 miles beyond launch points. And they do about the same as some of the advanced munitions fired by F-35s, such as the Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile, or JASSM, at $3 million a missile.

DJ: Some observers think that Russia is winning the drone war against Ukraine, including Eric Schmidt, whose recent Foreign Affairs article, “Ukraine Is Losing the Drone War,” cited the effective pairing of drones for observation and strike (Orlans and Lancets). Do you agree?

Hammes: Schmidt is right about Russia outproducing Ukraine in drones. But this does not translate directly to winning the conflict. I find it bizarre that some commentators essentially take the Russian side without critical comparison. This goes for commentators and in some cases political leaders. If you look at both Russian and Ukrainian sources, Ukraine continues to inflict three or four times as many casualties on attacking Russian forces: this is typically the case, an advantage to the defender.

With regards to UAS, both sides are training a lot of drone pilots. But as the war drags on, both Ukrainians and Russians are finding difficulty in recruiting for traditional combat arms. For instance, recent warehouse fires in Saint Petersburg and elsewhere in Russia reportedly stem from resistance to the forced roundup of conscripts for the war.

In the case of the Foreign Affairs article, title notwithstanding, the piece was not really about the drone competition—it was about industrial competition and the race to mass produce. The article was right: it’s an industrial competition. Ukraine can win and compete if the United States leans into it. But the Biden administration has been too reticent in providing advanced and long-range strike systems. The Kerch Strait Bridge should be down. And why are we demilitarizing MLRS [multiple launch rocket system] ammunition rather than allowing the Ukrainians to fire it in defense of their country? Domestic politics on both sides of the aisle has been working against us fully leaning into the defense industrial competition. The Russian production goal is two million UAS per year; they are not there yet. The Ukrainian goal is 100,000 per month. They are producing enough to pose a substantial long-range strike capability deep into Russia. Russia has already had to pull air defense systems back from Ukraine into its own territory to defend key sites. In the Ukraine war, we are seeing early forms of largely autonomous UAS and swarm usage. After launch, some of these systems can be fully autonomous. If you launch tens of thousands per month, the requirement for autonomous guidance grows. It is far more complex than UAS usage in counterinsurgency or small wars.

DJ: Turning to the US military, have we adapted doctrine, organization, and employment to shift from drones as a counterterror platform to drones as an integral part of maneuver warfare?

Hammes: The services are trying. The US Navy fielded Task Force 59 in the Persian Gulf as a way to deploy experimental unmanned technologies and designs. The US Fourth Fleet stood up an experimental task force. The Navy also deployed a four-ship squadron of unmanned systems in the Pacific—primarily as a sensor package. Following the Marine Corps FD2030 lead [Force Design 2030], the US Army has a Strategic Mid-range Fires program that includes small-signature trucks launching Tomahawks and other missiles up to and beyond 1,500 miles. In a major war against a near-peer competitor—say China—airfields and fixed installations will be heavily targeted, so distributed fires of this sort will be important. We can conceivably go to country X and buy native-style trucks, which will be very survivable due to blending in, and put these systems on them. The US Air Force is investing in unmanned combat vehicles as wingmen for F-35s or advanced bombers. But again, everyone will know where the advanced bombers live and stay. Containerized missiles based on commercial ships can saturate bomber airfields and kill low-density, high-cost assets on the ground. In sum, we are seeing adaptation beginning across the forces, but procurement and advanced planning remain the big problems. Instead of $360 million for one aircraft we should consider buying 360 $1 million missiles in containers. These systems need a high level of autonomy and small crews. In the current environment, we need to focus resources on the weapons, not the delivery platforms. Low cost and expendable, primarily unmanned weapons will overwhelm the large, exquisite but few platforms of our current forces.

DJ: Defense Journal examines issues of common interest to the United States, Turkey, and NATO. Can I get your views on the Turkish experience with UAS, and how they’ve become a major player in production, export, and operational use of UAS?

Hammes: Unmanned systems allow a country at very low cost to influence a conflict. With automated systems you can intervene regionally with lower human cost, and little risk of blowback. Turkey has done this successfully. What will be interesting is when the other side starts countering with their own UASs. As these systems proliferate, what is to keep cheap launch trucks and boats from approaching striking range of Turkey? When everyone has long-range precision strike capability, and every modern society has highly combustible, energy-dense targets embedded in their society, security concepts have to adapt. Not just medium powers, but insurgent groups have the ability increasingly to conduct this type of operation. The Houthis proved this with the attack on Saudi oil facilities. There are massive geopolitical implications when everyone can strike at long range.

DJ: In most military technological fields there is a sort of dialectic or cat-and-mouse game between developers of offensive and defensive systems. Why the great lag in counter-UAS systems vis-à-vis the platforms themselves?

Hammes: There is a lag. UASs present a very tough challenge. Many are very small and made of polymers, plastics, and wood, so they are very difficult to track and engage. That said, the electronic warfare (EW) systems of Russia and Ukraine have been very effective. But the counter-countermeasure has been more autonomy for the attack systems. We are seeing autonomous drones that carry EW jammers, and rely more on visual/optical IR [i.e., infrared] sensors. In the war in Karabagh, 70 percent of vehicle kills were achieved by drones or drone-fired munitions—and the Armenian side was not prepared. If you look at Reddit and other social media feeds covering the fighting in Ukraine, you can see absolutely terrifying videos of how UASs dominate the battlespace. UASs are hunting individual vehicles and soldiers. They can fly into buildings and turn corners in pursuit.

The game of competitive adaption has been a mixed bag. At one level, UAS have greatly strengthened tactical defense. Yet with increased methods of long-range strike, at the operational level, offensive capabilities are strengthened. Perhaps also strategically, as we see Ukraine going hard against the Russian oil industry.

We are starting to see the advent of counterdrone drones: drones that fly into other drones. It will be interesting to see how this further develops; we are likely to see a cheap version of the identify friend or foe (IFF) sensors carried on manned aircraft to protect drones operating over friendly forces, so you don’t have your own killing your own. The innovation cycle in Ukraine is very short, with each side adapting rapidly, sometimes in a few days, to innovations by the other side. In fact, Ukrainian innovation with naval drones has pushed the Russian Black Sea fleet back significantly. In less than a year, starting from scratch, Ukraine developed unmanned surface vessels that hit several Russia ships and restored export shipping lanes for Ukrainian products.

There is a need now for better command and control nodes to consolidate information from pervasive drone sensors and get it to commanders. We have entered the era of pervasive intelligence for targeting; everyone will be visible and targetable, so everyone will have to keep moving.

My key advice for the United States and its friends is to get away from focusing on platforms and focus on weapons.

T. X. Hammes is a nonresident senior fellow at the Forward Defense program of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. Hammes is also a distinguished research fellow in the Center for Strategic Research at the Institute of National Security Studies of the US National Defense University.

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The F-16 deal is as good for NATO as it is for Turkey

Andrew Bernard — Tue, 25 Jun 2024 00:00:00 +0000

The Biden administration’s January approval and June contract finalization of the sale of forty new F-16 fighter jets to Turkey and the upgrade of nearly eighty of its F-16 airframes was most certainly celebrated in Ankara. After years of acrimony following Turkey’s acquisition of the Russian S-400 air defense system and its subsequent expulsion from the US-led F-35 program, the inking of this deal represents a turn in the right direction in the US-Turkish relationship. NATO military planners in Europe also have reason to cheer Turkey’s commitment to upgrade its fighter aircraft fleet on a large scale, even though it is not a purchase of fifth-generation F-35s.

For the Turkish Air Force, this F-16 acquisition brings familiarity and precedence that will make the integration of these aircraft nearly seamless—or at least an order of magnitude easier than onboarding an unfamiliar airframe. Turkey explored the option of acquiring Eurofighter Typhoon aircraft as a hedge against the possibility of the US F-16 deal falling through and is publicly keeping this option alive. New weapon systems bring countless changes, and not all of them are better. Pilots, technicians, and support personnel would all be starting from square one to learn a different airframe such as the Typhoon and its associated systems. Aircraft maintenance procedures and logistics processes would involve a steep learning curve. With the next generation F-16, Turkish Air Force personnel would instead be evolving and adapting their current (and deep) knowledge of the weapon system, adjusting to particularities of the newest version. For NATO, such an ease of incorporating new and upgraded F-16s into the Turkish Air Force would be helpful, making the aircraft mission ready and available for NATO planning shortly after delivery. The scale of purchase that Turkey is pursuing should also please NATO air planners at Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) in Belgium and at NATO Air Command in Germany. With over 240 F-16s, the Turkish Air Force is already the largest NATO air arm—besides the United States—to employ the F-16. While the Turkish Air Force will likely retire some of their older jets upon obtaining the new F-16s, the rest of the fleet should remain in service for years to come.

Force offering with teeth

This is, however, about more than the number of airframes. It’s about Turkey upgrading such a large number to a high capability level, incorporating advanced active electronically scanned array radars, modern electronic warfare suites, and updated data links among other equipment. This shows that Turkey is willing to modernize its F-16 with improved capabilities to make them more lethal and survivable against modern air threats. Air forces failing to upgrade their fleets risk relegating their air arms to irrelevancy, and that is not the case with Turkey.

These F-16s are needed for NATO missions. NATO air leaders are most concerned about fighting anti-access, area denial (A2AD) campaigns at the beginning of any conflict with a near-peer adversary in an attempt to gain air superiority—and the F-35 is perfect for this role. Nonetheless, there will be plenty of other NATO missions beyond A2AD, and the Turkish F-16s will be in a prime position to conduct those missions at scale. While European air forces are forecast to have more than 600 fifth-generation F-35s on the continent by 2030, there will still be hundreds of aircraft of other generations at NATO’s disposal. As NATO air tacticians work to optimize the simultaneous integration of fourth- and fifth-generation aircraft in the same battlespace, Turkey’s upgraded F-16s will be better postured to implement that integration due to the advance avionics and sensors being included in the forty new F-16s and the nearly eighty receiving upgrades.

Just as important, if not more so, is the Turkish commitment to buy advanced weapons in large quantities for its F-16 fleet. The proposed sale includes nearly one thousand AIM-120 medium-range, radar-guided air-to-air missiles, over 400 AIM-9X short-range, infrared-guided air-to-air missiles, and a plethora of precision air-to-surface munitions to attack fixed and mobile targets. This is an important point for NATO planners, as it ensures that Turkey’s force offering comes with teeth. Some nations acquire major weapon systems (aircraft, tanks, ships), but underinvest in munitions needed to employ the weapons systems—a hollow force, effectively eroding deterrence potential. This is not the case with Turkey, whose air force will be ready from day one with a credible fleet upon completion of the contract, reinforcing NATO’s conventional air forces deterrent potential.

Beyond the equipment itself, Turkey is positioning itself to be the de facto leader of NATO F-16 users: a leadership role it should enthusiastically embrace with this new acquisition. Current and future NATO F-16 users in Europe include Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Greece, Turkey, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Bulgaria. Notably, the epicenter of NATO F-16 employment is shifting from northwest Europe to southeast Europe, as the nations of four of the five European Participating Air Forces (EPAF) have committed to the F-35 (Netherlands, Norway, Denmark, and Belgium). Portugal, the sole EPAF nation that has yet to commit to the F-35, intends to fly the F-16 for the foreseeable future while exploring a replacement aircraft.

For the next two decades, southeast Europe and the Black Sea region will be dominated by F-16 users. Romania acquired its first F-16s from Portugal, with more to come from Norway. Bulgaria’s first F-16 Block 70 should take flight this year, and Slovakia is purchasing fourteen Block 70 F-16s as well. (“Block 70” refers to new F-16s produced in Greenville, South Carolina, while the “Viper Upgrade Program” allows older F-16s to be modernized to Block 70 standards. ) And while not currently a member of NATO, Ukraine is poised to start employing the F-16 soon. Given Turkey’s long history of using the F-16, and the fact that this deal involves the same Block 70 version of F-16s that Slovakia and Bulgaria will have, the Turkish Air Force should step into this role and be a mentor among the NATO F-16 community. For example, the Turks should consider establishing an F-16 Block 70 Fighter Weapons Instructor Training course, the same way the Dutch hosted the program for the EPAF community. NATO air forces would benefit greatly from a new generation of top-tier F-16 instructors and tacticians.

Relationship renewal?

There are hurdles to overcome before all these advantages come to fruition. Lockheed Martin will need to clear its F-16 production backlog for Turkey to capitalize relatively quickly on this purchase, as will the various subcontractors and weapon producers. Nonetheless, should the United States and Turkey succeed in overcoming these challenges, this acquisition could open the way for a renewed defense-industrial relationship between the United States and Turkey at a strategic level.

It must be emphasized that Turkey’s eventual support for Sweden’s entry into the North Atlantic Alliance sealed the deal for this F-16 purchase, and it is in Ankara’s best interest to continue to make common-sense decisions like this. The continued insistence on maintaining the S-400 system in its inventory will likely ensure Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) implementation remains intact. The abandonment of the S-400 could start the process leading to a potential reentry into the F-35 program. There are other potential areas for defense industrial cooperation such as US participation in Turkish warship and submarine programs, or US subsystem co-development for some of Ankara’s ambitious organic defense production efforts.

Additionally, some skeptics argue that Turkey has no intention of using its F-16s to deter Russia, preferring to employ them in counterinsurgency operations or balance against neighbors. This argument ignores that Turkey actively participates in both the NATO Defense Planning Process and Supreme Allied Commander Europe’s (SACEUR) regional defense planning development as part of its Alliance commitments to defend NATO airspace. Turkey’s air power contributions reinforce NATO’s overall deterrence posture, leaving Moscow no choice but to look at NATO’s defensive capabilities as a whole and not its parts.

Some analysts suggest this purchase is a wasted effort, given Turkey will acquire F-16s and not F-35s. Clearly, newer and upgraded F-16s are not F-35s. Nonetheless, this type of analysis is blind to the realities of the relationships involved. No amount of wishful thinking will bring the F-35 to Turkey immediately, as sovereign decisions by both parties are now “water under a bridge.” Even if the US Congress approved F-35s for Turkey overnight (which is not going to happen soon), the process to get a single F-35 to Turkey is many, many years away. This new F-16 acquisition fills that gap, improving bilateral relations while providing quantifiable, fielded air power for national and NATO commitments on a realistic timeline. This is good for all parties involved. In the short term, finalizing the F-16 deal reestablishes trust between Washington and Ankara, and gives a boost to NATO planners who will need to rely on Turkish forces to meet deterrence plans for the decade to come.

Andrew Bernard is a retired US Air Force Colonel and a visiting fellow in the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center.

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FPV drones in Ukraine are changing modern warfare

Tomas Milasauskas, Liudvikas Jaškūnas — Thu, 20 Jun 2024 20:27:42 +0000

The full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine is often referred to as the world’s first large-scale drone war. But what exactly does “drone war” mean in practical terms, and how is this war being waged?

Media coverage of the drone war often focuses on particular models such as the Shahed drones used by Russia to attack Ukrainian cities and civilian infrastructure, or the Bayraktar drones that played an eye-catching role in Ukraine’s fight back during the initial stages of the invasion. However, behind these brands lies a much more complex and rapidly expanding drone ecosystem.

By far the most prevalent type of drone on the Ukrainian battlefield is the First Person View (FPV) drone—a type that our company sells in Ukraine and elsewhere. Despite their relatively low cost compared to other aerial platforms, FPV drones possess a number of capabilities that have resulted in a dramatic shift in our understanding of modern warfare. Given their navigation capabilities, these drones have become the preferred platform for mounting explosives and executing targeted strikes.

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Originally emerging from the realm of civilian hobby drone racing, FPV drones have robust motors and frames that are built to withstand the rigors of high-speed races and multiple crashes.

Relative to their fixed-wing cousins, copter-type drones have greater maneuvering capabilities, which, in the hands of skilled pilots, convert into precision targeting unique to FPV drones. It is not uncommon for pilots to fly their drones through the window of a building or into the open hatch of an armored vehicle, unleashing an explosion on exposed personnel inside. FPV drones are also well-suited for targeting specific equipment like optics, radars, and antennas mounted on the exteriors of armored vehicles.

FPV pilots in Ukraine do not normally operate from front-line trenches. Instead, they typically serve in specialized teams located around two to five kilometers away from the front line. This distance provides them with relative security from small arms and larger systems mounted on armored vehicles as well as from the indirect fire of mortars.

The nature of drone piloting equipment offers an additional layer of protection. Since everything is controlled remotely, only the antenna transmitting between the drone and operator needs to be exposed. The remaining equipment and the team can conduct their operations from the safety of a bunker or basement.

While hubs of drone operators are now recognized as high-value targets, in practice most attention is focused on blocking or destroying the drones themselves. This shift of lethal danger from personnel in forward positions to drones has accelerated the proliferation of FPV drone usage. It appeals to soldiers, who naturally seek to minimize the dangers of combat, and also appeals to Ukrainian and Russian commanders as they wage a war of attrition amid growing manpower shortages.

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The main feature that has made FPV drones such a key weapon in the Russian war on Ukraine is their relatively low cost, with prices for a single unit sometimes lower than five hundred US dollars. This affordability, coupled with performance and tactical versatility, helps to explain the ubiquity of FPV drones on the front lines of the war. For Ukraine, which has not always had access to predictable weapons supplies from its Western partners, the affordability of FPV drones has helped its military stay in the fight, despite being outgunned by Russia.

In technological terms, FPV drones are currently in the early stages of their development. Most components are still sourced from the civilian market, while many models offer only a relatively limited range of frequencies. This is significant, as jamming is considered the Achilles’ heel of FPV drones. Many skeptics argue that it won’t be long until jammers are employed everywhere, rendering radio controls useless. However, jammers have their own hardware limitations that can be difficult to overcome.

Creating signal interference relies on sending a stronger signal than the one it is aiming to jam. In other words, effective jamming capabilities require considerable electrical power and bulky hardware. This is why most infantry units can only operate with small jamming devices that create a limited protection bubble for short periods of time. Stronger jamming systems can be employed on armored vehicles, but the prevalence of tank “cope cages” and the recent appearance of “turtle tanks” hints that physical armor is still the go-to protection against FPV drone attacks.

Despite efforts to counter them with jamming technology, FPV drones have proven resilient and have managed to adapt effectively to electronic warfare measures. Ongoing innovations in areas such as customized frequencies, frequency-hopping, and automated flight patterns promise to further enhance their effectiveness.

The Russian invasion of Ukraine has brought FPV drones to prominence as a component of modern militaries and it appears that they are here to stay. This can be seen in the way the Ukrainian and Russian armies are both incorporating this technology into existing military structures. Indeed, in early 2024, Ukraine launched a new branch of the country’s armed forces dedicated exclusively to drones.

There are few reasons to believe the role of FPV drones will diminish in the coming years. On the contrary, as technologies advance and military tactics evolve, FPV drones are likely to become even more prominent in the wars of the future. This new reality is already being digested by military planners and commanders around the world. As they look to assess how best to incorporate FPV drones into their own defense doctrines, they will be studying the significant shifts currently taking place on the Ukrainian battlefield.

Tomas Milasauskas is CEO of RSI Europe, a Lithuania-based remotely controlled systems manufacturer for the defense sector. Liudvikas Jaškūnas is head of marketing and communications at RSI Europe.

Ukraine is making the Russian occupation of Crimea untenable

Olivia Yanchik — Wed, 12 Jun 2024 23:17:53 +0000

A combination of Ukrainian ingenuity and Western-supplied long-range missiles is making the Russian occupation of Crimea increasingly untenable. The continued weakening of Russia’s position on the Crimean peninsula is a major blow to Kremlin prestige that also has potentially serious practical implications for the future of the war.

In recent weeks, long-awaited supplies of US missiles have allowed Ukraine to step up a campaign of air strikes against Russian air defense assets and other military targets throughout the occupied peninsula. This follows on from an earlier series of drone and missile attacks on the Russian Black Sea Fleet, which forced the bulk of Putin’s warships to retreat from Crimea to the relative safety of Novorossiysk in Russia (and the Caribbean).

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Reports of fresh Ukrainian air strikes on Russian military assets in Crimea are now an almost daily occurrence. On June 10, for example, Ukraine claimed to have struck three advanced Russian air defense systems. Additional high value targets have included Russian airfields, radars, command posts, and communications centers. The majority of recent attacks have been possible thanks to the delivery of ATACMS missiles from the US as part of the military aid bill that was finally passed by Congress in April following months of delays.

In addition to steadily depleting Russia’s defensive capacities, Ukraine also appears intent on isolating Crimea by targeting the Kremlin’s logistical connections to the occupied peninsula. According to Britain’s Ministry of Defense, Ukrainian air strikes in late May damaged two rail ferries on the Crimean side of the Kerch Strait, putting them temporarily out of service. This represented a significant blow as Moscow has grown reliant on these ferry services to resupply its army in Crimea following a series of Ukrainian attacks on the Crimean Bridge connecting the peninsula to Russia.

Ukraine’s recent ferry service attack has reportedly forced Russia to resume the transportation of military supplies and fuel over the vulnerable Crimean Bridge. Moscow has sought to protect the bridge from possible attack by deploying a series of barges in addition to extensive existing defenses. However, the apparent ease with which Ukraine has been able to hit Russian air defenses and logistical hubs throughout Crimea has led some to suggest that the destruction of the Crimean Bridge may now only be a matter of time.

The Kremlin appears to be well aware of this vulnerability. For the past year, Russian engineers have been constructing a series of railway lines running from Russia itself through occupied regions of mainland Ukraine along the coast of the Sea of Azov to Crimea. This should help Moscow maintain connection with the peninsula and supply Russian forces in southern Ukraine, but the new railway routes will also serve as key targets for Ukrainian missiles and saboteurs.

Eurasia Center events

Ukraine’s advance in Kursk: What’s next and implications

Conflict Russia Security & Defense Ukraine

It is now evident that Ukraine’s growing air strike capabilities are placing Russian occupation forces in Crimea in a precarious position. By utilizing Western-provided cruise missiles and domestically produced naval drones, Ukraine has already succeeded in forcing most of the Russian Black Sea Fleet to withdraw from its home port of Sevastopol in Crimea. This has also restricted the ability of Russian warships to operate in the western Black Sea.

The next stage of this effort is now underway, with Ukraine methodically depleting Russian air defenses and exposing the entire peninsula to further attack. Ukraine is expected to receive the first F-16 fighter jets in the coming months, setting the stage for what is likely to be a broader air campaign against Russia’s extensive surviving military infrastructure throughout Crimea. With its air defenses decimated and supply lines under threat, the Russian army in Crimea may soon face the realization that its position is no longer sustainable.

Russia’s declining fortunes in Crimea represent a very personal humiliation for Vladimir Putin. The 2014 seizure of the peninsula marked the start of Russia’s Ukraine invasion and is still widely regarded as the greatest single achievement of Putin’s entire reign. With this in mind, he is likely to resist calls to reduce the Russian military presence in Crimea unless absolutely necessary. Nevertheless, it is already clear that Crimea is no longer the “unsinkable aircraft carrier” it once was. Instead, it is becoming a weak link in Russia’s invasion that Ukraine will continue to exploit.

Olivia Yanchik is a program assistant at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

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The Russian army has clearly failed to live up to its inflated prewar reputation in Ukraine, but it would nevertheless be reckless to underestimate Moscow’s military potential. Putin’s commanders have learned a series of important lessons since the start of the invasion in February 2022, and have acquired combat experience that no other major power can match. With a battle-hardened and rapidly modernizing army backed by a defense industry operating around the clock, Putin is now arguably in a stronger position relative to his slowly rearming Western adversaries than any Russian ruler since 1945. Victory in Ukraine would further widen this already alarming gap in military capabilities.

The Russian and Ukrainian armies are currently by far the largest and most formidable fighting forces in Europe. If Putin triumphs in Ukraine, he will control them both. While many Ukrainian soldiers would doubtless continue to wage a partisan war or seek to regroup abroad, a victorious Russia would look to rapidly conscript hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians into military service, just as it has already done in areas of Ukraine under Kremlin control. In addition to a massive manpower boost, Russia would also take possession of Ukraine’s extensive military equipment stores, ranging from stockpiles of artillery shells and attack drones to Western-supplied tanks and missile systems.

Control over Ukraine would allow Russia to reintegrate the vast Ukrainian military-industrial complex that played such a central role in arming the Red Army during the Cold War. For much of the Soviet era, Ukraine produced a large proportion of the USSR’s missiles, tanks, aircraft, and warships. This colossal industrial inheritance was neglected during the first three decades of Ukrainian independence and fell into a state of disrepair, but a Russian occupation administration or Kremlin-loyal puppet regime in Kyiv would likely prioritize the revival of military production. This increased output would allow Russia to rapidly recover from the punishing losses of the Ukrainian campaign, while also enabling Moscow to overcome many of the obstacles created by Western sanctions.

Eurasia Center events

Ukraine’s advance in Kursk: What’s next and implications

Conflict Russia Security & Defense Ukraine

Economically, the conquest of Ukraine would significantly improve Russia’s financial position and strengthen Moscow’s ability to shape world affairs. The Kremlin would acquire Ukraine’s sizable untapped energy reserves along with potentially trillions of dollars in mineral assets. Meanwhile, the famed Ukrainian breadbasket would enable Russia to establish itself virtually overnight as the dominant force on international agricultural markets. Putin has already demonstrated his readiness to weaponize global food security by blockading Ukraine’s Black Sea ports. Control over the Ukrainian farming industry would present the Kremlin with powerful new tools to reward allies and punish opponents.

Many in the Global South would not wait to be bribed with grain shipments or coerced by the threat of famine. Instead, they would readily recognize Russian victory in Ukraine as a major geopolitical turning point and would queue up in Moscow to pay their respects. The emphasis on diplomatic neutrality that is currently evident in much of Asia, Africa, and beyond, would be replaced by a scramble to strengthen ties with the Kremlin. Countries throughout the Global South would begin to ship arms and other military supplies to Moscow, while the West’s already limited ability to impose sanctions on Russia would become hopelessly compromised. Commentators everywhere would soon be trumpeting the dawn of a new post-Western era in international affairs.

Where would a strengthened and emboldened Putin be most likely to strike next? The Kremlin dictator has made clear that he sees the current war as an imperial quest to return “historically Russian lands.” Beyond Ukraine, there are more than a dozen other countries including Finland, Poland, the Baltic states, Belarus, and Moldova that were once part of the Russian Empire and therefore meet Putin’s definition of “historically Russian.” All would be potential targets. During the build-up to the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in late 2021, Putin underlined the scale of his ambition by calling on NATO to retreat to the borders of the former Warsaw Pact. It seems reasonable to assume that success in Ukraine will only make him more ambitious.

There is certainly little to indicate that Putin is in any way intimidated by the West. Quite the opposite, in fact. The Russian ruler has proven so skilled at intimidating his enemies that almost two-and-a-half years into the largest European invasion since World War II, Kyiv’s partners remain preoccupied with avoiding escalation and continue to impose absurd restrictions on Ukraine’s ability to defend itself. This escalation management is the appeasement of the twenty-first century, and risks inviting the same tragic consequences.

If Russia does expand the war further, the one thing Western leaders cannot do is claim they were not warned. Putin has placed the whole of Russian society on a war footing and is openly preparing his entire country for a protracted struggle against the West. The current invasion is an important part of this struggle, but it is only the beginning. Russian victory in Ukraine would set the stage for even bolder acts of international aggression. It would supercharge Putin’s war machine and radically increase the cost of stopping him. The only way to avoid this disastrous outcome is by making sure the Russian invasion of Ukraine ends in defeat.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

Hinata-Yamguchi quoted in South China Morning Post on Japan’s maritime plans

ylee — Tue, 11 Jun 2024 20:21:19 +0000

On June 10, IPSI nonresident senior fellow Ryo Hinata-Yamaguchi was quoted in a South China Morning Post article, discussing Japan’s plan to construct its largest-ever coastguard vessel to bolster patrols around the contested Diaoyu Islands. This endeavor is perceived as a response to China’s maritime activities in the region.

Fellow

Ryo Hinata-Yamaguchi

Indo-Pacific Security Initiative Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Defense Policy Indo-Pacific

The post Hinata-Yamguchi quoted in South China Morning Post on Japan’s maritime plans appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Rudder mentioned in international media on Taiwan-US Defense Industry Forum

ylee — Tue, 11 Jun 2024 19:36:06 +0000

This week, IPSI nonresident senior fellow Steven R. Rudder was mentioned in a South China Morning Post article and pieces by Focus Taiwan, China Daily, the Taipei Times, and Taiwan News regarding his participation in the Taiwan-US Defense Industry Forum, where he engaged in discussions regarding Taiwan’s procurement requirements for advanced defense technologies.

Fellow

Steven R. Rudder

Indo-Pacific Security Initiative Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Indo-Pacific Maritime Security

The post Rudder mentioned in international media on Taiwan-US Defense Industry Forum appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Friend-sourcing military procurement: Technology acquisition as security cooperation

James Hasik — Tue, 11 Jun 2024 13:00:00 +0000

Introduction
Research questions
Methodology
Historical cases of successful US military friend-sourcing
Assessment
Recommendations
Acknowledgments
About the author
Appendix 1

Introduction

In the United States, the military procurement bureaucracy tends to sponsor development of new technologies to fill requirements. The bureaucracy also largely seeks domestic sources for all new charismatic military megafauna: aircraft, ships, ground vehicles, and missile systems. Security “cooperation” in US policy and practice is largely a one-way process, neglecting the benefit of learning and sourcing from other countries. However, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and China’s concomitant threats from India to Korea, point to the need for coordinating the industrial capabilities of allies. As the United States faces simultaneous competition with two revisionist, nuclear-armed, major-power rivals, not to mention a challenging budgetary and fiscal environment, the additional research and development (R&D) costs assumed by the Department of Defense through its disregard of foreign suppliers, while never ideal, are no longer tenable.

Law, regulation, and policy can conspire against good economic thinking, though with clear exemptions. The Department of Defense Authorization Act for 1983 prohibited the construction of naval vessels in foreign shipyards, unless the president first informs Congress of a national security need otherwise (10 U.S.C. §§ 7309–7310). The Buy American Act of 1933 demands preference for domestic manufactures in federal procurement, though this is waived for imports from dozens of allied countries through reciprocal agreements (41 U.S.C. §§ 8301–8305). Note, though, that these laws say nothing of where products are designed, merely where they are manufactured. Further, the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994 mandates a “preference for commercial products . . . to the maximum extent practical,” with “market research . . . before developing new specifications for a procurement” (10 U.S.C. § 3453). Official policy periodically reemphasizes this mandate for off-the-shelf procurement.¹

An aerial view of the Pentagon, Washington, DC, May 15, 2023. DoD photo by US Air Force Staff Sgt. John Wright.

Much of the procurement bureaucracy in the Defense Department seems not to understand the exemptions and the mandates for off-the-shelf procurement of military capabilities. In contrast, the US Special Operations Command, imbued with its own procurement authority, has been far more open to procuring military systems off the shelf, and then heavily customizing them against specific military needs. The US Coast Guard, housed under the Department of Homeland Security, has also long preferred off-the-shelf solutions, often of foreign design and even manufacture—and with much less customization. Indeed, decades of procurement debacles and the economics of international commerce indicate that broad domestic preference is wrongheaded. At least three reasons point to the need for broader sources of supply:

Quality: With military off-the-shelf solutions, many of the qualities are observable, from performance in testing to actual use in battle. In developmental programs, quality is not so observable ex ante, and may disappoint ex post. Global procurement invites buyers to find the best equipment available anywhere, and often from countries with competitive advantages in particular industries.
Urgency: Off-the-shelf solutions may be sought as interim solutions to immediate military problems. If not restrained by production capacities or bottlenecks, they will arrive presently. What is purchased immediately may then suffice for anticipated problems, becoming enduring solutions, if the political and technological conditions do not too greatly change in the long run. In contrast, technological development requires greater lead time, delaying fielding.
Economy: Off-the-shelf solutions may come at lower upfront prices, if the development costs are spread among multiple national customers, or otherwise already amortized. With domestic development, the cost is disproportionately borne by the sponsoring government, and this roughly averages 20 percent of the life-cycle cost of more advanced systems. Spending on R&D competes with spending on procurement, but, in fielding capabilities, the measure of merit is procurement. Simultaneously, when immediate needs are adequately filled by off-the-shelf procurements, monies can be husbanded for developing systems targeted at more challenging, long-range problems. Later, the wider supply base for the off-the-shelf system, which should remain largely interoperable with foreign versions, will contribute to lower sustainment costs.

Because autarky is illusory, greater “friend-sourcing” can provide US forces with quick access to proven, economical solutions, while maintaining the option for domestic production when that is strategically desirable.² Informal consortia of allied buyers could then naturally divide responsibilities for development and production, through an emergent but controlled market process. Allowing US forces more opportunities to acquire military technologies abroad would then restructure security cooperation as a two-way process, with the avid participation of friendly countries. As Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy recently described Kyiv’s emerging military-industrial cooperation with the United States, “Ukraine does not want to depend only on partners. Ukraine aims to and really can become a donor of security for all our neighbors once it can guarantee its own safety.”³ Access to that sort of battled-hardened experience is part of the return on US assistance.

Research questions

Historical case studies can provide tangible evidence as to how well friend-sourcing approaches have fared in the recent past. The results can demonstrate whether actual procurements should more closely follow this course of action, already supported by law, policy, and economic theory. This study then poses two important and timely research questions. In the United States, since the end of the Cold War, how has the procurement of off-the-shelf systems developed for allied militaries:

Affected the quality, availability, and cost of national military capabilities?
Affected the long-term market for national, military-industrial R&D?

Methodology

To answer these questions, this paper seeks to identify all recent cases of off-the-shelf military procurements in the United States, subject to some boundaries. The set is limited to major end systems—aircraft, ships, ground vehicles, and missile systems—because the international trade in subsystems among friendly countries is already much more liberal. Also, the set includes only those US procurements undertaken since the end of the Cold War because global security dynamics changed radically at that point. Note that this excludes from consideration, for example, the US Army’s procurement of its Austrian-designed Family of Medium Tactical Vehicles, and the US Marine Corps’ procurement of LAV-25 armored vehicles, as these both began in the 1980s.

This paper further restricts the set to systems already in use by US forces, so that a firm decision for adoption, and some record of operation, can be observed. The study includes, however, customizations of off-the-shelf systems, as most countries have needs for subsystems (radios, racks, left- or right-hand drive, etc.) specific to their own military services, and modest customization is common in the international arms trade.

After review of histories and the author’s consultations with a wide set of experts on US military procurement, this paper identifies only nine cases—two missile systems, four aircraft, one ship, and two armored vehicles—in this set (see Appendix 1 for a summary):

The RGM-184A Naval Strike Missile (NSM)
The Norwegian Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile System (NASAMS)
The UH-72A Lakota helicopter
The MH-139A Grey Wolf helicopter
The HC-144 Ocean Sentry maritime patrol aircraft
The C-27J Joint Cargo Aircraft
The Sentinel-class Fast-Response Cutter
The RG-31 mine-protected vehicle
The Stryker LAV III Interim Armored Vehicle

Neither the author nor the Atlantic Council intends to endorse or oppose the specific platforms mentioned or the procurement choices made. Rather, the following section outlines how these systems were procured and what advantages the acquiring service derived from the purchase. The following assessment section gathers lessons from the case studies in aggregate to inform how the Department of Defense should consider friend-sourcing more military procurement.

Historical cases of successful US military friend-sourcing

RGM-184A Naval Strike Missile

The RGM-184A NSM is a 400 kilogram, jet-powered, sea-skimming, anti-ship cruise missile. In September 2014, seeking a lightweight but lethal anti-ship missile for its littoral combat ships (LCSs), the US Navy test-fired Kongsberg’s NSM from the USS Coronado. In 2015, the Navy undertook a competitive procurement to equip its LCSs. Kongsberg and Raytheon announced a teaming arrangement to bring the Norwegian missile to the United States.⁴ Boeing initially offered an extended-range RGM-84 Harpoon, and Lockheed Martin a surface-launched version of its AGM-158C Long-Range Anti-Ship Missile. The latter two firms, however, withdrew their entries in 2017. In May 2018, the Navy selected the NSM for its Independence-class LCSs, its Freedom-class LCSs, and its Constellation-class frigates. The Marine Corps subsequently selected the NSM to equip its new land-based, mobile anti-ship missile batteries, with two NSMs mounted on each robotic Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (see below), deemed the Navy-Marine Expeditionary Ship Interdiction System (NMESIS).

The USS Gabrielle Giffords (LCS 10) launches a Naval Strike Missile (NSM) during an exercise. Photo by Chief Petty Officer Shannon Renfroe, US Navy.

The missiles are mostly built in Norway, as they have been in production there since 2007, and they cost “slightly less than the Raytheon Tomahawk Block IV cruise missile.”⁵ In a press release, Raytheon noted that undertaking final assembly and testing of an already operational missile “saves the United States billions of dollars in development costs and creates new high-tech jobs in this country.”⁶ More labor, at possibly higher cost, would be required in the United States if production were fully domesticated, and Kongsberg and Raytheon have discussed a second production line to deliver yet more missiles.⁷ Navigation is provided by satellite, inertial, and terrain contour matching; terminal guidance relies on imaging infrared and a target-image database. With the latter technologies, the NSM is designed to strike specific, vulnerable points on an enemy ship, and detonate with its void-sensing fuse at the point of maximum damage. A single missile can thus render even a large warship hors de combat.

The NSM was initially developed by and for Norway. Missiles for mobile coastal defense batteries were quickly sold to Poland. Since then, the NSM has been adopted as well by Australia, Belgium, Canada, Indonesia, Latvia, the Netherlands, Malaysia, Romania, Spain, and the United Kingdom. In summary, with the NSM, the Navy and Marine Corps obtained one of the best anti-ship missiles in the world, from a running production line, and at a cost below that of its best alternative in inventory. The US Navy and Air Force have continued to fund development of other, longer-range cruise missiles.

Norwegian Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile System

The NASAMS (pronounced NAY-sams) is a ground-based, anti-aircraft missile system. NASAMS was developed in the 1990s by Kongsberg and Hughes Aircraft to replace the Nike Hercules batteries of the Royal Norwegian Air Force. (Raytheon acquired Hughes Aircraft in 1997.) NASAMS integrates Raytheon’s MPQ-36A Sentinel trailer-mounted radar and AIM-120 Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missile (AMRAAM) with Kongsberg’s launcher and battle-management system. In an apparently sole-source deal, the US Army procured several launchers for the medium-range air defense of Washington, DC, in 2005, and they have served in that role ever since, at a variety of locations in Virginia, the District of Columbia, and Maryland.⁸ The NASAMS case is remarkable in that the Norwegian-US team integrated two off-the-shelf components from a US manufacturer into its system before providing that system as an off-the-shelf product back to the US military.

US High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS) and Norwegian National Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile System (NASAMS) units counter a simulated threat at sea together. Courtesy Photo, US Naval Forces Europe-Africa/US Sixth Fleet.

The United States was the third user of NASAMS, after Norway and Spain. NASAMS is now in service with thirteen countries, including Australia, Chile, Finland, Hungary, Indonesia, Lithuania, the Netherlands, and Oman.“⁹ In 2022 and 2023, the United States, Norway, Lithuania, and Canada all provided NASAMS units to Ukraine.¹⁰ The Canadian purchase is notable because Canada itself had no ground-based air defenses; the Canadian federal government simply identified a cost-effective and already-available system to send.¹¹

In summary, with the NASAMS, the US Army obtained a medium-range air defense system that remains at the forefront of air defense against the most challenging (Russian) threats, from a running production line, and at a cost that global customers still willingly pay. The US Army and Navy have continued to fund several other families of medium- and long-range air defense missiles.

UH-72A (EC145) Lakota utility helicopter

The EC145 is a twin-turboshaft, utility helicopter capable of carrying nine passengers. In its Light Utility Helicopter program of 2005, the US Army sought a proven helicopter for logistical and medical missions within the United States. In its request for proposals (RFP), the Army specifically sought only off-the-shelf aircraft, and received such offers from Bell, AgustaWestland (now Leonardo), and Eurocopter (now Airbus Helicopters). In June 2006, the Army selected a version of Eurocopter’s EC145, and designated it the UH-72A Lakota. The EC145 first flew in 1999 and was itself developed from the MBB/Kawasaki BK 117, which had first flown in 1979.

All UH-72s have been assembled at Airbus’s factory in Columbus, Mississippi. The program has experienced no significant delays. The UH-72 was competitively sourced, and the Army has been sufficiently satisfied with its performance and cost-effectiveness that the service has purchased 481 of the aircraft. Along the way, the Army awarded Airbus further orders under the original contract to fully recapitalize its fleet of training helicopters.¹² The Army’s Lakota was subsequently upgraded into the UH-72B, as Airbus continued to develop its EC145 into the H145M.¹³

A new UH-72A Lakota Light Utility Helicopters at Hohenfel Army Airfield. Photo by Sgt. 1st Class JMRC PAO, Joint Multinational Readiness Center.

Military versions of the EC145 have also been in service with the military forces of thirteen other countries: Albania, Belgium, Bolivia, Cyprus, Ecuador, France, Germany, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Luxembourg, Serbia, Thailand, and the Cayman Islands. The US Army has several times rebuffed suggestions that the domestic-service helicopters could be deployed overseas, asserting that adding armor and decoys would be uneconomical. However, in December 2023, Airbus and the German Defense Ministry announced a deal for at least sixty-two H145Ms, configured as either commando transports or missile-firing anti-tank helicopters.¹⁴ In this way, the case provides an example of a US military service overestimating its need for technological development when an off-the-shelf product would suffice.

In summary, with the EC145, the US Army obtained a proven helicopter in wide military service around the world, relatively quickly, and at a price that won a competitive tender. The US Army continued to fund rotorcraft development, though more notably of tilt-rotor aircraft through its Future Long-Range Assault Aircraft program.

MH-139A (AW139) Grey Wolf helicopter

The AW139 is a twin-turboshaft, utility helicopter capable of carrying up to fifteen passengers.

In the late 1960s, Bell Helicopter developed its UH-1 Huey helicopter, a workhorse of the Vietnam War, into the twin-engine UH-1N Twin Huey, to meet a requirement of the Royal Canadian Air Force.¹⁵ The US Air Force began buying Twin Hueys in 1970, for a variety of utility functions. About forty-five years later, the USAF was ready to replace them, seeking up to eighty-four aircraft for passenger transport and other utility functions. The aircraft had two particularly important roles: flying commandos to any missile silos in Wyoming, Montana, and North Dakota that might come under attack, and evacuating government officials from Washington, DC should the capital city again come under attack.¹⁶ The USAF initially planned a sole-source award to Lockheed Martin’s Sikorsky for UH-60s. Under the Economy Act of 1932 (31 U.S.C. § 1535), an agency can select a system already in service with another branch of government in lieu of a competitive procurement. Congressional objections soon scuttled that idea, whether to provide others an opportunity to bid or simply because the UH-60 might not have been the best-value solution.¹⁷ In September 2016, the USAF released a request for information (RFI) from industry, and in December, a draft RFP.¹⁸

A MH-139A Grey Wolf’s successful live hoist test. Photo by Samuel King Jr. 96th Test Wing Public Affairs.

The Air Force asked for a proven helicopter, and in response, five companies or teams offered four types of aircraft. Sikorsky offered its HH-60U Pave Hawk, already in service with the USAF. Sierra Nevada offered to rebuild existing, out-of-service US Army UH-60As to a -60U configuration. Airbus offered its UH-72A, already (see above) in service with the US Army. Textron’s Bell Aircraft offered its UH-1Y, already in service with the US Marine Corps, which was developed in the 1990s under a perhaps questionable sole-source contract.¹⁹ Leonardo teamed with Boeing to offer a military version of the Italian company’s AW139. That aircraft had been developed initially by Agusta (later AgustaWestland, now Leonardo) and Bell in the late 1990s, though Agusta bought Bell’s interest in the program in 2005.

The Air Force rejected the Airbus and Bell offerings outright as too small and short-ranged for the missile security mission. In September 2018, the service chose the AW139. At the announcement, Air Force Secretary Heather Wilson told the assembled that “strong competition drove down costs for the program, resulting in $1.7 billion in savings to the taxpayer.”²⁰ In this instance, the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act beat the Economy Act at economy. At first delivery, in December 2019, the service named it the MH-139A Grey Wolf.²¹ Flight testing started in 2020, but did not conclude for several years. Leonardo and Boeing agreed to some requested modifications, and the aircraft had some unexpected difficulties with FAA certification.²² Low-rate production started in Philadelphia in March 2023.“²³ The Grey Wolves are today built on the north side of Philadelphia, where Leonardo has been building AW139s since 2007, and they are then customized on the south side of Philadelphia, by Boeing.

Prior to the Air Force’s purchase, AW139s were flying with at least three air services in the United States: the New Jersey State Police (since 2012), the Maryland State Police (2012), and the Los Angeles City Fire Department (2013). Miami-Dade Fire Rescue joined that group in 2020. Air forces or other public flying services in twenty-four other countries also operate AW139s.

In summary, with the AW139, the US Air Force obtained a proven helicopter in wide military service around the world, with a two-year delay, though at a price that won a competitive tender. The Air Force had not spent significant sums previously on rotorcraft development, and, with relatively few requirements for rotary-wing aircraft, the service has not since.

HC-144 (CN-235) Ocean Sentry maritime patrol aircraft

The CN-235 is a twin-turboprop, fixed-wing cargo aircraft capable of carrying fifty-one passengers or thirty-five paratroopers. In May 2003, the US Coast Guard selected the CN-235-300M maritime patrol aircraft from the European Aeronautic Defence and Space Company (EADS) as part of its “Deepwater” program to recapitalize much of its aircraft and ship fleets.“²⁴ In February 2004, Deepwater contractor Lockheed Martin ordered the first two aircraft from EADS on the Coast Guard’s behalf.²⁵ The service had specifically requested a proven, off-the-shelf aircraft to replace its HU-25 Guardian jets, Dassault Falcon 20s similarly purchased off the shelf in the early 1980s and originally developed in the early 1960s. The CN-235 was developed, starting in 1980, by a joint venture of Spain’s Construcciones Aeronáuticas SA (CASA, then part of EADS, now Airbus) and Industri Pesawat Terbang Nusantara (IPTN, now Indonesian Aerospace). The first flight was in 1983, and production began in 1986.

Deliveries to the USCG proceeded slowly, with the availability of funding. The first unit arrived in December 2006, and the eighteenth in October 2014, at which point the Coast Guard retired its last HU-25. The aircraft were largely built in Spain but fitted out with equipment specific to the Coast Guard at EADS’s facility in Mobile, Alabama. The USCG had initially intended to procure thirty-six, but the availability of surplus C-27Js (see the next case study) led the service to reduce its plan by half. By September 2017, the Coast Guard’s HC-144 fleet had flown for one hundred thousand hours—more than that of any country with CN235s besides France and South Korea. At that point, more than two hundred CN-235s were flying in more than twenty-four countries.²⁶

An HC-144A Ocean Sentry medium-range surveillance aircraft arrives at Coast Guard Air Station Washington. Photo by Chief Petty Officer Sarah Foster, US Coast Guard District 5.

The US Air Force also flies a few CN-235s within its Special Operations Command.²⁷ Notably, Air Force Special Operations also flies twenty Dornier 328 twin-engine turboprops, termed C-146A Wolfhounds; and a few CN212 Aviocars from CASA, termed C-41As.²⁸

In summary, with the CN-235, the US Coast Guard obtained a proven turboprop aircraft in wide military service around the world, at the pace it desired, and at an ongoing total cost that the service continues to support. The Coast Guard has generally not spent significant sums on aircraft development, and specifically not multiengine, fixed-wing aircraft development, preferring off-the-shelf purchases.

C-27J Joint Cargo Aircraft

The C-27J Spartan is a twin-turboprop, fixed-wing cargo aircraft capable of carrying sixty passengers or forty-six paratroopers.

In the early 2000s, the US Army and the US Air Force individually were seeking ideas for twin-engine turboprop transport aircraft. The Army sought to replace its C-23 Sherpas, C-12 Hurons, and C-26 Metroliners with a common fleet. The USAF sought to supplement its C-130s with a smaller aircraft capable of flying from shorter fields, particularly in Iraq and Afghanistan. In March 2006, Under Secretary of Defense Ken Krieg instructed the two services to combine all these requirements into plans for a single airplane, the JCA.²⁹

Lockheed Martin offered a shortened version of its four-engine C-130. In August 2006, the Army (which was managing the program for the Air Force as well) eliminated that aircraft from the program. CASA, teamed with Raytheon, offered its C-295 aircraft, a larger derivative of the CN-235, developed in the 1990s. Alenia, teamed with L3 Communications, offered its C-27J Spartan. The latter had begun development in 1996 as an improvement of the Aeritalia (later Alenia, later Leonardo) G.222. The USAF had purchased ten G.222s in 1990, designating them C-27As. The C-27J would feature more powerful engines and the glass cockpit of the C-130J, which explains the choice of modifying letter. The first flight was in September 1999, and the Italian air force ordered twelve that November.“³⁰

A C-27J aircraft lands in North Dakota. Courtesy Photo, North Dakota National Guard Public Affairs.

In June 2007, the US Army and US Air Force jointly chose the C-27J as the JCA.³¹ The Army planned to buy seventy-five for the National Guard, and the Air Force seventy for both the Air National Guard and its component of Special Operations Command. The Army soon found the aircraft very useful for relieving the workload of its Chinook heavy helicopter fleet.³² The Air Force, however, was never enthused about splitting the mission with the Army, and questions of the economy of the arrangement persisted.³³ In 2009, Defense Secretary Robert Gates decided to transfer all the aircraft to the Air Force. In 2012, Defense Secretary Leon Panetta decided just to retire the entire fleet, as the United States reefed back its enthusiasm for counterinsurgency. Over the next two years, fourteen of the surplus aircraft were provided to the US Coast Guard, and another seven went back to the Army for its Special Operations Aviation branch.³⁴

Prior to the US order, the C-27J had been ordered by Italy, Greece, Bulgaria, and Lithuania. Australia, Chad, Kenya, Mexico, Peru, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Zambia ordered aircraft subsequently.³⁵

In summary, with the C-27J, the US Army and Air Force initially obtained a proven turboprop aircraft in wide military service around the world, relatively quickly, and at a competitive price that they were willing to pay. Those aircraft continue to fly for the United States, just with different services or branches than initially intended. That is more a matter of changing requirements than the quality, availability, or cost of the aircraft. Regarding development funding, the US Air Force has only once spent a large sum on new multiengine fixed-wing aircraft since the C-17 Globemaster III program in the 1990s. Its recent orders for KC-46 Pegasus aerial refueling aircraft included development funds, but under the fixed-price deal, Boeing (the contractor) would eventually come to assume most of that cost through repeated overruns.

Sentinel-class (Damen Stan 4708) fast response cutter

The Damen Stan 4708 is a 42 meter patrol ship designed for a variety of naval and maritime constabulary missions.

In March 2007, the US Coast Guard terminated its contract with Lockheed Martin and Northrop Grumman to modify its 110-foot Island-class cutters with a 13 foot midship hull extension, intended to produce a more capable ship with an extended service life. The Island-class ships had been built in the 1980s by Bollinger Shipyards of Louisiana to an off-the-shelf design of the 1960s by Britain’s Vosper Thornycroft, which had been sold to several other naval forces, including those of Qatar, Abu Dhabi, and Singapore.³⁶ The concept was reasonable in principle, as hull plugs are not uncommon in naval architecture and shipbuilding. The problem was that the Island-class ships were already proving susceptible to late-in-life hull cracking, but neither the service nor the contractors were fully forthcoming with one another about the difficulties. After taking delivery of eight of the rebuilt ships, the Coast Guard terminated the program, and indeed withdrew the eight from service.³⁷

In September 2008, the USCG awarded a contract, after an open competition, to Bollinger to build a replacement class of “fast response cutters.” The Coast Guard had expressly requested an off-the-shelf solution, with at least two vessels from the parent design in patrol boat service for one year, or one vessel in patrol boat service for at least six years. Bollinger brought a design based on the Damen Stan (“Standard”) 4708 patrol vessel, by Damen Shipyards of the Netherlands. With options, the fixed-price contract called for twenty-four to thirty-six cutters. The first, USCGC Bernard C. Webber was launched in April 2011 and commissioned in April 2012. The Coast Guard was sufficiently pleased with the cost and quality that the service now has fifty-four in service, and another eleven in sea trials, under construction, or planned. Bollinger’s work has been noticed, bringing forth suggestions that the US Navy could also purchase 4708s to replace its Cyclone-class patrol boats, and perhaps for other uses.³⁸

The Coast Guard Cutter Bernard C. Webber is the Coast Guard’s first Sentinel-class Fast Response Cutter. Courtesy Photo, US Coast Guard Atlantic Area.

Three ships of the design had entered service in 2004 and 2005 in South Africa as the Lilian Ngoyi class of environmental inshore patrol vessels. In its explanation of the decision, the Coast Guard described Damen as an “internationally recognized ship designer with more than 30 shipyards and related companies worldwide [and] 4,000 vessels in service since [it was] founded in 1929.”³⁹ The 4708 was itself a development of the Damen Stan 4207, which has served in the navies, coast guards, or maritime constabularies of Albania, the Bahamas, Barbados, Bulgaria, Canada, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, the Netherlands, Nicaragua, the United Kingdom, Venezuela, and Vietnam.

In summary, with the Sentinel class, the US Coast Guard obtained a proven patrol ship whose preceding designs were in wide military service around the world, and at a price that led to procurement of scores more. The first ship was not available for forty-three months after contract signing, which is neither particularly fast nor slow by historical US standards. By avoiding much development spending with the Damen Stan 4708, the USCG saved those funds for its next-larger class of cutters in the Deepwater recapitalization program, of a wholly new design: the Heritage-class offshore patrol cutter.

RG-31 Charger (Nyala) mine-resistant armored vehicle

The RG-31 Nyala is a four-wheeled, all-wheel-drive, armored troop carrier, specifically designed for resistance to land mines. In 1996, the US Army purchased a few RG-31 mine-protected vehicles to equip its land-mine disposal squads on peacekeeping duty in Bosnia. Later described as a “rolling bank vault” of a troop carrier, the RG-31 had been developed in South Africa from the Mamba, an earlier mine-protected troop carrier that was built on a Unimog truck chassis and powered by a Mercedes-Benz six-cylinder diesel.⁴⁰ The “Bush Wars” of the 1970s and 1980s had culminated by the 1994 election that marked the end of apartheid, but part of the legacy was a remarkable industrial capability for developing armored vehicles. However, through a series of licensing arrangements and corporate mergers, the marketing rights for the RG-series vehicles in North America resided with GDLS-Canada. The vehicles were thus built in South Africa, but fitted out in Ontario, at the same plant that produced Strykers (see below).⁴¹

By the middle of 2003, the US-led coalition’s occupation of Iraq had elicited attacks by insurgents with leftover land mines and more improvised explosive devices (IEDs). Eager to get into the market of supplying the bomb squads, General Dynamics Land Systems looked globally in 2003 for an off-the-shelf solution and remembered its license for the RG series of vehicles.⁴² The US Army then ordered a small number of additional RG-31s. Service on the ground in Iraq created impressions of quality. In an urgent request to Quantico in 2003, the 1st Marine Brigade in Anbar Province requested one thousand mine-protected armored vehicles “similar to the South African RG-31, Casspir, or Mamba.”⁴³

In June 2004, General John Abizaid, the commander of US Central Command, which oversaw all military operations in both Iraq and Afghanistan, sent a message to the Joint Chiefs of Staff explaining his situation and requesting help. His most poignant statement was that “IEDs are my No. 1 threat. I want a full court press on IEDs . . . a Manhattan-like Project.” In November 2004, the Army ordered a further fifteen RG-31s. The vehicles were priced well below $1 million each—far below the price of a Stryker or Bradley troop carrier. The Army’s enthusiasm grew in February 2005, when the service entered into a $78 million contract for another 148 RG-31s from Canadian Commercial Corporation, the national armaments marketing firm, on behalf of GDLS. In that contract, the armored trucks were oddly termed “ground effect vehicles,” and the Army’s official nickname would be Charger. Deliveries took some time, as the supply line stretched almost the length of the Atlantic Ocean. Deliveries were scheduled to continue, however, through December 2006.⁴⁴

Soldiers connect L-Rod Bar Armor to an RG-31 Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicle at Kandahar Airfield, Afghanistan. Photo by Staff Sgt. Stephen Schester, 16th Mobile Public Affairs Detachment.

The first fatality in an RG-31 did not occur until May 2006. Early on, the US armed forces also ordered vehicles from Force Protection Industries of South Carolina. These were not off the shelf, but rather, had been developed domestically with technology licensed from the South African government. Eventually, the Army and the Marine Corps ordered over one thousand RG-31s, and thousands of other vehicles termed MRAPs—Mine-Resistant, Ambush-Protected vehicles—from multiple domestic producers.

In 2005, the Army and the Marines began work on an ambitious project for the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JTLV)—a vehicle only slightly larger than a Humvee, but with the protection of an MRAP. Developing the JLTV would ultimately require ten years, and full-rate production would not begin until 2019. During this time, US troops were protected from land mines by MRAPs, including RG-31s, and the origins of all that work reside in South Africa.

In summary, with the RG-31, the US Army obtained an armored vehicle long proven against land mines, relatively quickly, and at a price far below that of its other troop-carrying armored vehicles. While procuring the RG-31, and afterward, the US Army and Marine Corps would spend large sums developing the JLTV.

Stryker Light Armored Vehicle III

The LAV III is an eight-wheeled, all-wheel-drive, armored troop carrier, designed for higher road speeds and lighter weight than comparable tracked vehicles.

In June 1999, less than a week after assuming office, US Army Chief of Staff General Eric Shinseki signaled his intention to restructure much of the service.⁴⁵ The immediate impetus came from the Army’s difficulty over the preceding several months with deploying its Task Force Hawk, of attack helicopters and accompanying ground troops, from Germany to Albania for the Kosovo War. As analysts at RAND later described the problem, the Army needed to “expand ground force options to improve joint synergies.”⁴⁶ As Shinseki would more clearly say, its light forces were too light for fighting opponents with heavy weaponry, and its heavy forces too heavy for strategic mobility.⁴⁷ Neither bookend of capability had properly contributed to the overall war-fighting effort.

In October 1999, Shinseki described a plan to rebuild the Army around motorized formations equipped with wheeled armored vehicles small enough to fit on C-130 Hercules transport aircraft.⁴⁸ In February 2000, General Motors (GM) Canada and GDLS announced that they would together enter the pending competition with a version of the Canadian LAV III, itself a development of the Piranha series of armored vehicles, first developed in the early 1970s by the Swiss firm MOWAG (Motorwagenfabrik AG). Back in 1983, the US Marine Corps had procured a version of the Piranha I, armed with a 25 millimeter (mm) cannon, for reconnaissance and screening duties.

GM Canada held the license from MOWAG to build the vehicles in London, Ontario. The Army would later also receive offers from United Defense LP (UDLP) for a combination of remanufactured M113A2 tracked troop carriers and M8 medium tanks, from ST Engineering for Bionix tracked troop carriers, and another from GD for six-wheeled, Austrian-designed Pandur armored vehicles. Neither UDLP nor ST Engineering seem to have taken account of Shinseki’s strong and openly stated preference for wheels, though UDLP did suggest that a split purchase could include its tracked tank.

In March 2000, the Army reequipped the 3rd Infantry Brigade of the 2nd Infantry Division—a heavy brigade with Abrams tanks and Bradley fighting vehicles—at Fort Lewis, Washington, with LAV IIIs borrowed from the Canadian Army, and a variety of other vehicles under consideration.⁴⁹ In April 2000, the Army released an RFP for the Interim Armored Vehicle (IAV). The program was so named because almost simultaneously, the Army launched its Future Combat Systems (FCS) program to reequip all its heavy brigades (and eventually the “interim” brigades as well) with a common fleet of medium-weight vehicles of entirely new design. In March 2002, the Army selected a team of Boeing and SAIC to oversee development of the fourteen different vehicular and aerial systems, manned and unmanned, within the FCS.⁵⁰

In November 2000, after reviewing the four more-of-less off-the-shelf proposals, the Army awarded GM and GD a contract for 2,131 vehicles, in a variety of variants of the LAV III, to equip six brigades by 2008. Shinseki had wanted the first vehicles by the end of 2001, but at contract award, that schedule was clearly infeasible.⁵¹ The US Army’s order was far larger than any yet received, and the US vehicle required a significant redesign from the Canadian standard, with more armor (resistant to 14.5 mm armor-penetrating rounds) but less firepower (a remote 12.7 mm machine gun rather than a manned 25 mm turret). Thus, the first new-production Strykers to equip further brigades would not arrive until 2003. In those numbers, the price was considered reasonable, at roughly $1.42 million each. This considerably exceeded the procurement price of the M113 alternative, but the Stryker’s life-cycle costs were expected to be lower.⁵²

A US Army Soldier drives an Interim Armored Vehicle Stryker out of a C-17 Globemaster III. Photo by Senior Airman Tryphena Mayhugh, 62nd Airlift Wing Public Affairs.

In November 2003, the 3rd Brigade from Fort Lewis deployed to Iraq with Strykers. Also that year, GD consolidated the design-and-production arrangement by buying both GM Defense Canada and MOWAG. The next year, Shinseki’s successor as chief of staff, General Peter Schoomaker, became similarly enthused about the Stryker. In seeking what he called an “infantry-centric army,” in which troops were not defined by their means of conveyance to the battlefield, he specifically noted that Stryker brigades brought twice as many dismounts to the field as brigades equipped with Abrams and Bradleys.⁵³ The Strykers were also performing well in combat. Through early 2004 in Iraq, they had survived attacks from at least fifty-five IEDs, twenty-four RPGs, and a 500 pound car bomb without a single fatality.

On the other hand, the Army’s effort to field a version of the Stryker with a 105 mm assault gun did not fare as well. The service purchased enough to equip each of eventually eight Stryker brigades with twelve guns, but retired all the vehicles in 2022. Then again, the Army’s goal of “Future Combat Systems” as survivable as Abrams tanks but somehow fitting on C-130 aircraft did not survive past 2005.⁵⁴ Development continued for several years, but without tangible progress. In April 2009, Defense Secretary Robert Gates canceled most of the FCS program, which had not produced any operational vehicles, despite $19 billion in spending and six years of effort.⁵⁵

Because the vehicles were considered an interim solution, the Army initially chose to forego developing its own maintenance depot for Strykers, and to instead rely substantially on GDLS through an arrangement the US military calls contractor logistics support (CLS). The Army’s reliance on CLS was, in retrospect, a costly one, but it did subsequently facilitate modifying the vehicles for greater survivability, after battlefield lessons in Iraq and Afghanistan.⁵⁶ After the FCS program was clearly terminated, the Army began assuming more of the maintenance burden organically.

While only the US Army employs its customized Stryker series, LAV IIIs have been procured to equip land forces in Canada, Chile, Colombia, New Zealand, and Saudi Arabia. Piranha IIIs have been procured to equip land forces in Belgium, Botswana, Brazil, Denmark, Moldova, Ireland, Romania, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland. In 2011, GDLS began producing an upgraded version, the LAV 6, for the Canadian Army and the Saudi National Guard. In 2019, GDLS began building a development of the LAV 6, the Armoured Combat Support Vehicle (ACSV), to replace the Canadian Army’s M113s and LAV IIs. In 2022 and 2023, the United States sent surplus Strykers to Ukraine, and Canada sent new ACSVs.⁵⁷ In November 2023, the United States offered a coproduction deal to build Strykers, including air-defense variants, in India for the Indian Army.⁵⁸

In summary, with the LAV III, the US Army obtained an armored vehicle in wide service around the world, though somewhat more slowly than hoped, and at a price and life-cycle cost deemed acceptable. The Army’s heavy reliance on contractor logistics support was, in retrospect, a costly decision, but one which centralized management of upgrades at an important juncture. The Army spent a modest sum on development of the LAV IIIs, which required customization for its particular preferences. However, this was a small fraction of the funds spent developing the Future Combat Systems, the later and then-cancelled Ground Combat Vehicle, and the current effort with the Optionally Manned Fighting Vehicle. None of these programs have delivered vehicles to the field, but Strykers continue to serve.

Assessment

systems were procured starting between 2003 and 2008, during the comparatively free-trading George W. Bush administration, for which military-industrial cooperation with allies was a priority. Two of the systems were adopted in 2018, during the comparatively protectionist Trump administration. Plans for accepting off-the-shelf concepts for those two requirements, however, got their start during the preceding Obama administration. While the US Air Force’s twenty-year drama of aerial tanker procurements from Boeing—and not Airbus—does provide a counterpoint, all the military services but the Space Force have smoothly adopted at least one major system of foreign design. The summary record of these procurements has been largely positive.

Buying foreign military hardware off the shelf has generally brought the US military proven systems of lasting quality.

In the first seven cases described, the US Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force, and Coast Guard bought off-the-shelf systems to provide enduring capabilities, in lieu of developing new systems, and all seven are still in US service. The Army bought the RG-31 to provide a present capability, while also funding (with the Marine Corps) the development of enduring capabilities, culminating in that of the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle. For years along the way, the RG-31 provided very valuable protection to US troops against land mines. The Army similarly bought the Stryker LAV III to provide an interim capability, but it never succeeded in developing an enduring replacement. The Stryker thus continues in the Army’s force structure and inventory more than twenty years on. As the Army’s first program manager for Stryker recently put it, “The Army likes the vehicle, and still likes the vehicle”—for if it did not, it would not persist in service.⁵⁹

Note also that the Defense Department would not have entrusted the air defense of the federal capital to NASAMS for eighteen years if it had meaningful questions about its capabilities.

This finding in evidence comports with the logic of the market. Off-the-shelf products generally feature observable quality. Indeed, if one is trying to sell an important system to the Americans, it is wise to bring a quality product. Any US military service is an important customer to whom a sale conveys great reputation.

Buying foreign military hardware off the shelf has mostly fulfilled US military needs comparatively quickly.

The RG-31 was procured in an emergency and was available in small quantities within months. The NASAMS was not quite procured in an emergency, but its immediate availability was appreciated, with fresh memories of the aerial attack on the Pentagon in 2001. The NSM was sought urgently, in that the rising threat from the Chinese navy could not be adequately opposed with the US Navy’s existing anti-ship missiles. The Stryker (or any interim armored vehicle) was sought quickly, because the Army chief of staff was embarrassed by his service’s failure to contribute during the Kosovo War. Its service in Iraq was impressive, but only because it was available three years after contract award. That proved adequate under the circumstances, but General Shinseki initially had much quicker delivery in mind.

In all the other cases, the driving motivation for an off-the-shelf procurement was either economy or assured quality. This does not mean that speed was wholly unimportant. The MH-139A arrived after a flight-testing delay of a few years, and the Sentinel-class cutters also did not arrive quickly. In none of those cases, however, did the procuring service experience operationally damaging delays.

This finding also comports with the logic of the market. Off-the-shelf products generally can be provided more quickly, sometimes because the production process is running, and always because significant product development lead time is not required.

Buying foreign military hardware off the shelf has generally brought the US military cost-competitive matériel.

Three of the cases were not fully competitive procurements. The NSM was chosen as the Navy’s next anti-ship missile after Boeing and Lockheed Martin withdrew from the competition, apparently because neither could quite offer the combination of capabilities the Navy sought in a ship-killing missile for a small ship. The case of the NASAMS seems to have been a sole-source procurement, without a record of a competition. The case of the RG-31 was similarly a sole-source emergency purchase.

The remaining six cases were all competitive procurements, which indicates that foreign-designed systems have repeatedly delivered value for money to the US armed forces.

This finding further comports to the logic of the market. Any US military service is a customer with great buying power. As noted above, concluding the sale reinforces the seller’s reputation, which can be leveraged for many years in pursuing other sales. For these two reasons, offerers have strong incentives to bring good deals to American buyers.

Buying foreign military hardware off the shelf has had no strong effect on US capacity for military-industrial R&D.

The nine off-the-shelf procurements neatly fall into five industries. None have seen a strong effect from this pattern of spending.

In the two cases of missile manufacturing, the United States purchased two different missile systems, the NSM and NASAMS, from the same original designer, Kongsberg of Norway. On both projects, Kongsberg has cooperated with one of the US national champions in guided missiles, Raytheon Technologies. Over that time of the ongoing procurement, the US Defense Department has spent many more billions on missile development, for both offensive and defensive missions.
In two cases of rotorcraft manufacturing, the Army bought hundreds of EC145s, and the Air Force is planning to buy scores of AW139s. The Army could have paid a contractor to design a wholly new aircraft for utility and training purposes, but the marginal advantage in an industry with a slow cycle of technological development could not be cost effective. The Air Force’s requirements may have been somewhat more demanding, but a new design for a fleet of less than one hundred helicopters would be similarly foolish.
In two cases of fixed-wing transport aircraft manufacturing, the Coast Guard, the Army, and the Air Force took delivery of just eighteen CN-235s and twenty-one C-27Js. Developing new aircraft for small fleets would be a very bad use of money. The special operations commands of the US services understand this well, and thus sources most of their aircraft from existing designs.
In the one case of shipbuilding, the Coast Guard’s off-the-shelf purchase of the 300 ton Sentinel-class cutter freed up money for the development of the 3000 ton Heritage-class cutter—a much larger project. Additionally, none of this spending by the Coast Guard seems to have affected the Navy’s spending on ship design and development.
In two cases of armored vehicle manufacturing—those of the RG-31 and the Stryker—the Army did continue to spend large sums on follow-on systems: the JLTV and the FCS.

Recommendations

Since the end of the Cold War, the US armed forces have quite successfully taken into service nine major, off-the-shelf systems of foreign design. Again, this is good because a preference for the already available for federal procurement is federal law. Most of these products have been manufactured in the United States, and all have been serviced there. This is reasonable because the United States has huge industrial capacity and some strategic interest in domestic servicing. More pointedly, this technology transfer has effectively constituted security assistance from allies—a valuable concept too often overlooked by military policymakers.

Formulating a strategic framework

The federal government can better avail itself of the advantages in quality, speed, and economy offered by allies’ proven solutions, by adopting a two-part analytical framework for considering their procurement.

Consider the global extent of the market

Seven of the nine systems in this study were widely adopted by military forces around the world before a US military service purchased them. In all other cases, the procuring services had long lists of satisfied customers to consult for insights into the equipment. For future procurements, if the needs of the service do not genuinely exceed the global state-of-the art, the best design should be sought from any friendly source. As several of these cases demonstrate, for large production runs, production can be brought to the United States, if desired.

Measure the technological speed of the industry

Seven of the systems in this study represented modest technological developments. Only the naval strike missile constituted a great advancement over preceding options on the market. In all other cases, the procuring services were purchasing systems from industries with modest cycle speeds of technological development. Four of the procurements were from industries with substantially commercial underlying technologies and observably slow paces of change: helicopters and multiengine fixed-wing aircraft. If firms around the world are investing over the long-term for gradual technological progress, then a program to develop a wholly new system is duplicative.

Educating the procurement bureaucracy

Despite the logic, the procurement bureaucracy—outside US Special Operations Command and the Coast Guard—may remain disinclined to seek proven solutions, and especially those of foreign provenance. In the short run, this puts the onus of securing best value on the political leadership of the military departments and defense agencies. For better quality, speed, and economy, these leaders must meet military desires for novel equipment with demands for frank justification and global market research. This approach fits within the civil-military model of military innovation, which holds that beneficial change most often comes when “statesmen intervene in military service doctrinal development, preferably with the assistance of maverick officers from within the service.”⁶⁰

This last point addresses a longer-term approach. In the apparatus of any administrative state, career bureaucrats greatly outnumber appointees.⁶¹ Even if they are economically minded, the politicians cannot oversee everything. The “positive arbitrariness” of their occasional intervention can produce useful results, but it is also no way to build enduring institutional capacity.⁶² Officials beyond the mavericks need further schooling in the mandate for and economy of buying military systems off the shelf. This means education in the market research techniques of routinely surveying global markets for military off-the-shelf solutions that can inform processes for developing requirements for new procurements. In theory, educational opportunities exist through the Defense Acquisition University, the Eisenhower School of the National Defense University, and the military acquisition elective courses at the various other war colleges.

The benefits could be far-reaching. Procuring what others have already developed can permit the military to focus its R&D funds on its most challenging problems. Then, when war comes, procuring agencies and industrial enterprises will better understand, as organizations, how to put others’ designs into production here to meet the immediate needs of mobilization.

Acknowledgments

The Atlantic Council is grateful to Airbus for its generous sponsorship of this paper.

About the author

James Hasik is a political economist studying innovation, industry, and international security. Since September 2001, Hasik has been advising industries and ministries on their issues of strategy, planning, and policy. His work aims to inform investors, industrialists, technologists, and policymakers on how to effect, economically, a secure future.

Appendix 1

1 See, for example, Frank Kendall et al., Business Systems Requirements and Acquisition, Department of Defense Instruction 5000.75, Change 2, January 24, 2020, 5, https://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/DD/issuances/dodi/500075p.PDF?ver=2020-01-24-132012-177.

2 Steven Grundman and James Hasik, “Innovation Before Scale: A Better Business Model for Transnational Armaments Cooperation,” RUSI Journal 161, no. 5, December 2016, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/03071847.2016.1253366?journalCode=rusi20.

3 “Kyiv Does Not Want to Rely Solely on Allied Military Aid, Says Ukraine’s Zelensky,” Straits Times, December 7, 2023, https://www.straitstimes.com/world/europe/kyiv-does-not-want-to-rely-solely-on-allied-military-aid-zelenskiy.

4 Sam LaGrone, “Raytheon and Kongsberg Team to Pitch Stealthy Norwegian Strike Missile for LCS,” USNI News, US Naval Institute, April 9, 2015, https://news.usni.org/2015/04/09/raytheon-and-kongsberg-team-to-pitch-stealthy-norwegian-strike-missile-for-lcs.

5 Sam LaGrone, “Raytheon Awarded LCS Over-the-Horizon Anti-Surface Weapon Contract; Deal Could Be Worth $848M,” USNI News, May 31, 2018, https://news.usni.org/2018/05/31/raytheon-awarded-lcs-horizon-anti-surface-weapon-contract-deal-worth-848m.

6 Comment by Taylor W. Lawrence, president of Raytheon Missile Systems, in “US Navy Selects Naval Strike Missile as New, Over-the-Horizon Weapon: Raytheon, Kongsberg Will Partner to Deliver Advanced Missile,” press release, Raytheon on PR Newswire, June 1, 2018, https://raytheon.mediaroom.com/2018-06-01-US-Navy-selects-Naval-Strike-Missile-as-new-over-the-horizon-weapon.

7 Megan Eckstein, “Kongsberg, Raytheon Ready to Keep Up as Naval Strike Missile Demand Grows,” Defense News, October 27, 2021, https://www.defensenews.com/naval/2021/10/27/kongsberg-raytheon-ready-to-keep-up-as-naval-strike-missile-demand-grows/.

8 Andrew Feikert, “National Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile System,” Congressional Research Service, IF12230, December 1, 2022, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF12230; and Tyler Rogoway, “America’s Capitol Is Guarded By Norwegian Surface-to-Air Missiles,” Jalopnik, April 3, 2014, https://jalopnik.com/americas-capitol-is-guarded-by-norwegian-surface-to-ai-1556894733.

9 Lithuania Acquires More NASAMS Air Defense from Kongsberg,” press release, Kongsberg, December 14, 2023, https://www.forecastinternational.com/emarket/eabstract.cfm?recno=294263.

10 Joe Gould, “US to Send Ukraine Advanced NASAMS Air Defense Weapons in $820 Million Package,” Defense News, July 1, 2022, https://www.defensenews.com/pentagon/2022/07/01/us-to-send-ukraine-advanced-nasams-air-defense-weapons-in-820-million-package/; and “Norway Donates Additional Air Defence Systems to Ukraine,” Norwegian government, December 13, 2023, https://www.regjeringen.no/en/aktuelt/noreg-donerer-meir-luftvern-til-ukraina/id3018411/.

11 David Pugliese, “Canadian Military Eyes New Ground-Based Air Defence System at a Cost of $1 Billion,” Ottawa Citizen, May 2, 2022, https://ottawacitizen.com/news/national/defence-watch/canadian-military-eyes-new-ground-based-air-defence-system-at-a-cost-of-1-billion.

12 Gareth Jennings, “US Army Retires ‘Creek’ Training Helo,” Jane’s, February 19, 2021, https://www.janes.com/defence-news/news-detail/us-army-retires-creek-training-helo.

13 Jen Judson, “Airbus Unveils B-model Lakota Helos to Enter US Army Fleet Next Year,” Defense News, August 28, 2020, https://www.defensenews.com/land/2020/08/28/airbus-unveils-b-model-lakotas-will-enter-us-army-fleet-in-2021/.

14 Sebastian Sprenger, “Germany Spends $2.3 billion on Airbus Light Attack Helicopters,” Defense News, December 14, 2023, https://www.defensenews.com/global/europe/2023/12/14/germany-spends-23-billion-on-airbus-light-attack-helicopters/; and “Airbus Helicopters and German Armed Forces Sign Largest H145M Contract,” press release, Airbus Helicopters, via Defense-Aerospace.com, December 14, 2023, https://www.defense-aerospace.com/germany-orders-up-to-82-airbus-h145m-armed-helicopters/

15 Garrett Reim, “Retrospective: How the UH-1 ‘Huey’ Changed Modern Warfare,” Flight Global, December 12, 2018, https://www.flightglobal.com/helicopters/retrospective-how-the-uh-1-huey-changed-modern-warfare/130259.article; and José Gabriel Pugliese, “El Bell 212 en la Fuerza Aérea,” Aerospacio (official magazine of Argentina’s air force), October 28, 2008.

16 Joseph Trevithick, “Dark Horse Contender Boeing Snags Air Force Deal to Replace Aging UH-1N Hueys with MH-139,” War Zone, September 24, 2018, https://www.twz.com/23803/dark-horse-contender-boeing-snags-air-force-deal-to-replace-aging-uh-1n-hueys-with-mh-139.

17 Colin Clark, “Dozen Lawmakers Object to Sole-Source UH-1N Replacement,” Breaking Defense, April 18, 2016, https://breakingdefense.com/2016/04/slow-down-air-force-dozen-lawmakers-object-to-sole-source-uh-1n-replacement/.

18 Tyler Rogoway, “USAF Asks for Bids to Finally Replace Its Antique UH-1N Hueys,” War Zone, December 3, 2016,
https://www.twz.com/6318/usaf-asks-for-bids-to-finally-replace-its-antique-uh-1n-hueys.

19 Ryan E. Von Rembow, “The UH-1Y Was a Mistake: An Argument for the MH-60S,” Marine Corps Gazette 99, no. 1, January 2015, https://www.mca-marines.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/Gazette-January-2015.pdf.

20 Brian W. Everstine, “The Grey Wolf Arrives,” Air & Space Forces, March 1, 2020, https://www.airandspaceforces.com/article/the-grey-wolf-arrives/

21 Valerie Insinna, “The Air Force Picks a Winner for its Huey Replacement Helicopter Contract,” Defense News, September 24, 2018, https://www.defensenews.com/breaking-news/2018/09/24/the-air-force-picks-a-winner-for-its-huey-replacement-helicopter-contract/; and Insinna, “The US Air Force’s UH-1N Huey Replacement Helicopter Has a New Name,” Defense News, December 19, 2019, https://www.defensenews.com/air/2019/12/19/the-air-forces-uh-1n-huey-replacement-helicopter-got-a-new-name-today/.

22 Stefano D’Urso, “MH-139 Grey Wolf Finally Enters Developmental Testing,” Aviationist, August 28, 2022, https://theaviationist.com/2022/08/28/mh-139-enters-developmental-testing/.

23 US Air Force Decision Commences Low Rate Production of Boeing/Leonardo MH-139 Grey Wolf,” press release, Leonardo, March 9, 2023, https://www.leonardo.com/documents/15646808/24917778/ComLDO_Boeing_Leonardo_MH-139A_MilestoneC_09_03_2023_ENG.pdf?t=1678369973868

24 US Coast Guard Acquires EADS CASA CN-235,” EADS press release, May 12, 2003.

25 “Lockheed Martin Selects EADS CASA CN-235-300M for U.S. Coast Guard’s Deepwater Maritime Patrol Aircraft Solution,” press release, Lockheed Martin, February 18, 2004, https://investors.lockheedmartin.com/news-releases/news-release-details/lockheed-martin-selects-eads-casa-cn-235-300m-us-coast-guards.

26 Lawrence Specker, “Airbus, Coast Guard Celebrate 100,000 Hours in the Air,” Alabama Media Group’s AL.com, September 22, 2017, https://www.al.com/news/mobile/2017/09/airbus_coast_guard_celebrate_1.html.

27 Joseph Trevithick, “Shadowy USAF Spy Plane Spotted Over Seattle Reportedly Reappears Over Syria,” War Zone, June 30, 2019, https://www.twz.com/17511/shadowy-usaf-spy-plane-spotted-over-seattle-reportedly-reappears-over-eastern-syria; and “C-146A Wolfhound,” fact sheet, US Air Force, March 2021, https://www.af.mil/About-Us/Fact-Sheets/Display/Article/467729/c-146a-wolfhound/.

28 Joseph Trevithick, “Shedding Some Light on the Pentagon’s Most Shadowy Aviation Units,” War Zone, July 3, 2020, https://www.twz.com/8125/shedding-some-light-on-the-pentagons-most-shadowy-aviation-units.

29 John T. Bennett, Jen DiMascio, and Ashley Roque, “Wanted: A Bona-Fide ‘Bug Smasher,’” Inside the Air Force 17, no. 12 (2006): 8-10

30 C-27J Conducts Successful First Flight,” Defense Daily, September 29, 1999; and Andy Nativi, “Italian Order Launches C-27J,” Flight Global, November 17, 1999.

31 Gayle S. Putrick, “C-27J Tapped for Joint Cargo Aircraft,” Air Force Times, June 13, 2007.

32 Philip Ewing, “Far from DC Battles, C-27 Gets Glowing Reviews,” DoD Buzz, April 24, 2012, https://web.archive.org/web/20120427214404/http:/www.dodbuzz.com/2012/04/24/far-from-dc-battles-c-27-gets-glowing-reviews/.

33 Sandra I. Erwin, “Military Services Competing for Future Airlift Missions,” National Defense, November 2005, https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2005/10/31/2005november-military-services-competing-for-future-airlift-missions.

34 Aaron Mehta, “US SOCOM to Get 7 C-27Js from USAF,” Defense News, November 1, 2013, https://archive.ph/20131101201655/http:/www.defensenews.com/article/20131101/DEFREG02/311010012#selection-857.0-867.16; and Jon Hemmerdinger, “US Coast Guard to Acquire USAF’s remaining C-27J Spartans,” Flight Global, January 6, 2014, https://www.flightglobal.com/us-coast-guard-to-acquire-usafs-remaining-c-27j-spartans/112099.article.

35 Craig Hoyle, “Bulgaria Accepts Its Last C-27J Transport,” Flight Global, March 31, 2011; and Hoyle, “Romania Accepts First C-27J Spartans,” Flight Global, December 4, 2011.

36 Frank N. McCarthy, “The Coast Guard’s New Island in the Drug War,” Proceedings of the United States Naval Institute, February 1986.

37 Trevor L. Brown, Matthew Potoski, and David M. Van Slake, Complex Contracting: Government Purchasing in the Wake of the US Coast Guard’s Deepwater Program (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 173–179.

38 Collin Fox, “Two Birds with One Stone: A New Patrol Craft and Unmanned Surface Vessel,” Proceedings of the United States Naval Institute, February 2019, https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2019/february/two-birds-one-stone-new-patrol-craft-and-unmanned-surface.

39 “Sentinel Class Patrol Boat Media Round Table,” briefing by Rear Admiral Gary T. Blore, Assistant Commandant for Acquisition, and Captain Richard Murphy, Sentinel-Class Project Manager, September 30, 2008, https://web.archive.org/web/20090220012354/http:/uscg.mil/acquisition/newsroom/pdf/sentinelmediabrief.pdf.

40 John Carlson, “For Iowans on Streets of Iraq, War ‘Never Gets Routine,’” Des Moines Register, October 2, 2005.

41 This discussion follows James Hasik, Securing the MRAP: Lessons Learned in Marketing and Military Procurement (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2021), chapter 3.

42 Author’s telephone interview with Chris Chambers, former chairman of the board, BAE Systems Land Systems South Africa, September 23, 2015.

43 Ronald Heflin, “Universal Need Statement, Hardened Engineer Vehicle,” mimeograph provided by Mike Aldrich of Force Protection Industries. The request was undated, but the approval by Marine Forces Pacific was dated December 12, 2003.

44 E. B. Boyd and Brian L. Frank, “A New Front: Can the Pentagon Do Business with Silicon Valley?” California Sunday Magazine, October 2015.

45 Erin Q. Winograd, “Intent Letter Says Heavy Forces Are Too Heavy: Shinseki Hints at Restructuring, Aggressive Changes for the Army,” Inside the Army 11, no. 25 (1999), http://www.jstor.org/stable/43984647.

46 John Gordon IV, Bruce Nardulli, and Walker L. Perry, “The Operational Challenges of Task Force Hawk,” Joint Force Quarterly, no. 29, Autumn/Winter 2001–2002, 57, https://ndupress.ndu.edu/portals/68/Documents/jfq/jfq-29.pdf.

47 Gordon, Nardulli, and Perry, “The Operational Challenges of Task Force Hawk,” 57.

48 Catherine MacRae, “Service Wants to Be Lighter, Faster, More Lethal: Army Chief of Staff’s ‘Vision’ Is Focused on Medium-Weight Force,” Inside the Pentagon 15, no. 41 (1999), http://www.jstor.org/stable/43995956.

49 Kim Burger, “Brigade Combat Team Has Trained Mostly on LAVs: Soldiers Give Praise for Wheeled, Tracked Vehicles at Ft. Lewis,” Inside the Army 12, no. 39 (2000): 1, 11–12, http://www.jstor.org/stable/43985049; and “Rigorous Training Expected to Increase Comfort Level: Brigade Team Soldiers Give Up Tanks, Firepower with ‘Hard Feelings,’” Inside the Army 12, no. 39 (2000): 1, 8–10, http://www.jstor.org/stable/43985046

50 Andrew Feickert, The Army’s Future Combat System (FCS): Background and Issues for Congress, Congressional Research Service, RL32888, November 30, 2009, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/RL/RL32888/20.

51 Steven Lee Myers, “Army’s Armored Vehicles Are Already Behind Schedule,” New York Times, November 18, 2000, https://www.nytimes.com/2000/11/18/us/army-s-armored-vehicles-are-already-behind-schedule.html.

52 William M. Solis et al., Military Transformation: Army’s Evaluation of Stryker and M-113A3 Infantry Carrier Vehicles Provided Sufficient Data for Statutorily Mandated Comparison, GAO-03-671, US Government Accounting Office, May 2003, https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-03-671.pdf.

53 James Kitfield, “Army Chief Struggles to Transform Service during War,” Government Executive, October 29, 2004, https://www.govexec.com/federal-news/2004/10/army-chief-struggles-to-transform-service-during-war/17929/; and Grace Jean, “Army Transformation Modeled After Stryker Units, National Defense, October 2005, https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2005/10/1/2005october–army-transformation-modeled-after-stryker-units.

54 Sandra Erwin, “For Army’s Future Combat Vehicles, Flying by C-130 No Longer Required,” National Defense, November 2005, https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2005/10/31/2005november-for-armys-future-combat-vehicles-flying-by-c130-no-longer-required.

55 See Army Strong: Equipped, Trained and Ready: Final Report of the 2010 Army Acquisition Review, Department of the Army, June 2011, 163, https://breakingdefense.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/3/2011/07/213465.pdf.

56 E-mail message to the author from Christopher Cardine, former program manager for the US Army and executive for General Dynamics Land Systems, April 2, 2024.

57 David Akin, “As NATO Summit Ends, Canada Promises More Military Aid to Ukraine,” Global News (Canada), June 30, 2022, https://globalnews.ca/news/8958186/canada-military-aid-ukraine/.

58 Inder Singh Bisht, “US to Co-Produce Stryker Armored Vehicle with India,” Defence Post, November 13, 2023, https://www.thedefensepost.com/2023/11/13/us-produce-stryker-india/?expand_article=1; and Manjeet Negi, “US Offers India Air Defence Version of Stryker Armoured Fighting Vehicles,” India Today, November 30, 2023, https://www.indiatoday.in/india/story/us-offers-air-defence-system-equipped-stryker-infantry-combat-vehicles-to-india-2469243-2023-11-30.

59 Author’s interview with Donald Schenk, retired brigadier general, US Army, December 12, 2023.

60 Adam Grissom, “The Future of Military Innovation Studies,” Journal of Strategic Studies 29, no. 5 (2006); and citing Barry R. Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany between the World Wars (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1984), 222–36.

61 Dave Oliver and Anand Toprani, American Defense Reform: Lessons from Failure and Success in Navy History (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2022).

62 Douglas Bland, “Foreword,” xviii, in Alan Williams, Reinventing Canadian Defence Procurement: A View from the Inside (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2006).

The post Friend-sourcing military procurement: Technology acquisition as security cooperation appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Chilton in DefenseNews on nuclear triad investment

Atlantic Council — Thu, 06 Jun 2024 19:38:24 +0000

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

On June 5, Forward Defense distinguished fellow General Kevin Chilton, USAF (ret.) published an article in DefenseNews on the need to continue forward with the nuclear triad modernization program, entitled “US security demands continued nuclear triad investment.” In the article, Chilton argues for the necessity of an effective nuclear triad to ensure US leaders are empowered with credible, reliable military options to manage current and looming threats from nuclear-armed adversaries.

Fellow

Kevin P. Chilton

Distinguished Fellow

Cybersecurity Defense Industry

The post Chilton in DefenseNews on nuclear triad investment appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Garlauskas quoted in The Hill on Russia-North Korea relationship

kyusko — Mon, 03 Jun 2024 20:48:12 +0000

Indo-Pacific Security Initiative Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

On June 2, Markus Garlauskas was quoted in The Hill regarding the steadily growing relationship between Russia and North Korea and the challenges it presents to the Biden administration. Garlauskas discussed the risk that this increasing cooperation may help advance North Korea’s military capabilities and embolden Kim Jong Un, potentially raising his willingness to escalate.

Staff

Markus Garlauskas

Director

Crisis Management Indo-Pacific

The post Garlauskas quoted in The Hill on Russia-North Korea relationship appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Why the US is giving Ukraine the green light to attack inside Russia

Atlantic Council — Fri, 31 May 2024 01:57:02 +0000

JUST IN

One hand may be coming untied. The White House announced Thursday that it will allow Ukraine to use US weapons for limited strikes inside Russia—a reversal of a policy that had been criticized for, in the words of the Czech foreign minister, leaving Ukraine to fight “with one hand tied behind its back.” We turned to our leading Ukraine-watcher to get his assessment.

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John E. Herbst (@JohnEdHerbst): Senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center and former US ambassador to Ukraine

Less than meets the eye

Facing pressure from Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and NATO allies, the Biden administration has changed course, but it has “done so in its now well-known overly cautious way,” John tells us.
The decision comes with serious strings attached, he points out: “Ukraine may only use the weapons in Russian territory bordering northeast Ukraine.” Plus, strikes “can only be directed at massed troops on the border and weapons systems attacking or preparing to attack Ukraine.”
According to John, that seems to rule out letting Ukraine use the 300-kilometer range Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS)—which the United States first sent to Ukraine in March—even though the range of that system does not extend “very deep into Russia.” He adds that “it’s unclear” whether Ukraine will be allowed to use the 150-kilometer range ATACMS.

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The Kharkiv conundrum

The urgency of the course correction has to do with Russia’s ongoing advance on Kharkiv, Ukraine’s second-largest city, which sits just thirty kilometers from the Russian border.
Kharkiv “has been pounded mercilessly by artillery and bombs launched by Russian aircraft just over the border,” John notes, where Russian forces enjoyed “sanctuary” under the Biden administration’s previous rules blocking Ukrainian strikes into Russia with US weapons.
The White House’s decision “does the minimum to help Ukraine with a difficult situation in the northeast,” removing “a major burden on Ukraine’s efforts to defend civilians in Kharkiv and to stop the Russian offensive,” John concludes. At the same time, it “makes public a range of restrictions that seem designed to temper Moscow’s reaction.“
“This half step is certainly better than none,” he adds, but it “does not send the necessary message of American resolve to the Kremlin.”

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‘The time has come’: Calls grow to allow Ukrainian strikes inside Russia

Peter Dickinson — Tue, 28 May 2024 21:04:23 +0000

Since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion more than two years ago, most of Ukraine’s international allies have insisted that any weapons they provide be used exclusively within Ukrainian territory. These restrictions were initially imposed to prevent a broadening of the conflict, but a growing chorus of critics now say this approach is preventing Ukraine from defending itself and risks enabling Russian victory.

The debate over the use of Western weapons to attack targets inside Russia has rumbled on throughout the war, and has recently been thrust to the top of the agenda by the Russian army’s latest offensive. In early May, Russian troops crossed Ukraine’s northern border and began advancing toward the country’s second city, Kharkiv. This attack was no surprise; on the contrary, Ukrainian military officials had been monitoring preparations on the other side of the border for weeks, but were powerless to act.

Russia’s Kharkiv offensive has highlighted the military absurdity of current restrictions on the use of the Western weapons supplied to Ukraine. Russian commanders are well aware of Ukraine’s inability to strike back, and are actively exploiting the border zone as a safe haven to concentrate forces and launch bombardments. Understandably, this is fueling calls among Ukraine’s allies for a major rethink.

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The NATO Parliamentary Assembly is the latest international organization to voice its support for an end to restrictions on Ukraine’s use of Western weapons. Lawmakers from all 32 NATO states adopted a declaration on May 27 urging alliance members to allow strikes on military targets inside Russia. “Ukraine can only defend itself if it can attack Russia’s supply lines and Russian bases of operation. It is time to recognize this reality and let Ukraine do what it must,” stated NATO Parliamentary Assembly President Michal Szczerba.

This declaration echoed NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenburg’s May 24 interview with Britain’s The Economist calling on NATO allies to end their prohibition on the use of Western weapons against Russian targets. “The time has come for allies to consider whether they should lift some of the restrictions they have put on the use of weapons they have donated to Ukraine,” commented Stoltenberg. “Especially now when a lot of the fighting is going on in Kharkiv, close to the border, to deny Ukraine the possibility of using these weapons against legitimate military targets on Russian territory makes it very hard for them to defend themselves.”

A number of senior Western officials have also recently backed an end to restrictions. During an early May visit to Kyiv, UK Foreign Secretary David Cameron announced that Ukraine had the “right” to use British-supplied weapons for attacks inside Russia. Speaking in Germany on May 27, French President Emmanuel Macron noted that Ukraine was being attacked from Russia. “We must allow them to take out the military sites the missiles are fired from,” he commented. The following day, Dutch Defense Minister Kajsa Ollongren said the present ban was forcing Ukraine to fight “with one hand tied behind its back” and argued that lifting restrictions “should not be subject to debate.”

Eurasia Center events

Ukraine’s advance in Kursk: What’s next and implications

Conflict Russia Security & Defense Ukraine

Not everyone is convinced. For now, the Biden administration remains unwilling to revise its position limiting the use of US weapons. Meanwhile, a number of European countries including Germany and Italy have also called for caution. This reluctance to escalate the existing confrontation with Russia was on display in Brussels on Tuesday, when Belgian Prime Minister Alexander De Croo announced plans to provide Ukraine with thirty F-16 fighter jets, but informed visiting Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy that the planes were not to be used inside Russia.

Russian President Vladimir Putin has responded to mounting talk of an end to Western restrictions on attacks inside Russia by warning of “serious consequences” and hinting at a possible nuclear response. “If these serious consequences occur in Europe, how will the United States behave, bearing in mind our parity in the field of strategic weapons,” he commented in Tashkent this week. “Do they want a global conflict?”

Putin’s nuclear threats are nothing new, of course. Since the start of the Ukraine invasion, he has made numerous thinly-veiled references to nuclear escalation as part of efforts to intimidate the West and reduce the flow of weapons to Ukraine. These nuclear blackmail tactics have proved highly effective, encouraging Western leaders to embrace policies of escalation management that have significantly undermined the international response to Russia’s invasion.

The Kremlin dictator is now clearly hoping the same approach can deter the US and other key allies from giving Ukraine the green light to strike Russia using Western weapons. If he succeeds in this latest act of nuclear intimidation, it will bring Russian victory in Ukraine closer and set a dangerous precedent for the future of international security.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

Robert Soofer

Forward Defense

Arms Control Defense Policy

The post Soofer cited in Asia Times on the nuclear sea-launched cruise missile appeared first on Atlantic Council.

McCue article reprinted in RealClearDefense and featured in “Morning Recon” newsletter

Atlantic Council — Fri, 24 May 2024 19:55:40 +0000

On May 24, RealClearDefense republished an article from Forward Defense Visiting Senior Fellow Lt. Col. James McCue, USAF, and featured it in its “Morning Recon” newsletter. This article, entitled “Congress should save the Sentinel ICBM—its true value is more than simply its cost,” argues that, despite the increase in the Sentinel ICBM’s projected costs, the system ultimately provides the cheapest means of securing strategic deterrence, given its decades-long lifespan and the potential to reduce the cost of staffing and maintaining the system.

Fellow

James McCue

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

National Security Nuclear Deterrence

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Ukraine’s Western allies should fear Russian victory not Russian defeat

Peter Dickinson — Tue, 21 May 2024 21:33:07 +0000

Since the launch of Russia’s full-scale invasion more than two years ago, Western military support for Ukraine has been plagued by endless delays, restrictions, and half-measures. This underwhelming response has typically been blamed on concerns over possible Russian retaliation and the desire to avoid a wider war. In reality, however, some Western leaders may also be motivated by perceptions of Russian weakness rather than fear of Russian strength.

This was the argument set out by Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy last week as he bemoaned the inadequate Western reaction to Russia’s invasion. Speaking to journalists in Kyiv, Zelenskyy said he believes Ukraine’s partners “are afraid of Russia losing the war” because this would lead to “unpredictable geopolitical consequences.”

Zelenskyy’s comments are not entirely new, of course. There have long been suggestions that the West’s hesitant approach to aiding Ukraine reflects worries that a Russian defeat could lead to the fall of the Putin regime. Some have even speculated that the Russian Federation itself would be unlikely to survive, and would instead break up into a number of new states, in a continuation of the process that began in 1991.

It is easy enough to imagine why Western policymakers might be alarmed by the prospect of a new Russian collapse. Indeed, the Western response to the disintegration of the USSR was equally cautious, with US President George H. W. Bush traveling to Ukraine on the eve of the country’s declaration of independence in August 1991 to deliver his infamous “Chicken Kiev speech” warning against “suicidal nationalism.”

President Bush was far from alone in prioritizing geopolitical stability over the statehood aspirations of Ukraine and the USSR’s other captive nations. One year earlier, British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher had visited Ukraine and offered a similarly skeptical view of the country’s independence struggle. Bush and Thatcher were primarily concerned with the fate of the Soviet Union’s colossal war machine and vast nuclear arsenal. Allowing this to be redistributed among a collection of newly independent states seemed the height of recklessness. So rather than hasten the fall of the Soviet Empire, they sought to prevent or at least manage the process.

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These same concerns are now hampering support for Ukraine as it fights against Vladimir Putin’s efforts to reverse the verdict of 1991. But is today’s Russia really at risk of collapse?

The Wagner mutiny of June 2023 would certainly suggest that Putin’s grip on the country is far more fragile than the Kremlin would like us to believe. While the mutiny was a short-lived affair, it was nevertheless revealing that rebellious troops were able to seize control of one of Russia’s largest cities without encountering opposition. Equally noteworthy was the absence of establishment figures rushing to rally around the throne. At the same time, the demands of the Wagner rebels did not amount to regime change, never mind anything that might constitute a threat to Russia’s territorial integrity. On the contrary, they sought a stronger Russia with more effective wartime leadership.

This is not to say that the break-up of the Russian Federation is impossible, of course. The invasion of Ukraine has underlined Russia’s status as the last of the great European empires, and has sparked a long overdue debate over the need for decolonization. However, talk of an impending collapse may be wishful thinking. While Russia has a history of unraveling in sudden and dramatic fashion, there is currently little evidence of serious independence movements in any of the country’s ethnic minority republics.

Rather than sparking the next stage in Russia’s long retreat from empire, defeat in Ukraine would be far more likely to bring about the fall of the Putin regime and usher in a period of national reflection and reform. This has been the case following numerous other notable Russian military defeats. After losing the Crimean War in the middle of the nineteenth century, Russia abandoned serfdom. Defeat to Japan in 1905 led to a brief flirtation with parliamentary democracy.

Meanwhile, the failed Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in the 1980s fueled public demands for reform that helped end the Cold War. If the current invasion also ends in defeat, there is every reason to believe Russia will survive intact. After all, while a retreat from Ukraine would be deeply wounding for Russian national pride, it would hardly pose an existential threat to Russia itself.

Eurasia Center events

Ukraine’s advance in Kursk: What’s next and implications

Conflict Russia Security & Defense Ukraine

Rather than scaring themselves into self-deterrence with nightmare scenarios of future Russian collapse, Western leaders should be laser-focused on the far more immediate dangers posed by Russian victory. After a series of initial setbacks, the Russian army has now regained the initiative in Ukraine and is advancing. Putin is more confident than ever and is clearly preparing his entire country to wage a long war of attrition. Unless the West dramatically increases its military support for Ukraine, there is every chance he will succeed.

If Putin achieves victory in Ukraine, he will almost certainly go further. The Kremlin dictator is already boasting of his Ukrainian “conquests” and comparing himself to all-conquering eighteenth century Russian Czar Peter the Great. At the beginning the war, Putin had sought to frame the invasion as a defensive measure by blaming it on NATO expansion and imaginary “Ukrainian Nazis.” As his battlefield fortunes have improved, he has begun to talk openly of reclaiming “historically Russian lands.”

As anyone with a passing knowledge of Russian history will confirm, there are currently at least a dozen other countries beyond Ukraine that could also fit Putin’s definition of “historically Russian lands.” The list of potential targets includes Finland, Poland, the Baltic states, Belarus, Moldova, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Armenia, and the whole of Central Asia. None of these countries can feel safe. Putin’s entire reign has been defined by his desire to reestablish Russia as a Great Power and end the era of Western domination. If he achieves victory in Ukraine, it is ludicrous to suggest he will simply stop.

Some commentators are inclined to downplay the risk of further invasions by pointing to the poor performance of the Russian army in Ukraine and claiming that Russia is in no position to engage in further military adventures. Unfortunately, such arguments fail to take into account the impact of Russian success in Ukraine. A Russian victory would transform the geopolitical climate, leading to a surge in international support for the Kremlin and the demoralization of the West. Countries throughout the Global South would abandon neutrality and rush to foster closer ties with Moscow.

In material terms, the Russian conquest of Ukraine would have even more profound consequences for European security. Putin already commands Europe’s largest army. With Ukraine subjugated, he would also have control over Europe’s second-largest army, along with Ukraine’s long neglected but rapidly reviving military-industrial capabilities. Possession of Ukraine’s fabled black earth would make Russia the dominant power on global agricultural markets, providing Putin with a formidable tool to bribe and blackmail the international community.

Even if a victorious Russia did not immediately embark on new conquests, every government in Europe would be obliged to radically increase defense spending. Many are just starting to rearm now in reaction to the Russian war against Ukraine. Expenditures could soon rise far beyond the current cost of arming Ukraine. There would also be a very real danger of a new nuclear arms race. Given the evident effectiveness of Putin’s naked nuclear blackmail in deterring the West from aiding Ukraine, it would be entirely logical for other nations to conclude that they will only be truly safe with a nuclear deterrent of their own.

The international repercussions of a Russian victory in Ukraine would be equally disastrous. Autocrats around the world would view Putin’s triumph as a sign of unprecedented Western weakness and an open invitation to pursue their own expansionist agendas. The period of relative peace and progress that followed the end of the Cold War would be replaced by a new era of international instability and insecurity.

None of this is inevitable. Russia can still be defeated in Ukraine if the West takes the decisive step of committing itself to Ukrainian victory. This means supplying Ukraine with sufficient weapons to not only defend itself but to actually defeat Russia. Crucially, it means ending absurd restrictions on the use of Western weapons and allowing strikes on legitimate military targets inside Russia. And it means providing Ukraine with the kind of guaranteed long-term military support that will convince Putin his hopes of outlasting the West are futile.

Confronting the Kremlin effectively will require considerable political will and courage. Russia will inevitably respond to any hardening of Western resolve by escalating its nuclear intimidation tactics, but the usefulness of nuclear saber-rattling diminishes when Western governments don’t allow such threats to cloud their strategic calculus.

It is now painfully obvious that the hesitancy and indecisiveness of the past two years have not succeeded in appeasing Putin or reducing the challenge posed by a resurgent Russia. Instead, the West is now facing the very real prospect of a defeat that would have catastrophic consequences for the future of international security. In order to avert disaster, Putin must lose in Ukraine. Any worries about the future of the Russian Federation will have to wait until this far more urgent threat has been addressed.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

Guido Torres

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Defense Policy Defense Technologies

The post Torres coauthored for CSIS about Chinese hypersonic missiles in South American space ground control sites appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Congress should save the Sentinel ICBM—its true value is more than simply its cost

James McCue — Tue, 21 May 2024 14:20:26 +0000

In January, the US Air Force notified Congress that the new Sentinel intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) was costing more than expected to build. At 37 percent, the projected cost overruns were considered “critical” and triggered the Nunn-McCurdy act, a law designed to curtail cost growth in major military procurements. Now, as both supporters and critics of the program gear up for the required congressional testimony this summer, it’s important to understand not only what the program costs, but also its true value.

A thorough review reveals that some of the cost estimate increases seem understandable given expensive but worthwhile new requirements. These include replacing thousands of miles of communication cables, improving security, and rebuilding hundreds of silos. Understood in full context, Congress should insist on continuing this vital program—indeed, most Nunn-McCurdy-breaching programs are continued. At the same time, supporters in Congress and the Pentagon need a better argument regarding costs and value propositions. They need to make it clear, especially in the event that costs rise further still, that the value of program should be measured in decades, over its full lifetime, and not simply by its current price tag.

What is a Nunn-McCurdy Review?

Effectively fighting to retain Sentinel requires first understanding when a Nunn-McCurdy Review (NMR) becomes necessary. There are two kinds of cost that trip an NMR: either a sharp rise in the estimated program cost (research and development, construction costs, and procurement of each weapon) or a rise within single unit cost (that is, the cost of just one bomb, aircraft, or satellite). Both numbers are looked at on a per-unit basis to make it easier to weigh the cost of a particular capability separated from order quantity. Large acquisition programs take years to complete and so undergo checks at key milestones. A program’s cost estimate is updated with each milestone and so called its ‘current’ estimate, but the original can only be updated during an NMR. Finally, there are two types of review under the NMR based on the degree of cost overrun. The first is a “significant” breach, which entails a cost increase of either 15 percent above the current projection or 30 percent over the original, while a “critical” breach would be 25 percent or 50 percent respectively. A critical review is performed under the presumption of program cancellation—and such is the case for the Sentinel program now. Therefore, continuing the program will require a root-cause analysis, program restructuring, and the personal sign-off of the US secretary of defense. So, in total, there are eight ways to trigger an NMR, as indicated below.

The Nunn-McCurdy Act passed more than four decades ago to curtail large expenditures for significant defense projects, such as the Patriot missile defense system. From 1997 through 2015, there were ninety-four NMR breaches in total, with nearly half being major programs. Additionally, almost all of these large projects breached the rule twice before completing initial purchases.

Why is Sentinel so expensive?

It is no surprise that the Sentinel program—which will rebuild more than six hundred silos and other facilities, including creating hundreds of new cutting-edge modular missiles, all while consolidating and updating several complicated command-and-control systems—is expensive. For too many years, the Department of Defense waited to carry out missile, communications, silo, and other updates, and all those areas must now be updated all at once. This necessitates a much larger project with more variables, making it even harder to predict expenses.

With the Sentinel program, the Air Force is purchasing much more than just replacements of four-hundred operational Minuteman missiles. The program will also refurbish or rebuild more than six hundred facilities and purchase hundreds of maintenance and other support vehicles, as well as more than one hundred missiles for ongoing testing.

So what, then, explains the unanticipated costs? Pushing new technology too fast often leads to unexpected costs. But seventeen of Sentinel’s eighteen major subsystems are out of the danger zone of being considered “immature,” a period in which cost overruns often originate. Sentinel’s challenges have a blend of sources, including changed requirements, lingering aftereffects of economic realities driven by the COVID-19 pandemic, and most importantly, sheer scale.

The Air Force has never attempted an infrastructure build at this scale and the initial plan was overly optimistic. That initial rosy cost estimate was reconciled with the broader Pentagon’s cost estimate, which was around $95 billion. But the initial approved budget still supposed it could avoid rewiring and major rebuilds. This assumption might have held, but by early summer 2023, the scope of the requirements for the program was changed, in part, to deal with new threats. Though costly, the altered requirements improve Sentinel by leveling up to modern communications capabilities and by adding “security enhancement of both missile hardware and facilities.” A new fiber-based underground communications structure and sixty-two towers will add redundancy while requiring fewer people to operate, given the planned halving of launch control centers. The personnel savings may also impact security forces as well, with reduced on-site maintenance activity and lower false-alarm response rates. These design changes ensure US preeminence in nuclear weapon safety and security while suggesting relief options for recruitment challenges.

Another reason for the increase in the Sentinel program’s cost has been economy-wide increases in costs of construction above background inflation rates. Difficulties in finding and retaining engineers, including getting them timely security clearances, were also cited for increasing cost projections. Manufacturing and construction have been disproportionately impacted by supply-chain interruptions and labor scarcity. In 2019, when the most recent Sentinel cost estimates were being developed, no one was predicting the enduring economic impact of a pandemic.

But the simplest and biggest factor is the sheer size and scope of the project, and with that comes added uncertainty. This is why even post-NMR, the cost estimate has the potential to rise again.

Anyone who has renovated a house or even just watched a few HGTV episodes will know that, even if a building has “good bones,” surprises happen. The fine print on home renovation contracts accounts for the possibility that, after construction begins, new problems will be discovered. Half a century ago, Minuteman siloes in Montana were “rushed to completion,” with workers pouring concrete amid the Cuban missile crisis. These Cold War–era silos remain in some of the harshest environments that exist within the contiguous United States. Sentinel’s NMR should include comprehensive assessments of silo foundations to confirm that only the planned partial silo rebuilds is needed. Likewise, renovation can often be more costly than a new build, so there is merit in looking at so-called “green pasture” build options.

A better value proposition

Sentinel is a large and complex program, but it is worth more—and is a better value—than most realize. The Sentinel missile is slated for up to a sixty-year lifespan, now with a $131.5 billion projected cost for four hundred operational missiles. This amounts to an annualized cost of $2.2 billion for the fleet and facilities, or about $2.7 million per year per missile. For comparison, the F-35A has a flyaway cost of $82.5 million and a fifty-year planned lifespan, giving a per-unit-design-year cost of just under $1.6 million. Taking into account the discrepant availability rates for these two systems, the design year costs of putting each on alert twenty-four hours a day nears parity. This designed lifetime on-mission cost comparison is admittedly incomplete and inexact. But it offers a better way to compare costs across two headline military systems, both of which have faced an NMR.

An upside of Sentinel’s longevity by design is lowered maintenance. Over the past five years, Air Force Global Strike Command logged 2.5 million maintenance hours to keep Minuteman operational, a 30 percent increase from the previous five years. In March of this year, Lt. Col. Anthony Santino, the head of ICBM flight testing, said that he expects a further 25 percent increase over the rest of this decade. That much maintenance translates to needing at least sixty more full-time mechanics at a time when it’s getting harder to meet basic recruiting goals. Sentinel will allow personnel reductions and retain that savings for at least half a century. The nature of the nuclear mission does not lend itself to just-in-time production, or maintenance, to make up for weapons that fall offline during a crisis. Sentinel will invert the manpower needs curve while improving security, reliability, effectiveness, and upgradability of the ICBM force.

Seeing how the Sentinel program adds unique value to national defense requires thinking one step past the eight ways to trip an NMR. Using the annualized design-life cost metric is perhaps one way to show that Sentinel is no more expensive than other recent major military purchases. This framing helps show the sensibility in sustaining the cheapest means of securing strategic deterrence for future generations.

Lieutenant Colonel James McCue is a senior US Air Force SkillBridge fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security in the Forward Defense program.

Note: The Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security conducts work on nuclear and strategic forces that is sponsored by donors including Los Alamos National Laboratory, Northrop Grumman Corporation (which has the sole contract from the US Air Force to engineer and manufacture Sentinel ICBMs), the Norwegian Ministry of Defense, the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the United States Department of Defense, the United States Department of Energy, the United States Department of State, as well as general support to the Scowcroft Center. This article did not involve any of these donors and reflects only the author’s views. The positions expressed do not reflect the official position of the United States Air Force or the Department of Defense.

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Russia’s growing kamikaze drone fleet tests Ukraine’s limited air defenses

Marcel Plichta — Tue, 14 May 2024 15:59:46 +0000

The past few months have been a particularly challenging period for Ukraine’s overstretched air defense units. With the country suffering from mounting shortages of interceptor missiles, Russia has exploited growing gaps in Ukraine’s defenses to bomb cities and vital civilian infrastructure with deadly frequency. These escalating attacks have led to renewed calls from Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy for Kyiv’s partners to provide the country with more air defense systems in order to safeguard lives and prevent the collapse of basic municipal services.

While most attention has focused on the many Russian ballistic and cruise missiles that have reached their targets, Ukraine has actually managed to shoot down a strikingly high number of Russian kamikaze drones. On May 13, the Wall Street Journal reported that Ukraine had intercepted 82 percent of kamikaze drones over the past six months, just one percentage point lower than the total for the previous half-year period. This figure is even more remarkable given that Russia typically launches waves of drones as part of complex attacks that also feature a range of different missiles.

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Many in the Ukrainian media and beyond have been quick to publicize the numerous improvised and ingenious measures adopted by Ukraine to counter Russia’s drone attacks. These steps have included the establishment of mobile teams using older anti-aircraft guns mounted on trucks to shoot down drones at a fraction of the cost of more sophisticated air defense systems. In spring 2024, US General James Hecker, head of US Air Forces in Europe, described how Ukrainians had set up a detection network using cheap cell phones on poles to warn of incoming drones. German-supplied Gepard systems have also proved extremely cost-effective drone destroyers, as have newer systems such as the US-made VAMPIRE.

While Ukraine’s high interception rates are impressive, the threat posed by this form of aerial warfare remains grave and continues to evolve. Even when the majority of drones are shot down, those that do reach their targets often cause significant damage and loss of life. Indeed, when it comes to air defenses, even a 99 percent success rate is not good enough. While it is better to shoot down drones than allow them to hit their targets, interceptions can also be costly, with debris from falling drones frequently causing death and destruction in a terrifyingly random manner.

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Russia’s fleet of kamikaze drones is growing. During the first year of the invasion, the Kremlin organized regular deliveries of Shahed kamikadze drones from Iran. Moscow has since set up domestic production facilities and is now far less dependent on Tehran. This is allowing Russia to scale up its own output, making it possible to increase the frequency of attacks. As production continues to expand, more and more drones will be launched against targets across Ukraine. These increasing quantities of drones will deplete Ukraine’s anti-drone ammunition and could potentially overwhelm the country’s limited defenses.

In addition to producing a domestic version of Iran’s Shahed drone, Russia is also experimenting with a range of modifications. These efforts have included spraying drones to reduce detection and adding cameras to stream video footage of drone flights back to Russian operators. Meanwhile, Russia reportedly continues to receive new drone models from the country’s Iranian partners.

While these upgraded models and modifications have so far failed to make a big difference to Russia’s air offensive, they do serve as a reminder that this is a war of innovation and underline the need for Ukraine to maintain the highest degree of vigilance. Throughout the invasion of Ukraine, the Russian military has demonstrated its ability to learn from earlier mistakes and incorporate new technologies. Ukrainians cannot afford to assume that today’s defenses will necessarily be sufficient to stop tomorrow’s drones.

An additional drone-related headache for Ukrainian military planners is the need to spread air defenses across as wide an area as possible. While mobile anti-drone teams have proved relatively effective, they are only one part of a much wider network of air defenses centered around Ukraine’s major cities and key infrastructure sites. Given that air defenses are desperately needed to support military operations on the battlefield, guarding against frequent kamikaze drone attacks far away from the front lines weakens the Ukrainian war effort.

As long as Russia continues to build and deploy kamikaze drones, they will remain a significant problem for Ukraine. The country’s partners can help address this problem in two ways. They can supply more air defense systems, especially models that are designed to intercept slow-moving but plentiful drones rather than far faster missiles. They can also support Ukraine’s efforts to strike targets such as air bases, production facilities, and drone storage sites inside Russia. Destroying Russian drones before they are launched is the most effective way to protect Ukraine from further bombardment.

Putin appoints economist as defense minister as Russia plans for long war

Mercedes Sapuppo — Tue, 14 May 2024 14:54:02 +0000

Vladimir Putin has appointed technocrat economist Andrei Belousov as Russia’s new defense minister in a shake-up that underlines his determination to wage a long war of attrition against Ukraine.

The relatively unknown Belousov replaces long-serving Sergei Shoigu, who will now take up a new post as Secretary of Russia’s National Security Council. Shoigu had led the Defense Ministry since 2012. Known as both a Putin loyalist and a personal friend of the Russian dictator who accompanied him on hunting holidays, he is the most senior figure to be dismissed since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.

While Shoigu’s tenure in office coincided with Russian military success stories such as the 2014 occupation of Ukraine’s Crimean peninsula and the 2015 Russian intervention in Syria, his reputation had been severely tarnished in recent years by the poor performance of the Russian army in Ukraine. The many battlefield setbacks suffered in Ukraine have been particularly embarrassing for Putin, who has long pointed to the revival of Russia’s military strength as one his greatest achievements.

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Shoigu’s removal took many by surprise but was not entirely unexpected. The announcement came just weeks after his deputy defense minister, Timur Ivanov, was arrested on corruption charges. At the time of Ivanov’s removal in late April, many speculated that Shoigu’s days as defense minister may also be numbered.

Shoigu’s replacement, Andrei Belousov, is a former deputy prime minister and minister of economic development who also served for a number of years as an economic advisor to Putin. The appointment of a civilian technocrat suggests that Putin aims to control military spending and improve efficiency at the ministry of defense as he looks to outproduce Ukraine and the country’s Western partners in a protracted confrontation.

Unlike his predecessor, Belousov has played no significant role in the invasion of Ukraine and is not tainted by the military defeats of the past two years. His long record of government service and relative anonymity make him in many ways a typical pick for Putin, who is notoriously reluctant to raise ambitious new faces to senior positions within the Kremlin leadership.

Speculation over Shoigu’s future has been mounting ever since the failure of Russia’s blitzkrieg offensive in the spring of 2022 during the initial stages of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. He has frequently been singled out for criticism by Russia’s military blogger community, and was repeatedly accused of corruption by former Wagner mercenary chief Yevgeny Prigozhin in a series of explosive video addresses on the eve of the short-lived June 2023 Wagner mutiny.

Unsurprisingly, Shoigu’s departure was widely cheered within Russia’s so-called “Z-patriot” pro-war community. Media tycoon and prominent Russian nationalist Konstantin Malofeyev toasted the news, while suggesting Belousov’s appointment would now make defense “the absolute priority” of Russian state policy. “We’ll have both guns and butter,” he commented.

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Putin’s decision to finally remove Shoigu and replace him with a veteran economist comes as he begins a fifth presidential term while bogged down in the largest European invasion since World War II. His new defense minister is now expected to focus on boosting domestic Russian arms production while channeling resources toward the development of the country’s defense tech sector. “Today on the battlefield, the winner is the one who is more open to innovation,” commented Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov on the recent ministerial changes in Moscow.

Belousov appears well qualified to meet the twin challenges of improving armament output and aiding Russia’s efforts to regain the technological advantage in the war against Ukraine. His long career in government gives him detailed knowledge of the Russian economy and the intricacies of state budgets, while he has a record of supporting the development of Russia’s drone capabilities. Belousov will now join a number of other senior government officials with similarly strong defense tech credentials including Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin, Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Chernyshenko, and Minister of Digital Development Maksut Shadayev.

Despite being removed from his defense post, Shoigu has not been kicked to the curb. His appointment as Secretary of Russia’s National Security Council, replacing longtime Putin confidant Nikolai Patrushev, should allow him to retain significant influence within the Kremlin. At the same time, it is not clear whether Shoigu will be able to exercise the same kind of power as his predecessor, who now takes on a new role as an aide to Putin. While this has the appearance of a slight demotion for Patrushev, the parallel promotion of his son Dmitry to the position of deputy prime minister would suggest that he will remain an influential figure.

The recent changes in the leadership of Russia’s Defense Ministry do not signal any fundamental shift in Putin’s war aims. On the contrary, this week’s appointment confirms Putin’s continued commitment to the invasion of Ukraine and his readiness to prioritize the war effort over all other considerations. Putin clearly intends to place Russia on an indefinite wartime footing, and hopes Belousov is capable of managing the process with maximum efficiency.

Mercedes Sapuppo is a program assistant at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

Putin’s one tank victory parade is a timely reminder Russia can be beaten

Peter Dickinson — Thu, 09 May 2024 20:35:44 +0000

For the second year running, Russia’s Victory Day parade in Moscow on May 9 featured just one solitary tank. Throughout his twenty-four year reign, Russian ruler Vladimir Putin has used the annual Victory Day holiday to showcase his country’s resurgence as a military superpower. However, the underwhelming spectacle of a single World War II-era T-34 tank pootling across Red Square has now become a embarrassing tradition and a painful reminder of the catastrophic losses suffered by the Russian military in Ukraine.

Prior to the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Victory Day parades had typically featured dozens of tanks as the Kremlin sought to demonstrate its vast arsenal and trumpet Russia’s leading role in the defeat of Nazi Germany. The difference this year did not go unnoticed, with many commentators poking fun at Putin. “This T-34, the legendary Soviet tank from World War II, was the only Russian tank on display at the Victory Day parade in Red Square today. The others must all be busy somewhere!” quipped Financial Times Moscow bureau chief Max Seddon.

Putin’s parade came just one day after analysts at open source conflict monitoring site Oryx announced that visually confirmed Russian tank losses in Ukraine had passed the 3000 mark. Oryx researchers document military losses based on video or photographic evidence, while recognizing that overall figures are likely to be “significantly higher” than those verified by publicly available open source materials. Meanwhile, the latest figures from the Ukrainian military indicate Russia has lost as many as 7429 tanks since February 2022. While Ukraine’s claims regarding Russian battlefield losses are generally treated with a degree of skepticism, even the visually confirmed baseline figure of 3000 tanks underlines the devastating toll of Putin’s invasion on the Russian military.

In addition to exposing the Kremlin’s dwindling supply of tanks, this year’s strikingly modest Victory Day festivities have also drawn attention to other negative consequences of Russia’s ongoing Ukraine invasion. During the buildup to the holiday, a number of major Russian cities including Pskov, Kursk, Bryansk, and Belgorod announced they would not be staging traditional Victory Day parades this year. These cancellations were justified on security grounds, highlighting the growing threat posed by Ukraine to targets inside Russia.

Since the start of 2024, Ukraine has brought the war home to Russia with a highly successful long-range drone campaign against the country’s oil and gas industry, including air strikes against refineries located more than one thousand kilometers from the Ukrainian border. While Kyiv has largely refrained from attacks on civilian targets, Ukraine’s proven ability to strike deep inside Russia is a major blow to the Kremlin, which has vowed to shield the Russian public from the war and prevent any disruption to everyday life.

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The downgrading of Russia’s Victory Day celebrations is a personal blow for Putin, who has sought to place the holiday at the heart of efforts to revive Russian nationalism following the loss of status and perceived humiliations of the early post-Soviet period. This approach marked a departure from the Soviet years, when Victory Day was overshadowed by a number of more ideologically driven holidays such as May Day and the annual anniversary of the October Revolution. Indeed, during the 46-year period between the end of World War II and the fall of the USSR, the Soviet authorities held just three Victory Day military parades in Moscow.

It was Putin who masterminded the rise of Victory Day to its current position as Russia’s most important public holiday. Since the early 2000s, he has transformed Victory Day into the propaganda centerpiece of a pseudo-religious cult, complete with its own sacred symbols, feast days, saints, and dogmas. Anyone who dares question the Kremlin’s heavily distorted and highly sanitized version of the Soviet role in World War II is treated with the kind of ruthless severity once reserved for medieval heretics. Meanwhile, in a further nod to the continued potency of the World War II narrative in Putin’s Russia, opponents of the Kremlin are routinely branded as “fascists” and “Nazis.”

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The mythology surrounding Putin’s Victory Day cult is not just a matter of repairing battered Russian national pride. It has also helped strengthen perceptions of the Russian army as unbeatable. Both inside Russia and among international audiences, the pomp and propaganda surrounding the holiday have encouraged people to view the Russian army as simply too big and powerful to be defeated. This is complete nonsense. The past few centuries of Russian history are littered with resounding military defeats including the Crimean War, the Russo-Japanese War, and the failed Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Russia even managed to lose World War I, despite starting the war on the winning side.

The historically unjustified but widespread belief that Russian victory is somehow inevitable has helped shape the West’s weak response to the invasion of Ukraine. When the war began, most Western observers were convinced Ukraine would fall in a matter of days. Even after the Ukrainian military shocked the world by winning battle after battle and liberating half the land occupied by Russia, many have clung to the assumption that eventual Russian victory remains assured. This defeatist thinking has been an important factor hampering efforts to arm Ukraine adequately. It may yet become a self-fulfilling prophesy.

The sight of a lone tank on Red Square this week is a timely reminder that behind the facade of overwhelming strength, Putin’s Russia is far from invincible. For years, the Kremlin has sought to intimidate the outside world with carefully choreographed displays of military muscle-flexing. However, the invasion of Ukraine has revealed a very different reality. Since February 2022, Putin’s once vaunted army has seen its reputation plummet and has suffered a series of stinging battlefield defeats while failing to achieve a decisive breakthrough against its much smaller neighbor. The Russian military remains a formidable force and should not be underestimated, but the events of the past two years have demonstrated that it is also very much beatable. If Ukraine is finally given the necessary tools by the country’s partners, it will finish the job.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

Atlantic Council — Wed, 08 May 2024 20:19:23 +0000

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The drones are small—the arms race may not be. Here’s how the US can win.

Matthew Rose, Kathryn Levantovscaia — Wed, 08 May 2024 00:19:09 +0000

The era for small-drone warfare has arrived. Recent attacks on Israel and the continuing war in Ukraine have put a global spotlight on the proliferation of small, commercially available Unmanned Aerial Systems (sUAS), commonly known as drones. This proliferation of sUAS stands in stark contrast to the use of larger, more complex, and expensive military-grade UAVs, such as the MQ-9 Reaper, which remain out of reach for many militaries, rebel groups, and other non-state actors. These groups are instead embracing commercially available drones and transforming modern warfare and battlefield tactics as a result.

Russia and Ukraine have used drones to great effect on the battlefield. Now Russia is further developing Iranian designed “one-way” drones as an economically effective weapon. Leveraging the readily available technology, Ukraine has turned drones into tactical tools for reconnaissance, precision strikes, and the ongoing disruption of Russian forces.

Meanwhile in Yemen, Iran-backed Houthis have grown adept at using low-cost drones for attacks on Saudi infrastructure, international commercial shipping to disrupt global commerce, and, most recently, against Israel. In the Kurdistan region of Iraq and a small US outpost in Jordan, drones have been used to attack US and allied forces and punish their hosts.

Intercepted Iranian drones were broadcast across international media outlets following Tehran’s attack on Israel on April 14. Even before this, Israeli soldiers were being effectively attacked by Hamas’s deployment of drones outfitted with explosives and deployed to disrupt infrastructure and equipment such as cameras or to attack personnel.

Once viewed as mere toys, small drones have undergone a lightning-fast evolution into accessible, weaponized technology, disrupting the established international order. The deceptive simplicity of drone production and launch stands in stark contrast to the complexity of developing effective countermeasures and policies. Furthermore, past policies myopically focused on foreign trade or counterintelligence concerns, without considering the broader market, which is driving mass production.

How did this happen? In the early 2000s, drones arrived in two categories. The first were out of reach to most countries without advanced platform developers. The second and smaller category of drones was hobbled by limited flight times, speed, and range, as well as flaws in their basic functionality. However, over the last twenty years, advancements in battery technology, miniaturized electronics, sensor development, and artificial intelligence (AI)—as well as a proliferation of legitimate business use cases—have transformed the sUAS market. Drones have shed weight and size, extending flight times, and they have become enhanced by high-resolution cameras. Advanced features such as obstacle avoidance, GPS tracking, and AI integration are now commonplace. This breadth of accessibility sparked a boom in commercial and dual-use applications, bringing drones into everything from agriculture, delivery services, and filmmaking to search and rescue missions.

Countering the current threat while developing systems to address future evolutions is difficult. Recent attacks in Jordan and Israel show how easy and economical it is to deploy one-way “dumb” drones that have a simplistic flying mechanism with limited course correction capabilities. However, “smart” drones with more advanced capabilities are increasingly available, too. This includes lethal autonomous weapons systems that do not require data connectivity between the operator and the drone to attack targets. They’re known as “fire, forget, and find” platforms.

The situation becomes even more concerning when hundreds of sUAS could be deployed at once in swarms. Options to defend against such a barrage are currently limited. Layered air defense systems such as Israel’s Iron Dome, which employs a combination of radar, projectiles, and missiles to intercept all incoming threats from ballistic missiles to drones, are one option. Directed energy weapons are another, though they are in earlier stages of development and deployment.

In March, General Michael Kurilla, commander of US Central Command, described the problem facing US forces: “I would love to have the Navy produce more directed energy that can shoot down a drone, so I don’t have to use an expensive missile to shoot it down. But what’s worse than not having that expensive missile shoot it down is [the drone] hitting that two-billion-dollar ship with three hundred sailors on it.”

All of this raises a critical question: Could the United States effectively counter the continuous barrage of threats it faces given the global proliferation of this technology?

Despite the rapid evolution of drone technology over the last two decades, the United States military did not release its first Counter-Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems Strategy until 2021, and it’s vastly insufficient to address the new security challenges afoot. Other departments are standing up exploratory defensive efforts, such as the Department of Homeland Security’s Science and Technology Office, but a coherent all-of-government approach is lacking. The Department of Defense’s strategy currently emphasizes a defensive posture, or in other words, defeating adversarial drones once they’re airborne and on the attack. What does this mean in practice? US countermeasures are limited in their capacity to deter or dismantle the proliferation of smart bombs on the market. Regulation is difficult because the technology itself isn’t inherently dangerous—these drones are made up of a combination of readily available parts, including technologies often found in commercial items like hair dryers and Ring cameras.

From a tactical perspective, the technology used to neutralize small drones is underdeveloped. When used effectively, electronic warfare techniques can jam them and bring them down, but they do so at the cost of interfering with radios, cellphones, and every other related technology in the drone’s vicinity. Slower moving sUAS can be shot down but are often not relied on for a lethal attack. The Joint Counter-small Unmanned Aircraft Systems Office (JCO), stood up in 2020, is partnering with US Special Operations Command to finish an expanded counter-drone strategy. Their objective is to take the strategy beyond its current defense posture—“right of launch”—to disrupting enemy drones before they commence flight. As the US defense industrial base has astutely complained: Capacity is a challenge, so the United States cannot rely solely on counteracting threats with smart bombs of its own.

While the heightened focus on a new strategy is a welcome relief, there appears to be far less cross-collaboration planned across the rest of the government, the broader national security community, and other states. This will do little to deter or counter adversarial threats; the United States needs to overhaul its approach with a comprehensive counter-drone strategy. A national strategy would need to incentivize the market and create sustainable conditions for dual-use protection while not inhibiting the benefits of drone technology.

Such a strategy should have four guiding principles.

Reusable and more affordable solutions: The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) Research and Engineering (R&E) should drive down the lifecycle cost of counter-drone measures by exploring and scaling production of reusable and more affordable technologies. R&E should partner with the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) for advanced technology concepts and with the Joint Counter-Unmanned Aerial Systems Office (JCO) for rapid prototyping and fielding of mature solutions. This would reduce reliance on expensive single-use systems. JCO, in collaboration with defense contractors, should invest in the development of cheap drone hunters specifically designed to eliminate enemy drones. JCO can leverage its authorities for rapid acquisition and technology insertion to expedite the development and fielding of these drone hunters.

Sensor technology for cheaper drone hunters: The Department of Defense, through the JCO and OSD R&E, should request additional funding toward research and development in advanced sensor technology for both drone hunters and broader counter-drone systems. This includes exploring affordable sensors for early detection of enemy drones, as well as miniaturized sensors for equipping cost-effective drone hunters.

Multitiered approach to proliferation: While sanctions can target large commercially unavailable UAS platforms, a multi-pronged approach is needed to address the proliferation of smaller, more easily assembled drones due to their dual-use nature. Many of the components used in these drones have legitimate civilian applications, with parts widely available through online electronics stores, making them difficult to control through traditional export restrictions. The Department of State in collaboration with the Department of Commerce should develop more stringent and standardized export controls for drone components. These US departments should cooperate with allies and partners for a harmonized response and collaborate on joint research and development of counter-drone measures.

Multilayered defense: Develop and fund a comprehensive national counter-drone strategy that incorporates a multilayered defense system. This system should leverage:

Early warning and detection: The Department of Defense should utilize advanced radar and sensor technology across the services to achieve early detection of drone threats.
Kinetic countermeasures: JCO should plan for cost-effective kinetic countermeasures investment, such as reusable or attritable drone interceptors.
Non-kinetic countermeasures: Through DARPA and military labs, the Department of Defense should develop advanced non-kinetic countermeasures that disrupt drone control signals and GPS navigation.

Matthew Rose is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s GeoTech Center.

Kathryn Levantovscaia is a deputy director in the Forward Defense program of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

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Panikoff quoted in Channel 4 News on Iran drone and missile attack on Israel

Atlantic Council — Tue, 07 May 2024 19:37:54 +0000

The post Panikoff quoted in Channel 4 News on Iran drone and missile attack on Israel appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Cole spoke at the 2024 AI Expo in Washington DC

gmatchett — Tue, 07 May 2024 14:33:12 +0000

On May 7-8, Forward Defense Nonresident Senior Fellow August Cole spoke at the 2024 artificial intelligence for national competitiveness expo in Washington DC. He spoke on a “Venture Capital Perspectives on the Technologies That Will Drive the 21st Century” panel and did a meet and greet for his books Burn-In: A Novel of the Real Robotic Revolution & Ghost Fleet: A Novel of the Next World War.

Fellow

August Cole

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Defense Industry Defense Policy

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Putin cannot be allowed to use chemical weapons in Ukraine with impunity

Emma Nix — Tue, 07 May 2024 13:23:14 +0000

After years of Ukrainians sounding the alarm over Russia’s alleged use of chemical weapons, the US Department of State has now substantiated these claims and has announced new sanctions on Russian actors for their role in enabling the country’s chemical and biological weapons programs. In an official statement, the United States charged Russia with using “the chemical weapon chloropicrin against Ukrainian forces in violation of the Chemical Weapons Convention.” Why does this matter, and what comes next?

Historically, chemical weapons have been used to break a stalemate, weakening an enemy’s front line troops and providing an opening to push forward. Russia’s use of chemical weapons might suggest that strategists consider the invasion of Ukraine to be a stalemate, or are desperate to avoid one. As fears of a stalemate persist across Ukraine, Russia, and the West, it isn’t difficult to predict a scenario in which Russia could use chemical weapons more widely to achieve a breakthrough.

Chloropicrin, a chemical agent frequently used for riot control, is banned for use in a warfare setting under the Chemical Weapons Convention, which Russia has been a signatory to since its inception. Over the past two years, Ukraine has reported some 1,400 cases of chemical weapons use, but these claims had not been confirmed by third parties until the May 1 statement released by the US State Department.

If Putin has no qualms about using banned weapons, why choose chloropicrin? As far as chemical weapons go, chloropicrin is less lethal than other weapons suspected to be in Russia’s arsenal. By using a weaker agent, Putin’s goal does not seem to be maximum death and destruction in this case. Rather, he may be testing the waters to gauge the international response and determine just how far he can go. A strong reaction from the international community is therefore vital to make clear that widespread use of chemical weapons is completely unacceptable and will not be tolerated.

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Russia’s previous uses of chemical weapons outside of Ukraine have been met with a tepid response at best. For example, after Sergei Skripal was poisoned in the UK with a Novichok agent (a class of nerve agents developed in the Soviet Union) in 2018, the US and a handful of its European partners released a statement condemning the attack, expelled diplomats, and the US levied sanctions under the Chemical and Biological Weapons Control and Warfare Elimination Act. Did this rein in Russia’s chemical weapons tactics? Alexey Navalny’s subsequent poisoning with Novichok in 2020 would suggest not.

In response to the latest allegations, the United States has so far announced sanctions on seven Russian government programs and companies associated with the Kremlin’s chemical and biological weapons programs. These measures are an attempt to reduce Moscow’s ability to wage chemical warfare. More must now be done. Failing to curb the use of chemical weapons in Ukraine would have potentially catastrophic consequences, both for Ukrainians and for international security more broadly. The United States and its partners therefore cannot afford to wait and see whether current sanctions measures are effective.

In the early phases of Russia’s full-scale invasion, US President Joe Biden pledged that “Russia will pay a severe price if they use chemical weapons.” Do sanctions alone constitute a severe response? If such measures have not convinced Putin that he cannot use chemical weapons after recent assassination attempts, can we expect them to work when his back is against a wall trying to win a major war?

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Looking to the past provides little clarity on possible actions available to Ukraine’s partners. After the Bashar al-Assad regime used chemical weapons in Syria in 2013, the United States and Russia worked together to force Syria to join the Chemical Weapons Convention and destroy its stockpiles. Without Russia’s participation and considering its veto on the United Nations Security Council, something similar on this occasion looks impossible. When Syria continued to use chemical weapons, the United States, United Kingdom, and France targeted chemical weapons facilities with missiles, another option Western leaders have seemingly taken off the table in relation to Russia.

The best option available to the United States and its allies might be to deny Russia the opportunity to use banned weapons. If Putin’s strategy would dictate using chemical weapons in the case of a stalemate, then Ukraine’s partners must ensure it gets the military aid needed to avoid such a situation. While the United States might be unable to strike inside Russia as it did in Syria, providing Ukraine long-range weapons and the intelligence support to carry out strikes against chemical weapons facilities could take away Russia’s chemical capabilities while sending a strong message against using banned weapons.

This is not to say the United States should not explore options for international cooperation. At the end of the day, Russia using chemical weapons endangers more than Ukraine. Galvanizing broader support from around the world can help preserve critical norms and is a necessary step to protect against chemical weapons proliferation globally. While the West has struggled to work with China or partners in the Global South on Ukraine, a coalition rejecting the use of chemical weapons presents an opportunity to protect Ukrainian lives while reinforcing international norms and building trust that chemical weapons are unacceptable in all contexts.

Emma Nix is an assistant director with the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center.

Eftimiades published in intelNews on Chinese espionage

Atlantic Council — Fri, 03 May 2024 15:55:00 +0000

On May 3, Forward Defense nonresident senior fellow Nicholas Eftimiades published an article titled “Tradecraft observations on the Reichenbach/Fischer espionage case” in intelNews, detailing the alleged Chinese agents’ export of sensitive military technology from Germany.

Fellow

Nicholas Eftimiades

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

China Intelligence

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Yevgeniya Gaber speaks for the Bulgarian national TV on Russia’s war in Ukraine, the importance of the Western support and security in the Black Sea

aozen — Tue, 30 Apr 2024 11:05:47 +0000

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Hammes referenced in a Georgetown Security Studies Review article about autonomous military systems

gmatchett — Fri, 19 Apr 2024 16:01:32 +0000

On April 18, Forward Defense Nonresident Senior Fellow Thomas X. Hammes was referenced in a Georgetown Security Studies Review piece titled “From Sling and Stone to Autonomous Drone? Key Questions for Determining Whether Autonomy Favors Davids or Goliaths,” about autonomous military systems (AMS) favoring conventionally “weaker” or poorer actors.

Fellow

Thomas X. Hammes

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Conflict Defense Industry

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Grassroots diplomacy can help unlock international support for Ukraine

Benton Coblentz — Thu, 18 Apr 2024 17:15:28 +0000

Amid growing uncertainty over the future of international aid for Ukraine, diplomatic initiatives at the local and regional levels can play a critical role in securing continued public support around the world for Ukraine’s struggle against Russian aggression. These grassroots efforts, also known as subnational diplomacy, can go far beyond merely symbolic support, and have the potential to strengthen economic, cultural, and political ties between Ukraine and the country’s international partners.

Kyiv Oblast and the US state of Washington recently took a major step in this direction. In March 2024, Washington State Governor Jay Inslee and his Kyiv Oblast counterpart Ruslan Kravchenko signed the first Sister State Agreement between a US state and a Ukrainian region.

Washington’s Sister State Agreement with Kyiv Oblast is emblematic of the benefits that robust subnational diplomacy can provide. In Ukraine’s case, subnational diplomacy creates opportunities to highlight the strengths of Ukraine’s many diverse regions. Strong local and regional partnerships can also be maintained regardless of the changing political winds that envelop national capitals.

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The recently signed agreement with Kyiv Oblast was not the start of Washington State’s efforts to support Ukraine. Since the early days of Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022, Washington has provided a powerful example of the role regional governments can play in responding to global events.

In March 2022, Governor Inslee directed state agencies to begin reviewing and severing ties with Russian state institutions and companies. In the initial weeks of the invasion, local nonprofits worked together with the state’s Ukrainian diaspora community to organize the delivery of 32 tons of medical supplies to Ukraine. During 2022, Washington State officials allocated nearly $20 million to support the influx of Ukrainian refugees.

According to the Seattle Times, more Ukrainian refugees have arrived in Washington State over the past two years than any other US state. This warm welcome owes much to the state’s vibrant Ukrainian-American community, according Geoffrey Potter, director of international relations and protocol for Governor Jay Inslee. He says the new Sister State Agreement and Washington’s other efforts to support Ukraine are “an expression” of the way local residents with Ukrainian roots have become an integral part of the Washington community.

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Ukraine’s honorary consul in Seattle, Valeriy Goloborodko, believes the Sister State Agreement will pave the way for closer ties and can help “further relationships between academics, industries, and regional governments for the benefit of the people.” Meanwhile, Potter notes a number of common interests linking the Kyiv region and Washington including clean energy, forestry, and the aerospace industry.

As wartime Ukraine looks ahead toward the challenges of recovery and reconstruction, subnational diplomacy can open up a range of new business opportunities. Major Washington State-based business brands including Boeing and Microsoft are already active in Ukraine. The state’s many small businesses are also playing an important role in strengthening ties. In Tacoma, Washington-based SAFE Boats is currently outfitting eight patrol boats destined for Ukraine’s navy. BRINC Drones, based in Seattle, is supplying drones for Ukraine’s fight against Russian aggression.

At a time when the issue of vital military aid for Ukraine has become hostage to domestic US political tensions, grassroots relationships can help individual Ukrainian regions bypass the kind of obstacles that might otherwise hamper progress at the national level. With this in mind, Ukraine’s regional leaders and their counterparts across the globe should now be seeking to develop stronger subnational ties that can solidify relationships for the long term.

Washington State’s agreement with Kyiv Oblast offers an attractive model that others can follow, both in the US and beyond. In Goloborodko’s view, the recently signed Sister State Agreement “is a way to show leadership in supporting democracy.” The initiative is the first of its kind for a US state, but Potter is “pretty sure” it will not be the last. “We’re forging a model for what a meaningful, substantive collaboration looks like,” he says.

Benton Coblentz is a program assistant with the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

Does the West have the combined political will, industrial strength, and military capabilities to address the strategic challenges posed by Russia, Iran, North Korea, and China? These challenges are all linked and must be viewed as parts of a strategic whole, leading to the conclusion that it in the West’s interests to prioritize the defeat of Russia in Ukraine.

A “Russia first” approach would echo the example set by the allies during World War II. In 1942, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill and US President Franklin D. Roosevelt agreed on a “Germany first” strategy. One year later, they defined their war aim as the “unconditional surrender” of Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan. This provides a model for the kind of strategic clarity the current generation of Western leaders should be looking to emulate.

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An assessment of today’s battlefield confirms that the Ukrainian military faces a very difficult situation. However, present narratives are overly gloomy and defeatist. After ten years of war, and despite holding every advantage, Russia still only controls just under twenty percent of Ukraine.

The Russian army has suffered hundreds of thousands of losses, while the weaknesses of the Russian navy and air force have been revealed. The Black Sea Fleet has lost around one-third of its ships and is in retreat from Sevastopol. The Russian Air Force has failed in its two main tasks of securing air superiority over Ukraine and cutting the supply lines bringing military equipment into Ukraine from the EU.

Much has been made of minor Russian victories such as the recent capture of Avdiivka, but these advances should be put in a proper geopolitical and operational context. Despite efforts by many of the doom-mongers to make it sound like Stalingrad, Avdiivka is in reality a small town located close to the 2022 front lines in eastern Ukraine. Indeed, it is currently far from clear whether the Russians have the operational capability to exploit even local tactical successes.

At this stage of the war, neither side appears capable of delivering a knockout blow. For Ukraine’s new military Commander-in-Chief Oleksandr Syrsky, the key task this year is to stabilize the situation in order to buy time, build combat power, and fix the country’s personnel system. Worn-out units need to be reconstituted and new units built. Training should include a focus on countering Russia’s advantages in electronic and drone warfare.

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What does Ukraine need in order to actually win? The Ukrainian military needs the capacity to make Crimea, the decisive terrain of this war, untenable for the Russian navy, air force, and logistics. Every square inch of Crimea is within ATACMS range. Ukraine has already proven the concept with a relatively small number of cruise missiles provided by Britain and France. This has made it possible to seriously damage the Black Sea Fleet HQ and naval maintenance capability in Sevastopol, forcing the fleet to partially withdraw to Russia. There are no good reasons for not providing Ukraine with ATACMS missiles, only excuses from an administration that is unwilling or unable to develop a strategy for Ukrainian victory.

The Ukrainian military also needs a long-range strike capability to neutralize the Russian army on land by destroying Russian troop concentrations, command posts, artillery, and logistics. Significantly enhanced air defense and counter-drone capabilities are essential, along with more naval drones and anti-ship missiles to allow Ukraine to build on the country’s remarkable success in the Battle of the Black Sea.

One of the most important steps toward securing Ukrainian victory is a clear declaration from the US and EU that it is in our own strategic interest to help Ukraine win. The failure of the current US administration to clearly explain this to the American people has led to incoherent and self-deterring policies along with incremental decision-making and a drip-feed approach to military aid for Ukraine. This has left the door open for disinformation and made it possible for a MAGA-led minority within the Republican Party to block aid despite majority support.

The current year is a year of industrial competition that the West can and must win. Western countries should collectively be dwarfing Russia’s output but there is currently a lack of urgency. Encouragingly, ammunition production is finally picking up some momentum in Europe and the US. We just need the US Congress to approve delivery. Meanwhile, EU nations must reassess their priorities and address the large percentage of ammunition production that is currently heading to customers outside Europe. Greater efforts are also required to source existing ample ammunition stockpiles globally.

The West needs a return to the clarity of Churchill and Roosevelt, who communicated clear strategic priorities to the public, industry, and the military. Identifying these priorities was a vital step, making it possible for the allies to organize the war effort and secure victory. The lessons of this approach should now be applied to the confrontation with Putin’s Russia, Iran, and China. At the end of the day, it’s all about political will and leaders speaking to their populations as adults.

Lieutenant General (Ret.) Ben Hodges is the former Commander of US Army Europe.

Samantha Vinograd

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Arabic Defense Policy

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Vinograd on CBS “Face the Nation” about terrorism escalating since the Israel-Hamas conflict and US national security

gmatchett — Sun, 14 Apr 2024 15:01:35 +0000

On April 14, Forward Defense Nonresident Senior Fellow Samantha Vinograd appeared on CBS “Face the Nation” with Margaret Brennan to discuss the increasing amount of terrorism around the globe since the start of the Israel-Hamas conflict and its implications for US national security and Israeli-Iranian tension.

Fellow

Samantha Vinograd

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Arabic Defense Policy

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Konaev cited in the Washington Post about drone swarms escalating global conflict

gmatchett — Fri, 12 Apr 2024 13:43:50 +0000

Former Nonresident Senior Fellow

On April 12, Forward Defense Nonresident Senior Fellow Margarita Konaev was quoted in a Washington Post article titled “US-China competition to field military drone swarms could fuel global arms race,” about the risks of increasing the deployment of drone swarms.

Former fellow

Margarita Konaev

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Conflict Defense Technologies

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Ukraine pleads for Patriot air defense systems as Russia destroys power grid

Peter Dickinson — Thu, 11 Apr 2024 20:10:50 +0000

Ukraine’s top diplomat is becoming increasingly undiplomatic in his quest to bolster the fraying air defenses of his beleaguered country. Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba says he is no longer holding back as he desperately tries to secure additional Patriot air defense systems to protect Ukraine’s cities and civilian infrastructure from Russian bombardment. “Give us the damn Patriots,” he told Politico in late March.

Speaking to the Washington Post this week, Kuleba explained that his tough new tone reflects the growing sense of exasperation felt by many in Kyiv at the apparent lack of urgency among Ukraine’s partners amid growing shortages of vital military aid. “We’ve tried everything, and nothing seems to work,” he commented. “The feeling that extraordinary decisions are needed on a regular basis to end this war with a victory for Ukraine is gone.”

Kuleba says his team has identified more the one hundred available Patriot systems that could potentially be handed over to Ukraine. Officials in Kyiv say they need 26 systems in order to provide comprehensive cover for the entire country. The immediate objective is to acquire seven Patriot systems to guard key targets against Russian airstrikes. EU partners including Germany have vowed to assist in the search for Patriot systems, but there have yet to be any breakthroughs.

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Ukraine’s hunt for Patriot air defense systems is taking place against the backdrop of an escalating Russian air offensive that is capitalizing on months declining Western military support and prolonged deadlock in the US Congress over a major Ukrainian aid package. With gaps now growing in Ukraine’s air defense network and individual air defense units increasingly obliged to ration their dwindling resources, Russia has launched a series of overnight attacks in recent weeks that have decimated much of Ukraine’s power grid.

Ukraine’s second-largest city and former capital, Kharkiv, has been particularly hard hit. Located just a few dozen miles from the border with Russia in eastern Ukraine, the city has been subjected to an intensive bombing campaign since mid-March that has caused extensive damage to residential districts and civilian infrastructure. In recent weeks, hundreds of thousands have been left without power for extended periods.

The destruction in Kharkiv has been so severe that some analysts now believe Russia’s objective is to empty the city of its more than one million residents ahead of an anticipated summer offensive. “The Kremlin wants to make Ukraine’s second city unlivable,” reported Britain’s The Economist in early April.

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The latest wave of Russian missiles and drones struck targets across Ukraine early on April 11. In an indication of Ukraine’s increasingly ineffective air defenses and mounting vulnerability to Russian bombardment, all of the Kremlin’s hard-to-intercept hypersonic and ballistic missiles reportedly reached their objectives, according to the Kyiv Post.

A major power plant close to Kyiv was among those destroyed in the overnight attack, dealing a further significant blow to Ukraine’s energy resilience. The Trypilska Thermal Power Plant, the largest supplier of electricity to central Ukraine’s Kyiv, Cherkasy, and Zhytomyr regions, suffered a series of direct hits and was left in ruins.

“The scale of destruction is terrifying,” commented Andriy Hota, the chairman of Ukrainian energy company Centrenergo. Speaking to the BBC, Hota said the Kyiv region plant can be rebuilt with the help of spare parts from elsewhere in Europe, but warned that the facility will remain vulnerable to Russian attack unless Ukraine’s partners provide powerful air defenses. “We can repair. We can do the impossible. But we need protection.”

With each new Russian bombardment destroying more of Ukraine’s civilian infrastructure, there is a growing sense that time is now running out to prevent a humanitarian catastrophe in the country. Unless Ukraine urgently receives additional air defense systems and ammunition, entire regions could soon face rapidly deteriorating conditions without access to electricity and other basic services. This could fuel a new refugee crisis, with millions of Ukrainians entering the EU.

The collapse of the country’s power grid would also cause economic mayhem and dramatically undermine the Ukrainian war effort. This would set the stage for a Russian military victory that would have disastrous consequences for Ukraine itself and for the future of international security. Russia has so far been unable to break Ukraine on the battlefield, but there is now a very real chance that a lack of air defenses will allow the Kremlin to achieve its goals by targeting Ukraine’s increasingly undefended civilian infrastructure.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

Is the United States falling behind the North Korean ICBM threat? Congress needs answers.

Robert Soofer — Thu, 11 Apr 2024 18:03:23 +0000

Is the United States doing everything it reasonably can to protect the homeland against North Korean intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs)? This is a question that should be on the mind of every member of Congress. “Defending the homeland” and “deterring strategic attacks against the United States” literally are the first two stated priorities in the 2022 National Defense Strategy, yet the United States devotes less than 1 percent of the defense budget toward stopping the strategic threat posed by an incoming ICBM. If left unaddressed, the North Korean ICBM threat may soon outpace US homeland defenses—begging the question: How can the United States leave itself vulnerable to a destitute country with less than 1 percent of the economic power of the United States?

North Korea’s ICBM program, decades in the making, has been showing dramatic progress in recent years. After launching satellites on ICBM-class rockets periodically since the 1990s and developing new missiles of regional range, it began testing mobile ICBMs with three launches in 2017. In 2020, it unveiled a much larger mobile ICBM, clearly large enough to carry multiple re-entry vehicles and decoys, which it began flight-testing in 2022. More ICBM launches followed in 2023, including a new solid-propellant ICBM, most recently this past February.

This move to solid-rocket motors reduces the launch time for its mobile ICBMs, improving prelaunch survivability against US counterstrikes. Given the sensitivities regarding intelligence on North Korea, there is no unclassified government estimate of the number of North Korean ICBMs. However, General Gregory Guillot, head of US Northern Command, said on March 12 that he is “concerned that Kim Jong Un’s growing ICBM stockpile could approach our capacity to defend North America.” Guillot added that this is “a challenge that will only expand in the coming years if Kim Jong Un looks to add multiple reentry vehicles to his missiles.”

Policymakers have to decide now whether the United States is doing enough to protect the homeland in the years ahead.

To counter this threat, the United States fields forty-four ground-based interceptors, each armed with a single nonexplosive “kill vehicle” (destroying its target on impact). These interceptors are based in Alaska and California, and they are supported by early warning satellites and ground- and sea-based radars. An additional twenty next-generation interceptors (NGIs) will begin deployment in 2028, each armed with multiple kill vehicles.

Will sixty-four interceptors by 2030 be enough to handle the North Korean ICBM threat? It is a tough call, since analysts cannot be sure how many ICBMs North Korea is planning to build and if the ICBMs will be armed with multiple warheads and countermeasures. It is also impossible to predict how many ICBMs and launchers the United States and its allies would be able to destroy prior to launch, given how difficult it is to track and destroy mobile solid-propellant ICBMs that can be hidden in tunnels. However, because of the rapid progress North Korea’s ICBM program has made in recent years, it is reasonable to assume that North Korea might have the capability to overwhelm the currently planned level of defense after several more years of ICBM development and production. Policymakers have to decide now whether the United States is doing enough to protect the homeland in the years ahead, because it will take years to increase the capability and capacity of US defenses. The United States must not wait until North Korea is regularly test-launching ICBMs with multiple re-entry vehicles and countermeasures to begin further improvements—it will be too late.

Why would a North Korean leader attack the United States with a nuclear weapon when the US military could devastate his country in return? This is a fair question, but can US leaders count on the forbearance and caution of Kim or his successor if, for example, the regime is facing imminent defeat in a conflict?

Defense planners cannot know for sure under what circumstances North Korea would use nuclear weapons either in the region or against the United States. However, North Korea’s official nuclear policy, made public by Pyongyang in 2022, provides a range of justifications for the first use of nuclear weapons during, or even before, a war. It explicitly declares that, in the event North Korea’s nuclear command and control is in “danger” due to an attack, nuclear forces will execute a pre-approved plan to strike “automatically and immediately” against the “command” of the attack. Taken at face value, this means North Korea’s ICBM force commanders may already be authorized, if North Korean command-and-control sites are struck by US or South Korean forces, to attack the Pentagon and the White House without an explicit order from Kim Jong Un. This further clarifies a long-standing threat of nuclear retaliation against the US homeland if the North Korean leadership is threatened. In 2017, the North Korean foreign ministry threatened a nuclear strike on the United States if Washington ever showed the “slightest sign of attempt to remove our supreme leadership.”

In other words, the United States or South Korea could inadvertently prompt a nuclear response against the US homeland even while mounting a conventional defense against North Korean aggression. Protection of the homeland against North Korean ICBMs lessens this risk, providing the US president more options and greater freedom of maneuver to bring the conflict to a successful close. Such defenses also would serve to reassure South Korea and Japan of the credibility of US extended deterrence guarantees by assuaging fears that North Korean ICBM threats would cause the United States to hesitate to come to their aid in the event of a North Korean attack.

Congress would be wise to pursue three lines of inquiry related to US homeland missile defense:

Will the NGIs deploy on time and in the numbers necessary to pace the threat?
Can the United States augment homeland protection in the near term with existing sea-based missile defenses?
What can be done to accelerate space-based sensor support for homeland missile defense?

To begin, why is the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) requesting $414 million less in fiscal year 2025 for NGI than originally planned? Last year, MDA officials stated they were bringing two different NGI designs through critical design review, thereby fostering competition and reducing the technical risk that a particular design could fail. Why is the MDA now proposing to carry only one industry design? This might be penny wise and pound foolish.

Relatedly, Congress should determine whether the planned twenty NGIs are additive to the existing forty-four. If so, what is the plan to replace the older ground-based interceptors? The NGI, with its multiple kill vehicle design, is critical for staying ahead of the North Korean threat, so the entire fleet needs to be modernized. It is worth asking, too, where future NGIs should be deployed; a site on the east coast might help in the future against, for example, possible ICBM threats from Iran. Even better, why not make the NGI mobile and save on construction costs while improving its survivability? Decisions must be taken soon to prepare for an efficient production rate once the NGI is proven in testing.

Second, the Department of Defense can do more today to bolster homeland missile defense while waiting for the NGI. In a November 2020 test, the MDA and the US Navy intercepted a mock North Korean ICBM with the sea-based SM-3 block IIA missile. The MDA looked into using SM-3 IIA missiles—deployed on ships and/or on land—as an “underlayer” to its interceptors, but the concept was not pursued by the Biden administration. In a crisis or conflict with North Korea, ships armed with the SM-3 IIA missiles can be positioned to take a shot against an incoming North Korean ICBM. However, additional IIA missiles would need to be built and deployed. Congress should determine if additional funding can expedite production and whether the US Navy and US Northern Command have planned and exercised for this contingency capability.

Finally, key to staying ahead of North Korean ICBMs is the ability to distinguish between the real warhead and any accompanying countermeasures or decoys. While US forces do that today with ground-based radars, tracking (and discriminating) warheads is best done from space. The MDA’s new “Discriminating Space Sensor” is in the early stages of research, but it could “provide a pivotal capability as part of MDA’s space architecture,” as Vice Admiral Jon A. Hill, the then director of the the MDA, explained in May 2023. Congress should make this an item of special interest, with commensurate funding.

Needless to say, all this costs money. The fiscal year 2025 MDA budget request is $10.4 billion, of which $1.7 billion is for NGIs with an additional $1 billion to maintain and sustain the ground-based midcourse defense system with its forty-four interceptors. About a third of the MDA’s budget is devoted to homeland missile defense, which amounts to less than half of 1 percent of the entire defense budget. Just imagine what could be accomplished with a full 1 percent! Defending the homeland may be the top-stated national defense priority, but the budget request suggests otherwise. This may be where Congress ends up, but it should be a deliberate choice based on the facts—and the place to start evaluating those facts is at congressional hearings in the days and weeks ahead.

Robert M. Soofer is a senior fellow in the Forward Defense program of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, where he leads the Nuclear Strategy Project. He served as deputy assistant secretary of defense for nuclear and missile defense policy from 2017 to 2021.

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Hinata-Yamaguchi in the Times of India

everges — Thu, 11 Apr 2024 16:00:00 +0000

On April 10, IPSI Nonresident Senior Fellow Ryo Hinata-Yamaguchi was quoted in the Times of India on the recent launch of Japan’s first full aircraft carrier since World War II.

Fellow

Ryo Hinata-Yamaguchi

Indo-Pacific Security Initiative Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Defense Policy Indo-Pacific

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Groen at 2024 US Cyber Command Legal Conference on AI risks and innovation

gmatchett — Thu, 11 Apr 2024 03:14:43 +0000

On April 10, Forward Defense Nonresident Senior Fellow Michael Groen spoke at the 2024 US Cyber Command Legal Conference about implementing AI and balancing risk with defense innovation.

Fellow

Michael Groen

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Defense Policy Defense Technologies

II. Elements of innovation

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Accelerating transatlantic defense innovation in an era of strategic competition

John T. Watts — Fri, 05 Apr 2024 15:00:00 +0000

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I. Introduction

III. New concepts: Innovation in adoption and adaption

IV. New technologies: Exported concepts to returned capabilities

V. New attitudes: Niche innovations

VI. Conclusion

I. Introduction

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) warfighting edge has traditionally been anchored by the innovation and industrial capacity of the United States, but this will not be sufficient for the transatlantic community to weather today’s military and geopolitical realities. The return of true strategic competition, between nations that believe in the universal value of the free and open liberal international order and those that seek to remake it for their own benefit, has made every element of the international order a contested space—ranging from economics and information to seeking to redraw sovereign territorial borders through force. Strained by the return of industrial warfare on their borders and the need to ensure the security and territorial integrity of partners in the Middle East and Western Pacific, and faced with outdated acquisition systems and supply chains reliant on production in competitor nations, the United States and its NATO partners need new approaches, attitudes, and concepts for technology innovation and industrial production if they are to prevail on future battlefields.

Seen as the solution to every emerging military challenge, the call to innovate has been constant in recent years. Innovation is certainly going to be key to success, and some analysts have even defined the era of strategic competition in terms of an “innovation race.”¹ Too often, however, “innovation” is used as shorthand for “develop a new technology or widget.”

Innovation is as much about process, concepts, implementation, and execution as it is about the technology itself—and it is often in these enabling functions where innovation is needed most to gain significant improvements and advantages.

Society is also going through a transition phase from hardware led to software led, which impacts how we think about technology, its development, and its implementation. This is not new, and is evident across all aspects of modern life. But because the military is more heavily hardware defined than most other sectors, and often more cautious in its evolution, it has greater implications than might be immediately apparent. One key implication is the potential for easier collaboration between allies in capability development. But for this potential to be realized, there will need to be innovation not just in technology, but in the concepts, processes, and,
most importantly, attitudes that allow it to happen.

This is not to claim that hardware is no longer important. Anyone with a passing understanding of artificial intelligence (AI) and the possibilities it portends will also understand how critical the architecture of the silicon chips it runs on is, for instance. But to see how the importance between software and hardware has shifted, take the example of “network centric warfare.”² The term du jour in the early 2000s, this concept for how war would be fought has been proven right. Yet, most militaries attempted to implement it by forcing every partner military to use the same hardware and “network” systems. More recently, modern Western militaries have begun taking a more data-centric approach, which emphasizes shared data formats rather than shared systems, and has seen a rapid improvement in implementing the concepts network-centric warfare championed.³ The hardware is still important, but the software is the defining element.

If advanced technologies are a key pillar of winning the era of strategic competition, and allies are one of the United States’ great advantages, then surely tech collaboration with allies should be a center of gravity for the US to win. Defending the Euro-Atlantic area, and securing NATO’s advantage across operational domains in a moment of unprecedented strategic competition with near-peer adversaries, will require strengthened defense and technology cooperation between the United States and its allies and industry partners across the Atlantic. To achieve this, the United States will need innovative thinking and approaches—not just for the development of technologies, but for sharing and ultimately co-producing them.

II. Elements of innovation

The concept of innovation can be abstract, and there are few agreed rules or definitions for exactly how it can be achieved. Innovation can have many sources and take many forms, and occurs in every aspect of the human experience. In military terms, it has most often originated during times of conflict and out of necessity. Since the end of the Second World War and the start of the Cold War—a period of incredible innovation—technology development was driven by military and federal funding, and undertaken by a handful of centralized, traditional research organizations with a focus on government and military applications. The internet is the most commonly cited example of Department of Defense (DOD)-funded invention, having started as an Advanced Research Projects Agency project, but examples include the Global Positioning System (GPS), night vision, jet engines, and many others. This innovation was paired with experimentation of concepts and doctrine that often needed to occur in large, remote areas and involved significant infrastructure and forces.

Today, greater innovation is occurring in the commercial sector, led by a handful of technology behemoths and a vast number of decentralized start-ups funded by private capital.“⁴ As technology becomes increasingly software driven, there is greater scope for new entrants and broader collaboration as the development environments are less constrained by geography and infrastructure. Experimentation can happen virtually and through simulation, allowing for more input from a more diverse set of participants. This is critically important, as collaboration and cross-pollination of perspectives and ideas can be powerful drivers of innovation. And while national militaries still have a key role to play in innovation and technology development—for instance, through programs like the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) and NATO’s Defence Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic (DIANA)—many of the most important capabilities are dual use, with the rapid iteration and evolution in the commercial field outpacing those of government-driven programs.

Mobile phones are seen during the Locked Shields, cyber defence exercise organized by NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Exellence (CCDCOE) in Tallinn, Estonia April 10, 2019. REUTERS/Ints Kalnins

Technology will always play a key role in innovation, as it can enable us to do new things we couldn’t do before or provide new ways to complete existing tasks more efficiently. But innovation does not always require new technologies, and it is not always characterized by a sudden or high-profile shift. Even small improvements, new ways of doing things, or applying existing ideas in new contexts can generate significant innovation. In other cases, new processes or methods that enable something to occur, or encourage greater creativity in execution, can be considered innovative. And in the government sector, where departments of defense and militaries reside, these sometimes boring and arcane improvements can be the most significant.⁵ The problems and constraints created by the US International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) are an obvious area where even small changes could have a dramatic impact on cross-border innovation collaboration.⁶ An adaptation in attitude and mindset can be the most crucial, if it means that a new approach can be adopted where it would not previously have been.

Therefore, innovation can be defined as the successful implementation of new ideas, methods, or products that create value. It involves challenging the status quo, thinking creatively, and taking calculated risks to achieve positive outcomes. Fresh perspectives and unconventional thinking foster innovation by questioning existing assumptions and approaches. These new concepts can disrupt traditional methods and spark the creation of entirely new fields of study or application, in part by fusing seemingly unrelated fields. This is where open societies have an advantage, as they embrace diversity of experience and perspective. Leveraging niche expertise and many different cultural, geopolitical, educational, and experiential perspectives that exist within the United States’ robust network opens new opportunities. Closer cooperation across design, experimentation, and implementation of cutting-edge technologies and approaches help the United States not only strengthen connectivity with allies and industry partners, but share the burden of innovation investment while gaining insights and capabilities for its own forces.

Deeper transatlantic defense cooperation has the potential to unlock new advantages needed to ensure the United States and its allies retain their strategic edge over near-peer adversaries in a future conflict. But cashing in on these opportunities requires an understanding of the forms innovation takes, what is needed to best harness them, and a willingness within the traditional US defense establishment to reform procurement, contracting, and data-sharing mechanisms in ways that make it easier for trusted allies and industry partners to do business with the United States.⁷

Broadly, we can think of the forms of innovation as new concepts, new technologies, and new attitudes. New technologies become the tools to implement fresh concepts brought to life by a shift in attitudes. Fostering innovation requires more than just the latest technology. It necessitates a culture that embraces new ideas, encourages experimentation, and fosters collaboration—allowing all three ingredients to work together in a powerful synergy, shaping a more innovative and progressive future.

III. New concepts: Innovation in adoption and adaption

Experimentation is a vital component of innovation, and forces in active combat will always seek new ways to gain an advantage over enemy combatants. Their lives depend on it.

It is not surprising that we have seen a wide range of innovations emerge from brave Ukrainians defending themselves in the face of Russia’s war of aggression. As this is the first conventional conflict between two modern militaries in decades, there will be many attempts to extrapolate insights about the nature of modern and future warfare from successful technologies and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) implemented in Ukraine. But while the obvious lessons to learn might come from the extensive use of small commercial drones for precision strikes, this has been occurring at a smaller scale in Middle East since at least 2017, and is not particularly new or radical.⁸ What the Ukrainians have done, with great success, is integrate this drone capability effectively into combined-arms operations, and with the scale, sophistication, and diversity of platform capable of changing the nature of the battlespace.“⁹

A first-person view (FPV) drone is seen at a training location of the “Achilles” Attack Drone Battalion of the 92nd Separate Assault Brigade of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, amid Russia’s attack on Ukraine, at an undisclosed location in Donetsk region, Ukraine February 6, 2024. REUTERS/Alina Smutko

The more interesting lesson to learn, however, is the way Ukraine has leveraged the drones to amplify their effect through domestically created software. For years, analysts have predicted a transition from hardware-focused warfare to a software-defined ecosystem, mirroring similar transitions in civilian and commercial sectors. In the West, there is a slow process of moving from system- and platform-centric reference architectures for military systems to software products that enable larger platforms. Companies like Anduril and Palantir are transforming the traditional procurement pathways, but this will be a slow and iterative process. Ukraine is showing how it can be accelerated.¹⁰

Local software developers have created their own software solutions, like the Kropyva artillery targeting and blue-force tracking combat-control app; Delta, a cloud-based, comprehensive situational-awareness and battlefield-management system; and a chatbot, often integrated into the widely used Diia app, to crowdsource intelligence from the general population about enemy movements and military capabilities.¹¹

The development and deployment of these software-enabled capabilities share several key characteristics. They often include aspects of private-public partnership; integrate elements of crowdsourcing and support from the wider populations; automate key features; and mimic more sophisticated commercial services. Moreover, one of their key contributions is the ability to modernize and integrate old and outdated equipment with more modern systems and tactics, such as Ukraine’s legacy, Soviet-originated anti-aircraft systems.¹²

There are wider lessons to be learned from the development and deployment of such systems. A country facing an existential threat has an inherently different risk profile than a country in a state of peace, and a smaller nation will usually have less bureaucracy than a larger one. Nonetheless, private-public collaboration and the ability and willingness to quickly adapt, along with more flexible and streamlined procurement processes, show what can be possible. Moreover, this demonstrates how software can overcome the limitations of hardware—particularly dated, legacy systems—which will be vital as the United States seeks to modernize the forces of allies and partners around the world as efficiently as possible. The benefit cannot be understated. While all allies and partners strengthen the strategic value of the network, many may struggle to meaningfully contribute in a high-end contingency due to the capabilities of their legacy systems. Leveraging the expertise Ukraine has built in creating and effectively utilizing an ecosystem of partner security cooperation increases the second- and third-order value of past US security-cooperation investments, while increasing the deterrent value of its core strategic asset and increasing stability and security for all.

IV. New technologies: Exported concepts to returned capabilities

Alliances provide unique opportunities for innovation through the exportation and application of concepts—opening new doors for innovation in response to countries’ unique geopolitical needs and circumstances, with multiplying effects for others in the network. Australia’s Ghost Bat program is a fascinating example of this type of innovation across the alliance ecosystem. Boeing’s MQ-28 Ghost Bat is “a pathfinder for the integration of autonomous systems and artificial intelligence to create smart human-machine teams” that resulted from collaboration between the Australian Air Force and Boeing.¹³ The Ghost Bat represents a new way of conducting air-combat operations, in which human-flown aircraft like the F-35 will be able to seamlessly coordinate and cooperate with autonomous systems, in a concept known as the “loyal wingman.”¹⁴

A Boeing MQ-28 Ghost Bat fighter-like drone is kept on display at the Australian International Airshow, in Avalon, Australia February 28, 2023. REUTERS/Jamie Freed

The design of the Ghost Bat was so successful that it has been expanded by $250 million to build a Block 2 version, spawned an underwater unmanned-vehicle program called the Ghost Shark, and is now being exported to the United States for testing.¹⁵. What is more interesting is that the collaboration involves a US allied government, is led by a US defense manufacturer, and manifests a US-developed concept that, despite several conceptual iterations, is yet to be fully developed in the United States itself.¹⁶

A simplistic analysis of this case study could point to streamlined procurement processes and reduced bureaucracy in non-US governments, but this is not necessarily the case. The more useful framing for thinking about such a program is that every nation has a unique set of national circumstances—from geography and economy to national objectives and military approaches. As such, there will be varying requirements and incentives for military designs and programmatic commitments.

Rather than seeking to cover all possibilities, or even to replicate others’ experiences, streamlining the ability to leverage that experience and context to flow concepts, manufacturing, and techniques back and forth between nations means the United States can benefit from the diversity of its vast partner network, while sharing the burden of development costs.

It is the flow of concepts, skills, technology, and prototypes between partners in complex innovation ecosystems that reveals the possibilities for operationalizing ideas to capabilities. And while Ukraine demonstrates that makeshift and improvised solutions in real-time combat can provide paths to innovation, the Ghost Bat program was a long-term, planned procurement process, in which an ally’s pursuit of capabilities to meet its own needs (in Australia’s case, the need to amplify the effect of a small population across vast territory through high-end technology and capabilities) offers an opportunity to advance solutions the United States can leverage to achieve its own capabilities goals.

Partnerships such as the US National Technological and Industrial Base (NTIB) and AUKUS trilateral defense partnership have created vehicles for cooperation between the United States and some of its closest historical allies—which can drive collaboration like the Ghost Bat program. The NTIB, for example, supports security and defense objectives by “supplying military operations; conducting advanced R&D and systems development to ensure technological superiority of the US Armed Forces; securing reliable sources of critical materials; and developing industrial preparedness to support operations in wartime or during a national emergency.” ¹⁷ While effective, the NTIB and AUKUS only tap into a small subset of countries, excluding the advanced capabilities, platforms, and expertise spread across the United States’ twenty-nine other NATO allies. Bringing new partners into the US orbit via an AUKUS+ framework—or extending the NTIB to other close transatlantic allies with cutting-edge expertise and capabilities, like Sweden, Italy, and the Netherlands—would open new acquisition pathways and facilitate the enhanced cooperative development, experimentation, and industrial co-production needed for the United States to outpace competitors in today’s threat environment.¹⁸ Agreements like AUKUS should not be seen as ends in themselves, but pathfinders to create new and more streamlined channels for tech collaboration and cooperation.

V. New attitudes: Niche innovations

Another way to leverage allied innovation is through adapting and adopting niche capabilities that allies have naturally developed to meet their own needs, built on the native talents and expertise of their own populations. Some of the easiest and most critical of these tools are in the cyber and information domains, though across allied countries in NATO, for instance, there are numerous small drone, satellite communications, and ballistic-missile technologies that could be highly useful across the US-aligned alliance ecosystem. For instance, countries such as Estonia and the Netherlands are at the forefront in areas such as misinformation detection, cyber-threat intelligence, network security, and incident response. Co-production will also be vital for NATO to meet the challenges of this era of renewed strategic competition, and the value of it—particularly in niche advanced capabilities—can be seen through the ramping up of production for items such as first-person view (FPV) drones in support of Ukraine’s defense.¹⁹

The value of leveraging native conditions that can be leveraged by the wider alliance can be seen in countries like the Netherlands, where a high concentration of high-tech companies, knowledge economies, and widespread public-private collaborations has resulted in niche capabilities in ballistic-missile defense, sensor systems, and space, communications, and quantum technologies.²⁰ Its innovation hub at Brainport Eindhoven now also hosts a NATO DIANA accelerator cell to further leverage its successful investments and public-private collaborations, and its success in areas such as the launching of micro satellites has drawn attention from potential adversaries.²¹ More importantly, they are proactive in seeking to collaborate and disseminate natively developed insights, showing how important the attitude toward innovation must come from both sides of any collaboration.²²

US Secretary of State Antony Blinken speaks with Charles Marcus, professor at Niels Bohr Institute and principal researcher at Microsoft, as he tours the Quantum Materials Lab at the University of Copenhagen, in Copenhagen in Copenhagen, Denmark, May 17, 2021. Saul Loeb/Pool via REUTERS

In many cases, knowledge-based innovation should be easy to export and share. But it cannot occur without recognition of the expertise of the source country and a genuine desire to learn from and adopt the lessons being generated. This requires a shift in attitude toward the value of the innovation itself, and a willingness to learn from others’ experiences. At a more basic level, it requires appropriate information-sharing agreements to be in place, which also requires a degree of trust between parties and a dedication to reforming the bureaucratic processes needed to enable them. While initiatives like the NTIB have arguably failed to live up to their potential, their value in shaping attitudes and focusing attention on the need for collaboration and sharing of data and technologies could be as valuable as any other element.²³ For this reason alone, the United States should consider expanding the effort to more NATO nations, with the future intent of also bringing them into an expanded AUKUS+ framework.²⁴ Agreements of this type are a perfect example of the process innovation needed in addition to the development of technologies, because without process and regulatory reform—not to mention increased data sharing—and the attitude required to enable it, technological collaboration will not be able to occur in a meaningful way.

Successful innovation requires a shift in attitude across a number of issues, including willingness to experiment, increased risk appetite, open-mindedness, and an embracing of inevitable failures as a path to learning. But the need to recognize the value of diverse perspectives on addressing challenges—and have the willingness to enable the sharing of those perspectives and the data that support them—is vital to exploring untrodden paths and fostering a culture of continuous improvement. There are likely few across the US agencies, military, or defense industrial base who would disagree in principle. But for this attitude to have a material effect, there must be a shift from passive agreement to proactive measures to enable it.

VI. Conclusion

If advanced technologies are a key pillar of winning the era of strategic competition, and allies are one of the United States’ great advantages, then surely tech collaboration with allies should be a center of gravity of US means to win. In a race of innovation, harnessing the perspectives, experiences, and extant investment of a diverse network of partners is a huge strategic advantage for the United States and NATO. But it will be a squandered advantage if appropriate attitudes, concepts, and processes are not in place to amplify development and harness the resulting capabilities. There are already a number of programs that seek to do this, and they should be supported, studied, and replicated. But more should be done to harness the new concepts, technologies, and niche capabilities that the partner ecosystem is generating, particularly within NATO member states—either through expansion of programs such as the NTIB, AUKUS, and DIANA, or by using them as templates to reform and evolve other bilateral and multilateral frameworks. Doing so will be imperative if the transatlantic Alliance is not only to prevail in this era of strategic competition, but retain sufficient military advantage needed to ensure security and stability for a free and open international system.

About the author

Fellow

John T. Watts

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Conflict Crisis Management

Acknowledgement and disclaimer

This publication has been produced in cooperation with the Ministry of Defence of the Kingdom of the Netherlands under the auspices of a project on transatlantic defense innovation.

Fincantieri CEO Pierroberto Folgiero on transatlantic defense industrial innovation and cooperation

Atlantic Council — Wed, 03 Apr 2024 14:16:08 +0000

Pierroberto Folgiero, chief executive officer of Fincantieri, Italy’s leading shipbuilding company that works closely with the US Navy and has several shipbuilding sites in the United States, joined the Atlantic Council for an interview with Matthew Kroenig, vice president and senior director of the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. Folgiero shared his perspective on the importance of allied defense industrial cooperation, especially between the United States and Italy, technological innovation in the maritime theater, and the challenges of workforce constraints. Fincantieri is a donor to the Atlantic Council.

Full interview

Featured quotes

Here are a few highlights from the conversation:

On the state of the defense market

European defense needs to manage fragmentation, and the best way to manage fragmentation is to share platforms and to share as much as possible, also at a transatlantic level.

Pierroberto Folgiero

On the challenges facing shipbuilding

How to be a manufacturing power without enough labor? That’s the big question mark of Western countries… It’s very important that we convince our own people that production is a good job. So, we have to retell the story of shipbuilding. And to do this, we need to modernize shipyards.

Pierroberto Folgiero

On the future of shipbuilding and transatlantic cooperation

I am very focused on the underwater for the future… I believe that the Mediterranean underwater can be a kind of perfect place to validate the new approaches, new models, and new technology.

Pierroberto Folgiero

The Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security works to develop sustainable, nonpartisan strategies to address the most important security challenges facing the United States and the world.

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The post Fincantieri CEO Pierroberto Folgiero on transatlantic defense industrial innovation and cooperation appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The US is building a nuclear sea-launched cruise missile. Congress must make sure it’s built right.

Robert Soofer — Wed, 03 Apr 2024 12:39:52 +0000

Six years after the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review recommended a nuclear armed sea-launched cruise missile (SLCM-N) to counter the growing Russian and Chinese nuclear threat, the program is finally underway, according to recent congressional testimony by administration officials. By authorizing and funding the SLCM-N, Congress took a very important step toward bolstering nuclear deterrence in an increasingly dangerous world. But it must now pay attention to how the Department of Defense executes its decision in the coming years.

There are forces at play—bureaucratic, budgetary, and programmatic—that could stymie the SLCM-N if Congress does not keep an eye on its progress and, at times, push its development in certain directions. For example, US lawmakers should press officials to examine the suitability of existing missiles, or those under development, as starting points to build from. This could help control the potential for high costs and extended schedules. Likewise, Congress should ensure that the Department of Defense does not generate such onerous military requirements for the SLCM-N that the perfect becomes the enemy of the good.

Why the US needs the SLCM-N

The SLCM-N is a cruise missile launched from surface ships or attack submarines (SSNs)—not from ballistic missile submarines. The United States deployed these missiles on SSNs during the Cold War, but they were removed from service (along with most US tactical nuclear weapons) and eventually retired by 2010.

The decision to reintroduce the SLCM-N was not taken lightly in the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review; it was evaluated for need, cost, the burden on the US Navy, and how it might affect other nuclear modernization programs then underway. The expansion of Russian and Chinese regional nuclear forces made this decision necessary. Russia maintains about two thousand “tactical” nuclear weapons that can be deployed on land, at sea, and delivered by aircraft. China possesses about one thousand regional missiles that can be armed with conventional or nuclear warheads. None of these weapons are limited by treaty, and they far exceed US regional nuclear capabilities—a disparity noticed by US allies.

The SLCM-N would be the first new nuclear weapon introduced by the United States since the end of the Cold War, sending a strong message of deterrence to potential adversaries (and reassurance to allies) that the United States has the resolve and range of capabilities to respond to any nuclear use—limited or otherwise. It would signal to Russia and China that, despite their numerical advantage in regional nuclear weapons, there can be no coercive or military advantage gained by threatening the use of a nuclear weapon against the United States or its allies, while the risks of doing so would be unimaginably high.

The SLCM-N was recommended early in 2018, but it took several years for officials to complete the military requirements and conduct an analysis of alternatives. By this point, there was a new administration, and the Biden administration’s Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) reversed the SLCM-N decision in 2022. While there was no disagreement over the regional nuclear threat or the need to counter adversary limited nuclear use, the Biden NPR concluded that the threat could be handled with existing—and soon to be modernized—nuclear forces, thereby avoiding the costs of a new program.

Congress, however, took a different view. After two years of debate with the Biden administration, it passed, on a bipartisan basis, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024 with instructions to begin the SLCM-N program and achieve operational capability of the SLCM-N by 2034. The bill was accompanied by appropriations to start the program. Support for the SLCM-N from senior military officials, including a chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and two commanders of US nuclear forces, combined with a favorable mention by the bipartisan Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States and a deteriorating security environment likely clinched the deal.

How Congress can ensure an SLCM-N “sweet spot”

Building the SLCM-N will not be easy. The Department of Defense and the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) are already stretched thin executing the replacement programs for aging US nuclear weapons. This includes an intercontinental ballistic missile, nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine, strategic bomber, and an air-launched nuclear-armed cruise missile. Yet, there may be ways to develop and deploy the SLCM-N in a cost-bearable manner that causes the least amount of disruption to ongoing modernization programs and does not interfere with submarine operations. Finding this “sweet spot” among competing military requirements, production capacity, cost, and operational considerations is key to a successful outcome.

Here’s what Congress should pay attention to during this hearing cycle:

First, program success depends on a competent and fully staffed program office. Congress has directed that decision authority reside with the under secretary of defense for acquisition and sustainment, but the US Navy will execute the program. Congress needs to know when the program office will be stood up, how it will be manned, and if sufficient funding will be provided. ($130 million is provided in fiscal year 2024, but there does not yet appear to be funding requested for fiscal year 2025.)

Second, Congress should ensure that the Department of Defense builds on the work already in process for the SLCM-N. Left to its own devices, there might be a temptation for the defense bureaucracy to take another look at military requirements and conduct a new analysis of alternatives. But this temptation should be resisted, as this work was done by the previous administration.

Third, the Department of Defense should not start from scratch. Significant costs can be avoided by modifying existing or planned missiles rather than commencing a new developmental program. The Long Range Stand Off missile (LRSO)—a replacement for the current air-launched cruise missile—is already under development and may be adaptable for use on a submarine. Likewise, the US Navy should evaluate whether the current fifth-generation Tomahawk sea-launched cruise missile could be suitable for this role. After all, a previous version was employed with a nuclear warhead during the Cold War. The W80-4 warhead, now under development by NNSA for the LRSO, could be adapted for use in the SLCM-N. These are important lines of inquiry for Congress.

Congress will be instrumental in the Department of Defense finding the sweet spot among requirements, costs, and operations. For example, the currently fielded air-launched cruise missile and Tomahawk sea-launched cruise missile both have a range of approximately 1,000 to 1,500 miles; therefore, the Pentagon should not establish a military requirement for a missile with a range of 2,000-plus miles, unless it is absolutely necessary. Analysis has been done to show that the SLCM-N’s contribution to nuclear deterrence can be made at these shorter ranges. Likewise, the US Navy should determine the most effective way to deploy the missile on submarines to ease the operational burden on crews, allow the submarine to continue its conventional power-projection mission, and still provide maximum nuclear deterrent effect against the potential adversary.

Finally, senior US military leadership must stay focused on this project—and on achieving it in parallel with other projects. Nuclear modernization is a priority for the Department of Defense—there is no doubt about that. But the addition of another nuclear acquisition program will further strain management, funding, and attention. Ensuring no harm is done to schedules for the ongoing nuclear modernization programs must be a priority.

After much delay, the SLCM-N is moving forward. Congress and the Department of Defense must now work together to see the project through to completion.

The post The US is building a nuclear sea-launched cruise missile. Congress must make sure it’s built right. appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Iranian drones have proliferated under US watch

Daniel E. Mouton — Tue, 02 Apr 2024 17:41:56 +0000

According to senior military officials and independent analysis by the Global Terrorism Trends and Analysis Center (GTTAC), which provides data to the State Department’s Counterterrorism Bureau, most attack unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) used in the world today originate from Iran. Notably, the GTTAC data do not include Iranian drones used by Russia as part of its full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

Iran’s record-setting proliferation of attack UAVs did not happen overnight. Although the solution to stop the spread of Iranian drones is complex, it is important to note that there were plenty of warnings and time for the United States to prepare its defenses. In 2021, Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin delivered remarks at the annual Manama Dialogue to reassure the region of US security commitments, as the dialogue occurred only three months after the chaotic US withdrawal from Afghanistan. The remarks also occurred after the United States began its Global Posture Review and the Department of Defense (DOD) had already withdrawn a significant portion of its defense capability from the region. Austin had good reason to assuage regional leaders’ doubts about US credibility and commitment to the region. Notably, the remarks underscored another area in which the United States must reconsider its approach.

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By the time of the Manama Dialogue speech, Iran had proven its ability to regularly transfer sufficient quantities of drone components to the Houthi rebels in Yemen, resulting in the launch of hundreds of UAV and missile attacks against Saudi Arabia. Iran’s proliferation of UAVs to its regional proxies began in earnest several years earlier. In 2019, the Defense Intelligence Agency’s Iran Military Power Study noted that Iran was pursuing more and increasingly capable UAVs. The study also indicated that Iran was proliferating these systems to the Houthis in Yemen and Shia militia groups in Iraq and Syria. In his Manama remarks, Austin congratulated the Saudis for defeating nearly 90 percent of UAVs and missiles fired from Yemen, and promised to work with the Saudis to provide 100 percent coverage against attack.

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 provided a new opening for Iran—this time to supply Russia with lethal drones. With the UAV transfers first reported in mid-2022 and with more than one thousand UAVs reportedly delivered, Iran’s assistance to Russia appears to have ushered in a new period of strategic partnership between the two countries. Although the Iran-Russia partnership creates long-term security complications, the more immediate effects of Iranian drones were to come from Yemen. Following the October 7, 2023 Hamas attack and Israel’s subsequent military campaign in Gaza, Houthi attacks on Red Sea shipping and subsequent diversion of maritime traffic necessitated the establishment of Operation Prosperity Guardian and multiple rounds of US and allied strikes, as well as the predictable Houthi response attacks. Prior to the Houthis’ partial closure of Red Sea Shipping, the US government took several proactive steps.

It is just as important to disrupt the supply chain to limit UAV proliferation and attacks as it is to mount an adequate defense. In the case of Iran, the US government has identified and sanctioned the various suppliers of Iran’s UAV production enterprise. This effort included US Treasury designations of front companies in China, Russia, Turkey, and Germany. Because sanctions alone are ineffective, there has also been an international effort to interdict Iranian supply routes. Even before the advent of Operation Prosperity Guardian, the United States and allied nations, like the United Kingdom and France, conducted regular interdictions and seizures of Iranian smuggled material. However, these designations and interdictions were not enough. Even after the October 7, 2023 attacks caused the United States to reestablish a more robust naval presence in the Middle East, comprehensive interdiction of Iranian smuggled lethal assistance proved elusive. As much as stopping maritime smuggling remains a challenge, interdicting overland smuggling from Iran to militia groups in Iraq and Syria reportedly represents an even greater challenge.

Another potential option would be to destroy Iran’s production facilities. However, US administrations have avoided attacking drone production facilities inside Iran due to the risk of regional escalation. The most practical option has been to upgrade US defenses against UAVs. Since both the 2019 DIA Iran Power Study and Secretary Austin’s 2021 Manama Dialogue remarks indicated an appreciation for Iran’s UAV and missile-proliferation capability, this effort should already be well underway. However, the DOD’s institutional and executive-level recognition of the Iranian threat has yet to fully translate into a reallocation of resources in the DOD’s Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) process.

While the armed services have authority over major acquisitions, none of the services have wanted to devote a significant portion of their budget away from higher-priority Indo-Pacific and Eurasia based threats articulated in the National Defense Strategy. The Pentagon created a Joint Counter Unmanned Aerial System Office, but without the authority to direct major, service-level acquisitions, it focused on testing, training, and doctrine. In the $849.8-billion 2025 fiscal year budget request, the US Army has a $299.8 million line-item request for counter-UAV systems. In the US Central Command (CENTCOM) region, where there has been a clear threat for years, CENTCOM requested $17.1 billion in the budget. The 2025 fiscal year budget amount was $3.8 billion less than that for 2024. Although these CENTCOM funds go toward operational expenses, a fraction of the funds would go toward acquiring counter-UAV systems like the Coyote launcher system. Because CENTCOM also does not have authority over major program acquisitions, the systems it is acquiring do not have the validation of a service-level acquisition and haven’t been integrated across the military.

With recent annual defense budgets ranging from $700 billion to more than $800 billion, it is not clear why the Pentagon did not devote more resources to low-cost, plentiful defenses against an ever-growing threat. In addition to his description of how Iran uses its missiles and UAVs, a testimony by General Michael Kurilla clarified that US and coalition forces have experienced 175 Iran-supported attacks in Iraq, Syria, and Jordan since October 7, 2023. These attacks only span five months and do not include a number of previous attacks, including one that killed a US contractor in 2023. Additionally, senior Pentagon officials recently indicated that US Navy forces in the Red Sea have defended against almost one hundred Houthi attacks, with almost every attack involving a variety of Iranian-supplied drones and missiles. Based on the cost of the defensive missiles fired from a US Navy warship, destroying these Houthi attacks has already led to $1 billion of unbudgeted expenses. Iranian proxies are proving their ability to deplete the US military’s stores of its long-range and expensive air defense missiles.

However, unplanned expenses are not the worst part about mounting an adequate defense against drones and missiles, whether they originate from Iran or some other malign actor. One of the attacks mentioned in the CENTCOM posture testimony was an attack that led to the deaths of three US service members. Although death is not entirely preventable in conflict, the threat trend from Iran had been clear. The Pentagon could have done more to prepare for Iranian UAV proliferation and the range of opportunistic attacks that Kurilla described. At the same time that Secretary Austin had congratulated the Saudis for defending against Iranian-supplied Houthi attacks, the Pentagon should have undertaken a comprehensive effort, similar to the 2022 Foreign Military Sales Tiger Team, to improve US defenses against the mounting numbers of low-cost, widely proliferated UAVs and missiles from Iran. Whether doing so would have saved lives is unknown, but the effort and funds expended would not have been wasted.

Daniel E. Mouton is a nonresident senior fellow at the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative of the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs.

The post Iranian drones have proliferated under US watch appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Global China Hub Nonresident Fellow Dakota Cary in SC Media

Dakota Cary — Mon, 01 Apr 2024 15:28:05 +0000

On March 26th, Global China Hub Nonresident Fellow Dakota Cary was interviewed by SC Media about US and UK sanctions on Chinese cyber espionage.

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Global China Hub Nonresident Fellow Dakota Cary in SC Media

Dakota Cary — Mon, 01 Apr 2024 15:27:03 +0000

On March 27th, Global China Hub Nonresident Fellow Dakota Cary was interviewed by SC Media on Chinese state-backed threat operation APT31.

The post Global China Hub Nonresident Fellow Dakota Cary in SC Media appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Polymeropoulos quoted in USA Today about the “Havana Syndrome” and the US intelligence community

gmatchett — Mon, 01 Apr 2024 14:24:54 +0000

Original SOurce

On April 1, Forward Defense Nonresident Senior Fellow Marc Polymeropoulos reacted to a ’60 Minutes’ report that named the Russian military intelligence unit behind the mysterious “Havana Syndrome,” neurological symptoms that US diplomats and spies have reported suffering from for nearly a decade.

Fellow

Marc Polymeropoulos

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Afghanistan Europe & Eurasia

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Ukraine urgently needs air defenses as Russia decimates power grid

Suriya Evans-Pritchard Jayanti — Sun, 31 Mar 2024 21:15:50 +0000

A series of Russian drone and missile attacks beginning March 22 has destroyed much of Ukraine’s energy infrastructure. The damage, which will cost billions of dollars and many months to repair, has crippled Ukraine’s ability to light and heat itself for the medium term and marks a major escalation in Russia’s ongoing invasion.

The latest wave of Russian airstrikes has been notable for its breadth. Virtually every one of Ukraine’s thermal power plants has been hit along with a series of substations. DTEK, Ukraine’s largest private power company, reports that two of its thermal power plants (TPP) are no longer operational, with repairs expected to take several years. A separate plant in Kharkiv has also been seriously damaged and will take years to repair, according to regional authorities.

The specific condition of additional Ukrainian power plants remains classified, but reports of recent blackouts in multiple major cities have underlined the extent of the threat to Ukraine’s power grid. In a move indicating the scale of the damage caused by recent Russian bombing, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has ordered an early end to the country’s heating season.

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Russian targets in recent days have included the Dnipro Hydroelectric Dam, sparking fears of a possible ecological disaster. The dam itself has not collapsed, but the power plant was partially destroyed and pollutants are now reportedly leaking into the reservoir. Even more worryingly, the nearby Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant lost grid connectivity due to the attack, putting its cooling systems at risk of stopping. Energoatom called the situation “extremely dangerous.”

In a further escalation, Russia has also expanded its air offensive with attacks on Ukraine’s natural gas storage facilities. These facilities, which house large quantities of gas for European customers, had not previously been targeted in earlier Russian bombing campaigns. Although the storage facilities themselves are underground, the pumping stations that allow for the insertion and extraction of gas are not.

On March 24, Russia launched approximately 20 missiles and drones at the Bilche-Volitsko-Ugerskoye storage facility, which represents around half of Ukraine’s total storage capacity. Ukrainian state-owned gas company Naftogaz downplayed the extent of the damage but did acknowledge that repairs would be necessary. Naftogaz officials also sought to reassure European storage customers that all obligations would be met by Ukraine, regardless of the Russian airstrikes.

Eurasia Center events

Ukraine’s advance in Kursk: What’s next and implications

Conflict Russia Security & Defense Ukraine

The recent wave of Russian attacks on Ukraine’s energy system comes amid reports that the White House has been pressuring Kyiv to stop attacking Russian oil refineries due to concerns about the possible impact on oil prices ahead of the November 2024 US presidential election. Starting in January, Ukraine began a series of long-range drone strikes on refining facilities inside Russia. These attacks have succeeded in hurting Russia’s energy-dependent economy, with disruption reported to oil and oil product exports, gasoline and other fuel supplies in Russia, military fuel supplies, and Russian income from energy exports.

Global prices for crude oil and diesel, as well as other oil products, have risen in the wake of the Ukrainian attacks. This appears to be making US politicians nervous about the potential impact on their country’s forthcoming elections. Unsurprisingly, many in Kyiv have been outraged by the reported US efforts to effectively protect the Russian energy industry at a time when Moscow is bombing Ukraine’s civilian energy infrastructure and plunging entire cities into darkness. Ukrainian officials have responded by insisting Russian refineries are legitimate targets.

So far, there have been no reports of European leaders seeking to deter Ukraine from attacking Russia’s oil and gas industry, but that could change as the continent faces a range of looming geopolitical and energy market problems. Russia’s gas transit contract with Ukraine is set to expire in December 2024, with the Ukrainian authorities stating they will not seek an extension. With the vulnerability of Ukraine’s gas storage facilities now an issue thanks to recent Russian airstrikes, and with instability in the Middle East making Arabian Gulf LNG both less assured and much more expensive, Europe may soon begin to pressure Ukraine, too.

Each wave of Russian airstrikes makes Ukraine’s recovery and reconstruction more challenging while narrowing the options available to the country. Without crucial US military aid that remains held up in Congress, and faced with hypocritical but likely mounting pressure from Western capitals to play nice with Russia on energy infrastructure while Russia decimates Ukraine’s power grid, the path forward is unclear.

Instead of artificial restrictions on their own ability to strike back, Kyiv desperately needs adequate air defense systems so Ukraine can protect its power plants from Russian assaults. In the meantime, the many Ukrainians who are working tirelessly to maintain their country’s battered energy systems have a long road ahead of them.

Suriya Jayanti is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

Russian victory in Ukraine would leave Europe at Putin’s mercy

Mykola Bielieskov — Thu, 21 Mar 2024 21:06:18 +0000

If Putin wins in Ukraine, will he go further? This is the question currently being asked with increasing urgency in capital cities throughout Europe.

Skeptics note that the failures of the past two years have exposed the limitations of the Russian military, and claim a triumphant Putin would be in no position to expand the war beyond the borders of Ukraine. This argument is comforting but short-sighted. It ignores the practical implications of a Russian victory, and underestimates the geopolitical importance of Ukraine for the security of Europe.

The re-emergence of an independent Ukraine in 1991 profoundly altered the European geopolitical landscape. For centuries prior to 1991, the Russian Empire and the USSR had exploited Ukraine’s geographical location, natural resources, and population to project power into the heart of Europe. Hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians had served in the Red Army, while the Soviet war machine had relied heavily on Ukraine’s industrial base to produce everything from warships and tanks to intercontinental missiles.

The collapse of the Soviet Union temporarily reduced the imperial threat facing the countries of Central Europe. Neighbors such as Poland and Hungary understood the strategic importance of Ukrainian statehood perfectly well and were among the first to recognize Ukraine’s independence. This new geopolitical reality shielded countries across the region from potential Russian aggression and helped pave the way for their NATO accession.

Vladimir Putin was also well aware that Ukrainian independence was a major obstacle to the revival of Russia’s great power status. From the very beginning of his reign, he made the subjugation of Ukraine a foreign policy priority. At first, he attempted to achieve this goal via political means; when this failed, he resorted to the same military methods employed by generations of his Czarist and Soviet predecessors.

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The Russian army has suffered extremely heavy losses over the past two years in Ukraine, but this has not deterred Putin. On the contrary, with the future of Western military aid to Ukraine currently in doubt, the Russian dictator is growing visibly more confident of securing victory. If Putin is able to extinguish Ukrainian statehood, Russia’s military potential will be dramatically enhanced by the acquisition of Ukraine’s considerable resources.

Russia is already conscripting large numbers of men in occupied regions of Ukraine and using them as cannon fodder in brutal human wave offensives. If Ukraine falls, hundreds of thousands more would be forced to join the Russian military and deployed in similar fashion. As well as extra manpower, a conquered Ukraine would also provide Russia with vast natural resources, industrial strength, and agricultural wealth. Indeed, the occupation of Ukraine would allow Russia to dominate global agricultural markets.

The geographical implications of a Russian victory in Ukraine would be equally grave. Russia seized Crimea in 2014 then used the occupied Ukrainian peninsula as a springboard for the full-scale invasion of the country eight years later. As the Russian army continues to edge forward in eastern Ukraine, each advance brings Putin’s troops closer to the border with NATO.

Nobody is more conscious of the growing danger than Ukraine’s western neighbors. It is no surprise that Poland, the Czech Republic, and the Baltic states are among the biggest supporters of Ukraine and the most vocal when it comes to raising the alarm over the Russian threat. They know that if Ukraine is lost, they are next in line and will face a resurgent Russia emboldened by the success of the current invasion.

This is not to say that others are oblivious to the potentially disastrous consequences of a Russian victory in Ukraine. French President Emmanuel Macron has recently warned that European security is “at stake” in Ukraine, and has refused to rule out deploying Western troops to prevent Russia from overrunning the country.

Eurasia Center events

Ukraine’s advance in Kursk: What’s next and implications

Conflict Russia Security & Defense Ukraine

Influential voices in America have long recognized the geopolitical importance of Ukrainian independence. In the 1990s, former US National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski highlighted the country’s crucial role in the geopolitics of the region. “It cannot be stressed strongly enough that without Ukraine, Russia ceases to be an empire, but with Ukraine suborned and then subordinated, Russia automatically becomes an empire,” he famously observed.

During the early decades of Ukrainian independence, successive US administrations appeared inclined to follow Brzezinski’s counsel. However, from the late 2000s onward, the focus of US foreign policy began to shift away from Ukraine and the wider Eastern European region toward Asia.

This coincided with the rise of a more assertive Russia. In 2008, Russian troops invaded Georgia. Six years later, the Kremlin occupied Crimea and sparked a war in eastern Ukraine. By 2022, an emboldened Putin felt strong enough to launch the biggest European invasion since World War II. This escalating Russian aggression should serve as a painful lesson for anyone tempted to take the continued existence of an independent Ukraine for granted.

Ukraine is currently facing the most challenging period since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion. Starved of supplies, Ukrainian troops find themselves forced to ration ammunition. In many cases, they are already unable to prevent Russia from edging forward. This is fuelling increasingly pessimistic forecasts as the spring campaigning season draws near.

The stakes could hardly be higher. If Russia’s invasion succeeds, the consequences will be felt far beyond the borders of Ukraine. The Russian military will be revitalized by the capture of Ukraine’s vast human and material resources, and will loom large on the eastern border of a NATO alliance demoralized and discredited by its failure to defend Ukrainian independence. At that point, many in the West may begin to ask why they didn’t arm Ukraine when they had the chance. By then, of course, it will be too late.

With no warships of its own, Ukraine initially appeared to have little hope of challenging Russia’s naval dominance. However, it soon became clear that the outgunned Ukrainian military had no intention of conceding control of the Black Sea to the Kremlin. Instead, Ukraine has used a combination of innovative drone technologies and foreign firepower to even out the odds and inflict a string of defeats on Putin’s fleet.

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Ukraine scored its first major success at sea in April 2022, sinking the flagship of the Russian Black Sea Fleet, the Moskva, with a brace of domestically produced Neptune missiles. This forced Russian warships to pull back from the Ukrainian coastline, relieving the immediate threat of an amphibious landing close to Odesa.

Ukraine maintained this momentum into summer 2022, forcing Russian troops to retreat from the strategically important Snake Island and launching the first drone strikes against Russian naval targets in occupied Crimea.

The Battle of the Black Sea escalated significantly in 2023 when Britain and France began supplying Ukraine with cruise missiles. This enhanced strike capability enabled Ukraine to deliver a series of punishing blows to Russia’s fleet that severely damaged or destroyed multiple warships and a submarine. In one particularly symbolic strike, Ukraine bombed the Black Sea Fleet headquarters in Sevastopol.

The remarkable sequence of Ukrainian victories at sea has continued into 2024, with the reported sinking of a further three Russian warships since the start of the year. These most recent attacks have been carried out by Ukraine’s rapidly evolving fleet of domestically produced marine drones. By early March, Ukraine was claiming to have sunk or disabled around one-third of the entire Russian Black Sea Fleet.

Eurasia Center events

Ukraine’s advance in Kursk: What’s next and implications

Conflict Russia Security & Defense Ukraine

Ukraine’s success in the Battle of the Black Sea will not prove militarily decisive in a land war, but it has provided a significant boost to the country’s war effort. The sinking of so many Russian warships has forced Putin to move the bulk of his fleet away from occupied Crimea to the relative safety of Russian ports, making it more difficult for the Russian Navy to play a logistical role in the invasion or engage in missile attacks on Ukrainian targets.

Crucially, Ukraine’s progress at sea has made it possible to break the blockade of the country’s southern seaports and resume maritime commerce. By early 2024, export volumes were once again approaching prewar levels, providing Ukraine with a vital economic lifeline.

The steady stream of positive news coming from the Black Sea front has also helped boost morale among war-weary Ukrainians. This trend began on the very first day of the invasion, when a Russian warship approached the tiny Ukrainian garrison on Snake Island with an ultimatum to surrender, only to be told: “Russian warship, go f*ck yourself.”

This instantly iconic reply was soon embraced by Ukrainians as a symbol of national defiance and an unofficial slogan for the country’s entire war effort. Within days, it was appearing on billboards and bumper stickers, and even inspired an award-winning postage stamp.

Throughout the past two years, sunken Russian warships have remained a popular theme for Ukrainian meme-makers, with each new success sparking a flurry of online creativity. The Ukrainian military has joined in, publishing video footage of fresh drone attacks on Russian warships together with dramatic musical accompaniment.

For the Ukrainian public, the humbling of Putin’s navy is a source of hope in their country’s David-and-Goliath struggle against the might of the Russian military. This optimism is currently on display outside Kyiv City Hall in the heart of the Ukrainian capital, where a large poster board recently appeared bearing a mocked up image of Russian warships languishing at the bottom of the Black Sea. Amid the carnage and terror of Russia’s ongoing invasion, the sinking of Russian warships has given Ukrainians something meaningful to cheer.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

Grundman joins roundtable discussion on NSIB Report Card

jfranks — Wed, 20 Mar 2024 13:33:42 +0000

On March 19, Forward Defense senior fellow Steven Grundman joined a roundtable discussion hosted by The Reagan Institute that reviewed its 2024 National Security Innovation Base Program (NSIB) Report Card. The NSIB Report Card is an initiative to evaluate the state and effectiveness of the national security innovation ecosystem.

There’s been some improvement … but we are now going to be spending less on modernization right in the middle of this strategic moment; this moment of tremendous strategic importance to us.

Steven Grundman

Fellow

Steven Grundman

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Defense Industry Defense Policy

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Dean quoted in the West Australian

kyusko — Thu, 14 Mar 2024 20:32:47 +0000

On March 13, IPSI Nonresident Senior Fellow Peter Dean was quoted in a West Australian article on AUKUS submarine cuts.

Fellow

Peter J. Dean

Indo-Pacific Security Initiative Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Australia Conflict

The post Dean quoted in the West Australian appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Dean in Australia Broadcasting Corporation

everges — Tue, 05 Mar 2024 21:49:00 +0000

On March 4, IPSI Nonresident Senior Fellow Peter Dean was quoted in an Australia Broadcasting Corporation article discussing the benefits that AUKUS nuclear-powered submarines will bring to Australia.

Fellow

Peter J. Dean

Indo-Pacific Security Initiative Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Australia Conflict

The post Dean in Australia Broadcasting Corporation appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Kramer authors op-ed on the role of Congress in deterring Chinese cyber attacks

jfranks — Tue, 05 Mar 2024 21:44:00 +0000

Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security Transatlantic Security Initiative

On March 4, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security Distinguished Fellow and Board Director Franklin D. Kramer published an op-ed in The National Interest on the role of Congress in deterring Chinese cyber attacks.

In the article, Kramer highlights the serious threats Chinese cyberattacks pose to US economic security and critical infrastructure. It suggests four measures: providing cybersecurity tax credits to support small businesses, academia, and infrastructure; leveraging AI to improve security software; creating a corps of private-sector cybersecurity providers for wartime; and addressing the cybersecurity workforce shortage to enhance national resilience.

China’s determined cyber attacks on the United States call for significant actions to enhance national resilience both now and in the event of conflict.

Franklin D. Kramer

Board director

Franklin D. Kramer

Distinguished Fellow

Cybersecurity Defense Policy

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The Ukraine-Turkey defense partnership with the potential to transform Black Sea and Euro-Atlantic security

Pınar Dost — Tue, 05 Mar 2024 18:49:21 +0000

The burgeoning defense partnership between Ukraine and Turkey has helped Kyiv in its fight to fend off Russia and shored up Ankara’s security while bolstering the two partners’ economies. But now, there’s an opportunity to expand that partnership—and in so doing, secure the Black Sea and Europe at large.

The benefits of that partnership have been made clearer over the past two years, with Bayraktar TB2 drones—manufactured by Turkish defense company Baykar—grabbing headlines for helping Ukraine by bolstering Kyiv’s air-strike capabilities in the beginning of Russia’s full-scale invasion.

Just weeks before Russian President Vladimir Putin launched the war, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan—during a visit to Kyiv—struck a deal with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy to allow Ukrainian factories to produce Turkish drones. That deal is now bearing fruit, with Baykar breaking ground on a drone factory near Kyiv in February. The factory, which will take twelve months to build, is expected to create five hundred jobs and produce 120 units a year. NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg pointed to the project, calling it an example of how NATO allies are supporting Ukraine not only “with direct deliveries of weapons and ammunition but also by investing in and ramping up their capacity to produce their own weapons.”

Turkey and Ukraine’s strategic partnership stretches further. For example, Baykar’s Akıncı combat drone (introduced in 2021) and its Kızılelma combat drone (expected to be introduced this year) use Ukrainian-made Ivchenko-Progress engines. The Kızılelma has even been called a “Turkish bird with a Ukrainian heart.” Kyiv and Ankara also cooperate in the maritime domain; since 2021, Turkey has been building two Ada-class anti-submarine corvettes for Ukraine’s naval forces, expected to be completed and delivered this year. The Ukrainian Armed Forces received Cobra II tactical vehicles—developed by Turkish company Otokar—and were seen deploying them last year. Also in 2023: Ukraine sent two engines to the Turkish Aerospace Industries (TAI) for the company’s T929 ATAK-II attack helicopter; Ukraine has committed to send twelve more by 2025.

While the flow of Turkish defense equipment northward to Ukraine has been strong, it has experienced headwinds. For example, European countries have been unable to come to a consensus on topping up the European Peace Facility, the mechanism with which the European Union (EU) funds weapons supplies for Ukraine. France, Greece, and Cyprus have blocked additional financing out of a desire to ensure that funds are spent on weapons, technologies, and ammunition from the EU. Greece said that it did not want the money to go to Turkish defense companies. The countries should let up on this demand—France recently has, for the procurement of artillery. Supplying Ukraine is not just about Kyiv’s security; it is also about Black Sea security and Euro-Atlantic security.

Nevertheless, the Ukraine-Turkey bilateral defense partnership has room to expand. On February 21, TAI announced that its KAAN fighter jet conducted its first flight. The jet was conceptualized and developed initially to replace the Turkish Air Force’s aging F-16 fleet and to bolster Turkey’s self-sufficiency—before the United States decided to sell Turkey forty new F-16s and equipment to upgrade dozens more. While the KAAN jet prototype is currently powered by General Electric F-110 engines (the engine that powers F-16s), Turkey is aiming to start using domestically produced engines produced by TAI Engine Industries by 2028. However, there may be a role for Ukraine in the project, as Ukrainian Ambassador to Turkey Vasyl Bodnar recently stated that not only is Ukraine looking to buy and use the KAAN jet, but “Ukrainian teams continue to work on the engine” and are “competing” to be a partner on the project.

A Ukraine-Turkey partnership on joint engine production for the KAAN jet would contribute to Ukraine’s economy and also provide Turkey a trustworthy and steady partner in bolstering its self-defense—political divides between Ankara and the West could potentially erupt into measures such as export license bans as was the case in 2019 with some European Union governments’ limiting arms exports following Turkey’s operation in northeast Syria and in 2020 with the United States imposing sanctions on Turkey following Ankara’s purchase of Russia’s S-400 missile defense system.

NATO countries have acknowledged the important role that fighter jets play in the region’s security. Ukraine has been offered sixty second-hand F-16 fighter jets by the Netherlands, Denmark, and Norway. Last year, Denmark, the United States, and the United Kingdom began training Ukrainian pilots. In November last year, Romania received three of the thirty-two F-16s it bought from Norway. By 2025, Romania is expected to own forty-nine F-16s. Bulgaria is also gearing up to receive the sixteen F-16 Block 70 fighter jets it bought from the United States; the first eight are expected to arrive by 2025.

Turkey plans to export some KAAN jets, which could offer countries an alternative to fighter aircraft manufactured and sold by Russia and China. And, once Turkey has more KAAN jets off the ground and more F-16 upgraded in its fleet, it could support Ukraine with second-hand F-16s or by serving as a repair and upgrade hub for the F-16s that Ukraine and other Black Sea countries own.

Benefits that ripple across the sea

An expanded Ukraine-Turkey security partnership would compound upon the beneficial effects of previous efforts to secure the region undertaken by NATO countries.

In both its 2022 Strategic Concept and its 2023 Vilnius Summit communiqué, NATO called Russia “the most significant and direct threat to Allies’ security and to peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area.” In both documents, the Alliance also reiterated the “strategic importance” of the Black Sea. The United States—the NATO member with the largest military—echoed this in its 2024 National Defense Authorization Act, where it emphasized the need to bolster defenses in the region and increase cooperation on Black Sea security, not only bilaterally with regional partners—specifically Ukraine, Romania, Bulgaria, Moldova, and Georgia—but also with NATO and the EU to minimize the risk of duplicating efforts and to improve interoperability.

Strengthening NATO’s deterrence and defense in the Black Sea region is even more important as the US presidential election looms. Former US President Donald Trump, a candidate again this year, has repeatedly argued that the United States is unfairly carrying the burden of financing NATO. Recently, he added that he would encourage Russia to do whatever it wants to any NATO country that doesn’t meet the Alliance’s defense spending guidelines. This kind of announcement unfortunately encourages an imperialist president such as Putin.

Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine began and threats to the Black Sea region increased, NATO and its members have worked to bolster the region’s defense and deterrence capabilities. NATO increased its forward presence in the region by establishing four new battlegroups in Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania, and Slovakia. The United States has developed close security cooperation with Romania and Bulgaria, providing them with important defense technology and weapons as well as Foreign Military Financing to support their military modernization efforts and regional defense capabilities. The United States is also leading a Black Sea Maritime Domain Awareness project, in which Bulgaria, Romania, Ukraine, and Georgia are participants.

Ukraine has disabled one-third of the Russian Black Sea Fleet. With Turkey being the guardian of the straits under the Montreux Convention, Russia will not easily be able to replace these losses. NATO allies should take advantage of the opportunity they now have to get the upper hand in the maritime domain against Russia. Montreux limits the passage of non-Black Sea countries’ naval forces through the straits and the amount of time these forces can spend in the Black Sea; but the United States and non-littoral European countries, seeking to bolster Black Sea allies’ defense capabilities, can lean more on Turkey. The erosion of Russia’s capabilities has shifted the balance of power in the Black Sea to Turkey’s advantage. Turkey could lead naval operations in the international waters in the Black Sea, further out from its coastline, with its TCG Anadolu assault ship without a NATO mandate. While there is no specific mention of Turkey in the US Black Sea strategy, the outline for which is reflected in the US National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024, the existing structure of the law is enough for the US to support—alone or in cooperation with other NATO allies—the Black Sea countries with additional capabilities and efforts to improve interoperability.

A Ukraine-Turkey partnership on the KAAN jet would add to these efforts and bolster security in the region.

What’s at stake

Gridlock in the US Congress over approving additional financial support to Ukraine and debate over whether the war is at a stalemate—in addition to Ukraine’s losses on the battleground and its ammunition shortage—have alarmed many European capitals.

After weeks of resistance from Hungary, the EU agreed to $54 billion in long-term aid to Ukraine. European countries, for their part, are also pitching in to shore up Ukraine’s and the Euro-Atlantic community’s security. Germany, which ranks second in military assistance committed to Ukraine, is—among other initiatives—building a new ammunition factory in response to Germany’s and Europe’s needs. German Chancellor Olaf Scholz also called on Europe to “move… towards large-scale production of defense equipment.” Good news also came out of Denmark, as the prime minister announced that she would pledge all of the country’s artillery arsenal to Ukraine. France has also recently concluded a security pact with Ukraine, pledging up to three billion euros in military aid—including cooperation on artillery—and the Netherlands has committed to providing 2.2 billion euros in military aid this year.

Turkey has also looked to boost Euro-Atlantic security. Turkey and the United States are already cooperating to replenish the United States’ munitions stockpiles, critical considering Washington’s role in supplying ammunition to Ukraine. According to the US ambassador to Turkey, by next year, 30 percent of all 155 mm rounds made in the United States will be manufactured by factories that are part of a partnership between the US Department of Defense and a Turkish defense company. Turkey, as well as Greece, recently joined the German-led European Sky Shield Initiative, which offers participating countries a platform through which they can jointly procure air defense capabilities, an important contribution to European security. All these efforts and initiatives are important, as the United States, NATO, and EU will need to prepare over the next eleven months for a potential Trump presidency.

Leaders in the West are putting into words how important it is for Ukraine to win. As French President Emmanuel Macron said, Russian defeat in Ukraine is vital for security in Europe; Scholz stressed that what happens in Ukraine will decide “if our [peaceful] order, our rules-based world has a future.” Ukraine’s defense-industrial know-how and Turkey’s experience in manufacturing combine into a win-win security partnership that can pay dividends for Black Sea security, Euro-Atlantic security, and—ultimately—the international rules-based order.

Pınar Dost is a nonresident fellow at Atlantic Council IN TURKEY and a historian of international relations. She is also the former deputy director of Atlantic Council IN TURKEY. She is an associated researcher with the French Institute for Anatolian Studies. Follow her on LinkedIn.

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Global China Hub Nonresident Fellow Dakota Cary quoted 17 times on Chinese hacking campaigns

Dakota Cary — Mon, 04 Mar 2024 14:38:50 +0000

From February 21st to 27th, GCH Nonresident Fellow Dakota Cary was quoted 17 times on Chinese hacking campaigns. See below for a full list of his media appearances.

AP News: “An online dump of Chinese hacking documents offers a rare window into pervasive state surveillance”
Cyber Scoop: “Leaked documents show how firm supports Chinese hacking operations”
BBC: “China tech firm claimed it could hack Foreign Office”
Bloomberg: “Purported Leaks Show Global Reach of China-Sponsored Hacking”
CNN: “US officials combing leaked documents from Chinese tech firm for clues about Chinese hacking campaigns”
Dark Reading: “iSoon’s Secret APT Status Exposes China’s Foreign Hacking Machinations”
Financial Times: “Leak shows China uses private company to hack citizens and foreign states”
Krebs on Security: “New Leak Shows Business Side of China’s APT Menace”
NBC News: “An online dump of Chinese hacking documents offers a rare window into pervasive state surveillance”
Newsweek: “China’s Hacking and Spying Revealed in Bombshell Leak”
NPR: “Leaked document trove shows a Chinese hacking scheme focused on harassing dissidents”
SC Media: “US sounds cybersecurity alarm over water systems in latest wave of China-linked warnings”
The Record: “Leaked documents open the lid on China’s commercial hacking industry”
TechCrunch: “Spyware leak offers ‘first-of-its-kind’ look inside Chinese government hacking efforts”
The United Arab Emirates Business Journal: “Insight into Chinese Cyber Espionage Revealed by Massive Spyware Leak”
Infosecurity Magazine: “I-Soon GitHub Leak: What Cyber Experts Learned About Chinese Cyber Espionage”
Global Village Space: “Inside Look at Chinese Government Hacking Efforts Revealed in Spyware Leak”

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Hinata-Yamaguchi in the Japan Times

everges — Fri, 01 Mar 2024 22:00:00 +0000

On March 1, IPSI Nonresident Senior Fellow Ryo Hinata-Yamaguchi was quoted in the Japan Times on the Japan Self-Defense Forces’ plans to replace outdated aircraft with UAV technology.

Fellow

Ryo Hinata-Yamaguchi

Indo-Pacific Security Initiative Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Defense Policy Indo-Pacific

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Bowing to Putin’s nuclear blackmail will make nuclear war more likely

Peter Dickinson — Thu, 29 Feb 2024 22:01:18 +0000

Russia could respond with nuclear weapons if the West sends troops to Ukraine, Vladimir Putin has warned. In his annual State of the Nation address on February 29, the Russian dictator said any attempt to deploy Western troops in Ukraine “threatens a conflict with nuclear weapons and the destruction of civilization.”

This was the latest and most explicit in a series of nuclear threats made by Putin since he first ordered the full-scale invasion of Ukraine just over two years ago. When announcing the invasion, Putin warned against any Western intervention with promises of consequences “such as you have never seen in your entire history.” Four days later, he ordered Russia’s nuclear forces to be put on high alert.

Following Russia’s defeat in the March 2022 Battle of Kyiv, Putin sought to deter the West from arming Ukraine by promising a “lightning-fast” response and strongly hinting that he was ready to use nuclear weapons. “We have all the tools for this that no one else can boast of having,” he declared. “We won’t boast about it: We will use them if needed and I want everyone to know that. We have already taken all the decisions on this.”

Prior to this week’s statement, Putin’s most notorious nuclear threats came during a televised September 2022 address to announce Russia’s first mobilization since World War II. With the Russian army retreating in disarray in Ukraine, Putin referenced his country’s nuclear arsenal and vowed to use “all means at our disposal” to defend Russia. “This is not a bluff,” he declared.

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Ukraine has repeatedly called Putin’s bluff, exposing the emptiness of the Russian dictator’s nuclear bluster. Just weeks after his September 2022 speech, the Ukrainian military liberated Kherson, the only regional capital captured by Russia since the start of the invasion and a city that Putin himself had just trumpeted as “forever Russian.” Rather than reaching for the nuclear button, Putin reacted to this embarrassing defeat by ordering his troops to quietly withdraw.

Russia has responded in similar fashion to setbacks in the Battle of the Black Sea. Kremlin officials have long sought to position Crimea as a red line for Russia, but this has not prevented Ukraine from damaging or sinking approximately one-third of the Russian Black Sea Fleet. This humiliation has not provoked a nuclear response from Putin. Instead, the bulk of his fleet has retreated from its traditional home port in occupied Crimea to the safety of Russia.

While Ukraine has refused to be intimidated by Putin’s nuclear blackmail, the same cannot be said for the West. Putin’s thinly veiled threats may appear crude and primitive, but there can be little doubt that they have been instrumental in fueling the crippling fear of escalation that has plagued Western decision-making ever since the first days of the invasion. This has led to the disastrously slow delivery of military aid to Ukraine and the outright denial of weapons systems that could have set the stage for a Ukrainian victory.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has identified this Western fear of escalation as the single biggest obstacle to his country’s war effort. “Nothing has harmed our coalition more than this concept,” he commented in January 2024.

Eurasia Center events

Ukraine’s advance in Kursk: What’s next and implications

Conflict Russia Security & Defense Ukraine

Unless this changes, the damage will not be limited to Ukraine. If the mere suggestion of a possible nuclear escalation is enough to deter the West from preventing Russia’s takeover of Ukraine, Putin will inevitably employ the same tactics against other countries. He is already openly portraying the current invasion as a sacred mission to reclaim “historically Russian lands.” With more than a dozen other countries also potentially qualifying as “historically Russian,” it is all too easy to image further invasions in the coming years accompanied by more of Putin’s thinly veiled nuclear threats.

Nor will the implications be restricted to Russia’s wars of aggression. On the contrary, fellow autocrats around the world will take note of Putin’s success in Ukraine and draw the logical conclusions for their own expansionist agendas. If nuclear intimidation works for Moscow, why not for Beijing or Pyongyang?

This has the potential to spark a dangerous arms race. If Russia manages to normalize nuclear intimidation as a foreign policy tool, numerous countries will soon be scrambling to acquire nuclear arsenals of their own. There are indications that this issue is already being discussed in some quarters. Speaking in February 2024, Polish Foreign Minister Radoslaw Sikorski warned that if additional US support for Ukraine is not forthcoming, “some countries will start hedging, and others will be considering developing their own nuclear weapons programs.”

By allowing themselves to be intimidated by Putin’s nuclear threats, Western leaders risk plunging the whole world into a dark new era of insecurity and aggression. Russia’s successful use of nuclear blackmail in Ukraine will transform attitudes toward nuclear weapons and undermine decades of nonproliferation efforts. Nukes will become an essential tool for any country that wishes to avoid being bullied by their neighbors. The potential for nuclear war will increase dramatically, as will the possibility of stray nukes falling into the hands of non-state actors.

Vladimir Putin’s decision to use nuclear intimidation as part of his Ukraine invasion is a reckless gamble that reflects his firm belief in Western weakness. Unless the West proves him wrong, the consequences for global security will be catastrophic.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

Dean quoted in Australian media on Australia’s Navy overhaul

kyusko — Mon, 26 Feb 2024 20:37:35 +0000

On February 23, IPSI nonresident senior fellow Peter Dean was quoted in an Australian Financial Review article on Australia’s plans to revamp its navy amidst rising global tensions. Dean was also quoted in the Australian on Canberra’s decision to retain a downsized Hunter-class frigate program.

Fellow

Peter J. Dean

Indo-Pacific Security Initiative Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Australia Conflict

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Russia Sanctions Database cited by the US Senate Subcommittee on Investigations on US technology used by Russia

amagazzino — Fri, 23 Feb 2024 18:10:24 +0000

Read the full memo here.

The post Russia Sanctions Database cited by the US Senate Subcommittee on Investigations on US technology used by Russia appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Ukrainian long-range drones target Putin’s war machine inside Russia

Victoria Vdovychenko, Alexander Khara — Thu, 22 Feb 2024 21:29:53 +0000

For the past two years, international support for Ukraine has been hampered by widespread fear of escalation among the country’s Western partners. This has prevented Ukraine from receiving the kind of long-range weapons that would have allowed the Ukrainian military to strike back against strategic targets inside Russia. Ukraine has responded to the West’s escalation paralysis by developing its own fleet of domestically produced deep strike drones, and is now deploying these long-range weapons against Russian targets with growing frequency.

In the first two months of 2024, Ukraine has launched a new campaign of air strikes inside Russia. Key targets have included the Ust-Luga fuel export terminal on the Baltic Sea close to St. Petersburg, and major oil refineries in Yaroslavl and Volgograd. These attacks against Russia’s energy industry infrastructure mark a new stage in the conflict, with Ukraine aiming to bring the war home to Russia and weaken Putin’s war machine from within.

As the full-scale invasion enters a third year, Russia has largely managed to circumvent sanctions imposed on the country’s oil and gas industry. Despite the loss of European markets and the imposition of price caps, Russia has been able to identify new customers while also finding creative ways of bypassing restrictions.

With Western sanctions failing to have the desired impact, Ukraine’s long-range drone strikes represent a far more direct approach that Kyiv hopes will create greater challenges for the Kremlin. If drone attacks succeed in causing significant disruption to Russia’s economically vital energy sector, this could negatively impact military operations in Ukraine and domestic stability in Russia.

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The Ukrainian air strike campaign targeting high-value energy assets inside Russia is likely to expand in the coming months. In addition to undermining the economic foundations of the Putin regime, Ukraine’s attacks aim to damage or destroy the Western equipment that is widely used throughout the Russian oil and gas industry. Much of this equipment is already subject to sanctions, making it problematic for Russia to import replacements.

Ukraine’s drone raids are creating dilemmas for Russian military planners and forcing them to make tough choices regarding the deployment of scarce air defense, anti-drone, and electronic warfare capabilities. Much of this is currently concentrated along the front lines in Ukraine, but attacks inside Russia are now fueling calls to transfer units to the deep rear. Given Russia’s vast size and extensive energy infrastructure, it will be extremely difficult to provide comprehensive coverage.

Ukraine’s drone strikes also have an informational aspect as they are difficult to conceal. As a result, they are making the Russian public more aware of the ongoing war in Ukraine and forcing them to acknowledge that it has now reached the home front. This is potentially important as the Kremlin has worked hard for the past two years to insulate Russian society from the invasion of Ukraine, and has sought to keep any negative impact from the war to an absolute minimum.

Another focus of long-range Ukrainian attacks is Russia’s military industrial complex. Over the past year, Ukrainian drones have targeted at least four missile and air defense production facilities in Smolensk, Bryansk, Tula, and Kolomna. There are some indications that these attacks are hampering Russia’s ability to supply its invading army. For example, Ukrainian military officials noted a substantial reduction in the number of lancet drones deployed on the front lines following an attack on a Russian production facility.

Eurasia Center events

I. Foreword
II. Near- and medium-term MDO capabilities
A. Current planning for multidomain operations
B. Lessons from the Russia-Ukraine war
C. Commercially based US defense capabilities
III. Priority initiatives
A. Low-cost surveillance and sensor-shooter networks
B. SEAD: An inherently multidomain operation
C. Cyber: Multidomain offense and defense
D. Dynamic sustainment
E. Survivability and lethality of forward-stationed forces
F. Space
G. Command and control structures for MDO
IV. A multitiered approach to MDO
V. Conclusion: Toward combined all-domain operations

Ukraine’s advance in Kursk: What’s next and implications

Conflict Russia Security & Defense Ukraine

Determining the overall impact of Ukraine’s deep strike campaign on the Russian economy is difficult due to the Kremlin’s efforts to conceal evidence of any resulting damage. Nevertheless, international news reports indicate that the initial wave of drone attacks in early 2024 did manage to disrupt energy sector operations and force temporary stoppages at targeted facilities. This achievement underlines the potential of Ukraine’s strategy.

Future long-range operations inside Russia will be shaped by Ukraine’s recently formed Unmanned Systems Force, a new branch of the Ukrainian military dedicated to drone warfare established by President Zelenskyy in early February. While attacks are expected to continue, it will likely take some time for Ukraine to produce enough long-range drones to pose a more serious threat to Russia’s energy sector and military production facilities. Ukrainian officials are committed to producing one million drones in 2024, but this total includes large quantities needed for the front lines as well as additional marine drones to build on Ukraine’s success in the Black Sea.

While there are no wonder weapons or silver bullets in this war, correctly deployed drones in sufficient numbers are capable of making a meaningful difference, both on the battlefield and far beyond the front lines inside Russia. Ukraine’s strategy of targeting high-value energy assets using low-cost drones looks to be both effective and sustainable. It is also a sensible response to mounting concerns over the future of US military aid.

Ukraine’s new generation of long-range drones are comparatively easy to produce. They have also proven surprisingly difficult to intercept. Looking ahead, the key issue is likely to be quantity. If Ukraine can manufacture enough long-range drones, it may be possible to seriously degrade Russia’s essential military capabilities and impact the course of the war.

Victoria Vdovychenko is Program Director of the Security Studies Program at the Centre for Defence Strategies. Alexander Khara is a fellow at the Centre for Defence Strategies.

Low-cost multidomain surveillance and sensor-shooter networks utilizing unmanned aerial, ground, and maritime capabilities.
Multidomain capabilities for suppression of enemy air defenses.
Integrated cyber and kinetic offense, focused against adversary logistics and war-supporting infrastructures; and government and private-sector cyber defense, focused on support to militarily critical infrastructures.
Dynamic sustainment capabilities, including the use of artificial intelligence (AI), to ensure logistical effectiveness during high-intensity conflict.
MDO support for forward-deployed forces to assure survivability and lethality in the initial stages of conflict.
Assured provision in wartime of the private-sector space capabilities that are part of NATO’s Alliance Persistent Surveillance from Space initiative.
Multidomain task forces (MDTFs) to coordinate and integrate capabilities across domains.

I. Foreword

As NATO ramps up preparations for its 75th Anniversary Summit in Washington in July 2024, the world’s most successful military alliance will have much to celebrate. Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine—an assault on the rules-based order intended to weaken and divide NATO—instead made the Alliance larger and stronger than ever. The admission of Finland and anticipated entry of Sweden bring NATO even closer to Russia’s doorstep. Members bolstered NATO’s posture in Europe with a new Force Model and suite of defense plans commensurate with the spectrum of threats. And after decades of underinvestment, nations on both sides of the Atlantic seem to have awoken to the need for a reinvigorated defense-industrial base.

But these causes for celebration are stacked against a threat environment that continues to present enormous challenges to transatlantic security and defense. Allies on NATO’s eastern frontier, now facing the reality of protracted conflict in Ukraine, are staring down a Russian adversary that shows no signs of backing down. Though its land forces are severely depleted, Russia’s air and strategic forces—as well as its naval forces outside the Black Sea—remain largely untouched. Moreover, post-war Russia could reconstitute its land-based warfighting capabilities within three to five years. The Alliance must also come to terms with challenges emanating from beyond its borders and outside the conventional warfighting arena, as demonstrated by the coercive behavior of Xi Jinping’s China, increasing cyber threats below the threshold of war, and recent proliferation of crises that threaten the stability of NATO’s southern neighborhood.

In this moment of uncertainty and unprecedented geopolitical contestation, maintaining NATO’s warfighting advantage over adversaries will hinge upon the Alliance’s continued modernization and its ability to operate across domains at speed and scale. Today’s battlespace is increasingly connected—combined all-domain operations provide a vehicle for enhanced deterrence and defense, equipping NATO with the capacity to outmaneuver competitors with the coordinated execution of multiple, mutually reinforcing activities across air, space, land, sea, and cyberspace. Although NATO recognizes the value of such an approach, the Alliance and its constituent nations have yet to agree on what multidomain operations (MDO) are, changes they will necessitate in the NATO force structure, and the reforms, investments, and exercises needed to fully operationalize the concept.

The following report seeks to inform this process, offering recommendations for targeted investments that nations can pursue in the near and medium terms to accelerate NATO’s transformation into an MDO-enabled warfighting machine. Rather than provide a comprehensive assessment of all capabilities that will be important for a future multidomain fight, the paper prioritizes attainable capabilities and approaches—ranging from sensor-shooter networks to artificial intelligence (AI)-enabled agile logistics—that will be critical to MDO and have proven utility based on preliminary lessons learned from the war in Ukraine, but do not require massive budget outlays or decades-long acquisition processes. Understanding that not all capabilities recommended will be practicable for all allies, the paper concludes with a framework for thinking about platforms NATO countries large and small can acquire to complement existing US initiatives and contribute meaningfully to interallied efforts to conduct adaptable multidomain operations for the twenty-first century.

Due to its focus on capabilities with the capacity to effectuate near-immediate impact, this paper leaves out a number of more expensive, more exquisite, and more politically charged capabilities that are currently dominating NATO’s Defense Planning Process—all of which would benefit from an in-depth, follow-on treatment to measure added value against investment. This includes a NATO-wide integrated air- and missile-defense system (IAMDS), a reinforced NATO command-and-control (C2) architecture and battle-management system capable of supporting MDO, and manned air platforms. Somewhat counterintuitively, the utility of these capabilities is proven by their near absence in the war in Ukraine. Because neither side achieved air dominance, the battlefield resembles the trenches of World War I, with a few technological upgrades. Though Ukraine had capable air defenses in the run-up to the war, it has needed to cobble together “FrankenSAMS” to protect its cities and frontline forces. And Russia’s lack of assured C2 hastened the collapse of its initial offensive and led to the deaths of dozens of Russian officers. These capabilities will be critical in a future fight, but NATO nations already know this and have begun to pursue them accordingly.

Defending every inch tomorrow will ultimately come down to the investments NATO makes in its ability to execute military operations across domains today. This report charts a concrete path forward for NATO, providing a selective, prioritized set of MDO recommendations on matters not already under active pursuit, and which could be accomplished in the near to medium term with multiplying effects for allied force posture as NATO heads into its seventy-fifth year. Progress on this matter could be a key deliverable for the NATO summit—in the meantime, the NATO Defense Planning Process is moving forward, and allocation decisions will continue to be made.

II. Near- and medium-term MDO capabilities

MDO is far from a new concept. The Air-Land Battle, for example, was a major element of NATO’s Cold War deterrence and defense doctrine.² Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities from multiple sensors, including air and space, have long supported the striking elements of the force in sensor-to-shooter kill chains. The value of establishing a near- and medium-term NATO MDO construct derives from the availability of new or enhanced capabilities to accomplish three key warfighting tasks more quickly: Sensing to develop a prompt and accurate picture of the battlespace, command and control to rapidly and securely pass this picture of the battlespace across the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of conflict, and kinetic and nonkinetic fires to effect an outcome on the adversary.³

As background for the seven priority initiatives recommended in section II of this report, the discussion below sets forth:

The status of planning for multidomain operations in NATO and its constituent nations, especially the United States.
MDO lessons learned from the Ukraine-Russia war.
The US military’s current and planned usage of certain commercially available capabilities that can support MDO.

A. Current planning for multidomain operations

Defending every inch of allied territory in an age of unprecedented challenge from malign, near-peer competitors will require NATO and its constituent members to operate at speed and scale across all five operational domains. In recognition of the need for greater synchronization, NATO’s Strategic Commands developed the Alliance Concept for Multi-Domain Operations.⁴ The concept, which was delivered to NATO Headquarters in March 2023, defines MDO as the “orchestration of military activities, across all domains and environments, synchronized with non-military activities, to enable the Alliance to create converging effects at the speed of relevance.”⁵ It effectively outlines NATO military and political leaders’ vision for an adaptable, MDO-enabled Alliance capable of outpacing its adversaries.

In recognition of the critical importance of MDO to the Alliance’s long-term transformation, NATO Allied Command Transformation (ACT) has identified building an MDO-enabled Alliance as one of its strategic priorities for 2023.⁶ NATO ACT, in close cooperation with NATO’s Strategic Warfighting Command, strives to enhance the Alliance’s ability to conduct coordinated and data-driven military operations across domains, with its MDO Implementation Team supporting operationalization of the MDO concept through experimentation, training and exercises, war-gaming, and capability development intended to “[create] both the mind-set and means for military and non-military capabilities to synchronize seamlessly” across domains.⁷ NATO ACT, for example, recently signed a memorandum of understanding with the Latvian Ministry of Defense that will allow member nations to conduct operational experiments and test tactical research and development initiatives at the Baltic country’s Ādaži military base.⁸ In parallel with ACT’s efforts, the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) has created an MDO cell at ACO’s headquarters in Mons, Belgium. Yet, despite developments like these, most of the Alliance’s efforts over the past year have been oriented around definitional and conceptual alignment.⁹ While useful, what is missing are concrete, compounded steps toward developing and integrating attainable capabilities and approaches needed to build readiness, transform NATO’s force structure, and effectuate combined multidomain operations at speed and scale.

Within the Alliance, some individual nations have begun to embrace and implement multidomain operations, though it is being done unevenly at the national level and without consistent coordination or direction from NATO. Certain nations, like the United Kingdom, have concentrated their efforts on building conceptual frameworks for the integration of capabilities, while others have begun exercises and undertaken initiatives to prepare forces to combat the full spectrum of threats in a multidomain warfighting scenario. French Armed Forces—along with participating nations—concluded the Orion exercise in May 2023, a multiphase drill culminating in the synchronous operation of capabilities such as tactical vehicles, unmanned aerial systems, and spaceborne sensors in response to a scenario simulating multidomain conflict in the future battlespace.¹⁰ Canada has embarked on what it calls an Agile Pan-Domain Command and Control Experimentation Endeavour (APCCXe) that leverages data analytics and AI-enabled tools to test multidomain situational awareness.¹¹ And smaller member states, led by the Portuguese, rallied under the banner of exercise Real Thaw 2023 (RT23) earlier this year to test their interoperability and capacity to conduct combined operations.¹²

Despite increased attention on enhancing multidomain readiness among allies on both sides of the Atlantic, most member states are outpaced by the United States. The US Department of Defense’s joint warfighting concept (JWC)¹³ is a US attempt to make sense of the increasingly connected operational environment and functions as a roadmap for how the joint force will operate across all domains now and in the future.¹⁴ The operational concept is threat-informed and intended to drive the future of US warfighting, envisioning a networked “kill web” connecting sensors and fires across domains and between the armed forces to bolster the US ability to prevail in a highly contested fight with adversaries.¹⁵ What sets the United States apart from other allies, however, are its efforts to operationalize this concept and integrate MDO approaches and capabilities at the operational and tactical level.

Ongoing US efforts to coordinate synchronous activities are so far organized around the JWC and enabled by the Combined Joint All-Domain Command and Control (CJADC2) strategy, which the Defense Department describes as “actions to empower our Joint Force Commanders with the capabilities needed to command the Joint Force across all warfighting domains and throughout the electromagnetic spectrum to deter, and, if necessary, defeat any adversary at any time and in any place around the globe.”¹⁶ To implement the JWC, each military service is undertaking multiple different initiatives to build the capacity of the joint force to conduct combined and joint operations across domains.¹⁷ Four key initiatives include:

Advanced Battlefield Management System (ABMS): The Air Force’s ABMS seeks to create an Internet of Things (IoT) that uses AI to integrate Air Force and Space Force data to accelerate decision-making in the battlespace.¹⁸ Five on-ramp exercises have been performed since the system’s origination, with the next generation of efforts organized around supplementing the ABMS with what the Department of the Air Force (DAF) calls the DAF Battle Network—a new structure that Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics Andrew Hunter believes will facilitate service integration into the DOD’s joint all-domain command and control endeavor.¹⁹

Project Overmatch: Although the Navy has released few details about Project Overmatch, open-source reporting indicates that its contribution to CJADC2 includes enhancing software capabilities to bolster connectivity among systems.²⁰ The 2023 phase of the project will include activities associated with a carrier strike group, according to a Navy Times report.²¹

Project Convergence: Run by the Army Futures Command, Project Convergence aims to build sensor-shooter networks enabled with AI capabilities to equip commanders with a more accurate picture of their operating environment and speed decision-making processes.²² Annual experiments have been held since 2020 to test the Army’s ability to integrate capabilities across the joint force,²³ with the 2024 iteration to focus on theater-level experimentation to assess whether and how effectively its network of sensors is connecting threats with the capabilities needed to eliminate them.²⁴

Stand-in forces: The US Marine Corps released A Concept for Stand-In Forces in December 2021 under the banner of Force Design 2030.²⁵ Aligned with the JWC and intended to enhance integrated deterrence, the concept envisions Marine stand-in forces (SIF)—defined as “small but lethal, low signature, mobile, relatively simple to maintain and sustain forces designed to operate across the competition continuum within a contested area”—that can be employed to improve the situational awareness of the joint force, complete kill webs, and ultimately disrupt and deter potential adversaries.²⁶ SIF can be composed of personnel from each service, as well as allies and partners, making them an inherently joint effort and a conduit for enhanced interallied cooperation.

Against this backdrop and with the United States as the essential warfighting backbone of the Alliance, NATO’s ability to execute effective military operations will require its members both to build around the United States’ progress and to work together to integrate their national approaches to MDO in a way that complements their comparative advantages.

Operationalizing NATO’s MDO concept and bolstering the connective tissue that links the yet largely uncoordinated efforts of allies will be the most important lines of effort for the Alliance to pursue in the near and medium terms to build itself into an MDO-enabled warfighting machine. Organization and coordination of the efforts of NATO’s thirty-one member states will be a necessary factor for the Alliance to effectuate tactical operations across domains. A lack of investment into interallied coordination of MDO will undermine NATO’s new defense plans and broader efforts to modernize its force model and communications infrastructure—putting the North Atlantic alliance on the back foot before the first strike.

B. Lessons from the Ukraine-Russia war

The ongoing Ukraine-Russia war holds a series of lessons for NATO’s MDO activities. In the war, the Ukrainian forces have been able to build and communicate a highly accurate picture of the operational environment, and as a result have been able to establish an effective targeting capability, thereby mitigating Russian quantitative weapons and personnel advantages.

1. Sensing: At the sensing level, Ukraine has combined strategic and tactical intelligence shared by the United States and its European partners with information from their own intelligence apparatus, including open-source (and even crowd-sourced) intelligence to provide their civilian and military leaders informational advantages in the campaign.²⁷

An analyst recently described the innovation this way:

But what’s most noteworthy is how Ukrainian conscripts have been able to use clusters of commercial and military technologies (interacting technologies like sensors, satellites, machine learning, and quickly updateable software) to network, interact, and create dynamic systems much faster than Russian soldiers can. . . .

Everyone—from the Ukrainian soldier employing weaponized commercial drones to President Volodymyr Zelensky making nation-wide decisions—has relied on an interlinked system to collect, analyze, and translate data into actionable results in civilian neighborhoods or on the battlefield. With the help of NATO allies and open source companies outside Ukraine, the armed forces have leveraged both public and private technologies to create a data-driven command-and-control system through four dimensions—collection, connection, analysis, and action.²⁸

A critical element for Ukraine’s sensing operations has been its ability to combine military and commercial capabilities. As set forth in a prior Atlantic Council report (by one of the brief’s authors),²⁹ Ukraine has developed, for instance, the Delta Situational Awareness Systems, which an intelligence firm described as providing “a comprehensive picture of the current battle space displayed and summarised on a user-friendly digital map by collecting data from sensors and open and secret sources.”³⁰ A press report says it “integrates real-time intelligence data from multiple sources and provides real-time monitoring of the battlefield for commanders of different levels.”³¹

A key aspect of Delta is that it utilizes available commercial technology to provide the information to users as the system “is ready to use on laptops, tablets, or mobile phones.”³²

2. Communications: Ukraine’s military capabilities have relied heavily on communications facilitated by the commercial satellite company Starlink, which is operated by SpaceX. This has been well-described by Emma Schroeder and Sean Dack:

Starlink, a network of low-orbit satellites working in constellations operated by SpaceX, relies on satellite receivers no larger than a backpack that are easily installed and transported. Because Russian targeting of cellular towers made communications coverage unreliable . . . the government “made a decision to use satellite communication for such emergencies” from American companies like SpaceX. Starlink has proven more resilient than any other alternatives throughout the war. Due to the low orbit of Starlink satellites, they can broadcast to their receivers at relatively higher power than satellites in higher orbits. There has been little reporting on successful Russian efforts to jam Starlink transmissions.³³

In the wake of news that SpaceX CEO Elon Musk proscribed Starlink accessibility in a way that hindered a Ukrainian attack,³⁴ the Ukraine conflict also demonstrates the potential drawbacks should the military become overly reliant on private companies for low-earth orbit-enabled communications if there is not assured access to the capability. While this concern is valid and overreliance certainly would be problematic, governments should continue both their investments on more exquisite satellite capabilities while also leveraging commercially available LEO capabilities for communications and other capabilities. As discussed below, contracts with private companies should not allow for those companies to unilaterally alter their networks in a way that would negatively impact warfighting capabilities.

3. Command and control and fires: Ukraine’s ability to establish effective command and control, including coordinated targeting for fires, has likewise benefited from the combined use of commercial and military technologies that have established highly effective sensor-to-shooter linkages. One key geographic information system based on commercial technology is GIS Art for Artillery (Arta), which links targeting information with strike capabilities so that “forward observers, unmanned aerial systems, or other scout elements can share their observations of an enemy target’s location in real time over an encrypted network,” which uses “satellite, internet, and radio protocols across a number of devices readily available to all [Ukrainian] echelons.”³⁵

Another key software-based system is Kropvya, “an intelligence mapping and artillery software populated by information” from unmanned aerial systems and other sources. Forward-deployed tactical units download the software, which is continuously updated and allows them to plot enemy and friendly positions. The system uses short-wave and digital radio stations and is compatible with NATO’s security communications standards.³⁶

4. Unmanned aerial vehicles: The Ukraine-Russia war has shown the benefit of lower cost unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), both for sensing and striking.

Sensing has significantly benefited. In War on the Rocks, Audrey Kurth Cronin noted the widespread use and impact of commercial products:

Individual military units use commercial, off-the-shelf drones like DJI’s Phantom 3 or AeroVironment’s Quantix Recon to conduct intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance missions within a few miles of their positions. Hobbyist drones collect information critical to tactical intelligence requirements, especially for targeting. By May 2022, Ukraine had fielded 6,000 commercial drones to provide surveillance capabilities to military units. A year later they had vastly expanded their “Army of Drones” and the Royal United Services Institute estimated that the Ukrainians were losing 10,000 drones a month.³⁷

Low-cost drone capabilities facilitate striking, with information from field brigades sent to military intelligence, according to an Economist report:

Drones target “fuel depots, logistics, ammunition dumps and delivery routes,” says Detective, the pseudonym of a drone co-ordinator in Ukraine’s military intelligence. “We respond to appeals from our brigades. They tell us they know where Russian arms are being stored, but have no way of hitting them, and they plead with us to help.” Detective says much of his recent work has been focused on airfields near Ukraine’s borders. This “might” have included a recent strike that hit a Tu-22m strategic bomber based near Novgorod, he adds with a wink.³⁸.

Another strike capability is provided by “first person view” drones that are flown by an “operator [who] dons goggles that show a video feed from them as they fly.”³⁹

They are assembled by volunteers or by the soldiers themselves from components provided by fundraisers. The simplicity of the electronics and use of commercial components means that they are cheap to make. One Ukrainian-made Pegasus attack drone costs $462 to buy. The larger and more refined SwitchBlade drones that America supplies to Ukraine, which carry only a small antipersonnel warhead, cost $52,000 apiece or more. FPVs’ low cost compensates for their relatively low rate of success in destroying targets. Operators put their success rate at 50%-80%, compared with 90% or more for American Javelin anti-tank missiles.⁴⁰

5. Cyber resilience: Cyber resilience to Russian attacks has been critical to Ukraine’s military effort (as well as helping support the economy and society more generally). A Scoop News Group report by Elias Groll and AJ Vicens conveys the impact:

The war has inspired a defensive effort that government officials and technology executives describe as unprecedented—challenging the adage in cybersecurity that if you give a well-resourced attacker enough time, they will pretty much always succeed. The relative success of the defensive effort in Ukraine is beginning to change the calculation about what a robust cyber defense might look like going forward.⁴¹

The key to success has been the high degree of collaboration between governments—i.e., Ukraine’s effectiveness, bolstered by US and United Kingdom support—and the private sector:

The defensive cyber strategy in Ukraine has been an international effort, bringing together some of the biggest technology companies in the world such as Google and Microsoft, Western allies such as the U.S. and Britain and social media giants such as Meta who have worked together against Russia’s digital aggression.⁴²

C. Commercially based US defense capabilities

The United States has undertaken significant efforts in recent years to utilize commercial capabilities in support of military operations.

1. Low-earth orbit satellites: Satellites have long been used for multiple purposes to tie the space domain to the air, land, and maritime domains including ISR; positioning, navigation, and timing; communications; and targeting. A recent fundamental shift can be seen, however, in the expanding US use of low-earth orbit satellites to accomplish the tasks performed by existing higher-orbit satellites. In addition to Starlink (described above), the commercial sensing technologies of satellite companies like Planet, Capella Space, and Maxar, which have proven important in Ukraine’s fight, can likewise be used as a complement to the US military’s more exquisite sensing.⁴³

Commercial capabilities are similarly being increasingly relied upon to meet the military’s space-launch requirements. DOD recently used private-sector SpaceX Falcon 9 reusable rockets, which are regularly used for commercial satellites, to launch ten of an expected twenty-eight satellites for defense “low-latency communications” and “missile warning/missile tracking.”⁴⁴ That space architecture is planned to expand to 163 satellites.⁴⁵ Other companies such as Rocket Lab likewise have commercial launch capabilities.⁴⁶

2. Commercially based aerial and maritime surveillance: US Central Command has successfully utilized low-cost unmanned vehicles based on commercial technology for both maritime and aerial surveillance, and has coupled the surveillance with AI capabilities to maximize results.

One report described the maritime effort:

The Navy stood up TF 59 in September 2021 . . . [in a] turn to the private sector [and] . . . within a month, the new unit had begun deploying unmanned, unarmed, camera-laden sea drones linked by artificial intelligence into the Persian Gulf.⁴⁷

The task force has utilized a number of different commercial capabilities including Saildrones and MARTAC’s Mantas T12s and T38 Devil Rays. It also has conducted a series of exercises with navies in the Central Command area of responsibility including with Bahrain, Jordan, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and Israel, with the objective of having regional navies provide eighty such devices by the end of 2023.⁴⁸ The net result is a highly effective low-cost capability: “For pennies on the dollar, we can put unmanned platforms out there, we can couple it with artificial intelligence, and we can really get a sense for what’s happening,” Vice Adm. Brad Cooper told reporters during a Pentagon visit in October 2022. “The end result of that is you simply can advance your capability on orders of magnitude faster by this close connection with industry,” he is quoted as saying by Al-Monitor.⁴⁹

The Air Force’s Task Force 99 similarly utilizes commercially available “small, high-altitude drones linked by [a] mesh network” for air domain awareness.⁵⁰ As described by Lt. Gen. Alexus Grynkewich, commander of Air Force Central Command, in a press report, the surveillance capability is enhanced by coupling it with AI:

Task Force 99 was born out of the idea that if we take unmanned technologies and digital technologies and pair them together, and basically teach the robots and the algorithms to solve some of these problems for us, that it could fill some of those gaps.”⁵¹

3. The Replicator initiative to field attritable autonomous systems at scale: DOD has recently established a new initiative called Replicator. As described by Deputy Secretary Kathleen Hicks in late August, Replicator is intended to “create a new state of the art . . . leveraging attritable, autonomous systems in all domains—which are less expensive, put fewer people in the line of fire, and can be changed, updated, or improved with substantially shorter lead times.”⁵² The goal for the next eighteen to twenty-four months is, she said, “to field attritable autonomous systems at scale of multiple thousands, in multiple domains.”⁵³

While the deputy secretary did not identify particular domains or types of systems, the next section of this report proposes specifics which would build on the Replicator initiative as part of the recommended seven priority initiatives for NATO action.

III. Priority initiatives

NATO deterrence and defense capabilities will be substantially enhanced by implementing the seven initiatives described below. Each of these initiatives can be accomplished in the near or medium term (i.e., one to five years) and each is relatively inexpensive.

A. Low-cost surveillance and sensor-shooter networks

Ukraine has made effective use of low-cost, unmanned aerial vehicles in its conflict with Russia, as described above. DOD’s Replicator initiative demonstrates that this lesson has been incorporated into the thinking of senior US defense leadership. The rationale is not hard to discern. While the United States and other NATO allies and partners have multiple high-end unmanned capabilities, these systems are costly, as illustrated by the per-copy pricing for the US Gray Eagle ($127 million), Reaper ($28 million), and Global Hawk ($141 million).⁵⁴

Similarly, the US Air Force’s plans for sixth-generation uncrewed aircraft like Boeing’s MQ-28A Ghost Bat—more commonly known as the “Loyal Wingman”—include the ability to fly alongside F-35s and conduct AI-enabled teaming missions, but likely will entail significant expense (though pricing is as-yet uncertain). According to an estimate by the House of Representatives, the cost could range between $3 million and $25 million per copy.⁵⁵ Likewise, the Air Force’s acquisition strategy for its Collaborative Combat Aircraft program for high-end uncrewed fighters to be fielded within its Next Generation Air Dominance (NGAD) family of systems is looking to cap costs at no more than $40 million per copy.⁵⁶ While there would be value in having those capabilities, the Replicator initiative is also intended to bring valuable capabilities into the force at prices far below those required by current and planned systems—and far more quickly.

As Hicks pointed out, the key for the United States and NATO is to augment exquisite capabilities with less complex and inexpensive systems comparable in broad terms with the weapons systems being utilized in Ukraine. Such low-cost, still-effective unmanned capabilities will add to NATO’s ability to enhance ISR, to add mass to the battle, and to establish an offense-defense cost ratio that is in NATO’s favor. Importantly, such capabilities can come into the force quite promptly as both their usage in Ukraine and the specified Replicator time frame underscore.

In outlining the initiative, Hicks left open the particular areas of focus, but there are several described below that would have high impact for NATO deterrence and defense.

As a first step, a valuable starting point would be building on the capabilities demonstrated by Central Command’s Task Force 59, which focuses on integrating unmanned systems and AI with maritime operations, to establish maritime surveillance networks for the Baltic, Black, and Mediterranean seas. The United States should work with the relevant littoral NATO nations to put such capabilities promptly in place. Cooperative efforts could be undertaken bilaterally, regionally, or in a trisea consortium.

A second effort could focus on ground force lethality. Unmanned aerial vehicles could supply targeting information including through systems like GIS Arta to artillery units or to other UAVs with ground attack capabilities. Tactical unit capabilities could likewise be enhanced by combining video-viewing capabilities for operators of unmanned vehicles providing targeting information.

Above the tactical level, the potential for use of unmanned capabilities is even greater. As RAND Corporation researchers have described in a series of reports, a low-cost, but highly effective sensing and targeting grid can be based on inexpensive UAVs:

Ongoing developments in robotics and autonomous sensing can enable a force to establish a ubiquitous sensing and targeting grid in contested areas using large numbers of unmanned platforms. If the platforms and other hardware used in the grid can be procured at low cost, such an approach can achieve resiliency through sheer numbers. In the Taiwan Strait, for example, the United States’ and Taiwan’s forces together could launch hundreds of unmanned drones into the strait and the airspace above it. Each drone would be equipped with one or more sensors, allowing them to collect data via electro- optical, radar, and acoustic means. Using edge processing, these data could be processed onboard each sensor platform. Using automatic target recognition algorithms, the grid itself would determine what types of vessels it has observed. As defending forces launched antiship missiles toward the battlespace, the grid would assign a target to each one, communicating the target’s latest location to the incoming weapon using the same data links that were used to share information with other platforms within the grid.⁵⁷

While the foregoing describes a Taiwan strait scenario, a third specific NATO activity based on the RAND analysis would be establishing such a UAV-based targeting approach for sea control in the Baltic, Black, and Mediterranean seas.

A fourth NATO effort would be to utilize such a sensing and targeting grid against Russian land forces. The RAND researchers determined that the “same approach [as in a Taiwan scenario] could be employed to support a defense against Russia’s invasion, substituting unattended ground sensors for unmanned maritime drones.”⁵⁸ Utilizing that combination of capabilities would generate a modern “Air-Land Battle” that NATO could relatively promptly put in place. Such an approach would also have the value of including as part of the overall structure capabilities provided by nations with smaller defense budgets, as they would be able to afford lower cost UAVs.

The capabilities that the RAND analyses describe—and that have been proposed by Hicks for the Replicator initiative—are well within reach in the near and medium term, as they rely on commercially available capabilities. Drawing on press and Atlantic Council reports to illustrate how it can work: A targeting mesh would be built on “comparatively simple sensors based on commercial technology”; communication within the mesh “is provided by millimeter-wave (MMW) radio, a technology already widely used for 5G communications.”⁵⁹ There is even the potential for the commercial sector to utilize, as Ukraine has done,⁶⁰ “advanced manufacturing techniques [i.e., 3D printing]” that could lead to an “exponential drop in the cost of precision-guidance technologies.”⁶¹

The United States is pursuing the Replicator initiative with purpose. To maximize the benefits for NATO, US leaders should consider how the European defense industry might partner with US companies. A combination of historical underinvestment and the demands of supporting Ukraine have meant that NATO weapons inventories are far below desirable levels even though sustainment would likely be a key factor in a high-intensity conflict with Russia.⁶² As the Replicator initiative moves forward, the United States should evaluate the potential for multinational efforts—for example, by a US-led consortium of nations and its US commercial Replicator partners—to build the types of capabilities described above as key elements of NATO deterrence and defense.

B. SEAD: An inherently multidomain operation

Suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD) is a key factor for enabling ground maneuver. Russia’s failure to conduct a campaign to suppress enemy air defenses in Ukraine is one of the main reasons that it has done so poorly in the war. Part of why Russia did not do this is that SEAD is an incredibly complex mission set that requires not only high-end platforms but also flexible mission planning and tight coordination between different domains in order to achieve effects. In other words, SEAD is inherently an MDO.

The SEAD mission follows a find, fix, track, target, engage, assess (F2T2EA) process that is designed to degrade an adversary’s integrated air defense systems (IADS), and which requires use of the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS) as a key maneuver space. The initial finding and fixing efforts require effective ISR. How that is done will depend on a number of factors, including what is being targeted, where the target is, how and whether the target is controlling its electromagnetic emissions (EMCON), time of day, and the weather. In order to find and fix an EMCON target, it is necessary to get it to respond to some sort of stimulus so it can be seen (i.e., the target needs to be lit up). Doing this against IADS will often require the use of cyber and/or space capabilities. SEAD also requires an ability to discriminate between false EMS signals and legitimate targets. Tracking and targeting would generally then be taken over by other assets, usually manned or unmanned aerial systems, which can either engage the platforms themselves or pass a more refined track on to other platforms. This could include ground,⁶³ air,⁶⁴ and sea-based systems.⁶⁵ The final step in the F2T2EA process—undertaking battle-damage assessment—again can be conducted by a variety of capabilities in a variety of domains, ranging from maritime and air to space, cyber, and land.

Currently, the United States is the single nation that regularly trains and exercises SEAD (though China has recently tried). No other NATO nation can conduct SEAD, nor could NATO without US capabilities. However, NATO nations could usefully augment US capabilities as several possess or are in the process of acquiring high-end capabilities that can engage enemy IADS, including high-end aircraft (F-35), artillery (the High-mobility Artillery Rocket System, or HIMARS) and cruise missiles (e.g., Storm Shadow, SCALP-EG, Taurus) which can make significant contributions to the SEAD mission. Furthermore, nations that may not have higher-end platforms capable of contributing to the “engage” portion of the F2T2EA process still can invest in cyber, ISR, and/or special forces capabilities that would contribute to all of the other steps in the process.

Undertaking SEAD as a combined NATO mission—as opposed to a US-only effort—will require extensive training and exercising, but the process could be accomplished within the near-to-medium term and therefore would be of high value in the event of a conflict with Russia through an expanded NATO capacity for SEAD. Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers, Europe should organize the necessary training and exercising to achieve the requisite capability. Additionally, while the training and exercising process is underway, the nations that will be engaged should continue to ensure adequate stockpiles of munitions and other capabilities that can be used for a SEAD mission, including the Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System (GMLRS), Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) (and Precision Stike Missile in future), Joint Air-to-Surface Strike Missile (JASSM), small diameter bombs (or SDB) for less advanced air defense platforms, and joint direct attack munitions (JDAMS).⁶⁶

C. Cyber: Multidomain offense and defense

1. Cyber offense: Multidomain cyber offense can have both tactical and operational/strategic aspects. At each of the tactical and operational levels, cyber should not be considered in isolation, but rather commanders generally should look to rely on the “effective integration of kinetic and cyber strike capabilities,” according to a NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence paper.⁶⁷

Like other strike capabilities, cyber relies on effective ISR and, of course, has its own inherent ISR capabilities. However, cyber offense can also utilize ISR derived from UAVs deployed in battlespace or properly equipped LEO satellites. A multidomain unit could, for instance, “make use of either tactical or strategic intelligence assets (such as RF kit on the ground or a satellite) to gain access to a network and facilitate delivery of a cyberattack.”⁶⁸ And the effect could be tactical or strategic: disrupting a surface-to-air battery or theatre-level combat and control capacity.⁶⁹

The operational value of cyber offense capabilities includes cyber’s ability to attack an adversary’s critical infrastructure. Effective targeting of cyber capabilities, which “can be targeted in tandem with kinetic military action to yield significant effects,”⁷⁰ would include attacks against adversary logistics, communications networks, rear area military operations, and war-supporting industry, as well as against civilian critical infrastructures such as energy and transportation supporting those and other military capabilities.⁷¹

To prepare its capacity for cyber offense, NATO set up a Cyberspace Operations Center in Belgium to “support military commanders with situational awareness” for operations and missions including “operational activity in cyberspace, ensuring freedom to act in this domain and making operations more resilient to cyber threats.”⁷²

The actual implementation of NATO’s cyber offensive capabilities is by nations through a process described as the “sovereign cyber effects provided voluntarily by allies.”⁷³ Basically, this approach allows allies to support NATO commanders with cyberattacks, but to keep to themselves (as they choose), the particulars of their offensive cyber methods. Such an approach is understandable for security reasons, particularly prior to conflict, as the capacity to breach the cyber defenses of an adversary often relies on sensitive intelligence and methods. However, in conditions of conflict, the value of wartime cyber offensive operations may benefit from broader coordination with kinetic operations.

The discussion below recommends, as part of wartime NATO operations, the establishment and utilization of multidomain task forces that are designed to coordinate effects from all domains including cyber. Precisely how those MDTFs will operate is still to be determined, but if multidomain operations are to be successful, cyber offense will need to be effectively integrated.

2. Cyber defense of key critical infrastructures:In the event of conflict, cyber defense of key critical infrastructures necessary for military operations will rely in significant part on a different type of multidomain activity, namely on partnerships between governments and the private sector, with the latter undertaking operational activities as those now ongoing in Ukraine. Such government-private sector relationships essentially are creating a “sixth domain” in which the operational and coordinated activities of the private sector with government are a sphere of activities in the same sense as the other domains of air, sea, land, cyber, and space.⁷⁴ Obviously, private-sector support to militarily critical infrastructures will be key to effective battlefield and logistical operations by NATO forces in the context of a high-intensity conflict with Russia, as is reflected in the discussion above concerning Ukraine.

NATO has recognized the important role of the private sector for cyber defense, but thus far NATO has limited interactions with private-sector cyber defenders to strengthen engagement “through information-sharing, exercises, and training and education.”⁷⁵ Such activities are, of course, valuable but far from the operational coordination between governments and the private sector that is now taking place in Ukraine. In order to accomplish the degree of cyber resilience that will be required in wartime, NATO member nations will need to have highly capable cybersecurity support from the private sector, as one of the authors noted in an earlier Atlantic Council brief. Specifically, that cybersecurity support is essential “for those critical infrastructure necessary for effective military operations—which will generally involve the electric grid, pipelines, air, rail, and ports, as well as the information and communications networks themselves.⁷⁶

Accordingly, NATO should expand the current cyber requirements established by the Defense Planning Process to generate the appropriate taskings focused on the operational engagement in wartime with the private sector that nations will need to put in place.⁷⁷

D. Dynamic sustainment

NATO planners and logisticians are well aware of the issues that the United States and other NATO nations will have in promptly building forces in theater and in sustaining those forces to support a fight against Russia. The importance of doing so has been underscored by Russia’s disastrous sustainment failure at the outset of its February 2022 invasion of Ukraine.

Planners have long discussed the imperative to have dispersed, resilient logistics infrastructure to evade adversary sensors and to survive long-range strikes. However, what is less discussed is the importance of ensuring that NATO forces have the logistical wherewithal to leverage such dispersed capabilities, including the ability to offset the consequences of degraded civilian critical infrastructures—such as railroads, bridges, pipelines, and electrical capacity—that will be necessary to sustain a fight under realistic combat conditions.

The war in Ukraine provides many lessons for how a large-scale fight may play out. When artillery strikes utilizing longer-range HIMARS weapons forced Russia to move its sustainment operations further from the front lines (and to utilize trucks for dispersion rather than rail lines), their operations were slowed significantly. The key point for NATO is that dispersed, resilient logistics are critical, but the dispersion complicates sustainers’ ability to get matériel to the right place at the right time. A successful MDO fight will need to find ways to overcome these challenges.

From a sustainment perspective, it is clear from the war in Ukraine that sustainment will be incredibly important, and that the resource intensity of large-scale combat operations will necessitate a massive logistical lift. What Ukraine is not a good case study for, however, is sustainment operations in the rear. That is because Ukraine has had the benefit of an untouchable rear logistic support area in NATO. If NATO is in conflict, no logistics area—in theater or out, military or civilian—can be considered a safe haven, and NATO logisticians will need to be able to dynamically change sourcing solutions including air, ground, and sea lines of communication (LOCs).

AI capabilities should be developed that can support the requirement to provide dynamic rerouting options when LOCs become unusable. Data proliferation in future conflicts, resulting from an increase in available sensors and digital information, will provide challenges and opportunities for logisticians, but AI built and trained for such complexity should be able to provide significant benefits and advise on the most valuable logistical routes and other requirements. By way of example, a Modern War Institute piece notes that the United States is already pursuing “non-commercially dependent distributed logistics” including over the shore “when existing facilities are limited or unavailable—[to be] able to load and unload ships outside of fixed ports.”⁷⁸ But precisely where such activities should most effectively take place in a wartime scenario could be enhanced by analysis utilizing AI.

At the NATO level, the Joint Support and Enabling Command (JSEC),⁷⁹ which falls under the Supreme Allied Commander Europe at SHAPE, is responsible for coordinating sustainment during crisis or conflict. JSEC is leveraging large-scale NATO exercises to gather data about sustainment operations and to build out its reinforcement and sustainment network (RSN), which informs how JSEC advises SACEUR on sustainment.⁸⁰ However, JSEC’s roles, responsibilities, and authorities have still not been clearly delineated. As NATO works to define and clarify JSEC’s role, it should task JSEC with building out its RSN. In a dynamic MDO fight, this capability will be crucial to flowing forces in theater and also to consolidating and building upon gains.

JSEC will also need to work closely with the private sector. As previously noted, private-sector critical infrastructure will be at risk both from kinetic and cyber intrusions, and one critical aspect of multidomain operations will be working with the private sector on cyber security and resilience of critical private-sector infrastructure upon which military operations and basing infrastructure depend. NATO members’ national armament directors already have begun to work more closely with industry on munitions stockpiles as a result of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. NATO should use this cooperation as a stepping stone to work more closely with industry on other key tenets of military operational and basing security and resilience. For example, NATO could audit regional private infrastructure risk and establish both regionally focused and NATO-wide critical infrastructure wartime planning councils “with government and private-sector membership . . . to oversee planning for, and coordination of, government and private-sector wartime activities.”⁸¹

The military also must have tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) in place to adapt and overcome challenges when relying on private-sector logistics or civilian infrastructure that is degraded or destroyed. NATO should task JSEC to establish such TTPs, including the development of AI capabilities, which will allow for effective alternatives in light of destruction from adversary attack.⁸²

E. Survivability and lethality of forward-stationed forces

US Army doctrine recognizes that friendly forces likely will be isolated and under attack during the initial phases of a conflict. As a result, it lists “survivability and protection of forward-stationed forces when isolated or outnumbered” as one of the key MDO challenges.

Such a scenario could arise in a conflict in which Russia attacks or invades a NATO nation, particularly where Russia or Belarus border NATO countries. NATO planning needs to take account of such a prospect for the geographic area from Finland through Poland and especially for the geographically challenged Baltic states. Each country does have national forces, with Poland and Finland having significant capabilities. Moreover, since Russia’s second invasion of Ukraine, the United States has augmented its forces in Europe, including maintaining an armored brigade combat team (BCT) in Poland and a rotational BCT in Romania.⁸³ Additionally, there are multinational battalions and brigade headquarters in the Baltic countries and Poland. While the aggregate is substantial, it still falls short of the NATO Force Model objective, which states that NATO will have “well over 100,000 Tier 1 forces” within ten days.⁸⁴. While the new regional plans are presumably built with this capability in mind, mobility could present challenges to achieving the full force in the time desired and, accordingly, it is possible that NATO forward forces would be outnumbered until the planned forces arrive. As a result, it is important that the national and forward-stationed forces have the capabilities and support necessary to fight a successful defensive action while awaiting reinforcement. Effective use of multidomain operations will help achieve that result.

First, it will be very important for the forward forces to be heavily supported by large quantities of standoff weapons, including long-range fires, air-ground munitions, land-based anti-air capabilities, land-based anti-ship missiles, and cluster munitions to halt a Russian advance.⁸⁵ As should be obvious, multidomain ISR capabilities would support both the forward forces and those supporting them.

Second, unmanned systems are absolutely crucial for a smaller, defending force. This is why frontline nations should invest heavily in large quantities of unmanned aerial systems (and depending on their location, unmanned maritime systems as well). The obvious corollary to this recommendation is that frontline forces will themselves be susceptible to detection and attack emanating from low-cost, unmanned systems. As the war in Ukraine demonstrates, both sides have struggled to stay on the winning side of the value proposition in countering unmanned aerial systems (UAS), often forced to use high-value or low-density assets to counter cheap drones. NATO and its constituent countries should therefore cooperate in the development of cheap, reliable counter-UAS technologies that leverage kinetic and nonkinetic means. Given the nature and scope of this technological race, counter-UAS technologies could be an important area of focus for the recently established Defence Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic (DIANA), which provides mentoring and grant financing to start-ups developing technologies that can answer key “challenges” that face NATO militaries.⁸⁶

Third, frontline forces—and the militaries of the nations in which they are stationed—should be structured in a way that allows for disaggregated, smaller-unit operations and equipped with platforms that provide asymmetric spoiling capabilities. To the extent possible, those forces also should be capable of pairing with and augmenting the high-end capabilities that follow-on forces will employ across domains as part of a counterattack.

A primary example of this type of capability that requires geographic proximity, can be operated by small teams, and can create opportunities for employment of high-end capabilities are the electronic warfare (EW) hunting teams that Ukraine is employing in its fight against Russia. These small, covert teams range the battlefield to detect electronic signatures from Russian weapons systems and then provide coordinates to friendly units able to target the systems. In an MDO scenario, a high-end capability from the land, air, or maritime domain may be the platform that ends up taking the shot based on information from the hunt team. As discussed above, Ukraine has developed several such systems, and NATO should determine whether to utilize them or to develop comparable capabilities.⁸⁷ In order for this high-low mix to work, a survivable, secure communications system will be absolutely essential. This is another key capability that frontline countries should invest in for an MDO fight.

F. Space

NATO has recognized space as a key element of multidomain operations. At the 2023 Vilnius summit, allies stated: “As part of our work on space as an operational domain, we are accelerating the integration of space into planning, exercising and executing joint and multi-domain operations in peacetime, crisis, and conflict in order to ensure space effects are coordinated across all domains.”⁸⁸

The Vilnius communique noted the establishment of NATO’s Alliance Persistent Surveillance from Space (APSS) multinational program, “which will improve NATO’s intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capacity.”⁸⁹ The APSS initiative—called multiyear, multidomain, and multinational—is designed to achieve both “persistent surveillance” and the “speed at which space-based data is collected, aggregated and delivered,” aimed at making “more effective use of both government-owned and commercial space-based assets.”⁹⁰

The vision is further described by NATO:

APSS is not about creating NATO-owned and operated space assets. It will make use of existing and future space assets in Allied countries, and connect them together in a NATO virtual constellation called “Aquila.” This is a data-centric initiative. As such, APSS will be “sensor-agnostic and solution-agnostic”; it will be open to all existing—and future—space assets, regardless of their scope, technologies and specificities. It will bring together both government-owned and commercial space assets.“⁹¹

In addition to APSS, NATO had previously undertaken to engage with national space capabilities through the establishment of the NATO Space Centre, which “serves as a focal point to support NATO’s activities, operations and missions; share information; and help coordinate Allies’ efforts in the space domain, [including] reach[ing] out to national space entities to ensure that NATO commanders have access to required space data and services.”⁹²

Further illustrating NATO’s recognition of space’s inherent multidomain nature is provided by NATO’s Coalition Warrior Interoperability Exercise (CWIX), which NATO describes as its “Premier Interoperability Exercise.”⁹³ CWIX 2023 included a focus on space as part of meeting the Alliance’s MDO ambitions, with the aim of integrating it as an operational domain.⁹⁴

As the foregoing suggests, NATO’s reliance on both governmental and commercial satellites means that it will undertake to make extensive use of the proliferation of LEO satellites. In wartime, that will significantly add to the resilience of the NATO space enterprise. A Mitchell Institute paper describes the impact on deterrence:

The use of small, inexpensive satellites in a [proliferated low-earth orbit] constellation also improves deterrence because of its increased cost imposition potential. The cost of a direct-ascent kinetic antisatellite is now greater than the target satellite, and because of the sheer number of assets an enemy must attack, proliferation reduces the effectiveness and impact of these weapons and other coorbital threats.⁹⁵

In light of NATO’s developing space architecture that includes reliance on commercial space capabilities, a key issue for wartime will be to ensure that the commercial capabilities being relied upon are in fact available for use as required. Inasmuch as satellites are national assets, arrangements to assure availability will have to be established at the national level. One model for such assurance that deserves review would be based on ongoing actions by the United States.

Currently, the United States is undertaking to establish contractual arrangements with satellite companies somewhat along the lines of those utilized by DOD for support from the airline and maritime industries. By way of background, the civil reserve air fleet (CRAF) provides “selected aircraft from U.S. airlines [which are] contractually committed to CRAF [to] augment Department of Defense airlift requirements in emergencies when the need for airlift exceeds the capability of military aircraft.”⁹⁶

The US Space Force is now in the process of developing a commercial augmentation space reserve (CASR) program. As with CRAF, CASR would seek to establish “voluntary pre-negotiated contractual arrangements” that would provide support to the military by ensuring that “services like satellite communication and remote sensing are prioritized for US government use during national security emergencies.”⁹⁷

While each NATO nation with space capabilities will need to determine its own national framework, the CASR program offers a useful starting point. Among the issues that would need to be considered are which services, and in what amounts, could reliably be provided in a wartime environment; whether such services could be based on existing (or planned) private-sector constellations or whether those would need to be expanded; what provisions would need to be made for satellite and/or ground station replacement in the event of adversary attacks; what provision for indemnification would needs to be agreed upon; and what level of funding would be appropriate both to incentivize the private sector, accomplish the requisite wartime tasks, and undertake planning and training prior to conflict.

It is worth pointing out—especially in light of the noted limitation placed on Ukraine’s use of Starlink—that the US Defense Production Act, if necessary, authorizes the government to require the prioritized provision of services—which would include services from space companies—and exempts any company receiving such an order from liabilities such as inability to support other customers.⁹⁸ It would, of course, be much more desirable and effective if the arrangements were established in advance through a voluntary program, as the CASR program is seeking. However, other NATO nations will need to determine if they have or would want comparable mandatory authorities.

G. Command and control structures for MDO

NATO has just approved its new regional plans. Their implementation will almost certainly require revision of the command arrangements that heretofore have been built around the concept of a 40,000-person NATO Response Force, largely focused on out-of-area missions. By contrast, as noted above, the new NATO Force Model is intended as a European-focused force designed to meet the Russia military challenge by providing “well over 100,000 Tier 1 forces” within ten days and about “200,000 Tier 2 forces” in about ten to thirty days.⁹⁹ How multidomain operations will fit into these new approaches is as yet less than clear.

As an initial matter, however, it seems likely that operationalizing MDO will require—along the lines set forth by the unclassified summary of the DOD JADC2 strategy—“reforming, realigning, or creating organizations with the structure, agility, and resources to more effectively blend physical and informational power of the joint force and its mission partners.”¹⁰⁰ To be sure, given the still emerging contours of NATO command and control planning, organizational restructuring to effectuate MDO will be less than immediate—and that is particularly true since the United States is itself very much still in development with respect to MDO.¹⁰¹

There is, however, one effort that NATO could undertake for such “reforming, realigning, or creating organizations” for MDO consistent with ongoing actions by the United States. NATO should incorporate as part of its wartime planning the “multidomain task forces” in the process of being created by the US Army to include the activated 2nd Multi-Domain Task Force in the US European Command (EUCOM). The MDTF recently completed an exercise undertaken to “validat[e] the progress of modernization efforts of continuous integration of effects in various domains, including air, land, sea, space, and cyberspace.”¹⁰² As a subsequent related step, NATO could undertake to establish comparable combined task forces for the broader NATO force.

The creation of US Army multidomain task forces is part of a significant reorganization that the Army is undertaking to enhance its capability to prevail in high-intensity battle. That effort importantly focuses on MDO. As described by Gen. James Rainey and Lt. Gen. Laura Potter:

Last fall, the Army published Field Manual 3-0, Operations, transitioning multidomain operations from concept to doctrine. . . . Multidomain operations require commanders to synchronize effects from land, air, sea, space, and cyber to defeat an adversary in concert with our allies and partners as part of the joint force.¹⁰³

Accordingly, the Army is moving significant operational control to “higher echelons of theater army, corps, and divisions,” and building new organizational capabilities including the “joint task force-certified Army corps.”¹⁰⁴ The corps has critical MDO functions:

Corps are the Army’s primary echelon for synchronizing and delivering multidomain effects. A corps staff must synthesize the vast amount of data received from land, air, the electronic spectrum, and space sensors to create a shared visualization of the complex battlefield and then set conditions for divisions to dominate the close fight. Corps commanders bear responsibility for shaping the deep battle by synchronizing the delivery of long-range fires like missiles, aircraft, and unmanned vehicles with cyber, space, or information operations to disrupt an adversary’s operational level of operations.¹⁰⁵

In conjunction with this overall realignment, Army multidomain task forces are designed to support the synchronization and integration of MDO operations undertaken by higher echelons:

Multidomain task forces are purpose-built formations capable of coordinating and integrating cyberspace, electromagnetic activities, and space capabilities with long-range surface fires to deny enemy commanders the ability to prohibit friendly forces from operating in any land, air, or sea area.¹⁰⁶

In the near and medium term, NATO should undertake efforts comparable to those being undertaken by the US Army. As NATO’s new regional plans are put into place, NATO should establish for its ground forces the same theater-corps-division construct that the US Army is establishing. Multidomain task forces likewise will be needed to coordinate the capabilities available from all domains. Starting NATO’s implementation of MDO with US Army MDTFs will provide a practical basis for effectuating NATO MDO that can rely on US lessons learned and on the US Army as an MDO backbone.

IV. A multitiered approach to MDO

The time to move forward with implementation of MDO is now. To do so, NATO should adopt a multitiered approach that plays to the relative strengths inherent in different nations due to geography and economics.

In undertaking to establish MDO capabilities within the NATO force structure, it is important to take a realistic approach to the economic issues surrounding defense budgets, especially given requirements arising as a consequence of the Ukraine-Russia war. Multiple European economies are under strain as a result of the increased cost of energy following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, outlays of support to the Ukrainian Armed Forces, support to refugees and other humanitarian and economic assistance for Ukraine, and the flood of Ukrainian foodstuffs into Europe as a result of Russia’s withdrawal from the Black Sea grain deal—all the while still dealing with the COVID-19 pandemic’s hit to their economies. While all NATO nations have agreed to spending 2 percent of gross domestic product as a floor for their defense budgets, how that is spent will be quite important as nations evaluate multiple requirements, including the expenditures needed in order to backfill equipment donated to Ukraine, refill depleted munitions stockpiles, invest in new capabilities and platforms, and scale capabilities for high-intensity conflict.

In the context of MDO, a multitiered approach will both help accommodate economic constraints while nonetheless generating highly effective capabilities. Most specifically, it is important to underscore that not all NATO nations will need all key capabilities. Smaller countries should not chase after high-end, expensive capabilities such as those that can have effects at standoff distances, but rather should look to low-cost, highly effective attritable capabilities like those described in the Replicator initiative. Frontline countries should also include capabilities that require geographic proximity for employment and can be employed by smaller, dispersed units. Larger nations, however, can undertake to acquire capabilities that require expensive platforms. As the Replicator initiative implies, a high-low mix will be warranted for maximum effectiveness.

The mix of platforms that larger and smaller countries pursue should not just be interoperable. They should be mutually reinforcing when employed in concert. Using SEAD as an example:

No NATO nation aside from the United States could conduct a SEAD campaign, but all NATO nations, and especially frontline NATO nations, should consider how the capabilities they pursue and adopt could support portions of the F2T2EA process. For example, smaller nations could invest in sensing, cyber, and [special operations forces] capabilities to support the find, fix, target, track, and assess portions of SEAD, while larger nations can invest in fifth generation aircraft and long-range fires capabilities to assist with the engage portion of the process.

Three key factors should drive what platforms NATO countries acquire. First, nations should look to what the United States is acquiring and developing in support of an MDO fight. This is because the United States is further ahead than any other NATO nation on MDO, so NATO and its constituent nations should build around US progress.

Second, NATO and its constituent nations should be informed by the five-step NATO Defense Planning Process (NDPP) and heavily influenced by the three regionally focused defense plans. At Vilnius, NATO completed step one of the NDPP—establish political guidance—when it approved the Political Guidance for Defence Planning 2023 and its three regionally focused defense plans. Now NATO must execute the remaining NDPP steps: determine requirements, apportion requirements, facilitate implementation, and review results.

This report has recommended seven potential capability areas for near-term focus during the requirements determination process, which will establish minimum capability requirements for the Alliance. NATO’s Allied Command Transformation and Allied Command Operations strategic commands lead steps two and three, and while both steps are important, in a budget-constrained environment, the third step of the process—when ACT and ACO apportion out the minimum capability requirements as capability target packages for individual nations or groups of nations—will be absolutely critical to successful adoption of MDO. ACT and ACO will have to take a strategic view of how to deconflict acquisitions and coordinate training and collective capability development in an iterative manner. NATO should identify capabilities that require mass or significant quantities, and ensure that acquisition mechanisms are coordinated to achieve mass. MDO needs communication and timing across domains to work. Coordinating this across five domains and thirty-one (hopefully soon to be thirty-two) nations is a huge undertaking requiring significant doctrine and training. The Alliance should focus on leveraging the NATO Defense Planning Process as a vehicle to harmonize national and Alliance processes in a way that meets NATO’s warfighting objectives.

Third, countries should ensure that testing and experimentation inform their acquisitions process. Rather than trying to plan out a 90 percent solution before a single acquisition is made, countries should iterate and exercise capabilities in simulated combat settings to inform what they eventually adopt. This is precisely the approach that the US Army is pursuing with its Project Convergence. It seeks to repeatedly get technologies into the hands of its soldiers to test them in combat environments and see not only what technologies work, but also how soldiers are able to leverage technologies in novel ways. While this would not lead to all NATO nations marching in unison, it would at least help all nations walk in the same direction. Given the speed of technological innovation, this iterative approach would benefit the Alliance as a whole not just by allowing for continuous adoption of newer technologies, but also by having technology adoption be better tied to warfighting needs based on tactical and operational experimentation. For example, NATO nations should exercise capabilities like the GIS Arta system in a multilateral, multidomain environment to see what impact it has on the battlespace.

V. Conclusion: Toward combined all-domain operations

As the war in Ukraine has demonstrated, NATO’s ability to set the pace—and ultimately dominate—in the future battlespace will require the accelerated modernization of its digital infrastructure and mastery of synchronized activities across all domains and threat environments. To realize its vision for an MDO-enabled Alliance, NATO must move beyond efforts to align at the conceptual level by prioritizing the adoption and integration of capabilities that enhance its defense and deterrence posture across domains. Near- and medium-term capabilities such as sensor-shooter networks, AI-enabled agile logistics, private-sector space assets, and others outlined in this brief will accelerate the ability of NATO allies large and small to execute combined all-domain operations with agility and in unison—ensuring the advantage remains tilted in favor of the transatlantic community and the democratic values that define it.

Acknowledgments

Lt. Col. Tyson K. Wetzel, a nonresident senior fellow in the Forward Defense practice of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, and Conor Rodihan, a former associate director in the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security’s Transatlantic Security Initiative, made critical contributions in the early stages of the report’s conceptualization.

About the authors

Board director

Franklin D. Kramer

Distinguished Fellow

Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security Transatlantic Security Initiative

Cybersecurity Defense Policy

Fellow

Ann Marie Dailey

Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security Transatlantic Security Initiative

Defense Policy Europe & Eurasia

Staff

Joslyn Brodfuehrer

Associate Director, Transatlantic Security Initiative

Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security Transatlantic Security Initiative

China Disinformation

Franklin D. Kramer is a distinguished fellow and board director of the Atlantic Council. Kramer has served as a senior political appointee in two administrations, including as assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs. At the Department of Defense, Kramer was in charge of the formulation and implementation of international defense and political-military policy, with worldwide responsibilities including NATO and Europe, the Middle East, Asia, Africa, and Latin America.

Ann Marie Dailey is a nonresident senior fellow at the Transatlantic Security Initiative of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. She is a former senior advisor to the assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, and currently serves as a policy researcher at the RAND Corporation.

Joslyn Brodfuehrer is an assistant director with the Transatlantic Security Initiative (TSI) at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. In this capacity, she supports TSI’s efforts to strengthen the transatlantic alliance against emerging security threats. She previously served as a program assistant at the National Endowment for Democracy’s International Forum for Democratic Studies, where she supported the center’s information space and emerging technologies research portfolios.

Report Mar 16, 2023

The future of NATO C4ISR: Assessment and recommendations after Madrid

By Gordon B. “Skip” Davis Jr.

Current C4ISR capabilities, concepts, policies, and processes do not meet all of the Alliance’s needs. While much has been done to improve NATO C4ISR over the past decade, much work remains.

China Conflict

Issue Brief Sep 6, 2023

Alternative security futures in the High North

By David Auerswald

Climate change, combined with increasing geopolitical competition and hostilities, has focused renewed attention on national security interests in the Arctic. By 2035, how will those variables combine to influence the High North?

China Climate Change & Climate Action

Issue Brief Apr 18, 2023

NATO deterrence and defense: Military priorities for the Vilnius Summit

By Franklin D. Kramer

Ahead of the NATO Summit in Vilnius, this issue brief sets forth six priority actions that NATO should undertake to enhance its deterrent and defense posture.

Defense Technologies Europe & Eurasia

1 “NATO Defence Planning Process,” NATO, March 31, 2022, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49202.htm.

2 John L. Romjue, From Active Defense to Airland Battle: The Development of Army Doctrine, 1973-1982, US Army Training and Doctrine Command, TRADOC Historical Monograph Series, June 1984, https://www.tradoc.army.mil/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/From-Active-Defense-to-AirLand-Battle.pdf.

3 Undergirding all of this will be survivability. Given the high intensity of large-scale combat operations, militaries must adopt the technology and tactics, techniques, and procedures to enhance survivability if they are to succeed.

4 NATO’s two strategic commands are Allied Command Operations (ACO), based at Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), and NATO Allied Command Transformation (ACT). ACT and ACO cooperated closely on the conceptualization of NATO MDO and are now working together on the operational implementation of the concept.

5 “Multi-domain Operations: Enabling NATO to Out-pace and Out-think Its Adversaries,” NATO ACT, July 29, 2022, https://www.act.nato.int/article/multi-domain-operations-enabling-nato-to-out-pace-and-out-think-its-adversaries/#:~:text=The%20NATO%20’working’%20definition%20of,at%20the%20speed%20of%20relevance%E2%80%9D.

6 “Ongoing Military Transformation, Leading to NATO 2030—Multi-domain Operations, Deterrence and Defence, Improved Understanding,” NATO ACT, March 22, 2023, https://www.act.nato.int/article/ongoing-military-transformation-leading-to-nato-2030-multi-domain-operations-deterrence-and-defence-improved-understanding/.

7 “Ongoing Military Transformation,” NATO ACT.

8 Elisabeth Gosselin-Malo, “NATO to Test 5G Capabilities in Latvia with Virtual Reality, Drones,” Defense News, August 31, 2023, https://www.defensenews.com/global/europe/2023/08/31/nato-to-test-5g-capabilities-in-latvia-with-virtual-reality-drones/.

9 The definitional issue is illustrated by differences within and among allies. While the US Department of Defense (DOD) uses JADO (joint all domain operations) doctrinally, the US Army has doctrinally used MDO (multidomain operations). Canada favors pandomain operations, while other NATO members and NATO as a whole use MDO. NATO should adopt an official definition of MDO and take a decision at the level of the NATO Military Committee to designate MDO as the overarching warfighting concept for the Alliance. This, combined with the delineated tasks outlined in NATO’s new regional defense plans, would provide a direction, scope, and prioritization for NATO doctrine, force posture, training, and procurement in the wake of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. However, in the near and medium term, the seven initiatives described in this issue brief would substantially enhance NATO’s deterrence and defense capabilities.

10 Vivienne Machi, “French Forces Prep for Final Phase of Major Multidomain Exercise,” Defense News, April 14, 2023, https://www.defensenews.com/global/europe/2023/04/14/french-forces-prep-for-final-phase-of-major-multi-domain-exercise/.

11 “Joint Experimentation at the Canadian Joint Warfare Centre,” Government of Canada, August 10, 2023, https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/maple-leaf/defence/2023/08/joint-experimentation-canadian-joint-warfare-centre.html.

12 “Multinational Exercise Real Thaw Begins in Portugal,” NATO Allied Air Command, March 2, 2023, https://ac.nato.int/archive/2023/multinational-exercise-real-thaw-begins-in-portugal.

13 John Harper, “US Military Publishes New Joint Warfighting Doctrine,” DefenseScoop, September 13, 2023, https://defensescoop.com/2023/09/13/us-military-publishes-new-joint-warfighting-doctrine/. The current JWC was quietly published on August 27, but is not publicly available.

14 Gen. Mark A. Milley, “Strategic Inflection Point: The Most Historically Significant and Fundamental Change in the Character of War Is Happening Now—While the Future Is Clouded in Mist and Uncertainty,” Joint Force Quarterly 110 (July 2023), https://ndupress.ndu.edu/JFQ/Joint-Force-Quarterly-110/Article/Article/3447159/strategic-inflection-point-the-most-historically-significant-and-fundamental-ch/.

15 Lt. Col. Brittany Lloyd and 2nd Lt. Jeremiah Rozman, “Achieving Decision Dominance through Convergence: The U.S. Army and JADC2,” Association of the United States Army, February 2, 2022, https://www.ausa.org/publications/achieving-decision-dominance-through-convergence-us-army-and-jadc2.

16 Summary of the Joint All-Domain Command & Control (JADC2) Strategy, DOD, March 2022, 1, https://media.defense.gov/2022/Mar/17/2002958406/-1/-1/1/SUMMARY-OF-THE-JOINT-ALL-DOMAIN-COMMAND-AND-CONTROL-STRATEGY.PDF.

17 Charles McEnany, “Multi-domain Task Forces: A Glimpse at the Army of 2023,” Association of the United States Army, March 2, 2022, https://www.ausa.org/publications/multi-domain-task-forces-glimpse-army-2035. The US Army describes multidomain operational concepts more comprehensively than any other service branch in Field Manuel No. 3-0 (FM 3-0). Among other initiatives, the Army plans to operationalize MDO by fielding five Multi-Domain Task Forces (MDTFs)—defined as “theater-level, multi-domain maneuver elements that synchronize long-range precision effects (LRPE) . . . with long-range precision fires (LRPF)” to help forces win in the future battlespace.

18 John Hoehn, “Advanced Battle Management System (ABMS),” Congressional Research Service, last updated February 15, 2022, https://sgp.fas.org/crs/weapons/IF11866.pdf.

19 Sean Carberry, “Special Report: Air Force Reorganized to Tackle JADC2 Complexities,” National Defense, July 12, 2023, https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2023/7/12/air-force-reorganizes-to-tackle-jadc2-complexities.

20 Josh Luckenbaugh, “Special Report: Navy Testing Secret JADC2 Technologies,” National Defense, July 13, 2023, https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2023/7/13/navy-testing-secret-jadc2-technologies.

21 Geoff Ziezulewicz, “New in 2023: Project Overmatch Heads to Sea,” Navy Times, January 5, 2023, https://www.navytimes.com/news/your-navy/2023/01/05/new-in-2023-project-overmatch-heads-to-sea/.

22 Andrew Feickert, “The Army’s Project Convergence,” Congressional Research Service, last updated June 2, 2022, https://sgp.fas.org/crs/weapons/IF11654.pdf.

23 Feikert, “The Army’s Project Convergence.” The project is intended to “take the service’s big ideas for future warfare and test them in the real world.” Experiments have, for example, challenged the Joint Force to test joint all-domain situational awareness, conduct a joint fires operation, and facilitate AI-enabled reconnaissance missions.

24 Jen Judson, “Army Sets Sights on 2024 for Next Project Convergence,” Defense News, February 7, 2023, https://www.defensenews.com/land/2023/02/07/army-sets-sights-on-2024-for-next-project-convergence/#:~:text=The%20next%20Project%20Convergence%20will,include%20tackling%20more%20challenging%20threats.

25 Force Design 2030: Annual Update, US Marine Corps, June 2023, https://www.marines.mil/Portals/1/Docs/Force_Design_2030_Annual_Update_June_2023.pdf. Force Design 2030 provides a roadmap for the Marine Corps’ transformation into a “more agile, efficient, and technologically advanced force to meet the challenges of the future.” Stand-in forces, littoral operations, force sizing, training, and cooperation with allies are all prioritized under this strategy to bolster the services’ ability to deter and defend.

26 “A Concept for Stand-in Forces,” US Marine Corps, December 2021, https://www.hqmc.marines.mil/Portals/142/Users/183/35/4535/211201_A%20Concept%20for%20Stand-In%20Forces.pdf.

27 Neveen Shaaban Abdalla et al., “Intelligence and the War in Ukraine: Part II,” War on the Rocks, May 19, 2022, https://warontherocks.com/2022/05/intelligence-and-the-war-in-ukraine-part-2/.

28 Audrey Kurth Cronin, “Open Source Technology and Public-private Innovation Are the Key to Ukraine’s Strategic Resilience,” War on the Rocks, August 25, 2023, https://warontherocks.com/2023/08/open-source-technology-and-public-private-innovation-are-the-key-to-ukraines-strategic-resilience/.

29 Franklin D. Kramer, “NATO Deterrence and Defense: Military Priorities for the Vilnius Summit,” Issue Brief, Atlantic Council, April 18, 2023, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/issue-brief/nato-summit-military-priorities/.

30 Oscar Rosengren, “Network-centric Warfare in Ukraine: The Delta System,” Grey Dynamics, February 3, 2023, https://greydynamics.com/network-centric-warfare-in-ukraine-the-delta-system/.

31 “Ukraine to Implement Delta Situation Awareness System in Defense Forces,” Euromaidan Press, February 4, 2023, https://euromaidanpress.com/2023/02/04/ukraine-to-implement-delta-situation-awareness-system-in-defense-forces/.

32 Rosengren, “Network-centric Warfare in Ukraine.”

33 Emma Schroeder and Sean Dack, A Parallel Terrain: Public-private Defense of the Ukrainian Information Environment, Cyber Statecraft Initiative and Digital Forensic Research Lab, Atlantic Council, 2023, 16.

34 Tara Copp, “Elon Musk’s Refusal to Provide Starlink Support for Ukraine Attack in Crimea Raises Questions for Pentagon,” Associated Press via PBS NewsHour, September 11, 2023, https://www.pbs.org/newshour/economy/elon-musks-refusal-to-provide-starlink-support-for-ukraine-attack-in-crimea-raises-questions-for-pentagon#:~:text=(AP)%20%E2%80%94%20SpaceX%20founder%20Elon,purchases%20could%20be%20used%20in.

35 Mark Bruno, “‘Uber for Artillery’—What Is Ukraine’s GIS Arta System?,” The Moloch (blog), August 24, 2022, https://themoloch.com/conflict/uber-for-artillery-what-isukraines-gis-arta-system.

36 Seth G. Jones , Riley McCabe, and Alexander Palmer, Ukrainian Innovation in a War of Attrition, Center for Strategic and International Studies, February 27, 2023, https://www.csis.org/analysis/ukrainian-innovation-war-attrition.

37 Cronin, “Open Source Technology and Public-private Innovation.”

38 “Inside Ukraine’s Drone War against Putin,” Economist, August 27, 2023, https://www.economist.com/europe/2023/08/27/inside-ukraines-drone-war-against-putin

39 “How Could FPV Drones Change Warfare?,” Economist, August 4, 2023, https://www.economist.com/the-economist-explains/2023/08/04/how-could-fpv-drones-change-warfare.

40 “How Could FPV Drones Change Warfare?,” Economist.

41 Elias Groll and AJ Vicens, “A Year After Russia’s Invasion, the Scope of Cyberwar in Ukraine Comes into Focus,” Cyberscoop, February 24, 2023, https://cyberscoop.com/ukraine-russia-cyberwar-anniversary/.

42 Groll and Vicens, “A Year After Russia’s Invasion.”

43 “Christine H. Fox and Emelia S. Probasco, “Big Tech Goes to War,” Foreign Affairs, October 19, 2022, 4, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/bigtech-goes-war.

44 “Space Development Agency Successfully Launches Tranche 0 Satellites,” DOD, April 2, 2023, https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/3348974/space-development-agency-successfully-launches-tranche-0-satellites/.

45 “Space Development Agency Successfully Launches,“ DOD.

46 “About Us,” Rocket Lab, accessed July 5, 2023, https://www.rocketlabusa.com/about/about-us/.

47 Jared Szuba, “US Top Middle East Commander Tests New Model of Deterring Iran,” Al-Monitor, January 3, 2023, https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2022/12/us-top-middle-east-commander-tests-new-model-deterring-iran.

48 Szuba, “US Top Middle East Commander Tests New Model.”

49 Szuba, “US Top Middle East Commander Tests New Model.”

50 Szuba, “US Top Middle East Commander Tests New Model.”

51 John Harper, “US Central Command’s New Task Force 99 Begins Drone Operations in Middle East,” DefenseScoop, February 13, 2023, https://defensescoop.com/2023/02/13/us-central-commands-new-task-force-99-begins-drone-operations-in-middle-east/.

52 “Deputy Secretary of Defense Kathleen Hicks Keynote Address: ‘The Urgency to Innovate,’ ” DOD, August 28, 2023, https://www.defense.gov/News/Speeches/Speech/Article/3507156/deputy-secretary-of-defense-kathleen-hicks-keynote-address-the-urgency-to-innov/.

53 “Deputy Secretary of Defense Kathleen Hicks Keynote Address,” DOD.

54 John R. Hoehn and Paul K. Kerr, “Unmanned Aircraft Systems: Current and Potential Programs,” Congressional Research Service, July 28, 2022, 6, 7, 11, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/details?prodcode=R47067.

55 Eric Lipton, “A.I. Brings the Robot Wingman to Aerial Combat,” New York Times, August 27, 2023, https://www.nytimes.com/2023/08/27/us/politics/ai-air-force.html.

56 Valerie Insinna, “Coming Soon: A US Competition for Sixth-gen Drone Wingman Could Begin in FY24,” Breaking Defense, September 7, 2022, https://breakingdefense.com/2022/09/coming-soon-a-us-competition-for-sixth-gen-drone-wingman-could-begin-in-fy24/.

57 David A. Ochmanek et al., Inflection Point: How to Reverse the Erosion of U.S. and Allied Military Power and Influence (Santa Monica, California: RAND Corporation, 2023), 28-29, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA2555-1.html.

58 Ochmanek et al., Inflection Point: How to Reverse the Erosion, 29.

59 David Hambling, “Low-Tech, Unkillable ‘Mesh’ of Targeting Drones Could Help Destroy a Chinese Fleet Invading Taiwan,” Forbes, September 21, 2021, https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidhambling/2021/09/21/low-tech-targeting-mesh-drones-could-tip-the-odds-against-a-chinese-fleet-invadingtaiwan/?sh=2cf199084b45.

60 “Ukraine’s Latest Weapons in Its War with Russia: 3D-printed Bombs,” Economist, August 1, 2023, https://www.economist.com/science-and-technology/2023/08/01/ukraines-latest-weapons-in-its-war-with-russia-3d-printed-bombs.

61 T. X. Hammes, “Game-changers: Implications of the Russo-Ukraine War for the Future of Ground Warfare,” Atlantic Council, April 3, 2023 , 9, 13, 16, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/issue-brief/game-changers-implications-of-the-russo-ukraine-war-for-the-future-of-ground-warfare/.

62 Kramer, “NATO Deterrence and Defense: Military Priorities.”

63 Ground-based, long-range artillery systems such as the currently employed High-Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) have been used to great effect in Ukraine when paired with the Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System (GMLRS). HIMARS also can fire a single Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) missile with a range of 300 kilometers. In the near future, this also could include the Precision Strike Missile (PrSM), which will range 499+ km.

64 Air systems could include the Joint Air-to-Surface Strike Missile (JASSM), which is a cruise missile whose range with an extended range variant exceeds 525 miles, or the long-range anti-ship missiles (LRASM), which is precision guided and can target maritime missile defense platforms.

65 The Tomahawk Land Attack Cruise Missile (TLAM) is a ship- or submarine-launched cruise missile.

66 While area effect weapons, such as the dual-purpose improved conventional munition (DPICM), remain controversial for most NATO nations, the war in Ukraine has demonstrated their efficacy. NATO nations should consider including DPICMs in their munitions stocks, as they are an effective weapon for SEAD and beyond. While JASSM and TLAM are not the optimal munitions for SEAD, including them in exercises provides additional options for planners to create dilemmas for a defending force.

67 Franz-Stefan Gady and Alexander Stronell, “Cyber Capabilities and Multi-domain Operations in Future High-intensity Warfare in 2030,” NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCDCOE), December 8, 2020, 156, https://ccdcoe.org/uploads/2020/12/8-Cyber-Capabilities-and-Multi-Domain-Operations-in-Future-High-Intensity-Warfare-in-2030_ebook.pdf.

68 Gady and Stronell, “Cyber Capabilities.”

69 Gady and Stronell, “Cyber Capabilities,” 156-157.

70 Max Lesser, Simon Fellows, and Oakley Cox, “Defending Operational Technology (OT) in Kinetic, Cyber, and Hybrid Warfare,” Darktrace Federal, as noted in Industrial Control Systems Working Group quarterly newsletter, US Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, June 2022, 3, https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/ICSJWG-Archive/QNL_JUN_2022/Defending%20OT%20in%20Kinetic%20Cyber%20and%20Hybrid%20Warfare_s508c.pdf.

71 Attacks on civilian infrastructures that are supporting military activities would need to be evaluated in terms of the requirements of the laws of war of military necessity, distinction, and proportionality. See Department of Defense Law of War Manual, US DOD, December 2016, 50-65, https://DOD.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/DOD%20Law%20of%20War%20Manual%20-%20June%202015%20Updated%20Dec%202016.pdf.

72 “Cyber Defence,” NATO, August 3, 2023, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_78170.htm.

73 Wiesław Goździewicz, “Sovereign Cyber Effects Provided Voluntarily by Allies (SCEPVA),” Cyber Defense Magazine, November 11, 2019, https://www.cyberdefensemagazine.com/sovereign-cyber/.

74 The “sixth domain” as an operational domain of warfare is discussed in two works by Franklin D. Kramer: The Sixth Domain: The Role of the Private Sector in Warfare, Atlantic Council, October 4, 2023, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/the-sixth-domain-the-role-of-the-private-sector-in-warfare/; and “NATO Deterrence and Defense: Military Priorities,” 6-8

75 “Cyber Defence,” NATO.

76 Kramer, “NATO Deterrence and Defense,” 7.

77 NATO should also coordinate with the European Union to ensure consistency between NATO requirements and the EU’s recent network and information security (NIS2) directive with which EU nations are required to comply by October 2024. See “Directive (EU) 2022/2555 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 December 2022 on Measures for a High Common Level of Cybersecurity across the Union,” Official Journal of the European Union, December 27, 2023, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:32022L2555&qid=1672747885309&from=EN.

78 Garrett Chandler and Matthew Carstensen, “Lots to Be Desired: Why the US Army Needs to Invest in Logistics Over-the-Shore,” Modern War Institute, April 28, 2022, https://mwi.westpoint.edu/lots-to-be-desired-why-the-us-army-needs-to-invest-in-logistics-over-the-shore/.

79 JSEC was established in 2018 and just reached full operational capability in 2021.

80 The Reinforcement and Sustainment Network (RSN) is a JSEC-created database of sustainment-related physical infrastructure assets throughout NATO’s area of operations and the laws, regulations, and other administrative factors that impact the infrastructure’s utilization and maintenance. See “Exercise Spring Storm in Estonia—and the Link to JSEC in Ulm, Germany,” NATO news release, May 26, 2023, https://jsec.nato.int/newsroom/news-releases/exercise-spring-storm-in-estonia-and-the-link-to-jsec-in-ulm–germany-2.

81 Kramer, The Sixth Domain, 4.

82 Agile Combat Employment, US Air Force, August 23, 2022, 5-7, 9, 11, https://www.doctrine.af.mil/Portals/61/documents/AFDN_1-21/AFDN%201-21%20ACE.pdf. NATO will also need to utilize resilience techniques such as, in the case of aircraft, hardened shelters, assuring sufficient fuel at contingency bases, and undertaking deception techniques such as camouflage.

83 “Fact Sheet—U.S. Defense Contributions to Europe,” US DOD, June 29, 2022, https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/3078056/fact-sheet-us-defense-contributions-to-europe/.

84 “New NATO Force Model,” NATO, 2022, https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2022/6/pdf/220629-infographic-newnato-force-model.pdf

85 As demonstrated in Ukraine and planned for in Korea, cluster munitions capabilities such as DPICMS and rapidly deployable mine systems such as the family of artillery-scatterable mines (FASCAM) are key elements of defense in a high-intensity conflict.

86 DIANA is a new initiative, and 2023 is its pilot year. It seeks to help solve key military “challenges” by mentoring and providing grant financing to technology start-ups to get them through the “valley of death” of technological innovation. For 2023, the three challenges DIANA sought proposals for all have MDO applications; they are undersea sensing, energy resilience, and secure communications. While counter-UAS is not currently one of the three key challenges that DIANA is focused on solving, it should be considered for inclusion in DIANA’s Strategic Directive for the next two years, which is currently being written.

87 Frontline forces can also make the enemy’s job more difficult by utilizing systems that emit fake electronic signatures to draw enemy fires from high-value targets and use AI-enabled cyber campaigns to flood the publicly available information (PAI) space and degrade an enemy’s ability to use PAI for targeting.

88 “Vilnius Summit Communiqué,” NATO press release, July 11, 2023, paragraph 67,https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_217320.htm.

89 ”Vilnius Summit Communiqué,” NATO. The communique also referenced the “establishment of the NATO Space Centre of Excellence in France.”

90 “Alliance Persistent Surveillance from Space (APSS),” NATO, February 2023, https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2023/2/pdf/230215-factsheet-apss.pdf

91 Alliance Persistent Surveillance from Space (APSS),” NATO.

92 “NATO’s Approach to Space,” NATO, May 23, 2023, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_175419.htm.

93 “Allied Command Transformation Leads the Execution of the Annual Coalition Warrior Interoperability Exercise,” NATO ACT, June 5, 2023, https://www.act.nato.int/article/act-leads-2023-cwix/.

94 “Allied Command Transformation Leads the Execution,” NATO ACT.

95 Charles S. Galbreath, “Building U.S. Space Force Counterspace Capabilities: An Imperative for America’s Defense,” Mitchell Institute, June 2023, 16, https://mitchellaerospacepower.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/06/Building-US-Space-Force-Counterspace-Capabilities-FINAL2.pdf.

96 “Civil Reserve Air Fleet,” US Air Force, accessed July 4, 2023, https://www.af.mil/About-Us/Fact-Sheets/Display/Article/104583/civil-reserve-air-fleet/.

97 Sandra Erwin, “Space Force to Further Define Details of a ‘Commercial Space Reserve,’ ”Space News, July 25, 2023, https://spacenews.com/space-force-to-further-define-details-of-a-commercial-space-reserve/#:~:text=Open%20dropdown%20menu,Space%20Force%20to%20further%20define%20details%20of%20a%20’commercial%20space,Sandra%20Erwin%20July%2025%2C%202023.

98 US Defense Production Act of 1950, 50 U.S.C., §§ 4511, 4557.

99 “New NATO Force Model,” NATO, 2022, https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2022/6/pdf/220629-infographic-newnato-force-model.pdf.

100 Summary of the Joint All-Domain Command & Control (JADC2) Strategy, DOD, 6.

101 To be sure, significant efforts focused on capabilities are being undertaken by the Department of Defense. These include the Air Force’s Advanced Battle Management System, the Army’s Project Convergence, and the Navy’s Project Overmatch, as well as activities by the Chief Digital and Artificial Intelligence Office in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. However, as noted, those activities are as yet developmental, and, illustratively, as described in a January 2023 report by the Government Accountability Office focused on the US Air Force: the “Air Force has not delivered any capabilities to date.” See Battle Management: DOD and Air Force Continue to Define Joint Command and Control Efforts, Government Accountability Office, January 2023, highlights (unnumbered first page), 7, https://www.gao.gov/assets/820/814635.pdf; and Defense in a Digital Era Hearing Before the House Armed Services Subcomm. on Cyber, Information Technology, and Innovation, 118^th Cong. (2023) (statement for the record of Dr. Craig Martell, DOD chief digital and artificial intelligence officer), https://armedservices.house.gov/sites/republicans.armedservices.house.gov/files/Martell%20Testimony.pdf.

102 Maj. Jacqwayne Griffin, “The Army’s Future Fight: Maximizing 2nd Multi-domain Task Force’s Unprecedented Arcane Thunder 23 Exercise,” US Army, September 7, 2023, https://www.army.mil/article/269715/the_armys_future_fight_maximizing_2nd_multi_domain_task_forces_unprecedented_arcane_thunder_23_exercise.

103 Summary of the Joint All-Domain Command & Control (JADC2) Strategy, DOD, 6.

104 Summary of the Joint All-Domain Command & Control (JADC2) Strategy, DOD, 6.

105 Summary of the Joint All-Domain Command & Control (JADC2) Strategy, DOD, 6.

106 Summary of the Joint All-Domain Command & Control (JADC2) Strategy, DOD, 6.

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Grundman in Defense News on defense industry transformation goals

jfranks — Wed, 21 Feb 2024 14:10:43 +0000

On February 20, Forward Defense senior fellow Steven Grundman was quoted in Defense News discussing defense industry transformation goals. He states the industry is highly responsive to customer needs, noting that it consolidated in the 1990s to cut costs due to reduced military spending, which ultimately led to decreased competition and surge capacity.

The defense industry is hypersensitive to and responsive to its customers.

Steven Grundman

Fellow

Steven Grundman

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Defense Industry Defense Policy

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Outgunned Ukraine bets on drones as Russian invasion enters third year

Mykola Bielieskov — Tue, 20 Feb 2024 21:48:02 +0000

In early February, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy announced the creation of a separate branch of the Ukrainian Armed Forces devoted to drones. Ukraine’s new Unmanned Systems Force is a military innovation reflecting the growing prominence of drones in modern warfare. Zelenskyy’s decision also underlines the importance of UAVs to the Ukrainian war effort as Kyiv seeks to maintain a technological edge over Russia while grappling with mounting shortages in artillery shells and other more traditional weapons systems.

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine is not the first conflict to feature unmanned aerial vehicles in significant numbers. Reconnaissance and strike UAVs were employed extensively in eastern Ukraine following the onset of Russian aggression in 2014, and in a range of other combat zones over the past decade including Syria, Libya, and the Second Karabakh War in the southern Caucasus. Nevertheless, the unprecedented numbers of UAVs used by both sides over the past two years in Ukraine has led some to call Russia’s invasion the world’s first drone war.

The ubiquity of drones in Ukraine is leading to dramatic changes on the battlefield. Fleets of UAVs have revolutionized surveillance, making it extremely difficult for commanders to benefit from the element of surprise. This helps to explain why both the Russian and Ukrainian armies are finding it increasingly difficult to mount successful offensives against defensive positions. In addition to dramatically enhancing battlefield visibility, drones also serve as precision strike weapons capable of replicating many of the functions performed by artillery and missiles at only a fraction of the price.

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Over the past two years, the Ukrainian military has managed to incorporate drones with considerable success. This has often been done on a somewhat improvised basis, with separate UAV teams independently established as part of different units. Ukraine’s expanding drone capabilities have owed much to public fundraising efforts and contributions from diverse grassroots groups including volunteer networks. Meanwhile, a startup-style drone manufacturing and modification industry has emerged from within Ukraine’s vibrant tech industry.

The results have been impressive. During a single week in early 2024, Ukrainian Minister of Digital Transformation Mykhailo Fedorov reported that the country’s drone units had destroyed 73 Russian tanks along with air defense systems, fuel storage depots, and multiple other high-value targets. Longer range drones are now being used to strike strategic targets deep inside Russia including military production sites and energy industry infrastructure. At sea, marine drones have helped break the Russian naval blockade of Ukraine’s Black Sea ports and have forced the bulk of Putin’s fleet to retreat from Crimea.

Much of this has been possible thanks to expanding domestic production. According to Ukrainian Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal, by early 2024 there were approximately 200 companies producing drones in Ukraine, with domestic output around one hundred times higher in 2023 than during the first year of Russia’s full-scale invasion. As manufacturing potential continues to expand, Ukrainian officials have set a target of more than one million domestically produced drones in 2024.

Ukraine’s international partners are also focusing their efforts on helping the country stay one step ahead of Russia in the drone war. A coalition of around ten countries recently vowed to deliver one million drones to Ukraine by February 2025, while France is reportedly preparing to provide the Ukrainian military with the latest strike drone models in the coming weeks.

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Ukraine’s newly established Unmanned Systems Force must now manage this highly dynamic drone supply situation while making sure the country’s expanding UAV fleets are deployed effectively in what is a rapidly changing battlefield environment.

The creation of a separate branch of the armed forces dedicated to drones should allow Ukraine to assess developments in a systematic manner and gain an accurate overview of the most effective tactics, making it possible to create something approaching a drone warfare doctrine. This would represent a considerable improvement on today’s somewhat chaotic approach to sharing experience, which often relies on direct communication between individual drone pilots and unit commanders.

The Unmanned Systems Force could take the lead in developing a more coordinated approach to training. At present, many of Ukraine’s UAV training programs are private initiatives that typically offer valuable insights but lack any centrally established standards. Additionally, the new branch can contribute to more effective cooperation with the military industrial complex to make sure Ukrainian manufacturers are focused on producing the kinds of drones the military needs.

Zelenskyy’s decision to establish a specific drone branch of the army also creates a number of potential challenges. Ukraine’s drone warfare evolution over the past two years has often been organic in nature. On many occasions, creative solutions have been implemented with a high degree of operational flexibility by people on the front lines of the conflict. Ukrainian commanders must now make sure efforts to coordinate the country’s drone operations do not blunt this creativity or slow down reaction times by introducing new layers of bureaucracy.

There is also a danger that efforts to fill leadership and training positions within the Unmanned Systems Force could lead to the withdrawal of experienced pilots from the combat zone. One solution might be to prioritize the recruitment of wounded drone operators who are not currently able to serve in front line conditions but have valuable knowledge to share.

The Russian invasion of Ukraine has turned the country into a giant war lab and confirmed the status of drones as the weapons of the future. With Ukraine no longer assured of further military aid from the US and increasingly obliged to ration ammunition, drones are a cost-effective solution that plays to the country’s tech sector strengths. President Zelenskyy and his military leaders clearly recognize this, and will be hoping the new Unmanned Systems Force can help Ukraine maximize its drone potential without becoming a bureaucratic burden.

Fellow

Stephen Rodriguez

Senior Advisor

Defense Policy Defense Technologies

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Ukraine’s Black Sea success offers hope as Russian invasion enters third year

Peter Dickinson — Thu, 15 Feb 2024 21:43:51 +0000

As Ukrainians prepare to mark the second anniversary of Russia’s full-scale invasion, the news from the front lines is increasingly bleak. After the failure of last year’s counteroffensive, the Ukrainian military has now switched to active defense and is struggling to prevent fresh Russian advances. This task is being further complicated by delays in Western military aid that are leaving Ukrainian units outgunned and forcing them to ration ammunition.

Amid this mounting gloom, Ukraine’s remarkable success in the Black Sea continues to serve as a welcome source of inspiration. The most recent victory came in the early hours of February 14, when a major Russian warship was reportedly caught off the coast of Crimea and sunk by a mosquito fleet of five Ukrainian maritime drones. The Caesar Kunikov landing ship is the latest in an expanding list of Russian warships to be damaged or destroyed during the past two years. Ukraine has now disabled one-third of the entire Russian Black Sea Fleet since the start of the full-scale invasion, Ukrainian officials told CNN in the aftermath of Wednesday’s attack.

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The Battle of the Black Sea began on the eve of the full-scale invasion, with Vladimir Putin ordering his navy to impose a blockade on Ukraine’s Black Sea ports more than a week before Russian tanks rolled across the border on February 24, 2022. On paper, at least, the war at sea appeared to be a foregone conclusion, with the Ukrainian Navy’s handful of small vessels hopelessly outmatched by the might of the Russian Black Sea Fleet. However, it would not be long before Ukraine was challenging such assumptions.

Ukraine’s first naval triumph was the April 2022 sinking of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet flagship, the Moskva, which was struck by a brace of Ukrainian Neptune anti-ship missiles. Two months later, Ukraine succeeded in liberating Snake Island, a small by strategically important Black Sea island which had been occupied by Russia on the first day of the invasion. By late summer 2022, Ukraine had begun drone strikes on the Russian fleet and related naval facilities in Russian-occupied Crimea.

These attacks gained significant momentum in 2023, thanks to developments in Ukraine’s marine drone fleet along with the appearance of British and French-supplied cruise missiles in the Ukrainian arsenal. Landmark achievements included a successful long-range marine drone attack on a warship close to the Russian port of Novorossiysk in the eastern Black Sea, and the destruction of a Russian submarine and warship undergoing maintenance in Crimea’s Sevastopol, the traditional home port of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet.

This week’s attack on the Caesar Kunikov is the second successful naval operation in February 2024 alone, and comes following the reported destruction of Russian warship the Ivanovets at the start of the month. As is now customary, news of this latest sinking inspired a flood of memes on social media as Ukrainians toasted the further weakening of the Russian navy. Meanwhile, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg called it a “great victory for Ukrainians,” and noted that the country has been able to “inflict heavy losses on the Russian Black Sea Fleet.”

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The sinking of Russian warships will not prove decisive in a land war, of course. Nevertheless, Ukraine’s success in the Battle of the Black Sea is no mere morale boost and is already shaping the course of the wider war. Ukrainian attacks have made it difficult for the Russian navy to maintain a presence in the northwestern Black Sea and have forced Putin to withdraw the bulk of his fleet from Crimea to the relative safety of Russian ports. This is hampering Russia’s ability to bomb Ukraine using the Black Sea Fleet’s missile-carrying warships, while also disrupting the logistics of the Russian army in Crimea and southern Ukraine.

Crucially, sinking so many Russian warships has enabled Ukraine to break the blockade of the country’s Black Sea ports and resume maritime exports to global markets. The reopening of merchant shipping lanes for the country’s vast agricultural industry represents a financial lifeline for Ukraine, which is struggling to keep its battered economy afloat and fund the war effort. Many were skeptical that Ukraine could defy the Russian blockade, but the results speak for themselves. According to the Ukrainian Ministry of Economy, exports in January 2024 reached 12 million metric tons, the highest monthly total since the start of the invasion and just two million tons below prewar levels.

In addition to restricting the role of the Russian navy and boosting the domestic economy, Ukraine’s victories at sea are also providing important lessons for the future conduct of the war. The effective use of British and French cruise missiles has underlined Ukraine’s ability to deploy sophisticated Western weapons systems, while also highlighting Russia’s vulnerability. The success achieved over the past year in Crimea and the Black Sea with relatively limited supplies of cruise missiles offers a glimpse of what could be possible if Ukraine’s partners finally agree to deliver long-range missiles in anything like the quantities Kyiv is asking for.

Perhaps the single most important lesson to take from the Battle of the Black Sea is the need for the West to overcome its crippling fear of escalation. For the past two years, risk-averse Western leaders have consistently demonstrated excessive caution in their response to the Russian invasion, while warning against anything that might potentially provoke Putin. The Russian dictator has skillfully exploited these concerns, hinting at dire consequences if Western support for Ukraine passes certain thresholds. President Zelenskyy has long complained that this preoccupation with avoiding escalation plays directly into Russia’s hands while leaving Ukraine at a massive disadvantage.

Ukraine’s Black Sea success has now made a mockery of the West’s self-deterrence and exposed the emptiness of Russian threats. During the first year of the invasion, Putin and other senior Russian officials repeatedly indicated that attacks on Crimea represented a red line for the Kremlin. However, when Ukraine ignored these threats and proceeded with its campaign against the Russian navy, Putin’s promised retribution failed to materialize. Confronted with unfavorable new military realities, the Kremlin strongman simply ordered his fleet to retreat.

If Putin is prepared to quietly withdraw the bulk of his navy from Crimea, which is the jewel in the crown of his new Russian Empire, there is every reason to believe he will be similarly pragmatic when faced with the prospect of military disaster in mainland Ukraine. In other words, Putin can be defeated if Ukraine’s partners conquer their fear of escalation and refuse to be intimidated by the Kremlin.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

The NDIS is a step in the right direction. In just nine months, the Pentagon put together and released a multifaceted approach toward a holistic solution to revamping its industrial base. This approach acknowledges the interconnection of ongoing impediments and offers a rubric with shelf life for the next several rounds of Department of Defense budget requests and appropriations. However, the strategy also leaves important questions unanswered, including: How can the United States put it into effect? While that may very well be the job of the soon-to-follow implementation plan, the strategy itself often reads as if it were designed in a vacuum. It fails to account for critical impediments that would derail potential avenues of implementation, such as alarming budgetary constraints, “Buy American” provisions, and stringent export control restrictions. While it coincides with the National Defense Strategy, it does little to complement reality and take inventory of difficult challenges at home.

Budgetary constraints

Achieving the ambitious goals articulated by the NDIS would be an extraordinary and expensive undertaking. However, the report offers no indication of how additional resources will be secured or what compromises will be made to sustain them. Competing priorities within the US federal budget are enough to trigger opposition to a Department of Defense budget hike, and even more so during an election year, while offering trade-offs could prove equally polarizing among stakeholders and hinder progress as a result. Even if the NDIS’s priorities were effectively backed by appropriators in the fiscal year 2025 cycle, success will require sustained funding for years ahead.

The United States had a front-row seat to this phenomenon during the pandemic: Onshoring attempts only really worked from a business standpoint as long as pandemic-related federal funding sustained them. Without a clear and detailed plan to secure long-term federal funding or navigate trade-offs, the NDIS’s success will be constrained by short-term funding cycles and political agendas.

Internationalist goals amid a nationalist agenda

The NDIS is filled with references to US allies and partners, and it delivers a firm call to action for enhanced collaboration and cooperation. The strategy emphasizes the need for sustained global partnerships and acknowledges that by working together, “we and our allies and partners can address capacity and capability gaps, enhance production capacity and capabilities, boost economic advantages, and reinforce alliances.”

However, these internationalist themes in the strategy are up against “Buy American” provisions, which will ultimately limit opportunities for collaboration by prioritizing US-based procurement and alienating allies and partners as a result. While essential for safeguarding adversarial access to sensitive US technologies, export controls by design restrict access to technology with potential military applications or national security implications. These restrictions impede necessary technology transfers for co-development and interoperability. The NDIS does acknowledge the challenge posed by US export control regimes, such as the International Traffic in Arms Regulations and the Export Administration Regulations, but its acknowledgement is not enough to neutralize the impact on cooperation with allies and partners.

The United States’ first National Defense Industrial Strategy was a welcome red flag to the public on a bipartisan concern and has sparked necessary conversations about near-term implications and comparisons to China’s industrial capabilities. While effective in that right, any hope for success boils down to thoughtful and precise implementation guidance and a strategic approach to fiscal regulatory roadblocks.

As the Department of Defense gears up to unveil its implementation plan for the strategy, the spotlight should be on harnessing the right approaches to tackle the very deficiencies the NDIS identified. Here are three approaches at its disposal:

Invest in capabilities that require public capital: The Department of Defense should build a case for long-term federal funding beyond traditional budgetary cycles by delivering a comprehensive strategy to solicit appropriations for fiscal years 2025-2030. This approach should focus on two key lines of effort: first, fully utilizing and expanding authorities granted by the Defense Production Act’s Title III to prioritize and fund essential defense capabilities and their manufacturing base. This will help mitigate risks associated with reliance on global foreign suppliers, effectively optimizing domestic production capacity. Second, the department should leverage public-private partnerships to co-invest with private capital, ensuring sustainable funding for these crucial initiatives. Such a partnership would allow the Department of Defense to tap into the private sector’s expertise, efficiency, and financial resources, which is likely to lower long-term costs and expedite innovation adoption across the Department of Defense. By implementing these measures, the Department of Defense has a better shot at securing the substantial resources necessary to successfully implement the NDIS.
Renovate acquisition practices: The Pentagon should work to expedite long-needed acquisition reform tailored to speed and efficiency. The Atlantic Council’s Commission on Defense Innovation Adoption’s final report, released in January, offers several recommendations, including ways for the Department of Defense to streamline processes by simplifying and consolidating approval processes, eliminating unnecessary paperwork, and leveraging technology for automation. The Department of Defense should also standardize some procurement regulations and requirements across the services, which will further avoid duplication and delays. Finally, it should grant greater authority and decision-making power to program managers to navigate acquisition processes more effectively.
Advance allied industrial integration. The Department of Defense must find ways to address challenges impeding the NDIS’s international collaboration objectives without jeopardizing US national security. It should encourage joint projects where allies manufacture components or subsystems, creating economic benefits and shared responsibility. In addition, it could implement a tiered approach, which prioritizes US companies for sensitive technologies while allowing qualified allied firms to work on other components, balancing security with collaboration. The United States could establish a spectrum of procurement preferences based on a risk-benefit assessment of technologies and potential partners: highest security concerns, which prioritize US production for sensitive technologies; moderate security concerns, which allow qualified allied companies to compete for contracts, potentially with offsets or coproduction requirements; and lower security concerns, which open competition for all qualified companies regardless of nationality.

Kathryn Levantovscaia is a deputy director in the Forward Defense program of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. Prior to joining the Council, Levantovscaia served the US Chamber of Commerce as director for defense, aerospace, and acquisition policy.

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Dean quoted in the Australian on new Navy capabilities

kyusko — Wed, 14 Feb 2024 20:33:30 +0000

On February 13, IPSI nonresident senior fellow Peter Dean was quoted in an Australian article discussing a new fleet of “Tier 2” warships expected to soon enter the Australian Navy.

Fellow

Peter J. Dean

Indo-Pacific Security Initiative Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Australia Conflict

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Removal of Ukraine’s ‘Iron General’ is one of Zelenskyy’s biggest gambles

Peter Dickinson — Thu, 08 Feb 2024 21:54:54 +0000

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has announced the removal of Ukraine’s top general, Valery Zaluzhny, in the biggest shakeup of the country’s military leadership since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion almost two years ago.

In a statement confirming the move, Zelenskyy said he had decided to “renew the leadership” of the Ukrainian military as he seeks to regain the initiative following last year’s failed counteroffensive. The Ukrainian President praised Zaluzhny’s contribution to the Ukrainian war effort but noted that the changing nature of the conflict and a “feeling of stagnation” meant sweeping changes were now necessary.

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The decision to change Ukraine’s military leadership comes following months of speculation over deteriorating personal relations between Zelenskyy and Zaluzhny. Rumors of mounting tensions first began to circulate in 2022, with the Ukrainian President accused of viewing his top commander’s surging popularity among the Ukrainian public as a potential future threat to his own position.

During the early months of war, Zaluzhny emerged as a symbol of Ukraine’s fighting spirit as the country scored a string of remarkable victories against the invading Russians. He was soon being dubbed the “Iron General,” and was lionized in the Ukrainian and international media as a military mastermind.

The rift between Zelenskyy and Zaluzhny finally went public in late 2023, with the Ukrainian leader rebuking his military chief for stating that the war had reached a “stalemate” during a high-profile interview with Britain’s The Economist magazine. In a strongly worded response, Zelenskyy rejected Zaluzhny’s downbeat battlefield assessment, warning that it “aided the aggressor” and risked stirring up panic among Ukraine’s Western partners. This spat highlighted Zaluzhny’s growing tendency to go “off message” and challenge official Ukrainian positions in his interactions with the media.

Tensions have continued to rise in recent months, with the two men increasingly at odds over mobilization plans as Ukraine seeks to bolster the ranks of its depleted and exhausted military. In an opinion piece for CNN on the eve of his removal, Zaluzhny voiced his frustration with “the inability of state institutions in Ukraine to improve the manpower levels of our armed forces without the use of unpopular measures.”

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Zelenskyy has sought to downplay suggestions that today’s shakeup is the result of personal conflicts behind the scenes among the country’s civilian and military leadership. “This is not about surnames. And certainly not about politics,” he stated. Instead, the Ukrainian President spoke of the need for new management of the military and a more “technologically advanced” approach to the war.

Few would argue with Zelenskyy’s assertion that technological innovation should be among the top priorities for the outgunned but agile Ukrainian military. After all, Russia enjoys overwhelming advantages in a conventional war of attrition and is clearly aiming to wear Ukraine down while outlasting the West. However, when selecting his new Commander-in-Chief, the Ukrainian leader appears to have been guided primarily by the need for loyalty and stability.

Zaluzhny will be replaced as Ukraine’s top general by Oleksandr Syrsky, one of the country’s most experienced commanders who has led Ukraine’s ground forces since 2019. At 58 years old, Syrsky is significantly older than either Zelenskyy or Zaluzhny. He began his military career during the Soviet era, serving with the Red Army in Afghanistan.

Syrsky has held leadership positions within the Ukrainian military since the start of the Russian invasion in 2014 and has worked closely with Zaluzhny. He is credited with overseeing many of the most striking successes of the past two years, including the defense of Kyiv in the first month of the invasion and the stunning Kharkiv counteroffensive of September 2022.

Ukraine’s new Commander-in-Chief undoubtedly has an impressive resume as a military commander, but he has also faced significant criticism for his role in the Battle of Bakhmut, which resulted in heavy casualties on both sides. Opponents claim Syrsky is not popular within the ranks of the Ukrainian army, with some warning that his appointment could lead to a decline in morale among front line troops.

While Zelenskyy’s decision to dismiss Zaluzhny comes as no surprise, it is one of the Ukrainian leader’s biggest gambles of the entire war. With no major breakthroughs for more than a year, the need for a change in tactics was obvious. The breakdown in relations between the two men had also reached a point where it was creating dangerous divisions within the country’s leadership.

Nevertheless, the timing of Zaluzhny’s removal looks particularly unfortunate. Ukraine currently faces growing ammunition shortages amid alarming delays in Western military aid. This is already placing severe constraints on any offensive operations and has left Ukrainian commanders with little choice but to switch to active defense. If the military situation deteriorates further in the coming months, Zelenskyy will now find that he is held personally responsible.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

Konaev moderates CSET’s AI Executive Order Report Card Panel

Atlantic Council — Wed, 07 Feb 2024 12:56:29 +0000

Orginal Source

On January 31, Forward Defense Nonresident Senior Fellow Margarita Konaev moderated a virtual panel on the “AI Executive Order Report Card” for Georgetown University’s Center for Security and Emerging Technology (CSET). The panel discussed the security impacts of artificial intelligence and emerging technologies.

Former fellow

Margarita Konaev

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Conflict Defense Technologies

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Hammes mentioned in Forbes discussing drone warfare

Atlantic Council — Wed, 07 Feb 2024 12:50:10 +0000

On January 25, Forward Defense Nonresident Senior Fellow Thomas X. Hammes was quoted describing drone warfare as “bringing the detonator” in Forbes’ “Ukrainian Drones Are Burning Down Russia’s Oil And Gas Industry.”

Against these targets even a few ounces of explosives delivered directly to the target can initiate the secondary explosion that will destroy the target.

T.X. Hammes

Fellow

Thomas X. Hammes

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Conflict Defense Industry

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Requirements for nuclear deterrence and arms control in a two-nuclear-peer environment

Greg Weaver and Amy Woolf — Fri, 02 Feb 2024 17:24:28 +0000

I. US deterrence requirements in the coming two-nuclear peer threat

Foreword

II. Arms control opportunities in the emerging near-nuclear peer environment

Series conclusion

About the authors

The views expressed in these papers are those of the authors alone and do not necessarily reflect the official positions of the US government, the Department of Defense, the Department of Energy, the National Nuclear Security Administration, Los Alamos National Laboratory, or any other entity.

Foreword

After decades of seeking to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in international relations, the United States is now grappling with a global landscape marked by intense strategic competition and the growing salience of nuclear weapons—problems that will likely persist for years to come. Over the past year, Russia compounded its aggression in Ukraine with nuclear saber-rattling, modernizing and expanding its nuclear forces over the past decade. Furthermore, Russia’s possession of a substantial inventory of theater nuclear weapons continues to threaten regional deterrence. Meanwhile, in Asia, Beijing is pursuing an unprecedented surge in its nuclear capabilities. If current trends persist, China is projected to possess about 1,500 nuclear warheads by 2035.¹ While China was once viewed as a secondary nuclear power, its substantial investment in its nuclear arsenal—including the launch of a third ballistic missile early-warning satellite in 2022 and advancements in land-based ballistic missiles, aircraft, submarines, and hypersonic missiles—positions China to become a near-equal nuclear power in the coming decade. These trends mark a historic shift. For the first time in its history, the United States must face two near-peer nuclear competitors simultaneously.

At the same time, Russia’s suspension of its compliance with the New START agreement in 2023 has significantly weakened the last strategic arms control framework established in the Cold War and post-Cold War eras. This move leaves scant provisions governing the future of nuclear capabilities among the United States and its adversaries. For over half a century, Washington and Moscow negotiated to establish treaties that imposed limits on their nuclear arsenals, aiming to manage their nuclear rivalry and mitigate the risk of nuclear conflict. This process served the national security interests of both sides by curbing weapons and activities that could jeopardize deterrence, safeguarding strategic stability, offering insights into nuclear capacities, and potentially steering military competition toward less perilous avenues. However, shifts in the global security landscape have altered this calculus. The Russian Federation, much like the Soviet Union before it, has insisted that future agreements factor in the nuclear capabilities of Britain and France. On the other hand, the United States now confronts a security environment featuring two nuclear-armed adversaries—Russia and China—whose forces will potentially pose significant threats to the United States and its allies.

This evolving security landscape may prompt the United States to reevaluate its assessments of its deterrence and arms control requirements. But how should the United States approach this problem?

The papers below address the intricate challenge of maintaining nuclear deterrence through force structure and arms control requirements. They offer insights into these complex issues, each informed by two workshops attended by both technical and policy experts in the spring and summer of 2023, all supported by Los Alamos National Laboratory. The first paper, authored by Greg Weaver, examines the future of force requirements in this two-peer nuclear environment, arguing that the United States must reexamine its force structure to effectively deter China and Russia simultaneously. Weaver outlines the deterrence requirements for deterring both large-scale nuclear and conventional aggression and limited nuclear attack in a two-peer environment, and concludes that the United States may require a larger arsenal of deployed nuclear warheads than the 1,550 allowed by the New START Treaty, along with additional delivery systems like a nuclear-armed, sea-launched cruise missile, to effectively deter conflicts with both China and Russia simultaneously.

The second paper, authored by Amy Woolf, addresses the future of arms control by examining the future utility of stability dialogues and risk-reduction measures, instead of numerically binding treaties. Woolf finds that although stability discussions and measures for risk reduction could assist these three nations in lowering the likelihood of nuclear employment, they are unlikely to engage in negotiations for treaties or agreements that impose restrictions on the scale of their nuclear capabilities or provide insight into their plans. Together, this series will provide preliminary lessons and recommendations for the future of deterrence and arms control as the United States determines how to respond to this two-peer environment.

Whether or not one finds the specific proposals offered by each author compelling, it is clear that US and allied policy must be composed of both deterrence and arms control options. Since the 1970s, each major US nuclear modernization program has been accompanied by an arms control proposal, and each nuclear arms control treaty has been backed by tangible capabilities.

Robert Soofer, PhD
Senior Fellow, Forward Defense
Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security
Atlantic Council

William Tobey, MPP
Director, Office of National
Security and International Studies
Los Alamos National Laboratory

Part I: US deterrence requirements in the coming two-nuclear-peer threat environment

Introduction

A large-scale nuclear attack on the US homeland poses the only existential military threat to the United States. The nation relies on nuclear deterrence to prevent this threat. This makes nuclear deterrence the highest priority mission of the US military and the foundation of US national security strategy. If the nation fails at this mission, no other mission matters.²

US nuclear deterrence strategy and practice have arguably prevented nuclear war and contributed to preventing large-scale conventional war between nuclear-armed states as well. While correlation is not causation, the absence of nuclear or large-scale war between major powers since 1945 is difficult to explain without considering the role of nuclear deterrence in general, and US nuclear deterrence in particular.

However, the strategic circumstances in which US nuclear deterrence strategy and practice have operated are changing rapidly. Throughout the nuclear age, the United States designed its nuclear deterrence strategy, and shaped and sized its nuclear forces, to address the Russian nuclear threat, treating other nuclear adversaries (i.e., from China and North Korea) as “lesser included threats.” A US nuclear force structured and sized to address Russia had sufficient capability to address the lesser included threats as well, even after a nuclear war with Russia.

China, however, is deliberately and rapidly changing this equation, building up its nuclear forces on a scale and at a pace not seen since the US-Soviet arms race of the 1960s and 1970s. But, unlike during the Cold War, China is the only one racing in the US-China nuclear relationship. Declassified US intelligence assessments state that China’s nuclear stockpile will reach rough quantitative parity with currently planned US-deployed nuclear warheads by the mid-2030s (e.g., approximately 1,500 weapons by 2035), if China continues on its current trajectory.³ Should this assessment prove accurate, this means the United States will face two peer nuclear adversaries for the first time in the nuclear age in just over a decade.⁴

A Chinese DF-5B ICBM following the 2015 China Victory Day parade. Credit: Wikimedia user IceUnshattered.

This paper examines how US deterrence requirements will be affected by this coming two-nuclear-peer threat environment. First, it lays out four key assumptions which undergird the analysis. Second, it examines the complex nature of the future two-peer threat. Third, it identifies the critical US deterrence objectives in that two-peer environment. Finally, it examines what will be required to achieve those objectives.

Key assumptions

This analysis makes four assumptions regarding the two-nuclear-peer deterrence problem:

In the two-nuclear-peer environment, deterrence will continue to be a function of decisively influencing an adversary leadership’s decision calculus by affecting its assessment of the benefits and costs of taking the action one seeks to deter, and of the benefits and costs of continued restraint from taking that action. The way deterrence works will not change.
Deterring aggression and escalation is based on affecting an adversary’s assessment of the likely outcome of such military actions. Thus, while other factors contribute to deterrence, the perceived ability to fight and win a conflict below the level of large-scale nuclear exchanges is critical to deterrence success. Warfighting capability matters.⁵
No major power can achieve a measure of nuclear superiority sufficient to win a large-scale nuclear war without sustaining existential-level damage against technically sophisticated and well-resourced major-power adversaries. In a conflict between nuclear-armed major powers, mutually assured destruction is a condition, not a strategy.
While North Korea’s nuclear forces will continue to grow, they will not expand sufficiently to prevent US strategy from treating North Korea as a lesser included case of the Russia-China nuclear threat.

China is rapidly becoming a nuclear peer

China’s rapid nuclear buildup is comprehensive, including both strategic and theater-range forces and the addition of an array of new capabilities. China is fielding a triad of strategic nuclear delivery systems, adopting a launch under attack (LUA) posture for its intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) force, and has tested potentially destabilizing new intercontinental range systems (e.g., fractional or multiple orbital bombardment systems [FOBS/MOBS] that could threaten a potentially unwarned preemptive attack on the United States). For the first time, China is developing survivable theater nuclear forces capable of conducting low-yield precision strikes on US and allied/partner forces and infrastructure across East Asia.

Whether China is pursuing nuclear parity with or superiority over the United States is unclear. It also is unclear why Chinese leadership is doing so. China may have decided to change the role of nuclear weapons in its national security strategy by adopting an expanded theater nuclear war-fighting role and/or a counterforce role against US nuclear forces backed by national missile defenses. The force that China is building is not necessary to enable its traditional minimum deterrence/“no first use” strategy.⁶

Neither a change in Chinese nuclear strategy nor the larger and more diverse Chinese nuclear force to implement it were envisioned when the US nuclear modernization program was designed.⁷

China is also rapidly modernizing and expanding its conventional forces, which pose an increasing threat to US forces and allies/partners in Asia. By the 2030s, China’s conventional military buildup could flip the conventional military balance in Asia. This potential conventional imbalance could undermine deterrence of Chinese aggression by itself, but the impact would be exacerbated if China were contemplating either opportunistic aggression in the context of an already ongoing theater conflict between Russia and NATO, or collaborative Chinese-Russian aggression in both theaters.

Finally, China is rapidly fielding new nonnuclear strategic capabilities in space and cyberspace. These capabilities have the potential to deny or diminish US conventional forces’ ability to project power effectively, and possibly threaten US nuclear command and control.

The RT-2PM2, also known as the Topol-M, is a Russian intercontinental ballistic missile that entered service in the 1990s. Credit: Wikipedia User Stanislav Kozlovskiy

The Russian threat post-Ukraine

Even following its costly invasion of Ukraine, Russia remains a nuclear peer of the United States, one which may engage in further conventional aggression and nuclear coercion or use in the future. Russia has the largest deployed nuclear force of any state today. This is likely to remain true through 2035. Russia continues to expand its theater nuclear forces, increasing its existing advantage over NATO.

Russian strategy and doctrine envision limited first use of theater nuclear weapons to coerce war termination on terms acceptable to Russia if losing a conventional war, and larger scale use of theater nuclear forces to defeat NATO conventional forces, if coercive nuclear use fails. Russian strategy relies on strategic nuclear forces to deter a large-scale US nuclear response against the Russian homeland while Russia escalates to limited nuclear war in theater. Thus, Russian strategy indicates the Russian leadership believes that limited nuclear use is unlikely to escalate out of control.⁸

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine demonstrates both a propensity to take risk and to miscalculate while doing so, which makes Russian opportunistic or collaborative aggression against NATO states on its periphery a serious threat despite the dismal performance of Russian conventional forces in Ukraine. Those forces’ performance is likely to increase Russian reliance on nuclear weapons, increasing the probability of Russian limited nuclear first use early in a conflict with NATO. Reconstituted Russian conventional forces, while inferior to fully reinforced NATO forces, will continue to have a space/time advantage against NATO states on Russia’s periphery, potentially enabling them to occupy such states’ territory in a fait d’accompli before NATO forces can mobilize in their defense. The Russians might then threaten limited nuclear escalation to deter or defeat a NATO counteroffensive to restore the territorial status quo ante. Russia also continues to expand its space, cyber, and conventional deep precision strike capabilities to deny NATO forces critical enablers and to derive coercive leverage from threats to NATO critical infrastructure.

The unique nature of the two-nuclear-peer threat

If China’s nuclear buildup continues on its current trajectory, the United States will face two nuclear-peer adversaries for the first time in the mid-2030s. Russia and China will together pose an unprecedented threat to US defense strategy. The United States has yet to even substantively grapple with the implications of this two-nuclear-peer threat, much less effectively address it.

Facing China alone as a nuclear peer will alter the strategic landscape in the Asia-Pacific region. But the Russian-Chinese “friendship without limits” will pose qualitatively new threats of opportunistic or cooperative two-theater aggression.

Neither the 2018 US National Defense Strategy (NDS) nor the 2022 NDS adequately address this threat. As noted in the 2018 Commission on the National Defense Strategy’s assessment of the 2018 NDS:

The Department has largely abandoned the longstanding “two war” construct for a “one major war” sizing and shaping construct. In the event of large-scale conflict with Russia or China, the United States may not have sufficient remaining resources to deter other adversaries in one—let alone two—other theaters by denying them the ability to accomplish their objectives without relying on nuclear weapons.
National Defense Strategy Commission, Providing for the Common Defense: The Assessments and Recommendations of the National Defense Strategy Commission, November 13, 2018, 20.

The 2022 NDS also adopts a “one major war” sizing construct. And while both the 2022 NDS and the 2022 Nuclear Posture Review hint at reliance on US nuclear forces to deter opportunistic aggression by a second nuclear peer, neither document advocates for the US conventional and nuclear forces that will be required to do so when facing two nuclear peers in the mid-2030s.⁹

Failing to address this problem has the potential to undermine deterrence, especially deterrence of opportunistic aggression in a second theater or collaborative Russian and Chinese aggression in Europe and Asia simultaneously. Failing to address these threats because some deem them improbable will have the perverse effect of making them more likely.¹⁰

In this broader strategic context, facing a second nuclear peer poses several unique challenges to US nuclear strategy, force posture, and force structure.

A Chinese nuclear peer creates new first-strike threats that the United States must address to preserve sufficient assured second-strike capability to enable US deterrence strategy. The first new threat is a China-only preemptive counterforce strike on US nuclear forces. The much larger and more capable Chinese nuclear force of the mid-2030s will almost certainly include multiple warhead ICBMs with sufficient accuracy to destroy the US ICBM force, augmented by Chinese counter-space and cyber capabilities, potentially capable of denying the launch warning necessary to enable a US LUA option to preserve ICBM survivability. Chinese nuclear forces may also include FOBS/MOBS capable of conducting a strike on US national leadership and nuclear command and control and warning systems with little to no warning. Finally, China’s intense interest in artificial intelligence (AI), quantum computing, and autonomous systems research might lead to unexpected breakthroughs in antisubmarine warfare (ASW) that could pose a threat to US ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs).

An LGM-30 Minuteman III, a US ICBM, is launched as part of a test at Vandenberg Air Force Base, California. Credit: US Air Force

A Chinese nuclear peer also creates the potential for a collaborative preemptive counterforce strike by China and Russia simultaneously. This scenario not only significantly increases the number of nuclear weapons the United States might face in a first strike on its nuclear forces, but also combines the most threatening features of future Russian and Chinese nuclear capabilities in all relevant domains. Given current capabilities, the potential increase in threat numbers alone is unlikely to increase the first-strike threat to US nuclear forces significantly, because both Russia and China will independently have sufficient forces to target everything that is currently targetable. But, should there be a breakthrough in ASW that allows small-area (but not precise) geolocation of SSBNs at sea, then barrage attacks requiring larger numbers of weapons could become a relevant threat to the most survivable portion of the US nuclear deterrent.

The growth in Chinese nuclear forces also significantly increases the number of nuclear counterforce targets for US forces to potentially hold at risk to either deter aggression and escalation and/or to achieve other US objectives if deterrence fails.¹¹

These collective challenges posed by the future two-peer threat environment have important impacts on US future deterrence and assurance requirements.

A Patriot M903 launcher station at Eielson Air Force Base in Alaska. Credit: Senior Airman Joseph P. LeVeille, US Air Force

Determining US deterrence requirements for the two-nuclear-peer environment

To determine US deterrence requirements for the two-nuclear-peer environment one must identify whom we seek to deter from doing what under what conditions. The United States (and its allies and partners) must be able to achieve the following deterrence objectives against China and Russia:

Deter large-scale conventional aggression.
Deter limited nuclear escalation.
Deter large-scale nuclear attack.

Regarding the circumstances in which those objectives must be achieved, the United States (and its allies and partners) must be able to do so in three basic scenarios:

Deter either adversary alone.
Deter opportunistic aggression by one adversary while already at war against the other.
Deter simultaneous collaborative aggression by both adversaries.

US strategy for achieving these deterrence objectives must be tailored to decisively influence the unique decision calculus of Chinese leaders and of Russian leaders. This requires a strategy and supporting force structure and posture that can credibly defeat their respective “theories of victory” by denying them their objectives and imposing costs that far exceed what benefits they can achieve through aggression or escalation.

Deterring large-scale conventional aggression

Deterring conventional aggression by Russia or China individually is conceptually simple but operationally complex. The United States and its allies and partners must be perceived by Moscow or Beijing as willing and capable of fighting and winning a large-scale conventional conflict. This requires conventional military superiority applied in a way that defeats the adversary’s strategy.

But there is an additional element required to deter large-scale conventional aggression by a nuclear peer adversary: one must also convince such an adversary that it cannot escalate its way out of failed conventional aggression through nuclear means to force war termination on terms either favorable or acceptable to the adversary. Thus, the second deterrence objective of deterring limited nuclear escalation contributes directly to achieving the first deterrence objective as well.

But what about deterring opportunistic or collaborative large-scale conventional aggression? This is a much tougher challenge, requiring US, allied, and partner conventional superiority and the ability to deter limited nuclear escalation in both theaters.

Because the US forces required to achieve conventional superiority in Asia are somewhat different from those required to do so in Europe, there are potential adjustments to US and allied and partner conventional force structure and posture that could achieve superiority in both theaters.

The primary operational limitation on the ability of the United States to fight and win in both theaters simultaneously is logistics: the strategic airlift and sealift needed to get required forces where they need to be and then sustain them in combat, with sufficient stocks of advanced conventional munitions. There also are critical “low-density, high-demand” US military capabilities that would be in short supply in a two-theater conflict, including bombers; integrated air and missile defenses (IAMD); tanker aircraft; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities; and ASW capabilities.

Fixing this would require a shared understanding of the two-nuclear-peer threat among the United States and its allies and partners in Europe and Asia; significant increases in US, allied, and partner military spending; and an agreement on how to optimize the military capabilities of multiple nations in each theater.

The bottom line is that US allies and partners would have to agree to provide much more conventional capability more efficiently, without perceiving the US request to do so as signaling a reduced US commitment to their defense in either theater.

If the United States and its allies and partners cannot (or will not) maintain conventional superiority in a second theater conflict, deterring or defeating opportunistic or collaborative aggression will require reliance on nuclear weapons to counter adversary conventional superiority in the second theater. US nuclear forces do not currently play such a role, and the force the United States currently plans is not designed to play this role.

US ability to deter large-scale conventional aggression through increased reliance on nuclear weapons to compensate for conventional inferiority is greater against China than it is against Russia for several reasons.

First, during a possible amphibious invasion of Taiwan, China’s forces would be highly vulnerable to US limited nuclear use. And while China might well use nuclear weapons in response, China’s ability to seize Taiwan after sustaining a nuclear attack on its amphibious forces would be negated for years. Thus, Chinese nuclear counterescalation would not enable Beijing to achieve its original geopolitical objectives in the near term, while risking further nuclear escalation, including potentially uncontrolled escalation.¹²

Chinese People’s Liberation Army – Navy ship Changbaishan (LSD-989) at Nieuwe Waterweg, Rotterdam. Credit: Wikimedia user kees torn.

Compensating for NATO conventional inferiority with nuclear weapons to deter Russian opportunistic or collaborative aggression is more problematic. Russia’s growing theater nuclear force advantage would be extremely difficult to overcome in a way that would make such a US strategy credible, especially given the fact that Russian conventional operations would not be uniquely vulnerable to nuclear attack. However, given the performance of Russian conventional forces in Ukraine, it is reasonable to believe that increased, optimized conventional force contributions by European NATO allies combined with more prepositioning of US heavy ground force equipment in Europe could maintain NATO conventional superiority even if a Russia-NATO conflict began after the United States was engaged in a war against China in Asia.

So what are the key deterrence requirements for this deterrence objective?

The best military option is for the United States and its allies and partners to maintain conventional superiority over China and Russia in both theaters simultaneously. This can be done. But it is unclear whether it will be done, given the political and financial costs of doing so. A strategy that requires such conventional superiority in both theaters that is not supported by forces credibly capable of enabling it risks deterrence failure. In that event, the United States and its allies and partners would incur the much higher costs of fighting (and potentially losing) a major power war, and risk escalation to large-scale nuclear war.

If the United States and its allies and partners do not achieve two-theater conventional superiority, then the United States should increase reliance on nuclear weapons to deter large-scale opportunistic or collaborative conventional aggression in Asia while working with its NATO allies to ensure NATO conventional superiority even in the face of a two-theater war. In either case, it will be essential that the United States bolsters its ability to deter limited nuclear escalation in both theaters to enhance deterrence of large-scale conventional aggression by China and/or Russia. If either Beijing or Moscow perceives a viable option to escalate its way out of failed conventional aggression, it will be more likely to risk such a conventional attack.

Deterring limited nuclear escalation

When facing a peer nuclear adversary with a secure second-strike capability that poses an existential threat to the United States, deterrence of limited nuclear escalation requires the perceived ability of the United States, allies, and partners to persevere in the face of adversary limited nuclear escalation without being politically coerced into accepting war termination on the adversary’s terms, and without being decisively militarily disadvantaged. That requires a set of US nuclear capabilities that are militarily relevant in such a conflict. Current Russian theater nuclear capabilities are designed to be just that. The ongoing evolution of Chinese theater nuclear capabilities indicates that Chinese planners may now understand this as well.

The core requirement for deterring limited nuclear escalation in a war with a nuclear peer is a flexible response strategy that credibly convinces the adversary’s leadership that limited nuclear escalation:

Does not provide effective insurance against miscalculating about US and allied capability, resolve, and cohesion in the face of conventional aggression (as Moscow clearly concluded vis-à-vis Ukraine).
Will not result in war termination on its terms.
Runs the risk of uncontrolled escalation because the United States and its allies are visibly prepared for what nuclear scholar Thomas Schelling called a “competition in risk-taking” to defend their vital interests.

An effective flexible response strategy must be enabled by US, allied, and partner nuclear and conventional forces that are capable of three key things:

Providing a robust range of credible response options that can restore deterrence by convincing adversary leadership it has miscalculated in a dire way, that further use of nuclear weapons will not achieve its objectives, and that it will incur costs that far exceed any benefits it can achieve.
Countering the military impact of adversary theater nuclear use.
Continuing to operate effectively to achieve US, allied, and partner objectives in a limited nuclear use environment.

To meet these requirements the United States needs a range of continuously forward-deployed, survivable theater nuclear forces that can reliably penetrate adversary defenses with a range of explosive yields, and on operationally relevant delivery timelines. Based on these attributes, currently planned US theater nuclear capabilities are not sufficient for the two-peer threat the United States faces. Completing the modernization of NATO’s dual-capable fighter aircraft capabilities is necessary but not sufficient to meet this requirement. NATO’s planned theater nuclear forces are too small, insufficiently survivable, and insufficiently militarily relevant. The United States currently plans no continuously forward-deployed theater nuclear capabilities in the Asia-Pacific theater whatsoever, despite the rapid growth of Chinese theater nuclear capabilities and indications that China is changing its nuclear strategy.

US strategic nuclear forces alone cannot fill this gap because they lack the flexibility and timeliness necessary to convince the Russian or Chinese leadership that the United States and its allies are credibly prepared to counter limited nuclear first use with militarily effective nuclear responses of their own. Bombers based in the continental United States cannot deliver nuclear weapons on operationally relevant timelines in many scenarios and are vulnerable to preemptive attack if deployed forward in the theater.

The United States should supplement dual-capable fighter modernization with at least one additional survivable, continuously forward-deployed, selectable-yield delivery system with a higher probability of penetrating advanced defenses and delivering nuclear weapons to targets in the European and Asia-Pacific theaters on operationally relevant timelines. There are several candidate systems that could meet this requirement, but a US nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missile (SLCM-N) deployed on attack submarines would provide all these attributes in a highly effective manner.

Deterring large-scale nuclear attack

US strategy for deterring large-scale nuclear attack has always been to ensure that US nuclear forces can inflict unacceptable damage on any adversary under any circumstances.

Inflicting unacceptable damage against China and Russia simultaneously requires being able to destroy what both adversaries value most under any circumstances, including following a combined Chinese-Russian preemptive counterforce strike on US nuclear forces and their command and control. This begs two key questions:

What do the Chinese and Russian leaderships value most?
How many US nuclear weapons must survive a combined future Chinese-Russian counterforce attack to be able to credibly hold at risk what both adversaries most value?

During the Cold War, the United States assessed that the Soviet leadership most valued its ability to exercise control over the Soviet state, its war-supporting industry, and its military forces, including its strategic nuclear forces. Whether this remains the correct equation to deter a Chinese and/or Russian large-scale nuclear attack on the United States is largely a question for the intelligence community.

If the intelligence community assesses the United States must hold Chinese and Russian nuclear forces at substantial risk to deter a large-scale nuclear attack, then the United States must carefully evaluate the level and nature of US nuclear counterforce capability required to deter such an attack and modify its planned nuclear force structure accordingly. Given the scale of China’s nuclear force expansion, the currently planned US nuclear force will clearly be insufficient to address two-peer adversaries in this way.

However, two other issues regarding the need for US nuclear counterforce capabilities are questions of political-military strategy, not intelligence assessment. The first is whether holding a peer adversary’s nuclear forces at risk contributes significantly to deterring limited nuclear escalation by making the US will to engage in a competition in risk-taking more credible. The second is whether holding a peer adversary’s nuclear forces at risk is necessary to limit meaningfully the damage Russia and China can do to the United States and its allies if deterrence of large-scale nuclear attack fails.

Even if the United States determines it does not need to hold Chinese and Russian nuclear forces at substantial risk to deter a large-scale nuclear attack, the United States should still evaluate the level and nature of US nuclear counterforce capabilities required to achieve these other two political-military objectives and modify its planned nuclear force structure accordingly. Most analysts believe the most likely path to a large-scale nuclear war is limited nuclear escalation that results from large-scale conventional conflict between nuclear-armed adversaries. Thus, if such counterforce capability contributes to deterring limited nuclear escalation, and thus also contributes to deterring large-scale conventional aggression, it indirectly contributes to preventing large-scale nuclear attack, even if it is not necessary to deter such an attack directly.

Conclusion

The advent of the two-nuclear-peer threat means the United States must reevaluate the size and composition of the nuclear force it will need to credibly deter both China and Russia from initiating large-scale conventional aggression, escalating to limited nuclear use, and launching a large-scale nuclear attack.

China’s impending nuclear-peer status means that the United States can no longer treat the Chinese nuclear threat as a “lesser included case” of the Russian nuclear threat. It is a US national security imperative that the full implications of the impending two-peer threat identified in this paper be seriously addressed in the near term.

Why is this an urgent imperative? Because if US strategy to address the two-peer threat requires a US nuclear force that is larger in size, different in composition, or both, decisions need to be made in the near term (one to three years) to supplement the planned US nuclear modernization program, or the nation will not have the required additional capabilities in time to address the threat. The current and planned capacity of the US nuclear weapons enterprise, under the purview of both the DOD and the Department of Energy, severely limits the nation’s ability to supplement the planned modernization program significantly in a timely way.

To reevaluate the size and composition of the nuclear force needed to address the coming two-peer threat, the full US national security community—including those who do and those who do not normally focus on nuclear weapons issues—needs to answer three key questions about the future role of nuclear weapons in US strategy and the conventional and nuclear forces required to implement that strategy:

What is the strategic rationale for believing that the nuclear modernization program of record that was adopted in 2010, before Russian aggression against Ukraine in 2014 and 2022, and before China’s ongoing and rapid nuclear force expansion, will be sufficient to address a 2030s security environment that poses the threat of conflict with two-peer nuclear adversaries simultaneously?
Are the United States and its allies and partners likely to decide to bear the sustained political and financial costs necessary to build sufficient conventional forces to deter and defeat both Russia and China simultaneously?
Why would a nuclear weapons design and production infrastructure designed to just barely be able to maintain the existing US nuclear force be sufficient to provide what the nation needs in a potentially unconstrained nuclear competition with two-peer nuclear adversaries who are technically sophisticated, well-resourced, and geostrategicaly aligned, if not allied?

Part II: Arms control opportunities in the emerging two-nuclear-peer environment

By Amy F. Woolf

This issue brief¹³ considers whether and how the emerging challenge of two near-equal nuclear-armed adversaries might affect the US nuclear posture. This changing security environment may alter US assessments of its nuclear requirements, affecting both the size and structure of the US nuclear arsenal. The presence of two near-equal nuclear adversaries might also raise new questions about whether arms control can help manage the nuclear competition with Russia and China to ease US concerns about emerging threats and mitigate the need for a more robust US nuclear force posture.

While this paper briefly addresses the prospects for arms control with Russia, the core of this inquiry is the question of whether the United States can engage China in an arms control process that restricts the scope of China’s nuclear modernization program, and, therefore, the magnitude of a potential US response. In its simple form, this question asks whether China might agree to limit the size and scope of its arsenal in exchange for limits on the numbers or capabilities of US nuclear weapons. This would seem to mirror the US-Soviet and US-Russian arms control experience where the nations signed several treaties that limited and, eventually, reduced their numbers of deployed nuclear warheads.

But the United States and Soviet Union developed their arms control relationship and crafted the tools they used to manage their nuclear competition over more than fifty years of negotiations. They only agreed to reduce their numbers of deployed nuclear weapons once their political and security relationship had changed in ways that reduced their nuclear requirements. Arms control treaties that codified reductions in their numbers of nuclear weapons were the result, not the cause, of that changing political relationship.

The United States and China almost certainly will not begin their arms control relationship in the same place that the United States and Russia reached after fifty years—with formal treaties that limited their numbers of deployed weapons. Nor can the United States expect China to accept limits on its nuclear capabilities as long as it believes it needs to expand those capabilities to meet its national security requirements. Therefore, this paper looks beyond the question of whether and how to impose numerical limits on Russian or Chinese nuclear forces and considers other forms of cooperation that might ease US concerns about emerging threats and, therefore, mitigate the need for a more robust US nuclear force posture.

President Ford and Soviet Secretary Brezhnev sign a Joint Communique on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms in 1974. Credit: Gerald R. Ford White House Photographs

Prospects for arms control with Russia

The United States and Russia are unlikely to reach an agreement on a formal treaty retaining current limits or imposing further reductions on their deployed nuclear forces before the New START agreement expires in 2026. Although the United States seems willing to move forward with negotiations, it is unclear whether that these discussions will resume before the conflict in Ukraine ends. In June 2023, Jake Sullivan, President Joseph R. Biden’s national security advisor, said that “rather than waiting to resolve all our bilateral differences, the United States is ready to engage Russia now to manage nuclear risks and develop a post-2026 arms control framework.”¹⁴ Russia, however, has rejected this approach. Sergey Ryabkov, Russia’s deputy foreign minister, has blamed Russia’s suspension of New START participation on “the totality of circumstances related to the destructive and hostile actions of the United States.” In response to Sullivan’s statement, he said that “there is simply no basis for a productive discussion here, but we are ready to patiently state our approaches and explain why the US course is destructive.”¹⁵

Differences in the US and Russian priorities for a treaty to replace New START would further complicate their ability to complete a new treaty before New START expires. The United States has suggested that the subsequent agreement “sustain limits . . . on the Russian systems covered under new START . . . limit the new kinds of nuclear systems Russia is developing; and . . . address all Russian nuclear weapons, including theater-range weapons.”¹⁶ Russia, in contrast, wants the arms control process to “cover the entire spectrum of offensive and defensive, nuclear and non-nuclear weapons with a strategic potential.” This list includes offensive nuclear and conventional strategic weapons, ballistic missile defenses, space-based capabilities that could strike targets on Earth, and the nuclear weapons of the United Kingdom and France.¹⁷ It would likely take more than the short time remaining before 2026 to resolve differences and conclude a treaty.

The United States and Russia might find common ground if they seek to establish broad goals for cooperation while identifying specific measures to help manage risks and uncertainties created by their nuclear postures. Some analysts have suggested that they could maintain predictability and transparency by pledging to maintain their forces at the levels mandated in New START and to resume exchanging data on the numbers and locations of their deployed strategic weapons. They could also bolster their communication channels, like those established to ensure deconfliction in and around Syria, to reduce the risk of misunderstandings and misperceptions that could lead to inadvertent escalation.

Informal steps designed to demonstrate restraint and avoid miscalculations would, however, be less comprehensive than those mandated by formal treaties and would almost certainly lapse if either side sought additional forces to meet its national security requirements. Nevertheless, voluntary efforts at cooperation, new negotiations to reinvigorate existing communications channels, and consultations to identify new risk reduction measures could help the two sides forestall worst-case assessments and resist arms race pressures until security conditions improved and formal negotiations resumed.

Prospects for arms control with China

US officials have raised concerns about China’s growing nuclear arsenal and the potential that a regional crisis could spark a conflict that might escalate to nuclear war. In response to these concerns, during their meeting in November 2021, President Biden invited China’s President Xi Jinping to participate in a strategic stability dialogue that would establish “common-sense guardrails to ensure that competition does not veer into conflict and to keep lines of communication open.”¹⁸ According to the Biden White House, these talks would focus, at first, “on avoiding accidental conflict, then on each nation’s nuclear strategy and the related instability that could come from attacks in cyberspace and outer space,” before eventually providing a venue for more formal arms control negotiations.¹⁹

The five Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) nuclear-weapon states holding a joint press conference in 2013. Credit: Eric Bridiers, US Mission

China has embraced some forms of arms control, participating in multilateral negotiations and engaging in the P5 process—which brings together the five nuclear weapon states (NWS) recognized by the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States)—to address nuclear security and nonproliferation issues. In this context, Beijing has advocated for the “five nuclear-weapon States . . . to further strengthen communication on strategic stability and conduct in-depth dialogue on reducing the role of nuclear weapons in their national security doctrines and on a broad range of issues, including missile defense, outer space, cyberspace, and artificial intelligence.”²⁰

China has, however, been reticent about joining strategic stability talks with the United States and has expressly rejected negotiations toward an agreement that would require transparency into or limits on its nuclear forces, citing the significant disparity between the numbers of US, Russian, and Chinese nuclear warheads. According to Ambassador Fu Cong, then-director-general of the Department of Arms Control at the PRC’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “the countries with the largest nuclear arsenals should further conduct significant and substantive reduction in their nuclear arsenals in a verifiable, irreversible and legally binding manner. This will create conditions for other nuclear-weapon States to join the nuclear disarmament process.”²¹ Fu, who is now Chinese ambassador to the European Union, also argued that transparency would undermine China’s strategic capability because China is “faced with a strategic competitor [with] 6000 nuclear warheads” who is also “developing missile defense, deploying all these missiles defense system around China, [and] talking about deploying the intermediate-range missiles around China.”²²

The US government has estimated that China’s nuclear stockpile will grow to around 1,500 warheads by 2035.²³ Some see this as an opening for arms control because the number would be similar to the New START limit of 1,550 deployed warheads on US and Russian long-range delivery systems. But the New START agreement does not count all US and Russian weapons; their stockpiles contain around 3,700 and 4,000 warheads, respectively. Moreover, New START expires in 2026, after which the United States and Russia could expand their numbers of deployed strategic nuclear forces, leading to far more than 1,550 deployed warheads on each side by the time China’s stockpile reaches 1,500 warheads in the mid-2030s. Thus, whether one counts deployed warheads on strategic delivery vehicles or total stockpiles, China’s deployed forces in 2026 and its stockpile of warheads in 2035 could still fall below those of the United States and Russia.

Still, a strategic stability dialogue like the one mentioned in the statement following the Biden-Xi summit in 2021 might create a pathway for engagement if the United States remains interested and China agrees to participate. The key to progress, however, depends on the issues on the agenda and the incentives the United States provides to bring China to the table.²⁴ For example, China may be more willing to participate if the agenda extends beyond nuclear weapons and focuses on other capabilities, like ballistic missile defenses and conventional strategic strike systems, that China believes undermine its security. China might also be more willing to discuss the implications of its nuclear modernization program if the United States acknowledges that China’s nuclear deterrent poses a credible threat to the United States and places the two nations in a “mutually vulnerable” deterrence relationship. As a matter of policy, the United States has long refused to acknowledge this reality, in part because it could undermine allies’ confidence in the US extended nuclear deterrent. Still, the absence of an acknowledgment also serves to convince China that the United States is seeking “absolute security,” rather than mutual deterrence, with its nuclear weapons.

The two nations could also seek to identify and implement crisis management, communications, and risk reduction measures to address the risk that regional crises might escalate to nuclear war. For example, a missile launch notification agreement might reduce the risk that either nation misunderstands the purpose of a missile test flight, then responds with additional military action. Measures that restrain dangerous air operations or encounters at sea could also reduce the risk of inadvertent engagements and escalation during a crisis. China has been unwilling to engage in direct government-to-government discussions on these types of issues in the past, but, in the current security environment, this type of dialogue might serve as a starting point for a more fulsome arms control relationship.

US President Joseph Biden and Chinese President Xi Jinping meet on the sidelines of the G20 Summit in Indonesia in November 2021. Credit: The White House

Conclusion

The United States, Russia, and China are unlikely to accept restrictions on their numbers of deployed nuclear weapons as long as each continues to center nuclear weapons in its national security strategy, and all believe the threats in the current international security environment increase the salience of nuclear weapons. Moreover, they are unlikely to find an acceptable agenda for negotiations until each is willing to address the others’ concerns about threatening activities or capabilities. Even if they clear these two hurdles, they are unlikely to succeed in talks that focus on nuclear reductions if each believes that it needs to modernize and possibly expand the size of its nuclear stockpile to achieve its security objectives.

A process focused on transparency, communication, and risk reduction measures could provide a path forward, even if it did not lead to nuclear reductions. It would not, however, be without complications. While the United States believes that steps to reduce the risk of nuclear war have value, Russia and China might believe that the risk would be worth taking in the future if it would help coerce the United States to disengage from a conflict. Nuclear weapons make this type of risk-tolerant strategy all the more dangerous. Nevertheless, an agenda focusing on communications and risk reduction might reduce the pressure to increase the number of nuclear weapons.

Series conclusion

Nuclear weapons represent both the greatest threat to US national survival and a central tool in US defense and national security strategy. The potential for horrific destruction in even a limited nuclear attack has underlain the US doctrine of nuclear deterrence, for which the United States has sought to maintain a nuclear force posture sufficient to deny any potential adversary its objectives if it employed nuclear weapons and to ensure that the costs of a conflict that escalated to nuclear use would be unacceptably high for that adversary.

During the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union recognized that either side’s efforts to expand its own capabilities could not only introduce new threats for the other, but also create instabilities that might add to the risk of nuclear use in a crisis or conflict. Thus, these states pursued discussions to better understand their planned nuclear force structures and to identify potential sources of instability in the nuclear balance. For the United States, this arms control process was part of its national security toolbox, as the negotiations produced agreements that restrained the size and scope of the Soviet and Russian nuclear force, offered transparency and predictability into potential future developments, and allowed the United States to plan its own nuclear programs without relying on worst-case assessments of Soviet and Russian plans.

In the years following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the size and structure of the US nuclear force, the guidance and employment plans that would direct use of nuclear weapons, and the circumstances under which the United States would consider employing them evolved to reflect positive changes in the international security environment. But the last decade has seen concerns about nuclear weapons and great power rivalry return to the scene. The United States is now engaged in a security environment where it might face conflicts with two nuclear-armed nations at the same time. As Russia and China modernize and expand their nuclear forces, the United States must again consider how to alter the size and structure of its nuclear forces and whether cooperation through arms control can mitigate the need for a more robust US nuclear posture.

The two papers in this study offer answers to both sides of this problem. The first paper concludes that the United States will likely need a greater number of deployed nuclear warheads than the 1,550 permitted under the New START Treaty and additional, more flexible delivery systems—such as a nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missile—to ensure that it can simultaneously deter conflict with both China and Russia at the strategic and regional levels. The second paper concludes that, while stability dialogues and risk-reduction measures might help the three nations mitigate the risk of nuclear use, they are unlikely for the foreseeable future to negotiate treaties or agreements that limit the size of their nuclear forces or offer transparency into their future plans.

Because the United States, Russia, and China all see nuclear weapons as essential to their national security, they almost certainly will continue to expand their capabilities until the international security environment changes. Neither the United States and Russia, nor the United States and China, are likely to engage in bilateral arms control discussions until they believe they can strengthen their security by cooperating to manage nuclear risks. Moreover, these states are unlikely to find an acceptable agenda for negotiations until each is willing to address the others’ concerns about threatening activities or capabilities. Even if these states clear these two hurdles, negotiators are unlikely to find success in talks that focus on nuclear reductions if each believes that it needs to modernize and possibly expand the size of its nuclear stockpile to achieve its security objectives.

About the authors

Greg Weaver is the principal of Strategy to Plans LLC. Previously, he was deputy director for strategic stability in the Joint Chiefs of Staff Directorate for Strategic Plans and Policy (J5)

There, he was the principal policy and strategy adviser to the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on nuclear, space, cyber, missile defense, and arms control issues. Prior to joining the Joint Staff, he served as principal director for nuclear and missile defense policy in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.

Amy Woolf is a nonresident senior fellow in the Forward Defense program of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

Previously, she served as a specialist in nuclear weapons policy at the Congressional Research Service of the US Library of Congress for more than thirty years. In that role, she provided Congress with research support, background information, and expert analysis on issues related to nuclear forces and arms control. Before joining the Congressional Research Service, Woolf was a member of the research staff at the Institute for Defense Analyses. She also spent a year at the US Department of Defense, working on the 1994 Nuclear Posture Review. Woolf received a master in public policy from the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University and a bachelor of arts in political science from Stanford University.

Acknowledgments

The authors would like to thank Alyxandra Marine and Mark J. Massa for their assistance in editing this piece and Marine for writing the introduction.

The Atlantic Council is grateful to Los Alamos National Laboratory for its support of this paper.

1 2022 Report on Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China, US Department of Defense, 94.

2 The 2022 National Defense Strategy makes the primacy of the US nuclear deterrent abundantly clear; for example, the DOD focus on integrated deterrence is “backstopped by a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent.” The NDS emphasizes the importance of modernizing US nuclear forces as “the ultimate backstop to deter attacks on the homeland and our Allies and partners who rely on extended deterrence.” Numerous public statements by senior US government officials reiterate the priority of the US’s nuclear deterrent. See 2022 National Defense Strategy, https://media.defense.gov/2022/Oct/27/2003103845/-1/-1/1/2022-NATIONAL-DEFENSESTRATEGY-NPR-MDR.PDF.

3 Military and Security Developments Regarding the People’s Republic of China 2022, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2022, 94.

4 Or even sooner. Recent public US intelligence estimates of China’s future nuclear arsenal have repeatedly underestimated both the pace and scale of China’s nuclear buildup.

5 Intrawar deterrence is important to consider should a conflict begin following a deterrence failure and critical actions must be taken to mitigate escalation toward a large-scale nuclear exchange. Intrawar deterrence considerations are distinctly different from preconflict deterrence and escalation toward conflict.

6 For more on the debate regarding China’s “no first use” declaratory policy, see Nan Li, “China’s Evolving Nuclear Strategy: Will China Drop ‘No First Use?,’” China Brief, Jamestown Foundation, January 12, 2018, https://jamestown.org/program/chinas-evolving-nuclearstrategy-will-china-drop-no-first-use/. The author points out that debate over the efficacy of “no first use” among China’s nuclear scholars has increased in recent years, with some calling it into question. Also see Jennifer Bradley, “China’s Nuclear Modernization and Expansion: Ways Beijing Could Adapt Its Nuclear Policy,” National Institute for Public Policy Occasional Paper 2, no. 7, July 2022. Bradley points out that China contends a launch-on-warning capability (that it is developing) is fully consistent with its no-first-use nuclear policy.

7 For background on the development of the current program of record during the administration of President Barack Obama, see, for example, 2010 Nuclear Posture Review; 2015 National Security Strategy; Congressional Research Service, “U.S. Strategic Nuclear Forces: Background, Developments, and Issues,” updated September 3, 2019; and for the New START debate in Congress, see, for example, “November 2010 Update to the National Defense Authorization Act of FY2010 Section 1251 Report, New START Treaty Framework and Nuclear Force Structure Plans,” Los Alamos Study Group.

8 As pointed out by US experts on Russian military doctrine (e.g., Dave Johnson, Michael Kofman, Anya Fink), Russian military doctrine and strategy, particularly in the nuclear realm, cannot be reduced to the simplistic and misleading label—“escalate to deescalate.” For more on the Russian approach as a strategic deterrence, counter-escalation, and war-fighting strategy, see D. Johnson, “Russia’s Conventional Precision Strike Capabilities, Regional Crises, and Nuclear Thresholds,” Livermore Papers on Global Security No. 3, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, February 2018; M. Kofman and A. Fink, “Escalation Management and Nuclear Employment in Russian Military Strategy,” Center for New American Security, September 2022.

9 “In a potential conflict with a competitor, the United States would need to be able to deter opportunistic aggression by another competitor. We will rely in part on nuclear weapons to help mitigate this risk, recognizing that a near-simultaneous conflict with two nuclear-armed states would constitute an extreme circumstance.” See 2022 Nuclear Posture Review, US Department of Defense, 12.

10 Failing to address this problem also exacerbates issues around extended deterrence and assurance of allies and partners.

11 Note, however, that none of these objectives would likely require a US strategic nuclear force that matched the combined total of deployed warheads in the Russian and Chinese strategic nuclear forces.

12 For more details on this argument, see Greg Weaver, “The Role of Nuclear Weapons in a Taiwan Crisis,” Atlantic Council, November 2023.

13 The views expressed by Amy F. Woolf, a nonresident senior fellow in the Forward Defense program of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, are her own and do not reflect the views of her current or past affiliations.

14 White House, “Remarks by National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan for the Arms Control Association (ACA) Annual Forum,” White House Briefing Room (website), June 2, 2023, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2023/06/02/remarks-by-national-security-advisor-jake-sullivan-for-the-arms-control-association-aca-annual-forum/.

15 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, “Foreign Ministry Spokeswoman Maria Zakharova’s Answer to a Media Question about US National Security Adviser John Sullivan’s Remarks,” June 3, 2023, https://mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/1873993/.

16 “Keynote Address for the Commemoration of the 50th Anniversary of the Arms Control Association,” delivered by Mallory Stewart, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Arms Control, Compliance, and Verification, US Department of State, June 2, 2022, https://www.state.gov/keynote-address-for-the-commemoration-of-the-50th-anniversary-of-the-arms-control-association/.

17 Sergey Ryabkov, “Russia’s Nonproliferation Policy and Global Strategic Stability,” Modern Diplomacy, December 27, 2021, https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2021/12/27/russias-nonproliferation-policy-and-global-strategic-stability/.

18 White House, “Readout of President Biden’s Virtual Meeting with President Xi Jinping of the People’s Republic of China,” November 16, 2021, https://www.whitehouse. gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/11/16/readout-of-president-bidens-virtual-meeting-with-president-xi-jinping-of-the-peoples-republic-of-china/.

19 David E. Sanger and William J. Broad, “As China Speeds Up Nuclear Arms Race, the US Wants to Talk,” New York Times, November 28, 2021, https://www.nytimes. com/2021/11/28/us/politics/china-nuclear-arms-race.html.

20 “Upholding the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons for World Peace and Development,” Ambassador Fu Cong, Head of the Chinese Delegation and Director-General of the Department of Arms Control of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, August 2, 2022, https://reachingcriticalwill.org/ images/documents/Disarmament-fora/npt/revcon2022/statements/2Aug_China.pdf.

21 “Upholding the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.”

22 “Upholding the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.”

23 Military and Security Developments.

24 For more details on the points summarized here, see David Santoro, “Getting Past No: Developing a Nuclear Arms Control Relationship with China,” Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament, June 13, 2023, https://doi.org/10.1080/25751654.2023.2221830.

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Garlauskas published in Newsweek on rising threat of North Korea

kyusko — Wed, 31 Jan 2024 21:48:29 +0000

Indo-Pacific Security Initiative Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

On January 30, Markus Garlauskas published an op-ed in Newsweek at their request on “The Rising Threat of Kim Jong Un’s North Korea.” In his article, he explained that despite recent concerns that Pyongyang will pursue war on the Korean Peninsula, the imminent threats posed by North Korea are its advancing weapons programs, its evolving relationships with Russia and China, and its potential to expand a US-China military confrontation over Taiwan into a two-front war.

Staff

Markus Garlauskas

Director

Crisis Management Indo-Pacific

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Dean interviewed by Sky News on Australian killer drones

kyusko — Wed, 31 Jan 2024 18:25:38 +0000

On January 30, IPSI nonresident senior fellow Peter Dean spoke on Sky News, where he suggested that Australia should take a “calibrated approach” to acquiring killer drones.

Fellow

Peter J. Dean

Indo-Pacific Security Initiative Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Australia Conflict

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Rich Outzen joins Arab News to discuss Canada lifting defense export ban on Turkey

aozen — Sun, 28 Jan 2024 13:31:51 +0000

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Putin’s Achilles Heel: Ukraine targets Russia’s vital but vulnerable energy industry

Peter Dickinson — Thu, 25 Jan 2024 21:55:54 +0000

Ukrainian drones struck a major oil refinery in southern Russia early on January 25, sparking a blaze that highlighted an emerging new front in the war unleashed by Vladimir Putin almost two years ago. The incident was the latest in a series of recent attacks on Russian energy infrastructure as Ukraine seeks to bring the war home to Russia by targeting the country’s vital but vulnerable oil and gas industry.

Since the start of 2024, Ukraine has launched a number of drone strikes on energy facilities across Russia. These have included the first successful attacks on targets close to St. Petersburg, almost one thousand kilometers away from the Ukrainian border. Officials at Russian energy company Novatek confirmed on January 20 that they had been forced to temporarily suspend some operations at the huge Ust-Luga fuel export terminal on the Gulf of Finland due to a fire started by Ukrainian drones.

This unfolding drone campaign aims to hamper the ongoing Russian invasion of Ukraine, while also dealing a painful economic blow to the Putin regime. By using long-range drones to strike energy facilities across Russia, Ukraine seeks to disrupt the logistical networks supplying Putin’s invasion force and reduce the mobility of the Russian army in Ukraine.

Many in Kyiv believe the potential to cause economic mayhem is even greater. The Russian economy is heavily reliant on the energy sector, making it an obvious and attractive target for Ukrainian military planners. Russia’s oil and gas industry has so far proven remarkably resistant to Western sanctions, with clients from the Global South stepping in to replace exiting European customers. Ukrainians hope their far more direct approach will now succeed where sanctions have failed and impose crippling costs on the Kremlin.

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Kyiv’s recent attempts to expand attacks on energy targets inside Russia are in part a reflection of unfavorable battlefield realities. The failure of the much-hyped Ukrainian counteroffensive in the second half of 2023 forced the country’s commanders to acknowledge that the war had reached a stalemate. Meanwhile, the future of international military aid to Ukraine is now in doubt amid mounting political obstacles, leaving front line troops increasingly outgunned and forced to ration limited ammunition. With little choice but to adopt a strategy of active defense, long-range drone strikes against strategic targets inside Russia offer Ukraine an opportunity to break the deadlock and undermine Putin’s war machine.

This kind of asymmetrical warfare plays to Ukraine’s strengths while exploiting Russia’s weaknesses. The long-neglected Ukrainian arms industry has been unable to keep pace with the unprecedented demands of Russia’s full-scale invasion, but the country has managed to develop impressive domestic drone production capabilities. Government initiatives like the BRAVE1 hub are helping to support private sector efforts and harnessing the huge potential of Ukraine’s vibrant tech sector.

This emphasis on defense tech is enabling Ukraine to keep pace with its far wealthier adversary in what is widely seen as the world’s first drone war. Innovations are a daily feature of the contest between Russian and Ukrainian drone warriors, with both sides struggling to counter the latest enemy developments while implementing their own upgrades. For Ukraine, range has been a key factor. Recent drone attacks demonstrate that Kyiv now has the ability to hit targets throughout European Russia, where the vast majority of the country’s energy assets are located.

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Ukrainian drone attacks on Russia’s energy infrastructure are creating serious headaches for the Kremlin. Russia’s vastness and the sheer size of the country’s energy industry make it virtually impossible to provide all possible targets with adequate air defenses. The problem is further complicated by the fact that the bulk of Russia’s air defense systems have already been deployed to occupied Crimea and the front lines in Ukraine. If Ukraine’s current bombing campaign continues to gather momentum, Russian military chiefs will have to decide whether to reduce protection for the army in Ukraine or leave critical infrastructure on the home front exposed to potential attack.

The Kremlin is also likely to encounter significant challenges repairing any damage done to the country’s oil and gas facilities. The Russian energy sector is highly reliant on equipment imported from the West. While sanctions measures imposed since February 2022 have so far failed to seriously impede the Russian economy, import restrictions should make it difficult for Russian energy companies to replace sophisticated equipment following Ukrainian drone attacks.

Crucially, the use of domestically produced drones enables Ukraine to minimize any potential protests from the country’s international partners, who have consistently sought to prevent Kyiv from using Western weapons inside Russia due to escalation fears. While Ukrainian leaders remain sensitive to these concerns, they have long expressed frustration over what many regard as excessive caution among Ukraine’s Western allies. Speaking at the recent World Economic Forum in Davos, President Zelenskyy complained that the West’s emphasis on avoiding escalation at all costs had resulted in countless missed opportunities while emboldening the Kremlin. “Every ‘don’t escalate’ addressed to us, sounded like ‘you will prevail’ to Putin,” he commented.

Ukraine’s decision to target Russia’s energy infrastructure is one of the boldest moves of the entire war. For almost two years, hostilities have been largely confined to Ukraine itself. That now appears to be changing. So far, Ukraine’s drone strikes are too small in scale to seriously damage the Russian war effort. Nevertheless, the recent flurry of attacks inside Russia crosses a major red line and marks a new phase in the conflict. The oil and gas industry has long fueled Russia’s resurgence on the international stage; Ukrainians are now hoping it will become Putin’s Achilles Heel.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

Dean quoted in the Australian Financial Review on protecting AUKUS technology

kyusko — Tue, 23 Jan 2024 18:47:30 +0000

On January 22, IPSI nonresident senior fellow Peter Dean was quoted in an Australian Financial Review article, where he explained that Australian private sector security arrangements are insufficient to protect sensitive AUKUS technology.

Fellow

Peter J. Dean

Indo-Pacific Security Initiative Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Australia Conflict

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Cole publishes with the Peace Research Institute Oslo on AI and military operations

Atlantic Council — Tue, 23 Jan 2024 15:24:11 +0000

On January 23, Forward Defense Nonresident Senior Fellow August Cole coauthored a paper titled “Artificial Intelligence in Military Planning and Operations” through the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO). In the paper, Cole discussed technical and ethical issues surrounding artificial intelligence, as well as the advantages and shortcomings of expanding such technology in military operations.

Whichever nations—or other non-state groups—adopt these technologies will likely find that there are technological asymmetries which can be turned into advantages.

August Cole

Fellow

August Cole

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Defense Industry Defense Policy

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Ukraine’s Black Sea success exposes folly of West’s “don’t escalate” mantra

Peter Dickinson — Mon, 22 Jan 2024 21:43:06 +0000

There is no disguising the disquiet in today’s Ukraine as the country braces itself for what promises to be an exceptionally difficult year. The optimism of early 2023 has been replaced by a far gloomier outlook that reflects the failure of Ukraine’s much-hyped counteroffensive and mounting alarm over delays in vital military aid from the country’s international partners.

This is fueling fresh calls for a negotiated settlement, with advocates arguing that the war with Russia has now reached a stalemate. However, talk of an impasse may be premature. Although the 1000 kilometer front line of the conflict has barely moved for the past twelve months, events elsewhere indicate a military breakthrough could still be a realistic possibility.

While the international media has spent much of the past year firmly focused on the bloody but largely static battlefields of eastern and southern Ukraine, the most dynamic developments of the war in 2023 actually took place at sea. Despite having no warships of its own, Ukraine managed to force Putin’s fleet to retreat from Crimea and succeeded in breaking the Russian naval blockade of Ukraine’s Black Sea ports. This remarkable Ukrainian progress may now offer a blueprint for a more general victory over Russia.

Ukraine has been able to transform the balance of power in the Black Sea thanks to the skill, boldness, and ingenuity of the country’s military, together with ample supplies of Western weapons and the ability to use them without being hampered by restrictions based on misguided fears of a possible escalation. If applied to the wider Ukrainian war effort, this winning combination could pave the way for Russia’s eventual defeat.

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On the eve of the full-scale invasion two years ago, Russian mastery of the Black Sea seemed all but assured. Ukraine was even more hopelessly outgunned at sea than on land, and appeared no match for the might of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet. Putin was so confident that he began the blockade of Ukraine’s Black Sea ports under the guise of naval exercises almost two weeks before the start of the land invasion.

The first significant naval engagement came in the initial hours of the invasion when the Russian Black Sea Fleet’s powerful flagship, the Moskva, approached Ukraine’s Snake Island and ordered the tiny garrison to surrender, only to be told: “Russian warship, go f*ck yourself.” This instantly iconic reply was rapidly embraced by Ukrainians as a symbol of national defiance and an unofficial slogan for the country’s entire war effort. It was soon appearing on billboards and bumper stickers, and even inspired an award-winning postage stamp.

During the early weeks of the invasion, residents of southern Ukraine’s Odesa Oblast were on high alert over possible amphibious landings, with Russian warships cruising menacingly along the horizon. However, these landings would never take place. Instead, in April 2022, Ukraine scored its first major success in the Battle of the Black Sea by sinking Russia’s flagship with domestically produced cruise missiles.

Two months later, Ukraine used a mix of artillery, air power, and drones to force a Russian withdrawal from the small but strategically important Snake Island. This was followed by the first Ukrainian drone attacks on port facilities and naval infrastructure in Russian-occupied Crimea.

As 2022 drew to a close, it was clear that the tide was beginning to turn at sea, with Russian naval dominance no longer a foregone conclusion. Even so, the scale of Ukraine’s subsequent achievements on the Black Sea front would surpass all expectations.

Britain’s May 2023 decision to supply Ukraine with Storm Shadow long-range cruise missiles set the stage for the spectacular progress that was to follow. In July, France followed suit with deliveries of its own SCALP cruise missiles. This dramatically enhanced Ukraine’s ability to strike targets in Crimea.

During the second half of the year, Ukraine bombed an array of Russian warships, logistics hubs, air defense systems, and command centers throughout the occupied peninsula. Highlights included a series of attacks in September that seriously damaged a Russian warship and submarine along with the headquarters of the Black Sea Fleet itself.

At sea, Ukraine deployed domestically produced naval drones to great effect, striking Russian shipping in Crimea and across the northern Black Sea. In August 2023, Ukraine signaled the range of its naval drone fleet with successful attacks on a Russian warship and oil tanker close to the Russian port of Novorossiysk on the eastern coast of the Black Sea, which serves as a major hub for Russian energy exports.

This campaign of missile and drone attacks eventually forced Russia’s Black Sea Fleet commanders to acknowledge that their position was no longer tenable. By early October, Russia had reportedly withdrawn the bulk of its remaining warships and submarines from Crimea to the relative safety of Russian ports.

Russia’s naval retreat allowed Ukraine to end the blockade of the country’s seaports and resume merchant shipping. An earlier grain agreement brokered by the UN in July 2022 had made it possible for Ukraine to export some agricultural produce, but these shipments were on unfavorable terms and subject to Russian interference. When Putin announced Russia’s withdrawal from the initiative in summer 2023 and threatened to target any ships sailing for Ukrainian ports, Ukraine felt confident enough to defy the Kremlin and declare a new “humanitarian corridor” for cargo vessels.

This new corridor has thrived, with food exports in December 2023 already surpassing the maximum monthly volume achieved during the UN-backed grain deal. The renewal of maritime trade has provided Ukraine with a vital economic lifeline and contributed to last year’s impressive GDP growth of approximately five percent.

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Ukraine’s remarkable gains in the Black Sea arena highlight what can be achieved when the country’s partners overcome their escalation phobia and provide Ukrainian commanders with sufficient weapons without imposing artificial restrictions on their use.

Ever since the start of Putin’s full-scale invasion, Western leaders have withheld key categories of weapons while limiting Ukraine’s ability to strike back at Russia due to concerns over Moscow’s possible response. This self-defeating approach was also initially applied to Crimea, even though the Russian-occupied peninsula is internationally recognized as part of Ukraine.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy recently highlighted the damage done by the West’s obvious fear of escalation. Addressing the World Economic Forum in Davos, Zelenskyy recounted how Ukrainian officials constantly heard the same “don’t escalate” mantra from the country’s allies. “Every “don’t escalate” to us, sounded like “you will prevail” to Putin,” he noted. “Nothing has harmed our coalition more than this concept.”

There is no question that Putin has sought to exploit the West’s evident timidity. Throughout the invasion, he has employed threats and bluster to decrease the flow of weapons to Ukraine and determine where Ukraine can and cannot attack. Putin’s most powerful tool in this regard has been nuclear blackmail. On numerous occasions, he has hinted at a nuclear response if territory he regards as Russian is targeted. “I’m not bluffing,” he warned in September 2022.

While Western leaders have proven highly susceptible to Russian saber-rattling, Ukrainians have had no such qualms about calling Putin’s bluff and have done so repeatedly. On each occasion, it has soon become clear that the Russian dictator’s threats are about as credible as his promises.

Despite increasingly bold Ukrainian attacks on Crimean targets, Putin has failed to escalate in any meaningful way. Instead, when confronted by unfavorable new military realities in the Black Sea, the Russian fleet quietly withdrew. This makes a complete mockery of the crippling hesitancy displayed by much of the democratic world.

Ukraine’s strategic success in the Black Sea offers a number of important lessons for the future conduct of the war. It underlines the Ukrainian military’s ability to seamlessly integrate the latest Western weapons systems into their own offensive operations, while also confirming Russia’s inability to defend itself against this enhanced Ukrainian firepower.

By combining a limited number of cruise missiles provided by Britain and France with its own expanding drone capabilities, Ukraine has been able to destroy around 20 percent of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet and force the remaining warships to retreat. Additional weapons supplies could have a similarly profound impact on the battlefields of mainland Ukraine.

Perhaps most of all, Ukraine’s progress at sea confirms the emptiness of Russian threats and the utter folly of the West’s emphasis on avoiding escalation at all costs. Kremlin officials employ threatening language because they believe the West lacks resolve. So far, they have been proved correct.

For almost two years, Western leaders have allowed themselves to be intimidated by Russia. They have denied Ukraine the weapons needed to win the war for fear of provoking Putin. This disastrous approach has merely served to prolong hostilities and embolden the Kremlin. It should now be painfully clear that nothing is more likely to provoke Russian aggression than continued Western weakness.

In 2024, Ukraine’s partners must draw the logical conclusions from developments in the Black Sea and apply them to create a war-winning strategy. This means abandoning their own self-imposed red lines and finally providing Ukraine with the tools to finish the job. Western fear of Russian escalation is Putin’s secret weapon. It is high time he was disarmed.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

Fellow

Steven Grundman

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Defense Industry Defense Policy

The post Grundman quoted in Law360 on the National Defense Industrial Strategy appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Dean interviewed by Sky News on guided missile manufacturing

kyusko — Wed, 17 Jan 2024 18:19:57 +0000

On January 16, IPSI nonresident senior fellow Peter Dean appeared on a broadcast of the Australian media network Sky News to discuss the Australian government’s investment in guided missile manufacturing.

Fellow

Peter J. Dean

Indo-Pacific Security Initiative Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Australia Conflict

The post Dean interviewed by Sky News on guided missile manufacturing appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Grundman on DefAero podcast discussing defense industry

jfranks — Wed, 17 Jan 2024 15:43:21 +0000

On January 17, Forward Defense senior fellow Steve Grundman joined the Defense & Aerospace Report Daily Podcast to discuss the release of the Biden administration’s first-ever National Defense Industrial Strategy. He highlighted the strategy’s potential impact on future defense initiatives and the importance of leveraging tools like the Defense Production Act Title III, while also noting the strategy’s lack of concrete guidance for the commercial defense industrial base.

I think it’s a really good complement to the National Defense Strategy…it’s not a prescription of programs and budgets per se. Instead, its purpose is to frame the problem and express the priorities by which the department is going to address the problem.

Steve Grundman

Fellow

Steven Grundman

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Defense Industry Defense Policy

The post Grundman on DefAero podcast discussing defense industry appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Six ‘snow leopards’ to watch for in 2024

Andrea Ratiu — Wed, 17 Jan 2024 12:30:00 +0000

Six ‘snow leopards’ to watch for in 2024

The snow leopards that stalk the rocky mountains of Central Asia are so elusive and well-camouflaged that they’ve earned the nickname “ghost of the mountains.” They’re out there, but exceedingly hard to spot.

These solitary big cats are a useful analogy for the global phenomena that can seem to come out of nowhere and take even the most seasoned observer by surprise. In some cases, that’s because a high-profile threat has eclipsed others; we rightly worry about the proliferation of nuclear weapons, for instance, but missile proliferation receives relatively less attention. Some things are so woven into our daily lives that they become invisible, as in the case of the global shipping lanes that make it possible for us to tap “buy now” today and find a package on our doorstep tomorrow. Trends that gather momentum slowly but steadily, undetected developments, known but underappreciated risks—all of these “snow leopards” have the power to reshape the world.

This makes snow leopard-spotting an essential complement to any attempt to peer into the future. So our next-generation foresight team at the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security compared notes and identified six under-the-radar phenomena to watch. These are not predictions (for those, check out our list of top risks and opportunities for 2024, and our expert survey forecasting the decade ahead). What follows are trends and developments already underway whose disruptive potential, for good or for ill, we are overlooking.

In the year to come, here are six snow leopards we’re keeping an eye on.

The new race to the South Pole

With a key provision of Antarctica’s governing treaty set to come up for debate in 2048, many countries are eyeing the vast fisheries and hydrocarbons there. Most forms of military and economic activities on the world’s only uninhabited continent are banned under the 1961 Antarctic Treaty, which lays out a vision of peaceful scientific inquiry and cooperation and which fifty-six countries have now signed. But with Antarctica home to an estimated 500 billion tons of oil and 300 billion to 500 billion tons of natural gas, and with 135 billion tons of oil in the Southern Ocean region, the stage is set for the continent to become yet one more arena of geopolitical competition.

The Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty, signed in 1998, stipulates that during its first fifty years it can only be modified by the unanimous agreement of all parties to the treaty. In its current form, the protocol restricts any activities related to Antarctica’s natural resources except for those involving scientific research. But starting in 2048 any party can call for a review of the protocol, initiating a process that, while lengthy and complex, could result in a modified protocol that creates more of an opening for natural-resource exploration in Antarctica.

Notably, neither China nor the United States recognizes existing territorial claims to Antarctica made by other powers, with both reserving the right to participate in “any future uses of the region,” as the US government phrases it. China sees both polar regions as strategically valuable and ungoverned spaces, and has been increasing its physical footprint in Antarctica for years—having just broken ground on its fifth research station. China is planning to construct powerful antennas at its Antarctic bases that could serve two purposes: furthering legitimate scientific research, but also allowing China to gather intelligence across the Indo-Pacific region.

Given Antarctica’s increasing geopolitical and economic importance—from fresh water, iron, and copper resources to strategic transportation routes—it is unlikely that the protections of the original Antarctic Treaty will be renewed in their current form. In the meantime, expect countries to ramp up their jockeying for position in the region, in the process undermining one of the few successful expressions of cooperative global governance.

Imran Bayoumi, Associate Director, Scowcroft Strategy Initiative

Bayoumi graduated with his master’s degree in global affairs from the Munk School at the University of Toronto where he held a Joseph-Armand Bombardier Canada Graduate Scholarship. He also holds a BA from Queen’s University in political studies.

The climate-induced shocks to global shipping lanes

Climate change is now threatening the shipping lanes that underpin global commerce. While major supply-chain disruptions have made headlines in recent years—resulting from the COVID-19 pandemic beginning in 2020, the Suez Canal blockage in 2021, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, and Houthi attacks on shipping vessels in the Red Sea in 2023, climate impacts are poised to dominate such disturbances in the coming years. The disruption to the way water moves between the Earth and the atmosphere—the patterns of rain, evaporation, condensation, and runoff that affect how much water flows through the world’s waterways—appears to be here to stay.

Global supply chains depend on these waterways. China’s “golden shipping route,” the Yangtze River, carries as much as 2.93 billion tons of cargo annually, including advanced manufacturing products. But a severe summer drought in 2022 left the river at half its usual width, stopping shipping through the middle and lower sections of the river. Likewise, the water levels of the Mississippi River, which sends $130 billion in goods each year through the Port of New Orleans alone, dwindled during a major drought in late 2022 that led to $20 billion in economic losses. In both 2022 and 2023, the Rhine River, perhaps Europe’s most important inland waterway, was so low owing to drought that some ships were only carrying half their usual amount of goods. The capacity of the Panama Canal, which transports 40 percent of US container traffic, 5 percent of global trade, and $270 billion in goods, took a hit too. A 2023 drought—the region’s worst since 1950—reduced the number of ships transiting the canal each day, as well as the amount of goods each could carry, suggesting a difficult future for one of the world’s most important nodes of trade.

With climate change expected to make extreme weather more frequent, a big rethink of how goods move around the globe is necessary. Adaptation strategies, including refitting ships for shallower water or dredging and reengineering rivers, are costly and fail to solve the larger problem. A future with reliable transportation of goods will require rebuilding the global shipping map, from its hubs to its methods of transport, along with new technologies to navigate the world’s rapidly changing waterways.

Sydney Sherry, Project Assistant, Scowcroft Strategy Initiative

Before she joined the Atlantic Council, Sherry worked as an intern for the Wisconsin State Legislature and as a research assistant for a PhD candidate on projects focused on forced labor, migration, and female participation in governance in post-Soviet Central Asia. She graduated with a bachelor’s degree in political science and a certificate in history from the University of Wisconsin.

The power of super-reflective white paint

Cans of paint may prove to be an important solution in addressing the climate crisis—a very specific white paint, to be exact. A professor at Purdue University, Xiulin Ruan, and his team have developed a highly specialized white paint that can reflect 98 percent of the sun’s rays away from the Earth. It’s a record that goes well beyond what the best existing white paints can do. Coating structures with this paint lowers their surface heat, keeps them cool without requiring energy or generating waste heat, and reduces air-conditioning needs by up to 40 percent. Purdue’s paint stands out as a leading offering, but cool coatings, even those not as advanced as the one developed at Purdue, provide a number of benefits.

Imagine painting 1 percent or 2 percent of the entire planet in this heat-reflective white. According to one calculation, this could entirely offset the additional warming associated with ongoing carbon emissions. Though applying paint to structures at that scale would probably be impractical and costly, applying it to cars, roofs, and roads worldwide would create islands of coolness in a warming world.

The world’s growing number of city dwellers would also benefit. Buildings, roads and other infrastructure absorb and trap much more heat than greener natural landscapes. The retention and release of this heat, among other factors, can cause an urban heat-island effect, with daytime temperatures up to 7 degrees Fahrenheit higher in cities than in rural areas. Already, 56 percent of the global population resides in cities, and seven in ten people will live in cities by 2050. As temperatures around the world increase, some of these cities are becoming increasingly unlivable. Painting even a small part of the planet could keep cities cooler and healthier.

Imran Bayoumi, Associate Director, Scowcroft Strategy Initiative

The proliferation of long-range precision weapon systems

Take a global landscape of rising multipolar tensions and partnerships, add widely available dual-use technologies like unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), and voilà: A new era of proliferation is increasing the challenge to arms control and the potential for conflicts around the world to escalate.

At the end of the twentieth century, only a handful of powers had long-range precision-strike technology—primarily in the form of cruise and ballistic missiles. The technology was closely guarded, with international agreements and norms limiting the spread of such missile systems. Today, the number of countries acquiring and deploying long-range precision-strike systems is rising steadily— twenty-four states currently operate cruise missiles with a range greater than 300 kilometers, relative to just three in 1991—and similar technologies are now being deployed by nonstate actors as well.

More and more, agreements to restrict the proliferation of these systems have been eliminated or ignored. In 2019, the United States withdrew from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty after years of allegations that Russia had violated its terms. Another crumbling component of the arms-control architecture is the Missile Technology Control Regime, a 1987 voluntary agreement among nations to not sell or transfer technology for long-range missiles to other parties. But exports of restricted missile technology by the United Kingdom, France, Russia, India, China, Israel, and the United States have diminished the normative power of the agreement. What’s more, the Missile Technology Control Regime and other agreements have failed to control the spread of long-range armed UAVs. In 2020, for example, the United States changed its interpretation of the agreement’s rules so that it could more easily export armed drones—in reaction to the widespread sale of similar systems by China, Turkey, and Israel.

The proliferation of long-range precision-strike technology to nonstate actors has further confounded arms-control efforts. Iran has exported ballistic missiles, cruise-missile technology, and armed UAVs to Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Houthis in Yemen. Both groups have used these weapons in attacks in the region. Just in the past several months, the Houthis have attempted several missile attacks on Israel and targeted international shipping.

The upshot of all these trends? We may be headed for a world where most states and many nonstate actors will be able to attack targets deep within their neighbors’ territory, or even far beyond their borders, within hours. Civilian populations will become more vulnerable during war, as Russia’s attacks on Ukrainian cities show. The likelihood of local conflicts escalating across their region may increase along with the range of the weapons deployed—and more countries may need to develop plans and capabilities for air and missile defense.

Jacob Mezey, Program Assistant, Forward Defense Initiative

Jake Mezey is a program assistant in the Forward Defense practice of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. He contributes to the program’s research on nuclear security, space security, defense innovation and modernization, and grey zone conflict. Previously, Mezey interned with the International Institute for Strategic Studies and contributed to its Missile Dialogue Initiative. Mezey graduated with distinction from Yale University where his senior thesis focused on the role of the Russian military in Transnistria.

The tiny island nation with outsize importance in the event of a US-China conflict

If a US-China conflict ever breaks out, expect to hear a lot more about Palau. As the potential for a military clash in the Western Pacific grows, so does the strategic significance of this tiny island nation between the Philippines and Guam. Palau’s importance stems from its key geographic location and its political alignment: It is one of just four states in the Pacific that maintains formal diplomatic relations with Taiwan, and it provides exclusive military operating and basing rights to the United States.

Geographically, Palau is at the center of the “second island chain,” farther from China’s coastline than the chain of islands that includes Taiwan and part of the Philippines. Since China’s anti-access military capabilities—particularly land-based missiles—pose such a threat to military operations within the first island chain, the prevailing wisdom among defense experts is that the second island chain would be a more defensible platform for US forces in the event of a conflict with China. Palau—considered the anchor of the second island chain—could be a key location for rearming and repairing US military ships and aircraft as well as an important basing location for resupply, surveillance, communications, and other supporting activities.

Politically, Palau has long had a special relationship with the United States, with commitments on both sides that extend beyond those of the typical alliance. The 1994 US-Palau Compact of Free Association gives the United States exclusive military operating rights in Palau, including the right to establish defense sites. In return, the United States is committed to defend Palau and provide it economic assistance, among other forms of support. Under a May 2023 update to the original compact, Palau stands to receive $890 million from the United States over twenty years.

Washington’s focus on Palau has increased in recent years. The US Department of Defense awarded a $120 million contract at the end of 2022 to install a radar system in Palau by 2026, expected to improve the United States’ ability to track air and maritime threats from China and North Korea in the Western Pacific. More recently, in December 2023, Palau was one of the sites of the latest rounds of the Pacific Partnership military-exercise series. Expect to see more defense and infrastructure investments by the United States in Palau, as well as more military exercises in the area, which will only add to Palau’s importance.

Palau may not be the focus of a potential US-China military confrontation, but it could be the critical location just behind the scenes.

Emma Verges, Assistant Director, Indo-Pacific Security Initiative

Emma received her master’s degree in global affairs as a Schwarzman Scholar at Tsinghua University in Beijing. Her time in China lends a unique perspective to her work. She also holds a Bachelor of Arts in International Studies and Russian Studies from Macalester College.

The declining cost of turning salt water into fresh drinking water

Climate change and the rising demand for fresh water strain global water supplies and spark conflicts. Water stress affects billions of people in rich and poor countries alike, but the problem is most acute in poor regions that are arid and drought-prone. The number of droughts worldwide has risen 29 percent since 2000. The good news: Cheaper and less energy-intensive approaches to desalination—the process of turning seawater into fresh water for human consumption and use—are on the horizon and may provide the means to better quench demand.

For decades, desalination has increased the availability of fresh water in coastal regions with direct access to the sea. Yet the dominant process for converting salt water to fresh—reverse osmosis—is costly, uses a significant amount of energy (often from fossil fuels), and produces a lot of waste (known as brine) as a byproduct. As a result, reverse osmosis can only solve part of the fresh-water problem, mainly for low-volume and high-value applications such as drinking water, and almost exclusively in high- and middle-income countries.

But recent research breakthroughs could turn the tide. Researchers at MIT and in China have developed a briefcase-sized, solar-powered device that “could produce drinking water at a rate and price that is cheaper than tap water,” according to MIT’s description of the effort. Many other researchers are exploring forward osmosis, an alternative to reverse osmosis that can be applied at scale in large desalination plants. Forward osmosis uses natural osmosis, with an already present osmotic pressure drawing water through a membrane that separates the water from solids, and requires far less energy than reverse osmosis. In 2023, for example, a researcher at New Mexico Tech announced a forward-osmosis breakthrough that reduces energy consumption and pollution production.

Perfecting forward-osmosis processes for wider use should cut the cost of desalination dramatically, in turn allowing lower-income countries to create desalination facilities. With the right investment and scaling, it is possible that more of the world will have access to affordable, life-sustaining fresh water in the years to come.

Imran Bayoumi, Associate Director, Scowcroft Strategy Initiative

Global Foresight 2024

In this year’s Global Foresight edition, our experts identify the top risks and opportunities for 2024. Our foresight team spots “snow leopards” that could have major unexpected impacts in 2024 and beyond. And we share findings from our survey of global strategists and foresight practitioners on how human affairs could unfold over the next decade.

Learn More Full Survey

Atlantic Council Strategy Paper Series Jan 12, 2024

Welcome to 2034: What the world could look like in ten years, according to nearly 300 experts

To survey the future, we polled global strategists and foresight practitioners on our most burning questions about the biggest drivers of change over the next decade. Check out their forecasts on everything from the likelihood of war over Taiwan to the future of AI.

Atlantic Council Strategy Paper Series Jan 17, 2024

Six ‘snow leopards’ to watch for in 2024

Atlantic Council foresight experts spot the underappreciated phenomena that could have outsize impact on the world, driving global change and shaping the future.

Climate Change & Climate Action Defense Technologies

Atlantic Council Strategy Paper Series Jan 17, 2024

The top risks and opportunities for 2024

By Peter Engelke, Paul Saffo

2023 was marked by war in the Middle East and in Europe. What else looms on the horizon? The Atlantic Council’s top experts brought their globe-spanning expertise to the task of forecasting the near future.

Artificial Intelligence China

The post Six ‘snow leopards’ to watch for in 2024 appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Atlantic Council Commission on Defense Innovation Adoption: Final report

Whitney M. McNamara, Peter Modigliani, Matthew MacGregor, and Eric Lofgren* — Tue, 16 Jan 2024 14:00:00 +0000

Implementation actions to date

Final Report

Report Authors: Whitney M. McNamara, Peter Modigliani, Matthew MacGregor, and Eric Lofgren*

Co-chairs: The Hon. Mark T. Esper, PhD,
& The Hon. Deborah Lee James

Commission staff: Kathryn Levantovscaia, Mark J. Massa, Delharty M. Manson II, and Jacob Mezey

Commissioners

The Hon. Mark T. Esper, PhD, Board Director, Atlantic Council; 27th Secretary of Defense; Co-Chair, Atlantic Council Commission on Defense Innovation Adoption
The Hon. Deborah Lee James, Board Director, Atlantic Council; 23rd Secretary of the Air Force; Co-Chair, Atlantic Council Commission on Defense Innovation Adoption
Ambassador Barbara Barrett, Board Director, Atlantic Council; 25th Secretary of the Air Force
General James E. Cartwright, USMC (ret.), Board Director, Atlantic Council; 8th Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Frank A. Finelli, Managing Director, The Carlyle Group
The Hon. Michèle Flournoy, Co-founder and Managing Partner, WestExec Advisors; Former Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, US Department of Defense
Scott Frederick, Managing Partner, Sands Capital
The Hon. James “Hondo” Geurts, Distinguished Fellow, Business Executives for National Security; Former Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development, and Acquisition, US Department of Defense
Peter Levine, Senior Research Fellow, Institute for Defense Analyses; Former Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, US Department of Defense
The Hon. Ellen M. Lord, Former Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment, US Department of Defense
Major General Arnold L. Punaro, USMC (ret.), CEO, The Punaro Group; Member, Advisory Council, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, Atlantic Council
Nick Sinai, Senior Advisor, Insight Partners; Senior Fellow, Belfer Center for Science & International Affairs and Adjunct Lecturer in Public Policy, Harvard Kennedy School
Josh Wolfe, Co-founder and Managing Partner, Lux Capital
The Hon. Robert O. Work, Senior Counselor for Defense and Distinguished Senior Fellow for Defense and National Security, Center for a New American Security; 32nd US Deputy Secretary of Defense

Industry commissioners

Steven Escaravage, Executive Vice President and AI Lead, Booz Allen Hamilton
Wendy R. Anderson, Senior Vice President, Palantir Technologies
Prashant Bhuyan, Founder and CEO, Accrete AI
Mark Brunner, President, Primer Federal, Primer AI
Adam Hammer, Counselor, Schmidt Futures
Chris Lynch, CEO, Rebellion Defense
Michael Niggel, CEO, ACT1 Federal
Doug Philippone, Co-founder, Snowpoint Ventures

Former Industry commissioners

Caitlin Dohrman, Former President, US Defense and National Security, Improbable
Jim Gill, Former Chief Operating Officer, Accrete AI
Sean Gourley, Founder and Former Chief Executive Officer, Primer AI
Ahmed Humayun, Former Head of Federal Growth, Applied Intuition
Mara Motherway, Former Senior Vice President, Peraton; former chief growth officer, Epirus

Introduction

Foreword

Overview

Recommendations:

Introduce a new capability portfolio model
Consolidate program elements
Reset reprogramming authorities
Modernize DoD to align with the 21st century industrial base
Strengthen alignment of capital markets to defense outcomes
Incentivize tech companies to do business with DoD
Modernize budget documents
Establish bridge fund for successfully demonstrated technologies
Scale the Space Development Agency model
Modernize DoD’s requirements system

Vignettes:

Leveraging operational innovation and experimentation to demonstrate the value of commercial capabilities to meet operational needs
Purposeful experimentation and scaling SBIRs for more rapid and well aligned tech adoption
Tying experimentation to acquisition outcomes and leveraging DIU commercial landscape monitoring
Pivoting to modern IT capability portfolio management
Modernizing capability requirements
Communicating demand signal to leverage commercial sector innovation and adopt private sector best practices
Leveraging warfighting insights and commercial product vision to develop new innovative products
Incorporating robust user feedback with government and private seed funding to deliver unique commercial capability

* Eric Lofgren served as a project author until February 2023, when he transitioned to a position in government service. All of his contributions were made before his transition to that role.

Introduction

As the United States addresses the rise of competing powers on the global stage, it must confront the acute threat posed by Russia and the longer-term one presented by China. With its military modernization progress, advanced offensive cyber capabilities, hybrid-warfare strategies, and aggressive territorial ambitions in Eastern Europe, Russia poses a considerable threat to democratic institutions and Western norms. Meanwhile, China has built the world’s largest military and grown into an economic powerhouse, igniting tension in disputed regional territories and expanding its geopolitical influence far beyond the Indo-Pacific. For the first time in history, the United States is faced with two revisionist powers armed with nuclear capabilities and detrimental territorial ambitions. This new age has amplified the need for enhanced deterrence and defensive measures, particularly in the case of Taiwan. Unfortunately, the United States’ defense acquisition process is plagued with lengthy timelines and inefficiencies, underscoring the urgent need for a fundamental shift in how the Department of Defense (DoD) approaches the adoption and integration of new technology.

Historically, US advancements in defense technology have been spurred by international conflict or heavy government research and development (R&D). Outpacing adversaries was not as much an ambition as it was critical for the nation’s security. The Cold War served as a catalyst for one of the most innovative periods in US history, a time when US defense capabilities were driven by the military, federally funded research organizations, and traditional defense and aerospace industries. Today, much of that innovation is found in commercial dual-use technology and advancements made by smaller nontraditional companies in the private sector. Often, these advancements include software-driven solutions that are smaller in scale, yet highly attritable. Nontraditional companies have become key players in the defense market due to their ability to adapt quickly to evolving technological and threat landscapes. While US companies continue to demonstrate technological prowess, this rate of innovation serves little use in deterring conflict unless the DoD is able to procure and get new technology into the hands of warfighters at a faster pace.

The current US defense acquisition system was not designed to keep pace with today’s rapid rate of innovation. Despite the DoD’s recognition of these emergent dual-use technologies, lengthy budget timelines, inflexible procurement options, and outdated internal procedures create unnecessary barriers between the DoD and nontraditional companies seeking collaboration. Such limitations disincentivize smaller firms from engaging with military projects due to survival concerns in commercial markets; the resulting frustration often compels those that engage to drop out.

In an attempt to reconcile the disconnect between evolving operational needs and limitations posed by dated acquisition processes, the Atlantic Council’s Forward Defense Program established its Commission on Defense Innovation Adoption. Launched in 2022, the primary objective behind this commission was to take the DoD’s acquisition process, and Congress’ role in that system, out of the Cold War era. The commission sought actionable recommendations that would advance DoD’s adoption of innovative technologies and ability to rapidly field dual-use capabilities.

The commissioners and authors highlighted a number of challenges that the DoD faces. They identified an outdated R&D model that struggles to adopt and apply leading commercial innovations to weapon systems as one of these challenges. They also brought the long timeline and inflexible execution into focus, emphasizing their impact on the DoD’s ability to respond to dynamic threats and harness the latest technology. Addressing the critical role of gatekeeping state-of-the-art technology from the warfighter, the commission tackled issues such as a shrinking US defense industrial base, a limited number of prototypes advancing from research to production contracts, and a bureaucracy seemingly designed to stifle speed and innovation. Additionally, the commission assessed the impact of an insufficient understanding of emerging technology by those generating requirements, in addition to program-centric acquisition and cumbersome reporting processes.

The commission interviewed more than sixty key stakeholders across the DoD, industry, and Congress to support extensive research and deliberations. This effort produced ten recommendations to overcome key challenges, which are summarized below.

(1) Empower and resource five program executive offices (PEOs) through a new capability portfolio model, authorized by Congress and implemented by the under secretary of defense for acquisition and sustainment USD (A&S). This approach would break down barriers between the DoD and nontraditional companies seeking collaboration, allowing for faster procurement and integration of innovative technologies into military operations.

(2) Consolidate program elements and budget line items to simplify budget submissions and allow for greater flexibility in responding to changing warfighter needs, which would encourage smaller firms to engage with DoD without jeopardizing their commercial viability.

(3) Congressional appropriations committees should modify reprogramming authorities in their fiscal year (FY) 2024 joint explanatory statements to reflect historical norms, which entails maintaining the existing reprogramming thresholds, but shift from the requirement of prior approval to congressional notification with a thirty-day timeframe for briefing or rejection.

(4) Congress should elevate the Defense Innovation Unit (DIU) to report directly to the deputy secretary of defense and provide it with adequate resources within six months of enactment. This recommendation offers myriad suggested actions and authorities the DIU should be empowered to take, including engaging start-ups, nontraditional vendors, and capital market players to align capability requirements with the twenty-first-century industrial base, and modernize guidance and training for commercial acquisition.

(5) Strengthen existing capital market programs and create new pathways for mission-critical technologies by broadening programs for capital market-backed companies, leveraging capital market funding for defense innovation, and enhancing the Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) grants program to increase competition and widen the aperture of firms competing for SBIR grants.

(6) Congress, the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), and service acquisition executives (SAEs) should increase incentives and reduce barriers for leading technology companies to do business with the DoD by September 2024 by rebalancing defense budgets, modernizing access to capital markets, raising cost-accounting standards thresholds, improving online contract opportunities platforms, streamlining security-clearances processes, assigning visible leaders for various programs to champion adoption and simplify processes, mapping and improving acquisition processes for successful research and prototypes, and establishing a working group with primes to incentivize leveraging technology start-up companies.

(7) The under secretary of defense (comptroller) and chief financial officer of the DoD (USD (C)/CFO) should propose a streamlined budget-justification format for the president’s FY 2026 budget request, focusing on concise program overviews.

(8) Allocate $250 million of the DoD’s FY 2024 budget to programs that address challenges in scaling and accelerating successful demonstrations of operationally relevant technologies. Shortening the lag time for successful vendors to receive funding would incentivize new companies to work with the DoD, ultimately increasing the number of technologies transitioned at scale to the warfighter.

(9) Existing organizations should adopt the Space Development Agency (SDA) model, which provides a framework for preemptive disruption within the Space Force, focusing on rapidly fielding and scaling modern technologies.

(10) The vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (VCJCS) and services should establish a team by September 2024 to modernize the DoD’s requirements processes, which includes designing a new framework, enabling dynamic requirements systems, streamlining documents, integrating threat and technology assessments, collaborating with industry experts, improving training for requirements managers, and publishing new policies online.

If implemented in their entirety, these recommendations would go a long way toward allowing the United States to swiftly deploy cutting-edge technology at scale and have the potential to resolve near-term deterrence threats. Embracing the private sector’s rapid innovation, modernizing acquisition and budgeting processes, and fostering greater collaboration with nontraditional companies would allow the United States to swiftly adopt and deploy cutting-edge technology. As a result, the United States would amplify its leadership in defense innovation, thereby addressing immediate deterrence gaps and ensuring a robust posture against evolving threats in today’s era of strategic competition. As of November 2023, six of the commission’s ten recommendations have been implemented fully or in part by the DoD or Congress.

Foreword

The US Department of Defense (DoD) needs to accelerate the adoption of cutting-edge technology from the leading edge of the commercial and defense sectors. Doing so will enable the Pentagon to deliver high-impact operational solutions to the Warfighter in a much timelier manner. That is why we are co-chairing the Atlantic Council’s Commission on Defense Innovation Adoption, which has released this interim report.

In our time serving in the Defense Department, we have found that the United States does not have an innovation problem, but rather an innovation adoption problem. That is to say, our Nation leads in many emerging technologies relevant to defense and security—from artificial intelligence and directed energy to quantum information technology and beyond. But the DoD struggles to identify, adopt, integrate, and field these technologies into military applications.

The persistence of this challenge is not for lack of trying. The Air Force’s Rapid Capabilities Office has cut through bureaucratic constraints to accelerate even the most complicated major acquisitions. The Defense Innovation Unit stands out for expanding the range of firms involved in innovation for national security purposes. Army Futures Command has accelerated modernization in ground forces through its cross-functional team model. The new Office of Strategic Capital has a promising new approach to engaging capital markets in support of national security goals.

But the growing national security challenges facing our country and the threat they pose to the rules-based international order require actionable reform across the DoD. We and a group of distinguished Commissioners, with decades of service between us in government, the private sector, and capital markets, believe that time is running out to do so. The United States faces simultaneous competition with two nuclear-armed, autocratic great-power rivals. Russia’s ongoing war against Ukraine and China’s revanchism not only spur urgent geopolitical considerations, but also cast into sharp relief the US industrial base’s ability to produce and field innovative technologies at scale.

To address the DoD’s innovation adoption challenge in light of the urgency of the geopolitical environment we face, this interim report advances ten policy recommendations for Congress and the Pentagon, focusing on the three key areas of reforming acquisition; overcoming barriers to innovation; and revising specific Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution structures.

To that end, the DoD should adapt the way it conducts its acquisition programs to provide additional flexibility in the year of execution, and Congress can authorize that flexibility. We recommend that five DoD program executive offices be empowered to operate in a portfolio model so that they can more easily shift funding among possible products that meet their mission needs. Congress should appropriate money to DoD with fewer but larger discrete budget line items and reset reprogramming authorities so that acquisition professionals have greater flexibility.

To better leverage innovation in the commercial sector, Congress should restore at least the traditional ratio of procurement funding to other defense spending, and the DoD should more intentionally engage a much broader innovation base. Allocating a higher percentage of the DoD’s budget to procurement will clearly signal a larger market to nontraditional defense firms.

Additionally, the deputy secretary of defense, with the Defense Innovation Unit (DIU) as a direct report, should take a leadership role in aligning and harnessing stakeholders within the Pentagon and the existing defense industrial base for the twenty-first century. The DIU should be resourced and empowered to broaden the defense ecosystem by robustly engaging start-ups, nontraditional vendors, and capital market players.

The DoD must develop approaches to more rapidly validate its needs for commercial capabilities, rather than waiting years after identifying a key capability to write a requirement and submit a budget request. The DoD should both reform the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) to operate more swiftly and develop a military need validation system outside of JCIDS for mature commercial capabilities. Congress and the DoD should expand both eligibility for, and the award size of, Small Business Innovation Research grants. To provide additional mechanisms for rapidly matching key capabilities with funding, they should also provide funds to procure capabilities successfully demonstrated in exercises.

As the 2022 National Security Strategy states, we are living through a “decisive decade,” a sentiment shared by the previous administration as well. Congress and the DoD must seize this opportunity to enact near-term changes that will help get our service members the capabilities they need to defend our country and its interests.

The Hon. Mark T. Esper, PhD

27th US Secretary of Defense

The Hon. Deborah Lee James

23rd US Secretary of the Air Force

The Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security works to develop sustainable, nonpartisan strategies to address the most important security challenges facing the United States and the world.