Based on this feedback, this blog series was started to highlight important information about targeted human rights sanctions as they relate to the Islamic Republic of Iran; major updates on Iranian perpetrators who have been sanctioned for human rights abuses and why; and any other information that may be relevant to affected communities. Input is welcomed from readers, particularly in Iranian civil society, for questions and topics that should be addressed.

This page will be subsequently updated with a Persian translation of the post. 

Background

Despite the numerous sanctions issued against individuals linked to the Islamic Republic of Iran, an “illicit global network of shell companies, banks, and exchange houses” allows many of them to evade the consequences. This is partly due to the complications involved in identifying the true owner of an asset, the “beneficial owner.” A beneficial owner is a natural person—i.e., an individual, as opposed to a legal person or entity—who actually owns or controls a legal entity. 

Why is transparency over beneficial ownership important?

Targeted sanctions generally—though not always—involve freezing the assets of designated individuals or entities. Identifying property, including legal entities, they own or control is, therefore, a key component of sanctions enforcement. 

Increased transparency over beneficial ownership, as well as leaked documents, have yielded examples that highlight why beneficial ownership information is critical for sanctions enforcement. Leaked documents show that Russian oligarch Roman Abramovich changed the beneficial ownership of trusts shortly after the start of Russia’s 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine—seemingly to avoid asset freezes. His seven children are now the beneficial owners of at least $7 billion. When Luxembourg established a public database of beneficial ownership in 2019, investigators used it to map the local activity and businesses of Calabrian crime group ‘Ndrangheta; uncover additional evidence of allegedly corrupt dealings undertaken by former-Argentinian President Mauricio Macri’s family while he was in office; and identify the beneficial owners of properties throughout Europe bought by companies registered in Luxembourg, such as those of an Indonesian businessman accused of human rights abuses and tax evasion.

Such transparency can help investigators identify Iranian-linked assets globally, but especially in jurisdictions where they are known to have traveled. While there are critical privacy considerations that must be taken into account,  obstacles to accessing the information must be limited to ensure as much transparency as possible. This can ultimately increase the effectiveness of targeted sanctions through the identification of all relevant assets which can be promptly frozen, and, where the appropriate legal standards are met, seized.

When do jurisdictions restrict the legal entities of designated persons?

Asset freezes vary depending on the jurisdiction, but they generally prevent designated persons from accessing their property, such as bank accounts, real estate, and other real property, and ban others from engaging in financial transactions with those designated persons. When it comes to legal entities—which may have multiple owners and stakeholders, only some of whom are designated—jurisdictions generally require that designated persons’ ownership or control reaches a certain threshold.

• Australia: The Australian government prohibits dealing with “controlled assets,” which are those owned or controlled by a designated person or entity, but there does not appear to be public guidance or a definition for determining ownership or control.
• Canada: When a property is deemed controlled by a designated person, Canadian persons are prohibited from “dealing in” it. In 2023, Canada amended its Special Economic Measures Act and Justice for Victims of Corrupt Foreign Officials Act to include provisions under which a designated person is considered to control an entity when it meets one of three criteria: if they have at least 50 percent ownership or voting rights; they have the direct or indirect ability to “change the composition or powers of the entity’s board of directors”; or, it “is reasonable to conclude” that they are directly or indirectly able to direct the entity’s activities. 
• European Union: If an entity is owned or controlled by a designated person, then the funds and economic resources of that entity must also be frozen. Ownership involves possession of over 50 percent “proprietary rights” or a majority interest. Control is determined according to a non-exhaustive list of criteria, which includes the right or exercise of power “to appoint or remove a majority of the members of the administrative, management or supervisory body”; the right to use all or part of the entity’s assets; and the sharing of financial liabilities of the entity, or guaranteeing those liabilities. 
• United Kingdom: An entity is subject to an asset freeze and restrictions on “some financial services” when it is owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by a designated person. Like Canada, the United Kingdom requires one of three criteria to be met to establish ownership or control: when the person directly or indirectly holds more than 50 percent of the shares or voting rights; when they have the right to directly or indirectly appoint or remove a majority of the board of directors; or when it’s “reasonable to expect” the person would be able to “ensure the affairs of the entity are conducted in accordance with the person’s wishes.”
• United States: The US government uses the “50 Percent Rule”: when one or more “blocked” (i.e., designated) persons own an entity “by 50 percent or more in the aggregate,” then that entity is itself considered blocked. While the United States does not evaluate control under this rule, it may designate the entity itself if it is determined to be controlled by a designated person.

How are jurisdictions changing beneficial ownership frameworks?

To prevent designated persons from hiding their ownership of assets, jurisdictions have strengthened corporate transparency and reporting requirements on beneficial ownership. The Financial Action Task Force (FATF)—an intergovernmental organization tasked with combatting money laundering and terrorist and proliferation financing—released updated guidance on beneficial ownership in 2023. It recommended that countries establish a beneficial ownership register or alternative mechanism to document ownership information. 

• Australia: The Australian government has committed to beneficial ownership reform between January 2024 and December 2025 as part of its Third Open Government Partnership National Action Plan. This will include implementing a public beneficial ownership register, for which the Treasury previously undertook a consultation process in 2022.
• Canada: As of January 22, 2024, all corporations governed by the Canada Business Corporations Act are required to file beneficial ownership (or “individuals with significant control,” or ISC) information. Businesses have been required to maintain their own ISC registers since June 2019 but were not previously required to file them with the government. Some of the information in the filings—such as full legal names, the description of the significant control, the dates of significant control, and certain addresses—will be available through an online search on Corporations Canada, the country’s federal corporate regulator.
• European Union: The EU uses the Beneficial Ownership Registers Interconnection System (BORIS) to link the national registers of member states Iceland, Liechtenstein, and Norway. This was set up in line with a 2015 European Parliament and Council directive, as amended in 2018. Access to some information is restricted according to national laws. In November 2022, the Court of Justice of the European Union annulled provisions of a directive that granted public access to beneficial ownership information. A new version of the directive would instead grant access to the register to persons with a “legitimate interest” in the beneficial ownership information, like journalists or civil society. In January 2024, the European Council and Parliament reached a provisional agreement that includes provisions to make beneficial ownership rules “more harmonised and transparent,” for example, by clarifying rules to prevent beneficial owners from “hiding behind multiple layers of ownership of companies.” Notably, the beneficial ownership threshold was set at 25 percent.
• United Kingdom: The UK has three registers: for “people with significant control,” for trusts, and for overseas entities. Overseas entities were required to register with Companies House, the country’s corporate regulator, and tell them who the beneficial owners or managing officers were by January 21, 2023. Still, in February 2023, it was reported that almost half the companies required to do so had not. An act in the final stages of legislative approval will include reforms to Companies House, such as identity verification for certain personnel, more effective investigation and enforcement powers, and enhanced personal privacy protections.
• United States: Effective January 1, 2024, as required under the 2021 Corporate Transparency Act, certain “reporting companies”—including US-based corporations and limited liability companies, as well as foreign companies registered to do business in the US—must report information about their beneficial owners to the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN). This information will be stored in the Beneficial Ownership Information database. The Department of the Treasury issued a final rule that makes money services businesses, casinos, and “other non-bank financial institutions that have anti-money laundering obligations” eligible for access to the beneficial ownership registry. 

Celeste Kmiotek is a staff lawyer for the Strategic Litigation Project at the Atlantic Council.

Lisandra Novo is a staff lawyer for the Strategic Litigation Project at the Atlantic Council.

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Does the new EU-Serbia lithium deal undermine democracy? The European Union’s recent memorandum of understanding with Serbia on raw materials has sparked debate across the Balkans. Signed during German Chancellor Olaf Scholz’s visit, the MoU revives a controversial lithium mining project, drawing opposition from many Serbians.

In this episode, Nonresident Senior Fellow Ilva Tare is joined by Ivan Vejvoda, Permanent Fellow at the Institute for Human Sciences and Head of Europe’s Futures Project in Vienna, to dissect this complex issue.

Does Mr. Vejvoda share the criticism that the EU and Germany are prioritizing lithium access in Serbia over essential democratic principles like environmental protection, rule of law, and independent media?

With concerns about weak independent institutions and a critical public sphere in Serbia, can the country uphold high environmental and social standards?

How can the EU ensure that such agreements maintain rigorous environmental and social principles?

Could this agreement reduce Serbia’s reliance on China, and what might be the broader geopolitical implications?

Join #BalkansDebrief for an in-depth discussion on the potential impacts of this deal and the geoeconomic and geopolitical interests of the EU in the Western Balkans.

#BalkansDebrief is an online interview series presented by the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center and hosted by journalist Ilva Tare. The program offers a fresh look at the Western Balkans and examines the region’s people, culture, challenges, and opportunities.

Watch #BalkansDebrief on YouTube and listen to it as a Podcast.

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Ilva Tare

Resident Senior Fellow

Europe Center

Albanian English

The Europe Center promotes leadership, strategies, and analysis to ensure a strong, ambitious, and forward-looking transatlantic relationship.

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The post #BalkansDebrief – Does the new EU-Serbia lithium deal undermine democracy? A Debrief with Ivan Vejvoda appeared first on Atlantic Council.

During the 1990s, some Russians claimed the dictatorial Lukashenka model was exactly what the troubled and oligarchic Russian Federation needed. Although always opposed to the Belarusian language and broadly aligned with Moscow, Lukashenka tenaciously maintained his independence when Vladimir Putin came to power in Russia, skillfully extracting benefits from both the Kremlin and the West.

This independence was severely undermined by the massive grassroots protests that erupted in Belarus in the wake of the country’s 2020 presidential vote. Large numbers of Belarusians believed reformist opposition candidate Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya had won the election and took to the streets to protest. Lukashenka only survived thanks to Russian support. This left him far more reliant on the Kremlin and significantly reduced his room for maneuver.

In February 2022, Lukashenka allowed Putin to use Belarusian territory to launch his full-scale invasion of Ukraine. However, it soon became clear that things were not going according to Putin’s plan. Russia’s heavy losses during the initial weeks of the invasion restored some of Lukashenka’s independence, while disquiet in his own armed forces and some quarters of the security services convinced him that further direct involvement in Russia’s war would be folly. Since then, Lukashenka has provided training and equipment to Russian forces, but has resisted pressure to join the invasion.

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

Putin remains eager to exploit Belarus’s resources and strategic position to threaten Kyiv once more and to target Western supplies entering Ukraine from Poland. Belarus could also play an important role in the future, if Russia seeks to intensify hybrid hostilities against the Baltic states or to launch a direct attack. This looks unlikely as long as Lukashenka remains in power. The Belarusian dictator may therefore represent a status quo which fundamentally favors Ukraine and its allies more than Russia.

If Putin continues to fail in his immediate objective of occupying all of Ukraine’s Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson regions, there is a real possibility that he will ultimately lose patience with Lukashenka and move to either replace him or otherwise compel Belarus to join the invasion. Moreover, it is almost certain that Putin will attempt to secure Belarusian human and material resources if Lukashenka dies before him.

Many Belarusians already know what would await them if Putin fully incorporated and militarized their country. They would experience an oligarchic raiding of businesses, covert or overt mobilization, and the extinguishing of the traditionally Western-looking aspect that is an important part of Belarusian national identity.

In contrast, if Belarusians manage to maintain their independence and empower a reformist leadership, they can begin moving towards European integration, with European Union membership an eventual possibility. In this context, it is vital that all Belarusians, including political elites along with members of the military and security forces, receive assurances that they have a viable alternative to the Kremlin vision for their country’s future.

Eurasia Center events

Online Event Thu, August 15, 2024 • 9:00 am ET

Ukraine’s advance in Kursk: What’s next and implications

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Articulating a European future for Belarus does not need to entail talk of NATO membership. Instead, it should involve acknowledging the possibility of removing sanctions, enhancing access to EU travel, education, and capital, and eventually embracing Belarus’s modest population of 9.2 million people under democratic leadership and after deep structural reforms.

From a purely practical standpoint, European integration would not be an insurmountable task. Lukashenka’s repressive regime has actually resulted in relatively good infrastructure conditions for Belarusians, especially in rural areas, compared to most other former Soviet republics. Belarus boasts a highly educated and comparatively young demographic. Prior to the 2020 protests, the country had burgeoning IT and entrepreneurial sectors.

A Belarus free of Russian military entanglements and increasingly aligned with the Euro-Atlantic community instead of the developing Russia-China-Iran-North Korea axis of autocracies would contribute significantly to the security of Ukraine, Poland, and the Baltic states. A Belarusian geopolitical pivot toward the West could also encourage transformation inside Russia itself and compel more Russians to embrace a post-imperial identity.

Failure to articulate the possibility of a European future for Belarus leaves the Euro-Atlantic community at risk of being caught off guard without a plan when Belarus does, indeed, reach its fork in the road. This may come sooner than many are prepared for. By taking steps now to engage with Belarusian society, the EU can strengthen its own foreign policy credentials as a major geopolitical player, mitigate against the risk of a rapid Russian militarization of Belarus, and set the stage for a cooperative relationship with Belarusians in the years to come.

Richard Cashman is a nonresident fellow at the Centre for Defence Strategies.

Further reading

UkraineAlert Jul 25, 2024

Putin is convinced he can outlast the West and win in Ukraine

By Mykola Bielieskov

The West’s collective fear of escalation and reluctance to commit to Ukrainian victory have convinced Putin that he can outlast his opponents and achieve an historic triumph in Ukraine, writes Mykola Bielieskov.

Conflict Defense Industry

UkraineAlert Jul 16, 2024

Russia’s retreat from Crimea makes a mockery of the West’s escalation fears

By Peter Dickinson

The Russian Navy’s quiet retreat from Crimea highlights the emptiness of Putin’s red lines and the self-defeating folly of Western escalation management, writes Peter Dickinson.

Conflict Defense Policy

UkraineAlert Jul 18, 2024

Ukraine’s drone success offers a blueprint for cybersecurity strategy

By Anatoly Motkin

Ukraine’s rapidly expanding domestic drone industry offers a potentially appealing blueprint for the development of the country’s cybersecurity capabilities, writes Anatoly Motkin.

Conflict Cybersecurity

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

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UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia and Central Asia in the East.

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The post The West should articulate the possibility of a European future for Belarus now appeared first on Atlantic Council.

What EU reforms will make enlargement successful? Why should Europe focus on the Balkans? What are the potential opportunities and challenges for EU enlargement and the Growth Plan for this region?

Join Nonresident Senior Fellow Ilva Tare in this episode of #BalkansDebrief as she interviews Enrico Letta, former Prime Minister of Italy and current President of the Institut Jacques Delors. With his extensive experience in European Union affairs and his recent influential report on the future of the Single Market, Mr. Letta provides deep insights into the necessary reforms for successful EU enlargement.

In this episode, Mr. Letta discusses his advocacy for the “Regatta Method” over the “Big Bang” approach for EU enlargement, emphasizing the importance of allowing each country to join when ready rather than waiting for the slowest in the region. He also elaborates on his proposed blueprint for EU enlargement success, which includes critical reforms such as on veto rules and the creation of a “solidarity enlargement facility.”

Discover the future of the EU and the vital steps needed to integrate the six Western Balkan countries into the new Single Market, as envisioned by Enrico Letta, a staunch advocate of enlargement in the Western Balkans.

#BalkansDebrief is an online interview series presented by the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center and hosted by journalist Ilva Tare. The program offers a fresh look at the Western Balkans and examines the region’s people, culture, challenges, and opportunities.

Watch #BalkansDebrief on YouTube and listen to it as a Podcast.

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Ilva Tare

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The Europe Center promotes leadership, strategies, and analysis to ensure a strong, ambitious, and forward-looking transatlantic relationship.

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The post #BalkansDebrief – What EU reforms will make enlargement successful? A Debrief with Enrico Letta appeared first on Atlantic Council.

In a new Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative issue brief, “Is Iran an ideological state?,” Mahmood Sariolghalam argues that while Islamic fundamentalism did motivate Iran’s international presence in the first decade of the revolution, the Islamic Republic’s motives have transformed. Namely, after the death of its founder, Ayatollah Khomeini, on June 3, 1989, the country’s foreign policy maintains a fundamentalist posture but now prioritizes policies to guarantee its political survival.

From 1989 to the present, Sariolghalam argues, core revolutionary elites have applied ideology and religious symbolism to cloak policies to avoid normalization with the United States, pursue an anti-Israeli struggle to reinvigorate confrontation with Washington, and seek leverage vis-à-vis the United States and Israel by nurturing proxies, an extensive missile industry, and a robust nuclear program.

Regime security, Sariolghalam continues, is the core preoccupation of statecraft in Iran. All other essentials of modern governance—such as economic growth, net-zero policies, infrastructure development, research and development at higher-level institutions, civil society, and entertainment—are either downplayed or considered only insofar as they do not interfere with concerns about survival and security. Realpolitik now drives Iran’s foreign policy.

Mahmood Sariolghalam

Professor of international relations,
Shahid Beheshti University

Mahmood Sariolghalam is an advisory committee member of the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative’s Iran Strategy Project. He specializes in the political economy of development, US-Iranian relations, and Iranian foreign policy and political culture. His current research focuses on the political psychology of authoritarianism and conceptual roots of Iranian foreign policy. He has made 639 presentations in 114 countries over the last 28 years, including at the Brookings Institution, Carnegie, Chatham House, and ASERI, among others.

The Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative (SMESI) provides policymakers fresh insights into core US national security interests by leveraging its expertise, networks, and on-the-ground programs to develop unique and holistic assessments on the future of the most pressing strategic, political, and security challenges and opportunities in the Middle East. 

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For Bahrain, which takes its foreign policy directives from Saudi Arabia and the UAE, following in Riyadh and Abu Dhabi’s footsteps vis-à-vis the Islamic Republic is logical.

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The high price of dissident art in Iran: Silence or exile

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Many independent artists who remain in Iran have suspended their activities due to working bans or personal reluctance to engage in the current oppressive political climate.

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Shia Afghans are being brought to Iran to make up for the lack of religious Iranians

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The mass participation of Shia Afghans at regime-organized events sheds light on how the Islamic Republic is proactively using Afghan migrants to foster a loyal constituency and fill the widening gap between the state and Iranian society.

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The post Is Iran an ideological state? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

For decades, the United States and Serbia have engaged in a delicate diplomatic dance. Recently, Serbian think tank representatives visited Washington, DC, for critical talks with US policymakers.

Their agenda? Navigating the complexities of Serbia’s democratic health and evolving foreign policy, including unpacking its shifting alliances with Russia and China, and how these relationships impact Serbia’s aspirations for membership in the European Union (EU).

Ilva Tare is joined in this episode of #BalkansDebrief by Igor Bandovic, Director of the Belgrade Center for Security Policy, and Nikola Burazer, Program Director at the Center for Contemporary Politics, to discuss their main concerns regarding Serbia’s state of democracy, nationalistic rhetoric, and dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina.

What are the top foreign policy and security challenges facing Serbia currently?

The All-Serb Assembly reignited nationalist sentiment across the region. How significant is this, and what potential consequences could it have for Serbia and regional stability?

#BalkansDebrief is an online interview series presented by the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center and hosted by journalist Ilva Tare. The program offers a fresh look at the Western Balkans and examines the region’s people, culture, challenges, and opportunities.

Watch #BalkansDebrief on YouTube and listen to it as a Podcast.

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Ilva Tare

Resident Senior Fellow

Europe Center

Albanian English

The Europe Center promotes leadership, strategies, and analysis to ensure a strong, ambitious, and forward-looking transatlantic relationship.

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The post #BalkansDebrief – Where next for Serbian foreign policy? | A Debrief with Igor Bandovic and Nikola Burazer appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The talks, which took place within the framework of an intergovernmental conference in Luxembourg, marked the launch of a process that could still take years to complete. While much work lies ahead, Ukrainian officials were keen to emphasize the symbolic importance of this latest milestone in the country’s long journey toward European integration.

“Today is an historic day,” commented Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy in a celebratory social media post. “We will never be derailed from our path to a united Europe, to our common home of all European nations. A home that must be peaceful!”

Ukraine’s Deputy Prime Minister for European and Euro-Atlantic Integration Olga Stefanishyna, who headed the country’s delegation in Luxembourg, called the talks “a truly historical moment for my country.” Stefanishyna noted that Tuesday’s breakthrough would give Ukrainians “the moral power to continue withstanding” Russia’s invasion.  

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

While the official start of accession talks was widely toasted in Kyiv, formal negotiations are unlikely to get underway for several more months. Ukraine must then implement a wide range of reforms in thirty-five separate policy areas in order to bring the country’s laws and regulations into line with EU standards. Ukrainian officials have spoken tentatively of aiming to join the EU by 2030, but even this timeline might be overly optimistic.  

Nor does the start of negotiations represent any guarantee of future Ukrainian EU membership. A host of other European countries including Türkiye, Serbia, North Macedonia, and Albania are all also bidding to join the bloc. The experience of the Western Balkans in particular illustrates the challenges of transitioning from EU candidate to member status, with numerous countries still struggling to advance despite in some cases more than a decade of talks.  

Eurasia Center events

Online Event Thu, August 15, 2024 • 9:00 am ET

Ukraine’s advance in Kursk: What’s next and implications

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Ukraine’s progress on the road to EU membership has been remarkably rapid since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022. Days after the outbreak of hostilities, President Zelenskyy announced the country’s application to join the European Union in a video address delivered from Kyiv as columns of Russian troops advanced on the city. Four months later, EU leaders granted Ukraine official candidate country status. The decision to begin talks then followed amid much fanfare in December 2023. Rarely has Brussels bureaucracy seemed so dramatic.

For millions of Ukrainians, the quest for EU membership represents the country’s civilizational choice of a European future and the decisive rejection of Russian authoritarianism. This historic shift began in 1991, when more than ninety percent of Ukrainians backed the country’s declaration of independence and voted to leave the Soviet Union.

The next major milestone in Ukraine’s geopolitical divorce from Russia was the 2004 Orange Revolution, which saw Ukrainians from across the country flood into Kyiv to protest a rigged presidential vote and prevent the election of a Kremlin-backed candidate. This was to prove a watershed moment in post-Soviet history; the Orange Revolution established Ukraine’s European integration aspirations and sparked a rift with Russia that would only grow more pronounced over the coming decades.     

Nine years after the Orange Revolution, Ukrainians once more took to the streets to oppose a renewed Russian bid to force the country back into the Kremlin orbit. The 2013-14 Euromaidan Revolution further cemented Ukraine’s pivot toward the West, while deepening the divide separating the country from Russia. Days after Ukraine’s ousted pro-Kremlin president Viktor Yanukovych fled across the border to Russia, Vladimir Putin began the invasion of Ukraine with the seizure of Crimea, sparking a war that continues to this day.

The past decade of Russian aggression has had a profound impact on Ukraine’s commitment to European integration. Prior to the start of Russia’s invasion in 2014, many Ukrainians still favored close ties with Moscow and other former Soviet republics. However, the war unleashed by Putin has transformed Ukrainian public opinion, with the vast majority in today’s Ukraine now backing EU membership.    

Ukrainians understand that joining the European Union will not protect them from further Russian aggression. They are also realistic enough to recognize that huge challenges remain before they can finally achieve the goal of member status. Nevertheless, the start of official EU membership talks sends a strong signal that the country is moving in the right direction toward a future that is worth fighting for.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

Further reading

UkraineAlert May 30, 2024

If the West wants a sustainable peace it must commit to Ukrainian victory

By Hanna Hopko, Andrius Kubilius

Since 2022, Western policies of escalation management have failed to appease Putin and have only emboldened the Kremlin. If the West wants peace, it must help Ukraine win, write Hanna Hopko and Andrius Kubilius.

Civil Society Conflict

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Ukraine is making the Russian occupation of Crimea untenable

By Olivia Yanchik

Ukraine’s growing air strike capabilities are decimating Russian air defenses in Crimea and making the occupation of the peninsula increasingly untenable, writes Olivia Yanchik.

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UkraineAlert Jun 4, 2024

Vladimir Putin just tacitly admitted Crimea is not really part of Russia

By Peter Dickinson

Russia claims to have annexed five Ukrainian provinces but refuses to extend security red lines to these regions. This highlights the pragmatic political realities behind Putin’s talk of historic conquests, writes Peter Dickinson.

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The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

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UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia and Central Asia in the East.

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The post Historic day for Ukraine as EU launches official membership talks appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Why is distrust in institutions alarming for the Balkans? The recent International Republican Institute (IRI) poll on the Western Balkans has revealed some concerning trends for the region’s aspirations of joining the European Union. While the war in Ukraine presented a potential opening, the path to membership appears to be facing significant challenges. 

Nonresident Senior Fellow Ilva Tare is joined by Amila Karačić, Director of Programs of IRI in Bosnia and Herzegovina, who also oversees the Western Balkans regional programs, to discuss the main takeaways of the poll conducted in the six countries. 

Is there evidence that pro-Russian narratives are gaining traction outside of Serbia?

Why are citizens in the Western Balkans less likely to push for political change, despite wanting EU integration? How deep is their distrust in politicians and institutions?

Why does it seem that citizens prefer strongman leaders despite their potential to undermine the path towards the EU? 

Is nationalism a concern in the region? In which country is it most pronounced?

#BalkansDebrief is an online interview series presented by the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center and hosted by journalist Ilva Tare. The program offers a fresh look at the Western Balkans and examines the region’s people, culture, challenges, and opportunities.

Watch #BalkansDebrief on YouTube and listen to it as a Podcast.

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Ilva Tare

Resident Senior Fellow

Europe Center

Albanian English

The Europe Center promotes leadership, strategies, and analysis to ensure a strong, ambitious, and forward-looking transatlantic relationship.

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The post #BalkansDebrief – Why is distrust in institutions alarming for the Balkans? | A debrief with Amila Karačić appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The emir’s move certainly did not evoke a strong public reaction from Kuwaitis themselves. They are not known for manning the barricades in political protest, and some of them are likely just as frustrated as their emir with the lack of progress in the country—a country that is simultaneously wonderfully rich and utterly unable to diversify its economy away from producing oil and managing the cash that oil sales produce. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) projects that Kuwait’s real gross domestic product will actually decline by 1.4 percent in 2024, lagging behind its Gulf partners. Partly because of opposition in parliament, Kuwait has not been a welcoming destination for foreign investment. Kuwaitis and foreign investors still recall the 2008 cancellation of a $17-billion Dow Chemical investment in petrochemicals as emblematic of the difficult environment for major foreign investment.

Other Kuwaitis are likely waiting to see how strong the repression will be. A well-known Islamist and former member of parliament, Walid al-Tabtabaie, was arrested a day after the suspension on May 11, reportedly for a tweet suggesting foreign interference in Kuwaiti affairs—in other words, Gulf state support for the emir’s actions. Although Tabtabaie will likely consider his arrest a badge of honor, it will also serve as a warning to others who might consider publicly opining on their leadership’s actions. However, Kuwaitis will not abandon their tradition of having a say in their politics. They can be expected to find ways over time to express themselves and demand accountability from the ruling Sabah family.

Regional reaction has also been muted. Uniquely, Emirati President Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed quickly called his Kuwaiti counterpart to offer his support, noting the utmost value of stability. The sultan of Oman, Haithan bin Tariq, was in Kuwait for a previously scheduled state visit ending May 14. He did not comment on internal Kuwaiti matters, but there was some press spin that the visit was a show of support for Sabah’s moves. Other Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and regional leaders have been silent, perhaps quietly pleased that Kuwait’s longtime experience with a parliament with some genuine power has been quashed for the moment.

And what about the United States’ reaction to the backsliding of democratic norms in Kuwait? No public statements emerged from the White House or the US Department of State. An anonymous State Department official told me, “We are aware of the developments regarding the Kuwaiti parliament suspension and are monitoring the situation closely.”

In other words, this is not a fight the United States will pick. The reasons for this reticence could range from a simple lack of bandwidth to deal with what is considered a relatively minor matter in the Middle East to a more serious weighing of current priorities. Sabah is known as a reliable security partner, and Kuwait has been a generous and flexible host for US military installations. Thousands of US Army personnel have served at or passed through Camp Arifjan, and Ali al-Salem Air Base has provided a key hub for US aircraft.

Although Kuwait and Bahrain reportedly asked the United States not to use bases located on their soil for any attacks on Iran in reaction to its April 13 retaliation against Israel—which came in response to the killing of senior members of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) at  Iran’s embassy compound in Syria—these bases remain extremely useful.

But it is not impossible to balance concerns for security and stability with support for political liberalization. On April 15, Kuwait celebrated the nineteenth anniversary of Kuwaiti women achieving the right to vote, prompted by the George W. Bush administration’s “freedom agenda” in the Middle East. That very year, the United States was also pursuing a major war in Iraq, with Kuwait as the critical entry point for US forces. At the time, President Bush was instrumental in convincing Emir Sheikh Sabah to push this measure through the Kuwait parliament. Liz Cheney, a State Department official at that time, came to Kuwait to celebrate the granting of female suffrage.

Democracy mattered then. It still matters now. 

Ambassador (ret) Richard LeBaron is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council. He served as US Ambassador to Kuwait and in a number of other senior diplomatic positions in the Middle East and Washington. He is a member of the Advisory Council of Global Ties US. Follow him on X: @RBLeBaron.

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On April 18, Forward Defense nonresident senior fellow Thomas S. Warrick was mentioned in a Cipher Brief article releasing an open letter to the Senate. Signed by a group of former senior national security officials, this letter urged the reform of Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, adopting The Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act of 2024 (H.R. 7888 or RISA). The national security surveillance program allows the collection of communications of non-Americans abroad, without a warrant, by US government officials for foreign intelligence purposes.

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Millions of Ukrainians have served in the country’s armed forces since the onset of Russian aggression ten years ago. This large pool of veterans has the potential to transform Ukraine’s political landscape. Military veterans can bring a range of qualities to Ukrainian politics including patriotism, pragmatism, accountability, and an acute awareness about the costs of corruption. Crucially, Ukraine’s military veterans also enjoy unprecedented levels of trust among their compatriots.

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

Since the start of the full-scale Russian invasion in February 2022, a number of Ukrainian MPs and local officials have joined the military. Their experiences will inevitably influence their future political activities and may result in increased attention to issues including national security and the rights of veterans. However, these serving politicians are likely to form a small percentage of the military veterans active in postwar Ukrainian politics.

Hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians are currently defending their country against a threat that most view as existential. With Russia openly denying Ukraine’s right to exist and erasing all traces of Ukrainian identity in areas currently under Kremlin control, the stakes could hardly be higher. This experience is transforming Ukraine and producing an entire generation of Ukrainians defined by the courage and sacrifices of the struggle against Russian aggression.

Many of Ukraine’s military veterans will seek to continue serving the nation in the postwar environment. They will be driven by a profound sense of duty and by a deeply felt desire to build a Ukraine that will honor the memory of their fallen comrades. These veterans will be highly sought after by Ukraine’s existing political parties, but they also have the potential to become a potent political force in their own right.

The single greatest political asset Ukraine’s military veterans possess is the trust of their fellow Ukrainians. In a country where faith in the political classes is notoriously low, military veterans enjoy an enviable reputation for trustworthiness. One recent survey conducted in March 2024 found public levels of trust for different categories of veteran ranging from 84 to 96 percent. In contrast, a January 2024 poll found that 75 percent of Ukrainians distrust state officials.

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An influx of military veterans into the political arena would not necessarily create a more militarized Ukraine. Instead, it would likely enhance democratic accountability while also bringing valuable practical experience along with patriotic judgment that prioritizes the national interest. This has long been the case throughout the democratic world, where military veterans have frequently pursued political careers. For example, almost 20 percent of currently serving Congress members in the US come from military backgrounds.

The Ukrainian authorities should now be looking to create the conditions for more military veterans to play a role in building the country’s future. This means safeguarding their rights and status, while making sure they and their families enjoy maximum government support. State programs, private grants, and international initiatives should offer veterans free education. Efforts should also be made to improve employment opportunities, including initiatives to hire veterans in public service positions.

In light of the major challenges Ukraine will continue to face for many years to come, including the twin threats of further Russian aggression and economic instability, the active engagement of veterans in Ukrainian politics is more crucial than ever. Their proven commitment to serving their country, coupled with their firsthand knowledge of the realities of war, make them highly qualified to lead Ukraine.

From Dwight Eisenhower to Charles de Gaulle, there are many examples in modern history of military men who have gone on to become pivotal political figures in the democratic world. In many ways, it would be entirely natural if Ukraine’s own evolution as a European democracy follows a similar path.

Ukrainian policymakers need to recognize the potential of the country’s military veterans and provide them with opportunities to take on leadership roles in the political arena. This will allow Ukraine to tap into the wealth of talent, dedication, and experience that veterans can offer, while also strengthening the country’s democratic institutions and rebuilding public trust in the political classes.

Kateryna Odarchenko is a partner at SIC Group Ukraine.

Further reading

UkraineAlert Mar 31, 2024

Ukraine urgently needs air defenses as Russia decimates power grid

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A new Russian air offensive has destroyed much of Ukraine’s civilian energy infrastructure in a matter of days and threatens to spark a humanitarian catastrophe if Ukraine does not urgently receive enhanced air defenses, writes Suriya Evans-Pritchard Jayanti.

Conflict Defense Technologies

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In addition to imaginary NATO threats and phantom fascists, Putin has now added Islamist terrorism to the expanding list of absurd excuses for the invasion of Ukraine, writes Peter Dickinson.

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UkraineAlert Apr 3, 2024

Ukraine’s allies divided over drone campaign targeting Russian refineries

By Giorgi Revishvili

Ukraine’s expanding campaign of drone strikes on Russian refineries has inflicted significant damage on Putin’s oil and gas industry while also revealing divisions among Ukraine’s allies, writes Giorgi Revishvili.

Conflict Drones

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

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UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia and Central Asia in the East.

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The post Ukraine’s veterans can transform the country’s postwar political landscape appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The proposed legislation would oblige civil society organizations receiving more than 20% of annual funding from sources outside Georgia to openly state that they are “pursuing the interests of a foreign power.” They would be required to register as foreign agents and subjected to extensive additional reporting requirements. Organizations that fail to do so could face large fines.

Critics say the bill is very similar to Russia’s draconian foreign agents legislation, which is widely seen as a tool for the Kremlin to target potential dissidents and silence civil society. The similarities between the law proposed by the Georgian authorities and restrictions already in place inside Russia helped fuel large-scale protests in Tbilisi last year, with many denouncing what they termed as the “Russian law.”

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

Renewed efforts to pass last year’s foreign agents bill have sparked fresh debate over Georgia’s future. Opposition groups see the return of the draft law as a further indication of the ruling Georgian Dream party’s intention to steer the country away from Europe and toward Russia. The move comes just months after Georgia achieved a major breakthrough by securing official EU candidate nation status in December 2023.

EU officials voiced “regret” that Georgia’s foreign influence legislation was once again under consideration despite being “unconditionally” withdrawn last year. “Transparency should not be used as an instrument to limit civil society’s capacity to operate freely,” read an EU statement. “We encourage the political leaders in Georgia to adopt and implement reforms that are in line with the stated objective of joining the European Union, as supported by a large majority of Georgia’s citizens.”

The United States also voiced its concerns over the reappearance of the contentious foreign agents law. The largely unchanged draft legislation “undermines Georgia’s commitment to Euro-Atlantic integration and risks pulling Georgia off its European path,” commented US Department of State spokesperson Matthew Miller.

When officials from the ruling Georgian Dream party first proposed new legislation to curb foreign influence in February 2023, the backlash was so strong that the draft law was ultimately withdrawn from consideration. Thousands rallied against the bill in Tbilisi, leading to clashes with police that generated global headlines.

Criticism also came from a range of international human rights watchdogs. “The foreign agent bill seeks to marginalize and discredit independent, foreign-funded groups and media that serve the wider public interest in Georgia,” commented Hugh Williamson, Europe and Central Asia Director for Human Rights Watch.

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The reintroduction of the foreign agents law ahead of parliamentary elections in October casts a shadow over Georgia’s democratic progress. Critics say this renewed push to pass legislation virtually identical to last year’s abandoned bill is part of the Georgian Dream party’s efforts to silence opponents. They accuse the Georgian authorities of backsliding on the core values underpinning the country’s declared goal of securing a democratic, European future.

These concerns reflect fears over Russian influence. Despite widespread public opposition to Russia’s role in the country, the Georgian Dream party has long faced accusations of seeking to foster closer ties with the Kremlin. Russia continues to occupy approximately 20 percent of Georgia, and has recently announced plans to construct a major naval base on the Black Sea coast in Georgia’s occupied Abkhazia region.

Over the past two years, the Georgian authorities have responded ambiguously to the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine. Georgia has refused to join international sanctions or restrict trade with Russia, while Georgian PM Irakli Garibashvili echoed the Kremlin in May 2023 by claiming NATO enlargement was one of the main reasons for the war in Ukraine. Georgia also recently relaunched direct flights to Russia.

In the coming weeks, Georgia’s revived foreign influence legislation is expected to be reviewed by a parliamentary committee. A new round of protests against the law has already begun in the capital, and could serve as a focal point for opponents of the current authorities. The further passage of the law will reveal much about the Georgian Dream party’s grip on power, while also providing an indication of the country’s future geopolitical trajectory.

Mercedes Sapuppo is a program assistant at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

Further reading

UkraineAlert Mar 31, 2024

Ukraine urgently needs air defenses as Russia decimates power grid

By Suriya Evans-Pritchard Jayanti

A new Russian air offensive has destroyed much of Ukraine’s civilian energy infrastructure in a matter of days and threatens to spark a humanitarian catastrophe if Ukraine does not urgently receive enhanced air defenses, writes Suriya Evans-Pritchard Jayanti.

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In addition to imaginary NATO threats and phantom fascists, Putin has now added Islamist terrorism to the expanding list of absurd excuses for the invasion of Ukraine, writes Peter Dickinson.

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Ukraine’s allies divided over drone campaign targeting Russian refineries

By Giorgi Revishvili

Ukraine’s expanding campaign of drone strikes on Russian refineries has inflicted significant damage on Putin’s oil and gas industry while also revealing divisions among Ukraine’s allies, writes Giorgi Revishvili.

Conflict Drones

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

Read more from UkraineAlert

UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia and Central Asia in the East.

Learn more

The post Georgia launches new push to adopt Russian-style foreign agent law appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Yet, some argue, that election was widely boycotted. The two principal arguments underlying this claim are that the opposition parties boycotted the election and that Bangladeshis resoundingly rejected the poll in solidarity with the opposition’s call to boycott.

Participation or boycott?

While the major opposition Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) and its allies did sit out the election, not all opposition parties followed suit. Out of forty-four registered parties, twenty-seven fielded candidates. Additionally, nearly 1,900 independent candidates threw their hats in the ring for three hundred parliamentary seats. So, while the BNP’s absence resounded, reasonable multiparty competition and voter choice still transpired across multiple constituencies.

The official voter turnout reached 41.8 percent—a lower figure than in Bangladesh’s last contested election, albeit not an unprecedented low. Some see this low turnout as one indication that the opposition’s boycott reflected popular sentiment. The opposition boycott undoubtedly dampened some voter turnout. However, low participation does not necessarily indicate a blanket public rejection of the polls owing to opposition exhortations. In the run-up to the vote, the BNP’s anti-election protests degenerated into a violent crusade. BNP loyalists were found to be complicit in torching hundreds of vehicles. The BNP called for forty-eight hours of nationwide strikes and blockades on the eve of voting day. Arsonists set fire to polling booths and a train, killing four. This prevailing climate of trepidation likely caused some voters to stay at home on election day. Expanding absentee balloting could be a solution, but barring some exceptions, average citizens cannot vote by mail. Crucially, expats, who account for 10 percent of all voters, were effectively disenfranchised.

More tellingly, in constituencies where robust, competing candidates vied for seats, voter turnout topped 60 percent, suggesting genuine electoral contests did mobilize voters. Conversely, anemic turnout in some constituencies seems to have stemmed from lack of competition, not voters boycotting the election outright in solidarity with the BNP.

Confusion persists, however, over the Election Commission’s reported voter turnout statistics. The Commission initially announced a 27 percent turnout rate at its afternoon press briefing, later announcing a 41.8 percent final turnout. The Election Commission said that the lower afternoon figure was not in real time; it did not yet reflect delayed updates from all polling centers. Since Bangladesh uses a manual paper ballot system, where votes are hand counted and tallied, there were a few hours of lag in transmitting results from rural areas. This lag could explain the gap between the afternoon number and the final announced turnout. In that case, it is not true that 14 percent of the total votes would have had to have been cast in the final hour for the final given turnout to be accurate, as some commentators have stated.

And perhaps the Election Commission is right. But with the seeds of doubt sown, the Election Commission could help resolve any lingering doubts by publishing a detailed breakdown of hourly vote counts from all polling stations. Such transparency would provide definitive clarity on the turnout question that confused some observers.

Is Bangladesh a one-party state?

As Bangladesh charts its course following another landslide election victory for the ruling Awami League (AL), some critics warn that the country is sliding toward effective one-party rule. With AL sweeping 223 seats and its loyalist independents winning 62 more—making 95 percent of elected members broadly aligned with the ruling party—they argue that no meaningful opposition exists in parliament.

But there are a couple of problems here. First, dismissing independent members of parliament simply as AL lapdogs overlooks intricacies within Bangladesh’s political landscape. All independents prevailed after intense electoral combat with AL candidates. They will enjoy unchecked freedom to wield their votes and voices in the parliament. Article 70 of Bangladesh’s constitution prohibits members of parliament from voting against their party. But as independent candidates lacking formal party affiliation, they are immune from this restriction. In this context, the AL merits praise for taking affirmative steps to foster electoral competition and pluralism, despite lacking a formidable challenger. The AL, by allowing senior party figures to compete as independents, certainly risked potential intraparty discord. Yet, it prioritized providing voters with genuine electoral alternatives and widening the diversity of voices in parliament.

Additionally, a party achieving an overwhelming parliamentary majority through an electoral process does not equate to a one-party state. In the past, the AL and the BNP have held similar supermajorities without making Bangladesh a one-party state. Similarly, India and Japan have experienced one-party dominance without losing multiparty democracy. The key question is whether the AL orchestrated this supermajority parliament or if it was an inevitable outcome given the BNP’s election boycott.

The BNP would argue the former—that there was never a level playing field and that the crackdown and mass arrest of BNP leaders after the October 28 rally precluded any chance of a fair election, deterring their participation. However, even by October 28, the BNP had already rendered itself irrelevant to the polls by refusing participation. The October 28 protest sought to obstruct an election to called by the Election Commission in mid-November. Thus, law enforcement—at that point under the Commission’s authority—used force to halt the turmoil and ensure the election proceeded. Therefore, the state’s response to the rally should not be construed as barring the BNP’s electoral participation. The disproportionate use of force merits separate evaluation, but it is better viewed through a law-and-order lens rather than an electoral one.

Accountability starts with showing up

Rather than making alarmist claims of creeping authoritarianism, observers should have asked why the primary opposition, the BNP, forfeited the field. Just as the government warrants scrutiny for proportionality of force, the BNP should be held accountable for executing its democratic duties.

As a major political party representing 170 million people, the BNP had a duty to give voice to voters in parliament. By boycotting the election over hypothetical unfairness, they severely undermined democratic processes and disregarded people’s right to meaningful electoral choice. Even if the BNP’s claims are taken at face value that elections under the AL have no precedent of being free and fair, the demand to reinstate a caretaker government still lacks foundation. Bangladesh’s supreme court ruled it unconstitutional in May 2011. Moreover, the previous caretaker system overstayed its mandate, invoked a national emergency, and imprisoned leaders across party lines.

The boycott only assisted the incumbent AL. This squandered the chance for punitive international actions and domestic resistance had the BNP participated and electoral fraud still demonstrably occurred. As such, one could conclude that the BNP pinned higher hopes on spurring a constitutional crisis amid caretaker rule than pursuing a public mandate through elections. Through this self-defeating gambit, the BNP catapulted the AL into power, even as questions linger over the ruling party’s commitment to democratic fairness.

Gautam Lahiri is the president of Press Club of India. He served as Bangladesh as an independent foreign observer of the 2024 general elections in Bangladesh.

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Since the onset of Russia’s full-scale invasion two years ago, one of the key catalysts driving Ukraine’s reform agenda has been the June 2022 move to grant the country EU candidate status. When announcing this decision, the European Commission set Ukraine seven key reform goals to meet before official EU membership negotiations could begin. Priorities included reforms related to the rule of law, particularly the reform of crucial judicial bodies such as the High Council of Justice (HCJ) and the High Qualification Commission of Judges (HQCJ).

While significant progress has been made toward implementing these reforms, major challenges persist. For example, although new procedures have been introduced governing the selection of judges to the country’s Constitutional Court, there are still concerns regarding the appointment of politically compromised candidates. As Ukraine continues its judicial reform efforts, it is imperative to infuse these endeavors with renewed energy.

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

Looking ahead, a primary focus should be on reforming Ukraine’s Supreme Court, which plays a crucial role in the country’s judiciary. In spring 2023, the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine and the Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office uncovered evidence of a $2.7 million bribe involving the president of the Supreme Court. However, in the wake of this corruption scandal, three-quarters of Supreme Court judges appointed another judge as the new president of the court despite serious integrity concerns.

NGOs and members of the Ukrainian judiciary have proposed a two-step approach to Supreme Court reform featuring the vetting of sitting judges and implementation of a new selection process with the involvement of international experts. This format has been endorsed by the European Commission. Reforming the Supreme Court is widely recognized as an essential step toward strengthening the rule of law, combating corruption, and enhancing protection for investors.

Another reform priority is establishing the High Administrative Court (HACU), following the liquidation of the District Administrative Court of Kyiv (DACK) in December 2022. The DACK was widely accused of judicial misconduct. It wielded substantial power, overseeing cases involving municipal authorities and central executive bodies in the Ukrainian capital, but had become tainted by successive corruption scandals. To safeguard the integrity of HACU judges and prevent future allegations of corruption, it is vital to implement a selection process with the meaningful involvement of independent international experts, similar to the successful model used to establish the High Anti-Corruption Court.

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Reform of Ukraine’s legal education system is also indispensable for the success of the country’s judicial reforms. The judicial system currently suffers from a significant shortage of personnel, underscoring the need for a robust legal education system. Detrimental practices include the training of lawyers by traditional universities and law enforcement institutions. These institutions educate one-third of all legal professionals and receive about half of state funding allocated for legal education. However, rather than promoting critical thinking, students often encounter a curriculum and environment that stresses obedience.

Critics argue that this approach fails to instill the necessary professional skills. Additionally, graduates from law enforcement academies typically exhibit lower levels of specialist knowledge compared to university graduates. The EU highlighted its concerns regarding legal education in the Ukraine Accession Report 2023, stressing the necessity of addressing this issue by separating the training of lawyers in universities and law enforcement academies. G7 countries have also raised this issue.

Ukraine’s ability to defend itself against Russian aggression depends heavily on continued international support. Kyiv’s partners therefore have considerable leverage when it comes to maintaining the country’s reform momentum. With this in mind, it is crucial for Ukraine’s international allies to link continued financial assistance with the implementation of reforms. The effectiveness of this approach can be seen in the progress made between summer 2022 and late 2023 on the reform goals identified by the EU.

The EU has already outlined its additional reform recommendations. It would also be helpful to establish concrete reform requirements from G7 countries and connect these directly to aid. By linking financial support to specific reform targets, Ukraine’s international allies can make sure critical reforms are implemented and the country continues to move in the right direction. The need to maintain Ukraine’s reform momentum is another strong argument in favor of confirming further direct US budget support as part of future aid. This will provide vital leverage while bolstering Ukraine’s resilience and encouraging the authorities in Kyiv to implement the necessary reforms.

The road ahead is extremely challenging, but Ukraine can still emerge as a regional beacon of democracy, Euro-Atlantic security, and the rule of law. This will require the unwavering support of the country’s Western partners. To achieve this goal, future aid should be tied to a steadfast Ukrainian commitment to advance reforms without concessions. This can help shape the kind of future Ukrainians are currently fighting for.

Mykhailo Zhernakov is chair of the board of the DEJURE Foundation. Nestor Barchuk is international relations manager of the DEJURE Foundation.

Further reading

UkraineAlert Feb 20, 2024

Outgunned Ukraine bets on drones as Russian invasion enters third year

By Mykola Bielieskov

As Putin’s invasion passes the two-year mark, tech-savvy Ukraine is betting on drones as the best way to overcome Russia’s increasingly overwhelming advantage in traditional firepower, writes Mykola Bielieskov.

Civil Society Conflict

UkraineAlert Mar 14, 2024

Ukraine’s Security Council Secretary: The West is still in denial over Russia

By Peter Dickinson

Western leaders have yet to grasp the true scale of the threat posed by Putin’s Russia and are in danger of suffering an history defeat, warns the Secretary of Ukraine’s Security and Defense Council Oleksiy Danilov.

Conflict Disinformation

UkraineAlert Feb 22, 2024

Ukrainian long-range drones target Putin’s war machine inside Russia

By Victoria Vdovychenko, Alexander Khara

Ukraine is hoping a new campaign of long-range drone strikes against Russia’s strategically vital oil and gas industry can help weaken Putin’s war machine, write Victoria Vdovychenko and Alexander Khara.

Conflict Defense Technologies

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

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UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia and Central Asia in the East.

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The post Ukraine’s partners should link wartime aid to continued reform progress appeared first on Atlantic Council.

One challenge has remained constant for Haiti, however: It fades from attention just as quickly as it makes headlines. That must be stopped. The historical lack of commitment to putting Haiti on a different political and economic path—combined with the country being battered by natural disasters, in addition to the man-made ones—has meant that carving out a different trajectory for Haitians has eluded both local and international leaders. What is needed is a long-term approach, in which Caribbean leaders are in the driver’s seat along with their Haitian counterparts, while the United States and Canada help to offset the costs given the grave implications of inaction.

A window of opportunity

When Haitian Prime Minister Ariel Henry announced on March 12 that he will resign after a transitional presidential council is created, it opened a window of opportunity for a country battling multiple crises at once. Since Henry assumed power in 2021, following his predecessor’s assassination, Haiti has been taken hostage by fervent gang violence and political instability, plunging the country into a humanitarian crisis. With not enough food or medicine entering the country, Haitians suffer from hunger and disease.

Haiti’s problems are also no longer confined to its own borders. Haitians are emigrating in droves, and gangs that now control the island traffic firearms and drugs in the wider region. With the likelihood of further instability, Haiti’s neighbors must prepare for the repercussions of a failed state, where lawlessness will only invite other transnational criminal organizations to take advantage of the moment.

But amid this bleak outlook, the negotiated transitional presidential council gives a glimmer of hope that Haiti might see some form of stability in the coming years. Bringing the council and other potential solutions to fruition will require a sustained and collective effort from all parties across the hemisphere, including Haitian stakeholders.

The role of Caribbean countries

Caribbean leadership will be essential for coordinating regional and international support to Haiti. Central to this coordination should be the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), a bloc of fourteen independent member states that already has offered an open, two-way channel of communication between regional countries and Haitian stakeholders.

For example, just prior to his trip to Nairobi earlier this month to discuss the Kenyan-led Multinational Security Support mission, the Haitian prime minister was in Guyana for CARICOM’s annual heads of government meeting. It was also the current chair of CARICOM, Guyanese President Irfaan Ali, who led a leaders’ delegation to Jamaica that, alongside US Secretary of State Antony Blinken, announced the plan for a transitional presidential council. These meetings have held a spotlight on Haiti’s crisis, keeping it top of mind for both the region and foreign officials who engage with the Caribbean. In addition, Jamaica, Antigua and Barbuda, The Bahamas, and several other Caribbean countries have been essential in global coordination efforts on Haiti over the past few years.

But for Caribbean countries to continue leading on Haiti in a sustained way, they need resources. Engaging in frequent diplomatic discussions and devoting security personnel are cost-intensive efforts. The region has limited local capacity within its foreign ministries, and tight budgets make frequent travel difficult. Leaders also are grappling with a variety of pressing issues, including climate change, food and energy insecurity, and rising inflation.

The role of the United States and Canada

The United States and Canada must work in tandem with the Caribbean to provide the resources needed to play an active and continued role in Haiti’s future. This includes direct aid to Haiti to help restore law and order and provide the necessary humanitarian resources the country so desperately needs. Toward that end, the United States Agency for International Development on March 15 announced twenty-five million dollars in humanitarian aid, on top of the thirty-three million dollars announced by Blinken four days earlier, further solidifying the United States’ role as Haiti’s largest humanitarian donor. On February 22, Canada announced nearly ninety-one million dollars to support Haiti.

In addition to direct support, the United States and Canada should also help to offset the cost to Caribbean countries of remaining engaged on Haiti, which is essential for the country’s future.

First, traveling to Haiti or to other international convenings is costly, particularly when unplanned. Air connectivity between Caribbean islands is limited, and most governments do not have access to private aircraft. The United States or Canada can find ways to offset these costs, making it easier for leaders to attend convenings. Short-notice meetings, such as the ministerial meeting on the margins of the Group of Twenty (G20) foreign ministers’ meeting in late February or the Jamaica meeting this past week, should be led by CARICOM governments. But the cost of participation will constrain already tight budgets.

Second, deployment of security personnel is costly, particularly over a sustained period. The United States and Canada should consider alleviating the burden of these costs, which would allow leaders to justify to their national budgets and domestic populations why they should send or increase the police and defense personnel deployed to Haiti. Countries such as Jamaica and The Bahamas have committed personnel, but both countries have their own domestic security challenges to consider, meaning sending officers abroad is unlikely to win much support at home over a longer period. 

Finally, attention on Haiti cannot distract from the numerous challenges facing the rest of the region. Over the past few years, the United States and Canada have both launched new flagship Caribbean policies, and high-level diplomatic engagements have started to move the needle on important issues, including climate change and energy security. If Caribbean nations are expected to lead, then they need assurances that their priorities will not be forgotten.

What’s clear is that there is no quick fix to Haiti’s crisis, nor is there one solution over a longer period that will stabilize the country. Haiti’s challenges are complex and deeply rooted in its postcolonial history. Any cadre of solutions will only come after frequent and consistent diplomacy and action to negotiate a way forward for Haiti. All of this requires the resources to stand up the needed attention and engagement Haiti deserves.

Jason Marczak is vice president and senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center. 

Wazim Mowla is associate director and fellow of the Caribbean Initiative at the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center.

The post Addressing Haiti’s turmoil starts with its Caribbean neighbors—and US and Canadian support appeared first on Atlantic Council.

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There will be very little suspense surrounding Russia’s presidential election this month. Vladimir Putin will certainly win a fifth term as Kremlin leader. This is because Russian elections are not elections. Instead, they are mobilization and legitimization rituals in which the results are preordained. And even such a shock as opposition leader Alexei Navalny’s death probably won’t change this.

But the lack of suspense surrounding the result of the vote does not mean that it will not be meaningful. On the contrary, this ritual is a political watershed that will determine the landscape in Russia for years to come—and possibly what Russia will look like after Putin finally passes from the scene. That is because, in the absence of institutions, Russian politics are effectively court politics, dominated by the clan battles within the Kremlin leader’s inner circle.

What is the state of the “Putin court?” And how has Russia’s war against Ukraine influenced the clan battles that define it? Why does the Kremlin seek to leverage traditional conservative values and the Russian Orthodox Church? This report is based on extensive interviews with dozens of current and former Russian officials who spoke on condition of anonymity to discuss the inner workings of the Kremlin power elite without fear of reprisals.

The prime minister and his team

The most important question surrounding the election is not who is going to be the president, but rather who is going to become the prime minister. Once he is elected president for a new term, Putin will have an excuse to dismiss the government and form a new one. And under the Russian Federation’s constitution, the prime minister is the second in command—the one who will become the next president if Putin dies or is otherwise incapacitated. The current prime minister is Mikhail Mishustin, who assumed the role in January 2020. According to the constitution, he would become president if Putin passed from the scene.

Therefore, a key question is whether Putin will replace Mishustin. The incumbent prime minister, of course, is doing everything possible to remain in office. His main disadvantage is that he is not sufficiently connected to the war. He is too much of a technocrat, which is what Putin’s ideal prime minister in 2020 was supposed to be—a faceless bureaucrat who follows orders perfectly, knows how to deal with the economy, and has a reputation as an effective manager without political ambitions. But the past year has changed everything.

When Russia launched its full-scale invasion in February 2022, the idea was that the war should be discreet, quick, and victorious. And despite mounting evidence to the contrary, the Kremlin refused to believe that this was impossible. By 2023, however, it became obvious that the strategy had to change. Now it’s called a holy war against the West, a clash of civilizations, and a war for the survival of the Russian people. To be sure, there is a lot of exaggerated drama in this new paradigm, and initially no one took it seriously. But by the end of 2023, the Russian political elite began to assimilate it, and some even started believing it. For a Russia that is waging a holy war, Mishustin is not suitable—he is too liberal. That’s the main argument in favor of replacing him, the most prominent proponent of which is Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev.

Mishustin does have an important advantage, and it is the same as his main disadvantage: He is not trying to be associated with the war, he is not trying to be in the spotlight, and he is behaving exactly as an exemplary Putin prime minister should. But many in Putin’s inner circle believe that Mishustin has been too successful a prime minister to remain in office. His government handled the COVID-19 crisis, and some argue that he helped save the country from economic collapse in 2022. Therefore, to prevent Mishustin from becoming too powerful as a political figure, according to Putin’s logic, he should be removed.

Who would replace him? Of all the members of the current government, one name stands out: Marat Khusnullin, one of the most influential political figures in Russia. Khusnullin is the deputy prime minister in charge of construction, meaning he oversees rebuilding the Russian-occupied Ukrainian regions. That means he controls large budgets and is a key patron of the new elites in the occupied parts of the Donbas. It also means that he is on the rise regardless of Mishustin’s fate.

The prince and his father

Who else could be the new prime minister? And would that figure be Putin’s potential successor? If we go by Putin’s old practices, it will be someone who is not regarded as a contender for the post of prime minister—because the Russian president is maniacally fond of surprises.

Nevertheless, there are a few influential front-runners. And the first of these is Minister of Agriculture Dmitry Patrushev, the son of a longtime Putin associate who was the head of the Federal Security Service (FSB) and now serves as the Security Council secretary. The appointment of the younger Patrushev, however, would mean only one thing—his father, Nikolai, has become so influential that he has managed to appoint his son as heir to the throne. With a sane and capable Putin, such an option is hardly possible—as this could be his last decision.

It is noteworthy that such a transition of power from Putin to Patrushev is even predicted in popular fiction. In Vladimir Sorokin’s 2006 cult novel, The Day of the Oprichnik, Russia is completely isolated from the outside world. An almost medieval monarchy has been established and is ruled by the son of Nikolai Platonovich (which is Patrushev’s first name and patronymic).

Nikolai Patrushev is indeed one of the most influential people in modern Russia. And his importance has only increased since the war began. It is often Patrushev who makes the most important foreign policy statements. Patrushev is the ideologue of modern Russian anti-Americanism. Last September he published an article entitled “The Collapse of the Parasite States,” in which he essentially laid out Russia’s new foreign policy doctrine: It should unite with the countries of the Global South and fight against the neocolonial West.

Patrushev’s influence has also recently become the subject of curious rumors: For example, a popular Russian conspiracy theorist, Valery Solovey, claims that the real Putin died in October 2023 and that Patrushev is running the country, using Putin’s doppelgänger. (Sources in Moscow, however, treat this as disinformation launched by the Russian security services to discredit the Russian independent media in exile by baiting them into rebroadcasting delusional conspiracies.)

In addition, it was Patrushev who was named in a recent Wall Street Journal investigation as the organizer of Yevgeny Prigozhin’s killing in August 2023, an account Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov likened to “pulp fiction.” However, according to sources, Patrushev is not in a position to directly command the army or the FSB. His main strength lies in his influence on Putin.

The FSB, in turn, is a colossal iceberg, a state within a state, which influences everything, primarily economic processes in the country. The FSB is the most important player in any region, the most important partner for any large corporation. However, the FSB does not seem to engage directly in political initiatives. The most important generals of the FSB—its director, Alexander Bortnikov; his first deputy, Sergei Korolev; and the head of the FSB’s so-called second service (Russia’s modern secret police), Aleksey Sedov—are not independent political players. They have constant contact with Putin, and enjoy some influence over him, but will remain inside the structure.

The strategist and his patron

One Kremlin figure who is likely to be a key political player is Sergei Kiriyenko, the first deputy chief of staff in charge of all domestic politics. Kiriyenko is also responsible for the presidential elections this month. This means that Kiriyenko’s office will decide which candidates will be allowed to run, how the campaign will go, and how many votes the candidates will get.

Whether or not Putin views the elections as a success will determine whether Kiriyenko will retain his position or not. He has overseen domestic policy in the Kremlin for six years and has proven himself to be an effective and completely unscrupulous Kremlin strategist. But after this election, a variety of sources in Moscow say, he could be replaced. And that could mean the beginning of a new era in Russian politics.

Despite being just sixty-one years old, Kiriyenko is one of the most remarkable survivors in Russian politics. His career peaked in April 1998, when Russia’s first president, Boris Yeltsin, shockingly appointed the then-unknown thirty-five-year-old Kiriyenko as prime minister. It was a decision so unexpected (and ill-conceived) that the young Kiriyenko immediately earned the nickname “Kinder Surprise.” His premiership turned out to be the shortest and most unsuccessful in Russian history. His government defaulted on the government’s debts, and he resigned in August 1998.

Kiriyenko then became the head of the liberal Union of Right Forces political party. Boris Nemtsov, one of the most popular Russian democrats of the 1990s, was the number two on that party’s list. After Putin was first elected president in March 2000, Kiriyenko did not continue his political career, instead leaving parliament and becoming a bureaucrat again. For eleven years, he headed the state-owned corporation Rosatom, which manages all of Russia’s nuclear power plants. And in 2016—a year and a half after Nemtsov had been shot dead across the street from the Kremlin—Putin unexpectedly brought Kiriyenko back to the Kremlin as supervisor of Russian domestic policy.

Throughout his years in power, Kiriyenko has demonstrated that he is extremely loyal to Putin and that he is a technocrat without any beliefs or values. Kiriyenko was also keen to demonstrate that he had no political ambitions—after all, ambition was the reason why the Kremlin’s previous chief political strategist, Vyacheslav Volodin, was fired. Volodin wanted so badly to succeed Putin and made little secret of his desire; in 2016, he was demoted to the far lesser position of chair of the State Duma, the lower chamber of the Russian parliament.

Kiriyenko has a very powerful patron, Putin’s closest friend, Yuri Kovalchuk, the most powerful businessman in the country. It was Kovalchuk who lobbied for Kiriyenko’s appointment as domestic policy curator in 2016. Kovalchuk is, according to the US government, “the personal banker for senior officials of the Russian Federation including Putin.”

Kovalchuk is the only real Russian oligarch—that is, a businessman who seriously influences Putin. He became a major player in Russian politics after he managed to put his man, Kiriyenko, in a key position in the Kremlin. However, his role grew even stronger in 2020, when the pandemic prompted Putin to go into a strict quarantine while vacationing with Kovalchuk at the presidential residence in Valdai, between Moscow and Saint Petersburg.

Kovalchuk is the owner of a bank with the symbolic name Rossiya. He also manages almost all of Russia’s nominally private but de facto state-controlled media, including the Channel One television station. Kovalchuk has been close friends with Putin since the early 1990s, and in 1996 the two of them and a few friends co-founded the Ozero dacha cooperative near Saint Petersburg. By 2020, Kovalchuk had finally established himself as the most influential member of the president’s inner circle.

Although Kovalchuk owns key media outlets, the Kremlin has two officials in charge of state propaganda, per long-standing tradition. Alexei Gromov, Putin’s former press secretary, oversees traditional media (i.e., television), while Kiriyenko oversees new media (i.e., the internet). Kiriyenko’s son, Vladimir, is CEO of Russia’s most important digital holding company, VK. It is the younger Kiriyenko who oversees the process of luring Russian audiences away from YouTube to domestic platforms.

Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the importance of both Kovalchuk and Kiriyenko in Russian politics has dramatically increased. Kovalchuk still communicates regularly with Putin, while many officials who were considered close to the president have lost their access to him. And Kiriyenko’s role has expanded, too. In addition to domestic policy, he is now in charge of politics in the four Ukrainian regions currently occupied by Russia.

Kiriyenko is also the Kremlin’s chief personnel officer, selecting Russia’s governors. In this capacity, Kiriyenko has cultivated a new generation of regional officials—most of whom are under sixty—a potential source of power and influence. And he established the so-called governors’ school, an ideological training center for aspiring regional elites.

Kiriyenko’s growing influence has attracted the attention of his political enemies, most notably his Kremlin predecessor Volodin and powerful players in the security services led by the elder Patrushev. They are trying to undermine Kiriyenko by suggesting to Putin that he dreams of returning to the prime minister’s post. Kremlin sources say the deputy head of the presidential administration dreams of correcting past mistakes, getting rid of the humiliating nickname “Kinder Surprise,” and proving that he can be an effective head of government. However, Kiriyenko’s chances of becoming prime minister are nil. He could lose his high post if Putin decides that Kiriyenko has become too influential—and not even Kovalchuk would be able to protect him in that case.

Just before the new year, Kiriyenko stole Volodin’s favorite topic. Previously, it had been the speaker of the Duma who usually acted as the main champion of “traditional values” and fighter against the LGBTQI+ community. But in December 2023, it was Kiriyenko who led a campaign against several pop stars who attended a controversial “naked party,” a scandalous event that dominated Russian news coverage late in the year.

The far right and the Russian Orthodox Church

Russia’s war against Ukraine has greatly increased the influence of the Russian Orthodox Church and its head, Patriarch Kirill. Though he had been akin to an ordinary head of a state corporation—the church is constitutionally separate from the state, but has become a de facto bureaucratic structure dependent on the state—Patriarch Kirill is now a member of Putin’s informal Politburo.

His elevation was symbolized by the recent World Russian People’s Council, a nationalist gathering that proclaimed the supremacy of the Russian ethnicity, called for a fight against migration, and demanded a ban on abortion—all in the same Kremlin hall where the Soviet Union’s Communist Party congresses were once held.

The World Russian People’s Council was once considered a marginal organization. It was established thirty years ago under the Russian Orthodox Church with Patriarch Kirill as its chairman. In 2019, the council tapped as its deputy chairman Konstantin Malofeyev, described by the US Justice Department as a “Kremlin-linked Russian oligarch” who personally helped finance Russia’s initial invasion of Ukraine’s Donbas region in 2014. Malofeyev, who has never hidden his neofascist views, has run the far-right television station Tsargrad TV since 2013. However, the most famous figure on the Russian far right is not Malofeyev but his ally, Alexander Dugin, the neofascist philosopher and former editor-in-chief of Tsargrad TV.

This 2023 Council included “working groups” attended by Dugin, Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova, more than a dozen governors, several ministers, and several leading officials of the Russian Orthodox Church. In other words, for the first time, the unofficial but de facto Russian fascist party showed its face.

For many years, Western political scientists have written about Dugin’s strong influence on Putin—even though it appears that the two men have never met in person. Nevertheless, his ideology has finally become official because it is now used by the head of the Russian Orthodox Church.

During the 2023 World Russian People’s Council, Patriarch Kirill proposed a new Russian doctrine that can fairly be described as fascist. He claimed that there are superior nations (that can create empires) and second-class nations (that cannot). He stated that today’s “Russian world,” which asserts that Russia has the right to rule over the lands of the former Russian empire, is a continuation of a long tradition following the pax Romana, pax Hispanica, pax Britannica, and pax Americana. He argued that Russia should restrict the flow of incoming migrants, because many of them do not respect Russian culture. Then he urged the banning of abortion to alleviate Russia’s demographic decline.

Contrary to conventional wisdom in the West, the Russian Orthodox Church is not an important social or spiritual institution in Russia. According to surveys by the independent sociological service Levada Center, on average only 1 percent of Russians go to church on Sundays, and more than 65 percent of the population believes that religion does not play a significant role in their lives. Yet Putin’s regime is doing everything to strengthen the church as a political institution. Earlier this year, for example, one of the most famous icons in Russia, a work by fifteenth-century artist Andrei Rublev, was moved from the Tretyakov Gallery to the Cathedral of Christ the Savior. Pilgrims are now taken by bus from neighboring regions and long lines of believers can be seen, as they wait to view the icon in the cathedral. Before the new year, however, when the icon was hanging in the Tretyakov Gallery, there was no queue.

Putin is less interested in the church as such and more interested in popularizing far-right rhetoric. In this sense, the proposed abortion ban and the campaign against the LGBTQI+ community fits a broader Kremlin political strategy of advancing an illiberal agenda to win Putin supporters in the Global South and among Western conservatives. This is a very pragmatic plan—and it basically doesn’t matter that no one in Putin’s entourage seriously cares about these issues. The Kremlin believes that liberal values are a tool of the West, so it tries to use the opposite rhetoric to fight the West, especially since so-called traditional values are gaining more and more supporters not only in the Global South, but also in Europe and the United States.

Despite this, no far-right politicians have been allowed to participate in the upcoming presidential elections. Putin is the only candidate to use this populist rhetoric.

The army and its clones

From the very beginning of the war, Putin was afraid of the growing popularity of the army. He did not want his generals to get too much social support. This was why Prigozhin and his Wagner Group got the initial assignment of a major role in the conflict. According to Kremlin sources, Putin instructed Prigozhin to neutralize Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu and his generals—to criticize them through the media, trolls, and bots under his control. However, the result exceeded expectations. Prigozhin became so enthusiastic that he himself became that very military commander who gained popularity at Putin’s expense.

Along with Prigozhin, radical supporters of the war—ultranationalists who criticized Putin for his lack of decisiveness and resolve—began to grow in popularity. After Prigozhin’s mutiny in the summer of 2023, these elements were purged. For example, Igor Girkin, aka Strelkov, the army and FSB veteran who led Russian paramilitary forces in eastern Ukraine in 2014, was charged with extremism last year and in January was convicted and sentenced to four years in prison. Prigozhin’s death in an airplane crash widely believed to have been orchestrated by the Kremlin removed him and the Wagner Group from the scene. The elite tried to forget about the troublesome mercenary leader, as if he had never existed. A new status quo has been adopted: No more private armies; everything must be under the control of the state and the defense ministry. All military spending passes through Shoigu. And no generals become public figures or folk heroes.

There is, however, an important figure with a military background who appears to be a rising political star—a possible prime minister or defense minister, and a potential successor to Putin: Aleksey Dyumin, Putin’s former bodyguard, who has served as governor of the Tula region since 2016.

In 2014, at the head of the “special operations forces” (a structure within the Ministry of Defense), Dyumin played a key role in the occupation and annexation of Crimea. As deputy defense minister, Dyumin also supervised the establishment of the Wagner Group. And, according to sources, it was Dyumin who played an important role in negotiations between Prigozhin and the Kremlin during the infamous mutiny of June 24, 2023. Notably, it was in Tula Oblast, a region controlled by Dyumin, where Prigozhin’s troops stopped their march toward Moscow and turned around.

For years, Dyumin was Putin’s personal aide, one of the president’s closest and most trusted people. He has been a governor for nearly a decade and has proven his loyalty to Putin, which means he could be in Moscow next year.

The former successor and Mr. Hyde

A man who does not aspire to be prime minister or the Kremlin’s chief ideologue but is still a prominent figure in the power structure is Dmitry Medvedev. Over the past two years, the former president and prime minister has emerged as one of the most puzzling—and disturbing—figures in Putin’s inner circle.

A onetime liberal technocrat, a fan of gadgets and high tech, and an erstwhile buddy of then US President Barack Obama, Medvedev once seemed to be a democrat. Then, suddenly, like a werewolf, he has turned into a bloodthirsty boor threatening Ukraine and the West with the language of a gangster. What happened to Medvedev? While some media reports have suggested chronic drunkenness, that is not the case, according to several informed sources. Instead, this shift is a matter of cold political calculation. Today’s Russia requires such a transformation.

While still president, Medvedev was the object of universal ridicule—his nickname on the internet was “pathetic.” Videos of him dancing ridiculously or photos showing him sleeping at public events, including the opening and closing of the Olympic Games, were circulated online.

Until January 2020, Medvedev still hoped he would be Putin’s successor. From 2012 until early 2020, he behaved like Putin’s model prime minister, much like Mishustin behaves now. Medvedev kept his head down and said nothing at all, although, unlike Mishustin, he did almost nothing.

In January 2020, Putin unexpectedly fired Medvedev as premier, inventing for him the previously nonexistent position of deputy chairman of the security council. No one knew it at the time, but the following month the COVID-19 pandemic would come, and Medvedev’s departure as prime minister saved him from wrestling with that crisis. Still, his hopes of succeeding Putin appeared to be dead.

But the invasion of Ukraine two years later awakened Medvedev from his hibernation. “Dmitry the Pathetic” suddenly transformed into “Dmitry the Terrible.” Medvedev’s once intelligent and thoughtful Telegram channel suddenly became a model of monstrous rudeness. Speaking about US President Joe Biden, Medvedev writes that he is “an old man with clear signs of progressive dementia” and that his family is corrupt. He writes that European leaders have diarrhea from fear of Russia. And here’s what he wrote on January 3: “We never liked the French. Kind of froggy, fought with us. And generally, fa**ots. And [now I’m] convinced of it. I wrote the French Foreign Ministry. They called the strike on Belgorod with cluster munition a ‘right to self-defense.’ Scum. Sons of a whore. Assholes.”

In fact, according to sources close to Medvedev, most of these posts were not written by him (probably excluding the last one). With the outbreak of the war, a huge staff of new consultants and speechwriters has been hired for him to build up his militaristic and imperialistic bona fides.

The creation of a new image of Medvedev—not as a liberal, but as an obscurantist—is linked to his hopes of regaining the presidency. Medvedev remembers that in 2011, before he departed the presidency, Putin assured him that he would be the president again. So, he believes there is a chance. In 2022, sources say, Putin again hinted to Medvedev that the plan is on track—that he just must be a strong politician who fits the historical moment. This came shortly after the April 2022 death of Vladimir Zhirinovsky, the most militant populist in Russian politics. Medvedev understood he had to take up Zhirinovsky’s mantle if he wanted to be popular.

In recent years, Medvedev has done exactly what he thought he could do to regain the presidency. As prime minister, he sat quietly and inconspicuously, not interfering with anyone, so as not to make new enemies and not to upset Putin. Then the time of inactivity passed. Medvedev now believes that he needs to be aggressive and belligerent. This is Medvedev’s cold calculation for the post-war future. Medvedev is not alone in the race; boorishness and imperialism have already become the default tone in Russian politics (Russian diplomats, for example, do not miss opportunities to swear). But Medvedev is clearly trying harder than anyone else.

It is ironic that the mouthpiece of today’s Russian fascism is a man who was once considered the hope of democracy. There is no doubt that Medvedev has no political future. He no longer has his own team, and even those who used to be close to him have turned their backs on him. He could not earn the trust of the intelligentsia even when he was president, and he cannot earn the trust of the imperialists, who consider him a weakling. And most importantly, he cannot be Putin’s successor because he would not exist politically without Putin. A puppet does not function without a puppeteer.

Lurking liberals

The largest clan in the Russian government is, oddly enough, the so-called systemic liberals. This is the name given to those who served under former President Boris Yeltsin in the 1990s or have advocated a pro-Western course for Russia, yet at the same time have broadly supported Putin. This faction, despite appearances to the contrary, still holds a very important place in the Russian political elite. The camp of “systemic liberals” enjoyed its peak of influence during the Medvedev presidency, from 2008 to 2012, but their sway has ebbed significantly in the decade since.

Liberals have never been a single clan, but rather several disparate groups that may only partially consider themselves like-minded. The most prominent liberals in Russia in the past were Anatoly Chubais (former deputy prime minister and finance minister under Yeltsin) and Anatoly Kudrin (former deputy prime minister and finance minister under Putin). After the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Chubais left the country and Kudrin left public service, resigning as head of the Accounts Chamber to became head of Russia’s main tech company, Yandex.

However, a significant number of Russian officials in charge of the economy can still be considered liberals, most notably the current finance minister, Anton Siluanov, and the central bank head, Elvira Nabiullina. Typical of systemic liberals, they never express their opinion if it contradicts Putin’s, and they will never argue with the president. It is true that Nabiullina was going to resign after the attack on Ukraine, but Putin would not accept her resignation. After that, she is widely believed to have saved the Russian financial system from disaster following Western sanctions.

After the war began, the FSB (with the tacit consent of former liberal Kiriyenko) began a demonstrative crackdown on liberals. The arrest and eventual release of Vladimir Mau, rector of the Russian Academy of National Economy and Public Administration, the very university in which the “Kiriyenko school of governors” was established, was indicative. Ten years ago, Mau, together with Yaroslav Kuzminov, rector of the Moscow Higher School of Economics (and husband of Nabiullina), was commissioned by Putin to write Strategy 2020, an ambitious plan for the development of the Russian economy. Back then, before the annexation of Crimea, there was a strong conviction that Russia’s future lay in a liberal market economy, innovation, and overcoming dependence on raw materials. Systemic liberals rationalized Russia’s authoritarian political system, arguing that they needed to be patient and implement economic reforms first. Mau was one of the main proponents of this approach.

What do the systemic liberals believe? A key tenet seems to be tolerance of Putin, despite his authoritarian policies, for the sake of maintaining their power and influence. Even as the economy has become more and more state-centric and the political system more autocratic, “systemic liberals” have generally remained stoic.

Sometimes it seemed that the real reason for the silence and patience of the “systemic liberals” was their unwillingness to break away from the trough—their attempt to maintain their proximity to power. Perhaps they convinced themselves that they were sacrificing themselves for the future of Russia, even if that meant working side by side with the FSB.

The result of this stoic patience, however, has been escalating repression against the systemic liberals and the steady decline of their influence. In 2016, former Economics Minister Alexei Ulyukayev was humiliatingly arrested and jailed until April 2022. The campaign against the Higher School of Economics (HSE), the most popular and high-quality university in Russia, was next. Its rector, Kuzminov, was allowed to resign quietly. This is important because the HSE not only influences young minds, but is a colossal property with hundreds of buildings in Moscow and across the country. After Kuzminov’s departure, the changes began lightning fast—during the past few years, all professors who demonstrated their liberal beliefs were fired from his university.

Another battleground against the liberals has been Russian culture. In the last two years, the heads of most of the important theaters and all the most important museums have been fired in what appeared to be an effort to prevent the cultural elite from protesting the war—or to pressure them into supporting it.

Against the background of the general defeat of the liberal camp, however, there are still figures who look independent and relatively liberal. One of these is Roman Abramovich, who has been one of the most influential businessmen for more than twenty-five years. Despite his wealth, Abramovich has long shunned publicity, preferring to remain in the shadow of others—be it the late oligarch Boris Berezovsky, Yeltsin’s son-in-law Valentin Yumashev, or former head of presidential administration Alexander Voloshin. It was only with the outbreak of war in 2022 that Abramovich began to act openly and on his own behalf, becoming the most active supporter of negotiations between Russia and Ukraine. He was one of the most important mediators at the beginning of the war. Recently, he began to play a role in negotiating the exchange of prisoners and the return of children taken from Ukraine. In essence, Abramovich began his new political career out of desperation. But at the moment, he is probably the only Russian liberal who can call Putin—and whom Putin will listen to.

There is one more person who is not quite a liberal but who now looks like the public leader of that camp—and that, paradoxically, is Moscow Mayor Sergei Sobyanin. Formally, of course, he does not belong to the Yeltsin reformers, but in the 1990s he was governor of the oil-rich region of Tyumen and won several democratic elections, which distinguishes him from all other current politicians.

Sobyanin has always been seen as both a liberal ally and a technocrat. In 2020, at the beginning of the pandemic, the federal authorities withdrew and the mayor of Moscow took the initiative—while the other regions obediently introduced the same measures as Moscow. Thus, for several months, the Moscow mayor led Russia’s COVID-19 response, while Putin and Kovalchuk hid at Valdai.

When it was all over, it became clear that the Kremlin would not forgive Sobyanin for his independence and efficiency: In authoritarian countries, this is not an achievement but a crime. Then it was decided that Sobyanin would serve his last term and leave. But the war saved him. In the current situation, the last thing the Kremlin wanted was to anger Muscovites, and Sobyanin was again reelected in 2023. He is undeniably a symbol of stability. Despite the war, Moscow is becoming richer and more comfortable, and this is associated exclusively with Sobyanin. In this sense, Sobyanin is a symbol of peaceful life—a man from the past who sort of acts as if there is no war. This automatically makes him the leader of liberals nostalgic for prewar times.

A new system

For many years, there was such a thing as the “2024 problem” in Russia. It was believed that in 2024, Putin would no longer be eligible for reelection, so he would have to decide on a successor. However, in 2020, at the height of the pandemic, Putin held a referendum to change the constitution and “zeroed” his past presidential terms for the purpose of term limits. That means he is running for a “first” term this month. And legally he can remain president until 2036—when he would be eighty-three years old.

The real problem of 2024, however, has not gone away. Since the invasion of Ukraine, the old political system that was based on cronyism and corruption has become obsolete. Officials speak about a holy war and keeping the country on a war footing, so it seems the Russian state can no longer be built on cynical, corrupt hedonism. It seems like the only true idealists are those Russians who paid tribute to Navalny. They do have values they believe in.

It is true that the most influential people of this regime, Vladimir Putin and Yuri Kovalchuk, are still adherents of the old system based on cynicism and hedonism, while seeming to desire the creation of an Orthodox Christian version of an Iran-style theocracy. But this will not happen easily, because almost no one believes in these values: neither Kiriyenko’s young technocrats, nor FSB officers, nor lurking liberals. Moreover, Russian bureaucrats don’t believe in anything at all. The last decades have convinced them all that they ought to stop believing in anything. It’s safer that way.

Mikhail Zygar is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center. He is a journalist, writer, and filmmaker, and the founding editor-in-chief of Russia’s only independent news television channel, Dozhd (TVRain).

Under Zygar’s leadership, Dozhd provided an alternative to Kremlin-controlled federal television channels by focusing on news content and giving a platform to opposition voices. The channel’s coverage of politically sensitive issues, like the Moscow street protests in 2011 and 2012 as well as the conflict in Ukraine, has been dramatically different from the official coverage by Russia’s national television stations. In 2014, Zygar received the CPJ International Press Freedom Award.

Zygar’s bestseller All the Kremlin’s Men (2015) is based on an unprecedented series of interviews with Russian President Vladimir Putin’s inner circle, presenting a radically different view of power and politics in Russia. Time named it “one of nine books to understand Russia.” His book The Empire Must Die (2017) portrays the years leading up to the Russian revolution and the vivid drama of Russia’s brief and exotic experiment with civil society before it was swept away by the Communist Revolution. It was named a Kirkus Reviews Best Nonfiction Book of the Year. His latest book, War and Punishment: Putin, Zelensky, and the Path to Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine, was published in 2023 and was featured on the New Yorker’s list of the best books of the year.

In February 2022, after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Zygar authored a petition against the invasion cosigned by Russia’s most prominent writers, artists, and scholars. In March 2022, he organized the only interview of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy for the independent Russian media. He has also started his own Substack, where he writes regularly.

In 2023, Zygar moved to New York. He’s now a press freedom fellow at the City University of New York’s Craig Newmark School of Journalism and is a visiting professor at Princeton University’s School of Public and International Affairs.

Zygar is openly gay and is married to African-Russian journalist Jean Michel Shcherbak.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to promote policies that strengthen stability, democratic values, and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe in the West to the Caucasus, Russia, and Central Asia in the East.

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Conflict Disinformation

The post All the autocrat’s men: The court politics of Putin’s inner circle appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On March 5, after weeks of speculation over when the presidential election might be scheduled, Venezuela’s National Electoral Council (CNE) announced that the vote will be held on July 28. Both the timing of the announcement and the election date were no coincidence. March 5 was the anniversary of the death of Hugo Chávez, strongman Nicolás Maduro’s predecessor and founder of the ruling United Socialist Party, and July 28 is his birthday. Venezuela’s Unitary Platform opposition coalition now faces the difficult task of coming up with a united strategy ahead of the election in which the deeply unpopular Maduro will have an unfair systematic advantage–and the symbolism of the announcement shows Maduro has no shame in letting that be known.

The clock is ticking. According to the electoral timetable announced by the CNE, the opposition has until March 25 to register a candidate in the election. While it can name a placeholder to buy time and reserve a slot on the ballot, the name of the candidate that will appear on voting day must be finalized by April 20.

María Corina Machado, the winner of the opposition primary held five months ago, remains banned from participating in the presidential election. While the Barbados Agreement that the government signed in October 2023 with the opposition announced the creation of a “procedure” to review bans on interested candidates, the Maduro-friendly Supreme Court has doubled down on Machado’s ban. The CNE’s own website makes clear that she is banned from participating in any elections until 2036.

In the face of this reality, there are competing views on the way forward for Venezuela’s opposition. Machado has publicly rejected the government’s ban and insisted at campaign events around the country that she will run anyway. However, reports began surfacing since late in 2023 that she is more flexible in private and would be open to naming a successor if she ultimately could not run. Her public position remains firm, however, and at an Atlantic Council event on February 26, she acknowledged that she is holding her cards close to her vest. Although she said that she remains committed to “the electoral route,” she refused outright to reject the possibility of calling for abstention. Yet polls suggest an electoral boycott, such as the ones the mainstream opposition organized in the 2018 presidential election, would be deeply unpopular. According to a recent survey by the independent Caracas-based pollster Datincorp, 70 percent of Venezuelans say that if her ban remains in place, then Machado should name an alternate candidate to run instead.

In addition to being unpopular, calling for an electoral boycott would likely exacerbate divisions within the Unitary Platform that have long simmered under the surface. While some elements of the opposition coalition have rejected any talk of a substitute candidate, others have hinted that they will move to a “plan B” with or without Machado. The opposition governor of Barinas state, who himself won a deeply unfair election after the previous opposition winner had been banned from taking office, said in January: “Our position has always been clear, we are not going to stop for her [Machado], we will choose among all of us a new candidate, to be the president of all Venezuelans.” There have been reports that some members of the coalition are calling for Zulia state governor Manuel Rosales to be named as the alternate candidate.

The apparent willingness of some coalition members to field a candidate essentially guarantees that someone from the Unitary Platform will run for president in the July 28 election. The only question is whether it will be a united front. However reticent Machado may be to accept the idea of a substitute, it is almost certain that she would not endorse one who attempts to go around her back. And given her overwhelming popularity—Datincorp suggests she would beat Maduro by 40 points in a head-to-head match—Machado’s backing is essential for any replacement to stand a chance on July 28. With the deck stacked against it, the opposition needs every vote.

That leaves only one viable choice: Find a consensus candidate that has the full backing of the entire opposition spectrum, starting with Machado herself. This is easier said than done, but there is a way to ensure that a “plan B” scenario respects the outcome of the opposition primary and harnesses Machado’s popularity at the same time. In Venezuela, like in the United States, the vice president is next in the line of succession. Unlike the United States, however, candidates for vice president do not appear on the ballot. The position is appointed directly by the chief executive. Machado could, in theory, support a placeholder candidate—or a series of placeholder candidates, in the case that they face bans as well—with the understanding that this trusted individual would name her as vice president upon winning, and then resign from office. This would trigger new elections, or it would allow the vice president to assume the role of head of state if the resignation occurred in the last two years of the term.

This strategy would allow Machado to cement her image as not just a candidate, but as the leader of a broad and diverse majority of Venezuelans working to restore the country’s democratic institutions. Working alongside a renewed Unitary Platform coalition, she could energize and mobilize Venezuelans across the country, creating the best opportunity that the opposition has had in years to overcome an electoral system designed to work against them. The Datincorp poll shows that just 15 percent of Venezuelans would vote for Maduro, in line with other surveys which find that an extraordinary 85 percent of the country believes a change in government is necessary.

Even then, victory is far from guaranteed. At least four representatives of Machado’s campaign have been detained across the country in recent weeks, and rights groups say there are more than 250 political prisoners in Venezuela. This includes Rocío San Miguel, a well-known civil society activist whose arbitrary detention has sparked international condemnation. The government closed twelve radio stations across seven states last year, and the independent press faces an environment of constant censorship and repression. While the CNE has said it will invite credible electoral observers such as the European Union and the Carter Center to oversee the vote, the terms of these observation missions would have to be carefully negotiated. At this stage, it is entirely clear that Venezuela’s authoritarian reality will present the opposition with an uphill battle.

The path forward is narrow, and the opportunity is slim. But if the opposition can get behind a single candidate who can run in the election, the Venezuelan peoples’ overwhelming consensus against Maduro could be enough to—finally—bring democratic change.

Geoff Ramsey is a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center.

The post Venezuela’s opposition is challenging Maduro in the next election. The only question is how. appeared first on Atlantic Council.

In Vladimir Putin’s Russia, where institutions are weak and the rule of law nonexistent, all politics are essentially court politics.

All political power is wielded by a group of individuals with access to the Kremlin leader.

And all relevant political struggles are the result of the rivalries and clan battles within this small elite circle.

So what is the state of the Putin court today? How has it been influenced by Russia’s war on Ukraine? By Russia’s upcoming fake presidential election? And what do dramatic events like the killing of mercenary leader Yevgeny Prigozhin and opposition leader Alexey Navalny show us about these bulldogs fighting under the carpet?

On the Power Vertical Podcast this week, host Brian Whitmore speaks with Mikhail Zygar, a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center and author of the books All The Kremlin’s Men: Inside the Court of Vladimir Putin and War and Punishment: Putin, Zelensky, and the Path to Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine. Zygar is also the author of the Atlantic Council report “All the Autocrat’s Men.”

About the Podcast

The Power Vertical Podcast by Brian Whitmore covers emerging and developing trends in Russian politics, shining a spotlight on the high-stakes power struggles, machinations, and clashing interests that shape Kremlin policy today. Brian Whitmore is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center and Russia and Eurasia Specialist and Assistant Professor of Practice at the Charles T. McDowell Center for Global Studies at the University of Texas at Arlington.

Further reading

Russia Tomorrow Mar 14, 2024

All the autocrat’s men: The court politics of Putin’s inner circle

By Mikhail Zygar

A new Atlantic Council report by journalist Mikhail Zygar explores how Russia’s war on Ukraine has affected Vladimir Putin’s inner circle.

Elections Europe & Eurasia

Russia Tomorrow Feb 2, 2024

Russia Tomorrow: Five scenarios for Russia’s future

By Casey Michel

A new Atlantic Council report explores five paths that Russia future might take in its future. What forces will shape Russia’s future?

Europe & Eurasia Political Reform

New Atlanticist Feb 16, 2024

Russia’s democracy movement will survive the death of Navalny

By Dylan Myles-Primakoff

The strategies and messages that the late opposition leader developed for fighting the Putin regime have spread to a diverse group of Russian pro-democracy actors.

Civil Society Corruption

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to promote policies that strengthen stability, democratic values, and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe in the West to the Caucasus, Russia, and Central Asia in the East.

Learn more

The post Power Vertical Podcast: All the dictator’s men appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Democracy and freedom are in crisis. Freedom House reports that democracy around the world has been in constant retreat for seventeen consecutive years.¹ In 2021, sixty countries experienced declines in their democracy score, while only twenty-five showed improvement. Today, the world is less democratic than it has been at any time since 1997. Concurrently, there has been a steep decline in support for democracy. In international surveys, 60 percent of respondents reported a positive view of democracy in the mid-1990s; the number now stands at 50 percent.²

The erosion of democracy is intertwined with a crisis of freedom. The most common path toward democratic decline is via the election of authoritarian leaders who then clamp down on media, dissent, and opposition forces.³ Censorship is on the rise and freedom of expression is in decline around the world, led by China, where government surveillance has intensified, aided by controls over media, social media, the Internet, and all kinds of nongovernmental organizations, including businesses.⁴ Similar trends are visible not only in countries like Iran and Russia, similarly recognized for their repressive regimes, but also in the Middle East, Hungary, Turkey, India, Pakistan, Mexico, and several countries in Africa. There is growing demand for Chinese technologies for surveillance, exports of which are growing around the world.⁵

The chapters in this handbook summarize these worrying developments in rich detail. While many of them also point in hopeful directions, there are reasons to worry that even worse times may be ahead for freedom and democracy. Wars in Ukraine and the Middle East have already intensified controls over free expression.⁶ The COVID-19 pandemic provided an excuse for many governments to further tighten the screws, and in several cases these controls have remained in place even after the pandemic subsided.⁷ All of this could be made worse if, as forecasted, refugee and immigrant flows increase rapidly as a result of global climate change and domestic politics in destination countries shifts further in a nativist-populist direction.

Even more worrying are two major economic and technological developments which will likely continue to push toward more intense authoritarianism. The first is the growing sense that millions (or even billions) of people are being left behind while a global elite are benefiting from economic growth and technological progress.⁸ This grievance has been central to the rise of left-wing and right-wing populist regimes in both established and nascent democracies, and this worrisome trend shows no sign of subsiding.⁹ The second is the rapid pace of advances in artificial intelligence (AI), which has been used for data collection on a massive scale by many governments and multinational corporations, and which has also enabled large-scale surveillance, as in China, Russia, and Iran. Although AI technology could be developed in less repressive ways, its current trajectory is concerning for democracy and liberty.

A simple framework

There is still much we do not know about the consequences for prosperity, inequality, and the future of democracy and freedom. I argue in the rest of this foreword that a simple framework—building on my 2019 book The Narrow Corridor, jointly written with James Robinson—may be useful to shed light on the problems of democracy and freedom, and point to pathways for developing institutions, norms, and practices for democratic rejuvenation.¹⁰

The main thesis of this framework can be summarized by Figure 1 below, which I borrow from the book.

This figure exposits some of the key social and political forces shaping state-society dynamics and their implications for democracy and freedom. The centerpiece of this approach is the relationship between the powers of the state and society. By the “power of the society,” which is depicted on the horizontal axis of Figure 1, we mean the ability of society to organize collective action, act according to its norms and values, and participate in politics, even against opposition and repression from state institutions and elites (by “elites,” we refer to groups that wield disproportionate economic or political power). The vertical axis depicts the power of the state, which represents the relative capacity of state institutions and the power of economic and political elites who control the state and command the key roles in politics and the economy. State power has a repressive element, as it enables state institutions and elites to overwhelm and silence opposition and society at large, but also some positive aspects—because a more powerful state may provide better public services, collect useful information, resolve disputes, and handle societal problems.

In our framework, state-society relations determine the nature of political power. This is summarized by the three regions depicted in the figure. The region on the left is the “basin of attraction” of the “Despotic Leviathan,” which signifies a state that is despotic in the sense that it can implement policies or impose its wishes without input from society. The implied dynamics, reminiscent of a simplified version of Chinese political history, are inexorably toward lower levels of societal power. This is the reason why the trajectory indicated there moves gradually toward the vertical axis, where society’s power against the state reaches a minimum. 

The polar opposite of the despotic path is one where the state and its institutions are weak and society’s traditions and organizational capacity are strong. At first, this might appear as a remedy against state repression. In reality, it is also inimical to freedom. It impedes the development of political hierarchy, a precondition for the emergence and evolution of state institutions, including a legal system and regulatory rules that are essential for protecting individuals against predation, expropriation, and intimidation. Even when states do appear within this context, they are weak and, in fact, often absent from large parts of the territory they are supposed to control. James Robinson and I thus labeled them as “Absent Leviathans.” These dynamics lead toward even greater state weakness.

More interesting is the region in the middle: “the narrow corridor.” This corridor is defined by a balance of power between state and society. The trajectories in this region look very different than those outside of it. This, we argue, is the hallmark of a different type of state and different nature of political power. We label it the “Shackled Leviathan” to capture the notion that the state is still strong, but it is monitored, challenged, and controlled by society—and, ultimately, by democratic institutions.

The heart of our theory is that true democratic participation and liberty, as well as economic incentives encouraging innovation and experimentation, can only flourish within the corridor. The corridor itself, though precarious at the best of times, can be bolstered by societal mobilization and participation. Institutions matter, but neither a cleverly designed constitution nor the correct set of institutional guardrails are sufficient by themselves to protect the corridor, nor are they a true bulwark against threats to democracy. Put simply: democracy is seldom given to the people, and it is often taken; thus, democracy is almost always in need of defense by the people.

There is another important aspect to the corridor, emphasized by the direction of trajectories within it, contrasted with those outside. Outside of the corridor, historical dynamics are likely to weaken one party as they strengthen the other. Inside of the corridor, however, the capacities of both state and society can rise in tandem. There are two synergistic reasons for the mutually beneficial dynamics within the corridor. First, state and society are locked in a fairly balanced competition. As state institutions become stronger—for example, because of new exigencies—society strives to increase its own capacity in order to control the emboldened state. Second, when balanced in terms of their capacities, state and society can cooperate. For example, when institutions and societal mobilization mean that an upstart politician cannot immediately hijack the public budget or misuse information that state agencies collect, people will be more willing to allow greater taxation and information collection. The centerpiece of this state-society cooperation is a degree of trust between state institutions and the population at large.

Both the positive-sum state-society competition and the trust in institutions are fragile, however. Competition can easily spin out of control, and trust is easier to destroy than to build.

This framework also highlights why societal norms are so important. These norms determine the boundaries of what elites and the agents of the state are expected to do, and how much trust they can command. These norms also shape how society mobilizes and resolves its own differences in the service of organizing against elites and impositions from the state.

Norms themselves are shaped by broader cultural trends, and while The Narrow Corridor did not study cultural dynamics in detail, our more recent work has proposed a complementary framework for doing so.¹¹ This framework starts from the observation that no human society possesses an unambiguous and unchanging cultural structure. Rather, different human communities have a reservoir of “attributes,” which gel together in distinct ways to create different underpinnings of political and social behaviors. The importance of this perspective is that we should not think of culture as a hard constraint on democracy or freedom, but rather as the language through which ideas related to democracy, liberty, and inequality can be articulated. Nevertheless, there is persistence in culture. Once freedoms start to be sidelined, it becomes more difficult to build the cultural tools to defend them. Once trust between state and society is destroyed, it also becomes harder to generate the ideas and coalitions needed to rebuild it.

In The Narrow Corridor, James Robinson and I trace the history of many historical polities via these trajectories and explain what sorts of events can place a society inside or outside the corridor and what shapes its boundaries. Most importantly, the historical account reveals how the process of entering and traveling within the corridor is a slow, conflict-ridden process, and how trust between state and society develops gradually and often painfully over time—but also how this trust can be easily destroyed, and how competition can quickly turn zero-sum. 

The eclipse of democracy and freedom

What does this framework imply for the current difficulties and future prospects of democracy and freedom? Two complementary processes can be identified. First, societies inside of the corridor have experienced weakening democracies and intensifying clampdowns on freedoms. Second, Despotic Leviathans outside of the corridor have become more adept at defending their nondemocratic regimes against the counterbalancing powers of society, thanks to China’s rise, the use of AI and related technologies, and also because democracies themselves have become weaker. I now focus on the first process, returning to the second process later in this foreword.

The fact that support for democracy among the people has declined—rather than authoritarian leaders merely clamping down on democratic rights and freedoms against the people’s wishes—provides an important clue about the problems of democracy and freedom. The causes of this deteriorating support for democracy are explored in my joint work with Nicolás Ajzenman, Cevat Aksoy, Martin Fiszbein, and Carlos Molina.¹² We find that people who have experience with democratic institutions tend to support them. Hence, a history of democracy should boost people’s willingness to defend the regime. But a more detailed look at the data reveals that the relationship between democratic experience and support for democracy is far from unconditional. It is only people who have experience with successful democracies—meaning democracies that deliver the kinds of economic performance, public services, and outcomes that they desire—that support democracy. In fact, we found that people who live under unsuccessful democracies do not increase their support for these institutions at all. 

So, what is it that people want from democracies? Our results suggest several important dimensions of success: economic growth (democracies that get mired in economic crises do not garner support); peace and political stability (wars or instability are of course not what people want); control of corruption; good public services; and low inequality. These last three are particularly important, because they underpin one of the important pillars of trust between state and society, as emphasized by the framework in Figure 1. The cooperative, positive-sum relationship between state and society collapses when trust in democratic institutions is eroded. This becomes much more likely when democratic institutions malfunction, and especially when they enable malfeasance by public officials, fail to deliver basic public services, and cannot (or choose not to) control inequality.

I believe it is these dimensions in which democracies, and more generally societies, in or near the corridor, have failed in recent decades. There are several reasons for this failure. Some of them are technological, some of them economic, and some of them political. New technologies have favored the very well-educated elite both in industrialized and developing nations, and governments have not taken steps to redress these inequities. Economically, the rapid drive toward globalization, transmogrified by the rapid accession of China into the global trading order, has contributed to the same trends.

But even worse for democracy’s reputation has been the policy response to these trends. Neither technology nor globalization are acts of nature. They are choices that societies make about how to use existing scientific know-how, what types of new technologies to develop, and what kind of globalization to implement. In the case of industrialized nations, led by the United States, these were choices made by political and economic elites. Trust among the people was markedly undermined—especially for people who were not among the winners from these processes—because these decisions were made by an insular technocratic elite who kept claiming (with very vocal support from the mainstream media) that everybody would benefit from unlimited technological growth and expansive globalization. In the United States, nothing of the sort happened. For example, low-education households have seen their real incomes collapse since 1980. In several other industrialized nations, the trends are less clear-cut, but people in the bottom half of the income distribution did not receive much of the promised benefits. At the same time, the technocratic elite became more and more integrated with the business elite, convincing many that corruption was on the rise (whether this was true or not).

This collapse of trust in public institutions and public servants is inimical to life in the corridor, and it has been a major driver of eroding support for democracy. It has also been an important force toward declining respect for democratic rights and broader freedoms.

As democracy’s reputation has become tarnished in the West, this has created an opening for authoritarian regimes, led by China and Russia, to solidify control over their populations, with disastrous effects for freedom around the world.

If this account is correct, it is the failure of democratic institutions that is threatening the balance within the corridor. The corresponding declines in trust and support for democracy make the implications for future political regimes and myriad freedoms and rights especially dire.

Will it get worse?

There are at least three reasons to worry that the trends we are seeing could get worse.

First, there is no obvious end to the slide of demo­cratic norms around the world. As demo­cracies continue to perform poorly on many dimensions that their citizens care about and as powerful auto­cracies, such as China and Russia, expand their global reach and propaganda, it would be quixotic to hope for an immediate turnaround. Historical evidence is consistent with the idea that, once waves of democracy start, they go on for a while.¹³ Likewise, once the decline of democracy is underway, we may see further slides for quite some time.

Second, the key forces that have led to the benefits of prosperity not being shared equally are still present. As Simon Johnson and I argue in Power and Progress,¹⁴ the main factor leading to growing inequality and lack of wage growth around the world has been the use of digital technologies to drive workplace automation and worker disempowerment. With recent advances in generative AI, these forces may have gone into overdrive. While there is nothing inherent in the nature of AI that should make it always eliminate labor and increase inequality, our current technological trajectory is toward automation and a reduced role of labor across diverse sectors of the economy.¹⁵ If this technological trend continues, it will exacerbate the failure of democracies to create shared prosperity. Although certain aspects of globalization may have slowed down, the role of multinational corporations and other dimensions of global integration are likely to increase, which could create another set of forces toward unshared prosperity.¹⁶

Third, AI also has direct impacts on democracy, which will likely exacerbate democratic tensions in the years to come. As mentioned above, this is both because AI is being used increasingly skillfully by autocratic regimes to quell discontent and demand for democratic rights,¹⁷ but even more fundamentally, it is because AI is distorting political communication and discourse in electoral democracies around the world.¹⁸ The role of Facebook and other social media platforms in fostering filter bubbles and polarization and fomenting partisanship and misinformation during the 2010s is now well understood. There are concerns that, with advances in generative AI, even worse practices will take root in the new social media ecosystem.¹⁹

While several political, economic, and technological trends may augur hard times for democracy and freedom, there is one small silver lining suggested by the framework in The Narrow Corridor: leaving the corridor is not permanent, and countries that have recently lost the balance between state and society will also be the ones where this balance is still partly present. As conditions change, and as pro-democracy forces and measures strengthen the demand for democratic and civil rights, it is possible to reenter the corridor. For example, after the murderous, totalitarian Nazi regime in Germany, the country was able to rebuild a balance between state and society and develop fairly healthy democratic institutions in the postwar era.²⁰ The same perspective provides some hope that, even as we are witnessing the slide of democratic norms and institutions, rebuilding them is a possibility.

What to do?

Almost all of the chapters in this book suggest ideas to rejuvenate freedom. Let me add to these valuable insights by summarizing some perspectives from the framework presented here.

To put it simply, the best way to counter the current pernicious trends is to create another wave of democracy, similar to the one witnessed after the collapse of military dictatorships in Southern Europe in the 1970s. But how?

There is no surefire way of achieving something so ambitious. But I would like to briefly present a couple of ideas.

• Rebuild support for democracy. Democracy is nothing without people’s support. The first step in improving the future of democracy and freedom is to rebuild support for democracy within democratically governed populations, then hope that these ideas will spread around the world. In my assessment, the only way this can be achieved is by democracy performing better, at least starting in a number of key places, such as the United States, Western Europe and Latin America. Democracies in these ideological battlegrounds need to show that they deliver in terms of economic growth, shared prosperity, control of corruption, and responsiveness to people’s needs and wishes. The role of shared prosperity here cannot be overemphasized. Democracy will continue to lose support if it is seen as the handmaiden of a two-tiered society in which a small group of elites benefits from economic growth and technological change while the rest become increasingly dependent.
• Trust in institutions. Concurrently, democratic institutions need to foster people’s trust. This again starts with performance. But procedures matter too. One of the reasons why democracies started losing people’s trust and support is because of an error of “technocracy.” Increasingly, many segments of the population are becoming disillusioned with democracies because they think that, under the veneer of democracy, a small group of technocrats, in cahoots with economic and political elites, runs the show. This state of affairs is not conducive to trust in institutions or support for democracy. To get out of this situation is certainly not easy, especially after democratic norms have become weakened. Sidelining experts and expertise from policy making, or enabling the emergence of a tyranny of the majority that could damage civil rights and minority rights, would certainly be disastrous for broad freedoms. The solution then must be sought in democratizing procedures subject to well-articulated constraints. The alternative to technocracy should thus not be viewed as “mob rule,” but as institutions that are truly responsive to people’s needs and concerns. These institutions should be built and should function within well-defined and communicated constraints, set by constitutions, and a firm commitment to minority and human rights.
• The right kind of empowerment for civil society. The framework in The Narrow Corridor puts special emphasis on the role of civil society. The weakening of democratic norms and freedoms around the world has coincided with civil society becoming either weaker, as in many autocratic regimes, or more polarized, as in the United States and Western Europe.²¹ We need the right kind of empowerment for civil society, which means civil society becoming a true bulwark in the defense of freedoms and democracy. This must start with civil society organizations (CSOs) themselves recognizing that they should not be an instrument to suppress rights and freedoms. The tragedy in much of Western Europe and the United States today is that several CSOs have become active participants in banning free speech or silencing alternative voices.²² The right kind of civil society empowerment must start with a strong commitment to freedom of speech. All other concerns, including the fact that some groups may feel uncomfortable when certain ideas are expressed, must be subservient to this principle. It is only then that CSOs can be a true force against state repression and elite dominance and can help rebuild freedom and democracy.

Daron Acemoglu is an Institute Professor at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. He is also a fellow of NAS, APS, BAS, AAAS; the winner of BBVA Frontiers of Knowledge Award, Nemmers Prize, Global Economy Prize, A.SK Prize, CME Prize, and John Bates Clark Medal; and the author of New York Times bestseller Why Nations Fail (with James Robinson); The Narrow Corridor (with James Robinson); and Power and Progress: Our Thousand-Year Struggle over Technology and Prosperity (with Simon Johnson).

Trackers and Data Visualizations

Jun 15, 2023

Freedom and Prosperity Indexes

The indexes rank 164 countries around the world according to their levels of freedom and prosperity. Use our site to explore twenty-eight years of data, compare countries and regions, and examine the sub-indexes and indicators that comprise our indexes.

The post Foreword: Creating another wave of democracy appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Table of contents

Evolution of freedom

International comparisons recognize that Europeans enjoy the highest quality of life in the world. European society benefits from great equality in income, excellent healthcare and basic education, good infrastructure, and eminent rule of law.¹ However, the past decade has presented an array of challenges to European Union (EU) nations. Europe’s gross domestic product (GDP) in 2016 had only just returned to its 2008 level—before the eurozone crisis—and it has been losing market share in the global economy. Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014; the 2015–16 migrant crisis; the UK’s secession from the EU; COVID-19; and Russia’s full-scale attack on Ukraine, the EU’s ensuing sanctions, and complete reorientation of its foreign policy toward helping Ukraine—by any historical standards, the past decade has been trying.

The EU is also the freest region of the world in the Atlantic Council’s Freedom Index, 20 points above the global average throughout the period of analysis. The increase in aggregate freedom was sustained until 2014 but has stagnated in the past decade. The main reason is the changing priorities in the aftermath of the eurozone crisis, which diverted politicians’ attention towards reducing social vulnerabilities.² The ensuing decade brought several other challenges, starting in 2015–16 with a wave of migration from northern Africa that divided public opinion and engulfed the EU in heated debates about migration policy. These debates brought about political change in a number of European countries too, shifting the focus further from expanding freedoms and on to defining a narrower European identity. Just as this changing political landscape started to stabilize, the COVID-19 pandemic hit Europe hard, resulting in more demands for government participation in the economy and putting the emphasis on security rather than freedom. In sum, the past decade in Europe has been one of crisis abatement.

Crisis abatement has brought about new politics in Central Europe in particular, a region which was for a quarter century (1989–2014) at the forefront of increasing political freedom in Europe. The governments of Hungary and Poland, and to some degree Slovakia, have followed a path of what Viktor Orbán calls “illiberal democracy,” concentrating powers in the hands of few political leaders. This concentration has come at the expense of media freedom, judicial independence, and institutional development. The European Commission and other European institutions have responded with concerned actions to limit the loss of freedoms, with some success.

Economic freedom increased by more than 10 points until 2014, leveling off since then due to the various crises that emerged. However, there are some bright spots. Women’s economic freedom has increased continuously during the whole period, up 25 points. Investment freedom increased substantially during the period 2005–15, and has seen another upswing since as governments have tried to keep their economies competitive. This reflects the response of many EU countries to the pandemic, including significant subsidies to particular sectors of the economy, enlarging the role of the state, and crowding out the private sector. This effect continues to evolve, particularly in the energy sector where the war in Ukraine has given a jolt to Europe’s desire to be independent from Russian oil and gas.

The level of political freedom is very high in the EU, although “legislative constraints on the executive” receives a clearly lower score than the other three components of the political freedom subindex. All components of political freedom decrease slightly after 2016, coinciding with the reverberations from the migration crisis and the rise of populism in a number of European countries. The most prominent of these have been in Central Europe, where Hungary’s Viktor Orbán has been particularly outspoken on the need to curb political freedoms. The trend, however, runs deeper, with nationalist parties gaining popularity in Austria, Finland, Italy, Germany, and Sweden, among others. Europe is a more closed society now than it was thirty years ago.

From freedom to prosperity

Prosperity in the EU is around 17.6 points higher than the global average, and this gap has been stable since 1995. The trend is positive until 2019, but has stagnated since the pandemic struck. This is broadly consistent with the global pattern, suggesting that Europe is finding ways to maintain its edge in prosperity over its competitors.

The superior outlook on prosperity, coupled with geographic proximity, has made Europe a magnet for migrants from Africa, Asia, and the Middle East. The pandemic reduced this inflow, as have various country-level policies to prevent migrants from entering Europe. Still, 2022 saw a significant new wave of migration from Ukraine, reaching a total of 6 million refugees towards the end of the year. And a new wave of non-European migrants has posed challenges for Italy and Greece in 2023.

The effects of the eurozone crisis of 2008–10 and the COVID-19 pandemic of 2020–22 are evident in the income component data. Fortunately, financial assistance to vulnerable groups was quickly dispensed during both episodes, reducing social tensions. Europe’s social safety net expanded, increasing budget deficits but allowing the crises to pass with minimal losses in welfare. Reflective of these policies, inequality is relatively low compared to the global average.

Finally, the data show sustained improvements in health and education for the EU, probably driven by countries in Eastern Europe. These countries saw social supports deteriorating at the beginning of the post-communist transition period in the 1990s. Heavy government spending, assisted by EU funding since their accession in the 2000s, has reversed these losses and led to convergence in health and education indicators across the EU.³

The future ahead

The next decade of EU freedom and prosperity dynamics will be marked by the war in Ukraine. The EU has committed enormous financial resources, nearly €100 billion across 2022 and 2023, in supporting Ukraine’s fight against the aggressor. It has also imposed a dozen rounds of sectoral and economy-wide sanctions on Russia. These sanctions also have negative implications for some industries in Europe, which have traditionally relied on resources from Russia. The war, in other words, has a slowing effect on Europe’s economy.

Another major impact of Russia’s war in Ukraine is that it has forced the EU to rethink the Green Deal, which the European Commission has championed for the past decade. Given Russia’s threats to Europe’s energy security, a decision was taken in 2022 to sever the dependence on Russian energy products. With only two countries—Bulgaria and Hungary—receiving postponement of these measures to 2024, Europe has quickly weaned itself from Russian oil and gas. However, this change has come at a cost: a number of countries have increased their use of coal and other high-polluting sources of energy.

The war has also sped up the process of EU integration for Moldova and Ukraine, and this will occupy the attention of Brussels institutions in the years to come. Such integration provides for a larger European market: a welcome development. The past decade has shown that Europe cannot multitask—perhaps the inevitable result of gradual consensus building among twenty-seven member states—preferring to focus on one issue at a time. The clear task at hand is helping Ukraine win the war.

The two case studies in this volume on Ukraine (by Professor Yuriy Gorodnichenko from the University of California at Berkeley) and Russia (by Professor Konstantin Sonin from the University of Chicago) demonstrate what is at stake for these countries in terms of freedom and prosperity. In this chapter I suggest that, for Europe as a whole, what is at stake in the conflict is the further development of freedoms and the ensuing prosperity of Europe. Only with a free and victorious Ukraine can the EU refocus on its prosperity agenda.

In the face of Ukraine’s resolute response to Russia’s invasion, President Putin has escalated the economic warfare against its citizens by incessantly attacking the country’s energy infrastructure and cutting off vital trade channels. These acts have severely hampered the prospects for economic recovery in 2024.

A large part of Ukraine’s civilian population, an estimated 6 million refugees, is awaiting a ceasefire that would allow them to return to their homeland, as the frequent bombings and power outages have forced them to take temporary shelter in other European countries.⁴ These immigrants look forward to reuniting with their families and continuing with their jobs or finding new economic opportunities. In both cases—whether Ukraine’s refugees stay abroad or return home—massive European help is needed to jump-start the economy. The needs are enormous: rebuild infrastructure, provide financing for entrepreneurial activities as many old enterprises are razed to the ground, open new export opportunities, and invest in the training of workers and in new technologies.

Europe’s prosperity agenda

This prosperity agenda is fourfold. First, there are wide disparities across regions within Europe. These are seen within countries, for example southern versus northern Italy, and across countries, for example Scandinavia versus Eastern Europe. A significant portion of the EU budget is directed to reducing these disparities, through investments in infrastructure, agriculture, and regional economic development. Such financial aid needs to be coupled with policies that increase economic freedom at the regional level. For example, decentralization of some tax policies combined with explicit subsidy schemes will keep more resources in underdeveloped regions and thus attract businesses and individuals who would otherwise look for opportunities in more advanced parts of the EU.

Second, increased prosperity in the EU comes from completing the internal markets for energy and financial services. These topics were discussed even prior to the 2014 annexation of Crimea, which started a series of crisis years for the EU. 2024 is a good year to go back to the original design and create a single energy market in Europe, as well as a single financial market, with a single set of regulators. Much has been written and discussed about how to achieve these goals; now is the time to act.

Third, migration has been at the forefront of European politics in the past decade. It promises to remain an issue in the decade to come. On the one hand, Europe’s demographics are such that the labor market benefits from human capital coming into European countries and putting their labor and talents into productive use. On the other hand, social tensions have risen in the countries that have received large numbers of migrants. Even in countries with few actual migrants, the specter of competition for social services and jobs has boosted the fortunes of nationalist parties that have promised to erect barriers to further migration. This issue, more than any other in Europe, inflames public opinion.

Finally, prosperity in Europe emanates from open markets. While the European market itself is large, many innovations and technologies come from either the American or Asian markets. The two other superpowers—the United States and China—have been on a collision course in asserting their economic dominance, leaving Europe to choose how to align in the global picture. So far this path has meandered, with some calling for greater protections for Europe’s own market. Such an isolationist approach is counterproductive. Europe has to remain as open as possible, assimilating leading innovations and creating the space to implement these new ideas into better production processes and products.

The Atlantic Council’s Indexes also raise some philosophical questions regarding European identity: Has the golden age of European prosperity passed, weighed down by the heavy fiscal burden of an unwieldy social safety net? Has the energy of European integration through the accession of new member states tapered off? Is federalism, in the shape of the EU, losing momentum? The past decade has not given many indications of a clear reform agenda, as Europe has stumbled from one crisis to another. The existential crisis of a war in Europe has strained the abilities of European institutions to act, yet it has demonstrated a unity that has been largely absent in previous decisions Europe has faced. This unity leads to strength and such strength is needed to overcome the many challenges that lie in Europe’s path.

Simeon Djankov is policy director of the Financial Markets Group at the London School of Economics. He was deputy prime minister and minister of finance of Bulgaria from 2009 to 2013. Prior to his cabinet appointment, he was chief economist of the finance and private sector vice presidency of the World Bank.

Trackers and Data Visualizations

Jun 15, 2023

Freedom and Prosperity Indexes

The indexes rank 164 countries around the world according to their levels of freedom and prosperity. Use our site to explore twenty-eight years of data, compare countries and regions, and examine the sub-indexes and indicators that comprise our indexes.

The post EU’s future prosperity will be marked by war in Ukraine appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Table of contents

Evolution of freedom

For many years, I have had issues with discussing various graphs and indexes illustrating what is going on in Russia, because the picture on the ground was very different from what those indexes showed. But the Freedom Index very closely represents what I felt was happening in my country over the last ten years: basically, a gradual deterioration of all dimensions of freedoms, but especially political freedom. This process started even before the war in Ukraine, and accelerated after the war started. The deterioration in economic and legal freedoms is not so evident, but this is because the starting points were already low in 1995.

Thirty years ago, Russia was a competitive democracy. Of course, an unstable democracy, as we can see from the way it has unraveled in the twenty-first century, but it was really competitive. Opposition (i.e., those not aligned with the president) controlled the parliament, incumbents would lose elections at the subnational level, and measures of democratic standards would agree that the country could be labeled as a democracy. But the system has gradually deteriorated until today, when there are no longer any competitive elections at any level above small municipalities. Every reasonably sized city or town is already fully controlled from the political center; even in cases where officials are formally elected, they are still appointed.

Civil and political rights are at a minimum. Think of freedom of expression. Nowadays you can get arrested for just mentioning the word “war” when referring to the Russia-Ukraine conflict. I myself am a fugitive of Putin’s “justice,” and by the time this book is published I will probably have been sentenced in absentia to nine years in prison for my social media posts. So, in terms of freedom of the press or individual freedom of expression, Russia today is as close to a perfect score of zero as you can possibly imagine.

The fall into autocracy is also evident in the legal freedom subindex, especially in the components of clarity of the law and judicial independence. A clear example that connects both indicators is the passing of several laws by parliament that clearly contradict the Constitution. The criminalization of any comment on the war that contradicts the story told by the Ministry of Defence obviously contravenes the Constitution, which protects freedom of expression. There cannot be any clarity of the law when day-to-day legislation contradicts the Constitution. And citizens cannot try to defend their rights through the judicial system, as it is completely controlled by the executive.

Economic freedom has never been high in Russia, and the data confirm this. But economic freedom has further deteriorated in the last few years, especially since the beginning of the war. Future updates of the Indexes will surely reflect this evolution, as they will capture the outright expropriation of western-owned property that has been taking place. Foreign companies’ assets have been seized without compensation, and those who were lucky enough to sell their assets have done so at 80 percent discounts and with a 50 percent tax rate imposed. So, trade and investment freedom are surely lower than reflected in the data right now. Even the score on women’s economic freedom is likely to drop in the short run, as Putin’s government propaganda is already pushing the idea that women should marry and bear children at a very young age, because this is good for the nation, and this directly impacts women’s economic rights.

Overall, the picture portrayed by the Freedom Index and its subindexes is consistent with my view of the situation in Russia, and I believe things may be even worse than is currently captured in the data due to lags in the underlying sources.

From freedom to prosperity

The income component of prosperity clearly shows the stagnation of the Russian economy in the last fifteen years. Economic growth was extremely low until 2018, and Russian gross domestic product (GDP) has even contracted in the last few years. Moreover, the Russian economy appears in this graph to perform reasonably well, as it somewhat follows the European trend—but this is misleading. Russia’s income in 1995 was significantly lower than the European average, so the country should have grown faster and caught up with its neighbors, as did Poland and the Baltic countries. This process of convergence is clearly not happening for Russia, and we can even observe a divergence between Russia and the rest of Europe in the last decade.

The inequality indicator is very noisy. There is likely to be significant measurement error at short-term frequencies, but the big-picture situation is clear: Russia was a very unequal country in 1995, and that inequality remains at a similar level. Looking forward, some respectable economists argue that we may see an improvement in the in­equality measure. I think there are several forces at play. On the one hand, the government is providing very substantive wartime payments to the families of killed soldiers, and these are disproportionally going to the lower quantiles of the income distribution, which can improve inequality measures. But on the other hand, wartime profits are increasing, and these are captured by the top 1 percent of the distribution. So basically, it is the middle class that is being squeezed. The inequality indicator in the Prosperity Index is the share of income going to the top 20 percent of the distribution, so I think it very likely that this will deteriorate in the coming years as inequality increases.

Regarding minority rights, the worrisome negative trend is obvious in the graph, despite the fact that the indicator only captures religious liberty. The government is now persecuting anyone whose faith is not compatible with the heightened militarism of the Russian state. Even priests of the Orthodox Church, usually in favor with government officials, are being prosecuted if they utter words against the war. Religious minorities whose faith is incompatible with military service, such as Baptists and other minority Christian denominations, face criminal prosecution and extra-legal harassment.

It is not only religious minorities who are persecuted. Think about LGBTQ+ citizens, who are now criminalized to the point where even holding hands in public may see them prosecuted. The current situation is probably worse than in Iran, in some senses. Legally, there have not been any changes in the status of—or official attitude toward—different ethnicities, but it is evident that ethnic minorities in the poorest regions of the country have been disproportionately recruited for the war. Therefore, deaths among minority ethnic groups are significantly higher than, for example, for Muscovites.

The health indicator is one of only a couple in the Freedom and Prosperity Indexes that I do not think paints a fully accurate picture of reality, especially for the past few years. Russia was one of the worst performing countries during the COVID-19 pandemic, with more than a million deaths. The total number is similar to that of the United States, where the population is 2.5 times larger, so Russia performed significantly worse. Also, the indicator is probably not yet showing the thousands of deaths since the start of the war, and the deterioration in terms of mental health for a large share of the population due to post-traumatic stress disorder and the like. In 2023, the birth rate in Russia dropped to the level of the worst years of the economic crisis that resulted in the collapse of the Soviet Union. We will likely see further drops in health indicators in the short run.

In terms of environmental quality, it has always been the case that whatever is good for Russian industry is bad for environmental indicators. And vice versa. For many years Russia was one of the best performing countries with respect to the Kyoto protocol, but this was due to a dramatic drop in industrial output. I forecast further decreases in industrial production, so on that side environmental indicators may improve. But at the same time the government is currently removing several regulations and laws that were passed before the war, so this may have an offsetting effect. The effective ban on any public protest and many civil society organizations, including those working on environmental protection, will further erode the existing protections.

Another important process that is probably not fully captured by the data above concerns the educational system. I refer to the exodus of teachers and professors from all levels of the educational system that have left the country in recent years, and especially since the war in Ukraine began. Many have fled the country, others have relocated, some are looking for a way out. This is a huge blow to the Russian educational system. Moreover, tens of thousands of students who should be increasing their human capital through further education are being mobilized and sent to the battlefield, or have become refugees in neighboring countries due to their fear of being called up to fight. This reality is not yet visible as a fall in years of schooling, but as statistics update it will most likely emerge. Furthermore, this issue is not only about the quantity of schooling as measured by the average years of schooling of Russian pupils, but the quality of the education they receive, which then translates into skills and human capital. If the best professors and teachers are leaving the country, it is clear that the quality of the educational system will suffer significantly.

The future ahead

The short- to medium-term prospects for Russia and Putin’s regime are undeniably going to be determined by the evolution of the Russia-Ukraine war. Putin’s regime entered a declining stage even before the beginning of the war, which is typical of authoritarian and personalistic regimes: following a period of stagnation, the regime reaches its final stage, in which every effort is devoted to maintaining power. Even before 2022, political repression was very substantial. Tens of thousands of people were leaving the country every year because they feared arrest if they said something wrong on social media, for example. Yet the repression has dramatically increased since the war began.

I do not think there is an easy way out of the war, nor from Putin’s authoritarian rule. Change in any personalistic regime is always dramatic and turbulent, and even if a lot of the same people still hold power, it always engenders substantial changes. It was the same with the death of Stalin. I think there is always an upside to this, because if and when Putin is gone, the new leadership will be able to do some things that will immediately improve Russia’s situation. I believe any new leadership would withdraw the Russian troops from the newly occupied territories. Talks about lifting economic sanctions and reopening trade will immediately follow. Some companies that left Russia will quickly return. These steps might not generate sustained economic growth, as the loss of growth potential due to the war is substantial. Nonetheless, they will represent an immediate improvement over the status quo. But for now, until this change in leadership takes place, everything will be defined by the evolution of the war, and, as long as the war continues, Russia will suffer further decreases in every dimension of prosperity.

Konstantin Sonin is John Dewey distinguished service professor at the University of Chicago Harris School of Public Policy. He studies political economics. Previously, Sonin has served as faculty and a vice-president of NES and HSE University in Moscow and guest-lectured in dozens of schools across the country. Now he is on the federal wanted list in Russia for posting information about atrocities committed by the Russian occupying forces in Ukraine.

Trackers and Data Visualizations

Jun 15, 2023

Freedom and Prosperity Indexes

The indexes rank 164 countries around the world according to their levels of freedom and prosperity. Use our site to explore twenty-eight years of data, compare countries and regions, and examine the sub-indexes and indicators that comprise our indexes.

The post Russia will suffer decreases in every dimension of prosperity appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Table of contents

Evolution of freedom

The flat trend of the Freedom Index between 1995 and 2004 mainly reflects the presidency of Leonid Kuchma, a “red” premier with a Soviet mentality who was not particularly interested in building democracy. The Orange Revolution and the new presidency of Viktor Yushchenko, which began in 2005, brought significant change towards democracy, political freedom, and economic liberalization. These reforms are clearly picked up by the political freedom subindex. In particular, the indicator concerning legislative constraints on the executive seems to be reflecting the substantial changes in the Constitution introduced during this period, that reduced the power of the president in favor of the parliament.

The Freedom Index, and especially the political freedom subindex, starts declining in 2010 with Viktor Yanukovych as president. This period represents a clear backsliding in terms of democratic reform, which intensified in 2013–14 when the government tightened the screws on civil society and the economy. The subsequent recovery is attributable to the Revolution of Dignity (also known as the Euromaidan), with several positive changes towards liberalization in political and economic terms. For example, the press became much freer and more independent. Nowadays, in the midst of the Russian invasion, it is hard to measure the degree of freedom in Ukraine because martial law imposes many restrictions.

The economic freedom subindex reflects the ups and downs of Ukraine’s economy in the last three decades. Generally, the level of investment freedom in Ukraine is significantly lower than in other countries of the former Soviet bloc that introduced much more radical reforms upon independence (e.g., the Baltic states). This low level is consistent with other measures of openness; for example, the Chinn-Ito index of restrictions on capital accounts paints a similar picture. Although Ukraine tried to open up, various steps toward liberalization were rolled back when the country faced economic and security crises. For instance, the government introduced stricter capital controls during the global financial crisis of 2008–09 to tame the panic. At the same time, Ukraine’s external trade has been a success story. Not only did Ukraine become much more integrated in global markets, but it was also able to redirect trade away from Russia after Russia annexed Crimea and occupied parts of the Donbas in 2014. Ukraine generally has few barriers to cross-border flows of goods and services. These very divergent trajectories for capital openness versus trade openness are also shown in the components of the economic freedom subindex.

The lack of improvement in legal freedom from 1995 to 2014 could be explained by the fact that, unlike other Eastern European countries, Ukraine did not institute a radical reform of its legal architecture on independence. Instead, there were small incremental changes from the Soviet system. For example, the labor code was written in the 1970s, and only sporadic, piecemeal changes have been made since then to make it a little more modern. As a result, the Ukrainian legal system is fraught with contradictions and inconsistencies. The history of the Constitution illustrates the complexity and ever-changing nature of the legal system. After being adopted in 1996 (which is a slow start relative to peer countries), the Constitution was amended in 2004 to limit presidential powers. President Yanukovych cancelled these amendments in 2010 before they were reinstated after the Revolution of Dignity in 2013–14. The big drop in legal freedom in 2014 is mainly driven by a plummeting security component, which reflects Russia’s annexation of Crimea and partial occupation of the Donbas.

These dynamics are consistent with Figure 1 below, which shows the evolution of two indexes produced by the V-Dem Project—on judicial constraints on the executive and on political rights—since 1985. Upon the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, the path toward free institutions is markedly different for Ukraine than it is for other nations in the orbit of the USSR. While Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland quickly reached very high scores on both indexes, Ukraine followed the much weaker Russian reform path until the year 2000. With the turn of the century, Ukraine departs from the declining trend of Russia, but it still lags behind its more successful neighbors.

Figure 1. Institutional reform in selected countries (1985–2022)

One can see how the low level of legal and economic freedom generates inefficiencies and deters economic development in Ukraine by looking at the sectors and firms that are thriving. For example, the IT sector in Ukraine is very competitive and successful in the global market because it does not require a lot of physical capital. Instead, the IT sector is based on human capital which is much harder to expropriate than physical capital. This means that the sector does not need to rely on the judicial system as much as other sectors. Similarly, the agricultural sector, another highly successful part of the Ukrainian economy, is very decentralized, which creates competition and limits the power of oligarchs or other vested interests.

From freedom to prosperity

The evolution of the income component for Ukraine is very positive from 1995 up until the global financial crisis of 2008. During this period, the country experienced a fast recovery from the initial shock of transitioning from the Soviet system. A giant economic boom was fueled by easy credit and inflows of foreign direct investment. This economic expansion was halted by the global financial crisis. The banking sector was hit particularly hard and accumulated a large share of nonperforming loans. With no political will to reform the financial sector, banks became “zombie” institutions, weighing down the broader economy. Weakened by the financial crisis, the economy went through another massive upheaval after the Russian aggression of 2014. Although Ukraine implemented many reforms since 2014, and was thus more prepared to withstand the COVID-19 shock, security concerns weighed heavily on the country, depressing investment and consumption. In short, since 2008 the country has not been an attractive place to invest and produce, leading to the stagnant income we can see over the last fifteen years. The full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 obviously made the economic landscape even more difficult.

Data on inequality are always difficult to analyze, especially so for Ukraine because of its large informal sector. Although this factor distorts the level of inequality, examining changes in this component can still be a revealing exercise. For example, the distribution of income becomes more equal during the 1990s because incomes contracted deeply for nearly everyone due to the collapse of the previous system, hyperinflation, and so on. Inequality rose in the early 2000s as the economic recovery benefited some people more than others. The so-called oligarchs were clear winners, and this was the period in which they consolidated their economic and political power. From 2008 on, it is very hard to unpick the true evolution of inequality because of the deep crises the country faced: The global financial crisis of 2008–09 affected the population highly unevenly. The Russian annexation of Crimea and partial occupation of the Donbas displaced millions of people. The COVID-19 pandemic had heterogeneous effects on the economy and on different groups within the population. And then the fog of the current war makes any estimates of inequality tentative at best.

The very clear negative evolution of the minority rights component of the Prosperity Index, which measures religious freedom, is surprising. There is little indication that any ethnic or religious group is persecuted in Ukraine. Perhaps this dynamic reflects the fact that Ukraine was trying to limit the influence of a Russian “fifth column.” For example, Ukraine established a Ukrainian orthodox church, independent of Moscow, and has encouraged communities to switch from the Moscow patriarch to the Kyiv metropolitan. This may create formal signs of reduced rights of minorities but there have been hardly any objective impediments to citizens practicing their faith, or exercising their religious freedom. Indeed, religious and other minorities are well represented at the highest levels in Ukraine: President Zelenskyy is himself a Jew and Minister of Defense Umerov is a Crimean Tatar.

Regarding education, the divergence from the European average that seems to have started in 2005–06 does not have an obvious explanation. The capacity of universities in Ukraine exceeds the size of the graduating classes from high school. Therefore, anyone who wants to go to college can do so without problems. Surprisingly, this trend was not reversed by the economic crisis of 2008–10, because people delay entering the labor market in recessions and pursue further education in order to wait for better employment prospects. The trend away from the European average is perhaps partly explained by the fact that many more Ukrainians study abroad (the number more than tripled from 2007 to 2019) and it is possible that their educational attainment is not being properly recorded. Unfortunately, Ukraine has not had a census since 2001 and thus reliable data on socioeconomic outcomes are scarce.

The improvement in the environmental indicator in the 2004–14 period is most likely capturing the fact that Soviet-era heavy industry was clearly declining, and losing ground relative to other sectors of the economy like services. For example, the improvement in the indicator begins in 2007–08. This timing is consistent with the fact that the metals industry, a heavy polluter, was decimated during the global financial crisis (production declined by approximately 60 percent) and even after recovery, production stood at roughly 60 percent of its pre-crisis level. However, some of the improvement in the environment indicator is in line with a deliberate, but modest government policy to tighten environmental standards.

The initial level of the health indicator was very low. Heavy pollution, high consumption of alcohol, widespread smoking, and the low quality of healthcare services are clear contributors. From its low base, Ukraine could and did improve health outcomes through effective policies, a stronger economy, and a changing culture. For example, successive governments in Ukraine have consistently increased taxes on tobacco and alcohol, and higher incomes have helped to improve diet and access to food. The public healthcare system was largely unreformed until 2014, but after the Revolution of Dignity, the government pushed different measures to make the healthcare system more patient-centric, improve access, and reduce corruption. The system remains largely government run but there has been some entry of private providers in large cities.

The future ahead

The future of Ukraine will be shaped by its accession to the European Union (EU) and NATO. Joining the EU requires a lot of convergence—and hence upgrades—in terms of the legal structures, economic conditions, and environmental/health standards. The experience of Poland and other former communist countries suggests that Ukraine will see radical improvements after accession, in labor productivity, market access, infrastructure and other key metrics of economic progress. Joining NATO will be critical for addressing security concerns. To put it bluntly, if Ukraine were to join NATO, Russia would not be able to attack it again. NATO can guarantee peace and thus make Ukraine an investable country and allow refugees to return.

Obviously, with the ongoing war, any outlook is highly uncertain. However, one should flag two challenges for Ukraine.

First, there is a widespread perception that the Ukrainian judicial system does not adequately protect private property or the individual rights of citizens, and does not act as an effective check on executive power and corruption. This is a fundamental challenge that needs to be addressed in the next five to ten years if the country is to become a success story.

Second, the war will leave many scars on the country. These will be destroyed factories and homes (although rebuilding these could allow the country to modernize its infrastructure and productive capacity), and also huge swaths of land will have to be de-mined. Millions of Ukrainians are displaced; many (likely more than a million) will be veterans who will need reintegration into civilian lives, and hundreds of thousands will need medical attention (lost limbs, post-traumatic stress, etc.). Furthermore, there will be a whole generation of children who have not received a proper education through the years of COVID-19 and war. The losses of human capital are enormous and hard to reverse. Ukraine will need the help of its allies and deliberate policies to recover from these adversities.

Yuriy Gorodnichenko is Quantedge Presidential Professor at the Department of Economics, University of California – Berkeley. He received his B.A. and MA at EERC/Kyiv-Mohyla Academy (Kyiv, Ukraine) and his Ph.D. at the University of Michigan. He is broadly interested in macroeconomics and issues related to transition economies (especially, labour markets and firm performance). Gorodnichenko serves on many editorial boards, including Journal of Monetary Economics and VoxUkraine. He is also affiliated with NBER and IZA.

Trackers and Data Visualizations

Jun 15, 2023

Freedom and Prosperity Indexes

The indexes rank 164 countries around the world according to their levels of freedom and prosperity. Use our site to explore twenty-eight years of data, compare countries and regions, and examine the sub-indexes and indicators that comprise our indexes.

The post Ukraine’s recovery hinges on allied support appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Table of contents

Evolution of freedom

Aggregate freedom in Kenya has increased substantially and constantly since 1995, but the data correctly show a marked structural change in 2010. This was a crucial year in the recent politico-economic history of the country as it marked the inauguration of the new constitution, which has been the driving force behind many of the trends shown in the Freedom Index and subindexes. The 2010 Constitution reformed Kenya’s highly centralized institutional architecture, creating a devolved and highly decentralized system. This ensured that lower levels of government (regions and counties) receive much higher levels of funding, that can be better allocated according to the needs of local populations.

The economic freedom subindex clearly presents a jump around 2010, mainly attributable to a significant increase in women’s economic freedom. Legal changes that accompanied the constitutional reform had important effects on women’s empowerment and freedom. The endorsement of the 2010 Constitution established vital rights and encouraged additional reforms towards greater legal gender equality, including reserving seats for women’s political participation and encouraging nondiscrimination and equality. For example, the constitution outlined new principles relating to land policy, including the elimination of gender discrimination in law, customs, and practices related to land. Financial inclusion of women is an important area of improvement, and the Central Bank data—based on various FinAccess Surveys—clearly show that women are becoming much more economically included and empowered. Also, when you look at the disaggregated data for different regions of the country, you find that the gender gap in financial access is actually declining in many counties in Kenya. The growing economic empowerment of women is also evidenced by increasing employment rates of women and a reduction in the gender wage gap in many professions. Legislative changes have allowed women to hold and manage property, and placed them on a more equal legal footing with men in matters relating to property. For example, the passage of the Land Act and Land Registration Act in 2012 increased women’s rights over marital property. Regarding access to education, the gender gap is closing very fast. For example, in many university courses, the proportion of women and men enrolling is now much more equal than was the case a decade ago. The new decentralized constitutional framework has been crucial in creating the conditions in which women’s freedoms can improve. The situation of women is significantly worse in rural areas, but now local and regional governments have the autonomy and resources to provide and generate economic opportunities for women at a devolved level.

The economic freedom subindex also shows a sustained increase in property rights protection, which seems to reflect the judicial reforms that have been introduced since the 1990s. In the last three decades, there has been a significant improvement in the speed of judicial processes, and in the reliability of the guarantees given to domestic and foreign owners. For example, since the inauguration of the new constitution in 2010, parliament has enacted four major land laws aimed at improving land property rights: the Land Act of 2012, the Land Registration Act of 2012, the National Land Commission Act of 2012, and the Community Land Act of 2016. The World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business Index also undoubtedly incentivized Kenyan governments in this period to improve the institutional architecture of the country in order to facilitate economic activity. For example, the move towards “e-government”—the myriad reforms aimed at digitalizing interactions between citizens and government agencies—received a big push in order to improve Kenya’s position in the Doing Business ranking. This was, in fact, achieved in several successive years. The recent digitization of land records in Kenya is a means to improving security, by requiring a landowner to approve all applications relating to a specific property. Digitized records will also reduce the cost and time of land transactions. Section 9 of the Land Registration Act of 2012 facilitated the coming wave of digitalization and e-government by providing the Registrar of Lands with the right to maintain relevant documents in a secure and accessible format, including in electronic files.

Political freedom shows a substantial increase during the 1990s, which captures the movement from a one-party political system to a multiparty system. This was a generalized change in Sub-Saharan Africa, with levels of political freedom increasing in several countries. But such changes are always complicated, because it is easy to introduce political competition on paper, but always difficult in practice. This was a period of great political agitation in Kenya, reflecting broader political liberalization across Africa, with a very intense push for constitutional reform from civil society, resulting in significant achievements. External pressures to liberalize the political space were also crucial.

Kenya is probably one of the countries in Africa with the highest levels of civil and political liberties. However, the data show a significantly lower score for civil liberties than for the rest of the indicators of political freedom. It is likely that this relates to the protests, campaigning, and activism before and after electoral periods, which reached a peak with the serious electoral violence of 2007–08. But in general, Kenya is a society in which civil and political freedom is high, where citizens can express freely their political views, with a vibrant opposition in evidence. Electoral results have been challenged various times in recent years, accompanied by judicial reviews of the electoral results after several recent elections.

The large increase in legal freedom observed in 2010 is single-handedly driven by improved judicial independence and effectiveness, and this again is a product of the new constitution. The judicial system has proven to be very independent from political pressures; the challenges to—and judicial reviews of—the electoral results are a clear sign of this. The clarity of the law also improved significantly during the constitutional reform discussions that crystalized in 2010, and that is also evident in the data. In 2015, the judiciary adopted a nationwide case-tracking tool which enhanced the level of judicial accountability. There has been an attempt to standardize and speed up the handling of cases.

But the decentralization of power brought about by the new constitution has also had a negative side, at least in the short term. This is because now there is an additional level of government, the regional level, which necessarily increases the bureaucracy in the country. Moreover, three levels of government means a significant effort of coordination is required in order to efficiently provide the public services that were concentrated in the central government. These difficulties explain why bureaucracy quality does not show a significant change after 2010. Also, more bureaucracy opens the door for more corruption, especially with such a large structural change in the institutional framework. In recent years, there has been a clear aim to improve bureaucratic quality—for example, with the push for e-government—but Kenya has still a lot of room for progress.

From freedom to prosperity

The rapid growth in income in Kenya starts in 2002, a critical year for the country. In 2002 the country experienced a major political transition when the president, who had run the country for twenty-five years, stepped down. The new leadership was very keen on detailed government planning. They introduced a long-term development plan, called Vision 2030, with the objective of making Kenya an upper middle-income country by the year 2030. It was based on some crucial pillars, one of them being innovation. Kenya has led the region in some critical sectors thanks to this forward-thinking approach. Today, approximately 54 percent of Kenya’s gross domestic product (GDP) is generated by the services sector, parts of which are particularly vibrant and innovative, like tourism and financial services. The latter is a great example. Thanks to the innovative tool of mobile money, financial inclusion increased from 25 percent of the population in 2006 to about 84 percent in 2021, according to the 2021 FinAccess Survey, one of the highest levels in the whole Sub-Saharan Africa region. Mobile money in Kenya, which gained local popularity through the M-PESA application, allows users to deposit, withdraw, transfer money, make payments for goods and services, and access credit through cell phones. Mobile money products have evolved considerably since their introduction to Kenya in 2007, with a considerable range of innovative products and mobile service providers emerging. The agricultural sector, even though it is still very important in terms of employment, has been declining in terms of its contribution to GDP in Kenya and in several Sub-Saharan African countries. For several decades it represented about 30 percent of GDP in Kenya, but this has declined to about 20 percent—a fact reflected in the country’s debasing of GDP, which was carried out in 2021. Kenya is also trying to diversify its exporting industries towards nontraditional sectors. Today, 40 percent of Kenya’s exports are within the region, and these are mostly manufactured goods. With a strong base in manufacturing, Kenya is uniquely placed to benefit from the recently launched African Continental Free Trade Area.

Regarding inequality, the country clearly benefited from the constitutional change of 2010, because the devolved system of government significantly reduced regional disparities. Historically, the northern part of the country, for example, has lagged behind in terms of development because of its severe (semi-desert) climatic conditions. With the new system, funds are more easily transferred and more effectively administered by the regional and local governments, and inequality between rural and urban areas has clearly been reduced. The process of financial inclusion mentioned above, which was given major impetus by the introduction of mobile money in 2007, has been a second driver of reduced inequality. Segments of the population at the lower end of the income distribution have benefited most from this process, because it has opened the door to financing opportunities to start businesses, increase human capital, and so on.

Minority rights are also better protected with the decentralized system of government. The 2010 Constitution enables the state to put in place affirmative action programs to protect minorities and marginalized groups. Communities and ethnic groups that were somewhat marginalized before have been empowered in different regions. Even at a political level, it is clear that there is an effort to include previously silenced communities. The work carried out by civil society organizations has also been crucial on this point, in terms of creating an awareness about minority rights and demands in different parts of the country. This was demonstrated by the broad-based civic education carried out during the constitutional review process that culminated in the 2010 Constitution.

One of the primary goals of the political leadership that took power after 2002 was to improve the level and quality of education in the country. The aim was to reach 100 percent enrollment in primary education, and to increase significantly the enrollment levels in secondary and university education. However, the starting point was very low, so there is still a long way to go, particularly in secondary and tertiary enrollment. According to UNICEF, before the COVID-19 pandemic, nationwide enrollment in primary education in Kenya was at 93 percent while secondary school enrollment was only at 53 percent. Another important aspect is that increasing enrollment at a very fast pace requires vast resources to ensure that the quality of the education pupils receive is high. And this is not always the case in Kenya, even though education forms a very large part of the government budget. Some educational indicators, like the number of teachers, have not kept up with the levels of enrollment. The pupil-to-teacher ratio remains very high in some Kenyan counties. For example, in Turkana County in northern Kenya, it is at 77:1 according to UNICEF. So, the big challenge for the country at present is to improve both quality and quantity.

Once again, the 2010 Constitution will have major effects on life expectancy, and health more generally, but these are probably going to take longer to materialize in the data. Moreover, the slowing of progress on the health indicator in the decade before the COVID-19 pandemic may be explained by the same reason. The implementation of healthcare is now decentralized and run by the regional governments, even though healthcare policy is still in the hands of the central government. It is not easy to start running a regional health service from scratch, and there is obviously a learning period when indicators may even deteriorate. Inadequate resources provided by the national government to the counties and understaffed health facilities in many areas remain critical challenges. But in the medium and long run, once the implementation constraints begin to ease, it seems likely that healthcare services will be delivered more efficiently, and health statistics will show the results.

The future ahead

One of the critical issues that Kenya faces now is how to keep improving productivity. I see manufacturing as an obvious area for improvement, and this should include growing its share of GDP. Today, it is slightly below 10 percent, and Kenya should almost double that. I think we have a big opportunity in Africa with the implementation of the African Continental Free Trade Area. It would create tremendous opportunities for countries like Kenya that have some manufacturing base. Kenya is competing with manufactured goods from Asia and other places that have major cost advantages. Bigger markets, such as those that will become available through the African Continental Free Trade Area, can generate productivity improvements through export competition and also provide economies of scale benefits.

An important challenge for Kenya relates to the large share of informal employment. Moving part of these workers and firms towards formalization will ensure that economic opportunity and development are more stable. And, obviously, higher levels of formal employment and production generate larger and more stable sources of government revenue, as tax compliance is easier with formal sector firms. This will help the already firm path of fiscal consolidation that Kenya has followed in recent years. The current account deficit has also been declining, partly because of reduced imports, but also due to stronger and more competitive exports. This is a very promising path for Kenya, and the country now needs to take advantage not only of regional value chains, but also global value chains, particularly in areas like tourism where Kenya has long-standing experience and a diversity of tourist attractions.

But economic reform and development needs to be accompanied by continued institutional reform and transformation. Further pushing the inclusivity of institutions is the only way to ensure that increasing prosperity in Kenya is based on solid foundations and is therefore sustainable in the long run.

Robert Mudida is currently the director of the Research Department of the Central Bank of Kenya. He was a full-time academic for seventeen years, having taught and carried out extensive research at two leading universities in Africa: the University of Nairobi and Strathmore University. At Strathmore University he was full professor of political economy. He has published four books and numerous articles in top international peer-reviewed journals in the areas of political economy, financial economics, macroeconomics, and industrial organization.

Trackers and Data Visualizations

Jun 15, 2023

Freedom and Prosperity Indexes

The indexes rank 164 countries around the world according to their levels of freedom and prosperity. Use our site to explore twenty-eight years of data, compare countries and regions, and examine the sub-indexes and indicators that comprise our indexes.

The post Stabilizing revenue will lead Kenya to greater prosperity appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Table of contents

Evolution of freedom

The trends shown in the Freedom Index match some key historical events that impacted the region’s trajectory. The wave of democratization that followed the Soviet Union’s fall in 1988–89 peaked during the Asian financial crisis of 1997–98, before stagnating for several years afterwards. Despite, or perhaps because of Indonesia’s transition to democracy in the years after 1998, the overall regional political picture remained relatively constant, with democratic nations sustaining their democratic status and authoritarian countries largely doing the same. This relative stasis led to a plateau in the Freedom Index between 2000 and 2010. The visible improvements in political and economic freedom from 2012 onward are attributable to the quasi-democratic transition in Myanmar, a country previously governed by a military junta for seven decades, as well as greater political dynamism in Malaysia and the region’s overall continued economic liberalization.

The early 2000s also marked an era of substantial economic growth in China, accompanied by limited political liberalization. This trend toward liberalization has taken a dramatic downturn since 2013, which is associated with the rise of Xi Jinping as the paramount leader of China and his hardline approach to governance. This reversal, together with the 2021 coup in Myanmar, has exerted significant downward pressure on freedom across the region. This downward pressure, if weighted by China’s economic and demographic size, would show up even more clearly on the Freedom Index during this period. It is also crucial to acknowledge that the aggregate figures may actually understate the extent to which overall regional freedom was and is under pressure due to China’s internal policy shifts and its external influence over the democratic and economic development of neighboring countries.

On economic freedom, it is striking to observe the remarkable progress made on women’s economic freedom, emerging as a significant positive trend within the broader context. This progress has been led by several countries that recognized the economic potential inherent in women’s participation. This was a priority of the White House-led Women’s Global Development and Prosperity Initiative—that I was a part of—emphasizing the benefits of enhancing female workforce involvement and dismantling regulatory barriers. Such measures were projected to foster substantial economic growth, and by some metrics nearly all economic growth in the region can be attributed to the dramatic increase in women’s economic participation.

Comparatively, other factors like trade freedom, property rights, and investment freedom have shown only marginal improvements over the sample, underlining the pivotal role of women in propelling economic prosperity. This aspect becomes even more profound when considering the exponential economic growth experienced by these countries in the past thirty years. This warrants similar scrutiny to determine if this trend remains consistent on a global scale. There seems to be an undeniable correlation between women’s participation in the workforce and the stimulation of economic growth and prosperity worldwide. While this trend is an overall positive one, given the regression of women’s rights in China under Xi Jinping—a phenomenon that has accelerated in the past five years—we should expect to see a correlating loss of economic momentum across the region. Again, if these numbers were weighted by population and size of economy, China’s regression would wipe out most—if not all—of the recent and projected gains made by other countries in the region.

Overall, recent developments in China reveal a concerning pattern of exerting downward pressure on women’s rights, both politically and economically, in response to demographic challenges. This realization underscores the fragile nature of women’s economic progress, particularly when subjected to external pressures or anti-freedom regulatory changes. The potential impact of these trends could manifest as a significant downward force, consequently jeopardizing decades of progress. The adverse implications could extend to critical areas such as poverty alleviation, health outcomes, environmental sustainability, and educational attainment for entire economies, given the historically strong correlation between these socioeconomic indicators and the economic advancement of women.

On legal freedom, the graph shows periods of marginal improvement followed by stagnation and subsequent regression. Notably, while there appears to be a regional convergence around “legal clarity” and “bureaucracy and corruption” between 2014 and 2018, China sees a sharp divergence on these two issues starting around 2014. These trends coincide with Xi Jinping’s far-reaching anti-corruption campaign at home and the launch of the “Belt and Road” initiative abroad. This period also witnessed a simultaneous shift in China’s legal landscape, namely the reversal of prior, admittedly modest, efforts to cultivate nominally independent judicial and legal institutions that were somewhat separate from the influence of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). With China’s explicit shift from “rule of law” to Xi’s “rule by law” since 2013, law is increasingly utilized as a tool for the CCP to control people and institutions, rather than establishing an independent legal space. This reconsolidation of party control over state institutions wiped out twenty years of progress, with widespread consequences for the rule of law—particularly around the sanctity of contracts and other foundations of economic progress. This increasingly unpredictable legal and policy environment in China has had economic consequences, including a dramatic decline in foreign direct investment and an increase in capital flight.

In many countries in the region, legal freedom is intricately linked to political freedom, particularly in nondemocratic nations. Several of the region’s economies have attempted—with varying degrees of success—to disaggregate economic freedom from political freedom while maintaining a stable and predictable business climate. Singapore is by far the most successful example, but its success is generally considered an anomaly attributable to its small size and the highly competent nature of its ruling elite. Singapore’s long-ruling People’s Action Party (PAP) prizes the country’s reputation as a rule-of-law jurisdiction that maintains high standards and predictability in its banking, legal, and other economically important sectors. It is also worth noting that Singapore has benefited from a loss of confidence in Hong Kong as a regional financial hub. Even as the PAP has allowed a greater degree of personal freedoms in recent years—and maintains the formal aspects of democracy, such as multiparty elections and a functioning legislature—the Lee family dynasty continues to wield enormous influence on politics and policy. By contrast, in Myanmar, promising economic reforms that spurred dramatic economic growth during the 2012–21 “hybrid period” were also aimed at undoing decades of mismanagement by successive military regimes that ruled through extraction, corruption, and violence. Since the February 2021 coup however, the combination of political repression and armed conflict in Myanmar, together with the return of extractive military mismanagement of the economy, has wiped out a decade of substantial economic growth and plunged the country backwards across all freedom and prosperity metrics.

On security, the anomalies in certain periods can be attributed to global events such as the “war on terrorism” which drove legal uncertainties in countries like Indonesia and Malaysia. The period between 1998 and 2002 witnessed particularly intense geopolitical shifts in the region, including the establishment of Timor-Leste and Indonesia’s overall positive trajectory. However, while there have not been similarly earth-shaking transitions in recent years, the region has experienced an increased level of volatility from military coups in Thailand and Myanmar, political disruption in the Philippines and Malaysia, increasing authoritarianism in Cambodia, and China’s military adventurism towards Taiwan and grey-zone antagonism in the South China Sea, all of which have negatively influenced the overall political and legal landscape.

From freedom to prosperity

Consistently maintaining a 3-point lead over the global average in terms of overall prosperity from 1995 to 2019, the East Asia & the Pacific region has shown a remarkable level of economic resilience despite an often tumultuous political environment. With significant progress since the early 2000s, the average income score in the region has surged, positioning the region 5.5 points ahead of the global average by 2022, when the two had been roughly equal in the year 2000.

But it is also worth noting that, despite the frequent invocation of “the East Asian miracle,” the overall prosperity score for the region is parallel to the global trajectory, displaying a proportionate trend rather than a significant disparity. We know that over the past three decades China alone has contributed close to three-quarters of the overall global reduction in the number of people living in extreme poverty, but looking at overall prosperity brings a new light to that progress in the region. As in other regions, there is a complex interplay between economic growth, inequality, educational attainment, and minority rights that defies easy categorization or explanations.

As we see in the data, rapid economic expansion in nondemocratic countries can lead to progress on education and health indicators, but often coincides with growing income inequality. Environmental sustainability also appears to be a critical area for attention, as the region shows much slower progress than the global average on the environment indicator. This issue deserves a greater focus given the region is home to some of the largest and fastest-growing carbon emitters in the world and some of the planet’s most important and vulnerable areas for biodiversity, climate risk, and the blue economy.

The region also features a notable trend in the context of minority rights, where we see a lot of fluctuation. After a significant positive surge in recognition and protection following the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Soviet Union, events such as the 9/11 attacks, the war on terrorism, and global financial crises appear to have contributed to periods of stagnation and eventual regression. While international efforts to bolster human rights mechanisms focusing on minority rights intensified, the global trend in terms of actual impact remained mostly negative, and we see only minimal and isolated improvements in the region. Yet a closer examination reveals the intrinsic connection between minority rights and inequality. Looking at these two indicators together allows for a more nuanced understanding of the challenges faced by marginalized groups within societies experiencing rapid economic prosperity, and raises a number of interesting questions about sustainability and internal stability for both developing and developed countries in the region.

On education, the fact that the region is in line with the global trend is surprising, and could be considered something of a failure for a region that has been prioritizing progress on educational attainment for decades. Understanding this phenomenon would require a more nuanced evaluation of the region’s educational policies and practices, as well as the impact of social mobility and other economic factors.

The future ahead

The impact of China’s actions within and beyond its borders holds significant sway over the political and economic dynamics of the region. While the unweighted data offers a tantalizing glimpse of this impact, a weighted analysis that reflected China’s economic and demographic heft would likely further reveal its profound influence on political and economic freedoms across East Asia & the Pacific. The practices emerging from the People’s Republic of China, particularly the establishment of Beijing-facing economic infrastructure along the Belt and Road, contribute to a discouraging feedback loop. China’s mercantilist approach, both in its direct relationships with other countries and as articulated in Xi Jinping’s Global Development Initiative, is clearly geared towards replicating China’s securitization of governance and its state-led model of economic development across China’s near abroad. While other regional powers such as Japan, South Korea, and Australia are attempting to push back on this overall trendline—and there are indications that China’s economic weakness may inhibit its ability to project both power and ideology going forward—the sheer mass and momentum of the past decade’s efforts will continue to impede the expansion of freedom in the region.

One powerful force that could potentially counteract Beijing’s authoritarian trend is the persistence and consistency with which the region’s youth population has demonstrated its rejection of authoritarian governance models. From the revolution in Myanmar to the uprising in Hong Kong, and the May 2023 electoral results in Thailand, there has been a clear regional demand from young people for more responsive political systems and more sustainable and equitable growth. This youth wave dovetails with the region’s vulnerability to climate-related challenges, notably in Pacific Island states and littoral nations affected by extreme weather events, and many are calling for a concerted focus on environmental preservation and pragmatic solutions. Beyond the existential threats faced by the most vulnerable states, the general pursuit of cleaner air and water, fewer plastics, lower carbon emissions, and protection of biodiversity, has gained momentum across societies in the region as they progress, modernize, and move up the value chain.

Persistent challenges such as inequality, weak protection of minority and women’s rights, underdeveloped political institutions, endemic corruption, and regression in the rule of law are likely to continue to impede the region’s pursuit of both freedom and prosperity. While China’s influence contributes to these challenges, its success is largely derived from taking advantage of long-standing institutional weaknesses within individual countries. The persistence of weak institutions in developing Asian countries, despite substantial aid from various international donors and entities over a period of decades, deserves greater attention. Internal political instability, highly consequential elections, and ongoing armed conflicts within the region add further pressure, creating an environment of uncertainty and turbulence.

The slow growth of prosperous mature economies like Japan, Australia, and South Korea, coupled with the struggles of middle-income and low-income countries, underscores the need for diversified economic strategies toward this complex region. The persistent downward pressure on political freedom likewise highlights the imperative for stable democracies and allied partners to prioritize reinforcement of effective and pluralistic governing institutions in the region. Acknowledging the time and effort required to build political and economic resilience is crucial, especially in anticipating and effectively managing a potential conflict over Taiwan. The global implications of such a conflict are vast, as are the threats to regional and global stability and prosperity posed by the rogue regime in North Korea.

The more stable Southeast Asian countries continue to struggle with efforts to evade the middle-income trap. Recent trends in supply chain diversification away from China could prove to be an important opportunity for countries like Indonesia, Thailand, Vietnam, and Malaysia. This diversification has opened up new prospects for these countries, leading to an increasing focus on value-added production. Notably, countries such as Indonesia are actively striving to enhance their domestic production capabilities and move up the value chain, reducing reliance on the export of raw materials and commodities to China. This shift has garnered interest from affluent countries in the region, including South Korea, Japan, and Australia, which are extending support in critical areas such as critical minerals supply chain capabilities.

Amidst these developments, it is evident that positive economic prospects persist, although the sustained pressure on political freedom remains a concern. As such, stable and prosperous democracies in the region, along with their allied regional and global partners like the United States, Europe, and Canada, must continue their concerted efforts to strengthen institutions within these countries. It is crucial to recognize that progress in this domain may not be immediately visible, but the resilience and robustness of these countries’ institutions when faced with inevitable pressures and shocks—whether of the “black swan” or “grey rhino” variety—will be the ultimate measure of success.

Amb. (ret.) Kelley E. Currie is a nonresident senior fellow for the Atlantic Council’s Freedom and Prosperity Center and Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. She is also a founding partner of Kilo Alpha Strategies, a boutique geopolitical advisory firm. In addition, she currently serves as a senior adviser to the Krach Institute for Tech Diplomacy at Purdue University and as a member of the board of directors of the National Endowment for Democracy, the board of governors of the East-West Center, and the advisory boards of Spirit of America and the Vandenberg Coalition.

Trackers and Data Visualizations

Jun 15, 2023

Freedom and Prosperity Indexes

The indexes rank 164 countries around the world according to their levels of freedom and prosperity. Use our site to explore twenty-eight years of data, compare countries and regions, and examine the sub-indexes and indicators that comprise our indexes.

The post China’s authoritarian trend meets resistance in East Asia and the Pacific appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The post Dickinson interviewed by Radio Tavisupleba, RFE/RL’s Georgian service appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Imagine Russia in 2030. Will it resemble today’s imperial kleptocracy? Will it be a Western-style democracy? Will the Russian Federation exist at all? As Russia’s unprovoked invasion of Ukraine continues, the questions of what comes next have never been more pertinent. However, while questions of future developments in Ukraine continue to dominate discourse in places like Washington and Brussels, far less attention has been paid to what comes next in Moscow, and across the Russian Federation. Indeed, the discussion of developments within—and policy surrounding—Russia’s potential future has been largely muted across the West. Even after former militia head Yevgeny Prigozhin’s failed 2023 putsch, serious discussion regarding potential Russian futures remained largely subdued.

But given the magnitude and fallout of Russia’s invasion, to say nothing of the ongoing threats that a revanchist Kremlin poses to the West and its allies elsewhere, this lack of discussion surrounding Russia’s potential future is increasingly inexcusable. As such, this essay will seek to rectify that inadequate oversight in the broader policy conversations about Russia’s path forward.

Briefly, the five scenarios detailed below include:

• Putin’s continued rule
• Putin’s ouster, followed by the installation of a far-right, nationalistic figure or cadre
• Putin’s ouster, followed by a technocratic, if still largely antidemocratic, regime
• Putin’s ouster, followed by the rise of a liberal, thoroughly pro-Western government
• Russian Federation state fracture

These sections include potential developments leading to and through each scenario—imagining what such a scenario would entail—as well as how the West should respond strategically if the scenario comes to pass, as well as potential time horizons.

These scenarios should not be taken as necessarily exhaustive. Instead, these five scenarios should be treated as the five likeliest scenarios moving forward.

All five scenarios should be considered within Western capitals—and attendant policy tool kits should begin to be formulated in preparation of each potential scenario. While this will require efforts and exertion from Western policymakers, such efforts are necessary. After all, if there is one thing the rise of Putin’s regime has illustrated, it is that the West’s lack of broader Russian strategy—and the lack of preparation for potential openings in Russia—helped accelerate Moscow’s aggression and helped fuel the Kremlin’s irredentism. The more prepared the West can be for potential openings and potential evolutions in Russia moving forward, the better off all of us—including those in Russia—will be.

Explore the five scenarios

Scenario #1

Putin’s Russia survives

Scenario #2

Nationalists rise

Scenario #3

Technocrats reset

Scenario #4

Democracy triumphs

Scenario #5

The empire collapses

Scenario #1: Long live President Putin

Details: Following Russia’s expanded invasion of Ukraine in 2022, and the immediate quagmire and myriad failures Russia encountered, many observers in the West were quick to predict Putin’s downfall. And understandably so. Not only have bungled wars—from the Crimean War and Russo-Japanese War to World War I and the invasion of Afghanistan—long preceded significant political shifts in Moscow, but the immediate salvo of sanctions threatened to bring the Russian economy to its knees.

And to be sure, there have been costs: tens and potentially hundreds of thousands of dead Russian fighters, all without achieving even the barest Russian strategic goals in Ukraine; an overheated economy hurtling toward autarky; a looming nationwide mobilization, with the prospect of martial law on the horizon; all while Russia watches its geopolitical import crumble from the Caucasus to Central Asia. Putin’s unprovoked invasion is, in many ways, the greatest unforced geopolitical error Moscow has seen in decades—and potentially ever.

And yet, years after Russia first invaded Ukraine, the status quo in the Kremlin prevails. A cowed Russian populace refuses to march for anything other than local concerns. Saturated in a mixture of apathy and fear—and for a good chunk of Putin’s base, even support for a revanchist war—Russians refuse to move against the regime.

In the Kremlin, Putin continues to pursue the same domestic strategies he and his inner circle have perfected for a quarter of a century: jailing or exiling opposition figures, obliterating opposition media, and gathering more levers of power to the Kremlin itself. Putin’s moves toward outright dictatorship, and even totalitarianism, continue apace. Even while the Russian military sputters in Ukraine, and while the specter of a frozen conflict emerges across southern Ukraine, Putin’s grip on power strengthens. As Putin sees it, if the status quo can prevail, then so will he.

And so, Russia and its war in Ukraine slog on. Putin continues mortgaging Russia’s future because of his monomaniacal obsession with Ukraine, and bets on a Western alliance fracturing. And while it’s no guarantee for victory, it’s hardly a bet he is guaranteed to lose—especially if, in January 2025, former US president Donald Trump, who has refused to commit to backing Ukraine against Russia, returns to power and cuts off aid. This would in effect allow Putin the dominance of former Russian colonies that he has long craved.

Strategy and policy prescriptions: The strategy for such a potential outcome is relatively simple, entailing a continuation, expansion, and enhancement of the current slate of policy prescriptions. The current administration, as well as future administrations, should build on President Joe Biden’s recent Oval Office speech, making it clear that the US objective is containing an expansionist Kremlin, both to secure core US interests and to send a message to China not to touch Taiwan.

More specifically, such policies should include the expansion and strengthening of the current sanctions regime. Likewise, this includes the consideration of the expansion of secondary sanctions designations and leaning on nations like Turkey, India, and the United Arab Emirates to follow Western sanctions programs or face potential consequences. Further, this policy entails the strengthening of the price cap on Russian hydrocarbons, as well as the Group of Seven-led seizure of frozen Russian Central Bank assets, which can be rerouted to Ukrainian reconstruction efforts. In the security space, Western policymakers should pursue the increase of NATO forward operability capacity in Eastern European partner nations, as well as enhancing NATO-based security relationships with non-NATO partners, such as Bosnia and Kosovo.

In Ukraine, this entails an expedited path to European Union membership, as well as continued expansion and formalization of security partnerships and armaments shipments, focusing on providing the Ukrainians the tools required to fully succeed in defending their nation against Russian aggression. Elsewhere, the West should increase support to other nations targeted by Russian nationalists, including Moldova and Kazakhstan, so long as such assistance is predicated on democratic reforms (especially in the latter). Most broadly, this entails assuring partners elsewhere, especially in Kyiv, that the West will continue to support Ukraine’s efforts until every inch of Ukrainian territory is restored to Ukrainian sovereignty.

So long as Putin remains in power, Russia’s unprovoked war will continue, with designs on far broader conflagration. The West must use every tool it can find to force Russians—both those in the Kremlin and the broader populace itself—to realize the futility of Putin remaining as president.

Time horizons and likelihood: In the coming few years, and barring any unforeseen health concerns for Putin, this scenario is unfortunately the likeliest of the grouping presented in this paper. Given the endogenous factors in Russia—not least the lack of domestic pushback, even after Russia has seen more casualties than anything experienced since World War II—there is little reason to think that Putin cannot continue for the foreseeable future, so long as he faces no clear military defeat in Ukraine. While the Russian economy has shown clear struggles, it hardly appears near collapse.

Indeed, Putin’s strategy of simply waiting out the West is, presumably, his likeliest path to outright victory, not least considering the outlook for the US 2024 presidential election. And it is a strategy that must be shown to fail. The West must stand united, and must stand by Kyiv, regardless of the time horizon. The alternative would present a precedent devastating to stability in Europe, as well as globally—not least that it would illustrate that a nuclear-armed power can successfully invade, devastate, and carve up nonnuclear neighbors, including those that have already given up their nuclear arsenal.

Putin, in other words, may yet get the “long war” he desired. But he cannot—and must not—win.

Scenario #2: Nationalists rising

Details: In June 2023, Putin faced arguably the greatest threat to his grip on power yet seen. Led by caterer-turned-warlord Yevgeny Prigozhin, members of the Wagner Group private military company effectively took control of the southern Russian city of Rostov-on-Don, before marching hundreds of kilometers toward Moscow. While the forces themselves never reached the Kremlin—and significant confusion remains regarding the march’s ultimate objective—the quasi-mutiny, quasi-putsch revealed just how thin the base of Putin’s support appeared. That is, even while Wagner forces hauled north, few Russians appeared willing to stand in their way. To butcher a phrase, the emperor may not have been naked, but he certainly appeared with far fewer clothes than previously assumed. This reticence to back Putin was made all the more stark by Prigozhin’s previous comments on the war in Ukraine, which slammed not only Russia’s military leadership but the entire rationale for invasion in the first place.

Of course, by late 2023, Putin remained in power, while Prigozhin and his inner circle exploded in spectacular fashion. Yet even with Prigozhin’s death, the shallowness of Putin’s support is not something that can simply be forgotten or washed away. Moreover, combined with Putin’s increasingly obvious strategic blunders in Ukraine—and the climbing death tolls as well as ongoing assaults on Russian territory proper—there’s little reason to think he’ll manage to shore up that support anytime soon.

All of which presents a recipe, and an opening, for success for the one contingent that has becoming increasingly vocal and increasingly strident in its criticisms of Putin’s leadership: Russian nationalists. Indeed, while some had seen Prigozhin as perhaps the most prominent far-right figure—and certainly the one who illustrated what such a contingent can achieve, both domestically and internationally—other prominent Russian nationalists persist within and outside the Kremlin.

Indeed, it’s not difficult to imagine a scenario in which Putin, beset and besieged over his continued failings in Ukraine, finds his domestic support continuing to waffle, and even potentially crumble. This is a man, after all, who wagered Russia’s future on an historically futile, stupid gesture. And everyone, despite the best efforts of Russian propaganda organs, can see it. Meanwhile, the Russian body politic has begun fracturing: frustrated veterans committees have expanded; unemployed Russian youths increasingly gravitate toward nationalistic rhetoric; and local politicians unable to pay for basic services turn toward a nationalistic populism to remain in power.

Unlike the last time Russia experienced a far-right coup attempt—in 1991, following the Soviet KGB’s failed effort to depose Mikhail Gorbachev—there is a clear constituency willing, even happy, to welcome the rise of a nationalistic regime to replace Putin’s kleptocracy. Such a scenario, thanks to Prigozhin, can no longer be dismissed. And should it succeed, it will replace Putin’s fascistic lurch with outright Russian fascism—predicated on restoring a mythical Russian “nation,” and targeting all enemies both domestic and foreign. The notion of a rossiskii nation-state—of a broader, heterogenous Russian Federation—would be summarily replaced by a focus on the russkii ethnos, and on a restoration of a purified, sacrosanct, ethnically Russian people.

Russia, these nationalists claim, will rise once more. Putin may have had the right designs, but he was too weak or too corrupted to see such a project to its completion. Now, these nationalists argue, they can restore Russia to its rightful place—and ethnic Russians to their rightful glory.

Strategy and policy prescriptions: As with the scenario in which Putin remains ensconced in power, the broader strategy and policy playbook for the rise of a far-right, nationalistic regime in Russia remains largely the same. The continuation and extension of sanctions; the retention of a price cap on Russian hydrocarbon exports; the seizure of Russian Central Bank assets as a means of funding Ukrainian reconstruction; the enhancement of NATO forward operability; and more. All the policy prescriptions outlined in Scenario #1 are applicable to Scenario #2—because any nationalistic regime will share broadly similar geopolitical contours and theories as Putin, especially as it pertains to a (perpetual?) standoff with the West.

Given the paucity of resources available to the Russian military, a rising nationalistic regime may, at least in the short term, prefer to freeze the conflict in Ukraine, if not pull back from certain pockets. Without the legitimacy of political capital to call for a nationwide mobilization, such a nationalistic regime may opt to avoid escalation with Ukraine and the West, while pinning the strategic failures in Ukraine on Putin.

Such a stand-down would provide ample opportunity for the West to expand its existing playbook, especially as it pertains to shoring up Ukrainian arms and defenses. Likewise, and arguably more so than if Putin simply remains in power, such a scenario would present the West with far greater openings to rebuilding and shoring up relations with Russia’s neighbors, especially those targeted by Russian nationalistic rhetoric. From Belarus to Georgia, from Armenia to Kazakhstan, the West can focus diplomatic and, to an extent, security-related efforts on strengthening links with these nations.

All the while, the West must recall that any such regime in Russia will only turn inward for a set period. Such a pullback—in Ukraine or elsewhere—would only be temporary, presenting a mere lull in conflicts in Europe. A quasi-détente could arise, but it would hardly last. And the West must prepare for when that détente crumbles and such nationalists turn outward once more. If anything, such a prospective reality harkens back to a strategy that once served the West well: containment, for as long as the regime may remain. After all, containment helped to hem in Soviet expansionism—and could once more help to rein in an expansionist Moscow.

Time horizons and likelihood: Given Prigozhin’s failure—and the consequences of such failure, not least his spectacular death—the likelihood of such a rightward putsch is arguably less than it was just a year ago. It also is possible that some would-be kings conclude from the Prigozhin affair that his mistake was not launching the coup, but calling it off. But even if the possibility of a coup has diminished, such a threat has hardly been eliminated. Absent other unanticipated events, it remains arguably the second-likeliest scenario over any time horizon. Indeed, as the Russian economy continues to deflate, and especially as Russian casualties continue to pile up in Ukraine, the likelihood of such a scenario increases over time.

Put another way: as Russia continues to fail and flail in Ukraine, the potential for a “stabbed in the back” scenario only gains ground. And it is that failure narrative that nationalists would use against Putin—and as a propellant to potential power, for years to come.

Scenario #3: Technocratic reset

Details: As the years following Putin’s disastrous invasion wind on—and as the Russian economy spins toward collapse, with Moscow’s increasing irrelevance as a geopolitical player—it becomes clear to those in the Kremlin and elsewhere that there is no damage Putin isn’t willing to incur in his messianic mission to bring Ukraine to heel. Little matter that Western unity isn’t folding, or that Ukraine’s accession into the European Union is formalizing Kyiv’s Western trajectory. For Putin, victory is just around the corner.

That is, until a cadre of Kremlin insiders gather in his office, and it isn’t. In scenes reminiscent of Nikita Khrushchev’s 1964 ouster, an internal putsch removes Putin from power. Feting the now-former president as a restorer of Russian greatness, and as a worthy heir to imperial predecessors, the new regime nonetheless shunts Putin to the side, offering him a gilded retirement within his Black Sea palace, and pledging to never prosecute the former president (though that pledge does not necessarily apply to his closest allies).

Soon, the new regime—helmed by a small number of Western-trained, technocratic elites—begins implementing a range of post-Putin policies. They sound out potential diplomatic channels in the West, putting out feelers to those in Washington, London, Brussels, and even Kyiv. The new officials steering decisions in the Kremlin rescind previous Russian policies extending presidential terms, announcing snap elections scheduled for later that year. They likewise free some political prisoners and opposition politicians—though they pointedly refrain from reducing Alexey Navalny’s sentence, citing concerns about interfering in the Russian judiciary.

In public pronouncements, the new regime neuters nationalistic rhetoric. While they refrain from criticizing Putin outright, they nonetheless gesture at vague “mistakes” Russia had made in previous years, which they would seek to correct. With the conflict in Ukraine effectively frozen, they use Track II diplomacy to float a potential land-for-peace resolution to the conflict: retaining Crimea, but removing Russian troops from the remainder of Ukraine, while likewise rescinding Putin’s September 2022 annexations. And domestically, the new officials in the Kremlin announce an end to Putin’s autarkic lurch. They continue to protest the West’s freeze of Russian Central Bank assets, but they begin organizing meetings in Washington and Brussels to discuss means of lifting both sanctions and price caps.

All of it was, to many in the West, welcome. Such a new regime is not democratic, per se; but the new regime, led by a placeholder without an independent base of support—say, current Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin—would continue, even after the snap elections. But markets respond positively, as do a range of Western policymakers who call to give this “new Russia” a chance. An array of Western public relations experts swoops in, launching campaigns to highlight the regime’s “reformist” credentials. In backroom discussions, Russian officials begin expressing frustration to Western partners about Moscow’s “junior partner” role vis-à-vis China, and highlighting the role the Kremlin could play as a potential counterweight to Beijing.

And one word—a word that hadn’t been seen in years—begins floating around again: reset. Not like those resets seen previously, most especially (and notoriously) in 2009. But a real, honest reset. That’s what could emerge between this “new Russia” and the West (absent Kyiv, at least). A reset, finally done right. A reset that could actually, for the first time, work. Right?

Strategy and policy prescriptions: There’s reason to find appeal in any scenario that sees the replacement of Putin with a technocratic, reformist regime. Indeed, many of the topics mentioned in this scenario—removal of Russian forces from Ukrainian territory; annulment of 2022 annexations; lifting of restrictions on civil society and political opposition—should be encouraged.

However, despite the appeal of such progress, any optimism about a potential technocratic shift should be tempered. Not only would such a scenario fail to guarantee the success of Western strategy in Ukraine—that is, the new regime would likely insist on some form of sovereignty over the Crimean peninsula—but it would fail to pursue either full-scale lustration or large-scale democratic reforms. Rather than assigning culpability for Russia’s war in Ukraine to the nation itself, such a technocratic regime would rather place responsibility upon Putin and his inner circle. And rather than pursue reparations and restorative justice regarding Ukraine, such a regime would not only decline such calls, but claim that both topics were nonstarters.

There would be plenty of Westerners who see such progress as a means of restoring relations with Moscow to a status quo antebellum. And to be sure, such a reformist regime would be a significant improvement over its Putinist predecessor. The war would be, for all intents and purposes, over.

And yet, this is a story that many in the West have seen before: Russia may not be a democracy, the claims go, but it was “transitioning.” And it may not offer full property rights or an impartial judiciary, but it was nonetheless open for Western investment.

As we know, every time this reset-based approach has been pursued, Western interlocutors have ended up appearing foolish, myopic, or both. With all previous iterations ending in friction and frustration, such a reset-based strategy must be treated with severe skepticism. And while such democratic reforms should be encouraged and incentivized—such as by predicating sanctions relief on lifting restrictions on civil society, or on reparations for Ukraine—any improvements should be treated as temporary.

To paraphrase a previous administration: should a new, technocratic regime emerge from the rubble of Putinism, the strategy is simple: distrust, but verify. The policy slate should include a number of the containment measures mentioned above, not least as a hedge against Russia’s potential return to revanchism—and as a price for any continued occupation—but dialogue should commence, with a clear signal of a willingness to address ongoing concerns.

Time horizons and likelihood: While such a scenario cannot be dismissed out of hand, it is hardly likelier in the near term than Putin’s retention of power, or even a rightward putsch installing a nationalistic regime. However, and for many of the strategic and geoeconomic reasons outlined in Scenario #2, the likelihood of a reformist, technocratic government emerging in Moscow increases in likelihood over the medium term. Indeed, one factor that may make this scenario more likely than the nationalistic turn over the medium term is support and encouragement from Western partners, who will seek to offer swift recognition of any cadre bearing such reformist credentials.

But Western partners, for all the reasons listed above, should be careful—or, at the least, should be careful what they wish for. After all, in the early 2000s, Western partners were happy to back a new president rising who pronounced a willingness to pursue economic and even potentially political liberalization. Nearly a quarter of a century later, that president remains in power and is now the author of the greatest bloodshed Europe has seen since World War II.

Scenario #4: Democratic Russia returns home

Details: Years after launching a series of bloody, futile wars across its former colonial space, protests erupt around the country, demanding change. Too many of the protesters’ compatriots had already died, carried home in coffins from lands no longer theirs. Global pressure, especially from the West, becomes too much to bear. And, with coffers draining, the national economy teeters, bringing back memories among the older generations of previous economic ruin. It is time for something new. It is time, at last, to put these neoimperial dreams to bed. And it is time, at last, for democracy.

For those who study comparative imperial formation and, especially, imperial collapse, it is a familiar story. It is a playbook that was seen in the British Empire, undone by Irish republicans in the 1910s and by Indian patriots in the 1940s. It is a story seen in France, battered by failures in Algeria and Vietnam in the mid-twentieth century. It is a story seen in Portugal in the 1970s, when the vestiges of Lisbon’s southern African empire finally achieved independence. It is a story that European empire upon European empire had already experienced, effectively killing off the vestiges of imperial sentiment and any remaining revanchist tendencies in the former empires.

And now, thanks to Ukraine’s victories, Putin’s cascading failures, and economic ruin in the offing, it is Russia’s turn to experience the story. And Russia, just as every former European empire elsewhere, does not disappoint. Indeed, there is plenty of reformist history for Russians themselves to build on. After all, some of the most remarkable moments of democratic change in Russian history—the end of serfdom in the 1860s, the creation of the Duma in the early 1900s—came after military defeats in foreign wars.

In echoes of similar movements in the 1980s and early 1990s, after another failed military adventure in Afghanistan, Russians witness failure in Ukraine, and once again march en masse for change. And not just in Moscow, but in Irkutsk and Vladivostok, in Tomsk and Arkhangelsk, over and over, gathering pace and force as they demand change. There is a world of disagreement: on economic policy, on judicial reform, on potentially joining an expanded European Union. But at their broadest, the protests center on three elements:

1. Decentralization: unwinding the presidential powers, and amending Russia’s 1993 constitution to restore federalism and local sovereignties.
2. Deconfliction: removing Russian armed backing of separatist polities in Moldova, Georgia, and especially Ukraine.
3. Democracy: in the form of free and fair elections, at both local and national levels.

It is all so immediate, so swift, that Western policymakers can’t wrap their minds around it. It is a redux of 1989, or even 1991. This time, though, it is predicated on Russia’s colonialist, neoimperial failures, there for all to see. And this time, it comes with authorities in Moscow finally taking responsibility for the Kremlin’s colonialist crimes and an overdue recognition of Russia’s colonial legacies.

The final European empire has, at last, crumbled. And a post-imperial—and democratic—Russia emerges, ready to rejoin its European family.

Strategy and policy prescriptions: This outcome is among the best the West could possibly envision—and should be the one to incentivize, encourage, and accelerate. Opening dialogue on sanctions relief, especially related to domestic political and economic reforms, is a must. Providing investigative resources, such that a new Russian government can further investigate the crimes of the Putin regime and its allies, can also expedite a project of lustration. Rather than seizing frozen Russian Central Bank assets, the West can predicate their return upon Moscow sending reparations to Ukraine. The United States should likewise push to open further consular offices across Russia, including in Grozny, Yakutsk, Saint Petersburg, and elsewhere. Throughout, the West should provide diplomatic support for a broad array of democratic reforms—including the potential independence referenda proposed by Russian authorities—and offer the aid of constitutional experts from other parliamentary, federal democracies, including Canada and Germany.

All the while, the West must not—absolutely must not—get overexcited about such shifts taking place in Russia. More directly, the West must be especially attuned to any revanchist, neoimperialist rhetoric or posturing from Moscow. Indeed, it can be argued that ignoring the revanchism percolating around Boris Yeltsin’s and Vladimir Putin’s early years helped blind the West to the later imperialism saturating the Kremlin. Navalny, for instance, has a clear record of chauvinistic, neoimperialistic comments regarding non-Russian populations and former Russian colonies. While Navalny has largely recanted such statements, the West must be ever vigilant about any comments or related policies gaining credence and traction in Moscow.

In other words, the West should follow a simple policy: trust, but verify. Only then will Russia firmly enter its postimperial phase—and Europe will, at last, become whole, united, and free.

Time horizons and likelihood: While this scenario cannot be dismissed, it is unfortunately unlikely over the near and medium term. Given the decimation of Russian opposition parties and leadership, as well as the clear dearth of support from the broader Russian body politic, any dreams of a thoroughly democratic Russia in the foreseeable future are mere illusions.

However, over a longer time horizon—measured perhaps in decades, rather than years—such an outcome only grows in likelihood. The postimperial trajectories of Portugal, Spain, France, and other former European empires took decades to reach their completion. There’s no reason to think that Russia won’t follow a similar trajectory—or that it won’t eventually find its way to its European home.

Scenario #5: Chaos, civil war, and colonial freedoms

Details: Perhaps this was always inevitable. A country that refuses to recognize its brutal imperial history—a country that refuses to even recognize its role as a colonizer, obliterating and consuming surrounding nations—is always going to explode. Then factor in its geographic expanse, its crumbling economy, the exploding number of deaths in a senseless imperial war, the collapse of any kind of ruling legitimacy in the imperial metropole, and long-buried frictions and frustrations suddenly rippling across the country. A nation supposedly united under the steady hand of Moscow suddenly splinters, suddenly shatters, shredded along ethnonationalist lines—torn, as with other empires before it, between the colonizer and the colonized. Chaos sprints across the nation, which collapses into a mixture of anarchy, territorial fragmentation, and violence that leaves no region, and no family, untouched.

Such a scenario may, from the vantage of 2023, appear fanciful, almost fantastical. But it is a scenario that wracked Russia in the late 1910s and the early 1920s. It is a situation that unwound the Soviet Union in the late 1980s and early 1990s. And given the tinder Putin and his allies have built—from the failures in Ukraine to the imploding economy, to the targeting and in some cases terrorizing of minority populations, even to the rote refusal to acknowledge that Russia ever committed any colonial crimes—there’s little reason to think such a scenario cannot emerge in Russia once more, unleashing a frenzy of fracture and bloodshed across the empire yet again.

Indeed, it’s a scenario that’s increasingly easy to envision, especially as the twinned failures of Ukraine and the economy continue apace. Perhaps in Chechnya, an increasingly unhealthy Ramzan Kadyrov dies in office, and infighting over a successor spirals into a third Chechen War. Perhaps in Tatarstan, veterans’ committees and local students gather to protest both Moscow’s recruitment of Tatar infantry and smothering of Tatar identity—and the Kremlin, in a fit of failed strategy, opens fire on the protesters, sparking a broader anticolonial movement in Tatarstan. Or perhaps, in Sakha, unemployed Sakha men storm and seize control of Russian hydrocarbon infrastructure, demanding the funds be returned to their colonized nation, and demanding the sovereignty they agreed to in the early 1990s.

Again, these scenarios may all seem somewhat fanciful, insofar as Chechnya, Tatarstan, and Sakha have never enjoyed any kind of international recognition as independent polities—and Moscow has never evinced any interest in allowing them any kind of freedom.

But there are two points worth considering. First, all three colonies nearly obtained either full or near independence in the early 1990s. Chechnya, of course, is the most well-known example, with the Chechen nation decimated as a result. But in 1992, residents of Tatarstan clearly voted for full sovereignty, to be placed on equal footing with the Russian Federation. And Sakha leadership, in negotiations with Moscow, were promised in the 1990s everything from control of local revenues to the formation of a Sakha army.

All three—as well as a range of other polities including Bashkortostan, Dagestan, Buryatia, and more—watched their efforts at sovereignty collapse, undone by a renewed imperialism emanating from Moscow. And yet, all three of those efforts are within living memory. They’ve hardly dissipated, let alone disappeared. All it would take to renew such efforts would be the continuation of policies pursued by Putin—authored by the man who sees himself as the gatherer of Russian lands.

Given things like Prigozhin’s march and the increasing descent into conspiratorial mania from Putin, it is all too easy to envision a looming collapse of authority in Moscow, with an array of forces attempting to seize power. Perhaps that takes the form of the circa-1918 Russian Civil War, in which a competing array of anarchists, authoritarians (if not monarchists), fascists, and reformists launch putsch after putsch, destabilizing national policy. Distracted and destabilized, violence, tinged especially with anti-Russian animus, emerges once more in colonized republics, extending even to places like Tyva, Kalmykia, and Karelia. Declarations of independence rumble across Russia, and a parade of sovereignties once more emerges. All the while, militias congeal around Moscow, with no clear majority support from the broader Russian body politic.

History may not repeat; civil conflict may not claim the lives of tens of millions, and state collapse may not allow all of Russia’s current colonial holdings to gain their final freedom. But history can certainly rhyme. All empires, after all, collapse. And thinking Russia’s would be any different—that it wasn’t inevitable—was always going to be wishful thinking.

Strategy and policy prescriptions: On its face, such a scenario is potentially the most perilous of the paths forward for not only Russia, but for the West. While a range of concerns intersect with such an outcome, the overriding concern of such a path lies in the safety and security of Russia’s nuclear arsenal. Securing the stability of Russia’s nuclear arms must remain paramount as the West proceeds to navigate Russia’s fracturing polity. While the West successfully navigated a similar scenario during the Soviet collapse, such a precedent is not necessarily predictive in any future Russian state fracture. Where Kazakhstan, Belarus, Ukraine, and the Russian Federation were clear inheritors of the Soviet Union’s nuclear arsenal, such a clear line of ownership and control is not necessarily guaranteed should Moscow fall to infighting, and regions and nations colonized by Russian forces once more demand independence.

Such concern intersects with one of the other prongs of preparing for such a scenario: building links with regional elites, as well as regional opposition movements, that may act as inheritors of such an arsenal—and may be able to successfully navigate any Russian state degradation. Alongside the specific need to expand Tatar-, Sakha-, and Chechen-language education for Western policymakers, the West should focus on broader familiarity, political and otherwise, with these colonized nations. Constructing such links and networks can help mitigate the fallout of a power vacuum in Moscow—and help the West not only secure any loosening of nuclear security, but also craft the post-Putin, and potentially even post-Russian, futures of such polities. Strong consideration should be given to the potential for swift recognition of places like Chechnya, Tatarstan, Sakha, and others—so long as such polities exhibit clear signs of democracy and willingness to aid in nuclear security.

In such a fracturing Russia, priority should be given to a range of topics, from managing refugee outflows to economic instability. The West should focus on constructing third-party and multinational coalitions to manage not only nuclear stability, but also Russian instability more broadly. Working groups, diplomatic fora, multilateral meetings: a flexible array of multiparty policy groups should emerge. Policymakers can especially prioritize those with natural geographic connections, i.e. leaning on Turkish and Georgian partners to aid in conversations regarding the North Caucasus; Ukraine and Poland (and potentially post-Alyaksandr Lukashenka Belarus) regarding European Russia; Kazakhstan and Mongolia—if not China—regarding broader Siberia, and the like.

At its broadest, Western policy must avoid one overarching strategy: retaining the Russian Federation as it currently is, regardless of the cost. Not that this can’t be an outcome; should clear democratic consensus emerge for retaining both the structure and geographic limits of the Russian Federation, so be it. But in both the early 1920s and early 1990s, the West slow-walked and downplayed demands for aid and recognition from a range of nations still colonized by Russia. (Most tragically, Woodrow Wilson pointedly dismissed Ukrainians’ requests for recognition, convinced as he was that the Bolsheviks would soon be toppled.) It is a playbook that has resulted, multiple times, in a dictatorial regime that has pushed Europe, and the world, to the brink of nuclear catastrophe, all while decimating the broader Russian public’s political freedoms.

Flexibility, broadening the array of imaginable outcomes, and familiarizing ourselves with the Russian Federation as an empire: these are all elements of the strategy that should inform the West’s path forward. Perhaps most importantly, any efforts to avoid such an outcome should not impede Western efforts to ensure that Putin is defeated in Ukraine. That is, the West should not refrain from backing Ukraine because of outsized concerns of Russian instability.

Time horizons and likelihood: Such an outcome is, over the short term, hardly worth considering. However, and in similar fashion to the outcome that sees the rise of a liberal democratic Russia, the likelihood of such a potential path only increases as time passes, as Putin remains in power, as Russia’s economy degrades, and as Russia writ large fails to confront its imperial legacy. After all, no European imperial powers managed to retain their empires in perpetuity; why would Russia be any different?

Nor would such a transformation have to draw out over years. As seen in 1917-18, or in 1991, such tectonic shifts can take place in the blink of history’s eye. Such an outcome as outlined above need be no different—all of which is why the sooner the West begins digesting and preparing for such a potential fracture and destabilization (even if it never arises), the better off we, and future generations, will be.

Casey Michel is an author, journalist, and director of the Combating Kleptocracy Program at the Human Rights Foundation. His writing on offshoring, foreign lobbying, authoritarianism, and illicit wealth has appeared in outlets such as the Financial Times, the Wall Street Journal, the Atlantic, Foreign Affairs, and the Washington Post, and has also been interviewed by news outlets on NPR, BBC, CNN, and MSNBC. He has also testified in front of the Senate Judiciary Committee on the links between illicit financial networks and national security. He received his master’s degree in Russian, Eurasian, and East European Studies from Columbia University’s Harriman Institute. He is the author of American Kleptocracy and of the forthcoming book Foreign Agents, both published by St. Martin’s Press.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to promote policies that strengthen stability, democratic values, and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe in the West to the Caucasus, Russia, and Central Asia in the East.

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The post Russia Tomorrow: Five scenarios for Russia’s future appeared first on Atlantic Council.

What will Russia look like in ten years, or twenty? How much longer will Vladimir Putin’s two-decade-plus rule last? Who—and what—will come after him? Will Russia continue its expansionist and anti-Western course? Or will it seek rapprochement? Will Russia remain intact, or will it disintegrate like the Soviet Union before it? And how should the United States and its allies prepare for all of these contingencies?

An important new report from the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center that will be released this week seeks to address these and other questions about possible Russian futures.

The report, Five Scenarios for Russia’s Future, is the first in a series called Russia Tomorrow: Navigating a New Paradigm. On the Power Vertical Podcast, host Brian Whitmore, who is editing the series, speaks with the report’s author, Casey Michel.

About the Podcast

The Power Vertical Podcast by Brian Whitmore covers emerging and developing trends in Russian politics, shining a spotlight on the high-stakes power struggles, machinations, and clashing interests that shape Kremlin policy today. Brian Whitmore is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center and Russia and Eurasia Specialist and Assistant Professor of Practice at the Charles T. McDowell Center for Global Studies at the University of Texas at Arlington.

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UkraineAlert Dec 18, 2023

Support Ukraine today or fight Russia tomorrow

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The threat posed by Vladimir Putin’s revisionist agenda can no longer be downplayed or denied. Instead, the choice facing Western leaders is simple: Support Ukraine today or fight Russia tomorrow, writes Oleksandr Zavitnevych.

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By Peter Dickinson

Putin’s pro-war majority: almost two years on, most Russians still support the Ukraine invasion and have reconciled themselves to the reality of a long war, writes Peter Dickinson.

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The Eurasia Center’s mission is to promote policies that strengthen stability, democratic values, and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe in the West to the Caucasus, Russia, and Central Asia in the East.

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The post Power Vertical Podcast: Five scenarios for Russia’s future appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Ukraine’s strong performance in the authoritative anti-corruption ranking places the country alongside Brazil and ahead of fellow EU candidate nations Bosnia and Herzegovina and Turkey. Meanwhile, Russia continues to lag far behind, having dropped down a further two places in the 2023 index to occupy 141th position with just 26 points.

This year’s result is recognition for Ukraine’s ongoing anti-corruption efforts since the 2014 Revolution of Dignity. On the eve of Ukraine’s landmark pro-democracy uprising, the country languished in 144th place in Transparency International’s annual ranking. Following the Revolution of Dignity, the Ukrainian authorities have taken a number of steps against corruption including establishing a new anti-corruption architecture, embracing digitalization, and conducting ambitious reforms in key sectors such as government procurement, banking, and energy. Success has often been patchy, but the overall picture is one of unmistakable improvement that has allowed Ukraine to climb forty places in the anti-corruption index over the past decade.

Ukraine’s most recent progress is all the more notable as it has taken place amid the existential challenges of Russia’s ongoing invasion. While this has necessitated a range of wartime governance and security measures, anti-corruption efforts have continued. “The active work of Ukraine’s anti-corruption and other public authorities resulted in a growth in the 2023 Corruption Perceptions Index even during the full-scale war,” Transparency International acknowledged.

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Transparency International is not the only international body to positively assess wartime Ukraine’s anti-corruption credentials. The fight against corruption has long been a key issue in relations between Kyiv and Brussels, and has traditionally been viewed as an obstacle to further European integration. However, Ukraine’s reform efforts since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion have helped convince European leaders to grant the country EU candidate status and begin official negotiations on future membership.

Speaking last summer, European Union Commission President Ursula von der Leyen singled out Ukraine’s efforts to advance the country’s anti-corruption agenda despite facing a uniquely challenging wartime environment. “I must say it is amazing to see how fast and determined Ukraine is implementing these reforms despite the war,” she commented. “They are defending their country and reforming.”

These positive appraisals by Transparency International and the European Union undermine the credibility of attempts by Russia and others to portray Ukraine as hopelessly corrupt. For many years, Kremlin officials and regime propagandists have routinely depicted Ukraine as plagued by endemic corruption. This has been an important element of Moscow’s efforts to discredit Ukraine’s democratic transition, deter international support, and even mute criticism of Russian intervention.

Since the start of the full-scale invasion, Vladimir Putin himself has often referenced the alleged excesses of Ukrainian corruption in his public speeches. In November 2023, he declared that “corruption in Ukraine is unmatched anywhere in the world.” This ignores the inconvenient reality that Transparency International actually rates Putin’s Russia as significantly more corrupt than Ukraine.

The argument that Ukraine is simply too corrupt to support has also entered the mainstream in the United States, where it is often repeated by opponents of further US military aid. These objections continue, despite unprecedented levels of institutional oversight and successive Pentagon probes confirming no evidence of corruption or the misuse of weapons.

Across the Atlantic, Russia’s few remaining friends in the EU have made strikingly similar claims regarding Ukrainian corruption. In December 2023, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban branded Ukraine as “one of the most corrupt countries in the world” while arguing against Kyiv’s further EU integration. Orban, who is regarded as Putin’s closest European ally, certainly speaks with authority when it comes to corruption. His own country, Hungary, occupied last place among EU member states in this year’s Transparency International ranking.

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In a sense, Ukraine is currently paying the price for the unenviable reputation it earned during the first few decades of independence, when corruption throughout state institutions was a far more pervasive problem than it is today. It is no accident that Ukraine’s two post-Soviet revolutions in 2004 and 2014 were both driven largely by public exasperation over widespread corruption, with millions of Ukrainians taking to the streets to vent their anger. Despite undeniable signs of progress over the past ten years, examples of institutional corruption continue to emerge, keeping the old cliches alive.

With Ukrainians now fighting for national survival and heavily reliant on international support, attitudes toward corruption have hardened further. This is fueling a climate of heightened scrutiny that has led to a series of high-profile scandals since the onset of Russia’s full-scale invasion. In summer 2023, President Zelenskyy dismissed dozens of regional military enlistment officials on charges of bribery. Perhaps the most prominent scandal involved former Ukrainian Defense Minister Oleksiy Reznikov, who was forced to resign following claims of corruption within the ministry. Most recently, Ukraine’s State Security Service detained five people accused of conspiring with Defense Ministry officials to embezzle $40 million meant for the purchase of arms.

While these recent corruption scandals demonstrate that Ukraine still has a long way to go, it is worth emphasizing that they only came to light thanks to the investigative efforts of Ukraine’s own state organs and the country’s vibrant civil society. This vigilance should come as no surprise. After all, nobody is more conscious of their country’s corruption problems than Ukrainians themselves.

There is no doubt that today’s Ukraine continues to face serious corruption challenges. However, depictions of the country as irredeemably corrupt are false and misleading. The real story here is of a nation steadily emerging from centuries of imperial oppression and decades of dysfunction, with the current generation of Ukrainians determined to rid themselves of a corruption culture that is one of the most unwelcome legacies of this troubled past. Indeed, the fight against corruption is widely recognized by Ukrainians as an essential element of their country’s transformation toward a European future.

This year’s Transparency International ranking is a timely reminder that Ukraine is actually making meaningful progress in its historic struggle against corruption. While much remains to be done, the country is clearly moving in the right direction. Ukraine’s international partners are right to expect maximum accountability, but there are currently no grounds for abandoning Ukraine based on claims of corruption that are both exaggerated and outdated.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

Further reading

UkraineAlert Dec 17, 2023

2024 preview: The West must decide if it wants Ukraine to win

By Richard D. Hooker, Jr.

If Western leaders fail to provide Ukraine with the weapons to defeat Putin in 2024, this will significantly increase the likelihood of a direct military confrontation between Russia and NATO, writes Richard D. Hooker Jr.

Conflict Defense Technologies

UkraineAlert Jan 22, 2024

Ukraine’s Black Sea success exposes folly of West’s “don’t escalate” mantra

By Peter Dickinson

Ukraine’s remarkable success during 2023 in the Battle of the Black Sea can serve as a blueprint for victory over Putin’s Russia, writes Peter Dickinson.

Conflict Defense Policy

UkraineAlert Jan 4, 2024

To defeat Putin in a long war, Ukraine must switch to active defense in 2024

By Mykola Bielieskov

By embracing a strategy of active defense in 2024, Kyiv can achieve the twin goals of preventing any major Russian advances and creating conditions that strongly favor Ukraine in what is increasingly a war of attrition, writes Mykola Bielieskov.

Conflict Defense Policy

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

Read more from UkraineAlert

UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia and Central Asia in the East.

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The post Wartime Ukraine ranks among world’s top performers in anti-corruption index appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Final Report

Report Authors: Whitney M. McNamara, Peter Modigliani, Matthew MacGregor, and Eric Lofgren*

Co-chairs: The Hon. Mark T. Esper, PhD,
& The Hon. Deborah Lee James

Commission staff: Kathryn Levantovscaia, Mark J. Massa, Delharty M. Manson II, and Jacob Mezey 

Commissioners

• The Hon. Mark T. Esper, PhD, Board Director, Atlantic Council; 27th Secretary of Defense; Co-Chair, Atlantic Council Commission on Defense Innovation Adoption
• The Hon. Deborah Lee James, Board Director, Atlantic Council; 23rd Secretary of the Air Force; Co-Chair, Atlantic Council Commission on Defense Innovation Adoption
• Ambassador Barbara Barrett, Board Director, Atlantic Council; 25th Secretary of the Air Force
• General James E. Cartwright, USMC (ret.), Board Director, Atlantic Council; 8th Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
• Frank A. Finelli, Managing Director, The Carlyle Group
• The Hon. Michèle Flournoy, Co-founder and Managing Partner, WestExec Advisors; Former Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, US Department of Defense
• Scott Frederick, Managing Partner, Sands Capital
• The Hon. James “Hondo” Geurts, Distinguished Fellow, Business Executives for National Security; Former Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development, and Acquisition, US Department of Defense
• Peter Levine, Senior Research Fellow, Institute for Defense Analyses; Former Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, US Department of Defense
• The Hon. Ellen M. Lord, Former Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment, US Department of Defense
• Major General Arnold L. Punaro, USMC (ret.), CEO, The Punaro Group; Member, Advisory Council, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, Atlantic Council
• Nick Sinai, Senior Advisor, Insight Partners; Senior Fellow, Belfer Center for Science & International Affairs and Adjunct Lecturer in Public Policy, Harvard Kennedy School
• Josh Wolfe, Co-founder and Managing Partner, Lux Capital
• The Hon. Robert O. Work, Senior Counselor for Defense and Distinguished Senior Fellow for Defense and National Security, Center for a New American Security; 32nd US Deputy Secretary of Defense

Industry commissioners

• Steven Escaravage, Executive Vice President and AI Lead, Booz Allen Hamilton
• Wendy R. Anderson, Senior Vice President, Palantir Technologies
• Prashant Bhuyan, Founder and CEO, Accrete AI
• Mark Brunner, President, Primer Federal, Primer AI
• Adam Hammer, Counselor, Schmidt Futures
• Chris Lynch, CEO, Rebellion Defense
• Michael Niggel, CEO, ACT1 Federal
• Doug Philippone, Co-founder, Snowpoint Ventures

Former Industry commissioners

• Caitlin Dohrman, Former President, US Defense and National Security, Improbable
• Jim Gill, Former Chief Operating Officer, Accrete AI
• Sean Gourley, Founder and Former Chief Executive Officer, Primer AI
• Ahmed Humayun, Former Head of Federal Growth, Applied Intuition
• Mara Motherway, Former Senior Vice President, Peraton; former chief growth officer, Epirus

Table of contents

Introduction

Foreword

Overview

Recommendations:

1. Introduce a new capability portfolio model
2. Consolidate program elements
3. Reset reprogramming authorities
4. Modernize DoD to align with the 21st century industrial base
5. Strengthen alignment of capital markets to defense outcomes
6. Incentivize tech companies to do business with DoD
7. Modernize budget documents
8. Establish bridge fund for successfully demonstrated technologies
9. Scale the Space Development Agency model
10. Modernize DoD’s requirements system

Vignettes:

1. Leveraging operational innovation and experimentation to demonstrate the value of commercial capabilities to meet operational needs
2. Purposeful experimentation and scaling SBIRs for more rapid and well aligned tech adoption
3. Tying experimentation to acquisition outcomes and leveraging DIU commercial landscape monitoring
4. Pivoting to modern IT capability portfolio management
5. Modernizing capability requirements
6. Communicating demand signal to leverage commercial sector innovation and adopt private sector best practices
7. Leveraging warfighting insights and commercial product vision to develop new innovative products
8. Incorporating robust user feedback with government and private seed funding to deliver unique commercial capability

Implementation actions to date

Conclusion

Biographies

Acknowledgments

List of acronyms

* Eric Lofgren served as a project author until February 2023, when he transitioned to a position in government service. All of his contributions were made before his transition to that role.

Introduction

As the United States addresses the rise of competing powers on the global stage, it must confront the acute threat posed by Russia and the longer-term one presented by China. With its military modernization progress, advanced offensive cyber capabilities, hybrid-warfare strategies, and aggressive territorial ambitions in Eastern Europe, Russia poses a considerable threat to democratic institutions and Western norms. Meanwhile, China has built the world’s largest military and grown into an economic powerhouse, igniting tension in disputed regional territories and expanding its geopolitical influence far beyond the Indo-Pacific. For the first time in history, the United States is faced with two revisionist powers armed with nuclear capabilities and detrimental territorial ambitions. This new age has amplified the need for enhanced deterrence and defensive measures, particularly in the case of Taiwan. Unfortunately, the United States’ defense acquisition process is plagued with lengthy timelines and inefficiencies, underscoring the urgent need for a fundamental shift in how the Department of Defense (DoD) approaches the adoption and integration of new technology.

Historically, US advancements in defense technology have been spurred by international conflict or heavy government research and development (R&D). Outpacing adversaries was not as much an ambition as it was critical for the nation’s security. The Cold War served as a catalyst for one of the most innovative periods in US history, a time when US defense capabilities were driven by the military, federally funded research organizations, and traditional defense and aerospace industries. Today, much of that innovation is found in commercial dual-use technology and advancements made by smaller nontraditional companies in the private sector. Often, these advancements include software-driven solutions that are smaller in scale, yet highly attritable. Nontraditional companies have become key players in the defense market due to their ability to adapt quickly to evolving technological and threat landscapes. While US companies continue to demonstrate technological prowess, this rate of innovation serves little use in deterring conflict unless the DoD is able to procure and get new technology into the hands of warfighters at a faster pace.

The current US defense acquisition system was not designed to keep pace with today’s rapid rate of innovation. Despite the DoD’s recognition of these emergent dual-use technologies, lengthy budget timelines, inflexible procurement options, and outdated internal procedures create unnecessary barriers between the DoD and nontraditional companies seeking collaboration. Such limitations disincentivize smaller firms from engaging with military projects due to survival concerns in commercial markets; the resulting frustration often compels those that engage to drop out.

In an attempt to reconcile the disconnect between evolving operational needs and limitations posed by dated acquisition processes, the Atlantic Council’s Forward Defense Program established its Commission on Defense Innovation Adoption. Launched in 2022, the primary objective behind this commission was to take the DoD’s acquisition process, and Congress’ role in that system, out of the Cold War era. The commission sought actionable recommendations that would advance DoD’s adoption of innovative technologies and ability to rapidly field dual-use capabilities.

The commissioners and authors highlighted a number of challenges that the DoD faces. They identified an outdated R&D model that struggles to adopt and apply leading commercial innovations to weapon systems as one of these challenges. They also brought the long timeline and inflexible execution into focus, emphasizing their impact on the DoD’s ability to respond to dynamic threats and harness the latest technology. Addressing the critical role of gatekeeping state-of-the-art technology from the warfighter, the commission tackled issues such as a shrinking US defense industrial base, a limited number of prototypes advancing from research to production contracts, and a bureaucracy seemingly designed to stifle speed and innovation. Additionally, the commission assessed the impact of an insufficient understanding of emerging technology by those generating requirements, in addition to program-centric acquisition and cumbersome reporting processes.

The commission interviewed more than sixty key stakeholders across the DoD, industry, and Congress to support extensive research and deliberations. This effort produced ten recommendations to overcome key challenges, which are summarized below.  

(1) Empower and resource five program executive offices (PEOs) through a new capability portfolio model, authorized by Congress and implemented by the under secretary of defense for acquisition and sustainment USD (A&S). This approach would break down barriers between the DoD and nontraditional companies seeking collaboration, allowing for faster procurement and integration of innovative technologies into military operations.

(2) Consolidate program elements and budget line items to simplify budget submissions and allow for greater flexibility in responding to changing warfighter needs, which would encourage smaller firms to engage with DoD without jeopardizing their commercial viability.

(3) Congressional appropriations committees should modify reprogramming authorities in their fiscal year (FY) 2024 joint explanatory statements to reflect historical norms, which entails maintaining the existing reprogramming thresholds, but shift from the requirement of prior approval to congressional notification with a thirty-day timeframe for briefing or rejection. 

(4) Congress should elevate the Defense Innovation Unit (DIU) to report directly to the deputy secretary of defense and provide it with adequate resources within six months of enactment. This recommendation offers myriad suggested actions and authorities the DIU should be empowered to take, including engaging start-ups, nontraditional vendors, and capital market players to align capability requirements with the twenty-first-century industrial base, and modernize guidance and training for commercial acquisition.

(5) Strengthen existing capital market programs and create new pathways for mission-critical technologies by broadening programs for capital market-backed companies, leveraging capital market funding for defense innovation, and enhancing the Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) grants program to increase competition and widen the aperture of firms competing for SBIR grants.

(6) Congress, the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), and service acquisition executives (SAEs) should increase incentives and reduce barriers for leading technology companies to do business with the DoD by September 2024 by rebalancing defense budgets, modernizing access to capital markets, raising cost-accounting standards thresholds, improving online contract opportunities platforms, streamlining security-clearances processes, assigning visible leaders for various programs to champion adoption and simplify processes, mapping and improving acquisition processes for successful research and prototypes, and establishing a working group with primes to incentivize leveraging technology start-up companies.

(7) The under secretary of defense (comptroller) and chief financial officer of the DoD (USD (C)/CFO) should propose a streamlined budget-justification format for the president’s FY 2026 budget request, focusing on concise program overviews.

(8) Allocate $250 million of the DoD’s FY 2024 budget to programs that address challenges in scaling and accelerating successful demonstrations of operationally relevant technologies. Shortening the lag time for successful vendors to receive funding would incentivize new companies to work with the DoD, ultimately increasing the number of technologies transitioned at scale to the warfighter.

(9) Existing organizations should adopt the Space Development Agency (SDA) model, which provides a framework for preemptive disruption within the Space Force, focusing on rapidly fielding and scaling modern technologies.

(10) The vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (VCJCS) and services should establish a team by September 2024 to modernize the DoD’s requirements processes, which includes designing a new framework, enabling dynamic requirements systems, streamlining documents, integrating threat and technology assessments, collaborating with industry experts, improving training for requirements managers, and publishing new policies online.

If implemented in their entirety, these recommendations would go a long way toward allowing the United States to swiftly deploy cutting-edge technology at scale and have the potential to resolve near-term deterrence threats. Embracing the private sector’s rapid innovation, modernizing acquisition and budgeting processes, and fostering greater collaboration with nontraditional companies would allow the United States to swiftly adopt and deploy cutting-edge technology. As a result, the United States would amplify its leadership in defense innovation, thereby addressing immediate deterrence gaps and ensuring a robust posture against evolving threats in today’s era of strategic competition. As of November 2023, six of the commission’s ten recommendations have been implemented fully or in part by the DoD or Congress.

Foreword

The US Department of Defense (DoD) needs to accelerate the adoption of cutting-edge technology from the leading edge of the commercial and defense sectors. Doing so will enable the Pentagon to deliver high-impact operational solutions to the Warfighter in a much timelier manner. That is why we are co-chairing the Atlantic Council’s Commission on Defense Innovation Adoption, which has released this interim report. 

In our time serving in the Defense Department, we have found that the United States does not have an innovation problem, but rather an innovation adoption problem. That is to say, our Nation leads in many emerging technologies relevant to defense and security—from artificial intelligence and directed energy to quantum information technology and beyond. But the DoD struggles to identify, adopt, integrate, and field these technologies into military applications. 

The persistence of this challenge is not for lack of trying. The Air Force’s Rapid Capabilities Office has cut through bureaucratic constraints to accelerate even the most complicated major acquisitions. The Defense Innovation Unit stands out for expanding the range of firms involved in innovation for national security purposes. Army Futures Command has accelerated modernization in ground forces through its cross-functional team model. The new Office of Strategic Capital has a promising new approach to engaging capital markets in support of national security goals. 

But the growing national security challenges facing our country and the threat they pose to the rules-based international order require actionable reform across the DoD. We and a group of distinguished Commissioners, with decades of service between us in government, the private sector, and capital markets, believe that time is running out to do so. The United States faces simultaneous competition with two nuclear-armed, autocratic great-power rivals. Russia’s ongoing war against Ukraine and China’s revanchism not only spur urgent geopolitical considerations, but also cast into sharp relief the US industrial base’s ability to produce and field innovative technologies at scale. 

To address the DoD’s innovation adoption challenge in light of the urgency of the geopolitical environment we face, this interim report advances ten policy recommendations for Congress and the Pentagon, focusing on the three key areas of reforming acquisition; overcoming barriers to innovation; and revising specific Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution structures. 

To that end, the DoD should adapt the way it conducts its acquisition programs to provide additional flexibility in the year of execution, and Congress can authorize that flexibility. We recommend that five DoD program executive offices be empowered to operate in a portfolio model so that they can more easily shift funding among possible products that meet their mission needs. Congress should appropriate money to DoD with fewer but larger discrete budget line items and reset reprogramming authorities so that acquisition professionals have greater flexibility. 

To better leverage innovation in the commercial sector, Congress should restore at least the traditional ratio of procurement funding to other defense spending, and the DoD should more intentionally engage a much broader innovation base. Allocating a higher percentage of the DoD’s budget to procurement will clearly signal a larger market to nontraditional defense firms.  

Additionally, the deputy secretary of defense, with the Defense Innovation Unit (DIU) as a direct report, should take a leadership role in aligning and harnessing stakeholders within the Pentagon and the existing defense industrial base for the twenty-first century. The DIU should be resourced and empowered to broaden the defense ecosystem by robustly engaging start-ups, nontraditional vendors, and capital market players. 

The DoD must develop approaches to more rapidly validate its needs for commercial capabilities, rather than waiting years after identifying a key capability to write a requirement and submit a budget request. The DoD should both reform the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) to operate more swiftly and develop a military need validation system outside of JCIDS for mature commercial capabilities. Congress and the DoD should expand both eligibility for, and the award size of, Small Business Innovation Research grants. To provide additional mechanisms for rapidly matching key capabilities with funding, they should also provide funds to procure capabilities successfully demonstrated in exercises. 

As the 2022 National Security Strategy states, we are living through a “decisive decade,” a sentiment shared by the previous administration as well. Congress and the DoD must seize this opportunity to enact near-term changes that will help get our service members the capabilities they need to defend our country and its interests.

The Hon. Mark T. Esper, PhD

27th US Secretary of Defense

The Hon. Deborah Lee James

23rd US Secretary of the Air Force

The Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security works to develop sustainable, nonpartisan strategies to address the most important security challenges facing the United States and the world.

Learn more

Forward Defense, housed within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, generates ideas and connects stakeholders in the defense ecosystem to promote an enduring military advantage for the United States, its allies, and partners. Our work identifies the defense strategies, capabilities, and resources the United States needs to deter and, if necessary, prevail in future conflict.

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Overview

Mission statement

Accelerate the DoD’s ability to adopt cutting-edge technology from commercial and defense sectors and deliver high-impact operational solutions to the Warfighters.

Enterprise challenges

The DoD faces the following enterprise challenges in adopting defense innovations:

1. Outdated R&D model

The DoD’s requirements and acquisition processes were designed for a time when the DoD was the largest funder of global research and development (R&D). By 2020, however, the federal government’s share of national R&D had fallen below 20 percent, and yet its processes have not adapted to this new leader-to-follower reality. Today, while the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), Federally Funded Research and Development Centers (FFRDCs), national and service laboratories, and universities continue to innovate, many of the most critical technologies are driven by the commercial sector. The DoD struggles to adopt commercial technology at a relevant speed. Innovations from noncommercial R&D organizations are infrequently tied to a commercialization and adoption pipeline. Traditional prime contractors orient their independent R&D (IRAD) toward near-term defense requirements that are prescriptive relative to solutions rather than broadly defining warfighter gaps that allow applications of advanced technologies. As a result, the DoD is unable to effectively apply leading technologies to its weapon systems.

2. Long timelines and inflexible execution

Too often, the DoD delivers systems to meet requirements defined more than a decade earlier. It is difficult to insert new technology to effectively respond to dynamic adversary threats, technological opportunities, advances in warfighting concepts, or macroeconomic and supply-chain disruptions, especially within fiscal years. Hardware-centric models ineffectively integrate rapid software updates.

3. Fewer companies providing defense solutions

The DoD’s industrial base has shrunk by 40 percent over the past decade, due to both consolidation and exit. This decline stems from multiple causes, including a pivot to fewer more-complex major systems, long timelines, complex regulations, and the high compliance cost of doing business with the DoD. Many start-up, commercial, and international businesses are unable or unwilling to enter the DoD ecosystem. As a result, reduced competitive pressure has increased costs and decreased adoption of innovation.

4. Valleys of death

The DoD spends billions annually on research and prototypes, yet only a small percentage transitions to production contracts with revenue to sustain operations and scale output. Consequently, one must question why the DoD continues to fund so many defense research organizations when most technology innovation comes from the commercial sector. Long timelines for contracts and funding, program constraints, and a disconnected ecosystem are among the transition challenges for companies that have developed viable products or services.

5. Hamstrung workforce

The DoD acquisition workforce is subject to a bureaucratic culture of excessive compliance and oversight, a challenging environment for innovation. Creative problem-solving and measured risk-taking are not often rewarded, and too few individuals with an industry background agree to take senior leadership roles at the DoD.

6. Program-centric acquisition

Defining requirements, securing budgets, and acquiring capabilities are done for hundreds of individual programs. The DoD invests a significant percentage of its funds in complex major systems for which prime contractors offer closed, propriety solutions. This impedes interoperability and responsiveness to changes in operations, threats, and technologies. Open-system architectures with well-defined interface control documents are rarely adopted, which constrains the ability to insert innovative technology.

7. Cumbersome reporting from DoD to Congress

Budget justification documents run dozens of volumes and tens of thousands of pages. Document format, detail, and supporting information is inconsistent among military services and agencies. This impedes Congress’s ability to understand program objectives in a timely manner. In turn, Congress does not trust that delegated decisions will consistently result in more rapid technology adoption.

8. Limited understanding of emerging technology

The DoD struggles to effectively leverage critical emerging technologies (like biotechnology and quantum information technology) due to a lack of understanding of their state-of-the-art applications among those who generate requirements and draft requests for proposals. As these technologies mature, the DoD is challenged to have meaningful conversations about how to adopt, leverage, and defend against these technologies.

Top recommendations

To address these challenges, the Commission recommends that DoD leaders, congressional defense committees, and other executive branch agencies take the following ten high-priority actions to accelerate DoD innovation adoption:

1. Introduce a new capability portfolio model
2. Consolidate program elements
3. Reset reprogramming authorities
4. Modernize the DoD to align with the twenty-first century industrial base
5. Strengthen alignment of capital markets to defense outcomes
6. Incentivize tech companies to do business with the DoD
7. Modernize budget documents
8. Establish bridge fund for successfully demonstrated technologies
9. Scale the Space Development Agency model
10. Modernize the DoD’s requirements system

Recommendation 1: The DoD and Congress empower and resource five Program Executive Officers (PEOs) to operate via a new capability portfolio model in 2024

Addresses challenges 2, 4, and 6.

• Congress authorizes in the FY24 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) and/or the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment (USD(A&S)) implements via a memo empowering five PEO portfolios to operate via a new capability portfolio model. Component acquisition executives from the Departments of the Army, Navy, Air Force, Special Operations Command, and a defense agency will each select a PEO portfolio.
• Service requirements organizations capture portfolio requirements in a concise, high-level document that provides overarching, joint, enduring capability needs and key mission impact measures that focus on warfighter-informed needs and mission outcomes. The Joint Staff validates the portfolio requirements within thirty days. The portfolio requirements document enables leaner program requirements and shapes future research and prototypes.
• Selected PEOs negotiate with congressional defense appropriations staff the consolidation of at least 20 percent of the smallest budget line items within their portfolios. This enables reprogramming flexibility to meet evolving, warfighter-informed requirements. These merged budget accounts must provide Congress with sufficient visibility of major elements within each.
• Selected PEOs develop a set of portfolio strategies, processes, road maps, contracts, infrastructure, and architectures to enable programs to leverage for greater speed and success. Portfolio contracting strategies will look beyond individual contracts or programs to promote a robust industrial base by enabling continuous competition, iterative development, supply chain risk mitigation, greater participation of nontraditional companies, commercial service acquisition, and economies of scale.
• Selected PEOs may lay out plans to decompose large programs into modular acquisitions; leverage common platforms, components, and services; and maximize use of commercial solutions and DoD research. Portfolios will scale and align prototyping, experimentation, and testing infrastructure. They will invest in a common suite of engineering tools, platforms, and strategies to enable interoperability, cybersecurity, and resiliency.
• PEOs require portfolio leaders to actively engage the DoD’s R&D community, industry, and academia to communicate joint-warfighter portfolio needs and business opportunities, scout technologies, engage companies, and drive novel solutions to address portfolio needs.
• Congress appropriates at least $20 million to each portfolio per year for three years to enable PEOs to implement the new model with appropriate staff, analytic tools, and strategies. The five PEOs work out the details for others to adopt. In time, the department will realize savings and return on investment through greater program efficiencies and mission impact.
• PEOs provide the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and Congress a short annual report to share insight into the new portfolio model progress, including issues, successes, and inputs to scale adoption.
• Success measure: By the end of 2023, five PEO portfolios are identified to operate via the new portfolio model. By the end of 2024, these portfolios begin operating with clear direction, leadership support, and initial implementation plans.
• Notional example: A command-and-control PEO shapes a portfolio strategy that invests in a software factory and enterprise services as a common infrastructure, with smaller programs tapping a diverse vendor base to regularly and iteratively deliver a suite of applications that work together seamlessly.

Recommendation 2: Acquisition executives propose consolidated program elements to congressional staff and negotiate what can be included in the FY 2024 Appropriations Act joint explanatory statement

Addresses challenges 2, 6, and 7.

• The deputy secretary of defense (DepSecDef) directs acquisition executives to propose a list of program elements (PEs) and budget line items (BLIs) to consolidate. This will simplify budget submissions and enable greater flexibility within the year of execution to respond to rapid changes in warfighter needs and technology advancement within capability or mission portfolios.
  • Determine criteria for consolidation, such as BLIs and PEs under $20 million, software-defined technologies, and supply chain-affected efforts.
  • Determine constructs for consolidation, such as capability areas, mission areas, and organizational alignment.
• Reduce BLI and PE count from more than 1,700 today in the investment accounts by at least 200 BLI and PEs each year, starting with the FY 2024 markup, for three years to enable cost-schedule-performance trade-offs, including the prototyping and fielding of novel systems that meet defined capability or mission areas.
• Allow PEOs, warfighters, and other DoD stakeholders to provide input to acquisition executives. Senior leadership in the resourcing process should propose the items to be consolidated and negotiate with congressional staff in advance of FY 2024 appropriations.
• Identify line items that enable opportunistic efforts to insert technologies into existing weapons programs without requiring a new start. Identify best practices for broadly justifying activities within a capability set.

Success measure: The number of BLIs in the investment accounts is reduced by at least 200 in time for the passage of regular appropriations in FY 2024.

Notional example: A PEO identifies a novel technology from DARPA or industry to integrate into one of its programs to improve performance and accelerate capability delivery. With investment funds spread across fewer budget accounts, the PEO is able to reprogram funds from a lower-priority development within the year of execution.

Recommendation 3: Congressional appropriations committees reset reprogramming authorities to historical norms in their FY 2024 joint explanatory statements

Addresses challenges 2 and 7.

• Appropriations committees write into FY 2024 joint explanatory statements the following changes:
  • Current reprogramming thresholds will be maintained, but above-threshold actions will revert from congressional prior approval to the historical norm of congressional notification with a thirty-day window for briefing or rejection. This streamlines the process and enables greater reprogramming while still providing Congress “veto authority” to block reprogramming actions they oppose. Prior approval will remain in place for items omitted, deleted, or specifically reduced; general transfer authorities; or above threshold new starts.
• An alternative approach: Raise reprogramming thresholds from the lesser of $10 million or 20 percent to at least $40 million for Research, Development, Testing, and Evaluation (RDT&E) and $100 million for procurement appropriation titles. Historical norms for reprogramming thresholds were $15 million for RDT&E and $40 million for procurement yet were progressively lowered to this historically low threshold. This change would revert thresholds to account for decades of inflation.
  • Letter notifications for new starts will be “for the fiscal year,” not “for the entire effort.” This enables programs greater flexibility to start small programs while Congress retains the right to veto any new starts it opposes.

Success measure: Recommended language is included in the FY 2024 Appropriations Act joint explanatory statement by the time regular appropriations are passed.

Notional example: An acquisition program is “early to need” for procurement funds due to delays in finalizing development. Another program desperately seeks additional funds to accelerate and scale production of its weapon system. Service leadership decides to reprogram $50M in procurement funds between the programs to optimize investments.

Recommendation 4: Congress directs the DoD to elevate the DIU to a direct report to DepSecDef and resource it effectively to align and harness the nontraditional defense industrial base for the twenty-first century no later than six months of the enactment of this act

Addresses challenges 1, 2, 3, 4, and 8.

• Re-align DIU as a direct report to DepSecDef with the necessary staffing and resources to engage start-ups, nontraditional vendors, and capital market players in aligning capability requirements to harness solutions from the twenty-first-century industrial base per the 2022 National Defense Strategy.
  • DIU’s expanded role should complement existing efforts in USD(R&E) and USD(A&S) in terms of traditional industrial policy and technology scouting, respectively, by better connecting the nontraditional industry and its resources, intelligence, and technologies to the needs of the warfighter.
    • DIU, USD(R&E), USD(A&S), and service partners should regularly integrate their efforts, in communicating to the industrial base the department’s needs, planned investments, and business opportunities. In addition, they should share among themselves what is being discovered in industry that aligns with the department’s missions.
    • In its expanded role, DIU should be resourced to regularly engage with acquisition organizations (PEOs, program offices), science and technology (S&T) organizations (labs, DARPA), and combatant commands to share the insights it gets from nontraditional industry players throughout the DoD. Additionally, DIU will communicate back to industry where it can align its technologies to the needs of the warfighter as communicated by acquisition organizations and combatant commands.
    • Prioritization for expanded staffing for DIU should be for new billets from the services over funding for contractors. The billets would be priority assignments, selected from relevant PEOs and service acquisition executives (SAEs).
    • DIU should track the intelligence, insights, and inputs it receives from industry trade associations, venture capitalists (VCs), private equity firms, primes, nontraditional defense companies (NDCs), Other Transaction (OT) Consortia, and innovation hubs. This information should be interoperable with USD(R&E)’s existing repository of research and intelligence for the department’s needs.
  • DIU, USD(A&S), and SAEs charter a team, including joint warfighter perspectives, to streamline processes, reviews, and documents for acquiring commercial solutions. The team will reinforce “buy before build” commercial practices in the early phases of programs by baking it into acquisition strategy templates and program reviews. It will also collaborate with defense industry, capital markets, and Congress to develop a broader set of rapid funding tools and approaches to demand signals consistent with the speed of commercial innovation cycles. It will publish an initial commercial pathway or guide by December 2023, with a comprehensive version in 2024.
    • Joint Staff and service requirements organizations develop a rapid “military need validation” process, involving feedback from the warfighter, for commercial solutions in lieu of traditional Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) requirements documents. This new process will enable hundreds or even thousands of commercial solutions to be validated by empowered, distributed officials, and not subject to the JCIDS process managed by the Joint Staff and the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC).
    • The Defense Acquisition University and related organizations should modernize guidance and training for commercial acquisition, to include:
      • Collaborating with industry, traditional and otherwise, in the early phases of an acquisition program to inform concepts, alternatives, and designs. The focus should be on feeding into mission objectives, not market research for system specifications.
        • Contracting strategies focused on commercial solutions (e.g., Commercial Solutions Openings, Other Transactions, Federal Acquisition Regulation Parts 12 and 13).
        • Testing, experimentation, exercises, rapid deliveries, and iteration.
        • Scaling programs like DIU’s Immersive Commercial Acquisition Program.

Success measures: Higher number of DIU projects that transition to a program of record; increased number of vendors entering the federal market and competing for contracts; better alignment of capital market investment and lending to DoD missions; alignment of DoD R&D and prime IRAD funds to help a wider number of entrants across the Valley of Death; increased transparency with the industrial base on DoD’s priorities; a commercial pathway, guidance, and training enabling workforce to rapidly and successfully acquire commercial solutions; increased transparency and collaboration  within the department on tech-related initiatives and intelligence; resources saved and efficiencies gained from central repository information from traditional and nontraditional industrial base like market intelligence, technology landscape analysis and due diligence on vendors.

Notional example: Expanded engagement with nontraditional industrial base helps DIU identify the commercial sector’s leader in autonomous software for ground vehicles and through the streamlined, well-defined process for rapid acquisition, the Army begins adopting it across its fleet of logistics vehicles on CONUS bases.

In their quarterly engagement, the US Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory (MCWL) talks to DIU about its desire to procure better mission planning tools at the edge. DIU identifies and provides three viable commercial options for demonstrations. Before presenting them to MCWL, DIU leverages VC firm relationships to get existing due diligence on the potential vendors and discovers one of them draws components of its chips from China. DIU finds an alternative.

In its engagements with capital market players, DIU discovers there are several critical bottlenecks in the quantum computing supply chain due to either a severe lack of redundancy or routing through adversary nations. DIU flags this to R&E, the Office of Strategic Capital, and A&S Industrial Policy to determine how to address this. As part of this, DIU and OSC engage with capital market players to inform them this is now a department priority, helping to direct capital market funding toward these enabling technologies critical to the US broader tech competition vis-à-vis China.

Recommendation 5: Strengthen existing capital market programs and create new pathways for mission-critical technologies

Addresses challenges 1, 3, 4, and 8.

US capital markets represent a critical yet underutilized strategic advantage for the DoD. To better leverage vast capital market resources for defense innovation and mission outcomes, the DoD should broaden programs through which capital market-backed companies can participate and create new pathways for DoD program offices to leverage capital market funding for mission-critical technologies.

Congress directs in legislation the Small Business Agency (SBA), in coordination with the General Services Administration (GSA), to enhance the Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) grants program no later than six months after enactment.

To better scale SBIRs, the SBA should:

• Generate direct to Phase III SBIR grants in which early successful performers in Phase I can be fast-tracked to more-flexible contract vehicles, for which performers have exemptions from SBA size standards for procurement; no limits on dollar size of procurement; the right to receive sole-source funding agreements; and the ability to pursue flexible ways to add value to an end user, whether that be research, R&D, services, products, production, or any combination thereof.
• Direct the SBIR offices of the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps to pilot a Strategic Funding Increase (STRATFI) program to help bridge the Valley of Death between Phase II and Phase III SBIR grants, no later than twelve months after designated. Service pilots would replicate the STRATFI program in that SBIR funding ($15 million) would receive matched funding from customers ($15 million) and private funding (up to $30 million).

To increase competition and widen the aperture of firms competing for SBIR grants, the SBA should:

• Remove the barrier preventing companies with more than 50 percent backing by VCs or other capital market players to compete for SBIR grants. Small businesses often rely on VC funding to cover the costs of operating as they work to commercialize their products and generate sufficient revenue to sustain their business. This is particularly true in the case of software development, where highly skilled software engineers are the single most expensive operating cost. Placing strict limitations on the ability of these small businesses to compete for SBIR grants is contrary to the SBIR program goal of supporting scientific excellence and technological innovation.
• Remove the barrier preventing companies that meet the requirements of being a small business, but are publicly traded, to compete for SBIR grants. Small, high-tech R&D firms go public to continue their ability to raise funds for their capital-intensive technologies. By disallowing them from competing for SBIR grants, the DoD is limiting technology competition among some of the most technology-proficient corners of the industrial base.

To drive deep tech adoption, OSC should develop tools for leveraging external capital market funding for pilot projects to service R&D organizations in FY 2024, with a formalization plan in conjunction with the president’s FY 2025 budget request.

• OSC to be given expanded authorities to access capital markets to develop revenue, investment, and credit approaches for defense programs contracting with small-, mid-, and large-cap companies. As an initial step, direct $15 million of external capital market funding to the R&D organization of each military branch to pilot projects that identify two
• novel use cases in one or more of R&E’s deep-tech priority areas of quantum technology, biotechnology, or advanced materials that could be leveraged to achieve service-specific missions. The period of performance would be eighteen months. Service end users would provide matched funding of up to 25 percent of total outside funding to pilot these projects.
• This would assist in directing capital market funding to the DoD’s mission, providing additional R&D funding and incentives for deep-tech companies to commercialize their technologies, and creating optimization loops that connect technology to warfighter use cases that can help turn basic research into relevant products and services. Lastly, exposure to deep-tech applications would allow service end users to better understand emerging technologies’ applications to future defense requirements. This will help accelerate the well-aligned adoption of these capabilities to meet services’ unique missions at the speed of relevance.
• R&D leads will report to DIU’s director and USD(R&E) no more than 180 days past the period of performance on the pilot’s utility, lessons learned, and challenges DoD would face if technology were to be adopted at scale.

Success measures: Meaningful increase in capital market funding for defense-related companies; increased number of companies crossing Valley of Death and program offices integrating commercially developed technology to speed innovation milestones; increased number of production contracts from nontraditional vendors, with more vendors competing for each contract; increased touchpoints between cutting-edge tech and the warfighter/end users; and the identification of specific tech adoption challenges that can be addressed ahead of requirements process for more-seamless tech adoption and integration.

Notional examples: 1) A majority VC-backed company demonstrates a novel capability that provides an advantage over a near-peer adversary and is fast-tracked to SBIR Phase III, through which the firm begins production at scale and crosses the Valley of Death. 2) A publicly traded deep-tech company that qualifies as a small business, now allowed to compete for SBIR grants, begins to develop the foundation of a quantum network for the US military. 3) The army discovers through a biotech pilot project that an advanced material it hoped to put into a program of record does not provide meaningful benefit for the cost and pursues another alternative. 4) The navy uses its OSC pilot to buy hours of time on a quantum computer provided over the cloud, through which the navy discovers the quantum computer’s utility in improving logistics and maintenance. However, the navy does not know how to manage the data being generated and needs an extra data scientist to oversee the process. The navy begins to generate a data governance process, forms a new billet to manage it, and begins determining the best acquisition pathway in anticipation of purchasing quantum computing as a service.

Recommendation 6: Congress, OSD, and SAEs increase incentives and reduce barriers for leading technology companies to do business with the DoD by September 2024

Addresses challenges 1 and 3.

Increase incentives

• Production Contracts. The DoD and Congress in future defense budgets rebalance the ratio of RDT&E and Procurement funding to historical norms over the past thirty years. From 1990 to 2019, the ratio was 39 percent to 61 percent, respectively. This would provide more than $20 billion in additional procurement funds to acquire production quantities faster, leverage commercial R&D, and fuel a broader market for leading technology firms. Increasing production and lowering barriers to entry will attract venture capital firms and bring private research and development funding to the defense market. As most of USD(R&E)’s fourteen critical technologies are commercially driven, this rebalance would enable faster fielding of warfighter priorities.
• Set Precedent. USD(A&S) and SAEs report the number of large contracts (i.e., more than $50 million) awarded to start-ups and NDCs annually to measure and convey the trends of the DoD investing in these companies beyond small SBIR awards.
• Innovation Funds. USD(R&E) and services include start-ups and NDCs as part of selection criteria for congressionally directed innovation funds.
• Show Support. USD(A&S) and SAEs scale the direction, goals, and guidance for working with small and disadvantaged businesses to include technology start-ups and NDCs. Include NDCs as part of the small-business integration working group being established for FY23 NDAA Section 874.
• Broaden Access to Capital Markets. Congress and USD(A&S) modernize the use of Defense Production Act Title III and credit loan authorities available to other agencies and departments to dynamically access capital, embrace commercial terms, and strengthen the domestic industrial base capabilities, based on lessons learned from COVID and the war in Ukraine. This use could include purchase commitments and loan guarantees, similar to how the Export-Import Bank works with US companies overseas, to increase incentives and reduce risk for companies seeking to scale production of critical technologies.

Decrease barriers

• Congress should raise the cost accounting standards (CAS) threshold to at least $100 million; revise the commercial item exemption in 48 CFR 9903.201-1(b)(6); and make related CAS reforms as recommended by the Section 809 Panel to reduce compliance costs, which are the biggest barrier to entry in defense.
• DoD, GSA, and Office of Management and Budget invest in modernizing SAM.gov and related DoD websites that publish contract opportunities to improve user design, alerts, DoD-industry collaboration, processes, and status. Many find SAM.gov onerous to use.

• Fully resource and drive the Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency to streamline processes, increase staffing, and pursue novel approaches to reduce the large backlog of individual and facility security clearances that impose long delays on contractors to begin work or scale.
• USD(A&S) and SAEs assign visible leaders for SBIR, OT (including OT Consortia), Middle Tier of Acquisitions, and Commercial Solutions Openings to champion adoption; set vision; simplify processes; curate leading strategies; and improve guidance, training, structures, and direction to continuously improve adoption. Update policies and guidelines to ensure efforts conducted under OTs count for past performance and small disadvantaged business goals to incentivize industry and government use.
• USD(A&S), USD(R&E), and services establish a team to map and improve processes to scale successful research and prototypes into new or existing acquisition programs. This includes requirements, acquisition, budget, contracting, engineering, and testing, among others.
• USD(A&S) and SAEs establish a working group, to include primes and NDCs, to explore how to incentivize primes to better leverage technology start-up companies. The objective is to fuel disruptive defense innovation from novel tech companies and leverage the primes to scale integration and production of weapon systems to create an enduring battlefield advantage.
• Success measure: USD(A&S) reports an increase in the number of new companies in the industrial base by 5 percent, offsetting the recent trend of 5 percent decrease annually. At least ten NDCs are awarded contracts of more than $50 million that address validated defense requirements. Defense primes significantly increase partnerships, subcontracts, and acquisitions of start-ups and NDCs to integrate their technologies into weapon systems.
• Notional example: A leading technology company with viable solutions for defense that historically avoided defense contracts is now receptive (with board support) to pursue contracts given the higher CAS thresholds, reduced unique compliance requirements, and improved clearance processes.

Recommendation 7: USD comptroller proposes streamlined budget justification and chief digital and artificial intelligence officer (CDAO) modernizes supporting details in congressionally accessible information system for the president’s FY 2026 budget request

Addresses challenge 7.

• USD comptroller proposes a format for streamlining budget justification documents in the investment accounts, focusing on cogent six-page program overviews at the BLI/PE level (R-1 and P-1) with hyperlinks to supporting details.
  • Seek implementation for the president’s FY 2026 budget request.
• CDAO leads the effort to create a query tool and dashboard tied to Advana’s backend data that delivers insight down to the existing level of justification material, allowing for more frequent updates.
  • This tool should be capable of replicating Financial Management Regulation Volume 2B, Chapters 4 and 5 presentations.
  • Prototype early access to congressional staff with the president’s FY 2025 budget request, in addition to the traditional format.
  • This tool should seek to incorporate budget execution data such as quarterly DD1416s and contract obligations as data integration improves.

Success measure: Congressional staff use the new information system for their budgetary and program analysis; staff desires expansion into other accounts, including Operations and Maintenance and Military Personnel.

Notional example: Congressional staff can find up-to-date information on DoD program activities without having DoD officials provide the information directly to a committee.

Recommendation 8: Tying experimentation to acquisition outcomes: Scaling and accelerating successful demonstrations

Addresses challenges 1, 4, and 8.

The DoD and industry invest significant time, funding, and resources to conduct operational exercises that experiment and demonstrate emerging capabilities and technologies in an operationally relevant environment. Even after a major exercise in which senior commanders agree on the success of demonstrated capabilities and demand to acquire these at scale, there is often a two- to four-year lag time for DoD to formally define requirements, secure funding, and shape acquisition and contract strategies. For example, even successful capabilities selected by USD(R&E)’s Rapid Defense Experimentation Reserve (RDER) still must go through the Program Objective Memorandum and Deputy Secretary’s Management Action Group processes to begin scaling.

• Congress to pilot providing $250 million to scale operationally relevant technologies demonstrated at operational exercises that address the preeminent challenge of deterring the People’s Republic of China, such as RDER. The funds will facilitate the acceleration and scaling of novel capabilities into the hands of the warfighter at the speed of relevance, help vendors cross the Valley of Death, and incentivize new nontraditional companies to work with the DoD. This will significantly shorten the traditionally long lag times for successful vendors to receive funding while the DoD finalizes requirements, funding, and contracts. The associated funds would be particularly useful for the technology needed to integrate military forces that will revolve around digital tools and other foundational “middleware” technologies that sometimes fall in the seams of traditional major hardware-centric acquisition.

The fund should:

• Be allocated in FY 2024 spending bill to specific programs or initiatives no later than 180 days from completion of the exercise on discovered solutions.
• Be limited to five or fewer high-potential capabilities to ensure they are properly resourced to meaningfully scale.
• Be directly allocated to an acquisition organization, such as a program executive office, to rapidly acquire capabilities that have demonstrated success in order to address priority operational risks or opportunities.
• Use Defense Production Act Title III or adapt authorities available to other agencies and departments to provide credit guarantees or other funding approaches in support of technology and capability providers.
• Success measures: Increased number of technologies and capabilities demonstrated successfully that are transitioned at scale to the warfighter; increased number of vendors incentivized to demonstrate at exercises.
• Notional example: A company demonstrates a swarm of small undersea intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance drones at the Rim of the Pacific 2024 exercise. The firm is awarded a low-rate initial production contract within sixty days and deploys its capability with the navy in 2025.

Recommendation 9: USD(A&S) and acquisition executives propose realigning existing organizations to adopt the Space Development Agency (SDA) model, and Congress grants additional enabling authorities to those organizations in FY25 NDAA

Addresses challenges 2 and 4.

• USD(A&S) and SAEs charter a small team to build out a model, structure, key elements, and a framework replicating the SDA and lessons learned from rapid acquisition.
  • SDA provides an early model for preemptive disruption within the Space Force. The disruptive units should focus on current technologies from the labs and industry that can be quickly fielded and scaled within existing rapid acquisition authorities. Mature defense and commercial capabilities, along with broader portfolio requirements, can shape a streamlined process. This model builds upon successful organizations like the Air Force Rapid Capabilities Office, Big Safari, and Special Operations Command’s acquisition and SOFWERX organizations.
• Service leadership identifies priority capability areas that are ripe for disruption—ones where the current operational model is outmoded for the digital age and/or where novel technologies offer radically different operational capabilities at greater speed and scale to achieve mission priorities.
• Each identified service and defense agency employs an SDA model to a priority capability area and repurposes organizations, funding, and resources to implement.
  • Identify the right charismatic leader who embodies these characteristics: high technical acumen, proven product manager, well-defined vision, extensive personal network in warfighting and industry communities, commitment to a five-year tenure, and an intangible “wild card” quality. Provide statutory protections to extend top cover beyond the length of time of political appointees for the new organizations to disrupt entrenched mindsets on major systems, operations, and force structures employed for decades.
• DoD leaders continually discuss and iterate on the new model with key stakeholder organizations across the DoD and congressional defense committees.
• Success measure: Congressional buy-in, with a small set of targeted projects identified for each organization and underway in FY 2024 to prepare for rapid scaling in FY 2025 with capabilities initially fielded by FY 2027.
• Notional example: Navy leadership, in its commitment to autonomous systems, bundles PEO Unmanned and Small Combatants, Task Force 59, Unmanned Task Force, and the director of unmanned systems into a new naval autonomy organization with authorities and flexibilities similar to SDA and related rapid-innovation organizations.

Recommendation 10: Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (VCJCS) and services establish a team to collaboratively modernize JCIDS and service requirements processes by September 2024

Addresses challenges 2, 4, and 5.

The DoD’s JCIDS is a complex, disjointed bureaucracy across Joint Staff and the services. The DoD requires a streamlined, tailored requirements framework and processes that iterate operational needs and threats with technology solutions, while also aligning requirements, acquisition, and budget systems.

VCJCS and services charter a team or multiple teams to modernize DoD’s requirements enterprise to include:

• Design a requirements framework that better incorporates bottom-up capability requirements from the warfighter and addresses joint strategic capability concerns. It must align service/agency and JROC core processes while allowing some tailoring and flexibility.
• Enable a requirements system that breaks from the mindset of locking down all requirements up front to a dynamic model that enables software-intensive commercial solutions and emerging technologies that meet changing or evolving warfighting needs to iteratively shape capability developments.
• Overhaul, streamline, and tailor requirements documents based on capability size, urgency, product vs. service, and hardware vs. software. Develop new process to rapidly validate the military utility of a commercial solution instead of the traditional JCIDS.
• Aggressively streamline capability requirement development, coordination, and approval timelines from operational commands, through component commands, and Joint Staff. Impose tripwires for exceeding six months for software and twelve months for hardware to get senior leader involvement.
• Develop enduring overarching requirements for capability portfolios. Include a set of mission impact measures to focus investments and acquisitions to continuously improve.
• Retire the outmoded DoD Architecture Framework and focus on application programming interfaces per DepSecDef’s data decree, architectures, and standards to enable interoperability. Strike the right balance between enterprise, service, and portfolio orchestration with flexibility for program and industry solutions.
• Modernize the analysis of alternatives processes to enable a more streamlined and iterative approach that values prototypes, experiments, minimum viable products, and commercial solutions with warfighter and other user feedback over lengthy headquarters staff analysis.
• Better integrate threat and technology assessments early and throughout the process.
• The team must include external change management experts and collaborate with industry (traditional and nontraditional) and the DoD S&T community to get their input and feedback on providing options to inform DoD requirements.
• Develop a career path, structure, and improved training for DoD requirements managers.
• Publish new policies, guidance, and templates in dynamic online formats instead of five-hundred-page PDFs.
• Congress directs the Government Accountability Office to assess the DoD’s requirements management processes, policies, and practices to include timelines; alignment to the DoD
• budget and acquisition processes, mission outcomes, portfolio management; and harnessing commercial technologies.
• The Senate Armed Services Committee and/or House Armed Services Committee hold hearings with the VCJCS and the service chiefs on modernizing DoD requirements processes to enable greater speed, agility, and innovation.

Success measure: Joint Staff and service stakeholder organizations collaboratively develop a modern approach to managing defense requirements. The new requirements system integrates the key elements outlined above by September 2024.

Notional example: The Air Force establishes an uncrewed aerial systems (UAS) portfolio requirements document that aggressively streamlines all future UAS requirements, bakes in interoperability standards, and enables many novel commercial solutions.

Vignettes: What success looks like

The commission’s recommendations offer bold, actionable reforms to transform the enterprise to enable greater innovation adoption. They include scaling the great work of many dedicated professionals who explored novel practices to accelerate deliveries and increase mission impact. Furthermore, some recommendations require Congress to drive statutory changes or new language to enable greater innovation adoption.

To ensure the recommendations put forth in our interim report were clear, impactful, and achievable, the commission included metrics for how it would measure the implementation of the recommendations, in addition to offering examples of what successful execution would look like. In our final report, we sought to leverage real examples of recent successes of DoD and industry pursuing novel approaches and pathways for technology transition and scaling to ultimately improve mission outcomes for the end user. These real-world vignettes are not only meant to underscore what success looks like, but also highlight the excellent work of select DoD officials, organizations, and industry vendors who work tirelessly in pursuit of innovation adoption for a more resilient and adaptable force.

The following vignettes outline key challenges the department has faced, the solutions and processes it followed to address them, and the outcome of its efforts. Furthermore, they outline how these examples align with the commission’s recommendations and reinforce the key themes and objectives to modernize the department and its broader ecosystem to strengthen national security. All of the commission’s recommendations are reflected, with the exception of Recommendation 3, which suggests modernizing budget documents, because the DoD has yet to do so. However, the deputy secretary of defense directed the department to adopt any suggestions made in the Commission on Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) Reform’s Interim Report that can be implemented now, which reiterates our third recommendation

Vignette 1: Leveraging operational innovation and experimentation to demonstrate the value of commercial capabilities to meet operational needs

Challenge: The US Navy’s Fifth Fleet, overseeing key chokepoints like the Suez Canal and Strait of Hormuz, was facing key capability gaps due to shrinking allied defense budgets and growing operational commitments, including daily weapons smuggling, shipping harassment, drone attacks, speedboat interdictions, and military threats. Facing constrained bandwidth, the fleet needed novel approaches to conduct maritime domain awareness.

Solution and process: NATO’s experience with the Maritime Unmanned Systems Initiative underscored the role that maritime robotics could play when combined with machine learning and artificial intelligence (AI) in achieving more precise deployments of limited-crewed assets for enhanced maritime domain awareness, a concept previously untested in real-world conditions. A design sprint in Bahrain, leveraging the Chief of Naval Operations’ Unmanned Task Force, sought to integrate robotics and AI into fleet operations to meet mission demands and laid the groundwork for what would become Task Force 59 (TF-59).

Innovation occurred continuously in the live “lab” of the operational environment, with a focus not on technology adoption in a vacuum, but creatively leveraging and empowering people and dynamic leaders and partnerships, transforming processes and rethinking tempo to ultimately achieve operational problem solving and operational innovation.

This rapid innovation was driven by two pivotal process changes: capability as a service and the capability sprint model. When traditional government funding to procure capabilities was denied, the task force pivoted to the “capability as a service” model, which delivered instant access to cutting-edge technology, software updates, and maintenance. This cost-effective approach saved millions in operational expenses compared to traditional methods, and also enabled strong partnerships with a large number of industry partners. When the acquisition process did not accommodate purchasing or renting drones, TF-59 transitioned to a data-as-a-service model and collaborated with the Naval Information Warfare Center Atlantic to establish a comprehensive data lake—a centralized repository that securely stores and processes large amounts of data. These adaptations illustrate the dividends of process innovation and highlight that a focus on iterative improvement can deliver execution in complex, multi-stakeholder environments.

 From an organizational perspective, four principal innovations are notable.

• Problem holder inclusion: By integrating those facing challenges directly into technological-development discussions, operations drove innovation.
• Ideas over rank: A genuine meritocracy was implemented, in which the best ideas prevailed, regardless of the rank of those who proposed them.
• Problem-centric organization: TF-59 adopted a start-up structure oriented around the problems at hand. This focus created a dynamic environment in which solutions were devised with a clear understanding of the actual challenges faced.
• Team of teams execution: Recognizing the vast scope of the mission, TF-59 cultivated a wide network of collaboration with partners across government, academia, and industry.

Outcome: In January 2023, Fifth Fleet Commander Admiral Brad Cooper declared TF-59 had achieved initial operational capability after logging more than thirty-five thousand hours of maritime robotics operations, executing more than twenty multinational exercises, deploying more than twenty disruptive technologies, and creating a data lake of more than twenty million data points, all of which made a strong future hybrid fleet. The culmination of this work was demonstrated at the International Maritime Exercise—the largest-ever maritime unmanned-systems exercise. This exercise demonstrated the viability of what has been termed a “digital ocean”—a domain of sensors collecting new data from “ships, unmanned systems, subsea sensors, satellites, buoys…[with an] intelligent synthesis of around-the-clock inputs” that provides unprecedented maritime domain awareness. ¹

Aligns with Atlantic Council recommendations 1, 4, and 10: This anecdote highlights the importance of adopting a portfolio approach that allows the pursuit of multiple technical solutions. This was critical for TF-59 to be able to experiment and prototype with multiple vendors with differing solutions to help solve enduring operational challenges. DIU connected TF-59 with vendors that could provide a viable solution and business arrangements that could be suitable for nontraditional vendors. This vignette also shows that detailed requirements approved and validated years ago do not add value when it comes to rapidly advancing commercial technology and how it can solve operational needs using solutions that operators would not have envisioned.

Vignette 2: Purposeful experimentation and scaling SBIRs for more rapid and well-aligned tech adoption

Challenge: The Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC) identified the integration of AI for Small Unit Maneuver (AISUM) as a key mission priority to enhance warfighters’ situational awareness by providing a comprehensive 360-degree view, expediting threat identification and removal, and ultimately ensuring operator safety. In pursuit of that, AFSOC seeks to create teams of multi-agent unmanned aerial systems (UAS) that can operate and collaborate autonomously in complex, unstructured environments.

Solution and process: AFWERX Autonomy, in collaboration with the Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL) Sensors Directorate, selected vendors to conduct multiple flight demonstrations and evaluations to provide a baseline of current autonomous capabilities. A five-day flight event took place at Camp Roberts in California, during which autonomous UAS employed onboard autonomous software to circumvent obstacles and communicate elements of the surrounding environment while executing missions.

Outcome: As a result of successful performance, a start-up specializing in defense-focused autonomous drones won a $60-million contract through the Strategic Funding Increase (STRATFI) program to provide the AI technologies it used and unmanned systems to AFSOC. STRATFI is designed to identify companies that consistently meet the requirements of the Department of Defense and are well positioned to win multiple programs of record. The program aims to keep start-ups funded while they navigate the DoD’s acquisition cycles, enabling contracts to be issued more quickly compared to the traditional two-year budget cycle.

Companies that demonstrate potential for meaningful contributions to the DoD can receive up to $60 million over a span of three years. This funding structure provides $15 million each year for the first two years, and an additional $30 million in the third year, from either government or private-capital investment sources. The start-up, for its part, attracted funds from venture firms for its STRATFI award. Due to this expanded contract vehicle, not only are the start-up’s drones deployed alongside AFSOC operators, but it is also working with AFWERX and AFRL Sensors Directorate to deploy V-BATs team capabilities to conduct detect, identify, locate, and report operations in Global Positioning System- and communications-denied environments next year.

Aligns with recommendations 5, 6, and 8: This anecdote is a successful example of finding novel pathways to scale successfully demonstrated technologies that are aligned to mission outcomes and getting them across the valley of death between Phase II and Phase III SBIRs.

By utilizing STRATFI to expand SBIRs, more funding is made available for vendors to effectively demonstrate their capabilities. This approach also enables both the department and vendors to benefit from capital market investments in critical defense technologies. In turn, capital market investors receive a strong demand signal and have the potential for a return on investment by backing technology companies supporting the department. This positive cycle should help funnel more capital market dollars into defense technologies and encourage nontraditional entrants to do business with the DoD.

Vignette 3: Tying experimentation to acquisition outcomes and leveraging DIU commercial-landscape monitoring

Challenge: During operations in Syria and Afghanistan, US Army units acknowledged the significant role of small drones in offering intelligence and surveillance at the unit level. As a result, these units frequently procured commercially available off-the-shelf (COTS) systems from Chinese companies prior to these units’ deployments. After the department grounded Chinese-made COTS drones due to security risks in 2019, the Army needed an accelerated acquisition process to rapidly identify and field secure, capable solutions.

Solution and process: The Army short-range reconnaissance program sought a rucksack-portable system capable of providing real-time situational awareness to infantry platoons. Recognizing the advances in the commercial drone market, the Army bypassed its traditional industry partners and leveraged the DIU to build partnerships with more than thirty nontraditional drone providers to submit solutions. Five finalists were chosen for rigorous testing at the Small UAS Master Trainer Schoolhouse in Fort Benning, Georgia, before the winner was selected.

Outcome: This initiative, spearheaded in late 2019, not only generated the Army’s first program of record for a much-needed capability, but also represented a prototype for the delivery of more than one thousand systems in less than three years. Although the DIU led the Army-sponsored prototype competition, additional services and US government agencies benefited from the pipeline by being able to rapidly procure Blue UAS platforms to meet their small UAS program needs.

Aligns with recommendations 4 and 8: This anecdote showcases technology companies demonstrating capabilities in operationally relevant environments. It also demonstrates success generating an acquisition outcome that procures and scales mission-aligned technologies to be transitioned to the warfighter. This assessment highlights how the commission envisions the US military services utilizing the DIU’s commercial scanning capability to not only source leap-ahead, dual-use tech capabilities, but to find appropriate alternatives when existing vendors are no longer trusted nor the most efficient or cost-effective option. This process not only brings the best of what the private sector has to offer for US soldiers, but also allows the department to benefit from capital market dollars being spent on technology development and maturation.

Vignette 4: Pivoting to modern information-technology capability portfolio management

Challenge: In the 2010s, the US Navy was acquiring a series of disparate information-technology (IT) products in a manner that was cost-inefficient, performance ineffective, and put the burden on its customers to integrate solutions.

Solution and process: The Navy’s PEO Digital leaned forward over the last few years to adopt modern portfolio-management practices. In 2021, PEO Digital reorganized from traditional program management offices into eight portfolios, with five focused on delivering modern IT enterprise services and three oriented to other purposes. Portfolio support and control were provided through governance, common tools, staffing, and coordination.

PEO Digital modernized to be more service based, customer-centric, innovative, and agile. The PEO empowered employees and teams, while holding them accountable to a new set of mission-performance measures. A primary objective of the new structure was to foster greater collaboration across their programs and functional areas to reduce redundancy and increase agility.

PEO Digital published its “Technical Vision and Modern Service Delivery” report to convey how it will implement interoperable modern technologies to free warfighters’ time to focus on warfighting tasks.² Five of the eight IT service portfolios provide capabilities that align with the Modern Service Delivery Design Concepts and function as the proving ground for enhanced customer-centric solutions. PEO Digital’s customers are not simply users of individual acquisition programs. They are a diverse community of warfighters, dependents, civilians, and contractors who consume technologies across the Cyber and Operations, Digital Workplace Services, Infrastructure Services, Platform Application Services, and End-User Services portfolios. PEO Digital is also adopting modern architectures and industry frameworks. To remain at the forefront of modern service delivery, it coordinates acquisition, service delivery, and contract administration to maximize the Navy’s purchasing power and return on investment. The remaining portfolios focus on specific areas that demand tailored acquisition support.

Outcome: The Modern Service Delivery portfolios provide maximum flexibility to shift investments to address priorities, risks, and opportunities for maximum mission impact. The modern structure supports legacy-technology divestments through a rationalized portfolio of services instead of portfolios of programs, illuminates organizations that provide new services, and delivers shared services across the US Department of the Navy.

Aligns with recommendations 1 and 3: This anecdote is a successful example of acquiring an integrated suite of capabilities instead of stovepiped programs. By consolidating budget accounts, the PEO was able to structure the acquisition and technology underpinnings to increase mission impact. This also exemplifies the commission’s vision of continuous improvement through user-centric designs and feedback. Instead of imposing mandated IT solutions, PEO Digital sought to understand perspectives and proposed solutions.

Vignette 5: Modernizing capability requirements

Challenge: Defining, staffing, and approving enterprise IT system requirements is often a lengthy, cumbersome process that predates modern technologies and operations.

Solution and process: PEO Digital partnered with the Office of the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Information Warfare, the largest requirements sponsor, to pilot top-level requirements and modernize a set of decade-old enterprise IT and network requirements. The team employed high-level areas, outcome-oriented metrics, agile development and integration trains, and horizon pipelines. It fully embraced contemporary IT development practices like Agile that prioritize user needs, flexibility, and iterative processes.

Outcome: A ten-page requirements document replaced the outdated and overly prescriptive five-hundred-page legacy document. This new requirements document is a model for others across the Office of the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Information Warfare to hold their acquisition agents accountable for continuously improving mission outcomes.

Aligns with recommendations 1 and 10: This anecdote is a successful example of shifting from a program-centric to a customer-centric requirements document for portfolios to enhance mission outcomes. Instead of detailed system requirements, such a document provides a strategic perspective that compels value delivery to the customer. This anecdote demonstrates a collaborative agreement between the acquisition and user community that aligns technology investment decisions with enhanced mission outcomes. It shifts the focus of acquisition management from the minimum acceptable support levels and system specifications that fail to optimize the benefit to the warfighter to a focus on operational capability needs and outcomes.

Vignette 6: Communicating demand signal to leverage commercial-sector innovation and adopt private-sector best practices

Challenge: Many programs across the department develop and execute acquisition strategies and make investment decisions without fully appreciating the leading technology solutions. These programs focus primarily on cost, schedule, and performance against a predefined baseline, failing to consider technology’s value to the mission. Adoption of new technologies is stretched across multiple years due to duplicative development work and technical assessments, delaying warfighter capabilities, atrophying the tech value, and increasing development costs. The disconnect between acquisitions and the user community is a detriment to lethality.

Solution and process: PEO Digital partnered with the DIU, National Security Innovation Network (NSIN), Office of Naval Research, DARPA, other Department of the Navy PEOs, and NATO’s Defence Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic, to improve tech scouting. The organizations provided access to a diverse talent network across government, vendors, and academics. They collaborated with venture-capital firms to share their vision and mission needs, learn about emerging technologies, and generate opportunities for industry to innovate to advance the Department of the Navy’s Information Superiority Vision.³ The coordination across government and industry reduced capability deployment time and costs. Using early development work and empirical evidence of technology impacts on mission outcomes in similar contexts informed investment decisions.

PEO Digital implemented the World-Class Alignment Metrics framework to establish a centralized, data-driven investment-prioritization model to align technology outcomes and mission outcomes. ⁴ This approach increases mission context and simplifies the impacts of technology investments for rapid business decisions. The framework reduces reporting burdens to the metrics demonstrating the most significant relationship between technology and mission outcomes. A study by technology analysis firm Gartner reinforced the framework’s validity and benchmarked the organization against industry giants of similar size and complexity, such as large defense contractors, FedEx, and McDonalds. The five mission outcomes that technology investments must improve are: user time lost, operational resilience, customer satisfaction, cost per user, and adaptability/mobility. Each mission outcome has subordinate technical outcomes generated by the PEO.

Outcome: PEO Digital improved the efficacy of investment decisions while accelerating decision timelines from months to minutes. The approach significantly enhanced customer outcomes and diversified vendor and procurement mechanisms using the PEO’s R&D budget. The pilots achieved acquisition lead times as low as thirty days, reducing award times by eight months. They diversified vendor access and strengthened negotiating power. The organization delivers enhanced value faster and at a lower cost. Their collaboration with the NSIN also attracted new talent for the defense sector.

Aligns with recommendations 1 and 4: This anecdote exemplifies the successful implementation of capability portfolio management to realign acquisition, contracting, engineering, and other elements to achieve portfolio outcomes. This example also demonstrates the commission’s vision of leveraging commercial solutions, including the latest technologies from allies and partners, as well as adopting business practices used by leading commercial companies to strategically allocate investments, design solutions, and allocate resources.

Vignette 7: Leveraging warfighting insights and commercial product vision to develop new innovative products

Challenge: The commander of US Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) knew that his operational staff did not have the tools to integrate, process, and display all available intelligence that could help inform different courses of action rapidly and accurately. He worried that his ability to proactively identify threats and provide national leadership with decision space was becoming severely limited in an age of increasing threats. Service efforts to improve North American Aerospace Defense (NORAD) Command and USNORTHCOM systems, as part of large formal programs of record, had resulted in some improvements but still failed to meet combatant-commander needs.

Solution and process: In 2017, USNORTHCOM engaged the DIU to assist in finding a vendor that could not only support USNORTHCOM in developing tools to address these challenges, but also use its own corporate R&D funds, as well as funds awarded as part of the Air Force SBIR program. The DIU used its processes to identify commercial companies with the appropriate expertise, conducted a streamlined down-select process, and eventually awarded a contract to a vendor using DIU’s Other Transaction (OT) vehicle. Specifically, the DIU adopted evaluation criteria that enabled the vendor to focus on integrating live mission tracks to demonstrate their value rather than developing extensive proposals or detailed slide decks. This vendor’s product became known as the Joint Effects for Real-time Integrated Command and Control Operations (JERIC2O).

This steady stream of direct user feedback from USNORTHCOM personnel resulted in continuing success, as each release delivered more capability that addressed specific operator pain points. The application eventually grew to the point that it needed to be rolled into the Air Force’s Advanced Battle Management System (ABMS) portfolio to address broader challenges. This also resulted in the effort to move from the DIU contract to a more enduring ABMS Indefinite Delivery/Indefinite Quantity contract vehicle. This success was instrumental in USNORTHCOM collaborating with Joint Staff to issue a Joint Requirements Oversight Council Memorandum (JROCM) directing that the legacy system (which had never met user needs) be retired by the ABMS program, providing an opportunity for the vendor’s products to be scaled more broadly.

The vendor’s willingness to invest its own funds and staff its organization with military and technical experts who inherently understood USNORTCOM’s detailed operational needs and how to solve them provided it with a significant advantage in being able to achieve desired outcomes. The vendor’s financial posture, in which leadership was willing to accept a lower growth trajectory, provided the firm the ability to more effectively compete against the major defense primes in later awards.

Outcome: In July 2023, the vendor was awarded a three-year, $61-million contract to continue the development of this critical capability as part of the now formal program, Cloud Based Command and Control (CBC2), under the ABMS umbrella. The JERIC2O capabilities now reside in the vendor’s Command Center product, which provides a world-class geospatial data-visualization and actions platform, ingests large amounts of data, applies real-time threat analysis, makes AI-generated recommendations, and delivers intelligent insights and actions across all domains for customers beyond USNORTHCOM.

The month following the CBC2 award, a Dallas-based private-equity firm announced the acquisition of the vendor, thanks in no small part to its work with USNORTHCOM that demonstrated its ability to rapidly deliver actionable insights to warfighter using AI innovations. The vendor now has active contracts with multiple government customers, including the US Space Force, the Department of Homeland Security, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), the US Army, and the National Reconnaissance Office. It plans on growing its two-hundred-person team and expanding its customer base to include working with the US European Command, the US Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM), and the US Central Command—as the firm successfully did with USNORTHCOM.

Aligns with recommendations 1, 5, 6, and 10: This anecdote demonstrates the value of a capability portfolio model, in which smaller vendors can bring outsized capabilities to solve specific user problems that would likely have been impossible under the standard program-centric model, in which all requirements would be consolidated into one massive program. A portfolio approach also provides more options for deprecating a larger legacy system rather than moving from one behemoth system to another.

This example also illustrates the importance of using government tools that incentivize tech companies to do business with the DoD by using alternative contracting vehicles, like Other Transactions, that are better aligned with commercial business models; evaluation techniques such as oral and video demonstrations; or hyperlinked proposals that reduce the burden on small companies and are more suitable for those vendors with limited expertise working with the government. If DIU had used the standard procurement process, it is unlikely that this vendor would have been able to participate. This success story also illustrates how current requirement processes need to be more influenced by available commercial technology. Rather than having users articulate every need in advance, the DoD should establish mechanisms (as USNORTHCOM did) in which users are more directly tied in with the developers to enable delivery of capability that iteratively addresses users’ biggest pain points. Finally, this instance demonstrates the importance of funding flexibility, given how crucial it was for ABMS to be able to reallocate funds from other activities to support the continued development of this critical capability.

Vignette 8: Incorporating robust user feedback with government and private seed funding to deliver unique commercial capability

Challenge: After years of relying on the M4 carbine for executing infantry and special-operation missions, the US Army concluded that it needed a more cost-effective and powerful weapon to deal with emerging threats on the battlefield. In 2020, it initiated the Next Generation Squad Weapon (NGSW) program to meet a broad set of requirements, including the use of a certain type of fire-control system, weight, accuracy, and caliber. There were also requirements for integrating digital technology that would improve the ability to provide soldiers with real-time information about the weapons status (like round counts), as well as provide more detailed situational-awareness information.

Solution and process: The Army carried out a sequence of prototype experimentation events and evaluations, which led to the identification of seven vendors and the selection of one to finalize development and enter into initial production for the NGSW. A prime contractor competitor for the NGSW contract partnered with a research company as a key subcontractor.

The research company’s journey to fill this subcontractor role started as a beneficiary of an SBIR Phase I award, which provided modest funding but, more importantly, provided entry into the federal market. The awarding agency also offered an opportunity for accelerated achievement of SBIR Phase III awards. This was influenced by the Army’s Vista Initiative, which urged program offices to incorporate small-business partnerships as evaluation criteria with larger prime contractors. The larger companies were motivated by the prospect of receiving higher technical ratings during the selection process. This arrangement benefited the Army, as it allowed the service access to innovative technology that might otherwise be unavailable as a system subcomponent.

Despite receiving limited support from US government sponsors after the initial SBIR award, the subcontractor utilized its network to establish connections with relevant users that could offer feedback on its initial product. This involved creating use cases and conducting customer discovery with various stakeholders, such as the Army’s PEO Soldier, home of the NGSW program office.

Outcome: The user feedback was overwhelmingly positive, instilling confidence that the subcontractor’s product was suitable for a government contract. This feedback justified internal investments in further developing and enhancing the product. Shortly after securing $1 million in seed funding from venture-capital investors, the subcontractor embarked on a six-month R&D pivot. This strategic shift sought to enhance its data-analytic capabilities to improve round-count detection and weapon stress detection. These advancements were crucial for making informed decisions regarding condition-based maintenance. The successful implementation of this feature update proved beneficial for the company as it entered the NGSW competition.

Following its partnership with the prime, the subcontractor also announced the award of a five-year, $60-million SBIR Phase III contract with the DoD and General Services Administration as part of the Joint All-Domain Command and Control project portfolio. These projects focus on fusing data from AI-enabled edge computing sensors with other battlefield data sources to transmit decision-quality information to tactical forces through mobile and mixed-reality platforms. This capability is expected to greatly improve ground teams’ abilities to conceptualize line-of-fire dynamics and threat movements.

In April 2022, the US Army awarded a $4.5-billion production contract for the NGSW program to Sig Sauer, the configuration of which included the subcontractor’s round-count and inventory-management system. This system translates to all future orders of the XM5 rifle (replacing the M4/M4A1 carbine) and the XM250 automatic rifle (replacing the M249 squad automatic weapon) including the ARC system, which provides a long-term revenue path for the company, given the number of soldiers expected to require those new weapons.

Aligns with recommendations 5, 6, and 8: This anecdote highlights the significance of enhancing the government’s approach to conducting business with the tech industry. The utilization of evaluation criteria, which encompass nontraditional small businesses as innovation partners for significant contracts, proved to be a potent tool available to the government. This example also demonstrates the significance of utilizing private capital, which enabled ARC to adapt its product design while also using connections made through the SBIR award to obtain user feedback, which played a crucial role in informing the pivot. The acceleration into a SBIR Phase III instilled confidence in investors, as it demonstrated the government’s serious commitment to this technology. Despite the private-capital injection, ARC was left with a two-year gap between having a viable contract and awaiting the award of the NGSW contract to affirm its position as the subcontractor. This emphasizes the need for more bridge-fund opportunities to ensure promising subcontractors are able to stay viable through long source-selection periods and remain a viable part of the defense supply chain.

Implementation actions to date

Following publication of the commission’s interim report and engagement with key stakeholders, Congress and the DoD took the following actions (as of November 2023) consistent with the commission’s recommendations. These actions indicate the resonance of the report findings with key stakeholders in implementing reforms to ensure defense resources are maximized to meet challenges. At this time, Congress has not conferenced on the final FY 2024 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) or defense appropriation bills.

• 1. Introduce a new capability portfolio model. The assistant secretary of the Navy (research, development, and acquisition), citing this commission, designated PEO Integrated Warfare System (IWS) as the Department of Navy’s pilot PEO for portfolio management, effective immediately (September 2023). Other PEOs have moved, or plan to move, out on some portfolio-management practices with promising progress, to include Navy PEO Digital as noted in the vignettes in this report. William LaPlante, under secretary of defense for acquisition and sustainment and a public champion of capability portfolios, hosted a PEO Summit in July to discuss common challenges and solutions for delivering capability at speed and scale. He also updated DoD Directive 7045.20 on Capability Portfolio Management to reflect related practices at the Office of Secretary of Defense and Joint Staff levels.
• 2. Consolidate program elements. In its interim report, the congressionally directed Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) Commission recommended a systematic review and consolidation of budget line items among the “actions that can be implemented now.” The deputy secretary of defense directed the department to adopt all actions (PPBE Commission recommendations) that can be implemented now. The Senate version of the defense appropriations bill noted that the Army should consolidate Other Procurement Army funding lines.
• 3. Reset reprogramming authorities. The PPBE Commission’s interim report considered several alternatives to modify reprogramming authorities and policies. It seeks further inputs from congressional and DoD stakeholders on this potential recommendation. Its interim report has 215 mentions of reprogramming, a hot topic of discussion for challenges and reform opportunities. The deputy secretary of defense directed the department to adopt all actions from the PPBE Commission interim report that can be implemented now.
• 4. Modernize the DoD to align with the twenty-first-century industrial base. The secretary of defense elevated the DIU to be a direct report, and required a plan of actions, milestones, and resource requests. INDOPACOM established a Joint Mission Accelerator Directorate (JMAD) to help connect with the commercial sector. A DIU leader serves as the JMAD deputy director and chief technology officer. The Defense Subcommittee of the US House of Representatives Appropriation Committee (HAC-D) recommends $1 billion funding in the FY 2024 defense appropriations bill for a hedge portfolio fund run by the DIU for smart, affordable, modular, and sustainable systems—$600 million of that is allocated for agile research, development, test and evaluation, procurement, production, modification, operations, and maintenance. The House Armed Services Committee NDAA is supportive of DIU’s success and directs the DIU to identify a consolidation plan for DoD innovation organizations to engage nontraditional technology partners more effectively. The Senate NDAA Section 806 calls for reduction of barriers for commercial products and services. The House NDAA bill directs the Government Accountability Office to study reforming requirements, including processes to rapidly validate the military utility of commercial solutions to meet capability needs or opportunities. The Senate NDAA Section 212 supports the DoD’s providing up to $15 million per year to participate in NATO’s Defence Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic. The House NDAA Section 853 establishes a public-private partnership pilot program to accelerate scaling, production, and acquisition of advanced capabilities for national security. This measure is intended to bolster the defense industrial base and domestic supply-chain resilience.
• 5. Strengthen alignment of capital markets to defense outcomes. The House NDAA Section 883 directs the services’ SBIR offices to conduct a study on expanding STRATFI programs beyond the Air Force to help small businesses seek Phase III awards. The Senate NDAA Section 845 extended Small Business Innovation Research and Small Business Technology Transfer (STTR) programs to transfer to production. Senate NDAA Section 831 generated a Defense Industrial Base Advanced Capabilities Pilot Program that focuses on public-private partnerships with equity. Additionally, DARPA, Army, Navy, and Air Force have allowed majority VC-owned companies to participate in SBIR/STTR. Senate NDAA Section 845 extended the pilot program for streamlined technology transition from the SBIR/STTR programs by five years. Senate NDAA Section 834 generated a Program on Capital Assistance to Support Investment in the Defense Industrial Base. The Senate NDAA Section 901 amends Title X to establish the Office of Strategic Capital in statute. The House defense appropriations bill directed a report on opportunities for additional strategic capital tools, and other needed resources or authorities that could allow the Office of Strategic Capital to achieve greater impact.
• 6. Incentivize tech companies to do business with the DoD. The Senate NDAA, page 284, directs USD(A&S) to ensure that contracting officers are aware of Nontraditional Defense Contractor (NDC) statutes and practices and brief plans for a streamlined process for contractors to attest their status as an NDC. The office of the under secretary of defense for research and engineering tasked the Defense Innovation Board to deliver a study on lowering the barriers to innovation. The Senate NDAA Section 805 requires the DoD to create at least three new commercial solutions openings (CSOs) each year. CSOs were made a permanent authority in the FY 2022 NDAA.
• 7. Modernize budget documents. The House defense appropriations bill recommends the Chief Data and AI Office (CDAO) submit a report on a web interface that can provide access to data described for DIU project reporting to Congress and recommends $50 million to support this effort. The congressionally directed PPBE Commission, in its interim report, recommended among the “actions that can be implemented now” to establish classified and unclassified enclaves for DoD-congressional information sharing, to include electronic transmission of budget-justification books. It further recommended restructuring the justification books to provide the needed content in a common format. The deputy secretary of defense directed the department to adopt all actions (PPBE Commission recommendations) that can be implemented now.
• 8. Establish a bridge fund for successfully demonstrated technologies. The House defense appropriations bill includes a hedge portfolio that allocates $220 million for helping the DIU field capabilities with combatant commands (COCOMs). HAC-D also recommended adding $200 million to the department’s $100-million request for the Accelerated Procurement and Fielding of Innovative Technologies program. The House NDAA Section 851 establishes a pilot program for recurring awards for production, investment, and deployment through competitions. These are intended to solve urgent operational needs of attritable systems.
• 9. Scale the space development agency model. Deputy Secretary of Defense Kathleen Hicks announced a Replicator initiative to field thousands of attritable, autonomous systems at scale and in multiple domains within the next 18–24 months. The House Armed Services Committee Cyber, Information Technologies, and Innovation subcommittee held a hearing on “Outside Perspectives on DoD’s Replicator Program.” The Silicon Valley Defense Group led an industry letter supporting a DIU and Service Non-Traditional Innovation Fielding Enterprise-led Hedge portfolio. Navy leaders established the Disruptive Capabilities Office to rapidly field technologies to the fleet. This office would integrate and expand upon the Unmanned Task Force and related naval autonomy organizations and initiatives. The House Defense Appropriations bill includes a $1-billion hedge portfolio fund, which would empower the DIU and new Non-Traditional Innovation Fielding Enterprise to rapidly acquire many smaller capabilities harnessing commercial solutions. Space Acquisition Executive Frank Calvelli continues to praise the SDA and views its approach as a model for the broader space acquisition enterprise.
• 10. Modernize the DoD’s requirements system. The Senate NDAA, Section 802, requires the secretary of defense, through the VCJCS, and in cooperation with the military departments and combatant commands, to modernize DoD’s requirements process, consistent with the commission’s interim report, with reform elements and a report to Congress by October 2025. The House NDAA report page 269 expressed concern with the lack of modernization in the DoD’s requirements process, calling for a Government Accountability Office (GAO) report and recommendations.

Conclusion

This commission’s final report reiterated the actionable recommendations offered to elected officials and senior DoD leaders in the interim report, and showcased timely and replicable examples of successful adoption of dual-use technologies. The commission is pleased to witness considerable progress on many of the challenges identified in its interim report, reflected under “Implementation Actions to Date,” but acknowledges that broader, strategic matters will take time to reach full implementation. While that may be true, failure to adopt emerging technology at an effective pace would impede the DoD’s ability to deter China, a primary objective of the United States’ current National Defense Strategy.

Biographies

The Hon. Mark T. Esper, PhD

Board Director and Co-Chair of the Commission, Atlantic Council; 27th US Secretary of Defense

The Honorable Mark T. Esper is a partner and board member of the venture capital firm Red Cell Partners and a board director at the Atlantic Council. He was sworn in as the 27th Secretary of Defense on July 23, 2019, and served in that capacity until November 9, 2020. He previously served as acting secretary of defense from June 24, 2019, to July 15, 2019. Esper was confirmed as the 23rd secretary of the US Army in November 2017.

In the private sector, Esper was vice president for government relations at the Raytheon Company.

He earlier served concurrently as executive vice president of the US Chamber of Commerce’s Global Intellectual Property Center and as vice president for European and Eurasian affairs from 2008 to 2010. From 2006 to 2007, He was chief operating officer and executive vice president of defense and international affairs at the Aerospace Industries Association.

In addition to his work in the private sector, Esper served in a range of positions on Capitol Hill and in the Defense Department. He served as legislative director and senior policy advisor to former Senator Chuck Hagel. He was a senior professional staff member on the Senate Foreign Relations and Senate Governmental Affairs committees, policy director for the House Armed Services Committee, and national security advisor for former Senate Majority Leader Bill Frist. During the President George W. Bush administration, he served as deputy assistant secretary of defense for negotiations policy at the Pentagon. He was national policy director to the late Senator Fred Thompson for his 2008 presidential campaign and was a Senate-appointed commissioner on the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission. 

Esper began his career in the US Army. He is a 1986 graduate of the United States Military Academy and received his commission in the infantry. Upon completion of Ranger and Pathfinder training, he served in the 101st Airborne Division and participated in the 1990-91 Gulf War with the “Screaming Eagles.” He later commanded a rifle company in the 3-325 Airborne Battalion Combat Team in Vicenza, Italy. He retired from the army in 2007 after spending ten years on active duty and eleven years in the National Guard and Army Reserve. After leaving active duty, he served as chief of staff at the Heritage Foundation think tank.

He is a recipient of the Department of Defense Medal for Distinguished Public Service. Among his many military awards and decorations are the Legion of Merit, a Bronze Star Medal, the Kuwait Liberation Medal, Kuwait Liberation Medal-Saudi Arabia, and the Combat Infantryman Badge. Esper holds a PhD from the George Washington University.

The Hon. Deborah Lee James

Board Director and Co-Chair of the Commission, Atlantic Council; 23rd US Secretary of the Air Force

The Honorable Deborah Lee James is chair of the Defense Business Board and board director at the Atlantic Council. Previously, she served as the twenty-third secretary of the US Air Force and was responsible for the affairs of the Department of the Air Force, including the organizing, training, equipping, and providing for the welfare of its nearly 660,000 active-duty, National Guard, Reserve, and civilian airmen and their families. She also oversaw the Air Force’s annual budget of more than $139 billion. James has thirty years of senior homeland and national security experience in the federal government and the private sector.

Prior to her Air Force position, James served as president of Science Applications International Corporation’s (SAIC’s) technical and engineering sector, where she was responsible for 8,700 employees and more than $2 billion in revenue.

For twelve years, James held a variety of positions with SAIC, including senior vice president and director of homeland security. From 2000 to 2001, she was executive vice president and chief operating officer at Business Executives for National Security, and from 1998 to 2000 she was vice president of international operations and marketing at United Technologies. During the Bill Clinton administration, from 1993 to 1998, James served in the Pentagon as assistant secretary of defense for reserve affairs. In that position, she was senior advisor to the secretary of defense on all matters pertaining to the 1.8 million National Guard and Reserve personnel worldwide. In addition to working extensively with Congress, state governors, the business community, military associations, and international officials on National Guard and Reserve component issues, James oversaw a $10 billion budget and supervised a one-hundred-plus-person staff. Prior to her Senate confirmation in 1993, she served as an assistant to the assistant secretary of defense for legislative affairs. 

From 1983 to 1993, James worked as a professional staff member on the House Armed Services Committee, where she served as a senior advisor to the Military Personnel and Compensation Subcommittee, the NATO Burden Sharing Panel, and the chairman’s Member Services team. 

James earned a BA in comparative area studies from Duke University and an MA in international affairs from Columbia University School of International and Public Affairs.

Whitney M. McNamara

Vice President, Beacon Global Strategies; Author, Commission on Defense Innovation Adoption, Atlantic Council

Whitney McNamara is a vice president at Beacon Global Strategies. Prior to that, McNamara worked in the Office of the Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering, where she served as the S&T portfolio lead at the Defense Innovation Board, whose mission is to provide the secretary of defense, deputy secretary of defense, and other senior leaders with recommendations on emerging technologies and innovative approaches that DoD should adopt to ensure US technological and military dominance.

Before that, McNamara was an emerging technologies policy subject matter expert supporting the Department of Defense’s Chief Information Officer (CIO). Prior to that, she was a senior analyst at national security think tank the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, focusing on emerging technologies, future operating concepts, and informationized warfare in the context of long-term technological and military competition with great powers.

Peter Modigliani

Defense Acquisition Lead, MITRE Corporation; Author, Commission on Defense Innovation Adoption, Atlantic Council

Peter Modigliani is a defense acquisition leader within the MITRE Corporation enabling the DoD and intelligence community to deliver innovative solutions with greater speed and agility. He works with acquisition and CIO executives, program managers, the Section 809 Panel, congressional staffs, industry, and academia to shape acquisition reforms, strategic initiatives, and major program strategies.

Modigliani champions digitally transforming the acquisition enterprise to modernize and accelerate operations. He launched MITRE’s digital acquisition platform, AiDA. Prior to MITRE, Modigliani was an Air Force program manager for C4ISR programs and an assistant vice president with Alion Science and Technology, supporting the Air Force Acquisition Executive’s Information Dominance division.

Matthew MacGregor

Acquisition subject-matter expert (SME), Center for Acquisition and Management Sciences, MITRE; author, Commission on Defense Innovation Adoption, Atlantic Council

Matt MacGregor is an acquisition SME at MITRE’s Center for Acquisition and Management Sciences. Matt spent twenty-two years as a military and civil-service program manager (PM) across the space, command and control, weather, and aircraft portfolios. His last PM assignment was as the F-35 deputy program manager. His last five years in government before joining MITRE were at the Pentagon, where he served as a division chief in multiple headquarters acquisition roles. His work at MITRE has spanned multiple OSD-level organizations and program offices with specific emphasis on accelerating the fielding of digital capabilities to the warfighter. 

Stephen Rodriguez

Senior Advisor and Study Director of the Commission on Defense Innovation Adoption, Forward Defense, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, Atlantic Council

Stephen Rodriguez is a senior advisor with the Forward Defense program at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security and founding partner of One Defense, a next-generation strategic advisory firm that leverages machine learning to identify advanced software and hardware commercial capabilities and accelerate their transition into the defense industrial base. He is also a venture partner at Refinery Ventures, an early-scale fund investing in dual-use technologies across the country. Rodriguez began his career at Booz Allen Hamilton supporting its national security practice.

In his capacity as an expert on game-theoretic applications, he supported the US intelligence community, Department of Defense, and Department of Homeland Security as a lead architect for wargames. He subsequently was a vice president at Sentia Group, an artificial intelligence company, and served as chief marketing officer for NCL Holdings, an international defense corporation. Rodriguez serves as a board director or board advisor of ten venture-backed companies—Duco, Edgybees, Hatch Apps, HighSide, Omelas, Uniken, Ursa Major Technologies, Vantage Robotics, War on the Rocks, and Zignal Labs—as well as the nonprofit organizations Public Spend Forum and Training Leaders International. He is also senior innovation advisor at the Naval Postgraduate School.

Clementine G. Starling

Director, Forward Defense, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, Atlantic Council

Clementine G. Starling is the director of the Atlantic Council’s Forward Defense program and a resident fellow within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. In her role, she shapes the Center’s US defense research agenda, leads Forward Defense’s team of nine staff and forty fellows, and produces thought leadership on US security strategies and the evolving character of warfare. Her research focuses on long-term US thinking on issues like China’s and Russia’s defense strategies, space security, defense industry, and emerging technology. Prior to launching Forward Defense, Starling served as deputy director of the Atlantic Council’s Transatlantic Security team, specializing in European security policy and NATO.

From 2016, she supported NATO’s Public Diplomacy Division at two NATO summits (Brussels and London) and organized and managed three senior Atlantic Council task forces on US force posture in Europe, military mobility, and US defense innovation adoption. During her time at the Atlantic Council, Starling has written numerous reports and commentary on US space strategy, deterrence, operational concepts, coalition warfare, and US-Europe relations. She regularly serves as a panelist and moderator at public conferences. Among the outlets that have featured her analysis and commentary are Defense One, Defense News, RealClearDefense, the National Interest, SpaceNews, NATO’s Joint Air and Space Power Conference, the BBC, National Public Radio, ABC News, and Government Matters, among others. Starling was named the 2022 Herbert Roback scholar by the US National Academy of Public Administration. She also served as the 2020 Security and Defense fellow at Young Professionals in Foreign Policy. Originally from the United Kingdom, Starling previously worked in the UK Parliament focusing on technology, defense, Middle East security, and Ukraine. She also supported the Britain Stronger in Europe campaign, championing for the United Kingdom to remain within the European Union. She graduated with honors from the London School of Economics with a BS in international relations and history and is an MA candidate in security studies at Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service.

Kathryn Levantovscaia

Deputy director, Forward Defense, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, Atlantic Council

Kathryn Levantovscaia is a deputy director in the Forward Defense program of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. Prior to joining the Atlantic Council, Levantovscaia served the US Chamber of Commerce as director for defense, aerospace, and acquisition policy. In this capacity, she executed advocacy campaigns on the Hill, delivered dedicated business-development support, and led global and multilateral strategic initiatives. Before working for the US Chamber of Commerce, she supported Booz Allen Hamilton’s Defense and Intelligence Group. Her areas of expertise include international development and cooperation, US defense export policy and export controls, federal contracting, defense/federal acquisition regulation, and multilateralism.

Mark J. Massa is a deputy director in the Forward Defense program. His work focuses on nuclear deterrence strategy and policy. He holds an MA in security studies and a BSFS in science, technology, and international affairs from Georgetown University.

Delharty M. Manson II is a program assistant in the Forward Defense program. His work focuses on defense innovation and operational concepts. He holds a BA in public policy from the College of William & Mary.

Jacob Mezey is a program assistant in the Forward Defense program. His work focuses on nuclear security, space security, and defense innovation. He holds a BA in history from Yale University.

Acknowledgments

This report was written and prepared with the support and input of its authors, commissioners on the Atlantic Council’s Commission on Defense Innovation Adoption, and the Forward Defense program of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

This effort was conducted under the supervision of Commission Director Stephen Rodriguez, Forward Defense Director Clementine Starling, and Forward Defense Deputy Directors Kathryn Levantovscaia and Mark J. Massa. Thank you to Julia Siegel and Christian Trotti for earlier contributions. Special thanks to Atlantic Council CEO Fred Kempe, Matthew Kroenig, and Barry Pavel for their support of this effort.

This effort has been made possible through the generous support of Booz Allen Hamilton as the foundational sponsor, as well as sponsorship from Accrete AI, ACT1 Federal, Applied Intuition, Palantir, Peraton, Primer AI, Rebellion Defense, Schmidt Futures, and Snowpoint Ventures.

Foundational sponsor

Sponsors

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To produce this report, the authors conducted more than fifty interviews and consultations with current and former officials in the US Department of Defense, congressional staff members, allied embassies in Washington, DC, and other academic and think tank organizations. However, the analysis and recommendations presented in this report are those of the authors alone and do not necessarily reflect the views of individuals consulted, commissioners, commission sponsors, the Atlantic Council, or any US government organization. Moreover, the authors, commissioners, and consulted experts participated in a personal, not institutional, capacity.

List of acronyms

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Despite securing a year-long truce between the US and the Iraqi political and armed groups that reject the US military presence in Iraq, and receiving the Biden administration’s declared support for his government, Prime Minister Sudani has not traveled to Washington. Now, with the security truce dissolved following the Israel-Hamas war since October 7, 2023, and the tit-for-tat drone strikes in the past weeks, Sudani is unlikely to be received in the White House soon, if ever.

The invitation US Secretary of State Antony Blinken extended to Sudani in September 2023 “to visit the White House soon” will be frozen under the current tense relations and as President Biden’s calendar becomes increasingly crowded in the months leading to the November presidential election. Meanwhile, it would not be an exaggeration to state that US-Iraqi relations are rapidly approaching the dynamics observed under the Trump administration in 2020, when a US drone strike killed the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Quds Force Commander Qasem Soleimani and Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) Deputy Commander Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis. This led the Iraqi Council of Representatives to pass a resolution calling for the withdrawal of US forces from Iraq.

On January 4, a US drone strike inside Baghdad killed Mushtaq Jawad al-Saeedi, the deputy commander of Baghdad Belt for the PMF, who belongs to Harakat al-Nujaba, an armed group that is closely associated with Iraq and designated by the US as a terrorist group. The drone strike coincided with the Iraqi activities commemorating the fourth anniversary of the assassination near the Baghdad International Airport, which killed several Iraqis and Iranians, including Soleimani and Muhandis.

The Iraqi Presidency, the Prime Minister’s Office, and the Foreign Ministry issued three separate statements condemning the latest drone attack, calling it a violation of Iraqi sovereignty and a breach of the bilateral agreement on the rules of engagement and the terms of the presence of US forces in Iraq. Major General Yehia Rasool, the spokesperson of the Commander-in-Chief of Iraqi Armed Forces, described the drone strike in the following terms: “In a blatant aggression and violation of Iraq’s sovereignty and security, a drone conducted an act akin to terrorist activities.”

In his daily briefing at the Pentagon on January 4, Air Force Major General Pat Ryder reiterated the often-cited basis for the presence of US forces in Iraq: they are in the country at the invitation of the government of Iraq and they are stationed there “for one reason, which is to support the defeat-ISIS [Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham] mission.” He added that the US will “continue to work very closely with our Iraqi partners when it comes to the safety and security of our forces. When those forces are threatened, just like we would anywhere else in the world, we will maintain the inherent right of self-defense to protect our forces.”

However, this “inherent right of self-defense” has caused a bilateral crisis every time it has been exercised in Iraq. The Iraqi government’s reaction was articulated by Prime Minister Sudani, who called the January 4 drone strike “a crime” and said, “we affirmed our standing and principled position regarding ending the presence of the International Coalition after the end of the justifications of its presence, and we are working on setting a time to start the dialogue through the bilateral committee that was established to define the arrangements for ending this presence, and this is a commitment the government will not back down from.”

The Iraqi government took another unusual step: sending a text message surveying average Iraqis for their opinion on the matter. “Dear citizen, do you support the continuation of the International Coalition’s mission in Iraq?” the text read. A polling center sent the message, but the link people needed to click in order to give their answers led to a website administered by the government.

Despite this and the many strong statements made in the past few days, the Iraqi prime minister sent a soothing message to the United States while speaking to the press. On January 10, Sudani told Reuters that the upcoming talks to negotiate an end to international forces’ presence in Iraq “is not a discontinuation of the partnership between Iraq and the International Coalition, but a beginning of bilateral relations between Iraq, the US, and other countries, including security relations. We have no reservations on signing bilateral security agreements for general security cooperation or for training and capacity building purposes.”

The coming few months will reveal whether the Iraqi government intends to uphold the position Sudani announced and make an official request to withdraw US forces or, as skeptics claim, Sudani’s statement was made for domestic consumption.

What made an already tense situation worse was Major General Ryder’s statement to journalists at the Pentagon daily briefing on January 4: “We do know that the Iraqi security forces have continued to assist in identifying in some cases where these Iranian proxies have conducted attacks against US forces, and we are appreciative of that support.”

Prime Minister Sudani’s Iraqi opponents interpreted this as an accusation that Iraqi security forces were working as informants to aid the US airstrikes. The Prime Minister’s Security Media Cell issued a press release calling Ryder’s statement a deception attempt, adding, “We firmly deny the existence of such cooperation, but the opposite is true, yesterday’s aggression was executed directly without informing the knowledge of any Iraqi security or military entity.”

It is hard to explain how US government officials, who insist that the presence of US forces in Iraq is based on the invitation of Iraq’s government, fail to see the irony in the unanimous condemnations of their acts coming from all Iraqi leadership quarters. By the same token, it is also hard to explain how the Iraqi government, which validates the claim of their invitation of US forces, fails to protect its “guests” from attacks by groups it describes as Iraqi security forces, which are supposed to be working according to the authorities granted to them by the commander-in-chief. It is high time the governments of Iraq and the United States review and uphold their respective obligations instead of waffling between partnership and belligerence.

Dr. Abbas Kadhim is director of the Atlantic Council’s Iraq Initiative. Follow him on X: @DrAbbasKadhim.

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Are authoritarian regimes more successful than free countries in offering prosperity to their people? The answer is decidedly no, yet China and Russia actively advertise the “benefits” and “promise” of their authoritarian development model. Beijing and Moscow contend that their governance model—rooted in central control of political, social, and economic life—delivers for their people. The facts prove exactly the opposite and show that countries characterized by repression and concentrated control are far less successful across all metrics of human development than are free societies.

That free societies are better for the people residing in them is not an ideological position; it is a statement of fact backed by substantial evidence, including, but not limited to, the Atlantic Council’s Freedom and Prosperity Indexes.

This paper aims to showcase why and how the authoritarian development model is inferior to that of free societies. The first section documents democratic backsliding and the reversal of freedom’s fortunes. The second section presents data on how authoritarian regimes have failed to deliver prosperity for their people. The third section outlines how free societies have done the opposite—delivered sustained prosperity for their citizens. The final section offers the conclusion that authoritarian regimes, despite their claims, cannot deliver democratic progress or prosperity for society at large.

I. The end and return of history: Freedom’s emergence and decline

Over the past seventeen years , authoritarianism has been on the march. Autocratic regimes across the globe, including, but not limited to, China, Russia, and Iran have supercharged repression with the aim of consolidating control to benefit a small set of predatory elites. Other previously liberal democracies have also experienced backsliding, as neo-populist leaders hollow out institutions and tamp down dissent. Today, just 14 percent of the world’s population lives in free societies. This is in sharp contrast to the heady days immediately following the Cold War, where autocracy was largely defeated—or on the back foot—and liberal democracy on the ascent.

Various factors contributed to this reversal of freedom’s fortunes. China and Russia stepped up efforts to export authoritarianism—and undermine democracy—to make a world safe for autocracy and, therefore, their regimes. Citizens the world over increasingly doubted whether democracy can deliver for them and turned to populist leaders offering (often unsustainable) quick economic wins at the expense of political freedoms.

But all is not bleak. People power movements across the world are demanding accountability from their governments. From Poland to Ecuador, centrist political forces have dislodged populists and authoritarians through free and open political competition. Yet China and Russia continue making inroads with governments of developing nations who are deciding which path to pursue: the one rooted in centralized control or the one grounded in freedom. Across the developing world generally and sub-Saharan Africa in particular, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) actively exports and advocates its model of centralized state-led economic growth governed by authoritarian rule. Leaders of countries that China (and Russia) are actively engaging would benefit from examining the implications for prosperity—and their own political prospects—of heeding the CCP’s siren song.

This paper aims to undercut the argument that China, Russia, and some authoritarian populist firebrands make that prosperity requires sacrifices in freedom and turns this argument on its head by showing that the inverse is true: the surest path to citizens’ prosperity is through a political system that fosters and privileges political, economic, and legal freedoms.

II. The false promise that dictatorship delivers

Are authoritarian regimes more successful than free countries in offering prosperity to their people? The answer is undoubtedly no.

Authoritarian regimes oversee systems that benefit a powerful core of predatory elites and their clients. Autocratic systems might produce some initial economic successes, as seen in China in the 1980s and 1990s, but these advances are often short-lived, quickly give way to stagnation, and are never accompanied by broader social progress or political freedom.

From Venezuela to Russia, people residing in closed or closing societies characterized by already absent or receding freedoms enjoy far less prosperity than their counterparts in free countries. Comparing the prosperity of China and Russia to other countries in their respective regions—traced from the end of the Cold War to the present day—illustrates how freedom delivers prosperity and dictatorship does not.

For this paper we are using the concept of prosperity employed by the Atlantic Council’s Freedom and Prosperity Indexes. The Prosperity Index goes beyond the measurement of pure material well-being and includes additional social aspects that are necessary for a prosperous society. The Prosperity Index is formed by six components: income, health, education, environment, minority rights, and inequality.

China

Witness the markedly divergent paths taken by China, Taiwan, and South Korea starting in 1987, the year Taipei lifted martial law and South Korea held a transformational presidential election that marked the end of authoritarian rule. For Seoul and Taiwan, 1987 can be viewed as the starting point of democracy. Until this juncture, all three countries—China, South Korea, and Taiwan—were dictatorships overseeing largely low-income economies. China was a communist dictatorship without political or economic freedom. South Korea and Taiwan embraced capitalist economic policies but were military dictatorships; citizens enjoyed some economic freedoms but no political freedoms.

Since 1949, China has experienced overall economic growth despite very low freedom scores. During the Mao Tse-tung era (1949–78), Beijing was a centrally planned economy without private property and largely closed to the world. During this period, China had 6 percent annual growth, albeit from a very low base.

During the era of “Reform and Opening Up” begun by Deng Xiaoping in 1978, China enacted reforms that opened the country to the outside world, including allowing private business and foreign investment. China retained its centrally planned structure and authoritarian governance under the dictatorship of the CCP. During this period, the country experienced 10 percent growth annually. After the massacre of protesters in Beijing’s Tiananmen Square in 1989, the CCP walked back much of the Deng-era liberalizations, returning to a predominantly state-driven economy.

When Chinese President Xi Jinping assumed office in 2013, the limitations of state control became even more apparent, as well as the CCP’s ability to enact needed reforms given Xi’s personal and ideological beliefs. Over the last decade, China has experienced 5 percent growth annually. Despite the continuing growth over several decades, Beijing has delivered only limited prosperity for its people because it has not closed the gap between the wealthiest and its lower- and middle-income citizens—the authoritarian system has worked exactly as intended, delivering huge wealth for a small set of predatory elites while failing to generate prosperity for society at large.

By contrast, during the same period, from the 1980s to present day, South Korea and Taiwan enjoyed enhanced freedoms because of, among other factors, the hard work by reformers, civil society, and the assistance of allies regionally and globally. Taiwan and South Korea escaped the middle-income trap in the 1990s (while China has not) and their economies—and people—have thrived since.

Free countries across all measures do better than authoritarian regimes in delivering prosperity for their people. Comparisons present this quite stark difference. As we see in the chart below comparing economic growth as measured by Gross National Income (GNI) per capita from 1962 to 2022, South Korea outperforms Beijing by several fold.

Figure 1. GNI per capita of South Korea, Taiwan, and China (1962–2022)

China remains well below South Korea, Taiwan, and other free societies in measurements of prosperity that go beyond gross domestic product (GDP). The Atlantic Council’s Prosperity Index conceptualized the term prosperity as a combination of access to education, income, health outcomes, inequality, environment, and respect for minority rights. This broader definition of prosperity captures the full breadth of quality of life experienced by people in each country.

According to the Prosperity Index, China is characterized as “mostly unprosperous,” ranked 119th, whereas South Korea and Taiwan are characterized as “prosperous” and rank thirteenth and twenty-sixth, respectively. China’s prosperity score, as noted in the analysis above of reforms since the 1940s, increased through the mid-2000s but has recently plateaued.

Figure 2. Prosperity scores of South Korea, Taiwan, and China relative to ‘free’ countries (1995–2022)

Differences in freedom scores explain this divergence in fortune. In the case of China, freedom scores stagnated—at an already low level—through the 2000s and decreased further under Xi. Economic decisions are made according to Xi’s ideological beliefs. Economists across the spectrum agree that a stronger social safety net in China would help boost consumer spending, helping the economy transition away from its bloated model of state-dominated investment. Unfortunately, would-be reformers must contend with Xi’s stated belief that handouts make people lazy. The country’s social safety net is also suffering from Xi’s drive to harden China’s economy and boost military spending with an eye on Taiwan. Lessening the burden on China’s women—who are often expected to hold down jobs while shouldering the entire burden of domestic care—would also boost the economy, but the longer Xi has stayed in office, the more regressive his views on women’s autonomy have become. Much the same applies to the government’s approach to opportunities for youth, where Xi’s determination to limit the political power of the private sector through harsh regulatory action has limited the sector’s dynamism and reduced opportunities for educated youth to find better-paying, higher-skilled jobs. The causal link between increased freedom and prosperity generally, and in this case specifically, is clear and evidence based. Again, the comparison with South Korea and Taiwan is instructive. Seoul and Taipei are both “free” and ranked thirty-fourth and twenty-seventh, respectively, in the Freedom Index, whereas Beijing, characterized as “mostly unfree,” sits at 144th.

Russia

By the late 1980s, the Soviet Union’s political survival depended on the communist regime’s ability to reform its stagnating economy, which, as the Prosperity Index shows, was undermining its competitiveness with free countries, and its superpower status globally. Communist Party General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev’s unprecedented reforms targeted a cadre of predatory Communist Party officials whose corruption stood in the way of the USSR’s economic modernization. The anti-corruption campaigns against powerful political bosses controlling the Soviet republics unleashed a wave of popular anti-communist, nationalist movements. The Baltics were the first republics to declare their independence from the USSR in 1991.

Seizing their geopolitical moment, as the Soviet Union collapsed, the Baltic countries—Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania—undertook a full-scale market restructuring of their communist economies. Strong long-term popular and political support for integration with Europe sustained the Baltics through an initial sharp economic downturn. A path to European Union accession for the Baltics, agreed to in 1995, required economic transformation and democratic reforms that align with the Atlantic Council’s Freedom Index: economic freedom (market reforms), legal (independent judiciary), and political (multiparty system). The index shows the Baltic states’ corresponding increase in prosperity, which improved dramatically in the 1990s and 2000s to the level of other free states.

Figure 3. Prosperity scores of the Baltic states and Russia relative to ‘free’ countries (1995–2022)

Russia stands in stark contrast to the Baltic states. As constituent republics of the Soviet Union, they began in much the same place in terms of both freedom and prosperity. However, Russia’s acute economic downturn in the early 1990s (due to radical economic reforms) and its deformed democracy—the corrupt Boris Yeltsin regime instituted presidential rule by decree, and media and civil society intimidation campaigns—set the stage in 1999 for a transfer of power, orchestrated by Yeltsin and the oligarchs, that brought Vladimir Putin to power. Putin quickly re-centralized power within the executive presidency. Under Putin, Russia has become an authoritarian state that weaponizes the private and public sector and civil society in the service of the regime. The regime’s media shutdowns, criminalization of civil society, intimidation (and assassinations) of the political opposition, and suppression of basic political rights are represented in Russia’s freedom scores, which in 2022 fell precipitously to 42.1 due to internal political repression in Russia as the Putin regime launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine—less than half of the average score for the Balkans (87.2).

Figure 4. Freedom scores of the Baltic states and Russia relative to ‘free’ countries (1995–2022)

The decline in freedom in Russia has had a noticeable impact on every measure of its Prosperity Index. Putin’s re-centralization of political power has taken away representation from Russia’s ethnic minorities and power from its ethnic autonomous republics and regions. Russia has not successfully diversified its economy away from natural resources, a political decision by the Putin regime which relies on the distribution of rents to maintain political and social stability. While Russia still maintains a strong tertiary education system, the economic return on that education is low due to a stagnating market economy with few jobs requiring advanced degrees. Widespread corruption benefits the oligarchic class creating high levels of income disparity, which is increasing as a result of Russia’s war in Ukraine, after falling steadily since the 2008 financial crisis. The current regime’s stifling of debate and restrictions on data and information, combined with a policy of “economic development at all costs,” has resulted in significant levels and types of environmental damage: air pollution, industrial and radioactive waste, and endangered wildlife and ecosystems.

Yet, rarely has the “less freedom impact” on prosperity been as obvious as on the population of Russia, which The Economist cautions may be entering a “doom loop of demographic decline” due to “war, disease, and exodus.”² As the Atlantic Council’s Prosperity Index shows, Russia today is in a worse place, compared to countries in the “free” category, than in 1995 when its implementation of economic “shock therapy” caused the wholesale impoverishment of its citizens.

III. Fact-based promise that freedom delivers

Freedom is the surest path to durable prosperity. Free countries in general have a much higher prosperity score, as we see in the graph below. The characteristics of free societies are what enable prosperity.

Figure 5. Prosperity scores of countries (1995–2022)

Political freedoms mean that a plurality of actors participate in the political system, including citizens through free elections; autonomous social groups and civic organizations, which have political authority; and political representatives who are responsive and accountable to citizens. This power of the public depends on certain conditions such as universal suffrage, access to information alternative to that of the government’s, and freedom of speech and association. Health care, education, and environmental protections are stronger in free states where governments respond to citizens’ interest in a better quality of life for themselves and future generations.

In response to the COVID-19 pandemic, China’s authoritarian, top-down controls—data secrecy, criminalization of criticism, coercive lockdowns, and invasive surveillance—violated human rights, jeopardized marginal communities, and caused severe economic hardship, while also resulting in unnecessary deaths when restrictions were fully lifted. In Russia, political power is so concentrated in the person that Putinism is its own brand of authoritarianism. Russia’s pandemic response laid bare the weakness of a personality-centric political system, which could not function without Putin’s direct management of the response.

Strong legal freedoms mean citizens and the government abide by the rule of law and that transparent processes are in place, which citizens and companies can trust are enforced by institutions or processes. Laws are accessible; they are publicly known, clearly articulated, and reasonable, and applied equally to everyone. Legal freedoms help marginalized groups extend their political freedoms. For example, in free countries, when women have the legal protection to pursue equality, all groups benefit. The Women’s Economic Freedom indicator in the Freedom Index correlates with general advancement in those societies.

In contrast, Hong Kong’s National Security Law, passed in secret by the Communist Party in 2020 , was applied retroactively, resulting in the arrest of pro-democracy activists for protests and demonstrations that were not crimes at the time they took place.³ The resulting shrinking of civil society space suppressed Hong Kong’s nascent feminist movement, as pro-democracy figures who advocated for gender rights were arrested, or their organizations disbanded. While the CCP endorses gender equality, the subordination of women to its brand of Chinese nationalism is key to its authoritarian stability: its laws on domestic violence are not fully implemented, gender quotas for women’s political leadership are not met, and the gender pay gap remains. In 2017, Russia decriminalized domestic violence in cases where injuries are not substantial, and the abuse occurs only once a year. The weaponization of the law is a characteristic of authoritarian systems.⁴

Economic freedom indicates that the majority of that country’s economic activity is guided not by centrally planned dictates, like those on offer from the CCP, but the principles of free and competitive markets. Free markets are more efficient in that they generate clear and transparent incentives for citizens on where to seek employment and channel investments. The basic foundation of a market economy is property rights that are clearly spelled out and protected.

Meanwhile, China’s crackdown on its technology industry beginning in 2020 was politically motivated, part of a larger government effort to curb private enterprise which had become too powerful for the CCP.⁵ The loss in value by tech companies is contributing to a greater economic slowdown that is hurting Chinese citizens. In Russia, before the war in Ukraine, significant levels of capital flight by oligarchs had decreased the overall well-being of Russian citizens.⁶ Why did the regime not crack down on capital flight? If wealthy oligarchs invested in Russia, they might have demanded political and economic reforms. The management of elite power in authoritarian regimes greatly distorts economic incentives in ways that negatively impact citizens.

IV. Conclusion

Much has been said about the ongoing contest between democracy and autocracy. Countries do not persist as authoritarian enclaves because the people residing within their borders want less freedom. Autocracies persist because the regimes ruling them benefit from centralized control and nearly nonexistent political freedoms. A small cabal of predatory elites thrives in these countries while the majority of their citizens struggle to get by. Autocracy results in prosperity for a select few and misery for most.

Russia and China have been aggressive in promoting the superiority of their political models to those of liberal democracies. The proof, they claim, is in the output; that their systems deliver on economics, national values, stability, and modernization in ways that democracies do not. In fact, China has gone so far as to claim that the CCP under Xi has reinvented and improved on the Western model of democracy as a “whole-process people’s democracy” that is focused on human development and prosperity for all.⁷ In China, this singular attention to development is not disrupted by the political processes that Western democracies observe—elections, changes in administration, etc. In Russia, Putin has defined democracy as a strong state that can deliver for its citizens and protect them from foreign influence and interference, referring to his ability to provide stability to citizens after the turbulent 1990s. His political vision is reactionary and not progressive.

The Atlantic Council’s Freedom and Prosperity Indexes demonstrate the inaccuracy of these claims to democratic progress and prosperity by China and Russia. As the indexes show, China has not delivered prosperity to its citizens, its primary claim to a superior governance model. Putin’s assertion that Russia is a better place than it was in the 1990s, especially relative to other former republics of the Soviet Union that have chosen freedom, is likewise false. An inherent weakness of authoritarian regimes is that they cannot even deliver on the mirage of democracy that they promote.

Joseph Lemoine is a director of the Atlantic Council’s Freedom and Prosperity Center.

Dan Negrea is the senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Freedom and Prosperity Center.

Patrick W. Quirk is the vice president for strategy, innovation, and impact at the International Republican Institute and a nonresident senior fellow with both the Atlantic Council’s Freedom and Prosperity Center and Scowcroft Strategy Initiative at the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. 

Lauren van Metre is a senior advisor for peace, climate, and democratic resilience at the National Democratic Institute and a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

The Freedom and Prosperity Center aims to increase the prosperity of the poor and marginalized in developing countries and to explore the nature of the relationship between freedom and prosperity in both developing and developed nations.

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As Ukraine fights for its survival as a nation, it may be time for the country to adopt a new constitution of its own that matches current realities. Ukraine’s present Constitution was created in 1996 and was designed to supersede the 1978 Constitution of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. Even though its adoption was a significant step forward in Ukraine’s state-building process, the influence of Soviet socialism was still clearly evident in the document as it was written in 1996.

In addition, it is worth underlining that when the current Constitution was adopted, the newly independent Ukrainian nation was in the midst of an identity crisis and was still struggling to define the nature of its post-Soviet relationship with Russia. It would not be until the Orange Revolution in 2004 that Ukraine established a truly independent identity.

Since 1996, revisions to the Ukrainian Constitution have created further issues. As part of the compromise reached during the Orange Revolution to bring about a peaceful transition of power, constitutional amendments were passed to create a weakened presidency and turn the country into a parliamentary republic. It is often forgotten that the primary author of these amendments was Viktor Medvedchuk, a man with close ties to the Kremlin who was facing treason charges even prior to Russia’s full-scale 2022 invasion.

This now looks particularly inappropriate. At a time when Ukraine is seeking to consolidate its European identity and distance itself from any remaining links to the Russian imperial past, why keep a Constitution shaped by one of the most notorious pro-Kremlin figures of modern Ukrainian history?

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

Many of the more problematic aspects of Ukraine’s Constitution are not related to Medvedchuk’s involvement and can be traced to the document’s conception. For example, the Ukrainian Constitution attempts to cover every imaginable legal contingency and contains 161 articles. In comparison, the US Constitution contains a mere seven articles.

Another key complaint is that the Ukrainian Constitution essentially makes promises the government cannot keep. Citizens are assured of everything from free housing to free medical care and free higher education. In practice, this has proven impossible.

Its not uncommon for constitutions to promise and even guarantee such basic needs, of course. However, the countries that successfully meet these commitments tend to be mature Western democracies with advanced economies that can afford to pay for massive social support programs.

It should be noted that the US Constitution does not guarantee basic needs such as healthcare and education. Instead, provision is delegated to state, federal, or local governments. With a new constitution, Ukraine could similarly delegate social welfare to state agencies, parliament, oblast administrations, municipal authorities, or other government institutions which actually have the capacity to fulfill public needs.

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Crucially, Ukraine’s Constitution in its current form remains little known to the wider public. While the average American can often tell you why they like or dislike various different amendments, most Ukrainians are unfamiliar with the details of their country’s Constitution and know little about what rights it actually contains.

A June 2019 survey by the Democratic Initiatives Foundation showed that 47 percent of Ukrainians had never read their Constitution, while 67 percent wanted to have the Constitution amended. It would be fair to say that the current Ukrainian Constitution is hardly near and dear to the hearts of Ukrainians.

Ukraine is clearly not the country it was during the uncertain early years of independence in the 1990s. For that matter, Ukraine is also no longer the nation it was at the time of the 2004 Orange Revolution and the 2014 Euromaidan Revolution. Russia’s ongoing invasion, which began in early 2014 with the seizure of Crimea and escalated dramatically in February 2022, has changed everything.

Today’s Ukraine is undergoing an historic transformation in the crucible of war. It has rejected the legacy of authoritarian empire, exited the geopolitical wilderness, and is now firmly set on a trajectory toward full integration within the European community of nations.

In the current circumstances, merely tweaking or correcting aspects of the existing Ukrainian Constitution is no longer an option. Instead, Ukraine requires an entirely new Constitution reflecting the magnitude of the changes that have taken place in the country over the past decade. This new Constitution should aim to capture the hearts and minds of Ukrainian citizens, while providing a practical framework for the modern European nation that Ukraine seeks to become.

Brian Mefford is the Director of Wooden Horse Strategies, LLC, a governmental-relations and strategic communications firm based in Kyiv, Ukraine. He is a senior nonresident fellow at the Atlantic Council and has lived and worked in Ukraine since 1999.

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As Russia launches a long-awaited new bombing campaign against Ukrainian cities, fears are mounting that deadlock over continued US and EU military aid may soon leave Ukraine facing critical air defense shortages, writes Peter Dickinson.

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If Western leaders fail to provide Ukraine with the weapons to defeat Putin in 2024, this will significantly increase the likelihood of a direct military confrontation between Russia and NATO, writes Richard D. Hooker Jr.

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The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

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UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia and Central Asia in the East.

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While Biden came into office affirming the importance of shoring up democracy overseas as a core national interest, such promises have often not been backed up with action. The White House’s two high-level democracy summits, in December 2021 and March 2023, highlighted the importance of good governance. But summitry does not equate to a strategy. At a time when anti-democratic forces are driving global instability, this is a policy area that the United States can ill afford to ignore. American leadership—and above all, action—is critical.

With a contentious election to fight and multiple foreign policy challenges to grapple with, it may be tempting to relegate the work of advancing democracy to a minor item on Washington’s foreign policy agenda. Yet enhancing democratic resilience is essential to the overall effort to promote global security and protect core US interests.

Looking ahead at this year, the Biden administration must continue to counter the Chinese Communist Party’s authoritarian influence overseas and associated undermining of democracy in strategically important areas—and it must allocate more resources to do so. In addition, here are six strategic areas that the White House should focus on as part of a bolder democracy agenda. Further US leadership in these areas is necessary to address critical challenges around the world that affect core US interests.

1. Prepare resistance stakeholders for a post-conflict transition in Burma. Pro-democracy resistance forces are gaining momentum in Burma, while the junta continues to weaken, indicating that the ongoing revolution may be moving into a new and possibly final phase. With the country awash in weapons, teeming with historic and unresolved grievances, lacking a central authority to maintain order, and facing sky-high expectations, the post-revolution transition could be the most dangerous period in Burma’s history. The United States should urgently increase support for the interim government and for ethnic resistance organizations, with a particular focus on capacity building in transition planning. US support can also advance disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration, as well as ceasefire and peace negotiations. This work can help establish local institutions to implement federal democracy in the country.

2. Shore up democratic champions across Asia that are preserving democratic space in closed societies (Burma, Cambodia, China, and North Korea) and in entrenched anti-democratic systems (Thailand and Bangladesh). Democratic activists in these difficult environments are often the only hope for preserving civic space and rights. The United States can help keep their cause alive by providing moral, technical, and financial support to those fighting for democracy and fundamental freedoms. This assistance should prioritize building connections between activists across the region to facilitate sharing of successful tactics and fostering support networks among activists—networks that activists routinely cite as crucial to strengthening their cause.

3. Support conditions for democratic reform in Guatemala by investing in political party development and consensus building. The incoming Arévalo administration will face obstacles to reform from a corrupt judiciary; from a legislature, in which its party is in the minority; and from the private sector, relations with which have been characterized by suspicion and mistrust. The new government will need sustained support, in the form of media protections and civil society oversight, to maintain stability and credibility in the face of these obstacles. The Semilla movement, which propelled Arévalo to victory, will also need assistance strengthening its own party structure and reaching consensus on reform priorities with other political parties, the private sector, and the citizens and protesters—including indigenous movements—that defended recent election results.

4. Support democratic governance structures in a post-Hamas Gaza. Forging a governance strategy for a post-Hamas Gaza is perhaps the most difficult political and security challenge facing the Biden administration. Some are looking to the Palestinian Authority (PA) in the West Bank as part of a solution. Yet for more than a decade, attention to governance and civil liberties in the PA has slipped from the West’s lists of priorities, and with it funding and support for institution-building and rule of law. If Israel, the United States, and other powers determine that the PA is best positioned to help govern Gaza, then Washington should offer a robust package of democracy and human rights-strengthening assistance, coupled with engagement, focused on ensuring that democratic outcomes rank high on the list of Western priorities. Stringent safeguards must also be put in place to prevent misappropriation of these United States-provided resources.

5. Press for free and fair elections in Africa to reverse the deficiencies of 2023. From Nigeria to Eswatini, flawed elections in 2023 harmed democracy across sub-Saharan Africa. US attention and resources can help reverse this trend in 2024, when voters will go to polls in South Africa, Guinea, Ghana, and Senegal. Support should begin far in advance of election day, in order to strengthen the conditions for free and fair polls. Assistance should include a renewed focus on strengthening critical components of successful elections, including voter registration, campaign finance, election observation, polling agent capacity, and parallel vote tabulations.

6. Proactively counter Russian political influence in Europe, particularly in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH). Rampant corruption and political clientelism are undermining trust in democracy and driving the young and educated to emigrate from BiH. Separatist forces in Republika Srpska are reportedly colluding with Russia and undermining prospects for further integration with the West. The United States should strongly support pro-democratic forces and focus assistance on further strengthening political parties, thereby empowering these actors to address the root causes of corruption. With the help of the United States and European countries, BiH can enact reforms necessary for its Euro-Atlantic integration and help restore citizen trust in the political process. Greater support from partners should seek to assist democratic actors among the Bosniak, Croat, and Serb populations, and to prioritize longer-term investment in promising leaders—especially youth and women—in politics and civil society.

Biden has both an obligation and a political interest in showing that the United States remains the leader of the free world—with all the responsibilities and benefits that title entails. As 2024 begins, his administration must take urgent steps to put its pro-democracy rhetoric into action in key theaters around the world.

Patrick Quirk is the vice president for strategy, innovation, and impact at the International Republican Institute and a nonresident senior fellow with both the Atlantic Council’s Freedom and Prosperity Center and Scowcroft Strategy Initiative at the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. He previously served as a member of the US secretary of state’s Policy Planning Staff as the lead advisor for fragile states, conflict and stabilization, and foreign assistance.

The post Six ways for the US to put democracy back on the global agenda in 2024 appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Signs of ordinary everyday life in wartime Ukraine are a reflection of the remarkable resilience demonstrated by Ukrainians since the onset of Russia’s full-scale invasion almost two years ago. This normality is also due to the little-noticed fact that the Ukrainian economy did surprisingly well in 2023.

Ukraine’s strong economic performance is reflected in recent EU and IMF assessments. These traditionally harsh reviews now read like love letters. “Despite the war, the country has benefited from a stronger-than-expected recovery and steadfast reform momentum,” noted the IMF in an entirely typical December 2023 summary.

The Russian invasion drove Ukraine’s GDP down by 29 percent in 2022, but in 2023 the economy grew by 19.5 percent year-on-year in the second quarter and by 9.5 percent in the third quarter. Rather than an expected stabilization, Ukraine is likely to achieve annual economic growth of nearly 6 percent in 2023. Admittedly, that still means a decline of around 25 percent from the prewar level in 2021. However, given the scale of the destruction caused by the Russian invasion and the fact that Russia still occupies around 17 percent of Ukraine’s territory, these figures are nevertheless impressive.

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

In the fall of 2022, many were concerned by the threat of rising inflation in Ukraine due to the EU’s failure to meet its commitments. Ukraine was forced to print money, and inflation rose to 27 percent in December 2022. The European Commission took heed and secured $20 billion in financing for 2023, covering around half of Ukraine’s budget requirements. The United States contributed another $10.9 billion, with the IMF providing $4.5 billion. In the end, Ukraine’s budget deficit of some $40 billion was more than financed. As a consequence, inflation plummeted to just five percent by October 2023.

Ukraine had budgeted for foreign financing of $41 billion in 2024, but as foreign funds may fall short, the country’s finance minister has suggested a revision down to $37 billion, not least because of greater than expected tax revenues. This revised figure may be realistic. The IMF noted that tax collections were up by 23 percent year-on-year in January-September 2023.

Usually, a country with an IMF program fails on some accounts, but that was not true of Ukraine in 2023. The IMF confirmed that Ukraine had met all quantitative performance criteria as well as all indicative targets by the end of September, and had done so with big margins, having collected much more in taxes than anticipated, while social spending continued as planned. Despite wartime conditions, Ukraine has not yet suffered from any arrears in state sector wages or pensions.

Ukraine’s National Bank has done particularly well since the start of Russia’s invasion. While inflation in Russia is currently around 7.5 percent, Ukraine’s rate has fallen to five percent. Ukraine recently cut its interest rate from 16 percent to 15 percent, while the Central Bank of Russia did the opposite.

Ukraine is maintaining a relatively open currency market with a floating exchange rate that held relatively stable throughout 2023. Ukraine’s international currency reserves are currently higher than they have ever been, at around $40 billion. The country’s banking system functions surprisingly normally. According to a recent IMF report, Ukraine’s total banking system assets and client deposits increased by 36 percent and 51 percent respectively between the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion and August 2023. Ukraine’s banks are flush with money and offer ample and cheap credits.

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Remarkably, Ukraine has carried out more systemic reforms than ever during the war. These reforms have been driven by the EU and the IMF, with keen support from the United States and the G7 group of nations.

On December 14, 2023, the EU decided to open membership negotiations with Ukraine. This landmark decision was based on Ukraine having fulfilled seven vital conditions set by the EU in June 2022. Four concerned the rule of law, while three were political. The most important conditions were the cleansing of the notoriously corrupt Constitutional Court and the similarly deficient Supreme Council of Justice, which appoints Ukraine’s judges. These steps are among the most important rule of law reforms ever implemented in Ukraine.

The EU appears to have learned from its excessively lenient earlier policies toward Bulgaria and Romania. Brussels now demands specific changes and details them. Ukraine has complied with all its demands, with President Zelenskyy signing off on the last three laws the week before the EU convened in December 2023.

In its most recent assessment, the IMF stated that the Ukrainian authorities had demonstrated “a strong commitment to reforms.” It noted that the authorities met seven of the 12 structural benchmarks for June-October 2023 on time, while four benchmarks were implemented with delays under very difficult circumstances. These were significant reforms related to corporate governance and anti-corruption measures. The law restoring asset declarations for public officials was enacted in October and public access to asset declarations was reinstated. Meanwhile, money-laundering legislation was tightened. The IMF’s key remaining demand is to render the special anti-corruption prosecutor truly independent from the prosecutor general.

Despite wartime conditions, the Ukrainian authorities are performing better than expected, both in terms of daily financial administration and advancing the country’s reform agenda. Higher than anticipated tax revenues are being collected, with pensions and wages so far paid on time. The nation’s currency reserves are larger than ever, and inflation has been brought down to five percent. Quietly, Ukraine has finally carried out important and politically challenging rule of law reforms. The Ukrainian government is to be congratulated for its considerable accomplishments on the economic front while defending itself against Europe’s largest invasion since World War II.

Anders Åslund is the author of “Russia’s Crony Capitalism: The Path from Market Economy to Kleptocracy.”

Further reading

UkraineAlert Dec 21, 2023

Putin scents historic victory amid growing signs of Western weakness

By Peter Dickinson

Recent indications of growing Russian confidence in victory over Ukraine owe much more to Western weakness than to the Kremlin’s own military might, writes Peter Dickinson.

Conflict Defense Technologies

UkraineAlert Dec 20, 2023

Ukrainian telecoms hack highlights cyber dangers of Russia’s invasion

By Mercedes Sapuppo

An unprecedented December 12 cyber attack on Ukraine’s largest telecoms operator Kyivstar left tens of millions of Ukrainians without mobile services and underlined the cyber warfare potential of Russia’s ongoing invasion, writes Mercedes Sapuppo.

Conflict Cybersecurity

UkraineAlert Dec 19, 2023

Ukraine’s EU accession process faces bureaucratic and political hurdles

By James Batchik

The European Council’s recent decision to open accession negotiations with Ukraine was a momentous moment both for Kyiv and the European Union. Now the serious work begins, writes James Batchik.

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The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

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UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia and Central Asia in the East.

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The post Ukraine’s wartime economy is performing surprisingly well appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Ukraine’s EU story is a decade in the making. Ukraine’s European aspirations were a driving factor behind the 2013-14 Revolution of Dignity. Since Russia’s full-scale invasion began in February 2022, Ukraine’s EU integration has received a much-needed push, with both Ukrainian and EU leaders treating the country’s EU bid with fresh seriousness. The European Council’s green light for the opening of accession negotiations means Ukraine has now taken a major step closer to realizing its EU ambitions.

The coming negotiations to bring Ukraine into line with EU standards and regulations will be a technocratic and political feat. The European Commission, the EU’s executive, will be the contact throughout this process. The European Council, made up of the EU’s twenty-seven member states, must formally approve Ukraine’s progress.

Membership in the EU is not a foregone conclusion for Ukraine. On the contrary, Kyiv will now have its work cut out. Ukraine has already implemented a series of reforms including to its judiciary, minority rights, and anti-corruption legislation to meet European Commission conditions before the opening of membership talks, but that was just the beginning. Ukraine will now need to align with the EU’s vast body of rules and procedures, known as the acquis communautaire or acquis for short. These cover everything from economic and trade policies, public finances, rule of law, education, and tax policies to energy infrastructure and agriculture rules.

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

Following the recent Council Summit, and once Ukraine fulfills the final measures set out in the Commission’s recommendations, the European Commission will draft a framework for negotiations for approval by the Council. Negotiations are broken down into thirty-five distinct categories or “Chapters.” These chapters make up the EU’s acquis from judiciary and fundamental rights to the free movement of goods and intellectual property, energy and transport policy, and so on.

Once the Commission and Council are satisfied Ukraine has implemented the necessary reforms to close each chapter one by one, the Commission will generate a final recommendation for Ukraine to become a member. The Council and the European Parliament must then approve, with the final step coming when all existing member states sign and ratify a treaty welcoming Ukraine to the EU.

While tedious, these rules are critical to the EU’s basic functioning. The building blocks of the EU, such as the single market, require shared rules across all members to function and ensure a level playing field. The EU must be able to facilitate seamless cross-border trade and movement, for example. The same logic applies to rule of law and political stability, which impact the integrated economies and societies of other EU members.

If the process sounds long and burdensome, that’s because it is. Membership negotiations have usually taken around a decade for successful candidates in the past. Croatia, the last successful candidate to join the bloc, took ten years. Ukraine’s case is new territory. There has never been a candidate that is fighting a war for survival as it pursues these reforms, which brings up questions about how enlargement will work.

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Ukraine’s advance in Kursk: What’s next and implications

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There is also a political element that adds uncertainty to Ukraine’s accession process. All decisions by the European Council during this process require unanimity, thereby giving each member state a veto at any stage. Should any member feel dissatisfied for any reason, even for issues not related to a candidate country’s reform efforts, they may unilaterally block the process.

Politicking around enlargement has happened before. Greece and Bulgaria have both separately used vetoes on North Macedonia’s accession due to domestic politics and bilateral spats. Countries have also delayed enlargement before due to concerns over the EU’s internal functioning. For Ukraine, this was already on full display as leaders dreamed up a theatrical solution around Hungary’s veto of Ukraine’s accession negotiations. There are also concerns over the implications of Ukrainian membership for domestic priorities including Poland’s agricultural sector. The politics of enlargement have contributed to recent enlargement fatigue, which has specifically plagued candidates from the Western Balkans, who have been relegated to the EU’s waiting room for decades.

The earlier reluctance of EU members to embrace further enlargement also speaks to another potential wrinkle in Ukraine’s EU bid: Internal EU reform. EU member states are hotly debating the future functioning of the EU including, for example, the use of unanimity in critical decision-making. This reform process will directly impact Ukraine’s accession. With some members pushing for internal reform before taking on new members including Ukraine, Kyiv’s bid looks to be increasingly vulnerable to political factors not related to its own reforms.

Finally, without reforms, Ukraine’s size and level of development also risks capsizing the EU’s internal transfer system of agricultural and structural subsidies. This could transform member states that currently benefit from EU funds into net contributors to the budget of a union that includes Ukraine.

The timeline of Ukraine’s EU integration will depend both on Ukraine and the EU’s ambitions. Ukraine will fundamentally control the pace and seriousness of its reforms. The EU for its part will have to find a way to square the circle of maintaining momentum on Ukraine’s enlargement effort while not letting Ukraine’s EU aspirations get bogged down in internal squabbles or caught up in debates about EU reform.

Despite these challenges, Ukraine’s EU progress remains hugely significant. It is inspirational for the people of Ukraine, who remain determined to chart their country’s free and democratic trajectory, and for Europe as a geopolitical actor, pushing to secure Ukraine’s place in the West. Getting there will be a tall, but necessary, order.

James Batchik is an assistant director with the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center.

Further reading

UkraineAlert Nov 28, 2023

Putin debunks his own propaganda by disarming Russia’s NATO borders

By Peter Dickinson

Putin publicly blames NATO for provoking the invasion of Ukraine, but Russia’s recent demilitarization of the country’s borders with neighboring NATO members makes a mockery of such claims, writes Peter Dickinson.

Conflict Democratic Transitions

UkraineAlert Dec 17, 2023

2024 preview: The West must decide if it wants Ukraine to win

By Richard D. Hooker, Jr.

If Western leaders fail to provide Ukraine with the weapons to defeat Putin in 2024, this will significantly increase the likelihood of a direct military confrontation between Russia and NATO, writes Richard D. Hooker Jr.

Conflict Defense Technologies

UkraineAlert Dec 18, 2023

Support Ukraine today or fight Russia tomorrow

By Oleksandr Zavitnevych

The threat posed by Vladimir Putin’s revisionist agenda can no longer be downplayed or denied. Instead, the choice facing Western leaders is simple: Support Ukraine today or fight Russia tomorrow, writes Oleksandr Zavitnevych.

Conflict Defense Policy

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

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UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia and Central Asia in the East.

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The post Ukraine’s EU accession process faces bureaucratic and political hurdles appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On December 14-15, EU27 leaders met for the final European Council (EUCO) meeting of the year. At the EUCO summit, the Council approved opening accession negotiations with Ukraine. What does this decision mean for Ukraine and the EU?  In what ways does the EU’s unanimity rule on foreign policy issues impact the EU’s role as a geopolitical actor? Can we expect much next year on the EU’s reform and enlargement debates with the European elections in early June?  

On this episode of #AtlanticDebrief, Jörn Fleck sits down with Europe Center Distinguished Fellow Fran Burwell to discuss the outcome of the EUCO summit and the decision to open accession negotiations with Ukraine.  

You can watch #AtlanticDebrief on YouTube and as a podcast.  

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Click to jump to an expert analysis:

Jörn Fleck: An important signal but also a missed opportunity for Europe to step up on the transatlantic stage

Andrew D’Anieri: A triumph for Ukraine’s army of tireless civil society activists and government reformers

Maia Nikoladze: Georgia’s candidate status needs to include more EU economic and financial integration

James Batchik: Europe isn’t leaving Ukraine in the lurch—even as Orbán plays the lone spoiler

Benton Coblentz: A crucial announcement that came just as Putin reiterated his goal of crushing Ukraine

An important signal but also a missed opportunity for Europe to step up on the transatlantic stage

The decision by EU leaders to approve launching accession talks with Ukraine is an important symbolic step and a shot in the arm for Ukrainians at a time of great uncertainty and anxiety over waning Western support for the country’s defensive war against Russia’s aggression. It is only the start of a long process of accession negotiations and reforms, and the decision cannot make up for the lack of US military aid that’s rapidly running out as negotiations on a new budget package in Congress drag on. But what it can do is provide a much-needed boost for Ukrainians’ morale and European aspirations. Ultimately, it is that European aspiration that carried much of Ukraine’s resilience, from the Maidan protests to Russia’s initial invasion in 2014, through to the darkest hours of the defense of Kyiv in early 2022. It is those same democratic, European aspirations of Ukraine that instilled so much fear in Russian President Vladimir Putin that he chose to launch a full-scale military invasion.

However, the approval of accession talks alone, by itself—without an agreement on the EU’s fifty billion euro macro-financial assistance bundle for the next four years, a decision on which was pushed to a January summit amid Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s blocking—is short on practical support for Kyiv. It is a missed opportunity for Europe to step up on the transatlantic and geopolitical stage at a critical time. Imagine the powerful signal at this moment for Ukraine of a package of launching accession talks and of fifty billion euros in financial assistance that is military assistance in so many ways, too. Bundle that for once with the otherwise disparate national announcements on additional military aid commitments—the delivery of another German Patriot battery, a Finnish pledge of doubling ammo production, and others—and the EU could have sent four unmistakable messages at once: one of timely reassurance to Ukraine; one of defiance and determination to an increasingly bullish Moscow (and even Beijing); another of encouragement to do the right thing to Washington; and one to its detractors at home and abroad of the EU shouldering its responsibility and stepping up.

—Jörn Fleck is the senior director at the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center.

A triumph for Ukraine’s army of tireless civil society activists and government reformers

Ukraine officially submitted its application to European Union membership on February 28, 2022, just days after Russia launched a full-scale invasion to topple its government and subjugate it to Moscow. Less than two years later, Ukraine’s European choice remains clear, as the European Council agreed on December 14 to open accession negotiations with Kyiv. The Council’s decision was excellent counterprogramming to Putin’s highly-choreographed call-in show earlier in the day, where he riffed on destroying and “de-Nazifying” Ukraine. The brutal Russian war continues in Ukraine’s east and south, but Putin has undoubtedly lost the battle for Ukrainian hearts and minds and has consolidated Ukrainian society against him; 80 percent of Ukrainians want to join the EU, while just 2 percent want to join a Russian-led bloc. Few could have imagined such public consensus when Russia illegally annexed Crimea and instigated the war in Donbas in 2014 in the wake of Ukraine’s Euromaidan Revolution.

The beginning of accession talks is a triumph for Ukraine’s army of tireless civil society activists and government reformers, who have worked to improve their country and better integrate it with Europe. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and his team working on Euro-Atlantic integration deserve great credit, too, and will now take up the difficult, and painstakingly long task of readying Ukraine for the EU single market. Kyiv will need to enact deep, lasting reforms and be flexible enough to negotiate political roadblocks that will crop up throughout the accession process, while fighting back against Russian aggression keen to slow Ukraine’s shift toward Europe. Yet with Ukraine’s indomitable spirit on display every day, few would dare bet against its eventual accession to the EU.

Moldova—with whom the European Council also agreed to open accession talks—faces its own problems of malign Russian aggression as it prepares for EU membership. Russia continues to back criminal elements in Moldova with the intent of destabilizing the country’s politics, and it still controls the breakaway Transnistria region. And yet Moldovan democracy is stronger than ever and the country’s European trajectory has never been more clear. The Council’s opening accession talks with Chisinau is a massive credit to Moldovan President Maia Sandu’s commitment to reform and democratic principles. Moldova is now closer to Europe than many ever thought possible.

—Andrew D’Anieri is a resident fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center. 

Georgia’s candidate status needs to include more EU economic and financial integration

The European Council’s decision to grant candidate status to Georgia is a victory for the Georgian people, who have been protesting against signs of their country’s democratic backsliding, such as the foreign agents law proposed earlier this year. While Georgia’s path to EU accession remains a long and laborious one, the EU should provide economic and financial incentives to Georgia even before accession and formal economic integration. 

The EU already has existing frameworks and projects that enhance Georgia’s trade and connectivity with Europe. They only need to expand. For example, the EU and Georgia signed an association agreement in 2014, which opened the EU market to Georgian businesses and products through the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area agreement. The EU has also removed visa requirements for Georgian tourists in the Schengen zone since 2017. Brussels remains the largest provider of financial assistance to Georgia and also its largest trading partner. Tbilisi is working on solutions for increasing cross-border e-commerce with the EU by 50 percent. 

Apart from strengthening trading ties and giving Georgia access to the European market, the EU has also invested in capacity building to prevent sanctions evasion through the Georgian banking system. For example, in 2022, the Council of Europe delivered a training course on financial investigation to Georgian prosecutors and investigators as part of the CyberEast project. Such projects with Georgia should expand, and should also include representatives of US financial regulatory agencies to deepen transatlantic engagement with Georgia, Ukraine, and other Eastern Partnership countries. 

The EU’s decision to grant candidate status to Georgia empowers and gives hope to the Georgian people, who have demonstrated their readiness and ability to keep the government accountable and ensure that the country follows the European path. Increasing Georgia’s economic and financial integration with the EU even before accession will strengthen the Georgian people’s ability to continue doing so.

—Maia Nikoladze is an assistant director within the Atlantic Council’s GeoEconomics Center.

Europe isn’t leaving Ukraine in the lurch—even as Orbán plays the lone spoiler

There is both a positive and a not-so-positive story to tell from the European Council Summit. The positive: It is a big deal that the European Council opted to open accession negotiations with Ukraine. The Council’s go-ahead continues Ukraine (and Moldova) along the path toward membership in the European Union at a record pace. It is a testament to the Ukrainian government’s efforts to enact the tedious and difficult reforms and to the seriousness with which EU leaders consider Ukraine’s EU future. 

The opening of negotiations is a historic milestone, but the work is just beginning. Kyiv will now have to run the gauntlet to align and reform just about every sector of its society and government with the EU’s prized acquis. This process has taken years for other applicants—none of which were simultaneously fighting a war for survival. Nevertheless, Ukraine has been serious about reform and was rightly rewarded. EU member state leaders, (minus one creative abstention) for their part, rightly demonstrated the bloc’s geopolitical weight and its ability to use enlargement to promote long-term stability and security in the region. The Council’s decision is also a confirmation of the bloc’s normative power. EU membership means something for the people of Ukraine: a symbol of a free, democratic Ukraine situated squarely in the West. The decision shows that Europe isn’t leaving Ukraine in the lurch and is serious about welcoming it into the fold. 

On the less positive side, the Council failed to agree to the fifty billion euro aid package for Kyiv as part of the EU’s top-up of its seven-year budget, punting the decision to January at the earliest. The package, meant to guarantee Ukraine much-needed macroeconomic assistance over the coming four years, is in many ways more important in the short term than the approval of accession negotiations. With additional US aid to Ukraine stymied in the US Congress and the war’s grinding pace, the EU needed more than ever to step up and provide Ukraine with predictable aid and send a message that Europe could continue its world-leading long-term tangible support for Ukraine even in difficult times. European leaders have already stressed that aid will continue to flow bilaterally, and the EU still has existing aid to dole out. But the failure to reach an agreement does diminish the EU’s historic decision on accession negotiations and, more generally, Europe’s ambitions as a geopolitical actor. Orbán continues to play the lone spoiler, using aid to Ukraine as blackmail to unlock Hungary’s frozen EU funds and putting the limits of the EU’s consensus decision-making on full display.

An extraordinary summit of EU leaders will pick the Ukraine aid question back up in January. EU leaders are bullish on securing a deal on aid to Ukraine in January. Hopefully they are proven right. 

—James Batchik is an assistant director with the Europe Center.

A crucial announcement that came just as Putin reiterated his goal of crushing Ukraine

Ten years after Ukrainians flooded onto the Maidan in Kyiv to make their choice of a European future clear, the decision at the European Council summit in Brussels on December 14 to open negotiations with Ukraine on accession is a practical and symbolic milestone on Ukraine’s path toward European integration.

In its recommendation to open accession negotiations with Ukraine in November, the European Commission reported that Ukraine made steady progress on all seven benchmarks that had been laid out when Ukraine was granted candidacy status in the spring of 2022. This included progress on laws relating to de-oligarchization, the rights of national minorities, and the strengthening of anti-corruption institutions, although the Commission clarified that it will take time to fully implement its recommendations. Several hurdles remain on the path to EU membership and negotiations will take many years. Of the non-founding members of the EU, accession talks have lasted nine years on average. The recent protests by Polish farmers at the Ukrainian border underscore the difficulties of integrating Ukraine’s agriculture sector, which is the largest in Europe, to align with the European Union’s Common Agricultural Policy, for example.

Despite these future challenges, the EU leaders’ decision is a critical morale boost to Ukraine’s leaders and the Ukrainian people. As Ukrainians continue to fight against Russian aggression and in favor of their country’s European future, the announcement was greeted with elation in Kyiv. A strong majority of Ukrainians back EU membership, with support spread evenly throughout the country. Zelenskyy hailed the move as a “victory” for Ukraine and for Europe, and Minister of Foreign Affairs Dmytro Kuleba called it a “historic day.”

The announcement couldn’t have come at a more crucial moment. Earlier in the same day, Putin reiterated his goal of crushing Ukraine at his annual marathon press conference, repeating his twisted retelling of Ukrainian history to try to justify his revanchist invasion. Meanwhile in Washington, negotiations over border and immigration policy have put a hold on a new aid package for Ukraine as legislators prepare to head home for a holiday recess.

The European Council’s summit was not without its own drama, Orbán was publicly committed to blocking progress on Ukraine’s accession before the summit. Meetings were held between the Ukrainian and Hungarian foreign ministers and among Orbán, French President Emmanuel Macron, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz and European Commision President Ursula von der Leyen. Zelenskyy was even seen talking with Orbán on the sidelines of Argentinian President Javier Milei’s inauguration in Buenos Aires. Orbán left the summit room when the European Council voted to open accession talks, a move reportedly suggested to him by Scholz. Orbán clarified after the announcement that Hungary “did not participate in the decision,” but made clear that Hungary had allowed the other EU countries to “go their own way.”

Europe is clearly stepping up its support for Ukraine. European countries have overtaken the United States in the total amount of aid sent to Ukraine over the course of its struggle against Russia’s full-scale invasion. The European Council’s decision only reinforces Europe’s commitment to support Ukraine as it faces Russia’s war of aggression. By entering into EU accession talks, Ukrainians are now one step closer to the future for which they are fighting.

—Benton Coblentz is a program assistant at the Eurasia Center.

The post Experts react to the EU starting Ukraine membership talks while failing to agree on aid appeared first on Atlantic Council.

As news emerged of what was widely viewed in Ukraine as an historic breakthrough, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy led the country’s celebrations. In a series of social media posts, Zelenskyy said the decision to begin EU membership talks was a victory for Ukraine and for all Europe. “History is made by those who don’t get tired of fighting for freedom,” he commented.

Senior European Union officials in Brussels also shared in the celebratory mood. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, who long been a vocal candidate of closer EU ties with Ukraine, said the step to open membership talks was “a strategic decision and a day that will remain engraved in the history of our Union.”

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

The news from Brussels has provided Ukrainians with some timely cheer amid mounting gloom due to the military stalemate in the war with Russia and signs of a weakening in Western resolve to continue backing Ukraine into 2024 and beyond. In recent months, a major new US aid package for Ukraine has become hostage to domestic politics, while internal divisions have emerged within the EU over ambitious plans to provide Ukraine with a long-term support program. Meanwhile, pledges of new aid from Ukraine’s international partners have fallen to their lowest level since the start of the Russian invasion.

These negative signals have caused considerable alarm among Ukrainian audiences, and have fueled a wave of international speculation over the potentially disastrous consequences of a Russian victory if Ukraine is abandoned. Meanwhile, the mood in Moscow has become increasingly jubilant, with Putin boasting recently that Ukraine would have “one week to live” if Western military aid came to a halt.

The EU’s decision will significantly alter the optics around the Russian invasion while providing new impetus to Ukraine’s war effort. While the start of accession negotiations does not come with any guarantees of future EU membership, it represents a major milestone for Ukraine in a geopolitical reformation that first began decades ago and has gained unprecedented momentum against the backdrop of Russia’s invasion.

Since 1991, all of independent Ukraine’s political leaders have paid lip service to the country’s European identity. However, during the early years of independence, almost nothing was done to promote Ukraine’s EU integration. This lack of progress was highlighted in 2002 when European Commission President Romano Prodi suggested Ukraine was about as plausible a candidate for EU membership as New Zealand.

Things changed in 2004 when millions of Ukrainians took to the streets to protest a rigged presidential election and defend their country’s fledgling democracy. The Orange Revolution was to prove a watershed moment for Ukraine and the wider post-Soviet region. It marked an ideological parting of the ways with Putin’s increasingly authoritarian Russia, while putting Ukrainian integration on the EU agenda for the first time.

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In the years following the Orange Revolution, Kyiv and Brussels began negotiating a comprehensive EU-Ukraine Association Agreement. By the time this document was finally ready, pro-Kremlin politician Viktor Yanukovych had become president of Ukraine. Despite favoring closer ties with Moscow, Yanukovych had made an election campaign promise to maintain Ukraine’s European integration. However, just days before he was set to sign the Association Agreement, Russia pressured Yanukovych into a dramatic U-turn. This rejection sparked a repeat of Ukraine’s 2004 street protests. After months of heavy-handed crackdowns including the killing of dozens of protesters, Yanukovych was eventually deserted by his Ukrainian allies and fled to Russia. Days later, Russian troops began the invasion of Ukraine with the seizure of Crimea.

The war unleashed by Vladimir Putin in February 2014 has driven Ukrainian support for EU integration to record highs. Prior to 2014, opinion polls often identified similar levels of Ukrainian public backing for closer ties with both Russia and the European Union. However, the past decade of escalating Russian aggression has drastically reduced any lingering enthusiasm for a return to the Kremlin orbit. Instead, recent surveys consistently indicate that around eighty percent of Ukrainians back EU membership. This shift in opinion is mirrored across the EU, where support for future Ukrainian membership has grown considerably since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion.

Over the past decade, Ukraine’s EU aspirations have come to represent the country’s dreams of a national transformation away from the authoritarian past and toward a democratic, European future. Russia’s increasingly violent response to these aspirations has served to convince more and more Ukrainians of the need to turn decisively away from Moscow and pursue EU membership.

This sentiment is now shared by a clear majority of European leaders, who have reached the conclusion that Ukraine can no longer remain in the geopolitical grey zone and must instead be integrated into the EU. The road ahead toward eventual membership remains long and challenging, but today’s decision is a big win for Ukrainians and a huge moment in Ukraine’s historic return to the European community of nations.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

Further reading

UkraineAlert Nov 28, 2023

Putin debunks his own propaganda by disarming Russia’s NATO borders

By Peter Dickinson

Putin publicly blames NATO for provoking the invasion of Ukraine, but Russia’s recent demilitarization of the country’s borders with neighboring NATO members makes a mockery of such claims, writes Peter Dickinson.

Conflict Democratic Transitions

UkraineAlert Dec 5, 2023

2023 review: Ukraine scores key victories in the Battle of the Black Sea

By Oleksiy Goncharenko

The front lines of the Russian invasion in Ukraine have barely moved in 2023, but Ukraine has had far more success in the Black Sea, where it has broken Russia’s blockade and forced Putin’s fleet to retreat from Crimea, writes Oleksiy Goncharenko.

Conflict Drones

UkraineAlert Dec 5, 2023

Fake history is a crucial weapon in Vladimir Putin’s bid to destroy Ukraine

By Ihor Smeshko

The invading Russian army is not the only enemy Ukraine faces; the Kremlin propaganda and false historical narratives that drive and justify the invasion are arguably just as deadly, writes Ihor Smeshko.

Conflict Disinformation

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

Read more from UkraineAlert

UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia and Central Asia in the East.

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The post Historic breakthrough for Ukraine as EU agrees to begin membership talks appeared first on Atlantic Council.

With Russia’s invasion now approaching the two-year mark, it is increasingly clear that the outcome of the war will shape the geopolitical climate for decades to come. Ukraine is set to play a key role not only in the stability of Eastern Europe, but also in terms of global food and energy security.

If it is to meet the historic challenges that lie ahead, Ukraine must be able to defend itself. This will require substantial and sustained military aid from the country’s partners. In addition to this immediate focus on strengthening security, it is also vital for Ukraine to continue pursuing reforms in order to counter corruption, bolster national institutions, and consolidate the country’s democracy.

Nothing on Ukraine’s reform agenda is more important than judicial reform. Indeed, it is no exaggeration to say that Ukraine’s future prosperity and international position depend on the effective reform of the country’s legal system. This is well understood in Kyiv’s corridors of power. Against the backdrop of Russia’s ongoing invasion, Ukraine continues to work with international partners to implement effective rule of law reforms.

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

Judicial reform has been consistently close to the top of the government’s agenda ever since President Zelenskyy was first elected in 2019, and has remained so in the current wartime environment. Progress has included fulfilling the conditions set by the European Commission regarding the composition of the High Council of Justice and the High Qualification Commission of Judges. Changes have also been introduced to the selection procedure for Constitutional Court judges in line with Venice Commission recommendations.

As part of efforts to counter the threat of politically motivated appointments within the Ukrainian justice system, Ukraine has taken the unprecedented step of involving the country’s international partners in the selection of members to serve on reformed judicial bodies. For example, selection committees have featured the participation of senior British and American officials with extensive experience in the UK and US justice systems. Following months of consultations and negotiations with the Venice Commission and the European Commission, legislation has also been adopted to create an advisory group of experts including international representatives charged with selecting potential judges for Ukraine’s Constitutional Court.

Advancing Ukraine’s unprecedented judicial reform agenda requires a careful balance between achieving meaningful change, protecting the rights of every Ukrainian citizen, and maintaining maximum transparency. Measures are in place to ensure Ukraine’s international partners are informed of any new initiatives, with the G7 group of ambassadors paying particularly close attention to developments and offering positive assessments of recent progress.

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Ukraine’s advance in Kursk: What’s next and implications

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While wartime advances in Ukraine’s judicial reform agenda are encouraging, many major challenges remain. For example, there are currently almost two thousand vacancies for judges in Ukraine. It is absolutely critical to fill these vacancies with the best candidates, who must be subjected to rigorous and competitive selection procedures that scrutinize both their professionalism and their integrity. The future of Ukraine’s judicial system depends on it.

As they defend their statehood and national identity, Ukrainians are acutely aware that they are writing a fresh chapter in the country’s history. Together with an international coalition of partner countries, they are building a new Ukraine that is already emerging as a trusted and valued member of the democratic world. A firm commitment to establishing the rule of law is absolutely foundational to this process.

Despite the uniquely challenging circumstances created by Russia’s ongoing invasion, there is currently reason for cautious optimism regarding the further reform of the Ukrainian legal system. For arguably the first time in the history of independent Ukraine, all the necessary elements are now in place to achieve lasting judicial reform. These include the requisite political will on the part of both president and parliament, along with the active participation of Ukrainian civil society and expert support from the country’s international partners. This helps make continued reform progress possible, even amid Europe’s biggest armed conflict since World War II.

Denys Maslov is a member of the Ukrainian Parliament with the Servant of the People party and head of the Ukrainian Parliament’s Committee on Legal Policy. Oleksandr Vasiuk is a member of the Ukrainian Parliament with the Servant of the People party and a member of the Ukrainian Parliament’s Committee on Legal Policy.

Further reading

UkraineAlert Nov 28, 2023

Putin debunks his own propaganda by disarming Russia’s NATO borders

By Peter Dickinson

Putin publicly blames NATO for provoking the invasion of Ukraine, but Russia’s recent demilitarization of the country’s borders with neighboring NATO members makes a mockery of such claims, writes Peter Dickinson.

Conflict Democratic Transitions

UkraineAlert Dec 5, 2023

2023 review: Ukraine scores key victories in the Battle of the Black Sea

By Oleksiy Goncharenko

The front lines of the Russian invasion in Ukraine have barely moved in 2023, but Ukraine has had far more success in the Black Sea, where it has broken Russia’s blockade and forced Putin’s fleet to retreat from Crimea, writes Oleksiy Goncharenko.

Conflict Drones

UkraineAlert Nov 30, 2023

Western leaders must choose: Arm Ukraine or enable Putin’s genocide

By Taras Kuzio

Western leaders must decide whether they are finally prepared to arm Ukraine adequately or face the consequences of a Russian victory which would lead to genocide in the heart of Europe, writes Taras Kuzio.

Conflict Disinformation

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

Read more from UkraineAlert

UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia and Central Asia in the East.

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The post Russia’s invasion cannot derail Ukraine’s rule of law reforms appeared first on Atlantic Council.

In the last week of November, Ukraine marked ten years since the start of protests in late 2013 over then president Viktor Yanukovych’s decision to turn away from an association agreement with the European Union. When thousands of Ukrainians flooded into central Kyiv’s Independence Square (“Maidan Nezalezhnosti”) to oppose this sudden U-turn, Yanukovych responded with a heavy-handed crackdown that transformed a protest movement into a revolution. By the time the Euromaidan Revolution was over three months later, dozens of protesters had been killed and Yanukovych had fled to Russia.  

In the immediate aftermath of the revolution, Russia launched a military operation to seize control of Ukraine’s Crimean peninsula. This was to prove the first act in ten years of escalating Russian military aggression against Ukraine that would eventually lead to the full-scale invasion of February 2022.

Russia’s use of force has caused untold suffering but it has failed to reverse Ukraine’s historic pivot toward Europe. On the contrary, Ukrainian public support for European integration has surged over the past decade to record highs, while enthusiasm for closer ties with Moscow has evaporated.

Political developments have mirrored this historic shift in Ukrainian public opinion. In summer 2014, new Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko reversed his predecessor’s rejection and signed a landmark association agreement with the EU. Following the successful implementation of anti-corruption reforms and other measures to bring Ukrainian legislation more into line with European Union norms, Ukraine secured visa-free EU travel in 2017.  

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

In the first days of Russia’s full-scale invasion, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy officially applied for EU membership. The move was a clever piece of political theater that drew attention to Russia’s war aim of derailing Ukraine’s Euro-Atlantic integration and robbing the country of its independence. European leaders certainly seemed to recognize the significance of the moment. Four months later, they officially granted Ukraine EU candidate nation status.

Candidate status was accompanied by a list of seven recommendations Ukraine needed to address before it could be considered for full EU membership. Tasks included judicial reform and progress in the fight against corruption along with measures to tame the influence of oligarchs, improve press freedoms, and protect national minorities.

Ukraine’s progress over the past year on these seven points was deemed sufficient by the European Commission to recommend the opening of official membership talks. This progress included steps to reform appointments within the judiciary and measures targeting graft. Meanwhile, new legislation has imposed restrictions on the ability of oligarchs to influence Ukrainian politics. The European Commission responded by stating that Ukraine had implemented “important measures to curb the oligarchs’ grip on public life.”

Significant challenges remain. The recent European Commission report recommending membership talks called on Ukraine to further revise existing legislation protecting the rights of national minorities. This has long been a point of contention, particularly as EU member state Hungary has stated its determination to block Ukraine’s EU integration until its demands regarding Ukraine’s Hungarian minority are met.

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Ukraine’s advance in Kursk: What’s next and implications

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While multiple obstacles lie ahead, Ukraine’s reform efforts have drawn praise from senior EU officials in Brussels. “Ukrainians are deeply reforming their country, even as they are fighting a war that is existential for them,” European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen said in a recent address. “Ukraine has completed well over 90 percent of the necessary steps that the Commission set out last year in its report.”

Ukrainians are now looking forward to the next EU summit in December and are optimistic that European leaders will back the opening of official accession negotiations. This would be a genuine geopolitical breakthrough for the country, although it would not guarantee Ukraine’s future place among EU member states. Advancing toward membership would still take time, but the start of talks would provide some very welcome momentum to Ukraine’s European integration drive, while also acknowledging the considerable progress the country has made toward meeting the reform requirements set out by the European Union in summer 2022. 

Ukraine has defied expectations by implementing ambitious and comprehensive reform measures in the most extreme of wartime conditions. This reflects Ukraine’s commitment to a European future and underlines the importance of EU integration for Ukrainians at a time when they are fighting for their country’s survival.

The Ukrainian authorities have made clear that they view EU membership as a strategic priority and are fully committed to pursuing this goal, even while defending themselves against Russia’s ongoing invasion. It is now up to EU leaders to make history in the coming weeks by officially opening accession negotiations.   

Mark Temnycky is a nonresident fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

Further reading

UkraineAlert Nov 16, 2023

Vladimir Putin’s anti-colonial posturing should not fool the Global South

By Taras Kuzio

The countries of the Global South may have many good reasons for pursuing closer ties with Putin’s Russia, but a shared opposition to imperialism is most certainly not one of them, writes Taras Kuzio.

Africa Conflict

UkraineAlert Nov 14, 2023

Why Ukraine refuses to negotiate with “habitual liar” Vladimir Putin

By Peter Dickinson

Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba has dismissed mounting calls for a negotiated peace deal with Russia, arguing that Vladimir Putin is a “habitual liar” who cannot be trusted to keep his word, writes Peter Dickinson.

Conflict Disinformation

UkraineAlert Nov 7, 2023

Peace is impossible while Vladimir Putin denies Ukraine’s right to exist

By Taras Kuzio

While calls to end the bloodshed in Ukraine are perfectly understandable, anyone advocating a compromise peace deal with Vladimir Putin must first reckon with the genocidal reality of Russia’s invasion, writes Taras Kuzio.

Conflict Democratic Transitions

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

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UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia and Central Asia in the East.

Learn more

The post Wartime Ukraine is making historic progress toward EU membership appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Since October 28, after the grand rally of the opposition Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) was dispersed with force by law enforcement agencies, the country has entered a spiral of violence which further intensified after the country’s election commission announced the poll date as January 7, 2024. The announcement was made on November 15, after the ruling party dismissed the call from US Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asian Affairs Donald Lu on November 13 for “unconditional dialogue” among three major parties. The opposition parties demand the resignation of Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina’s government and the installation of a neutral government to oversee the 2024 election. They have called for hartal (general strike) and blockades throughout the country in recent weeks and have continued to do so after the poll schedule was announced. Violence has been reported from across the country; as of November 13, at least thirteen people have died in the violence, and hundreds, including thirty journalists, have been injured. Although the government claims that the violence is being perpetrated by opposition activists, a statement from the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights noted that journalists were assaulted on October 28 by “masked individuals riding on motorcycles, who are thought to have been ruling party supporters.” During the blockades and hartal called by the opposition, incidents of arson on buses in the major cities have taken place despite police presence in full gear.

The government, which began arresting the BNP leaders in the days ahead of the rally, has embarked on a full-scale crackdown of the opposition since then. Almost all the BNP central leaders, including the party’s secretary general, Mirza Fakhrul Islam Alamgir, have been arrested and charged with arson, damage to state property, and violence against members of law enforcement agencies. Thousands of opposition activists have been arrested, and the government appears to have plans for harsher clampdowns on the grassroots of the BNP. The party headquarters has been sealed by the police, which claim that the office is a crime scene following the clashes on October 28.

Bangladesh’s slide toward autocracy

Hasina came to power in 2009 in an election held under a caretaker government backed by the military and was elected twice since in elections that international observers said were seriously flawed. The 2014 election was boycotted by all opposition parties after the ruling party removed the caretaker government provision from the constitution in 2011. Although opposition parties participated in the 2018 election, media reports revealed that in some places the votes were cast the night before, and that many voters were barred from voting.

As the ruling Bangladesh Awami League (BAL) established its control over the administration, law enforcement agencies have enacted a series of laws to muzzle freedom of expression since 2014, most notably the Digital Security Act of 2018. And as a compromised judiciary failed to act, the country incrementally slid toward becoming an elected autocracy. The impunity enjoyed by BAL activists and the support of the business community exacerbated the situation.

The opposition parties, meanwhile, remained fragmented. The main opposition party, the BNP, became seriously handicapped due to the absence of its chairperson, Khaleda Zia, who was convicted on dubious graft charges in early 2018, sentenced to ten years in prison, and is currently under house arrest. This caused the party to become organizationally weak and lack a cohesive direction. However, as the country began to experience serious economic turmoil in July 2022, with a depleting foreign reserve, an energy crisis, high inflation, and a balance of payment crisis, people began to take to the streets. The BNP had by then revitalized its grassroots and began a series of public rallies around the country and at the capital, Dhaka.

The international response

Despite this incremental progress toward autocracy, Bangladesh’s domestic politics drew little attention from international actors until late 2021, when the US Treasury Department imposed sanctions on the country’s elite force Rapid Action Battalion and seven of its former and current officials for egregious violations of human rights and the State Department imposed sanctions on two high-ranking police officials. This was combined with the Biden administration’s decision not to invite Bangladesh to the virtual Summit of Democracy, which the United States hosted in November 2021. 

US officials have continued to impress upon the Bangladeshi government the need to create a conducive environment for elections. In May 2023, for example, the US government enacted a new “Visa Policy to Promote Democratic Elections in Bangladesh,” which included the denial of visas to those engaged in undermining the “democratic election process.” In September of this year, the United States announced that it is taking steps to implement the new visa policy.

The Bangladeshi government blasted US statements stressing the importance of free, fair, and inclusive elections as meddling in domestic politics. On the other hand, US support for a democratic election energized the opposition, boosting the morale of activists. China and Russia, which have become close allies of the Hasina government, have sided with her.  India, Hasina’s principal backer, after maintaining silence for a long time, expressed support for her.  In the past months, two pre-election exploratory missions, conducted by the European Union (EU) and a bipartisan group from the United States, have indicated that the country’s political environment is not conducive to an inclusive election. The EU decided that it will not deploy a full election observer team, citing the absence of “necessary conditions,” while the US team, comprised of representatives of the International Republican Institute and the National Democratic Institute said “the current political environment presents significant obstacles to electoral integrity.” The latter report underscored the importance of the upcoming election, saying that, “Bangladesh is at a crossroads and the upcoming elections provide a litmus test of the country’s commitment to a democratic, participatory, and competitive political process.”

The United States and seven other countries expressed deep concerns in a joint statement after the violence of October 28. The statement was signed among others by two Asian countries, Japan and South Korea, major economic partners of Bangladesh. The EU has expressed concerns too. As the clampdown started, various human rights groups such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch have condemned the government’s actions. Stéphane Dujarric, a spokesperson for the United Nations secretary-general, spoke out against “harassment or arbitrary arrest.” High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Josep Borrell also expressed concerns over the arrests of the opposition activists.

It is against this background that the election commission announced the schedule which indicates that the ruling party intends to forge ahead unilaterally. However, the situation is still in flux and Bangladesh is faced with two possible scenarios in the coming months. The scenarios are based on the understanding that the ruling BAL will try to secure a victory at any cost, and that international actors, especially the United States, have a role to play. Under the first scenario, a non-inclusive election will be held under the present system with the BAL in power, while in the second scenario, a negotiated settlement will be reached, which may allow the election to be deferred. Each scenario has three pathways.

Scenario 1: The government has the upper hand; a unilateral election takes place

Pathway 1: The ruling party succeeds in exhausting the BNP and other opposition parties in their efforts to continue the movement. The 2015 scenario emerges—this is apparently what the government is betting on. Consequently, the local leaders of various parties are likely to join the election as independent candidates. A dejected BNP loses its ground resulting in a low turnout but somewhat “participatory” election.

Pathway 2: The BAL flips some high-profile leaders of the BNP in custody to join “king’s parties,” which creates a fracture in the BNP. Leaders of other parties are targeted and either accused of being involved in violence or pressured to join the election rather than boycott it. These results create enough confusion to pave the way for an “inclusive” election. Islamist parties, particularly the Bangladesh Islami Andolon and the Hefazate Islam, emerge as key players.

Pathway 3: The BAL renders the BNP leaderless and disbands it ahead or immediately after holding a unilateral election (or making all the BNP candidates ineligible to file nominations). The BAL holds a well-engineered election with some violence to provide the aura of a regular Bangladeshi election, with multiple candidates from the ruling party and its allies participating, providing a few seats to “king’s parties” and the Jatiya Party.

As of November 15, the measures taken by the government are pushing the country toward this first scenario, but each pathway poses serious challenges.

Scenario 2: The opposition has the upper hand; a negotiated inclusive election takes place

Pathway 1: The opposition succeeds in transforming its currently quiet public support into popular mobilization and unnerves the police and civil administration. The business community feels the pressure. Cracks emerge within the power bloc, forcing the government either to fall or to find a negotiated settlement.

Pathway 2: The opposition finds different ways to put pressure on the government besides the blockades and hartals. And/or the economic situation takes a sudden precipitous downturn forcing people to take to the streets.

Pathway 3: External actors, particularly the United States, take punitive measures, including targeted sanctions, which will affect the ruling party’s support base, or the state institutions, weakening the resolve of the government. And/or external actors take an active mediating role.

Bangladeshi politics has entered a time of grave uncertainty; how the election will be held and what kind of future lies ahead will be decided in the coming weeks. The country has reached the tipping point. It is at this critical juncture that the international community, particularly the United States, needs to play a robust role in ensuring what Washington committed to in the announcement of the Visa Policy on May 23, 2023—lending “support to all those seeking to advance democracy in Bangladesh” and helping to hold “free and fair elections.” The US sanctions on the Rapid Action Battalion in December 2021 dramatically reduced the number of extrajudicial killings and saved many lives; it is time to think of equivalent measures to stop Bangladesh from spiraling toward a closed autocracy.

Ali Riaz is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council South Asia Center and a distinguished professor at Illinois State University.

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Removing Halbousi from the highest office the Sunni minority holds brings back old accusations of marginalizing the second-largest segment of the Iraqi population. This charge is made every time a minority politician is removed from office, even when his or her wrongdoing is evident and proven beyond any reasonable doubt in a court of law. Claims of marginalization have often assisted these politicians, as well as other leaders who oppose the Iraqi political system, in their effort to fan the flames of ethno-sectarian grievances. This has led to violence and instability, ultimately providing a suitable environment for insurgency and terrorism. Halbousi reminded his opponents of this risk in his reaction to the verdict, referring to “some who are working towards destabilizing [Iraq].”

Speaker Halbousi was elected to the Council of Representatives as a representative of Western Anbar province in 2014, resigning from the position to serve as governor of Anbar in 2017. He then won a seat in the 2018 parliamentary election and was elected fourth president of the Iraqi CoR. In 2022, he became the first representative to be elected twice for the CoR presidency.

In Iraqi politics, Halbousi embodied a new generation of Sunni leadership that took a realist approach to Iraqi politics. This departure from the confrontational style of past leaders aimed to avoid the recurring conflicts and painful consequences that have plagued the Sunni-majority provinces: the 2003 insurgency; the catastrophic Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) invasion in 2014; and the subsequent war to liberate Iraq ending in 2017. Halbousi and the political bloc he founded, Taqaddum, focused on national inter-sectarian cooperation, local reconstruction, and services.

The current crisis dates back to May 2022, when Halbousi removed one of his bloc’s members, Laith al-Dulaimi, from the CoR membership, claiming that Dulaimi submitted his resignation from the parliament. Dulaimi denied the claim and took his case to the Iraqi Supreme Court, accusing Halbousi of forgery and abuse of power. He claimed that Halbousi forced him and other members from his bloc to sign undated resignations during the previous parliamentary term to ensure their future cooperation. Dulaimi was restored to his CoR position after he reconciled his differences with Halbousi, but the latter revoked Dulaimi’s membership for the second time in January.

Citing several legal violations by Halbousi, the November 14 Supreme Court decision revoked both Dulaimi’s and Halbousi’s membership. The latter presided in the CoR session immediately after the announcement of his removal and stated from the speaker seat that “there are people who seek to shake the stability in the country and the fragmentation of its political and social components.” He proceeded to characterize the court’s verdict as “strange.” Addressing his colleagues and the Iraqi audience, Halbousi emphasized that he and his party “came from a community that opposed the political process until 2014. This multifaceted opposition contributed to the fall of one-third of Iraqi territory” to the hands of ISIS.

Halbousi also revealed his intention to take constitutional measures to confront the verdict, which he attributed to external pressure on the court. In his November 15 press conference, Halbousi rejected the Supreme Court decision, arguing that the Iraqi Constitution grants the court the authority to adjudicate the accusations against the president of the republic, the prime minister, and ministers, but not the authority to look into the accusations against the president of the CoR nor its members, nor the authority to remove them from the office they hold. Halbousi did not comment on the allegations against him and did not deny any wrongdoing.

The consequences of this decision, which is mandatory and not subject to appeal, are not yet apparent. However, what has happened is the resignation of three ministers who had won their cabinet seats with Halbousi’s support: the Minister of Culture, Tourism and Antiquities, Ahmed Fakak Al-Badrani; Minister of Planning, Muhammad Tamim; and Industry Minister, Khaled Battal (the minister of planning also holds a position of deputy prime minister).

In the CoR, Halbousi’s Taqaddum bloc has declared their intention to resign from committee chairmanship and abstain from parliamentary sessions. However, if widespread resignation of Halbousi’s political bloc in the parliament occurs, it would mark the second-largest intra-sectarian shift in political balance since the mass resignation of the Sadrist bloc in June 2022, which caused intra-Shia political upheaval. The Sadrists and Taqaddum emerged as the primary winners of their respective sectarian constituencies in the 2021 elections.

The timing of this development is particularly crucial, given that Iraq, like the rest of the region, is entangled in the escalating Israel-Hamas war. Additionally, the country is in the midst of an election campaign to reinstate provincial councils. These councils disbanded in 2019 following the parliament’s vote to terminate their operations due to Iraq’s inability to hold comprehensive provincial elections amid the war on ISIS.

An important development to watch for is the position of Halbousi’s Sunni allies in the Azm bloc, led by Khamis al-Khanjar, who is leading the collective Sunni coalition that includes Azm and Taqaddum. If they imitate Shia cleric Muqtada al-Sadr’s Shia rivals and move to fill the positions vacated by Taqaddum, a similar intra-sectarian fragmentation to the intra-Shia and intra-Kurdish fragmentations will be seen among the Sunnis. This scenario will lead to bitterly fought provincial elections across Iraq—not to mention its menacing consequences to the government of Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani, who has refrained from commenting on the removal of Halbousi thus far.

Sudani’s government promised to prepare for an early national election within one year of his term, which began on October 27, 2022, to mitigate the fallout of Sadrist mass resignations from parliament. However, relative political stability and the acquiescence of Sadr to the continuation of the current government have encouraged the Sudani government to carry on for the time being and hold a provincial election instead. Nonetheless, justifying the continuation of governance becomes challenging when considering the absence of key representation from the largest Shia and Sunni winners in the 2021 general elections.

Dr. Abbas Kadhim is director of the Atlantic Council’s Iraq Initiative. Follow him on X: @DrAbbasKadhim.

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With the first opportunity for approval coming up as soon as next month, a united and undivided “yes” from EU leaders would be a boost to Ukraine going into what is shaping up to be a pivotal 2024.

What are the results of the report?

The EU decided to grant candidate status to Ukraine in June 2022, shortly after the beginning of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. This decision galvanized the Ukrainian government to meet the initial steps outlined in the membership application adjacent to approving candidate status.

The Commission report published as part of the overall Enlargement Package outlined Kyiv’s considerable efforts to address the initial application criteria. Ukraine has, for example, cracked down on several high-profile officials accused of bribery and embezzlement and expanded specialized anti-corruption agencies. It has also moved forward on judicial selection and governance reform, and it has made progress in aligning Ukrainian law to the full body of EU law, or the acquis.

Regarding the progress Ukraine has made, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen said that “Ukraine has completed well over 90 percent of the necessary steps that [the Commission] set out last year.”

While formally recommending that Ukraine advance to accession negotiations, the report also outlined several areas that require improvement. Though Ukraine has made great strides on decentralization, public administration reform, and laws ensuring freedom of expression and fundamental human rights, there is still a long way to go in reforming the courts, tackling systematic corruption, and preparing to integrate into the EU common market.

What’s next?

Though the report outlined areas that need continued improvement, the Commission recommended that the European Council, the second executive arm consisting of the heads of state of the twenty-seven EU member states, formally open accession negotiations.  

The first opportunity for the Council to back the Commission’s plan toward Ukraine’s accession will be at an upcoming summit of EU leaders in Brussels on December 14 and 15. Following unanimous approval from the European Council, the EU will formally open negotiations.

Even as the Commission signaled that it is ready to begin preparatory work on Ukraine’s accession following the Council’s approval in December, it is worth noting that the actual start of the negotiations is dependent on Kyiv’s progress on key measures outlined in the report. These include steps toward limiting oligarch influence and establishing the legal framework and implementation of laws protecting the rights of national minorities, media, and education. The Commission would then report on the progress of these measures in March 2024 and finalize the negotiating framework pending satisfactory development.

Though some consider a smooth approval to open these negotiations in December nearly inevitable, concerns remain over continued resistance from Hungary to greenlighting accession negotiations amid a deepening divide between Budapest and Brussels. There is also concern about the extent to which EU and international attention has shifted from Ukraine to the Israel-Hamas conflict.

What are the stakes?

Failure to open negotiations as expected in December risks putting Ukraine in uncertain territory heading into 2024 and into the third year of Russia’s full-scale invasion.

The symbolism of 2024 is also important—it will mark a decade since the beginning of Russia’s invasion of eastern Ukraine and the February 2014 Revolution of Dignity that saw the ousting of pro-Russia former President Viktor Yanukovych. Hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians marched throughout Ukraine from November 2013 to February 2014 in the Euromaidan protests against Yanukovych’s turn toward Russia and sudden withdrawal from closer integration with the EU.

Many Ukrainians—hoping for a prosperous, free, and independent country—marched draped not only in the blue and yellow of the Ukrainian flag, but also in the flag of the EU.

More than 90 percent of Ukrainians support their country’s membership in the EU by 2030, according to a poll earlier this year by the National Democratic Institute.

Ukraine’s continued commitment toward reform—even as significant portions of the country remain under continuous attack or occupation by Russian forces—has more than proved Ukraine’s dedication and will in aligning itself with the EU and the West.

A decision this December would not only represent an important vindication of Kyiv’s decade-long effort to join the EU, but also cement the EU’s continued commitment to Ukraine’s rightful place in Europe.

Aleksander Cwalina is a program assistant for the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

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The European Commission’s decision was welcomed in Kyiv as a major milestone in Ukraine’s bid to join the European Union. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy toasted the news as “a strong and historic step that paves the way to a stronger EU with Ukraine as its member.” Meanwhile, the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry posted that the country was now returning to its European roots.

The start of accession negotiations does not mean Ukraine is now guaranteed EU membership, of course. On the contrary, a long road lies ahead marked by numerous bureaucratic obstacles and demands regarding Ukraine’s continued adoption of EU norms. Nevertheless, this week’s green light for membership talks represents genuinely historic progress at a time when Ukrainians are fighting to defend their independence and their right to choose a European future.

The ongoing Russian invasion of Ukraine began in February 2014 in the immediate aftermath of Ukraine’s Euromaidan Revolution, which saw millions of Ukrainians protest against a Kremlin-backed turn away from European integration. Since the onset of Russian aggression almost ten years ago, Ukrainian public support for EU membership has surged to unprecedented highs, while enthusiasm for a return to the Russian sphere of influence has dwindled to negligible levels.

The Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service asked a range of Ukrainian politicians and academics for their thoughts on what the European Commission’s recommendation means for today’s Ukraine and for the country’s future.

Yulia Svyrydenko, Ukraine’s First Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Economy: We consider ourselves part of the European Union family and are sincerely grateful for this week’s European Commission decision to recommend accession talks. This is just one of many important steps, but it is a significant signal which gives us hope.

There is still a lot of joint work ahead to confirm Ukraine’s position as a fully-fledged member of the European family and to make the Ukrainian economy part of the single European market. To achieve this, we will continue working on a wide range of reforms. This includes the reform of public administration, justice systems, the fight against corruption, and economic reforms. Ukraine is on a path toward great improvements in the coming years that I hope will deepen the country’s EU integration.

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

Kira Rudik, Ukrainian MP, leader of Golos party: The European Commission’s recommendation to open EU accession negotiations with Ukraine is not just a formal green light for our path toward EU membership. It is also of huge importance for every Ukrainian. This decision is a source of motivation for our defenders; it is essential for them to know that while fighting continues along the front lines of the war with Russia, many people in the rear are actively working to bring us closer to our goal as a nation.

This is a chance to secure a democratic European future for our children, many of whom have become used to studying and sleeping in bomb shelters. Ultimately, this is an opportunity and at the same time a challenge for all of us as a state. When I am asked what the journey toward EU membership means for Ukrainians, I usually say that we are on our way home.

Lisa Yasko, Ukrainian MP, Servant of the People party: The European Commission decision is a crucial step that confirms the EU is serious when it speaks of Ukraine as a future member. I believe this decision is also highly significant for the EU itself, as Ukraine’s European integration has the potential to become a success story that will strengthen the image of the entire bloc.

The allocation of 50 billion euros is a further clear signal that Europe is ready to partner with Ukraine right now to achieve the country’s European future. I am particularly happy to see that our European partners are objective in their approach toward Ukraine and recognize our achievements including progress in constitutional justice, anti-corruption efforts, and the fight against money laundering.

It is important to stress that the European Commission’s report also contains recommendations for further steps in the reform process, such as rebooting the Bureau of Economic Security, developing a new Customs Code, and criminalizing smuggling. This is not just a question of having the requisite political will to continue these reforms; it is an existential issue for all Ukrainians. We must now keep working to bring EU membership closer, because Europe without Ukraine is unthinkable and Ukraine is unthinkable without Europe.

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Oleksiy Goncharenko, Ukrainian MP, European Solidarity party: It has now been almost 10 years since the Revolution of Dignity when Ukrainians first declared that Ukraine belongs in Europe. We have already proven ourselves by protecting democratic values on the battlefield. We are paying the highest price possible for our right to be a democratic and free country.

Support for EU integration within Ukrainian society has never been stronger than it is today. We are grateful that the European Commission recognizes our efforts and recommends the start of accession talks. This decision has sent an extremely valuable signal that Ukraine is part of Europe. The European Commission has confirmed that it is not a question of “if” but “when” Ukraine will join the EU.

At the same time, we understand that there is still much work to be done on the path toward future membership. Upcoming EU summits in December 2023 and next year will provide a better understanding of what the next steps will be. We have already demonstrated that we are capable of carrying out reforms in wartime conditions and have no intention of stopping. On the contrary, we will proceed with reforms for the sake of our country’s future development and will continue to advance toward the goal of EU membership.

Volodymyr Dubovyk, associate professor, Odesa Mechnikov National University: The European Commission’s recommendation is good news for Ukrainians in general. It confirms that Ukraine belongs in the European family of nations.

This decision is important feedback that recognizes Ukraine’s strenuous efforts to meet key EU membership criteria, including requirements that have been outlined during the extreme wartime circumstances of the past twenty months. It directs Ukraine to conduct further reforms while offering the clear incentive of a realistic EU membership perspective rather the vague talk of future integration. This should give new impetus to meaningful change in Ukraine.

The start of accession talks will deepen ties between the EU and Ukraine, including in terms of trade relations. This might help resolve certain tensions with some of Ukraine’s neighbors. EU security assistance will also be enhanced, with the EU becoming an even more important partner in this sphere than at present. In other words, this is a sign of deepening commitment by both sides. Crucially, it is also a very welcome development for Ukrainians living with the reality of an existential war, which proves that their fight is not in vain.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

Further reading

UkraineAlert Oct 24, 2023

Battle of Avdiivka: Putin’s new offensive continues despite heavy Russian losses

By Olivia Yanchik

Russia has returned to the offensive in Ukraine in recent weeks with a major assault on the town of Avdiivka. The Russian offensive continues despite reports of catastrophic losses, underlining Putin’s determination to secure victory at any price in Ukraine, writes Olivia Yanchik.

Conflict Defense Policy

UkraineAlert Nov 2, 2023

Putin will win unless the West finally commits to Ukrainian victory

By Ivan Verstyuk

Russian dictator Vladimir Putin is more confident than ever that time is on his side in Ukraine and believes the Western world ultimately lacks the political will to oppose him, writes Ivan Verstyuk.

Conflict Defense Industry

UkraineAlert Nov 7, 2023

Ukraine reports fresh success in the Battle of the Black Sea

By Peter Dickinson

Ukraine’s success in the Battle of the Black Sea should convince the country’s Western partners to finally abandon their cautious approach and provide the Ukrainian military with the weapons they need to defeat Russia, writes Peter Dickinson.

Conflict Defense Policy

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

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UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia and Central Asia in the East.

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Turkey has evolved from a small, rump state trying to consolidate its regime, economy, and army, into a rising middle power and important regional and global player. The country is now the home of NATO’s second-largest army and the world’s nineteenth-largest economy; it is also the world’s twelfth-largest arms exporter, the twelfth-largest country by manufacturing output, and the host of more refugees than any other country. While it sits at the forefront of many of the world’s most pressing issues, Turkey has at the same time come under heavy criticism from Western countries, based on their notion that Turkey is abandoning secular democracy for sectarian authoritarianism and on Turkey’s adoption of an autonomous and assertive foreign policy, which has been branded as Neo-Ottomanism.

Today, Turkey is one of the rising middle powers pursuing an independent path. Its moves on the global stage—especially in the military domain—demonstrate that the balance of global power is determined by much more than great power competition. Those moves are a reminder for the West that developing countries are shaping and will continue to influence the course of international relations.

A different trajectory, but persisting tensions

Turkey was founded one hundred years ago on the ruins of the six-hundred-year-old Ottoman Empire, which once stretched across the Balkans, Anatolia, the Gulf, and North Africa. After managing to keep Anatolia and some of Thrace in its war for independence, the young republic was quite introverted. This was translated in the words of the republic’s founding father, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk: “Peace at home, peace in the world.”

Over the course of its first few decades, Turkey adopted a foreign policy of neutrality in major confrontations and entered into peace and friendship treaties with its neighbors. Ankara prioritized creating a nation-state within internationally recognized frontiers and modernizing its state and population as a continuation of the Ottoman Empire’s modernization efforts in the nineteenth century. It also looked to break away from its Ottoman past with reforms that set out to completely transform the society and the state by installing a set of codes through which the Muslim Turks identified themselves—and through which the West perceived them.

Despite having conducted democratic elections—and despite having had a multi-party system since 1946—Turkey’s democratic progress has been threatened or all-out disrupted by coups and military memorandums, including a “postmodern” coup in 1997 and a failed coup attempt in 2016 that was led by FETÖ, the group associated with cleric Fethullah Gülen. Turkish society is polarized today, split based on whether they support or oppose Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.

Turkey’s transition from a parliamentary democracy to a presidential system in 2018 has been perceived in the West as a death warrant for Turkish democracy. While needing improvements, Turkish elections remain democratic and competitive. Obviously, a country’s democratic health is more than its electoral democracy; but looking beyond elections, Turkey continues to suffer from the ramifications of insufficient progress in boosting rights for women and religious, ethnic, and social minority groups.

An expanding sphere of influence and independent foreign policy

Turkey underwent a foreign-policy transformation after the Justice and Development Party’s (AKP) rise to power in 2002, turning attention more deeply toward non-Western countries in the Middle East, the Balkans, Central Asia, and Africa.

While before the AKP era, there were leaders who supported Turkey taking on a role as a bridge between the West and Islamic civilizations and supported Turkey adopting an assertive foreign policy and close relations with the Middle East, the application and extension of these ideas happened under AKP rule.

The Balkan countries have historically been important for Turkey’s national security, fueling Turkey’s engagement in the region even before the AKP era. For example, Turkey supported fragile Balkan countries (such as Bosnia and Herzegovina, Albania, and Kosovo) following the end of the Cold War and the breakup of Yugoslavia. But later, Turkey was among the first countries to recognize the independence of Kosovo, was involved in mediation efforts in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and initiated trilateral talks with Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia in 2009 and Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia in 2010. It also supported peacekeeping missions in the region. AKP foreign-policy leaders strongly supported Western Balkan countries’ integration into NATO and intensified economic relations while encouraging Turkish investments in the region.

Regarding Turkey’s relationship with Central Asian countries, the Organization of Turkic States (previously called the Turkic Council) formalized those relationships when it was established in 2009, bringing together Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkey, and Uzbekistan as members and Hungary, Turkmenistan, and the Turkish Cypriot community as observers.

In the first decade of AKP rule, party leaders pursued a soft-power-based foreign policy, putting emphasis on creating relationships with other countries based on shared history, cultural resemblances, and economic exchanges. Historical and cultural ties made clear that it was particularly important for Turkey to play a central role in the Middle East. After the Arab Spring and the start of the Syrian civil war, Turkey shifted to a more assertive foreign policy to respond to increasing threats in the immediate neighborhood, with Turkey starting to use hard power and its military beyond its borders.

Over the past decade, Turkey struck deals with Somalia, Libya, Ethiopia, Niger, and Togo for jointly training troops and developing military programs. In Syria, Turkish armed forces trained and supported opposition groups in the northwest, helping to centralize them into the Syrian National Army (SNA). To prevent the establishment of an autonomous Syrian Kurdish state on its borders, Turkish troops, together with the SNA, held several military operations against the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK)—labeled a terrorist organization by the United States and the European Union—and its Syrian offshoot, the People’s Defense Units (YPG). As a result of these operations, areas overseen by the Syrian Interim Government are now assisted by the Turkey-backed SNA through an array of different bases and posts.

Additionally, Turkey sent its troops to and supported other groups in military operations in Libya, helping the internationally recognized government in its struggle against strongman Khalifa Belqasim Haftar. Ankara also sent drones to and advised Azeri military personnel in operational planning and command to back them in their fight against Armenia in the second Nagorno-Karabakh war; Turkey and Azerbaijan also held more than twenty joint military exercises in 2022. Following the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Turkish drones helped Ukrainian forces keep Kyiv while the West was still proposing assistance to Ukraine to evacuate the city. Turkey has also been continuing operations in northern Iraq against PKK/YPG targets and Iran-supported groups.

Currently, Turkey’s power projection outside its borders can also be seen in its growing number of military posts and bases. Since 1974, Turkey has maintained a Cyprus Turkish Peace Command with more than forty thousand troops in the north. There are around forty different Turkish posts on the Turkey-Iraq and Iran-Iraq borders in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq. In 2015, Turkey announced that it would be opening its first base abroad (in Qatar); yet the biggest Turkish military base is one in Somalia (built in 2017), where Turkish armed forces train Somali armed forces and are currently structuring them with the hopes of reconstituting the army.

In addition, Turkey has also contributed peacekeeping troops and established a military presence as part of programs with the United Nations, European Union, and NATO. This is the case in the Balkans (Albania, Kosovo, and Bosnia and Herzegovina), in Lebanon, in African countries (South Sudan, Sudan, the Democratic Republic of Congo, the Central African Republic, Mali, and Somalia), and in Afghanistan.

Turkey’s broader foreign policy—from its efforts to increase its diplomatic agency to its striving for energy independence—has also played a role in helping the country evolve from a small state and into a rising middle power. For example, by ramping up arms production (especially of unmanned aerial vehicles) Turkey carved out for itself a role as a key player in arms exports and, therefore, the global defense ecosystem writ large. Turkey’s rise to middle-power status can also be seen in its eagerness to play a leading role in mediation efforts among conflicting parties, such as with the Black Sea Grain Initiative, and its worldwide humanitarian diplomacy efforts, best illustrated by the high level of humanitarian aid it gives (it is the top donor country globally, when considering the aid in relation to gross domestic product) and the number of refugees it hosts (more than any other country).

On Turkey’s one-hundredth anniversary, the West would be wise to recognize how Turkey has become a frontrunner in a group of middle powers that is “increasingly influential, self-confident, and independent.” If the West is to contend with this new era, in which middle powers have increased influence on the global stage, it must consider the needs and concerns of these countries—and especially the wants and priorities of such a close partner and NATO ally as Turkey.

Pınar Dost is a nonresident fellow at Atlantic Council IN TURKEY and a historian of international relations. She is also the former deputy director of Atlantic Council IN TURKEY. She is an associated researcher with the French Institute for Anatolian Studies and the author of Le bon dictateur: L’image de Mustafa Kemal Atatürk en France (1939-1938) (Libra, 2014). Follow her on X (formerly known as Twitter): @pdosting.

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Speaking in Kyiv, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy underlined the significance of beginning negotiations on EU membership before the end of the current year, calling it a “top priority” for Ukraine. “If we can get rid of gray geopolitical zones, we must do so,” he stated on October 24 during a video address to EU colleagues.

The start of official talks would not make future Ukrainian EU membership a formality. Indeed, negotiations could conceivably last for many years with the potential for major obstacles along the way. Nevertheless, the opening of negotiations would represent significant progress for Ukraine and would enable Kyiv to accelerate a geopolitical process that has repeatedly left Ukrainians frustrated or disillusioned for almost two decades.

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

Discussions over a possible EU-Ukraine association agreement first began following Ukraine’s landmark 2004 Orange Revolution, a popular uprising that represented the country’s first post-independence attempt to exit the Kremlin orbit and reintegrate with the wider European community. By 2013, both Ukraine and the European Union were poised to sign off on a deal that would take the bilateral relationship to a new level. However, Russia intervened at the eleventh hour, forcing Ukraine’s then president Viktor Yanukovych to perform a dramatic U-turn.

Thousands rallied in downtown Kyiv against Yanukovych’s decision. When they were brutally dispersed by riot police, these street protests escalated into a national uprising. What became known as the Euromaidan Revolution lasted from November 2013 until February 2014. By the time it was over, dozens of Ukrainians had been killed and Yanukovych had fled to Russia. Days later, Russian troops invaded Crimea and began a war that would eventually lead to the full-scale invasion of February 2022.

Throughout the past decade of escalating military hostilities with Russia, EU membership has become something of a talisman for Ukrainians, symbolizing their commitment to a democratic form of government and a European future. At a time when the Putin regime’s imperial aggression has poisoned attitudes toward Russia, more and more Ukrainians have embraced their country’s quest to join the European Union, with polls now consistently indicating 80 percent support or higher.

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Ukraine’s advance in Kursk: What’s next and implications

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Following the Euromaidan Revolution, Ukraine initially struggled to make any major progress in its bid to move closer to the European Union. The much-hyped EU-Ukraine Association Agreement was duly signed in summer 2014, but this highly technical document was then implemented in stages over the coming few years, leaving many observers distinctly underwhelmed. The only truly historic breakthrough came in summer 2017, when Ukrainians were granted visa-free access to the EU, ending years of widely resented visa restrictions that had often served as a physical barrier to European integration.

Ukraine’s EU membership bid has gained considerable momentum in the twenty months since the onset of Russia’s full-scale invasion. Four days after the start of the invasion, President Zelenskyy made headlines by signing an official application to join the EU. This clear stance on Ukraine’s European future was echoed by EU leaders, who were among the first to visit the Ukrainian capital during the early months of the war. In June 2022, Ukraine was granted official EU candidate country status in a move that was hailed as “historic” in both Brussels and Kyiv.

This week’s news of the latest potential milestone toward future Ukrainian EU membership comes at a time when Ukraine’s European partners are playing an increasingly prominent role in the international coalition supporting the country’s efforts to resist Russia’s ongoing invasion. By September 2023, Europe had “clearly overtaken the United States in promised aid to Ukraine.” In early October, this commitment was underlined when all 27 EU foreign ministers traveled to Kyiv in an unprecedented show of support for Ukraine.

Even if Ukraine moves closer to joining the European Union in the coming weeks, Kyiv will still need to win the war against Russia and reach comprehensive security agreements that will deter the Kremlin from repeating the current invasion. Few believe the EU is capable of providing such guarantees. Even so, further progress toward future EU membership will bring a range of practical advantages while providing Ukrainians with a timely morale boost and a clear indication that their country is moving in the right direction.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

Further reading

UkraineAlert Oct 19, 2023

Zelenskyy should say a Churchillian “no” to wartime elections in Ukraine

By Alan Riley

If Winston Churchill were still with us, he would surely be advising Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy to ignore mounting international pressure to call elections in wartime Ukraine, writes Alan Riley.

Civil Society Conflict

UkraineAlert Oct 4, 2023

Putin’s fleet retreats: Ukraine is winning the Battle of the Black Sea

By Peter Dickinson

Putin was already struggling to account for his army’s evident inability to conquer a nation that he insists does not exist. He must now also explain how his once vaunted Black Sea Fleet is being defeated by a country without a navy, writes Peter Dickinson.

Conflict Defense Technologies

UkraineAlert Oct 24, 2023

Battle of Avdiivka: Putin’s new offensive continues despite heavy Russian losses

By Olivia Yanchik

Russia has returned to the offensive in Ukraine in recent weeks with a major assault on the town of Avdiivka. The Russian offensive continues despite reports of catastrophic losses, underlining Putin’s determination to secure victory at any price in Ukraine, writes Olivia Yanchik.

Conflict Defense Policy

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

Read more from UkraineAlert

UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia and Central Asia in the East.

Learn more

The post Ukraine’s EU membership bid set to receive big boost in November appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Civil Network OPORA, a Ukrainian civil society group focused on elections and democracy, together with the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) in Ukraine, recently unveiled a roadmap for timely and critical electoral reforms that Ukraine can and should pursue now. They build upon and are intended to expand Ukraine’s significant electoral progress to date. Advancing these reforms now would ensure that postwar elections are minimally disruptive to Ukraine’s recovery and European Union membership ambitions, while building on Ukraine’s significant electoral progress to date.

The challenges facing Ukraine should not be underestimated. The country must address key electoral reform priorities such as developing and implementing measures to fully enfranchise the millions of forcibly displaced voters in Ukraine and abroad. An election that effectively excludes millions of displaced voters risks potential questions around the legitimacy of future elected representatives and Ukraine’s commitment to inclusive electoral democracy for all its citizens.

It is also important to further strengthen Ukraine’s electoral system for parliamentary elections by removing loopholes for political corruption and tightening campaign finance regulations. If the regulation of money in politics is insufficient, it will keep the door open for illicit influence from Russia and from domestic oligarchs. That door needs to be effectively shut.

Another critical change will be replacing the current framework that pegs representation in parliament to the turnout of regions rather than to the size of the population in the regions. If Ukraine’s next parliament is represented in proportion to local turnouts, Ukrainians in the east and south of the country may be gravely underrepresented and alienated from the political process. Future elected representatives should represent the entire nation, not only the voters who turn up at polling stations on election day.

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

The stakes could not be higher for getting postwar elections right in Ukraine. A failed election can jeopardize all other areas of reform, from combating corruption to advancing the rule of law and beyond.

Among its broader prewar electoral reform successes, Ukraine’s peaceful and well-administered transitions of power, notably parliamentary and presidential elections in 2019 and local elections in 2020, were regarded by international observation missions as demonstrating considerable progress. The European Parliament, Freedom House, and The Economist’s Democracy Index all recognized these elections as core indicators of the nation’s democracy.

While elections are currently on pause, and with good reason, Ukraine anticipates a torrent of elections once Russia’s all-out war of aggression ends. By prioritizing electoral reform now, Ukraine can lay the groundwork for a postwar era that is not just about recovery but also about resurgence, resilience, modernization, and a renewed commitment to the democratic ideals that define today’s Ukrainian nation and its fight for freedom.

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Ukraine’s advance in Kursk: What’s next and implications

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The sooner electoral reforms are initiated, the better. Meaningful and inclusive reform takes time. The Council of Europe’s Venice Commission recommends at least 12 months between major electoral reforms and election day. Experts, civil society, government, and lawmakers need time to convene, discuss, write, check, test, amend, adopt, and implement.

If reform is not conducted now, Ukrainian lawmakers will be forced to rush through significant reforms after the war. A hurried process will likely be neither transparent nor inclusive. With electoral reforms ready and refined, Ukraine can swiftly move toward holding free and fair elections and transition from wartime governance to democratic civilian rule.

A sufficient gap between reforms and election day ensures that political parties (including emerging political parties) and candidates have enough time to adjust to new rules. Voters inside and outside of Ukraine will also need time to update themselves on how, where, and when to register and vote, functions that will evolve given the need to enfranchise millions of forcibly displaced Ukrainians inside and outside the country. This is important as it will ensure that all citizens, including women who are disproportionately represented among the forcibly displaced, and all the Ukrainian men and women serving in the military, will have a say in the future of their country.

Notably, Ukraine will also need to train tens of thousands of election administrators, members of law enforcement, judges, observers, staff at its diplomatic missions, and other stakeholders on election procedures that will need to change. Prioritizing electoral reform now will position Ukraine for postwar democratic resilience and will underscore the nation’s dedication to sustaining and improving its democratic traditions, even in the face of great adversity.

Peter Erben is the principal advisor for IFES and senior country director for IFES Ukraine. Gio Kobakhidze is the deputy country director for IFES Ukraine.

Further reading

UkraineAlert Oct 9, 2023

Russian imperialism shapes public support for the war against Ukraine

By Neringa Klumbytė

Modern Russia retains an imperialistic ideology that is fueling strong public support for the war in Ukraine amid deep-rooted perceptions of Ukrainians as misguided younger siblings in need of correction, writes Neringa Klumbytė.

Civil Society Conflict

UkraineAlert Oct 17, 2023

Ukraine receives potentially game-changing long-range US missiles

By Peter Dickinson

Ukraine has finally received long-range ATACMS missiles from the United States and has begun deploying them against Russian targets, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy announced on October 17.

Conflict Defense Industry

UkraineAlert Oct 16, 2023

The state of Russia’s war on Ukraine as it nears 2024

By Mykola Bielieskov

The current fighting season is still far from over in Ukraine, but it is already clear that the war unleashed by Putin in February 2022 will continue into the coming year, writes Mykola Bielieskov.

Conflict Defense Industry

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

Read more from UkraineAlert

UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia and Central Asia in the East.

Learn more