Arms Control - Atlantic Council

Former Nonresident Senior Fellow

Ukraine’s advance in Kursk: What’s next and implications

Conflict Russia Security & Defense Ukraine

Looking to the past provides little clarity on possible actions available to Ukraine’s partners. After the Bashar al-Assad regime used chemical weapons in Syria in 2013, the United States and Russia worked together to force Syria to join the Chemical Weapons Convention and destroy its stockpiles. Without Russia’s participation and considering its veto on the United Nations Security Council, something similar on this occasion looks impossible. When Syria continued to use chemical weapons, the United States, United Kingdom, and France targeted chemical weapons facilities with missiles, another option Western leaders have seemingly taken off the table in relation to Russia.

The best option available to the United States and its allies might be to deny Russia the opportunity to use banned weapons. If Putin’s strategy would dictate using chemical weapons in the case of a stalemate, then Ukraine’s partners must ensure it gets the military aid needed to avoid such a situation. While the United States might be unable to strike inside Russia as it did in Syria, providing Ukraine long-range weapons and the intelligence support to carry out strikes against chemical weapons facilities could take away Russia’s chemical capabilities while sending a strong message against using banned weapons.

This is not to say the United States should not explore options for international cooperation. At the end of the day, Russia using chemical weapons endangers more than Ukraine. Galvanizing broader support from around the world can help preserve critical norms and is a necessary step to protect against chemical weapons proliferation globally. While the West has struggled to work with China or partners in the Global South on Ukraine, a coalition rejecting the use of chemical weapons presents an opportunity to protect Ukrainian lives while reinforcing international norms and building trust that chemical weapons are unacceptable in all contexts.

Emma Nix is an assistant director with the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center.

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Conflict Defense Technologies

Forward Defense, housed within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, generates ideas and connects stakeholders in the defense ecosystem to promote an enduring military advantage for the United States, its allies, and partners. Our work identifies the defense strategies, capabilities, and resources the United States needs to deter and, if necessary, prevail in future conflict.

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Torres writes on rare earth metal niobium and the hypersonic race with China

gmatchett — Mon, 04 Mar 2024 19:21:00 +0000

OrIginal Source

On March 4, Forward Defense Nonresident Senior Fellow Guido Torres coauthored an article for the Center for Strategic and International Studies. The piece underscores that the US must address the connection between mineral control and technological advancements to shift its strategic approach to hypersonic weapons in a complex international landscape.

Expert bio

Guido Torres

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Defense Policy Defense Technologies

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Bowing to Putin’s nuclear blackmail will make nuclear war more likely

Peter Dickinson — Thu, 29 Feb 2024 22:01:18 +0000

Russia could respond with nuclear weapons if the West sends troops to Ukraine, Vladimir Putin has warned. In his annual State of the Nation address on February 29, the Russian dictator said any attempt to deploy Western troops in Ukraine “threatens a conflict with nuclear weapons and the destruction of civilization.”

This was the latest and most explicit in a series of nuclear threats made by Putin since he first ordered the full-scale invasion of Ukraine just over two years ago. When announcing the invasion, Putin warned against any Western intervention with promises of consequences “such as you have never seen in your entire history.” Four days later, he ordered Russia’s nuclear forces to be put on high alert.

Following Russia’s defeat in the March 2022 Battle of Kyiv, Putin sought to deter the West from arming Ukraine by promising a “lightning-fast” response and strongly hinting that he was ready to use nuclear weapons. “We have all the tools for this that no one else can boast of having,” he declared. “We won’t boast about it: We will use them if needed and I want everyone to know that. We have already taken all the decisions on this.”

Prior to this week’s statement, Putin’s most notorious nuclear threats came during a televised September 2022 address to announce Russia’s first mobilization since World War II. With the Russian army retreating in disarray in Ukraine, Putin referenced his country’s nuclear arsenal and vowed to use “all means at our disposal” to defend Russia. “This is not a bluff,” he declared.

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Ukraine has repeatedly called Putin’s bluff, exposing the emptiness of the Russian dictator’s nuclear bluster. Just weeks after his September 2022 speech, the Ukrainian military liberated Kherson, the only regional capital captured by Russia since the start of the invasion and a city that Putin himself had just trumpeted as “forever Russian.” Rather than reaching for the nuclear button, Putin reacted to this embarrassing defeat by ordering his troops to quietly withdraw.

Russia has responded in similar fashion to setbacks in the Battle of the Black Sea. Kremlin officials have long sought to position Crimea as a red line for Russia, but this has not prevented Ukraine from damaging or sinking approximately one-third of the Russian Black Sea Fleet. This humiliation has not provoked a nuclear response from Putin. Instead, the bulk of his fleet has retreated from its traditional home port in occupied Crimea to the safety of Russia.

While Ukraine has refused to be intimidated by Putin’s nuclear blackmail, the same cannot be said for the West. Putin’s thinly veiled threats may appear crude and primitive, but there can be little doubt that they have been instrumental in fueling the crippling fear of escalation that has plagued Western decision-making ever since the first days of the invasion. This has led to the disastrously slow delivery of military aid to Ukraine and the outright denial of weapons systems that could have set the stage for a Ukrainian victory.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has identified this Western fear of escalation as the single biggest obstacle to his country’s war effort. “Nothing has harmed our coalition more than this concept,” he commented in January 2024.

Eurasia Center events

Ukraine’s advance in Kursk: What’s next and implications

Conflict Russia Security & Defense Ukraine

Unless this changes, the damage will not be limited to Ukraine. If the mere suggestion of a possible nuclear escalation is enough to deter the West from preventing Russia’s takeover of Ukraine, Putin will inevitably employ the same tactics against other countries. He is already openly portraying the current invasion as a sacred mission to reclaim “historically Russian lands.” With more than a dozen other countries also potentially qualifying as “historically Russian,” it is all too easy to image further invasions in the coming years accompanied by more of Putin’s thinly veiled nuclear threats.

Nor will the implications be restricted to Russia’s wars of aggression. On the contrary, fellow autocrats around the world will take note of Putin’s success in Ukraine and draw the logical conclusions for their own expansionist agendas. If nuclear intimidation works for Moscow, why not for Beijing or Pyongyang?

This has the potential to spark a dangerous arms race. If Russia manages to normalize nuclear intimidation as a foreign policy tool, numerous countries will soon be scrambling to acquire nuclear arsenals of their own. There are indications that this issue is already being discussed in some quarters. Speaking in February 2024, Polish Foreign Minister Radoslaw Sikorski warned that if additional US support for Ukraine is not forthcoming, “some countries will start hedging, and others will be considering developing their own nuclear weapons programs.”

By allowing themselves to be intimidated by Putin’s nuclear threats, Western leaders risk plunging the whole world into a dark new era of insecurity and aggression. Russia’s successful use of nuclear blackmail in Ukraine will transform attitudes toward nuclear weapons and undermine decades of nonproliferation efforts. Nukes will become an essential tool for any country that wishes to avoid being bullied by their neighbors. The potential for nuclear war will increase dramatically, as will the possibility of stray nukes falling into the hands of non-state actors.

Vladimir Putin’s decision to use nuclear intimidation as part of his Ukraine invasion is a reckless gamble that reflects his firm belief in Western weakness. Unless the West proves him wrong, the consequences for global security will be catastrophic.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

kyusko — Fri, 16 Feb 2024 21:51:51 +0000

On February 15, Markus Garlauskas and the Korea Society’s Jonathan Corrado published a new piece in Foreign Affairs titled, “The Arsenal of Autocracy: How North Korean Weapons Fuel Conflict—and How to Stop the Flow.” The article emphasizes the importance of building a United States-led international effort to stop North Korea from establishing arms trade relationships with powerful authoritarian states like Russia and malicious nonstate actors such as Hamas.

Staff

Markus Garlauskas

Indo-Pacific Security Initiative Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Crisis Management Indo-Pacific

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Russian nuclear anti-satellite weapons would require a firm US response, not hysteria

Clementine G. Starling-Daniels, Mark J. Massa — Fri, 16 Feb 2024 00:04:04 +0000

The prospect of space combat is gripping Washington this week. The White House on Thursday confirmed that Russia is developing a “troubling” anti-satellite capability, following statements from leading members of Congress and ensuing reports that Russia is working on a nuclear-armed, on-orbit, anti-satellite weapon. The news has sparked concern about the imminence and degree of such a threat. If fielded, Russian nuclear-armed anti-satellite weapons, or ASATs, would directly challenge norms of responsible behavior in space and present a serious risk to all nations’ satellites. With or without such a system, nuclear and space threats from Russia call for a firm response by the United States and its allies and partners.

So what’s all the fuss about ASATs anyway?

Anti-satellite weapons have existed almost as long as satellites have. They are used to destroy or incapacitate satellites, either through physical destruction (crashing into a satellite with a missile or another satellite) or through non-kinetic attacks, such as by electromagnetic jamming, lasers, and cyberattacks.

Satellites orbiting in space are essential to everyday functions of life on Earth. Data that transits through satellites support the positioning, navigation, timing, and communications that modern society relies on—from financial transactions to Global Positioning System (GPS) navigation. Beyond these civilian uses, space systems support secure military and government communications, such as intelligence, command and control, missile warning, and more.

It follows that an adversary wishing to cause major disruption may seek to target satellites. While destructive ASATs have not yet been deployed in warfare, countries such as Russia, India, China, and the United States have demonstrated their ability to operate such weapons by destroying their own satellites. As countries’ reliance on space increases, the ability to hold other countries’ satellites at risk is a significant and concerning capability. Additionally, ASAT testing has generated significant orbital debris, which is a problem for the wider international community of spacefaring nations.

What is known about existing Russian ASATs

Today, Russia fields a range of ASAT capabilities, ranging from cyberattacks and the jamming of satellite signals to ground-based, direct-ascent, hit-to-kill ASAT missiles. In recent years, US officials and open-source researchers have raised concerns about large Russian satellites releasing smaller “daughter” satellites in space that are capable of approaching, interfering with, and potentially destroying US satellites.

To address these counterspace threats, the United States has sought to increase the resilience of its space systems, while doubling down on international norms against nuclear weapons in space and destructive ASAT testing. If put into operation, Russia’s possible nuclear ASAT would pose a test to these US efforts and international norms.

Nuclear-armed ASATs would cause mass destruction

The United States is moving away from a small number of large, expensive, complex satellites to constellations of smaller, cheaper satellites more resilient to kinetic attack. But the threat of nuclear attacks on satellites may change this calculus. In 2017, Gen. John Hyten, the then head of US Strategic Command, memorably stated that he would no longer “support buying big satellites that make juicy targets.” In part through the Space Development Agency, the US Space Force has moved toward an architecture that relies more on constellations of small satellites.

A kinetic attack from Earth on any single small satellite would be highly inefficient. But a nuclear attack presents a wider problem. A nuclear detonation in space would add significant radiation to orbits used by a number of US military satellites, causing them to degrade in the weeks and months following the detonation unless they are specifically hardened against radiation. A so-called high-altitude nuclear detonation against low-Earth orbit satellites (HALEOS) would also damage thousands of civilian satellites from all nations, making this a true weapon of mass destruction.

Moscow has a history of fielding nuclear-powered satellites that are not nuclear armed; and Russia is currently reinvigorating its nuclear-powered satellite program. Nuclear-powered satellites can generate additional energy to power electromagnetic jammers, radars, and other technologies that could be used for anti-satellite purposes. Nuclear power in space can also be used for spacecraft propulsion, which would allow a space asset to change orbits more frequently than a satellite powered with conventional propulsion. Still, a nuclear-powered Russian satellite is potentially less alarming than a nuclear-armed satellite, since it would neither be norm-shattering nor give Russia the ability to degrade a large swath of all satellites on orbit in one fell swoop.

A nuclear-armed ASAT would violate the Outer Space Treaty

The United States has long endorsed the principle of nonplacement of weapons of mass destruction in space, and more recently it has rallied support against destructive direct-ascent ASAT testing in space. The key piece of international law here is the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, which, among other provisions, prohibits the placement of weapons of mass destruction in outer space, which would be highly destabilizing.

A Russian nuclear-armed anti-satellite weapon stationed on orbit would be a flagrant violation of this principle. More recently, the Biden administration has committed the United States to refrain from destructive tests of direct-ascent ASATs and convinced several likeminded nations to make similar pledges. The goal of this moratorium on destructive ASAT testing is to increase predictability in space and reduce the generation of dangerous space debris.

Russia’s recent experiments with “exotic” nuclear weapons

Because Russia can already detonate nuclear weapons in space from Earth, a new nuclear-armed ASAT likely would not give Moscow significant new military capability, even though it remains concerning.

While a nuclear-armed ASAT would advance Russian counterspace capabilities, challenge US space strategy, undermine norms, and alarm allies, it does not appear to add a qualitatively different capability to the Russian arsenal. Any nation with a nuclear-armed intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) can detonate a nuclear weapon in space. Both the United States and the Soviet Union tested nuclear weapons in space during the Cold War.

In recent years, Russia has announced the development of several new so-called “exotic” nuclear weapons—including a nuclear-powered, nuclear-armed cruise missile and submarine drone—which Western analysts have found challenging to understand. These new weapons do not add a significant military capability to Russia’s nuclear arsenal, which is capable of inflicting unacceptable damage to the US homeland under virtually any circumstance. While there are plausible ways in which a nuclear-armed ASAT could be more effective than an ICBM-delivered nuclear detonation in space, such a development may be similar in practical effect to the rest of this class of exotic nuclear weapons.

A major concern, in addition to the potential weapon itself, is that this development would be grim news for the future of arms control and could potentially set in motion an arms race in space. If Russia were to abandon the Outer Space Treaty to field such a weapon (or to deploy it without withdrawing, in an echo of its treatment of the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty, Open Skies Treaty, and New START), the act would further signal the end of the era of legally binding arms-limiting treaties between the United States and Russia.

A response is in order; hysteria is not

Hysteria is not in order. While concerning for international norms, signaling, and precedent, even if fielded, a nuclear ASAT capability would not significantly revise the US-Russia balance of power in space or on Earth. Still, the United States and its allies and partners must respond.

This development should serve as further impetus for US space planners to take seriously the prospect of nuclear use in space. Nuclear scholars are highly focused on the prospect of limited coercive nuclear use by US adversaries early in a major-power war, for example. Space planners should appreciate this risk and ensure that defense plans for high-end conflicts are resilient against a loss of unhardened space systems, either by hardening a sufficient number of systems or ensuring alternate sensing and communications options are in place. Further, if space norms are to mean anything, then the United States must rally like-minded nations to register their concern over this potential flagrant violation of the Outer Space Treaty.

Clementine Starling is the director of the Atlantic Council’s Forward Defense program.

Mark J. Massa is the deputy director for strategic forces policy at the Atlantic Council’s Forward Defense program, which hosts the Nuclear Strategy Project.

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Guevara Moyano in eseuro.com on arms transfer controls

Inigo Guevara Moyano — Tue, 13 Feb 2024 21:39:00 +0000

Original source

On February 13, Transatlantic Security Initiative nonresident senior fellow Inigo Guevara Moyano published an opinion piece on the eseuro.com website discussing arms transfer controls.

Fellow

Inigo Guevara Moyano

Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security Transatlantic Security Initiative

Americas Arms Control

The Transatlantic Security Initiative, in the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, shapes and influences the debate on the greatest security challenges facing the North Atlantic Alliance and its key partners.

I. US deterrence requirements in the coming two-nuclear peer threat

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Requirements for nuclear deterrence and arms control in a two-nuclear-peer environment

Greg Weaver and Amy Woolf — Fri, 02 Feb 2024 17:24:28 +0000

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Foreword

II. Arms control opportunities in the emerging near-nuclear peer environment

Series conclusion

About the authors

The views expressed in these papers are those of the authors alone and do not necessarily reflect the official positions of the US government, the Department of Defense, the Department of Energy, the National Nuclear Security Administration, Los Alamos National Laboratory, or any other entity.

Foreword

After decades of seeking to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in international relations, the United States is now grappling with a global landscape marked by intense strategic competition and the growing salience of nuclear weapons—problems that will likely persist for years to come. Over the past year, Russia compounded its aggression in Ukraine with nuclear saber-rattling, modernizing and expanding its nuclear forces over the past decade. Furthermore, Russia’s possession of a substantial inventory of theater nuclear weapons continues to threaten regional deterrence. Meanwhile, in Asia, Beijing is pursuing an unprecedented surge in its nuclear capabilities. If current trends persist, China is projected to possess about 1,500 nuclear warheads by 2035.¹ While China was once viewed as a secondary nuclear power, its substantial investment in its nuclear arsenal—including the launch of a third ballistic missile early-warning satellite in 2022 and advancements in land-based ballistic missiles, aircraft, submarines, and hypersonic missiles—positions China to become a near-equal nuclear power in the coming decade. These trends mark a historic shift. For the first time in its history, the United States must face two near-peer nuclear competitors simultaneously.

At the same time, Russia’s suspension of its compliance with the New START agreement in 2023 has significantly weakened the last strategic arms control framework established in the Cold War and post-Cold War eras. This move leaves scant provisions governing the future of nuclear capabilities among the United States and its adversaries. For over half a century, Washington and Moscow negotiated to establish treaties that imposed limits on their nuclear arsenals, aiming to manage their nuclear rivalry and mitigate the risk of nuclear conflict. This process served the national security interests of both sides by curbing weapons and activities that could jeopardize deterrence, safeguarding strategic stability, offering insights into nuclear capacities, and potentially steering military competition toward less perilous avenues. However, shifts in the global security landscape have altered this calculus. The Russian Federation, much like the Soviet Union before it, has insisted that future agreements factor in the nuclear capabilities of Britain and France. On the other hand, the United States now confronts a security environment featuring two nuclear-armed adversaries—Russia and China—whose forces will potentially pose significant threats to the United States and its allies.

This evolving security landscape may prompt the United States to reevaluate its assessments of its deterrence and arms control requirements. But how should the United States approach this problem?

The papers below address the intricate challenge of maintaining nuclear deterrence through force structure and arms control requirements. They offer insights into these complex issues, each informed by two workshops attended by both technical and policy experts in the spring and summer of 2023, all supported by Los Alamos National Laboratory. The first paper, authored by Greg Weaver, examines the future of force requirements in this two-peer nuclear environment, arguing that the United States must reexamine its force structure to effectively deter China and Russia simultaneously. Weaver outlines the deterrence requirements for deterring both large-scale nuclear and conventional aggression and limited nuclear attack in a two-peer environment, and concludes that the United States may require a larger arsenal of deployed nuclear warheads than the 1,550 allowed by the New START Treaty, along with additional delivery systems like a nuclear-armed, sea-launched cruise missile, to effectively deter conflicts with both China and Russia simultaneously.

The second paper, authored by Amy Woolf, addresses the future of arms control by examining the future utility of stability dialogues and risk-reduction measures, instead of numerically binding treaties. Woolf finds that although stability discussions and measures for risk reduction could assist these three nations in lowering the likelihood of nuclear employment, they are unlikely to engage in negotiations for treaties or agreements that impose restrictions on the scale of their nuclear capabilities or provide insight into their plans. Together, this series will provide preliminary lessons and recommendations for the future of deterrence and arms control as the United States determines how to respond to this two-peer environment.

Whether or not one finds the specific proposals offered by each author compelling, it is clear that US and allied policy must be composed of both deterrence and arms control options. Since the 1970s, each major US nuclear modernization program has been accompanied by an arms control proposal, and each nuclear arms control treaty has been backed by tangible capabilities.

Robert Soofer, PhD
Senior Fellow, Forward Defense
Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security
Atlantic Council

William Tobey, MPP
Director, Office of National
Security and International Studies
Los Alamos National Laboratory

Part I: US deterrence requirements in the coming two-nuclear-peer threat environment

Introduction

A large-scale nuclear attack on the US homeland poses the only existential military threat to the United States. The nation relies on nuclear deterrence to prevent this threat. This makes nuclear deterrence the highest priority mission of the US military and the foundation of US national security strategy. If the nation fails at this mission, no other mission matters.²

US nuclear deterrence strategy and practice have arguably prevented nuclear war and contributed to preventing large-scale conventional war between nuclear-armed states as well. While correlation is not causation, the absence of nuclear or large-scale war between major powers since 1945 is difficult to explain without considering the role of nuclear deterrence in general, and US nuclear deterrence in particular.

However, the strategic circumstances in which US nuclear deterrence strategy and practice have operated are changing rapidly. Throughout the nuclear age, the United States designed its nuclear deterrence strategy, and shaped and sized its nuclear forces, to address the Russian nuclear threat, treating other nuclear adversaries (i.e., from China and North Korea) as “lesser included threats.” A US nuclear force structured and sized to address Russia had sufficient capability to address the lesser included threats as well, even after a nuclear war with Russia.

China, however, is deliberately and rapidly changing this equation, building up its nuclear forces on a scale and at a pace not seen since the US-Soviet arms race of the 1960s and 1970s. But, unlike during the Cold War, China is the only one racing in the US-China nuclear relationship. Declassified US intelligence assessments state that China’s nuclear stockpile will reach rough quantitative parity with currently planned US-deployed nuclear warheads by the mid-2030s (e.g., approximately 1,500 weapons by 2035), if China continues on its current trajectory.³ Should this assessment prove accurate, this means the United States will face two peer nuclear adversaries for the first time in the nuclear age in just over a decade.⁴

A Chinese DF-5B ICBM following the 2015 China Victory Day parade. Credit: Wikimedia user IceUnshattered.

This paper examines how US deterrence requirements will be affected by this coming two-nuclear-peer threat environment. First, it lays out four key assumptions which undergird the analysis. Second, it examines the complex nature of the future two-peer threat. Third, it identifies the critical US deterrence objectives in that two-peer environment. Finally, it examines what will be required to achieve those objectives.

Key assumptions

This analysis makes four assumptions regarding the two-nuclear-peer deterrence problem:

In the two-nuclear-peer environment, deterrence will continue to be a function of decisively influencing an adversary leadership’s decision calculus by affecting its assessment of the benefits and costs of taking the action one seeks to deter, and of the benefits and costs of continued restraint from taking that action. The way deterrence works will not change.
Deterring aggression and escalation is based on affecting an adversary’s assessment of the likely outcome of such military actions. Thus, while other factors contribute to deterrence, the perceived ability to fight and win a conflict below the level of large-scale nuclear exchanges is critical to deterrence success. Warfighting capability matters.⁵
No major power can achieve a measure of nuclear superiority sufficient to win a large-scale nuclear war without sustaining existential-level damage against technically sophisticated and well-resourced major-power adversaries. In a conflict between nuclear-armed major powers, mutually assured destruction is a condition, not a strategy.
While North Korea’s nuclear forces will continue to grow, they will not expand sufficiently to prevent US strategy from treating North Korea as a lesser included case of the Russia-China nuclear threat.

China is rapidly becoming a nuclear peer

China’s rapid nuclear buildup is comprehensive, including both strategic and theater-range forces and the addition of an array of new capabilities. China is fielding a triad of strategic nuclear delivery systems, adopting a launch under attack (LUA) posture for its intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) force, and has tested potentially destabilizing new intercontinental range systems (e.g., fractional or multiple orbital bombardment systems [FOBS/MOBS] that could threaten a potentially unwarned preemptive attack on the United States). For the first time, China is developing survivable theater nuclear forces capable of conducting low-yield precision strikes on US and allied/partner forces and infrastructure across East Asia.

Whether China is pursuing nuclear parity with or superiority over the United States is unclear. It also is unclear why Chinese leadership is doing so. China may have decided to change the role of nuclear weapons in its national security strategy by adopting an expanded theater nuclear war-fighting role and/or a counterforce role against US nuclear forces backed by national missile defenses. The force that China is building is not necessary to enable its traditional minimum deterrence/“no first use” strategy.⁶

Neither a change in Chinese nuclear strategy nor the larger and more diverse Chinese nuclear force to implement it were envisioned when the US nuclear modernization program was designed.⁷

China is also rapidly modernizing and expanding its conventional forces, which pose an increasing threat to US forces and allies/partners in Asia. By the 2030s, China’s conventional military buildup could flip the conventional military balance in Asia. This potential conventional imbalance could undermine deterrence of Chinese aggression by itself, but the impact would be exacerbated if China were contemplating either opportunistic aggression in the context of an already ongoing theater conflict between Russia and NATO, or collaborative Chinese-Russian aggression in both theaters.

Finally, China is rapidly fielding new nonnuclear strategic capabilities in space and cyberspace. These capabilities have the potential to deny or diminish US conventional forces’ ability to project power effectively, and possibly threaten US nuclear command and control.

The RT-2PM2, also known as the Topol-M, is a Russian intercontinental ballistic missile that entered service in the 1990s. Credit: Wikipedia User Stanislav Kozlovskiy

The Russian threat post-Ukraine

Even following its costly invasion of Ukraine, Russia remains a nuclear peer of the United States, one which may engage in further conventional aggression and nuclear coercion or use in the future. Russia has the largest deployed nuclear force of any state today. This is likely to remain true through 2035. Russia continues to expand its theater nuclear forces, increasing its existing advantage over NATO.

Russian strategy and doctrine envision limited first use of theater nuclear weapons to coerce war termination on terms acceptable to Russia if losing a conventional war, and larger scale use of theater nuclear forces to defeat NATO conventional forces, if coercive nuclear use fails. Russian strategy relies on strategic nuclear forces to deter a large-scale US nuclear response against the Russian homeland while Russia escalates to limited nuclear war in theater. Thus, Russian strategy indicates the Russian leadership believes that limited nuclear use is unlikely to escalate out of control.⁸

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine demonstrates both a propensity to take risk and to miscalculate while doing so, which makes Russian opportunistic or collaborative aggression against NATO states on its periphery a serious threat despite the dismal performance of Russian conventional forces in Ukraine. Those forces’ performance is likely to increase Russian reliance on nuclear weapons, increasing the probability of Russian limited nuclear first use early in a conflict with NATO. Reconstituted Russian conventional forces, while inferior to fully reinforced NATO forces, will continue to have a space/time advantage against NATO states on Russia’s periphery, potentially enabling them to occupy such states’ territory in a fait d’accompli before NATO forces can mobilize in their defense. The Russians might then threaten limited nuclear escalation to deter or defeat a NATO counteroffensive to restore the territorial status quo ante. Russia also continues to expand its space, cyber, and conventional deep precision strike capabilities to deny NATO forces critical enablers and to derive coercive leverage from threats to NATO critical infrastructure.

The unique nature of the two-nuclear-peer threat

If China’s nuclear buildup continues on its current trajectory, the United States will face two nuclear-peer adversaries for the first time in the mid-2030s. Russia and China will together pose an unprecedented threat to US defense strategy. The United States has yet to even substantively grapple with the implications of this two-nuclear-peer threat, much less effectively address it.

Facing China alone as a nuclear peer will alter the strategic landscape in the Asia-Pacific region. But the Russian-Chinese “friendship without limits” will pose qualitatively new threats of opportunistic or cooperative two-theater aggression.

Neither the 2018 US National Defense Strategy (NDS) nor the 2022 NDS adequately address this threat. As noted in the 2018 Commission on the National Defense Strategy’s assessment of the 2018 NDS:

The Department has largely abandoned the longstanding “two war” construct for a “one major war” sizing and shaping construct. In the event of large-scale conflict with Russia or China, the United States may not have sufficient remaining resources to deter other adversaries in one—let alone two—other theaters by denying them the ability to accomplish their objectives without relying on nuclear weapons.
National Defense Strategy Commission, Providing for the Common Defense: The Assessments and Recommendations of the National Defense Strategy Commission, November 13, 2018, 20.

The 2022 NDS also adopts a “one major war” sizing construct. And while both the 2022 NDS and the 2022 Nuclear Posture Review hint at reliance on US nuclear forces to deter opportunistic aggression by a second nuclear peer, neither document advocates for the US conventional and nuclear forces that will be required to do so when facing two nuclear peers in the mid-2030s.⁹

Failing to address this problem has the potential to undermine deterrence, especially deterrence of opportunistic aggression in a second theater or collaborative Russian and Chinese aggression in Europe and Asia simultaneously. Failing to address these threats because some deem them improbable will have the perverse effect of making them more likely.¹⁰

In this broader strategic context, facing a second nuclear peer poses several unique challenges to US nuclear strategy, force posture, and force structure.

A Chinese nuclear peer creates new first-strike threats that the United States must address to preserve sufficient assured second-strike capability to enable US deterrence strategy. The first new threat is a China-only preemptive counterforce strike on US nuclear forces. The much larger and more capable Chinese nuclear force of the mid-2030s will almost certainly include multiple warhead ICBMs with sufficient accuracy to destroy the US ICBM force, augmented by Chinese counter-space and cyber capabilities, potentially capable of denying the launch warning necessary to enable a US LUA option to preserve ICBM survivability. Chinese nuclear forces may also include FOBS/MOBS capable of conducting a strike on US national leadership and nuclear command and control and warning systems with little to no warning. Finally, China’s intense interest in artificial intelligence (AI), quantum computing, and autonomous systems research might lead to unexpected breakthroughs in antisubmarine warfare (ASW) that could pose a threat to US ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs).

An LGM-30 Minuteman III, a US ICBM, is launched as part of a test at Vandenberg Air Force Base, California. Credit: US Air Force

A Chinese nuclear peer also creates the potential for a collaborative preemptive counterforce strike by China and Russia simultaneously. This scenario not only significantly increases the number of nuclear weapons the United States might face in a first strike on its nuclear forces, but also combines the most threatening features of future Russian and Chinese nuclear capabilities in all relevant domains. Given current capabilities, the potential increase in threat numbers alone is unlikely to increase the first-strike threat to US nuclear forces significantly, because both Russia and China will independently have sufficient forces to target everything that is currently targetable. But, should there be a breakthrough in ASW that allows small-area (but not precise) geolocation of SSBNs at sea, then barrage attacks requiring larger numbers of weapons could become a relevant threat to the most survivable portion of the US nuclear deterrent.

The growth in Chinese nuclear forces also significantly increases the number of nuclear counterforce targets for US forces to potentially hold at risk to either deter aggression and escalation and/or to achieve other US objectives if deterrence fails.¹¹

These collective challenges posed by the future two-peer threat environment have important impacts on US future deterrence and assurance requirements.

A Patriot M903 launcher station at Eielson Air Force Base in Alaska. Credit: Senior Airman Joseph P. LeVeille, US Air Force

Determining US deterrence requirements for the two-nuclear-peer environment

To determine US deterrence requirements for the two-nuclear-peer environment one must identify whom we seek to deter from doing what under what conditions. The United States (and its allies and partners) must be able to achieve the following deterrence objectives against China and Russia:

Deter large-scale conventional aggression.
Deter limited nuclear escalation.
Deter large-scale nuclear attack.

Regarding the circumstances in which those objectives must be achieved, the United States (and its allies and partners) must be able to do so in three basic scenarios:

Deter either adversary alone.
Deter opportunistic aggression by one adversary while already at war against the other.
Deter simultaneous collaborative aggression by both adversaries.

US strategy for achieving these deterrence objectives must be tailored to decisively influence the unique decision calculus of Chinese leaders and of Russian leaders. This requires a strategy and supporting force structure and posture that can credibly defeat their respective “theories of victory” by denying them their objectives and imposing costs that far exceed what benefits they can achieve through aggression or escalation.

Deterring large-scale conventional aggression

Deterring conventional aggression by Russia or China individually is conceptually simple but operationally complex. The United States and its allies and partners must be perceived by Moscow or Beijing as willing and capable of fighting and winning a large-scale conventional conflict. This requires conventional military superiority applied in a way that defeats the adversary’s strategy.

But there is an additional element required to deter large-scale conventional aggression by a nuclear peer adversary: one must also convince such an adversary that it cannot escalate its way out of failed conventional aggression through nuclear means to force war termination on terms either favorable or acceptable to the adversary. Thus, the second deterrence objective of deterring limited nuclear escalation contributes directly to achieving the first deterrence objective as well.

But what about deterring opportunistic or collaborative large-scale conventional aggression? This is a much tougher challenge, requiring US, allied, and partner conventional superiority and the ability to deter limited nuclear escalation in both theaters.

Because the US forces required to achieve conventional superiority in Asia are somewhat different from those required to do so in Europe, there are potential adjustments to US and allied and partner conventional force structure and posture that could achieve superiority in both theaters.

The primary operational limitation on the ability of the United States to fight and win in both theaters simultaneously is logistics: the strategic airlift and sealift needed to get required forces where they need to be and then sustain them in combat, with sufficient stocks of advanced conventional munitions. There also are critical “low-density, high-demand” US military capabilities that would be in short supply in a two-theater conflict, including bombers; integrated air and missile defenses (IAMD); tanker aircraft; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities; and ASW capabilities.

Fixing this would require a shared understanding of the two-nuclear-peer threat among the United States and its allies and partners in Europe and Asia; significant increases in US, allied, and partner military spending; and an agreement on how to optimize the military capabilities of multiple nations in each theater.

The bottom line is that US allies and partners would have to agree to provide much more conventional capability more efficiently, without perceiving the US request to do so as signaling a reduced US commitment to their defense in either theater.

If the United States and its allies and partners cannot (or will not) maintain conventional superiority in a second theater conflict, deterring or defeating opportunistic or collaborative aggression will require reliance on nuclear weapons to counter adversary conventional superiority in the second theater. US nuclear forces do not currently play such a role, and the force the United States currently plans is not designed to play this role.

US ability to deter large-scale conventional aggression through increased reliance on nuclear weapons to compensate for conventional inferiority is greater against China than it is against Russia for several reasons.

First, during a possible amphibious invasion of Taiwan, China’s forces would be highly vulnerable to US limited nuclear use. And while China might well use nuclear weapons in response, China’s ability to seize Taiwan after sustaining a nuclear attack on its amphibious forces would be negated for years. Thus, Chinese nuclear counterescalation would not enable Beijing to achieve its original geopolitical objectives in the near term, while risking further nuclear escalation, including potentially uncontrolled escalation.¹²

Chinese People’s Liberation Army – Navy ship Changbaishan (LSD-989) at Nieuwe Waterweg, Rotterdam. Credit: Wikimedia user kees torn.

Compensating for NATO conventional inferiority with nuclear weapons to deter Russian opportunistic or collaborative aggression is more problematic. Russia’s growing theater nuclear force advantage would be extremely difficult to overcome in a way that would make such a US strategy credible, especially given the fact that Russian conventional operations would not be uniquely vulnerable to nuclear attack. However, given the performance of Russian conventional forces in Ukraine, it is reasonable to believe that increased, optimized conventional force contributions by European NATO allies combined with more prepositioning of US heavy ground force equipment in Europe could maintain NATO conventional superiority even if a Russia-NATO conflict began after the United States was engaged in a war against China in Asia.

So what are the key deterrence requirements for this deterrence objective?

The best military option is for the United States and its allies and partners to maintain conventional superiority over China and Russia in both theaters simultaneously. This can be done. But it is unclear whether it will be done, given the political and financial costs of doing so. A strategy that requires such conventional superiority in both theaters that is not supported by forces credibly capable of enabling it risks deterrence failure. In that event, the United States and its allies and partners would incur the much higher costs of fighting (and potentially losing) a major power war, and risk escalation to large-scale nuclear war.

If the United States and its allies and partners do not achieve two-theater conventional superiority, then the United States should increase reliance on nuclear weapons to deter large-scale opportunistic or collaborative conventional aggression in Asia while working with its NATO allies to ensure NATO conventional superiority even in the face of a two-theater war. In either case, it will be essential that the United States bolsters its ability to deter limited nuclear escalation in both theaters to enhance deterrence of large-scale conventional aggression by China and/or Russia. If either Beijing or Moscow perceives a viable option to escalate its way out of failed conventional aggression, it will be more likely to risk such a conventional attack.

Deterring limited nuclear escalation

When facing a peer nuclear adversary with a secure second-strike capability that poses an existential threat to the United States, deterrence of limited nuclear escalation requires the perceived ability of the United States, allies, and partners to persevere in the face of adversary limited nuclear escalation without being politically coerced into accepting war termination on the adversary’s terms, and without being decisively militarily disadvantaged. That requires a set of US nuclear capabilities that are militarily relevant in such a conflict. Current Russian theater nuclear capabilities are designed to be just that. The ongoing evolution of Chinese theater nuclear capabilities indicates that Chinese planners may now understand this as well.

The core requirement for deterring limited nuclear escalation in a war with a nuclear peer is a flexible response strategy that credibly convinces the adversary’s leadership that limited nuclear escalation:

Does not provide effective insurance against miscalculating about US and allied capability, resolve, and cohesion in the face of conventional aggression (as Moscow clearly concluded vis-à-vis Ukraine).
Will not result in war termination on its terms.
Runs the risk of uncontrolled escalation because the United States and its allies are visibly prepared for what nuclear scholar Thomas Schelling called a “competition in risk-taking” to defend their vital interests.

An effective flexible response strategy must be enabled by US, allied, and partner nuclear and conventional forces that are capable of three key things:

Providing a robust range of credible response options that can restore deterrence by convincing adversary leadership it has miscalculated in a dire way, that further use of nuclear weapons will not achieve its objectives, and that it will incur costs that far exceed any benefits it can achieve.
Countering the military impact of adversary theater nuclear use.
Continuing to operate effectively to achieve US, allied, and partner objectives in a limited nuclear use environment.

To meet these requirements the United States needs a range of continuously forward-deployed, survivable theater nuclear forces that can reliably penetrate adversary defenses with a range of explosive yields, and on operationally relevant delivery timelines. Based on these attributes, currently planned US theater nuclear capabilities are not sufficient for the two-peer threat the United States faces. Completing the modernization of NATO’s dual-capable fighter aircraft capabilities is necessary but not sufficient to meet this requirement. NATO’s planned theater nuclear forces are too small, insufficiently survivable, and insufficiently militarily relevant. The United States currently plans no continuously forward-deployed theater nuclear capabilities in the Asia-Pacific theater whatsoever, despite the rapid growth of Chinese theater nuclear capabilities and indications that China is changing its nuclear strategy.

US strategic nuclear forces alone cannot fill this gap because they lack the flexibility and timeliness necessary to convince the Russian or Chinese leadership that the United States and its allies are credibly prepared to counter limited nuclear first use with militarily effective nuclear responses of their own. Bombers based in the continental United States cannot deliver nuclear weapons on operationally relevant timelines in many scenarios and are vulnerable to preemptive attack if deployed forward in the theater.

The United States should supplement dual-capable fighter modernization with at least one additional survivable, continuously forward-deployed, selectable-yield delivery system with a higher probability of penetrating advanced defenses and delivering nuclear weapons to targets in the European and Asia-Pacific theaters on operationally relevant timelines. There are several candidate systems that could meet this requirement, but a US nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missile (SLCM-N) deployed on attack submarines would provide all these attributes in a highly effective manner.

Deterring large-scale nuclear attack

US strategy for deterring large-scale nuclear attack has always been to ensure that US nuclear forces can inflict unacceptable damage on any adversary under any circumstances.

Inflicting unacceptable damage against China and Russia simultaneously requires being able to destroy what both adversaries value most under any circumstances, including following a combined Chinese-Russian preemptive counterforce strike on US nuclear forces and their command and control. This begs two key questions:

What do the Chinese and Russian leaderships value most?
How many US nuclear weapons must survive a combined future Chinese-Russian counterforce attack to be able to credibly hold at risk what both adversaries most value?

During the Cold War, the United States assessed that the Soviet leadership most valued its ability to exercise control over the Soviet state, its war-supporting industry, and its military forces, including its strategic nuclear forces. Whether this remains the correct equation to deter a Chinese and/or Russian large-scale nuclear attack on the United States is largely a question for the intelligence community.

If the intelligence community assesses the United States must hold Chinese and Russian nuclear forces at substantial risk to deter a large-scale nuclear attack, then the United States must carefully evaluate the level and nature of US nuclear counterforce capability required to deter such an attack and modify its planned nuclear force structure accordingly. Given the scale of China’s nuclear force expansion, the currently planned US nuclear force will clearly be insufficient to address two-peer adversaries in this way.

However, two other issues regarding the need for US nuclear counterforce capabilities are questions of political-military strategy, not intelligence assessment. The first is whether holding a peer adversary’s nuclear forces at risk contributes significantly to deterring limited nuclear escalation by making the US will to engage in a competition in risk-taking more credible. The second is whether holding a peer adversary’s nuclear forces at risk is necessary to limit meaningfully the damage Russia and China can do to the United States and its allies if deterrence of large-scale nuclear attack fails.

Even if the United States determines it does not need to hold Chinese and Russian nuclear forces at substantial risk to deter a large-scale nuclear attack, the United States should still evaluate the level and nature of US nuclear counterforce capabilities required to achieve these other two political-military objectives and modify its planned nuclear force structure accordingly. Most analysts believe the most likely path to a large-scale nuclear war is limited nuclear escalation that results from large-scale conventional conflict between nuclear-armed adversaries. Thus, if such counterforce capability contributes to deterring limited nuclear escalation, and thus also contributes to deterring large-scale conventional aggression, it indirectly contributes to preventing large-scale nuclear attack, even if it is not necessary to deter such an attack directly.

Conclusion

The advent of the two-nuclear-peer threat means the United States must reevaluate the size and composition of the nuclear force it will need to credibly deter both China and Russia from initiating large-scale conventional aggression, escalating to limited nuclear use, and launching a large-scale nuclear attack.

China’s impending nuclear-peer status means that the United States can no longer treat the Chinese nuclear threat as a “lesser included case” of the Russian nuclear threat. It is a US national security imperative that the full implications of the impending two-peer threat identified in this paper be seriously addressed in the near term.

Why is this an urgent imperative? Because if US strategy to address the two-peer threat requires a US nuclear force that is larger in size, different in composition, or both, decisions need to be made in the near term (one to three years) to supplement the planned US nuclear modernization program, or the nation will not have the required additional capabilities in time to address the threat. The current and planned capacity of the US nuclear weapons enterprise, under the purview of both the DOD and the Department of Energy, severely limits the nation’s ability to supplement the planned modernization program significantly in a timely way.

To reevaluate the size and composition of the nuclear force needed to address the coming two-peer threat, the full US national security community—including those who do and those who do not normally focus on nuclear weapons issues—needs to answer three key questions about the future role of nuclear weapons in US strategy and the conventional and nuclear forces required to implement that strategy:

What is the strategic rationale for believing that the nuclear modernization program of record that was adopted in 2010, before Russian aggression against Ukraine in 2014 and 2022, and before China’s ongoing and rapid nuclear force expansion, will be sufficient to address a 2030s security environment that poses the threat of conflict with two-peer nuclear adversaries simultaneously?
Are the United States and its allies and partners likely to decide to bear the sustained political and financial costs necessary to build sufficient conventional forces to deter and defeat both Russia and China simultaneously?
Why would a nuclear weapons design and production infrastructure designed to just barely be able to maintain the existing US nuclear force be sufficient to provide what the nation needs in a potentially unconstrained nuclear competition with two-peer nuclear adversaries who are technically sophisticated, well-resourced, and geostrategicaly aligned, if not allied?

Part II: Arms control opportunities in the emerging two-nuclear-peer environment

By Amy F. Woolf

This issue brief¹³ considers whether and how the emerging challenge of two near-equal nuclear-armed adversaries might affect the US nuclear posture. This changing security environment may alter US assessments of its nuclear requirements, affecting both the size and structure of the US nuclear arsenal. The presence of two near-equal nuclear adversaries might also raise new questions about whether arms control can help manage the nuclear competition with Russia and China to ease US concerns about emerging threats and mitigate the need for a more robust US nuclear force posture.

While this paper briefly addresses the prospects for arms control with Russia, the core of this inquiry is the question of whether the United States can engage China in an arms control process that restricts the scope of China’s nuclear modernization program, and, therefore, the magnitude of a potential US response. In its simple form, this question asks whether China might agree to limit the size and scope of its arsenal in exchange for limits on the numbers or capabilities of US nuclear weapons. This would seem to mirror the US-Soviet and US-Russian arms control experience where the nations signed several treaties that limited and, eventually, reduced their numbers of deployed nuclear warheads.

But the United States and Soviet Union developed their arms control relationship and crafted the tools they used to manage their nuclear competition over more than fifty years of negotiations. They only agreed to reduce their numbers of deployed nuclear weapons once their political and security relationship had changed in ways that reduced their nuclear requirements. Arms control treaties that codified reductions in their numbers of nuclear weapons were the result, not the cause, of that changing political relationship.

The United States and China almost certainly will not begin their arms control relationship in the same place that the United States and Russia reached after fifty years—with formal treaties that limited their numbers of deployed weapons. Nor can the United States expect China to accept limits on its nuclear capabilities as long as it believes it needs to expand those capabilities to meet its national security requirements. Therefore, this paper looks beyond the question of whether and how to impose numerical limits on Russian or Chinese nuclear forces and considers other forms of cooperation that might ease US concerns about emerging threats and, therefore, mitigate the need for a more robust US nuclear force posture.

President Ford and Soviet Secretary Brezhnev sign a Joint Communique on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms in 1974. Credit: Gerald R. Ford White House Photographs

Prospects for arms control with Russia

The United States and Russia are unlikely to reach an agreement on a formal treaty retaining current limits or imposing further reductions on their deployed nuclear forces before the New START agreement expires in 2026. Although the United States seems willing to move forward with negotiations, it is unclear whether that these discussions will resume before the conflict in Ukraine ends. In June 2023, Jake Sullivan, President Joseph R. Biden’s national security advisor, said that “rather than waiting to resolve all our bilateral differences, the United States is ready to engage Russia now to manage nuclear risks and develop a post-2026 arms control framework.”¹⁴ Russia, however, has rejected this approach. Sergey Ryabkov, Russia’s deputy foreign minister, has blamed Russia’s suspension of New START participation on “the totality of circumstances related to the destructive and hostile actions of the United States.” In response to Sullivan’s statement, he said that “there is simply no basis for a productive discussion here, but we are ready to patiently state our approaches and explain why the US course is destructive.”¹⁵

Differences in the US and Russian priorities for a treaty to replace New START would further complicate their ability to complete a new treaty before New START expires. The United States has suggested that the subsequent agreement “sustain limits . . . on the Russian systems covered under new START . . . limit the new kinds of nuclear systems Russia is developing; and . . . address all Russian nuclear weapons, including theater-range weapons.”¹⁶ Russia, in contrast, wants the arms control process to “cover the entire spectrum of offensive and defensive, nuclear and non-nuclear weapons with a strategic potential.” This list includes offensive nuclear and conventional strategic weapons, ballistic missile defenses, space-based capabilities that could strike targets on Earth, and the nuclear weapons of the United Kingdom and France.¹⁷ It would likely take more than the short time remaining before 2026 to resolve differences and conclude a treaty.

The United States and Russia might find common ground if they seek to establish broad goals for cooperation while identifying specific measures to help manage risks and uncertainties created by their nuclear postures. Some analysts have suggested that they could maintain predictability and transparency by pledging to maintain their forces at the levels mandated in New START and to resume exchanging data on the numbers and locations of their deployed strategic weapons. They could also bolster their communication channels, like those established to ensure deconfliction in and around Syria, to reduce the risk of misunderstandings and misperceptions that could lead to inadvertent escalation.

Informal steps designed to demonstrate restraint and avoid miscalculations would, however, be less comprehensive than those mandated by formal treaties and would almost certainly lapse if either side sought additional forces to meet its national security requirements. Nevertheless, voluntary efforts at cooperation, new negotiations to reinvigorate existing communications channels, and consultations to identify new risk reduction measures could help the two sides forestall worst-case assessments and resist arms race pressures until security conditions improved and formal negotiations resumed.

Prospects for arms control with China

US officials have raised concerns about China’s growing nuclear arsenal and the potential that a regional crisis could spark a conflict that might escalate to nuclear war. In response to these concerns, during their meeting in November 2021, President Biden invited China’s President Xi Jinping to participate in a strategic stability dialogue that would establish “common-sense guardrails to ensure that competition does not veer into conflict and to keep lines of communication open.”¹⁸ According to the Biden White House, these talks would focus, at first, “on avoiding accidental conflict, then on each nation’s nuclear strategy and the related instability that could come from attacks in cyberspace and outer space,” before eventually providing a venue for more formal arms control negotiations.¹⁹

The five Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) nuclear-weapon states holding a joint press conference in 2013. Credit: Eric Bridiers, US Mission

China has embraced some forms of arms control, participating in multilateral negotiations and engaging in the P5 process—which brings together the five nuclear weapon states (NWS) recognized by the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States)—to address nuclear security and nonproliferation issues. In this context, Beijing has advocated for the “five nuclear-weapon States . . . to further strengthen communication on strategic stability and conduct in-depth dialogue on reducing the role of nuclear weapons in their national security doctrines and on a broad range of issues, including missile defense, outer space, cyberspace, and artificial intelligence.”²⁰

China has, however, been reticent about joining strategic stability talks with the United States and has expressly rejected negotiations toward an agreement that would require transparency into or limits on its nuclear forces, citing the significant disparity between the numbers of US, Russian, and Chinese nuclear warheads. According to Ambassador Fu Cong, then-director-general of the Department of Arms Control at the PRC’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “the countries with the largest nuclear arsenals should further conduct significant and substantive reduction in their nuclear arsenals in a verifiable, irreversible and legally binding manner. This will create conditions for other nuclear-weapon States to join the nuclear disarmament process.”²¹ Fu, who is now Chinese ambassador to the European Union, also argued that transparency would undermine China’s strategic capability because China is “faced with a strategic competitor [with] 6000 nuclear warheads” who is also “developing missile defense, deploying all these missiles defense system around China, [and] talking about deploying the intermediate-range missiles around China.”²²

The US government has estimated that China’s nuclear stockpile will grow to around 1,500 warheads by 2035.²³ Some see this as an opening for arms control because the number would be similar to the New START limit of 1,550 deployed warheads on US and Russian long-range delivery systems. But the New START agreement does not count all US and Russian weapons; their stockpiles contain around 3,700 and 4,000 warheads, respectively. Moreover, New START expires in 2026, after which the United States and Russia could expand their numbers of deployed strategic nuclear forces, leading to far more than 1,550 deployed warheads on each side by the time China’s stockpile reaches 1,500 warheads in the mid-2030s. Thus, whether one counts deployed warheads on strategic delivery vehicles or total stockpiles, China’s deployed forces in 2026 and its stockpile of warheads in 2035 could still fall below those of the United States and Russia.

Still, a strategic stability dialogue like the one mentioned in the statement following the Biden-Xi summit in 2021 might create a pathway for engagement if the United States remains interested and China agrees to participate. The key to progress, however, depends on the issues on the agenda and the incentives the United States provides to bring China to the table.²⁴ For example, China may be more willing to participate if the agenda extends beyond nuclear weapons and focuses on other capabilities, like ballistic missile defenses and conventional strategic strike systems, that China believes undermine its security. China might also be more willing to discuss the implications of its nuclear modernization program if the United States acknowledges that China’s nuclear deterrent poses a credible threat to the United States and places the two nations in a “mutually vulnerable” deterrence relationship. As a matter of policy, the United States has long refused to acknowledge this reality, in part because it could undermine allies’ confidence in the US extended nuclear deterrent. Still, the absence of an acknowledgment also serves to convince China that the United States is seeking “absolute security,” rather than mutual deterrence, with its nuclear weapons.

The two nations could also seek to identify and implement crisis management, communications, and risk reduction measures to address the risk that regional crises might escalate to nuclear war. For example, a missile launch notification agreement might reduce the risk that either nation misunderstands the purpose of a missile test flight, then responds with additional military action. Measures that restrain dangerous air operations or encounters at sea could also reduce the risk of inadvertent engagements and escalation during a crisis. China has been unwilling to engage in direct government-to-government discussions on these types of issues in the past, but, in the current security environment, this type of dialogue might serve as a starting point for a more fulsome arms control relationship.

US President Joseph Biden and Chinese President Xi Jinping meet on the sidelines of the G20 Summit in Indonesia in November 2021. Credit: The White House

Conclusion

The United States, Russia, and China are unlikely to accept restrictions on their numbers of deployed nuclear weapons as long as each continues to center nuclear weapons in its national security strategy, and all believe the threats in the current international security environment increase the salience of nuclear weapons. Moreover, they are unlikely to find an acceptable agenda for negotiations until each is willing to address the others’ concerns about threatening activities or capabilities. Even if they clear these two hurdles, they are unlikely to succeed in talks that focus on nuclear reductions if each believes that it needs to modernize and possibly expand the size of its nuclear stockpile to achieve its security objectives.

A process focused on transparency, communication, and risk reduction measures could provide a path forward, even if it did not lead to nuclear reductions. It would not, however, be without complications. While the United States believes that steps to reduce the risk of nuclear war have value, Russia and China might believe that the risk would be worth taking in the future if it would help coerce the United States to disengage from a conflict. Nuclear weapons make this type of risk-tolerant strategy all the more dangerous. Nevertheless, an agenda focusing on communications and risk reduction might reduce the pressure to increase the number of nuclear weapons.

Series conclusion

Nuclear weapons represent both the greatest threat to US national survival and a central tool in US defense and national security strategy. The potential for horrific destruction in even a limited nuclear attack has underlain the US doctrine of nuclear deterrence, for which the United States has sought to maintain a nuclear force posture sufficient to deny any potential adversary its objectives if it employed nuclear weapons and to ensure that the costs of a conflict that escalated to nuclear use would be unacceptably high for that adversary.

During the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union recognized that either side’s efforts to expand its own capabilities could not only introduce new threats for the other, but also create instabilities that might add to the risk of nuclear use in a crisis or conflict. Thus, these states pursued discussions to better understand their planned nuclear force structures and to identify potential sources of instability in the nuclear balance. For the United States, this arms control process was part of its national security toolbox, as the negotiations produced agreements that restrained the size and scope of the Soviet and Russian nuclear force, offered transparency and predictability into potential future developments, and allowed the United States to plan its own nuclear programs without relying on worst-case assessments of Soviet and Russian plans.

In the years following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the size and structure of the US nuclear force, the guidance and employment plans that would direct use of nuclear weapons, and the circumstances under which the United States would consider employing them evolved to reflect positive changes in the international security environment. But the last decade has seen concerns about nuclear weapons and great power rivalry return to the scene. The United States is now engaged in a security environment where it might face conflicts with two nuclear-armed nations at the same time. As Russia and China modernize and expand their nuclear forces, the United States must again consider how to alter the size and structure of its nuclear forces and whether cooperation through arms control can mitigate the need for a more robust US nuclear posture.

The two papers in this study offer answers to both sides of this problem. The first paper concludes that the United States will likely need a greater number of deployed nuclear warheads than the 1,550 permitted under the New START Treaty and additional, more flexible delivery systems—such as a nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missile—to ensure that it can simultaneously deter conflict with both China and Russia at the strategic and regional levels. The second paper concludes that, while stability dialogues and risk-reduction measures might help the three nations mitigate the risk of nuclear use, they are unlikely for the foreseeable future to negotiate treaties or agreements that limit the size of their nuclear forces or offer transparency into their future plans.

Because the United States, Russia, and China all see nuclear weapons as essential to their national security, they almost certainly will continue to expand their capabilities until the international security environment changes. Neither the United States and Russia, nor the United States and China, are likely to engage in bilateral arms control discussions until they believe they can strengthen their security by cooperating to manage nuclear risks. Moreover, these states are unlikely to find an acceptable agenda for negotiations until each is willing to address the others’ concerns about threatening activities or capabilities. Even if these states clear these two hurdles, negotiators are unlikely to find success in talks that focus on nuclear reductions if each believes that it needs to modernize and possibly expand the size of its nuclear stockpile to achieve its security objectives.

About the authors

Greg Weaver is the principal of Strategy to Plans LLC. Previously, he was deputy director for strategic stability in the Joint Chiefs of Staff Directorate for Strategic Plans and Policy (J5)

There, he was the principal policy and strategy adviser to the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on nuclear, space, cyber, missile defense, and arms control issues. Prior to joining the Joint Staff, he served as principal director for nuclear and missile defense policy in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.

Amy Woolf is a nonresident senior fellow in the Forward Defense program of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

Previously, she served as a specialist in nuclear weapons policy at the Congressional Research Service of the US Library of Congress for more than thirty years. In that role, she provided Congress with research support, background information, and expert analysis on issues related to nuclear forces and arms control. Before joining the Congressional Research Service, Woolf was a member of the research staff at the Institute for Defense Analyses. She also spent a year at the US Department of Defense, working on the 1994 Nuclear Posture Review. Woolf received a master in public policy from the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University and a bachelor of arts in political science from Stanford University.

Acknowledgments

The authors would like to thank Alyxandra Marine and Mark J. Massa for their assistance in editing this piece and Marine for writing the introduction.

The Atlantic Council is grateful to Los Alamos National Laboratory for its support of this paper.

1 2022 Report on Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China, US Department of Defense, 94.

2 The 2022 National Defense Strategy makes the primacy of the US nuclear deterrent abundantly clear; for example, the DOD focus on integrated deterrence is “backstopped by a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent.” The NDS emphasizes the importance of modernizing US nuclear forces as “the ultimate backstop to deter attacks on the homeland and our Allies and partners who rely on extended deterrence.” Numerous public statements by senior US government officials reiterate the priority of the US’s nuclear deterrent. See 2022 National Defense Strategy, https://media.defense.gov/2022/Oct/27/2003103845/-1/-1/1/2022-NATIONAL-DEFENSESTRATEGY-NPR-MDR.PDF.

3 Military and Security Developments Regarding the People’s Republic of China 2022, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2022, 94.

4 Or even sooner. Recent public US intelligence estimates of China’s future nuclear arsenal have repeatedly underestimated both the pace and scale of China’s nuclear buildup.

5 Intrawar deterrence is important to consider should a conflict begin following a deterrence failure and critical actions must be taken to mitigate escalation toward a large-scale nuclear exchange. Intrawar deterrence considerations are distinctly different from preconflict deterrence and escalation toward conflict.

6 For more on the debate regarding China’s “no first use” declaratory policy, see Nan Li, “China’s Evolving Nuclear Strategy: Will China Drop ‘No First Use?,’” China Brief, Jamestown Foundation, January 12, 2018, https://jamestown.org/program/chinas-evolving-nuclearstrategy-will-china-drop-no-first-use/. The author points out that debate over the efficacy of “no first use” among China’s nuclear scholars has increased in recent years, with some calling it into question. Also see Jennifer Bradley, “China’s Nuclear Modernization and Expansion: Ways Beijing Could Adapt Its Nuclear Policy,” National Institute for Public Policy Occasional Paper 2, no. 7, July 2022. Bradley points out that China contends a launch-on-warning capability (that it is developing) is fully consistent with its no-first-use nuclear policy.

7 For background on the development of the current program of record during the administration of President Barack Obama, see, for example, 2010 Nuclear Posture Review; 2015 National Security Strategy; Congressional Research Service, “U.S. Strategic Nuclear Forces: Background, Developments, and Issues,” updated September 3, 2019; and for the New START debate in Congress, see, for example, “November 2010 Update to the National Defense Authorization Act of FY2010 Section 1251 Report, New START Treaty Framework and Nuclear Force Structure Plans,” Los Alamos Study Group.

8 As pointed out by US experts on Russian military doctrine (e.g., Dave Johnson, Michael Kofman, Anya Fink), Russian military doctrine and strategy, particularly in the nuclear realm, cannot be reduced to the simplistic and misleading label—“escalate to deescalate.” For more on the Russian approach as a strategic deterrence, counter-escalation, and war-fighting strategy, see D. Johnson, “Russia’s Conventional Precision Strike Capabilities, Regional Crises, and Nuclear Thresholds,” Livermore Papers on Global Security No. 3, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, February 2018; M. Kofman and A. Fink, “Escalation Management and Nuclear Employment in Russian Military Strategy,” Center for New American Security, September 2022.

9 “In a potential conflict with a competitor, the United States would need to be able to deter opportunistic aggression by another competitor. We will rely in part on nuclear weapons to help mitigate this risk, recognizing that a near-simultaneous conflict with two nuclear-armed states would constitute an extreme circumstance.” See 2022 Nuclear Posture Review, US Department of Defense, 12.

10 Failing to address this problem also exacerbates issues around extended deterrence and assurance of allies and partners.

11 Note, however, that none of these objectives would likely require a US strategic nuclear force that matched the combined total of deployed warheads in the Russian and Chinese strategic nuclear forces.

12 For more details on this argument, see Greg Weaver, “The Role of Nuclear Weapons in a Taiwan Crisis,” Atlantic Council, November 2023.

13 The views expressed by Amy F. Woolf, a nonresident senior fellow in the Forward Defense program of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, are her own and do not reflect the views of her current or past affiliations.

14 White House, “Remarks by National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan for the Arms Control Association (ACA) Annual Forum,” White House Briefing Room (website), June 2, 2023, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2023/06/02/remarks-by-national-security-advisor-jake-sullivan-for-the-arms-control-association-aca-annual-forum/.

15 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, “Foreign Ministry Spokeswoman Maria Zakharova’s Answer to a Media Question about US National Security Adviser John Sullivan’s Remarks,” June 3, 2023, https://mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/1873993/.

16 “Keynote Address for the Commemoration of the 50th Anniversary of the Arms Control Association,” delivered by Mallory Stewart, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Arms Control, Compliance, and Verification, US Department of State, June 2, 2022, https://www.state.gov/keynote-address-for-the-commemoration-of-the-50th-anniversary-of-the-arms-control-association/.

17 Sergey Ryabkov, “Russia’s Nonproliferation Policy and Global Strategic Stability,” Modern Diplomacy, December 27, 2021, https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2021/12/27/russias-nonproliferation-policy-and-global-strategic-stability/.

18 White House, “Readout of President Biden’s Virtual Meeting with President Xi Jinping of the People’s Republic of China,” November 16, 2021, https://www.whitehouse. gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/11/16/readout-of-president-bidens-virtual-meeting-with-president-xi-jinping-of-the-peoples-republic-of-china/.

19 David E. Sanger and William J. Broad, “As China Speeds Up Nuclear Arms Race, the US Wants to Talk,” New York Times, November 28, 2021, https://www.nytimes. com/2021/11/28/us/politics/china-nuclear-arms-race.html.

20 “Upholding the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons for World Peace and Development,” Ambassador Fu Cong, Head of the Chinese Delegation and Director-General of the Department of Arms Control of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, August 2, 2022, https://reachingcriticalwill.org/ images/documents/Disarmament-fora/npt/revcon2022/statements/2Aug_China.pdf.

21 “Upholding the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.”

22 “Upholding the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.”

23 Military and Security Developments.

24 For more details on the points summarized here, see David Santoro, “Getting Past No: Developing a Nuclear Arms Control Relationship with China,” Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament, June 13, 2023, https://doi.org/10.1080/25751654.2023.2221830.

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Iran is on its way to replacing Russia as a leading arms exporter. The US needs a strategy to counter this trend.

Danny Citrinowicz — Fri, 02 Feb 2024 16:21:20 +0000

The latest reports regarding the sale of Iran’s Mohajer-6 Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) to the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) for use in the Sudanese civil war, which has been raging for the past year, should not surprise those who follow Iranian arms sales.

In recent years, and even more so in the last year alone, Iran has been increasing the pace of its sales and transfers of UAVs to various parts of the globe, including Ethiopia, Bolivia, Venezuela, and Western Sahara’s Polisario Front. Iran is well on its way to becoming a leading arms exporter globally, especially since additional countries are interested in buying these capabilities.

The economic profit Iran receives in this regard is clear. It is estimated that the cost of the popular Shahed-136 is $20,000-$40,000 for one unit. This fact, together with the reports that Iran sold more than two thousand drones to Russia alone, makes it clear that Tehran earns millions of dollars from these transactions. However, Iran obtains more than financial gains from this dynamic, as it also deepens the Islamic Republic’s political foothold in these countries, creating dependence on the former and its products.

In this context, Iran has significant advantages compared to countries like the United Kingdom, Israel, or the United States, which export similar capabilities worldwide. Iran’s drones and other military capabilities, such as Fateh-110 short-range missiles, are cheaper than its Western competitors. On top of that, Iran has no political or legal restrictions that prevent it from selling these weapons around the world; it is apparently not afraid that these products will fall into the hands of dangerous foreign parties.

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Most importantly, Iran’s products have been proven on the battlefield, whether it has been through Russia’s use of them in the war against Ukraine or the terrorist organizations’ use of them under Iran’s auspices, such as Lebanese Hezbollah, Yemen’s Houthis, or the Shia militias in Iraq. The potency of these weapons in the hands of the latter category of actors was evidenced in the January 28 attack on a base in northeastern Jordan, which killed three service members, as well as the start of the “Iron Swords” campaign, when Israel was viciously attacked by the terrorist group Hamas on October 7, 2023.

This situation has allowed Iran to dramatically increase its sales to many countries worldwide, especially to those to which the West has difficulty transferring weapons, such as countries involved in military conflicts or civil wars.

Another relevant factor in this equation is the position of Russia, which was once a leading weapons exporter before experiencing difficulty maintaining its position as a major power after invading Ukraine. The resulting war has consumed vast Russian resources and provoked an array of sanctions, producing a vacuum in the world of arms sales and military equipment in a time of global instability.

As a result, Iran has become more dominant and attractive in the eyes of countries that previously depended on Russia’s supply of military equipment. Furthermore, the current situation can create a joint venture between Iran and Russia that may increase their conventional mutual arms sales due to their high production capabilities.

Iran’s recent activities in this regard are a clear warning of what will happen if it increases its weapons exports. On top of the other problems this trend creates, it must be remembered that giving strategic capabilities to those with problematic decision-making mechanisms/processes may lead to the misuse of said capabilities, which can significantly destabilize various areas of the world.

The recent events in the Bab al-Mandab Strait are an example of these alarming developments; that the Houthis can threaten the maritime routes in the Red Sea and beyond is driven by the fact that they received strategic capabilities, including drones and Coastal Defense Cruise Missiles (CDCMs), from Iran. If Iran increases the spread of these capabilities, it will probably duplicate the situation in the Red Sea in other places around the world.

For this reason alone, the US government should understand the seriousness of these developments. Ignoring this trend could lead to an irreversible situation that might make Iran the leading arms exporter in the world.

There are multiple actions the Joe Biden administration needs to take to prevent this from happening. First, it must significantly increase pressure on Iran’s drone industry by placing more sanctions on relevant entities, thereby preventing companies from sending dual-use components that could be used in the Iranian drone industry and so forth. Such a measure would make it much more complicated and much more expensive to produce these drones.

Imposing economic and political sanctions on any country that acquires military capabilities from Iran or conducts joint military ventures with it, like Tajikistan, will present hefty trade-offs that could act as a deterrent.

At the same time, the Biden administration needs to consider how to facilitate and speed up its own selling capabilities in order to block the infiltration of Iranian weapons into different countries. As the Sudan case proves, states in need will turn to Iran for help even if a diplomatic rift exists (i.e., Sudan angered Iran by deciding to join the normalization process with Israel). In that regard, the United States can consider selling a version of conventional capabilities with a lower classification, including less sensitive technology, with the understanding that selling weapons to different countries strengthens their stability and increases their dependence on the US.

As mentioned before, the perceived effectiveness of Iran’s drones is bolstered by their use in various combat arenas around the world. The recent tragic event in Jordan, where Kataib Hezbollah wielded an Iranian Shahed drone, further highlights the need to increase the focus on Iran’s UAV industry and its distribution around the Middle East, especially its proxies, in order to prevent these weapons from becoming attractive to countries and organizations that will use them to harm US interests around the globe.

The Biden administration must build a plan aimed at undermining this perception. For example, the Pentagon claimed that the missiles fired from Iran toward Syria on January 15th were inaccurate. If the credibility of Iran’s drones is damaged, it will cause countries to question the benefit of buying from Tehran.

The worst thing the Biden administration can do is ignore the disturbing development of Iran’s weapons transfers in favor of focusing on other negative features of its activities, be it its nuclear program or regional proxies. The US must understand the seriousness of the situation: without active measures, it will be extremely tough to stop Tehran from becoming a world leader in arms sales, not to mention all the negative implications for international stability that would accompany such a reality.

Danny Citrinowicz served for twenty-five years in a variety of command positions units in Israel Defense Intelligence (IDI), including as the head of the Iran branch in the Research and Analysis Division (RAD) in the Israeli defense intelligence and as the division’s representative in the United States. Follow him on Twitter: @citrinowicz.

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IPSI report on simultaneous conflicts referenced in VOA

kyusko — Mon, 15 Jan 2024 20:55:59 +0000

On January 14, IPSI’s report, “The United States and its allies must be ready to deter a two-front war and nuclear attacks in East Asia,” was referenced in a VOA article, which underscored the report’s warning about the potential for China to target US bases in South Korea in a conflict with the United States.

Staff

Markus Garlauskas

Indo-Pacific Security Initiative Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Crisis Management Indo-Pacific

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Arsenal of Autocracy: North Korea and Iran are arming Russia in Ukraine

Olivia Yanchik — Thu, 11 Jan 2024 20:48:09 +0000

Over the New Year holiday period, Russia launched some of the biggest bombardments of Ukrainian cities since the start of the full-scale invasion almost two years ago. These attacks had been widely expected, with Russia believed to have been actively stockpiling missiles and drones during the final few months of 2023. Nevertheless, the origin of some of the missiles used in Russia’s latest air attacks has sparked considerable disquiet in Ukraine and throughout Western capitals.

In the days following these latest bombardments, the White House announced that Russia had used North Korean ballistic missiles to strike Ukraine. These claims were subsequently corroborated by senior Ukrainian officials. In a joint statement issued on January 9, the US, UK, EU, Australia, Germany, Canada and nearly 40 other partner nations condemned North Korea’s export of ballistic missiles to Russia.

The delivery of North Korean ballistic missiles marks the latest escalation in the country’s support for Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Reports of North Korean arms shipments to Russia first emerged in late 2022. In October 2023, US National Security Council Spokesperson John Kirby announced that Pyongyang had delivered more than 1,000 containers of equipment and munitions to Russia. Speaking in late 2023, South Korean officials claimed North Korean military production facilities were operating “at maximum capacity” in order to meet Russian demand for armaments.

It is not clear what Russia is offering in exchange for the weapons it is receiving from North Korea, but there are fears that Moscow is providing the heavily sanctioned nation with access to new military technologies. During a September 2023 visit to Russia, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un visited a number of military sites showcasing advanced weapons systems.

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North Korea is not the only authoritarian regime currently providing Putin with weapons for the invasion of Ukraine. Iran has supplied Russia with large quantities of attack drones as well as artillery shells, while Russia is using Iranian drone technologies to establish large-scale domestic production of attack drones for use in Ukraine. Recent reports indicate this cooperation is now intensifying. Russia is poised to receive Iranian ballistic missiles, with Iran also delivering upgraded drones.

The military support currently being provided by North Korea and Iran is believed to be critical for the Russian war effort. While Vladimir Putin has succeeded in moving much of the Russian economy onto a war footing, the intensity of the fighting in Ukraine means Russia is currently unable to meet high demand for key munitions categories including drones, missiles, and artillery shells.

With the invasion of Ukraine about to enter a third year, deliveries of Iranian and North Korean ammunition are enabling Russia to maintain a significant artillery advantage in what is now widely regarded as a war of attrition. Likewise, the steady supply of Iranian drones makes it possible for Russia to continue its intensive bombing campaign against Ukrainian cities and the country’s civilian infrastructure. Deliveries of North Korean and Iranian ballistic missiles will allow Russia to further expand the air war against Ukraine.

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Ukraine’s advance in Kursk: What’s next and implications

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While Putin’s fellow autocrats in Tehran and Pyongyang grow bolder in their readiness to back the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the West’s collective commitment to the Ukrainian war effort is now increasingly in question. In recent months, a major new US aid package for Ukraine has become hostage to domestic American politics, while the passage of long-term EU aid has been blocked in Brussels thanks to opposition from Hungary. This is fueling speculation over the future of Western support for Ukraine in a long war with Russia.

Vladimir Putin has clearly been encouraged by mounting recent indications of Western weakness, and believes he can ultimately outlast the West in a test of political wills. The Russian dictator has long framed the invasion of Ukraine in historic terms as an attempt to end the era of Western dominance. He aims to usher in a new multipolar world order and is building alliances with like-minded authoritarian regimes.

It is now clear that Russia has succeeded in establishing an Arsenal of Autocracy together with Iran and North Korea. Moscow, Tehran, and Pyongyang are leveraging their military potential and producing the quantities of weapons necessary to overwhelm Western resistance and achieve Russian victory in Ukraine.

This authoritarian alliance poses grave threats to the future of global security. If Russia prevails in Ukraine thanks to military support from Iran and North Korea, Ukrainians will not be the last victims. On the contrary, Putin’s triumph would set a disastrous precedent. The international community would soon be faced with further wars of aggression as the world plunged into a dangerous new era where today’s rules regarding national sovereignty and territorial integrity no longer applied.

None of this is inevitable, but the clock is already ticking. If Western leaders wish to avoid decades of international insecurity and instability, they must send a clear message to all autocratic rulers and Putin wannabes by making sure the Russian invasion of Ukraine ends in decisive defeat.

Olivia Yanchik is a program assistant at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

Fellow

Robert Soofer

Arms Control Defense Policy

Vice President and Senior Director, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

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Deliberate nuclear use in a war over Taiwan: Scenarios and considerations for the United States

Matthew Kroenig — Thu, 30 Nov 2023 14:54:09 +0000

FORWARD DEFENSE

REPORT RELEASE

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The Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security’s Forward Defense program is delighted to share our latest report: Deliberate Nuclear Use in a War over Taiwan: Scenarios and Considerations for the United States. This report by Matthew Kroenig, the Atlantic Council’s vice president and senior director for the Scowcroft Center for Security and Strategy, aims to foster a deeper understanding of the prospects for nuclear use in the context of a potential invasion of Taiwan by the People’s Republic of China.

The report examines the potential deterrent, coercive, and warfighting roles of nuclear weapons for the United States and China in such a contingency, evaluating possible targets, employment logics, and implications. The report examines potential scenarios in which China might use nuclear weapons to deter US and allied intervention in support of Taiwan, to coerce a halt to US and allied support to Taiwan, and to defeat Taiwanese and US forces. It also evaluates how the United States could use nuclear weapons for deterrent, coercive, and warfighting roles. The report assesses various possible targets for each side’s possible nuclear employment and assesses the implications of such actions on security globally and in the greater Indo-Pacific.

Other scholars have recognized the risk of a US-China war over Taiwan inadvertently escalating to nuclear use, but few have thought through each party’s rational incentives to deliberately employ nuclear weapons and how a nuclear exchange might play out.
Matthew Kroenig

Main arguments

China might use its nuclear forces to support an invasion of Taiwan and deter a US response. If China used nuclear weapons against the United States, it would need to respond with nuclear forces. Several targets could be chosen for a US nuclear response, including People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Navy vessels, militarized islands in the South China Sea, PLA beachheads in Taiwan, and various mainland targets. The selection of these targets could have varying impacts on the conflict and different levels of risks escalation.
The United States should consider nuclear first use if conventional forces cannot stop a Chinese invasion force from reaching Taiwan.
The United States needs strategic clarity toward Taiwan, including an explicit pledge to defend Taiwan from an unprovoked Chinese invasion and possibly the extension of a US nuclear umbrella over Taiwan.

Recommendations

The report recommends policy shifts, diplomacy, military preparation, and investments to deter conventional and nuclear war over Taiwan.

Deterrence of conventional war: The first step towards avoiding nuclear war is to prevent a conventional war that could escalate. The United States should work closely with its allies and Taiwan to create an effective deterrent to Chinese aggression.
Strategic clarity and nuclear umbrella: The United States should pledge to defend Taiwan from an unprovoked Chinese invasion and consider extending its nuclear umbrella over Taiwan. This could discourage Chinese nuclear use by creating a credible threat of a powerful US response.
Dialogue with Taiwan: Ongoing dialogue with Taiwan is essential to understand the risks of nuclear escalation, plan for possible US nuclear use, and help prepare Taiwan to operate effectively after a nuclear detonation.
Communication with China: The United States should convey to China that its mainland will not be immune from nuclear retaliation if China employs nuclear weapons against US or allied forces.
Hardening and dispersal of US facilities: US military installations in the region should be protected against attacks through strategies such as dispersion and hardening.
Improvements to US nuclear forces: The United States should modernize its strategic nuclear forces and consider additional theater nuclear options, including developing capabilities to target moving naval vessels.
Broadening of homeland missile defense plans: Given the potential for limited nuclear use, US missile defense should also be scoped to include limited nuclear attacks from China (or Russia), not just from rogue states.

About the author

Staff

Matthew Kroenig

China Defense Policy

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Soofer quoted in Politico discussing Chinese and US nuclear arsenals

Atlantic Council — Thu, 16 Nov 2023 14:13:44 +0000

On November 15, Forward Defense senior fellow Robert Soofer was quoted in a Politico article in which the author discussed both Chinese and US approaches to nuclear deterrence. In the article, Soofer explains that the Biden Administration is now expanding its nuclear arsenal in response to China’s burgeoning nuclear modernization program and repeated Russian threats to use low-yield nuclear weapons in Ukraine.

Biden’s new embrace of nuclear deterrence is clearly a response to dramatically changed circumstances

Robert Soofer

Fellow

Robert Soofer

Arms Control Defense Policy

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AUKUS is hamstrung by outdated US export control rules. Here’s what Congress can do.

Deborah Cheverton, John T. Watts — Wed, 15 Nov 2023 21:26:19 +0000

Amid recent chaos in Congress, it is often difficult to see the progress being made on any area of legislation. However, beneath the fractious noise and political posturing, some inhabitants of the Hill have been diligently working toward bipartisan legislation in a critical area of US foreign policy that deserves a brighter spotlight—export control reform.

For decades, some of the United States’ closest allies have been quietly frustrated by the indiscriminate and extraterritorial application of US export controls, which seriously hinders efforts to share technologies and collaborate on capability development projects. In particular, the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) has drawn the ire of allies for restricting the export and import of certain defense products. As one of the authors explained in June, and with no criticism toward the hardworking State Department officials who have dedicated their careers to keeping the nation’s most critical technological advancements out of enemy hands, the current legislative and regulatory regimes are not structured to support the pace or flexibility that modern technology and the strategic competition with China demands.

It is fortunate then that AUKUS, the trilateral partnership between Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States, has driven an unprecedented state of urgency into the discussion. Politicians and policymakers in all three nations—and on both sides of the aisle in the United States—now recognize that the partnership just won’t stand with ITAR as it’s currently enforced. This is particularly clear when it comes to the wider cooperation envisaged in AUKUS for critical technologies, including those dealing with artificial intelligence, autonomy, cybersecurity, and electronic warfare.

Progress at last

Positive movement on the issue first started to appear in summer of this year, when UK Prime Minister Rishi Sunak and US President Joe Biden jointly announced the Atlantic Declaration, which included modernization of export controls as part of a broader US-UK economic partnership. Since then, both the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House Foreign Affairs Committee have passed provisions aimed at legislating an ITAR exemption for AUKUS nations. That language choice is important, as any exemption which was narrowly applied to AUKUS projects would cover only a very minor portion of collaborative development among the nations and, at best, provide limited benefit in terms of removing the unnecessary delays and compliance costs which currently cause so much pain.

Some policy experts who watch this legislation closely say that Congress now stands closer to truly reforming ITAR than it ever has before. However, the differing approaches between the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and House Foreign Affairs Committe mean that a compromise bill must first be agreed through a bicameral conference committee before it can proceed. The need for a compromise bill, chaos in the House of Representatives, and continued congressional disagreement over federal spending mean there is no sign of a full floor vote in either chamber any time soon.

AUKUS is fundamentally a partnership for deterrence, and no one except for the partnering nations’ adversaries benefits from delay and continued uncertainty. The United States and its closest allies have a generational opportunity to work together to combat the increasingly dynamic threat posed by common adversaries. Allowing it to fall away because of legislative complications in one nation would be a failure of enormous magnitude. Both houses of Congress must stay the course and pass legislation for an AUKUS nations ITAR exemption as soon as possible.

Half the battle

As is often the case in Washington, legislation is only a first step. Even if a compromise bill results in the holy grail of an ITAR free transfer zone among the United States, United Kingdom, Australia, and their respective industrial bases, then it will only be the beginning of the story. Many previous attempts at export control reform have failed in implementation, as other experts have pointed out. Once legislation is passed, new regulations must be written, the State Department must implement and enforce them, and the defense industries in all three nations must be willing and able to use them.

There are three areas of implementation which will require particular attention if an AUKUS exemption is to succeed. These are the scope of the exemption, the mechanisms through which industry partners can use the exemption, and the definition of “comparable standards.”

Taken in reverse order, it is almost certain that the legislation will require the United Kingdom and Australia to demonstrate that their export control regimes protect sensitive technologies to a standard that is comparable to the US regime. For the United Kingdom, this should be relatively simple, as the country has a long history of cooperation with the United States on the most sensitive of defense technologies, including nuclear propulsion and weapons development. Moreover, the United Kingdom already has a strong defense industry of its own, which develops sensitive capabilities and has a proven record of protecting US technologies. The United Kingdom also already has a robust export controls regime, which has been further reinforced in recent years through the 2021 National Security Investment Act, which significantly strengthened existing legislation on investment security, and a more recent expansion of military end-use controls, which broadened the scope and number of countries to which exports can be blocked. The United Kingdom’s forthcoming National Security Act will also strengthen protections around intangible exports already in place under the 1989 Official Secrets Act.

Australia is in a slightly different position, as its defense industrial base is much smaller and its exports are far more modest, meaning that it might be harder to demonstrate a sustained level of comparable protections. But it does already have a domestic export controls regime in the Defence Trade Controls Act of 2012, and is currently consulting on amendments to strengthen the Act, including by creating three new criminal offenses. Australia, like the United Kingdom, is also party to multilateral export control regimes, including the Missile Technology Control Regime, and voluntarily submits to end-use monitoring of items.

So, while there may be specific areas that need tightening up, there is no defensible need for either the United Kingdom or Australia to follow the example set by Canada in the early 2000s and overhaul their existing export control regimes to exactly match the United States. This is primarily because “comparable” does not mean identical, but also because it doesn’t exactly set the right tone of trusted partnership for the United States to demand other sovereign nations change their domestic laws to suit itself. Practically speaking, even if the UK or Australian government was willing to change its domestic laws in this way, any change requiring primary legislation to enact would take time to pass through its respective parliament and would introduce further, unnecessary delays. The key implementation questions here for partner nations are how, and by whom, the comparable standards criteria will be judged, how quickly that decision will be made, and how many hoops they will be willing to jump through to get the green light.

The other two issues—the scope of the exemption and the mechanisms through which industry partners can use it—are interlinked and relatively straightforward, but just as critical. In today’s world of private sector-dominated research, which produces technologies that are increasingly dual-use, industry and academia are crucial partners in defense capability development. Any exemption that these partners are unwilling to use because the risk is too high or are unable to use because the processes are too burdensome will be dead on arrival. This has happened in previous attempts to reform export controls, such as the Defence Trade Cooperation Treaties of 2007, with their overly complicated carve-outs and sign-up processes, and the more recent Open General License Pilot, which applies only to the “maintenance, repair, or storage” of a narrow range of existing technologies and is therefore almost entirely ineffectual. Moreover, the US military may be left guarding second-tier capabilities while the commercial domain races ahead with unclassified and commercially available best-in-class alternatives. This is particularly likely in the realm of software development.

These examples of past failures highlight the critical importance of clarity of scope and ease of access in delivering a workable exemption. In designing its implementation and enforcement approaches to any new exemption, the State Department should consult with the United Kingdom and Australian governments, but also with partners in industry and academia. It should ensure that the mechanism to sign up to use the exemption is as straightforward as possible, that reporting and audit processes are appropriate to the relatively low levels of security risk involved, and that there is no uncertainty regarding the scope of technologies that are covered. It is especially important that the new approach does not inadvertently introduce a dual-track system, in which some areas of technology development cooperation are covered and others are not.

If the AUKUS experiment is to live up to its promise of allowing the closest of allies to genuinely work hand in hand to advance global security into the second half of this century, then Congress and the Biden administration must both show that they are willing to make the necessary changes to a needlessly limiting export control regime that, in this case, does more harm than good. Let’s all hope they are up to the challenge.

Deborah Cheverton is a visiting senior fellow in the Atlantic Council’s Forward Defense program within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

John T. Watts is a nonresident senior fellow in the Forward Defense practice of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security and head of US federal coordination at Cocoon Data.

Note: This piece has been updated to correct John Watts’s employer.

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Hinata-Yamaguchi quoted in South China Morning Post on Japan-Russia relations

kyusko — Tue, 14 Nov 2023 19:43:50 +0000

On November 13, IPSI nonresident senior fellow Ryo Hinata-Yamaguchi was quoted in South China Morning Post article on the end of a thirty-year-old nuclear decommissioning pact between Japan and Russia, suggesting that “the agreement in itself is less important” than the overall decline in relations.

Fellow

Ryo Hinata-Yamaguchi

Indo-Pacific Security Initiative Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Defense Policy Indo-Pacific

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Soofer speaks at Project Atom report launch

Atlantic Council — Wed, 08 Nov 2023 16:44:47 +0000

On November 7, Forward Defense senior fellow Robert Soofer attended the Center for Strategic and International Studies’ launch event of their Project Atom report, a piece which he coauthored along with eight other nuclear experts. In Soofer’s contribution, written alongside Tom Karako, he addresses the changing international security environment and its impact on arms control and extended deterrence. Soofer and Karako describe possible changes to US posture and strategy as the United States works to deter two nuclear powers, Russia and China, simultaneously. Soofer served as a panelist at this launch event, discussing nuclear flexibility and credibility with adversaries and allies.

In summary, potential Russian and Chinese cooperation poses a challenge to U.S. interests in peacetime,
crisis, and war.

Robert Soofer

Fellow

Robert Soofer

Arms Control Defense Policy

Introduction
Background
Research question
Key findings summary
Methodology
Scenario-building workshop
Interviews with officials and experts
Insights from the scenario-building workshop
Part I: Understanding the effect of Russia’s conventional warfare capabilities and regime stability on CBRN escalation
Key ta keaways from Part I
Part II: Conceptualizing integrated deterrence among the United States and its European Allies to address CBRN weapons use
Key takeaways from Part II
Insights from interviews
Allied alignment over the severity of Russian CBRN threat
Existing cooperation among Allies supports US goals
Areas for improved cooperation with Allies and Partners
Mixed understanding of integrated deterrence as a concept
Key findings and recommendations
Conclusion

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Continued US and allied integration is essential to deter Russian CBRN use

Natasha Lander Finch, Ryan Arick, Christopher Skaluba — Thu, 26 Oct 2023 17:50:09 +0000

This report presents the findings and recommendations of the Atlantic Council project, Conceptualizing Integrated Deterrence to Address Russian Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) Escalation. The objective of this project was to develop an approach for incorporating European allies and partners into the US model of integrated deterrence against Russian CBRN use.

Key findings summary:

Allies and partners already significantly contribute to US approaches to counter Russian CBRN threats in Europe. Future cooperation—bilaterally, multilaterally, and through NATO— should focus on areas of greatest need as mutually identified by the United States and its European allies and partners.
As a concept, integrated deterrence is a useful frame for examining cooperation with European nations to counter Russia’s CBRN threats, but the US Government should use this framing to identify new opportunities, rather than detract from or encapsulate ongoing cooperation.
Civil-military cooperation across a variety of sectors is essential to respond to CBRN threats, especially among public health agencies and law enforcement. To fully realize integrated deterrence in the next five to ten years, greater coordination among civilian and military communities—within the United States and among its European allies and partners—is essential to enhancing resilience.
Challenges for US cooperation with allies and partners to counter CBRN threats, especially as these threats become more complex. The United States and its European allies should remain vigilant about emerging threats, while leveraging new technological developments in detection and attribution systems and emergency response mechanisms to build comprehensive defenses against CBRN threats.
As Russia deploys hybrid warfare tactics to support and conceal potential CBRN escalation, the United States and its European allies must prepare to combat malign influence efforts, such as information influence activities, targeted assassinations, energy sabotage, and economic coercion, related to CBRN use as part of the US strategy of integrated deterrence.

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Introduction

This report presents the findings and recommendations of the Atlantic Council project Conceptualizing Integrated Deterrence to Address Russian Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) Escalation. The objective of this project was to develop an approach for incorporating European allies and partners into the US model of integrated deterrence against Russian CBRN use.

Background

Russia’s foreign policy has grown increasingly destabilizing to US interests as its economic decline, adverse demographic trends, and conventional capability inferiority vis-à-vis NATO have led to an aggressive pursuit of military modernization. Of particular concern is Russia’s routine flouting of arms control, disarmament, and nonproliferation norms. For instance, Russia violated its arms control commitments by developing and using a novel fourth-generation nerve agent, Novichok, in the United Kingdom in 2018.¹ Russia’s exit from the New START Treaty in 2023 constituted a further move away from accepted arms control and verification standards.² These actions, combined with Russia’s persistent false claims of US and Ukrainian development of biological weapons in Ukraine, contribute to an environment of volatility and instability, especially about the prospect of the Kremlin choosing to use CBRN weapons for punishment or compellence to seize military advantage, or to deter allied support for Ukraine.³

The hollowness of Russia’s conventional capability, combined with its military doctrine and dangerous rhetoric, reinforces the important role that CBRN capabilities will likely play in Russian defense strategy in the coming years. However, there is currently a gap in US and European understanding of the manifestation of this risk in the nearto mid-term. Moreover, it remains uncertain how allies and partners fit into the United States’ approach to mitigating CBRN risks through integrated deterrence, a cornerstone of the 2022 National Defense Strategy (NDS). As defined in the NDS, integrated deterrence entails “working seamlessly across warfighting domains, theaters, the spectrum of conflict, all instruments of US national power, and our network of Alliances and partnerships.⁴ This report explores how the United States can include allies and partners in integrated deterrence strategies to counter potential CBRN escalation by Russia.

Research question

The research question guiding this project was, “What is the risk of Russian CBRN weapons use in Europe in the next five to ten years, and how can the United States counteract or mitigate such risk?” The project team considered several aspects of this research question to establish how best to involve allies and partners in ongoing and new US efforts to mitigate Russian CBRN threats, including the following:

How the activities of NATO allies could fit into a US campaign plan to deter Russian escalation in Ukraine and beyond

How the United States could maintain resolve among its allies while coordinating allied activities to support integrated deterrence objectives

What specific steps the United States could take now to ensure European allies are part of a broader integrated deterrence strategy five to ten years from now

A security guard looks through a door of a hospital in Omsk, Russia. REUTERS/Alexey Malgavko

Key findings summary

The Atlantic Council sought to identify and develop approaches for incorporating European allies and partners into the US model of integrated deterrence against Russian CBRN threats. We derived five key findings, summarized below, which incorporate the opportunities and critical challenges we discovered from the scenario- building workshop, insights from expert interviews and roundtable discussions, and background research. The Key Findings and Recommendations section explains each of these findings in detail, outlining actionable recommendations to address these challenges.

Allies and partners already significantly contribute to US approaches to counter Russian CBRN threats in Europe. Future cooperation—bilaterally, multilaterally, and through NATO—should focus on areas of greatest need as mutually identified by the United States and its European allies and partners.

As a concept, integrated deterrence is a useful frame for examining cooperation with European nations to counter Russia’s CBRN threats, but the US Government should use this framing to identify new opportunities, rather than detract from or encapsulate ongoing cooperation.

Civil-military cooperation across a variety of sectors is essential to respond to CBRN threats, especially among public health agencies and law enforcement. To fully realize integrated deterrence in the next five to ten years, greater coordination among civilian and military communities—within the United States and among its European allies and partners—is essential to enhancing resilience.

Technological advances present significant opportunities and challenges for US cooperation with allies and partners to counter CBRN threats, especially as these threats become more complex. The United States and its European allies should remain vigilant about emerging threats, while leveraging new technological developments in detection and attribution systems and emergency response mechanisms to build comprehensive defenses against CBRN threats.

As Russia deploys hybrid warfare tactics to support and conceal potential CBRN escalation, the United States and its European allies must prepare to combat malign influence efforts, such as information influence activities, targeted assassinations, energy sabotage, and economic coercion, related to CBRN use as part of the US strategy of integrated deterrence.

Methodology

Two primary analytic approaches guided the research for this project: a scenario-building workshop and a series of interviews with subject matter experts and officials. The team also conducted secondary source research, including official publications from the US Department of Defense (DoD) and NATO, as part of our background research to corroborate information and insights from workshop and interview participants. Background research on scenario planning was also critical to developing the workshop methodology. Finally, the project team used Atlantic Council roundtable discussions with senior US and European officials to gauge perspectives on CBRN escalation risks and methods through the lens of integrated deterrence.

Scenario-building workshop

The Atlantic Council convened a group of experts and officials from the United States and Europe in December 2022 to participate in a scenario planning exercise to conceptualize integrated deterrence with respect to Russia’s potential CBRN weapons use in Europe. Using strategic foresight scenario planning methodology, which involves a structured exploration of multiple plausible futures to inform present decision-making,⁵ the workshop identified four possible futures for Russian CBRN use in Europe over ten years for which the transatlantic community will have to prepare. A more detailed explanation of strategic foresight planning is included in Appendix C.

The workshop encouraged participants to think creatively about possible future scenarios with respect to Russia’s development and use of CBRN weapons. Using analytic tools prescribed by strategic foresight methodology,⁶ participants explored options for future Russian decision-making around CBRN use and the consequent impact on the security landscape in Europe. Participants were divided into groups and asked to define the likelihood of Russia’s use of CBRN weapons in the year 2032 using the parameters outlined in each of the four scenarios based on the interaction of two pre-selected factors: Russia’s regime stability and Russia’s conventional warfare capabilities. After briefing the plenary session on the results from the four scenario groups, participants were invited to identify opportunities for US-European cooperation through integrated deterrence strategies.

Interviews with officials and experts

To build on insights obtained from the workshop, the project team conducted 13 interviews with US, NATO, and European government officials, military officers, and civilian security experts from eight NATO member states. The list of organizations represented by the interviewees is included in Appendix A. These interviews provided firsthand perspectives to better understand possible scenarios for Russia’s use of CBRN weapons and options for enhancing cooperation with allies and partners against CBRN threats.

U.S. Marine Corps explosive ordnance disposal technicians walk to a chemical weapons site during a joint EOD exercise at Marine Corps Training Area Bellows, Hawaii. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Cpl. Patrick King)

Insights from the scenario-building workshop

To conceptualize integrated deterrence with respect to Russia’s potential CBRN weapons use in Europe, the Atlantic Council’s virtual scenario-building workshop presented four scenarios in a ten year timeframe with respect to CBRN escalation. Comprehensive accounts of each of the four scenarios that participants designed, based on the parameters provided, are outlined for both Part I and Part II in Appendix B. The workshop illuminated several key themes, concepts, and takeaways, which we describe in detail below.

Scenario 1: High regime stability and strong conventional warfare capabilities

Conditions: The Russian threat is acute due to the country’s strong military capabilities and stable regime, which enjoys significant support at home. These characteristics could make the use of CBRN weapons more attractive to Russia, especially as a method to complement its conventional military strength.

Key perspectives:

• Russia may employ technological advances, such as bioengineering, artificial intelligence, machine learning, and additive manufacturing, alongside strong conventional capabilities to increase its CBRN capabilities, especially with respect to tactical nuclear weapons and bioengineered weapons.

• Russia might also use CBRN weapons to demonstrate strength or as a means to expend fewer conventional forces in times of conflict.

Scenario 2: High regime stability and weak conventional warfare capabilities

Conditions: The Russian regime maintains control over political and social life, potentially drawing from continued authoritarianism and political repression. However, with weakened conventional power, Russia may turn to drastic measures to achieve its goals, including employing CBRN weapons.

Key perspectives:

• To offset weak conventional capabilities, Russia may consider using CBRN weapons in targeted instances—such as political assassinations or direct attacks on critical infrastructure—with greater incentives to create unconventional weapons not governed by international norms.

• Russia may look to augment its nuclear capabilities to prop up its military power. Russia could refuse to relinquish control of its nuclear weapons arsenal or agree to future arms control treaties as a last means to maintain global legitimacy and offset the global posture of the United States.

Scenario 3: Low regime stability and weak conventional warfare capabilities

Conditions: Russia’s regime becomes more fragile as its conventional capabilities weaken, raising the specter of instability in Eurasia. These factors leave fewer options for Russian decision-makers to achieve their geopolitical goals and, as such, Russia may employ CBRN weapons in both targeted assassinations and on the battlefield to achieve its geopolitical agenda.

Key perspectives:

• With an unstable regime and weak conventional capabilities, Russia could lose its position as a world power, setting it on a course toward isolationism and instability. Its participation in and support for multilateral institutions, including arms control regimes and disarmament treaties that monitor compliance regarding CBRN weapons, are in question.

• Russia may place greater emphasis on its existing nuclear capabilities as a deterrent, consider isolated use of chemical and biological weapons to target political opponents, or employ tactical nuclear weapons against key targets to compensate for conventional weakness.

Scenario 4: : Low regime stability and strong conventional warfare capabilities

Conditions: The Russian regime is vulnerable to both the Russian public and the international community, which could cause Russian decision-makers to rely on all available means to restore power and legitimacy, including through its strong conventional warfare and existing CBRN capabilities.

Key perspectives:

• To reestablish or defend its regime stability from further erosion, Russia will seek to suppress democratic movements and growing support for opposition candidates. As a solution, Russia may turn to targeted CBRN attacks using chemical agents to neutralize opponents and further deter efforts that would challenge the Russian regime.

• As Russia’s central authority weakens, illegal markets may surface where organized crime groups and terrorist organizations transport and transfer CBRN weapons, materials, and technology to malign actors, thus broadening the possibility of CBRN escalation and conflict beyond Russia.

PART I: Understanding the effect of Russia’s conventional warfare capabilities and regime stability on CBRN escalation

For the first part of the workshop, participants considered the strengths and/or weaknesses of the Russian regime and Russia’s conventional capabilities assigned to their scenario. Participants also considered how those characteristics could affect Russian decision-making around using CBRN weapons and the consequent impact on the security landscape in Europe. In advance of the workshop, the project team predefined these characteristics as the key drivers of change based on extensive background research.⁷ The conditions of each scenario, as well as the key perspectives from participants and lessons learned, are included in Table 1.

Key takeaways from Part I

CBRN weapons are an attractive option for Russia to showcase its strength

Part I revealed participants’ views that Moscow perceives opportunities to use CBRN weapons as a tactic to supplement conventional methods to achieve its geopolitical objectives. While Russia maintains a vast nuclear arsenal,⁸ questions remain regarding the scope and scale of Russia’s biological and chemical weapons capabilities.⁹

As Russia becomes deadlocked or begins to lose the conventional war against Ukraine, Moscow may use CBRN weapons to achieve its objectives.

Regardless of whether Russia’s conventional capabilities are strong or weak, two key trends emerged:

When Russia is losing in a conventional war, the Kremlin will seek any potential opportunities to showcase its strength. While Moscow may not turn to large-scale deployment of CBRN weapons on the battlefield, it may turn to more frequent targeted strikes with CBRN weapons in the near term.

Even if Russia is winning a conventional war, the Kremlin will maintain its CBRN weapons capabilities to project legitimacy and its status as a great power. Russia will also rely on CBRN weapons as a demonstration of strength and as a method of deterrence.

Hybrid warfare remains a temptation for Russia to achieve its geopolitical agenda

Throughout Part I, each scenario featured a significant emphasis on Russia’s use of hybrid warfare to achieve its broader security goals.¹⁰ Russia reinforces its conventional capabilities in war with hybrid warfare tactics, such as political executions and manipulation, foreign malign influence in the information space, economic coercion, cyberattacks, and energy sabotage.¹¹ This phenomenon extends to CBRN agents, with an emphasis on assassination attempts and information influence campaigns.

In all four scenarios, Russia leaned into hybrid warfare tactics to enhance its broader military strategy. The project team observed two key trends in this area:

Russia may use CBRN weapons in a limited fashion to protect its domestic authority from political opposition, potential “color revolutions,” and exiled activists. If the Russian regime is under threat from viable political opposition or active dissidents, the Kremlin may turn to targeted attacks using biological and chemical weapons in assassination attempts intended to neutralize any political threats to the Russian regime. This behavior is consistent with Russia’s previous attacks—both inside Russia and within NATO member states, which targeted Viktor Yushchenko (2004), Alexander Litvinenko (2006), Sergei and Yulia Skripal (2018), and Alexey Navalny (2020), among others.¹²

Over the last decade, Russia has turned to foreign malign influence efforts, especially within the information space, to support and amplify its geopolitical agenda. In particular, the Kremlin has injected escalatory rhetoric and inflammatory campaigns related to potential CBRN use and continues to circulate foreign malign influence efforts and propaganda to support its agenda.¹³ These tactics target and weaken international regimes and treaty organizations that govern arms control, disarmament, and nonproliferation efforts, undermining public trust in multilateral organizations and leaving little room for recourse and accountability. Russia’s malign influence tactics within the information space are intended to sow doubt and confusion among the public, deny responsibility for Russia’s use of CBRN weapons, and undermine the effectiveness of an international response.¹⁴

Emerging technologies present new opportunities—and new challenges

Regardless of the strength of Russia’s conventional warfare capabilities, participants agreed that the country will continue to explore technological advancements to aid its military modernization. In each scenario detailed above, Russia placed greater emphasis on dual-use material and technology, which have both civilian and military purposes, and pursued greater development of CBRN weapons.¹⁵

When Russia possesses few avenues for deploying conventional warfare capabilities, dual-use technologies and equipment present new opportunities for the Kremlin to achieve its geopolitical goals. For example, Russia may turn to increased imports and further refinement of nuclear technology and material; chemical and biological agents; missiles and unmanned aircraft systems; and associated materials and equipment. Such activities would permit, or at a minimum conceal, Russia’s continued development of CBRN weapons.

In addition, the COVID-19 pandemic demonstrated how biological agents could cause destruction and disruption around the world. Russia inherited a portion of the Soviet-era biological weapons research program,¹⁶ and while Moscow denies any continuation of the bioweapons program, allegations of its continuance remain.

Additionally, current developments in biology and chemistry, especially with respect to engineered organisms, viruses, pathogens, and other diseases, offer an avenue to create biological weapons with heightened virulence and infectivity that can threaten society.¹⁷Moscow could employ such technologies against its adversaries.

New technologies, such as artificial intelligence and machine learning, also introduce new challenges. Because CBRN capabilities and technologies have rapidly evolved, many developments are not explicitly covered in existing frameworks that govern responsible use. In each scenario, Russia may exploit these ambiguities to avoid export controls, treaty obligations, and other regulatory measures to improve these capabilities.

PART II: Conceptualizing integrated deterrence among the United States and its European Allies to address CBRN weapons use

For the second part of the workshop, participants considered how the United States could use integrated deterrence to incorporate European allies and partners into US strategy to respond to a scenario in which Russia would consider the use of CBRN weapons in Europe. The conditions of each scenario, as well as the key perspectives and lessons learned, are described in Table 2.

Scenario 1: High regime stability and strong conventional warfare capabilities

Conditions: Russia could integrate CBRN weapons into its strong conventional capabilities. The United States and its European allies and partners would need comprehensive counter-responses to this threat, especially given Russia’s regime stability in this scenario.

Key perspectives:

• Allies must look beyond specific military preparations to incorporate civilian preparedness with respect to readiness related to potential CBRN attacks. These efforts would include strategic communication efforts to push back on escalatory rhetoric and maintain cohesion among allies.

• When Russia’s conventional warfare capabilities are strong, it is more difficult for NATO to take a hardline stance to deter both conventional and hybrid warfare tactics. Greater coordination among allies is crucial, especially for detection and attribution of the use of CBRN weapons below NATO’s Article 5 threshold, where an attack on one ally is an attack on all, resulting in a NATO-wide response.

Scenario 2: High regime stability and weak conventional warfare capabilities

Conditions: Russia will likely pursue development of unconventional weapons to offset its weakened conventional warfare capabilities, including enhanced CBRN weapons not governed by international conventions. The United States and its European allies and partners would need to identify effective methods to counteract Russia’s potential use of CBRN weapons to achieve geopolitical goals.

Key perspectives:

• Allies should consider prioritizing greater integration of civil-military relations on critical security infrastructure, such as power grids, public health systems, cyber infrastructure, and other domains, to reinforce defenses against potential attacks with CBRN weapons.

• To combat CBRN-related threats at all levels, cooperation among the United States and its European allies and partners needs to extend beyond strategic-level decision-making. The United States could better coordinate and integrate operational and tactical planning in bilateral settings with its European allies as well as in multilateral platforms, such as NATO.

Scenario 3: Low regime stability and weak conventional warfare capabilities

Conditions: In this scenario, Russia is the most unpredictable in its behavior given its weakened conventional warfare capabilities and dwindled regime stability. This scenario would prompt the United States and its European allies and partners to prepare for any possible scenario in which Russia uses CBRN weapons.

Key perspectives:

• The United States and its European allies and partners must prepare forces to fight through a contaminated environment to ensure complete and comprehensive readiness against CBRN threats.

• Conceptually, the United States and its European allies and partners should consider how deterrence against CBRN weapons use could be adapted and expanded beyond traditional forms of deterrence. Coordination at the multilateral level, such as within NATO, in which there is one central authority in charge of key priorities, may be effective.

Scenario 4: Low regime stability and strong conventional warfare capabilities

Conditions: In this scenario, Russia maintains strong conventional capabilities, but lacks centralized political control. The United States and its European allies and partners should prepare for potential scenarios in which the Russian military looks to the use of CBRN weapons to reassert political control.

Key perspectives:

• There is a greater need to develop a holistic response following a CBRN event, including the design of decontamination, protection, and evacuation procedures. Specific safeguards can protect against and deter CBRN attacks, such as increased border security, intelligence capabilities, and investigative mandates.

• The United States and its European allies and partners must find opportunities to suppress and counter hybrid warfare and Russian malign influence. Strong counter-messaging strategies that debunk and proactively share truthful information before false flag scenarios can materialize and escalate could prevent Russia from turning to CBRN weapons.

Key takeaways from Part II

Civil-military coordination in critical sectors presents a key opportunity for allies and partners

One important aspect of using integrated deterrence to address potential CBRN attacks from Russia is the need for greater dialogue and cooperation between civilian and military sectors. In Part II of the exercise, civilian institutions played a critical role in designing mitigative, preventative, and responsive measures to potential deployment of CBRN weapons. Organizations that coordinate disaster relief and humanitarian assistance might rely on military technologies and capabilities to respond to security threats, such as evacuation protocols from air and sea, medical support capabilities, and crisis response mechanisms. One perspective from the workshop highlighted that the United States has an ability to support and strengthen specialized training procedures for law enforcement personnel in Europe—especially in states that border Russia—to respond to hazardous environments, including those that are contaminated with CBRN agents. Greater integration between civilian and military organizations could better prepare civilian elements that might respond to a possible attack from Russia using CBRN weapons.

Public health agencies play an important role in developing, acquiring, and deploying medical countermeasures against Russia’s potential use of CBRN agents. Naturally occurring and human-made biohazards can inflict a significant amount of damage and disruption on broader society. Throughout Part II, participants placed a greater emphasis on developing an effective response to bioweapons, which demonstrated the need for the United States and its European allies and partners to prioritize coordination among public health and medical agencies as well as with the armed forces in times of crisis.¹⁸

Critical infrastructure—including energy, transportation, information technology, and communications systems—plays an important role in combatting CBRN threats, implementing critical responses, and protecting broader societal resilience.¹⁹ In particular, the energy sector plays a crucial role in managing nuclear power and materiel capabilities and in the event of a potential CBRN attack, these facilities will require additional safeguards. Military forces depend on both the civilian and commercial sectors when responding to CBRN attacks to provide key services, such as transportation, communications, and energy reliability all while ensuring that sectors can withstand external attacks and internal disruptions. Workshop participants pointed to greater coordination among public and private sector partners as an opportunity to address vulnerabilities and increase overall preparedness. Increasing cybersecurity and mitigating risk within the cyber domain could reduce potential vulnerabilities and the risk of cyberattacks while protecting from potential CBRN attacks.

Greater recognition of recurring challenges will overcome barriers to more effective coordination

Throughout Part II, Russia had the opportunity to inflict further damage by exploiting weaknesses in the absence of coordination among the United States and its European allies. By sharing expertise and maximizing resources, the United States and Europe can address these vulnerabilities and build broader resilience efforts.

In Part II, participants recommended implementing methods to promote regular and coordinated intelligence sharing, especially related to CBRN attacks. One participant emphasized that formal and regular channels for exchanging information and sharing best practices would support a comprehensive response to CBRN threats from the United States and Europe. Another key point raised during the discussion was that as CBRN threats become more complex and more difficult to detect, the United States and its European allies should consider designating common standards and equipment across jurisdictions.

Resilience in the information space is an important tool to combat Russian hybrid warfare

In each scenario, Russia turned to hybrid warfare as a political tool to complement its conventional warfare tactics, sow doubt and confusion among the broader public, distort reality and objectivity, and ultimately offer cover for possible military intervention. To combat Russian malign influence and employ integrated deterrence against Russian threats, one participant suggested that a multipronged approach in the information space might encourage greater digital resilience on social media platforms, facilitate strategic communications efforts, and enhance media literacy programs. Proactive messaging among allies to counter escalatory rhetoric—especially with respect to CBRN capabilities and potential escalation—is especially critical. If the Russian regime becomes less stable and pursues any possible avenue to achieve its geopolitical agenda, the United States and its European allies and partners should consider methods to invest in and implement proactive messaging. Several opportunities exist for the United States and its European allies and partners to counter hybrid warfare such as through investing in early detection capabilities, augmenting information-sharing systems, and countering foreign malign influence and propaganda emanating from Russia.

Technological developments offer important opportunities for CBRN attack counter-responses

In each scenario in Part II, Russia turned to technological advancements to bolster its military capabilities, and new developments with CBRN capabilities were an important component of Russia’s overall force posture.²⁰ Participants recommended that in response, the United States and its European allies and partners utilize new technologies to enhance broader capabilities to deter, counter, and combat Russian CBRN attacks. One participant argued for greater collaboration through potential partnerships with the private sector, which is often at the forefront of research and development of emerging technologies.

Emergency personnel carry a woman out on a stretcher during a re-enactment of a hazardous situation in a subway train in the lower level of the Bay Subway station that is no longer in use in Toronto in 2011. The Canadian Standards Association (CSA) and the Canadian government set up the event to reveal its new standards for emergency services personnel and equipment to respond to chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear (CBRN) incidents. REUTERS/Mark Blinch

Insights from interviews

Our interviews with subject matter experts and government officials illuminated four major themes related to integrated deterrence of CBRN threats from Russia. The following section describes these themes in greater detail.

Allied alignment over the severity of Russian CBRN threats

The officials interviewed for this report took seriously the threat of Russia using CBRN weapons in the near-to-mid future. Specifically, respondents referred to the possibility of chemical weapons use, including through assassinations, further use of riot control agents in urban combat, or the deployment of tactical nuclear weapons.

Multiple interviewees also highlighted Russia’s use of foreign malign influence as another aspect of its overall CBRN threat. Russia has a long history of making false claims that the United States and Ukraine are developing biological weapons, and this has continued during its war in Ukraine.²¹ Some respondents feared Russia could conduct a false flag attack with chemical weapons. In such a scenario, Russia would promote false claims that Ukraine intends to use chemical weapons as a pretense for its own use of these weapons on Ukrainian soil. Russia made these claims in the lead-up to its February 2022 invasion of Ukraine, which renewed the credibility of Russian CBRN threats.²²

Interviewees also commented on the conditions under which Russia could consider using a CBRN weapon. For example, escalation to CBRN use could occur if Russia were to view US- or NATO-led exercises or training events as a provocation. Such misunderstandings could have grave consequences for Ukraine or neighboring NATO countries. The depletion of Russia’s conventional forces could also make it more likely for Russia to consider using nonconventional weapons, especially since reconstituting conventional forces would take significant time. According to one US official, the risk of CBRN weapons use increases the longer the war in Ukraine continues.

However, some respondents questioned Russia’s motivations for using a CBRN weapon in Ukraine or Europe now and in the future. Russia has demonstrated its disregard for global norms against the development and use of CBRN weapons through its use of fourth-generation chemical weapons to silence opposition figures; its long-standing support of the Syrian regime, which has used chemical weapons against its citizens since 2012; and its disruptive actions in non-proliferation treaty organizations. However, the international community would swiftly condemn Russia if Russia employed CBRN weapons on a larger scale in Ukraine.²³ At a technical level, it is difficult to control the spread of chemicals once they are released, which could result in Russian troops being sickened or killed as well. This contamination risk could also spread to NATO territory through air, soil, or water, possibly exacerbating the conflict beyond Ukraine.

In the event of Russian CBRN weapons use in Ukraine or in NATO territory, response options are less clear. Interviewees could not offer specific suggestions given the need to protect sensitive information, but several US and European officials identified the need for timely, accurate attribution of any CBRN weapons use to ensure perpetrators are brought to justice. Timely attribution requires forensic detection capabilities to be available in proximity to an attack, but current detection capabilities were considered insufficient. Some respondents also pointed to the role of civilian authorities in the event of a CBRN attack, as NATO or other military forces might not be called upon immediately. First responders and medical professionals might be a more expedient and appropriate choice depending on the location of an attack. Furthermore, there is also a question of when NATO or individual European allies would respond to Russian CBRN use: what is the threshold for response, and what would that response entail? One US official pointed out that Russia had already been accused of using riot control agents in combat, but that has not been enough to warrant a response from Western governments.²⁴ The threshold question is a topic of ongoing discussion among NATO and US officials.

Existing cooperation among Allies supports US goals

In Europe, proficiency in CBRN defense has typically resided in a small but active cadre of countries that cooperate in bilateral and multilateral formats and through NATO. The United States is active in NATO CBRN planning, but it also maintains its own relationships with European allies separate from Alliance constructs. Russia’s threats of incorporating chemical or nuclear weapons into its tactics in Ukraine have garnered attention from countries such as Germany, Czechia, Poland, the United Kingdom, and others that have been historically more active in CBRN defense.

Additionally, NATO’s CBRN Defense Policy was released in 2022— the first update in thirteen years.²⁵ The new policy provided allied countries with a framework to use to update or create their own national policies and bring them in line with NATO priorities. Several allied military representatives we interviewed referenced this policy, which promotes a coordinated approach based on Alliance- agreed priorities when describing how their national governments think about preparedness against CBRN threats. Given the leading role the United States played in shaping NATO’s CBRN Defense Policy, US NATO CBRN personnel are active in operationalizing key tenets of allied and partner involvement in integrated deterrence in Europe.

An important step in enhancing US contributions to European CBRN defense was US involvement in the NATO Framework Nations Concept (FNC) CBRN Defense Cluster. The FNC construct began at NATO in 2014 as a way for European NATO member states to organize capabilities around specialized interest areas to promote interoperability and burden sharing.²⁶ Germany led the development of the CBRN defense cluster, which included contributions from several member states that participated in exercises and training events. According to a US European Command (USEUCOM) official familiar with the deliberations, incorporation of the United States into the CBRN defense cluster took two years of negotiations, as the FNC was originally intended as a way for European NATO allies to bolster their capabilities without the direct involvement of the United States. However, US integration into the CBRN defense cluster opens greater possibilities for US Government-led training and exercising designed to improve the readiness of NATO CBRN defense elements.

Additionally, the United States is expanding the network of countries it has traditionally worked with to promote CBRN defense-related initiatives in Europe. Part of the expansion strategy includes identifying allies with generally robust capabilities but specific weaknesses, such as the United Kingdom and Norway, which, if improved, could enable these countries to better train other European allies and partners. Two US officials we interviewed spoke to the power of broadening the network of countries with which the United States works closely on CBRN issues to empower regional leaders so that the United States does not have to play a direct role in all facets of cooperation. This type of cooperation deepens strategic integration with highly capable allies, which is an important facet of achieving integrated deterrence. As a regional leader in CBRN defense, Germany provides training to allies such as the Netherlands and France, and non-NATO countries like Austria, and hosts exercises that include US elements. In this capacity, Germany’s efforts further US goals for integrated deterrence against Russia’s CBRN threats.

Areas for improved cooperation with Allies and Partners

Interviewees identified five key areas for greater cooperation between the United States and Europe that would enhance overall preparedness against Russia’s CBRN threats. These areas are described below.

Every US official we interviewed mentioned the need to improve information sharing among the United States and its NATO allies, including sensitive intelligence about Russian CBRN threats. Sharing is possible to some extent given common classification standards at NATO but is much more difficult to achieve with non-NATO partners. The challenge is understood: the United States has information about Russian CBRN threats it cannot share. How to overcome this challenge to all allies’ satisfaction is less clear, as it is not always possible to downgrade highly protected information. Information sharing has improved since the Ukraine invasion, with both the United States and United Kingdom sharing more within NATO, and the United States and individual allies have made progress on select topics. However, without an institutionalized process to improve intelligence sharing, it is difficult to prove why allies should make greater investments in their CBRN preparedness should the need arise to integrate a transatlantic response.²⁷

Awareness of in-theater CBRN assets

CBRN threats require advanced planning to ensure preparedness and proper coordination within the US military and with allies. For example, in the event of an attack, a specialized US Army chemical company will have inadequate time to travel into theater to perform consequence management duties. US forces need to know which countries in Europe can provide such assistance and do so rapidly. One US official we interviewed believed it was imperative for allies to have the capability to collect samples, analyze them, and, if possible, attribute them without having to wait for a US or other European unit to arrive in country to strengthen their resilience.

However, if US forces are in theater during a CBRN attack, allied military commanders we spoke to were unaware what US forces would require of European allies, such as support for mobility or protection for people and equipment. Crisis planning efforts that began after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine include CBRN preparedness measures to ensure staging and mobility of assets that might arrive in Europe for a CBRN contingency, which is an important step in ensuring that both US and allied forces understand what to expect from each other in the event of a CBRN attack.

Opacity of US government can hinder closer cooperation

Several NATO allies we interviewed described challenges in understanding the depth and breadth of actors within the US Government that have some role in CBRN cooperation. For smaller countries with fewer resources for CBRN defense, it is easier to work with regional leaders, such as Germany, that are more familiar in both organization and approach than the US military. A better strategy for communicating US CBRN defense and response activities and coordinating outreach to European allies would improve understanding and potentially facilitate easier cooperation.

Expanding education about CBRN threats to a broader community

Knowledge of nuclear deterrence and CBRN weapons capabilities atrophied at the end of the Cold War, leaving a notable gap in the overall US and allied understanding of nuclear threats across the total force. US, European, and NATO officials agreed that awareness of these topics cannot reside within specialized communities in the United States, NATO, or European nations. Ukraine has helped raise the profile of CBRN within NATO, but because the United States and Europe have viewed these issues as a niche capability for so long, it is difficult to compel all allies to pay attention to CBRN threats and take necessary steps to improve their overall posture and capabilities. NATO is trying raise the profile of these issues through its CBRN Defense Policy, but greater action is needed to expand CBRN-focused discussions to broader defense policy and planning committees that emphasize wider threats to the NATO alliance. Additionally, increased training and education in US and allied militaries is required to ensure equal understanding of CBRN threats. With enough time and emphasis from senior leaders, the United States and allied militaries can incorporate these topics into joint exercises and training events.

Improving civil-military cooperation

In many European countries, first responders and civilian authorities might lead the response to a CBRN incident, not the military. Medical professionals and law enforcement personnel might have a better understanding of the effects of chemical exposure, for example. Allied military representatives we interviewed recognized the need to establish more regular cooperation with civilian authorities, including exercises and cooperative planning, to better understand the role of each side in the event of a CBRN incident. NATO officials described some cooperation between NATO and the European Union’s European External Action Service, but these discussions are mainly used to deconflict the aid that the European Union and NATO provide to Ukraine; these discussions could happen more frequently and cover a broader range of topics. Additionally, the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre coordinates support among NATO member and partner states, but only for civilian entities.²⁸ To improve resilience, civil-military coordination is essential because a large-scale CBRN attack could result in military reliance on civilian hospital systems. While efforts are underway to improve connectivity between these two sectors, allied government officials expect progress to be slow.

Mixed understanding of integrated deterrence as a concept

US, European, and NATO officials broadly agree that knowledge of integrated deterrence is uneven across European allies. Even when non-US officials and experts recognized the term, they were unsure how it differed from existing CBRN cooperation activities either bilaterally with the United States, multilaterally with US and/or other European allies, or within NATO. The term is problematic for some nations, such as France, which has a nuclear-focused view of the term “deterrence”; even though French officials expressed understanding of what the United States is trying to achieve with the concept, their national views of deterrence prevent their support of the semantics.

A USEUCOM official we interviewed expressed difficulties communicating integrated deterrence to key allies because the concept is defined ambiguously and does not comport with how NATO views either conventional or nuclear deterrence, or related terms such as “coherence,” “conventional-nuclear integration,” or “deterrence by denial.” Furthermore, incorporating integrated deterrence into CBRN cooperation was perceived by another US official as “difficult and unnecessary” when doing so interfered with ongoing cooperation activities.

Incorporating integrated deterrence into dialogue with allies could emphasize non-military means of countering Russian CBRN threats by emphasizing the use of all elements of national power. Some allies, such as Romania, already view activities associated with integrated deterrence in terms of a “whole-of-government” approach to cooperation. Such framing could broaden the aperture beyond military-to-military dialogues to include representatives from allied ministries of health, foreign affairs, and interior, and their US counterparts, for example. Security experts we interviewed believed that to communicate integrated deterrence effectively to allies, especially for a technical area like CBRN, US officials need to tailor the messaging to NATO and specific allies depending on the request. The United States should sustain these discussions to promote meaningful action to support US integrated deterrence priorities.

A member of the CBRN unit decontaminates a boat, during the Baltic Tiger 2022 binational military exercise, which is a contribution at NATO’s eastern flank, at the harbor in Tallinn, Estonia, in 2022. REUTERS/Lisi Niesner

Key findings and recommendations

These findings and recommendations are based on our research and the insights we uncovered through the scenario-building workshop and expert interviews. Where possible, we include the organization(s) that are the most appropriate to carry out our recommendations.

Finding: Allies and partners already significantly contribute to US approaches to counter Russian CBRN threats in Europe. Future cooperation—bilaterally, multilaterally, and through NATO—should focus on areas of greatest need as mutually identified by the United States and its European allies and partners.

Recommendation: Given the strength of US cooperation with many European countries on CBRN defense, continued US support should focus on areas such as improved information sharing, civil-military coordination, and awareness of Russian CBRN threats beyond the specialist community. Senior leader buy-in is critical to driving these changes, so the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) should organize director-level engagements with senior leaders in the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and within each branch of the services that emphasize the importance of incorporating CBRN considerations in broader planning. US officials should also hold these discussions in parallel with key NATO allies, NATO officials at headquarters, and NATO military commanders at Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE). The US should also discuss with NATO’s Allied Command Transformation, which identifies opportunities to innovate and maintain a warfighting edge, how to incorporate CBRN considerations into defense planning and capability development with European allies and partners. Senior US and NATO headquarters- level discussions should also consider how, when, or if to respond to possible Russian CBRN weapons use.

Recommendation: The DoD should sustain its support for joint exercises, training events, and personnel exchanges with European allies and partners and at NATO, as US support contributes to enhanced interoperability and shared understanding of operational concepts. Areas that require increased engagement include intelligence sharing, risk assessments, and cooperative research projects. The DoD should promote specialized knowledge transfer programs to facilitate learning among allies and partners, while investing in joint collaborative research and development initiatives to produce advancements in CBRN protection and consequence management.

Recommendation: To improve information and intelligence sharing, the United States and its European allies should pursue greater collaboration on joint threat assessments related to CBRN weapons and capabilities stemming from Russia. The DoD should closely coordinate with relevant elements of the US intelligence community to increase collaboration with bilateral partners, especially as the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) develops the Annual Threat Assessment of the United States.

Recommendation: Joint defense planning and preparedness efforts with respect to CBRN threats offer another opportunity for the United States to build on preexisting cooperation with its European allies. DTRA and the Defense Security Cooperation Agency should regularly coordinate to ensure mutual awareness of CBRN defense capabilities provided to allies and partners to identify possible redundancies and areas for additional support.

Finding: As a concept, integrated deterrence is a useful frame for examining cooperation with European nations to counter Russia’s CBRN threats, but the United States should use this framing to identify new opportunities, rather than detract from or encapsulate ongoing cooperation.

Recommendation: Given the mixed understanding among NATO allies of integrated deterrence as it applies to CBRN-related cooperation, OSD Policy should provide clear guidance to USEUCOM, DTRA, and other DoD elements on how to build cooperation strategies in line with integrated deterrence objectives. This guidance should include other parts of the US Government where applicable, including the Department of State and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). Outside the United States, the guidance should include specific requests for European allies and partners that reflect mutual priorities in the region. Enhanced cooperation with allies that have strong CBRN capabilities should also remain a priority for USEUCOM and NATO activities to help establish strong regional leaders.

Recommendation: The United States and its European allies and partners can better integrate the military and private sector to maximize cooperation with industry and expand integrated deterrence. The DoD should enhance partnerships with the private sector, especially in key areas of critical infrastructure that would allow the United States and Europe to counter possible CBRN threats by recognizing and potentially mitigating vulnerabilities while promoting resilience.

Finding: Civil-military cooperation across a variety of sectors is essential to respond to CBRN threats, especially among public health agencies and law enforcement. To fully realize integrated deterrence in the next five to ten years, greater coordination among civilian and military communities—within the United States and among its European allies and partners—is essential to enhancing resilience.

Recommendation: A stronger partnership between the CDC and the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control could strengthen US and European public health surveillance efforts. The US Government should invest in specialized training programs, capacity building, and information sharing alongside leading research institutions, such as the National Institutes of Health in the United States and the European Union’s Framework Programme for Research and Innovation, which could help build integrated resilience strategies against biohazards and other threats.

Recommendation: Given the important role of law enforcement agencies related to CBRN threats, information sharing among the armed forces and law enforcement personnel is crucial. US and European military personnel can more closely collaborate with the appropriate law enforcement agencies to improve mutual awareness of protocols and enhance joint investigative efforts. DTRA can work through appropriate DoD channels to understand US government interagency activities to facilitate this integration. In addition, DTRA can identify opportunities for joint training exercises and tabletop simulations focused on CBRN threat scenarios, emphasizing interoperability and integration of capabilities from both civilian and military sectors.

Finding: Technological advances present significant opportunities and challenges for US cooperation with allies and partners to counter CBRN threats, especially as these threats become more complex. The United States and its European allies should remain vigilant about emerging threats while leveraging new technological developments in detection and attribution systems and emergency response mechanisms to build comprehensive defenses against CBRN threats.

Recommendation: The United States and its European allies and partners should leverage public-private partnerships to invest in new technologies that enhance capabilities to identify and counter Russian CBRN attacks. Supporting research and prioritizing ongoing support for these efforts, including joint research projects and cooperative initiatives to leverage resources, is key.

Recommendation: Through greater understanding of new technologies, the United States and Europe can employ new capabilities to mitigate, detect, and prevent CBRN attacks. The US and its European allies and partners can augment CBRN activation systems, which play a vital role in early detection and CBRN incident responses, with new technologies, such as more efficient sensors and early warning alert systems. In addition, reconnaissance, surveillance, and decontamination efforts can rely on new advancements with autonomous systems. In the long term, advances in biotechnology and medical capabilities could result in more effective countermeasures against biological agents. Additionally, artificial intelligence can analyze huge troves of data to identify patterns, trends, and potential threats related to CBRN attacks and can employ predictive capabilities for response planning and early warning. DTRA should work with the US Joint Program Executive Office for Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Defense to understand the latest developments in these technologies to determine where additional investment is required.

Finding: As Russia deploys hybrid warfare tactics to support and conceal potential CBRN escalation, the United States and its European allies must prepare to combat malign influence efforts, such as information influence activities, targeted assassinations, energy sabotage, and economic coercion, related to CBRN use as part of the US strategy of integrated deterrence.

Recommendation: The United States and its European allies should build on pre-existing collaboration, foster knowledge sharing, and invest in fact-checking and debunking strategies to combat Russia’s information influence activities related to CBRN weapons. DTRA’s Information Resiliency Office, the Department of State’s Global Engagement Center, ODNI’s Foreign Malign Influence Center, and the US Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, among other institutions, can enhance synchronicity and interagency coordination to promote accurate and reliable information related to CBRN issues. US officials must also sustain dialogue with European allies and partners on foreign malign influence efforts related to CBRN threats. Further emphasis on robust and sustained efforts that stress collaboration, education, transparency, resilience, and strategic communication between the United States and Europe is needed to counter Russian malign influence around CBRN weapons and potential false flag scenarios. Specific debunking and counter-response strategies should consider methods to communicate scientific and technical data to non-expert audiences.

Recommendation: To ensure success in this arena, the United States and Europe must strengthen broader societal resilience and safeguard political institutions from malign influence to mitigate the effectiveness of Russian hybrid tactics. Using collaborative and cross-border efforts in strategic communications can counter malign influence efforts that are part of Russia’s hybrid warfare.

Conclusion

Russia will continue to pose a variety of CBRN risks that will necessitate a robust, coordinated response from the United States and its European allies and partners. The United States can use integrated deterrence as a framework to counter evolving threats by incorporating allies and partners in an effort to stop continued Russian CBRN provocations or, should use of CBRN weapons occur, to prevail against them.

Integrating capabilities across domains between the United States and Europe—including in the military, political, technological, economic, information, and cyber sectors—is critical to dissuade and dispel Russia from considering the use and escalation of CBRN weapons. Integrated deterrence emphasizes and relies on the collective efforts of the United States and its European allies in deterring, detecting, mitigating, and responding to CBRN threats while maintaining resolve and ensuring interoperability among capacities.

Key elements of a successful integrated deterrence approach include intelligence sharing, civil-military integration, joint exercises and rapid response capabilities, strategic communications and counter malign influence efforts, and technological investments. While questions remain about the operationalization of integrated deterrence, the United States and its European allies can enhance collective preparedness and protect shared security interests. Only through a unified, coordinated, and integrated approach can the United States and Europe effectively address potential challenges from Russia posed by CBRN weapons.

Please note that the appendixes are not included in this publication, but they can be accessed in the attached PDF file. The appendixes contain the following information: Appendix A – Interview Participants; Appendix B – Scenario Workshop Methodology and Detailed Results; Appendix C. Biographies and Acknowledgements. These appendixes provide additional details and insights on the research methods and findings.

The research team thanks the US Defense Threat Reduction Agency’s Strategic Trends Research Initiative (STRI) for sponsoring this work and for the guidance and support provided throughout the course of the project. Special thanks go to the wide range of experts and stakeholders, inside and outside of the US and European governments, who took part in the scenario-building exercise, contributed their perspectives during the interview process, spoke during roundtable discussions, and participated in other contexts to enrich the analysis.

We would also like to acknowledge Hans Binnendijk and Dr. Matthew Kroenig who offered strategic direction and key perspectives throughout the project. Within the Atlantic Council’s Transatlantic Security Initiative team, we recognize our colleagues Leah Scheunemann, Anca Ioana Agachi, Zelma Sergejeva, Viltautė Zarembaitė, and Alvina Ahmed for their project management, peer review, and research support. We would also like to thank the Atlantic Council’s Gretchen Ehle, Nicholas O’Connell, Ursula Murdoch, and Caroline Simpson, whose support for this project was invaluable.

This report is intended to live up to General Brent Scowcroft’s standard for rigorous, relevant, and nonpartisan analysis on national security issues. The Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security works to continue his nonpartisan commitment to the cause of security, support for US leadership in cooperation with allies and partners, and dedication to the mentorship of the next generation of leaders.

The views expressed herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, the US Department of Defense, or the United States Government.

About the authors

Fellow

Natasha Lander Finch

Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security Transatlantic Security Initiative

Arms Control Europe & Eurasia

Staff

Ryan Arick

Associate Director

Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security Transatlantic Security Initiative

NATO Security & Defense

Former staff

Christopher Skaluba

Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security Transatlantic Security Initiative

NATO Security & Defense

Natasha Lander Finch is a nonresident senior fellow with the Transatlantic Security Initiative in the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. She previously worked as a senior policy analyst at the RAND Corporation, where she led and conducted research on a range of issues, including chemical, biological, and nuclear policy; counterterrorism; European security; and military and civilian workforce policy.

Ryan Arick is an assistant director with the Transatlantic Security Initiative (TSI) at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. In this capacity, he supports TSI’s work to strengthen the transatlantic alliance against emerging security threats from around the world. Previously, he served as an assistant program officer with the International Forum for Democratic Studies at the National Endowment for Democracy, where he supported the center’s transnational kleptocracy portfolio.

Christopher Skaluba leads the Transatlantic Security Initiative in the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, where he and his team direct a broad portfolio of programming related to NATO and transatlantic security as well as manage a vast network of expert fellows. Before joining the Atlantic Council, Chris served as a career civil servant in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, rising from presidential management fellow to the senior executive service.

Report Mar 16, 2023

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By Gordon B. “Skip” Davis Jr.

Current C4ISR capabilities, concepts, policies, and processes do not meet all of the Alliance’s needs. While much has been done to improve NATO C4ISR over the past decade, much work remains.

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By Franklin D. Kramer

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Defense Technologies Europe & Eurasia

Issue Brief Sep 6, 2023

Alternative security futures in the High North

By David Auerswald

Climate change, combined with increasing geopolitical competition and hostilities, has focused renewed attention on national security interests in the Arctic. By 2035, how will those variables combine to influence the High North?

China Climate Change & Climate Action

1 “Russia, the Skripal Poisoning, and US Sanctions,” Congressional Research Service, August 14, 2019, https://crsreports.congress.gov/ product/pdf/IF/IF10962.

2 “Russian Noncompliance with and Invalid Suspension of the New START Treaty,” US Department of State, Office of the Spokesperson, March 15, 2023, https://www.state.gov/russian-noncompliance-with-and-invalid-suspension-of-the-new-start-treaty/.

3 “The Kremlin’s Never-Ending Attempt to Spread Disinformation about Biological Weapons,” US Department of State, Global Engagement Center, March 14, 2023, https://www.state.gov/the-kremlins-never-ending-attempt-to-spread-disinformation-about-biological- weapons/; “Many Speakers Voice Concern over Increase in Dangerous Nuclear Weapons Rhetoric amidst Ongoing War against Ukraine, as Disarmament Commission Opens Session,” United Nations, Meetings Coverage and Press Releases, April 3, 2023, https://press.un.org/en/2023/dc3847.doc.htm.

4 ”The 2022 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America, US Department of Defense, 2022, https://media.defense.gov/2022/Oct/27/2003103845/-1/-1/1/2022-NATIONAL-DEFENSE-STRATEGY-NPR-MDR.PDF.

5 For more, see Alberto Behar and Sandile Hlatshwayo, “How to Implement Strategic Foresight (and Why),” International Monetary Fund, February 2021, https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/analytical-notes/Issues/2021/12/22/Strategic-Foresight-at-the-International-Monetary- Fund-463660.

6 See “Tools for Futures Thinking and Foresight across UK Government,” UK Government Office for Science, November 2017, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/674209/futures-toolkit-edition-1.pdf; or Alun Rhydderch, “Scenario-Building: The 2×2 Matrix Technique,” Prospective and Strategic Foresight Toolbox, June 2017, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/331564544_Scenario_Building_The_2x2_Matrix_Technique.

7 The project team conducted extensive background research related to the outlined drivers of change that formed the basis of the scenario exercise. On regime stability, see Robert Person, “Putin’s Big Gamble,” Journal of Democracy, September 2022, https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/putins-big-gamble/; Tatiana Stanovaya, “Russia’s Elites Are Starting to Admit the Possibility of Defeat,” Carnegie Politika, October 3, 2022, https://carnegieendowment.org/politika/88072; Richard D. Hooker, Jr., “Climbing the Ladder: How the West Can Manage Escalation in Ukraine and Beyond,” Atlantic Council, April 21, 2022, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depthresearch- reports/report/managing-escalation-in-ukraine/; F. Joseph Dresen, “Putin’s Russia Today: Sources of Stability and Emerging Challenges,” Wilson Center, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/putins-russia-today-sources-stability-and-emerging-challenges. On Russia’s conventional capabilities, see Scott Boston and Dara Massicot, “The Russian War of Warfare: A Primer,” RAND Corporation, 2017, https://www.rand.org/pubs/perspectives/PE231.html; “Russia’s Armed Forces: More Capable by Far, but for How Long?” International Institute for Strategic Studies, October 9, 2020, https://www.iiss.org/online-analysis//military-balance/2020/10/ russia-armed-forces; Michael Kofman and Rob Lee, “Not Built for Purpose: The Russian Military’s Ill-Fated Force Design,” War on the Rocks, June 2, 2022, https://warontherocks.com/2022/06/not-built-for-purpose-the-russian-militarys-ill-fated-force-design/; John E. Herbst, Anders Åslund, David J. Kramer, Alexander Vershbow, and Brian Whitmore, Global Strategy 2022: Thwarting Kremlin Aggression Today for Constructive Relations Tomorrow, Atlantic Council, February 8, 2022, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/content-series/ atlantic-council-strategy-paper-series/thwarting-kremlin-aggression-today-for-constructive-relations-tomorrow/.

8 The Visual Journalism Team, “Putin Threats: How Many Nuclear Weapons Does Russia Have?” BBC News, October 7, 2022, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-60564123.

9 See Robert Peterson, “Fear and Loathing in Moscow: The Russian Biological Weapons Program in 2022,” Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, October 5, 2022, https://thebulletin.org/2022/10/the-russian-biological-weapons-program-in-2022/.

10 For background on hybrid warfare, see Christopher Chivvis, “Understanding Russian ‘Hybrid Warfare,’” RAND Corporation, May 11, 2017, https://www.rand.org/pubs/testimonies/CT468.html; Alice R. Chen, Andrew Thvedt, Gregory F. Treverton, Kathy Lee, and Madeline McCue, “Addressing Hybrid Threats,” Hybrid Center of Excellence, May 9, 2018, https://www.hybridcoe.fi/publications/addressing- hybrid-threats/.

11 For one explanation of Russia’s hybrid warfare tactics, see Simon Tisdall, “Unseen and Underhand: Putin’s Hidden Hybrid War Is Trying to Break Europe’s Heart,” The Guardian, October 23, 2022, https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2022/oct/23/unseen-andunderhand- putins-hidden-hybrid-war-is-trying-to-break-europes-heart.

12 Patrick Reevell, “Before Navalny, a Long History of Russian Poisonings,” ABC News, August 26, 2020, https://abcnews.go.com/International/navalny-long-history-russian-poisonings/story?id=72579648.

13 On biological weapons-related disinformation, see “The Kremlin’s Never-Ending Attempt to Spread Disinformation about Biological Weapons,” US Department of State. On chemical weapons related disinformation, see “The Kremlin’s Chemical Weapons Disinformation Campaigns,” US Department of State, Global Engagement Center, May 1, 2022, https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/ The-Kremlins-Chemical-Weapons-Disinformation-Campaigns_edit.pdf.

14 For more, see Sarah Jacobs Gamberini, “Social Media Weaponization: The Biohazard of Russian Disinformation Campaigns,” Joint Force Quarterly 99, November 19, 2020, https://wmdcenter.ndu.edu/Publications/Publication-View/Article/2422660/social-media- weaponization-the-biohazard-of-russian-disinformation-campaigns/; Abigail Stowe Thurston, “Russia’s Non-proliferation Disinformation Campaign,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, March 22, 2022, https://thebulletin.org/2022/03/russias-non-proliferation-disinformation- campaign/.

15 For example, see Austin Wright, “Dual-Use Goods Are Fueling Russia’s War on Ukraine,” Foreign Policy, November 8, 2022, https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/11/08/dual-use-goods-are-fueling-russias-war-on-ukraine/.

16 Raymond A. Zilinskas, “The Soviet Biological Weapons Program and Its Legacy in Today’s Russia,” Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Case Study, the Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction (CSWMD) at the National Defense University, July 18, 2016, https://inss.ndu.edu/Media/News/Article/848285/the-soviet-biological-weapons-program-and-its-legacy-in-todays-russia/.

17 J. Kenneth Wickiser, Kevin J. O’Donovan, Michael Washington, et. al., “Engineered Pathogens and Unnatural Biological Weapons: The Future Threat of Synthetic Biology,” Combating Terrorism Center Sentinel at West Point, August 2020, https://ctc.westpoint.edu/engineered-pathogens-and-unnatural-biological-weapons-the-future-threat-of-synthetic-biology/.

18 Lois M. Davis and Jeanne S. Ringel, “Public Health Preparedness for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Weapons,” originally published in WMD Terrorism: Science and Policy Choices, RAND Corporation, 2009, https://www.rand.org/pubs/reprints/RP1415.html.

19 For more, see “Critical Infrastructure Sectors,” US Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, n.d., https://www.cisa.gov/topics/critical-infrastructure-security-and-resilience/critical-infrastructure-sectors, accessed May 2023.

20 For more on the impact of emerging technologies related to WMD, see Future Implications of Emerging Disruptive Technologies on Weapons of Mass Destruction, Arizona State University Threatcasting Lab, September 2022, https://cyber.army.mil/Portals/3/Documents/Threatcasting/wmds/Threatcasting_WMDs.pdf.

21 “Disinformation Roulette: The Kremlin’s Year of Lies to Justify an Unjustifiable War,” US Department of State, Global Engagement Center, February 23, 2023, https://www.state.gov/disarming-disinformation/disinformation-roulette-the-kremlins-year-of-lies-to-justify- an-unjustifiable-war/.

22 Davey Alba, “Russia Has Been Laying Groundwork Online for a ‘False Flag’ Operation, Misinformation Researchers Say,” New York Times, February 19, 2022, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/02/19/business/russia-has-been-laying-groundwork-online-for-a-false-flag-operation- misinformation-researchers-say.html.

23 For more, see Washington Post Editorial Board, “How Russia Turned America’s Helping Hand to Ukraine into a Vast Lie,” Washington Post, March 29, 2023, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2023/03/29/russia-disinformation-ukraine-bio-labs/; Kenneth D. Ward, “Syria, Russia, and the Global Chemical Weapons Crisis,” Arms Control Association, September 2021, https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2021-09/features/syria-russia-global-chemical-weapons-crisis; Filippa Lentzos and Jez Littlewood, “How Russia Worked to Undermine UN Bioweapons Investigations,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, December 11, 2020, https://thebulletin.org/2020/12/how-russia-worked-to-undermine-un-bioweapons-investigations/.

24 “Statement by Ms. Dr. Kateryna Bila—Representative of Ukraine to the 27th Session of the Conference of States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention,” Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, 2022, https://www.opcw.org/sites/default/files/documents/2022/11/National%20Statement_Ukraine_Agenda%20item%209%28d%29-rev%20pdf.pdf.

25 NATO’s Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) Defense Policy, NATO, last updated July 2022, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_197768.htm.

26 Diego Ruiz Palmer, “The Framework Nations Concept and NATO: Game-Changer for a New Strategic Era or Missing Opportunity,” NATO Defense College, July 2016, https://www.ndc.nato.int/news/news.php?icode=965.

27 AVM Sean Corbett, CB MBE and James Danoy, “Beyond NOFORN: Solutions for Increased Intelligence Sharing among Allies,” Atlantic Council, October 31, 2022, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/issue-brief/beyond-noforn-solutions-for-increased- intelligence-sharing-among-allies/.

28 “Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre,” NATO, September 2021, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_52057.htm.

The post Continued US and allied integration is essential to deter Russian CBRN use appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Soofer in The National Interest on missile defense

Atlantic Council — Wed, 25 Oct 2023 18:15:16 +0000

On October 24, Forward Defense senior fellow Robert Soofer published an op-ed in The National Interest arguing that the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) should consider developing an “underlayer” to the Ground-Based Midcourse Defense System using US capabilities that previously had only been deployed to defend allies such as the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense System (THAAD) and Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense System.

The MDA should explore the utility of Aegis ashore and THAAD against North Korean ICBM threats. A full exploration of the utility of the underlayer, including deep technical analysis, is required if the United States wants to strengthen its defenses.

Robert Soofer

Fellow

Robert Soofer

Arms Control Defense Policy

The post Soofer in The National Interest on missile defense appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Wechsler joins Seznam Zprávy to discuss Israeli operations in Gaza

Atlantic Council — Wed, 11 Oct 2023 13:31:33 +0000

The post Wechsler joins Seznam Zprávy to discuss Israeli operations in Gaza appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Garlauskas quoted in VOA and iNews

kyusko — Fri, 29 Sep 2023 18:59:00 +0000

On September 27, Markus Garlauskas was quoted several times in a Voice of America article, “South Korea’s Dilemma: Is North Korea the Only Threat?” He emphasized that South Korea should increase its preparations to deal with threats beyond North Korea, particularly China. The article also referenced IPSI’s recent report on the risks of Chinese intervention in a renewed Korean conflict and of a war over Taiwan spreading to engulf Korea. On September 28, the British outlet iNews quoted this report as well, warning of the potential for the United States to face two adversaries simultaneously in East Asia.

Staff

Markus Garlauskas

Indo-Pacific Security Initiative Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Crisis Management Indo-Pacific

The post Garlauskas quoted in VOA and iNews appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Soofer contributes to Project Atom on US nuclear strategy

slad — Fri, 29 Sep 2023 15:41:06 +0000

On September 28, Forward Defense senior fellow Robert Soofer co-authored a paper in a recent publication by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) Project on Nuclear Issues, titled Project Atom: Defining U.S. Nuclear Strategy, 2030–2050. The authors discussed the nuclear concepts, policies, strategies, forces, and posture necessary to deter and prevent nuclear use as China emerges as a nuclear peer competitor to the United States alongside Russia.

The United States must persuade Beijing and Moscow through words and deeds that nuclear
competition is a failing proposition that will provide no strategic advantage.

Robert Soofer and Tom Karako

Fellow

Robert Soofer

Arms Control Defense Policy

The post Soofer contributes to Project Atom on US nuclear strategy appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Kroenig, Garlauskas, and Taylor appear as featured panelists at the Korea Society

kyusko — Fri, 22 Sep 2023 18:52:43 +0000

On September 21, the Scowcroft Center and the Korea Society hosted a joint panel event on “New Nuclear Dynamics of Northeast Asia” in New York City featuring Matthew Kroenig, Markus Garlauskas, and IPSI nonresident fellow Jessica Taylor, alongside Dr. Sue Mi Terry and moderator Jonathan Corrado. The conversation explored issues such as growing PRC and North Korean nuclear capabilities, the potential for simultaneous conflicts in the Indo-Pacific, and the need for a paradigm shift in thinking about US deterrence posture in the region.

Staff

Markus Garlauskas

Indo-Pacific Security Initiative Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Crisis Management Indo-Pacific

Staff

Matthew Kroenig

Vice President and Senior Director, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Indo-Pacific Security Initiative Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

China Defense Policy

Fellow

Jessica Taylor

Nonresident Fellow

Crisis Management East Asia

The post Kroenig, Garlauskas, and Taylor appear as featured panelists at the Korea Society appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Cynkin interviewed by Yonhap News on intelligence approaches to Russia-North Korea partnership

kyusko — Tue, 19 Sep 2023 17:32:00 +0000

On September 17, IPSI nonresident senior fellow Thomas Cynkin was quoted in Yonhap News. Cynkin suggested that the United States may benefit from declassifying and disclosing more information related to trade activity between North Korea and Russia, as it did with intelligence on Russian military action prior to the invasion of Ukraine. He explained that this approach could help prevent North Korea from acquiring Russian military technology by creating international pressure on Russia to uphold international nonproliferation laws.

Fellow

Thomas Cynkin

Indo-Pacific Security Initiative Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Indo-Pacific Japan

The post Cynkin interviewed by Yonhap News on intelligence approaches to Russia-North Korea partnership appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Cynkin appears on VOA “Washington Talk” weekly program

kyusko — Tue, 19 Sep 2023 16:39:11 +0000

On September 16, IPSI nonresident senior fellow Thomas Cynkin appeared on VOA Korea’s weekly program, “Washington Talk,” regarding the recent meeting between Russian President Vladimir Putin and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un. He described the North Korean-Russian partnership as an “unholy alliance” and a “marriage of convenience,” particularly as it pertains to nuclear issues, but suggested that South Korea should not provide lethal aid directly to Ukraine to avoid ostensibly “triggering” dangerous transactions within the partnership.

Fellow

Thomas Cynkin

Indo-Pacific Security Initiative Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Indo-Pacific Japan

The post Cynkin appears on VOA “Washington Talk” weekly program appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Garlauskas quoted in the EurAsian Times

kyusko — Mon, 04 Sep 2023 17:35:49 +0000

On September 3, Markus Garlauskas’s recent comments to Nikkei Asia were quoted in the EurAsian Times. The article underscored Garlauskas’s statement that the world has underestimated the nuclear threat posed by North Korea, particularly “its risk calculus, its willingness to provoke, its willingness to engage in limited acts of aggression.”

Staff

Markus Garlauskas

Indo-Pacific Security Initiative Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Crisis Management Indo-Pacific

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Putin’s Russia must not be allowed to normalize nuclear blackmail

Olivia Yanchik — Thu, 31 Aug 2023 20:05:48 +0000

Since the beginning of Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022, the Kremlin has repeatedly employed nuclear threats to deter countries from arming Ukraine. This extreme tactic has proven highly effective against risk-averse Western leaders, who have deliberately slow-walked the flow of weapons to Ukraine for fear of provoking a nuclear response.

Such caution could have grave implications for the future of international security. Unless the West confronts Vladimir Putin’s nuclear intimidation, there is a very real chance that he will continue with such tactics. Inevitably, others will seek to emulate him. This could plunge the entire world into a new era of international instability as countries scramble to secure a nuclear deterrent of their own.

Much of Russia’s nuclear saber-rattling has been deliberately ambiguous in nature and highly choreographed for maximum impact. In the first days of the war, Putin very publicly announced that he was placing his country’s nuclear forces on special alert, while warning that anyone who attempted to interfere with the Russian invasion of Ukraine would face consequences on a scale “you have never seen in your history.”

Seven months later in September 2022, Putin once again indicated that he was prepared to use nuclear weapons to protect the Russian people and defend the country’s borders. “We will certainly use all the means available to us, and I’m not bluffing,” he warned. This was a particularly menacing threat as it came at a time when Russia was preparing to “annex” four partially occupied Ukrainian provinces, therefore making any attempt to liberate these regions an attack on Russia itself.

Other senior figures within the Russian establishment have been even more explicit. Former Russian president and prime minister Dmitry Medvedev, who now serves as the deputy chairman of Russia’s Security Council, is particularly notorious for issuing nuclear threats. In a July 2023 social media post, he warned that if Ukraine’s summer counteroffensive succeeded in liberating Ukrainian regions claimed by Russia, “we would have to use nuclear weapons by virtue of the stipulations of the Russian presidential decree.” Russia’s enemies “should pray to our fighters that they do not allow the world to go up in nuclear flames,” he added.

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Although such threats violate norms of responsible state behavior, they align with what we understand about existing nuclear doctrine. “Ambiguity plays a crucial role in deterrence,” explains Marion Messmer, a senior research fellow in the International Security Program at Chatham House. “States worry about adversaries aiming for a strike just below the red line if they are too clear about what that red line is.”

Russia’s nuclear threats appear designed to maintain a high degree of uncertainty while focusing Western minds on the potential risks of miscalculation. Russia has threatened or hinted at nuclear use over a wide range of issues, but has remained intentionally vague about potential triggers in order to create the illusion that Putin has a low threshold for nuclear deployment. However, as each of the Kremlin’s red lines has been crossed, Putin’s nuclear posture has not changed. Most notably, in late 2022, Ukraine liberated a number of occupied cities that Putin himself had earlier declared to be Russian “forever,” but this did not result in the threatened nuclear response.

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Although Russia’s nuclear threats suffer from obvious credibility problems, the extreme reluctance of many in the West to test Moscow’s resolve means that these tactics have nevertheless been highly effective in restricting or delaying the delivery of military aid to Ukraine. While the quantity and quality of weapons supplied to Ukraine has steadily increased throughout the past eighteen months, every stage in this process has been marked by hesitation and procrastination.

At present, the US has still not agreed to provide long-range ATACM long-range missile systems, with many commentators attributing this reluctance to fears of escalation. “Our administration does not want to see Ukraine succeed wildly, because we are deterred, we are intimidated, and we don’t want Mr. Putin to widen or deepen the war,” retired US Air Force General Philip Breedlove commented recently.

Western timidity in the face of Russian nuclear saber-rattling is extremely short-sighted and could have disastrous consequences in Ukraine and beyond. While the risks of confronting Russia’s nuclear threats are immediately apparent, the dangers of inaction may actually be far greater. Since the full-scale invasion began eighteen months ago, Russia has been able to leverage its status as a nuclear-armed state to occupy entire regions of its neighbor’s land while deterring the international community from coming to Ukraine’s aid.

The more time passes without a decisive response from Ukraine’s partners, the more likely Russia’s aggressive use of nuclear intimidation will become a normalized element of international relations. Countries around the world will change their own nuclear postures to achieve their expansionist aims or defend themselves against their neighbors. If Putin is allowed to normalize nuclear blackmail as a foreign policy tool, longstanding nonproliferation initiatives will collapse and the world will enter a dangerous new era of nuclear-armed instability.

Olivia Yanchik is a program assistant at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center. Follow her on Twitter at @oliviayanchik.

Markus Garlauskas

Indo-Pacific Security Initiative Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Crisis Management Indo-Pacific

The post Garlauskas quoted in Nikkei during 2023 USSTRATCOM Deterrence Symposium appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The United States and its allies must be ready to deter a two-front war and nuclear attacks in East Asia

Markus Garlauskas — Wed, 16 Aug 2023 14:30:00 +0000

Introduction

“If hostilities were to renew on the [Korean Peninsula] it is not a matter of ‘if’ the Chinese Communist Party will intervene, it is when … This has been a very difficult topic for us to address as an alliance.”— Retired Gen. Robert Abrams, former commander of US Forces Korea (USFK)¹

“I’ve wargamed conflicts with China and with North Korea dozens of times. If we look at a map and consider the forces involved, it is almost impossible for either to occur without some form of simultaneity.”—US defense official, name withheld

“If the political survival of Xi Jinping or Kim Jong Un is at stake in [a] military conflict they are losing, escalating to a limited nuclear strike would be rational … hesitating to use nuclear weapons would be the irrational act.”—US intelligence official, name withheld

The challenges to deterrence in East Asia have begun to change fundamentally in recent years, putting them on track to present grave risks to US national security interests over the coming decade. This report summarizes the results of a study focused on two of these emerging and interrelated challenges to deterrence in East Asia. The first is the potential for a conflict with either the People’s Republic of China (PRC) or North Korea to escalate horizontally and become a simultaneous conflict with both. The other is the possibility that either or both adversaries would choose to escalate vertically to a limited nuclear attack—rather than concede defeat—in a major conflict.

US thinking about war in East Asia often neglects the possibility that the United States would have to fight the PRC and North Korea simultaneously rather than separately. Furthermore, conventional wisdom in the United States underestimates the risk that either the PRC or North Korea would resort to a limited nuclear strike in the event of a conflict in the region. However, the recent behavior of the United States’ adversaries in East Asia suggests that this thinking may be off the mark; the PRC military has reorganized itself to prepare to fight a two-front war, while both the PRC and North Korea continue to develop the sophistication and size of their tactical nuclear arsenals.

To better understand the threats posed by these two major risks five to ten years from now (in the 2027-2032 timeframe), we conducted a series of workshops and interviews with key government personnel and experts, and analyzed our findings in this report, originally written for the US Defense Threat Reduction Agency (but not necessarily representing its views). These findings should serve as a wake-up call: The United States and its allies can no longer think about conflicts with the PRC and North Korea in isolation from each other, and they must take urgent action to prepare for the possibility of facing limited nuclear attacks in an East Asia conflict scenario.

Definitions

The study’s methodology required development and refinement of working definitions for several key terms central to the study’s goals: simultaneous conflicts, limited nuclear use, and integrated deterrence.

Simultaneous conflicts with the PRC and North Korea, for the purposes of this study, are military conflicts that take place in overlapping timeframes. The conflicts could begin at different times and occur at different levels of intensity, and might or might not geographically overlap. This definition also includes the possibility of simultaneous conflicts wherein some PRC and North Korean military forces would be engaged in combat with each other, even as other PRC and North Korean military forces fought US and/or US-allied forces.

Limited nuclear attack (LNA), for the purposes of this study, is the employment of nuclear weapons for lethal, destructive, and/or electromagnetic effects on US and/or allied personnel and assets, while remaining sufficiently limited in scope and scale to be only a small fraction of the adversary’s capabilities. Mere tests, demonstrations, or threats were not considered to qualify as LNA, but as part of a broader category of limited nuclear use. Though nuclear weapons defined by treaty as “nonstrategic,” or considered “low yield” or employed by a “tactical” delivery system, might be particularly suited to LNA, such attacks could employ other weapons and delivery systems.

Integrated deterrence was not publicly defined by the US government until late in the study; however, the study utilized a working definition similar to that used in the 2022 US National Security Strategy. The various aspects to be “integrated” included: integration across military and nonmilitary domains; integration across geographic areas; integration across levels of conflict; integration across US government and military organizations; and integration with allies and partners.¹

Key findings

If a conflict with one adversary in East Asia doesn’t end quickly, expect it to widen. If a conflict is initiated by either the PRC or North Korea, the potential for expansion to simultaneous conflicts with both would pose a high risk to US and allied defense objectives, particularly because this would impose severe operational and strategic challenges. During this study, we found many plausible pathways from which a conflict with one could expand into conflicts with both, even without Beijing and Pyongyang coordinating with one another. Though it is ill-advised to confidently predict the flow of a conflict up to a decade from now, such pathways are sufficiently numerous and plausible that—if a conflict with either the PRC or North Korea does not conclude quickly—we should anticipate that simultaneous conflicts with both could result.

Deep distrust currently exists between the PRC and North Korea, and we found that neither is likely to feel compelled by any obligation to fight alongside the other—but this would not prevent the emergence of simultaneous conflicts with both. Advance coordination between the two is one of the less likely ways such simultaneous conflicts could emerge. We identified a series of far more plausible pathways, depicted in Figures 1 and 2.
Simultaneous conflicts impose challenges so severe that the risk should still be considered high, even if the probability of these two conflicts occurring simultaneously is uncertain. The logistical challenges alone are daunting, given the requirements of such major conflicts, including stocks of precision standoff munitions and missile-defense interceptors. Operationally, simultaneous conflicts would force overstretched US command-and-control (C2) systems to make hard choices about how to allocate limited numbers of their most valuable assets. Meanwhile, alliance management and escalation management would become exponentially more complex.
If North Korean aggression triggers a successful counteroffensive by the US and South Korea, this will likely prompt the PRC to intervene to protect its interests as North Korea collapses. Such intervention would likely spark a confrontation in the context of US-PRC rivalry and distrust, which could escalate to military conflict. Further, Beijing would likely be willing to risk a conflict to prevent Seoul and Washington from dictating the terms of Korean unification via an unchecked counteroffensive.
Any major US-PRC conflict—for example, if the PRC attacks Taiwan—is likely to escalate horizontally and engulf Korea, unless the US-PRC conflict is a limited war with a quick, decisive outcome. In such a conflict, Beijing is likely to strike US regional bases, possibly including US Forces Korea (USFK) bases well within mutual striking distance of the PRC mainland. Even if the South Korean military and USFK are initially fenced off from hostilities, either side could view them as a US tool to break a stalemate or be drawn in as the PRC attacks US bases in Japan by overflying Korea. Additionally, Beijing could encourage Pyongyang to escalate in order to tie down US and ROK forces. Whether or not Beijing does, a US-PRC conflict would disturb North Korea’s escalation calculus. US reinforcements flowing to the region, along with US commitments and losses, could prompt opportunistic or preemptive aggression from North Korea—particularly because the conflict’s outcome would have immense implications for Pyongyang.
A second conflict need not even escalate very far for such challenges to come into play. As a major conflict with the PRC or North Korea begins, the potential for escalation to draw in the other immediately affects the political and military options available to the United States and its allies, even if war is averted. Seoul’s efforts to avoid being dragged into a US-PRC war, for example, could constrain US forces in South Korea. Meanwhile, US and South Korean efforts to avoid a war with the PRC could hamstring US-South Korean operations in the Yellow Sea, or in mountainous areas near the PRC-North Korean border.

The risk that a war in East Asia would go nuclear is rising, as the PRC and North Korea have increasing incentive and capabilities for limited nuclear attacks. The risk of a limited nuclear attack by the PRC or North Korea in the event of conflict is likely to grow through the 2027–2032 time frame, and simultaneous conflicts would exacerbate this risk. Building on the results of another study we conducted, “Preventing Strategic Deterrence Failure on the Korean Peninsula,” this study found that North Korea has been rapidly advancing its capability and intent to initiate a limited nuclear attack in the event of conflict.² Though the study did not find evidence as compelling to show that the PRC is currently moving aggressively in this direction, it found evidence that the PRC’s capability to employ nuclear weapons for operational and tactical purposes is increasing.

North Korean weapons capabilities and policy have moved rapidly toward enabling limited nuclear attacks. Pyongyang’s September 8, 2022, nuclear policy declaration set the stage and justification for limited nuclear attacks, stating that nuclear first use is an option to retake the initiative in a conflict, for example.³ Meanwhile, since January 2021, North Korea has been sounding a drumbeat on its tactical nuclear capabilities, including tests of claimed tactical nuclear-capable missiles and displays of a new tactical nuclear warhead.⁴ ⁵
Though Beijing may not be matching Pyongyang’s focus on tactical nuclear options, PRC capabilities suited to limited nuclear attack—such as the DF-26 ballistic missile, dubbed the “carrier killer” or “Guam killer”—are already significant and on track to increase.⁶ Though North Korea seems more likely than the PRC to initiate a limited nuclear attack, a North Korean nuclear attack would also raise the risk of a US-PRC nuclear confrontation, particularly if Beijing perceives the US response as threatening. In addition, if a US-PRC conflict starting elsewhere “horizontally” escalates to Korea, and yet PRC victory remains elusive, a “vertical” escalation to limited nuclear attack may be the next logical step from Beijing’s perspective.⁷
A PRC military intervention in a Korean conflict would also add dangerous new variables to North Korea’s nuclear calculus. An intervention without the North Korean regime’s prompting or permission would be a clear threat to its survival, likely making a limited nuclear attack appear to be the “least bad” option. Conversely, a PRC intervention permitted by North Korea, designed to help protect the regime from the consequences of its escalation, might lead Pyongyang to expect US restraint in response to a limited nuclear attack because of Washington’s fear of triggering a US-PRC nuclear war.

The United States and its allies are not situated to fight a two-front limited nuclear war in East Asia; the PRC may be soon. US and allied capabilities, command-and-control arrangements, and posture (including forces, bases, and agreements with allies) are unsuited to prevent simultaneous conflict with the PRC and North Korea and/or a limited nuclear attack or provide robust military response options if they occur.

Based on the workshop discussions, the logistical, command and control, basing, and alliance policy considerations of the United States and its allies in the Indo-Pacific all appear designed around and suited for one fight or the other. They aren’t designed for simultaneous conflicts with the PRC and North Korea. Further, this design signals, perhaps unintentionally, that the United States and its key East Asian allies are not yet seriously considering, much less preparing for, simultaneous conflicts. The US-South Korean alliance, in particular, often appears to be avoiding even discussion of this politically sensitive, yet critical, topic.
The United States and its allies have appeared reluctant in recent years to actively and openly prepare a response to limited tactical nuclear attack in East Asia, much less to prepare to fight a “limited” nuclear conflict. Statements such “a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought” and “there is no scenario in which the Kim regime could employ nuclear weapons and survive” may be unintentionally signaling that the United States is deliberately unprepared for such possibilities, and is instead counting on the implicit threat of all-out nuclear conflict resulting from a single nuclear strike as a deterrent.⁸ Decisions and statements about posture and capabilities also signal a disinterest in preparing limited-nuclear-response options, with US officials publicly dismissing the idea of redeploying tactical nuclear weapons to the region.⁹
If current trends continue, the PRC is likely to be far better prepared than the United States to fight on multiple fronts in East Asia and to conduct limited nuclear strikes. The apparent lack of preparedness of the United States and its allies to fight simultaneous conflicts with the PRC and North Korea and for a limited nuclear conflict increases the chances that Beijing or Pyongyang—if already in conflict with the United States—would see advantage in moving first to expand to a dual conflict or escalate to a limited nuclear attack. The PRC’s establishment of a separate Northern Theater Command for Korea contingencies and the Eastern Theater Command for Taiwan contingencies, along with the fielding of accurate dual-capable missiles (nuclear and conventional) shows Beijing’s progress in this direction.

If conflict breaks out, however, the United States has options to manage escalation. The study found that, even if the United States fails to deter aggression by either the PRC or North Korea, there will still be key opportunities for integrated deterrence approaches to help reduce the risk of escalation to conflicts with both, or to a limited nuclear attack. The study identified a range of leverage points in Beijing and Pyongyang’s decision-making that could help to limit such “horizontal” and “vertical” escalation.

Beijing’s view: Beijing probably wants to limit conflict and avoid a regional or nuclear war if it is employing force to achieve goals regarding Taiwan or maritime disputes, or if it is intervening to protect its interests in a Korea conflict. Workshop participants noted likely concerns in Beijing about the potential for uncontrolled escalation in such scenarios, and one expert particularly highlighted that Beijing’s “nightmare scenario” could be fighting the United States, Japan, and South Korea simultaneously. Given the difficulty that Beijing has had in influencing or constraining Pyongyang under more stable circumstances, PRC leaders are likely to believe that expanding a US-PRC war to the Korean peninsula would introduce new, uncontrolled, and unpredictable elements and complicate conflict termination. Similarly, Beijing likely recognizes that a military intervention during a North Korean conflict with South Korea and the United States holds many risks and uncertainties, including unpredictable effects on Pyongyang’s escalation calculus.
Pyongyang’s view: Though North Korea is likely to see both opportunities and threats in the event of a US-PRC conflict, it almost certainly would be initially hesitant to embark on a level of aggression risking regime-ending consequences. Pyongyang would likely be skeptical of Beijing’s willingness to prioritize defending North Korea, even as “co-belligerents” fighting the United States and its allies simultaneously. North Korea would also likely be uncertain as to whether the United States or the PRC would be able to win a decisive victory, regardless of North Korean involvement. Though it may not be possible to deter some posturing or limited aggression by North Korea in such scenarios, there would be an opportunity to raise Pyongyang’s level of caution through integrated deterrence approaches.
Personnel below the regime leaders’ level in both states could be susceptible to influence to delay or discourage escalation in such scenarios. Their personal interests may sharply diverge from those of their leaders in such extreme circumstances, as the risks of conflict escalation take precedence over fear of punishment for passivity or disobedience. The US and its allies could exploit the tendency of high-level officials in autocratic systems toward delay and confirmation, rather than prompt action.

Biases in US and allied institutions are impeding their understanding of how an East Asian conflict could escalate, and their preparations to manage such escalation. Deep-seated organizational and cognitive biases have obstructed the ability of the United States and its allies to anticipate, deter, and prepare for these two possibilities: simultaneous conflicts with the PRC and North Korea, or limited nuclear attack by either adversary. During the study, members of the research team and many of the expert participants found that such biases have often led to unfounded optimistic assertions, particularly the idea that Beijing or Pyongyang would remain a passive observer while the other fights a conflict that would have profound consequences for the security of both. (For more on the biases at work in the way the United States and its allies think about East Asian security, see Jonathan Corrado’s essay, “Biases blind us to the risk of Chinese military intervention in Korea.”)

A bias toward overcentralized perception of adversary decision-making has obstructed US consideration of simultaneous conflicts with the PRC and North Korea. Many US personnel who have not closely studied the Pyongyang-Beijing relationship make unsupported assumptions about either the level of coordination between Beijing and Pyongyang or North Korea’s level of responsiveness to PRC direction—driving another assumption, that simultaneous conflicts would only happen by Beijing’s conscious choice. Others assume that the low trust between Beijing and Pyongyang made simultaneous conflicts impossible.
Mirror imaging and wishful thinking were also common US and allied biases reported by study participants. In particular, some participants reported the widespread belief that the United States and the PRC have a common overriding interest in avoiding a two-front war or nuclear escalation, without considering whether this would hold true if the PRC were losing a war with the United States. Similarly, a frequent response to the idea of a limited North Korean nuclear attack is that North Korea “wouldn’t dare” to use nuclear weapons because its leaders “know it would be the end of their regime,” without considering scenarios in which the regime is already facing imminent destruction.
What’s known as the “law of the instrument bias” was often identified during the study, as each of the three most relevant US four-star joint commands for these issues has a distinct and separate role. Deterring nuclear attack is the domain of US Strategic Command; deterring PRC aggression is the domain of US Indo-Pacific Command; and North Korean aggression is the domain of Combined Forces Command/US Forces Korea. This makes it difficult, but important, to enable integration across these commands in order to best address security challenges in East Asia. Integration will increase the range of resources available to each command and will thus help commands to view problems from new angles, rather than with a disproportionate focus on their own command’s regional or strategic domain.

How could simultaneous conflicts break out?

Considered separately, the risks to US interests posed by simultaneous conflicts and limited nuclear attacks in East Asia are complex and daunting. Considering them together introduces further complexity. Given the relatively low potential for either the PRC or North Korea to begin aggression with a nuclear attack at the outset of a conflict, this analysis first establishes the potential pathways to simultaneous conflicts with the PRC and North Korea, along with the general scenarios that might result. It then establishes some of the driving and restraining factors for a limited-nuclear-attack decision, and from these derives a summary of conditions wherein simultaneous conflicts would be most likely to place the greatest strain on the potential for limited nuclear attack.

The study found numerous plausible pathways from which aggression by either the PRC or North Korea could result in simultaneous conflicts with the United States in the coming decade, some of which are more likely than others. The study also found some pathways to be implausible. For example, it found that the prospects for a truly “collaborative” decision between Beijing and Pyongyang to initiate joint aggression are remote, even if one assumes that PRC-North Korea relations will have improved a decade from now. Therefore, the following analysis assumes that either Beijing or Pyongyang would be the “first mover” initiating the planning and preparations for such aggression, even in the unlikely scenario that PRC-North Korea relations and trust have improved to the point that some degree of joint planning and preparations take place.

The flow of a conflict initiated by the People’s Republic of China

Beijing has a wide range of potential justifications and motivations for initiating aggression. The scenario that receives the most attention is the potential for a PRC offensive to bring Taiwan under its control, either through a massive amphibious invasion or a coercive campaign using some combination of threats, limited strikes, and isolation of the island. However, there are other plausible scenarios for PRC aggression, including disputes over territorial claims in the South China Sea and the Senkaku Islands. In all of these cases, however, the PRC’s goals appear limited, and the PRC almost certainly seeks—at least at the outset—to achieve a decisive victory without having to resort to nuclear strikes or escalate to a global war with the United States. This is likely to motivate the PRC to limit the geographic scope of its initial aggression, to at least some degree. As a result, the study considered it possible that the PRC could plausibly choose not to initially attack US bases in South Korea, even if it attacks US bases and forces located elsewhere—on Japanese territory, for example. (See Figure 4 for some geographic factors constraining such a PRC approach.) Figure 1 depicts a range of potential pathways for a conflict initiated with a PRC attack on Taiwan to escalate to include North Korea.

Figure 1.

The flow of a conflict initiated by North Korea

Pyongyang also has a wide range of possible reasons and incentives for initiating aggression, with its most likely target being South Korea (ROK). For the purposes of this study, a foundational assumption, based on assessments of Pyongyang’s mindset and calculus, is that North Korea’s aggression would be intended to result in a limited conflict—rather than an all-out war to absorb the ROK, which it almost certainly understands it could not win.¹⁰ As a result, such a conflict is unlikely to begin with a nuclear attack. To make for a more manageable scope, the study also set aside scenarios of a US- or ROK-initiated “invasion” or intervention in a North Korean collapse.

Figure 2 depicts pathways of how such a conflict could flow, including situations that could serve as triggering conditions for North Korea to conduct a limited nuclear attack. Though focused on the potential for simultaneous conflicts, this graphic also shows that PRC intervention is not necessarily inevitable, and that there is even the possibility of a cooperative US-PRC response. However, the study participants largely assessed such cooperation as unlikely in the context of the expected intensification of US-PRC rivalry in the coming decade.

Figure 2.

Will these conflicts go nuclear?

We have no historical record of limited nuclear attacks to inform analysis of what might lead to such an attack—unlike the long track record for nuclear threats, demonstrations, and coercion—so it is appropriate to limit expectations of how confident we can be in such assessments. Similarly, parsing statements on nuclear-weapons policy by Beijing or Pyongyang is likely to reveal more about their current intentions for nuclear signaling than the actual dynamics and calculus for a limited nuclear attack in a conflict up to a decade from now. The wording of Pyongyang’s September 2022 “Law on Policy of Nuclear Forces” establishes explicit justifications for first use of nuclear weapons by North Korea in various scenarios short of all-out nuclear war, but only alludes to the possibility of conducting limited nuclear attacks.¹¹ The PRC’s potential logic for a limited nuclear attack is even more opaque, given its ostensible “no first use” policy. Despite this current policy, some US scholars argue that Beijing could, in a future war, choose “limited nuclear escalation as a way to force an end to the conflict.”¹²

Lacking concrete evidence of PRC or North Korean calculations for limited nuclear attacks, Figure 3 summarizes a set of potential variables that could either restrain or encourage the adversary considering a limited nuclear attack, modeling the logic of an authoritarian regime considering such options.¹³ These considerations are not a definitive “checklist,” but can provide analytic insight on the varying factors that are likely to come into play.

The first and foundational set of variables to consider for this model is the state of the adversary’s leadership and its nuclear C2 system, including its perception of direct domestic and external threats to the leadership. This would set both the lens through which the adversary sees other variables and its ability to make and transmit a nuclear-use decision. Some damage to the nuclear C2 system—presuming it is not destroyed—is particularly likely to trigger nuclear strikes, which may not even be truly “limited.” For example, North Korea’s September 2022 policy warned that attacks on its nuclear C2 would automatically trigger a retaliatory nuclear response.¹⁴

An additional set of variables expands to include operational considerations. If the capability to conduct such an attack is clear and tested, and a lucrative target for a limited nuclear attack is identified, this further incentivizes such an attack, particularly if the adversary sees it is facing a “a use or lose” window of time to execute it.

A final set of variables adds the context of the broader strategic environment that could shape a decision. Though these broader strategic factors are unlikely to be decisive on their own in triggering a limited nuclear attack, these variables could help determine the final decision if the leadership and operational factors are tilting toward limited nuclear attack as an option. The study’s workshop discussions concluded that additional parties intervening against the adversary could be a particularly important factor in incentivizing a nuclear attack.

Figure 3.

Considering all the variables outlined above and depicted in Figure 3, the overall set of conditions most likely to prompt a limited adversary nuclear attack on US or allied targets in East Asia would be a case in which the adversary’s C2 and missile forces have come under attack, and it perceives it is losing. More specifically, if the PRC intervenes when North Korea is facing such conditions, but in a way that is not supportive of the North Korean regime, this intervention would make a North Korean limited nuclear attack even more likely. Such conditions would give the North Korean regime little reassurance of its survival without drastic measures, including a limited nuclear attack, while increasing its confidence that the United States would either respond to a limited nuclear attack forcefully, possibly stoking a US-PRC nuclear confrontation, or with restraint to avoid such a confrontation. Meanwhile, the strategic and operational context of such a conflict would incentivize quick escalation to limited nuclear attack as the best hope for leadership survival.

Though it is difficult to assess the probability of a limited nuclear attack beyond its overall plausibility in the event of simultaneous conflicts in East Asia, we can be more confident in assessing the gravity of such an attack’s consequences. The near-immediate strategic and operational effects of even the smallest limited nuclear attack—including disrupting military operations, inflaming public opinion, and sharply increasing escalatory risks—would almost certainly far exceed its direct physical and tactical effects. Over the longer term, such a clear violation of the “nuclear taboo” and failure of nuclear deterrence would also mean that the consequences of a limited nuclear attack in East Asia could ripple globally and be felt for generations.

What is it about East Asia that makes simultaneous conflicts more likely? Politics and geography.

The geography of East Asia is a key potential variable increasing both the probability and impact of a US conflict with the PRC or North Korea expanding to simultaneous conflicts with both—particularly given the increasing ranges of modern sensors and weapons systems. Some examples of this are shown in Figure 4 below.

Beijing could view USFK bases as threatening due to their proximity, even if USFK restrains its operations from these bases during a conflict. This is likely to become a greater concern for Beijing as US weapon and sensor ranges increase. From US bases in South Korea, the Army’s Precision Strike Missile (PrSM) would be able to strike portions of the PRC mainland, even the outskirts of Beijing and Shanghair, in the 2027–2032 timeframe (as depicted by the blue range radius). This is based on a US Army general’s publicly stated expectations for the extended range of this system in the next decade, which would be used as a primary weapon by US field artillery units.¹⁵

In a US-PRC conflict, even if the PRC refrains from striking US bases in South Korea, its ability to strike US bases in Japan would be constrained by the need to either avoid overflight of the Korean peninsula or risk provoking North or South Korea by flying missiles through their airspace (illustrated by Figure 4). Figure 4 also illustrates how much of a constraint for the PRC it would be to avoid overflight of the Korean peninsula and its nearby airspace if the PRC were attempting to effectively strike key US bases on the Japanese home islands as part of a US-PRC conflict. If the PRC were to employ its more numerous, and potentially more evasive, short-range ballistic missiles to overcome the missile defenses of these bases, this would require such overflights, as would medium-range missiles. The PRC could bypass Korea by employing aircraft, some cruise missiles, and intermediate-range missiles from eastern and southern China to strike these bases instead, but striking only in this way without attacks across the Korea peninsula would provide longer warning time and more favorable geometry for US and Japanese air and missile defenses of these bases.

Figure 4: Northeast Asian geographic considerations in a US-PRC conflict

How should the United States and allies prepare—intellectually and operationally?

Policy recommendations for key finding #1: If a US conflict with one adversary in East Asia doesn’t end quickly, expect it to widen.

The United States and its allies should re-conceptualize planning for aggression by either the PRC or North Korea as marking the start of an Indo-Pacific campaign that also requires deterring—and potentially defeating—the other possible adversary.
The United States and South Korea should shift their focus to a broader priority of protecting South Korea from aggression—encompassing deterrence of PRC aggression in addition to North Korean aggression.
The US government and non-government institutions should sponsor studies and wargaming on the potential conditions and drivers that might cause a US-PRC conflict over Taiwan to escalate to Korea.

Policy recommendations for key finding #2: The risk that a war in East Asia would go nuclear is rising, as the PRC and North Korea have increasing incentives and capabilities for limited nuclear attacks.

The US defense community should direct and sponsor analysis and studies by the intelligence community and outside analytic entities to track and identify signposts of North Korea’s increasing capabilities and potential for limited first nuclear use, as well as signposts of the PRC potentially moving down this path.
In collaboration with its allies, the United States should refine and amplify declaratory policies to emphasize that the United States and its allies will not be divided by a limited nuclear attack. This should include contextualizing the US declaration that “there is no scenario in which the Kim [Jong Un] regime could employ nuclear weapons and survive.”¹⁶
In coordination with the United States’ East Asian allies and partners, US military planners should expand efforts to ensure preparedness to fight and win even if faced with limited nuclear attacks, and to clearly communicate this preparedness to adversaries and allies alike. To preserve a range of military response options other than nuclear retaliation, the stage must be set to avoid giving the impression that any response but an immediate nuclear counterattack would indicate weakness or hesitation.
The United States should lead interagency efforts to explore and prepare options to respond to, mitigate risks of, and deter a limited nuclear attack by the PRC or North Korea—to include studies, workshops, and tabletops/wargames, at both unclassified and classified levels. This analysis should include evaluation of the pros and cons of a range of potential options to increase and signal readiness to employ US tactical nuclear weapons in response to a limited nuclear attack, if the situation calls for it—up to and including the potential ramifications of the reintroduction of US tactical nuclear weapons to the region or the Korean Peninsula itself.

Policy recommendations for key finding #3: The United States and its allies in the Indo-Pacific are not situated to fight a two-front limited nuclear war in East Asia; the PRC may be soon.

The United States should undertake a comprehensive reassessment of its C2 relationships and posture in East Asia in the context of evolving North Korean, PRC, and nuclear threats, to identify the appropriate C2 relationships in the event of simultaneous conflicts with North Korea and the PRC, as well as the best C2 arrangements for theater-level tactical nuclear responses, if needed.
US defense and military planners should ensure that the United States has effective, timely, and credible options for its own limited nuclear strikes in response to a limited nuclear attack, in addition to robust non-nuclear options. Relevant nuclear capabilities should be resourced, trained, staffed, equipped, and supported, while enabling messaging to dispel any perception among adversaries and friends that there is a gap in US capability that could be exploited through a limited nuclear attack.
The United States defense community should expand its forward presence in South Korea and Japan, and its interactions with Taiwan, to help ensure that key US allies and partners are intellectually and operationally better prepared for a conflict with the PRC and/or North Korea that involves a limited nuclear attack by either or both.

Policy recommendations for key finding #4: However, if conflict breaks out, the United States has options for managing escalation.

Across an array of commands, the US military should undertake efforts to apply and operationalize a greater focus on integrated deterrence approaches for intra-conflict deterrence, rather than just deterrence of conflict in general.
The United States and its allies should seek more multilateral (such as including Australian, UK, or Canadian) rotational contributions of aircraft and maritime patrols, and involvement in exercises to reinforce international commitment and contributions to deterrence of both North Korean and PRC aggression.
The US government should pursue study, development, and execution of approaches to pursue “sub-regime deterrence” within the PRC and North Korea as part of US integrated deterrence strategy, including targeted influence of mid-level actors, to delay or prevent execution of escalatory moves, particularly limited nuclear attack.

Policy recommendations for key finding #5: Biases in US and allied institutions are impeding their understanding of how an East Asian conflict could escalate and their preparations to manage such escalation.

The United States and allied analysts should develop new assessments of the likelihood and potential indicators of simultaneous conflicts with the PRC and North Korea, as well as limited nuclear attack by Beijing or Pyongyang. These should use structured analytic techniques, like key-assumptions checks, to identify and overcome biases.
US and allied leaders should establish guidance that the risks of simultaneous conflicts with the PRC and North Korea, and limited nuclear attack by either, have such key implications that they military planning and exercises should consider and address these possibilities, even if they are not used as the “baseline.”
The United States and its allies should establish working groups that cut across a variety of military commands to address preparation for simultaneous conflicts and limited nuclear attacks.
US policymakers and analysts should lead efforts to ensure their allied counterparts engage with the potential for simultaneous conflicts and adversary limited nuclear attacks through repeated inclusion of these possibilities in scenarios for exercises and dialogue agendas.

Author biography and acknowledgments

Markus Garlauskas is the director of the new Indo-Pacific Security Initiative of the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, which replaces the former Asia Security Initiative. He leads this new initiative’s efforts focused on security, prosperity, and freedom in the Indo-Pacific region. He led projects focused on deterrence and defense issues in East Asia as a nonresident senior fellow from August 2020 until assuming his duties as director in January 2023.

Garlauskas served in the US government for nearly twenty years. He was appointed to the Senior National Intelligence Service as the National Intelligence Officer (NIO) for North Korea on the National Intelligence Council from July 2014 to June 2020. As NIO, he led the US intelligence community’s strategic analysis on North Korea issues and expanded analytic outreach to non-government experts. He also provided direct analytic support to top-level policy deliberations, including the presidential transition, as well as the Singapore and Hanoi summits with North Korea.

Garlauskas served for nearly twelve years overseas at the headquarters of United Nations Command, Combined Forces Command and US Forces Korea in Seoul. His staff assignments there included chief of the Intelligence Estimates Branch and director of the Strategy Division. For his service in Korea, he received the Joint Civilian Distinguished Service Award, the highest civilian award from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Garlauskas holds a BA in History from Kent State University. He earned a master’s degree from Georgetown University’s Security Studies graduate program, where he is now an adjunct professor.

A version of this report was originally written for the U.S. Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), but it does not necessarily express the views of DTRA or any other US government organization. The principal investigator thanks DTRA, particularly the Strategic Trends team, for sponsorship, guidance, support, and resources for this study. Thanks also go to all the experts and stakeholders, inside and outside of government, who participated in the study’s program events and contributed their perspectives to enrich the analysis. Special appreciation goes to members of the staffs of USSTRATCOM, UNC/CFC/USFK, Air Force Futures, and the Defense Intelligence Agency for their willingness to repeatedly donate their limited time to inform this study with invaluable operational and strategic perspectives.

The principal investigator would also like to thank Lauren Gilbert, Kyoko Imai, Emma Verges, and Katherine Yusko of the Indo-Pacific Security Initiative Team for their key supporting roles in this study and this final technical report, as well as contributors and project consultants Jonathan Corrado, Gregory Park, and a colleague who prefers to remain anonymous. Thanks also go to the Atlantic Council’s president and CEO Frederick Kempe, as well as Gretchen Ehle, Nicholas O’Connell, and Caroline Simpson, without whose support the resources for this study would not have been possible. Lastly, he would like to acknowledge acting Scowcroft Center Senior Director Matthew Kroenig and former Senior Director Barry Pavel for their leadership and support for this project. This report is intended to live up to their charge to meet Gen. Brent Scowcroft’s standard for rigorous, relevant, and nonpartisan analysis on national security issues.

Key references

Theoretical and historical references

These theoretical and historical references provided foundational background for this study.

“Alliance of ‘Tooth and Lips’ or Marriage of Convenience? The Origins and Development of the Sino-North Korean Alliance, 1946–1958,” US-Korea Institute, School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, December 2008, https://policycommons.net/artifacts/1500962/working-paper-series/2159898/.

Gerald Brown, “Conflict and Competition: Limited Nuclear Warfare and the New Face of Deterrence,” Global Security Review, June 13, 2022, https://globalsecurityreview.com/conflict-competition-limited-nuclear-warfare-new-face-deterrence/.

Dean Cheng, “An Overview of Chinese Thinking About Deterrence,” Netherlands Annual Review of Military Studies, 2020, 177–200, https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-94-6265-419-8_10.

Jeffery A. Larsen and Kerry M. Kartchner, eds., On Limited Nuclear War in the 21st Century (Stanford, CA: Stanford Security Studies, 2014).

Keir A. Lieber and Daryl G. Press, “Coercive Nuclear Campaigns in the 21st Century: Understanding Adversary Incentives and Options for Nuclear Escalation,” US Naval Postgraduate School, 2013, https://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/34337/nps08-040813-01.pdf.

V. P. Malik, Kargil: From Surprise to Victory (New York: Harper Collins, 2010).

Jerry Meyerle, “Nuclear Weapons and Coercive Escalation in Regional Conflicts: Lessons from North Korea and Pakistan,” Center for Naval Analyses, November 2014, https://www.cna.org/archive/CNA_Files/pdf/drm-2014-u-008209-final2.pdf.

Shane Praiswater, “Strategies of Limited Nuclear War with Modern Authoritarians,” in Sarah Minot Asrar, ed., On the Horizon: A Collection of Papers from the Next Generation (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2019), http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep22545.16.

Manpreet Sethi, “The Idea of ‘Limited Nuclear War’: As Impractical and Dangerous Now, As It Was Then,” Indian Foreign Affairs Journal14, 3 (2019), 235–247, https://www.jstor.org/stable/48636729.

John K. Warden, “Limited Nuclear War: The 21st Century Challenge for the United States,” Center for Global Security Research, July 2018, https://cgsr.llnl.gov/content/assets/docs/CGSR_LP4-FINAL.pdf.

Unclassified government reports and documents

These unclassified government documents provided authoritative information relevant to the study.

“China’s Evolving North Korea Strategy,” US-China Economic and Security Review Commission, September 2019, https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/2019-09/Chapter%203%20Section%205-%20China%27s%20Evolving%20North%20Korea%20Strategy_0.pdf.

Ben Frohman, Emma Rafaelof, and Alexis Dale-Huang, “The China-North Korea Strategic Rift: Background and Implications for the United States,” US-China Economic and Security Review Commission, January 24, 2022, https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/2022-01/China-North_Korea_Strategic_Rift.pdf.

“National Security Strategy,” White House, October 2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/Biden-Harris-Administrations-National-Security-Strategy-10.2022.pdf.

“Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2021: Report to Congress,” Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2021, https://media.defense.gov/2021/Nov/03/2002885874/-1/-1/0/2021-CMPR-FINAL.PDF.

“North Korea Military Power: A Growing Regional and Global Threat,” Defense Intelligence Agency, 2021, https://www.dia.mil/Portals/110/Documents/News/NKMP.pdf.

Papers and articles

These books and articles from nongovernment sources also contributed significant insights, perspectives, and/or data points that informed the study.

Sungmin Cho and Oriana Skylar Mastro, “North Korea Is Becoming an Asset for China: Pyongyang’s Missiles Could Fracture America’s Alliances,” Foreign Affairs, February 3, 2022, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/north-korea/2022-02-03/north-korea-becoming-asset-china.

Paul K. Davis and Bruce W. Bennett, “Nuclear-Use Cases for Contemplating Crisis and Conflict on the Korean Peninsula,” Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament 5, sup1 (2022), 24–49, https://doi.org/10.1080/25751654.2022.2053426.

Markus Garlauskas, Preventing Strategic Deterrence Failure on the Korean Peninsula, Atlantic Council via Defense Threat Reduction Agency, February 13, 2022.

“In Focus: South Korea Unlikely to Avoid a Taiwan Conflict,” Taipei Times, September 26, 2022, https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2022/09/27/2003786002.

Ki Suh Jung, “The Implications of Simultaneous Conflicts in South Korea and Taiwan,” Center for International Maritime Security, November 2, 2021, https://cimsec.org/the-implications-of-simultaneous-conflicts-in-south-korea-and-taiwan/.

Heather Kearney and Michelle Black, “Identifying Leader’s Intent: An Analysis of Kim Jong-Un, Defense & Security Analysis 36, 4 (2021), 398–421, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14751798.2020.1857910.

Matthew Kroenig, Deterring Chinese Strategic Attack: Grappling with the Implications of China’s Strategic Forces Buildup, Atlantic Council, November 2021, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/Deterring_Chinese_Strategic_Attack_Rpt_10312190.pdf.

Dave Lawler, “South Korea Would Expect U.S. to Intervene If China Invades Taiwan, Official Says,” Axios, June 27, 2022, https://www.axios.com/2022/06/27/south-korea-expect-us-respond-china-invade-taiwan.

Christy Lee, “Former Top US Commander in Korea Urges Allies to Include China in War Plans,” Voice of America, January 11, 2022, https://www.voanews.com/a/former-top-us-commander-in-korea-urges-allies-to-include-china-in-war-plans/6391856.html.

Keir A. Lieber and Daryl G. Press, “The Next Korean War,” Foreign Affairs, March 11, 2022, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/north-korea/2013-04-01/next-korean-war.

Austin Long, “Myths or Moving Targets? Continuity and Change in China’s Nuclear Forces.” War on the Rocks, December 4, 2020, https://warontherocks.com/2020/12/myths-or-moving-targets-continuity-and-change-in-chinas-nuclear-forces/.

Adam Lowther, ed., Guide to Nuclear Deterrence in the Age of Great-Power Competition (Bossier City, LA: Louisiana Tech Research Institute, 2020), https://atloa.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/Guide-to-Nuclear-Deterrence-in-the-Age-of-Great-Power-Competition-Lowther.pdf.

Li Nan, “60 Years on, China-North Korea Treaty Still Important for Cooperation and Peace,” NK News, July 10, 2021, https://www.nknews.org/2021/07/60-years-on-china-north-korea-treaty-still-important-for-cooperation-and-peace/.

Vipin Narang, “The Challenges of Multipolar Deterrence: Theory and Evidence,” National Strategic Research Institute, September 29, 2021, https://nsiteam.com/the-challenges-of-multipolar-deterrence-theory-and-evidence/.

Ankit Panda, “Sure, Deter China—but Manage Risk with North Korea, Too,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, March 10, 2022, https://thebulletin.org/premium/2022-03/sure-deter-china-but-manage-risk-with-north-korea-too/#post-heading.

Brad Roberts, “Living With a Nuclear-Arming North Korea: Deterrence Decisions in a Deteriorating Threat Environment,” 38 North, Stimson Center, November 2020, https://www.38north.org/wp-content/uploads/pdf/38-North-SR-2011-Brad-Roberts-Nuclear-North-Korea-Deterrence.pdf.

James A. Russell, “Flexible Response and Integrated Deterrence at Sea in the 21st Century: Implications for the U.S. Navy,” Military Strategy Magazine 8, 1 (2022), 20–26, https://www.militarystrategymagazine.com/article/flexible-response-and-integrated-deterrence-at-sea-in-the-21st-century-implications-for-the-u-s-navy/.

Josh Smith, “to 28,000 U.S. Troops, South Korea Unlikely to Avoid a Taiwan Conflict,” Reuters, September 27, 2022, https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/home-28000-us-troops-skorea-unlikely-avoid-taiwan-conflict-2022-09-26/.

Sang-Ho Song, “Defense Ministry Highlights USFK’s ‘Top Priority’ on Addressing N. Korean Threats,” Yonhap News Agency, September 27, 2022, https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20220927004200325.

Stokes, Jacob. “Tangled Threats: Integrating U.S. Strategies toward China and North Korea.” Center for a New American Security, October 7, 2021. https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/tangled-threats.

Caitlin Talmadge, “Would China Go Nuclear? Assessing the Risk of Chinese Nuclear Escalation in a Conventional War with the United States,” International Security 41, 4 (2017), 50–92, https://doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00274.

Caitlin Talmadge, “Beijing’s Nuclear Option,” Foreign Affairs, April 16, 2020, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2018-10-15/beijings-nuclear-option.

David F. von Hippel, et. al., “Possible Nuclear Use Cases in Northeast Asia: Implications for Reducing Nuclear Risk,” Asia Pacific Leadership Network, January 2022, https://cms.apln.network/wpcontent/uploads/-2022/01/Year-1-Report_Possible-Nuclear-Use-Cases-in-NEA.pdf.

John Warden, “Limited Nuclear War: The 21st Century Challenge for the United States, Livermore Papers on Global Security 4 (2018), https://cgsr.llnl.gov/content/assets/docs/CGSR_LP4-FINAL.pdf.

Joel Wuthnow, “System Overload: Can China’s Military Be Distracted in a War over Taiwan?” China Strategic Perspectives 15 (2020), https://inss.ndu.edu/Media/News/Article/2232448/system-overload-can-chinas-military-be-distracted-in-a-war-over-taiwan/.

Christopher Yeaw, “The Escalatory Attraction of Limited Nuclear Employment for Great Power Competitors of the United States,” National Strategic Research Institute, December 2021, https://nsiteam.com/the-escalatory-attraction-of-limited-nuclear-employment-for-great-power-competitors-of-the-united-states/.

Tong Zhao, “What’s Driving China’s Nuclear Buildup?” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, August 5, 2021, https://carnegieendowment.org/2021/08/05/what-s-driving-china-s-nuclear-buildup-pub-85106.

New Atlanticist Jun 28, 2023

Reading between the lines of the new North Korea intelligence estimate

By Markus Garlauskas

The US intelligence community has just released its National Intelligence Estimate on North Korea, a watershed analysis. But more is worth adding to the discussion.

China Intelligence

New Atlanticist Apr 27, 2023

Not every North Korean missile needs a response. South Korea and the US should focus more on readiness and deterrence.

By Jessica Taylor

The nuclear collaboration announced by the US and South Korean presidents this week is the type of strategic measure the allies need to focus on, rather than a reactive approach.

East Asia Indo-Pacific

New Atlanticist Apr 26, 2023

Experts react: The US and South Korea strike a deal on nuclear weapons. What’s next for the alliance?

By Atlantic Council experts

US President Joe Biden and South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol are navigating political tensions around nuclear weapons and microchips to find a common future.

Indo-Pacific Korea

1 Robert Abrams, panel discussion moderated by Markus Garlauskas, “Veteran Commanders and Diplomats Forum,” KDVA Reunion and ROK-US Alliance Peace Conference, Washington, DC, July 27, 2022, 4:17:38, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ztategs1rxM&t=15458s.

2 See the results of this study in Markus Garlauskas, Deterrence is crumbling in Korea: How we can fix it, Atlantic Council, November 9, 2023, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/deterrence-is-crumbling-in-korea-how-we-can-fix-it/.

3 Ibid.

4 Uri Friedman, “A Third Nuclear Age is Upon Us,” Atlantic, August 2, 2022, https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2022/08/north-korea-kim-jong-un-third-nuclear-weapon-age/670993; “North Korea Confirms a Simulated Use of Nukes to ‘Wipe Out’ Its Enemies,” National Public Radio, October 10, 2022, https://www.npr.org/2022/10/10/1127796517/north-korea-confirms-a-simulated-use-of-nukes-to-wipe-out-its-enemies.

5 Tianran Xu, “Size Estimates of DPRK’s Nuclear Devices,” Open Nuclear Network, June 29, 2023, https://opennuclear.org/publication/size-estimates-dprks-nuclear-devices.

6 Austin Long, “Myths or Moving Targets? Continuity and Change in China’s Nuclear Forces,” War on the Rocks, December 4, 2020, https://warontherocks.com/2020/12/myths-or-moving-targets-continuity-and-change-in-chinas-nuclear-forces/

7 For context, see: Talmadge, “Would China Go Nuclear?” 50–92.

8 Ibid.; “Joint Statement of the Leaders of the Five Nuclear-Weapon States on Preventing Nuclear War and Avoiding Arms Races,” White House, January 3, 2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/01/03/p5-statement-on-preventing-nuclear-war-and-avoiding-arms-races.

9 William Gallo, “US Rules Out Redeploying Tactical Nukes to South Korea,” Voice of America, September 24, 2021, https://www.voanews.com/a/us-rules-out-redeploying-tactical-nukes-to-south-korea/6243767.html.

10 For more on the logic of limited NK escalation, see: Markus Garlauskas, Deterrence is crumbling in Korea: How we can fix it, Atlantic Council, November 9, 2023, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/deterrence-is-crumbling-in-korea-how-we-can-fix-it/, pp. 5, 10–11, 21.

11 “DPRK’s Law on Policy of Nuclear Forces Promulgated,” Naenara, September 9, 2022, https://kcnawatch.org/newstream/1662721725-307939464/dprk%E2%80%99s-law-on-policy-of-nuclear-forces-promulgated/.

12 Caitlin Talmadge, “Beijing’s Nuclear Option,” Foreign Affairs, April 16, 2020, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2018-10-15/beijings-nuclear-option.

13 This hypothetical logic is informed by a number of the study’s references, but particularly by: John Warden, “Limited Nuclear War: The 21st Century Challenge for the United States,” Livermore Papers on Global Security 4 (2018), https://cgsr.llnl.gov/content/assets/docs/CGSR_LP4-FINAL.pdf; and Shane Praiswater “Strategies of Limited Nuclear War with Modern Authoritarians,” in Sarah Minot Asrar, ed., On the Horizon: A Collection of Papers from the Next Generation (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2019), http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep22545.16.

14 “DPRK’s Law on Policy of Nuclear Forces Promulgated.”

15 Ken Kamper, “Fires Modernization,” Maneuver Warfighter Conference, Fort Benning, Georgia, February 15, 2022, 28:08, https://youtu.be/RuZxEbWV7s8?t=1689.

16 “2022 National Posture Review,” US Department of Defense, 2022, 12, https://media.defense.gov/2022/Oct/27/2003103845/-1/-1/1/2022-NATIONAL-DEFENSE-STRATEGY-NPR-MDR.PDF.

The post The United States and its allies must be ready to deter a two-front war and nuclear attacks in East Asia appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Biases blind us to the risk of Chinese military intervention in Korea

Jonathan Corrado — Wed, 16 Aug 2023 14:30:00 +0000

More than seventy years ago, the US intelligence community, military leaders, and policymakers systematically downplayed and discounted the risk tolerance and threat perception of the CCP leadership on the eve of PRC intervention in the Korean War. This intervention resulted in the massive loss of lives, territory, and initiative, all of which could have been prevented. Far from an isolated incident, this intelligence failure is better understood as a pervasive and accumulating system of misperceptions widespread throughout the US national security community, including policymakers in Washington, the leadership at Tokyo’s Far East Command, and intelligence analysts in the military and the nascent Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). These misperceptions corroded the assessment at five critical junctures, including

in the run-up to North Korea’s invasion on June 25, 1950;
when the PRC mobilized tens of thousands of troops to the North Korean border in July 1950;
when the PRC foreign minister relayed a strategic warning message on October 3, 1950;
when PRC forays into North Korea and skirmishes began in late October 1950; and
when the major mobilization occurred before the full assault by the PRC in late November 1950.

The reason for the intelligence failure was a collection of cognitive and organizational biases that went unrecognized and unaddressed. Variations of these factors remain prevalent today, impairing the United States’ ability to forecast and plan for PRC intervention on the Korean peninsula and the possibility of simultaneous conflict involving the Korean peninsula and Taiwan. In addition, the presence of organizational bias reinforces, exacerbates, and disguises the effect of cognitive biases. This compounds the problem, making it harder to recognize and address. Perhaps most troubling is that the alchemy of US cognitive and organizational biases is uniquely suited to advantage PRC strategic proclivities.

This paper examines the historical record of cognitive biases, focusing on the US intelligence community’s failure to forecast PRC intervention in the Korean War, despite collecting information and evidence indicative of that outcome. The cognitive biases examined in this paper include mirror imaging, over-centralization of decision-making, under-centralization of decision-making, over-sensitivity to consistency, and the vividness criterion.¹ The organizational bias examined is the law of the instrument bias, which describes a tendency to assess problems through the prism of the tools at one’s disposal, rather than viewing the problem on its own terms. This is caused by a division of labor that separates resources and authorities in such a way that stifles forecasts and plans that acknowledge the high degree of integration and overlap between the challenges posed by the PRC and North Korea.

Mirror-imaging bias

Mirror imaging describes the tendency to impose one’s own background, culture, and beliefs when analyzing another’s behavior. From a historical perspective, US analysts have underestimated the PRC’s threat perception and risk tolerance, particularly Beijing’s willingness to expend blood and treasure to maintain influence over the Korean peninsula. One reason for this is Chinese propaganda, which has historically emphasized the cause of aiding a fellow socialist state in describing its motivation to intervene in Korea. However, that narrative has changed in recent years. The new version is more reflective of the deeper reason for that intervention, pointing to the direct security threat the PRC feels from contingencies on the Korean peninsula.² A few quotes by CCP Chairman Mao Zedong and CCP Chairman Xi Jinping can demonstrate this point.

In the summer of 1950, Mao said the following at a politburo meeting: “If the U.S. imperialists win [in Korea], they may get so dizzy with success that they may threaten us. We therefore must come to [North] Korea’s aid and intervene.”³ This contrasts with later propaganda treatments of the rationale for PRC intervention, which painted PRC intervention in less conflictual tones and emphasized the cause of fraternal socialism. However, at events marking the seventieth anniversary of the start of the Korean War, this narrative changed, with the new version more closely approximating the original justification advanced by Mao. This transition to a more confrontational approach also coincided with the CCP’s turn toward a more aggressive diplomatic posture, typified by “wolf warrior” diplomats. In particular, statements by Chairman Xi clarify that the PRC continues to view Korea as within its sphere of influence. He said, “Seventy years ago, the Imperialist invaders fired on the doorstep of a new China.”⁴ Xi then argued that the PRC’s military should draw inspiration from this history by dealing “head on” with threats to its security.

US analysts have historically underappreciated Beijing’s perception of the linkage of Korea and Taiwan as national security issues. This mistake is especially puzzling given that US policymakers, through their actions, have demonstrated the strategic value of this linkage, only to later suffer from sudden amnesia and disregard how the adversary could make that same connection. Prior to the Korean War, in late 1949 and early 1950, “American officials were prepared to let PRC forces cross the Strait and defeat [Kuomintang leader] Chiang.”⁵ Mao and the CCP were eager to complete their war of unification by eradicating the remaining Nationalist Kuomintang forces and claim Taiwan as their prize. US Secretary of State Dean Acheson recommended that the United States recognize the communist government as the official representation of the PRC.⁶ The CCP allied with the Soviets and prepared to attack. But before Mao could mobilize his forces, Kim Il-Sung beat him to the punch. This changed everything.

Two days after the invasion, President Harry Truman said, “communism has passed beyond the use of subversion to conquer independent nations and will now use armed invasion and war.”⁷ He, therefore, ordered the US Seventh Fleet into the Taiwan Strait to block a CCP invasion. However, despite seeing a North Korean invasion as an opening gambit for communist expansion, US intelligence analysts continued to downplay the possibility that PRC leaders would themselves be willing to enter the Korean theater of war for the furtherance of their own aims. On the other hand, President Truman’s assurances that the United States had no intention to carry the fight into the PRC was cold comfort for the communist leaders in Beijing. Having suffered the humiliation of a spoiled Taiwan invasion at the hands of the US Navy, Beijing’s leaders came to see the US defense of the ROK as the opening move of a larger ambition to roll back communism in Asia.

Another aspect of mirror imaging is US misunderstanding of PRC strategic culture, particularly a version of deterrence that is more akin to the Western concept of preemption. The PLA concept of a “self-defensive counterattack” involves using a sudden blow against an imminent threat in order to change the enemy’s willingness to take risks and make concessions.⁸ This leads to political negotiations and a favorable outcome for the PRC. This strategy was utilized by the PRC in Korea, India, and Vietnam. Deterrence failures are more likely in such cases of underestimation.

Importantly, a simple calculation of present military conditions will not yield a satisfactory forecast. “Long term political, economic, and social prospects” must also be considered.⁹ This requires not only understanding the political decision-making calculus, but also the strategic culture that filters the military balance calculation. What looks like “certain suicide” from one nation’s perspective could appear as an acceptable risk to another. Americans could not imagine how communist China, limping from a long and bloody civil war and suffering economically, would be willing to trade blows with a superpower, nuclear-armed United States. Only by taking PRC strategic culture into account is it possible to understand the rationality of Beijing’s risk tolerance.

Mirror imaging remains a problem in the US assessment of PRC intervention in Korea and the possibility of simultaneous conflict. Ascribing to Chinese leaders the same strategic playbook that Washington uses, the United States is likely to continue to downplay the likelihood of an early PRC aggression designed to seize the initiative in a contingency. It is likely that US analysts will discount this move because it appears to invite an unacceptably high level of escalation risk. However, the “self-defensive counterattack” accords with the CCP’s military record and contemporary posture. This also means that the United States is likely to downplay the extent to which regional flare-ups are viewed by the CCP as interrelated and relevant to its own security.

Over-centralization of decision-making bias

Over-centralization of decision-making describes a tendency to group actors together and view their behavior as centrally directed, even when that is not the case. In its analysis, the United States grouped adversaries together and applied the same logic of restraint demonstrated by the patron state when assessing the actions of the client state. US analysts failed to imagine that local actors would risk superpower escalation to pursue regional objectives. First, they failed to predict Kim Il-Sung’s invasion, and later, they failed to predict PRC intervention. In each case, US analysts and policymakers widely shared the belief that the Soviet Union would not be willing to risk aggression by its client states, because this could escalate into a direct confrontation between the Soviet Union and the United States, precipitating World War Three. As it turned out, the Soviet Union quite effectively used client-state aggression to tie down the United States without risking direct escalation. This logic set the parameters of engagement for the entirety of the Cold War. However, it is useful to remember how, before they became a fact of life, these conventions were seen as risky and unlikely at the time.

This bias also explains why US analysts frequently misquote and misinterpret Mao’s appraisal of the PRC-North Korea relationship as “close as lips and teeth.” A better translation of the statement is, “when the lips are gone, the teeth will be cold.”¹⁰ This emphasizes the point that the PRC and North Korea are two independent actors behaving in self-interest, and occasionally benefiting from sharing the same adversary. Mao supported Kim’s war in principle, but was agitated by the timing, which he (accurately) predicted would greatly delay the CCP’s designs on Taiwan. The Korean War played out as it did because North Korean leader Kim Il-Sung was able to launch his invasion of unification before Mao could launch his. Although greatly annoyed by this outcome, once North Korea lost the initiative and UN forces streamed across the 38th Parallel, the CCP felt compelled to intervene. Much to Beijing’s frustration, most of the PRC’s military advice to North Korea—which could have been helpful—went unheeded by the Korean People’s Army in the fall of 1950.¹¹ Reflecting the difficulty of influencing North Korea’s policy choices, PRC Foreign Minister Zhou Enlai told his Soviet interlocutor in 1956 that the Korean Workers’ Party leadership “does not listen to the CCP advice 100%, and it does not listen to you [the Soviet Union] 30%.”¹²

The over-centralization of decision-making bias continues today, leading US analysts to discount a wide array of potential scenarios. It is important to remember that the PRC-North Korea alliance is not unconditional; an editorial in the CCP-run Global Times hinted that Beijing would “remain neutral” if North Korea launches missiles against the United States. This bias tends to feed into the US illusion of control.¹³ Some policymakers and analysts assess that the PRC controls North Korea, and they can at least reason with the PRC, which can prevent an escalation spiral on the Korean peninsula. But sharp disparities in Pyongyang and Beijing’s risk tolerance, threat perception, and strategic culture could result in coordination failure.

Another present bias could be considered under-centralization of decision-making. Unlike in the Korean War, when the United States forecast that the PRC would be restrained by the Soviets because of a mistaken presumption about their hierarchical relationship, US strategists now tend to write off a host of intervention scenarios based on the premise of mutual distrust. As the study illustrates, the mutual distrust at the heart of the modern PRC-North Korea relationship could actually enable, rather than inhibit, intervention and simultaneous conflict. The following list is not exhaustive, but it underscores the kind of analytical errors that are likely to follow when analysts engage in the natural, automatic tendency to group actors together and disregard the divergence in their interests, and in the tendency to underappreciate the extent to which convergence in interests can lead to simultaneous conflict.

In the case of a North Korean nuclear accident, domestic instability, or mistaken escalation, it is possible that PRC-North Korean disagreement could lead to PRC intervention, especially if there are spillover effects on the PRC side of the border, such as migration or radiation.
North Korea could deliberately escalate on the peninsula against the PRC’s wishes, presenting a fait accompli that prompts PRC intervention.
North Korea could take advantage of chaos resulting from PRC action on Taiwan before or after US intervention, and with or without coordination with the PRC.
This bias could also lead to an underestimation of the PRC instigating a provocation on the peninsula to drag North Korea into conflict with the United States as a distraction while the PRC takes action against Taiwan.

The law of the instrument bias

The law of the instrument bias is also referred to as “Maslow’s Hammer.” Abraham Maslow was a psychologist who wrote, “If the only tool you have is a hammer, it is tempting to treat everything as if it were a nail.”¹⁴ The United States is more focused on using the tools at its disposal to respond to a Korea/Taiwan contingency than on thinking from the ground up: what are the most likely contingencies and what tools are optimally suited to address them? The cause of this bias is rooted in organizational and bureaucratic division of labor that separates resources and authorities and stifles holistic forecasting and planning. Both historically and contemporarily, this type of organizational or office-culture bias exacerbates and conceals the impact of cognitive biases. One Pentagon official explained, “Cognitive biases are deeply rooted in the division of labor between the combatant commands and the resources and authorities underneath them.”¹⁵

The official described multiple demilitarized zones (DMZs) or firewalls that prevent effective coordination and strategic creativity. This includes a DMZ dividing conventional warfighters and nuclear weapons and a DMZ dividing USFK and USINDOPACOM. These DMZs are primarily caused by a structural division of resources and authorities. Consequently, both sides of the DMZ struggle to plan with a recognition of the region’s high degree of integration. As one example, the Pentagon official described an unclassified wargame involving a PRC invasion of Taiwan with a map that excluded North Korea and featured South Korea as an island. This visually represents the way that North Korea is absent in the strategic imagination of planners in Taiwan scenarios. This is quite common both in and outside of government. In a recent Center for a New American Security PRC-Taiwan wargame, North Korean and Russian potential to distract was mentioned once but discussed no further.¹⁶

Wishful-thinking bias: “The PRC will help us with Korea”

White House officials tend to make statements to the effect of “The PRC should or will help us with North Korea.” This message often hits a wall in Beijing. In some instances, the motivation for said statements is to persuade and pressure the PRC to collaborate. It is reasonable to make performative statements to push for coordination with the PRC on a Korea scenario, but this must be coupled with high-level military and diplomatic dialogues on contingency planning. Absent direct and continuous communication on this issue, including between combatant commanders to address contingencies such as a North Korean nuclear accident, it is mistaken to assume that US-PRC coordination can be executed smoothly in the heat of the moment.

An assumption of PRC cooperation could play into the hands of one of the PRC’s go-to strategies, the “self-defensive counterattack,” which employs a sudden, decisive blow to seize the initiative or change the facts on the ground. What will the US president actually do if the PRC intervenes in a manner antithetical to US and ROK interests? The psychological sting would be pronounced if the United States expects cooperation. It is prudent to recall President Truman’s reaction to PRC intervention in November 1950: “Because of the historic friendship between the people of the United States and China, it is particularly shocking to us to think that Chinese are being forced into battle against our troops.”

Oversensitivity to consistency bias

This cognitive bias describes the tendency to expect continuity, and to overattribute causality when consistency is observed, even in a very small data set.¹⁷ In the Korean War, analysts discounted PRC intervention because the PRC refrained from entering the conflict at earlier junctures (Incheon landing, UN forces crossing 38th Parallel, etc.). This was understood as an indication of unwillingness to intervene. In actuality, this restraint was an intentional tactic to lure UN forces further north into the mountainous regions, to separate lines of communication and supply and handicap the fighting force. This, therefore, serves as another example of a cognitive bias that helps the efficacy of the self-defensive counterattack. Moving forward, there are numerous applications to the cases of North Korea and Taiwan, all revolving around an initial failure to perceive the security threat posed by an inciting incident, and then the use of deception and obfuscation by the adversary to feed its expectations of inaction or misdirection.

The vividness criterion

This cognitive bias describes the tendency “to favor “vivid, concrete and personal” information over abstract and dull information, even when the vivid information is less causally relevant to the outcome under assessment.”¹⁸ For instance, “on November 24, 1950, General Douglas MacArthur flouted the advice of his subordinates by boarding a propeller plane and flying the length of the Yalu, putting himself within range of enemy fire. Gazing down at the borderland below, MacArthur declared that he detected no sign of PRC presence.”¹⁹ Just a few days later, hundreds of thousands of PLA troops streamed over the border in a full-frontal assault. This sort of bias does not exclusively apply to leaders. It also can apply to analysts, as vivid data points can make a particularly strong impression and distract from other relevant evidence pointing toward a contrary conclusion.

Application of historical lessons

The alchemy of cognitive and organizational biases is uniquely suited to advantage a PRC self-defensive counterattack strategy. Politicization, obfuscation, and organizational biases exacerbate and disguise the impact of cognitive biases. Importantly, an assessment of capabilities alone will not only fail to yield an effective forecast but will also hamstring contingency planning. A better understanding of the enemy informs a broader range of policy response solutions, including deterrence, dissuasion, reassurance, and the “artful orchestration of political, military, and economic instruments of power.”²⁰

To overcome the mirror-imaging bias, there is a need for deep regional and country-specific expertise, including knowledge of language, history, and strategic culture. Structured analytic tradecraft, particularly Red Team exercises, should take advantage of said country expertise. However, participants in the study noted a tendency to sideline Red Team insights from mainline authoritative assessments that serve as the foundation for decision-making. Participants also noted that there is a need to address these biases everywhere they exist—within both the analysts and the customers of their products. To address this, one participant suggested the creation of formal products to help analysts and policymakers recognize and address the deleterious effects of cognitive and organizational biases on these issues.

These techniques should be buttressed by other methods to cope with the high degree of uncertainty, such as integrating quantitative analysis to complement and cross-check qualitative methods.²¹ The limits of intention analysis underscore the need for robust systems for monitoring capabilities and strategic-warning indicators to inform continuing reassessments based on new capabilities and situational factors. Finally, cognitive biases thrive wherever bureaucratic divisions of labor blunt more holistic views of the problems presented. In the case of PRC intervention on the Korean peninsula and/or a simultaneous conflict involving a PRC invasion of Taiwan and North Korean aggression, the impact of the law of the instrument bias is particularly severe.

Author biography

Jonathan Corrado is Director of Policy for The Korea Society. He was previously a non-resident James A. Kelly Fellow at Pacific Forum, an Emerging Leader at the National Committee on American Foreign Policy, and a contributor to NK Pro, and he has published peer-reviewed articles and analyses in a wide range of journals and outlets. Beginning in Fall 2023, Jonathan will teach a class at SUNY Stony Brook University titled, “North Korea: State, Society, Diplomacy, and Security.” Jonathan received an MA from Georgetown University’s Asian Studies Program in the Walsh School of Foreign Service and a BA in anthropology and philosophy from the University of Maryland College Park.

This piece was written in collaboration with the Atlantic Council Indo-Pacific Security Initiative as a supplement to the main report, “The United States and its allies must be ready to deter a two-front war and nuclear attacks in East Asia.”

Report Aug 16, 2023

The United States and its allies must be ready to deter a two-front war and nuclear attacks in East Asia

By Markus Garlauskas

This report highlights two emerging and interrelated deterrence challenges in East Asia with grave risks to US national security: 1) Horizontal escalation of a conflict with China or North Korea into simultaneous conflict; 2) Vertical escalation to a limited nuclear attack by either or both adversaries to avoid conceding.

Arms Control China

Report Dec 23, 2021

Proactively countering North Korea’s advancing nuclear threat

By Markus Garlauskas

Markus Garlauskas suggests a strategy to counter North Korean nuclear weapons by impeding the growth of its arsenal, investing to stay ahead of new nuclear threats, and adjusting operations on the Korean Peninsula.

Defense Policy Defense Technologies

New Atlanticist Jun 28, 2023

Reading between the lines of the new North Korea intelligence estimate

By Markus Garlauskas

The US intelligence community has just released its National Intelligence Estimate on North Korea, a watershed analysis. But more is worth adding to the discussion.

China Intelligence

1 Richards J. Heuer, Jr., “Psychology of Intelligence Analysis,” Central intelligence Agency, Center for the Study of Analysis, 1999, https://www.ialeia.org/docs/Psychology_of_Intelligence_Analysis.pdf.

2 Jonathan Corrado, “China Put Itself in the Spotlight with Its Flurry of New Korean War Propaganda,” NK Pro, October 28, 2020, https://www.nknews.org/pro/china-put-itself-in-the-spotlight-with-its-flurry-of-new-korean-war-propaganda/.

3 Guang Zhang Shu, Mao’s Military Romanticism: China and the Korean War, 1950-1953 (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1995), p. 63.

4 Sarah Zheng, Laura Zhou, and William Zheng, “Xi Jinping Says China ‘Determined to Defeat Invaders’ in Korean War Anniversary Speech,” South China Morning Post, October 23, 2020, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3106759/china-ready-fight-xi-jinping-says-korean-war-address-aimed-us.

5 “The Taiwan Straits Crises: 1954–55 and 1958,” US State Department Office of the Historian, last visited December 11, 2022, https://history.state.gov/milestones/1953-1960/taiwan-strait-crises.

6 Additional Background Information: US Enters the Korean Conflict, US National Archives, last visited December 11, 2022, https://www.archives.gov/education/lessons/korean-conflict.

7 “President Truman’s Statement on the Situation in Korea,” US National Archives, June 27, 1950, https://www.archives.gov/education/lessons/korean-conflict.

8 Andrew Scobell, et al., The People’s Liberation Army and Contingency Planning in China (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2015), https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/Books/PLA-contingency/PLA-Contingency-Planning-China.pdf. Also see: Henry Kissinger, On China (New York: Penguin 2011).

9 Michael E. Brown, “Deterrence Failures and Deterrence Strategies,” RAND, 1977, https://www.rand.org/pubs/papers/P5842.html.

10 Dan Miller, “China and North Korea: A Tangled Partnership,” China News, April 18, 2013, https://chinanews.net.au/2013/04/18/china-and-north-korea-a-tangled-partnership/.

11 Charles Kraus, “Zhou Enlai and China’s Response to the Korean War,” Wilson Center, last visited December 11, 2022, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/zhou-enlai-and-chinas-response-to-the-korean-war.

12 Sergey Radchenko, “‘We Do Not Want to Overthrow Him:’ Beijing, Moscow, and Kim Il Sung, 1956,” Wilson Center, last visited December 11, 2022, https://www.wilsonceter.org/blog-post/we-do-not-want-to-overthrow-him-beijing-moscow-and-kim-il-sung-1956.

13 Simon Denyer and Amanda Erickson, “Beijing Warns Pyongyang: You’re on Your Own if You Go After the United States,” Washington Post, August 11, 2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/china-warns-north-korea-youre-on-your-own-if-you-go-after-the-us/2017/08/11/a01a4396-7e68-11e7-9026-4a0a64977c92_story.html.

14 Abraham H. Maslow, The Psychology of Science: A Reconnaissance (New York: Harper and Row, 1966).

15 Anonymous source in a telephone interview with Jonathan Corrado, June 16, 2022.

16 Stacie Pettyjohn, Becca Wasser, and Chris Dougherty, Dangerous Straits Wargaming a Future Conflict over Taiwan, Center for a New American Security, June 2022, https://s3.amazonaws.com/files.cnas.org/CNAS+Report-Dangerous+Straits-Defense-Jun+2022-FINAL-print.pdf.

17 Jonathan Corrado, “Rethinking Intelligence Failure: China’s Intervention in the Korean War,” International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 36, 1 (2023), p. 214, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/08850607.2021.1938905?journalCode=ujic20.

18 Id., p. 213.

19 Id., p. 210.

20 Paul K. Davis, et al., “Influencing Adversary States Quelling Perfect Storms,” RAND, 2021, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA161-1.html.

21 Daniel Irwin and David R. Mandel, “Improving Information Evaluation for Intelligence Production,” Intelligence and National Security 34, 4 (2019), https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684527.2019.1569343.

The post Biases blind us to the risk of Chinese military intervention in Korea appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Before embarking on arms control talks, Biden needs a nuclear deal with Congress

Robert Soofer — Wed, 14 Jun 2023 15:39:58 +0000

Arms control is entering its most uncertain period in decades. New START is set to expire in February 2026, and the ongoing war in Ukraine complicates any US-Russia negotiations toward a new agreement. Meanwhile, China could have 1,500 nuclear weapons by 2035 and has shown no real inclination to discuss limits. The Biden administration has said it will “engage in bilateral arms control discussions with Russia and with China without preconditions,” as US National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan explained in a speech on June 2. However, there is a precondition the US side should set with itself before any bilateral agreement moves forward.

The White House and Congress currently disagree over the type and number of nuclear weapons required to deter nuclear-armed adversaries in the coming decade, including Russia and China, but also North Korea and potentially Iran. As long as this disagreement persists, it casts doubt on the viability of whatever the administration might agree to in bilateral talks—in particular, whether any new treaty could be ratified or survive a change in administrations. However, a bargain is available that bridges these differences, and it would strengthen the president’s hand in arms control negotiations, if the administration and Congress seize the opportunity.

2010 plans do not address 2030 threats

In his June 2 speech at the Arms Control Association annual forum, Sullivan called attention to the growing threats posed by China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran. In doing so, he reaffirmed the warnings in the Biden administration’s National Defense Strategy and Nuclear Posture Review that as it approaches 2030, “the United States will need to deter two near-peer nuclear powers for the first time in its history.” To address this emerging challenge, the White House is continuing the nuclear modernization program begun by the Obama administration and reaffirmed by the Trump administration, though the Biden administration has canceled the development and deployment of a nuclear sea-launched cruise missile (SLCM-N) proposed in the 2019 Nuclear Posture Review.

These 2010 modernization plans assumed a reset with Russia. And they did not envision the rapid expansion of Chinese conventional and nuclear capabilities or the “no limits” partnership between an aggressive Moscow and Beijing bent on upsetting the international world order. This begs the question, then, whether the current nuclear modernization program—which amounts to a one-for-one replacement of nuclear force levels established in the 2010 New START—will be sufficient against two nuclear great powers.

In March, Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman Jack Reed (D-RI) asked General Anthony Cotton, head of US Strategic Command, how the US nuclear command is adapting to this “new trilateral nuclear competition.” Cotton replied that the United States is “in an absolutely good place today with our [nuclear] systems… but the basis of which we did our modernization efforts was on a 2010 threat.”

The divide over more nuclear weapons

The threats have grown manifestly worse since 2010, but the administration has been ambivalent about them. According to Sullivan in his recent speech, “the United States does not need to increase our nuclear forces to outnumber the combined total of our competitors in order to successfully deter them.” Sullivan added that “effective deterrence means that we have a ‘better’ approach—not a ‘more’ approach.” This position is at odds with Republican leaders in the House and Senate armed services committees, who have advocated “higher numbers and new capabilities” for nuclear weapons.

There are practical limits to how quickly the United States could expand its nuclear capabilities to address the expansion of China’s nuclear forces. One option by the time New START expires in 2026 is to restore nuclear warheads to existing intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) that were removed to accommodate the lower New START force limits (a process called “uploading”). Additional nuclear bombs and cruise missiles could be loaded onto heavy bombers, and bombers previously converted to conventional weapons use only can be made ready for nuclear operations.

Importantly, Sullivan said in his speech that “the type of limits the United States can agree to after [New START] expires will of course be impacted by the size and scale of China’s nuclear build-up.” The administration will require a sense of what additional nuclear forces may be needed beyond New START, both to ensure any negotiated limits provide the United States with headroom to deploy sufficient forces in the future, and because adjustments to US nuclear posture will likely take years to implement.

It is entirely conceivable that Russia and the United States could agree to new (modestly larger) nuclear force limits that consider US requirements to address China’s expanding nuclear capabilities and limit and reduce Russia’s regional nuclear weapons and new novel long-range systems that are not covered under New START. Such an approach might maintain limits (albeit somewhat higher than the current 1,550 warhead limit in New START) on all US and Russian nuclear forces while allowing the United States to address the problem of two nuclear peers.

The bargain the White House and Congress could strike

Sullivan was correct when he said that “responsibly enhancing our deterrent capabilities allows us to negotiate arms control from a position of strength and confidence.” But if “responsibly” implies a set policy of no new US nuclear capabilities or no expansion of US strategic nuclear forces, then Russia has no reason to come to the negotiating table. A big incentive for Moscow to negotiate is if it fears the United States will build up its own nuclear arsenal. Just as important, an arms control approach that does not include some augmented nuclear capabilities will be a non-starter for Republicans and some Democrats on Capitol Hill.

A bargain is required. The Biden administration could, for example, agree to develop the SLCM-N and prepare for a nuclear upload onto existing ICBMs and SLBMs. In exchange, congressional Republicans could lend public support to the administration’s efforts, hopefully fruitful but perhaps not, to secure a post–New START follow-on arms control framework or agreement. In such a deal, the arms control community would see the value in continued constraints on arms competition, while the deterrence community would welcome augmented nuclear capabilities to answer the growth in Chinese nuclear forces. Russia also would have an interest in limiting the potential expansion of US nuclear forces. This approach leaves out China for the time being, given its unwillingness to engage in a dialogue; but any future limits on Russian and US forces will have to take into account the likely expansion of China’s nuclear arsenal.

During the question-and-answer period following his speech, Sullivan spoke about the bipartisan US Senate support of the 2010 New START. He failed to mention, however, that the Obama administration’s commitment—insisted upon by Republican senators as part of the deal for New START—to modernize each leg of the nuclear triad enabled that consensus. It is worth demonstrating once more that nuclear deterrence and arms control go hand in hand.

Robert Soofer is a senior fellow in the Forward Defense program in the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, where he leads its Nuclear Strategy Project. He formerly served as US deputy assistant secretary of defense for nuclear and missile defense policy and as a professional staff member on the Senate Armed Services Committee.

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Soofer in RealClear Defense

nnunez — Mon, 12 Jun 2023 16:06:39 +0000

On June 12, Forward Defense Senior Fellow Dr. Robert Soofer’s recent nuclear arms control article was republished in RealClearDefense.

Fellow

Robert Soofer

Arms Control Defense Policy

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Export controls: A surprising key to strengthening UK-US military collaboration

Deborah Cheverton — Wed, 07 Jun 2023 15:06:15 +0000

UK Prime Minister Rishi Sunak arrived in Washington Tuesday night for talks with US President Joe Biden. According to the White House, discussions will focus on shared economic and security challenges including energy security, the climate crisis, and Ukraine. Both leaders are fresh off the Group of Seven (G7) Summit in Japan where these issues got a thorough airing, and these talks should be an opportunity to go deeper into the details on a bilateral basis. While Ukraine will likely grab the headlines from a national security perspective, another important, albeit under-the-radar issue should also be on the agenda: export controls reform.

Export controls are often thought of for their role in preventing the transfer of arms and other sensitive technologies to malign actors, or as a foreign policy tool used alongside economic sanctions to punish illegal activity. This was the angle taken at the G7 with specific reference to Russia and China, but that viewpoint obscures a different problem. The United States’ closest allies have been quietly frustrated for decades that the indiscriminate and extraterritorial application of these same export controls, in particular the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), seriously hinders efforts to share technologies and collaborate with allies on capability development projects. This is due to the costly and time-consuming processes associated with ITAR compliance. But this isn’t just a time-versus-cost-versus-quality issue for program managers to deal with. It’s much bigger than that. As William Greenwalt, a nonresident senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, has said, “US government security policies related to export controls no longer support long-term national security interests and if not modified will likely result in the US military falling further behind in the competition with China.” ITAR was enacted during the Cold War, at a time when the United States enjoyed such technological and industrial dominance over its potential adversaries that it could afford to go it alone, write off allied contributions to military capability development, and absorb the consequences in time and cost when they did choose to partner up. None of those things are true anymore.

The Department of Defense has long recognized that it no longer holds complete technological advantage and recent administrations of both parties have promoted the critical role of allies and partners in their national security strategies. Yet ITAR directly prevents the United States from accessing some of the best allied technology and indirectly reduces the military capabilities of its allies. For example, the UK government estimated in 2017 that it costs UK companies almost half a billion dollars a year to comply with ITAR. That’s effectively a 0.7 percent tax levied by the United States on the national defense budget of a close ally, and money which could be far better spent on increased readiness or on more advanced capabilities that would benefit the United States. After all, depending on exchange rate fluctuations and production lot, half a billion dollars equates to four or five F-35B fighter jets. Even worse, that figure only covers those companies that have the resources and risk appetite to work with the United States in the first place. So-called “ITAR taint,” the risk that any technical cooperation with US entities will lead to the loss of control over their technology, prevents some non-US companies from engaging at all. Data is anecdotal as it mainly comes down to internal bidding decisions by individual companies, but it seems that small and medium size enterprises are especially affected. These are exactly the sort of cutting-edge companies that the United States needs in its corner on everything from quantum computing to materials science.

A focus for discussions at the White House

You would think that with such an obvious downside it would be an easy fix, but no. Unfortunately for the Department of Defense, it doesn’t own ITAR policy or its implementation. The State Department does, and it does not feel the pain of delayed programs and degraded technological advantage. Despite the efforts of many talented and hardworking officials who have dedicated their careers to keeping the United States’ most critical technological advancements out of enemy hands, the organizational incentives are not structured to support the pace or flexibility that modern technology and the current geostrategic and security situation demand. The outdated systems State Department officials are working within have become a mechanism of national self-harm and, at the end of the day, it is the warfighter that loses out.

The good news is that the right people in the legislative and executive branches of the US government are starting to take notice of the problem, particularly in the context of the nuclear submarine deal involving Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States, known as AUKUS. To date, much of the press about AUKUS has been on the trilateral effort to support Australia in acquiring conventionally armed, nuclear-powered submarines under Pillar One of the agreement. Arguably though, it is the wider cooperation in critical technologies such as artificial intelligence, autonomy, cyber, and electronic warfare envisaged under Pillar Two that represents the real generational opportunity. Behind the scenes, officials and politicians in all three nations are realizing that Pillar Two just won’t stand with ITAR as it’s currently enforced. This is driving unprecedented interest on Capitol Hill, where congressional Republicans in the House and Senate are leading efforts to force the State Department to address the problem. They are advancing the fantastically named Truncating Onerous Regulations for Partners and Enhancing Deterrence Operations (TORPEDO) Act. To quote Senator Jim Risch (R-Idaho), the ranking member of the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee, this legislation “aims to speed up the implementation process by reforming the US regulatory system so we can cooperate in a timely and efficient manner on the capabilities we and our partners need.” This is extremely welcome, but in the complicated world of export controls reform the story begins with legislation but it doesn’t end there. Previous attempts at reform, such as the 2016 legal expansion of the National Technology Industrial Base and the 2022 Open General License pilot program, have stumbled on implementation issues which can only be fixed from within the State Department and will require coordinated action between the executive and legislative branches.

This is where Sunak and Biden should focus their discussions. With his reputation for pragmatism, Sunak should easily avoid the temptation to request a blanket ITAR exemption for the United Kingdom as this would be politically unpalatable and counterproductive. Biden, with his flagship foreign policy initiative in the balance, should commit to work with Congress on a bounded and enforceable exemption under the Arms Export Controls Act for AUKUS nations, and then incentivize the State Department to make it work in practice. Collaboration with longstanding allies and partners is critical to the United States’ success in combating the increasingly dynamic threat posed by its adversaries. To let that flounder on account of an out-of-date and inappropriately enforced export control regime should be an unacceptable outcome for all involved.

Deborah Cheverton is a visiting senior fellow in the Atlantic Council’s Forward Defense program within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. Cheverton is a career civil servant from the United Kingdom’s Ministry of Defence (MOD), where she has spent almost fifteen years working across a range of policy and delivery areas with a particular focus on science and technology policy, industrial strategy, capability development, and international collaboration. She writes here in her personal capacity as an Atlantic Council fellow, not in an official government capacity. Her views are her own.

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Kroenig and Ashford debate responses to advancements in North Korean nuclear capabilities

sodal — Tue, 02 May 2023 17:26:31 +0000

Vice President and Senior Director, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

On March 10, Foreign Policy published its biweekly “It’s Debatable” column featuring Scowcroft Center Vice President and Senior Director Matthew Kroenig and Emma Ashford assessing the latest news in international affairs.

In their latest column, they discuss the recent leak of sensitive government documents, the ongoing conflict in Sudan, and North Korea’s recent advancements in nuclear weapon capabilities. Specifically, in light of the developments in North Korea, the pair debate the utility and feasibility of nuclear disarmament.

Washington should stick to its long-standing policy that North Korea must completely disarm. Striking an arms control agreement is contrary to that principle. It would essentially say that the world is willing to live with a nuclear North Korea. It would also undermine nuclear nonproliferation more broadly.

Matthew Kroenig

North Korean disarmament is a nonstarter, at least while the Kim family regime rules. And the result has been bad when it comes to proliferation: It shows that a determined state can succeed in building a nuclear program under sanctions; it creates a bad actor willing to sell its technology to other states for hard currency; and it has prompted debate in South Korea about whether it needs to develop its own nuclear program in response.

Emma Ashford

Staff

Matthew Kroenig

China Defense Policy

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To stop the fighting in Sudan, take away the generals’ money

Ernst Jan “EJ” Hogendoorn — Mon, 01 May 2023 13:25:35 +0000

International partners are scrambling to limit the humanitarian disaster created by the fighting between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) in Sudan that erupted on April 15 while the last steps of discussions leading to a civilian and democratic transition were expected. Now, it is not enough to simply call for a ceasefire and a return to negotiations because those outcomes could reestablish the fraught balance of power between the SAF and RSF that stymied the eighteen-month-long negotiations for a return to a civilian government—the type of government that most people in Sudan are demanding.

Rather, international partners must increase financial pressure on the RSF, former Bashir-era government officials, and the SAF to change their political calculations at the negotiation table.

Sudan cannot be stable if there are two armies and if former regime elites/Islamists are allowed to sow discord. International partners need to put coordinated financial pressure on RSF leaders to commit to integrating rapidly into the army and on former regime leaders to stop inciting violence; international partners should also put SAF generals on notice that they must honor their pledges to hand over power.

Sudan’s long-ruling former dictator, Omar al-Bashir, was able to stay in power for thirty years by fragmenting the security services and deftly playing them against each other to prevent any one of them from becoming powerful enough to launch a successful coup. In return for their obedience, military and political leaders were allowed to gain control over large parts of the economy and accumulate great wealth. Sustained protests led to Bashir’s April 2019 ouster, a brief period of military rule, and eventually a civilian-military transitional government nominally headed by then Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok, who governed in “partnership” with SAF General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and RSF General Mohamed Hamdan “Hemedti” Dagalo, the chair and vice-chair respectively of the Transitional Sovereignty Council.

International partners acquiesced to the generals taking these positions of power, thinking that it would help prevent conflict from breaking out between the two rival forces—and that competition between the SAF and the RSF would keep either from dominating the country and would allow the heavily constrained Hamdok and his civilian ministers to implement at least some reforms. While the prime minister was able to introduce some difficult but necessary economic reforms, Burhan and Hemedti launched another coup on October 25, 2021, to block a planned transfer of the Transitional Sovereignty Council chair to a civilian.

The return of military rule was roundly rejected by the Sudanese people, who held frequent protests, and donors, who paused more than four billion dollars in planned economic assistance. The coup leaders came under enormous economic and diplomatic pressure to negotiate another transition, but they occupied irreconcilable positions on security-sector reform. Burhan and his hardline generals wanted the RSF to be rapidly subsumed into the SAF, while Hemedti (backed by his supporters from the periphery) wanted to keep his independent power base and played for time. As “negotiations” dragged on, the two leaders employed different tactics to try to strengthen their own position and weaken the other’s, including importing more weapons, arming communities, trying to splinter their rival’s forces, cutting off sources of funding, allying with civilian politicians, developing bonds with foreign leaders (including Russia), and—at least according to persistent chatter in Khartoum—planning coups in case these other efforts failed to change the balance of power. Tensions waxed and waned over the past one-and-a-half years, and external actors had to intercede a number of times to prevent combat from breaking out. Unfortunately this time, with the Islamists reportedly exacerbating strife and the political negotiations seemingly about to conclude, diplomats have been unable to avert a war.

Neither the SAF nor RSF is capable of a decisive victory, particularly given Sudan’s size and its fractured political landscape. Barring decisive intervention, the most likely scenario is a long and bloody multisided civil war and a staggering humanitarian disaster, like ones seen in Somalia, Syria, or Yemen. This disaster would not be limited to Sudan; it could also destabilize the greater region and drive tens of millions of Sudanese people to flee to neighboring states, the Middle East, and Europe.

That scenario needs to be prevented in a way that ensures the political and military calculations of Hemedti, Burhan, and their supporters change when serious negotiations to restore a civilian government resume. Simply calling for ceasefires or evenly applying diplomatic pressure is not enough. This would only preserve the rough parity of military power between the RSF and SAF. This is not to suggest that either Hemedti or Burhan is “better.” Both have failed the Sudanese people and should be encouraged to move on from power. However, international partners must aim to immediately stop the fighting, bring back negotiations for a transition to civilian government, and then ensure both generals honor their public pledges to hand over power.

Thus, international and regional leaders must, in coordination, begin to strategically apply pressure by freezing Sudanese bank accounts and temporarily blocking the business activities of Sudanese leaders and their forces. This cutoff in money and revenue will impact those actors’ abilities to pay their soldiers and allies to fight and resupply. More importantly, it will impact their calculations about their willingness to return to serious negotiations and to compromise. Given the RSF is unlikely to prevail against the SAF with its heavy weapons and support from Egypt, the least bad option to stop the fighting is to first apply pressure on Hemedti’s business empire, which funds the RSF—his soldiers are loyal because they are paid better, not for any ideological reason. External actors, particularly the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia (where, because of past Western sanctions, most Sudanese have their bank accounts and base their businesses), should freeze known RSF and Hemedti-family bank accounts and business activities until RSF leaders commit to rapidly integrating their troops into the SAF. Some of the most important assets have been identified and others are known by the Emirati and Saudi governments. Similarly, international partners must quickly freeze the assets of known Bashir-regime/Islamist leaders who are inciting violence in an effort to return to power.

Finally, partners should identify foreign-held SAF assets and business interests for possible freezing and seizure in case the army does not honor its pledge to hand over power—or perpetuates the historic political and economic dominance of elites from Khartoum at the expense of Sudanese people living in the rest of the country. Only in this way is a sustainable ceasefire and peace possible.

Ernst Jan “EJ” Hogendoorn is a former senior advisor to the US special envoy to Sudan and South Sudan, and former deputy Africa Program director at the International Crisis Group.

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How to keep Western tech out of Russian weapons

Aleksander Cwalina — Tue, 04 Apr 2023 18:13:20 +0000

One prong of the Western response to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine has been the designation of strong sanctions and export controls to punish Russian aggression and limit the Kremlin’s ability to effectively wage war. However, numerous recent reports have revealed that some Russian weapons continue to utilize components ostensibly coming from Western countries including the United States, the United Kingdom, and the European Union.

A joint March 2023 International Partnership for Human Rights and Independent Anti-Corruption Commission (NAKO) report found Western components critical in the construction and maintenance of drones, missiles, and communications complexes in weapons used by Russia in Ukraine. Also in March, the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center convened a panel of experts for a virtual event to discuss how to stem the flow of dual-use technology to Russia. Moderated by Ambassador John Herbst, panelists described how sanctioned Western tech gets to Russia and offered concrete recommendations to better implement and enforce export bans on Moscow.

Panelists noted that companies and manufacturers could simply be unaware their products are entering the Russian market. Though distributors may believe they are selling dual-use components to non-sanctioned consumer markets, many components are resold through secondary markets such as Hong Kong or Turkey and end up in Russia. Urging more due diligence, Olena Tregub, executive director of NAKO, explained, “if a company has a client from Turkey, for example, it should ask if the product is for Russia. They should study the supply chain.”

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While the West should be lauded for the speed and breadth of sanctions and export controls imposed on Moscow, compliance offices are still catching up. “Western companies and countries still seem to be finding their footing when it comes to compliance, implementation, and maintenance of these restrictions,” said Jack Crawford, research analyst at the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI). According to Crawford, Western governments lack the capacity to effectively monitor and act against Russian sanctions evasion. This results in delays, not only in dealing with sanctions breaches but also in terms of identifying them in the first place.

As for the private sector, Sam Jones, president and co-founder of the Heartland Initiative, noted that investors and companies have increased responsibility when conducting business in respect to conflict-affected areas such as Ukraine. Jones said companies should be more diligent in determining the end use of their products, as outlined in the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, and argued that “companies would be well advised to take the findings in these reports seriously and consider the potential material risk in terms of future investments.”

Western companies and investors also do not always appear to recognize dual-use components as belonging to the same category as other heavily restricted military technology, such as cluster munitions and anti-personnel landmines. This puts dual-use components in a sanctions gray area. Jones suggested that future steps could include increased restrictions on dual-use components through conduct-based exclusion, which would target repurposed components in terms of how they are actually used and not through their intended use.

Eurasia Center events

Vice President and Senior Director, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Ukraine’s advance in Kursk: What’s next and implications

Conflict Russia Security & Defense Ukraine

Another key element in efforts to successfully control Russian access to critical Western tech is effective monitoring and enforcement of sanctions. This is an area in which governments can cooperate effectively with civil society, NGOs, and think tanks.

Benjamin Schmitt, senior fellow at the University of Pennsylvania Department of Physics and Astronomy and Kleinman Center for Energy Policy, noted that Western companies and NGOs “have easily available open-source intelligence tools at their fingertips, whether they’re commodity trading platforms or automatic identification system-based vessel tracking websites.” These tools empower watchdog organizations and risk assessment committees in governmental and non-governmental organizations to monitor malign transfers of products and technologies that would undermine sanctions efficacy.

Panelists pointed out that the implementation of sanctions oversight depends in large part on increased interoperability between business, government, and civil society powered by information exchange, open dialogue, and cooperation with emerging intelligence technology and organizations.

Schmitt cautioned that Western hesitancy toward sanctioning Western-based entities could be a real threat to an effective sanctions regime. He pointed out that Nord Stream AG, the company behind the Nord Stream 2 pipeline from Russia to Germany, evaded Western sanctions despite majority ownership by Russian state-owned Gazprom, because the company was based in Switzerland. Considering that Russia’s brutal war against Ukraine aims to fracture Western political and financial stability, it is key that Western countries work in concert and take every step possible to slow the Kremlin’s efforts to control Ukraine and threaten European security.

Tregub put it more bluntly: “War crimes are a Russian strategy. To implement this strategy, Russia needs to build weapons. Without Western components, Russia wouldn’t be able to accomplish its war aims.”

Aleksander Cwalina is a program assistant at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

Disclaimer: The purpose of the International Partnership for Human Rights and NAKO report is to explain and illustrate how Western-made components are used by Russia to commit suspected war crimes in Ukraine. To achieve this, the report identifies several companies and governments who are believed to be involved in the manufacturing of components which have been acquired by the Russian military and are used in their military hardware. For the avoidance of doubt, the authors of the report do not allege any legal wrongdoing on the part of the companies who manufacture the components and do not suggest that they have any involvement in any sanctions evasion-related activity. Furthermore, the authors of the report do not impute that the companies which make the components are involved in directly or indirectly supplying the Russian military and/or Russian military customers in breach of any international (or their own domestic) laws or regulations restricting or prohibiting such action. Where a link is drawn between manufacturers and the weapons being used in suspected war crimes, this is done solely to highlight ethical and moral concerns. The existence of counterfeit components is a recognized global problem. The authors of the report recognize the possibility that components featuring the logos and/or branding of named entities may not have indeed been manufactured by said entities. However, given a) leaked Russian “shopping lists” showing the intent to acquire components manufactured by such companies in order to support its military, and b) the history of Soviet and Russian military procurement efforts targeting leading global technology companies, the authors of the report have worked on the assumption that the components they and third parties have identified are genuine.

Staff

Matthew Kroenig

China Defense Policy

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Binnendijk in Global Politics and Strategy: Towards Nuclear Stewardship with China

Hans Binnendijk — Sun, 19 Mar 2023 14:41:56 +0000

Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security Transatlantic Security Initiative

Fellow

Hans Binnendijk

Distinguished Fellow

Defense Policy Europe & Eurasia

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Kroenig in the Boston Globe discussing the suspension of New START

sodal — Mon, 27 Feb 2023 21:08:51 +0000

Vice President and Senior Director, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

On February 21, a tweet by Scowcroft director Matthew Kroenig was quoted by Travis Anderson of the Boston Globe discussing the geopolitical implication of Putin’s suspension of New START, the only remaining nuclear arms control pact between Russia and the US. Kroenig theorizes how this may be the start of a long-term strategic arms competition between the two powers.

Putin announced the suspension of New START… This means that for the first time since the 1970s, there are no limits on Russian and US strategic nuclear forces. Combined with China’s rapid nuclear expansion, we could be entering a new, long-term strategic arms competition.

Matthew Kroenig

Staff

Matthew Kroenig

Brian O’Toole and Daniel Fried: New sanctions will damage Moscow’s financial networks and military tech—and send a message to other capitals

China Defense Policy

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Russia policy after the war: A new strategy of containment

Alexander Vershbow — Wed, 22 Feb 2023 17:10:01 +0000

As Vladimir Putin’s world-altering war against Ukraine enters its second year, any hope of reviving the post-Cold War European security order depends on defeating Russia in Ukraine. But that will only be the first step in what will be a long struggle—one that calls for an updated strategy of containment.

We, the transatlantic community together with other like-minded democracies, face a long-term strategic confrontation with Russia—a hostile adversarial relationship that will have few guardrails, and where even the modest ambition of peaceful coexistence may be out of reach for a long time to come.

The nature of the Putin regime, its disregard for international law, its brutal suppression of all dissent, its whitewashing of Russian history, plus Putin’s obsession with subjugating his neighbors and reconstituting the Russian empire—all these factors make peaceful coexistence difficult, if not impossible, to conceive in the near and medium term.

Even if developments on the battlefield force Russia to end the war on terms relatively favorable to Kyiv, Putin will not readily abandon his broader revisionist aims. For Putin’s Russia, Ukraine is Ground Zero in its existential war against the West. A winding down of the military conflict is not likely to lead to a reduction in Russia’s efforts to control Ukraine by other means or to dominate its other neighbors, including the Baltic states and other NATO and European Union (EU) members.

Indeed, in non-military domains the conflict is likely to intensify while Russia seeks to rebuild and reconstitute its decimated conventional forces. Information warfare, covert action, sabotage, energy blackmail, counter-sanctions, support for pro-Russian separatists, and other hybrid attacks will all remain active parts of the Russian toolkit against its neighbors and the West. For NATO and the European Union, resilience against hybrid threats will be as important as bolstering defense and deterrence, and the effort to build such resilience should receive significantly more financial support at the national level and in Brussels.

Don’t let Putin seize victory from the jaws of defeat in Ukraine

While Russia grossly underestimated Western unity and resolve, Putin may still hope that allied publics and parliaments will grow tired of supporting Ukraine and bearing the burden of sanctions, just as he hopes to break the will of the Ukrainian people by bombing the country’s civilian infrastructure. As the war grinds on into the spring and summer of 2023, it could devolve into a stalemate. In that case, Russia may count on some allies to revive proposals for early negotiations to freeze the conflict with a ceasefire in place, the first step toward a broader “reset” in relations at Ukraine’s expense.

Russia needs to understand that there can be no normalization of relations until it once again upholds—in deed as well as in word—the fundamental principles laid down in the Helsinki Final Act, Paris Charter, and NATO–Russia Founding Act.

Allied leaders will need to explain to their citizens what is at stake, why a ceasefire in current conditions would only help Putin seize victory from the jaws of defeat, and why it is vital to maintain sanctions and supply advanced weapons to the Ukrainians for as long as it takes to defeat Russia and expel Russian forces from Ukrainian lands. US President Joe Biden hit the right notes in his remarks in Kyiv and Warsaw this week.

Russia needs to understand that there can be no normalization of relations until it once again upholds—in deed as well as in word—the fundamental principles laid down in the Helsinki Final Act, Paris Charter, and NATO–Russia Founding Act. If the United States were to settle for anything less, it would only embolden the Russians to use force to change borders again after they have had time to regroup and rearm. Chinese leader Xi Jinping and other autocrats will happily follow Russia’s example if Putin gets off with little more than a slap on the wrist.

Pursue containment to stop Russian expansionism

To prevent further damage to the rules-based international order, the United States and its allies will need a comprehensive strategy of containment that aims to deter Russia militarily, raises the cost to Russia for its destabilizing behavior, and increasingly decouples Russia from the international community, politically and economically, until Moscow has earned the right to be considered a partner once more.

Containment today is similar to the containment policy enunciated by George Kennan and adopted in the early years of the Cold War. The idea is to stop Russian expansionism, exert forceful counter-pressure on Russian efforts to extend its influence, weaken the Russian regime economically, and conduct an aggressive information campaign to undermine domestic support—the ultimate goal being to encourage the emergence of forces that could liberalize the regime and end the geopolitical competition, as occurred in ending the first Cold War in the 1980s and 1990s.

Containment today benefits from the fact that the Russians are much weaker militarily after the Ukraine war and more isolated politically, although today’s Russia benefits from its close alignment with China and the fact that many nations beyond the democratic West are sitting on the fence.

Containment today also means taking a patient, long-term approach to the promotion of internal change in Russia. While it may be a generation before such change happens, we should be prepared to act quickly when the Russian people themselves demand leaders who are ready to return to the path of cooperation and integration that Putin has abandoned.

While it may be a generation before such change happens, we should be prepared to act quickly when the Russian people themselves demand leaders who are ready to return to the path of cooperation and integration that Putin has abandoned.

Military strength and Alliance cohesion are the foundation of an effective containment policy. We need a NATO- and EU-coordinated strategy to push back against all forms of Russian expansionism, in Ukraine and beyond, and to strengthen our resilience against conventional and hybrid warfare.

In the short term, we need to commit unambiguously to the goal of Ukrainian victory. We should help Ukraine capitalize on its successful counter-offensives by boosting and accelerating the supply of heavy weapons, long-range strike systems, and air and missile defense that can inflict further defeats on Russia in the weeks and months ahead, while increasing economic and humanitarian assistance at the same time.

For Ukraine to prevail, we need to speed up the weapons delivery process and restart production of the most urgently needed systems such as High Mobility Rocket Artillery Systems (HIMARS) and advanced drones, both to secure new gains for the Ukrainians and to replenish depleted allied stocks.

We need to calibrate what weapons we provide to avoid escalation, but we should not let ourselves be intimidated or self-deterred by Russian saber-rattling. Putin is more interested than we are in avoiding a direct clash with NATO, conventional or nuclear, and he understands that any use of nuclear weapons, even a “demonstration” strike, would open Pandora’s box and fundamentally change the nature of the war.

Right now, it is the Russians who are doing the escalating, with their barbaric missile and drone attacks on civilian infrastructure and terrorization of the Ukrainian people.

In my view, it is time to reconsider our self-imposed range limits and provide systems that enable Ukraine to deny the Russians a sanctuary for launching their infrastructure attacks. If the Russians can strike with impunity from Crimea or across the Russian border, they will continue to escalate, at horrific human cost. Enabling Kyiv to target those systems is not escalation, but legitimate self-defense.

Press pause on the NATO–Russia Founding Act

Beyond helping Ukraine prevail, NATO’s number one defense priority is to implement the forward-looking decisions at the 2022 Madrid summit on deterring and defending against threats to allied territory. The Russians have suffered enormous losses of military equipment and manpower. But like the Terminator, they will be back.

As agreed at Madrid, NATO needs to move expeditiously from forward presence to forward defense, with larger forces along the eastern flank able to repel any attempted land grab and not simply serving as tripwires. In particular, NATO needs to fully implement the decision to expand from battalion-sized battle groups to brigade-sized forces in the east as part of the shift to deterrence by denial.

Establishing the new force model could be easier if allies declared that they are no longer bound by the constraints in the NATO–Russia Founding Act on permanent stationing of substantial combat forces, given Russia’s flagrant violations of that document. This would allow a mix of permanent and rotational deployments, which would be more effective than rotational forces alone.

Ending NATO’s self-imposed constraint on deploying nuclear weapons on the territory of NATO’s post-Cold War members could bolster deterrence and allied cohesion by spreading responsibilities and risks among a larger number of allies.

The NATO–Russia Founding Act could be suspended rather than terminated. But it makes no sense to pretend that the security environment after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is anywhere comparable to the more benign security environment in 1997 when the act was signed.

In the face of Putin’s nuclear saber-rattling since the invasion of Ukraine, allies also need to undertake a more serious review of NATO’s nuclear posture and policy than that reflected in the Biden administration’s recent Nuclear Policy Review.

In addition to threatening “catastrophic consequences” for any Russian use of nuclear weapons, we must be sure we have a wide enough set of non-strategic capabilities to defeat the Russian “escalate to deescalate” strategy under any scenario. In this regard, developing a new nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missile would be a valuable addition to the US force mix.

This may be another area where we should review commitments under the NATO–Russia Founding Act and consider bringing more allies into the Alliance’s nuclear-sharing arrangements. Ending NATO’s self-imposed constraint on deploying nuclear weapons on the territory of NATO’s post-Cold War members could bolster deterrence and allied cohesion by spreading responsibilities and risks among a larger number of allies.

Just raising the possibility could be effective as leverage to persuade the Russians to accept verifiable constraints on their non-strategic nuclear weapons. For the United States and NATO, limiting Russian non-strategic systems is a sine qua non for any successor to the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, known as New START. Putin put that treaty’s future in doubt with his recent announcement that Russia is suspending implementation.

Aim for Europe to evenly shoulder collective defense by 2030

In implementing the Madrid summit’s decisions, NATO needs to move toward a more balanced sharing of responsibility across the Atlantic. Even before the 2022 US midterm elections, concerns were growing among congressional Republicans about burden-sharing and allied free-riding, and this could become an even bigger concern in the 2024 US presidential election.

European allies could head off a future transatlantic rift by committing now to produce and deploy, by the end of this decade, at least 50 percent of the capabilities that NATO requires for collective defense. This would also be a prudent hedge in case the United States should need to divert some of its NATO reinforcements to the Indo-Pacific theater to deal with a simultaneous China crisis.

Ensuring that European countries provide half of the capabilities and enablers for collective defense will also make it possible for Europe to become the first responder for managing crises along NATO’s periphery. That would be a tangible demonstration of greater strategic responsibility for Europe in its own neighborhood.

As NATO strengthens its own deterrence posture, the Alliance should take on a formal, long-term role in helping all of Russia’s vulnerable neighbors strengthen their own deterrence capabilities and their resilience against cyber and other hybrid threats. This could be called the “Secure Neighborhood Initiative.”

Unfortunately, it is clear that for the foreseeable future allies will remain reluctant to give NATO membership and an Article 5 security guarantee to Ukraine, Georgia, or any other former Soviet state, no matter how deserving and qualified they may be. While NATO membership should be the long-term goal, the next-best thing allies can do now is to ensure that these vulnerable partners acquire the capabilities, training, and intelligence needed to deter and, if necessary, defeat Russian aggression. A commitment to that effect could form the core of security guarantees for Ukraine under a potential peace agreement to end the war.

Ensure containment goes beyond defense

An effective containment strategy should also seek to maximize Russia’s economic and political isolation. Economic decoupling should be achieved through a long-term policy of sanctions on the Russian economy and following through on moves to end the West’s dependence on Russian energy and raw materials.

In terms of political isolation, we need to treat Russia as a pariah or rogue state and avoid any premature return to business as usual. We should not rule out future discussions on arms control and strategic stability, while recognizing the difficulty of negotiating new agreements with a Russia that has violated every existing agreement and has behaved recklessly in occupying the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant in southern Ukraine.

While isolating Russia politically, we should look for ways to engage with Russian civil society and the growing number of political oppositionists operating from exile in neighboring countries. This should include efforts to connect to the next generation of potential leaders, making clear that our issues with Russia are with the policies of the regime, not the Russian people.

The death of Mikhail Gorbachev last year is a reminder that it was internal change that ended the first Cold War forty years after it began. It may take decades to happen this time around, but we should be ready to engage with a better Russia when it appears.

Alexander Vershbow is a distinguished fellow at the Atlantic Council. He is a former US ambassador to NATO, Russia, and South Korea; US assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs; and NATO deputy secretary general. This article is adapted from a speech Vershbow delivered to the NATO Parliamentary Assembly in December.

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Experts react: One year after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the US releases new sanctions and China steps in with a ‘peace’ plan

Atlantic Council experts — Mon, 20 Feb 2023 16:43:07 +0000

This post was updated on Friday, February 24.

At the one-year mark of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the United States slapped new sanctions on Russia’s banks, metals, microchips, and more. Meanwhile China’s foreign ministry released a “peace plan” shortly after its top diplomat visited Moscow and met with Vladimir Putin.

The announcements cap a busy week including dueling speeches by Putin and US President Joe Biden, and a surprise Biden visit to Kyiv. Below, Atlantic Council experts share their insights on all of it as the war enters its second year. This post will be updated as news around the war continues to unfold.

Expert reactions on the new US sanctions:

Expert reactions on China’s peace proposal:

Ahmed Aboudouh: The Global South will cheer China’s peace plan

Niva Yau: China’s continued support for Russia means losing Eurasia

Expert reactions on Tuesday’s dueling speeches:

Matthew Kroenig: The beginning of the end of legally binding US-Russia arms control

Robert Soofer: Expect Russia to comply with New START after all—but arms control doesn’t mean security

Brian Whitmore: Like a washed-up rock band, Putin plays the old hits

Daniel Fried: Biden correctly casts Putin as a twentieth-century dictator

Expert reactions on Biden’s trip to Kyiv:

John Herbst: A visit that reflects Biden’s policies—useful and sound but not strong or visionary

Oleh Shamshur: An emotional welcome for Biden from Ukrainians—and hysteria in Russia

Daniel Fried: An echo of Kennedy and Reagan

Melinda Haring: A message of continued American support, with political battles ahead

Peter Dickinson: A bitter reaction in Russia

New sanctions will damage Moscow’s financial networks and military tech—and send a message to other capitals

The US sanctions package released on the anniversary of Russia’s unprovoked invasion of Ukraine is a strong set of actions that will have real impact on Russia’s economy, and it signals more to come. The package covers many of the areas we assessed were likely to be hit: banking, the military, microchips, evasion networks, and the metals and mining sector. These sanctions will further impair Russia’s financial networks and military and technology procurement networks, and although the metals and mining sanctions do not yet target the largest Russian firms, they are a clear message of who is next in line to be cut off from the West.

Notably, the United States sanctioned Russia’s MTS Bank, which was given a banking license in the United Arab Emirates shortly after a visit from the Treasury Department’s top sanctions official, Brian Nelson. The timing of the banking license announcement was a clear diplomatic slight after a visit where Russian sanctions evasion was a central topic, and Friday’s sanctions on MTS send a signal to other capitals—including Ankara, Beijing, and Delhi—that have come under scrutiny for potentially assisting Russian sanctions-busting. The United States has not gone after any new oligarchs in this round, instead opting to sanctions a wealth management firm and its key managers, which is a route of attacking those who benefit from the Kremlin’s rampant corruption without causing economic spillover to the West.

Looking forward, this action signals where the United States and its partners are looking for additional economic pressure, and future rounds of sanctions will likely follow this blueprint. Sanctions and other forms of economic pressure such as export controls will not be airtight. They don’t have to be. The pressure they exert on Russia’s kleptocratic economy will grow over time, leading, as happened with the Soviet economy, to systemic stagnation and systemic crisis.

—Brian O’Toole is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s GeoEconomics Center and a former senior adviser to the director of the Office of Foreign Assets Control at the US Department of the Treasury. Daniel Fried is the Weiser Family distinguished fellow at the Atlantic Council and served as the coordinator for sanctions policy during the Obama administration.

The Global South will cheer China’s peace plan

The Ukraine war officially ended China’s “peaceful rising” holiday from world politics and geostrategic competition with the West. This new reality is best demonstrated in China’s “peace plan,” a mere reiteration of China’s position on the war throughout the past year, but a meaningful diplomatic intervention that would turn China into a necessary peace actor in any future settlement.

China has maintained its support for Russia—refusing to condemn the invasion or call it “war”—which makes it far from neutral. But, regardless of the moral position on the war, the Global South will find China’s call for a ceasefire and respect for all countries’ sovereignty appealing. Sovereignty in the United Nations Charter framework has always been a contentious and sensitive issue in the Western hegemonic behavior toward the South. China’s call for “stopping unilateral sanctions” and opposing “using the world economy as a tool or weapon for political purposes” is another manifestation of the South’s historical grievance toward coercion to pick sides and deprive its nations of choices except for two: With us or against us. To be clear, no other Chinese diplomatic undertaking could better reflect China’s desire to lead the Global South in promoting the third option: Neutrality without consequences.

Another long-standing dilemma involves double standards. When it comes to Ukraine, officials in the South criticize Washington for the centrality of liberal ideology in its calculations over understanding Russia’s security concerns and the regional balance of power. China’s “position paper” stated: “The security of a region should not be achieved by strengthening or expanding military blocs,” a veiled swipe at NATO. It also said: “The legitimate security interests and concerns of all countries must be taken seriously and addressed properly.” For many Southern countries, this position precisely reflects their view on the conflict. Food security and maintaining the stability of supply chains are two other powerfully attractive points that will further polish China’s image as a responsible and peace-loving power in the South.

The potential embrace of China’s peace statement by the South may accelerate the emergence of a new coalition of non-aligned countries led by major powers such as China and India. In Beijing’s view, pushing this trend forward is beneficial because it creates a future front-line defense as the West moves on from calling on the world to pick sides against Russia to, very soon, pressuring it to isolate China.

—Ahmed Aboudouh is a nonresident fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs

China’s continued support for Russia means losing Eurasia

In the former Soviet space, many countries have favored China with the goal of balancing Russia. The points that China made on Ukraine on Friday, however, are going to be perceived by the region as tone-deaf, cold, and detached. Reality for populations in Eurasia in the past year has been weekly, if not daily consumption of the horrific humanitarian crisis created by Russia. Stopping the war, as the Chinese press release lays out in detail, means for Ukraine to stop receiving military aid from others and for Ukraine to get rid of those reasons that triggered Russia’s invasion. “The international community should stay committed to the right approach of promoting talks for peace,” as the Chinese side sees it, is an approach that takes into consideration Russia’s demands. However, much of the proposal deviates from established norms and practices: It asks, for example, for countries to stop sanctioning Russia.

Let’s be extremely clear: China is not asking Russia to stop its aggression. China recognizes that Russia had reasons for war, the same narrative that Russian propaganda tries to spread across Eurasia, without much success. At this point, Сhina’s failure to recognize Russian aggression toward Ukraine is a full wake-up call for Eurasia. Unlike China, many countries in Eurasia have helped Ukraine directly and indirectly. Iven Kazakhstan, which now genuinely worries what Russia’s aggression might mean for its own sovereignty, has indirectly sent humanitarian support to Ukraine. For Eurasia, the war is not simply some grand geopolitical rivalry, but its consequences dictate the capacity and ambition of Russia in the future.

US Secretary of State Antony Blinken is due to visit Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan early next week to meet with all Central Asian heads of state. Already, with the war, Central Asian elites who once favored China with the hope of balancing Russia are no longer so sure. On top of this, they have been trapped for years to ignore (sometimes even facilitate) the human rights violations China commits across the border toward its Turkic populations in Xinjiang, including Uyghurs, Kazakhs, and Kyrgyz. It appears that Beijing continues to bank on this war’s ability to shake up the international order to its favor.,But it is already losing Eurasia.

—Niva Yau is a nonresident fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Global China Hub.

The beginning of the end of legally binding US-Russia arms control

On Tuesday, Putin announced that Moscow was suspending its participation in New START—its last remaining arms-control treaty with the United States. This means that, for the first time since the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT I) of 1972, there are no negotiated limits on Russia’s nuclear forces.

In an accompanying statement, Russian officials explained that they would consider resuming compliance and did not intend to exceed the numerical thresholds on nuclear weapons imposed by New START. (Inspections of nuclear sites under the treaty have ceased since March 2020 due to COVID-19. Russia’s refusal to resume inspections, despite improving public health conditions, led the US Department of State to recently declare Russia in “noncompliance” with the treaty.) While it is possible that Russia will return to compliance, a return to the treaty is not a likely outcome, given the state of US-Russian relations.

Instead, this moment likely marks the beginning of the end of legally binding numerical arms control between the United States and Russia. New START was already scheduled to expire in 2026, and, given China’s strategic nuclear breakout, US strategists were already concerned about being locked into numerical parity in strategic forces with Russia, the core tenet of New START.

Washington needs to prepare for a new, long-term strategic arms competition, a first since the end of the Cold War. In doing so, the United States must ensure that it has the forces capable of deterring and, if necessary, defending against an attack on itself and its more than thirty formal treaty allies, a task complicated by its multiple nuclear-armed rivals.

—Matthew Kroenig is the senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security and a former nuclear-weapons expert in the US Department of Defense and intelligence community.

Expect Russia to comply with New START after all—but arms control doesn’t mean security

Putin’s announcement to suspend Russia’s participation in the New START Treaty is most likely intended to shore up his domestic political support and distract public attention against a failing war effort. It is also meant to weaken the will of the West by holding an arms-control treaty hostage to Putin’s demands. While Russia has suspended inspections and consultations, it is not clear whether Russia has or intends to violate any of the treaty’s central limitations by deploying additional nuclear weapons. This seems unlikely, however, because Russia already enjoys a ten-to-one advantage in regional, shorter-range nuclear weapons that are not limited by the treaty.

It is in Russia’s interest to limit US strategic nuclear forces via New START while it enjoys superiority in regional nuclear weapons—an imbalance the Biden administration hopes to rectify in any follow-on agreement. For this reason, I believe that Russia will eventually return into compliance with the treaty, which is scheduled to expire in just over two years. The whole episode is a reminder that arms control cannot be separated from the broader geopolitical landscape, and that the United States cannot rely on arms-control treaties for its security. It also illustrates clearly why a survivable, modern nuclear arsenal is needed more than ever to hedge against an expansion of Russian (and Chinese) nuclear capabilities.

—Robert Soofer is a senior fellow in the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security’s Forward Defense practice and a former deputy assistant US secretary of defense for nuclear and missile defense policy.

Like a washed-up rock band, Putin plays the old hits

Putin hit most of his usual notes in his widely anticipated state-of-the-nation speech just days before the first anniversary of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. He falsely characterized his war of aggression and war of choice as a struggle to defend Russia and what he inaccurately called “its historical lands which are now called Ukraine.” He blamed the war on the West, claiming, absurdly, that “the Ukrainian people have become hostages of the Kyiv regime and its Western masters, which have effectively occupied the country.” He revived his nuclear saber-rattling by suspending Russia’s participation in the New START Treaty, announcing that he is putting Russia’s ground-based strategic nuclear systems “on combat standby duty” and threatening to resume nuclear tests.

But like a washed-up rock band past its prime trying to play its greatest hits, Putin’s performance was predictable, flat, and unconvincing. This was a speech by a leader who is losing a war—and is trying to convince himself and his nation otherwise. It is worth recalling that Putin was originally scheduled to give this speech in December, but it was canceled following a series of military setbacks in Ukraine. The postponement was reportedly because Putin wanted a major battlefield victory to boast about in the speech. But one wasn’t forthcoming. Russia recently suffered catastrophic losses in its unsuccessful attempt to take the city of Vuhledar, and its offensive appears to have stalled near Bakhmut.

So instead, Putin prepared the Russian people for a long and protracted conflict, promising soldiers two weeks of home leave every six months and pledging that Moscow would continue the war “step by step, carefully and consistently.” As many commentators have noted, Putin is trying to normalize the war. But as he does so, he also clearly appears to be losing his mojo.

—Brian Whitmore is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center and an assistant professor of practice at the University of Texas-Arlington.

Biden correctly casts Putin as a twentieth-century dictator

In a strong speech in Warsaw, Biden made the case for supporting Ukraine in terms of a broad struggle between freedom and autocracy. In doing so, he was right to reach back to US strategic thinking from the twentieth century: Putin in his actions and rhetoric resembles his twentieth century tyrannical predecessors, and Biden was speaking as the leader of the Free World who will defy this latest dictator and his aggressive designs. Comparisons to John F. Kennedy’s and Ronald Reagan’s iconic Berlin speeches are apt; it was another moment of US leadership coming just after Biden’s stirring Kyiv visit.

Good speeches set the stage. They do not win wars on their own. With Biden having put the case in strong terms, the administration will have to show that its assistance to Ukraine—economic and especially military, as the battle hangs in the balance—is commensurate with the stakes as Biden has described them. There has been a tension between the urgency of helping Ukraine defend itself and concern about avoiding direct confrontation with Moscow. This has sometimes led to a cautious and deliberate process of deciding which weapons to send Ukraine. Biden’s speech may, and hopefully will, move the administration to send the Ukrainians what they need to liberate their land and win this war of national survival.

—Daniel Fried is the Weiser Family distinguished fellow at the Atlantic Council, and a former US ambassador to Poland and US assistant secretary of state for Europe and Eurasia.

A visit that reflects Biden’s policies—useful and sound but not strong or visionary

Biden’s trip to Kyiv was useful, positive, and even necessary. It is of a piece with his overall policy since the threat of a massive Russian invasion emerged in 2021. That policy is adequate to the greatest challenge to US security and prosperity since the implosion of the Soviet Union over thirty years ago. Biden’s three-part strategy is a sound one: rally allies and partners to provide weapons and other aid to Ukraine, impose major sanctions on Moscow, and bolster NATO defenses in the east. Given the great weight of the danger, even an adequate policy requires skill, great effort, and large resources. For sure, this policy has prevented Vladimir Putin from subduing Ukraine for a year.

But the policy is neither strong nor visionary, and this trip is a reflection of that. A statesman would rise to the challenge of Putin’s aggression by laying out in clear terms the threats to vital US interests: Kremlin statements and actions indicate that a victory in Ukraine could be followed by a direct threat to US NATO allies—a danger to US security and prosperity. And while the bookkeeper is comfortable with a policy that vows to “stay with Ukraine as long as it takes,” a statesman (or woman) would state clearly that the United States’ goal is a Ukrainian victory or a Kremlin defeat. Such a clear description—constantly repeated—would be followed by resolute action to make it happen. That means giving Ukraine the weapons systems—in this case, tanks in abundance, advanced fighter planes, and long-range fires (out to three hundred kilometers)—that would immediately stop Moscow’s bloody offensive near Bakhmut and enable a decisive Ukrainian counteroffensive to cut Moscow’s land bridge to Crimea. But we heard nothing along these lines from Vice President Kamala Harris and other senior administration officials at the Munich Security Conference or from Biden in Kyiv. Biden’s trip to Kyiv will be noted by historians but not cited as a shining moment of US clarity and leadership. Biden can do better. Let’s hope he does.

—John Herbst is the senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center and a former US ambassador to Ukraine.

An emotional welcome for Biden from Ukrainians—and hysteria in Russia

As soon as the visit to Poland had been announced, the rumors concerning the possibility of the Biden-Zelenskyy meeting (most likely in western Ukraine), started to circulate in Kyiv. Even before the first photos appeared, many citizens of Kyiv guessed that the US president was in town because of extraordinary security measures and the blocking of several streets. Biden’s visit was one of those events when the emotional reaction of the Ukrainian governing class and the population was equally positive and even enthusiastic. It should be mentioned that the morning started for Kievites with an air-raid alert, which has become almost a part of their daily routine during the war.

Biden’s visit was definitely significant as proof of staunch US support of Ukraine’s struggle against Russian aggression, especially to counter the doubts generated by positions taken by some Republican congressmen. The message of continuation of military, economic, and humanitarian assistance on the part of the US-led anti-Putin coalition was extremely important for the Ukrainians to hear. Announcement of a new weapons package was meant to reinforce this message, and it did. However, given that the weapons in the package are largely what the United States has already agreed to send, one might conclude that discussion in Washington about the fighting range and power of weapons provided to Ukraine is still far from being over.

Russian reaction to the visit was predictably hysterical. While on the quasi-official level it was branded as a “demonstrative humiliation of Russia,” social media users went even further, calling for new missile and bomb attacks against Kyiv and other Ukrainian cities. There is no doubt that Biden’s visit will be used by the Russian propaganda machine to fan even stronger the feelings of chauvinism and anti-American animosity already well-embedded with the majority of Russians.

—Oleh Shamshur is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center and a former ambassador of Ukraine to the United States.

An echo of Kennedy and Reagan

President Biden’s visit to Kyiv ranks with other great presidential moments of leadership in defense of freedom, like President John F. Kennedy’s “Ich bin ein Berliner” and President Ronald Reagan’s “Mr. Gorbachev, tear down this wall!” speeches in Berlin during the Cold War. Biden’s visit does not change US policy of support for Ukraine’s freedom, but it shows US commitment and determination to see that policy succeed. It’s not a trip a president would make if the US were planning to push Ukraine into a bad settlement on Putin’s terms; it’s a trip that sends a message to Putin of US staying power in support of Ukraine.

Biden’s Kyiv trip creates a powerful backdrop for his Warsaw visit. In Warsaw, Biden is likely to make the case that Ukraine’s cause is the Free World’s as well; that by supporting Ukraine against a tyrant’s war of conquest and national extermination the United States, Europe, and other countries are advancing their interests as well as values. The Kyiv visit gives that message greater power.

Finally, full props to the administration for pulling together such a trip at all. It’s much harder than presidential trips to, say, Baghdad during the Iraq War, where the US had massive military assets on the ground. In Kyiv, the US has a first-rate but small embassy. And the visit came off. Given the hurdles, Biden must have really wanted to make the trip—a long, complex, and risky undertaking. That suggests he means what he says about supporting Ukraine for the long haul. It’s a powerful and welcome message.

—Daniel Fried is the Weiser Family distinguished fellow at the Atlantic Council and a former US assistant secretary of state for Europe and Eurasia.

A message of continued American support, with political battles ahead

Biden’s visit to Kyiv was pitch-perfect, as were the visuals. He even donned a blue and yellow tie as he walked enthusiastically outside in the middle of an air raid. Although he was one of the last major world leaders to visit the war-torn capital, Ukrainians feel exhausted by the fight one year in and needed reassurance that they haven’t been forgotten. His visit buoyed their spirits. Ordinary Ukrainians took to social media expressing their gratitude for the symbolism of the visit.

Biden’s words that the United States will stand with Ukraine for “as long as it takes”—his consistent talking point—are fully in line with US public opinion. One year after the war, 65 percent of Americans want to continue to support Ukraine reclaiming its territory even if it means a prolonged conflict. That number hasn’t changed from 2022 to 2023, which is remarkable, but there are serious partisan differences between Republicans and Democrats, and we should only expect them to grow.

But Biden’s visit also raised expectations. Ukrainians want and expect more assistance, but every additional large assistance package Congress authorizes will be hard-fought. Reassuring Kyiv that Washington has its back while keeping the assistance flowing will be Biden’s big task until the US presidential election.

—Melinda Haring is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

A bitter reaction in Russia

Biden’s surprise visit to Kyiv has been widely hailed as a victory by Ukrainians, who see it as a timely morale boost and a welcome indication of the United States’ long-term commitment to their country’s fight for survival. Meanwhile, news of the trip has sparked a mixture of shock and fury among Russian audiences. On Russian state TV, pundits discussing the visit attempted to spare Putin’s blushes by insisting that Moscow must have given Washington prior “security guarantees” in order for the trip to go ahead.

Others were in a less charitable mood. Prominent pro-Kremlin journalist Sergei Mardan branded the visit a “demonstrative humiliation of Russia” that made a mockery of the Putin regime’s claims to be waging a “holy war” against the West. “It seems there are also lunch breaks during a holy war,” he commented. One popular Telegram account run by Russian servicemen noted bitterly that with the first anniversary of the Ukraine invasion now fast approaching, “Russian city” Kyiv was welcoming the US president and not Putin. Elsewhere on Russian social media, the visit sparked an outpouring of calls for the bombing of Kyiv and other Ukrainian cities. It is not hard to see why Biden’s presence in the Ukrainian capital provoked such a strong Russian reaction. His visit was a painful reminder that Russia has failed to achieve its military objectives despite twelve months of efforts and huge losses.

—Peter Dickinson is the editor of UkraineAlert.

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Arms racing under nuclear tripolarity: Evidence for an action-reaction cycle?

Matthew Kroenig — Tue, 20 Dec 2022 13:58:05 +0000

FORWARD DEFENSE

ISSUE BRIEF

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Conventional wisdom suggests that the world is approaching a tripolar arms race among the United States, Russia, and China. As Russia attempts to dramatically revise the post-Cold War security environment in Europe, China is expected to increase its nuclear arsenal to at least 1,500 warheads by 2035. In 2021, the then-commander of US Strategic Command, Admiral Richard, laid out the challenge of nuclear tripolarity before Congress testifying that: “for the first time in our history, the nation is on a trajectory to face two nuclear-capable, strategic peer adversaries at the same time.”

In this issue brief, the Scowcroft Center’s Matthew Kroenig challenges the evidence for action-reaction arms races in the post-Cold War period but warns we may be facing one in this new tripolar nuclear environment.

Action-reaction arms races are usually unlikely to occur

The theory behind action-reaction arms races is grounded in the “spiral model,” in which countries build their own weapons to protect themselves against the military forces of their rivals. But the spiral model suggests that countries will seek security by matching their adversaries in nuclear weapons warhead for warhead—empirical evidence does not match this claim. The United States, for example, does not try to match Russia’s nonstrategic arsenal, and China was content with a minimum deterrent for many decades. Countries, therefore, can be motivated by other drivers and sometimes expand—or do not expand—nuclear arsenals for financial, bureaucratic, or political reasons.

Action-reaction arms races have been absent in the post-Cold War period

Action-reaction arms races have not occurred in the post-Cold War period. In fact, the last twenty years have shown very little evidence for arms racing in the nuclear modernization of the United States and Russia, and the specific systems which China is developing do not comport with a desire to respond to US nuclear forces. Therefore, all three states have taken on their recent modernizations and buildups largely for other reasons.

Coming nuclear tripolarity may drive an action-reaction arms race

The author finds that there is a possibility of such an arms race only in strategic forces and much less of a prospect for an arms race in theater nuclear forces. US nuclear strategy does not aim to match Russia and China warhead for warhead in theater nuclear weapons, but, as China and Russia build their strategic nuclear forces, the United States must decide how to respond to this problem. It is not a foregone conclusion that Russia and China would react to an increase in US strategic forces with their own buildups, however, making an arms race possible but not inevitable.

Key recommendations

The report advances a number of recommendations to understand and respond to the future nuclear dynamics among the United States, Russia, and China in the 2020s and 2030s.

The motivation behind China’s nuclear buildup is a key variable in assessing the possibility of a future arms race. This should be a key priority for US intelligence agencies.

An increase in the number of US nonstrategic nuclear weapons is unlikely to touch off an action-reaction arms race. The United States should continue to develop the nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missile and consider other theater-range nuclear weapons.

The United States should maintain its current nuclear strategy, including those elements related to targeting and force-sizing. It is not a foregone conclusion that Russia and China would respond to a US nuclear arms buildup. However, if they did, the United States would be better off dealing with the consequences of a nuclear arms race than accepting the risks of deterrence failure.

About the author

Staff

Matthew Kroenig

Vice President and Senior Director, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

China Defense Policy

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Kroenig on Fox News Sunday discussing North Korea and Iran

Atlantic Council — Mon, 28 Nov 2022 19:26:55 +0000

Vice President and Senior Director, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

On November 27, Scowcroft Center acting director Matthew Kroenig was interviewed by Jennifer Griffin on Fox News Sunday discussing North Korea’s latest missile test and protests in Iran.

The [North Korean nuclear] threat continues to grow. The right [US] approach is a pressure and engagement campaign. Increase the diplomatic, economic, and political pressure on North Korea so long as it pursues these destabilizing policies, but hold out the possibility for engagement and negotiations if Kim Jong Un is willing to come talk.

Matthew Kroenig

Staff

Matthew Kroenig

China Defense Policy

The Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security works to develop sustainable, nonpartisan strategies to address the most important security challenges facing the United States and the world.

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Ukraine must be allowed to strike back against targets inside Russia

Ira Straus — Tue, 22 Nov 2022 20:27:03 +0000

When will the Ukrainian military finally retaliate for the ongoing destruction of their own country by striking back at targets inside Russia? The short answer is: When Ukraine’s partners allow them to do so.

Many people may not have noticed, but the United States and Ukraine’s other Western allies have been protecting Russia from Ukrainian counterattack ever since the invasion began on February 24. Ukraine has a legal right to hit back inside Russia, but is currently not being permitted to do so by partners whose support Kyiv cannot afford to lose. The US and others have placed limits on acceptable targets for the arms they provide, while also demanding assurances from Kyiv that these weapons will not be used inside Russia itself.

The current approach grants Putin impunity to continue attacking and escalating without fear of a proportionate response. It has resulted in a surrealistic war where the aggressor benefits from guarantees that any destruction will be limited to the territory of his victim.

This is particularly evident in the devastating recent Russian attacks on Ukraine’s critical civilian infrastructure, which will keep getting worse until Ukraine regains its right of retaliation. If Ukraine received the appropriate weapons and a green light from its Western partners to hit back against Russia’s own infrastructure, Moscow would likely think twice about its current bombing campaign.

Today’s war is arguably not the first time Russia has benefited from restrictions imposed by the West on Ukraine’s ability to defend itself. In 1994, the US and UK partnered with Moscow in the nuclear disarmament of post-Soviet Ukraine. There were a number of good reasons for this step, but the West should have provided Ukraine with a conventional deterrent force in exchange. It should do so now.

Self-defense is a basic right of every nation and includes proportionate lawful retaliation. This is essential in order to deter international aggression. Ukraine’s partners should be facilitating the country’s ability to exercise this right, not undermining it.

Restricting Ukraine’s ability to defend itself could lead to alarming international security consequences far from the front lines of the current conflict. It is one thing for the United States to restrain NATO allies which it is directly protecting, but it is quite another for the US to limit the right to self-defense of a friendly non-NATO country that it is helping only at arm’s length. This could establish a dangerous precedent and invite the invasion of other US allies.

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Why does the West protect Russia? The reasons given for this have often been less than logical. Some have argued that allowing Ukraine to strike targets inside Russia, or even arming Ukraine enough to win on its own turf, would provide Putin with a pretext for attacking further, as if he needed one. Instead, Putin has been granted impunity to attack and escalate at will. Unsurprisingly, he has done so.

The only reason Russia enjoys “escalation dominance,” to use the doctrinal phrase, is because the West keeps granting it. This is based on false assumptions. Russia may have more weapons, but Ukrainians are fighting for their homeland. They believe in their cause and are prepared to fight hard for it. The same cannot be said for Russians. This is the simple reality ignored by Western policymakers when they adopt a defeatist-leaning doctrine.

The flawed thinking behind current doctrines and policies also helps to explain why so many Western governments planned on Ukraine collapsing in a matter of days. It sheds light on why they did not arm Ukraine properly in advance to deter the attack, and why subsequent efforts to arm Ukraine have consistently fallen short. There has also been a widespread reluctance to voice support for a Ukrainian victory, reflecting the mistaken belief that too much Ukrainian success would be dangerous.

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Ukraine’s advance in Kursk: What’s next and implications

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The Biden Administration appears to have settled in for a war of attrition, but this approach risks weakening the alliance in support of Ukraine. Attrition undermines NATO morale and increases the prospects of a defeat that would discredit the entire alliance.

Crucially, attrition leaves Ukraine and Europe to bear the main burden of a protracted war, with Ukraine suffering destruction and Europe paying for sanctions. These costs are already nearing one trillion US dollars for Ukraine and another trillion for Europe, according to some estimates. Europeans find themselves confronted with the prospect of a perilous winter heating season and a new wave of Ukrainian refugees. Meanwhile, many Americans are angry about Europe’s failure to share the burden of arming Ukraine.

If Ukraine had been given sufficient weapons for a fair fight, the country would likely have secured victory long ago. Indeed, if Kyiv had received enough arms before Putin launched his full-scale invasion, there would probably not even have been a war at all. This is the cost of ambivalence.

Overly cautious Western policies have clearly failed to restrain Putin. Yet the realities of a losing war are now restraining him anyway. He can see that his invasion is not going according to plan. Putin wanted a short, victorious war but finds himself embroiled in the largest European conflict since World War II. The Russian military shows little enthusiasm for the war and may refuse to follow orders if he goes too far. This could have fatal consequences for the Putin regime, which is significantly more brittle than people may assume. The defeatist perspective in many Western capitals fails to take these realities into account.

The Ukrainian military has already demonstrated that it is capable of defeating Russia on the battlefield. Ukraine will win the war if we let it. This means providing Ukraine with the weapons it needs in the necessary quantities without delay. It also means lifting restrictions on Ukraine’s ability to hit Russian targets. In order to defeat Putin and end the war, Ukraine must be allowed to strike back inside Russia.

Ira Straus is chair of the Center for War/Peace Studies and senior advisor at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center. He was a Fulbright professor of international relations in Moscow in 1997-98 and 2001-02.

The US Congress has indicated that it shares the White House’s political appetite for setting up IAMD in the Middle East. In June, US lawmakers introduced the Deterring Enemy Forces and Enabling National Defenses (DEFEND) Act, which could lead to transnational information and technology sharing architecture needed for IAMD. This call for a security alliance among Israel, Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Qatar, Oman, Kuwait, and Iraq stems from the diplomatic momentum started by the Abraham Accords. In parallel, Congress has increased authorizations for missile-defense initiatives (equipment, upgrades, testing, administration, etc.) from roughly $6.6 billion for fiscal year 2022 to $6.9 billion for 2023. This US-led IAMD diplomacy and missile-defense funding has great stabilizing potential for the Middle East if US policymakers carry them out with careful forethought.

The US military industrial complex is already exporting missile defense globally. The Netherlands, Germany, Japan, Israel, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Taiwan, Greece, Spain, South Korea, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Romania, Sweden, Poland, and Bahrain have all purchased missile-defense systems from the United States.

Congressional debates on the above foreign military sales often center on whether recipient countries fully observe international laws and conventions. But there is a solution available to policymakers backing IAMD in the Middle East: Limit foreign military sales to missiles with an exclusive purpose of supporting IAMD and make those sales contingent on countries decreasing their missile and bomb reserves.

Through this arrangement, the US government can limit the ability of a Middle East country to wage war without detracting from US security support for that country. Saudi Arabia’s actions show why US policymakers must strike this balance. Saudi Arabia is the world’s leading importer of arms, and these imports—mainly from the United States, France, and the United Kingdom—enabled it to conduct 150 airstrikes on targets in Yemen that have amounted to 24,000 casualties, including 9,000 civilian casualties by a conservative estimate. Nonetheless, the United States’ economic and security goals in the region rely on the US-Saudi Arabia relationship, highlighting the longtime US foreign policy dissonance between American values and interests in the Middle East. And as countries across the globe look for alternatives to Russian energy in response to Russia’s war in Ukraine, they’ll likely become increasingly dependent on Saudi Arabia, especially with today’s high oil prices and inflation. Saudi Arabia is not naïve about this, given its decision to team up with Russia and other oil producers in OPEC+ to choke oil production to keep prices high. In the end, countries depend on a secure Saudi Arabia but not necessarily Saudi military capabilities.

This distinction is where the strategic and political value lies for the United States in leveraging IAMD assistance to reduce missile and bomb reserves in the Middle East. If the United States provides IAMD in exchange for scaling down offensive stockpiles, it could, by matching Riyadh’s transactional nature, reconfigure the US-Saudi Arabia relationship, in which Washington’s attempts to solidify a long-term strategic relationship have so far gone unreciprocated.

Anchoring IAMD to concessions from Middle East partners to reduce their inventories of missiles and bombs may chip away at their will to participate in this US-coordinated proposal. However, the value of IAMD assistance increasingly outweighs the drawbacks of curtailing offensive stocks as more actors gain access to ballistic, cruise, and hypersonic missiles. Superiority within this context is not a matter of the quantity of missiles and bombs: It is a matter of the quality of defensive technology. Just as guerilla warfare upset the status quo of conventional-military warfare, proxy forces firing missiles by drone press the same advantage in asymmetrical warfare today. Iran-backed Houthi rebels illustrate this as they continue to wage a missile campaign against oil facilities in Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. The most successful attack took Saudi Arabia’s Khurais and Abqaiq facilities offline, temporarily shutting off output, which amounted to about 6 percent of global daily supply. While US partners in the region may balk at any proposed constraints on their arsenals, they should reconsider as the Iranian missile threat evolves and as the tradeoff for an IAMD becomes increasingly attractive. Not to mention that the United States’ self-critical democracy makes it a more reliable IAMD provider, as its relatively open and transparent internal debate makes it less likely to overpromise technological capabilities in the face of credible missile threats. Moreover, neither China nor Russia has appeared willing or able to act as a regional security guarantor, by default making the United States the most willing and experienced partner for IAMD.

Counteracting forces at play also present opportunities. Political ruptures between countries on the seams of Iranian engagement, Israeli normalization, and Iraqi counterbalancing—coupled with Arab Gulf countries’ wider mistrust of one another—have limited the prospects for any integrated security. Some US partners in the Middle East have expressed the will to amend or evolve their air-defense capabilities for tighter or more capable IAMD, but still cite a need for US coordination. Until these countries can build enough intra-regional goodwill to trust one another, the Middle East will continue to rely on the United States for IAMD. US policymakers can use the necessity of IAMD, therefore, to broker stable relationships and as leverage for missile and bomb concessions within this splintered intra-regional context. In that event, diminishing offensive stockpiles could deter another aggravated response from Iran, a country caught in an ever-escalating security dilemma with its neighbors.

But the United States faces rightful skepticism in the region about its ability to be a reliable partner. The murder of Saudi critic and Washington Post journalist Jamal Khashoggi corroded US-Saudi Arabia diplomacy. During this volatility, Saudi leadership interpreted the US removal of Saudi-based PATRIOT missile batteries in 2021 as a direct repercussion, and the systems were returned in March 2022 after escalating tensions in Europe. International rule of law justly demands that there are consequences for human-rights violations, but this pursuit should not be at the cost of regional stability. Biden breaking the diplomatic ice with Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and other Gulf Cooperation Council leaders in July was a step in the right direction because it opened more space for dialogue. Now the White House plans to “review the bilateral relationship” with Saudi Arabia as a consequence of the OPEC+ decision. It would be a mistake to shun the Saudis again. Communication, not the silent treatment, begets accountability.

The United States is strategically teed up to revisit its relationship with Saudi Arabia and logistically well positioned to back IAMD in the Middle East. Thus, US policymakers can best serve the country’s interests by moving past conventional single-partner security cooperation and taking a more long-term and regional view, one that answers the transactional foreign policy of the Arab Gulf in kind; they can do that by decreasing missile and bomb reserves and increasing regional cohesion through IAMD. Lawmakers can drive the effort by passing the DEFEND Act, but they should first amend it to de-escalate the Middle Eastern arms race. Reducing offensive stockpiles in the region lends itself to lessening negative humanitarian outcomes, or at least can remove US support from any negative humanitarian outcomes. US policymakers must remember to look ahead or risk extending the US legacy of short-sighted assistance that only worsens or enables endemic instability, with evidently little to show from its relationships in the region.

Alex Elnagdy is the assistant director of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative

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Bowing to Putin’s nuclear blackmail will make nuclear war more likely

Andriy Zagorodnyuk — Tue, 18 Oct 2022 20:56:25 +0000

With his armies in retreat and his invasion of Ukraine rapidly unraveling, Russian President Vladimir Putin has recently resorted to nuclear saber-rattling. This has caused widespread international alarm and is fueling mounting calls for Ukraine to reach a compromise with the Kremlin in order to avert World War III.

The current rush to appease Moscow is deeply unnerving and reflects a shortsighted failure to appreciate the appalling security implications of bowing down to Russian intimidation. Giving in to Putin’s nuclear blackmail would not end the war in Ukraine. What it would do is set a disastrous precedent that makes a future nuclear war far more likely while encouraging dozens of countries to acquire nuclear arsenals of their own.

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Putin first raised the prospect of a nuclear escalation in a September 21 address that saw him announce plans to annex large swathes of occupied Ukrainian territory and launch Russia’s first mobilization since World War II. “I’m not bluffing,” the Russian ruler declared. The following week, he accused the United States of “creating a precedent” by dropping atomic bombs on Japan in 1945 and vowed to use “all means at our disposal,” to defend Ukrainian regions annexed by Russia.

The Western response has been mixed. US officials have informed the Kremlin that Russia would face “catastrophic consequences” if it moves to use nuclear weapons in Ukraine, while EU foreign policy chief Josep Borrell has warned Moscow that any nuclear attack would be met with “such a powerful answer that the Russian army will be annihilated.”

Others have been less forthright, with French President Emmanuel Macron in particular coming under fire for unilaterally ruling out the use of nuclear weapons in response to a Russian nuclear attack on Ukraine. Meanwhile, tech billionaire Elon Musk has been one of numerous high-profile figures to promote Kremlin-friendly peace plans while arguing that the world faces possible nuclear apocalypse unless Ukraine cedes land (and millions of citizens) to Russia.

Eurasia Center events

Vice President and Senior Director, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Ukraine’s advance in Kursk: What’s next and implications

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What comes next will determine the future role of nuclear weapons in international relations and shape the security climate for decades to come. If Russia’s nuclear threats succeed and Ukraine is forced to accept partial partition, the entire doctrine of mutually assured destruction (MAD), which served so well throughout the Cold War, will be torn up and a new age of instability will begin.

MAD worked because the two Cold War era superpowers balanced each other out. The Russian invasion of Ukraine is completely different. We are currently witnessing a nuclear superpower threatening a non-nuclear state precisely because it has failed to win a war by conventional military means. The message from Moscow is both menacing and unmistakable: countries with nuclear weapons cannot be defeated by those who have none. This is a recipe for nuclear proliferation.

If Putin is able to rescue his failing invasion and achieve his military goals through the use of nuclear blackmail, it will spark a nuclear arms race of unprecedented proportions. A long list of countries including everyone from Iran and Saudi Arabia to Nigeria and South Korea will take note of the new rules established in Ukraine and scramble to join the nuclear club. Eventually, not having nukes could come to be seen as an invitation for invasion.

This would be bitterly ironic as Ukraine was once something of a poster child for nuclear non-proliferation. In 1994, Ukraine agreed to hand over what was at the time the world’s third-largest nuclear arsenal in exchange for “security assurances” from Russia, the United States, and the United Kingdom. The Budapest Memorandum is now widely recognized as one of the most notorious diplomatic blunders of the modern era. It is a mistake few are eager to repeat. Indeed, given Ukraine’s current predicament, why would any country abandon their own nuclear aspirations in return for empty assurances?

The only way to prevent the world from descending into a dark future of spiraling nuclear confrontation is to make sure Putin fails. His nuclear threats require an overwhelming response spelling out that any atomic aggression in Ukraine would mean defeat and ruin for Russia. There is no longer room for strategic ambiguity or talk of proportional retaliation; Putin must be made to personally understand that neither he nor his regime would survive if he chooses to cross the nuclear red line.

Many NATO member states will no doubt be deeply uncomfortable with the idea of directly confronting the Kremlin in this manner. Others will warn that such posturing could easily ignite a third world war. These are valid concerns, but there are no longer any risk-free options available. Unless the international community stands up to Putin now, the entire world will be plunged into a dangerous new era defined by the constant threat of nuclear warfare.

Andriy Zagorodnyuk is chairman of the Center for Defence Strategies and Ukraine’s former minister of defense (2019–2020).

Staff

Matthew Kroenig

China Defense Policy

The Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security works to develop sustainable, nonpartisan strategies to address the most important security challenges facing the United States and the world.

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Kroenig in Foreign Policy on a potential new Iran nuclear deal

daniellemiller — Fri, 26 Aug 2022 16:24:40 +0000

Vice President and Senior Director, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

On August 26, Foreign Policy published its biweekly “It’s Debatable” column featuring Scowcroft Center acting director Matthew Kroenig assessing the latest news in international affairs.

In his latest column, he discusses ongoing US-Iran nuclear talks and outlines what an effective new Iran deal might look like.

The goal for negotiations with Iran should be for Iran to shut down its uranium enrichment program. [The] world gave up in 2015 and signed this lousy deal that allows Iran to make nuclear fuel.

The alternative would be to insist that Iran shut down its enrichment facilities, and if it refuses to do so, then as a last resort, the U.S. Defense Department can shut down its facilities for them.

Matthew Kroenig

Staff

Matthew Kroenig

China Defense Policy

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Kroenig discusses nuclear risk on NHK World-Japan

Atlantic Council — Sun, 07 Aug 2022 17:44:00 +0000

Vice President and Senior Director, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

On August 6, Matthew Kroenig spoke on a televised panel hosted on NHK World-Japan. Dr. Kroenig covered the risks of nuclear escalation due to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the implications of China’s nuclear build up, and the evolution of US nuclear posture.

I think the risk is low, but not zero. I have been saying maybe a 10% chance that Putin uses nuclear weapons…from his point of view using nuclear weapons would be more attractive than losing the war in Ukraine.

Matthew Kroenig

Staff

Matthew Kroenig

China Defense Policy

Executive Chairman Emeritus

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Gen. James Jones: ‘the Black Sea region is being pounded into the soft underbelly of security in Europe’

aahmed — Wed, 06 Jul 2022 12:38:00 +0000

22nd Parliamentary Intelligence-Security Forum
Bucharest, Romania, July 6, 2022

Remarks by Gen. James L. Jones, Atlantic Council board director and executive chairman emeritus, on Black Sea security after the NATO Summit

Thank you, Chairman Popescu, for such a generous introduction. It is great to be back in Bucharest.

Good morning to you all.

Let me also express my appreciation to Chairman Popescu, Mr. Pottenger and the Parliament of Romania for their hospitality and for hosting and orchestrating this intelligence security forum.

It is good be among here, among old friends and in person, including, of course, Prime Minister Ciucă, Minister Bode, and President of the Parliament Marcel Ciolacu.

We convene here today, at a time when war has returned to Europe and in the days immediately following NATO Summit in Madrid.

This morning I would like to share with you some personal thoughts regarding what is at stake in Ukraine’s courageous and inspiring defense against Russia’s aggression, NATO’s response to that unprovoked invasion, and what seems to be needed in an era where the scope of international competition and conflict is becoming ever wider and, thus, more complex.

Regarding Ukraine, I fear the situation is increasingly ominous.

The Russian government’s rhetoric against Ukraine, NATO, and the West has intensified.

Although Russian territorial advances have slowed, their offensives in the East have taken on a new and dangerous intensity where they recently seized control of the Luhansk region.

The root cause of this carnage is found within the soul of one man, Vladimir Putin, his refusal to recognize Ukraine as a sovereign nation, his hatred for the NATO expansion following the collapse of the Soviet Union, and his deep-seated belief that the United State did not do enough in Russia’s hour of need. As some of you know, Putin believes that there was an unwritten agreement at the time that NATO would never expand its membership to include former Warsaw Pact nations. There is no evidence to support his belief, but it is a documented fact that he believes this fable.

As an aside, the next panel should probably not be titled “The War in Ukraine” but rather “Russia’s Unprovoked Invasion of Ukraine.”

There should be no question that this aggression was not triggered by any events or issues inside Ukraine – that is Putin’s false narrative, and we should never buy into it.

This is a war of unjustified aggression driven by the imperialist ambitions of an autocrat—whose rise to power was weaned by corruption, sustained through brutality, and now marked forever by a savage war of conquest and criminality.

In fact, Putin’s historical revisionism and territorial ambitions aim to eliminate the very existence of Ukraine, its history, and its distinctive ethnicity—and with it the Ukrainian people’s rights to independence, liberty, and democracy.

I’m certain that we all agree that much is at stake in this conflict and how it is terminated.

Ukraine’s sovereignty and survival is obviously in the balance.

It is jeopardized for the second time in a decade by a regime whose ambitions, actions, and atrocities herald back to the darkest times of the last century.

Ukraine has become today’s defining collision point between democracy and autocracy, between the rule of law in international affairs and a world whose future is shaped by brute force.

If Putin is allowed to prevail, we will find ourselves back in a world dominated by spheres of influence and military coercion — this time one that features not only new forms of aggression – such as cyber-attacks and disinformation — but also the more active and destabilizing exercise of nuclear power.

We can all agree that every aspiring autocrat, on multiple continents is watching carefully to see whether or not Putin succeeds and survives in the diplomatic sense as a legitimate head of state.

They are also keen to learn whether or not the combination of indiscriminate military force, nuclear threats, economic disruption, and time will weaken the resolve of democracies to reject his crimes and assign him the pariah status he has earned.

Putin’s invasion of Ukraine has also highlighted the centrality of the Black Sea region to transatlantic security.

The Black Sea region is, quite literally, the zone where Putin’s Russia has most violently confronted the West over the last two decades.

And I am not just referring the two invasions of Ukraine and Putin’s transformation of Crimea into the hub of an anti-access/area denial zone spanning the Black Sea.

I am also referring to the continued occupation of Transnistria, the invasion of Georgia, and Moscow’s exercise of the full spectrum of hybrid warfare across this region, including trade and energy embargoes, cyber-attacks, information warfare and even sabotage and assassination.

In many ways, the Black Sea region is being pounded into the soft underbelly of security in Europe.

Vladmir Putin is determined to transform the Black Sea into his personal military lake, one which he will use to further his revisionist agenda if Western allies do not take adequate steps to deter this aggression.

Only recently have our policymakers and military planners at NATO and in the US begun to focus needed attention and resources to reinforce the Black Sea region.

Indeed, it is combination of the stark brutality of Putin’s invasion of Ukraine and the courageous and inspiring resistance of the Ukrainian people that has precipitated this long overdue Transatlantic response.

This includes our support to Ukraine today which is significant.

The West is sending huge amounts of military equipment to that nation — as well as other forms of assistance, imposed a growing array of economic sanctions against Russia, and, of course, is bolstering NATO’s own eastern flank, including the deployment of a new NATO battlegroup here in Romania led by France

I applaud Washington’s recent announcement that it will send a rotational Brigade Combat Team to Romania to bolster the eastern flank.

I am confident that this BCT will help further deepen the US-Romanian bilateral relationship in addition to its regional duties…and I hope it will be a step toward a more robust permanent US military presence here in this nation.

These are important steps in the military domain, but Russia’s belligerence against Ukraine and beyond has long been a multidimensional assault.

Russia blends the application of its conventional military power with threats of nuclear weapons, but also disinformation campaigns, cyber-attacks, and the weaponization of energy exports, among other non-military fronts.

To be fully effective, the West’s response must be equally full spectrum.

In this regard, Romania and eleven other Central European nations are to be applauded for launching and driving forward the Three Seas Initiative.

If you have not yet heard of the Three Seas, it is an effort to accelerate the development of cross border energy, transport and digital infrastructure in the region between the Baltic, Black and Adriatic Seas – hence the name Three Seas.

In this innovative undertaking, the nations are harnessing the power of collaboration and the free market.

They are using their combined geo-economic potential to leverage private capital to address a long-standing deficit in regional cross-border connectivity, a legacy from the era of Soviet domination that today inhibits economic growth and is a source of vulnerability – as demonstrated by Russia’s recent efforts to pressure these nations by cutting energy supplies.

In the realm of energy security, the Three Seas promises to build the infrastructure needed to diversify the region’s sources of supply, enabling it to tap more effectively into global energy markets.

The Three Seas is all about the power of infrastructure to generate growth, strengthen economic resilience, and above all provide the foundations necessary to complete the vision of a Europe undivided, prosperous, free, and secure.

Next year, Romania will host the 8th Three Seas Initiative Summit and Business Forum – the second time President Iohannis will be hosting this gathering.

We are all grateful for the leadership Romania has brought to the Initiative.

Recently, we have been heartened by another realm of collaboration, a form of transatlantic collaboration: the launch of a new strategic partnership between the National School of Political and Administrative Studies (SNSPA) in Romania and the Atlantic Council in Washington, DC.

Our work together focuses on common interests between the US and Romania and how the two can and should foster regional collaboration to strengthen and secure the Black Sea region.

Such forums allow us to discuss topics that too often don’t make it to the top tier of subjects addressed by NATO Summits, like cyber security, intelligence sharing, critical infrastructure protection, the harnessing and securing of 5G, and the leveraging of artificial intelligence and quantum-enabled technologies.

Allow me to dig into two of these areas where intensified transatlantic — and since I am in Bucharest, let me add US-Romania — collaboration is urgently needed: the integration of secure 5G technologies into civilian and military networks and cyber-security for critical infrastructure.

5G is rapidly emerging as the central nervous system of society, harnessing the sensors, communication links, computing capacity and learning that will make everybody, everything and everyplace smarter and more functional.

That is why the US military is investing hundreds of millions of dollars testing and integrating 5G into its force structure and operations.

There is a clear reason for this.

On the battlefield — my old domain — the 5G leader will be more interoperable, coordinated, agile, and lethal.

The ramifications of 5G dominance are both tactical and strategic, and they are economic as well as military.

The 5G leader – the country or group of countries that most effectively and quickly operationalizes the potentials of 5G — will enjoy a first mover advantage in developing the innovation-related goods, services, and solutions 5G will enable — and the jobs and growth that will generate

Today, it is still too early to conclude that US and West have an upper hand in the race to 5G and follow-on generations of wireless communications already in the offing.

The winner of this race — be it China or the West — will have the upper hand in setting global wireless communication norms and standards.

Nothing could be more consequential in how the global future takes shape.

Under the China model – the authoritarian model — precedent informs us that 5G capabilities will be employed to steal intellectual property, monitor and control its population, and to surveil and coerce others beyond its borders.

Under the US and allied model 5G will be a platform to empower citizens, protect their privacy, and enable growth and development.

The transition to 5G provides the United States and its allies a golden opportunity to leverage the societal and economic potentials of 5G and to build greater security into our networks by applying new technologies and creating more responsible and enforceable global norms.

Making these improvements is crucial to protecting US and Allied qualitative military edge, securing command, control and communications networks, protecting the nation’s critical infrastructure, and safeguarding personal privacy.

5G collaboration is very much both an opportunity and an urgency.

Another topic for immediate action is the protection of critical infrastructure which is increasingly reliant on cyber-networks.

Regardless of whether transportation, energy, telecommunication or other forms of infrastructure are private or state-owned, they face the same threats.

We are all aware of the cyber-attacks endured by Ukraine over the last five months and the earlier attacks on its power infrastructure and banking systems.

Another recent example is the widespread disruptive cyberattacks on the country of Georgia by the Russian GRU.

My point is that cyber attacks on critical infrastructure have become a regular pattern of aggression from a widening array of actors ranging from our geopolitical adversaries to criminal gangs.

Addressing this challenge requires heightened vigilance and proactive measures, at the national and multi-national levels.

These should include regular assessments of infrastructure security, exercises, information sharing, collaboration in developing advanced cyber-security technology, and the coordinated plans for incident response.

5G, cyber, and infrastructure protection are but a few of the factors that are widening the breadth of what defines security today and tomorrow..

They are only a few of the reasons why NATO and the transatlantic community need to both broaden and intensify their scope of intelligence collaboration and sharing.

Nowhere is this more apparent and urgent than in the Black Sea Region

Russia’s war against Ukraine has demonstrated the value of sharing real time intelligence and enhancing shared operating pictures.

This war is a lesson on the mutual benefits of intelligence collaboration for all NATO allies.

By fostering broader and deeper intelligence cooperation, this Forum, the Parliamentary Intelligence-Security Forum is playing an increasingly important function – both in terms of facilitating needed exchanges among legislators and in driving forward essential collaboration between governments.

Let me close by noting that this year marks the 25th anniversary of the Strategic Partnership between the United States and Romania.

This bilateral pact reflects our two nation’s commitment to shared values and our determination to protect and promote shared interests.

This strategic partnership is more than words on paper. It has been made material by real action.

In the military domain, this has included Romania’s contribution to NATO and other joint operations in Europe, the Middle East, Central Asia, and elsewhere.

It underscored by the actions that Romania and the US are taking today to help Ukraine defend itself.

And for all this, American are most grateful to our Romanian hosts, and look forward to a US-Romania relationship that continues to deepen and widen, contributing ever more to the transatlantic community’s security, prosperity and freedom.

I deeply appreciate the honor of addressing you in my capacity as a private citizen and as Chairman Emeritus of the Atlantic Council. Today, Romania stands on the front lines of the 21st century’s European Defense. The United States has committed its renewed support to that defense through its NATO and bilateral pledges. We have no better ally than Romania, and we will be successful once again. Thank you.

Board director

James L. Jones, Jr.

Issue Brief Mar 9, 2022

Defending every inch of NATO territory: Force posture options for strengthening deterrence in Europe

By The Scowcroft Center Task Force on Deterrence and Force Posture

Deterrence in Europe can be enhanced through a range of US and NATO force posture enhancements.

Conflict Defense Policy

Testimony Nov 1, 2021

Brzezinski testifies to US Senate Foreign Relations Committee on Black Sea security

By Ian Brzezinski

Atlantic Council Senior Fellow Ian Brzezinski testifies before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on a US strategy for security in the Black Sea region.

Arms Control Defense Policy

New Atlanticist May 18, 2022

Dashboard: Tracking the Western response to the war in Ukraine

By Atlantic Council

Explore the Atlantic Council’s interactive trackers for how the world has responded by sending humanitarian and military aid, redeploying forces, and hammering Russia’s economy.

Economic Sanctions Economy & Business

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Huessy in Warrior Maven on nuclear deterrence and modernization

Atlantic Council — Sun, 12 Jun 2022 14:57:00 +0000

Vice President and Senior Director, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

On June 12, Forward Defense nonresident senior fellow Peter Huessy was interviewed in Warrior Maven where he discussed nuclear deterrence and modernization in a modern context.

Staff

Matthew Kroenig

China Defense Policy

The Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security works to develop sustainable, nonpartisan strategies to address the most important security challenges facing the United States and the world.

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Putin deploys nuclear-capable missiles to Belarusian border with Ukraine

Brian Whitmore — Wed, 25 May 2022 21:13:08 +0000

Alyaksandr Lukashenka warned the West this week that it was risking World War III by continuing to arm Ukraine, even as he allowed Russia to deploy nuclear-capable missiles on Belarusian territory near the Ukrainian border.

In a rambling letter to United Nations Secretary General António Guterres on May 23, the Belarusian autocrat wrote that the West’s “disrespect for” what he called Russia’s “legitimate interests” led to the current East-West tension and “provoked a heated conflict on the territory of Ukraine.” Lukashenka also called on the West to “refrain from the supply of weapons” to Ukraine in order to “prevent a regional conflict in Europe from escalating into a full-scale world war.”

In the letter, which was delivered as Lukashenka was meeting Putin in Sochi, he also decried the fact that much of the world views him as a co-aggressor in the war. “We are not aggressors, as some states try to present us. Belarus has never been the initiator of any wars or conflicts,” he wrote.

The Belarus dictator’s protestations have repeatedly proven to be hollow given that Lukashenka has allowed Russia to use Belarusian territory as a platform to attack Ukraine, and this time was no exception. With Lukashenka, it is always best to watch what he does rather than listening to what he says. Shortly after warning the West about escalation and protesting that he was not a co-aggressor, Lukashenka proceeded to act like an aggressor and help Putin escalate the war in Ukraine.

One day after Lukashenka’s letter, on May 24, the Ukrainian General Staff announced that Russia had deployed a division of nuclear-capable Iskander-M missiles in the Brest region of Belarus near to the Ukrainian border. “There is a growing threat of missile and air strikes on our country from the territory of the Republic of Belarus. The aggressor has deployed a battery of Iskander-M mobile short-range ballistic missile systems in the Brest region, approximately 50 kilometers away from the Ukrainian state border,” the Ukrainian General Staff wrote in a post on Facebook.

The missiles have a range of 400-500 kilometers, which puts large swaths of central and western Ukraine within striking distance. Lukashenka also announced the previous week that Belarus had purchased Iskanders and S-400 anti-aircraft missiles from Russia.

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The missile deployments and sales came as Belarus conducted military exercises near the Ukrainian border and Kyiv warned about increased troop levels and military activity. In a situation report on May 23, the Ukrainian General Staff warned that “the armed forces of the Republic of Belarus are intensifying reconnaissance and additional units are being deployed in the border areas of the Homel region.”

The Russian missile deployments to Belarus and the uptick in Belarusian military activity suggests that while the fighting in Ukraine may currently be concentrated in the east of the country, Moscow still intends to pressure Ukraine from the north.

The military build-up on the Belarusian-Ukrainian border has been mirrored by similar activity along Ukraine’s nearby northern frontier with Russia. Seven weeks after Russia withdrew from the Chernihiv and Sumy regions in northern Ukraine, Ukrainian officials have recently noted an uptick in cross-border rocket and artillery fire and an increased Russian troop presence. “In any case, we are preparing for a possible reinvasion,” Oleksandr Vadovsky, deputy commander of Chernihiv’s border guards, told The Washington Post.

The Russian deployment of Iskander missiles to Belarus also starkly illustrates that despite his claims to the contrary and his half-hearted attempts to distance himself from the conflict, Lukashenka remains Putin’s chief enabler in the war against Ukraine and is very much a co-aggressor.

He allowed the Kremlin autocrat to use his country’s territory to stage an illegal invasion of a sovereign and democratic country. Lukashenka let Belarus become a platform for Russia to bomb Ukrainian cities and villages. He is directly responsible for the deaths of thousands of innocent Ukrainian civilians. And now he is allowing Putin to deploy nuclear-capable Iskander missiles near Ukraine’s border.

The blood of any Ukrainians who may be killed by those missiles will also be on Lukashenka’s hands and he should be held accountable for it.

Brian Whitmore is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center, an Assistant Professor of Practice at the University of Texas at Arlington, and host of The Power Vertical Podcast.

“New technologies and evolving geopolitical challenges are putting strategic deterrence under its greatest strain in decades,” said Barry Pavel, senior vice president at the Atlantic Council and director of the Scowcroft Center. “This Commission will serve an essential purpose in charting a bipartisan path forward for strategic forces policy, a key goal of the Scowcroft Center as we honor the legacy of our namesake, the late General Brent Scowcroft, who chaired an eponymous commission in 1983 that paved the way for US strategic forces policy for decades.”

Dr. Kroenig has served in several positions in the US Department of Defense and the intelligence community in the Bush, Obama, and Trump administrations. From 2017-2021, he was a Special Government Employee (SGE) and Senior Policy Adviser in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy, Plans, and Capability/Nuclear and Missile Defense Policy. He was a national security adviser on the presidential campaigns of Mitt Romney (2012) and Marco Rubio (2016).

Dr. Kroenig is also a tenured professor of government and foreign service at Georgetown University. He is the author or editor of seven books, including The Logic of American Nuclear Strategy: Why Strategic Superiority Matters (Oxford University Press, 2018). Dr. Kroenig co-authors the bi-weekly “It’s Debatable” column at Foreign Policy. He holds an MA and PhD in political science from the University of California at Berkeley.

In assuming his new position, Kroenig said, “The security environment has deteriorated significantly since 2009 (the last time a congressional commission issued a report assessing these issues), making it necessary for this Commission to take a fresh look at an appropriate strategic forces policy for the United States. I am honored to serve alongside a distinguished group of national security leaders to take on this important challenge.”

The Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security works to develop sustainable, nonpartisan strategies to address the most important security challenges facing the United States and the world. The Center honors General Brent Scowcroft’s legacy of service and embodies his ethos of nonpartisan commitment to the cause of security, support for US leadership in cooperation with allies and partners, and dedication to the mentorship of the next generation of leaders. Our namesake, General Scowcroft, was the chairman of the 1983 Scowcroft Commission that established the bipartisan basis for US nuclear deterrence and arms control to this day. As the United States enters a new era of strategic challenges, the Scowcroft Center is proud to play a central role in crafting an effective and nonpartisan strategic forces policy for the twenty-first century.

For any questions or to request an interview with Dr. Kroenig, please contact us at press@AtlanticCouncil.org.

The Atlantic Council is a nonpartisan organization that promotes constructive leadership and engagement in international affairs based on the Atlantic Community’s central role in meeting global challenges. The Council provides an essential forum for navigating the dramatic economic and political changes defining the twenty-first century by informing and galvanizing its uniquely influential network of global leaders. The Atlantic Council—through the papers it publishes, the ideas it generates, the future leaders it develops, and the communities it builds—shapes policy choices and strategies to create a more free, secure, and prosperous world. For more information, please visit AtlanticCouncil.org and follow us on Twitter @AtlanticCouncil

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Will Putin use chemical weapons in Ukraine?

Ben Connable — Sun, 15 May 2022 23:15:24 +0000

With Russia’s war in Ukraine foundering, there are increasing fears that Vladimir Putin might unleash chemical or biological weapons on Ukrainian soldiers and civilians. How realistic is this scenario?

Putin knows there is a special terror associated with chemical and biological weapons. Ukrainians have good reason to fear their use: the effects are awful. But delivering chem-bio weapons is difficult and dangerous even for well-trained professional soldiers. There is little to suggest Russian troops would be successful.

Chemical weapons like nerve, blistering, and choking agents are designed to kill or maim victims. For example, Russia used Novichok nerve agent in an attempt to murder political opponents in Salisbury in 2018. Biological agents like ricin and botulism are deadly or incapacitating toxins or diseases. For example, shortly after the 9/11 attacks, an unknown assailant sent weaponized anthrax through the US mail in an unsuccessful effort to kill members of Congress.

I experienced the fear of chemical attack firsthand while examining suspicious unexploded shells during the 1991 Gulf War, and while invading Saddam Hussein’s Iraq in 2003. I never quite knew if my chemical suit or mask were fitted just right, or if a tiny gap had opened up that might have exposed me to unspeakable suffering. Luckily I experienced nothing but false alarms. But even those unfounded fears were sobering.

Others have not been so lucky. Saddam used poison gas to kill thousands of Iranian troops in the Iran-Iraq War. He also deployed chemical weapons to murder thousands of his own people. More recently, Syrian civilians experienced deadly chemical attacks launched by their own Russian-backed government.

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Russia almost certainly retains a sizable store of chemical and biological weapons. Moscow’s commitments to destroy the last vestiges of its Soviet-era stockpiles are no more believable than any random story on Russian state media. But having these terrifying weapons and putting them to effective use are two different matters. I see at least three reasons why the use of chemical or biological weapons in Ukraine could go badly wrong for the Russians.

There is little doubt that direct attribution would be unavoidable for any Russian chemical weapon attack in Ukraine. Experts on chem-bio weapons and Russian tactics assume the Russians would try to use a false flag operation to deny responsibility for their attack. They might attempt to make it look like the Ukrainians attacked their own civilians in an effort to discredit Russia, or they might even try to pin the blame on NATO.

This could still be an effective tactic for the Russian domestic audience, but the days of gaslighting Western leaders and reporters are over. Advanced Western surveillance, detection, and forensics will not allow Russia’s armed forces to secretly deploy chem-bio weapons. Russia’s failure to cover up even its most highly classified assassination attempts suggest it would fail even more spectacularly to cover up much larger battlefield attacks.

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Ukraine’s advance in Kursk: What’s next and implications

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The chance of grave errors in chemical weapon delivery would be very high. Delivering chem-bio weapons is a complicated task best left to well-trained and practiced professionals. It is highly unlikely that Putin’s air, ground, or missile forces have retained the skills necessary to ensure safe and effective delivery of these deadly weapons from storage to target.

First, they must transport the weapons without mishap. Some containers, bombs, and shells are so old that their often caustic payloads may be leaking. Next, they have to prepare the weapons for delivery by airplane, missile, or artillery strike. This involves careful handling by soldiers trussed up in head-to-toe protective gear, a fraught prospect even under ideal conditions. Even before they launch their attacks, Russian soldiers would be at high risk of catastrophic failure.

It is important to note that Russian ground forces are not prepared to capitalize on chem-bio attacks. Launching these weapons can cause terror, injury, and death. But chem-bio attacks are not magical. They will not kill everyone they affect, and weaponized gasses cannot seize or hold territory. Simply firing these weapons into civilian areas like Kharkiv or Kyiv is likely to harden rather than weaken Ukrainian and Western resolve.

Chemical weapons are used most effectively to soften up targets for follow-on ground attack. Troops wearing protective gear must push forward into the contaminated zone riding in protected vehicles supported by decontamination trucks while carrying lots and lots of extra protective supplies. Given the present state of Russian forces in Ukraine and the probable lack of advanced chem-bio training, this would be all but impossible. If the Russians try to push their own troops into a chem-bio environment they are likely to suffer much the same fate as their victims.

The Russian military can certainly attack Ukraine with chemical and biological weapons. But they probably cannot do so effectively or without significant risk to their own forces. Russia will be caught out and, in keeping with its overall strategic failure in Ukraine, achieve little more than increasing international opprobrium and isolation. Putin would be wise to leave his chemical and biological weapons safely tucked away in cold storage or, better yet, to destroy them as promised.

Ben Connable is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council and adjunct professor of security studies at Georgetown University.

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Kroenig and Ashford in Foreign Policy: Is There a Risk of a NATO vs. Russia War?

Atlantic Council — Mon, 02 May 2022 18:27:36 +0000

Vice President and Senior Director, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

On February 24, Scowcroft Center deputy director Matthew Kroenig and NAEI senior fellow Emma Ashford discussed the risk of a NATO war with Russia.

Staff

Matthew Kroenig

China Defense Policy

The Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security works to develop sustainable, nonpartisan strategies to address the most important security challenges facing the United States and the world.

Vice President and Senior Director, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

The post Kroenig and Ashford in Foreign Policy: Is There a Risk of a NATO vs. Russia War? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Kroenig interviewed on BBC radio about Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant

Atlantic Council — Mon, 02 May 2022 18:18:35 +0000

On March 03, Scowcroft Center deputy director Matthew Kroenig spoke with BBC Radio 5 live about Russia’s seizure of the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant in Ukraine.

Staff

Matthew Kroenig

China Defense Policy

The Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security works to develop sustainable, nonpartisan strategies to address the most important security challenges facing the United States and the world.

The post Kroenig interviewed on BBC radio about Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Kroenig interviewed on CBS News about China’s approach to the war in Ukraine

Atlantic Council — Mon, 02 May 2022 18:02:24 +0000

Vice President and Senior Director, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

On March 21, Scowcroft Center deputy director Matthew Kroenig spoke on CBS News about China’s response to the war in Ukraine and its attempt to balance between Russia and the West.

Staff

Matthew Kroenig

China Defense Policy

The Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security works to develop sustainable, nonpartisan strategies to address the most important security challenges facing the United States and the world.

The post Kroenig interviewed on CBS News about China’s approach to the war in Ukraine appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Kroenig and Ashford in Foreign Policy: does the new US national defense strategy make any sense?

Atlantic Council — Mon, 02 May 2022 18:00:10 +0000

Vice President and Senior Director, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

On April 08, Scowcroft Center deputy director Matthew Kroenig and NAEI resident senior fellow Emma Ashford discussed the Pentagon’s new national defense strategy in Foreign Policy magazine.

Staff

Matthew Kroenig

China Defense Policy

The Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security works to develop sustainable, nonpartisan strategies to address the most important security challenges facing the United States and the world.

The post Kroenig and Ashford in Foreign Policy: does the new US national defense strategy make any sense? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Kroenig and Ashford in Foreign Policy: is weakening Russia a bad idea?

Atlantic Council — Mon, 02 May 2022 17:58:41 +0000

Vice President and Senior Director, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

On April 29, Scowcroft Center deputy director Matthew Kroenig and NAEI resident senior fellow Emma Ashford discussed recent proposals to weaken Russia in the long term.

Staff

Matthew Kroenig

China Defense Policy

The Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security works to develop sustainable, nonpartisan strategies to address the most important security challenges facing the United States and the world.

The post Kroenig and Ashford in Foreign Policy: is weakening Russia a bad idea? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Arbit quoted in The Dispatch on escalations in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict

Atlantic Council — Wed, 27 Apr 2022 22:13:00 +0000

Explore the #BritainDebrief series

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#BritainDebrief – What’s at stake in France’s Presidential Election? | A Debrief from Ambassador Gérard Araud

Ben Judah, Gérard Araud — Mon, 25 Apr 2022 15:38:25 +0000

What’s at stake in France’s Presidential Election?

As French President Emmanuel Macron maintains a lead ahead of his far-right challenger Marine Le Pen, Senior Fellow Ben Judah interviews Ambassador Gérard Araud, former French Ambassador to the US and Senior Fellow, for #BritainDebrief to discuss how this election will impact France. What is France’s role in NATO? What will happen to the European Union and France-Russia relations if Le Pen wins the election?

You can watch #BritainDebrief on YouTube and as a podcast on Apple Podcasts and Spotify.

subscribe to #BritainDebrief

listen to #britaindebrief as a podcast

MEET THE #BRITAINDEBRIEF HOST

Former staff

Ben Judah

Europe Center Transform Europe Initiative

Economy & Business European Union

The Europe Center promotes leadership, strategies, and analysis to ensure a strong, ambitious, and forward-looking transatlantic relationship.

The post #BritainDebrief – What’s at stake in France’s Presidential Election? | A Debrief from Ambassador Gérard Araud appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Kroenig and Ashford in Foreign Policy and POLITICO: Would Putin use nuclear weapons?

Atlantic Council — Tue, 12 Apr 2022 14:20:00 +0000

Vice President and Senior Director, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

On April 12, Emma Ashford and Matthew Kroenig participated in a Foreign Policy debate over whether Russia would use nuclear weapons, which was also featured in Politico.

“I think one of the Cold War lessons we absolutely need to take is Ronald Reagan’s famous dictum that a nuclear war cannot be won and should never be fought. The problem, of course, is that everybody agrees on that, but people disagree pretty strongly on how to avoid having to fight that war in the first place. There’s a couple of models: the one that I favor…is mutually assured destruction. MAD is…both sides in a nuclear relationship have a secure second strike capability: that is to say that even after nuclear weapons start flying, they maintain the ability to strike back at the other side. Throughout much of the Cold War, MAD helped to assure that neither side felt that they could benefit from starting a nuclear war,” Ashford argued.

Staff

Matthew Kroenig

China Defense Policy

The Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security works to develop sustainable, nonpartisan strategies to address the most important security challenges facing the United States and the world.

The post Kroenig and Ashford in Foreign Policy and POLITICO: Would Putin use nuclear weapons? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Kroenig on the Ben Domenech Podcast on the Russian nuclear threat

Atlantic Council — Mon, 11 Apr 2022 19:40:00 +0000

Vice President and Senior Director, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

On April 11, deputy director of the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security Matthew Kroenig was featured on the Ben Domenech Podcast episode “Complex strategy: Navigating international & Domestic relations.” Kroenig explains the Russian nuclear shadow over Ukraine but clarifies that Putin does not want a nuclear war.

In a way he [Putin] has already used nuclear weapons with the threat of using them to back stop this invasion.
Matthew Kroenig

Staff

Matthew Kroenig

China Defense Policy

The post Kroenig on the Ben Domenech Podcast on the Russian nuclear threat appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Lend-Lease for Ukraine: US revives WWII anti-Hitler policy to defeat Putin

Chris Alexander — Sat, 09 Apr 2022 16:01:31 +0000

On April 7, the US Senate unanimously passed the “Ukraine Democracy Defense Lend-Lease Act of 2022,” a revival of FDR’s Lend-Lease policy enacted in March 1941 which helped win the Second World War.

This new Lend-Lease arrangement has not yet passed the US House of Representatives, which has adjourned for a two-week break. If confirmed, it will complement previous Congressional support for Ukraine, which has already seen USD 1.7 billion in military assistance authorized since Russia’s full-scale invasion began on February 24.

The new Lend-Lease bill significantly enhances existing lend-lease authorities available to US President Joe Biden under the Arms Export Control Act, while waiving several current requirements. It should ensure that shipments of urgently-needed weapons systems, ammunition, and military assistance in other forms arrive in Ukrainian hands faster and more seamlessly.

The bill was first conceived in the months prior to the outbreak of hostilities as a measure to deter a renewed Russian onslaught. Since February 24, it has evolved into an initiative to bolster Ukraine’s war-fighting capabilities while ensuring NATO allies also receive the support they need in the new context of a major war in the heart of Europe.

The Lend-Lease bill has been bipartisan from the start. “We introduced this measure in January as part of a broad campaign to deter Russia from making a terrible mistake, which the Kremlin has nevertheless now done. This horrific, unnecessary and unprovoked war against Ukraine has to end, with Ukraine prevailing against Russia’s aggression,” commented Sen. Ben Cardin (D-MD). “Our bipartisan bill streamlines the president’s ability to bolster Ukraine’s defenses, defend innocent civilians, and also to protect our frontline NATO allies who may become targets of a desperate Vladimir Putin.”

The Lend-Lease vote in the Senate happened as the US was authorizing USD 100 million in further defense support for Ukraine. This latest arms package will augment Ukraine’s Javelin anti-armor systems while providing 100 Switchblade drones which will extend the ability of the Ukrainian Armed Forces to hit Russian military targets at greater distance.

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The revival of Lend-Lease has enormous historical resonance as the 1941 initiative was a crucial factor enabling Allied victory in World War II. Stalin himself credited Lend-Lease, which benefited Great Britain, France, China and the Soviet Union, with winning the war.

As Stalin’s successor as Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev wrote, “I would like to recall some remarks Stalin made and repeated several times when we were discussing freely among ourselves. He stated bluntly that if the United States had not helped us, we would not have won the war. If we had had to fight Nazi Germany one on one, we could not have stood up against Germany’s pressure, and we would have lost the war.”

Lend-Lease was not used in the Korean War, where US regular forces fought. It was also never activated in Afghanistan during the 1980s, where the US supported an irregular campaign against the Soviet invasion.

After a pause of more than 75 years, Lend-Lease is now set to be revived to ensure Ukraine repels the largest attack on a European state since 1945. This revival aims to thwart a dictator whose explicit ambition to destroy Ukraine as a state and a nation echoes the criminal goals of Hitler and Stalin.

Eurasia Center events

Ukraine’s advance in Kursk: What’s next and implications

Conflict Russia Security & Defense Ukraine

Other democracies are taking similar approaches to countering the Kremlin. The European Union has committed EUR 1.5 billion in military support since February 24, an unprecedented step for its 27 member states. Meanwhile, Slovakia has sent an S-300 surface-to-air missile system to Ukraine, the first NATO ally to do so. The Czech Republic has delivered T-72 tanks. Even faraway Australia is sending 20 Bushmaster armored vehicles to Ukraine.

These shipments come in the wake of the latest NATO ministerial meeting, where NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg urged allies to provide “both light and heavy weapons” while acknowledging that distinctions between offensive and defensive weapons “don’t actually have any real meaning in the kind of defensive war Ukraine is fighting.”

The original Lend-Lease scheme was devised months before the US entered the Second World War to enable countries under attack from Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan to defend themselves. Today it is being activated to help Ukraine defend itself from Russian attack, as it has every right to do under article 51 of the United Nations Charter, which confirms “the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a member of the United Nations.”

Thanks to Congressional support for Lend-Lease and similar steps taken by democracies around the world, Ukraine is set to enjoy potentially unlimited military support from the United States, as well as from dozens of countries committed to defeating Russia.

Roosevelt first referred to the United States as the “Arsenal of Democracy” in a radio broadcast on December 29, 1940, over three months before Lend-Lease became law. Today, the US is resuming this central role, but this time as one of 30 NATO allies and many other partners taking similar steps to ensure Ukraine fights on to victory.

Lend-Lease is a potential game-changer for the war in Ukraine. If confirmed in the coming weeks as expected, it should cheer Ukraine’s defenders as they prepare to wage new battles against a formidable but increasingly vulnerable adversary.

Chris Alexander is a distinguished fellow of the Canadian International Council and the Macdonald-Laurier Institute. He was formerly Canada’s deputy head of mission in Moscow, parliamentary secretary for national defence, and minister of citizenship and immigration.

Atlantic Council — Mon, 04 Apr 2022 19:45:00 +0000

The post Fontenrose quoted in Middle East Eye on obstacles facing Russia in pursuit of arms deals in the Middle East appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Fontenrose in Defense News: Turkish drones won’t give Ukraine the edge it needs

Atlantic Council — Fri, 01 Apr 2022 18:56:00 +0000

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Kroenig in the Wall Street Journal on Ukrainian nuclear disarmament

Atlantic Council — Thu, 31 Mar 2022 21:03:04 +0000

Vice President and Senior Director, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

On March 31, deputy director of the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security Matthew Kroenig authored an op-ed in the Wall Street Journal titled “Leaving nukes in Ukraine was not the answer.” Kroenig refutes the idea that the West should not have pressed Ukraine into nuclear disarmament upon the disintegration of the Soviet Union.

If Kyiv had tried to cling to nukes, Washington would have treated it like Iran and North Korea over the past several decades. Instead, Ukraine became seen in the West as a responsible partner.
Matthew Kroenig

Staff

Matthew Kroenig

China Defense Policy

The post Kroenig in the Wall Street Journal on Ukrainian nuclear disarmament appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Global Times cites Kroenig on strategic simultaneity

Atlantic Council — Wed, 30 Mar 2022 16:02:00 +0000

Vice President and Senior Director, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

On March 30, deputy director of the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security Matthew Kroenig was cited in an article in the Global Times, a nationalist daily of the Chinese Communist Party. The article criticized Kroenig’s support for a US foreign and security policy to deal with strategic simultaneity and his “Global Strategy 2021: An Allied Strategy for China.” You can read the strategy below.

Staff

Matthew Kroenig

China Defense Policy

The post Global Times cites Kroenig on strategic simultaneity appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Kroenig on C-SPAN on the Russian nuclear threat

Atlantic Council — Mon, 28 Mar 2022 17:36:00 +0000

Vice President and Senior Director, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

On March 28, deputy director of the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security Matthew Kroenig was featured on a segment of C-SPAN, where he outlines the Russian nuclear threat against Ukraine and the West.

When talking about WMD [chemical, biological, and nuclear] use I think the risk is remote but it is not zero and I think the chance of its use now is greater than at any time in recent memory.
Matthew Kroenig

Staff

Matthew Kroenig

China Defense Policy

The post Kroenig on C-SPAN on the Russian nuclear threat appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Huessy in Warrior Maven on the Russian nuclear threat

Atlantic Council — Sat, 26 Mar 2022 17:13:00 +0000

Vice President and Senior Director, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

On March 26, Forward Defense nonresident senior fellow Peter Huessy spoke with Warrior Maven’s Center for Military Modernization on the holistic nuclear and conventional threat that Russia poses to the West and how the United States must respond.

The only thing he [Putin] recognizes and understands is deterrence and deterrence requires a formidable nuclear and conventional capability.
Peter Huessy

Staff

Matthew Kroenig

China Defense Policy

The post Huessy in Warrior Maven on the Russian nuclear threat appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Kroenig in Financial Times on US nuclear force posture

Atlantic Council — Fri, 25 Mar 2022 17:22:00 +0000

Vice President and Senior Director, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

On March 25, deputy director of the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security Matthew Kroenig was quoted in an article in the Financial Times titled “Biden steers away from big changes to US nuclear weapons policy.” Referencing the forthcoming Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), Kroenig expresses concern that a shift in US nuclear posture during the 2022 Russia-Ukraine war will rebuff US allies.

It [Biden’s nuclear posture declaration] essentially says that America’s nuclear weapons might not be on the table to deter a Russian or Chinese conventional [non-nuclear] attack.
Matthew Kroenig

Staff

Matthew Kroenig

China Defense Policy

The post Kroenig in Financial Times on US nuclear force posture appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Lipner quoted in Mother Jones on Israel’s response to Russian invasion of Ukraine and Israel’s diplomatic obstacles

Atlantic Council — Thu, 24 Mar 2022 14:44:00 +0000

Explore the #BritainDebrief series

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#BritainDebrief – How will the war in Ukraine end? A Debrief from Rob Lee

Ben Judah — Thu, 17 Mar 2022 21:05:39 +0000

How will the war in Ukraine end?

As the Russian military advance continues to stall, Senior Fellow Ben Judah interviewed Rob Lee, FPRI Senior Fellow, for #BritainDebrief. How have lethal British military aid, like anti-tank MLAWs, performed so far? Can Ukraine continue to hold out against Russia? How real is the threat of Russian chemical weapon attacks in Ukraine?

You can watch #BritainDebrief on YouTube and as a podcast on Apple Podcasts and Spotify.

subscribe to #BritainDebrief

listen to #britaindebrief as a podcast

MEET THE #BRITAINDEBRIEF HOST

Former staff

Ben Judah

Europe Center Transform Europe Initiative

Economy & Business European Union

The Europe Center promotes leadership, strategies, and analysis to ensure a strong, ambitious, and forward-looking transatlantic relationship.

The post #BritainDebrief – How will the war in Ukraine end? A Debrief from Rob Lee appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Kroenig quoted in the Atlantic on Russia’s nuclear threat

Atlantic Council — Tue, 15 Mar 2022 15:12:00 +0000

Vice President and Senior Director, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

On March 15, deputy director of the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security Matthew Kroenig was quoted in an article in the Atlantic titled “Putin’s Nuclear Threats Are a Wake-Up Call for the World.”

All nuclear command-and-control systems, including America’s, have a “first rule of Fight Club”-like aspect to them: you don’t talk much about them, to keep your enemies guessing.
Uri Friedman

Staff

Matthew Kroenig

China Defense Policy

The post Kroenig quoted in the Atlantic on Russia’s nuclear threat appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Kroenig in the Washington Post on the Russian nuclear threat

Atlantic Council — Tue, 15 Mar 2022 14:13:00 +0000

Vice President and Senior Director, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

On March 15, deputy director of the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security Matthew Kroenig was quoted in an article in the Washington Post titled “Why Putin’s nuclear threat could be more than bluster.” Kroenig postulates that Putin will use limited nuclear strikes to prevent a decisive Russian military defeat.

I think he [Putin] sees limited nuclear use as more attractive than accepting defeat.
Matthew Kroenig

Staff

Matthew Kroenig

China Defense Policy

The post Kroenig in the Washington Post on the Russian nuclear threat appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Kroenig in Providence on Russia’s nuclear threat

Atlantic Council — Mon, 14 Mar 2022 19:46:00 +0000

Vice President and Senior Director, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

On March 14, deputy director of the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security Matthew Kroenig spoke with Providence students about the current Russia-Ukraine crisis and its potential nuclear implications.

Staff

Matthew Kroenig

China Defense Policy

The post Kroenig in Providence on Russia’s nuclear threat appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Kroenig quoted in New York Times on seriousness of Putin’s nuclear threat

Atlantic Council — Mon, 14 Mar 2022 16:14:22 +0000

Vice President and Senior Director, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

On March 02, Scowcroft Center deputy director Matthew Kroenig invoked historical examples in the New York Times to evaluate the seriousness of Putin’s nuclear threat.

Staff

Matthew Kroenig

China Defense Policy

The Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security works to develop sustainable, nonpartisan strategies to address the most important security challenges facing the United States and the world.

The post Kroenig quoted in New York Times on seriousness of Putin’s nuclear threat appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Kroenig and Ashford in Foreign Policy: would Putin use nuclear weapons?

Atlantic Council — Fri, 11 Mar 2022 18:24:34 +0000

Vice President and Senior Director, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

On March 11, Scowcroft Center deputy director Matthew Kroenig and NAEI resident senior fellow Emma Ashford discussed the potential that Putin might use nuclear weapons in Foreign Policy magazine.

Staff

Matthew Kroenig

China Defense Policy

The Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security works to develop sustainable, nonpartisan strategies to address the most important security challenges facing the United States and the world.

The post Kroenig and Ashford in Foreign Policy: would Putin use nuclear weapons? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Kroenig interviewed on CBS Mornings about Russia’s tactical nuclear weapons

Atlantic Council — Fri, 11 Mar 2022 17:32:35 +0000

Vice President and Senior Director, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

On March 11, Scowcroft Center deputy director Matthew Kroenig spoke on CBS Mornings about Russia’s stockpile of tactical nuclear weapons and the implications of their potential use.

Staff

Matthew Kroenig

China Defense Policy

The Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security works to develop sustainable, nonpartisan strategies to address the most important security challenges facing the United States and the world.

The post Kroenig interviewed on CBS Mornings about Russia’s tactical nuclear weapons appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Katz joins the Gulf International Forum to discuss the implications of Ukraine crisis on the Gulf region

Atlantic Council — Tue, 08 Mar 2022 16:08:00 +0000

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Kroenig in CNBC on Russia’s attack on Ukraine nuclear plant

Atlantic Council — Fri, 04 Mar 2022 21:08:02 +0000

Vice President and Senior Director, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

On March 4, deputy director of the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security Matthew Kroenig was featured on a segment of CNBC titled “This could be at least as bad as Chornobyl.” Kroenig explains the alarming risks of a potential nuclear meltdown at the Ukrainian nuclear plant and whether the Russians are purposefully targeting it.

The spread of [radiation material] could be as bad as Chornobyl and could cause a nuclear meltdown.
Matthew Kroenig

Staff

Matthew Kroenig

China Defense Policy

The post Kroenig in CNBC on Russia’s attack on Ukraine nuclear plant appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Kroenig in Fast Company on Putin’s nuclear alert

Atlantic Council — Thu, 03 Mar 2022 21:29:49 +0000

Vice President and Senior Director, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

On March 3, deputy director of the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security Matthew Kroenig was quoted in an article in Fast Company titled “How prepared are we for a nuclear attack?” Kroenig highlights that it is unlikely that Putin will actually utilize its nuclear forces.

Staff

Matthew Kroenig

China Defense Policy

The post Kroenig in Fast Company on Putin’s nuclear alert appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Cimmino quoted in the Washington Examiner on outlook for Ukraine conflict

aelliott — Wed, 02 Mar 2022 23:43:00 +0000

Vice President and Senior Director, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

On March 2, Scowcroft Strategy Initiative associate director Jeffrey Cimmino told the Washington Examiner that Putin may have no off-ramp short of escalation — and the conflict in Ukraine is likely to get worse before it gets better.

Staff

Matthew Kroenig

China Defense Policy

The Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security works to develop sustainable, nonpartisan strategies to address the most important security challenges facing the United States and the world.

The post Cimmino quoted in the Washington Examiner on outlook for Ukraine conflict appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Slavin quoted in the Daily Mail on Biden’s nuclear negotiations with Iran

Atlantic Council — Wed, 02 Mar 2022 22:05:00 +0000

The post Slavin quoted in the Daily Mail on Biden’s nuclear negotiations with Iran appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Kroenig quoted in Washington Examiner on China’s response to Ukraine crisis

Atlantic Council — Tue, 01 Mar 2022 21:04:00 +0000

Vice President and Senior Director, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

On March 1, Scowcroft Center deputy director Matthew Kroenig discussed China’s recent efforts to balance between supporting Russia and avoiding international condemnation with the Washington Examiner.

Staff

Matthew Kroenig

China Defense Policy

The Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security works to develop sustainable, nonpartisan strategies to address the most important security challenges facing the United States and the world.

The post Kroenig quoted in Washington Examiner on China’s response to Ukraine crisis appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Kroenig quoted in Washington Examiner on Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky

Atlantic Council — Tue, 01 Mar 2022 21:01:00 +0000

Vice President and Senior Director, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

On March 1, Scowcroft Center deputy director Matthew Kroenig discussed Zelensky’s “resolute wartime leadership” with the Washington Examiner.

Staff

Matthew Kroenig

China Defense Policy

The Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security works to develop sustainable, nonpartisan strategies to address the most important security challenges facing the United States and the world.

The post Kroenig quoted in Washington Examiner on Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Kroenig in the Telegraph Online on Putin’s nuclear alert

Atlantic Council — Tue, 01 Mar 2022 18:11:00 +0000

Vice President and Senior Director, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

On March 1, deputy director of the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security Matthew Kroenig was quoted in an article in the Telegraph Online titled “Vladimir Putin declares nuclear alert, Joe Biden seeks de-escalation” from his previously published article in the New York Times. Kroenig highlights that it is unlikely that Putin will actually utilize its nuclear forces.

Staff

Matthew Kroenig

China Defense Policy

The post Kroenig in the Telegraph Online on Putin’s nuclear alert appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Kroenig in New York Magazine on Putin’s nuclear alert

Atlantic Council — Tue, 01 Mar 2022 18:03:00 +0000

Vice President and Senior Director, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

On March 1, deputy director of the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security Matthew Kroenig was quoted in an article in New York Magazine’s Intelligencer titled “Could Putin go nuclear?” from his previously published article in the New York Times. Kroenig highlights that it is unlikely that Putin will actually utilize its nuclear forces.

Staff

Matthew Kroenig

China Defense Policy

The post Kroenig in New York Magazine on Putin’s nuclear alert appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Kroenig quoted in Politico on Russian nuclear threats

Atlantic Council — Mon, 28 Feb 2022 21:27:00 +0000

Vice President and Senior Director, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

On February 28, Scowcroft Center deputy director Matthew Kroenig was quoted in Politico discussing Russia’s “escalate to de-escalate” doctrine of backstopping conventional aggression with nuclear threats.

Staff

Matthew Kroenig

China Defense Policy

The Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security works to develop sustainable, nonpartisan strategies to address the most important security challenges facing the United States and the world.

The post Kroenig quoted in Politico on Russian nuclear threats appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Kroenig quoted in Fox News on US embassy evacuation

Atlantic Council — Mon, 28 Feb 2022 20:36:00 +0000

Vice President and Senior Director, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

On February 28, Scowcroft Center deputy director Matthew Kroenig was quoted in Fox News arguing that the decision to shut down the US embassy in Kiev was the “correct and prudent move.”

Staff

Matthew Kroenig

China Defense Policy

The Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security works to develop sustainable, nonpartisan strategies to address the most important security challenges facing the United States and the world.