How did this happen? Russia, long opposed to the Council of Europe’s 2001 Budapest Convention on cybercrime, began this process in 2017. Then, in 2019, Russia, along with China, North Korea, Myanmar, Nicaragua, Syria, Cambodia, Venezuela, and Belarus, presented a resolution to develop a global treaty. Despite strong opposition from the United States and European states, the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution in December 2019, by a vote of seventy-nine in favor and sixty against (with thirty abstentions), that officially began the process. Already, it was clear that the member states did not share one vision. Indeed, they could not even agree on a name for the convention until last week. What they ended up with is a mouthful: “Draft United Nations convention against cybercrime: Strengthening international cooperation for combating certain crimes committed by means of information and communications technology systems and for the sharing of evidence in electronic form of serious crimes.”

This exceedingly long name reveals one of the biggest problems with this convention: its scope. At its heart, this convention is intended to allow law enforcement from different countries to cooperate to prevent, investigate, and prosecute cybercrime, which costs trillions of dollars globally each year. However, the convention covers much more than the typical cybercrimes that come to mind, such as ransomware, and includes crimes committed using technology, which reflects the different views as to what constitutes cybercrime. As if that were not broad enough, Russia, China, and other states succeeded in pushing for negotiations on an additional protocol that would expand the list of crimes even further. Additionally, under the convention, states parties are to cooperate on “collecting, obtaining, preserving, and sharing of evidence in electronic form of any serious crime”—which in the text is defined as a crime that is punishable by a maximum of four years or more in prison or a “more serious penalty,” such as the death penalty.

In Russia, for example, association with the “international LGBT movement” can lead to extremism charges, such as the crime of displaying “extremist group symbols,” like the rainbow flag. A first conviction carries a penalty of up to fifteen days in detention, but a repeat offense carries a penalty of up to four years. That means a repeat offense would qualify as a “serious crime” under the cybercrime convention and be eligible for assistance from law enforcement in other jurisdictions that may possess electronic evidence relevant to the investigation—including traffic, subscriber, and even content data. Considering how much of modern life is carried out digitally, there will be some kind of electronic evidence for almost every serious crime under any domestic legislation. Even the UN’s own human rights experts cautioned against this broad definition.

Further, under the convention, states parties are obligated to establish laws in their domestic system to “compel” service providers to “collect or record” real-time traffic or content data. Many of the states behind the original drive to establish this convention have long sought this power over private firms. At the same time, states parties are free to adopt laws that keep requests to compel traffic and content data confidential—cloaking these actions in secrecy. Meanwhile, grounds for a country to refuse a cooperation request are limited to instances such as where it would be against that country’s “sovereignty,” security, or other “essential” interest, or if it would be against that country’s own laws. The convention contains a vague caveat that nothing in it should be interpreted as an obligation to cooperate if a country “has substantial grounds” to believe the request is made to prosecute or punish someone for their “sex, race, language, religion, nationality, ethnic origin, or political opinions.”

Russia claimed that such basic safeguards, which do offer some protection in the example regarding LGBT activity as “extremist,” were merely an opportunity for some countries to “abuse” the opportunity to reject cooperation requests. Those safeguards, conversely, could also be abused by the very same states that opposed them. The Iranian delegation, for its part, proposed a vote to delete that provision, as well as all other human rights safeguards and references to gender, on the day the text was adopted. These provisions had already been weakened significantly throughout the negotiation process and only survived thanks to the firm stance taken by Australia, Canada, Colombia, Iceland, the European Union, Mexico, and others that drew a red line and refused to accept any more changes.

The possible negative consequences of this convention are not limited to human rights but can seriously threaten global cybersecurity and national security. The International Chamber of Commerce, a global business organization representing millions of companies, warned during negotiations that “people who have access to or otherwise possess the knowledge and skills necessary” could be forced “to break or circumvent security systems.” Worse, they could even be compelled to disclose “previously unknown vulnerabilities, private encryption keys, or proprietary information like source code.” Microsoft agreed. Its representative, Nemanja Malisevic, added that this treaty will allow “for unauthorized disclosure of sensitive data and classified information to third states” and for “malicious actors” to use a UN treaty to “force individuals with knowledge of how a system functions to reveal proprietary or sensitive information,” which could “expose the critical infrastructure of a state to cyberattacks or lead to the theft of state secrets. Malisevic concluded that this “should terrify us all.”

Similarly, independent media organizations called for states to reject the convention, which the International Press Institute has called a “surveillance treaty.” Civil society organizations including Electronic Frontier Foundation, Access Now, Human Rights Watch, and many others have also long been ringing the alarm bell. They continue to do so as the final version of the convention adopted by the committee has failed to adequately address their concerns.

Given the extent and cross-border nature of cybercrime, it is evident that a global treaty is both necessary and urgent—on that, the international community is in complete agreement. Unfortunately, this treaty, perhaps a product of sunk-cost fallacy thinking or agreed to under duress for fear of an even worse version, does not solve the problems the international community faces. If the UN General Assembly adopts the text and the required forty member states ratify it so that it comes into force, experts are right to warn that governments intent on engaging in surveillance will have the veneer of UN legitimacy stamped on their actions. Rights-respecting states should not allow themselves to be co-opted into assisting abusive practices under the guise of cooperation. Nor should they willingly open the door to weakening their own national security or global cybersecurity.

Lisandra Novo is a staff lawyer for the Strategic Litigation Project at the Atlantic Council specializing in law and technology.

The post The UN finally advances a convention on cybercrime . . . and no one is happy about it appeared first on Atlantic Council.

While previous G20 meetings have been noteworthy for their disagreements, Brazil has emphasized substance and consensus over geopolitics during its G20 presidency. Felipe Hees, the Brazilian diplomat and sous-sherpa of this year’s G20 presidency, explained this strategy on July 25 at an Atlantic Council conference on the sidelines of the meeting. Brasília, he said, has sought to acknowledge fundamental disagreements on geopolitics between some members, and then to sidestep them entirely at the ministerial level. The big question now is: How long can this approach last?

So far, Brazilian officials have chosen to focus on economic development issues that already enjoy widespread support. Last week, this approach resulted in one of the few joint G20 ministerial-level communiqués in the past two years. Released on July 26, this communiqué displays G20 members’ alignment on launching the Global Alliance against Hunger and Poverty under the Brazilian presidency. It’s an important topic for the host country, since Brazil is the world’s leading producer of soybeans, corn, and meat, and Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva has emphasized his country’s role in alleviating global food insecurity. At the same time, the issue has a wider resonance. At the Atlantic Council conference, Cindy McCain, executive director of the World Food Program, emphasized that “food security is a national security issue, and it should be labeled as one.”

Climate finance and the energy transition were at the forefront in Rio last week as well. Discussions focused on how to mobilize the public and private sector in achieving climate goals. At the Atlantic Council’s conference, Renata Amaral, the Brazilian secretary for international affairs and development in the Ministry of Planning and Budget, formally called for technical assistance from multilateral development banks for catastrophic weather events, such as the floods in southern Brazil this May. Immediately following the summit, US Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen headed to Belém, the capital city of the northern Brazilian province Pará. Located near the mouth of the Amazon River, Belém was a symbolic choice for the unveiling of the US Treasury’s Amazon Region Initiative Against Illicit Finance, which is intended to help combat nature crimes.

Another issue that garnered attention last week was wealth inequality, which the Brazilian president spotlighted in his speech on June 24. “The poor have been ignored by governments and by wealthy sectors of society,” he said. Despite disagreements on whether the G20 is the right forum for the issue, it issued the first ever ministerial declaration on taxation. While Brazil’s ambition was to move the needle on a 2 percent global wealth tax, the declaration simply said that ultra-high-net-worth individuals must pay their fair share in taxes. While this fell short of Brazil’s hopes on this issue, the meetings in Rio have done more on building consensus than the past two presidencies, which have been rife with outbursts over geopolitical issues between member states.

In 2022, the then G20 president, Indonesia, saw its plan to build international cooperation for the post-pandemic recovery paralyzed by Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February. When finance ministers and foreign ministers met in April and July of the year, officials from Russia and from the United States and Europe walked out of the room when their counterparts spoke. Ministers failed to agree on a communiqué, and negotiations on climate and education also broke down over criticisms of the war. Ahead of the leaders’ summit in November 2022, Western leaders balked at the thought of sharing a table with Russian President Vladimir Putin, who ultimately did not attend the summit. In the end, the leaders could only agree to a declaration that was a broad, noncommittal summary of approaches to addressing global challenges.

Last year, India focused its G20 presidency on depoliticizing the issue of the global supply of food, fertilizers, and fuels, as well as on addressing climate change and restoring the foundations of negotiations at the forum. Its strategy was to move geopolitics off center stage by highlighting perspectives from the “Global South,” including formally adding the African Union as a full member, and thus shaping the platform as an action and communication channel between advanced economies and emerging markets.

This was difficult. Shortly into India’s presidency, Russia and China withdrew their support for the text in the Bali statement on Ukraine. At the technical level, none of the ministerial meetings produced a joint communiqué, and New Delhi was forced to issue chairs’ statements instead. Since the leaders’ summit in New Delhi, the outbreak of war between Israel and Hamas in October 2023 has made the job of navigating geopolitical tensions all the more difficult for Brazil.

While the Russian and Chinese leaders did not attend last year’s leaders’ summit, the New Delhi Declaration was nevertheless bolder and more specific than its Bali predecessor. It set the agenda for the G20 for the years ahead but offered few specifics on how to achieve these goals.

Will Brazil’s strategy of sidestepping geopolitics work at the leaders’ summit scheduled for November 18-19 in Rio? Finance ministers and central bank governors can ignore geopolitics; presidents and prime ministers often cannot. If Brasília concludes technical negotiations on the various proposals ahead of the leaders’ summit, then consensus-building at the gathering will be easier, as geopolitics will remain just an elephant in the room.

If Brazil is successful, it can end the stalemate that the G20 has found itself in and remake it into a relevant economic coordination body—one that can adequately address the goals of its emerging market and advanced economy members. If Brazilian officials are not successful, however, the forum’s relevance may begin to wane.

It has been in the interest of the last few G20 presidencies to keep up the balancing act between the United States, China, and Russia. Moreover, it is likely that South Africa will follow this approach as it takes on its presidency in 2025. As many of the discussions in Rio noted, however, what happens in the US presidential elections this November could determine both the relevance and the tone of the G20 meetings going forward.

Ananya Kumar is the deputy director, future of money at the Atlantic Council’s GeoEconomics Center.

Mrugank Bhusari is assistant director at the Atlantic Council’s GeoEconomics Center.

The post Dispatch from Rio: Can Brazil set the G20 leaders’ summit up for success? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Kharlan’s Olympic victory has additional significance for Ukraine as she almost missed out on participating in Paris altogether due to her principled stand over the Russian invasion of her homeland. During the 2023 World Fencing Championship, Kharlan refused to shake hands with a Russian opponent in protest over the war, offering instead to tap blades. The Russian declined this offer and staged a protest of her own, leading to Kharlan’s disqualification and making it virtually impossible for her to take part in the 2024 Olympic Games.

The incident sparked a heated debate over the role of politics in sport and the continued participation of Russian athletes in international events at a time when Russia is conducting Europe’s largest military invasion since World War II. Following a considerable outcry, Kharlan was reinstated and received the personal backing of International Olympic Committee President Thomas Bach, himself a former fencer. Meanwhile, Kharlan’s gesture made her a hero to millions of Ukrainians.

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

The controversy over Kharlan’s refusal to shake hands with her Russian opponent has been mirrored elsewhere in the sporting arena, highlighting the complex moral issues facing Ukrainian athletes as they compete internationally while their country is fighting for national survival. Ukrainian tennis star Elina Svitolina in particular has attracted headlines for her decision to avoid handshakes with Russian and Belarusian players.

Some critics have accused Ukrainians of politicizing sport, and have argued against holding individual Russians accountable for crimes committed by the Kremlin. Meanwhile, supporters of Ukrainian protest efforts have noted the Kremlin’s frequent use of sport as a propaganda tool, and have also pointed to the often close links between some Russian athletes and the Putin regime.

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Ukraine’s advance in Kursk: What’s next and implications

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For Ukraine’s Olympic team, participation in this year’s Summer Games is an opportunity to provide their war weary compatriots back home with something to cheer, while also reminding the world of Russia’s ongoing invasion. Since the start of the full-scale invasion in February 2022, many of Ukraine’s Olympic athletes have had to train in exceptionally difficult conditions. Some have been forced to relocate from areas that have fallen under Russian occupation, while all have grown used to the daily trauma of the war and the regular disruption caused by Russian air raids.

Ahead of the Paris Olympics, Olga Kharlan was widely seen as one of Ukraine’s best medal hopes. Born in Mykolaiv, she has been fencing since the age of ten. Prior to the 2024 Olympics, she had already amassed four Olympic medals in a glittering career that has also seen her win six world titles. The thirty-three-year-old Ukrainian star demonstrated her mental strength during the third place playoff in Paris, overcoming South Korea’s Choi Sebin in a dramatic comeback win.

Thanks to her new bronze medal, Kharlan now shares top spot among Ukraine’s leading Olympians with a total of five medals. She claimed her first medal at the Beijing Olympics in 2008 before securing further honors in 2012 and 2016. However, the Ukrainian star says her success in the French capital stands out. “This medal is totally different,” commented Kharlan in Paris this week. “It’s special because it’s for my country. This is a message to all the world that Ukraine will never give up.”

Mark Temnycky is a nonresident fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

Further reading

UkraineAlert Jul 25, 2024

Putin is convinced he can outlast the West and win in Ukraine

By Mykola Bielieskov

The West’s collective fear of escalation and reluctance to commit to Ukrainian victory have convinced Putin that he can outlast his opponents and achieve an historic triumph in Ukraine, writes Mykola Bielieskov.

Conflict Defense Industry

UkraineAlert Jul 22, 2024

Andriy Yermak: Ukraine and NATO are restoring Europe’s security architecture

By Andriy Yermak

Together with the country’s allies, Ukraine has set out on the path to restore the European security architecture, writes the head of Ukraine’s Office of the President Andriy Yermak.

Conflict Defense Industry

UkraineAlert Jun 12, 2024

Ukraine is making the Russian occupation of Crimea untenable

By Olivia Yanchik

Ukraine’s growing air strike capabilities are decimating Russian air defenses in Crimea and making the occupation of the peninsula increasingly untenable, writes Olivia Yanchik.

Conflict Defense Technologies

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

Read more from UkraineAlert

UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia and Central Asia in the East.

Learn more

The post Paris Olympics: Ukrainian dedicates medal to athletes killed by Russia appeared first on Atlantic Council.

What EU reforms will make enlargement successful? Why should Europe focus on the Balkans? What are the potential opportunities and challenges for EU enlargement and the Growth Plan for this region?

Join Nonresident Senior Fellow Ilva Tare in this episode of #BalkansDebrief as she interviews Enrico Letta, former Prime Minister of Italy and current President of the Institut Jacques Delors. With his extensive experience in European Union affairs and his recent influential report on the future of the Single Market, Mr. Letta provides deep insights into the necessary reforms for successful EU enlargement.

In this episode, Mr. Letta discusses his advocacy for the “Regatta Method” over the “Big Bang” approach for EU enlargement, emphasizing the importance of allowing each country to join when ready rather than waiting for the slowest in the region. He also elaborates on his proposed blueprint for EU enlargement success, which includes critical reforms such as on veto rules and the creation of a “solidarity enlargement facility.”

Discover the future of the EU and the vital steps needed to integrate the six Western Balkan countries into the new Single Market, as envisioned by Enrico Letta, a staunch advocate of enlargement in the Western Balkans.

#BalkansDebrief is an online interview series presented by the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center and hosted by journalist Ilva Tare. The program offers a fresh look at the Western Balkans and examines the region’s people, culture, challenges, and opportunities.

Watch #BalkansDebrief on YouTube and listen to it as a Podcast.

Fellow

Ilva Tare

Resident Senior Fellow

Europe Center

Albanian English

The Europe Center promotes leadership, strategies, and analysis to ensure a strong, ambitious, and forward-looking transatlantic relationship.

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The post #BalkansDebrief – What EU reforms will make enlargement successful? A Debrief with Enrico Letta appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Ever since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion almost two and a half years ago, the Kremlin has faced repeated accusations of deliberately targeting Ukrainian medical facilities. On the first anniversary of the invasion, CNN reported that “nearly one in ten” Ukrainian hospitals had been damaged as a result of Russian military actions. Underlining the frequency of such incidents, Kyiv’s Okhmatdyt Children’s Hospital was one of three separate Ukrainian medical facilities to be struck by Russian missiles on July 8.

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

The Russian military has killed a large number of Ukrainian healthcare professionals over the past two and a half years. Monday’s bombings resulted in the deaths of an least six Ukrainian medics. They joined hundreds of colleagues from the healthcare industry who have been killed since the invasion began. Russian military actions have also resulted in billions of dollars worth of damage to Ukrainian healthcare facilities. In many cases, this has made it impossible to continue providing essential medical support, leading to significant further human costs.

The campaign against Ukraine’s healthcare infrastructure is in no way exceptional and appears to align with Russian military doctrine. Similar patterns of attacks on clinics and hospitals have been identified during Russian military campaigns in Syria, Georgia, Chechnya, and beyond. Unless Russia can be held accountable for the targeting of healthcare infrastructure, it potentially opens the door for other countries to adopt similar military tactics in future conflicts.

Eurasia Center events

Online Event Thu, August 15, 2024 • 9:00 am ET

Ukraine’s advance in Kursk: What’s next and implications

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According to international humanitarian law, healthcare institutions and medical personnel are afforded specific and enhanced protection in conflict zones. Despite this status, Russia is accused of systematically targeting medical facilities across Ukraine. These attacks have been documented by the “Attacks on Health Care in Ukraine” project, which is run by a coalition of Ukrainian and international civil society organizations.

In addition to direct military attacks on healthcare infrastructure, research carried out by this civil society initiative has also identified a clear pattern of Russian behavior in occupied areas involving restricted access to essential healthcare services. Throughout regions of Ukraine that are currently under Kremlin control, the occupation authorities reportedly withhold medical care unless Ukrainians accept Russian citizenship and are otherwise cooperative.

It is also crucial to acknowledge the indirect impact of the Russian invasion on Ukrainian healthcare. The war unleashed by Vladimir Putin in February 2022 has created a range of long-term challenges including unprecedented demographic changes and a dramatic increase in mental health disorders. The healthcare ramifications of Russian aggression extend beyond Ukraine’s borders, including the burden placed on foreign healthcare systems by millions of Ukrainian refugees fleeing the war.

Prosecuting Russia for war crimes related to the targeting of Ukraine’s healthcare infrastructure is likely to be an extremely challenging and time-consuming process. Potential obstacles include slow judicial systems, difficulties in identifying individuals responsible for deliberate attacks, and problems establishing clear links between the perpetrators and the crime. Collecting evidence that meets international prosecution standards is also a complex task during ongoing combat operations.

In order to break the cycle of impunity, the international community must prioritize the investigation and prosecution of those who deliberately target healthcare infrastructure and medical personnel. This process should involve international and domestic legal systems along with the relevant UN investigative bodies.

Russia is clearly targeting the Ukrainian healthcare system and weaponizing the provision of medical services as part of a campaign aimed at breaking Ukrainian resistance and strengthening Moscow’s grip on occupied regions of the country. Unless there is accountability for these crimes, Russia’s actions will set a dangerous precedent that will lead to similar offenses in other conflict zones.

Olha Fokaf is a healthcare specialist currently serving as a consultant to the World Bank in Kyiv.

Further reading

UkraineAlert Jun 4, 2024

Vladimir Putin just tacitly admitted Crimea is not really part of Russia

By Peter Dickinson

Russia claims to have annexed five Ukrainian provinces but refuses to extend security red lines to these regions. This highlights the pragmatic political realities behind Putin’s talk of historic conquests, writes Peter Dickinson.

Conflict Disinformation

UkraineAlert May 30, 2024

If the West wants a sustainable peace it must commit to Ukrainian victory

By Hanna Hopko, Andrius Kubilius

Since 2022, Western policies of escalation management have failed to appease Putin and have only emboldened the Kremlin. If the West wants peace, it must help Ukraine win, write Hanna Hopko and Andrius Kubilius.

Civil Society Conflict

UkraineAlert Jun 12, 2024

Ukraine is making the Russian occupation of Crimea untenable

By Olivia Yanchik

Ukraine’s growing air strike capabilities are decimating Russian air defenses in Crimea and making the occupation of the peninsula increasingly untenable, writes Olivia Yanchik.

Conflict Defense Technologies

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

Read more from UkraineAlert

UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia and Central Asia in the East.

Learn more

The post Hospital bombing was latest act in Russia’s war on Ukrainian healthcare appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The post Charai for The National Interest: Assessing the G7 Summit appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On July 3, Markus Garlauskas appeared on CBS to discuss Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping’s recent meeting at the Shanghai Cooperation Organization Summit in Kazakhstan. Garlauskas explained that this partnership allows China to support Russia’s war against Ukraine and more effectively confront the US in their attempt to reshape the strategic environment and challenge the rules-based international order.  

Staff

Markus Garlauskas

Director

Indo-Pacific Security Initiative Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Crisis Management Indo-Pacific

The post Garlauskas featured on CBS discussing Putin-Xi meeting appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On the eve of the invasion in February 2022, the Russian Navy began blocking Ukraine’s Black Sea ports, cutting off long-established trade routes taking Ukrainian grain and other agricultural goods to international markets. This represented a devastating blow to the Ukrainian economy, while also increasing the threat of famine in countries throughout the Global South dependent on Ukrainian food supplies.

For more than two years, this attack on the Ukrainian agricultural sector has continued to accelerate. From Odesa to the Danube Delta, the southern Ukrainian port facilities that are so crucial to the export of agricultural produce have been subjected to relentless bombardment. According to Odesa Military Administration head Oleh Kiper, this has made it impossible to accumulate large quantities of grain in warehouse facilities, and is forcing the country’s agricultural exporters to operate under constant threat of attack.

Ukraine’s agricultural infrastructure is also being systematically targeted across the country, with regular Russian attacks on equipment, storage facilities, and transport hubs. According to recent research, the total value of destroyed agricultural assets amounts to more than ten billion US dollars. Meanwhile, approximately two billion dollars worth of Ukrainian agricultural products have been destroyed or stolen and shipped to Kremlin allies such as Syria and Iran.

The scale of the damage done to Ukraine’s farmlands is staggering. More than one-third of the Ukrainian agricultural land dedicated to cereal production has been directly affected by the war, with about four million hectares currently unusable due to mining, munitions, or ongoing hostilities. A further eight million hectares of Ukrainian farmland is currently under Russian occupation. Beyond the front lines, Russia is also accused of deliberately setting fire to Ukrainian grain fields.

The Kremlin’s goal is clear: Russia aims to inflict irreparable damage on Ukraine’s agricultural industry, leading to economic collapse and depopulation. Ukraine has historically been known as Europe’s breadbasket, with the country’s agricultural sector serving as a key engine of the national economy. By blocking agricultural exports, destroying agricultural infrastructure, and preventing farmers from growing crops, Moscow hopes to undermine the economic foundations of Ukrainian statehood and pave the way for the country’s subjugation.

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

Russia’s campaign against the Ukrainian agricultural industry also has a broader international dimension. The Kremlin is using food as a weapon to expand its influence throughout the Global South while employing a combination of blackmail and bribery. Moscow seeks to prevent Ukraine from exporting foodstuffs to countries in Africa and Asia, while at the same time looking to “replace Ukrainian grain” with Russian supplies.

In summer 2022, there were hopes of some relieve for the Ukrainian agricultural sector when Russia signed up to a UN-brokered grain deal. This apparent breakthrough sparked initial optimism, but ultimately highlighted the Kremlin’s readiness to exploit global food security concerns. The UN-backed grain agreement allowed for limited exports of grain from Ukraine’s Black Sea ports, but it soon became apparent that Moscow saw the deal primarily as an opportunity to secure further concessions. The Kremlin consistently sabotaged implementation of the grain agreement, before unilaterally withdrawing one year later when its escalating demands were not met.

Eurasia Center events

Online Event Thu, August 15, 2024 • 9:00 am ET

Ukraine’s advance in Kursk: What’s next and implications

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Ukraine has achieved some notable successes in defense of the country’s farming industry. Beginning in August 2023, Ukraine has managed to partially unblock the country’s Black Sea ports and resume grain deliveries through the creation of a new corridor for merchant shipping. Maritime agricultural export volumes are now close to prewar levels, underlining the remarkable resilience of wartime Ukraine.

The resumption of agricultural exports via Ukraine’s Black Sea ports represents one of the country’s most significant victories since the onset of Russia’s full-scale invasion. This was made possible by the innovative use of Ukrainian drone technologies and the effective deployment of missiles provided by the country’s international partners, allowing Ukraine to significantly reduce the Russian Navy’s effectiveness in the Black Sea.

Despite this progress, much more still needs to be done in order to safeguard shipping lanes and allow for the free passage of agricultural produce across the Black Sea to global markets. As the trade routes that Russia is targeting lie in international waters, this is not an issue for Ukraine alone. Instead, there are implications for the wider international community, especially for other Black Sea region countries. It is important to hold Russia accountable for jeopardizing the security of vital maritime trade routes and for engaging in conduct that could be classified as piracy.

Ukraine has proven that it can fight back effectively against Russia with even limited resources. The Ukrainian military has damaged or destroyed around one-third of the Russian Black Sea Fleet, and has forced Putin to withdraw the bulk of his remaining warships from occupied Crimea to Russia itself. Ukraine now urgently needs to receive fighter jets, long-range missiles, and air defenses from the country’s international partners. With the right tools, Ukraine will be able to protect its ports and agricultural infrastructure, enforce international law in the Black Sea, and safeguard the breadbasket of Europe from further Russian attack.

Hanna Hopko is co-founder of the International Center for Ukrainian Victory and head of the ANTS Network. She was a member of the Ukrainian Parliament from 2014 to 2019 and served as head of the Parliamentary Committee on Foreign Affairs.

Further reading

UkraineAlert May 30, 2024

If the West wants a sustainable peace it must commit to Ukrainian victory

By Hanna Hopko, Andrius Kubilius

Since 2022, Western policies of escalation management have failed to appease Putin and have only emboldened the Kremlin. If the West wants peace, it must help Ukraine win, write Hanna Hopko and Andrius Kubilius.

Civil Society Conflict

UkraineAlert Jun 12, 2024

Ukraine is making the Russian occupation of Crimea untenable

By Olivia Yanchik

Ukraine’s growing air strike capabilities are decimating Russian air defenses in Crimea and making the occupation of the peninsula increasingly untenable, writes Olivia Yanchik.

Conflict Defense Technologies

UkraineAlert Jun 4, 2024

Vladimir Putin just tacitly admitted Crimea is not really part of Russia

By Peter Dickinson

Russia claims to have annexed five Ukrainian provinces but refuses to extend security red lines to these regions. This highlights the pragmatic political realities behind Putin’s talk of historic conquests, writes Peter Dickinson.

Conflict Disinformation

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

Read more from UkraineAlert

UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia and Central Asia in the East.

Learn more

The post Bombing Europe’s breadbasket: Russia targets Ukrainian farmers appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The ICC first opened proceedings into Russia’s invasion in March 2022. One year later, arrest warrants were issued for Putin himself and the Russian President’s human rights ombudsman, Maria Lvova-Belova, over the mass abduction of Ukrainian children. Ukrainian officials say thousands of Ukrainian children have been deported to Russia since the start of the full-scale invasion, with many adopted into Russian families or sent to camps where they are subjected to ideological indoctrination designed to erase their Ukrainian identity. This may qualify as an act of genocide, according to the UN’s 1948 Genocide Convention and the Rome Statute. 

In March 2024, the ICC announced new arrest warrants for Russian Air Force long range aviation chief Sergei Kobylash and Russian Black Sea Fleet commander Viktor Sokolov in connection with the bombing of Ukraine’s power grid. ICC prosecutors aim to charge the Russian commanders with the alleged commission of war crimes and crimes against humanity because they say the bombing campaign was part of a state policy of widespread attacks on the civilian population.

This week’s warrants represent a significant step forward in efforts to hold Russia legally accountable for crimes committed in Ukraine. The latest suspects are top Russian military officials and key figures alongside Putin in the leadership of the invasion. Both Gerasimov and Shoigu would be potential suspects in a future prosecution for the crime of aggression. However, the ICC does not have jurisdiction over this crime, while plans to establish a special tribunal remain at the early stages. 

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

News of the arrest warrants for Shoigu and Gerasimov was welcomed in Ukraine, with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy calling the ICC decision “a clear indication that justice for Russian crimes against Ukrainians is inevitable.” At the same time, there is little prospect of Russian leaders standing trial in The Hague any time soon.

All member countries of the ICC are expected to hand over suspects to the court, but Russia is not a member. Predictably, Russian officials have denounced the court’s latest warrants as part of a “hybrid war” being waged against the country. Ukraine is also not a member of the ICC but has granted the court jurisdiction to prosecute war crimes committed since the start of Russia’s invasion.

Eurasia Center events

Online Event Thu, August 15, 2024 • 9:00 am ET

Ukraine’s advance in Kursk: What’s next and implications

Conflict Russia Security & Defense Ukraine

While it remains unlikely that the ICC will be able to enforce its arrest warrants, the charges do have potential practical implications including restrictions on international travel. Indeed, concerns over possible arrest for war crimes are believed to have been instrumental in convincing Putin not to attend last summer’s annual BRICS summit in South Africa. If Shoigu and Gerasimov had any plans to travel internationally, they may now be forced to rethink.

It is also significant that the latest charges include allegations of crimes against humanity. While there is no such thing as an official hierarchy of international crimes, it is generally accepted that crimes against humanity are more serious offenses than war crimes and incur graver penalties. This may help Ukraine to consolidate support for Kyiv’s peace initiatives, while also strengthening international efforts to bring Russia to justice for crimes committed during the invasion. 

Russia’s bombardment of the Ukrainian electricity grid has been a particular focus for ICC investigators. This year’s arrest warrants address the period from October 2022 to March 2023, which saw the first campaign of intensified attacks. However, the bombing has continued, with Russian missile and drone strikes during the first half of 2024 damaging or destroying around half of Ukraine’s remaining power-generating capacity. 

This destruction has left Ukraine facing a possible humanitarian catastrophe during the coming winter months. Officials are currently warning that the civilian population may be restricted to six hours of electricity per day at a time when temperatures typically fall well below freezing for extended periods. This underlines the urgency of challenging Russian impunity and demonstrating that senior Russian officials will be held responsible for crimes committed in Ukraine.

Andrii Mikheiev is a lawyer at the International Centre for Ukrainian Victory.

Further reading

UkraineAlert May 30, 2024

If the West wants a sustainable peace it must commit to Ukrainian victory

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The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

Read more from UkraineAlert

UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia and Central Asia in the East.

Learn more

The post More senior Russian officials join Putin on war crimes wanted list appeared first on Atlantic Council.

In early June, new developments in The Hague served as a reminder to key Russian propagandists, including one of Russia’s former presidents, that they may one day face similar charges. As allowed by Article 15 of the Rome Statute, a coalition of non-government organizations jointly submitted a formal Communication to the Office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC) requesting an investigation into six Russian nationals involved in state propaganda. Notably, this coalition included international and Ukrainian groups, as well as one Russian NGO.

The Communication urged the ICC to investigate the Russians for criminal hate speech. The accused include Dmitry Medvedev, former Russian president and current Security Council Deputy Chairman; Vladimir Solovyov, a popular host on Russian state-owned television channel Rossiya-1; Margarita Simonyan, editor-in-chief of Russia Today; Dmitry Kiselyov, head of the state-owned media consortium Rossiya Segodnya; and Sergey Mardan, a popular television and radio host. The Communication also named Alexey Gromov, First Deputy to the Presidential Executive Office’s Chief of Staff, stating his role in ordering or failing to prevent over 300 examples of criminal incitement to violence from February 24, 2022 to February 24, 2024. 

This initiative is arguably long overdue. Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine began more than two years ago, Russian state and state-aligned actors are accused of committing a daily litany of horrific atrocities against Ukrainians. In such a context, it is tempting to overlook the rhetoric behind these actions, but the Russia-Ukraine War illustrates the dangers of ignoring the threats made by powerful Russian media figures. Many in the Russian media have openly telegraphed eliminationist rhetoric against Ukrainians for years, setting the stage for the largest military attack in Europe since World War II. Their continuing threats against the existence of Ukraine, and against other Western countries, pose a direct threat to international security.  

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

Since 2022, it has become increasingly apparent that Russia’s highly sophisticated propaganda machine requires novel legal and policy responses. New dangerous and diffuse platforms for Russia’s inciting language and other disinformation continue to emerge. In addition to the kind of conventional propaganda most are familiar with, Russian actors now spread public incitement and more subtle disinformation through social media, bot farms, video games, movies, and manipulated content (including deepfakes). International law does not yet cover each of these categories, as older legal frameworks concentrate on historical understandings of propaganda in legacy media formats.

These realities pose serious challenges for anyone seeking to protect victimized groups from atrocity crimes. International law, including the United Nations Genocide Convention, prohibits all means of disseminating direct and public incitement. Still, Russia’s sophisticated networks of propaganda platforms make upholding these provisions difficult. As these challenges increase, Russian techniques of shaping subconscious dehumanization continue to evolve. This fostering of cascading radicalization within Russian society may prove even more impactful than one-time calls for violence, while being more difficult to trace and prosecute.

Some Russian efforts to stay ahead of judicial accountability are clear. Even the Russian authorities felt compelled to respond to Russian journalist Anton Kravosky’s call to drown Ukrainian children in a river (he was suspended from RT for these comments, although an investigative committee later stated he had committed no crime). After these events, some Russian propagandists became noticeably more careful, cloaking their rhetoric through allusions and metaphors. Still, even this “hidden rhetoric” often meets legal requirements for incitement and other criminal propaganda. 

Eurasia Center events

Online Event Thu, August 15, 2024 • 9:00 am ET

Ukraine’s advance in Kursk: What’s next and implications

Conflict Russia Security & Defense Ukraine

The gravity of alleged Russian atrocities against Ukrainians compels international urgency to disrupt Moscow’s escalation in direct violence and associated inciting propaganda to destroy Ukraine and Ukrainians. Days after posting a profanity-filled acknowledgement of the NGO-led Communication to the ICC, Dmitry Medvedev followed up with a video showing all of Ukraine as “belonging” to Russia. This complete obliteration of Ukraine from world maps was the first time a top Kremlin official had overtly claimed the entirety of Ukraine as a stated goal, showing a link between words and projected actions.

The international community now faces a critical moment. It also has a unique chance to create a legal framework and enforcement mechanism capable of implementation through international cooperation. Beginning at home, Ukraine’s legal system requires amendments to systematize prosecutions in absentia for genocidal incitement. International partners must support these efforts by surging law enforcement resources to monitor the flood of calls for violence emanating from Russian media and from more shadowy Kremlin-backed propaganda platforms.

For Russian propagandists to face the criminal consequences of their conduct, international arrest warrants are indispensable. Bolstering political will for judicial accountability and opening criminal proceedings should be the two major areas of focus. To ensure accountability, Ukraine and its partners must now plan for realistic enforcement mechanisms that implement trial verdicts and deny safe havens of non-extradition. The words and actions of Kremlin propagandists have combined to fuel unimaginable atrocities in Ukraine. To protect Ukrainians and other victims, and to prevent further armed conflicts fuelled by propaganda, the international community must break the cycle of Russia’s real or imagined impunity.

Kristina Hook is assistant professor of conflict management at Kennesaw State University and a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center. Anna Vyshniakova is a war crimes lawyer and a legal consultant, head of legal NGO LingvaLexa, and author of the book “Incitement to Genocide: How to Bring Propagandists to Justice.”

Further reading

UkraineAlert Jun 12, 2024

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Civil Society Conflict

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

Read more from UkraineAlert

UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia and Central Asia in the East.

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The post Holding Putin’s propagandists accountable for crimes in Ukraine appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Solving these administrative problems is one of the biggest impediments to formalizing a secretariat. To ensure that the Three Seas Initiative (3SI), which convenes at the annual summits, can effectively and quickly address the unique challenges facing its thirteen Southeastern, Central, and Eastern European member states, associate states, and strategic partners in reaching common goals, its leaders must now agree on a structure.

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More than 900 participants joined this year’s summit, which every year aims to explore ways to tap members’ vast economic potential while fortifying against mounting security threats. They discussed ways to advance connectivity, economic growth, and broader security by overcoming shared regional barriers via the 3SI mechanism. However, making progress between summits requires institutionalization of the 3SI through a permanent secretariat body to maintain momentum and focus between the annual events.

How a 3SI institution could work

The secretariat could be launched and housed in a neutral, non-3SI city in Europe, preferably a financial hub, like Brussels, with a small permanent team whose operating costs would be covered by the 3SI country hosting the summit that year. The 3SI team’s initial guidance could include exchange of information between 3SI stakeholders, outreach to private investors, and the promotion of cross-border digital, energy, and transportation projects in the region, with a particular focus on the project priority list. In a sense, the secretariat would serve as a library of projects for inquiring investors. The 3SI platform can play a meaningful role in helping resolve top priority issues in the region, which were raised repeatedly at the summit, ministerial, and in private events (including those jointly hosted by the Atlantic Council, Clean Air Task Force, and Amber Infrastructure Group). These issues include:

• Access to finance
• Fragmented market
• Supply chains risks
• Russian aggression in Ukraine and the broader region
• Commercialization of new technologies and innovative solutions
• Workforce shortages

By addressing these challenges throughout the year (through the work between the summits), the 3SI stakeholders would create compounding benefits, securities, and efficiencies for Europe, particularly through 3SI’s unique power to connect traditionally siloed sectors and geographies and its magnifying platform for bringing attention to the top challenges in the region.  

Leaning into the 3SI mission

Once a 3SI body is created, it can rapidly get to work on actualizing steps toward achieving its goals, including regional integration of resources, coordination of workforce development, optimization of external partnerships, and raising finance. Dialogue at the Three Seas summits has yielded broad consensus and support for these priorities.

Goal 1: Integrating the regions, markets, and innovation

Despite gigantic leaps in connectivity across Europe, regional integration is hampered by the lack of cross-border coordination, regulatory hurdles, supply chain risks, and market fragmentation. These gaps create diverging prices, inefficient routes, and lags in information sharing. 3SI would not be a one-fix-fits-all in resolving these issues, but the presidential-level platform has untapped potential to alleviate some of these challenges. 3SI is uniquely positioned to highlight the regional cost and security threats of insufficient energy interconnection, transportation routes, and digital integration. Priority-project lists should be frequently updated and expanded, something the secretariat can manage, to provide ample options for potential investors with projects’ bankability and other relevant details included.

Moreover, 3SI has a unique opportunity to embrace a technologically neutral approach while focusing on solutions-driven criteria: competitive pricing, carbon emissions, environmental impacts, and secure and diversified supply chains. To scale new technologies, the 3SI secretariat could support existing regional coordination on regulatory alignment to forge an easy-to-navigate investment environment. Cooperation on cyber security and kinetic threats across 3SI stakeholders can enhance protection for these technologies and infrastructure in the region.

Goal 2: Investing in a workforce that will transform the region

In addition to the work dismantling regulatory barriers, 3SI can contribute to forging an innovation ecosystem through building a talented workforce for the future. The Three Seas economies have a unique opportunity to exchange data around the current labor force and the anticipated talent gap in energy, digital, and transportation sectors. The region is already leading in science and technology education in Europe and can build on this competitive advantage by scaling the number of trained professionals through coordinating programs and forging an efficient education-to-workforce placement pipeline. The annual 3SI summits could include programming dedicated to student engagement, recruitment, and education on key opportunities in the growing sectors.

Goal 3: Optimizing collaboration with 3SI associated and strategic partners

Japan’s inclusion as a 3SI strategic partner this year is a testament to the value of global partnership on commercialization of new technologies and diversified supply chains. Several summit panels touched on driving Japanese companies’ investments in the region, particularly rail and communications sectors development.

3SI countries also have an opportunity to develop strategic priorities in support of associate members Ukraine and Moldova (complementary to the existing efforts), while exploring the potential to build additional energy and transport interconnections, as well as collaboration in the digital space.

Goal 4: Financing a secure, competitive, and low-carbon Three Seas region

An enormous barrier to achieving 3SI priorities is the trillion-dollar gap between where infrastructure stands today and where the region agrees it needs to be. National budgets are insufficient. EU funding is challenging to access and excludes some infrastructure and technologies. The Three Seas Fund, 3SI’s investment arm, can play an important role in leveraging private finance and helping match public and private capital to realize the projects. As the next round of the 3SI fund is established, attracting private equity will be crucial for reaching scale of impact. Cross-country coordination creates efficiency and minimizes risk for cross-border investments, particularly in addressing the grid infrastructure gaps and preparing roads for a safe, low-carbon transportation future.

Achieving a shared vision of the future

No similar coalition exists with focus on security and economic prosperity through integration. This shared vision of a secure, digitized, integrated, low-carbon, resilient economy is refined every year at the Three Seas Summit as new ideas are shared on stage, discussed during coffee breaks, and put to the test following the conference. With the formalization of a 3SI institution to build on the work between summits, 3SI could be an unstoppable platform for realizing the region’s rich potential and talent.

Olga Khakova is the deputy director for European energy security at the Atlantic Council Global Energy Center

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Olga Khakova

Deputy Director, European Energy Security

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Central Asia Central Europe

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The Three Seas Initiative (3SI) Summit in Bucharest takes place next week. To catalyze investment and diversify away from Russian energy, the summit should establish a Three Seas Chamber of Commerce, capable of sustaining progress and unleashing the region’s full potential.

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Central and Eastern European leaders discussed the Initiative’s efforts to attract investment, as well as Ukraine’s potential membership.

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The post From Vilnius to Warsaw: How to Advance Three Seas Goals Between Summits appeared first on Atlantic Council.

“This summer more than ever before, our national team will be playing for all Ukrainians and for every single defender of the country,” comments Igor Gryshchenko of the Ukrainian Football Association. “Euro 2024 is also a great opportunity to remind the world that the Russian invasion of Ukraine is not over and is currently escalating.”

Officials from the Ukrainian Football Association have sought to maintain contact with those currently serving on the front lines of the war. Gryshchenko says this engagement helps underline the morale-boosting role of the national football team’s success. “We see the positive impact our victories can have, generating a sense of pride and strength.”

Ukrainian national team coach Serhiy Rebrov has voiced similar sentiments. Following Ukraine’s March 2024 victory in the Euro 2024 play-off final against Iceland, Rebrov said qualification for this summer’s tournament was “for our supporters, for our country, for our people, and for our soldiers who are now protecting our freedom.”

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

The full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine has had a dramatic impact on almost every aspect of daily life, including the country’s football industry. In the days following the invasion, the Ukrainian Premier League abandoned the 2021-2022 season entirely. The league returned months later, with matches now mostly staged in western Ukraine without the presence of supporters in stadiums. Games are often interrupted by air raids.

For security reasons, the Ukrainian national team has been forced to train and play outside the country since February 2022. Ukraine narrowly missed out on a berth at the 2022 FIFA World Cup in Qatar, but made it through the Euro 2024 play-offs to secure a place at the European Championship for only the fourth time in the country’s history.

Many of Ukraine’s soccer stars have become prominent supporters of the country’s war effort, providing humanitarian and military aid while also using their high public profiles to keep the invasion in the international spotlight. National team captain Andriy Yarmolenko is one of numerous players to donate significant sums, while colleague Taras Stepanenko was nominated for an award from FIFPRO, the worldwide representative organization for professional footballers, for his work aiding Ukrainians whose lives have been impacted by the Russian invasion.

Eurasia Center events

Online Event Thu, August 15, 2024 • 9:00 am ET

Ukraine’s advance in Kursk: What’s next and implications

Conflict Russia Security & Defense Ukraine

Oleksandr Zinchenko is one of Ukraine’s most recognizable faces thanks to stints with English Premier League heavyweights Manchester City and Arsenal. He was appointed by Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy as an ambassador for the country’s official UNITED24 fundraising initiative, and teamed up with fellow Ukrainian footballing icon Andriy Shevchenko to organize a star-studded charity match in London last summer to support Ukrainian humanitarian efforts.

Zinchenko has spoken about the conflicting emotions of supporting his country’s war effort from afar. “I really want to be in Ukraine,” he told BBC Newsnight in April. In common with many of Ukraine’s most prominent sports personalities, Zinchenko has concluded that he can have a bigger impact by leveraging his public profile on the international stage. “The question is where we are more helpful for our country,” he commented.

As well as individual efforts, Ukrainian footballers have also worked together to found the Stands of Heroes organization. This initiative was established to support the relatives of football fans defending the country. So far, Ukrainian footballers have assisted more than 200 families impacted by the war. “This is one way for Ukrainian footballers to help football supporters who are fighting and volunteering on the front,” said Ukrainian national team defender Yukhym Konoplya.

Despite frequent claims that sport should be kept separate from politics, Ukraine’s appearance at the European Championship will inevitably help draw international attention to the ongoing Russian invasion of the country. The Ukrainian squad will also be acutely aware of their role as ambassadors of a nation that is currently fighting for survival.

Ukraine can expect no favors at Euro 2024 and will have to overcome Romania, Slovakia, and Belgium if they are to progress beyond the group stages of the tournament. Serhiy Rebrov’s players will be motivated by the knowledge that victory on the football pitch could provide their war-weary compatriots with a much-needed morale boost.

Mark Temnycky is a nonresident fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center. 

Further reading

UkraineAlert May 16, 2024

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The mood in Kharkiv is a mix of anger, anxiety, and defiance as Ukraine’s second city prepares to defend itself against a new Russian offensive, writes Maria Avdeeva.

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Russia has opened a new front in the invasion of Ukraine with a cross-border offensive in the northeastern Kharkiv region as Putin seeks to capitalize on a window of opportunity before fresh Western aid reaches Ukrainian front line troops, writes Mykola Bielieskov.

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Putin’s one tank victory parade is a timely reminder Russia can be beaten

By Peter Dickinson

Putin’s one tank victory parade reflects the catastrophic scale of Russian losses in Ukraine and is a reminder that behind the facade of overwhelming strength, the Russian army is far from invincible, writes Peter Dickinson.

Conflict Defense Industry

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

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UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia and Central Asia in the East.

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The post Ukraine’s soccer stars aim for Euro 2024 glory amid Russian invasion appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On Thursday, April 25, the Atlantic Council’s WIn Fellowship hosted a panel discussion on the vital role Arab women ambassadors play in shaping the field of diplomacy, both in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, and globally.

The conversation was moderated by Lynn Monzer, Deputy Director of the Atlantic Council’s WIn Fellowship and featured H.E. Sheikha Al-Zain Al-Sabah, Ambassador of the State of Kuwait to the United States of America; H.E. Hanene Tajouri Bessassi, Ambassador of the Republic of Tunisia to the United States of America; and H.E. Amal Mudallali, former Ambassador to the Permanent Mission of Lebanon to the United Nations (UN).  

Deciding on diplomacy

H.E. Sheikha Al-Zain Al-Sabah initiated the conversation by sharing insights from her background in journalism, where she encountered diverse mindsets through storytelling. This experience highlighted her natural diplomatic skills, as navigating complex systems and creating sustainable solutions in business mirrored key aspects of diplomacy. These experiences and insights logically paved the way for her career in diplomacy.

Similarly, H.E. Hanene Tajouri Bessassi transitioned from an initial aspiration to become a physician to recognizing the diplomatic field as another form of healing. In her view, diplomacy involves listening to those in distress, diagnosing societal issues, and crafting viable solutions, thus paralleling the healing processes in medicine.

Like Al-Sabah, H.E. Amal Mudallali started in journalism, with ambitions centered on reporting at the UN. After achieving this, she ventured deeper into politics, eventually serving under two Lebanese prime ministers and later as the Ambassador of Lebanon to the UN. She emphasized the critical role of male allies in politics, where men predominantly hold power but greatly benefit from women’s collaborative and problem-solving skills.

In addition to winding career paths, all three diplomats agreed on the importance of a robust support system for success in diplomacy. Bessassi thanked her parents and husband specifically for the strength, independence, and commitment necessary to work in the diplomatic field. Echoing the sentiment on support systems, Mudallali highlighted her grandmother’s empowering role during her upbringing. She also stressed the crucial need for political backing, citing the potential difficulties and injustices faced without such support. Al-Sabah, similarly, underscored the significance of a nurturing ecosystem for achieving success. For her, the focus is on contributing back to this ecosystem and the broader community, often through mentoring other women, providing support, advice, and honest guidance on their professional journeys.

Navigating the field’s challenges

Bessassi then turned to the challenges facing women in diplomacy. She noted that despite Tunisia’s rich history of influential women leaders, gender parity remains elusive. This disparity is underscored by prevailing gender stereotypes that still hinder women’s effectiveness in all fields, including diplomacy. Bessassi argued against the perception that empathy—a trait often associated with women—is a weakness. Instead, she illustrated how empathy enhances diplomatic efforts by fostering consensus and compromise, bringing more people into the fold while working toward peace and cooperation.

The underrepresentation of women in global diplomacy was further addressed by Al-Sabah, who pointed out that women make up only 21 percent of ambassadors worldwide. She emphasized the importance of improving representation and noted that the participation of women on the panel, along with other women ambassadors in the United States from Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Mauritania, represents significant progress in altering public perceptions about women in diplomacy.

Mudallali echoed these concerns with specific examples from the United Nations, where women’s representation has been backsliding; the number of women UN representatives decreased from 52 in 2020 to 46 today. She linked this trend to a global phenomenon such as Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, as countries have become more brazen in rejecting previously held norms such as equal gender representation. She also noted the decrease in women’s participation in peace negotiations. In 2020, women represented 23 percent of negotiators in active peace processes, dropping to 16 percent in 2023. Based on analysis of real-world peace processes, agreements between negotiators are much more likely to be reached when women have a strong influence on the negotiations.

Al-Sabah added that 2023 saw a 50 percent increase in war-induced violence against women, reinforcing the necessity for women’s voices in peace negotiations. This backslide in gender representation, Mudallali argued, demands urgent attention and action in line with UN Security Council Resolution 1325, which focuses on women, peace, and security.

Bessassi acknowledged these recent challenges nut also emphasized the power of collective effort among women ambassadors, which has the potential to catalyze global change. Mudallali shared this sentiment,expressing her feeling of responsibility to do everything possible to elevate women, believing that these challenges require structured, codified solutions. Al-Sabah concluded by underscoring the importance of integrating advocacy into diplomacy to empower women effectively. In Kuwait, for instance, the government established the Department of Human Rights within the country’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs in part to address women’s empowerment. Internationally, too, organizations with similar aims must work together to implement Resolution 1325 to ensure countries adhere to international principles of women’s empowerment. For young women in the MENA region and beyond, seeing women in these roles not only offers a glimpse of what is possible but also instills hope and inspiration.

The future of diplomacy

Building on the theme of hope, Al-Sabah discussed a significant shift toward civic diplomacy following Israel’s invasion of Gaza, with women taking on an increased role in this space. She highlighted the courageous efforts of journalists like Shireen Abu Akleh, Plestia Alaqad, and Hind Khoudary who have used their personal cameras and cellphones to broadcast their voices are around the world. Al-Sabah stressed the urgent need for greater protection of journalists in Gaza and around the world, who face harassment and life-threatening dangers in their line of work.

Continuing the conversation, Bessassi emphasized the increasing importance of multilateralism now more than ever in addressing global challenges. She called for consistency in the international community’s approach, as the international community’s engagement on issues like the war in Gaza must avoid “double standards” to effectively address challenges in diplomacy.

Mudallali echoed the sentiments of her colleagues, concluding the panel with a call for strong advocacy for peace. She pointed out that recent global tensions have shifted the focus from collaboration to competition. By supporting women in diplomatic roles, Mudallali argued, societies will not only lift but also enhance their prospects for achieving lasting peace.

The way forward

Over a century since the first appointment of a women ambassador in 1920, women remain severely underrepresented in the predominantly male diplomacy sector. As of 2023, women account for only 20.54 percent of ambassadors worldwide, a decrease from 23 percent in 2020. The disparity is even more pronounced in the MENA region, where women make up just 10 percent of ambassadors, the lowest regional rate globally, highlighting a significant challenge for women in MENA diplomacy.

Despite these daunting numbers in MENA, there have been some encouraging signs of progress. The United Arab Emirates, for instance, has increased its proportion of women ambassadors by 5.5 percent between 2018 and 2023, reaching 12.5 percent. Additionally, a recent Arab Barometer report has shown a marked decrease throughout the MENA region over the past decade in the belief that men are better political leaders than women, suggesting growing acceptance of women in political and diplomatic roles.

However, effectively capitalizing on these openings requires systematic and sustained support. Algeria serves as a cautionary tale where a 2011 gender quota led to increased opposition to women in political leadership due to the absence of systemic improvements or societal readiness for such changes. Conversely, Tunisia witnessed an increase in openness toward women political leadership after the implementation of a similar quota and was further bolstered by President Kais Saied’s appointment of Najla Bouden Romdhane as the first female prime minister in the MENA region. These moves demonstrate that political backing and continued support of women is a crucial component to increasing women’s representation at both the political and diplomatic levels.

In addition to national efforts, international initiatives are crucial. UN Security Council Resolution 1325, which calls for women’s equal participation in preventing violent conflicts, is particularly significant. Supporting this resolution could significantly legitimize women’s roles in conflict mediation. This is supported by data showing that peace negotiations involving women are 35 percent more likely to last for at least fifteen years. Therefore, in the midst of shifting attitudes, a global drive for greater women participation in diplomacy, and the myriad conflicts necessitating peace negotiations, reform toward gender parity in diplomacy is as pressing and timely as ever for the MENA region.

Charles Johnson is a Young Global professional in the Atlantic Council’s Middle East programs

Jun 14, 2023

The WIn Fellowship 2023-2024 cohort

Building on the success of its inaugural cohort, the Women Innovators Fellowship (WIn) is expanding to Bahrain and the UAE, in addition to Saudi Arabia, as it continues to empower more women entrepreneurs from the Middle East. The program is thrilled to announce this year’s eighty-six recipients of its 2023 WIn Fellowship. The participants will receive a year-long program of executive education, mentoring, and networking opportunities in collaboration with Georgetown McDonough School of Business and with the support of the United States embassies in the three target countries and PepsiCo.

May 3, 2024

2024 WIn Fellowship Roadshow

WIn Fellows participate in a fully sponsored trip to the United States for leadership training at Georgetown and meetings with US business and government leaders.

Feb 24, 2023

2023 WIn Fellowship Roadshow

The WIn Fellowship roadshow is led by the Atlantic Council’s empowerME Initiative in cooperation with Georgetown University’s McDonough School of Business with support from US Embassy Riyadh, UPS, and PepsiCo. The WIn Fellowship Roadshow participants, chosen from a highly competitive cohort of more than thirty applicants, receive a fully sponsored trip to the United States for leadership training at Georgetown and meetings with US business and government leaders.

Event Recap Jul 31, 2023

Empowering the future: The rising women workforce in Saudi Arabia’s private sector

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Event recap on the empowering future of the workplace in Saudi Arabia and its impact on the private sector.

Economy & Business Future of Work

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Bridging the gender gap in venture capital

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Event recap on the significance of venture funding for women entrepreneurs in the UAE.

Economy & Business Middle East

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empowerME at the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East is shaping solutions to empower entrepreneurs, women, and youth and building coalitions of public and private partnerships to drive regional economic integration, prosperity, and job creation.

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The report includes the now-infamous Qatargate scandal, in which several sitting and former MEPs were arrested in December 2022 for a cash-for-influence operation. But the report also includes lesser-known cases, such as a privately funded trip for two Irish MEPs to the headquarters of Hashd al-Shaabi, an Iranian-backed, Russian-allied militant organization in Iraq, to criticize US and European military action in Iraq.

The upcoming European Parliament elections in June amplify the urgency of defending the institution against foreign meddling. To accomplish this, EU institutions should codify stricter definitions of foreign influence and interference, and they should pass future reforms as legally binding EU regulations. At the same time, EU officials must ensure that the organization’s transparency and anti-corruption reforms are crafted so that they don’t infringe on member states’ civil society organizations.

It’s not just Qatargate

Qatargate was the most prominent recent scandal to plague the European Parliament. The scheme’s primary goal was to rehabilitate Qatar’s image before the 2022 FIFA World Cup by stifling European Parliament resolutions critical of Doha and drafting speeches for Qatari ministers at EU hearings in exchange for under-the-table payments.

The case came to a head on December 9, 2022, when authorities conducted nineteen raids with eight arrests in Belgium and Italy, complete with the seizure of more than one million euros in cash. The highest-profile arrest was Greek MEP and then Parliament Vice President Eva Kaili. Her partner, Francesco Giorgi, and his boss, former Italian MEP Antonio Panzeri, were both arrested and confessed to involvement in the scandal. Throughout the investigation, authorities uncovered evidence of three hundred alleged attempts to manipulate the European Parliament, with Qatar at the center of the influence deal, which was purportedly worth four million euros.

The Parliament continues to find its current, former, and prospective MEPs embroiled in scandals with foreign governments, often involving Russia or China, especially during election years. In March, the Parliament opened an investigation into Latvian MEP Tatjana Ždanoka, who faces accusations of operating as a Russian agent since 2004. Regional news sites published numerous emails linking Ždanoka to a handler in the Russian Federal Security Service.

Additionally, the far-right Euroskeptic party Alternative for Germany, currently polling second among German voters, has made headlines for major scandals involving its top two candidates for the European elections, Petr Bystron and Maximilian Krah.

In March, reports emerged that Bystron was linked to the Russian-backed propaganda outlet “Voice of Europe,” a platform that spreads disinformation and provides financial support to pro-Russian politicians in the EU. Czech intelligence authorities claim that Bystron received “about 20,000 euros” from the site’s Kremlin-connected operator. The Munich Public Prosecutor’s Office has announced preliminary investigations against Bystron for “possible bribery of elected officials.”

Voice of Europe’s news reports would blend in with typical Russian propaganda if not for the political legitimacy they gained by featuring sitting MEPs. Additionally, some Voice of Europe videos appear to have been filmed at VoxBox, the Parliament’s in-house studio, using the heart of the institution’s broadcast system to disseminate Kremlin talking points, including arguments against Ukraine’s accession to the EU and in favor of peace talks with Russia.

In addition to the investigation against Bystron, Krah has been involved in multiple scandals. In April, German police arrested Jian Guo, an aide for Krah, over accusations that he used his proximity to Krah to spy for China. That same week, the Dresden Public Prosecutor’s Office announced two preliminary investigations against Krah over alleged payments from Russia and China for his work as an MEP.

Can the EU defend its own democracy?

In the wake of Qatargate, the European Parliament and European Commission moved to tighten rules to protect the EU’s democratic process. Last September, the Parliament adopted new rules requiring detailed declarations on MEP private interests, reporting on external income over five thousand euros per year, and bans on engagement with paid lobbying activity that could directly impact the EU’s decision-making processes.

The EU’s executive, the European Commission, adopted the Defense of Democracy package in December 2023 in tandem with the Parliament’s reforms to prepare for the 2024 European elections. The plan includes rules designed to increase transparency and safeguard European institutions from corruption. This rollout is the most significant package of reforms at the EU level since Qatargate, but it could benefit from stronger and stricter definitions to maximize its impact.

The road to reform

First, the EU should provide stronger definitions for the most basic terms in the defense toolkit. Chapter I, Article 2 of the Directive on Transparency of Interest Representation on behalf of Third Countries (2023/0463) fails to provide working definitions for foreign “influence” versus “interference,” a critical debate in the field, nor for the concept of “transparency.” The absence of these definitions is detrimental to the EU’s enforcement efforts, as there is little consensus across the bloc on what these categories include and exclude, or whether they can be used interchangeably. This lack of clarity is understandable in the short term. Creating a narrow definition related only to commonly used tactics may be too restrictive. At the same time, creating too broad a definition could inhibit political participation. In the long term, however, the EU must stop relying on a principle akin to US Supreme Court Justice Potter Stewart’s nondefinition of obscenity—“I know it when I see it”—and instead create specific, workable definitions for the member states to enforce.

Second, the EU must keep legal precedent in mind when creating legislation relating to civil society. In 2020, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) struck down a Hungarian transparency law on nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). The law mandated that NGOs listed as recipients of foreign funding by the Hungarian government must declare their income each year to the state and include disclaimers in all publications noting their designation. The ECJ ruled that the law taken in totality had a “deterring effect” on NGOs. The decision noted that while increasing transparency is a legitimate aim, states must establish how their additional regulations contribute to increasing transparency, which Hungary failed to do. The ECJ decision demonstrates that the EU must balance its necessity for transparency legislation without overregulating, which could lead to the inhibition of civil society.

Third, the EU should pass future reforms as legally binding EU regulations, rather than as directives, which only require member states to create legislation at the national level. The Defense of Democracy package, for instance, issued directives, meaning member states have flexibility in how they interpret and enforce each of its provisions, which increases the likelihood that it will be enforced in a variety of ways throughout the bloc. Thus, to ensure that future transparency and anti-corruption polices are equitably enforced EU-wide, it is important that they be legally binding regulations.

Taken together, these reforms to corruption-fighting legislation will help the EU’s institutions defend their reputation, integrity, and accountability, particularly in an election year.

Sophia Athan is a young global professional with the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center.

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On May 8, Transatlantic Security Initiative non-resident senior fellow Valbona Zeneli wrote an article in The National Interest discussing Italy’s G7 presidency and the future of the Mediterranean region.

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Valbona Zeneli

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The Transatlantic Security Initiative, in the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, shapes and influences the debate on the greatest security challenges facing the North Atlantic Alliance and its key partners.

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Bathily’s resignation was motivated by the UN’s inability to successfully support the political transition process that it has been trying to foster in Libya for more than a decade in the wake of the country’s civil war and enduring political fragmentation. As Bathily pointed out, the reason for this inability is that Libya’s various political actors are unwilling to place the collective interest above their own personal interests. Bathily bluntly described the leaders of the country’s political factions as lacking “good faith,” rendering UN initiatives futile and ruling out the possibility of any solution to the country’s current chaotic and unstable political impasse. His resignation, and his candid assessment of the political process in Libya, demonstrate the slim prospects for UN initiatives in Libya so long as national leaders remain unwilling to collaborate.

Bathily described the attitude of Libyan political leaders as driven by a “selfish resolve” to defend their individual interests and impede the transition process through political and administrative expedients. Bathily’s criticism is directed at the major political figures in Libya whom the UN special envoy had often described as the “big five”: General Khalifa Haftar, Mohammed Takala, Mohamed al-Menfi, Aguila Saleh, and Abdul Hamid Dbeibah. For these five political figures, the transition process doesn’t offer any incentives, but rather would severely limit their current ability to control the political system and the national economy. Particularly frustrating for Bathily, after almost two years of continuous initiatives that these internal actors systematically boycotted, the UN needed to put off a planned national reconciliation conference, which was initially scheduled for April 28 and is now postponed indefinitely due to the rival parties’ intransigence. 

The reasons for Bathily’s criticisms are clear. Although a relative calm has returned to the country since the failure of Haftar’s siege of Tripoli in 2020, this calm has not facilitated the resumption of national dialogue nor the start of the necessary transition process to organize national elections. Instead, this quiet period has allowed the different political factions’ balance of power to freeze in place. They are now unwilling to give up their respective spheres of power by initiating an unpredictable transition to elections that could subvert the status quo.

The web of individual political interests, moreover, is closely linked to a variegated framework of parallel interests, including control of the economy, corruption, management of the various militias that control most of Tripolitania (although in a disorganized manner), and deep ties with organized crime, which runs trafficking of all kinds in Libya.

Bathily’s resignation thus demonstrates how the role of the UN special envoy to Libya has become frustrating and devoid of real prospects over time. In 2020, Ghassan Salame resigned after two years in office citing health reasons, although he expressed deep disappointment at how the transition process had been systematically opposed by both local actors and the foreign powers and regional actors that have been intermingling in Libya since the 2011 revolution. He was succeeded by Jan Kubis, who in turn resigned in 2021 without clearly specifying the reasons, although he had clearly determined that it was impossible to fulfil his mandate.

The question remains how and whether the United Nations intends to appoint a new special representative. Talk among insiders indicates that the next special envoy could be Stephanie Koury, currently the vice head of the UN mission in Libya, who would take up the post on an interim basis pending new guidelines from the Security Council.

But regardless of who replaces Bathily, the next special envoy will not be able to solve Libya’s longstanding political impasse as long as the leaders of the country’s factions remain unwilling to meaningfully engage with the UN’s initiatives. The country’s political stasis is unlikely to shift anytime soon.

Karim Mezran is director of the North Africa Initiative at the Rafik Hariri Center and Middle East Programs at the Atlantic Council.

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Despite initial promises of moderation and a pledge to the United Nations (UN) when the group seized power in 2021, the Taliban has swiftly restored oppressive policies reminiscent of its previous rule in the late 1990s.

In less than three years, the Taliban has issued more than fifty edicts and directives imposing strict measures to bar women from participation in public and political life. These measures include restricting women’s access to education, employment, freedom of speech, freedom of movement, access to public spaces, health care, and access to justice.

A UN experts report said the situation may amount to “gender apartheid,” with the Taliban “governing by systemic discrimination with the intention to subject women and girls to total domination.” 

Violations of international law

As reported by the UN Human Rights Council, the Taliban significantly restricts women’s participation in society and denies them avenues for seeking justice and redress. Women who speak out against these restrictions or advocate for their rights face severe consequences, including harassment, violence, imprisonment, and death. The Taliban also targets women activists, professionals, and both men and women who are supporters of women’s rights, viewing them as threats to their authority. The situation has deteriorated further in the past few months, as evidenced by recent extrajudicial arrests and forced disappearances. There has also been an alarming increase in gender-related killings (femicide).

The Taliban’s gender apartheid policies deliberately violate international legal frameworks to which Afghanistan is still bound, perpetuating a cycle of gender-based discrimination and brutality. International law on the protection of women’s rights is unequivocal. It emphasizes the fundamental responsibility of governing authorities to promote and safeguard the rights of women in all aspects of their lives.

The International Bill of Human Rights—which is comprised of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights—guarantees the right to equality and nondiscrimination. The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women explicitly prohibits gender-based discrimination, obligating state parties to ensure gender equality in all spheres of life. The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) criminalizes gender persecution as a crime against humanity under article 7. 

The ICC’s 2022 Policy on the Crime of Gender Persecution broadens the scope of targeted individuals beyond direct members of a particular group to include that group’s sympathizers and affiliates. This inclusive stance is particularly relevant for Afghanistan. In schools that ban girls, staff—including male teachers—who teach girls can also be targeted. Similarly, journalists are targeted and face persecution for their coverage of violations of women’s basic human rights. Such incidents, which fall under the ICC’s purview, highlight the interconnectedness of gender-related issues and the diverse ways individuals can be affected by gender-based persecution.

The Taliban’s capital and corporal punishments target women more often than men. Despite Afghanistan’s ratification of the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, the Taliban persists in brutally treating and punishing women. Taliban punishments, ranging from public floggings to executions, demonstrate a deliberate effort to instill fear and maintain control over women’s lives, flagrantly violating the Convention against Torture.

When the Taliban shields perpetrators from accountability, including insulating its own system, it further perpetuates a cycle of violence. Under the current regime, documentation of human rights abuses has become nearly impossible. The Taliban’s restrictions on international and local human rights organizations and media, including censorship and intimidation tactics, have severely hindered their ability to document and report these violations. The absence of comprehensive reporting on human rights abuses under the Taliban not only obscures the true extent of the violations but also allows perpetrators to act with impunity.

The broader international significance

The ongoing violations perpetrated by the Taliban in Afghanistan, particularly on women, have sparked diplomatic condemnation from the international community. However, this condemnation exposes a deeper issue: the weakening consensus among members of the international community on how to effectively respond to such crises. One of the primary risks associated with this trend is the normalization of the extremists. Engaging with the Taliban and normalizing relations without meaningful concessions on human rights encourages the Taliban and other repressive regimes, signaling that they can flout international norms with impunity.

This impunity gravely undermines more than two decades’ worth of efforts to achieve justice, reconciliation, and sustainable peace in Afghanistan. The Taliban has not only refused to acknowledge its past atrocities but also enjoys impunity for its current actions.

The continued impunity not only denies justice to women survivors but also sends a dangerous message that violence against women can be tolerated and even condoned, with far-reaching implications. The denial of education and participation in public life hinders the development and empowerment of women and girls, perpetuating cycles of poverty, inequality, and marginalization. It also undermines fundamental principles of justice and human rights, eroding trust in the ability of international institutions to provide justice and accountability. This lack of accountability also enables the Taliban to spread extremist ideologies, creating a nurturing environment for conflict and terrorism, with dire implications for regional stability.

What the international community can do

Considering the dire situation in Afghanistan, the UN should take a lead role in establishing robust accountability mechanisms. This may entail creating an independent investigative body to monitor and document human rights abuses and violations of international law.

The UN should also change its approach to the Taliban. Instead of engaging with the regime without conditions, the UN should work with regional and global partners and directly with the Afghan people, including civil society, to develop a unified strategy that prioritizes women, human rights, and security, rather than legitimizing a regime that promotes oppression and instability. Taliban leaders’ rigid ideology means dialogue with them is futile. Moreover, targeted sanctions and travel bans on Taliban leaders should be imposed. The UN can leverage its authority and resources to coordinate efforts among member states and ensure a unified approach to the crisis within the organization.

At the same time, the international community can use diplomatic engagement to exert pressure on the Taliban to respect international human rights standards. Diplomatic recognition, aid, and other forms of cooperation should be conditioned on tangible improvements in human rights and accountability.

Human rights organizations outside Afghanistan play a crucial role in amplifying the voices of Afghan women and advocating for their rights. These organizations should mobilize support for Afghan civil society groups and grassroots organizations, particularly those championing human rights and women’s rights. By collaborating with local activists and providing resources, these organizations can help promote accountability and protect vulnerable populations—particularly women.

Samira Abrar is human rights activist currently working in the field of immigration law in the United States.

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Stability at home translates to leadership abroad

Across the political divide, the consensus in Rome is that Meloni’s position is secure. A year and a half into her tenure, Meloni maintains strong approval ratings. She faces no real threats from the opposition or her coalition partners. Would-be rivals of Meloni’s Brothers of Italy party, including Deputy Prime Minister and Infrastructure Minister Matteo Salvini and the League, have been outflanked. Forza Italia, led by Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Antonio Tajani, is on the rise, but it still lags in the polls. Both those in power and in opposition predict that Meloni will last for the remaining three years of the legislature—barring any twists, which even now no one can write off in Italy.

An important part of this stability comes from the fact that Meloni’s foreign policy priorities are largely supported among Italy’s policymakers and fit within transatlantic priorities. Initially feared as another weak link in the European Union (EU), Meloni has shown herself to be staunchly pro-Ukraine. She is a Euroskeptic but not anti-EU. And while US President Joe Biden differs from her on several notable domestic policies, he has found an ally in Meloni. “We have each other’s backs,” Biden declared during their March 1 meeting in Washington. It’s an interesting turn given that, shortly after her election, Biden used Meloni as a warning to Democrats. She has played a delicate balancing act on China, officially leaving the Belt and Road Initiative—Italy being the only Group of Seven (G7) country to have signed on—while still maintaining economic ties with Beijing. If anything, Meloni’s domestic opposition criticizes her for a lack of follow-through, especially on Italy’s aid to Ukraine and the funds pledged for development projects in North Africa.

Uncontested leadership and support for its foreign policy priorities allow Italy’s government to be much more impactful abroad. This stability comes at an opportune time. Italy holds the G7 presidency in 2024 and for that reason is in the driver’s seat when it comes to advancing the vision of the “steering committee for the world’s most advanced democracies,” as described by US Secretary of State Antony Blinken. Stability and popularity also allow Rome to make its priorities for the West heard, most notably the security of the Mediterranean and Western outreach to Africa.

Recentering the Mediterranean

Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, and arguably before, much of the West’s attention has focused on Europe’s eastern flank—and with good reason. As a result, Rome’s focus on the Mediterranean can at times seem like a regional preoccupation, but the case for the area’s importance for the transatlantic alliance is strong.

The Mediterranean is NATO’s southern flank, and a rather weak one at that. Italian policymakers do not see Russia as just threatening NATO’s eastern flank. Russia has long played a destabilizing role in Libya, for example, funneling weapons into the country as well as deploying its own forces. This destabilizing activity directly affects Europe, impacting migration flows and propping up an important presence off Italy’s coast. Italy’s leadership in the EU’s naval Operation Aspides in the Red Sea provides a useful example of the role Italy can play in organizing its European counterparts, and Rome should seek to extend that leadership to provide greater security in the Mediterranean in the face of threats from Russia and other actors.

The Mediterranean region is also poised to play an important role in the planned India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC). A major deliverable of the 2023 Group of Twenty (G20) Summit in New Delhi, this rail-and-sea infrastructure network has huge potential for countries such as India and for Italy and the Mediterranean region to be a conduit that deepens Europe’s ties with emerging new global partners. Europe could provide these partners with an alternative to deepening economic ties with China and boost sustainable infrastructure investments across the network. Italy is well positioned to carry forward this effort. But it needs to make sure this massive project stays viable and on the West’s agenda. Italy should use its current G7 presidency to garner greater Western support for IMEC, and position itself as a key partner on the European link of the corridor.

The infrastructure development race to the top

Italy’s focus on infrastructure goes beyond IMEC. Rome is paying greater attention to infrastructure development across the Global South and stands ready to build on earlier efforts by the West. In June 2022, the G7 adopted the Partnership for Global Infrastructure Investment (PGII) to facilitate six hundred billion dollars in infrastructure projects by 2027. The EU’s Global Gateway promises to provide three hundred billion dollars for EU-supported projects, also by 2027.

Meloni, too, has jumped into the infrastructure development space. She has made infrastructure a cornerstone of her foreign policy and of Italy’s relationship with Africa through the Mattei Plan for North Africa, unveiled in January 2024.

Rome’s Mattei Plan has several drivers that fit in with the West’s larger infrastructure push. First, the plan aims to help African countries build stability at home to limit migration abroad. Meloni explicitly stated this goal, as Italy remains a key port of entry from North Africa. Second, the plan is intended to position Italy as a European energy hub, deepening the economic link between Europe and Africa. Third, the plan fits within the G7’s larger effort to prove the West’s rules-based system is fit for purpose and to offset the influence of China through a truly nonexploitative partnership framework. Fourth, mineral-rich states in Africa will be critical to the twin green and digital transitions. The extraction and processing of these resources must be supported with sustainable practices that respect the rule of law and labor standards, and help countries move up the global value chain. Doing so will help in the West’s de-risking efforts to shift away from overreliance on China while boosting states’ long-term development.

Building relationships that are not extractive or exploitive will be key to ensuring long-term partnerships, and Italy has said it intends to take this approach with future infrastructure development. Creating public-private partnerships will also be important, since the private sector will play an integral role in the financing of said investments. But the private sector needs to be convinced that investing doesn’t come along with an unacceptable amount of risk. There is a role for the government to play in minimizing these risks, and focusing on the opportunities presented by these markets.

Italy is well suited to set up the mechanisms needed to coordinate these projects. With its G7 presidency, Italy should focus on deepening the coordination of projects such as the PGII, Global Gateway, and the Mattei Plan. The Mattei Plan specifically will require greater effort to be successful. While the plan’s framework presents a possible blueprint for increased European and G7 engagement with the Global South, in its current form it is humble both in the number of projects and the amount of financing proposed—just over five billion euros for nine projects—compared to the PGII and Global Gateway. For this project to really take off, Rome will need to find more money to invest through the Mattei Plan and expand its scope, while fully integrating it into larger investment plans.

Until recently, political chaos and economic woes have caused Italy, the EU’s third-largest economy and a G7 member, to punch below its weight. The current political calm won’t last forever, but in this period of steadiness at home, Rome can expand its leadership role abroad.

Jörn Fleck is the senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center.

Rachel Rizzo is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center.

James Batchik is an associate director at the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center.

Nicholas O’Connell is the deputy director for public sector partnerships at the Atlantic Council.

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For well over a year, DPI discussions have simmered in capitals around the world, drawing in policymakers, diplomats, and development experts alike. As a quick primer on DPI, think of it as the digital equivalent of laying down highways and bridges, but for the virtual world. Just as physical infrastructure drives economic growth, investing in DPI can propel inclusive development at a societal scale. Identity, payments, and data exchange platforms are often cited as the core building blocks of DPI, mirroring the multilayered structure of India’s famous homegrown technology stack.

India has been a trailblazer in deploying DPI at home and globalizing the DPI model. With its Group of Twenty (G20) presidency in 2023, New Delhi championed DPI on the world stage, securing political buy-in for the concept at the highest levels. G20 digital ministers endorsed a framework to govern the design, development, and deployment of DPI last August. And with the unanimous endorsement of G20 leaders, the New Delhi Leaders’ Declaration from last November set the stage for accelerated DPI development in 2024.

However, as the G7’s foray into the DPI arena reveals, the conversation is far from over. There are still different views of what DPI is and ought to be, as well as how it should shape the way markets function. Contrasting the G7 and G20 ministerial texts on DPI reveal three important areas of contention.

Differing visions

First, there’s the question of scope and purpose: Should DPI focus on enhancing public service delivery by governments or seek to restructure markets and delivery of private services? The G7 ministerial text opts for a narrower focus, solely emphasizing DPI’s role in enhancing citizen access to public services delivered by governments, while the G20 imagines a more expansive canvas, where DPI serves as a conduit for “equitable access” to both public and private services. This distinction is not merely academic; it gets to the core of what makes DPI novel and contested.

What does it mean to use DPI to enable equitable access to private services at a societal scale? It’s an evolving concept, but the basic thrust is to leverage the design, deployment, and governance of DPI to “dynamically create and shape new markets” and advance policy goals. For example, with a market-shaping DPI in place, a system operator, often the state itself, can define technical standards for private service providers to ensure interoperability. It can cap market share to give force to its vision of competition policy. It can influence pricing and business strategies through system rules and design features, with the DPI operator playing the role of “market orchestrator.” This is a different paradigm for the digital economy than a traditional market-led model—and to DPI champions, that’s precisely the point.

Second, consider the motivations for deploying DPI: Should these include advancing competition policy objectives? When describing the objectives for deploying DPI, G7 ministers borrow from the G20 framework but make a notable omission: There is no reference to “competition” as a core rationale for DPI. This omission is fully consistent with the G7’s vision of DPI, narrowly focused on public service delivery by governments. For the G7, the task of building competitive markets for the private sector is left to national regulators and antitrust authorities, not DPI builders and operators.

By contrast, the G20’s framework invokes the role of DPI in promoting competition twice, and that’s no accident. All governments want competitive digital ecosystems, but some see overexposure to Western tech giants as compounding the risks posed by pure market concentration alone. In this context, deployment of DPI serves two related purposes: disrupting entrenched incumbent positions while increasing state capacity to offer core digital services that reduce reliance on Western tech firms.

Third, what about design principles? Should DPI require open-source tech and open standards? The G7 ministerial statement omits all specific references to open source or open standards; instead, it vigorously defends the role of the private sector in building interoperable elements of DPI, presumably using open or proprietary technologies. In comparison, the G20’s DPI framework pointedly and repeatedly emphasizes the need for open software, open standards, and open application programming interfaces (APIs). Ultimately, however, the G20 statement hedges on this question, stating that DPI can be built on “open source and/or proprietary solutions, as well as a combination of both.”

Nevertheless, speak to DPI theorists shaping G20 and Global South thinking on DPI, and it’s clear they see “openness” as a defining principle of well-built DPI, citing the role open architectures, open-source tech, and open APIs play in enabling transparency, scale, interoperability, and reduced risk of vendor lock-in. Still, fuzziness around the term “openness” and its application in some of the largest DPI systems deployed to date suggests there is much left to unpack.

How will the G7 engage with DPI going forward?

It’s clear that the G7’s vision for DPI differs from the G20’s in at least three important areas. The question that remains is what comes next: How will the G7 (or its member states) assert their point of view?

The G7’s ministerial text offers some early clues. It acknowledges that G7 members will have “different approaches to the development of digital solutions, including DPI” and notes that the upcoming G7 Compendium on Digital Government Services will collect “relevant examples of digital public services from G7 members.” The compendium would also summarize factors that have led to “successful deployment and use of digital government services, such as national strategies, investment, public procurement practices, governance frameworks, and partnerships.”

Developing the compendium is a good start. But looking ahead, G7 members will need to weigh in this year at fast-moving multilateral discussions during Brazil’s G20 presidency, for instance, or within the United Nations’ multiple DPI workstreams. In each case, G7 perspectives on corporate governance, privacy, market disciplines, and regulatory best practices will strengthen discussions and outcomes, just as the G20’s and the Global South’s focus on inclusion, competition, and openness help ground the conversation in public interest concerns. The push and pull of the different visions for DPI could yield a better outcome for all—that’s the optimistic case.

A pessimist may insist that the gaps between the G7 and G20 views on DPI are tough to bridge. And it’s true, there is a real difference between a DPI scoped for public service delivery and one intended to shape the structure of digital markets and digital services offered by the private sector. If the latter view of DPI holds, G7 member states may need to find new ways to constructively participate in global DPI discussions. This could involve promoting individual layers of the DPI stack, as the G7 is already doing with digital ID governance, and emphasizing the need for sustainable public-private partnerships for DPI build-out. 

Ultimately, time will tell how the G7 chooses to lean into the global DPI debate. The only certainty is that the G7’s active engagement isn’t optional anymore—it’s essential.

Anand Raghuraman is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s South Asia Center, where he leads research initiatives on US-India digital cooperation and publishes expert commentary on Indian data governance and digital policy initiatives. He is also director of global public policy at Mastercard.

Mastercard, through its Policy Center for the Digital Economy, is a financial supporter of an Atlantic Council project on digital public infrastructure.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s and do not necessarily reflect those of Mastercard.

The post What should digital public infrastructure look like? The G7 and G20 offer contrasting visions. appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Despite the headwinds, Brazil’s non-aligned, cooperative, and practical approach holds out the promise of a constructive outcome for this year’s G20 meetings—especially if progress is not being measured by joint communiques (which have become irrelevant) but by agreements on concrete global initiatives. Under the overarching theme “Building a Just World and a Sustainable Planet”, Brazil has worked with countries in the Global South as well as developed countries to build consensus in launching a variety of global initiatives by the time of the G20 Summit. These initiatives reflect the key concerns of the Global South but have built on previous international agreements and include practical proposals for implementation.

Brazil’s proposed initiatives

First is the push to reform the United Nations system and the Bretton Woods institutions like the IMF, World Bank, and World Trade Organization. Reforms to the UN Security Council—where five permanent members (P5) have veto power—have been on the international agenda for a long time. While widely acknowledged in principle, no specific proposal has gained any traction. Brazil has put forward the idea that a P5 member should not be allowed to use its veto power in cases directly relating to itself—somewhat similar to the Western judiciary practice of reclusion of judges in cases of conflicts of interest. This would have meant that Russia would not have been able to use its veto power when the Security Council discussed the war in Ukraine. Such a proposal will not get the backing of the P5, especially amid the current geopolitical rivalry. But it could gather support from many countries, and not only within the Global South—keeping pressure on P5 members to respond with counter-proposals.

Calls for reform of the IMF and World Bank have been widely shared by the Global South, reiterated most recently by China demanding a redistribution of quota and voting shares to “better reflect the weight a country carries.” The G24, representing developing countries at the IMF and World Bank, has circulated a paper proposing specific reforms. These and other ideas about quota reform are scheduled be discussed by the IMF in the year ahead.

Second, another of Brazil’s linchpins for this year is launching a Global Alliance Against Hunger and Poverty as a tool for reaching the UN Sustainable Development Goals by 2030. That initiative leverages Brazil’s position as the second biggest food-exporting country. Specifically, the alliance will not be about initiating new funds or programs but finding ways to coordinate numerous existing funds and programs to make them more useful to recipient countries and easier to solicit contributions from developed countries. It also will compile a basket of best practices in anti-hunger and anti-poverty policies to help other countries develop their own programs. In this context, Brazil will showcase its acclaimed Bolsa Familia family welfare program, which has helped significantly reduce the country’s poverty rate and has been adapted in almost twenty other nations.

Third, Brazil will launch a Task Force for the Global Mobilization Against Climate Change to spur the G20 to help create a conducive political environment for a new and robust goal on climate finance to be agreed at this year’s COP 29 in Azerbaijan as well as for countries to present their renewed and more ambitious Nationally Determined Commitments (NDCs) to reach net zero emissions at the 2025 COP30 under Brazil’s chairmanship. Brazil will also advance its proposed Global Bioeconomy Initiative to bring together science, technology, and innovation on the use of biodiversity to promote sustainable development. This initiative will also try to expand developing countries’ access to various fragmented climate funds including the Green Climate Fund, the Climate Investment Fund, the Adaptation Fund, and the Global Environment Facility.

Fourth, leveraging the momentum of the global corporate minimum tax (effective at the beginning of this year), Brazil wants to propose a global initiative to impose a minimum tax on the super-rich which France has endorsed. This will help Brazil rally support from Global South countries as well as others to advance the proposal.

Last but not least, in September 2023 Brazil and the United States signed an MOU for a Partnership for Workers’ Rights (in particular in the gig economy). They pledged to pass necessary national legislation to achieve that goal and hope to use it as an example to get other countries to join.

The themes across these initiatives are practicality, leading by example, and a willingness to bypass time-consuming, top-down international negotiations.

While Brazil’s proposals will not all be adopted at the G20 Summit, especially in their original versions, most probably will be with some modifications. This outcome, with or without a joint communique, would represent a serious contribution by a key member of the Global South to the global reform agenda. And it comes after the achievements of India in its Presidency of last year’s G20. If South Africa keeps up this track record when assuming the G20 Presidency in 2025 (when Brazil will chair the BRICS-10 and COP30), an important step forward will be made in establishing the leadership roles of the major countries in the Global South. They are showing the ability to rally their members and to reach out to developed countries to shape global reform efforts. And if those countries, working with their partners, can sustain the implementation of the initiatives they sponsored, that would begin to make meaningful changes in the current international political and economic system. The main risk, of course, is that geopolitical rivalry will derail cooperative efforts to address pressing global problems. It remains to be seen to what extent that will happen.

Hung Tran is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Geoeconomics Center, a former executive managing director at the Institute of International Finance and former deputy director at the International Monetary Fund.

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Churches often issue decrees stating official positions on key issues, but rarely do these proclamations involve calls to violence or territorial ambitions. Russia is mentioned 53 times in the 3000-word document, underlining the very clear focus on the Russian state’s earthly interests. “From the spiritual and moral point of view, the Special Military Operation is a Holy War, in which Russia and its people are defending the single spiritual space of Holy Russia,” the document states, using the Kremlin’s preferred euphemism for the full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

The decree goes on to stress Ukraine’s status as part of the wider “Russian World,” while underlining the need to extinguish Ukrainian statehood once and for all. Following the conclusion of the current war, it states, “the entire territory of modern Ukraine should enter Russia’s exclusive zone of influence. The possibility of a political regime hostile to Russia and its people existing on this territory must be completely excluded.”

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

The sentiments expressed in this recently approved document expand on previous statements made by Patriarch Kirill since the onset of Russia’s full-scale invasion more than two years ago. The head of the Russian Orthodox Church has frequently asserted that Ukrainians and Russians are “one nation,” and is widely viewed as a key ideological supporter of the war. Kirill’s comments have led to widespread criticism, including a warning from Pope Francis to avoid becoming “Putin’s altar boy.”

The new decree positions Russia’s invasion of Ukraine as part of a larger spiritual struggle against the West, which it accuses of having “fallen into Satanism.” This is strikingly similar to the ideological arguments favored by Islamist radicals, who have long sought to portray the United States and other Western nations as “Satanic” as part of efforts to justify their extremist agenda. In addition to the Russian Orthodox Church, numerous senior Kremlin officials have sought to frame the war in Ukraine as an existential fight with Western “Satanism.” In a further chilling echo of the Islamist doctrine, Patriarch Kirill has also claimed Russian soldiers killed in Ukraine would have their sins “washed away.”

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The Russian Orthodox Church’s endorsement of language more typically associated with religious extremism should come as no surprise. After all, the entire Russian invasion of Ukraine has been framed as a crusade from the very beginning. Following the 2014 seizure of Crimea, Putin compared the occupied Ukrainian peninsula to Temple Mount and spoke of its spiritual importance to the Russian nation. He routinely insists Ukrainians are actually Russians (“one people”), and has labeled Ukraine “an inalienable part of our own history, culture, and spiritual space.”

The recent confirmation of a holy war against Ukraine and the West comes at a pivotal point in Russia’s full-scale invasion. Since February 2022, Putin’s invading army has been unable to overcome Ukrainian resistance or break the country’s will to defend itself. With little current prospect of a decisive military breakthrough, the Kremlin is now turning increasingly to terror tactics, including a sharp escalation in the bombing of Ukrainian cities and the methodical destruction of Ukraine’s civilian power grid.

By defining the invasion in explicitly spiritual terms, the Russian Orthodox Church hopes to whitewash the war crimes being committed in Ukraine and encourage more ordinary Russians to volunteer. Moscow’s recent declaration of a holy war also sends an unmistakable message to anyone in the West who still believes in the possibility of striking some kind of compromise with the Kremlin. While Putin initially sought to justify the invasion as a pragmatic response to the growth of NATO, it is now apparent that he views the war as a sacred mission and will not stop until Ukraine has been wiped off the map of Europe.

Brian Mefford is the Director of Wooden Horse Strategies, LLC, a governmental-relations and strategic communications firm based in Kyiv, Ukraine. He is a senior nonresident fellow at the Atlantic Council.

Further reading

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The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

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These elections could change the foreign policy trajectory of the G7, even if key players such as US President Joe Biden and European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen retain their seats. At the same time, the G7 faces a slew of challenges. Among these are the emergence of a new “axis” among Russia, Iran, and North Korea, as well as the continued strategic challenge posed by China. There is also the potential for current progress on climate action to be derailed by climate-skeptic populist governments. Amid all of these challenges and more, the G7 must be able to continue its work as “a steering committee for the free world,” as US national security adviser Jake Sullivan described it.

To ensure the G7 stays the course amid potential future political upheavals, pools its staff resources, and develops a separate policymaking capacity alongside its presidency, it must commit to establishing a permanent secretariat.

In many ways, the G7 is already drifting toward establishing a permanent secretariat. The days in which the G7 was solely a “fly-in, fly-out” summit series ended with the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, as G7 members made regular contact with each other to develop global health policy and address the global economic slowdown. This dynamic was further reinforced when G7 leaders held emergency meetings to coordinate their responses to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Nevertheless, as global security continues to deteriorate, from the emergence of the “coup belt” in Africa’s Sahel region to the twin threats of the Israel-Hamas war and Red Sea crisis, the G7 must maintain political inertia to head off these dangers. Meanwhile, the current G7 contact structures are insufficient for the tasks at hand.

A permanent G7 secretariat would offer several important benefits. Firstly, with the numerous elections taking place in 2024, policy continuity after changes in government will be vital for global security. This dynamic is especially visible with the growing debates in the US Congress over aid to Ukraine, Taiwan, and Israel. While a secretariat would not necessarily guarantee such aid, it would partially institutionalize such policies. Establishing an “institutional memory” in the G7 would enable members to develop more consistent strategies together, which will be vital to face the growing regional crises across the world. These crises, which were either instigated or exploited by the emerging Moscow-Tehran-Pyongyang axis, could even potentially benefit Beijing at the expense of G7 members if they do not maintain a steady and united approach.

Secondly, the expertise on intergovernmental and geoeconomic policy that the G7 needs is currently scattered throughout individual ministries and in international financial institutions such as the International Monetary Fund, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, and Financial Action Task Force. Although contact groups between ministries and experts in the G7 have already emerged, these coordination platforms would strongly benefit from a permanent and centralized bureaucracy, especially under the continued oversight of an executive committee of the G7 “sherpas.” One G7 initiative that would benefit immensely from the oversight of a permanent staff is the Partnership for Global Infrastructure Investment, widely seen as the G7’s response to China’s Belt and Road Initiative, as the staff could coordinate more global large-scale sustainable development projects.

Thirdly, a secretariat could emerge as a policymaking body in its own right alongside the rotating G7 presidency. The G7’s occasional need to reconfigure its priorities and policies is evident through the return of its practice of external invitations, especially in the cases of outreach to leading Indo-Pacific democracies such as Australia and South Korea. Previously, these countries were invited to the 2008 and 2009 G8 summits, but due to the formation of the larger Group of Twenty (G20) forum in 2008, were not invited to subsequent G7 conferences until the 2021 summit. Oddly, Australia and South Korea were similarly not invited to attend the 2022 summit despite decisively assisting the G7 in enforcing sanctions on Russia and providing aid to Ukraine following Russia’s invasion. Without a secretariat, leading partners such as Australia and South Korea must rely solely on the incumbent G7 president to receive invitations. This is a mistake, especially when both have leading roles to play in promoting security in the Indo-Pacific region. In its role as a policymaking body, a G7 secretariat could contribute to promoting standing invitations to Australia and South Korea, which could open the option to expand the G7 to a G9 with them, as proposed by Biden’s former Chief of Staff Ron Klain.

A G7 secretariat could start small. In fact, the foundations for a G7 secretariat have already emerged out of the existing G7 contact and working groups. Annual (and sometimes biannual) G7 ministerial meetings work in tandem with expert working groups on topics ranging from science and innovation to countering democratic interference. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine also necessitated the establishment of the Russian Elites, Proxies, and Oligarchs (REPO) task force between the G7 members and Australia to enforce sanctions on the Kremlin. REPO could set a precedent for similar sanctions enforcement groups on North Korea and other rogue states under a permanent secretariat.

Granted, the G7’s informal structure is flexible, an advantage that it has often flexed. Its recent invitations to Australia and South Korea to the 2023 and 2024 summits prove this. Nevertheless, a secretariat would not necessarily hamper the political flexibility of the institution itself. It would merely provide a base from which the group could expand operations. Such an organizational dynamic would not be novel either. For example, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations established a secretariat decades before it adopted an official charter, using the founding Bangkok Declaration to set the secretariat’s operational objectives.

Regardless, the growing convergence of autocracies like those in Russia, Iran, and North Korea poses a growing threat to global security, while China’s potential as a rising revisionist power could eventually become an even bigger policy challenge. Moreover, even though the international community has made significant progress in reducing the rate of global warming, the climate crisis remains at a critical juncture.

The G7 must outmaneuver all these risks. The establishment of a G7 secretariat would cement the existing progress the G7 has made on stabilizing the global security situation and climate action, as well as provide a platform for further decisive actions to defend the community of democracies.

Francis Shin is a research assistant in the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center.

The post The G7 needs a permanent secretariat. The 2024 elections cycle demonstrates why. appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Yet, the international community, defined loosely as the collection of United Nations (UN) member states, finds itself unable to emerge as a powerful and unified voice for the women of Afghanistan despite its stated commitments to gender equality. For years, international conventions and declarations have served as inspirations of hope and offered guidelines and principles aimed at safeguarding the rights of women worldwide. Now the people who wrote and advocated for these international standards must translate them into concrete actions to address the world’s most severe women’s rights crisis. These efforts should include codifying gender apartheid as a crime against humanity and prosecuting Afghanistan at the International Criminal Court. Moreover, any international engagement with the Taliban regime must prioritize ensuring its compliance with international law in its treatment of women.

International legal frameworks

Despite critical reports by prominent international organizations such as Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and the UN special rapporteur on the human rights situation in Afghanistan, the standing of women and girls in the country continues to deteriorate rapidly. Women inside Afghanistan have bravely taken to the streets, and their counterparts outside the country have advocated for them in numerous international meetings, conferences, and private roundtable discussions. But these demands and protests have so far failed to garner a robust response from existing international legal mechanisms, obligations, or conventions.  

Bridging the gap

The fundamental human rights that the women of Afghanistan are demanding are clearly defined in the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and elsewhere. These pivotal frameworks mandate governments and international institutions to actively address women’s needs and provide robust protection against any violations, especially in the complex landscapes of conflict and post-conflict situations.

UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325 on Women, Peace, and Security, while nonbinding, expands upon binding conventions by clarifying women’s rights standards, even in states experiencing conflict or those not party to conventions such as CEDAW. The resolution extends its reach beyond governments and states to all parties participating in conflicts.

While UNSCR 1325 does not have direct legal enforcement mechanisms, it carries significant political weight. The resolution “calls upon all parties to armed conflict to respect fully international law applicable to the rights and protection of women and girls” under the relevant conventions and to “bear in mind the relevant provisions of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.” The resolution further calls upon all parties to armed conflicts to “take special measures to protect women and girls from gender-based violence, particularly rape and other forms of sexual abuse, and all other forms of violence in situations of armed conflict.” The resolution has promoted actions at the national, regional, and international levels. Civil society organizations, international actors, and UN bodies regularly monitor and assess progress on the implementation of the resolution and call for greater accountability mechanisms to ensure that commitments are translated into action.

As a United Nations member, Afghanistan ratified CEDAW in 2003 and adopted UNSCR 1325 in 2015, affirming its commitment to international legal obligations and the promotion of the rule of law. The Islamic Republic of Afghanistan successfully submitted its periodic reports to the CEDAW committee and its status reports on the implementation of the national action plan on UNSCR 1325. Under the Taliban’s rule, Afghanistan has disregarded such established international mechanisms and is no longer abiding by any of these international obligations. 

The group’s continued enforcement of oppressive policies and the lack of international accountability has reduced international standards aimed at protecting women’s rights to nothing more than empty rhetoric. Consequently, Afghan women and girls turn to the international community for robust advocacy and support, urging for their voices to be heard and for the use of all available international mechanisms on their behalf.

To date, the international community has failed to deliver. Countries with feminist foreign policies have sought to exert pressure on the Taliban regime and demand the protection of Afghan women’s rights through soft diplomatic meetings and statements. The recent statement issued by the foreign ministers of the Feminist Foreign Policy Network regarding the plight of women in Afghanistan, for example, employed significantly stronger language than their previous statements since August 2021, as they called on the international community to redouble its efforts to leverage all available legal instruments to end the systematic and egregious violations of international law against women. This call has not yet led to meaningful action.

The way forward

To effectively protect and promote women’s rights, it is imperative that members of the international community first agree to refrain from any form of engagement with the Taliban that contradicts their commitments and obligations under international law. This requires a coherent and unified approach, as well as proactive accountability measurements, to avoid contradictory behavior that would undermine the objectives of promoting women’s rights and ending violence against women in Afghanistan. Nevertheless, expecting an illegitimate group such as the Taliban to adhere to international frameworks concerning women’s rights is unlikely to yield significant results.

But the international community, in collaboration with civil society organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and human rights groups, can take proactive measures toward ensuring accountability. One significant step would be to codify gender apartheid as a crime against humanity. By leveraging the instruments provided by binding conventions such as CEDAW, the international community could establish legal frameworks that explicitly recognize and condemn systematic gender-based discrimination and persecution. Over the past three years, there has been significant documentation of gender-based persecution in Afghanistan, including last month’s report from the UN special rapporteur on the human rights situation in Afghanistan. The next step would be for state parties to CEDAW to pursue a case against Afghanistan at the International Court of Justice, either individually or through joint initiatives.

The CEDAW committee should support the re-establishment of Afghanistan’s CEDAW steering committee, technical committee, and drafting committee, both within the country and among Afghan communities in exile. While the current authorities of Afghanistan refuse to provide periodic reports, the committees of experts should be tasked with providing shadow reports.

Moreover, it is imperative for the International Criminal Court to collaborate closely with relevant states and international organizations such as UN bodies, as well as civil society organizations and other stakeholders, to garner support for its investigation into the Taliban’s treatment of women, particularly regarding crimes against humanity such as gender persecution.

The United Nations must adhere to fundamental principle before considering any form of “structured engagement” with the Taliban—a form of cooperation recommended in the independent report by UN Special Coordinator Feridun Sinirlioğlu. The UN should first prioritize the implementation of UNSCR 1325 and other relevant resolutions, ensuring that the rights and needs of women are fully integrated into its strategies and initiatives, including by facilitating direct discussions between women and the Taliban.  

UN Women, in close collaboration with relevant states, must prioritize the revitalization of the focal points in Afghanistan’s UNSCR 1325 national action plan, which was established in 2017. These focal points, people who represented the relevant ministries and civil society organizations before the Taliban takeover, play a pivotal role in guaranteeing the participation of Afghan women in all dialogues. New focal points could be established under the auspices of the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, UN Women, or even the European Union delegation in Afghanistan. The international community must prioritize Afghanistan as a paramount concern in its policy agenda and cease engaging in actions and diplomatic meetings that inadvertently bolster the Taliban’s sense of superiority and embolden similar fundamentalist groups worldwide. The future of Afghan women and the international commitment to gender equality hangs in the balance.

Parwana Paikan is the minister counsellor of the embassy of Afghanistan in France and co-founder of Conseil des Femmes Franco-Afghan. She previously served as deputy director general of human rights and women’s international affairs at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Afghanistan.

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In 2022, the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security launched a project, with funding from Dataminr, to address how US diplomacy should adapt to meet twenty-first-century challenges. The first paper produced as part of this project considered the changing context of twenty-first-century diplomacy and how US diplomacy could begin to adapt. In 2023, the center hosted a workshop that brought together diplomats, scholars, technologists, and other experts to share their insights on the challenges and opportunities presented by artificial intelligence for twenty-first-century diplomacy. This paper benefited greatly from the insights of workshop participants, with the authors drawing on their analysis and recommendations.

Introduction

Three decades after the end of the Cold War, the United States is in a new era of strategic competition. Navigating this era successfully requires the United States to leverage diverse instruments of power—diplomatic, economic, military, etc.—to deter, outcompete, and, if need be, defeat revisionist autocratic rivals.

Much scholarly attention has focused on the potential military flashpoints of strategic competition, such as a potential invasion of Taiwan by the People’s Republic of China. Given Russia’s demonstrated willingness to use force to prosecute its revanchist aims, the risk of direct military conflict between nuclear-armed rivals should not be taken lightly. Nevertheless, the military domain is but one dimension of this competition, and the United States needs to shore up its strength in other areas, including diplomacy.

The purpose of the Scowcroft Center’s project on twenty-first-century diplomacy is to produce the analysis and develop the ideas necessary to strengthen US diplomacy. This project focuses particular attention on technology’s role in bolstering the exercise of diplomacy.

The first issue brief in this series, “Twenty-first-century diplomacy: Strengthening US diplomacy for the challenges of today and tomorrow,” addressed the changing context in which US diplomacy is practiced and began to point toward ways the United States could adapt its diplomacy to the twenty-first century. This issue brief will build on this body of work by outlining the challenges and opportunities that are posed by artificial intelligence (AI) in the practice of twenty-first-century diplomacy, and offering recommendations for how to efficiently leverage AI to strengthen diplomacy. Notably, this paper will focus primarily on generative AI (GAI), the subset of AI oriented to creating new content.

As argued in this first issue brief, the diplomatic domain has been a key arena of strategic competition. China has taken steps to deepen its influence in international institutions, both to shape norms and divert attention away from Beijing’s human-rights abuses. China uses public diplomacy to cultivate favorable narratives about the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), including through Confucius Institutes at universities. China has also sought to bolster its “discourse power,” defined by our Digital Forensic Research Lab colleague Kenton Thibaut as “a type of narrative agenda-setting ability focused on reshaping global governance, values, and norms to legitimize and facilitate the expression of state power.” Toward this end, China has worked to increase channels for its messaging through traditional and social media, tailor content to target audiences more effectively, and embed Chinese norms and standards regarding digital connectivity.

This challenge is not limited to China: Russia also uses diplomacy to expand its global influence, especially in the Global South. For example, while a March 2022 United Nations General Assembly resolution condemning Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine received support from more than 140 countries, there were notable pockets of opposition or abstention, including much of Africa. This was due, in part, to the diplomatic overtures Russia has made since its 2014 invasion of Crimea, including signing nineteen military cooperation agreements in sub-Saharan Africa over the last ten years and a tour of Africa by Russia’s foreign minister in the weeks leading up to the vote. It is also rooted in historical relationships going back to the Soviet Union; the Soviet Union was, for example, an early supporter of South Africa’s ruling African National Congress.

The salient point is this: Diplomacy is critical in strategic competition.

While AI has received attention for years, interest in it has erupted in recent years, in both the scholarly and popular imaginations, particularly as tools like ChatGPT have grown ubiquitous. The entirety of the US government, including the executive and legislative branches, are required to meet the challenge, and fortunately, the State Department has not sat idly by while AI has advanced.

In 2021, Secretary of State Antony Blinken spoke about the modernization of American diplomacy at the Foreign Service Institute, where he highlighted five pillars guiding the transformation of US diplomacy. This included building “capacity and expertise in the areas that will be critical to our national security in the years ahead, particularly . . . emerging technologies.” He noted that the United States has a “major stake in shaping the digital revolution that’s happening around us and making sure that it serves our people, protects our interests, boosts our competitiveness, and upholds our values.”

In October 2023, the White House published an Executive Order on the Safe, Secure, and Trustworthy Development and Use of Artificial Intelligence. The executive order offers guiding principles for the development and use of AI and outlines actions for a broad array of departments and agencies. This includes calling on the secretary of state to use “discretionary authorities to support and attract foreign nationals with special skills in AI.

Also in October 2023, the US State Department released Enterprise Artificial Intelligence Strategy FY2024-FY2025: Empowering Diplomacy Through Responsible AI. The strategy begins by stating outright that the exponential increase of easy-to-use generative AI and the “once-in-a-generation opportunity” it provides the State Department must underpin the strategy moving forward. It then outlines four objectives for the department, including leveraging secure AI infrastructure; fostering a culture that embraces AI; ensuring AI is applied responsibly; and innovating. Each objective emphasizes the importance of the State Department’s staff in this monumental effort and indicates that AI will not replace employees but rather serve as a tool that will allow them to turn from rote administrative tasks to higher-level actions like personal diplomacy.

These steps demonstrate a recognition on the part of the US government and its diplomatic apparatus that it needs to get smart on AI and emerging technologies more broadly. This issue brief will support this effort by both explaining the risks and prospective benefits of AI for diplomacy, and recommending a path forward for seizing the latter.

In brief, this paper will recommend the following courses of action for the US government.

• Look to GAI as a critical asset in engaging the information space;
• Work with allies and partners to shape norms around AI and cooperate to dominate the commanding heights of this technology;
• Leverage GAI as a tool of soft power;
• Establish standards for transparency and ethical guardrails in the use of GAI; and
• Reorient the State Department’s workforce to integrate AI.

Opportunities presented by GAI for diplomacy

Despite its challenges, GAI holds great promise for the future of diplomacy, and it presents a number of opportunities that should be exploited prudently. This issue brief is intended to be a summary, so this will not be an exhaustive list. Some of the opportunities presented by GAI include facilitating communication and enhancing negotiations; assisting in content distillation; and augmenting strategic communications.

• GAI and negotiations. GAI has a role to play in facilitating interactions between diplomats and enhancing negotiations. Andrew Moore, chief of staff to former Google CEO Eric Schmidt, noted last year that ChatGPT and similar tools are already helping diplomats prepare for negotiations. He writes, “As Nathaniel Fick, the inaugural U.S. ambassador at large for cyberspace and digital policy, recently quipped, briefings generated by the AI-powered ChatGPT are now ‘qualitatively close enough’ to those prepared by his staff.” He also cites the example of IBM’s Cognitive Trade Advisor, which has supported negotiators by answering questions about trade treaties that might otherwise delay talks.
  
  Looking ahead, Moore argues that AI could play a more direct role in shaping diplomatic agreements, adding, “As more and more parties develop their own AI, we could see AI ‘hagglebots’—computers that identify optimal agreements given a set of trade-offs and interests—take on a key role in negotiations.”
• GAI and content distillation. GAI has an important role to play in helping diplomats sift through vast quantities of information. This even applies to internal or even classified stores of data. As Ilan Manor, senior lecturer at Ben Gurion University of the Negev, has argued, “Instead of ChatGPT, imagine a ‘StateGPT’ able to analyze decades of internal documents generated by the State Department. Diplomats could view this internal AI to track changes in other nation’s policy priorities, identify shifts in foreign public opinion, or even identify changes in how America narrates its policies around the world.”
  
  One caveat to this opportunity: The proliferation of AI-enabled disinformation could prove challenging to using GAI in a content-distillation capacity. Outputs generated by AI-sifted datasets should not be seen as foolproof.
• AI and strategic communications. GAI’s information-analysis capabilities can be further leveraged to help with strategic communications. As Moore notes, the use of technology to solicit input from citizens is well-developed:
  
  “More than a decade ago, Indonesia pioneered a platform called UKP4, allowing everyday citizens to submit complaints about anything from damaged infrastructure to absent teachers. Although technology can be misused for manipulation and misinformation, artificial intelligence can also serve as a powerful tool to identify these misbehaviors, creating an ongoing struggle in the race between AI that will help and AI that will harm.”
  
  The ability to solicit input or review datasets documenting the needs and concerns of a body of citizens can be used to tailor public diplomacy campaigns. Moreover, AI can help diplomats engaged in public diplomacy to test messaging by sorting through reactions from various sources, including news and social media, to public-facing campaigns.
  
  Furthermore, Jessica Brandt, policy director for the Artificial Intelligence and Emerging Technology Initiative at the Brookings Institution, has argued, “We can use AI-enabled sentiment analysis tools to better understand where authoritarian narratives are taking root in target societies around the world, so that we know where to focus our attention and resources.” Does it make sense to respond to a certain bit of critical information, or would doing so “actually give oxygen to something that otherwise would not get much traction?”
  
  Given scarce resources, knowing where and when to devote energy to messaging and counter-messaging is just as important as knowing how to message. Using the nuance and know-how of diplomats and the data-distillation abilities of GAI in conjunction will be a boon to State Department efforts.

• GAI and cultural diplomacy. GAI has a key role to play in strengthening US soft power, as it can support cultural diplomacy, including preserving cultural heritage through digitization of documents, audio enhancement, and content restoration.
  
  Consider one example of the potential of GAI outside the realm of diplomacy: genealogy. FamilySearch, one of the foremost providers of digitized ancestral records, has collected billions of documents in need of transcription in order to be searchable. As one senior manager said last year, “In just a couple of hours, the computer can index more than you or I could do in a whole lifetime if we did nothing besides indexing for the rest of our lives.”
  
  The United States is a global leader in the development of GAI technology, and it could take advantage of this to bolster its soft power by enhancing its cultural restoration and preservation efforts. As outlined above, the United States could help states index cultural documents, as well as preserve and restore important audio and video files, and items of cultural significance. For example, the United States and Cambodia first signed a cultural cooperation agreement on “preserving and restoring Cambodia’s rich cultural heritage” in 2003, and since then, the United States has helped return more than one hundred antiques and assisted with preservation efforts. The use of GAI could contribute to this agreement by helping to identify stolen antiquities, determine forgeries, and restore damaged artifacts or locations. Doing so will help the United States to form and solidify positive diplomatic relations with countries in the Global South that have been victimized by the looting and trafficking of cultural artifacts.

Challenges of GAI for diplomacy

AI holds much promise for the future of diplomacy, but it is important to be clear-eyed about the risks and challenges associated with it. In particular, GAI can be harnessed toward nefarious ends, especially in the realm of disinformation and misinformation. US officials also should be wary of AI’s limits. While it can be a major asset to diplomats, caution and a healthy awareness of where AI might fall short or have negative externalities is essential. Finally, AI, broadly, is predicated on a triad of algorithms, computing power, and data. This paper will not explore all three in a technical manner, but on the latter (data), there is a risk of distrust from diplomats and the public, absent transparency and ethical guardrails.

This section will explore each of these challenges in greater detail.

• GAI and the information space. GAI can be used to amplify disinformation and misinformation, muddying the environment in which diplomats engage in public diplomacy. For example, in late 2022, Graphika, a research firm that examines social media and disinformation, uncovered a pro-China information campaign leveraging deepfake video technology in the form of fake news anchors. The videos of AI-generated avatars were distributed by pro-China social media bot accounts and disparaged the United States while portraying China as a good geopolitical actor. While these videos were not compelling to audiences and had few clicks, the utilization of this technology quickly accelerated. A year later, The New York Times reported on a pro-China YouTube network of channels that used GAI to cast aspersions on US policy. According to the report, “Some of the videos used artificially generated avatars or voice-overs, making the campaign the first influence operation known to [the Australian Strategic Policy Institute] to pair A.I. voices with video essays.” The clips covered an array of issues in a manner designed to favor China, from advancing “narratives that Chinese technology was superior to America’s, that the United States was doomed to economic collapse, and that China and Russia were responsible geopolitical players” to “fawn[ing] over Chinese companies like Huawei and denigrat[ing] American companies like Apple.” The network was sophisticated, gathering 120 million views and 730,000 subscribers across thirty channels.
  
  Deepfakes, relying on AI to generate misleading audio and video content, proliferate on social media, in contexts involving state and nonstate actors. In volatile situations, GAI can be leveraged to distort the information environment, promote damaging narratives toward the United States, and potentially stoke violent action against US diplomats.
  
  “The affordability and accessibility of generative AI is lowering the barrier of entry for disinformation campaigns,” Allie Funk, co-author of Freedom on the Net 2023: The Repressive Power of Artificial Intelligence, told MIT Technology Review. Funk, research director for technology and democracy at Freedom House, noted that the spread of AI-generated content is “going to allow for political actors to cast doubt about reliable information.”
  
  GAI, therefore, increases challenges for diplomats operating in the information space, especially as autocratic rivals seek to leverage this technology to cast the United States in a bad light.
• The limits of GAI. Diplomats should be aware of GAI’s limits and potential negative externalities. Diplomacy, especially when engaged in at a personal level, demands a high degree of skill and psychological competence. This includes understanding the idiosyncrasies that shape human-to-human engagements, and gauging potential cognitive biases shaping an interlocutor. Therefore, while GAI can augment the capacity for communication, a human touch remains essential, especially for personal diplomacy.
  
  There also is a risk of GAI degrading institutional expertise. Quickly generating summaries of news and conversations is a value-added capacity of GAI; however, the ease with which diplomats can scroll through an AI-generated distillation may discourage them from following up with more in-depth primary or secondary sources developed by humans. AI can often be helpful for generating a top-line summary, but it should not be viewed as a substitute for cultivating a 360-degree perspective on an issue.
  
  In addition, while GAI use for translation can facilitate communication, an overreliance on AI-driven tools may result in a loss of nuance or bad translations. A report by The Guardian in September 2023 observed, “AI-powered translation tools are particularly unreliable for languages that are considerably different from English or are less comprehensively documented.”
  
  In one example cited by that report, an individual arriving at a US Customs and Immigration Enforcement (ICE) detention center spoke Portuguese, but no one on staff did. ICE staff used an AI-powered voice-translation tool to communicate “but the system didn’t pick up or understand his regional accent or dialect. So Carlos spent six months in ICE detention unable to meaningfully communicate with anyone.” In addition, some Afghan refugees have had substantial difficulties with AI translation tools, as Dari, an official language of Afghanistan, is not an option on many of these tools.
  
  The lesson: while GAI is a powerful tool for facilitating communication, users of the technology should be wary of its limits, especially in life-transforming situations—or high-stakes diplomatic conversations. The State Department will need to use AI alongside its staff of technical experts and translators to ensure that it is used properly.
• Data and distrust. As noted earlier in this paper, AI is built on a triad of algorithms, computing power, and data. A technical discussion of each of these elements is beyond the scope and purpose of this paper, but a discussion of ethical concerns surrounding the third element is warranted.
  
  Data is a critical component of GAI, shaping the outputs generated by these systems. In a diplomatic context, data is vital for officials seeking to leverage AI to understand more clearly how residents of a country think, perceive, and make sense of the world around them.
  
  Nevertheless, data also presents potential pitfalls, absent ethical guardrails. First, illegal or unethical data collection, real or perceived, can foster distrust and backlash. This could consist of illicit solicitation of private information absent consent.
  
  Second, transparency with regard to datasets is important so that diplomats can have confidence in the outputs generated by AI, as well as a healthy awareness of where GAI might be imperfect. The inclusion or exclusion of certain datasets will inform the outputs generated by an AI system, biasing results in a certain direction that diplomats will need to be aware of in case they need to correct them. For example, if one created a GAI system intended to generate a top-line summary of US attitudes toward race in the early nineteenth century, and it only pulled from abolitionist newspapers, the output would be misleading. In addition, the State Department should seek tools that have resolved the “black box” problem, or when it is difficult or impossible to determine how a GAI model reached a particular result. Doing so will allow for a better understanding of why errors occurred and how the model can be improved to avoid them in the future. Transparency regarding both what data has been fed and how results are reached will build trust and caution in the use of GAI in diplomacy.

Recommendations for US diplomacy

Having explored challenges and opportunities related to GAI and diplomacy, the final section of this paper will offer recommendations for the United States to mitigate the challenges, take advantage of the opportunities, and position itself in such a way that it becomes a global leader in the integration of GAI and diplomacy. In doing so, the United States will strengthen a key instrument of power, better enabling it to outcompete autocratic rivals.

Toward this end, this issue brief proposes the following recommendations for the US government:

• Look at GAI as a critical asset in engaging the information space. US diplomats have already started to leverage tools that enable them to attain better situational awareness of changing information environments, as noted earlier.
  
  Moreover, elements of the State Department that directly engage publics and counter disinformation targeting the United States should see GAI as a critical tool for allocating resources. It is simply not possible to respond to every piece of disinformation proffered by a hostile state actor; the key is to respond quickly and effectively when there is the highest risk of damage. GAI can help in this regard.

• Work with allies and partners to shape norms around GAI and cooperate to dominate the commanding heights of this technology. This is another pillar of action found in the initial paper in this series. Without recapitulating its arguments, the salient point is that efforts to integrate GAI and diplomacy will be bolstered if the United States works in concert with allies and partners.
  
  One component of this is working with allies and partners to lead in the development of GAI and innovative applications of GAI for the diplomatic domain. The US-EU Trade and Technology Council is still young and holds promise for overcoming transatlantic differences over technology; meanwhile, countries participating in the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, known as the Quad, have publicly expressed an interest in working together more closely on emerging technologies. The United States should deepen those and other efforts to work collaboratively with allies and partners to maintain technological leadership in the twenty-first century.
  
  Another piece of this is shaping norms around emerging technologies, such as AI, and advancing a democracy-affirming approach to these technologies—in contrast to China’s efforts to export autocracy and oppression. We reiterate the call of the first paper for the United States to “export digital information infrastructure that promotes freedom, privacy, and the rule of law.” China has a leg up on the United States in Africa and other parts of the world when it comes to funding information and communication technologies. Now is the time for the United States and its allies and partners to leverage their technical know-how and wealth to become a viable alternative to countries developing their digital infrastructure and integrating AI. This includes continuing to invest in infrastructure partnerships like the Build Back Better World Partnership and the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment, which are transparent and values-driven.

• Leverage GAI as a tool of soft power. The United States generally ranks highly in assessments of soft power, but there is room for improvement. Taking the cultural diplomacy angle as an example, diplomats ought to take advantage of US technical leadership in AI to bolster its attractiveness to other countries. A concentrated cultural diplomacy campaign focused on helping countries preserve their heritage is a clear way for the United States to increase its soft power.
• Establish standards for transparency and ethical guardrails. US officials should seek to mitigate potential distrust surrounding their use of GAI. Toward this end, the State Department should develop clear guidelines for how it will leverage GAI in a manner that respects privacy, regularly examines the integrity of datasets, allows for an understanding of errors, and ensures diplomats have sufficient technical know-how to engage GAI critically, understanding bias and other shortfalls.
• Reorient the department’s workforce to integrate AI. This effort should be pushed at the level of the secretary, with bureau chiefs also accountable for implementing changes in their respective departments. This shift will require undertaking careful studies and applying test cases to see how AI augments the work of diplomats—and where it falls short or is limited.
  
  Congress has a role to play in its capacity as overseer of the government’s purse strings. It should fund initiatives that enable the modernization of the department, while discouraging wasteful spending on legacy equipment and efforts that are reflective of the diplomacy of yesteryear.
  
  The State Department must take the challenge seriously and work to demonstrate to Congress that it is developing a diplomatic workforce that can utilize and innovate using AI and a department built to support the leadership and staff in pursuit of national priorities. AI needs to be integrated into training, and requisite expertise should be sought through hiring, whether through new employees or rotational programs with the private sector. This latter approach has the added benefit of fostering public-private cooperation and infusing fresh ways of thinking into the government bureaucracy.
  
  As noted in the first paper in this series, the State Department is making some progress in this regard. We reiterate calls in the first paper in this series for the State Department to “consider tech knowledge as part of its assessment of Foreign Service Officers and other hires throughout the department,” as well as to “incentivize tech training by making professional development in this space a consideration for promotions.”
  
  Apart from working with the commercial sector, this space is ripe for collaboration with universities and think tanks. This could take the form of executive or management training initiatives that seek to instill both technical know-how and broader policy awareness of AI, other emerging technologies, and their intersection with diplomacy. These efforts should be undertaken with congressional support and funding and could serve as a model for collaboration in other departments and federal agencies.
  
  Notably, in October 2023, the State Department released its Enterprise Artificial Intelligence Strategy, which both articulates a strategy for the entire department and explains briefly how the Enterprise Data & AI Council, the AI Steering Committee, and others will work in partnership to execute and modify the strategy moving forward. This includes following the model of the Enterprise Data Strategy’s data campaign approach, which has campaign delivery teams working with staff on one mission and one management priority for a six-month period. These campaigns have served as a “force multiplier” for efforts to innovate and develop the data tools the department needs. This model, with its short timelines and whole-of-department nature, can help create an AI mindset and allow staff to determine how to meld their expertise and diplomatic abilities with the computing and generative power of AI. To truly address the importance of AI in an era of strategic competition, State Department officials at the highest levels, from the secretary on down, will need to use their influence and substantial resources to propel the effort and ensure it remains top-of-mind for the entirety of the department.

Conclusion

This issue brief has outlined the opportunities and challenges for AI and diplomacy, with a focus on GAI, and it has sought to build on the initial paper in this series through its analysis and recommended courses of action to integrate AI into US diplomacy.

This paper does not include a complete analysis of AI or GAI, but it highlights the importance of AI for strengthening US diplomacy and offers a way forward for the United States to take advantage of its technical expertise in this domain. Successfully navigating a new era of strategic competition will require diverse instruments of power, including robust diplomacy. AI can help the US State Department become more agile in its exercise of diplomacy, better positioning it to pursue US national interests in an era of strategic competition with China and Russia.

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Jeffrey Cimmino

Former Deputy Director, Operations and Fellow, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

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Andrew A. Michta

Director and Senior Fellow, Scowcroft Strategy Initiative

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This is very much the case in Ukrainian Black Sea port city Odesa, where Russian bombardments have become part of daily life. With each new air raid alert, people check social media channels to assess the projected trajectory of incoming Russian drones and missiles. This is usually followed by a frenzied exchange of texts with friends and neighbors to determine whether a dash for the nearest bomb shelter is necessary.

During the initial phases of the war, this grand port city known as an international symbol of intercultural unity and a treasure trove of cultural sites remained relatively untouched from Russian aggression, to the point that it became a temporary home to tens of thousands of internally displaced Ukrainians. A huge banner in the city center reflects this status with the message: “You are not refugees, you are guests of Odesa.” At the city’s non-profit Mriya Family Center, volunteers provide free daycare and psychosocial sessions for children along with vocational training for displaced moms wishing to start new careers. However, escalating air attacks mean Odesa has now lost its status as a sanctuary away from the horrors of the Russian invasion.

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

The air strike campaign against Odesa first began to intensify last summer following Russia’s withdrawal from a UN-brokered agreement that had allowed shipments of Ukrainian grain to sail from the city’s port to global markets. Since July 2023, Russia has attacked Odesa region with over 880 drones and more than 170 missiles, according to Ukrainian Navy officials. The mood in Odesa has darkened significantly in recent weeks as Russian attacks have become more frequent and deadlier. At least 17 people, including five children, have died so far in March.

This is fueling renewed discussion among local residents and international officials over whether to stay or go. The question is no longer rhetorical: French President Emmanuel Macron recently told opposition party leaders he had sketched out a possible Russian military advance toward Odesa or Kyiv that “could lead to an intervention.” In response to the recent surge in air attacks, at least one foreign mission is pro-actively thinning its presence in Odesa for the time being.

In one of the most brazen attacks on Odesa since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022, the Kremlin sent a missile on March 6 to within a few hundred meters of where Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy was meeting Greek PM Kyriakos Mitsotakis. “It is a very intense experience. It’s really different to read about the war in newspapers, and to hear it with your own ears, see it with your own eyes,” Mitsotakis commented after the attack.

Russian air strikes on Odesa are not only acts of aggression against Ukraine. The Kremlin’s bombing campaign also poses a direct threat to global food security. In this context, recent developments have been encouraging. Since Ukraine broke the Russian naval blockade of the country’s Black Sea ports last summer, cargo volumes of agricultural products have reached about two-thirds of their prewar levels, leading to a stabilization of grain prices on world markets.

This begs the question: Why has the international community not responded to the Russian maritime threat with the same robustness seen when protecting commercial shipping in the Red Sea? Do deliveries of consumer goods really matter more than grain shipments to world markets, especially to countries on the brink of starvation such as Sudan, to which Ukraine recently donated 7,000 tons of wheat?

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Ukraine’s advance in Kursk: What’s next and implications

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Increasingly, friends in Ukraine ask how long I think the war will last and whether the country can expect to be abandoned by weak-kneed Western allies afraid of provoking Putin. Military cemeteries such as the one at Lychakiv in Lviv are now full as war dead are carried to their final resting place, underlining the sense that not one Ukrainian family has been untouched by this war.

If anyone doubts Russia’s resolve to seize more Ukrainian land, they should carefully study former Russian President Dmitry Medvedev’s recent remarks to a forum in Sochi. Medvedev, who now serves as deputy head of Russia’s influential Security Council, outlined his vision for the near complete destruction of the Ukrainian state, with Ukraine reduced to a landlocked rump around Kyiv and most of the country incorporated into the Russian Federation. “One of Ukraine’s former leaders once said that Ukraine is not Russia. That concept needs to disappear forever,” he commented. “Ukraine is definitely Russia.”

The darkening mood in today’s Ukraine is not limited to Odesa. As the full-scale invasion passed the two-year mark recently, increasing doubts about Western pledges to support Ukraine “for as long as it takes” could be heard from politicians and civil society members. Several panelists at a high-profile forum in Kyiv on February 24 called out Western partners for failing to deliver on promises ranging from ammunition and longer-range missiles to tougher sanctions. Since then, worries have increased even further as US legislators kick the ball further down the road on the $60 billion supplemental bill for Ukraine that has yet to pass the US Congress.

There is now a growing feeling in Odesa and across Ukraine that time is running out. Unless new US aid is confirmed and the West arms Ukraine to the teeth, there may soon be nothing to prevent Russia from advancing all the way to Odesa and on to the border with Moldova. If that happens, the verdict of history, which can be extremely unkind to cowards, will be harsh for all those who failed to provide Ukraine with the support it so desperately needs.

Michael Bociurkiw is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

Further reading

UkraineAlert Feb 20, 2024

Outgunned Ukraine bets on drones as Russian invasion enters third year

By Mykola Bielieskov

As Putin’s invasion passes the two-year mark, tech-savvy Ukraine is betting on drones as the best way to overcome Russia’s increasingly overwhelming advantage in traditional firepower, writes Mykola Bielieskov.

Civil Society Conflict

UkraineAlert Feb 22, 2024

Ukrainian long-range drones target Putin’s war machine inside Russia

By Victoria Vdovychenko, Alexander Khara

Ukraine is hoping a new campaign of long-range drone strikes against Russia’s strategically vital oil and gas industry can help weaken Putin’s war machine, write Victoria Vdovychenko and Alexander Khara.

Conflict Defense Technologies

UkraineAlert Feb 12, 2024

Putin’s history lecture reveals his dreams of a new Russian Empire

By Peter Dickinson

Vladimir Putin turned his hotly anticipated interview with Tucker Carlson into a history lecture that laid bare the dangerous delusions and imperial ambitions driving the invasion of Ukraine, writes Peter Dickinson.

Conflict Disinformation

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

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A report by the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center in partnership with the US Department of State. This readout was informed by multi-stakeholder dialogues focused on facilitating greater, constructive exchange among multi-sectoral thought leaders and government leaders as they work to implement Summit commitments.

Executive summary

The Democracy and Governance commitment at the Ninth Summit of the Americas marked an imperative platform for strengthening the region’s democratic values and institutions. As the experts deliberated how to incorporate those values into practice, they stressed the importance of good governance for the advancement of human rights,
anticorruption practices, sustainable development, and citizen inclusion. Partnering with regional stakeholders will be imperative for crucial issues like civic engagement, transparency, adherence to international order, and the rule of law, encouraging Latin American and Caribbean countries to continue to prioritize their work in democratic renewal.

Recommendations for advancing and institutionalizing democratic practices in the Americas:

Report

Nov 8, 2023

Future of the Cities Summit of the Americas

By Willow Fortunoff, Diego Area

The first-ever Cities Summit of the Americas created a new platform for mayors across the hemisphere to build partnerships with civil society organizations–particularly those focused on the region and/or local governance–private sector companies, and one another.

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Amid global uncertainties and new challenges, the ninth Summit of the Americas is a renewed opportunity to bring about hemispheric cooperation and consensus to reach regional prosperity and security.

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The joint future of the Caribbean working with Latin America

A series of discussions featuring heads of state and government following the conclusion of the Summit of the Americas.

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Fast forward fifteen years and Brazil and India continue to share views on key global issues. For the first time since its inception in 1999, the Group of Twenty (G20) will have four consecutive emerging economy presidencies (Indonesia in 2022, India in 2023, Brazil this year, and South Africa in 2025). As G20 foreign ministers kick off their meeting in Rio de Janeiro on Wednesday, expect to see the shared views of India and Brazil reflected in a high degree of continuity between their G20 agendas.

The members of the G20 collectively account for more than 80 percent of global gross domestic product, three-quarters of world trade, and two-thirds of the world’s population. Moreover, the forum remains the world’s premium platform for coordinating international policy. Over the next year, the Atlantic Council’s G20 programming and research will track how Brazil leads this group in addressing four key areas (presented below) and will work to promote continuity with South Africa’s presidency in 2025 and the United States’ in 2026.

Food security and hunger elimination

Both New Delhi and Brasília have sought to highlight the needs of emerging markets and developing economies through their agenda-setting role at the G20. Perhaps no need stands out as urgently and pervasively as food insecurity. According to the World Food Programme, 783 million people worldwide faced chronic hunger in 2023, and most are in emerging markets and developing economies.

Under the Indian G20 presidency, the New Delhi Declaration was adopted by all members at the leaders’ summit. Among other provisions, it committed members to cooperate on agriculture research, access to fertilizers, capacity-building, and market transparency to foster food security among vulnerable populations. In particular, India emphasized the export and provision of millets, aligning with the “International Year of Millets” initiated by the United Nations General Assembly. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi was even nominated for a Grammy award for his appearance in a song titled “Abundance in Millets.”

Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva has doubled down on the social dimension of development, with a focus on combating poverty, inequality, and hunger. Food security is front and center in his domestic and foreign policy. As president of the G20, he has announced Brasília’s intention to launch a Global Alliance Against Hunger and Poverty at the leaders’ summit in November. Brazil is the world’s second-largest exporter of agriculture and is central to global supply chains—and in particular supply chains for emerging markets and developing economies. Expect to see Brazil leverage its weight in global markets to build consensus on the path forward in addressing food insecurity this year.

Climate and development finance

On climate and sustainable finance, Brazil’s G20 presidency appears poised to build on the legacy of India’s, while offering notable innovations and customizations. The four priorities of 2024’s Sustainable Finance Working Group are illustrative of Brazil’s particular interests and this G20’s overall mandate of “Building a Just World and a Sustainable Planet.” For example, financial instruments for nature-based solutions are rightfully receiving greater attention than ever in Brazil, which should not be a surprise in a country that contains two-thirds of the Amazon rainforest and 15-20 percent of the world’s biodiversity.

Leveraging Brazil’s active participation in various international financial institutions, the Brazilian finance sherpas are also placing a sharp technical focus on streamlined coordination among multilateral development banks and vertical funds. The troika of India-Brazil-South Africa G20 presidencies will press on with key Global South development financing priorities, such as just transition plans and blended finance for adaptation (see Atlantic Council’s related work on this here). In addition, Brazil has a unique opportunity to bridge this year’s G20 with the UN climate change conference known as COP30, which it will host in Belem in 2025. Brazil can coordinate its presidencies of both platforms to spur continued progress in Belem on landmark accomplishments from recent COPs, including the Loss and Damage Fund announced during last year’s COP28, held in Dubai.

Digital public infrastructure

Another area of continuity and compatibility between the G20 presidencies of India and Brazil is the provision of digital public infrastructure through payments, identity, and other digital networks created by the state to digitize and upgrade the provision of public services. Through Brazil’s Pix and India’s Unified Payments Interface (UPI), for example, both countries have seen tremendous success in building digital payments ecosystems and increasing digital and financial connectivity. 

Through the payments working group, G20 member states set targets for payments modernization for central banks and multilateral institutions. These targets address the cost, transparency, and speed of global payments. In 2023, the cost of retail payments to businesses and individuals across countries exceeded the previously set 3 percent target in a quarter of jurisdictions around the world. Similarly, the average cost of remittances is more than twice the goal of 3 percent. These metrics benchmark the G20’s progress and lay out the actions that member states still need to undertake to achieve these targets by 2027 (for cross-border retail payments) and 2030 (for remittances). 

Both India and Brazil position themselves as leaders among emerging markets in the provision of digital public infrastructure, and the G20 provides a platform to showcase their digital payment and identity models to the rest of the world. While both countries view the adoption of these platforms as a mechanism to increase financial inclusion and digital democratization, the wider adoption of digital public infrastructure will also present challenges. The G20 will have to come together to provide robust frameworks on data privacy, consumer protection, cybersecurity, competition, and public-private collaboration. These are going to be ongoing discussions, to be reflected in targets to come in the future. 

International financial institutions

During its G20 presidency, India initiated a set of processes and frameworks through the New Delhi Declaration that committed to “pursue reforms for better, bigger, and more effective Multilateral Development Banks.” The Declaration also included provisions to improve the multilateral development banks’ capital adequacy frameworks, which could yield an additional two hundred billion dollars in lending headroom over the next decade. India’s efforts focused on the quality and quantity of financing provided by international financing institutions and were supported by the United States, the largest shareholder at the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank.

Brazil is adding to India’s priorities with a focus on governance and on augmenting the influence of emerging markets over decision-making at international financing institutions. However, divergent interests between the United States and China, the world’s two largest economies, and heightened geopolitical tensions between Russia and Western economies will make meaningful progress on economic global governance difficult.

India learned as much late last year in negotiations regarding an increase in IMF quotas—or the capital a country contributes to the institution, which correlates with that country’s voting power. The United States had proposed an increase in the quotas that would leave voting shares unchanged—a proposal that drew criticism from China and other emerging market economies who feel underrepresented at the IMF. Ultimately, the countries agreed to the US-backed “equiproportional” increase in quota resources that, in effect, pushed the issue of expanding voting power in the IMF for emerging markets to a future date.

Just like the Indian G20 presidency, Brazil’s achievements in this area will likely be incremental yet important. For example, Brazil might advance innovative ideas for increasing private finance partnerships and for making measurable improvements in international financial institutions’s operations and development impact assessments. These increments will accumulate, particularly as the G20 presidency moves in 2026 to the United States, by far the largest shareholder of various international financial institutions. Reform is a current priority for the United States, as stated by US Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen at the Atlantic Council in April 2022 and elsewhere, and the subject will be high on the agenda when G20 finance ministers meet next during the April IMF-World Bank Spring Meetings in Washington, DC.

Mrugank Bhusari is assistant director at the Atlantic Council’s GeoEconomics Center.

Ananya Kumar is the associate director for digital currencies at the GeoEconomics Center.

Pepe Zhang is a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center.

Valentina Sader is a deputy director at the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center.

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Brazil’s breadbasket to the Global South

Beginning in the 1970s, both the Brazilian government and private entities invested heavily in agricultural innovations, leading to the development of more resilient crop varieties. Along with the expansion of farmland and widespread adoption of double cropping, the investments significantly enhanced agricultural productivity and gave Brazil an edge over other farming nations.

Fast forward to 2022 and Brazil has become the world’s second-largest exporter of agricultural products. It leads the world in soy, meat, coffee and sugar exports and is the second-largest exporter of oilcake and corn. Several large economies, emerging markets in particular, now heavily rely on Brazil to secure their food needs.

The benefits granted by MERCOSUR, a regional trade bloc within South America, make Brazil a prime source of agriculture for Argentina. Many Asian and African countries in the G20 are large consumers of soybeans, corn, and meat—all commodities where Brazil has a large market share. The United States, Mexico, and Canada in turn barely source any agriculture from Brazil as they source the majority of their food imports from one another as a result of the benefits granted by USMCA. Most European countries similarly import the majority of their agriculture from other European countries in the single market. 

Across the G20 economies, China is the most reliant on Brazil for agriculture, buying up a quarter of all Brazilian exports including most of its soy and beef. Brazil’s rise as an agripower since the 1970s aligned neatly with the population boom in China and the growing concern of the Chinese Communist Party over how to secure food for its population. But the real push came in the last decade as Beijing looked for agriculture suppliers other than the United States following intensification of trade tensions. 

To help Brazil increase its capacity and to reduce logistical costs, the state-owned China Oil and Foodstuffs Corporation (COFCO) invested over $2.3 billion, amounting to about 40 percent of its worldwide investments, in Brazil’s agricultural infrastructure since 2014. A key investment is at the Port of Santos, where a terminal expansion will take the company’s own capacity from 3 million to 14 million tonnes. Further cooperation in Brazilian railways, waterways, and farmland restoration is on the agenda.

Lula’s leverage is his history 

By itself, influence in the agriculture sector vis-a-vis emerging markets doesn’t provide a pathway to leadership of the Global South. Agriculture is not like semiconductors; food is an absolutely necessary resource for physical survival. Russia’s sudden blockage of the Black Sea in 2022, for instance, led to massive global grain shortages that created significant price spikes for food around the world. Moreover, the United States remains the world’s largest exporter of agriculture and for several countries in the G20, it remains the largest supplier. Lastly, although Brazil supplies about a fifth of global corn exports, it has relatively little weight in the global market for grains like wheat and rice, two critical food items for developing economies.

But Lula and Brazil nevertheless bring unique credibility with developing and advanced economies on the subject of food security.  

When he first came to office in 2003, Lula launched the ‘Fome Zero’ (Zero Hunger) programme, a series of coordinated large-scale government interventions that resulted in Brazil’s removal from the United Nations’ Hunger Map in 2014. Throughout the 2000s, Lula’s Brazil also mobilized budgetary, legislative, organizational, and narrative channels to orient its foreign policy toward hunger-reduction abroad. 

Since his return to power in 2023, Lula has once again made hunger a domestic priority. He has consistently raised the issue internationally. Now, his moment has come. As President of the G20, he has announced Brasília’s intention to launch a Global Alliance Against Hunger and Poverty at the Leaders Summit in November.

Both Brazil and the global economy have evolved since Lula was last in power. But the country possesses decades of trade and technical assistance relationships with developing economies, the know-how in the sector, and a track-record in hunger-reduction. Chronic hunger and famine remain real prospects for a tenth of the global population and developing countries will likely see Lula’s Brazil to act as a reliable representative in trying to bring together a global consensus on the path forward.

In recent years, China and India have both positioned themselves as leaders of the Global South. Now, the leader of the former is focused on his troubled domestic economy and the leader of the latter has an election on his hands. Meanwhile Lula is about to host the world twice—once for the G20 this year and then again for COP30 in 2025. If Brazil delivers tangible, material, and clearly observable benefits on food security, it will cement its position as a key leader of the Global South.

Josh Lipsky is the senior director of the Atlantic Council GeoEconomics Center and a former adviser to the International Monetary Fund.

Mrugank Bhusari is assistant director at the Atlantic Council GeoEconomics Center focusing on multilateral institutions and the international role of the dollar.

This post is adapted from the GeoEconomics Center’s weekly Guide to the Global Economy newsletter. If you are interested in getting the newsletter, email SBusch@atlanticcouncil.org

At the intersection of economics, finance, and foreign policy, the GeoEconomics Center is a translation hub with the goal of helping shape a better global economic future.

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Impact Iran, a coalition of nineteen civil society organizations focused on promoting respect for human rights in the country, was joined by several international advocates to communicate their concerns in an open letter dated January 29 to Deputy High Commissioner Nada Al-Nashif. While they value the importance of diplomatic engagement and recognize the critical role of her office in addressing human rights, they raise concerns about the visit’s timing. Notably, the UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC) is set to convene in mid-March to scrutinize Iran’s human rights record, a session that follows closely on the heels of the high commissioner’s visit. The group fears that the visit might lend an unwarranted veneer of acceptability to Iran’s human rights record, thereby weakening the UN’s ability to hold the country accountable.

The UNHRC’s upcoming session is poised to be a pivotal moment in international human rights advocacy, as it will feature a report from the UN Independent Fact-Finding Mission on the Islamic Republic of Iran that will present its findings. Tasked with a rigorous independent inquiry into the alleged human rights violations related to protests and civil unrest that erupted across Iran in 2022 following news of the killing of 22-year-old Mahsa Jina Amini while in the custody of the country’s so-called “morality police,” the mission aims to articulate the scope and scale of violations and create a repository of evidence that could be instrumental in holding perpetrators accountable in international legal frameworks. Thus, the UNHRC braces for presentations that may profoundly influence the course of justice and shape its strategy in advocating for the protection and promotion of human rights in Iran.

The UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran, Javaid Rehman, will present his findings in concert with their report. His report, informed by thorough investigations and eyewitness accounts, will shed light on the current situation and evaluate Iran’s adherence to its international human rights obligations. The rapporteur’s insights support the global community’s understanding and response to Iran’s human rights challenges.

The UNHRC will also select a new special rapporteur to monitor Iran in the late spring. Established in 2011, this mechanism is tasked with the painstaking monitoring of Iran’s adherence to human rights norms. Yet, the Islamic Republic has consistently resisted cooperation with the UN in this capacity, denying entry to three previous mandate holders despite the worsening human rights situation within the country. The deputy high commissioner’s visit offers a timely opportunity to broach the subject of increased cooperation with the Iranian authorities. Al-Nashif could leverage the meeting to negotiate terms that may foster a more collaborative relationship with the forthcoming mandate holder, thereby influencing the council’s decision-making process regarding who is best suited to fulfill this sensitive and pivotal role effectively.

In light of this, the deputy high commissioner’s visit will likely be scrutinized by the international human rights community during and after her trip, as the rights advocates anxiously await to see how her engagement may impact the council’s critical decisions in the coming weeks and months. This is especially the case since the recent surge in executions in the country, including the execution of four ethnic Kurds who were hanged for alleged espionage after trials that were purportedly conducted without proper due process. The execution of individuals under the age of thirty, accused of plotting a bomb attack, has sparked widespread condemnation and drawn attention to the lack of fair trials and allegations of torture. The secretive nature of the judicial process and reports of physical assaults and suppression of information by security forces following the executions have raised alarm about the treatment of political prisoners.

Articulating a deep-seated unease about the visit’s potential impact, particularly in light of escalating executions and the suppression of women’s movements, the coalition led by Impact Iran warns of the possibility that the visit could serve as a tool of propaganda for the Iranian authorities, potentially undermining the UN’s unwavering commitment to human rights in Iran. Renowned figures like Nobel Laureate Shirin Ebadi have also called on the deputy high commissioner to align with the victims and protestors by either reconsidering her visit or assuming symbolic gestures of protest, such as forgoing the headscarf. They urge her to engage with groups beyond government officials, including individuals and families directly impacted by the regime’s draconian policies. However, civil society advocates are also careful to point out that they aren’t pushing for non-engagement but for a strategic reassessment of the visit’s timing and scope, advocating for thorough monitoring measures and unfettered access to individuals in detention.

Some note, for example, that scheduling the visit after the UNHRC session allows for a more strategic and impactful engagement. This timing would enable the Deputy High Commissioner Al-Nashif to discuss the findings of the council’s mechanisms with Iranian officials, armed with the most up-to-date information and evaluations from the UN special rapporteur and the UN fact-finding mission. Such synchronization would also ensure that the engagement is informed by the council’s discussions and resolutions, further equipping the deputy high commissioner to address Iranian authorities with clear international expectations in mind.

Moreover, the scheduled visit has stirred a broader discourse about the consistency and coherency of the UN’s strategy for promoting and protecting human rights in Iran. Critics argue that while such high-profile visits could elevate awareness, their ill-timed execution could undercut the momentum of other UN bodies and efforts. Scheduled ahead of the UNHRC’s critical evaluation, including the fact-finding mission, the visit risks sending mixed signals about the United Nation’s stance on human rights in Iran.

For the UN to maintain the efficacy and integrity of its human rights advocacy, it’s imperative to harmonize its various mechanisms to avoid providing inadvertent avenues for violators to evade their obligations. When UN bodies operate in isolation, without a cohesive strategy, their actions can be counterproductive. High-profile visits, such as that of the UN Deputy High Commissioner for Human Rights Al-Nashif, should be intricately coordinated with ongoing investigations and diplomatic initiatives to avoid any semblance of legitimizing or endorsing a state’s actions prematurely.

It is critical for the various arms of the United Nations to conduct their work in a manner that is synchronized, reinforcing each other’s efforts, to ensure there are no mixed messages that could bolster a violator’s resolve. This coordination is essential to present a unified front that stands up to scrutiny and holds violators accountable with tenacity and unequivocal clarity. To maintain the integrity and effectiveness of its human rights advocacy, the UN must send a clear and consistent message: cooperation on one front does not negate accountability on another.

Rose Parris Richter is the executive director of Impact Iran, a coalition of nineteen human rights organizations committed to advocating for human rights in the country.

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The dichotomy between the West and the Rest has come to the fore over the past few years, marked by the return of war in Europe and great power competition—embodied most clearly by the rivalry between China and the United States. Developed countries from the so-called geopolitical West have been rallying behind Ukraine and striving to consolidate the front against autocratic powers, asserting the value of rules-based international governance while reshaping their relations to fit the times. In parallel, a host of nonaligned nations have refrained from taking sides and have resisted the binary definition through which Western countries tend to see the world.

There’s a string of reasons why countries from the Rest do not see themselves reflected in the West’s approach, ranging from the purely commercial to the ideologically and historically motivated. A common critique is that the Western worldview often seems to conveniently align with Western interests, to the point that Western countries adopt double standards on adhering to the very rules they thrust upon emerging countries. The West-Rest division itself is historically rooted, and the bolstering of non-Western international fora seems to reinforce it. This includes the recent expansion of the Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa grouping known as the BRICS.

Time and again, this West-Rest division has hindered collective efforts to address pressing global challenges. Beyond the tensions between major powers, economic disparities and structural mismatches have created a world in which collaboration is increasingly complex. As a result, shared issues—ranging from climate change and public health crises to economic inequalities—tend to end up on the back burner, behind national interests and country-specific priorities.

In addition, global governance has become a contentious issue, with competing visions seeking do define it. The pro–global governance liberal international institutionalist view has had a difficult time lately, to say the least. Concepts that until recently were indisputable dogmas seem to be under attack, if not relegated to the backseat of international politics. These include the essential role of the United Nations and the international community’s attempts to modernize it, empowerment of regional organizations such as the European Union and the African Union, the strengthening of international law and human rights protections, and the fostering of free trade and free movement of capital and people.

A more crude and realistic approach is emerging. Conflictual geopolitical blocs organized around nuclear superpowers and their hard power are rising, at least in the short and medium terms. Western nations must adapt to this change in the international environment and be ready to act swiftly to succeed. This rapidly developing situation may force Western populations to coalesce again around a strong definition of their values, vision, and ideals, which they want to adopt and then must follow rigorously. Western nations could turn to institutions such as the G7 to organize their actions to better face the challenges brought about by competition between blocs.

The road ahead goes through Rome

From its privileged position in the center of the Mediterranean, Italy has been taking stock of these asymmetries and looking at ways to shape a different trajectory.

Rome is already working on revamping traditional power structures and fostering a new ethos—one that envisions the West not in opposition to the Rest but as partners in a shared global endeavor. Italian diplomats have pushed for a reallocation and expansion of seats on the United Nations Security Council, for example, to strengthen regional representation through a fairer geographical distribution.

These efforts have coursed through the strengthening of diplomatic networks that Italy has been fostering in recent years. A prime example is its new strategic partnership with India and the excellent personal entente that Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni has developed with her Indian counterpart, Narendra Modi, which has facilitated the African Union’s entry into the Group of Twenty (G20). Beyond New Delhi, Rome has expanded bilateral relations across the Indo-Pacific region, where rapidly emerging countries are vying to be heard at the global table.

In parallel, Meloni has spearheaded a major effort to redefine Italy’s relationship with African countries, ushering in a novel model of cooperation (which she hopes may be replicated by other European states) based on non-predatory, investment-based partnerships across industries, such as energy, infrastructure, and telecommunications, as well as in academia and the political sphere. This approach, dubbed the “Mattei Plan,” was unveiled as the centerpiece in the Italy-Africa Conference, held this week in Rome. 

Cultural proximity and cross-fora cooperation between Rome and Brasilia constitute a fertile occasion to establish a deeper dialogue between the West and the BRICS, thus extending an olive branch to emerging powers, acknowledging their grievances and curbing the latter group’s drive to become an “anti-West” front.

In this sort of framework, the diversity of views can lead to more innovative approaches and nuanced solutions to complex issues such as climate change and economic inequalities. It can also expand opportunities for joint initiatives that can drive sustainable economic growth, while ensuring the benefits of growth are more equitably distributed on a global scale.

How Italy can set the agenda for cooperation

In practical terms, what should the West and the Rest work on together? As highlighted in the Mattei Plan, which features it as one of its five pillars, energy is a fruitful area for cooperation. Green energy and greentech, for example, are pathways to addressing climate change that double as a way to enhance supply chain resilience. Italy could make the case during its G7 presidency for more green energy and greentech investment in the Global South, which would allow those countries to tap into their natural resources, from fossil fuels and raw materials to solar and wind power, and develop their national industrial prowess, while diversifying the Global North’s energy supplies.

On the digital front, the avenue for cooperation is the technological “plumbing”—ranging from trustworthy telecoms infrastructure to privacy—and business-friendly international data transfer frameworks, not to mention chips and artificial intelligence tools. The latter two especially are among the most powerful drivers of growth, which still cannot materialize in the absence of an environment that’s conducive to investment—one of the main takeaways from the first Africa Climate Summit in Nairobi. In talking via international fora, national institutions must work to foster the conditions and offer guarantees so that money movers can unlock potential growth.

For this degree of cooperation to exist, recognizing and respecting cultural, structural, and political differences is paramount. Maintaining a high degree of transparency is also important to building trust and avoiding accusations of double standards. Boosted by the G7 presidency, Rome holds the right cards to foster an open environment that’s conducive to meaningful interaction, addressing disparities and promoting inclusive economic growth on a global scale.

Paolo Messa is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Transatlantic Security Initiative in the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

Karim Mezran is a resident senior fellow and the director of the North Africa Program at the Atlantic Council.

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By doing so, the EU will leverage its economic power to support the fledgling democracies’ goal of balancing against Russia’s economic influence. In other words, the EU has an opportunity to demonstrate how positive economic statecraft—the use of economic incentives by a government to influence the behavior of another government—can encourage Ukraine and Georgia to further reduce their economic dependence on Russia and deepen ties with the West, even before their EU accession.

The first step will be for the EU to support additional capacity-building in Ukraine and Georgia by providing financial and technical assistance. This process will look different in each country’s case: For Ukraine, which must fight a full-scale war while making progress on meeting the EU’s accession requirements, financial and economic capacity-building will require immediate financial assistance for recovery. For Georgia, it will require training Georgian financial intelligence analysts and prosecutors on anti-money laundering and counter–terrorist financing best practices to prevent sanctions evasion through the Georgian banking system.

Ongoing projects

The EU already promotes positive economic statecraft with Ukraine and Georgia and is developing new tools that can be further expanded. For example, the EU is negotiating to establish the Ukraine Facility designed to support Ukraine, its recovery, and its path to EU accession, with plans to provide up to fifty billion euros for the period from 2024 to 2027. Even though Hungary vetoed the allocation of these funds to Ukraine in December while demanding that Brussels unfreeze Hungary’s funds, the EU will come back to this issue again next month. The establishment of this tool would show the EU’s long-term commitment to supporting Ukraine.

Moreover, the EU and Ukraine have an Association Agreement that promotes deeper economic ties through a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA). To ensure Ukraine’s access to the EU’s common market, the Priority Action Plan allows for the free circulation of industrial goods, improves supply chain security, and explores the possibility of extending Ukraine access to the Single Euro Payments Area (SEPA).

Like Ukraine, Georgia also has an Association Agreement with the EU, which opened the EU market to Georgian businesses and products through the DCFTA and has allowed visa-free travel for Georgian citizens since 2017. The EU is Georgia’s largest financial assistance provider and also its largest trading partner. Furthermore, Tbilisi is working on solutions for increasing cross-border e-commerce with the EU by fifty percent. The EU has also invested in capacity-building projects in Georgia and has trained Georgian prosecutors and investigators in fighting money laundering, corruption, and terrorist financing.

Expanding cooperation

The EU should continue its capacity-building efforts with Ukraine and Georgia to ensure Ukraine has the financial assistance it needs for recovery, while both countries’ banking systems meet international anti-money laundering and counter-terrorism financing standards.

The most immediate action that the EU should take is to agree on the fifty billion euro financial aid to Ukraine during the special summit in Brussels on February 1. If Hungary keeps opposing the decision, the EU’s other options are to either give funding to Ukraine without Hungary’s approval or to distribute funding bilaterally. The EU’s hesitation with both options is understandable, given that they could both signal a weakening of the bloc’s unity. However, because of the unusual circumstances created by the war and Ukraine’s significance to Europe’s security from Russia, European leaders have signaled readiness to provide funding to Ukraine with or without Orbán’s support.

Moreover, as part of the EU’s positive economic statecraft strategy, Ukraine and Georgia should both be accepted into SEPA—Europe’s cross-border payment system that allows member states to make euro-denominated credit transfers in a few seconds. The SEPA zone is a significant element of the EU common market and would draw Ukraine and Georgia closer to the single market where cross-border trade is predominantly in euros. The opportunity to transact with European businesses and individuals with lower transaction costs will incentivize Ukraine and Georgia to comply with SEPA standards faster. This would also give the EU oversight of Ukraine’s and Georgia’s euro-dominated financial transactions.

This financial and technical assistance will help turn the enthusiasm on display in Ukraine and Georgia in December, when the start of accession talks was announced, into deeper and stronger connections with the EU.

Maia Nikoladze is the assistant director at the Economic Statecraft Initiative within the Atlantic Council’s GeoEconomics Center. Follow her at @Mai_Nikoladze.

Yulia Bychkovska is a young global professional at the Economic Statecraft Initiative within the Atlantic Council’s GeoEconomics Center. Follow her at @_YuliaB_.

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“We need development. And one of the most important factors for that development is connectivity,” said Polish President Andrzej Duda on January 17 at the Atlantic Council’s Three Seas Hub on the sidelines of the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland. Duda spoke alongside Lithuanian President Gitanas Nausėda, Latvian President Edgars Rinkēvičs, and Croatian Prime Minister Andrej Plenković as the heads of state took stock of the Three Seas Initiative at age nine, with an eye toward what’s next for the group at a time of war and uncertainty.

The Three Seas Initiative, established in 2015 by Duda and Croatia’s then President Kolinda Grabar-Kitarović, is a forum of thirteen European Union (EU) member states running north to south from the Baltic to the Black and Adriatic seas. The initiative is dedicated to advancing connectivity, security, and foreign investment in the Central and Eastern Europe region.

The initiative’s founding mission “to establish north-south access” in Central and Eastern Europe required “a visionary approach,” said Nausėda. Today, amid Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine that has led to Moscow’s isolation, “it’s very important to replace west-east access with north-south access.”

Below are more highlights from this discussion, which was moderated by Atlantic Council President and CEO Frederick Kempe.

Integrating Ukraine

• When it comes to cooperating on projects under the Three Seas Initiative, Nausėda said, “I am looking not only at the member states of the European Union,” but also potential future members of the bloc—especially Ukraine and Moldova. The initiative’s agenda is “also about the recovery and reconstruction of Ukraine,” said Nausėda, who will host the next Three Seas Summit and Business Forum on April 11 in Vilnius.

• Building more infrastructure and increasing connectivity also has implications for Ukraine’s war effort. “We need excellent infrastructure, motorways, railways to deliver military equipment” to Ukraine, said Duda.

• Ukraine and fellow EU candidate Moldova were made associate states of the initiative at the Three Seas Summit in Bucharest last September. Membership in the initiative is reserved for EU member states, and there is no plan to change this rule, Duda said. However, he said, “We hope Ukraine will be a full member of Three Seas Initiative because we all support Ukrainian efforts to join the European Union.”

Jumpstarting investment

• Nausėda said the initiative needs to make its projects “economically interesting” to private businesses and foreign investors. “Otherwise it will be very difficult to implement these projects” only with state and EU resources, he said. “Those are also important, but they cannot cover all the financial gaps we have with the Three Seas Initiative.”
• Looking at ways the initiative can attract more outside investment, Plenković said that “we should all strengthen our judiciary. We should all fight corruption.”
• “It will take several multi-annual financial frameworks and investments” to attain the level of economic development of the EU’s founding members, said Plenković. “And this catching up policy is not something you can do overnight.”

Raising ambitions

• The countries in the initiative “need to get more attraction also outside this region” to increase foreign investment, said Rinkēvičs. “While there is a profound interest” for cooperation within the Three Seas region, he said, “there is also an interest to attract more investment, trade relations with the outside world.”
• There is also room to increase security cooperation with outside countries, including the United States, through the Three Seas Initiative, argued Rinkēvičs. “When we talk about military security, energy security, cyber security, we need to put more effort into working with our transatlantic partners,” he said.

Daniel Hojnacki is an assistant editor on the editorial team at the Atlantic Council.

Watch the full panel

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On January 14, Transatlantic Security Initiative nonresident senior fellow Ambassador Stefano Stefanini wrote an op-ed in Formiche that analyzed Africa’s role in the G7 and how Italy could serve as an interlocutor in Western institutions for the interests of countries in the so-called Global South (original source in Italian).

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Following global trend lines, significant shifts in Latin America and the Caribbean—including presidential elections in Ecuador, Guatemala, and Argentina, unprecedented agreements with the Venezuelan government, a worsening security situation in many countries, and a pressing focus on climate change—set the stage for even more change to come in 2024.

Join the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center as we explore top questions that may shape this upcoming year in the hemisphere.

What will the region’s newest presidents accomplish? How might Latin America’s ties with countries such as China and Russia evolve? What might be the role of the United States in an election year? Will the Caribbean see new, international attention to the specific threats faced by major climatic events?

Take our quiz to find out if you agree with what we’re predicting!

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Western partners and Georgian policymakers must now intensify their efforts to shape the conversation and push for progress in Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic accession, especially ahead of the Georgian parliamentary elections expected in October. Given Russia’s preoccupation with its invasion of Ukraine, Georgian officials should recognize the diminished threat from Russia to Georgia’s westward ambitions and the Georgian public must be encouraged to hold their government accountable to reform. This will not be easy when the sincerity of the Georgian government’s commitment to EU integration is in question.

Receding Russia

Russia is the greatest hurdle dissuading Euro-Atlantic integration in Georgia. In 2008, following a promise by NATO to bring Georgia into the Alliance in the future, Russia acted quickly to block Georgia’s integration with the West through invasion. As Georgia lacked Western security guarantees, the country was left alone to fend off a Russian invasion, resulting in the occupation of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Ever since, Georgian politicians have toed carefully between the country’s pro-European sentiments and appeasing any possible security threats from Moscow.

However, recent developments lend little credibility to suggestions that Georgia must forgo EU integration to ensure its security. Since the onset of war in Ukraine, Russia withdrew more than two thousand troops from Georgia’s breakaway regions, while also failing to intervene in recent fighting between Armenia and Azerbaijan. These trends indicate that the South Caucasus no longer constitute a top political priority for the Kremlin when compared with its ongoing invasion of Ukraine. Even Moldova, threatened by a Russian presence in the breakaway region of Transnistria, became an EU candidate in June 2022 with no major military repercussions from Moscow.

Threats to Georgia remain, however, with particular regard to Russia’s growing Black Sea naval presence. Though security concerns must be taken seriously, it is not clear that the threats to Georgia are greater than to other countries in the region that already pursue a strong westward course. Western policymakers must bear these concerns in mind when pushing for reform in Georgia, while not allowing security to excuse Tbilisi of engaging with reform.

With Russia ultimately preoccupied in Ukraine, this then raises the question of whether Tbilisi’s hesitancy toward reform truly stems from security threats from Moscow or from a deeper hesitation by powerful voices within Georgia.

Georgian Dream vs. Georgia’s European dream

Despite its official commitments to Europe, analysts question whether the commitments of the ruling Georgian Dream party toward European accession are genuine, or a ploy aimed at appeasing the pro-European sentiments of the Georgian populous.

Bidzina Ivanishvili, Georgian Dream’s founder and first prime minister, wields considerable influence over the party. Despite his term as prime minister ending in 2012, Ivanishvili’s reported control of 20 percent of Georgia’s economy and immense political influence cause experts to argue that he maintains a sizable role within Georgian Dream. Ivanishvili, having made his fortune in Russia during the 1990s, has been accused of holding pro-Russian views to benefit his business dealings, explaining his drive to normalize relations with Moscow and his kowtowing to Russia in setting the scope of Georgia’s foreign policy. Furthermore, EU recommendations to combat oligarchy and reduce political polarization in Georgia seem to run contrary to the interests of Ivanishvili and his party.

If Georgian Dream’s commitments to EU accession are indeed disingenuous, Euroskeptic administrations in other accession candidate countries offer a roadmap in deflecting blame for stalled reforms and working to diminish popular support to join the EU. Since applying for accession in 2009, Serbia has stalled on its reforms, and backslid on media freedom and rule of law. As a result, public support in Serbia to join the EU has dropped from 65 percent in 2009 to just 33 percent in 2022. In 2023, the Serbian government openly expressed its skepticism, with President Aleksandar Vučić remarking that Serbia is “pessimistic” about EU accession while arguing that the EU appeared unenthusiastic about Serbia’s integration.

With Georgian Dream’s similarly questionable commitments to EU integration, Western officials must engage intensively to prevent Georgia from reaching a similar fate.

The moment for action

First, the Georgian public must understand that Russia poses a diminished threat and cannot be blamed for government failures. Though Russia’s security threat to Georgia has clearly receded, expanding military cooperation with NATO might further affirm Georgia’s security while discrediting misleading narratives that Georgian Dream proliferates among the public. However, any military or financial support must be conditioned on sustained progress toward reform.

Second, the EU must remain visibly engaged with Georgia’s progress so political opportunists cannot place blame for slow progress on the West. Working closely with civil society and independent media, Western observers must develop a comprehensive public diplomacy strategy to maintain popular support for EU integration, while offering reporting of Georgia’s reform progress to the Georgian public and Western officials. This will be crucial in the lead-up to the 2024 parliamentary elections, where Georgian Dream’s undermining of reform can be challenged by the opposition and grassroots organizers.

Georgians have demonstrated unquestionable capacity to influence government policy through peaceful mass mobilization during the 2003 Rose Revolution and the more recent protests in March 2023 which brought about the failure of a “foreign agent” law that ran contrary to European Commission recommendations. Furthermore, with growing concerns that the 2024 elections may be subject to meddling by Georgian Dream, the need for consolidated pro-reform opposition only becomes more apparent. If opposition parties, civil society, and media cooperate with international observers to strengthen popular pressure in the lead-up to the elections, then Georgian Dream will have to make the decisive choice to embrace voters’ Euro-Atlantic aspirations. Otherwise, Georgian Dream will suffer the backlash, either in the voting booth or on the streets.

Jacob Paquette is a program associate for Freedom House’s Europe & Eurasia Program. He is a former young global professional with the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center and a recent graduate from American University’s School of International Service.

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On December 6, 2023, invoking Article 99 for the first time since he took office, Secretary-General António Guterres called on the Security Council to adopt a resolution designed to put pressure on Israel to adopt a total ceasefire in Gaza to avert a humanitarian catastrophe.

Why did Guterres invoke Article 99 in the case of Gaza but not in the case of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine? The intention here is not to compare the appalling suffering endured in both cases by blameless civilians, even if it would be interesting to recall the respective causes and instigators of the two conflicts. Rather, what deserves to be compared is which of the two conflicts is more dangerous to the “maintenance of international peace and security,” which is the subject of Article 99.

The Russian nuclear threat in Ukraine

From the outset of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Moscow irresponsibly brandished the threat of nuclear fire to try to force Ukraine to capitulate to its demands and to dissuade NATO countries from aiding Kyiv.

Russian political scientist Sergey Karaganov, a close associate of Russian President Vladimir Putin who heads the Council for Foreign and Defense Policy, wrote on June 13, 2023: “The enemy must know that we are ready to deliver a pre-emptive strike in retaliation for all of its current and past acts of aggression in order to prevent a slide into global thermonuclear war.”

Similarly, Dmitri Trenin, a former Russian military intelligence colonel, also a member of Russia’s Council for Foreign and Defense Policy, wrote a few days later: “The possibility of using nuclear weapons during the current conflict should not be hushed up. Such a perspective, real not theoretical, should serve as an incentive to curb and stop conflict escalation and ultimately pave the way for a strategic equilibrium in Europe that suits us.”

The aim of these statements is clear: to frighten the leaders and citizens of NATO member countries into giving up their support for the Ukrainian defense and counterattack effort. Even if Putin is unlikely to risk the ramifications of using a low-yield tactical nuclear weapon in Ukraine, the potential consequences of such folly are well worth Guterres’s concern.

In addition to Moscow’s threats of nuclear strikes against Ukraine, the Russian army is occupying and using Ukraine’s Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant for military purposes, endangering its operation.

A resolution against nuclear threats

Given the threat to global security posed by Russia’s threats to use nuclear weapons, Guterres should once again use Article 99 of the UN Charter to request that the Security Council adopt a generic, legally binding resolution under Chapter VII of the charter:

• deciding that any withdrawal from the Non-Proliferation Treaty constitutes a threat to international peace and security;
• deciding that any test of a nuclear explosive device is a threat to international peace and security;
• deciding that the use of nuclear weapons against a country that does not possess them is a crime against humanity;
• deciding that any attack on or seizure of an operating nuclear power plant for military purposes is a war crime.

The adoption by the Security Council of such a generic resolution, which would be non-discriminatory in nature, would represent a significant step forward in the fight against the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Russia will certainly exercise its right of veto against such a resolution. Even so, putting it to a vote would at least have the merit of showing the world who is threatening international peace and security, and forcing China to clarify its position on the use of nuclear weapons.

For Guterres, the stakes are high, and he risks political retribution from Moscow. But applying the double standard of invoking Article 99 in the case of Gaza but not Ukraine would undermine his credibility.

Few things “threaten the maintenance of international peace and security” more than a potential nuclear attack. Guterres should therefore force the issue onto the Security Council’s agenda before it is too late.

We should not always have to wait for disasters to occur before moving national and international institutions toward systems more capable of guaranteeing peace between nations.

Pierre Goldschmidt is a former deputy director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency and head of the Department of Safeguards.

The post Why is the UN secretary-general so worried about Gaza but not Ukraine? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

While the much-anticipated US-EU critical minerals agreement is still under negotiation, the Biden administration and von der Leyen commission have shown a willingness to move past the dispute over the Inflation Reduction Act. The EU and United States have already, for example, increased cooperation on critical minerals supply chains, such as the continued convening of the secure supply chains working group under the US-EU Trade and Technology Council, with a goal of addressing potential economic coercion by China. Yet with future unknowns bedeviling US-EU trade relations—namely elections and divergent approaches on open trade—as well as China’s dominance in critical minerals mining and processing, the EU needs to swing into action. With estimates showing the EU’s mining industry is fifteen years behind Beijing and a staggering 98 percent of Europe’s rare earth metals are imported from China, there is a lot of ground for the EU to make up. 

This isn’t to say the EU is sitting idle. When the US Congress passed the Inflation Reduction Act in 2022, the blow to the EU’s green tech sector became a catalyzing moment. In March 2023, the European Commission announced the Critical Raw Materials Act mandating that at least 10 percent of EU critical raw materials be mined and 40 percent processed in Europe by 2030. The legislation is expected to accelerate permitting procedures for new mines and alleviate some of Europe’s capacity issues (though implementation won’t be easy nor happen overnight). The EU is likewise pursuing new strategic partnerships on critical minerals in an effort to diversify its critical raw materials (CRM) supply chains. However, as the vast majority of EU imports of CRM are exempt from tariffs, new trade agreements alone offer little in terms of added benefits from new investments or economic incentives. The EU should pursue more ad hoc measures, particularly as Argentina throws a spanner in the EU-Mercosur trade pact and overall “fatigue” over stalled free trade negotiations in the EU sets in. 

One possibility for action is the EU’s forthcoming Critical Raw Materials Club for all like-minded countries, which seeks to strengthen the global CRM value chain in cooperation with allies and partners. At present, the Critical Raw Materials Club lacks structure, but it holds potential as a useful trade tool to pool investment into “resource rich” countries in the global value chain. As the EU faces an uncertain economic and geopolitical future ahead, it is important that the EU works quickly to link its CRM diversification efforts with others, especially with its largest trading partner, the United States.

EU should stand up the Critical Raw Materials Club

As it stands, the Critical Raw Materials Club aims to invite allies and partners to participate in what would primarily be a buyers’ cartel that would pool investment and facilitate coordination of market behavior among members in line with geopolitical and economic security concerns. The EU has already extended invitations to like-minded allies such as the United States, partly to prevent competition over the same resources.

However, the Club cannot be solely a buyers’ cartel, as that would put downstream pressure on critical mineral producers while the global market for them is volatile. And, although China has the existing advantage in terms of speed and scale for such partnerships, the EU can offer more reliable investments with ESG goals instead of greater potential risk of exploitation, which China has been accused of doing. Consequently, the Club should aim to place both the advanced economies of the EU and its allies on fairer footing with critical mineral exporters to prevent the former from unfairly exploiting the latter. This would ensure that critical mineral exporters should not have to choose between trade with the Club and their own economic development. 

EU should work with key allies including in the Indo-Pacific

Like the EU, the United States has been moving toward safeguarding its own supply chains. In May 2022, President Joe Biden announced the Indo-Pacific Economic framework (IPEF), a trade initiative meant to, among other priorities, strengthen supply chain resilience in the region. Taking it a step further, at the August 2023 Camp David Summit, the United States, Japan, and South Korea pledged to develop a pilot form of the IPEF supply chain Early Warning System (EWS) to share information on supply chain resiliency.  Notably, the trilateral declaration not only highlighted critical mineral supply chains as an area of interest, but also explicitly suggested linking the EWS to “complement” existing mechanisms with the European Union. 

As such, along with the United States, the EU should welcome Japan and South Korea into the Club during its establishment. Given their position in supply chains to China, Japan and South Korea will face the impact of Chinese-led disruptions faster than the United States and the European Union, making them strong economic bellwethers. This is especially true for critical mineral supply chains. As Europe has had increasingly close trade relations with Japan and South Korea, inviting them both would complement their similar goals of securing critical mineral supply chains and avoiding competition with their allies.

Discussions that are already happening on critical mineral supply chains at the Group of Seven (G7) summit and ministerial levels offer the opportunity for the EU to deepen cooperation. Although South Korea is not a formal member of the G7, it was represented at the G7 Hiroshima summit in May by South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol—entrenching South Korea’s position in G7-level and adjacent discussions. 

Political challenges

Taken together, there is much that the EU should take stock in for its work in supply chain resiliency including in cooperation with the United States. All things considered, the outcome of next year’s US presidential election could inhibit cooperation on a number of transatlantic agenda items including on critical minerals. The EU should look to institutionalize the Critical Raw Materials Club, working with like-minded partners and allies, to anchor itself within the global CRM supply chain and do so ahead of next year’s elections to ensure better longevity.

Nicole Lawler is a program assistant in the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center.

Francis Shin is a research assistant in the Europe Center.

The post The EU needs a buyers’ club for critical minerals. Here’s why. appeared first on Atlantic Council.

To that end, in recent months the SLP team has continued and built upon efforts to codify the crime of gender apartheid in international law, including by advocating for its inclusion in the United Nations Sixth Committee’s draft crimes against humanity treaty. In partnership with Afghan and Iranian women’s rights defenders and the Global Justice Center, we issued a joint letter and legal brief on the issue, in addition to publishing an explainer in the Atlantic Council’s New Atlanticist and highlighting the campaign in our recent report about existing international pathways toward accountability.

We greatly appreciate your support as we’ve continued to grow our team, scope of work, and ability to effectively seize upon new opportunities. If you wish to support our work further, we hope you will follow our newly-launched X (formerly known as Twitter) and Instagram accounts under the handle @SLPJustice, or donate directly to help fund our projects.

As always, we are dedicated to responding to the evolving needs of human rights defenders, practitioners, and affected communities. If you have ideas for additional lines of work or thoughts on our initiatives, we welcome your feedback.

Kind regards,

Staff

Gissou Nia

Director, Strategic Litigation Project

Rafik Hariri Center & Middle East programs

Civil Society Corruption

Send Feedback Support our work

In October, the SLP published its latest report, which aims to provide an overview of and recommendations relating to international options that can be used to pursue accountability for human rights violations committed by the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI).

Report

Oct 5, 2023

International avenues to hold the Islamic Republic of Iran accountable for human rights violations

By Lisandra Novo, Celeste Kmiotek, Elise Baker, Gissou Nia

The Islamic Republic of Iran’s discriminatory domestic legal framework and brutal suppression of dissent have left Iranians looking for international responses to their plight. This report aims to provide an overview of and recommendations relating to international avenues for accountability for atrocity crimes and human-rights violations committed in Iran.

Human Rights International Norms

The different avenues covered in the report were selected by considering the treaties that have been ratified by Iran, international courts that do or could have jurisdiction over the IRI or relating to violations that take place in Iran, different mechanisms available in which the IRI participates under the United Nations and other international organizations, and mechanisms designed specifically to address issues in Iran. The report ends by looking to the future and highlighting current developments in international law that, if successful, could provide new avenues for accountability.

In October, the United Nations (UN) Sixth Committee met to debate its draft treaty on crimes against humanity. Ahead of the meeting, the SLP, in partnership with the Global Justice Center, issued a joint letter and legal brief urging the international community to codify the crime of gender apartheid in the crimes against humanity treaty.

The letter and legal brief were endorsed by dozens of prominent jurists, scholars, and civil society representatives, including Afghan women’s rights defender Shaharzad Akbar and Nobel laureates Shirin Ebadi, Malala Yousafzai, Nadia Murad, and (this year’s honoree) Narges Mohammadi. Also included among the endorsements: South African jurists Justice Richard Goldstone and Navi Pillay, former US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, former Irish President Mary Robinson, former International Criminal Court Chief Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda, Baroness Helena Kennedy of the Shaws KC, renowned global feminist Gloria Steinem, and more.

On December 5, our co-signatory Malala Yousafzai delivered the twenty-first annual Nelson Mandela lecture in Johannesburg, South Africa. In her speech, she called on governments “in every country” to “stand with Afghan girls and women” and codify the crime of gender apartheid in the UN crimes against humanity treaty.

Want to learn more about gender apartheid?

SLP Director Gissou Nia published a Q&A with the Atlantic Council’s New Atlanticist to explain the letter and brief, how they define gender apartheid, why it should be enshrined as a crime under international law, and how it would be prosecuted.

New Atlanticist

Oct 5, 2023

Gender apartheid is a horror. Now the United Nations can make it a crime against humanity. 

By Gissou Nia

The international community has an opportunity to codify the crime of gender apartheid in the United Nations’ crimes against humanity treaty. Learn more about gender apartheid from the Atlantic Council’s Gissou Nia.

Afghanistan Education

More recently, Gissou—along with SLP Deputy Director Nushin Sarkarati, Senior Legal and Policy Advisor Alyssa Yamamoto, and incoming team members Sareta Ashraph and Akila Radhakrishnan—wrote for Just Security about the campaign, parallels between South Africa and Afghanistan, and how apartheid differs from other international crimes.

In September, SLP Nonresident Senior Fellow Rayhan Asat hosted an event on the margins of the UN General Assembly. The panel, “From holding the line to a robust international response to the atrocities against the Uyghurs,” aimed to reflect upon and examine international action after the UN’s Uyghur report, which was released by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights last year.

Public Event Tue, September 19, 2023 • 3:30 pm ET

From holding the line to a robust international response to the atrocities against the Uyghurs

An event on the margins of the UN General Assembly reflecting and reexamining international action after the UN’s Uyghur report.

Watch the Event Read the Recap

The event featured remarks by US Ambassador-at-Large for Global Criminal Justice Beth Van Schaack, the European External Action Service’s Managing Director for Multilateral Affairs Belén Martinez Carbonell, and Division Head for the German Federal Foreign Office’s Directorate for Asia and the Pacific Peter Loeffelhardt. The panel was moderated by the Economist’s Gady Epstein and featured Rayhan, Former UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Prince Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein, Amnesty International Secretary General Agnès Callamard, and former Human Rights Watch China Director Sophie Richardson.

Prior to the event, the Chinese mission to the UN distributed a letter to other missions urging their staff to not attend. The letter and the event’s impressive turnout prompted coverage in the New York Times, Bloomberg, Radio Free Asia, and the National Review.

In November, SLP Nonresident Senior Fellow Nizar El Fakih submitted an amicus curiae brief to the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in case 12.919, García Romero y otros v. Ecuador. This amicus aims to persuade the court to advance a more protective interpretation of the admissibility requirement to exhaust domestic remedies in general. If adopted, it may help advance a criterion that could hopefully greatly benefit the region by allowing victims to effectively seek international protection without an overly formalistic approach to the exhaustion requirement.

The court has developed different interpretations of the said admissibility requirement, and although some significant progress was made in the past, the issue remains disputed. For example, in this case, even when more than eighteen years have passed since the death of the victim, the State of Ecuador insists upon requiring the court to deny the admission of the case, arguing the alleged lack of exhaustion of the domestic remedies by the victim’s loved ones.

In the brief, Nizar argues that the exhaustion of civil claims, constitutional protection actions, and requests of recusal are not needed to fulfill the said admissibility requirement. He also argues that in cases of a criminal nature involving public action crimes, the exhaustion requirement should not be considered without balancing it with the fact that public action crimes require the state, and not the victim, to ex officio develop the internal domestic proceedings.

Read the full brief and a summary of the case here.

Fellow

Sareta Ashraph

Senior Legal Advisor

Rafik Hariri Center & Middle East programs

Arabic English

We are thrilled to bring on Sareta Ashraph as a senior legal advisor. She is a barrister specializing in international criminal law with expertise in gender-competent and intersectional analyses of the commission and impact of international crimes. Ashraph served as the director of investigations for the UN Investigative Team to Promote Accountability for Crimes Committed by Da’esh/ISIL (UNITAD) and as chief legal analyst for the UN Commission of Inquiry on Syria and the Commission of Inquiry on Libya. 

Fellow

Bahar Ghandehari

Junior Policy Fellow

Rafik Hariri Center & Middle East programs

Afghanistan English

In November, we welcomed Bahar Ghandehari as a junior policy fellow. Ghandehari is an Iranian human rights defender focused on international law, human rights, and Middle East policy. She is the founder of Middle East Matters, which focuses on media journalism and digital human rights campaigns. She is also the advocacy officer at the Syrian Emergency Task Force, where she works on policy, advocacy, and accountability efforts concerning human rights issues and atrocities in Syria. 

Fellow

Akila Radhakrishnan

Strategic Legal Advisor, Gender Justice

Rafik Hariri Center & Middle East programs

Human Rights International Norms

Akila Radhakrishnan is the SLP’s new strategic legal advisor for gender justice and the outgoing president of the Global Justice Center, where she leads its work on gender equality and human rights. Radhakrishnan has led work on abortion access in conflict, gender in genocide and crimes against humanity, and accountability for reproductive violence. She has briefed the UN Security Council, presented at the International Criminal Court, and regularly advises governments and multilateral institutions.

MENASource

Oct 18, 2023

Humanitarian aid cannot be weaponized. Gazans are depending on it.

By Lisandra Novo

Despite urgent appeals for aid and multiple deliveries to Egypt, no outside aid appears to have made it into Gaza.

Civil Society Conflict

IranSource

Sep 21, 2023

The House passed the MAHSA Act. Now what?

By Celeste Kmiotek, Lisandra Novo, Gissou Nia

The MAHSA Act—which focuses on targeted sanctions—will have to be approved by the Senate and signed by the president to become law.

Human Rights Iran

MENASource

Oct 16, 2023

Hamas’s actions are war crimes. Israel should not respond with further war crimes.

By Elise Baker

There are clear indications that both Hamas and the IDF have violated international humanitarian law, and some of their attacks constitute grave violations.

Human Rights Israel

New Atlanticist

Nov 30, 2023

Putin has been accused of starving civilians as a warfare tactic. Will the ICC agree?

By Alana Mitias, Celeste Kmiotek

New evidence about Russia’s actions in Ukraine offers the ICC an opportunity to prosecute starvation as a war crime or crime against humanity affecting Ukrainians and other global victims.

Conflict Human Rights

MENASource

Oct 31, 2023

Israel claims it is no longer occupying the Gaza Strip. What does international law say?

By Celeste Kmiotek

The laws of occupation codify a basic principle of humanity: those with effective control over a population have obligations to protect it.

Israel Middle East

Subscribe to our newsletter for quarterly updates on the SLP’s work on prevention and accountability efforts for atrocity crimes, human rights violations, and terrorism and corruption offenses around the world:

The post Strategic Litigation Quarterly Newsletter: Pursuing gender justice through international law appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Click to jump to an expert analysis:

Jörn Fleck: An important signal but also a missed opportunity for Europe to step up on the transatlantic stage

Andrew D’Anieri: A triumph for Ukraine’s army of tireless civil society activists and government reformers

Maia Nikoladze: Georgia’s candidate status needs to include more EU economic and financial integration

James Batchik: Europe isn’t leaving Ukraine in the lurch—even as Orbán plays the lone spoiler

Benton Coblentz: A crucial announcement that came just as Putin reiterated his goal of crushing Ukraine

An important signal but also a missed opportunity for Europe to step up on the transatlantic stage

The decision by EU leaders to approve launching accession talks with Ukraine is an important symbolic step and a shot in the arm for Ukrainians at a time of great uncertainty and anxiety over waning Western support for the country’s defensive war against Russia’s aggression. It is only the start of a long process of accession negotiations and reforms, and the decision cannot make up for the lack of US military aid that’s rapidly running out as negotiations on a new budget package in Congress drag on. But what it can do is provide a much-needed boost for Ukrainians’ morale and European aspirations. Ultimately, it is that European aspiration that carried much of Ukraine’s resilience, from the Maidan protests to Russia’s initial invasion in 2014, through to the darkest hours of the defense of Kyiv in early 2022. It is those same democratic, European aspirations of Ukraine that instilled so much fear in Russian President Vladimir Putin that he chose to launch a full-scale military invasion.

However, the approval of accession talks alone, by itself—without an agreement on the EU’s fifty billion euro macro-financial assistance bundle for the next four years, a decision on which was pushed to a January summit amid Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s blocking—is short on practical support for Kyiv. It is a missed opportunity for Europe to step up on the transatlantic and geopolitical stage at a critical time. Imagine the powerful signal at this moment for Ukraine of a package of launching accession talks and of fifty billion euros in financial assistance that is military assistance in so many ways, too. Bundle that for once with the otherwise disparate national announcements on additional military aid commitments—the delivery of another German Patriot battery, a Finnish pledge of doubling ammo production, and others—and the EU could have sent four unmistakable messages at once: one of timely reassurance to Ukraine; one of defiance and determination to an increasingly bullish Moscow (and even Beijing); another of encouragement to do the right thing to Washington; and one to its detractors at home and abroad of the EU shouldering its responsibility and stepping up.

—Jörn Fleck is the senior director at the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center.

A triumph for Ukraine’s army of tireless civil society activists and government reformers

Ukraine officially submitted its application to European Union membership on February 28, 2022, just days after Russia launched a full-scale invasion to topple its government and subjugate it to Moscow. Less than two years later, Ukraine’s European choice remains clear, as the European Council agreed on December 14 to open accession negotiations with Kyiv. The Council’s decision was excellent counterprogramming to Putin’s highly-choreographed call-in show earlier in the day, where he riffed on destroying and “de-Nazifying” Ukraine. The brutal Russian war continues in Ukraine’s east and south, but Putin has undoubtedly lost the battle for Ukrainian hearts and minds and has consolidated Ukrainian society against him; 80 percent of Ukrainians want to join the EU, while just 2 percent want to join a Russian-led bloc. Few could have imagined such public consensus when Russia illegally annexed Crimea and instigated the war in Donbas in 2014 in the wake of Ukraine’s Euromaidan Revolution.

The beginning of accession talks is a triumph for Ukraine’s army of tireless civil society activists and government reformers, who have worked to improve their country and better integrate it with Europe. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and his team working on Euro-Atlantic integration deserve great credit, too, and will now take up the difficult, and painstakingly long task of readying Ukraine for the EU single market. Kyiv will need to enact deep, lasting reforms and be flexible enough to negotiate political roadblocks that will crop up throughout the accession process, while fighting back against Russian aggression keen to slow Ukraine’s shift toward Europe. Yet with Ukraine’s indomitable spirit on display every day, few would dare bet against its eventual accession to the EU.

Moldova—with whom the European Council also agreed to open accession talks—faces its own problems of malign Russian aggression as it prepares for EU membership. Russia continues to back criminal elements in Moldova with the intent of destabilizing the country’s politics, and it still controls the breakaway Transnistria region. And yet Moldovan democracy is stronger than ever and the country’s European trajectory has never been more clear. The Council’s opening accession talks with Chisinau is a massive credit to Moldovan President Maia Sandu’s commitment to reform and democratic principles. Moldova is now closer to Europe than many ever thought possible.

—Andrew D’Anieri is a resident fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center. 

Georgia’s candidate status needs to include more EU economic and financial integration

The European Council’s decision to grant candidate status to Georgia is a victory for the Georgian people, who have been protesting against signs of their country’s democratic backsliding, such as the foreign agents law proposed earlier this year. While Georgia’s path to EU accession remains a long and laborious one, the EU should provide economic and financial incentives to Georgia even before accession and formal economic integration. 

The EU already has existing frameworks and projects that enhance Georgia’s trade and connectivity with Europe. They only need to expand. For example, the EU and Georgia signed an association agreement in 2014, which opened the EU market to Georgian businesses and products through the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area agreement. The EU has also removed visa requirements for Georgian tourists in the Schengen zone since 2017. Brussels remains the largest provider of financial assistance to Georgia and also its largest trading partner. Tbilisi is working on solutions for increasing cross-border e-commerce with the EU by 50 percent. 

Apart from strengthening trading ties and giving Georgia access to the European market, the EU has also invested in capacity building to prevent sanctions evasion through the Georgian banking system. For example, in 2022, the Council of Europe delivered a training course on financial investigation to Georgian prosecutors and investigators as part of the CyberEast project. Such projects with Georgia should expand, and should also include representatives of US financial regulatory agencies to deepen transatlantic engagement with Georgia, Ukraine, and other Eastern Partnership countries. 

The EU’s decision to grant candidate status to Georgia empowers and gives hope to the Georgian people, who have demonstrated their readiness and ability to keep the government accountable and ensure that the country follows the European path. Increasing Georgia’s economic and financial integration with the EU even before accession will strengthen the Georgian people’s ability to continue doing so.

—Maia Nikoladze is an assistant director within the Atlantic Council’s GeoEconomics Center.

Europe isn’t leaving Ukraine in the lurch—even as Orbán plays the lone spoiler

There is both a positive and a not-so-positive story to tell from the European Council Summit. The positive: It is a big deal that the European Council opted to open accession negotiations with Ukraine. The Council’s go-ahead continues Ukraine (and Moldova) along the path toward membership in the European Union at a record pace. It is a testament to the Ukrainian government’s efforts to enact the tedious and difficult reforms and to the seriousness with which EU leaders consider Ukraine’s EU future. 

The opening of negotiations is a historic milestone, but the work is just beginning. Kyiv will now have to run the gauntlet to align and reform just about every sector of its society and government with the EU’s prized acquis. This process has taken years for other applicants—none of which were simultaneously fighting a war for survival. Nevertheless, Ukraine has been serious about reform and was rightly rewarded. EU member state leaders, (minus one creative abstention) for their part, rightly demonstrated the bloc’s geopolitical weight and its ability to use enlargement to promote long-term stability and security in the region. The Council’s decision is also a confirmation of the bloc’s normative power. EU membership means something for the people of Ukraine: a symbol of a free, democratic Ukraine situated squarely in the West. The decision shows that Europe isn’t leaving Ukraine in the lurch and is serious about welcoming it into the fold. 

On the less positive side, the Council failed to agree to the fifty billion euro aid package for Kyiv as part of the EU’s top-up of its seven-year budget, punting the decision to January at the earliest. The package, meant to guarantee Ukraine much-needed macroeconomic assistance over the coming four years, is in many ways more important in the short term than the approval of accession negotiations. With additional US aid to Ukraine stymied in the US Congress and the war’s grinding pace, the EU needed more than ever to step up and provide Ukraine with predictable aid and send a message that Europe could continue its world-leading long-term tangible support for Ukraine even in difficult times. European leaders have already stressed that aid will continue to flow bilaterally, and the EU still has existing aid to dole out. But the failure to reach an agreement does diminish the EU’s historic decision on accession negotiations and, more generally, Europe’s ambitions as a geopolitical actor. Orbán continues to play the lone spoiler, using aid to Ukraine as blackmail to unlock Hungary’s frozen EU funds and putting the limits of the EU’s consensus decision-making on full display.

An extraordinary summit of EU leaders will pick the Ukraine aid question back up in January. EU leaders are bullish on securing a deal on aid to Ukraine in January. Hopefully they are proven right. 

—James Batchik is an assistant director with the Europe Center.

A crucial announcement that came just as Putin reiterated his goal of crushing Ukraine

Ten years after Ukrainians flooded onto the Maidan in Kyiv to make their choice of a European future clear, the decision at the European Council summit in Brussels on December 14 to open negotiations with Ukraine on accession is a practical and symbolic milestone on Ukraine’s path toward European integration.

In its recommendation to open accession negotiations with Ukraine in November, the European Commission reported that Ukraine made steady progress on all seven benchmarks that had been laid out when Ukraine was granted candidacy status in the spring of 2022. This included progress on laws relating to de-oligarchization, the rights of national minorities, and the strengthening of anti-corruption institutions, although the Commission clarified that it will take time to fully implement its recommendations. Several hurdles remain on the path to EU membership and negotiations will take many years. Of the non-founding members of the EU, accession talks have lasted nine years on average. The recent protests by Polish farmers at the Ukrainian border underscore the difficulties of integrating Ukraine’s agriculture sector, which is the largest in Europe, to align with the European Union’s Common Agricultural Policy, for example.

Despite these future challenges, the EU leaders’ decision is a critical morale boost to Ukraine’s leaders and the Ukrainian people. As Ukrainians continue to fight against Russian aggression and in favor of their country’s European future, the announcement was greeted with elation in Kyiv. A strong majority of Ukrainians back EU membership, with support spread evenly throughout the country. Zelenskyy hailed the move as a “victory” for Ukraine and for Europe, and Minister of Foreign Affairs Dmytro Kuleba called it a “historic day.”

The announcement couldn’t have come at a more crucial moment. Earlier in the same day, Putin reiterated his goal of crushing Ukraine at his annual marathon press conference, repeating his twisted retelling of Ukrainian history to try to justify his revanchist invasion. Meanwhile in Washington, negotiations over border and immigration policy have put a hold on a new aid package for Ukraine as legislators prepare to head home for a holiday recess.

The European Council’s summit was not without its own drama, Orbán was publicly committed to blocking progress on Ukraine’s accession before the summit. Meetings were held between the Ukrainian and Hungarian foreign ministers and among Orbán, French President Emmanuel Macron, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz and European Commision President Ursula von der Leyen. Zelenskyy was even seen talking with Orbán on the sidelines of Argentinian President Javier Milei’s inauguration in Buenos Aires. Orbán left the summit room when the European Council voted to open accession talks, a move reportedly suggested to him by Scholz. Orbán clarified after the announcement that Hungary “did not participate in the decision,” but made clear that Hungary had allowed the other EU countries to “go their own way.”

Europe is clearly stepping up its support for Ukraine. European countries have overtaken the United States in the total amount of aid sent to Ukraine over the course of its struggle against Russia’s full-scale invasion. The European Council’s decision only reinforces Europe’s commitment to support Ukraine as it faces Russia’s war of aggression. By entering into EU accession talks, Ukrainians are now one step closer to the future for which they are fighting.

—Benton Coblentz is a program assistant at the Eurasia Center.

The post Experts react to the EU starting Ukraine membership talks while failing to agree on aid appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Although history properly credits former First Lady Eleanor Roosevelt with exercising political influence to accomplish the passage of the UDHR in 1948, it was Malik who had the pen and wrestled with the game-changing ideas. December 10, 2023, is the seventy-fifth anniversary of the UDHR, a perfect opportunity to measure its impact and acknowledge that some declared rights are still only aspirational for many. The UDHR calls countries to what they are becoming and offers a clear standard by which we can measure nations.

Here are seven lessons to consider from this remarkable document on its seventy-fifth anniversary:

1. The world can find uncommon agreement on a controversial idea

Due to perpetual manufactured outrage and legitimate global conflicts, the world feels more divided than ever. During this current season of discord, it is encouraging to remember that all 192 member states of the United Nations have signed on to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. This stunning display of unanimity is rare and particularly uncommon among controversial ideas. Malik took on big ideas and the UDHR picked sides in many contentious worldview battles. People and governments should find shade and comfort under the agreed principles of the UDHR and expand its common ground for the common good.

2. “Inherent” and “inalienable” are powerful concepts

The UDHR’s preamble deems all thirty of the articulated rights “inherent” and “inalienable.” Although most people do not use these terms regularly, they are solemn and meaningful. “Inherent” conveys the idea that an individual’s rights are not dependent on their performance, accomplishments, ability, wealth, or status. Neither governments nor cultures bestow or grant our rights. Likewise, we cannot be “alienated” or separated from our rights. The UDHR even states that the will of these inherently valuable people “shall be the basis of the authority of government.” In the aftermath of two world wars, Malik led the drafters with these twin concepts of “inherent” and “inalienable” that elevate the value of individuals over governments, cultures, and traditions.

3. The UDHR was the foundation of future anti-discrimination laws

The UDHR took aim at the classifications that historically provided the foundation of state-sanctioned discrimination:

“Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.”

This was a direct attack on the caste system in India, Jim Crow laws in the United States, and the genocide of Armenians, among many other injustices. Malik drew inspiration from the concept of imago Dei and believed that if God’s image was in every person, then one cannot allow racism, gender discrimination, and xenophobia to exist. Sixteen years after its adoption, the UDHR’s language and structure influenced the United States Civil Rights Act, which prohibits discrimination with a similar refrain: on the basis of “race, color, religion, sex or national origin.”

4. The legal consensus against human trafficking still needs stronger enforcement

The UDHR’s Article 4 demands that governments stop enslaving people and move to prohibit human trafficking. The good news is that legislatures around the world have passed laws prohibiting coercing people to work or engage in commercial sex acts. Since 2000, every country in the world has passed some sort of law against modern slavery. The world should celebrate this legal consensus for freedom.

Yet, the United Nations estimates that traffickers are currently enslaving 27.6 million people and raking in $150.2 billion annually from their crimes. Even more troubling, the US State Department has determined that eleven governments (that have ratified the UDHR) are trafficking their own people, including China, North Korea, and Cuba. Malik’s declaration of freedom resulted in much better national laws that governments inconsistently implement.

5. Both religious expression and conversion deserve protection

Malik also elevated the right to “thought, conscience, and religion.” Not only does the UDHR specifically embrace a right to individual and corporate religious expression, it also highlights the right to change religions. Inquisitions, faith-based tests, and anti-conversion laws stand in stark relief to the towering religious freedom protections of the UDHR.

Meanwhile, the US State Department’s most recent International Religious Freedom Report designates twelve governments as “Countries of Particular Concern” because they “engaged in or tolerated ‘particularly severe violations of religious freedom.’”

6. Families are central to a free, rights-driven society

Across continents and cultures, the UDHR declares that the “fundamental group unit of society” is the family. Marriages require consent of both adult spouses, and both have equal rights when marriages dissolve. The UDHR even directs that parents have the right to determine how their children are educated. Malik’s emphasis on uniquely valuable people connected in intermediate institutions, such as the family and community structures, won the day over two competing philosophies: 1) the communist’s government-centric and anti-family construction; and 2) an emerging Western society of individuals prioritizing their own self-interest.

Yet today, twelve million girls under eighteen years old are married every year. That means twenty-eight girls every minute become child brides. Some advocates argue that governments that do not provide equal legal rights for both spouses lead to increased “marital rape, forced pregnancy, and domestic violence.” In many nations, the declared “fundamental group unit of society” needs additional practical protections.

7. The freedom to choose one’s leaders is a human right—one that needs more vigilance than ever

Drawing from a democratic tradition and the Enlightenment, Malik and the drafters included a litany of political rights in the UDHR. These include the right to assemble, freedom of expression, a free press, public impartial trials, and a presumption of innocence. Arbitrary arrest and torture are prohibited. The UDHR even weighed in on the necessary form of government, with a dramatic embrace of democracy. Article 21 states:

“The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government; this will shall be expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret vote or by equivalent free voting procedures.”

Despite the UDHR’s clarity, Freedom House’s most recent Freedom in the World report found that 80 percent of the world’s population does not live in a free country.

The rights declared in the UDHR have stood the test of time and are as meaningful today as ever before. Kudos to Malik and his fellow diplomats, who laid down a clear statement that continues to guide the flawed nations of Earth like a north star as they navigate the complicated intersections of human rights, national security, and economic prosperity. We must keep declaring these noble ideas to make them real.

John Cotton Richmond is a nonresident senior fellow at the Scowcroft Strategy Initiative of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. He served as the US ambassador to monitor and combat trafficking in persons from 2018 to 2021. Follow him on X, formerly Twitter, @JohnRichmond1.

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• Introduction
• Definitions, institutions, and norms
• Trends and uncertainties
• Scenarios
• Sahel regional analysis
• Questions for policymakers

I. Introduction

The multilateral system, defined as the set of rules, norms, and institutions that together constitute the world’s governance architecture, is not static. Rather, this system both evolves over time and, less frequently, is reconstituted by periodic upheavals. Such upheavals usually occur during or after a global crisis—for example, a major power war (1815, 1918, 1945)—or another extended period during which underlying drivers of change allow a reset of the global system. Such changes allow the new system to function for a time until dynamics again shift underneath it. Systems come under strain when they cannot adjust to new geopolitical, technological, sociopolitical, demographic, and (in the twenty-first century) environmental realities.

The current multilateral system, the core components of which were created in the first decade after World War II and then reshaped after the end of the Cold War, is now facing such a period because it bears little resemblance to the world that existed when it was created.

Several drivers of change threaten to erode hard-earned gains that the multilateral system has delivered since 1945. Today’s challenges include but are not limited to rising geopolitical tensions among nuclear-armed major powers, a seemingly inevitable climate catastrophe, technological changes that have the potential to remake every aspect of life, and the increasing powers and capabilities of non-state actors to reshape sub-national, national, and international affairs (for better and for worse). There is a flip side: within each challenge also lies an opportunity for positive transformational change.

These drivers have altered and continue to alter the dynamics of armed conflicts around the world. For example, the proliferation of increasingly capable armed nonstate actors (ANSAs) have reshaped the contours of conflict, furthering the fragmentation of international affairs, and altering how states and multilateral institutions such as the United Nations (UN) have approached conflict resolution and peacebuilding. Understanding the evolution and impact of these drivers on the conflict-prevention architecture should enable key state and nonstate actors within the multilateral system to anticipate change and reform governance approaches.

It is important to emphasize that the post-1945 multilateral system has delivered on two core points, i.e., the lack of systemic war among major powers (in other words, no third world war) and global economic growth—yet there are now, and have been since the creation of the system, many dissenters in the North and South. The postwar system never has eliminated wars and conflicts, which continue to this day (if admittedly not among and between the major powers, which must be counted as a significant benefit of the current system); not all countries and populations have benefited equally from the robust and unprecedented global economic growth since the 1950s; the major powers, including those most supportive of the system (the United States in particular) have not always acted consistently with the ideals that they claim the system embodies; and there is a misalignment of economic and demographic weight on the one hand with political power on the other (by which is meant the distribution of voting power within the system’s core multilateral institutions).

The world is in a critical period, given the system’s rising inability to tackle challenges related to the management of conflict—to its prevention, its outbreak, and its resolution. This problem is reflected in how the United Nations, the principal multilateral institution that is responsible for the management of conflict, assesses its own situation vis-à-vis conflict dynamics in the world today. In Our Common Agenda (2021), UN Secretary-General António Guterres argued that although “investments in prevention and preparedness pay for themselves many times over,” there has been “too little progress on adequate, predictable and sustained financing for peacebuilding” by UN member states. Guterres reiterated these points in a July 2023 policy brief, A New Agenda for Peace, written as a preparatory document for the UN’s 2024 Summit of the Future.¹

Building on this call for action, this report assesses the impacts of structural forces or drivers—otherwise known as global trends and uncertainties—on the future of global governance including the governance of conflict throughout the conflict cycle, meaning conflict prevention, peacekeeping, and peacebuilding. Those four core trends and uncertainties (often called “drivers” of change) are about geopolitics, the rise of new actors within the global system, the rapidly changing planet that we live on, and the speed and impacts of technological transformations. Atlantic Council staff utilized a strategic foresight methodology to assess how these global trends and uncertainties might reshape the world a decade into the future, until the mid-2030s. This assessment produced four alternative scenarios, which are stories about what the world in the mid-2030s might look like. Those four scenarios, presented in section IV of this paper, are designed to provoke the readers’ imaginations about what could plausibly occur over the coming decade given the dynamic interaction of the drivers of change identified in this report.

Over an eighteen-month time span, the project team conducted desk research, interviewed outside experts, and convened a series of workshops, all focused on assessing how the drivers of change might shape the future and what the world’s foremost governing bodies, including key multilateral institutions, national and subnational governments, and nonstate actors might do in response. Early drafts of this report were peer reviewed by external experts; their input has been incorporated into the final version.

This report contains the following sections. Section II provides an overview of the key terms, institutions, and norms that undergird the global conflict- prevention architecture. Section III provides a lengthy assessment of the four key drivers that are altering the world, and addresses their implications for the management of conflict across the conflict cycle. Section IV articulates the four scenarios that describe how these drivers of change might reshape the world in the 2030s, with impacts on global conflict and conflict prevention. These scenarios are complemented by a separate assessment of how they may play out in the Sahel region, which was chosen as this report’s regional case study.

The concluding section, section V, asks five big questions of the highest relevance about the future:

1. How should multilateral organizations such as the UN adapt to and manage a multipolar world?
2. How can multilateral organizations plan for and adapt to conflict-management challenges brought on by the evolution of Earth systems and emerging technologies?
3. What will the role of nonstate actors be in this space going forward and how can the UN and other multilateral institutions both leverage opportunities and manage threats posed by nonstate groups?
4. How can the UN support regional bodies in advancing their conflict-prevention and peace-building goals in line with global multilateralism?
5. How can the UN, and particularly the UN Security Council (UNSC), overcome concerns that it lacks legitimacy, especially in the Global South?

None of these five questions have simple answers. Rather, as with the scenarios, the questions (and their possible answers) are designed to prod policymakers, experts, and practitioners about the dynamics of global change in the coming years.

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II. A note on definitions, institutions, and norms

A. Conflict prevention and peacebuilding: Definitions

The definitions of conflict prevention and peacebuilding have long been debated within broader conflict studies fields. Their definitions have evolved over time. For example, the release of Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali’s 1992 Agenda for Peace asserted that conflict prevention consisted of four guiding principles: preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peacekeeping, and postconflict peacebuilding.² Further developments within the UN system included a 2001 report to the UNSC by then Secretary-General Kofi Annan, which highlighted the need for a “culture of prevention” that both prevented conflict in the near term while working to limit factors that may lead to the outbreak of conflict in the long term.³

Today, conflict prevention is defined by the United Nations Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs (DPPA) as “[involving] diplomatic measures to keep intra-state or inter-state tensions and disputes from escalating into violent conflict.”⁴ It encompasses structural, operational, and transnational components:

• Structural conflict prevention addresses the root causes of conflict over the longer term and often employs tools rooted in development and economic policy.⁵
• Operational conflict prevention or “direct prevention” refers to management of immediate crises in the short term and often employs diplomatic or military tools or both.⁶
• Transnational conflict prevention focuses on risks such as climate change or transnational organized crime (TOC) that undermine security and contribute to conflict.⁷

All types of prevention are dynamic rather than static; thus, global trends and uncertainties will shift the effectiveness of these three types of prevention. Greater multipolarity may limit transnational prevention if states are less able to agree on far-reaching global programs, for example, or it may accelerate the shift of operational conflict prevention from the UN Security Council to regional organizations.⁸

Peacebuilding consists of activities that build sustainable peace over time within a society or across them, often in postconflict settings.⁹ It is defined by the United Nations as follows:

“Peacebuilding aims to reduce the risk of lapsing or relapsing into conflict by strengthening national capacities at all levels for conflict management, and to lay the foundation for sustainable peace and development. It is a complex, long-term process of creating the necessary conditions for sustainable peace. Peacebuilding measures address core issues that effect the functioning of society and the State and seek to enhance the capacity of the State to effectively and legitimately carry out its core functions.”¹⁰

Several key United Nations reports have provided a definitional foundation, including the Agenda for Peace (1992), the UN Report of the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations on Uniting Our Strengths for Peace: Politics, Partnership and People (2015), and the Report[s] on Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace.¹¹ In 2016, the UN General Assembly and the UN Security Council passed twin resolutions, A/RES/70/262 and S/RES/2282, that focused on conflict resolution and peacebuilding, helping to codify the concept within the UN system.¹² These documents stressed the need for close coordination within the UN—among the Peacebuilding Support Office, the Department of Political Affairs, and the UN Development Programs, for example—and outside of it, for instance, with the World Bank.

In summary, the definitional debate concerning the terms conflict prevention and peacebuilding is robust in both academia and practice. This report recognizes that these terms are contested and varied in their definitions, but understands conflict prevention to consist of structural, operational, and transnational components while peacebuilding is seen as an encompassing process that seeks to build conflict-resilient nations at all stages of the conflict cycle (before, during, and afterward). The report therefore relies on the phrase “conflict management” to encapsulate the multiple dimensions of conflict prevention and peacebuilding.

B. Actors and institutions engaged in conflict prevention and peacebuilding activities

There are numerous actors at all levels of governance (supranational, regional, national, and local) that are involved in conflict prevention and peace-building processes. These actors span both state and nonstate institutions and organizations. While not exhaustive, this section focuses on several of the most important typologies and influential institutions.

The United Nations is by far the main actor at the global level. Its center is the United Nations Security Council, which is empowered to identify threats to peace, make recommendations regarding how best to restore peace, and authorize nonmilitary and military action to do so. UNSC decisions can take place at all stages of the conflict cycle and within a wide array of responses ranging from calling for dialogue to mandating military intervention.¹³ Despite the wide-ranging tools available to the Security Council, its ability to act depends on the willingness of its member states to engage, especially those of the five states holding veto power—the United States, France, Great Britain, Russia, and the People’s Republic of China. The UN General Assembly (UNGA) also can act on conflict prevention: it can hold special or emergency sessions on a wide range of issues and can adopt declarations on peace and disputes.¹⁴ Resolutions and decisions that are adopted at UNGA by a majority of states, however, are nonbinding on member states, in contrast to those of the UNSC.¹⁵

At the global level, the World Bank and International Monetary Fund also play critical roles in funding initiatives related to preventing the escalation of conflict, preserving institutions during and after crises, and developing opportunities for refugees within their host communities. The role of the World Bank is primarily focused on structural prevention, achieved through funding development-related projects such as those relating to climate change adaptation and mitigation and demographic change.¹⁶ In 2020, the World Bank released the World Bank Strategy for Fragility, Conflict, and Violence, which aligns the institution with making progress toward achieving the UNGA-adopted sustainable development goals (SDGs) while preventing the outbreak of violence.¹⁷ In 2021, it approved more than $30 billion for countries and territories affected by these problems.¹⁸

Whereas the World Bank focuses on funding projects that impact structural prevention, the IMF focuses on limiting the potential impact of economic shocks and mitigating their repercussions when they do occur. In 2022, the IMF released its own strategy for fragile and conflict-affected states (FCS), which calls for the advancement of several new policy tools and focuses on developing sustainable fiscal, monetary, and private-sector policy, all of which aim to grow economies and make them more resilient to the potential outbreak of conflict.¹⁹

There are numerous regional bodies that are critically important actors within specific geographic contexts. Within Africa, the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) emphasizes democracy promotion, early warning and conflict prevention, peace support operations, post-conflict reconstruction, and humanitarian action and disaster management.²⁰ The APSA’s fifteen members include the Peace and Security Council (PSC), which is the African Union’s decision-making body focused on conflict prevention and peacebuilding.²¹

The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) are examples of subregional organizations on the African continent that undertake multilateral conflict prevention and peace-building initiatives. ECOWAS maintains its own conflict-prevention framework, allowing its member states to discuss and cooperate on issues of conflict prevention and peacekeeping alongside international partners. The framework aims to mainstream conflict prevention across ECOWAS while building capacity to respond to conflict through the ECOWAS Standby Force.²² SADC consists of sixteen member states from across southern Africa. Though primarily focused on economic issues, SADC sees peace and security as vital to economic success for its members.²³ As such, it has invested in conflict prevention and in 2004, SADC set up the Mediation and Conflict Prevention and Preventative Diplomacy Structure that aims to foster political and security stability across member states.²⁴

Regional and subregional bodies like the AU, ECOWAS, and SADC differ in their political dynamics, resources, tools, and methodologies. While some groups have been able to forge a consensus among member states and make meaningful progress on advancing conflict-management goals, others are plagued by instability within and among member states, limiting their effectiveness. A positive example involves SADC, which has maintained a mission in Mozambique to address the ongoing crisis in the northern province of Cabo Delgado, contributing troops and developing capacity-building initiatives such as skill-development programs and enhancing police services.²⁵ ECOWAS, in contrast, is an example of a regional institution beset by instability among its West African member states, several of which have gone through one or more coups within the last several years.

Regional bodies within Africa have worked closely with the United Nations to advance conflict management. Collaboration has included coordination between the UN and the AU’s PSC, resulting in practical efforts as in Sudan, where the DPPA has supported AU-led peace efforts.²⁶

A bottom-line observation is that there is a larger trend in this space: the countries most impacted by conflict are taking a more active role in managing it through regional institutions, as the efforts of the AU, ECOWAS, and the SADC show.

Beyond Africa, other regional institutions have played important roles in conflict management including the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the European Union (EU), and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). In the post-Cold War era, NATO has provided stabilization operations in various theaters beyond the borders of its member states, notably in Afghanistan. It still maintains a presence in Kosovo, helping to maintain peace in the Western Balkans alongside the EU, and contributes to a capacity-building mission in Iraq, targeting the broader Iraqi security architecture. The EU maintains military missions across Africa, the Western Balkans, Eastern Europe, and the Middle East. It operates a mix of civilian- and military-led missions working to build partner military capacity to stabilize countries in conflict, maintain peace, and prevent the resurgence of conflict. The EU also funds international bodies such as the UN, giving approximately $1.1 million to the DPPA in 2022.²⁷ For its part, ASEAN has built a robust sense of trust among its member states, via numerous informal meetings and annual forums, which (arguably) has helped limit conflict within the region.²⁸

Outside of these multilateral and regional bodies, there are two important sets of actors that deserve attention. The first, obviously, are individual states, in particular the world’s major powers. Although the definition of a major power is a highly debated topic, this paper focuses most of its analytical attention on the two states that are widely viewed as the world’s foremost major powers, the United States and China. Russia and occasionally the European Union (as a supranational entity) and India are lumped into the major power category, but the inclusion of each of these entities as major powers is a contested topic among international relations scholars.²⁹

Major powers have important conflict-management functions. The United States, China, and Russia are three of the five permanent members (P5) of the UNSC, and as such hold veto power, which means they are critical to any determination (positive or negative) regarding creation of UN peacekeeping missions. Major powers provide financial, logistical, and occasional personnel (troops) support to peacekeeping operations and broader conflict-management operations.³⁰ Outside of the formal UN system, major powers also engage in bilateral conflict-management activities, including provision of development aid and investment funding that contribute to structural conflict prevention. Examples here are development aid provided through the United States Agency for International Development, and infrastructure development funding through China’s Belt and Road Initiative (though these institutions, their funding models, and their purposes admittedly are very different).³¹ Major powers also have intervened directly in conflict situations, with and without UN authorization. For example, after the 9/11 terror attacks, the United States invoked Article 51 of the UN Charter (right to self-defense) as justification for military operations in Afghanistan; later, its leadership of a NATO military coalition was viewed as justified by the UNSC’s authorization of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF).³² Major powers also act as spoilers. The Wagner Group, widely understood to be a Russian state-backed proxy organization, has routinely made peace harder to achieve across the Sahel and is suspected of being linked to several coups in the region.³³

Beyond the major powers, the world’s middle and emerging powers are important actors in conflict management. The definition of what constitutes a middle power also is contested, with some scholars defining middle powers as states that possess limited material capabilities and assume limited international tasks on the world stage.³⁴ Others define middle powers as states that actively pursue policies of mediation and conflict resolution, and advocate for multilateral solutions on the world stage.³⁵ This report views middle powers as countries with reasonable economic or military means, but which often punch above their weight diplomatically. Emerging powers have an analogous standing to middle powers, but generally are regarded as being on an upward trajectory (in demographic, economic, and military senses) toward becoming a major power. The dividing lines between middle and emerging powers are frequently unclear and ill defined. There are numerous countries that fit one or both definitions, and that are engaged in conflict management around the world. Turkey, as an example, played an instrumental and constructive role in brokering an essential grain deal between Russia and Ukraine in 2022, and for years has been involved in managing the ongoing Libyan crisis.³⁶ Such powers also sometimes are themselves engaged in conflict dynamics.

Finally, as discussed at length in section III, nonstate actors also play a large role in conflict prevention and peacebuilding. This includes two subtypes of actors, those that contribute positively to conflict management and those that do not. Examples of actors falling into the first camp include several major philanthropies such as the Gates Foundation, which has funded poverty-reduction programs in conflict-afflicted states around the world. Examples in the second camp include armed nonstate actors such as terror groups and transnational organized criminal groups that contribute to violence, undermining the sovereignty of the states in which they operate and harming civilians. Such groups also often carry out governance roles in the areas in which they operate, owing to weak or nonexistent state capacity. In Nigeria, the militant group Boko Haram collected taxes from the citizens who lived in the areas it controlled, while in Syria, ANSAs provide healthcare for their citizens.³⁷ These groups engage in such behavior to influence communities under their control.

There are several mechanisms that are used by different actors across the conflict cycle. These include early warning systems (EWS), preventive diplomacy and mediation, peace operations, development assistance, and post-conflict mediation reconstruction and recovery. EWS are systems that alert decision-makers to the potential of conflict and increased risks, relying on both qualitative and quantitative data. EWS are employed by governments, nongovernmental organizations, and multilateral bodies. Preventive diplomacy uses dialogue and mediation to prevent conflict from starting, escalating, or recurring. The UN secretary-general plays a pivotal role in preventive diplomacy through dialogue and leverage, and the deployment of special envoys. Conflict mediation is increasingly undertaken by a variety of bodies such as UN mediators, individual states, and nongovernmental organizations.

Development aid, targeted at conflict-affected and fragile states, is essential to reducing the potential outbreak of violent conflict and the possibility that conflict reemerges. Aid can be viewed as nonpolitical, but operating in conflict zones requires that aid and development organizations pay close additional attention to how their giving is perceived. Finally, in the post-conflict phase, activities include disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration programs, which may build domestic capacity to respond to criminal acts and reform the security sector, and which may develop institutions and bodies to work nationally to prevent the outbreak of conflict.

C. Norms within the conflict prevention and peacebuilding process

Two deeply held norms shape the conflict-prevention and peacebuilding fields, those of collective security and state sovereignty. Collective security, enshrined in the UN Charter (and within those of other institutions such as NATO), asserts that aggression can be prevented by collective action, including force, by other states, or at least responded to by collective action should aggression occur.³⁸ The UN developed the concept of peacekeeping operations as a collective security pillar starting in 1948 when a UN mediator asked for a small group of guards to monitor a truce between Israel and its neighbors, which was then formalized in 1956 during the Suez Crisis.³⁹ Peacekeeping is by no means the UN’s only role in collective security. Chapter VII of the UN Charter details how the UNSC will respond to threats to peace and acts of aggression, ranging from nonkinetic means (under Article 41, the UNSC may undertake “measures not involving the use of armed force”) to military intervention (under Article 42, the UNSC “may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security”).⁴⁰

Yet despite the benefits of the UN’s collective security apparatus, the concept has never fulfilled its original promise of preventing aggression. States only occasionally have confronted aggressors swiftly and decisively through collective security responses, via the UN and other multilateral bodies. (It is important to note that the reason for this shortcoming has less to do with the willingness of the UN as an institution to engage and more to do with political divisions among UN member states about whether and how to respond.)

State sovereignty asserts that no state should interfere in other states’ domestic affairs, a concept that can be traced at least back to the Peace of Westphalia in 1648. Although state sovereignty has remained a core principle of international affairs since then, there also has long been a debate regarding how to respond to human security concerns, including acts of genocide and other crimes against humanity that occur within states. The “responsibility to protect” (R2P) principle is the most famous and fairly recent attempt to blur the state sovereignty norm. Formulated in the 1990s and adopted in 2005 at the UN World Summit, the R2P principle asserts that if a state fails to protect its citizens from crimes against humanity, then other states (if authorized by multilateral bodies) have a right to intervene.⁴¹ R2P long has been controversial, even well before the 2011 UNSC-authorized no-fly zone to protect civilians in Libya, adopted via resolutions 1970 and 1973 and justified on R2P grounds.⁴² Although some saw the Libyan operation as the proper course of action under the R2P norm, others viewed it as justification for an imperialist act of aggression by a group of states, largely Western members of NATO, motivated by their own interests to use R2P as justification to remove Libyan leader Muammar al-Qaddafi.

Not all multilateral institutions that are engaged in collective security subscribe to the state sovereignty norm. For example, the AU was created in part as a reaction against its predecessor, the Organization of African Unity (OAU), which embraced the norm of noninterference in member states’ domestic affairs. This embrace was sufficient to see the OAU credibly accused of ignoring human security concerns. In contrast, early in its history, the AU embraced the norm of “non-indifference” to the suffering among member states’ citizens, signaling that the organization embraced a norm that acknowledged the centrality of human security considerations within its membership.⁴³

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III. Trends and uncertainties affecting the multilateral system and their hypothesized impacts

The multilateral system and conflict-prevention architectures are under pressure as novel developments and old fractures are reshaping how humanity lives, moves, cooperates, trades, and fights. Strategic foresight research long has insisted that there are multiple geopolitical, economic, social, environmental, and technological shifts underway that collectively are reshaping the global system, including the multilateral governance system. These trends and uncertainties, sometimes lumped together as “megatrends,” have significant implications for peace and security.⁴⁴

This report identifies four significant drivers of change that collectively are reshaping the global system now and will continue to do so into the future. These four are: geopolitical shifts, referring to power shifts among the world’s states; ongoing and rising significance of nonstate actors—groups and individuals—that collectively hold significant power within the global system, and therefore need to be accounted for and engaged with by the world’s states; Earth systems changes, including (prominently) climate change; and ongoing and significant technological disruption.

A. Contested multipolarity

Contested multipolarity refers to how shifts in the global balance of interstate power alter the ability of the multilateral system and its core institutions, norms, and processes to keep peace and resolve armed conflicts. These power shifts arguably pose the greatest challenge for multilateral conflict prevention and peacebuilding over the coming decade. Although states always have had competing interests at both global and regional levels, the power shifts described in this section reduce the incentives for cooperation among the world’s major and middle powers. In turn, the prevention of violent conflict will be negatively affected as it always has relied on convergence of those state interests, among other things, to be effective. As a result, these changing power dynamics threaten the effectiveness of multilateral institutions, including but not limited to the UNSC, and their approaches to conflict prevention and peacebuilding.

Increasing rivalry and tension among the major powers, in particular Russia and China on the one hand and the United States and its allies and partners on the other, is of utmost significance. So too is their willingness to support multilateralism and core multilateral institutions. At the same time, regional players such as India, Brazil, Turkey, South Africa, Gulf Cooperation Council states, and Nigeria are becoming more important in their regional contexts and globally, and in turn influencing multilateral norms including sovereignty, intervention, and cooperation.⁴⁵

Despite slowing growth, China might still overtake the United States as the largest economy in the world by 2035, with accompanying military and diplomatic significance.⁴⁶ Its emergence as a peer competitor to the United States is reshaping international affairs, including in the hard security domain. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022 was an affront to the UN’s core principles and has severely damaged relations between it and many of the world’s democratic states, while appearing to bring China and Russia closer together (though their relationship was becoming a closer one well before the war in Ukraine). For its part, the United States has been inconsistent in supporting the multilateral system and the UN: examples include initiating the 2003 Iraq War without explicit UNSC authorization; and the Trump administration’s withdrawing the United States from the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC), the UN-brokered Paris climate accord, and the World Health Organization (WHO)—though the Biden administration rejoined each of these

The rise of middle and emerging powers in the Global South is compounded by the relative demographic and economic decline of the world’s wealthy core.⁴⁷ Aging populations, slower economic growth, and domestic political dissatisfaction are disadvantaging North America and Europe relative to more youthful regions. Although many East and Southeast Asian countries face similar if not worse demographic headwinds, the shift of economic power to Asia already has reshaped global geopolitics, multilateralism, and multilateral institutions.⁴⁸

These shifts explain why the Global South’s middle and emerging powers are increasingly uneasy with the current multilateral system and the institutions that undergird it. Much frustration revolves around the exclusivity and perceived inadequacy of prominent multilateral economic institutions such as the UN Security Council, core Bretton Woods institutions (typically defined as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund), and the Group of Seven and Twenty groupings. Enlargement of the BRICS grouping, (referring to the emerging markets bloc that was created in 2009 by Brazil, Russia, India and China, with South Africa joining in 2010) is a prominent and recent example of how this frustration is manifesting itself on the world stage. Prior to the BRICS June 2023 annual summit in South Africa, a reported nineteen nations expressed formal or informal interest in joining the group (that number was later revised to forty countries expressing interest).⁴⁹ The bloc voted to admit six new members— Argentina, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates—to bring its total membership to eleven nations.⁵⁰

Such changes are opening avenues for contestation of the multilateral system, including its institutions, rules, and norms, and are creating novel frameworks of influence and power. A lack of agreement on a unitary alternative could hinder the system’s capacity to reform itself and deal proactively with conflict dynamics.

Implications for structural conflict prevention

China’s rise and its impact on multilateral conflict prevention. Although all the world’s major powers have demonstrated sporadic fidelity to the ideals of multilateralism, China’s rise is the most significant disrupter owing to the increasingly tense competition with the sole superpower, the United States, and China’s expression of its interests in the world.

This claim about the importance of the Sino-American bilateral relationship does not mean that their relationship is the sole driver of change within the interstate system. Nor does it deny other countries’ agency in these questions. Other countries, including several discussed in this section, also are interested in reforming the multilateral system for their own purposes and ends that, in turn, are separate from those of the two major powers. Rather, this claim asserts that the trajectory of the Sino-American relationship is the single most important bilateral relationship in international relations and, as such, has the most consequence for global governance among all such dyads in the world.

China has shown much interest in adapting the current multilateral system to its will and in creating new multilateral governance institutions.⁵¹ Beijing is contesting global governance norms and tenets while increasing its economic and diplomatic weight everywhere. It has created overseas economic investment vehicles such as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), and has invested in places of strategic interest such as the Sahel, a resource-rich region in petroleum, iron ore, uranium, and more.⁵² China often is accused of crafting so-called debt traps in recipient countries, indirectly limiting (although not eliminating) their political and economic options while increasing their dependency upon China.⁵³ China remains cautious about fundamentally reshaping the conflict prevention and peacekeeping architecture, though it is interested in securing senior political posts for its nominees within the UN system.⁵⁴

Implications for conflict prevention institutions

Great power gridlock in the UNSC. Gridlock within multilateral conflict-prevention institutions, especially the UNSC, is a serious institutional risk resulting from contested geopolitics. For decades, the UNSC’s five permanent members have used their veto powers to block decisions or political statements perceived as being against their interests.⁵⁵ More recently, the UNSC has been unable to condemn Syria’s use of chemical attacks against its own population, halt the conflict in Yemen, respond to either the 2014 Russian annexation of Crimea or its 2022 invasion of Ukraine, navigate China’s contested claims over the South China Sea, or address the Israeli/Palestinian conflict.⁵⁶ Veto patterns also have shifted: within the UNSC, China has sided more frequently with Russia over the past decade in exercising its veto.⁵⁷

UNSC gridlock risks the legitimacy and effectiveness of the institution, shrinking its ability to address key issues such as nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction or management of civil wars. The secretary-general (and many other parties around the world) have decried the UNSC’s inability to respond to threats to international peace and security, including to novel threats such as COVID-19, and has repeatedly called for UNSC reform.⁵⁸ As Russia’s war in Ukraine shows, the UNSC’s inability to address such crises has meant an elevated role for the UN General Assembly (UNGA), even if that role has been more symbolic than binding.⁵⁹

Growing representational gap. Calls for reform of multilateral institutions—especially the UNSC but also the Bretton Woods institutions—to make them more reflective of global power shifts have gone unheeded. Since the end of the Cold War at least, such calls have grown over time, yet the failure to do so appears to be risking the reputations and therefore power of these institutions, even possibly to the point of irrelevance. Such calls are bound to increase over the coming decade, given trends outlined in this section, with India, South Africa, Nigeria, and Germany, the largest states in their regions, currently not represented in the UNSC, likely at the forefront.

The Biden administration’s recent support for UNSC reform suggests at least some potential for change, limited as it may be.⁶⁰ Western countries, including the United States, feel pressure to improve relations with nonaligned countries such as India as (potential) important allies and balancers against China and Russia. For example, the September 2023 meeting between President Joe Biden and Prime Minister Narendra Modi generated a joint diplomatic statement that, among many other things, endorsed India’s bid for a permanent UNSC seat while reiterating the importance of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, or Quad, consisting of Australia, India, Japan, and the United States—which China views as a forum for these states to coordinate efforts against it.⁶¹ Western governments have been concerned by uneven condemnation within the Global South of Russia’s war in Ukraine, as discussed further below.⁶²

Evolving role of peace and security institutions and architectures outside the UN system. Partially as a result of the gridlock within global multilateral institutions, regional and alternative institutions such as the African Union and its African Peace and Security Architecture have expanded their roles and modalities of engagement in conflict management. So too have other subgroupings such as the G20 or ASEAN; while not holding peace and security mandates, they also have emerged as important actors in the conflict-management space (e.g., the G20 as a coordinator on the pandemic recovery).

This development holds promise for regional ownership (“African solutions for Africans”), but also poses challenges. The AU, for example, will have to tackle more conflict prevention and peacekeeping responsibilities even as it faces shortcomings in finances and institutional capacity.⁶³ There are opportunities for the UN and regional institutions to work more closely together, as was shown for example in 2014-15 by collaboration between the United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel (UNOWAS) and the Economic Community of West African States in Burkina Faso (these institutions deployed a joint early warning mission to the country in hopes of initiating a democratic transition).⁶⁴

Emergence of coalitions within and outside of the UN. A more complex global landscape is emerging, one that is coalition driven and requiring coalitions that shift according to issue area, both within the UN and outside of it. A more complex landscape will require deft diplomacy aimed at coalition building across different modalities. Western countries will need to engage actively and regularly with countries from the Global South.

A timely example involves voting at UNGA. In 2022, after Russia precluded UNSC condemnation of its actions in Ukraine, UNGA took up the mantle by passing several resolutions affirming the principles of the UN Charter and rejecting Russia’s invasion.⁶⁵ Yet the resolutions also witnessed multiple abstentions and negative votes by some Global South countries, which point toward how Russia and China have built their own alliances and partnerships through development cooperation, political exchanges, and more. This dynamic underscores the fact that the Global South is not a monolith—countries within the Global South have their own interests within the international system, including as they pertain to conflict management, which inform how they view their relationships with the major powers. A recent International Crisis Group analysis notes that Western countries “should look closely at how to mitigate the effects of the [Ukraine] war on countries outside Europe” if they expect to receive greater support among non-Western states within multilateral institutions.⁶⁶

Declining good offices role of the UN secretary-general. One of the most important roles of the UNSG is his deployment of good offices, meaning “steps taken publicly and privately, drawing upon their independence, impartiality and integrity, to prevent international disputes from arising, escalating or spreading.”⁶⁷ In an era of intensifying great power competition, the UNSG’s good offices are at risk of carrying even less weight than usual. Major powers like the United States and China as well as middle and emerging powers such as India or Turkey can exert influence over regional and even global events without operating within and through the UN system and the UNSG. Although this always has been true, it is arguable that the trend line is toward more rather than less of it, hence it is a diversion from the past. Indeed, over just the past few years, Guterres’s calls for a global cease-fire during the COVID-19 pandemic went unheeded, his role (and the UN’s more generally) in the war in Ukraine has been limited despite some milestones such as the Black Sea grain deal, and he and his representatives have had little influence on the current situation in Sudan.⁶⁸

Implications for conflict prevention norms

Demise of the standard treatment. The rise of a multipolar world order risks the end of the “standard treatment” of conflict management. The standard treatment consists of mediation to cease hostilities, leading to a unitary peace agreement or framework, enforceable through UN-sanctioned peacekeepers. Behind the treatment’s success, especially the high-level mediation of conflicts, lay the great powers. Great power cooperation was highest during the United States’ unipolar moment in the 1990s, allowing for important treatment successes in the Balkans, Liberia, and Timor-Leste.⁶⁹ However, since then the system has lost its capacity to deliver as the necessary underlying support has diminished.

It should be noted that not all states view the demise of the standard treatment approach as a problem. As has been discussed or inferred elsewhere in this report, states have viewed previous conflict-prevention efforts as violations of state sovereignty and therefore have embraced multilateral approaches that are less focused on direct intervention by UN-sanctioned peacekeepers.

Norms contestation. Contested multipolarity has weakened consensus surrounding key global norms. On human rights, China’s growing influence has allowed it to limit criticisms of its own practices at home.⁷⁰ Its growing weight outside the UN system, via the BRI or AIIB, allows China to promote a system of “rights-free development.”⁷¹ States with deep ties to Beijing may mute criticisms of China’s record on human rights or even support weakening international norms.⁷² Such developments impact the pursuit of rights-centric conflict-prevention and peacebuilding efforts. Middle powers also are actively involved in norm contestation and erosion. Iran’s efforts to gain a nuclear weapon are in direct contrast to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the norm of nonproliferation.⁷³ Russia’s 2014 invasion of Crimea, alongside its full invasion of Ukraine in 2022, show Moscow actively contesting the well-established norm of state sovereignty. The actions of both nations not only undermine well-established norms, but also lead to a more volatile and conflict-prone world.

Western states are not blameless: the United States’ 2003 non-UN sanctioned declaration of war on Iraq, for example, undermined the norm against violations of state sovereignty except in cases of clear self-defense. Although the United States presented its case for war in self-defense terms, this claim often rang hollow elsewhere.⁷⁴

Other relevant norms also have eroded including the R2P norm. Although NATO countries viewed the Libyan intervention as a successful implementation of R2P, others (Brazil and India, most notably) saw it more as justifying the use of NATO’s power.⁷⁵ Brazil proposed a replacement called “responsibility while protecting” (RwP) to limit R2P’s override of sovereignty claims.⁷⁶

Implications for operational conflict prevention

Restructuring of peacekeeping mandates and deployments. A contested geopolitical landscape may pose challenges for UN-mandated peacekeeping operations.⁷⁷ Three dimensions are in question: maintaining the political coherence of peacekeeping coalitions where multilateral, governmental (nation-state), and nonstate actors all have an important presence in a conflict setting; maintaining a minimum use of force standard (referring to the long-standing norm of how peacekeepers should use only the minimum amount of force necessary to achieve an outcome); and finally, limiting peacekeeping operations to core missions consisting of “protection, stability, and politics.”⁷⁸ Since the 1980s and 1990s, UN peacekeeping missions have had expanded mandates that include a variety of complex goals that run well beyond their original cease-fire monitoring function. These items include institution and capacity building, election monitoring, and peacebuilding roles, among others, even as their resources have remained the same. Peacekeeping operations have not had enough political support or the resources to accomplish the expanding and ambitious goals set for them, as shown by the recently announced withdrawal of the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) and the domestic contestation of UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, more widely known as MONUSCO.⁷⁹

B. State and non-state transformations

During the past couple decades, global economic growth, enhanced access to education, and increasingly ubiquitous technology drove widespread progress in human development including in poverty reduction, hunger and malnutrition reduction, child mortality, and other indicators.⁸⁰ (This claim holds true while acknowledging the uneven, spotty, and sometimes halting nature of progress around the world, as for example occurred during the 2008-2009 financial crisis and the 2020-2022 COVID-19 pandemic.)

During the early 2010s, foresight analysts utilized the phrase “individual empowerment” to describe how individuals were increasingly capable of shaping world events and outcomes.⁸¹ Individual empowerment was meant in two senses: one positive, in that individuals might become more engaged in solving problems, and one negative, in that individuals might become more destructive, for example through wider access to more lethal weapons. The positive side of this equation has meant, among other things, that aspirations and expectations rose along with fundamental economic and social indicators. However, since the onset of COVID-19, some human development gains have been lagging and even backsliding.⁸² Economic volatility, a slowdown in global poverty reduction, rising inequality, and ongoing gender gaps continue to frustrate the global sustainable development agenda.⁸³ This turbulence risks increasing popular dissatisfaction and distrust in state institutions, which can fray the social contract, increase the potential for violent conflicts within countries, and make structural conflict-prevention efforts more difficult.

The rise of nonstate groups complements that of individuals. Over the past decades, multinational corporations, nongovernmental organizations, community groups, and labor unions have proliferated globally. These have been enabled by the Internet, which also has created groups that exist entirely online, e.g., online gaming communities. This proliferation was not always positive: illicit and criminal networks; armed nonstate actors and paramilitary organizations; terrorist groups; private military contractors; domestic militia groups; and other malignant or misanthropic groups also increased in number. In 2022, according to the ACLED, “nonstate groups were involved in 64 percent of all armed, organized activities globally and perpetrated 76 percent of all violence targeting civilians.”⁸⁴

The ANSA phenomenon is problematic not just for its scale but also its heterogeneity and complexity. According to Michael von der Schulenburg, a former UN diplomat, ANSAs “are extremely diverse [and] include ideologically, religiously and ethnically motivated groups…; rent seeking groups such as warlords, rebel forces, pirates, clans and gangs; and outright criminal organizations such as transnational crime syndicates, drug and arms cartels and human traffickers.” For these reasons, he argues, “in the realities of most armed conflicts, political insurgents, criminal syndicates and state-sponsored paramilitary often become indistinguishable.”⁸⁵

Even as states remain the central actors within the international system, individuals and nonstate groups are altering relationships with state authorities, gaining more prominence, and thereby rebalancing the global power architecture. Their rise raises major questions about both the social contract within states and the Westphalian state model that (nominally) has been the premise of international relations for centuries. These questions carry significant implications for designing and implementing conflict prevention and peacebuilding strategies, identifying and engaging key actors, and maintaining common objectives over the longer run.

Implications for structural conflict prevention

(Likely) permanence and significance of ANSAs in conflict-management settings. A minimum of 195 million people live in ANSA-controlled areas, of which some sixty-five million are under the exclusive control of these groups.⁸⁶ In many cases, ANSAs provide paragovernance activities such as taxation or health services, as was or is the case in the territories controlled by the jihadist group; the terrorist group al-Shabaab; and ANSAs operating in the Sahel.⁸⁷

Globally, ANSAs are proliferating, posing challenges for multilateral institutions and states. The lack of sanctioned guidelines from the UN makes engagement with ANSAs difficult, including in situations where their involvement might assist peace and security outcomes.⁸⁸ The securitization of this subfield, a remnant of the counterterrorism agenda, precludes nonmilitary approaches such as dialogues and training with some ANSAs that might advance peace and security goals, including respect for international humanitarian laws and the safe passage of humanitarian aid.⁸⁹

Implications for conflict prevention institutions

Defining responsibilities becomes more challenging. As the role of individuals and nonstate groups expands, including by taking on governance roles especially where states are weak, there is a greater need to define operational guidelines for cooperation on the ground. For example, during the pandemic, the Iraqi government’s poor pandemic response gave informal militias, the Popular Mobilization Forces, an opening to furnish a pandemic response of their own, thereby helping them to increase their popular legitimacy.⁹⁰ More positively, some actors such as corporations or philanthropies can play some key roles, such as pandemic response or climate financing, also raising challenges for their inclusion, management, and coordination with state authorities.

Implications for conflict prevention norms

Inclusivity in conflict mediation and beyond. Elite mediation processes rarely work if they are not inclusive and representative of larger segments of a population. Individual and group empowerment means that the pressure on multilateral institutions to be inclusive of nonstate actors in their mediation and negotiation processes should continue to increase. Although broader participation means increased complexity and requires careful sequencing of efforts, the benefits are outsized. Women and youth are essential groups in civil society, whose early inclusion in mediation, negotiation, reconciliation, or other peacebuilding processes capitalizes on their unique knowledge and skills, increases the chances of success of the deals reached, and ensures more equitable outcomes.⁹¹ More generally, inclusion itself is a conflict prevention tool: inclusion of individuals and groups within all aspects of society (government, economy, etc.) is critical to defusing grievances against other groups and the government.⁹²

Not all nonstate actors are alike, of course, and not all are easily integrated into mediation and negotiation processes. By far the most complex and contested cases involve ANSAs, the groups that possess military and (often) political power in affected conflict zones (and hence cannot be ignored in conflict mediation processes) yet frequently act in bad faith and/or are unsavory actors on the battlefield and among civilian populations. Because of the proliferation of ANSAs in general (and proliferation of the number of conflicts where ANSAs are the central actors), to date there has been no single template for dealing with them in Track 1 or Track 1.5 processes.⁹³

Implications for operational conflict prevention

Challenges to exclusivity of UN mediation. High-level, elite peace agreements brokered through UN-sanctioned efforts are becoming more difficult to achieve in isolation, given more complex environments, the proliferation of conflicts, and the proliferation of ANSAs and other nonstate actor groups. There is both an increased demand for mediation and an increased supply of institutions (including nongovernmental organizations) to provide it. The AU, EU, “the European Institute of Peace (EIP), the Crisis Management Initiative (CMI), the Dialogue Advisory Group (DAG), the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (HD), and the Community of Sant’Egidio,”⁹⁴ are just some of the institutions that provide direct or indirect support to mediation efforts. HD, for example, has been involved in mediation efforts in Mali, albeit with limited impact.⁹⁵ There are many other positive examples of organizations, including non-Western organizations, that have been important mediators in conflicts around the world, such as Cambodia’s Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies, Colombia’s El Centro de Investigación y Educación Popular (CINEP), and Myanmar’s Euro-Burma Office (EBO).⁹⁶

A broader consequence of having nonstate actors involved in mediation is the volume of effort. Nonstate mediators, including regular citizens, can engage all parties, including ANSAs and insurgents, in ways that states cannot. Some agreements are arrived at entirely among armed groups. In Burkina Faso and Mali, local truces, formal and informal, among belligerents including ANSAs and violent extremist organizations have been reached, sometimes with little or no outside mediation.⁹⁷ Although often temporary, they can offer communities some stability. While such agreements do little to bolster the legitimacy of broader efforts aimed at national justice and peace, different kinds of agreements serve different purposes, which speak to the need to bolster complementary approaches to resolving conflicts. It should be noted that such peace agreements may have some downsides in that they can further fragmentation, decreasing cohesion and support for the state and entrenching rather than addressing the root causes of conflict dynamics.⁹⁸

These developments mean that the UN’s role will need to change.⁹⁹ UN envoys should be “conductors, not soloists,” according to one expert, coordinating roles within mediation efforts.¹⁰⁰

C. Climate and Earth systems

Climate change is arguably the most important driver of change shaping the long-term future of international affairs. If viewed solely in ecological terms, this trend has a high degree of certainty, meaning that the ongoing carbon loading of the atmosphere and oceans is certain to transform the planet’s ecosystems. For scientists, the uncertainties surround the pace and scale of those transformations, not whether they will occur. Much will depend on the speed with which the global economy decarbonizes. The climate’s transformative impacts on human systems will be far reaching, and if left unchecked, likely will alter the scale, location, and intensity of conflict globally, making planning and execution of global, national, and subnational conflict prevention efforts far more challenging.

Scenarios released by the UN indicate that temperatures will increase in the 2030s above the target of 1.5°C codified in the 2015 Paris Agreement, with the world on track for a 2.4°C to 2.6°C temperature increase.¹⁰¹ Scientists estimate that the world has less than a decade left to dramatically change emissions trajectories before irreversible damage sets in.¹⁰²

Climate change causes or worsens extreme weather events, heat waves, flooding, drought, ocean acidification, and more, which increase social and economic disasters, human fatalities, economic losses, societal fragility, and forced migration.¹⁰³ The extent of disruption varies regionally and increases with rising temperatures: for example, in the United States, for every degree Fahrenheit increase in temperature the gross domestic product will shrink by 0.7 percent.¹⁰⁴

The costs of adapting to a climate-changed world are staggering—estimates suggest that between $315 billion to $565 billion would have to be spent annually by 2050 on climate adaptation efforts.¹⁰⁵ As shown by debates at the recent annual Conference of Parties (COPs) under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), there have been terse global negotiations about who will pay for climate adaptation.

Climate change long has been regarded by the climate security community as a “threat multiplier” that if unchecked will exacerbate societal, economic, and political fragility, while worsening conflict dynamics.¹⁰⁶ For decades, this community labored to have its assertions about the climate-security-conflict nexus taken seriously within governments, multilateral institutions, and other policymaking settings. That effort has paid off in that this nexus now is widely regarded as an important (if tragic) feature of the global conflict landscape, with serious work done on the topic within multiple institutions around the world.¹⁰⁷ For poverty-stricken communities and those in conflict zones, adaptation problems are more acute owing to institutional and governance shortcomings.¹⁰⁸ Climate impacts also are expected to be greater for women and girls.¹⁰⁹

Implications for structural conflict prevention

Exacerbation of instability. Climate change disrupts economic systems and access to critical natural resources, in turn reshaping their governance and allocation in society. These effects undermine food and water security, especially in poor and vulnerable societies, and thereby induce out-migration and conflict. Climate change could exacerbate conflict dynamics and create new escalation ladders, especially in conflict-prone or fragile sociopolitical and socioeconomic contexts, and where institutions are unresponsive to changing conditions on the ground (for example, unable or unwilling to address rising water insecurity). Conflict prevention and peacebuilding institutions will have to develop an improved understanding of these climate drivers, how they map onto conflict dynamics, and how they will alter core processes.¹¹⁰ Across poor and wealthy societies alike, climate change might increase existing public dissatisfaction, fray societal trust, polarize citizens, and amplify social grievances.¹¹¹

Implications for conflict prevention institutions

Impact of climate change on institutional strategies and operations. Foreign and security policy institutions the world over are struggling to incorporate climate security into their strategic and operational portfolios. Institutions within the conflict management system, including the UN, are in the same situation in that they will have to account for the multiplicity of climate impacts on the peace and security problem set as well as their approaches to assessing the problem.

Much thinking is underway on this front. For example, the UN’s DPPA has attempted to include climate considerations within “analytical and planning mechanisms as well as . . . prevention, mediation and peace-building strategies” through new guidance in areas such as mediation.¹¹² Its work in this space is facilitated by the Climate Security Mechanism, a joint initiative of the DPPA, United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), and United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) that works across these programs to provide analysis.¹¹³

Emphasis on early warning systems. A climate-altered world will increase the need for robust and thorough early warning systems that provide analysts with timely and accurate information about where climate-induced changes might have the most impact on societies, particularly fragile societies, and on conflict. Such systems therefore can assist in providing analysts with information regarding where and when conflict prevention and peacebuilding activities are most likely to be needed. EWS can help identify how local and regional climates will change (meaning chronic and acute changes in precipitation and temperature, as examples), inform local populations about those changes, and help policymakers adapt planning and investments to help mitigate and adapt, all of which should increase transparency and trust and minimize loss of life and livelihoods. If EWS is applied properly in these contexts, such systems would assist with conflict prevention and its escalation.¹¹⁴

There are numerous databases, dashboards, and EWS systems that cover pieces of the climate security equation. The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the East African trade bloc, is an example. IGAD has developed multiple data tools and EWS dashboards that monitor and assess hydrological and climatological conditions in the region.¹¹⁵

Yet despite the existence of such tools, there remains a significant amount of work to be done in this space around the world. The complexity and difficulty in building these kinds of real-time EWS systems that track the multiplicity of Earth system changes, map those changes onto all world regions, and then link them to other drivers of conflict—all at a level of granularity that allows analysts to forecast when and where conflict is more likely to occur—is an enormous technical and bureaucratic challenge.

Implications for operational conflict prevention

Complexity of operating environment. Climate change adds an important layer of complexity to international relations, the global system, and governance. As a threat multiplier, climate change is “already increasing food insecurity, water scarcity, and resource competition, while disrupting livelihoods and spurring migration.”¹¹⁶ In places such as the Sahel, which contains many agricultural and pastoral subsistence economies, climate disruptions have enormous potential for disruption and deprivation, thus exacerbating tensions over scarce resources.¹¹⁷ Climate will drive more complex crises, which exist when multiple challenges occur simultaneously in the same place.¹¹⁸

As a result, conflict management institutions will be forced to adjust how they conduct their work. The greater frequency and severity of natural disasters will strain resources for conflict management efforts at domestic and international levels while adding yet another layer of political and socioeconomic complexity to the task. Further, the same trends will make it harder for such institutions to conduct their work, given climate disaster impacts on conditions on the ground.

D. Technological revolutions

Although technological change is an omnipresent feature of the modern world since the Industrial Revolution, the speed and significance of technologically driven change arguably is greater today than at any time in history.¹¹⁹ The technologies under development now have the potential to remake society in every way, owing to their unprecedented capabilities, in positive and negative senses.¹²⁰ The multilateral conflict-prevention architecture is not being spared from these developments.

The impacts of technological development are among the more difficult drivers to forecast for two big reasons. First, only rarely are technological breakthroughs predictable, which means that it is difficult to anticipate when, where, and who will produce a truly groundbreaking discovery. Second, it is almost as difficult to forecast what the second and third order impacts of any new technology are likely to be, for better and for worse.

These caveats aside, several of the key technologies that are likely to influence the future of international affairs and the multilateral system include:

• Artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning (ML).
• Information technologies (the internet, 5G, 6G).
• Automation and manufacturing technologies (e.g., 3D printing).
• Advanced computing technologies (e.g., quantum computing).
• Remote sensing and monitoring technologies (e.g., satellites and drones).
• Health technologies (biotechnologies).¹²¹

Some types of technological change can scale to near-universal levels, although scaling can take decades if not longer, as occurred historically with the railroad and automobile. The length of universal adoption underscores that technological progress is an uneven phenomenon. Advanced technologies are not uniformly available to all people immediately upon their creation. Quite the contrary: most often, new technologies take much time for universal adoption. The internet is an apt example. The International Telecommunication Union’s (ITU) seminal Global Connectivity Report 2022 reported that although two-thirds of humankind uses the internet, one-third remains offline even though the internet has existed for decades. The ITU report asserted that “multiple digital divides [now exist], across and within countries, between men and women, between youth and older persons, between cities and rural areas, between those who enjoy a fiber connection and those who struggle on a spotty 3G connection.”¹²² Access to reliable internet service is a critical component of social and economic development—its availability is so important that it is difficult to imagine how advanced societies now could function without it.

Technological change can be a double-edged sword. Social media, for example, enables nonviolent resistance, democratic protest, documentation of violence, and sharing of information among groups (state and nonstate alike) that are engaged in finding solutions to conflict. But social media also amplifies harmful narratives, facilitates the recruitment of at-risk youth into ANSAs, and further polarizes societies. In the United States, given that some 48 percent of adults get their news from social media at least occasionally, it becomes easy to understand how misinformation can spread quickly and contribute to societal division.¹²³ Technological change therefore presents new risks and opportunities for conflict prevention and peacebuilding.¹²⁴

Implications for structural conflict prevention

Cyber conflict. Cyber conflict is not new, but it is proliferating and scaling: cyber activities are commonly employed by state and nonstate actors alike to disrupt, divert, steal, and to achieve strategic impacts.¹²⁵ Cyberattacks and cybercrime are common and increasing throughout the world.¹²⁶ This trend will continue given the relatively low barriers to entry into cybercrime and cyberattacks for bad-faith actors such as authoritarian governments, criminal networks, and terrorist groups.

The UN has supported creation of the Open-Ended Working Group that focuses on developing rules for states and responsible behavior in cyberspace.¹²⁷ However, progress has been difficult given the transference of major power competition into the digital arena. For this reason, managing cyber conflict should remain a key priority area for the UN given the likelihood of increased cyber activity by state and nonstate actors alike.¹²⁸ To counter the risk of escalation to physical conflict, the UN can focus on norms development, cyber diplomacy, confidence-building measures, and innovative concepts such as “cyber peacekeepers.”¹²⁹

AI and social media are creating a more contested information environment. Newer technology tools such as AI/ML and older ones such as social media together will alter the information environment, making it both faster and more contested. The significant downside risk is that the pace and content of disinformation (through, for example, AI/ML-generated deepfake videos and other content) will negatively impact conflict dynamics as they will give bad-faith actors even more capabilities to alter and even define the information landscape. This problem has been much in evidence already with just social media on its own, which can be and has been used by various actors (state and nonstate) to create or amplify false narratives that have a direct bearing on conflict dynamics, often exacerbating existing polarization. Nonstate actors in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Mali, the Central African Republic (CAR), and elsewhere have proven themselves adept at using social media to amplify misleading narratives, contributing to distrust among local communities, insurgents, and the government.¹³⁰

Disinformation also can be manufactured by state actors. During the Wagner Group’s deployment in CAR and Mali, Russia pushed narratives that were “predominantly pro-regime, anti-French, and pro-Russian” via local proxies such as Radio Lengo Songo in CAR (although not an AI/ML or social media example per se, this case does underscore the importance of state actors using communication tools to spread information and disinformation).¹³¹

Communication runs in more than one direction. Hence, the same tools that are used for disinformation can be employed by good-faith actors to relay accurate information and to counter false and misleading narratives from elsewhere. Social media also can be used to counter disinformation. For example, in West Africa, ECOWAS used social media to conduct training sessions, run online campaigns, enable storytelling, and counter harmful narratives online.¹³² In Ukraine, social media is used to debunk Russian false narratives.¹³³

Implications for conflict prevention and conflict prevention norms

Automation changing the battlefield. Advanced automated systems, driven by AI/ML and remote-sensing capabilities, are beginning to change battlefields. Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs) have appeared in Ukraine and elsewhere, including in sub-Saharan Africa, either in interstate warfare or in asymmetric contexts (e.g., fighting insurgent or criminal networks.)¹³⁴ Given the pace of AI/ML development, by the mid-2030s automation could be ubiquitous on battlefields and across multiple warfighting domains.

Automated technologies might increase conflict and instability for several reasons. First, weapons and systems can be deployed without a full understanding of their battlefield impacts or rules for their use. For example, as UAV operators are far from the battlefield, they may become desensitized to their targets. Second, automated weapons could enable all conflict actors, including governments and ANSAs, to assault human rights, as has occurred with automated surveillance systems used by authoritarian countries to control their citizens.¹³⁵ On the battlefield, such systems might have insufficient capabilities to properly differentiate between civilians and combatants, risking poor decision-making about lawful targets.

Implications for conflict prevention institutions

Digital technologies for good. The list of applications of digital and emerging technologies in conflict prevention is extensive and includes the following:¹³⁶

• Improving early warning, for assessment of insights and trends as well as response processes to supplement offline engagement, as ECOWAS Early Warning and Response Network (ECOWARN) did in West Africa.¹³⁷ The applications are numerous, from the identification of patterns of violence through the use of AI, to improving satellite imaging capacity with the help of better space assets.
• Facilitating the coordination or deployment of humanitarian assistance, from using geolocation services to monitor Ebola outbreaks¹³⁸ to the use of drones to deliver critical medical aid,¹³⁹ or other assistance in the aftermath of a natural disaster.
• Assisting with reconciliation and postconflict peacebuilding efforts by “offering tools that foster collaboration, transform attitudes, and give a stronger voice to communities.”¹⁴⁰
• Enhancing performance, efficiency, and resource allocation within multilateral institutions, for instance in peacekeeping operations.¹⁴¹ Powerful AI/ML-based algorithms could improve the quality and speed of decision-making.¹⁴²

Institutions will need to assess the potential impact of such technologies on their processes and activities, develop normative frameworks for their use, and integrate them into operations. As with climate change, DPPA has made some initial forays into this space. In 2018, DPPA set up an innovation unit to “test new technologies for . . . conflict prevention, peace mediation and peacebuilding work [and to improve] analytical tools and practices” for more rapid and focused action.¹⁴³

Implications for operational conflict prevention

Digital diplomacy and activism on the rise. The COVID-19 pandemic required swift adaptation. Diplomacy moved online, which both limited engagement (i.e., reduced or eliminated face-to-face interaction) and expanded it, given the explosion of meetings online.¹⁴⁴ Women-led peacebuilding efforts adapted to the new digital world during COVID-19 using platforms such as Zoom, Signal, and WhatsApp.¹⁴⁵ Although the post-pandemic world is returning to more in-person engagement, the trends toward virtual engagement are unlikely to return to pre-pandemic levels.

Digital technologies are changing the face of mediation. Digital technologies can be helpful in conflict mediation, for example by providing better communication platforms to the negotiating parties, increasing inclusivity by helping identify and engage actors who should sit at the negotiating table, especially those coming from historically underrepresented groups such as women and youth, and helping with strategic communications via use of social media to promote positive outcomes and peaceful narratives.¹⁴⁶ As an example, in 2020, the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) conducted the “first-ever, large-scale digital dialogue online with Libyan youth . . . [to] inform the UNSMIL-facilitated intra-Libyan dialogue tracks about . . . outstanding security, political and economic issues.”¹⁴⁷ UNSMIL later engaged in additional similar digital dialogues with other Libyan stakeholders.¹⁴⁸

Convergence of peacekeeping and the digital world. In 2021, the UN secretary-general released a strategy for the digital transformation of UN peacekeeping, with a focus on mandate implementation and personnel safety.¹⁴⁹ Two complex matters should be prioritized concerning the nexus between peacekeeping and emerging technologies: protecting civilians from AI-related and other harm that can infringe upon their human rights; and building internal capacity and collaborations to ensure data integrity and internal network protection against activities that can undermine peacekeeping operations and with them, the credibility surrounding the UN mandate.¹⁵⁰

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IV. Scenarios

This section presents four scenarios based on the trends and uncertainties discussed in section III. Each scenario is a plausible story of how the drivers of change might combine to shape the world over the next ten to fifteen years. This section is not a prediction: none of the scenarios are offered as the most probable future outcome. The reader should regard all of the scenarios as equally plausible.

Directly following these global scenarios is an assessment of how the four scenarios in this section might play out in the Sahel, a region that illustrates many of the challenges resulting from the interplay of the driving forces outlined in this report. If the peoples and communities of the Sahel region are to have a positive future, then the various actors involved—multilateral organizations, national governments (within and outside of the Sahel), subnational governments, and nonstate actors—will have to come to grips with these forces, despite the many pressures that these drivers will bring. As a result, the Sahel region was chosen as a case study precisely because it offers a complex and important illustration of where conflict dynamics may be headed over the coming decade and where the possibilities might lie for finding solutions.

Scenario 1: Major power clash

The world in 2033 is dominated by the rivalry between two powerful countries, China and the United States. Throughout the late 2020s and into the early 2030s, China continued in its quest to displace the United States as the world’s hegemon. To date, it has not succeeded. China’s economic slowdown, which started in 2023, has continued (admittedly, it still grew at rates typical of a mature economy). Added to this problem has been China’s demographic winter, which has limited the country’s rise and prevented it from becoming a true global hegemon. China’s struggle to displace the United States did not mean smooth sailing for the formerly sole superpower, however. Through the 2020s, the United States struggled to lead given ongoing turbulence in its domestic politics, which hampered both its reputation abroad and its ability to act boldly economically or diplomatically when it most counted.

Locked into an increasingly adversarial relationship yet being unable to achieve economic or military superiority over the other power, both the United States and China pursued aggressive policies oriented around the recruitment of new allies and partners. China focused much of its effort on other authoritarian countries, conveying influence through the export of technologically infused goods and services and infrastructure investment (though the Belt and Road Initiative was pared back owing to domestic concern in China about its debt). The United States took a different route, focusing more on democratic states through diplomatic, political, and economic means. America remained committed to its partners but failed to mount a major effort to win over partners beyond its sphere of influence. Both nations were cognizant of the flawed optics of military support and stayed away from directly providing arms within their spheres.

In a fashion parallel to the Cold War, the United States and China eventually settled into a state where each had a defined grouping of countries that it considered within its own sphere of influence. And as occurred during the Cold War, both countries chose noninterference over confrontation within each other’s sphere of influence.

The strategic competition between the United States and China split the world’s nonaligned states into two groups. The first were states that were of strategic value to one or both countries, countries that both major powers saw as valuable for different reasons, for example as important trading partners, for key natural resources, or simple geography. In these countries, the United States and China aimed to limit the ability of the other nation to intervene. Key regions here included: the Great Lakes Region of Africa, the South Pacific, and parts of Latin America.

For states within this first group, the conflict prevention and peacekeeping equation proved to be a difficult one. These states were nonaligned, but at the same time they were also seen as strategically valuable to either major power (and sometimes both). Hence, UNSC resolutions for peacekeeping missions in these countries tended to be vetoed by either the United States or China, which were reluctant to watch the other power fiddle in what each saw as something it alone valued. Some affected states received peacekeeping and peacebuilding assistance from regional bodies such as ECOWAS. Many took bilateral aid—economic, military and otherwise—from wherever they could find it. In many cases, they leveraged the two major powers against one another, as had occurred during the Cold War.

The second group of nonaligned countries offered minimal strategic value to either the United States or China and were treated accordingly by the major powers. In these nations, the United States and China were less willing to invest, seeing efforts as unlikely to result in a major payoff. Yet these countries’ lack of perceived strategic value also had an upside. Both the United States and China showed a willingness to cooperate on peacekeeping missions in these countries, precisely because they were perceived as having a lower strategic status. Both countries had other motives too. The United States wanted to avoid the optics of a unilateral intervention and China remained committed to its principle of sovereignty promotion. This meant that despite the ongoing rivalry between two of the P5 states, the UNSC managed to continue to function in a core role, which was the authorization of peacekeeping missions, as occurred for example in the Sahel.

The world’s conflict zones were not only in those areas that were nonaligned with the major powers. Conflict occurred in areas of the world that were within the two powers’ spheres of influence. For states that the major powers deemed within their spheres of influence, in cases of intrastate or interstate conflict there was no possibility of both the United States or China authorizing a mission at the UNSC. This meant that the United States and China, plus whatever allies and partners they could muster, dealt with instances of conflict as they saw fit and on their terms. Not all of this was post hoc conflict resolution and peacekeeping. At least some of their actions focused on the prevention of conflict within or between states they viewed as partners, which meant employment of social and economic development tools and extended diplomatic overtures.

The clash between the major powers had other consequences. China continued its investment in alternative multilateral institutions, including the AIIB and the BRI (which, despite hiccups, survived as China found that the money it poured into the initiative paid diplomatic dividends around the world). These efforts were designed at least in part to advance China’s goals and priorities outside of the UN system. At a certain point, the AIIB and the BRI hit their limits and began transitioning from efforts to gain new partners to shoring up support among existing ones.

Yet China also regarded the UN as an important forum for maximizing its influence and legitimacy around the world. China acted within the UN when it could and where it saw opportunities, shaping the institution to its will as best it could. This included placing Chinese nationals in leadership positions within the UN, for example as envoy for the Great Lakes Region. There was some concern that Chinese nationals in these roles represented the interests of the Chinese state rather than working on behalf of the United Nations (unsurprisingly, this narrative was pressed hard by the United States). There was little proof that Chinese nationals did this any more than other UN executives.

China approached UN peacekeeping operations differently than it did in the 2020s. It shifted away from deploying specialized, highly skilled troops for support and logistical operations to supplying more soldiers on the front lines of peacekeeping mandates. China’s motivation for increasing its blue helmet presence was the same as for its other interests within the UN system, namely, to boost its profile within the institution and increase goodwill among affected states in conflict regions, and within the UNSC and UNGA.

The United States continued to be an important funder of UN peacekeeping operations and offered specialized assistance in myriad forms. However, as it always had, the United States shied away from sending foot soldiers, worried as ever of the optics of it losing troops in multilateral peacekeeping missions abroad.

Finally, and paradoxically, there was some halting progress on the provision of global public goods. Perhaps the most important was that both the United States and China saw making progress on climate mitigation goals as a means to boost their economies through technological innovation and show the world some diplomatic leadership in the process. As such, both countries find ways to cooperate within the UNFCCC. Cooperation around key emerging technologies, however, continued to prove difficult to manage as both the United States and China sought to isolate the other from first-mover development. Recognizing the large strategic value of technology, neither nation was willing to share or collaborate in this space. This competition had knock-on effects as both sought to restrict or eliminate the others’ firms from competing in foreign markets.

Scenario 2: Networks of power

In the mid-2020s, another global pandemic accelerated cooperation within the international system. Although this second global pandemic, coming so soon after COVID-19, portended public health, economic, social, and even political disaster, its impacts were far less severe than feared owing to the willingness of key actors, state and nonstate alike, to build networked approaches to solving the problem. Within a few years after the pandemic’s onset, this unprecedented global cooperation inspired action in other fields and toward other problems such as climate change and even conflict prevention and peacebuilding. Now in 2033, the world is in a different and better place than it was in 2023.

In the early 2020s, few would have argued that such a change was in the offing, given the myriad obstacles to effective global governance: rising tensions among nuclear-armed powers, including the major powers; the slow return to robust economic growth after the COVID-19 pandemic; the debt challenges overshadowing much of the world (rich and poor countries alike); conflicts in Ukraine, the Middle East, and the Sahel; the democratic world’s ongoing struggles; and swiftly changing Earth systems.

Underneath these real problems, however, there were some countervailing and promising signals. Although democratic deficits were real, reflecting disenchantment with government and fears of the erosion of the social contract from AI-driven unemployment, there was at the same time a growing willingness among citizens to engage on these problems through civil society and within their democratic systems. This spirit animated younger generations, especially Gen Z, who were just entering the workforce and politics. Their activism coincided with rising engagement from nonstate actors—NGOs, firms, and philanthropies—and even from some governments and multilateral institutions. This engagement was sporadic rather than systematic and extended only to a few policy arenas. But some leaders had come to realize that partnerships across and among different stakeholders had been successful in responding to public health challenges, including the COVID-19 pandemic. For example, the Global Vaccine Action Plan (GVAP) and GAVI, the Vaccine Alliance brought together research and technical health institutions, foundations, private-sector partners, individual states/governments, and multilateral institutions such as the World Bank and WHO.

This was the setting when, in 2026, another global pandemic arose, this one an easily transmissible version of a deadly avian flu. As this pandemic began to sweep around the world, leaders from the public, private, philanthropic, and nonprofit sectors all understood the need to act swiftly and in coordinated fashion. Much of this interest in a speedy and coordinated response was owed to experience from the COVID-19 pandemic, but much of it also was owed to the preexisting desire to engage in cooperative and networked action to address problems. The result was an upwelling of interest in leveraging resources and skills from wherever they could be found. Governments acted fast but not alone, finding willing partners in pharmaceutical companies to develop new vaccines, tech companies to employ their AI/ML capabilities for everything from contact tracing to big data analytics, social media companies to combat disinformation, and philanthropies to provide significant financial support. Citizens around the world also engaged, understanding the important roles they had to play in combating the disease and in maintaining social coherence and solidarity in the face of yet another crisis. The flu itself helped in one critical sense: it was a far deadlier version of a common communicable disease, and which had a much shorter incubation period than COVID-19, factors which dramatically reduced the impacts of disinformation surrounding it.

There was a critical international response to this latest transnational threat. Through its public health institutions, most critically the WHO, the UN played an important if traditional role as a leading research and convening organization. Yet the timing also appeared right for the UN to invest heavily in the secretary-general’s 2019 call for networked and inclusive multilateralism. As was the case with national governments around the world, the UN’s institutions rapidly augmented their engagement with state and nonstate actors of every kind, including national and subnational governments (e.g., municipalities and regions), philanthropies, the private sector, nonprofits, academics, and grassroots citizens’ groups. It worked on everything: humanitarian funding to mitigate the deadly pandemic’s impact; vaccine development and (eventual) distribution; and community engagement. Critically, in this fluid crisis, other international actors engaged in similar fashion. Regional multilateral institutions such as the African Union responded likewise, as did the various global groupings of states—the G20, G7, BRICS, and others.

As was true of the influenza epidemic of 1918-1919, the trajectory of this flu was swift, global, and deadly—but also mercifully short, ending by 2027. Although this pandemic left a grim trail of death in its wake, there was one silver lining. The demonstrable success from widespread collaboration not only left behind a new cooperative spirit—building upon pre-pandemic roots—it also demonstrated that inclusive and networked multilateralism could work in practice. This time, there was enough political, economic, and demographic heft to make a difference, with not only policymakers sensing a true shift but private firms, philanthropies, subnational governments, large nonprofits, grassroots groups, and ordinary citizens as well.

The UN continued to accelerate and invest in its convening, mediation, and consultative capabilities, deepening and extending its partnerships with institutions of all kinds at global, regional, national, and local levels. Moving to a more networked model becomes the central focus of UN reform.

The UN’s thematic aperture expanded as well, extending beyond public health and disease to the panoply of issues confronting the world, including conflict. Growing inclusivity and diversity of actors created flexibility in approaches to conflict prevention, conflict resolution, and peacebuilding. Localization of mediation efforts, for example, became more common, as did the development of frameworks for engaging with ANSAs, or at least those deemed legitimate and supportive of basic human rights.

By the mid-2030s, the world’s problems were far from being solved. Yet there were at least new approaches and a new willingness to experiment and cooperate, and that mattered enormously. Civil society groups formed and sprang into action around the world, some with great success, others far less so, some good, some not so good. In many places facing conflict or recovering from conflict, the state was more of a hybrid entity, sharing governance responsibilities with mixtures of citizen and paramilitary groups, private-sector firms and philanthropies, and nongovernmental organizations. In the Sahel, for example, coalitions emerged to address various crises. Solutions became more ad hoc, localized, and harder to scale. Yet the emergence of nonstate actor coalitions, which included good-faith actors that were empowered by the new conditions, was slowly reshaping power dynamics in the region, leading to new social contracts and, quite often, new hope for the people who lived there.

Scenario 3: Fragmentation

Looking back from the year 2033, it is clear that the world has been unable to grapple with the myriad problems that it has faced for a decade and even longer. Many of these problems were well known in 2023, when analysts were talking about a polycrisis, a term coined for the interplay of multiple crises that heightens the collective impact.¹⁵¹ Over the 2020s and into the 2030s, a combination of factors prevented the world from arriving at workable solutions to any of its major problems. Although hardly the only cause, a massive and worsening ecological crisis, still unfolding, has been a central and unpleasant driver of this change and an unwelcome part of the world in 2033. Unfortunately, there are few workable political mechanisms for dealing with this crisis and many others. The global system has fragmented.

The centrifugal forces that were at play in the early 2020s continued to erode the multilateral system through the middle of the decade. US-China tensions, always at the limit, never boiled over. Nor did tensions between Russia and the US-led NATO over Ukraine. Yet those relationships also did not get better, which hampered governance efforts across all manner of global challenges. This situation was worsened by ongoing strife within the US-led system of alliances revolving principally around geoeconomic policies. The Biden administration continued to press allies and partners to comply with its increasingly punitive measures aimed at China’s tech development, for example, targeting exports of semiconductors (chips) and chip-making equipment. Combined with unrelated US legislation that subsidized and even mandated some domestic manufacturing in areas such as chips and Greentech, the Biden administration found itself having to negotiate constantly with disaffected allies and partners. Reflecting a gloomy mood, The Economist magazine ran a New Year’s 2025 issue titled “Globalization is dead .”

Low global growth, combined with ongoing shockwaves from Russia’s war in Ukraine on global food security, for example, impacted poorer countries especially. Poverty and inequality within and among countries remained stubbornly high during the 2020s and into the 2030s. To make matters worse, tech transfers from the rich to the poor world also slowed down, the result of an increasingly zero-sum tech development environment. With it, the pacing of high-value-added service industries in the Global South was reduced. The upshot was that human development indexes faltered in the 2020s, and diplomats at the UN spoke in hushed tones about the sustainable development goals, deeming them all but unattainable.

Yet none of this was even the worst of it. In 2027, just as the world breached the 1.5°C threshold set by scientists as a climatological tipping point (and formally acknowledged in the Paris Agreement), a devastating El Niño event developed, worsening what had already been bad conditions around the world. This event, coupled with ongoing carbon loading of the atmosphere and reductions in aerosol pollutants (ironically, such pollutants had helped to slow atmospheric temperature rises), brought extreme conditions to much of the world, outweighing even the worst of the already-hot years of the early- and mid-2020s. New temperature records were set everywhere, from Alaska to the Indian subcontinent to South America, while the seemingly unending list of record drought and flooding got even longer. Fire became a default condition for much of the world, as forests began to dry out and even die back, as happened in the vast Amazon basin.

The predictions that the climate security community had offered for years, perhaps decades, began to come true around the world: swiftly rising food and water insecurity; public health crises from extreme heat and disease proliferation; disrupted supply chains; and fire and flooding. Famine struck in the Sahel and Pakistan, with millions at risk for their lives. Migrant crises arose around the world, for example Central American climate refugees poured north toward Mexico and the United States.

The multilateral system fragmented owing to the combined scale and complexity of overlapping and mutually reinforcing disasters. Although UN agencies and individual countries dedicated themselves to addressing the crises, they were overwhelmed and under resourced.

Wealthier nations invested heavily in domestic disaster management and resilience but had few remaining means, and almost no willingness, to direct funds toward the rest of the world. These governments did not honor their financial commitments to key funds such as the Green Climate Fund, with the $100 billion commitment for investments in climate adaptation expiring in 2025, even before the onset of the 2027 El Niño event.

Multilateral funding for and cooperation around conflict resolution and peacebuilding stagnated and then began to decline. Much of the funding that remained for peace and security efforts came from China, with significant strings attached, worsening debt traps and eroding lending standards related to human rights, for example.

Stripped of its conflict prevention and peacekeeping center, the UN became a technocratic institution that dispensed useful advice and provided valuable services, but otherwise could not secure peace and security.

Unfortunately, climate disruptions continued after 2027, which despite the El Niño event did not prove to be an unusual year after all. In 2033, the climate clearly has changed for the worse, disrupting entire ecosystems and creating permanent crises that fragile governments in particular are unable to deal with. Mass migration events, arising from agricultural implosions and natural disasters, have become a regular feature of the landscape, which has only caused wealthier nations to pull the drawbridges up even tighter.

The climate crisis is now, in 2033, a permanent feature of our world, worsening fragility, exacerbating polarization, causing mass hardship, discontent, and outrage, and undermining institutions. As states have proven unable to deal with the cascading problems, governance gaps are increasingly filled by bad-faith nonstate actors, often but not always in fragile states, that try to seize power wherever possible.

In regions such as the Sahel, all this is a disaster. The feeble multilateral interventions at the global level are insufficient to counter the region’s destructive dynamics, exacerbating food insecurity, growing social polarization, and emboldening ANSAs. Governance gaps widen in the Sahel as weak and corrupt governments are incapable of dealing with the climate crisis, leading to spiraling conflict and the largest forced out-migration from the region in history.

Scenario 4: Reinvigoration

In the early 2020s, the multilateral system was unable to address the world’s biggest problems, including interstate and intrastate conflict. This situation owed much to the intransigence of the world’s major powers, which were uninterested in cooperation within the UN Security Council and other key multilateral forums and, worse, had been antagonizing one another for years. In 2025, China and the United States got what both had been fearing yet also planning for, which was a showdown over Taiwan. The resulting crisis, which was worse even than the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 in bringing the world close to a nuclear Armageddon, reset not only their bilateral relationship but the multilateral system as well. The UNSC and other key multilateral instruments for resolving conflict were reinvigorated, the result of a newly found desire to have the major powers play much more constructive and cooperative roles in the global system.

Through 2023 and 2024, a gridlocked multilateral system had been incapable of managing peace and security matters around the world. Diplomatic successes were few and far between. Russia’s war in Ukraine, for example, was at a stalemate and risked becoming a true frozen conflict. Neither the US-led NATO nor Russia and its ally China seemed interested in making a decisive move in one direction or another to resolve the situation in Ukraine. Other conflicts around the world, for example in the Sahel, were given a low priority by the major powers and therefore by the UNSC.

All of this changed in 2025, when China under President Xi Jinping decided the time had come to make a play for Taiwan. Although long feared in Washington, Xi’s play was not the expected full-scale invasion but rather a blockade of the island, an unorthodox move that appeared to give China maneuvering room vis-à-vis the United States and its allies while maximizing pressure on Taiwan. As Washington and Moscow had in 1962, Washington and Beijing maneuvered for advantage within an ever-more dangerous and increasingly nuclear-hued crisis.

And for weeks, the world watched the escalations on television and via social media: first the sober announcements from both capitals, other states, and UN leadership, then the opening acts of intimidation at sea and in the air around Taiwan, and finally reports of the two countries’ armed forces shooting at one another—a step that the Soviet Union and the United States had managed to (almost) completely avoid in 1962. At each stage, rhetorical and bureaucratic escalation matched the physical acts, first at the UNSC where both countries accused the other of acting in bad faith, then to both countries announcing they had placed their nuclear forces on highest alert, and finally to leadership telling their citizens, as calmly as they could muster, to be prepared for a nuclear exchange.

For the public watching around the world, this showdown evolved from apathy to disbelief to deep worry and finally to mass panic. Rally-around-the-flag demonstrations in China, the United States, and their allies quickly faded as both powers began talking openly about the risk of nuclear escalation, including at UNSC emergency meetings, held daily throughout the crisis. Impromptu street marches and sit-ins focused on peace took the place of nationalistic rallies, including among publics in the Indo-Pacific and Eurasian regions that feared being targeted by nuclear warheads should the worst occur. These events occurred even in regions with little fear of direct targeting, such as Latin America and Africa, owing to the real risk of an apocalyptic nuclear winter that would occur should the United States and China exchange only a fraction of their nuclear arsenals. Toward the end, as shooting began around Taiwan, mass panic set in nearly everywhere. The situation was not helped by the social media environment, where bad-faith actors used AI tools to generate deepfakes showing realistic attacks on ships, aircraft, and even Taipei, most of which had yet to occur. Few could differentiate between reality and fiction, which helped sow confusion and mass panic.

It took several kinetic incidents, including the sinking of a few ships, for Presidents Xi and Biden (the US leader having been reelected) to find their way to a truce. Years later, as with the Cuban Missile Crisis, it came out that both sides had come within millimeters of escalating to conventional missile attacks on one another’s territory (the United States on bases in southern China, and China on bases in Guam and Hawaii). Fortunately, cooler heads indeed prevailed, as had occurred in 1962.

The crisis having subsided, the two leaders agreed to meet for an extraordinary bilateral summit. There, they signed a declaration reiterating the need for multilateral cooperation, including an announcement of arms control negotiations, and pledged their joint support for managing, containing, and reducing conflict around the world. The effect of this summit was so profound on elite and public opinion the world over that many compared it to the Reagan-Gorbachev summit at Reykjavík in 1986.

The two leaders appeared to be genuine in their convictions, which were buttressed by overwhelming sentiment in support of multilateralism from every corner of the world. Governments representing the two countries’ allies and partners as well as the world’s nonaligned states pressed hard for a return to multilateralism to ensure that such a near-death experience would never happen again.

With the United States and China in the lead, and with the support of most other countries, there was a recognition of the need to reinvigorate the UN system’s core functions, especially conflict resolution, which once again were seen as having failed in preventing this near catastrophe. The P5 agreed to UNSC reforms, which included the expansion of the number of elected seats and reforms to various processes that give elected seat holders more influence in setting the body’s agenda and in coalition building. Yet there was no veto reform, so concerns persisted that the world would return to gridlock within the UNSC. However, those concerns were temporarily assuaged given the willingness of the world’s two greatest powers to cooperate, which they did on more occasions than not from 2025 to the mid-2030s.

The severity of the Taiwan crisis ensured that the conflict prevention and peacebuilding architecture also would be subject to an overhaul. There was a marked increase in interest within the UNSC to revitalize engagement in conflict zones. Existing peacekeeping missions were reauthorized, and new ones deployed, including special missions to monitor situations among and between nuclear powers, for example India and Pakistan. There was some progress in managing interstate conflicts, where the bulk of the multilateral diplomatic and mediation efforts focused. In 2027, the war in Ukraine formally ended with a peace deal. Through the late 2020s and early 2030s, there was a reinvestment in the Sahel, which enjoyed broad material and financial support from the P5, including both the United States and China, in turn helping to stabilize the region and end much of the fighting there, if only temporarily.

Regarding arms control, China, the United States, and Russia started promising talks that were hoped would result in binding agreements, as had occurred during the Cold War. Under the auspices of the UNSC, promising talks on the Korean peninsula were started for normalizing relations with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (aka North Korea), and serious multilateral negotiations restarted concerning Iran’s nuclear program.

Although this reinvigoration of the historic tools of multilateral conflict prevention and peacebuilding was welcomed, peace activists around the world remained concerned that the system had not been overhauled sufficiently. Among other worries, they feared that intrastate conflicts had been given too little attention and imagination. Within the UNSC, they pushed for what they called a new Charter for Resilience that would push countries away from the post-Cold War model of military intervention and focus on an indirect model that would invest in partnerships with local populations within affected countries.

Regional case study: How the scenarios could play out in the Sahel

By Soda Lo

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V. Questions for policymakers

This report has assessed how core trends and uncertainties are reshaping the world, the contours of conflict, and the management of conflict. This section asks five questions that policymakers should consider as they assess how best to navigate the interaction of the trends and uncertainties over the coming decade. Some answers to these five questions are easier to implement and can be scaled relatively quickly. Others will require a broader shift in how institutions approach conflict management and the conflict cycle, requiring both more time and resources for successful implementation.

Some of the questions and potential responses presented in this section are consistent with topics discussed in UN Secretary-General Guterres’s A New Agenda for Peace. Where there is overlap, this work offers steps for the UN to build beyond its findings.

1. How should multilateral organizations such as the UN adapt to and manage a multipolar world?

As discussed at length in the trends and uncertainties section, the UN’s core security apparatus, the UNSC, today is marked by sustained disagreements among the P5 nations. Those disagreements mirror the ideological and geopolitical divergencies among (principally) China, Russia, and the United States. It is tempting to dismiss efforts to find mutual ground among these powers, given the unlikelihood of positive results. Our Common Agenda recognizes the risk of increasing tensions among the major powers and the need for diplomacy to take place during times of high tension. Indeed, conflict will not pause in an era of increased tensions among major powers.

The UN as an institution was never designed to be a cure-all for conflict, violence, and warfare, but rather as a forum wherein states could attempt to find collective solutions to such problems. Given the sensitivities among major powers to interventions that could impinge upon their sovereignty or interests, the UNSC was never meant to enable collective security responses to international crises through majoritarian decision-making processes. Hence the veto given to the P5 states. (At the time of the UN’s founding, the P5 were the world’s remaining major powers.) The UNSC’s system of permanent membership, including the veto, “was explicitly built to be unfair, giving the victors of World War II an outsized role in international peace and security . . . and it was explicitly structured to be easily deadlocked, with any of the P5 able to unilaterally grind its work to a halt,” as two United States Institute of Peace (USIP) analysts put it.¹⁵²

This means that although policymakers (and others) should temper their expectations for UNSC reform, and although the current state of play among the major powers is discouraging as reflected in the UNSC’s (frequent) deadlock regarding its peace and security agenda, cooperation remains possible despite it all. For example, in 2013 and 2014 the United States, China, and Russia all voted to approve the MINUSMA mission in Mali.¹⁵³ Though this mission has now fallen apart, the fact that all five of the P5 states agreed to its formation shows that common ground existed within the UNSC, at least at the time, regarding this area of the world.¹⁵⁴

A longer look back into history shows that sporadic cooperation among the major powers on peace and security matters did occur. During the Cold War, although the Soviet Union and United States infrequently cooperated, they did join on some important matters within the UN framework generally and on occasion within the UNSC. For example, they backed creation of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in 1957 and signed the UN-brokered Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in 1968.¹⁵⁵

There are analogous opportunities among the major powers today. For example, China’s interests might align with those of the United States in some parts of the world where both countries seek stability more than they do gaining an upper hand over their geopolitical rival. Here, some analysts point to Africa and the Middle East as examples of regions where such conditions hold.¹⁵⁶

Also like the Cold War, cooperation among great powers in an era of multipolarity will likely resemble more limited and targeted interventions in scope. MINUSMA’s renewal in 2022, before it was dissolved, offers a hint of what may come. At that time, although the mission was renewed, there was debate within the UNSC regarding the scope of MINUSMA’s human rights reporting mechanism. This dispute led to China and Russia abstaining in the vote and a declaration by Mali that they would not enforce the human rights provisions of MINUSMA’s mandate.¹⁵⁷ This event suggests that policymakers should be prepared for interventions, if they are to be approved by the UNSC, to have a tighter mandate compared with past missions.

It also suggests that policymakers should reconsider what success looks like within the confines of the UNSC. As Jean-Pierre Lacroix, the UN under-secretary-general for peacekeeping operations has stated, “the ultimate goal of peacekeeping” that encompasses the entirety of the peace process or the conflict cycle is unlikely to occur anytime soon. Rather, as the International Crisis Group rightly notes, missions should focus on other goals short of the ultimate one such as providing aid and protecting civilians.¹⁵⁸ Such goals are practical, useful, and achievable. For example, the UN mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, MONUSCO, has made aid delivery and infrastructure development across the DRC a focus of its work.¹⁵⁹

The implications of multipolarity extend well beyond the UN as an institution for addressing peace and conflict. Here it is well worth discussing minilateralism as a solution set to conflict management. Minilateral approaches to international governance problems refer to the formation of (often) small coalitions of actors—quite often, state actors but occasionally state and nonstate actors in tandem—that have a desire to address a specific type of problem in the world. Minilateral approaches often are utilized when the multilateral system has failed to address and solve a problem and/or when minilateral participants want to avoid the strictures (institutional, legal, or otherwise) that the multilateral system imposes.

Although the roots of minilateralism extend back centuries, this approach to international governance has been enjoying a renaissance owing to the difficulty of finding comprehensive solutions to the world’s myriad challenges within the multilateral system. Advocates of minilateralism insist that the format easily attracts both state and nonstate actors alike that are interested in addressing specific problems in (often) ad hoc diplomatic arrangements. Minilateralism’s virtues can include geographic and thematic flexibility, speed of formation and work modalities, convenience, nonideologically based groupings, and the power that comes from networked relationships. Minilateral arrangements have been increasing in number and significance across regional settings, including Asia and the Middle East, for example the Quad, AUKUS (Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States), and I2U2 (Israel, India, the United States, and the United Arab Emirates).¹⁶⁰

For the United Nations and other multilateral institutions that are responsible for maintaining the integrity of the global conflict-management system, minilateralism presents as much risk as opportunity. On the risk side, USIP’s Andrew Cheatham writes that minilateralism “cannot take the place of multilateral organizations” because those are “based on norms and laws” that reflect a set of universal democratic ideals.¹⁶¹ Minilateralism, he argues, has the potential to dilute the multilateral system’s global governance model and undermine its norms, laws, and standards. On the opportunity side, minilateralism’s virtues—nimbleness, ease of inclusion, and issue- and region-specific purpose—mean that the UN can find many ways to insert itself into such processes when doing so suits its purposes, if not as a formal participant then at least in an advisory or other role.

There is little to suggest a reversal in the minilateral trend, given its upsides for participants in a world characterized by messy and complex problems that no single global institution is equipped to solve on its own. According to Paul Heinbecker, a former Canadian diplomat, “peace, order and progress will increasingly demand shifting combinations of multilateral, minilateral and bilateral cooperation between governments . . . [and] require a wide variety of institutional responses—some evolutionary, others revolutionary, some inside the United Nations System and Breton Woods institutions and others outside of them. . . . No country or small group of countries can long dominate this complex, integrating, changing world or alone determine its future.”¹⁶²

2. How can multilateral organizations plan for and adapt to conflict management challenges brought on by the evolution of Earth systems and emerging technologies?

In a rapidly changing global environment, the UN needs to have a better sense of risks and opportunities that are on the longer-term horizon. Strategic foresight and futures thinking is a well-established and highly respected field that for decades has established its value in large public- and private-sector organizations the world over. Mainstreaming foresight and futures practices within the UN and other multilateral conflict resolution and peacebuilding bodies can make them nimbler in the face of emerging risks and opportunities that are arising within the global system.

A piece of good news here is that the UN secretary-general has embraced a future-oriented agenda, as outlined in Our Common Agenda, published in 2021, and the Summit of the Future, a high-level UN conference planned for September 2024.¹⁶³ Our Common Agenda called for strengthening “international foresight” capabilities within multilateral conflict resolution and peacebuilding bodies. UN agencies appear to be trending toward institutionalization of foresight and futures thinking.

Two bodies stand out in this regard. The first is the Climate Security Mechanism, a joint operation managed by multiple UN agencies. CSM works at the nexus of Earth systems change and conflict, and seeks to provide policymakers with a greater understanding of their intersection. While a good start, to be truly effective, the resources and mandate behind CSM need to be scaled. As CSM itself notes, the mechanism consists of a small, New York headquarters-based team that lacks the mandate and capacity to coordinate broader UN work on climate security. As a result, due to budgetary constraints and institutional capacity, much of CSM’s engagement takes place remotely through virtual relationships.¹⁶⁴ Scaling the CSM through an appropriate budgetary increase and an expanded mandate would allow it to work closely with more UN agencies, implement on-the-ground field work, and expand its remit to cover the entire world (its current focus areas are the Arab states, Latin America and the Caribbean, and sub-Saharan Africa.

Similarly, the rapid development and advancement of technology is also changing the world that policymakers will have to navigate as well as providing them with powerful tools to manage it. Mainstreaming foresight thinking is important to develop an understanding of the different possible trajectories that technological advancement may take, including their future impacts on conflict. The DPPA has created what is calls an Innovation Cell that is tasked with utilizing novel approaches to its work, including greater emphasis on “data-driven foresight [consistent] with its early warning role.”¹⁶⁵ A focus of the Innovation Cell is the Futuring Peace project, which studies how emerging technologies such as generative AI may alter the UN system in the future.¹⁶⁶ The work of the Innovation Cell is important and timely, but like the CSM its funding and mandate are limited. The Innovation Cell should be empowered to work with UN agencies beyond the DPPA by increasing its mandate or funding. One possibility might be to change where the Innovation Cell is located within the UN system. The UN should consider moving the Innovation Cell from the DPPA to the secretary-general’s office.

Beyond the UN, other multilateral organizations should seek to improve their foresight capabilities, including as they relate to Earth systems and technology. The World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and regional bodies such as the European Union, ECOWAS, SADC, NATO, and more should all seek to develop or build out their capabilities in this space through increases in financing or expansions of mandate. Where existing systems such as early warning mechanisms are in place, multilateral institutions should integrate foresight techniques to allow for their data analytics to be mapped onto decision-making processes that focus on longer time horizons.

Foresight is a practice that is designed to anticipate disruption and assist organizations to develop strategies that are resilient in the face of many possible futures. Indeed, foresight is the primary instrument and analytical lens behind this study. And as this study has endeavored to show, the UN will confront a rapidly changing world, marked by new opportunities and challenges resulting from alterations in the global balance of power, technological and ecological disruptions, and other drivers of change.

3. What will the role of nonstate actors be in this space going forward and how can the UN and other multilateral institutions both leverage opportunities and manage threats posed by nonstate groups?

As section III endeavored to show, nonstate groups are playing an important role in international affairs. This category includes both ANSAs such as terror groups and transnational organized criminal groups, as well as groups with a more positive intent including private philanthropies that fund vaccine development or nutrition assistance. The UN and other multilateral organizations will need to continue engaging with such groups, using their expertise to their advantage where they can, while limiting the negative impacts that they might have.

Minilateralism includes an assertion that states and international organizations should form partnerships with nonstate actors, at least on occasion, if their efforts are to succeed. Nonstate actors’ roles in the global system are important enough to warrant their own assessment. Private- and philanthropic-sector actors often provide resources for addressing global challenges in areas ranging from public health to climate change to hunger and conflict. For example, in response to COVID-19, the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation authorized up to $300 million in forgivable loans to support vaccine manufacturing in low- and middle-income countries and up to another $300 million for the procurement of vaccines and treatments in low- and middle-income countries.¹⁶⁷

Gavi, established in 1999, is perhaps the most apt and strongest example of a public-private model that was designed to attack a major global problem: access to immunization. Gavi marries significant financial assistance and technical expertise from dozens of corporate and philanthropic partners with those from multilateral institutions including the World Health Organization, World Bank, and the United Nations Children’s Fund, known widely as UNICEF.¹⁶⁸

Tapping into philanthropies and the private sector offers a way for multilateral institutions such as the UN DPPA not only to overcome funding shortfalls they may be facing to complete their work, but also to augment their own capabilities.¹⁶⁹ Given the scale of the conflict management problem, the DPPA should embrace a partnership model to secure donations from private and philanthropic actors and to find other pathways and capabilities for doing its work. The UN Population Fund (UNFPA), as another example, already does so, having secured a partnership with (once again) the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation. According to their press release announcing the partnership, the Gates Foundation “brings a global network of partners and expertise in technology and innovation, while UNFPA contributes country-level reach, experience working with governments and expertise in family planning and reproductive health.”¹⁷⁰

There are several considerations for DPPA and other multilateral organizations to successfully engage private and philanthropic partners in a common endeavor. First, partnerships will have to provide an attractive value proposition wherein they can provide tangible results in the real world (and with impacts that justify costs). They will need to demonstrate that such tangible results will occur only if all actors work in concert. Demonstrating this value proposition will incentivize external actors to invest in a UN-led or UN-managed partnership. Doing so also would discourage private donors from entering the conflict prevention and peacebuilding space unilaterally. Second, for private-sector and philanthropic actors who become partners, multilateral organizations such as DPPA must find ways to leverage their preexisting capabilities for maximum positive impact on the conflict prevention and peacebuilding spaces. Potential partners from the tech sector, as an example, offer valuable capabilities ranging from AI/ML processing to big data analytics to remote sensing and much more. Third, organizations such as DPPA will need to ensure that private and philanthropic partners understand that although their voices and participation are critical, only the public organizations have final decision-making responsibilities regarding core priorities and tasks.

Beyond private and philanthropic partners, multilateral organizations will need to manage the growth of ANSAs. Membership within the United Nations is confined to nation-states, which means that the UN is confronted with an awkward conflict-management challenge involving nonmember groups. ANSAs are playing an increasingly powerful role in conflicts, where they can sometimes claim more legitimacy than the state itself, in large part because states often have weak or even nonexistent governance capacities across parts of their territories. Across all UN peacekeeping and conflict prevention operations, the UN will have to contend with this complex of weakened state capacity on the one hand and heightened ANSA capabilities on the other. Minilateralism is unlikely to work when engaging ANSAs, as minilateral institutions tend to offer limited technical knowledge, have minimal financial backing, and do not possess the organizational infrastructure and know-how to engage as the UN can.

In adapting to the reality posed by nonstate actors, including ANSAs, the UN ideally should establish clear and concise guidelines about engaging such actors in all conflict phases (before, during, and after conflict). The established policies should include red lines that the UN should not cross, for example ensuring there is no engagement with ANSAs that commit human rights violations. Policies should include metrics to determine if ANSAs have enough popular legitimacy in areas they control to justify serious engagement with them.

These policy goals are relatively easy to state and more difficult to realize, owing to both political sensitivities within the UN (i.e., member states’ reluctance to have the UN acknowledge the legitimacy of ANSAs for political negotiation) and the difficulty of finding ANSAs that meet the above criteria. UN institutions, including the UNSC, for years have developed guidelines for engaging with ANSAs for humanitarian purposes, but have been extremely hesitant to do the same within conflict prevention and peacebuilding processes, owing largely to push back from states.¹⁷¹

A central challenge for any sort of operational guidance is that no two conflict situations are the same. While some of the main themes, causes, and even actors may transfer over between conflicts, each conflict is unique. As such, the above guidelines should be developed in a way that does not make them definitive, but rather allows them to be customized and applied to each conflict situation in a way that will result in the most positive possible outcome.

A key example of the need to define these guidelines can be seen following the Taliban’s takeover of Afghanistan. The UN has a clear mandate to protect civilians, including those living in territory controlled by ANSAs.¹⁷² There exists debate within the UN about how to approach and engage the Taliban, including within the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) regarding the government’s actions to exclude woman from public life and concerns over the harboring of terrorists, thus limiting the ability of the UN to even start to protect civilians.¹⁷³ The dire situation in Afghanistan demands that the international community find productive ways to engage and promote human and civil rights, despite lack of a clear international consensus on how to approach the situation in Afghanistan. Developing a set of guidelines to guide interactions with ANSAs could result in a more effective international response the next time a situation like the Taliban’s rise to power occurs.

The UN and other multilateral institutions are hardly the only public-sector actors struggling to come to grips with how to deal with ANSAs in conflict settings. Important states in the conflict management space, especially donor states such as the United States, also face the question of whether and how to engage such nonstate actors. Lauren Mooney and Patrick W. Quirk write that such groups “pose a thorny policy dilemma” for the US and other state actors for the reasons outlined above. Like the UN, these states have yet to devise clear guidelines for selecting which groups to engage and under what principles. They assert that those principles ought to prioritize democratic governance, local dialogue, and human rights.¹⁷⁴ However, as others rightly note, a lack of defined guidelines can be effective, allowing special envoys to operate under the radar without following a set of rules, a process that can sometimes result in success.¹⁷⁵

4. How can the UN support regional bodies in advancing their conflict prevention and peacebuilding goals in line with global multilateralism?

Assuming the UN continues to be plagued by major power competition, especially within the UNSC, regional organizations like the AU and ECOWAS likewise should continue to play an outsized role in conflict management.¹⁷⁶ These regional organizations are smaller (they have fewer member states), operate closer to the ground within specific regional geographies, and often possess high legitimacy and buy-in from their member states. Most often, these organizations are a step removed from the great power competition that plagues multilateral bodies like the UN and its decision-making organ, the UNSC.

The UN should continue to prioritize its engagement with and increase its financial and technical support of regional institutions (as practicable), given their importance in regional settings and as levers for the UN. Cooperative provision of institutional and expert knowledge, for instance, should be prioritized and strengthened. An example concerns UN engagement with the AU. Our Common Agenda notes that the UNSC should more systematically interact with the AU, rather than treating its recommendations in ad hoc fashion. The UN should revisit funding the AU; past proposals have called for the UN to fund 75 percent of AU-led peace operations, with the AU picking up the remaining 25 percent.

At the same time, the UN and the DPPA should expand its development and promotion of tailored strategies to manage conflict within individual states. This model would have the UN deepen its work with individual state governments to develop strategies for both preventing and responding to conflict within their borders. Such an approach would have the UN engage host states to build trust and capacity that would be sensitive to highly localized settings.

Beyond strategy development, the UN and other multilateral bodies should also invest in building institutions within nations that can carry out these strategies. The UNDP has already undertaken efforts to do this, creating local peace communities (LPCs) in Ghana, Kenya, Sierra Leone, Malawi, and South Africa, to name a few examples. (LPCs are broad-based community forums that “meet regularly to discuss emerging conflicts or tensions affecting a district, municipality, town or village.”)¹⁷⁷ These efforts utilize UNDP staff who are trained in peacebuilding to assist LPCs, local governments, and other stakeholders.¹⁷⁸ Further funding of these resources can be a helpful tool to ensure the effective implementation of locally developed strategies.

Although there are pitfalls to be avoided in this model—the UN would have to ensure that any coordination efforts were consistent with its mandate and ideals—the promotion of such localized approaches might have several benefits. These include their flexibility, sustained engagement with national and subnational leadership, and the possibility of greater buy-in from major powers owing to the approach’s respect for state sovereignty. China, for example, often used state sovereignty as a rationale not to support UN-sanctioned multilateral interventions.¹⁷⁹

5. How can the UN, and particularly the UNSC, overcome concerns that it lacks legitimacy, especially in the Global South?

A longstanding criticism of the UNSC is that power is held in the hands of the body’s permanent members, the P5, reflective of the global distribution of power at the end of World War II in 1945, when the UN was founded. A growing number of Global South states and outside observers increasingly see the UNSC and the UN as a whole as an organization lacking legitimacy. Reforming the UNSC, whether by function or by structure, would allow the body to overcome a perception that it is a (largely) Western-led body that is unrepresentative of the world and that, accordingly, fails to act in the interests of the UN’s member states. For this reason, and for years, countries in the Global South have called for permanent seats on the UNSC to rebalance the body geographically, economically, and demographically. According to this argument, the inclusion of one or more nations from Latin America and the Caribbean, Africa, the Middle East, Asia, and elsewhere would assist the UNSC and other institutions to be more responsive to conflicts in those regions.

Although decades old, calls for reform have become louder since US President Biden endorsed UNSC reform in an address to the UN General Assembly in 2022. “The United States supports increasing the number of both permanent and non-permanent representatives of the council,” he said, including “permanent seats for those nations we’ve long supported and permanent seats for countries in Africa [and] Latin America and the Caribbean.”¹⁸⁰ Since his address, the US proposal has called for the addition of six permanent seats on the UNSC, albeit none holding veto power.¹⁸¹ The Biden administration continues to work with partner nations to develop a plan for reform.¹⁸² Other states, such as India and Italy, have also tabled their own proposals for UNSC reform,¹⁸³ and states such as Brazil, Germany, India, Japan, Kenya, Mexico, Nigeria, and South Africa have all expressed an intent to join the UNSC.¹⁸⁴

UNSC reform, if defined narrowly as the addition of new permanent (veto-holding) seats, might be the least plausible policy recommendation on this list, in terms of the odds of coming to fruition. There are numerous serious obstacles standing in the way, including the resistance of P5 members to dilution of their power within the UNSC as well as the number of non-P5 states that have no interest in seeing other states become permanent members. The veto within the UNSC is designed to give the body a deliberative mechanism that will slow action and even prevent it, while protecting the interests of its permanent members.

Beyond major power alignment, there are concrete actions that might spur greater cooperation within the UNSC, including among the E10, which are the body’s ten elected (nonpermanent) members. One way to do so would be by expanding “pen holding” privileges, which refers to the current system that enables P5 countries to draft and circulate statements, declarations, and resolutions. Currently, the United States, United Kingdom, and France hold the pen on twenty-three out of thirty-three country-specific files at the UNSC, including eleven of twelve countries in peacekeeping contexts.¹⁸⁵ What this means is that a small number of P5 states have extraordinary power to shape the UNSC’s substantive and procedural work, which other members view as unacceptable. For example, France holds the pen on files related to Mali and the Central African Republic, despite both of those states’ opposition to its role, given France’s history and recent presence in West Africa.¹⁸⁶

Yet as the pen-holding example shows, even without P5 reform, it is possible to retain and even strengthen the institution’s ability to function. The E10 has had an important role here. Aside from insisting on changing the rules around pen holding, E10 members also have built new coalitions among one another and with P5 states, and have strategically utilized the rotating UNSC to shape the Council’s work where they can.¹⁸⁷

Outside of further developing pen-holding privileges, the UN should also explore expanding the UNSC beyond the E10. Currently, the ten elected members come from five different regional groupings: three from the Africa group, two from the Asia and Pacific group, one from the Eastern Europe group, two from the Latin America and the Caribbean group, and two from the Western European and Others group.¹⁸⁸ (Of the P5 members, China is in the Asia and the Pacific group, Russia is in the Eastern Europe group, and the UK, France, and the United States are all in the Western European and Others group.)¹⁸⁹ By offering more elected seats to Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean, and Asia, the UNSC can help to overcome some of the claims that it geographically concentrates power in the Global North.

Outside of Security Council reform, the nature of UN peacekeeping interventions will also need to be addressed. UN peacekeeping interventions are often faced with the criticism that they are led by foreign powers having little respect for the host country’s government and institutions.¹⁹⁰ UN peacekeeping operations are built around the principle that the host country consents to the mission, though there is no document that codifies this and there is no way to ensure consent for the mission is given at subnational government levels. Rather, consent is believed to have been granted at the start of the mission and is not negotiated until the mission mandate is up for renewal.

Creating a strengthened consent regime that incorporates and respects the wishes of host states will result in UN operations gaining legitimacy and support. To this end, the UN should define a standardized consent document (as the current system relies on documents that fall short of express consent). A new document process, to be developed and executed by DPPA and the host nation, would establish the boundaries of host nation consent, including the scope of operations and conditions under which a renewal would occur.

Although a revised consent document process could proceed based on an agreement solely with elites representing the host government, the challenge is to find consensus outside of that small circle of national elites. To build and sustain the baseline for the mission’s success, DPPA should devise ways in which it can canvas elites outside of a nation’s capital during the initial consent process and iteratively thereafter.

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About the authors

Staff

Peter Engelke

Senior Fellow, Scowcroft Strategy Initiative

Global Energy Center Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Technology & Innovation Europe & Eurasia

Fellow

Anca Agachi

Nonresident Fellow

Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security Transatlantic Security Initiative

Africa Conflict

Staff

Imran Bayoumi

Associate Director

Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security Scowcroft Strategy Initiative

Former staff

Soda Lo

Former Project Assistant

Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security Scowcroft Strategy Initiative

Politics & Diplomacy Resilience & Society

This body of work was generously supported by the United States Institute of Peace.

The Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security works to develop sustainable, nonpartisan strategies to address the most important security challenges facing the United States and the world.

Learn more

The post The future of multilateral peacebuilding and conflict prevention appeared first on Atlantic Council.

About the authors

Staff

Peter Engelke

Senior Fellow, Scowcroft Strategy Initiative

Global Energy Center Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Technology & Innovation Europe & Eurasia

Fellow

Anca Agachi

Nonresident Fellow

Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security Transatlantic Security Initiative

Africa Conflict

Staff

Imran Bayoumi

Associate Director

Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security Scowcroft Strategy Initiative

Former staff

Soda Lo

Former Project Assistant

Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security Scowcroft Strategy Initiative

Politics & Diplomacy Resilience & Society

This body of work was generously supported by the United States Institute of Peace.

The Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security works to develop sustainable, nonpartisan strategies to address the most important security challenges facing the United States and the world.

Learn more

The post Four scenarios for the future of multilateral peacebuilding and conflict prevention appeared first on Atlantic Council.

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

Ukraine’s heritage protection unit carries echoes of the World War II era “Monuments Men” and the US Army’s 2019 creation of a Cultural Heritage Task Force charged with ensuring the US military is equipped to preserve local heritage sites. However, there are key differences: Ukraine’s new Territorial Defense Forces unit is not only working to protect the physical cornerstones of Ukraine’s national identity, but to collect an expanding body of evidence for future prosecutions.

Since the full-scale invasion began on February 24, 2022, Russia has been accused of committing countless war crimes in Ukraine. Targeted attacks on Ukraine’s cultural heritage are seen as part of a broader strategy to eradicate all traces of Ukrainian national identity, which Russia regards as an existential threat to its own imperial identity. Some Ukrainian cultural leaders have defined the Russian invasion as “a heritage war.” Ihor Poshyvailo, the director of Kyiv’s Maidan Museum who currently serves in the Ukrainian military’s cultural heritage protection unit, has described Russia’s invasion as a war “against our historical memory. Against our soul.”

By mid-November 2023, UNESCO had verified damage to 329 cultural sites in Ukraine since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion. This includes damage to 125 religious sites, 143 buildings of historical and artistic importance, 28 museums, 19 monuments, 13 libraries, and one archive. From Odesa’s National Art Museum to Kherson’s regional library, and from Kharkiv’s Drobytskyi Holocaust Memorial and Memorial to Victims of Totalitarianism to Zaporizhzhia’s Popov Manor House museum, Russia has shelled, bombed, and looted Ukraine’s cultural heritage extensively across the country.

The Russian military’s campaign to erase Ukrainian national identity is sparking strong resistance and a determination to hold Russia internationally accountable. The recently formed Territorial Defense Forces unit is working alongside a growing network of cultural industry experts committed to cataloging Russian crimes.

Ukrainian museum experts have set up the Heritage Emergency Response Initiative (HERI) to document Russia’s attacks while working in coordination with UNESCO. HERI works to collect resources to support museums across Ukraine, responding to regularly updated requests from different regions of the country. Some museum staff have been painstakingly evacuating their collections and storing them to protect priceless works of art from Russian aggression, while others have stayed behind despite obvious dangers to help safeguard Ukraine’s cultural heritage.

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Ukraine’s cultural guardians are also receiving international support. One year after the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion, the US Department of State announced that it would invest $7 million to support Ukraine’s cultural heritage protection efforts. In addition, the US Army’s Civil Affairs and Psychological Operation Command has joined forces with the Smithsonian Cultural Rescue Initiative to train Ukrainian soldiers in protecting cultural heritage during armed conflict.

The Smithsonian Institution has also partnered with the Kosciuszko Foundation to provide museums with the necessary tools and technology to safely store priceless works of art. Across the Ukrainian border in neighboring Poland, the Polish Ministry of Culture and National Heritage has established a Cultural Assistance Center to help coordinate domestic and foreign actions to protect Ukraine’s cultural resources.

In a March 2023 study commissioned and published by the European Parliament, researchers determined that the protection of cultural heritage in armed conflict is covered by international humanitarian law, human rights law, cultural law, and criminal law. A report for the European Union Advisory Mission Ukraine found concrete evidence that cultural property has been intentionally targeted during the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

Russia’s war in Ukraine is being fought along many different fronts. This includes the targeting of cultural heritage as Russia attempts to erase Ukraine’s national identity and impose an imperial identity on a conquered nation. The creation of a dedicated Territorial Defense Forces unit reflects Ukraine’s determination to expose this genocidal agenda. By documenting the deliberate destruction of their country’s cultural heritage, Ukrainians aim to raise international awareness of the criminal objectives underpinning Russia’s invasion. Ultimately, the aim is to hold Russia accountable for its crimes.

Mercedes Sapuppo is a program assistant at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

Further reading

UkraineAlert Nov 14, 2023

Why Ukraine refuses to negotiate with “habitual liar” Vladimir Putin

By Peter Dickinson

Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba has dismissed mounting calls for a negotiated peace deal with Russia, arguing that Vladimir Putin is a “habitual liar” who cannot be trusted to keep his word, writes Peter Dickinson.

Conflict Disinformation

UkraineAlert Nov 16, 2023

Vladimir Putin’s anti-colonial posturing should not fool the Global South

By Taras Kuzio

The countries of the Global South may have many good reasons for pursuing closer ties with Putin’s Russia, but a shared opposition to imperialism is most certainly not one of them, writes Taras Kuzio.

Africa Conflict

UkraineAlert Aug 3, 2023

Russian Orthodox leader Patriarch Kirill’s unholy war against Ukraine

By Borys Gudziak

Russia’s Unholy War: Russian Orthodox Church leader Patriarch Kirill has provided the ideological justification for Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine and Russian efforts to eliminate Ukrainian national identity.

Civil Society Conflict

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

Read more from UkraineAlert

UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia and Central Asia in the East.

Learn more

The post Ukraine aims to hold Russia accountable for heritage site attacks appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The post Nusairat in LA Times: What Biden’s staunch support for Israel’s war in Gaza will cost America appeared first on Atlantic Council.

With the first opportunity for approval coming up as soon as next month, a united and undivided “yes” from EU leaders would be a boost to Ukraine going into what is shaping up to be a pivotal 2024.

What are the results of the report?

The EU decided to grant candidate status to Ukraine in June 2022, shortly after the beginning of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. This decision galvanized the Ukrainian government to meet the initial steps outlined in the membership application adjacent to approving candidate status.

The Commission report published as part of the overall Enlargement Package outlined Kyiv’s considerable efforts to address the initial application criteria. Ukraine has, for example, cracked down on several high-profile officials accused of bribery and embezzlement and expanded specialized anti-corruption agencies. It has also moved forward on judicial selection and governance reform, and it has made progress in aligning Ukrainian law to the full body of EU law, or the acquis.

Regarding the progress Ukraine has made, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen said that “Ukraine has completed well over 90 percent of the necessary steps that [the Commission] set out last year.”

While formally recommending that Ukraine advance to accession negotiations, the report also outlined several areas that require improvement. Though Ukraine has made great strides on decentralization, public administration reform, and laws ensuring freedom of expression and fundamental human rights, there is still a long way to go in reforming the courts, tackling systematic corruption, and preparing to integrate into the EU common market.

What’s next?

Though the report outlined areas that need continued improvement, the Commission recommended that the European Council, the second executive arm consisting of the heads of state of the twenty-seven EU member states, formally open accession negotiations.  

The first opportunity for the Council to back the Commission’s plan toward Ukraine’s accession will be at an upcoming summit of EU leaders in Brussels on December 14 and 15. Following unanimous approval from the European Council, the EU will formally open negotiations.

Even as the Commission signaled that it is ready to begin preparatory work on Ukraine’s accession following the Council’s approval in December, it is worth noting that the actual start of the negotiations is dependent on Kyiv’s progress on key measures outlined in the report. These include steps toward limiting oligarch influence and establishing the legal framework and implementation of laws protecting the rights of national minorities, media, and education. The Commission would then report on the progress of these measures in March 2024 and finalize the negotiating framework pending satisfactory development.

Though some consider a smooth approval to open these negotiations in December nearly inevitable, concerns remain over continued resistance from Hungary to greenlighting accession negotiations amid a deepening divide between Budapest and Brussels. There is also concern about the extent to which EU and international attention has shifted from Ukraine to the Israel-Hamas conflict.

What are the stakes?

Failure to open negotiations as expected in December risks putting Ukraine in uncertain territory heading into 2024 and into the third year of Russia’s full-scale invasion.

The symbolism of 2024 is also important—it will mark a decade since the beginning of Russia’s invasion of eastern Ukraine and the February 2014 Revolution of Dignity that saw the ousting of pro-Russia former President Viktor Yanukovych. Hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians marched throughout Ukraine from November 2013 to February 2014 in the Euromaidan protests against Yanukovych’s turn toward Russia and sudden withdrawal from closer integration with the EU.

Many Ukrainians—hoping for a prosperous, free, and independent country—marched draped not only in the blue and yellow of the Ukrainian flag, but also in the flag of the EU.

More than 90 percent of Ukrainians support their country’s membership in the EU by 2030, according to a poll earlier this year by the National Democratic Institute.

Ukraine’s continued commitment toward reform—even as significant portions of the country remain under continuous attack or occupation by Russian forces—has more than proved Ukraine’s dedication and will in aligning itself with the EU and the West.

A decision this December would not only represent an important vindication of Kyiv’s decade-long effort to join the EU, but also cement the EU’s continued commitment to Ukraine’s rightful place in Europe.

Aleksander Cwalina is a program assistant for the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

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1. What did the European Commission recommend and what effect will it have?

Politically and symbolically, Wednesday’s European Commission recommendations are major milestones for Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia. But the path to full EU membership for all three countries remains a long and laborious one. The call for the opening of accession talks with Kyiv and Chisinau, as well as candidacy status for Tbilisi, are conditional upon fulfillment of further rule of law and anti-corruption measures. That is in line with Commission President Ursula von der Leyen’s tightrope walk on expectations management in recent months. Von der Leyen has sought to provide Kyiv in particular with a real EU perspective while stressing that the enlargement process will remain merit-based—both to maintain leverage in the process and to assuage concerns among EU members. 

—Jörn Fleck is the senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center.

2. What are the next steps for the EU?

The Commission’s recommendations shared on Wednesday are a key step, albeit one that is quite early in the accession process, toward these countries’ EU ambitions. But these recommendations do not, themselves, start negotiations. That can only happen once EU member states vote (unanimously) on the Commission’s suggestions at the European Council meeting this December. The vote is expected to pass as the Council traditionally follows the recommendation of the Commission, but before a unanimous “yes” there will likely be robust debate about the budgetary reform and the common agriculture policy reform that will largely define the way that enlargement will work.

Once aspiring new members receive unanimous support to be given candidate status (Georgia) and then to open accession negotiations (Ukraine, Moldova, and Bosnia and Herzegovina), the real work begins. Once a negotiating framework is established, aspiring members work through more than thirty negotiating chapters organized into six thematic clusters to prepare countries to implement EU laws and standards (acquis). And, again, member states must agree unanimously that all requirements have been met. Only then can there be the final round of Commission recommendations, member state votes, and European Parliament sign-off that precedes the ratification of an accession treaty which finalizes the process.

Needless to say, the process is long and technical. And a recurring complicating factor is the need for unanimous member state approval at numerous intervals throughout. With European Parliament elections coming up in June 2024, and a number of national elections in the same time period, the composition of the Parliament, and the priorities of member states toward enlargement (and, relatedly, EU reform) may shift significantly during the same timeframe these aspiring members are working through negotiations.

Despite a consensus in Brussels that enlargement has significant geopolitical momentum, the historic scope of this ten-country enlargement package will necessitate EU reform negotiations to happen in parallel, and it is not yet clear how these reforms will shake out.

—Lisa Homel is an assistant director of the Europe Center.

3. What does this mean for Ukraine?

The European Commission’s recommendation that the bloc open accession talks with Ukraine is a significant step toward the country’s eventual membership. Russia initially attacked Ukraine in 2014 in part because Ukrainians wanted closer ties with Brussels, rather than Moscow, which rankled Russia President Vladimir Putin’s imperial view of Ukraine as “Little Russia.” Kyiv’s dogged determination to continue its Euro-Atlantic trajectory in the face of Russia’s full-scale invasion is impressive and was repeatedly noted in the Commission’s recommendation report card.

Indeed, Ukraine’s post-2014 reforms have helped the country fight back more effectively against Russia and helped push the country further down the path toward EU membership. Decentralization reform, privatization initiatives, digitalization of state services, and improved anti-corruption efforts have all made Ukrainian society more resilient and brought the country more in line with EU standards.

Yet Kyiv still has many ways it can improve its case for EU accession. As the Commission noted, Ukraine still needs to implement comprehensive judicial reform to root out shady judges and improve oversight. Ukraine’s anti-corruption authorities have made strides in combating graft, but they need to be truly independent to fully uphold their mandates. Both of these will make the Ukrainian economy more competitive and resilient and improve its attractiveness to foreign investors, all of which are key to mitigating some of the structural deficiencies the Commission noted in its report. 

The recommendation for opening accession talks with Ukraine is a win for Kyiv and for its partners that want to see the country defeat Russia and formalize its integration with the European Union.

—Andrew D’Anieri is a resident fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

The start of accession negotiations—if approved by the twenty-seven EU leaders in December—is a major step for Ukraine. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has clearly infused the EU enlargement process with some much-needed geopolitical meaning and urgency. Combined, the geopolitical moment and Kyiv’s impressive progress on domestic reforms while fighting a war have led to a promising change in Ukraine’s accession prospects over the long term. 

But the transformations required on both sides—within the EU and for Ukraine—are too complex to allow for any more fast-tracking in the process. Ukrainian policymakers will have to sustain ambition and public support in the demanding process of aligning with EU standards. This ranges from judicial and public sector changes to deep economic, tax, and budgetary reforms across more than thirty so-called chapters, organized into six thematic clusters. Meanwhile, the EU and its member states will have to not only navigate contentious reforms of some of the pillars of the union but also find creative ways to offer Ukraine some quick wins and visible progress to maintain momentum for reforms on the path to full membership.

—Jörn Fleck

4. Where does this leave Moldova and Georgia?

The Commission’s recommendation to open accession talks with Moldova is another notch in President Maia Sandu’s sterling record of furthering her country’s aspirations for European integration. Chisinau and Kyiv are now in very similar places on their EU accession path, having made significant progress since gaining candidate status in July 2022 but with discrete reform priorities left to fulfill in the coming months. For Moldova, that means taking comprehensive measures to clean up its judicial system, continue to fight the oligarchs that preside over an entrenched system of high-level graft and organized crime, and make further progress on strengthening the country’s democracy and human rights protections. The stakes are high: Fugitive oligarch Ilan Shor and pro-Russian cadres reportedly met with Kremlin officials in Istanbul immediately after the Commission’s decision, as Moscow-oriented opposition parties in Moldova prepare to challenge Sandu in next fall’s presidential election.

The European Commission’s recommendation of candidate status for Georgia comes roughly eighteen months after Moldova and Ukraine officially became EU candidates. Tbilisi has fallen behind Chisinau and Kyiv on the path to EU membership largely because it can’t seem to get out of its own way. The ruling Georgian Dream party, led by Bidzina Ivanishvili, has poisoned the country’s politics over the past several years by consolidating power, harassing civil society leaders, and playing footsie with Moscow while Russia continues to occupy 20 percent of the country’s territory and is conducting a major war of aggression against Ukraine. These policies have deeply polarized Georgia. Even so, 83 percent of Georgians want to join the EU, which the Commission noted in its report, but they are held hostage by political infighting in the capital and the government’s counterproductive policies.

—Andrew D’Anieri 

5. What about Western Balkans countries?

The Commission report paints a mixed picture for the countries of the Western Balkans, some of which have been in the EU’s anteroom for two decades. Frustration among some in the region that Ukraine appears to have been fast-tracked by the EU for political reasons compares with Commission assessments of modest progress in reforms, at best, even among the most forward-leaning countries. If Albania and North Macedonia meet further EU demands and previous commitments, the Commission suggests opening negotiations on the first cluster of so-called “fundamentals” relating to public sector, judicial, and fundamental rights reforms. Self-proclaimed accession frontrunner Montenegro and the surprise winner of candidacy status last year, Bosnia and Herzegovina, have been left largely empty-handed after what Brussels considers limited progress.     

—Jörn Fleck

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On September 28, 2023, the Atlantic Council’s Syria Program hosted a hybrid event on “Addressing the captagon Crisis in MENA: Strategies & Challenges” with an array of experts to discuss the evolving captagon trade in the MENA region and beyond. The panel focused on the current captagon landscape in Syria, captagon’s place within the global illicit supply chain, the importance of captagon for the United States (US), the Syrian American advocacy efforts against captagon, and the available tools to press for accountability.  

The event featured opening remarks by Nour Dabboussi, Program Assistant for the Rafik Harris & Middle East programs, keynotes remarks by Ethan Goldrich, US Deputy Assistant Secretary (DAS) for Near Eastern Affairs, and was moderated by Qutaiba Idibi, Project Manager of the Syria Program at the Atlantic Council. The panelist are Caroline Rose, Director of the Strategic Blind Spots Portfolio at New Lines Institute; Annette Idler, Director of the Minerva Global Security Program, and Associate Professor in Global Security at University of Oxford; Betsy Dribben, Head of Advocacy for Multifaith Alliance; Yasser Tabbara is an international human rights attorney who, as Co-founder and Chief Strategist at the Syrian Forum and Chairman of the American Relief Coalition for Syria, and Dylan Frost, Deputy Chief of Staff and Legislative Director for Representative James French Hill.

Opening remarks 

In its pursuit of sustaining financial stability after years of enduring years of diplomatic and economic isolation, the Assad regime has transformed many war-torn areas into the world’s cardinal captagon laboratories. Nour highlighted how this psychoactive drug, estimated as a multibillion-dollar chain, has, on one hand, empowered the Assad regime to maintain access over foreign current assets amidst international sanctions, and on the other, bolster its smuggling network which operates across 17 countries to guarantee the drugs’ export throughout Europe and the Gulf. Moreover, the Iran-backed Hezbollah has proved as a successful partner for the Assad regime, as it oversees both local production and packaging of captagon. Notably, unchecked corruption facilitates the exploitation of public infrastructure, such as the port of Beirut, for exporting captagon without government surveillance. 

Furthermore, the Assad regime’s narcotic distribution infrastructure has become a top health and security threat to neighboring Arab states but also a growing concern to the United States. In an attempt to curtail this threat, Arab states have resorted to diplomatic reproachment by readmitting the Assad regime into the Arab League earlier in May. However, the United States is pursuing a distinct approach through an inter-agency strategy that aims to disrupt and dismantle narcotics production and trafficking, along with affiliated networks connected to the Assad regime. 

Keynote remarks

In June, the US unveiled its interagency strategy for combating captagon trafficking. In his speech, Goldrich emphasized this strategy’s overarching lines of efforts:

• i. To support law enforcement agencies involved in investigating captagon-related activities 
• ii. To utilize economic sanctions and other tools to disrupt and dismantle captagon networks.
• iii. To aid regional partners in combating drug trafficking and consumption. The United States is providing security assistance to Jordan and Lebanon 
• iv. To build coordinated approaches with multilateral institutions in order to strengthen the global response against captagon 

Although captagon is neither produced nor widely available in the US, Goldrich highlighted the deep concern about its impact on the health, economy, and social welfare of communities in the Middle East. In July, Secretary Blinken initiated a global coalition aimed at combating the rising threat of synthetic drugs, which pose a critical threat, not only as a leading cause of mortality among Americans aged 18 to 49, but also a significant concern in regions like Africa, the Middle East and Asia. 

Regional impact, challenges, and trends 

The captagon trade should not be considered in isolation when assessing its ramifications on local security, public health, and the economic landscape in Syria. Rather, Rose emphasized the transnational and transregional threat of the drug. The captagon trade targets established markets in the Gulf, while concurrently attempting to create novel consumption and destination markets. Rose mentioned that there has been credible evidence of captagon trafficking and production that extends beyond Syria into countries such as Libya, Chad, Nigeria, Netherlands, and Germany.  

Rose highlighted two challenges in addressing the captagon crisis. The first consists of the lack of a precise definition of captagon’s composition. The latter has evolved over time, departing from its original formula prevalent in illicit markets during the 1960s to 1980s. Presently, it is comprised of a mélange of interpretations of a synthetic amphetamine-type stimulant, sometimes devoid of any amphetamine. In April 2022, the New Lines Institute reported that captagon typically contains amphetamine, sometimes in minuscule quantities, and occasionally comprising a substantial portion of up to 45-47% in the form of amphetamine metabolites per pill.  Also, captagon may encompass caffeine, quinine, and sometimes toxic levels of metals such as copper and zinc. 

Notably, there is a burgeoning trend of pseudoephedrine potentially being used in captagon production. Rose noted Syria’s consistent demand for pseudoephedrine since the onset of the Syrian war, underlining the paramount role this precursor material plays in the context of captagon production. She also acknowledged that there may be other various reasons to account for this, yet Syria remains one of the largest importers of pseudoephedrine, despite the pharmaceutical industry’s collapse. Although this does not definitively establish pseudoephedrine as the primary input of captagon production, the mounting evidence does lend credence to the notion that it plays a significant role. This confluence of factors strongly indicates a substantial and intricate link between pseudoephedrine and the mass production of captagon by the Assad regime. 

Secondly, the participation of the Syrian regime in discussions regarding the containment and prevention of captagon production and trafficking, particularly in the context of Interpol’s efforts, warrants scrutiny. Interpol plays a pivotal role in combating illicit trade including captagon. Operation Lionfish, as highlighted by Rose, focuses on regular seizures of captagon, meth, crystal, and cocaine. Interpol also actively fosters the exchange of regional information and intelligence among stakeholders. However, as of June 2021, Interpol’s persistent attempts to incorporate the Syrian regime within regional discussions – despite evidence of the regime’s involvement in captagon production and trafficking — has compromised Interpol’s creditability and ability to address interdiction. As Rose succinctly phrased it, “It’s like giving the cartel a seat at the table.” 

A global supply chain network 

Idler outlined five key points through which captagon is intricately embedded within the global illicit supply chain networks. First, captagon does not exist within a vacuum; it intricately intersects with a diverse array of illicit flows, including the trafficking of weapons, humans, and various narcotics. This interconnection is exemplified by the case of precursor chemicals vital for captagon production, as previously noted by Rose. Second, the management of these supply chains is multifaceted. At each stage, from material sourcing to production, transportation, trafficking, and the final market distribution is overseen by distinct actors that are globally connected. The third aspect reveals the instrumental role played by intermediaries or brokers, who operate at the local, regional, and global levels. They facilitate the coordination and unification of all the different phases of the supply chain. Fourth, the routes utilized for captagon trafficking are not confined to physical locations; they also encompass the requisite expertise and knowledge needed to execute these operations. Also, these trafficking nodes are not limited to one commodity. Lastly, illicit markets are interconnected, irrespective of the varying priorities given to different substances in different countries. Meaning, that a shock to one market can reverberate globally across other markets, prompting shifts in production strategies. For instance, while the United States places greater emphasis on fentanyl, a shock in the fentanyl market can lead consumers to seek alternatives, thereby increasing the demand for other markets, including captagon. Idler anticipates that captagon could be the next substance to be exploited by organizations like the Mexican cartels, furthering their endeavors to consolidate power and exacerbating the security risks already present.

A Global Health Crisis

For her part, Dribben explained an often under-researched and under-reported perspective: global health. Captagon should be an American priority because it can easily become a prominent drug in America causing major health implications. Like Fentanyl and Oxycontin, of which America already has a serious addiction problem, captagon is a synthetic drug that requires little knowledge and equipment to produce. She noted that even if captagon trade was halted and addicts were cut off, there is no protocol for dealing with the addiction. In Saudi Arabia, an estimated 40% of youth are addicted to captagon but the region’s medical treatment facilities are not well-equipped to treat drug addiction due to the way it is stigmatized as a criminal problem and not a health one. The American medical community is beginning to take note of captagon, and this attention will hopefully drive greater constituent interest in Congress. There is also increased global engagement, especially from the United Kingdom and the European Union, which is a promising step forward.

Finding Accountability

Tabbara focused on accountability methods for the Syrian Assad Regime. He explained that the captagon crisis is just one piece in the larger puzzle of the Assad Regime’s human and legal rights abuses, but that it can perhaps offer an entry way into taking accountability measures for other crimes. Trials over the illegality of captagon production and export in the International Criminal Court are one possible avenue for accountability. The Syrian Forum’s legal team has also researched existing legislative frameworks that can hold individuals and companies with associations and dealings with the captagon trade accountable here in the United States. The research found that the existing legal frameworks fall short of providing the opportunity for criminal prosecution of those who are involved in the captagon criminal networks. This type of accountability is also greatly important for US national security. Research has shown that both Hezbollah and Iran are directly involved in the captagon trade. A major faciliatory player in captagon trade is the 4th division, an Iran sponsored division of Syria’s military led by Bashar Al Assad’s brother, Maher Al Assad. Tabbara also explained that the Arab world already lost one avenue for accountability when they decided to pursue normalization with the Assad regime and re-admit it into the Arab League. This was a very important negotiating card that was given away for empty promises. The Arab world is now realizing that it is not a question of willingness for Assad to stop captagon and other illicit activities, but that Assad is unable to deliver and to keep order in his country.

The Role of Congress and the Executive Branch

Frost explained that Hill has been at the forefront of the United States’ legislative fight against captagon as he has introduced two important Acts on the topic: the Illicit Captagon Trafficking Suppression Act to sanction those involved in the production and trafficking of the drug, and the Countering Assad’s Proliferation Trafficking And Garnering of Narcotics (CAPTAGON) Act. The latter will allow the State Department and Treasury to sanction other actors in this trade, and it also grants power to the administration to designate political organizations, militias, and state/non-state actors involved in drug trafficking. Frost explained that these important bills were only possible because of the grass–roots support Representative French Hill receives from his district on this issue. The current administration is also supportive of fighting captagon trade as evident by Secretary Blinken’s recent speech in front of the House Foreign Affairs Committee on captagon and normalization with Assad.

Takeaways and Recommendations 

• 1. Goldrich recommends seeking innovative strategies to address drug demand and consumption, emphasizing that Global Reduction Programs could also benefit US partners in the region.  
• 2. Moving forward, Betsy urges educating and fostering support from the medical community at a grassroots level. Their involvement is integral to developing medical protocols for captagon addiction that can be used throughout the world, but especially in the region. The United States must also designate and recognize the actors involved in captagon trade as those are not always obvious. 
• 3. Goldrich urges sustained coordination on sanctions with the United Kingdom and European partners to exert pressure for accountability regarding the Assad regime’s abuses, and to constrain the regime’s ability to profit from the conflict in Syria. 
• 4. Rose underscores the critical importance of understanding the composition of captagon for law enforcement, intelligence, and the healthcare sector.
• 5. Idler proposes that the United States proactively takes measures to prevent the exploitation of captagon by organizations like the Mexican cartel. Therefore, it is imperative to channel international efforts toward disrupting the captagon trade network and the associated power dynamics to safeguard global security interests.
• 6. Yasser recommends filling the research gaps that could allow for the creation of stronger legal frameworks under which US based companies and individuals can be held accountable for their involvement in illicit captagon trade and networks.  Before any legislation is written, there needs to be an analysis of the jurisdictional limitations of the United States on captagon including money laundering operations, supply chain operations, the use of the US dollar in captagon trade, and extradition of foreign nationals. Research on the role and extent of involvement of Hezbollah, Iran, and Iranian militias in captagon trade also must be greatly expanded upon. In order for this research to be effective, there must be open communication between the United States and its allies like Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. When those make arrests related to captagon, it is extremely important for them to hold public prosecutions, so that the public is aware of the risk and consequences of involving themselves with captagon.
• 7. Dylan suggests that the next step for Congress should focus on passing an anti-normalization act with the Assad regime, which would help hold corporations accountable for illicit interactions with the Syrian government – noting the exemptions provided for humanitarian aid. Congress can also find ways to hold individuals involved with captagon who are outside of Syria accountable through existing laws and extradition treaties.

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The fragmentation of the global economy has been on display at two international conferences in recent weeks—and it doesn’t bode well for deeply indebted developing countries beset by inflation and lost access to capital markets.

The fault lines, centered on the divide between the United States and China, are adding new difficulties to efforts to restructure defaulted loans, and that will produce more pain for countries whose limited resources go to creditors instead of their own people. The recent sharp rise of global interest rates will only exacerbate the problem.

The debt issue loomed over ministers from 190 countries at the annual meetings of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank in Marrakesh, Morocco, earlier this month. There was one breakthrough: an agreement on restructuring Zambia’s debt to government lenders, of which China is the largest creditor. But that came nearly three years after the country defaulted and then only after nine months of hard negotiations with a creditor committee headed by China and France. Those talks followed a Group of 20 (G20) Common Framework agreement in 2020 to establish a mechanism for restructuring the debt of the world’s poorest nations. The Marrakech meetings also announced progress at a roundtable on “processes and practices” related to restructuring—euphemisms for technical issues (mostly raised by China) that have slowed the provision of debt relief.

Perhaps the most significant development on debt during Marrakech was bad news: Sri Lanka announced an agreement with the Export-Import Bank of China to restructure $4.2 billion of debt. Sri Lanka, a more developed country whose 2020 default is not covered by the G20 framework, has been conducting what one IMF official described at an Atlantic Council panel as “ten parallel discussions.” The agreement underlined China’s willingness to undercut a multilateral workout in pursuit of its own interests. In this case, Beijing cut its deal even as it sat in as an “observer” in talks between Sri Lanka and a creditor committee led by India and Japan. The Ex-Im Bank deal, whose terms have not been released, also got out ahead of Sri Lanka’s negotiations with private sector creditors.

China’s approach took on more meaning when representatives from more than 100 countries, including twenty-two heads of state, gathered last week in Beijing under the patronizing gaze of Chinese leader Xi Jinping to celebrate the 10^th anniversary of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). That vast effort has built infrastructure throughout the developing world, but also has saddled countries with over $1 trillion of debt. Unlike Marrakech, discussion of debt was largely absent from the proceedings, outside of remarks from Vice Premier He Lifeng at a side event and a paragraph in the forum’s 16,500 word “white paper.” Xi Jinping’s speech to the forum focused on the BRI’s achievements and criticized “ideological confrontation, geopolitical rivalry, and bloc politics,” a pointed reference to US policies toward China.

The divergence between the two international gatherings underlined the increasing difficulty of sustaining international cooperation on debt issues. In the pre-COVID era, restructurings normally proceeded quickly after a country defaulted, with the defaulter reaching an agreement with the IMF on a loan and reform program, creditor governments providing financing assurances to support restructuring, and subsequent debt talks normally taking about two months.

While the Zambia negotiations were an improvement over the first Common Framework process with Chad, which took eleven months, each restructuring is essentially terra incognita. These days, debtor countries face a complicated creditor landscape—a largely Western group of government lenders called the Paris Club; multilateral financial institutions like the IMF and World Bank; China and other new sovereign lenders like India, which works closely with the Paris Club; and the private sector, which accounts for the largest amount of lending in many countries and has its own conflicting stakeholders (traditional banks vs bondholders).

The Common Framework has sought to incentivize the various creditor groups to act in relative concert and reduce the negative economic impact on low-income countries. But distrust has made this much more difficult to achieve, especially as Beijing and private-sector lenders jostle for the best terms. The disorder is more pronounced in non-Common Framework countries, where there is no agreement on an orderly process. For example, the IMF now lends to Suriname while its government has stopped repaying Chinese loans—a process called lending into arrears—because Beijing has not provided assurances of continued financing during restructuring. Meanwhile, private bondholders forged ahead with a deal that will involve a 25 percent “haircut”—or reduction in principal owed—on two bond issues, with repayment to be funded by future oil revenues.

While it is useful that creditors and debtors meet under the aegis of the IMF and World Bank roundtable to discuss outstanding issues, this is no substitute for real progress. There are still many issues even for Zambia, which still must reach separate agreements with each individual creditor government. While it has reached an agreement in principle with Eurobond holders—with an 18 percent haircut—there is still a long way to go with other private-sector bondholders and banks, which include Chinese state banks that Beijing insisted be excluded from the sovereign portion of the Zambia agreement. There are many issues still to resolve before a final restructuring accord is in place, as Brad Setser and Théo Maret enumerated in September.

Private sector lenders will inevitably insist on similar terms to the sovereign creditors. But this emphasis on “comparability of treatment” may compound future problems because creditors in both Zambia and Sri Lanka are requiring higher interest rates on restructured debt if economic growth recovers. One problem this poses for debtor countries is that the burden of higher interest payments—which will only become heavier with global rates rising—will fall on already strained fiscal resources. An IMF study on debt in sub-Saharan Africa released during the Marrakech meeting detailed the sharp rise in the share of government revenue going to interest payments. It warned about the “difficult policy choices” countries will confront “to remain current on debt.” Those policy choices will hit the most vulnerable citizens hardest in the form of less money for health, education, and economic development.

The principle that a country should repay its obligations when economic conditions have recovered makes sense, at least in theory. However, if creditors insist that borrowers facing severe economic challenges continue to tighten their belts when conditions improve—which is what the growth-linked repayment schedules would entail—there will still be serious social costs. That will be part and parcel of an increasingly unmanageable restructuring process that likely will increase global inequality and fragmentation.

Vasuki Shastry, formerly with the IMF, Monetary Authority of Singapore, and Standard Chartered Bank, is the author of the recently published The Notorious ESG: Business, Climate, and the Race to Save the Planet.

Jeremy Mark is a senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Geoeconomics Center. He previously worked for the IMF, CNBC Asia, and The Asian Wall Street Journal.

At the intersection of economics, finance, and foreign policy, the GeoEconomics Center is a translation hub with the goal of helping shape a better global economic future.

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The IMF/World Bank meetings in Marrakesh

One of the concrete results of this year’s IMF/WB annual meetings is the agreement for an “equi-proportional” IMF quota increase without changing the relative voting shares of members. India’s Finance Minister broke the news of the quota agreement, affirming her country’s support for the US proposal as an immediate and temporary solution, pending continuing negotiations about changing the relative voting power.

By contrast, China has wanted both an increase and a realignment of quota to reflect the growing share of developing countries, especially its own, in the global economy. China’s view seems to be more in line with that of the G24 (comprised of major developing countries) which emphasized that an equi-proportional IMF quota increase without quota realignment will weaken the IMF by continuing to undermine its legitimacy and effectiveness. India has taken a pragmatic approach, agreeing to changes which are feasible now and not insisting on measures which are out of reach due to geopolitical conflicts among major countries.

Also noteworthy was the difference between the G20 Ministerial meeting statement coming out of the meetings. Under India’s chairmanship, the G20’s statement omitted condemnation of Russia’s war in Ukraine, as had the New Delhi G20 Summit statement.  India’s ability to craft a consensus statement yet again stands in contrast with the lack of consensus in the International Monetary and Financial Committee (IMFC) under Spain’s chairmanship. IMFC failed to issue a joint statement coming out of the meetings; instead the Spanish chair issued an individual statement containing a strong condemnation of Russia. This difference again highlights India’s ability to forge a global consensus over thorny issues.

The third Belt and Road forum

Since its inception in 2013, China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has concluded deals worth about $1 trillion in 150 countries. About 130 of those countries have sent delegations to this week’s Forum, including about twenty heads of state—of countries like Russia, Hungary, Indonesia, Sri Lanka, Argentina, Kenya and Zambia. India is conspicuous by its absence. The gathering is intended to showcase President Xi Jingping’s leading role in global development efforts—in contrast to his absence at the G20 Summit in New Delhi where Prime Minister Narendra Modi took the limelight.

Amidst criticisms about inefficiency in project implementations and huge debt buildups, China is using the Forum to affirm that the BRI will continue, albeit in smaller and greener forms focusing on digital infrastructure, instead of large-scale physical projects. The interests shown by many developing countries suggest that participation in the BRI will remain an important consideration in their dealings with China—especially if the United States and its allies don’t provide their own alternative financing. By contrast, India has criticized the BRI for promoting projects that have failed to meet international quality and transparency standards, and in particular has been against the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, one of the BRI flagship projects, which has raised India’s sovereignty concerns as it passes through disputed Kashmir.

Reactions to the Israel/Gaza situation

Perhaps the most dramatic difference between China and India in response to recent events has been their reactions to unfolding events in the Middle East.

Immediately after Hamas attacks on Israel, PM Modi expressed shock over the terrorist attacks, saying “we stand in solidarity with Israel at this difficult hour.” The Indian government then reiterated its long-standing support for an independent Palestinian state. India’s stance is closer to that of the West.

By contrast, China has avoided condemning Hamas but called for all parties to push for a ceasefire, an end to the fighting, and returning to the negotiating table. However, in more recent days, China has criticized Israel’s actions as “acting beyond the scope of self-defense and should stop its collective punishment of Gaza civilians.”

China’s evolving view on the Israel/Gaza situation seems to be in line with that of many developing countries, including major ones such as Brazil, South Africa, and Indonesia as well as the African Union. That view attributes Israel’s denial of the fundamental rights of the Palestinian people as the root cause of the current tensions and calls for negotiations to resolve the conflicts.

Is there a consensus agenda of the Global South?

Recent events have revealed major differences in policy and posture, not only between China and India, but among developing countries. Those differences suggest that it is not straightforward to describe a grand common view of the diverse countries in the Global South. Nor is such a consensus around the corner. It is more likely that different configurations of countries will coalesce around different issues, depending on their circumstances and national interests.

Developing countries will likely pick and choose their alignment with China and India based on their specific goals. For example, developing countries eager to develop their trade and investment opportunities will continue to approach China—whose global economic footprint is much larger than that of India. Furthermore, countries with a strong anti-colonial inclination will find more affinity with China.

On the other hand, when countries prioritize the importance of being able to negotiate with developed countries to change current international economic and financial institutions and practices to be more supportive of their own economic growth and development, India’s pragmatic approach has become more attractive—as demonstrated by the support of major countries for India’s presidency of the G20 in 2023.

The result will be a complex web of multi-alignment, instead of simple non-alignment, among countries in the Global South. This will make it challenging for the West to win hearts and minds of developing countries in its geopolitical competition with China. It also highlights the importance for the West to engage constructively with countries like India to address the grievances and concerns of developing countries. Finally, it could constrain the diplomatic clout of both India and China, as neither will truly be able to say it represents the whole range of views of the Global South without a single overall consensus.

Hung Tran is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s GeoEconomics Center, a former executive managing director at the Institute of International Finance and former deputy director at the International Monetary Fund.

At the intersection of economics, finance, and foreign policy, the GeoEconomics Center is a translation hub with the goal of helping shape a better global economic future.

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Ever since the invasion began in February 2022, Moscow has used its position as one of five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council to block efforts to end the war or hold Russia accountable. Faced with relentless Russian obstruction, UN leaders have been forced to focus on mediation efforts, while the United Nations General Assembly has been limited to voting on a series of largely symbolic resolutions condemning the invasion. If the purpose of the UN is to prevent major wars, the current approach is obviously not working.

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

The full-scale invasion of Ukraine has focused international attention on Russia’s problematic role as one of the most influential nations at the United Nations. Some have asked why Russia has not been expelled for its attack on Ukraine, and have pointed to the expulsion of the Soviet Union from the UN’s predecessor, the League of Nations, in response to the November 1939 invasion of Finland.

Others have questioned the legal status of the Russian Federation as a UN member state, noting that Russia has never actually gone through the proper formal and recognized procedures of applying to become a member of the United Nations. The Soviet Union was a key founding member of the United Nations and enjoyed a seat on the UN Security Council, but the USSR officially ceased to exist on December 26, 1991. Russia then took over the vacated Soviet seat at the top table of the United Nations without any further formalities.

When Czechoslovakia ceased to exist just two years later, the two new nations that had once been component parts of that country, the Czech Republic and Slovakia, both formally applied for and were granted membership status in the United Nations. The same is true for the states that were once part of Yugoslavia. This is a step that Russia never took. The Charter of the United Nations states that “the admission of any such state to membership in the United Nations shall be effected by a decision of the General Assembly.” While Slovakia and the Czech Republic went through this procedure, the Russian Federation did not.

The UN Charter also states that membership of the body is contingent on “accepting the obligations contained in the present Charter.” On these grounds, too, Russia does not meet the required standards. The UN Charter states that all United Nations members “shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state.” By invading Ukraine and attempting to annex entire Ukrainian regions, Russia has evidently violated this fundamental commitment expected of all UN member states. It can therefore be argued that Russia’s membership of the United Nations is invalid as it was not formally applied for, and because the invasion of Ukraine places Russia in direct breach of the UN Charter.

This raises obvious questions over Russia’s continued presence among the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council. Russia’s status within the UNSC is particularly controversial as Moscow stands accused of repeatedly abusing its veto power to further its own foreign policy objectives and avoid censure for breaches of international law. The Security Council’s five permanent members are the only nations to wield veto power.

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Almost twenty months since the invasion began, few would argue that the devastating scale of Russia’s attack on Ukraine has highlighted the shortcomings of the United Nations. As noted by Tom Grant, a Senior Fellow at the Lauterpacht Centre for International Law, “Russia’s aggression against Ukraine is the most serious violation of the UN Charter in the Charter’s history.” How can a country engaged in Europe’s largest invasion since World War II and led by a man wanted by the International Criminal Court for war crimes be allowed to undermine an organization committed to maintaining world peace?

The absurdity of Russia’s position among the five permanent members of the UN Security Council is fueling calls for fundamental reform of the United Nations. For two years in a row, the reform of the United Nations Security Council has featured in US President Joe Biden’s annual address to the UN General Assembly. The reform debate centers on the need for the highest body at the United Nations to be more representative. At present, the UNSC lacks any permanent members from Africa or Latin America, and is also missing valuable input from emerging powerhouses such as India and significant developed economies including Japan.

One of the roadblocks to such reform is the current make-up of the Security Council, which under the existing regulations would be required to vote to approve any expansion of the UNSC. This would likely be blocked by Russia, due to perceptions in the Kremlin that any expansion would weaken the Russian position. Tellingly, other permanent members would also see their influence diluted by an expanded UNSC, and yet the push for this reform is being led by one of them, the United States.

Other possible reforms of the United Nations include the removal or restriction of veto powers for permanent members of the UN Security Council. This could potentially prevent individual countries from unilaterally derailing efforts to address global crises or uphold international law. Some critics feel even this would not go far enough, and argue for a complete rethink of the role played by the United Nations in international affairs.

The UN was founded in 1945 to maintain international peace and security, but it has been unable to prevent one of its leading members from invading a neighbor and committing war crimes not witnessed in Europe since the darkest days of twentieth century totalitarianism. Clearly, the UN Security Council is broken and the entire UN approach to issues of war and peace is no longer fit for purpose.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is a watershed moment in world history that will have a profound impact on the future of international relations. If the United Nations wants to survive as an institution and remain relevant in the decades ahead, it must be ready to embrace fundamental reform.

Paul Niland is the founder of Lifeline Ukraine.

Further reading

UkraineAlert Aug 3, 2023

Russian Orthodox leader Patriarch Kirill’s unholy war against Ukraine

By Borys Gudziak

Russia’s Unholy War: Russian Orthodox Church leader Patriarch Kirill has provided the ideological justification for Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine and Russian efforts to eliminate Ukrainian national identity.

Civil Society Conflict

UkraineAlert Oct 4, 2023

Putin’s fleet retreats: Ukraine is winning the Battle of the Black Sea

By Peter Dickinson

Putin was already struggling to account for his army’s evident inability to conquer a nation that he insists does not exist. He must now also explain how his once vaunted Black Sea Fleet is being defeated by a country without a navy, writes Peter Dickinson.

Conflict Defense Technologies

UkraineAlert Sep 14, 2023

It is still far too early to write off Ukraine’s counteroffensive

By Dennis Soltys

The slow pace of Ukraine’s much hyped counteroffensive is sparking fresh calls for a negotiated peace, but the Ukrainian military may yet achieve its goals as long as international support continues, writes Dennis Soltys.

Conflict Disinformation

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

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Introduction

The economic and military rise of China presents Western democracies with a challenge unlike any they have faced since the inception of the Bretton Woods system.¹ The Warsaw Pact was too weak to question the West’s economic dominance during the Cold War, but China—with its successful brand of state capitalism—has turned into a formidable competitor. It has become the largest trade partner for many countries, and the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), despite its shortcomings, has made geopolitical inroads into the Global South that the West has struggled to match.

As the West has begun to respond to the challenge, concerns about economic fragmentation have intensified after Russia’s attack on Ukraine and increasing military tensions in the Taiwan Strait. Both China and Western countries are considering means to shore up critical supply chains and reduce strategic dependencies on each other. Global trade volumes have not yet been affected in a significant way, but a growing web of trade and investment restrictions has had a chilling effect on economic sentiment.

This dynamic also throws a shadow over the work of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank, as well as other institutions created to support free markets and open trade. Nations that were once dependent on multilateral institutions for development funding, investment projects, and emergency aid now have the opportunity to secure economic and financial assistance from other creditors with less benign interests. Moreover, a shift toward protectionist trade policies, and the sanctioning of foreign exchange reserves by the United States and its allies, has diminished the West’s standing in many capitals around the world.

On the other hand, the US dollar’s central role in the international monetary system, of which the Bretton Woods institutions are an integral part, still provides the West with a significant advantage. The renminbi may challenge the dollar’s dominance at some point, but China’s efforts to internationalize its currency have so far been met with only modest success.

Nevertheless, the Bretton Woods institutions clearly lost influence in recent years. With many emerging markets enjoying stable market access even during the COVID-19 pandemic, the IMF and World Bank have been left to work mostly with low-income countries and a few larger countries with chronic economic problems. Many of those countries require debt restructuring to allow multilateral loans to resume, but China’s long-delayed debt workouts are effectively blocking the Bretton Woods institutions from fulfilling their mandate. Moreover, program countries question why they should subject themselves to the advice or conditionality of institutions in which they have little say, given that governance arrangements remain strongly in favor of the United States and other Group of Seven (G7) countries.

As a result, both institutions have been in search of a new role for themselves. The World Bank (along with other multilateral development banks) is looking to leverage its capital base to step up climate and development loans, and the IMF has repurposed dormant Special Drawing Rights (SDR) reserves provided by its richer members to increase its concessional loan volume, a model that could be also adopted by other multilateral lenders. Both approaches contain elements of financial engineering, reflecting tighter budgets in member countries and diminishing political support for development aid, even among traditional donor countries.

These efforts are intended to help meet large climate and development financing needs in the Global South. Moreover, multilateral institutions can be instrumental in attracting private capital to the climate fight, provided that loans fulfill their objectives and are being repaid with sufficient return. Recipient countries will, therefore, need to put any additional funding to good use, an issue that has so far attracted less attention than the intricacies of leveraging development banks’ capital base. Bretton Woods shareholders should encourage an effective division of labor among the institutions, insist on sensible loan conditionality, and, where necessary, actively support governments in meeting program targets.

However, stepped-up climate lending will not be enough to win the struggle for hearts and minds in the Global South. Given China’s current resource advantage, Western countries also need to make better use of the IMF and World Bank where doing so is in their interest. For example, to incentivize critical reforms and boost growth prospects in partner countries, multilateral financing should be flanked by co-financing, investment finance, specific trade preferences, or other forms of geopolitical support that increase the chances of program success. Unlike previous efforts, this attempt has to be meaningful and better coordinated between Western shareholders for maximum effect and burden sharing.

The example of Ukraine has set a precedent for how the institutions can be part of a strong allied effort to support a partner country within their multilateral setting. If applied more broadly, this approach could provide incentives for other governments to return to multilateral institutions, instead of China, for support. However, Western shareholders must be careful to stay within the institutions’ rules-based framework and operate on a consensual basis, where possible. The multilateral character of the IMF and World Bank is an international public good that the West would be well advised to preserve.

If and when the political climate were to turn back toward multilateral collaboration, the Bretton Woods institutions could play an important role in helping the global economy to defragment, just as they did in the years after World War II. At that point, voting shares in the institutions should be adjusted to correct the significant underrepresentation of China and other emerging markets. In the meantime, the West should identify other ways to raise the influence of the Global South, including on the two boards and in the selection of management positions.

I. China’s rise and the mulitlateral order

China rose to become the world’s second-largest economy on the back of a mercantilist economic policy that exploited Western countries’ commitment to free trade and open markets. Although a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO) since 2001, it successfully leveraged a comparative advantage in labor-intensive manufacturing through unfair trade practices to become the world’s major exporter.

While benefiting from the existing multilateral international order over several decades, China has also been turning inward for some time to replace its dependence on net exports with domestic sources of growth. Aggressive trade measures by the United States may also have prompted China to double down on domestic demand and support for domestic innovation. In 2021, China’s Communist Party embraced a strategy of “independence and self-reliance” that seeks to both establish global leadership in key technologies and secure access to the raw materials needed to reach this objective. As part of thisstrategy, China has been developing partnerships with countries in the Global South and is building up military strength, challenging US naval dominance in the Western Pacific and elsewhere.