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Ukraine’s advance in Kursk: What’s next and implications

Conflict Russia Security & Defense Ukraine

The occupation authorities in Luhansk have attempted to justify these measures by framing the Holodomor as a Ukrainian propaganda myth and positioning memorials to the victims of Soviet crimes as “pilgrimage sites for Ukrainian nationalists.” They have also argued that the dismantling of monuments is in response to grassroots demands from the local population.

Russia’s selective monument removals are part of a deliberate strategy to rehabilitate favorable aspects of the Soviet past while whitewashing the crimes of the Communist era. A similarly partisan approach has been adopted toward the historical role of Tsarist Russia. Throughout occupied regions of Ukraine, the Kremlin seeks to craft a narrative glorifying Russian imperialism that legitimizes Moscow’s land grab while suppressing any traces of a separate Ukrainian national identity. In this manner, Putin is weaponizing the past to serve his own present-day geopolitical ambitions.

The demolition of memorials is only one aspect of Russia’s war on Ukrainian national identity. In areas of Ukraine under Kremlin control, anyone deemed pro-Ukrainian is at risk of being detained or simply disappearing. Speaking Ukrainian is considered a serious offense. Ukrainians are pressured into accepting Russian citizenship, while thousands of Ukrainian children have been abducted and sent to Russia, where they are subjected to indoctrination in camps designed to rob them of their Ukrainian heritage.

Unlike earlier attempts to erase entire nations, today’s Kremlin campaign to extinguish Ukrainian identity is taking place in full view of international audiences in the heart of twenty-first century Europe. This poses fundamental challenges to the entire notion of a rules-based international order and represents a major obstacle to any future peace process. As long as Russia remains committed to the destruction of Ukraine, a truly sustainable settlement to today’s war will remain elusive.

Yevhenii Monastyrskyi is a PhD student of history at Harvard University and a lecturer at Kyiv School of Economics. John Vsetecka is an assistant professor of history at Nova Southeastern University.

Guns for Hire podcast is a production of the Atlantic Council’s North Africa Initiative. Taking Libya as its starting point, it explores the causes and implications of the growing use of mercenaries in armed conflict.

The podcast features guests from many walks of life, from ethicists and historians to former mercenary fighters. It seeks to understand what the normalization of contract warfare tells us about the world we currently live in, the future of the international system, and what war could look like in the coming decades.

The EU needs to adapt its fiscal framework to the threat of war

Piotr Arak — Mon, 29 Jul 2024 14:15:35 +0000

This year, the fiscal rules entrenched in the European Union (EU) treaties are coming back with force. Debt and deficit rules, which were frozen in 2020 to allow public spending to soften the economic blow of the COVID-19 pandemic, were reintroduced this year. Although the rules have been revised, they are still lacking in one crucial respect—they do not prioritize military expenditure over other types of spending. Without further revisions, the fiscal rules will constrain member states from increasing their defense budgets even as Russian aggression threatens European security.

With EU countries now facing greater fiscal constraints, the bloc needs to either further amend them or find a way to have more common European debt. Only then will EU member states be able to make the increases in defense spending that are necessary to bolster security on the continent and deter further aggression from Moscow.

The EU’s fiscal rules

The EU is a partial monetary union (not every state uses the euro) and is not a fiscal union. Twenty of its twenty-seven member states use the euro, but they maintain their own public accounts. The EU’s budget amounts to just 1 percent of the bloc’s entire gross domestic product (GDP). Brussels levies few taxes and spends little for the bloc, and that relatively small budget is the sum of the EU’s fiscal union. The real power of the EU resides in the supervision of the member states’ fiscal policies.

This is why some countries with high levels of debt or deficit—France, Italy, Poland (which spends 4.1 percent of its GDP on the military), and several others—might be under special supervision by the European Commission under the Excessive Debt Procedure (EDP). The EDP requires the country in question to provide a plan of fiscal consolidation that it will follow, as well as deadlines for its achievement. Countries that do not follow up on the recommendations may be fined. Of course, many EU countries are in debt, and most of them run a deficit even in good times; in bad times, they just run even bigger deficits. The European Commission will take into account additional military expenditures in the assessment, but only on military equipment, not on increasing the number of soldiers.

In 2023, the average debt-to-GDP ratio in the EU reached 82 percent, and it was even higher in the eurozone, at 89 percent (with France exceeding 110 percent and Italy going beyond 137 percent). The highest deficits were recorded in Italy (7.4 percent of GDP), Hungary (6.7 percent), and Romania (6.6 percent). Eleven EU member states had deficits higher than 3 percent of GDP. In comparison, the United States has a debt of around 123 percent of GDP and ran a deficit of 6.3 percent in 2023.

The original EU fiscal rules implemented thresholds for each country’s deficit and debt at 3 percent and 60 percent of GDP, respectively, and they required cutting national excess debt-to-GDP ratios by one-twentieth each year. These restrictive rules contributed to the eurozone’s prolonged recession from 2011 to 2013, and some rules have since been relaxed. In response to the COVID-19 pandemic, for example, the bloc activated its general escape clause, which allows for deviations from the EU’s Stability and Growth Pact in times of crisis. Moving forward, however, the rules will likely turn restrictive again, though less so than the old ones. In April 2024, EU institutions agreed on a consensual change to the fiscal framework, making the path back to a debt of 60 percent GDP and a deficit below 3 percent of GDP a matter of negotiations between each member state’s government and the European Commission.

Treat military spending differently

Some EU countries, such as France and Poland, argue for military expenditures to be treated differently, as some member states have different needs in the current geopolitical climate. Not all EU member states are in NATO; for example, Austria is neutral. But under the current EU rules, the fiscal space for military expenditures is one-size-fits-all. After Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, defense expenditures incurred that year were within the escape clause, but this does not address the underfunding of the military within the EU.

In 2024, the average military expenditures of NATO and EU members is expected to reach 2.2 percent of GDP, with a group of countries far below the threshold of 2 percent. More importantly, these are big economies with relatively large armies, such as Italy (1.49 percent of GDP), Belgium (1.3 percent), and Spain (1.28 percent). All of these countries have high levels of debt and issues with deficits. Germany is set to reach 2.12 percent of GDP on defense spending this year, but it is held back by its constitutional debt brake, which does not allow for an annual deficit higher than 0.35 percent of GDP. This has created tensions within Germany’s coalition government, since spending more on weapons might mean having to spend less on climate change mitigation and social services.

Meanwhile, the United States spends 3.38 percent of its GDP on defense. To put that into perspective, the total expenditure of all European NATO members is $380 billion, almost three times lower than that of the United States (nearly $968 billion). At the same time, Russian military spending this year is estimated to reach $140 billion, or 7.1 percent of its GDP.

Common debt

European capitals need to treat the need for a stronger military in Europe as urgent and serious, but their accountants in the finance departments are not going to make it easy. Unless Brussels changes its fiscal rules to allow for greater defense spending, common EU debt might be the only solution.

The bloc can issue EU debt outside of national fiscal rules, which it did for the first time in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. Some analysts argue for common debt for a European air defense system, which is a good starting point. EU debt funding could include spending on the further development of European defense industrial capacities. EU leaders such as former Estonian Prime Minister and future EU High Representative Kaja Kallas, French President Emmanuel Macron, and European Commissioner for Internal Market Thierry Breton have supported some version of common debt for defense purposes.

Utilizing common debt should not aim solely to expand the power of the European Commission, as some critics in various capitals fear. Instead, it should transform this measure from a temporary crisis-management tool into a standard policy instrument, enabling Europe to develop a meaningful defense industrial strategy, which has been lacking since the EU’s inception. After the failed attempt to establish a European Defence Community in the 1950s, the European project has primarily focused on economic issues. Unfortunately, it’s time to revisit that discussion.

Europeans must now prepare for a challenging geopolitical environment by investing in European defense, whether through changes in fiscal rules or by taking on more European debt.

Whichever path forward the EU chooses, it must do so quickly. There’s no time to waste.

Piotr Arak is the chief economist at VeloBank Poland.

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Putin is convinced he can outlast the West and win in Ukraine

Mykola Bielieskov — Thu, 25 Jul 2024 18:16:56 +0000

The annual NATO summit in early July resulted in a range of encouraging statements and practical measures in support of Ukraine. However, this widely anticipated gathering in Washington DC failed to produce the kind of decisive steps that could convince Vladimir Putin to end his invasion.

It was already clear some time before the NATO summit that there would be no serious discussion of a membership invitation for Ukraine. Instead, the emphasis would be on improving the existing partnership, with alliance leaders preserving as much room to maneuver as possible when dealing with the Russo-Ukrainian War.

Post-summit coverage focused on the official communique declaring Ukraine’s “irreversible path” to future NATO membership, but not everyone saw the wording of the joint statement as a breakthrough. Indeed, some skeptics interpreted this latest rephrasing of NATO’s open door for Ukraine as an indication that the alliance is still no closer to agreeing on a specific time frame regarding Ukrainian membership.

The summit was not a complete anticlimax, of course. A number of countries pledged additional air defense systems to Ukraine, meeting one of Kyiv’s most urgent requests to help protect the country from Russian bombardment. There were announcements regarding the imminent arrival of the first F-16 fighter jets in Ukraine, while additional mechanisms to coordinate weapons deliveries and enhance cooperation were unveiled.

NATO members also agreed in Washington to allocate forty billion euros for Ukrainian military aid next year. While this figure is certainly significant, it falls far below the level of funding needed to ensure Ukrainian victory. This is not a new issue. While the collective GDP of the West dwarfs Russia’s, Western leaders have yet to mobilize their financial resources to provide Ukraine with an overwhelming military advantage. As a consequence, it is the much smaller Russian economy that is currently producing more artillery shells than the entire Western world.

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The modest progress made at the NATO summit reflects a lack of urgency that has hampered the Western response ever since the onset of Russia’s full-scale invasion. There is little chance this hesitancy will provoke a change of heart in Moscow. On the contrary, Russian policymakers are far more likely to regard the West’s current posture as proof that the war is going according to plan.

Unlike the West, the Kremlin has a clear and coherent vision for a future Russian victory in Ukraine. This involves gradually wearing down Ukrainian battlefield resistance with relentless high intensity combat along the front lines of the war, while extensively bombing civilian infrastructure and population centers across the country.

In parallel to these military measures, Russia will also continue to conduct diverse influence operations targeting Ukrainian and Western audiences, with the goal of undermining morale and sowing division. This will leave Ukraine increasingly isolated and exhausted, leading eventually to collapse and capitulation.

The Russian authorities believe Ukraine will struggle to maintain the attention of its Western allies, and are encouraged by growing signs that many in the West now view the invasion as a stalemate. Putin himself appears to be more confident that ever that the West will lose interest in the war, and expects Western leaders to reluctantly pressure Kyiv into a negotiated settlement on Russian terms.

Eurasia Center events

Ukraine’s advance in Kursk: What’s next and implications

Conflict Russia Security & Defense Ukraine

Since the invasion began nearly two and a half years ago, Western leaders have failed to demonstrate the kind of resolve that would force Putin to revise his expectations. Instead of flooding Kyiv with the very latest tanks, jets, drones, and missiles, Ukraine’s partners have consistently slow-walked military aid while imposing absurd restrictions on the use of Western weapons.

The West’s messaging has been equally inadequate. Rather than publicly committing themselves to Ukrainian victory, Western leaders have spoken of preventing Ukrainian defeat and of standing with Ukraine “for as long as it takes.” This is not the language of strength that Putin understands.

Confronted by continued signs of Western indecisiveness, the Russian dictator is now escalating his demands. His most recent peace proposal envisaged Ukraine ceding all lands already occupied by Russia along with significant additional territory not currently under Kremlin control. There can be little doubt that he remains as committed as ever to the complete surrender and subjugation of Ukraine.

Putin knows he could not hope to match the collective might of the democratic world, but this does not discourage him. Instead, he fully expects continued Western weakness to hand Russia an historic victory in Ukraine. Unless the West is finally prepared to translate its vast financial, military, and technical potential into war-winning support for Ukraine, he may be proved right.

Mykola Bielieskov is a research fellow at the National Institute for Strategic Studies and a senior analyst at Ukrainian NGO “Come Back Alive.” The views expressed in this article are the author’s personal position and do not reflect the opinions or views of NISS or Come Back Alive.

Andriy Yermak: Ukraine and NATO are restoring Europe’s security architecture

Andriy Yermak — Mon, 22 Jul 2024 12:04:47 +0000

As I listened to world leaders announce the signing of the Ukraine Compact on the sidelines of NATO’s 75th anniversary summit at the Walter E. Washington Convention Center, my mind drifted back to September 13, 2022. On that cold, rainy day, Anders Fogh Rasmussen and I first unveiled the Kyiv Security Compact concept.

President Zelenskyy’s idea, which Anders and I began to implement together, was that allies should provide Ukraine with everything necessary to defeat Russia on the battlefield and to deter further aggression. The proposal outlined a set of measures designed to ensure that Ukraine could defend itself independently until it joins NATO.

Specifically, it included commitments from a group of guarantor states to provide weapons, conduct joint exercises under the EU and NATO flags, share intelligence, and assist in developing Ukraine’s defense industry. We claimed that security commitments were not an end in themselves, but a transitional phase towards Ukraine’s full-fledged membership in both the European Union and the NATO Alliance.

At the time, one journalist asked if I truly believed we could find even half a dozen countries willing to support this initiative. I responded with a line from John Lennon’s song: “You may say I’m a dreamer, but I’m not the only one.” This has proved to be an accurate forecast.

At the NATO Vilnius summit in July 2023, G7 leaders issued a Joint Declaration of Support for Ukraine, based on our initiative. Other countries began joining soon after. Before long, their number exceeded thirty. By that time, we already had several bilateral security agreements in place. This work is ongoing, with 23 bilateral agreements currently signed. Together with our allies, we set out on the path to restore the European security architecture. We are determined not to stray from it again.

The Ukraine Compact, open for others to join, became the final piece in creating an ecosystem of security guarantees for our country. It is designed to enhance Ukraine’s resilience and ability to defend itself in the future, and to serve as a bridge during the period when Article 5 does not yet apply. I’m pleased that this aligns perfectly with Anders’ and my original draft. The bridge metaphor is also enshrined in the NATO summit’s final declaration. This is a crucial detail. Since 2008, Ukraine has been hitting a glass wall trying to enter the Alliance’s supposedly “open doors,” and now it has been removed.

The summit declaration’s statement on Ukraine’s irreversible path to NATO is another strong step. Throughout the past year, Anders and I have emphasized again and again: NATO leaders need to make it clear to Vladimir Putin that his war is futile, that support for Ukraine will not waver, and that Ukraine will sooner rather than later become a NATO member. Finally, this signal has now been sent: Russia’s war of choice has been stripped of its stated pretext.

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Currently, the Ukraine Compact bears 25 signatures. It has been supported by the United States and Canada, nineteen European countries, and the European Union. Japan is also among the signatories. This is very telling, as Ukraine is a cornerstone not only of European but also of global security.

The Washington summit demonstrated that the Alliance can no longer limit itself to the Euro-Atlantic space as it seeks to effectively counter global challenges and threats. Aggressive autocracies are increasingly collaborating and taking on the shape of a military-political alliance. For all democratic countries this means one thing: Russia is not alone in its aggression against Ukraine, and the possibility of new conflicts elsewhere depends on Moscow’s ability to succeed. It is therefore in our common interest to do everything to ensure that Ukraine emerges victorious from this war, and that this victory is convincing.

I note that the recent NATO summit’s decisions are aimed precisely at this. Three key points are worth mentioning here. First, the institutionalization of aid formats that have emerged ad hoc during the war. Second, building Ukraine’s defense capabilities and strengthening the potential of its defense-industrial base. And third, the course toward deepening Ukraine’s political and military interaction with NATO structures.

We are sincerely grateful for these steps and extend thanks to our allies, whose unwavering leadership has allowed us to successfully defend ourselves despite Russia’s often overwhelming advantages in terms of resources. Your dedication and your value-based choices strengthen the chances of our common victory over a lawless and cynical enemy.

Eurasia Center events

Ukraine’s advance in Kursk: What’s next and implications

Conflict Russia Security & Defense Ukraine

Looking ahead, I need to outline several critical points. The further strengthening of Ukraine’s air defense system is crucial. Russia intends to continue terrorizing our civilian population by destroying residential buildings, power grids, and other critical infrastructure. The recent strikes on the Okhmatdyt children’s hospital in Kyiv, as well as two additional health clinics, have once again clearly demonstrated that for the Russian military, there are no red lines in terms of international law and ethics. There is therefore no alternative to strengthening the air shield over Ukraine.

One of the key components of this air shield will be F-16 jets. Ukraine’s allies have committed to delivering the first batch this summer. However, I have to emphasize that this is not enough. The Russians boast about using three-ton guided bombs against Ukraine. Their bombers are based at airfields in Russia’s border regions. In order to neutralize this threat, we still need long-range capabilities. Simply put, if there is a hornet’s nest in your neighborhood, you can hunt them one by one with varying success, or you can destroy the nest itself. Currently, only the first option is available to us, and even that is quite limited.

Addressing this problem will not only reduce the number of casualties; it will also further enhance the operational compatibility of Ukrainian defense forces with NATO. We sincerely welcome steps in this direction, in particular the creation of the NSATU (NATO Security Assistance and Training for Ukraine) program.

We are also extremely grateful to member states for their specific commitments to aid Ukraine, and for implementing a system of proportional contributions that will provide base funding of forty billion euros over the next year. We expect these funds to be spent specifically on purchasing weapons, rather than alternative forms of support, which are undoubtedly important as well.

At the same time, it is worth noting that this burden could be reduced by fine-tuning mechanisms for transferring frozen Russian assets to Ukraine. A related issue is the further intensification of sanctions pressure on both Russia and the partners who enable Moscow to continue making weapons using microelectronics produced in the West. This has made it possible for Russia to manufacture the type of missile that hit the Okhmatdyt children’s hospital with Western components.

Our relationship with NATO has always been a two-way street, and we remain committed to this principle. We fully understand that one of the leading factors in Ukraine’s Euro-Atlantic integration is our capacity for transformation. President Zelenskyy and his team remain dedicated to reforms aimed at strengthening institutional resilience and democratic processes in the country.

Changes continue despite the war, and they are irreversible. We unhesitatingly and without reservations agree that the reforms mentioned in the summit’s final declaration are of utmost importance for Ukraine’s prospects. At the same time, common sense suggests that all these changes will only matter if Ukraine withstands this war. Withstands and wins. Only a strong, free, and successful Ukraine can be a reliable outpost of democracy in Eastern Europe. Comprehensive and long-term assistance to Ukraine is not charity. It’s an investment in a secure future for the entire Euro-Atlantic community.

Andriy Yermak is the head of Ukraine’s Office of the President.

Ukraine’s drone success offers a blueprint for cybersecurity strategy

Anatoly Motkin — Thu, 18 Jul 2024 20:28:12 +0000

In December 2023, Ukraine’s largest telecom operator, Kyivstar, experienced a massive outage. Mobile and internet services went down for approximately twenty four million subscribers across the country. Company president Alexander Komarov called it “the largest hacker attack on telecom infrastructure in the world.” The Russian hacker group Solntsepyok claimed responsibility for the attack.

This and similar incidents have highlighted the importance of the cyber front in the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Ukraine has invested significant funds in cybersecurity and can call upon an impressive array of international partners. However, the country currently lacks sufficient domestic cybersecurity system manufacturers.

Ukraine’s rapidly expanding drone manufacturing sector may offer the solution. The growth of Ukrainian domestic drone production over the past two and a half years is arguably the country’s most significant defense tech success story since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion. If correctly implemented, it could serve as a model for the creation of a more robust domestic cybersecurity industry.

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Speaking in summer 2023, Ukraine’s Minister of Digital Transformation Mykhailo Fedorov outlined the country’s drone strategy of bringing together drone manufacturers and military officials to address problems, approve designs, secure funding, and streamline collaboration. Thanks to this approach, he predicted a one hundred fold increase in output by the end of the year.

The Ukrainian drone production industry began as a volunteer project in the early days of the Russian invasion, and quickly became a nationwide movement. The initial goal was to provide the Ukrainian military with 10,000 FPV (first person view) drones along with ammunition. This was soon replaced by far more ambitious objectives. Since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion, more the one billion US dollars has been collected by Ukrainians via fundraising efforts for the purchase of drones. According to online polls, Ukrainians are more inclined to donate money for drones than any other cause.

Today, Ukrainian drone production has evolved from volunteer effort to national strategic priority. According to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, the country will produce more than one million drones in 2024. This includes various types of drone models, not just small FPV drones for targeting personnel and armored vehicles on the battlefield. By early 2024, Ukraine had reportedly caught up with Russia in the production of kamikaze drones similar in characteristics to the large Iranian Shahed drones used by Russia to attack Ukrainian energy infrastructure. This progress owes much to cooperation between state bodies and private manufacturers.

Marine drones are a separate Ukrainian success story. Since February 2022, Ukraine has used domestically developed marine drones to damage or sink around one third of the entire Russian Black Sea Fleet, forcing Putin to withdraw most of his remaining warships from occupied Crimea to the port of Novorossiysk in Russia. New Russian defensive measures are consistently met with upgraded Ukrainian marine drones.

Eurasia Center events

Ukraine’s advance in Kursk: What’s next and implications

Conflict Russia Security & Defense Ukraine

In May 2024, Ukraine became the first country in the world to create an entire branch of the armed forces dedicated to drone warfare. The commander of this new drone branch, Vadym Sukharevsky, has since identified the diversity of country’s drone production as a major asset. As end users, the Ukrainian military is interested in as wide a selection of manufacturers and products as possible. To date, contracts have been signed with more than 125 manufacturers.

The lessons learned from the successful development of Ukraine’s drone manufacturing ecosystem should now be applied to the country’s cybersecurity strategy. “Ukraine has the talent to develop cutting-edge cyber products, but lacks investment. Government support is crucial, as can be seen in the drone industry. Allocating budgets to buy local cybersecurity products will create a thriving market and attract investors. Importing technologies strengthens capabilities but this approach doesn’t build a robust national industry,” commented Oleh Derevianko, co-founder and chairman of Information Systems Security Partners.

The development of Ukraine’s domestic drone capabilities has been so striking because local manufacturers are able to test and refine their products in authentic combat conditions. This allows them to respond on a daily basis to new defensive measures employed by the Russians. The same principle is necessary in cybersecurity. Ukraine regularly faces fresh challenges from Russian cyber forces and hacker groups; the most effective approach would involve developing solutions on-site. Among other things, this would make it possible to conduct immediate tests in genuine wartime conditions, as is done with drones.

At present, Ukraine’s primary cybersecurity funding comes from the Ukrainian defense budget and international donors. These investments would be more effective if one of the conditions was the procurement of some solutions from local Ukrainian companies. Today, only a handful of Ukrainian IT companies supply the Ukrainian authorities with cybersecurity solutions. Increasing this number to at least dozens of companies would create a local industry capable of producing world-class products. As we have seen with the rapid growth of the Ukrainian drone industry, this strategy would likely strengthen Ukraine’s own cyber defenses while also boosting the cybersecurity of the wider Western world.

Anatoly Motkin is president of StrategEast, a non-profit organization with offices in the United States, Ukraine, Georgia, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan dedicated to developing knowledge-driven economies in the Eurasian region.

Steven R. Rudder

Indo-Pacific Security Initiative Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Indo-Pacific Maritime Security

The post Rudder quoted in Digitimes Asia on Taiwan’s military modernization and drone warfare appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Indo-Pacific production diplomacy event and report quoted by Aviation Week and Janes

ylee — Thu, 11 Jul 2024 20:13:00 +0000

Original source

On July 1, IPSI’s recent public event and issue brief on production diplomacy in the Indo-Pacific were quoted in an Aviation Week article. On July 10, this work was also featured in a Janes report focusing on defense industrial resilience through production diplomacy.

Staff

Markus Garlauskas

Director

Indo-Pacific Security Initiative Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Crisis Management Indo-Pacific

Fellow

John T. Watts

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Conflict Crisis Management

Fellow

Andrew Brown

Nonresident Fellow

Indo-Pacific Security Initiative Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Indo-Pacific Intelligence

The post Indo-Pacific production diplomacy event and report quoted by Aviation Week and Janes appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Dispatch from Madrid: For Spain’s contributions to NATO, look beyond its defense spending

Andrew Bernard — Tue, 09 Jul 2024 16:03:53 +0000

NATO’s recent defense expenditure report was a cringeworthy moment in Madrid. Despite self-applauding recent years of defense spending growth, Spain had the unenviable distinction of ranking dead last among Alliance members for defense expenditures as a share of gross domestic product (GDP), clocking in at an estimated 1.28 percent for 2024. Although consistently investing in equipment expenditures at or above the NATO guideline of 20 percent of its defense budget, Spain’s inability to spend on defense at a rate agreed upon by allies will lend credence to naysayers who question its commitment to the Alliance.

However, while Spain unambiguously falls short of the 2 percent of GDP metric, a careful look at Madrid’s commitment to transatlantic security shows that Spain not only actively participates in the Alliance’s military operations, it also enthusiastically leads NATO missions and supports Ukraine while helping guard Europe’s southern flank.

Spanish public opinion takes a turn

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 shook Spanish public opinion. Blessed by favorable geography, Spain did not consider Russia to be a threat to its sovereignty, and most Spaniards did not feel Russia threated European security writ large. The invasion changed all of that. Spanish citizens judged Russia’s actions to be a clear violation of international law.

According to a Pew Research Center poll, only 5 percent of Spaniards held a favorable opinion of Russia in 2023, down sharply from 31 percent in 2020 and 46 percent in 2011. Many Spaniards disapprove of Russia’s malign activity, such as its propensity for election interference, including during the 2017 Catalonia independence referendum. More recently, the alleged Russian assassination in February in Alicante, Spain, of a Russian helicopter pilot who defected has further hardened Spanish public opinion against Russia’s role in the world.

With broad public backing, Spain has given Ukraine unwavering support since the beginning of the conflict. Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez optimized Spain’s July-December 2023 Presidency of the Council of the European Union (EU) to showcase the nation’s commitment to Ukraine. Sánchez traveled to Kyiv on the first day of Spain’s presidency while hosting Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy during the October 2023 European Political Community gathering, with both King Felipe VI and Sánchez individually meeting Zelenskyy. Spain also guided Ukraine’s EU accession negotiation process during its presidency.

Direct Spanish support to Ukraine continues to intensify as the war progresses. Madrid and Kyiv signed a bilateral security cooperation agreement in May 2024, accompanied by a Spanish pledge of one billion euros in military aid. Spain has provided Ukraine vast amounts of lethal and nonlethal military assistance, both bilaterally and through EU mechanisms. Spanish military equipment contributions have included air defense systems, tanks, armored personnel carriers, and artillery systems with associated ammunition, including Patriot missiles, which had been desperately requested by Ukraine.

Given Spain’s underinvestment in defense prior to 2022, the Ukrainian donations have cut into Spanish reserves. This has not dampened Spain’s willingness to support Ukraine, with Sánchez meeting Spanish defense industry executives in March to ask them to prioritize Ukrainian needs over Spanish requirements. Spain hosts an EU training facility in Toledo as part of the EU Military Assistance Mission and has exceeded its mandate to train two thousand soldiers, with the Spanish Army more than doubling its output with nearly five thousand Ukrainian graduates. Spanish leaders also highlight their nonmilitary support for Ukraine, including hosting more than two hundred thousand Ukrainian refugees, earmarking reconstruction funds, and actively supporting Ukraine’s efforts for judicial accountability for Russian war crimes in the country.

Spain’s commitment to NATO deterrence and defense

In addition to supporting Ukraine, Spain bolstered its commitment to NATO deterrence efforts in the wake of Russia’s invasion. Spain deploys a high proportion of its armed forces to participate in NATO operations while actively volunteering to lead NATO missions in all domains. The Spanish Air and Space Force deploys fighter aircraft to either the Baltics or the Black Sea region eight months out of the year on average, and currently leads the April-July 2024 Baltic Air Policing detachment in Lithuania. For the maritime domain, the Spanish Navy commanded NATO’s Standing Maritime Group 1 for the first half of 2024, helming a multination, multi-ship maritime deterrence force in the Baltic Sea.

The Spanish Army notably increased its operational tempo in the wake of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine. The Spanish Army immediately augmented its troops in Latvia following the invasion, where it had been participating in NATO’s legacy Enhanced Forward Presence. The Spanish footprint in Latvia is a reinforced company-sized unit equipped with armor, artillery, and air defense enablers. This reinforcement included bilateral support to Latvia in the form of an advanced air defense unit. More importantly, Spain enthusiastically volunteered to be the framework nation for a new battlegroup in Slovakia. The Spanish Army officially took command of the battlegroup on July 1, bringing the same quality of forces to Slovakia as it did to Latvia, while it keeps another reserve battlegroup ready in Spain to augment its forward deployed forces if needed. Finally, the Spanish Marines (naval infantry) will send a company of soldiers to Romania to embed with the French-led battlegroup later this year. Thus, Spain is one of the few NATO members to have land forces defending the Alliance’s territory in the three separate regions along the eastern flank.

Keeping a vigilant eye on Europe’s south

Although Spain’s commitments to the eastern flank speak for themselves, it is Europe’s southern flank that gives Madrid the most cause for concern. Spain is a long-standing contributor to security and defense missions in Africa and the Middle East, often under a United Nations (UN) or EU mandate. Through these experiences, especially in the Sahel and Sub-Saharan Africa, Madrid consistently raises concerns about Russia’s behavior in Africa, closely observing Russian malign activity, including through Moscow’s Wagner Group or post-Wagner operatives. Spanish diplomats are especially concerned about Russia’s support for illegitimate governments and military juntas, viewing this as a deliberate effort by Moscow to hinder these nations’ development toward freedom and prosperity.

Spain urged NATO to launch its “southern neighborhood” working group and was an active participant in the final report, advocating for a larger yet humbler role for NATO in these regions. Spain led the NATO Mission in Iraq for one year, participates in every EU military and civilian mission in Africa, and is currently the commander for the UN mission in Lebanon (UNIFIL) with a force commitment of more than seven hundred troops.

Another Spanish commitment in support of Europe’s southern flank is often overlooked: Spain hosts US forces at its Rota naval base and Morón air base. These installations provide two of the four large runways in Europe for US air power projection (with the other two in Germany), enables the forward deployment of US maritime power in and beyond the Mediterranean Sea, and provides a gateway for three US geographic combatant commands, which itself contributes to European security.

Increasing defense spending for Spain’s benefit

Spain’s support for Ukraine and its reinforcement of NATO’s eastern flank do not absolve it from its defense spending credibility problem. While it is likely to try to spin the defense spending discussion toward recent increases, Spain still has a long and steep climb to reach its self-proclaimed 2029 goal of passing the 2 percent of GDP threshold. To accomplish this, Spanish defense spending will need to grow at a minimum of 10 percent each year through 2029, while staying ahead of inflation. This is a real challenge, especially given the fractured nature of Spanish politics, budget processes, and high debt levels. While there is a consensus between the center-left and center-right in support of increased defense spending, both parties would be wise to formalize this and pass budgets so the armed forces can invest over time with confidence no matter which party is in power.

Increased spending is critical for acquiring much-needed capabilities. The Spanish Navy’s sole aircraft carrier, the multi-purpose Juan Carlos I, will face irrelevancy as a fixed-wing launch platform if the navy does not procure a replacement for its fleet of EAV-8B Harrier II jump jets. Although Spain joined the French-German Future Combat Air System project, the earliest any production aircraft may join the Spanish Air and Space Force is 2040, beyond the lifespan of its EF-18 fleet. The Spanish Army’s Fuerza 2035 program needs to be funded through completion. Soldier salaries continue to fall behind the cost of living and inflation, and the military may need to grow to employ future capabilities.

In other words, the to-do list is long. Spain’s political leaders need to commit to funding these capabilities if there is any hope for the Spanish military to keep pace with the rapidly changing security environment.

Andrew Bernard is a retired US Air Force colonel and a visiting fellow in the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center.

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Turkey’s emerging and disruptive technologies capacity and NATO: Defense policy, prospects, and limitations

Can Kasapoğlu and Sine Özkaraşahin — Mon, 08 Jul 2024 21:00:00 +0000

Introduction

The NATO Parliamentary Assembly’s Science and Technology Committee considers emerging and disruptive technologies (EDTs) capable of transforming future military capabilities and warfare through advanced tech applications. Today, official documents indicate that NATO’s EDT-generation efforts focus on nine areas : artificial intelligence (AI), autonomous systems, quantum technologies, biotechnology and human enhancement technologies, space, hypersonic systems, novel materials and manufacturing, energy and propulsion, and next-generation communications networks.

This brief does not cover all of Turkey’s defense-technological capabilities but aims to outline Turkey’s growing focus on EDTs and high-tech advancements. Some signature programs reflect Turkey’s political-military approach and the trends in defense-technological and industrial policies. These programs hint at Ankara’s future military modernization efforts and smart assets. This paper highlights some of Turkey’s critical defense tech programs, focusing on AI, robotics, directed energy weapons, and future soldier/exoskeleton technologies to illustrate the comprehensive and integrated structure of the Turkish EDT ecosystem.

Emerging and disruptive technologies, the future of war, and NATO

Breakthroughs in EDTs are essential for NATO’s future military strength. They will significantly impact defense economics and help shape NATO’s defense-technological and industrial priorities. These efforts involve not just state policies but also public-private partnerships and transatlantic cooperation for sustainable and comprehensive EDT initiatives.

NATO supports these projects through initiatives like the Defence Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic and the NATO-Private Sector Dialogues, which explore collaboration between NATO and private companies on technology and defense.

According to Greg Ulmer, currently president of Lockheed Martin Aeronautics, “the decisive edge in today and tomorrow’s missions will be determined by combining technologies to bring forward new capabilities.” This view is shared by US Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin, demonstrating the importance of AI in Washington’s military modernization efforts to deter adversaries in a future confrontation. There seems to be a consensus in the Western policy community that integrating AI and machine learning into modern battle networks, perhaps the most critical contemporary EDT applications in defense, is essential to succeed in tomorrow’s wars. In an era of increasingly digital and transparent warfare, rapid technological adaptation is key to success.

Smart technologies are proliferating fast, and continuous innovation has become a strategic requirement in today’s geopolitical landscape. AI-augmented precision kill chains, hypersonic weapons within mixed-strike packages, and satellite internet-enabled command and control nodes are already changing warfare. The use of commercial satellite imagery and geospatial intelligence has revolutionized open-source intelligence. Facial recognition algorithms are now used in war crime investigations. Robotic warfare, drone-on-drone engagements, and manned-unmanned teaming are all changing the characteristics of war for better or worse.

Defense economics is also changing. Start-ups are becoming increasingly essential actors in military innovation. According to McKinsey & Company, the number of seed funding rounds in defense and dual-use technology (in the United States) almost doubled between 2011 and 2023, hinting at a rapid proliferation of start-ups in the high-tech defense industry. This trend is fostering new collaborations. NATO is leveraging the strengths of the start-up industry with a $1.1 billion Innovation Fund and is reportedly working with several European tech companies on robotic solutions, AI-driven systems, and semiconductors.

Keeping up with innovation is like boarding a fast-moving train, where getting a good seat ensures a strategic advantage over competitors. By investing in holistic, across-the-spectrum EDT-generation efforts, Turkish decision-makers seem to recognize this imperative.

Great expectations: Turkey in the high-technology battlespace

Turkey has faced challenges with industrial advancements, lagging behind in the Industrial Revolution. For instance, the country’s first main battle tank is still not in service. Despite ambitions to operate its fifth-generation combat aircraft, Kaan, within a decade, Turkey has not ever produced third- or fourth-generation tactical military aircraft. This situation is striking given that Turkey excels in producing and exporting state-of-the-art drones but has struggled with other key conventional military assets.

According to Haluk Bayraktar, CEO of the prominent Turkish unmanned aerial systems manufacturer Baykar, missing out on the Industrial Revolution has slowed Turkey’s military modernization. However, it also pushed the country to leverage digital age technologies, building new strengths in intelligent assets and EDTs.

In recent decades, Turkey’s military-industrial sector has focused heavily on innovation and increasing research and development, driven by a desire for self-sufficiency and operational sovereignty. The country’s National Artificial Intelligence Strategy 2021-2025 outlines these ambitions. Forming the central pillar of the government’s AI policy, the document “focuses on generating value on a global scale with an agile and sustainable AI ecosystem.” The strategy also lays out the strategic pillars of the effort, including strengthening international collaboration, encouraging innovation, and increasing the number of experts working on AI.

Similarly, the 2023-2027 Sectoral Strategy Document of the Turkish Presidency of Defense Industries outlines several focus areas for Turkey’s future EDT efforts. These include quantum computing, nanotechnology, and directed energy weapons. The document also highlights the importance of establishing a sustainable, resilient production and testing infrastructure for advanced aerial platforms and increasing the competitiveness of Turkey’s high-tech defense exports.

Selected military programs

Kemankeş loitering munitions baseline

Turkey’s aerial drone warfare capabilities first gained attention with medium-altitude long-endurance (MALE) and high-altitude long-endurance (HALE) platforms such as the Bayraktar TB-2 MALE drone, Akıncı HALE unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV), and TUSAS’ Anka MALE drone baseline. Recently, Turkey’s has advanced further in this field, developing smart aerial assets such as the Kemankeş family.

The Kemankeş, introduced by Baykar in 2023, is a “mini-intelligent cruise missile” that combines features of loitering munitions and cruise missiles. It can carry a 6-kilogram payload , and operates autonomously with an AI-supported autopilot system, one-hour endurance, and a jet engine. The Kemankeş is designed for both striking targets and conducting intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition, and reconnaissance missions. It can be integrated with other aerial drones, making it a versatile tool in modern warfare.

The Kemankeş system offers advanced datalinks and sensors, providing real-time battle updates while targeting adversaries. The upgraded version, Kemankeş-2, boasts a range of over 200 kilometers and an AI-supported autopilot system for precise, autonomous flight. Baykar announced that Kemankeş-2 passed its system verification tests in June 2024.

Kemankeş-2 can operate day and night, in various weather conditions, and in environments where GPS is jammed. Its AI-supported optical guidance system demonstrates Turkey’s rapid advancements in robotic aerial technology.

Naval and ground robotic warfare capabilities

Russia’s war on Ukraine and the ongoing turmoil in the Red Sea have highlighted the importance of kamikaze naval drones. In the Black Sea, Ukraine has used unmanned surface vehicles (USV) compensate for its lack of conventional naval capabilities. It has successfully eliminated about one-third of the Russian Black Sea Fleet with naval drones and other long-range capabilities such as the Storm Shadow/SCALP-EG air-launched cruise missiles and coastal defense missiles. Similarly, in the Red Sea, Iranian-backed Houthis have employed low-cost kamikaze USVs effective anti-access/area-denial assets, disrupting global maritime trade and limiting Western commercial activities in the region. Some assessments suggest that the United States should consider forming “hedge forces” consisting entirely of unmanned, low-cost systems to counter initial aggression from a peer opponent, such as in a scenario involving China invading Taiwan. This strategy would minimize harm to military personnel and the loss of valuable equipment.

Turkey has one of the largest USV programs within NATO, with about half a dozen ongoing projects. For example, Marlin, produced by the Turkish defense giant Aselsan and Sefine Shipyards, was the first Turkish naval drone to participate in NATO joint exercises, indicating potential for coalition warfare.

Turkey is also advancing its ground warfare capabilities, leveraging its expertise in robotics. Otokar’s Alpar is a recent example of an unmanned ground vehicle (UGV) that can map the battlefield in 2D and 3D, navigate without a global navigation satellite system, identify friend or foe, and has Advanced Driver Assistance Systems, low thermal and acoustic signature, and autonomous patrol capability. It can also serve as a “mother tank” for smaller UGVs, enhancing mission capability. Alpar has been showcased at major international defense exhibitions, including the Eurosatory 2024 event held in Paris in June.

In addition to developing new robotic systems, Turkey is focusing on innovative concepts like Havelsan’s “digital troops,” which integrate manned and unmanned teams to act as force multipliers on the battlefield. These efforts across multiple domains demonstrate Turkey’s vision of becoming a leading player in a “Mad Max”-like battlespace that combines conventional and smart assets.

Laser precision: Turkey’s drive in directed energy weapon projects

In Turkey’s expansion of EDTs, directed energy weapons and laser guns are gaining attention. The prominent Turkish arms maker Roketsan has introduced the Alka Directed Energy Weapon System, which has successfully completed live fire tests. The Alka system combines soft kill and hard kill capabilities, featuring both an electromagnetic jamming system and a laser destruction system.

Another key initiative is Aselsan’s Gökberk Mobile Laser Weapon System, first unveiled at the Turkish defense exhibition IDEF in 2023. Gökberk can search for, detect, and track UAVs using radar and electro-optical sensors, and then intercept these threats with an effective laser weapon. Additionally, Gökberk has soft kill capabilities, using its Kangal jammer subsystem to render UAVs dysfunctional. According to Aselsan, Gökberk can protect land and naval platforms, critical national infrastructure, and border outposts.

Turkish future soldier concepts

Turkey is also advancing future soldier technologies as part of its efforts in EDTs. The concept, pioneered by the United Kingdom within NATO, aims to create a modernized force by 2030. Shifting the focus of warfighting from close to deep battles, the British program seeks to transform the army into a resilient and versatile force that can find and attack enemy targets at a greater distance and with higher accuracy.

Ankara’s efforts in this segment are not new. A few years ago, BITES, a leading defense technology and intelligent systems manufacturer owned by Aselsan, developed the Military Tactical Operation Kit ATOK. Equipped with portable and wearable integrated technology, the solution in question was designed to enhance the situational awareness of Turkish troops in a rapidly changing battlefield and maximize personnel security. In line with the future soldier concept, BITES also produced several solutions based on virtual/augmented reality to provide realistic simulation environments.

Aselsan’s “Military Exoskeleton” is another visionary initiative designed to assist troops during demanding battlefield conditions. The exoskeleton provides over 400 watts of leg support. The support is adaptive and AI-supported, meaning that it understands and responds to the needs of the soldier wearing the smart suit. It has an 8-kilometer operation range on a single charge and transfers the soldier’s weight to the ground during long missions, reducing physical strain and improving combat performance.

The way forward: Opportunities and restraints

Keeping up with industrial trends in a competitive environment is challenging, and Turkey’s defense industry faces several obstacles that limit its full potential.

First, the Turkish defense industry is monopolized. There are structural gaps in the collaboration between the public and private sectors. Unlike other tech-driven nations like the United States, Turkey’s defense ecosystem is not very friendly to start-ups, with established companies dominating the field.

Second, Turkey has a shortage of skilled human capital, largely due to issues in higher education. According to 2022 OECD data, Turkey’s Program for International Student Assessment test scores fell below the OECD average in mathematics, science, and reading comprehension. In addition, evidence shows that in Turkey, the proportion of bachelor’s, master’s, and doctoral or equivalent graduates in the field of STEM (science, technology, engineering, and mathematics) is among the lowest among OECD and partner countries.

For sustainable and resilient defense innovation, R&D, business, and a well-educated workforce must go hand in hand. A good example is Baykar, whose chief technology lead was educated at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, one of the United States’ leading engineering universities.

Third, high-technology goods comprise a relatively low share of Turkish exports. Despite a focus on high-tech products, over half of the gross value generated in the Turkish defense industry comes from low- and medium-technology products. In 2022, Turkey’s high-tech exports were approximately $7.5 billion, and in 2023, this figure exceeded $9 billion.

While Turkey’s strategic plans and defense industrial goals are ambitious, the abovementioned challenges could jeopardize its position as a leading EDT producer in the medium and long term. Addressing these issues is crucial not only for enhancing Turkey’s EDT edge but also for meeting NATO’s strategic needs.

About the authors

Can Kasapoğlu is a nonresident senior fellow at Hudson Institute. Follow him on X @ckasapoglu1.

Sine Özkaraşahin is a freelance defense analyst and consultant. Follow her on X @sineozkarasahin.

The Atlantic Council in Turkey, which is in charge of the Turkey program, aims to promote and strengthen transatlantic engagement with the region by providing a high-level forum and pursuing programming to address the most important issues on energy, economics, security, and defense.

Rudder featured in Intelligence Online on Taiwan’s military advancements

ylee — Mon, 08 Jul 2024 20:24:08 +0000

Original source

On July 5, IPSI nonresident senior fellow Steven Rudder was featured in Intelligence Online discussing Taiwan’s military advancements. The article highlighted his crucial role in facilitating Taiwan’s acquisition of American drones.

Fellow

Steven R. Rudder

Indo-Pacific Security Initiative Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Indo-Pacific Maritime Security

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Don’t cut corners on US nuclear deterrence

Matthew Kroenig, Mark J. Massa — Wed, 03 Jul 2024 13:42:12 +0000

The nuclear threats to the United States and its allies are growing. To deter these threats, the bipartisan Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States (a commission on which one of the authors, Matthew Kroenig, served) recently recommended that the United States plan for its first strategic forces buildup since the end of the Cold War.

In contrast to this bipartisan consensus, House Armed Services Committee Ranking Member Adam Smith (D-WA) argued in Newsweek in May for adjustments and cuts to the US intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) force. Smith’s argument that the United States should consider mobile basing for a portion of its ICBM force has merit, but his other arguments do not stand up to scrutiny. Rather, bipartisan support for modernizing and expanding the US nuclear arsenal will be essential for ensuring that the United States and its allies have the strategic forces they need to deter aggression in the face of hostile, nuclear-armed, autocratic rivals.

There are several problems with Smith’s arguments. First, he questions whether land-based nuclear forces are needed at all. Yet, every presidential administration since the 1950s has considered this question and concluded that ICBMs are necessary. Indeed, as we have argued at length elsewhere (see here and here), ICBMs contribute to the major goals of US nuclear strategy—they deter adversaries from launching a strategic attack, assure allies, and give the United States the ability to respond if deterrence fails.

There is simply no room to cut the number of ICBMs at this moment.

Second, Smith argues that an enemy nuclear attack on vulnerable ICBMs could force a US president into a use-them-or-lose-them situation and a “rushed” decision to launch a nuclear attack. But the president is not forced to launch nuclear weapons as soon as a possible enemy missile launch is detected. The president has the option to ride out the attack and retaliate with other, more survivable forces, if necessary. Moreover, it does not make sense to argue that ICBMs are, on the one hand, so important that the president would need to launch them if under attack and, on the other hand, the United States should slash their numbers. ICBMs are either important or they are not. If ICBMs are expendable, then there is no reason for the president to launch them if under attack. If they are important, as we believe they are, then it is unwise to curtail them.

Third, Smith argues that US ICBM silos are uniquely dangerous because they invite an adversary to target its nuclear weapons in the US heartland, and that such an attack could kill millions of people. But the purpose of nuclear weapons is, of course, to deter nuclear attack in the first place. If ICBMs continue to deter effectively, as they have for the past half century and more, then an attack will not come. Moreover, if the adversary did not need to target its nuclear weapons on missile silos in the isolated high plains of Montana and North Dakota, for example, then the attacker could reallocate those weapons toward major US cities, which would only result in more US deaths in the event of a nuclear war.

Fourth, Smith continues by arguing that, even if the United States does maintain some silo-based ICBMs, the Department of Defense should purchase fewer of them. But again, this argument does not stand up to scrutiny. The bipartisan Strategic Posture Commission argued that the current US nuclear modernization program of record—which includes the new Sentinel ICBMs,* new ballistic missile submarines, new strategic bombers, and new air-launched nuclear cruise missiles—is necessary but not sufficient to maintain strategic deterrence. There is simply no room to cut the number of ICBMs at this moment.

Fifth, Smith argues that, if the United States keeps the same number of nuclear weapons, then it should shift warheads from ICBMs to the submarine leg of the nuclear triad. But there is not much room to shift large numbers of warheads to the sea-based leg without increasing the total number of submarines, and the United States is already straining to produce the planned number of Columbia-class ballistic missile submarines on time. Moreover, if the United States were to build more submarines, that would be inconsistent with Smith’s stated concern about costs. Building and operating more submarines is much more expensive than modernizing ground-based missile silos.

Sixth, Smith worries that the Department of Defense does not have the resources to complete the US nuclear modernization program while making necessary investments in conventional forces. It is true that the Department of Defense must make tradeoffs in some areas, but not with nuclear deterrence, which is its highest priority. Congress should ensure that the United States has sufficient resources at its disposal to build and deploy the necessary nuclear and conventional forces.

Smith’s strongest argument is that the United States should consider putting some portion of its ICBM force on mobile launchers instead of in silos. In fact, the bipartisan congressional commission recommends this option to enhance the survivability of the ground-based leg. But this option would not result in cost savings, contrary to what Smith suggests. A mobile option would require building new missile garrisons and also result in higher operational and security costs. Given the worsening international security environment, land-mobile missiles should be a complement to, not a replacement for, the ICBM program of record.

Now is not the time to be making cuts to the US nuclear arsenal. As the bipartisan Strategic Posture Commission argued in its consensus report, the United States must urgently complete its nuclear modernization program of record and take actions today to enhance its strategic posture. The future of international peace and security depends on it.

Matthew Kroenig is vice president of the Atlantic Council and senior director of its Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. He is currently a commissioner on the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States and was a senior policy adviser in the Pentagon in support of the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review.

Mark J. Massa is the deputy director for strategic forces policy in the Forward Defense program within the Scowcroft Center.

Note: The Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security conducts work on nuclear and strategic forces that is sponsored by donors including Los Alamos National Laboratory, Northrop Grumman Corporation (which has the sole contract from the US Air Force to engineer and manufacture Sentinel ICBMs), the Norwegian Ministry of Defense, the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the United States Department of Defense, the United States Department of Energy, and the United States Department of State, as well as general support to the Scowcroft Center. This article did not involve any of these donors and reflects only the authors’ views.

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NATO allies need a better approach to industrial strategy

Kristen Taylor — Mon, 01 Jul 2024 20:40:34 +0000

Against the backdrop of Russia’s war in Ukraine and rising aggression across the globe, allies and partners are ramping up defense investment, but increased spending is only part of the equation. Both the United States and Europe are failing to match defense priorities with industrial output. US and European efforts to increase munition production fall drastically short of the needed quantity to both sustain Ukraine’s war effort and replenish allied stockpiles. Russia is producing nearly three times more artillery munitions than allied industries.

Allies are finding that scaling up industrial production is more difficult than expected. Decades of slashed defense budgets have left allied defense industrial bases vulnerable. As war rages in Europe and allies face increasingly depleted stocks, allies should use the NATO Summit next week in Washington as an opportunity to send clear demand signals to industry and develop more coordinated, effective industrial strategies.

In light of growing vulnerabilities, US and European policymakers alike are courting stronger relationships with industry—evidenced by the United States and European Union advancing their own, first-ever defense industrial strategies in 2024. However, these strategies do not fully address the critical vulnerabilities facing allied militaries. The European Defense Industrial Strategy (EDIS) is a positive step in strengthening Europe’s fragmented defense industrial bases, but this go-at-it-alone approach alienates Europe’s closest ally, the United States, and fails to tap into needed industrial capacity across the Alliance.

Instead, the United States and Europe should turn to NATO to bridge the gap and produce coordinated efforts toward defense production, in line with preexisting NATO policies and procedures designed to do just this, such as the Defense Production Action Plan. Current NATO efforts underscore the Alliance’s prioritization of defense industry issues, but due in part to insufficient buy-in from some allies, these plans fall short of orchestrating the cooperation necessary to address critical allied vulnerabilities.

Greater NATO involvement in allied industrial strategies could strike a balance between mitigating potential vulnerabilities in defense capacity, while improving defense industrial competency in the long term. This approach should:

Increase joint procurement efforts. NATO should orchestrate more allied defense cooperation agreements, such as the European Sky Shield Initiative, which seeks to coordinate European air defense purchases into one common approach. Such initiatives encourage greater interoperability and allow for specialization across allied defense industrial bases. For example, NATO could coordinate a broader joint procurement effort to produce more critical military equipment, such as unmanned aerial vehicles, across the Alliance.

Encourage multiyear procurement and acquisition contracts. The United States and European allies must match means to ends, convincing industry that rhetoric and spending pledges will manifest into long-term investments. Allies, under the direction of the NATO Defense Planning Process and the Conference of National Armaments Directors, should invest more heavily in multiyear procurement and acquisition contracts to increase demand signals needed to support the current shift in defense prioritization.

Enhance allied partnerships on defense production. Rather than focusing on economic competition, allies should look for ways to reduce bureaucratic hurdles to transatlantic defense industrial cooperation. NATO’s Defense Industrial Production Board should look for ways to match industrial synergies across the Alliance to maintain its warfighting edge. In order to achieve this aim, allies should seek to reduce national requirements that make it difficult for allied companies to break into national markets.

Eliminate onerous export controls between allies. The United States should seek to eliminate export controls and licensing requirements for exports and transfers on select defense equipment and technology for certain NATO allies. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024 shifted US policy on export controls and the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) regulatory regime to provide more flexibility for London and Canberra under the Australia-United Kingdom-United States partnership known as AUKUS. In line with this recent shift, the United States should also seek to expand exemptions to ITAR for NATO allies such as France, Germany, and Sweden.

Invest in next-generation technologies. The Alliance must invest in integrating new technologies into its military assets. Allies should look to foster deeper research and development partnerships that cut across the Atlantic. In the short term, allies should look to NATO’s Defence Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic and Innovation Fund to prioritize research partnerships that promulgate technological advancement and deepen industrial connections. In addition, allies should seek to deepen cooperation on military innovation projects to harness the unique skills of individual allies.

The United States and Europe should undoubtedly invest more in their own defense industrial bases in the long term. However, in the short term, allies and partners should prioritize integrating crucial efforts to address critical vulnerabilities, ramp up defense industrial capacity to speed and scale, and reduce bureaucratic hurdles and protectionist measures. As the United States and Europe court industry executives, allies and partners would do well to prioritize greater investment in NATO’s industrial policies and procedures as an important deliverable at the Washington summit to mitigate critical vulnerabilities that place the Alliance at a disadvantage to its adversaries.

Kristen Taylor is a program assistant with the Transatlantic Security Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

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Production diplomacy for deterrence, readiness, and resilience in the Indo-Pacific

Andrew Brown, John T. Watts, Markus Garlauskas — Thu, 27 Jun 2024 16:42:13 +0000

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Executive summary

Production diplomacy integrates the defense industrial bases (DIB) of allies and partners by protecting supply chains, strengthening alliances and partnerships, enhancing deterrence, and building defense readiness, though it is not without risks and challenges. In order to meet growing challenges of an evolving geostrategic environment including facing multiple adversaries simultaneously, the United States should rapidly develop and implement new production diplomacy initiatives in the Indo-Pacific.

The term production diplomacy was coined by Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment William A. LaPlante, and subsequently defined in the National Defense Industrial Strategy as a strategy to protect DIB supply chain. It can additionally support national security objectives in the Indo-Pacific geostrategic environment.

Production diplomacy plays a key role in deepening and broadening integration among allies and partners, while enhancing resilience and building stockpiles and surge capacity. The application of production diplomacy also comes with risks and challenges, including difficulties creating sustainable industry environments, unintended technology transfer to adversaries, and domestic political environments.

While production diplomacy will not apply in every case, when applied creatively under the right circumstances, it has the potential to enhance US, allied, and partner national security. This creativity can include both coproducing and assembling forward, as well as multilateral coproduction to create win-win-win outcomes.

Maximizing effectiveness of production diplomacy initiatives to support US, allied, and partner national security objectives will require executive branch and congressional action. The full issue brief includes recommendations that think creatively; craft programs to support multiple national security objectives; assess and manage risks; overcome gaps and seams; and apply historical lessons.

The Tiger Project, an Atlantic Council effort, develops new insights and actionable recommendations for the United States, as well as its allies and partners, to deter and counter aggression in the Indo-Pacific. Explore our collection of work, including expert commentary, multimedia content, and in-depth analysis, on strategic defense and deterrence issues in the region.

Ukraine’s innovative drone industry helps counter Putin’s war machine

David Kirichenko — Wed, 26 Jun 2024 13:02:03 +0000

Since the outbreak of hostilities in February 2022, Ukraine’s domestic drone industry has emerged as an increasingly crucial element in the struggle to resist and outmaneuver the formidable Russian war machine. Ukraine’s innovative use of drones has allowed the country to counter Russia’s far greater resources and strike back at targets everywhere from the Black Sea to oil refineries deep inside Russia itself.

For more than two years, Ukrainian commanders have been adapting to rapidly evolving battlefield conditions shaped by the use of drones. In the initial weeks of the war, Turkish-made Bayraktar TB2 drones were instrumental in allowing Ukraine to strike over-stretched Russian lines as Putin’s invading army attempted to take Kyiv. A range of countermeasures, including increasingly sophisticated electronic warfare capabilities, have since created an environment where Russian and Ukrainian forces are constantly competing to gain an innovative edge over their adversaries. Many view this military tech contest as the decisive front of the war.

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As the front line stabilized during the first winter of Russia’s invasion, trench warfare became the defining feature of the conflict, with drones filling the skies and searching for targets. This has created unprecedented visibility on both sides of the front lines and made offensive operations increasingly challenging. A large proportion of the drones buzzing above the Ukrainian battlefield in winter 2022 were Chinese in origin, which placed Russia at a significant advantage due to Moscow’s close ties with Beijing.

Meanwhile, many of the Western drone models used in Ukraine have proved costly and ineffective, according to the Wall Street Journal. Additionally, delays in military aid have underlined the risks for Ukraine of relying too heavily on the country’s Western partners. These factors have helped convince policymakers in Kyiv to concentrate on the development of their own domestic drone industry. They have been able to call upon Ukraine’s vibrant tech sector to support these efforts.

With Ukraine typically losing thousands of drones per month, keeping production costs as low as possible is vital. Flexibility in drone operations is also essential, as drone units frequently use 3D printing to modify and adapt parts to meet specific needs. With this in mind, Ukraine has adopted a decentralized approach to drone development that allows for rapid testing and deployment.

Ukraine’s emphasis on agility contrasts with the more centralized military structure favored by the Kremlin. While Russia can produce vast quantities of military equipment, comparatively slower decision-making processes and bureaucratic inefficiencies often hinder the Kremlin’s ability to respond swiftly to new battlefield realities. Many analysts believe this was a factor behind the recent appointment of a technocrat economist as Russia’s new defense minister.

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Ukraine’s advance in Kursk: What’s next and implications

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The growth of Ukraine’s domestic drone industry over the past two years has been striking, with more than 200 drone-manufacturing companies created. The Ukrainian authorities have allocated $2 billion for the production of drones in 2024, with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy setting an annual production target of one million FPV drones.

Ukraine’s leaders hope more drones will mean less reliance on traditional munitions and fewer casualties. “We don’t have as many human resources as Russia. They fight, they die, they send more people, they don’t care, but that’s not how we see war,” commented Alex Bornyakov, Ukraine’s Deputy Minister of Digital Transformation.

A key element in Ukraine’s drone strategy is the BRAVE1 initiative, a government-led defense tech cluster established in spring 2023 to streamline cooperation between the public and private sectors. This cluster has helped numerous companies cut through red tape, speeding up the implementation of new technologies to support Ukraine’s defense.

The race to innovate is relentless, with Ukraine’s steadily improving drone capabilities mirrored by Russia’s own rapidly expanding electronic warfare arsenal. Ukrainian engineers are now attempting to overcome the Kremlin’s increasingly sophisticated jamming efforts by embedding artificial intelligence (AI) technologies into drones. This innovation has already played a part in Kyiv’s long-range drone strike campaign against Russia’s energy industry, with CNN reporting that Ukraine has employed AI-enabled drones to hit targets as far away as Russia’s Tatarstan region, well over one thousand kilometers from the Ukrainian border.

Ukraine’s partners certainly seem to recognize the importance of drones and have set up an international drone coalition to aid deliveries. In a further example of institutional innovation, Ukraine has this year become the first nation to establish a separate branch of its military dedicated to drone warfare.

Looking ahead, Ukraine’s drone warfare strategy will continue to focus on flexibility, innovation, and the daily challenge of maintaining a technological advantage over Russia. Ukraine’s leaders know they cannot hope to defeat Russia in a traditional war of attrition, and must instead make the most of the agility and technological ingenuity that the country has demonstrated since February 2022. As Ukraine’s understanding of drone warfare continues to evolve, the outside world will be watching and learning.

David Kirichenko is an Associate Research Fellow at the Henry Jackson Society.

Chinese dominance of the global UAV industry poses a number of national security challenges for the United States. On the battlefield, drones play a crucial role in intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), and in conducting strikes. Chinese leadership in UAVs provides the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) with potential battlefield advantages.

At home, these devices provide critical support to law-enforcement agencies and a variety of government departments, in everything from undertaking infrastructure inspections to fulfilling vital roles in scientific research. Chinese commercial drones operating in the United States and allied countries, therefore, provide the PLA with a potential source of intelligence about personal data and critical infrastructure that can be used to identify and exploit vulnerabilities in US and allied homelands.

Finally, Chinese UAVs raise human rights concerns, as Chinese drone companies surveil Chinese citizens and assist the CCP in its mistreatment of its Muslim Uyghur minority.

Washington has begun to wake up to the challenges presented by China’s dominance of the global UAV market. Federal agencies and some states have banned the use of Chinese drones. The federal government has enacted tariffs. Recognizing UAVs’ potential benefit to defense and deterrence, the Department of Defense created the Replicator initiative, a flagship effort to promote the development and fielding of autonomous systems. Congress has also introduced legislation with new measures to protect the US market from Chinese drones and to promote the production of US-made drones.

These are good initial steps, but, to date, they have been piecemeal in nature and lack an overarching strategic framework.

This issue brief proposes a comprehensive three-part “protect-promote-align” strategy for the United States and its allies to secure their national security interests in the global UAV market. It argues that the United States and its allies should introduce new restrictions on the use of Chinese drones in their markets. They should promote the development of alternative drone manufacturers in the United States and trusted allies. Finally, they should align their policies to advance a whole-of-free-world approach to the global drone competition.

If adopted, the strategy proposed here will go a long way toward ensuring that the United States and its allies can remain secure at home, deter their adversaries, and benefit from an emerging technology that is likely to play a critical role in twenty-first-century defense.

Deborah Lee James
Atlantic Council Board Director
Former Secretary of the Air Force

Executive summary

The United States has been the world’s innovation leader since the time of Thomas Edison, and this innovation edge has provided the United States and its allies with enormous economic, military, and geopolitical benefits. China, however, aims to usurp the US position as the world’s leader in the most important technologies of the twenty-first century, including artificial intelligence (AI), quantum computing, hypersonic missiles, and unmanned aerial systems (UAS), commonly known as drones. Using a variety of unfair trade practices, including massive intellectual-property theft, China has closed the gap, and even maintains the lead, in some of these critical technologies, including UAS.

While the United States has preserved its edge in large military drones, China dominates the market for smaller and commercially available drones with dual-use civilian and military applications. China controls 90 percent of the drone market in the United States and 80 percent globally.

China’s supremacy in the commercial UAS market creates a number of national security threats for the United States and its allies. First, Chinese drones operating in the United States and its democratic allies create an intelligence vulnerability, as these drones scoop up sensitive data that can be transferred back to Beijing for a variety of national security purposes, including aiding the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) in targeting critical infrastructure for cyber and kinetic military attacks.

Second, China’s drone-manufacturing prowess provides a military edge. Russia’s war in Ukraine demonstrates that inexpensive commercial drones will be critical to intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and strike in twenty-first-century warfare.

Third, and related, the free world has a supply-chain vulnerability problem, as it is dependent on an autocratic adversary for access to UAS for both civilian and military purposes, creating dangerous dependencies that China could exploit in crisis or peacetime. States increasingly utilize “drone diplomacy” to gain influence abroad. The act of selling a drone can be used to “extract concessions, exert influence, counter rivals, and strengthen military ties.” China’s artificially low prices for UAS, achieved through state subsidies, crowd out the development of a homegrown domestic drone industry in the United States and among US allies.

Fourth, Chinese-built drones threaten democratic values and human rights, as the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and other autocracies employ Chinese drones for surveilling their populations, including in the CCP’s genocide of the Uyghur minority.

To address these challenges, the United States and its allies need a new strategy to protect against the threats posed by Chinese drones, strengthen their position in the international UAS market, and assert global leadership in this key twenty-first-century technology. To help the United States and its allies win the new tech race, the Scowcroft Center previously published a three-part “promote, protect, and coordinate” strategy. This paper updates that framework, and applies it to the issue of dual-use drones.

First, the United States and its allies should protect their countries from the national security threat posed by Chinese-made drones by prohibiting their use in sensitive areas, such as by the government and in critical infrastructure.

Specific recommendations include the following.

The US Congress should pass the Countering CCP Drones Act and the Drone Infrastructure Inspection Grant (DIIG) Act.
The US Congress should pass legislation to make US state-level bans effective and actionable by offering federal-government support for their implementation, including through targeted grant programs accelerating the transition to secure and capable systems.
The US State Department should, in light of increasing global restrictions on People’s Republic of China (PRC)-made drones, launch an initiative to educate allies and partners on the risks associated with those systems, and support secure and capable alternatives.
The US State Department should encourage allies and partners to enact tariffs and sanctions on PRC-made UAS to counter China’s unfair trade practices.

Second, the United States and its allies should promote domestic drone manufacturing to provide a secure alternative to PRC-made drones.

Specific recommendations include the following.

The US federal government should provide targeted grants to accelerate the transition to secure drones in the government and critical-infrastructure sectors, and should consider funding to expand domestic drone manufacturing.
The US State Department should encourage allied governments to do the same, providing reasonable funding measures to accelerate the transition to secure US and allied solutions.
The US Congress and the Department of Defense (DOD) should ensure that the Replicator initiative has the proper funding and support to achieve the ambitious goals laid out in the program.
The US Departments of State and Defense should encourage key allies to adopt their own versions of the Replicator initiative to ensure the free world has UAS in mass necessary to deter and defeat aggression.
The US Congress should pass legislation, using a public-private partnership framework, to stimulate investment in research and development of autonomous drones, and scale existing UAS-manufacturing capabilities in the United States.

Third, and finally, the United States should align with its allies and partners to forge a coherent free-world approach to the setting of policies, regulations, and norms regarding commercial UAS.

Specific recommendations include the following.

The US State Department should elevate drones in technology and commercial diplomacy, starting by designating an individual to lead allied cooperation on drone policies, manufacturing, and supply-chain security.
The United States and its allies should work with existing multilateral frameworks including the US-EU Trade and Technology Council (TTC), Group of Seven (G7), Group of Twenty (G20), Quad, Department of Commerce, and World Trade Organization (WTO) to develop regulations and norms for the responsible use of drones and autonomous systems.
The United States should leverage NATO and AUKUS Pillar II to improve defense coordination related to UAS.

Pursuing this strategy now will help the United States and its allies maintain their innovation edge and prevail in a new era of strategic competition against revisionist autocracies.

The threat posed by China’s dominance of the global unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) industry

In 2023, the global UAS market was worth more than $30 billion, a number projected to increase to more than $55 billion by 2030. The market is dominated by firms based in China, with DJI controlling 80 percent of the commercial market within the United States and as much as 70 percent of the global market, and Autel, another PRC manufacturer, controlling 7 percent globally. As of 2021, estimates put Autel’s US market share at 15 percent. In comparison, Skydio, perhaps the most prominent US-based company, had only a 3 percent share of the global market, the same as Parrot, a French-based entity.

DroneAnalyst’s 2021 Drone Market Sector Report includes data from a survey of drone industry stakeholders in over 100 countries on the percentage of all new commercial drone purchases. The graph examines the percentage each company has of the global market share and sorts by the headquarter location of each company. DroneAnalyst

In 2020, 90 percent of UAS operated by US public-safety agencies were manufactured by DJI, though this number has since fallen due to a series of state and local bans. In Florida, before a recent ban was enacted, more than 1,800 of 3,000 UAS registered by the government and police departments were manufactured by DJI and Autel. However, in some states, DJI and Autel still hold a disproportionate market share among public-sector entities. In New Jersey, more than 500 of the 550 UAS registered by the state and local police departments were made by DJI or Autel.

US allies continue to rely heavily on PRC-made drones. In the United Kingdom (UK), for example, 230 out of the 337 drones operated by police forces across the country are DJI products. In Australia, a report revealed that federal agencies owned several thousand DJI drones, although the Australian military had grounded its systems and other agencies had begun to move away from them as well.

The global-market dominance of DJI and Autel has been supported by two national CCP policies, Made in China 2025 and Military-Civil Fusion, which are supported in part by industrial and corporate theft of foreign technology. The PRC has never been a market economy. Instead, it relies on a noncompetitive system of trade, bolstered by subsidies and other unfair practices.

Made in China 2025 was announced in 2015 and seeks to boost China’s manufacturing competitiveness across a variety of industries. The plan focuses on ten different sectors, including the development of UAS. Across each sector, the PRC aims to increase China’s domestic manufacturing capacity to have 70 percent of the core components and materials produced in China by 2025. To achieve this goal, the PRC uses a variety of tactics, such as creating financial and tax incentives to convince foreign-based firms to shift manufacturing and research and development (R&D) operations to China, intellectual-property theft, predatory procurement policies, and financing state-owned enterprises in their acquisitions of overseas companies.

Military-Civil Fusion (MCF) is central to Xi Jinping’s plan to allow China to modernize its military by 2035 and ensure that the PLA becomes “world-class” by 2049. At its core, MCF is a strategy that aims to break down barriers between commercial R&D and military products, allowing the PLA to rapidly identify, adopt, scale up, and leverage commercial technologies that also have a military application, such as UAS. The MCF system also encourages linkages between the state and dozens of private companies that can contribute to military projects and help meet procurement needs, including companies that develop unmanned systems. To achieve the goals of MCF, the PRC uses both licit and illicit means, including exploiting global academic exchanges, investment in foreign companies, forced military transfer, and, in some cases, blatant theft.

As a result of these strategies, DJI and Autel can sell their UAS at below-market cost to the United States and allied countries, a process known as dumping. A 2017 investigation by the US Department of Homeland Security found that, in 2015, DJI slashed its prices by 70 percent, leading to a problem highlighted in 2019 by then Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment Ellen Lord, who said, “We don’t have much of a UAS industrial base because DJI dumped so many low-price quadcopters on the market, and we then became dependent on them.” DJI has even clearer linkages to the CCP than just state support for illegal trade practices. A 2022 Washington Post investigation found four different CCP-owned or operated investment vehicles invested in DJI.

The US government recognizes the threat posed by PRC-made drones. In 2021, the Department of Defense released a statement indicating that DJI systems pose potential threats to national security. In 2022, the department identified DJI as a Chinese military company operating in the United States. Similarly, the Treasury Department added DJI to the Chinese Military-Industrial Complex (CMIC) companies list, which prevents US citizens from investing in or trading their stock, should DJI attempt to build a public company.

PRC-made UAS pose four direct national security concerns. The first concern relates to Chinese intelligence collection in the United States. In early 2024, the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) released an alert that stated, “The use of Chinese-manufactured UAS in critical infrastructure operations risks exposing sensitive information to PRC authorities, jeopardizing U.S. national security, economic security, and public health and safety.” These concerns represented by the joint CISA-FBI alert are compounded by China’s 2017 National Intelligence Law, which mandates that private companies work with the PRC’s intelligence services. Article 14 of the law states, “State intelligence work organs, when legally carrying forth intelligence work, may demand that concerned organs, organizations, or citizens provide needed support, assistance, and cooperation.” In practice, this may include Chinese drone companies sharing sensitive flight data, the personal information of users, geolocation data, images, and video collected in the United States with the CCP. The transfer of such information to the CCP would allow Beijing to identify and exploit US vulnerabilities and facilitate the sabotage, disruption, or destruction of US critical infrastructure in times of crisis or conflict. Indeed, in 2017, US Immigration and Customs Enforcement determined that DJI was likely providing information about critical US infrastructure sites to the PRC, which the PRC then used to target specific assets. At the strategic level, FBI Director Christopher Wray warns that the Chinese security services present a “broad and unrelenting threat” to US critical infrastructure and are prepared to “wreak havoc.” PRC-made UAS have also been located in restricted airspace, including over Washington, DC. This is despite DJI claiming to have geofencing restrictions, which, in theory, limit where its UAS can operate.

The second concern relates to military effectiveness. The war in Ukraine is a testbed for new military technologies, and small commercial UAS have been a game changer in the conflict. They allow troops on the ground to conduct more accurate, real-time intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) of adversary positions and troop movements, and to facilitate more effective fires. They have also proven to be an effective and economical strike option, as UAS can destroy much more expensive platforms by crashing into them or dropping inexpensive bombs. Indeed, Chinese drones are making Vladimir Putin’s war machine more lethal. As of March 2023, the PRC had sold more than $12 million in UAS and parts to Russia. The consistent supply of UAS has allowed Russia access to a cheap and plentiful way to carry out ISR and targeted attacks. DJI and Autel are the number one and two brands, respectively, that China exports to Russia. To maintain deterrence in Europe and the Indo-Pacific, the United States and its allies will need the ability to develop trusted drones, at scale, for military purposes and to counter adversaries’ drones. Recent news from China makes that reality more important. Last year, China enacted export controls on small commercial drones for the first time. Those controls threaten to choke Ukraine’s primary source of drones without affecting supplies to Russia. That development highlights the criticality of the United States and its allies developing alternative sources of supply.

An Autel Robotics Dragonfish Pro drone, with an 18-mile range, is displayed during CES 2022 at the Las Vegas Convention Center in Las Vegas, Nevada, U.S. January 5, 2022. REUTERS/Steve Marcus

A third concern relates to secure supply chains. In recent years, the United States and its allies have recognized they are economically vulnerable due to dependence on autocratic rivals—China and Russia—for critical supplies, including semiconductors, critical minerals, energy, and much else. As demonstrated by the recent Chinese efforts to strangle Ukraine’s source of supply, the PRC has the ability to restrict US and allied access to UAS, potentially limiting their access in wartime. Similarly, drone customers not subject to federal or state prohibitions on Chinese drones, such as commercial entities, remain vulnerable to the PRC’s ability to restrict their access to UAS for civil purposes in peacetime.

The fourth and final concern relates to human rights. China commits gross human rights violations, including genocide against its Uyghur minority population. Under the Uyghur Human Rights Act of 2020, Washington committed to sanctioning companies that participate in atrocities against the Uyghurs. The US Treasury Department stated, “SZ DJI has provided drones to the Xinjiang Public Security Bureau, which are used to surveil Uyghurs in Xinjiang. The Xinjiang Public Security Bureau was previously designated in July 2020, pursuant to the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act for connection to human rights abuses in Xinjiang.” DJI has already been added to the Commerce Department’s entity list, which restricts the ability of US companies to sell technology and component parts to DJI. DJI’s complicity in the human rights violations against the Uyghurs is indicative of the CCP’s support of authoritarianism globally. China and its authoritarian partners increasingly use UAS to suppress democracy and human rights globally. Countering DJI and other PRC UAS companies is critical to limiting the reach of autocrats and supporting democracy globally.

Ongoing efforts to counter PRC-made drones

The United States and its allies have already undertaken some efforts to challenge the dominance of Chinese UAS. At the federal level, the Donald Trump administration banned the sale of US technology to DJI without a license. The Department of Defense, Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and Department of the Interior stopped using Chinese drones in 2018, 2019, and 2020, respectively. Congress codified the Pentagon’s ban in 2019. The 2022 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) expanded those restrictions to prohibit DOD from buying UAS or components from Russia, Iran, and North Korea. This law was further expanded to ban defense contractors from using UAS and components manufactured in the PRC, Russia, Iran, and North Korea in execution of their DOD contracts starting in 2023. The American Security Drone Act, passed in the 2024 NDAA, bans federal government entities from buying and operating UAS from designated adversarial nations, including China, and prohibits the use of federal funds to purchase or operate these drones starting in December 2025.

At the state level, Arkansas, Florida, Hawaii, Mississippi, Nevada, Texas, Tennessee, and Utah have restricted the use of PRC-made UAS by state agencies, local agencies, or both. Those restrictions generally mirror federal laws, protecting government agencies from insecure products connected to adversarial nations. This first phase of state action focused on government end-user restrictions, but a second phase—focused on providing grants to accelerate the transition away from insecure drones—is under way. In 2023 Florida enacted a $25-million grant program to help local agencies reduce their dependency on insecure drones. In 2024, legislators in several states proposed similar grant programs.

There are additional efforts under way in the US Congress. Representatives Elise Stefanik and Mike Gallagher introduced the Countering CCP Drones Act to amend the Secure and Trusted Communications Networks Act of 2019. Their bill would add DJI to the list of equipment banned from operating on US telecommunications infrastructure, potentially impacting DJI’s ability to place new products on the market. The bill would not affect existing DJI drones.

In an effort to better equip the United States with UAS for military purposes, the DOD recently announced the Replicator initiative, which aims to directly counter PRC dominance in the domain of attritable autonomous systems. Replicator was motivated, in part, by the recognition that the PRC has a scale advantage, which allows Beijing to rapidly manufacture and field weapons systems, including attritable autonomous systems. With Replicator, DOD aims to deploy thousands of autonomous systems. Open questions remain as to what systems will be selected for Replicator, how the initiative will be funded, and how many systems will be procured. To be decisive in a near-peer conflict, Replicator will likely need to purchase tens of thousands of various systems to be used across all domains. For example, the UK-based Royal United Services Institute estimates that Ukraine is losing ten thousand drones per month in its fight against Russia, providing insight into the scale of the total number of UAS. To complement Replicator and make all-domain attritable autonomous systems decisive in near-peer conflict, the DOD should consider stockpiling drones. The stockpiling of these systems would be a hedge against supply-chain interruptions in times of conflict, and would allow for the quick delivery of drones to theaters of conflict as these systems are rapidly expended on the battlefield.

US allies have also started to act. In 2022, Lithuania banned the purchase of technology from countries deemed “untrustworthy” for applications in defense and security, including PRC-made UAS. India has gone further, banning both Chinese-made drones and their component parts. Australia’s military services and border force have grounded DJI drones, and other agencies appear to be transitioning to secure systems. In Japan, the coast guard stopped using DJI drones in 2020 due to cybersecurity concerns.

While the above actions are a good start, the United States and its allies need a whole-of-free-world strategic framework to mitigate the threat posed by PRC-made drones.

A free-world strategy for securing UAV supply chains

The United States and its allies should adopt a comprehensive strategy to address the threat posed by Chinese-made drones. The goal should be to reduce or eliminate the national security threats that come from an overreliance on PRC-made drones, and to develop an alternative drone market in trusted countries. To achieve these goals, the United States and its allies should pursue a three-part “protect, promote, and align” strategy.

1. Protect the United States and its allies from the national security threat posed by PRC-made drones.

The first element of a strategy for securing UAV supply chains is to protect US and allied markets from PRC-made drones that threaten national security or that violate international trade laws and norms. This begins by pursuing a hard decoupling from Chinese-made drones in areas of sensitive national security concern. The regulation of UAS can be modeled after the “small yard, high fence” approach that the United States is taking to the regulation of other critical technologies, such as semiconductors.

In the United States, the American Security Drone Act is a good first step, but it is insufficient to fully address the problem. In addition, Congress should pass the Countering CCP Drones Act to prohibit Chinese drones from operating on Federal Communications Commission (FCC) infrastructure, just as the United States did for Chinese telecommunication companies Huawei and ZTE. As identified by CISA and the FBI, the continued operation of Chinese UAS on US infrastructure raises the risk that the PRC will gain access to sensitive information and could use that information to conduct espionage on vulnerabilities in US critical infrastructure and public-safety response footprint, and to stage potential cyberattacks. Volt Typhoon, a recently disclosed Chinese threat activity discovered penetrating US critical infrastructure to prepare for future attacks, illustrates the stark nature of the threat. Currently, the American Security Drone Act would only ban DJI, but this should be amended to include all PRC-made drones, including those made by Autel.

Reasonable restrictions on PRC-made drones should be extended to state and local governments. Currently, the diverse range of legislation at the state and local levels has created a piecemeal approach that is confusing and leaves loopholes. Furthermore, the ban on Chinese drones operating in the United States should include the US private sector operating in sensitive national security areas, such as inspecting critical-infrastructure sites.

Next, the State Department should work with US allies and partners and encourage them to pass similar legislation restricting Chinese drones in sensitive sectors and to cooperate on common drone policies going forward. US global defense readiness and ability to project power in key regions could be compromised if China is able to gather sensitive intelligence and targeting information through drones operating in key allied countries. The United States and its allies already discuss critical and emerging technology cooperation through various forums, such as the US-EU Trade and Technology Council. The State Department should elevate drone cooperation as a key agenda item for discussion and cooperation in these forums. Additionally, the State Department should designate an individual who has the mandate to lead diplomatic efforts on drone cooperation.

In addition, the United States and its allies should seek coordinated tariffs and other countervailing measures to offset China’s unfair trade practices and level the playing field. The United States should maintain, if not increase, its 25-percent tariff on Chinese-made drones. There will, of course, be a cost to these measures, but they can be partially offset by the recommendations in the following “promote” element of the strategy. Should the United States increase tariffs on Chinese-made drones, the corresponding increased tariff revenue could be used to fund various grant programs to help existing Chinese drone customers—such as law-enforcement agencies—transition to US or allied drones.

When considering tariffs, it is critical to counter tariff evasion. In March 2024, bipartisan members of Congress wrote to the Joe Biden administration raising serious concerns that Chinese drone makers are evading the 25-percent tariffs by transshipping drones through Malaysia. The letter said, “[A]fter exporting virtually zero drones to the United States and being home to no major domestic drone manufacturers prior to 2022, Malaysia’s drone exports to the United States jumped inexplicably to 242,000 units that year.” In “the first eleven months of 2023 the United States imported more than 565,000 drones from Malaysia.” It is critically important to tackle transshipment, and to apply equivalent tariffs to—or categorical bans on—companies and products found to be complicit.

As part of this strategy to secure drone supply chains, the United States must be wary of efforts by DJI and other Chinese drone companies to avoid US sanctions. The New York Times reported earlier this year, for example, about a Texas-based company that licenses its drone designs from DJI and sources much of its parts from China. Legislative initiatives by Congress and other efforts by federal regulators to curb dependence on Chinese drones need to eliminate loopholes that would enable Chinese companies to evade punitive measures by distributing their products through US-based companies.

In preparation for a possible crisis or conflict with China, Washington and its allies should also be prepared to enact wide-reaching sanctions against Chinese companies critical for China’s military and intelligence activities, including DJI and Autel.¹ Washington must also be prepared to sanction companies involved in the overall procurement process for UAS, something that the Treasury Department has done in targeting companies that support Iran’s UAV industry. A response to the PRC in a time of crisis would also include enacting retaliatory export restrictions of US technology to China. To best prepare for these potential impacts, the Sanctions Economic Analysis Unit, established within the Department of the Treasury, should undertake research to understand the possible “collateral damage of sanctions before they’re imposed, and after they’ve been put in place to see if they should be adjusted.” A quick and easy win in this space would be adding Autel to the Department of Defense’s 1260H list, the Commerce Department’s entity list, and the Treasury Department’s Chinese Military-Industrial Complex Companies List, joining DJI. Additionally, the United States must work to develop robust and durable secure supply chains for all components of UAS, including through the development of a domestic industrial base.

To guide engagement with its allies, the United States should leverage the recently established Office of the Special Envoy for Critical and Emerging Technology (S/TECH). The S/TECH should make secure supply chains for drones a priority, along with other measures such as coordinating restrictions and safeguards against Chinese drones. Additionally, the DOD should elevate UAS as a priority agenda item for all bilateral and multilateral technology engagements carried out by US diplomats with allies and partners.

Taken together, these steps will offer significant protection for the United States and its allies from the threat of Chinese-made UAS.

U.S Secretary of State Antony Blinken, accompanied by the U.S. Ambassador to Nigeria Mary Beth Leonard, walks past a Zipline drone while touring an Innovation Exhibition at Innov8 Hub in Abuja, Nigeria November 19, 2021. Andrew Harnik/Pool via REUTERS

2. Promote the development of a robust drone-manufacturing capability in the United States and allied countries to provide a secure alternative to PRC-made drones.

The second major element of the strategy is to promote the development of a robust drone-manufacturing capability in the United States and allied countries. As outlined above, drones are critical for many purposes, and Chinese-made systems dominate all drone markets. As the United States and allied countries successfully de-risk from Chinese-made drones, they will need to replace this supply with drones produced by trusted sources.

Some of the steps identified in the “protect” element of the strategy will also stimulate domestic US and allied production. A selective ban on Chinese drones will naturally increase demand for drones produced elsewhere. Stiffer tariffs on Chinese-made drones will help to level the playing field and make non-PRC-made drones more competitive in the market.

To ensure these bans can be effectively enacted while being minimally disruptive, the federal government should provide funding incentives to facilitate the transition away from PRC-made UAS. As noted earlier, Florida’s ban on PRC-made UAS left local bodies, including fire departments and law-enforcement agencies, scrambling to find funding for alternatives. The provision of federal funds can help overcome the financial burden of buying alternatives to PRC UAS. The DIIG Act, for example, promises to provide funding for state and local agencies to purchase UAS for infrastructure inspections. Federal funding should be conditional, and only available to states that fully ban PRC-made UAS. For example, states that only ban DJI and not Autel, or that fail to ban the use of PRC-made UAS by contractors, would not be eligible for this funding.

The State Department should share these efforts, such as the DIIG Act, with allied countries and encourage the adoption of similar measures by allied governments. Its network of allies is the cornerstone of US national security. Therefore, the United States must encourage its allies to adopt similar policies that promote their own security as well.

In addition, the Pentagon’s Replicator initiative should be harnessed to stimulate a major leap forward in the development and deployment of US autonomous systems. In the short timeframe of 18–24 months, Replicator can help modernize the DOD’s warfighting capabilities and produce thousands of new drones. The US Congress and the DOD should prioritize significant, enduring funding for the Replicator initiative.

The efforts initially achieved through Replicator can be boosted by utilizing the Office of Strategic Capital (OSC). Established in 2022, OSC identifies critical technologies for the DOD and partners with private capital and other agencies to create investment vehicles. Given Replicator’s priority status for the department, the development of the autonomous UAS industry should be a prioritized area for OSC. However, OSC funding is designed to target small companies that would not be able to produce systems at scale in order to contribute to Replicator. Instead, OSC should consider boosting small, innovative companies that are in the UAS supply chain and help enable the critical domestic industrial base of advanced components for current and future UAS systems. By designating UAS as a priority area for OSC, the Department of Defense can help create a strong domestic manufacturing base for this technology.

There is potential for OSC funding to play an important role in strengthening the domestic UAS industry, with the White House requesting $144 million for the office in 2025. In addition to fully meeting the White House’s request for OSC funding, Congress should continue funding other accelerators and offices that strengthen the development of companies across the DOD’s fourteen critical technology areas.

In order to meet any potential funding gaps, the DOD should be prepared to provide additional funding for investment in small UAV systems outside of OSC, including by increasing related funding to the relevant task forces working inside of the Army, Navy, and Air Force. Furthermore, Congress should authorize additional funding for the Defense Production Act that will allow the Department of Defense to further invest in the defense industrial base, including the development of asymmetric capabilities such as the small drones that have played a critical role in Ukraine’s battlefield success.

The US Departments of State and Defense can encourage key allies to adopt their own versions of the Replicator program to ensure the free world has UAS in mass that will be necessary to deter and defeat aggression in the twenty-first century. Additionally, the Department of Defense should consider the potential to invite other allies and partners into the Replicator program, or establish a multinational, allied Replicator initiative. In doing so, the department would scale the allied drone industry, create interoperability among combined allied forces, and strengthen allied deterrence against great-power adversaries.

DOD is already working to integrate UAS and autonomous systems more broadly into its operations. The US Navy’s Task Force 59 aims to better integrate emerging technologies into warfighting, and is currently focused on robotics and autonomous systems. Task Force 59 operates a variety of uncrewed vehicles, including submersible and surface-level ships, alongside UAS.

The Air Force operates Task Force 99.² Based in Qatar, it has developed a 3D-printed UAV, dubbed the “kestrel,” which can be produced for $2,500 and can carry a payload of up to three kilograms.

The efforts of Task Forces 59 and 99 are a solid start, but they have been challenged by institutional hurdles and a lack of funding. Similar concerns have been raised about the ability of the private sector to meet the government’s demand for Replicator. Any successful long-term strategy in this area will require close coordination between the private and public sectors. Replicator offers a good starting point, allowing the DOD to establish trust with the defense-technology industry, break free from the antiquated Cold War procurement process, and establish the new defense industrial base required for twenty-first-century security.

Beyond Replicator, Congress should pass legislation modeled on the CHIPS and Science Act to produce autonomous unmanned aerial vehicles. Recognizing a similar challenge related to domestic semiconductor manufacturing, Congress passed the CHIPS and Science Act in 2022. The act provides billions of dollars in incentives for the research, development, and manufacturing of semiconductors. It has already stimulated the construction of new semiconductor-fabrication facilities in the United States. Similarly, the United States should provide a variety of incentives, including tax credits and investments, for the research, development, and manufacturing of autonomous vehicles. Stimulating US manufacture of autonomous vehicles will make drones available for DOD procurement, while also allowing US-made UAS to be sold globally for commercial applications.

Creating an equivalent piece of legislation for the manufacturing of UAS would have one major difference compared to the CHIPS Act—the price would be significantly lower. A manufacturing facility for the production of semiconductor chips costs a minimum of $10 billion while taking at least five years to build. Compare that to the US drone manufacturer Skydio, which raised $230 million in additional funding in 2023, part of which paid for the construction of a new UAV-manufacturing facility within the United States that expanded its production capacity ten times. For a fraction of the $54-billion CHIPS Act, the United States can successfully develop and support a variety of domestic UAV-manufacturing operations.

US allies and partners have taken note of the CHIPS Act and passed their own legislation to advance in this space. For example, the European Union enacted the European Chips Act into law in September 2023. As the US encouraged allies to invest in CHIPS, it can encourage key allies to stimulate domestic drone manufacturing in their countries.

Coordinating these actions will require a whole-of-free-world approach, among the White House, the Department of Defense, the Department of State, the Department of Commerce, and US allies and partners. To achieve these ambitious goals, the president should consider designating an individual within the State Department’s S/TECH office. This individual would be responsible for coordinating this slate of policy proposals, similar to how the White House coordinator for CHIPS implementation operates. The special envoy should set a date for achieving the above benchmarks to ensure accountability.

Taken together, these actions can help create an industrial base in the United States and allied countries to provide a secure supply for UAS.

3. Align with allies and partners to forge a coherent free-world approach to the setting of policies, regulations, and norms regarding commercial UAS.

The third major element of the strategy is to forge a coherent free-world approach to the setting of policies, regulations, and norms regarding commercial UAS. Among the United States’ greatest strengths in its competition with China is its network of allies and partners. Combined, the United States and its allies possess nearly 60 percent of global gross domestic product (GDP) and, when they work together, they retain a preponderance of power to shape global outcomes.

The G7, the G20, and the Quad are all multilateral groupings in which the United States has galvanized allies and partners alike to develop a series of secure supply chains for semiconductors. It should do the same with UAS.

The Scowcroft Center has previously argued that the United States and its allies should establish a new Democratic Technology Alliance to coordinate the free world’s approach on emerging technology, including UAS. Short of this, the United States and its allies should work through existing bilateral and multilateral channels.

The United States should continue to work with its allies to develop regulations and norms for the responsible use of new technology, including UAS, through bodies such as the US-EU TTC, NATO, G7, G20, and WTO. The United States would be well served to develop polices in coordination with its allies and partners through these forums. Doing so will help ensure a coordinated approach going forward. The United States should also raise concerns in these bodies about China’s unfair and illegal behavior. Though the WTO lacks teeth when coming after China, raising concerns about its behavior and trade disputes at the WTO can help build evidence of a pattern of unfair actions. The development of clear norms would help to demonstrate that the free world is not taking punitive measures against China or seeking to hold China down. Rather, it is taking prudent actions to protect itself from China’s unfair and threatening practices. If China were to reform its practices and its economic system, it could be welcomed back into US and allied markets.

Concurrently, the Department of Commerce and its International Trade Administration should play a central role in developing a trusted ecosystem—both in the United States and with its allies and partners—to secure critical components to strengthen domestic UAS manufacturing while promoting US-made drones around the world.

In addition, the United States should leverage the new trilateral defense pact, AUKUS. AUKUS Pillar II brings together Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States to improve defense coordination across critical-technology areas, including artificial intelligence and autonomy, innovation, and information sharing. The Pentagon should work with AUKUS partners to prioritize the development of advanced UAS.

Moreover, Washington should work with allies and partners to develop a secure supply chain for UAV components and manufacturing. DOD has already cleared two drones produced by Parrot, a French UAV manufacturer, as secure and reliable through its Blue UAS program. This will allow for the manufacturing of component parts through final assembly to take place in trusted countries.

NATO offers other opportunities for Washington to coordinate with allies on emerging technologies. The NATO Defence Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic (DIANA) is a venue for Alliance members to coordinate on the development of emerging technologies, bringing together researchers, industry, and government. In 2023, DIANA announced the first three areas in which it aims to encourage the development of dual-use technologies. One of these domains, sensing and surveillance, is a logical avenue for the allied development of UAS. Indeed, DIANA has already accepted a Czech UAV manufacturer into the program. Here, the United States should utilize DIANA as a means to further cooperation on UAS and enable reciprocal development and manufacturing relationships across Europe, creating the basis of a dual-use drone industry.

In addition, the United States should work with its allies to secure the key UAS component supply chain, including batteries and battery cells. Part of the solution concerns mineral access. Amid a global transition to low-carbon energy sources, China’s strong position in the global lithium market and Russia’s robust nickel-mining capacity present challenges to US efforts to secure access to minerals needed for batteries. As several colleagues in the Atlantic Council’s Global Energy Center have argued, one option to address these challenges is supporting research, development, and capacity building for alternative battery chemistries. This includes leveraging public capital from US and allied governments and using tax incentives to encourage diversification of battery inputs. In 2021, the Department of Energy announced that innovations related to advanced batteries, which were developed via taxpayer dollars through Department of Energy (DOE) funding, would need to be “substantially” manufactured in the United States. In 2023, as a result of the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law, DOE announced $3.5 billion “to boost domestic production of advanced batteries and battery materials nationwide.” At the same time, the federal government, as well state and local governments, will need to muster the political will to allow domestic mining and refining of these minerals to ensure truly secure access to batteries. Once regulatory red tape is reduced, private capital necessary for the development of this domestic capability will enter the battery market. This sort of public-private engagement is an important part of shoring up the US battery supply chain and mitigating vulnerabilities vis-à-vis China.

Taken together, these steps will help to ensure a successful and coordinated free-world approach to UAS.

Conclusion

This paper recommended a protect-promote-align strategy to help the United States and its allies secure a trusted UAS industry to compete against China. China’s dominance of the dual-use UAS sector presents an unacceptable national security risk to the United States and its allies. Following this strategy will allow the United States and its allies to counter the unfair CCP practices that have led to China’s ill-begotten dominance of the global UAS market. A dedicated strategy, one that limits the use of PRC-made UAS, creates incentives for domestic UAS production, aligns the United States and its likeminded allies, and will allow the free world to retain its innovation edge over the CCP and better position itself for victory in a new era of strategic competition.

About the authors

Matthew Kroenig is vice president and senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. In these roles, he manages the Scowcroft Center’s nonpartisan team of more than thirty resident staff and oversees the Council’s extensive network of nonresident fellows. His own research focuses on US national security strategy, strategic competition with China and Russia, and strategic deterrence and weapons nonproliferation.

Imran Bayoumi is an associate director with the Scowcroft Strategy Initiative in the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. He supports the Center’s work on foresight and strategy development, focusing on emerging technologies, conflict, and climate security. In addition, Bayoumi contributes to the development of the Center’s annual “Global Foresight” publication.

Sweden’s NATO accession: A twenty-month square dance

Rich Outzen — Tue, 25 Jun 2024 00:00:00 +0000

Square dancing is a time-honored American folk tradition involving four couples, energetic movements with rotating partners, intricate footwork, and a good deal of hidden coordination. When done well, the outward effect is spirited and graceful, if subtly frantic. For the unskilled, there can be awkward collisions and slips, ending in a tumble. There is often a degree of muddling through, with flying elbows and a missed turn or two. The dance represents a multilateral coordination challenge, unlike, say, the passionate pairing of the tango or an exquisite variation by a solo ballerina.

NATO has just gone through something like a twenty-month square dance. Shortly after Russia’s February 2022 invasion of Ukraine, Sweden and Finland applied to join NATO. Turkey and Hungary delayed the Finns for nearly a year (March 2023), and the Swedes even longer (with Turkey approving accession in late January 2024 and Hungary approving ın late February 2024). The twenty-month process was complicated, involving bargaining among multiple partners with common direction but conflicting agendas and styles: applicants (Sweden and Finland), ratifiers (Turkey and Hungary), facilitators (NATO leadership and the Biden administration), and would-be spoilers (Russia and the US Congress). With the process only recently concluded, some analysts erroneously attribute its drawn-out nature to one man—Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan—and his domestic political needs, personal business interests, and/or supposed Russophilia. Given an explicit Turkish criterion has been lax Swedish policies regarding the anti-Turkish Partiya Karkaren Kurdistan (Kurdish Workers’ Party, or PKK), does this make sense? The real, if complicated, story of divergent interests nested within a mutually beneficial proposition—and the diplomatic choreography that ultimately reconciled them—deserves a more nuanced telling.

Partners on the square

Two partners in this dance, Finland and Sweden, functioned as leads. Their decision to apply stemmed from the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Abandoning traditions of armed neutrality centuries or decades in the making—Sweden and Finland, respectively—both sought security guarantees after Putin’s menace toward neighbors had been made clear. Sweden brings strategically significant territory, military forces, and defense industry into the Alliance. Finns have recent memory of fighting the Russians, and provide a strong anchor to limit Russian ambitions in the far north.

Turkey and Hungary dragged their feet, and NATO bylaws require unanimity. This caused significant grumbling in Washington and other Western capitals, where the Turkish rationale for nonapproval—toleration of PKK activities in both countries—was seen as exaggerated, and Hungary’s objections as a mere echo of Erdoğan’s. Whatever other motives Ankara and Budapest had—demanding defense industrial cooperation, muting human-rights criticism, and/or influencing Washington—the differential speed of accession for Finland and Sweden suggests the PKK factor at play for the latter (but really not the former) was no pretext. Turkish policy analysts, including Erdoğan’s opposition, saw PKK recruitment, propaganda, and fundraising in Sweden as the crux of the matter, and believe delaying accession led to positive remedial steps by Sweden. Turkish parliamentarians considered Swedish implementation of the June 2022 Trilateral Memorandum alongside incentives from Brussels and Washington as central criteria for approval.

For NATO and the White House, bringing applicants and approvers into line was no simple hop, skip, and jump. NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg conducted an intensive effort over the twenty months to reconcile Turkish concerns with those of the aspiring Nordic candidates. Stoltenberg praised Turkey after Finland’s admission, and pressed in positive terms for the addition of Sweden, coaxing and cajoling Erdoğan and Hungary’s Viktor Orbán at summits and in bilateral engagements. The Biden administration constructed a set of interlocking assurances that ended a de facto arms embargo on Turkey by the United States, Canada, and others; strengthened bilateral strategic dialogue; signaled intent to curtail a US partnership with a PKK-affiliated militia in Syria; and convinced Congress that F-16 sales to Turkey in exchange for Swedish accession was a sound deal.

Two parties on the periphery of the proverbial square made their presence felt too, each with incentive to trip the fancy footwork or stop the music altogether. One was Russia, which responded to the prospect of Finnish and Swedish NATO membership with threats of military escalation and the revival of dormant border disputes. Some commentators speculated that Erdoğan’s delays were less about supposedly exaggerated PKK concerns than about currying favor with Putin—with Orbán’s delay about pleasing both men. Moscow expressed its displeasure about NATO expansion early and often, undoubtedly doing what it could to exacerbate skepticism toward the Swedish bid, but failed in the end to stop accession. The US Congress nearly undid the Biden administration’s carefully constructed arrangement by hinting US arms sales to Turkey would not resume even if Ankara approved Sweden’s entry. Not only Senator Robert Menendez, well known as Ankara’s bête noire, but other key members of the House and Senate foreign affairs committees intimated that F-16s would only be approved after a broader set of behavioral modifications by the Turks. It took months of effort by the US ambassador to Turkey, Jeff Flake, and State Department officials to lobby Flake’s former congressional colleagues, and soften their resistance by linking Turkish F-16s to the sale of F-35 fighters to neighboring Greece. These efforts finally paid off in the January 2024 decisions by Turkish and American legislators to approve Sweden’s accession and Turkey’s aircraft, respectively.

Sweden and the PKK

Acknowledging the complexity of the Nordic accession story does not negate the role that Western policies toward the PKK played in Turkish calculus. Sweden has a complicated history regarding PKK presence and activities in the country. In the 1980s Sweden first banned, then tacitly accepted PKK presence. During the 1990s a significant number of Kurdish immigrants settled in Sweden, some with PKK sympathies, and took advantage of Sweden’s liberal criminal and terror laws to conduct recruitment, propaganda, and fundraising activities on behalf of the organization. PKK founder Abdullah Öcalan considered the role of Europe, and Sweden in particular, as a crucial rear support base—a role which did not change after the United States and the European Union designated the group as a terrorist organization.

Sweden’s tolerance—is it an affinity?—for the PKK movement deepened significantly with the rise of its Syrian affiliate, the People’s Protection Units (aka the YPG), as the Western-supported ground force battling the Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) in Syria. Social Democrat-led center-left coalitions in Sweden from 2014 to 2022 espoused “the Kurdish cause,” Swedish political leaders met with and feted YPG leaders, and the government provided funding for the group’s de facto administration in northeast Syria. These actions created growing dissatisfaction in Ankara—and coincided with shifting Swedish views about NATO membership based on the war in Ukraine. The tension between treating the PKK and its affiliates as Kurdish civil society groups and asking Turkey to approve Sweden’s NATO application was taken seriously by the conservative government that assumed office in 2022. Building on proposals initially considered by the previous Social Democrat government, legal reforms were enacted to criminalize terror support activities on Swedish soil, whereas previously, membership and support were not indictable so long as no violent terror acts were carried out within Sweden. Those reforms took full effect in mid-2023, but Swedish officials have recognized that the problem runs deep and substantive progress will take time. There has been growing concern in Sweden about criminal, gang, and terror activities in Swedish cities, of which PKK activities form but a part. It is hardly surprising that PKK protests targeted the legal reforms, while agitating against Sweden’s NATO bid itself.

Sweden changes tune

In addition to the aforementioned constitutional reforms, diplomatic sources indicated that Sweden posted permanent security liaison staff in Ankara and provided Turkish officials regular access to security ministries in Stockholm, long-standing requests from the Turks. The new laws, if vigorously implemented, might resolve most of Ankara’s concerns, though provocations blurring the line between incitement and free speech have convinced Swedish authorities that even more tightening is needed.

There has not been much in the way of actual arrests or deportations. PKK financier Yahya Gungor was convicted and ordered deported, but his expulsion was overturned on appeal. PKK sympathizer Mehmet Kokulu was extradited for drug offenses, largely because the Swedish court found little evidence of political activities. PKK activist Mahmut Tat was extradited in December 2022 for PKK membership, shortly after Swedish Foreign Minister Tobias Billström acknowledged the need to put distance between his country and the terror organization. Billström later described PKK activities in Sweden as “quite wide-ranging.” Swedish accession negotiator Oscar Stenström conceded in early 2023 that “a non-negligible part of the funding of the organization emanates from Sweden.” As European Police (EUROPOL) reports have noted, PKK continues to raise money in Sweden via kampanya, a fundraising campaign that targets the Kurdish diaspora community, is referred to as a tax, and is alleged to involve harassment and extortion. Europol separately points to group members allegedly involved in “organised crime activities such as money laundering, racketeering, extortion and drug trafficking.”

Lack of trust in Sweden’s ability to deliver helps explain why Ankara required inducements from Washington and Brussels. Ömer Özkizilcik, an Ankara-based analyst, assessed that as a stand-alone proposition, Sweden’s counter-PKK enforcement was insufficient:

Sweden has taken steps, but they are not enough. We still see PKK supporters marching in Sweden with PKK flags. Sweden—unlike Germany, for example—has not banned PKK symbols. More importantly, the PKK network is still active and the Swedish law enforcement has to take strong action and dismantle it. The PKK network operates in a quadrangle between France, Belgium, Germany, and Sweden. In this quadrangle, Sweden is the most progressive democracy. Turkey hopes that Sweden will become a positive example for other European nations. Turkey may bomb and eliminate the PKK in Iraq and Syria, but in Europe, the fight against the PKK is diplomatic.

Therein lies a central logic of ultimate Turkish approval: demonstrating to other European countries that enforcing counterterror laws against the PKK is compatible with democratic governance.

Soner Cagaptay of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy has argued that the PKK itself took steps to delay or derail accession:

Turkey was about to finalize and ratify in October, and the day the Parliament came back into session the PKK carried out a terror attack in Ankara, making it politically impossible to ratify. The PKK wanted to delay ratification, which would result in F-16s for Türkiye and a reset in the US-Turkish relations. The PKK dimension is easy for analysts working at a distance to dismiss as Erdoğan grandstanding. But one thing about Erdoğan is that he’s very good at making what is good for Türkiye good for him. He doesn’t make these conflicts or concerns up—but he is very good at using them to boost his image.

Squaring up anew

It can be tempting to oversimplify the accession affair or dismiss it as unnecessary, unseemly, or capricious—but to do so is to misread context, dynamics, and implications. Such a misread might also incline an observer to miss the significant potential openings the process has created for the Alliance, above and beyond the addition of two new members. Those members certainly are welcome in terms of the geographical and military dimensions of the Alliance. Successful negotiation of Swedish accession required patience and creativity, given the low-trust environment prevailing in recent years between two of the main actors, the United States and Turkey. This might create a virtuous cycle, where other positive developments take root as a more conducive tone emerges. One possibility is broader defense industrial cooperation on new projects, as the first major US-Turkish arms deal in a generation gets off the ground. Another might be a more sustainable, and less hypocritical, approach by European countries toward criminal and terror-related activities in their urban centers, with Sweden as a test case. As NATO does a more complete job of accounting for the security concerns of a cornerstone member (Turkey) beyond the singular threat of Russia, intra-Alliance frictions should attenuate significantly. As with most dances, a degree of theater was involved—but where the couples go after the music stops may be more interesting than the show.

Rich Outzen is a geopolitical consultant and nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council in Turkey with thirty-two years of government service both in uniform and as a civilian. Follow him on Twitter @RichOutzen.

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Defense Journal by Atlantic Council in Turkey interview with Gregory Bloom

Atlantic Council Turkey Programs — Tue, 25 Jun 2024 00:00:00 +0000

Gregory Bloom is a board director of the American Turkish Business Roundtable (ATBR), an initiative to strengthen bilateral cooperation in strategic business affairs between the US and Turkish private sectors. Bloom is a distinguished business and industry leader with an extensive record of thought leadership in print and broadcast media. He is also a senior advisor at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security the chief operating officer of Jones Group International, which is involved in the ATBR as an initiative to deepen bilateral US-Turkish strategic cooperation.

Defense Journal by Atlantic Council IN TURKEY (DJ): ATBR is a fairly new enterprise but one with potentially big impact on US-Turkish strategic cooperation. Can you tell us a little about its mission and purpose?

Bloom: The American Turkish Business Roundtable, or ATBR, is a nonprofit organization with 501(c)(6) legal status in the United States with a singular purpose of promoting bilateral trade between the United States and Turkey. The organizers have deep experience with the US defense industrial base (DIB) and a related interest in energy infrastructure and energy security. Simply put, ATBR is an initiative to improve stability and advance the interests of the United States and its treaty allies through cooperation in defense and energy, where there are obvious synergies but also numerous roadblocks—thus the need for a forum to seek creative, mutually beneficial solutions to common challenges. The ATBR is a priority for the Jones Group, a business run under the guidance of former Supreme Allied Commander Europe and former US National Security Advisor Gen. James Jones. Gen. Jones’ time in NATO, and later as head of the American-Turkish Council, formed his understanding of Turkey as a defense and strategic partner for the United States—but also a potentially very important trade and economic partner. The Jones Group sees ATBR as a form of public-private partnership that enables cooperation in defense, energy, and trade.

DJ: If the focus is trade, how is this different from other commercial support groups, such as the US Chamber of Commerce and its Turkish counterpart?

Bloom: We focus on helping Turkish companies engage with potential US partners and seek areas of mutual benefit. This is a bit different from the mission of US trade promotion organizations, such as the US Chamber of Commerce, that promote the interests of US companies abroad. ATBR looks to collaborate and cooperate with other trade promotion organizations and strengthen the bilateral relationship. We are seeking synergies. The Turkish DIB benefited in many ways from partnerships with US companies, including F-16 production over several decades and early development of the F-35, the contentious end of Turkish production for the F-35 notwithstanding. This demonstrated that the US and Turkish DIBs have a synergistic capacity in a number of areas. Partnerships and collaboration can benefit both sides. As we like to say, defense cooperation begins not on the battlefield but on the factory floor.

DJ: Defense industrial collaboration went into a deep freeze between 2010 and 2024. The approval of the F-16 deal and announcement of artillery ammunition coproduction in early 2024 seem like the opening of a new stage. Is defense cooperation now increasing in scope?

Bloom: We are engaged with a great number of defense sector producers in both Turkey and the United States; we, and those we talk with, see the current fragility of the US DIB as an urgent call for partners. Turkey has the ability and resources to be a great partner in this regard. US defense manufacturers focus on high-end but frequently expensive solutions—what we might call the few and exquisite. Turkish defense industry produces items at a lower price point but an effective level of performance—what we might call the many and adequate. In terms of defense strategy, there is a need for both.

DJ: If the need is obvious, why is there a need for an organization to facilitate? Won’t the governmental or corporate organizations find opportunities for collaboration?

Bloom: This is not always a natural or easy strategic partnership, though it is one with great present and potential value. There are many differences in politics, strategic culture, and position that make this a thornier relationship on both sides than, say, the one between the United States and the United Kingdom. Given the number of complicating factors, private sector facilitation, especially from the US side, provides an important balancing and catalytic element to motivate both sides to overcome the known obstacles.

DJ: The hallmark of bilateral cooperation during the Cold War was defense, but ATBR focuses on energy as an important second pillar. Why?

Bloom: Energy policy is a central strand of statecraft. Strong partnership in geopolitical matters requires not just cooperation on defense but a common approach to stability—and energy matters as much as military or counterterrorism and counterintelligence for stability. Cooperation on energy makes the region more stable—in the case of the United States and Turkey, multiple regions. Washington and Ankara are both interested in energy flows from the Caucasus, through the Black Sea, Iraq, the Gulf, North Africa, the eastern Mediterranean. Energy policy is a key tool to incentivize partnerships and reconciliation—if we get this right with Turkey, the profits will be geopolitical and strategic, as well as economic.

DJ: Is the ATBR interested in areas beyond defense and energy?

Bloom: Our project is about connecting Turkish companies and US partners for mutually beneficial and strategically important projects. We’ve talked to both sides about minerals, heavy industry, construction, and tourism. But defense and energy are the most tangible projects that generate momentum for the others, and so they have been an early focus.

DJ: Given the turbulence in bilateral relations over the past fifteen years, is the private sector gun-shy or risk-averse? Is there an appetite on both sides for new initiatives?

Bloom: For certain, there is appetite on defense and energy. People who understand the limitations of the US DIB get the need for it. The “few and exquisite” combined in a package with “the many and adequate” in terms of price and sophistication is the sine qua non of warfare in the early twenty-first century. Tons of Turkish and US defense and industry experts see this, so we see an increasing desire for corporate cooperation. With the recent deal between Turkish Repkon and General Dynamics as an example, we find that when the private sector finds complementary solutions, the policy process becomes easier. Sometimes, bottoms-up works better than top-down in defense-industrial cooperation.

DJ: Final thoughts on what the ATBR might achieve in the defense sector?

Bloom: ATBR is chaired by Gen. Jones. Gen. Tod Wolters, another former SACEUR, is a board member. This shows that the most authoritative voices on transatlantic security consider the US-Turkish bilateral relationship as a critical component of security for those two countries but also for the Alliance as a whole. There is a parallel to the thinking behind the Abraham Accords—that trade and mutual interest can overcome frictions and disinclinations. The overriding logic of mutual benefit, operationalized by US and Turkish companies, will benefit the strategic interests of both countries.

Gregory Bloom is a board director of the American-Turkish Business Roundtable (ATBR). He also serves as Chief Operating Officer for the Jones Group International, and as a senior advisor to the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

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Small, smart, many and cheaper: Competitive adaptation in modern warfare

Atlantic Council Turkey Programs — Tue, 25 Jun 2024 00:00:00 +0000

Defense Journal’s Rich Outzen spoke with T. X. Hammes, a nonresident senior fellow in the Forward Defense program of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security and a distinguished research fellow in the Center for Strategic Research at the Institute of National Security Studies of the US National Defense University, on January 26, 2024. The conversation is lightly edited for style.

Defense Journal by Atlantic Council IN TURKEY (DJ): Dr. Hammes, you’ve been tracking and predicting developments in drones, unmanned systems, and the changing nature of combined arms warfare for over a decade now. Looking back, what has surprised you and what has confirmed your early surmises in recent years?

T. X. Hammes: From the beginning I expected that “small, smart, and many” could overcome “few and exquisite” by sheer numbers. The general trend has held, but what has surprised me—especially in Ukraine—has been how quickly users have adapted. For instance, Ukraine has employed carpenters to build drones made out of wood powered by outboard motors. It was undeterred by its lack of manufacturing facilities for advanced synthetic materials. These drones launch from a simple wheeled carriage but can achieve a range of 750 kilometers, and carry a fairly substantial payload. These very cheap systems are being used to attack oil facilities deep in Russia.

I suggested in 2016 that, in many cases, an unmanned aerial system (UAS) doesn’t necessarily have to deliver the explosive; it is enough to bring the detonator. Modern societies provide their own explosives and combustibles. Very small drones can do great damage by impacting with enough of a detonating charge to induce fuel, ammunition, or energy sources to explode. Large warheads are not required.

In 2016, the idea had little traction with senior [officers], but younger, field grade officers got it. Unfortunately, developing a concept and bending the procurement system are two very different things. We have the “iron triangle” of vested interests in procurement—defense contractors, the Pentagon, and Congress. Each is vested in keeping current systems and approaches for as long as possible. This is very difficult to change. Congressional reversal of the US Navy’s attempt to not refuel an aircraft carrier (the Harry S. Truman) in favor of devoting more resources to advanced strike capabilities is an example of this. There are thousands of jobs in congressional districts engaged in military production: the Joint Strike Fighter (F-35) involves production in forty-five of the fifty states. Couple these economic incentives with the fact that military officers are inherently conservative as a group, and you see resistance to real or rapid change.

As always, warfare will include the adaption, counteradaption and counter-counteradaption cycle. The Turkish Bayraktar drones were a shock early in the war in Ukraine, but the Russians gradually got an air defense system together and effectively neutralized the Bayraktar. Today, the Turks are developing jet stealth systems like the US Valkyrie XQ58A. I don’t know what the Turkish model will cost, but the Valkyrie is roughly $4 million apiece. The F-35 costs nearly $140 million each. With an expected operational lifespan of 8,000 hours, at $30,000 per flight hour, the lifetime operations and maintenance (O&M) cost can exceed $360 million per F-35. This gets to be real money over time. Further, with the current fleet-wide mission capable rate of just over 50 percent, you effectively need two aircraft (for $720 million) to ensure one mission-capable aircraft. Current full-mission capable rates on the F-35 are 28 percent, so we’re close to needing four to ensure one fully mission-capable aircraft. In essence you are spending $1.4 billion for each full mission-capable F-35. You can have hundreds of XQ58As at that price. And the world will know where the F-35s are (few in number, operating in a world with pervasive surveillance). Keep in mind, these figures cover only O&M costs for F-35s. They do not cover the cost of pilot or maintenance personnel and training pipelines. Nor do they cover the cost of large fixed air bases and air defense for the facilities required to operate F-35s. The Turks will likely develop an export version of their aircraft, and so we can see a world in which small, high-speed, deep-penetrating drones with a variety of onboard armaments and sensors will be available to almost anyone. Drones like these can operate up to 1,500 miles beyond launch points. And they do about the same as some of the advanced munitions fired by F-35s, such as the Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile, or JASSM, at $3 million a missile.

DJ: Some observers think that Russia is winning the drone war against Ukraine, including Eric Schmidt, whose recent Foreign Affairs article, “Ukraine Is Losing the Drone War,” cited the effective pairing of drones for observation and strike (Orlans and Lancets). Do you agree?

Hammes: Schmidt is right about Russia outproducing Ukraine in drones. But this does not translate directly to winning the conflict. I find it bizarre that some commentators essentially take the Russian side without critical comparison. This goes for commentators and in some cases political leaders. If you look at both Russian and Ukrainian sources, Ukraine continues to inflict three or four times as many casualties on attacking Russian forces: this is typically the case, an advantage to the defender.

With regards to UAS, both sides are training a lot of drone pilots. But as the war drags on, both Ukrainians and Russians are finding difficulty in recruiting for traditional combat arms. For instance, recent warehouse fires in Saint Petersburg and elsewhere in Russia reportedly stem from resistance to the forced roundup of conscripts for the war.

In the case of the Foreign Affairs article, title notwithstanding, the piece was not really about the drone competition—it was about industrial competition and the race to mass produce. The article was right: it’s an industrial competition. Ukraine can win and compete if the United States leans into it. But the Biden administration has been too reticent in providing advanced and long-range strike systems. The Kerch Strait Bridge should be down. And why are we demilitarizing MLRS [multiple launch rocket system] ammunition rather than allowing the Ukrainians to fire it in defense of their country? Domestic politics on both sides of the aisle has been working against us fully leaning into the defense industrial competition. The Russian production goal is two million UAS per year; they are not there yet. The Ukrainian goal is 100,000 per month. They are producing enough to pose a substantial long-range strike capability deep into Russia. Russia has already had to pull air defense systems back from Ukraine into its own territory to defend key sites. In the Ukraine war, we are seeing early forms of largely autonomous UAS and swarm usage. After launch, some of these systems can be fully autonomous. If you launch tens of thousands per month, the requirement for autonomous guidance grows. It is far more complex than UAS usage in counterinsurgency or small wars.

DJ: Turning to the US military, have we adapted doctrine, organization, and employment to shift from drones as a counterterror platform to drones as an integral part of maneuver warfare?

Hammes: The services are trying. The US Navy fielded Task Force 59 in the Persian Gulf as a way to deploy experimental unmanned technologies and designs. The US Fourth Fleet stood up an experimental task force. The Navy also deployed a four-ship squadron of unmanned systems in the Pacific—primarily as a sensor package. Following the Marine Corps FD2030 lead [Force Design 2030], the US Army has a Strategic Mid-range Fires program that includes small-signature trucks launching Tomahawks and other missiles up to and beyond 1,500 miles. In a major war against a near-peer competitor—say China—airfields and fixed installations will be heavily targeted, so distributed fires of this sort will be important. We can conceivably go to country X and buy native-style trucks, which will be very survivable due to blending in, and put these systems on them. The US Air Force is investing in unmanned combat vehicles as wingmen for F-35s or advanced bombers. But again, everyone will know where the advanced bombers live and stay. Containerized missiles based on commercial ships can saturate bomber airfields and kill low-density, high-cost assets on the ground. In sum, we are seeing adaptation beginning across the forces, but procurement and advanced planning remain the big problems. Instead of $360 million for one aircraft we should consider buying 360 $1 million missiles in containers. These systems need a high level of autonomy and small crews. In the current environment, we need to focus resources on the weapons, not the delivery platforms. Low cost and expendable, primarily unmanned weapons will overwhelm the large, exquisite but few platforms of our current forces.

DJ: Defense Journal examines issues of common interest to the United States, Turkey, and NATO. Can I get your views on the Turkish experience with UAS, and how they’ve become a major player in production, export, and operational use of UAS?

Hammes: Unmanned systems allow a country at very low cost to influence a conflict. With automated systems you can intervene regionally with lower human cost, and little risk of blowback. Turkey has done this successfully. What will be interesting is when the other side starts countering with their own UASs. As these systems proliferate, what is to keep cheap launch trucks and boats from approaching striking range of Turkey? When everyone has long-range precision strike capability, and every modern society has highly combustible, energy-dense targets embedded in their society, security concepts have to adapt. Not just medium powers, but insurgent groups have the ability increasingly to conduct this type of operation. The Houthis proved this with the attack on Saudi oil facilities. There are massive geopolitical implications when everyone can strike at long range.

DJ: In most military technological fields there is a sort of dialectic or cat-and-mouse game between developers of offensive and defensive systems. Why the great lag in counter-UAS systems vis-à-vis the platforms themselves?

Hammes: There is a lag. UASs present a very tough challenge. Many are very small and made of polymers, plastics, and wood, so they are very difficult to track and engage. That said, the electronic warfare (EW) systems of Russia and Ukraine have been very effective. But the counter-countermeasure has been more autonomy for the attack systems. We are seeing autonomous drones that carry EW jammers, and rely more on visual/optical IR [i.e., infrared] sensors. In the war in Karabagh, 70 percent of vehicle kills were achieved by drones or drone-fired munitions—and the Armenian side was not prepared. If you look at Reddit and other social media feeds covering the fighting in Ukraine, you can see absolutely terrifying videos of how UASs dominate the battlespace. UASs are hunting individual vehicles and soldiers. They can fly into buildings and turn corners in pursuit.

The game of competitive adaption has been a mixed bag. At one level, UAS have greatly strengthened tactical defense. Yet with increased methods of long-range strike, at the operational level, offensive capabilities are strengthened. Perhaps also strategically, as we see Ukraine going hard against the Russian oil industry.

We are starting to see the advent of counterdrone drones: drones that fly into other drones. It will be interesting to see how this further develops; we are likely to see a cheap version of the identify friend or foe (IFF) sensors carried on manned aircraft to protect drones operating over friendly forces, so you don’t have your own killing your own. The innovation cycle in Ukraine is very short, with each side adapting rapidly, sometimes in a few days, to innovations by the other side. In fact, Ukrainian innovation with naval drones has pushed the Russian Black Sea fleet back significantly. In less than a year, starting from scratch, Ukraine developed unmanned surface vessels that hit several Russia ships and restored export shipping lanes for Ukrainian products.

There is a need now for better command and control nodes to consolidate information from pervasive drone sensors and get it to commanders. We have entered the era of pervasive intelligence for targeting; everyone will be visible and targetable, so everyone will have to keep moving.

My key advice for the United States and its friends is to get away from focusing on platforms and focus on weapons.

T. X. Hammes is a nonresident senior fellow at the Forward Defense program of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. Hammes is also a distinguished research fellow in the Center for Strategic Research at the Institute of National Security Studies of the US National Defense University.

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US-Turkey relations in an era of geopolitical conflict

Atlantic Council Turkey Programs — Tue, 25 Jun 2024 00:00:00 +0000

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Foreword

The first half of 2024 has brought new energy and dynamics to US-Turkish bilateral strategic ties, much—though not all—positive. The successful sequential approval of Swedish accession into NATO and Turkish acquisition of upgraded F16V air warfare deterrent restored a level of trust, albeit rooted in transactionalism, after nearly a decade of unarrested divergence and increasing mistrust. New hope in defense industrial cooperation has been embodied by new investments in the field including a significant new munitions collaboration in Texas. Turkish diplomatic reconciliations with a number of US regional allies—Egypt, Greece, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE—have removed an additional source of friction while the war in Gaza has led to new tensions, and very divergent policies. This issue of Defense Journal provides a snapshot of several current dynamics in the strategic relationship at a critical time, approaching the NATO Summit in Washington. Enjoy!

Dr. Rich Outzen & Dr. Can Kasapoglu, Defense Journal by Atlantic Council IN TURKEY Co-managing editors

Articles

Sweden’s NATO accession: A twenty-month square dance

By Rich Outzen

Drones and more: Turkish defense cooperation trends in the air

By Can Kasapoglu

Türkiye and the Russian military threat to NATO

By Gen. (ret.) Yavuz Türkgenci

The F-16 deal is as good for NATO as it is for Turkey

By Andrew Bernard

Small, smart, many and cheaper: Competitive adaptation in modern warfare

Interview with Thomas X. Hammes

Defense Journal by Atlantic Council in Turkey interview with Gregory Bloom

Interview with Gregory Bloom

Honorary advisory board

The Defense Journal by Atlantic Council IN TURKEY‘s honorary advisory board provides vision and direction for the journal. We are honored to have Atlantic Council board directors Gen. Wesley K. Clark, former commander of US European Command; Amb. Paula J. Dobriansky, former Under Secretary of State for Global Affairs; Gen. James L. Jones, former national security advisor to the President of the United States; Franklin D. Kramer, former Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs; Lt. Gen. Douglas E. Lute, former US Ambassador to NATO; and Dov S. Zakheim, former Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) and Chief Financial Officer for the Department of Defense.

Gen. Wesley K. Clark

Chairman and CEO of Wesley K. Clark & Associates & Board Director, Atlantic Council

Amb. Paula J. Dobriansky, Ph.D.

Senior Fellow at Harvard University JFK Belfer Center for Science & International Affairs; former Under Secretary of State for Global Affairs (2001-2009)

Gen. James L. Jones

President, Jones Group International; Former National Security Advisor to the President of the United States; Executive Chairman Emeritus, Atlantic Council

Franklin D. Kramer

Distinguished Fellow & Board Director, Atlantic Council

Lt. Gen. Douglas E. Lute

CEO, Cambridge Global Advisors & Board Director, Atlantic Council; Former Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs

Dov S. Zakheim

Senior Advisor, Center for Strategic and International Studies; Senior Fellow, CNA Corporation; & Board Director, Atlantic Council

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Drones and more: Turkish defense cooperation trends in the air

Can Kasapoglu — Tue, 25 Jun 2024 00:00:00 +0000

The Turkish defense technological and industrial base has reached a critical mass across certain segments. The successful trajectory of the unfolding projects manifests a new reality in the realm of air power. While the Bayraktar TB-2, aka the “flying Kalashnikov” by Baykar, has made most of the headlines, the Turkish drone program is not merely about that. Turkey has built a reputable edge in designing wide range of high-value assets.

In the drone warfare segment, Baykar’s unmanned combat aircraft Kizilelma and the company’s high-altitude drone equipped with high-end weapons, Akinci, as well as Turkish Aerospace Industries’ flying wing, stealthy unmanned combat aircraft Anka-3 loom large as some examples. Even more importantly, the Anka-3 and Kizilelma are designed to fly within the loyal wingman concept alongside manned aircraft, which is technically a sixth-generation tactical military aviation feature, presaging the future horizons of Turkish defense planning.

In the manned fighter jet segment, Kaan, formerly known as the Milli Muharip Uçak, presents interesting takeaways to grasp the Turkish defense industry’s international dynamics. In February 2024, Turkey’s indigenous, stealth combat aircraft, Kaan, conducted its maiden flight. Besides painting a shiny picture of the future of Turkish air power, Kaan also sheds light on some of the ongoing capability limitations of the nation’s defense technological and industrial base (DTIB). The first problem pertains to the jet’s power configuration. The initial batches, and the prototype of the aircraft, fly with the F-110 engines that power the F-16 fighter jet, illustrating a clear dependency.

With the rising trajectory and still-in-place limitations of the Turkish DTIB’s air power generation capacity, one has to answer two political-military questions pertaining to the nature of defense business: First, what kind of an arms exporter is Turkey to become considering its aerial assets? Will it follow a more reserved model, such as Germany? Or a more business-friendly one like France? Or, will it pursue more of a market disrupter role like China? Second, how will the nation’s foreign collaboration network take shape?

Turkey’s defense cooperation outlook

From a geopolitical standpoint, Turkey’s success in unmanned aerial technologies has positioned it as a burgeoning drone-exporting nation within the transatlantic Alliance.

Indeed, Turkey’s drone warfare success, at least in the headlines, started with the Bayraktar TB-2’s combat record in Syria and Libya. Still, to grasp the Turkish drone warfare’s defense diplomacy dimension, one has to know more about other operators of the drone.

Both in the second Nagorno-Karabakh War and the ongoing Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the Turkish Bayraktar TB-2 has helped the operating countries, Azerbaijan and Ukraine, in the hard turning points of their respective quests. Having proven its combat performance, the TB-2 paved the way for a fruitful strategic collaboration with these nations. A series of cooperative production deals between the Turkish drone manufacturer Baykar, and Ukraine and Azerbaijan, respectively, stand out as important examples of such defense industry collaborations. More importantly, having capitalized on the TB-2’s combat performance, Baykar established defense companies in Kyiv and Baku. But these are not one-way journeys. The engine collaboration for the Kizilelma drone with Kyiv, for example, has opened a new chapter in Ukrainian-Turkish military ties. At present, Ukraine also eyes engine deals for Turkey’s manned combat aircraft segment.

In the manned aircraft segment, a careful assessment of Kaan’s export portfolio would explain Turkey’s defense diplomacy outlook for its advanced solutions. To keep the unit costs at manageable levels, Turkey needs to find lucrative deals to market the aircraft. Yet Kaan will enter an international market characterized by fierce competition. Therefore, transforming the Kaan into an attractive platform for clients seeking either enhanced fourth- or the more advanced fifth-generation fighter jets will be a critical priority, especially at a time when the F-35 dominates the Euro-Atlantic market and when other alternatives, such as the Rafale by Dassault Aviation of France and soon the South Korean KF-21 Boramae by Korea Aerospace Industries, are seeking to capture the remainder of the pie globally. SAAB’s Gripen, on the other hand, is losing its market share. All in all, Paris and Seoul are aiming to increase their market share in critical arms industries, indicating that Turkey will also face heavy competition. The Kaan could function as a geopolitical ledger that opens the path for new international partnerships. The combat aircraft will likely offer an effective solution to countries that cannot procure F-35s such as Pakistan or the Gulf Arab nations, due to a series of sensitive political impediments; though the latter may impinge on Seoul’s interest in selling its new Boramae. Another natural target for Turkey’s multirole combat solution would be militaries that want to replace their Soviet era-remnant arsenals with a defense ecosystem that is in line with NATO standards, such as the non-NATO former Soviet space, which has traditionally been Russia’s markets. In this regard, Azerbaijan and Ukraine loom large as two particularly interesting potential operator nations as Kaan’s export market slowly takes shape in the coming years.

The geopolitical showdown ahead

From a defense economics standpoint, Turkey’s serious air power projects, such as high-end drones and advanced manned aircraft, will also help the West to counterbalance its great power competitors in the international arms market. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Moscow and Beijing constituted around 16 percent and 5.2 percent of the global arms exports between 2018 and 2022, respectively, although the former’s share decreased following its stumbling invasion in Ukraine. Yet China continues to pose a real risk to the NATO members’ overall weapons market presence in several regions.

China has already snatched up the Middle Eastern drone market amid a long absence of American solutions due to restrictions. Turkey’s drone sales to the Gulf, and recently Egypt, offered a critical comeback to tackle the Chinese share in the unmanned aerial systems segment. In the coming years, China’s potential presence in the Middle Eastern manned aircraft market will be among the highest priorities to track. The Kaan can offer some help in this respect.

Therefore, it is important to note that, unlike popular speculations in the Turkish press, the Kaan will not compete with the F-35 head-on. Instead, it will introduce an alternative, NATO-grade solution in the manned aircraft segment that can be delivered to the nations that cannot purchase the F-35. While it will directly compete with the combat aircraft of Russia and China, both Korea and France will join the contest. The million-dollar question, for now, is about who will dominate the Gulf manned aircraft market in the absence of F-35.

Extending technology transfers in the drone warfare realm

Along with market opportunities, Turkey’s limits in arms transfers and coproduction deals remain key to understanding how the nation’s defense business will play out in the near term.

The Akinci is an interesting example, as it illustrates how the Turkish DTIB is evolving around high-end platforms. Akinci’s weapon systems configuration, featuring Turkey’s first aeroballistic missile, TRG-230-İHA, and a stand-off missile (SOM) baseline of cruise missiles, transforms the platform into a deep strike asset. The high-altitude long endurance (HALE) drone can also fly up to 40,000 feet (out of the engagement envelope of short-to-medium air defense systems). Looming large as one of the most capable platforms in the Turkish export portfolio, Akinci has started to leave a footprint in the international weapons market. In the summer of 2023, Baykar signed a historic export and coproduction deal with the state-owned Saudi Arabian Military Industries for local production and technology transfer. Roketsan and Aselsan, the primary manufacturers of the platform’s critical weapon systems configuration and sensors, were also included in the deals.

Baykar’s deal with the United Arab Emirates’ Edge Group to arm the Bayraktar TB-2 with Emirati payloads in early 2024 is another notable example. The procurement package marked the first instance of a Turkish drone maker certifying foreign munitions to be integrated into its platforms.

Last, having monitored the Ukrainian military’s successful TB-2 employment at the outset of the conflict, the TB-2 is also expanding its footprint in NATO markets. Following Poland, Romania has purchased the drone in a lucrative deal.

Next up

During the Cold War, Turkey—a NATO nation standing up to more than twenty Soviet Red Army divisions—remained a decades-long net arms importer. Thus, perhaps the country’s transformation into a key arms exporter, especially in advanced technologies such as drone warfare assets, has marked one of the most important developments in the Euro-Atlantic security affairs in the twenty-first century.

The Turkish model comes with successes and limitations. Turkey’s shipyards are now capable of designing principal surface combatants, frigates, and corvettes. In the submarine segment, however, especially in air-independent propulsion systems, Turkey’s needs foreign collaboration. Likewise, the Turkish defense industry can produce most of the land warfare solutions, albeit, the national tank program, Altay, still awaits its entry into the army’s arsenal. The aerial systems segment in not a different one compared to the naval and land warfare segments. In the air, the Turkish aerial drone design and production prowess is one of the best in the international weapons market. The manned aircraft segment, nonetheless, is lagging behind. As to high-end systems, manned or unmanned, engine configuration will continue to be troublesome for years to come. Turkey’s calculus goes well beyond merely becoming an off-the-shelf arms supplier. Ankara aims to establish deep-rooted ties in the market nations while paving the way to bring those nations’ capabilities to Turkey’s DTIB when possible, as is the case with the Ukrainian industries. Drones are still pioneering the Turkish defense outreach in the air. The path of Kaan, as well as the unmanned combat aircraft/loyal wingman projects, Kizilelma and Anka-3, will determine the final trajectory of the nation’s defense business outlook in the air.

Can Kasapoglu is a non-resident senior fellow at Hudson Institute. Follow him on Twitter @ckasapoglu1.

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FPV drones in Ukraine are changing modern warfare

Tomas Milasauskas, Liudvikas Jaškūnas — Thu, 20 Jun 2024 20:27:42 +0000

The full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine is often referred to as the world’s first large-scale drone war. But what exactly does “drone war” mean in practical terms, and how is this war being waged?

Media coverage of the drone war often focuses on particular models such as the Shahed drones used by Russia to attack Ukrainian cities and civilian infrastructure, or the Bayraktar drones that played an eye-catching role in Ukraine’s fight back during the initial stages of the invasion. However, behind these brands lies a much more complex and rapidly expanding drone ecosystem.

By far the most prevalent type of drone on the Ukrainian battlefield is the First Person View (FPV) drone—a type that our company sells in Ukraine and elsewhere. Despite their relatively low cost compared to other aerial platforms, FPV drones possess a number of capabilities that have resulted in a dramatic shift in our understanding of modern warfare. Given their navigation capabilities, these drones have become the preferred platform for mounting explosives and executing targeted strikes.

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Originally emerging from the realm of civilian hobby drone racing, FPV drones have robust motors and frames that are built to withstand the rigors of high-speed races and multiple crashes.

Relative to their fixed-wing cousins, copter-type drones have greater maneuvering capabilities, which, in the hands of skilled pilots, convert into precision targeting unique to FPV drones. It is not uncommon for pilots to fly their drones through the window of a building or into the open hatch of an armored vehicle, unleashing an explosion on exposed personnel inside. FPV drones are also well-suited for targeting specific equipment like optics, radars, and antennas mounted on the exteriors of armored vehicles.

FPV pilots in Ukraine do not normally operate from front-line trenches. Instead, they typically serve in specialized teams located around two to five kilometers away from the front line. This distance provides them with relative security from small arms and larger systems mounted on armored vehicles as well as from the indirect fire of mortars.

The nature of drone piloting equipment offers an additional layer of protection. Since everything is controlled remotely, only the antenna transmitting between the drone and operator needs to be exposed. The remaining equipment and the team can conduct their operations from the safety of a bunker or basement.

While hubs of drone operators are now recognized as high-value targets, in practice most attention is focused on blocking or destroying the drones themselves. This shift of lethal danger from personnel in forward positions to drones has accelerated the proliferation of FPV drone usage. It appeals to soldiers, who naturally seek to minimize the dangers of combat, and also appeals to Ukrainian and Russian commanders as they wage a war of attrition amid growing manpower shortages.

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The main feature that has made FPV drones such a key weapon in the Russian war on Ukraine is their relatively low cost, with prices for a single unit sometimes lower than five hundred US dollars. This affordability, coupled with performance and tactical versatility, helps to explain the ubiquity of FPV drones on the front lines of the war. For Ukraine, which has not always had access to predictable weapons supplies from its Western partners, the affordability of FPV drones has helped its military stay in the fight, despite being outgunned by Russia.

In technological terms, FPV drones are currently in the early stages of their development. Most components are still sourced from the civilian market, while many models offer only a relatively limited range of frequencies. This is significant, as jamming is considered the Achilles’ heel of FPV drones. Many skeptics argue that it won’t be long until jammers are employed everywhere, rendering radio controls useless. However, jammers have their own hardware limitations that can be difficult to overcome.

Creating signal interference relies on sending a stronger signal than the one it is aiming to jam. In other words, effective jamming capabilities require considerable electrical power and bulky hardware. This is why most infantry units can only operate with small jamming devices that create a limited protection bubble for short periods of time. Stronger jamming systems can be employed on armored vehicles, but the prevalence of tank “cope cages” and the recent appearance of “turtle tanks” hints that physical armor is still the go-to protection against FPV drone attacks.

Despite efforts to counter them with jamming technology, FPV drones have proven resilient and have managed to adapt effectively to electronic warfare measures. Ongoing innovations in areas such as customized frequencies, frequency-hopping, and automated flight patterns promise to further enhance their effectiveness.

The Russian invasion of Ukraine has brought FPV drones to prominence as a component of modern militaries and it appears that they are here to stay. This can be seen in the way the Ukrainian and Russian armies are both incorporating this technology into existing military structures. Indeed, in early 2024, Ukraine launched a new branch of the country’s armed forces dedicated exclusively to drones.

There are few reasons to believe the role of FPV drones will diminish in the coming years. On the contrary, as technologies advance and military tactics evolve, FPV drones are likely to become even more prominent in the wars of the future. This new reality is already being digested by military planners and commanders around the world. As they look to assess how best to incorporate FPV drones into their own defense doctrines, they will be studying the significant shifts currently taking place on the Ukrainian battlefield.

Tomas Milasauskas is CEO of RSI Europe, a Lithuania-based remotely controlled systems manufacturer for the defense sector. Liudvikas Jaškūnas is head of marketing and communications at RSI Europe.

Victory in Ukraine would dramatically strengthen Putin’s war machine

Peter Dickinson — Tue, 11 Jun 2024 20:58:43 +0000

What will Vladimir Putin do next if he wins in Ukraine? In recent months, more and more Western policymakers have reached the conclusion that a victorious Russia would almost certainly expand the war deeper into Europe as Putin seeks to rewrite the existing world order and continue on his crusade to return “historically Russian lands.” This realization is helping to rally support for Ukraine, with leaders such as French President Emmanuel Macron now openly warning that a Russian victory would have disastrous consequences for the rest of Europe.

Not everyone is convinced, of course. Many skeptics point to the Russian army’s surprisingly poor performance during the invasion of Ukraine, and argue that Putin is clearly in no position to embark on further military adventures. According to the doubters, Russia’s obvious difficulties in Ukraine mean Moscow cannot be regarded as a genuine threat to the far greater military might of the NATO alliance. Indeed, some are convinced that any direct Russian attack on the West would amount to a suicide mission.

This argument is dangerously shortsighted. Crucially, it ignores the profound impact military success in Ukraine would have on the Kremlin’s ability to wage war. A Russian victory over Ukraine would transform the geopolitical situation, greatly strengthening Russia militarily, economically, and strategically, while at the same time severely weakening the West. Faced with such uniquely favorable circumstances, it is delusional to believe a triumphant Putin would simply stop and go no further.

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The Russian army has clearly failed to live up to its inflated prewar reputation in Ukraine, but it would nevertheless be reckless to underestimate Moscow’s military potential. Putin’s commanders have learned a series of important lessons since the start of the invasion in February 2022, and have acquired combat experience that no other major power can match. With a battle-hardened and rapidly modernizing army backed by a defense industry operating around the clock, Putin is now arguably in a stronger position relative to his slowly rearming Western adversaries than any Russian ruler since 1945. Victory in Ukraine would further widen this already alarming gap in military capabilities.

The Russian and Ukrainian armies are currently by far the largest and most formidable fighting forces in Europe. If Putin triumphs in Ukraine, he will control them both. While many Ukrainian soldiers would doubtless continue to wage a partisan war or seek to regroup abroad, a victorious Russia would look to rapidly conscript hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians into military service, just as it has already done in areas of Ukraine under Kremlin control. In addition to a massive manpower boost, Russia would also take possession of Ukraine’s extensive military equipment stores, ranging from stockpiles of artillery shells and attack drones to Western-supplied tanks and missile systems.

Control over Ukraine would allow Russia to reintegrate the vast Ukrainian military-industrial complex that played such a central role in arming the Red Army during the Cold War. For much of the Soviet era, Ukraine produced a large proportion of the USSR’s missiles, tanks, aircraft, and warships. This colossal industrial inheritance was neglected during the first three decades of Ukrainian independence and fell into a state of disrepair, but a Russian occupation administration or Kremlin-loyal puppet regime in Kyiv would likely prioritize the revival of military production. This increased output would allow Russia to rapidly recover from the punishing losses of the Ukrainian campaign, while also enabling Moscow to overcome many of the obstacles created by Western sanctions.

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Economically, the conquest of Ukraine would significantly improve Russia’s financial position and strengthen Moscow’s ability to shape world affairs. The Kremlin would acquire Ukraine’s sizable untapped energy reserves along with potentially trillions of dollars in mineral assets. Meanwhile, the famed Ukrainian breadbasket would enable Russia to establish itself virtually overnight as the dominant force on international agricultural markets. Putin has already demonstrated his readiness to weaponize global food security by blockading Ukraine’s Black Sea ports. Control over the Ukrainian farming industry would present the Kremlin with powerful new tools to reward allies and punish opponents.

Many in the Global South would not wait to be bribed with grain shipments or coerced by the threat of famine. Instead, they would readily recognize Russian victory in Ukraine as a major geopolitical turning point and would queue up in Moscow to pay their respects. The emphasis on diplomatic neutrality that is currently evident in much of Asia, Africa, and beyond, would be replaced by a scramble to strengthen ties with the Kremlin. Countries throughout the Global South would begin to ship arms and other military supplies to Moscow, while the West’s already limited ability to impose sanctions on Russia would become hopelessly compromised. Commentators everywhere would soon be trumpeting the dawn of a new post-Western era in international affairs.

Where would a strengthened and emboldened Putin be most likely to strike next? The Kremlin dictator has made clear that he sees the current war as an imperial quest to return “historically Russian lands.” Beyond Ukraine, there are more than a dozen other countries including Finland, Poland, the Baltic states, Belarus, and Moldova that were once part of the Russian Empire and therefore meet Putin’s definition of “historically Russian.” All would be potential targets. During the build-up to the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in late 2021, Putin underlined the scale of his ambition by calling on NATO to retreat to the borders of the former Warsaw Pact. It seems reasonable to assume that success in Ukraine will only make him more ambitious.

There is certainly little to indicate that Putin is in any way intimidated by the West. Quite the opposite, in fact. The Russian ruler has proven so skilled at intimidating his enemies that almost two-and-a-half years into the largest European invasion since World War II, Kyiv’s partners remain preoccupied with avoiding escalation and continue to impose absurd restrictions on Ukraine’s ability to defend itself. This escalation management is the appeasement of the twenty-first century, and risks inviting the same tragic consequences.

If Russia does expand the war further, the one thing Western leaders cannot do is claim they were not warned. Putin has placed the whole of Russian society on a war footing and is openly preparing his entire country for a protracted struggle against the West. The current invasion is an important part of this struggle, but it is only the beginning. Russian victory in Ukraine would set the stage for even bolder acts of international aggression. It would supercharge Putin’s war machine and radically increase the cost of stopping him. The only way to avoid this disastrous outcome is by making sure the Russian invasion of Ukraine ends in defeat.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

Steven R. Rudder

Indo-Pacific Security Initiative Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Indo-Pacific Maritime Security

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Friend-sourcing military procurement: Technology acquisition as security cooperation

James Hasik — Tue, 11 Jun 2024 13:00:00 +0000

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Introduction
Research questions
Methodology
Historical cases of successful US military friend-sourcing
Assessment
Recommendations
Acknowledgments
About the author
Appendix 1

Introduction

In the United States, the military procurement bureaucracy tends to sponsor development of new technologies to fill requirements. The bureaucracy also largely seeks domestic sources for all new charismatic military megafauna: aircraft, ships, ground vehicles, and missile systems. Security “cooperation” in US policy and practice is largely a one-way process, neglecting the benefit of learning and sourcing from other countries. However, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and China’s concomitant threats from India to Korea, point to the need for coordinating the industrial capabilities of allies. As the United States faces simultaneous competition with two revisionist, nuclear-armed, major-power rivals, not to mention a challenging budgetary and fiscal environment, the additional research and development (R&D) costs assumed by the Department of Defense through its disregard of foreign suppliers, while never ideal, are no longer tenable.

Law, regulation, and policy can conspire against good economic thinking, though with clear exemptions. The Department of Defense Authorization Act for 1983 prohibited the construction of naval vessels in foreign shipyards, unless the president first informs Congress of a national security need otherwise (10 U.S.C. §§ 7309–7310). The Buy American Act of 1933 demands preference for domestic manufactures in federal procurement, though this is waived for imports from dozens of allied countries through reciprocal agreements (41 U.S.C. §§ 8301–8305). Note, though, that these laws say nothing of where products are designed, merely where they are manufactured. Further, the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994 mandates a “preference for commercial products . . . to the maximum extent practical,” with “market research . . . before developing new specifications for a procurement” (10 U.S.C. § 3453). Official policy periodically reemphasizes this mandate for off-the-shelf procurement.¹

An aerial view of the Pentagon, Washington, DC, May 15, 2023. DoD photo by US Air Force Staff Sgt. John Wright.

Much of the procurement bureaucracy in the Defense Department seems not to understand the exemptions and the mandates for off-the-shelf procurement of military capabilities. In contrast, the US Special Operations Command, imbued with its own procurement authority, has been far more open to procuring military systems off the shelf, and then heavily customizing them against specific military needs. The US Coast Guard, housed under the Department of Homeland Security, has also long preferred off-the-shelf solutions, often of foreign design and even manufacture—and with much less customization. Indeed, decades of procurement debacles and the economics of international commerce indicate that broad domestic preference is wrongheaded. At least three reasons point to the need for broader sources of supply:

Quality: With military off-the-shelf solutions, many of the qualities are observable, from performance in testing to actual use in battle. In developmental programs, quality is not so observable ex ante, and may disappoint ex post. Global procurement invites buyers to find the best equipment available anywhere, and often from countries with competitive advantages in particular industries.
Urgency: Off-the-shelf solutions may be sought as interim solutions to immediate military problems. If not restrained by production capacities or bottlenecks, they will arrive presently. What is purchased immediately may then suffice for anticipated problems, becoming enduring solutions, if the political and technological conditions do not too greatly change in the long run. In contrast, technological development requires greater lead time, delaying fielding.
Economy: Off-the-shelf solutions may come at lower upfront prices, if the development costs are spread among multiple national customers, or otherwise already amortized. With domestic development, the cost is disproportionately borne by the sponsoring government, and this roughly averages 20 percent of the life-cycle cost of more advanced systems. Spending on R&D competes with spending on procurement, but, in fielding capabilities, the measure of merit is procurement. Simultaneously, when immediate needs are adequately filled by off-the-shelf procurements, monies can be husbanded for developing systems targeted at more challenging, long-range problems. Later, the wider supply base for the off-the-shelf system, which should remain largely interoperable with foreign versions, will contribute to lower sustainment costs.

Because autarky is illusory, greater “friend-sourcing” can provide US forces with quick access to proven, economical solutions, while maintaining the option for domestic production when that is strategically desirable.² Informal consortia of allied buyers could then naturally divide responsibilities for development and production, through an emergent but controlled market process. Allowing US forces more opportunities to acquire military technologies abroad would then restructure security cooperation as a two-way process, with the avid participation of friendly countries. As Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy recently described Kyiv’s emerging military-industrial cooperation with the United States, “Ukraine does not want to depend only on partners. Ukraine aims to and really can become a donor of security for all our neighbors once it can guarantee its own safety.”³ Access to that sort of battled-hardened experience is part of the return on US assistance.

Research questions

Historical case studies can provide tangible evidence as to how well friend-sourcing approaches have fared in the recent past. The results can demonstrate whether actual procurements should more closely follow this course of action, already supported by law, policy, and economic theory. This study then poses two important and timely research questions. In the United States, since the end of the Cold War, how has the procurement of off-the-shelf systems developed for allied militaries:

Affected the quality, availability, and cost of national military capabilities?
Affected the long-term market for national, military-industrial R&D?

Methodology

To answer these questions, this paper seeks to identify all recent cases of off-the-shelf military procurements in the United States, subject to some boundaries. The set is limited to major end systems—aircraft, ships, ground vehicles, and missile systems—because the international trade in subsystems among friendly countries is already much more liberal. Also, the set includes only those US procurements undertaken since the end of the Cold War because global security dynamics changed radically at that point. Note that this excludes from consideration, for example, the US Army’s procurement of its Austrian-designed Family of Medium Tactical Vehicles, and the US Marine Corps’ procurement of LAV-25 armored vehicles, as these both began in the 1980s.

This paper further restricts the set to systems already in use by US forces, so that a firm decision for adoption, and some record of operation, can be observed. The study includes, however, customizations of off-the-shelf systems, as most countries have needs for subsystems (radios, racks, left- or right-hand drive, etc.) specific to their own military services, and modest customization is common in the international arms trade.

After review of histories and the author’s consultations with a wide set of experts on US military procurement, this paper identifies only nine cases—two missile systems, four aircraft, one ship, and two armored vehicles—in this set (see Appendix 1 for a summary):

The RGM-184A Naval Strike Missile (NSM)
The Norwegian Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile System (NASAMS)
The UH-72A Lakota helicopter
The MH-139A Grey Wolf helicopter
The HC-144 Ocean Sentry maritime patrol aircraft
The C-27J Joint Cargo Aircraft
The Sentinel-class Fast-Response Cutter
The RG-31 mine-protected vehicle
The Stryker LAV III Interim Armored Vehicle

Neither the author nor the Atlantic Council intends to endorse or oppose the specific platforms mentioned or the procurement choices made. Rather, the following section outlines how these systems were procured and what advantages the acquiring service derived from the purchase. The following assessment section gathers lessons from the case studies in aggregate to inform how the Department of Defense should consider friend-sourcing more military procurement.

Historical cases of successful US military friend-sourcing

RGM-184A Naval Strike Missile

The RGM-184A NSM is a 400 kilogram, jet-powered, sea-skimming, anti-ship cruise missile. In September 2014, seeking a lightweight but lethal anti-ship missile for its littoral combat ships (LCSs), the US Navy test-fired Kongsberg’s NSM from the USS Coronado. In 2015, the Navy undertook a competitive procurement to equip its LCSs. Kongsberg and Raytheon announced a teaming arrangement to bring the Norwegian missile to the United States.⁴ Boeing initially offered an extended-range RGM-84 Harpoon, and Lockheed Martin a surface-launched version of its AGM-158C Long-Range Anti-Ship Missile. The latter two firms, however, withdrew their entries in 2017. In May 2018, the Navy selected the NSM for its Independence-class LCSs, its Freedom-class LCSs, and its Constellation-class frigates. The Marine Corps subsequently selected the NSM to equip its new land-based, mobile anti-ship missile batteries, with two NSMs mounted on each robotic Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (see below), deemed the Navy-Marine Expeditionary Ship Interdiction System (NMESIS).

The USS Gabrielle Giffords (LCS 10) launches a Naval Strike Missile (NSM) during an exercise. Photo by Chief Petty Officer Shannon Renfroe, US Navy.

The missiles are mostly built in Norway, as they have been in production there since 2007, and they cost “slightly less than the Raytheon Tomahawk Block IV cruise missile.”⁵ In a press release, Raytheon noted that undertaking final assembly and testing of an already operational missile “saves the United States billions of dollars in development costs and creates new high-tech jobs in this country.”⁶ More labor, at possibly higher cost, would be required in the United States if production were fully domesticated, and Kongsberg and Raytheon have discussed a second production line to deliver yet more missiles.⁷ Navigation is provided by satellite, inertial, and terrain contour matching; terminal guidance relies on imaging infrared and a target-image database. With the latter technologies, the NSM is designed to strike specific, vulnerable points on an enemy ship, and detonate with its void-sensing fuse at the point of maximum damage. A single missile can thus render even a large warship hors de combat.

The NSM was initially developed by and for Norway. Missiles for mobile coastal defense batteries were quickly sold to Poland. Since then, the NSM has been adopted as well by Australia, Belgium, Canada, Indonesia, Latvia, the Netherlands, Malaysia, Romania, Spain, and the United Kingdom. In summary, with the NSM, the Navy and Marine Corps obtained one of the best anti-ship missiles in the world, from a running production line, and at a cost below that of its best alternative in inventory. The US Navy and Air Force have continued to fund development of other, longer-range cruise missiles.

Norwegian Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile System

The NASAMS (pronounced NAY-sams) is a ground-based, anti-aircraft missile system. NASAMS was developed in the 1990s by Kongsberg and Hughes Aircraft to replace the Nike Hercules batteries of the Royal Norwegian Air Force. (Raytheon acquired Hughes Aircraft in 1997.) NASAMS integrates Raytheon’s MPQ-36A Sentinel trailer-mounted radar and AIM-120 Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missile (AMRAAM) with Kongsberg’s launcher and battle-management system. In an apparently sole-source deal, the US Army procured several launchers for the medium-range air defense of Washington, DC, in 2005, and they have served in that role ever since, at a variety of locations in Virginia, the District of Columbia, and Maryland.⁸ The NASAMS case is remarkable in that the Norwegian-US team integrated two off-the-shelf components from a US manufacturer into its system before providing that system as an off-the-shelf product back to the US military.

US High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS) and Norwegian National Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile System (NASAMS) units counter a simulated threat at sea together. Courtesy Photo, US Naval Forces Europe-Africa/US Sixth Fleet.

The United States was the third user of NASAMS, after Norway and Spain. NASAMS is now in service with thirteen countries, including Australia, Chile, Finland, Hungary, Indonesia, Lithuania, the Netherlands, and Oman.“⁹ In 2022 and 2023, the United States, Norway, Lithuania, and Canada all provided NASAMS units to Ukraine.¹⁰ The Canadian purchase is notable because Canada itself had no ground-based air defenses; the Canadian federal government simply identified a cost-effective and already-available system to send.¹¹

In summary, with the NASAMS, the US Army obtained a medium-range air defense system that remains at the forefront of air defense against the most challenging (Russian) threats, from a running production line, and at a cost that global customers still willingly pay. The US Army and Navy have continued to fund several other families of medium- and long-range air defense missiles.

UH-72A (EC145) Lakota utility helicopter

The EC145 is a twin-turboshaft, utility helicopter capable of carrying nine passengers. In its Light Utility Helicopter program of 2005, the US Army sought a proven helicopter for logistical and medical missions within the United States. In its request for proposals (RFP), the Army specifically sought only off-the-shelf aircraft, and received such offers from Bell, AgustaWestland (now Leonardo), and Eurocopter (now Airbus Helicopters). In June 2006, the Army selected a version of Eurocopter’s EC145, and designated it the UH-72A Lakota. The EC145 first flew in 1999 and was itself developed from the MBB/Kawasaki BK 117, which had first flown in 1979.

All UH-72s have been assembled at Airbus’s factory in Columbus, Mississippi. The program has experienced no significant delays. The UH-72 was competitively sourced, and the Army has been sufficiently satisfied with its performance and cost-effectiveness that the service has purchased 481 of the aircraft. Along the way, the Army awarded Airbus further orders under the original contract to fully recapitalize its fleet of training helicopters.¹² The Army’s Lakota was subsequently upgraded into the UH-72B, as Airbus continued to develop its EC145 into the H145M.¹³

A new UH-72A Lakota Light Utility Helicopters at Hohenfel Army Airfield. Photo by Sgt. 1st Class JMRC PAO, Joint Multinational Readiness Center.

Military versions of the EC145 have also been in service with the military forces of thirteen other countries: Albania, Belgium, Bolivia, Cyprus, Ecuador, France, Germany, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Luxembourg, Serbia, Thailand, and the Cayman Islands. The US Army has several times rebuffed suggestions that the domestic-service helicopters could be deployed overseas, asserting that adding armor and decoys would be uneconomical. However, in December 2023, Airbus and the German Defense Ministry announced a deal for at least sixty-two H145Ms, configured as either commando transports or missile-firing anti-tank helicopters.¹⁴ In this way, the case provides an example of a US military service overestimating its need for technological development when an off-the-shelf product would suffice.

In summary, with the EC145, the US Army obtained a proven helicopter in wide military service around the world, relatively quickly, and at a price that won a competitive tender. The US Army continued to fund rotorcraft development, though more notably of tilt-rotor aircraft through its Future Long-Range Assault Aircraft program.

MH-139A (AW139) Grey Wolf helicopter

The AW139 is a twin-turboshaft, utility helicopter capable of carrying up to fifteen passengers.

In the late 1960s, Bell Helicopter developed its UH-1 Huey helicopter, a workhorse of the Vietnam War, into the twin-engine UH-1N Twin Huey, to meet a requirement of the Royal Canadian Air Force.¹⁵ The US Air Force began buying Twin Hueys in 1970, for a variety of utility functions. About forty-five years later, the USAF was ready to replace them, seeking up to eighty-four aircraft for passenger transport and other utility functions. The aircraft had two particularly important roles: flying commandos to any missile silos in Wyoming, Montana, and North Dakota that might come under attack, and evacuating government officials from Washington, DC should the capital city again come under attack.¹⁶ The USAF initially planned a sole-source award to Lockheed Martin’s Sikorsky for UH-60s. Under the Economy Act of 1932 (31 U.S.C. § 1535), an agency can select a system already in service with another branch of government in lieu of a competitive procurement. Congressional objections soon scuttled that idea, whether to provide others an opportunity to bid or simply because the UH-60 might not have been the best-value solution.¹⁷ In September 2016, the USAF released a request for information (RFI) from industry, and in December, a draft RFP.¹⁸

A MH-139A Grey Wolf’s successful live hoist test. Photo by Samuel King Jr. 96th Test Wing Public Affairs.

The Air Force asked for a proven helicopter, and in response, five companies or teams offered four types of aircraft. Sikorsky offered its HH-60U Pave Hawk, already in service with the USAF. Sierra Nevada offered to rebuild existing, out-of-service US Army UH-60As to a -60U configuration. Airbus offered its UH-72A, already (see above) in service with the US Army. Textron’s Bell Aircraft offered its UH-1Y, already in service with the US Marine Corps, which was developed in the 1990s under a perhaps questionable sole-source contract.¹⁹ Leonardo teamed with Boeing to offer a military version of the Italian company’s AW139. That aircraft had been developed initially by Agusta (later AgustaWestland, now Leonardo) and Bell in the late 1990s, though Agusta bought Bell’s interest in the program in 2005.

The Air Force rejected the Airbus and Bell offerings outright as too small and short-ranged for the missile security mission. In September 2018, the service chose the AW139. At the announcement, Air Force Secretary Heather Wilson told the assembled that “strong competition drove down costs for the program, resulting in $1.7 billion in savings to the taxpayer.”²⁰ In this instance, the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act beat the Economy Act at economy. At first delivery, in December 2019, the service named it the MH-139A Grey Wolf.²¹ Flight testing started in 2020, but did not conclude for several years. Leonardo and Boeing agreed to some requested modifications, and the aircraft had some unexpected difficulties with FAA certification.²² Low-rate production started in Philadelphia in March 2023.“²³ The Grey Wolves are today built on the north side of Philadelphia, where Leonardo has been building AW139s since 2007, and they are then customized on the south side of Philadelphia, by Boeing.

Prior to the Air Force’s purchase, AW139s were flying with at least three air services in the United States: the New Jersey State Police (since 2012), the Maryland State Police (2012), and the Los Angeles City Fire Department (2013). Miami-Dade Fire Rescue joined that group in 2020. Air forces or other public flying services in twenty-four other countries also operate AW139s.

In summary, with the AW139, the US Air Force obtained a proven helicopter in wide military service around the world, with a two-year delay, though at a price that won a competitive tender. The Air Force had not spent significant sums previously on rotorcraft development, and, with relatively few requirements for rotary-wing aircraft, the service has not since.

HC-144 (CN-235) Ocean Sentry maritime patrol aircraft

The CN-235 is a twin-turboprop, fixed-wing cargo aircraft capable of carrying fifty-one passengers or thirty-five paratroopers. In May 2003, the US Coast Guard selected the CN-235-300M maritime patrol aircraft from the European Aeronautic Defence and Space Company (EADS) as part of its “Deepwater” program to recapitalize much of its aircraft and ship fleets.“²⁴ In February 2004, Deepwater contractor Lockheed Martin ordered the first two aircraft from EADS on the Coast Guard’s behalf.²⁵ The service had specifically requested a proven, off-the-shelf aircraft to replace its HU-25 Guardian jets, Dassault Falcon 20s similarly purchased off the shelf in the early 1980s and originally developed in the early 1960s. The CN-235 was developed, starting in 1980, by a joint venture of Spain’s Construcciones Aeronáuticas SA (CASA, then part of EADS, now Airbus) and Industri Pesawat Terbang Nusantara (IPTN, now Indonesian Aerospace). The first flight was in 1983, and production began in 1986.

Deliveries to the USCG proceeded slowly, with the availability of funding. The first unit arrived in December 2006, and the eighteenth in October 2014, at which point the Coast Guard retired its last HU-25. The aircraft were largely built in Spain but fitted out with equipment specific to the Coast Guard at EADS’s facility in Mobile, Alabama. The USCG had initially intended to procure thirty-six, but the availability of surplus C-27Js (see the next case study) led the service to reduce its plan by half. By September 2017, the Coast Guard’s HC-144 fleet had flown for one hundred thousand hours—more than that of any country with CN235s besides France and South Korea. At that point, more than two hundred CN-235s were flying in more than twenty-four countries.²⁶

An HC-144A Ocean Sentry medium-range surveillance aircraft arrives at Coast Guard Air Station Washington. Photo by Chief Petty Officer Sarah Foster, US Coast Guard District 5.

The US Air Force also flies a few CN-235s within its Special Operations Command.²⁷ Notably, Air Force Special Operations also flies twenty Dornier 328 twin-engine turboprops, termed C-146A Wolfhounds; and a few CN212 Aviocars from CASA, termed C-41As.²⁸

In summary, with the CN-235, the US Coast Guard obtained a proven turboprop aircraft in wide military service around the world, at the pace it desired, and at an ongoing total cost that the service continues to support. The Coast Guard has generally not spent significant sums on aircraft development, and specifically not multiengine, fixed-wing aircraft development, preferring off-the-shelf purchases.

C-27J Joint Cargo Aircraft

The C-27J Spartan is a twin-turboprop, fixed-wing cargo aircraft capable of carrying sixty passengers or forty-six paratroopers.

In the early 2000s, the US Army and the US Air Force individually were seeking ideas for twin-engine turboprop transport aircraft. The Army sought to replace its C-23 Sherpas, C-12 Hurons, and C-26 Metroliners with a common fleet. The USAF sought to supplement its C-130s with a smaller aircraft capable of flying from shorter fields, particularly in Iraq and Afghanistan. In March 2006, Under Secretary of Defense Ken Krieg instructed the two services to combine all these requirements into plans for a single airplane, the JCA.²⁹

Lockheed Martin offered a shortened version of its four-engine C-130. In August 2006, the Army (which was managing the program for the Air Force as well) eliminated that aircraft from the program. CASA, teamed with Raytheon, offered its C-295 aircraft, a larger derivative of the CN-235, developed in the 1990s. Alenia, teamed with L3 Communications, offered its C-27J Spartan. The latter had begun development in 1996 as an improvement of the Aeritalia (later Alenia, later Leonardo) G.222. The USAF had purchased ten G.222s in 1990, designating them C-27As. The C-27J would feature more powerful engines and the glass cockpit of the C-130J, which explains the choice of modifying letter. The first flight was in September 1999, and the Italian air force ordered twelve that November.“³⁰

A C-27J aircraft lands in North Dakota. Courtesy Photo, North Dakota National Guard Public Affairs.

In June 2007, the US Army and US Air Force jointly chose the C-27J as the JCA.³¹ The Army planned to buy seventy-five for the National Guard, and the Air Force seventy for both the Air National Guard and its component of Special Operations Command. The Army soon found the aircraft very useful for relieving the workload of its Chinook heavy helicopter fleet.³² The Air Force, however, was never enthused about splitting the mission with the Army, and questions of the economy of the arrangement persisted.³³ In 2009, Defense Secretary Robert Gates decided to transfer all the aircraft to the Air Force. In 2012, Defense Secretary Leon Panetta decided just to retire the entire fleet, as the United States reefed back its enthusiasm for counterinsurgency. Over the next two years, fourteen of the surplus aircraft were provided to the US Coast Guard, and another seven went back to the Army for its Special Operations Aviation branch.³⁴

Prior to the US order, the C-27J had been ordered by Italy, Greece, Bulgaria, and Lithuania. Australia, Chad, Kenya, Mexico, Peru, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Zambia ordered aircraft subsequently.³⁵

In summary, with the C-27J, the US Army and Air Force initially obtained a proven turboprop aircraft in wide military service around the world, relatively quickly, and at a competitive price that they were willing to pay. Those aircraft continue to fly for the United States, just with different services or branches than initially intended. That is more a matter of changing requirements than the quality, availability, or cost of the aircraft. Regarding development funding, the US Air Force has only once spent a large sum on new multiengine fixed-wing aircraft since the C-17 Globemaster III program in the 1990s. Its recent orders for KC-46 Pegasus aerial refueling aircraft included development funds, but under the fixed-price deal, Boeing (the contractor) would eventually come to assume most of that cost through repeated overruns.

Sentinel-class (Damen Stan 4708) fast response cutter

The Damen Stan 4708 is a 42 meter patrol ship designed for a variety of naval and maritime constabulary missions.

In March 2007, the US Coast Guard terminated its contract with Lockheed Martin and Northrop Grumman to modify its 110-foot Island-class cutters with a 13 foot midship hull extension, intended to produce a more capable ship with an extended service life. The Island-class ships had been built in the 1980s by Bollinger Shipyards of Louisiana to an off-the-shelf design of the 1960s by Britain’s Vosper Thornycroft, which had been sold to several other naval forces, including those of Qatar, Abu Dhabi, and Singapore.³⁶ The concept was reasonable in principle, as hull plugs are not uncommon in naval architecture and shipbuilding. The problem was that the Island-class ships were already proving susceptible to late-in-life hull cracking, but neither the service nor the contractors were fully forthcoming with one another about the difficulties. After taking delivery of eight of the rebuilt ships, the Coast Guard terminated the program, and indeed withdrew the eight from service.³⁷

In September 2008, the USCG awarded a contract, after an open competition, to Bollinger to build a replacement class of “fast response cutters.” The Coast Guard had expressly requested an off-the-shelf solution, with at least two vessels from the parent design in patrol boat service for one year, or one vessel in patrol boat service for at least six years. Bollinger brought a design based on the Damen Stan (“Standard”) 4708 patrol vessel, by Damen Shipyards of the Netherlands. With options, the fixed-price contract called for twenty-four to thirty-six cutters. The first, USCGC Bernard C. Webber was launched in April 2011 and commissioned in April 2012. The Coast Guard was sufficiently pleased with the cost and quality that the service now has fifty-four in service, and another eleven in sea trials, under construction, or planned. Bollinger’s work has been noticed, bringing forth suggestions that the US Navy could also purchase 4708s to replace its Cyclone-class patrol boats, and perhaps for other uses.³⁸

The Coast Guard Cutter Bernard C. Webber is the Coast Guard’s first Sentinel-class Fast Response Cutter. Courtesy Photo, US Coast Guard Atlantic Area.

Three ships of the design had entered service in 2004 and 2005 in South Africa as the Lilian Ngoyi class of environmental inshore patrol vessels. In its explanation of the decision, the Coast Guard described Damen as an “internationally recognized ship designer with more than 30 shipyards and related companies worldwide [and] 4,000 vessels in service since [it was] founded in 1929.”³⁹ The 4708 was itself a development of the Damen Stan 4207, which has served in the navies, coast guards, or maritime constabularies of Albania, the Bahamas, Barbados, Bulgaria, Canada, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, the Netherlands, Nicaragua, the United Kingdom, Venezuela, and Vietnam.

In summary, with the Sentinel class, the US Coast Guard obtained a proven patrol ship whose preceding designs were in wide military service around the world, and at a price that led to procurement of scores more. The first ship was not available for forty-three months after contract signing, which is neither particularly fast nor slow by historical US standards. By avoiding much development spending with the Damen Stan 4708, the USCG saved those funds for its next-larger class of cutters in the Deepwater recapitalization program, of a wholly new design: the Heritage-class offshore patrol cutter.

RG-31 Charger (Nyala) mine-resistant armored vehicle

The RG-31 Nyala is a four-wheeled, all-wheel-drive, armored troop carrier, specifically designed for resistance to land mines. In 1996, the US Army purchased a few RG-31 mine-protected vehicles to equip its land-mine disposal squads on peacekeeping duty in Bosnia. Later described as a “rolling bank vault” of a troop carrier, the RG-31 had been developed in South Africa from the Mamba, an earlier mine-protected troop carrier that was built on a Unimog truck chassis and powered by a Mercedes-Benz six-cylinder diesel.⁴⁰ The “Bush Wars” of the 1970s and 1980s had culminated by the 1994 election that marked the end of apartheid, but part of the legacy was a remarkable industrial capability for developing armored vehicles. However, through a series of licensing arrangements and corporate mergers, the marketing rights for the RG-series vehicles in North America resided with GDLS-Canada. The vehicles were thus built in South Africa, but fitted out in Ontario, at the same plant that produced Strykers (see below).⁴¹

By the middle of 2003, the US-led coalition’s occupation of Iraq had elicited attacks by insurgents with leftover land mines and more improvised explosive devices (IEDs). Eager to get into the market of supplying the bomb squads, General Dynamics Land Systems looked globally in 2003 for an off-the-shelf solution and remembered its license for the RG series of vehicles.⁴² The US Army then ordered a small number of additional RG-31s. Service on the ground in Iraq created impressions of quality. In an urgent request to Quantico in 2003, the 1st Marine Brigade in Anbar Province requested one thousand mine-protected armored vehicles “similar to the South African RG-31, Casspir, or Mamba.”⁴³

In June 2004, General John Abizaid, the commander of US Central Command, which oversaw all military operations in both Iraq and Afghanistan, sent a message to the Joint Chiefs of Staff explaining his situation and requesting help. His most poignant statement was that “IEDs are my No. 1 threat. I want a full court press on IEDs . . . a Manhattan-like Project.” In November 2004, the Army ordered a further fifteen RG-31s. The vehicles were priced well below $1 million each—far below the price of a Stryker or Bradley troop carrier. The Army’s enthusiasm grew in February 2005, when the service entered into a $78 million contract for another 148 RG-31s from Canadian Commercial Corporation, the national armaments marketing firm, on behalf of GDLS. In that contract, the armored trucks were oddly termed “ground effect vehicles,” and the Army’s official nickname would be Charger. Deliveries took some time, as the supply line stretched almost the length of the Atlantic Ocean. Deliveries were scheduled to continue, however, through December 2006.⁴⁴

Soldiers connect L-Rod Bar Armor to an RG-31 Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicle at Kandahar Airfield, Afghanistan. Photo by Staff Sgt. Stephen Schester, 16th Mobile Public Affairs Detachment.

The first fatality in an RG-31 did not occur until May 2006. Early on, the US armed forces also ordered vehicles from Force Protection Industries of South Carolina. These were not off the shelf, but rather, had been developed domestically with technology licensed from the South African government. Eventually, the Army and the Marine Corps ordered over one thousand RG-31s, and thousands of other vehicles termed MRAPs—Mine-Resistant, Ambush-Protected vehicles—from multiple domestic producers.

In 2005, the Army and the Marines began work on an ambitious project for the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JTLV)—a vehicle only slightly larger than a Humvee, but with the protection of an MRAP. Developing the JLTV would ultimately require ten years, and full-rate production would not begin until 2019. During this time, US troops were protected from land mines by MRAPs, including RG-31s, and the origins of all that work reside in South Africa.

In summary, with the RG-31, the US Army obtained an armored vehicle long proven against land mines, relatively quickly, and at a price far below that of its other troop-carrying armored vehicles. While procuring the RG-31, and afterward, the US Army and Marine Corps would spend large sums developing the JLTV.

Stryker Light Armored Vehicle III

The LAV III is an eight-wheeled, all-wheel-drive, armored troop carrier, designed for higher road speeds and lighter weight than comparable tracked vehicles.

In June 1999, less than a week after assuming office, US Army Chief of Staff General Eric Shinseki signaled his intention to restructure much of the service.⁴⁵ The immediate impetus came from the Army’s difficulty over the preceding several months with deploying its Task Force Hawk, of attack helicopters and accompanying ground troops, from Germany to Albania for the Kosovo War. As analysts at RAND later described the problem, the Army needed to “expand ground force options to improve joint synergies.”⁴⁶ As Shinseki would more clearly say, its light forces were too light for fighting opponents with heavy weaponry, and its heavy forces too heavy for strategic mobility.⁴⁷ Neither bookend of capability had properly contributed to the overall war-fighting effort.

In October 1999, Shinseki described a plan to rebuild the Army around motorized formations equipped with wheeled armored vehicles small enough to fit on C-130 Hercules transport aircraft.⁴⁸ In February 2000, General Motors (GM) Canada and GDLS announced that they would together enter the pending competition with a version of the Canadian LAV III, itself a development of the Piranha series of armored vehicles, first developed in the early 1970s by the Swiss firm MOWAG (Motorwagenfabrik AG). Back in 1983, the US Marine Corps had procured a version of the Piranha I, armed with a 25 millimeter (mm) cannon, for reconnaissance and screening duties.

GM Canada held the license from MOWAG to build the vehicles in London, Ontario. The Army would later also receive offers from United Defense LP (UDLP) for a combination of remanufactured M113A2 tracked troop carriers and M8 medium tanks, from ST Engineering for Bionix tracked troop carriers, and another from GD for six-wheeled, Austrian-designed Pandur armored vehicles. Neither UDLP nor ST Engineering seem to have taken account of Shinseki’s strong and openly stated preference for wheels, though UDLP did suggest that a split purchase could include its tracked tank.

In March 2000, the Army reequipped the 3rd Infantry Brigade of the 2nd Infantry Division—a heavy brigade with Abrams tanks and Bradley fighting vehicles—at Fort Lewis, Washington, with LAV IIIs borrowed from the Canadian Army, and a variety of other vehicles under consideration.⁴⁹ In April 2000, the Army released an RFP for the Interim Armored Vehicle (IAV). The program was so named because almost simultaneously, the Army launched its Future Combat Systems (FCS) program to reequip all its heavy brigades (and eventually the “interim” brigades as well) with a common fleet of medium-weight vehicles of entirely new design. In March 2002, the Army selected a team of Boeing and SAIC to oversee development of the fourteen different vehicular and aerial systems, manned and unmanned, within the FCS.⁵⁰

In November 2000, after reviewing the four more-of-less off-the-shelf proposals, the Army awarded GM and GD a contract for 2,131 vehicles, in a variety of variants of the LAV III, to equip six brigades by 2008. Shinseki had wanted the first vehicles by the end of 2001, but at contract award, that schedule was clearly infeasible.⁵¹ The US Army’s order was far larger than any yet received, and the US vehicle required a significant redesign from the Canadian standard, with more armor (resistant to 14.5 mm armor-penetrating rounds) but less firepower (a remote 12.7 mm machine gun rather than a manned 25 mm turret). Thus, the first new-production Strykers to equip further brigades would not arrive until 2003. In those numbers, the price was considered reasonable, at roughly $1.42 million each. This considerably exceeded the procurement price of the M113 alternative, but the Stryker’s life-cycle costs were expected to be lower.⁵²

A US Army Soldier drives an Interim Armored Vehicle Stryker out of a C-17 Globemaster III. Photo by Senior Airman Tryphena Mayhugh, 62nd Airlift Wing Public Affairs.

In November 2003, the 3rd Brigade from Fort Lewis deployed to Iraq with Strykers. Also that year, GD consolidated the design-and-production arrangement by buying both GM Defense Canada and MOWAG. The next year, Shinseki’s successor as chief of staff, General Peter Schoomaker, became similarly enthused about the Stryker. In seeking what he called an “infantry-centric army,” in which troops were not defined by their means of conveyance to the battlefield, he specifically noted that Stryker brigades brought twice as many dismounts to the field as brigades equipped with Abrams and Bradleys.⁵³ The Strykers were also performing well in combat. Through early 2004 in Iraq, they had survived attacks from at least fifty-five IEDs, twenty-four RPGs, and a 500 pound car bomb without a single fatality.

On the other hand, the Army’s effort to field a version of the Stryker with a 105 mm assault gun did not fare as well. The service purchased enough to equip each of eventually eight Stryker brigades with twelve guns, but retired all the vehicles in 2022. Then again, the Army’s goal of “Future Combat Systems” as survivable as Abrams tanks but somehow fitting on C-130 aircraft did not survive past 2005.⁵⁴ Development continued for several years, but without tangible progress. In April 2009, Defense Secretary Robert Gates canceled most of the FCS program, which had not produced any operational vehicles, despite $19 billion in spending and six years of effort.⁵⁵

Because the vehicles were considered an interim solution, the Army initially chose to forego developing its own maintenance depot for Strykers, and to instead rely substantially on GDLS through an arrangement the US military calls contractor logistics support (CLS). The Army’s reliance on CLS was, in retrospect, a costly one, but it did subsequently facilitate modifying the vehicles for greater survivability, after battlefield lessons in Iraq and Afghanistan.⁵⁶ After the FCS program was clearly terminated, the Army began assuming more of the maintenance burden organically.

While only the US Army employs its customized Stryker series, LAV IIIs have been procured to equip land forces in Canada, Chile, Colombia, New Zealand, and Saudi Arabia. Piranha IIIs have been procured to equip land forces in Belgium, Botswana, Brazil, Denmark, Moldova, Ireland, Romania, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland. In 2011, GDLS began producing an upgraded version, the LAV 6, for the Canadian Army and the Saudi National Guard. In 2019, GDLS began building a development of the LAV 6, the Armoured Combat Support Vehicle (ACSV), to replace the Canadian Army’s M113s and LAV IIs. In 2022 and 2023, the United States sent surplus Strykers to Ukraine, and Canada sent new ACSVs.⁵⁷ In November 2023, the United States offered a coproduction deal to build Strykers, including air-defense variants, in India for the Indian Army.⁵⁸

In summary, with the LAV III, the US Army obtained an armored vehicle in wide service around the world, though somewhat more slowly than hoped, and at a price and life-cycle cost deemed acceptable. The Army’s heavy reliance on contractor logistics support was, in retrospect, a costly decision, but one which centralized management of upgrades at an important juncture. The Army spent a modest sum on development of the LAV IIIs, which required customization for its particular preferences. However, this was a small fraction of the funds spent developing the Future Combat Systems, the later and then-cancelled Ground Combat Vehicle, and the current effort with the Optionally Manned Fighting Vehicle. None of these programs have delivered vehicles to the field, but Strykers continue to serve.

Assessment

systems were procured starting between 2003 and 2008, during the comparatively free-trading George W. Bush administration, for which military-industrial cooperation with allies was a priority. Two of the systems were adopted in 2018, during the comparatively protectionist Trump administration. Plans for accepting off-the-shelf concepts for those two requirements, however, got their start during the preceding Obama administration. While the US Air Force’s twenty-year drama of aerial tanker procurements from Boeing—and not Airbus—does provide a counterpoint, all the military services but the Space Force have smoothly adopted at least one major system of foreign design. The summary record of these procurements has been largely positive.

Buying foreign military hardware off the shelf has generally brought the US military proven systems of lasting quality.

In the first seven cases described, the US Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force, and Coast Guard bought off-the-shelf systems to provide enduring capabilities, in lieu of developing new systems, and all seven are still in US service. The Army bought the RG-31 to provide a present capability, while also funding (with the Marine Corps) the development of enduring capabilities, culminating in that of the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle. For years along the way, the RG-31 provided very valuable protection to US troops against land mines. The Army similarly bought the Stryker LAV III to provide an interim capability, but it never succeeded in developing an enduring replacement. The Stryker thus continues in the Army’s force structure and inventory more than twenty years on. As the Army’s first program manager for Stryker recently put it, “The Army likes the vehicle, and still likes the vehicle”—for if it did not, it would not persist in service.⁵⁹

Note also that the Defense Department would not have entrusted the air defense of the federal capital to NASAMS for eighteen years if it had meaningful questions about its capabilities.

This finding in evidence comports with the logic of the market. Off-the-shelf products generally feature observable quality. Indeed, if one is trying to sell an important system to the Americans, it is wise to bring a quality product. Any US military service is an important customer to whom a sale conveys great reputation.

Buying foreign military hardware off the shelf has mostly fulfilled US military needs comparatively quickly.

The RG-31 was procured in an emergency and was available in small quantities within months. The NASAMS was not quite procured in an emergency, but its immediate availability was appreciated, with fresh memories of the aerial attack on the Pentagon in 2001. The NSM was sought urgently, in that the rising threat from the Chinese navy could not be adequately opposed with the US Navy’s existing anti-ship missiles. The Stryker (or any interim armored vehicle) was sought quickly, because the Army chief of staff was embarrassed by his service’s failure to contribute during the Kosovo War. Its service in Iraq was impressive, but only because it was available three years after contract award. That proved adequate under the circumstances, but General Shinseki initially had much quicker delivery in mind.

In all the other cases, the driving motivation for an off-the-shelf procurement was either economy or assured quality. This does not mean that speed was wholly unimportant. The MH-139A arrived after a flight-testing delay of a few years, and the Sentinel-class cutters also did not arrive quickly. In none of those cases, however, did the procuring service experience operationally damaging delays.

This finding also comports with the logic of the market. Off-the-shelf products generally can be provided more quickly, sometimes because the production process is running, and always because significant product development lead time is not required.

Buying foreign military hardware off the shelf has generally brought the US military cost-competitive matériel.

Three of the cases were not fully competitive procurements. The NSM was chosen as the Navy’s next anti-ship missile after Boeing and Lockheed Martin withdrew from the competition, apparently because neither could quite offer the combination of capabilities the Navy sought in a ship-killing missile for a small ship. The case of the NASAMS seems to have been a sole-source procurement, without a record of a competition. The case of the RG-31 was similarly a sole-source emergency purchase.

The remaining six cases were all competitive procurements, which indicates that foreign-designed systems have repeatedly delivered value for money to the US armed forces.

This finding further comports to the logic of the market. Any US military service is a customer with great buying power. As noted above, concluding the sale reinforces the seller’s reputation, which can be leveraged for many years in pursuing other sales. For these two reasons, offerers have strong incentives to bring good deals to American buyers.

Buying foreign military hardware off the shelf has had no strong effect on US capacity for military-industrial R&D.

The nine off-the-shelf procurements neatly fall into five industries. None have seen a strong effect from this pattern of spending.

In the two cases of missile manufacturing, the United States purchased two different missile systems, the NSM and NASAMS, from the same original designer, Kongsberg of Norway. On both projects, Kongsberg has cooperated with one of the US national champions in guided missiles, Raytheon Technologies. Over that time of the ongoing procurement, the US Defense Department has spent many more billions on missile development, for both offensive and defensive missions.
In two cases of rotorcraft manufacturing, the Army bought hundreds of EC145s, and the Air Force is planning to buy scores of AW139s. The Army could have paid a contractor to design a wholly new aircraft for utility and training purposes, but the marginal advantage in an industry with a slow cycle of technological development could not be cost effective. The Air Force’s requirements may have been somewhat more demanding, but a new design for a fleet of less than one hundred helicopters would be similarly foolish.
In two cases of fixed-wing transport aircraft manufacturing, the Coast Guard, the Army, and the Air Force took delivery of just eighteen CN-235s and twenty-one C-27Js. Developing new aircraft for small fleets would be a very bad use of money. The special operations commands of the US services understand this well, and thus sources most of their aircraft from existing designs.
In the one case of shipbuilding, the Coast Guard’s off-the-shelf purchase of the 300 ton Sentinel-class cutter freed up money for the development of the 3000 ton Heritage-class cutter—a much larger project. Additionally, none of this spending by the Coast Guard seems to have affected the Navy’s spending on ship design and development.
In two cases of armored vehicle manufacturing—those of the RG-31 and the Stryker—the Army did continue to spend large sums on follow-on systems: the JLTV and the FCS.

Recommendations

Since the end of the Cold War, the US armed forces have quite successfully taken into service nine major, off-the-shelf systems of foreign design. Again, this is good because a preference for the already available for federal procurement is federal law. Most of these products have been manufactured in the United States, and all have been serviced there. This is reasonable because the United States has huge industrial capacity and some strategic interest in domestic servicing. More pointedly, this technology transfer has effectively constituted security assistance from allies—a valuable concept too often overlooked by military policymakers.

Formulating a strategic framework

The federal government can better avail itself of the advantages in quality, speed, and economy offered by allies’ proven solutions, by adopting a two-part analytical framework for considering their procurement.

Consider the global extent of the market

Seven of the nine systems in this study were widely adopted by military forces around the world before a US military service purchased them. In all other cases, the procuring services had long lists of satisfied customers to consult for insights into the equipment. For future procurements, if the needs of the service do not genuinely exceed the global state-of-the art, the best design should be sought from any friendly source. As several of these cases demonstrate, for large production runs, production can be brought to the United States, if desired.

Measure the technological speed of the industry

Seven of the systems in this study represented modest technological developments. Only the naval strike missile constituted a great advancement over preceding options on the market. In all other cases, the procuring services were purchasing systems from industries with modest cycle speeds of technological development. Four of the procurements were from industries with substantially commercial underlying technologies and observably slow paces of change: helicopters and multiengine fixed-wing aircraft. If firms around the world are investing over the long-term for gradual technological progress, then a program to develop a wholly new system is duplicative.

Educating the procurement bureaucracy

Despite the logic, the procurement bureaucracy—outside US Special Operations Command and the Coast Guard—may remain disinclined to seek proven solutions, and especially those of foreign provenance. In the short run, this puts the onus of securing best value on the political leadership of the military departments and defense agencies. For better quality, speed, and economy, these leaders must meet military desires for novel equipment with demands for frank justification and global market research. This approach fits within the civil-military model of military innovation, which holds that beneficial change most often comes when “statesmen intervene in military service doctrinal development, preferably with the assistance of maverick officers from within the service.”⁶⁰

This last point addresses a longer-term approach. In the apparatus of any administrative state, career bureaucrats greatly outnumber appointees.⁶¹ Even if they are economically minded, the politicians cannot oversee everything. The “positive arbitrariness” of their occasional intervention can produce useful results, but it is also no way to build enduring institutional capacity.⁶² Officials beyond the mavericks need further schooling in the mandate for and economy of buying military systems off the shelf. This means education in the market research techniques of routinely surveying global markets for military off-the-shelf solutions that can inform processes for developing requirements for new procurements. In theory, educational opportunities exist through the Defense Acquisition University, the Eisenhower School of the National Defense University, and the military acquisition elective courses at the various other war colleges.

The benefits could be far-reaching. Procuring what others have already developed can permit the military to focus its R&D funds on its most challenging problems. Then, when war comes, procuring agencies and industrial enterprises will better understand, as organizations, how to put others’ designs into production here to meet the immediate needs of mobilization.

Acknowledgments

The Atlantic Council is grateful to Airbus for its generous sponsorship of this paper.

About the author

James Hasik is a political economist studying innovation, industry, and international security. Since September 2001, Hasik has been advising industries and ministries on their issues of strategy, planning, and policy. His work aims to inform investors, industrialists, technologists, and policymakers on how to effect, economically, a secure future.

Appendix 1

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1 See, for example, Frank Kendall et al., Business Systems Requirements and Acquisition, Department of Defense Instruction 5000.75, Change 2, January 24, 2020, 5, https://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/DD/issuances/dodi/500075p.PDF?ver=2020-01-24-132012-177.

2 Steven Grundman and James Hasik, “Innovation Before Scale: A Better Business Model for Transnational Armaments Cooperation,” RUSI Journal 161, no. 5, December 2016, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/03071847.2016.1253366?journalCode=rusi20.

3 “Kyiv Does Not Want to Rely Solely on Allied Military Aid, Says Ukraine’s Zelensky,” Straits Times, December 7, 2023, https://www.straitstimes.com/world/europe/kyiv-does-not-want-to-rely-solely-on-allied-military-aid-zelenskiy.

4 Sam LaGrone, “Raytheon and Kongsberg Team to Pitch Stealthy Norwegian Strike Missile for LCS,” USNI News, US Naval Institute, April 9, 2015, https://news.usni.org/2015/04/09/raytheon-and-kongsberg-team-to-pitch-stealthy-norwegian-strike-missile-for-lcs.

5 Sam LaGrone, “Raytheon Awarded LCS Over-the-Horizon Anti-Surface Weapon Contract; Deal Could Be Worth $848M,” USNI News, May 31, 2018, https://news.usni.org/2018/05/31/raytheon-awarded-lcs-horizon-anti-surface-weapon-contract-deal-worth-848m.

6 Comment by Taylor W. Lawrence, president of Raytheon Missile Systems, in “US Navy Selects Naval Strike Missile as New, Over-the-Horizon Weapon: Raytheon, Kongsberg Will Partner to Deliver Advanced Missile,” press release, Raytheon on PR Newswire, June 1, 2018, https://raytheon.mediaroom.com/2018-06-01-US-Navy-selects-Naval-Strike-Missile-as-new-over-the-horizon-weapon.

7 Megan Eckstein, “Kongsberg, Raytheon Ready to Keep Up as Naval Strike Missile Demand Grows,” Defense News, October 27, 2021, https://www.defensenews.com/naval/2021/10/27/kongsberg-raytheon-ready-to-keep-up-as-naval-strike-missile-demand-grows/.

8 Andrew Feikert, “National Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile System,” Congressional Research Service, IF12230, December 1, 2022, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF12230; and Tyler Rogoway, “America’s Capitol Is Guarded By Norwegian Surface-to-Air Missiles,” Jalopnik, April 3, 2014, https://jalopnik.com/americas-capitol-is-guarded-by-norwegian-surface-to-ai-1556894733.

9 Lithuania Acquires More NASAMS Air Defense from Kongsberg,” press release, Kongsberg, December 14, 2023, https://www.forecastinternational.com/emarket/eabstract.cfm?recno=294263.

10 Joe Gould, “US to Send Ukraine Advanced NASAMS Air Defense Weapons in $820 Million Package,” Defense News, July 1, 2022, https://www.defensenews.com/pentagon/2022/07/01/us-to-send-ukraine-advanced-nasams-air-defense-weapons-in-820-million-package/; and “Norway Donates Additional Air Defence Systems to Ukraine,” Norwegian government, December 13, 2023, https://www.regjeringen.no/en/aktuelt/noreg-donerer-meir-luftvern-til-ukraina/id3018411/.

11 David Pugliese, “Canadian Military Eyes New Ground-Based Air Defence System at a Cost of $1 Billion,” Ottawa Citizen, May 2, 2022, https://ottawacitizen.com/news/national/defence-watch/canadian-military-eyes-new-ground-based-air-defence-system-at-a-cost-of-1-billion.

12 Gareth Jennings, “US Army Retires ‘Creek’ Training Helo,” Jane’s, February 19, 2021, https://www.janes.com/defence-news/news-detail/us-army-retires-creek-training-helo.

13 Jen Judson, “Airbus Unveils B-model Lakota Helos to Enter US Army Fleet Next Year,” Defense News, August 28, 2020, https://www.defensenews.com/land/2020/08/28/airbus-unveils-b-model-lakotas-will-enter-us-army-fleet-in-2021/.

14 Sebastian Sprenger, “Germany Spends $2.3 billion on Airbus Light Attack Helicopters,” Defense News, December 14, 2023, https://www.defensenews.com/global/europe/2023/12/14/germany-spends-23-billion-on-airbus-light-attack-helicopters/; and “Airbus Helicopters and German Armed Forces Sign Largest H145M Contract,” press release, Airbus Helicopters, via Defense-Aerospace.com, December 14, 2023, https://www.defense-aerospace.com/germany-orders-up-to-82-airbus-h145m-armed-helicopters/

15 Garrett Reim, “Retrospective: How the UH-1 ‘Huey’ Changed Modern Warfare,” Flight Global, December 12, 2018, https://www.flightglobal.com/helicopters/retrospective-how-the-uh-1-huey-changed-modern-warfare/130259.article; and José Gabriel Pugliese, “El Bell 212 en la Fuerza Aérea,” Aerospacio (official magazine of Argentina’s air force), October 28, 2008.

16 Joseph Trevithick, “Dark Horse Contender Boeing Snags Air Force Deal to Replace Aging UH-1N Hueys with MH-139,” War Zone, September 24, 2018, https://www.twz.com/23803/dark-horse-contender-boeing-snags-air-force-deal-to-replace-aging-uh-1n-hueys-with-mh-139.

17 Colin Clark, “Dozen Lawmakers Object to Sole-Source UH-1N Replacement,” Breaking Defense, April 18, 2016, https://breakingdefense.com/2016/04/slow-down-air-force-dozen-lawmakers-object-to-sole-source-uh-1n-replacement/.

18 Tyler Rogoway, “USAF Asks for Bids to Finally Replace Its Antique UH-1N Hueys,” War Zone, December 3, 2016,
https://www.twz.com/6318/usaf-asks-for-bids-to-finally-replace-its-antique-uh-1n-hueys.

19 Ryan E. Von Rembow, “The UH-1Y Was a Mistake: An Argument for the MH-60S,” Marine Corps Gazette 99, no. 1, January 2015, https://www.mca-marines.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/Gazette-January-2015.pdf.

20 Brian W. Everstine, “The Grey Wolf Arrives,” Air & Space Forces, March 1, 2020, https://www.airandspaceforces.com/article/the-grey-wolf-arrives/

21 Valerie Insinna, “The Air Force Picks a Winner for its Huey Replacement Helicopter Contract,” Defense News, September 24, 2018, https://www.defensenews.com/breaking-news/2018/09/24/the-air-force-picks-a-winner-for-its-huey-replacement-helicopter-contract/; and Insinna, “The US Air Force’s UH-1N Huey Replacement Helicopter Has a New Name,” Defense News, December 19, 2019, https://www.defensenews.com/air/2019/12/19/the-air-forces-uh-1n-huey-replacement-helicopter-got-a-new-name-today/.

22 Stefano D’Urso, “MH-139 Grey Wolf Finally Enters Developmental Testing,” Aviationist, August 28, 2022, https://theaviationist.com/2022/08/28/mh-139-enters-developmental-testing/.

23 US Air Force Decision Commences Low Rate Production of Boeing/Leonardo MH-139 Grey Wolf,” press release, Leonardo, March 9, 2023, https://www.leonardo.com/documents/15646808/24917778/ComLDO_Boeing_Leonardo_MH-139A_MilestoneC_09_03_2023_ENG.pdf?t=1678369973868

24 US Coast Guard Acquires EADS CASA CN-235,” EADS press release, May 12, 2003.

25 “Lockheed Martin Selects EADS CASA CN-235-300M for U.S. Coast Guard’s Deepwater Maritime Patrol Aircraft Solution,” press release, Lockheed Martin, February 18, 2004, https://investors.lockheedmartin.com/news-releases/news-release-details/lockheed-martin-selects-eads-casa-cn-235-300m-us-coast-guards.

26 Lawrence Specker, “Airbus, Coast Guard Celebrate 100,000 Hours in the Air,” Alabama Media Group’s AL.com, September 22, 2017, https://www.al.com/news/mobile/2017/09/airbus_coast_guard_celebrate_1.html.

27 Joseph Trevithick, “Shadowy USAF Spy Plane Spotted Over Seattle Reportedly Reappears Over Syria,” War Zone, June 30, 2019, https://www.twz.com/17511/shadowy-usaf-spy-plane-spotted-over-seattle-reportedly-reappears-over-eastern-syria; and “C-146A Wolfhound,” fact sheet, US Air Force, March 2021, https://www.af.mil/About-Us/Fact-Sheets/Display/Article/467729/c-146a-wolfhound/.

28 Joseph Trevithick, “Shedding Some Light on the Pentagon’s Most Shadowy Aviation Units,” War Zone, July 3, 2020, https://www.twz.com/8125/shedding-some-light-on-the-pentagons-most-shadowy-aviation-units.

29 John T. Bennett, Jen DiMascio, and Ashley Roque, “Wanted: A Bona-Fide ‘Bug Smasher,’” Inside the Air Force 17, no. 12 (2006): 8-10

30 C-27J Conducts Successful First Flight,” Defense Daily, September 29, 1999; and Andy Nativi, “Italian Order Launches C-27J,” Flight Global, November 17, 1999.

31 Gayle S. Putrick, “C-27J Tapped for Joint Cargo Aircraft,” Air Force Times, June 13, 2007.

32 Philip Ewing, “Far from DC Battles, C-27 Gets Glowing Reviews,” DoD Buzz, April 24, 2012, https://web.archive.org/web/20120427214404/http:/www.dodbuzz.com/2012/04/24/far-from-dc-battles-c-27-gets-glowing-reviews/.

33 Sandra I. Erwin, “Military Services Competing for Future Airlift Missions,” National Defense, November 2005, https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2005/10/31/2005november-military-services-competing-for-future-airlift-missions.

34 Aaron Mehta, “US SOCOM to Get 7 C-27Js from USAF,” Defense News, November 1, 2013, https://archive.ph/20131101201655/http:/www.defensenews.com/article/20131101/DEFREG02/311010012#selection-857.0-867.16; and Jon Hemmerdinger, “US Coast Guard to Acquire USAF’s remaining C-27J Spartans,” Flight Global, January 6, 2014, https://www.flightglobal.com/us-coast-guard-to-acquire-usafs-remaining-c-27j-spartans/112099.article.

35 Craig Hoyle, “Bulgaria Accepts Its Last C-27J Transport,” Flight Global, March 31, 2011; and Hoyle, “Romania Accepts First C-27J Spartans,” Flight Global, December 4, 2011.

36 Frank N. McCarthy, “The Coast Guard’s New Island in the Drug War,” Proceedings of the United States Naval Institute, February 1986.

37 Trevor L. Brown, Matthew Potoski, and David M. Van Slake, Complex Contracting: Government Purchasing in the Wake of the US Coast Guard’s Deepwater Program (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 173–179.

38 Collin Fox, “Two Birds with One Stone: A New Patrol Craft and Unmanned Surface Vessel,” Proceedings of the United States Naval Institute, February 2019, https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2019/february/two-birds-one-stone-new-patrol-craft-and-unmanned-surface.

39 “Sentinel Class Patrol Boat Media Round Table,” briefing by Rear Admiral Gary T. Blore, Assistant Commandant for Acquisition, and Captain Richard Murphy, Sentinel-Class Project Manager, September 30, 2008, https://web.archive.org/web/20090220012354/http:/uscg.mil/acquisition/newsroom/pdf/sentinelmediabrief.pdf.

40 John Carlson, “For Iowans on Streets of Iraq, War ‘Never Gets Routine,’” Des Moines Register, October 2, 2005.

41 This discussion follows James Hasik, Securing the MRAP: Lessons Learned in Marketing and Military Procurement (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2021), chapter 3.

42 Author’s telephone interview with Chris Chambers, former chairman of the board, BAE Systems Land Systems South Africa, September 23, 2015.

43 Ronald Heflin, “Universal Need Statement, Hardened Engineer Vehicle,” mimeograph provided by Mike Aldrich of Force Protection Industries. The request was undated, but the approval by Marine Forces Pacific was dated December 12, 2003.

44 E. B. Boyd and Brian L. Frank, “A New Front: Can the Pentagon Do Business with Silicon Valley?” California Sunday Magazine, October 2015.

45 Erin Q. Winograd, “Intent Letter Says Heavy Forces Are Too Heavy: Shinseki Hints at Restructuring, Aggressive Changes for the Army,” Inside the Army 11, no. 25 (1999), http://www.jstor.org/stable/43984647.

46 John Gordon IV, Bruce Nardulli, and Walker L. Perry, “The Operational Challenges of Task Force Hawk,” Joint Force Quarterly, no. 29, Autumn/Winter 2001–2002, 57, https://ndupress.ndu.edu/portals/68/Documents/jfq/jfq-29.pdf.

47 Gordon, Nardulli, and Perry, “The Operational Challenges of Task Force Hawk,” 57.

48 Catherine MacRae, “Service Wants to Be Lighter, Faster, More Lethal: Army Chief of Staff’s ‘Vision’ Is Focused on Medium-Weight Force,” Inside the Pentagon 15, no. 41 (1999), http://www.jstor.org/stable/43995956.

49 Kim Burger, “Brigade Combat Team Has Trained Mostly on LAVs: Soldiers Give Praise for Wheeled, Tracked Vehicles at Ft. Lewis,” Inside the Army 12, no. 39 (2000): 1, 11–12, http://www.jstor.org/stable/43985049; and “Rigorous Training Expected to Increase Comfort Level: Brigade Team Soldiers Give Up Tanks, Firepower with ‘Hard Feelings,’” Inside the Army 12, no. 39 (2000): 1, 8–10, http://www.jstor.org/stable/43985046

50 Andrew Feickert, The Army’s Future Combat System (FCS): Background and Issues for Congress, Congressional Research Service, RL32888, November 30, 2009, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/RL/RL32888/20.

51 Steven Lee Myers, “Army’s Armored Vehicles Are Already Behind Schedule,” New York Times, November 18, 2000, https://www.nytimes.com/2000/11/18/us/army-s-armored-vehicles-are-already-behind-schedule.html.

52 William M. Solis et al., Military Transformation: Army’s Evaluation of Stryker and M-113A3 Infantry Carrier Vehicles Provided Sufficient Data for Statutorily Mandated Comparison, GAO-03-671, US Government Accounting Office, May 2003, https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-03-671.pdf.

53 James Kitfield, “Army Chief Struggles to Transform Service during War,” Government Executive, October 29, 2004, https://www.govexec.com/federal-news/2004/10/army-chief-struggles-to-transform-service-during-war/17929/; and Grace Jean, “Army Transformation Modeled After Stryker Units, National Defense, October 2005, https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2005/10/1/2005october–army-transformation-modeled-after-stryker-units.

54 Sandra Erwin, “For Army’s Future Combat Vehicles, Flying by C-130 No Longer Required,” National Defense, November 2005, https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2005/10/31/2005november-for-armys-future-combat-vehicles-flying-by-c130-no-longer-required.

55 See Army Strong: Equipped, Trained and Ready: Final Report of the 2010 Army Acquisition Review, Department of the Army, June 2011, 163, https://breakingdefense.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/3/2011/07/213465.pdf.

56 E-mail message to the author from Christopher Cardine, former program manager for the US Army and executive for General Dynamics Land Systems, April 2, 2024.

57 David Akin, “As NATO Summit Ends, Canada Promises More Military Aid to Ukraine,” Global News (Canada), June 30, 2022, https://globalnews.ca/news/8958186/canada-military-aid-ukraine/.

58 Inder Singh Bisht, “US to Co-Produce Stryker Armored Vehicle with India,” Defence Post, November 13, 2023, https://www.thedefensepost.com/2023/11/13/us-produce-stryker-india/?expand_article=1; and Manjeet Negi, “US Offers India Air Defence Version of Stryker Armoured Fighting Vehicles,” India Today, November 30, 2023, https://www.indiatoday.in/india/story/us-offers-air-defence-system-equipped-stryker-infantry-combat-vehicles-to-india-2469243-2023-11-30.

59 Author’s interview with Donald Schenk, retired brigadier general, US Army, December 12, 2023.

60 Adam Grissom, “The Future of Military Innovation Studies,” Journal of Strategic Studies 29, no. 5 (2006); and citing Barry R. Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany between the World Wars (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1984), 222–36.

61 Dave Oliver and Anand Toprani, American Defense Reform: Lessons from Failure and Success in Navy History (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2022).

62 Douglas Bland, “Foreword,” xviii, in Alan Williams, Reinventing Canadian Defence Procurement: A View from the Inside (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2006).

The post Friend-sourcing military procurement: Technology acquisition as security cooperation appeared first on Atlantic Council.

What makes Colombian mercenaries so interesting?

Alia Brahimi — Wed, 29 May 2024 13:17:10 +0000

Coming up this Thursday, in Season 2, Episode 2 of the Guns for Hire podcast, host Alia Brahimi is joined by Dr. Andrés Macías, a Bogota-based expert on Colombian mercenaries. They begin by looking at the explosive case of 26 Colombians arrested for their part in the 2021 assassination of the Haitian president, as well as the public debate within Colombia. Andrés goes on to explain what makes former Colombian soldiers so interesting to the international private security market, the link back to the protracted armed conflict in Colombia and the recognized value of US training, as well as the need for the Colombian government to strengthen its veterans’ policy. They also discuss the thousands of Colombians who enlist under the banner of the United Arab Emirates and what’s driving hundreds of Colombians to sign up to fight Russia in Ukraine.

“What is the Colombian government doing with the huge number of veterans that we have had throughout the years? Because we actually don’t know much about what they are doing, what activities they are performing, and what their status is.”

Dr. Andrés Macías, Bogota-based expert on Colombian mercenaries

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General CQ Brown, Jr., on the US role in Gaza, Ukraine, and other crises around the world

Katherine Walla — Thu, 23 May 2024 18:11:01 +0000

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General CQ Brown, Jr. on how US forces are readying for new global threats

An #ACFRONTPAGE EVENT—General CQ Brown, Jr., Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, discusses the challenges the joint force faces today and what to expect in the years ahead.

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It’s time to plan for the long term in the Middle East, said General CQ Brown, Jr., chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

“What do we collectively want this to look like years from now? That’s the work that has to start,” he continued. The general spoke at an Atlantic Council Front Page event, which was also part of the Forward Defense initiative’s Commanders Series, sponsored by Saab.

Brown explained that this forward-looking planning will need to involve “a number of different nations,” including both their militaries and diplomats.

Asked about the United States’ role in the conflict, Brown said that the US military would “not necessarily” be involved on the ground to help with security. “You also have to think about who’s best . . . to actually work the details on the ground, [who] has the working knowledge,” he said.

But he said the US military could leverage experience gained in other situations around the globe to help the postwar process. “We’re always willing to do that to help make it as smooth as possible,” he said.

Below are more highlights from the conversation, moderated by NBC News National Security and Military Correspondent Courtney Kube, during which the general spoke about the Middle East, Ukraine, Africa, and beyond.

Addressing crises in the Middle East

Brown said that as Israel was planning its operations in Rafah, the United States asked Israeli leaders to account for the civilian population by providing food and shelter. “I’m not sure how much of that’s come together, but a good portion of the civilians have actually moved out of Rafah,” Brown acknowledged.
Last week, the US military put into operation a humanitarian aid pier—a Joint Logistics Over-the-Shore (JLOTS)—off the coast of Gaza. Thus far, Brown said, the military has brought “over six hundred metric tons into the marshalling yard” and that “some of that” has left the yard for Gaza, where aid organizations will distribute the assistance.
On Tuesday, the Pentagon said that none of the aid thus far unloaded from the pier has made it to the Palestinian population. “We’re going to make sure we connect the dots,” Brown said, adding that the aid organizations have been working through immense security challenges. Nevertheless, he said he is “pleased” with how the delivery is going so far.

What’s next in Ukraine

Nearly a month after the passage of the US supplemental spending package for security priorities, Brown said that equipment is already moving to Ukraine. When there was “movement” on the Ukraine aid bill ahead of passage, Brown said, “we started posturing ourselves . . . to respond when called upon.” He said there’s now a “constant flow of capability.”
Ukraine’s leaders have complained about restrictions on using US weapons and equipment to attack inside Russia. Brown said that the United States and Ukraine will “continue to work through those details,” adding that Ukraine does have capabilities to attack Russia—they just can’t use US tools to do so. Nevertheless, he said that he doesn’t think one weapons system “is going to be the magic thing that is going to turn the tide” in the war.
With NATO reportedly considering sending troops to Ukraine to train forces there, Brown said that he doesn’t see that happening while it is an active combat zone. “I do expect,” he said, “when this conflict is over that we will have an opportunity” to return to the training and coordination seen before the war.

Surveying global threats

“When you have a conflict in one part of the world, it doesn’t actually stay in one part of the world,” Brown warned. “The goal here is to make sure it doesn’t spread and make sure we deter any broader conflicts.”
Pointing to the Biden administration’s National Defense Strategy, released in 2022, Brown said that Washington is closely watching five main challengers: China, Russia, Iran, North Korea, and violent extremist groups. “They’re all active in some form or fashion and in some cases,” such as with China’s support for Russia’s defense industrial base, “[are] working together.”
On Tuesday, the Pentagon revealed that Russia likely launched a counter-space weapon into orbit last week. The launch shows how the space domain “is much more challenging today” than even a few years ago, Brown said. “Naming space as a warfighting domain was kind of forbidden, but that’s changed . . . based on what our adversaries are doing in space.”
With the United States preparing to leave Niger by September, Brown said that the Pentagon is “adjusting” its approach but that he expects the United States will be able to accomplish its counterterrorism objectives in the region. “We’ve got to have willing partners, and in this case, there were some things where we didn’t actually see eye to eye,” he said, adding that now, with the departure, “there are other opportunities for those that want to work with the United States.”
“US leadership is still watched, and it’s wanted. [That] doesn’t mean that it’s always going to be a smooth road everywhere we go,” he said. “But I think in the big scheme of things, we can get and meet the objectives . . . set out by our national leaders.”

Katherine Walla is an associate director on the editorial team at the Atlantic Council.

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Ukraine’s Western allies should fear Russian victory not Russian defeat

Peter Dickinson — Tue, 21 May 2024 21:33:07 +0000

Since the launch of Russia’s full-scale invasion more than two years ago, Western military support for Ukraine has been plagued by endless delays, restrictions, and half-measures. This underwhelming response has typically been blamed on concerns over possible Russian retaliation and the desire to avoid a wider war. In reality, however, some Western leaders may also be motivated by perceptions of Russian weakness rather than fear of Russian strength.

This was the argument set out by Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy last week as he bemoaned the inadequate Western reaction to Russia’s invasion. Speaking to journalists in Kyiv, Zelenskyy said he believes Ukraine’s partners “are afraid of Russia losing the war” because this would lead to “unpredictable geopolitical consequences.”

Zelenskyy’s comments are not entirely new, of course. There have long been suggestions that the West’s hesitant approach to aiding Ukraine reflects worries that a Russian defeat could lead to the fall of the Putin regime. Some have even speculated that the Russian Federation itself would be unlikely to survive, and would instead break up into a number of new states, in a continuation of the process that began in 1991.

It is easy enough to imagine why Western policymakers might be alarmed by the prospect of a new Russian collapse. Indeed, the Western response to the disintegration of the USSR was equally cautious, with US President George H. W. Bush traveling to Ukraine on the eve of the country’s declaration of independence in August 1991 to deliver his infamous “Chicken Kiev speech” warning against “suicidal nationalism.”

President Bush was far from alone in prioritizing geopolitical stability over the statehood aspirations of Ukraine and the USSR’s other captive nations. One year earlier, British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher had visited Ukraine and offered a similarly skeptical view of the country’s independence struggle. Bush and Thatcher were primarily concerned with the fate of the Soviet Union’s colossal war machine and vast nuclear arsenal. Allowing this to be redistributed among a collection of newly independent states seemed the height of recklessness. So rather than hasten the fall of the Soviet Empire, they sought to prevent or at least manage the process.

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These same concerns are now hampering support for Ukraine as it fights against Vladimir Putin’s efforts to reverse the verdict of 1991. But is today’s Russia really at risk of collapse?

The Wagner mutiny of June 2023 would certainly suggest that Putin’s grip on the country is far more fragile than the Kremlin would like us to believe. While the mutiny was a short-lived affair, it was nevertheless revealing that rebellious troops were able to seize control of one of Russia’s largest cities without encountering opposition. Equally noteworthy was the absence of establishment figures rushing to rally around the throne. At the same time, the demands of the Wagner rebels did not amount to regime change, never mind anything that might constitute a threat to Russia’s territorial integrity. On the contrary, they sought a stronger Russia with more effective wartime leadership.

This is not to say that the break-up of the Russian Federation is impossible, of course. The invasion of Ukraine has underlined Russia’s status as the last of the great European empires, and has sparked a long overdue debate over the need for decolonization. However, talk of an impending collapse may be wishful thinking. While Russia has a history of unraveling in sudden and dramatic fashion, there is currently little evidence of serious independence movements in any of the country’s ethnic minority republics.

Rather than sparking the next stage in Russia’s long retreat from empire, defeat in Ukraine would be far more likely to bring about the fall of the Putin regime and usher in a period of national reflection and reform. This has been the case following numerous other notable Russian military defeats. After losing the Crimean War in the middle of the nineteenth century, Russia abandoned serfdom. Defeat to Japan in 1905 led to a brief flirtation with parliamentary democracy.

Meanwhile, the failed Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in the 1980s fueled public demands for reform that helped end the Cold War. If the current invasion also ends in defeat, there is every reason to believe Russia will survive intact. After all, while a retreat from Ukraine would be deeply wounding for Russian national pride, it would hardly pose an existential threat to Russia itself.

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Rather than scaring themselves into self-deterrence with nightmare scenarios of future Russian collapse, Western leaders should be laser-focused on the far more immediate dangers posed by Russian victory. After a series of initial setbacks, the Russian army has now regained the initiative in Ukraine and is advancing. Putin is more confident than ever and is clearly preparing his entire country to wage a long war of attrition. Unless the West dramatically increases its military support for Ukraine, there is every chance he will succeed.

If Putin achieves victory in Ukraine, he will almost certainly go further. The Kremlin dictator is already boasting of his Ukrainian “conquests” and comparing himself to all-conquering eighteenth century Russian Czar Peter the Great. At the beginning the war, Putin had sought to frame the invasion as a defensive measure by blaming it on NATO expansion and imaginary “Ukrainian Nazis.” As his battlefield fortunes have improved, he has begun to talk openly of reclaiming “historically Russian lands.”

As anyone with a passing knowledge of Russian history will confirm, there are currently at least a dozen other countries beyond Ukraine that could also fit Putin’s definition of “historically Russian lands.” The list of potential targets includes Finland, Poland, the Baltic states, Belarus, Moldova, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Armenia, and the whole of Central Asia. None of these countries can feel safe. Putin’s entire reign has been defined by his desire to reestablish Russia as a Great Power and end the era of Western domination. If he achieves victory in Ukraine, it is ludicrous to suggest he will simply stop.

Some commentators are inclined to downplay the risk of further invasions by pointing to the poor performance of the Russian army in Ukraine and claiming that Russia is in no position to engage in further military adventures. Unfortunately, such arguments fail to take into account the impact of Russian success in Ukraine. A Russian victory would transform the geopolitical climate, leading to a surge in international support for the Kremlin and the demoralization of the West. Countries throughout the Global South would abandon neutrality and rush to foster closer ties with Moscow.

In material terms, the Russian conquest of Ukraine would have even more profound consequences for European security. Putin already commands Europe’s largest army. With Ukraine subjugated, he would also have control over Europe’s second-largest army, along with Ukraine’s long neglected but rapidly reviving military-industrial capabilities. Possession of Ukraine’s fabled black earth would make Russia the dominant power on global agricultural markets, providing Putin with a formidable tool to bribe and blackmail the international community.

Even if a victorious Russia did not immediately embark on new conquests, every government in Europe would be obliged to radically increase defense spending. Many are just starting to rearm now in reaction to the Russian war against Ukraine. Expenditures could soon rise far beyond the current cost of arming Ukraine. There would also be a very real danger of a new nuclear arms race. Given the evident effectiveness of Putin’s naked nuclear blackmail in deterring the West from aiding Ukraine, it would be entirely logical for other nations to conclude that they will only be truly safe with a nuclear deterrent of their own.

The international repercussions of a Russian victory in Ukraine would be equally disastrous. Autocrats around the world would view Putin’s triumph as a sign of unprecedented Western weakness and an open invitation to pursue their own expansionist agendas. The period of relative peace and progress that followed the end of the Cold War would be replaced by a new era of international instability and insecurity.

None of this is inevitable. Russia can still be defeated in Ukraine if the West takes the decisive step of committing itself to Ukrainian victory. This means supplying Ukraine with sufficient weapons to not only defend itself but to actually defeat Russia. Crucially, it means ending absurd restrictions on the use of Western weapons and allowing strikes on legitimate military targets inside Russia. And it means providing Ukraine with the kind of guaranteed long-term military support that will convince Putin his hopes of outlasting the West are futile.

Confronting the Kremlin effectively will require considerable political will and courage. Russia will inevitably respond to any hardening of Western resolve by escalating its nuclear intimidation tactics, but the usefulness of nuclear saber-rattling diminishes when Western governments don’t allow such threats to cloud their strategic calculus.

It is now painfully obvious that the hesitancy and indecisiveness of the past two years have not succeeded in appeasing Putin or reducing the challenge posed by a resurgent Russia. Instead, the West is now facing the very real prospect of a defeat that would have catastrophic consequences for the future of international security. In order to avert disaster, Putin must lose in Ukraine. Any worries about the future of the Russian Federation will have to wait until this far more urgent threat has been addressed.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

An #ACFRONTPAGE EVENT—General Christopher G. Cavoli, Commander of US European Command and Supreme Allied Commander Europe, discusses the 2024 Washington NATO Summit, modernizing the Alliance’s military capabilities, and destabilizing Russia’s impact on Euro-Atlantic security.

Right now, NATO’s Steadfast Defender 2024 military exercise is taking place across Europe and at sea.

The effort, the largest the Alliance has undertaken since the Cold War, is not just a demonstration of the transatlantic bond; it is also NATO’s opportunity to “rigorously test” its defense and deterrence strategy, said General Christopher Cavoli, supreme allied commander Europe (SACEUR) and commander of US European Command.

Cavoli spoke at a May 7 Atlantic Council Front Page event, which was part of the Forward Defense program’s Commanders Series (in partnership with Saab) and of the Transatlantic Security Initiative’s programming organized in advance of the NATO Summit in Washington.

The general went on to say that NATO’s 2020 defense and deterrence strategy is part of an effort to conduct a “wholesale modernization” of NATO’s collective defense to respond to today’s security challenges.

“We had previously been optimized for a very different task,” he said. Cavoli explained that after the Cold War, NATO pivoted toward conducting crisis-management missions well beyond its borders that allowed the Alliance to participate in missions on its “own terms” and on a predictable schedule.

But “all that has changed,” Cavoli said, pointing to Russia’s war in Ukraine. “It is happening all the time, 24/7, [with] no respite for more than two years.”

The war has shown that today, “you either win up front, fast, and big, or you’re in a long fight. So . . . win up front but be ready to win long,” he said.

Below are more highlights from the event, where Cavoli touched upon NATO’s plans to modernize its defenses and the intensifying threats to the Alliance.

Defending in a new era

At last year’s NATO Summit in Vilnius, allies adopted regional defense plans, which spark three changes, as Cavoli explained: First, they bring a revamped expectation for NATO’s force structure, which outlines not only the forces required but also the spending needed to resource and maintain it. “You will find that 2 percent [of a country’s gross domestic product spent on the military] is certainly not a ceiling, but a floor,” he said, adding that the plans provide a “blueprint for burden sharing.”
Second, the new regional defense plans delegate authority for operational decision making. Cavoli said that when the Alliance was primarily focused on out-of-area operations, military authorities were limited to higher, political levels. “SACEUR requires basic military authorities,” Cavoli said. “These are working their way through the new, modernized alert system.”
Third, the new plans also change systems of command and control, Cavoli said. Before, NATO focused on cyclical deployments to regions and terrains that were unfamiliar to parts of the command chain. Now, regional plans are assigning specific geographic areas to each of the Alliance’s headquarters so that each one will know “exactly what terrain it’s required to defend” and the tactical units it has to defend with.
The modernization effort will also require a ramp-up in the defense industry. “I don’t think anybody is satisfied with current levels of production,” Cavoli said. Going forward, he added, the government and industry will need to work together to increase cooperation between Allies and industry partners. “I believe we’ll get there,” he said.
“This modernization of NATO’s collective defense will not be realized immediately,” Cavoli said. “It will require relentless focus and determination from across NATO and in all member nations . . . It will be difficult, but we are well on our way.”

The threats ahead

While Beijing is far from Brussels, NATO “does have China challenges inside it right now,” Cavoli said, related to strategic infrastructure, intellectual property, and private data.
“Russia will pose a long-term threat to the Alliance,” said Cavoli, adding that the West will have a “big Russia problem for years to come,” as Moscow works to expand the size of its military and reconstitute losses.
“The Russian army in Ukraine is bigger now than it was at the beginning of the fight,” he pointed out. “Many of the troops are not as high quality . . . a lot of the equipment fielded is older: It’s refurbished, but it’s based on an older model.”
Cavoli said the question at the top of Western leaders’ minds shouldn’t be about how fast Russia can reconstitute: It should be how fast can Russia rebuild its forces compared to the West. Maintaining an advantage in speed, he explained, is a matter of maintaining “political will” and developing the “elasticity” of the defense industrial base.
Many countries facing Russian influence “are looking westward right now” in search of new security partners, Cavoli said. While the Alliance was created to defend its members, “we don’t exist in a vacuum,” he said. “We need friends and partners.”

Katherine Walla is an associate director on the editorial team at the Atlantic Council.

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Russia’s growing kamikaze drone fleet tests Ukraine’s limited air defenses

Marcel Plichta — Tue, 14 May 2024 15:59:46 +0000

The past few months have been a particularly challenging period for Ukraine’s overstretched air defense units. With the country suffering from mounting shortages of interceptor missiles, Russia has exploited growing gaps in Ukraine’s defenses to bomb cities and vital civilian infrastructure with deadly frequency. These escalating attacks have led to renewed calls from Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy for Kyiv’s partners to provide the country with more air defense systems in order to safeguard lives and prevent the collapse of basic municipal services.

While most attention has focused on the many Russian ballistic and cruise missiles that have reached their targets, Ukraine has actually managed to shoot down a strikingly high number of Russian kamikaze drones. On May 13, the Wall Street Journal reported that Ukraine had intercepted 82 percent of kamikaze drones over the past six months, just one percentage point lower than the total for the previous half-year period. This figure is even more remarkable given that Russia typically launches waves of drones as part of complex attacks that also feature a range of different missiles.

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Many in the Ukrainian media and beyond have been quick to publicize the numerous improvised and ingenious measures adopted by Ukraine to counter Russia’s drone attacks. These steps have included the establishment of mobile teams using older anti-aircraft guns mounted on trucks to shoot down drones at a fraction of the cost of more sophisticated air defense systems. In spring 2024, US General James Hecker, head of US Air Forces in Europe, described how Ukrainians had set up a detection network using cheap cell phones on poles to warn of incoming drones. German-supplied Gepard systems have also proved extremely cost-effective drone destroyers, as have newer systems such as the US-made VAMPIRE.

While Ukraine’s high interception rates are impressive, the threat posed by this form of aerial warfare remains grave and continues to evolve. Even when the majority of drones are shot down, those that do reach their targets often cause significant damage and loss of life. Indeed, when it comes to air defenses, even a 99 percent success rate is not good enough. While it is better to shoot down drones than allow them to hit their targets, interceptions can also be costly, with debris from falling drones frequently causing death and destruction in a terrifyingly random manner.

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Russia’s fleet of kamikaze drones is growing. During the first year of the invasion, the Kremlin organized regular deliveries of Shahed kamikadze drones from Iran. Moscow has since set up domestic production facilities and is now far less dependent on Tehran. This is allowing Russia to scale up its own output, making it possible to increase the frequency of attacks. As production continues to expand, more and more drones will be launched against targets across Ukraine. These increasing quantities of drones will deplete Ukraine’s anti-drone ammunition and could potentially overwhelm the country’s limited defenses.

In addition to producing a domestic version of Iran’s Shahed drone, Russia is also experimenting with a range of modifications. These efforts have included spraying drones to reduce detection and adding cameras to stream video footage of drone flights back to Russian operators. Meanwhile, Russia reportedly continues to receive new drone models from the country’s Iranian partners.

While these upgraded models and modifications have so far failed to make a big difference to Russia’s air offensive, they do serve as a reminder that this is a war of innovation and underline the need for Ukraine to maintain the highest degree of vigilance. Throughout the invasion of Ukraine, the Russian military has demonstrated its ability to learn from earlier mistakes and incorporate new technologies. Ukrainians cannot afford to assume that today’s defenses will necessarily be sufficient to stop tomorrow’s drones.

An additional drone-related headache for Ukrainian military planners is the need to spread air defenses across as wide an area as possible. While mobile anti-drone teams have proved relatively effective, they are only one part of a much wider network of air defenses centered around Ukraine’s major cities and key infrastructure sites. Given that air defenses are desperately needed to support military operations on the battlefield, guarding against frequent kamikaze drone attacks far away from the front lines weakens the Ukrainian war effort.

As long as Russia continues to build and deploy kamikaze drones, they will remain a significant problem for Ukraine. The country’s partners can help address this problem in two ways. They can supply more air defense systems, especially models that are designed to intercept slow-moving but plentiful drones rather than far faster missiles. They can also support Ukraine’s efforts to strike targets such as air bases, production facilities, and drone storage sites inside Russia. Destroying Russian drones before they are launched is the most effective way to protect Ukraine from further bombardment.

Marcel Plichta is a PhD candidate at the University of St Andrews and former analyst at the US Department of Defense. He has written on the use of drones in the Russian invasion of Ukraine for the Atlantic Council, the Telegraph, and the Spectator.

Putin appoints economist as defense minister as Russia plans for long war

Mercedes Sapuppo — Tue, 14 May 2024 14:54:02 +0000

Vladimir Putin has appointed technocrat economist Andrei Belousov as Russia’s new defense minister in a shake-up that underlines his determination to wage a long war of attrition against Ukraine.

The relatively unknown Belousov replaces long-serving Sergei Shoigu, who will now take up a new post as Secretary of Russia’s National Security Council. Shoigu had led the Defense Ministry since 2012. Known as both a Putin loyalist and a personal friend of the Russian dictator who accompanied him on hunting holidays, he is the most senior figure to be dismissed since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.

While Shoigu’s tenure in office coincided with Russian military success stories such as the 2014 occupation of Ukraine’s Crimean peninsula and the 2015 Russian intervention in Syria, his reputation had been severely tarnished in recent years by the poor performance of the Russian army in Ukraine. The many battlefield setbacks suffered in Ukraine have been particularly embarrassing for Putin, who has long pointed to the revival of Russia’s military strength as one his greatest achievements.

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Shoigu’s removal took many by surprise but was not entirely unexpected. The announcement came just weeks after his deputy defense minister, Timur Ivanov, was arrested on corruption charges. At the time of Ivanov’s removal in late April, many speculated that Shoigu’s days as defense minister may also be numbered.

Shoigu’s replacement, Andrei Belousov, is a former deputy prime minister and minister of economic development who also served for a number of years as an economic advisor to Putin. The appointment of a civilian technocrat suggests that Putin aims to control military spending and improve efficiency at the ministry of defense as he looks to outproduce Ukraine and the country’s Western partners in a protracted confrontation.

Unlike his predecessor, Belousov has played no significant role in the invasion of Ukraine and is not tainted by the military defeats of the past two years. His long record of government service and relative anonymity make him in many ways a typical pick for Putin, who is notoriously reluctant to raise ambitious new faces to senior positions within the Kremlin leadership.

Speculation over Shoigu’s future has been mounting ever since the failure of Russia’s blitzkrieg offensive in the spring of 2022 during the initial stages of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. He has frequently been singled out for criticism by Russia’s military blogger community, and was repeatedly accused of corruption by former Wagner mercenary chief Yevgeny Prigozhin in a series of explosive video addresses on the eve of the short-lived June 2023 Wagner mutiny.

Unsurprisingly, Shoigu’s departure was widely cheered within Russia’s so-called “Z-patriot” pro-war community. Media tycoon and prominent Russian nationalist Konstantin Malofeyev toasted the news, while suggesting Belousov’s appointment would now make defense “the absolute priority” of Russian state policy. “We’ll have both guns and butter,” he commented.

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Putin’s decision to finally remove Shoigu and replace him with a veteran economist comes as he begins a fifth presidential term while bogged down in the largest European invasion since World War II. His new defense minister is now expected to focus on boosting domestic Russian arms production while channeling resources toward the development of the country’s defense tech sector. “Today on the battlefield, the winner is the one who is more open to innovation,” commented Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov on the recent ministerial changes in Moscow.

Belousov appears well qualified to meet the twin challenges of improving armament output and aiding Russia’s efforts to regain the technological advantage in the war against Ukraine. His long career in government gives him detailed knowledge of the Russian economy and the intricacies of state budgets, while he has a record of supporting the development of Russia’s drone capabilities. Belousov will now join a number of other senior government officials with similarly strong defense tech credentials including Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin, Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Chernyshenko, and Minister of Digital Development Maksut Shadayev.

Despite being removed from his defense post, Shoigu has not been kicked to the curb. His appointment as Secretary of Russia’s National Security Council, replacing longtime Putin confidant Nikolai Patrushev, should allow him to retain significant influence within the Kremlin. At the same time, it is not clear whether Shoigu will be able to exercise the same kind of power as his predecessor, who now takes on a new role as an aide to Putin. While this has the appearance of a slight demotion for Patrushev, the parallel promotion of his son Dmitry to the position of deputy prime minister would suggest that he will remain an influential figure.

The recent changes in the leadership of Russia’s Defense Ministry do not signal any fundamental shift in Putin’s war aims. On the contrary, this week’s appointment confirms Putin’s continued commitment to the invasion of Ukraine and his readiness to prioritize the war effort over all other considerations. Putin clearly intends to place Russia on an indefinite wartime footing, and hopes Belousov is capable of managing the process with maximum efficiency.

Mercedes Sapuppo is a program assistant at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

Putin’s one tank victory parade is a timely reminder Russia can be beaten

Peter Dickinson — Thu, 09 May 2024 20:35:44 +0000

For the second year running, Russia’s Victory Day parade in Moscow on May 9 featured just one solitary tank. Throughout his twenty-four year reign, Russian ruler Vladimir Putin has used the annual Victory Day holiday to showcase his country’s resurgence as a military superpower. However, the underwhelming spectacle of a single World War II-era T-34 tank pootling across Red Square has now become a embarrassing tradition and a painful reminder of the catastrophic losses suffered by the Russian military in Ukraine.

Prior to the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Victory Day parades had typically featured dozens of tanks as the Kremlin sought to demonstrate its vast arsenal and trumpet Russia’s leading role in the defeat of Nazi Germany. The difference this year did not go unnoticed, with many commentators poking fun at Putin. “This T-34, the legendary Soviet tank from World War II, was the only Russian tank on display at the Victory Day parade in Red Square today. The others must all be busy somewhere!” quipped Financial Times Moscow bureau chief Max Seddon.

Putin’s parade came just one day after analysts at open source conflict monitoring site Oryx announced that visually confirmed Russian tank losses in Ukraine had passed the 3000 mark. Oryx researchers document military losses based on video or photographic evidence, while recognizing that overall figures are likely to be “significantly higher” than those verified by publicly available open source materials. Meanwhile, the latest figures from the Ukrainian military indicate Russia has lost as many as 7429 tanks since February 2022. While Ukraine’s claims regarding Russian battlefield losses are generally treated with a degree of skepticism, even the visually confirmed baseline figure of 3000 tanks underlines the devastating toll of Putin’s invasion on the Russian military.

In addition to exposing the Kremlin’s dwindling supply of tanks, this year’s strikingly modest Victory Day festivities have also drawn attention to other negative consequences of Russia’s ongoing Ukraine invasion. During the buildup to the holiday, a number of major Russian cities including Pskov, Kursk, Bryansk, and Belgorod announced they would not be staging traditional Victory Day parades this year. These cancellations were justified on security grounds, highlighting the growing threat posed by Ukraine to targets inside Russia.

Since the start of 2024, Ukraine has brought the war home to Russia with a highly successful long-range drone campaign against the country’s oil and gas industry, including air strikes against refineries located more than one thousand kilometers from the Ukrainian border. While Kyiv has largely refrained from attacks on civilian targets, Ukraine’s proven ability to strike deep inside Russia is a major blow to the Kremlin, which has vowed to shield the Russian public from the war and prevent any disruption to everyday life.

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The downgrading of Russia’s Victory Day celebrations is a personal blow for Putin, who has sought to place the holiday at the heart of efforts to revive Russian nationalism following the loss of status and perceived humiliations of the early post-Soviet period. This approach marked a departure from the Soviet years, when Victory Day was overshadowed by a number of more ideologically driven holidays such as May Day and the annual anniversary of the October Revolution. Indeed, during the 46-year period between the end of World War II and the fall of the USSR, the Soviet authorities held just three Victory Day military parades in Moscow.

It was Putin who masterminded the rise of Victory Day to its current position as Russia’s most important public holiday. Since the early 2000s, he has transformed Victory Day into the propaganda centerpiece of a pseudo-religious cult, complete with its own sacred symbols, feast days, saints, and dogmas. Anyone who dares question the Kremlin’s heavily distorted and highly sanitized version of the Soviet role in World War II is treated with the kind of ruthless severity once reserved for medieval heretics. Meanwhile, in a further nod to the continued potency of the World War II narrative in Putin’s Russia, opponents of the Kremlin are routinely branded as “fascists” and “Nazis.”

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The mythology surrounding Putin’s Victory Day cult is not just a matter of repairing battered Russian national pride. It has also helped strengthen perceptions of the Russian army as unbeatable. Both inside Russia and among international audiences, the pomp and propaganda surrounding the holiday have encouraged people to view the Russian army as simply too big and powerful to be defeated. This is complete nonsense. The past few centuries of Russian history are littered with resounding military defeats including the Crimean War, the Russo-Japanese War, and the failed Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Russia even managed to lose World War I, despite starting the war on the winning side.

The historically unjustified but widespread belief that Russian victory is somehow inevitable has helped shape the West’s weak response to the invasion of Ukraine. When the war began, most Western observers were convinced Ukraine would fall in a matter of days. Even after the Ukrainian military shocked the world by winning battle after battle and liberating half the land occupied by Russia, many have clung to the assumption that eventual Russian victory remains assured. This defeatist thinking has been an important factor hampering efforts to arm Ukraine adequately. It may yet become a self-fulfilling prophesy.

The sight of a lone tank on Red Square this week is a timely reminder that behind the facade of overwhelming strength, Putin’s Russia is far from invincible. For years, the Kremlin has sought to intimidate the outside world with carefully choreographed displays of military muscle-flexing. However, the invasion of Ukraine has revealed a very different reality. Since February 2022, Putin’s once vaunted army has seen its reputation plummet and has suffered a series of stinging battlefield defeats while failing to achieve a decisive breakthrough against its much smaller neighbor. The Russian military remains a formidable force and should not be underestimated, but the events of the past two years have demonstrated that it is also very much beatable. If Ukraine is finally given the necessary tools by the country’s partners, it will finish the job.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

This year’s Distinguished Leadership Awards celebrate leaders navigating the world through multifaceted crises.

Event transcript

Uncorrected transcript: Check against delivery

JOHN F.W. ROGERS: I want to welcome everyone to the Atlantic Council Distinguished Leadership Awards. And it’s a pleasure to see all of you here tonight. And we gather to honor some of the world’s most impressive and influential leaders, and to highlight the Atlantic Council’s time-honored commitment to providing the intellectual, engaged global leadership necessary to meet the world’s most demanding challenges, and to ensure that self-determination, that freedom and prosperity can one day be an enduring reality across all nations.

We convene, however, at a decisive moment for the Atlantic Council and the world over. In an era of uncommon geopolitical uncertainty and unrest, as we navigate the social, economic, and political issues that define one of the most fragile, if not foreboding, moments of our time. It is vital that we are guided by people of insight, and experience, and resolve. Leaders who confront obstacles with the confidence and the steady hand that will help chart a course towards a more stable and secure world order. We are fortunate to have such individuals with us as we honor them tonight.

Moreso, the collective interest of peoples and of cultures and countries everywhere, with so much at stake, are fortunate to have our slate of honorees as their—at their posts, defending the principles of democracy and promoting a peaceful way of life [to] which all are entitled as a basic tenet of humanity—intrinsic and universal actually to all humankind. In no small way, the formidable trials we face in the world today are a reminder that the Atlantic Council raison d’être has never been more relevant or critically central to geopolitical harmony.

We must acknowledge that the work will be difficult, that the solutions are hard earned. But I say, with optimism and confidence, that we are prepared as we’ve ever been in our sixty-year history, with world-class thought leadership, tactical acumen, and operational expertise, to meet this moment with a single-minded resolve that is second to none. In doing so, working in tandem with our international partners, we are able to galvanize an influential network of global leaders and policy experts, whose own intellectual contribution and actionable strategies both complement and buttress the work of the Council. In solidarity we stand proven and ready to shape the global future together. That mission is greatly enriched by the distinguished leaders that we celebrate tonight.

An American president once observed, if your actions inspire others to dream, to learn more, to do more, and become more, you are a leader.

This year, the Atlantic Council recognizes that undeniable few who inspire us and the world to become more, to envision something better, to strive for something brighter, and safeguard those ideals that we hold dear. They represent the very best of our transatlantic partnership and serve as shining examples of the Atlantic Council’s highest aspirations.

And it’s now my privilege to add four exemplary leaders to the rolls of our past honorees who have distinguished themselves each in their own way and made an enduring if not indelible impact on the world.

Tonight we salute a high school physics teacher who became a mayor of his hometown, a leader of a national political party, and eventually reaching the highest rungs of his land, the president of Romania; an army brat who earned a degree in biology from Princeton, who speaks four languages, and who has forged a career from a combat infantryman to a supreme allied commander of Europe; a precocious student, one of the very first women ever to attend La Salle Academy, who would graduate valedictorian, become a Rhodes scholar, governor of her home state, and now the US secretary of Commerce; and an Academy Award winner, an action hero, and a reluctant Miss World contestant, an actress whose acclaimed roles include goodwill ambassador for the United Nations.

Ladies and gentlemen, these are our 2024 Distinguished Leader honorees, and I know I speak for all of us in this room when I say that we are in awe of their achievements, inspired by their character, and humbled in their presence.

Now please turn your attention to the screen, and we will begin the first of our videos honoring the president of Romania.

We convene at a decisive moment for the Atlantic Council and the world over in an era of uncommon geopolitical uncertainty.

Atlantic Council Board Chairman John F.W. Rogers kicks off tonight’s #ACAwards.

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— Atlantic Council (@AtlanticCouncil) May 8, 2024

ANNOUNCER: To present the Distinguished International Leadership Award, please welcome Atlantic Council International Advisory Board chairman, Stephen J. Hadley.

STEPHEN J. HADLEY: Good evening. Thank you all for being here for this terrific evening program. We have a wonderful group of awardees, and I have the honor of introducing one of them to you now.

From his early days as a physics teacher in the small town of Sibiu, to serving as head of state of Romania, President Klaus Werner Iohannis has always had a vision for the future of his country. Over the course of his career, President Iohannis has led his country in bolstering judicial independence and strengthening the rule of law, increasing electoral participation, protecting the rights of minorities, and reforming Romania’s educational system. He has shown what nations of vision can achieve with a steadfast commitment to democracy, fairness, confidence, and rule of law.

Importantly, President Iohannis has always believed that there is no contradiction between a united Europe and a strong transatlantic alliance. Quite the contrary; they are mutually reinforcing.

As national security adviser to President George W. Bush, I was present in Romania’s capital city of Bucharest during the 2008 NATO Summit. I witnessed the failure of NATO to offer a membership action plan to Ukraine and Georgia, a failure that gave Russian President Vladimir Putin the belief that he could invade each of these countries without fear of a unified NATO response.

Now, with Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine at their doorstep, Romanians have an enormous stake in maintaining and reinforcing European and allied unity. President Iohannis has responded by bolstering Romania and NATO’s defense of the alliance’s eastern flank, strengthening the US-Romanian strategic partnership, advocating for continued NATO and EU enlargement, and forging strategic partnerships with Japan and South Korea. Under his leadership, Romania has provided critical support to Ukraine in its fight for freedom and has been the most important route for Ukrainian grain shipments to the Global South by sea, road, and rail. As we celebrate President Iohannis tonight, let us hope that his principled leadership inspires others to face this historic moment as he has, with courage, with dedication, and above all, with vision.

And now, please join me in welcoming President Iohannis to the stage.

KLAUS WERNER IOHANNIS: Thank you very much. Good evening.

I am honored to receive this award. I accept it as a recognition of Romania’s leadership over the past twenty years as a proud NATO member, and US partner and friend.

Starting in 2001, a few years before we joined NATO, and then throughout our two decades of membership, Romania and the Romanian people have made bold, brave, and determined decisions to strengthen the democratic fabric of our society, live up to our transatlantic security commitments, and turn our country into an anchor of strategic stability, prosperity, and progress in a still troubled part of Europe.

Romania has set an example in many areas in Central and Eastern Europe from defending the eastern flank of NATO to investing in democracy, human rights, and the rule of law. These Romanian efforts have consequences that go far beyond our national borders. They, in fact, have helped strengthen Europe and the transatlantic alliance and they deserve to be recognized.

So I would like to thank Fred Kempe and the Atlantic Council board of directors for making this choice to recognize and honor Romania for these efforts. I’m also grateful to the former National Security Adviser Stephen Hadley for the introduction tonight and for the unparalleled work in helping to shape and implement President George W. Bush’s vision of a Europe whole and free where Romanians and the other Central and East European nations can embrace dignity, democracy, and prosperity. We should honor this tonight as well.

In 2011 Vice President Joe Biden was on this stage for the same award and at the time made a very powerful statement about America’s engagement in Central Europe. He said, I quote, “The time for Central Europe has come. You have shown yourselves ready for common challenges, willing to tackle them, and able to overcome them. That’s why in America we no longer think in terms of what we can do for Central Europe but, rather, in terms of what we can do together with Central Europe.”

And, indeed, our country stepped up to meet the responsibilities of being America’s eastward partners and allies. That is how the Bucharest Nine format occurred, an initiative spearheaded in 2015 by Romania and Poland that includes all eastern flank nations and provides a robust platform to coordinate our security resources within NATO.

This is how most of our countries on the eastern flank have started to make progress in raising defense budgets and upgrading our military infrastructure and equipment. That is how our countries have been empowered to act with unity and resolve and to put up a strong deterrent against the Russian expansionism while at the same time holding true to our core transatlantic democratic values.

There is no other more powerful proof of that than the way in which our countries on the eastern flank have responded to Russia’s unjustified aggression against Ukraine and to Ukraine’s vital needs to defend itself and to reject this horrible Russian attack.

As president of Romania I can tell you that Romania has truly been standing out in the first line through its efforts to help Ukraine. Over 7.5 million Ukrainians have crossed the border into Romania seeking refuge, safety, and safe passage. Almost forty thousand children are now studying in Romanian classrooms.

Millions of tons of humanitarian assistance have crossed into Ukraine through and from Romania. Romania also helped Ukraine maintain a vital economic lifeline, leveraging our unique maritime connections and facilitating the transit of almost forty million tons of grain, almost 70 percent of Ukrainian grain exports through the Romanian ports on the Danube River and the Black Sea. All these efforts continue for as long as it takes because we know that Romania plays a key role in helping Ukraine achieve victory and peace, succeed economically, and integrate into the European Union.

So my message to you tonight is, Romania took this call seriously. What can America do, together with Central Europe? We are working together to enhance our collective security, advanced freedom and economic progress, and make sure that democracy continues to deliver. It is our shared responsibility. And you can count on our ability to carry through because the United States has no better ally than Romania. I dedicate this award to all Romanians and to the partnership and friendship between Romania and the United States of America. Thank you very much.

“The United States has no better ally than Romania.”

President @KlausIohannis accepts the @AtlanticCouncil’s Distinguished International Leadership Award.

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— Atlantic Council (@AtlanticCouncil) May 8, 2024

ANNOUNCER: To present the Distinguished [International] Leadership Award, please welcome back John F.W. Rogers.

JOHN F.W. ROGERS: Ladies and gentlemen, on behalf of the Atlantic Council it’s a great privilege to recognize the honorable Gina Raimondo with a Distinguished International Leadership Award. We do so for her pioneering spirit, and her extraordinary record of achievement, for selfless service to people and causes that rise above self-interest or parochial interests, and for unflinching determination to always do what’s right to find a way forward and to see her vision through. In short, we honor Gina not for what she has accomplished but what she has accomplished for and on behalf of others.

And she does so with grace, and with understanding, with empathy, and, yes, with a relentless tenacity and a sense of purpose that make her an undeniable force of nature. And I think it was her son who best described it to me: Never stand in between an Italian woman and her objective. It’s no hyperbole to say that Gina is set apart with a rare handful who come along each generation, the most gifted and self-driven among us, be that innate or shaped by one’s experiences, with a capacity to help the rest of us not only see what the future can be, but can lead us to it. Who can show us the way.

You have all heard the expression, it is the hope that kills you. Now, usually that’s applied to my favorite sports team. But when you are on Gina’s team, it is the lack of hope that is fatal. Because she views the world through the optimistic lens of opportunity rather than dwelling on how difficult things may be, she focuses on getting things done. It’s something that I’ve had the opportunity to witness firsthand, or more aptly put, the privilege to be able to learn from, as we’ve partnered to support programs for small businesses during her tenure as Rhode Island’s governor. In a state where small enterprises employ nearly 50 percent of the private workforce, Gina made it her personal mission to create jobs and opportunities, if not a better way of life, for her constituents. From my front row seat, both her efforts and outcomes were nothing shy of awe-inspiring. But I’ve come to learn that that’s just Gina.

You know, an English poet once wrote, originality is being different from oneself, not others, which has at its essence, a message about exploring more, growing more, becoming more than who we are at the outset of life’s journey. And from her earliest years, Gina demonstrated a markable aptitude for progressive achievement. Further still, it seemed to be a rare sort of success, boldly crossing any lines of expectation. She was always improvising, innovating, pushing boundaries, even her own, showing us that being different from oneself is perhaps the most authentic way to be true to oneself, when considering the outer limits of our potential.

As an adolescent riding the public bus to school, Gina proved destined to be a trailblazer. She was among the first girls allowed to attend her high school, not an insignificant display of courage and grit for those, and all of us here, who can remember the tribulations of teenage years. She would go on to graduate as the class valedictorian, ratifying her right to be there in spades, and paving the way for girls to follow. More than that, Gina showed them what was possible, a real-world application of the adage, if you can see it, you can be it.

Continuing on to Harvard where she would graduate, here again, as the top economic student in her class, Gina found new areas for growth, if not her fair share of sprains, and bumps, and bruises by joining the women’s rugby team which she has since credited as being the good training for her career on politics. Something that I’m sure all of us can certainly understand.

She would go on to become a Rhodes Scholar and earn her doctorate at Oxford, where her thesis on single motherhood and her experiences with housing and poverty clinics inspired her passion for advocacy, and eventually, a law degree from Yale. Years later, having spent time in the private sector working for a venture capital firm before deciding to start her own investment firm, Gina recounts that it wasn’t until the prospect of local public libraries closing—the same institution that taught her immigrant grandfather to read English—that she redirected her efforts toward public service, first becoming the treasurer of her state, and four years later, the first woman governor of the state of Rhode Island.

And from her perch today as commerce secretary, Gina continues to create the conditions for good-paying jobs, thriving entrepreneurship, and a competitive business landscape. In doing so, she is roundly recognized for being innovative, pragmatic, open-minded, and most of all, collaborative. And by the way, if you ever took a college course on legislative processes in the US, you have come across a book, The Dance of Legislation, and you only need to look at the dance of the CHIPS Act as the case study of how she gets things done. All the while, she has managed to fulfill what she would describe as her most important duties, as a spouse and a mother of two. And I’m very happy that her husband is here tonight, Andy Moffit, to see her.

Let me conclude with these remarks: I think all of you may remember Robert Frost’s poem “The Road Not Taken”: “Two roads diverged into a yellow wood, and sorry [I could not travel both. And be one traveler, long I stood, and looked down [one] as [far] as I could.”

But in the end of this poem, it is all that one road is chosen. “Took [the] one less traveled by, and that has made all the difference.” Now, whether that is a satire on decision making, or a commentary on destiny, in any event, in Gina’s case her road has been few would ever be able to take, even if they wanted to, as it requires an echelon of insight, tenacity, charisma, and character. As such, by fortitude or fate, Gina Raimondo’s road has indeed been the one less taken, and that has made all the difference. Ladies and gentlemen, please welcome Secretary Raimondo.

GINA RAIMONDO: Thank you, John. I certainly feel unworthy of this award, but I think I feel even more unworthy of that introduction. A better friend you will not find then John Rogers, a man of grace, integrity, and passion. Thank you. He also knows me extremely well, so I was a little nervous when I heard he was introducing me. So I appreciate the kindness.

A huge thank you and gratitude to the Atlantic Council for this award. And more important, thank you for your work which has endured for more than sixty years to promote transatlantic cooperation and the core values that have made our world a better place. I also have to congratulate my fellow awardees. Mr. President, congratulations. Thank you for being with us. Thank you for your leadership. It’s quite humbling for me to share the stage with the honorees this evening.

I asked, why would I be chosen for this award? And I was told that it was in part because of the work I’ve done to advance US national security and the security of democracies around the world. Now, I have to be honest with you. When President Biden, or president-elect, asked me if I would serve as his commerce secretary, truth be told I wasn’t really sure what a commerce secretary did. Then you start learning about the job, and you realize you do everything from running the weather service to national fisheries, to space commerce, to export controls. So really, honestly, there’s not much you don’t do.

But it didn’t take me long to realize the absolutely vital role that the Commerce Department plays in ensuring our national security. And here’s why: Because our economic strength, our economic competitiveness is national security. And that is truer now than it has ever been, because in the twenty-first century, this technological age, the source of our strength isn’t just that we have the best, most advanced military in the world—although, of course, we do and we need to.

But the truth of the matter is that our ability to operate in the world, to lead the world, depends vitally on our economic strength. And as this institution knows well, the world is a safer place when America leads. And our ability to lead depends entirely on the strength of the US economy, its dynamism, and the speed at which we innovate. And so that’s why I’m so focused—persistent, as John would say, obsessed, as I have said—with helping US businesses to out-compete, and out-innovate, and to do that with our allies.

Because when I travel all around the globe, I often bring private sector leaders with me. And it’s America’s brands, America’s entrepreneurs, and our technical leadership that are the envy of the world. And it helps to make the US a partner of choice. But I’ll tell you, some of my most successful trips have included—have included trips where I’ve invited a top member of the US military to join me. I’ve done this several times, most recently to Costa Rica.

I had the great privilege to travel to Costa Rica with the [US Southern Command] Commander General Laura Richardson, first female four-star in the US Army. And why did we go together to Costa Rica? We went together to focus on diversifying and strengthening our semiconductor supply chains in the Western Hemisphere. This helps US companies to be more competitive, to diversify away from just one or two countries in Asia, and it enhances our national security. And as the president just said, it also allows us to show that democracy delivers. Democracy delivers jobs, investment, and opportunity.

And so whether we’re talking about enhancing supply chain resiliency with our investments in Latin America, working with our allies in Europe, expanding our commercial presence in the Indo-Pacific, it has never been truer that our national security and our economic competitiveness are interconnected and inexorably linked. If we want to secure resilient supply chains, if want a safe and prosperous future, and if we want to maintain US leadership, it all depends on the strength and dynamism of our economy and our private sector.

So tomorrow when I go back to work, or later this evening, it means we’re going to get back to work investing at home, investing in broadband, investing in manufacturing, investing in chips, investing in AI. It means we’re going to continue to work to deepen our commercial relationships with commercial partners and allies all across the world. And it means we’re going to work alongside our allies, many in this room, to fuel innovation, and to do it consistent with our shared values. And of course, we must always protect our most sensitive technology from falling into the wrong hands, those countries who don’t share our values.

So now I know what the Commerce Department secretary does. That’s what we’re focused on, the commerce secretary. And I will end by saying none of the work that I do, none of the work that the fifty thousand incredible employees that I have at the Commerce Department does would be possible without your support. With partners like the Atlantic Council, every person in this room—private sector, public sector, civil society—we have to stay committed now more than ever. So thank you to the Atlantic Council for your decades of dedication to supporting a strong international system, and thank you again for this great honor. Thank you.

“Our ability to operate in the world—to lead the world, depends vitally on our economic strength.”

@SecRaimondo accepts the @AtlanticCouncil’s Distinguished International Leadership Award.

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— Atlantic Council (@AtlanticCouncil) May 9, 2024

ANNOUNCER: Please welcome Atlantic Council President and CEO Frederick Kempe.

FREDERICK KEMPE: So, first of all, congratulations to President Iohannis and Secretary Raimondo. What a wonderful start of the evening.

We’re about to go into the dinner break, and then after that we’ll be honoring General Cavoli and Michelle Yeoh.

But first I wanted to say something about the flags that you see here along the wall. These flags are to commemorate the seventy-fifth anniversary of NATO, history’s most successful and enduring alliance. The flags represent all thirty-two members of the alliance, with the recent addition of Finland and Sweden. So welcome, Finland and Sweden.

Right now, and in honor of the alliance and before the break, and also in recognition of General Cavoli’s award upcoming, we’re going to present you a delicious appetizer in the form of a musical tribute to honor this year’s seventy-fifth anniversary of NATO. Joining America’s Own, an incredible brass and wind ensemble, please welcome Jazz at Lincoln Center favorite, trumpeter and celebrated recording artist, Bria Skonberg.

[Dinner break]

FREDERICK KEMPE: Hello, everybody. If you could take your seats, we’re going to continue our awards.

Ladies and gentlemen—ladies and gentlemen, distinguished guests, tonight’s honorees, thank you so night—for all coming out tonight for this small birthday party for my wife, Pam. Now, I promised Pam that I would do nothing to embarrass her in front of this vast audience. As one of America’s leading deception detectors, she should have known I was lying. But happy birthday, Pam. Thanks for participating with us. By the way, it’s also the 140th birthday of Harry Truman, but I’m going to come back to that. Pam is much younger.

With apologies, Pam, and on a more serious note, as you all know by now, we are here to celebrate a birthday that’s somewhat more fundamental to the purpose of the Atlantic Council. NATO was born seventy-five years ago, just down the street from here at Mellon Auditorium on April 4, 1949. That is when the alliance founders signed the world’s most—the world’s most enduring, history’s most enduring and successful alliance into being.

As I wrote on that anniversary, President Truman and other founders had an advantage, a really significant advantage, that today’s leaders cannot replicate. All of them had experienced—all of them had experienced the horrors of World War II. All the founders of the Atlantic Council—Dean Acheson, Mary Pillsbury Lord, Henry Cabot Lodge, Lucius Clay, they had all experienced those horrors. And a great many of them also personally knew the ravages of World War I. They understood the urgency of the moment. I’m not sure we do.

That deficit of memory is our greatest peril in 2024, a time when we are facing the greatest threats to global order since the 1930s. It’s perhaps why we have, in my view, responded insufficiently to the challenges of our age, recognizing too slowly the dangers posed by Russian despot Vladimir Putin and like-minded autocrats. One cannot change the historical experience of today’s alliance leaders, nor can one change the historic experience of their electorates. Even President Biden, at age eighty-one, was only two years old when World War II ended.

The best we can do is listen to President Harry S. Truman’s words from the day of the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty, and heed its warnings. And I quote: “Twice in recent years nations have felt the sickening blow of unprovoked aggression. Our peoples, to whom our governments are responsible, demand that these things shall not happen again. We are determined that they shall not happen again,” end quote, Harry Truman.

He called the treaty, a simple document. He likened it to a homeowner’s agreement to protect the neighborhood. He said, if it had existed in 1914 or 1939, the community it brought together could have prevented the acts of aggression which led to two world wars. It is in Truman’s spirit that we come together this evening as a global neighborhood and, as I said, by coincidence, this would be his 140th birthday.

You are sitting among six hundred individuals from more than fifty countries to celebrate Distinguished Leadership and tonight’s honorees. You are senior officials, global business executives, military brass, leading journalists, civil society leaders, and more. President Iohannis, General Cavoli, Secretary Raimondo, and Michelle Yeoh, congratulations and thank you for inspiring us all with your example of principled leadership toward a better world.

President Iohannis, you don’t know this, but my relationship with your country dates back to the time of Ceaușescu, when I was working as a journalist for Newsweek and the Wall Street Journal. And anyone who’s experienced any of that can only wonder at the miracle of Romania’s free markets, free peoples, membership in the European Union, NATO. None of that was to be taken for granted. So congratulations to Romania for that.

I can tell you a lot about my time in Romania. Our relationship, the Atlantic Council’s relationship with Romania, dates back to the NATO summit of 2008, where we hosted a youth summit, supported by Dinu Patriciu, who became a member of the Atlantic Council, in partnership with the intelligence leader at that time of Romania, George Maior, who was an ambassador here, with speakers that included President George W. Bush.

I think Steve Hadley was right that the outcome of that summit was not great. But I think the Atlantic Council’s relationship with Romania started there, and that’s terrific.

It’s great to have in the audience Alex Serban, who has been one of our strongest supporters in Bucharest ever since. It’s wonderful to be working with your embassy here and Ambassador Muraru. We have our partner in the audience, Remus Pricopie. And Remus, it’s so wonderful to work with you and your university.

President Iohannis, for us this is not a one-off event. We understood the strategic importance of Romania early on. And we’ve just wondered at how you’ve built it, and we agree with you that there is no better American ally than Romania. There are a lot of good Romanian allies, so we’ll count them equal. But there is no better.

Our honoring of you this evening marks a high point in this long and strategic relationship.

General Cavoli, we’ll be turning to you soon for your award. I know you’re joined tonight by members of your family. Oh, my God, how proud you must be of General Cavoli. It’s nice to have your family here.

In the early 1960s, the Atlantic Council’s founders debated a core question: How should they define the scope of their organization’s mission? Mary Pillsbury Lord, the sole signatory of the Council’s certificate of incorporation in 1961, argued for a global approach to transatlantic concerns. And there were people who were against her. But she wanted an approach for the Atlantic Council that went far beyond the United States and Europe.

I wish she were here today to see the Atlantic Council in this room. She foresaw the challenges we would face together. The Atlantic Council’s mission is to shape the global future together with partners and allies, building from our transatlantic base, but working closely with our global partners.

We do this at a time when we confront wars in Europe and the Middle East, continued tensions regarding China, a contest for the commanding heights of technological change, and a breathtaking slate of elections around the world. More than 50 percent of humanity is voting in this year, including our own elections this November.

We act, at the Atlantic Council, in the conviction that with sufficient political will, we can not only navigate these difficulties, but emerge even stronger. We do that across sixteen dynamically collaborative programs and centers, both regional and functional in nature.

Just last year, we were involved in major convenings in Asia, the Middle East, Africa, Latin America, Europe, and, of course, the United States. We took leading roles at COP28 in Dubai and at the IMF-World Bank meetings in Marrakesh.

Mary Pillsbury Lord, I wish you were here.

Our functional centers tackle geopolitical and geoeconomic issues, energy and climate issues, security and technological issues, the connection between freedom and prosperity. Tonight I’m delighted to announce the creation of something new, something we’re calling Atlantic Council Global Technology Programs, which will help galvanize all the amazing technology-related work we’re doing across the organization, with a focus on harnessing technology for good.

Managed by Atlantic Council Vice President Graham Brookie, this will bring together our GeoTech Center, our Digital Forensic Research Lab, our Cyber Statecraft Initiative, and our Technology and Democracy Initiative. It’ll work closely with the Scowcroft Center, which remains the lead on defense-related and strategic-related technologies, and the Europe Center, which leads our work on transatlantic technological cooperation, trying to build a transatlantic digital marketplace, and the Global Energy Center, which focuses on clean energy technology.

Bolstered by programmatic innovations like this, the Atlantic Council will move this fall—and I hope you’ll all come there—into a new global headquarters at 1400 L, just two blocks from our current office. It’s a gorgeous space. It will be a transformative move for the Atlantic Council. You will be in great company with members of our board and international advisory board leadership, who have also contributed and named high-profile spaces in the building. And on that score, let me thank Adrienne Arsht, John Rogers, and Phillipe Amon for stepping up first. I encourage anyone interested in learning more about our new global headquarters to speak to me or anyone else at the Atlantic Council.

These two announcements, the creation of the Atlantic Council Global Technology Program and the opening of our new global headquarters, are just two examples of our continued story of growth and innovation, a story so many of you in this audience helped write. Thanks to you, the Atlantic Council has become a remarkable force multiplier, and for our transatlantic and global partners in our quest to navigate these difficult times, hugely difficult times, and shape a freer and more prosperous and secure future.

And in that spirit, we now want to thank many of you who are here this evening as co-chairs of tonight’s distinguished leadership awards dinner. I’d ask you to turn your attention to the screens as we salute those individuals who have made this possible tonight. And I join my finance chair in George Lund, in thanking you so much for this. Please hold your applause so that everyone can hear the names and companies who have co-chaired this evening.

“Thank you for inspiring us all with your example of principled leadership toward a better world.”

Atlantic Council President and CEO @FredKempe congratulates tonight’s Distinguished Leadership Awards honorees.

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— Atlantic Council (@AtlanticCouncil) May 9, 2024

ANNOUNCER: And now, please join us in saluting the co-chairs of the 2024 Atlantic Council Distinguished Leadership Awards. We thank all of tonight’s sponsors for their generous support for this evening’s program, and for the Atlantic Council’s ongoing work to shape the global future together.

Adrienne Arsht. Sarah Beshar. John F.W. Rogers. RTX, represented by Greg Hayes. Airbus, represented by C. Jeffrey Knittel. Alpha Ring International, represented by Peter Liu. Robert J. Abernethy. Bank of America, represented by Larry Di Rita. Blackstone Charitable Foundation, represented by Stephen A. Schwarzman. Ahmed Charai. Chevron Corporation, represented by Albert J. Williams. Edelman, represented by Richard Edelman. E-INFRA Group, represented by Teofil Muresan. FedEx Corporation, represented by Gina F. Adams. Georgetown Entertainment Group, represented by Franco Nuschese. Google, represented by Karan Bhatia. Kirkland & Ellis, represented by Ivan Schlager. John and Susan Klein. KNDS, represented by Marcel Grisnigt. Leviatan Group, represented by Cătălin Robert Podaru. George Lund. Mapa Group, represented by Mehmet Nazif Günal. William Marron. Alexander V. Mirtchev. MITRE, represented by Keoki Jackson. Ahmet M. Oren. Pernod Ricard USA, represented by Tara Engel. Charles O. Rossotti. SAIC, represented by John Bonsell. Serban and Musneci Associates, represented by Alex Serban. Squire Patton Boggs, represented by Edward J. Newberry. Steptoe, represented by Karl Hopkins. Thales, represented by Alan Pellegrini. UPS, represented by Laura Lane. Ambassador Clifford M. Sobel.

FREDERICK KEMPE: I want to ask all the co-chairs to rise. If all the co-chairs could rise, so we can applaud you. Thank you so much. We can’t do our work without you. Thanks so much for that.

And finally, I’d like to ask the following individuals to rise. Some of you will be rising for a second time. So, International Advisory Board members of the Atlantic Council and Atlantic Council staff and board members of the Atlantic Council, please rise. Please join me in applauding this remarkable community of action.

One last point before our next honoree. Don’t forget to take your gift bags tonight. Which include my dear friend David Ignatius’ new novel, hot off the press, Phantom Orbit, generously contributed by Adrienne Arsht, and Frank McCourt’s provocative new book about managing our new digital age, Our Biggest Fight.

With that, ladies and gentlemen, please turn your attention to the screens as we salute tonight’s next honoree.

ANNOUNCER: To present our next awardee, please welcome General John Abizaid.

GENERAL JOHN P. ABIZAID (RET.): Good evening, everybody. It’s great to see you. I have the great honor of introducing to you General Chris Cavoli. Now, Cavoli and I have known each other for a long time. That’s very difficult for him to imagine what I’m going to say. But it’s all right. Relax, Chris.

But before we do that, I really want all the veterans of the United States armed forces and our allied nations in NATO to stand up and be recognized. Thank you. It’s great to have veterans in the audience.

I first met Chris when he was a lieutenant of infantry when I assumed command of the Third Battalion 325th Airborne Battalion Combat Team in Vicenza, Italy. In a battalion packed with the most talented junior officers in our Army, most of whom were top West Point graduates, Chris distinguished himself as a skilled leader and superb trainer. A Princeton graduate, he was well known for his famous undergraduate thesis entitled The Effect of Earthworms on the Vertical Distribution of Slime Molds in the Soil. As you could imagine, this work held him in good stead with the sergeants of the US Army Ranger School.

However, Chris demonstrated his true genius by marrying Christina Dacey, a smart, dynamic leader in her own right. These two professionals not only built wonderful careers together, they also built an Army family that traveled the world and had two sons who exhibit the great talents of both their parents.

Chris’s career is filled with remarkable achievements: a master’s degree in Russian studies at Yale, a foreign area officer who speaks Italian, Russian, and French. He personifies our nation’s commitment to the Atlantic alliance.

Not only does he understand the complexities of our most dangerous adversary but he knows how to fight and win. As a general he reformed the doctrine and structure of the alliance to reflect the realities of modern warfare and he ably assists our Ukrainian friends in their difficult struggle against Russian aggression.

He, along with his partners, have forged a formidable alliance. While his accomplishments of a general officer are great, I also honor him for his combat leadership. I can remember visiting his infantry battalion in one of the most restive dangerous provinces of Afghanistan.

There he led tough, disciplined American soldiers of the 10th Mountain Division while at the same time building professional confidence and competence of his Afghan allies. Here was a fit, dedicated, charismatic young colonel serving in one of the most isolated, dangerous places on earth and it was clear he held the respect of all.

His leadership is marked by courage both on and off the battlefield, by professional competence second to none, and by a remarkable common sense often not seen. Many officers aspire to high command but too few understand that being a warfighter means forging a team that must be able to fight and win tomorrow.

It’s been remarkable to know Chris all these years. He was the best lieutenant I ever knew, the best lieutenant colonel I ever knew, and the best general I know. In Chris Cavoli, our nation has built a gifted soldier, statesman, and leader. Thank God for his leadership at this dangerous time in our history.

Ladies and gentlemen, please welcome this remarkable soldier.

GENERAL CHRISTOPHER G. CAVOLI: Good evening, ladies and gentlemen, distinguished guests. Way too many to mention you all. What a gathering.

Thank you all. I’m very deeply humbled to stand before you tonight, mostly because I recognize that this honor is really not about me. It’s really about the defenders of thirty-two nations, the men, women, and families of the United States and our NATO allies who tirelessly stand guard to secure our freedoms, and I thank them for that in front of you tonight.

General Abizaid, thank you for the far too kind introduction. Thank you for reminding everybody why I became an infantry officer, because I was not a biologist. Thank you for your leadership and your inspiration since I met you when I was a young lieutenant. There is no one I have wanted to emulate more. I’m so lucky to have you and Kathy here tonight.

To the Atlantic Council, thank you for this award. Your dedication to transatlantic cooperation is exemplary and it contributes to the peace and prosperity that we have come to enjoy.

My fellow honorees, it’s a privilege to share the stage with you. Your accomplishments remind us that security requires a full commitment from across all elements of society from everyone. So thank you. We salute you.

Finally, to my family—my wife, my brothers Jim and Steve, my parents. I think they provide a fitting backdrop to this evening. You see, my dad was born and raised in Italy. He lived there without his own dad throughout the war, the Second World War. Afterwards, he came to America. He became an officer. He married my mom, who is from the exact same small town in the Dolomites of northern Italy. We’re working with a very shallow gene pool here. He served a career devoted to our country and to the transatlantic alliance.

My brothers and I grew up as Army brats, as you have heard: Kansas, Texas, so forth, but also Germany and Italy. And my own sons—not here tonight, unfortunately; out in California—grew up the same way, in an Army family living abroad, living the alliance—living the alliance—because our alliance is so much more than simply a promise of collective defense. It’s a promise of a wonderful future. It’s a promise of a future based on shared values of liberty, freedom, and democracy.

It’s the promise that twelve nations made to each other seventy-five years ago this year. Standing amid the ruination of the Second World War, twelve nations banded together and they declared never again. For seventy-five years, we have held that line: An attack on one would be an attack on all. And so there was not an attack on anyone. There has been peace. It hasn’t been easy. We’ve been tested. We’ve been tried. But we have always come through, always. And we have together produced a world that was at peace and growing and prosperous.

But today, dark clouds gather on the horizon. The specter of war once again hangs over the European continent and, indeed, the world. Russia’s ruthless, unprovoked, senseless war in Ukraine stands as yet another, as the latest test to our alliance and to the globe.

And so NATO does what it does: It rises again to its mission. We are reinvigorating our system of collective defense. We have developed and approved plans to defend every square inch of our alliance. Nations are racing to resource those plans. Nations have raised their defense spending dramatically in the past two years. Our exercise program demonstrates our readiness, and we are learning and modernizing at the speed of innovation that we see in the war in Ukraine. We are stronger today than ever.

It is fantastic, unexpected, and yet it’s not unexpected. It’s what we do. We have always banded together. For seventy-five years, we have spotted the key problems, organized against them, and then faced them down. And we are doing that again. NATO is now stronger, it’s more united, it’s more determined, it is bigger than I have ever seen.

These are truly historic times, ladies and gentlemen. History doesn’t always come easy, doesn’t always flow nicely, and this is one of those times. An adversary has threatened us, and we respond. But our response is historic.

It’s such a privilege for me to be part of that response. It’s such a privilege to be part of that response. And it’s a privilege to be here tonight receiving this award on behalf of the brave men and women of our alliance. God bless you all. Thank you very much.

“@NATO is now stronger. It’s more united. It’s more determined.”

SACEUR and @US_EUCOM Commander Gen. Christopher Cavoli accepts the @AtlanticCouncil’s 2024 Distinguished Military Leadership Award.

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— Atlantic Council (@AtlanticCouncil) May 9, 2024

ANNOUNCER: To present our final award this evening, please welcome the Oscar-nominated, Tony, Grammy, and Emmy Award-winning artist, Cynthia Erivo.

CYNTHIA ERIVO: Good evening, excellencies and distinguished guests. It is an honor to be here with you tonight. I would like to thank the Atlantic Council, John Rogers, and the extraordinary Adrienne Arsht, who is also extremely stylish, for giving me the pleasure of presenting the 2024 Distinguished Artistic Leadership Award to my dear friend, Michelle Yeoh.

As we come together in celebration and recognition of global champions, it is no doubt that Michelle embodies the dedication, grace, and empowerment deserving of such an award. Her decades-long career is stellar in depth and dazzling in variety. From her captivating performances in martial arts to her magnetic portrayals in epic drama, her charisma and star quality is undeniable. Michelle is simply a trailblazer, a pioneer who has shattered glass ceilings and defied stereotypes, paving the way for future generations of artists to follow in her footsteps, just like me. Her dedication to her craft, her commitment to excellence, and her unwavering passion for storytelling serve as an inspiration to us all. She’s the reason I want to do my own stunts. Truly.

But it’s more than just her artistic talent that we recognize tonight. Any friend of Michelle knows that beyond her remarkable gifts on screen, she is a woman of humanity and compassion which extends well beyond her work in front of a camera. Her longtime advocacy for gender equality, ending poverty, and environmental protection is a testimony of her moral obligation to help others and fight against global inequality. In 2016, Michelle was appointed as goodwill ambassador of the United Nations Development Programme, a title she has taken dutifully to promote the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals. She continues to use her platform to promote and mobilize her humanitarian efforts in hopes of securing a brighter future for our entire planet.

She is a symbol of perseverance, empowerment, and an inspiration to us all. So tonight, in honoring her excellence, unwavering passion, and inspiring character, it is my absolute pleasure to present—now, wait a minute. I also have to say that this extraordinary woman is one of the most stylish people I have ever met in my life. She is also one of the kindest, most gentle human beings I have ever had the privilege of standing in front of a screen with. It is not easy to sing in front of a camera, and now we have discovered that she can. And I can’t wait for all of you to hear that.

But, it is my absolute pleasure to present the 2024 Distinguished Artistic Leadership Award to the one and only, ever graceful and always elegant, Michelle Yeoh.

MICHELLE YEOH: Oh, gosh. Thank you, Cynthia. I can’t wait for all of you to see Elphaba played amazingly by Cynthia in October—no, November, Thanksgiving, soaring to the skies, not just physically but with her voice, as well. You all are in for a real treat, and thank you for all those kind words! I’m going to have to make up for that. Lovely, thank you.

Good evening, ladies and gentlemen. It is a true pleasure and privilege to spend this evening in such amazing, great, and warm company. Thank you, Atlantic Council, for this prestigious honor. I don’t know what I did to deserve this.

Last week was surreal with the Medal of Freedom; this is—I think I’ve just gone to the heavens and I’m not coming back down for a while.

I would also like to congratulate my fellow honorees: Your Excellency, President Iohannis; Secretary Gina Raimondo; and Commander General Christopher Cavoli. I want to be a general like you. I am so humbled to share the stage with you tonight.

Over the past year, my life has been a whirlwind. It’s not an exaggeration to say that my life was everything everywhere all at once—changed in an instant when the Academy made me the first Asian to win an Oscar for best actress. It did take us ninety-seven years to get there, but at least we are there.

But tonight I would like to talk about another life-changing moment, one that shook my outlook on the world nine years ago. It was April 25, 2015, and I was in Nepal with my husband, Jean, visiting local organizations and doing advocacy for road safety.

Suddenly the ground beneath me began to shake, literally. I’ve never felt that type of instant gut-wrenching fear and panic as the earth trembled violently all around me. And you know I do some crazy stunts in some crazy action movies.

That moment, I dropped to the ground. I crawled to a door to escape the low-rise building we were in. A massive, deadly earthquake was ravaging the country. I was fortunate to survive that day unscathed, but the experience was truly harrowing. Its effects linger with me still.

As we made our way to the airport to be evacuated, I saw the ruins and destruction all around me. I couldn’t shake the thought of how unfair it was that I had a home to go to, unlike the thousands of families whose entire lives were suddenly reduced to rubble. This feeling stayed with me so much that I had to return to Nepal three weeks later to try and help with the relief efforts, and my family did try to stop me. But it was a calling that I felt that I needed to be there.

Disasters of such magnitude cause irreparable damage to the lives of those who already have so little, and for generations after. Many were homeless—were left homeless without means to rebuild or keep their families safe. What I witnessed in Nepal made me realize that crises like this expose deep, pre-existing inequalities. Those living in poverty, especially women and girls, bear the brunt of it. A world that is already unfair becomes even more unfair.

My experience in Nepal inspired me to leverage the platform I was given through my work in film and use it to help others. I wanted to shine a light on the inequalities around the world, particularly how disproportionately they impact women and girls. That’s one of the reasons why I became a goodwill ambassador for the United Nations Development Programme, UNDP.

I was—I am determined to use my voice to advocate for gender equality globally. The issue of gender equality is very personal to me. As an actor in Hollywood who is female, Asian, and now in my early sixties—oh, thirties. Did I say sixties? I know a thing or two about discrimination. I have spent my decades-long career fighting against stereotypes based on gender, race, and age.

As a society, we are far from where we need to be when it comes to gender equality. Much like the film industry, gender bias continues to hold women back. According to the Gender Social Norms Index released by UNDP, almost 90 percent of the world’s population is still biased against women. A staggering 2.4 billion working-age women live in countries that do not grant them the same rights as men. This inequity is ingrained in the fabric of our society at all levels, from our lives at home, to our economy, to our governments. Because of social norms, women around the world shoulder the bulk of unpaid care work, such as childcare, cooking, cleaning, which are viewed as female responsibilities. Caring for our families and households is an essential part of being human, and it’s the backbone of our economies. But the uneven distribution of it means that women miss out on opportunities for stable, paid employment, and are blocked from equal participation in economies that depend on their free labor.

Progress to ensure women’s full and equal economic participation is alarmingly slow. At the current pace, it will take three hundred years to achieve full gender equality. Sorry, but I’m really too impatient for that.

Here’s the thing. When women earn more, everyone wins. That’s because global wealth would potentially increase by 172 trillion [dollars] if women had the same lifetime earnings as men, according to the World Bank. But instead of benefiting women, many countries’ fiscal policies push them deeper into poverty. We are only hurting ourselves. To state the obvious, government policies have a direct impact on women’s lives. This is why UNDP launched a new campaign to advocate for building gender-equal economies, and is working with countries to transform their systems and policies to advance true gender equality in all aspects of life and society.

We have a long road ahead, achieving full gender parity, but it all begins with us here and now.

The film industry I’ve spent a lifetime working in is notorious for unequal pay for male and female actors. In many corners, gender-based discrimination runs rampant. Throughout my career, I have been typecast, stereotyped, put in boxes, and faced a lot of rejection. But I have fought against it all, with varying degrees of success. But time and time again, I refused to accept an unfair world. Today, I am living proof that change is possible.

So let’s not let anyone tell us that our goals are too ambitious, or that we will never achieve them. It’s never too late. After all, I won my first Golden Globe and Oscar at sixty. I know something about perseverance. And I know that we can fight for gender equality. But we have to do it together, and we have to go all in. And it can’t take three hundred years.

So thank you all for listening to me, and have a wonderful night. Thank you.

“At the current pace, it will take 300 years to achieve full gender equality. Sorry, but I’m really too impatient for that.”

Michelle Yeoh accepts the @AtlanticCouncil’s Distinguished Artistic Leadership Award.

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— Atlantic Council (@AtlanticCouncil) May 9, 2024

ANNOUNCER: Please welcome Atlantic Council Executive Vice Chair Adrienne Arsht.

ADRIENNE ARSHT: Congratulations again to Michelle Yeoh. I want to take a moment of personal privilege to mention someone who just spoke and who inspires me every day, Cynthia Erivo. And it’s not just her nails. Cynthia is one of the most talented and extraordinary individuals I know. Specifically, I’m thinking of her stirring portrayal of Harriet Tubman in the title role in the movie Harriet Tubman, and her Oscar-nominated song that she wrote for the movie, entitled, “Stand Up.”

I’m going to read you the lyrics, not sing them. It goes this way: “I’m gonna stand up, take my people with me. Together we are going to a brand-new home far across the river. Do you hear freedom calling?” It’s so very powerful. She too is a rock star. And, as was mentioned, she’ll play Elphaba in the upcoming film Wicked. Cynthia, you told me so many times that when you grow up you wanted to be me. Well, tonight I say I want to be you.

Again, congratulations to all our honorees this evening. And a huge thanks to all who presented and took part in this evening. I’d also like to thank America’s Own and the American Pops Orchestra, led by Luke Frazier. And now, speaking of music, to close out tonight’s program you’re in for a real treat. As we gather to celebrate individuals who understand the importance of democracy, and in honor of the seventy-fifth anniversary of NATO, this song couldn’t be more appropriate. As I bring the performers on, she was recently featured in PBS’s Black Broadway, and he is currently gearing up to star in the Metropolitan Opera’s production of Turandot. Please welcome Brittany Chanell Johnson and Soloman Howard.

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The drones are small—the arms race may not be. Here’s how the US can win.

Matthew Rose, Kathryn Levantovscaia — Wed, 08 May 2024 00:19:09 +0000

The era for small-drone warfare has arrived. Recent attacks on Israel and the continuing war in Ukraine have put a global spotlight on the proliferation of small, commercially available Unmanned Aerial Systems (sUAS), commonly known as drones. This proliferation of sUAS stands in stark contrast to the use of larger, more complex, and expensive military-grade UAVs, such as the MQ-9 Reaper, which remain out of reach for many militaries, rebel groups, and other non-state actors. These groups are instead embracing commercially available drones and transforming modern warfare and battlefield tactics as a result.

Russia and Ukraine have used drones to great effect on the battlefield. Now Russia is further developing Iranian designed “one-way” drones as an economically effective weapon. Leveraging the readily available technology, Ukraine has turned drones into tactical tools for reconnaissance, precision strikes, and the ongoing disruption of Russian forces.

Meanwhile in Yemen, Iran-backed Houthis have grown adept at using low-cost drones for attacks on Saudi infrastructure, international commercial shipping to disrupt global commerce, and, most recently, against Israel. In the Kurdistan region of Iraq and a small US outpost in Jordan, drones have been used to attack US and allied forces and punish their hosts.

Intercepted Iranian drones were broadcast across international media outlets following Tehran’s attack on Israel on April 14. Even before this, Israeli soldiers were being effectively attacked by Hamas’s deployment of drones outfitted with explosives and deployed to disrupt infrastructure and equipment such as cameras or to attack personnel.

Once viewed as mere toys, small drones have undergone a lightning-fast evolution into accessible, weaponized technology, disrupting the established international order. The deceptive simplicity of drone production and launch stands in stark contrast to the complexity of developing effective countermeasures and policies. Furthermore, past policies myopically focused on foreign trade or counterintelligence concerns, without considering the broader market, which is driving mass production.

How did this happen? In the early 2000s, drones arrived in two categories. The first were out of reach to most countries without advanced platform developers. The second and smaller category of drones was hobbled by limited flight times, speed, and range, as well as flaws in their basic functionality. However, over the last twenty years, advancements in battery technology, miniaturized electronics, sensor development, and artificial intelligence (AI)—as well as a proliferation of legitimate business use cases—have transformed the sUAS market. Drones have shed weight and size, extending flight times, and they have become enhanced by high-resolution cameras. Advanced features such as obstacle avoidance, GPS tracking, and AI integration are now commonplace. This breadth of accessibility sparked a boom in commercial and dual-use applications, bringing drones into everything from agriculture, delivery services, and filmmaking to search and rescue missions.

Countering the current threat while developing systems to address future evolutions is difficult. Recent attacks in Jordan and Israel show how easy and economical it is to deploy one-way “dumb” drones that have a simplistic flying mechanism with limited course correction capabilities. However, “smart” drones with more advanced capabilities are increasingly available, too. This includes lethal autonomous weapons systems that do not require data connectivity between the operator and the drone to attack targets. They’re known as “fire, forget, and find” platforms.

The situation becomes even more concerning when hundreds of sUAS could be deployed at once in swarms. Options to defend against such a barrage are currently limited. Layered air defense systems such as Israel’s Iron Dome, which employs a combination of radar, projectiles, and missiles to intercept all incoming threats from ballistic missiles to drones, are one option. Directed energy weapons are another, though they are in earlier stages of development and deployment.

In March, General Michael Kurilla, commander of US Central Command, described the problem facing US forces: “I would love to have the Navy produce more directed energy that can shoot down a drone, so I don’t have to use an expensive missile to shoot it down. But what’s worse than not having that expensive missile shoot it down is [the drone] hitting that two-billion-dollar ship with three hundred sailors on it.”

All of this raises a critical question: Could the United States effectively counter the continuous barrage of threats it faces given the global proliferation of this technology?

Despite the rapid evolution of drone technology over the last two decades, the United States military did not release its first Counter-Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems Strategy until 2021, and it’s vastly insufficient to address the new security challenges afoot. Other departments are standing up exploratory defensive efforts, such as the Department of Homeland Security’s Science and Technology Office, but a coherent all-of-government approach is lacking. The Department of Defense’s strategy currently emphasizes a defensive posture, or in other words, defeating adversarial drones once they’re airborne and on the attack. What does this mean in practice? US countermeasures are limited in their capacity to deter or dismantle the proliferation of smart bombs on the market. Regulation is difficult because the technology itself isn’t inherently dangerous—these drones are made up of a combination of readily available parts, including technologies often found in commercial items like hair dryers and Ring cameras.

From a tactical perspective, the technology used to neutralize small drones is underdeveloped. When used effectively, electronic warfare techniques can jam them and bring them down, but they do so at the cost of interfering with radios, cellphones, and every other related technology in the drone’s vicinity. Slower moving sUAS can be shot down but are often not relied on for a lethal attack. The Joint Counter-small Unmanned Aircraft Systems Office (JCO), stood up in 2020, is partnering with US Special Operations Command to finish an expanded counter-drone strategy. Their objective is to take the strategy beyond its current defense posture—“right of launch”—to disrupting enemy drones before they commence flight. As the US defense industrial base has astutely complained: Capacity is a challenge, so the United States cannot rely solely on counteracting threats with smart bombs of its own.

While the heightened focus on a new strategy is a welcome relief, there appears to be far less cross-collaboration planned across the rest of the government, the broader national security community, and other states. This will do little to deter or counter adversarial threats; the United States needs to overhaul its approach with a comprehensive counter-drone strategy. A national strategy would need to incentivize the market and create sustainable conditions for dual-use protection while not inhibiting the benefits of drone technology.

Such a strategy should have four guiding principles.

Reusable and more affordable solutions: The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) Research and Engineering (R&E) should drive down the lifecycle cost of counter-drone measures by exploring and scaling production of reusable and more affordable technologies. R&E should partner with the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) for advanced technology concepts and with the Joint Counter-Unmanned Aerial Systems Office (JCO) for rapid prototyping and fielding of mature solutions. This would reduce reliance on expensive single-use systems. JCO, in collaboration with defense contractors, should invest in the development of cheap drone hunters specifically designed to eliminate enemy drones. JCO can leverage its authorities for rapid acquisition and technology insertion to expedite the development and fielding of these drone hunters.

Sensor technology for cheaper drone hunters: The Department of Defense, through the JCO and OSD R&E, should request additional funding toward research and development in advanced sensor technology for both drone hunters and broader counter-drone systems. This includes exploring affordable sensors for early detection of enemy drones, as well as miniaturized sensors for equipping cost-effective drone hunters.

Multitiered approach to proliferation: While sanctions can target large commercially unavailable UAS platforms, a multi-pronged approach is needed to address the proliferation of smaller, more easily assembled drones due to their dual-use nature. Many of the components used in these drones have legitimate civilian applications, with parts widely available through online electronics stores, making them difficult to control through traditional export restrictions. The Department of State in collaboration with the Department of Commerce should develop more stringent and standardized export controls for drone components. These US departments should cooperate with allies and partners for a harmonized response and collaborate on joint research and development of counter-drone measures.

Multilayered defense: Develop and fund a comprehensive national counter-drone strategy that incorporates a multilayered defense system. This system should leverage:

Early warning and detection: The Department of Defense should utilize advanced radar and sensor technology across the services to achieve early detection of drone threats.
Kinetic countermeasures: JCO should plan for cost-effective kinetic countermeasures investment, such as reusable or attritable drone interceptors.
Non-kinetic countermeasures: Through DARPA and military labs, the Department of Defense should develop advanced non-kinetic countermeasures that disrupt drone control signals and GPS navigation.

Matthew Rose is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s GeoTech Center.

Kathryn Levantovscaia is a deputy director in the Forward Defense program of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

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Putin cannot be allowed to use chemical weapons in Ukraine with impunity

Emma Nix — Tue, 07 May 2024 13:23:14 +0000

After years of Ukrainians sounding the alarm over Russia’s alleged use of chemical weapons, the US Department of State has now substantiated these claims and has announced new sanctions on Russian actors for their role in enabling the country’s chemical and biological weapons programs. In an official statement, the United States charged Russia with using “the chemical weapon chloropicrin against Ukrainian forces in violation of the Chemical Weapons Convention.” Why does this matter, and what comes next?

Historically, chemical weapons have been used to break a stalemate, weakening an enemy’s front line troops and providing an opening to push forward. Russia’s use of chemical weapons might suggest that strategists consider the invasion of Ukraine to be a stalemate, or are desperate to avoid one. As fears of a stalemate persist across Ukraine, Russia, and the West, it isn’t difficult to predict a scenario in which Russia could use chemical weapons more widely to achieve a breakthrough.

Chloropicrin, a chemical agent frequently used for riot control, is banned for use in a warfare setting under the Chemical Weapons Convention, which Russia has been a signatory to since its inception. Over the past two years, Ukraine has reported some 1,400 cases of chemical weapons use, but these claims had not been confirmed by third parties until the May 1 statement released by the US State Department.

If Putin has no qualms about using banned weapons, why choose chloropicrin? As far as chemical weapons go, chloropicrin is less lethal than other weapons suspected to be in Russia’s arsenal. By using a weaker agent, Putin’s goal does not seem to be maximum death and destruction in this case. Rather, he may be testing the waters to gauge the international response and determine just how far he can go. A strong reaction from the international community is therefore vital to make clear that widespread use of chemical weapons is completely unacceptable and will not be tolerated.

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Russia’s previous uses of chemical weapons outside of Ukraine have been met with a tepid response at best. For example, after Sergei Skripal was poisoned in the UK with a Novichok agent (a class of nerve agents developed in the Soviet Union) in 2018, the US and a handful of its European partners released a statement condemning the attack, expelled diplomats, and the US levied sanctions under the Chemical and Biological Weapons Control and Warfare Elimination Act. Did this rein in Russia’s chemical weapons tactics? Alexey Navalny’s subsequent poisoning with Novichok in 2020 would suggest not.

In response to the latest allegations, the United States has so far announced sanctions on seven Russian government programs and companies associated with the Kremlin’s chemical and biological weapons programs. These measures are an attempt to reduce Moscow’s ability to wage chemical warfare. More must now be done. Failing to curb the use of chemical weapons in Ukraine would have potentially catastrophic consequences, both for Ukrainians and for international security more broadly. The United States and its partners therefore cannot afford to wait and see whether current sanctions measures are effective.

In the early phases of Russia’s full-scale invasion, US President Joe Biden pledged that “Russia will pay a severe price if they use chemical weapons.” Do sanctions alone constitute a severe response? If such measures have not convinced Putin that he cannot use chemical weapons after recent assassination attempts, can we expect them to work when his back is against a wall trying to win a major war?

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Ukraine’s advance in Kursk: What’s next and implications

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Looking to the past provides little clarity on possible actions available to Ukraine’s partners. After the Bashar al-Assad regime used chemical weapons in Syria in 2013, the United States and Russia worked together to force Syria to join the Chemical Weapons Convention and destroy its stockpiles. Without Russia’s participation and considering its veto on the United Nations Security Council, something similar on this occasion looks impossible. When Syria continued to use chemical weapons, the United States, United Kingdom, and France targeted chemical weapons facilities with missiles, another option Western leaders have seemingly taken off the table in relation to Russia.

The best option available to the United States and its allies might be to deny Russia the opportunity to use banned weapons. If Putin’s strategy would dictate using chemical weapons in the case of a stalemate, then Ukraine’s partners must ensure it gets the military aid needed to avoid such a situation. While the United States might be unable to strike inside Russia as it did in Syria, providing Ukraine long-range weapons and the intelligence support to carry out strikes against chemical weapons facilities could take away Russia’s chemical capabilities while sending a strong message against using banned weapons.

This is not to say the United States should not explore options for international cooperation. At the end of the day, Russia using chemical weapons endangers more than Ukraine. Galvanizing broader support from around the world can help preserve critical norms and is a necessary step to protect against chemical weapons proliferation globally. While the West has struggled to work with China or partners in the Global South on Ukraine, a coalition rejecting the use of chemical weapons presents an opportunity to protect Ukrainian lives while reinforcing international norms and building trust that chemical weapons are unacceptable in all contexts.

Emma Nix is an assistant director with the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center.

Dispatch from Vilnius: Allies still waiting for the ‘Long Telegram’ from Washington

Andrew D’Anieri, Doug Klain — Mon, 06 May 2024 19:04:47 +0000

For the last four months, NATO forces have staged the largest drills since the Cold War to rehearse defending their eastern flank against a Russian invasion. It’s the first time they’ve explicitly trained against Russia instead of an unnamed adversary. With Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and its explicit threats to conquer NATO allies, there’s little use in pretending otherwise.

This was the context of our trip to Lithuania and Belgium in late April for meetings with officials in Vilnius, NATO forces near the border with Russia, and European Union (EU) officials in Brussels working to bolster the continent’s defense. With crucial supplemental aid for Ukraine now passed by Congress, policymakers in the United States and across Europe should learn from the urgency with which frontline nations regard the threat of a Russian invasion.

Lithuania is all in when it comes to support for Ukraine’s victory. As NATO’s closest capital city to Minsk, Kyiv, and Moscow, Vilnius can’t afford complacency. US forces stationed at a newly built base near Pabradė, thirty miles northeast of the capital, laid out the stakes for us in shockingly plain terms: The territory captured by Russia in Ukraine during the first few weeks of its full-scale 2022 invasion is equivalent to more than half of the territory of the Baltic states—Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia. Deterring a potential invasion of the Baltics is perhaps the most important objective for NATO today.

Russia’s war against Ukraine has made it clear that the Kremlin is comfortable pursuing maximalist war aims.

A close second is being prepared if deterrence fails. If Russia were to gear up for another major invasion, NATO would likely see it coming. The world watched for months in the winter of 2021-2022 as Moscow built up its forces around Ukraine. But NATO troops stationed today in Lithuania don’t have the fuel, ammunition, or manpower they would need to hold their ground in a worst-case scenario. At best, these US and Lithuanian troops currently have the capacity to repel a “minor incursion” by Russian troops.

But Russia’s war against Ukraine has made it clear that the Kremlin is comfortable pursuing maximalist war aims. NATO forces would likely need to evacuate before regrouping elsewhere, most likely Poland, before counterattacking. Should Russia capture the Suwałki Gap—the tight corridor between the Russian exclave of Kaliningrad and Belarus which links Lithuania to Poland—the Baltics would be all but encircled.

This is why Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is so existential for Lithuania—NATO’s plan is less to defend the Baltics than to retake them in the event that Russia launches another major land invasion. One look at the horrific war crimes uncovered in places like Bucha—buildings razed, civilians slaughtered in the streets, mass graves—shows why even a few weeks of occupation by Russian forces would pose a serious threat for Lithuanians.

Against this backdrop, the prospect of a second Trump administration in the United States raises concern in NATO’s eastern flank. In February, former President Donald Trump remarked that he “would encourage [Russia] to do whatever the hell they want” to allies who “didn’t pay” the equivalent of at least 2 percent of their gross domestic product (GDP) in defense spending. This threat raised the fear that the United States’ commitment to defend NATO allies—the critical factor deterring Russian President Vladimir Putin from widening his war beyond Ukraine—might not be so ironclad under Trump 2.0.

Of course, Lithuania and at least ten NATO allies are spending more than 2 percent of their GDP on defense, according to the latest figures from the Alliance. In 2023, Lithuania spent an estimated 2.5 percent of GDP, with the aim of reaching 3.5 percent, while the United States spent 3.5 percent. But 2023 figures also show that many countries in Western Europe are not meeting the 2 percent target, though Germany and France are on track to do so this year.

While the 2 percent threshold is a guideline, not a requirement, a lack of investment in defense has real implications for transatlantic security. European policymakers with whom we met in Brussels laid out the problem: Today, Europe alone does not have the industrial capacity to produce the materiel needed to defend the continent from a major Russian attack. Tepid economic growth, few incentives to entice companies to invest, lack of political will, and bureaucracy have all cut into the resources necessary to defend Europe should Russia embark on another aggressive military adventure.

The single best way to defend the Baltics is to ensure that Ukrainians get the tools they need to defeat Russia today.

As a result, countries such as Lithuania and Poland, which do see the urgent need for greater defense expenditure, often buy from the United States. This is good news for US manufacturers, but it raises interoperability concerns when countries try to integrate European and US systems, as well as concerns about US systems being expensive to purchase and maintain. “If we want to hit 3.5 percent of GDP on defense,” one Lithuanian official who requested anonymity told us, “we can buy lots of artillery shells or just a few F-35s.” European states that rely too heavily on the United States could risk failing to make necessary investments into Europe’s own defense industrial base. With the supplemental aid legislation recently passed by Congress injecting major new investments into the US defense sector, the clock is ticking for Europe to ramp up its own production.

To make up the gap, one EU policymaker, who requested anonymity to discuss sensitive matters, estimated that European allies would need to spend 3 percent of GDP on defense for the next several years, a prospect the official noted is likely untenable for a range of allies in Western and Southern Europe. Shaking whole countries from their complacency is no easy task when the Russian threat is comparably far away. While Trump’s comments in February unhelpfully raised concerns about the United States’ commitment to its allies, our conversations in Brussels suggested they may have also injected some urgency into defense discussions in Europe. July’s NATO Summit in Washington is an important opportunity for allies to announce a more energetic approach to collective defense.

In fact, the NATO Summit is an excellent platform for the United States and its NATO allies to coalesce around a strategy for victory in Ukraine. In almost every meeting with officials from Lithuania’s Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense, parliament, and presidential administration, we heard a serious desire for bolder US support for Ukraine and a more focused strategy for victory. While at a dinner with several Lithuanian officials, phones buzzing with news that long-range Army Tactical Missile Systems, known as ATACMS, had been sent to Ukraine elicited an immediate celebratory toast.

“We’re still waiting for the ‘Long Telegram,’” one Lithuanian official told us, referencing US diplomat George Kennan’s famous 1946 warning from Moscow painting the bigger picture for Washington about the threat represented by the Soviet Union. Kennan’s warning was the first real step toward crafting what would become Washington’s Cold War strategy of containment.

Tucked into the recently-passed supplemental aid package for Ukraine is a new requirement that the Biden administration deliver to Congress a strategy to “help hasten Ukrainian victory against Russia’s invasion forces in a manner most favorable to United States interests.” With Ukraine aid passed, this is the next big opportunity for the United States to show its allies that Washington is serious about Ukrainian victory.

NATO’s ongoing exercises will help the Alliance prepare for—and ideally deter—a potential Russian invasion of the Baltics. But one thing is clear from our conversations in Europe: The single best way to defend the Baltics is to ensure that Ukrainians get the tools they need to defeat Russia today, instead of NATO being forced to defend against Russia further down the line. That strategy is in progress in Europe, but it will require a clearer focus on victory from Washington and sustained investment from European capitals and manufacturers to become reality.

Andrew D’Anieri is a resident fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

Doug Klain is a policy analyst at Razom for Ukraine and a nonresident fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

Their trip to Brussels and Vilnius was organized and supported by the European External Action Service as part of its EU-US Emerging Leaders Programme.

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NATO chief urges long-term Ukraine aid as Russian army advances

Peter Dickinson — Wed, 01 May 2024 15:52:16 +0000

With Russian troops once again advancing in eastern Ukraine, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg has accused alliance members of failing to provide Kyiv with promised military aid and renewed calls for a more sustainable response to Russian aggression.

Speaking during an unannounced visit to Kyiv on Monday, Stoltenberg acknowledged that supply shortfalls had left Ukraine increasingly outgunned in recent months and had enabled the Russian military to seize new territory. “Serious delays in support have meant serious consequences on the battlefield,” he commented.

The NATO chief’s frank remarks come following an April 20 US House of Representatives vote that unblocked vital Ukraine aid following months of deadlock that had forced Ukrainian troops to ration ammunition and created growing gaps in the country’s air defenses. In addition to this long-awaited US military aid, Britain, Germany, and the Netherlands have all also recently announced large new support packages.

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Officials in Kyiv hope this new wave of weapons deliveries will arrive in time to help stabilize the front lines of the war and prevent further Russian advances. In recent months, Russia has taken advantage of the Ukrainian military’s mounting supply problems to edge forward at various points along the one thousand kilometer front line, often overwhelming Ukrainian defenses with sheer numbers and relentless bombardments.

During Stoltenberg’s Kyiv visit, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy urged NATO partners to send additional military aid as quickly as possible. The Ukrainian leader said the battlefield situation “directly depended” on the timely delivery of ammunition supplies to Ukraine. “Today, I don’t see any positive developments on this point yet. Some supplies have begun to arrive, but this process needs to speed up.”

The sense of urgency in Kyiv reflects widespread expectations that Vladimir Putin will launch a major summer offensive in late May or early June. Having already succeeded in regaining the battlefield initiative, Russian commanders now hope to smash through Ukraine’s weakened defensive lines and achieve major territorial gains for the first time since the initial stages of the invasion in spring 2022. Ukraine’s international partners currently find themselves in a race against the clock to strengthen the country’s defensive capabilities before Russia’s anticipated offensive can get fully underway.

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Ukraine’s recent supply issues and battlefield setbacks have highlighted the need for a more reliable long-term approach to arming the country against Russia. At present, Ukraine’s ability to defend itself depends heavily on the changing political winds in a number of Western capitals. This makes it difficult for Ukraine’s military and political leaders to plan future campaigns, while also encouraging the Kremlin to believe it can ultimately outlast the West in Ukraine.

In order to address this problem, Stoltenberg has proposed the creation of a $100 billion, five-year fund backed by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s 32 members. While in the Ukrainian capital, he reiterated his support for this initiative. “I believe we need a major, multi-year financial commitment to sustain our support. To demonstrate that our support to Ukraine is not short term and ad hoc, but long-term and predictable.”

Crucially, Stoltenberg believes a five-year fund would help convince the Kremlin that Ukraine’s NATO partners have the requisite resolve to maintain their support until Russia’s invasion is defeated. “Moscow must understand: They cannot win. And they cannot wait us out,” the NATO chief commented in Kyiv.

Stoltenberg’s message has never been more relevant. With the Russian invasion now in its third year, Putin is widely believed to be counting on a decline in Western support for Ukraine. Following the failure of his initial blitzkrieg attack in 2022, the Russian dictator has changed tactics and is now attempting to break Ukraine’s resistance in a long war of attrition. Given Russia’s vastly superior human and material resources, this approach has a good chance of succeeding, unless Ukraine’s Western partners remain committed to arming the country.

The issue of a long term military fund for Ukraine will likely be high on the agenda at the 2024 NATO Summit in Washington DC in July. With little hope of any meaningful progress on Ukraine’s NATO membership aspirations, a commitment to provide reliable long-term support may be the most realistic summit outcome for Kyiv. This would not solve the existential challenges posed by resurgent Russian imperialism, but it would bolster the Ukrainian war effort and dent morale in Moscow while sending a message to Putin that time is not on his side.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

Alia Brahimi — Wed, 24 Apr 2024 21:17:20 +0000

In Season 2, Episode 1 of the Guns for Hire podcast, host Alia Brahimi is joined by the award-winning BBC investigative journalist Nawal Al-Maghafi to talk about her film on American mercenaries in Yemen. One of the few journalists to report from Yemen first-hand, Nawal discusses the Delaware-registered private military company (PMC) contracted by the UAE to kill “terrorists”, her meetings with two of the Americans involved, and the PMC’s training of Yemeni units to conduct targeted assassinations. She also describes how so many of those killed have been activists, teachers, and cultural figures, and the terror that has now gripped the population of southern Yemen.

“He knows these guys aren’t terrorists. This was a business deal. He knew what he was doing but he will never say it”.

Nawal Al-Maghafi, award-winning BBC investigative journalist

Find the Guns For Hire podcast on the app of your choice

About the podcast

‘A bad day for Putin’: US aid vote gives Ukrainians renewed hope

Peter Dickinson — Sun, 21 Apr 2024 10:15:40 +0000

Millions of Ukrainians let out a collective sigh of relief on Saturday as the US House of Representatives finally passed a long-delayed $61 billion aid bill that will provide Ukraine with a crucial lifeline in the struggle against Russian aggression. The vote came following months of political deadlock in the United States that had forced Ukrainian troops to ration ammunition and raised serious doubts over the future of Western support for the embattled Eastern European nation.

Responding to the news from Washington DC, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy sought to underline the broad historical significance of the vote. “I am grateful to the United States House of Representatives, both parties, and personally to Speaker Mike Johnson for a decision that keeps history on the right track,” he commented. “Democracy and freedom will never fail as long as America helps protect it. A just peace and security can only be attained through strength.”

In his daily address, Zelenskyy also noted the critical importance of fresh US military supplies for Ukraine’s war effort and for the entire country’s security amid an escalating Russian bombing campaign. The bill passed by the House of Representatives is “a very significant package that will be appreciated both by our soldiers on the front lines and by our towns and villages suffering from Russian terror,” the Ukrainian leader stated.

Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba called the vote “a bad day for Putin” and “a bad day for anyone who dared to believe that America could waver when it comes to defending what and who it stands for.” Ukraine’s top diplomat also stressed the role of the bill in bolstering the US position on the international stage. “Everyone who made this decision a reality made the right choice. The United States has reaffirmed its global leadership.”

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Saturday’s vote in the United States was closely monitored by Ukrainian troops stationed thousands of miles away on the front lines of the war in eastern and southern Ukraine. Ukrainian ambassador-at-large Olexander Scherba shared a message sent to him by one soldier serving in the Donbas, who recounted the enthusiastic reaction among his comrades. “The whole unit was watching. After the vote, you could hear shouts of “YESSS!” along the entire trench.”

For many Ukrainians, the House of Representatives vote has helped rebuild faith in the country’s international partners following months of mounting frustration and feelings of abandonment. Since late summer 2023, Ukrainians have watched in dismay as their country’s survival has become hostage to US domestic politics. Meanwhile, Russia has taken advantage of Ukraine’s dwindling ammunition and air defenses to regain the battlefield initiative in eastern Ukraine and launch a nationwide bombing campaign targeting the country’s increasingly unprotected residential districts and civilian infrastructure.

With major new US weapons shipments reportedly “ready to go” once final confirmation of the aid package is received from the Senate and the White House, there are now renewed hopes that Ukraine will receive the military support it needs in order to push Russian forces back and defend the country. This boost could not be more timely, with Ukrainian weapons shortages rapidly approaching critical levels and preparations well underway for what is expected to be a major Russian offensive in the coming months.

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Ukraine’s advance in Kursk: What’s next and implications

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In the wake of Saturday’s vote, Ukrainian army medic Yulia Paievska was one of numerous prominent figures from the country’s military community to praise Ukraine’s American partners and stress the importance of their continued support in the struggle against Russia. “They have lived up to their promises, which once again proves that justice and freedom are not empty words to the American people,” she commented. “Despite all the obstacles, we advance toward victory.”

These upbeat sentiments were echoed by a number of front line soldiers quoted by CNN. “We thought our partners had forgotten about us. This news gives us a sense of support and an understanding that we have not been forgotten,” one Ukrainian intelligence officer serving on the Zaporizhzhia front noted. “When we feel support from the outside, it motivates us. After all, the military knows it cannot win with sticks and bows and arrows,” stated another.

While the House of Representatives vote clearly boosted Ukrainian morale, many in Ukraine were also realistic about the scale of the challenges that remain. With the US presidential election set to take place later this year, further large-scale US military aid cannot be taken for granted. Meanwhile, Ukraine’s European partners are working to boost defense production but have so far struggled to fill the gap created by the recent pause in US security assistance.

If Western leaders are serious about preventing a Russian victory in Ukraine, they will have to look beyond the current $61 billion US aid package and develop the necessary resources to prevail in a long confrontation with the Kremlin. “Please don’t forget that Russia’s annual military budget is more than $100 billion,” noted Ukrainian MP Oleksiy Goncharenko on Saturday evening. “We have won time today, but we have not won the war. We will still need to finish the job.”

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

While the US strategy emphasizes cooperation with allies and partners, the EU’s strategy is looking to break dependence on US military hardware. To do so, it seeks to establish a new European Defence Industry Programme aimed at boosting weapons production on the continent. While the strategic disparity has raised concerns in Washington, it’s important to discern the difference between geopolitics and managing transnational defense industrial integration. Multilateral collaboration on developing, producing, and maintaining military equipment takes years, and, in some cases, decades of policy work and alliance building; these relationships do not unravel overnight.

The United States often struggles to meet defense capacity needs, which requires overcoming its own bureaucratic hurdles. The challenges of coordinating defense efforts are only amplified when dealing with a complex structure such as the EU. National interests, protectionism, and ingrained bureaucratic apparatuses have historically hampered defense industrial collaboration within the EU. Further complicating matters, EU treaties restrict the use of funds for direct military spending despite the defense industry falling under the European Commission’s domain. Past attempts to regulate it proved unsuccessful due to concerns about duplicating NATO’s role and EU member states’ reluctance to cede control over defense industrial matters. While EU member states can invoke the national security clause to circumvent the European Commission’s authority and single market rules, the Commission may investigate and challenge the invocation if the spending does not fall under national security concerns.

Challenges for transatlantic cooperation

The consolidation of the industrial base has created single points of failure for production when suppliers run into problems. These issues are further exacerbated by cyberattacks, which disrupt production, compromise sensitive data, and facilitate intellectual property theft. Both the US and EU strategies diagnose supply chain challenges as a major contributor to unfavorable conditions as a result of global dependence, consolidation, and cybersecurity threats.

Addressing concerns about overreliance on foreign suppliers, the EU is setting up a Security of Supply regime to build resilience and a competitive edge for the European defense technology industrial base and its supply chains. Meanwhile, the United States is establishing a Supply Chain Disruptions Task Force to mitigate disruptions and integrate allies and partners more deeply into its supply chains.

Both strategies aim to strengthen resilience by reducing reliance on single sources and exploring the reshoring of critical materials production, enhancing stockpiles of essential equipment and subcomponents, and strengthening cybersecurity measures.

Fostering innovative defense technology is also a goal of both strategies. They aim to achieve this through investment in research and development of next-generation technology, such as artificial intelligence, hypersonics, and autonomous systems. They also both seek to streamline acquisition and enhance public-private partnerships. Strengthening collaboration between the private sector and government alone is a hefty feat, which is why both strategies support joint research and development, private sector incentives, and exchanging best practices.

In theory, these aims are one and the same, but a closer look at doctrinal and cultural differences sheds light on where these efforts diverge. As a global power, the United States has a long-standing motivation to sustain its dominance in military capabilities and its ability to project power. The National Defense Strategy explicitly states the need to maintain military superiority and deter US adversaries from challenging a free and open order. This aligns closely with Pax Americana, a term that identifies the United States as the global security guarantor and superpower.

Europe, on the other hand, seems motivated by the desire to increase its autonomy. For years, a few European leaders have periodically bandied about the idea of strategic autonomy in the sense of building up both the capability and the will to act independently from the United States or another major power. For just as long, however, little has come of this idea. Nonetheless, the impulse toward greater European autonomy, even if short of full autonomy, has proved remarkably resilient. This impulse shows up, for example, in the European Defence Industrial Strategy, specifically when it comes to the dependency on US military hardware. The strategy makes it a priority to eliminate “excessive external dependencies or bottlenecks” from the industrial base, noting that “the volume of acquisitions made through the US Foreign Military Sales (FMS) in the EU has increased by 89 percent between 2021 and 2022.”

Beyond diverging ambitions and the difficulty of securing reliable supply chains, a significant challenge to transatlantic collaboration lies in the inherent competition between US and EU defense companies. Both sides vie for a significant share of the global defense market (estimated at two trillion dollars in 2023), potentially incentivizing contractors to prioritize winning individual bids over collaborative efforts. This competitive dynamic is further amplified by existing procurement policies such as “Buy American” in the United States and EU preference rules in Europe, which can restrict competition and hinder cross-border collaboration.

In the United States, export controls have limited technology transfers to allies and partners long before the war in Ukraine. These controls include the International Traffic in Arms Regulations on defense technology and information and Export Administration Regulations on dual-use materials. Not only do these negatively impact European partners who experience a lack of reciprocity, they also discourage US companies from collaborating with foreign partners, fearing denials or delays that tack on years to project timelines. Meanwhile, member states must now harmonize fragmented national procurement processes across the EU to even the playing field for their own firms—let alone US contractors attempting to navigate multinational defense projects.

In short, industrial cooperation and strategic alignment are not mutually inclusive in the near term. Divergent strategic directions will eventually impact the alignment and coordination necessary for industrial cooperation, but not today. The real challenge won’t be found in differing objectives on the horizon, but in the array of obstacles facing the United States and the EU now.

To overcome these hurdles, both the United States and the EU need to explore alternative procurement models that encourage collaboration over competition. Additionally, streamlining export control processes with the same emphasis devoted to AUKUS (the trilateral partnership between Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States) and fostering a culture of trust and reciprocity are crucial steps toward strengthening transatlantic cooperation in defense.

Kathryn Levantovscaia is a deputy director in the Forward Defense program of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

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Organizing for victory

Ben Hodges — Mon, 15 Apr 2024 16:34:40 +0000

Ten years since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine began with the illegal annexation of Crimea, it is clear that a Russia containment strategy 2.0 is inevitable. I am convinced Ukraine will be our best partner for such a strategy in terms of intelligence, understanding of Russian psychology, and military defense. It will be a bulwark against Putin’s clearly articulated plans for further European conquest. Ukraine’s survival and the necessity of bringing it into NATO as soon as possible are paramount to a new European and global deterrence and containment strategy.

We are currently witnessing the continuing collapse of the USSR, which began in 1991. This process is not a straight-line decline, but it is unmistakable. Putin’s unprovoked war against Ukraine has undermined Russia’s economy and severed it from much of the West. His military has been exposed for its many shortcomings and corruption. Nearly all the former Soviet republics and Warsaw Pact members have turned their backs on Russia. Finland and Sweden have joined NATO.

We should not fear this Russian decline. In fact, we should seek to accelerate it by helping Ukraine defeat Russia and eject it back to its 1991 borders. Ukraine defeating Russia now is the best way to ensure NATO never has to fight directly against Russia. This is in our own strategic interest.

Does the West have the combined political will, industrial strength, and military capabilities to address the strategic challenges posed by Russia, Iran, North Korea, and China? These challenges are all linked and must be viewed as parts of a strategic whole, leading to the conclusion that it in the West’s interests to prioritize the defeat of Russia in Ukraine.

A “Russia first” approach would echo the example set by the allies during World War II. In 1942, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill and US President Franklin D. Roosevelt agreed on a “Germany first” strategy. One year later, they defined their war aim as the “unconditional surrender” of Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan. This provides a model for the kind of strategic clarity the current generation of Western leaders should be looking to emulate.

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An assessment of today’s battlefield confirms that the Ukrainian military faces a very difficult situation. However, present narratives are overly gloomy and defeatist. After ten years of war, and despite holding every advantage, Russia still only controls just under twenty percent of Ukraine.

The Russian army has suffered hundreds of thousands of losses, while the weaknesses of the Russian navy and air force have been revealed. The Black Sea Fleet has lost around one-third of its ships and is in retreat from Sevastopol. The Russian Air Force has failed in its two main tasks of securing air superiority over Ukraine and cutting the supply lines bringing military equipment into Ukraine from the EU.

Much has been made of minor Russian victories such as the recent capture of Avdiivka, but these advances should be put in a proper geopolitical and operational context. Despite efforts by many of the doom-mongers to make it sound like Stalingrad, Avdiivka is in reality a small town located close to the 2022 front lines in eastern Ukraine. Indeed, it is currently far from clear whether the Russians have the operational capability to exploit even local tactical successes.

At this stage of the war, neither side appears capable of delivering a knockout blow. For Ukraine’s new military Commander-in-Chief Oleksandr Syrsky, the key task this year is to stabilize the situation in order to buy time, build combat power, and fix the country’s personnel system. Worn-out units need to be reconstituted and new units built. Training should include a focus on countering Russia’s advantages in electronic and drone warfare.

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Ukraine’s advance in Kursk: What’s next and implications

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What does Ukraine need in order to actually win? The Ukrainian military needs the capacity to make Crimea, the decisive terrain of this war, untenable for the Russian navy, air force, and logistics. Every square inch of Crimea is within ATACMS range. Ukraine has already proven the concept with a relatively small number of cruise missiles provided by Britain and France. This has made it possible to seriously damage the Black Sea Fleet HQ and naval maintenance capability in Sevastopol, forcing the fleet to partially withdraw to Russia. There are no good reasons for not providing Ukraine with ATACMS missiles, only excuses from an administration that is unwilling or unable to develop a strategy for Ukrainian victory.

The Ukrainian military also needs a long-range strike capability to neutralize the Russian army on land by destroying Russian troop concentrations, command posts, artillery, and logistics. Significantly enhanced air defense and counter-drone capabilities are essential, along with more naval drones and anti-ship missiles to allow Ukraine to build on the country’s remarkable success in the Battle of the Black Sea.

One of the most important steps toward securing Ukrainian victory is a clear declaration from the US and EU that it is in our own strategic interest to help Ukraine win. The failure of the current US administration to clearly explain this to the American people has led to incoherent and self-deterring policies along with incremental decision-making and a drip-feed approach to military aid for Ukraine. This has left the door open for disinformation and made it possible for a MAGA-led minority within the Republican Party to block aid despite majority support.

The current year is a year of industrial competition that the West can and must win. Western countries should collectively be dwarfing Russia’s output but there is currently a lack of urgency. Encouragingly, ammunition production is finally picking up some momentum in Europe and the US. We just need the US Congress to approve delivery. Meanwhile, EU nations must reassess their priorities and address the large percentage of ammunition production that is currently heading to customers outside Europe. Greater efforts are also required to source existing ample ammunition stockpiles globally.

The West needs a return to the clarity of Churchill and Roosevelt, who communicated clear strategic priorities to the public, industry, and the military. Identifying these priorities was a vital step, making it possible for the allies to organize the war effort and secure victory. The lessons of this approach should now be applied to the confrontation with Putin’s Russia, Iran, and China. At the end of the day, it’s all about political will and leaders speaking to their populations as adults.

Lieutenant General (Ret.) Ben Hodges is the former Commander of US Army Europe.

Economic impacts

The defense industry is inherently driven by the needs of conflict and deterrence. This often leads to increased production during periods of heightened tensions, as seen with the recent surge in revenue for major defense contractors (upward of 25 percent). The military-industrial complex also injects significant capital into local economies, creating jobs in manufacturing as well as in the restaurants, retail shops, and other businesses that make up the communities around the manufacturing plants.

A map published by the Department of Defense showcases the impact of the Ukraine Security Assistance program on US industry as of January 15. It depicts the value of defense contracts awarded to companies in each state, which amounts to $33.6 billion and counting. The interactive map below builds on this data to showcase an alarming correlation between the states benefiting most from this funding and how many of their representatives voted against the Ukraine funding bill last fall.

Republican Senator Ted Cruz voted against a $95 billion foreign aid package, which included $60 billion of aid for Ukraine, in February, calling it a “bad bill.” He opposed the bill despite the fact that Texas has received $1.45 billion in funding to produce High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS), 155 millimeter shells, and other weapons, therefore absorbing significant economic benefits. The increased demand signal is expected to create jobs in Grand Prairie, Mesquite, and other parts of Texas.

But it’s not just Cruz: Thirty-one senators and House members whose states or districts benefit from this funding have voted against it, according to American Enterprise Institute Senior Fellow Marc Thiessen. Florida-based manufacturers have received over one billion dollars to produce weapons, but several of the state’s representatives continue to oppose funding for Ukraine. Representative Gus Bilirakis, a Republican, opposed President Joe Biden’s 2023 request for emergency Ukraine funding as “tone deaf and out-of-touch with the harsh economic realities facing American families,” even though his district north of Tampa houses facilities that were awarded contracts to produce AN/TPQ-53 radar and HIMARS guidance sets.

The data above only reflect the location of factories producing weapons systems, but the influx of federal funding creates ripple effects on unrelated sectors of the economy as well. For example, Camden, Arkansas, is preparing for an economic boom resulting from the incoming workers and their families, anticipating a rise in everything from retail and housing to breweries. “Small businesses are interested in investing in downtown . . . There are some people that work really hard in making downtown really nice. It’s growing,” Camden shop owner Cecilia Davoren told Politico.

The defense primes and subcontractors rely on components and subcomponents often sourced and manufactured in other states and districts, thereby spreading the wealth beyond the borders of the map above. Whether directly or indirectly, it would be harder to identify a congressional district that has not benefitted from US aid packages for Ukraine than one that has. While many of these US representatives may oppose security assistance to Ukraine on cost grounds, they may be overlooking the significant impact on job creation in their own districts.

Over the objection of Cruz and nearly thirty of his GOP colleagues, the Senate passed its funding bill in February, but with US funding drying up, the House has yet to act.

National and international security enhancement

Beyond the economic advantages, US support for Ukraine offers strategic benefits for national security. The war has provided a real-world testing ground for US weapons, offering invaluable insights into their performance against a near-peer adversary. This live-fire environment exposes weaknesses and allows for improvements, ensuring US forces remain equipped with the most effective technology.

Additionally, the war has weakened Russia significantly, depleting its military manpower and resources. Declassified intelligence estimates that 315,000 Russian troops have been killed or wounded in Ukraine, with reports suggesting Russian losses of nearly one thousand soldiers per day in November and December. And beyond the human cost, Russia is hemorrhaging weaponry, financial reserves, and influence as it sustains the invasion. Ukraine has been effectively exhausting Russia’s military capacity. The United States and its allies are directly benefiting from a wide-scale depletion of Russian manpower and defense capabilities for pennies on the dollar. US aid to Ukraine is around 5 percent of the Department of Defense’s annual budget, which is quite a deal for containing and exhausting one of the United States’ largest adversaries. To that end, a Russian loss in Ukraine would be a double whammy—it would strengthen deterrence against China and potentially discourage near-term moves on Taiwan.

Beyond the limitations of simulations and war games, this live-fire environment also allows for a far more nuanced evaluation of US capabilities and their performance against a near-peer adversary. Troops in Ukraine fielding US weaponry are providing a real-world feedback loop on the durability and accuracy of US platforms, as well as their interoperability and integration with existing systems. The United States is taking inventory of deficiencies and vulnerabilities, all without sparing a single pair of boots on the ground. This allows the Department of Defense to better identify areas for improvement while actively informing the development of future iterations, ensuring US forces remain equipped with the most effective and adaptable technology possible. In essence, the war is serving as a lengthy, unscripted exercise, yielding crucial insights into the US arsenal that would be impossible to replicate through any other means.

Simply put, US support for Ukraine is not philanthropy. It’s an investment in US economic and national security that is already paying off.

Kathryn Levantovscaia is a deputy director in the Forward Defense program of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

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Fincantieri CEO Pierroberto Folgiero on transatlantic defense industrial innovation and cooperation

Atlantic Council — Wed, 03 Apr 2024 14:16:08 +0000

Pierroberto Folgiero, chief executive officer of Fincantieri, Italy’s leading shipbuilding company that works closely with the US Navy and has several shipbuilding sites in the United States, joined the Atlantic Council for an interview with Matthew Kroenig, vice president and senior director of the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. Folgiero shared his perspective on the importance of allied defense industrial cooperation, especially between the United States and Italy, technological innovation in the maritime theater, and the challenges of workforce constraints. Fincantieri is a donor to the Atlantic Council.

Full interview

Featured quotes

Here are a few highlights from the conversation:

On the state of the defense market

European defense needs to manage fragmentation, and the best way to manage fragmentation is to share platforms and to share as much as possible, also at a transatlantic level.

Pierroberto Folgiero

On the challenges facing shipbuilding

How to be a manufacturing power without enough labor? That’s the big question mark of Western countries… It’s very important that we convince our own people that production is a good job. So, we have to retell the story of shipbuilding. And to do this, we need to modernize shipyards.

Pierroberto Folgiero

On the future of shipbuilding and transatlantic cooperation

I am very focused on the underwater for the future… I believe that the Mediterranean underwater can be a kind of perfect place to validate the new approaches, new models, and new technology.

Pierroberto Folgiero

The Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security works to develop sustainable, nonpartisan strategies to address the most important security challenges facing the United States and the world.

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Is the US Congress finally poised to pass Ukraine aid?

Doug Klain — Tue, 26 Mar 2024 21:09:57 +0000

The end of March will mark eight months since United States President Joe Biden first requested supplemental aid to resupply Ukraine’s armed forces and help the country prepare for coming Russian offensives. With Congress beginning yet another recess, there may finally be an end in sight to the partisan logjam, but the shape that Ukraine aid ultimately takes and the path to getting a bill to Biden’s desk for his signature remain unclear.

Since former representative Kevin McCarthy was forced to vacate his leadership role as Speaker of the House, Speaker Mike Johnson has feared inviting a similar ouster. Before leaving for a two-week recess on March 22, House Democrats signaled they will protect him from just such a motion to vacate if he announces a plan to take up the bipartisan National Security Supplemental package passed by the Senate last month.

Johnson has said he’d take on Ukraine aid after passing a federal budget, which he’s now accomplished. The next two weeks may see him coordinating with allies and negotiating with Democrats on a potential deal before Congress resumes on April 9, meaning the earliest that Ukraine aid could optimistically be passed is mid to late April.

There are four likely vehicles for passing the supplemental military, budgetary, and humanitarian aid requested by Biden: Johnson bringing forth the Senate-passed supplemental to a vote on the House floor, as is typically done with legislation; a potential new supplemental package crafted by Republicans at Johnson’s behest; a Democrat-led bipartisan discharge petition to bring the Senate-passed supplemental to a vote; or a Republican-led discharge petition to bring slimmed-down supplemental aid to a vote.

A critical factor in any of these options is that if the House passes legislation that differs from the supplemental aid, it will have to revert to the Senate for further deliberations and another series of votes. This would lead to additional delays, opportunities for political sabotage, and a sharper advantage for Russia on the battlefield in Ukraine.

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The best option for swiftly passing Ukraine aid is for Johnson to bring the bill that already passed the Senate to the floor for a vote, which could be done quickly upon Congress’s return. Democrats are signaling that Johnson announcing this move would guarantee their support against a motion to remove him from the speakership, which was already filed by Rep. Marjorie Taylor Greene and could soon come to a procedural vote.

Johnson in recent weeks has also reportedly been working to craft his own new version of supplemental aid. After Republicans aligned with former president Donald Trump tanked a bipartisan supplemental aid deal that included substantial reforms to US immigration policy, the Senate passed an aid package that omitted border policy changes and focused on foreign aid to Ukraine, Israel, Taiwan, and Palestine. Johnson has directed three prominent Republican committee chairs to put together a proposal that pairs foreign aid with border policy, as well as other potential legislation such as the REPO Act to transfer Russian state assets to Ukraine.

No text has been released and minimal details about this new prospective aid package have emerged, but Johnson may try to negotiate with Democrats to include some of these provisions in whatever he brings to the floor. While Johnson and many other congressional Republicans agree on the need to pass Ukraine aid, the electoral incentives in their party may pressure some to present any eventual deal as some kind of political win over Democrats, even if the details are largely the same as what Democrats are asking for. The REPO Act, in addition to being smart policy, would also allow Johnson to claim that he’s helping relieve the burden of foreign aid from the American taxpayer, though Russian state assets in the US are reportedly only around $5 billion.

Eurasia Center events

Ukraine’s advance in Kursk: What’s next and implications

Conflict Russia Security & Defense Ukraine

Johnson has failed to bring Ukraine aid to the floor for months and Democrats are now hedging their bets. Rep. Jim McGovern opened a discharge petition earlier this month to forcibly bring the Senate-passed supplemental to a vote. Discharge petitions are rare parliamentary mechanisms in which members must physically walk to the rostrum on the House floor and add their signature to a petition which, should it reach a majority of 218, will sideline the Speaker and trigger a vote on the associated legislation.

The McGovern petition quickly garnered Democratic support and has reached 191 signatures, including a lone Republican signature from Rep. Ken Buck on the second-to-last day before his retirement from Congress. There is significant pressure on Republicans not to side with what appears to be a Democratic effort, but delays from Johnson and dysfunction within their own party make defections more likely. Progressive Democrats are also reluctant to sign due to the package’s Israel aid, though many have privately signaled their willingness to sign if the White House announces accountability measures for this military aid to prevent misuse by Israeli forces.

A second discharge petition is being floated by Republican Rep. Brian Fitzpatrick, a co-chair of the Congressional Ukraine Caucus. Fitzpatrick has crafted a slimmed-down version of supplemental aid that includes controversial border measures such as Trump’s “Remain in Mexico” policy, seen as toxic by most Democrats.

Fitzpatrick’s version reduces total aid for Ukraine by eliminating all humanitarian funding, cuts crucial financial aid that allows the Ukrainian government to function, and doesn’t expand allowances for the Presidential Drawdown Authority, which would mean less immediate aid to Ukraine at a critical time.

Under this package, new military aid may not be provided until next year, though the White House would be able to replenish stocks depleted in the past. Some Ukraine aid is certainly better than none, but this would appear far from a first choice for Ukraine. If Fitzpatrick were to amend his proposal to address these issues, he’d be far more likely to attract Democratic support.

The next two weeks will see private negotiations between Johnson and Democratic leadership as well as further pressure on representatives to sign onto discharge petitions. Further GOP signatures onto the McGovern petition in particular would increase the pressure on Johnson to avoid embarrassment by bringing aid to the floor himself, while also increasing the likelihood of aid passing regardless. Another important variable is that, as in the case of the Senate border deal, Trump could intervene at the eleventh hour to pressure Republicans not to pass Ukraine aid.

After nearly eight months of delays, there may finally be a path to passing Ukraine aid through Congress. With Russia planning a new offensive in the coming months, potentially to conquer the city of Kharkiv, it can’t come a moment too soon. Ukrainian forces have had to ration ammunition because of Republicans blocking supplemental aid, losing towns and lives in the process. If the US wants to stop burning the trust of its allies and show that it can still be a reliable security partner, the time and place to do so is now on the floor of the House of Representatives.

Doug Klain is a nonresident fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center and a policy analyst at Razom for Ukraine, a nonprofit humanitarian aid and advocacy organization.

Russian victory in Ukraine would leave Europe at Putin’s mercy

Mykola Bielieskov — Thu, 21 Mar 2024 21:06:18 +0000

If Putin wins in Ukraine, will he go further? This is the question currently being asked with increasing urgency in capital cities throughout Europe.

Skeptics note that the failures of the past two years have exposed the limitations of the Russian military, and claim a triumphant Putin would be in no position to expand the war beyond the borders of Ukraine. This argument is comforting but short-sighted. It ignores the practical implications of a Russian victory, and underestimates the geopolitical importance of Ukraine for the security of Europe.

The re-emergence of an independent Ukraine in 1991 profoundly altered the European geopolitical landscape. For centuries prior to 1991, the Russian Empire and the USSR had exploited Ukraine’s geographical location, natural resources, and population to project power into the heart of Europe. Hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians had served in the Red Army, while the Soviet war machine had relied heavily on Ukraine’s industrial base to produce everything from warships and tanks to intercontinental missiles.

The collapse of the Soviet Union temporarily reduced the imperial threat facing the countries of Central Europe. Neighbors such as Poland and Hungary understood the strategic importance of Ukrainian statehood perfectly well and were among the first to recognize Ukraine’s independence. This new geopolitical reality shielded countries across the region from potential Russian aggression and helped pave the way for their NATO accession.

Vladimir Putin was also well aware that Ukrainian independence was a major obstacle to the revival of Russia’s great power status. From the very beginning of his reign, he made the subjugation of Ukraine a foreign policy priority. At first, he attempted to achieve this goal via political means; when this failed, he resorted to the same military methods employed by generations of his Czarist and Soviet predecessors.

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The Russian army has suffered extremely heavy losses over the past two years in Ukraine, but this has not deterred Putin. On the contrary, with the future of Western military aid to Ukraine currently in doubt, the Russian dictator is growing visibly more confident of securing victory. If Putin is able to extinguish Ukrainian statehood, Russia’s military potential will be dramatically enhanced by the acquisition of Ukraine’s considerable resources.

Russia is already conscripting large numbers of men in occupied regions of Ukraine and using them as cannon fodder in brutal human wave offensives. If Ukraine falls, hundreds of thousands more would be forced to join the Russian military and deployed in similar fashion. As well as extra manpower, a conquered Ukraine would also provide Russia with vast natural resources, industrial strength, and agricultural wealth. Indeed, the occupation of Ukraine would allow Russia to dominate global agricultural markets.

The geographical implications of a Russian victory in Ukraine would be equally grave. Russia seized Crimea in 2014 then used the occupied Ukrainian peninsula as a springboard for the full-scale invasion of the country eight years later. As the Russian army continues to edge forward in eastern Ukraine, each advance brings Putin’s troops closer to the border with NATO.

Nobody is more conscious of the growing danger than Ukraine’s western neighbors. It is no surprise that Poland, the Czech Republic, and the Baltic states are among the biggest supporters of Ukraine and the most vocal when it comes to raising the alarm over the Russian threat. They know that if Ukraine is lost, they are next in line and will face a resurgent Russia emboldened by the success of the current invasion.

This is not to say that others are oblivious to the potentially disastrous consequences of a Russian victory in Ukraine. French President Emmanuel Macron has recently warned that European security is “at stake” in Ukraine, and has refused to rule out deploying Western troops to prevent Russia from overrunning the country.

Eurasia Center events

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Ukraine’s advance in Kursk: What’s next and implications

Conflict Russia Security & Defense Ukraine

Influential voices in America have long recognized the geopolitical importance of Ukrainian independence. In the 1990s, former US National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski highlighted the country’s crucial role in the geopolitics of the region. “It cannot be stressed strongly enough that without Ukraine, Russia ceases to be an empire, but with Ukraine suborned and then subordinated, Russia automatically becomes an empire,” he famously observed.

During the early decades of Ukrainian independence, successive US administrations appeared inclined to follow Brzezinski’s counsel. However, from the late 2000s onward, the focus of US foreign policy began to shift away from Ukraine and the wider Eastern European region toward Asia.

This coincided with the rise of a more assertive Russia. In 2008, Russian troops invaded Georgia. Six years later, the Kremlin occupied Crimea and sparked a war in eastern Ukraine. By 2022, an emboldened Putin felt strong enough to launch the biggest European invasion since World War II. This escalating Russian aggression should serve as a painful lesson for anyone tempted to take the continued existence of an independent Ukraine for granted.

Ukraine is currently facing the most challenging period since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion. Starved of supplies, Ukrainian troops find themselves forced to ration ammunition. In many cases, they are already unable to prevent Russia from edging forward. This is fuelling increasingly pessimistic forecasts as the spring campaigning season draws near.

The stakes could hardly be higher. If Russia’s invasion succeeds, the consequences will be felt far beyond the borders of Ukraine. The Russian military will be revitalized by the capture of Ukraine’s vast human and material resources, and will loom large on the eastern border of a NATO alliance demoralized and discredited by its failure to defend Ukrainian independence. At that point, many in the West may begin to ask why they didn’t arm Ukraine when they had the chance. By then, of course, it will be too late.

Fellow

Steven Grundman

Senior Fellow

Defense Industry Defense Policy

Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security Transatlantic Security Initiative

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Kramer authors op-ed on the role of Congress in deterring Chinese cyber attacks

jfranks — Tue, 05 Mar 2024 21:44:00 +0000

Original Source

On March 4, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security Distinguished Fellow and Board Director Franklin D. Kramer published an op-ed in The National Interest on the role of Congress in deterring Chinese cyber attacks.

In the article, Kramer highlights the serious threats Chinese cyberattacks pose to US economic security and critical infrastructure. It suggests four measures: providing cybersecurity tax credits to support small businesses, academia, and infrastructure; leveraging AI to improve security software; creating a corps of private-sector cybersecurity providers for wartime; and addressing the cybersecurity workforce shortage to enhance national resilience.

China’s determined cyber attacks on the United States call for significant actions to enhance national resilience both now and in the event of conflict.

Franklin D. Kramer

Board director

Franklin D. Kramer

Distinguished Fellow

Cybersecurity Defense Policy