How did this happen? Russia, long opposed to the Council of Europe’s 2001 Budapest Convention on cybercrime, began this process in 2017. Then, in 2019, Russia, along with China, North Korea, Myanmar, Nicaragua, Syria, Cambodia, Venezuela, and Belarus, presented a resolution to develop a global treaty. Despite strong opposition from the United States and European states, the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution in December 2019, by a vote of seventy-nine in favor and sixty against (with thirty abstentions), that officially began the process. Already, it was clear that the member states did not share one vision. Indeed, they could not even agree on a name for the convention until last week. What they ended up with is a mouthful: “Draft United Nations convention against cybercrime: Strengthening international cooperation for combating certain crimes committed by means of information and communications technology systems and for the sharing of evidence in electronic form of serious crimes.”

This exceedingly long name reveals one of the biggest problems with this convention: its scope. At its heart, this convention is intended to allow law enforcement from different countries to cooperate to prevent, investigate, and prosecute cybercrime, which costs trillions of dollars globally each year. However, the convention covers much more than the typical cybercrimes that come to mind, such as ransomware, and includes crimes committed using technology, which reflects the different views as to what constitutes cybercrime. As if that were not broad enough, Russia, China, and other states succeeded in pushing for negotiations on an additional protocol that would expand the list of crimes even further. Additionally, under the convention, states parties are to cooperate on “collecting, obtaining, preserving, and sharing of evidence in electronic form of any serious crime”—which in the text is defined as a crime that is punishable by a maximum of four years or more in prison or a “more serious penalty,” such as the death penalty.

In Russia, for example, association with the “international LGBT movement” can lead to extremism charges, such as the crime of displaying “extremist group symbols,” like the rainbow flag. A first conviction carries a penalty of up to fifteen days in detention, but a repeat offense carries a penalty of up to four years. That means a repeat offense would qualify as a “serious crime” under the cybercrime convention and be eligible for assistance from law enforcement in other jurisdictions that may possess electronic evidence relevant to the investigation—including traffic, subscriber, and even content data. Considering how much of modern life is carried out digitally, there will be some kind of electronic evidence for almost every serious crime under any domestic legislation. Even the UN’s own human rights experts cautioned against this broad definition.

Further, under the convention, states parties are obligated to establish laws in their domestic system to “compel” service providers to “collect or record” real-time traffic or content data. Many of the states behind the original drive to establish this convention have long sought this power over private firms. At the same time, states parties are free to adopt laws that keep requests to compel traffic and content data confidential—cloaking these actions in secrecy. Meanwhile, grounds for a country to refuse a cooperation request are limited to instances such as where it would be against that country’s “sovereignty,” security, or other “essential” interest, or if it would be against that country’s own laws. The convention contains a vague caveat that nothing in it should be interpreted as an obligation to cooperate if a country “has substantial grounds” to believe the request is made to prosecute or punish someone for their “sex, race, language, religion, nationality, ethnic origin, or political opinions.”

Russia claimed that such basic safeguards, which do offer some protection in the example regarding LGBT activity as “extremist,” were merely an opportunity for some countries to “abuse” the opportunity to reject cooperation requests. Those safeguards, conversely, could also be abused by the very same states that opposed them. The Iranian delegation, for its part, proposed a vote to delete that provision, as well as all other human rights safeguards and references to gender, on the day the text was adopted. These provisions had already been weakened significantly throughout the negotiation process and only survived thanks to the firm stance taken by Australia, Canada, Colombia, Iceland, the European Union, Mexico, and others that drew a red line and refused to accept any more changes.

The possible negative consequences of this convention are not limited to human rights but can seriously threaten global cybersecurity and national security. The International Chamber of Commerce, a global business organization representing millions of companies, warned during negotiations that “people who have access to or otherwise possess the knowledge and skills necessary” could be forced “to break or circumvent security systems.” Worse, they could even be compelled to disclose “previously unknown vulnerabilities, private encryption keys, or proprietary information like source code.” Microsoft agreed. Its representative, Nemanja Malisevic, added that this treaty will allow “for unauthorized disclosure of sensitive data and classified information to third states” and for “malicious actors” to use a UN treaty to “force individuals with knowledge of how a system functions to reveal proprietary or sensitive information,” which could “expose the critical infrastructure of a state to cyberattacks or lead to the theft of state secrets. Malisevic concluded that this “should terrify us all.”

Similarly, independent media organizations called for states to reject the convention, which the International Press Institute has called a “surveillance treaty.” Civil society organizations including Electronic Frontier Foundation, Access Now, Human Rights Watch, and many others have also long been ringing the alarm bell. They continue to do so as the final version of the convention adopted by the committee has failed to adequately address their concerns.

Given the extent and cross-border nature of cybercrime, it is evident that a global treaty is both necessary and urgent—on that, the international community is in complete agreement. Unfortunately, this treaty, perhaps a product of sunk-cost fallacy thinking or agreed to under duress for fear of an even worse version, does not solve the problems the international community faces. If the UN General Assembly adopts the text and the required forty member states ratify it so that it comes into force, experts are right to warn that governments intent on engaging in surveillance will have the veneer of UN legitimacy stamped on their actions. Rights-respecting states should not allow themselves to be co-opted into assisting abusive practices under the guise of cooperation. Nor should they willingly open the door to weakening their own national security or global cybersecurity.

Lisandra Novo is a staff lawyer for the Strategic Litigation Project at the Atlantic Council specializing in law and technology.

The post The UN finally advances a convention on cybercrime . . . and no one is happy about it appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Ever since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion almost two and a half years ago, the Kremlin has faced repeated accusations of deliberately targeting Ukrainian medical facilities. On the first anniversary of the invasion, CNN reported that “nearly one in ten” Ukrainian hospitals had been damaged as a result of Russian military actions. Underlining the frequency of such incidents, Kyiv’s Okhmatdyt Children’s Hospital was one of three separate Ukrainian medical facilities to be struck by Russian missiles on July 8.

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

The Russian military has killed a large number of Ukrainian healthcare professionals over the past two and a half years. Monday’s bombings resulted in the deaths of an least six Ukrainian medics. They joined hundreds of colleagues from the healthcare industry who have been killed since the invasion began. Russian military actions have also resulted in billions of dollars worth of damage to Ukrainian healthcare facilities. In many cases, this has made it impossible to continue providing essential medical support, leading to significant further human costs.

The campaign against Ukraine’s healthcare infrastructure is in no way exceptional and appears to align with Russian military doctrine. Similar patterns of attacks on clinics and hospitals have been identified during Russian military campaigns in Syria, Georgia, Chechnya, and beyond. Unless Russia can be held accountable for the targeting of healthcare infrastructure, it potentially opens the door for other countries to adopt similar military tactics in future conflicts.

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According to international humanitarian law, healthcare institutions and medical personnel are afforded specific and enhanced protection in conflict zones. Despite this status, Russia is accused of systematically targeting medical facilities across Ukraine. These attacks have been documented by the “Attacks on Health Care in Ukraine” project, which is run by a coalition of Ukrainian and international civil society organizations.

In addition to direct military attacks on healthcare infrastructure, research carried out by this civil society initiative has also identified a clear pattern of Russian behavior in occupied areas involving restricted access to essential healthcare services. Throughout regions of Ukraine that are currently under Kremlin control, the occupation authorities reportedly withhold medical care unless Ukrainians accept Russian citizenship and are otherwise cooperative.

It is also crucial to acknowledge the indirect impact of the Russian invasion on Ukrainian healthcare. The war unleashed by Vladimir Putin in February 2022 has created a range of long-term challenges including unprecedented demographic changes and a dramatic increase in mental health disorders. The healthcare ramifications of Russian aggression extend beyond Ukraine’s borders, including the burden placed on foreign healthcare systems by millions of Ukrainian refugees fleeing the war.

Prosecuting Russia for war crimes related to the targeting of Ukraine’s healthcare infrastructure is likely to be an extremely challenging and time-consuming process. Potential obstacles include slow judicial systems, difficulties in identifying individuals responsible for deliberate attacks, and problems establishing clear links between the perpetrators and the crime. Collecting evidence that meets international prosecution standards is also a complex task during ongoing combat operations.

In order to break the cycle of impunity, the international community must prioritize the investigation and prosecution of those who deliberately target healthcare infrastructure and medical personnel. This process should involve international and domestic legal systems along with the relevant UN investigative bodies.

Russia is clearly targeting the Ukrainian healthcare system and weaponizing the provision of medical services as part of a campaign aimed at breaking Ukrainian resistance and strengthening Moscow’s grip on occupied regions of the country. Unless there is accountability for these crimes, Russia’s actions will set a dangerous precedent that will lead to similar offenses in other conflict zones.

Olha Fokaf is a healthcare specialist currently serving as a consultant to the World Bank in Kyiv.

Further reading

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The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

Read more from UkraineAlert

UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia and Central Asia in the East.

Learn more

The post Hospital bombing was latest act in Russia’s war on Ukrainian healthcare appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On the eve of the invasion in February 2022, the Russian Navy began blocking Ukraine’s Black Sea ports, cutting off long-established trade routes taking Ukrainian grain and other agricultural goods to international markets. This represented a devastating blow to the Ukrainian economy, while also increasing the threat of famine in countries throughout the Global South dependent on Ukrainian food supplies.

For more than two years, this attack on the Ukrainian agricultural sector has continued to accelerate. From Odesa to the Danube Delta, the southern Ukrainian port facilities that are so crucial to the export of agricultural produce have been subjected to relentless bombardment. According to Odesa Military Administration head Oleh Kiper, this has made it impossible to accumulate large quantities of grain in warehouse facilities, and is forcing the country’s agricultural exporters to operate under constant threat of attack.

Ukraine’s agricultural infrastructure is also being systematically targeted across the country, with regular Russian attacks on equipment, storage facilities, and transport hubs. According to recent research, the total value of destroyed agricultural assets amounts to more than ten billion US dollars. Meanwhile, approximately two billion dollars worth of Ukrainian agricultural products have been destroyed or stolen and shipped to Kremlin allies such as Syria and Iran.

The scale of the damage done to Ukraine’s farmlands is staggering. More than one-third of the Ukrainian agricultural land dedicated to cereal production has been directly affected by the war, with about four million hectares currently unusable due to mining, munitions, or ongoing hostilities. A further eight million hectares of Ukrainian farmland is currently under Russian occupation. Beyond the front lines, Russia is also accused of deliberately setting fire to Ukrainian grain fields.

The Kremlin’s goal is clear: Russia aims to inflict irreparable damage on Ukraine’s agricultural industry, leading to economic collapse and depopulation. Ukraine has historically been known as Europe’s breadbasket, with the country’s agricultural sector serving as a key engine of the national economy. By blocking agricultural exports, destroying agricultural infrastructure, and preventing farmers from growing crops, Moscow hopes to undermine the economic foundations of Ukrainian statehood and pave the way for the country’s subjugation.

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

Russia’s campaign against the Ukrainian agricultural industry also has a broader international dimension. The Kremlin is using food as a weapon to expand its influence throughout the Global South while employing a combination of blackmail and bribery. Moscow seeks to prevent Ukraine from exporting foodstuffs to countries in Africa and Asia, while at the same time looking to “replace Ukrainian grain” with Russian supplies.

In summer 2022, there were hopes of some relieve for the Ukrainian agricultural sector when Russia signed up to a UN-brokered grain deal. This apparent breakthrough sparked initial optimism, but ultimately highlighted the Kremlin’s readiness to exploit global food security concerns. The UN-backed grain agreement allowed for limited exports of grain from Ukraine’s Black Sea ports, but it soon became apparent that Moscow saw the deal primarily as an opportunity to secure further concessions. The Kremlin consistently sabotaged implementation of the grain agreement, before unilaterally withdrawing one year later when its escalating demands were not met.

Eurasia Center events

Online Event Thu, August 15, 2024 • 9:00 am ET

Ukraine’s advance in Kursk: What’s next and implications

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Ukraine has achieved some notable successes in defense of the country’s farming industry. Beginning in August 2023, Ukraine has managed to partially unblock the country’s Black Sea ports and resume grain deliveries through the creation of a new corridor for merchant shipping. Maritime agricultural export volumes are now close to prewar levels, underlining the remarkable resilience of wartime Ukraine.

The resumption of agricultural exports via Ukraine’s Black Sea ports represents one of the country’s most significant victories since the onset of Russia’s full-scale invasion. This was made possible by the innovative use of Ukrainian drone technologies and the effective deployment of missiles provided by the country’s international partners, allowing Ukraine to significantly reduce the Russian Navy’s effectiveness in the Black Sea.

Despite this progress, much more still needs to be done in order to safeguard shipping lanes and allow for the free passage of agricultural produce across the Black Sea to global markets. As the trade routes that Russia is targeting lie in international waters, this is not an issue for Ukraine alone. Instead, there are implications for the wider international community, especially for other Black Sea region countries. It is important to hold Russia accountable for jeopardizing the security of vital maritime trade routes and for engaging in conduct that could be classified as piracy.

Ukraine has proven that it can fight back effectively against Russia with even limited resources. The Ukrainian military has damaged or destroyed around one-third of the Russian Black Sea Fleet, and has forced Putin to withdraw the bulk of his remaining warships from occupied Crimea to Russia itself. Ukraine now urgently needs to receive fighter jets, long-range missiles, and air defenses from the country’s international partners. With the right tools, Ukraine will be able to protect its ports and agricultural infrastructure, enforce international law in the Black Sea, and safeguard the breadbasket of Europe from further Russian attack.

Hanna Hopko is co-founder of the International Center for Ukrainian Victory and head of the ANTS Network. She was a member of the Ukrainian Parliament from 2014 to 2019 and served as head of the Parliamentary Committee on Foreign Affairs.

Further reading

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Civil Society Conflict

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The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

Read more from UkraineAlert

UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia and Central Asia in the East.

Learn more

The post Bombing Europe’s breadbasket: Russia targets Ukrainian farmers appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The ICC first opened proceedings into Russia’s invasion in March 2022. One year later, arrest warrants were issued for Putin himself and the Russian President’s human rights ombudsman, Maria Lvova-Belova, over the mass abduction of Ukrainian children. Ukrainian officials say thousands of Ukrainian children have been deported to Russia since the start of the full-scale invasion, with many adopted into Russian families or sent to camps where they are subjected to ideological indoctrination designed to erase their Ukrainian identity. This may qualify as an act of genocide, according to the UN’s 1948 Genocide Convention and the Rome Statute. 

In March 2024, the ICC announced new arrest warrants for Russian Air Force long range aviation chief Sergei Kobylash and Russian Black Sea Fleet commander Viktor Sokolov in connection with the bombing of Ukraine’s power grid. ICC prosecutors aim to charge the Russian commanders with the alleged commission of war crimes and crimes against humanity because they say the bombing campaign was part of a state policy of widespread attacks on the civilian population.

This week’s warrants represent a significant step forward in efforts to hold Russia legally accountable for crimes committed in Ukraine. The latest suspects are top Russian military officials and key figures alongside Putin in the leadership of the invasion. Both Gerasimov and Shoigu would be potential suspects in a future prosecution for the crime of aggression. However, the ICC does not have jurisdiction over this crime, while plans to establish a special tribunal remain at the early stages. 

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

News of the arrest warrants for Shoigu and Gerasimov was welcomed in Ukraine, with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy calling the ICC decision “a clear indication that justice for Russian crimes against Ukrainians is inevitable.” At the same time, there is little prospect of Russian leaders standing trial in The Hague any time soon.

All member countries of the ICC are expected to hand over suspects to the court, but Russia is not a member. Predictably, Russian officials have denounced the court’s latest warrants as part of a “hybrid war” being waged against the country. Ukraine is also not a member of the ICC but has granted the court jurisdiction to prosecute war crimes committed since the start of Russia’s invasion.

Eurasia Center events

Online Event Thu, August 15, 2024 • 9:00 am ET

Ukraine’s advance in Kursk: What’s next and implications

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While it remains unlikely that the ICC will be able to enforce its arrest warrants, the charges do have potential practical implications including restrictions on international travel. Indeed, concerns over possible arrest for war crimes are believed to have been instrumental in convincing Putin not to attend last summer’s annual BRICS summit in South Africa. If Shoigu and Gerasimov had any plans to travel internationally, they may now be forced to rethink.

It is also significant that the latest charges include allegations of crimes against humanity. While there is no such thing as an official hierarchy of international crimes, it is generally accepted that crimes against humanity are more serious offenses than war crimes and incur graver penalties. This may help Ukraine to consolidate support for Kyiv’s peace initiatives, while also strengthening international efforts to bring Russia to justice for crimes committed during the invasion. 

Russia’s bombardment of the Ukrainian electricity grid has been a particular focus for ICC investigators. This year’s arrest warrants address the period from October 2022 to March 2023, which saw the first campaign of intensified attacks. However, the bombing has continued, with Russian missile and drone strikes during the first half of 2024 damaging or destroying around half of Ukraine’s remaining power-generating capacity. 

This destruction has left Ukraine facing a possible humanitarian catastrophe during the coming winter months. Officials are currently warning that the civilian population may be restricted to six hours of electricity per day at a time when temperatures typically fall well below freezing for extended periods. This underlines the urgency of challenging Russian impunity and demonstrating that senior Russian officials will be held responsible for crimes committed in Ukraine.

Andrii Mikheiev is a lawyer at the International Centre for Ukrainian Victory.

Further reading

UkraineAlert May 30, 2024

If the West wants a sustainable peace it must commit to Ukrainian victory

By Hanna Hopko, Andrius Kubilius

Since 2022, Western policies of escalation management have failed to appease Putin and have only emboldened the Kremlin. If the West wants peace, it must help Ukraine win, write Hanna Hopko and Andrius Kubilius.

Civil Society Conflict

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By Peter Dickinson

Russia claims to have annexed five Ukrainian provinces but refuses to extend security red lines to these regions. This highlights the pragmatic political realities behind Putin’s talk of historic conquests, writes Peter Dickinson.

Conflict Disinformation

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

Read more from UkraineAlert

UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia and Central Asia in the East.

Learn more

The post More senior Russian officials join Putin on war crimes wanted list appeared first on Atlantic Council.

In early June, new developments in The Hague served as a reminder to key Russian propagandists, including one of Russia’s former presidents, that they may one day face similar charges. As allowed by Article 15 of the Rome Statute, a coalition of non-government organizations jointly submitted a formal Communication to the Office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC) requesting an investigation into six Russian nationals involved in state propaganda. Notably, this coalition included international and Ukrainian groups, as well as one Russian NGO.

The Communication urged the ICC to investigate the Russians for criminal hate speech. The accused include Dmitry Medvedev, former Russian president and current Security Council Deputy Chairman; Vladimir Solovyov, a popular host on Russian state-owned television channel Rossiya-1; Margarita Simonyan, editor-in-chief of Russia Today; Dmitry Kiselyov, head of the state-owned media consortium Rossiya Segodnya; and Sergey Mardan, a popular television and radio host. The Communication also named Alexey Gromov, First Deputy to the Presidential Executive Office’s Chief of Staff, stating his role in ordering or failing to prevent over 300 examples of criminal incitement to violence from February 24, 2022 to February 24, 2024. 

This initiative is arguably long overdue. Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine began more than two years ago, Russian state and state-aligned actors are accused of committing a daily litany of horrific atrocities against Ukrainians. In such a context, it is tempting to overlook the rhetoric behind these actions, but the Russia-Ukraine War illustrates the dangers of ignoring the threats made by powerful Russian media figures. Many in the Russian media have openly telegraphed eliminationist rhetoric against Ukrainians for years, setting the stage for the largest military attack in Europe since World War II. Their continuing threats against the existence of Ukraine, and against other Western countries, pose a direct threat to international security.  

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

Since 2022, it has become increasingly apparent that Russia’s highly sophisticated propaganda machine requires novel legal and policy responses. New dangerous and diffuse platforms for Russia’s inciting language and other disinformation continue to emerge. In addition to the kind of conventional propaganda most are familiar with, Russian actors now spread public incitement and more subtle disinformation through social media, bot farms, video games, movies, and manipulated content (including deepfakes). International law does not yet cover each of these categories, as older legal frameworks concentrate on historical understandings of propaganda in legacy media formats.

These realities pose serious challenges for anyone seeking to protect victimized groups from atrocity crimes. International law, including the United Nations Genocide Convention, prohibits all means of disseminating direct and public incitement. Still, Russia’s sophisticated networks of propaganda platforms make upholding these provisions difficult. As these challenges increase, Russian techniques of shaping subconscious dehumanization continue to evolve. This fostering of cascading radicalization within Russian society may prove even more impactful than one-time calls for violence, while being more difficult to trace and prosecute.

Some Russian efforts to stay ahead of judicial accountability are clear. Even the Russian authorities felt compelled to respond to Russian journalist Anton Kravosky’s call to drown Ukrainian children in a river (he was suspended from RT for these comments, although an investigative committee later stated he had committed no crime). After these events, some Russian propagandists became noticeably more careful, cloaking their rhetoric through allusions and metaphors. Still, even this “hidden rhetoric” often meets legal requirements for incitement and other criminal propaganda. 

Eurasia Center events

Online Event Thu, August 15, 2024 • 9:00 am ET

Ukraine’s advance in Kursk: What’s next and implications

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The gravity of alleged Russian atrocities against Ukrainians compels international urgency to disrupt Moscow’s escalation in direct violence and associated inciting propaganda to destroy Ukraine and Ukrainians. Days after posting a profanity-filled acknowledgement of the NGO-led Communication to the ICC, Dmitry Medvedev followed up with a video showing all of Ukraine as “belonging” to Russia. This complete obliteration of Ukraine from world maps was the first time a top Kremlin official had overtly claimed the entirety of Ukraine as a stated goal, showing a link between words and projected actions.

The international community now faces a critical moment. It also has a unique chance to create a legal framework and enforcement mechanism capable of implementation through international cooperation. Beginning at home, Ukraine’s legal system requires amendments to systematize prosecutions in absentia for genocidal incitement. International partners must support these efforts by surging law enforcement resources to monitor the flood of calls for violence emanating from Russian media and from more shadowy Kremlin-backed propaganda platforms.

For Russian propagandists to face the criminal consequences of their conduct, international arrest warrants are indispensable. Bolstering political will for judicial accountability and opening criminal proceedings should be the two major areas of focus. To ensure accountability, Ukraine and its partners must now plan for realistic enforcement mechanisms that implement trial verdicts and deny safe havens of non-extradition. The words and actions of Kremlin propagandists have combined to fuel unimaginable atrocities in Ukraine. To protect Ukrainians and other victims, and to prevent further armed conflicts fuelled by propaganda, the international community must break the cycle of Russia’s real or imagined impunity.

Kristina Hook is assistant professor of conflict management at Kennesaw State University and a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center. Anna Vyshniakova is a war crimes lawyer and a legal consultant, head of legal NGO LingvaLexa, and author of the book “Incitement to Genocide: How to Bring Propagandists to Justice.”

Further reading

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By Olivia Yanchik

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Conflict Defense Technologies

UkraineAlert Jun 4, 2024

Vladimir Putin just tacitly admitted Crimea is not really part of Russia

By Peter Dickinson

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Conflict Disinformation

UkraineAlert May 30, 2024

If the West wants a sustainable peace it must commit to Ukrainian victory

By Hanna Hopko, Andrius Kubilius

Since 2022, Western policies of escalation management have failed to appease Putin and have only emboldened the Kremlin. If the West wants peace, it must help Ukraine win, write Hanna Hopko and Andrius Kubilius.

Civil Society Conflict

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

Read more from UkraineAlert

UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia and Central Asia in the East.

Learn more

The post Holding Putin’s propagandists accountable for crimes in Ukraine appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On Thursday, April 25, the Atlantic Council’s WIn Fellowship hosted a panel discussion on the vital role Arab women ambassadors play in shaping the field of diplomacy, both in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, and globally.

The conversation was moderated by Lynn Monzer, Deputy Director of the Atlantic Council’s WIn Fellowship and featured H.E. Sheikha Al-Zain Al-Sabah, Ambassador of the State of Kuwait to the United States of America; H.E. Hanene Tajouri Bessassi, Ambassador of the Republic of Tunisia to the United States of America; and H.E. Amal Mudallali, former Ambassador to the Permanent Mission of Lebanon to the United Nations (UN).  

Deciding on diplomacy

H.E. Sheikha Al-Zain Al-Sabah initiated the conversation by sharing insights from her background in journalism, where she encountered diverse mindsets through storytelling. This experience highlighted her natural diplomatic skills, as navigating complex systems and creating sustainable solutions in business mirrored key aspects of diplomacy. These experiences and insights logically paved the way for her career in diplomacy.

Similarly, H.E. Hanene Tajouri Bessassi transitioned from an initial aspiration to become a physician to recognizing the diplomatic field as another form of healing. In her view, diplomacy involves listening to those in distress, diagnosing societal issues, and crafting viable solutions, thus paralleling the healing processes in medicine.

Like Al-Sabah, H.E. Amal Mudallali started in journalism, with ambitions centered on reporting at the UN. After achieving this, she ventured deeper into politics, eventually serving under two Lebanese prime ministers and later as the Ambassador of Lebanon to the UN. She emphasized the critical role of male allies in politics, where men predominantly hold power but greatly benefit from women’s collaborative and problem-solving skills.

In addition to winding career paths, all three diplomats agreed on the importance of a robust support system for success in diplomacy. Bessassi thanked her parents and husband specifically for the strength, independence, and commitment necessary to work in the diplomatic field. Echoing the sentiment on support systems, Mudallali highlighted her grandmother’s empowering role during her upbringing. She also stressed the crucial need for political backing, citing the potential difficulties and injustices faced without such support. Al-Sabah, similarly, underscored the significance of a nurturing ecosystem for achieving success. For her, the focus is on contributing back to this ecosystem and the broader community, often through mentoring other women, providing support, advice, and honest guidance on their professional journeys.

Navigating the field’s challenges

Bessassi then turned to the challenges facing women in diplomacy. She noted that despite Tunisia’s rich history of influential women leaders, gender parity remains elusive. This disparity is underscored by prevailing gender stereotypes that still hinder women’s effectiveness in all fields, including diplomacy. Bessassi argued against the perception that empathy—a trait often associated with women—is a weakness. Instead, she illustrated how empathy enhances diplomatic efforts by fostering consensus and compromise, bringing more people into the fold while working toward peace and cooperation.

The underrepresentation of women in global diplomacy was further addressed by Al-Sabah, who pointed out that women make up only 21 percent of ambassadors worldwide. She emphasized the importance of improving representation and noted that the participation of women on the panel, along with other women ambassadors in the United States from Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Mauritania, represents significant progress in altering public perceptions about women in diplomacy.

Mudallali echoed these concerns with specific examples from the United Nations, where women’s representation has been backsliding; the number of women UN representatives decreased from 52 in 2020 to 46 today. She linked this trend to a global phenomenon such as Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, as countries have become more brazen in rejecting previously held norms such as equal gender representation. She also noted the decrease in women’s participation in peace negotiations. In 2020, women represented 23 percent of negotiators in active peace processes, dropping to 16 percent in 2023. Based on analysis of real-world peace processes, agreements between negotiators are much more likely to be reached when women have a strong influence on the negotiations.

Al-Sabah added that 2023 saw a 50 percent increase in war-induced violence against women, reinforcing the necessity for women’s voices in peace negotiations. This backslide in gender representation, Mudallali argued, demands urgent attention and action in line with UN Security Council Resolution 1325, which focuses on women, peace, and security.

Bessassi acknowledged these recent challenges nut also emphasized the power of collective effort among women ambassadors, which has the potential to catalyze global change. Mudallali shared this sentiment,expressing her feeling of responsibility to do everything possible to elevate women, believing that these challenges require structured, codified solutions. Al-Sabah concluded by underscoring the importance of integrating advocacy into diplomacy to empower women effectively. In Kuwait, for instance, the government established the Department of Human Rights within the country’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs in part to address women’s empowerment. Internationally, too, organizations with similar aims must work together to implement Resolution 1325 to ensure countries adhere to international principles of women’s empowerment. For young women in the MENA region and beyond, seeing women in these roles not only offers a glimpse of what is possible but also instills hope and inspiration.

The future of diplomacy

Building on the theme of hope, Al-Sabah discussed a significant shift toward civic diplomacy following Israel’s invasion of Gaza, with women taking on an increased role in this space. She highlighted the courageous efforts of journalists like Shireen Abu Akleh, Plestia Alaqad, and Hind Khoudary who have used their personal cameras and cellphones to broadcast their voices are around the world. Al-Sabah stressed the urgent need for greater protection of journalists in Gaza and around the world, who face harassment and life-threatening dangers in their line of work.

Continuing the conversation, Bessassi emphasized the increasing importance of multilateralism now more than ever in addressing global challenges. She called for consistency in the international community’s approach, as the international community’s engagement on issues like the war in Gaza must avoid “double standards” to effectively address challenges in diplomacy.

Mudallali echoed the sentiments of her colleagues, concluding the panel with a call for strong advocacy for peace. She pointed out that recent global tensions have shifted the focus from collaboration to competition. By supporting women in diplomatic roles, Mudallali argued, societies will not only lift but also enhance their prospects for achieving lasting peace.

The way forward

Over a century since the first appointment of a women ambassador in 1920, women remain severely underrepresented in the predominantly male diplomacy sector. As of 2023, women account for only 20.54 percent of ambassadors worldwide, a decrease from 23 percent in 2020. The disparity is even more pronounced in the MENA region, where women make up just 10 percent of ambassadors, the lowest regional rate globally, highlighting a significant challenge for women in MENA diplomacy.

Despite these daunting numbers in MENA, there have been some encouraging signs of progress. The United Arab Emirates, for instance, has increased its proportion of women ambassadors by 5.5 percent between 2018 and 2023, reaching 12.5 percent. Additionally, a recent Arab Barometer report has shown a marked decrease throughout the MENA region over the past decade in the belief that men are better political leaders than women, suggesting growing acceptance of women in political and diplomatic roles.

However, effectively capitalizing on these openings requires systematic and sustained support. Algeria serves as a cautionary tale where a 2011 gender quota led to increased opposition to women in political leadership due to the absence of systemic improvements or societal readiness for such changes. Conversely, Tunisia witnessed an increase in openness toward women political leadership after the implementation of a similar quota and was further bolstered by President Kais Saied’s appointment of Najla Bouden Romdhane as the first female prime minister in the MENA region. These moves demonstrate that political backing and continued support of women is a crucial component to increasing women’s representation at both the political and diplomatic levels.

In addition to national efforts, international initiatives are crucial. UN Security Council Resolution 1325, which calls for women’s equal participation in preventing violent conflicts, is particularly significant. Supporting this resolution could significantly legitimize women’s roles in conflict mediation. This is supported by data showing that peace negotiations involving women are 35 percent more likely to last for at least fifteen years. Therefore, in the midst of shifting attitudes, a global drive for greater women participation in diplomacy, and the myriad conflicts necessitating peace negotiations, reform toward gender parity in diplomacy is as pressing and timely as ever for the MENA region.

Charles Johnson is a Young Global professional in the Atlantic Council’s Middle East programs

Jun 14, 2023

The WIn Fellowship 2023-2024 cohort

Building on the success of its inaugural cohort, the Women Innovators Fellowship (WIn) is expanding to Bahrain and the UAE, in addition to Saudi Arabia, as it continues to empower more women entrepreneurs from the Middle East. The program is thrilled to announce this year’s eighty-six recipients of its 2023 WIn Fellowship. The participants will receive a year-long program of executive education, mentoring, and networking opportunities in collaboration with Georgetown McDonough School of Business and with the support of the United States embassies in the three target countries and PepsiCo.

May 3, 2024

2024 WIn Fellowship Roadshow

WIn Fellows participate in a fully sponsored trip to the United States for leadership training at Georgetown and meetings with US business and government leaders.

Feb 24, 2023

2023 WIn Fellowship Roadshow

The WIn Fellowship roadshow is led by the Atlantic Council’s empowerME Initiative in cooperation with Georgetown University’s McDonough School of Business with support from US Embassy Riyadh, UPS, and PepsiCo. The WIn Fellowship Roadshow participants, chosen from a highly competitive cohort of more than thirty applicants, receive a fully sponsored trip to the United States for leadership training at Georgetown and meetings with US business and government leaders.

Event Recap Jul 31, 2023

Empowering the future: The rising women workforce in Saudi Arabia’s private sector

By Lynn Monzer, Nibras Basitkey

Event recap on the empowering future of the workplace in Saudi Arabia and its impact on the private sector.

Economy & Business Future of Work

Event Recap Jul 24, 2023

Bridging the gender gap in venture capital

By Lynn Monzer, Nibras Basitkey

Event recap on the significance of venture funding for women entrepreneurs in the UAE.

Economy & Business Middle East

Event Recap Jul 18, 2023

An overview of gender parity in Bahrain: Progress, challenges, and the path forward

By Lynn Monzer, Nibras Basitkey

A recap of the First Workshop in Bahrain

Economy & Business Inclusive Growth

empowerME

empowerME at the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East is shaping solutions to empower entrepreneurs, women, and youth and building coalitions of public and private partnerships to drive regional economic integration, prosperity, and job creation.

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The post Gender parity in MENA diplomacy and its impact on peace appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Bathily’s resignation was motivated by the UN’s inability to successfully support the political transition process that it has been trying to foster in Libya for more than a decade in the wake of the country’s civil war and enduring political fragmentation. As Bathily pointed out, the reason for this inability is that Libya’s various political actors are unwilling to place the collective interest above their own personal interests. Bathily bluntly described the leaders of the country’s political factions as lacking “good faith,” rendering UN initiatives futile and ruling out the possibility of any solution to the country’s current chaotic and unstable political impasse. His resignation, and his candid assessment of the political process in Libya, demonstrate the slim prospects for UN initiatives in Libya so long as national leaders remain unwilling to collaborate.

Bathily described the attitude of Libyan political leaders as driven by a “selfish resolve” to defend their individual interests and impede the transition process through political and administrative expedients. Bathily’s criticism is directed at the major political figures in Libya whom the UN special envoy had often described as the “big five”: General Khalifa Haftar, Mohammed Takala, Mohamed al-Menfi, Aguila Saleh, and Abdul Hamid Dbeibah. For these five political figures, the transition process doesn’t offer any incentives, but rather would severely limit their current ability to control the political system and the national economy. Particularly frustrating for Bathily, after almost two years of continuous initiatives that these internal actors systematically boycotted, the UN needed to put off a planned national reconciliation conference, which was initially scheduled for April 28 and is now postponed indefinitely due to the rival parties’ intransigence. 

The reasons for Bathily’s criticisms are clear. Although a relative calm has returned to the country since the failure of Haftar’s siege of Tripoli in 2020, this calm has not facilitated the resumption of national dialogue nor the start of the necessary transition process to organize national elections. Instead, this quiet period has allowed the different political factions’ balance of power to freeze in place. They are now unwilling to give up their respective spheres of power by initiating an unpredictable transition to elections that could subvert the status quo.

The web of individual political interests, moreover, is closely linked to a variegated framework of parallel interests, including control of the economy, corruption, management of the various militias that control most of Tripolitania (although in a disorganized manner), and deep ties with organized crime, which runs trafficking of all kinds in Libya.

Bathily’s resignation thus demonstrates how the role of the UN special envoy to Libya has become frustrating and devoid of real prospects over time. In 2020, Ghassan Salame resigned after two years in office citing health reasons, although he expressed deep disappointment at how the transition process had been systematically opposed by both local actors and the foreign powers and regional actors that have been intermingling in Libya since the 2011 revolution. He was succeeded by Jan Kubis, who in turn resigned in 2021 without clearly specifying the reasons, although he had clearly determined that it was impossible to fulfil his mandate.

The question remains how and whether the United Nations intends to appoint a new special representative. Talk among insiders indicates that the next special envoy could be Stephanie Koury, currently the vice head of the UN mission in Libya, who would take up the post on an interim basis pending new guidelines from the Security Council.

But regardless of who replaces Bathily, the next special envoy will not be able to solve Libya’s longstanding political impasse as long as the leaders of the country’s factions remain unwilling to meaningfully engage with the UN’s initiatives. The country’s political stasis is unlikely to shift anytime soon.

Karim Mezran is director of the North Africa Initiative at the Rafik Hariri Center and Middle East Programs at the Atlantic Council.

The post The UN Libya envoy’s resignation shows why the political transition is failing appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Yet, the international community, defined loosely as the collection of United Nations (UN) member states, finds itself unable to emerge as a powerful and unified voice for the women of Afghanistan despite its stated commitments to gender equality. For years, international conventions and declarations have served as inspirations of hope and offered guidelines and principles aimed at safeguarding the rights of women worldwide. Now the people who wrote and advocated for these international standards must translate them into concrete actions to address the world’s most severe women’s rights crisis. These efforts should include codifying gender apartheid as a crime against humanity and prosecuting Afghanistan at the International Criminal Court. Moreover, any international engagement with the Taliban regime must prioritize ensuring its compliance with international law in its treatment of women.

International legal frameworks

Despite critical reports by prominent international organizations such as Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and the UN special rapporteur on the human rights situation in Afghanistan, the standing of women and girls in the country continues to deteriorate rapidly. Women inside Afghanistan have bravely taken to the streets, and their counterparts outside the country have advocated for them in numerous international meetings, conferences, and private roundtable discussions. But these demands and protests have so far failed to garner a robust response from existing international legal mechanisms, obligations, or conventions.  

Bridging the gap

The fundamental human rights that the women of Afghanistan are demanding are clearly defined in the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and elsewhere. These pivotal frameworks mandate governments and international institutions to actively address women’s needs and provide robust protection against any violations, especially in the complex landscapes of conflict and post-conflict situations.

UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325 on Women, Peace, and Security, while nonbinding, expands upon binding conventions by clarifying women’s rights standards, even in states experiencing conflict or those not party to conventions such as CEDAW. The resolution extends its reach beyond governments and states to all parties participating in conflicts.

While UNSCR 1325 does not have direct legal enforcement mechanisms, it carries significant political weight. The resolution “calls upon all parties to armed conflict to respect fully international law applicable to the rights and protection of women and girls” under the relevant conventions and to “bear in mind the relevant provisions of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.” The resolution further calls upon all parties to armed conflicts to “take special measures to protect women and girls from gender-based violence, particularly rape and other forms of sexual abuse, and all other forms of violence in situations of armed conflict.” The resolution has promoted actions at the national, regional, and international levels. Civil society organizations, international actors, and UN bodies regularly monitor and assess progress on the implementation of the resolution and call for greater accountability mechanisms to ensure that commitments are translated into action.

As a United Nations member, Afghanistan ratified CEDAW in 2003 and adopted UNSCR 1325 in 2015, affirming its commitment to international legal obligations and the promotion of the rule of law. The Islamic Republic of Afghanistan successfully submitted its periodic reports to the CEDAW committee and its status reports on the implementation of the national action plan on UNSCR 1325. Under the Taliban’s rule, Afghanistan has disregarded such established international mechanisms and is no longer abiding by any of these international obligations. 

The group’s continued enforcement of oppressive policies and the lack of international accountability has reduced international standards aimed at protecting women’s rights to nothing more than empty rhetoric. Consequently, Afghan women and girls turn to the international community for robust advocacy and support, urging for their voices to be heard and for the use of all available international mechanisms on their behalf.

To date, the international community has failed to deliver. Countries with feminist foreign policies have sought to exert pressure on the Taliban regime and demand the protection of Afghan women’s rights through soft diplomatic meetings and statements. The recent statement issued by the foreign ministers of the Feminist Foreign Policy Network regarding the plight of women in Afghanistan, for example, employed significantly stronger language than their previous statements since August 2021, as they called on the international community to redouble its efforts to leverage all available legal instruments to end the systematic and egregious violations of international law against women. This call has not yet led to meaningful action.

The way forward

To effectively protect and promote women’s rights, it is imperative that members of the international community first agree to refrain from any form of engagement with the Taliban that contradicts their commitments and obligations under international law. This requires a coherent and unified approach, as well as proactive accountability measurements, to avoid contradictory behavior that would undermine the objectives of promoting women’s rights and ending violence against women in Afghanistan. Nevertheless, expecting an illegitimate group such as the Taliban to adhere to international frameworks concerning women’s rights is unlikely to yield significant results.

But the international community, in collaboration with civil society organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and human rights groups, can take proactive measures toward ensuring accountability. One significant step would be to codify gender apartheid as a crime against humanity. By leveraging the instruments provided by binding conventions such as CEDAW, the international community could establish legal frameworks that explicitly recognize and condemn systematic gender-based discrimination and persecution. Over the past three years, there has been significant documentation of gender-based persecution in Afghanistan, including last month’s report from the UN special rapporteur on the human rights situation in Afghanistan. The next step would be for state parties to CEDAW to pursue a case against Afghanistan at the International Court of Justice, either individually or through joint initiatives.

The CEDAW committee should support the re-establishment of Afghanistan’s CEDAW steering committee, technical committee, and drafting committee, both within the country and among Afghan communities in exile. While the current authorities of Afghanistan refuse to provide periodic reports, the committees of experts should be tasked with providing shadow reports.

Moreover, it is imperative for the International Criminal Court to collaborate closely with relevant states and international organizations such as UN bodies, as well as civil society organizations and other stakeholders, to garner support for its investigation into the Taliban’s treatment of women, particularly regarding crimes against humanity such as gender persecution.

The United Nations must adhere to fundamental principle before considering any form of “structured engagement” with the Taliban—a form of cooperation recommended in the independent report by UN Special Coordinator Feridun Sinirlioğlu. The UN should first prioritize the implementation of UNSCR 1325 and other relevant resolutions, ensuring that the rights and needs of women are fully integrated into its strategies and initiatives, including by facilitating direct discussions between women and the Taliban.  

UN Women, in close collaboration with relevant states, must prioritize the revitalization of the focal points in Afghanistan’s UNSCR 1325 national action plan, which was established in 2017. These focal points, people who represented the relevant ministries and civil society organizations before the Taliban takeover, play a pivotal role in guaranteeing the participation of Afghan women in all dialogues. New focal points could be established under the auspices of the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, UN Women, or even the European Union delegation in Afghanistan. The international community must prioritize Afghanistan as a paramount concern in its policy agenda and cease engaging in actions and diplomatic meetings that inadvertently bolster the Taliban’s sense of superiority and embolden similar fundamentalist groups worldwide. The future of Afghan women and the international commitment to gender equality hangs in the balance.

Parwana Paikan is the minister counsellor of the embassy of Afghanistan in France and co-founder of Conseil des Femmes Franco-Afghan. She previously served as deputy director general of human rights and women’s international affairs at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Afghanistan.

The post Afghan women’s rights are not a lost cause. Here’s what the international community can do. appeared first on Atlantic Council.

This is very much the case in Ukrainian Black Sea port city Odesa, where Russian bombardments have become part of daily life. With each new air raid alert, people check social media channels to assess the projected trajectory of incoming Russian drones and missiles. This is usually followed by a frenzied exchange of texts with friends and neighbors to determine whether a dash for the nearest bomb shelter is necessary.

During the initial phases of the war, this grand port city known as an international symbol of intercultural unity and a treasure trove of cultural sites remained relatively untouched from Russian aggression, to the point that it became a temporary home to tens of thousands of internally displaced Ukrainians. A huge banner in the city center reflects this status with the message: “You are not refugees, you are guests of Odesa.” At the city’s non-profit Mriya Family Center, volunteers provide free daycare and psychosocial sessions for children along with vocational training for displaced moms wishing to start new careers. However, escalating air attacks mean Odesa has now lost its status as a sanctuary away from the horrors of the Russian invasion.

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

The air strike campaign against Odesa first began to intensify last summer following Russia’s withdrawal from a UN-brokered agreement that had allowed shipments of Ukrainian grain to sail from the city’s port to global markets. Since July 2023, Russia has attacked Odesa region with over 880 drones and more than 170 missiles, according to Ukrainian Navy officials. The mood in Odesa has darkened significantly in recent weeks as Russian attacks have become more frequent and deadlier. At least 17 people, including five children, have died so far in March.

This is fueling renewed discussion among local residents and international officials over whether to stay or go. The question is no longer rhetorical: French President Emmanuel Macron recently told opposition party leaders he had sketched out a possible Russian military advance toward Odesa or Kyiv that “could lead to an intervention.” In response to the recent surge in air attacks, at least one foreign mission is pro-actively thinning its presence in Odesa for the time being.

In one of the most brazen attacks on Odesa since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022, the Kremlin sent a missile on March 6 to within a few hundred meters of where Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy was meeting Greek PM Kyriakos Mitsotakis. “It is a very intense experience. It’s really different to read about the war in newspapers, and to hear it with your own ears, see it with your own eyes,” Mitsotakis commented after the attack.

Russian air strikes on Odesa are not only acts of aggression against Ukraine. The Kremlin’s bombing campaign also poses a direct threat to global food security. In this context, recent developments have been encouraging. Since Ukraine broke the Russian naval blockade of the country’s Black Sea ports last summer, cargo volumes of agricultural products have reached about two-thirds of their prewar levels, leading to a stabilization of grain prices on world markets.

This begs the question: Why has the international community not responded to the Russian maritime threat with the same robustness seen when protecting commercial shipping in the Red Sea? Do deliveries of consumer goods really matter more than grain shipments to world markets, especially to countries on the brink of starvation such as Sudan, to which Ukraine recently donated 7,000 tons of wheat?

Eurasia Center events

Online Event Thu, August 15, 2024 • 9:00 am ET

Ukraine’s advance in Kursk: What’s next and implications

Conflict Russia Security & Defense Ukraine

Increasingly, friends in Ukraine ask how long I think the war will last and whether the country can expect to be abandoned by weak-kneed Western allies afraid of provoking Putin. Military cemeteries such as the one at Lychakiv in Lviv are now full as war dead are carried to their final resting place, underlining the sense that not one Ukrainian family has been untouched by this war.

If anyone doubts Russia’s resolve to seize more Ukrainian land, they should carefully study former Russian President Dmitry Medvedev’s recent remarks to a forum in Sochi. Medvedev, who now serves as deputy head of Russia’s influential Security Council, outlined his vision for the near complete destruction of the Ukrainian state, with Ukraine reduced to a landlocked rump around Kyiv and most of the country incorporated into the Russian Federation. “One of Ukraine’s former leaders once said that Ukraine is not Russia. That concept needs to disappear forever,” he commented. “Ukraine is definitely Russia.”

The darkening mood in today’s Ukraine is not limited to Odesa. As the full-scale invasion passed the two-year mark recently, increasing doubts about Western pledges to support Ukraine “for as long as it takes” could be heard from politicians and civil society members. Several panelists at a high-profile forum in Kyiv on February 24 called out Western partners for failing to deliver on promises ranging from ammunition and longer-range missiles to tougher sanctions. Since then, worries have increased even further as US legislators kick the ball further down the road on the $60 billion supplemental bill for Ukraine that has yet to pass the US Congress.

There is now a growing feeling in Odesa and across Ukraine that time is running out. Unless new US aid is confirmed and the West arms Ukraine to the teeth, there may soon be nothing to prevent Russia from advancing all the way to Odesa and on to the border with Moldova. If that happens, the verdict of history, which can be extremely unkind to cowards, will be harsh for all those who failed to provide Ukraine with the support it so desperately needs.

Michael Bociurkiw is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

Further reading

UkraineAlert Feb 20, 2024

Outgunned Ukraine bets on drones as Russian invasion enters third year

By Mykola Bielieskov

As Putin’s invasion passes the two-year mark, tech-savvy Ukraine is betting on drones as the best way to overcome Russia’s increasingly overwhelming advantage in traditional firepower, writes Mykola Bielieskov.

Civil Society Conflict

UkraineAlert Feb 22, 2024

Ukrainian long-range drones target Putin’s war machine inside Russia

By Victoria Vdovychenko, Alexander Khara

Ukraine is hoping a new campaign of long-range drone strikes against Russia’s strategically vital oil and gas industry can help weaken Putin’s war machine, write Victoria Vdovychenko and Alexander Khara.

Conflict Defense Technologies

UkraineAlert Feb 12, 2024

Putin’s history lecture reveals his dreams of a new Russian Empire

By Peter Dickinson

Vladimir Putin turned his hotly anticipated interview with Tucker Carlson into a history lecture that laid bare the dangerous delusions and imperial ambitions driving the invasion of Ukraine, writes Peter Dickinson.

Conflict Disinformation

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

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UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

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Impact Iran, a coalition of nineteen civil society organizations focused on promoting respect for human rights in the country, was joined by several international advocates to communicate their concerns in an open letter dated January 29 to Deputy High Commissioner Nada Al-Nashif. While they value the importance of diplomatic engagement and recognize the critical role of her office in addressing human rights, they raise concerns about the visit’s timing. Notably, the UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC) is set to convene in mid-March to scrutinize Iran’s human rights record, a session that follows closely on the heels of the high commissioner’s visit. The group fears that the visit might lend an unwarranted veneer of acceptability to Iran’s human rights record, thereby weakening the UN’s ability to hold the country accountable.

The UNHRC’s upcoming session is poised to be a pivotal moment in international human rights advocacy, as it will feature a report from the UN Independent Fact-Finding Mission on the Islamic Republic of Iran that will present its findings. Tasked with a rigorous independent inquiry into the alleged human rights violations related to protests and civil unrest that erupted across Iran in 2022 following news of the killing of 22-year-old Mahsa Jina Amini while in the custody of the country’s so-called “morality police,” the mission aims to articulate the scope and scale of violations and create a repository of evidence that could be instrumental in holding perpetrators accountable in international legal frameworks. Thus, the UNHRC braces for presentations that may profoundly influence the course of justice and shape its strategy in advocating for the protection and promotion of human rights in Iran.

The UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran, Javaid Rehman, will present his findings in concert with their report. His report, informed by thorough investigations and eyewitness accounts, will shed light on the current situation and evaluate Iran’s adherence to its international human rights obligations. The rapporteur’s insights support the global community’s understanding and response to Iran’s human rights challenges.

The UNHRC will also select a new special rapporteur to monitor Iran in the late spring. Established in 2011, this mechanism is tasked with the painstaking monitoring of Iran’s adherence to human rights norms. Yet, the Islamic Republic has consistently resisted cooperation with the UN in this capacity, denying entry to three previous mandate holders despite the worsening human rights situation within the country. The deputy high commissioner’s visit offers a timely opportunity to broach the subject of increased cooperation with the Iranian authorities. Al-Nashif could leverage the meeting to negotiate terms that may foster a more collaborative relationship with the forthcoming mandate holder, thereby influencing the council’s decision-making process regarding who is best suited to fulfill this sensitive and pivotal role effectively.

In light of this, the deputy high commissioner’s visit will likely be scrutinized by the international human rights community during and after her trip, as the rights advocates anxiously await to see how her engagement may impact the council’s critical decisions in the coming weeks and months. This is especially the case since the recent surge in executions in the country, including the execution of four ethnic Kurds who were hanged for alleged espionage after trials that were purportedly conducted without proper due process. The execution of individuals under the age of thirty, accused of plotting a bomb attack, has sparked widespread condemnation and drawn attention to the lack of fair trials and allegations of torture. The secretive nature of the judicial process and reports of physical assaults and suppression of information by security forces following the executions have raised alarm about the treatment of political prisoners.

Articulating a deep-seated unease about the visit’s potential impact, particularly in light of escalating executions and the suppression of women’s movements, the coalition led by Impact Iran warns of the possibility that the visit could serve as a tool of propaganda for the Iranian authorities, potentially undermining the UN’s unwavering commitment to human rights in Iran. Renowned figures like Nobel Laureate Shirin Ebadi have also called on the deputy high commissioner to align with the victims and protestors by either reconsidering her visit or assuming symbolic gestures of protest, such as forgoing the headscarf. They urge her to engage with groups beyond government officials, including individuals and families directly impacted by the regime’s draconian policies. However, civil society advocates are also careful to point out that they aren’t pushing for non-engagement but for a strategic reassessment of the visit’s timing and scope, advocating for thorough monitoring measures and unfettered access to individuals in detention.

Some note, for example, that scheduling the visit after the UNHRC session allows for a more strategic and impactful engagement. This timing would enable the Deputy High Commissioner Al-Nashif to discuss the findings of the council’s mechanisms with Iranian officials, armed with the most up-to-date information and evaluations from the UN special rapporteur and the UN fact-finding mission. Such synchronization would also ensure that the engagement is informed by the council’s discussions and resolutions, further equipping the deputy high commissioner to address Iranian authorities with clear international expectations in mind.

Moreover, the scheduled visit has stirred a broader discourse about the consistency and coherency of the UN’s strategy for promoting and protecting human rights in Iran. Critics argue that while such high-profile visits could elevate awareness, their ill-timed execution could undercut the momentum of other UN bodies and efforts. Scheduled ahead of the UNHRC’s critical evaluation, including the fact-finding mission, the visit risks sending mixed signals about the United Nation’s stance on human rights in Iran.

For the UN to maintain the efficacy and integrity of its human rights advocacy, it’s imperative to harmonize its various mechanisms to avoid providing inadvertent avenues for violators to evade their obligations. When UN bodies operate in isolation, without a cohesive strategy, their actions can be counterproductive. High-profile visits, such as that of the UN Deputy High Commissioner for Human Rights Al-Nashif, should be intricately coordinated with ongoing investigations and diplomatic initiatives to avoid any semblance of legitimizing or endorsing a state’s actions prematurely.

It is critical for the various arms of the United Nations to conduct their work in a manner that is synchronized, reinforcing each other’s efforts, to ensure there are no mixed messages that could bolster a violator’s resolve. This coordination is essential to present a unified front that stands up to scrutiny and holds violators accountable with tenacity and unequivocal clarity. To maintain the integrity and effectiveness of its human rights advocacy, the UN must send a clear and consistent message: cooperation on one front does not negate accountability on another.

Rose Parris Richter is the executive director of Impact Iran, a coalition of nineteen human rights organizations committed to advocating for human rights in the country.

The post To challenge the Islamic Republic’s propaganda agenda, the UN deputy high commissioner must delay her visit appeared first on Atlantic Council.

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On December 6, 2023, invoking Article 99 for the first time since he took office, Secretary-General António Guterres called on the Security Council to adopt a resolution designed to put pressure on Israel to adopt a total ceasefire in Gaza to avert a humanitarian catastrophe.

Why did Guterres invoke Article 99 in the case of Gaza but not in the case of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine? The intention here is not to compare the appalling suffering endured in both cases by blameless civilians, even if it would be interesting to recall the respective causes and instigators of the two conflicts. Rather, what deserves to be compared is which of the two conflicts is more dangerous to the “maintenance of international peace and security,” which is the subject of Article 99.

The Russian nuclear threat in Ukraine

From the outset of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Moscow irresponsibly brandished the threat of nuclear fire to try to force Ukraine to capitulate to its demands and to dissuade NATO countries from aiding Kyiv.

Russian political scientist Sergey Karaganov, a close associate of Russian President Vladimir Putin who heads the Council for Foreign and Defense Policy, wrote on June 13, 2023: “The enemy must know that we are ready to deliver a pre-emptive strike in retaliation for all of its current and past acts of aggression in order to prevent a slide into global thermonuclear war.”

Similarly, Dmitri Trenin, a former Russian military intelligence colonel, also a member of Russia’s Council for Foreign and Defense Policy, wrote a few days later: “The possibility of using nuclear weapons during the current conflict should not be hushed up. Such a perspective, real not theoretical, should serve as an incentive to curb and stop conflict escalation and ultimately pave the way for a strategic equilibrium in Europe that suits us.”

The aim of these statements is clear: to frighten the leaders and citizens of NATO member countries into giving up their support for the Ukrainian defense and counterattack effort. Even if Putin is unlikely to risk the ramifications of using a low-yield tactical nuclear weapon in Ukraine, the potential consequences of such folly are well worth Guterres’s concern.

In addition to Moscow’s threats of nuclear strikes against Ukraine, the Russian army is occupying and using Ukraine’s Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant for military purposes, endangering its operation.

A resolution against nuclear threats

Given the threat to global security posed by Russia’s threats to use nuclear weapons, Guterres should once again use Article 99 of the UN Charter to request that the Security Council adopt a generic, legally binding resolution under Chapter VII of the charter:

• deciding that any withdrawal from the Non-Proliferation Treaty constitutes a threat to international peace and security;
• deciding that any test of a nuclear explosive device is a threat to international peace and security;
• deciding that the use of nuclear weapons against a country that does not possess them is a crime against humanity;
• deciding that any attack on or seizure of an operating nuclear power plant for military purposes is a war crime.

The adoption by the Security Council of such a generic resolution, which would be non-discriminatory in nature, would represent a significant step forward in the fight against the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Russia will certainly exercise its right of veto against such a resolution. Even so, putting it to a vote would at least have the merit of showing the world who is threatening international peace and security, and forcing China to clarify its position on the use of nuclear weapons.

For Guterres, the stakes are high, and he risks political retribution from Moscow. But applying the double standard of invoking Article 99 in the case of Gaza but not Ukraine would undermine his credibility.

Few things “threaten the maintenance of international peace and security” more than a potential nuclear attack. Guterres should therefore force the issue onto the Security Council’s agenda before it is too late.

We should not always have to wait for disasters to occur before moving national and international institutions toward systems more capable of guaranteeing peace between nations.

Pierre Goldschmidt is a former deputy director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency and head of the Department of Safeguards.

The post Why is the UN secretary-general so worried about Gaza but not Ukraine? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

• Introduction
• Definitions, institutions, and norms
• Trends and uncertainties
• Scenarios
• Sahel regional analysis
• Questions for policymakers

I. Introduction

The multilateral system, defined as the set of rules, norms, and institutions that together constitute the world’s governance architecture, is not static. Rather, this system both evolves over time and, less frequently, is reconstituted by periodic upheavals. Such upheavals usually occur during or after a global crisis—for example, a major power war (1815, 1918, 1945)—or another extended period during which underlying drivers of change allow a reset of the global system. Such changes allow the new system to function for a time until dynamics again shift underneath it. Systems come under strain when they cannot adjust to new geopolitical, technological, sociopolitical, demographic, and (in the twenty-first century) environmental realities.

The current multilateral system, the core components of which were created in the first decade after World War II and then reshaped after the end of the Cold War, is now facing such a period because it bears little resemblance to the world that existed when it was created.

Several drivers of change threaten to erode hard-earned gains that the multilateral system has delivered since 1945. Today’s challenges include but are not limited to rising geopolitical tensions among nuclear-armed major powers, a seemingly inevitable climate catastrophe, technological changes that have the potential to remake every aspect of life, and the increasing powers and capabilities of non-state actors to reshape sub-national, national, and international affairs (for better and for worse). There is a flip side: within each challenge also lies an opportunity for positive transformational change.

These drivers have altered and continue to alter the dynamics of armed conflicts around the world. For example, the proliferation of increasingly capable armed nonstate actors (ANSAs) have reshaped the contours of conflict, furthering the fragmentation of international affairs, and altering how states and multilateral institutions such as the United Nations (UN) have approached conflict resolution and peacebuilding. Understanding the evolution and impact of these drivers on the conflict-prevention architecture should enable key state and nonstate actors within the multilateral system to anticipate change and reform governance approaches.

It is important to emphasize that the post-1945 multilateral system has delivered on two core points, i.e., the lack of systemic war among major powers (in other words, no third world war) and global economic growth—yet there are now, and have been since the creation of the system, many dissenters in the North and South. The postwar system never has eliminated wars and conflicts, which continue to this day (if admittedly not among and between the major powers, which must be counted as a significant benefit of the current system); not all countries and populations have benefited equally from the robust and unprecedented global economic growth since the 1950s; the major powers, including those most supportive of the system (the United States in particular) have not always acted consistently with the ideals that they claim the system embodies; and there is a misalignment of economic and demographic weight on the one hand with political power on the other (by which is meant the distribution of voting power within the system’s core multilateral institutions).

The world is in a critical period, given the system’s rising inability to tackle challenges related to the management of conflict—to its prevention, its outbreak, and its resolution. This problem is reflected in how the United Nations, the principal multilateral institution that is responsible for the management of conflict, assesses its own situation vis-à-vis conflict dynamics in the world today. In Our Common Agenda (2021), UN Secretary-General António Guterres argued that although “investments in prevention and preparedness pay for themselves many times over,” there has been “too little progress on adequate, predictable and sustained financing for peacebuilding” by UN member states. Guterres reiterated these points in a July 2023 policy brief, A New Agenda for Peace, written as a preparatory document for the UN’s 2024 Summit of the Future.¹

Building on this call for action, this report assesses the impacts of structural forces or drivers—otherwise known as global trends and uncertainties—on the future of global governance including the governance of conflict throughout the conflict cycle, meaning conflict prevention, peacekeeping, and peacebuilding. Those four core trends and uncertainties (often called “drivers” of change) are about geopolitics, the rise of new actors within the global system, the rapidly changing planet that we live on, and the speed and impacts of technological transformations. Atlantic Council staff utilized a strategic foresight methodology to assess how these global trends and uncertainties might reshape the world a decade into the future, until the mid-2030s. This assessment produced four alternative scenarios, which are stories about what the world in the mid-2030s might look like. Those four scenarios, presented in section IV of this paper, are designed to provoke the readers’ imaginations about what could plausibly occur over the coming decade given the dynamic interaction of the drivers of change identified in this report.

Over an eighteen-month time span, the project team conducted desk research, interviewed outside experts, and convened a series of workshops, all focused on assessing how the drivers of change might shape the future and what the world’s foremost governing bodies, including key multilateral institutions, national and subnational governments, and nonstate actors might do in response. Early drafts of this report were peer reviewed by external experts; their input has been incorporated into the final version.

This report contains the following sections. Section II provides an overview of the key terms, institutions, and norms that undergird the global conflict- prevention architecture. Section III provides a lengthy assessment of the four key drivers that are altering the world, and addresses their implications for the management of conflict across the conflict cycle. Section IV articulates the four scenarios that describe how these drivers of change might reshape the world in the 2030s, with impacts on global conflict and conflict prevention. These scenarios are complemented by a separate assessment of how they may play out in the Sahel region, which was chosen as this report’s regional case study.

The concluding section, section V, asks five big questions of the highest relevance about the future:

1. How should multilateral organizations such as the UN adapt to and manage a multipolar world?
2. How can multilateral organizations plan for and adapt to conflict-management challenges brought on by the evolution of Earth systems and emerging technologies?
3. What will the role of nonstate actors be in this space going forward and how can the UN and other multilateral institutions both leverage opportunities and manage threats posed by nonstate groups?
4. How can the UN support regional bodies in advancing their conflict-prevention and peace-building goals in line with global multilateralism?
5. How can the UN, and particularly the UN Security Council (UNSC), overcome concerns that it lacks legitimacy, especially in the Global South?

None of these five questions have simple answers. Rather, as with the scenarios, the questions (and their possible answers) are designed to prod policymakers, experts, and practitioners about the dynamics of global change in the coming years.

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II. A note on definitions, institutions, and norms

A. Conflict prevention and peacebuilding: Definitions

The definitions of conflict prevention and peacebuilding have long been debated within broader conflict studies fields. Their definitions have evolved over time. For example, the release of Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali’s 1992 Agenda for Peace asserted that conflict prevention consisted of four guiding principles: preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peacekeeping, and postconflict peacebuilding.² Further developments within the UN system included a 2001 report to the UNSC by then Secretary-General Kofi Annan, which highlighted the need for a “culture of prevention” that both prevented conflict in the near term while working to limit factors that may lead to the outbreak of conflict in the long term.³

Today, conflict prevention is defined by the United Nations Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs (DPPA) as “[involving] diplomatic measures to keep intra-state or inter-state tensions and disputes from escalating into violent conflict.”⁴ It encompasses structural, operational, and transnational components:

• Structural conflict prevention addresses the root causes of conflict over the longer term and often employs tools rooted in development and economic policy.⁵
• Operational conflict prevention or “direct prevention” refers to management of immediate crises in the short term and often employs diplomatic or military tools or both.⁶
• Transnational conflict prevention focuses on risks such as climate change or transnational organized crime (TOC) that undermine security and contribute to conflict.⁷

All types of prevention are dynamic rather than static; thus, global trends and uncertainties will shift the effectiveness of these three types of prevention. Greater multipolarity may limit transnational prevention if states are less able to agree on far-reaching global programs, for example, or it may accelerate the shift of operational conflict prevention from the UN Security Council to regional organizations.⁸

Peacebuilding consists of activities that build sustainable peace over time within a society or across them, often in postconflict settings.⁹ It is defined by the United Nations as follows:

“Peacebuilding aims to reduce the risk of lapsing or relapsing into conflict by strengthening national capacities at all levels for conflict management, and to lay the foundation for sustainable peace and development. It is a complex, long-term process of creating the necessary conditions for sustainable peace. Peacebuilding measures address core issues that effect the functioning of society and the State and seek to enhance the capacity of the State to effectively and legitimately carry out its core functions.”¹⁰

Several key United Nations reports have provided a definitional foundation, including the Agenda for Peace (1992), the UN Report of the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations on Uniting Our Strengths for Peace: Politics, Partnership and People (2015), and the Report[s] on Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace.¹¹ In 2016, the UN General Assembly and the UN Security Council passed twin resolutions, A/RES/70/262 and S/RES/2282, that focused on conflict resolution and peacebuilding, helping to codify the concept within the UN system.¹² These documents stressed the need for close coordination within the UN—among the Peacebuilding Support Office, the Department of Political Affairs, and the UN Development Programs, for example—and outside of it, for instance, with the World Bank.

In summary, the definitional debate concerning the terms conflict prevention and peacebuilding is robust in both academia and practice. This report recognizes that these terms are contested and varied in their definitions, but understands conflict prevention to consist of structural, operational, and transnational components while peacebuilding is seen as an encompassing process that seeks to build conflict-resilient nations at all stages of the conflict cycle (before, during, and afterward). The report therefore relies on the phrase “conflict management” to encapsulate the multiple dimensions of conflict prevention and peacebuilding.

B. Actors and institutions engaged in conflict prevention and peacebuilding activities

There are numerous actors at all levels of governance (supranational, regional, national, and local) that are involved in conflict prevention and peace-building processes. These actors span both state and nonstate institutions and organizations. While not exhaustive, this section focuses on several of the most important typologies and influential institutions.

The United Nations is by far the main actor at the global level. Its center is the United Nations Security Council, which is empowered to identify threats to peace, make recommendations regarding how best to restore peace, and authorize nonmilitary and military action to do so. UNSC decisions can take place at all stages of the conflict cycle and within a wide array of responses ranging from calling for dialogue to mandating military intervention.¹³ Despite the wide-ranging tools available to the Security Council, its ability to act depends on the willingness of its member states to engage, especially those of the five states holding veto power—the United States, France, Great Britain, Russia, and the People’s Republic of China. The UN General Assembly (UNGA) also can act on conflict prevention: it can hold special or emergency sessions on a wide range of issues and can adopt declarations on peace and disputes.¹⁴ Resolutions and decisions that are adopted at UNGA by a majority of states, however, are nonbinding on member states, in contrast to those of the UNSC.¹⁵

At the global level, the World Bank and International Monetary Fund also play critical roles in funding initiatives related to preventing the escalation of conflict, preserving institutions during and after crises, and developing opportunities for refugees within their host communities. The role of the World Bank is primarily focused on structural prevention, achieved through funding development-related projects such as those relating to climate change adaptation and mitigation and demographic change.¹⁶ In 2020, the World Bank released the World Bank Strategy for Fragility, Conflict, and Violence, which aligns the institution with making progress toward achieving the UNGA-adopted sustainable development goals (SDGs) while preventing the outbreak of violence.¹⁷ In 2021, it approved more than $30 billion for countries and territories affected by these problems.¹⁸

Whereas the World Bank focuses on funding projects that impact structural prevention, the IMF focuses on limiting the potential impact of economic shocks and mitigating their repercussions when they do occur. In 2022, the IMF released its own strategy for fragile and conflict-affected states (FCS), which calls for the advancement of several new policy tools and focuses on developing sustainable fiscal, monetary, and private-sector policy, all of which aim to grow economies and make them more resilient to the potential outbreak of conflict.¹⁹

There are numerous regional bodies that are critically important actors within specific geographic contexts. Within Africa, the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) emphasizes democracy promotion, early warning and conflict prevention, peace support operations, post-conflict reconstruction, and humanitarian action and disaster management.²⁰ The APSA’s fifteen members include the Peace and Security Council (PSC), which is the African Union’s decision-making body focused on conflict prevention and peacebuilding.²¹

The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) are examples of subregional organizations on the African continent that undertake multilateral conflict prevention and peace-building initiatives. ECOWAS maintains its own conflict-prevention framework, allowing its member states to discuss and cooperate on issues of conflict prevention and peacekeeping alongside international partners. The framework aims to mainstream conflict prevention across ECOWAS while building capacity to respond to conflict through the ECOWAS Standby Force.²² SADC consists of sixteen member states from across southern Africa. Though primarily focused on economic issues, SADC sees peace and security as vital to economic success for its members.²³ As such, it has invested in conflict prevention and in 2004, SADC set up the Mediation and Conflict Prevention and Preventative Diplomacy Structure that aims to foster political and security stability across member states.²⁴

Regional and subregional bodies like the AU, ECOWAS, and SADC differ in their political dynamics, resources, tools, and methodologies. While some groups have been able to forge a consensus among member states and make meaningful progress on advancing conflict-management goals, others are plagued by instability within and among member states, limiting their effectiveness. A positive example involves SADC, which has maintained a mission in Mozambique to address the ongoing crisis in the northern province of Cabo Delgado, contributing troops and developing capacity-building initiatives such as skill-development programs and enhancing police services.²⁵ ECOWAS, in contrast, is an example of a regional institution beset by instability among its West African member states, several of which have gone through one or more coups within the last several years.

Regional bodies within Africa have worked closely with the United Nations to advance conflict management. Collaboration has included coordination between the UN and the AU’s PSC, resulting in practical efforts as in Sudan, where the DPPA has supported AU-led peace efforts.²⁶

A bottom-line observation is that there is a larger trend in this space: the countries most impacted by conflict are taking a more active role in managing it through regional institutions, as the efforts of the AU, ECOWAS, and the SADC show.

Beyond Africa, other regional institutions have played important roles in conflict management including the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the European Union (EU), and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). In the post-Cold War era, NATO has provided stabilization operations in various theaters beyond the borders of its member states, notably in Afghanistan. It still maintains a presence in Kosovo, helping to maintain peace in the Western Balkans alongside the EU, and contributes to a capacity-building mission in Iraq, targeting the broader Iraqi security architecture. The EU maintains military missions across Africa, the Western Balkans, Eastern Europe, and the Middle East. It operates a mix of civilian- and military-led missions working to build partner military capacity to stabilize countries in conflict, maintain peace, and prevent the resurgence of conflict. The EU also funds international bodies such as the UN, giving approximately $1.1 million to the DPPA in 2022.²⁷ For its part, ASEAN has built a robust sense of trust among its member states, via numerous informal meetings and annual forums, which (arguably) has helped limit conflict within the region.²⁸

Outside of these multilateral and regional bodies, there are two important sets of actors that deserve attention. The first, obviously, are individual states, in particular the world’s major powers. Although the definition of a major power is a highly debated topic, this paper focuses most of its analytical attention on the two states that are widely viewed as the world’s foremost major powers, the United States and China. Russia and occasionally the European Union (as a supranational entity) and India are lumped into the major power category, but the inclusion of each of these entities as major powers is a contested topic among international relations scholars.²⁹

Major powers have important conflict-management functions. The United States, China, and Russia are three of the five permanent members (P5) of the UNSC, and as such hold veto power, which means they are critical to any determination (positive or negative) regarding creation of UN peacekeeping missions. Major powers provide financial, logistical, and occasional personnel (troops) support to peacekeeping operations and broader conflict-management operations.³⁰ Outside of the formal UN system, major powers also engage in bilateral conflict-management activities, including provision of development aid and investment funding that contribute to structural conflict prevention. Examples here are development aid provided through the United States Agency for International Development, and infrastructure development funding through China’s Belt and Road Initiative (though these institutions, their funding models, and their purposes admittedly are very different).³¹ Major powers also have intervened directly in conflict situations, with and without UN authorization. For example, after the 9/11 terror attacks, the United States invoked Article 51 of the UN Charter (right to self-defense) as justification for military operations in Afghanistan; later, its leadership of a NATO military coalition was viewed as justified by the UNSC’s authorization of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF).³² Major powers also act as spoilers. The Wagner Group, widely understood to be a Russian state-backed proxy organization, has routinely made peace harder to achieve across the Sahel and is suspected of being linked to several coups in the region.³³

Beyond the major powers, the world’s middle and emerging powers are important actors in conflict management. The definition of what constitutes a middle power also is contested, with some scholars defining middle powers as states that possess limited material capabilities and assume limited international tasks on the world stage.³⁴ Others define middle powers as states that actively pursue policies of mediation and conflict resolution, and advocate for multilateral solutions on the world stage.³⁵ This report views middle powers as countries with reasonable economic or military means, but which often punch above their weight diplomatically. Emerging powers have an analogous standing to middle powers, but generally are regarded as being on an upward trajectory (in demographic, economic, and military senses) toward becoming a major power. The dividing lines between middle and emerging powers are frequently unclear and ill defined. There are numerous countries that fit one or both definitions, and that are engaged in conflict management around the world. Turkey, as an example, played an instrumental and constructive role in brokering an essential grain deal between Russia and Ukraine in 2022, and for years has been involved in managing the ongoing Libyan crisis.³⁶ Such powers also sometimes are themselves engaged in conflict dynamics.

Finally, as discussed at length in section III, nonstate actors also play a large role in conflict prevention and peacebuilding. This includes two subtypes of actors, those that contribute positively to conflict management and those that do not. Examples of actors falling into the first camp include several major philanthropies such as the Gates Foundation, which has funded poverty-reduction programs in conflict-afflicted states around the world. Examples in the second camp include armed nonstate actors such as terror groups and transnational organized criminal groups that contribute to violence, undermining the sovereignty of the states in which they operate and harming civilians. Such groups also often carry out governance roles in the areas in which they operate, owing to weak or nonexistent state capacity. In Nigeria, the militant group Boko Haram collected taxes from the citizens who lived in the areas it controlled, while in Syria, ANSAs provide healthcare for their citizens.³⁷ These groups engage in such behavior to influence communities under their control.

There are several mechanisms that are used by different actors across the conflict cycle. These include early warning systems (EWS), preventive diplomacy and mediation, peace operations, development assistance, and post-conflict mediation reconstruction and recovery. EWS are systems that alert decision-makers to the potential of conflict and increased risks, relying on both qualitative and quantitative data. EWS are employed by governments, nongovernmental organizations, and multilateral bodies. Preventive diplomacy uses dialogue and mediation to prevent conflict from starting, escalating, or recurring. The UN secretary-general plays a pivotal role in preventive diplomacy through dialogue and leverage, and the deployment of special envoys. Conflict mediation is increasingly undertaken by a variety of bodies such as UN mediators, individual states, and nongovernmental organizations.

Development aid, targeted at conflict-affected and fragile states, is essential to reducing the potential outbreak of violent conflict and the possibility that conflict reemerges. Aid can be viewed as nonpolitical, but operating in conflict zones requires that aid and development organizations pay close additional attention to how their giving is perceived. Finally, in the post-conflict phase, activities include disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration programs, which may build domestic capacity to respond to criminal acts and reform the security sector, and which may develop institutions and bodies to work nationally to prevent the outbreak of conflict.

C. Norms within the conflict prevention and peacebuilding process

Two deeply held norms shape the conflict-prevention and peacebuilding fields, those of collective security and state sovereignty. Collective security, enshrined in the UN Charter (and within those of other institutions such as NATO), asserts that aggression can be prevented by collective action, including force, by other states, or at least responded to by collective action should aggression occur.³⁸ The UN developed the concept of peacekeeping operations as a collective security pillar starting in 1948 when a UN mediator asked for a small group of guards to monitor a truce between Israel and its neighbors, which was then formalized in 1956 during the Suez Crisis.³⁹ Peacekeeping is by no means the UN’s only role in collective security. Chapter VII of the UN Charter details how the UNSC will respond to threats to peace and acts of aggression, ranging from nonkinetic means (under Article 41, the UNSC may undertake “measures not involving the use of armed force”) to military intervention (under Article 42, the UNSC “may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security”).⁴⁰

Yet despite the benefits of the UN’s collective security apparatus, the concept has never fulfilled its original promise of preventing aggression. States only occasionally have confronted aggressors swiftly and decisively through collective security responses, via the UN and other multilateral bodies. (It is important to note that the reason for this shortcoming has less to do with the willingness of the UN as an institution to engage and more to do with political divisions among UN member states about whether and how to respond.)

State sovereignty asserts that no state should interfere in other states’ domestic affairs, a concept that can be traced at least back to the Peace of Westphalia in 1648. Although state sovereignty has remained a core principle of international affairs since then, there also has long been a debate regarding how to respond to human security concerns, including acts of genocide and other crimes against humanity that occur within states. The “responsibility to protect” (R2P) principle is the most famous and fairly recent attempt to blur the state sovereignty norm. Formulated in the 1990s and adopted in 2005 at the UN World Summit, the R2P principle asserts that if a state fails to protect its citizens from crimes against humanity, then other states (if authorized by multilateral bodies) have a right to intervene.⁴¹ R2P long has been controversial, even well before the 2011 UNSC-authorized no-fly zone to protect civilians in Libya, adopted via resolutions 1970 and 1973 and justified on R2P grounds.⁴² Although some saw the Libyan operation as the proper course of action under the R2P norm, others viewed it as justification for an imperialist act of aggression by a group of states, largely Western members of NATO, motivated by their own interests to use R2P as justification to remove Libyan leader Muammar al-Qaddafi.

Not all multilateral institutions that are engaged in collective security subscribe to the state sovereignty norm. For example, the AU was created in part as a reaction against its predecessor, the Organization of African Unity (OAU), which embraced the norm of noninterference in member states’ domestic affairs. This embrace was sufficient to see the OAU credibly accused of ignoring human security concerns. In contrast, early in its history, the AU embraced the norm of “non-indifference” to the suffering among member states’ citizens, signaling that the organization embraced a norm that acknowledged the centrality of human security considerations within its membership.⁴³

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III. Trends and uncertainties affecting the multilateral system and their hypothesized impacts

The multilateral system and conflict-prevention architectures are under pressure as novel developments and old fractures are reshaping how humanity lives, moves, cooperates, trades, and fights. Strategic foresight research long has insisted that there are multiple geopolitical, economic, social, environmental, and technological shifts underway that collectively are reshaping the global system, including the multilateral governance system. These trends and uncertainties, sometimes lumped together as “megatrends,” have significant implications for peace and security.⁴⁴

This report identifies four significant drivers of change that collectively are reshaping the global system now and will continue to do so into the future. These four are: geopolitical shifts, referring to power shifts among the world’s states; ongoing and rising significance of nonstate actors—groups and individuals—that collectively hold significant power within the global system, and therefore need to be accounted for and engaged with by the world’s states; Earth systems changes, including (prominently) climate change; and ongoing and significant technological disruption.

A. Contested multipolarity

Contested multipolarity refers to how shifts in the global balance of interstate power alter the ability of the multilateral system and its core institutions, norms, and processes to keep peace and resolve armed conflicts. These power shifts arguably pose the greatest challenge for multilateral conflict prevention and peacebuilding over the coming decade. Although states always have had competing interests at both global and regional levels, the power shifts described in this section reduce the incentives for cooperation among the world’s major and middle powers. In turn, the prevention of violent conflict will be negatively affected as it always has relied on convergence of those state interests, among other things, to be effective. As a result, these changing power dynamics threaten the effectiveness of multilateral institutions, including but not limited to the UNSC, and their approaches to conflict prevention and peacebuilding.

Increasing rivalry and tension among the major powers, in particular Russia and China on the one hand and the United States and its allies and partners on the other, is of utmost significance. So too is their willingness to support multilateralism and core multilateral institutions. At the same time, regional players such as India, Brazil, Turkey, South Africa, Gulf Cooperation Council states, and Nigeria are becoming more important in their regional contexts and globally, and in turn influencing multilateral norms including sovereignty, intervention, and cooperation.⁴⁵

Despite slowing growth, China might still overtake the United States as the largest economy in the world by 2035, with accompanying military and diplomatic significance.⁴⁶ Its emergence as a peer competitor to the United States is reshaping international affairs, including in the hard security domain. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022 was an affront to the UN’s core principles and has severely damaged relations between it and many of the world’s democratic states, while appearing to bring China and Russia closer together (though their relationship was becoming a closer one well before the war in Ukraine). For its part, the United States has been inconsistent in supporting the multilateral system and the UN: examples include initiating the 2003 Iraq War without explicit UNSC authorization; and the Trump administration’s withdrawing the United States from the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC), the UN-brokered Paris climate accord, and the World Health Organization (WHO)—though the Biden administration rejoined each of these

The rise of middle and emerging powers in the Global South is compounded by the relative demographic and economic decline of the world’s wealthy core.⁴⁷ Aging populations, slower economic growth, and domestic political dissatisfaction are disadvantaging North America and Europe relative to more youthful regions. Although many East and Southeast Asian countries face similar if not worse demographic headwinds, the shift of economic power to Asia already has reshaped global geopolitics, multilateralism, and multilateral institutions.⁴⁸

These shifts explain why the Global South’s middle and emerging powers are increasingly uneasy with the current multilateral system and the institutions that undergird it. Much frustration revolves around the exclusivity and perceived inadequacy of prominent multilateral economic institutions such as the UN Security Council, core Bretton Woods institutions (typically defined as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund), and the Group of Seven and Twenty groupings. Enlargement of the BRICS grouping, (referring to the emerging markets bloc that was created in 2009 by Brazil, Russia, India and China, with South Africa joining in 2010) is a prominent and recent example of how this frustration is manifesting itself on the world stage. Prior to the BRICS June 2023 annual summit in South Africa, a reported nineteen nations expressed formal or informal interest in joining the group (that number was later revised to forty countries expressing interest).⁴⁹ The bloc voted to admit six new members— Argentina, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates—to bring its total membership to eleven nations.⁵⁰

Such changes are opening avenues for contestation of the multilateral system, including its institutions, rules, and norms, and are creating novel frameworks of influence and power. A lack of agreement on a unitary alternative could hinder the system’s capacity to reform itself and deal proactively with conflict dynamics.

Implications for structural conflict prevention

China’s rise and its impact on multilateral conflict prevention. Although all the world’s major powers have demonstrated sporadic fidelity to the ideals of multilateralism, China’s rise is the most significant disrupter owing to the increasingly tense competition with the sole superpower, the United States, and China’s expression of its interests in the world.

This claim about the importance of the Sino-American bilateral relationship does not mean that their relationship is the sole driver of change within the interstate system. Nor does it deny other countries’ agency in these questions. Other countries, including several discussed in this section, also are interested in reforming the multilateral system for their own purposes and ends that, in turn, are separate from those of the two major powers. Rather, this claim asserts that the trajectory of the Sino-American relationship is the single most important bilateral relationship in international relations and, as such, has the most consequence for global governance among all such dyads in the world.

China has shown much interest in adapting the current multilateral system to its will and in creating new multilateral governance institutions.⁵¹ Beijing is contesting global governance norms and tenets while increasing its economic and diplomatic weight everywhere. It has created overseas economic investment vehicles such as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), and has invested in places of strategic interest such as the Sahel, a resource-rich region in petroleum, iron ore, uranium, and more.⁵² China often is accused of crafting so-called debt traps in recipient countries, indirectly limiting (although not eliminating) their political and economic options while increasing their dependency upon China.⁵³ China remains cautious about fundamentally reshaping the conflict prevention and peacekeeping architecture, though it is interested in securing senior political posts for its nominees within the UN system.⁵⁴

Implications for conflict prevention institutions

Great power gridlock in the UNSC. Gridlock within multilateral conflict-prevention institutions, especially the UNSC, is a serious institutional risk resulting from contested geopolitics. For decades, the UNSC’s five permanent members have used their veto powers to block decisions or political statements perceived as being against their interests.⁵⁵ More recently, the UNSC has been unable to condemn Syria’s use of chemical attacks against its own population, halt the conflict in Yemen, respond to either the 2014 Russian annexation of Crimea or its 2022 invasion of Ukraine, navigate China’s contested claims over the South China Sea, or address the Israeli/Palestinian conflict.⁵⁶ Veto patterns also have shifted: within the UNSC, China has sided more frequently with Russia over the past decade in exercising its veto.⁵⁷

UNSC gridlock risks the legitimacy and effectiveness of the institution, shrinking its ability to address key issues such as nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction or management of civil wars. The secretary-general (and many other parties around the world) have decried the UNSC’s inability to respond to threats to international peace and security, including to novel threats such as COVID-19, and has repeatedly called for UNSC reform.⁵⁸ As Russia’s war in Ukraine shows, the UNSC’s inability to address such crises has meant an elevated role for the UN General Assembly (UNGA), even if that role has been more symbolic than binding.⁵⁹

Growing representational gap. Calls for reform of multilateral institutions—especially the UNSC but also the Bretton Woods institutions—to make them more reflective of global power shifts have gone unheeded. Since the end of the Cold War at least, such calls have grown over time, yet the failure to do so appears to be risking the reputations and therefore power of these institutions, even possibly to the point of irrelevance. Such calls are bound to increase over the coming decade, given trends outlined in this section, with India, South Africa, Nigeria, and Germany, the largest states in their regions, currently not represented in the UNSC, likely at the forefront.

The Biden administration’s recent support for UNSC reform suggests at least some potential for change, limited as it may be.⁶⁰ Western countries, including the United States, feel pressure to improve relations with nonaligned countries such as India as (potential) important allies and balancers against China and Russia. For example, the September 2023 meeting between President Joe Biden and Prime Minister Narendra Modi generated a joint diplomatic statement that, among many other things, endorsed India’s bid for a permanent UNSC seat while reiterating the importance of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, or Quad, consisting of Australia, India, Japan, and the United States—which China views as a forum for these states to coordinate efforts against it.⁶¹ Western governments have been concerned by uneven condemnation within the Global South of Russia’s war in Ukraine, as discussed further below.⁶²

Evolving role of peace and security institutions and architectures outside the UN system. Partially as a result of the gridlock within global multilateral institutions, regional and alternative institutions such as the African Union and its African Peace and Security Architecture have expanded their roles and modalities of engagement in conflict management. So too have other subgroupings such as the G20 or ASEAN; while not holding peace and security mandates, they also have emerged as important actors in the conflict-management space (e.g., the G20 as a coordinator on the pandemic recovery).

This development holds promise for regional ownership (“African solutions for Africans”), but also poses challenges. The AU, for example, will have to tackle more conflict prevention and peacekeeping responsibilities even as it faces shortcomings in finances and institutional capacity.⁶³ There are opportunities for the UN and regional institutions to work more closely together, as was shown for example in 2014-15 by collaboration between the United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel (UNOWAS) and the Economic Community of West African States in Burkina Faso (these institutions deployed a joint early warning mission to the country in hopes of initiating a democratic transition).⁶⁴

Emergence of coalitions within and outside of the UN. A more complex global landscape is emerging, one that is coalition driven and requiring coalitions that shift according to issue area, both within the UN and outside of it. A more complex landscape will require deft diplomacy aimed at coalition building across different modalities. Western countries will need to engage actively and regularly with countries from the Global South.

A timely example involves voting at UNGA. In 2022, after Russia precluded UNSC condemnation of its actions in Ukraine, UNGA took up the mantle by passing several resolutions affirming the principles of the UN Charter and rejecting Russia’s invasion.⁶⁵ Yet the resolutions also witnessed multiple abstentions and negative votes by some Global South countries, which point toward how Russia and China have built their own alliances and partnerships through development cooperation, political exchanges, and more. This dynamic underscores the fact that the Global South is not a monolith—countries within the Global South have their own interests within the international system, including as they pertain to conflict management, which inform how they view their relationships with the major powers. A recent International Crisis Group analysis notes that Western countries “should look closely at how to mitigate the effects of the [Ukraine] war on countries outside Europe” if they expect to receive greater support among non-Western states within multilateral institutions.⁶⁶

Declining good offices role of the UN secretary-general. One of the most important roles of the UNSG is his deployment of good offices, meaning “steps taken publicly and privately, drawing upon their independence, impartiality and integrity, to prevent international disputes from arising, escalating or spreading.”⁶⁷ In an era of intensifying great power competition, the UNSG’s good offices are at risk of carrying even less weight than usual. Major powers like the United States and China as well as middle and emerging powers such as India or Turkey can exert influence over regional and even global events without operating within and through the UN system and the UNSG. Although this always has been true, it is arguable that the trend line is toward more rather than less of it, hence it is a diversion from the past. Indeed, over just the past few years, Guterres’s calls for a global cease-fire during the COVID-19 pandemic went unheeded, his role (and the UN’s more generally) in the war in Ukraine has been limited despite some milestones such as the Black Sea grain deal, and he and his representatives have had little influence on the current situation in Sudan.⁶⁸

Implications for conflict prevention norms

Demise of the standard treatment. The rise of a multipolar world order risks the end of the “standard treatment” of conflict management. The standard treatment consists of mediation to cease hostilities, leading to a unitary peace agreement or framework, enforceable through UN-sanctioned peacekeepers. Behind the treatment’s success, especially the high-level mediation of conflicts, lay the great powers. Great power cooperation was highest during the United States’ unipolar moment in the 1990s, allowing for important treatment successes in the Balkans, Liberia, and Timor-Leste.⁶⁹ However, since then the system has lost its capacity to deliver as the necessary underlying support has diminished.

It should be noted that not all states view the demise of the standard treatment approach as a problem. As has been discussed or inferred elsewhere in this report, states have viewed previous conflict-prevention efforts as violations of state sovereignty and therefore have embraced multilateral approaches that are less focused on direct intervention by UN-sanctioned peacekeepers.

Norms contestation. Contested multipolarity has weakened consensus surrounding key global norms. On human rights, China’s growing influence has allowed it to limit criticisms of its own practices at home.⁷⁰ Its growing weight outside the UN system, via the BRI or AIIB, allows China to promote a system of “rights-free development.”⁷¹ States with deep ties to Beijing may mute criticisms of China’s record on human rights or even support weakening international norms.⁷² Such developments impact the pursuit of rights-centric conflict-prevention and peacebuilding efforts. Middle powers also are actively involved in norm contestation and erosion. Iran’s efforts to gain a nuclear weapon are in direct contrast to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the norm of nonproliferation.⁷³ Russia’s 2014 invasion of Crimea, alongside its full invasion of Ukraine in 2022, show Moscow actively contesting the well-established norm of state sovereignty. The actions of both nations not only undermine well-established norms, but also lead to a more volatile and conflict-prone world.

Western states are not blameless: the United States’ 2003 non-UN sanctioned declaration of war on Iraq, for example, undermined the norm against violations of state sovereignty except in cases of clear self-defense. Although the United States presented its case for war in self-defense terms, this claim often rang hollow elsewhere.⁷⁴

Other relevant norms also have eroded including the R2P norm. Although NATO countries viewed the Libyan intervention as a successful implementation of R2P, others (Brazil and India, most notably) saw it more as justifying the use of NATO’s power.⁷⁵ Brazil proposed a replacement called “responsibility while protecting” (RwP) to limit R2P’s override of sovereignty claims.⁷⁶

Implications for operational conflict prevention

Restructuring of peacekeeping mandates and deployments. A contested geopolitical landscape may pose challenges for UN-mandated peacekeeping operations.⁷⁷ Three dimensions are in question: maintaining the political coherence of peacekeeping coalitions where multilateral, governmental (nation-state), and nonstate actors all have an important presence in a conflict setting; maintaining a minimum use of force standard (referring to the long-standing norm of how peacekeepers should use only the minimum amount of force necessary to achieve an outcome); and finally, limiting peacekeeping operations to core missions consisting of “protection, stability, and politics.”⁷⁸ Since the 1980s and 1990s, UN peacekeeping missions have had expanded mandates that include a variety of complex goals that run well beyond their original cease-fire monitoring function. These items include institution and capacity building, election monitoring, and peacebuilding roles, among others, even as their resources have remained the same. Peacekeeping operations have not had enough political support or the resources to accomplish the expanding and ambitious goals set for them, as shown by the recently announced withdrawal of the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) and the domestic contestation of UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, more widely known as MONUSCO.⁷⁹

B. State and non-state transformations

During the past couple decades, global economic growth, enhanced access to education, and increasingly ubiquitous technology drove widespread progress in human development including in poverty reduction, hunger and malnutrition reduction, child mortality, and other indicators.⁸⁰ (This claim holds true while acknowledging the uneven, spotty, and sometimes halting nature of progress around the world, as for example occurred during the 2008-2009 financial crisis and the 2020-2022 COVID-19 pandemic.)

During the early 2010s, foresight analysts utilized the phrase “individual empowerment” to describe how individuals were increasingly capable of shaping world events and outcomes.⁸¹ Individual empowerment was meant in two senses: one positive, in that individuals might become more engaged in solving problems, and one negative, in that individuals might become more destructive, for example through wider access to more lethal weapons. The positive side of this equation has meant, among other things, that aspirations and expectations rose along with fundamental economic and social indicators. However, since the onset of COVID-19, some human development gains have been lagging and even backsliding.⁸² Economic volatility, a slowdown in global poverty reduction, rising inequality, and ongoing gender gaps continue to frustrate the global sustainable development agenda.⁸³ This turbulence risks increasing popular dissatisfaction and distrust in state institutions, which can fray the social contract, increase the potential for violent conflicts within countries, and make structural conflict-prevention efforts more difficult.

The rise of nonstate groups complements that of individuals. Over the past decades, multinational corporations, nongovernmental organizations, community groups, and labor unions have proliferated globally. These have been enabled by the Internet, which also has created groups that exist entirely online, e.g., online gaming communities. This proliferation was not always positive: illicit and criminal networks; armed nonstate actors and paramilitary organizations; terrorist groups; private military contractors; domestic militia groups; and other malignant or misanthropic groups also increased in number. In 2022, according to the ACLED, “nonstate groups were involved in 64 percent of all armed, organized activities globally and perpetrated 76 percent of all violence targeting civilians.”⁸⁴

The ANSA phenomenon is problematic not just for its scale but also its heterogeneity and complexity. According to Michael von der Schulenburg, a former UN diplomat, ANSAs “are extremely diverse [and] include ideologically, religiously and ethnically motivated groups…; rent seeking groups such as warlords, rebel forces, pirates, clans and gangs; and outright criminal organizations such as transnational crime syndicates, drug and arms cartels and human traffickers.” For these reasons, he argues, “in the realities of most armed conflicts, political insurgents, criminal syndicates and state-sponsored paramilitary often become indistinguishable.”⁸⁵

Even as states remain the central actors within the international system, individuals and nonstate groups are altering relationships with state authorities, gaining more prominence, and thereby rebalancing the global power architecture. Their rise raises major questions about both the social contract within states and the Westphalian state model that (nominally) has been the premise of international relations for centuries. These questions carry significant implications for designing and implementing conflict prevention and peacebuilding strategies, identifying and engaging key actors, and maintaining common objectives over the longer run.

Implications for structural conflict prevention

(Likely) permanence and significance of ANSAs in conflict-management settings. A minimum of 195 million people live in ANSA-controlled areas, of which some sixty-five million are under the exclusive control of these groups.⁸⁶ In many cases, ANSAs provide paragovernance activities such as taxation or health services, as was or is the case in the territories controlled by the jihadist group; the terrorist group al-Shabaab; and ANSAs operating in the Sahel.⁸⁷

Globally, ANSAs are proliferating, posing challenges for multilateral institutions and states. The lack of sanctioned guidelines from the UN makes engagement with ANSAs difficult, including in situations where their involvement might assist peace and security outcomes.⁸⁸ The securitization of this subfield, a remnant of the counterterrorism agenda, precludes nonmilitary approaches such as dialogues and training with some ANSAs that might advance peace and security goals, including respect for international humanitarian laws and the safe passage of humanitarian aid.⁸⁹

Implications for conflict prevention institutions

Defining responsibilities becomes more challenging. As the role of individuals and nonstate groups expands, including by taking on governance roles especially where states are weak, there is a greater need to define operational guidelines for cooperation on the ground. For example, during the pandemic, the Iraqi government’s poor pandemic response gave informal militias, the Popular Mobilization Forces, an opening to furnish a pandemic response of their own, thereby helping them to increase their popular legitimacy.⁹⁰ More positively, some actors such as corporations or philanthropies can play some key roles, such as pandemic response or climate financing, also raising challenges for their inclusion, management, and coordination with state authorities.

Implications for conflict prevention norms

Inclusivity in conflict mediation and beyond. Elite mediation processes rarely work if they are not inclusive and representative of larger segments of a population. Individual and group empowerment means that the pressure on multilateral institutions to be inclusive of nonstate actors in their mediation and negotiation processes should continue to increase. Although broader participation means increased complexity and requires careful sequencing of efforts, the benefits are outsized. Women and youth are essential groups in civil society, whose early inclusion in mediation, negotiation, reconciliation, or other peacebuilding processes capitalizes on their unique knowledge and skills, increases the chances of success of the deals reached, and ensures more equitable outcomes.⁹¹ More generally, inclusion itself is a conflict prevention tool: inclusion of individuals and groups within all aspects of society (government, economy, etc.) is critical to defusing grievances against other groups and the government.⁹²

Not all nonstate actors are alike, of course, and not all are easily integrated into mediation and negotiation processes. By far the most complex and contested cases involve ANSAs, the groups that possess military and (often) political power in affected conflict zones (and hence cannot be ignored in conflict mediation processes) yet frequently act in bad faith and/or are unsavory actors on the battlefield and among civilian populations. Because of the proliferation of ANSAs in general (and proliferation of the number of conflicts where ANSAs are the central actors), to date there has been no single template for dealing with them in Track 1 or Track 1.5 processes.⁹³

Implications for operational conflict prevention

Challenges to exclusivity of UN mediation. High-level, elite peace agreements brokered through UN-sanctioned efforts are becoming more difficult to achieve in isolation, given more complex environments, the proliferation of conflicts, and the proliferation of ANSAs and other nonstate actor groups. There is both an increased demand for mediation and an increased supply of institutions (including nongovernmental organizations) to provide it. The AU, EU, “the European Institute of Peace (EIP), the Crisis Management Initiative (CMI), the Dialogue Advisory Group (DAG), the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (HD), and the Community of Sant’Egidio,”⁹⁴ are just some of the institutions that provide direct or indirect support to mediation efforts. HD, for example, has been involved in mediation efforts in Mali, albeit with limited impact.⁹⁵ There are many other positive examples of organizations, including non-Western organizations, that have been important mediators in conflicts around the world, such as Cambodia’s Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies, Colombia’s El Centro de Investigación y Educación Popular (CINEP), and Myanmar’s Euro-Burma Office (EBO).⁹⁶

A broader consequence of having nonstate actors involved in mediation is the volume of effort. Nonstate mediators, including regular citizens, can engage all parties, including ANSAs and insurgents, in ways that states cannot. Some agreements are arrived at entirely among armed groups. In Burkina Faso and Mali, local truces, formal and informal, among belligerents including ANSAs and violent extremist organizations have been reached, sometimes with little or no outside mediation.⁹⁷ Although often temporary, they can offer communities some stability. While such agreements do little to bolster the legitimacy of broader efforts aimed at national justice and peace, different kinds of agreements serve different purposes, which speak to the need to bolster complementary approaches to resolving conflicts. It should be noted that such peace agreements may have some downsides in that they can further fragmentation, decreasing cohesion and support for the state and entrenching rather than addressing the root causes of conflict dynamics.⁹⁸

These developments mean that the UN’s role will need to change.⁹⁹ UN envoys should be “conductors, not soloists,” according to one expert, coordinating roles within mediation efforts.¹⁰⁰

C. Climate and Earth systems

Climate change is arguably the most important driver of change shaping the long-term future of international affairs. If viewed solely in ecological terms, this trend has a high degree of certainty, meaning that the ongoing carbon loading of the atmosphere and oceans is certain to transform the planet’s ecosystems. For scientists, the uncertainties surround the pace and scale of those transformations, not whether they will occur. Much will depend on the speed with which the global economy decarbonizes. The climate’s transformative impacts on human systems will be far reaching, and if left unchecked, likely will alter the scale, location, and intensity of conflict globally, making planning and execution of global, national, and subnational conflict prevention efforts far more challenging.

Scenarios released by the UN indicate that temperatures will increase in the 2030s above the target of 1.5°C codified in the 2015 Paris Agreement, with the world on track for a 2.4°C to 2.6°C temperature increase.¹⁰¹ Scientists estimate that the world has less than a decade left to dramatically change emissions trajectories before irreversible damage sets in.¹⁰²

Climate change causes or worsens extreme weather events, heat waves, flooding, drought, ocean acidification, and more, which increase social and economic disasters, human fatalities, economic losses, societal fragility, and forced migration.¹⁰³ The extent of disruption varies regionally and increases with rising temperatures: for example, in the United States, for every degree Fahrenheit increase in temperature the gross domestic product will shrink by 0.7 percent.¹⁰⁴

The costs of adapting to a climate-changed world are staggering—estimates suggest that between $315 billion to $565 billion would have to be spent annually by 2050 on climate adaptation efforts.¹⁰⁵ As shown by debates at the recent annual Conference of Parties (COPs) under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), there have been terse global negotiations about who will pay for climate adaptation.

Climate change long has been regarded by the climate security community as a “threat multiplier” that if unchecked will exacerbate societal, economic, and political fragility, while worsening conflict dynamics.¹⁰⁶ For decades, this community labored to have its assertions about the climate-security-conflict nexus taken seriously within governments, multilateral institutions, and other policymaking settings. That effort has paid off in that this nexus now is widely regarded as an important (if tragic) feature of the global conflict landscape, with serious work done on the topic within multiple institutions around the world.¹⁰⁷ For poverty-stricken communities and those in conflict zones, adaptation problems are more acute owing to institutional and governance shortcomings.¹⁰⁸ Climate impacts also are expected to be greater for women and girls.¹⁰⁹

Implications for structural conflict prevention

Exacerbation of instability. Climate change disrupts economic systems and access to critical natural resources, in turn reshaping their governance and allocation in society. These effects undermine food and water security, especially in poor and vulnerable societies, and thereby induce out-migration and conflict. Climate change could exacerbate conflict dynamics and create new escalation ladders, especially in conflict-prone or fragile sociopolitical and socioeconomic contexts, and where institutions are unresponsive to changing conditions on the ground (for example, unable or unwilling to address rising water insecurity). Conflict prevention and peacebuilding institutions will have to develop an improved understanding of these climate drivers, how they map onto conflict dynamics, and how they will alter core processes.¹¹⁰ Across poor and wealthy societies alike, climate change might increase existing public dissatisfaction, fray societal trust, polarize citizens, and amplify social grievances.¹¹¹

Implications for conflict prevention institutions

Impact of climate change on institutional strategies and operations. Foreign and security policy institutions the world over are struggling to incorporate climate security into their strategic and operational portfolios. Institutions within the conflict management system, including the UN, are in the same situation in that they will have to account for the multiplicity of climate impacts on the peace and security problem set as well as their approaches to assessing the problem.

Much thinking is underway on this front. For example, the UN’s DPPA has attempted to include climate considerations within “analytical and planning mechanisms as well as . . . prevention, mediation and peace-building strategies” through new guidance in areas such as mediation.¹¹² Its work in this space is facilitated by the Climate Security Mechanism, a joint initiative of the DPPA, United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), and United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) that works across these programs to provide analysis.¹¹³

Emphasis on early warning systems. A climate-altered world will increase the need for robust and thorough early warning systems that provide analysts with timely and accurate information about where climate-induced changes might have the most impact on societies, particularly fragile societies, and on conflict. Such systems therefore can assist in providing analysts with information regarding where and when conflict prevention and peacebuilding activities are most likely to be needed. EWS can help identify how local and regional climates will change (meaning chronic and acute changes in precipitation and temperature, as examples), inform local populations about those changes, and help policymakers adapt planning and investments to help mitigate and adapt, all of which should increase transparency and trust and minimize loss of life and livelihoods. If EWS is applied properly in these contexts, such systems would assist with conflict prevention and its escalation.¹¹⁴

There are numerous databases, dashboards, and EWS systems that cover pieces of the climate security equation. The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the East African trade bloc, is an example. IGAD has developed multiple data tools and EWS dashboards that monitor and assess hydrological and climatological conditions in the region.¹¹⁵

Yet despite the existence of such tools, there remains a significant amount of work to be done in this space around the world. The complexity and difficulty in building these kinds of real-time EWS systems that track the multiplicity of Earth system changes, map those changes onto all world regions, and then link them to other drivers of conflict—all at a level of granularity that allows analysts to forecast when and where conflict is more likely to occur—is an enormous technical and bureaucratic challenge.

Implications for operational conflict prevention

Complexity of operating environment. Climate change adds an important layer of complexity to international relations, the global system, and governance. As a threat multiplier, climate change is “already increasing food insecurity, water scarcity, and resource competition, while disrupting livelihoods and spurring migration.”¹¹⁶ In places such as the Sahel, which contains many agricultural and pastoral subsistence economies, climate disruptions have enormous potential for disruption and deprivation, thus exacerbating tensions over scarce resources.¹¹⁷ Climate will drive more complex crises, which exist when multiple challenges occur simultaneously in the same place.¹¹⁸

As a result, conflict management institutions will be forced to adjust how they conduct their work. The greater frequency and severity of natural disasters will strain resources for conflict management efforts at domestic and international levels while adding yet another layer of political and socioeconomic complexity to the task. Further, the same trends will make it harder for such institutions to conduct their work, given climate disaster impacts on conditions on the ground.

D. Technological revolutions

Although technological change is an omnipresent feature of the modern world since the Industrial Revolution, the speed and significance of technologically driven change arguably is greater today than at any time in history.¹¹⁹ The technologies under development now have the potential to remake society in every way, owing to their unprecedented capabilities, in positive and negative senses.¹²⁰ The multilateral conflict-prevention architecture is not being spared from these developments.

The impacts of technological development are among the more difficult drivers to forecast for two big reasons. First, only rarely are technological breakthroughs predictable, which means that it is difficult to anticipate when, where, and who will produce a truly groundbreaking discovery. Second, it is almost as difficult to forecast what the second and third order impacts of any new technology are likely to be, for better and for worse.

These caveats aside, several of the key technologies that are likely to influence the future of international affairs and the multilateral system include:

• Artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning (ML).
• Information technologies (the internet, 5G, 6G).
• Automation and manufacturing technologies (e.g., 3D printing).
• Advanced computing technologies (e.g., quantum computing).
• Remote sensing and monitoring technologies (e.g., satellites and drones).
• Health technologies (biotechnologies).¹²¹

Some types of technological change can scale to near-universal levels, although scaling can take decades if not longer, as occurred historically with the railroad and automobile. The length of universal adoption underscores that technological progress is an uneven phenomenon. Advanced technologies are not uniformly available to all people immediately upon their creation. Quite the contrary: most often, new technologies take much time for universal adoption. The internet is an apt example. The International Telecommunication Union’s (ITU) seminal Global Connectivity Report 2022 reported that although two-thirds of humankind uses the internet, one-third remains offline even though the internet has existed for decades. The ITU report asserted that “multiple digital divides [now exist], across and within countries, between men and women, between youth and older persons, between cities and rural areas, between those who enjoy a fiber connection and those who struggle on a spotty 3G connection.”¹²² Access to reliable internet service is a critical component of social and economic development—its availability is so important that it is difficult to imagine how advanced societies now could function without it.

Technological change can be a double-edged sword. Social media, for example, enables nonviolent resistance, democratic protest, documentation of violence, and sharing of information among groups (state and nonstate alike) that are engaged in finding solutions to conflict. But social media also amplifies harmful narratives, facilitates the recruitment of at-risk youth into ANSAs, and further polarizes societies. In the United States, given that some 48 percent of adults get their news from social media at least occasionally, it becomes easy to understand how misinformation can spread quickly and contribute to societal division.¹²³ Technological change therefore presents new risks and opportunities for conflict prevention and peacebuilding.¹²⁴

Implications for structural conflict prevention

Cyber conflict. Cyber conflict is not new, but it is proliferating and scaling: cyber activities are commonly employed by state and nonstate actors alike to disrupt, divert, steal, and to achieve strategic impacts.¹²⁵ Cyberattacks and cybercrime are common and increasing throughout the world.¹²⁶ This trend will continue given the relatively low barriers to entry into cybercrime and cyberattacks for bad-faith actors such as authoritarian governments, criminal networks, and terrorist groups.

The UN has supported creation of the Open-Ended Working Group that focuses on developing rules for states and responsible behavior in cyberspace.¹²⁷ However, progress has been difficult given the transference of major power competition into the digital arena. For this reason, managing cyber conflict should remain a key priority area for the UN given the likelihood of increased cyber activity by state and nonstate actors alike.¹²⁸ To counter the risk of escalation to physical conflict, the UN can focus on norms development, cyber diplomacy, confidence-building measures, and innovative concepts such as “cyber peacekeepers.”¹²⁹

AI and social media are creating a more contested information environment. Newer technology tools such as AI/ML and older ones such as social media together will alter the information environment, making it both faster and more contested. The significant downside risk is that the pace and content of disinformation (through, for example, AI/ML-generated deepfake videos and other content) will negatively impact conflict dynamics as they will give bad-faith actors even more capabilities to alter and even define the information landscape. This problem has been much in evidence already with just social media on its own, which can be and has been used by various actors (state and nonstate) to create or amplify false narratives that have a direct bearing on conflict dynamics, often exacerbating existing polarization. Nonstate actors in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Mali, the Central African Republic (CAR), and elsewhere have proven themselves adept at using social media to amplify misleading narratives, contributing to distrust among local communities, insurgents, and the government.¹³⁰

Disinformation also can be manufactured by state actors. During the Wagner Group’s deployment in CAR and Mali, Russia pushed narratives that were “predominantly pro-regime, anti-French, and pro-Russian” via local proxies such as Radio Lengo Songo in CAR (although not an AI/ML or social media example per se, this case does underscore the importance of state actors using communication tools to spread information and disinformation).¹³¹

Communication runs in more than one direction. Hence, the same tools that are used for disinformation can be employed by good-faith actors to relay accurate information and to counter false and misleading narratives from elsewhere. Social media also can be used to counter disinformation. For example, in West Africa, ECOWAS used social media to conduct training sessions, run online campaigns, enable storytelling, and counter harmful narratives online.¹³² In Ukraine, social media is used to debunk Russian false narratives.¹³³

Implications for conflict prevention and conflict prevention norms

Automation changing the battlefield. Advanced automated systems, driven by AI/ML and remote-sensing capabilities, are beginning to change battlefields. Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs) have appeared in Ukraine and elsewhere, including in sub-Saharan Africa, either in interstate warfare or in asymmetric contexts (e.g., fighting insurgent or criminal networks.)¹³⁴ Given the pace of AI/ML development, by the mid-2030s automation could be ubiquitous on battlefields and across multiple warfighting domains.

Automated technologies might increase conflict and instability for several reasons. First, weapons and systems can be deployed without a full understanding of their battlefield impacts or rules for their use. For example, as UAV operators are far from the battlefield, they may become desensitized to their targets. Second, automated weapons could enable all conflict actors, including governments and ANSAs, to assault human rights, as has occurred with automated surveillance systems used by authoritarian countries to control their citizens.¹³⁵ On the battlefield, such systems might have insufficient capabilities to properly differentiate between civilians and combatants, risking poor decision-making about lawful targets.

Implications for conflict prevention institutions

Digital technologies for good. The list of applications of digital and emerging technologies in conflict prevention is extensive and includes the following:¹³⁶

• Improving early warning, for assessment of insights and trends as well as response processes to supplement offline engagement, as ECOWAS Early Warning and Response Network (ECOWARN) did in West Africa.¹³⁷ The applications are numerous, from the identification of patterns of violence through the use of AI, to improving satellite imaging capacity with the help of better space assets.
• Facilitating the coordination or deployment of humanitarian assistance, from using geolocation services to monitor Ebola outbreaks¹³⁸ to the use of drones to deliver critical medical aid,¹³⁹ or other assistance in the aftermath of a natural disaster.
• Assisting with reconciliation and postconflict peacebuilding efforts by “offering tools that foster collaboration, transform attitudes, and give a stronger voice to communities.”¹⁴⁰
• Enhancing performance, efficiency, and resource allocation within multilateral institutions, for instance in peacekeeping operations.¹⁴¹ Powerful AI/ML-based algorithms could improve the quality and speed of decision-making.¹⁴²

Institutions will need to assess the potential impact of such technologies on their processes and activities, develop normative frameworks for their use, and integrate them into operations. As with climate change, DPPA has made some initial forays into this space. In 2018, DPPA set up an innovation unit to “test new technologies for . . . conflict prevention, peace mediation and peacebuilding work [and to improve] analytical tools and practices” for more rapid and focused action.¹⁴³

Implications for operational conflict prevention

Digital diplomacy and activism on the rise. The COVID-19 pandemic required swift adaptation. Diplomacy moved online, which both limited engagement (i.e., reduced or eliminated face-to-face interaction) and expanded it, given the explosion of meetings online.¹⁴⁴ Women-led peacebuilding efforts adapted to the new digital world during COVID-19 using platforms such as Zoom, Signal, and WhatsApp.¹⁴⁵ Although the post-pandemic world is returning to more in-person engagement, the trends toward virtual engagement are unlikely to return to pre-pandemic levels.

Digital technologies are changing the face of mediation. Digital technologies can be helpful in conflict mediation, for example by providing better communication platforms to the negotiating parties, increasing inclusivity by helping identify and engage actors who should sit at the negotiating table, especially those coming from historically underrepresented groups such as women and youth, and helping with strategic communications via use of social media to promote positive outcomes and peaceful narratives.¹⁴⁶ As an example, in 2020, the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) conducted the “first-ever, large-scale digital dialogue online with Libyan youth . . . [to] inform the UNSMIL-facilitated intra-Libyan dialogue tracks about . . . outstanding security, political and economic issues.”¹⁴⁷ UNSMIL later engaged in additional similar digital dialogues with other Libyan stakeholders.¹⁴⁸

Convergence of peacekeeping and the digital world. In 2021, the UN secretary-general released a strategy for the digital transformation of UN peacekeeping, with a focus on mandate implementation and personnel safety.¹⁴⁹ Two complex matters should be prioritized concerning the nexus between peacekeeping and emerging technologies: protecting civilians from AI-related and other harm that can infringe upon their human rights; and building internal capacity and collaborations to ensure data integrity and internal network protection against activities that can undermine peacekeeping operations and with them, the credibility surrounding the UN mandate.¹⁵⁰

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IV. Scenarios

This section presents four scenarios based on the trends and uncertainties discussed in section III. Each scenario is a plausible story of how the drivers of change might combine to shape the world over the next ten to fifteen years. This section is not a prediction: none of the scenarios are offered as the most probable future outcome. The reader should regard all of the scenarios as equally plausible.

Directly following these global scenarios is an assessment of how the four scenarios in this section might play out in the Sahel, a region that illustrates many of the challenges resulting from the interplay of the driving forces outlined in this report. If the peoples and communities of the Sahel region are to have a positive future, then the various actors involved—multilateral organizations, national governments (within and outside of the Sahel), subnational governments, and nonstate actors—will have to come to grips with these forces, despite the many pressures that these drivers will bring. As a result, the Sahel region was chosen as a case study precisely because it offers a complex and important illustration of where conflict dynamics may be headed over the coming decade and where the possibilities might lie for finding solutions.

Scenario 1: Major power clash

The world in 2033 is dominated by the rivalry between two powerful countries, China and the United States. Throughout the late 2020s and into the early 2030s, China continued in its quest to displace the United States as the world’s hegemon. To date, it has not succeeded. China’s economic slowdown, which started in 2023, has continued (admittedly, it still grew at rates typical of a mature economy). Added to this problem has been China’s demographic winter, which has limited the country’s rise and prevented it from becoming a true global hegemon. China’s struggle to displace the United States did not mean smooth sailing for the formerly sole superpower, however. Through the 2020s, the United States struggled to lead given ongoing turbulence in its domestic politics, which hampered both its reputation abroad and its ability to act boldly economically or diplomatically when it most counted.

Locked into an increasingly adversarial relationship yet being unable to achieve economic or military superiority over the other power, both the United States and China pursued aggressive policies oriented around the recruitment of new allies and partners. China focused much of its effort on other authoritarian countries, conveying influence through the export of technologically infused goods and services and infrastructure investment (though the Belt and Road Initiative was pared back owing to domestic concern in China about its debt). The United States took a different route, focusing more on democratic states through diplomatic, political, and economic means. America remained committed to its partners but failed to mount a major effort to win over partners beyond its sphere of influence. Both nations were cognizant of the flawed optics of military support and stayed away from directly providing arms within their spheres.

In a fashion parallel to the Cold War, the United States and China eventually settled into a state where each had a defined grouping of countries that it considered within its own sphere of influence. And as occurred during the Cold War, both countries chose noninterference over confrontation within each other’s sphere of influence.

The strategic competition between the United States and China split the world’s nonaligned states into two groups. The first were states that were of strategic value to one or both countries, countries that both major powers saw as valuable for different reasons, for example as important trading partners, for key natural resources, or simple geography. In these countries, the United States and China aimed to limit the ability of the other nation to intervene. Key regions here included: the Great Lakes Region of Africa, the South Pacific, and parts of Latin America.

For states within this first group, the conflict prevention and peacekeeping equation proved to be a difficult one. These states were nonaligned, but at the same time they were also seen as strategically valuable to either major power (and sometimes both). Hence, UNSC resolutions for peacekeeping missions in these countries tended to be vetoed by either the United States or China, which were reluctant to watch the other power fiddle in what each saw as something it alone valued. Some affected states received peacekeeping and peacebuilding assistance from regional bodies such as ECOWAS. Many took bilateral aid—economic, military and otherwise—from wherever they could find it. In many cases, they leveraged the two major powers against one another, as had occurred during the Cold War.

The second group of nonaligned countries offered minimal strategic value to either the United States or China and were treated accordingly by the major powers. In these nations, the United States and China were less willing to invest, seeing efforts as unlikely to result in a major payoff. Yet these countries’ lack of perceived strategic value also had an upside. Both the United States and China showed a willingness to cooperate on peacekeeping missions in these countries, precisely because they were perceived as having a lower strategic status. Both countries had other motives too. The United States wanted to avoid the optics of a unilateral intervention and China remained committed to its principle of sovereignty promotion. This meant that despite the ongoing rivalry between two of the P5 states, the UNSC managed to continue to function in a core role, which was the authorization of peacekeeping missions, as occurred for example in the Sahel.

The world’s conflict zones were not only in those areas that were nonaligned with the major powers. Conflict occurred in areas of the world that were within the two powers’ spheres of influence. For states that the major powers deemed within their spheres of influence, in cases of intrastate or interstate conflict there was no possibility of both the United States or China authorizing a mission at the UNSC. This meant that the United States and China, plus whatever allies and partners they could muster, dealt with instances of conflict as they saw fit and on their terms. Not all of this was post hoc conflict resolution and peacekeeping. At least some of their actions focused on the prevention of conflict within or between states they viewed as partners, which meant employment of social and economic development tools and extended diplomatic overtures.

The clash between the major powers had other consequences. China continued its investment in alternative multilateral institutions, including the AIIB and the BRI (which, despite hiccups, survived as China found that the money it poured into the initiative paid diplomatic dividends around the world). These efforts were designed at least in part to advance China’s goals and priorities outside of the UN system. At a certain point, the AIIB and the BRI hit their limits and began transitioning from efforts to gain new partners to shoring up support among existing ones.

Yet China also regarded the UN as an important forum for maximizing its influence and legitimacy around the world. China acted within the UN when it could and where it saw opportunities, shaping the institution to its will as best it could. This included placing Chinese nationals in leadership positions within the UN, for example as envoy for the Great Lakes Region. There was some concern that Chinese nationals in these roles represented the interests of the Chinese state rather than working on behalf of the United Nations (unsurprisingly, this narrative was pressed hard by the United States). There was little proof that Chinese nationals did this any more than other UN executives.

China approached UN peacekeeping operations differently than it did in the 2020s. It shifted away from deploying specialized, highly skilled troops for support and logistical operations to supplying more soldiers on the front lines of peacekeeping mandates. China’s motivation for increasing its blue helmet presence was the same as for its other interests within the UN system, namely, to boost its profile within the institution and increase goodwill among affected states in conflict regions, and within the UNSC and UNGA.

The United States continued to be an important funder of UN peacekeeping operations and offered specialized assistance in myriad forms. However, as it always had, the United States shied away from sending foot soldiers, worried as ever of the optics of it losing troops in multilateral peacekeeping missions abroad.

Finally, and paradoxically, there was some halting progress on the provision of global public goods. Perhaps the most important was that both the United States and China saw making progress on climate mitigation goals as a means to boost their economies through technological innovation and show the world some diplomatic leadership in the process. As such, both countries find ways to cooperate within the UNFCCC. Cooperation around key emerging technologies, however, continued to prove difficult to manage as both the United States and China sought to isolate the other from first-mover development. Recognizing the large strategic value of technology, neither nation was willing to share or collaborate in this space. This competition had knock-on effects as both sought to restrict or eliminate the others’ firms from competing in foreign markets.

Scenario 2: Networks of power

In the mid-2020s, another global pandemic accelerated cooperation within the international system. Although this second global pandemic, coming so soon after COVID-19, portended public health, economic, social, and even political disaster, its impacts were far less severe than feared owing to the willingness of key actors, state and nonstate alike, to build networked approaches to solving the problem. Within a few years after the pandemic’s onset, this unprecedented global cooperation inspired action in other fields and toward other problems such as climate change and even conflict prevention and peacebuilding. Now in 2033, the world is in a different and better place than it was in 2023.

In the early 2020s, few would have argued that such a change was in the offing, given the myriad obstacles to effective global governance: rising tensions among nuclear-armed powers, including the major powers; the slow return to robust economic growth after the COVID-19 pandemic; the debt challenges overshadowing much of the world (rich and poor countries alike); conflicts in Ukraine, the Middle East, and the Sahel; the democratic world’s ongoing struggles; and swiftly changing Earth systems.

Underneath these real problems, however, there were some countervailing and promising signals. Although democratic deficits were real, reflecting disenchantment with government and fears of the erosion of the social contract from AI-driven unemployment, there was at the same time a growing willingness among citizens to engage on these problems through civil society and within their democratic systems. This spirit animated younger generations, especially Gen Z, who were just entering the workforce and politics. Their activism coincided with rising engagement from nonstate actors—NGOs, firms, and philanthropies—and even from some governments and multilateral institutions. This engagement was sporadic rather than systematic and extended only to a few policy arenas. But some leaders had come to realize that partnerships across and among different stakeholders had been successful in responding to public health challenges, including the COVID-19 pandemic. For example, the Global Vaccine Action Plan (GVAP) and GAVI, the Vaccine Alliance brought together research and technical health institutions, foundations, private-sector partners, individual states/governments, and multilateral institutions such as the World Bank and WHO.

This was the setting when, in 2026, another global pandemic arose, this one an easily transmissible version of a deadly avian flu. As this pandemic began to sweep around the world, leaders from the public, private, philanthropic, and nonprofit sectors all understood the need to act swiftly and in coordinated fashion. Much of this interest in a speedy and coordinated response was owed to experience from the COVID-19 pandemic, but much of it also was owed to the preexisting desire to engage in cooperative and networked action to address problems. The result was an upwelling of interest in leveraging resources and skills from wherever they could be found. Governments acted fast but not alone, finding willing partners in pharmaceutical companies to develop new vaccines, tech companies to employ their AI/ML capabilities for everything from contact tracing to big data analytics, social media companies to combat disinformation, and philanthropies to provide significant financial support. Citizens around the world also engaged, understanding the important roles they had to play in combating the disease and in maintaining social coherence and solidarity in the face of yet another crisis. The flu itself helped in one critical sense: it was a far deadlier version of a common communicable disease, and which had a much shorter incubation period than COVID-19, factors which dramatically reduced the impacts of disinformation surrounding it.

There was a critical international response to this latest transnational threat. Through its public health institutions, most critically the WHO, the UN played an important if traditional role as a leading research and convening organization. Yet the timing also appeared right for the UN to invest heavily in the secretary-general’s 2019 call for networked and inclusive multilateralism. As was the case with national governments around the world, the UN’s institutions rapidly augmented their engagement with state and nonstate actors of every kind, including national and subnational governments (e.g., municipalities and regions), philanthropies, the private sector, nonprofits, academics, and grassroots citizens’ groups. It worked on everything: humanitarian funding to mitigate the deadly pandemic’s impact; vaccine development and (eventual) distribution; and community engagement. Critically, in this fluid crisis, other international actors engaged in similar fashion. Regional multilateral institutions such as the African Union responded likewise, as did the various global groupings of states—the G20, G7, BRICS, and others.

As was true of the influenza epidemic of 1918-1919, the trajectory of this flu was swift, global, and deadly—but also mercifully short, ending by 2027. Although this pandemic left a grim trail of death in its wake, there was one silver lining. The demonstrable success from widespread collaboration not only left behind a new cooperative spirit—building upon pre-pandemic roots—it also demonstrated that inclusive and networked multilateralism could work in practice. This time, there was enough political, economic, and demographic heft to make a difference, with not only policymakers sensing a true shift but private firms, philanthropies, subnational governments, large nonprofits, grassroots groups, and ordinary citizens as well.

The UN continued to accelerate and invest in its convening, mediation, and consultative capabilities, deepening and extending its partnerships with institutions of all kinds at global, regional, national, and local levels. Moving to a more networked model becomes the central focus of UN reform.

The UN’s thematic aperture expanded as well, extending beyond public health and disease to the panoply of issues confronting the world, including conflict. Growing inclusivity and diversity of actors created flexibility in approaches to conflict prevention, conflict resolution, and peacebuilding. Localization of mediation efforts, for example, became more common, as did the development of frameworks for engaging with ANSAs, or at least those deemed legitimate and supportive of basic human rights.

By the mid-2030s, the world’s problems were far from being solved. Yet there were at least new approaches and a new willingness to experiment and cooperate, and that mattered enormously. Civil society groups formed and sprang into action around the world, some with great success, others far less so, some good, some not so good. In many places facing conflict or recovering from conflict, the state was more of a hybrid entity, sharing governance responsibilities with mixtures of citizen and paramilitary groups, private-sector firms and philanthropies, and nongovernmental organizations. In the Sahel, for example, coalitions emerged to address various crises. Solutions became more ad hoc, localized, and harder to scale. Yet the emergence of nonstate actor coalitions, which included good-faith actors that were empowered by the new conditions, was slowly reshaping power dynamics in the region, leading to new social contracts and, quite often, new hope for the people who lived there.

Scenario 3: Fragmentation

Looking back from the year 2033, it is clear that the world has been unable to grapple with the myriad problems that it has faced for a decade and even longer. Many of these problems were well known in 2023, when analysts were talking about a polycrisis, a term coined for the interplay of multiple crises that heightens the collective impact.¹⁵¹ Over the 2020s and into the 2030s, a combination of factors prevented the world from arriving at workable solutions to any of its major problems. Although hardly the only cause, a massive and worsening ecological crisis, still unfolding, has been a central and unpleasant driver of this change and an unwelcome part of the world in 2033. Unfortunately, there are few workable political mechanisms for dealing with this crisis and many others. The global system has fragmented.

The centrifugal forces that were at play in the early 2020s continued to erode the multilateral system through the middle of the decade. US-China tensions, always at the limit, never boiled over. Nor did tensions between Russia and the US-led NATO over Ukraine. Yet those relationships also did not get better, which hampered governance efforts across all manner of global challenges. This situation was worsened by ongoing strife within the US-led system of alliances revolving principally around geoeconomic policies. The Biden administration continued to press allies and partners to comply with its increasingly punitive measures aimed at China’s tech development, for example, targeting exports of semiconductors (chips) and chip-making equipment. Combined with unrelated US legislation that subsidized and even mandated some domestic manufacturing in areas such as chips and Greentech, the Biden administration found itself having to negotiate constantly with disaffected allies and partners. Reflecting a gloomy mood, The Economist magazine ran a New Year’s 2025 issue titled “Globalization is dead .”

Low global growth, combined with ongoing shockwaves from Russia’s war in Ukraine on global food security, for example, impacted poorer countries especially. Poverty and inequality within and among countries remained stubbornly high during the 2020s and into the 2030s. To make matters worse, tech transfers from the rich to the poor world also slowed down, the result of an increasingly zero-sum tech development environment. With it, the pacing of high-value-added service industries in the Global South was reduced. The upshot was that human development indexes faltered in the 2020s, and diplomats at the UN spoke in hushed tones about the sustainable development goals, deeming them all but unattainable.

Yet none of this was even the worst of it. In 2027, just as the world breached the 1.5°C threshold set by scientists as a climatological tipping point (and formally acknowledged in the Paris Agreement), a devastating El Niño event developed, worsening what had already been bad conditions around the world. This event, coupled with ongoing carbon loading of the atmosphere and reductions in aerosol pollutants (ironically, such pollutants had helped to slow atmospheric temperature rises), brought extreme conditions to much of the world, outweighing even the worst of the already-hot years of the early- and mid-2020s. New temperature records were set everywhere, from Alaska to the Indian subcontinent to South America, while the seemingly unending list of record drought and flooding got even longer. Fire became a default condition for much of the world, as forests began to dry out and even die back, as happened in the vast Amazon basin.

The predictions that the climate security community had offered for years, perhaps decades, began to come true around the world: swiftly rising food and water insecurity; public health crises from extreme heat and disease proliferation; disrupted supply chains; and fire and flooding. Famine struck in the Sahel and Pakistan, with millions at risk for their lives. Migrant crises arose around the world, for example Central American climate refugees poured north toward Mexico and the United States.

The multilateral system fragmented owing to the combined scale and complexity of overlapping and mutually reinforcing disasters. Although UN agencies and individual countries dedicated themselves to addressing the crises, they were overwhelmed and under resourced.

Wealthier nations invested heavily in domestic disaster management and resilience but had few remaining means, and almost no willingness, to direct funds toward the rest of the world. These governments did not honor their financial commitments to key funds such as the Green Climate Fund, with the $100 billion commitment for investments in climate adaptation expiring in 2025, even before the onset of the 2027 El Niño event.

Multilateral funding for and cooperation around conflict resolution and peacebuilding stagnated and then began to decline. Much of the funding that remained for peace and security efforts came from China, with significant strings attached, worsening debt traps and eroding lending standards related to human rights, for example.

Stripped of its conflict prevention and peacekeeping center, the UN became a technocratic institution that dispensed useful advice and provided valuable services, but otherwise could not secure peace and security.

Unfortunately, climate disruptions continued after 2027, which despite the El Niño event did not prove to be an unusual year after all. In 2033, the climate clearly has changed for the worse, disrupting entire ecosystems and creating permanent crises that fragile governments in particular are unable to deal with. Mass migration events, arising from agricultural implosions and natural disasters, have become a regular feature of the landscape, which has only caused wealthier nations to pull the drawbridges up even tighter.

The climate crisis is now, in 2033, a permanent feature of our world, worsening fragility, exacerbating polarization, causing mass hardship, discontent, and outrage, and undermining institutions. As states have proven unable to deal with the cascading problems, governance gaps are increasingly filled by bad-faith nonstate actors, often but not always in fragile states, that try to seize power wherever possible.

In regions such as the Sahel, all this is a disaster. The feeble multilateral interventions at the global level are insufficient to counter the region’s destructive dynamics, exacerbating food insecurity, growing social polarization, and emboldening ANSAs. Governance gaps widen in the Sahel as weak and corrupt governments are incapable of dealing with the climate crisis, leading to spiraling conflict and the largest forced out-migration from the region in history.

Scenario 4: Reinvigoration

In the early 2020s, the multilateral system was unable to address the world’s biggest problems, including interstate and intrastate conflict. This situation owed much to the intransigence of the world’s major powers, which were uninterested in cooperation within the UN Security Council and other key multilateral forums and, worse, had been antagonizing one another for years. In 2025, China and the United States got what both had been fearing yet also planning for, which was a showdown over Taiwan. The resulting crisis, which was worse even than the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 in bringing the world close to a nuclear Armageddon, reset not only their bilateral relationship but the multilateral system as well. The UNSC and other key multilateral instruments for resolving conflict were reinvigorated, the result of a newly found desire to have the major powers play much more constructive and cooperative roles in the global system.

Through 2023 and 2024, a gridlocked multilateral system had been incapable of managing peace and security matters around the world. Diplomatic successes were few and far between. Russia’s war in Ukraine, for example, was at a stalemate and risked becoming a true frozen conflict. Neither the US-led NATO nor Russia and its ally China seemed interested in making a decisive move in one direction or another to resolve the situation in Ukraine. Other conflicts around the world, for example in the Sahel, were given a low priority by the major powers and therefore by the UNSC.

All of this changed in 2025, when China under President Xi Jinping decided the time had come to make a play for Taiwan. Although long feared in Washington, Xi’s play was not the expected full-scale invasion but rather a blockade of the island, an unorthodox move that appeared to give China maneuvering room vis-à-vis the United States and its allies while maximizing pressure on Taiwan. As Washington and Moscow had in 1962, Washington and Beijing maneuvered for advantage within an ever-more dangerous and increasingly nuclear-hued crisis.

And for weeks, the world watched the escalations on television and via social media: first the sober announcements from both capitals, other states, and UN leadership, then the opening acts of intimidation at sea and in the air around Taiwan, and finally reports of the two countries’ armed forces shooting at one another—a step that the Soviet Union and the United States had managed to (almost) completely avoid in 1962. At each stage, rhetorical and bureaucratic escalation matched the physical acts, first at the UNSC where both countries accused the other of acting in bad faith, then to both countries announcing they had placed their nuclear forces on highest alert, and finally to leadership telling their citizens, as calmly as they could muster, to be prepared for a nuclear exchange.

For the public watching around the world, this showdown evolved from apathy to disbelief to deep worry and finally to mass panic. Rally-around-the-flag demonstrations in China, the United States, and their allies quickly faded as both powers began talking openly about the risk of nuclear escalation, including at UNSC emergency meetings, held daily throughout the crisis. Impromptu street marches and sit-ins focused on peace took the place of nationalistic rallies, including among publics in the Indo-Pacific and Eurasian regions that feared being targeted by nuclear warheads should the worst occur. These events occurred even in regions with little fear of direct targeting, such as Latin America and Africa, owing to the real risk of an apocalyptic nuclear winter that would occur should the United States and China exchange only a fraction of their nuclear arsenals. Toward the end, as shooting began around Taiwan, mass panic set in nearly everywhere. The situation was not helped by the social media environment, where bad-faith actors used AI tools to generate deepfakes showing realistic attacks on ships, aircraft, and even Taipei, most of which had yet to occur. Few could differentiate between reality and fiction, which helped sow confusion and mass panic.

It took several kinetic incidents, including the sinking of a few ships, for Presidents Xi and Biden (the US leader having been reelected) to find their way to a truce. Years later, as with the Cuban Missile Crisis, it came out that both sides had come within millimeters of escalating to conventional missile attacks on one another’s territory (the United States on bases in southern China, and China on bases in Guam and Hawaii). Fortunately, cooler heads indeed prevailed, as had occurred in 1962.

The crisis having subsided, the two leaders agreed to meet for an extraordinary bilateral summit. There, they signed a declaration reiterating the need for multilateral cooperation, including an announcement of arms control negotiations, and pledged their joint support for managing, containing, and reducing conflict around the world. The effect of this summit was so profound on elite and public opinion the world over that many compared it to the Reagan-Gorbachev summit at Reykjavík in 1986.

The two leaders appeared to be genuine in their convictions, which were buttressed by overwhelming sentiment in support of multilateralism from every corner of the world. Governments representing the two countries’ allies and partners as well as the world’s nonaligned states pressed hard for a return to multilateralism to ensure that such a near-death experience would never happen again.

With the United States and China in the lead, and with the support of most other countries, there was a recognition of the need to reinvigorate the UN system’s core functions, especially conflict resolution, which once again were seen as having failed in preventing this near catastrophe. The P5 agreed to UNSC reforms, which included the expansion of the number of elected seats and reforms to various processes that give elected seat holders more influence in setting the body’s agenda and in coalition building. Yet there was no veto reform, so concerns persisted that the world would return to gridlock within the UNSC. However, those concerns were temporarily assuaged given the willingness of the world’s two greatest powers to cooperate, which they did on more occasions than not from 2025 to the mid-2030s.

The severity of the Taiwan crisis ensured that the conflict prevention and peacebuilding architecture also would be subject to an overhaul. There was a marked increase in interest within the UNSC to revitalize engagement in conflict zones. Existing peacekeeping missions were reauthorized, and new ones deployed, including special missions to monitor situations among and between nuclear powers, for example India and Pakistan. There was some progress in managing interstate conflicts, where the bulk of the multilateral diplomatic and mediation efforts focused. In 2027, the war in Ukraine formally ended with a peace deal. Through the late 2020s and early 2030s, there was a reinvestment in the Sahel, which enjoyed broad material and financial support from the P5, including both the United States and China, in turn helping to stabilize the region and end much of the fighting there, if only temporarily.

Regarding arms control, China, the United States, and Russia started promising talks that were hoped would result in binding agreements, as had occurred during the Cold War. Under the auspices of the UNSC, promising talks on the Korean peninsula were started for normalizing relations with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (aka North Korea), and serious multilateral negotiations restarted concerning Iran’s nuclear program.

Although this reinvigoration of the historic tools of multilateral conflict prevention and peacebuilding was welcomed, peace activists around the world remained concerned that the system had not been overhauled sufficiently. Among other worries, they feared that intrastate conflicts had been given too little attention and imagination. Within the UNSC, they pushed for what they called a new Charter for Resilience that would push countries away from the post-Cold War model of military intervention and focus on an indirect model that would invest in partnerships with local populations within affected countries.

Regional case study: How the scenarios could play out in the Sahel

By Soda Lo

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V. Questions for policymakers

This report has assessed how core trends and uncertainties are reshaping the world, the contours of conflict, and the management of conflict. This section asks five questions that policymakers should consider as they assess how best to navigate the interaction of the trends and uncertainties over the coming decade. Some answers to these five questions are easier to implement and can be scaled relatively quickly. Others will require a broader shift in how institutions approach conflict management and the conflict cycle, requiring both more time and resources for successful implementation.

Some of the questions and potential responses presented in this section are consistent with topics discussed in UN Secretary-General Guterres’s A New Agenda for Peace. Where there is overlap, this work offers steps for the UN to build beyond its findings.

1. How should multilateral organizations such as the UN adapt to and manage a multipolar world?

As discussed at length in the trends and uncertainties section, the UN’s core security apparatus, the UNSC, today is marked by sustained disagreements among the P5 nations. Those disagreements mirror the ideological and geopolitical divergencies among (principally) China, Russia, and the United States. It is tempting to dismiss efforts to find mutual ground among these powers, given the unlikelihood of positive results. Our Common Agenda recognizes the risk of increasing tensions among the major powers and the need for diplomacy to take place during times of high tension. Indeed, conflict will not pause in an era of increased tensions among major powers.

The UN as an institution was never designed to be a cure-all for conflict, violence, and warfare, but rather as a forum wherein states could attempt to find collective solutions to such problems. Given the sensitivities among major powers to interventions that could impinge upon their sovereignty or interests, the UNSC was never meant to enable collective security responses to international crises through majoritarian decision-making processes. Hence the veto given to the P5 states. (At the time of the UN’s founding, the P5 were the world’s remaining major powers.) The UNSC’s system of permanent membership, including the veto, “was explicitly built to be unfair, giving the victors of World War II an outsized role in international peace and security . . . and it was explicitly structured to be easily deadlocked, with any of the P5 able to unilaterally grind its work to a halt,” as two United States Institute of Peace (USIP) analysts put it.¹⁵²

This means that although policymakers (and others) should temper their expectations for UNSC reform, and although the current state of play among the major powers is discouraging as reflected in the UNSC’s (frequent) deadlock regarding its peace and security agenda, cooperation remains possible despite it all. For example, in 2013 and 2014 the United States, China, and Russia all voted to approve the MINUSMA mission in Mali.¹⁵³ Though this mission has now fallen apart, the fact that all five of the P5 states agreed to its formation shows that common ground existed within the UNSC, at least at the time, regarding this area of the world.¹⁵⁴

A longer look back into history shows that sporadic cooperation among the major powers on peace and security matters did occur. During the Cold War, although the Soviet Union and United States infrequently cooperated, they did join on some important matters within the UN framework generally and on occasion within the UNSC. For example, they backed creation of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in 1957 and signed the UN-brokered Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in 1968.¹⁵⁵

There are analogous opportunities among the major powers today. For example, China’s interests might align with those of the United States in some parts of the world where both countries seek stability more than they do gaining an upper hand over their geopolitical rival. Here, some analysts point to Africa and the Middle East as examples of regions where such conditions hold.¹⁵⁶

Also like the Cold War, cooperation among great powers in an era of multipolarity will likely resemble more limited and targeted interventions in scope. MINUSMA’s renewal in 2022, before it was dissolved, offers a hint of what may come. At that time, although the mission was renewed, there was debate within the UNSC regarding the scope of MINUSMA’s human rights reporting mechanism. This dispute led to China and Russia abstaining in the vote and a declaration by Mali that they would not enforce the human rights provisions of MINUSMA’s mandate.¹⁵⁷ This event suggests that policymakers should be prepared for interventions, if they are to be approved by the UNSC, to have a tighter mandate compared with past missions.

It also suggests that policymakers should reconsider what success looks like within the confines of the UNSC. As Jean-Pierre Lacroix, the UN under-secretary-general for peacekeeping operations has stated, “the ultimate goal of peacekeeping” that encompasses the entirety of the peace process or the conflict cycle is unlikely to occur anytime soon. Rather, as the International Crisis Group rightly notes, missions should focus on other goals short of the ultimate one such as providing aid and protecting civilians.¹⁵⁸ Such goals are practical, useful, and achievable. For example, the UN mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, MONUSCO, has made aid delivery and infrastructure development across the DRC a focus of its work.¹⁵⁹

The implications of multipolarity extend well beyond the UN as an institution for addressing peace and conflict. Here it is well worth discussing minilateralism as a solution set to conflict management. Minilateral approaches to international governance problems refer to the formation of (often) small coalitions of actors—quite often, state actors but occasionally state and nonstate actors in tandem—that have a desire to address a specific type of problem in the world. Minilateral approaches often are utilized when the multilateral system has failed to address and solve a problem and/or when minilateral participants want to avoid the strictures (institutional, legal, or otherwise) that the multilateral system imposes.

Although the roots of minilateralism extend back centuries, this approach to international governance has been enjoying a renaissance owing to the difficulty of finding comprehensive solutions to the world’s myriad challenges within the multilateral system. Advocates of minilateralism insist that the format easily attracts both state and nonstate actors alike that are interested in addressing specific problems in (often) ad hoc diplomatic arrangements. Minilateralism’s virtues can include geographic and thematic flexibility, speed of formation and work modalities, convenience, nonideologically based groupings, and the power that comes from networked relationships. Minilateral arrangements have been increasing in number and significance across regional settings, including Asia and the Middle East, for example the Quad, AUKUS (Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States), and I2U2 (Israel, India, the United States, and the United Arab Emirates).¹⁶⁰

For the United Nations and other multilateral institutions that are responsible for maintaining the integrity of the global conflict-management system, minilateralism presents as much risk as opportunity. On the risk side, USIP’s Andrew Cheatham writes that minilateralism “cannot take the place of multilateral organizations” because those are “based on norms and laws” that reflect a set of universal democratic ideals.¹⁶¹ Minilateralism, he argues, has the potential to dilute the multilateral system’s global governance model and undermine its norms, laws, and standards. On the opportunity side, minilateralism’s virtues—nimbleness, ease of inclusion, and issue- and region-specific purpose—mean that the UN can find many ways to insert itself into such processes when doing so suits its purposes, if not as a formal participant then at least in an advisory or other role.

There is little to suggest a reversal in the minilateral trend, given its upsides for participants in a world characterized by messy and complex problems that no single global institution is equipped to solve on its own. According to Paul Heinbecker, a former Canadian diplomat, “peace, order and progress will increasingly demand shifting combinations of multilateral, minilateral and bilateral cooperation between governments . . . [and] require a wide variety of institutional responses—some evolutionary, others revolutionary, some inside the United Nations System and Breton Woods institutions and others outside of them. . . . No country or small group of countries can long dominate this complex, integrating, changing world or alone determine its future.”¹⁶²

2. How can multilateral organizations plan for and adapt to conflict management challenges brought on by the evolution of Earth systems and emerging technologies?

In a rapidly changing global environment, the UN needs to have a better sense of risks and opportunities that are on the longer-term horizon. Strategic foresight and futures thinking is a well-established and highly respected field that for decades has established its value in large public- and private-sector organizations the world over. Mainstreaming foresight and futures practices within the UN and other multilateral conflict resolution and peacebuilding bodies can make them nimbler in the face of emerging risks and opportunities that are arising within the global system.

A piece of good news here is that the UN secretary-general has embraced a future-oriented agenda, as outlined in Our Common Agenda, published in 2021, and the Summit of the Future, a high-level UN conference planned for September 2024.¹⁶³ Our Common Agenda called for strengthening “international foresight” capabilities within multilateral conflict resolution and peacebuilding bodies. UN agencies appear to be trending toward institutionalization of foresight and futures thinking.

Two bodies stand out in this regard. The first is the Climate Security Mechanism, a joint operation managed by multiple UN agencies. CSM works at the nexus of Earth systems change and conflict, and seeks to provide policymakers with a greater understanding of their intersection. While a good start, to be truly effective, the resources and mandate behind CSM need to be scaled. As CSM itself notes, the mechanism consists of a small, New York headquarters-based team that lacks the mandate and capacity to coordinate broader UN work on climate security. As a result, due to budgetary constraints and institutional capacity, much of CSM’s engagement takes place remotely through virtual relationships.¹⁶⁴ Scaling the CSM through an appropriate budgetary increase and an expanded mandate would allow it to work closely with more UN agencies, implement on-the-ground field work, and expand its remit to cover the entire world (its current focus areas are the Arab states, Latin America and the Caribbean, and sub-Saharan Africa.

Similarly, the rapid development and advancement of technology is also changing the world that policymakers will have to navigate as well as providing them with powerful tools to manage it. Mainstreaming foresight thinking is important to develop an understanding of the different possible trajectories that technological advancement may take, including their future impacts on conflict. The DPPA has created what is calls an Innovation Cell that is tasked with utilizing novel approaches to its work, including greater emphasis on “data-driven foresight [consistent] with its early warning role.”¹⁶⁵ A focus of the Innovation Cell is the Futuring Peace project, which studies how emerging technologies such as generative AI may alter the UN system in the future.¹⁶⁶ The work of the Innovation Cell is important and timely, but like the CSM its funding and mandate are limited. The Innovation Cell should be empowered to work with UN agencies beyond the DPPA by increasing its mandate or funding. One possibility might be to change where the Innovation Cell is located within the UN system. The UN should consider moving the Innovation Cell from the DPPA to the secretary-general’s office.

Beyond the UN, other multilateral organizations should seek to improve their foresight capabilities, including as they relate to Earth systems and technology. The World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and regional bodies such as the European Union, ECOWAS, SADC, NATO, and more should all seek to develop or build out their capabilities in this space through increases in financing or expansions of mandate. Where existing systems such as early warning mechanisms are in place, multilateral institutions should integrate foresight techniques to allow for their data analytics to be mapped onto decision-making processes that focus on longer time horizons.

Foresight is a practice that is designed to anticipate disruption and assist organizations to develop strategies that are resilient in the face of many possible futures. Indeed, foresight is the primary instrument and analytical lens behind this study. And as this study has endeavored to show, the UN will confront a rapidly changing world, marked by new opportunities and challenges resulting from alterations in the global balance of power, technological and ecological disruptions, and other drivers of change.

3. What will the role of nonstate actors be in this space going forward and how can the UN and other multilateral institutions both leverage opportunities and manage threats posed by nonstate groups?

As section III endeavored to show, nonstate groups are playing an important role in international affairs. This category includes both ANSAs such as terror groups and transnational organized criminal groups, as well as groups with a more positive intent including private philanthropies that fund vaccine development or nutrition assistance. The UN and other multilateral organizations will need to continue engaging with such groups, using their expertise to their advantage where they can, while limiting the negative impacts that they might have.

Minilateralism includes an assertion that states and international organizations should form partnerships with nonstate actors, at least on occasion, if their efforts are to succeed. Nonstate actors’ roles in the global system are important enough to warrant their own assessment. Private- and philanthropic-sector actors often provide resources for addressing global challenges in areas ranging from public health to climate change to hunger and conflict. For example, in response to COVID-19, the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation authorized up to $300 million in forgivable loans to support vaccine manufacturing in low- and middle-income countries and up to another $300 million for the procurement of vaccines and treatments in low- and middle-income countries.¹⁶⁷

Gavi, established in 1999, is perhaps the most apt and strongest example of a public-private model that was designed to attack a major global problem: access to immunization. Gavi marries significant financial assistance and technical expertise from dozens of corporate and philanthropic partners with those from multilateral institutions including the World Health Organization, World Bank, and the United Nations Children’s Fund, known widely as UNICEF.¹⁶⁸

Tapping into philanthropies and the private sector offers a way for multilateral institutions such as the UN DPPA not only to overcome funding shortfalls they may be facing to complete their work, but also to augment their own capabilities.¹⁶⁹ Given the scale of the conflict management problem, the DPPA should embrace a partnership model to secure donations from private and philanthropic actors and to find other pathways and capabilities for doing its work. The UN Population Fund (UNFPA), as another example, already does so, having secured a partnership with (once again) the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation. According to their press release announcing the partnership, the Gates Foundation “brings a global network of partners and expertise in technology and innovation, while UNFPA contributes country-level reach, experience working with governments and expertise in family planning and reproductive health.”¹⁷⁰

There are several considerations for DPPA and other multilateral organizations to successfully engage private and philanthropic partners in a common endeavor. First, partnerships will have to provide an attractive value proposition wherein they can provide tangible results in the real world (and with impacts that justify costs). They will need to demonstrate that such tangible results will occur only if all actors work in concert. Demonstrating this value proposition will incentivize external actors to invest in a UN-led or UN-managed partnership. Doing so also would discourage private donors from entering the conflict prevention and peacebuilding space unilaterally. Second, for private-sector and philanthropic actors who become partners, multilateral organizations such as DPPA must find ways to leverage their preexisting capabilities for maximum positive impact on the conflict prevention and peacebuilding spaces. Potential partners from the tech sector, as an example, offer valuable capabilities ranging from AI/ML processing to big data analytics to remote sensing and much more. Third, organizations such as DPPA will need to ensure that private and philanthropic partners understand that although their voices and participation are critical, only the public organizations have final decision-making responsibilities regarding core priorities and tasks.

Beyond private and philanthropic partners, multilateral organizations will need to manage the growth of ANSAs. Membership within the United Nations is confined to nation-states, which means that the UN is confronted with an awkward conflict-management challenge involving nonmember groups. ANSAs are playing an increasingly powerful role in conflicts, where they can sometimes claim more legitimacy than the state itself, in large part because states often have weak or even nonexistent governance capacities across parts of their territories. Across all UN peacekeeping and conflict prevention operations, the UN will have to contend with this complex of weakened state capacity on the one hand and heightened ANSA capabilities on the other. Minilateralism is unlikely to work when engaging ANSAs, as minilateral institutions tend to offer limited technical knowledge, have minimal financial backing, and do not possess the organizational infrastructure and know-how to engage as the UN can.

In adapting to the reality posed by nonstate actors, including ANSAs, the UN ideally should establish clear and concise guidelines about engaging such actors in all conflict phases (before, during, and after conflict). The established policies should include red lines that the UN should not cross, for example ensuring there is no engagement with ANSAs that commit human rights violations. Policies should include metrics to determine if ANSAs have enough popular legitimacy in areas they control to justify serious engagement with them.

These policy goals are relatively easy to state and more difficult to realize, owing to both political sensitivities within the UN (i.e., member states’ reluctance to have the UN acknowledge the legitimacy of ANSAs for political negotiation) and the difficulty of finding ANSAs that meet the above criteria. UN institutions, including the UNSC, for years have developed guidelines for engaging with ANSAs for humanitarian purposes, but have been extremely hesitant to do the same within conflict prevention and peacebuilding processes, owing largely to push back from states.¹⁷¹

A central challenge for any sort of operational guidance is that no two conflict situations are the same. While some of the main themes, causes, and even actors may transfer over between conflicts, each conflict is unique. As such, the above guidelines should be developed in a way that does not make them definitive, but rather allows them to be customized and applied to each conflict situation in a way that will result in the most positive possible outcome.

A key example of the need to define these guidelines can be seen following the Taliban’s takeover of Afghanistan. The UN has a clear mandate to protect civilians, including those living in territory controlled by ANSAs.¹⁷² There exists debate within the UN about how to approach and engage the Taliban, including within the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) regarding the government’s actions to exclude woman from public life and concerns over the harboring of terrorists, thus limiting the ability of the UN to even start to protect civilians.¹⁷³ The dire situation in Afghanistan demands that the international community find productive ways to engage and promote human and civil rights, despite lack of a clear international consensus on how to approach the situation in Afghanistan. Developing a set of guidelines to guide interactions with ANSAs could result in a more effective international response the next time a situation like the Taliban’s rise to power occurs.

The UN and other multilateral institutions are hardly the only public-sector actors struggling to come to grips with how to deal with ANSAs in conflict settings. Important states in the conflict management space, especially donor states such as the United States, also face the question of whether and how to engage such nonstate actors. Lauren Mooney and Patrick W. Quirk write that such groups “pose a thorny policy dilemma” for the US and other state actors for the reasons outlined above. Like the UN, these states have yet to devise clear guidelines for selecting which groups to engage and under what principles. They assert that those principles ought to prioritize democratic governance, local dialogue, and human rights.¹⁷⁴ However, as others rightly note, a lack of defined guidelines can be effective, allowing special envoys to operate under the radar without following a set of rules, a process that can sometimes result in success.¹⁷⁵

4. How can the UN support regional bodies in advancing their conflict prevention and peacebuilding goals in line with global multilateralism?

Assuming the UN continues to be plagued by major power competition, especially within the UNSC, regional organizations like the AU and ECOWAS likewise should continue to play an outsized role in conflict management.¹⁷⁶ These regional organizations are smaller (they have fewer member states), operate closer to the ground within specific regional geographies, and often possess high legitimacy and buy-in from their member states. Most often, these organizations are a step removed from the great power competition that plagues multilateral bodies like the UN and its decision-making organ, the UNSC.

The UN should continue to prioritize its engagement with and increase its financial and technical support of regional institutions (as practicable), given their importance in regional settings and as levers for the UN. Cooperative provision of institutional and expert knowledge, for instance, should be prioritized and strengthened. An example concerns UN engagement with the AU. Our Common Agenda notes that the UNSC should more systematically interact with the AU, rather than treating its recommendations in ad hoc fashion. The UN should revisit funding the AU; past proposals have called for the UN to fund 75 percent of AU-led peace operations, with the AU picking up the remaining 25 percent.

At the same time, the UN and the DPPA should expand its development and promotion of tailored strategies to manage conflict within individual states. This model would have the UN deepen its work with individual state governments to develop strategies for both preventing and responding to conflict within their borders. Such an approach would have the UN engage host states to build trust and capacity that would be sensitive to highly localized settings.

Beyond strategy development, the UN and other multilateral bodies should also invest in building institutions within nations that can carry out these strategies. The UNDP has already undertaken efforts to do this, creating local peace communities (LPCs) in Ghana, Kenya, Sierra Leone, Malawi, and South Africa, to name a few examples. (LPCs are broad-based community forums that “meet regularly to discuss emerging conflicts or tensions affecting a district, municipality, town or village.”)¹⁷⁷ These efforts utilize UNDP staff who are trained in peacebuilding to assist LPCs, local governments, and other stakeholders.¹⁷⁸ Further funding of these resources can be a helpful tool to ensure the effective implementation of locally developed strategies.

Although there are pitfalls to be avoided in this model—the UN would have to ensure that any coordination efforts were consistent with its mandate and ideals—the promotion of such localized approaches might have several benefits. These include their flexibility, sustained engagement with national and subnational leadership, and the possibility of greater buy-in from major powers owing to the approach’s respect for state sovereignty. China, for example, often used state sovereignty as a rationale not to support UN-sanctioned multilateral interventions.¹⁷⁹

5. How can the UN, and particularly the UNSC, overcome concerns that it lacks legitimacy, especially in the Global South?

A longstanding criticism of the UNSC is that power is held in the hands of the body’s permanent members, the P5, reflective of the global distribution of power at the end of World War II in 1945, when the UN was founded. A growing number of Global South states and outside observers increasingly see the UNSC and the UN as a whole as an organization lacking legitimacy. Reforming the UNSC, whether by function or by structure, would allow the body to overcome a perception that it is a (largely) Western-led body that is unrepresentative of the world and that, accordingly, fails to act in the interests of the UN’s member states. For this reason, and for years, countries in the Global South have called for permanent seats on the UNSC to rebalance the body geographically, economically, and demographically. According to this argument, the inclusion of one or more nations from Latin America and the Caribbean, Africa, the Middle East, Asia, and elsewhere would assist the UNSC and other institutions to be more responsive to conflicts in those regions.

Although decades old, calls for reform have become louder since US President Biden endorsed UNSC reform in an address to the UN General Assembly in 2022. “The United States supports increasing the number of both permanent and non-permanent representatives of the council,” he said, including “permanent seats for those nations we’ve long supported and permanent seats for countries in Africa [and] Latin America and the Caribbean.”¹⁸⁰ Since his address, the US proposal has called for the addition of six permanent seats on the UNSC, albeit none holding veto power.¹⁸¹ The Biden administration continues to work with partner nations to develop a plan for reform.¹⁸² Other states, such as India and Italy, have also tabled their own proposals for UNSC reform,¹⁸³ and states such as Brazil, Germany, India, Japan, Kenya, Mexico, Nigeria, and South Africa have all expressed an intent to join the UNSC.¹⁸⁴

UNSC reform, if defined narrowly as the addition of new permanent (veto-holding) seats, might be the least plausible policy recommendation on this list, in terms of the odds of coming to fruition. There are numerous serious obstacles standing in the way, including the resistance of P5 members to dilution of their power within the UNSC as well as the number of non-P5 states that have no interest in seeing other states become permanent members. The veto within the UNSC is designed to give the body a deliberative mechanism that will slow action and even prevent it, while protecting the interests of its permanent members.

Beyond major power alignment, there are concrete actions that might spur greater cooperation within the UNSC, including among the E10, which are the body’s ten elected (nonpermanent) members. One way to do so would be by expanding “pen holding” privileges, which refers to the current system that enables P5 countries to draft and circulate statements, declarations, and resolutions. Currently, the United States, United Kingdom, and France hold the pen on twenty-three out of thirty-three country-specific files at the UNSC, including eleven of twelve countries in peacekeeping contexts.¹⁸⁵ What this means is that a small number of P5 states have extraordinary power to shape the UNSC’s substantive and procedural work, which other members view as unacceptable. For example, France holds the pen on files related to Mali and the Central African Republic, despite both of those states’ opposition to its role, given France’s history and recent presence in West Africa.¹⁸⁶

Yet as the pen-holding example shows, even without P5 reform, it is possible to retain and even strengthen the institution’s ability to function. The E10 has had an important role here. Aside from insisting on changing the rules around pen holding, E10 members also have built new coalitions among one another and with P5 states, and have strategically utilized the rotating UNSC to shape the Council’s work where they can.¹⁸⁷

Outside of further developing pen-holding privileges, the UN should also explore expanding the UNSC beyond the E10. Currently, the ten elected members come from five different regional groupings: three from the Africa group, two from the Asia and Pacific group, one from the Eastern Europe group, two from the Latin America and the Caribbean group, and two from the Western European and Others group.¹⁸⁸ (Of the P5 members, China is in the Asia and the Pacific group, Russia is in the Eastern Europe group, and the UK, France, and the United States are all in the Western European and Others group.)¹⁸⁹ By offering more elected seats to Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean, and Asia, the UNSC can help to overcome some of the claims that it geographically concentrates power in the Global North.

Outside of Security Council reform, the nature of UN peacekeeping interventions will also need to be addressed. UN peacekeeping interventions are often faced with the criticism that they are led by foreign powers having little respect for the host country’s government and institutions.¹⁹⁰ UN peacekeeping operations are built around the principle that the host country consents to the mission, though there is no document that codifies this and there is no way to ensure consent for the mission is given at subnational government levels. Rather, consent is believed to have been granted at the start of the mission and is not negotiated until the mission mandate is up for renewal.

Creating a strengthened consent regime that incorporates and respects the wishes of host states will result in UN operations gaining legitimacy and support. To this end, the UN should define a standardized consent document (as the current system relies on documents that fall short of express consent). A new document process, to be developed and executed by DPPA and the host nation, would establish the boundaries of host nation consent, including the scope of operations and conditions under which a renewal would occur.

Although a revised consent document process could proceed based on an agreement solely with elites representing the host government, the challenge is to find consensus outside of that small circle of national elites. To build and sustain the baseline for the mission’s success, DPPA should devise ways in which it can canvas elites outside of a nation’s capital during the initial consent process and iteratively thereafter.

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About the authors

Staff

Peter Engelke

Senior Fellow, Scowcroft Strategy Initiative

Global Energy Center Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Technology & Innovation Europe & Eurasia

Fellow

Anca Agachi

Nonresident Fellow

Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security Transatlantic Security Initiative

Africa Conflict

Staff

Imran Bayoumi

Associate Director

Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security Scowcroft Strategy Initiative

Former staff

Soda Lo

Former Project Assistant

Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security Scowcroft Strategy Initiative

Politics & Diplomacy Resilience & Society

This body of work was generously supported by the United States Institute of Peace.

The Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security works to develop sustainable, nonpartisan strategies to address the most important security challenges facing the United States and the world.

Learn more

The post The future of multilateral peacebuilding and conflict prevention appeared first on Atlantic Council.

About the authors

Staff

Peter Engelke

Senior Fellow, Scowcroft Strategy Initiative

Global Energy Center Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Technology & Innovation Europe & Eurasia

Fellow

Anca Agachi

Nonresident Fellow

Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security Transatlantic Security Initiative

Africa Conflict

Staff

Imran Bayoumi

Associate Director

Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security Scowcroft Strategy Initiative

Former staff

Soda Lo

Former Project Assistant

Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security Scowcroft Strategy Initiative

Politics & Diplomacy Resilience & Society

This body of work was generously supported by the United States Institute of Peace.

The Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security works to develop sustainable, nonpartisan strategies to address the most important security challenges facing the United States and the world.

Learn more

The post Four scenarios for the future of multilateral peacebuilding and conflict prevention appeared first on Atlantic Council.

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

Ukraine’s heritage protection unit carries echoes of the World War II era “Monuments Men” and the US Army’s 2019 creation of a Cultural Heritage Task Force charged with ensuring the US military is equipped to preserve local heritage sites. However, there are key differences: Ukraine’s new Territorial Defense Forces unit is not only working to protect the physical cornerstones of Ukraine’s national identity, but to collect an expanding body of evidence for future prosecutions.

Since the full-scale invasion began on February 24, 2022, Russia has been accused of committing countless war crimes in Ukraine. Targeted attacks on Ukraine’s cultural heritage are seen as part of a broader strategy to eradicate all traces of Ukrainian national identity, which Russia regards as an existential threat to its own imperial identity. Some Ukrainian cultural leaders have defined the Russian invasion as “a heritage war.” Ihor Poshyvailo, the director of Kyiv’s Maidan Museum who currently serves in the Ukrainian military’s cultural heritage protection unit, has described Russia’s invasion as a war “against our historical memory. Against our soul.”

By mid-November 2023, UNESCO had verified damage to 329 cultural sites in Ukraine since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion. This includes damage to 125 religious sites, 143 buildings of historical and artistic importance, 28 museums, 19 monuments, 13 libraries, and one archive. From Odesa’s National Art Museum to Kherson’s regional library, and from Kharkiv’s Drobytskyi Holocaust Memorial and Memorial to Victims of Totalitarianism to Zaporizhzhia’s Popov Manor House museum, Russia has shelled, bombed, and looted Ukraine’s cultural heritage extensively across the country.

The Russian military’s campaign to erase Ukrainian national identity is sparking strong resistance and a determination to hold Russia internationally accountable. The recently formed Territorial Defense Forces unit is working alongside a growing network of cultural industry experts committed to cataloging Russian crimes.

Ukrainian museum experts have set up the Heritage Emergency Response Initiative (HERI) to document Russia’s attacks while working in coordination with UNESCO. HERI works to collect resources to support museums across Ukraine, responding to regularly updated requests from different regions of the country. Some museum staff have been painstakingly evacuating their collections and storing them to protect priceless works of art from Russian aggression, while others have stayed behind despite obvious dangers to help safeguard Ukraine’s cultural heritage.

Eurasia Center events

Online Event Thu, August 15, 2024 • 9:00 am ET

Ukraine’s advance in Kursk: What’s next and implications

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Ukraine’s cultural guardians are also receiving international support. One year after the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion, the US Department of State announced that it would invest $7 million to support Ukraine’s cultural heritage protection efforts. In addition, the US Army’s Civil Affairs and Psychological Operation Command has joined forces with the Smithsonian Cultural Rescue Initiative to train Ukrainian soldiers in protecting cultural heritage during armed conflict.

The Smithsonian Institution has also partnered with the Kosciuszko Foundation to provide museums with the necessary tools and technology to safely store priceless works of art. Across the Ukrainian border in neighboring Poland, the Polish Ministry of Culture and National Heritage has established a Cultural Assistance Center to help coordinate domestic and foreign actions to protect Ukraine’s cultural resources.

In a March 2023 study commissioned and published by the European Parliament, researchers determined that the protection of cultural heritage in armed conflict is covered by international humanitarian law, human rights law, cultural law, and criminal law. A report for the European Union Advisory Mission Ukraine found concrete evidence that cultural property has been intentionally targeted during the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

Russia’s war in Ukraine is being fought along many different fronts. This includes the targeting of cultural heritage as Russia attempts to erase Ukraine’s national identity and impose an imperial identity on a conquered nation. The creation of a dedicated Territorial Defense Forces unit reflects Ukraine’s determination to expose this genocidal agenda. By documenting the deliberate destruction of their country’s cultural heritage, Ukrainians aim to raise international awareness of the criminal objectives underpinning Russia’s invasion. Ultimately, the aim is to hold Russia accountable for its crimes.

Mercedes Sapuppo is a program assistant at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

Further reading

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Why Ukraine refuses to negotiate with “habitual liar” Vladimir Putin

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Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba has dismissed mounting calls for a negotiated peace deal with Russia, arguing that Vladimir Putin is a “habitual liar” who cannot be trusted to keep his word, writes Peter Dickinson.

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Vladimir Putin’s anti-colonial posturing should not fool the Global South

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The countries of the Global South may have many good reasons for pursuing closer ties with Putin’s Russia, but a shared opposition to imperialism is most certainly not one of them, writes Taras Kuzio.

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Russian Orthodox leader Patriarch Kirill’s unholy war against Ukraine

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The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

Read more from UkraineAlert

UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia and Central Asia in the East.

Learn more

The post Ukraine aims to hold Russia accountable for heritage site attacks appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The post Nusairat in LA Times: What Biden’s staunch support for Israel’s war in Gaza will cost America appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Ever since the invasion began in February 2022, Moscow has used its position as one of five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council to block efforts to end the war or hold Russia accountable. Faced with relentless Russian obstruction, UN leaders have been forced to focus on mediation efforts, while the United Nations General Assembly has been limited to voting on a series of largely symbolic resolutions condemning the invasion. If the purpose of the UN is to prevent major wars, the current approach is obviously not working.

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

The full-scale invasion of Ukraine has focused international attention on Russia’s problematic role as one of the most influential nations at the United Nations. Some have asked why Russia has not been expelled for its attack on Ukraine, and have pointed to the expulsion of the Soviet Union from the UN’s predecessor, the League of Nations, in response to the November 1939 invasion of Finland.

Others have questioned the legal status of the Russian Federation as a UN member state, noting that Russia has never actually gone through the proper formal and recognized procedures of applying to become a member of the United Nations. The Soviet Union was a key founding member of the United Nations and enjoyed a seat on the UN Security Council, but the USSR officially ceased to exist on December 26, 1991. Russia then took over the vacated Soviet seat at the top table of the United Nations without any further formalities.

When Czechoslovakia ceased to exist just two years later, the two new nations that had once been component parts of that country, the Czech Republic and Slovakia, both formally applied for and were granted membership status in the United Nations. The same is true for the states that were once part of Yugoslavia. This is a step that Russia never took. The Charter of the United Nations states that “the admission of any such state to membership in the United Nations shall be effected by a decision of the General Assembly.” While Slovakia and the Czech Republic went through this procedure, the Russian Federation did not.

The UN Charter also states that membership of the body is contingent on “accepting the obligations contained in the present Charter.” On these grounds, too, Russia does not meet the required standards. The UN Charter states that all United Nations members “shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state.” By invading Ukraine and attempting to annex entire Ukrainian regions, Russia has evidently violated this fundamental commitment expected of all UN member states. It can therefore be argued that Russia’s membership of the United Nations is invalid as it was not formally applied for, and because the invasion of Ukraine places Russia in direct breach of the UN Charter.

This raises obvious questions over Russia’s continued presence among the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council. Russia’s status within the UNSC is particularly controversial as Moscow stands accused of repeatedly abusing its veto power to further its own foreign policy objectives and avoid censure for breaches of international law. The Security Council’s five permanent members are the only nations to wield veto power.

Eurasia Center events

Online Event Thu, August 15, 2024 • 9:00 am ET

Ukraine’s advance in Kursk: What’s next and implications

Conflict Russia Security & Defense Ukraine

Almost twenty months since the invasion began, few would argue that the devastating scale of Russia’s attack on Ukraine has highlighted the shortcomings of the United Nations. As noted by Tom Grant, a Senior Fellow at the Lauterpacht Centre for International Law, “Russia’s aggression against Ukraine is the most serious violation of the UN Charter in the Charter’s history.” How can a country engaged in Europe’s largest invasion since World War II and led by a man wanted by the International Criminal Court for war crimes be allowed to undermine an organization committed to maintaining world peace?

The absurdity of Russia’s position among the five permanent members of the UN Security Council is fueling calls for fundamental reform of the United Nations. For two years in a row, the reform of the United Nations Security Council has featured in US President Joe Biden’s annual address to the UN General Assembly. The reform debate centers on the need for the highest body at the United Nations to be more representative. At present, the UNSC lacks any permanent members from Africa or Latin America, and is also missing valuable input from emerging powerhouses such as India and significant developed economies including Japan.

One of the roadblocks to such reform is the current make-up of the Security Council, which under the existing regulations would be required to vote to approve any expansion of the UNSC. This would likely be blocked by Russia, due to perceptions in the Kremlin that any expansion would weaken the Russian position. Tellingly, other permanent members would also see their influence diluted by an expanded UNSC, and yet the push for this reform is being led by one of them, the United States.

Other possible reforms of the United Nations include the removal or restriction of veto powers for permanent members of the UN Security Council. This could potentially prevent individual countries from unilaterally derailing efforts to address global crises or uphold international law. Some critics feel even this would not go far enough, and argue for a complete rethink of the role played by the United Nations in international affairs.

The UN was founded in 1945 to maintain international peace and security, but it has been unable to prevent one of its leading members from invading a neighbor and committing war crimes not witnessed in Europe since the darkest days of twentieth century totalitarianism. Clearly, the UN Security Council is broken and the entire UN approach to issues of war and peace is no longer fit for purpose.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is a watershed moment in world history that will have a profound impact on the future of international relations. If the United Nations wants to survive as an institution and remain relevant in the decades ahead, it must be ready to embrace fundamental reform.

Paul Niland is the founder of Lifeline Ukraine.

Further reading

UkraineAlert Aug 3, 2023

Russian Orthodox leader Patriarch Kirill’s unholy war against Ukraine

By Borys Gudziak

Russia’s Unholy War: Russian Orthodox Church leader Patriarch Kirill has provided the ideological justification for Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine and Russian efforts to eliminate Ukrainian national identity.

Civil Society Conflict

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Putin’s fleet retreats: Ukraine is winning the Battle of the Black Sea

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Putin was already struggling to account for his army’s evident inability to conquer a nation that he insists does not exist. He must now also explain how his once vaunted Black Sea Fleet is being defeated by a country without a navy, writes Peter Dickinson.

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It is still far too early to write off Ukraine’s counteroffensive

By Dennis Soltys

The slow pace of Ukraine’s much hyped counteroffensive is sparking fresh calls for a negotiated peace, but the Ukrainian military may yet achieve its goals as long as international support continues, writes Dennis Soltys.

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The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

Read more from UkraineAlert

UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

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The post Russia’s Ukraine invasion highlights the need for fundamental UN reform appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The tragic death of twenty-two-year-old Mahsa Jina Amini—a Kurdish-Iranian woman arrested by the Islamic Republic of Iran’s (IRI) infamous morality police in September 2022 for allegedly defying the state’s mandatory hijab laws—has brought the brutality of the IRI’s discriminatory legal framework against women, girls, and other marginalized populations into clear focus for the global community. Amini’s death sparked waves of massive protests throughout Iran, animated by the slogan “woman, life, freedom,” serving as a rallying cry for Iranians inside Iran and in the diaspora. It is a cry of resistance against the state and of a desire to hold IRI officials accountable for atrocity crimes and human rights violations.

The IRI response to dissent has been a brutal crackdown on peaceful protesters, including internet shutdowns, excessive use of force, arbitrary arrests and detentions, sexual and gender-based violence, torture, enforced disappearances, summary trials, and even executions. These abuses of the state have left Iranians looking for internationalized responses to their plight, as domestic avenues for accountability in the Islamic Republic’s courts are not reliable for victims. Countries around the world have responded in a range of ways, including via diplomatic channels and through the issuance of targeted sanctions against individuals and entities for gross human rights violations in Iran. However, many options for justice remain underused or unexplored.

International forums and mechanisms can be used to pursue accountability for these violations. To put these mechanisms and avenues into context and to shed light on how they may apply to Iran, as well as to illustrate any limitations, the Atlantic Council Strategic Litigation Project has authored this report, which aims to provide an overview of and recommendations relating to international options that can be used to pursue accountability for human rights violations committed in Iran.

The different avenues covered in this report were selected by considering the treaties that have been ratified by Iran, international courts that do or could have jurisdiction over the IRI or relating to violations that take place in Iran, different mechanisms available in which the IRI participates under the United Nations (UN) and other international organizations, and mechanisms designed specifically to address issues in Iran. Lastly, this report ends by looking to the future and highlighting current developments in international law that, if successful, could provide new avenues for accountability.

Strategic Litigation Project

The Atlantic Council’s Strategic Litigation Project injects fresh thinking into how governments and practitioners can apply legal tools to advance human rights and democracy around the world.

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Holding the Islamic Republic of Iran accountable for atrocity crimes

By Celeste Kmiotek, Alana Mitias, Nushin Sarkarati

Under the principle of universal jurisdiction, certain domestic justice systems allow prosecutions in national courts for crimes committed abroad, regardless of the victim’s or perpetrator’s nationality. This manual outlines the universal jurisdiction process in selected European states for those pursuing prosecutions of crimes committed by the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Human Rights International Norms

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Closing the accountability gap on human rights violators in the Islamic Republic of Iran through global litigation strategies

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Gissou Nia presents recommendations for new laws, amendments to existing laws, and the creation of enforcement mechanisms to aid in the effort to combat impunity for the IRI’s human rights violations and atrocity crimes.

Human Rights International Norms

The post International avenues to hold the Islamic Republic of Iran accountable for human rights violations appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On October 5, the Atlantic Council’s Strategic Litigation Project, together with the Global Justice Center, issued a joint letter and legal brief urging the international community to codify the crime of gender apartheid in the UN’s crimes against humanity treaty. The letter and legal brief were endorsed by dozens of prominent jurists, scholars, and civil society representatives. This includes Afghan women’s rights defender Shaharzad Akbar and Nobel laureates Shirin Ebadi, Malala Yousafzai, and Nadia Murad. It also includes South African jurists Justice Richard Goldstone and Navi Pillay, former US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, former Irish President Mary Robinson, former International Criminal Court Chief Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda, and renowned global feminist Gloria Steinem. Former Executive Director of Human Rights Watch Kenneth Roth, former Mongolian President Tsakhiagiin Elbegdorj, and Baroness Helena Kennedy endorsed the letter and legal brief as well. 

The prominence and diversity of this group speak to the high stakes of this issue. Some people might be encountering this term for the first time, however, so it is worth exploring the crime of gender apartheid in greater detail.

1. What is gender apartheid?

Gender apartheid occurs when perpetrators seek to maintain a form of governance designed to systematically oppress and dominate another gender group or groups so that the dominant group may live alongside them and benefit from their subjugation. 

In Afghanistan, gender apartheid is seen in the Taliban banning women and girls from education and almost all employment, and from traveling long distances without a male guardian, all while having to abide by a severe dress code. Women in Afghanistan are banned from almost all public spaces including public parks, gyms, and most recently beauty salons.

In Iran, gender apartheid is seen in the Islamic Republic not allowing a woman the right to divorce her husband or to gain custody of her children, and in banning women from obtaining a passport and traveling outside the country without the permission of a male guardian. Women in Iran are banned from many fields of study and are not permitted into sports stadiums. Their lives and their testimony are worth half a man’s under the law, and they are forced to wear compulsory hijab.

Gender apartheid in these countries is seen in a series of policies and daily abuses that bar women and girls from engaging in public life and having hopes of any financial autonomy. It is in all these measures designed and enacted by the Taliban and the Islamic Republic as a system of governance that aims to compress and relegate Afghan and Iranian women and girls into narrow roles: as child-bearers, child-rearers, and sources of unremunerated domestic labor.

Although it has not yet been codified as a crime under international law, gender apartheid has long been recognized as a concept. It dates back at least to the Taliban’s first takeover of Afghanistan in 1996. In our letter to UN member states, we’ve defined the crime of gender apartheid as the commission of inhuman acts with the intent to maintain an institutionalized regime of systematic oppression and domination of one gender group over another. This amends the existing definition of the crime of race-based apartheid under the Rome Statute—the animating document of the International Criminal Court—to encompass the same act and mental element, but with regard to domination of gender groups rather than racial groups.

2. Why should gender apartheid be recognized under international law?

The addition of the crime of gender apartheid under international law will give victims and survivors a clear legal avenue to hold perpetrators—whether state or individual—to account for the totality of crimes being perpetrated against them. The situations of women and girls living under the Taliban and Islamic Republic of Iran, for example, demonstrate just what’s at stake. As these regimes continue to tighten their grip, aiming to entrench a system of governance that eviscerates any semblance of women and girls’ autonomy and agency, every available option is needed to prevent and punish the full scale of their conduct. Codifying gender apartheid would equip the international community with a new and powerful tool for accountability to mobilize against these deteriorating situations.

3. Who supports the codification of gender apartheid? 

On March 8, 2023 a group of prominent Afghan and Iranian human rights defenders, international jurists, and civil society leaders launched the End Gender Apartheid Campaign, which calls for the global recognition of the crime of gender apartheid. Their demands were powered by the deteriorating situation for women and girls in Afghanistan with each successive Taliban decree and the rise of the “Woman, Life, Freedom” movement in Iran capturing global attention in support of women’s rights in these countries. 

The campaign builds upon a long history of work on this issue. For decades, international officials, lawyers, scholars, and activists have increasingly recognized the commission of gender apartheid and sought to codify it. Over the last year, UN Secretary-General António Guterres and other UN experts specifically recognized the deteriorating situation for women and girls in Afghanistan as gender apartheid. UN experts have also come together to caution against laws in Iran that are a form of gender apartheid. Just last month, UN Women’s Executive Director Sima Bahous called on the international community to explicitly codify gender apartheid under international law.

4. What can the international community do to recognize gender apartheid?

The United Nations has a unique opportunity to codify gender apartheid as a crime under international criminal law because the draft crimes against humanity treaty—the first major global treaty on core international crimes since the 1998 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court—is moving forward. However, the International Law Commission’s draft articles, the starting point for the treaty, replicate the twenty-five-year-old definition of apartheid from the Rome Statute, which focuses on race-based apartheid only. The Rome Statute’s focus is not surprising given the recent memories of apartheid-era South Africa when it was written, but the definition of apartheid can and should be expanded today.

The letter we issued to UN member states—endorsed by dozens of leading jurists and rights defenders, including those who worked to dismantle the apartheid regime in South Africa—urges states to amend the draft definition of the crime of apartheid to encompass gender-based apartheid, too. UN member states will have an opportunity to debate next steps for the draft treaty on October 11-12 during the ongoing UN Sixth Committee session. They can then submit written comments by the end of this year and debate the draft treaty provisions in substance in April 2024.

5. How is gender apartheid distinct from the international crime of gender persecution?

The crime of apartheid is different from what is on the books now because of its distinguishing intent and animating context. This means gender apartheid requires the commission of an inhuman act of requisite character with the intent to maintain an institutionalized regime of systematic oppression and domination. The crime of gender persecution requires neither such context nor intent. Rather, it concerns itself with the “severe deprivation of fundamental rights” where the victim or victims have been targeted “by reason of the identity of a group or collectivity or targeted the group or collectivity as such.” 

The intent to maintain an institutionalized regime of systematic oppression and domination of one group over others is markedly different in scope and dystopian ambition from the crime of persecution, as serious and significant as the latter is. This is already recognized, without controversy, given that the current definition of race-based apartheid sits neatly alongside the crime of persecution on the ground of race in the Rome Statute’s 1998 codification of international crimes. To the extent that the two crimes involve overlapping facts, it is also well-settled under international law that courts can charge perpetrators with cumulative crimes in order to capture the full extent of criminal conduct.

6. How would prosecution work?

Accountability against governmental actors in Afghanistan and Iran has been tough. The proposed codification would open new avenues to hold perpetrators—both state and individual—to account.

If the crimes against humanity treaty is adopted and the crime of gender apartheid is included, countries that are party to the treaty would be obligated to criminalize gender apartheid and take other measures to prevent and punish crimes against humanity under their domestic laws. This could potentially open the pathway to prosecutions under the principle of universal jurisdiction, which essentially means that some crimes are so heinous that they can be prosecuted in courts anywhere, even if the perpetrator is from a different country, the victims are from a different country, or the acts occurred in a different country. 

Iranian officials responsible for the architecture of gender apartheid do travel outside of Iran and into countries with universal jurisdiction laws—so this could expand options for prosecution of officials, much in the same way a former Iranian official was convicted by a Swedish district court in July 2022 for the executions of thousands of political prisoners in Iran’s jails. With respect to the Taliban, similar approaches may apply. 

Codification of the crime of gender apartheid in the crimes against humanity treaty would also affirm the obligations of states and international organizations to prevent and punish gender apartheid, even if they’re not direct parties to the treaty. In this way, the hope is that codification will mobilize diplomatic, legal, and social movements of resistance, including in the contexts of Afghanistan and Iran, and also in similar crisis situations now and in the future.

Gissou Nia is the founder and director of the Strategic Litigation Project at the Atlantic Council and advisor to the End Gender Apartheid Campaign.

The post Gender apartheid is a horror. Now the United Nations can make it a crime against humanity.  appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Zelenskyy’s words made headlines, but it is not clear if UN officials were listening. Two weeks earlier, United Nations investigators in Kyiv confirmed that they had not yet conclusively established whether Russia is committing genocide in Ukraine. Erik Mose, who heads the UN’s Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine, informed journalists in the Ukrainian capital that while his investigation was ongoing, “as of now, we do not have sufficient evidence to meet the legal qualifications of the Genocide Convention.”

The cautious approach adopted by United Nations investigators sparked considerable anger and exasperation, but it is not entirely surprising. After all, the legal bar for determining genocide is necessarily high. Crucially, in order to confirm that a genocide is taking place, evidence of the relevant war crimes must be supported by conclusive proof of genocidal intent. In this case, efforts to demonstrate Russia’s genocidal intent will be bolstered by the unprecedented amount of genocidal rhetoric coming from senior Kremlin officials and regime propagandists in Moscow over a period stretching back at least fifteen years.

Russian President Vladimir Putin has set the tone for Russia’s viciously anti-Ukrainian public dialogue and has frequently engaged in what could be classed as genocidal language. He routinely asserts that Ukrainians are actually Russians (“one people”), and has repeatedly denied Ukraine’s right to exist while insisting the country is guilty of occupying “historical Russian lands.” In one particularly chilling recent outburst in September 2023, Putin denounced the “anti-human essence” of the modern Ukrainian state. Such dehumanization is widely recognized as an important indicator of genocidal intent.

Others throughout the Russian establishment have enthusiastically echoed Putin. According to research conducted by the Washington-based New Lines Institute and the Raoul Wallenberg Centre for Human Rights in Montreal, Russia’s state-orchestrated incitement to genocide includes “the denial of the existence of a Ukrainian identity” by senior Russian officials and state media.

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

The UN defines genocide as “the intent to destroy a national, ethnic, racial, or religious group, in whole or in part.” The five acts internationally defined as genocide include killings, causing serious harm, deliberately inflicting physically destructive conditions of life, imposing birth prevention measures, and forcibly transferring children to another group. Russia stands accused of committing all five acts against Ukrainians.

Evidence of Russian war crimes in Ukraine is extensive. An array of state and non-state international organizations have documented a vast amount of Russian crimes in Ukraine including the torture and execution of civilians and POWs, forced deportations, and the targeting of Ukrainian cultural, historical, and religious sites. Tens of thousands of Ukrainian civilians were killed during the Russian attack on Mariupol in spring 2022. Dozens of other Ukrainian towns and cities have since suffered similar fates.

The Kremlin began setting the stage for these crimes many years before the onset of the full-scale invasion in February 2022. According to the Just Security forum at the New York University School of Law, this process dates back to at least 2008 or 2009, and has been marked by “increasingly hostile language laying the groundwork for rejecting Ukraine’s existence as a state, a national group, and a culture.”

Even casual consumers of Russia’s mainstream media will be immediately familiar with this poisonous anti-Ukrainian agenda. Indeed, the demonization of Ukraine has long since become totally normalized throughout the Russian information space, with the Ukrainian authorities groundlessly portrayed as fascists and symbols of Ukrainian national identity routinely equated with Nazism. Russian television hosts and invited “experts” regularly talk of the need to destroy Ukraine.

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Ukraine’s advance in Kursk: What’s next and implications

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For more than a decade, Putin’s powerful propaganda machine has prepared the Russian public for the genocide they are now committing in Ukraine. This process has included the coordinated promotion of anti-Ukrainian messaging designed to rob the country of legitimacy and position it as an existential threat to Russia. Ukraine has consistently been portrayed as a failed state, an anti-Russian project devised by the West, and a puppet of anti-Russian forces. Meanwhile, the Ukrainian language and all other expressions of Ukrainian national identity have been derided as artificial and historically illegitimate.

This relentless flood of anti-Ukrainian propaganda appears to have conditioned the majority of Russians to accept the current invasion. Independent polls indicate overwhelming levels of public support for the war, despite widespread awareness of atrocities such as the destruction of entire Ukrainian cities and the deliberate bombing of Ukraine’s essential civilian infrastructure.

President Zelenskyy is not the only prominent figure to accuse Russia of committing genocide in Ukraine. Indeed, US President Joe Biden and his rival Donald Trump both did so during the early months of the invasion. More recently, US lawmakers visiting The Hague in September 2023 said Putin had “tried to erase a culture, a people, and a religion, and that is the definition of genocide.” They join a growing chorus of experts and academics who unambiguously state that Russia’s actions in Ukraine represent a genocide.

It will be some time before the United Nations and other relevant international bodies arrive at a definitive legal verdict on the genocide question. At this relatively early stage in the investigation process, the International Criminal Court has already issued an arrest warrant for Putin over the mass abduction of Ukrainian children, which itself likely qualifies as an act of genocide. As investigations progress, the role of Russia’s propaganda machine and the genocidal intent displayed by Kremlin officials including Putin himself will be closely scrutinized.

Dr. Taras Kuzio is a professor in the Department of Political Science at the National University of Kyiv Mohyla Academy and an associate research fellow at the Henry Jackson Society. His latest book “Fascism and Genocide. Russia’s War Against Ukrainians” was published by Columbia University Press this year.

Further reading

UkraineAlert Aug 3, 2023

Russian Orthodox leader Patriarch Kirill’s unholy war against Ukraine

By Borys Gudziak

Russia’s Unholy War: Russian Orthodox Church leader Patriarch Kirill has provided the ideological justification for Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine and Russian efforts to eliminate Ukrainian national identity.

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UkraineAlert Sep 19, 2023

Putin “knows very well” NATO poses no security threat to Russia

By Peter Dickinson

Russia’s recent demilitarization of its NATO borders proves that Putin does not view alliance as a genuine security threat and makes a complete mockery of Kremlin propaganda blaming the invasion of Ukraine on NATO, writes Peter Dickinson.

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UkraineAlert Sep 14, 2023

It is still far too early to write off Ukraine’s counteroffensive

By Dennis Soltys

The slow pace of Ukraine’s much hyped counteroffensive is sparking fresh calls for a negotiated peace, but the Ukrainian military may yet achieve its goals as long as international support continues, writes Dennis Soltys.

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The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

Read more from UkraineAlert

UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia and Central Asia in the East.

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The post Zelenskyy tells United Nations: Russia is committing genocide in Ukraine appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Ukraine’s sense of national identity has only strengthened since the onset of Russia’s current full-scale invasion. This was demonstrated recently when the Ukrainian government replaced the Soviet crest featured on the shield of Kyiv’s Motherland statue with the Ukrainian trident. Similar efforts to remove the symbols of Soviet and Russian imperialism are underway across the country.

The strengthening of Ukraine’s national identity and the consolidation of Ukrainian independence since 1991 is regarded by Vladimir Putin and many within the Russian establishment as an existential threat to Russia itself. Rather than acknowledge the existence of an independent and sovereign Ukraine, Putin remains in denial, and continues to insist that Ukrainians are really Russians (“one people”). Nor is Putin alone; many Russian leaders routinely question the legitimacy of Ukrainian statehood. Former Russian President Dmitry Medvedev is a particularly prominent Ukraine denier, proclaiming recently that the Ukrainian nation was established “by accident in the twentieth century.”

This refusal to recognize Ukraine as an independent nation is a longstanding Russian tradition stretching back hundreds of years. From the eighteenth century onward, successive Russian rulers have viewed any expression of a separate Ukrainian identity as direct challenge to Russia’s imperial identity and a potential catalyst for the breakup of the Russian state. In the modern era, independent Ukraine’s gradual embrace of European democratic values has added an ideological dimension to this Russian opposition, with Kremlin leaders fearful that Ukrainian democracy could prove contagious and spell doom for their own authoritarian regime.

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

Ukraine’s first push for statehood came in the seventeenth century, when Ukrainian cossacks rose up in an ultimately failed attempt to establish a state of their own. The modern independence movement gained ground throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, leading to the declaration of Ukrainian independence in 1918 during the chaotic aftermath of the Russian Revolution. The Ukrainian People’s Republic proved to be short-lived, but in many ways it paved the way for the independent state that would emerge from the wreckage of the Soviet Union in 1991.

Russia’s denial of Ukrainian identity and refusal to accept the reality of Ukrainian independence are now fueling an invasion that many view as genocidal in nature. According to the UN, a crucial indicator of genocide is the “denial of the existence of protected groups or of recognition of elements of their identity.” A very large number of public statements by Russian officials including Putin would seem to meet this definition. Russia’s efforts to destroy Ukraine’s cultural heritage, along with the relentless barrage of genocidal anti-Ukrainian rhetoric in Russia’s heavily censored and carefully choreographed mainstream media, strongly indicate genocidal intent.

In areas of Ukraine under Russian control, local populations are being subjected to a range of genocidal policies including summary executions and mass deportations, along with the abduction and anti-Ukrainian indoctrination of children. Those who remain are being forced to accept Russian citizenship. Meanwhile, all symbols of Ukrainian national identity are being systematically removed. An international investigation into alleged war crimes committed by Russian forces during the occupation of Kherson found that “Putin’s plan to extinguish Ukrainian identity includes a range of crimes evocative of genocide.”

Eurasia Center events

Online Event Thu, August 15, 2024 • 9:00 am ET

Ukraine’s advance in Kursk: What’s next and implications

Conflict Russia Security & Defense Ukraine

So far, Putin’s invasion is failing to achieve its imperial objectives. Indeed, the war he unleashed in February 2022 appears to have greatly consolidated Ukrainian national identity and confirmed the finality of the country’s historic departure from the Russian sphere of influence. Last year, as Ukrainians marked Independence Day for the first time since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion, President Zelenskyy stressed the impact of the war on Ukrainian national identity, commenting that Ukraine had been “not born but reborn.”

Evidence of this rebirth can be seen in villages, towns, and cities across Ukraine. Millions of people who initially fled the Russian invasion have since returned home. Many are choosing to switch to the Ukrainian language in their everyday lives, while interest in Ukrainian history and culture has risen to unprecedented highs. Despite the horrors of the ongoing invasion, national pride is soaring, while polls consistently indicate overwhelming opposition to any kind of compromise peace that would cede Ukrainian land to Russia.

Ukrainian historian Serhii Plokhy, the Mykhailo Hrushevsky professor of Ukrainian history at Harvard University, echoes President Zelenskyy’s comments on the profound impact of the Russian invasion on Ukrainian identity. “What you see today in Ukraine is really something that many other nations experienced. It is a war for independence. And the war for independence is very much about the formation of this new identity,” he commented during an interview with NPR.

In February 2022, Vladimir Putin set out to extinguish Ukrainian statehood and erase Ukrainian identity. In doing so, he was pursuing a genocidal agenda that has deep roots in Russian imperial history. However, the Russian invasion has backfired disastrously for the Kremlin, greatly strengthening Ukrainian national identity while poisoning bilateral ties and shattering historic links that had once bound the two countries closely together. Russians may still be in denial over Ukrainian identity, but sooner or later they will have to face up to the reality of living next door to a strong and independent Ukraine.

Mercedes Sapuppo is a program assistant at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

Further reading

UkraineAlert Aug 22, 2023

Belarus dictator Lukashenka must face justice for role in Russia’s Ukraine war

By Katie LaRoque

It is time for a serious conversation on how to hold Belarusian dictator Alyaksandr Lukashenka accountable for his participation in Russia’s brutal full-scale invasion of Ukraine, writes Katie LaRoque.

Belarus Conflict

UkraineAlert Jul 31, 2023

Zelenskyy advisor: Defeat in Ukraine will spark collapse of Putin regime

By Peter Dickinson

Ukrainian presidential advisor Mykhailo Podolyak says the Wagner mutiny has exposed Russia’s internal weakness and predicts battlefield defeats in Ukraine will spark the collapse of the Putin regime, writes Peter Dickinson.

Conflict Defense Policy

UkraineAlert Aug 7, 2023

Ukraine’s slow counteroffensive is a wake-up call for the West

By Maksym Skrypchenko

Ukraine’s lack of counteroffensive progress over the past two months should serve as a wake-up call for Western leaders. Their response will shape the geopolitical landscape for decades to come, writes Maksym Skrypchenko.

Conflict Defense Policy

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

Read more from UkraineAlert

UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia and Central Asia in the East.

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The post Putin’s Russia is trapped in genocidal denial over Ukrainian independence appeared first on Atlantic Council.

First and foremost, Lukashenka permitted approximately 30,000 Russian troops onto Belarusian territory prior to the full-scale invasion, which allowed Putin to attempt an ultimately failed blitzkrieg assault on Kyiv in early 2022. Not only could Russian troops stage their northern offensive from Belarusian land, but evidence also suggests that the country’s air defenses, air traffic control systems, and fueling stations were put under Kremlin military command. Belarusian hospitals were even used to treat injured Russian soldiers. The Russian atrocities that Ukrainian investigators have documented in Kyiv region towns such as Bucha, Irpin, and Borodyanka were only possible due to Lukashenka’s complicity in the war.

Second, through October 2022, Lukashenka routinely allowed Russian missiles to be fired from Belarus at targets across Ukraine, as he has publicly admitted. Hundreds of Russian missiles were fired from Belarus in the early stages of the full-scale invasion, with devastating consequences for the Ukrainian civilian population. The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights estimates that at least 9,000 Ukrainian civilians have been killed since the start of the full-scale invasion, though the true figure is believed to be considerably higher. These deaths are not all a consequence of missile strikes launched from Belarus, but many are.

Third, there is a rapidly growing body of evidence that the Lukashenka regime is also engaged in the systematic abduction of Ukrainian children from occupied regions of Ukraine. Data presented by Belarusian democratic forces suggests that more than 2100 Ukrainian children were forcibly transferred to so-called health camps and sanatoriums in Belarus from September 2022 to May 2023. It bears reminding that the forcible transfer of children from one group to another is an act of genocide under the UN Genocide Convention.

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

For the first two offenses, Lukashenka’s involvement would fall under the crime of aggression. According to the United Nations definition, the crime of aggression can be proven when a country “[allows] its territory, which it has placed at the disposal of another State, to be used by that other State for perpetrating an act of aggression against a third State.” As such, Lukashenka should be prosecuted alongside Putin for the crime of aggression in a special international tribunal.

Critically, the establishment of a special international tribunal for the crime of aggression would circumvent potential head of state immunity that could limit other accountability mechanisms and prevent the prosecution of Lukashenka. This approach has already garnered the support of several countries including the Ukrainian government. It has also been backed by a number of international bodies including the European Parliament and the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe.

Eurasia Center events

Online Event Thu, August 15, 2024 • 9:00 am ET

Ukraine’s advance in Kursk: What’s next and implications

Conflict Russia Security & Defense Ukraine

When seeking justice for the systematic abduction of Ukrainian children, we must turn to the International Criminal Court (ICC), which has already issued arrest warrants for Vladimir Putin and the Russian Children’s Rights Commissioner Maria Lvova-Belova in response to their roles in the alleged mass abductions. Belarusian and Russian state media has openly covered a number of potentially incriminating statements by Lukashenka, in which he admits to his regime’s involvement in the forcible transfer of Ukrainian minors.

In June 2023, Lukashenka stated publicly: “I went to Putin, I said ‘let’s spend part of the Union budget on these children.’ That’s how we started to bring them.” Such an admission suggests a political agreement at the highest levels of Belarusian and Russian government to kidnap Ukrainian children. In response to mounting evidence, both the Ukrainian and Lithuanian Prosecutors General have launched investigations into the role of Belarus in child abductions. Further investigation is needed to fully scope the extent of the Belarusian regime’s role, but publicly available data supports the conclusion that the ICC should issue an additional warrant for Lukashenka’s arrest.

As we assess the litany of alleged human rights violations perpetrated by Lukashenka and his regime, it is essential to stress that the Belarusian people are not to blame. Belarusians also deserve accountability for the crimes committed against them by their leaders. The repression they have endured has been severe, inhumane, and ongoing. Justice cannot end with accountability for Lukashenka’s crimes against Ukraine; it must come full circle to address crimes committed in Belarus. In the meantime, full accountability for the war against Ukraine provides an opportunity to hold Putin and his accomplices, Lukashenka chief among them, accountable. We must seize this moment.

Katie LaRoque is the deputy director for policy and advocacy at Freedom House and focuses on Europe and Eurasia.

Further reading

UkraineAlert Aug 3, 2023

Russian Orthodox leader Patriarch Kirill’s unholy war against Ukraine

By Borys Gudziak

Russia’s Unholy War: Russian Orthodox Church leader Patriarch Kirill has provided the ideological justification for Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine and Russian efforts to eliminate Ukrainian national identity.

Civil Society Conflict

UkraineAlert Jul 31, 2023

Zelenskyy advisor: Defeat in Ukraine will spark collapse of Putin regime

By Peter Dickinson

Ukrainian presidential advisor Mykhailo Podolyak says the Wagner mutiny has exposed Russia’s internal weakness and predicts battlefield defeats in Ukraine will spark the collapse of the Putin regime, writes Peter Dickinson.

Conflict Defense Policy

UkraineAlert Apr 28, 2023

Placing Russian nukes in Belarus could destabilize Putin’s last ally

By Olivia Yanchik

Vladimir Putin’s decision to place nuclear weapons in Belarus will strengthen Russia’s grip on the country but could also spark a new wave of opposition to Belarusian dictator Alyaksandr Lukashenka, writes Olivia Yanchik.

Belarus Civil Society

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

Read more from UkraineAlert

UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia and Central Asia in the East.

Learn more

The post Belarus dictator Lukashenka must face justice for role in Russia’s Ukraine war appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On August 21, it was announced that Transatlantic Security Initiative nonresident senior fellow Deborah McCarthy was designated as the US Head of Delegation and Lead Negotiator for the sixth negotiating session of the Ad Hoc Committee (AHC) to elaborate a UN cybercrime convention.  

Fellow

Deborah McCarthy

Nonresident Senior Fellow

Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security Transatlantic Security Initiative

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The Transatlantic Security Initiative, in the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, shapes and influences the debate on the greatest security challenges facing the North Atlantic Alliance and its key partners.

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The post McCarthy tapped to lead the US Head of Delegation and Lead Negotiator appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Allowing Putin to get away with this will have disastrous consequences for the entire region, not only for Ukraine. Ben Hodges, the former commander of US forces in Europe, has it right: “The future of the West may be decided on the Black Sea and Washington isn’t prepared. We must get in the game.”

There can be no mistaking Russia’s intentions. Moscow is determined to cut off Ukraine’s access to world markets, and aims to assert its own dominance over the entire Black Sea region. For the past few weeks, Russian forces have been staging airstrikes on granaries in Ukraine’s main port city of Odesa, as well as ports on the Danube River that serve as Ukraine’s most important alternate export route. One of these Danube attacks came perilously close to NATO member Romania.

Meanwhile, Russia continues to export large amounts of grain and fertilizer from its own Black Sea ports to the outside world, often using trickery to evade sanctions. To keep this going, Putin is determined to bully and intimidate the other countries who share the Black Sea.

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

The US and its allies are admittedly limited in what actions they can take. Turkey, which controls access through the Bosphorus according to the 1936 Montreux Convention, has barred foreign warships from entering the Black Sea since the Russians launched the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. That leaves Bulgaria, Romania, and Turkey itself as the only NATO members operating naval vessels in the Black Sea. But NATO has continued to fly into international airspace above the sea, on several occasions resulting in confrontations with Russian aircraft.

There are several ways the West can push back against Russian efforts to dominate the Black Sea. First of all, it can provide Ukraine with additional military resources to even out the odds. This could include beefing up anti-aircraft defenses around Odesa and other port cities to fend off Russian missiles.

US President Joe Biden should also send Kyiv sufficient numbers of anti-ship missiles to allow Ukraine to target Russian-controlled Black Sea ports on Ukrainian territory including Crimea. That would have the welcome side effect of raising international insurance costs for Russian vessels. In recent weeks, Ukraine has already shown itself capable of striking fear into the hearts of the Russian navy with its seagoing drones. The Ukrainian military could do much more with an ample supply of anti-ship missiles.

Financial and logistical assistance, smartly administered, can also go a long way. Ukrainian grain traders have told me that $200-300 million in insurance from the United States International Development Finance Corporation could help them to cover damage from future strikes.

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Meanwhile, Brussels should intensify its efforts to counter the current ban on Ukrainian grain imposed by five European Union countries whose farmers feel threatened by cheaper exports from their neighbor to the east. It’s doable but politically hard, especially with Poland’s upcoming elections.

Another small but potentially helpful measure would be to accelerate European Union funded upgrades to the port in Alexandroupolis, Greece, where up to 200,000 tons of grain exports per month could eventually be stored. Ukraine could send its grain there via Bulgaria and Romania.

All these proposals point to a larger issue: Coming up with effective answers to Russia’s control of the Black Sea requires formulating a comprehensive strategy for the entire region. The Russian grain blockade of 2023 was entirely predictable, yet the US and the European Union somehow failed to plan ahead for it, or to anticipate that Moscow would have the chutzpah to attack the alternative Danube route.

Some policymakers have noticed this lack of foresight. A bill stipulating the creation of just such a Black Sea strategy is currently making its way through the Foreign Relations Committee of the US Senate. However, similar plans have been in the works before without leading anywhere. Perhaps it’s time for President Biden and some leading Republicans to get together and move things ahead toward a coherent Black Sea strategy. Ukraine can’t afford more dithering.

Melinda Haring is the senior community engagement advisor at Razom for Ukraine and a non-resident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council.

Further reading

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Russian Orthodox leader Patriarch Kirill’s unholy war against Ukraine

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Russia’s Unholy War: Russian Orthodox Church leader Patriarch Kirill has provided the ideological justification for Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine and Russian efforts to eliminate Ukrainian national identity.

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Ukraine’s lack of counteroffensive progress over the past two months should serve as a wake-up call for Western leaders. Their response will shape the geopolitical landscape for decades to come, writes Maksym Skrypchenko.

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The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

Read more from UkraineAlert

UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia and Central Asia in the East.

Learn more

The post Putin must not be allowed to turn the Black Sea into a Russian lake appeared first on Atlantic Council.

In May 2022, the New Lines Institute and Raoul Wallenberg Centre for Human Rights issued an independent legal inquiry that found the Russian Federation in breach of the United Nations Genocide Convention’s prohibition on direct and public incitement to genocide. The report identified a serious risk of genocide. In other words, the first few months of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine provided ample evidence to trigger the central duty of the United Nations Genocide Convention, namely to prevent genocide in Ukraine.

The UN Genocide Convention legally obligates its 152 signatories, including Russia, to act as soon as they become aware (or should have become aware) of genocide risks. All forms of violence should be condemned everywhere, but genocides have been declared the “crime of crimes” in international law, as they target a community’s most basic right to exist.

The horrors of genocidal violence sometimes obscure a crucial point in analyses of Russia’s egregious actions against Ukrainians. While the Genocide Convention forbids genocidal violence itself (“the commission of genocide”), it also prohibits four other related actions: Conspiracy to commit genocide, attempts to commit genocide, complicity in genocide, and direct and public incitement to genocide (Article III). The inciting language of Russian state actors has long met the “direct and public” standard and is a crime with no statute of limitations.

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

I am the principal author of a new report by the New Lines Institute and Raoul Wallenberg Centre for Human Rights, an updated legal analysis into the evidence of Russia’s breaches of the UN Genocide Convention in Ukraine. This report features nearly sixty pages of verifiable, open-source information.

To begin, we reviewed Russian state actors’ direct and public incitement to genocide since they were formally put on notice regarding these breaches of the Genocide Convention in May 2022. Organizing verifiable examples through an expert framework on the five “D’s” of incitement (demonization, delegitimization, dehumanization, denial, and disinformation), we found durable genocidal incitement across all levels of Russian state authority.

Over the past year, direct and public incitement to genocide by Russian state actors neither decreased in tone or in volume. In fact, we demonstrate that this specific breach of the Genocide Convention escalated. New dehumanizing tropes, such as “de-Satanizing” Ukrainians, have even been introduced through powerful, state-endorsed platforms. In legal language, there are reasonable grounds to believe that Russia is responsible for direct and public incitement to genocide against Ukrainians.

This inciting language is horrifying on its own, as it calls for the erasure and destruction of Ukrainians through graphic slurs and threats. However, Russia’s actions in Ukraine have mirrored the violence of the rhetoric coming out of Moscow.

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Ukraine’s advance in Kursk: What’s next and implications

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Over the past year, we have identified evidence of a surge in systematic and coordinated genocidal tactics against Ukrainians. Our legal analysis found reasonable grounds to believe that Russia is responsible for the commission of genocide. This position is supported both by actions prohibited in the Genocide Convention and an underlying pattern of atrocities indicating that Russia aims to destroy the Ukrainian national group in part.

While Russia’s direct orchestration and participation in actions prohibited under the Genocide Convention are undeniable, such as the forcible transfer of Ukrainian children, our report breaks new ground by linking these actions of genocide with evidence of its mental element, the motive to destroy a national group in whole or in part.

We invite others to engage with the sheer volume of evidence captured in our report and avoid allowing Russia’s daily atrocities to cloud our vision. When Russian state actors’ words and actions are analyzed systematically and across the timeline of the full-scale invasion, abundant evidence indicates that Russia’s genocidal tactics are escalating. The Genocide Convention compels the international community to proactively meet the challenges posed by Russia’s clear and evolving genocidal tactics, halting this genocide in motion.

In addition, our report reveals singular aspects of Russia’s genocide, including documented evidence of all five acts prohibited in the Genocide Convention’s Article II: Killing, serious bodily and mental harm, inflicting conditions of life calculated to bring about the victims’ physical destruction, measures to prevent births, and the forcible transfer of children. The Genocide Convention does not require evidence of all five prohibited acts to meet the legal standard. Russia’s violation of all five acts of genocide is therefore particularly heinous and adds to the overall portrait of their escalating attempts to commit genocide in Ukraine.

Looking ahead, many atrocity prevention policy and legal precedents will be set by the international community’s response to Russia’s escalating genocide in Ukraine. Genocide reports can make for harrowing reading, but nothing can compare to the horrors Ukrainians face each day. We hope our report will galvanize both policy and public action to advocate for the millions of Ukrainians whose lives have been forever changed by Russia’s genocide, and whose safety is not yet secured.

Kristina Hook is assistant professor of conflict management at Kennesaw State University and a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center. She is the lead author of the expert report The Russian Federation’s Escalating Commission of Genocide in Ukraine: A Legal Analysis.

Further reading

UkraineAlert Aug 3, 2023

Russian Orthodox leader Patriarch Kirill’s unholy war against Ukraine

By Borys Gudziak

Russia’s Unholy War: Russian Orthodox Church leader Patriarch Kirill has provided the ideological justification for Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine and Russian efforts to eliminate Ukrainian national identity.

Civil Society Conflict

UkraineAlert Jul 31, 2023

Zelenskyy advisor: Defeat in Ukraine will spark collapse of Putin regime

By Peter Dickinson

Ukrainian presidential advisor Mykhailo Podolyak says the Wagner mutiny has exposed Russia’s internal weakness and predicts battlefield defeats in Ukraine will spark the collapse of the Putin regime, writes Peter Dickinson.

Conflict Defense Policy

UkraineAlert Aug 7, 2023

Ukraine’s slow counteroffensive is a wake-up call for the West

By Maksym Skrypchenko

Ukraine’s lack of counteroffensive progress over the past two months should serve as a wake-up call for Western leaders. Their response will shape the geopolitical landscape for decades to come, writes Maksym Skrypchenko.

Conflict Defense Policy

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

Read more from UkraineAlert

UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia and Central Asia in the East.

Learn more

The post New report highlights evidence of escalating Russian genocide in Ukraine appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The focus on elections did not bring the establishment of a new political regime but, by crystalizing differences among the forces on the ground, caused the perpetuation of the same civil war, which is still ongoing today, albeit in a different form.

The other big mistake was the enactment, on April 11, 2013, of the General National Congress’s Political Isolation Law “with the aim of removing former [Gaddafi] personnel from the country’s political, economic, educational, and security institutions. This law represented a purely punitive instrument, without any of the conciliatory measures that have proved instrumental” The enactment of this law—barring individuals from holding government positions or participating in Libya’s political life if they had supported or been involved to any extent with the previous regime—caused the definitive break between old and new elites and the system’s polarization. 

The rest of Libya’s more recent history is the continuance of this dynamic with relative differences among actors and players. The fragmentation of the country in various diverse and antagonistic poles occurred in all the milestones of today’s Libya’s history, such as the clashes in 2014 between General Khalifa Haftar’s militias in the Eastern part of Libya (what is historically known as Cirenaica) and a set of mostly Islamist militias dominant in the western part operating under the name of Libya Dawn. It became clear that the political fragmentation that caused the proliferation of militias and warlords and determined the paralysis of the Libyan system was the inevitable outcome of the previous structural socio-political conditions described above.

The intervention of external actors, in particular those regional and international powers that have projected their national interests onto the country, should be added to the conditions that led to this internal situation . A geopolitical confrontation soon turned into full support for rival Libyan local political factions and/or armed militias, heightening internal fragmentation. For example, the maintenance of a division between an eastern region dominated by General Haftar and his militias and another area in the west under the United Nations–recognized government of Fayez Serraj is the result of strongly Egyptian and Emirati support for Haftar versus Italian, Turkish, and Qatari support for Tripoli.

For a long period, the situation in Libya was considered a de facto proxy war. Deeper studies showed this was only partially the case; it was evident that the domestic actors were not simply proxies but maintained a relative degree of independence and the capacity to manipulate the foreign backers according to their interests.

With the passing of time and the lack of oversight and control from a central government, the various militias turned into gangs while the international community stood idly by and discussed phantasmal disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration and army training programs. Little by little, the gangs entrenched themselves in diverse territories, primarily through illegal means such as extortion and racketeering, beyond their increasing involvement in the various smuggling trades.

After the failure of the attack by General Haftar’s forces against the city of Tripoli in 2019, the international community, led by Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on Libya Stephanie Williams, devised and planned for the election of a government of national unity (GNU) to be elected by an assembly of Libyan representatives selected by the United Nations, the Libyan Political Dialogue Forum (LPDF). This assembly, formed by seventy-five members representing multiple constituencies, elected a three-person Presidential Council headed by President of the Presidential Council Mohamed Mnefi and Prime Minister Abdulhamid Dbeibah.

The government’s task was mainly to prepare the country for a round of presidential and parliamentary elections. For multiple reasons, the GNU failed in doing so. The parliament in Tobruk, the House of Representatives, demanded the resignation of Dbeibah. At his refusal, they proceeded to appoint Fathi Bashaga as the new prime minister. However, Bashaga never succeeded in entering Tripoli and assuming the role of prime minister. Dbeibah was elected by bribing some of the voters in the LPDF and continued to govern the country through a vast system of corruption and cooptation.

This allowed the various gang-like militias to entrench their positions further and strengthen their grip on the local territories. While Libya remained formally divided, very recently, behind-the-curtain deals among Haftar’s sons and relatives of Dbeibah seem to lead to an agreement to form a new Dbeibah-led reshuffled government. The main purpose of this new government would be to lead the country to elections. However, according to most, it will only be a continuation of the previous one—which means a continuation of corruption and pillage of the country’s resources by these ruling groups.

This most probable outcome of the Libyan process—the progressive creation of a mafia-like state in the middle of North Africa—seems to be the most certain outcome. Such an end could hypothetically be avoided by a military intervention by a more substantial power, such as Turkey or Egypt, that conquers the country and exercises overwhelming power to establish the rule of law. It is a possibility but not highly probable. The alternative, constituted by the potential agreement among healthy Libyan elites, is also improbable as there is no sign of these elites. Another possible scenario could be a conscious decision by a Western country to exercise pressure and other means to force Libyan elites to follow a direct path to election, creating a shared government of national unity and the slow progressive establishment of a pluralistic modern system.

However, almost none of these scenarios will likely bring a positive outcome. All the pain and suffering that the Libyan population has been enduring since 2011 could have been avoided had the international community and the new Libyan elite paid more attention to the reconstruction and rebuilding of the state rather than the conquest and appropriation of power.

Karim Mezran is director of the North Africa Initiative and resident senior fellow with the Rafik Hariri Center and Middle East Programs at the Atlantic Council 

Alessia Melcangi is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center and Middle East Programs, associate professor of contemporary history of North Africa and the Middle East at the Department of Social Sciences and Economics at the Sapienza University of Rome.

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South African officials will likely be relieved by Putin’s decision to skip the summit. For months, they have sought to prevent a potential confrontation with the Kremlin over the issue, with South African President Cyril Ramaphosa even reportedly requesting permission from the International Criminal Court for some form of exemption in order to avoid arresting Putin during the summit. with tensions mounting ahead of the summit, South Africa Deputy President Paul Mashatile admitted in a July 14 interview that the best option would be for Putin to stay away. “The Russians are not happy, though,” he commented. “They want him to come.”

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

Moscow’s earlier eagerness for Putin to attend the summit is easy to understand. Following the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Russia’s relationship with the Western world has reached its lowest point since the Cold War. The Kremlin has sought to counter perceptions of mounting international isolation by emphasizing continued engagement with non-Western nations such as the BRICS grouping, which brings together Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa. With this in mind, Putin’s attendance of the August summit was seen as an important signal that Russia could not be isolated and remained a major force in global affairs.

With Russian prestige at stake, Kremlin officials reportedly pressed their South African counterparts hard over the issue. Indeed, in a court affidavit made public earlier this week, President Ramaphosa claimed any attempt to detain Putin could lead to war between Russia and South Africa. “I must highlight, for the sake of transparency, that South Africa has obvious problems with executing a request to arrest and surrender President Putin,” he said. “Russia has made it clear that arresting its sitting president would be a declaration of war.”

Russia’s efforts to pressure South Africa clearly failed, leading to the July 19 announcement that Putin would not be attending. This exercise in damage limitation makes perfect sense. Speculation over Putin’s possible arrest in South Africa was rapidly becoming a PR disaster for the Kremlin, drawing attention to his status as a suspected war criminal and undermining his strongman persona. Meanwhile, headlines claiming Moscow had threatened South Africa with war if the country dared to arrest Putin for war crimes did little to enhance Russia’s reputation as a credible partner. With South African officials unwilling or unable to provide the necessary assurances, the only remaining option was to cancel the visit entirely.

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This forced cancellation is the latest in a series of very public humiliations for Putin, who is struggling to maintain his authority as the full-scale invasion of Ukraine continues to unravel. The March 2023 ICC decision to charge him with war crimes dealt a powerful blow to Putin’s standing at a time when unprecedented sanctions and revelations of Russian atrocities in Ukraine had already made him a toxic figure. Weeks later, he was forced to cancel traditional Victory Day parades in cities across Russia amid rumors of shortages in both troops and tanks due to heavy losses in Ukraine.

Putin’s most humiliating moment came in late June, when units of Russia’s state-funded paramilitary Wagner Group staged a mutiny and briefly threatened to seize control of the country. The Wagner uprising ended as suddenly as it had begun, but not before mutinous troops had captured one of Russia’s largest cities without a fight and marched virtually unopposed to within 200 kilometers of Moscow. The mutiny exposed the fragility of the current regime and the lack of popular support for Putin himself; while crowds of ordinary Russians flocked to cheer Wagner rebels, nobody rallied to defend the country’s current ruler.

The Wagner episode may have played a role in this week’s decision to miss the forthcoming summit in South Africa. With Putin looking weaker than at any point in his 23-year reign, there is widespread speculation that it is only a matter of time before he faces fresh domestic challenges. Coups are often staged when dictators leave the security of their capitals and few in Moscow will have forgotten the failed KGB coup of 1991, which took place in August while Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev was in Crimea.

The Kremlin’s inability to find a way for Putin to attend next month’s BRICS summit in South Africa is a clear indication of Russia’s declining influence on the global stage. Ten years ago, Putin was a respected statesman and the leader of a G8 nation. Today, he must plan his international travel based on the likelihood of being arrested for war crimes. Commenting on Putin’s canceled South Africa visit, US State Department Spokesperson Matthew Miller said there was “no better illustration” of Russia’s vastly diminished standing in the world. “President Putin can hardly leave his own borders now,” he noted. “He’s an international pariah who can barely leave his own borders for fear of arrest.”

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

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The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

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UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

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The post “Pariah” Putin forced to cancel travel plans over fears of war crimes arrest appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has recently warned that Moscow may intend to blow up the Russian-occupied Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant in southern Ukraine. Meanwhile, US President Joe Biden acknowledged on June 19 that the threat of Putin using nuclear weapons is “real.” Days later, Ukrainian military intelligence chief Kyrylo Budanov accused Russia of mining the cooling pond used to control temperatures at the Zaporizhzhia plant’s reactors. Clearly, an occupied nuclear plant that is blown up becomes a nuclear weapon.

Preventing this from happening should be an international priority. The fallout from a detonation at the plant would spread across many countries in a matter of hours. In addition to Ukraine itself, Belarus, Moldova, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Poland, Romania, Serbia, Hungary, Slovakia, the Czech Republic, and Russia would all be at serious risk, according to analysis by Ukraine’s Hydrometerological Institute.

Russia has occupied Ukraine’s Zaporizhzhia plant since the first weeks of the invasion. Last summer, the Kremlin allowed the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to monitor its operational safety remotely. But in April 2023, IAEA officials began warning of growing risks and calling for additional measures to protect the plant. With Ukraine’s long-awaited counteroffensive now underway, alarm is mounting.  

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

Zelenskyy’s claims that the Kremlin is planning to orchestrate a nuclear disaster in Ukraine are not at all far-fetched, given how Putin’s forces have been purposely laying waste to the country for the past sixteen months. The invading Russian army has planted landmines across an area the size of Switzerland, displaced more than ten million people, and destroyed dozens of Ukrainian towns and cities. Countless residential apartment buildings, schools, and hospitals have been reduced to ruins. A comprehensive and methodical nationwide bombing campaign has targeted the country’s civilian infrastructure. 

In recent weeks, Russia is suspected of having blown up the Khakovka dam in southern Ukraine, causing an ecological catastrophe. However, even this unprecedented act of ecocide failed to stop Ukraine’s counteroffensive. With Russia’s military predicament expected to become increasingly grim in the weeks and months ahead, the likelihood of further extreme measures will grow. “They constantly need destabilization here. They want the world to put pressure on Ukraine to stop the war,” commented Zelenskyy.

Putin has been making nuclear threats since the very first days of Russia’s full-scale invasion. During the initial stages of the war, he very publicly placed his nuclear forces on high alert. With the invasion in danger of unravelling in September 2022, he again hinted at a possible nuclear response while warning, “I’m not bluffing.”

Not everyone is convinced. Former Russian diplomat Boris Bondarev, who resigned after last year’s invasion, told Newsweek in early 2023: “today [Putin is] bluffing and we know that he has bluffed about nuclear threats. Ukrainians recovered some parts of their territory, and there was no nuclear retaliation. If you’re afraid of Putin using nukes, then you already lose the war against him and he wins.”

Others warn against possible complacency. The recent destruction of Kakhovka dam has caused many observers to reassess their earlier skepticism over Russia’s readiness to go nuclear in Ukraine. Putin has also crossed another red line by vowing to place nukes in Belarus. The Russian dictator is currently holding all Europeans hostage with the threat of a deadly explosion at the continent’s largest nuclear plant, and is moving nuclear weapons closer to the heart of Europe.

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The world must heed Ukraine’s warnings before it is too late. Zelenskyy first raised the alarm about the Kakhovka dam in October 2022 but the international community failed to react. Since the destruction of the dam, the relatively weak and ineffective international response has fuelled fears that Russia will read this as a green light to go further.   

For now, most international attention appears to be focused on Putin’s placement of nukes in Belarus. “I absolutely believe that moving weapons to Belarus demands an unequivocal response from NATO,” Polish President Andrzej Duda said recently before meeting with French President Emmanuel Macron and German Chancellor Olaf Scholz. Significantly, Russia’s decision to deploy nukes to Belarus even drew a critical response from Chinese officials, who renewed calls for de-escalation and reminded Russia that its leaders had reaffirmed their opposition to nuclear war at their March 2023 summit with China in Moscow.

Ultimately, there is no way of knowing whether Russia’s nuclear threats are genuine or not, but Western leaders cannot afford to let Putin’s nuclear blackmail tactics succeed. If the Russian dictator’s nuclear saber-rattling enables him to rescue the faltering invasion of Ukraine, he will do it again and others will follow. To prevent this nightmare scenario, the West must respond forcefully by escalating support for Ukraine militarily, diplomatically, and economically. The only sensible answer to Russia’s reckless nuclear intimidation is a heightened international commitment to Ukrainian victory.  

In parallel to increased support for Ukraine, international watchdogs must be dispatched to monitor the situation at the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant and other Ukrainian infrastructure sites that Russia could potentially target. Strong pressure must also be placed on China and India to condemn Russia’s nuclear threats. The invasion of Ukraine has already transformed the international security climate; Putin must not be allowed to normalize nuclear blackmail.  

Diane Francis is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center, editor-at-large with the National Post in Canada, author of ten books, and author of a newsletter on America.

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The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

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UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

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The post Putin’s nuclear threats will escalate as Ukraine’s counteroffensive unfolds appeared first on Atlantic Council.

In a Twitter post, President Zelenskyy described his telephone conversation with Xi as “long and meaningful.” In an expanded statement that appeared to address Xi’s calls for a “political settlement to the crisis,” Zelenskyy stressed Ukraine’s rejection of any land-for-peace compromises with the Kremlin. “No one wants peace more than the Ukrainian people,” wrote Zelenskyy. “Peace must be just and sustainable, based on the principles of international law and respect for the UN Charter. There can be no peace at the expense of territorial compromises.”

According to Chinese state media, Xi sought to assure Zelenskyy that China would refrain from taking sides in the ongoing war, while also offering thinly veiled criticism of US-led Western support for Ukraine. “China is neither the creator nor a party to the Ukraine crisis,” he was quoted as saying. “As a permanent member of the UN Security Council and a responsible great power, we will not stand idly by, we will not add fuel to the fire, and above all, we will not seek to profit from the crisis.”

While the call did not produce any major breakthroughs, the two leaders agreed on the appointment of a new Ukrainian Ambassador to China. Xi also committed to dispatching former Chinese Ambassador to Russia Li Hui as a special envoy to Ukraine and other unspecified countries with a brief “to conduct in-depth communication with all parties,” as Beijing seeks to lead peace efforts.

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The timing of Wednesday’s call sparked considerable debate. Zelenskyy has sought to engage directly with Xi for a number of months, publicly expressing his readiness for dialogue in late March following the Chinese leader’s high-profile visit to Moscow. However, in early April, Xi refused to confirm when he planned to call his Ukrainian counterpart, stating instead that the conversation would take place “when the conditions and the time are right.”

It is unclear why Beijing decided that conditions are now suitable for renewed dialogue with Kyiv. The most recent diplomatic development certainly did little to convince doubters that China is a credible peacemaker. Speaking in Paris last Friday, Chinese Ambassador to France Lu Shaye questioned Ukraine’s sovereignty and indicated that all former Soviet countries lack “effective status under international law.” His comments sparked a strong diplomatic backlash, with Ukraine branding the Chinese ambassador’s position “absurd” and senior officials in other post-Soviet capitals demanding urgent clarification.

In a bid to defuse tensions, China’s foreign ministry officially distanced itself from Ambassador Lu Shaye’s remarks early this week and confirmed that it respected the independence of all post-Soviet states. Wednesday’s call to Zelenskyy may have been viewed in Beijing as an opportunity to repair the damage caused by the scandal and shift international attention back toward China’s push for progress toward a negotiated peace.

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Ukraine’s advance in Kursk: What’s next and implications

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Since the onset of Russia’s full-scale invasion in early 2022, China has sought to portray itself as neutral. At the same time, Beijing has refused to condemn Russia for the war, preferring instead to express cautious understanding for Moscow’s actions while voicing criticism for the alleged role of the West in provoking the conflict. A 12-point plan published in February 2023 was China’s first major intervention, but the vague document failed to gain serious traction.

China’s attempts to position itself as a neutral mediator have inevitably been undermined by the country’s close relations with the Kremlin. Moscow and Beijing have strengthened ties considerably over the past decade, notably in the wake of the 2014 Russian occupation of Crimea and military intervention in eastern Ukraine’s Donbas region. Following Xi’s official visit to Moscow in March 2023, China said the bilateral relationship had now “acquired critical importance for the global landscape and the future of humanity.”

At the same time, other Chinese officials have attempted to downplay the significance of Beijing’s links to the Putin regime. Speaking to the New York Times in early April, Chinese Ambassador to the European Union Fu Cong denied China is on Russia’s side in the war and dismissed earlier official statements about a “friendship without limits” between the two countries as “nothing but rhetoric.” The diplomat also stated that China would not provide arms for Russia to use in Ukraine now or in the future.

While China’s decision to call Kyiv is a welcome gesture, there is little to suggest Beijing is currently in a position to broker a sustainable peace. Both Russia and Ukraine continue to reject talk of a compromise settlement, with Moscow demanding recognition for its claims to around 20% of Ukrainian territory and Ukraine insisting on the complete deoccupation of the country.

Despite these obstacles, Wednesday’s conversation between Zelenskyy and Xi is nevertheless noteworthy. The call was a diplomatic victory for Ukraine and an indication of China’s desire to be seen as a global force for peace rather than a Russian ally. This positioning could take on greater significance in the coming months if battlefield developments create opportunities for serious talks to take place.

Peter Dickinson is Editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert Service.

Further reading

UkraineAlert Apr 8, 2023

Human wave tactics are demoralizing the Russian army in Ukraine

By Olivia Yanchik

Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine has not gone according to plan but he still hopes to win a long war of attrition. However, Russia’s reliance on human wave tactics risks undermining morale within his invading army, writes Olivia Yanchik.

Conflict Defense Policy

UkraineAlert Apr 6, 2023

NATO poses a threat to Russian imperialism not Russian security

By Peter Dickinson

Russia’s passive acceptance of neighboring Finland’s NATO membership raises serious questions over the Kremlin’s efforts to portray the invasion of Ukraine as a response to NATO expansion, writes Peter Dickinson.

Conflict Disinformation

UkraineAlert Apr 20, 2023

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is also being fought in cyberspace

By Vera Mironova

While the war in Ukraine often resembles the trench warfare of the twentieth century, the battle for cyber dominance is highly innovative and offers insights into the future of international aggression, writes Vera Mironova.

Conflict Cybersecurity

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

Read more from UkraineAlert

UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia and Central Asia in the East.

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The blockade of Ukraine’s Black Sea ports began on the eve of Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022. It aims to break Ukraine economically by undermining the country’s position as one of the world’s leading agricultural exporters. The impact of the blockade goes beyond Ukraine and is global in scale. By preventing the free passage of merchant shipping in the Black Sea, Russia deprives world markets of vital Ukrainian agricultural produce while also challenging the core principles of international maritime law.

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

From the very beginning, Russia’s attack on Ukraine has always gone beyond the boundaries of conventional military operations and attempted to strike at Ukraine’s very ability to exist as a functioning state. Russian troops have systematically destroyed vast swathes of farmland and made Ukraine the most mined country in the world. For the past six months, Russia has conducted a campaign of airstrikes targeting Ukraine’s civilian infrastructure in a bid to deprive Ukrainians of access to heating, electricity, and water supplies. The maritime blockade is another element in this war against Ukrainian statehood.

The suffering inflicted by Russia’s brutal invasion is not restricted to Ukrainians. According to the country’s Ministry of Infrastructure, more than 400 million people in Asia and Africa face the prospect of mounting food insecurity as a result of Russian efforts to restrict Ukrainian agricultural exports. While the current Grain Deal goes some way to countering this threat, it offers only a partial and short-term solution. Much more is needed in order to improve global food security and reaffirm the right to free passage for merchant shipping in international waters.

It is clearly in the interests of the international community to work toward ending Russia’s Black Sea blockade. First and foremost, this would lead to dramatically improved food security for many of the world’s most vulnerable communities. The resumption of maritime trade in the Black Sea would also provide the Ukrainian economy with approximately $20 billion in additional annual revenues. This would significantly reduce the economic burden on Ukraine’s partners and international financial institutions, which are now being asked to prop up the struggling Ukrainian economy indefinitely. Renewed merchant shipping would also be good for other economies, allowing Ukraine to resume imports worth tens of billions of dollars in 2021.

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Ukraine’s advance in Kursk: What’s next and implications

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Ukrainians understand that there is no international appetite for any direct military intervention to break Russia’s Black Sea blockade. Nevertheless, there are numerous other tools available to the international community that could be used to pressure Moscow. The most obvious measures would include additional sanctions and restrictions targeting Russian shipping.

This approach has yet to be fully explored. At present, Russian ships are not subject to the same checks and inspections that Ukrainian vessels must undergo in line with the terms of the Grain Deal. Instead, they are free to continue their international trade unhindered. Over the past year, Russia has reportedly increased its maritime exports by more than a quarter. At the same time, there have been numerous accusations made against Russian vessels for allegedly shipping military cargoes, including in contravention of the 1936 Montreux Convention governing maritime passage through the Bosporus and Dardanelles Straits in Turkey.

By blockading Ukraine’s Black Sea ports, Russia is violating the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and the UN Charter. In response, Ukraine is calling on the International Maritime Organization (IMO) to force Russia to unblock the country’s sea ports. The IMO must use its powers as a UN agency to hold Russia accountable for violating the UNCLOS, and must be ready to impose suitable sanctions measures if Moscow refuses to comply.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has created a wide range of fundamental challenges to the rules-based international order that first emerged from the ashes of World War II. This is very much part of Putin’s plan. He wishes to return the world to an era when a handful of major powers were able to dictate to their weaker neighbors.

One of the many front lines in this geopolitical confrontation is the maritime front. Putin seeks to bankrupt Ukraine and overcome international opposition to his war by weaponizing agricultural exports. He does so in clear violation of international maritime law. If he succeeds, other autocrats will take note and adopt similarly aggressive tactics, with potentially catastrophic consequences for global trade. Ending Russia’s Black Sea blockade will not be easy and will require considerable political courage, but failure to do so will lead to rising costs in the years to come.

Oleksiy Goncharenko is a Ukrainian member of parliament with the European Solidarity party.

Further reading

UkraineAlert Feb 20, 2023

‘You cannot outlast us’: Biden’s Kyiv visit sends strong message to Moscow

By Peter Dickinson

US President Joe Biden’s bold surprise visit to wartime Kyiv sent a strong message to Moscow that time is not on Putin’s side and Russia should not pin its hopes on a weakening of Western resolve to stand with Ukraine.

Conflict Freedom and Prosperity

UkraineAlert Mar 19, 2023

Putin the Pariah: War crimes arrest warrant deepens Russia’s isolation

By Anders Åslund

The ICC decision to indict Putin for war crimes is a highly consequential step that will deepen Russia’s international isolation while weakening Putin’s personal position both at home and abroad, writes Anders Åslund.

Conflict Human Rights

UkraineAlert Mar 8, 2023

Ukrainians will never surrender. How long can they count on the West?

By Serhiy Prytula

Ukraine’s remarkable resistance during the first days of the Russian invasion convinced the democratic world to back the country but with Putin now preparing for a long war, continued Western resolve is vital writes Serhiy Prytula.

Civil Society Conflict

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

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UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia and Central Asia in the East.

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• How the Iraq war changed…
• What Iraq needs now
• What the United States can do now

Twenty years on from the US invasion of the country, Iraq has fallen off the policymaking agenda in Washington, DC—cast aside in part as a result of the bitter experience of the war, the enormous human toll it exacted, and the passage of time. But looking forward twenty years and beyond, Iraqis need a great deal from their own leaders and those of their erstwhile liberators. A national reconciliation commission, a new constitution, and an economy less dependent on oil revenue are just some of the areas the experts at the Atlantic Council’s Iraq Initiative highlight in this collection of reflections marking two decades since the US invasion.

What else will it take to transform Iraq into a prosperous, productive regional player? What can the United States do now, with twenty years’ worth of hindsight? And just how far-reaching were the effects of the war? Twenty-one experts from across the Atlantic Council take on these questions in a series of short essays and video interviews below.

Oula Kadhum on what March 20, 2003 was like for a young Iraqi

How the Iraq war changed…

The cause of democracy in the region

When the United States invaded Iraq two decades ago, one of the public justifications for the war was that it would help spread democracy throughout the Middle East. The invasion, of course, had the opposite effect: it unleashed a bloody sectarian conflict in Iraq, badly undermining the reputation of democracy in the region and America’s credibility in promoting it.

Yet the frictions between rulers and ruled that helped precipitate the US invasion of Iraq persist. The citizens of the region, increasingly educated and connected to the rest of the world, have twenty-first-century political aspirations, but continue to be ruled by unaccountable nineteenth-century-style autocrats. Absent a change, these frictions will continue to shape political developments in the region, often in cataclysmic fashion, over the next two decades.

The George W. Bush administration’s failures in Iraq severely set back the cause of democracy in the region. In the perceptions of Arab publics, democratization became synonymous with the exercise of American military power. Meanwhile, Iraq’s chaos strengthened the hand of the region’s autocrats: as inept or heavy-handed as their own rule might be, it paled in comparison to the breakdown of order and human slaughter in Iraq. 

Citizens’ frustrations with their political leaders finally erupted in the Arab Spring of 2010 and 2011, but their protests failed to end autocracy in the region. Gulf monarchs were able to throw money at the problem, first to shore up their own rule and then other autocracies in the region. The Egyptian experiment with democracy proved short-lived; Tunisia’s endured far longer but also appears over. More broadly, the region has seen democratic backsliding in Lebanon and Israel as well.

The yawning gap between what citizens want and what they get from their governments remains. The World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators show that, on aggregate, states in the region are no more politically stable, effectively governed, accountable, or participatory than two decades ago. Unless political leaders address that gap, further Arab Spring-like protests—or even social revolution—are probable. 

Having apparently gotten out of the business of invasion and occupation following the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the United States could play a new and constructive role here. It could both cajole and assist the region’s political leaders to improve governance for their citizens. 

The United States exacerbated political tensions in the region two decades ago; now it has an opportunity to help ameliorate them.

—Stephen R. Grand is the author of Understanding Tahrir Square: What Transitions Elsewhere Can Teach Us About the Prospects for Arab Democracy. He is a nonresident senior fellow with the Council’s Middle East programs.

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State sovereignty

Since the seventeenth century, more or less, world order has been based on the concept of state sovereignty: states are deemed to hold the monopoly of force within mutually recognized territories, and they are generally prohibited from intervening in one another’s domestic affairs. The invasion of Iraq challenged this standard in three important ways. 

First, the fact of the war represented a direct attack on the sovereignty of the Iraqi state, which undermined the ban on aggressive war. While the Bush administration cast the invasion as a case of preemptive self-defense, it was widely seen as a preventive war of choice against a state that did not pose a clear and present danger. Moreover, the main exceptions to sovereignty that have developed over time, such as ongoing mass atrocities or United Nations authority, were not applicable in Iraq. Thus, the United States dealt a major blow to the rules-based international system of which it was one of the chief architects. This may have made more imaginable later crimes of aggression by other states. 

Second, the means of the war, and especially the occupation, powered the reemergence of the private military industry. Driven by the need to sustain two long wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the US armed forces became dependent on military contractors, which sometimes involved authorizing paid civilians to kill. The US effort to (re)privatize warfare brought back into fashion the use of private military force, generating a multibillion-dollar industry that is here to stay. Over time the spread of private military companies could unspool the state’s exclusive claim to violence and hammer the foundations of the current international system.

Third, the consequences of the war led to the spectacular empowerment of armed nonstate actors in the region and beyond, who launched a full-frontal assault on the sovereignty of many states. The Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham, of course, emerged amid the brutal contestation of power in post-invasion Iraq and pursued its “caliphate” as an alternative (Sunni) political institution to rival the nation-state. While the threat has been contained, for now, in the Middle East, it is only beginning to gather force on the African continent. In addition, because Iran effectively won the war in Iraq, it was able to sponsor a deep bench of Shia nonstate groups which have eroded state sovereignty in Lebanon, Syria, Yemen, and Iraq itself. 

The US invasion of Iraq left us a world with less respect for state sovereignty, more guns for hire, and a dizzying array of well-armed and determined nonstate groups. 

—Alia Brahimi is a nonresident senior fellow of the Atlantic Council’s Middle East programs and host of the Guns for Hire podcast. 

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Abbas Kadhim on the opportunities missed

US-Turkish ties

By launching a war on Turkey’s border, against Turkish advice, in a manner that prejudiced Turkish interests, the United States in 2003 upended a strategic understanding that had dominated bilateral relations for five decades. 

During and immediately after the Cold War, Turkey and the United States shared a strategic vision centered on containing the Soviet Union and its proxies. In exchange for strategic cooperation, Washington provided aid, modulated criticisms of Turkish politics, and deferred to Ankara’s sensitivities regarding its geopolitical neighborhood. With notable exceptions (e.g., Turkish opposition to the Vietnam War and US opposition to Turkey’s 1974 Cyprus operation), consensus was the norm and aspiration of both sides. After close collaboration in the Balkans, Somalia, Iraq, and Afghanistan from 1991 to 2001, though, Ankara became increasingly alarmed about the prospect of a new war in Iraq.

Bilateral relations deteriorated sharply after the Turkish parliament voted against allowing the United States to launch combat operations from Turkish soil. The war was longer, bloodier, and costlier than its planners had anticipated. The Kurdistan Workers’ Party (known as the PKK and designated by the United States as a terrorist organization in 1997) ended a cease-fire in place since the 1999 capture of its founder, Abdullah Öcalan, and gained broad new freedom of movement and action in northern Iraq. US military aid to Turkey ended, while defense industrial cooperation and military-to-military contacts dropped. In July 2003 US soldiers detained and hooded a Turkish special forces team in Sulaymaniyah, Iraq, on suspicions that they were colluding with insurgents. This event, coupled with Turkish anger over the bitter conduct and conclusion of the prewar negotiations, helped fuel a sustained rise in negative views about the United States among the Turkish public.

Sanctions and the war in Iraq damaged Turkish economic interests, though these would rebound from 2005 onward. The relationship of the US military to the PKK—first as tacit tolerance of PKK attacks into Turkey from northern Iraq despite the US presence, and later with employment of the PKK affiliate in Syria as a proxy force against the Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS)—rendered the frictions of 2003 permanent. That US forces train, equip, and operate with a PKK-linked militia along Turkey’s border today is fruit of the Iraq war, because US-PKK contacts were brokered in northern Iraq, and US indifference to Turkish security redlines traces back to 2003.

The story of US-Turkish estrangement can be told from other perspectives: that Ankara sought strategic independence for reasons broader than Iraq, that President Erdoğan’s anti-Westernism drove divergence, that the countries have fewer shared interests now. There may be truth in these arguments, though they are based largely on speculation and imputed motives. Yet they, too, cannot be viewed except through the lens of the 2003 Iraq War, which came as Erdoğan’s Justice and Development Party was assuming power and greatly influenced his subsequent decision-making.

Many effects of the Iraq War have faded, but the strategic alienation of Turkey and the United States has not.

—Rich Outzen, a retired colonel, is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council IN TURKEY and a geopolitical analyst and consultant currently serving private-sector clients as Dragoman LLC.

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China’s rise

As George W. Bush took office in 2001, managing the US-China relationship was regarded as a top foreign policy concern. The administration’s focus shifted with 9/11 and a wartime footing—which in turn altered Beijing’s foreign policy and engagement in the Middle East. 

A high point in US-China tension came in April with the Hainan Island Incident. The collision of a US signals intelligence aircraft and a Chinese interceptor jet resulted in one dead Chinese pilot and the detention of twenty-four US crew members, whose release followed US Ambassador Joseph Prueher’s delivery of the “letter of the two sorries.” 

But after the September 11 attacks, the United States launched the global war on terrorism, and the ensuing wars in Afghanistan and Iraq became the all-encompassing focal points. While that relieved pressure on China, the US decision to invade Iraq raised serious concerns in Beijing and elsewhere about the direction of global order under US leadership. 

American willingness to attack a sovereign government with the stated goal of changing its regime set a worrisome precedent for authoritarian governments. Worries transformed into something else following the global financial crisis in 2008. Chinese leaders became even more wary of US leadership, with former Vice Premier Wang Qishan telling then-Treasury Secretary Hank Paulson after the financial crisis, “Look at your system, Hank. We aren’t sure we should be learning from you anymore.”

The war in Iraq was especially troubling for Chinese leaders. Few believed that the United States would engage in such a disastrous war over something as idealistic as democracy promotion in the Middle East. The dominant assumption was that the war was about maintaining control of global oil—and using that dominance to prevent China from rising to a peer competitor status. The so-called “Malacca Dilemma” became a feature of analysis in China’s strategic landscape: the idea that any power that could control the Strait of Malacca could control oil shipping to China, and therefore its economy. Since then, China has developed the world’s largest navy and invested in ports across the Indian Ocean region through its Maritime Silk Road Initiative. Its defense spending has increased fivefold this century, from $50 billion in 2001 to $270 billion in 2021, making it the second-largest defense spender in the Indo-Pacific region after Japan, and higher than the next thirteen Indo-Pacific countries combined. 

Since the Iraq war, the Middle East has become a much greater focus in Chinese foreign policy. In addition to building up its own military, China began discussing security and strategic affairs with Middle East energy suppliers, conducting joint exercises, selling more varied weapons systems, and pursuing a regional presence that increasingly diverges or competes with US preferences. 

Would China’s growing presence in the Middle East have followed the same trajectory had the United States not invaded Iraq? Possibly, although one could argue that the same sense of urgency would not have animated decision makers in the People’s Republic of China.

—Jonathan Fulton is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council and host of the China-MENA podcast. He is also an assistant professor of political science at Zayed University in Abu Dhabi. Follow him on Twitter: @jonathandfulton.

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The country’s readiness to meet climate challenges

Over the course of the last two decades, Iraq has become one of the five most vulnerable countries in the world to climate change. It has been affected by rising temperatures, insufficient and diminishing rainfall, intensified droughts that reduce access to water, sand and dust storms, and flooding. Iraq’s environmental ministry warns that the country may face dust storms for more than 270 days per year in the next twenty years. 

While not the sole cause of environmental mismanagement in Iraq, the muhasasa system of power sharing has exacerbated and contributed to a culture of corruption and political patronage that has undermined efforts to protect the environment and to sustainably manage Iraq’s natural resources. Muhasasa is an official system that allocates Iraqi government positions and resources based on ethnic and sectarian identity. It may have been a good temporary compromise to promote stability in the early 2000s, but today it is widely viewed as a harmful legacy of the post-invasion occupation period.

In the context of protecting the environment, the muhasasa system has led to a situation where some government officials are appointed to their respective positions without the necessary skills or qualifications to manage resources efficiently or effectively. Forced ethnosectarian balancing has encouraged natural resource misuse for political or personal gain to the immediate detriment of average Iraqis. While muhasasa was intended to promote political stability and prevent marginalization of minority groups, in practice it has contributed to a culture of corruption and nepotism, and undermined efforts to promote good governance and sustainable development. 

To address its acute climate challenges, Iraq needs to move away from the sectarian-based power sharing and toward a more inclusive, merit-based system of governance. It must strengthen its environmental regulations, commit itself to sustainable development, and better manage its natural resources for the country and as part of the global effort to mitigate climate change. The international community has a role to play here through supporting technical assistance, capacity building, and providing financial resources to help address these concerns along the way. 

—Masoud Mostajabi is an associate director of the Middle East programs at the Atlantic Council. 

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Iran’s regional footprint

From the outset of the invasion of Iraq, the United States’ decision was built on several dubious premises that the administration masterfully overhyped to build support for its aspirations of removing Saddam Hussein by force. The last two decades have tragically shown the consequences of this decision—with high costs of blood and treasure and a serious blow to American credibility. But from a strategic standpoint, one particular miscalculation continues to create blowbacks to US regional security interests: top US policymakers willfully ignored the need for an adequate nation-rebuilding strategy, leaving a power vacuum that an expansionist Iran could fill.

With the removal of the Baathist regime, Iran finally saw the defeat of a rival it could not best after eight years of one of the region’s bloodiest wars. This cleared the path to influence Iraqi Shia leaders who had long relied on the Islamic theocracy next door for support. Even as some Shia learning centers in Najaf and Karbala challenged (once again) Qom, new opportunities of influence that never existed before opened up for Iran. 

By infiltrating Iraq’s political institutions through appointed officials submissive to its regime’s wishes, Iran succeeded in two goals: deterring future threats of Iraqi hostilities and preventing the United States from using Iraqi territories as a platform to invade Iran. Through its Islamic Revolution Guards Corps Qods Force, Iran trained and supplied several militia groups that later officially penetrated Iraq’s security architecture through forces called Popular Mobilization Units, which have repeatedly carried out anti-American attacks. Nevertheless, those groups would eventually prove valuable to the United States in the fight against the Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS)—yet even then Iran succeeded in appearing as the protector of Iraq’s sovereignty by immediately equipping the Popular Mobilization Units, unlike the delayed US response that arrived months later. 

Regionally, Iran’s military leverage and political allies inside Iraq provided it with a strategic ground link to its network in Syria and Lebanon, where the Qods Force ultimately shifted the political power dynamics to Iran’s advantage, especially as they crucially strengthened engagement in recruiting volunteers to support Bashar al-Assad’s fighters in Syria. Through the land bridge that connects Iran to the Bekaa Valley, Iran has helped spread its weapons-trafficking and money-laundering capabilities while reinforcing an abusive dictatorship in Syria and a crippled state in Lebanon.

Twenty years ago, the United States went to liberate Iraq from its oppressive dictatorship. What it left behind is a void in governance and an alternative system that fell far short of what the United States wanted for Iraq. Meanwhile, the Iranian regime continues to base its identity on anti-Americanism while it gets closer to its political and ideological ambitions. With US sanctions having so far failed to halt Iran’s network of militia training and smuggling—and the attempt to revive the nuclear deal stalled, despite being the main focus of US Iran policy—the question remains: How long will the United States tolerate Iran’s regional ascendancy before it intensifies its efforts toward restraining it? 

—Nour Dabboussi is a program assistant to the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center and Middle East programs.

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How governments counter terrorist financing 

Without the experience of the war in Iraq, US and transatlantic economic statecraft would be less agile and less able to prevent terrorist financing. However, more work and continued international commitment is needed to ensure Iraq and its neighbors are able to strengthen and enforce their anti-money-laundering regimes to protect their economies from corruption and deny terrorists and other illicit actors from abusing the global financial system to raise, use, and move funds for their operations.

The tools of economic statecraft, including but not limited to sanctions, export controls, and controlling access to currency, became critical to US national security in the wake of 9/11 and the US invasion of Iraq in 2003. Sanctions and other forms of economic pressure had been applied against the government of Iraq and illicit actors prior to 2003. However, economic pressure and the use of financial intelligence to combat terrorist financing became increasingly sophisticated as the war progressed. Since 2001, the State Department and Treasury have designated more than 500 individuals and entities for financially supporting terrorism in Iraq. Following the money and figuring out how terrorist networks raised, used, and moved funds was a critical aspect in understanding how they operated in Iraq and across the region. Information on terrorist financial networks and facilitators helped identify vulnerabilities for disruption, limiting their ability to fund and carry out terrorist attacks, procure weapons, pay salaries for fighters, and recruit. 

Sanctioning the terrorist groups and financial facilitators operating in Iraq and across the region disrupted the groups’ financial flows and operational capabilities while protecting the US and global financial systems from abuse. Targets included al-Qaeda and the Islamic State group, among others. For example, the US Treasury recently sanctioned an Iraqi bank moving millions of dollars from the Revolutionary Guard Corps to Hezbollah, preventing terrorists from abusing the international financial system. 

Notably, the fight against terrorist financing set in motion the expansion of the Department of the Treasury’s sanctions programs and helped the US government refine its sanctions framework and enforcement authorities and their broad application. 

Equally important, the US government’s efforts and experience in countering the financing of terrorism increased engagement and coordination with foreign partners to protect the global financial system from abuse by illicit actors. The Financial Action Task Force (FATF), the inter-governmental body responsible for setting international anti-money-laundering and counter-terrorist financing standards, strengthened and revised its standards, recommendations, and red flags to account for what the international community learned from the experience of combatting terrorist financing in Iraq. The United States and partner nations provided, and continue to provide, training and resources to build Iraq’s and its neighbors’ capabilities to meet FATF standards and address terrorist financing and money laundering issues domestically. 

—Kim Donovan is the director of the Economic Statecraft Initiative within the Atlantic Council’s GeoEconomics Center. 

—Maia Nikoladze is an assistant director at the Economic Statecraft Initiative within the Atlantic Council’s GeoEconomics Center. 

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The United States

Perhaps no event since the end of the Cold War shaped American politics more than the invasion of Iraq. It is fair to say that without the Iraq war neither Donald Trump nor Barack Obama would likely have been president.      

Weirdly, the invasion of Iraq in 2003 is still almost a forbidden topic in GOP foreign policy circles. After the Bush years, a kind of collective-guilt omerta about the Iraq war took hold among Republicans. It was as if US-Iraqi history had started in 2005, or 2006, with Democrats and a few Republicans baying for a needed defeat. It never came. The 2007 surge, as David Petraeus’s counterinsurgency strategy came to be known, was the gutsiest political call by an American leader in my lifetime.      

It happened also to be right when very little else about the war was: There were, of course, no weapons of mass destruction found. Iran did expand its power, massively. Iraq did not offer an example of democracy to the region: rather, it horrified the region. It became linked to al-Qaeda only after the invasion. The White House refused to take the insurgency seriously until it was very serious. Iraq pulled attention away from Afghanistan. And of course there were 4,431 Americans killed.

By 2016, the narrative favored by Republicans had become that the execution of the war was flawed. Paul Bremer, head of the Coalition Provisional Authority in Baghdad, was the villain in this story: But for Bremer’s incomprehensible decision to disband the Iraqi army and institute de-Baathification in early 2003, so the story went, the Iraq war could have succeeded. But in retrospect these decisions were defendable. Bremer was erring on the side of satiating the Shia majority, not the Sunni minority, and trying to reassure them that a decade after they were abandoned in 1991 the United States would deliver them political power. And the one real success of the Iraq war, beginning to end, is that the United States never faced a generalized Shia insurgency.

The other villain was Barack Obama, who played in the sequel. (Obama largely owed his electoral victory to the Iraq war, brilliantly using Hillary Clinton’s vote for the invasion to invalidate her experience and judgment and thus the main argument for her candidacy.) In this version of events, Obama’s precipitous decision to withdraw troops from Iraq in 2011 contributed to the country’s near-collapse three years later under the rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS). This was basically accurate. The withdrawal of US forces eliminated a key political counterweight from Iraq, and the main incentive for then-Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki to hedge his sectarianism and friendliness with Iran. This accelerated political support for Sunni rejectionist movements like ISIS.

Both the Bremer narrative and the Obama narrative allowed George Bush’s Republican party to avoid revisiting the core questions of American power: intervention, exceptionalism, and its limits—precisely the same questions that had featured prominently in the 2006 and 2008 elections.

This was the broken market that Donald Trump exploited: that Republican voters’ views on Iraq after 2008 looked much like Democratic voters’, but the Republican establishment’s views did not. And it was no accident, in the 2016 presidential primaries, that the two candidates most willing to criticize the interventionism of the 2000s, Trump and Ted Cruz, were the ones who did best.      

This debate remains critical. More than any other decision, Bush’s war created the contemporary Middle East. Above all that includes the unprecedented regional dominance of Iran, the power of the Arab Shia, and the constraints on American power in buttressing its traditional allies. That imbalance, combined with a decade-long sense that America is leaving the region and wants no more conflict, has led Sunni Arab states to look for their security in other places.

Especially in the wake of Russia’s war against Ukraine, which if anything has sharpened foreign policy divisions, the Republican party and the United States need a dialectic, not a purge; a discussion, not a proscription; and a reasonable synthesis of the lessons of Iraq. People want to vote for restraint and realism, as much as or more than they want to vote and pay for interventionism and idealism. Was the Iraq War a mistake? Let us start this debate there, and produce something better.

—Andrew L. Peek is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs. He was previously the senior director for European and Russian affairs at the National Security Council and the deputy assistant secretary for Iran and Iraq at the US Department of State’s Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs.

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Andrew Peek on the historical context of the 2003 invasion

US foreign policy

The US decision to invade Iraq twenty years ago was, to use the words of Charles-Maurice de Talleyrand, a wily French statesman and diplomat of the Napoleonic era, “worse than a crime; it’s a mistake.” 

While Saddam Hussein was a monster, and had ignored numerous United Nation-mandated commitments, the US-led effort in 2003 to topple him as president of Iraq was strategically unnecessary. It became the center of a failed mission in nation-building—one that has proved disastrous for US interests in the greater Middle East and beyond. 

Iraq was at the center, but it was only one of four failed American interventions in the region.  The others were Afghanistan, Libya, and, to a lesser extent, Syria.  The operation to take down the Taliban was fast and efficient, but consolidation of a post-Taliban Afghanistan never occurred. Part of the reason for that was the United States’ war of choice in Iraq, which began less than eighteen months after Afghanistan. That sucked up most of the resources and attention for the rest of that decade. But the other reason for US failure in Afghanistan was that we were beguiled by the same siren song that misled us in Iraq: that we could overcome centuries of history and culture and create a stable society at least somewhat closer to US values. Failure on such a scale is not good for the prestige and influence of a superpower.

But that is not the end of it. There is also the domestic side. The misadventures in the greater Middle East were a failure not just of the US government but of the US foreign policy elite. It was a bipartisan affair. Neoconservative thinking dominated the Republican Party throughout the aughts, while liberal interventionism prevailed in the Democratic Party. They were all in for the utopian policies in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, and Syria. 

While the failures in the greater Middle East were widely understood even before the unnecessarily embarrassing 2021 departure from Afghanistan, there has never been a public reckoning. There was nothing like the Church Committee, which in the mid-1970s shined a very harsh light on US failures in Southeast Asia. Few prominent thinkers or officials have publicly acknowledged their failed policy choices. And the same figures who led us into those debacles are still widely quoted on all major foreign policy matters.   

This has had the consequence in the United States of providing ground for the growth of neoisolationist thinking. In running for the presidency in 2016, Donald Trump was not wrong in pointing out the failures of elites in both parties in conducting foreign policy in the greater Middle East. Since then, populists on the right have used this insight to undermine the credibility of foreign policy experts. And like generals fighting the last war, they have applied their “insight” from the Middle East to the latest challenges to US interests, such as Moscow’s war on Ukraine.  

In this reading, US support for Ukraine is comparable to US interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan and will result in failure. There is no analysis—simply dismissal—of the dangers that Vladimir Putin’s war in Ukraine poses to US security and economic prosperity. No recognition that, as Putin has stated numerous times, he wants to restore Kremlin political control over all the states that used to make up the Soviet Union—which includes NATO and European Union (EU) member states. In other words, he seeks to undermine NATO and the EU. 

Furthermore, there’s no understanding that despite the presence of American troops, the United States’ local allies in Iraq and Afghanistan could not win—but without one NATO soldier on the battlefield, Ukraine is fighting Russia to a standstill. Indeed, Ukraine has destroyed between 30 percent and 50 percent of Moscow’s conventional military capability. These analogies with the Iraq war ignore the reality that if Putin takes control of Ukraine, the United States will likely spend far more in financial resources and perhaps American lives in defending its NATO allies.

These failures of understanding are not simply or mainly a consequence of US errors in the Middle East. Utopian thinking in the United States and especially Europe was a natural consequence of the absence of great-power war since 1945. Especially since the fall of the Soviet Union, people on both sides of the Atlantic got comfortable with the notion that Russia was no longer an adversary. And isolationism also has a long pedigree in US society. So it would be vastly oversimplifying to blame the confusion of today’s neoisolationists exclusively on US failures in the Middle East. But the strong US response to the challenge of a hostile Soviet Union was possible because a bipartisan approach on containment was endorsed by leaders of both parties. After the United States’ misadventures in Iraq, such endorsements carry less weight today. In US foreign policy as elsewhere, we still do not know what the ultimate impact of the decision to invade Iraq will be. 

—John Herbst’s 31-year career in the US Foreign Service included time as US ambassador to Uzbekistan, other service in and with post-Soviet states, and his appointment as US ambassador to Ukraine from 2003 to 2006.

What Iraq needs now

William F. Wechsler on the future of Iraq

A reconciliation commission to rebuild national unity

One of the most devastating shortcomings of the 2003 Iraq invasion was the dismantlement of state institutions and the weakening of the Baghdad central government. That structural vacuum of power and services forced Iraqis back into tribal, religious, and ethnic allegiances, contributing to the nation-state’s fragmentation and exacerbating divisive sectarian discourses and intercommunity tensions. A quota-based constitutional system only served to institutionalize and legitimize the ethnosectarian distribution of power.   

Conflicting groups grew further apart over the past two decades and became more motivated by accumulating political positions, hefty oil incomes, and territorial and symbolic gains rather than collectively seeking to rebuild their balkanized nation. Iraqi youth, on the other hand—who campaigned in the name of “We Want a Homeland” [نريد_وطن#] during the 2019 Tishreen (October) protests—seem to have understood what political elites might be missing: the necessity for national reconciliation and memorialization. 

The bombing of the al-Askari shrine in Samarra in 2006 unleashed the chaos trapped inside Pandora’s box and resulted in violent Sunni-Shia confrontations, which pushed the country to the brink of civil war. Today, political elites, aware of the fragility and precariousness of the political consensus, pretend the time of friction is over. My firsthand work in Iraqi prisons and camps, and the research projects I led in the country’s conflict zones off the beaten path, such as west of the Euphrates, in Zubair, and in rural areas in the Makhoul Basin, prove the absolute contrary. 

A flagrant example of the sectarian ticking bomb that persists in Iraq is the mismanagement of the Sunni populations in the aftermath of the war against the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS). Many pretended that ISIS fighters came from some fictional foreign entity and refused to face the fact that most of them, including their leader, were Iraqi-born and raised, which I observed as an eyewitness working with the International Committee of the Red Cross during the ISIS war in Nineveh and Salahuddin. Many people who were accomplices of the atrocities even engaged in rewriting the narrative altogether after 2017 in the name of national unity. 

A number of Sunni populations in Iraq were mystified by their sudden loss of power with the toppling of Saddam Hussein and were in disbelief that the Shia they stigmatized as shrouguis—literally, “easterners,” a derogatory reference used by Sunni elites to refer to Shia Iraqis from the southeast—became the new lords of the land. Instead of engaging in meaningful mediation and reconciliation to work through these social changes, the majority parties preferred to bury their heads in the sand. This tendency led them to allow militia groups to displace and isolate the Sunni inhabitants of a key city like Samarra, to submerge under water the citizens of northern Kirkuk and Salaheddin, or to conceal the evidence incriminating Tikrit Sunnis during the Speicher massacre, in which ISIS fighters killed more than a thousand Iraqi military cadets, most of them Shia. 

These are not isolated examples in a chaotic political and constitutional system in which many communities feel persistently misunderstood, including Kurds, Assyrians, Mandaeans, Baha’is, Afro-Iraqis, Turkmen—and even the Shia themselves. The only possible and plausible pathway for the country to be one again in the next twenty years is to engage in an excruciating but indispensable reconciliation process, through which responsibilities are determined, dignity is restored, and justice is served. 

—Sarah Zaaimi is the deputy director for communications at the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center & Middle East programs.

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A new constitution

Iraq needs a new constitution. A good constitution spells out the framework and structure of government. It provides essential checks and balances to prevent dictators from coming to power. It helps protect the people’s rights. It has measures to prevent gridlock or the collapse of a functioning government.

Judged by these standards, the 2005 Iraqi constitution is only a partial success.

However, complaints have built up since 2005: over the muhasasa system under which the established political parties divide up ministerial appointments; over the failure of Iraq’s government or other institutions to deliver basic services like electricity and water; over perceptions of excessive Iranian meddling in Iraq’s politics; and over the inability of the government to provide meaningful employment for millions of young Iraqis—or to foster a private sector capable of doing so. These grievances came to a head in the 2019 Tishreen protests in which more than 600 Iraqis died.

The United States invaded Iraq in 2003 in part to bring democracy to Iraq, so it is ironic that Iraq’s 2005 constitution was the product of mostly Iraqi political forces unleashed by the failure of the United States to ensure a democratic transition. It was expected that the Kurdish political parties, which had worked closely with the United States for years, would insist upon a federal republic to ensure their autonomy from a central government whose long-term character and leanings in 2005 were far from settled. Beyond this, however, the small number of Americans actually involved in advising the key Iraqi players in the constitutional process—in the room where it happened—actually had relatively little experience in constitutional mechanics or modern comparative constitutional practice. The American sins of commission during the first two years after Iraq’s liberation were replaced by sins of omission during the crucial months of negotiation of the 2005 constitution.

Genuine constitutional reform in Iraq is not likely to be accomplished directly through the parliament, given the interests of Iraq’s political parties and the parliament’s need to focus on legislative responsibilities. Instead, Iraqi civil society—including scholars, lawyers, religious and business leaders, and retired government officials and jurists—should initiate serious discussions about constitutional reform. Many of these voices were not heard when the 2005 constitution was adopted. Their effort can be far more open and transparent than the process was in 2005.

Foreign governments should have a minimal role, limited to supporting and encouraging Iraqi-led efforts, without trying to broker a particular outcome. International foundations, institutes, universities, and think tanks can offer outside expertise, particularly in comparative constitutional law and other kinds of technical assistance. But the overall effort needs to be Iraqi-led, with input from a broad spectrum of Iraqi voices.

While civil society discussions in Iraq could begin with considering amendments to the 2005 constitution, US experience may be relevant. The US Constitutional Convention convened in May 1787 to consider amendments to the Articles of Confederation decided to completely redesign the government, resulting in a Constitution that, with amendments, has been in force in the United States for more than 230 years. Sometimes it’s better to start over.

Iraq’s path to constitutional reform is not clear today, but there is a path nevertheless. Incremental reform is possible, but reform on a larger scale may achieve a more lasting result. The more promising outcome could be for a slate of candidates to run for office with the elements of the new constitution as their platform. A reform slate is not likely to gain an absolute majority, but if its base of support is broad enough, it may be able to gain support in a new parliament needed to send a revised constitution to the Iraqi people for their approval. A new constitution, done right, could propel Iraq towards a better future.

—Thomas S. Warrick led the State Department’s “Future of Iraq” project from 2002 to 2003, served in both Baghdad and Washington, and was director (acting) for Iraq political affairs from July 2006 to July 2007. He is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

Thomas S. Warrick on the need for Iraqi-led constitutional reform

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An economy diversified away from oil

The post-2003 political order, based on the muhasasa system of sectarian apportionment, came with the promise of a complete break with the past. The 2005 constitution, drafted by the new order, promised: “The State shall guarantee the reform of the Iraqi economy in accordance with modern economic principles to insure the full investment of its resources, diversification of its sources, and the encouragement and development of the private sector.” 

As with other bold promises made, the economic promise was broken as soon as the constitution came into effect, as the political order pursued a decentralized and multiheaded evolution of the prior economic model, and persistently expanded the patrimonial role of the state as a redistributor of the country’s oil wealth in exchange for social acquiescence to its rule. 

Over the last twenty years the economy developed significant structural imbalances, and was increasingly bedeviled by fundamental contradictions. Essentially, it was dependent on government spending directly through its provisioning of goods and services as well as public services, and indirectly on the spending of public-sector employees. However, this spending was almost entirely dependent on volatile oil revenues that the government had no control over; yet the spending was premised on ever-increasing oil prices.

The political order had the opportunity to correct course and honor the original promise during three major economic and financial crises, each more severe than the last and all a consequence of an oil-price crash: in 2007 to 2009, due to the global financial crisis; in 2014 to 2017, due to the conflict with the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham; and in 2020, due to the emergence of COVID-19. Yet, paradoxically, the political order doubled down on the policies that led to these crises as soon as oil prices recovered.

On the eve of the twentieth anniversary of the invasion of Iraq, the political order—buoyed by the bounty of high, yet unsustainable, oil prices—is planning a budget that is expected to be the largest ever since 2003, to seek legitimacy from an increasingly alienated public. These plans will only deepen the economy’s structural imbalance and its fundamental contradictions, and as such could likely lead to even greater public alienation if an oil-price crash triggers yet another economic and financial crisis. Even if oil prices were to stay high, however, the country’s demographic pressures will in time create the conditions for a deeper rolling crisis. 

—Ahmed Tabaqchali is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Middle East programs. An experienced capital markets professional, he is chief strategist of the AFC Iraq Fund.

Andrew Peek on the current state of Iraq and the US-Iraq relationship

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An inclusive vision, representative of all its people

One of the enduring legacies of the 2003 invasion has been its deleterious effect on the many diverse ethnic and religious minority communities that make up the social fabric of Iraq. Yet it is that diversity and rich heritage that could now unlock a brighter future for the nation, if the political system can recognize and represent it. 

Marginalized by an institutionally inscribed political system and few representative seats in parliament, Iraq’s minority communities have found themselves peripheralized by the state—and in the imaginations of the country’s future. Many have emigrated and now reside in diaspora, changing the ethnic and religious heterogeneity of Iraq. 

Calculating the cultural toll of war goes beyond the destruction of shrines and artifacts, and the looting of museums and buildings: One of the biggest social and cultural losses for Iraq has been the exclusion of minority communities from the nation-building processes. This is a tragic state of affairs for Iraq, whose uniqueness, strength, and richness stems from its ancient histories and cultures, its religious, artistic, and musical traditions, and the languages that have contributed to its heritage and development. That heritage deserves to be protected and celebrated. 

Until the day the muhasasa system is dismantled, and a new Iraq built on meritocracy can thrive, minority communities must be safeguarded and included in Iraq’s future. Yet, this can only be achieved through the protection of minorities’ rights in Iraq’s political life, and genuine and concerted effort to increase parliamentary seats and legal representation of minorities. Investment in areas destroyed by terrorism and conflict, more reparations for communities whose livelihoods and homes have been ruined, and more boots on the ground to protect communities and religious shrines should be a priority. 

Twenty years of destruction, corruption, violence, and the subsequent emigration of many communities cannot be erased. Yet the twentieth anniversary of Iraq’s occupation ought to serve as a point of reflection for the kind of Iraq that Iraqis want now. There is certainly much hope in a new generation of Iraqis calling for new national visions, an end to muhasasa, more civil rights, and expanding economic opportunities. 

Yet all of Iraq’s communities must be part of this conversation. A more inclusive Iraq that applauds its diversity and takes pride in difference could be the driving force needed to unify the nation. 

—Oula Kadhum, a former nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council, is a postdoctoral research fellow at Lunds University in Sweden and a fellow of international migration at the London School of Economics and Political Science in the United Kingdom. 

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Oula Kadhum on the reforms needed to reposition Iraq in the next twenty years

A new US Iraq policy focused on youth and education

As the global community reflects on the twentieth anniversary of the US-led invasion of Iraq and looks to the future, it is time for foreign policy toward Iraq to move beyond its traditional, security-heavy approach. 

While security threats persist, including a potential resurgence of the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS), and should be a priority, US aid to Iraq has historically been ineffective and financially irresponsible. Humanitarian assistance, meanwhile, tends to focus on short-term issues like the response to COVID-19 and assisting displaced individuals. And while such aid can be beneficial, continuing with the traditional avenues of support is not a sustainable solution to rebuild Iraq. The United States and the international community must begin to focus on long-term solutions that address human security, development, infrastructure, education, and the economy. At the center of all these issues are two key variables that must be the focal point of policy: education and the youth population.

A 2019 UNICEF report estimates that a staggering 60 percent of Iraq’s population is under the age of twenty-five. Learning levels and access to education in Iraq remain among the lowest in the region. The great challenges these two facts pose can also be seen as a unique opportunity: to place its large youth population at the epicenter of Iraq’s future through policy that increases the number of educators and trains them, ensures sanitary and competent learning conditions, and increases access to education.

The benefits of a long-term investment in Iraq’s education system and youth population go beyond simply educating its citizens: It would be the first step in unlocking the human potential of Iraq. More education means more qualified professionals; more doctors would increase the quality and access to healthcare, an increase in engineers will ensure that the country’s infrastructure continues to develop, and additional business leaders and entrepreneurs will assist in growing the economy. 

To truly rebuild Iraq, the United States and the international community can no longer view the country as only a security issue. Rather, this moment must be seen as an opportunity to empower bright Iraqi youths, who hope to lead in rebuilding their own country—providing them with a fair shot of again being a cradle of civilization. 

—Hezha Barzani is a program assistant with the Atlantic Council’s empowerME initiative. Follow him on Twitter @HezhaFB.

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Iraq’s Deputy Prime Minister Fuad Hussein reflects on the twentieth anniversary of the invasion

What the United States can do now

Recommit to the cause of Iraqi freedom

It’s hard to believe that it has been twenty years since the US invasion of Iraq. As I sat waiting to launch my first mission on March 20, the war’s historical significance was not my primary thought. How I found myself flying on the first night of the war in Afghanistan and Iraq was. That thought was accompanied by the tightness in the pit of my stomach that I always got before launching into the unknown. 

We didn’t debate the case for the war among ourselves. It has been discussed thoroughly since, and I don’t claim to have any new insight to offer on that topic. We were focused on not letting down our fellow Marines and accomplishing our mission: to remove Saddam Hussein’s dictatorship and replace it with a democracy that would give the people of Iraq the freedom that people everywhere deserve as their birthright. 

Did we succeed? We certainly succeeded in rapidly destroying the Baathist regime and its military, the third largest in the world. The answer to the second question is less clear. On my second and third tours in Iraq, I saw the chaos from the al-Qaeda-fueled insurgency in 2005 and 2006 and the dramatic turnaround following the al-Anbar “Sunni Awakening” in 2006-2007. From afar, I watched the horrors that the Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham inflicted on its people after US troops withdrew without a status-of-forces agreement. 

Today, Iraq is rated “not free,” scoring twenty-nine out of one hundred in Freedom House’s Freedom in the World 2022 report. Although not up to Western liberal democracy standards, this is an improvement over 2002, when it received the lowest score possible and was listed as one of the eleven most repressive countries in the world. Moreover, Iraq’s 2022 score is vastly better than most of its neighbors: Iran scored fourteen, Syria scored one, and Afghanistan scored ten. 

Despite Afghanistan being widely seen as “the good war” of the two post-9/11 conflicts, where the casus belli was clear, today it is Iraq, and not Afghanistan, that gives me hope that twenty years from now, on the fortieth anniversary, we will see our efforts to promote democracy in Iraq come entirely to fruition. We owe it to the 36,425 Americans killed and wounded there, the thousands of veterans who took their own lives, and the many more still struggling with post-traumatic stress disorder to stay engaged in Iraq and the region to try and make sure that they do.

—Col. John B. Barranco was the 2021-22 Senior US Marine Corps Fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. These views are his own and do not represent those of the Department of Defense or Department of the Navy. 

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Balance confidence and humility

I officially swore into the military at Fort Hamilton, Brooklyn, on April 4, 2003, during the early stages of the US “shock and awe” campaign in Iraq. Having decided to join the Air Force following 9/11, the lengthy administrative process I’d endured to get to this point had been agonizing. I recall going through the in-processing line at Officer Training School on April 9, when an instructor whispered to us: “Coalition forces have taken Baghdad, stay motivated.” The thought that immediately went through my mind was: “I’m going to miss the wars.”

I had made the choice to pursue special operations and still had two years of training ahead of me. At the time, the war in Afghanistan seemed like it was nearing completion, and the swift overthrow of Saddam Hussein in Iraq had me convinced that, by the time I was ready to deploy, there would be no fighting left. Little did I know that the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, along with their expansions across the Middle East and Africa, would end up consuming a large majority of my twenty years of service, take the lives of many of my special operations teammates, and impact the health and well-being of a generation of US service members and their families.

It’s impossible to know how the war in Iraq shaped other US endeavors in the region. Did it take our focus from Afghanistan and put us on a path of increased escalation and investment there? Did it set conditions for the Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham to take root many years later, setting off another expansive counterterrorism campaign? 

More broadly, did it allow adversaries the time and space to study US capabilities and ultimately inform their strategies for malign influence? I often think of this today when I’m asked about what’s going to happen with the Russian war in Ukraine, or how prepared the United States is to defend Taiwan. 

The United States needs the confidence to confront global challenges to peace and prosperity, but also the humility to know we get things wrong, and mistakes involving direct military intervention can be catastrophic. Given the escalatory risks associated with the security challenges in the world today, our pursuit of a balance of confidence and humility has never been more important.

—Lt. Col. Justin M. Conelli is the 2022-23 Senior US Air Force fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

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William F. Wechsler on the current political discourse around Iraq

Recognize the successes as well as the failures

“Was the invasion of Iraq worth it?”

I’ve spent a great deal of my military and postmilitary career answering questions about Iraq, but this one—from a brigadier general in the audience—caught me off guard. It was 2018, seven years after the formal withdrawal of US forces from Iraq, and I found myself in front of a roomful of Army officers giving a talk on the future of US-Iraq security cooperation. By that time, such talks had become a little frustrating. The fight against the Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham (aka the Islamic State group) demonstrated that Iraqi forces could rise to the immediate challenge; however, the conditions that led to their unceremonious collapse in 2014 had not much changed. As a result, there remained many questions about the best way to continue the security partnership to prevent future catastrophe. 

The question I got that day, however, had little to do with how to partner with Iraqi forces. A co-presenter from Kurdistan jumped in immediately to answer the brigadier general’s question: the US invasion had removed Iraqi Kurdistan’s most significant threat—Saddam Hussein—and had provided opportunities for economic and political development it would not have had otherwise. Sensing a trap, I nonetheless walked right into it. While Iraqi Kurdistan was certainly in a better position, I pointed out that was not consistently so for the rest of Iraq. The US invasion had unleashed a sectarian free-for-all that allowed Sunni extremists, Shia militias, and their Iranian sponsors to fill the vacuum of oppression Saddam’s departure had left. Moreover, this vacuum had empowered Iran to challenge the United States and its partners regionally. So my answer was no, toppling Saddam likely did not outweigh the costs.

In previous years, the questions had been more policy-focused. For example, when I arrived at the Pentagon’s Iraq Intelligence Working Group in August 2002, the first question asked was how Iraq’s diverse ethnic and confessional demographics would affect military operations and enable—or impede—victory. By early 2003, the questions were about the larger effort to construct a new political order. Before long, we were asking how the confluence of Islamist terrorism, sectarian rivalries, and external intervention drove resistance to efforts to reconstruct Iraq. 

In 2012, I became the US defense attaché in Baghdad, just after the last US service members withdrew. At first, the question I heard in this capacity was how to continue the reconstruction project with a limited military and civilian presence whose movement was often severely restricted in a sovereign, sometimes uncooperative, Iraq with frequent interference from Iran. Before I left, al-Qaeda had metastasized into the Islamic State group and the question became how to cooperate to prevent the group’s further expansion and liberate the territory it had seized. Meanwhile, Iran’s influence with the Iraqi government continued to grow. 

In retrospect, the conditions I described in 2018 were accurate (and still largely hold today), but I wish I had given a more considered response. What I wish I had said was that a better question than “was it worth it” is: what have we learned about past failures to assess future opportunities? A prosperous Iraq that contributes to regional stability was not possible under Saddam. Now Iraq is an effective partner against Islamist extremists, and the Iraqi people, if not always their government, are in a position to push back on Iran in their own way, exposing Tehran for the despotic government it is. Moreover, Iraq’s hosting of discussions between Saudi Arabia and Iran was a catalyst to their recent normalization of relations. 

The point is not to rationalize failure. Rather, the question now is: what have we learned from those failures to effectively capitalize on the success we have had, and how can we take advantage of the opportunities the current situation presents?

—C. Anthony Pfaff, PhD, is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Iraq Initiative and a research professor for strategy, the military profession, and ethic at the Strategic Studies Institute of the US Army War College in Carlisle, Pennsylvania.

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Tony Pfaff on the future of US-Iraq relations

Remember the price of hubris

For me, the memories of those first days and weeks in Iraq remain quite clear. I remember calling my family from a satellite phone on the tarmac of Baghdad International Airport to let them know I was alive, late night meetings with Iraqi agents in safe houses, wrapping up Iraqi high-value targets, the fear amid firefights and the carnage on streets strewn with dead and mutilated bodies, and a confused Iraqi population that at the time did not know what to make of US forces who claimed to be liberating them from the regime of Saddam Hussein. 

Upon arrival in Baghdad in early April, there were few signs of the resistance that would haunt the United States for decades to come. Yes, there were still combat operations underway, but that was against Iraqi military and paramilitary units. So, as we tracked down Iraqi regime targets one by one—members of the famed “deck of fifty-five cards” that US Central Command had dreamed up and distributed like we were trading baseball cards—we saw this as part of a new beginning.

Yet soon after, the wheels began to fall off. Orders came from Washington policy officials with absolutely zero substantive Middle East experience both to disband the Iraqi military and purge the future government of Baath party officials, which immediately put tens of thousands of hardened military officers, conscripts, and officials out of work and on the street. The CIA presence on the ground protested, but to no avail. I had never seen Charlie, my station chief, so angry, including face-to-face confrontations with senior figures in the Coalition Provisional Authority. Charlie—the most accomplished Arabist in the CIA’s history—sadly predicted the insurgency that was about to come. If only Washington had listened.

I rarely think of Iraq in terms of big-picture strategy. As a CIA operations officer, I was a surgical instrument of the US government, and I gladly answered the bell when called upon to do so. I am proud to have served with other CIA officers and special operations personnel who performed valiantly. I suppose I can defend the invasion on human rights grounds. It seems we forget that Saddam was one of the great war criminals in history, and Iraq has been freed from his depravity. Yet two numbers are haunting: 4,431, and 31,994. Those are the number of Americans killed and wounded in action, per official Department of Defense statistics. 

War is a nasty business, and many times a terrible price is paid for hubris. The casualty figures noted above paint a stark picture of the historic intelligence failure that the analytic assessment that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction was. The CIA in particular suffered a credibility hit that has taken decades to recover from.

—Marc Polymeropoulos, a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council, served for twenty-six years at the CIA before retiring in 2019. 

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Thomas S. Warrick on the lessons to learn from the Iraq War

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Since the invasion began, the concept of a special tribunal has been developed by various groups of international and Ukrainian legal experts. There have been several significant breakthrough developments in the past few months that have elevated this proposal from an academic proposition to the decision-making level and placed it firmly on the international agenda.

The crime of aggression is the underlying crime that triggers all other crimes. It is a leadership crime, for which those perpetrators who organized, decided on, and ordered aggression are tried. If plans for a special tribunal proceed, the crime of Russian aggression against Ukraine would be tried for the first time since the Nazi leadership was tried and convicted by the International Military Tribunal in Nuremberg following World War II.

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

It has already been established that the International Criminal Court (ICC) at present and for the foreseeable future does not have jurisdiction over Russia’s use of aggression against Ukraine, so a special tribunal is needed. ICC Prosecutor Karim Khan appears to be an isolated voice disputing this consensus. He argues for reforms to address the gap at the ICC, but has not been able to advance any practical and timely solution, keeping in mind the principle that justice delayed is justice denied.

So far, three options for a special tribunal have crystallized. The first is the institution-based option, which envisages a tribunal established on the basis of a treaty between Ukraine and the UN, following the adoption of the relevant UN General Assembly resolution. If this scenario does not work out, a tribunal could be set up on the basis of another international organization such as the Council of Europe, EU, or G7, preferably still with the backing of the UN General Assembly.

Another option is the treaty-based approach. This would involve setting up a tribunal on the basis of a multilateral international treaty, which would potentially be open to any state. There is also a hybrid option, which could see a specialized court based on Ukrainian law and jurisdiction, with some type of international element. At this stage, the institution-based option involving the UN is widely seen as optimal.

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When the idea of a tribunal was first introduced, it was supported by international law experts, civil society, and opinion leaders, but not by individual governments. This began to change after the Ukrainian government elaborated on its initial concept and started working with expert groups to develop the possible format of a future tribunal. Towards the end of 2022 and during the first months of 2023, the debate advanced to the inter-governmental level.

The first breakthrough came in November 2022, when European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen declared that the EU was proposing “to set up a specialized court, backed by the United Nations, to investigate and prosecute Russia’s crime of aggression.” At the same time, the French Foreign Ministry announced that it had started “working with our European and Ukrainian partners on the proposal to establish a special tribunal on Russia’s crime of aggression against Ukraine.” Dutch officials also confirmed that the Netherlands would be willing to house a new UN-backed tribunal to try Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

In the first weeks of 2023, German Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock noted the “disastrous” limitations on the ICC’s jurisdiction over the crime of aggression and called for a “special solution” to address what she termed as a gap in international law. Minister Baerbock also backed the immediate establishment of an investigating authority in The Hague to address Russian aggression.

Speaking in January, Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte said he could not accept that the international community would let the Russian invasion of Ukraine go unpunished, and confirmed Dutch officials are working with their Ukrainian colleagues and others to set up an aggression tribunal, preferably in The Hague. Meanwhile, Italian Foreign Minister Antonio Tajani stated, “if a special tribunal is created, we are not against it.”

The European Parliament adopted a resolution in January 2023 backing the establishment of a special tribunal. Also in January, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) voted for a resolution which confirmed that Russia’s invasion of Ukraine meets the definition of international aggression and reiterated its call “to set up a special international criminal tribunal for the crime of aggression against Ukraine, which should be endorsed and supported by as many states and international organizations as possible, and in particular by the United Nations General Assembly.”

Recent months have witnessed further practical steps toward the establishment of a special tribunal. In early 2023, a core group of more than 20 countries was created to develop plans for a tribunal, with the first in-person meeting taking place on January 26 in Prague. On February 2, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen announced that an international center for the prosecution of the crime of aggression in Ukraine would be set up in The Hague.

It is evident from recent developments that initial calls for a special tribunal are now evolving toward practical implementation, with the various legal options taking more concrete form and being evaluated in terms of preference. This process will continue in the coming months as inter-governmental engagement on the issue deepens.

Dr. Irina Paliashvili is Chair of the Legal Committee at the US-Ukraine Business Council (USUBC) and International Rule of Law Officer at the IBA Rule of Law Forum.

Further reading

New Atlanticist Dec 6, 2022

How Ukraine’s proposed special tribunal for Russian aggression would work

By Celeste Kmiotek

A special tribunal on Russian aggression would raise questions around jurisdiction, legal details, and the role of the US. Here’s how they can be addressed.

Conflict Human Rights

UkraineAlert Dec 9, 2022

Zelenskyy urges special tribunal for Russian aggression against Ukraine

By Peter Dickinson

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy is urging the international community to establish a special tribunal for the crime of aggression in order to prosecute Russia’s political and military leadership.

Conflict European Union

UkraineAlert May 24, 2022

Putin’s Mariupol Massacre is one of the 21st century’s worst war crimes

By Paul Niland

The Russian destruction of Mariupol ranks among the gravest crimes against humanity of the twenty-first century and sends a clear message to the international community that can be no compromise peace with Putin.

Conflict Democratic Transitions

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

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The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia and Central Asia in the East.

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One year ago, Russian troops streamed over the borders of Ukraine in the dead of night in an attempt to swiftly seize the country and topple its government. Instead they met with remarkable Ukrainian resistance and the rallying of Ukraine’s international allies to its defense, thwarting Russian President Vladimir Putin’s plans. It is hard to calculate the suffering, destruction, and global upheaval caused by the conflict, which has evolved into a brutal war of attrition with no end in sight. But there are some eye-opening numbers that help tell this story. To mark one year since Putin’s full-scale invasion, experts from across the Atlantic Council have identified the figures they believe best illustrate all the ways this war has shaken the world.

Many analysts see Russia’s failure to topple Kyiv as a sign of Russian weakness. They argue that Washington and Brussels need not worry about Russia’s threat to NATO because Russia’s military is weaker than we thought. These data tell a different story: Russia’s invasion of Ukraine shows that Moscow—which controls roughly 108,000 square kilometers of Ukrainian land, according to Institute for the Study of War data analyzed by the New York Times—is capable of seizing and occupying territory on its border the size of two Baltic states. Estonia’s total territory is about 45,000 square kilometers, while Latvia checks in at 64,000 and Lithuania at 65,000. The Russian military is potentially strong enough to cause World War III and break NATO. These are the data that keeps US European Command planners and vulnerable Eastern flank NATO allies up at night.

—Matthew Kroenig is the senior director of the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

Russian atrocities in Ukraine over the past year have caused untold disaster and spurred the largest humanitarian crisis in Europe in nearly eighty years. The Kremlin has launched unrelenting assaults on civilian infrastructure, culminating in the deaths of civilians and permanently damaging energy facilities. Meanwhile, over fifty thousand allegations of war crimes have emerged from recently liberated Ukrainian cities, including harrowing reports of mass graves, torture in detainment camps, and the utilization of sexual assault as a weapon of war.

As a result, Europe has opened its doors to more than eight million refugees fleeing from Ukraine for their safety. While the prevailing belief is that large, Western European countries have led Europe’s efforts to counter Russia’s aggression, Central and Eastern European countries bear the brunt of refugee waves coming from Ukraine—due to both their proximity and already established Ukrainian diaspora communities. Nearly one-third, or 2.5 million, of total refugees from Ukraine in Europe have settled in countries included in the United Nations’ Refugee Response Plan (Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Moldova, Romania, and Slovakia), while Poland has settled the greatest number of refugees at over 1.5 million and has seen over eight million refugees cross its border seeking safety since the start of the war (though six million have also returned to Ukraine).

Looking at the refugees taken in as a proportion of national population, Estonia, Montenegro, and the Czech Republic top the list, while some larger countries such as France and the United Kingdom fall toward the bottom. As Ukraine’s closest neighbors, Central and Eastern European countries have served on the front line of Europe’s greatest refugee crisis in generations and are likely to continue doing so as the war enters its second year.

—Kristen Taylor was a Young Global Professional at the Europe Center in the fall of 2022 and is a master’s student at American University. Akshat Dhankher and Emma Nix are program assistants at the Europe Center and lead the Ukraine Aid Tracker project.

Russia’s piped natural gas export volumes have shrunk from four hundred to five hundred million cubic meters (mcm) per day to around sixty mcm per day, one year after Putin unleashed his bloody war of choice on Ukraine and an energy assault on Europe, Moscow’s biggest energy consumer at the time. Neither is going as planned.

While oil and gas are vital for Russia’s state budget, Moscow leans heavier on oil exports for revenue and gas exports for geopolitical leverage, which Putin unleashed by abruptly stopping supplies to multiple nations in Europe in order to discourage support for Ukraine. But by cutting supplies, Moscow also cut itself out of the European market as nations adjusted to the massive curtailment—albeit at a hefty price. Much of the market share will be challenging or impossible to recover, regardless of the war’s outcome, as European buyers commit to long-term contracts with alternative suppliers and invest in new liquefied natural gas (LNG) infrastructure to bring gas to areas previously monopolized by Russian exports. 

However, a full decoupling from reliance on Russian gas is far from complete. New projects must come online to fill the supply gap in the long term, and the allure of discounted Russian exports could tempt some regions in Europe to take in gas from the Kremlin after the war. Additionally, Russian LNG exports to Europe increased in 2022—an important trend for European nations to observe as they work to unburden themselves from dependance on an unreliable producer.

Nevertheless, Putin accelerated Europe’s preexisting diversification efforts with his energy blackmail and, ironically, without Western sanctions on Russian methane. Moscow will never again supply 40 percent of Europe’s natural gas.

—Olga Khakova is the deputy director for European energy security at the Global Energy Center.

Moscow’s budget deficit in the month of January alone is more than half of its planned deficit for the entirety of 2023. Looking at the below graph, you’ll see a clear surge in Russia’s budget deficit in December. While December spending in Russia is usually high, January remained far into negative territory at a loss of 1.8 trillion rubles. Why the mismatch with Moscow’s predictions? 

It’s because the 2023 budget is calculated based on oil revenues coming in at sixty dollars per barrel—the same value that the Group of Seven (G7) nations set as its price cap on December 5—but prices have since dropped well below that mark. With income shrinking, and heavy costs of the war to bear, Russia’s budget deficit is likely to widen past its own 2023 estimate of 2.9 trillion rubles. 

—Sophia Busch is a program assistant at the GeoEconomics Center.

Prior to last February’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Russia was estimated to possess around 3,330 operational tanks. After one year of fighting, open-source intelligence has visually confirmed that Russia has lost over 1,700 tanks, or just over 50 percent of its pre-war total operational stocks. One estimate suggests that the total lost could be over 70 percent, given that not all losses are accessible to open-source intelligence. Russia is estimated to have around 17,000 additional tanks in storage, ranging from early Cold War-era T-55s, T-62s, and T-64s to more recent T-72s, T-80s, and T-90s, however the condition of these stored tanks is unclear.

—Jeffrey Cimmino is an associate director in the Scowcroft Strategy Initiative in the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

The response to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine—and the 68,321 crimes of aggression and war crimes registered by Ukraine—has included rapid international action to ensure accountability. Ukraine tops the list with domestic investigations and trials, advocacy to establish a Special Tribunal on the Crime of Aggression, and work to establish a claims commission. However, other countries have followed suit with domestic processes including criminal investigations, targeted sanctions designations, and asset seizures, as well as coordinated efforts through a joint investigative team and the Russian Elites, Proxies, and Oligarchs Task Force.

This is an atypical amount of legal action. This is partly due to practical reasons: Ukraine has an incentive to cooperate with other jurisdictions, and countries close to Ukraine are likely to have refugees who can provide evidence and perpetrators arriving on their territory. However, there are also known double standards in global access to justice—there is less clamor for international action when the perpetrators are from politically well-connected Western countries or part of intractable conflicts—which are considered likely to be a contributing factor to a reported lack of support for certain measures from the Global South. These accountability efforts will shape international legal precedent as they progress, but authorities should also ensure that they become the norm and serve to expand the options available to all atrocity victims.

—Celeste Kmiotek is a staff lawyer for the Atlantic Council’s Strategic Litigation Project.

On March 2, 2022, in an emergency special session following Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine, the United Nations General Assembly advanced resolution ES-11/1 demanding full withdrawal of Russian forces from Ukraine. A total of 141 countries voted in favor of the resolution, including many of the world’s democracies. Thirty-five countries, from China and India to Iran and South Africa, abstained. Five countries— Belarus, North Korea, Nicaragua, Russia, and Syria—voted against it.

Seven months later, the General Assembly voted again to condemn Russia’s invasion and not recognize Russia’s claims to Ukrainian territory. The votes remained largely unchanged, with only two additional countries voting in favor (a total of 143) of a weakened resolution, thirty-five abstentions, and the same five no’s. (Several countries missed the vote in both cases.)

Both votes show that the international community overwhelmingly stands together to rebuke Russia’s invasion. But such little movement in vote numbers and member groupings—after nearly a year of an increasingly brutal and illegal war, human-rights abuses and apparent war crimes, and massive disruptions to the global economy—suggests that the world is roughly divided into three blocs. The first is a collection of countries, encompassing many members of the free world, that stand together to defend international law and order when it is most under threat. The second is a new nonaligned movement of countries that, for varied political or strategic reasons, choose to hedge or stay out of the fray completely. The third is an “axis of autocracies” that act to disrupt or displace the rules-based order.

These groups are of course not exact or exhaustive. Many states who voted in favor of both resolutions are not free or democratic or may not be supportive of more punitive steps to punish Russia, such as sanctions. Still, how countries have voted on these resolutions displays a real fact of today’s global order: Countries are increasingly coalescing into democratic and autocratic blocs when responding to international issues, with some remaining non-aligned.

—Danielle Miller and Imran Bayoumi are assistant directors with the Scowcroft Strategy Initiative.

Despite the Kremlin’s bet that its war of aggression would isolate Ukraine from Europe, the European Union (EU) and its member states have responded with unity of purpose by sending immediate and continued aid to Ukraine.

An estimated 12 billion euros of this assistance was dispatched in the form of military aid, which accounts for both the 3.6 billion euros the EU has contributed via the European Peace Facility and bilateral donations from twenty-four EU member states. European partners not only sent a major wave of this military assistance immediately after Russia’s initial incursion but have also sustained donations throughout the year since—progressively sending heavier and longer-range weaponry—suggesting growing trust in Ukraine’s defensive capabilities and an increasing realization that Ukraine is the front line for the defense of Europe overall.

Meanwhile, an estimated 1.7 billion euros has taken the form of humanitarian aid, which has provided food, clothing, shelter, health care, and other basic needs to nearly fourteen million people in Ukraine. The European Commission has coordinated this unprecedented operation under the auspices of the EU Civil Protection Mechanism, standing up logistical hubs in Poland, Romania, and Slovakia to direct aid into the country. Lastly, as the challenge of Ukraine’s physical and institutional reconstruction looms ahead, the EU has provided 7.2 billion euros in macro-financial assistance—with an additional 18 billion euros of loans approved by the European Council in December 2022—and is sending other financial support through the European Investment Bank and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development.

—Akshat Dhankher and Emma Nix are program assistants at the Europe Center and lead the Ukraine Aid Tracker project.

The post One year, eight world-changing numbers. Quantifying Russia’s war in Ukraine. appeared first on Atlantic Council.

My company, Nibulon, is one of Ukraine’s largest grain producers and exporters. We were enjoying some of the best years in our 30-year history before the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022. In a matter of weeks, we went from being a healthy business with a bright future to one battling for survival.

Around 20% of Nibulon’s assets are currently inaccessible in temporarily occupied regions of Ukraine. Other assets including grain elevators, barges, silos, and terminals have been destroyed. In 2022, our exports collapsed because we could no longer access our main export route through the port of Mykolaiv. Thousands of other Ukrainian companies have had similarly grim wartime experiences.

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

The liberation of Kherson and the surrounding region in late 2022 revealed the scale of the effort that will be necessary to restore agricultural production in regions of Ukraine subjected to Russian occupation. These regions are now believed to be among the most heavily mined areas in the world. De-mining will add significant costs and delays before farming activities can resume. Experts say that one day of war means one month of de-mining. We are already investing in de-mining equipment and personnel. At present, we calculate that with 20-25 people working ten hours a day, it will take three years to clear our fields in the worst affected areas.

To a greater or lesser degree, these problems are affecting the entire agricultural industry in Ukraine. The UN estimates that this strategically crucial sector of the Ukrainian economy has already suffered damages and losses of over $30 billion. Prior to the full-scale Russian invasion of February 2022, Ukraine had been steadily expanding its global reach as a food exporter and was widely seen as an emerging agricultural superpower. There is now a very real danger that Putin will succeed in bankrupting the Ukrainian breadbasket.

Like so many other Ukrainian companies, we have been adapting our business model to wartime conditions. We have successfully re-routed exports via land and rail and have built a new grain terminal on the Danube close to the Romanian border. However, we need to invest more in order to increase our exports and reduce the much higher transportation costs that farmers are now having to pay.

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One of the key problems facing the entire private sector in wartime Ukraine is the lack of access to financing because of prohibitively high borrowing rates domestically and internationally. Not surprisingly, war creates a significant risk premium. As a result, international capital markets are effectively closed for Ukrainian companies. Alternative forms of financing are urgently needed.

The United Nations and Turkey have succeeded in establishing a grain corridor to allow limited exports of Ukrainian grain through the Black Sea. Now is the time to establish a “financing corridor.” Just as the grain corridor has been a lifeline for Ukraine’s agricultural sector, the Ukrainian economy needs a mechanism to help private businesses secure immediate survival and safeguard their futures by investing to become more resilient and competitive.

A financing corridor would help ensure private businesses are not forced to close and can instead go on to underpin Ukraine’s reconstruction and recovery. The requirements are simple. First, lenders should offer Ukrainian businesses a standstill on their existing liabilities. A standstill will provide much-needed flexibility to address some of the immediate challenges to their operations. Second, international institutions should provide fresh financing for urgent working capital needs or strategic investments. Third, G7 countries and international financial institutions should offer partial guarantees to enable Ukraine’s major exporters to issue new debt at acceptable cost levels.

In the agricultural sector, enhanced financial support is essential as businesses look to repair or replace damaged equipment and facilities. The World Bank estimates the sector will require $18.7 billion in new investment over the coming decade. The next agricultural planting season is just around the corner. Without increased access to capital, farmers will not be able to obtain the equipment and fertiliser they need to sow their crops as planned.

If this happens, the consequences will be felt not only in Ukraine but far beyond the country’s borders as well. Reduced yields in Ukraine will impact global food security. The UN World Food Program estimates that the ongoing Russian invasion of Ukraine could increase the number of people at risk of acute hunger by 47 million, with the greatest impact on Sub-Saharan Africa.

Agriculture is a slow-motion business. If producers cannot invest today, the negative effects will be felt for years to come. The survival of the country’s major agricultural exporters is essential for Ukraine’s long-term economic reconstruction and recovery. It is also important for global stability. Good business strategy requires looking to the risks and opportunities that lie ahead. Western governments need to think beyond the immediate challenges of the war today and also consider what will be needed to secure Ukraine’s future.

Andriy Vadaturskyy is the owner and CEO of Ukrainian agribusiness Nibulon.

Further reading

UkraineAlert Jan 28, 2023

Poland is leading Europe’s response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine

By Diane Francis

Poland was the unsung hero of the recent landmark decision by Berlin and Washington to provide Ukraine with tanks as Polish leadership continues to shape the European response to Russia’s genocidal invasion.

Conflict Economic Sanctions

UkraineAlert Feb 6, 2023

Hero Ukrainian medic: “Russia will not stop until it is stopped”

By Peter Dickinson

Ukrainian military medic Yulia Paievska has a simple message for anyone who still believes in the possibility of a compromise peace with Putin’s Russia. “They will not stop until they are stopped,” she says.

Civil Society Conflict

UkraineAlert Feb 1, 2023

Europe’s last empire: Putin’s Ukraine war exposes Russia’s imperial identity

By Botakoz Kassymbekova

Vladimir Putin’s genocidal invasion of Ukraine has exposed modern Russia’s unapologetically imperial identity but could yet lead to the collapse of the Kremlin’s broader imperial ambitions, writes Botakoz Kassymbekova.

Belarus Central Asia

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

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If the world gets lucky, this could be the year fossil fuel producers and climate activists bury their hatchets and join hands to reduce emissions and ensure our planet’s future.

If that sounds hopelessly utopian, take that up with the leaders of this resource-rich, renewables-generating Middle Eastern monarchy. The United Arab Emirates is determined to inject specificity, urgency, and pragmatism into a process that often has lacked all three: the twenty-eighth convening of the United Nations Climate Change Conference, known as COP28, from November 30 to December 12.

To kick off 2023, the oil and gas and climate communities gathered this weekend for the Atlantic Council Global Energy Forum, launching the annual Abu Dhabi Sustainability Week. After decades of mutual mistrust, there is a growing recognition that they can’t live without each other.

Thank Russian President Vladimir Putin’s criminal war in Ukraine, and his ongoing weaponization of energy, for injecting a new dose of hard-headed reality into climate conversations. It’s seldom been so clear that energy security and cleaner energy are indivisible. The guiding principle is “the energy sustainability trilemma,” defined as the need to balance energy reliability, affordability, and sustainability.

What’s contributing to this new pragmatism is a recognition by much of the climate community that the energy transition to renewables can’t be achieved without fossil fuels, so they must be made cleaner. They have come to accept that natural gas, in particular liquified natural gas (LNG), with half the emissions footprint of coal, provides a powerful bridging fuel.

Once derided by green activists, nuclear power is also winning over new fans—particularly when it comes to the small, modular plants where there are fewer concerns over safety and weapons proliferation.

For their part, almost all major oil and gas producers, who once viewed climate activists with disdain, now embrace the reality of climate science and are investing billions of dollars in renewables and efforts to make their fossil fuels cleaner.

“Every serious hydrocarbon producer knows the future, in a world of declining use of fossil fuels, is to be low cost, low risk, and low carbon,” said David Goldwyn, the former State Department special envoy for energy. “The only way to ensure we do this is to have industry at the table.”

Nowhere is this shift among climate activists more evident than in Germany, where Vice Chancellor Robert Habeck, the Green Party leader, is serving as the pragmatist-in-chief.

Habeck, who serves as federal minister for economic affairs and climate action, has been the driving force behind extending the life of the country’s three nuclear plants through April and in launching Germany’s first LNG import terminal in December, with as many as five more to follow.

“I am ultimately responsible for the security of the German energy system,” Habeck told Financial Times reporter Guy Chazan in a sweeping profile of the German politician. “So, the buck stops with me. … I became minister to make tough decisions, not to be Germany’s most popular politician.”

Some climate activists were aghast this Thursday when the UAE named Sultan Al Jaber, the CEO of the Abu Dhabi National Oil Company (ADNOC), as president of this year’s COP28.

“This appointment goes beyond putting the fox in charge of the henhouse,” said Teresa Anderson of ActionAid, a development charity. “Like last year’s summit, we’re increasingly seeing fossil fuel interests taking control of the process and shaping it to meet their own needs.”

What that overlooks is that Al Jaber’s rich background in both renewables and fossil fuels makes him an ideal choice at a time when efforts to address climate change have been far too slow, lacking the inclusivity to produce more transformative results.

Full disclosure: Al Jaber’s companies ADNOC and the clean-energy innovator Masdar (where he was founding CEO in 2005 and is now chairman) are sponsors of the annual Atlantic Council Global Energy Forum in Abu Dhabi, a fact that has given me a close-up look at his years-long commitment to reducing emissions and promoting renewables.

Al Jaber also represents a country that despite its resource riches has become a major nuclear power producer, was the first Middle East country to join the Paris Climate Agreement, and was the first Middle East country to set out a roadmap to net-zero emissions by 2050.

Over the past fifteen years, the UAE has invested forty billion dollars in renewable energy and clean tech globally. In November it signed a partnership with the United States to invest an additional one hundred billion dollars in clean energy. Some 70 percent of the UAE economy is generated outside the oil and gas sector, making it an exception among major producing countries in its diversification.

Sheikh Mohamed bin Zayed al Nahyan, president of the United Arab Emirates, has explained his country’s approach this way: “There will be a time, fifty years from now, when we load the last barrel of oil aboard the ship. The question is… are we going to feel sad? If our investment today is right, I think—dear brothers and sisters—we will celebrate that moment.”

Al Jaber, speaking to the Global Energy Forum, captured his ambition to drive faster and more transformative results at COP28.

“We are way off track,” said Al Jaber.

“The world is playing catch-up when it comes to the key Paris goal of holding global temperatures down to 1.5 degrees,” he said. “And the hard reality is that in order to achieve this goal, global emissions must fall 43 percent by 2030. To add to that challenge, we must decrease emissions at a time of continued economic uncertainty, heightened geopolitical tensions, and increasing pressure on energy.”

He called for “transformational progress… through game-changing partnerships, solutions, and outcomes.” He said the world must triple renewable energy generation from eight terawatt hours to twenty-three and more than double low-carbon hydrogen production to 180 million tons for industrial sectors, which have the hardest carbon footprint to abate.

“We will work with the energy industry on accelerating the decarbonization, reducing methane, and expanding hydrogen,” said Al Jaber. “Let’s keep our focus on holding back emissions, not progress.”

If that sounds utopian, let’s have more of it.

This article originally appeared on CNBC.com.

Frederick Kempe is president and chief executive officer of the Atlantic Council. You can follow him on Twitter @FredKempe.

THE WEEK’S TOP READS

#1 A new world energy order is taking shape
Rana Foroohar | FINANCIAL TIMES

In this smart piece, the FT’s Rana Foroohar warns of a China-led energy order and how that could shift the global balance of power.

“What does that mean in practice?” Foroohar asks. “For starters, a lot more oil trade will be done in renminbi. [Chinese leader] Xi [Jinping] announced that, over the next three to five years, China would not only dramatically increase imports from [Gulf] countries, but work towards all-dimensional energy co-operation.”

“This could potentially involve joint exploration and production in places such as the South China Sea, as well as investments in refineries, chemicals, and plastics. Beijing’s hope is that all of it will be paid for in renminbi, on the Shanghai Petroleum and Natural Gas Exchange, as early as 2025.” 

This is something any serious thinker on energy should bear in mind. Read more →

#2 Ships going dark: Russia’s grain smuggling in the Black Sea
ECONOMIST

In this thought-provoking narrative, the Economist highlights the growing economic potential of the North Sea, particularly as a producer of wind power.

While the Economist acknowledges significant hurdles, from the vagaries of weather to the threat of cheaper competition in Southern Europe, it also writes that if “these problems can be overcome, the new North Sea economy’s impact on the continent will be momentous.

“As Europe’s economic epicentre moves north, so will its political one, predicts Frank Peter of Agora Energiewende, a German think-tank. Coastal Bremen, one of Germany’s poorest states, could gain clout at the expense of rich but landlocked Bavaria. At the European level, France and Germany, whose industrial might underpinned the European Coal and Steel Community, the EU’s forebear, may lose some influence to a new bloc led by Denmark, the Netherlands and, outside the EU, Britain and Norway.”  Read more →

#3 Time is not on Ukraine’s side
Condoleezza Rice and Robert Gates | WASHINGTON POST

Former Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, two of the most perceptive international strategists out there, deliver a compelling argument for how President Joe Biden’s administration should do more for Ukraine now.

The only way to avoid Russian domination of Ukraine, they write, “is for the United States and its allies to urgently provide Ukraine with a dramatic increase in military supplies and capability — sufficient to deter a renewed Russian offensive and to enable Ukraine to push back Russian forces in the east and south. Congress has provided enough money to pay for such reinforcement; what is needed now are decisions by the United States and its allies to provide the Ukrainians the additional military equipment they need — above all, mobile armor.”

“Because there are serious logistical challenges associated with sending American Abrams heavy tanks, Germany and other allies should fill this need,” they write. “NATO members also should provide the Ukrainians with longer-range missiles, advanced drones, significant ammunition stocks (including artillery shells), more reconnaissance and surveillance capability, and other equipment. These capabilities are needed in weeks, not months.”

One hopes Biden is reading. Read more →

#4 Robert Habeck was Germany’s most popular politician. Then he took office
Guy Chazan | FINANCIAL TIMEs

Don’t miss Guy Chazan’s brilliant, sweeping profile of German Vice Chancellor Robert Habeck, who oversees his country’s energy and economic policies, and his struggle as a Green politician to diversify resources away from Russia.

“As the energy crisis continued, traits that distinguished Habeck from other politicians came to the fore,” Chazan writes, reporting on Habeck’s willingness to make tough decisions. “On the day of the invasion last February, amid rounds of emergency meetings, he found time to visit Andrij Melnyk, Ukraine’s ambassador to Berlin. ‘That was the most important meeting I had since the war began,’ Melnyk told Der Spiegel, ‘because he offered real human sympathy.’ Habeck also spoke openly about the uncertainties the government faced.”

Read this for a profile of the type of leader who, understanding the importance of compromise and pragmatism, will be vital in making the energy transition a success. Read more →

#5 American Democracy is Still In Danger
Erin Baggot Carter, Brett L. Carter, and Larry Diamond | FOREIGN AFFAIRS

This week’s must-read is a clarion call on the importance of US democracy and the dangers it faces, from Erin Baggot Carter, Brett L. Carter, and Larry Diamond.

“The health of American democracy,” they write, “is both a domestic and a national security concern. China and Russia—the United States’ principal authoritarian adversaries—have been using (and exacerbating) America’s democratic divisions and travails to gain advantage in the competition for global leadership. To regain the advantage, the United States must both repair its own democracy and reinvigorate its voice for democracy in the global arena. Democracy must go on the offensive.”

To do this, they argue, “Washington must rejoin the battle for global soft power, in a manner that reflects American values. It must transmit the truth, and in ways that engage and persuade global audiences. The goal must be not only to counter disinformation persuasively with the truth but to promote democratic values, ideas, and movements. In order to counter disinformation and report the truth that autocracies suppress, multiple credible streams of information are needed. Furthermore, they must be independent; while the US government may provide material support, these outlets must operate free of editorial control. That way, they will be seen to be independent because they are.” Read more →

Atlantic Council top reads

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In December 2022, Wagner Group organized a hackathon that was won by a man wanted by the FBI for his connection to computer malware.

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The post Dispatch from Abu Dhabi: How to reduce carbon emissions without blocking progress appeared first on Atlantic Council.

In 2014, Russia began “breaking windows” in Crimea. When the world failed respond adequately, Russian aggression expanded into eastern Ukraine and escalated into armed hostilities that left more than 14,000 dead while forcing millions to flee their homes. Again, the international community did not react with sufficient decisiveness. This led directly to the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine which began in February 2022.

For the past eight-and-a-half years, Russia has been permitted to slowly but steadily challenge and undermine the global security order established in the decades following World War II. For many in the West, this process has been unspectacular and has involved minor inconveniences such as rising food prices and mounting energy bills. Some even complain of “Ukraine fatigue,” seemingly oblivious to the fact that atrocities are being committed in Europe on a scale not seen since the days of Stalin and Hitler.

This leads us back to the broken window theory. In order to arrest this slide toward a dark future of international lawlessness, it is vital to hold Russians accountable for the crimes they are committing in Ukraine. And yet at present, the issue of war crimes is being addressed in vague terms without any real mechanisms in place to bring specific defendants to court.

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

While there is general recognition within the international community that Russia is guilty of grave war crimes in Ukraine, we currently lack the tools to prosecute thousands of potential suspects. This could create a dangerous precedent for future conflicts and must change.

I have first-hand experience of Russian crimes in Ukraine. I previously spent two-and-a-half years as a prisoner in the notorious Izolyatsia prison in Russian-occupied Donetsk. I was subjected to torture during my incarceration and was eventually freed in a prisoner exchange. Following my release, I helped locate the commandant of the prison and contributed to his arrest.

I was able to do this thanks to the Justice Initiative Fund (JIF), an initiative I founded that seeks to identify and track down Russian war criminals. The JIF lists those who are officially suspected of war crimes and offers a reward for anyone who can provide information that will lead to their arrest.

This task is just beginning. Huge obstacles must yet be overcome before justice can be served. Today’s Russian war criminals are not like the Nazis after World War II, who were scattered around the world. On the contrary, they overwhelmingly live in Russia itself, and have no intention of leaving. Most are part of a vast Russian underclass with low incomes and even lower expectations that Putin has been careful to cultivate during his two decades in power.

Eurasia Center events

Online Event Thu, August 15, 2024 • 9:00 am ET

Ukraine’s advance in Kursk: What’s next and implications

Conflict Russia Security & Defense Ukraine

The first step toward justice is to identify war criminals. There is currently no single international organization that is willing or able to identify and search for large numbers of war crimes suspects around the world. The JIF seeks to expand its scope internationally in order to help meet this challenge. There is a logic to these ambitions. Many of the war crimes suspects in locations such as Africa and Syria are also sought in relation to atrocities committed in Ukraine.

The war crimes committed by the Russian military wherever it is deployed can be traced to the sense of impunity felt by the perpetrators. In order to bring this impunity to an end, it is vital to identify individual war criminals. This will require the combined efforts of the international community. Ukraine should be at the heart of such efforts.

Along with identification, the other key goal is bringing war crimes suspects to trial. The experience of recent decades indicates that only a handful of suspects ever actually make it to the courtroom, while thousands of actual perpetrators never face justice. I have personally participated in three war crimes trials relating to atrocities committed at the Izolyatsia prison, and only one of the three featured an actual defendant.

I would like to see the democratic world take the lead in developing new legal procedures for the transfer of war crimes suspects to the jurisdiction of the relevant international and national courts. Everyone is well aware that Russia will never hand over war crimes suspects within the framework of existing extradiction procedures. New mechanisms are required that will place war criminals on an equal footing with terrorism suspects, with all the legal consequences of this status.

Without these initiatives, there is a risk that all the current work being done to collect evidence of Russian war crimes in Ukraine will be futile. Unless we have the resources to identify the perpetrators and the tools to bring them to justice, exposing the atrocities committed in Ukraine will fail to prevent these crimes from being repeated.

Stanislav Aseyev is a Ukrainian author, journalist, and founder of the Justice initiative fund.

Further reading

UkraineAlert Nov 30, 2022

As Putin retreats in Ukraine, he is also losing Kazakhstan

By Kamila Auyezova

Putin’s rapidly unraveling invasion of Ukraine is eroding Russian influence throughout the former Soviet Empire. This process of imperial retreat is nowhere more visible than in Kazakhstan, writes Kamila Auyezova.

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UkraineAlert Oct 17, 2022

Putin’s blackout blitz: Russia aims to freeze Ukrainians into surrender

By Suriya Evans-Pritchard Jayanti

Russia is seeking to plunge Ukraine into darkness ahead of the winter heating season by destroying the country’s energy infrastructure. Ukraine’s partners must step in to make sure Ukrainians are not frozen into surrender.

Conflict Energy Markets & Governance

UkraineAlert Nov 10, 2022

Battle of Kherson: Russian retreat confirms Putin is losing the war

By Andriy Zagorodnyuk

The war is still far from over, but Ukraine’s victory in the Battle of Kherson may eventually come to be seen as one of the key turning points in the defeat of Vladimir Putin’s invasion, writes Andriy Zagorodnyuk.

Conflict Freedom and Prosperity

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

Read more from UkraineAlert

UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia and Central Asia in the East.

Learn more

The post Individual Russians must be held accountable for war crimes in Ukraine appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Zelenskyy reiterated his call for a special tribunal on December 7 during an event hosted in Washington DC by the United States Institute of Peace, the Atlantic Council, and the Ukrainian Embassy. In keynote remarks delivered on Zelenskyy’s behalf by presidential chief of staff Andriy Yermak, the Ukrainian leader stressed that without justice, peace would be impossible. In the context of Russia’s ongoing Ukraine invasion, Zelenskyy defined justice as prosecuting not only those guilty of committing individual war crimes but also “those who gave the order to start this criminal war.”

While war crimes prosecutions typically address how wars are fought, Zelenskyy’s push for a special tribunal seeks to target the people in senior positions who are responsible for unleashing the war. The initiative envisions a special tribunal established specifically to put Russian officials on trial for the crime of aggression against Ukraine. “The crime of aggression is the alpha and omega of the war,” noted the Ukrainian President in his address. “To start a criminal and unprovoked war is to open the door to thousands of crimes committed during hostilities and in occupied territory.”

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

Zelenskyy’s initiative appears to be gaining international momentum. In recent days, France became the first major Western nation to publicly back the creation of a special tribunal. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen also stated on November 30 that the European Union will try to set up a specialized court, backed by the United Nations, to “investigate and prosecute Russia’s crime of aggression” in Ukraine.

While the US has yet to adopt an official position on the issue, individual US politicians and commentators have spoken in favor of establishing a special tribunal. Speaking at this week’s Washington DC event, Ukrainian Ambassador to the United States Oksana Markarova noted growing support for the idea of a special tribunal both in the US and in Europe. The Ukrainian diplomat underlined the importance of the initiative for the future of international security. “We need this tribunal for Ukraine, but we also need it for the entire world,” commented Markarova. “If we can hold Putin accountable, we can prevent more wars.”

Fellow panelist Andriy Smyrnov, who serves as Deputy Head of Ukraine’s Office of the President, highlighted the legal barriers that currently prevent the International Criminal Court (ICC) from prosecuting Russia for crimes of aggression. At present, the ICC is only able to address the crime of aggression via referral from the UN Security Council, where Russia has a veto, or if both the aggressor and victim states have ratified the Kampala Amendments to the Rome Statute, which neither Russia nor Ukraine has done. “We have come to the conclusion that the only effective mechanism for holding the Russian Federation accountable for the crime of aggression is the creation of a special international tribunal,” Smyrnov commented.

Eurasia Center events

Online Event Thu, August 15, 2024 • 9:00 am ET

Ukraine’s advance in Kursk: What’s next and implications

Conflict Russia Security & Defense Ukraine

The exact structure of a possible future special tribunal has yet to be determined. However, most observers agree that in order to gain the confidence of the international community, it would need to involve the United Nations. Former US Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes Issues David Scheffer told fellow panelists this week that a UN role was “entirely feasible.” Scheffer has a wealth of personal experience to draw on, having participated in the creation of international criminal tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, the Special Court for Sierra Leone, and the Khmer Rouge Tribunal. He also headed the United States negotiating team during talks on the creation of the International Criminal Court.

Scheffer noted that a framework agreement to establish a special tribunal could be reached relatively quickly once the necessary support had been secured from the United Nations General Assembly. “You have to have political will at the UN, and right now you do have that political will,” he commented, pointing to the numerous UN General Assembly votes since the invasion began in February that have overwhelmingly condemned Russian aggression against Ukraine.

The creation of a UN-backed special tribunal may well be technically feasible, but many skeptics continue to argue that Russia’s status as a major world power makes it practically impossible to put senior Russian officials on trial. Ambassador John Herbst, who serves as Director of the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center, acknowledged that most previous international war crimes trials have targeted comparatively smaller nations. He also noted that the only trials involving major powers took place following the unconditional surrender of Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan at the end of World War II. While nobody envisages similar circumstances in relation to Putin’s Russia, Herbst said there were a number of reasons why the current push for a special tribunal is nevertheless worthwhile.

One of the most compelling arguments in favor of establishing a special tribunal is the role such an institution could play in exposing the invasion and ensuring Russia’s defeat in Ukraine. Herbst highlighted that in recent weeks, some of the Kremlin’s top propagandists have already begun publicly complaining that senior Russian officials are talking about the possibility of prosecution in The Hague. “This is helping to undermine the morale of the bad guys conducting this war and bringing it to the attention of the entire Russian people,” he commented. Herbst also noted that a special tribunal could create a legal framework to distribute hundreds of billions of dollars in frozen Russian assets to Ukraine as reparations for war damage.

Peter Dickinson is Editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert Service.

Further reading

UkraineAlert Oct 12, 2022

No, Russia’s airstrike escalation is not retaliation for the Crimean Bridge

By Razom Advocacy Team

International media coverage depicting Russia’s recent airstrike escalation as retaliation for the alleged Ukrainian attack on the Crimean Bridge risks creating false equivalency over Vladimir Putin’s war of aggression.

Conflict Disinformation

UkraineAlert Nov 17, 2022

Kherson euphoria highlights the folly of a premature peace with Putin

By Peter Dickinson

Footage of the euphoric scenes in liberated Kherson should be compulsory viewing for anyone who still believes in the possibility of a negotiated settlement between Ukraine and Russia, argues Peter Dickinson.

Civil Society Conflict

UkraineAlert Oct 17, 2022

Putin’s blackout blitz: Russia aims to freeze Ukrainians into surrender

By Suriya Evans-Pritchard Jayanti

Russia is seeking to plunge Ukraine into darkness ahead of the winter heating season by destroying the country’s energy infrastructure. Ukraine’s partners must step in to make sure Ukrainians are not frozen into surrender.

Conflict Energy Markets & Governance

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

Read more from UkraineAlert

UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia and Central Asia in the East.

Learn more