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Ukraine’s advance in Kursk: What’s next and implications

Conflict Russia Security & Defense Ukraine

Beyond the military practicalities of the battlefield, the Kursk offensive is challenging some of the most fundamental assumptions about the war. Crucially, Ukraine’s invasion of Russia has demonstrated that Putin’s nuclear threats and his talk of red lines are in reality a big bluff designed to intimidate the West.

Ukrainians have long accused Western policymakers of being overly concerned about the dangers of provoking Putin. They argue that since 2022, the international response to Russian aggression has been hampered by a widespread fear of escalation that has led to regular delays in military aid and absurd restrictions on the use of Western weapons. Ukraine’s offensive has now made a mockery of this excessive caution. If the Kremlin does not view the actual invasion of Russia by a foreign army as worthy of a major escalation, it is hard to imagine what would qualify.

As the Kursk offensive unfolds, Ukraine is hoping the country’s allies will draw the logical conclusions. Initial indications are encouraging, with US and EU officials voicing their support for Ukraine’s cross-border incursion despite longstanding concerns over any military operations inside Russia. At the same time, restrictions on the use of certain categories of weapons remain in place. This is hindering the advance of Ukrainian troops in Kursk Oblast. It is also preventing Kyiv from striking back against the airbases used to bomb Ukrainian cities and the country’s civilian infrastructure.

Ukraine’s Kursk offensive represents a powerful signal to the country’s partners. It demonstrates that the Ukrainian military is a highly professional force capable of conducting complex offensive operations and worthy of greater international backing. It also confirms that Putin’s Russia is dangerously overstretched and is militarily far weaker than it pretends to be.

The muddled and unconvincing Russian response to Ukraine’s invasion speaks volumes about the relative powerlessness of the Putin regime. This should persuade Kyiv’s allies of the need for greater boldness and convince them that the time has come to commit to Ukrainian victory.

Oleksiy Goncharenko is a Ukrainian member of parliament with the European Solidarity party.

This cross-cutting sense of purpose is important because the true strength of US and Philippine efforts—and the efforts of both with other countries in the Indo-Pacific—lies not simply in diplomacy among top officials and leaders. It also rests on what is happening on the ground among US and Philippine servicemembers and officials—the action officers. It’s in the day-to-day communication, coordination, planning, and relationship-building that is required to establish deterrence. This work is part of what the US Department of Defense calls “integrated deterrence,” an important but often misunderstood concept.

Taking integrated deterrence from concept to reality

In 2022, when the current National Defense Strategy was released with its “primary focus on the need to sustain and strengthen US deterrence against China,” I was working as an operations analyst for the Department of Defense, contributing toward the development of the Joint Warfighting Concept. As concept writers do, my fellow officers and I dismantled, debated, and explored what the words on screen meant and how they should be translated into action at each echelon of command within the Department of Defense—particularly the new idea of “integrated deterrence.” The idea was often met with skepticism early on. Some people asked: How is this different from what the United States has always done? At the same time, there was a shared belief in our discussion group that making deterrence a reality required a new conceptual approach.

After this experience, I wanted to take what we had done conceptually and see it implemented in practice. The Indo-Pacific seemed the most logical place for this, and I asked for my next assignment to return me to the tactical level, a regiment in the Marine Corps, hoping to take ideas discussed in wargames and within the walls of the Pentagon and do my small part to help see them realized at the forward edge of the first island chain. My request was granted, so I write this while in the Philippines, deployed with one of the most lethal, modern US military formations. We are manned by some of the smartest and most capable humans I have ever met and equipped with cutting-edge technology that has yet again changed the character of warfare. But, with each month of being here and working with our allies in the Philippines, especially as a logistician, it becomes clearer to me that integrated deterrence is not simply a product of measured combat power born of sheer numbers of postured tanks and ships; there is something more to getting deterrence right.

Preparation is essential. It is hard to imagine today, but during World War II, the United States wrote and trained its military leaders on plans written to contend against many of the credible military powers of the day: Japan, Mexico, Latin American countries, and even the British empire. These plans prepared military leaders for a multitude of scenarios that may require action from them. Hearkening back to the spirit of these color-coded plans, the Joint Staff continues to develop concepts for employment and wrestle with what it would take to win. To be ready for a potential conflict, the United States and its allies and partners must find innovative ways to implement the capabilities and tools they have developed. This leads to another essential requirement: integration.

All the components contributing to defense need to work together to be effective. Traditional measures of military strength, such as the number of servicemembers, ships, and tanks available, count for little if they cannot operate together and be sustained. This integration must happen across several areas, including:

Integration to reinforce and balance Joint Force and ally capabilities. Host nations are ready to defend their homelands, and US international partners and allies are eager to contribute; the United States must be ready to stand by them as leaders. That means knowing what everyone brings to the table. As the Joint Force, the world will look to the United States to provide the structure. A combat-credible force must have clear command relationships, a clear understanding of available combat power, and be ready to exercise decision-making authority quickly and effectively. Forces must be ready to find commonalities and overlaps that can mutually benefit each other’s maneuver and sustainment.

Integration across multiple spectrums of conflict to sustain military operations posturing. The spectrum of conflict ranges from competition to crisis to armed conflict. To integrate across this spectrum, senior leaders must attain a greater understanding of what stakeholders bring to the table. How do nations in the competition phase strengthen their militaries, develop new technologies, and deter hostilities? Educating all parties on the gruesome realities of war and the amount of resources required to sustain open conflict could be just as important as the technology required to wage such a war.

Integration of capabilities across terrestrial with non-terrestrial domains. Even today, tanks, piloted airplanes, and battleships appear to many people as national power realized. It is one of the reasons why Hollywood remains obsessed with World War II movies. And while the terrestrial domains of land, air, and maritime remain important, before these weapons are wielded, there are tools that have already been at work, clearing a path. It is important to understand how the information environment, cyberspace, and space contribute toward integrated deterrence and how they will aid in the rapid decision-making needed to execute warfare.

Deterrence is and will continue to be a team effort. The United States and its allies and partners must work together across all levels, from meetings among top-level officials to servicemembers on the ground helping teach close-quarter battle tactics. Success will be measured by maintaining order, under a structure agreed to by multiple nations as equals, benefiting as many peoples as possible.

Kevin M. Wheeler is a nonresident fellow in the Indo-Pacific Security Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. Wheeler is an active-duty US Marine Corps Major serving as the regimental logistics officer for the 3d Marine Littoral Regiment. He was previously assigned to the Joint Staff J-7, focusing on assessments and analysis for future employment of the US military Joint Force. His comments are his own views, and do not represent those of the Department of Defense, the United States Marine Corps, or any other US government or military organization.

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Ukraine’s Kursk offensive proves surprise is still possible in modern war

Mykola Bielieskov — Tue, 13 Aug 2024 15:19:36 +0000

Ukraine’s invasion of Russia is now in its second week and the sense of shock is still tangible. The Ukrainian military was able to achieve almost total surprise when it crossed the border into Russia’s Kursk Oblast on August 6. While the ultimate goals of the operation remain subject to much debate, Ukraine’s success in catching the Russians completely off-guard is a considerable accomplishment in its own right.

The Ukrainian military’s ability to maintain a veil of secrecy around preparations for the current operation is all the more remarkable given the evidence from the first two-and-a-half years of Russia’s invasion. The war in Ukraine has been marked by the growing importance of drone and electromagnetic surveillance, creating what most analysts agree is a remarkably transparent battlefield. This is making it more and more difficult for either army to benefit from the element of surprise.

Given the increased visibility on both sides of the front lines, how did Ukraine manage to spring such a surprise? At this stage there is very little detailed information available about Ukraine’s preparations, but initial reports indicate that unprecedented levels of operational silence and the innovative deployment of Ukraine’s electronic warfare capabilities played important roles.

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Ukraine’s political leaders have been unusually tight-lipped about the entire offensive, providing no hint in advance and saying very little during the first week of the campaign. This is in stark contrast to the approach adopted last year, when the country’s coming summer offensive was widely referenced by officials and previewed in the media. Ukraine’s efforts to enforce operational silence appear to have also extended to the military. According to The New York Times, even senior Ukrainian commanders only learned of the plan to invade Russia at the last moment.

Ukraine’s Kursk offensive appears to have been a major surprise for Ukraine’s Western partners. The Financial Times has reported that neither the US nor Germany were informed in advance of the planned Ukrainian operation. Given the West’s record of seeking to avoid any actions that might provoke Putin, it is certainly not difficult to understand why Kyiv might have chosen not to signal its intentions.

Eurasia Center events

Ukraine’s advance in Kursk: What’s next and implications

Conflict Russia Security & Defense Ukraine

It is also likely that Ukraine benefited from Russia’s own complacency and overconfidence. Despite suffering a series of defeats in Ukraine since 2022, the Kremlin remains almost pathologically dismissive of Ukrainian capabilities and does not appear to have seriously entertained the possibility of a large-scale Ukrainian invasion of the Russian Federation. The modest defenses established throughout the border zone confirm that Moscow anticipated minor border raids but had no plans to repel a major Ukrainian incursion.

Russia’s sense of confidence doubtless owed much to Western restrictions imposed on Ukraine since the start of the war that have prohibited the use of Western weapons inside Russia. These restrictions were partially relaxed in May 2024 following Russia’s own cross-border offensive into Ukraine’s Kharkiv Oblast, but the Kremlin clearly did not believe Kyiv would be bold enough to use this as the basis for offensive operations inside Russia. Vladimir Putin is now paying a steep price for underestimating his opponent.

It remains far too early to assess the impact of Ukraine’s surprise summer offensive. One of the most interesting questions will be whether Ukraine can force the Kremlin to divert military units from the fighting in eastern Ukraine in order to defend Russia itself. Much will depend on the amount of Russian land Ukraine is able to seize and hold. Putin must also decide whether his military should focus on merely stopping Ukraine’s advance or liberating occupied Russian territory.

Ukraine’s Kursk offensive has succeeded in demonstrating that surprise is still possible on the modern battlefield. This is a significant achievement that underlines the skill and competence of the Ukrainian military. The Ukrainian invasion has also confirmed once again that Putin’s talk of Russian red lines and his frequent threats of nuclear escalation are a bluff designed to intimidate the West. Taken together, these factors should be enough to convince Kyiv’s partners that now is the time to increase military support and provide Ukraine with the tools for victory.

Mykola Bielieskov is a research fellow at the National Institute for Strategic Studies and a senior analyst at Ukrainian NGO “Come Back Alive.” The views expressed in this article are the author’s personal position and do not reflect the opinions or views of NISS or Come Back Alive.

Ukraine’s most obvious intention is probably to ease the military pressure in the south and east of the country, where Russia has been slowly but steadily advancing in recent months. By attacking across the lightly defended border and seizing Russian territory, Ukrainian commanders believe they can force the Kremlin to withdraw troops from the front lines of the war in Ukraine in order to redeploy them for the defense of Russia itself.

The offensive also creates opportunities for Ukraine to regain the military initiative after a year of costly and demoralizing defensive operations. It has long been obvious that Ukraine cannot realistically hope to win a war of attrition against the far larger and wealthier Russian Federation. Kyiv’s best chance of military success lies in returning to a war of mobility and maneuver that allows Ukrainian commanders to take advantage of their relative agility while exploiting the Russian army’s far more cumbersome decision-making processes. This is exactly what the invasion of Kursk Oblast has achieved.

In psychological terms, bringing the war home to Russia has allowed Ukraine to strike a powerful blow against enemy morale. The Ukrainian army’s advances in Kursk Oblast are spreading panic throughout the surrounding region and undermining Putin’s efforts to prevent the invasion of Ukraine from disrupting the daily lives of ordinary Russians. On the home front, Ukraine’s surprise summer offensive has provided Ukrainian society with a desperately needed morale boost, reviving hopes that the war-weary nation can still achieve meaningful military success.

The Kursk offensive may ultimately be part of Ukraine’s preparations for a future peace process, with Kyiv looking to occupy as much Russian territory as possible to use as a bargaining chip in any negotiations with the Kremlin. Indeed, during the initial days of the invasion, there was widespread speculation that Ukraine’s primary target may be the Kursk nuclear power plant, with a view to trading it for the Russian-occupied Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant in southern Ukraine. An eventual land swap on a far larger scale may be part of Kyiv’s calculations.

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The Ukrainian army’s advance into Russia has profound implications for perceptions of the war. It directly challenges the widespread belief that Russia’s invasion has reached a stalemate and can no longer be decided on the battlefield. Crucially, it also exposes the emptiness of Vladimir Putin’s red lines and the folly of the West’s emphasis on escalation management.

Ever since the Russian invasion of Ukraine began in February 2022, the international response has been hindered by fear of escalation. Western leaders have allowed themselves to be intimidated by Putin, who has used thinly veiled nuclear threats and frequent talk of Russian red lines to restrict the flow of military aid and convince Ukraine’s partners to impose absurd restrictions on the use of Western weapons inside Russia. As a result, Ukraine has effectively been forced to wage war with one hand tied behind its back.

Eurasia Center events

William F. Wechsler: With the parties eager to avoid a wider war, the primary danger remains miscalculation

Ukraine’s advance in Kursk: What’s next and implications

Conflict Russia Security & Defense Ukraine

What we are currently witnessing is entirely in line with a well-established pattern of Russian threats being exposed as bluffs by Ukrainian boldness. During the first year of the war as Putin prepared to announce the annexation of occupied Ukrainian city Kherson, he warned that any attempt to reclaim this “Russian land” would result in a nuclear reply. “I’m not bluffing,” he famously declared. But when Ukraine liberated Kherson just weeks later, Putin did not reach for the nuclear button. Instead, he ordered his beaten troops to quietly retreat.

Russia’s reaction to wartime setbacks in Crimea has been similarly underwhelming. The 2014 seizure of the Ukrainian peninsula remains Putin’s crowning glory and serves as the basis for his claim to a place in Russian history alongside the country’s greatest rulers. Nevertheless, when Ukraine deployed missiles and marine drones to sink or disable around one-third of the entire Russian Black Sea Fleet, there was no apocalyptic response from the Kremlin. On the contrary, Putin instructed his remaining warships to withdraw from Crimea and seek safety in Russian ports.

This record of inglorious Russian retreats makes the West’s frequently voiced fear of escalation all the more difficult to justify. Ukrainians will now be hoping Putin’s characteristically weak response to the Kursk offensive can persuade Western leaders to belatedly abandon their failed policies of escalation management and acknowledge that the quickest way to end the war is by arming Ukraine for victory.

There are some indications that attitudes among Ukraine’s Western allies may finally be changing. The EU has led the way, with European Commission spokesperson Peter Thano responding to the Ukrainian cross-border push into Kursk Oblast by saying Ukraine has the “legitimate right” to defend itself, including inside Russia. Berlin has reacted in the same manner, with the German Foreign Ministry issuing a statement confirming that Ukraine’s right to self defense “is not limited to its own territory.” Meanwhile, US officials have also signaled their approval. “Ukraine is doing what it needs to do to be successful on the battlefield,” commented a Pentagon official.

This broadly supportive international reaction is welcome news for Ukraine, but officials in Kyiv are also well aware that further steps are required in order to set the stage for Putin’s eventual defeat. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy underlined this point in his August 11 evening address, when he once again called for the lifting of all Western restrictions on long-range strikes against military targets in Russia. Until that happens, Moscow will retain the ability to pummel Ukrainian cities at will and Putin will have little reason to end his invasion.

The West has spent more than two years slow-walking military aid to Ukraine for fear of provoking Putin. And yet time after time, Ukraine has proved that whenever the Russian dictator is confronted with the prospect of defeat, he is far more likely to retreat than escalate. Now that the Ukrainian military has crossed the last of Putin’s red lines and invaded Russia without sparking World War III, there are no more excuses for restricting Kyiv’s ability to defend itself or denying Ukraine the weapons it needs to win the war.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

Daniel Fried (@AmbDanFried): Weiser family distinguished fellow at the Atlantic Council and former US assistant secretary of state for Europe
John E. Herbst (@JohnEdHerbst): Senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center and former US ambassador to Ukraine
Konstantin Eggert (@kvoneggert): Deutsche Welle Russian affairs analyst and program host
Shelby Magid (@shelbyjmag): Deputy director of the Eurasia Center

The element of surprise

“In a war where battlefield transparency is supposedly universal, the Ukrainians achieved surprise, demonstrating a Russian failure of intelligence and weakness along its border,” says Dan. “The attack thus upends the Kremlin narrative of inevitable Russian victory,” which “Kremlin propaganda deploys in Europe and the United States to advance its argument that Ukrainian resistance is useless and support for Ukraine futile.”

“Even if Ukrainian forces are soon forced out of Kursk, this is a clear shot in the arm for Ukraine,” John tells us. In recent weeks, Russia has made advances in eastern Ukraine, but this incursion may now “force the Kremlin to relieve its current pressure on Ukrainian positions in the Donbas or north of Kharkiv.” If Ukrainian forces do establish defensible positions on Russian territory, then “Moscow will have to consider even more adjustments of its forces in Ukraine” and “a ceasefire in place” would be “less attractive to the Putin clique.”

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A rattled Russia and uplifted Ukraine

As with the short-lived mutiny by Wagner Group mercenary leader Yevgeniy Prigozhin in June 2023, Ukraine’s incursion into Kursk revealed “the vacuousness and inefficiency of modern Russia’s governance system, based on corruption and fear,” argues Konstantin. “Even reports in Russian state media (which are generally upbeat) had to mention the evacuation of the population and hint at the intensity of the fighting,” while “pro-Kremlin Telegram channels paint a picture of a major strike that took Russia’s military and civilian authorities by surprise.”

Dan notes that another risky and successful raid, George Washington’s crossing of the Delaware River in December 1776, boosted troop morale and political support at a critical moment in the American Revolutionary War. Like Washington’s raid, Ukraine’s Kursk incursion reveals its “cunning, audacity, and tenacity against a superior foe” and could have “strategic significance.”

Ukrainians are closely following reports of the raid. “As a further sign of success and a morale boost for the exhausted Ukrainian troops and society, video is circulating of dozens of Russian troops surrendering to Ukrainian forces,” Shelby points out.

For Ukrainians, it’s an opportunity to “show to Russia’s ruling class how vulnerable the country is,” Konstantin explains, noting that the situation has been made all the more urgent by the fact that the Kursk nuclear power plant is within reach of Ukraine’s forces. The incursion also “shows Kyiv’s determination to incorporate the politico-psychological warfare factor into purely military operations.”

What’s next?

While some Ukrainians have characterized the raid as an effort to “seize and hold Russian territory as a bargaining chip in eventual negotiations, that seems a stretch,” according to Dan. “Raids are one thing, a full-scale offensive is another.” Shelby agrees, noting that “entering and seizing land is different than holding it.”

It’s “highly likely” that part of Ukraine’s goal is to demonstrate its capability to its partners, observes John. Kyiv faced a months-long delay in receiving additional US aid, and continues to be restricted by US and German reluctance to provide more advanced weapons in large quantities and allow their use against strategic targets deeper inside Russia, he explains. The Kursk incursion, John maintains, “should be a reminder to the more timid Western leaders that Ukraine can win this war if we enable and allow them to win.”

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Sailing through the spyglass: The strategic advantages of blue OSINT, ubiquitous sensor networks, and deception

Guido L. Torres and Austin Gray — Thu, 08 Aug 2024 10:43:41 +0000

In today’s technologically enabled world, the movements of every vessel—from nimble fishing boats to colossal aircraft carriers—can be meticulously tracked by a massive network of satellites and sensors. With every ripple on the ocean’s surface under scrutiny, surprise naval maneuvers will soon be relics of the past. The vast expanse of the world’s oceans will no longer be shrouded in mystery, but illuminated by data streams flowing from millions of eyes and ears aware of every movement from space to seabed.

Open-source intelligence (OSINT) refers to intelligence derived exclusively from publicly or commercially available information that addresses specific intelligence priorities, requirements, or gaps. OSINT encompasses a wide range of sources, including public records, news media, libraries, social media platforms, images, videos, websites, and even the dark web. Commercial technical collection and imagery satellites also provide valuable open-source data. The power of OSINT lies in its ability to provide meaningful, actionable intelligence from diverse and readily available sources.

Thanks to technological advances, OSINT can provide early warning signs of a conflict to come long before it actually breaks out. On land, the proliferation of inexpensive and ubiquitous sensor networks has rendered battlefields almost transparent, making surprise maneuvers more difficult. Through open-source data from smartphones and satellites, persistent OSINT provides early warning of mobilization and other key indicators of military maneuvers. This capability is further augmented by artificial intelligence (AI)-enhanced reconnaissance and real-time data analysis, which have proven remarkably effective in modern conflicts including in Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Gaza and Israel, and Sudan. As this paradigm extends to maritime operations, it brings unique challenges and characteristics compared to land operations.

As technology races forward, Blue OSINT stands out as a key tool in the arsenal of contemporary naval warfare during global great-power competition. Blue OSINT harnesses data from commercial satellites, social media, and other publicly available sources to specifically enhance maritime domain awareness, identify emerging threats, and inform strategic decisions.

The current state of Blue OSINT across the spectrum of conflict points to an accelerating technology-driven evolution enabling maritime security and sea-control missions. The US Navy (USN) can enhance Blue OSINT collection with its own commercially procured sensor networks and bespoke uncrewed systems to shape operational environments, prevent and resolve conflicts, and ensure accessibility of sea lines of communications.

Commercially procured sensors span a wide array of technologies, including sonar and acoustic sensors, as well as video and seismic devices that are utilized to detect activities in strategic locations. These sensors can function independently or operate from uncrewed systems, providing flexibility and adaptability in various maritime operations. For instance, uncrewed aerial systems (UAS) equipped with high-resolution cameras and radar can deliver persistent surveillance over expansive oceanic areas, while uncrewed underwater vehicles (UUVs) with sonar capabilities can monitor subsea activities, such as submarine movements and underwater installations. These uncrewed platforms enable the continuous collection of critical data, enhancing the Navy’s situational awareness and operational readiness without putting sailors at risk.

For the US Navy to best support the joint force and maintain its strategic edge, it must integrate ubiquitous sensor networks and Blue OSINT into naval strategies adapted for tomorrow’s increasingly complex maritime environment. The Navy’s multiyear Project Overmatch is a good start to developing its “network of networks” and contributing to the Joint All-Domain Command and Control (JADC2) program.

With escalating tensions in the South China Sea, conventional forces are stretched thin and face asymmetric threats such as the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN)’s undersea sensing arrays and China’s maritime militia forces. Integrating Blue OSINT and sensor networks into the Navy’s strategies complements traditional naval power, while allowing intelligence missions to be conducted at lower risk and cost. Moreover, the open-source nature of this information enhances the Navy’s ability to share information and collaborate with allies and partners while bypassing cumbersome security classification issues. By relying on easily shareable information, the Navy can better synchronize efforts with partner navies, making command of the sea a more coordinated and viable endeavor.

The impact of evolving open-source intelligence on warfare

Feature	OSINT	Traditional Intelligence
Source of data	Commercial satellites, social media, public sources	HUMINT, SIGINT, classified sources
Coverage	Global, real-time updates, highly accessible	Selective, based on specific operational requirements
Cost	Low cost, leveraging existing commercial infrastructure	High cost, involving extensive human and technical resources
Risk	Low risk, minimal direct exposure	Higher risk, involves clandestine operations
Data volume	Extremely high, necessitates AI and advanced analytics	Moderate to high, manageable with traditional methods
Ease of sharing	High, fewer classification issues	Low, often restricted by security classifications
Data warning	Effective, provides pre-conflict indicators	Effective, but often limited by operational scope
Deception tactics	Requires advanced techniques to counteract	Relies on traditional counterintelligence and technical methods
Collaboration	Enhances collaboration with allies using open data	Limited, restricted sharing due to classification
Operational impact	Supports continuous monitoring and quick response	Supports deep, targeted insights into adversaries

The table above provides a comparison between OSINT and traditional intelligence methods, highlighting the strengths and weaknesses of each approach. OSINT offers global, real-time updates at a lower cost by leveraging existing commercial infrastructure. This approach presents a lower risk, as it involves minimal direct exposure and facilitates easier information sharing due to fewer classification issues.

On the other hand, traditional intelligence methods such as human intelligence (HUMINT) and signals intelligence (SIGINT) provide selective, targeted insights based on specific operational requirements. These methods often involve higher costs and risks due to the need for extensive human and technical resources, as well as the nature of clandestine operations. While traditional intelligence can offer deep, targeted insights, it is often limited by operational scope and security classification issues, making information sharing more challenging.

In the maritime domain, these distinctions are particularly significant. The concept of Blue OSINT integrates these principles specifically for naval operations, emphasizing the need for continuous monitoring and rapid-response capabilities.

Blue OSINT and persistent maritime monitoring

In the pre-conflict stage, global satellite coverage and social media provide a wealth of data that can map maritime activity with unprecedented detail. Nonprofit organizations like Global Fishing Watch use commercial satellite constellations to track ships and monitor maritime activity. Increased affordability and accessibility of satellite technology have enabled nongovernmental and commercial entities to contribute to maritime domain awareness in new ways. For instance, maritime radar emissions—once the exclusive domain of military and intelligence satellites—are now easily observable and “tweetable,” allowing for vessel identification to be accomplished more easily when actors execute deceptive techniques. Similarly, platforms like X (formerly Twitter) host numerous “ship spotting” accounts, where enthusiasts post photos and updates of vessels passing through strategic chokepoints and major straits, further enriching the available data.

Through persistent monitoring and large-scale data analysis, Blue OSINT can be used to significantly mitigate the challenge of monitoring large exclusive economic zones (EEZs). It offers a cost-effective alternative to traditional patrols, allowing these navies to adopt a more targeted approach when deploying their limited resources. By embracing Blue OSINT, naval forces can enhance their surveillance and response capabilities without a heavy financial burden, ensuring that these forces remain agile and effective in their maritime operations. Additionally, data streams from ubiquitous sensor networks can be coupled with Blue OSINT collection to give naval intelligence experts near-endless amounts of data in support of complex reconnaissance operations, without placing sailors and special operators at increased risk to collect it.

In addition to myriad opportunities for intelligence collection, using Blue OSINT presents technological challenges for the US Navy. The sheer volume of data generated by ubiquitous sensor networks and Blue OSINT tools necessitate substantial investments in software and analytic tools to manage and interpret this information effectively. Intelligence professionals must sift through endless amounts of data to identify actionable insights. Even the most skilled analysts need software and computer processing that can help organize and parse raw data.

To address these challenges, the US Navy and other maritime forces are ramping up investments in commercially procured sensor networks and cutting-edge analytic tools. In June 2024, the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency issued its first-ever commercial solicitation for unclassified technology to help track illicit fishing in the Pacific. Such investments aim to access, exploit, and process the massive amounts of data generated, a key step to achieving comprehensive maritime domain awareness. Better software and analytic tools can help maximize the potential of Blue OSINT and sensor networks, ensuring that intelligence analysts can better inform decision-makers at the speed of relevance.

Strategic deployment of distributed sensors

While Blue OSINT provides valuable insights into chokepoints and shipping lanes, it does not yet offer comprehensive coverage of the open ocean. Its effectiveness is greater in populated and coastal areas, where the density of electronic devices and human activity is significantly higher than on the high seas. Moreover, OSINT data can often be easily manipulated, presenting challenges in ensuring the accuracy and reliability of the information gathered. For example, although ships emitting Automatic Identification System (AIS) signals can be tracked on the web, navies are aware that bad actors often tamper with their transponders in order to disguise their locations, ultimately limiting the signals’ reliability.

To bypass these limitations of open-source data, navies and intelligence agencies can enhance their Blue OSINT capabilities by augmenting them with strategically deployed clandestine sensor networks in key locations, such as harbors, straits, and other critical chokepoints. This combination of data flows allows for effective monitoring and data collection on vessel movements, communications, and adversary intentions. Additionally, other covert sensors can be hidden on the seabed or disguised on civilian vessels, like fishing boats, in regions such as the South China Sea. Using distributed sensors along with Blue OSINT data ensures continuous and comprehensive maritime situational awareness, even in areas less frequented by military assets.

However, fixed sensor networks alone are insufficient to cover the dynamic maritime environment. Deploying a mobile network of distributed sensors necessitates a diverse array of platforms and technologies. While military satellites, ships, and aircraft equipped with advanced sensors can offer intermittent coverage, they are costly and limited in number, and their findings are less easily shareable with partners and allies. To bridge these gaps, allied navies should invest in affordable and scalable solutions such as uncrewed surface vehicles (USVs), UUVs, and UASs. Outfitted with various sensors, these platforms can effectively detect and track adversary movements, ensuring that navies maintain situational awareness across the vast expanse of the Pacific Ocean and other critical regions.

Small UASs launched from naval ships can be used to rapidly surveil large swaths of sea, providing real-time data on both surface and subsurface activities. Recognizing the strategic advantage of uncrewed systems, China has taken a bold step to outpace the US Navy by developing an aircraft carrier specifically designed to launch and recover UASs, rather than sophisticated manned platforms like the J-20 fighter jet. This significant investment in a carrier solely for uncrewed vehicles by the PLAN should prompt the United States to reconsider, and potentially adjust, its future resourcing strategy. Similarly, USVs can conduct long-duration patrols at a fraction of the cost of manned ship operations, exemplified by Saildrone vessels patrolling the Indian Ocean, providing the USN a robust sensor network. UUVs, deployed from submarines or surface ships, can monitor subsea activities, such as the movement of submarines and other submersible assets.

By monitoring the air, sea, and underwater environments, uncrewed vehicles and their sensors can significantly enhance overall maritime situational awareness. However, these tools are only effective if they are integrated into a cohesive architecture that combines traditional intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) with Blue OSINT data and affordable long-term leave-behind sensors. Project Overmatch exemplifies how to achieve this integration by developing a network that links sensors, shooters, and command nodes across all domains. For instance, Project Overmatch aims to leverage advanced data analytics, artificial intelligence, and secure communications to create a unified maritime operational picture, enabling faster and more informed decision-making. By incorporating these elements, the US Navy can ensure that uncrewed vehicles and their sensors are effectively utilized to maintain operational superiority in the maritime domain.

Moreover, the low-signature nature of some of these sensors increases the odds that they can operate undetected by adversaries, providing a strategic advantage. By deploying sensors in unexpected locations, and disguising them as civilian assets in some cases, navies can gather intelligence without alerting potential threats to their presence.

Blue OSINT and sensor networks in conflict

While Blue OSINT collection and distributed sensor networks can easily collect data in uncontested waters, they have immediate applications to modern maritime conflict as well. For instance, in the event of a cross-strait invasion by the People’s Republic of China (PRC), the transparency provided by Blue OSINT would make it difficult for navies to maneuver undetected. Satellites and social media continuously monitor naval piers, strategic chokepoints, and even some open ocean areas, making it increasingly difficult to achieve tactical surprise. Historical instances—such as Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor, the D-Day invasion, or the successful surprise dash to transit the English Channel by the German fleet during World War II—would be much harder to achieve in the modern era due to the pervasive nature of Blue OSINT.

In the context of a potential Taiwan invasion, Blue OSINT would likely be used to detect and closely follow Chinese naval activities, including the movement of amphibious assault ships and submarines. OSINT analysts frequently examine satellite imagery of Chinese shipyards and military installations, which could provide early indications of mobilization.

However, relying solely on satellite imagery and AIS for Blue OSINT is insufficient. Multi-intelligence capabilities are essential to provide a comprehensive assessment. For instance, in 2020, two commercial firms collaborated to use radio frequency and synthetic aperture radar collection to detect Chinese illegal, unregulated, and unreported fishing near the Galapagos EEZ. This open-source technique revealed the ability to identify fishing vessels that turned off their AIS to cross into the EEZ. In a future conflict with China, the same methodology of combining multiple Blue OSINT sources could be used to identify and track vessels of the People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia (PAFMM). This would bypass the AIS vulnerabilities that the PAFMM traditionally exploits to avoid detection, while also revealing its intentions as directed by the PLAN.

The Russo-Ukraine conflict revealed how OSINT can thwart surprise maneuvers and provide crucial targeting data deep behind enemy lines. However, it also underscores the limitations of OSINT in sparsely populated environments, such as the open ocean. For example, in December 2023, as missiles flew over the Red Sea, 18 percent of global container-ship capacity was rerouted. While civilian mariners and commercial shipping significantly contribute to Blue OSINT during peacetime, their absence in a high-risk conflict scenario would shift the burden more heavily onto satellite and uncrewed systems.

Deception and stealth

While the US Navy can take advantage of these technologies, its adversaries can, and almost certainly will, do the same. The US Navy and its allies must develop countermeasures to mitigate the risks posed by sensor networks while also leveraging its benefits. One approach is to invest in advanced deception tactics designed to mislead adversaries. These include the use of decoys, electronic warfare, and signal spoofing to create false targets and confuse enemy sensors. The Navy has been quietly developing these tools to obscure its true movements and intentions, ultimately confounding adversaries and making it harder for them to accurately target US forces.

In addition to deception, the United States and its allies need to enhance their naval stealth capabilities to evade adversaries’ distributed sensor networks. This involves not only minimizing the electromagnetic signatures of their vessels, but also employing innovative designs and operational tactics to reduce their radar cross-sections and avoid detection.

Distributed sensors in conflict

The ability to complement Blue OSINT with distributed sensors will be a decisive factor in near-term conflict dynamics. Just as frontline units in Ukraine are detected and targeted by cheap drones and stationary sensors, naval forces can be identified and pinpointed by similar systems at sea. Distributed sensors can provide continuous monitoring and data collection, ensuring that navies can maintain situational awareness and respond swiftly to emerging threats.

Three pillars are necessary to distribute sensors effectively across the ocean.

First, large conventional fleets play a critical role in maritime strategy. These fleets must be capable of extended operations and diverse missions, providing the backbone of naval presence, power projection, sea lines of communication, and, ultimately, sea control. During the COVID-19 pandemic, the US Navy demonstrated its endurance with record-length deployments, showcasing an advantage that could be significant in future maritime campaigns.

Second, organic reconnaissance drones are essential. Each destroyer and aircraft carrier should be equipped with its own fleet of multi-domain drones to conduct surveillance and gather intelligence. Currently, US carrier strike groups rely on land-launched surveillance drones, which are vulnerable and limited in number. Integrating organic drones into each vessel would enhance situational awareness and operational flexibility, allowing for more effective and autonomous intelligence-gathering capabilities.

Third, large fleets of affordable USVs and UUVs can deploy sensors across the ocean, increasing sensor hours at sea and improving maritime domain awareness. The first Replicator tranche is equipping forces with thousands of attritable systems to turn the Taiwan Strait into “an unmanned hellscape,” demonstrating the strategic value of uncrewed systems in contested waters. Moreover, the Navy is experimenting with diverse types of uncrewed platforms, aiming to create a distributed fleet architecture that is even more lethal than today’s carrier-centric fleet. These unmanned systems provide a cost-effective means to enhance surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities across vast oceanic areas, ensuring that the Navy can maintain a strategic advantage in both peacetime and conflict scenarios.

Recommendations

To maximize the efficacy of maritime domain awareness, it is crucial to integrate data from both Blue OSINT and ubiquitous sensor networks. While these two systems of data collection are largely distinct, their combined use can significantly enhance the accuracy and comprehensiveness of intelligence assessments and naval warfare.

Leverage Blue OSINT. Significant investment in artificial intelligence and advanced analytics is necessary to manage and interpret the endless amounts of data generated by open-source intelligence. By fostering a coordinated approach to maritime security, Blue OSINT can facilitate easier information sharing with allies and partners, but only if its utilization is preplanned. Collaborative pathways for Blue OSINT data collection, processing, and analysis must take shape early in the concept and planning phases. This collaborative effort will significantly enhance collective situational awareness and operational effectiveness, making it easier for navies to synchronize their efforts. Additionally, complementing Blue OSINT with traditional intelligence collection such as HUMINT and SIGINT provides a comprehensive threat assessment. By integrating these capabilities, navies can more easily attain a well-rounded understanding of adversary actions.
Commercially procure distributed sensing capabilities and networks. The US Navy must invest in Replicator-style unmanned platforms that can affordably deploy sensors across maritime battlefields, similar to the use of small UAS for land reconnaissance. These commercially procured distributed sensing platforms will significantly enhance the Navy’s ability to continuously and comprehensively monitor vast areas, improving overall maritime domain awareness.
Recognize a new maritime operating environment. The US Navy must prepare for protracted missions away from easily monitored ports and chokepoints while penetrating adversary-controlled, denied waters. This mission set requires a robust logistical framework capable of supporting extended deployments in remote and contested waters. By developing sophisticated tactics to deceive and confuse distributed sensor networks, the Navy can minimize its visibility to adversaries and maintain strategic surprise. This necessitates investing in advanced deception technologies such as electronic warfare, signal spoofing, and decoys to create false targets and obscure true movements. Additionally, enhancing the stealth capabilities of vessels through innovative designs and operational practices will further ensure that naval forces can evade detection and operate effectively in a sensor-saturated environment. By embracing these realities, the Navy can sustain its operational effectiveness and strategic advantage across the competition continuum.

Conclusion

In an era of distributed sensing networks and Blue OSINT, adaptation is not just about leveraging technology but also about evolving operational doctrines to meet the challenges of contemporary maritime conflicts. By integrating Blue OSINT capabilities, deploying distributed sensors, and countering (and employing) deception, naval forces can maintain an asymmetric advantage in the increasingly visible and contested maritime domain.

The success of modern naval operations hinges on the ability to swiftly adapt to technological advancements and evolving threats. Navies must transcend beyond traditional methods and embrace innovative strategies to remain agile and effective. This demands a concerted effort from all levels of naval leadership, from policymakers to forward operators, to implement these changes.

On the unforgiving sea, only those who rapidly transform to the era of Blue OSINT will avoid the abyss, with the rest risk sinking into obsolescence as adversaries gain decisional advantage. Navies that fail to adjust to the realities of Blue OSINT and sensor networks risk ending up like the Russian Black Sea Fleet: at the bottom of the ocean.

Authors

Guido L. Torres is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Forward Defense Program and the executive director of the Irregular Warfare Initiative.

Austin Gray is co-founder and chief strategy officer of Blue Water Autonomy. He previously worked in a Ukrainian drone factory and served in US naval intelligence.

Experts react: Two top Hamas and Hezbollah leaders have been killed. What’s next for Israel, Iran, and the war in Gaza?

Atlantic Council experts — Wed, 31 Jul 2024 17:31:29 +0000

Israel widened its range of targets. Will it lead to a wider regional war? On Wednesday, a strike killed Hamas’s political leader Ismail Haniyeh while he was visiting Tehran for the Iranian presidential inauguration. Haniyeh’s death, and resulting threats of harsh responses against Israel from Iran and its proxies, comes one day after Israel claimed that it killed top Hezbollah commander Fuad Shukur in Beirut in retaliation for an alleged Hezbollah attack that killed twelve children in the Israel-controlled Golan Heights town of Majdal Shams. What will these two apparent assassinations mean for the broader regional conflict in the Middle East? And how might Haniyeh’s death and the response from the Axis of Resistance affect Israel-Hamas ceasefire negotiations? Our experts delve into the possibilities below.

Click to jump to an expert analysis:

Kirsten Fontenrose: The Gaza conflict is already spilling over into a regional war

Jonathan Panikoff: The strikes were a tactical success for Israel. But the strategic impact will depend on Iran’s response.

Ahmed Fouad Alkhatib: Watch for a split within Hamas, and pressure on Iran and Hezbollah for a calibrated retaliation

Beth Sanner: Israel boldly threads a needle

Thomas Warrick: Haniyeh’s death will not change Hamas’s goal of destroying Israel

Danny Citrinowicz: Even if the current escalation stops here, the next one is around the corner

Alex Plitsas: The difference between these strikes and Israel’s Iran strike in April

Holly Dagres: The attacks reveal—yet again—the Islamic Republic’s intelligence weaknesses

Nour Dabboussi: Dark clouds now hang over Beirut

With the parties eager to avoid a wider war, the primary danger remains miscalculation

It was a bad day to be an Iranian proxy. From Tehran’s perspective, the significance wasn’t only the importance of the targets—Hamas’s Haniyeh, Lebanese Hezbollah’s Shukur, and Kataib Hezbollah’s drone bases—but the locations, the near simultaneous timing, and what they demonstrate about the reach of Israel and the United States.

Israel was able to find, fix, and finish Shukur in Beirut, in a building close to Hezbollah’s Shura Council. It was able to do the same (presumably, as Jerusalem hasn’t confirmed this action) to Haniyeh in Tehran, at his state-provided residence while he was visiting to attend the inauguration of Iran’s new president, Masoud Pezeshkian. And the US strikes in Iraq, the first since February, took place south of Baghdad against a key element of the Iranian-backed umbrella organization Islamic Resistance in Iraq, which has taken credit for attacks on US forces and on Israel.

Together, the United States and Israel have demonstrated, once again, their impressive intelligence and strike capacities in places that the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) undoubtedly has put on the top of their list to defend. It is also notable that senior US officials are currently in Riyadh to discuss US defensive maritime and air operations against the Houthis, another key Tehran terrorist partner whose recent deadly drone attack in Tel Aviv triggered a direct Israeli counterattack in Hodeidah. I hope these talks are intended to gain Saudi cooperation for a wider US special operations campaign to target Houthi leadership. This all follows, of course, Israel’s successful killing in April of senior Quds Force leader Mohammad Reza Zahedi in what was purported to be the Iranian consulate in Damascus, an attack that prompted Iran to launch an unprecedented, large-scale, direct strike on Israel less than two weeks later. If it were not for the US-led, region-wide air defenses, that Iranian attack would have killed a large number of Israelis.

Of course, Iran and its proxies have promised to respond to these attacks once again. But as I have described previously, the current environment in the wake of Hamas’s terrorist attacks on October 7 is one that unfortunately advantages the Iranian regime. Indeed, Israel’s actions can be seen as attempts to degrade this advantage. From Tehran’s perspective, they would thus be foolhardy to intentionally provoke the kind of regional war that would reverse this progress, especially one that risks involving the United States. Therefore, just as it was predictable that Israel would respond to Hezbollah’s attack against civilians in Majdal Shams in a targeted fashion rather than launching a full-scale war in Lebanon, I suspect Tehran will also respond in a manner that it believes will avoid a regional war. The primary danger today therefore remains more a question of miscalculation than of intent.

—William F. Wechsler is the senior director of Middle East Programs at the Atlantic Council. His most recent US government position was deputy assistant secretary of defense for special operations and combating terrorism.

The Gaza conflict is already spilling over into a regional war

The assassination of Ismail Haniyeh should surprise no one other than Iran’s Air Defense Force. Israel was clear on October 8 that it would seek to eliminate Hamas leadership anywhere in the world. Israel has not targeted the group’s political leadership in Doha out of respect for Qatar’s role as mediator, at the behest of the United States. Traveling to Tehran to attend Pezeshkian’s inauguration was a known risk.

One thing is certain: This assassination will not alter Hamas military leader Yahya Sinwar’s calculus. In fact, when news of the assassination first broke, I heard questions among Palestinians about whether this was an inside job orchestrated by Sinwar to eliminate a colleague who might sell him out. It would not be the first Sinwar assassination of his own political leaders. Sinwar likely reads this probable Israeli operation as confirmation that Israel cannot reach him, since he is higher on the target list than was Haniyeh. Sinwar will be as unenthusiastic now about making a hostage deal with Israel as he was before Haniyeh’s death. Haniyeh and his political ilk have not figured into Sinwar’s calculus at any point, and were rarely looped in on it.

Smart questions are being asked after this event. Will it force the new Iranian president to abandon his reformist tendencies and move to the right? This depends on how “reformist” you believe he is; Israel’s assessment is “not very.” Pezeshkian’s statements affirming allegiance with Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Houthis immediately after his election seem to support this assessment, as do videos of him warmly embracing Haniyeh this week in Tehran. But we can expect ongoing debate about whether coming hardline decisions out of his office were inevitable or colored by the assassination. Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, for his part, has threatened revenge against Israel.

Another question being asked: Does this assassination in Tehran indicate that Israel can reach all of its adversaries inside Iran? Mulling this over will unnerve IRGC and Iranian political leadership and could influence decision making. It will make Palestinian Islamic Jihad leader Ziyad al-Nakhalah wonder why he is alive. It will make Abdulmalik al-Houthi in Yemen glad he did not attend. In the United States, calls from some corners for Doha to expel Hamas political leadership were countered with the argument that it would not be as easy to track and monitor them if they relocated to Iran. This remains comparatively true, but the assassination of Haniyeh makes the argument almost moot.

A third question under discussion: How will this event, on the heels of the assassination of Hezbollah senior military advisor Fuad Shukur, impact Hezbollah’s strategy? Shukur’s death was in retaliation for a strike on a dozen Syrian Druze children that Hezbollah was loath to claim. The group may have wished to consider the case closed, a tit for tat. The strike on Haniyeh will put pressure on Hezbollah from their peers inside Gaza and Tehran to bundle the two assassinations and retaliate for both. Hezbollah would be wise to analyze the two events separately, focus bilaterally, recall Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah’s statement of regret after the 2006 war with Israel, and consider their own interests.

The fourth question resurfacing is whether the conflict in Gaza is now spilling over and threatening to engulf the region. Attacks on Israel from as far as Iran and Yemen as well as Syria and Iraq, the quick action of regional states such as Saudi Arabia and Jordan in preventing further loss of life in such attacks, and creeping escalation despite the tireless diplomatic energy of Egypt and Qatar all indicate that we are already at the point of regional spillover. It is the interests of the parties in the conflict themselves that have dictated the ebb and flow of escalation thus far.

—Kirsten Fontenrose is a nonresident fellow at the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative in the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs. She was previously the senior director for the Gulf at the National Security Council.

The strikes were a tactical success for Israel. But the strategic impact will depend on Iran’s response.

In a matter of twenty-four hours, Israel killed not one but two of the most senior officials in the so-called Axis of Resistance. The deaths of both Hezbollah senior military leader and Jihad Council member, Fuad Shukur, and Hamas’s political leader, Ismael Haniyeh, led to Israel having its most impactful day of tactical successes in months. But tactical success does not always beget strategic victory, and Israel’s short- and long-term strategy remains unclear, likely to be driven in part by the answers to two key questions.

Will Iran independently respond or seek to attach itself to whatever retaliation Hamas and Hezbollah undertake? For Iran, which always prioritizes regime stability above everything else, it might see the timing and targets of the assassination as an opportunity to claim retaliation while foisting the actual kinetic response off on Hezbollah and Hamas. This would be the traditional pathway of response and is probably the most likely one. But two potentially interceding considerations may challenge Iran in taking this path.

First, Haniyeh’s assassination happened in Iran. In April, following Israel’s killing of senior IRGC officials in Damascus, Iran decided it had to respond directly, opening a new stage in the shadow war between Iran and Israel. In this case, it was not an Iranian official killed, but Iran may decide that it has to respond itself in order to not fall into a deterrence deficit against Israel.

Second, Haniyeh was in Tehran to attend the Pezeshkian’s inauguration. The new president was viewed as the “reformist” in the election and lacks the depth of ties to Iran’s security establishment and IRGC that some of the other candidates had. Ultimately, it will be the supreme leader who signs off on any response. But Pezeshkian may decide, one day into his term, that he needs to align with whatever response the IRGC prefers or risk diminished standing and immediate tensions with one of the most important power bases in the Iranian government.

What does this mean for the hostage negotiations? The killing of Haniyeh, one of the primary negotiators for Hamas, does not mean the chances of a hostage release and temporary ceasefire are over, but they will almost certainly be delayed—again. Haniyeh was negotiating from Doha, but decision making power has always rested with Yahya Sinwar, Hamas’s leader in Gaza and the mastermind behind the October 7 terrorist attack. That reality does not change because of the assassination.

Sinwar has long calculated that for Hamas, continued civilian deaths is ultimately a net positive, and has been more reluctant to agree to a ceasefire than others. But the conditions on the ground in Gaza don’t shift because of Haniyeh’s assassination. Hamas fighters are reported to be exhausted and desperate for the reprieve a ceasefire might bring.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, meanwhile, has continuously changed the terms of a ceasefire but has always been clear since immediately after October 7 that Israel will hunt and kill the leaders of Hamas responsible for the attack. The prime minister may view a byproduct of Haniyeh’s death to be that it provides him sufficient political goodwill to make a deal that the ultranationalists in his coalition continue to oppose.

Iran’s, Hezbollah’s, and Hamas’s responses will drive the direction of the Middle East for the coming weeks and months: a reversion to current tensions or toward a potential broader regional war.

—Jonathan Panikoff is the director of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative. He is a former deputy national intelligence officer for the Near East at the US National Intelligence Council.

Watch for a split within Hamas, and pressure on Iran and Hezbollah for a calibrated retaliation

There is no doubt that the assassination of Haniyeh, Hamas’s head of the Politburo and chief political figure, will impact the war in Gaza and the entire region in numerous ways. Here are six thoughts on this significant event:

Israel could have killed Haniyeh months ago but didn’t want to compromise its relationship with Qatar, which remains the chief mediator with the Islamist group. Plus, the presence of the Al Udeid Air Base, the largest US military installation in the region, in Qatar prevents Israel from carrying out political assassinations in the Gulf Emirate. That’s why when Haniyeh entered Iran, which is known to be compromised by Israeli intelligence assets, and following the attack on the Golan Heights, an opportunity presented itself to take him out. After this assassination, Hamas is unlikely to move its headquarters out of Qatar, which affords the group unparalleled safety.
The assassination was likely ordered to coincide with the strike against Hezbollah’s senior commander in Beirut’s suburbs hours earlier to send a strong signal that Israel could fight on two fronts simultaneously. However, Netanyahu’s government may have intended for the assassination to pressure Hamas’s senior leadership into accepting a hostage deal and ending the war in Gaza, given the limits to how much more can be done on the ground in the coastal enclave. This is especially so following the assassination of senior military commanders in the Gaza Strip, including Marwan Issa and probably Mohammed Deif—not to mention the assassination of Saleh al-Arouri in January in Lebanon. Yahya Sinwar remains the only major figure still out of Israel’s reach.
This event will likely generate pressure on Hamas, even if the group doesn’t capitulate or change its stance immediately, to end the war and seek to preserve what remains of its political structures. The group is weakened militarily despite not being outright defeated. However, it is interested in self-preservation, and the group’s political wing may view this event as a monumental shift that necessitates ending the war quickly to ensure the continuity of Hamas’s political relevance, which requires the survival of its senior political figures. In the months following the October 7 Hamas attack on Israel, and during negotiations, Haniyeh was a mere messenger and courier of communication that was sent to Sinwar in Gaza. This means that Haniyeh’s actual influence over Hamas’s military wing was quite limited. The assassination will likely widen the gap between the political and military wings of Hamas, both of whom have divergent interests that are increasingly disconnected.
Haniyeh’s assassination may expedite political reconciliation between Hamas and Fatah, integrating the group into the Palestine Liberation Organization and offering it a political off-ramp that could save it from its trouble. While the agreement last week in China is part of a long series of attempts to reconcile Hamas and Fatah, the assassination may finally force Hamas to feel unprecedented pressure that finally bridges the seemingly irreconcilable differences between it and its chief political rival.
Iran will likely respond to the assassination in a manner similar to its missile and drone strikes against Israel in April. Haniyeh’s death mere hours after the inauguration of the new Iranian president on Iranian soil is a huge, humiliating blow to the Islamic Republic’s prowess and prestige. There’s no way that the IRGC will not respond directly or in a dramatic fashion. Iran is unlikely to launch an all-out confrontation with Israel over Haniyeh’s assassination. However, Tehran has no choice but to attempt to restore its deterrence capability, fearing that its people and regional proxies will start doubting the country’s power. For Pezeshkian, his tenure begins with a major embarrassment and security incident that forces him to take a hardline position toward Israel and the United States. He’ll quickly lose whatever “moderate” margins he was hoping to operate within, especially as he vowed to remove Western sanctions, which are crippling the nation’s economy. Pezeshkian will have to toe the line of hardliners seeking revenge and retaliation, greatly frustrating his efforts to usher in new geopolitical opportunities for his nation.
Hezbollah is facing a difficult choice to either return to the pre-Majdal Shams strike established rules of engagement with Israel or escalate to retaliate for the strike on Beirut’s suburb and avenge the assassination of Haniyeh. The group does not want an escalation that triggers an all-out war but will nevertheless face immense pressure to respond to a significant slap in the face of its partner Hamas and chief sponsor Iran.

—Ahmed Fouad Alkhatib is a nonresident senior fellow with the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs. He is an American writer and analyst who grew up in Gaza City.

Israel boldly threads a needle

Israel has carefully calibrated blows against its main adversaries in the region in the past week, with an assist (although not intended as such) of the United States in its own strike against Iranian-backed proxies in Iraq. Israel is executing deterrence in its most bold and raw form, and may have done so without the full blessing, or even foreknowledge, of the United States. This could have long-term implications for the bilateral relationship. But for now, the question is whether Israel has calibrated correctly in deterring Iran and its proxies or if they have set off an escalatory cycle. The answer to that cannot be known until Iran’s supreme leader decides on Tehran’s next steps.

The target selections and methods speak volumes about Israel’s capabilities and the intended effects:

Beirut: The strike that killed Fuad Shukur not only demonstrates that Israel has the intelligence and capability to conduct a precision strike on Hezbollah’s senior leadership on its home turf, but it also removes its main operational commander, which could affect Hezbollah’s military command-and-control in the near term. Israel seems to have conducted this strike against the wishes of the United States. But because Shukur played a central role in the attack on the US Marine barracks in Beirut in 1983, (which killed more than three hundred people including 241 US soldiers) it is impossible for the United States to object.

Tehran: The audacious strike on Haniyah in Tehran is part of Netanyahu’s goal of decapitating Hamas’s leadership. More importantly, it clearly establishes, following Iran’s retaliatory strike on Israel and Israel’s counterstrike inside Iran, the new normal of direct strikes between Israel and Iran. Iran’s failure to prevent this will rightfully terrify the regime, but also force it to respond in some way. That said, the statement from the Iranian United Nations mission that it will respond with special operations suggests that we will not see a missile attack on Israel as we did in April. The strike also exposes Netanyahu’s willingness to forge ahead with his main goal—deterring Iran—even at the expense of a hostage-ceasefire deal, Washington’s key objective as a first step toward its broader goals in the region.

—Beth Sanner is a member of the Atlantic Council’s Iran Strategy Project advisory committee and a former US deputy director of national intelligence for mission integration.

Haniyeh’s death will not change Hamas’s goal of destroying Israel

Israel’s strike on Haniyeh is a strategic gamble. While many Israelis will take grim satisfaction at the death of a leader of the group that organized the October 7 attack that killed 1,200 Israelis and started a war that has killed almost 40,000 Gazans, previous attacks on Hamas’s top leadership like Ahmed Yassin in 2004 have not changed Hamas’s intent to destroy the state of Israel. The strike will almost certainly derail ceasefire-for-hostages talks for weeks, at best, so the short-term consequences could be considerable.

The medium-term consequences for how the war ends are likely smaller, however. Israel is determined that Hamas not have a role in postwar governance in Gaza, and Hamas has been angling for a role that preserves its ability to rebuild itself militarily into a Hezbollah-like military power without the burden of civil governance. Hamas’s military leaders are more important to the group’s strategy than its exiled political leadership like Haniyeh.

—Thomas S. Warrick is a senior fellow and director of the Future of DHS Project at the Atlantic Council. He served in the Department of State from 1997-2007 and as deputy assistant secretary for counterterrorism policy at the US Department of Homeland Security from 2008 to 2019.

Even if the current escalation stops here, the next one is around the corner

The recent assassinations of Shukur (Hajj Mahsan) in Beirut and Haniyeh in Tehran might lead to a strong reaction from Iran and especially Hezbollah, which likely see these assassinations as crossing all red lines by Israel and in complete contradiction to the rules of the game between Israel and the Axis of Resistance.

These reactions may drive the parties, despite their reluctance, into a regional war in light of the desire of Iran and Hezbollah to restore the deterrence equation vis-à-vis Israel and to prevent similar acts from It in the future.

Israel’s ability to thwart the expected attacks by the axis elements, along with Israel’s relatively measured response to these reactions, may lead to the containment of the current event. It is still important to remember that without a ceasefire in Gaza, even if the current escalation is prevented, the next escalation is around the corner. Very tense days lie ahead.

—Danny Citrinowicz is a nonresident fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs and a member of the Atlantic Council’s Iran Strategy Project working group. He previously served for twenty-five years in a variety of command positions units in Israel Defense Intelligence.

The difference between these strikes and Israel’s Iran strike in April

Yesterday, Israel launched lethal strikes against Haniyeh in Tehran, Iran, following his attendance of Iran’s presidential inauguration, and Shukur, architect of the 1983 bombings of the US Marine Corps barracks that killed 241 US servicemembers and French barracks that killed fifty-eight French servicemembers. The strikes served several purposes: decapitating Hamas and Hezbollah leadership as well as making it clear that Israel will find and eliminate its enemies anywhere in the world, including in nonpermissive environments such as Iran. The strikes likely eliminated a false sense of security for leaders in the Iran threat network of proxy forces and were also meant to reestablish deterrence against attacking Israel. The strikes also were a response to a recent Hezbollah attack that targeted a soccer field in northern Israel and killed twelve Israeli children and adolescents.

While still measured, Israel’s strikes were stronger than the retaliatory strike Israel launched against Iran in April, which had followed Iran’s failed attack on Israel involving several hundred one-way attack drones and missiles. At that time, Israel chose to respond in a way that communicated that Israel was capable of evading Iranian defenses and striking Iran’s nuclear facilities. Israel did so through a missile strike at a single site in Isfahan, home of Iran’s nuclear program, that didn’t cause significant damage but made it clear that Israel could do so if and when it wants. While the April strike was more symbolic and meant to convey a deterrence message, the strikes in the last two days decapitated senior leaders in the threat network attacking Israel.

—Alex Plitsas is a nonresident senior fellow with the Middle East Programs’ N7 Initiative and former chief of sensitive activities for special operations and combating terrorism in the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

The attacks reveal—yet again—the Islamic Republic’s intelligence weaknesses

In Karaj, a city west of Tehran, two boxes of pastries were placed on a street corner with signs saying these were sweets to celebrate the news of Ismail Haniyeh’s assassination in Tehran. For anti-regime Iranians, inside Iran and in the diaspora, this news was much welcomed because of the Islamic Republic’s material and financial backing of Hamas. For years, Iranians have been honing in on the reality that the people’s money is being spent on proxies abroad, as noted in the popular chant, “No to Gaza, no to Lebanon, our lives for Iran.”

Haniyeh’s assassination, presumably by Israeli intelligence agency Mossad, was yet another major blow to the intelligence apparatuses of the Islamic Republic, which have repeatedly failed to prevent sabotage, assassinations, and cyber attacks on Iranian soil. In 2022, IRGC intelligence chief Hossein Taeb was sacked, in part because he failed to thwart those very events during his ten-year tenure. Some officials have pointed to the fact that the intelligence apparatuses have invested too much in domestic “threats,” in other words suppressing civil society and arresting and imprisoning dissidents.

While Haniyeh was technically the second member of a terrorist organization killed in Iran by Mossad—the first being Abu Muhammad al-Masri, al-Qaeda’s second-highest leader, in 2020—the fact that this happened while on a visit for Pezeshkian’s inauguration sends a big message about Israel’s ability to infiltrate Iran at a moment of its choosing, even if that moment is during heightened security for more than one hundred foreign delegations.

—Holly Dagres is editor of the Atlantic Council’s IranSource and MENASource blogs, and a nonresident senior fellow with the Middle East Programs. She also curates The Iranist newsletter.

Dark clouds now hang over Beirut

I left Lebanon less than a week ago—it was brimming with life as it always does during summertime, with an airport bustling with tourists and restaurants filled with long-awaited expats family reunions, bringing a light of hope during these somber times. Yet, since yesterday, and for the first time since the region’s conflict, serious anguish has started to fill the air of Beirut.

In the aftermath Israel’s assassination of Shukur in Hezbollah’s heartland, Haret Hreik, on Tuesday, Lebanon has maintained its official position of not wanting war with Israel by calling for the full implementation of UN Resolution 1701, which it reiterated in a letter of concern to the UN Security Council. Despite asking to give peace a chance, the country’s caretaker foreign minister also announced that “there’s going to be retaliation,” which he said he hoped would not be met by an Israeli response. With a quasi-functioning Lebanese government under Hezbollah’s influence over military, political, and security institutions, these contradictory statements do little more than reveal the government’s frailty.

Ultimately, the intensity, timing, and nature of this declared retaliation remains at the discretion of Iran and under the execution of Hezbollah. Lebanese opinion about such a decision seems divided between those who support Hezbollah’s rhetoric and those who want to avoid any escalatory action that could take the country back to 2006, when Hezbollah and Israel fought a destructive thirty-four-day war.

Following Israel’s assassination of Haniyeh, Iran’s supreme leader gave an order to strike Israel directly, a statement which, in the eyes of many, gives the green light for its Lebanese proxy to execute a direct response.

Hezbollah’s response will be critical for its leadership to maintain credibility in light of its repeated pledge to respond to any Israeli aggression on Lebanon. Still, such a response will need to be carefully calibrated. A direct response by Hezbollah that, for example, hits important Israeli military sites might lead to an all-out war, which the group has been trying to avoid, despite its repeated claims of being ready for such a scenario.

Alternatively, Hezbollah could aim for a more diluted attack that might avenge the killing of Shukur while also containing further escalation. But such a response threatens to undermine the group’s deterrence strategy; after all, this isn’t the first time Hezbollah is being cornered to respond to an Israeli political assassination of a high-level target on Lebanese soil. Earlier in January, the group retaliated against the killing of Hamas leader Saleh al-Arouri in Beirut by firing rockets into Israel, and since then, Hezbollah’s secretary-general, Hassan Nasrallah, has vowed that “any assassination on Lebanese territory targeting a Lebanese, Palestinian, Iranian, or Syrian . . . [would] be met with a strong reaction.” Cognizant of this dilemma, Hezbollah is tactically limited.

The international community may very well get additional clarity on what Hezbollah’s response will entail during Nasrallah’s speech Thursday at Shukur’s funeral. In the meantime, amid growing fears of what looms ahead, Beirut International Airport has started to grapple with frantic travelers again; yet this time, facing delayed or canceled flights as they try to return back.

—Nour Dabboussi is the assistant director to the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center and Middle East Programs.

The post Experts react: Two top Hamas and Hezbollah leaders have been killed. What’s next for Israel, Iran, and the war in Gaza? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The role Turkey can play in NATO’s post-Washington summit aims

Mehmet Fatih Ceylan — Wed, 31 Jul 2024 15:21:00 +0000

The NATO Summit held earlier this month in Washington was a testament to the Alliance’s enduring relevance in upholding shared ideals, values, and common interests as enshrined in the 1949 Washington Treaty. But it also showed that there is still work for NATO and its members to do, particularly in enhancing the Alliance’s collective deterrence and defense in the face of challenges by state and nonstate actors.

NATO has established its place among the most successful political and military alliances in history—despite facing very challenging circumstances since its founding—by dint of solidarity, unity of purpose, and resolve.

Today, allies are presented with challenges such as increasing global systemic rivalry and a complex, interconnected, and unstable security landscape, which threaten Euro-Atlantic security. Russia, as the most significant and direct threat for NATO, has been undermining Euro-Atlantic security since its invasion of Georgia in 2008, and its aggression has since expanded in the form of its invasion of Ukraine. In addition, terrorism—in all forms and manifestations—persists. The topic has been on NATO’s agenda since the adoption of the Alliance’s 1991 Strategic Concept and it (specifically, the 9/11 terror attacks on the United States) was the reason the Alliance decided to invoke Article 5 for the first and only time in history. Since 2001, nonstate actors have continued to lodge a series of terror attacks on a number of allies such as the United Kingdom, Spain, France, and Belgium as well as Turkey, which still grapples with terror attacks from the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), as well as the latter’s Syrian leg.

NATO allies must maintain their resolve and remain vigilant and ready to face challenges from any direction. Defense is not cheap, and it requires constant attention, care, and investment.

Since joining the Alliance seventy-two years ago, Turkey has contributed to NATO’s security in various theaters of instability and conflicts. Turkey was a bulwark against the Soviet threat in the Cold War period, and it continued to spend significantly on defense, sacrificing the opportunity to spend more elsewhere. For example, Turkey dedicated a level of forces and capabilities NATO in that period that was significant for the Alliance’s security and reduced pressure on allies in Central and Eastern Europe.

Turkey, because it continued to spend on defense, did not benefit from the post-Cold War “peace dividend” to the extent that European NATO allies enjoyed during the early 1990s when the unifying vision to establish a belt of security, stability, and prosperity that included Russia (extending from Vancouver to Vladivostok) was first launched by the United States. During this period, Turkey spent around or above 4 percent of its gross domestic product on defense, while most other allies saw their commitments wane over time.

In the immediate post-Cold War era, Turkey faced challenges from nearby regional conflicts in the Gulf, the Balkans, and the South Caucasus. Yet this conflictual period did not stop Turkey from contributing to NATO efforts designed to protect peace and stability throughout the Euro-Atlantic area and beyond. Turkey actively took part in NATO operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo, and it also made significant contributions to the International Security Assistance Forces in Afghanistan, which was followed by the Resolute Support Mission.

Today, Turkey has similarly consistently supported NATO efforts to enhance peace, stability, and prosperity in the Euro-Atlantic area, even despite divergent perceptions in allied capitals about Turkey’s approach to recent global challenges such as Russia’s war in Ukraine and the war in Gaza.

For example, Turkey did join its NATO allies in approving the most recent NATO Strategic Concept, adopted at Madrid in 2022, that identified Russia and terrorism (along with other regional and global challenges) as threats for the Alliance. Turkey is also set to play a pivotal role in the implementation of regional plans launched at the Vilnius summit last year which are dedicated to the defense of Southern Europe against the pervasive challenges in its immediate vicinity.

Turkey’s role in Washington summit outcomes

With the Russian threat looming over European security, it is high time to strengthen the European pillar of NATO. Allies at the NATO summit acknowledged the need to close the gaps between Europe’s defense needs and its capabilities. This includes, as highlighted at the Washington summit, expanding European allies’ defense manufacturing capacity in a coherent, complementary, and interoperable manner. To achieve interoperability will also require Turkey and NATO to find a lasting solution to the spat over the current Turkish administration’s decision in 2017 to procure the S-400 Russian missile system. While expanding capacity, the allies must take into account both the Alliance’s defense priorities and Ukraine’s needs as it continues to face up against Russian aggression.

Turkey can play a crucial role in helping expand the Alliance’s defense capacity through its contributions to collective deterrence and defense. Capabilities being produced by the growing Turkish defense industry cannot be sidelined in the Alliance’s endeavor to enhance deterrence and defense and maintain a technological edge against both state and nonstate adversaries. This will require result-oriented consultations within NATO and especially between European allies and Turkey, conducted with renewed vigor and mutual resolve. To this end, it is high time for the European Union (EU) to revisit its policies that engage only EU members in enhancing Europe’s defense capacity. Today’s challenges require collaboration with non-EU countries, such as Turkey, to the fullest extent.

With terrorism plaguing Turkey’s neighborhood, and with the issue remaining high on Turkey’s agenda, Ankara likely welcomed allies’ commitment (as outlined in the Washington Summit Declaration) to “counter, deter, defend, and respond to threats and challenges posed by terrorists and terrorist organizations based on a combination of prevention, protection, and denial measures with determination, resolve, and in solidarity.” If allies align their perceptions of the threat to Turkey posed by the PKK and its affiliates by including, for instance, deterrence and defensive measures against the threat in the regional defense plan for Southern Europe, this would help ease the friction on this major issue and help erase the Turkish society’s negative perceptions of NATO allies.

The Washington Summit Declaration also included a reference to the 1936 Montreux Convention. While some Turkish observers have oddly argued the reference is ill-intentioned, it is actually a major outcome for Turkey, as the allies reaffirmed their commitments to “regional efforts aimed at upholding security, safety, stability, and freedom of navigation in the Black Sea region.” The communiqué also welcomed the joint endeavor of three littoral allies (Turkey, Bulgaria, and Romania) to launch the Black Sea Mine Countermeasures Task Group.

Finally, with the global order at stake—due to Russia’s aggression, China’s growing global influence, and threats to security including terrorism—it has become vitally important to maintain and increase cooperation with southern neighborhood countries. The Alliance recognized this importance at the Washington summit, when it committed to taking a new approach toward its “southern neighborhood.” As part of that approach, the NATO secretary general appointed a new special representative for the southern neighborhood to coordinate NATO’s efforts in that neighborhood. Turkey could play a positive role in improving ties between the Alliance and the southern neighborhood by leveraging the linguistic, kinship, religious, and cultural ties it has with other countries. Turkey could also mobilize opportunities that it has in being part of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation and Organization of Turkic States, and in working with the Gulf Cooperation Council and African Union.

The Alliance has once again proven its relevance and value in protecting and defending the Euro-Atlantic area. As it continues to work to keep the Euro-Atlantic area safe, secure, and stable, Turkey has an important role to play.

Mehmet Fatih Ceylan is a retired career ambassador with forty years of experience in international security and defense affairs. Formerly, he served in the Turkish Foreign Ministry and served as Turkey’s ambassador to NATO from 2013 to 2018.

The views expressed in TURKEYSource are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

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To deter Russia, NATO must adapt its nuclear sharing program

Michael John Williams — Tue, 30 Jul 2024 18:22:17 +0000

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine and the Kremlin’s frequent nuclear saber-rattling to deter allied assistance to Kyiv have revived discussions about NATO’s nuclear deterrence to a degree not seen in four decades. “Nuclear deterrence is the cornerstone of Alliance security,” NATO allies reaffirmed earlier this month in their Washington summit communiqué. But the Alliance’s nuclear deterrence posture, especially in Eastern Europe, remains inadequate.

To enhance the Alliance’s nuclear deterrence and counter Russia’s nuclear threats, the United States should expand nuclear sharing arrangements within NATO to allies such as Poland, Finland, and Romania. The United States should also expand the presence of medium-range US ground-based dual-capable missile systems in Europe. Connected to these changes, NATO should stop adhering to the NATO-Russia Founding Act, which is limiting the Alliance’s freedom and which Moscow has repeatedly violated. Only by expanding its approach to nuclear sharing can the Alliance adequately improve its deterrence posture and counter Russia’s nuclear blackmail.

The spread of nuclear weapons was a major concern at the dawn of the Cold War. In 1963, US President John F. Kennedy worried about “a world in which fifteen or twenty or twenty-five nations may have these weapons” within a decade. NATO’s current nuclear sharing program emerged in the 1960s as Washington sought to manage the proliferation of nuclear weapons and two other pressing challenges: bilateral relationships across Europe and the defense of Western European NATO allies. Of particular concern to the United States, its NATO allies, and the Soviet Union, was West Germany’s desire for some sort of access to the nuclear deterrent at the heart of NATO’s defense strategy.

US efforts originally focused on a “hardware” solution to this dilemma known as the Multilateral Force, which would have created a fleet carrying Polaris A-3 missiles under NATO command. But once Washington realized Soviet opposition to this arrangement would also kill the much-desired Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the Johnson administration switched to a “software” approach based on training and consultation with allies—what is now referred to as “nuclear sharing” within NATO. Under this arrangement US B-61 nuclear weapons are stored in secure locations in Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Turkey. The weapons are under US custody and control to maintain compliance with the NPT.

In the event of a nuclear war, a nuclear mission by NATO allies can only occur with explicit approval from NATO’s Nuclear Planning Group, along with authorization by the US president and UK prime minister. France remains outside the nuclear consultation mechanism with its own sovereign nuclear force.

NATO’s current nuclear sharing policy, which has been detailed in various publications, is based on layers encapsulated in the 2012 Deterrence and Defence Posture Review, the post-2012 NATO summit declarations, and the 2022 NATO Strategic Concept. The doctrine deliberately avoids specificity when it comes to qualifying circumstances for nuclear weapon use.

Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea and the war in the Donbas has prompted NATO to reconsider the Alliance’s previous inattention to its nuclear deterrent. The 2016 Warsaw Summit signaled this change, but despite the Alliance speaking more publicly about the nuclear issue and signaling more clearly about its nuclear exercise (Steadfast Noon), the bulk of the balancing efforts have focused on conventional forces. The problem with this, as Simond de Galbert and Jeffrey Rathke note, is that conventional parity is “unrealistic and costly” and perhaps even “escalatory.”

Making matters worse for NATO were Russia’s violations of the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) in 2019. Although disputed by the Kremlin, Russian President Vladimir Putin’s reportedly deployed missiles (9M729) with a range of 2,500 kilometers in Mozdok, North Ossetia, and near Moscow, which was a gross violation of the treaty, placing NATO’s eastern and northern allies under direct threat. In response, the United States withdrew from the INF treaty in 2019, a move that NATO allies supported.

Three years later, in 2022, the Alliance once again increased its signaling on the nuclear deterrent in its Strategic Concept, saying that it would “take all necessary steps to ensure the credibility, effectiveness, safety and security of the nuclear deterrent mission.” The following year, the Alliance announced further modernization of NATO’s nuclear capability at its Vilnius summit. This modernization of NATO nuclear capability is facilitated through the renewal of national forces in the United States, the United Kingdom, and France, as well as upgrades to European dual-capable aircraft. For current nuclear sharing allies, the old B-61 gravity bombs, which number around one hundred, will be replaced by the advanced B61-12. These are new weapons utilizing existing warheads and the replacement does not represent an increase in the overall number of US warheads.

To date, despite modernization and stronger signaling, NATO’s nuclear posture remains stagnant. To improve the Alliance’s deterrence posture, the United States and its allies should take two steps: expand current nuclear sharing arrangements eastward and deploy land-based US tactical nuclear weapons in Europe.

Expanding current nuclear sharing arrangements eastward will require fully breaking with the NATO-Russia Founding Act of 1997, which Moscow has torn to shreds. Several allies refuse to abandon under the mistaken notion that it somehow provides a road back to peace. In practice, this has meant that the Alliance has focused on rotating conventional forces in Eastern Europe to stay within the spirit of the Founding Act.

But it is Russia, not NATO, that has destabilized Europe. Time and again, the Kremlin has blatantly ignored the Founding Act. There should be no illusions that there is a road back, and heeding the spirit of the act while Russia wages a brutal, illegal war against Ukraine and engages in political warfare against NATO allies including the United States is foolish.

Balancing Russia with conventional forces in places such as the Baltics is simply an attempt at reassurance rather than an actual effective deterrence and defense strategy. Equally ineffectual would be relying just on F-35 combat aircraft in bases already storing US nuclear weapons in Europe.

The only adequate solution is to respond to Russian moves in a tit-for-tat manner that George Bunn and Rodger Payne call an iterated prisoner’s dilemma. Only in responding to the Kremlin in a manner that inflicts a real price can Washington bring about eventual cooperation from the Kremlin. The United States can do this by continually raising the stakes to a point where Russia views cooperation, rather than competition, as the best solution. Given the economic strength of the United States, and nuclear allies France and Britain, it would be logical for them to impose increasing costs on Russia through expanded nuclear sharing.

Moreover, the Pentagon recently announced that it would send Tomahawk, SM-6, and developmental hypersonic missiles to Germany in 2026. This is a good start, but again it does not impose a high enough price on Russian actions and a broader deployment should be considered for two reasons. First, Russia has deployed reciprocal technologies, and the current US deterrent is inadequate. Second, as noted above, the deployment of US ground-based dual-capable missile systems to NATO allies could be used as a bargaining chip to influence Russian behavior—in effect, escalating to deescalate. While this last point may not be appreciated by all advocates of expanding NATO’s deterrent, if it results in a decrease in Russian tactical nuclear deployments, it may be worth the trade if it elicits cooperation.

The United States should take a page out of the new Russian deterrent playbook, which sees little distinction between peacetime and wartime, instead favoring persistent engagement with the enemy across a range of capabilities as part of overall deterrence. Putin has time and again played Washington and its European allies, believing that they are too scared of the long shadow cast by nuclear weapons to push back against his threats. Only by responding in kind may Washington find the Kremlin perhaps willing to listen.

Michael John Williams is a nonresident senior fellow with the Transatlantic Security Initiative in the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security and associate professor of international affairs and director of the International Relations Program at the Maxwell School for Citizenship and Public Affairs at Syracuse University.

NATO’s seventy-fifth anniversary is a milestone in a remarkable story of reinvention, adaptation, and unity. However, as the Alliance seeks to secure its future for the next seventy-five years, it faces the revanchism of old rivals, escalating strategic competition, and uncertainties over the future of the rules-based international order.

With partners and allies turning attention from celebrations to challenges, the Atlantic Council’s Transatlantic Security Initiative invited contributors to engage with the most pressing concerns ahead of the historic Washington summit and chart a path for the Alliance’s future. This series will feature seven essays focused on concrete issues that NATO must address at the Washington summit and five essays that examine longer-term challenges the Alliance must confront to ensure transatlantic security.

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The EU needs to adapt its fiscal framework to the threat of war

Piotr Arak — Mon, 29 Jul 2024 14:15:35 +0000

This year, the fiscal rules entrenched in the European Union (EU) treaties are coming back with force. Debt and deficit rules, which were frozen in 2020 to allow public spending to soften the economic blow of the COVID-19 pandemic, were reintroduced this year. Although the rules have been revised, they are still lacking in one crucial respect—they do not prioritize military expenditure over other types of spending. Without further revisions, the fiscal rules will constrain member states from increasing their defense budgets even as Russian aggression threatens European security.

With EU countries now facing greater fiscal constraints, the bloc needs to either further amend them or find a way to have more common European debt. Only then will EU member states be able to make the increases in defense spending that are necessary to bolster security on the continent and deter further aggression from Moscow.

The EU’s fiscal rules

The EU is a partial monetary union (not every state uses the euro) and is not a fiscal union. Twenty of its twenty-seven member states use the euro, but they maintain their own public accounts. The EU’s budget amounts to just 1 percent of the bloc’s entire gross domestic product (GDP). Brussels levies few taxes and spends little for the bloc, and that relatively small budget is the sum of the EU’s fiscal union. The real power of the EU resides in the supervision of the member states’ fiscal policies.

This is why some countries with high levels of debt or deficit—France, Italy, Poland (which spends 4.1 percent of its GDP on the military), and several others—might be under special supervision by the European Commission under the Excessive Debt Procedure (EDP). The EDP requires the country in question to provide a plan of fiscal consolidation that it will follow, as well as deadlines for its achievement. Countries that do not follow up on the recommendations may be fined. Of course, many EU countries are in debt, and most of them run a deficit even in good times; in bad times, they just run even bigger deficits. The European Commission will take into account additional military expenditures in the assessment, but only on military equipment, not on increasing the number of soldiers.

In 2023, the average debt-to-GDP ratio in the EU reached 82 percent, and it was even higher in the eurozone, at 89 percent (with France exceeding 110 percent and Italy going beyond 137 percent). The highest deficits were recorded in Italy (7.4 percent of GDP), Hungary (6.7 percent), and Romania (6.6 percent). Eleven EU member states had deficits higher than 3 percent of GDP. In comparison, the United States has a debt of around 123 percent of GDP and ran a deficit of 6.3 percent in 2023.

The original EU fiscal rules implemented thresholds for each country’s deficit and debt at 3 percent and 60 percent of GDP, respectively, and they required cutting national excess debt-to-GDP ratios by one-twentieth each year. These restrictive rules contributed to the eurozone’s prolonged recession from 2011 to 2013, and some rules have since been relaxed. In response to the COVID-19 pandemic, for example, the bloc activated its general escape clause, which allows for deviations from the EU’s Stability and Growth Pact in times of crisis. Moving forward, however, the rules will likely turn restrictive again, though less so than the old ones. In April 2024, EU institutions agreed on a consensual change to the fiscal framework, making the path back to a debt of 60 percent GDP and a deficit below 3 percent of GDP a matter of negotiations between each member state’s government and the European Commission.

Treat military spending differently

Some EU countries, such as France and Poland, argue for military expenditures to be treated differently, as some member states have different needs in the current geopolitical climate. Not all EU member states are in NATO; for example, Austria is neutral. But under the current EU rules, the fiscal space for military expenditures is one-size-fits-all. After Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, defense expenditures incurred that year were within the escape clause, but this does not address the underfunding of the military within the EU.

In 2024, the average military expenditures of NATO and EU members is expected to reach 2.2 percent of GDP, with a group of countries far below the threshold of 2 percent. More importantly, these are big economies with relatively large armies, such as Italy (1.49 percent of GDP), Belgium (1.3 percent), and Spain (1.28 percent). All of these countries have high levels of debt and issues with deficits. Germany is set to reach 2.12 percent of GDP on defense spending this year, but it is held back by its constitutional debt brake, which does not allow for an annual deficit higher than 0.35 percent of GDP. This has created tensions within Germany’s coalition government, since spending more on weapons might mean having to spend less on climate change mitigation and social services.

Meanwhile, the United States spends 3.38 percent of its GDP on defense. To put that into perspective, the total expenditure of all European NATO members is $380 billion, almost three times lower than that of the United States (nearly $968 billion). At the same time, Russian military spending this year is estimated to reach $140 billion, or 7.1 percent of its GDP.

Common debt

European capitals need to treat the need for a stronger military in Europe as urgent and serious, but their accountants in the finance departments are not going to make it easy. Unless Brussels changes its fiscal rules to allow for greater defense spending, common EU debt might be the only solution.

The bloc can issue EU debt outside of national fiscal rules, which it did for the first time in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. Some analysts argue for common debt for a European air defense system, which is a good starting point. EU debt funding could include spending on the further development of European defense industrial capacities. EU leaders such as former Estonian Prime Minister and future EU High Representative Kaja Kallas, French President Emmanuel Macron, and European Commissioner for Internal Market Thierry Breton have supported some version of common debt for defense purposes.

Utilizing common debt should not aim solely to expand the power of the European Commission, as some critics in various capitals fear. Instead, it should transform this measure from a temporary crisis-management tool into a standard policy instrument, enabling Europe to develop a meaningful defense industrial strategy, which has been lacking since the EU’s inception. After the failed attempt to establish a European Defence Community in the 1950s, the European project has primarily focused on economic issues. Unfortunately, it’s time to revisit that discussion.

Europeans must now prepare for a challenging geopolitical environment by investing in European defense, whether through changes in fiscal rules or by taking on more European debt.

Whichever path forward the EU chooses, it must do so quickly. There’s no time to waste.

Piotr Arak is the chief economist at VeloBank Poland.

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Dean interviewed by Sky News on AUKUS

ylee — Thu, 25 Jul 2024 15:34:03 +0000

On July 24, IPSI nonresident senior fellow Peter Dean appeared in an interview with Sky News discussing the AUKUS submarine deal and its potential trajectory under a Trump presidency. This interview was regenerated through the Mercury, Townsville Bulletin, and Cairns Post.

Fellow

Peter J. Dean

Indo-Pacific Security Initiative Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Australia Conflict

The post Dean interviewed by Sky News on AUKUS appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The Women, Peace, and Security agenda made important strides at NATO’s Washington summit

Sarah Dawn Petrin — Wed, 24 Jul 2024 12:12:53 +0000

Much of the NATO summit earlier this month was overshadowed by US domestic politics, but one issue did make significant and bipartisan, if underacknowledged, headway when allies met in Washington: the Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) agenda. During the three-day summit, leaders from the United States and other NATO member states recognized recent gains, including allied militaries implementing inclusive strategies to adapt to women in the armed forces as a means of preparedness. They also welcomed the role of women in political leadership—and underscored its importance.

“Bringing women on board is not only a women’s rights issue. It brings benefits to the whole of society and to our collective security,” Icelandic Foreign Minister Thórdís Kolbrún Reykfjörd Gylfadóttir said on the first day of the summit. “It’s not about waiting for the time when you can afford focusing on women, peace, and security, or gender equality for that matter, or empowering women,” she added. “You become stronger because you focus on those points, not when you afford them.”

Icelandic Foreign Minister Thordis Kolbrun Reykfjord Gylfadottir addresses the Women, Peace, and Security reception organized by the US Department of State, on July 9, 2024. REUTERS/Tom Brenner

WPS commitments at the Washington summit

The show of support for advancing the WPS agenda during the summit was not just rhetorical. It included concrete commitments, such as adopting a new NATO policy on WPS that is “fit for purpose” for the twenty-first century security environment. Several allies also committed to fund more than ten thousand uniforms and body armor sets for Ukrainian female servicemembers defending their country against Russia’s full-scale invasion.

If the Alliance is looking for something that increasingly earns bipartisan support in the United States, then it should look to the importance of women’s inclusion in national security strategies. In 2017, then President Donald Trump signed the first national law that took steps to institutionalize a United Nations mandate to make the security sector more inclusive of female leadership and more responsive to the needs of women and girls, including freedom from conflict-related sexual violence. In 1994, then Senator Joe Biden was an original cosponsor of the Violence Against Women Act that year, and the Biden-Harris administration continues to make important reforms to the military code of justice on sexual assault in the military.

One of the highlights of the Washington summit was the announcement that as of 2024, twenty-three allied nations have met the commitment to spend 2 percent of annual gross domestic product on defense spending, a change that is applauded by both sides of the aisle in the United States. What is less known is how those fiscal commitments relate to national aspirations for a more inclusive force. According to the most recently published NATO Committee on Gender Perspectives report, released in 2020, twenty-seven members of the Alliance, including the United States, have national action plans on WPS. NATO’s newest members, Sweden and Finland, also have national action plans on WPS. Furthermore, twenty-five NATO nations reported an increase in female participation in the armed forces in the years before 2020. On average, 13 percent of allied forces were comprised of women that year.

In the Washington Summit Declaration, allies committed to integrate an ambitious WPS and human security agenda across all of NATO’s core tasks. NATO had previously committed to women’s meaningful participation in the security sector. But the new policy recognizes the conditions that make women’s leadership possible, including their full, equal, safe, and meaningful participation in decision making in national institutions.

The declaration also referred to the human security trends shaping today’s conflicts, including disregard for international humanitarian law and the protection of civilians, cultural property protection, and forced displacement that fuels human trafficking and irregular migration. These human security trends disproportionately affect women and girls, who make up more than half of the 117 million people forcibly displaced worldwide, according to the United Nations. In Washington, the Alliance also renewed its commitment to international law and the fundamental norms of armed conflict, which distinguishes between military targets and civilians.

Lessons from Ukraine

Although NATO did not welcome Ukraine into the Alliance at the summit, Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg said in his closing press statement that it is a matter of when, not if, Ukraine will become a member. This followed NATO commitments at the summit to establishing a new NATO-Ukraine Joint Analysis, Training, and Education Center and NATO Security Assistance Training for Ukraine to increase Kyiv’s interoperability with the Alliance.

For the last decade, and especially since Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022, Ukraine has shown that the conduct of war involves more than military strategy. Providing security has become a whole-of-society effort, involving women in uniform and civilians providing support to the front lines. The evolving nature of conflict can blur the distinction between civilian and military action and change societal norms on what roles are appropriate for men and women. These dynamics are important for understanding the human domain, which is adaptive to evolving threats. Supporting female soldiers and addressing civilian harm caused by the war should be an integral part of NATO plans to train for the future operational environment and to secure peace in Ukraine.

The NATO Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary General for WPS, which has responsibility for a broader umbrella of cross-cutting human security policies, can continue working toward integrating lessons from the human domain in military training. While NATO continues to identify military lessons from the war in Ukraine, these lessons should also include concrete steps to protect civilians from air missile attacks, mitigate the use of sexual violence in conflict, and protect children against forced deportations to Russia. NATO can emphasize the lessons allies have learned about how to protect civilians in other conflicts, such as in Iraq and Libya, as it establishes new security cooperation training centers.

The war in Ukraine is a test case for whether the Alliance can help partner nations achieve stability and whether its actions are inclusive of the whole-of-society approach that has characterized the mobilization of the Ukrainian population. While volunteerism, patriotism, and the inclusion of women have sustained Ukraine’s war effort, the need to protect the civilian population from attack remains paramount.

Sarah Dawn Petrin is a nonresident senior fellow at the Transatlantic Security Initiative in the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. She previously advised the US Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute on integrating women, peace, and security and human security in US military operations.

The post The Women, Peace, and Security agenda made important strides at NATO’s Washington summit appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Cho quoted in the Diplomat on geopolitical tensions in East Asia

ylee — Fri, 19 Jul 2024 15:46:14 +0000

On July 18, IPSI nonresident senior fellow Sungmin Cho was quoted in the Diplomat regarding heightened geopolitical tensions in East Asia and the implications for South Korea. He emphasized the increased risk of unconventional action by an emboldened Kim Jong Un, such as terrorist attacks on South Korean infrastructure and civilians.

Fellow

Sungmin Cho

Indo-Pacific Security Initiative Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

China Defense Policy

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Rudder quoted in Digitimes Asia on Taiwan’s military modernization and drone warfare

ylee — Tue, 16 Jul 2024 20:53:25 +0000

On July 15, IPSI nonresident senior fellow Steven R. Rudder was quoted in Digitimes Asia discussing Taiwan’s military modernization and emphasizing the need for adaptable procurement strategies and doctrinal development in drone warfare.

Fellow

Steven R. Rudder

Indo-Pacific Security Initiative Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Indo-Pacific Maritime Security

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Russia’s retreat from Crimea makes a mockery of the West’s escalation fears

Peter Dickinson — Tue, 16 Jul 2024 20:52:12 +0000

This week marked another milestone in the Battle of the Black Sea as the Russian Navy reportedly withdrew its last remaining patrol ship from occupied Crimea. The news was announced by Ukrainian Navy spokesperson Dmytro Pletenchuk, who signaled the historic nature of the Russian retreat with the words: “Remember this day.”

The withdrawal of Russian warships from Crimea is the latest indication that against all odds, Ukraine is actually winning the war at sea. When Russia first began the blockade of Ukraine’s ports on the eve of the full-scale invasion in February 2022, few believed the ramshackle Ukrainian Navy could seriously challenge the dominance of the mighty Russian Black Sea Fleet. Once hostilities were underway, however, it soon became apparent that Ukraine had no intention of conceding control of the Black Sea to Putin without a fight.

Beginning with the April 2022 sinking of the Russian Black Sea Fleet flagship, the Moskva, Ukraine has used a combination of domestically produced drones and missiles together with Western-supplied long-range weapons to strike a series of devastating blows against Putin’s fleet. Cruise missiles delivered by Kyiv’s British and French partners have played an important role in this campaign, but the most potent weapons of all have been Ukraine’s own rapidly evolving fleet of innovative marine drones.

The results speak for themselves. When the full-scale invasion began, the Russian Black Sea Fleet had seventy four warships, most of which were based at ports in Russian-occupied Crimea. In a little over two years, Ukraine managed to sink or damage around one third of these ships. In the second half of 2023, reports were already emerging of Russian warships being hurriedly moved across the Black Sea from Crimea to the relative safety of Novorossiysk in Russia. By March 2024, the Russian Black Sea Fleet had become “functionally inactive,” according to the British Ministry of Defense.

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Ukraine’s remarkable success in the Battle of the Black Sea has had significant practical implications for the wider war. It has disrupted Russian logistics and hindered the resupply of Russian troops in southern Ukraine, while limiting Russia’s ability to bomb Ukrainian targets from warships armed with cruise missiles. Crucially, it has also enabled Ukraine to break the blockade the country’s Black Sea ports and resume commercial shipping via a new maritime corridor. As a result, Ukrainian agricultural exports are now close to prewar levels, providing Kyiv with a vital economic lifeline.

The Russian reaction to mounting setbacks in the Battle of the Black Sea has also been extremely revealing, and offers valuable lessons for the future conduct of the war. It has often been suggested that a cornered and beaten Vladimir Putin could potentially resort to the most extreme measures, including the use of nuclear weapons. In fact, he has responded to the humiliating defeat of the Black Sea Fleet by quietly ordering his remaining warships to retreat.

This underwhelming response is all the more telling given the symbolic significance of Crimea to the Putin regime. The Russian invasion of Ukraine first began in spring 2014 with the seizure of Crimea, which occupies an almost mystical position in Russian national folklore as the home of the country’s Black Sea Fleet. Throughout the past decade, the occupied Ukrainian peninsula has featured heavily in Kremlin propaganda trumpeting Russia’s return to Great Power status, and has come to symbolize Putin’s personal claim to a place in Russian history.

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Indo-Pacific Security Initiative Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Ukraine’s advance in Kursk: What’s next and implications

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Crimea’s elevated status was initially enough to make some of Ukraine’s international partners wary of sanctioning strikes on the occupied peninsula. However, the Ukrainians themselves had no such concerns. Instead, they simply disregarded the Kremlin’s talk of dire consequences and began attacking Russian military targets across Crimea and throughout the Black Sea. More than two years later, these attacks have now become a routine feature of the war and are taken for granted by all sides. Indeed, the Kremlin media plays down attacks on Crimea and largely ignores the frequent sinking of Russian warships, no doubt to save Putin’s blushes.

The Russian Navy’s readiness to retreat from its supposedly sacred home ports in Crimea has made a mockery of Moscow’s so-called red lines and exposed the emptiness of Putin’s nuclear threats. Nevertheless, Kyiv’s international allies remain reluctant to draw the obvious conclusions. Instead, Western support for Ukraine continues to be defined by self-defeating fears of escalation.

For almost two and a half years, Ukraine’s partners have allowed themselves to be intimidated into denying Ukraine certain categories of weapons and restricting attacks inside Russia. This is usually done while piously citing the need to prevent the current conflict from spreading any further. Western policymakers apparently prefer to ignore the overwhelming evidence from the Battle of the Black Sea, which confirms that when confronted by resolute opposition, Putin is far more likely to back down than escalate.

The West’s fear of escalation is Putin’s most effective weapon. It allows him to limit the military aid reaching Kyiv, while also preventing Ukraine from striking back against Russia. This is slowly but surely setting the stage for inevitable Russian victory in a long war of attrition. Western leaders claim to be motivated by a desire to avoid provoking a wider war, but that is exactly what will happen if they continue to pursue misguided policies of escalation management and fail to stop Putin in Ukraine.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

Brian Kerg

Nonresident Fellow

Afghanistan Conflict

The post Kerg referenced in Australian Independent Media Network regarding US-China conflict appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Modernizing space-based nuclear command, control, and communications

Peter L. Hays and Sarah Mineiro — Mon, 15 Jul 2024 13:00:00 +0000

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Abstract
Introduction
What is the NC3 system?
The nature of NC3
Current NC3 missions and space systems
How the attributes of space and space systems shape space security
Geopolitical challenges to the current NC3 system
Counterspace threats to space-based NC3
Modernization plans for space-based NC3
Conclusion and recommendations
About the authors
Acknowledgements

If I take nuclear command and control and spread it across 400 satellites … how many satellites do I have to shoot down now to take out the US nuclear command and control?”

Gen. B. Chance Saltzman, Chief of Space Operations (CSO) United States Space Force (USSF)

Abstract

US nuclear command, control, and communications (NC3) is a bedrock for nuclear deterrence and the US-led, rules-based international order that it supports. Like the rest of the US nuclear arsenal, NC3 is in the midst of a modernization overhaul. The space-based elements of NC3, however, face different geopolitical, technical, and bureaucratic challenges during this modernization. Geopolitically, the two-nuclear-peer challenge, China’s perception of NC3 and strategic stability, and the prospect of limited nuclear use call into question the sufficiency of existing and next-generation NC3. Technically, Russia and China are developing more sophisticated counterspace weapons, which hold at risk space-based US NC3. Bureaucratically, the US Department of Defense (DOD)’s shift to a proliferated space architecture may not be appropriately prioritizing requirements for systems that are essential for NC3 missions. To address these challenges, space-focused agencies in the DOD need to ensure that nuclear surety is not given short shrift in the future of space systems planning.

Introduction

The NC3 system is one of the most opaque, complex, hardened, least understood, and perhaps least appreciated foundations for nuclear deterrence and strategic stability. While each military service is busy developing and attempting to resource its instantiation of combined joint all domain command and control (CJADC2), NC3 has not yet enjoyed this same focus and attention. As security dynamics and technology developments continue to evolve, the United States must commit appropriate resources and focus to ensure the continuing effectiveness of NC3. In simple terms, NC3 is the protected and assured missile, air, and space warning and communication system enabling the command and control of US nuclear forces that must operate effectively under the most extreme and existentially challenging conditions—employment of nuclear weapons. The 2022 US Nuclear Posture Review explains the five essential functions of NC3: “detection, warning, and attack characterization; adaptive nuclear planning; decision-making conferencing; receiving and executing Presidential orders; and enabling the management and direction of forces.”¹

The NC3 system must never permit the use of nuclear weapons unless specifically authorized by the president, the only use-approval authority (negative control), while always enabling their use in the specific ways the president authorizes (positive control). Risk tolerance for NC3 systems is understandably nonexistent; there can be no uncertainty in the ability of the United States to positively command and control its nuclear forces at any given moment. The DOD and Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration use the term “nuclear surety” to describe their comprehensive programs for the safety, security, and control of nuclear weapons that leave no margin for error. The requirement for nuclear surety is constant, but it is becoming more difficult to deliver because threats to US NC3 systems are increasing, due to geopolitical, technical, and bureaucratic trends and developments.

The geopolitical environment has shifted in significant ways since current US NC3 systems were deployed. The space-based elements of NC3 are now threatened in unprecedented ways, due to Chinese and Russian testing and deployment of a range of counterspace capabilities that can hold space-based NC3 systems at risk. As demonstrated by the current war in Ukraine, even regional conflicts can manifest long-standing questions and concerns about NC3 in a multipolar and increasingly complex global security environment. Layer in China’s quantitative and qualitative rise in strategic nuclear weapons delivery systems and the unwillingness of China’s leadership to have basic discussions about strategic stability, and the 1960s architecture that is the foundation of US NC3 systems seems to be growing increasingly inadequate to deal with the geopolitical challenges of today and tomorrow. The reality is that the current NC3 system and architectures were predicated upon a bipolar nuclear geopolitical situation that no longer exists. Today, a multipolar, globally proliferated, and largely unconstrained nuclear weapons environment requires integrated deterrence across domains, sectors, and alliances.

The E-4B National Airborne Operations Center, which provides travel support for the Secretary of Defense and their staff to ensure command and control connectivity outside of the continental United States. Credit: US Air Force.

While the geopolitical environment has evolved, so too has the technology available to deliver NC3 capabilities. Many of the current NC3 systems were developed decades ago using analog technology but are now being updated to digital interfaces, switches, and underlying network topologies. This transition will enable enhanced capabilities, but it will also open more threat vectors that can be exploited via various cyber means through all segments of the system. As the space-based systems that are part of the NC3 system are being comprehensively upgraded, whether for missile warning (detecting and characterizing a missile), missile tracking, or delivering persistent assured communications, the DOD must work to eliminate exploitable cyber vulnerabilities and maintain distributed end-to-end network and supply chain security.

Additionally, almost all the DOD’s bureaucratic structures that acquired the current NC3 systems have changed, sometimes in radical ways. Primary responsibility for acquisition of important elements of the NC3 system are now divided between several organizations that are not focused on nuclear surety, making it a significant challenge to achieve effective integration and unity of command and effort across this structure. Moreover, the overall architecture for US space systems is transitioning toward a hybrid approach that uses commercial, international, and government systems and capabilities to enhance space mission assurance. The benefits of this hybrid approach seem clear for most mission areas, but it is not necessarily optimal for NC3. The DOD must ensure that nuclear surety remains a foundational and non-negotiable requirement for next-generation NC3 systems and cannot allow this requirement to be out-prioritized by other important considerations or become adrift in new bureaucratic structures.

Given the importance of the capabilities, evolving geopolitical and technical threats, and the diverse units planning modernization of the system, the United States must think carefully about the best ways to acquire the next-generation, and generation-after-next, of space-based NC3 to continue delivering nuclear surety in a new landscape that is characterized by a breathtaking degree and pace of change, troubling factors which seem likely to persist or even accelerate. The 2022 US Nuclear Posture Review reaffirms the US commitment to modernizing NC3 and lays out key challenges:

We will employ an optimized mix of resilience approaches to protect the next-generation NC3 architecture from threats posed by competitor capabilities. This includes, but is not limited to, enhanced protection from cyber, space-based, and electro-magnetic pulse threats; enhanced integrated tactical warning and attack assessment; improved command post and communication links; advanced decision support technology; and integrated planning and operations.”

2022 Nuclear Posture Review.

This paper characterizes the existing NC3 system and focuses on its space-based missions and elements. It describes how orbital dynamics shape space security and examines the emerging geopolitical, technical, and bureaucratic challenges to the extant NC3 system. Finally, it analyzes how ongoing modernization programs are addressing these challenges and offers some recommendations.

What is the NC3 system?

The nature of NC3

Department of the Air Force (DAF) doctrine defines the NC3 system as “the means through which Presidential authority is exercised and operational command control of nuclear operations is conducted. The NC3 system is part of the larger national leadership command capability (NLCC), which encompasses the three broad mission areas of: (1) Presidential and senior leader communications; (2) NC3; (3) and continuity of operations and government communications.”²

The current NC3 architecture is comprised of two separate but interrelated layers. The DOD’s 2020 Nuclear Matters Handbook describes it as follows:

The first layer is the day-to-day architecture which includes a variety of facilities and communications to provide robust command and control over nuclear and supporting government operations. The second layer provides the survivable, secure, and enduring architecture known as the “thin-line.”

Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear Matters, Nuclear Matters Handbook 2020 [Revised], https://www.acq.osd.mil/ncbdp/nm/NMHB2020rev/chapters/chapter2.html.

The thin-line uses several communication technologies and pathways to provide “assured, unbroken, redundant, survivable, secure, and enduring connectivity to and among the President, the Secretary of Defense, the CJCS [Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff], and designated commanders through all threat environments to perform all necessary command and control functions.”³ Assessments of space-based NC3 tend to focus most on the ways these systems support the thin-line; this assured connectivity is an essential foundation, but any comprehensive analysis must also consider the contributions of space systems to broader NC3 functions. Moreover, the highly integrated nature of modern command, control, communications, and battle management (C3BM) systems necessitates the integration of NC3 capabilities into a broader system-of-systems across the C3BM enterprise. For the DAF, this integrated system-of-systems is the DAF Battle Network and includes more than fifty-five programs and $21.5 billion in procurement as part of the broader DOD CJADC2 initiative.⁴

An Upgraded Early Warning Radar (UEWR), a dual-sided ballistic missile early warning radar, at US Space Force’s northernmost base in Greenland. Credit: US Space Force.

To instantiate a survivable communications network, the NC3 system is comprised of terrestrial, airborne, and space-based systems. Satellite terminals like the Family of Advanced Beyond Line-of-Sight Terminals (FAB-T) ensure that the satellite communications, cryptographic keys, and actual control functions of the network are available to the necessary decision-makers during nuclear conflict.⁵ Boeing was the original contractor for the FAB-T program, but a February 2023 report delivered to Congress from Frank Calvelli, the assistant secretary of the Air Force for space acquisition and integration, indicated that FAB-T had fallen more than a decade behind schedule under Boeing and that a new sole-source contract for FAB-T was awarded to Raytheon in 2014.⁶ Allowing FAB-T to fall more than a decade behind schedule is an indication of the DOD’s reduced emphasis on NC3 in the post-Cold War era.

Satellite command post terminals in airborne command centers like the E-4B National Airborne Operations Center and the E-6B Looking Glass Airborne Nuclear Command Post (ABNCP) on the Navy’s Take Charge and Move Out (TACAMO) aircraft ensure that national decision-makers can command and control nuclear forces even if key ground sites and decision-makers come under attack.⁷ TACAMO aircraft can link national decision-makers with “naval ballistic missile forces during times of crisis. The aircraft carries a Very Low Frequency communication system with dual trailing wire antennas” and can also perform the Looking Glass ABNCP mission, which facilitates the launch of US land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles using a robust and survivable airborne launch-control system.⁸

Current NC3 missions and space systems

Space systems provide three capabilities that are essential for the NC3 enterprise: missile warning/missile tracking (MW/MT), assured communications, and nuclear detonation detection. Space-based MW/MT uses infrared sensors to detect missile launches worldwide. This can be the first warning of an attack and, when combined with other attack indications from systems using different phenomenologies, provides high confidence that an actual attack is underway. This warning is essential for initiating other steps that may include moving the president, conferencing with senior leaders, and determining response options. Today, the space-based infrared system (SBIRS) provides MW/MT. SBIRS consists of the space segment of geostationary Earth orbit (GEO) satellites, highly elliptical orbit (HEO) sensors, legacy Defense Support Program (DSP) satellites, and the associated worldwide deployed ground systems. SBIRS satellites were first launched in 2011, and the sixth and final satellite was launched in August 2022.⁹ In 2017, then-Commander US Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) Gen. John Hyten famously described SBIRS satellites as “big, fat, juicy targets,” pledging that USSTRATCOM would no longer support acquisition of such NC3 systems and that “we are going to go down a different path. And we have to go down that path quickly.”¹⁰ The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) (and its predecessor organizations) has, since the 1980s, conducted several experiments and developed prototype capabilities supportive of MW/MT/missile defense and adaptive nuclear planning. MDA’s prior efforts include Delta 180, Midcourse Space Experiment/Space-Based Visible, and Space Tracking and Surveillance System.¹¹

Assured, survivable communications capabilities are essential for the president to conduct conferences with senior leaders and exercise command and control over nuclear forces. Space-basing enhances survivability and enables global communications. The Advanced Extremely High-Frequency (AEHF) system currently provides many communication links for nuclear command and control. AEHF provides “survivable, global, secure, protected, and jam-resistant communications for high-priority military ground, sea and air assets.”¹² AEHF replaced the Cold War-era Milstar system; the first AEHF satellite was launched in 2010, and the sixth and final satellite was launched in March 2020.

A rendition of the Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) System, a space-based communication system. Credit: US Space Force.

A final space capability providing important support to NC3 is data about the location of nuclear detonations worldwide. This information is essential for effective and adaptive planning in a nuclear conflict. The United States Nuclear Detonation Detection System (USNDS) currently provides this capability.¹³ As described by the DOD, “the USNDS is a worldwide system of space-based sensors and ground processing equipment designed to detect, locate, and report nuclear detonations in the earth’s atmosphere and in space. The USNDS space-based segment is hosted on a combination of global positioning system (GPS) satellites, DSP satellites, and other classified satellites.”¹⁴ The enhanced detection capabilities of the Space and Atmospheric Burst Reporting System (SABRS-2) payload were first deployed in 2016.

How the attributes of space and space systems shape space security

Comprehensive analysis about modernizing space-based NC3 cannot be complete without a baseline understanding of the attributes of space and space systems that shape the most appropriate modernization paths and trade-offs. NC3 systems were first moved to space in the 1960s because this domain provides unique speed and positional advantages, persistent emplacement, and a global perspective. These developments were highly effective and efficient, despite the considerable expense of developing reliable space hardware and the great energy required to move a satellite above the atmosphere at the bottom of Earth’s gravity well and to accelerate it so it can sustain the specific orbit for which it was designed. Orbital dynamics, along with the lack of traditional cover and concealment measures available on Earth, means satellites can be more easily detected, tracked, and targeted than terrestrial forces, which are routinely able to maneuver and hide.

Attributes of space launch and orbital dynamics also drive space technology and operations in significant ways. Traditional satellite architectures have been shaped by several factors, including the costs and dangers of space launch (still the most hazardous part of satellite operations), significant limitations on capability to service satellites, perceived economies from custom-building very small numbers of increasingly capable and large satellites, and the ability of just a few of these highly capable satellites to perform a variety of key missions very competently. Due to these factors, several countries, and the United States in particular, in the past chose to develop and operate a very small number of highly expensive, sophisticated, and exquisitely capable satellites. Each of these attributes adds to the vulnerability of legacy satellite architectures and exacerbates temptations for enemies to negate them because these orbital assets are so fragile, so few, increasingly important, operate in highly predictable ways, and cannot today be repaired, refueled, or upgraded on orbit.

Another important defining characteristic of most space systems is that they are dual use, meaning that they can be used for both civilian and military applications. This dual-use characteristic has been inherent since the earliest days of space technology development and is highlighted by a description of Wernher von Braun (the leading space technology pioneer) as a “dreamer of space, engineer of war.”¹⁵ The hybrid space architecture under development by the United States is an integrated system of both government (civil, national security, intelligence) and commercial (industry) elements that is also inherently dual use, particularly when the government procures commercial goods and services. This architecture can also be extended to international and institutional (interagency, academia) allies, coalition members, and partners. Dual-use considerations sometimes create difficult balancing and trade-off issues, as the United States and other countries attempt to promote space technologies and activities considered to be benign, while limiting similar capabilities or actions that may be threatening or destabilizing.

An implication of the dual-use nature of space systems is that any satellite that can transmit or maneuver could be sent toward a potential collision (known as a conjunction) with a nearby satellite or used to jam satellite transmissions, making it a simple anti-satellite (ASAT) weapon. Such use is not likely to be as effective as a purpose-built ASAT weapon, but increasing development of in-orbit servicing, assembly, and manufacturing (ISAM) and active debris removal (ADR) capabilities may blur and complicate distinctions between commercial, civil, and military applications and operations. Similarities between ASAT systems and some of the technologies and operations of ISAM and ADR systems are so great that analysts worry that widespread development of these beneficial commercial and civil capabilities would also create significant but latent ASAT potential.¹⁶ The dual-use characteristic of satellites or spacecraft is perhaps the single largest factor that complicates space security considerations, making it more difficult for analysts to determine ways to incentivize desired applications, constrain malign potential, and consider how these factors shape space superiority.

Dedicated or dual-use capabilities can strengthen capability, capacity, resilience, and security, but security is an ambiguous and relative concept. Analysts use the term “security dilemma” to describe the relative and interactive aspects of security and study them as a cause of war and one of the central problems of international relations.¹⁷ The characteristics of space and satellites exacerbate some of these issues and make their relative contributions to security more ambiguous and elusive. Accordingly, modernizing space-based NC3 in the context of these technical and political issues is a complex endeavor that may promote or inhibit cooperation under the security dilemma.¹⁸

On this subject, strategist Brad Townsend builds from earlier analysis and applies it directly to space, finding that the current space security situation is less dire than some originally predicted.¹⁹ CSO Saltzman acknowledges that the security dilemma is a concern but notes that weapons are not inherently offensive or defensive: “Weapons are just weapons. And the operations that you choose to undertake with those weapons makes them more offensive or defensive.”²⁰ As described in a 2023 New York Times Magazine profile of the US Space Force:

The important question, as [General Saltzman] saw it, was this: At what point does a buildup of defensive weapons in space constitute an ability to conduct offensive operations so that someone else feels threatened? “There is a balance here,” he said. “And this is about stability management. What actions can we take to protect ourselves before we start to cross the line and maybe create a security dilemma?” The line, he suggested—harder to find in space, no doubt, and at this point not clearly defined—had not yet been crossed.

Gertner, “What Does the US Space Force Actually Do?” Interior quotes are from General Saltzman.

A final attribute of space capabilities is rapidly evolving due to the burgeoning commercial space sector: the value of commercial space systems in supporting a wide range of military operations. These contributions have grown exponentially, as illustrated by the stunning successes of the Ukrainians in defending their country following the Russian invasion.²¹ Commercial space capabilities provide critical information that strengthens worldwide support for Ukraine, supply communications connectivity that is essential for coordinating many Ukrainian military operations, and demonstrate that states do not necessarily need to own and operate space systems to use them effectively.

US Vice President Kamala Harris announces a new US pledge to not destructively test direct-ascent anti-satellite weapons during a visit to Vandenberg Space Force Base in April 2022. US Space Force photo by Michael Peterson.

These characteristics of space and space systems are driving the United States toward a wholesale reorientation of its national security space enterprise that is focused on improving resilience and advancing better transparency- and confidence-building measures (TCBMs) for space governance. The current enterprise-wide modernization and recapitalization of government space systems provides resilient, robust, and responsive solutions, seeking to take advantage of new capabilities and technologies through approaches including highly proliferated constellations in multiple orbits; in-plane and multi-orbit, multi-node cross-links; and shorter development and deployment cycles. Helpful TCBM steps include the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space’s promulgation of twenty-one guidelines for the long-term sustainability of space activities, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s declaration that space is a fifth operational domain where attacks could invoke Article 5 defense obligations,the DOD’s tenets of responsible space behavior in space, and the pledge by the United States that it will no longer conduct destructive direct-ascent (DA)-ASAT tests that has now been joined by several other countries and adopted by the United Nations General Assembly.²² These steps and others seem to be generating momentum toward greater consensus and more specifics on what constitutes responsible behavior in space, which will facilitate the “naming and shaming” of parties that do not act in responsible ways. Nonetheless, these efforts also highlight just how far the space governance regime is from governance regimes in other domains that include much more specific obligations and robust verification mechanisms, rather than voluntary guidelines and pledges.

Geopolitical challenges to the current NC3 system

Two elements of the changing international security environment pose a challenge to the current NC3 system beyond what it was designed to face—principally, the nature and number of nuclear-armed countries which the United States seeks to deter using its nuclear arsenal and the increasing risk of limited nuclear use. The People’s Republic of China (PRC), the “pacing challenge” for the DOD, is currently engaged in a significant nuclear breakout. This has two key consequences for NC3. First, the increased focus on, and risk of nuclear conflict with, China raises the salience of Beijing’s possible lack of understanding of or appreciation for the principle of noninterference with space-based NC3 that Washington and Moscow arrived at during the Cold War. The second challenge posed by China’s nuclear breakout is the so-called two-nuclear-peer problem.²³ The United States may need to deter or, if deterrence fails, restore deterrence against two nuclear peers which may aggress against the United States or its allies in coordination, in sequence, or in overlapping timeframes. This development may raise the requirements for survivable NC3. Finally, US government documents evince a growing concern that Russia and China may be lowering the threshold for limited nuclear use to achieve their aims in a conflict with the United States or its allies, potentially requiring a graduated US nuclear response. These developments create a challenging environment for effective NC3 operations.

The NC3 system is arguably the most important communication system that the US maintains and is the bedrock of nuclear deterrence. As such, deliberate degradation or destruction of these capabilities is a “red line” (meaning an unacceptable action that could trigger a nuclear war) for senior US decision-makers. Disruption, degradation, or denial of NC3 capabilities could have strategically destabilizing effects for the United States, as well as the allies that depend on US extended deterrence commitments to ensure their security. Japan, the Republic of Korea, and NATO allies all tangibly benefit from US extended strategic deterrence commitments that are predicated on assured NC3; confidence in US extended deterrence commitments is undermined if states question whether NC3 will always work as needed.

The first key development in the international security environment posing challenges to NC3 is the changing nature and number of nuclear-armed states which the United States seeks to deter using its nuclear arsenal. China’s growing importance as a nuclear competitor presents a challenge to space-based NC3 because Washington and Beijing do not have a mutual understanding of red lines surrounding NC3 assets that is comparable to the understanding Washington developed with Moscow during the Cold War. The current NC3 system evolved based on important assumptions about strategic nuclear bipolarity between two superpowers with a shared understanding about red lines and at least a nominal commitment to reducing the risk of strategic miscalculation in decisions about using nuclear weapons.

China presents strategic challenges that cannot be met with the approaches used for Russia. The United States and China do not maintain regular strategic security dialogues designed to reach shared understanding about critical issues, such as red lines on disrupting NC3. Whereas Russia and the United States generally agree that degrading, denying, disrupting, or destroying systems associated with NC3 is destabilizing and potentially a precursor to nuclear exchange, there is no such understanding with China, and Chinese leaders may even see value in such uncertainty.²⁴ Additionally, China has chosen to remain outside of strategic arms control treaties and dialogues, ostensibly because it fails to see a strategic benefit to being bound to the terms of such agreements and is unwilling to submit to a stringent verification regime. Instead, China has been pursuing rapid quantitative and qualitative growth in its entire nuclear force structure and C3BM systems, while also concurrently developing and fielding counterspace and cyber weapons that could be employed against US space-based NC3 systems. Specifically, China’s first deployment of its own ballistic missile early warning satellites and putative move toward a nuclear launch-on-warning posture could be quite destabilizing.

The DF-41 land-mobile missile on parade. The DF-41 is one of China’s most advanced intercontinental ballistic missiles and a significant component of its nuclear breakout. Credit: Chinese People’s Liberation Army.

With China’s rapid nuclear modernization, the United States faces a possible two-nuclear-peer problem of deterring simultaneous, sequential, or overlapping aggression from both China and Russia. China has achieved a strategic breakout with its rapid expansion in scope, scale, and capabilities for strategic nuclear weapons, including their own nuclear triad in development and operations. China is expected to field a nuclear arsenal of at least one thousand deliverable warheads by 2030, a number which may continue to grow, and presents considerable challenges for effective NC3 in various two-nuclear-peer conflict scenarios.²⁵

An additional geopolitical challenge to NC3 is the increased likelihood of limited nuclear use by Russia or China. Limited nuclear use—that is, nuclear employment less than a full exchange against strategic targets in either party’s homeland—poses challenges to NC3 because NC3 elements may need to survive several limited exchanges while maintaining the ability to characterize attacks in detail to enable the National Command Authority to order responses that convey clear messages of resolve and restraint in a graduated manner. Recent world events and US government analysis demonstrates concern that both Russia and China are considering limited nuclear use strategies. President Vladimir Putin’s Russia has backslid toward destabilizing activity in which the employment of “tactical nuclear weapons” has been contemplated to an unprecedented extent. As reported by the BBC, “In February 2022, shortly before invading Ukraine, President Putin placed Russia’s nuclear forces at ‘special combat readiness’ and held high-profile nuclear drills.”²⁶ As the conflict in Ukraine continued, Putin made this statement: “If the territorial integrity of our country is threatened, we will, without a doubt, use all available means to protect Russia and our people. This is not a bluff.”²⁷ Even before the Russian re-invasion of Ukraine, scholars and analysts had grown concerned that Russia would consider using nuclear weapons in a limited way in Europe.²⁸

As will be described in more detail in the following section, the problem of limited nuclear use is particularly nettlesome when considering that the nuclear taboo since Nagasaki may be weakening. Uncertainty caused by the latest round of threatening rhetoric and dynamic saber-rattling over Ukraine clearly reemphasizes the need for a robust, assured NC3 system that can operate through all contemplated nuclear scenarios, including nuclear detonations in space and regional nuclear exchanges. These kinds of unprecedented scenarios highlight tangible architectural threats to the system as it currently exists, even with the strategic competitor with whom the United States has the most historical basis for reducing miscalculation.

Nuclear dynamics have moved far beyond the nuclear bipolarity of the Cold War; today’s world is robustly multipolar with the peer competitors or peer adversaries of the United States having an “unlimited partnership” that is further complicated by their alliances and relationships with other emerging nuclear powers. The NC3 architecture as designed in the 1960s surely did not contemplate India, Pakistan, North Korea, and others potentially using nuclear weapons which the United States would need to be able to detect, characterize, respond to, and operate through. The physical architecture, data throughput capacity links, and even geographic and temporal constraints of the NC3 system all require upgrading and expansion to address today’s far more complex and challenging geopolitical environment.

Counterspace threats to space-based NC3

Accelerating development, testing, and deployment of a range of Chinese and Russian counterspace capabilities significantly challenges the ability of space-based NC3 to continue delivering nuclear surety. Other states, including Iran and North Korea, also possess some limited counterspace capabilities, but these capabilities are considerably less worrisome than those of China and Russia and are not the focus of this paper.

The DOD recognizes significant threats to its space systems from Russia and China, including to space-based NC3. As one of the authors has argued:

By describing space as a warfighting domain, the 2018 National Defense Strategy marked a fundamental shift away from legacy perspectives on uncontested military space operations and aspirations for free access and peaceful purposes espoused in the Outer Space Treaty. America’s potential adversaries, particularly China and Russia, now view space—from launch, to on-orbit, the up- and downlinks, and the ground stations—as a weak link in US warfighting capabilities. Conversely, the United States for generations believed space to be a permissive environment and did not make major investments in defensive capabilities, even as almost all modern military operations became increasingly reliant on space capabilities. These facts, coupled with the reemergence of great power competition, have led adversaries to believe that by denying US space-enabled capabilities, they can gain strategic advantage over US response options—making those options less assured, less opportune, and less decisive.”

Peter L. Hays, “Is This the Space Force You’re Looking For? Opportunities and Challenges for the US Space Force,” in Benjamin Bahney, ed., Space Strategy at a Crossroads: Opportunities and Challenges for 21st Century Competition, Center for Global Security Research, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, May 2020, 20. The following five paragraphs draw substantially from Hays’ chapter cited here.

Most disturbingly, US adversaries, particularly China with its lack of interest in strategic arms control and seeming disregard for traditional norms surrounding stability and deterrence, may now perceive that undermining the efficacy of space-based NC3 may be one of its most attractive options for gaining strategic advantage. These are destabilizing conditions in that:

Adversaries may believe they can deter US entry into a conflict by threatening or attacking US space capabilities. This may even embolden adversaries to employ a space attack as a “first salvo” in anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) strategies. This is a potentially dangerous situation that has moved past an inflection point and is starting to create strategic disadvantages rather than the strategic advantages space traditionally provided the United States. From a Clausewitzian perspective, the Space Force must also consider whether current US space strategy may be approaching a culminating point where it becomes counterproductive to continue either offensive or defensive space operations in wartime [unless it has deployed a far more resilient architecture].

Hays, “Is This the Space Force You’re Looking For?,” 20. Internal citations omitted.

China has reformed its military and developed significant capabilities to hold at risk US space assets. As part of its 2015 military reforms, China established the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Strategic Support Force (SSF).²⁹ The SSF combines space and counterspace capabilities, electronic warfare, and cyber operations in one organization and enables the PLA to be more effective in its approach to space as a warfighting domain. “The PLA views space superiority, the ability to control the space-enabled information sphere and to deny adversaries their own space-based information gathering and communication capabilities, as critical components to conduct modern ‘informatized warfare.’”³⁰ In the words of a recent DOD report to Congress on protection of satellites:

The PRC views counterspace systems as a means to deter and counter outside intervention during a regional conflict. The PLA is developing, testing, and fielding capabilities intended to target US and allied satellites, including electronic warfare to suppress or deceive enemy equipment, ground-based laser systems that can disrupt, degrade, and damage satellite sensors, offensive cyberwarfare capabilities, and direct-ascent anti-satellite (DA-ASAT) missiles that can target satellites in low Earth orbit (LEO). The PRC has launched multiple experimental satellites to research space maintenance and debris cleanup with advanced capabilities, such as robotic arm technologies that could be used for grappling other satellites. In 2022, the PRC’s Shijian-21 satellite moved a derelict satellite to a graveyard orbit above geosynchronous Earth orbit (GEO).”

US Department of Defense, “Space Policy Review and Strategy on Protection of Satellites,” September 2023, 2-3, https://media.defense.gov/2023/Sep/14/2003301146/-1/-1/0/COMPREHENSIVE-REPORT-FOR-RELEASE.pdf.

The Shijian-21 demonstration was particularly threatening to US space-based NC3, as it indicated a potential capability to grapple and move or disable noncooperative satellites; many of the most important US NC3 systems are in GEO.

The PRC continues to seek new methods to hold US satellites at risk, probably intending to pursue DA-ASAT weapons capable of destroying satellites up to GEO. As the PRC has developed and fielded these counterspace weapons, it has simultaneously promoted false claims that it will not place weapons in space and, along with Russia, has proposed at the United Nations a draft of a flawed, legally-binding treaty on the nonweaponization of space that is inherently unverifiable and unenforceable.”

“Space Policy Review and Strategy on Protection of Satellites,” 3.

For decades, Russia has developed doctrine and pursued capabilities to target US satellites, including NC3 systems.

Russia reorganized its military in 2015 to create a separate space force because Russia sees achieving supremacy in space as a decisive factor in winning conflicts. Although Russia has a smaller fleet of satellites than China, Russia operates some of the world’s most capable individual ISR [intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance] satellites for optical imagery, radar imagery, signals intelligence, and missile warning. Russia increasingly integrates space services into its military, though it wants to avoid becoming overly dependent on space for its national defense missions because it views that as a potential vulnerability. Russia is developing, testing, and fielding a suite of reversible and irreversible counterspace systems to degrade or deny US space-based services as a means of offsetting a perceived US military advantage and deterring the United States from entering a regional conflict. These systems include jamming and cyberspace capabilities, directed energy weapons, on-orbit capabilities, and ground-based DA-ASAT missile capabilities. In November 2021, Russia tested a DA-ASAT missile against a defunct Russian satellite, which created more than 1,500 pieces of trackable space debris and tens of thousands of pieces of potentially lethal but non-trackable debris. The resulting debris continues to threaten spacecraft of all nations in LEO, astronauts and cosmonauts on the International Space Station, and taikonauts on China’s Tiangong space station.”

“Space Policy Review and Strategy on Protection of Satellites,” 3. Internal citations omitted.

Launch preparations for the Russian Nudol system, which serves as both an anti-ballistic missile interceptor as well as an anti-satellite weapon, 2021. Russian Ministry of Defense

In a most disturbing scenario, the efficacy of commercial LEO satellites in supporting Ukraine could lead the Russians (or the Chinese in a Taiwan invasion, for instance) to assess that the greatest military effectiveness from the limited use of nuclear weapons would be to detonate just one in LEO. A high-altitude nuclear detonation (HAND) would raise the peak radiation flux in parts of the Van Allen radiation belts by three to four orders of magnitude, cause the failure in weeks to months of most if not all LEO satellites not specifically hardened against this threat, result in direct financial damages probably approaching $500 billion and over $3 trillion in overall economic impact, and present daunting response challenges, since the attack would be outside of any state’s sovereign territory and not directly kill anyone.³¹

Modernization plans for space-based NC3

While the NC3 system currently appears to be sufficiently redundant, capable, and secure, it must be modernized to keep pace with the evolving geopolitical environment, technical developments, and planned modernization of the nuclear triad (submarines, bombers, and land-based missiles). As described by the DOD’s Nuclear Matters Handbook:

In July 2018, the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff formally appointed the USSTRATCOM Commander to be “the NC3 enterprise lead, with increased responsibilities for operations, requirements, and systems engineering and integration.” USSTRATCOM has created an NC3 Enterprise Center inside the command’s headquarters at Offutt Air Force Base, Nebraska. On November 5, 2018, Commander, USSTRATCOM stated, “It is imperative that the US government modernize its three-decade-old NC3 in a manner that accounts for current and future threats to its functionality and vulnerabilities.” The NC3 Enterprise Center is developing and evaluating NC3 architectures and approaches for modernization.”

Nuclear Matters Handbook 2020, 28.

In earlier congressional testimony, General Hyten had simply stated that “nuclear command and control and communications, NC3, is my biggest concern when I look out towards the future.”³²

US Navy VADM David Kriete, then-deputy commander of US Strategic Command, announced the initial operational capability of the Nuclear Command, Control, and Communications Enterprise Center in April 2019. USSTRATCOM photo.

No nuclear weapon delivery platform can execute its mission without NC3, but the NC3 system is so complex that a former commander of USSTRATCOM stated it includes over 204 individual systems.³³ While many space systems contribute ISR data that supports NC3, this analysis focuses just on the space systems that were designed for and dedicated to supporting NC3. Focusing on space systems in this way is, however, becoming increasingly difficult, as the DOD works to modernize both its overall space architecture and space-based NC3. Modernizing the ground- and air-based NC3 systems supporting the triad remains on a relatively straightforward path, but the path toward modernizing space-based NC3 is being reconsidered within the context of broader changes to deploy a more resilient hybrid space architecture overall. This requires consideration of different factors and trade-offs than those that shaped legacy US space-based NC3. Defense planners must now consider the value of disaggregated, diversified, and distributed systems supporting just NC3 versus entangled systems supporting many mission areas; the role of proliferation and protection; the proper timing and phasing of deployments; appropriate ways commercial systems and deception might support space-based NC3; and the many challenges associated with balancing and integrating across an increasingly complex NC3 enterprise. A recent detailed analysis of these complex factors and trade-offs from Wilson and Rumbaugh presented the troubling finding that “the US decision to disaggregate its nuclear-conventional satellite communications capabilities poses strategic consequences, but it may not have been a strategic decision.”³⁴ An even more detailed report analyzing just the sensor requirements and trade-offs for missile defense against hypersonic threats is over one hundred pages long.³⁵ As the DOD’s work to field a resilient, hybrid space architecture proceeds apace, it is not always clear that the requirement for nuclear surety in space-based NC3 has been analyzed and weighted appropriately.

The DOD has major programs and plans in place to modernize systems supporting the NC3 missions of assured communications and MW/MT. For assured communications, the plan is to augment and eventually replace AEHF with the Evolved Strategic Satcom (ESS) program by the 2030s.³⁶ ESS will operate in GEO and will provide a worldwide and Arctic protected, secure, and survivable satellite communications system supporting critical networks for strategic operations. The ESS system is being acquired by Space Systems Command (SSC); it “is the first DOD hybrid space program that is leveraging alternate acquisition pathways for each of its segments” under the adaptive acquisition framework that the DOD implemented in 2020.³⁷ ESS satellites are currently being acquired using a middle-tier acquisition (MTA) down-select rapid prototyping competition between Boeing and Northrop Grumman. SSC is expected to issue a request for proposals on ESS satellites in 2024, and the program is projected to cost about $8 billion.³⁸ In May 2024, SSC announced it is seeking proposals for the development and production of four ESS satellites through a competitive contract award; the program is projected to cost about $8 billion.³⁹ The ESS Program Office plans to transition from the MTA-rapid prototyping pathway to a tailored major capability acquisition (MCA) pathway beginning with the award of the ESS space segment production contract. The space segment is being designed to deliver an integrated system capability that is resilient, flexible, cyber secure, and utilizes a modular open system architecture to support NC3. The ground “segment is leveraging a series of Software Acquisition Pathway contracts for subsets of mission capability in agile software sprints”; in May 2023, Lockheed Martin and Raytheon each won $30 million contracts to develop prototypes of the ground system for ESS.⁴⁰ Use of alternate acquisition pathways and competing teams of contractors is designed to spur innovation and speed, “allowing development to stay ahead of changing strategic need.”⁴¹ The first prototype payloads are due to launch in 2024. Much depends on validating the performance of the prototypes and successful integration of the separate acquisition pathways for the space and ground segments.

Specific details regarding how MW/MT capabilities will be improved are complex and evolving. Efforts are now divided between three separate organizations: SSC, the Space Development Agency (SDA), and the MDA. MW/MT is “the first capability area to be redeveloped through a resilient-by-design approach.”⁴² As advocated by General Hyten and explained in a report to Congress: “This effort assessed architectures designed to meet future warfighting performance needs, establish resilience against modern military threats, and ensure cost parameters, resulting in recommendations on numbers of satellites and diversifying capabilities across orbital regimes.”⁴³ Using a Combined Program Office construct, SSC, SDA, and MDA are teaming to develop and implement a system-of-systems integration strategy for MW/MT and missile defense (MD) constellations of satellites in LEO, GEO, medium Earth orbit (MEO), and polar orbital regimes.

These efforts to develop next-generation overhead persistent infrared (NG-OPIR) capabilities are designed to provide MW/MT capabilities that can support MD for evolving intercontinental and theater ballistic missile threats using satellites in various orbits that are more survivable against emerging threats. “SSC’s Resilient MW/MT-MEO space and ground efforts pivot the Department of the Air Force’s legacy missile warning force design to a more resilient multi-orbit approach to counter advanced missiles, hypersonic glide vehicles, and fractional orbital bombardment threats.”⁴⁴ SCC’s NG-OPIR will be deployed in GEO (Next Generation OPIR GEO or NGG) and Polar (Next Generation OPIR Polar or NGP) orbits.⁴⁵ The original plan called for three NGG satellites and two NGP satellites; in its fiscal year 2024 request, the USSF cut the number of NGG satellites to two, and Congress has subsequently requested more information about the analysis underlying this change to the NGG program structure.⁴⁶ Lockheed Martin was awarded the contract to build NGG satellites and ground systems projected to cost $7.8 billion, and Northrop Grumman won a $1.9 billion definitized contract to build two NGP satellites; the first NGP is to be launched in 2028.⁴⁷ Both the NGG and NGP programs are expected to transition from the rapid prototype MTA pathway to the MCA pathway in early 2024. Additionally, SSC announced that, in November 2023, it “completed the critical design review for six [MW/MT/MD] satellites built by Millennium Space Systems that will go in MEO, clearing the way to start production ahead of a first scheduled launch by late 2026.”

The SDA, an independent space acquisition organization that was established in March 2019 and became part of the Space Force in October 2022, is leading parts of the effort to field resilient-by-design MW/MT capabilities via new proliferated space architectures. SDA’s business model values speed, simplicity, and resilience, while lowering costs by “harnessing commercial development to achieve a proliferated architecture and enhance resilience”; SDA plans to deliver a new layer (or tranche) of LEO satellites to support various missions every two years.⁴⁸ The first satellites in the Tranche 1 Tracking Layer are to begin launching in late 2024 and will include “28 satellites in Low Earth Orbit (LEO) optimized for use by Indo-Pacific Command to monitor Chinese and North Korean missile launches.”⁴⁹ In September 2023, SDA issued a solicitation for the Tranche 2 Tracking Layer that will provide MW/MT capabilities by using infrared sensors for near-global continuous stereoscopic coverage and incorporating missile defense fire-control-quality infrared sensors on a selected number of satellites.⁵⁰ The Tranche 2 Tracking Layer is being designed to have some capabilities against advanced missile threats, including hypersonic missile systems, and is scheduled for first launch in April 2027.

MDA’s current MW/MT/missile defense (MW/MT/MD) program is the HBTSS (Hypersonic and Ballistic Tracking Space Sensor), an experimental early warning mission to “demonstrate the sensitivity and fire-control quality of service necessary to support both the emerging hypersonic threat kill chain and dim upper stage ballistic missiles.”⁵¹ Two HBTSS satellites were launched on February 14, 2024; the system is intended to work with SDA’s Tracking Layer, track dim targets not visible with current sensors, and provide near-global coverage. A DOD press release about the HBTSS launch indicated:

MDA, the US Space Force and SDA are collaborating to develop HBTSS as a space sensor prototype demonstration providing fire-control quality data required to defeat advanced missile threats. Ultimately, this data is critical to enabling engagement by missile defense weapons, including engagement of hypersonic glide-phase weapons. This “birth-to-death” tracking by HBTSS will make it possible to maintain custody of missile threats from launch through intercept regardless of location.”

“MDA, SDA Announce Upcoming Launch of the Hypersonic and Ballistic Tracking Space Sensor and Tranche 0 Satellites,” DOD Press Release, February 14, 2024, https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/3676902/mda-sda-announce-upcoming-launch-of-the-hypersonic-and-ballistic-tracking-space/.

It is laudable that the DOD is moving in innovative ways so quickly and comprehensively to field MW/MT/MD capabilities designed to be more resilient and address evolving missile threats. However, it is not clear from unclassified sources how the various significantly different approaches will meet stringent nuclear surety requirements for MW/MT. Operationally, the new approach will require the USSF to transition from its decades of experience in interpreting high-fidelity infrared data from a few exquisite sensors toward developing improved understanding of new missile threats based on lower fidelity inputs from many more sensors. Effectively integrating across these proliferated sensors acquired by separate agencies to produce an MD “kill chain”⁵² is likely to be an even more significant challenge that will require focused attention and resources. In the words of one missile defense scholar:

It remains unclear, however, how many HBTSS or HBTSS-derived payloads will eventually be fitted to SDA’s Tracking Layer constellation. While MDA requested $68 million for the program in FY 2023, funding is expected to decline after demonstration activities conclude and responsibility for fire control transfers to SSC and SDA. Following this transition, SDA aims to launch four HBTSS-derived sensor payloads as part of its Tranche 1 activities and an additional six fire control sensors in Tranche 2. Further developmental spirals, the priority accorded to the hypersonic defense mission, and SDA’s responsibilities for supporting missile defense, however, have not yet been publicly defined.”

Dahlgren, Getting on Track, 73. Internal citations omitted.

It is difficult to manage acquisition programs to meet requirements for cost, schedule, and performance. Unfortunately, however, it can be far more difficult to integrate effectively across separate systems to achieve required performance for an enterprise such as NC3. Tensions can arise between acquisition and integration objectives, which are made more acute when separate systems are acquired by separate organizations (as is the case for space-based NC3), and present daunting challenges for achieving nuclear surety.

Hypersonic and Ballistic Tracking Space Sensor (HBTSS). Image courtesy US Missile Defense Agency.

Much of the work to integrate various MW/MT/MD efforts will be performed by the ground segment. The largest ground system effort is the USSF’s Future Operationally Resilient Ground Evolution (FORGE), a complex program to develop a new ground system for NG-OPIR that is projected to cost $2.4 billion.⁵³ SSC has divided the FORGE program into various thrusts that include FORGE command and control, Next-Gen Interim Operations, FORGE Mission Data Processing Application Framework, Relay Ground Stations, and E-FORGE. Integration across these various thrusts within FORGE to advance unity of effort and meet nuclear surety requirements will be a significant challenge. An additional challenge relates to Assistant Secretary Calvelli’s space acquisition tenet that calls for delivery of the ground segment before launch of the space segment, a goal that may be difficult for FORGE to meet.⁵⁴

There are modest programs to modernize elements of the USNDS.⁵⁵ It should be noted that, as a hosted payload, USNDS does not always enjoy a high priority, and the schedule for its fielding can slip, depending on the priority of its host satellite. Additionally, a former commander of USSTRATCOM has raised concerns about the ability of USNDS data to support NC3 in timely and effective ways.⁵⁶ Overall, even while modernization efforts are underway, the geopolitical and technical challenges to the system are increasing and will require generation-after-next space-based NC3.

Conclusion and recommendations

The modernization of space-based NC3 is of vital importance to US national security objectives. While maintaining constant responsibility for enabling the employment of the world’s most capable nuclear arsenal, NC3 must be modernized to meet the significant changes and challenges presented by the evolving geopolitical and technical environment. Adding to the complexity of this modernization effort is an evolution in national security space architectures and their relationship with commercial providers of dual-use space services. The DOD must maintain a focused and sustained commitment as well as adequate resources to meet the range of daunting challenges that are entailed in modernizing space-based NC3.

As the DOD instantiates CJADC2 programs that are working to integrate sensors and shooters on complex kill webs, the modernization of NC3 systems must continue to meet unique requirements for positive and negative control unlike any other command-and-control system. The recognition of these unique requirements drives special emphasis on understanding deterrence scenarios and objectives, technical capabilities, and potential commercial contributions.

Based on the preceding analysis, this paper presents the following recommendations:

The United States should continue to support the modernization of space-based NC3, with specific tailoring that enables adapting to changes in the geopolitical threat environment, harnessing hybrid architectures and the evolution of national security space architectures, and meeting deterrence objectives across a range of increasingly challenging potential scenarios.
1. Modernization efforts for space-based NC3 systems must adhere to the strict need for nuclear surety at all times, while also exploring areas where technological innovation should be embraced.
2. LEO satellites supporting NC3 should be hardened against residual radiation effects following a HAND to strengthen deterrence against this type of attack.
3. More study on the specific deterrence scenarios and objectives for space-based NC3 systems is needed. The variance in scenarios, objectives, and threats (nonkinetic and kinetic) should drive modernization priorities.
4. More study is needed on the nuclear surety implications for the current exploration of disaggregation as a means to ensure resiliency.
As one of the authors has argued previously, “A whole-of government approach is then needed to assess the commercial viability [and military utility] of those [space-based] services upon which the US government intends to rely, either wholly or in part, and the government must act to improve the commercial viability of these services.”⁵⁷
1. The government should act to improve the commercial viability of the services deemed necessary through flexible contracting mechanisms and/or procurement.
2. The DOD should maintain unity of effort for space-based NC3 acquisitions regardless of whether the specific effector or system is ground-, air-, or sea-based.
3. The United States should continue supporting and advancing international approaches to strengthen deterrence of attacks on commercial space capabilities and improve protection measures for these systems.
The DOD should recognize the significant challenges and potential incompatibilities it faces in rapidly and simultaneously developing modernized space-based NC3 and fielding an overall hybrid space architecture that is far more resilient.
1. Integrating systems developed by separate organizations with sometimes divergent priorities into a unified NC3 system-of-systems that meets nuclear surety requirements is a novel challenge for space-based NC3 and will require focused attention to overcome. Additionally, NC3 and CJADC2 systems-of-systems must be distinct, but also integrated for national unity of command and effort.
2. Acquisition approaches that emphasize speed, use of commercial-off-the-shelf components, and fielding of ground systems before satellite launch are highly appropriate for deploying a resilient hybrid space architecture but may present dangerous incompatibilities with nuclear surety requirements. The DOD must not rush to deploy space-based NC3 that is not well integrated, suffers from avoidable supply chain and cybersecurity vulnerabilities, and contains other weaknesses that hackers and adversaries can exploit during the decades the next generation of space-based NC3 is likely to be in operation.

About the authors

Peter L. Hays is an adjunct professor of space policy and international affairs at George Washington University’s Space Policy Institute, space chair at Marine Corps University, and a senior policy adviser with Falcon Research. He supports the space staff in the Pentagon and has been directly involved in helping to develop and implement major national security space policy and strategy initiatives since 2004. Dr. Hays serves on the Center for Strategic and International Studies Missile Defense Project advisory board, was a term member of the World Economic Forum’s Global Agenda Council on Space Security from 2010 to 2014, and is a member of the editorial board for Space and Defense and Astropolitics. He earned a PhD from the Fletcher School at Tufts University and was an honor graduate of the USAF Academy. Dr. Hays served as an Air Force officer from 1979 to 2004; transported nuclear weapons worldwide as a C-141 pilot; and previously taught international relations, defense policy, and space policy courses at the USAF Academy, School of Advanced Airpower Studies, and National Defense University.

Sarah Mineiro is the founder and CEO of Tanagra Enterprises, a defense, intelligence, space, science, and technology consulting firm. Over her career, Sarah has worked in venture capital-backed private industry and in the executive and legislative branches of government. Previously, she was the senior director of space strategy for Anduril Industries. Sarah was the staff lead for the Strategic Forces Subcommittee for the House Armed Service Committee, where she led the subcommittee’s activities of all Department of Defense and Military Intelligence Program space programs, US nuclear weapons, missile defense, directed energy, and hypersonic systems. Sarah was the senior legislative adviser to Chairman Mac Thornberry. In this role, she was the primary drafter and negotiator of the Space Force and Space Command legislation for the House Republicans.

The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors alone and do not represent the official position of any US government organization.

Acknowledgements

The authors would like to acknowledge Robert Soofer and Mark J. Massa for their comments on earlier drafts of this paper.

The Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security’s work on nuclear and strategic forces has been made possible by support from our partners, including Los Alamos National Laboratory, Northrop Grumman Corporation, the Norwegian Ministry of Defense, the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, the United States Department of Defense, the United States Department of Energy, the United States Department of State, as well as general support to the Scowcroft Center. The partners are not responsible for the content of this report, and the Scowcroft Center maintains a strict intellectual independence policy.

1 Department of Defense, “2022 Nuclear Posture Review,” October 2022, https://media.defense.gov/2022/Oct/27/2003103845/-1/-1/1/2022-NATIONAL-DEFENSE-STRATEGY-NPR-MDR.pdf, 22.

2 Air Force Doctrine Publication 3-72, “Nuclear Operations,” LeMay Center, December 18, 2020, https://www.doctrine.af.mil/Portals/61/documents/AFDP_3-72/3-72-AFDP-NUCLEAR-OPS.pdf, 17.

3 Nuclear Matters Handbook 2020.

4 Information provided by Maj. Gen. John Olsen, PhD, Space Force operations lead for CJADC2 and C3BM. For the past three years, General Olsen has served as the lead airborne emergency action officer and an instructor/evaluator on the Looking Glass Airborne Nuclear Command Post.

5 In “Air Force Awards Raytheon $625 Million Contract for Nuclear-Hardened Satcom Terminals,” Sandra Erwin indicates the US Air Force Nuclear Weapons Center awarded this contract to deliver an unspecified number of nuclear-hardened satellite communications force element terminals to connect B-52 and RC-135 aircraft with Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) military communications satellites. Space News, June 28, 2023, https://spacenews.com/air-force-awards-raytheon-625-million-contract-for-nuclear-hardened-satcom-terminals/.

6 “Air Force Awards Raytheon $625 Million Contract.” In 2020, Raytheon became part of the RTX Corporation.

7 Air Force Fact Sheet, “E-4B,” https://www.af.mil/About-Us/Fact-Sheets/Display/Article/104503/e-4b/; NAVAIR Fact Sheet, “E-6B Mercury,” https://www.navair.navy.mil/product/E-6B-Mercury.

8 NAVAIR Fact Sheet, “E-6B Mercury.”

9 The original plan for SBIRS called for eight satellites; the seventh and eighth satellites were cancelled in 2019 after work began on the next-generation system.

10 Sandra Erwin, “STRATCOM Chief Hyten: ‘I Will Not Support Buying Big Satellites That Make Juicy Targets,’” Space News, November 19, 2017, https://spacenews.com/stratcom-chief-hyten-i-will-not-support-buying-big-satellites-that-make-juicy-targets/.

11 Dwayne A. Day, “Smashing Satellites as Part of the Delta 180 Strategic Defense Initiative Mission,” Space Review, July 17, 2023, https://www.thespacereview.com/article/4622/1; Jayant Sharma, Andrew Wiseman, and George Zollinger, “Improving Space Surveillance with Space-Based Visible Sensor,” MIT Lincoln Laboratory, March 1, 2001, https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA400541.pdf; Missile Defense Agency Fact Sheet, “Space Tracking and Surveillance System,” August 23, 2022, https://www.mda.mil/global/documents/pdf/stss.pdf.

12 United States Space Force Fact Sheet, “Advanced Extremely High-Frequency System,” July 2020, https://www.spaceforce.mil/About-Us/Fact-Sheets/Fact-Sheet-Display/Article/2197713/advanced-extremely-high-frequency-system/.

13 United States Space Force Fact Sheet, “Space Based Infrared System,” March 2023, https://www.spaceforce.mil/About-Us/Fact-Sheets/Article/2197746/space-based-infrared-system/; National Nuclear Security Administration, “NNSA delivers enduring space-based nuclear detonation detection capability,” March 22, 2018, https://www.energy.gov/nnsa/articles/nnsa-delivers-enduring-space-based-nuclear-detonation-detection-capability.

14 Department of Defense Office of Inspector General, “Evaluation of the Space-Based Segment of the US Nuclear Detonation Detection System,” September 28, 2018, https://www.dodig.mil/FOIA/FOIA-Reading-Room/Article/2014314/evaluation-of-the-space-based-segment-of-the-us-nuclear-detonation-detection-sy/.

15 Michael J. Neufeld, Von Braun: Dreamer of Space, Engineer of War (New York: Vintage, 2008), is the authoritative assessment of von Braun’s contributions and legacy.

16 See, for example, Brian G. Chow, “Space Arms Control: A Hybrid Approach,” Strategic Studies Quarterly 12, no. 2 (Summer 2018): 107-32; and James Alver, Andrew Garza, and Christopher May, “An Analysis of the Potential Misuse of Active Debris Removal, On-Orbit Servicing, and Rendezvous & Proximity Operations Technologies” (capstone paper, George Washington University, 2019), https://swfound.org/media/206800/misuse_commercial_adr_oos_jul2019.pdf.

17 Some of the earliest and most influential analyses of the relative and ambiguous characteristics of security include John Herz, “Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma,” World Politics 2, no. 2 (January 1950): 157-80; and Arnold Wolfers, “‘National Security’ as an Ambiguous Symbol,” Political Science Quarterly 67, no. 4 (December 1952): 481-502.

18 Robert Jervis, “Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma,” World Politics 30, no. 2 (January 1978): 167-214. In this seminal article, Jervis applied game theory approaches to scenarios commonly used to analyze causes of war such as Stag Hunt and Prisoner’s Dilemma, positing that two variables are primary determinants of how likely or unlikely it is that states can achieve cooperation: 1) whether offensive or defensive capabilities have the advantage; and 2) whether analysts can distinguish between offensive and defensive capabilities. Applying this framework creates a 2 x 2 matrix in which Jervis labels situations where offense has the advantage, and analysts cannot distinguish between offensive and defensive capabilities as “doubly dangerous” and situations with the opposite conditions as “doubly stable.” Some disagree, but unfortunately, today most analysts perceive that the doubly dangerous situation corresponds most closely to the current characteristics of space. Jervis finds that this situation “is the worst for status-quo states. There is no way to get security without menacing others, and security through defense is terribly difficult to obtain.”

19 See Brad Townsend, “Strategic Choice and the Orbital Security Dilemma,” Strategic Studies Quarterly 14, no. 1 (Spring 2020): 64-90; and Brad Townsend, Security and Stability in the New Space Age: The Orbital Security Dilemma (Milton Park, UK: Routledge, 2020).

20 Gertner, “What Does the US Space Force Actually Do?”

21 See, for example, Benjamin Schmitt, “The Sky’s Not the Limit: Space Aid to Ukraine,” Center for European Policy Analysis, May 19, 2022, https://cepa.org/article/the-skys-not-the-limit-space-aid-to-ukraine/; David T. Burbach, “Early Lessons from the Russia-Ukraine War as a Space Conflict,” Atlantic Council, August 30, 2022, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/content-series/airpower-after-ukraine/early-lessons-from-the-russia-ukraine-war-as-a-space-conflict/; and Jonathan Beale, “Space, the Unseen Frontier in the War in Ukraine,” BBC News, October 5, 2022, https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-63109532.

22 Report of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Sixty-Second Session, June 2019, 54-69, https://www.unoosa.org/res/oosadoc/data/documents/2019/a/a7420_0_html/V1906077.pdf; NATO’s decision to consider space an operational domain like land, sea, air, and cyber is helpful, but it added caveats weakening Article 5 obligations for attacks in space: “A decision as to when such attacks would lead to the invocation of Article 5 would be taken by the North Atlantic Council on a case-by-case basis.” See NATO, “NATO’s Overarching Space Policy,” January 17, 2022, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_190862.htm?utm_source=linkedin&utm_medium=nato&utm_campaign=20220117_space; and Secretary of Defense, “Tenets of Responsible Behavior in Space,” July 7, 2021, https://www.spacecom.mil/Newsroom/Publications/Pub-Display/Article/3318236/tenets-of-responsible-behavior-in-space/. On April 18, 2022, Vice President Kamala Harris announced that the United States will no longer conduct destructive tests of DA-ASAT missiles (https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/04/18/fact-sheet-vice-president-harris-advances-national-security-norms-in-space/). Through October 2023, thirty-seven other countries including Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Japan, New Zealand, South Korea, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom have made similar pledges. On December 7, 2022, 155 countries in the United Nations General Assembly voted in favor of a resolution calling for a halt for this type of ASAT testing, while nine voted against the resolution (including China and Russia) and nine (including India) abstained. Ching Wei Soo, Direct-Ascent Anti-Satellite Missile Tests: State Positions on the Moratorium, UNGA Resolution, and Lessons for the Future, Secure World Foundation, October 2023, https://swfound.org/media/207711/direct-ascent-antisatellite-missile-tests_state-positions-on-the-moratorium-unga-resolution-and-lessons-for-the-future.pdf.

23 For more, see Madelyn Creedon, chair, and Jon Kyl, vice chair, The Final Report of the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States, October 2023, https://armedservices.house.gov/sites/republicans.armedservices.house.gov/files/Strategic-Posture-Committee-Report-Final.pdf.

24 Department of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2023, October 2023, 103-13, https://media.defense.gov/2023/Oct/19/2003323409/-1/-1/1/2023-MILITARY-AND-SECURITY-DEVELOPMENTS-INVOLVING-THE-PEOPLES-REPUBLIC-OF-CHINA.PDF.

25 Military and Security Developments Involving China 2023.

26 BBC, “Ukraine War: Could Russia Use Tactical Nuclear Weapons?” September 24, 2022, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-60664169.

27 Nina Tannenwald, “The Bomb in the Background: What the War in Ukraine Has Revealed About Nuclear Weapons,” Foreign Affairs, February 24, 2023, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/bomb-background-nuclear-weapons.

28 See, for instance, Matthew Kroenig, A Strategy for Deterring Russian Nuclear De-Escalation Strikes, Atlantic Council, April 24, 2018, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/a-strategy-for-deterring-russian-de-escalation-strikes/.

29 Military and Security Developments Involving China 2023, 70. In April 2024, the Strategic Support Force was dissolved and split into three independent units: the PLA Aerospace Force, the PLA Cyberspace Force, and the PLA Information Support Force. Namrata Goswami, “The Reorganization of China’s Space Force: Strategic and Organizational Implications — The rationale behind the new ‘Aerospace Force,’” The Diplomat, May 3, 2024, https://thediplomat.com/2024/05/the-reorganization-of-chinas-space-force-strategic-and-organizational-implications/.

30 Military and Security Developments Involving China 2023, vii.

31 Defense Threat Reduction Agency, Advanced Systems and Concepts Office, “High Altitude Nuclear Detonations (HAND) against Low Earth Orbit Satellites (‘HALEOS’),” April 2001, https://spp.fas.org/military/program/asat/haleos.pdf. No satellites are known to be hardened against these nuclear effects. Estimates on financial damages from General Olsen. For further details about the threat from HAND and a discussion on a potential licensing requirement for commercial LEO satellites to be hardened against residual radiation effects following a HAND, see Peter L. Hays, United States Military Space: Into the Twenty-First Century (Maxwell AFB: Air University Press, 2002), 101-03. National security communications adviser John Kirby told reporters at a White House news conference that Russia “is developing an anti-satellite weapon capability, describing it as a serious threat.” Sandra Erwin, “White House Confirms It Has Intelligence on Russia’s Anti-Satellite Weapon, But Says No Immediate Threat,” Space News, February 15, 2024, https://spacenews.com/white-house-confirms-it-has-intelligence-on-russians-anti-satellite-weapon-but-says-no-immediate-threat. On April 24, 2024, Russia vetoed a UN Security Council resolution that would have reaffirmed its obligation not to station nuclear weapons in space in any manner, as stipulated in Article IV of the OST. Jeff Foust, “Russia vetoes U.N. resolution on nuclear weapons in space,” Space News, April 25, 2024, https://spacenews.com/russia-vetoes-u-n-resolution-on-nuclear-weapons-in-space/.

32 “Military Assessment of Nuclear Deterrence Requirements,” House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, HASC Hearing No. 115-11, March 8, 2017, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-115hhrg24683/html/CHRG-115hhrg24683.htm.

33 Yasmin Tadjdeh, “JUST IN: Stratcom Revitalizing Nuclear Command, Control Systems,” National Defense, January 5, 2021, https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2021/1/5/work-underway-for-next-generation-nuclear-command-control-and-communications.

34 Robert Samuel Wilson and Russell Rumbaugh, “Reversal of Nuclear-Conventional Entanglement in Outer Space,” Journal of Strategic Studies 47, no. 1 (September 15, 2023): 3.

35 Masao Dahlgren, Getting on Track: Space and Airborne Sensors for Hypersonic Missile Defense, Center for Strategic and International Studies, December 2023, https://www.csis.org/analysis/getting-track-space-and-airborne-sensors-hypersonic-missile-defense.

36 Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2024 Budget Estimates, Air Force Justification Book Volume 1, Research, Development, Test & Evaluation, Space Force, March 2023, PE1206855SF, 263-76, https://www.saffm.hq.af.mil/Portals/84/documents/FY24/Research%20and%20Development%20Test%20and%20Evaluation/FY24%20Space%20Force%20Research%20and%20Development%20Test%20and%20Evaluation.pdf?ver=BQWN2ms9pfLNN_gvIz4mQQ%3D%3D.

37 Space Systems Command Media Release, “Evolved Strategic SATCOM Program Uses Innovative Competition to Drive Acquisition of Threat-Focused Software,” May 2, 2023, https://www.ssc.spaceforce.mil/Portals/3/Documents/PRESS%20RELEASES/Evolved%20Strategic%20SATCOM%20Program%20Uses%20Innovative%20Competition%20to%20Drive%20Acquisition%20of%20Threat-Focused%20Software.pdf?ver=9hYpAExEQifvYTYBilFG2g%3D%3D; Department of Defense Instruction 5000.02, “Operation of the Adaptive Acquisition Framework,” June 8, 2022, https://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/DD/issuances/dodi/500002p.PDF.

38 Sandra Erwin, “Space Force Planning $8 Billion Satellite Architecture for Nuclear Command and Control,” Space News, October 25, 2023, https://spacenews.com/space-force-planning-8-billion-satellite-architecture-for-nuclear-command-and-control/.

39 “Evolved Strategic Satellite Communications (ESS) Space Vehicle (SV) Development and Production,” GOVTRIBE, May 4, 2024, https://govtribe.com/opportunity/federal-contract-opportunity/evolved-strategic-satellite-communications-ess-space-vehicle-sv-development-and-production-fa880724rb004; Sandra Erwin, “Space Force Planning $8 Billion Satellite Architecture for Nuclear Command and Control,” Space News, October 25, 2023, https://spacenews.com/space-force-planning-8-billion-satellite-architecture-for-nuclear-command-and-control/.

40 “Evolved Strategic SATCOM Program”; Sandra Erwin, “Lockheed, Raytheon to Develop Ground Systems for Nuclear-Hardened Satellite Communications,” Space News, May 3, 2023, https://spacenews.com/lockheed-raytheon-to-develop-ground-systems-for-nuclear-hardened-satellite-communications/.

41 “Evolved Strategic SATCOM Program.”

42 “Space Policy Review and Strategy on Protection of Satellites,” 9.

43 “Space Policy Review and Strategy on Protection of Satellites,” 19.

44 Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2024 Budget Estimates.

45 Space Systems Command Media Release, “Next-Generation Overhead Persistent Infrared Program Selects Mission Payload Suppliers,” March 1, 2022, https://www.ssc.spaceforce.mil/Portals/3/Documents/PRESS%20RELEASES/Next-Generation%20Overhead%20Persistent%20Infrared%20Program%20Selects%20Mission%20Payload%20Suppliers%20v4.pdf; Northrop Grumman, “Next Gen OPIR Polar (NGP),” https://www.northropgrumman.com/space/next-gen-polar.

46 Courtney Albon, “Congress Queries Space Force Plan for Fewer Missile Warning Satellites,” Air Force Times, July 12, 2023, https://www.airforcetimes.com/battlefield-tech/space/2023/07/12/congress-queries-space-force-plan-for-fewer-missile-warning-satellites/.

47 Theresa Hitchens, “Space Force Polar-Orbiting Missile Warning Satellites Move Toward Production,” Breaking Defense, May 24, 2023, https://breakingdefense.com/2023/05/space-force-polar-orbiting-missile-warning-sats-move-toward-production/; Courtney Albon, “Northrop Missile-Warning Satellites Pass Early Design Review,” C4ISRNET, May 24, 2023, https://www.c4isrnet.com/battlefield-tech/space/2023/05/24/northrop-missile-warning-satellites-pass-early-design-review/.

48 Space Development Agency, “Who We Are,” https://www.sda.mil/home/who-we-are/.

49 Theresa Hitchens, “Budget roadblock delaying Pentagon satellite program to track hypersonic missiles,” Breaking Defense, March 1, 2022, https://breakingdefense.com/2022/03/budget-roadblock-delaying-pentagon-satellite-program-to-track-hypersonic-missiles/.

50 Space Development Agency, “Tracking,” https://www.sda.mil/tracking/.

51 “Hypersonic and Ballistic Tracking Space Sensor Phase IIb Awards,” MDA Press Release, January 22, 2021, https://www.mda.mil/news/21news0001.html.

52 “Kill chain” is a term commonly used by the DOD to describe the ISR and C3 capabilities and processes needed to find, fix, track, target, engage, and assess the effectiveness of strike operations.

53 Theresa Hitchens, “Space Force Taps 4 Firms to Vie for Missile Warning C2 Prototype,” Breaking Defense, November 9, 2023, https://breakingdefense.com/2023/11/space-force-taps-4-firms-to-vie-for-missile-warning-c2-prototype/.

54 Summer Myatt, “How Frank Calvelli’s 9 Space Acquisition Tenets Aim to Transform Space Procurement,” GovConWire, January 10, 2023, https://www.govconwire.com/2023/01/frank-calvellis-9-space-acquisition-tenets-aim-to-transform-space-procurement/.

Indo-Pacific Security Initiative Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Defense Policy Indo-Pacific

The post Hinata-Yamaguchi quoted in NK News on Russia-North Korea relationship appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Michta in German Council on Foriegn Relations and RealClearWorld on Germany’s defense policy and the US presidential election

gmatchett — Wed, 10 Jul 2024 18:54:16 +0000

Director and Senior Fellow, Scowcroft Strategy Initiative

On June 25, Andrew Michta, director and senior fellow in the Scowcroft Strategy Initiative, was published in the German Council on Foreign Relations and RealClearWorld about Germany’s defense policy and how it may be impacted by the US presidential election. He underscored that Germany must commit to significantly expanding its defense industrial base so that it will be well-positioned to collaborate with whichever candidate wins in November.

The relationship between the United States and Europe—and Washington and Berlin in particular—will rise or fall depending on what America’s allies in Europe do to shore up their militaries.

Andrew Michta

Staff

Andrew A. Michta

Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security Scowcroft Strategy Initiative

Central Europe Eastern Europe

The post Michta in German Council on Foriegn Relations and RealClearWorld on Germany’s defense policy and the US presidential election appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Ullman in the Hill on potential US defense spending plan

gmatchett — Wed, 10 Jul 2024 18:50:13 +0000

Original SOurce

On June 3, Atlantic Council senior advisor Harlan Ullman published an op-ed for The Hill that analyzes Senator Roger Wicker’s (R-MS) increased defense spending plan and identified a few major missing components. He underscores the need for a broader military strategy, evidence that proves a larger force is affordable, and discussions regarding recruitment issues.

Despite the benefits of recruiting and retaining service members, the DoD cannot make the numbers to sustain an active-duty force of 1.3 million. People are crucial. And we lack a plan to deal with this most critical of issues.

Harlan Ullman

International Advisory Board member

Harlan Ullman

Senior Advisor

The Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security works to develop sustainable, nonpartisan strategies to address the most important security challenges facing the United States and the world.

The post Ullman in the Hill on potential US defense spending plan appeared first on Atlantic Council.

‘I’m an optimist for the future of this Alliance,’ says NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg

Atlantic Council — Wed, 10 Jul 2024 16:23:56 +0000

Watch the full event

NATO Public Forum

Allied leaders, senior officials, international security experts, and opinion-shapers discuss the Alliance’s agenda and what’s happening behind closed doors at the summit.

Event transcript

Uncorrected transcript: Check against delivery

Speaker

Jens Stoltenberg
Secretary General, NATO

Moderated by

Frederick Kempe
President and CEO, Atlantic Council

FREDERICK KEMPE: Good morning, if it still is the morning. It’s great to see you all here in person. It’s wonderful to have so many people here online from all over the world and, of course, across all of our allies in Europe as well.

So, it’s my honor to introduce someone I’ve known a long time now, the NATO secretary general, Jens Stoltenberg. And I’m going to moderate conversation with you at a moment—something you’ve called a pivotal moment for our Alliance. I was going to start by saluting you on something I didn’t know about, which is your great arm because you threw out the first pitch of the Nationals game. And it was an amazing. I was there in the heat, sweating while I was watching you. But it was—it was an amazing salute to NATO.

But having been at Mellon Auditorium yesterday evening, one of the most moving events I’ve been at, I’ll instead quote President Biden, what he said to you as he gave you the Presidential Medal of Freedom to a standing ovation—a really remarkable moment. He called you a man of integrity and intellectual rigor, a calm temperament in a moment—in moments of crisis, a consummate diplomat. And I think the consummate diplomat, a person who can engage with leaders across all spectrums and across all nationalities, and I just want to salute you on behalf of everyone in the audience for more than a decade of the most extraordinary leadership. So let’s start with that.

JENS STOLTENBERG: Thank you.

FREDERICK KEMPE: So we at the Atlantic Council gave you our highest honor, the Atlantic Council Distinguished Leadership Award, in 2017. And I consider that visionary. We knew you’d already accomplished a lot in your life, and I won’t go through it all—you know, prime minister of Norway, all the things you’ve done for NATO and at NATO in terms of strengthening its defense, strengthening the defense spending. And I think it would take too time—too long to go on that. And you’re a humble man, and I don’t think you would even want that. So I’m going to go right into the questions.

You laid out three goals for this summit—increasing support for Ukraine for the long haul, reinforcing collective defense, and deepening global partnerships. I’m sure they’re all important, but for this week what do you consider most crucial?

JENS STOLTENBERG: I will answer that in a moment, but let me first say that it’s great to be here, to be at the Public Forum. And many thanks to you, Fred. And also many thanks to all those who have organized and are making this event possible, because this is an important part of the summit, the public outreach which this Public Forum is a very important part of. Then thank you for your kind words. It has actually been a great privilege serving as secretary general of NATO for ten years. And I see around in the in the audience that there are many people who have helped me, supported me. And so many thanks to all of you for your advice, your help, and support throughout these years.

Then on throwing the first pitch, that is the most difficult task I ever committed as secretary general of NATO. Not least because I’ve never been at the baseball match ever before. The first time I touched a baseball, actually when I started to exercise for this, I thought it was a tennis ball. But it’s not the case. So it was a very steep learning curve. And I think my future is not in baseball. I think my future is in something else.

FREDERICK KEMPE: I was going to say in the introduction that it showed that NATO always sets lofty targets.

JENS STOLTENBERG: Yeah, yeah. And we have to adapt to the challenges. Then, of course, this summit. It’s, of course, a summit where we’re going to celebrate the seventy-fifth anniversary of the strongest, most successful alliance in history. But the only way to truly celebrate that achievement, the seventy-fifth anniversary, is, of course, to demonstrate that NATO is adapting, that we are changing when the world is changing. Because we are the most successful alliance in history because we have changed when the world is changing. And now we live in a more dangerous, more challenging security environment. And therefore, NATO is changing again.

And therefore, we will make important decisions at this summit for the future, not only celebrate the past. And there are three main issues. It’s deterrence and defense. It’s our partnership with our Asia-Pacific partners. But of course, the most urgent, the most critical task at this summit, will be everything we will do and decide on Ukraine. Because this is really the time where we are tested. If we want to stand up for democracy and freedom, it’s now. And the place is Ukraine.

And I expect that NATO leaders will agree a substantial package for Ukraine. There are, affirmatively, five elements in that package.

One is that we will establish a NATO command for Ukraine to facilitate and ensure training and delivery of security assistance to Ukraine. It will be seven-hundred personnel. It will take over much of what the US have done so far in leading the coordination of security assistance and training. It will be a command in Wiesbaden in Germany, but also with logistical nodes or hubs in the eastern part of the Alliance, to ensure that we have a more institutionalized framework for our support to Ukraine.

Then it will be a long-term pledge to support Ukraine, not least to send the message to President Putin that he cannot wait those out, because the paradox is that the stronger and the more we are committed for a long-term to support Ukraine, the sooner this war can end. So that’s the thing we have to do.

Then we will have—and we have already seen some of the announcements of military immediate support with the air defense systems, with F-16s, other things that allies have and will announce. We have the bilateral—that’s a third—the announcement on more military aid, and then we have the bilateral security agreements—twenty agreed between NATO allies and Ukraine.

And then the fifth element of the package for Ukraine will be more interoperability. We will have a new joint training and relations center in Bydgoszcz in Poland. We will have the comprehensive assistance package to help Ukraine implement reforms on their defense and security institutions to ensure that the armed forces are more and more interoperable with NATO.

And together, the NATO command, the pledge, the bilateral security agreements, the announcement of new military support, and interoperability—these five elements combined constitute the bridge to NATO membership for Ukraine. And later on today, you will see the language which we will agree, and the NATO declaration on how to ensure that Ukraine is moving closer to NATO membership. So these are the five important deliverables on Ukraine that I expect allies will agree later on today.

FREDERICK KEMPE: Not to press you on what’s actually going to be in the document because, of course, you can’t reveal that, but we saw at the Vilnius Summit—hearing it again in Washington—that allies closer to Russia were more eager to provide NATO membership sooner for Ukraine, and no doubt the bridge and all the elements of the bridge are pretty impressive, including the new command.

But are Ukraine’s NATO membership prospects sufficient? We did our own wargaming with our Estonian partners and the Estonian government, and we found almost under any scenario, Ukraine was safer in NATO, that Russia would respond in a way that would be less provocative within and outside. What’s your thinking on that, and have we gone far enough with Ukraine?

JENS STOLTENBERG: So first of all, the language you will see later on today in the NATO declaration or the declaration from the heads of state and government, of course that language is important because language matters. It sets an agenda. It points a direction. But, of course, action speaks louder than words. So, in addition to that language in the declaration on membership, which again is important, I think that what we actually do together with Ukraine is as important. And therefore the fact that we now have a NATO framework—will have a NATO framework around the support, the fact that we have a long-term NATO commitment when we agreed the pledge, and also the fact that we actually are delivering more weapon systems to Ukraine—all of that has helped Ukraine to become closer to NATO—come closer to NATO membership because we will now deliver F-16s. We don’t want to deliver F-16s; we deliver the training, the doctrines, the operational concepts that will actually move Ukraine closer to being fully interoperable with NATO on more and more areas.

So, again, language is important. But the elements in the package I mentioned, they are actually changing the reality, enabling Ukraine to be—to come closer to membership so we can then—when the time is right, when you have consensus and the political conditions are in place—so when an invitation then is issued, they can become members straightaway. I can’t give you a date because, as you know, there has to be consensus in this Alliance on membership.

But what I can say is that when the fighting stops in Ukraine, we need to ensure that that’s really the end. Because what you have seen is a pattern of aggression. First, Russia annexed Crimea. We said that was unacceptable. After some few months, they went to the eastern Donbas. We said that that was unacceptable. Then we had the Minsk I agreement, with the delimitation of the ceasefire line. That was violated. And Russia pushed the front lines further east—no, sorry—further west in Donbas in 2014. We had Minsk II, and the Russians waited then for seven years. And they had the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, because Minsk II was in 2015.

So, we have seen a pattern where they’ve taken slices of Ukraine. If there is now a new ceasefire, a new agreement, then we need to be 100 percent certain it stops there, regardless of where that line is. And therefore, I strongly believe that when the fighting stops we need to ensure that Ukraine has the capabilities to deter future aggression from Russia and they need security guarantees. And, of course, the best and strongest security guarantee will be Article Five. So therefore, I believe that a way to ensure that it stops is actually a NATO membership.

FREDERICK KEMPE: Thank you for that very clear answer. One more brief question on Ukraine, then we’ll move on to Indo-Pacific. In a press conference you had with President Macron a couple of weeks ago you noted recent gaps in delays in how they’ve led—in funding and weapons—and led to battlefield consequences. You said, quote, “We must give Ukraine the predictability and accountability it needs to defend itself.” So, two questions: Is everything you’ve talked about today that’s going to be agreed enough? And, secondarily, not just with uncertainties in US politics, which exist, but also uncertainties in European politics, do you worry at all about the sustainability of that support over time?

JENS STOLTENBERG: So, first of all, you are right that I have referred to—I also did that in Kyiv in a meeting with President Zelensky earlier this spring—to the fact that during this winter and the early spring allies didn’t deliver on their promises to Ukraine. We saw the delays in the US, months agreeing on a supplemental. But we also saw European allies not being able to deliver the ammunition and the support they have announced. So, of course, these gaps and these delays in military support to Ukraine, they created a very difficult situation for Ukrainians on the battlefield.

The good news in that difficult situation is that, despite all the delays in our support to Ukraine, Ukrainians have actually been able to hold the line, more or less. So the Russians have not been able to utilize these delays in really making any big advantage on the battlefield. Now we are providing more support, and I’m confident that allies will now actually deliver. And we see that, for instance, ammunition moving into Ukraine, been significant increase over the last weeks.

The purpose of a stronger NATO role in providing training and security assistance, the purpose of the command, and the purpose of the pledge is, of course, to minimize the risks for future delays and gaps. But of course, you don’t have guarantees, because at the end of the day it has to be support in all the individual allied capitals and parliaments to providing this support. At the end of the day, you have to go to the Congress, to the parliaments across Europe and Canada, to get support. But I believe that when we turn this into something which is more a NATO obligation, a NATO framework, it is—the threshold for not delivering will be higher than when it’s based on a more voluntary, ad hoc, national announcements.

So the purpose of creating a stronger NATO framework is to make the support more robust and more predictable. It’s also another part of this NATO framework for the support on the pledge and the command. And that is that it will visualize and ensure burden sharing, because my impression is that, especially in the United States, there is this perception that the United States is almost alone in delivering support to Ukraine. That’s not the case. When you look at military support, roughly 50 percent of the military support is provided by European allies and Canada. Ninety-nine percent of the support—the military support to Ukraine—comes from NATO allies, but 50 percent of that comes from European allies and Canada. If you add economic, macroeconomic support, humanitarian support, the European allies are providing much more than the United States.

So the point with the pledge to ensure that we have some kind of agreed formulas for burden sharing, that we have more transparency, and also that we have more accountability, because then we can use NATO to count, to measure, and to ensure that allies deliver. It’s not the same, but it’s a bit like the 2 percent pledge because the importance with the pledge made in Wales in 2014 was actually to give NATO a role to enforce and to ensure that allies delivered, and also that we agreed how to count and what to count. And that’s also what we now will do with the pledge, to agree how to count and what to count, and to give NATO a role to having also accountability.

So, again, there are no guarantees. But by giving NATO that role, I think the likelihood for allies delivering what they have promised will increase and the likelihood of new gaps will decrease. And that’s the purpose of giving NATO a stronger role.

FREDERICK KEMPE: Thank you, Mr. Secretary General. Let’s go to China. The 2022 Strategic Concept, NATO Strategic Concept, recognized China as a challenge for the first time in the broader rules-based system. You’ve noted that Russia imports 90 percent of its microelectronics from China, which goes into military. Secretary Blinken today talked about 70 percent of machine tools that helped the military coming from China. You’ve also said that this—if this doesn’t change, as they’re fueling the greatest armed conflict in Europe since World War II, allies need to impose a cost. Is it time for that? And what cost can NATO and NATO countries actually impose?

JENS STOLTENBERG: So first of all, I think it’s important that we recognize the reality, and that’s the first step towards any action. And that is that not only are Iran and North Korea important when it comes to enabling Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, but China is the main enabler because, as you referred to, they are delivering the tools—the dual-use equipment, the microelectronics, everything Russia needs to build the missiles, the bombs, the aircraft, and all the other systems they use against Ukraine.

Well, I have said that it remains to be seen how far allies are willing to go, but I strongly believe that it—if China continues, they cannot have it both ways. They cannot believe that they can have a kind of normal relationship with NATO allies in North America and Europe, and then continue to fuel the war in Europe that constitutes the biggest security challenge to—for our security since the Second World War. So this is a challenge for the Alliance. Let’s see how far we’re willing to go as allies.

FREDERICK KEMPE: So we’re getting close to the end of time, so just two other brief questions. First, the Indo-Pacific four—Australia, Japan, South Korea, New Zealand—are here. Third time taking part in a NATO summit, but it’s going to be the first NATO joint document with this group. Can you give us some insight into what might be in it? Any concrete outcomes?

JENS STOLTENBERG: Yeah. So, first I would just say that the fact that we now are engaging so closely with our Indo-Pacific partners—Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and South Korea—that reflects a change in NATO, because that was not the case a few years ago. And as many of you may know, the first time we mentioned China in an agreed negotiated document in NATO is at the NATO summit in London in 2019. And in the previous NATO Strategic Concept, China was not mentioned with a single word; now China has a prominent place in the Strategic Concept we agreed in Madrid. And the fact that we now are engaging so closely with our Indo-Pacific partners reflects, of course, the fact that we have to take China seriously when it comes to the challenges it poses for our security, and the war in Ukraine is perhaps the most obvious example. Or, as the Japanese prime minister said several times: What happens in Ukraine today can happen in Asia tomorrow.

We are now working with our Asia-Pacific partners how we can do more together with them. We will agree some flagship projects. That’s about technology. It’s about support to Ukraine. But we are also working, for instance, as part of our defense industrial pledge, how we can ramp up defense industrial production and cooperation with these countries. They are big, some of them, on defense industry. We can work closely with them to ramp up our combined defense industrial capacity. We can exchange more information.

And I also welcome the fact that more and more allies are now also conducting joint exercises. Recently, there was a big air exercise. Allies are also more and more actively also looking into how they can also have more naval exercises with our Asia-Pacific partners. Because NATO will remain an alliance of North America and Europe. There will not be a global NATO. NATO will be North America and Europe. But this region, the North Atlantic region, we face global threats. And the reality is, that’s nothing new. Global terrorism—international terrorism brought us to Afghanistan. Cyber is global. Space, which is becoming more and more important for our armed forces, is truly global. And, of course, the threats that—and challenges that China poses to our security is a global challenge.

So this region, the North Atlantic region, faces global challenges. We will remain a regional alliance, but we need to work with our global partners, the Asia-Pacific partners, to address these global challenges. That, I guess, will be a very important issue at the next NATO summit. I will not be there, but I’m certain it will be –

FREDERICK KEMPE: Well, and that brings—and that brings me to my final question. This is your swan song summit. And as you prepare to step down, I think everybody in the audience, everybody virtually, would love to hear what gives you the most hope stepping down from this, but also what gives you the most concern.

JENS STOLTENBERG: So, first of all, I’m an optimist. Because the reality is that we are very different in this Alliance. We are different countries with different histories, different cultures, from both sides of the Atlantic, and we have different parties. And we are always very concerned that when a new party comes into government they will make bad things for the Alliance. And if you read the history of NATO, we have been concerned about since—about that for from the beginning.

There were big concerns in NATO when you had a new—when actually you got the democratically elected government in Portugal in 1975. There were concerns whether or not they were going to be committed to NATO. There were concerns when you had some left-wing parties coming into government in some European countries in the ’70s. When I formed my government in—my second government—in 2005 there were big concerns that we had the Left Socialist Party there. It went quite well, to be honest. And now there are big concerns again.

But the reality is that despite all these differences, which are part of NATO, we have proven extremely resilient and strong. Because when we face the reality, all these different governments and politicians and parliamentarians, they realize that we are safer and stronger together. And that’s a very strong message. And that’s the reason why this Alliance prevails again and again.

As I said in my speech yesterday, we cannot take it for granted. It’s not a given. It was not a given in ’49. It’s not a given now. And it’s not a given in the future. But the reality is that we have a strong common interest in standing together. So therefore, I’m an optimist for the future of this Alliance. That was the first question. The second I’ve forgotten. I think I answered both of them.

But I will only say one thing about this. That I remember very well when I became prime minister in 2000. First of all, I attended my first NATO Summit in 2001. That was a very different guest list. It was—President Bush, newly elected. It was Gerhard Schröder, Tony Blair. And, yeah, very different people than now. As I think it’s time for me to leave. But second, also, I remember then my predecessor when I became prime minister in 2000, she told me—Gro Harlem Brundtland, Norwegian prime minister—she told me, Jens, you have to remember that most of your life you’ll be former prime minister.

And now I have to acknowledge that most of my life, I’ll be former secretary general NATO. But that’s not so bad. And I will hang around and see you, and I look forward to then perhaps being a part of this audience next time. Thank you so much. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you, Fred.

FREDERICK KEMPE: Mr. secretary general, nothing more need be said.

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Any attempt to undermine NATO undermines US security, says Lloyd Austin

Atlantic Council — Wed, 10 Jul 2024 15:08:09 +0000

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NATO Public Forum

Allied leaders, senior officials, international security experts, and opinion-shapers discuss the Alliance’s agenda and what’s happening behind closed doors at the summit.

Event transcript

Uncorrected transcript: Check against delivery

Speaker

Lloyd Austin
US Secretary of Defense

Introductory Remarks

Frederick Kempe
President and CEO, Atlantic Council

FREDERICK KEMPE: What a great lineup to start the day—the secretary of state, the supreme allied commander Europe, secretary of defense. It’s really an honor to be here. And thanks to everyone in the room. Good morning to you all, and good afternoon to everyone joining from Europe, and hello to everyone joining from all over the world virtually.

Since its founding in 1949, since NATO’s founding, the United States has played a pivotal role in safeguarding transatlantic security. And the secretary of defense has always been at the center of that. As one of NATO’s founding members, the US has proven to be a critical part of the Alliance’s collective defense and its adaptability to deter evolving threats. And they have been evolving. America has always stood ready to defend and protect the Euro-Atlantic area and beyond, continuing its commitments to the principles of the Washington Treaty. US leadership was pivotal, particularly following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, mobilizing tremendous support—and you’ve heard more about that today, new Air Force batteries, F-16s—to bolster collective defenses on NATO’s eastern flank, fortifying the commitment to NATO allies, and extending that kind of critical assistance to Ukraine.

So it’s my privilege to introduce a leader who embodies this commitment to transatlantic and, indeed, global security—US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin. A graduate of West Point in 1975, Secretary Austin’s career in the US Army spanned more than forty years. Throughout his years of service, he has led the command at the corps, division, battalion, and brigade levels in the US armed forces. Secretary Austin was awarded the Silver Star for his leadership of the US Army’s Third Infantry Division during the invasion of Iraq in 2003.

Before he concluded his uniformed service, Secretary Austin was the commander of the US Central Command from 2013 to 2016, one of our most challenging positions where he was responsible for all the military operations in the Middle East and Afghanistan. Under his leadership, the US Department of Defense has adapted national defense strategies to address the greatest global challenges of our time. And it’s reaffirmed the US commitment to allies and its role as a champion of the rules-based order.

In particular, and this is really important, Secretary Austin’s leadership in the Ukraine defense contact group has proven invaluable in uniting over fifty nations to provide critical military support and security assistance to Ukraine. We saw Vladimir Putin’s message to the NATO summit on Monday this week, with a barrage of more than forty missiles on Ukraine including hitting a children’s hospital. We’ve seen an answer in more—in more air defenses. We’ve seen an answer in the F-16s. We’ve seen an answer in everything else that Secretary Austin and all the allies are doing.

As President Biden has said, the world is at an inflection point with wars in the Middle East, Europe, rising challenge posed to China, biggest defense buildup—peacetime defense buildup in history from China. The secretary of defense is facing more simultaneous challenges than perhaps any predecessor. And we’re lucky to have a man of his pedigree and capability at this historic moment. So with that, ladies and gentlemen, please join me in welcoming to the stage the twenty-eighth US Secretary of Defense, Lloyd Austin.

LLOYD AUSTIN: Well, good morning. It’s really good to be here with all of you and, Fred, thanks for that kind introduction and for all that you’ve done for the Atlantic Council and for bringing us together on a pretty big week.

It’s a huge honor for the United States and President Biden to host this historic summit in Washington, just down the road from the site where the original twelve NATO allies signed the North Atlantic Treaty seventy-five years ago, and together we’re marking one of the great success stories that the world has ever known.

On April 4, 1949, those twelve democracies came together in the wake of two world wars and at the dawn of a new Cold War and they all remembered, as President Truman put it, “the sickening blow of unprovoked aggression.”

And so they vowed to stand together for their collective defense and to safeguard freedom and democracy across Europe and North America. They made a solemn commitment, declaring that an armed attack against one ally would be considered an attack against them all.

Now, that commitment was enshrined in Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. It was the foundation of NATO and it still is.

And on that bedrock we have built the strongest and most successful defensive alliance in human history. Throughout the Cold War, NATO deterred Soviet aggression against Western Europe and prevented a third world war.

In the 1990s, NATO used air power to stop ethnic cleansing in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in Kosovo, and the day after September 11, 2001, when al-Qaeda terrorists attacked our country, including slamming a plane into the Pentagon, NATO invoked Article 5 for the first and only time in its history.

So NATO has always stood by us and we’re going to stand by NATO. Without NATO the past seventy-five years would have been far different and far more dangerous. You know, I’m proud of the ways that NATO continues to strengthen our shared security.

I’m proud of the way that NATO and other—NATO and America’s other alliances and partnerships have grown and strengthened under the leadership of President Biden and I’m especially proud of the way that our allies and partners, including our NATO allies, have met the challenge of Putin’s increasingly aggressive Russia.

In 2014, Putin made an illegal land grab against Ukraine’s Crimea region in eastern Ukraine and since then NATO has undertaken the largest reinforcement of our collective defense in a generation with more forces, more capabilities, and more investment.

Since 2014, our fellow allies have increased their defense spending by an average of 72 percent, accounting for inflation. In February 2022, the world again saw what President Truman called the sickening blow of unprovoked aggression as the Kremlin’s forces invaded the free and sovereign state of Ukraine.

As this administration has made very clear, we will not be dragged into Putin’s reckless war of choice but we will stand by Ukraine as it fights for its sovereignty and security. We will defend every inch of NATO and we will continue to strengthen NATO’s collective defense and deterrence.

In the wake of Putin’s imperial invasion of Ukraine, we bolstered NATO’s forward defense posture with more troops at high readiness, larger exercises, sharper vigilance, and multinational battle group—battle groups in eight countries. NATO is now larger than ever. And our new allies in Finland and Sweden have brought the alliance’s membership to thirty-two. And make no mistake, NATO’s—Putin’s war is not the result of NATO enlargement. Putin’s war is the cause of NATO enlargement.

Over the past three and a half years, we’ve also seen an historic increase in annual defense spending across the alliance by almost eighty billion dollars. All NATO allies have agreed to spend at least 2 percent of their GDP on defense. In 2014, only three allies hit that target. In 2021, only six allies did so. But this year, a record twenty-three NATO allies are meeting the 2 percent defense spending target. Now, our NATO allies are not just spending more on their own defense, they’re also spending more on America’s defense industrial base. That means platforms and munitions built in America. And that’s helping to revitalize production lines across our country and to create good jobs for American workers.

Now, all of that progress is a testament to US leadership and allied solidarity. But it’s also a testament to the leadership of our outgoing secretary general, my good friend Jens Stoltenberg. Throughout a decade of challenge, Jens has guided the Alliance with skill and steel, and we are all deeply, deeply grateful. Now we’re going to keep building on our progress, and we’ve got an ambitious agenda this week. First, we’ll continue to implement NATO’s new family of plans, the most robust since the Cold War. And that will significantly improve our ability to deter and defend against any new threat. Second, we’ll work to endorse a pledge to expand industrial capacity across the alliance. And this will help us scale up military production and send an important long-term signal to industry.

Third, we’ll deepen cooperation in support of Ukraine’s self-defense. We’ll launch a new military effort to help coordinate some aspects of security assistance and training for Ukraine and we’re poised to agree on a new financial pledge to Ukraine. As another sign of our deep commitment to Ukraine’s self-defense, a coalition of countries has been working tirelessly to provide F-16 fighter jets to Ukraine. And today, President Biden, alongside the Dutch and Danish prime ministers, is proud to announce the transfer of F-16s is officially underway, and Ukraine will be flying F-16s this summer.

And finally, we’ll continue to deepen ties with our global partners, especially in the Indo-Pacific. I know that we’re all troubled by China’s support for Putin’s war against Ukraine, but that just reminds us of the profound links between Euro-Atlantic security and Indo-Pacific security. And it sends a message to the world that we are united in our values. So we have a lot to tackle together. But we’re also here to mark this moment. We’re here to strengthen an Alliance that has kept millions of people safe for seventy-five years. And we’re here to reaffirm the ironclad commitment that those twelve leaders made on April 4, 1949: An armed attack against one ally is an attack against us all.

You know, as you heard Fred say, I had a brief forty-one-year career in uniform. I started working with NATO back in 1975, when I was Lieutenant Austin. And I’ve never seen NATO stronger or more united than it is today. And we are determined to keep it that way. You know, I learned a lesson early on in my Army career. And that lesson is that, as a soldier, the last thing that you want to do is to fight alone. So here’s the blunt military reality: America is stronger with our allies. America is safer with our allies. And America is more secure with our allies. And any attempt to undermine NATO only undermines American security.

So we are here this week to strengthen NATO and to strengthen American and allied security for the next seventy-five years. As President Biden has said, our foes and rivals have tried to shatter our unity, but our democracies have stood unwavering. Ladies and gentlemen, that is the legacy that we celebrate. That is the vow that we uphold. And that is the work that we will continue. Thank you very much.

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Dispatch from Madrid: For Spain’s contributions to NATO, look beyond its defense spending

Andrew Bernard — Tue, 09 Jul 2024 16:03:53 +0000

NATO’s recent defense expenditure report was a cringeworthy moment in Madrid. Despite self-applauding recent years of defense spending growth, Spain had the unenviable distinction of ranking dead last among Alliance members for defense expenditures as a share of gross domestic product (GDP), clocking in at an estimated 1.28 percent for 2024. Although consistently investing in equipment expenditures at or above the NATO guideline of 20 percent of its defense budget, Spain’s inability to spend on defense at a rate agreed upon by allies will lend credence to naysayers who question its commitment to the Alliance.

However, while Spain unambiguously falls short of the 2 percent of GDP metric, a careful look at Madrid’s commitment to transatlantic security shows that Spain not only actively participates in the Alliance’s military operations, it also enthusiastically leads NATO missions and supports Ukraine while helping guard Europe’s southern flank.

Spanish public opinion takes a turn

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 shook Spanish public opinion. Blessed by favorable geography, Spain did not consider Russia to be a threat to its sovereignty, and most Spaniards did not feel Russia threated European security writ large. The invasion changed all of that. Spanish citizens judged Russia’s actions to be a clear violation of international law.

According to a Pew Research Center poll, only 5 percent of Spaniards held a favorable opinion of Russia in 2023, down sharply from 31 percent in 2020 and 46 percent in 2011. Many Spaniards disapprove of Russia’s malign activity, such as its propensity for election interference, including during the 2017 Catalonia independence referendum. More recently, the alleged Russian assassination in February in Alicante, Spain, of a Russian helicopter pilot who defected has further hardened Spanish public opinion against Russia’s role in the world.

With broad public backing, Spain has given Ukraine unwavering support since the beginning of the conflict. Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez optimized Spain’s July-December 2023 Presidency of the Council of the European Union (EU) to showcase the nation’s commitment to Ukraine. Sánchez traveled to Kyiv on the first day of Spain’s presidency while hosting Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy during the October 2023 European Political Community gathering, with both King Felipe VI and Sánchez individually meeting Zelenskyy. Spain also guided Ukraine’s EU accession negotiation process during its presidency.

Direct Spanish support to Ukraine continues to intensify as the war progresses. Madrid and Kyiv signed a bilateral security cooperation agreement in May 2024, accompanied by a Spanish pledge of one billion euros in military aid. Spain has provided Ukraine vast amounts of lethal and nonlethal military assistance, both bilaterally and through EU mechanisms. Spanish military equipment contributions have included air defense systems, tanks, armored personnel carriers, and artillery systems with associated ammunition, including Patriot missiles, which had been desperately requested by Ukraine.

Given Spain’s underinvestment in defense prior to 2022, the Ukrainian donations have cut into Spanish reserves. This has not dampened Spain’s willingness to support Ukraine, with Sánchez meeting Spanish defense industry executives in March to ask them to prioritize Ukrainian needs over Spanish requirements. Spain hosts an EU training facility in Toledo as part of the EU Military Assistance Mission and has exceeded its mandate to train two thousand soldiers, with the Spanish Army more than doubling its output with nearly five thousand Ukrainian graduates. Spanish leaders also highlight their nonmilitary support for Ukraine, including hosting more than two hundred thousand Ukrainian refugees, earmarking reconstruction funds, and actively supporting Ukraine’s efforts for judicial accountability for Russian war crimes in the country.

Spain’s commitment to NATO deterrence and defense

In addition to supporting Ukraine, Spain bolstered its commitment to NATO deterrence efforts in the wake of Russia’s invasion. Spain deploys a high proportion of its armed forces to participate in NATO operations while actively volunteering to lead NATO missions in all domains. The Spanish Air and Space Force deploys fighter aircraft to either the Baltics or the Black Sea region eight months out of the year on average, and currently leads the April-July 2024 Baltic Air Policing detachment in Lithuania. For the maritime domain, the Spanish Navy commanded NATO’s Standing Maritime Group 1 for the first half of 2024, helming a multination, multi-ship maritime deterrence force in the Baltic Sea.

The Spanish Army notably increased its operational tempo in the wake of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine. The Spanish Army immediately augmented its troops in Latvia following the invasion, where it had been participating in NATO’s legacy Enhanced Forward Presence. The Spanish footprint in Latvia is a reinforced company-sized unit equipped with armor, artillery, and air defense enablers. This reinforcement included bilateral support to Latvia in the form of an advanced air defense unit. More importantly, Spain enthusiastically volunteered to be the framework nation for a new battlegroup in Slovakia. The Spanish Army officially took command of the battlegroup on July 1, bringing the same quality of forces to Slovakia as it did to Latvia, while it keeps another reserve battlegroup ready in Spain to augment its forward deployed forces if needed. Finally, the Spanish Marines (naval infantry) will send a company of soldiers to Romania to embed with the French-led battlegroup later this year. Thus, Spain is one of the few NATO members to have land forces defending the Alliance’s territory in the three separate regions along the eastern flank.

Keeping a vigilant eye on Europe’s south

Although Spain’s commitments to the eastern flank speak for themselves, it is Europe’s southern flank that gives Madrid the most cause for concern. Spain is a long-standing contributor to security and defense missions in Africa and the Middle East, often under a United Nations (UN) or EU mandate. Through these experiences, especially in the Sahel and Sub-Saharan Africa, Madrid consistently raises concerns about Russia’s behavior in Africa, closely observing Russian malign activity, including through Moscow’s Wagner Group or post-Wagner operatives. Spanish diplomats are especially concerned about Russia’s support for illegitimate governments and military juntas, viewing this as a deliberate effort by Moscow to hinder these nations’ development toward freedom and prosperity.

Spain urged NATO to launch its “southern neighborhood” working group and was an active participant in the final report, advocating for a larger yet humbler role for NATO in these regions. Spain led the NATO Mission in Iraq for one year, participates in every EU military and civilian mission in Africa, and is currently the commander for the UN mission in Lebanon (UNIFIL) with a force commitment of more than seven hundred troops.

Another Spanish commitment in support of Europe’s southern flank is often overlooked: Spain hosts US forces at its Rota naval base and Morón air base. These installations provide two of the four large runways in Europe for US air power projection (with the other two in Germany), enables the forward deployment of US maritime power in and beyond the Mediterranean Sea, and provides a gateway for three US geographic combatant commands, which itself contributes to European security.

Increasing defense spending for Spain’s benefit

Spain’s support for Ukraine and its reinforcement of NATO’s eastern flank do not absolve it from its defense spending credibility problem. While it is likely to try to spin the defense spending discussion toward recent increases, Spain still has a long and steep climb to reach its self-proclaimed 2029 goal of passing the 2 percent of GDP threshold. To accomplish this, Spanish defense spending will need to grow at a minimum of 10 percent each year through 2029, while staying ahead of inflation. This is a real challenge, especially given the fractured nature of Spanish politics, budget processes, and high debt levels. While there is a consensus between the center-left and center-right in support of increased defense spending, both parties would be wise to formalize this and pass budgets so the armed forces can invest over time with confidence no matter which party is in power.

Increased spending is critical for acquiring much-needed capabilities. The Spanish Navy’s sole aircraft carrier, the multi-purpose Juan Carlos I, will face irrelevancy as a fixed-wing launch platform if the navy does not procure a replacement for its fleet of EAV-8B Harrier II jump jets. Although Spain joined the French-German Future Combat Air System project, the earliest any production aircraft may join the Spanish Air and Space Force is 2040, beyond the lifespan of its EF-18 fleet. The Spanish Army’s Fuerza 2035 program needs to be funded through completion. Soldier salaries continue to fall behind the cost of living and inflation, and the military may need to grow to employ future capabilities.

In other words, the to-do list is long. Spain’s political leaders need to commit to funding these capabilities if there is any hope for the Spanish military to keep pace with the rapidly changing security environment.

Andrew Bernard is a retired US Air Force colonel and a visiting fellow in the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center.

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Turkey’s emerging and disruptive technologies capacity and NATO: Defense policy, prospects, and limitations

Can Kasapoğlu and Sine Özkaraşahin — Mon, 08 Jul 2024 21:00:00 +0000

Introduction

The NATO Parliamentary Assembly’s Science and Technology Committee considers emerging and disruptive technologies (EDTs) capable of transforming future military capabilities and warfare through advanced tech applications. Today, official documents indicate that NATO’s EDT-generation efforts focus on nine areas : artificial intelligence (AI), autonomous systems, quantum technologies, biotechnology and human enhancement technologies, space, hypersonic systems, novel materials and manufacturing, energy and propulsion, and next-generation communications networks.

This brief does not cover all of Turkey’s defense-technological capabilities but aims to outline Turkey’s growing focus on EDTs and high-tech advancements. Some signature programs reflect Turkey’s political-military approach and the trends in defense-technological and industrial policies. These programs hint at Ankara’s future military modernization efforts and smart assets. This paper highlights some of Turkey’s critical defense tech programs, focusing on AI, robotics, directed energy weapons, and future soldier/exoskeleton technologies to illustrate the comprehensive and integrated structure of the Turkish EDT ecosystem.

Emerging and disruptive technologies, the future of war, and NATO

Breakthroughs in EDTs are essential for NATO’s future military strength. They will significantly impact defense economics and help shape NATO’s defense-technological and industrial priorities. These efforts involve not just state policies but also public-private partnerships and transatlantic cooperation for sustainable and comprehensive EDT initiatives.

NATO supports these projects through initiatives like the Defence Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic and the NATO-Private Sector Dialogues, which explore collaboration between NATO and private companies on technology and defense.

According to Greg Ulmer, currently president of Lockheed Martin Aeronautics, “the decisive edge in today and tomorrow’s missions will be determined by combining technologies to bring forward new capabilities.” This view is shared by US Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin, demonstrating the importance of AI in Washington’s military modernization efforts to deter adversaries in a future confrontation. There seems to be a consensus in the Western policy community that integrating AI and machine learning into modern battle networks, perhaps the most critical contemporary EDT applications in defense, is essential to succeed in tomorrow’s wars. In an era of increasingly digital and transparent warfare, rapid technological adaptation is key to success.

Smart technologies are proliferating fast, and continuous innovation has become a strategic requirement in today’s geopolitical landscape. AI-augmented precision kill chains, hypersonic weapons within mixed-strike packages, and satellite internet-enabled command and control nodes are already changing warfare. The use of commercial satellite imagery and geospatial intelligence has revolutionized open-source intelligence. Facial recognition algorithms are now used in war crime investigations. Robotic warfare, drone-on-drone engagements, and manned-unmanned teaming are all changing the characteristics of war for better or worse.

Defense economics is also changing. Start-ups are becoming increasingly essential actors in military innovation. According to McKinsey & Company, the number of seed funding rounds in defense and dual-use technology (in the United States) almost doubled between 2011 and 2023, hinting at a rapid proliferation of start-ups in the high-tech defense industry. This trend is fostering new collaborations. NATO is leveraging the strengths of the start-up industry with a $1.1 billion Innovation Fund and is reportedly working with several European tech companies on robotic solutions, AI-driven systems, and semiconductors.

Keeping up with innovation is like boarding a fast-moving train, where getting a good seat ensures a strategic advantage over competitors. By investing in holistic, across-the-spectrum EDT-generation efforts, Turkish decision-makers seem to recognize this imperative.

Great expectations: Turkey in the high-technology battlespace

Turkey has faced challenges with industrial advancements, lagging behind in the Industrial Revolution. For instance, the country’s first main battle tank is still not in service. Despite ambitions to operate its fifth-generation combat aircraft, Kaan, within a decade, Turkey has not ever produced third- or fourth-generation tactical military aircraft. This situation is striking given that Turkey excels in producing and exporting state-of-the-art drones but has struggled with other key conventional military assets.

According to Haluk Bayraktar, CEO of the prominent Turkish unmanned aerial systems manufacturer Baykar, missing out on the Industrial Revolution has slowed Turkey’s military modernization. However, it also pushed the country to leverage digital age technologies, building new strengths in intelligent assets and EDTs.

In recent decades, Turkey’s military-industrial sector has focused heavily on innovation and increasing research and development, driven by a desire for self-sufficiency and operational sovereignty. The country’s National Artificial Intelligence Strategy 2021-2025 outlines these ambitions. Forming the central pillar of the government’s AI policy, the document “focuses on generating value on a global scale with an agile and sustainable AI ecosystem.” The strategy also lays out the strategic pillars of the effort, including strengthening international collaboration, encouraging innovation, and increasing the number of experts working on AI.

Similarly, the 2023-2027 Sectoral Strategy Document of the Turkish Presidency of Defense Industries outlines several focus areas for Turkey’s future EDT efforts. These include quantum computing, nanotechnology, and directed energy weapons. The document also highlights the importance of establishing a sustainable, resilient production and testing infrastructure for advanced aerial platforms and increasing the competitiveness of Turkey’s high-tech defense exports.

Selected military programs

Kemankeş loitering munitions baseline

Turkey’s aerial drone warfare capabilities first gained attention with medium-altitude long-endurance (MALE) and high-altitude long-endurance (HALE) platforms such as the Bayraktar TB-2 MALE drone, Akıncı HALE unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV), and TUSAS’ Anka MALE drone baseline. Recently, Turkey’s has advanced further in this field, developing smart aerial assets such as the Kemankeş family.

The Kemankeş, introduced by Baykar in 2023, is a “mini-intelligent cruise missile” that combines features of loitering munitions and cruise missiles. It can carry a 6-kilogram payload , and operates autonomously with an AI-supported autopilot system, one-hour endurance, and a jet engine. The Kemankeş is designed for both striking targets and conducting intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition, and reconnaissance missions. It can be integrated with other aerial drones, making it a versatile tool in modern warfare.

The Kemankeş system offers advanced datalinks and sensors, providing real-time battle updates while targeting adversaries. The upgraded version, Kemankeş-2, boasts a range of over 200 kilometers and an AI-supported autopilot system for precise, autonomous flight. Baykar announced that Kemankeş-2 passed its system verification tests in June 2024.

Kemankeş-2 can operate day and night, in various weather conditions, and in environments where GPS is jammed. Its AI-supported optical guidance system demonstrates Turkey’s rapid advancements in robotic aerial technology.

Naval and ground robotic warfare capabilities

Russia’s war on Ukraine and the ongoing turmoil in the Red Sea have highlighted the importance of kamikaze naval drones. In the Black Sea, Ukraine has used unmanned surface vehicles (USV) compensate for its lack of conventional naval capabilities. It has successfully eliminated about one-third of the Russian Black Sea Fleet with naval drones and other long-range capabilities such as the Storm Shadow/SCALP-EG air-launched cruise missiles and coastal defense missiles. Similarly, in the Red Sea, Iranian-backed Houthis have employed low-cost kamikaze USVs effective anti-access/area-denial assets, disrupting global maritime trade and limiting Western commercial activities in the region. Some assessments suggest that the United States should consider forming “hedge forces” consisting entirely of unmanned, low-cost systems to counter initial aggression from a peer opponent, such as in a scenario involving China invading Taiwan. This strategy would minimize harm to military personnel and the loss of valuable equipment.

Turkey has one of the largest USV programs within NATO, with about half a dozen ongoing projects. For example, Marlin, produced by the Turkish defense giant Aselsan and Sefine Shipyards, was the first Turkish naval drone to participate in NATO joint exercises, indicating potential for coalition warfare.

Turkey is also advancing its ground warfare capabilities, leveraging its expertise in robotics. Otokar’s Alpar is a recent example of an unmanned ground vehicle (UGV) that can map the battlefield in 2D and 3D, navigate without a global navigation satellite system, identify friend or foe, and has Advanced Driver Assistance Systems, low thermal and acoustic signature, and autonomous patrol capability. It can also serve as a “mother tank” for smaller UGVs, enhancing mission capability. Alpar has been showcased at major international defense exhibitions, including the Eurosatory 2024 event held in Paris in June.

In addition to developing new robotic systems, Turkey is focusing on innovative concepts like Havelsan’s “digital troops,” which integrate manned and unmanned teams to act as force multipliers on the battlefield. These efforts across multiple domains demonstrate Turkey’s vision of becoming a leading player in a “Mad Max”-like battlespace that combines conventional and smart assets.

Laser precision: Turkey’s drive in directed energy weapon projects

In Turkey’s expansion of EDTs, directed energy weapons and laser guns are gaining attention. The prominent Turkish arms maker Roketsan has introduced the Alka Directed Energy Weapon System, which has successfully completed live fire tests. The Alka system combines soft kill and hard kill capabilities, featuring both an electromagnetic jamming system and a laser destruction system.

Another key initiative is Aselsan’s Gökberk Mobile Laser Weapon System, first unveiled at the Turkish defense exhibition IDEF in 2023. Gökberk can search for, detect, and track UAVs using radar and electro-optical sensors, and then intercept these threats with an effective laser weapon. Additionally, Gökberk has soft kill capabilities, using its Kangal jammer subsystem to render UAVs dysfunctional. According to Aselsan, Gökberk can protect land and naval platforms, critical national infrastructure, and border outposts.

Turkish future soldier concepts

Turkey is also advancing future soldier technologies as part of its efforts in EDTs. The concept, pioneered by the United Kingdom within NATO, aims to create a modernized force by 2030. Shifting the focus of warfighting from close to deep battles, the British program seeks to transform the army into a resilient and versatile force that can find and attack enemy targets at a greater distance and with higher accuracy.

Ankara’s efforts in this segment are not new. A few years ago, BITES, a leading defense technology and intelligent systems manufacturer owned by Aselsan, developed the Military Tactical Operation Kit ATOK. Equipped with portable and wearable integrated technology, the solution in question was designed to enhance the situational awareness of Turkish troops in a rapidly changing battlefield and maximize personnel security. In line with the future soldier concept, BITES also produced several solutions based on virtual/augmented reality to provide realistic simulation environments.

Aselsan’s “Military Exoskeleton” is another visionary initiative designed to assist troops during demanding battlefield conditions. The exoskeleton provides over 400 watts of leg support. The support is adaptive and AI-supported, meaning that it understands and responds to the needs of the soldier wearing the smart suit. It has an 8-kilometer operation range on a single charge and transfers the soldier’s weight to the ground during long missions, reducing physical strain and improving combat performance.

The way forward: Opportunities and restraints

Keeping up with industrial trends in a competitive environment is challenging, and Turkey’s defense industry faces several obstacles that limit its full potential.

First, the Turkish defense industry is monopolized. There are structural gaps in the collaboration between the public and private sectors. Unlike other tech-driven nations like the United States, Turkey’s defense ecosystem is not very friendly to start-ups, with established companies dominating the field.

Second, Turkey has a shortage of skilled human capital, largely due to issues in higher education. According to 2022 OECD data, Turkey’s Program for International Student Assessment test scores fell below the OECD average in mathematics, science, and reading comprehension. In addition, evidence shows that in Turkey, the proportion of bachelor’s, master’s, and doctoral or equivalent graduates in the field of STEM (science, technology, engineering, and mathematics) is among the lowest among OECD and partner countries.

For sustainable and resilient defense innovation, R&D, business, and a well-educated workforce must go hand in hand. A good example is Baykar, whose chief technology lead was educated at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, one of the United States’ leading engineering universities.

Third, high-technology goods comprise a relatively low share of Turkish exports. Despite a focus on high-tech products, over half of the gross value generated in the Turkish defense industry comes from low- and medium-technology products. In 2022, Turkey’s high-tech exports were approximately $7.5 billion, and in 2023, this figure exceeded $9 billion.

While Turkey’s strategic plans and defense industrial goals are ambitious, the abovementioned challenges could jeopardize its position as a leading EDT producer in the medium and long term. Addressing these issues is crucial not only for enhancing Turkey’s EDT edge but also for meeting NATO’s strategic needs.

About the authors

Can Kasapoğlu is a nonresident senior fellow at Hudson Institute. Follow him on X @ckasapoglu1.

Sine Özkaraşahin is a freelance defense analyst and consultant. Follow her on X @sineozkarasahin.

The Atlantic Council in Turkey, which is in charge of the Turkey program, aims to promote and strengthen transatlantic engagement with the region by providing a high-level forum and pursuing programming to address the most important issues on energy, economics, security, and defense.

Don’t cut corners on US nuclear deterrence

Matthew Kroenig, Mark J. Massa — Wed, 03 Jul 2024 13:42:12 +0000

The nuclear threats to the United States and its allies are growing. To deter these threats, the bipartisan Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States (a commission on which one of the authors, Matthew Kroenig, served) recently recommended that the United States plan for its first strategic forces buildup since the end of the Cold War.

In contrast to this bipartisan consensus, House Armed Services Committee Ranking Member Adam Smith (D-WA) argued in Newsweek in May for adjustments and cuts to the US intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) force. Smith’s argument that the United States should consider mobile basing for a portion of its ICBM force has merit, but his other arguments do not stand up to scrutiny. Rather, bipartisan support for modernizing and expanding the US nuclear arsenal will be essential for ensuring that the United States and its allies have the strategic forces they need to deter aggression in the face of hostile, nuclear-armed, autocratic rivals.

There are several problems with Smith’s arguments. First, he questions whether land-based nuclear forces are needed at all. Yet, every presidential administration since the 1950s has considered this question and concluded that ICBMs are necessary. Indeed, as we have argued at length elsewhere (see here and here), ICBMs contribute to the major goals of US nuclear strategy—they deter adversaries from launching a strategic attack, assure allies, and give the United States the ability to respond if deterrence fails.

There is simply no room to cut the number of ICBMs at this moment.

Second, Smith argues that an enemy nuclear attack on vulnerable ICBMs could force a US president into a use-them-or-lose-them situation and a “rushed” decision to launch a nuclear attack. But the president is not forced to launch nuclear weapons as soon as a possible enemy missile launch is detected. The president has the option to ride out the attack and retaliate with other, more survivable forces, if necessary. Moreover, it does not make sense to argue that ICBMs are, on the one hand, so important that the president would need to launch them if under attack and, on the other hand, the United States should slash their numbers. ICBMs are either important or they are not. If ICBMs are expendable, then there is no reason for the president to launch them if under attack. If they are important, as we believe they are, then it is unwise to curtail them.

Third, Smith argues that US ICBM silos are uniquely dangerous because they invite an adversary to target its nuclear weapons in the US heartland, and that such an attack could kill millions of people. But the purpose of nuclear weapons is, of course, to deter nuclear attack in the first place. If ICBMs continue to deter effectively, as they have for the past half century and more, then an attack will not come. Moreover, if the adversary did not need to target its nuclear weapons on missile silos in the isolated high plains of Montana and North Dakota, for example, then the attacker could reallocate those weapons toward major US cities, which would only result in more US deaths in the event of a nuclear war.

Fourth, Smith continues by arguing that, even if the United States does maintain some silo-based ICBMs, the Department of Defense should purchase fewer of them. But again, this argument does not stand up to scrutiny. The bipartisan Strategic Posture Commission argued that the current US nuclear modernization program of record—which includes the new Sentinel ICBMs,* new ballistic missile submarines, new strategic bombers, and new air-launched nuclear cruise missiles—is necessary but not sufficient to maintain strategic deterrence. There is simply no room to cut the number of ICBMs at this moment.

Fifth, Smith argues that, if the United States keeps the same number of nuclear weapons, then it should shift warheads from ICBMs to the submarine leg of the nuclear triad. But there is not much room to shift large numbers of warheads to the sea-based leg without increasing the total number of submarines, and the United States is already straining to produce the planned number of Columbia-class ballistic missile submarines on time. Moreover, if the United States were to build more submarines, that would be inconsistent with Smith’s stated concern about costs. Building and operating more submarines is much more expensive than modernizing ground-based missile silos.

Sixth, Smith worries that the Department of Defense does not have the resources to complete the US nuclear modernization program while making necessary investments in conventional forces. It is true that the Department of Defense must make tradeoffs in some areas, but not with nuclear deterrence, which is its highest priority. Congress should ensure that the United States has sufficient resources at its disposal to build and deploy the necessary nuclear and conventional forces.

Smith’s strongest argument is that the United States should consider putting some portion of its ICBM force on mobile launchers instead of in silos. In fact, the bipartisan congressional commission recommends this option to enhance the survivability of the ground-based leg. But this option would not result in cost savings, contrary to what Smith suggests. A mobile option would require building new missile garrisons and also result in higher operational and security costs. Given the worsening international security environment, land-mobile missiles should be a complement to, not a replacement for, the ICBM program of record.

Now is not the time to be making cuts to the US nuclear arsenal. As the bipartisan Strategic Posture Commission argued in its consensus report, the United States must urgently complete its nuclear modernization program of record and take actions today to enhance its strategic posture. The future of international peace and security depends on it.

Matthew Kroenig is vice president of the Atlantic Council and senior director of its Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. He is currently a commissioner on the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States and was a senior policy adviser in the Pentagon in support of the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review.

Mark J. Massa is the deputy director for strategic forces policy in the Forward Defense program within the Scowcroft Center.

Note: The Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security conducts work on nuclear and strategic forces that is sponsored by donors including Los Alamos National Laboratory, Northrop Grumman Corporation (which has the sole contract from the US Air Force to engineer and manufacture Sentinel ICBMs), the Norwegian Ministry of Defense, the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the United States Department of Defense, the United States Department of Energy, and the United States Department of State, as well as general support to the Scowcroft Center. This article did not involve any of these donors and reflects only the authors’ views.

The post Don’t cut corners on US nuclear deterrence appeared first on Atlantic Council.

US signals long-term support for Ukraine with new security pact

Mykola Bielieskov — Tue, 02 Jul 2024 17:59:59 +0000

The United States and Ukraine signed a bilateral security agreement on June 13 in a bid to underline Washington’s long-term support as Ukraine fights for national survival against Russia’s ongoing invasion. The agreement is the latest in a series of similar bilateral security pacts concluded by Kyiv since the start of 2024, but has attracted additional attention due to the critical role of US support for the Ukrainian war effort.

Since the onset of Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022, the United States has been the single biggest provider of military aid to Ukraine. Without US hardware, ammunition, training, and intelligence, Ukraine would not have been able to defend itself in a high intensity conventional war for so long. In other words, the US has emerged over the past two and a half years as an indispensable partner for Ukraine, both in terms of the country’s current military operations and long-term security.

The new US-Ukraine security agreement contains no major surprises. Rather than breaking new ground, it aims to establish a more long-term commitment to existing forms of military cooperation including training and weapons supplies, while also setting the stage for deepening partnership in defense production. “A lasting peace for Ukraine must be underwritten by Ukraine’s own ability to defend itself now, and to deter future aggression,” President Biden commented.

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Crucially, the US-Ukraine bilateral security pact is not a formal treaty or military alliance and does not oblige the US to defend Ukraine. Instead, the terms of the agreement commit the United States to engage in high-level consultations with Ukraine within twenty-four hours of any future attacks on the country. This cautious approach is in line with well documented concerns within the Biden administration over the possibility of a direct clash between the US and Russia.

Critics claim the terms of the security agreement are deliberately broad and open to interpretation, reflecting what they see as Washington’s reluctance to provide Ukraine with anything approaching binding security guarantees. The absence of any official ratification procedures also leaves the ten-year agreement vulnerable to potential future changes in US foreign policy if Donald Trump wins the 2024 presidential election in November.

The Biden White House is not the first US administration to face claims of adopting an excessively cautious approach toward Russian aggression in Ukraine. Since the Russian invasion of Ukraine first began in 2014 with the seizure of Crimea, three successive US presidents have all been accused of failing to effectively deter the Kremlin.

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While welcomed by both sides, this latest security initiative is unlikely to convince Moscow of any fundamental change in the US stance or persuade Putin to end his invasion. It comes weeks after the end of a prolonged pause in US military aid to Ukraine caused by political deadlock in Congress over the passage of a sixty billion dollar support bill.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy sought to put an optimistic spin on the signing of the new security agreement, hailing it as “historic” and saying the pact would serve as a bridge toward his country’s future NATO membership. Others have been less generous, noting that the absence of specific military commitments underlines the limitations of Western support for Ukraine.

Ukraine remains heavily dependent on continued Western military aid and is clearly in no position to demand greater commitment from the country’s Western partners. However, many Ukrainians believe the US and other Western nations have a vital self-interest in maintaining their support for the country.

Amid mounting frustration at the failure to offer Kyiv any fully-fledged military alliances, advocates of stronger support for Ukraine argue that the West’s unprecedented material and political investment since the outbreak of hostilities in 2022 means a Ukrainian defeat would represent a massive blow to Western prestige. It would therefore make more sense for the US and other partners to back Ukraine now, rather than face the far higher costs that would follow a Russian victory.

In a best case scenario, this new security agreement could create the conditions to anchor Ukraine firmly within the Western world, and could serve as a gateway to eventual Ukrainian NATO membership. However, without the requisite political will in Washington, the pact could come to be seen as the successor to the infamous 1994 Budapest Memorandum, which saw Ukraine unilaterally surrendering the world’s third-largest nuclear arsenal in exchange for security assurances that were exposed as worthless by Russia’s subsequent invasion.

A realistic appraisal of the recently signed US-Ukraine security pact is particularly important as both countries look to strengthen their partnership amid the largest European invasion since World War II. If Kyiv and Washington wish to convince Moscow to abandon its hopes of outlasting the West, they will need to match the sentiments expressed in the security agreement with concrete steps that will set the stage for Ukrainian victory.

Strengthening Taiwan’s resiliency

Franklin D. Kramer, Philip W. Yu, Joseph Webster, Elizabeth Sizeland — Tue, 02 Jul 2024 13:00:00 +0000

Introduction
Establish a comprehensive security strategy
Cybersecurity and critical infrastructure resilience
Energy
Food and water resiliency
Enhancing defense resilience
Conclusion
About the authors
Acknowledgments

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Introduction

This report recommends actions for the new leadership of Taiwan to take to enhance its societal resilience against Chinese aggression in the context of both “gray zone” conflict and wartime attacks. The report focuses on establishing a comprehensive security strategy and analyzes three key areas particularly important for effective resilience: enhancing cybersecurity for critical infrastructures; improving energy security; and accelerating defense transformation.

The new administration of Lai Ching-te faces both existing resilience challenges and the potential for significantly greater problems if the People’s Republic of China (PRC) pursues expanded gray zone activities or if actual conflict occurs.¹ The ongoing challenges include substantial disinformation campaigns, cyberattacks, military incursions, and periodic economic coercion. Potential future challenges could involve expansion of one or more of these ongoing Chinese activities. In the context of a more contested environment such as a quarantine,² blockade, or a kinetic conflict, Chinese actions could seek to cause leadership failures and loss of social cohesion; undertake cyberattacks to target critical infrastructures; generate energy shortages; and seek to defeat Taiwan militarily before the United States could provide effective support. The potential for such harms substantially increases the importance of resilient responses by Taiwan.

The report recommends four major sets of actions to enhance Taiwan’s resilience:

Establish a comprehensive security strategy that engages government, the private sector, and individuals in cooperative efforts to ensure all facets of resilience including:
1. Risk analyses and priority requirements.
2. Organization of data relevant to responding to challenges from the PRC.
3. Development of expertise in key areas required for response.
4. Provision of governmental leadership and activation of the whole nation as part of a comprehensive approach.
Enhance cybersecurity by establishing:
1. Off-island, cloud-based capabilities to duplicate governmental and other critical functions.
2. Working arrangements with high-end, private-sector cybersecurity providers.
3. A surge capability of cybersecurity experts.
4. Regular engagement with US Cyber Command’s Hunt Forward program.
5. Alternatives to undersea cables through low-earth orbit (LEO) communications satellites.
Bolster energy security resilience by:
1. Rationalizing—that is, increasing—energy prices, especially for electricity.
2. Supporting indigenous supply, including nuclear energy.
3. Prioritizing energy needs.
4. Dispersing and hardening energy storage facilities.
5. Preparing comprehensive rationing plans for energy.
Enhance defense resilience by:
1. Continuing the trend of higher defense spending to at least 3 percent of gross domestic product (GDP).
2. Leveraging Taiwan’s strength in high tech manufacturing and shipbuilding to accelerate the development of a Ukraine-style, public-private “capability accelerator”³ for emerging technologies.
3. Fielding low-cost, high-effectiveness capabilities including unmanned surface vessels, unmanned aerial vehicles, and naval mines.
4. Incorporating training in emerging technologies and unconventional tactics for conscripts and reserves.
5. Investing in East Coast port infrastructure as counterblockade strongholds.
6. Raising the All-out Defense Mobilization Agency (ADMA) to the national level and implementing a larger civil defense force that fully integrates civilian agencies and local governments.

Establish a comprehensive security strategy

Resilience is not a new theme in Taiwan. Former President Tsai Ing-wen, who completed two terms in office on May 20, entitled her 2022 National Day Address “Island of Resilience,”⁴ and similarly identified resilience as a key factor for Taiwan in her two subsequent National Day addresses.⁵ “The work of making the Republic of China (Taiwan) a more resilient country is now our most important national development priority,” she stated in that 2022 speech, in which she articulated four key areas of resilience: economy and industry, social safety net, free and democratic government system, and national defense. What is left undone, however, is aligning these and other resilience elements into a comprehensive security strategy similar to those undertaken by Finland⁶ and Sweden,⁷ which utilize a whole-of society approach to enhance resilience.

Resilience is a nation’s ability to understand, address, respond to, and recover from any type of national security risk. Given the scale of risk Taiwan faces from China, domestic resilience should be front and center in Taiwan’s national security strategy.⁸ Comparable comprehensive national security approaches, such as the Finnish model, aim to foster and enable an engaged national ecosystem of partners, each with a clear understanding of their roles and responsibilities. Finland’s model is instructive, underscoring the importance of engagement by the entire society:

The Security Strategy for Society lays out the general principles governing preparedness in Finnish society. The preparedness is based on the principle of comprehensive security in which the vital functions of society are jointly safeguarded by the authorities, business operators, organisations and citizens.⁹

Comprehensive security thus is far more than just government activities:

Comprehensive security has evolved into a cooperation model in which actors share and analyse security information, prepare joint plans, as well as train and work together. The cooperation model covers all relevant actors, from citizens to the authorities. The cooperation is based on statutory tasks, cooperation agreements and the Security Strategy for Society.¹⁰

The Finnish strategy identifies seven “vital functions” as key areas: leadership; international and European Union activities; defense capability; internal security; economy, infrastructure, and security of supply; functional capacity of the population and services; and psychological resilience.¹¹

Taiwan has taken a variety of actions to enhance resilience including the establishment in 2022 of the All-out Defense Mobilization Agency.¹² That agency has a useful but limited scope with its mandate of “comprehensive management of ‘planning for mobilization, management, service, civil defense, [and] building reserve capacity.’ ”¹³ But while defense is important (and further discussed below), as the Finnish and Swedish strategies underscore, Taiwan should expand its approach to resilience to include the full spectrum of governmental, private sector, and individual tasks—and the necessary cooperative efforts to make them most effective.

President Lai’s recent election ushered in an unprecedented third consecutive term for the Democratic Progressive Party.¹⁴ This outcome not only provides continuity in the agenda set by the island’s duly elected leader, but also presents an opportunity to sharpen the focus areas for resilience. As Taiwan transitions to a Lai presidency, the challenge of shoring up the island’s resilience should be at the forefront.

As a valuable starting point for establishing such an expanded resilience strategy, the Lai government should undertake extensive consultations with both Finland and Sweden—which could be facilitated as necessary by the United States. Taiwan should also seek to engage with the Hybrid Center of Excellence, based in Finland, which is an “autonomous, network-based international organization countering hybrid threats.”¹⁵

The discussion below describes several important elements of a comprehensive resilience strategy, and it will be a crucial task for the Lai administration to expand Taiwan’s current efforts to the full scope of such an approach. Resilience is a team game with the whole of society playing a role. But only Taiwan’s central government can act as the team captain, setting expectations, establishing priorities, formulating and communicating national strategy, and coordinating activities. Only leaders in national-level government can oversee the critical work of developing institutional effectiveness in key areas of risk management and resilience.

As a starting point, Taiwan should undertake a comprehensive audit now to uncover any gaps in the country’s ability to understand, respond to, and recover from both the chronic risks it currently faces and any more acute manifestations of PRC aggression in the future. Taiwan’s government should examine the following areas to pursue greater resilience:

Activating the whole nation: Working with the private sector and local government, and communicating to households are essential to develop a truly comprehensive approach to Taiwan’s resilience.
Understanding risk: Developing a set of scenarios that will help prioritize activities across government and beyond. Prioritizing is critical where resources are limited—as is identifying areas of cross-cutting work that can help to reduce risk in multiple scenarios.
Building data capacity: Laying a foundation for data exploitation needs will be critical for Taiwan, which will need this capacity both ahead of and during any crisis response. Preparing for and providing this capacity is not just the preserve of government, as commercially available and industry data sources will provide critical insights. Planning to access, receive, store, and process this data needs to start early, as the foundations for technical infrastructure, capabilities, data-sharing policies, and data expertise in government all require time and cannot just be activated on the cusp of crisis. Part of this work entails developing scenarios to help analysts map out gaps in information sources (intelligence, open source, commercial, and from allies) that Taiwan will likely need in each circumstance to build situational awareness. Ahead of and during crisis, risk assessment and effective decision-making will be highly dependent on the availability, quality, and usability of intelligence, information, and data.
Expanding its network of professional skills and resources: Assessing the range of skills and the levels of resourcing needed in government to manage a long-term crisis posture should start well ahead of any crisis. It would be helpful to look now at the gaps in key areas of professional expertise: analysts, data experts, crisis-response professionals, and operational planners will all be needed in larger numbers to sustain an effective response. Taiwan will also need professionally administered and well-exercised crisis facilities, resilient technical infrastructure, and business continuity approaches in place.
Preparedness and planning: Thinking through potential impacts of crisis scenarios in advance and working up potential policy and operational responses will bolster the quality of adaptability, which is an essential component of resilience. The process of exercising and refining plans is also helpful to build the professional connections and networks that will be activated during a live response.

Working with countries that are already developing vanguard resilience capabilities could help Taiwan quickly establish a workable model. For example, the United Kingdom’s National Situation Centre¹⁶—built in less than a year during the COVID-19 pandemic—is a model of developing access to critical data in peacetime and lessons learned from previous crisis scenarios about the practical challenges a nation could face in a variety of scenarios. Many commercial providers offer competent ways of displaying data insights on dashboards, and while this is helpful, it is only part of what can be achieved.

As a model for its broader resilience requirements, Taiwan will have the benefit of its existing efforts including in the counterdisinformation arena, where it has programs as effective as any in the world, despite the fact that Taiwan consistently faces the world’s highest volume of targeted disinformation campaigns.¹⁷ The saturation of PRC information manipulation across Taiwan’s traditional and social media platforms is strategically designed to undermine social cohesion, erode trust in government institutions, and soften resistance to Beijing’s forced unification agenda, while sowing doubts about America’s commitment to peace and stability in the region.

Taiwan has developed a multifaceted strategy to combat this onslaught, eschewing heavy-handed censorship in favor of promoting free speech and empowering civil society. This approach serves as a beacon for other democracies, demonstrating how to effectively counter disinformation through rapid-response mechanisms, independent fact-checking, along with widespread media literacy initiatives. Collaborative efforts such as the Taiwan FactCheck Center, Cofacts, and MyGoPen have proven instrumental in swiftly identifying and debunking false rumors, notably during the closely watched presidential election on January 13.¹⁸

Taiwan’s Minister of Digital Affairs (MoDA) attributes the island’s success in combating this “infodemic” to its sophisticated civil-sector efforts, which avoids reliance on reactive takedowns of malicious content akin to a game of whack-a-mole. Much like its handling of the pandemic—where Taiwan achieved one of the world’s lowest COVID-19 fatality rates without resorting to draconian lockdowns—it has demonstrated resilience and innovation in the digital sphere.¹⁹

Taiwan’s response to disinformation demonstrates that it is well-positioned to establish a comprehensive approach to societal resilience. The discussion below describes several important elements of a comprehensive resilience strategy, but it will be a crucial task for the Lai administration to expand Taiwan’s current efforts to the full scope of such an approach.

Cybersecurity and critical infrastructure resilience

Cyber risks to critical infrastructures

Like all advanced economies, Taiwan depends on its critical infrastructures. Critical infrastructures have been described as “sectors whose assets, systems, and networks, whether physical or virtual, are considered so vital . . . that their incapacitation or destruction would have a debilitating effect on security, national economic security, national public health or safety.”²⁰ Since several critical infrastructures are interlinked, it is important in evaluating resilience to “capture cross-cutting risks and associated dependencies that may have cascading impacts within and across sectors.”²¹ Among those interlinked critical infrastructures are energy, communications, transportation, and water. Each of these are critical to society as a whole and each are dependent on digital technology for their operations.

In Taiwan, the Administration for Cyber Security has identified critical infrastructures “by their feature types into the following eight fields: energy, water resource, telecommunications, transportation, banking and finance, emergency aid and hospitals, central and local governments, and high-tech parks.”²² It is worth underscoring that several of Taiwan’s critical infrastructures, such as the electric grid²³ and the water system,²⁴ are significantly centralized or have other notable vulnerabilities such as the dependency on undersea cables for international communications²⁵ that increase the potential consequences from a successful cyberattack.

The Taiwan government has fully recognized the significant risks from cyberattacks. As described by Taiwan’s Administration for Cyber Security, “Due to Taiwan’s unique political and economic situation, the country faces not only a complex global cyber security environment but also severe cyber security threats, making the continuous implementation and improvement of cyber security measures a necessity.”²⁶

The number of cyberattacks against Taiwan is notable.²⁷ Published estimates range from five million cyberattacks per day against Taiwanese government agencies²⁸ to the detection of 15,000 cyberattacks per second, including attempted intrusions, in Taiwan during the first half of 2023.²⁹

The attacks often focus on key societal infrastructures. A recent Voice of America report noted that just prior to the January 2024 elections:

Most of the attacks appeared to focus on government offices, police departments, and financial institutions, with the attackers focused on internal communications, police reports, bank statements and insurance information.³⁰

Google researchers have likewise described the cyber threat to key critical infrastructures, revealing that it is “tracking close to 100 hacking groups out of China [and that these] malicious groups are attacking a wide spectrum of organizations, including the government, private industry players and defense organizations.”³¹

The attacks themselves are often relatively sophisticated. Trellix, a cybersecurity firm, described multiple techniques utilized by attackers that “focused on defense evasion, discovery, and command and control . . . to subvert system defenses to gather information about accounts, systems, and networks.” Among them are “living-off-the-land” techniques, which allow attackers to maintain their intrusions over time with smaller chances of detection.³²

While no one can say with certainty what actions the PRC would take in the context of a blockade of or outright conflict with Taiwan, the United States is clear-eyed about the potential for attacks on its own critical infrastructures if engaged in conflict with China. The February 2023 Annual Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community notes the likelihood of such PRC cyberattacks in that context:

If Beijing feared that a major conflict with the United States were imminent, it almost certainly would consider undertaking aggressive cyber operations against U.S. homeland critical infrastructure and military assets worldwide . . . China almost certainly is capable of launching cyber attacks that could disrupt critical infrastructure services within the United States, including against oil and gas pipelines, and rail systems.³³

The ongoing Russian cyberattacks against Ukraine in the Russia-Ukraine war further underscore the reality of critical infrastructures as a target in a conflict. It seems reasonable to assume that comparable actions (and perhaps even more) would be undertaken against Taiwan in the event of a blockade or kinetic conflict. “Probable targets,” according to James A. Lewis, would include critical infrastructures such as electrical power facilities, information and communications systems, and pipelines.³⁴

Actions to enhance Taiwan’s cyber resilience

Taiwan can enhance its cyber resilience through its own actions and in collaborative activities with private-sector companies and with the United States. While cyberattacks can be highly disruptive, one of the important lessons of the Ukraine-Russia conflict is that the effects on operations can be mitigated, as described in a CyberScoop analysis that underscores a shift in expectations:

The war has inspired a defensive effort that government officials and technology executives describe as unprecedented—challenging the adage in cybersecurity that if you give a well-resourced attacker enough time, they will pretty much always succeed. The relative success of the defensive effort in Ukraine is beginning to change the calculation about what a robust cyber defense might look like going forward.³⁵

According to the analysis, the critical element for such success has been significant multinational and public-private collaboration:

This high level of defense capability is a consequence of a combination of Ukraine’s own effectiveness, significant support from other nations including the United States and the United Kingdom, and a key role for private sector companies.
The defensive cyber strategy in Ukraine has been an international effort, bringing together some of the biggest technology companies in the world such as Google and Microsoft, Western allies such as the U.S. and Britain and social media giants such as Meta who have worked together against Russia’s digital aggression.³⁶

Actions by Taiwan

Taiwan should utilize the Ukraine model of cyber resilience—backed in part by private-sector companies—and take comparable actions to enhance its cybersecurity. Taiwan has a substantial existing cybersecurity framework on which to build such mitigating actions. Since 2022, the Ministry of Digital Affairs, through its Administration for Cyber Security, is responsible for “implementing cyber security management and defense mechanisms for national critical infrastructures” including “evaluating and auditing cyber security works at government agencies and public entities.”³⁷ Utilizing that framework, Taiwan should undertake the following four actions that would significantly enhance the island’s cybersecurity resilience.

First, Taiwan should utilize cloud-based capabilities to establish a duplicative set of cyber-enabled governmental functions outside of Taiwan. Ukraine undertook such actions, thereby rendering Russian cyberattacks in Ukraine unable to disrupt ongoing governmental activities. Taiwan’s Ministry of Digital Affairs has been evaluating the use of public clouds including the possibility of “digital embassies” abroad to hold data.³⁸ Taiwan should organize such actions with key cloud providers such as Amazon Web Services, which provided support to Ukraine.³⁹ The United States should work with Taiwan and appropriate cloud providers to help effectuate such a result.

Second, Taiwan should establish arrangements with private-sector cybersecurity providers to undertake defensive operations against PRC cyberattacks in the context of a blockade or kinetic conflict. As noted above, such private-sector actions have been instrumental to Ukraine, and would similarly be invaluable for Taiwan. The United States should also help facilitate such private-sector defensive cyber operations for Taiwan.

Third, Taiwan should organize a surge capability of individual cybersecurity experts who can be called upon to complement governmental resources. Both Estonia and the United Kingdom have very effective cyber-reserve approaches, and Taiwan should engage with each country, seeking lessons learned as part of establishing its own reserve corps.

Fourth, Taiwan needs to accelerate its low-earth orbit satellite communications program. The Ministry of Digital Affairs’ two-year, US$18 million plan to strengthen the resilience of government communications entails building more than 700 satellite receiver stations. The impetus: ships from mainland China have repeatedly severed submarine internet cables in what Taiwan perceived as “a trial of methods” that the PRC could use to prepare for a military invasion.⁴⁰

The existing program involves satellites as well as ground-based receivers. The Taiwan Space Agency disclosed its plan for a “dedicated” LEO satellite communications project in late 2022,⁴¹ as a public-private partnership:

Distinct from traditional government programs, this groundbreaking project is structured as a privately operated venture, wherein the Taiwanese government would retain a substantial minority ownership. . . . This project intends to enhance the Taiwan Space Agency’s initial proposal for two government-built LEO satellites by evolving it into a “2+4” configuration. This will involve constructing four additional satellites through collaborative efforts between the public and private sectors.⁴²

Actions with the United States

In accord with the Taiwan Relations Act,⁴³ and as a matter of long-standing policy, the United States strongly supports Taiwan’s defensive capabilities including for cybersecurity. The Integrated Country Strategy of the American Institute in Taiwan (essentially the unofficial US embassy) specifically provides that “bolster[ing] Taiwan’s cybersecurity resilience” is one of the United States’ strategic priorities for the island.⁴⁴ To support that objective, the United States can enhance Taiwan cybersecurity through cooperative defensive activities.

First, US Cyber Command regularly supports the network resilience of allied countries and partners through its “Hunt Forward” operations, which are “strictly defensive” joint ventures, undertaken following an invitation from the ally or partner, to “observe and detect malicious cyber activity” on these networks, together searching out “vulnerabilities, malware, and adversary presence.”⁴⁵

While Taiwan has not been specifically identified as a Hunt Forward participant, Anne Neuberger, who is the US deputy national security advisor for cyber and emerging technology, said at a Politico Tech Summit in 2023 that in the event of a major cyberattack on Taiwan, the United States would “send its best teams to help hunt down the attackers, the same approach typically used to help global allies in cyberspace.”⁴⁶ She described the typical approach as:

Putting our best teams to hunt on their most sensitive networks to help identify any current intrusions and to help remediate and make those networks as strong as possible.”⁴⁷

Neuberger also highlighted US work with Taiwan to carry out military tabletop games and exercises to prepare for potential cyberattack.⁴⁸

More recently, the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2024 explicitly authorized the Defense Department to cooperate on:

Defensive military cybersecurity activities with the military forces of Taiwan to (1) defend military networks, infrastructure, and systems; (2) counter malicious cyber activity that has compromised such military networks, infrastructure, and systems; (3) leverage United States commercial and military cybersecurity technology and services to harden and defend such military networks, infrastructure, and systems; and (4) conduct combined cybersecurity training activities and exercises.⁴⁹

Going forward, those authorities authorize not only Hunt Forward actions but also actions to leverage commercial and military technology to harden such networks (which would seem to resolve any export control issues) and to conduct combined training and exercises, all of which underscores clear congressional approval for enhanced cybersecurity activities with Taiwan.⁵⁰

Second, the United States should undertake to enhance Taiwan’s communications resilience by making available access to US commercial and military LEO networks. The important role of the commercial provider Starlink in assuring communications in the context of the Ukraine-Russia war is well-known.⁵¹ Starlink’s parent company, SpaceX, is, however, controlled by Elon Musk, whose Tesla company has major investments in China. That linkage has raised the question of whether Taiwan could rely on any commercial arrangements it might make on its own with Starlink—particularly since Starlink did impose some limitations on Ukraine’s use of the network.⁵² However, as previously described by one of the authors of this report, the US government has sway on such matters:

The Defense Production Act authorizes the [US] government to require the prioritized provision of services—which would include services from space companies—and exempts any company receiving such an order from liabilities such as inability to support other customers.⁵³

Accordingly, the US should rely on this authority to organize appropriate arrangements with Starlink—and other space companies that provide like capabilities—to ensure access that would support Taiwan communications. One way to do this would be to incorporate appropriate terms into the commercial augmentation space reserve (CASR) program arrangements that US Space Force is currently negotiating with civil space providers,⁵⁴ as part of the Department of Defense’s overall commercial space strategy.⁵⁵

Additionally, the DOD is developing its own LEO capability through a variety of constellations being put in place by Space Force.⁵⁶ Pursuant to the recent NDAA authorization noted above, DOD should work with the Taiwan military to ensure that those constellations will be available to support Taiwan as necessary.

Longer term, the United States should also undertake to enhance the resilience of Taiwan’s undersea cables. As previously proposed by one of the authors, the United States should lead in establishing an international undersea infrastructure protection corps. It should:

Combine governmental and private activities to support the resilience of undersea cables and pipelines. Membership should include the United States, allied nations with undersea maritime capabilities, and key private-sector cable and pipeline companies.⁵⁷

Such an activity would include focus on cybersecurity for undersea cable networks, hardening and other protection for cable landing points, and capabilities and resources to ensure expeditious repair of cables as needed.⁵⁸ To be sure, getting such an activity up and running will necessarily be a multiyear effort. However, Taiwan’s vulnerability underscores the importance of beginning promptly and working as expeditiously as possible.

Cybersecurity recommendations for Taiwan

Utilize cloud-based capabilities to establish a duplicative set of cyber-enabled governmental functions outside of Taiwan.
Establish arrangements with private-sector cybersecurity providers to undertake defensive operations against PRC cyberattacks.
Organize a surge capability of individual cybersecurity experts who can be called upon to complement governmental resources.
Accelerate the low-earth orbit satellite communications program.
Actively engage with Cyber Command’s Hunt Forward activities.
Enhance Taiwan’s communications resilience by making available access to US commercial and military LEO networks.
Undertake on a longer-term basis enhanced resilience of Taiwan’s undersea cables.

Energy

As part of its efforts to enhance resilience, Taiwan must mitigate its energy vulnerabilities, as its reliance on maritime imports for about 97 percent⁵⁹ of its energy needs creates acute risks. To lessen its dependency on maritime imports and strengthen its resiliency in the face of potential PRC coercion, Taiwan should curb energy and electricity demand, bolster indigenous supply, overhaul its inventory management, and prepare rationing plans. A resilient energy security approach would credibly signal to the PRC that Taiwan could hold out for long durations without maritime resupply.

Curbing demand by rationalizing prices

Taiwan’s ultra-low electricity prices are a security risk (and a black eye for its climate targets). Reliance on seaborne energy shipments presents straightforward security problems, and Taiwan’s low electricity prices subsidize consumption that is being met by imports of hydrocarbons, especially coal. The new Lai administration should make haste prudently, increasing electricity prices more frequently and significantly, without exceeding the limits of the politically possible.

Taiwan’s electricity price quandary is illustrated by Taipower, the state-owned monopoly utility. In 2022 and 2023, Taipower lost 227.2 billion New Taiwan dollars (NTD) and 198.5 billion NTD, respectively, as its per kilowatt hour cost of electricity sold substantially exceeded per unit prices.⁶⁰ Taipower’s prices failed to offset the steep rise in electricity input costs amid Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the post-COVID-19 unsnarling of supply chains.

Taiwan’s electricity costs remain too low, diminishing the island’s resiliency, although policymakers have now taken some steps in light of the problem. The Ministry of Economic Affairs’ latest electricity price review, in March 2024, raised average prices by about 11 percent, with the new tariff reaching about 3.4518 NTD, or approximately $0.11 USD/kWh.⁶¹ This rationalization of prices, while welcome, is insufficient. In the United States, the rolling twelve-month ending price in January 2024 for all sectors totaled $0.127/kWh.⁶² Taiwan’s heavily subsidized electricity consumers therefore enjoy a discount in excess of 13 percent compared to their US counterparts, despite US access to low-cost, abundant, and indigenously produced energy.

Taiwan’s heavily subsidized electricity prices incentivize maritime imports, especially coal. Astonishingly, Taiwan was the world’s largest per capita user of coal generation for electricity in 2022, higher than even Australia, a major coal exporter.

Taiwan’s low electricity prices and use of coal expose the island to PRC economic coercion. Taiwan’s dependency on imported coal heightens its vulnerability in the summer, when the island’s electricity-generation needs peak. Concerningly, Taiwan has already experienced electricity shortfalls in summer peacetime conditions, including a wave of outages⁶³ between July and August 2022. With the island’s future summer cooling needs set to rise even further due to climate change and hotter temperatures, Taiwan’s electricity needs pose a vulnerability that the PRC may attempt to exploit.

Curbing Taiwan’s electricity demand during summer months is critical, necessitating a rise in prices. While this reduction is a principal energy security challenge, the island must also do more to secure supply, especially for nuclear energy.

Supply: Support indigenous production

Taiwan’s resiliency will be strengthened by producing as much indigenous energy as possible, especially during the critical summer months. Taiwan, which has virtually no hydrocarbon resources, can therefore indigenously produce only four different forms of energy at scale: nuclear energy, offshore wind, onshore wind, and solar. Taiwan should pursue each of these indigenous energy sources. Taiwan should apply “carrots” by strengthening incentives and payments for indigenous production. At the same time, applying the “stick” of higher prices to energy consumption, especially for energy imports, would bolster the island’s resiliency.

Taiwan’s renewable resources are significant and often economically viable, but they cannot secure adequate levels of resiliency by themselves. Taiwan’s wind speeds slow in the summer,⁶⁴ limiting onshore and offshore wind’s effectiveness in bolstering energy security. Additionally, Taiwan’s stringent localization requirements for offshore appropriately minimize PRC components and sensors in Taiwan’s offshore wind turbines, but also raise the costs of this technology. Taiwan’s solar potential⁶⁵ is also limited⁶⁶ by cloudy skies, frequent rainfall, and land scarcity.

Accordingly, nuclear energy is the most viable way for Taiwan to address its summer electricity needs without turning to maritime imports. While Taiwan’s nuclear reactors must acquire fuel from abroad, this fuel can be used for approximately eighteen to twenty-four months.⁶⁷ Taiwan should maintain its existing nuclear energy capacity; restart retired capacity as soon as politically and technically feasible; and seek new, incremental capacity over time.⁶⁸

Unpacking Taiwan’s storage complexities: Dispersal and hardening is critical

To cope with various contingencies, including the possibility of a prolonged summertime blockade, Taiwan should increase its stockpiles of energy, disperse inventory around the island, and harden facilities.

While Taiwan’s ability to hold out against a blockade involves by many factors, energy inventories are a critical element. Taiwan’s electricity reserves are limited: it reported fifty-six days of supply of coal inventories in February 2023,⁶⁹ and aims to raise its natural gas inventories from eleven days to more than twenty days by 2030.⁷⁰ These inventory levels should be expanded, in part because “days of supply” fail to encapsulate uncertainty. Demand fluctuates depending on temperature and other variables, while Taiwan’s access to energy storage inventories faces the risk of sabotage and, in certain scenarios, kinetic strikes.

Taiwan’s management of petroleum reserves is a matter of great importance, given the use of these fuels, especially diesel, for military matters. Taiwan’s Energy Administration, in the Ministry of Economic Affairs, reported in April 2024 that its total oil inventories stood at 167 days of supply.⁷¹ This topline figure presents an overly optimistic portrait of Taiwan’s petroleum security, however. For instance, Taiwan’s government-controlled inventories in April 2024⁷² included 2.6 million kiloliters of crude oil and refined products; private stocks added another 6.5 million kiloliters. Accordingly, Taiwan reports forty-seven days of supply from government stockpiles, with an additional 120 days from private inventories.⁷³ Given that domestic sales and consumption equated to about 54,200 kiloliters per day from prior comparable periods,⁷⁴ Taiwan calculated it had about 167 days of supply.

There may, however, be insufficient monitoring of private inventories. Marek Jestrab observed:

A concerning—and possibly significant—loophole exists in these laws, where the criteria and computation formulas for the actual on-hand security stockpiles will be determined by the central competent authority, and are not required to be disclosed. This presents the opportunity for energy that is loaded onboard merchant shipping while in transit to Taiwan to count toward these figures.⁷⁵

While Taiwan should ensure that stockpiles are actually on the island, and not at sea, it also needs to carefully examine the inventory split between crude oil and crude products, such as diesel, gasoline, jet fuel, etc. Additionally, Taiwan’s policymakers should not expect to rely on its crude inventories, which only have a latent potential: crude oil cannot be used until it is refined into a crude product. Therefore, if the PRC disrupted Taiwan’s refineries via cyber or even kinetic means, Taiwan would not be able to access the totality of its crude oil reserves.

Taiwan’s military requirements for fuel would likely surge during a confrontation or conflict with the PRC, reducing the “days of supply.” Since Taiwan’s military vehicles largely run on diesel, the island should pay careful attention to this product.

Taiwan should disperse and harden its energy assets, especially diesel storage, as concentrated objects would present inviting targets for the PRC. Beijing is studying Russia’s invasion of Ukraine closely and will not fail to notice that Moscow attacked about 30 percent of Ukrainian infrastructure in a single day.⁷⁶ As one author witnessed during his recent visit to Kyiv, Ukraine’s dispersal of electricity assets is achieving a reasonable degree of success. Indeed, Russia’s more recent campaign⁷⁷ attacking large-scale thermal and hydroelectric power plants illustrates the utility of dispersed energy infrastructure. Like Ukraine, Taiwan should disperse and harden its energy storage inventories to the maximal feasible extent.

Rationing plans

While both Taiwan’s electricity supply and demand will be very hard to predict in a state of emergency, rationing plans must be considered—especially for the island’s manufacturing and semiconductor industries.

Taiwan’s economy is uniquely⁷⁸ tied to electricity-intensive manufacturing, as industrial consumers accounted for more than 55 percent of Taiwan’s electricity consumption in 2023.⁷⁹ Most of these industrial producers (such as chipmaker Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company) service export markets—not Taiwan. While the PRC might attempt to disrupt the island’s energy and electricity supply via cyber and kinetic means, Taiwan’s electricity consumption would fall dramatically during a crisis if Taiwan’s industries were forced to shut down. Although the closure of Taiwan’s industry would prove economically ruinous, it would also make the island’s electricity and energy issues much more manageable. Adding an additional layer of complication, many of Taiwan’s most valuable exports – such as chips – are shipped via civilian airliners, not on seaborne vessels, and would consequently be more difficult to interdict in circumstances short of war.⁸⁰ Taiwan should prepare rationing plans for a variety of contingencies, adapting to a range of scenarios, including a quarantine, siege, or even kinetic conflict. Taiwan must be ready.

Energy recommendations for Taiwan

Gradually raise electricity and energy prices, communicating that price hikes will persist and require significant adjustments over the medium term.
Expand the frequency of electricity price reviews from twice a year to a quarterly basis. More frequent price adjustments will allow smaller incremental increases while also enabling Taiwan to respond more quickly to potential contingencies.
Expand fiscal support for indigenous forms of energy. Demand-side management programs could include virtual power plants, building efficiency measures, two-way air conditioning units, and more. On the supply side, Taiwan should incentivize indigenous energy production, including nuclear energy, onshore wind, offshore wind, and solar.
Extend the life of Taiwan’s nuclear energy power plants and consider expanding capacity. Nuclear energy is not only Taiwan’s best option for meeting its summer generation needs but also extremely safe and reliable. In the event of a conflict, the PRC is extremely unlikely to launch highly escalatory and provocative attacks against nuclear facilities on territory it seeks to occupy.
Bolster domestic energy supplies and decarbonization objectives including by considering easing localization requirements for offshore wind projects—while ensuring that PRC components and sensors are not incorporated.
Disperse and, where possible, harden energy and electricity assets and volumes across the island for both military and civil defense needs.
Examine potential alternatives to diesel, as diesel inventories can begin to degrade after several weeks, including “long-duration diesel” solutions that, while more polluting, could extend the shelf life of its inventories, enhancing the durability of Taiwan’s military and civil defense efforts.
Deepen liquified natural gas (LNG) ties with the United States. Contracting with US LNG producers would moderately bolster Taiwan’s energy security, as the PRC would be more reluctant to interdict US cargoes than vessels from other nations.
Conduct comprehensive studies into energy contingency planning, examining how energy and electricity would be prioritized and rationed during various scenarios.

Food and water resiliency

Taiwan’s food supply needs will be significant in the event of a contingency, but pale in comparison to its energy and water requirements. Taiwan’s water security is a serious concern, as it is already suffering from water access issues in noncrisis periods. Taiwan should prioritize scarce land for electricity generation, especially onshore wind and solar, which are much less water-intensive than coal and natural gas generation. Repurposing farmland for renewables would ease Taiwan’s electricity and water needs in peacetime and during any crisis.

Taiwan’s food security challenges are serious, but manageable. The island’s self-sufficiency ratio for food stands at about 40 percent, after rising somewhat in recent years. Unlike energy, however, Taiwan can both store food, especially rice, and replenish these inventories. Meals ready to eat (MREs) can store for more than eighteen months.

Additionally, the island would likely be able to resupply itself aerially in all situations short of conflict. The PRC might well be extremely reluctant to shoot down a civilian aircraft resupplying Taiwan with food. The PRC’s shootdown of a civilian aircraft would damage external perceptions of the PRC, and strengthen global support for sanctions. While there can be no certainty, the PRC’s self-interest in managing perceptions of a confrontation would increase the likelihood of the safe transit of aerial and perhaps even maritime food deliveries to the island.

Taiwan’s water access problems are serious. Water shortages have manifested even in peacetime, as Taiwan experienced a severe drought in 2021. During a contingency with the PRC, Beijing might attempt to exploit this vulnerability.

Luckily, Taiwan’s water resiliency can be strengthened by tackling agricultural consumption and, wherever politically and technically feasible, repurposing farmland for energy generation. From 2013 to 2022, 71 percent of Taiwan’s water consumption was attributable to agriculture. Meanwhile, Taiwan’s industries comprised only 10 percent of demand during that period, with domestic (i.e., residential and commercial) consumption accounting for the remainder. Taiwan’s water needs are growing, due to “thirsty” industrial customers, but the agricultural sector is primarily responsible for the majority of the island’s consumption, although consumption and supply sources vary across the island.

Taiwan’s policymakers recognize its water problems and have begun raising water prices, especially for heavy users. Taiwan should continue to encourage efficiency by gradually but perceptibly increasing water prices. Concomitantly, it should further reduce demand by repurposing water-intensive farmland for electricity generation, when feasible. Repurposing farmland will undoubtedly prove politically difficult, but it will also improve Taiwan’s water and electricity resiliency.

Food and water security recommendations

Prioritize energy and water security needs over food production.
Secure and disperse inventories of foodstuffs, such as MREs, medicines, and water, along with water purification tablets.
Bolster the island’s cold storage supply chains and overall foodstuff inventories.
Plan and work with partners to stage food supply if a Berlin airlift-style operation becomes necessary.
Continue to encourage water conservation by increasing water prices gradually but steadily.
Ensure redundancy of water supplies and systems, especially in the more populous northern part of the island.
Ensure that drinking water and sanitation systems can operate continuously, after accounting for any electricity needs.

SOURCES

Gustavo F. Ferreira and J. A. Critelli, “Taiwan’s Food Resiliency—or Not—in a Conflict with China,” US Army War College Quarterly: Parameters 53, no. 2 (2023), doi:10.55540/0031-1723.3222; Joseph Webster, “Does Taiwan’s Massive Reliance on Energy Imports Put Its Security at Risk?,” New Atlanticist, Atlantic Council blog, July 7, 2023, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/does-taiwans-massive-reliance-on-energy-imports-put-its-security-at-risk/; Amy Chang Chien, Mike Ives, and Billy H. C. Kwok, “Taiwan Prays for Rain and Scrambles to Save Water,” New York Times, May 28, 2021, https://www.nytimes.com/2021/05/28/world/asia/taiwan-drought.html; “Water Resources Utilization,” Ministry of Economic Affairs (MOEA), Water Resources Agency, 2022, https://eng.wra.gov.tw/cp.aspx?n=5154&dn=5155; Meng-hsuan Yang, “Why Did Formosa Plastics Build Its Own Desalination Facility?,” CommonWealth Magazine, May 31, 2023, https://english.cw.com.tw/article/article.action?id=3440; and Chao Li-yen and Ko Lin, “Taiwan State-Owned Utility Evaluates Water Price Adjustments,” Focus Taiwan, January 26, 2024, https://focustaiwan.tw/society/202401260017#:~:text=As%20of%20Aug.

NOTE

The Berlin airlift of 1948 and 1949 demonstrates the power of aerial food replenishment logistics in an uncontested environment. From June 26, 1948, to September 30, 1949, Allied forces delivered more than 2.3 million tons of food, fuel, and supplies to West Berlin in over 278,000 airdrops. While Taiwan’s population of more than twenty-three million is significantly larger than West Berlin’s population of 2.5 million, the world civilian air cargo fleet has expanded dramatically over the past seventy-five years. In all situations short of conflict, Taiwan would be able to restock food from the air. For more on the Berlin airlift, see Katie Lange, “The Berlin Airlift: What It Was, Its Importance in the Cold War,” DOD News, June 24, 2022, https://www.defense.gov/News/Feature-Stories/Story/Article/3072635/the-berlin-airlift-what-it-was-its-importance-in-the-cold-war/.

Enhancing defense resilience

Ever since Beijing leveraged then-Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s August 2022 visit to Taiwan as an excuse to launch large-scale joint blockade military exercises, pundits have labeled the residual military situation around Taiwan as a “new normal.” Yet there is really nothing normal about a permanent presence of People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Navy warships menacingly surrounding the island along its twenty-four nautical mile contiguous zone, and nothing usual about increasing numbers of manned and unmanned military aircraft crossing the tacit median line in the Taiwan Strait—a line that held significance for seven decades as a symbol of cross-strait stability. Nor should it be viewed as normal that a steady stream of high-altitude surveillance balloons—which are suspected of collecting military intelligence—violate Taiwan’s airspace.⁸¹ Some have better described this “new normal” as a strategy akin to an anaconda noticeably tightening its grip around the island, drawing close enough to reduce warning time and provocative enough to raise the risk of inadvertent clashes. In other words, the PRC has unilaterally dialed up a military cost-imposition campaign meant to chip away at peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait, wear down Taiwan’s military, and erode confidence and social cohesion in Taiwan society.

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 was an additional wake-up call for the citizens of Taiwan, following mainland China’s 2019 crackdown on Hong Kong freedoms, heightening recognition of the risks presented by the PRC and, in particular, that the long-standing status quo in cross-strait relations is no longer acceptable to Beijing. Taiwan thus finds itself in the unenviable position of simultaneously countering PLA gray zone intrusions and cognitive warfare—what NATO calls affecting attitudes and behaviors to gain advantage⁸²—while beefing itself up militarily to deter the growing threat of a blockade or assault.

With this backdrop, Taipei authorities have since embarked on long-overdue reforms in defense affairs, marked by several developments aimed at bolstering the island democracy’s military capabilities and readiness in the face of growing threats from Beijing.

First, Taiwan’s overall defense spending has undergone seven consecutive year-on-year increases, reaching 2.5 percent of gross domestic product.⁸³ While this is commendable, Taiwan’s defense requirements are very substantial, and its budget in US dollars is only $19.1 billion.⁸⁴ Accordingly, it will be important for Taiwan to continue the trend of higher defense spending to at least 3 percent of GDP both to bolster Taiwan’s military capabilities and as a deterrent signal to Beijing—and also to garner international community recognition that Taiwan is serious about its own defense. A key element will be to ensure that Taiwan has sufficient stocks of ammunition and other weapons capabilities to fight effectively until the United States could fully engage and in the event of a longer war. One area that deserves a high degree of attention is defense against ballistic and cruise missiles and unmanned vehicles. Especially in light of the recent coalition success in defeating such Iranian attacks against Israel, planning should be undertaken to assure comparable success for Taiwan against PRC attacks. Adding mobile, short-range air defenses to the high-priority list of military investments for Taiwan—such as the highly mobile National Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile System (NASAMS)⁸⁵—will make it harder for the PLA to find and destroy Taiwan defenses, especially if combined with passive means for target detection and missile guidance.

Second, the new president can kick-start an enhanced approach to defense by embracing full integration of public-private innovation and adopting Ukraine’s model of grass-roots innovation for defense, which has served it well through a decade of war against a much larger Russia. Recognizing that innovation is itself a form of resilience, Taiwan can draw valuable lessons from Ukraine, particularly in leveraging private-sector expertise. By implementing what some Ukrainian defense experts term a “capability accelerator” to integrate emerging technologies into mission-focused capabilities, Taiwan can enhance its resilience and swiftly adapt to evolving security challenges, including rapidly fielding a high volume of unmanned systems to achieve distributed surveillance, redundant command and control, and higher survivability.⁸⁶ This comprehensive approach, which recognizes the private sector as the greatest source of innovation in today’s complex security environment, holds significant potential for enhancing Taiwan’s defense capabilities through the utilization of disruptive technologies. The island’s overall resilience would significantly benefit by drawing the private sector in as a direct stakeholder in national defense matters.

Ukraine’s grass-roots model of defense innovation, spearheaded by volunteers, nongovernment organizations, and international partners, is a worthy and timely model for Taiwan. Ukraine’s approach has yielded significant advancements in drone warfare, as well as sophisticated capabilities like the Delta battlefield management system—a user-friendly cloud-based situational awareness tool that provides real-time information on enemy and friendly forces through the integration of data from sources such as drones, satellites, and even civilian reports.⁸⁷ This collaborative model, reliant on cooperation between civilian developers and military end users, has propelled Ukraine’s military technological revolution by integrating intelligence and surveillance tasks, while enhancing decision-making and kill-chain target acquisition. Taiwan will benefit from a comparable approach.

Third, as suggested above, Taiwan should focus a large portion of its defense budget on low-cost, highly effective systems. In terms of force structure, it appears that Taiwan has settled on a design that blends large legacy platforms of a twentieth-century military with the introduction of more survivable and distributable low-end asymmetric capabilities. The latter are best exemplified by Taiwan’s indigenously produced Ta Chiang-class of high-speed, guided-missile corvettes (PGG) and Min Jiang-class fast mine laying boats (FMLB).⁸⁸ But much more must be done to bolster Taiwan’s overall defense capabilities by focusing on less expensive, but nonetheless highly effective systems.

In Ukraine’s battle against Russian Federation invaders, drones have provided Ukrainian forces with important tactical capabilities by enabling them to gather intelligence, monitor enemy movements, and conduct precision strikes on high-value targets. Taiwan can comparably utilize low-cost UAVs to establish mesh networks that connect devices for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance and for targeting that would be invaluable in countering a PRC amphibious assault. Lessons from Ukraine further highlight the importance of having the right mix of drone types and capabilities in substantial stockpiles, capable of a variety of missions. Notably, Ukrainian officials have called for the production of more than one million domestically produced drones in 2024.⁸⁹ Then-President Tsai’s formation of a civilian-led “drone national team” program is a commendable step in this direction and underscores the power of collaborative innovation in joint efforts between users.⁹⁰ Encouraging cooperation between Taiwan drone makers and US private industry will accelerate the development of a combat-ready unmanned systems fleet with sufficient range, endurance, and payload to enhance situational awareness and battlefield effects.

Concurrent with those efforts utilizing unmanned systems, Taiwan should bolster its naval mining capabilities as a strategic measure against PRC aggression. Naval mines represent one of the most cost-effective and immediately impactful layers of defense.⁹¹ In this regard, Taiwan’s new Min Jiang class of FMLB represents the right type of investments in capabilities which could prove pivotal in thwarting potential invasion attempts.

Even more significantly for a Taiwan audience, Ukraine broke a blockade of its Black Sea ports using a combination of naval drones and coastal defense missiles—and repelled the once-mighty Russian Black Sea Fleet—all without a traditional navy of its own.⁹² Faced with clear intent by a PLA Navy practicing daily to isolate the island, the time is past due for Taiwanese authorities to hone their own counterblockade skills including a heavy reliance on unmanned surface vehicles.

Taiwan should also make rapid investments in port infrastructure and defenses along Taiwan’s eastern seaboard in places such as Su’ao and Hualien harbors, which can serve as deepwater ports that are accessible, strategic, antiblockade strongpoints, and where any conceivable PLA blockade would be at its weakest and most vulnerable point logistically. Su’ao harbor, as a potential future homeport for Taiwan’s new indigenous Hai Kun-class diesel submarines, could also serve a dual purpose as an experimentation and development zone for public-private collaboration on unmanned-systems employment and operations. Infrastructure investments in East Coast ports could enhance the island’s ability to attain emergency resupply of energy, food, humanitarian supplies, and munitions under all conditions, broadening options for international community aid and complicating PLA efforts.

Fourth, every new capability needs trained operators who are empowered to employ and engage. This year Taiwan began implementation of a new, one-year conscript training system for male adults born after January 1, 2005 (up from a wholly inadequate four months of conscription in the past decade).⁹³ Taiwan’s “all-out defense” plan realigns into a frontline main battle force consisting of all-volunteer career military personnel, backed up by a standing garrison force composed mainly of conscripted military personnel guarding infrastructure, along with a civil defense system integrated with local governments and private-sector resources. Upon mobilization, there would also be a reserve force to supplement the main battle and garrison forces.

According to details laid out in its 2023 National Defense Report, Taiwan’s revamped one-year conscript system and reorganized reserve mobilization system place significant emphasis on traditional military combat skills, such as rifle marksmanship and operation of mortars.⁹⁴ However, in response to evolving security challenges and the changing nature of warfare, Taiwan’s military should incorporate greater training in emerging technologies and unconventional tactics, along with decentralized command and control, especially in the areas of drone warfare, where unmanned aerial vehicles and surface vessels play a crucial role in reconnaissance, surveillance, and targeted strikes. By integrating drone warfare training into the conscript system as well as in annual reserve call-up training, Taiwan can better prepare its military personnel to adapt to modern battlefield environments and effectively counter emerging threats.

Integrating drone operations into military operations down to the conscript and reservist level offers a cost-effective means to enhance battlefield situational awareness and operational capabilities, and also has the added benefit of enhancing the attractiveness and value of a mandatory conscription system emerging from years of low morale and characterized by Taiwan’s outgoing president as “insufficient” and “full of outmoded training.”⁹⁵ Recognizing the imperative to modernize military training to face up to a rapidly expanding PLA threat, Taiwan’s military force realignment plan came with a promise to “include training in the use of Stinger missiles, Javelin missiles, Kestrel rockets, drones, and other new types of weapons . . . in accordance with mission requirements to meet the needs of modern warfare.”⁹⁶ Looking at the example of Ukraine, where drones have been utilized, underscores the importance of incorporating drone warfare training into its asymmetric strategy.

The Taiwan Enhanced Resilience Act “prioritize[d] realistic training” by the United States, with Taiwan authorizing “an enduring rotational United States military presence that assists Taiwan in maintaining force readiness.”⁹⁷ There have been numerous reports of US special forces in Taiwan,⁹⁸ and those forces could provide training in tactical air control, dynamic targeting, urban warfare, and comparable capabilities.⁹⁹ Likewise, parts of an Army Security Force Assistance Brigade could do similar work on a rotational basis, on- or off-island.

To facilitate a comprehensive and integrated approach to defense planning and preparedness between the military, government agencies, and civilian organizations, Taiwan has also established the All-out Defense Mobilization Agency, which (as noted above) is a centralized body subordinate to the Ministry of National Defense that is tasked with coordinating efforts across various sectors, down to the local level, to enhance national defense readiness. That agency would be significantly more effective if raised to the national level with a broadened mandate as part of a comprehensive approach.

The Taiwanese leadership also should consider elevating their efforts to create a large-scale civil defense force, offering practical skills training which would appeal to Taiwanese willing to dedicate time and effort toward defense of their communities and localities. These skills could include emergency medical training, casualty evacuation, additive manufacturing, drone flying, and open-source intelligence. Private, nonprofit civil defense organizations such as Taiwan’s Kuma Academy hold widespread appeal to citizens seeking to enhance basic preparedness skills.¹⁰⁰ With a curriculum that covers topics ranging from basic first aid to cognitive warfare, Kuma Academy’s popular classes typically sell out within minutes of going online. According to a recent survey of domestic Taiwan opinions sponsored by Spirit of America, “When facing external threats, 75.3% of the people agree that Taiwanese citizens have an obligation to defend Taiwan.”¹⁰¹ A well-trained civil defense force and other whole-of-society resilience measures provide an additional layer of defense and enhance social cohesion to better deny Beijing’s ultimate political objective of subjugating the will of the people.

Defense resilience recommendations for Taiwan

Raise defense spending to at least 3 percent of GDP.
Adopt Ukraine’s model of grass-roots innovation in defense.
Focus a large portion of its defense budget on low-cost, highly effective systems including unmanned vehicles and naval mines.
Incorporate greater training in emerging technologies and unconventional tactics for conscripts and reserves.
Invest in East Coast port infrastructure as counterblockade strongholds.
Elevate the All-out Defense Mobilization Agency to the national level and implement a larger civil defense force that fully integrates civilian agencies and local governments.

Conclusion

On April 3, 2024, Taiwan was struck by the strongest earthquake in twenty-five years. In the face of this magnitude 7.4 quake, Taiwan’s response highlights the effectiveness of robust investment in stricter building codes, earthquake alert systems, and resilience policies, resulting in minimal casualties and low infrastructure damage.¹⁰² Taiwan’s precarious position on the seismically vulnerable Ring of Fire, a belt of volcanoes around the Pacific Ocean, mirrors its vulnerability under constant threat of military and gray zone aggression from a mainland China seeking seismic changes in geopolitical power. Drawing from its success in preparing for and mitigating the impact of natural disasters, Taiwan can apply a similarly proactive approach in its defense preparedness. Safeguarding Taiwan’s sovereignty and security requires investments in a comprehensive security strategy for resilience across society—including cybersecurity for critical infrastructures, bolstering energy security, and enhanced defense resilience. Such an approach would provide Taiwan the greatest likelihood of deterring or, if necessary, defeating PRC aggression including through blockade or kinetic conflict.

About the authors

Franklin D. Kramer is a distinguished fellow at the Atlantic Council and a member of its board. He is a former US assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs.

Philip Yu is a nonresident senior fellow in the Indo-Pacific Security Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, and a retired US Navy rear admiral.

Joseph Webster is a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Global Energy Center, a nonresident senior fellow in the Indo-Pacific Security Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, and editor of the independent China-Russia Report.

Elizabeth “Beth” Sizeland is a nonresident senior fellow at the Scowcroft Strategy Initiative of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. Earlier, she served in the United Kingdom’s government including as deputy national security adviser and as adviser to the UK prime minister on intelligence, security, and resilience issues.

This analysis reflects the personal opinions of the authors.

Acknowledgments

The authors would like to thank the following individuals for their helpful comments and feedback: Amber Lin, Elsie Hung, Kwangyin Liu, and Alison O’Neil.

Executing distributed operations in an increasingly contested maritime environment

Dmitry Filipoff — Mon, 01 Jul 2024 13:00:00 +0000

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Distributed Maritime Operations (DMO) is the US Navy’s service warfighting concept. However, the concept suffers from a wide variety of interpretations across the service and needs more specificity regarding on what warfighting approaches it is concentrating. While the concept describes mass fires and decision advantage as core themes, DMO lacks sufficient coherence and concrete focus to effectively guide the Navy’s development.

DMO is a departure from how the Navy traditionally operates. In past decades, the Navy would pull forces into concentrated formations for high-end threats, or disaggregate formations into independent assets for low-end threats. Distribution in DMO describes spreading warships outward and more broadly, but still having them act with unity of purpose, and primarily with a high-end warfighting focus. DMO is a fleet-level warfighting concept, centered on a higher level of command across a broader geographic expanse compared to the strike group-centric operating norms of recent decades.

The desire to distribute naval forces is part defensive reaction and part offensive evolution. Defensively, distribution aims to improve survivability by imposing more friction on the targeting process that precedes strikes. China fields a significant array of sensors and anti-ship firepower, and distribution attempts to prevent that sensing from culminating in decisive strikes. Distribution is an asymmetric approach for circumventing an adversary’s sensing and firepower by employing nontraditional schemes of maneuver and force posturing. Offensively, distribution better postures US forces to harness new anti-ship capabilities that are emerging across the joint force. All services are now procuring long-range anti-ship missiles and introducing newfound anti-ship firepower into a broad swath of untapped force structure, including surface warships, submarines, bombers, and land-based forces. This will level the playing field against China in key respects and provide the joint force with new options for mass fires.

Deception is a natural partner to distribution by targeting decision-making. Deception operations and capabilities should form a cornerstone of the DMO approach. These capabilities can include unmanned systems and decoy missiles that help overload adversary sensing. Deception can help compensate for force generation challenges by inflating the number of contacts that appear to be confronting an adversary. These capabilities are much more affordable than the platforms they replicate, and they can be broadly distributed across existing force structure.

Distributed forces may still be commanded by heavily centralized command structures. The Navy should consider distributing its command elements by having more expeditionary and afloat Maritime Operation Centers (MOCs). It can also better distribute command by enabling platforms with considerable command-and-control (C2) capability to take on certain command functions when networks are contested. Aerial platforms such as E-2s, F-35s, and P-8s are especially strong candidates for taking on the key role of backup joint fires integrators.

The Navy’s ability to investigate and implement DMO is heavily contingent upon the service’s system of operational learning. This system needs reform to better translate the concept into concrete updates to tactical development programs, as well as warfighter training and education. This system also needs to be reformed so the warfighting development of the Navy’s siloed communities can be deliberately integrated into fleet-level approaches under the overarching framework of DMO. The Navy’s MOCs should be specifically targeted with an intensive wargaming curriculum and additional staffing to markedly increase their warfighting skill in the near term.

About the author

Dmitry Filipoff is the director of online content of the Center for International Maritime Security (CIMSEC) and an associate research analyst in the Operational Warfighting Division of the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA). He is the author of the Fighting DMO and How the Fleet Forgot to Fight series. He is coauthor of Learning to Win: Using Operational Innovation to Regain the Advantage at Sea against China.

acknowledgements

The Atlantic Council is grateful to Fincantieri, MBDA, and Thales for their generous sponsorship of this paper.

Panikoff joins Bloomberg to discuss Secretary Blinken’s trip to the Middle East

Atlantic Council — Fri, 28 Jun 2024 18:57:50 +0000

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Panikoff quoted in The Jerusalem Post on Israeli-Saudi normalization as part of a US defense treaty

Atlantic Council — Fri, 28 Jun 2024 18:57:47 +0000

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Panikoff quoted in The Wall Street Journal on US defense treaty with Saudi Arabia and Israeli normalization

Atlantic Council — Fri, 28 Jun 2024 18:57:45 +0000

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Hinata-Yamaguchi quoted in South China Morning Post on Japan’s reaction to Russia-North Korea ties

ylee — Thu, 27 Jun 2024 19:05:13 +0000

On June 26, IPSI nonresident senior fellow Ryo Hinata-Yamaguchi was quoted in a South China Morning Post article on Japan’s possible responses to the tightening Russia-North Korea relationship.

Fellow

Ryo Hinata-Yamaguchi

Indo-Pacific Security Initiative Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Defense Policy Indo-Pacific

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Mercenary meatgrinder: The price of Bakhmut

Alia Brahimi — Thu, 27 Jun 2024 14:49:59 +0000

In Season 2, Episode 3 of the Guns for Hire podcast, host Alia Brahimi is joined by the Russian photographer and journalist, David Frenkel, to consider the staggering toll of the “Bakhmut meatgrinder.” They talk through the latest report from independent Russian news platform Mediazona and the BBC Russian Service, “The Price of Bakhmut”, and David’s methodology for determining which prisoners were recruited and from where. David also examines the numbers that were killed, the question marks over whether promised death payments were made, and why the Wagner Group turned to prisons for manpower in the first place.

“This is a long tradition from Soviet times when inmates were used for building factories and deforestation in Siberia and so basically, they came back to that old idea to use inmates as soldiers.”

David Frenkel, Russian photographer and journalist

Find the Guns For Hire podcast on the app of your choice

About the podcast

Guns for Hire podcast is a production of the Atlantic Council’s North Africa Initiative. Taking Libya as its starting point, it explores the causes and implications of the growing use of mercenaries in armed conflict.

The podcast features guests from many walks of life, from ethicists and historians to former mercenary fighters. It seeks to understand what the normalization of contract warfare tells us about the world we currently live in, the future of the international system, and what war could look like in the coming decades.

Jo quoted in ASB Zeitung on recent Russia-North Korea agreement

ylee — Mon, 24 Jun 2024 18:21:54 +0000

On June 21, IPSI nonresident senior fellow Bee Yun Jo was quoted in ASB Zeitung regarding the recent Russia-North Korea agreement, which contains a concerning clause allowing for potential military assistance between the two nations.

Fellow

Bee Yun Jo

Indo-Pacific Security Initiative Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Korea Korean

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Jo quoted in CNN on Putin’s North Korea visit

ylee — Fri, 21 Jun 2024 17:05:08 +0000

On June 20, IPSI nonresident senior fellow Bee Yun Jo was quoted in CNN discussing Putin’s recent first visit to North Korea and the escalating cooperation between the two countries, specifically regarding the “comprehensive strategic partnership pact” they signed and its article outlining the possibility of military-technical cooperation.

Fellow

Bee Yun Jo

Indo-Pacific Security Initiative Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Korea Korean

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Putin just reminded the world why Russia must lose

Peter Dickinson — Thu, 20 Jun 2024 21:26:06 +0000

On the eve of last weekend’s Global Peace Summit in Switzerland, Vladimir Putin unveiled a peace proposal of his own. The presentation of this rival peace plan was an obvious attempt to undermine Ukraine’s Swiss initiative, but it also served as a timely reminder that Putin is waging an old-fashioned war of imperial conquest and will continue to escalate his demands until he is defeated.

Putin’s uncompromising vision for a future peace in Ukraine was widely condemned, with Kyiv officials and world leaders rejecting it as an “ultimatum.” Crucially, the terms outlined by the Kremlin leader would leave around twenty percent of Ukraine under Russian control, including significant portions of the country that Putin’s army has so far been unable to capture.

This new peace proposal is the latest example of the growing territorial demands that have accompanied Russia’s ten-year invasion of Ukraine. Time after time over the past decade, Putin has rejected accusations of an expansionist agenda, only to then escalate his invasion of Ukraine further.

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When Russia first attacked Ukraine in February 2014, Putin insisted Moscow had no territorial ambitions beyond the seizure of Ukraine’s Crimean peninsula. “We do not want to divide Ukraine,” he assured the watching world. Within weeks, however, Kremlin forces posing as locals had sparked a separatist war in eastern Ukraine’s Donbas region.

For the following eight years, Putin steadily strengthened his grip on the so-called “separatist republics” of eastern Ukraine, while consistently denying any direct involvement. The failure of the international community to hold Putin accountable for this shameless duplicity fuelled a sense of impunity in Moscow that set the stage for the largest European invasion since World War II.

In his February 2022 address announcing the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Putin once again denied harboring any ambitions to annex additional Ukrainian lands. “It is not our plan to occupy Ukrainian territory,” he stated. “We do not intend to impose anything on anyone by force.” Just six months later, Putin demonstrated the true value of his word by solemnly announcing the annexation of four more Ukrainian provinces.

Significantly, the invading Russian army did not fully control any of the Ukrainian provinces claimed by Putin in September 2022. This created a degree of ambiguity regarding the exact geographical extent of Russia’s goals, with Kremlin officials typically limiting themselves to vague calls for Ukraine to recognize the “new territorial realities” created by the front lines of the invasion.

Putin’s new peace plan has now removed all doubt. Indeed, he took special care to clarify that he expects the Ukrainian military to withdraw completely from the four Ukrainian provinces in question, including unoccupied areas. Among other things, this would mean handing over the Ukrainian city of Zaporizhzhia, with a prewar population of more than seven hundred thousand, along with Kherson, which was the only Ukrainian regional capital captured by the Russians before being liberated in November 2022.

Ukraine would also have to voluntarily demilitarize, accept geopolitical neutrality, and submit to “denazification,” Kremlin code for the suppression of Ukrainian national identity and the imposition of a Russian imperial ideology. In other words, Putin is insisting Ukraine admit defeat and surrender.

Eurasia Center events

Philippe Dickinson: Rutte must keep the Alliance unified to finish his predecessor’s job

Ukraine’s advance in Kursk: What’s next and implications

Conflict Russia Security & Defense Ukraine

The terms offered by Putin confirm that he has no intention of reaching a sustainable peace with Ukraine. On the contrary, the Russian dictator evidently remains as committed as ever to his overriding war aim of extinguishing Ukrainian statehood and erasing the Ukrainian nation. As if to underline the point, Putin accompanied his latest demands with a chilling warning that “the existence of Ukraine” depends on Kyiv’s readiness to accept his conditions.

In fact, there is even more at stake than the continued existence of the Ukrainian state. It is no exaggeration to say that the future of global security is currently being determined on the battlefields of Ukraine. If Putin’s invasion succeeds, it will signal the dawning of a new era marked by rising international insecurity, ballooning defense budgets, and increasingly frequent wars of aggression.

A victorious Russia would almost certainly remain at the forefront of this descent into lawlessness for many years to come. Throughout the past decade, Putin has steadily escalated his invasion of Ukraine while shifting his entire country onto a war footing. By this point, it should be painfully clear to all objective observers that he will not stop until he is stopped. Indeed, Putin has openly compared today’s war to the eighteenth century imperial conquests of Peter the Great, and frequently speaks in terms of a sacred mission to “return historically Russian lands.”

As anyone with a passing knowledge of Russian history will confirm, there are at least fifteen other countries beyond Ukraine that were once part of the Russian Empire and therefore meet Putin’s definition of “historically Russian.” All are now potential targets. While it is impossible to know exactly what Putin will do next if he defeats Ukraine, the idea that he will simply choose to stop is perhaps the most far-fetched scenario of all.

Nor will Putin be the only authoritarian ruler looking to embrace a new age of imperial aggression. China, Iran, and North Korea are all already providing the Russian war effort with varying degrees of support, and make no secret of their eagerness to overturn the existing world order. If Moscow achieves an historic victory in Ukraine, Beijing, Tehran, and Pyongyang will also be emboldened, along with a whole host of fellow autocrats throughout the Global South.

The only way to avoid a geopolitical future shaped by rising insecurity and resurgent imperialism is by ensuring Russia loses in Ukraine. Putin’s recent bogus peace proposal is essentially a call for Kyiv’s capitulation and the absorption of Ukraine into a new Russian Empire. This is entirely in line with the policies of escalation he has pursued throughout the past decade, and reflects an imperial agenda that leaves no room for meaningful compromise.

The Russian dictator still clearly believes he can overwhelm Ukraine with brute force while intimidating the wider Western world into inaction. If he succeeds, the consequences for international security will be devastating. Ukraine’s leaders have already responded to Putin’s latest demands with characteristic defiance. Kyiv’s international partners must now go further and provide the military support to secure Ukrainian victory.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

Experts react: Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte will be NATO’s next secretary general. How will he lead the Alliance?

Atlantic Council experts — Thu, 20 Jun 2024 19:56:13 +0000

NATO’s Dutch tilt is official. After a seven-month campaign, outgoing Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte received unanimous approval from all thirty-two NATO member states to become the Alliance’s next secretary general. Rutte won his last remaining necessary endorsement from Romania on Thursday. A staunch advocate of military aid for Ukraine with a political reputation as a conservative consensus-builder, Rutte will take office in early October after current Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg steps down. How will Rutte navigate the war in Ukraine, efforts to bolster European security, and an upcoming US election with massive implications for the future of the Alliance? Below, our experts reveal the answers.

Click to jump to an expert analysis:

Rachel Rizzo: Rutte could be the key to ‘Trump-proofing’ the Alliance

Dominykas Kaminskas: Rutte has an outstanding track record, but he has ‘a mammoth task’ ahead of him

James J. Townsend Jr.: NATO’s adversaries can see it close ranks around a new leader at the Washington summit

Rutte must keep the Alliance unified to finish his predecessor’s job

History will look kindly on Stoltenberg’s stewardship of NATO. Throughout his ten years as secretary general, he has navigated major shifts in geopolitics to imbue NATO with renewed purpose and direction. But how NATO navigates the challenges of the next decade will determine the long-term future of the world’s most successful alliance.

The in-tray for Rutte, the Dutch prime minister since 2010, is daunting: reinforcing defense and deterrence across the Alliance in the face of a hostile and bellicose Russia, helping Ukraine to defeat Russia and welcoming Kyiv into the Alliance, and establishing NATO’s role in dealing with the rising challenge posed by China. And he must manage these priorities all while evolving the Alliance to keep up with fast-paced technological change and without neglecting NATO’s counterterrorism and crisis management responsibilities.

But the preeminent challenge is a political one. Rutte will take the reins of NATO at a time of significant political uncertainty across the Alliance. The new secretary general will have to manage whatever configuration of leaders the electorates in Europe and North America choose in the coming months. From his many years in Dutch politics and on the international stage, Rutte is an adroit balancer of political relationships. Much has been made about his role as a “Trump whisperer,” and it is this political savvy that helped him secure the job. This political savvy will be put to the test to an unprecedented extent in the years ahead. How he handles that test will determine whether he completes the good work of his laudable predecessor.

—Philippe Dickinson is the deputy director of the Transatlantic Security Initiative within the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security and a former career diplomat for the United Kingdom.

Rutte could be the key to ‘Trump-proofing’ the Alliance

At last, NATO allies are poised to agree on Rutte as the Alliance’s next secretary general. This decision has been a long time coming, as allies have extended Stoltenberg’s term four times by unanimous consent.

Rutte will bring a wealth of pragmatic governance experience to his role as the new secretary general. Nicknamed “the Trump whisperer,” Rutte’s leadership of NATO comes at a critical time, as he will assume the position less than a month before the US presidential election. Should Donald Trump, famously critical of NATO and European “free riders,” win a second term as US president, allies feel confident that Rutte is the key to Trump-proofing the alliance. He’s seen as cool, calm, and collected. He knows how to handle big egos, he’s worked with Trump before (even praising him at times), and he understands the need for European allies to increase their share of the burden of European security.

Finally, Rutte has demonstrated strong Dutch support for Ukraine, including by sending F-16 fighter jets to help Kyiv fend off Russia’s brutal assault. So will the Alliance look different under Rutte’s leadership? His predecessor, Stoltenberg, is known as a master of diplomacy, deftly handling the now thirty-two-strong Alliance so that it speaks with one voice, a crucial art given the complex geopolitics both within and beyond Europe’s borders. We should expect Rutte to be skilled at this as well. After all, he’s led his country as prime minister for the last fourteen years.

—Rachel Rizzo is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center.

Rutte has an outstanding track record, but he has ‘a mammoth task’ ahead of him

Rutte will take office at a decisive moment for NATO. With a lot of talk about unity surrounding the Alliance’s seventy-fifth anniversary and the upcoming summit in Washington, it’s important to not only project it, but to ensure it. It’s hard to think of anyone who would be better fit for this task than Rutte, his already-outstanding track record again confirmed by getting the thirty-two allies to sign off on his candidacy.

Make no mistake, this will still be a mammoth task, even for someone with his experience. Despite all the talk about NATO being the strongest, the largest, and the best in so many different ways, it is also the most diverse it has ever been. Rutte can be very pragmatic, but at a time when the rules-based order is under serious threat, NATO requires leadership that will have to go beyond what everyone can agree on. We know the Dutch prime minister can find consensus when it’s difficult, but whether he will be able to get allies to make sacrifices and decisions that they might not otherwise be comfortable making remains to be seen.

—Dominykas Kaminskas is a visiting fellow with the Transatlantic Security Initiative.

NATO’s adversaries will see it close ranks around a new leader at the Washington summit

Stoltenberg gave a master class in how to keep the Alliance together during both political turbulence and war. He will hand off this legacy to Rutte, the seasoned Dutch leader who must now carry it forward and make it his own. To keep NATO together in time of war takes a strength of character that Rutte has in abundance and a political savvy that will help him work over, around, and through obstacles most leaders never have to confront. In this year, Rutte needs the full support not just of the allies, but of the International Staff and the NATO military authorities as well.

Leadership change at NATO is hard, especially after a tenure as long as Stoltenberg’s. But the July summit is the time for NATO’s adversaries to see the Alliance closing ranks behind one of Europe’s most seasoned leaders as we also say farewell to one of NATO’s greatest secretaries general.

—James J. Townsend Jr. is a senior advisor in the Scowcroft Center’s Transatlantic Security Initiative.

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The view from Kyiv: Why Ukrainian NATO membership is in US interests

Alyona Getmanchuk — Sat, 15 Jun 2024 14:40:58 +0000

In his recent interview with TIME magazine, US President Joe Biden indicated that his skepticism about Ukrainian NATO membership is deep-rooted and goes far beyond any practical opposition to granting Kyiv an invitation to join the alliance while the current war with Russia is still ongoing. It would seem that President Biden does not regard Ukrainian NATO membership as a prerequisite for lasting peace in the region.

Unsurprisingly, the view in wartime Kyiv is strikingly different. Record numbers of Ukrainians now support NATO membership, which is widely seen as the best way to preserve the country’s sovereignty and prevent any future invasions. Crucially, many Ukrainians are also convinced that their country’s NATO accession would be in the national interests of the United States as well as Ukraine itself.

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There are a number of reasons to believe Ukrainian NATO accession would also be beneficial for the US. These range from military practicalities to potential strategic advantages and geopolitical gains.

First, the United States has an obvious and immediate interest in ending the Russian invasion of Ukraine, as this would allow the US to focus on other pressing domestic and foreign policy priorities. But it is equally clear that the war unleashed by Vladimir Putin in February 2022 will never truly end as long as the issue of Ukraine’s NATO membership remains undecided.

Second, the apparent reluctance of the United States to make a clear commitment regarding future Ukrainian NATO membership sends a dangerous signal to Putin. It encourages him to believe his policy of invading and occupying neighboring countries to prevent them from joining NATO is successful and should be continued.

Eurasia Center events

John Herbst: Putin’s bad late spring continues

Ukraine’s advance in Kursk: What’s next and implications

Conflict Russia Security & Defense Ukraine

Third, Ukrainian NATO membership is the best way to protect the considerable US investment in Ukrainian security. The United States has invested tens of billions of dollars in security assistance since Russia’s full-scale invasion began more than two years ago. This investment can only be regarded as successful if Ukraine is secure from further Russian attack. At this stage, the only credible way to guarantee Ukrainian security is by providing the country with a road map to NATO membership.

Some critics of military aid to Ukraine have complained about so-called “blank checks” in support of the Ukrainian war effort. While this characterization of aid is misleading, it is worth underlining that NATO accession would likely be a far more economical way of safeguarding Ukraine’s future security than the regular financial support packages the country’s partners currently provide.

Fourth, as a NATO member, Ukraine would be a considerable asset. The Ukrainian military is large, combat-hardened, highly skilled, and boasts unrivaled experience in the realities of modern warfare. In other words, Ukraine’s army is ideally suited to become the core of NATO’s eastern flank. This would significantly enhance European security while reducing the current military burden on the United States, potentially freeing up US forces for deployment elsewhere.

Lastly, Russia’s imperial ambitions did not begin with Vladimir Putin and do not end in Ukraine. Nevertheless, inviting Ukraine to join NATO would represent a powerful blow to the imperial identity cherished by many ordinary Russians and members of the Kremlin elite. Indeed, granting Ukraine membership of the alliance is perhaps the only way to fully convince Russian society that neither the Soviet Union nor the Russian Empire will ever be restored in any form. This would represent a huge gain for the US and for the future of international security.

Alyona Getmanchuk is the founder and director of New Europe Center and a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council Eurasia’s Center.

Experts react: Ukraine gets $50 billion from Russian assets and a US security deal at the G7 summit

Atlantic Council experts — Thu, 13 Jun 2024 22:11:56 +0000

From Russia, with interest. The Group of Seven (G7) leaders announced Thursday that they had agreed on a plan to send fifty billion dollars to Ukraine in the coming months by pulling forward interest income on Russian assets that had been immobilized in Western countries since February 2022 (a novel idea that Atlantic Council research helped shape). Combined with the announcement of a bilateral security deal with the United States, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy took home significant wins from joining the summit of the world’s democratic economic heavyweights along Italy’s Adriatic coast. Below, our experts dig into the details on how these agreements came together and how they might reshape the conflict.

Click to jump to an expert analysis:

Charles Lichfield: The beauty of compromise

Daniel Fried: After some wobbling, this was a week of solid Western backing for Ukraine

Rachel Rizzo: Amid G7 political uncertainty, Meloni is emerging as a bulwark of support for Ukraine

Ian Brzezinski: The US-Ukraine security deal can’t just be a bridge to indefinite NATO delay

Kimberly Donovan: New US sanctions are already impacting Russia—will China feel them too?

Olga Khakova: Ukraine’s allies should keep up the momentum to rebuild its energy sector

Putin’s bad late spring continues

Good news arrived from Italy today because of the superb work of the Biden administration. The G7 finally agreed to Deputy National Security Advisor Daleep Singh’s ingenious initiative to offer Ukraine this year a fifty-billion-dollar-low interest loan collateralized by frozen Russian state assets. US Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen’s strong intervention with reluctant G7 partners—France, Germany, Italy, and Japan—helped turn this initiative into G7 policy, which is critical for Ukraine as it fights intensifying Russian attacks on its energy infrastructure. This loan follows the renewal of US aid, the prompt dispatch of US war materiel to Ukraine after the renewal, the decision by the United States and several of its allies to permit Ukraine to use their weapons in Russia, and the subsequent halting of Moscow’s offensive in the north. In other words, Russian President Vladimir Putin’s bad late spring continues. This latest blow to the Kremlin underscores how important strong US leadership can be.

This leaves Putin’s coterie fulminating that it will strike back by expropriating Western assets in Russia. Maybe, but prudent firms—like France’s Total—have already written off investments in Russia; and if Russia wants to further mortgage its future by taking this step, it will make even more unlikely the return of foreign capital after its aggression in Ukraine flops and it tries to rejoin the community of nations. Put another way, Russia needs Western investment far more than Western investors need Russia. The havoc created in Russia’s financial markets by this week’s new US sanctions is just the latest indicator of who has the whip hand in the economic relationship between Russia and the West.

This tactical victory against Russian aggression is sweeter because it is also a defeat for Putin’s partner, Chinese leader Xi Jinping, who tried to bully the reluctant G7 members to deter them from embracing this policy. It might also provide a lesson to India, Saudi Arabia, Indonesia, and others who needlessly embarrassed themselves by supporting this failed Chinese effort.

While we should celebrate this day’s accomplishment, we must not rest on our laurels. The Biden administration should follow up its big win by building support for the initiative launched by Philip Zelikow, Lawrence Summers, and Robert Zoellick to seek the transfer of nearly all the roughly $300 billion in frozen Russian state assets to Ukraine.

—John E. Herbst is the senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center and a former US ambassador to Ukraine.

The beauty of compromise

The G7 has struck a deal on bringing forward the value of interest income made off Russia’s immobilized assets. Given that the group was acrimoniously divided over what to do as recently as February, this is an extraordinary achievement.

While it remains unclear exactly how, the United States will be involved. As one of the strongest supporters of the approach, Washington saw itself providing the biggest contribution to a sovereign loan of fifty billion dollars or more. But the European Union (EU) sanctions legislation, which keeps the bulk of the assets blocked, has to be renewed every six months, and the United States could not convince the twenty-seven member states of the EU to switch to a different approach. Reportedly, the United States will still now participate—though the full details of the plan have not yet been made public. Washington may use the five to eight billion dollars allegedly still in the United States to make a smaller loan, while the United Kingdom, Canada, and the EU make a bigger loan. Or perhaps the parties have agreed to keep working on a risk-sharing formula in case EU sanctions are lifted before the United States and other lenders have been paid back.

Fifty billion dollars is over half of Ukraine’s total expenditures in 2023—a game-changing amount. Still, supporters of confiscation are already calling today’s achievement “step one.” But we should appreciate how elegantly today’s compromise navigated the red lines of France, Germany, and other EU member states, while still providing a substantial amount. Let’s take the win and accept that confiscation remains off the table until a multilateral solution can be found.

—Charles Lichfield is the deputy director and C. Boyden Gray senior fellow of the Atlantic Council’s GeoEconomics Center.

After some wobbling, this was a week of solid Western backing for Ukraine

Western backing for Ukraine has firmed up in the wake of the miserably delayed vote for additional assistance by the US Congress in late April. On June 12, the United States issued its most effective sanctions against Russia in two years, a well-thought-out set of measures by the departments of Treasury, State, and Commerce that struck at Russia’s military industry; energy production; evasion of technology controls by firms in China, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, and elsewhere; and more. One interesting measure was the expansion of authority for sanctions against non-Russian banks and other firms that support Russia’s military industry (“secondary sanctions” that European governments have loudly opposed but now seem to tacitly accept). It’s about time the United States took that step, and it needs to follow through, but it’s a welcome step all the same.

In another welcome move, the G7 has finally agreed (at least in principle) on an arrangement to use immobilized Russian sovereign assets, estimated at around $280 billion, to back Ukraine. In a swift and bold move days after the all-out Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the G7 locked down Russian assets but has ever since debated whether to use those funds to help Ukraine and, if so, how. Some argued for simply taking Russia’s money and having Russia pay directly for its war against Ukraine. But many in Europe resisted taking that step as too aggressive, even given Russia’s own aggressive war.

Extended European discussions produced a soft consensus to use the interest on the Russian assets. But that would generate only about three billion dollars per year, a sum not commensurate with Ukraine’s need. The United States came up with a creative (and complex) solution: Use twenty years’ or so worth of that interest to back funds to Ukraine, a scheme that could generate a sum of about fifty billion dollars. After much effort, the G7 has reached consensus on that plan. While details have yet to be worked out, fifty billion dollars is nothing to sneer at. The United States was right to close the deal on this compromise and also right in what seems to be its intention to use the principal, the full $280 billion.

In a third action, the United States and Ukraine have signed a bilateral memorandum of understanding (MOU) providing for ten years of security cooperation. This is the most recent of a series of bilateral MOUs between Ukraine and the countries supporting it in its fight for national survival. It’s not NATO membership, but the US and other security MOUs are arguably part of Ukraine’s “bridge to NATO,” as the Biden administration has put it.

Much depends on the battlefield, and the news is mixed: Ukraine seems to have halted the Russian ground offensive against Kharkiv, but the Russians could attack elsewhere. Russia is battering Ukraine’s energy infrastructure, but Ukraine has hit Russian military infrastructure in occupied Crimea and elsewhere. Still, it’s been a week of solid Western backing for Ukraine.

—Daniel Fried is the Weiser Family distinguished fellow at the Atlantic Council. His last position in the US government was as sanctions coordinator at the Department of State.

Amid G7 political uncertainty, Meloni is emerging as a bulwark of support for Ukraine

As leaders from the world’s G7 countries gather in Puglia, it’s hard to ignore a few big elephants in the room. First, French President Emmanuel Macron’s trouncing in the recent European Parliament elections by Marine Le Pen’s party led to his potentially politically fatal decision to dissolve parliament. Second, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz’s Social Democratic Party faced a similar result from the center-right Christian Democrats, and a map of Germany’s European Parliament voting results shows that the country is still clearly divided between east and west, with the former solidly in the Alternative for Germany (AfD) camp. Finally, US President Joe Biden arrived in Puglia after a months-long battle on Capitol Hill to pass the latest tranche of Ukraine aid and as the November election looms.

Who seems to be left out of all the political drama? Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni, whose Brothers of Italy party took home a solid win in the European Parliament elections and who is taking the opportunity to bask in the limelight of transatlantic leadership. In fact, she said Italy is going into the summit with the “strongest government of them all.” She’s not wrong. It’s a surprising turn for Italy’s famously mercurial internal politics: Not only is she seen as a leader on the world stage, supporting Ukraine and NATO, but her leadership is also expected to hold through the entirety of her term. Meloni is using this moment to chart a new course for Italy, including by bringing leaders from outside the G7 to the summit, such as Narendra Modi of India, Cyril Ramaphosa of South Africa, and the pope for his first G7 appearance. She is also solidifying the country’s place at the center of a new relationship between the West and Africa, as well as supporting the EU’s plan to provide a fifty-billion-dollar lifeline to Ukraine using frozen Russian assets.

Not only is this good for Meloni, but having a bulwark of support amid uncertain political futures in much of the West is good for Ukraine, too.

—Rachel Rizzo is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center.

The US-Ukraine security deal can’t just be a bridge to indefinite NATO delay

The just-announced US-Ukraine security agreement has much good in it, if the US government chooses to execute it in a manner that enables Ukraine to defeat Russia’s invasion quickly, decisively, and on Kyiv’s terms.

However, the language presenting “a bridge to Ukraine’s eventual membership in the NATO alliance” is yet another repeat of the Alliance’s sixteen-year-old assertion that membership is not a matter of if but when—this time backed by extensive inferences that Ukraine is far from ready for NATO membership.

Nothing is further from the truth. Ukraine meets all the requirements spelled out in Article 10 of the Washington Treaty. It’s a European state. Its democratic credentials are codified in repeated elections found to be free and fair—even when subjected to Russian interference. No country has sacrificed more blood in the defense of transatlantic security in NATO’s history.

That Ukraine would sign up to such language reflects its own disillusionment in the face of US resistance to its aspirations for NATO membership—a disillusionment that was reinforced by Biden’s recent assertion to TIME that peace in Europe does not require Ukrainian membership in NATO.

To reverse this disillusionment and convince Ukraine that this bridge to NATO is not a route to indefinite delay, the Alliance must take tangible steps to integrate Ukraine into its operations and decision making. For too long, Ukraine has remained an outsider to the Alliance amid empty promises of eventual inclusion.

Ukraine should be invited to assign personnel to NATO headquarters and command structures and to sit as an observer at the North Atlantic Council, the Alliance’s top decision-making body. The latter privilege was afforded to countries such as Sweden and Finland, after they were invited to join NATO but before they became members. While that privilege gave those allies a voice in NATO deliberations, it came with no vote and no veto in Alliance decisions and no Article 5 security guarantee.

Ukraine has much to add to the Alliance in those capacities. No country has more experience and expertise to share when it comes to fighting Russia.

These proposals would resonate powerfully in Ukraine and would receive broad support across the Alliance. Even if there is resistance, just by pressing them forward, the United States, as the leader of NATO, would significantly bolster the credibility of its—and the Alliance’s—promise to fulfill Ukraine’s well-deserved transatlantic aspirations.

—Ian Brzezinski is a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council and a former US deputy assistant secretary of defense for Europe and NATO policy.

New US sanctions are already impacting Russia—will China feel them too?

The US Treasury’s latest round of sanctions targeted critical aspects of Russia’s financial infrastructure, including the Moscow Exchange (MOEX) and National Clearing Center, among others. These new sanctions are already having an effect. The Central Bank of Russia and MOEX halted trading in US dollars and euros in response to the announcement.

Treasury’s announcement also came with an expansion of secondary sanctions. The secondary sanctions authority that was announced in December was specific to Russia’s military industrial base. The expanded definition of secondary sanctions now includes any Russian individual and entity designated pursuant to Executive Order 14024, which accounts for most of the US Russia-related sanctions. This means that banks that are still transacting with Russia in places such as China and India are exposed to the risk of secondary sanctions. It will be interesting to see how China, and specifically Chinese financial institutions, respond to the latest US actions, considering how Russia has become economically and financially reliant on China over the past two years.

Further, Treasury clarified that the foreign branches of designated Russian banks, such as VTB in China and India, are sanctioned and added their entity names and addresses to the Specially Designated Nationals list. We called out this sanctions gap in the latest edition of the Russian Sanctions Database that we published in May. This action should restrict how Chinese companies do business with Russia, but we’ll have to see, as much of the transactions occur in renminbi, not US dollars.

—Kimberly Donovan is the director of the Economic Statecraft Initiative within the Atlantic Council’s GeoEconomics Center and a former senior official with the US Treasury Department’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network.

Ukraine’s allies should keep up the momentum to rebuild its energy sector

The G7 agreement to deliver fifty billion dollars for Ukraine, generated by the interest from seized Russian assets, embodies the West’s reinvigorated willingness to deploy bold, innovative solutions to hold Russia accountable for its immeasurable crimes against Ukraine, particularly when Moscow’s damages (direct and indirect) account for at least $56 billion in losses to Ukraine’s energy sector.

Some of this interest could be used for air defense against the further destruction of power plants and for rebuilding the energy sector—half of its 18 gigawatt capacity has been blown up. Unsurprisingly, energy dominated the conversations this week at the Ukraine Recovery Conference in Berlin, as energy supply security and affordability underpin every facet of Ukraine’s society and will be the backbone to the success of Ukraine’s rebuilding and recovery. Reliable energy access is vital for citizens’ survival but is also a lifeline for large industries and small and medium-sized enterprises, which have shown inspiring resilience and tenacity in the face of an unrelenting assault.

It’s crucial to appreciate the novelty, speed, and monumental diplomatic lift of building consensus over such agile solutions. Such a cadence should continue for all work on protecting and rebuilding Ukraine—especially its invaluable energy sector. Most urgently, allies should:

Overcome speed bumps in the procurement of gas piston and gas turbine power plants, transformers, and other technical equipment
Support Ukraine’s further progress on decentralization reforms
Empower municipalities in their role in replacing lost power generation
Accelerate investments in efficiency solutions to reduce peak demand
Lift restrictions on how Ukraine can deploy Western weapons to defend its critical energy infrastructure

—Olga Khakova is the deputy director for European energy security at the Atlantic Council’s Global Energy Center.

The post Experts react: Ukraine gets $50 billion from Russian assets and a US security deal at the G7 summit appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Hinata-Yamguchi quoted in South China Morning Post on Japan’s maritime plans

ylee — Tue, 11 Jun 2024 20:21:19 +0000

On June 10, IPSI nonresident senior fellow Ryo Hinata-Yamaguchi was quoted in a South China Morning Post article, discussing Japan’s plan to construct its largest-ever coastguard vessel to bolster patrols around the contested Diaoyu Islands. This endeavor is perceived as a response to China’s maritime activities in the region.

Fellow

Ryo Hinata-Yamaguchi

Indo-Pacific Security Initiative Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Defense Policy Indo-Pacific

The post Hinata-Yamguchi quoted in South China Morning Post on Japan’s maritime plans appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Friend-sourcing military procurement: Technology acquisition as security cooperation

James Hasik — Tue, 11 Jun 2024 13:00:00 +0000

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Introduction
Research questions
Methodology
Historical cases of successful US military friend-sourcing
Assessment
Recommendations
Acknowledgments
About the author
Appendix 1

Introduction

In the United States, the military procurement bureaucracy tends to sponsor development of new technologies to fill requirements. The bureaucracy also largely seeks domestic sources for all new charismatic military megafauna: aircraft, ships, ground vehicles, and missile systems. Security “cooperation” in US policy and practice is largely a one-way process, neglecting the benefit of learning and sourcing from other countries. However, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and China’s concomitant threats from India to Korea, point to the need for coordinating the industrial capabilities of allies. As the United States faces simultaneous competition with two revisionist, nuclear-armed, major-power rivals, not to mention a challenging budgetary and fiscal environment, the additional research and development (R&D) costs assumed by the Department of Defense through its disregard of foreign suppliers, while never ideal, are no longer tenable.

Law, regulation, and policy can conspire against good economic thinking, though with clear exemptions. The Department of Defense Authorization Act for 1983 prohibited the construction of naval vessels in foreign shipyards, unless the president first informs Congress of a national security need otherwise (10 U.S.C. §§ 7309–7310). The Buy American Act of 1933 demands preference for domestic manufactures in federal procurement, though this is waived for imports from dozens of allied countries through reciprocal agreements (41 U.S.C. §§ 8301–8305). Note, though, that these laws say nothing of where products are designed, merely where they are manufactured. Further, the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994 mandates a “preference for commercial products . . . to the maximum extent practical,” with “market research . . . before developing new specifications for a procurement” (10 U.S.C. § 3453). Official policy periodically reemphasizes this mandate for off-the-shelf procurement.¹

An aerial view of the Pentagon, Washington, DC, May 15, 2023. DoD photo by US Air Force Staff Sgt. John Wright.

Much of the procurement bureaucracy in the Defense Department seems not to understand the exemptions and the mandates for off-the-shelf procurement of military capabilities. In contrast, the US Special Operations Command, imbued with its own procurement authority, has been far more open to procuring military systems off the shelf, and then heavily customizing them against specific military needs. The US Coast Guard, housed under the Department of Homeland Security, has also long preferred off-the-shelf solutions, often of foreign design and even manufacture—and with much less customization. Indeed, decades of procurement debacles and the economics of international commerce indicate that broad domestic preference is wrongheaded. At least three reasons point to the need for broader sources of supply:

Quality: With military off-the-shelf solutions, many of the qualities are observable, from performance in testing to actual use in battle. In developmental programs, quality is not so observable ex ante, and may disappoint ex post. Global procurement invites buyers to find the best equipment available anywhere, and often from countries with competitive advantages in particular industries.
Urgency: Off-the-shelf solutions may be sought as interim solutions to immediate military problems. If not restrained by production capacities or bottlenecks, they will arrive presently. What is purchased immediately may then suffice for anticipated problems, becoming enduring solutions, if the political and technological conditions do not too greatly change in the long run. In contrast, technological development requires greater lead time, delaying fielding.
Economy: Off-the-shelf solutions may come at lower upfront prices, if the development costs are spread among multiple national customers, or otherwise already amortized. With domestic development, the cost is disproportionately borne by the sponsoring government, and this roughly averages 20 percent of the life-cycle cost of more advanced systems. Spending on R&D competes with spending on procurement, but, in fielding capabilities, the measure of merit is procurement. Simultaneously, when immediate needs are adequately filled by off-the-shelf procurements, monies can be husbanded for developing systems targeted at more challenging, long-range problems. Later, the wider supply base for the off-the-shelf system, which should remain largely interoperable with foreign versions, will contribute to lower sustainment costs.

Because autarky is illusory, greater “friend-sourcing” can provide US forces with quick access to proven, economical solutions, while maintaining the option for domestic production when that is strategically desirable.² Informal consortia of allied buyers could then naturally divide responsibilities for development and production, through an emergent but controlled market process. Allowing US forces more opportunities to acquire military technologies abroad would then restructure security cooperation as a two-way process, with the avid participation of friendly countries. As Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy recently described Kyiv’s emerging military-industrial cooperation with the United States, “Ukraine does not want to depend only on partners. Ukraine aims to and really can become a donor of security for all our neighbors once it can guarantee its own safety.”³ Access to that sort of battled-hardened experience is part of the return on US assistance.

Research questions

Historical case studies can provide tangible evidence as to how well friend-sourcing approaches have fared in the recent past. The results can demonstrate whether actual procurements should more closely follow this course of action, already supported by law, policy, and economic theory. This study then poses two important and timely research questions. In the United States, since the end of the Cold War, how has the procurement of off-the-shelf systems developed for allied militaries:

Affected the quality, availability, and cost of national military capabilities?
Affected the long-term market for national, military-industrial R&D?

Methodology

To answer these questions, this paper seeks to identify all recent cases of off-the-shelf military procurements in the United States, subject to some boundaries. The set is limited to major end systems—aircraft, ships, ground vehicles, and missile systems—because the international trade in subsystems among friendly countries is already much more liberal. Also, the set includes only those US procurements undertaken since the end of the Cold War because global security dynamics changed radically at that point. Note that this excludes from consideration, for example, the US Army’s procurement of its Austrian-designed Family of Medium Tactical Vehicles, and the US Marine Corps’ procurement of LAV-25 armored vehicles, as these both began in the 1980s.

This paper further restricts the set to systems already in use by US forces, so that a firm decision for adoption, and some record of operation, can be observed. The study includes, however, customizations of off-the-shelf systems, as most countries have needs for subsystems (radios, racks, left- or right-hand drive, etc.) specific to their own military services, and modest customization is common in the international arms trade.

After review of histories and the author’s consultations with a wide set of experts on US military procurement, this paper identifies only nine cases—two missile systems, four aircraft, one ship, and two armored vehicles—in this set (see Appendix 1 for a summary):

The RGM-184A Naval Strike Missile (NSM)
The Norwegian Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile System (NASAMS)
The UH-72A Lakota helicopter
The MH-139A Grey Wolf helicopter
The HC-144 Ocean Sentry maritime patrol aircraft
The C-27J Joint Cargo Aircraft
The Sentinel-class Fast-Response Cutter
The RG-31 mine-protected vehicle
The Stryker LAV III Interim Armored Vehicle

Neither the author nor the Atlantic Council intends to endorse or oppose the specific platforms mentioned or the procurement choices made. Rather, the following section outlines how these systems were procured and what advantages the acquiring service derived from the purchase. The following assessment section gathers lessons from the case studies in aggregate to inform how the Department of Defense should consider friend-sourcing more military procurement.

Historical cases of successful US military friend-sourcing

RGM-184A Naval Strike Missile

The RGM-184A NSM is a 400 kilogram, jet-powered, sea-skimming, anti-ship cruise missile. In September 2014, seeking a lightweight but lethal anti-ship missile for its littoral combat ships (LCSs), the US Navy test-fired Kongsberg’s NSM from the USS Coronado. In 2015, the Navy undertook a competitive procurement to equip its LCSs. Kongsberg and Raytheon announced a teaming arrangement to bring the Norwegian missile to the United States.⁴ Boeing initially offered an extended-range RGM-84 Harpoon, and Lockheed Martin a surface-launched version of its AGM-158C Long-Range Anti-Ship Missile. The latter two firms, however, withdrew their entries in 2017. In May 2018, the Navy selected the NSM for its Independence-class LCSs, its Freedom-class LCSs, and its Constellation-class frigates. The Marine Corps subsequently selected the NSM to equip its new land-based, mobile anti-ship missile batteries, with two NSMs mounted on each robotic Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (see below), deemed the Navy-Marine Expeditionary Ship Interdiction System (NMESIS).

The USS Gabrielle Giffords (LCS 10) launches a Naval Strike Missile (NSM) during an exercise. Photo by Chief Petty Officer Shannon Renfroe, US Navy.

The missiles are mostly built in Norway, as they have been in production there since 2007, and they cost “slightly less than the Raytheon Tomahawk Block IV cruise missile.”⁵ In a press release, Raytheon noted that undertaking final assembly and testing of an already operational missile “saves the United States billions of dollars in development costs and creates new high-tech jobs in this country.”⁶ More labor, at possibly higher cost, would be required in the United States if production were fully domesticated, and Kongsberg and Raytheon have discussed a second production line to deliver yet more missiles.⁷ Navigation is provided by satellite, inertial, and terrain contour matching; terminal guidance relies on imaging infrared and a target-image database. With the latter technologies, the NSM is designed to strike specific, vulnerable points on an enemy ship, and detonate with its void-sensing fuse at the point of maximum damage. A single missile can thus render even a large warship hors de combat.

The NSM was initially developed by and for Norway. Missiles for mobile coastal defense batteries were quickly sold to Poland. Since then, the NSM has been adopted as well by Australia, Belgium, Canada, Indonesia, Latvia, the Netherlands, Malaysia, Romania, Spain, and the United Kingdom. In summary, with the NSM, the Navy and Marine Corps obtained one of the best anti-ship missiles in the world, from a running production line, and at a cost below that of its best alternative in inventory. The US Navy and Air Force have continued to fund development of other, longer-range cruise missiles.

Norwegian Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile System

The NASAMS (pronounced NAY-sams) is a ground-based, anti-aircraft missile system. NASAMS was developed in the 1990s by Kongsberg and Hughes Aircraft to replace the Nike Hercules batteries of the Royal Norwegian Air Force. (Raytheon acquired Hughes Aircraft in 1997.) NASAMS integrates Raytheon’s MPQ-36A Sentinel trailer-mounted radar and AIM-120 Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missile (AMRAAM) with Kongsberg’s launcher and battle-management system. In an apparently sole-source deal, the US Army procured several launchers for the medium-range air defense of Washington, DC, in 2005, and they have served in that role ever since, at a variety of locations in Virginia, the District of Columbia, and Maryland.⁸ The NASAMS case is remarkable in that the Norwegian-US team integrated two off-the-shelf components from a US manufacturer into its system before providing that system as an off-the-shelf product back to the US military.

US High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS) and Norwegian National Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile System (NASAMS) units counter a simulated threat at sea together. Courtesy Photo, US Naval Forces Europe-Africa/US Sixth Fleet.

The United States was the third user of NASAMS, after Norway and Spain. NASAMS is now in service with thirteen countries, including Australia, Chile, Finland, Hungary, Indonesia, Lithuania, the Netherlands, and Oman.“⁹ In 2022 and 2023, the United States, Norway, Lithuania, and Canada all provided NASAMS units to Ukraine.¹⁰ The Canadian purchase is notable because Canada itself had no ground-based air defenses; the Canadian federal government simply identified a cost-effective and already-available system to send.¹¹

In summary, with the NASAMS, the US Army obtained a medium-range air defense system that remains at the forefront of air defense against the most challenging (Russian) threats, from a running production line, and at a cost that global customers still willingly pay. The US Army and Navy have continued to fund several other families of medium- and long-range air defense missiles.

UH-72A (EC145) Lakota utility helicopter

The EC145 is a twin-turboshaft, utility helicopter capable of carrying nine passengers. In its Light Utility Helicopter program of 2005, the US Army sought a proven helicopter for logistical and medical missions within the United States. In its request for proposals (RFP), the Army specifically sought only off-the-shelf aircraft, and received such offers from Bell, AgustaWestland (now Leonardo), and Eurocopter (now Airbus Helicopters). In June 2006, the Army selected a version of Eurocopter’s EC145, and designated it the UH-72A Lakota. The EC145 first flew in 1999 and was itself developed from the MBB/Kawasaki BK 117, which had first flown in 1979.

All UH-72s have been assembled at Airbus’s factory in Columbus, Mississippi. The program has experienced no significant delays. The UH-72 was competitively sourced, and the Army has been sufficiently satisfied with its performance and cost-effectiveness that the service has purchased 481 of the aircraft. Along the way, the Army awarded Airbus further orders under the original contract to fully recapitalize its fleet of training helicopters.¹² The Army’s Lakota was subsequently upgraded into the UH-72B, as Airbus continued to develop its EC145 into the H145M.¹³

A new UH-72A Lakota Light Utility Helicopters at Hohenfel Army Airfield. Photo by Sgt. 1st Class JMRC PAO, Joint Multinational Readiness Center.

Military versions of the EC145 have also been in service with the military forces of thirteen other countries: Albania, Belgium, Bolivia, Cyprus, Ecuador, France, Germany, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Luxembourg, Serbia, Thailand, and the Cayman Islands. The US Army has several times rebuffed suggestions that the domestic-service helicopters could be deployed overseas, asserting that adding armor and decoys would be uneconomical. However, in December 2023, Airbus and the German Defense Ministry announced a deal for at least sixty-two H145Ms, configured as either commando transports or missile-firing anti-tank helicopters.¹⁴ In this way, the case provides an example of a US military service overestimating its need for technological development when an off-the-shelf product would suffice.

In summary, with the EC145, the US Army obtained a proven helicopter in wide military service around the world, relatively quickly, and at a price that won a competitive tender. The US Army continued to fund rotorcraft development, though more notably of tilt-rotor aircraft through its Future Long-Range Assault Aircraft program.

MH-139A (AW139) Grey Wolf helicopter

The AW139 is a twin-turboshaft, utility helicopter capable of carrying up to fifteen passengers.

In the late 1960s, Bell Helicopter developed its UH-1 Huey helicopter, a workhorse of the Vietnam War, into the twin-engine UH-1N Twin Huey, to meet a requirement of the Royal Canadian Air Force.¹⁵ The US Air Force began buying Twin Hueys in 1970, for a variety of utility functions. About forty-five years later, the USAF was ready to replace them, seeking up to eighty-four aircraft for passenger transport and other utility functions. The aircraft had two particularly important roles: flying commandos to any missile silos in Wyoming, Montana, and North Dakota that might come under attack, and evacuating government officials from Washington, DC should the capital city again come under attack.¹⁶ The USAF initially planned a sole-source award to Lockheed Martin’s Sikorsky for UH-60s. Under the Economy Act of 1932 (31 U.S.C. § 1535), an agency can select a system already in service with another branch of government in lieu of a competitive procurement. Congressional objections soon scuttled that idea, whether to provide others an opportunity to bid or simply because the UH-60 might not have been the best-value solution.¹⁷ In September 2016, the USAF released a request for information (RFI) from industry, and in December, a draft RFP.¹⁸

A MH-139A Grey Wolf’s successful live hoist test. Photo by Samuel King Jr. 96th Test Wing Public Affairs.

The Air Force asked for a proven helicopter, and in response, five companies or teams offered four types of aircraft. Sikorsky offered its HH-60U Pave Hawk, already in service with the USAF. Sierra Nevada offered to rebuild existing, out-of-service US Army UH-60As to a -60U configuration. Airbus offered its UH-72A, already (see above) in service with the US Army. Textron’s Bell Aircraft offered its UH-1Y, already in service with the US Marine Corps, which was developed in the 1990s under a perhaps questionable sole-source contract.¹⁹ Leonardo teamed with Boeing to offer a military version of the Italian company’s AW139. That aircraft had been developed initially by Agusta (later AgustaWestland, now Leonardo) and Bell in the late 1990s, though Agusta bought Bell’s interest in the program in 2005.

The Air Force rejected the Airbus and Bell offerings outright as too small and short-ranged for the missile security mission. In September 2018, the service chose the AW139. At the announcement, Air Force Secretary Heather Wilson told the assembled that “strong competition drove down costs for the program, resulting in $1.7 billion in savings to the taxpayer.”²⁰ In this instance, the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act beat the Economy Act at economy. At first delivery, in December 2019, the service named it the MH-139A Grey Wolf.²¹ Flight testing started in 2020, but did not conclude for several years. Leonardo and Boeing agreed to some requested modifications, and the aircraft had some unexpected difficulties with FAA certification.²² Low-rate production started in Philadelphia in March 2023.“²³ The Grey Wolves are today built on the north side of Philadelphia, where Leonardo has been building AW139s since 2007, and they are then customized on the south side of Philadelphia, by Boeing.

Prior to the Air Force’s purchase, AW139s were flying with at least three air services in the United States: the New Jersey State Police (since 2012), the Maryland State Police (2012), and the Los Angeles City Fire Department (2013). Miami-Dade Fire Rescue joined that group in 2020. Air forces or other public flying services in twenty-four other countries also operate AW139s.

In summary, with the AW139, the US Air Force obtained a proven helicopter in wide military service around the world, with a two-year delay, though at a price that won a competitive tender. The Air Force had not spent significant sums previously on rotorcraft development, and, with relatively few requirements for rotary-wing aircraft, the service has not since.

HC-144 (CN-235) Ocean Sentry maritime patrol aircraft

The CN-235 is a twin-turboprop, fixed-wing cargo aircraft capable of carrying fifty-one passengers or thirty-five paratroopers. In May 2003, the US Coast Guard selected the CN-235-300M maritime patrol aircraft from the European Aeronautic Defence and Space Company (EADS) as part of its “Deepwater” program to recapitalize much of its aircraft and ship fleets.“²⁴ In February 2004, Deepwater contractor Lockheed Martin ordered the first two aircraft from EADS on the Coast Guard’s behalf.²⁵ The service had specifically requested a proven, off-the-shelf aircraft to replace its HU-25 Guardian jets, Dassault Falcon 20s similarly purchased off the shelf in the early 1980s and originally developed in the early 1960s. The CN-235 was developed, starting in 1980, by a joint venture of Spain’s Construcciones Aeronáuticas SA (CASA, then part of EADS, now Airbus) and Industri Pesawat Terbang Nusantara (IPTN, now Indonesian Aerospace). The first flight was in 1983, and production began in 1986.

Deliveries to the USCG proceeded slowly, with the availability of funding. The first unit arrived in December 2006, and the eighteenth in October 2014, at which point the Coast Guard retired its last HU-25. The aircraft were largely built in Spain but fitted out with equipment specific to the Coast Guard at EADS’s facility in Mobile, Alabama. The USCG had initially intended to procure thirty-six, but the availability of surplus C-27Js (see the next case study) led the service to reduce its plan by half. By September 2017, the Coast Guard’s HC-144 fleet had flown for one hundred thousand hours—more than that of any country with CN235s besides France and South Korea. At that point, more than two hundred CN-235s were flying in more than twenty-four countries.²⁶

An HC-144A Ocean Sentry medium-range surveillance aircraft arrives at Coast Guard Air Station Washington. Photo by Chief Petty Officer Sarah Foster, US Coast Guard District 5.

The US Air Force also flies a few CN-235s within its Special Operations Command.²⁷ Notably, Air Force Special Operations also flies twenty Dornier 328 twin-engine turboprops, termed C-146A Wolfhounds; and a few CN212 Aviocars from CASA, termed C-41As.²⁸

In summary, with the CN-235, the US Coast Guard obtained a proven turboprop aircraft in wide military service around the world, at the pace it desired, and at an ongoing total cost that the service continues to support. The Coast Guard has generally not spent significant sums on aircraft development, and specifically not multiengine, fixed-wing aircraft development, preferring off-the-shelf purchases.

C-27J Joint Cargo Aircraft

The C-27J Spartan is a twin-turboprop, fixed-wing cargo aircraft capable of carrying sixty passengers or forty-six paratroopers.

In the early 2000s, the US Army and the US Air Force individually were seeking ideas for twin-engine turboprop transport aircraft. The Army sought to replace its C-23 Sherpas, C-12 Hurons, and C-26 Metroliners with a common fleet. The USAF sought to supplement its C-130s with a smaller aircraft capable of flying from shorter fields, particularly in Iraq and Afghanistan. In March 2006, Under Secretary of Defense Ken Krieg instructed the two services to combine all these requirements into plans for a single airplane, the JCA.²⁹

Lockheed Martin offered a shortened version of its four-engine C-130. In August 2006, the Army (which was managing the program for the Air Force as well) eliminated that aircraft from the program. CASA, teamed with Raytheon, offered its C-295 aircraft, a larger derivative of the CN-235, developed in the 1990s. Alenia, teamed with L3 Communications, offered its C-27J Spartan. The latter had begun development in 1996 as an improvement of the Aeritalia (later Alenia, later Leonardo) G.222. The USAF had purchased ten G.222s in 1990, designating them C-27As. The C-27J would feature more powerful engines and the glass cockpit of the C-130J, which explains the choice of modifying letter. The first flight was in September 1999, and the Italian air force ordered twelve that November.“³⁰

A C-27J aircraft lands in North Dakota. Courtesy Photo, North Dakota National Guard Public Affairs.

In June 2007, the US Army and US Air Force jointly chose the C-27J as the JCA.³¹ The Army planned to buy seventy-five for the National Guard, and the Air Force seventy for both the Air National Guard and its component of Special Operations Command. The Army soon found the aircraft very useful for relieving the workload of its Chinook heavy helicopter fleet.³² The Air Force, however, was never enthused about splitting the mission with the Army, and questions of the economy of the arrangement persisted.³³ In 2009, Defense Secretary Robert Gates decided to transfer all the aircraft to the Air Force. In 2012, Defense Secretary Leon Panetta decided just to retire the entire fleet, as the United States reefed back its enthusiasm for counterinsurgency. Over the next two years, fourteen of the surplus aircraft were provided to the US Coast Guard, and another seven went back to the Army for its Special Operations Aviation branch.³⁴

Prior to the US order, the C-27J had been ordered by Italy, Greece, Bulgaria, and Lithuania. Australia, Chad, Kenya, Mexico, Peru, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Zambia ordered aircraft subsequently.³⁵

In summary, with the C-27J, the US Army and Air Force initially obtained a proven turboprop aircraft in wide military service around the world, relatively quickly, and at a competitive price that they were willing to pay. Those aircraft continue to fly for the United States, just with different services or branches than initially intended. That is more a matter of changing requirements than the quality, availability, or cost of the aircraft. Regarding development funding, the US Air Force has only once spent a large sum on new multiengine fixed-wing aircraft since the C-17 Globemaster III program in the 1990s. Its recent orders for KC-46 Pegasus aerial refueling aircraft included development funds, but under the fixed-price deal, Boeing (the contractor) would eventually come to assume most of that cost through repeated overruns.

Sentinel-class (Damen Stan 4708) fast response cutter

The Damen Stan 4708 is a 42 meter patrol ship designed for a variety of naval and maritime constabulary missions.

In March 2007, the US Coast Guard terminated its contract with Lockheed Martin and Northrop Grumman to modify its 110-foot Island-class cutters with a 13 foot midship hull extension, intended to produce a more capable ship with an extended service life. The Island-class ships had been built in the 1980s by Bollinger Shipyards of Louisiana to an off-the-shelf design of the 1960s by Britain’s Vosper Thornycroft, which had been sold to several other naval forces, including those of Qatar, Abu Dhabi, and Singapore.³⁶ The concept was reasonable in principle, as hull plugs are not uncommon in naval architecture and shipbuilding. The problem was that the Island-class ships were already proving susceptible to late-in-life hull cracking, but neither the service nor the contractors were fully forthcoming with one another about the difficulties. After taking delivery of eight of the rebuilt ships, the Coast Guard terminated the program, and indeed withdrew the eight from service.³⁷

In September 2008, the USCG awarded a contract, after an open competition, to Bollinger to build a replacement class of “fast response cutters.” The Coast Guard had expressly requested an off-the-shelf solution, with at least two vessels from the parent design in patrol boat service for one year, or one vessel in patrol boat service for at least six years. Bollinger brought a design based on the Damen Stan (“Standard”) 4708 patrol vessel, by Damen Shipyards of the Netherlands. With options, the fixed-price contract called for twenty-four to thirty-six cutters. The first, USCGC Bernard C. Webber was launched in April 2011 and commissioned in April 2012. The Coast Guard was sufficiently pleased with the cost and quality that the service now has fifty-four in service, and another eleven in sea trials, under construction, or planned. Bollinger’s work has been noticed, bringing forth suggestions that the US Navy could also purchase 4708s to replace its Cyclone-class patrol boats, and perhaps for other uses.³⁸

The Coast Guard Cutter Bernard C. Webber is the Coast Guard’s first Sentinel-class Fast Response Cutter. Courtesy Photo, US Coast Guard Atlantic Area.

Three ships of the design had entered service in 2004 and 2005 in South Africa as the Lilian Ngoyi class of environmental inshore patrol vessels. In its explanation of the decision, the Coast Guard described Damen as an “internationally recognized ship designer with more than 30 shipyards and related companies worldwide [and] 4,000 vessels in service since [it was] founded in 1929.”³⁹ The 4708 was itself a development of the Damen Stan 4207, which has served in the navies, coast guards, or maritime constabularies of Albania, the Bahamas, Barbados, Bulgaria, Canada, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, the Netherlands, Nicaragua, the United Kingdom, Venezuela, and Vietnam.

In summary, with the Sentinel class, the US Coast Guard obtained a proven patrol ship whose preceding designs were in wide military service around the world, and at a price that led to procurement of scores more. The first ship was not available for forty-three months after contract signing, which is neither particularly fast nor slow by historical US standards. By avoiding much development spending with the Damen Stan 4708, the USCG saved those funds for its next-larger class of cutters in the Deepwater recapitalization program, of a wholly new design: the Heritage-class offshore patrol cutter.

RG-31 Charger (Nyala) mine-resistant armored vehicle

The RG-31 Nyala is a four-wheeled, all-wheel-drive, armored troop carrier, specifically designed for resistance to land mines. In 1996, the US Army purchased a few RG-31 mine-protected vehicles to equip its land-mine disposal squads on peacekeeping duty in Bosnia. Later described as a “rolling bank vault” of a troop carrier, the RG-31 had been developed in South Africa from the Mamba, an earlier mine-protected troop carrier that was built on a Unimog truck chassis and powered by a Mercedes-Benz six-cylinder diesel.⁴⁰ The “Bush Wars” of the 1970s and 1980s had culminated by the 1994 election that marked the end of apartheid, but part of the legacy was a remarkable industrial capability for developing armored vehicles. However, through a series of licensing arrangements and corporate mergers, the marketing rights for the RG-series vehicles in North America resided with GDLS-Canada. The vehicles were thus built in South Africa, but fitted out in Ontario, at the same plant that produced Strykers (see below).⁴¹

By the middle of 2003, the US-led coalition’s occupation of Iraq had elicited attacks by insurgents with leftover land mines and more improvised explosive devices (IEDs). Eager to get into the market of supplying the bomb squads, General Dynamics Land Systems looked globally in 2003 for an off-the-shelf solution and remembered its license for the RG series of vehicles.⁴² The US Army then ordered a small number of additional RG-31s. Service on the ground in Iraq created impressions of quality. In an urgent request to Quantico in 2003, the 1st Marine Brigade in Anbar Province requested one thousand mine-protected armored vehicles “similar to the South African RG-31, Casspir, or Mamba.”⁴³

In June 2004, General John Abizaid, the commander of US Central Command, which oversaw all military operations in both Iraq and Afghanistan, sent a message to the Joint Chiefs of Staff explaining his situation and requesting help. His most poignant statement was that “IEDs are my No. 1 threat. I want a full court press on IEDs . . . a Manhattan-like Project.” In November 2004, the Army ordered a further fifteen RG-31s. The vehicles were priced well below $1 million each—far below the price of a Stryker or Bradley troop carrier. The Army’s enthusiasm grew in February 2005, when the service entered into a $78 million contract for another 148 RG-31s from Canadian Commercial Corporation, the national armaments marketing firm, on behalf of GDLS. In that contract, the armored trucks were oddly termed “ground effect vehicles,” and the Army’s official nickname would be Charger. Deliveries took some time, as the supply line stretched almost the length of the Atlantic Ocean. Deliveries were scheduled to continue, however, through December 2006.⁴⁴

Soldiers connect L-Rod Bar Armor to an RG-31 Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicle at Kandahar Airfield, Afghanistan. Photo by Staff Sgt. Stephen Schester, 16th Mobile Public Affairs Detachment.

The first fatality in an RG-31 did not occur until May 2006. Early on, the US armed forces also ordered vehicles from Force Protection Industries of South Carolina. These were not off the shelf, but rather, had been developed domestically with technology licensed from the South African government. Eventually, the Army and the Marine Corps ordered over one thousand RG-31s, and thousands of other vehicles termed MRAPs—Mine-Resistant, Ambush-Protected vehicles—from multiple domestic producers.

In 2005, the Army and the Marines began work on an ambitious project for the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JTLV)—a vehicle only slightly larger than a Humvee, but with the protection of an MRAP. Developing the JLTV would ultimately require ten years, and full-rate production would not begin until 2019. During this time, US troops were protected from land mines by MRAPs, including RG-31s, and the origins of all that work reside in South Africa.

In summary, with the RG-31, the US Army obtained an armored vehicle long proven against land mines, relatively quickly, and at a price far below that of its other troop-carrying armored vehicles. While procuring the RG-31, and afterward, the US Army and Marine Corps would spend large sums developing the JLTV.

Stryker Light Armored Vehicle III

The LAV III is an eight-wheeled, all-wheel-drive, armored troop carrier, designed for higher road speeds and lighter weight than comparable tracked vehicles.

In June 1999, less than a week after assuming office, US Army Chief of Staff General Eric Shinseki signaled his intention to restructure much of the service.⁴⁵ The immediate impetus came from the Army’s difficulty over the preceding several months with deploying its Task Force Hawk, of attack helicopters and accompanying ground troops, from Germany to Albania for the Kosovo War. As analysts at RAND later described the problem, the Army needed to “expand ground force options to improve joint synergies.”⁴⁶ As Shinseki would more clearly say, its light forces were too light for fighting opponents with heavy weaponry, and its heavy forces too heavy for strategic mobility.⁴⁷ Neither bookend of capability had properly contributed to the overall war-fighting effort.

In October 1999, Shinseki described a plan to rebuild the Army around motorized formations equipped with wheeled armored vehicles small enough to fit on C-130 Hercules transport aircraft.⁴⁸ In February 2000, General Motors (GM) Canada and GDLS announced that they would together enter the pending competition with a version of the Canadian LAV III, itself a development of the Piranha series of armored vehicles, first developed in the early 1970s by the Swiss firm MOWAG (Motorwagenfabrik AG). Back in 1983, the US Marine Corps had procured a version of the Piranha I, armed with a 25 millimeter (mm) cannon, for reconnaissance and screening duties.

GM Canada held the license from MOWAG to build the vehicles in London, Ontario. The Army would later also receive offers from United Defense LP (UDLP) for a combination of remanufactured M113A2 tracked troop carriers and M8 medium tanks, from ST Engineering for Bionix tracked troop carriers, and another from GD for six-wheeled, Austrian-designed Pandur armored vehicles. Neither UDLP nor ST Engineering seem to have taken account of Shinseki’s strong and openly stated preference for wheels, though UDLP did suggest that a split purchase could include its tracked tank.

In March 2000, the Army reequipped the 3rd Infantry Brigade of the 2nd Infantry Division—a heavy brigade with Abrams tanks and Bradley fighting vehicles—at Fort Lewis, Washington, with LAV IIIs borrowed from the Canadian Army, and a variety of other vehicles under consideration.⁴⁹ In April 2000, the Army released an RFP for the Interim Armored Vehicle (IAV). The program was so named because almost simultaneously, the Army launched its Future Combat Systems (FCS) program to reequip all its heavy brigades (and eventually the “interim” brigades as well) with a common fleet of medium-weight vehicles of entirely new design. In March 2002, the Army selected a team of Boeing and SAIC to oversee development of the fourteen different vehicular and aerial systems, manned and unmanned, within the FCS.⁵⁰

In November 2000, after reviewing the four more-of-less off-the-shelf proposals, the Army awarded GM and GD a contract for 2,131 vehicles, in a variety of variants of the LAV III, to equip six brigades by 2008. Shinseki had wanted the first vehicles by the end of 2001, but at contract award, that schedule was clearly infeasible.⁵¹ The US Army’s order was far larger than any yet received, and the US vehicle required a significant redesign from the Canadian standard, with more armor (resistant to 14.5 mm armor-penetrating rounds) but less firepower (a remote 12.7 mm machine gun rather than a manned 25 mm turret). Thus, the first new-production Strykers to equip further brigades would not arrive until 2003. In those numbers, the price was considered reasonable, at roughly $1.42 million each. This considerably exceeded the procurement price of the M113 alternative, but the Stryker’s life-cycle costs were expected to be lower.⁵²

A US Army Soldier drives an Interim Armored Vehicle Stryker out of a C-17 Globemaster III. Photo by Senior Airman Tryphena Mayhugh, 62nd Airlift Wing Public Affairs.

In November 2003, the 3rd Brigade from Fort Lewis deployed to Iraq with Strykers. Also that year, GD consolidated the design-and-production arrangement by buying both GM Defense Canada and MOWAG. The next year, Shinseki’s successor as chief of staff, General Peter Schoomaker, became similarly enthused about the Stryker. In seeking what he called an “infantry-centric army,” in which troops were not defined by their means of conveyance to the battlefield, he specifically noted that Stryker brigades brought twice as many dismounts to the field as brigades equipped with Abrams and Bradleys.⁵³ The Strykers were also performing well in combat. Through early 2004 in Iraq, they had survived attacks from at least fifty-five IEDs, twenty-four RPGs, and a 500 pound car bomb without a single fatality.

On the other hand, the Army’s effort to field a version of the Stryker with a 105 mm assault gun did not fare as well. The service purchased enough to equip each of eventually eight Stryker brigades with twelve guns, but retired all the vehicles in 2022. Then again, the Army’s goal of “Future Combat Systems” as survivable as Abrams tanks but somehow fitting on C-130 aircraft did not survive past 2005.⁵⁴ Development continued for several years, but without tangible progress. In April 2009, Defense Secretary Robert Gates canceled most of the FCS program, which had not produced any operational vehicles, despite $19 billion in spending and six years of effort.⁵⁵

Because the vehicles were considered an interim solution, the Army initially chose to forego developing its own maintenance depot for Strykers, and to instead rely substantially on GDLS through an arrangement the US military calls contractor logistics support (CLS). The Army’s reliance on CLS was, in retrospect, a costly one, but it did subsequently facilitate modifying the vehicles for greater survivability, after battlefield lessons in Iraq and Afghanistan.⁵⁶ After the FCS program was clearly terminated, the Army began assuming more of the maintenance burden organically.

While only the US Army employs its customized Stryker series, LAV IIIs have been procured to equip land forces in Canada, Chile, Colombia, New Zealand, and Saudi Arabia. Piranha IIIs have been procured to equip land forces in Belgium, Botswana, Brazil, Denmark, Moldova, Ireland, Romania, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland. In 2011, GDLS began producing an upgraded version, the LAV 6, for the Canadian Army and the Saudi National Guard. In 2019, GDLS began building a development of the LAV 6, the Armoured Combat Support Vehicle (ACSV), to replace the Canadian Army’s M113s and LAV IIs. In 2022 and 2023, the United States sent surplus Strykers to Ukraine, and Canada sent new ACSVs.⁵⁷ In November 2023, the United States offered a coproduction deal to build Strykers, including air-defense variants, in India for the Indian Army.⁵⁸

In summary, with the LAV III, the US Army obtained an armored vehicle in wide service around the world, though somewhat more slowly than hoped, and at a price and life-cycle cost deemed acceptable. The Army’s heavy reliance on contractor logistics support was, in retrospect, a costly decision, but one which centralized management of upgrades at an important juncture. The Army spent a modest sum on development of the LAV IIIs, which required customization for its particular preferences. However, this was a small fraction of the funds spent developing the Future Combat Systems, the later and then-cancelled Ground Combat Vehicle, and the current effort with the Optionally Manned Fighting Vehicle. None of these programs have delivered vehicles to the field, but Strykers continue to serve.

Assessment

systems were procured starting between 2003 and 2008, during the comparatively free-trading George W. Bush administration, for which military-industrial cooperation with allies was a priority. Two of the systems were adopted in 2018, during the comparatively protectionist Trump administration. Plans for accepting off-the-shelf concepts for those two requirements, however, got their start during the preceding Obama administration. While the US Air Force’s twenty-year drama of aerial tanker procurements from Boeing—and not Airbus—does provide a counterpoint, all the military services but the Space Force have smoothly adopted at least one major system of foreign design. The summary record of these procurements has been largely positive.

Buying foreign military hardware off the shelf has generally brought the US military proven systems of lasting quality.

In the first seven cases described, the US Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force, and Coast Guard bought off-the-shelf systems to provide enduring capabilities, in lieu of developing new systems, and all seven are still in US service. The Army bought the RG-31 to provide a present capability, while also funding (with the Marine Corps) the development of enduring capabilities, culminating in that of the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle. For years along the way, the RG-31 provided very valuable protection to US troops against land mines. The Army similarly bought the Stryker LAV III to provide an interim capability, but it never succeeded in developing an enduring replacement. The Stryker thus continues in the Army’s force structure and inventory more than twenty years on. As the Army’s first program manager for Stryker recently put it, “The Army likes the vehicle, and still likes the vehicle”—for if it did not, it would not persist in service.⁵⁹

Note also that the Defense Department would not have entrusted the air defense of the federal capital to NASAMS for eighteen years if it had meaningful questions about its capabilities.

This finding in evidence comports with the logic of the market. Off-the-shelf products generally feature observable quality. Indeed, if one is trying to sell an important system to the Americans, it is wise to bring a quality product. Any US military service is an important customer to whom a sale conveys great reputation.

Buying foreign military hardware off the shelf has mostly fulfilled US military needs comparatively quickly.

The RG-31 was procured in an emergency and was available in small quantities within months. The NASAMS was not quite procured in an emergency, but its immediate availability was appreciated, with fresh memories of the aerial attack on the Pentagon in 2001. The NSM was sought urgently, in that the rising threat from the Chinese navy could not be adequately opposed with the US Navy’s existing anti-ship missiles. The Stryker (or any interim armored vehicle) was sought quickly, because the Army chief of staff was embarrassed by his service’s failure to contribute during the Kosovo War. Its service in Iraq was impressive, but only because it was available three years after contract award. That proved adequate under the circumstances, but General Shinseki initially had much quicker delivery in mind.

In all the other cases, the driving motivation for an off-the-shelf procurement was either economy or assured quality. This does not mean that speed was wholly unimportant. The MH-139A arrived after a flight-testing delay of a few years, and the Sentinel-class cutters also did not arrive quickly. In none of those cases, however, did the procuring service experience operationally damaging delays.

This finding also comports with the logic of the market. Off-the-shelf products generally can be provided more quickly, sometimes because the production process is running, and always because significant product development lead time is not required.

Buying foreign military hardware off the shelf has generally brought the US military cost-competitive matériel.

Three of the cases were not fully competitive procurements. The NSM was chosen as the Navy’s next anti-ship missile after Boeing and Lockheed Martin withdrew from the competition, apparently because neither could quite offer the combination of capabilities the Navy sought in a ship-killing missile for a small ship. The case of the NASAMS seems to have been a sole-source procurement, without a record of a competition. The case of the RG-31 was similarly a sole-source emergency purchase.

The remaining six cases were all competitive procurements, which indicates that foreign-designed systems have repeatedly delivered value for money to the US armed forces.

This finding further comports to the logic of the market. Any US military service is a customer with great buying power. As noted above, concluding the sale reinforces the seller’s reputation, which can be leveraged for many years in pursuing other sales. For these two reasons, offerers have strong incentives to bring good deals to American buyers.

Buying foreign military hardware off the shelf has had no strong effect on US capacity for military-industrial R&D.

The nine off-the-shelf procurements neatly fall into five industries. None have seen a strong effect from this pattern of spending.

In the two cases of missile manufacturing, the United States purchased two different missile systems, the NSM and NASAMS, from the same original designer, Kongsberg of Norway. On both projects, Kongsberg has cooperated with one of the US national champions in guided missiles, Raytheon Technologies. Over that time of the ongoing procurement, the US Defense Department has spent many more billions on missile development, for both offensive and defensive missions.
In two cases of rotorcraft manufacturing, the Army bought hundreds of EC145s, and the Air Force is planning to buy scores of AW139s. The Army could have paid a contractor to design a wholly new aircraft for utility and training purposes, but the marginal advantage in an industry with a slow cycle of technological development could not be cost effective. The Air Force’s requirements may have been somewhat more demanding, but a new design for a fleet of less than one hundred helicopters would be similarly foolish.
In two cases of fixed-wing transport aircraft manufacturing, the Coast Guard, the Army, and the Air Force took delivery of just eighteen CN-235s and twenty-one C-27Js. Developing new aircraft for small fleets would be a very bad use of money. The special operations commands of the US services understand this well, and thus sources most of their aircraft from existing designs.
In the one case of shipbuilding, the Coast Guard’s off-the-shelf purchase of the 300 ton Sentinel-class cutter freed up money for the development of the 3000 ton Heritage-class cutter—a much larger project. Additionally, none of this spending by the Coast Guard seems to have affected the Navy’s spending on ship design and development.
In two cases of armored vehicle manufacturing—those of the RG-31 and the Stryker—the Army did continue to spend large sums on follow-on systems: the JLTV and the FCS.

Recommendations

Since the end of the Cold War, the US armed forces have quite successfully taken into service nine major, off-the-shelf systems of foreign design. Again, this is good because a preference for the already available for federal procurement is federal law. Most of these products have been manufactured in the United States, and all have been serviced there. This is reasonable because the United States has huge industrial capacity and some strategic interest in domestic servicing. More pointedly, this technology transfer has effectively constituted security assistance from allies—a valuable concept too often overlooked by military policymakers.

Formulating a strategic framework

The federal government can better avail itself of the advantages in quality, speed, and economy offered by allies’ proven solutions, by adopting a two-part analytical framework for considering their procurement.

Consider the global extent of the market

Seven of the nine systems in this study were widely adopted by military forces around the world before a US military service purchased them. In all other cases, the procuring services had long lists of satisfied customers to consult for insights into the equipment. For future procurements, if the needs of the service do not genuinely exceed the global state-of-the art, the best design should be sought from any friendly source. As several of these cases demonstrate, for large production runs, production can be brought to the United States, if desired.

Measure the technological speed of the industry

Seven of the systems in this study represented modest technological developments. Only the naval strike missile constituted a great advancement over preceding options on the market. In all other cases, the procuring services were purchasing systems from industries with modest cycle speeds of technological development. Four of the procurements were from industries with substantially commercial underlying technologies and observably slow paces of change: helicopters and multiengine fixed-wing aircraft. If firms around the world are investing over the long-term for gradual technological progress, then a program to develop a wholly new system is duplicative.

Educating the procurement bureaucracy

Despite the logic, the procurement bureaucracy—outside US Special Operations Command and the Coast Guard—may remain disinclined to seek proven solutions, and especially those of foreign provenance. In the short run, this puts the onus of securing best value on the political leadership of the military departments and defense agencies. For better quality, speed, and economy, these leaders must meet military desires for novel equipment with demands for frank justification and global market research. This approach fits within the civil-military model of military innovation, which holds that beneficial change most often comes when “statesmen intervene in military service doctrinal development, preferably with the assistance of maverick officers from within the service.”⁶⁰

This last point addresses a longer-term approach. In the apparatus of any administrative state, career bureaucrats greatly outnumber appointees.⁶¹ Even if they are economically minded, the politicians cannot oversee everything. The “positive arbitrariness” of their occasional intervention can produce useful results, but it is also no way to build enduring institutional capacity.⁶² Officials beyond the mavericks need further schooling in the mandate for and economy of buying military systems off the shelf. This means education in the market research techniques of routinely surveying global markets for military off-the-shelf solutions that can inform processes for developing requirements for new procurements. In theory, educational opportunities exist through the Defense Acquisition University, the Eisenhower School of the National Defense University, and the military acquisition elective courses at the various other war colleges.

The benefits could be far-reaching. Procuring what others have already developed can permit the military to focus its R&D funds on its most challenging problems. Then, when war comes, procuring agencies and industrial enterprises will better understand, as organizations, how to put others’ designs into production here to meet the immediate needs of mobilization.

Acknowledgments

The Atlantic Council is grateful to Airbus for its generous sponsorship of this paper.

About the author

James Hasik is a political economist studying innovation, industry, and international security. Since September 2001, Hasik has been advising industries and ministries on their issues of strategy, planning, and policy. His work aims to inform investors, industrialists, technologists, and policymakers on how to effect, economically, a secure future.

Appendix 1

1 See, for example, Frank Kendall et al., Business Systems Requirements and Acquisition, Department of Defense Instruction 5000.75, Change 2, January 24, 2020, 5, https://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/DD/issuances/dodi/500075p.PDF?ver=2020-01-24-132012-177.

2 Steven Grundman and James Hasik, “Innovation Before Scale: A Better Business Model for Transnational Armaments Cooperation,” RUSI Journal 161, no. 5, December 2016, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/03071847.2016.1253366?journalCode=rusi20.

3 “Kyiv Does Not Want to Rely Solely on Allied Military Aid, Says Ukraine’s Zelensky,” Straits Times, December 7, 2023, https://www.straitstimes.com/world/europe/kyiv-does-not-want-to-rely-solely-on-allied-military-aid-zelenskiy.

4 Sam LaGrone, “Raytheon and Kongsberg Team to Pitch Stealthy Norwegian Strike Missile for LCS,” USNI News, US Naval Institute, April 9, 2015, https://news.usni.org/2015/04/09/raytheon-and-kongsberg-team-to-pitch-stealthy-norwegian-strike-missile-for-lcs.

5 Sam LaGrone, “Raytheon Awarded LCS Over-the-Horizon Anti-Surface Weapon Contract; Deal Could Be Worth $848M,” USNI News, May 31, 2018, https://news.usni.org/2018/05/31/raytheon-awarded-lcs-horizon-anti-surface-weapon-contract-deal-worth-848m.

6 Comment by Taylor W. Lawrence, president of Raytheon Missile Systems, in “US Navy Selects Naval Strike Missile as New, Over-the-Horizon Weapon: Raytheon, Kongsberg Will Partner to Deliver Advanced Missile,” press release, Raytheon on PR Newswire, June 1, 2018, https://raytheon.mediaroom.com/2018-06-01-US-Navy-selects-Naval-Strike-Missile-as-new-over-the-horizon-weapon.

7 Megan Eckstein, “Kongsberg, Raytheon Ready to Keep Up as Naval Strike Missile Demand Grows,” Defense News, October 27, 2021, https://www.defensenews.com/naval/2021/10/27/kongsberg-raytheon-ready-to-keep-up-as-naval-strike-missile-demand-grows/.

8 Andrew Feikert, “National Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile System,” Congressional Research Service, IF12230, December 1, 2022, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF12230; and Tyler Rogoway, “America’s Capitol Is Guarded By Norwegian Surface-to-Air Missiles,” Jalopnik, April 3, 2014, https://jalopnik.com/americas-capitol-is-guarded-by-norwegian-surface-to-ai-1556894733.

9 Lithuania Acquires More NASAMS Air Defense from Kongsberg,” press release, Kongsberg, December 14, 2023, https://www.forecastinternational.com/emarket/eabstract.cfm?recno=294263.

10 Joe Gould, “US to Send Ukraine Advanced NASAMS Air Defense Weapons in $820 Million Package,” Defense News, July 1, 2022, https://www.defensenews.com/pentagon/2022/07/01/us-to-send-ukraine-advanced-nasams-air-defense-weapons-in-820-million-package/; and “Norway Donates Additional Air Defence Systems to Ukraine,” Norwegian government, December 13, 2023, https://www.regjeringen.no/en/aktuelt/noreg-donerer-meir-luftvern-til-ukraina/id3018411/.

11 David Pugliese, “Canadian Military Eyes New Ground-Based Air Defence System at a Cost of $1 Billion,” Ottawa Citizen, May 2, 2022, https://ottawacitizen.com/news/national/defence-watch/canadian-military-eyes-new-ground-based-air-defence-system-at-a-cost-of-1-billion.

12 Gareth Jennings, “US Army Retires ‘Creek’ Training Helo,” Jane’s, February 19, 2021, https://www.janes.com/defence-news/news-detail/us-army-retires-creek-training-helo.

13 Jen Judson, “Airbus Unveils B-model Lakota Helos to Enter US Army Fleet Next Year,” Defense News, August 28, 2020, https://www.defensenews.com/land/2020/08/28/airbus-unveils-b-model-lakotas-will-enter-us-army-fleet-in-2021/.

14 Sebastian Sprenger, “Germany Spends $2.3 billion on Airbus Light Attack Helicopters,” Defense News, December 14, 2023, https://www.defensenews.com/global/europe/2023/12/14/germany-spends-23-billion-on-airbus-light-attack-helicopters/; and “Airbus Helicopters and German Armed Forces Sign Largest H145M Contract,” press release, Airbus Helicopters, via Defense-Aerospace.com, December 14, 2023, https://www.defense-aerospace.com/germany-orders-up-to-82-airbus-h145m-armed-helicopters/

15 Garrett Reim, “Retrospective: How the UH-1 ‘Huey’ Changed Modern Warfare,” Flight Global, December 12, 2018, https://www.flightglobal.com/helicopters/retrospective-how-the-uh-1-huey-changed-modern-warfare/130259.article; and José Gabriel Pugliese, “El Bell 212 en la Fuerza Aérea,” Aerospacio (official magazine of Argentina’s air force), October 28, 2008.

16 Joseph Trevithick, “Dark Horse Contender Boeing Snags Air Force Deal to Replace Aging UH-1N Hueys with MH-139,” War Zone, September 24, 2018, https://www.twz.com/23803/dark-horse-contender-boeing-snags-air-force-deal-to-replace-aging-uh-1n-hueys-with-mh-139.

17 Colin Clark, “Dozen Lawmakers Object to Sole-Source UH-1N Replacement,” Breaking Defense, April 18, 2016, https://breakingdefense.com/2016/04/slow-down-air-force-dozen-lawmakers-object-to-sole-source-uh-1n-replacement/.

18 Tyler Rogoway, “USAF Asks for Bids to Finally Replace Its Antique UH-1N Hueys,” War Zone, December 3, 2016,
https://www.twz.com/6318/usaf-asks-for-bids-to-finally-replace-its-antique-uh-1n-hueys.

19 Ryan E. Von Rembow, “The UH-1Y Was a Mistake: An Argument for the MH-60S,” Marine Corps Gazette 99, no. 1, January 2015, https://www.mca-marines.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/Gazette-January-2015.pdf.

20 Brian W. Everstine, “The Grey Wolf Arrives,” Air & Space Forces, March 1, 2020, https://www.airandspaceforces.com/article/the-grey-wolf-arrives/

21 Valerie Insinna, “The Air Force Picks a Winner for its Huey Replacement Helicopter Contract,” Defense News, September 24, 2018, https://www.defensenews.com/breaking-news/2018/09/24/the-air-force-picks-a-winner-for-its-huey-replacement-helicopter-contract/; and Insinna, “The US Air Force’s UH-1N Huey Replacement Helicopter Has a New Name,” Defense News, December 19, 2019, https://www.defensenews.com/air/2019/12/19/the-air-forces-uh-1n-huey-replacement-helicopter-got-a-new-name-today/.

22 Stefano D’Urso, “MH-139 Grey Wolf Finally Enters Developmental Testing,” Aviationist, August 28, 2022, https://theaviationist.com/2022/08/28/mh-139-enters-developmental-testing/.

23 US Air Force Decision Commences Low Rate Production of Boeing/Leonardo MH-139 Grey Wolf,” press release, Leonardo, March 9, 2023, https://www.leonardo.com/documents/15646808/24917778/ComLDO_Boeing_Leonardo_MH-139A_MilestoneC_09_03_2023_ENG.pdf?t=1678369973868

24 US Coast Guard Acquires EADS CASA CN-235,” EADS press release, May 12, 2003.

25 “Lockheed Martin Selects EADS CASA CN-235-300M for U.S. Coast Guard’s Deepwater Maritime Patrol Aircraft Solution,” press release, Lockheed Martin, February 18, 2004, https://investors.lockheedmartin.com/news-releases/news-release-details/lockheed-martin-selects-eads-casa-cn-235-300m-us-coast-guards.

26 Lawrence Specker, “Airbus, Coast Guard Celebrate 100,000 Hours in the Air,” Alabama Media Group’s AL.com, September 22, 2017, https://www.al.com/news/mobile/2017/09/airbus_coast_guard_celebrate_1.html.

27 Joseph Trevithick, “Shadowy USAF Spy Plane Spotted Over Seattle Reportedly Reappears Over Syria,” War Zone, June 30, 2019, https://www.twz.com/17511/shadowy-usaf-spy-plane-spotted-over-seattle-reportedly-reappears-over-eastern-syria; and “C-146A Wolfhound,” fact sheet, US Air Force, March 2021, https://www.af.mil/About-Us/Fact-Sheets/Display/Article/467729/c-146a-wolfhound/.

28 Joseph Trevithick, “Shedding Some Light on the Pentagon’s Most Shadowy Aviation Units,” War Zone, July 3, 2020, https://www.twz.com/8125/shedding-some-light-on-the-pentagons-most-shadowy-aviation-units.

29 John T. Bennett, Jen DiMascio, and Ashley Roque, “Wanted: A Bona-Fide ‘Bug Smasher,’” Inside the Air Force 17, no. 12 (2006): 8-10

30 C-27J Conducts Successful First Flight,” Defense Daily, September 29, 1999; and Andy Nativi, “Italian Order Launches C-27J,” Flight Global, November 17, 1999.

31 Gayle S. Putrick, “C-27J Tapped for Joint Cargo Aircraft,” Air Force Times, June 13, 2007.

32 Philip Ewing, “Far from DC Battles, C-27 Gets Glowing Reviews,” DoD Buzz, April 24, 2012, https://web.archive.org/web/20120427214404/http:/www.dodbuzz.com/2012/04/24/far-from-dc-battles-c-27-gets-glowing-reviews/.

33 Sandra I. Erwin, “Military Services Competing for Future Airlift Missions,” National Defense, November 2005, https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2005/10/31/2005november-military-services-competing-for-future-airlift-missions.

34 Aaron Mehta, “US SOCOM to Get 7 C-27Js from USAF,” Defense News, November 1, 2013, https://archive.ph/20131101201655/http:/www.defensenews.com/article/20131101/DEFREG02/311010012#selection-857.0-867.16; and Jon Hemmerdinger, “US Coast Guard to Acquire USAF’s remaining C-27J Spartans,” Flight Global, January 6, 2014, https://www.flightglobal.com/us-coast-guard-to-acquire-usafs-remaining-c-27j-spartans/112099.article.

35 Craig Hoyle, “Bulgaria Accepts Its Last C-27J Transport,” Flight Global, March 31, 2011; and Hoyle, “Romania Accepts First C-27J Spartans,” Flight Global, December 4, 2011.

36 Frank N. McCarthy, “The Coast Guard’s New Island in the Drug War,” Proceedings of the United States Naval Institute, February 1986.

37 Trevor L. Brown, Matthew Potoski, and David M. Van Slake, Complex Contracting: Government Purchasing in the Wake of the US Coast Guard’s Deepwater Program (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 173–179.

38 Collin Fox, “Two Birds with One Stone: A New Patrol Craft and Unmanned Surface Vessel,” Proceedings of the United States Naval Institute, February 2019, https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2019/february/two-birds-one-stone-new-patrol-craft-and-unmanned-surface.

39 “Sentinel Class Patrol Boat Media Round Table,” briefing by Rear Admiral Gary T. Blore, Assistant Commandant for Acquisition, and Captain Richard Murphy, Sentinel-Class Project Manager, September 30, 2008, https://web.archive.org/web/20090220012354/http:/uscg.mil/acquisition/newsroom/pdf/sentinelmediabrief.pdf.

40 John Carlson, “For Iowans on Streets of Iraq, War ‘Never Gets Routine,’” Des Moines Register, October 2, 2005.

41 This discussion follows James Hasik, Securing the MRAP: Lessons Learned in Marketing and Military Procurement (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2021), chapter 3.

42 Author’s telephone interview with Chris Chambers, former chairman of the board, BAE Systems Land Systems South Africa, September 23, 2015.

43 Ronald Heflin, “Universal Need Statement, Hardened Engineer Vehicle,” mimeograph provided by Mike Aldrich of Force Protection Industries. The request was undated, but the approval by Marine Forces Pacific was dated December 12, 2003.

44 E. B. Boyd and Brian L. Frank, “A New Front: Can the Pentagon Do Business with Silicon Valley?” California Sunday Magazine, October 2015.

45 Erin Q. Winograd, “Intent Letter Says Heavy Forces Are Too Heavy: Shinseki Hints at Restructuring, Aggressive Changes for the Army,” Inside the Army 11, no. 25 (1999), http://www.jstor.org/stable/43984647.

46 John Gordon IV, Bruce Nardulli, and Walker L. Perry, “The Operational Challenges of Task Force Hawk,” Joint Force Quarterly, no. 29, Autumn/Winter 2001–2002, 57, https://ndupress.ndu.edu/portals/68/Documents/jfq/jfq-29.pdf.

47 Gordon, Nardulli, and Perry, “The Operational Challenges of Task Force Hawk,” 57.

48 Catherine MacRae, “Service Wants to Be Lighter, Faster, More Lethal: Army Chief of Staff’s ‘Vision’ Is Focused on Medium-Weight Force,” Inside the Pentagon 15, no. 41 (1999), http://www.jstor.org/stable/43995956.

49 Kim Burger, “Brigade Combat Team Has Trained Mostly on LAVs: Soldiers Give Praise for Wheeled, Tracked Vehicles at Ft. Lewis,” Inside the Army 12, no. 39 (2000): 1, 11–12, http://www.jstor.org/stable/43985049; and “Rigorous Training Expected to Increase Comfort Level: Brigade Team Soldiers Give Up Tanks, Firepower with ‘Hard Feelings,’” Inside the Army 12, no. 39 (2000): 1, 8–10, http://www.jstor.org/stable/43985046

50 Andrew Feickert, The Army’s Future Combat System (FCS): Background and Issues for Congress, Congressional Research Service, RL32888, November 30, 2009, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/RL/RL32888/20.

51 Steven Lee Myers, “Army’s Armored Vehicles Are Already Behind Schedule,” New York Times, November 18, 2000, https://www.nytimes.com/2000/11/18/us/army-s-armored-vehicles-are-already-behind-schedule.html.

52 William M. Solis et al., Military Transformation: Army’s Evaluation of Stryker and M-113A3 Infantry Carrier Vehicles Provided Sufficient Data for Statutorily Mandated Comparison, GAO-03-671, US Government Accounting Office, May 2003, https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-03-671.pdf.

53 James Kitfield, “Army Chief Struggles to Transform Service during War,” Government Executive, October 29, 2004, https://www.govexec.com/federal-news/2004/10/army-chief-struggles-to-transform-service-during-war/17929/; and Grace Jean, “Army Transformation Modeled After Stryker Units, National Defense, October 2005, https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2005/10/1/2005october–army-transformation-modeled-after-stryker-units.

54 Sandra Erwin, “For Army’s Future Combat Vehicles, Flying by C-130 No Longer Required,” National Defense, November 2005, https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2005/10/31/2005november-for-armys-future-combat-vehicles-flying-by-c130-no-longer-required.

55 See Army Strong: Equipped, Trained and Ready: Final Report of the 2010 Army Acquisition Review, Department of the Army, June 2011, 163, https://breakingdefense.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/3/2011/07/213465.pdf.

56 E-mail message to the author from Christopher Cardine, former program manager for the US Army and executive for General Dynamics Land Systems, April 2, 2024.

57 David Akin, “As NATO Summit Ends, Canada Promises More Military Aid to Ukraine,” Global News (Canada), June 30, 2022, https://globalnews.ca/news/8958186/canada-military-aid-ukraine/.

58 Inder Singh Bisht, “US to Co-Produce Stryker Armored Vehicle with India,” Defence Post, November 13, 2023, https://www.thedefensepost.com/2023/11/13/us-produce-stryker-india/?expand_article=1; and Manjeet Negi, “US Offers India Air Defence Version of Stryker Armoured Fighting Vehicles,” India Today, November 30, 2023, https://www.indiatoday.in/india/story/us-offers-air-defence-system-equipped-stryker-infantry-combat-vehicles-to-india-2469243-2023-11-30.

59 Author’s interview with Donald Schenk, retired brigadier general, US Army, December 12, 2023.

60 Adam Grissom, “The Future of Military Innovation Studies,” Journal of Strategic Studies 29, no. 5 (2006); and citing Barry R. Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany between the World Wars (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1984), 222–36.

61 Dave Oliver and Anand Toprani, American Defense Reform: Lessons from Failure and Success in Navy History (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2022).

62 Douglas Bland, “Foreword,” xviii, in Alan Williams, Reinventing Canadian Defence Procurement: A View from the Inside (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2006).

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Building the bridge: How to inject credibility into NATO’s promise of membership for Ukraine

Ian Brzezinski — Mon, 10 Jun 2024 15:23:30 +0000

At a press conference in Prague on May 31, US Secretary of State Antony Blinken promised that the upcoming NATO Summit in Washington will provide Ukraine with a “bridge to NATO membership.” It has already been a long road to get to this point. The Alliance first asserted back in 2008 that Ukraine will become a NATO member state. Sixteen years later, failure to fulfill that pledge has been disillusioning to Ukraine and has contributed to Russian President Vladimir Putin’s confidence that he can resubordinate the country. Another empty promise of membership or a bridge to nowhere would be counterproductive. To be credible, a bridge to NATO membership must be built in a way that institutionalizes Ukraine’s integration into the Alliance’s structures starting now.

It is an unfortunate reality that NATO lacks the consensus necessary to grant Ukraine membership today. At the 2023 NATO Summit in Vilnius, Lithuania, that consensus was narrowly missed when the United States and Germany blocked efforts led by a wide coalition of allies to issue a membership invitation to Kyiv. Nonetheless, the summit was notable for the unprecedented support across NATO allies for Ukraine’s aspirations for membership. Moreover, in the Vilnius Summit Communiqué, the Alliance’s members reaffirmed “the commitment we made at the 2008 Summit in Bucharest that Ukraine will become a member of NATO.”

There is already speculation among NATO watchers about what might be included in Blinken’s proposed bridge to NATO for Ukraine. One possibility is a more robust focus on accession in the NATO-Ukraine Council. Another is the Alliance taking responsibility for generating and coordinating security assistance to Ukraine. A third might even be an expanded NATO role in training Ukrainian soldiers.

While each of these elements would be constructive—especially those that focus on helping Ukraine defeat Russia’s invasion—none inspires great confidence in the Alliance’s pledge to one day grant Kyiv NATO membership. This is because all of those potential elements are engagements in which Ukraine and NATO member states remain on separate sides of the table. While they would help Ukraine, they do not mitigate the perception that Ukraine, after more than a decade and half, remains outside the NATO community.

A bridge to membership will only be credible if it includes elements that tangibly and institutionally further Ukraine’s integration into the Alliance’s structures. Reiterated or reworded promises are no longer sufficient. Institutional integration, not just additional engagement, is the key to making the bridge credible.

At the upcoming Washington summit, NATO can make three decisions that will make Blinken’s bridge to membership tangible and convincing:

First, the Alliance should formally recognize that Ukraine meets the requirements of NATO membership. Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty clearly and simply spells out the requirements of membership: “The Parties may, by unanimous agreement, invite any other European State in a position to further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area to accede to this Treaty.” Ukraine, of course, is situated in Europe. It is an established democracy with a vibrant civil society that has repeatedly conducted free and fair elections. Its democratic resilience was underscored when some of those elections had to withstand active Russian interference. No country is contributing more today—and sacrificing more blood—to defend the security of the North Atlantic area than Ukraine.

When NATO allies deny these realities and assert that Ukraine is not ready for membership, it is immensely disillusioning to Ukraine and undercuts the credibility of the Alliance’s promises of membership. It can only appear to Russia as weakness in the Alliance’s commitment to supporting Ukraine.

Some may argue that recognizing Ukraine’s readiness will reveal the real reason for the West’s failure to grant Ukraine membership—fear of being dragged directly into the war. But that hesitancy is hardly camouflaged by NATO’s refusal to recognize Ukraine’s qualifications. Rightly or wrongly, keeping out of the fight has been an openly stated objective for NATO leaders. Refusing to recognize and applaud Ukraine’s qualifications just foments distrust and frustration in Ukraine to Putin’s benefit.

Second, the Alliance should invite Ukraine to assign military and civilian personnel to take up positions in NATO’s headquarters, agencies, and military command structure. This would enable Ukraine to gain experience in NATO’s institutional culture and procedures and deepen its relationship with NATO and its member states. Ukrainian officials would bring to NATO invaluable—indeed, unmatched—experience, expertise, and insight into how to most effectively fight against Russia’s military forces. As for the security risk of bringing nonmember states into secret NATO deliberations and information, Ukraine is not an issue. No country is more determined than Ukraine when it comes to preventing intelligence from flowing to its adversaries. In fact, Ukraine is probably more reliable in this regard than a number of allies.

NATO defense ministers meet in Brussels, Belgium, October 12-13, 2022, with Finland and Sweden, then NATO invitees, represented by their ministers of defense. Source: NATO.

Third, NATO should grant Ukraine what was granted to other candidate countries invited to cross the bridge to NATO membership—an observer’s seat at the North Atlantic Council (NAC), the Alliance’s decision-making body. In this capacity, Ukraine would not have a vote or veto at the table but would be able to observe and contribute to NAC deliberations. Clearly, Ukrainian officials have perspectives and experiences that would be invaluable to these top-level NATO discussions on how to deter and defend against Russian aggression.

In the decades following the Cold War, Poland, the Baltic states, Romania, and most recently Finland and Sweden sat as observers on the NAC after they were invited to join NATO. A Ukrainian seat at the NAC would be a hugely symbolic demonstration of the Alliance’s determination to grant Ukraine membership. It would resonate powerfully across Ukraine and would chip away at Putin’s confidence in his ability to block Ukraine’s accession to the Alliance.

Since 2008, the mantra that “it is not a matter of if but when Ukraine joins NATO” has grown increasingly hollow, if not counterproductive. If an invitation to join NATO is not possible at the Washington summit, then the Alliance does have options to add needed credibility to its promise of membership to Ukraine. It should exercise them.

Ian Brzezinski is a resident senior fellow with the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security and is a member of the Atlantic Council’s Strategic Advisors Group. He is also a former US deputy assistant secretary of defense for Europe and NATO policy.

NATO’s seventy-fifth anniversary is a milestone in a remarkable story of reinvention, adaptation, and unity. However, as the Alliance seeks to secure its future for the next seventy-five years, it faces the revanchism of old rivals, escalating strategic competition, and uncertainties over the future of the rules-based international order.

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Chilton in DefenseNews on nuclear triad investment

Atlantic Council — Thu, 06 Jun 2024 19:38:24 +0000

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

On June 5, Forward Defense distinguished fellow General Kevin Chilton, USAF (ret.) published an article in DefenseNews on the need to continue forward with the nuclear triad modernization program, entitled “US security demands continued nuclear triad investment.” In the article, Chilton argues for the necessity of an effective nuclear triad to ensure US leaders are empowered with credible, reliable military options to manage current and looming threats from nuclear-armed adversaries.

Fellow

Kevin P. Chilton

Distinguished Fellow

Cybersecurity Defense Industry

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Gadzala Tirziu in The New York Sun on Europe’s response to escalating Russian aggression

gmatchett — Fri, 31 May 2024 19:03:00 +0000

On May 30, Nonresident Senior Fellow Aleksandra Gadzala Tirziu published an op-ed entitled “Europe Stumbles Toward Escalation With Russia Over Ukraine — Without a Strategy for Victory” for The New York Sun discussing Europe’s slow response to increasing Russian aggression.

Fellow

Aleksandra Gadzala Tirziu

Africa Center Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Economy & Business Technology & Innovation

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Bakir quoted in Breaking Defense on US-Saudi defense pact

Atlantic Council — Tue, 28 May 2024 19:46:09 +0000

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Samaan joins Channel News Asia to discuss the United States cutting off weapons to Israel

Atlantic Council — Tue, 28 May 2024 19:46:05 +0000

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Why NATO matters

Richard D. Hooker, Jr. — Tue, 28 May 2024 15:13:44 +0000

The 2024 US presidential election will be, among other things, a referendum on the United States’ continued role in NATO. With a combined population of more than nine hundred million people and $1.3 trillion dollars in defense spending, NATO is by far the largest, oldest, and most capable defensive alliance in the world. Increasingly, however, some argue that years of “underinvestment” in defense by NATO allies justify US disengagement or even withdrawal from the Alliance. Others see China as the “pacing” threat and argue that a wealthy and populous Europe should be left to provide for its own security. In this context, why does NATO still matter?

NATO matters to the United States because Europe does. Today, the European Union (EU) is the world’s largest trading bloc and largest trader of manufactured goods and services, ranking first in both inbound and outbound international investments. The European Union (EU) is the top trading partner for eighty countries, a statistic greatly magnified with the addition of the United Kingdom, Turkey, Norway, Switzerland, and other partners who are not EU members. (By comparison, the United States is the top trading partner for around twenty countries.) Except for energy, Europe imports more from developing countries than the United States, Canada, Japan, and China combined. Trade does not thrive amid war and instability, and NATO has been an indispensable component of international peace and the backbone of US national security since 1949. The Alliance is second only to nuclear deterrence as a guarantor of peace in Europe and a major force for global stability. Looking forward, however, NATO cannot stand on its past record. For the United States to continue as its leader and most important ally, the Alliance must be seen to serve US national interests in a direct and consequential way.

Economic, political, and military benefits

The US-Europe relationship is crucial to US prosperity. The EU and the United States, two of the three largest economies in the world, are each other’s largest trading partners in goods and services. The US-EU economic partnership is the largest bilateral trade relationship in the world, accounting for more than 4 percent of global gross domestic product (GDP), while US goods and services trade with the EU totaled an estimated $1.2 trillion in 2023, 25 percent more than US goods trade with China. The US-EU trade and investment relationship is the largest in the world, with four times more US foreign direct investment than with Asia-Pacific countries. According to the US Chamber of Commerce, “no two other regions in the world are as deeply integrated as the US and Europe.” The loss or disruption of these trade relations would have an immediate and drastic impact on the US and global economies.

The benefits of close transatlantic ties also play out politically. Nuclear powers France and the United Kingdom join the United States as permanent members of the United Nations (UN) Security Council to balance out China and Russia. And European support in the UN General Assembly and in international organizations, such as the Group of Seven (G7), the International Monetary Fund, and the World Bank, plays a critical role in advancing democracy and the rule of law. In the global competition between democratic and autocratic states, Europe is a vital player, often aligning with US interests and supporting US efforts to maintain a stable international system. As a community with a shared commitment to human rights, representative democracy, and the rule of law, the transatlantic region represents a bulwark against a rising tide of autocracy that threatens these ideals everywhere.

These shared values and close relationships have undergirded key European actors’ provision of materiel and assistance in numerous US-led operations, even when European interests were not directly affected. In the Gulf War in 1990, for example, NATO allies France, Italy, Canada, Turkey, and the United Kingdom each contributed in critical ways to the coalition. In humanitarian operations in Somalia in 1992 and 1993, initiated in the waning days of President George H. W. Bush’s administration, Italy, France, Belgium, and Canada provided large military contingents. The Afghanistan intervention following 9/11 was a NATO-led operation with the participation of nineteen NATO allies, which suffered more than one thousand troops killed in action. In Iraq beginning in 2003, seventeen NATO allies contributed troops and civilian aid workers, as well as financial assistance totaling in the billions of dollars. A total of twenty-three allies participated in the NATO Training Mission-Iraq from 2004 to 2011, while its successor, the NATO Mission Iraq, continues to this day. When the United States finds itself compelled to use force “out of area,” NATO allies often join in as important members of US-led coalitions.

Today, the Alliance includes thirty-one of the United States’ thirty-seven treaty allies (excluding Latin American states covered by the 1947 Rio Treaty). Japan, Australia, and South Korea are both NATO global partners and bilateral US allies. NATO allies and official partners together constitute almost 70 percent of the GDP and military power on the planet, far more than China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea combined. Although often criticized for lagging defense spending, European NATO allies are this year expected to spend $380 billion, or 2 percent of their collective GDP, on defense. (Even on a war footing, Russia spent $120 billion last year on defense). Since 2014, NATO’s European allies and Canada have spent more than six hundred billion dollars in increased defense spending over that year’s baseline military budgets. This includes an 11 percent increase in 2023 alone. While some readiness shortfalls persist, the “free rider” narrative has little basis in fact. The United States’ NATO allies are shouldering a fair share of the spending burden.

The ongoing conflict in Ukraine—the largest outbreak of major-theater war in Europe since 1945—also illustrates Europe’s actual and potential contributions to regional security and international stability. Since February 2022, the EU has contributed more than $101 billion in financial, military, humanitarian, and refugee assistance to Ukraine, with another $54 billion on the way. (Actual US assistance to date totals $107 billion). Non-EU members Britain and Norway added an additional $15.2 billion and $5.2 billion, respectively.

In the opening stages of the conflict, immediate assistance in the form of anti-tank and short-range air defense weapons, along with small arms and artillery ammunition, played a crucial role in helping Ukraine stave off the massive Russian invasion. Since then, European allies have provided main battle tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, howitzers, rocket artillery, high-altitude air defense, fighter aircraft, and secure communications systems to stiffen Ukraine’s defense against a much larger and stronger adversary. Intelligence sharing and “train the trainer” programs also represent major contributions. On a per capita basis, allies such as Poland, Norway, and the Baltic States have contributed significantly more than the United States, highlighting their resolve and commitment. NATO has been critical in coordinating allies’ aid to Ukraine.

The Alliance’s value as the principal security provider for the transatlantic community has only increased in recent months with the addition of Sweden and Finland. They bring with them effective and technologically advanced militaries, backed up by large reserve forces and comprehensive and resilient home defense. Both have increased defense spending dramatically in recent years: since 2020, Sweden has nearly doubled its defense budget, which will exceed 2 percent of its GDP this year. In the same time frame, Finnish defense spending has increased by 70 percent and is projected to reach 2.3 percent of its GDP in 2024. In geostrategic terms, NATO’s posture in the High North and in the Baltic Sea is materially enhanced by the accession of Sweden and Finland, which together with Norway and Denmark, constitute a strong regional bloc with a landmass larger than the rest of NATO’s European allies combined.

The US military is still indispensable to transatlantic security

Increases in European defense spending and new, powerful members encourage some critics to argue that Europe can stand alone without US presence and leadership. While European allies possess impressive capabilities in some categories, the US military remains indispensable to transatlantic security. Collective action across thirty-one parliaments and polities can be both fractious and ineffective without strong and consistent US leadership. In areas like strategic airlift and sealift, long-range fires, offensive cyber capacity, space-based communications and surveillance, amphibious assault platforms, tankers, nuclear-powered supercarriers and attack submarines, the United States remains by far the sole or dominant provider. Though the majority of US military power is focused away from Europe, in-place forces under US European Command or based on the eastern seaboard are formidable, contributing greatly to deterrence and defense.

The US contribution to European security is even greater in the nuclear realm. While US conventional capabilities are critical to transatlantic security, the US nuclear umbrella remains the most important guarantor of security and stability in the North Atlantic region. Should it be withdrawn, it is unlikely that European states could provide or develop credible alternatives. Russian nuclear forces dwarf those of France and the United Kingdom, which are unlikely to extend their limited nuclear assets to cover neighbors. Domestic opposition, long lead times, and the high costs involved, as well as Russian intimidation, suggest that developing nuclear weapons by nonnuclear states like Germany is also improbable. In short, without an assured US nuclear guarantee, a transatlantic security architecture is no longer viable and the prospects for renewed Russian aggression increase exponentially.

Russia is still a threat

Two years into its full-scale invasion of Ukraine and resulting Western sanctions, the Russian economy is actually expanding, while leaky international sanctions and support from China, Iran, and others continue to prop up Russian industry and economic performance. Despite heavy casualties, the Russian military continues to put growing numbers into uniform and into the field, while ramping up the production of military equipment and munitions. Russian President Vladimir Putin’s ambitions to restore Russian imperial greatness and recover lost Russian territories are well-documented, regularly communicated by his closest advisers, and apparently endorsed by a majority of Russians.

The threat of Russian aggression expanding to additional countries is real. As Mark Rutte, the current Dutch prime minister and likely next NATO secretary general, has said, “If we were to accept for one moment that Putin could be successful in Ukraine, that he would get Kyiv, that he would get the whole country, it won’t end there. History has taught us that.” Should the war in Ukraine subside into yet another frozen conflict, the Russian military will regroup and rebuild its forces. Across NATO, fear of a vengeful Russia, angry over Western support for Ukraine and determined to recover its former territories, is palpable—and with good reason. After Russian aggression in Georgia in 2008, in Crimea and the Donbas in 2014, and against all of Ukraine in 2022, the West cannot afford to assume that future Russian behavior will moderate.

Capable of coping with Russia and China

Important voices today also argue that the United States lacks the capacity to deal with both China and Russia and that Europe should therefore be left to itself. In fact, the US military presence in Europe in no way prevents the ability to deter or defend against Chinese aggression in the Indo-Pacific region. Only a small fraction of US forces is based in Europe, while the bulk of US military strength is available to deter or confront the threat from China. Should China seek to expand its territory through force, allies and partners such as India, South Korea, Vietnam, Japan, Australia, Thailand, and the Philippines together represent a powerful potential coalition to counter Chinese aggression. Wavering US commitment in Europe would send a worrying signal to these countries. There are few strategic outcomes from the Ukraine war that China would value more than the fracturing of transatlantic cohesion and the NATO Alliance. Working with allies and partners is the United States’ best route to coping with both China and Russia simultaneously.

In a challenging world, NATO provides real economic, political, and military strength that enables the United States to confront serious threats elsewhere, while still securing vital US interests in Europe. It does so at bargain rates, with only 5 percent of US defense spending going to Europe and NATO. These relationships confer a broad range of benefits on the United States, including basing and overflight rights; intelligence sharing, diplomatic, economic, and military support; and a united front in support of democratic values and the stability of the international system. The benefits to the United States are clear and unmistakable, while the risks of withdrawal are profound. And the US public agrees: A strong majority, 78 percent, of Americans said the United States should increase or maintain its commitment to NATO, according to a poll last year by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs.

The United States supports and leads NATO not out of altruism, but because it is manifestly in its interest to do so. US national security and economic prosperity depend on it. To pull out from NATO would mean the end of the most successful alliance in history, alarming allies around the world and destabilizing an international order already under attack. Europe is experiencing its largest armed conflict since 1945, a war that directly affects the United States and the world. Now is no time to retreat.

Richard D. Hooker Jr. is a nonresident senior fellow with the Transatlantic Security Initiative in the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

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Soofer cited in Asia Times on the nuclear sea-launched cruise missile

Atlantic Council — Tue, 28 May 2024 13:00:00 +0000

original source

On Tuesday, May 28 Forward Defense Senior Fellow Dr. Robert Soofer’s recent article “The US is building a nuclear sea-launched cruise missile. Congress must make sure it’s built right” was cited in an article in the Asia Times.

Fellow

Robert Soofer

Senior Fellow

Forward Defense

Arms Control Defense Policy

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Michta in DW News on potential NATO secretary general candidates

gmatchett — Fri, 24 May 2024 16:36:17 +0000

Director and Senior Fellow, Scowcroft Strategy Initiative

On February 24, Andrew Michta, director and senior fellow in the Scowcroft Strategy Initiative, was quoted in DW News about the candidates to replace NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg. He assessed that a candidate from the Alliance’s eastern flank may be well-suited for the role, as they “understand the existential nature of the threat” from Russia.

Staff

Andrew A. Michta

Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security Scowcroft Strategy Initiative

Central Europe Eastern Europe

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General CQ Brown, Jr., on the US role in Gaza, Ukraine, and other crises around the world

Katherine Walla — Thu, 23 May 2024 18:11:01 +0000

Watch the full event

Public Event Wed, May 22, 2024 • 10:50 am ET

General CQ Brown, Jr. on how US forces are readying for new global threats

An #ACFRONTPAGE EVENT—General CQ Brown, Jr., Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, discusses the challenges the joint force faces today and what to expect in the years ahead.

Conflict Crisis Management Defense Policy National Security

It’s time to plan for the long term in the Middle East, said General CQ Brown, Jr., chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

“What do we collectively want this to look like years from now? That’s the work that has to start,” he continued. The general spoke at an Atlantic Council Front Page event, which was also part of the Forward Defense initiative’s Commanders Series, sponsored by Saab.

Brown explained that this forward-looking planning will need to involve “a number of different nations,” including both their militaries and diplomats.

Asked about the United States’ role in the conflict, Brown said that the US military would “not necessarily” be involved on the ground to help with security. “You also have to think about who’s best . . . to actually work the details on the ground, [who] has the working knowledge,” he said.

But he said the US military could leverage experience gained in other situations around the globe to help the postwar process. “We’re always willing to do that to help make it as smooth as possible,” he said.

Below are more highlights from the conversation, moderated by NBC News National Security and Military Correspondent Courtney Kube, during which the general spoke about the Middle East, Ukraine, Africa, and beyond.

Addressing crises in the Middle East

Brown said that as Israel was planning its operations in Rafah, the United States asked Israeli leaders to account for the civilian population by providing food and shelter. “I’m not sure how much of that’s come together, but a good portion of the civilians have actually moved out of Rafah,” Brown acknowledged.
Last week, the US military put into operation a humanitarian aid pier—a Joint Logistics Over-the-Shore (JLOTS)—off the coast of Gaza. Thus far, Brown said, the military has brought “over six hundred metric tons into the marshalling yard” and that “some of that” has left the yard for Gaza, where aid organizations will distribute the assistance.
On Tuesday, the Pentagon said that none of the aid thus far unloaded from the pier has made it to the Palestinian population. “We’re going to make sure we connect the dots,” Brown said, adding that the aid organizations have been working through immense security challenges. Nevertheless, he said he is “pleased” with how the delivery is going so far.

What’s next in Ukraine

Nearly a month after the passage of the US supplemental spending package for security priorities, Brown said that equipment is already moving to Ukraine. When there was “movement” on the Ukraine aid bill ahead of passage, Brown said, “we started posturing ourselves . . . to respond when called upon.” He said there’s now a “constant flow of capability.”
Ukraine’s leaders have complained about restrictions on using US weapons and equipment to attack inside Russia. Brown said that the United States and Ukraine will “continue to work through those details,” adding that Ukraine does have capabilities to attack Russia—they just can’t use US tools to do so. Nevertheless, he said that he doesn’t think one weapons system “is going to be the magic thing that is going to turn the tide” in the war.
With NATO reportedly considering sending troops to Ukraine to train forces there, Brown said that he doesn’t see that happening while it is an active combat zone. “I do expect,” he said, “when this conflict is over that we will have an opportunity” to return to the training and coordination seen before the war.

Surveying global threats

“When you have a conflict in one part of the world, it doesn’t actually stay in one part of the world,” Brown warned. “The goal here is to make sure it doesn’t spread and make sure we deter any broader conflicts.”
Pointing to the Biden administration’s National Defense Strategy, released in 2022, Brown said that Washington is closely watching five main challengers: China, Russia, Iran, North Korea, and violent extremist groups. “They’re all active in some form or fashion and in some cases,” such as with China’s support for Russia’s defense industrial base, “[are] working together.”
On Tuesday, the Pentagon revealed that Russia likely launched a counter-space weapon into orbit last week. The launch shows how the space domain “is much more challenging today” than even a few years ago, Brown said. “Naming space as a warfighting domain was kind of forbidden, but that’s changed . . . based on what our adversaries are doing in space.”
With the United States preparing to leave Niger by September, Brown said that the Pentagon is “adjusting” its approach but that he expects the United States will be able to accomplish its counterterrorism objectives in the region. “We’ve got to have willing partners, and in this case, there were some things where we didn’t actually see eye to eye,” he said, adding that now, with the departure, “there are other opportunities for those that want to work with the United States.”
“US leadership is still watched, and it’s wanted. [That] doesn’t mean that it’s always going to be a smooth road everywhere we go,” he said. “But I think in the big scheme of things, we can get and meet the objectives . . . set out by our national leaders.”

Katherine Walla is an associate director on the editorial team at the Atlantic Council.

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NATO must ‘win up front but be ready to win long’ in modern warfare, says General Christopher Cavoli

Katherine Walla — Fri, 17 May 2024 15:09:35 +0000

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Online Event Fri, May 17, 2024 • 10:00 am ET

Road to Washington: General Christopher Cavoli on the NATO Summit

An #ACFRONTPAGE EVENT—General Christopher G. Cavoli, Commander of US European Command and Supreme Allied Commander Europe, discusses the 2024 Washington NATO Summit, modernizing the Alliance’s military capabilities, and destabilizing Russia’s impact on Euro-Atlantic security.

Right now, NATO’s Steadfast Defender 2024 military exercise is taking place across Europe and at sea.

The effort, the largest the Alliance has undertaken since the Cold War, is not just a demonstration of the transatlantic bond; it is also NATO’s opportunity to “rigorously test” its defense and deterrence strategy, said General Christopher Cavoli, supreme allied commander Europe (SACEUR) and commander of US European Command.

Cavoli spoke at a May 7 Atlantic Council Front Page event, which was part of the Forward Defense program’s Commanders Series (in partnership with Saab) and of the Transatlantic Security Initiative’s programming organized in advance of the NATO Summit in Washington.

The general went on to say that NATO’s 2020 defense and deterrence strategy is part of an effort to conduct a “wholesale modernization” of NATO’s collective defense to respond to today’s security challenges.

“We had previously been optimized for a very different task,” he said. Cavoli explained that after the Cold War, NATO pivoted toward conducting crisis-management missions well beyond its borders that allowed the Alliance to participate in missions on its “own terms” and on a predictable schedule.

But “all that has changed,” Cavoli said, pointing to Russia’s war in Ukraine. “It is happening all the time, 24/7, [with] no respite for more than two years.”

The war has shown that today, “you either win up front, fast, and big, or you’re in a long fight. So . . . win up front but be ready to win long,” he said.

Below are more highlights from the event, where Cavoli touched upon NATO’s plans to modernize its defenses and the intensifying threats to the Alliance.

Defending in a new era

At last year’s NATO Summit in Vilnius, allies adopted regional defense plans, which spark three changes, as Cavoli explained: First, they bring a revamped expectation for NATO’s force structure, which outlines not only the forces required but also the spending needed to resource and maintain it. “You will find that 2 percent [of a country’s gross domestic product spent on the military] is certainly not a ceiling, but a floor,” he said, adding that the plans provide a “blueprint for burden sharing.”
Second, the new regional defense plans delegate authority for operational decision making. Cavoli said that when the Alliance was primarily focused on out-of-area operations, military authorities were limited to higher, political levels. “SACEUR requires basic military authorities,” Cavoli said. “These are working their way through the new, modernized alert system.”
Third, the new plans also change systems of command and control, Cavoli said. Before, NATO focused on cyclical deployments to regions and terrains that were unfamiliar to parts of the command chain. Now, regional plans are assigning specific geographic areas to each of the Alliance’s headquarters so that each one will know “exactly what terrain it’s required to defend” and the tactical units it has to defend with.
The modernization effort will also require a ramp-up in the defense industry. “I don’t think anybody is satisfied with current levels of production,” Cavoli said. Going forward, he added, the government and industry will need to work together to increase cooperation between Allies and industry partners. “I believe we’ll get there,” he said.
“This modernization of NATO’s collective defense will not be realized immediately,” Cavoli said. “It will require relentless focus and determination from across NATO and in all member nations . . . It will be difficult, but we are well on our way.”

The threats ahead

While Beijing is far from Brussels, NATO “does have China challenges inside it right now,” Cavoli said, related to strategic infrastructure, intellectual property, and private data.
“Russia will pose a long-term threat to the Alliance,” said Cavoli, adding that the West will have a “big Russia problem for years to come,” as Moscow works to expand the size of its military and reconstitute losses.
“The Russian army in Ukraine is bigger now than it was at the beginning of the fight,” he pointed out. “Many of the troops are not as high quality . . . a lot of the equipment fielded is older: It’s refurbished, but it’s based on an older model.”
Cavoli said the question at the top of Western leaders’ minds shouldn’t be about how fast Russia can reconstitute: It should be how fast can Russia rebuild its forces compared to the West. Maintaining an advantage in speed, he explained, is a matter of maintaining “political will” and developing the “elasticity” of the defense industrial base.
Many countries facing Russian influence “are looking westward right now” in search of new security partners, Cavoli said. While the Alliance was created to defend its members, “we don’t exist in a vacuum,” he said. “We need friends and partners.”

Katherine Walla is an associate director on the editorial team at the Atlantic Council.

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A bold policy to protect the US by helping Ukraine stop Russian aggression

John E. Herbst — Thu, 16 May 2024 20:40:40 +0000

Ambassador John Herbst, senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center, testifies before the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe hearing on “Closing the skies, liberating Ukraine.” Video from the hearings and other testimonies can be found below.

Below is the oral argument presented by Ambassador John Herbst.

The greatest national security challenge facing the United States is the partnership of aggressive authoritarian regimes seeking to undermine US leadership globally. The larger long-term threat comes from China. But the greatest short-term danger comes from our peer nuclear power, Russia, which is conducting a savage war designed to subjugate Ukraine and which would like to restore political control over all the territory of the Soviet Union, including three NATO states.

Ukraine is the place where we can and must deal a decisive blow to our adversaries. If we help Kyiv defeat Putin in Ukraine, we prevent further Russian aggression to the west and send a cautionary message to Xi to lay off Taiwan. It would also make it harder for Moscow to enable further Iranian aggression in the Middle East—a key factor in Hamas’ assault on Israel and the Houthis’ attacks on global shipping.

What does this mean for American policy now that Congress has passed the aid bill. The administration must first identify what is at stake in Ukraine. The problem is not a war in Ukraine, but a nuclear power seeking to subjugate Ukraine, and then move further west.

Containing a revisionist Russia…

Two things flow from this. First, we need a policy of containment for Russia, a position endorsed by representatives from ten think tanks at a Capitol Hill conference in early February. The place to contain and defeat Moscow is in Ukraine, a large country fighting for its right to live free as proud Ukrainians. Stopping Moscow there does not involve American soldiers. If our need is to contain and defeat Russia, providing $40 billion in aid a year is not a gift to Ukraine, but a smart investment in US security that represents under 4 percent of our defense budget.

Second, we need a clear policy goal towards Moscow’s war on Ukraine. The administration has repeated frequently that it would “stay with Ukraine as long as it takes.” That is not good enough. We need a clear goal of dealing a defeat to Russia or enabling a victory by Ukraine.

And enabling a Ukrainian victory…

What does this look like? The first order of business is to enhance Ukraine’s defensive lines so that Russia does not add to the incremental gains made when US military aid was in doubt. Russia is trying to take the town of Chasiv Yar and Kharkiv, 30 kilometers from the Russian border. Lately the Administration has moved smartly to get ammunition and artillery to Ukraine.

But more needs to be done to protect Kharkiv, other Ukrainian cities, and critical energy infrastructure from Russia’s massive aerial assault. This requires more air defense systems—American-produced Patriots and French SAMP-Ts. Ukraine has three Patriot batteries; it needs at least nine more. Some allies not in harm’s way could fill this void. There is a second dimension to this problem coming from American reluctance until mid-last year to back sending of F-16s to Ukraine even from European countries. NATO Allies are now on track to deliver over an air brigade’s worth of aircraft. Ukraine needs well over one hundred F-16s in order to stop Moscow’s successful use of glide bombs, launched from Russian warplanes that have been pounding Kharkiv. These F-16s would also be essential to any Ukrainian offensive in 2025. The White House needs to decide now to arrange the transfer of US F-16s with the necessary avionics and missiles.

Kyiv will choose the target of its next offensive. Putin’s greatest achievement in his ten-year war on Ukraine was the seizure of Crimea. But that asset is also a liability because it needs energy, water and weapons supply via the Kerch Bridge and the “land bridge” from occupied Donbas. The principal land bridge supply line is the railroad that runs south of Melitopol. Fear that a Ukrainian move 25-50 kilometers south and east of current lines could jeopardize rail supply has prompted Moscow to start constructing a line along the coast of the Sea of Azov.

The United States needs to take the lead in supplying Ukraine the means to jeopardize these supply lines. Were this to happen, the Kremlin would find it very expensive to supply Crimea, and Russian troops in Ukraine’s mainland south might find it necessary to retreat to either Crimea or Donbas. This would be a major setback and might even pose political problems for the Putin regime.

The administration must not repeat the mistakes of the first two years since the big invasion— undue caution in approving the transfer of the more advanced weapons systems Ukraine needs for success. The aid bill explicitly calls on the Administration to avoid this approach.

A strong policy designed to promote a Ukrainian victory would include an arms package with more de-mining equipment, tanks, artillery, and advanced electronic warfare (EW) capabilities. But the key here is not to enumerate all the current weapons needed. It is to make sure our policy follows military developments closely with the objective of anticipating and responding quickly to meet new Ukrainian needs on a fast-evolving battlefield. This also means that we need to change the Rules of Engagement for use of our weapons. We should follow the British and permit Ukraine to use our equipment to strike all military and military-related economic and logistical targets not just in occupied Ukraine, but in Russia. Russian troops and supplies are massed in Russia, less than 100 kilometers from Kharkiv. Why should we shackle Ukraine’s defense of its second largest city?

Organizing and innovating for success

The United States must also organize itself to meet the current, grave national security challenges. We need to put ourselves on a crisis or even a war-time footing. Major power war is arms-intensive. The United States and its allies need to substantially ramp up arms production, not just to arm Ukraine, but to prepare for a possible confrontation with Russia or China.

The United States should also name a senior official with the authority to ensure our increase in defense production and our efforts to facilitate a Ukrainian victory. That official would make sure that we are expediting the delivery of our military aid and other assistance and ensure integration of lessons learned from the battlefield into our assistance and plans for our own weapons production.

Finally, the administration should remove restrictions on military contractors from working in Ukraine—to aid Ukraine’s effort to establish maintenance and sustainment facilities for US equipment.

Congress too has a critical role to play in ensuring Ukraine the means to defeat Putin. The war shows the need for much greater flexibility in defense authorizations and appropriations. This means multi-year appropriations and greater flexibility in approving defense expenditures. Normally, Congress approves specific weapons projects. But the war in Ukraine has shown how rapidly even new weapons find themselves thwarted by electronic warfare countermeasures. Therefore approved weapons expenditures must have built in approval for adjustments as required by battlespace developments.

The United States won in World War II and in the Cold War in part because we had the ability to out-innovate and out-produce our foes. We need to build into our appropriations process measures that enable constant innovation.

None of this is beyond our means. We have a proud history of marshaling our material and intellectual resources to meet the greatest challenges. Doing so to ensure a Ukrainian victory is the smart way to keep us secure and prosperous. It is also the right thing to do to stop Moscow’s massive war crimes in Ukraine.

Ambassador John Herbst is the senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

Putin appoints economist as defense minister as Russia plans for long war

Mercedes Sapuppo — Tue, 14 May 2024 14:54:02 +0000

Vladimir Putin has appointed technocrat economist Andrei Belousov as Russia’s new defense minister in a shake-up that underlines his determination to wage a long war of attrition against Ukraine.

The relatively unknown Belousov replaces long-serving Sergei Shoigu, who will now take up a new post as Secretary of Russia’s National Security Council. Shoigu had led the Defense Ministry since 2012. Known as both a Putin loyalist and a personal friend of the Russian dictator who accompanied him on hunting holidays, he is the most senior figure to be dismissed since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.

While Shoigu’s tenure in office coincided with Russian military success stories such as the 2014 occupation of Ukraine’s Crimean peninsula and the 2015 Russian intervention in Syria, his reputation had been severely tarnished in recent years by the poor performance of the Russian army in Ukraine. The many battlefield setbacks suffered in Ukraine have been particularly embarrassing for Putin, who has long pointed to the revival of Russia’s military strength as one his greatest achievements.

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Shoigu’s removal took many by surprise but was not entirely unexpected. The announcement came just weeks after his deputy defense minister, Timur Ivanov, was arrested on corruption charges. At the time of Ivanov’s removal in late April, many speculated that Shoigu’s days as defense minister may also be numbered.

Shoigu’s replacement, Andrei Belousov, is a former deputy prime minister and minister of economic development who also served for a number of years as an economic advisor to Putin. The appointment of a civilian technocrat suggests that Putin aims to control military spending and improve efficiency at the ministry of defense as he looks to outproduce Ukraine and the country’s Western partners in a protracted confrontation.

Unlike his predecessor, Belousov has played no significant role in the invasion of Ukraine and is not tainted by the military defeats of the past two years. His long record of government service and relative anonymity make him in many ways a typical pick for Putin, who is notoriously reluctant to raise ambitious new faces to senior positions within the Kremlin leadership.

Speculation over Shoigu’s future has been mounting ever since the failure of Russia’s blitzkrieg offensive in the spring of 2022 during the initial stages of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. He has frequently been singled out for criticism by Russia’s military blogger community, and was repeatedly accused of corruption by former Wagner mercenary chief Yevgeny Prigozhin in a series of explosive video addresses on the eve of the short-lived June 2023 Wagner mutiny.

Unsurprisingly, Shoigu’s departure was widely cheered within Russia’s so-called “Z-patriot” pro-war community. Media tycoon and prominent Russian nationalist Konstantin Malofeyev toasted the news, while suggesting Belousov’s appointment would now make defense “the absolute priority” of Russian state policy. “We’ll have both guns and butter,” he commented.

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Putin’s decision to finally remove Shoigu and replace him with a veteran economist comes as he begins a fifth presidential term while bogged down in the largest European invasion since World War II. His new defense minister is now expected to focus on boosting domestic Russian arms production while channeling resources toward the development of the country’s defense tech sector. “Today on the battlefield, the winner is the one who is more open to innovation,” commented Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov on the recent ministerial changes in Moscow.

Belousov appears well qualified to meet the twin challenges of improving armament output and aiding Russia’s efforts to regain the technological advantage in the war against Ukraine. His long career in government gives him detailed knowledge of the Russian economy and the intricacies of state budgets, while he has a record of supporting the development of Russia’s drone capabilities. Belousov will now join a number of other senior government officials with similarly strong defense tech credentials including Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin, Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Chernyshenko, and Minister of Digital Development Maksut Shadayev.

Despite being removed from his defense post, Shoigu has not been kicked to the curb. His appointment as Secretary of Russia’s National Security Council, replacing longtime Putin confidant Nikolai Patrushev, should allow him to retain significant influence within the Kremlin. At the same time, it is not clear whether Shoigu will be able to exercise the same kind of power as his predecessor, who now takes on a new role as an aide to Putin. While this has the appearance of a slight demotion for Patrushev, the parallel promotion of his son Dmitry to the position of deputy prime minister would suggest that he will remain an influential figure.

The recent changes in the leadership of Russia’s Defense Ministry do not signal any fundamental shift in Putin’s war aims. On the contrary, this week’s appointment confirms Putin’s continued commitment to the invasion of Ukraine and his readiness to prioritize the war effort over all other considerations. Putin clearly intends to place Russia on an indefinite wartime footing, and hopes Belousov is capable of managing the process with maximum efficiency.

Mercedes Sapuppo is a program assistant at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

Intercepted Iranian drones were broadcast across international media outlets following Tehran’s attack on Israel on April 14. Even before this, Israeli soldiers were being effectively attacked by Hamas’s deployment of drones outfitted with explosives and deployed to disrupt infrastructure and equipment such as cameras or to attack personnel.

Once viewed as mere toys, small drones have undergone a lightning-fast evolution into accessible, weaponized technology, disrupting the established international order. The deceptive simplicity of drone production and launch stands in stark contrast to the complexity of developing effective countermeasures and policies. Furthermore, past policies myopically focused on foreign trade or counterintelligence concerns, without considering the broader market, which is driving mass production.

How did this happen? In the early 2000s, drones arrived in two categories. The first were out of reach to most countries without advanced platform developers. The second and smaller category of drones was hobbled by limited flight times, speed, and range, as well as flaws in their basic functionality. However, over the last twenty years, advancements in battery technology, miniaturized electronics, sensor development, and artificial intelligence (AI)—as well as a proliferation of legitimate business use cases—have transformed the sUAS market. Drones have shed weight and size, extending flight times, and they have become enhanced by high-resolution cameras. Advanced features such as obstacle avoidance, GPS tracking, and AI integration are now commonplace. This breadth of accessibility sparked a boom in commercial and dual-use applications, bringing drones into everything from agriculture, delivery services, and filmmaking to search and rescue missions.

Countering the current threat while developing systems to address future evolutions is difficult. Recent attacks in Jordan and Israel show how easy and economical it is to deploy one-way “dumb” drones that have a simplistic flying mechanism with limited course correction capabilities. However, “smart” drones with more advanced capabilities are increasingly available, too. This includes lethal autonomous weapons systems that do not require data connectivity between the operator and the drone to attack targets. They’re known as “fire, forget, and find” platforms.

The situation becomes even more concerning when hundreds of sUAS could be deployed at once in swarms. Options to defend against such a barrage are currently limited. Layered air defense systems such as Israel’s Iron Dome, which employs a combination of radar, projectiles, and missiles to intercept all incoming threats from ballistic missiles to drones, are one option. Directed energy weapons are another, though they are in earlier stages of development and deployment.

In March, General Michael Kurilla, commander of US Central Command, described the problem facing US forces: “I would love to have the Navy produce more directed energy that can shoot down a drone, so I don’t have to use an expensive missile to shoot it down. But what’s worse than not having that expensive missile shoot it down is [the drone] hitting that two-billion-dollar ship with three hundred sailors on it.”

All of this raises a critical question: Could the United States effectively counter the continuous barrage of threats it faces given the global proliferation of this technology?

Despite the rapid evolution of drone technology over the last two decades, the United States military did not release its first Counter-Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems Strategy until 2021, and it’s vastly insufficient to address the new security challenges afoot. Other departments are standing up exploratory defensive efforts, such as the Department of Homeland Security’s Science and Technology Office, but a coherent all-of-government approach is lacking. The Department of Defense’s strategy currently emphasizes a defensive posture, or in other words, defeating adversarial drones once they’re airborne and on the attack. What does this mean in practice? US countermeasures are limited in their capacity to deter or dismantle the proliferation of smart bombs on the market. Regulation is difficult because the technology itself isn’t inherently dangerous—these drones are made up of a combination of readily available parts, including technologies often found in commercial items like hair dryers and Ring cameras.

From a tactical perspective, the technology used to neutralize small drones is underdeveloped. When used effectively, electronic warfare techniques can jam them and bring them down, but they do so at the cost of interfering with radios, cellphones, and every other related technology in the drone’s vicinity. Slower moving sUAS can be shot down but are often not relied on for a lethal attack. The Joint Counter-small Unmanned Aircraft Systems Office (JCO), stood up in 2020, is partnering with US Special Operations Command to finish an expanded counter-drone strategy. Their objective is to take the strategy beyond its current defense posture—“right of launch”—to disrupting enemy drones before they commence flight. As the US defense industrial base has astutely complained: Capacity is a challenge, so the United States cannot rely solely on counteracting threats with smart bombs of its own.

While the heightened focus on a new strategy is a welcome relief, there appears to be far less cross-collaboration planned across the rest of the government, the broader national security community, and other states. This will do little to deter or counter adversarial threats; the United States needs to overhaul its approach with a comprehensive counter-drone strategy. A national strategy would need to incentivize the market and create sustainable conditions for dual-use protection while not inhibiting the benefits of drone technology.

Such a strategy should have four guiding principles.

Reusable and more affordable solutions: The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) Research and Engineering (R&E) should drive down the lifecycle cost of counter-drone measures by exploring and scaling production of reusable and more affordable technologies. R&E should partner with the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) for advanced technology concepts and with the Joint Counter-Unmanned Aerial Systems Office (JCO) for rapid prototyping and fielding of mature solutions. This would reduce reliance on expensive single-use systems. JCO, in collaboration with defense contractors, should invest in the development of cheap drone hunters specifically designed to eliminate enemy drones. JCO can leverage its authorities for rapid acquisition and technology insertion to expedite the development and fielding of these drone hunters.

Sensor technology for cheaper drone hunters: The Department of Defense, through the JCO and OSD R&E, should request additional funding toward research and development in advanced sensor technology for both drone hunters and broader counter-drone systems. This includes exploring affordable sensors for early detection of enemy drones, as well as miniaturized sensors for equipping cost-effective drone hunters.

Multitiered approach to proliferation: While sanctions can target large commercially unavailable UAS platforms, a multi-pronged approach is needed to address the proliferation of smaller, more easily assembled drones due to their dual-use nature. Many of the components used in these drones have legitimate civilian applications, with parts widely available through online electronics stores, making them difficult to control through traditional export restrictions. The Department of State in collaboration with the Department of Commerce should develop more stringent and standardized export controls for drone components. These US departments should cooperate with allies and partners for a harmonized response and collaborate on joint research and development of counter-drone measures.

Multilayered defense: Develop and fund a comprehensive national counter-drone strategy that incorporates a multilayered defense system. This system should leverage:

Early warning and detection: The Department of Defense should utilize advanced radar and sensor technology across the services to achieve early detection of drone threats.
Kinetic countermeasures: JCO should plan for cost-effective kinetic countermeasures investment, such as reusable or attritable drone interceptors.
Non-kinetic countermeasures: Through DARPA and military labs, the Department of Defense should develop advanced non-kinetic countermeasures that disrupt drone control signals and GPS navigation.

Russia’s war against Ukraine has made it clear that the Kremlin is comfortable pursuing maximalist war aims.

A close second is being prepared if deterrence fails. If Russia were to gear up for another major invasion, NATO would likely see it coming. The world watched for months in the winter of 2021-2022 as Moscow built up its forces around Ukraine. But NATO troops stationed today in Lithuania don’t have the fuel, ammunition, or manpower they would need to hold their ground in a worst-case scenario. At best, these US and Lithuanian troops currently have the capacity to repel a “minor incursion” by Russian troops.

But Russia’s war against Ukraine has made it clear that the Kremlin is comfortable pursuing maximalist war aims. NATO forces would likely need to evacuate before regrouping elsewhere, most likely Poland, before counterattacking. Should Russia capture the Suwałki Gap—the tight corridor between the Russian exclave of Kaliningrad and Belarus which links Lithuania to Poland—the Baltics would be all but encircled.

This is why Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is so existential for Lithuania—NATO’s plan is less to defend the Baltics than to retake them in the event that Russia launches another major land invasion. One look at the horrific war crimes uncovered in places like Bucha—buildings razed, civilians slaughtered in the streets, mass graves—shows why even a few weeks of occupation by Russian forces would pose a serious threat for Lithuanians.

Against this backdrop, the prospect of a second Trump administration in the United States raises concern in NATO’s eastern flank. In February, former President Donald Trump remarked that he “would encourage [Russia] to do whatever the hell they want” to allies who “didn’t pay” the equivalent of at least 2 percent of their gross domestic product (GDP) in defense spending. This threat raised the fear that the United States’ commitment to defend NATO allies—the critical factor deterring Russian President Vladimir Putin from widening his war beyond Ukraine—might not be so ironclad under Trump 2.0.

Of course, Lithuania and at least ten NATO allies are spending more than 2 percent of their GDP on defense, according to the latest figures from the Alliance. In 2023, Lithuania spent an estimated 2.5 percent of GDP, with the aim of reaching 3.5 percent, while the United States spent 3.5 percent. But 2023 figures also show that many countries in Western Europe are not meeting the 2 percent target, though Germany and France are on track to do so this year.

While the 2 percent threshold is a guideline, not a requirement, a lack of investment in defense has real implications for transatlantic security. European policymakers with whom we met in Brussels laid out the problem: Today, Europe alone does not have the industrial capacity to produce the materiel needed to defend the continent from a major Russian attack. Tepid economic growth, few incentives to entice companies to invest, lack of political will, and bureaucracy have all cut into the resources necessary to defend Europe should Russia embark on another aggressive military adventure.

The single best way to defend the Baltics is to ensure that Ukrainians get the tools they need to defeat Russia today.

As a result, countries such as Lithuania and Poland, which do see the urgent need for greater defense expenditure, often buy from the United States. This is good news for US manufacturers, but it raises interoperability concerns when countries try to integrate European and US systems, as well as concerns about US systems being expensive to purchase and maintain. “If we want to hit 3.5 percent of GDP on defense,” one Lithuanian official who requested anonymity told us, “we can buy lots of artillery shells or just a few F-35s.” European states that rely too heavily on the United States could risk failing to make necessary investments into Europe’s own defense industrial base. With the supplemental aid legislation recently passed by Congress injecting major new investments into the US defense sector, the clock is ticking for Europe to ramp up its own production.

To make up the gap, one EU policymaker, who requested anonymity to discuss sensitive matters, estimated that European allies would need to spend 3 percent of GDP on defense for the next several years, a prospect the official noted is likely untenable for a range of allies in Western and Southern Europe. Shaking whole countries from their complacency is no easy task when the Russian threat is comparably far away. While Trump’s comments in February unhelpfully raised concerns about the United States’ commitment to its allies, our conversations in Brussels suggested they may have also injected some urgency into defense discussions in Europe. July’s NATO Summit in Washington is an important opportunity for allies to announce a more energetic approach to collective defense.

In fact, the NATO Summit is an excellent platform for the United States and its NATO allies to coalesce around a strategy for victory in Ukraine. In almost every meeting with officials from Lithuania’s Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense, parliament, and presidential administration, we heard a serious desire for bolder US support for Ukraine and a more focused strategy for victory. While at a dinner with several Lithuanian officials, phones buzzing with news that long-range Army Tactical Missile Systems, known as ATACMS, had been sent to Ukraine elicited an immediate celebratory toast.

“We’re still waiting for the ‘Long Telegram,’” one Lithuanian official told us, referencing US diplomat George Kennan’s famous 1946 warning from Moscow painting the bigger picture for Washington about the threat represented by the Soviet Union. Kennan’s warning was the first real step toward crafting what would become Washington’s Cold War strategy of containment.

Tucked into the recently-passed supplemental aid package for Ukraine is a new requirement that the Biden administration deliver to Congress a strategy to “help hasten Ukrainian victory against Russia’s invasion forces in a manner most favorable to United States interests.” With Ukraine aid passed, this is the next big opportunity for the United States to show its allies that Washington is serious about Ukrainian victory.

NATO’s ongoing exercises will help the Alliance prepare for—and ideally deter—a potential Russian invasion of the Baltics. But one thing is clear from our conversations in Europe: The single best way to defend the Baltics is to ensure that Ukrainians get the tools they need to defeat Russia today, instead of NATO being forced to defend against Russia further down the line. That strategy is in progress in Europe, but it will require a clearer focus on victory from Washington and sustained investment from European capitals and manufacturers to become reality.

Andrew D’Anieri is a resident fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

Doug Klain is a policy analyst at Razom for Ukraine and a nonresident fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

Their trip to Brussels and Vilnius was organized and supported by the European External Action Service as part of its EU-US Emerging Leaders Programme.

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Starling and Gen. Cartwright publish in Defense One emphasizing the value of a new image for special operations forces

gmatchett — Sun, 05 May 2024 15:04:25 +0000

Director, Forward Defense

On May 5, Forward Defense Director Clementine Starling and Atlantic Council Board Director General James E. Cartwright, USMC (Ret.), published commentary in Defense One about the value that special operations forces (SOF) have in today’s great power competition.

They argued that SOF should reinforce not only their direct-action capabilities, but also the indirect competencies—special reconnaissance, unconventional warfare, foreign internal defense, civil affairs operations, military information support operations, and security force assistance—that can be employed both before, during, and after different phases of conflict. Starling and Cartwright emphasized that enhancing the role special operations forces in strategic competition requires the national security enterprise to support a new image of special operators as valuable enablers and a not just a last-minute force for avoiding escalation.

Staff

Clementine G. Starling-Daniels

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Security & Defense NATO

Report

Mar 7, 2024

Stealth, speed, and adaptability: The role of special operations forces in strategic competition

By Clementine G. Starling and Alyxandra Marine

Clementine G. Starling and Alyxandra Marine discuss how special operations forces enhance US readiness in an era of strategic competition.

Conflict Defense Policy

New Atlanticist

Apr 19, 2024

Great power competition is back. What does that mean for US special operations forces?

By Alyxandra Marine

With their wide array of capabilities, US special operations forces can play a central role in strategic competition.

China Conflict

The post Starling and Gen. Cartwright publish in Defense One emphasizing the value of a new image for special operations forces appeared first on Atlantic Council.

UK gives Ukraine green light to use British weapons inside Russia

Peter Dickinson — Fri, 03 May 2024 21:23:35 +0000

Ukraine can use British-supplied weapons to strike targets inside Russia, UK Foreign Secretary David Cameron stated during a May 2 visit to Kyiv. “Ukraine has that right,” Cameron told Reuters. “Just as Russia is striking inside Ukraine, you can quite understand why Ukraine feels the need to make sure it’s defending itself.”

The British Foreign Secretary’s comments represent a departure from the cautious position adopted by most of Ukraine’s Western partners over the past two years. Since Russia’s full-scale invasion began in February 2022, the majority of countries backing Ukraine have insisted that Western weapons can only be used within Ukraine’s international borders and must not be deployed against targets inside the Russian Federation.

These restrictions reflect widespread concerns in Western capitals over a possible escalation of the current war into a far broader European conflict. Moscow has skillfully exploited the West’s fear of escalation, with Kremlin officials regularly warning of Russian red lines and Vladimir Putin making frequent thinly-veiled nuclear threats.

So far, Russia’s intimidation tactics have proved highly effective. By threatening to escalate the war, Moscow has been able to slow down the flow of military aid to Ukraine, while also deterring the delivery of certain weapons categories and limiting Kyiv’s ability to strike back against otherwise legitimate targets inside Russia.

This has placed Ukraine at a significant military disadvantage. Already massively outgunned and outnumbered by its much larger and wealthier Russian adversary, Ukraine has had to defend itself without the ability to deploy Western weapons against Russia’s military infrastructure. Critics of this approach claim the West is effectively making Ukraine fight against a far larger opponent with one hand tied behind its back.

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With the existence of their country under threat, Ukrainians have bristled at Western restrictions and are using their own limited range of weapons to strike back. These attacks include a recent campaign of long-range drone strikes on Russian refineries that have hurt the Russian energy sector and divided opinion among Ukraine’s partners. While US officials have voiced their disapproval and urged Kyiv to focus on military targets, France has indicated its support.

The situation regarding the use of Western weapons on Russian territory has been further complicated by the Kremlin’s territorial claims inside Ukraine. In September 2022, Moscow declared the “annexation” of four Ukrainian regions and officially incorporated them into the Russian Constitution. Fighting has continued in all four of these partially occupied Ukrainian provinces, with the Ukrainian military free to deploy Western weapons despite the Kremlin’s insistence that these regions are now part of Russia.

In contrast to the caution displayed by Western leaders, Ukraine has repeatedly called Putin’s bluff and exposed the emptiness of Russia’s nuclear blackmail. Weeks after the Kremlin dictator ceremoniously announced the entry of Kherson into the Russian Federation, Ukrainian troops liberated the city. Rather than retaliating by deploying the might of Russia’s nuclear arsenal, Putin simply accepted this humiliating defeat and withdrew his beleaguered army across the Dnipro River.

The Kremlin’s reaction to mounting Ukrainian attacks on the Russian-occupied Crimean peninsula has been similarly underwhelming. Since first occupying Crimea in 2014, Putin has portrayed the peninsula in almost mystical terms as a symbol of Russia’s return to Great Power status. However, when Ukraine used a combination of locally developed naval drones and Western-supplied cruise missiles to sink or damage around one-third of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet, Putin quietly ordered the bulk of his remaining warships to retreat from Crimea and head for Russian ports. Despite the crucial role played by Western weapons in this Ukrainian success, there has been no sign of any escalation from Russia.

Eurasia Center events

Ukraine’s advance in Kursk: What’s next and implications

Conflict Russia Security & Defense Ukraine

With the Russian invasion now in its third year, there are indications that Western leaders may now finally be overcoming their self-defeating fear of escalation. In addition to David Cameron’s landmark comments regarding the use of British weapons inside Russia, the US has recently begun providing Ukraine with large quantities of long-range ATACMS missile systems capable of striking targets throughout occupied Ukrainian territory. Moscow had consistently warned against such deliveries, but has yet to provide any meaningful response to this highly conspicuous crossing of yet another Russian red line.

Meanwhile, French President Emmanuel Macron is actively attempting to reclaim the escalation initiative from Moscow by refusing to rule out the deployment of Western troops to Ukraine. This development has clearly riled the Kremlin. Putin has reacted to Macron’s newfound boldness by engaging in more nuclear blackmail, while the nuclear saber-rattling continued last weekend on Russia’s flagship current affairs TV show. None of this seems to have put Macron off. On the contrary, he remains adamant that direct Western military involvement in the defense of Ukraine must remain on the table.

This apparent strengthening of Western resolve comes at a pivotal moment in the war. With Ukrainian forces suffering from shortages in both ammunition and manpower, Russia has recently been able to regain the battlefield initiative and make significant advances for the first time in two years. Preparations are now underway for a major Russian summer offensive that could potentially break through Ukraine’s weakened front lines and deliver a knockout blow to the war weary country.

Removing restrictions on attacks inside Russia would enable Ukraine to disrupt preparations for the coming offensive. It would also limit Russia’s ability to bomb Ukrainian cities and destroy the country’s civilian infrastructure with impunity. This will not be enough to transform the course of the war, but it will go some way to evening out the odds.

By giving Kyiv the green light to use Western weapons in Russia, British Foreign Secretary David Cameron has established an important new precedent. This is in many ways fitting. After all, Britain has consistently set the tone for international aid since the eve of the Russian invasion, providing Ukrainians with anti-tank weapons, tanks, and cruise missiles in advance of other allies. Ukrainians will now be hoping the country’s other partners follow suit soon.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

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Ukraine’s mobilization bill was subject to approximately 4500 amendments, underlining the complexity of the issue. The final version focused on regulating the process of identifying and registering potential conscripts, reviewing eligibility for mobilization, and revising penalties for evading service. Key points include the introduction of an online registry for recruits and the lowering of the age for draft eligibility from 27 to 25.

In line with the new regulations, men of military age will now be obliged to update their registration details within 60 days of the law entering into force, either at regional offices or via an online portal. They will be required to carry their military registration documents and present them upon request or when applying for a passport. Meanwhile, penalties for evading mobilization remain relatively mild. These include modest fines and the potential revocation of drivers licenses.

The new mobilization law does not extend to military-age females. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy had earlier stated his opposition to obligatory military service for women. While they are not subject to conscription, many Ukrainian women do choose to enlist in the armed forces voluntarily, with approximately 60,000 currently serving in a variety of positions including front line roles.

To further boost the mobilization process, the Ukrainian army plans to open a network of 27 new recruitment centers in the coming months in major cities across the country. These centers will function as advisory and information hubs, providing guidance to those interested in joining the armed forces and allowing candidates to choose which unit they prefer to serve in. The first recruitment centers have already opened in Lviv and Zaporizhzhia. Initial reports are positive and indicate this modern approach to military service could help address some of the key concerns among potential recruits.

Eurasia Center events

Ukraine’s advance in Kursk: What’s next and implications

Conflict Russia Security & Defense Ukraine

Most of the criticism leveled at Ukraine’s new mobilization law has focused on the removal of earlier provisions regarding demobilization. Initial drafts envisaged the demobilization of military personnel after 36 months of service, and the rotation of those serving on the front lines for over six months. However, these clauses were taken out of the legislation at the last minute following appeals from Ukraine’s military leadership, who argued that they would weaken Ukraine by facilitating the withdrawal of the country’s most experienced military personnel without providing sufficient trained replacements. The Ukrainian Ministry of Defense is now working on a separate law to handle the demobilization issue.

While opinion remains divided over the fairness and effectiveness of Ukraine’s new mobilization law, few would argue that the country urgently needs to address manpower issues within the armed forces. Many analysts cite troop shortages as one of main challenges facing the Ukrainian military, along with insufficient weapons and ammunition deliveries from the country’s Western partners.

Russia does not currently appear to be encountering any such problems. In recent weeks, Ukrainian commanders have reported that their forces are now outnumbered by as many as ten to one at certain points along the front lines of the war. This overwhelming superiority in numbers is enabling Russia to advance on the battlefield despite suffering consistently high casualty rates.

With Russia’s initial blitzkrieg invasion now transformed into a war of attrition, the Kremlin aims to avoid a politically risky second wave of mobilization and maintain a steady stream of volunteers by offering a range of cash incentives for new recruits, including extremely high salaries and generous financial support for the families of servicemen. Recent reports indicate Russia is aiming to sign up hundreds of thousands of additional troops in the near future amid preparations for a major summer offensive.

Ukraine is now racing against the clock to strengthen its military before Russia’s summer offensive can get fully underway. The recent breakthrough in Washington DC regarding desperately needed US military aid will boost these efforts, as will the new mobilization law. However, with no end in sight to Russian aggression, Ukraine must also find long-term solutions to the country’s lack of new recruits and the thorny issue of demobilization.

Dr. Elena Davlikanova is a Democracy Fellow at the Center for European Policy Analysis and an associate professor at Sumy State University in Ukraine. Kateryna Odarchenko is a partner at SIC Group Ukraine.

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Officials in Kyiv hope this new wave of weapons deliveries will arrive in time to help stabilize the front lines of the war and prevent further Russian advances. In recent months, Russia has taken advantage of the Ukrainian military’s mounting supply problems to edge forward at various points along the one thousand kilometer front line, often overwhelming Ukrainian defenses with sheer numbers and relentless bombardments.

During Stoltenberg’s Kyiv visit, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy urged NATO partners to send additional military aid as quickly as possible. The Ukrainian leader said the battlefield situation “directly depended” on the timely delivery of ammunition supplies to Ukraine. “Today, I don’t see any positive developments on this point yet. Some supplies have begun to arrive, but this process needs to speed up.”

The sense of urgency in Kyiv reflects widespread expectations that Vladimir Putin will launch a major summer offensive in late May or early June. Having already succeeded in regaining the battlefield initiative, Russian commanders now hope to smash through Ukraine’s weakened defensive lines and achieve major territorial gains for the first time since the initial stages of the invasion in spring 2022. Ukraine’s international partners currently find themselves in a race against the clock to strengthen the country’s defensive capabilities before Russia’s anticipated offensive can get fully underway.

Eurasia Center events

Ukraine’s advance in Kursk: What’s next and implications

Conflict Russia Security & Defense Ukraine

Ukraine’s recent supply issues and battlefield setbacks have highlighted the need for a more reliable long-term approach to arming the country against Russia. At present, Ukraine’s ability to defend itself depends heavily on the changing political winds in a number of Western capitals. This makes it difficult for Ukraine’s military and political leaders to plan future campaigns, while also encouraging the Kremlin to believe it can ultimately outlast the West in Ukraine.

In order to address this problem, Stoltenberg has proposed the creation of a $100 billion, five-year fund backed by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s 32 members. While in the Ukrainian capital, he reiterated his support for this initiative. “I believe we need a major, multi-year financial commitment to sustain our support. To demonstrate that our support to Ukraine is not short term and ad hoc, but long-term and predictable.”

Crucially, Stoltenberg believes a five-year fund would help convince the Kremlin that Ukraine’s NATO partners have the requisite resolve to maintain their support until Russia’s invasion is defeated. “Moscow must understand: They cannot win. And they cannot wait us out,” the NATO chief commented in Kyiv.

Stoltenberg’s message has never been more relevant. With the Russian invasion now in its third year, Putin is widely believed to be counting on a decline in Western support for Ukraine. Following the failure of his initial blitzkrieg attack in 2022, the Russian dictator has changed tactics and is now attempting to break Ukraine’s resistance in a long war of attrition. Given Russia’s vastly superior human and material resources, this approach has a good chance of succeeding, unless Ukraine’s Western partners remain committed to arming the country.

The issue of a long term military fund for Ukraine will likely be high on the agenda at the 2024 NATO Summit in Washington DC in July. With little hope of any meaningful progress on Ukraine’s NATO membership aspirations, a commitment to provide reliable long-term support may be the most realistic summit outcome for Kyiv. This would not solve the existential challenges posed by resurgent Russian imperialism, but it would bolster the Ukrainian war effort and dent morale in Moscow while sending a message to Putin that time is not on his side.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

Fellow

Max Brooks

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Crisis Management National Security

Public Event Fri, April 19, 2024 • 2:30 pm ET

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Michta in Politico on the imperative of Europe’s rearmament

gmatchett — Tue, 23 Apr 2024 18:30:00 +0000

Original SOurce

On April 22, Andrew Michta, director and senior fellow in the Scowcroft Strategy Initiative, published an op-ed entitled “Without European rearmament, NATO is setting itself up for failure” in Politico that discusses why Europe must rearm at speed and scale to prevent future threats to its security architecture.

Europe’s NATO allies need to move full speed ahead to resource their militaries. As long as the Russian imperial state exists in its current form, the threat it poses to Europe won’t go away.

Andrew Michta

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The war in Ukraine could reach a decision point by the NATO Summit. Policymakers need to prepare now.

Andrew A. Michta — Tue, 23 Apr 2024 15:45:38 +0000

Russia has launched its third major mobilization wave in anticipation of its upcoming spring/summer campaign to take more land in Ukraine. On March 31, Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a decree to begin the next conscription drive, setting the target at 150,000 new inductees slated for military service. This came after a decision in July of last year by the Russian Duma to raise the maximum age of conscription from twenty-seven to thirty, significantly increasing the pool of available recruits. Ukrainian estimates put the number of new soldiers that could be inducted in the third Russian mobilization drive at as many as three hundred thousand by June.

There are various assessments about the extent to which the Russian land forces have been reconstituted since Russia’s initial losses, with some analysts arguing that the process is nearly complete. But regardless of these various assessments, the gap between Russia’s and Ukraine’s military capabilities—and the difference in sheer mass—continues to grow apace, even though Kyiv recently lowered the draft age for Ukrainian males from twenty-seven to twenty-five. Recent frontline gains by Russia, along with US aid to Ukraine moving forward in Congress only after months of delays, suggest that a major decision point in the war may be approaching in the coming months. While the US House of Representatives at last agreed on Saturday to send $60.8 billion in aid to Ukraine, which means the United States could soon be sending desperately needed ammunition and air defenses to the front lines, a Russian push already appears to be in its early stages. And it could well create a crisis for the NATO alliance much bigger than the current grumbling over who is spending more on Ukraine’s behalf.

Considering that Russian infantry may receive as little as a few months’ training before they are thrown into battle—and the fact that Moscow continues to build new training facilities—it is likely that the new offensive will coincide or overlap with the upcoming seventy-fifth anniversary NATO summit in Washington on July 9-11. In line with official Russian propaganda that this war is being fought not just against Ukraine but against NATO, and that it is a civilizational struggle against the “collective West,” Putin could seize the opportunity to launch a major offensive during the Washington summit, with the intention of humiliating the Alliance precisely as it celebrates three-quarters of a century of containing Moscow’s imperial ambitions. In such a scenario, the US presidential election could become a defining variable in how the war ends. (Increasingly extreme scenarios of how the war may end following the US presidential election have already emerged in the European press.)

Simply put, if Putin launches a major push during the summit, would the Biden administration be able to maintain its “as long as it takes” strategy of sustaining Ukraine while minimizing the risk of nuclear escalation? Or would a Russian breakthrough in Ukraine be seen by the president’s reelection team as an untenable liability just months before the vote, especially given that his likely Republican opponent would be certain to make the failure of US policy in Ukraine an issue in the campaign?

A shared vision of victory in Ukraine

The monthslong delay of approving additional US aid to Ukraine, and the fact that Kyiv got serious about building up its defenses only six months ago, increase the country’s vulnerabilities and the prospect that the latest Russian offensive may achieve a breakthrough, or at the very least widen the front. However, the biggest problem remains the Biden administration’s overall approach of providing just enough aid to Kyiv so that Ukraine can hold the line, while draining Russian warfighting capabilities and limiting the risk of nuclear escalation. This position taken by the Biden administration has, for example, allowed Chancellor Olaf Scholz of Germany, the largest power in Europe, to sustain his “Russia must not win, Ukraine must not lose” strategic ambiguity, which stays the course toward eventual negotiations with Moscow to end the conflict.

Given the perceived stalemate on land, and despite clear Ukrainian gains at sea, some analysts today are indeed coming to the view that the war in Ukraine is heading for a negotiated settlement. In such a hypothetical settlement, Ukraine would preserve its sovereignty and independence while Russia keeps its territorial gains in the east, plus Crimea. Setting aside the fact that such an outcome would be tantamount to a Russian victory, these predictions could be undone by developments on the ground, much as the prevailing view in early 2022 that Ukraine would fall fast and resort to guerrilla operations was invalidated by Kyiv’s staunch resolve to stand its ground and fight. So, rather than incessantly speculating about this or that territorial settlement or this or that negotiated deal, what Ukraine and the transatlantic community need most urgently is a shared vision of victory in Ukraine, one that Kyiv and its supporters can rally around. Next, the United States and its allies and partners need a strategy—with resources to match—that will allow Ukraine to achieve that victory. After all, to rephrase a cliché, visions without resources are merely hallucinations.

In the coming months, the Biden administration could change course on Ukraine. If the Russians advance in Ukraine, the administration would have two choices: stay the course and increase the risk of Ukrainian losses, or shift from a “for as long as it takes” policy to an approach of “whatever the Ukrainians need to beat the Russians back.” This would potentially increase the risk of escalation with Russia, but it would also deflect the electoral risk of being blamed for the failure of US policy in Ukraine, while giving Kyiv a fighting chance to reach a favorable position from which to negotiate.

If Ukraine is to have a shot at reversing the tide on the battlefield, it will need to receive a large quantity of long-range artillery to strike at rail links, fuel depots, ammunition depots, command posts, and airfields deep inside Russian territory. Absent those weapons and authorities, another Ukrainian frontal assault on the Russian defensive line is likely to lead to widespread casualties for the Ukrainian army once again.

At the strategic level, the Biden administration and US allies across Europe need a serious public conversation about a vision of victory that goes beyond the assertions that Russia cannot win in Ukraine and that the West’s enduring commitment to Ukraine remains unshakeable. The transatlantic community needs a forthright discussion of the end state it wants, in clearly defined geostrategic terms rather than open-ended general support, followed by a commitment of resources to achieve those goals.

This summer will likely bring a decision point when it comes to US Ukraine policy. Depending on what happens in the next several months, the conflict may move into uncharted territory.

Andrew A. Michta is senior fellow and director of the Scowcroft Strategy Initiative at the Atlantic Council. Views expressed here are his own.

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Iraq’s prime minister on how to elevate US-Iraqi relations beyond just security

Daniel Hojnacki — Mon, 22 Apr 2024 18:12:13 +0000

Watch the event

Iraq’s prime minister on building a stronger relationship with the United States

AN #ACFRONTPAGE EVENT—Mohammed Shia’ Al-Sudani, the prime minister of Iraq, discusses his state visit to the United States.

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“I came to Washington to open a new chapter in the relationship between Iraq and the United States,” said Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia’ Al-Sudani at an Atlantic Council Front Page event on April 19.

This new chapter in US-Iraqi relations will entail Washington and Baghdad activating the Strategic Framework Agreement, which he said will encompass the economic, cultural, education, and energy sectors and “move away” from “restricting the relationship to security and military cooperation.”

Sudani outlined the meetings he had had with US officials in Washington last week, including discussions with US President Joe Biden on April 15. The two leaders reached an agreement on the US-Iraqi security dialogue, pledging to follow the US-Iraq Higher Coordinating Committee’s recommendations for updating the two countries’ relations.

“We are looking forward to a more sustainable relation with the United States that rests on mutual interests, reciprocal respect, and fruitful cooperation between our people,” said Sudani.

Below are more highlights from the discussion with Sudani—moderated by Abbas Kadhim, director of the Atlantic Council’s Iraq Initiative—on US-Iraqi relations, Iraq’s diplomacy with Turkey, and the Israel-Hamas war.

US-Iraq relations

Sudani said his diplomatic goal for his country “is to make Iraq a common ground for cooperation” rather than “a ground for settling scores of the exchange of messages of hostility.”
The emphasis on military and security cooperation in Iraq’s relations with the United States was “required in certain times in the past,” Sudani said. But, he argued, Iraq is now experiencing “a new reality of adequate security and stability.” He added that Iraqi “security forces today cooperate well with their counterparts in many Arab countries and other partners.”
In addition to US government officials, Sudani also met last week with “a large number of US companies,” some of which are already operating in Iraq and some “interested in doing business in our country.”

Erdoğan’s Iraq visit

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s April 22 trip to Iraq “is not a casual visit,” said Sudani, as the trip comes after years of diplomatic work and preparation.
On Iraqi-Turkish security issues, Sudani stated: “We do not allow anyone to use Iraqi territories to threaten Turkey, and we will not accept any operations against threats to Turkey without coordination with the Iraqi government.”
Sudani also said that he and Erdoğan would discuss improving cooperation on water management as well as the “development road” project planned to link an Iraqi port in Basra to Turkey, which Sudani said he expects to be “operational in a short time.”

Regional challenges

“We all, with the United States in the lead,” said Sudani, need to work toward “ending the war in Gaza immediately and terminating the bloodshed once and for all,” as well as to “create the conditions to form a Palestinian state.”
Sudani spoke of the need to prevent the Israel-Hamas war from becoming a wider regional conflict, stating that the expansion of the war “will constitute a real threat to international peace and security.”
Sudani also addressed the case of Elizabeth Tsurkov, the Russian-Israeli researcher who has been held hostage by Kata’ib Hezbollah in Iraq since March 2023. “This is not a case we have abandoned,” Sudani said, adding that Iraq has formed an investigative team and is working with other countries “in order to find her and to take all the culprits in the kidnapping to the justice system.”

Daniel Hojnacki is an assistant editor on the editorial team at the Atlantic Council.

Watch the full event

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Konaev cited in Taipei Times about drone warfare, deterring China, and global conflict

gmatchett — Sat, 20 Apr 2024 15:08:38 +0000

Former Nonresident Senior Fellow

On April 20, Forward Defense Nonresident Senior Fellow Margarita Konaev was quoted in the Taipei Times about drone warfare as a deterrent against China and its implications on increasing global conflict.

Former fellow

Margarita Konaev

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Conflict Defense Technologies

The post Konaev cited in Taipei Times about drone warfare, deterring China, and global conflict appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Iran once had air inferiority. After its attack on Israel, it flies high.

Borzou Daragahi — Fri, 19 Apr 2024 19:39:21 +0000

Iran’s unprecedented April 14 attack on Israeli territory was a warning shot. It showed Tehran’s potential ability to put a dent in Israel’s formidable air superiority despite essentially its lacking a modern air force.

The direct Iranian air attack on Israeli soil was a watershed moment in the region’s steadily deteriorating security status quo. It revealed nothing new about Iran’s military capabilities. But it suggested the alarming potential for Iran to exploit Israel’s lack of strategic depth and showed a frightening willingness on the part of Tehran’s leadership to outmatch Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s recklessness. It was the first time any nation directly targeted Israel since Iraq’s Saddam Hussein launched Scud missiles against the country in 1991.

While it is highly unlikely that this attack will deter future Israeli actions against Iranian assets, it will prompt defense strategists in Washington and Israel to revise their calculations about the limits of Iran’s risk tolerance and capabilities. That, combined with pressure from the White House, may have reigned in the magnitude of Israel’s response, which came on April 19 in a series of attacks on central Esfahan province.

Some foreign policy hands described Iran’s attack on Israel as a miscalculation, a strategically and diplomatically counterproductive response to the deadly April 1 Israeli attack on the Iranian embassy compound in Damascus, Syria, which killed Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Quds Force commander Mohammad Reza Zahedi, seven other officers, and two civilians. Iran’s counterattack, some said, will rally world opinion around Israel just as it was coming under pressure over its conduct in the unfolding six-month offensive against Hamas in Gaza.

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But the Islamic Republic and its Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei see the world through a different prism. In numerous public statements, Tehran celebrated the multipronged attack on Israel as a resounding success. “We carried out a limited operation, which was commensurate with the Zionist regime’s evil acts,” IRGC commander Major General Hossein Salami said in comments reported by IRGC-affiliated Tasnim News Agency. “It could have been more widespread, but we confined the operation to that section of the Zionist regime’s facilities that had been used for attacking our embassy.”

At such moments, Iranian officials are often full of rhetoric that fails to live up to the facts. Indeed, none of the drones or missiles managed to evade Israel’s air defenses—which were assisted by the United States, United Kingdom, France, and Jordan—or inflict significant infrastructural damage.

But that may have well been by design. Israel and the United States, through European and Middle Eastern intermediaries, had warnings that the attack was coming, giving them crucial hours or days to ready air defenses.

Iran considers itself surrounded by enemies and threats, some of an existential caliber. When backed into what it perceives as a corner, as it was after the United Nations refused to condemn the attack on its Damascus embassy, it almost always favors escalation over compromise, provoking fear and uncertainty over conventional diplomacy.

In any case, none of the countries it considers friendly will punish Tehran for the attack. China, Iran’s most important patron, referred to the drone and rocket barrage as “spillover from the Gaza conflict.” Russia, too, focused on “numerous unresolved crises in the Middle East, primarily in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict” and made an unsubtle dig at Netanyahu by describing the Damascus attack as “irresponsible” and “provocative.” Beijing and Moscow will likely lead the way in watering down or vetoing any United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolution that singles out Iran, which has turned even more strongly away from its Eurasian partners since the breakdown of the nuclear deal after the US withdrawal in 2018.

Khamenei publicly ordered retaliation after characterizing the consulate attack as an Israeli attack on Iranian soil—and thus equivalent to an attack within Iran’s borders—a proposition that is debatable at best. It is also likely that the Iranians had already designed some version of the attack that unfolded and that leadership of the IRGC and the Supreme National Security Council was eagerly looking forward to an opportunity to demonstrate its ability to shatter Israel’s sense of calm.

According to unnamed Israeli officials cited by the New York Times, the late-night attack involved 185 drones, thirty-six cruise missiles, and 110 surface-to-surface missiles launched mainly from Iran, but also from Iraq and Yemen. The attack closed schools, throttled commerce, and brought the country to a standstill during the first day of its workweek. While air defenses prevented the attack from damaging targets, one can easily imagine the impact of such a barrage if three thousand or thirty thousand weapons were launched without the benefit of a seventy-two-hour warning. Lebanon’s Hezbollah, Iran’s staunchest ally, reportedly wields an arsenal of 150,000 rockets and missiles.

Air power has been Iran’s security Achilles heel since the eight-year Iran-Iraq war (1980–1988), when Saddam Hussein bombed Iranian cities, including the capital, in a series of campaigns that traumatized a generation of Iranians. Following that war, Iran struggled to build air power and instead invested the bulk of its resources in building a ballistic missile program. Iran’s cheap combat drones were first deployed in clandestine attacks by proxies in Yemen against Saudi Arabia, and in Syria and Iraq against US forces.

Even as its militias and proxies extend Iran’s influence throughout the region, Iran has struggled to gain traction in the air, in part, due to sanctions. It wrangled with Russia for years to finally deliver and install $800 million worth of S-300 mobile anti-aircraft defense systems. Iran has been even more frustrated in its efforts to update a rickety fleet of planes consisting of a few dozen MiG-29s that it appropriated from Iraq ahead of the first US war, and a couple of dozen dilapidated 1970s F-14s Tomcats maintained with black-market parts.

Iran recently made progress on acquiring some modern aircraft, including Sukhoi Su-35 fighter jets, but it will take years before it can train pilots and field such a force. Facing years of UNSC restrictions on transfers of most weapons, it has steadily expanded both the range and accuracy of its missile and drone programs.

In a prophetic essay published last year in the journal Aether, US Air Force Major Joshua Dryden described the core of the Iran-Israel conflict “as one in which Iran seeks to deny Israel freedom of action in the air, while Israel attempts to counter these efforts.”

While Israel has largely been successful at stalling Iran’s advances, “the broader trend toward a more contested environment is one Israeli political leaders must now consider.”

Though it is difficult to glean the regime’s calculations in ordering the scale and nature of the attack, it likely considered the domestic cost and damaged morale of failing to retaliate to a strike that killed several senior security officials. Khamenei and his advisers may have felt compelled to deliver a response that would be at least as disruptive, headline grabbing, and potentially deterrent as the cruise missiles Iran launched against a US military base in western Iraq after the 2020 assassination of IRGC Quds Force commander Qasem Soleimani. While much of the discussion of the Iran-Israel conflict has been focused on proxy ground attacks, clandestine operations, and cyberwarfare, April 14 marks a new and dangerous escalation in the skies.

Borzou Daragahi is a journalist who has covered the Middle East, North Africa, and Europe for US and UK news outlets since 2002. He is also a nonresident fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Security Initiative. Follow him on X: @borzou.

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Hammes referenced in a Georgetown Security Studies Review article about autonomous military systems

gmatchett — Fri, 19 Apr 2024 16:01:32 +0000

On April 18, Forward Defense Nonresident Senior Fellow Thomas X. Hammes was referenced in a Georgetown Security Studies Review piece titled “From Sling and Stone to Autonomous Drone? Key Questions for Determining Whether Autonomy Favors Davids or Goliaths,” about autonomous military systems (AMS) favoring conventionally “weaker” or poorer actors.

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Thomas X. Hammes

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John E. Herbst: The long overdue aid package is good news for Ukraine and US interests

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Your primer on the US House security bills for Ukraine, Israel, the Indo-Pacific, and more

Atlantic Council experts — Thu, 18 Apr 2024 23:38:53 +0000

Here’s the 4-1-1. Four bills are heading toward a vote in the US House, likely Saturday, intended to provide additional aid to Ukraine, Israel, and Taiwan—more than ninety billion dollars in all. One man, Speaker Mike Johnson, is orchestrating this four-part package, which would also back efforts to seize Russian assets to support Ukraine, among other measures. Finally, there’s one group to turn to make sense of the pending legislation: Atlantic Council experts. Below, they share their insights on what’s in the legislation and why it matters.

Click to jump to an expert analysis:

Shelby Magid: How Speaker Johnson got to yes

Kitsch Liao: New Indo-Pacific funding reflects Congress’s concern with the state of US deterrence against China

Charles Lichfield: The House is taking a page from the Senate on immobilized Russian assets

Thomas S. Warrick: Beware the pitfalls ahead for this national security package

The long overdue aid package is good news for Ukraine and US interests

Johnson made good Wednesday on his months-long promise to put a major aid package for Ukraine on the floor of the House of Representatives. The amount of aid to Ukraine is roughly the same as the package passed by the Senate in February—$60.5 billion in overall aid, with about $37 billion for weapons, and $10 billion for economic aid in the form of a loan. Making the economic aid a loan was a new feature in the package required by the Republicans. The military package also includes three-hundred-kilometer range ATACMS, a missile system that the Biden administration had long refused to provide for fear of Kremlin “escalation.” The original Senate package included aid to Ukraine, Israel, and the Western Pacific. Johnson has introduced separate bills for each region.

Johnson’s move is very good news for Ukraine, as well as US interests in Europe and globally. While Republican populists in the House are pushing back hard against the aid for Ukraine, it is likely to pass with a substantial bipartisan majority—in the same way the Senate aid bill passed in February.

The introduction of the aid package is long overdue. A major aid package should have been passed in September. The Kremlin greeted the delay—and the uncertainty regarding the aid’s future—as a victory because without US weapons, Ukraine would likely be conquered by Russian President Vladimir Putin. Russia has enjoyed a large advantage in weaponry since it launched its 2022 invasion. Even before the delay, Russia had a five-to-one advantage in ordnance. And the delay in aid has in fact required Ukraine to ration the use of ordnance over the past four months—one major factor in Russia’s success in capturing Avdiivka last winter.

The Biden administration has assured us that it is prepared to send ordnance to Ukraine upon passage of the bill. That will have an immediate, positive impact on the course of the war. Along with the ammunition and weapons likely to arrive soon under Czech President Petr Pavel’s initiative, Ukraine should soon be in a position to stop the incremental gains Moscow has eked out this year with massed kamikaze assaults. Ukraine should also be able to better defend its infrastructure against Moscow’s massive air campaign. But this last need requires the supply of more Patriot missiles and other air-defense systems.

—John E. Herbst is the senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center and a former US ambassador to Ukraine.

How Speaker Johnson got to yes

It has been a dizzying six months watching House Republicans fight over how to both respond to national security priorities, especially regarding aid to Ukraine in its fight against Russian aggression, and manage dynamics within their own conference. Johnson has faced months of increasing pressure from all fronts—the White House, NATO allies, influential former and current GOP voices, religious leaders, Ukrainians, and House Democrats who have sought to force a vote on the Senate-approved package via a discharge petition.

First behind closed doors and now publicly, Johnson has grown firmer in his understanding that the United States needs to stand up against the threat from Russia, an adversary increasingly aligned with Iran, North Korea, and other US foes. By Wednesday, he was giving the most forceful public case he’s made yet. “We’re going to stand for freedom and make sure that Vladimir Putin doesn’t march through Europe,” Johnson said in one TV interview. But he has had to balance this belief and the knowledge that he needs to lead with a desire to keep his position as speaker amid another growing pressure—that of an ouster from far-right members whose opposition to supporting Ukraine has benefitted Putin’s aggression and found favor in the Kremlin.

These months of deliberation have put Russia in a stronger position in its war against Ukraine, directly increasing the threat to US and allied national security. But by moving ahead with these four bills this week, Johnson appears to have finally risen to the challenge—while trying to make it palatable for his party. The long-held view remains that once Ukraine aid gets to the floor it will pass, with enough Republicans joining Democrats to vote for it. For those who fear that Republicans may still pull the rug out from under Ukraine and only support the Israel bill, it’s worth remembering that the Senate stands strong in its bipartisan conviction that US national security requires a response to Russia—and that support for Ukraine must be included in the military aid package. As with the whole saga of this package, we need to see the gavel drop on a House floor vote to believe it is finally happening. But with a necessary dose of caution, it appears we’re nearly there.

—Shelby Magid is the deputy director of the Eurasia Center.

New Indo-Pacific funding reflects Congress’s concern with the state of US deterrence against China

First of all, it is a relatively positive development to disaggregate the three bills, as the Pacific portion of the bill has largely received unanimous bipartisan support. The bill’s aim is threefold: to address China’s rapid growth into a nuclear peer power, tackle the inadequacies in authorization for the Pacific Deterrence Initiative (PDI), and to rectify some issues in Taiwan’s unique security assistance situation.

The bill’s two billion-dollar investment in the Columbia-class ballistic missile submarine force reflected Congress’s concern over the average age of the current force, which is already exceeding its original thirty-year projected service life. This is in contrast to China’s rapidly increasing number of nuclear warheads and new Type 096 ballistic missile submarines, which are projected to enter construction in the near future. Additionally, the $293 million for the submarine industrial base also neatly addressed the Navy’s top unfunded priorities mere weeks after Admiral Lisa Franchetti submitted them to Congress. This funding, as well as the fact that Congress raised the PDI’s 2024 budget from the Biden administration’s $8.1 billion request by $5 billion, indicated that Congress is concerned about the speed with which the United States is implementing its deterrence against China in the near term.

For the Taiwan portion of the bill, it is worth noting this language: “for replacement, through new procurement or repair of existing unserviceable equipment, or defense articles from stocks of the Department of Defense.” This is a clear reference to the previous assistance Taiwan received through the Presidential Drawdown Authority (PDA). The successful PDA transfer has established a valuable precedent, worked out relevant bureaucratic processes, and established several new categories of valuable security assistance. However, the understandable priority of aiding Ukraine in its ongoing struggle against the Russian invasion has resulted in some of that aid coming from excess US defense articles. Questions about the ability to maintain and support these aging articles threaten Taiwan’s readiness for future operations. These issues can now be resolved through the new bill.

Additionally, Title Three of the bill further provides the Department of State, which heads the interagency effort in foreign military sales to Taiwan, with the necessary resources to combat chronic delays in the delivery of weapon systems to Taiwan.

—Kitsch Liao is an assistant director of the Atlantic Council’s Global China Hub. Previously, he worked in the US Congress, in diplomatic postings, and as a cyber intelligence analyst for the private sector.

The House is taking a page from the Senate on immobilized Russian assets

We know the Rebuilding Economic Prosperity and Opportunity for Ukrainians (REPO) Act from the Senate. Senators Jim Risch and Sheldon Whitehouse managed to secure bipartisan support for their draft in the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee in late January. The draft, which appeared this week as part of the “fourth pillar” of the House Republican national security supplemental package, is very similar. It still empowers the executive branch to seize the immobilized sovereign assets of the Russian Federation, but does not force it to.

This would only apply to the less than ten billion dollars believed to be in the United States, and not the majority of the $320 billion in immobilized assets in Europe. It acknowledges the need for robust dialogue with the rest of the sanctions-wielding coalition before taking this step together. Like the Senate draft, it would also provide the administration with another six months before having to declare how much is immobilized in the United States, and where. Given how much we know about where and how assets are immobilized in Europe, it is surprising that Washington is still able to keep the details of the relatively small amount that is here a secret.

—Charles Lichfield is the deputy director and C. Boyden Gray senior fellow of the Atlantic Council’s GeoEconomics Center.

Beware the pitfalls ahead for this national security package

Congress should pass a supplemental appropriation for military aid to Ukraine, Israel, and the United States’ Pacific allies, as well as humanitarian aid for Gaza and Sudan, because this is in the security interest of the United States. There is a reason House Democratic leader Hakeem Jeffries called this a “Churchill or Chamberlain moment.” Yet for this to work out in the next few days, the bill must still go through a considerable number of steps. With stakes this high, it’s worth noting where the pitfalls are, so they can be avoided.

1. On Thursday or Friday, the House of Representatives needs to pass a rule governing debate on military and humanitarian aid packages and a related bill on a set of security measures that have bipartisan support. Johnson is committed to voting on each package separately, perhaps with a package of Republican-only measures on the border, then combining the first four—but not the border measures—into a single bill to send to the Senate. The rule will set out the procedures for how debate will occur and what amendments will be allowed on the floor of the House. Given opposition from some Republicans, Democrats will need to go against Washington tradition and vote for the rule.

2. Saturday’s floor debate has to produce no serious surprises. It’s possible that two disgruntled House members could bring a motion to vacate the position of speaker of the House, a privileged motion that could derail the debate on the aid bills or delay the vote.

3. Depending on the rule (see point 1), there could be showstopping amendments that will be voted on the floor of the House. This overall supplemental is viable only because it has elements that both Democrats and Republicans want, with no “poison pills” on abortion, climate change policy, or other divisive issues. There need to be no surprises on showstopping amendments.

4. The bills have to pass the House. So long as points 1-3 are met, the aid packages should all pass, but voting can never be taken for granted. Final passage will require a significant number of both Democratic and Republican “yea” votes.

5. The Senate needs to move quickly. After House passage, Majority Leader Chuck Schumer will likely ask for the unanimous consent of the Senate to agree on a few hours for debate and a vote. One senator could object, forcing the Senate to take several days to debate the bill, no matter how urgent the military aid is.

6. The Senate needs to avoid amending the House bill. That would require the House to approve the revised version. Here’s hoping the Senate passes what the House passes. Otherwise, go back to point 1.

7. The Senate needs to pass the bill. If there are no changes from where the bills stand now, the Senate vote should be strongly in favor.

8. Once the same version is passed by both the House and the Senate, President Joe Biden will sign it. That part, at least, is sure to go as it should.

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Pax Americana vs. autonomy: How the US and EU defense industrial strategies diverge

Kathryn Levantovscaia — Wed, 17 Apr 2024 17:58:52 +0000

The United States has a two-pronged approach to strategy making, with both a National Security Strategy and a National Defense Strategy. These documents function as roadmaps for policymakers, guiding military planning, shaping other Department of Defense initiatives, and informing resource allocation to address the most significant threats facing the nation.

But these strategies depend on a robust industrial base. A healthy industrial sector enables deterrence against aggression, battlefield success in times of conflict, and the maintenance of a technological edge over adversaries. While the importance of this sector has long been recognized, it wasn’t until this year that both the United States and the European Union (EU) formally introduced dedicated defense industrial strategies.

Why? The war in Ukraine was a wake-up call to the West—one which exposed lengthy production timelines, capability gaps, supply chain vulnerabilities, workforce deficiencies, and a number of other inefficiencies in both the United States and Europe. While both the US National Defense Industrial Strategy and European Union Defence Industrial Strategy prioritize building resilience and fostering innovation, their success hinges on transatlantic cooperation. But only one of the strategies embraces the need for sustained commitment and close cooperation.

While the US strategy emphasizes cooperation with allies and partners, the EU’s strategy is looking to break dependence on US military hardware. To do so, it seeks to establish a new European Defence Industry Programme aimed at boosting weapons production on the continent. While the strategic disparity has raised concerns in Washington, it’s important to discern the difference between geopolitics and managing transnational defense industrial integration. Multilateral collaboration on developing, producing, and maintaining military equipment takes years, and, in some cases, decades of policy work and alliance building; these relationships do not unravel overnight.

The United States often struggles to meet defense capacity needs, which requires overcoming its own bureaucratic hurdles. The challenges of coordinating defense efforts are only amplified when dealing with a complex structure such as the EU. National interests, protectionism, and ingrained bureaucratic apparatuses have historically hampered defense industrial collaboration within the EU. Further complicating matters, EU treaties restrict the use of funds for direct military spending despite the defense industry falling under the European Commission’s domain. Past attempts to regulate it proved unsuccessful due to concerns about duplicating NATO’s role and EU member states’ reluctance to cede control over defense industrial matters. While EU member states can invoke the national security clause to circumvent the European Commission’s authority and single market rules, the Commission may investigate and challenge the invocation if the spending does not fall under national security concerns.

Challenges for transatlantic cooperation

The consolidation of the industrial base has created single points of failure for production when suppliers run into problems. These issues are further exacerbated by cyberattacks, which disrupt production, compromise sensitive data, and facilitate intellectual property theft. Both the US and EU strategies diagnose supply chain challenges as a major contributor to unfavorable conditions as a result of global dependence, consolidation, and cybersecurity threats.

Addressing concerns about overreliance on foreign suppliers, the EU is setting up a Security of Supply regime to build resilience and a competitive edge for the European defense technology industrial base and its supply chains. Meanwhile, the United States is establishing a Supply Chain Disruptions Task Force to mitigate disruptions and integrate allies and partners more deeply into its supply chains.

Both strategies aim to strengthen resilience by reducing reliance on single sources and exploring the reshoring of critical materials production, enhancing stockpiles of essential equipment and subcomponents, and strengthening cybersecurity measures.

Fostering innovative defense technology is also a goal of both strategies. They aim to achieve this through investment in research and development of next-generation technology, such as artificial intelligence, hypersonics, and autonomous systems. They also both seek to streamline acquisition and enhance public-private partnerships. Strengthening collaboration between the private sector and government alone is a hefty feat, which is why both strategies support joint research and development, private sector incentives, and exchanging best practices.

In theory, these aims are one and the same, but a closer look at doctrinal and cultural differences sheds light on where these efforts diverge. As a global power, the United States has a long-standing motivation to sustain its dominance in military capabilities and its ability to project power. The National Defense Strategy explicitly states the need to maintain military superiority and deter US adversaries from challenging a free and open order. This aligns closely with Pax Americana, a term that identifies the United States as the global security guarantor and superpower.

Europe, on the other hand, seems motivated by the desire to increase its autonomy. For years, a few European leaders have periodically bandied about the idea of strategic autonomy in the sense of building up both the capability and the will to act independently from the United States or another major power. For just as long, however, little has come of this idea. Nonetheless, the impulse toward greater European autonomy, even if short of full autonomy, has proved remarkably resilient. This impulse shows up, for example, in the European Defence Industrial Strategy, specifically when it comes to the dependency on US military hardware. The strategy makes it a priority to eliminate “excessive external dependencies or bottlenecks” from the industrial base, noting that “the volume of acquisitions made through the US Foreign Military Sales (FMS) in the EU has increased by 89 percent between 2021 and 2022.”

Beyond diverging ambitions and the difficulty of securing reliable supply chains, a significant challenge to transatlantic collaboration lies in the inherent competition between US and EU defense companies. Both sides vie for a significant share of the global defense market (estimated at two trillion dollars in 2023), potentially incentivizing contractors to prioritize winning individual bids over collaborative efforts. This competitive dynamic is further amplified by existing procurement policies such as “Buy American” in the United States and EU preference rules in Europe, which can restrict competition and hinder cross-border collaboration.

In the United States, export controls have limited technology transfers to allies and partners long before the war in Ukraine. These controls include the International Traffic in Arms Regulations on defense technology and information and Export Administration Regulations on dual-use materials. Not only do these negatively impact European partners who experience a lack of reciprocity, they also discourage US companies from collaborating with foreign partners, fearing denials or delays that tack on years to project timelines. Meanwhile, member states must now harmonize fragmented national procurement processes across the EU to even the playing field for their own firms—let alone US contractors attempting to navigate multinational defense projects.

In short, industrial cooperation and strategic alignment are not mutually inclusive in the near term. Divergent strategic directions will eventually impact the alignment and coordination necessary for industrial cooperation, but not today. The real challenge won’t be found in differing objectives on the horizon, but in the array of obstacles facing the United States and the EU now.

To overcome these hurdles, both the United States and the EU need to explore alternative procurement models that encourage collaboration over competition. Additionally, streamlining export control processes with the same emphasis devoted to AUKUS (the trilateral partnership between Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States) and fostering a culture of trust and reciprocity are crucial steps toward strengthening transatlantic cooperation in defense.

Kathryn Levantovscaia is a deputy director in the Forward Defense program of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

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Organizing for victory

Ben Hodges — Mon, 15 Apr 2024 16:34:40 +0000

Ten years since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine began with the illegal annexation of Crimea, it is clear that a Russia containment strategy 2.0 is inevitable. I am convinced Ukraine will be our best partner for such a strategy in terms of intelligence, understanding of Russian psychology, and military defense. It will be a bulwark against Putin’s clearly articulated plans for further European conquest. Ukraine’s survival and the necessity of bringing it into NATO as soon as possible are paramount to a new European and global deterrence and containment strategy.

We are currently witnessing the continuing collapse of the USSR, which began in 1991. This process is not a straight-line decline, but it is unmistakable. Putin’s unprovoked war against Ukraine has undermined Russia’s economy and severed it from much of the West. His military has been exposed for its many shortcomings and corruption. Nearly all the former Soviet republics and Warsaw Pact members have turned their backs on Russia. Finland and Sweden have joined NATO.

We should not fear this Russian decline. In fact, we should seek to accelerate it by helping Ukraine defeat Russia and eject it back to its 1991 borders. Ukraine defeating Russia now is the best way to ensure NATO never has to fight directly against Russia. This is in our own strategic interest.

Does the West have the combined political will, industrial strength, and military capabilities to address the strategic challenges posed by Russia, Iran, North Korea, and China? These challenges are all linked and must be viewed as parts of a strategic whole, leading to the conclusion that it in the West’s interests to prioritize the defeat of Russia in Ukraine.

A “Russia first” approach would echo the example set by the allies during World War II. In 1942, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill and US President Franklin D. Roosevelt agreed on a “Germany first” strategy. One year later, they defined their war aim as the “unconditional surrender” of Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan. This provides a model for the kind of strategic clarity the current generation of Western leaders should be looking to emulate.

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An assessment of today’s battlefield confirms that the Ukrainian military faces a very difficult situation. However, present narratives are overly gloomy and defeatist. After ten years of war, and despite holding every advantage, Russia still only controls just under twenty percent of Ukraine.

The Russian army has suffered hundreds of thousands of losses, while the weaknesses of the Russian navy and air force have been revealed. The Black Sea Fleet has lost around one-third of its ships and is in retreat from Sevastopol. The Russian Air Force has failed in its two main tasks of securing air superiority over Ukraine and cutting the supply lines bringing military equipment into Ukraine from the EU.

Much has been made of minor Russian victories such as the recent capture of Avdiivka, but these advances should be put in a proper geopolitical and operational context. Despite efforts by many of the doom-mongers to make it sound like Stalingrad, Avdiivka is in reality a small town located close to the 2022 front lines in eastern Ukraine. Indeed, it is currently far from clear whether the Russians have the operational capability to exploit even local tactical successes.

At this stage of the war, neither side appears capable of delivering a knockout blow. For Ukraine’s new military Commander-in-Chief Oleksandr Syrsky, the key task this year is to stabilize the situation in order to buy time, build combat power, and fix the country’s personnel system. Worn-out units need to be reconstituted and new units built. Training should include a focus on countering Russia’s advantages in electronic and drone warfare.

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Ukraine’s advance in Kursk: What’s next and implications

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What does Ukraine need in order to actually win? The Ukrainian military needs the capacity to make Crimea, the decisive terrain of this war, untenable for the Russian navy, air force, and logistics. Every square inch of Crimea is within ATACMS range. Ukraine has already proven the concept with a relatively small number of cruise missiles provided by Britain and France. This has made it possible to seriously damage the Black Sea Fleet HQ and naval maintenance capability in Sevastopol, forcing the fleet to partially withdraw to Russia. There are no good reasons for not providing Ukraine with ATACMS missiles, only excuses from an administration that is unwilling or unable to develop a strategy for Ukrainian victory.

The Ukrainian military also needs a long-range strike capability to neutralize the Russian army on land by destroying Russian troop concentrations, command posts, artillery, and logistics. Significantly enhanced air defense and counter-drone capabilities are essential, along with more naval drones and anti-ship missiles to allow Ukraine to build on the country’s remarkable success in the Battle of the Black Sea.

One of the most important steps toward securing Ukrainian victory is a clear declaration from the US and EU that it is in our own strategic interest to help Ukraine win. The failure of the current US administration to clearly explain this to the American people has led to incoherent and self-deterring policies along with incremental decision-making and a drip-feed approach to military aid for Ukraine. This has left the door open for disinformation and made it possible for a MAGA-led minority within the Republican Party to block aid despite majority support.

The current year is a year of industrial competition that the West can and must win. Western countries should collectively be dwarfing Russia’s output but there is currently a lack of urgency. Encouragingly, ammunition production is finally picking up some momentum in Europe and the US. We just need the US Congress to approve delivery. Meanwhile, EU nations must reassess their priorities and address the large percentage of ammunition production that is currently heading to customers outside Europe. Greater efforts are also required to source existing ample ammunition stockpiles globally.

The West needs a return to the clarity of Churchill and Roosevelt, who communicated clear strategic priorities to the public, industry, and the military. Identifying these priorities was a vital step, making it possible for the allies to organize the war effort and secure victory. The lessons of this approach should now be applied to the confrontation with Putin’s Russia, Iran, and China. At the end of the day, it’s all about political will and leaders speaking to their populations as adults.

Lieutenant General (Ret.) Ben Hodges is the former Commander of US Army Europe.

Frederick Kempe — Wed, 10 Apr 2024 11:40:00 +0000

Israel’s strike last week on Iran’s consulate in Syria, killing seven Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) officers, has done the world one favor: It has refocused attention on Iran, which remains the Middle East’s most significant obstacle to peace and stability.

The Israeli attack—killing Mohammad Reza Zahedi, reportedly the IRGC Quds Force commander for Syria and Lebanon—was either strikingly bold or recklessly provocative, depending on your perspective. The Biden administration has insisted it had no advance knowledge of the airstrike.

US officials said they had gathered intelligence indicating that Iran would launch a retaliatory attack, although the timing and target remain unknown; reports said that the attack would likely unfold sometime before the end of Ramadan, which Iranians are celebrating today. For its part, Israel has put its forces on high alert and could strike back again at Iran, depending on Tehran’s next move.

It’s tempting to contribute to the breathless speculation, which I’ll do only by reminding readers that Tehran is unlikely to respond in any manner that would trigger a direct Israeli or US attack on its soil. Iran has been the biggest beneficiary of the war thus far, so why would it take unnecessary risk?

Most mystifying about all the reporting following Hamas’ horrifying October 7 terrorist attack on Israel and the six months of bloody war in Gaza that has followed is how little focus has been placed on Iran’s complicity, gains, and thinking.

“The post-October 7 strategic landscape in the Middle East is one that was largely created by Iran and that plays to its strengths,” writes Brookings’ Suzanne Maloney in a must-read Foreign Affairs essay. “Tehran sees opportunity in chaos. Iranian leaders are exploiting and escalating the war in Gaza to elevate their regime’s stature, weaken and delegitimize Israel, undermine US interests, and further shape the regional order in their favor. The truth is that the Islamic Republic is now in a better position than ever to dominate the Middle East.”

Given that, it’s worth remembering that the most effective way to address Iran’s regional ambitions, which require little more than continued violence and chaos, is to return as quickly as possible to the path of normalization between Israel and modernizing Arab states—in particular Saudi Arabia.

As the Atlantic Council’s Jonathan Panikoff writes, “Resolving the conflict would enhance Israel’s security against its true existential threat, Iran, by enabling Israel to normalize relations with almost all of its Arab neighbors, not just a few.”

Perhaps here is the real point: If left unchecked, the perils of despotic regimes like Iran and Russia grow. Failure to act only encourages their common cause, from the Middle East to Ukraine. In the Middle East, China, Russia, and Iran recently held live-fire exercises in the Gulf of Oman. In Ukraine, Chinese and Iranian support for the Russian war effort is expanding.

There’s no wishing away this gathering danger, which only gains momentum from neglect.

Frederick Kempe is president and chief executive officer of the Atlantic Council. You can follow him on Twitter: @FredKempe.

This edition is part of Frederick Kempe’s Inflection Points Today newsletter, a column of quick-hit insights on a world in transition. To receive this newsletter throughout the week, sign up here.

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This aspect of the Biden-Kishida summit will define the military response to an Indo-Pacific crisis

Markus Garlauskas — Wed, 10 Apr 2024 09:00:00 +0000

At today’s summit between Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida and US President Joe Biden, a wide range of measures will be announced to “upgrade” the US-Japan alliance. Perhaps one of the most vital and least widely understood of these upgrades is the plan to modernize the alliance’s military command and control (C2) arrangements. Today’s announcement will only mark a first step toward what should be larger C2 improvements in the months and years ahead that would be key to ensuring the ability to manage military crises, reinforce deterrence, and defeat aggression if deterrence fails.

This issue is both timely and strategically critical. Our research and analysis at the Atlantic Council’s Indo-Pacific Security Initiative, including private tabletop exercises exploring conflict scenarios, suggests that improved US and multinational C2 arrangements in the Indo-Pacific are urgently needed. This should include a focus on ensuring these C2 structures address three key challenges: conflicts short of full-scale war; simultaneous conflicts with multiple adversaries—particularly China and North Korea; and multilateral rather than just bilateral operations.

In need of an update

Speculation abounds about what form US-Japan C2 modernization will eventually take, and there is no shortage of opinions on what would be best.

Japan itself has already begun the process of modernizing its own C2 arrangements, which had previously not been designed to enable joint operations across Japan’s military services during crises and war. Under Japan’s Defense Buildup Program, announced in late 2022, it has moved to establish a permanent joint headquarters. By 2025, this is planned to take the form of a Japan Joint Operations Command (J-JOC) commanded by a four-star officer with a staff of more than two hundred.

However, most of the recent public discussion, speculation, and debate has focused on what will change with the US command structure in Japan. There is a broad consensus that this structure is a legacy of the vastly different strategic and operational environment of the 1950s and needs updating. For more than six decades, US forces in Japan have fallen under the modestly sized US Forces Japan (USFJ) headquarters at Yokota Air Force Base commanded by a three-star US Air Force general. USFJ has historically not been considered a true “warfighting” headquarters, as it has limited authorities for joint operations—and it also does not have a role in C2 over any Japanese forces.

Planned upgrades

The Financial Times reported that the “biggest upgrade” to the alliance in sixty years will include a plan to “restructure the US military command in Japan to strengthen operational planning and exercises between the nations.” Some speculate that this change will even involve upgrading USFJ to a four-star command like US Forces Korea, in part to allow the USFJ commander to be of equivalent rank to Japan’s J-JOC commander. Whatever form it ultimately takes, a more “operationalized” headquarters in Japan will benefit not only the US-Japan alliance, but also US military capabilities and posture in the western Indo-Pacific.

Though such Japanese and US operational headquarters will improve the ability to employ Japanese and US forces, the new structures must also ensure that US and Japanese forces can more effectively work together to deter aggression and fight alongside each other if necessary. Whether or not their commanders are ultimately four-star level officers, it is still unclear how these two headquarters will work together and what overarching structure will connect them. What is clear is that the US headquarters in Japan will not have authority over the J-JOC. James Schoff, a scholar with the Sasakawa Peace Foundation USA and former Pentagon official, notes that though measures should be taken for “bilateral planning and coordination,” it is “legally and politically impossible” for Japan’s Self Defense Forces to come under US command.

One model for closer integration would be a bilateral command with US and Japanese officers working side by side. The US-South Korea alliance has long had a well-established structure for wartime C2 under a single Combined Forces Command headquarters staffed with US and South Korean military officers commanded by a US four-star general, which conducts bilateral military planning and regular major bilateral exercises. This command is going through a transition itself, under plans to prepare for a South Korean officer to take command of alliance forces in wartime. Though some elements might be taken from this model, it has its own limitations and may not be realistic for the US-Japan alliance.

Schoff—along with Chris Johnstone, another former Pentagon official with deep expertise on Japanese defense issues—recently assessed that parallel structures with separate US and Japanese chains of command will be legally and politically necessary, and argued in favor of a co-located joint, bilateral planning and coordination office to connect these structures. Though this may be pragmatic, it is hardly optimal from an operational perspective. US military doctrine for multinational operations notes that “because of the absence of a single commander, the use of a parallel command structure should be avoided, if at all possible.”

Conditions for success

Whatever form these new C2 arrangements ultimately take, they will have to address the Japanese C2 component, the future structure of US Forces Japan, how US and Japanese forces will operate together in and around Japan, and how these forces will operate with other countries’ forces and farther afield from Japan. Such arrangements should meet several key criteria:

Enable effective joint and bilateral operations in conflicts short of full-scale war. One of the major shortcomings of the South Korea-US bilateral military structure, according to our analysis, is that it is not designed to respond to a limited attack and it does not enable “quick, calibrated, and combined” bilateral responses to provocations. In case of a small-scale provocation, South Korea’s military commands the response unilaterally, while the US-South Korea Combined Forces Command only takes command for full-scale wartime operations. This leaves a gap in alliance response capability that could be exploited by North Korea. The future US-Japan structure should instead provide political leaders with C2 options for US and Japanese forces to quickly respond together to threats of all types from the very outset of a crisis.

Prepare to simultaneously confront aggression from China, North Korea, and even Russia. Japan is in the unenviable position of being close to three nuclear-armed adversaries with aggressive authoritarian leaders. In the event of a conflict started by either China or North Korea, Japan is likely to come under attack from either aggressor, even if not initially targeted as the conflict begins. There are also plausible scenarios for simultaneous conflicts with both China and North Korea involving Japan, particularly where a conflict that starts with North Korean aggression leads to China’s involvement, or vice versa. Russia is also a potential threat that could either initiate or be drawn into a conflict—as it has not relinquished its territorial claims in the disputed Northern Territories and is even deploying new weapons there. Whatever US-Japan C2 arrangements are settled upon, they should be designed to confront two or three of these adversaries simultaneously.

Facilitate multinational rather than just bilateral military operations. The US-Japan alliance may face multiple adversaries, but it also has friends that bring important military capabilities and basing options that can help deter or defeat aggression. So, though getting the bilateral C2 arrangement between the United States and Japan right is important, it will also be important to ensure the new structure effectively enables military operations working with the forces of other allies and partners, particularly Australia, South Korea, Taiwan, and the Philippines.

With the rising risk of Chinese aggression against Taiwan, the crumbling of deterrence on the Korean Peninsula, and Russia more closely aligned with China and North Korea than at any time since the 1950s, it is vital to follow up on the progress announced at today’s summit to ensure that the United States’ C2 arrangements with allies in the Indo-Pacific are best aligned for this new threat environment.

Markus Garlauskas is the director of the Indo-Pacific Security Initiative at the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. He is a former senior US government official with two decades of experience as an intelligence officer and strategist, with twelve years stationed overseas in the region, including five years as the chief strategist for the US-South Korea Combined Forces Command. He posts as @Mister_G_2 on X.

This analysis is informed by Atlantic Council research and tabletop exercises supported by the US Defense Threat Reduction Agency, but it represents the author’s views and not those of any US government organization.

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Western weakness in Ukraine could provoke a far bigger war with Russia

Oleksiy Goncharenko — Mon, 08 Apr 2024 01:15:19 +0000

Does the West actually want Ukraine to defeat Russia? That is the question many in Kyiv are now asking amid continued signs of Western indecision as the biggest European invasion since World War II approaches its third summer with no end in sight.

The mounting sense of frustration among Ukrainians is easy to understand. Encouraged by delays in military aid for Ukraine, Russia has intensified the bombing of Ukraine’s civilian infrastructure over the past month, plunging entire cities into darkness and leaving millions without access to electricity, heating, water, or internet. Despite the looming prospect of a humanitarian catastrophe, the Western response has been notably lacking in urgency.

Meanwhile, Ukraine has begun striking back with drone attacks on Russian refineries, and has succeeded in disrupting more than ten percent of Russian refining capacity. Rather than supporting this seemingly effective campaign to weaken Putin’s war machine, The US has reportedly called on Kyiv to end its drone strikes due to concerns over global oil prices and possible retaliation. Viewed from Ukraine, these do not look like the actions of partners who are fully committed to Ukrainian victory.

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Over the past two years, Ukrainians have grown accustomed to excessive Western caution and insufficient Western support. While the democratic world deserves considerable credit for delivering the weapons that have allowed Ukraine to survive, the military aid provided since February 2022 has been subject to frequent delays, and has consistently fallen far short of the quantities required to defeat a military superpower like Russia.

The West’s inadequate response to Russia’s invasion is primarily due to a crippling fear of escalation. Putin sees this indecisiveness and acts accordingly. He easily intimidates Western leaders with nuclear blackmail, while escalating his own attacks on Ukrainian cities and the country’s civilian infrastructure.

In March 2024 alone, Russia attacked Ukraine with 264 missiles and 515 drones, according to Ukrainian Air Force data. Some were intercepted by Ukrainian air defenses, but ammunition is rapidly running out. With no clear idea of when the next batches of interceptor missiles may arrive, Ukrainian troops must ration supplies, leaving millions vulnerable to the horrors of Russian bombardment.

The situation on the front lines of the war is equally critical. With half of promised weapons deliveries arriving late and vital US military aid held up in Congress for the past eight months, Ukrainian troops are running short of crucial ammunition and are currently in danger of being overwhelmed by Russian firepower. In late March, President Zelenskyy admitted that if US aid is not forthcoming, Ukraine will be forced to retreat. If that happens, he warned, Russia could break through Ukraine’s defensive lines and attempt to seize the country’s biggest cities.

Despite this deteriorating picture, there is currently a surreal sense of business as usual in much of the West. The political classes are increasingly preoccupied with upcoming elections and appear largely unaware of the geopolitical disaster unfolding on Europe’s eastern frontier. Many seem to think Ukrainian courage alone will be enough to hold Russia back until the invasion runs out of steam. This is wishful thinking. In reality, if Ukraine does not urgently receive increased support, there is a very real chance that Putin will win. And if Putin wins in Ukraine, he will go further.

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At present, the West appears content to wage of a slow war of attrition while drip-feeding Ukraine minimal supplies. This is a recipe for defeat. Russia enjoys huge advantages in terms of manpower and weapons, while the Kremlin has successfully shifted the entire Russian economy onto a war footing. Putin clearly believes he can outlast the West in Ukraine, and is confident time is on his side.

This does not mean a Ukrainian victory is unachievable, but Ukraine’s partners need to demonstrate far more resolve if they genuinely hope to secure Putin’s defeat. Ukraine’s long-range drone attacks on Russian refineries have exposed the vulnerability of Russia’s economically crucial energy industry, but the Western response has so far been predictably cautious. This needs to change. Ukraine cannot win a war against such a powerful enemy with one hand tied behind its back.

Likewise, Ukraine’s remarkable success in the Battle of the Black Sea debunks notions of Russian red lines and offers a road map toward victory over the Kremlin. Despite not having a conventional navy of its own, Ukraine has used drones and missile strikes to sink around a quarter of the Russian Black Sea Fleet. This has forced Putin to quietly withdraw the bulk of his remaining warships from Crimea.

Similar success is possible on land if Ukraine’s Western partners give the country the tools it needs. Ukraine’s requirements are already well known; the Ukrainian military needs vast quantities of artillery shells and drones along with increased deliveries of armored vehicles, combat aircraft, air defense systems, electronic warfare technologies, and long-range missiles.

Without this military aid, Ukraine’s prospects look grim. Nor would the consequences of a Russian victory be confined to Ukraine alone. On the contrary, the shock waves would be felt around the world as Putin and his fellow autocrats sought to capitalize on Western weakness.

A triumphant Putin would almost certainly look to build on the considerable geopolitical momentum created by success in Ukraine. In practical terms, this would mean expanding his quest to reverse the verdict of 1991 and reclaim “historically Russian lands.” Putin’s revisionist agenda would place more than a dozen independent states that formerly belonged to the Russian Empire at risk of suffering the same fate as Ukraine. The most probable initial targets would include Moldova, Georgia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan, but his ambitions would likely expand further.

The fall of Ukraine would leave NATO demoralized and discredited, creating a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity for the Russian dictator to achieve his ultimate goal and instigate the break-up of the alliance. NATO leaders have already demonstrated that they are afraid of escalation and inclined to back down when confronted by the Kremlin. In a post-Ukraine environment, Putin may look to exploit this lack of resolve by testing NATO’s own red lines while stopping short of full-scale hostilities. If the alliance failed to rise to this challenge, it would risk losing all credibility overnight. While NATO could technically survive such a crisis, the alliance would struggle to maintain any legitimacy without its cast-iron commitment to collective security.

Fellow authoritarian powers like China and Iran are also watching the West’s weakness in Ukraine and are drawing the obvious conclusions. This is already helping to fuel insecurity in the Middle East and increasing the threat to Taiwan. The global security architecture established over the past eighty years is clearly crumbling, and Ukraine is the front line in the fight to shape the future of international relations.

The West’s fear of escalation is Vladimir Putin’s secret weapon. It has deterred Western leaders from arming Ukraine, and has prolonged the war by preventing the Ukrainian army from building on its early battlefield successes. Unless the West can overcome this self-defeating fear, it may ultimately lead to Russian victory.

Russian success in Ukraine would almost certainly set the stage for a far bigger military confrontation between the Kremlin and the democratic world. Since February 2022, Putin has placed his entire country on a war footing and has positioned Russia as the leader of an anti-Western coalition of authoritarian states aiming to transform the world order. As the invasion of Ukraine has escalated, he has become increasingly open about his own imperial ambitions. It is dangerously delusional to suggest Putin will simply stop if he wins in Ukraine. Instead, Western leaders must decide whether they would rather arm Ukraine for victory today, or find themselves confronted with a resurgent and emboldened Russia tomorrow.

Oleksiy Goncharenko is a Ukrainian member of parliament with the European Solidarity party.

Most GCC states condemned the attack on the Iranian embassy complex in Syria. An escalation is what they fear most.

Giorgio Cafiero — Fri, 05 Apr 2024 13:41:36 +0000

From the perspective of many governments around the world, Israel moved up the escalation ladder when it razed Iran’s embassy annex in Damascus on April 1. This airstrike killed Mohammad Reza Zahedi, a top Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) commander, in addition to at least six others in the IRGC’s elite Quds Force, its foreign arm. Given that this diplomatic facility was, according to international law, on Iranian soil and that Zahedi was the IRGC’s highest-ranking commander to be killed since Qasem Soleimani’s assassination in early 2020, this attack intensified the “shadow war” between Israel and Iran.

Interestingly, the first country to condemn the airstrike was the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Shortly after the attack occurred, the Emirati foreign ministry released a statement “[condemning] the targeting of the Iranian diplomatic mission in the Syrian capital, Damascus.” Then, four other Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) members—Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia—also denounced the attack, with Bahrain the exception. This was unlike after Soleimani’s assassination when GCC states, especially Oman and Qatar, called for de-escalation between Washington and Tehran. Still, no Arab monarchy in the Persian Gulf outright condemned the killing of Soleimani.

Unknowns of Iranian retaliation

The leadership in Abu Dhabi has grave concerns about being caught up in any escalation of regional hostilities, which have been exacerbated since the Gaza war began in October 2023 and spread to Lebanon, Yemen, and elsewhere. The fact that the UAE normalized relations with Israel in 2020 via the Abraham Accords leaves the Persian Gulf country increasingly vulnerable to the Middle East’s conflict dynamics.

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The UAE has reason to fear Iran-backed actors in the Arab world, particularly in light of the Houthi drone and missile attacks against Abu Dhabi in 2022. Today, the UAE—with an Israeli embassy in Abu Dhabi and a consulate in Dubai, Israeli tourists in Dubai, and Israeli businesspeople and expatriates in the country—does not want Tehran targeting Israeli diplomats, citizens, or interests on Emirati soil in retaliation for the April 1 attack in Damascus. As Dubai is a popular tourism destination and a Middle Eastern hub for finance and business, the UAE’s brand depends heavily on peace and stability.

By quickly condemning Israel’s airstrike against Iran’s diplomatic facility in Damascus, the leadership in Abu Dhabi was able to send a strong message to Iran and various Tehran-backed groups in the Middle East. Despite the UAE normalizing relations with Israel and refusing to abrogate the Abraham Accords in response to Israel’s conduct in Gaza since October 2023, Abu Dhabi is increasingly confident and vocal in criticizing certain Israeli actions.

The UAE’s swift condemnation of Israel’s killing of six international World Central Kitchen workers in an airstrike on April 2, as well as the strong language regarding the Gaza war from the UAE during its time as a non-permanent member of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), further underscores this point. Although Algeria—which replaced the UAE as the only Arab state sitting on the UNSC on January 2—has a far more adversarial relationship with Israel, the UAE repeatedly condemned Israel’s actions in Gaza while it had a seat on the body. Within the war’s first month, the UAE ambassador to the UN, Lana Nusseibeh, addressed Israel’s “dangerous, unrealistic evacuation orders” and declared that Israel’s killing of Palestinian children in Gaza “should stain our moral conscience if nothing else does” while speaking at the UNSC.

In a grander context, the UAE is attempting to conduct an increasingly nonaligned—or, perhaps more accurately, multi-aligned—approach to geopolitics. This entails Abu Dhabi striving to maintain positive ties with a host of countries in the Middle East—Iran, Israel, Syria, Qatar, and Turkey—as well as all five permanent members of the UNSC. Ultimately, as US hegemony steadily declines, the UAE strives to shore up relationships with states in the neighborhood that have been on historically negative terms with Abu Dhabi, including Iran. At the same time, the UAE is diversifying its global partnerships by deepening ties with Beijing and Moscow.

Such a foreign policy requires the Emiratis to strike a delicate balancing act. In terms of Abu Dhabi’s reaction to Israel’s April 1 airstrike, this consisted of the UAE condemning the attack without ever mentioning Israel. In doing so, Abu Dhabi signaled its disapproval of Israel’s illegal bombing of a diplomatic mission without appearing to align with the Iran-led Resistance Axis.

Dangerous ripple effects

Five of the GCC’s six members quickly condemned this attack on Iran’s diplomatic facility in Damascus, which occurred against the backdrop of Gulf Arab officials taking diplomatic steps aimed at ending the Gaza war as soon as possible. With the war further regionalizing, policymakers in Abu Dhabi, Riyadh, and other GCC capitals fear spillover into the Persian Gulf and Strait of Hormuz. This scenario could severely harm their countries’ economies and threaten their security.

Saudi Arabia, which has not normalized relations with Israel but took a host of small steps in that direction before October 7, 2023, embraced the same approach as the UAE in terms of responding to Israel’s April 1 attack against Iran’s embassy complex in Syria. Riyadh reacted by putting out a statement expressing its “categorical rejection of targeting diplomatic facilities for any justification, and under any pretext, which is a violation of international diplomatic laws and the rules of diplomatic immunity.” Yet, at no point has Saudi Arabia officially called out Israel by name for this airstrike, despite Riyadh consistently condemning Israel for its conduct in Gaza throughout this war.

One reason why further expansion of the Gaza war unsettles officials in Abu Dhabi and Riyadh is that they remain deeply suspicious of Tehran. This is despite their détente with Iran following the UAE’s diplomatic outreach to Tehran and the return of its ambassador to Iran in 2019 and 2022, respectively, and Saudi Arabia’s renormalization of diplomatic relations with the Islamic Republic in 2023. Leaders in both the UAE and Saudi Arabia fear Tehran’s capacity to foment turmoil on Emirati and Saudi soil if Iran’s leadership comes to see GCC states supporting Israeli adventurism in the Middle East that targets Iranians and Iranian interests.

Sometimes referred to as the GCC’s “doves,” Kuwait, Oman, and Qatar perceive Iran as much less of a threat than other GCC members do. Over the past three decades, Oman and Qatar have played critical bridging roles between the West and Tehran. Since October 2023, Kuwait City, Muscat, and Doha have used strong language to condemn Israel’s war against Gaza. Notably, Kuwait, which is said to be the most anti-Israeli GCC member, was the only Gulf Arab monarchy to call out Israel by name when condemning the April 1 airstrike.

Fearful that hostilities between Israel and Iran could spiral out of control, the GCC states are keen to avoid the heat as much as possible.

As Israel ratchets up tensions with Iran, Abu Dhabi, Riyadh, and other GCC capitals want Tehran to know that they have nothing to do with such Israeli behavior and are on record condemning it. At this point, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and other GCC members have significant fears about how the continuation of the Gaza war and its spillover effects threaten their national interests. For a host of reasons, including their domestic purposes, Gulf Arab states desperately want a ceasefire implemented immediately.

Giorgio Cafiero is the chief executive officer of Gulf State Analytics, a Washington, DC-based geopolitical risk consultancy, and an adjunct assistant professor at Georgetown University.

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Aiding Ukraine is a strategic investment, not charity

Kathryn Levantovscaia — Thu, 04 Apr 2024 19:32:38 +0000

Many in the United States calling for more aid to Ukraine seem to base their decision on multiple factors. It’s less that one factor alone is decisive, and more that, taken together, they amount to a holistic case for support. In Ukraine, they point out, Russia is causing unspeakable destruction, and Ukrainian forces are asking for help to defend themselves against a brutal aggressor. Beyond Ukraine, they add, Russia’s invasion has broken important international norms and therefore represents a threat that extends much farther than Europe.

Contrast this approach with many of those who oppose more aid to Ukraine, including several prominent US politicians. They often focus on one decisive factor: Continuing aid is simply too costly, they say. It is true that aid to Ukraine has a cost. However, this position overlooks the potential benefits at home that outweigh the costs. US assistance to Ukraine has the potential to strengthen both US economic and national security.

As the protracted war continues to strain Russia’s arsenal and weaken its military posture, US arms exports to Ukraine are stimulating the US economy and boosting its global arms leadership. In addition, the war is generating invaluable intelligence on Russian tactics, which is helping to refine the United States’ and NATO’s defense strategies, facilitating a real-world testing ground for US weapons systems beyond the simulation and wargaming on which the Department of Defense’s modernization efforts typically rely. In essence, aiding Ukraine is “not only a good deed. It’s also a good deal,” as Polish Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski aptly stated recently at the Atlantic Council.

Economic impacts

The defense industry is inherently driven by the needs of conflict and deterrence. This often leads to increased production during periods of heightened tensions, as seen with the recent surge in revenue for major defense contractors (upward of 25 percent). The military-industrial complex also injects significant capital into local economies, creating jobs in manufacturing as well as in the restaurants, retail shops, and other businesses that make up the communities around the manufacturing plants.

A map published by the Department of Defense showcases the impact of the Ukraine Security Assistance program on US industry as of January 15. It depicts the value of defense contracts awarded to companies in each state, which amounts to $33.6 billion and counting. The interactive map below builds on this data to showcase an alarming correlation between the states benefiting most from this funding and how many of their representatives voted against the Ukraine funding bill last fall.

Republican Senator Ted Cruz voted against a $95 billion foreign aid package, which included $60 billion of aid for Ukraine, in February, calling it a “bad bill.” He opposed the bill despite the fact that Texas has received $1.45 billion in funding to produce High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS), 155 millimeter shells, and other weapons, therefore absorbing significant economic benefits. The increased demand signal is expected to create jobs in Grand Prairie, Mesquite, and other parts of Texas.

But it’s not just Cruz: Thirty-one senators and House members whose states or districts benefit from this funding have voted against it, according to American Enterprise Institute Senior Fellow Marc Thiessen. Florida-based manufacturers have received over one billion dollars to produce weapons, but several of the state’s representatives continue to oppose funding for Ukraine. Representative Gus Bilirakis, a Republican, opposed President Joe Biden’s 2023 request for emergency Ukraine funding as “tone deaf and out-of-touch with the harsh economic realities facing American families,” even though his district north of Tampa houses facilities that were awarded contracts to produce AN/TPQ-53 radar and HIMARS guidance sets.

The data above only reflect the location of factories producing weapons systems, but the influx of federal funding creates ripple effects on unrelated sectors of the economy as well. For example, Camden, Arkansas, is preparing for an economic boom resulting from the incoming workers and their families, anticipating a rise in everything from retail and housing to breweries. “Small businesses are interested in investing in downtown . . . There are some people that work really hard in making downtown really nice. It’s growing,” Camden shop owner Cecilia Davoren told Politico.

The defense primes and subcontractors rely on components and subcomponents often sourced and manufactured in other states and districts, thereby spreading the wealth beyond the borders of the map above. Whether directly or indirectly, it would be harder to identify a congressional district that has not benefitted from US aid packages for Ukraine than one that has. While many of these US representatives may oppose security assistance to Ukraine on cost grounds, they may be overlooking the significant impact on job creation in their own districts.

Over the objection of Cruz and nearly thirty of his GOP colleagues, the Senate passed its funding bill in February, but with US funding drying up, the House has yet to act.

National and international security enhancement

Beyond the economic advantages, US support for Ukraine offers strategic benefits for national security. The war has provided a real-world testing ground for US weapons, offering invaluable insights into their performance against a near-peer adversary. This live-fire environment exposes weaknesses and allows for improvements, ensuring US forces remain equipped with the most effective technology.

Additionally, the war has weakened Russia significantly, depleting its military manpower and resources. Declassified intelligence estimates that 315,000 Russian troops have been killed or wounded in Ukraine, with reports suggesting Russian losses of nearly one thousand soldiers per day in November and December. And beyond the human cost, Russia is hemorrhaging weaponry, financial reserves, and influence as it sustains the invasion. Ukraine has been effectively exhausting Russia’s military capacity. The United States and its allies are directly benefiting from a wide-scale depletion of Russian manpower and defense capabilities for pennies on the dollar. US aid to Ukraine is around 5 percent of the Department of Defense’s annual budget, which is quite a deal for containing and exhausting one of the United States’ largest adversaries. To that end, a Russian loss in Ukraine would be a double whammy—it would strengthen deterrence against China and potentially discourage near-term moves on Taiwan.

Beyond the limitations of simulations and war games, this live-fire environment also allows for a far more nuanced evaluation of US capabilities and their performance against a near-peer adversary. Troops in Ukraine fielding US weaponry are providing a real-world feedback loop on the durability and accuracy of US platforms, as well as their interoperability and integration with existing systems. The United States is taking inventory of deficiencies and vulnerabilities, all without sparing a single pair of boots on the ground. This allows the Department of Defense to better identify areas for improvement while actively informing the development of future iterations, ensuring US forces remain equipped with the most effective and adaptable technology possible. In essence, the war is serving as a lengthy, unscripted exercise, yielding crucial insights into the US arsenal that would be impossible to replicate through any other means.

Simply put, US support for Ukraine is not philanthropy. It’s an investment in US economic and national security that is already paying off.

Kathryn Levantovscaia is a deputy director in the Forward Defense program of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

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NATO at 75: The Alliance’s future lies in Ukraine’s victory against Russia

Ian Brzezinski — Wed, 03 Apr 2024 15:10:42 +0000

NATO will mark its seventy-fifth anniversary on April 4 as history’s most successful military alliance. However, its future as a credible deterrent to aggression now lies in the success or failure of Russia’s unjust and brutal invasion of Ukraine.

NATO’s past successes are unquestioned and impressive. It was NATO that enabled the transatlantic community to defeat the Soviet Union without firing a shot. NATO operations brought peace and stability to the Balkans following the flareup of violence and aggression there in the 1990s. Allied forces leveraged their interoperability fostered by NATO to fight courageously and effectively in Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere around the world.

NATO’s success is rooted not only in its development and deployment of highly capable integrated military forces, but also in the Alliance’s unquestioned political will and readiness to exercise those forces in combat. Nowhere was this more clearly demonstrated than during the Alliance’s defense of West Berlin, its Cold War enclave in East Germany. The Alliance’s robust force posture and unquestioned resoluteness is what kept West Berlin from being overtaken by Warsaw Pact forces during the most tense and volatile periods of that era.

How NATO contributes to Ukraine’s defense will significantly determine the outcome of Russia’s invasion.

Looking forward, can this NATO anniversary—which will also be marked by a summit hosted by US President Joe Biden in Washington, DC, in July—be one that inspires confidence about NATO’s future credibility? In particular, can it do so when Ukraine is at a stalemate or losing territory to Russia?

Ukraine’s loss of momentum in its defense against Russia’s full-scale invasion is deeply rooted in Moscow’s ability to deter the Alliance from providing more robust assistance to Ukraine. A key element of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s strategy has been the exercise of nuclear coercion to deter the West from intervening directly in the defense of Ukraine. The strategy has so far worked out better than he must have hoped. Putin’s threats of nuclear war caused the Alliance to pledge “no boots on the ground” and have intimidated allies into restricting their flow of military equipment to Ukraine.

Underscoring the effectiveness with which Russia has exercised nuclear coercion is the sheer imbalance of power between NATO and Russia. The combined gross domestic product (GDP) of NATO member states is some fifty-one trillion dollars, more than twenty times Russia’s GDP. NATO members spent $1.3 trillion on defense in 2023, around ten times that spent by Russia, and Russian military equipment and personnel are no match for the technology and professionalism deployed by the Alliance’s forces.

This imbalance begs the question: How is it that the Alliance is unable or unwilling to decisively defeat Russia’s invasion? That question will be unavoidable at the July summit. Allied leaders have unambiguously bound NATO’s security to this war. NATO summits have repeatedly condemned the invasion and demanded that Russia “completely and unconditionally withdraw all of its forces and equipment from the territory of Ukraine.”

And the rhetoric has escalated. French President Emmanuel Macron recently described the war as “existential” for Europe. “If Russia wins this war, Europe’s credibility would be reduced to zero,” Macron said, adding that war would then come to NATO’s eastern frontier. Biden, in his latest State of the Union address, said: “If anybody in this room thinks Putin will stop at Ukraine, I assure you, he will not.” Numerous allied leaders have said the same, if not in as urgent of terms.

NATO has a long and important agenda at its upcoming Washington summit: Alliance leaders will highlight NATO’s rejuvenated unity. They will deliver its updated concept for defense and deterrence. And they will roll out its refined war plans that are already being backed by increased defense spending and more intensive and larger-scale exercises. All true . . . but will the summit confirm that NATO can still draw upon the political will—the political grit—necessary to defeat its adversaries?

If the upcoming Washington summit is to inspire continued confidence in NATO’s credibility, and thus its future, then the Alliance must take action to place Ukraine onto a clear path to victory. That will require a strategy featuring five essential elements:

Allied leaders must unambiguously endorse Ukraine’s war objectives—that is, total territorial reconstitution back to the nation’s 1991 borders. Anything short of that is a disillusioning signal to Ukraine and encouragement to Putin to sustain his invasion.

NATO can no longer hesitate in providing Ukraine the weapons it so urgently needs—at the rate it needs, and without any restrictions on their use against legitimate military targets in Russia. That list includes fighter aircraft, long-range fires, mine-clearing equipment, additional tanks, and air and missile defense systems.

Truly comprehensive and effective sanctions must be imposed on Russia. Russia’s GDP grew by more than 3 percent last year, despite Western sanctions intended to impede Moscow’s war effort. That fact underscores the inadequacy of the West’s sanctions regime. Severe sanctions alone may not stop Putin’s invasion, but their imposition—and their enforcement—will weaken Russia’s war machine, undermine political stability in the country, and serve as a positive reflection of the Alliance’s resolve.

NATO allies must energetically engage the Russian people about the brutal realities of this war. The transatlantic community just doesn’t have an intensive information campaign in this regard for fear of creating the impression that the West is intent on regime change in Russia. In the meantime, Russia and its allies have steadily intensified their information campaigns against the West.

The Washington summit must grant Ukraine a clear path to NATO membership. NATO membership in Ukraine is not only necessary to secure a postwar peace. It is essential to an effective win strategy that enables Ukraine to achieve its war objectives quickly and decisively. Ukraine’s membership in NATO and the security guarantee that comes with it is the only way to convince Putin that Ukraine is irreversibly locked into the transatlantic community and no longer vulnerable to his subordination.

How NATO contributes to Ukraine’s defense will significantly determine the outcome of Russia’s invasion. It will also speak volumes about the strength of the Alliance’s political will and resoluteness. That resoluteness is the underpinning of NATO’s ability to deter aggression over the next seventy-five years as successfully as it has over the past seventy-five years.

Ian Brzezinski is a resident senior fellow with the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security and is a member of the Atlantic Council’s Strategic Advisors Group.

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Iranian drones have proliferated under US watch

Daniel E. Mouton — Tue, 02 Apr 2024 17:41:56 +0000

According to senior military officials and independent analysis by the Global Terrorism Trends and Analysis Center (GTTAC), which provides data to the State Department’s Counterterrorism Bureau, most attack unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) used in the world today originate from Iran. Notably, the GTTAC data do not include Iranian drones used by Russia as part of its full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

Iran’s record-setting proliferation of attack UAVs did not happen overnight. Although the solution to stop the spread of Iranian drones is complex, it is important to note that there were plenty of warnings and time for the United States to prepare its defenses. In 2021, Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin delivered remarks at the annual Manama Dialogue to reassure the region of US security commitments, as the dialogue occurred only three months after the chaotic US withdrawal from Afghanistan. The remarks also occurred after the United States began its Global Posture Review and the Department of Defense (DOD) had already withdrawn a significant portion of its defense capability from the region. Austin had good reason to assuage regional leaders’ doubts about US credibility and commitment to the region. Notably, the remarks underscored another area in which the United States must reconsider its approach.

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By the time of the Manama Dialogue speech, Iran had proven its ability to regularly transfer sufficient quantities of drone components to the Houthi rebels in Yemen, resulting in the launch of hundreds of UAV and missile attacks against Saudi Arabia. Iran’s proliferation of UAVs to its regional proxies began in earnest several years earlier. In 2019, the Defense Intelligence Agency’s Iran Military Power Study noted that Iran was pursuing more and increasingly capable UAVs. The study also indicated that Iran was proliferating these systems to the Houthis in Yemen and Shia militia groups in Iraq and Syria. In his Manama remarks, Austin congratulated the Saudis for defeating nearly 90 percent of UAVs and missiles fired from Yemen, and promised to work with the Saudis to provide 100 percent coverage against attack.

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 provided a new opening for Iran—this time to supply Russia with lethal drones. With the UAV transfers first reported in mid-2022 and with more than one thousand UAVs reportedly delivered, Iran’s assistance to Russia appears to have ushered in a new period of strategic partnership between the two countries. Although the Iran-Russia partnership creates long-term security complications, the more immediate effects of Iranian drones were to come from Yemen. Following the October 7, 2023 Hamas attack and Israel’s subsequent military campaign in Gaza, Houthi attacks on Red Sea shipping and subsequent diversion of maritime traffic necessitated the establishment of Operation Prosperity Guardian and multiple rounds of US and allied strikes, as well as the predictable Houthi response attacks. Prior to the Houthis’ partial closure of Red Sea Shipping, the US government took several proactive steps.

It is just as important to disrupt the supply chain to limit UAV proliferation and attacks as it is to mount an adequate defense. In the case of Iran, the US government has identified and sanctioned the various suppliers of Iran’s UAV production enterprise. This effort included US Treasury designations of front companies in China, Russia, Turkey, and Germany. Because sanctions alone are ineffective, there has also been an international effort to interdict Iranian supply routes. Even before the advent of Operation Prosperity Guardian, the United States and allied nations, like the United Kingdom and France, conducted regular interdictions and seizures of Iranian smuggled material. However, these designations and interdictions were not enough. Even after the October 7, 2023 attacks caused the United States to reestablish a more robust naval presence in the Middle East, comprehensive interdiction of Iranian smuggled lethal assistance proved elusive. As much as stopping maritime smuggling remains a challenge, interdicting overland smuggling from Iran to militia groups in Iraq and Syria reportedly represents an even greater challenge.

Another potential option would be to destroy Iran’s production facilities. However, US administrations have avoided attacking drone production facilities inside Iran due to the risk of regional escalation. The most practical option has been to upgrade US defenses against UAVs. Since both the 2019 DIA Iran Power Study and Secretary Austin’s 2021 Manama Dialogue remarks indicated an appreciation for Iran’s UAV and missile-proliferation capability, this effort should already be well underway. However, the DOD’s institutional and executive-level recognition of the Iranian threat has yet to fully translate into a reallocation of resources in the DOD’s Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) process.

While the armed services have authority over major acquisitions, none of the services have wanted to devote a significant portion of their budget away from higher-priority Indo-Pacific and Eurasia based threats articulated in the National Defense Strategy. The Pentagon created a Joint Counter Unmanned Aerial System Office, but without the authority to direct major, service-level acquisitions, it focused on testing, training, and doctrine. In the $849.8-billion 2025 fiscal year budget request, the US Army has a $299.8 million line-item request for counter-UAV systems. In the US Central Command (CENTCOM) region, where there has been a clear threat for years, CENTCOM requested $17.1 billion in the budget. The 2025 fiscal year budget amount was $3.8 billion less than that for 2024. Although these CENTCOM funds go toward operational expenses, a fraction of the funds would go toward acquiring counter-UAV systems like the Coyote launcher system. Because CENTCOM also does not have authority over major program acquisitions, the systems it is acquiring do not have the validation of a service-level acquisition and haven’t been integrated across the military.

With recent annual defense budgets ranging from $700 billion to more than $800 billion, it is not clear why the Pentagon did not devote more resources to low-cost, plentiful defenses against an ever-growing threat. In addition to his description of how Iran uses its missiles and UAVs, a testimony by General Michael Kurilla clarified that US and coalition forces have experienced 175 Iran-supported attacks in Iraq, Syria, and Jordan since October 7, 2023. These attacks only span five months and do not include a number of previous attacks, including one that killed a US contractor in 2023. Additionally, senior Pentagon officials recently indicated that US Navy forces in the Red Sea have defended against almost one hundred Houthi attacks, with almost every attack involving a variety of Iranian-supplied drones and missiles. Based on the cost of the defensive missiles fired from a US Navy warship, destroying these Houthi attacks has already led to $1 billion of unbudgeted expenses. Iranian proxies are proving their ability to deplete the US military’s stores of its long-range and expensive air defense missiles.

However, unplanned expenses are not the worst part about mounting an adequate defense against drones and missiles, whether they originate from Iran or some other malign actor. One of the attacks mentioned in the CENTCOM posture testimony was an attack that led to the deaths of three US service members. Although death is not entirely preventable in conflict, the threat trend from Iran had been clear. The Pentagon could have done more to prepare for Iranian UAV proliferation and the range of opportunistic attacks that Kurilla described. At the same time that Secretary Austin had congratulated the Saudis for defending against Iranian-supplied Houthi attacks, the Pentagon should have undertaken a comprehensive effort, similar to the 2022 Foreign Military Sales Tiger Team, to improve US defenses against the mounting numbers of low-cost, widely proliferated UAVs and missiles from Iran. Whether doing so would have saved lives is unknown, but the effort and funds expended would not have been wasted.

Daniel E. Mouton is a nonresident senior fellow at the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative of the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs.

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Vinograd on CBS “Face the Nation” about the recent ISIS terrorist attack in Moscow, US border security, and more

gmatchett — Sun, 24 Mar 2024 19:41:36 +0000

On March 24, Forward Defense Nonresident Senior Fellow Samantha Vinograd appeared on CBS “Face the Nation” with Margaret Brennan discussing the recent terrorist attack carried out by ISIS-K in Moscow and southern US border security. She also spoke about the criticality of supplying resources for vetting architecture, intelligence sharing, and enhancing information arrangements with international partners.

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Public Event Tue, March 19, 2024 • 10:00 am ET

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Tony Pfaff: The ethics of proxy relationships applies to everyone

Holly Dagres — Wed, 20 Mar 2024 18:40:06 +0000

Dr. C. Anthony Pfaff is the research professor for strategy, the military profession, and ethics at the US Army War College’s Strategic Studies Institute. A retired Army colonel and Foreign Area Officer (FAO) for the Middle East and North Africa, Pfaff has served as director for Iraq on the National Security Council. His last active-duty posting was senior army and military adviser to the State Department from 2013–2016, where he served on the policy planning staff advising on cyber, regional military affairs, the Arab Gulf region, Iran, and security sector assistance reform.

Our MENASource editor, Holly Dagres, had the pleasure of sitting down with Dr. Pfaff on March 7 to discuss his most recent book, Proxy War Ethics: The Norms of Partnering in Great Power Competition, and its implications for US foreign policy.

MENASOURCE: What compelled you to write a book about proxies?

DR. TONY PFAFF: Great question! This project originally started as a presentation for the US Naval Academy’s Post-Doctoral Fellowship Program back in 2017. The director of the program was interested in exploring the topic, but there was not much at the time written on it. What got me interested was not only that this is an under-covered area of research and policy, but the lack of understanding regarding governing proxy relationships sets us up for significant moral failure and hazard.

Part of the problem is that “proxy” is often used pejoratively. To have a “proxy” is to be exploitive and to be a “proxy” is demeaning. The difficulty with that view is that “proxy” describes a structure of relationship that exists independently from the label. It might make political sense to call a “proxy” an “ally,” but that does not change the political reality. So the first step in understanding how to govern these relations is understanding their structure, which is much of the first chapter in the book, where I examine the differences between alliances, partnerships, and proxies.

Put simply, what differentiates proxies from other relationships is the indirect nature of the benefit for the sponsor, the extra-constitutionality of the proxy, and divergent interests. Under such a principle-agent arrangement, the sponsor enables the proxy to fight while the proxy enables the sponsor to minimize its risks. It is not difficult to see how proxies get a bad name. Even where sponsors and proxies share an interest, they often are not willing to pay the same price to achieve it. As a result, the history of proxy wars is littered with proxies who were “hung out to dry” by sponsors or sponsors that are dragged into a quagmire, escaping from which is costly. Perhaps more importantly, the presence of a sponsor can make nonviolent but politically costly alternatives to war less attractive, leading to wars that may have otherwise not happened. So, there is a lot to uncovering proxy relationships and trying to explain how to manage and govern such relationships.

MENASOURCE: Were there any things that surprised you or really stood out to you during your research that you were not aware of?

DR. TONY PFAFF: The understanding of proxy as a structure, and showing how that impacts the application of the just war tradition, I thought was illuminating. Also, the ubiquity of moral hazards identified in the book in the history of proxy wars really underscores the need for more robust international norms. What you often see in that history is that even well-meaning actors who are willing to self-regulate get caught up in the logic of the proxy relationship and cause all sorts of harm. The United States, for example, did condition assistance to El Salvador in the 1980s on conformity to the law of armed conflict and holding violators accountable—but those conditions were waived when rebel forces achieved any level of success. In Afghanistan, providing Stinger missiles seemed like a good idea—though there is some controversy over how impactful they really were—until they started showing up all over the world.

MENASOURCE: Which countries are the top sponsors of proxies today? Some obvious countries come to mind, but I wonder if there are ones we have missed.

DR. TONY PFAFF: Well, the Oscar for “Best Use of Proxies” probably goes to Iran, which has successfully utilized proxies to advance its national security objectives, generally at very little risk to itself, in part because there is very little in the way of international law or norms—formal or informal—that would allow the international community to hold it responsible. But…many international actors, including the United States, have relationships that more resemble a proxy structure than an ally or partner.

That brings me to another important point. “Proxy,” “ally,” and “partner” are ideal descriptions. Any particular relationship may exhibit traits of more than one; it is not all or nothing. So, you can have an element where there is just enough indirect benefit or where there is just enough risk mitigation and cost-cutting that something that you might actually get genuinely described as a partnership or alliance is still prone to the same kind of moral failure and hazard more obvious proxy relationships are.

So it would be naïve to look at US support to Ukraine or Saudi Arabia in Yemen and not count them as some kind of proxy relationship. This doesn’t entail that the United States is wrong for providing this support or that Ukraine or Saudi Arabia are demeaned for accepting it. However, that support raises the kinds of concerns that one would expect from a proxy relationship. While the United States and Ukraine may share an interest in repelling Russia’s invasion, they are not willing to pay a similar price to achieve it. That’s because while these interests are shared, they are not fully aligned. So, there is a risk that limiting US and NATO support will place Ukraine in a position where it ends up with the same result had it not fought at all, but at a much higher price.

Having said all that, I think Iran’s use of proxies is much more central to how it generally meets its security objectives, whereas for actors like the United States and even Russia, such relationships may complement other means, but they are not as reliant on them as the Iranians seem to be.

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MENASOURCE: It is interesting you mention the United States because the term “proxy” is typically associated with a negative connotation. Do you think that there is a misunderstanding of the nomenclature?

DR. TONY PFAFF: Sometimes I feel like the kid in The Sixth Sense film who saw dead people. Except I see proxies. But as I mentioned, the word “proxy” describes a particular structure of relationships that I distinguish from alliances and partnerships. So yes, the United States has proxies. The Russians have proxies. The Iranians have proxies. The Chinese use proxies. Ukraine is a good example. Saudi Arabia is a good example. We supported Saudi Arabia against Houthis in Yemen for a very long time before we got directly involved as a way of containing Iran. That is the structure of a proxy relationship.

My point is that engaging in such relationships is not necessarily exploitative or otherwise wrong. In this view, proxy relationships are just another way actors mitigate cost and risk. What matters are the norms they employ that govern them.

So, for me, the word “proxy” is morally neutral. Supporting Ukraine in its fight against Russia is a just cause and fits under the traditional “just war” rubric of defense of another. However, because we are doing it indirectly, we are mitigating our own risks. Thus, you start seeing those proxy dynamics creep in. For example, why are we having discussions about terminating support to Ukraine? Because we can. In an alliance where actors take on similar costs and risks against a common threat, it would be much harder to have that discussion. If we had skin in the game, if we were fighting alongside the Ukrainians, with US troops engaged alongside the Ukrainians, quitting would be a whole lot harder.

I don’t think there is anything wrong with our support for Ukraine or Saudi Arabia, for that matter. But that support forces us to ask questions, such as when it is permissible to withdraw it. It also forces us to consider to what extent we are responsible for how that support is used. When Saudi operations in Yemen raised discrimination concerns, we were arguably obligated to, and to an extent did, modify our support to address those concerns.

But it isn’t just about regulating our actions. Absent adequate international norms, it is difficult to rein in more abusive practices, such as Iran’s. The problem is traditional just war theory, even as it is reflected in international law, does not fully account for the effect the introduction of a sponsor has. Moreover, there is very little with which to hold sponsors accountable.

The reason accountability is important here is because the structure of the relationship frequently discourages it. For example, Nicaragua took the United States to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) over its support to the Contras, who had arguably committed a number of law of war violations in their resistance against the Sandinistas. The court decided that because no organ of the United States ordered those violations, even though the court did find that the United States provided a manual that appeared to advocate illegal practices like assassination, the United States was not accountable. What is interesting is that the manual was intended to rein in the Contras’ abuses.

The problem with both these standards is that they disincentivize sponsors to hold proxies accountable. The more a sponsor gets involved in trying to control proxy behavior, the more likely they could be accountable for it. So, it is better, as Iran did for Hamas, to provide resources and training but little else. This is why I think more robust international norms would be beneficial. As it stands, not only would Iran not likely be legally responsible for Hamas’s atrocities on October 7, 2023, or Houthi attacks against Red Sea shipping for that matter, if the United States or Israel decided to attack Iran directly in response, they would arguably, at least from a legal point of view, be the aggressor.

MENASOURCE: Are there any other examples of proxies being held accountable in the context of international law? Given how they are set up, it seems like a really hard thing to do.

DR. TONY PFAFF: There are two precedents that are usually cited in this regard. One is the ICJ ruling on Nicaragua, which I just mentioned, that applied a standard of “effective control.” The other is in Yugoslavia, where it applied a standard of “overall control.” There, the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia found that the Yugoslav government was accountable for Serbian Army actions in Bosnia since the Serbian and Yugoslav armies effectively shared personnel, paid salaries, provided logistics, and so on. This standard, however, basically says that for an actor to be accountable for a proxy’s action, they pretty much have to assimilate them into their constitutional structure to the extent they are not really a proxy anymore.

There is also the Arms Trade Treaty, which prohibits transfers of weapons where the exporting party knows that the receiving party will use them to “commit genocide, crimes against humanity, grave breaches of the 1949 Geneva Convention, or attacks against civilians.” The difficulty here is that Russia, Iran, or the United States are not parties to the treaty—despite the fact the United States was largely responsible for drafting the treaty—and even for those who are, enforcement is pretty weak. I should note that for the United States, many of the provisions in the treaty are already a part of US law. Israel is a signatory, but it has yet to ratify it.

MENASOURCE: What is your read on Tehran’s use of proxies?

DR. TONY PFAFF: Well, Iran’s use of proxies is more central to how it operates than other similar actors. It is not the only thing, of course, but it certainly prefers asymmetric to symmetric means. Ballistic missiles, for example, are also a security pillar because they are hard to defend against.

So, Iran uses [proxies] because they are a great way to mitigate cost and risk, whatever their actual objectives are—until they are not. The case of Iran actually illustrates the pros and cons of proxy use. For example, one of its proxies, Kata’ib Hezbollah, attacked a facility in Jordan, killing three US soldiers and wounding several others, who were supporting the fight against the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS). While there has been a tit-for-tat exchange going on for a while in Iraq and Syria, attacking US troops in Jordan was a significant escalation, and one it appears Tehran didn’t intend. After the attack, Kata’ib Hezbollah put out a statement that, while it certainly didn’t apologize for the attack, did say it would not retaliate against any subsequent US attacks and that Tehran had no prior knowledge of the attack. So, this could certainly have been a case of a proxy dragging a sponsor into a deeper, more costly conflict.

MENASOURCE: Can Tehran be held accountable for its proxies?

DR. TONY PFAFF: Absent a consensus that providing assistance used in an atrocity could make one, in some way at least, accountable for it, I’m not sure how. Of course, one can always impose non-lethal costs such as sanctions and so on, but those typically haven’t been effective.

MENASOURCE: What do you think policymakers in Washington get wrong about proxies?

DR. TONY PFAFF: The first part goes back to what I started talking about at the beginning. Proxy refers to a particular structure and to ignore the effects of that structure is to risk moral failure and hazards, which I discuss in detail in the book. Moral failure occurs, for example, when sponsors facilitate wars that may not have otherwise needed to happen, and especially when they withdraw support in ways that leave the proxy worse off for having fought in the first place. That doesn’t mean support should be open-ended or unconditioned. However, it is important to be upfront about what those limits and conditions are so all actors can make better informed decisions.

Ukraine is a great example. Had we not supported it—and I am not saying we should not have—at worst, there would be a new Russia-aligned government in Ukraine. At best, Ukrainians would have been forced to settle earlier on. They may have lost Donbas, they may have lost Crimea, but they may have been able to come to an accommodation with the Russians, and the fighting would have been over much sooner. The fact we supported them allowed them to continue their fight, which made settlement less attractive. That by itself is not a bad thing. As I noted previously, they have a just cause. However, if withdrawing that support encourages or enables Russia to achieve a more complete victory, then I think there is a moral failure. I think once an actor provides support, it should continue absent bad actions by the recipient, physical limitations of the sponsor, or a conflict with a higher priority.

Holly Dagres is a nonresident senior fellow in the Atlantic Council’s Middle East programs and editor of the Atlantic Council’s IranSource and MENASource blogs. Follow her on X: @hdagres.

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Gen. Laura Richardson on what an international response to Haiti might look like

Katherine Walla — Wed, 20 Mar 2024 16:33:16 +0000

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General Laura Richardson on security in the Western Hemisphere

AN #ACFRONTPAGE EVENT—Gen. Laura J. Richardson, Commander of US Southern Command, discusses her vision for US security partnership with Latin America and the Caribbean.

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The United States isn’t ruling out deploying military forces to Haiti in response to the country’s crisis—as long as such a measure is part of an “international solution” that incorporates Haiti’s perspective, said General Laura Richardson, commander of US Southern Command (SOUTHCOM).

“We wouldn’t discount that at any time,” she said at an Atlantic Council Front Page event on Tuesday hosted by the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center and the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. “We are prepared if called upon by our State Department and by our Department of Defense.”

But while the United States isn’t currently planning to put boots on the ground, Richardson clarified, SOUTHCOM has a wide range of contingency plans that it is responsible for maintaining. For example, to prepare for potential mass migration from Haiti, Richardson said that SOUTHCOM readied its naval station in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, to process a possible influx of migrants.

“We want to be able to do exactly what’s right and humane and be able to take care of populations that are trying to escape,” she said.

Richardson said that it is important to ready these plans as the situation continues to evolve in Haiti. Meanwhile, she said that the US State Department is working with the fifteen-member Caribbean Community and Haitian leaders to get a transitional presidential council in place—which will pave the way not only for the selection of an interim prime minister but also for the deployment of a Kenya-led international force to restore security.

Below are more highlights from Richardson’s conversation with Politico National Security Reporter Alexander Ward, which touched upon challenges seen in other countries around SOUTHCOM’s area of responsibility and China’s influence in the region.

Causes for concern

Last month, satellite images showed the Venezuelan military bolstering its presence near the border with Guyana. Richardson reiterated the United States’ support to Guyana, saying that the United States is continuing “all of our activities, our operations, activities, and investments,” with the country and that it is important for its allies to come together and “to show strong support for Guyana in this situation.”
With Ecuador now in a state of emergency after an escalation of violence between the government and criminal groups, Richardson said the United States has “doubled down” on its operations and activities there and has delivered emergency security equipment—it recently donated a C-130 military transport aircraft that is on the way. “As they wrestle with those hard challenges and security and instability, we have to continue with our economic investment,” she said.

China stepping in

Richardson touched upon China’s rising influence in the Panama Canal, a Chinese military-run space station in Argentina, and reports last year that China is enhancing its spy capabilities in Cuba. “What’s happening in Latin America and the Caribbean is not new,” Richardson said. “It’s not new to the globe, and it’s not new to [China’s] . . . vision and strategy.”
She argued that China has noticed the vast resources available in Latin America and the Caribbean—and also the relative vulnerability of the countries there, which are “still digging out” from the economic impact of COVID-19 and the “insecurity and instability” created by organized crime. “There’s not one country that’s being spared from all the challenges from the transnational criminal organizations.”
Richardson noted that when China makes agreements with countries in Latin America and the Caribbean, such as within the Belt and Road Initiative, they’re often “tit for tat” and accompanied by demands such as not recognizing Taiwan. “There’s always a hook,” she said.

The counteroffer from “Team USA”

With China increasing its presence in the region, Richardson said that the United States is sharing information with partner countries about China’s aims and activities so that they, in turn, can make their own decisions about working with Beijing.
“We don’t do things for strings attached; we don’t have the fine print on things,” Richardson said. “We do it because we’re a like-minded democracy . . . and we would like this region to remain free, secure, and prosperous.”
Richardson also called upon US companies to offer competitive alternatives to China’s critical-infrastructure projects in the region. “We’re not competing as much as we should,” she said. “Strategic competition is alive and well in the hemisphere. But if you’re going to compete, you’ve got to be on the ground. You’ve got to have your jersey on. You’ve got to have your number. You’ve got to be out there competing.”
The general admitted that the United States “could have done a little bit better” in paying attention to the region in recent years. “Certainly, when there are crises that require our attention in other parts of the world, that’s where the focus is,” she said. But “we can’t just focus on one or two places. We have got to continue to focus on our partners in the hemisphere that we’re part of.”

Katherine Walla is an associate director on the editorial team at the Atlantic Council.

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Grundman joins roundtable discussion on NSIB Report Card

jfranks — Wed, 20 Mar 2024 13:33:42 +0000

original source

On March 19, Forward Defense senior fellow Steven Grundman joined a roundtable discussion hosted by The Reagan Institute that reviewed its 2024 National Security Innovation Base Program (NSIB) Report Card. The NSIB Report Card is an initiative to evaluate the state and effectiveness of the national security innovation ecosystem.

There’s been some improvement … but we are now going to be spending less on modernization right in the middle of this strategic moment; this moment of tremendous strategic importance to us.

Steven Grundman

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Steven Grundman

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Background: What makes special operations forces “special”?

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Even as war continues, NATO should open the door to defense integration with Ukraine

Karsten Friis — Tue, 19 Mar 2024 16:22:48 +0000

French President Emmanuel Macron created shockwaves in Europe (again) recently, when he stated that “nothing should be excluded” when discussing the possibility of NATO troops on the ground in Ukraine.

Unsurprisingly, Germany had a different message: “Once again, in a very good debate, it was discussed that what was agreed from the outset among ourselves and with each other also applies to the future, namely that there will be no ground troops, no soldiers on Ukrainian soil sent there by European countries or NATO states,” German Chancellor Olaf Scholz said.

The sentiment from Berlin—no Western troops on the ground in Ukraine—was echoed in statements from the White House, and from London, Rome, Madrid, and other capitals. Yet in an interview on March 14, Macron declined again to rule out sending troops to Ukraine.

Macron has a point: the deployment of troops from NATO members in Ukraine—in noncombatant positions—should not be categorically ruled out. A future mission to train Ukrainian soldiers in Ukraine conducted by, for example, British or German troops might be possible. In some scenarios, it would be more efficient to bring instructors to Ukraine than to send Ukrainian troops to Germany or the United Kingdom. Similarly, as the French Foreign Minister Stéphane Séjourné has stated, tasks such as assisting with mine clearance, production of weapons, and cyber defense are all possible to envisage being done with direct Western help in Ukraine in the near future.

But what these discussions illustrate is NATO’s internal discord when it comes to Ukraine. This discord was present in the run-up to the Vilnius NATO Summit last year, and the same tendencies are beginning to arise yet again. Some countries, most notably the Baltics, Poland, and France, want to provide Ukraine with a clear roadmap toward NATO membership. This will require more—and more direct—NATO involvement in Ukraine. Others, led by the United States and Germany, want to take a more cautious approach and do not wish to promise too much to Ukraine too early.

Ensuring Ukraine prevails on the battlefield will be imperative to securing the European continent.

The current front-runner to become the next NATO secretary general, Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte, stated at the Munich Security Conference in February that “as long as the war is raging, Ukraine cannot become a member of NATO.” This statement is just as unwise and short-sighted as Scholz’s denial of the possibility of a NATO presence in Ukraine. What Rutte is in effect saying to Russian President Vladimir Putin is that as long as Russia keeps the war warm, it will prevent Ukraine from becoming a NATO member. It provides Putin with an incentive to keep the war going, and in practice an indefinite veto power over NATO enlargement, just as he had in the years after Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014.

Ensuring Ukraine prevails on the battlefield will be imperative to securing the European continent. It is time for NATO to get smarter about its Ukraine strategy, including the messaging that articulates that strategy. At the moment, NATO and its constituent members are attempting to walk the line between reassuring Ukraine of NATO countries’ commitments to its security and seeking to avoid escalation into a nuclear confrontation with Russia. Avoiding such escalation is a legitimate concern, but it is not enough to constitute a strategy.

What NATO should do instead is steadily build defense and deterrence against Russian aggression in Ukraine by integrating it into its structures step by step. This will mean some degree of Ukrainian integration with NATO, even while Russia’s invasion is ongoing. This is where new and creative thinking is needed.

NATO can allow for functional integration, or, to repurpose a term from the European Union enlargement literature: differentiated integration. By beginning in certain sectors, such as cybersecurity, air defense, logistics, training, and future force design, NATO could engage with Ukraine without embarking yet on full integration. This is already happening to some extent, but often in a bilateral manner rather than from within a NATO framework. NATO can also take over several of the tasks which today are coordinated in the US-led Ukraine Defense Contact Group. Lastly, NATO can also begin to think in geographical terms. Maybe not all Ukrainian territory needs to be covered under Article 5 right away, but perhaps some of the westernmost regions?

It’s possible NATO could even commit forces to operating within Ukraine while still avoiding a direct fight with Russia. If, for instance, NATO declared a no-fly zone in parts of Ukraine and deployed air defense systems to assist Ukrainian defense in this region, then these systems could be limited to shooting down incoming missiles. They do not need to target the Russian planes firing the missiles from inside Russia. This is a much riskier step than providing training, of course, but it is not unimaginable.

Deterrence is sometimes most effective if it is ambiguous. When an adversary is uncertain about where the red lines are, then it might act more cautiously than if it knows the exact threshold it can escalate up to without crossing. Ambiguity also provides allies with a greater degree of flexibility about a response. NATO has, for example, declared that cyberattacks are covered by Article 5, but it has never stated exactly how serious such an attack must be for the allies to invoke the article. Going forward, if NATO allies wanted to create a greater degree of ambiguity about whether troops would be sent to Ukraine, amplifying Macron’s recent statement, then it might affect how far Russia carries out its invasion.

However, on the physical battlefield, where forces clash, deterrence cannot be ambiguous. A Russian tank crossing the Finnish border would be grounds to invoke the North Atlantic Treaty’s Article 5, which accords with Article 51 in the United Nations Charter permitting collective defense against an armed attack. The same applies if a Russian Iskander missile hits Warsaw. NATO’s future collective defense of Ukraine should be similarly explicit and clearly communicated to Moscow. There must be lines that Russia cannot cross. This is risky, but there is no risk-free way of bringing Ukraine into NATO.

Unlike the Alliance’s disjointed approach to the security and defense of Ukraine, differentiated integration is the strategy the Alliance needs to continue bringing Ukraine into its orbit while signaling unity in the lead-up to the milestone summit in July.

Whether intended or not, Macron may have set in motion an important conversation about Ukrainian defense integration. Western leaders and policymakers should continue and build on that conversation as the NATO Summit in Washington approaches. Ukraine needs a clear plan for differentiated integration—in terms of function and space—even as the war rages on.

The alternative hands Putin the power to veto the future of Ukraine as a free and sovereign state.

Karsten Friis is a research professor focusing on security and defense at the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs.

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Turkey and Egypt bury the hatchet, marking an end to emerging third axis in the Middle East

Borzou Daragahi — Fri, 15 Mar 2024 14:39:24 +0000

President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s visit to Egypt on February 14 marked a milestone in diplomatic relations between two countries that fell grievously afoul of each other during a rare period of political and ideological divergence that lasted almost a decade.

The carefully choreographed and worded meeting between Erdogan and his Egyptian counterpart, President Abdel-Fattah el-Sisi, also served as a final burial ceremony for what was once an emerging third axis in the Middle East. This axis was distinct from the Saudi-led, pro-Western camp of Arab states that includes the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Morocco, and Jordan, as well as the Iranian-led, self-described “Axis of Resistance” consisting of Lebanese Hezbollah, Yemen’s Houthis, the Bashar al-Assad regime in Syria, and Shia militias in Iraq.

That partnership consisted of Turkey, Qatar, and movements and political parties in the Middle East and North Africa rooted in the Muslim Brotherhood and the Sunni political populism that peaked in the region following the 2011 Arab uprisings. Erdogan last visited Cairo in 2011, when he came to address the Arab League while pro-democracy and Islamist protesters were still triumphantly celebrating the toppling of longtime President Hosni Mubarak. In the afterglow of the Arab uprisings, Erdogan, then then prime minister of Turkey, was hailed as a “rock star” by Arab activists and Western thinkers for his country’s perceived model of moderate Islamic principles within a secular democracy.

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Back then, Sisi was an obscure but powerful senior army officer and a member of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces, the body that assumed power in Egypt after removing Mubarak in 2011. He emerged from the shadows in 2013, removing and jailing democratically elected President Mohamed Morsi and rebuilding Mubarak’s autocratic military regime but with himself at the center.

Erdogan led the way in condemning the coup d’état, as he saw Morsi as a political fellow traveler. Turkey welcomed Egyptians—mostly Muslim Brotherhood or Islamist-leaning dissidents fleeing Sisi’s purges and mass arrests—allowing the activists to launch television stations and operate relatively freely. Egyptian authorities abruptly canceled Erdogan’s planned visit to the Gaza Strip via its Sinai border. Just months after the coup, in November 2013, diplomatic ties between Egypt and Turkey were downgraded.

In Sisi, Erdogan likely saw the type of military autocrat who had undermined Turkish democratic aspirations since the republic’s founding. The generals sent one of Erdogan’s political idols, the popularly elected Adnan Menderes, to the gallows in 1961, and removed his onetime political mentor, Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan, from office in 1997.

Relations between Turkey and Egypt remained bitter for years. Egypt drew closer to Saudi Arabia and the UAE, which considered the Muslim Brotherhood their archenemy.

In 2017, the Gulf states, with the backing of Egypt, launched an unprecedented blockade of Qatar over its geopolitical ambitions and support for populist Islamic groups. Turkey came to Doha’s aid, not only airlifting emergency provisions but deploying additional troops, expanding a security cooperation deal the countries had signed in 2014.

Though tensions had been developing since Sisi’s coup, the blockade and its aftermath can be seen as marking the emergence of the third axis.

After Morsi died in prison in 2019, relations between Cairo and Ankara worsened. Erdogan described Sisi as a “tyrant” and accused him of having a direct role in the death of the ousted president, who died from a heart attack suffered while in court. “They are so cowardly that they could not even deliver his body to his family,” Erdogan said. Meanwhile, Egyptian officials accused Turkey of backing terrorist groups.

The rift impacted commerce. Turkey’s exports to Egypt fell to a twelve-year low of $2.3 billion in 2017, while Egypt’s exports to Turkey sank to a twelve-year low of $1.2 billion in 2015.

More dangerously, Turkey and Egypt—along with their respective partners—found themselves on opposite sides of armed conflicts and political struggles across the Middle East and North Africa. Ankara backed the Syrian rebels, while Sisi sought to ease tensions with President Assad. Turkey sought engagement with Iran even as Cairo’s Saudi and UAE partners, backed by then US President Donald Trump, were at the forefront of confronting Tehran.

But Libya’s civil war was the most perilous and decisive battleground between the Saudi-led axis and Turkey’s camp. Cairo and Abu Dhabi funneled arms and fighters, including fighter jets as well as Russian Wagner military forces, to warlord Khalifa Haftar’s eastern-based army as it launched an attack on Tripoli in 2019. Turkey, with the possible financial backing of Qatar, openly ferried weapons and military advisers to help defend the government in Tripoli, which included elements of the Muslim Brotherhood’s Libya branch. It was in Libya that Turkey first successfully deployed the now famous Bayraktar drones. They helped turn back Haftar’s forces in an expensive and bloody full-blown proxy war.

As 2021 began, the blockade of Qatar was ended in a deal brokered by Washington and Kuwait. Concluding the dispute made sense. For one thing, Morsi was dead. The Muslim Brotherhood and its offspring had been wiped out, along with domestic political-reform movements in the Arab world. Haftar’s expensive gamble had failed. Turkey had successfully inserted itself into the Arab world, establishing semipermanent military presences in former Ottoman lands, including Libya, Syria, Qatar, and Somalia.

Effectively, there was nothing left to fight about.

While alongside Erdogan in February, Sisi said he welcomed this “current period of calm” in the region. “I hope we can build upon it to reach lasting solutions to outstanding disputes,” he said.

Days after Erdogan’s meeting with Sisi on February 14, Turkey stripped the acquired Turkish citizenship of former Muslim Brotherhood branch leader Mahmoud Hussein and his wife, along with fifty other members of the organization.

Continuing to hold grudges would hurt both countries. As tensions have eased, trade has rebounded. Turkey’s exports to Egypt jumped to $4.5 billion in 2021, a 43-percent increase from the previous year, and to $4.5 billion in 2022. Egypt’s exports to Turkey increased from $2 billion in 2018 to a ten-year high of $2.6 billion in 2021 and a record high of $3.7 billion in 2022.

Making nice with Egypt, along with ending the Muslim Brotherhood’s free reign in Turkey, was also likely required for rapprochement with the UAE and Saudi Arabia, as well as access to their pools of liquidity amid an economic crisis and the most formidable political challenge Erdogan had faced since 2003. During his public appearance in Egypt last month, Erdogan said the two countries had committed to doubling their trade volume. He spoke of collaboration on defense and energy projects, including eastern Mediterranean gas reserves.

While the de-escalation between the two countries began in earnest in 2021, it would likely have begun sooner had Morsi not died, an event that sharply escalated the rhetoric between the two countries. In addition to economic interests and a regional shift toward more multipolar diplomatic postures, Erdogan’s political ideology began to change in 2015. That is when he abandoned hopes of courting pious Kurdish voters or the liberals who had once supported him, and instead embraced the same hardline nationalists who tormented his ideological forebears for decades.

Egypt and Turkey nearly slipped into armed conflict in the late 1950s as the Arab nationalist movement led by Gamal Abdel Nasser sought to draw Syria into Egypt’s temporary unification with Iraq. But the latest rift between Egypt and Turkey was anomalous. Two militaristic nations ruthlessly fixated for decades on territorial security and empowerment of privileged elites fell dramatically afoul not over a border or resources, but on matters of principle, including popular legitimacy, human rights, and political teleology.

Before his historic Cairo visit in 2011, in which he addressed activists in Tahrir Square, Erdogan was scheduled to visit Mubarak in a grand state visit, presumably to cut the kinds of deals he recently forged with Sisi. Erdogan canceled that visit over the president’s response to the ongoing protests at Tahrir Square, a testament to the Arab uprising’s far-reaching impact.

“Listen to the shouting of the people, the extremely humane demands. Without hesitation, satisfy the people’s desire for change,” Erdogan said.

The tremors of the 2011 earthquake have long since dissipated. The region has settled into a duller status quo dominated by autocrats divvying up the spoils behind closed doors. Both Erdogan and Sisi alluded to their support for the Palestinian cause amid Israel’s offensive in Gaza, but it is unlikely the two countries will take bold steps in that regard. For the foreseeable future, Turkey and Egypt’s relations will be focused on big energy deals, tourism numbers, and expansion of lucrative business ties.

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Why Washington’s approach to Black Sea security may be about to change—for the better

Arnold C. Dupuy — Mon, 11 Mar 2024 19:32:33 +0000

Washington’s engagement with the Black Sea has ebbed and flowed in the post-Cold War era. The lack of consistent focus has contributed to relative insecurity in the littoral states and emboldened Russian aggression.

But as the region continues to be destabilized by Russia’s war on Ukraine, there is a sign that this period of US neglect may be ending. This sign comes in the form of Section 1247 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024 (NDAA), which US President Joe Biden signed on December 22 last year, authorizing a total national security budget of $886 billion.

Section 1247 instructs the National Security Council to develop a Black Sea security and development strategy across government agencies. But until that strategy is released, Section 1247 outlines five ways the United States will aim to support the region: “(1) to increase coordination with [NATO] and the [European Union (EU)]; (2) to deepen economic ties; (3) to strengthen energy security; (4) to support efforts to bolster their democratic resilience; and (5) to enhance security assistance with regional partners in accordance with the values and interests of the United States.”

These aims will require a whole-of-government approach in addition to participation from the private sector, for example through private investment in projects across Black Sea regional partners—which the NDAA lists as Bulgaria, Georgia, Moldova, Romania, Turkey, and Ukraine.

Some initial assessments can be made about the United States’ five aims.

US coordination with NATO and the EU

The Black Sea region’s most pressing concern is Ukraine, which is struggling to fend off Russia. Though Ukraine has already received considerable military and economic support from the West, this aid will continue in the form of the EU’s recently approved fifty-billion-euro package. The US Congress is still in gridlock over additional aid. Ultimately, Ukraine’s role as a bulwark against Russian aggression is too important for Washington and Brussels to ignore.

Over the long term, there is a need for greater military capability and interoperability, as well as a more resilient civil-military infrastructure, across the Black Sea region. While all the littoral states would benefit from a greater US presence, two nations will be particularly important for achieving the United States’ coordination goals. Turkey is not only home to the second-largest military in NATO; it is also the guardian of the straits that connect the Black Sea to the Mediterranean Sea (and beyond), so any US strategy must include Ankara. Therefore, rapprochement between Ankara, Washington, and Brussels will be necessary. Romania’s size, strategic location, and strong transatlantic ties have positioned it to become a military and economic hub for the region, particularly as more NATO assets are deployed there.

Deepening economic ties

Section 1247 calls for enhancing US business ties with Black Sea regional partners in part to reduce the impact of Russian and Chinese “economic coercion.” It is here where the various chambers of commerce—as well as the US Agency for International Development (USAID) and other US government development organs—can contribute by coordinating with stakeholders, lending institutions, and entrepreneurs.

Corruption and entrenched bureaucracies prevalent in the region inhibit growth and investment and undermine public confidence in national institutions. There have been improvements, though. Hopefully, increased attention from Washington will provide the impetus for the regional states to implement and enforce additional serious anticorruption measures.

Strengthening energy security

There is a need to strengthen the wider Black Sea region’s energy security by enhancing source diversification and reducing or eliminating dependence on Russia. Due to their geographical location and historical ties with Russia, most countries in the region are dependent on Russia for oil and gas imports. With the price cap placed on Russian oil—designed to reduce money flows to Moscow—these countries have worked on reducing their dependences. However, because of waivers, lax controls, or illegal trading activities, money from around the world still flows into the Kremlin’s coffers.

Moldova’s efforts to wean itself from Russian energy have had some success, with notable Romanian support. Ankara has worked to diversify its energy sources—although Turkey is proceeding with an agreement it signed with Russia that allows Russian state nuclear energy company Rosatom to build, own, and operate a nuclear power plant in Akkuyu, drawing criticism from experts in the West. Moreover, Russian energy still flows into Turkey. For example, Turkey has become the second-largest importer of Russian fossil fuels.

Finally, NATO’s lack of pipeline infrastructure in Eastern Europe is a potential vulnerability, meaning that it may not be able to rapidly move fuel to forward-deployed forces in the Black Sea region. Addressing that vulnerability will require a major effort that includes increasing oil and gas production by Black Sea states, exploiting renewable energy sources, and expanding the distribution network through expanded pipeline, road, rail, and barge infrastructure. This will be expensive, controversial, and time consuming, requiring funding, strong diplomacy, and patience.

Bolstering democratic resilience

Russia’s relentless malign influence campaigns are difficult to counter for small states without the vast resources to do so. A comprehensive, multinational response is needed to blunt Russian propaganda and disinformation in the Black Sea region. The NDAA advocates for an increase in independent media and US-supported media initiatives in the region, in addition to initiatives led by the State Department and USAID, to “combat foreign malign influence in the region.” This also presents the opportunity to leverage US-owned news network Voice of America and US-supported media organization Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. The United States could look to incorporate other resources, such as NATO’s strategic communications arm—including its Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence based in Riga, Latvia.

Enhancing security assistance with regional partners

The longstanding mistrust between the littoral states creates an indispensable role for the United States. Indeed, the United States has encouraged collaboration on Black Sea security among the region’s states. Such collaboration is on the rise, most recently seen in January when Turkey, Bulgaria, and Romania agreed to conduct demining operations in the Black Sea once Russia’s war in Ukraine comes to an end. Georgia is positioning itself as a key player in the middle corridor—promoting itself as a trusted partner in Eastern Europe’s trade system—by improving its port facilities and ancillary infrastructure. Georgia is also the proposed source for a potential undersea power and internet cable to Romania. Additionally, the strategy calls for assessments on “sustainable, long-term” food-security solutions. Cooperation between Ukraine and the countries along its Black Sea shipping corridor (Romania, Bulgaria, and Turkey) has allowed shipping, including millions of tons of agricultural goods such as grain, to continue along the Black Sea’s western coast within each state’s territorial waters. The United States’ aim to enhance security assistance with these regional partners is an opportunity for Washington to solidify its role as a trusted third party in such cooperation.

Section 1247 of the NDAA appears to be the beginning of an effort to bring stability to the United States’ traditionally unpredictable and uneven commitment to lend focus to the Black Sea region. However, Russia will continue to present a threat to the region. Thus, the United States must solidify its plans for engagement in order to change Russia’s perception of the political and economic costs of its activities and, ultimately, to deter the Kremlin.

Arnold C. Dupuy is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council IN TURKEY, a faculty member of the US Naval Postgraduate School, and chair of the NATO Science and Technology Organization’s SAS-183, “Energy Security Capabilities, Resilience and Interoperability.” Follow him on LinkedIn.

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A geopolitical European Commission is a must for 2025 and beyond

James Batchik, Stuart Jones — Thu, 07 Mar 2024 21:21:44 +0000

From the eurozone crisis in 2011 to Russia’s ongoing invasion of Ukraine, Europe has faced existential tests more or less continuously for over a decade. This year is no exception, especially as citizens on both sides of the Atlantic head to the polls to decide the future of their political leadership and, as a result, the direction of transatlantic relations.

Europe votes first in June, when elections for the European Parliament will usher in a tenth parliamentary session and, circuitously, a new European Commission for the next five years. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen has announced that she is running for a second term, driven, among other priorities, to deliver a geopolitically relevant European Union (EU). Whoever ends up at the helm in the Berlaymont, a critical task will be to prioritize this ambition—especially in the bloc’s defense transformation and economic security—all while carefully navigating the EU’s relationship with the United States.

Europe’s elections and the geopolitical Commission

The first test of the bloc’s geopolitical ambitions will be the indirect election of the European Commission president. With the much-anticipated announcement of von der Leyen’s candidacy to lead the European People’s Party (EPP) on February 19, and with the official nod from the EPP Congress on March 7, her hat is officially in the ring.

As a committed Atlanticist and proponent of a “geopolitical Commission,” a term she has popularized, von der Leyen is the face of a more muscular and active EU in world affairs, with the Commission at the steering wheel. Hers is a world in which the Commission president answers Henry Kissinger’s famous question of who the United States should call to speak with Europe. She looks to continue that vision. “Prosperity. Security. Democracy,” will be her priorities for the next Commission, von der Leyen stressed at the EPP Congress.

Von der Leyen’s return is likely, but it is not guaranteed. The EPP is on course to collect the most seats in the parliamentary elections, which would put von der Leyen, as the EPP’s Spitzenkandidat (or “lead candidate”), in pole position for another term as Commission president. However, the EU’s twenty-seven member state leaders at the European Council will be the ones to officially nominate the president, and EU treaties only require them to take “into account” June’s election results when making this decision. One recalls how in 2019, von der Leyen was controversially not her party’s lead candidate—or even officially in the running—but was still nominated by the Council to become Commission president.

Von der Leyen has already collected the endorsement of European leaders from her EPP family as well as those from the rival Party of European Socialists, including Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez. She has also garnered positive murmurs from Berlin—even though von der Leyen is part of Germany’s opposition Christian Democrats, Chancellor Olaf Scholz’s main rivals. However, her style and ambition have not been without controversy. She has earned the ire of national capitals for not consulting with them on major decisions, overstepping her role, and centralizing powers inside her office.

With a projected rightward shift in the Parliament, von der Leyen will have to win over European leaders and a constellation of parliamentary parties outside the EPP to secure a new mandate. The European elections are mostly national affairs and voters are mobilized by national priorities, such as the rising cost of living or farmers’ protests. But the elections and subsequent horse trading at the Council can still be seen, in part at least, as a vote of confidence—or not—on von der Leyen and her leadership of the Commission. Regardless of von der Leyen’s future, the next Commission president will have to contend with crises and challenges at their doorstep.

Adapting Europe for the realities of war

Once the dust settles after the election, Europe will face a litany of priorities commanding the attention of the Commission. While environmental and agricultural regulations, reforms to immigration policy, and concerns over the common market’s sluggish competitiveness are all important considerations, the first order priorities must be bolstering European security and supporting Ukraine. This means recognizing the need to reshape Europe’s defense footing for the near and long term.

Europe has come a long way since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine two years ago. Member states have emptied their stockpiles of arms and munitions. The bloc has activated nearly one hundred billion euros in support for Ukraine, accented by a fifty-billion-euro financial aid package to Kyiv earlier this year. The EU additionally blocked Russian state assets, enacted thirteen packages of sanctions against Russia, weathered a difficult and costly ongoing energy decoupling from Moscow, and pioneered new mechanisms to fund, arm, and train Ukrainians.

Much more is needed. Europe continues to struggle to arm Ukraine with the kit it needs. National differences inside the bloc have hampered efforts to buy ammunition for Ukraine or agree on top-ups to the European Peace Facility. Joint defense procurement, a perennial goal, remains underdeveloped.

On these fronts, the EU institutions can play an important role and have already made promising signals. Von der Leyen and others have already endorsed establishing the post of commissioner for defense, and the EPP’s electoral manifesto calls for the creation of a “Single Market for Defence.” On March 5, the Commission unveiled its European Defence Industrial Strategy (EDIS) which outlines a path to revitalize Europe’s defense industrial complex, meet ambitious targets for homegrown defense capabilities, and continue to arm Ukraine. The Commission complemented EDIS with its proposal for the European Defence Industry Programme (EDIP), which includes an investment plan worth €1.5 billion to boost domestic production and common procurement of military equipment in Europe.

Individually, however, a new initiative or a European defense commissioner will not solve Europe’s woes. As proposed, EDIP only spans until 2027 and offers a paltry sum—just 1.5 percent of the one hundred billion euros needed in the long term, as European Commissioner for the Single Market Thierry Breton has argued. As EDIP itself states, it is only a bridge to longer-term changes. EDIS sets laudable targets, but defense competencies remain in national capitals, and there are still wide divergences on how to take EU defense efforts forward, never mind how to finance them. All the while, Ukraine desperately needs European military aid now.

Time is also running short to enact EDIP this legislative term. The Parliament will need to debate and adopt the proposal and square any differences with member states in the Council of the European Union before electoral campaigning begins in May.

As a result, Brussels will need to hit the ground running on defense. After the election, EU policymakers must implement EDIP and subsequently look ahead to the long-term plan. The next Commission cannot afford to be absent in this debate and must spearhead the effort to design a more unified and concerted approach to European defense.

Preparing for economic security in action

Alongside defense, the next Commission’s agenda must deal with security concerns in international trade and industrial policy. Following the COVID-19 pandemic and Russia’s invasion, Europe has reassessed how to conduct trade with unreliable actors, including China, on which the EU market is vulnerably dependent. Subsequently, the EU is debating how to shore up supply chains and “de-risk” its critical dependences from one of the bloc’s biggest trade partners.

Fears of overexposure to Chinese exports, dependence on unreliable states for critical materials needed for the green transition, unfair market practices skewing trade relations, and strategic investments of critical infrastructure have already pushed the European Commission to release a comprehensive economic security package. The policy proposes bloc action to confront nonmarket actors and would-be antagonists. Although it does not mention China by name, the EU has already begun to screen Chinese investment and state subsidies into electric vehicles and solar panel imports. The next Commission will likely continue its current posture and maintain a delicate balance of trade and security vis-à-vis China, despite the caution expressed by some member states (especially Germany) over von der Leyen’s hawkish tone.

In doing this, however, the EU must also ensure its commitment to the values of free trade and open markets on which the bloc was founded. Europe cannot compete dollar for dollar as the United States can on issues of economic security. Nor can it fully engage in industrial policy, as Mario Draghi’s forthcoming report on the single market likely suggests. These deficiencies need not be crippling, though, as the European Commission can still work to complete new free trade agreements with strategic partners such as Canada and Mercosur.

Transatlantic relations on and off the ballot

While Europe’s strategic attention is focused on Ukraine and China, the EU will still need to look to the United States for partnership. Whether the transatlantic relationship persists in its current form or gets upended will depend in part on the outcome of the US presidential election in November. In any case, the next Commission must aim to maintain at least stable relations with Washington.

It is fundamentally in the United States’ interest to have a strong and cooperative partner across the pond—a proactive Europe on the world stage, capable of securing its own defense and taking the lead on supporting Ukraine. It has already made great strides on the latter but will need to address the former from day one after June’s elections. Meanwhile, the US-EU Trade and Technology Council remains a central vessel for harmonizing digital policy and mediating trade disputes, which will only grow in prominence amid transatlantic de-risking from China.

Given how often Europe has overcome serious institutional headwinds and geopolitical crises before, observers may dismiss the EU’s current wave of structural challenges as merely one more in a long series. But it would be mistaken to downplay Europe’s coming troubles or the scale of the institutional reforms that will be necessary to surmount them. While Europe has so far managed to avoid sending its own forces into direct combat with Russia or facing heavy Chinese economic pressure, it is increasingly clear that the EU must develop its defense and economic statecraft capabilities to guarantee its security and geopolitical weight in the long term. The legacy of the next European Parliament and Commission president will be defined by how they rise to these challenges.

James Batchik is an associate director of the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center.

Stuart Jones is a young global professional with the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center.

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Stealth, speed, and adaptability: The role of special operations forces in strategic competition

Clementine G. Starling and Alyxandra Marine — Thu, 07 Mar 2024 17:10:17 +0000

Executive summary

Introduction

How are US Special Operations Forces organized today?
The five SOF truths
USSOF’s twelve core activities
USSOF’s role prior to and during conflict

History of USSOF: SOF’s evolving purpose and how its history lends to competition today

The creation of USSOF and its role in the twentieth century
USSOF in the GWOT and the twenty-first century
Public perceptions of USSOF

USSOF today in the context of strategic competition

USSOF’s strengths applied to strategic competition
I. Global and persistent engagement with allies and partners
II. Gaining placement and access across the globe
III. Operations across the competition continuum
IV. At the cutting edge of capability development and employment

What’s next? Enhancing USSOF in the 2020s and beyond

Revamping USSOF’s mindset for strategic competition
“Walk and chew gum at the same time”
Applying SOF’s strengths in new ways
Knowing what success looks like

Executive summary

Today, the US Joint Force grapples with an array of security challenges that transcend traditional boundaries and cut across theaters and domains. US competitors—China and Russia—conduct military, information, economic, cyber, and diplomatic activities across the globe, from the Indo-Pacific and Europe to Africa, Latin America, Central Asia, and the Arctic. Managing strategic competition necessitates the United States taking proactive measures to counter malign activities and advance US strategic objectives across multiple theaters and domains.

US Special Operations Forces (USSOF) possess distinct abilities and expertise that can greatly aid in addressing the complexities of strategic competition, yet these assets are often overlooked or misunderstood. USSOF is too often seen as the direct-action, finishing force of the Global War on Terror era. Yet, the special operator of 2024 is not just the physically imposing “trigger puller,” but also the young man or woman who is an expert at coding. USSOF has a unique position that allows it to elevate the Joint Force’s capacity to navigate the entire spectrum of competition. Its activities prior to conflict, such as operational preparation of the environment (OPE), can shape the strategic environment with US competitors. This report contends that, when leveraged effectively, USSOF has the potential to play a pivotal role in promoting US global interests, particularly in addressing vulnerabilities across the competition continuum.

A U.S. Army Special Forces Soldier demonstrates lateral marksmanship drills to U.S. and Panamanian security forces during joint combined exchange training in Panama City, Panama. Credit: DVIDS – U.S. Army photo by Staff Sgt. Osvaldo Equite.

To fully harness USSOF’s role in strategic competition, the authors of this report propose recommendations to United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict (ASD(SO/LIC)), the Joint Force, the Department of Defense (DOD), and policymakers within the defense ecosystem. The recommendations are aimed at enhancing USSOF’s capabilities that already have utility in strategic competition, while shifting USSOF’s mindset toward this role. By implementing these measures, USSOF can better support the US interagency and promote US global interests in strategic competition. The recommendations are summarized below.

First, USSOF must adapt its mindset to play a larger role in strategic competition, expanding its non-kinetic activities and irregular-warfare concepts to counter the sophisticated capabilities of near-peer US adversaries like China and Russia. To do this, USSOF must balance its traditional tasks like countering violent extremist organizations (VEO) and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) operations, which will remain critical, with new challenges posed by strategic competitors. The latter necessitates the global synchronization of Joint Force planning to fully leverage USSOF’s capabilities across seven geographic combatant commands. Effective communication between ASD(SO/LIC) and USSOCOM is essential for articulating SOF’s strategic role across the DOD enterprise, but USSOF must be empowered by the Joint Force to proactively support competition below the threshold of conflict.

Second, USSOF’s capacity to synchronize the efforts of interagency partners, allied and partner militaries, and the Joint Force serves as a linchpin in addressing the complexities of strategic competition. There is nevertheless a gap in understanding regarding USSOF’s pre-conflict role among decision-makers. Many of USSOF’s activities can be leveraged more strategically to shape the competition environment, such as its aptitudes in special reconnaissance, foreign internal defense, civil-affairs operations, military information-support operations, unconventional warfare, security-force assistance, and foreign humanitarian assistance. By recognizing USSOF’s integral role in the competition continuum and integrating it more effectively into strategic planning, the DOD can leverage USSOF’s capabilities to their fullest extent, ensuring a proactive and comprehensive approach to strategic competition.

Third, USSOF can adapt its strengths to new challenges by enhancing capabilities in cyber, space, and undersea warfare, bolstering civil-affairs expertise for extreme environments like the Arctic, and investing in technological advancements like artificial intelligence (AI) to achieve cognitive overmatch in complex operating environments. Empowering USSOF to succeed in 2024 and beyond will require USSOF and the broader DOD enterprise to recognize that the special operator of the future includes a diverse cadre of cyber operators, culturally immersed experts, specialists in space, AI, engineering, or physics support operations, and gender-diverse teams.

Fourth, USSOF must find ways to measure its success in an unclassified setting by internally defining clear mission objectives for strategic competition and establishing tracking mechanisms to assess progress. Articulating success through deliberate campaigns to disrupt adversaries’ strategies can help communicate USSOF’s contributions and impact while safeguarding classified information.

Fifth, enhancing integration between USSOF and the US military services necessitates a better understanding of USSOF’s current capabilities and roles, improved communication, and synchronized global campaign planning to leverage USSOF’s strategic advantages effectively across multiple combatant commands and interagency partners. Clarifying USSOF’s presence and activities in regions pre-conflict, and facilitating collaboration between commands, can enhance intelligence sharing and support strategic-competition efforts.

Sixth, it is critical to leverage USSOF’s agility in identifying innovations from nontraditional defense-industrial partners. USSOF is a leader in identifying, testing, fielding, and evolving new, cutting-edge technologies that have utility across the Joint Force, DOD, and the Intelligence Community (IC). Enhancing USSOF and defense-industrial base relations involves improving collaboration between USSOF and leading-edge defense industries. Initiatives like SOFWERX and recommendations from the Atlantic Council’s Commission on Innovation Adoption can facilitate this collaboration, ensuring a culture of operational experimentation and incentivizing private-sector engagement to support USSOF’s mission success. Appropriately resourced, USSOF can continue to advance innovation adoption for the Joint Force at a time when doing so is essential for strategic competition.

Finally, USSOF must maintain effective cooperation with its allied counterparts while communicating its current and future plans, particularly regarding areas of focus, investments, and adaptations. The US interagency and DOD can learn from the experiences and models put forward by allies—such as the United Kingdom, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, and Norway—that have highly integrated special operations into their plans to compete with strategic challengers like Russia and China. In so doing, the United States should continue to recognize the importance of prioritizing special-forces capabilities, investing in small, specialized teams, and aligning with allies on shared priorities to facilitate multilateral operations.

These recommendations not only ensure USSOF’s relevance and effectiveness, but also reinforce its pivotal role in safeguarding US interests and promoting global stability. The US interagency and DOD should invest in USSOF’s many strengths for strategic competition. In so doing, USSOF will stand ready to navigate the complexities of the modern conflict and to serve as a formidable force in advancing US strategic objectives on the global stage.

East-coast based U.S. Naval Special Warfare Operators (SEALs) conduct visit, board, search and seizure training with Allied Special Operations Forces near Athens, Greece. Credit: DVIDS – U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 1st Class Bill Carlisle

Introduction

The United States and its allies and partners face an increasingly complex security environment in the twenty-first century, with competitors China and Russia leveraging all elements of their national power—diplomatic, information, military, and economic—to undermine US and allied security and prosperity. Considering strategic competition, the US Joint Force must adapt how it operates, recognizing that today’s security threats stretch well beyond the physical battlefield, and that competition and deterrence must be shaped prior to conflict. Both China and Russia view competition with the United States as taking place on a continuum, while the United States too often draws a bright line between peace and war while underinvesting in the competitive space between, leaving the United States at a disadvantage.

USSOF offers unique skills, competencies, capabilities, and experiences that can significantly support US goals and outcomes in strategic competition—but these tools are poorly understood. USSOF is often thought about through the lens of its past successes over the last two decades, notably in counterterrorism. But who special operators are today, where and how they operate, and the significant role they play in shaping the environment and creating successful outcomes for strategic competition remain underappreciated.

The 2018 and 2022 National Defense Strategies—and the integrated deterrence concept—acknowledge that today’s security threats will only be deterred through “employing every tool at the Department [of Defense]’s disposal.” USSOF is uniquely positioned to model, support, and enhance the Joint Force’s ability to do this. This report argues that, if harnessed correctly, USSOF can play a central role in advancing global US interests—especially across the seams and gaps of national power and artificial geographic boundaries that US adversaries exploit.

Some defense leaders are considering cuts to USSOF, which could dramatically alter its ability to contribute to strategic competition with China and leave an operational gap in current capabilities and future joint planning. How does USSOF support US and allied security imperatives, and how would a degradation of USSOF impact US competitive advantage in the 2020s and beyond?

This paper examines how the US government can best employ USSOF and apply its past successes and unique and joint operational approach to the challenges present in today’s era of strategic competition. The authors examine USSOF’s background and history, how USSOF enhances the US ability to outcompete China, and areas in which USSOF can be more effectively employed. The paper benefited from consultations with and peer review from many experts and practitioners across the national security community.

A group of US Army Paratroopers, assigned to 20th Special Forces Group, Alabama Natonal Guard, begin to board a C27J aircraft with their MC-6 parachutes at Northeast Alabama Regional Airport, Gadsden, Alabama. Credit: DVIDS – US Army photo by Staff Sgt. Ausitn Berner

Background: What makes special operations forces “special”?

Special operators are ubiquitous across the US military services and combatant commands, yet their organization, operations, and missions are distinct from their counterparts across the Joint Force. USSOF comprises the active, guard, and reserve elements of each service component of the US Armed Forces that are designed, trained, and equipped to conduct and support special operations—“activities or actions requiring unique modes of employment, tactical techniques, equipment, and training often conducted in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive environments.” USSOF is unique from other parts of the military in its light footprint, specialized and inherently joint operations, and stealth approach. SOF typically deploys as tailored units based on an operation’s requirements, risk, and capabilities to sensitive regions of the world—often to places that conventional forces otherwise cannot access—and, in doing so, it can generate outsized strategic effects.

Globally positioned and readily deployed, USSOF provides decision-makers with low-visibility, small-footprint, and often low-cost options to secure US interests. It does this either by directly addressing threats or by indirectly engaging by, with, and through international allies and partners, thus allowing the United States to leverage partners’ capabilities and geographical familiarity and providing unique placement and access to partners that might be otherwise unavailable across the interagency. Accounting for just 3 percent of the US DOD’s budget, USSOF expands the response options available to the United States and its allies and partners, buying decision space for US and allied leaders. This is especially important in enabling US forces to shape the environment and conditions of competition well before conflict arises.

A crew chief with Helicopter Sea Combat Squadron 85 (HSC-85) scans the skies while on a mission to emplace US and Australian Special Operations Forces (SOF) during Talisman Sabre. Credit: DVIDS – US Marine Corps photos by Lance Cpl. Nicole Rogge

How are US Special Operations Forces organized today?

The ASD(SO/LIC) “oversees and advocates for Special Operations and Irregular Warfare throughout the Department of Defense to ensure these capabilities are resourced, ready, and properly employed in accordance with the National Defense Strategy.” USSOF is consolidated under the United States Special Operations Command, the unified combatant command headquartered at MacDill Air Force Base in Tampa, Florida. USSOCOM oversees the US Army Special Operations Command (USASOC), US Naval Special Warfare Command (WARCOM), US Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC), and US Marine Forces Special Operations Command (MARSOC). Within USSOCOM, the interoperability planning and equipment standardization of the various service SOF commands is overseen by the Joint Special Operations Commander (JSOC). To support the Geographic Combatant Commands (GCCs), SOCOM offers a sub-unified command per region aligned with the GCC in the form of Theater Special Operations Commands (TSOCs).

The five SOF truths

USSOF is guided by its Five Truths—key tenets that define both USSOF and special operators.

Humans are more important than hardware.
Quality is better than quantity.
Special Operations Forces cannot be mass-produced.
Competent Special Operations Forces cannot be created after emergencies occur.
Most Special Operations require non-SOF assistance.

These truths echo the fact that a small number of SOF operators—carefully selected, well-trained, and exceptionally led—offer an unorthodox or specialized approach to security challenges that cannot be replicated at a larger scale across the conventional military force.

The special operator’s experience is distinctive—marked by high levels of adaptability, cultural understanding, and exceptional physical prowess that reflect years of specialized training, as well as global and joint experience that other servicemembers may not obtain. Special operations are joint in nature and involve liaising across the Joint Force and US government interagency organizations. As such, special operators gain unique exposure and understanding of how to execute joint operations with interagency partners during competition, and in preparation for crisis and conflict. Special operators are highly educated and uniquely trained for different environments and locales, and they possess the capability to employ unconventional thinking to achieve success.¹ Furthermore, they are highly specialized, and their operational approach is characterized by cultural awareness, flexibility, and a tolerance for ambiguity, which allows them to function in complex and ever-changing conditions—a critical component when the presence of overt conventional forces may escalate tensions in any given region. These characteristics and capabilities mean that USSOF can be harnessed in creative ways to respond to strategic competitors whenever and wherever they are operating across the globe.

Members of the Jordanian Armed Forces Special Task Force, Air Force Special Tactics Airmen with the 24th Special Operations Wing and Italian special operations forces provide security for an incoming Royal Jordanian Air Force UH-60L Blackhawk helicopter during a combat search and rescue mission at Eager Lion. Credit: DVIDS – US Air Force photo by Senior Airman Ryan Conroy

USSOF’s twelve core activities

USSOF is known for its role in US counterterrorism missions of the past two decades. Special operators played a central role in the twenty-year Global War on Terror (GWOT) via counterterrorism and counterinsurgency missions. However, USSOF executes twelve core activities (both before and during conflicts or crises) that are lesser known and crucial to strategic competition. These activities often overlap and rarely take place in isolation. Many of these activities are highly relevant to combatting China’s and Russia’s malign activity or altering their decision calculus and popular perceptions across the globe.

Direct Action: Executing short-duration strikes and small-scale offensive actions to seize, destroy, capture, exploit, recover, or damage designated targets.
Special Reconnaissance: Actions conducted in sensitive environments to collect or verify information of strategic or operational significance.
Unconventional Warfare: Executing actions to enable a resistance movement or insurgency that is aiming to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a government or occupying power.
Foreign Internal Defense (FID): Activities geared toward supporting the host nation’s internal defense and development, including safeguarding against subversion, terrorism, insurgency, or other threats to stability and internal security.
Civil Affairs Operations (CAO): Enhancing the relationship between US and allied and partner military forces and civilian authorities in areas where military forces are present.
Counterterrorism (CT): Actions taken directly against terrorist networks, as well as actions to influence or render global and regional environments inhospitable to terrorist networks.
Military Information Support Operations (MISO): Planned activities aimed at conveying specific, pre-selected information to foreign audiences. Such information is often aimed at influencing the emotions, motives, objective reasoning, or behavior of foreign audiences, groups, individuals, or sometimes governments in a manner favorable to US or host-nation objectives.
Counter-proliferation of WMD: Activities to support US government efforts to curtain the development, possession, proliferation, and use of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) weapons by governments and non-state actors.
Security Force Assistance: Organizing, training, equipping, rebuilding, or advising various components of foreign security forces.
Counterinsurgency (COIN): The amalgamation of civilian and military efforts designed to end insurgent violence and facilitate a return to peaceful political processes.
Hostage Rescue and Recovery: Offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, preempt, and respond to hostage incidents, which may include the recapture of US facilities, installations, sensitive materials, or personnel in areas hostile to the United States.
Foreign Humanitarian Assistance: A range of Department of Defense humanitarian activities conducted outside the United States and its territories, and alongside other humanitarian entities, to relieve and reduce human suffering.

These twelve activities form a robust, interconnected, and mutually supportive framework that allows USSOF to navigate different phases of competition and conflict across the competition continuum. Rarely does a special operation occur without involving or impacting one or more core activities. For instance, an unconventional-warfare campaign might seamlessly incorporate direct action and special reconnaissance elements, highlighting the fluidity and adaptability inherent in special operations. Some special operations are carried out by USSOF’s cross-functional teams (CFTs), which combine the unique capabilities of Civil Affairs, psychological operations (PSYOP) forces, special forces, and enablers. USSOF was the first to execute and operate multi-domain command and control, and helped define what is now doctrine in multi-domain operations.

Special operations are multifaceted by design, and each service may bring distinctive skills and missions.² Employing different specialties and tools, USSOF takes a holistic approach to threats across the competition continuum. Such an approach is critical to compete with US strategic rivals that operate in spaces beyond the military domain, including the information, diplomatic, economic, and legal realms. As such, USSOF has, and can continue to have, a tremendously valuable role in strategic competition.

USSOF’s role prior to and during conflict

Special operators are adept at shaping outcomes in response to evolving challenges, performing their core activities years before conflict breaks out and remaining on the ground in the aftermath of a crisis. For example, during pre-conflict phases, USSOF’s reconnaissance missions can provide information to the IC in key regions. USSOF can operate behind enemy lines and sometimes have access to sources and information that members of the IC do not, contributing vast amounts of intelligence to the United States.

Army Spc. Daniel Lynch, a soldier with B Company, 182nd Infantry Regiment, Massachusetts National Guard, uses a rope bridge constructed by Guatemalan special forces. Credit: DVIDS – US Army photo by Spc. Samuel D. Keenan

Meanwhile, USSOF’s security cooperation programs are dedicated to enhancing partner capability and capacity while increasing US regional access and influence. Key aspects of this relationship include fostering partner resilience against subversion and coercion—and, when necessary, resistance to occupation. A prime example of this is the significant role that USSOF played in helping Ukraine build and train a professional and capable military force after the illegal Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014. At that time, Ukrainian military forces lacked command and control and were not well-trained in operating key capabilities. Following 2014, US, United Kingdom (UK), and other allied SOF trained the Ukrainian military, supporting its evolution into the professional and capable military force we see today, which has been much better positioned to respond to and tenaciously fight Russia’s ongoing war against Ukraine.

USSOF provides a critical leg of integrated deterrence, alongside conventional and nuclear military capabilities, by executing irregular aspects of competition that remain below the threshold of armed conflict. This includes undertaking specialized reconnaissance, irregular warfare, medical support, clandestine logistics, data collection, and human intelligence (HUMINT) analysis—or military information-support operations, known as MISO—against potential adversaries before a conflict arises. SOF also bolsters deterrence by denial and punishment, demonstrating to allies and partners how to stand up to coercion from Russia, China, and other adversaries.

In the event of a crisis, USSOF is strategically positioned at the forefront, offering support across the Joint Force and US government interagency organizations in critical areas. For example, USSOF supports the development of US Embassy Emergency Action Plans, provides humanitarian assistance, and generates intelligence to establish conditions for large-scale combat operations. In essence, USSOF’s role is proactive. Instead of waiting for the onset of conflict, special operators are engaged in a region for an extended period before such a conflict ever emerges, and they set the environment for future engagement and interoperability with other military forces.

History of USSOF: SOF’s evolving purpose and how its history lends to competition today

The creation of USSOF and its role in the twentieth century

The inception of USSOF dates back to 1942. Born out of necessity during the Second World War (WWII), the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) was created by President Franklin D. Roosevelt, establishing air, ground, and maritime SOF to meet the particular needs of warfighting theaters. These OSS forces, led by Bill Donovan, became critical to the global operations of the Allied forces in World War II, acting as elite raiding forces in Europe, enablers of Nazi- and fascist-resistance movements in the Mediterranean and Middle East, and the executors of an unconventional-warfare campaign in China and East Asia. The OSS forces were dissolved by President Harry Truman following the end of WWII, and all the special intelligence and warfare functions were then transferred to the War Department. By the time the Korean War began in 1953, there were no remaining official standing special-operations units, but their noticeable absence resulted in an accelerated effort to rebuild such capabilities during that decade.

During the Cold War, the Department of Defense recognized the value of irregular warfare to enable resistance groups in Warsaw Pact countries. This led to the 1952 establishment of the Army’s Psychological Warfare Center at Fort Bragg—later renamed the Special Warfare Center. As their capability was rebuilt, USSOF forces deployed troops throughout the Cold War, supporting covert Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) operations in Tibet, Iran, Eastern Europe, and Cuba; supporting and training south Vietnamese troops; and evacuating missionaries and other personnel from unstable regions of the Congo, among other missions.

US and Estonian Special Operation Forces prepare to board a US Air Force CV-22B Osprey, assigned to the 352nd Special Operations Wing during a training mission near Tallin, Estonia. Credit: DVIDS – U.S. Army photo by Elizabeth Pena

The true value of USSOF during the Cold War was realized when President John F. Kennedy stressed the need for the armed services to invest more heavily in guerrilla and counter-guerrilla operations as an effort to combat Soviet influence operations worldwide. As it expanded to create new units and training centers across the services, USSOF emerged as “pioneers in interagency cooperation,” collaborating with entities such as the CIA by conducting long-range reconnaissance missions and medical support missions to Vietnam.³ During this time, special operations became one of the US military’s key enablers to counter coercion below the threshold of armed conflict.

In the aftermath of Vietnam, USSOF’s capabilities—like those of other services and commands—were reduced because of budget cuts and downsizing. The failed Iranian rescue mission of 1980, known as Operation Eagle Claw, led to a flurry of reorganization efforts in Congress, culminating in the permanent establishment of USSOCOM in 1987 and the creation of an office devoted to special operations and low-intensity conflict (SO/LIC) within the Office of the Secretary of Defense, all of which resulted in the current organization of USSOF.

USSOF in the GWOT and the twenty-first century

USSOF is perhaps best known for its work throughout the GWOT. USSOF carried out a diverse range of missions worldwide, serving as the primary tool in the US fight to counter VEOs. Beyond engaging in combat operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria, and the Philippines, USSOF played a crucial role in executing theater campaign plans and implementing national strategy on a global scale.

During this time, USSOF doubled in force size and more than tripled in budget to meet the growing threat environment; during some periods, its presence overseas more than quadrupled. SOF was vital in building partner capacity, providing low-cost, low-footprint options to understand and impose costs on malign adversary activity and expand US influence and access with key partners and allies. Importantly, USSOF established linkages to conceive and implement a true Joint Interagency Intergovernmental Multinational (JIIM) strategy in multiple locations—especially in areas in which the Department of Defense could not be the lead active player, such as in Africa. The value of SOF’s authorities and culture of moving quickly against a problem was clearly demonstrated during GWOT.  This entailed applying resources and focus against a challenge, but it also meant the research and development (R&D), experimentation, fielding, and application of novel—and potentially game-changing technology—tactics, techniques, and procedures.

While USSOF conducted a diverse range of operations during this time, the bulk of US public and policymaker attention was focused on the direct-action campaigns—such as the one that killed Osama Bin Laden, Operation Neptune Spear—that made USSOF better known. In some ways, USSOF suffers from its own success. USSOF faces the challenge of its media-molded image versus the reality of it being a highly expert and quiet force. As such, some still perceive USSOF’s role as confined to direct action despite the range of indirect action and other operations it conducts, ranging from training and equipping components of foreign security forces to enhancing relationships between US forces and foreign civilian authorities.

Italian special operations forces, US Air Force Special Tactics and members of the Jordanian Armed Forces Special Task Force assault a compound during Exercise Eager Lion at King Abdullah II Special Operations Training Center. Credit: DVIDS – US Air Force photo by Senior Airman Ryan Conroy

Public perceptions of USSOF

Perhaps due to its success in the GWOT, USSOF is too often viewed only as the finish force, closing the kill chain for its conventional service counterparts.⁴Instead, modern special operators should be understood as playing a role much earlier in the management of competition, prior to conflict. USSOF operates globally, across the entire competition continuum, and rapidly tests and employs novel or critical capabilities to enhance security operations.⁵ USSOF will continue to conduct CT and COIN operations, when necessary, but today’s security environment requires USSOF to prioritize its role in strategic competition—this may more closely mirror the role it played below active armed conflict in the Cold War era.⁶

USSOF has continued to play this role in some capacity over the past twenty years, albeit less visibly than some of its actions during the GWOT. Furthermore, if called upon, USSOF has the competencies and authorities to employ irregular-warfare concepts and gray-zone tactics in strategic competition. Nevertheless, few decision-makers think of it that way. It is time that policymakers update their understanding of USSOF and enhance the valuable role it can play in strategic competition.

USSOF today in the context of strategic competition

USSOF’s strengths applied to strategic competition

Today, the US Joint Force confronts a pacing threat in China and an acute threat in Russia—far more sophisticated adversaries than it faced in VEOs throughout the GWOT.⁷ Prevailing in this era of strategic competition requires the Joint Force to shift its competitive mindset in order to effectively respond to threats spanning the competition continuum and cutting across theaters and domains. Within this three-dimensional approach to competition, USSOF is a critical operator, complementing conventional-force readiness and military dominance with a unique blend of competencies and capabilities that can be leveraged to deter, prepare for, and respond to armed conflict.

The 2023 Joint Concept for Competing defines strategic competition as “a persistent and long-term struggle that occurs between two or more adversaries seeking to pursue incompatible interests without necessarily engaging in armed conflict with each other.”⁸ In addition, the concept of the “competition continuum” was introduced as a Joint Concept in 2019, and describes a world of enduring competition conducted through a mixture of cooperation, competition below armed conflict, and armed conflict—a description that allows for simultaneous interaction with the same actor across different situations.⁹ These two concepts acknowledge that US adversaries have circumvented US conventional military dominance by competing below the threshold of armed conflict for some time. Following Operation Desert Storm in 1991, the United States celebrated a decisive battlefield win, while US competitors learned they must devise ways to compensate for unrivaled US conventional power and win without fighting through non-conventional means. USSOF is accustomed to operating across the competition continuum and cooperating with allies and partners to support US objectives, while simultaneously creating dilemmas for adversaries in an evolving threat environment. These factors make USSOF a versatile and critical instrument in strategic competition not only in the military domain, but also operating in support of diplomatic and economic objectives.

The following section outlines four key competencies USSOF brings to bear to support US strategic competition: its engagement with allies and partners, its global footprint, its ability to achieve effects across the competition continuum, and its cutting-edge use of technology.

Chile and US Special Operations Forces prepare to fast rope to a simulated objective during exercise Southern Star in Mejillones, Chile. Credit: DVIDS – U.S. Army Photo by Staff Sgt. Osvaldo Equite

I. Global and persistent engagement with allies and partners

The first major competency of USSOF is its proactive and sustained engagement of allies and adversaries globally.

USSOF is global by nature, confronting adversaries across every domain and every part of the world where China and Russia are undermining US and allied interests. Beijing leverages its influence, military, and predatory economic practices to bully its neighbors and project power far beyond the Indo-Pacific. Russia simultaneously wages a war of aggression against Ukraine, challenges national sovereignty across Europe, and undermines the security of nations globally through its cyberattacks, intimidation, and information operations. USSOF’s global role enables it to respond to China and Russia internationally.

USSOF builds and maintains authentic and multigenerational connections with allies and partners by training, advising, and assisting various countries in their security. This global presence and these relationships also enable USSOF to observe and counter Chinese and Russian influence in key regions while simultaneously engaging with and building trust with key partners. US partners may have greater access to observe Chinese or Russian activity. As such, USSOF engagement internationally not only supports partners but also creates greater options for the United States to counter adversarial influence.

USSOF approaches its relationships with allies and partners through persistent (rather than episodic) engagement, which generates a comprehensive understanding of host nations, threats to their security, and the second- and third-order effects of decisions and operations in those local contexts. USSOF’s enduring partnerships allow the United States to engage with nations in areas of strategic competition by assisting them with the problems they care about most. This is especially important for certain partners that may not view China or Russia as a threat, leaving USSOF as one of the only viable and trusted partners to discreetly engage on US foreign policy matters in certain areas.

USSOF spearheaded the by, with, and through approach for the US military, in which “operations are led by [US] partners, state or nonstate, with enabling support from the United States or US-led coalitions, and through US authorities and partner agreements.” USSOF’s approach centers allies and partners in the defense of their own nations, often leading to more successful results. This approach is better for the partner nation and also for the United States.

USSOCOM also has a USSOF Civil Affairs element, which works “by, with, and through unified action partners to shape conditions and influence indigenous populations and institutions” in support of DOD and US embassy strategies.¹⁰In this capacity, USSOF supports other parts of allied governments to leverage non-military instruments of power. In so doing, USSOF is able to gain “placement and access”—proximity to or the ability to approach an individual, facility, or information that enables one to carry out an intended mission—in geographic areas where US embassies otherwise do not have a presence. This expands the options available to US decision-makers to respond to activities by China and Russia in areas where the United States may not have much of a diplomatic or conventional military presence.

While physical presence remains important, USSOF can also support nations from a distance or virtually, which helps reduce costs and provides operators with greater flexibility by avoiding direct confrontation or escalation that may come from physical presence. Throughout the war in Ukraine, USSOF has advised and assisted Kyiv from a distance. Following the 2014 invasion, the US military brought together conventional and special-operations troops to create the Joint Multinational Training Group-Ukraine, including a “Q course.” This Army Special Forces qualification course (formally called the Special Forces Qualification Course) teaches everything from combat competencies and survival, evasion, resistance, and escape (SERE) to how to navigate in an unconventional-warfare environment. Even without a large physical footprint in Ukraine, USSOF has been able to effectively assist Ukrainians with training and logistics.¹¹This demonstrates a valuable competency, and can serve as a model for training and supporting other countries relevant to strategic competition that may otherwise be difficult to physically operate within.

An Air Commando from the U.S. 320th Special Tactics Squadron rappels down a steep mountainside to recover a downed pilot while conducting a personnel recovery (PR) training mission during Talisman Sabre. Credit: DVIDS – U.S. Marine Corps photos by Lance Cpl. Nicole Rogge

USSOF’s relationships can be multigenerational. By operating in the same regions for decades, USSOF builds relationships that can breed mutual trust and understanding. These relationships (and the inherent trust with allies and partners that follows) are sustained through USSOF and allied counterparts participating in joint training exercises, attending each other’s training courses, and sharing tactical and strategic experience. Through such exchanges and training, US allies and partners enhance their warfighting capabilities and improve their interoperability with the United States. In turn, the United States gains a deeper understanding of the security cultures and threat perceptions of other countries. This information improves US activities and operations, and further guides decision-making by opening avenues for the United States to engage new stakeholders abroad. US engagement with regional stakeholders can complicate an adversary’s risk calculus, as it is forced to consider the potential consequences of aggression against regional actors to which the United States is tied.

USSOF’s tailored approach to its regional relationships generally produces special operators with more global and joint experience earlier in their careers when compared to their service counterparts. Through their deployments, special operators exchange tactics, techniques, and procedures with partner nations. Their cultural adeptness and multi-domain backgrounds empower USSOF to plug in quickly, adjust to varying cultural, geographic, and political contexts, and build new connections for the Joint Force for years to come.

II. Gaining placement and access across the globe

Secondly, USSOF’s deep alliances and partnerships offer an asymmetric advantage over China, Russia, and other competitors. USSOF collaborates with allies and partners to create global impact in a way that may be outsized to its presence. Even a small USSOF unit can take localized actions that might compel adversaries to contend with widespread repercussions. For example, USSOF may work with an Indo-Pacific nation to gain increased access for the United States Air Force to operate in the region, signaling to China increased US capacity and maneuverability that could alter China’s risk calculus as it conducts maritime activities in the Indo-Pacific. Or USSOF may work with an African partner to counter Chinese or Russian local information operations that adversely affect its influence in multiple countries across the region and beyond.

USSOF’s partnerships and presence in host nations build US regional placement and access, in turn providing virtual and/or physical proximity to an entity of interest. This placement and access support the Intelligence Community by providing insights in normally inaccessible locations while also enhancing the Joint Force’s ability to compete across the globe’s farthest corners, enabling it to support allies and partners in identifying and responding to adversarial and illicit behavior. For USSOF, in particular, this proximity forms the foundation for responding to coercive or subversive activity below the threshold of armed conflict. For example, China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) gives it placement and access in a range of countries across the Indo-Pacific, Africa, Europe, and Latin America. Through subversive economic practices, China has capitalized on key industries, accessed new markets, and coercively influenced local decisions in developing countries by leveraging its economic power. This all-of-nation approach buys China influence and could enable an expanded military presence—for instance, through the acquisition of ports and waterways that serve as potential maritime chokepoints. China’s BRI activities have taken place in some countries where the United States lacks a large presence or access, but USSOF can and does operate in areas where other US entities do not.

If harnessed effectively, USSOF can be leveraged in key strategic regions to educate local governments, conduct reconnaissance of local activity, employ information operations, collect intelligence, and collaborate with interagency partners. As such, USSOF can be used to mitigate or respond to Chinese and Russian attempts to expand their influence in regions that are lesser priorities for US conventional force presence. USSOF’s global access is particularly important when crises or conflicts erupt. For instance, as the Israel-Hamas conflict continues, USSOF could surge on its CT, COIN, and hostage-rescue mission sets in the Middle East, allowing the Joint Force at large to remain focused on the pacing challenge of China. Overall, USSOF global presence enables the United States to maintain strategic ground in other, less-prioritized regions, while preserving a relatively light and inexpensive footprint.

The light and relatively affordable nature of USSOF’s global presence furthers US interests in parts of the globe where the United States may not have a strong foothold, providing outsized value.

III. Operations across the competition continuum

USSOF is adept and experienced in operating below the threshold of conflict. This “gray zone” of competition can be defined as “the space in which defensive and offensive activity occurs above the level of cooperation and below the threshold of armed conflict.” Dating back to the Cold War era, special operations were one of the few military capabilities that challenged coercion below the threshold of armed conflict. This space and time prior to armed conflict is increasingly central in modern competition, especially when adversaries employ a “win without fighting” strategy. China and Russia rely on cyber, economic, information, and other asymmetric capabilities to advance their interests, especially when they cannot outmatch US conventional military superiority or when unconventional activities achieve their objectives just as well.

The United States has recognized the need to operate more strategically along this competition continuum in order to better compete with China and Russia. The 2022 National Defense Strategy recognized the need to “campaign across domains and the spectrum of conflict” to improve the US understanding of its operating environment and to shape the perceptions and risk calculi of US adversaries.¹² Through the United States’ own gray-zone activities—such as the development of partner nations’ resistance and resilience capabilities, and information and cognitive operations—USSOF can help mitigate strategic risk, support US national objectives, and buy “decision space” for US and allied leaders, while limiting exposure to political and economic risks that may come from a larger military presence or more overt action.¹³

“Integrated deterrence” campaigning should rely upon USSOF activities, including (but not limited to) its ability to establish resistance mechanisms, conduct information operations, engage in Civil Affairs, and collect intelligence. Such activities impact adversaries by tying up or forcing them to reposition their resources, thus creating disruptions and dilemmas that benefit the United States.¹⁴ USSOF’s role in executing integrated deterrence is perhaps best articulated through its irregular-warfare capabilities, which offer a “critical tool to campaign across the spectrum of conflict, enhance interoperability and access, and disrupt competitor warfighting advantages while reinforcing our own.” USSOF deters adversaries’ actions across the continuum by illuminating and confronting acts of proxy aggression, information warfare, economic warfare, and subversion. This enhances the options available to US decision-makers while simultaneously sowing chaos that disrupts adversarial decision-making.

USSOF’s competencies across the competition continuum are as follows.

A U.S. Air Force KC-135 Stratotanker aircrew with the 340th Expeditionary Air Refueling Squadron, deployed to Al Udeid Air Base, Qatar, take off from Al Udeid AB. Credit: DVIDS – U.S. Air Force photo by Senior Master Sgt. Joshua L. DeMotts

Information Warfare

USSOF actively engages in the information domain by exposing and countering adversary propaganda and disinformation, as well as campaigning—that is, conducting “logically linked military initiatives”—to achieve US defense priorities over time.¹⁵ In 2019, then commander of US Special Operations Command General Richard Clarke stated that 60 percent of the special-operations community’s focus was “working in the information space,” as opposed to a 90-percent focus on “the kinetic fight” just a decade earlier. USSOF’s MISO activities have more than tripled in the past three years, with special operations contributing 60 percent of MISO activities conducted worldwide in fiscal year 2022. This trend will likely intensify in future conflict as the information domain remains a key arena for strategic competition, as China and Russia use information or “informatized” warfare to counter US strategic objectives and further their own.¹⁶ Information operations can be used to great effect. For example, Ukraine has successfully leveraged information operations to rally support for its armed forces and—tactically and operationally—to “[erode] the will of individual [Russian] soldiers,” which has partially contributed to seventeen thousand Russians deserting the military.

Recognizing the prominence of information and cognitive warfare, USSOCOM established the Information Warfare Center (IWC) in 2021. The IWC aims to enhance and consolidate USSOCOM’s psychological-operations capabilities, in conjunction with information-related capabilities in the cyber and space domains, specializing in “influence artillery rounds”—detecting adversarial activity across the globe and pushing that information to operators, who then must identify tailored informational “munitions” to match the target confronting them.

Space and cyber warfare

USSOF similarly recognizes the significance of the cyber and space domains, with the US Army spearheading the concept of a “modern triad” consisting of space, cyber, and special operations to “provide options to commanders to deter activity below the threshold of conflict.” While cyber, space, and special-operations capabilities are powerful on their own, melded together they generate vast options and opportunities for the Joint Force to rapidly influence outcomes across the competition continuum.

The triad might manifest as follows.

Special Operations Command “provides unique access at the tip of the spear for both space enabling infrastructure and cyber access”;
Space and Missile Defense Command “provides missile defeat and other unique space capabilities”; and
Cyber Command “provides cyber capabilities as well as data analytics to better inform operations of the other two legs.”

For example, USSOF could use its unique placement and access to enable a US Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM) operation into a remote adversary downlink site, holding its ability to conduct space domain awareness at risk and giving USSPACECOM an option during crisis or conflict. This triad, which combines intelligence threads and capabilities, offers commensurate responses to low-intensity and hybrid threats.

Cyber, space, and special operations are distinct from other military instruments in their multi-domain “global reach.” Each of these tools is not confined to operations in a traditional domain or geographic theater; rather, their application extends across all the military services and combatant commands.¹⁷ USSOF’s ability to effectively employ the triad, in turn, will integrate this response option into Joint Force campaigning and contingency response plans to fill operational gaps across domains and regions. Still today, this idea remains largely conceptual at the joint level—the space component is less natural to bring in, given USSOF has long utilized cyber and signals intelligence capabilities to track targets.

Supporting the Joint Force and interagency

The primary objectives of operating in the gray zone are to counter malign actions below the threshold of armed conflict and to ensure competition does not escalate into full-blown conflict. Should conflict break out, however, USSOF’s OPE activities will prove critical for supporting large-scale combat operations. During combat, USSOF is equally critical as an enabler for the Joint Force. USSOF is well-positioned to provide a firsthand assessment of the situation and response options given its persistent presence and engagement in key regions. For example, USSOF could play a pivotal role in capturing key terrain and securing ground lines of communication—both actions that would set the conditions for Joint Force success while disrupting adversarial military planning. During conflict, USSOF can help mitigate strategic risk for the Joint Force through supporting operations. This was demonstrated during Operation Inherent Resolve, during which small numbers of special operators, in concert with regional partners, took back territory held by the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS), constrained Iranian aggression, pushed back against Russian encroachment, and limited escalation between Kurdish and Turkish forces.

Furthermore, USSOF teams can serve as a focal point for synchronizing the effects of interagency partners, allied and partner militaries, and the Joint Force. This collaborative approach is evident in the fifth “SOF Truth,” which states that “most special operations require non-SOF assistance.”¹⁸ USSOF’s effectiveness is enhanced by its integration with other DOD components and interagency partners, merging military expertise with diplomatic, economic, and informational tools. At the same time, USSOF augments joint and interagency operations, thus enabling a comprehensive approach to address strategic competition by aligning diverse capabilities toward common objectives. Decision-makers across the interagency and in the DOD may not appreciate the full role USSOF plays prior to conflict. Not only is it impossible to build USSOF capabilities overnight in the event of a conflict, but also, if USSOF capabilities are employed only at the onset of a conflict, they will not have been employed to their full effect.

A U.S. Army Special Forces soldier assigned to Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force-Afghanistan provides security during an advising mission in Afghanistan. Credit: DVIDS – U.S. Army photo by Spc. Sara Wakai

With the proper authorities, special operations can extend the scope, scale, and reach of interagency deterrent tools by both providing US government partners with the inputs required to execute operations (e.g., placement and access) and amplifying the desired output or effect (e.g., bringing together various instruments of power). This is particularly important given that USSOF has formal operational-planning experience that is not inherently a function of other government departments and agencies. For example, USSOF works with the Department of Treasury’s Office of Foreign Asset Controls to enhance sanctions support capability on the ground; it leverages MISO and Civil Affairs to amplify Department of State public diplomacy; and it convenes various stakeholders for cross-cutting human security issues such as illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing, and mitigating harm to civilians. JIIM partnerships are required to compete against China and Russia, and USSOF is well-positioned to support and enable them.

USSOF includes specialized teams that can bolster US security advantages below the threshold of conflict. While much of USSOF’s activity falls within the classified realm, USSOF’s cross-functional teams execute numerous SOF operations. Building upon the definitions of USSOF’s core activities provided above, this holistic approach addresses threats across the competition continuum in the following ways.

Civil Affairs forces “conduct preparation of the environment, support to unconventional warfare, foreign internal defense, and civil network development and engagement across the competition continuum”;
Psychological Operations forces “conduct Military Information Support Operations (MISO) in permissive, uncertain, and hostile environments to change the behavior of foreign audiences—both friendly and adversarial—in support of US objectives”; and
Special Forces “discretely shapes the operating environment in both peace and complex uncertainty,” with two primary missions of unconventional warfare and foreign internal defense.¹⁹

These three elements comprise a comprehensive intelligence picture and can support the Joint Force’s creation and execution of plans to counter Chinese, Russian, and other adversaries’ gray-zone activities in key regions.

IV. At the cutting edge of capability development and employment

USSOF is creative about harnessing and experimenting with emerging technology and capabilities. USSOCOM “continues to serve as a pathfinder” for integrating data-driven technologies, such as artificial intelligence and machine learning, into the Joint Force by serving as early adopters of new technology.²⁰USSOF have a proven track record of engaging with the US defense-industrial base and testing novel capabilities in combat effectively. Such experimentation is valuable as emerging technology enables the Joint Force to compete with an increasingly technologically advanced China. USSOF is adept at proactively identifying promising early technology from the private sector and reaching out to companies to adapt technology to suit the forces’ needs.

Due to USSOF’s smaller size, proactivity, and service-like acquisition authorities, it is often able to acquire technology more rapidly than other parts of the DOD. USSOF’s external innovation unit, SOFWERX, collaborates with various nontraditional participants in the defense innovation ecosystem through events and Small Business Innovation Research programs (SBIRs), rapidly enhancing the equipment and capabilities of special operators.²¹ SOFWERX, in turn, became the beta model and launch point for all the subsequent “WERX” across the services, such as AFWERX, SPACEWERX, etc. From transmitting and seeing in dark tunnels to flying unmanned aerial vehicles in denied airspace, USSOF often serves as a technological testbed for capabilities that have utility across the Joint Force and, in many cases, advances capabilities to ensure battlefield superiority. USSOF is a leader in identifying, testing, fielding, and evolving new, cutting-edge technologies across the Department of Defense and the IC. Appropriately resourced, USSOF can continue to advance innovation adoption for the Joint Force at a time when doing so is essential for strategic competition.

USSOF is a particularly impressive model for innovation because it can “turn the crank of force design, force development, and force employment faster than any other part of DoD,” which “lend[s] it an inherent advantage in generating innovative capabilities.” Able to rapidly develop, test, and implement emerging technologies at earlier points of relevance, USSOF tends to live at the cutting edge of defense innovation. For example, the Global Positioning System (GPS) was largely untested in combat until Operation Desert Storm, during which special operations forces used GPS to conduct special reconnaissance deep in enemy territory. USSOF informed GPS techniques and equipment for the entire Joint Force. This form of combat testing can help the larger military identify, transition, and adopt promising technologies for future conflicts.

A U.S. Army sergeant, assisted by fellow soldiers, properly aligns the sight of a Common Remotely Operated Weapon Station mounted on a Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicle at Kandahar Air Field, Afghanistan. Credit: DVIDS – US Army

What’s next? Enhancing USSOF in the 2020s and beyond

This report has established the invaluable role that USSOF can and does play in enabling the United States to achieve its strategic objectives, including adapting to and outpacing China, the pacing threat. USSOF should be harnessed more effectively by the US policymaking community and the DOD to help achieve US strategic-competition goals. USSOF is uniquely able to operate in early phases of the competition continuum (prior to conflict) and in austere locations, while using specialized tools and methods that the rest of the Joint Force cannot. Specifically, USSOF can help realize US deterrence goals without the need for escalation to conflict, and can provide the Joint Force with preconditioned advantages if crisis erupts.

Looking forward, as the whole Joint Force adapts to meet an era of strategic competition, USSOF must also continue to evolve. USSOF should consider the following recommendations to ensure it can best support US goals in strategic competition.

Revamping USSOF’s mindset for strategic competition

First, USSOF must continue to adapt its competitive mindset to play a larger role in strategic competition. In addition to the important role it plays in direct action, USSOF should expand its disruptive non-kinetic activities and irregular-warfare concepts with the goal of chipping away at US adversaries’ diplomatic, economic, and military strength. Those who weave USSOF capabilities into regional and global campaign plans should consider the significant utility of SOF’s indirect action. China and Russia pose vastly different challenges from VEOs, with which USSOF became well-acquainted over the past two decades. Near-peer competitors deploy sophisticated military, intelligence, diplomatic, and economic capabilities to secure their interests, and strategic competition thus creates a threat environment that is quantitatively and qualitatively distinct from the GWOT. Direct action—such as countering VEOs—will continue to be a task for USSOF, enabling the rest of the DOD to focus on other strategic priorities. However, as USSOF recommends to decision-makers how best to harness its capabilities, it should emphasize its in-depth understanding of complex problems, rather than a predisposition for immediate action.

Second, it is important that USSOF—and the Joint Force at large—recognize that the US military should most often play a “supporting,” rather than “supported,” role in conducting foreign affairs, in support of the State Department as lead.²² This necessitates flexibility and adaptability, which USSOF showcases with its ability to quickly plug into new contexts and work with interagency counterparts and country teams. However, even then, much of today’s existing USSOF-interagency cooperation is built around the GWOT era, during which non-military instruments of power primarily supported USSOF-led operations (rather than the other way around) and partnerships were based largely around information sharing. USSOF’s role as a supporting entity will be most evident below the threshold of conflict, where non-DOD levers of power are often better suited than the military arsenal. USSOF must be empowered to play a supporting role by policymakers, who should see USSOF as playing a proactive—rather than reactive—role in the management of competition, employed preemptively to avoid escalation, rather than as a last resort when nothing else works.

Third, this shift in USSOF’s role must be similarly reflected in its alliances and partnerships. While USSOF fosters partner-nation resilience against Russia and China through foreign internal defense (FID), there is more it could do. For example, USSOF could expand its support for implementing the Global Fragility Act with focus countries, applying those principles in partnership with Taiwan and European nations to further develop their reserve force capabilities and whole-of-society resilience, both of which would be crucial to inhibit China from taking over Taiwan or respond to a potential Russian invasion. Policymakers should consider revising legislation such as the foreign security force capacity-building authority in Section 333 to support USSOF’s evolving role in strategic competition and stabilization activities.

Finally, as USSOF evolves its actions and attitudes toward strategic competition, it will face hurdles in overcoming orthodox DOD culture, bureaucratic morass, budget constraints, and recruitment and retention issues, including as other services request billets back. The office of ASD(SO/LIC) offers an important voice for USSOF in Washington, DC, to help USSOCOM navigate and advocate for its mission requirements within the Pentagon and wider interagency.

Paratroopers walk together toward a rallypoint after jumping from a C-130J Super Hercules during an Airborne training exercise near Alzey, Germany. Credit: DVIDS – Photo by U.S. Army Staff Sgt. Nicholas Moyte

“Walk and chew gum at the same time”

Operating in an era of strategic competition does not mean that threats prioritized during GWOT have disappeared—USSOF must be able to manage its more traditional tasks and its coordinating authority for countering VEO and WMD operations while executing its new ones.²³

USSOF partially does this through its activities across seven geographic combatant commands; thus, globally synchronizing Joint Force planning is key to fully recognizing and enabling the value of special operations. USSOF can compete with both China and Russia in traditional and less-traditional theaters. For example, USSOF’s pre-conflict capabilities can and should be employed more extensively in China’s near abroad—the Indo-Pacific—through maritime and undersea operations, sensitive activities, and partnership building. At the same time, USSOF can play a central role by competing with China and Russia in their far-abroads, particularly in US Southern Command and US Africa Command, while other parts of the Joint Force are focused elsewhere. Both of these combatant commands are “deeply immersed in peer-competition with China” in ways that have direct implications for the United States’ overall security posture. For example, China’s base in Djibouti allows it to project power further abroad than it would otherwise be able, and China’s space ground station in Argentina enables it to monitor US space assets. In these two regions, USSOF could leverage its OPE, special reconnaissance, intelligence capabilities, and partnerships to gain competitive advantages over near-peer adversaries. Altogether, USSOF’s global footprint enables the Joint Force to target and track near-peer adversaries globally and coordinate approaches to them regionally.

USSOF is challenged to balance both future operations, such as campaigning in the information and cognitive domains, while also managing ongoing threats from VEOs, hostage rescue, and proxy wars, which simultaneously place operational demands on USSOF. While CT and COIN operations may not be as relevant for strategic competition today, SOF’s crisis response and CVEO will remain key competencies. To fit within this complex and taxing operating landscape, USSOF’s mission and priorities must be integrated across the DOD, and special operations must be viewed as an offering falling within each respective service, rather than as a separate entity. This need is complicated by the reality that USSOF components are distinctive across the military, filling disparate roles and viewed differently by their parent services.

Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) airmen secure their C-27J Spartan from the RAAF 35 Squadron after U.S. and Australian special operations forces (SOF) conduct a high-altitude low-opening (HALO) parachute jump during Talisman Sabre. Credit: DVIDS – U.S. Marine Corps photos by Lance Cpl. Nicole Rogge

Applying SOF’s strengths in new ways

USSOF must play to its strengths, applying its operational approaches from the GWOT to new problem sets in the context of strategic competition. This includes operating in new domains, applying and accelerating emerging technologies, and building upon core activities that were de-prioritized over the past two decades. USSOF excels at operating in denied and niche environments. For instance, USSOF is uniquely trained to operate in underground tunnels and facilities, which otherwise pose a threat to situational awareness and target execution. The salience of this environment is illustrated by the current conflict in Gaza, where underground tunnels serve as a strategic vantage point for Hamas and complicate Israeli operations and US efforts to rescue US hostages held by terrorists. The ability to operate underground is just one example of how USSOF can fill an operational gap for the US military, as USSOF is the only component that has the highly specialized tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) for operating in those environments.  

How can SOF’s strengths be applied in new ways? First, USSOF’s ability to quickly adapt to new environments could be further leveraged in strategic competition. For example, USSOF should enhance its capabilities in cyber, space, and undersea warfare—all with a foundation of flexible doctrine and tactical innovations—in order to compete with China’s approach to “informatized warfare” and its rapid technology development.²⁴ Additionally, WARCOM (the naval component of USSOCOM) is undergoing a modernization effort in two key underwater systems—namely the shallow-water combat submersible and the dry-combat submersible, which are both critical to moving SEALS through oceans. These modernizations provide enhanced situational awareness to operators, improved range, increased payload, better speed and loitering time, and a modernized command-and-control architecture—all of which will enable USSOF to leverage undersea capabilities for strategic competition.

Another example exists in the Arctic, where MARSOC is uniquely positioned to operate in extreme weather conditions and address burgeoning security challenges that continue to arise as polar ice melts. However, to effectively operate there, MARSOC’s Civil Affairs expertise must be bolstered to fully enhance its role in support of Arctic security. USAF SOF trains in Alaska and with European Arctic countries to support extreme weather operations like search and rescue. As Chinese and Russian activity and presence above the Arctic Circle increase—including under the auspices of science, energy, and environmental missions—USSOF intelligence and access will be invaluable.

Second, USSOF’s Civil Affairs and PSYOPs components require further attention to be fully harnessed in strategic competition. Civil Affairs is a tightly stretched, low-density function, with just one brigade of USSOF Civil Affairs force structure in the entire military. That brigade houses capabilities such as economic analysis, special collections, observations and advanced intelligence gathering, penetrations of transnational criminal organizations (TCO), training and cultural immersion, and placement and access into adversarial commercial and government networks. If resourced effectively, Civil Affairs can take on more tasks, such as building civil-military reconnaissance in politically sensitive areas, helping legitimize local governing powers in contested regions, or helping respond to natural disasters and humanitarian crises (which will only become more prevalent with climate change). Additionally, MARSOC’s Civil Affairs strength is in its language and cultural skills. For instance, MARSOC has been very active in the Philippines for many years, and the expanded partnership between the United States and the Philippines is evidence of this investment paying off. Such Civil Affairs activities are worth increased investment, particularly with key partners in the Indo-Pacific.

Finally, the technological and cognitive performance solutions required for USSOF’s—and the Joint Force’s—success will continue to evolve in response to the growing arsenals of US adversaries like China. On today’s battlefield, USSOF will need to achieve cognitive overmatch—the “ability to dominate the situation by making informed decisions faster than the opponent”—which can be dramatically enhanced with the aid of advanced technologies like artificial intelligence. The hyper-enabled operator of the future must be “empowered by technologies that enhance the operator’s cognition at the edge by increasing situational awareness, reducing cognitive load, and accelerating decision making.” As such, special operators will need to operate with the support of an interconnected network of sensors, a robust communications architecture, and human-machine interfaces. Through its Preservation of the Force and Family (POTFF) program, USSOF has placed increased attention on cognitive performance and brain health, which it sees as necessary “to operate in an increasingly complex, information-rich environment.” These investments have led to demonstrated improvements in “self-regulation, cognitive processing speed, and sustained attention” for participants. At the same time, USSOF has partnered with DOD Health Affairs to improve its traumatic brain injury (TBI)-prevention efforts. Investing in the cognitive domain is critical to ensure special operators are well-prepared for, and avoid accepting undue risk in, a complex operating environment.²⁵

Members of the U.S. Naval Special Warfare Operators and Australian Defence Force conduct training with their Armed Forces of the Philippines counterparts during Exercise Balikatan 2019 (BK19). Credit: DVIDS – U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 1st Class Eric Chan

Knowing what success looks like

One of USSOF’s biggest challenges in a transforming security environment is constructing its identity in 2024 and beyond. This requires USSOF and DOD leadership to ask and respond to ambitious questions regarding the requirements of future warfare and the role of USSOF.

Who is the special operator in 2024 and beyond?

As USSOF’s role in strategic competition evolves, so does the face of the special operator. The special operator of 2024 may be a cyber operator gaining virtual placement and access, rather than the Hollywood depiction of the frontline operator deployed in the kinetic, physical battle. The SOF operator who is culturally immersed in a region or area that holds strategic value plays a key role in enabling US activities and intelligence. So do the SOF experts in space, AI, engineering, or physics support operations, who bring invaluable cognitive power and technological know-how. Although enablers are frequently perceived as secondary to operators, their work is often high-end and critical to mission success, making them a focal point for current investment needs. Additionally, as USSOF continues to adapt, gender may play a valuable role in military competition, education, negotiations, and training. For instance, an all-female special-operations team (Operational Detachment Alpha, or ODA), can engage with women in local populations, like Afghanistan, in different and valuable ways than an all-male team. Gender diversity allows SOF to operate in varied roles, opening up new opportunities where gender may lead to favorable outcomes.

How can USSOF measure its own success?

Landing on clear metrics or conducting a net assessment to quantify the success of special operations is nearly impossible, as it is difficult to measure the effectiveness of preventing something from occurring over time. Despite this difficulty, USSOF must internally define a clear mission for strategic competition and establish a tracking mechanism to assess whether it is making progress toward its goals. In particular, the DOD should place emphasis on developing MISO/influence campaigns with measurable criteria that focus on output, not just input, to ensure that such activities are truly changing behavior and perceptions of the target audience. Moreover, USSOF must be able to effectively articulate its value and successes to the public, Congress, the DOD at large, and the wider interagency, while protecting some of its more unique contributions that should remain classified. For example, while the taglines of “creating dilemmas” and “imposing costs” are useful in their simplicity for describing USSOF, they do not give policymakers a clear framework to understand how USSOF achieves a desired impact. USSOF could instead articulate its success by citing deliberate campaigns to disrupt and frustrate an adversary’s strategy or operations, with the ultimate goal of undermining an adversary’s confidence that its military can win decisively. Such an articulation could mirror RAND’s 2023 “Strategic Disruption” framework for five pillars of disruption (resist, support, influence, understand, target), which helps communicate the role USSOF plays in achieving strategic effects as defined by measurable results.

How should USSOF prioritize its core activities for strategic competition?

Joint Force decision-makers should consider the myriad ways USSOF can increasingly support strategic competition and work with ASD SO/LIC and USSOCOM to re-prioritize some of USSOF’s core activities to match the needs of strategic competition. This prioritization could see an increased role for USSOF pre-conflict in China and Russia’s near-abroad—the Indo-Pacific and Europe—and a deeper role for USSOF during conflict in China and Russia’s far-abroad, such as AFRICOM, SOUTHCOM, and other areas of responsibility.

USSOF cannot establish its own priorities in a vacuum—it will prioritize what the Joint Force needs. But ASD SO/LIC and USSOCOM can align to effectively communicate their vision for SOF’s role in strategic competition within the Pentagon. This will likely include identifying where USSOF is insufficiently prepared for strategic competition and developing methodologies to test and measure the performance of various activities in the context of competing with China and Russia.

A crew chief with Helicopter Sea Combat Squadron 85 (HSC-85) scans the skies while on a mission to emplace U.S. and Australian Special Operations Forces (SOF) during Talisman Sabre. Credit: DVIDS – U.S. Marine Corps photos by Lance Cpl. Nicole Rogge

As discussed, rebalancing to strategic competition must be done in balance—crisis response (CR) will remain a top priority for USSOF, in which countering VEOs remains key as they frequently cause crises that require response. CT and COIN missions have value, and USSOF’s ability to counter VEOs allows the broader force to stay focused on near-peer competitors. With that being said, USSOF should outwardly view its CT, COIN, counternarcotic (CN), and partner capacity-building activities in a new light, as contributing factors to competition by maintaining influence and trust with partners.

USSOF should also preemptively invest in Civil Affairs, MISO, and intelligence, which are actively engaged prior to conflict. A good example of USSOF’s leadership approach within the Pentagon is its centralization and special interest-item designation of MISO funding, which demonstrates congressional and civilian leadership exercising oversight, control, and authority over the military. The role of ASD(SO/LIC) in advocating for and prioritizing MISO efforts is important to ensure this function remains funded.

How can USSOF and the services find new opportunities for better integration?

USSOF and the US military services need to better integrate, understanding how they can work together to achieve missions. Part of this requires the Pentagon at large and military services to better understand what USSOF looks like today and the different missions and roles it can play. It is the authors’ hope that this report helps elucidate this for decision-makers. In addition, USSOF and the military services can improve their communication to further understand the presence and activities that USSOF conducts in regions pre-conflict. USSOF’s placement and access can be a significant advantage from an intelligence perspective, but too often US military operations globally are not synchronized as part of global campaign plans. Missions conducted by USSOF in one Combatant Command’s area of responsibility could have utility and reinforce the goals of another. Improving awareness to support more synchronized global campaign planning would help USSOF to be better harnessed for strategic competition. For example, a SOF team present in USAFRICOM may be able to conduct one or two additional tasks as part of an existing mission, which could help support or supply information to another Combatant Command or interagency partner to support its intelligence and missions. In other words, USSOF teams can support linkages between geographic combatant commands, wherein strategic competition spans geographic seams.

How can USSOF and defense-industrial base relations be enhanced?

Given the strength of USSOF as a leader in innovation and experimentation, there are opportunities to improve collaboration between USSOF and the leading edge of the US defense-industrial ecosystem. USSOF can often identify new innovations from nontraditional partners for the DOD with more agility than the department at large. However, given the specialized nature of USSOF, the traditional defense-industrial base and newer defense entrants must continue to consider partnering with the special-operations community at a much smaller scale than they might for other parts of the military services. SOFWERX has a good model for engaging with the defense-industrial base, but as the DOD strives to work with newer entrants into the defense market, including technology companies that do not have large contracting teams, SOFWERX must continue to find new ways to reach out to the private sector and inform it of its operational needs. The Atlantic Council’s Commission on Innovation Adoption provides a range of recommendations for improving the DOD’s process of absorbing innovative technology from the leading edge of the private sector. Continuing to cultivate a culture of operational experimentation and incentivizing and rewarding private-sector engagement will help USSOF remain an effective testing ground for new capabilities in support of USSOF’s mission success.

How can USSOF continue to effectively cooperate with its allied counterparts?

Similarly critical is the need to communicate to US allies and partners where USSOF is today and where it plans to go in terms of future areas of focus, investments, and adaptations. In some cases, US allies and partners are steps ahead in realizing the critical role that their special-operations forces play in strategic competition—US decision-makers should take lessons from this. In Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia, for example, the special forces are considered and understood to be a priority capability, as SOF allow the geographically small Baltic countries to do more in relation to their deterrence and defense against Russia with fewer troops. Norway, for its part, is a leader in developing close coordination between the Norwegian SOF, NATO SOF Headquarters, and the international SOF liaison division at USSOCOM.83 The UK, which has some of the oldest and most entrenched special forces in the world, has recognized that the nature of strategic competition necessitates investing in small, specialized teams that can operate globally, maintaining concurrent points of presence and access while also countering state disinformation campaigns, disrupting terrorist groups, protecting military deployments overseas, and countering adversaries’ cyber capabilities in the virtual domain. To learn from allied special-operations forces and integrate with them, the United States must continue to align with them on shared priorities and seek opportunities for multilateral operations.

Picture this

As we consider USSOF’s role over the last twenty years, it is helpful to see the interconnected parts that collectively comprise its unparalleled capability, which takes highly specialized selection, training, and resourcing to remain agile, innovative, and exceptional.  

Figure 1: USSOF’s four major tasks.

Bubble 1:  Counter-terrorism (CT)/countering violent extremist organizations (CVEO)  
Bubble 2:  Conflict 
Bubble 3:  Crisis response 
Bubble 4:  Competition with near-peers

These mission areas are inextricably linked, requiring USSOF to constantly evolve and improve in an agile and efficient way by shifting resources as the threat environment changes. In the past twenty years, Bubble 1 has been the largest USSOF role, as that is what the United States has needed. But it has come at a cost to the rest of the bubbles (particularly Bubbles 2 and 4). As the Office of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE) and congressional discussions around budgets ensue, discussions should not focus on saving money by shaving forces historically associated with Bubble 1. Rather, budget discussions should be oriented around how to repurpose and refocus SOF as a dynamic, nimble, and culturally focused force against new priorities the United States faces. Just as SOF was refocused on CT and CVEO after 9/11, it is time to refocus USSOF on its other bubbles without overemphasizing one bubble at the cost of the others.

In addition to a continued need for predicting, assessing, and providing the indications and warning and response capability for VEOs around the world, there are other things USSOF must continue to do.  

USSOF should continue to build influence and capability with allies and partners, because this cannot be surged.
USSOF should be placed physically or virtually forward to understand adversary activities and create options to affect them below the level of armed conflict.
USSOF should prepare the environment for major combat operations; this cannot be surged.

Much of state-actor and near-peer activity will be expressed through surrogates and proxies. Surrogate and proxy activity is not deterred only by conventional activity of aircraft carriers or fighter squadrons. Rather, deterrence can be supported by USSOF that can create asymmetric effects and provide policymakers options up and down the escalatory ladder.   

Finally, the policy community must understand how these bubbles converge, and find ways that the United States can gain advantages and mitigate risks in certain areas by taking advantage of the work in other areas. For example, USSOF must continue its CT/VEO work, as VEOs are likely to cause regional crises. Maintaining a robust crisis-response capability helps mitigate the risk of strategic distraction as it pertains to strategic competition, allowing other areas of the DOD and the interagency to focus on mitigating risks from Russia and China.

Conclusion

Conventional force is a blunt instrument—USSOF can be dialed up or down and tailored in response to competition and aggression. Looking to USSOF as the last resort or finish force diminishes the critical and unique role that USSOF plays prior to conflict, shaping competition and supporting deterrence. USSOF should continue to adapt its approach to meet the demands of strategic competition, all while maintaining its ability to meticulously train a cadre of specialized professionals who can undermine the malign influence and operations of China, Russia, and other adversaries globally. USSOF offers an unparalleled return on investment—if the national security community fails to empower and resource special-operations forces in strategic competition, it misses a significant opportunity and leaves operational gaps that play right into the goals of strategic competitors China and Russia.

About the authors

Clementine G. Starling is the director of the Atlantic Council’s Forward Defense program and a resident fellow within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. In her role, she shapes the Center’s US defense research agenda, leads Forward Defense’s team of nine staff and forty fellows, and produces thought leadership on US security strategies and the evolving character of warfare. Her research focuses on long-term US thinking on issues like China’s and Russia’s defense strategies, space security, defense industry, and emerging technology.

Prior to launching the Forward Defense program at the Atlantic Council, Starling served as the deputy director of the Atlantic Council’s Transatlantic Security team, specializing in European security policy and NATO. From 2016, she supported NATO’s Public Diplomacy Division at two NATO summits (Brussels and London) and organized and managed three senior Atlantic Council Task Forces on US force posture in Europe, military mobility, and US defense innovation adoption.

During her time at the Atlantic Council, Starling has written numerous reports and commentary on US space strategy, deterrence, operational concepts, coalition warfare, and US-Europe relations. Starling regularly serves as a panelist and moderator at public conferences, and her analysis and commentary have been featured in Defense One, Defense News, Real Clear Defense, the National Interest, Space News, NATO’s Joint Air & Space Power Conference, the BBC, National Public Radio, ABC News, and Government Matters, among others.

Starling was named the 2022 Herbert Roback scholar by the US National Academy of Public Administration. She also served as the 2020 Security and Defense fellow at Young Professionals in Foreign Policy.

Originally from the United Kingdom, Starling previously worked in the UK Parliament focusing on technology, defense, Middle East security, and Ukraine. She also supported the Britain Stronger in Europe campaign, championing for the United Kingdom to remain within the European Union.

She graduated with honors from the London School of Economics with a Bachelor of Science in international relations and history and is a Master of Security Studies candidate at Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service.

Alyxandra Marine is an assistant director in the Forward Defense practice at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. Marine contributes to Forward Defense programs and research on nuclear security, strategic studies, and defense strategy and policy. Prior to her work at the Atlantic Council, Marine worked as a researcher for a New York-based nonprofit aimed at bringing truth to political advertising, where she conducted research on foreign election interference. She also previously worked for the US Senate, where she provided research support on foreign relations and US fisheries policy.

Marine graduated with distinction from a dual degree program in international history, receiving an MA from Columbia University and an MSc from the London School of Economics and Political Science. Her thesis focused on the forward deployment of intermediate-range Jupiter ballistic missiles in Turkey, exploring the non-military and unconventional value of nuclear deployments within NATO and in a bilateral diplomatic context. While completing her graduate degrees, she conducted extensive research on the comparative nuclear policies during the global Cold War, US global economic and trade policy, and Cold War crises and inflection points, with a particular focus on de-escalation at moments with the potential for kinetic or nuclear warfare. She earned her BA with honors from New York University, where she dual-majored in history and political science, focusing on international environmental politics and the effects of the Cold War in the Middle East and East Asia.

Acknowledgments

The Atlantic Council is grateful to the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict for its support of this research project.

The authors would like to acknowledge the critical research contributions made by Julia Siegel, who contributed her thought leadership to this paper during her time at the Atlantic Council—thank you. The authors are very grateful to the many experts and practitioners who made themselves available for consultations to inform this report and to those who provided invaluable peer review.

1 Will Irwin and Isaiah Wilson, The Fourth Age of SOF: The Use and Utility of Special Operations Forces in a New Age (Macdill Air Force Base, FL: Joint Special Operations University Press, 2022).

2 In some cases, the distinct differences between the mission sets of each service are classified, but certain obvious differences are plain. Each service conducts foreign internal-defense operations. For example, AFSOC may work with foreign airmen to assess and improve foreign aviation capabilities, while WARSOC may support foreign forces on harbor clearance, search and recovery, and critical maritime infrastructure. For more information, see: “Joint Publication 3-22: Foreign Internal Defense.”

3 Irwin and Wilson, The Fourth Age of SOF.

4 Because of its reputation for direct action, some policymakers interviewed for this project described USSOF as being seen as the “finish force.” This concept refers to the idea that, during a conflict, USSOF can step in and conduct operations that its conventional service counterparts cannot—but this flexibility should not just be seen as adaptability on the battlefield.

5 The competition continuum describes a world neither at peace nor at war, but instead a world of “enduring competition conducted through a mixture of cooperation, competition below armed conflict, and armed conflict.” For more information, see: Department of Defense, “Joint Doctrine Note 1-19, Competition Continuum.”

6 See section above about USSOF’s history and role during the Cold War.

7 “2022 National Defense Strategy.”

8 “Joint Concept for Competing.”

9 Ibid.; “Joint Doctrine Note 1-19, Competition Continuum.”

10 Under the DOD “Directive 2000.13, Civil Affairs,” USSOCOM developed “Directive 525-38, Civil Military Engagement.”

11 Atlamazoglou, “US Special Operators Borrowed a Unique Part of Army Green Beret Training to Prepare Ukrainians to Fight Russia.”

12 “2022 National Defense Strategy,” 8–11.

13 Individuals interviewed for this study highlighted USSOF’s ability to “buy decision space” for the United States. This is possible because USSOF is able to discreetly build placement and access in regions otherwise denied or difficult for the United States to access. By doing this, USSOF gains a holistic intelligence picture, intricate relationships, and a local understanding of actors and areas that the US government may not otherwise have, thereby expanding the range of policy options available to US and allied decision-makers.

14 A planned resistance mechanism is the well-organized resistance capability prior to a potential invasion and subsequent occupation for US allies and partners. Establishing such mechanisms prior to an invasion that could lead to a loss of territorial integrity or sovereignty provides the United States and its allies and partners a blueprint for national resilience in a pre-crisis setting, while formulating resistance requirements and facilitating planning and operations in the event of an adversary compromising or violating the sovereignty and independence of allied or partner nations.

15 “2022 National Defense Strategy,” 1.

16 Maier and Fenton, “Statement for the Record.”

17 Maier and Fenton, “Statement for the Record.”

18 “SOF Truths.”

19 “A Vision for 2021 and Beyond.”

20 Maier and Fenton, “Statement for the Record.”

21 “Industry,” SOFWERX, last visited February 17, 2024, https://sofwerx.org/industry.

22 In this sense, the DOD will support and enable other interagency partners, like the Department of State, in achieving their goals across the spectrum of competition, rather than remaining in pole position as the lead entity of an operation. See: Cartwright, et al., Operationalizing Integrated Deterrence.

23 It should be noted that China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea all use proxy elements to achieve their objectives, some of which may include terrorist organizations or other nefarious elements that USSOF is equipped to address.

24 Dean Cheng, Cyber Dragon: Inside China’s Information Warfare and Cyber Operations (New York: Bloomsbury, 2016).

25 Maier and Fenton, “Statement for the Record.”

The post Stealth, speed, and adaptability: The role of special operations forces in strategic competition appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Kramer authors op-ed on the role of Congress in deterring Chinese cyber attacks

jfranks — Tue, 05 Mar 2024 21:44:00 +0000

Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security Transatlantic Security Initiative

On March 4, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security Distinguished Fellow and Board Director Franklin D. Kramer published an op-ed in The National Interest on the role of Congress in deterring Chinese cyber attacks.

In the article, Kramer highlights the serious threats Chinese cyberattacks pose to US economic security and critical infrastructure. It suggests four measures: providing cybersecurity tax credits to support small businesses, academia, and infrastructure; leveraging AI to improve security software; creating a corps of private-sector cybersecurity providers for wartime; and addressing the cybersecurity workforce shortage to enhance national resilience.

China’s determined cyber attacks on the United States call for significant actions to enhance national resilience both now and in the event of conflict.

Franklin D. Kramer

Board director

Franklin D. Kramer

Distinguished Fellow

Cybersecurity Defense Policy