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The Kremlin is cutting Russia’s last information ties to the outside world

Mercedes Sapuppo — Thu, 15 Aug 2024 20:02:49 +0000

On August 8, millions of Russian internet users found that they were no longer able to access YouTube. This disruption was widely interpreted as the latest step toward blocking the popular video sharing site in Russia, where it has served since 2022 as one of the last remaining platforms connecting Russian audiences to the outside world.

Russians first began reporting significantly slower YouTube loading speeds in the weeks preceding the August shutdown. Officials in Moscow claimed this was the result of technical problems, but the Kremlin has also recently signaled its mounting dissatisfaction with YouTube. In July, Russian media regulator Roskomnadzor called on Google’s CEO to restore over 200 pro-Kremlin YouTube channels that had been blocked for violations. Meanwhile, the Russian Foreign Ministry has accused the platform of carrying out “the political directives of Washington.”

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The recent crackdown on YouTube is the latest milestone in a war against free speech in Russia that began when Vladimir Putin came to power in 2000. During the 1990s, the Russian media sector had briefly flourished amid unprecedented freedoms. One of Putin’s first major acts as president was to reverse this trend and reassert Kremlin control over Russia’s mainstream media.

The Russian authorities have continued to expand their campaign against the country’s shrinking independent media sector for much of the past two decades. Following the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the Kremlin moved to block or restrict major Western social media platforms such as Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram. These measures were imposed in parallel to Orwellian new restrictions banning any references to “war” and forcing Russian media outlets to refer to the invasion of Ukraine as a “special military operation.”

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Recent steps to limit access to YouTube are seen as somewhat risky due to the video sharing platform’s status as the most popular social media site in Russia. Indeed, it came as no surprise when the apparent shutdown of YouTube sparked significant alarm and anger on Russian social media. Notably, no genuine alternative currently exists in Russia. The Kremlin has promoted similar domestic platforms such as VK Video and RuTube, but these options have not been able to rival the popularity or audience reach of YouTube itself.

There are additional indications that the Kremlin may now be seeking to strengthen its control over the information space and further cut Russia off from the outside world. On August 9, Roskomnadzor blocked access to Signal, a messaging app that allows for end-to-end encrypted communications. Reports also continue to circulate that the Kremlin is preparing to take similar steps against messenger platform WhatsApp.

Recent measures to prevent Russians from accessing YouTube represent the latest escalation in the Kremlin’s campaign to dominate the domestic information space and eliminate all independent media in today’s Russia. Over the past twenty-four years, Vladimir Putin has created a powerful propaganda machine that has proved instrumental in legitimizing his own increasingly dictatorial rule and mobilizing public support for the invasion of Ukraine. Popular social media platforms like YouTube remain outside of Moscow’s control and therefore pose a significant threat to the Kremlin censors. With Ukrainian troops now advancing inside Russia itself, it would seem that this threat can no longer be tolerated.

Mercedes Sapuppo is a program assistant at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

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Ukraine’s political leaders have been unusually tight-lipped about the entire offensive, providing no hint in advance and saying very little during the first week of the campaign. This is in stark contrast to the approach adopted last year, when the country’s coming summer offensive was widely referenced by officials and previewed in the media. Ukraine’s efforts to enforce operational silence appear to have also extended to the military. According to The New York Times, even senior Ukrainian commanders only learned of the plan to invade Russia at the last moment.

Ukraine’s Kursk offensive appears to have been a major surprise for Ukraine’s Western partners. The Financial Times has reported that neither the US nor Germany were informed in advance of the planned Ukrainian operation. Given the West’s record of seeking to avoid any actions that might provoke Putin, it is certainly not difficult to understand why Kyiv might have chosen not to signal its intentions.

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It is also likely that Ukraine benefited from Russia’s own complacency and overconfidence. Despite suffering a series of defeats in Ukraine since 2022, the Kremlin remains almost pathologically dismissive of Ukrainian capabilities and does not appear to have seriously entertained the possibility of a large-scale Ukrainian invasion of the Russian Federation. The modest defenses established throughout the border zone confirm that Moscow anticipated minor border raids but had no plans to repel a major Ukrainian incursion.

Russia’s sense of confidence doubtless owed much to Western restrictions imposed on Ukraine since the start of the war that have prohibited the use of Western weapons inside Russia. These restrictions were partially relaxed in May 2024 following Russia’s own cross-border offensive into Ukraine’s Kharkiv Oblast, but the Kremlin clearly did not believe Kyiv would be bold enough to use this as the basis for offensive operations inside Russia. Vladimir Putin is now paying a steep price for underestimating his opponent.

It remains far too early to assess the impact of Ukraine’s surprise summer offensive. One of the most interesting questions will be whether Ukraine can force the Kremlin to divert military units from the fighting in eastern Ukraine in order to defend Russia itself. Much will depend on the amount of Russian land Ukraine is able to seize and hold. Putin must also decide whether his military should focus on merely stopping Ukraine’s advance or liberating occupied Russian territory.

Ukraine’s Kursk offensive has succeeded in demonstrating that surprise is still possible on the modern battlefield. This is a significant achievement that underlines the skill and competence of the Ukrainian military. The Ukrainian invasion has also confirmed once again that Putin’s talk of Russian red lines and his frequent threats of nuclear escalation are a bluff designed to intimidate the West. Taken together, these factors should be enough to convince Kyiv’s partners that now is the time to increase military support and provide Ukraine with the tools for victory.

Mykola Bielieskov is a research fellow at the National Institute for Strategic Studies and a senior analyst at Ukrainian NGO “Come Back Alive.” The views expressed in this article are the author’s personal position and do not reflect the opinions or views of NISS or Come Back Alive.

The future of digital transformation and workforce development in Latin America and the Caribbean

Isabel Chiriboga, Maite Gonzalez Latorre, Diego Area — Thu, 08 Aug 2024 14:00:00 +0000

The sixth of a six-part series following up on the Ninth Summit of the Americas commitments.

An initiative led by the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center in partnership with the US Department of State continues to focus on facilitating greater constructive exchange among multisectoral thought leaders and government leaders as they work to implement commitments made at the ninth Summit of the Americas. This readout was informed by a private, information-gathering roundtable and several one-on-one conversations with leading experts in the digital space.

Executive summary

At the ninth Summit of the Americas, regional leaders agreed on the adoption of a Regional Agenda for Digital Transformation that reaffirmed the need for a dynamic and resilient digital ecosystem that promotes digital inclusion for all peoples. The COVID-19 pandemic exacerbated the digital divide globally, but these gaps were shown to be deeper in developing countries, disproportionately affecting women, children, persons with disabilities, and other vulnerable and/or marginalized individuals. Through this agenda, inclusive workforce development remains a key theme as an avenue to help bridge the digital divide and skills gap across the Americas.

As part of the Atlantic Council’s consultative process, thought leaders and practitioners evaluated progress made in the implementation of the Regional Agenda for Digital Transformation agreed on at the Summit of Americas, resulting in three concrete recommendations: (1) leverage regional alliances and intraregional cooperation mechanisms to accelerate implementation of the agenda; (2) strengthen public-private partnerships and multisectoral coordination to ensure adequate financing for tailored capacity-building programs, the expansion of digital infrastructure, and internet access; and (3) prioritize the involvement of local youth groups and civil society organizations, given their on-the-ground knowledge and role as critical indicators of implementation.

Recommendations for advancing digitalization and workforce development in the Americas:

Leverage regional alliances and intraregional cooperation mechanisms to accelerate implementation of the agenda.

Establish formal partnerships between governments and local and international universities to broaden affordable student access to exchange programs, internships, and capacity-building sessions in emerging fields such as artificial intelligence and cybersecurity. Programs should be tailored to country-specific economic interests and sectors such as agriculture, manufacturing, and tourism. Tailoring these programs can also help enhance students’ access to the labor market upon graduation.
Ensure existing and new digital capacity-building programs leverage diaspora professionals. Implement virtual workshops, webinars, and collaborative projects that transfer knowledge and skills from technologically advanced regions to local communities. Leveraging these connections will help ensure programs are contextually relevant and effective.
Build on existing intraregional cooperation mechanisms and alliances to incorporate commitments of the Regional Agenda for Digital Transformation. Incorporating summit commitments to mechanisms such as the Alliance for Development in Democracy, the Americas Partnership for Economic Prosperity, the Caribbean Community and Common Market, and other subregional partnerships can result in greater sustainability of commitments as these alliances tend to transcend finite political agendas.
Propose regional policies to standardize the recognition of digital nomads and remote workers, including visa programs, tax incentives, and employment regulations. This harmonization will facilitate job creation for young professionals and enhance regional connectivity.

Prioritize workforce development for traditionally marginalized groups by strengthening public-private partnerships and multisectoral collaboration.

Establish periodic and open dialogues between the public and private sectors to facilitate the implementation of targeted digital transformation for key sectors of a country’s economy that can enhance and modernize productivity. For instance, provide farmers with digital tools for precision agriculture, train health care workers in telemedicine technologies, and support tourism operators in developing online marketing strategies.
Foster direct lines of communication with multilateral organizations such as the Inter-American Development Bank and the World Bank. Engaging in periodic dialogues with these actors will minimize duplication of efforts and maximize the impact of existing strategies and lines of work devoted to creating digital societies that are more resilient and inclusive. Existing and new programs should be paired with employment opportunities and competitive salaries for marginalized groups based on the acquired skills, thereby creating strong incentives to pursue education in digital skills.
Collaborate with telecommunications companies to offer subsidized internet packages for low-income households and small businesses and simplify regulatory frameworks to attract investment in rural and underserved areas, expanding internet coverage and accessibility.
Enhance coordination with private sector and multilateral partners to create a joint road map for sustained financing of digital infrastructure and workforce development to improve investment conditions in marginalized and traditionally excluded regions and cities.

Increase engagement with local youth groups and civil society organizations to help ensure digital transformation agendas are viable and in line with local contexts.

Facilitate periodic dialogues with civil society organizations, the private sector , and government officials and ensure that consultative meetings are taking place at remote locations to ensure participation from disadvantaged populations in the digital space. Include women, children, and persons with disabilities to ensure capacity programs are generating desired impact and being realigned to address challenges faced by key, targeted communities.
Work with local actors such as youth groups and civil society organizations to conduct widespread awareness campaigns to help communities visualize the benefits of digital skills and technology use. Utilize success stories and case studies to show how individuals and businesses can thrive in a digital economy, fostering a culture of innovation and adaptation.
Invest in local innovation ecosystems by providing grants and incentives for start-ups and small businesses working on digital solutions. Create business incubators and accelerators to support the growth of digital enterprises, particularly those addressing local challenges.
Offer partnership opportunities with governments to provide seed capital, contests, digital boot camps, and mentorship sessions specifically designed for girls and women in school or college to help bridge the gender digital divide.

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Russia’s Black Sea defeats get flushed down Vladimir Putin’s memory hole

Peter Dickinson — Tue, 06 Aug 2024 13:51:05 +0000

There was much pomp and pageantry on display recently in former Russian imperial capital Saint Petersburg as Vladimir Putin presided over the country’s annual Navy Day festivities. In truth, however, Putin and his assembled admirals had very little to celebrate. Over the past year, Russia’s once-vaunted Black Sea Fleet has been decimated by Ukrainian drones and missiles in what must rank as the most remarkable series of naval defeats in modern military history.

Despite barely having a navy of its own, Ukraine has managed to sink or severely damage approximately one-third of Putin’s fleet, forcing the bulk of his remaining warships to retreat from occupied Crimea. The war at sea has gone so badly for Russia that by spring 2024, Britain’s Ministry of Defense was already declaring the Black Sea Fleet “functionally inactive.”

The details of this year’s Russian Navy Day program provided some hints of the inglorious reality behind Moscow’s efforts to project naval strength. Tellingly, the traditional parade of Russian warships along the Neva River to the Kronstadt naval base, which usually serves as the centerpiece of the entire holiday, was canceled due to security concerns. In its place, a reduced flotilla took part in a significantly scaled down event that featured around half as many vessels as in previous years.

Despite being by far the smallest Russian Navy Day since the holiday was reinstated in 2017, this year’s event nevertheless represented an excellent opportunity for Putin to honor Russia’s fallen sailors and vow retribution for the country’s unprecedented losses in the Black Sea. In fact, he did nothing of the sort. Throughout his official address, Putin barely mentioned the casualties suffered or the sacrifices made by the Russian Navy during the invasion of Ukraine. Instead, the Kremlin dictator preferred to flush Russia’s Black Sea defeats down the memory hole. He was aided by the loyal Russian media, which carefully avoided any awkward references to the disaster that has befallen the country’s Black Sea Fleet.

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All this brings to mind an old Soviet joke that begins with Napoleon, Julius Caesar, and Alexander the Great looking down from heaven at a Red Army parade on Red Square. Caesar indicates the endless rows of Soviet troops and says, “with so many men, I could have held Germania.” Alexander points to the tanks and missiles and declares, “with such weapons of war, I could have conquered all India.” Napoleon, meanwhile, completely ignores the parade and is instead engrossed in a copy of Pravda. “If I had such a newspaper,” he proclaims, “nobody would have heard of Waterloo.”

Many Soviet jokes have not aged well, but this particular punchline remains as relevant as ever in modern Russia, where Putin has succeeded in creating a propaganda machine every bit as potent as its Soviet predecessor. Today’s Kremlin-controlled multimedia ecosystem is far more sophisticated than its Communist forerunner, but it serves the same basic function of bending reality to suit the whims of Russia’s ruling elite.

For the past decade, Putin has used this unrivaled information weapon to fuel the biggest European invasion since World War II. Kremlin propagandists have managed to convince millions of ordinary Russians that democratic Ukraine is actually a “Nazi state” whose very existence poses an intolerable threat to Russia. Ukrainians have been demonized and dehumanized to such an extent that genocidal anti-Ukrainian rhetoric is now a routine feature on prime time Russian TV.

The success of these efforts is all too apparent, with a wide range of opinion polls, research, and anecdotal evidence pointing to consistently high levels of Russian public support for the invasion. Meanwhile, there is no meaningful anti-war movement in the country, despite widespread knowledge of the horrors taking place in neighboring Ukraine. This is not surprising. After all, as Voltaire once warned, those who can make you believe absurdities can make you commit atrocities.

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Putin’s ability to distort Russian reality is genuinely terrifying, but the sheer scale of his propaganda operation could also inadvertently offer hope for the future. Many commentators have argued that failure in Ukraine would lead to the fall of the Putin regime and quite possibly the breakup of Russia itself, but these concerns may be exaggerated. While a third Russian collapse in a little over a century cannot be ruled out, the experience of the past two-and-a-half years gives good cause to believe that Moscow’s disinformation industry is more than capable of rebranding any future retreat from Ukraine in a favorable light, or of burying it completely. In other words, if the Russian media can manufacture a major war, it can also fabricate a suitably plausible peace.

Anyone who still doubts the Kremlin’s capacity to whitewash military defeat in Ukraine hasn’t been paying attention. We have recently witnessed Putin hosting the biggest naval event of the year while studiously ignoring the historic humbling of his southern fleet. It was the same story in 2022, when he ceremoniously announced that Kherson had joined Russia “forever,” only to order his beaten troops to abandon the city just weeks later. Likewise, when Russia lost the Battle of Kyiv during the initial phase of the invasion, the Kremlin refused to acknowledge defeat and absurdly insisted that the retreat from northern Ukraine was a mere “goodwill gesture.” If Putin is eventually forced to end his invasion, it seems safe to assume he will downplay this humiliation in similar fashion.

Since February 2022, Western leaders have found numerous reasons to limit their support for Ukraine. Some are restricted by modest defense budgets and competing domestic priorities. Most are afraid of possible escalation and have allowed themselves to be intimidated by Putin’s talk of Russian red lines. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy says many of his country’s Western partners are also reluctant to arm Ukraine because they fear the unpredictable geopolitical consequences of a Russian defeat. This Western alarm over a possible Russian collapse is exaggerated and fails to account for the power of Putin’s propaganda.

If Russia suffers a decisive defeat in Ukraine, past experience indicates that the Kremlin will almost certainly seek to move the goalposts, change the narrative, or devise some other way of rewriting history and claiming victory. Any embarrassing evidence of failure would simply be flushed down the memory hole, along with all the sunken Russian warships of the Black Sea Fleet.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

Latour’s point was underscored by those released with Evan: two other Americans wrongfully detained—journalist Alsu Kurmasheva and former US Marine Paul Whelan—as well as Russian political dissident and Pulitzer Prize winner Vladimir Kara-Murza, among others. In exchange, a contemptible lot, including a convicted murderer and several hackers and spies, was welcomed back to Russia by President Vladimir Putin.

Watch Latour’s full speech below:

Evan’s resilience and steadfastness are testament to the courage of journalists worldwide who take risks every day in service to freer societies. In partnership with Adrienne Arsht, the Atlantic Council has been proud to champion Evan’s cause through our “Reporters at Risk” series, which highlights those dangers and underscores the importance of supporting their critical work.

The Atlantic Council remains committed to press freedom and defending the safety of reporters at risk like Evan. As a twenty-five-year veteran of the Wall Street Journal, I welcome him home as a colleague. On behalf of the Atlantic Council, we commit ourselves to defending the freedoms he and reporters like him around the world represent.

Evan Gershkovich’s parents, Mikhail and Ella, meet with German Chancellor Olaf Scholz, Wall Street Journal Publisher Almar Latour, Atlantic Council Executive Vice Chair Adrienne Arsht, and Atlantic Council President and CEO Frederick Kempe at the Atlantic Council Global Citizen Awards, September 28, 2023.

Frederick Kempe is president and chief executive officer of the Atlantic Council. You can follow him on Twitter: @FredKempe.

This edition is part of Frederick Kempe’s Inflection Points Today newsletter, a column of quick-hit insights on a world in transition. To receive this newsletter throughout the week, sign up here.

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Experts react: What to know about the release of Evan Gershkovich and others held by Russia

Atlantic Council experts — Thu, 01 Aug 2024 19:35:18 +0000

They’re coming home. On Thursday, Russia and the West carried out a massive prisoner swap in Ankara, Turkey, that saw Moscow free American journalists Evan Gershkovich and Alsu Kurmasheva, former US Marine Paul Whelan, and Russian political dissidents Vladimir Kara-Murza and llya Yashin, among others. In exchange, Western countries released eight Russian prisoners, including convicted Russian assassin Vadim Krasikov, who had been imprisoned in Germany. US President Joe Biden called the deal, which involved Germany, Poland, Turkey, Norway, and Slovenia, “a feat of diplomacy and friendship.” Below, our experts explain who was freed, the implications of their release, and what the prisoner exchange says about Russian President Vladimir Putin’s use of domestic oppression to gain leverage against the West.

Click to jump to an expert analysis:

John E. Herbst: Putin’s motivation for hostage trades is personal

Mercedes Sapuppo: The prisoner releases are historic—but the Kremlin’s strategy hasn’t changed

Hanna Liubakova: German national’s case reveals Belarus’s hostage-taking tactics

Brian Whitmore: This wasn’t a Cold War prisoner swap, but rather a negotiation with a crime syndicate

Putin’s motivation for hostage trades is personal

Today’s news is a truly extraordinary event: a large prisoner exchange involving twenty-four captives in seven countries. Russia and Belarus released sixteen prisoners; and the United States, Germany, Poland, Norway, and Slovenia sent eight back to Russia. Those released by Moscow include three Americans held essentially as hostages on trumped-up charges—businessman Whelan and journalists Gershkovich and Kurmasheva—and political prisoners Kara-Murza and Yashin. Belarus released Rico Krieger, a German convicted of “terrorism” in Belarus, who was sentenced to death but then pardoned by Lukashenka’s regime. The most notable prisoner released to Russia is Krasikov, a Kremlin operative who murdered a Chechen activist in Germany.

Two constants drove this deal. The first is Putin’s great interest in securing the release of Russian spies and provocateurs captured and jailed in the West. When he succeeded in trading American basketball player Brittney Griner for Viktor Bout with the United States in December 2022, Putin’s highest priority became the release of Krasikov from Germany. When Putin gave up Griner, he still had Whelan as a hostage for future trades with the United States. Then he added Gershkovich in March 2023 for additional trade bait and Kurmasheva this past spring. The second constant is the Biden administration’s interest in securing the release of all Americans unfairly detained by Moscow. After the Griner-Bout exchange, US efforts to secure the freedom of Whelan and then Gershkovich foundered on the refusal of Germany to include Krasikov—Putin’s prime objective—in any trade.

These constants alone do not explain this deal. The new factor was the arrest of Krieger in Belarus last fall. This gave Berlin a reason to consider releasing Krasikov. Germany’s willingness to do so likely set in motion a long negotiation that led to today’s news. The final deal also gave Putin back Russian operatives in Norway, Poland, and Slovenia; and provided an opportunity to free prominent Russian opposition figures Kara-Murza and Yashin.

It is notable that sixteen prisoners moved West and only eight east. But, as we know from the lopsided trade that sent 215 Ukrainian prisoners of war home in exchange for Putin-favorite Viktor Medvedchuk and others in the fall of 2022, there are times when Putin’s interest in a particular captive persuades him to make an uneven trade.

Still, Putin has the tactical advantage of being able to grab additional hostages from Americans and other Western visitors in Russia. One way for the West to reduce this nasty advantage would be to lower the evidentiary requirements for holding spies from Russia and other US adversaries.

—John E. Herbst is the senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center and a former US ambassador to Ukraine.

The prisoner releases are historic—but the Kremlin’s strategy hasn’t changed

The news that Gershkovich, Kurmasheva, Whelan, Kara-Murza, and Yashin—along with other human rights activists and innocent civilians—have been released from Russia in a prisoner swap is historic. For those now free who were wrongfully detained on contrived and false charges and bravely endured the conditions of Russian detention, today is hugely celebratory. It is also a good day for their families and for all who have been advocating for their freedom, including the Biden-Harris administration. The swap released many who suffered unjustly and marks a positive day for independent media and press freedom.

The timing of this swap—and its scope—indicates that Putin thought it was time to cash out the bargaining chips that he had illegally collected to leverage against the West in the form of innocent Americans and Russian activists. However, it does not suggest that the Kremlin will pull back on its malign tactics of aggression against Ukraine as well as the United States and its allies, and Putin is by no means walking away empty-handed: Russia will welcome home convicted murderers, spies, hackers, fraudsters, and smugglers.

What this swap demonstrates on the Kremlin’s strategic front is a twisted and self-serving pragmatism that is unlikely to translate into a deescalation of Russia’s violence in Ukraine, nor into a new appreciation for international norms. Putin is still a war criminal, and he is still bolstering his autocratic alliances abroad. The drive demonstrated by global leaders and advocates pushing for the release of these unjustly detained journalists and activists should not be the end. Rather, it should be only the beginning of continued work to defeat Putin in Ukraine and deter his aggression, which includes the imprisonment of Ukrainian civilians and soldiers being kept in harrowing conditions in temporarily occupied areas of Ukraine.

—Mercedes Sapuppo is a program assistant at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

German national’s case reveals Belarus’s hostage-taking tactics

The prisoner swap story between Russia and Western countries took an unexpected turn with Belarusian dictator Alyaksandr Lukashenka’s involvement. Krieger, a German national sentenced to death in Belarus, was among the Western prisoners released in Thursday’s exchange. His case gained attention following his pardon on July 30. The unusual circumstances surrounding Krieger’s sentencing had sparked speculation that the Minsk regime was positioning itself for a high-profile prisoner exchange.

Shortly after the pardon, Lukashenka’s spokesperson indicated that Minsk was open to negotiations regarding Krieger, stating that various “proposals” had been made. This suggested that the pardon was a strategic maneuver to facilitate discussions with Germany. Krieger’s exchange demonstrated the Belarusian regime’s manipulative tactics, with speculation arising that he was swapped for Krasikov, a Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) assassin imprisoned in Germany.

Krieger was arrested in Belarus in October for allegedly acting as a mercenary and planting explosives. He appeared in a propaganda video, claiming he wanted to fight in Ukraine but was directed to a mission in Belarus. However, the inconsistencies in the video raise doubts about his claims.

The regime’s actions—capturing a foreigner, sentencing him to death, and then negotiating his release—resemble hostage-taking tactics. While Russia may have reclaimed some of its agents in part through Krieger’s exchange, Lukashenka seems to be sacrificing his relationship with Germany to support Putin’s interests. This mirrors Lukashenka’s previous concessions to Russia, including offering Belarusian territory for the invasion of Ukraine, despite his people’s opposition, or stationing Wagner Group troops in Belarus.

Amid these high-stakes negotiations, the plight of Belarusian political prisoners is often overlooked. Although eighteen political prisoners were released last month, an estimated 1,400 remain imprisoned, many urgently needing medical assistance.

—Hanna Liubakova is a nonresident fellow with the Eurasia Center and a Belarusian journalist.

This wasn’t a Cold War prisoner swap, but rather a negotiation with a crime syndicate

The sweeping prisoner exchange that freed Kurmasheva, Gershkovich, Whelan, and others from Russian captivity was a remarkable diplomatic achievement, and the Biden administration deserves enormous credit for working with the United States’ allies to make it happen. And full disclosure, this one is personal. Two of the released hostages—Kurmasheva, a journalist with whom I worked for more than a decade at Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, and Kara-Murza, a Russian dissident whom I have known for years—are close personal friends. The fact that sixteen hostages of Putin’s regime—including Americans, Germans, British nationals, and Russian political prisoners—are now free is cause for celebration.

That said, we should all use this occasion to reflect on what this prisoner exchange illustrates about the nature of Putin’s Russia. In order to get these hostages released, the United States and its allies needed to free actual criminals who were convicted after receiving the benefit of due process and fair trials in Western courts of law. Among these were a hitman, Krasikov, convicted of an assassination in Germany, and a cybercriminal, Roman Seleznev, who was convicted of bank fraud and identity theft in the United States. This is reminiscent of the United States securing the release of WNBA star and Olympic gold medalist Brittney Griner in exchange for convicted Russian arms trafficker Viktor Bout and swapping US Marine Corps veteran Trevor Reed for Russian drug trafficker Konstantin Yaroshenko back in 2022.

One has to wonder, why does Putin want all these hitmen, cybercriminals, arms traffickers, and drug dealers released? And why is he willing to take Western hostages to do so? The answer is simple: The line between the government and the criminal underworld in Putin’s Russia is so thin that it is nonexistent. As I have argued in the past, the Putin regime is effectively a crime syndicate masquerading as a state. The correct metaphor for this prisoner exchange is not the storied Cold War-era swapping of Western and Soviet spies. Instead, it is the result of an unfortunately necessary hostage negotiation with a criminal and terrorist regime.

—Brian Whitmore is a nonresident senior fellow at the Eurasia Center, an assistant professor of practice at the University of Texas-Arlington, and host of the Power Vertical podcast.

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Reporters at risk: In honor of Evan Gershkovich

Leading journalists discuss risks facing foreign correspondents, resilience in reporting, and global press freedom.

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Paris Olympics: Ukrainian dedicates medal to athletes killed by Russia

Mark Temnycky — Tue, 30 Jul 2024 17:22:56 +0000

Ukrainian fencing star Olga Kharlan won her country’s first medal at the 2024 Paris Olympics on July 29, taking bronze in the women’s saber event. In an emotionally charged statement, Kharlan dedicated her medal to all the Ukrainian athletes “who couldn’t come here because they were killed by Russia.” According to the Ukrainian authorities, a total of 487 Ukrainian athletes have been killed as a result of Russia’s invasion, including numerous former Olympians and future Olympic hopefuls.

Kharlan’s Olympic victory has additional significance for Ukraine as she almost missed out on participating in Paris altogether due to her principled stand over the Russian invasion of her homeland. During the 2023 World Fencing Championship, Kharlan refused to shake hands with a Russian opponent in protest over the war, offering instead to tap blades. The Russian declined this offer and staged a protest of her own, leading to Kharlan’s disqualification and making it virtually impossible for her to take part in the 2024 Olympic Games.

The incident sparked a heated debate over the role of politics in sport and the continued participation of Russian athletes in international events at a time when Russia is conducting Europe’s largest military invasion since World War II. Following a considerable outcry, Kharlan was reinstated and received the personal backing of International Olympic Committee President Thomas Bach, himself a former fencer. Meanwhile, Kharlan’s gesture made her a hero to millions of Ukrainians.

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The controversy over Kharlan’s refusal to shake hands with her Russian opponent has been mirrored elsewhere in the sporting arena, highlighting the complex moral issues facing Ukrainian athletes as they compete internationally while their country is fighting for national survival. Ukrainian tennis star Elina Svitolina in particular has attracted headlines for her decision to avoid handshakes with Russian and Belarusian players.

Some critics have accused Ukrainians of politicizing sport, and have argued against holding individual Russians accountable for crimes committed by the Kremlin. Meanwhile, supporters of Ukrainian protest efforts have noted the Kremlin’s frequent use of sport as a propaganda tool, and have also pointed to the often close links between some Russian athletes and the Putin regime.

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For Ukraine’s Olympic team, participation in this year’s Summer Games is an opportunity to provide their war weary compatriots back home with something to cheer, while also reminding the world of Russia’s ongoing invasion. Since the start of the full-scale invasion in February 2022, many of Ukraine’s Olympic athletes have had to train in exceptionally difficult conditions. Some have been forced to relocate from areas that have fallen under Russian occupation, while all have grown used to the daily trauma of the war and the regular disruption caused by Russian air raids.

Ahead of the Paris Olympics, Olga Kharlan was widely seen as one of Ukraine’s best medal hopes. Born in Mykolaiv, she has been fencing since the age of ten. Prior to the 2024 Olympics, she had already amassed four Olympic medals in a glittering career that has also seen her win six world titles. The thirty-three-year-old Ukrainian star demonstrated her mental strength during the third place playoff in Paris, overcoming South Korea’s Choi Sebin in a dramatic comeback win.

Thanks to her new bronze medal, Kharlan now shares top spot among Ukraine’s leading Olympians with a total of five medals. She claimed her first medal at the Beijing Olympics in 2008 before securing further honors in 2012 and 2016. However, the Ukrainian star says her success in the French capital stands out. “This medal is totally different,” commented Kharlan in Paris this week. “It’s special because it’s for my country. This is a message to all the world that Ukraine will never give up.”

Mark Temnycky is a nonresident fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

Across the government and nongovernment sectors alike, there is considerable variation regarding the definition and scope of information manipulation. For example, the Department of State’s (DOS’s) GEC has an expansive definition, which includes “leveraging propaganda and censorship, promoting digital authoritarianism, exploiting international organizations and bilateral partnerships, pairing cooptation and pressure, and exercising control of Chinese-language media.” Others define it more narrowly as disinformation and propaganda spread by a foreign threat actor in a coordinated, inauthentic manner, and largely occurring on social media platforms.

This variation is a reflection of the holistic and multifaceted nature of Chinese influence. Coercive tactics and influence operations have long been a central part of China’s strategic tool kit and core to how it engages with the outside world. Because China conceives of the information domain as a space that must be controlled and dominated to ensure regime survival, information operations are part of a much bigger umbrella of influence that spans the economic, political, and social domains. It may be more useful to think of information manipulation as existing within the broader conceptual framework of China’s weaponization of the information domain in service of its goal to gain global influence.

As previous work by the Digital Forensic Lab (DFRLab) has shown, China’s approach to the information domain is coordinated and proactive, taking into account the mutually constitutive relationships between the economic, industrial, and geopolitical strategies of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). The aim of its efforts is to gain influence—or “discourse power”—with the ultimate goal of decentering US power and leadership on the global stage. One of the main mechanisms through which the CCP seeks to achieve this objective is by focusing on the dominance of information ecosystems. This ecosystem encompasses not only narratives and content that appear in traditional and social media but also the digital infrastructure on which communication systems rely, the policies that govern those systems at the international level, and the diplomatic strategy deployed by Beijing’s operatives abroad to gain buy-in for the CCP’s vision of the global order.

The DFRLab’s previous two reports, which explored China’s strategy and the impacts of its operations abroad, found that the United States will not be successful in addressing the challenges of Chinese influence if it sees that influence as separate from the interconnected economic, political, and technical domains in which its strategy is embedded.

To this end, the DFRLab hosted a series of one-on-one expert interviews, conducted research and workshops, and held a virtual roundtable discussion with scholars and practitioners with expertise on or experience in addressing authoritarian influence and information operations, US government processes and policies around these issues, and Chinese foreign policy. This issue brief is part of a larger body of work that examines the Chinese government’s interests and capabilities and the impacts of party’s efforts to shape the global information ecosystem. The focus of this report is on how the US government can best respond to those challenges, including the architecture, tools, and strategies that exist for addressing PRC influence and information manipulation, as well as any potential gaps in the government tool kit.

This report finds that, to mount the most effective response to Chinese influence and the threat it poses to democratic interests at home and on the international stage, the United States should develop a global information strategy, one that reflects the interconnected nature of regulatory, industrial, and diplomatic policies with regard to the information domain. A core assumption undergirding this concept is that US policymaking space tends to over-index on the threat of information manipulation in particular while under-indexing on the core national interest of fostering a secure, interoperable information environment on a larger scale.

The limits of understanding Chinese influence as systemic and part of a broader strategy has sometimes led US response to be pigeonholed as an issue of strategic communications, rather than touching on the information and technology ecosystems, among others, where China focuses its information and influence efforts. Responding to Chinese influence with government messaging is not sufficient to address the complex nature of the challenge and places the United States in a position of reactivity.

In short, understanding that the CCP (1) integrates its tech industrial strategy, governance policy, and engagement strategy and (2) connects its approach at home to how it engages abroad, the United States needs to do the same, commensurate with its values. It should not respond tit-for-tat but rather have a collective strategy for a global competition for information that connects its tech strategy to its governance approach to its engagement around the world.

That is not to say that a US strategy on information resilience should mirror China’s, or that such a strategy should be developed in response to the PRC’s actions in the information domain. Nor is it to say that the United States should adopt a similar whole-of-government approach to the information domain. There are silos by design in the US system and important legal and normative foundations for the clear delineation of mission between them. What this issue brief argues for is a strategic breaking down of silos to facilitate proactive action versus a dangerous breaking down of legally required silos.

This report emphasizes that the United States should articulate how major initiatives like the CHIPS and Science Act, regulatory approaches like the recent executive orders on AI and data security, and the DOS’s recent cyberspace and digital policy strategy are part of a cohesive whole and should be understood and operationalized as such.

The strategy should outline what the United States stands for as much as what it is against. This requires that the United States frame its assessment of threat within a broader strategy of what its values are and how those values should be articulated in its regulatory, strategic, and diplomatic initiatives to promote open information environments and shore up information resilience. This includes working with allies and partners to ensure that a free, open, and interoperable internet is a global priority as well as a domestic one; developing common standards for understanding and thresholding foreign influence; and promoting connectivity at home and abroad. One finding of this report is that the United States is already leaning into its strengths and values, including championing policies that support openness and continuing support for civil society. This, along with the awareness of influence operations as the weaponization of the information domain, is a powerful response to authoritarian attacks on the integrity of both the domestic US and global information spaces.

The United States has a core national security interest in the existence of a rules-based, orderly, and open information environment. Such an environment facilitates the essential day-to-day tasks related to public diplomacy, the basic expression of rights, and investment in industries of strategic and economic value. Absent a coherent strategy on these core issues related to the integrity of the United States’ information environment that is grounded in an understanding of the interconnected nature of their constitutive parts, the challenges of foreign influence and interference will only continue to grow. This issue brief contains three sections. For sections one and two, experts in different aspects of the PRC’s information strategy addressed two to three main questions; during the course of research, further points were raised that are included in the findings. Each section represents a synthesis of the views expressed in response to these questions. The third section comprises recommendations for the US government based on the findings from the first two sections.

About the author

Staff

Kenton Thibaut

Senior Resident Fellow, China

Digital Forensic Research Lab

China Disinformation

Putin accused of jailing US journalists as ‘bargaining chips’ for prisoner swap

Mercedes Sapuppo — Tue, 23 Jul 2024 19:14:45 +0000

On July 19, Wall Street Journal reporter and US citizen Evan Gershkovich was sentenced to sixteen years in Russian prison on espionage charges. The same day, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty reporter Alsu Kurmasheva, a journalist who holds dual American-Russian citizenship, was sentenced to six and a half years by a Russian court for supposedly spreading false information about the Russian military. Both trials took place largely behind closed doors under a veil of secrecy.

Gershkovich is the first US journalist to be convicted in Russia on charges of espionage since the Cold War. So far, the Russian authorities have not provided any credible evidence to support their accusations. Kurmasheva was convicted on a charge frequently used by the Kremlin to suppress unfavorable reporting on the realities of Russia’s war in Ukraine.

The imprisonment of two US journalists marks a new escalation in the Kremlin’s confrontation with the West. Wall Street Journal publisher Almar Latour and editor Emma Tucker released a statement calling Gershkovich’s sentence “a disgraceful, sham conviction.” RFE/RL President and CEO Steve Capus deemed Kurmasheva’s conviction “a mockery of justice.”

US citizens Gershkovich and Kurmasheva are now facing the prospect of long prison sentences in extremely harsh conditions. An AP series published earlier this year described the “physical and psychological pressure, sleep deprivation, insufficient food, heath care that is poor or simply denied” and “dizzying set of arbitrary rules” that the pair are likely to encounter in Russian jails. Both journalists have already spent an extended period in pretrial detention.

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The Russian authorities have a long record of targeting journalists. These efforts have gained further momentum since February 2022 and the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, with the Kremlin using draconian new legislation to silence anti-war voices and shut down any remaining independent Russian media outlets. In May 2024, the United Nations human rights office reported that the number of journalists imprisoned in Russia had reached an all-time high.

While the Putin regime is notorious for seeking to censor the media, that may not actually be the main motive in this case. Instead, there has been widespread speculation that the Kremlin ultimately aims to use Gershkovich and Kurmasheva as bargaining chips in negotiations with the US to secure the release of Russian citizens currently serving prison sentences in the West.

Putin is no doubt well aware that the United States will go to considerable lengths to free the two American journalists. Following Gershkovich’s conviction, the White House issued a statement that the US government has “no higher priority” than seeking the release and safe return of Gershkovich “and all Americans wrongly detained and held hostage abroad.”

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Speculation about a potential prisoner swap has swirled ever since Gershkovich was first detained in 2023. Typically, Russia only engages in prisoner exchanges once suspects have been convicted and sentenced. This has led some analysts to suggest that the relative speed of the two recent trials could indicate the Kremlin’s desire to proceed with an exchange in the near future.

Moscow will likely demand a high price for the release of Gershkovich and Kurmasheva. This may include handing over Vadim Krasikov, a Russian secret service colonel who is currently serving a life sentence in Germany for gunning down a Chechen dissident in a Berlin park in 2019. Sentencing Krasikov in 2021, a Berlin court called the killing “a state-ordered murder.”

US Senate Foreign Relations Chair Ben Cardin said Gershkovich’s trial and conviction were “stark reminders of the lengths to which tyrants like Putin will leverage innocent people as bargaining chips, stifle free speech, and suppress the truth.” While many now expect a prisoner swap to take place sooner rather than later, the targeting of US journalists in this manner highlights the Kremlin’s retreat from international norms and underlines the potential dangers facing any Western nationals who choose to visit Putin’s Russia.

Mercedes Sapuppo is a program assistant at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

How Venezuela became a model for digital authoritarianism

Iria Puyosa, Andrés Azpúrua, Daniel Suárez Pérez — Mon, 22 Jul 2024 11:00:00 +0000

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Once the most vigorous democracy in Latin America, Venezuela started down a slow path toward autocracy twenty-five years ago. It also became a model for digital authoritarianism and an exporter of democratic backsliding to the rest of the Americas. Control of the information space, widespread surveillance, and digital repression are significant pillars of the current regime’s survival. Incumbent Nicolás Maduro is counting on this, along with electoral manipulation and judicial control, to remain in power as Venezuela holds a presidential election on July 28. Nonetheless, a cohesive democratic coalition mobilizing the population across the country has a serious chance of making this election the starting point for a transition toward re-democratization.

The media landscape in Venezuela is fragmented and marked by censorship. The rise of government-run media and state control through ownership changes or censorship mechanisms led independent journalists to migrate to small internet outlets. Venezuela’s media ecosystem shrank further when the country’s economy collapsed after 2015. The aftermath of the 2017 cycle of protests saw another significant shift in the media landscape, with surviving newscasts characterized by censorship and heavily biased coverage in favor of the ruling party. In addition, censorship has caused the closure of many radio stations, leaving many areas without access to local or regional news. The National Telecommunications Commission in Venezuela routinely censors the use of certain topics and words during programming, and also bans interviews with democratic opposition leaders. It prohibits public coverage of corruption allegations or human rights violations attributed to state officials or their family members, coverage of citizen protests or demonstrations against the regime, and discussion of international courts and other human rights entities.

In their new report, “Venezuela: A playbook for digital repression,” Iria Puyosa, Andrés Azpúrua, and Daniel Suárez Pérez dive deep into the state of media in Venezuela, the role it played in the country’s slide toward authoritarianism, and whether other Latin American countries will adopt Venezuela’s model of digital repression.

Additional contributions by Marco Ruíz and Valentina Aguana

Edited by Iain Robertson and Andy Carvin

Global China Newsletter – Sharp words, sharper tools: Beijing hones its approach to the Global South

Dexter Tiff Roberts — Thu, 20 Jun 2024 14:07:30 +0000

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The statement released by G7 leaders after their summit last week garnered ample attention for its strong language on China’s unfair economic practices and ongoing support for Russia’s war on Ukraine, and triggered a predictably sharp Chinese response. The back-and-forth is another reminder of China’s worsened relations with developed democracies over the past few years.

Beijing is by no means abandoning those relationships – Premier Li Qiang’s visit to Australia and New Zealand this week, not to mention President Xi’s trip to Europe last month, underscore a drive to mend damaged ties. But the incident is another piece of evidence confirming that Beijing’s positions on global and economic issues receive a more welcoming reception in the developing world, where China’s economic and political ties are growing by the day.

China’s strategic shift toward greater focus on the so-called Global South is unmistakable. One need only look at where China is spending diplomatic attention and propaganda dollars.

As colleagues at the Digital Forensics Research Lab explore in a new report on China’s messaging in Africa, China is increasingly promoting pro-Russian narratives about Ukraine in sub-Saharan Africa using its media platforms, commentators, social media, and broadcasting infrastructure. The effort aims to portray China as a force for peace while the United States prolongs the war, in line with Beijing’s drive to enhance its reputation relative to Washington across the developing world.

Source: (Murtala Zhang; CGTN Hausa) Screenshot of a cartoon shared by a China Radio International (CRI) illustrator, depicting the US arms industry as profiting from the war in Ukraine. Also, a screenshot of the Facebook post of the article that written for CRI defending China’s amplification of the biolabs in Ukraine disinformation translated from Hausa.

This effort to shape perceptions of China’s responsible global role in contrast to the United States is now routinely reflected in the content of high-level diplomatic engagements with developing countries.

In his speech just last week at the BRICS Dialogue with Developing Countries in Russia, Foreign Minister Wang Yi not only underscored China’s leadership of the Global South as the “largest developing country” but also called for the convening of “a true international peace conference” on the Ukraine war that involves Russia – after Beijing pulled out all the stops to try to scuttle the Swiss-organized conference earlier this month – and threw in some choice words on US efforts to “maintain its unipolar hegemony” for good measure.

As I and the Global China Hub team discovered on a trip to Brazil, Colombia, and Honduras earlier this month, China is also ramping up diplomatic, economic, and technological engagement across Latin America, and pairing those efforts with a push to shape understanding of China across the region. Our editor-in-chief Tiff Roberts dives into that and much more in this issue of Global China – take it away, Tiff!

-David O. Shullman, Senior Director, Atlantic Council Global China Hub

China Spotlight

Fellow

Dexter Tiff Roberts

Nonresident Senior Fellow

Global China Hub Indo-Pacific Security Initiative

China Chinese

Latin American officials flood Beijing revealing China’s global priorities

Want to know one key region of the Global South China is now focusing on? Take a look at who visited Beijing in early June. Before the first week of the month was even over, Brazil’s Vice President Geraldo Alckmin, Venezuela’s Foreign Minister Yván Gil, and special envoy of Cuban President Miguel Díaz-Canel and Minister of Foreign Affairs Bruno Rodríguez Parrilla had all passed through China’s capital (the Brazilian vice president met with Xi Jinping and secured $4.49 billion in credit concessions. Brazil has been a key market for China too, as evidenced by an eighteen-fold surge in Chinese EV sales by value).

Latin America, with its rich resources, is a key target as China expands its global economic and political reach, and that’s a concern for the US. Testifying before the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission hearing “Key Economic Strategies for Leveling the U.S.-China Playing Field: Trade, Investment, and Technology,” Pepe Zhang of the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center called for a development-focused economic partnership with LAC that would make the Western Hemisphere more competitive, resilient, and better integrated with the US.

Economics used to bolster authoritarian power in Global South training

China’s commerce ministry isn’t just fretting about EU tariffs (see below). It has also spearheaded an effort to train officials in countries across the Global South. And perhaps not surprisingly, the instruction is about more than trade and economics: “This effort is integral to the PRC’s drive to transform a global order currently predicated on the centrality of democracy and individual rights to one more “values-agnostic” and thus suited to China’s rise under authoritarian CCP rule,” writes the Global China Hub’s Niva Yau in a June 12 report called “A Global South with Chinese Characteristics” (watch the launch event here). The 795 training descriptions reviewed by Yau show “how the PRC marries economics and politics in its trainings, revealing that Chinese economic achievements are used to support authoritarian ideals.”

The report certainly got the PRC’s attention. The Chinese Embassy responded, saying the report is “full of Cold War mentality and ideological prejudice,” with the Foreign Ministry adding that “China has always respected the peoples of all countries in independently choosing their development paths and social systems,” which is very reassuring.

A new, coordinated transatlantic response to China emerges on trade?

In a widely expected move, the European Union announced new tariffs on Chinese electric vehicles on June 12, up as much 38.1% on top of existing taxes of 10% before, affecting companies including BYD, SAIC, and NIO. Also to no surprise was the heated response from Beijing: the move by the EU “undermines the legitimate rights and interests of China’s EV industry,” and is “blatant protectionism,” Ministry of Commerce spokesperson He Yadong said in a press briefing. On June 17, Beijing officially launched an anti-dumping probe on imported pork and its by-products from the EU in response.

With the EU action coming just over a month after US President Joe Biden imposed tariffs on EVs of 100%, is a new, more coordinated transatlantic response to the Chinese trade juggernaut emerging? On June 3rd, in an ACFrontPage conversation with United States Trade Representative Katherine Tai, she did not mince words on how the US and the EU should adapt the transatlantic trade relationship to reflect the realities of China’s economic system, saying “Capitalism with Chinese characteristics… I haven’t heard that term used in many, many years. At this point, I think it’s less diplomatic than just sort of ahistorical. The China that we’re dealing with now, the PRC, is not a democracy. It’s not a capitalist, market-based economy.”

In an Econographics article exploring a similar theme entitled “Biden’s electric vehicle tariff strategy needs a united front,” the GeoEconomics Center’s Sophia Busch and Josh Lipsky write, “tariffs, working in isolation, can’t fully achieve all the objectives—no matter how high they go. It’s only when tariffs are relatively aligned across countries… that the trajectory could change.”

And it’s not just EVs that pose a threat to global industries. Without tariffs, the EU faces a flood of Chinese imports of the “new three” clean tech exports—lithium-ion batteries, solar panels, and, of course, electric cars (along with the action against EVs, the White House also raised tariffs simultaneously on lithium-ion batteries and solar cells to 25%.) “Imports of the new-three cleantech export categories have skyrocketed in recent years. Over the course of 2023, China’s exports to the EU totaled $23.3 billion for lithium-ion batteries, $19.1 billion in solar panels, and $14.5 billion for electric vehicles,” the Global Energy Center’s Joseph Webster wrote in a piece for EnergySource.

ICYMI

Beginning on June 17, Atlantic Council President and CEO Fred Kempe and former President of Latvia Egils Levits have co-led the Atlantic Council’s annual delegation trip to Taiwan, hosted by the Taiwanese government. Joined by former Czech Minister of Foreign Affairs Tomáš Petříček, they will meet with Taiwan government leaders, including President Lai, think tanks, and business representatives to discuss security and economic issues facing Taiwan and the Indo-Pacific.
The Global China Hub hosted a public conversation on allied solutions to de-risking tech supply chains from Chinese investment to spur collective action between the United States and government and private sector partners in Europe and the Indo-Pacific. The event was a continuation of the Hub’s work on tech competition and China’s drive to dominate emerging technologies and relevant supply chains.
China’s trade with Russia has risen substantially since the Kremlin’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, significantly bolstering Moscow’s war aims, according to new research by the Global Energy Center’s Joseph Webster.
Xi Jinping’s recent visit to Europe was in part intended to divide it as the EU increasingly hardens its stance on China. The Global China Hub’s Zoltán Fehér explores the degree to which Xi was successful in these efforts in a New Atlanticist piece.

Global China Hub

The Global China Hub researches and devises allied solutions to the global challenges posed by China’s rise, leveraging and amplifying the Atlantic Council’s work on China across its 16 programs and centers.

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Holding Putin’s propagandists accountable for crimes in Ukraine

Kristina Hook, Anna Vyshniakova — Tue, 18 Jun 2024 13:12:25 +0000

At dawn in May 2020, a French police raid on a sleepy village near Paris ended a 26-year manhunt for one of the Rwanda genocide’s most notorious fugitives. By October 2022, 89-year-old Felician Kabuga was standing trial in The Hague for crimes without a statute of limitations: Genocide, direct and public incitement to genocide, and conspiracy to commit genocide, among other human rights violations. Prosecutors singled out his role as founder of a notorious Rwanda radio station, calling this dehumanizing media a key cause of the genocide.

In early June, new developments in The Hague served as a reminder to key Russian propagandists, including one of Russia’s former presidents, that they may one day face similar charges. As allowed by Article 15 of the Rome Statute, a coalition of non-government organizations jointly submitted a formal Communication to the Office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC) requesting an investigation into six Russian nationals involved in state propaganda. Notably, this coalition included international and Ukrainian groups, as well as one Russian NGO.

The Communication urged the ICC to investigate the Russians for criminal hate speech. The accused include Dmitry Medvedev, former Russian president and current Security Council Deputy Chairman; Vladimir Solovyov, a popular host on Russian state-owned television channel Rossiya-1; Margarita Simonyan, editor-in-chief of Russia Today; Dmitry Kiselyov, head of the state-owned media consortium Rossiya Segodnya; and Sergey Mardan, a popular television and radio host. The Communication also named Alexey Gromov, First Deputy to the Presidential Executive Office’s Chief of Staff, stating his role in ordering or failing to prevent over 300 examples of criminal incitement to violence from February 24, 2022 to February 24, 2024.

This initiative is arguably long overdue. Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine began more than two years ago, Russian state and state-aligned actors are accused of committing a daily litany of horrific atrocities against Ukrainians. In such a context, it is tempting to overlook the rhetoric behind these actions, but the Russia-Ukraine War illustrates the dangers of ignoring the threats made by powerful Russian media figures. Many in the Russian media have openly telegraphed eliminationist rhetoric against Ukrainians for years, setting the stage for the largest military attack in Europe since World War II. Their continuing threats against the existence of Ukraine, and against other Western countries, pose a direct threat to international security.

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Since 2022, it has become increasingly apparent that Russia’s highly sophisticated propaganda machine requires novel legal and policy responses. New dangerous and diffuse platforms for Russia’s inciting language and other disinformation continue to emerge. In addition to the kind of conventional propaganda most are familiar with, Russian actors now spread public incitement and more subtle disinformation through social media, bot farms, video games, movies, and manipulated content (including deepfakes). International law does not yet cover each of these categories, as older legal frameworks concentrate on historical understandings of propaganda in legacy media formats.

These realities pose serious challenges for anyone seeking to protect victimized groups from atrocity crimes. International law, including the United Nations Genocide Convention, prohibits all means of disseminating direct and public incitement. Still, Russia’s sophisticated networks of propaganda platforms make upholding these provisions difficult. As these challenges increase, Russian techniques of shaping subconscious dehumanization continue to evolve. This fostering of cascading radicalization within Russian society may prove even more impactful than one-time calls for violence, while being more difficult to trace and prosecute.

Some Russian efforts to stay ahead of judicial accountability are clear. Even the Russian authorities felt compelled to respond to Russian journalist Anton Kravosky’s call to drown Ukrainian children in a river (he was suspended from RT for these comments, although an investigative committee later stated he had committed no crime). After these events, some Russian propagandists became noticeably more careful, cloaking their rhetoric through allusions and metaphors. Still, even this “hidden rhetoric” often meets legal requirements for incitement and other criminal propaganda.

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The gravity of alleged Russian atrocities against Ukrainians compels international urgency to disrupt Moscow’s escalation in direct violence and associated inciting propaganda to destroy Ukraine and Ukrainians. Days after posting a profanity-filled acknowledgement of the NGO-led Communication to the ICC, Dmitry Medvedev followed up with a video showing all of Ukraine as “belonging” to Russia. This complete obliteration of Ukraine from world maps was the first time a top Kremlin official had overtly claimed the entirety of Ukraine as a stated goal, showing a link between words and projected actions.

The international community now faces a critical moment. It also has a unique chance to create a legal framework and enforcement mechanism capable of implementation through international cooperation. Beginning at home, Ukraine’s legal system requires amendments to systematize prosecutions in absentia for genocidal incitement. International partners must support these efforts by surging law enforcement resources to monitor the flood of calls for violence emanating from Russian media and from more shadowy Kremlin-backed propaganda platforms.

For Russian propagandists to face the criminal consequences of their conduct, international arrest warrants are indispensable. Bolstering political will for judicial accountability and opening criminal proceedings should be the two major areas of focus. To ensure accountability, Ukraine and its partners must now plan for realistic enforcement mechanisms that implement trial verdicts and deny safe havens of non-extradition. The words and actions of Kremlin propagandists have combined to fuel unimaginable atrocities in Ukraine. To protect Ukrainians and other victims, and to prevent further armed conflicts fuelled by propaganda, the international community must break the cycle of Russia’s real or imagined impunity.

Kristina Hook is assistant professor of conflict management at Kennesaw State University and a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center. Anna Vyshniakova is a war crimes lawyer and a legal consultant, head of legal NGO LingvaLexa, and author of the book “Incitement to Genocide: How to Bring Propagandists to Justice.”

In 1991, Ukrainian was officially recognized as the only state language of the newly independent country. In practice, however, Ukraine remained deeply embedded within a Russian language culture inherited from the Soviet era. This informal empire extended from schools to popular culture, with generations of post-independence Ukrainians growing up in an information space that was still dominated by Moscow.

While old imperial ties remained strong, only the privileged few could afford to travel to most Western countries. Strict visa regimes acted as an additional barrier to engagement with the Western world until Ukrainians finally secured visa-free travel to the EU in 2017. Despite these obstacles, the popularity of English language studies in the decades following 1991 reflected Ukraine’s growing openness to the outside world.

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Research indicates that demand for English language learning has increased significantly since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022. This interest in language skills may at first glance appear somewhat unexpected, given the enormous challenges facing Ukrainian society over the past two years. For many Ukrainians it makes perfect sense. In wartime Ukraine, studying English is an attractive route toward greater personal development that can also provide opportunities to boost the country’s defense and support integration into the wider European community.

The war with Russia has dramatically underlined the importance of the English language as a tool for international communication. At the most immediate and practical level, knowledge of English has been a huge asset for Ukrainian soldiers and commanders learning new skills and encountering new weapons systems for the first time. Indeed, it was striking to see English language fluency specifically cited as a key requirement during discussions with Western partners over plans to train Ukrainian pilots.

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The same linguistic logic has applied to non-military engagement with international partners at the governmental and nongovernmental levels. As Ukrainians have sought to develop new relationships and address complex wartime issues with officials and volunteers from dozens of different countries, English language skills have proven absolutely crucial.

This deepening dialog is very much a two-way street. While greater English language proficiency is proving important for Ukrainians in their engagement with the international community, it is also allowing foreign partners to learn more from the Ukrainian side. In the military sphere, for example, no other country is currently able to match Ukraine’s experience in modern warfare. Speaking the same language makes it far easier to share this experience and pass on important lessons to allies.

As Ukraine moves closer to the rest of Europe and continues to make progress toward the goal of EU membership, the role of the English language within Ukrainian society will only increase. The recently adopted law on the status of English reflects this reality, and should help create an environment that supports the country’s broader Euro-Atlantic integration aspirations.

For centuries, Russia has used language as a tool to suppress Ukrainian independence and impose an artificial imperial identity on Ukrainians. By officially embracing English as the language of international communication, Ukrainians now aim to support their country’s historic pivot away from Moscow and return to the European community of nations.

Oleksiy Goncharenko is a Ukrainian member of parliament with the European Solidarity party.

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Other measures have led to concern from the European Union and the United States. Both have expressly called for restraint by the Tunisian government in its crackdown on dissent, which President Saied has since described as intolerable foreign interference in the internal affairs of the Tunisian government.

The Tunisian Journalists’ Union (SNJT) has also denounced the government’s gradual authoritarian turn and the judiciary’s tendency to indict many journalists for criticizing the government’s line. SNJT claimed that more than fifty journalists have been detained over the past year for expressing views critical of government policy and have been accused of spreading fake news aimed at disrupting the constitutional order.

The government reshuffle also resulted in the appointment of Khaled Nouri as the head of the Interior Ministry, replacing Kamel Feki. Kamel Madouri, head of the Ministry of Social Affairs, replaced Malek Ezzahi. At the same time, Sufyan bin Sadiq was appointed under secretary of the Interior Ministry and was responsible for the new director of national security post. All three officials are considered very close and loyal to Saied. The president has since to comment on the decision behind this reshuffle or his reason for establishing a new post for national security within the Interior Ministry.

It seems quite clear that the cabinet reshuffle was brought about by the president’s dissatisfaction with the management of national security and the containment of the ongoing protests in the country, particularly in the capital, where the tone of accusations toward the government is becoming more serious by the day. The replacement of Feki with Nouri is most likely motivated by the intention to implement a more aggressive policy against opposition forces and to reduce the scale of protests. This is likely also behind the establishment of the new post of under secretary for national security, now chaired by Sufyan bin Sadiq, who will be specifically tasked with managing the growing phenomenon of dissent.

Despite the growing number of protests, however, President Saied’s popularity appears to be solid. Meanwhile, the opposition—however vocal and persistent in expressing its opposition to the government’s authoritarian drift—appears disorganized, divided, and seemingly unable to counter the government’s pervasive action in suppressing dissent.

President Saied succeeded in arresting the leaders of the Islamic Ennahda Party and the Free Desturian Party in 2023, considerably reducing the capacity of the main opposition parties. This, in turn, has paved the way for him to compete with a greater chance of success in the presidential elections scheduled for later this year.

Thus, at this stage the main force of opposition to the Tunisian government remains the National Salvation Front coalition, led by Ahmed Nejib Chebbi, which includes many of the smaller political groups opposed to the government’s authoritarian drift. Members of the front include the Islamist Ennahda party, the Al Amal party, Islamist parties Al Irada and Al Karama, and other minor groups of different ideological backgrounds united by a shared condemnation of President Saied’s policies.

Aware of his weakness, and in an attempt to fuel further critical debate of the government, Chebbi declared in March 2023 that he does not intend to run in the presidential elections unless authorities meet at least some basic conditions, including the reopening of Ennahda headquarters, the release of political prisoners, and, above all, the guarantee of the independence of the electoral commission that will monitor the elections. This last point is especially complex, as the constitutional amendments promoted by Saied have given the president the power to appoint the members of the electoral commission, making it somewhat unlikely that guarantees of transparency and impartiality will be provided.

What emerges from these latest events in Tunisia is a progressive increase in President Saied’s repression of all opposition to his role and, as a consequence, further opposition to him. The events in Tunisia are taking place in front of the international community, including Western democracies, which once again show their inability to uphold actions that they support in theory: human rights and democracy.

Karim Mezran is a resident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center and Middle East Programs.

Nicola Pedde is director of the Institute for Global Studies.

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Russia is bombing book publishers as Putin wages war on Ukrainian identity

Maria Avdeeva — Mon, 27 May 2024 12:05:35 +0000

On May 23, Russia launched a missile strike against Ukraine’s largest printing house, killing seven employees and leaving the facility in ruins. The attack on Kharkiv’s Factor Druk printing plant is the latest indication that Russia is deliberately targeting the Ukrainian book publishing industry.

Factor Druk owner Serhiy Polituchy said the loss of the plant could reduce Ukraine’s overall printing capacity by as much as forty percent. Around one-third of all new books published in Ukraine last year were printed at the Kharkiv facility. “We are now trying to figure out what we can do in the short term to prevent the book publishing industry from collapsing,” commented Polituchy.

Thursday’s bombing followed a number of similar air strikes on publishing houses and print facilities in Kharkiv, which serves as the unofficial capital of Ukraine’s publishing industry. The Kharkiv printing presses accounted for more than eighty percent of new Ukrainian books on the eve of Russia’s full-scale invasion just over two years ago. The city remains the primary source of new books in wartime Ukraine.

As Russia has escalated its air war against Kharkiv since the beginning of 2024, the publishing industry has been repeatedly hit. In a single March attack, Russian missiles destroyed another of Kharkiv’s largest print facilities and a publishing house, killing five. Mykhailo Khrypak, who serves as commercial director at one of Ukraine’s biggest printing plants, says Russia is systematically attempting to destroy the country’s book publishing industry, and warns that production capacity will be difficult to restore.

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With Kharkiv desperately short of air defenses and located dangerously close to advancing Russian troops, the city’s remaining publishers are taking steps to ensure the safety of staff. Oleksandr Popovych, director of the Unisoft printing plant, has established a bomb shelter for his more than three hundred employees. Despite the recent escalation in attacks, he says he currently has no plans to relocate, pointing to the extreme difficulty of moving bulky printing equipment and relocating his highly skilled staff along with their families.

Ukraine’s domestic publishing industry has flourished over the past decade following the onset of Russian military aggression against the country in 2014. With the Kremlin openly weaponizing the Russian language to justify the invasion of Ukraine, demand for Ukrainian-language literature has risen to unprecedented levels. A new generation of Ukrainian authors has emerged, becoming part of a broader cultural renaissance that has also had a profound impact on the country’s music, fashion, and art scenes.

This trend has not proved popular in Russia, to say the least. Russian dictator Vladimir Putin has made no secret of the fact that he bitterly opposes the consolidation of an independent Ukrainian national identity, which he views as a direct threat to Russia’s own imperial identity.

Putin is notorious for insisting Ukrainians are in fact Russians (“one people”). He published an entire essay in July 2021 denying Ukraine’s right to an independent existence. On the eve of the full-scale invasion, Putin called Ukraine “an inalienable part of our own history, culture, and spiritual space.” More recently, he declared that “no Ukraine ever existed in the history of the world.” According to Putin, occupied regions of Ukraine are “historically Russian lands.”

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Many believe Russia’s recent attacks on the Ukrainian book publishing industry are part of a coordinated Kremlin campaign to erase Ukrainian national identity that qualifies as genocide. Responding to the latest bombing, Yale historian Timothy Snyder said the targeted missile strikes were “an example of a larger genocidal policy.”

The evidence of Russia’s intention to extinguish Ukrainian national identity is overwhelming. In virtually every area of Ukraine occupied by Russia since February 2022, strikingly similar reports have emerged of efforts to eradicate all traces of Ukrainian nationality. The Ukrainian language has been outlawed in schools and public spaces, with all symbols of Ukrainian statehood dismantled and removed.

Meanwhile, Russian occupation forces work with local collaborators to detain community leaders and anyone deemed pro-Ukrainian, including elected officials, journalists, civil society activists, military veterans, and cultural figures. Thousands of people detained in this manner are unaccounted for. Those who remain are pressured into accepting Russian citizenship and threatened with the loss of access to essential services such as healthcare.

Throughout occupied Ukraine, the Kremlin is going to great lengths to indoctrinate Ukrainian children and rob them of their Ukrainian heritage. Large numbers of Russian teachers have been brought to occupied regions to manage the indoctrination process in Ukrainian schools, while tens of thousands of Ukrainian children have been deported to Russia and sent to reeducation camps. This is a textbook act of genocide, according to the UN’s own 1948 Genocide Convention.

The actions of Putin’s army in Ukraine are very much in line with Russian imperial tradition. For centuries, generation after generation of Russian rulers sought to suppress Ukraine’s statehood aspirations and prevent the emergence of a separate Ukrainian nation. This insistence that Ukrainians be made to accept an imperial Russian identity was perhaps best expressed in a notorious mid-nineteenth century tsarist decree stating that the Ukrainian language “never existed, does not exist, and shall not exist.”

Kharkiv’s Slovo Building is a particularly striking symbol of these efforts to eradicate Ukrainian culture. Designed and constructed in the 1920s to host prominent Ukrainian writers, it was home to many of the country’s leading authors and poets who were later killed by the Soviet authorities. Today, they are known as the “Executed Renaissance.”

The efforts of successive Russian tsars and Soviet commissars failed to extinguish the Ukrainian desire for a country and an identity of their own. Putin’s own war on Ukrainian national identity is now proving similarly counter-productive. From poetry to pop music, contemporary Ukrainian culture is experiencing a golden age amid the horror and trauma of Russia’s full-scale invasion. Indeed, as news of Russia’s recent air strikes spread, it was no surprise to see various fundraising initiatives quickly emerge in support of the country’s beleaguered publishing industry. Putin may be able to burn Ukrainian books and bomb Ukraine’s printing presses, but his imperial crusade to erase Ukrainian identity is destined to fail.

Maria Avdeeva is a Kharkiv-based Ukrainian security analyst and strategic communication expert.

Ukrainian national team coach Serhiy Rebrov has voiced similar sentiments. Following Ukraine’s March 2024 victory in the Euro 2024 play-off final against Iceland, Rebrov said qualification for this summer’s tournament was “for our supporters, for our country, for our people, and for our soldiers who are now protecting our freedom.”

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The full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine has had a dramatic impact on almost every aspect of daily life, including the country’s football industry. In the days following the invasion, the Ukrainian Premier League abandoned the 2021-2022 season entirely. The league returned months later, with matches now mostly staged in western Ukraine without the presence of supporters in stadiums. Games are often interrupted by air raids.

For security reasons, the Ukrainian national team has been forced to train and play outside the country since February 2022. Ukraine narrowly missed out on a berth at the 2022 FIFA World Cup in Qatar, but made it through the Euro 2024 play-offs to secure a place at the European Championship for only the fourth time in the country’s history.

Many of Ukraine’s soccer stars have become prominent supporters of the country’s war effort, providing humanitarian and military aid while also using their high public profiles to keep the invasion in the international spotlight. National team captain Andriy Yarmolenko is one of numerous players to donate significant sums, while colleague Taras Stepanenko was nominated for an award from FIFPRO, the worldwide representative organization for professional footballers, for his work aiding Ukrainians whose lives have been impacted by the Russian invasion.

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Oleksandr Zinchenko is one of Ukraine’s most recognizable faces thanks to stints with English Premier League heavyweights Manchester City and Arsenal. He was appointed by Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy as an ambassador for the country’s official UNITED24 fundraising initiative, and teamed up with fellow Ukrainian footballing icon Andriy Shevchenko to organize a star-studded charity match in London last summer to support Ukrainian humanitarian efforts.

Zinchenko has spoken about the conflicting emotions of supporting his country’s war effort from afar. “I really want to be in Ukraine,” he told BBC Newsnight in April. In common with many of Ukraine’s most prominent sports personalities, Zinchenko has concluded that he can have a bigger impact by leveraging his public profile on the international stage. “The question is where we are more helpful for our country,” he commented.

As well as individual efforts, Ukrainian footballers have also worked together to found the Stands of Heroes organization. This initiative was established to support the relatives of football fans defending the country. So far, Ukrainian footballers have assisted more than 200 families impacted by the war. “This is one way for Ukrainian footballers to help football supporters who are fighting and volunteering on the front,” said Ukrainian national team defender Yukhym Konoplya.

Despite frequent claims that sport should be kept separate from politics, Ukraine’s appearance at the European Championship will inevitably help draw international attention to the ongoing Russian invasion of the country. The Ukrainian squad will also be acutely aware of their role as ambassadors of a nation that is currently fighting for survival.

Ukraine can expect no favors at Euro 2024 and will have to overcome Romania, Slovakia, and Belgium if they are to progress beyond the group stages of the tournament. Serhiy Rebrov’s players will be motivated by the knowledge that victory on the football pitch could provide their war-weary compatriots with a much-needed morale boost.

Mark Temnycky is a nonresident fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

Kharkiv has been on the front lines of the war ever since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine began in February 2022. Situated approximately half an hour by car from the Russian border, the city was one of the initial targets of the invading Russian army and witnessed heavy fighting in spring 2022. Following Ukraine’s successful September 2022 counteroffensive, which liberated most of Kharkiv Oblast and pushed Russian troops further away from the city itself, the Kharkiv population rose from a wartime low of around 300,000 to well over a million.

With delays in US military aid creating growing gaps in Ukraine’s air defenses, Russia has intensified the bombardment of Kharkiv since early 2024. A series of strikes in March destroyed the city’s main power plants, creating an energy crisis that has led to widespread blackouts. In mid April, Kharkiv Mayor Ihor Terekhov warned that the city was now at risk of becoming a “second Aleppo,” a grim reference to the Syrian city partially destroyed almost a decade ago following heavy bombing by Russian and Syrian government forces.

The extensive use of highly destructive glide bombs has further exacerbated the situation and added to the psychological strain on the Kharkiv population, with many attacks on residential districts taking place in broad daylight. One of the most recent blows was the destruction of Kharkiv’s iconic television tower, a city landmark and also an important element of local communications infrastructure.

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Russia’s escalating bombing campaign has been accompanied by a major information offensive. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov is one of numerous senior Kremlin officials to encourage a mood of mounting insecurity among Kharkiv residents by publicly speaking of a coming campaign to seize the city. In April, Lavrov noted Kharkiv’s “important role” in Vladimir Putin’s plans to create a demilitarized “sanitary zone” inside Ukraine.

This message has been reinforced throughout Russia’s tightly-controlled mainstream media space. During a revealing recent lecture to Russian students, prominent Kremlin propagandist Olga Skabeyeva argued that patriotic journalists should portray the bombing of Kharkiv region not as evidence of Russian aggression, but as part of efforts to establish a “sanitary zone” along the Ukrainian border with Russia.

Statements from Russian establishment figures on the need to destroy and depopulate Kharkiv have been accompanied by a steady stream of similar chatter on social media. Since January 2024, there have been growing signs of a coordinated campaign to flood the online information space with intimidating and alarmist posts pushing the idea that Kharkiv will soon become an uninhabitable grey zone.

The role of social media in Russia’s information offensive against Kharkiv cannot be overstated. Platforms like Telegram, TikTok, and X (formerly known as Twitter) have become battlegrounds for competing narratives and serve as platforms for carefully choreographed Russian propaganda. Groups of pro-Kremlin accounts frequently engage in the intensive promotion of key propaganda messages. These include the alleged hopelessness of Ukraine’s military position, the inability of the Ukrainian state to protect its citizens, and the likelihood of Kharkiv suffering the same fate as Mariupol, a Ukrainian port city with a prewar population of around half a million that was largely destroyed by the invading Russian army during the first months of the war.

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Russia’s information offensive features a strong disinformation component. This includes the distribution of fake statements supposedly released by the Ukrainian authorities. On one occasion, Kremlin accounts spread disinformation that the Ukrainian government was calling on residents to leave Kharkiv urgently in order to avoid imminent Russian encirclement. In a separate incident, Russian sources pushed fake Ukrainian government reports stating that Kharkiv was on the brink of a humanitarian collapse.

These elaborate fakes are typically presented in a convincing manner and closely resemble official Ukrainian government communications. They have even been accompanied by detailed information about “safe evacuation routes.” Inevitably, many Kharkiv residents are fooled by this disinformation and become unwitting accomplices in the dissemination of weaponized Russian fakes.

Russian accounts have also taken genuine news reports and distorted them in ways designed to mislead the public and maximize panic. For example, a series of planned evacuations from specific front line settlements was repackaged by Kremlin trolls as a complete evacuation of entire Kharkiv region districts.

In addition to fake government announcements and deliberate distortions, Kremlin-linked social media accounts are also actively spreading misleading video footage. One widely shared recent video purported to show long lines of cars evacuating Kharkiv while proclaiming that an “exodus” of the “ruined” city was underway. However, this video was later debunked as archive footage shot during the early days of the invasion in spring 2022.

Russia’s disinformation campaign seeks to sow fear and confusion among the Kharkiv population, says local resident Nataliya Zubar, who heads the Maidan Monitoring Information Service. “Disinformation clouds people’s judgment, leading to emotional reactions and stress,” she notes. “This fuels instability and places additional strains on the limited resources that are needed for the city’s defense and to address the growing humanitarian crisis Russia is creating.”

Kharkiv officials and civil society organizations are well aware of Russia’s ongoing information offensive. Work is currently underway to debunk false information and reduce the city’s vulnerability to information attack. These efforts include methodically exposing false claims, while also informing city residents of Russian information warfare tactics and educating them on ways to detect and counter disinformation. The stresses and strains of the emotionally charged wartime environment in today’s Kharkiv make this is a particularly complex task.

Meanwhile, the Ukrainian authorities are developing a draft law to target the spread of deliberate disinformation via social media. This initiative mirrors similar undertakings in a number of other countries, but skeptics question whether legislative measures will prove effective against sophisticated state-backed information operations conducted across multiple media platforms.

Russia failed to take Kharkiv in the early weeks of the invasion more than two years ago. As the city braces for the possibility of a new Russian offensive in the coming summer months, local residents are equally determined to defy the Kremlin once again. In order to do so, they must withstand unprecedented aerial bombardment, while also guarding against the demoralizing impact of relentless Russian disinformation.

Maria Avdeeva is a Kharkiv-based Ukrainian security analyst and strategic communication expert.

As a young Iranian-American man struggling with his half-Iranian identity after growing up with the anti-Iranian hate crimes and discrimination of the 1980s, the protests were a lightning bolt to my heart. People who looked like me were not chanting, “Death to America,” but instead calling for democratic values that I held dear—ones that were in my Iranian immigrant father’s heart as he fled to the United States after the 1979 revolution with my pregnant American mother. The Green Movement changed how I saw myself, and I felt a deep call to get involved in the Iranian people’s quest for freedom. That is why in 2009 I helped co-found Access Now, one of the largest human rights organizations dedicated to defending digital rights.

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During the Green Movement, I quickly learned how to develop and distribute proxy servers to allow Iranians uncensored internet access to tell their stories. This work gathered a group of young activists to support the protestors with whatever tools and expertise they needed, and required shifts of eighteen hours per day. The servers were used by tens of thousands of Iranians daily, and websites that were defended from being taken down by the regime—reaching five million Iranians per day, or more than 25 percent of the entire country’s internet users—were the main news sources for Western media outlets covering the ongoing protests. Tools were developed to defend hundreds of key journalists and activists inside Iran sharing news and video. These elements became the foundations of Access Now.

But one project stayed close to my heart: video archiving. The clerical establishment was trying to erase protest videos, while activists were removing videos for fear of persecution. History was being erased as quickly as it was being made. In response, I downloaded thousands of videos filled with violence, hope, tears, and joy, which were converted to mobile formats and redistributed across the country, where they were downloaded by more than three million Iranians.

In 2022, when Mahsa Amini was murdered by the so-called morality police for “violating” mandatory hijab rules, I gathered a small group of colleagues and friends and together we downloaded thousands of videos to ensure that the Women, Life, Freedom uprising led by women would not be erased. This became the Azadi (freedom) Archive, created in September 2022 and later joined by an international archival coalition led by the Atlantic Council’s Strategic Litigation Project and Mnemonic, with the Promise Institute for Human Rights at the University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) Law, the University of California, Berkeley’s Human Rights Center, Amnesty International’s Digital Verification Corps, and the Iran Human Rights Documentation Center.

The newly renamed Iranian Archive now holds more than one million videos and contributed to the investigation carried out by the United Nations Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Islamic Republic of Iran (FFMI), which unveiled a report in March detailing how the Islamic Republic committed crimes against humanity and other serious human rights violations against Woman, Life, Freedom protesters. On March 21, the United Nations Human Rights Council voted to renew the mandate of the FFMI, giving it more time to strengthen its significant findings and ensure the effective preservation of evidence for use in legal proceedings, including the significant photo and video shared throughout the protests.

The world’s tragedies deserve justice and to be remembered. Iranians who risked their lives to share images of protest violence did so with the hope that information would get out and the world would respond to the Islamic Republic’s atrocious human rights violations. Even now, thousands of videos are uploaded by brave activists from around the globe every day—but without a systematic and funded approach to preservation, the opportunities for accountability, remembering, research, and memorialization are lost.

The global coalition of universities, nonprofits, and companies committed to archiving and preserving videos is making that vision a reality by working together through the nonprofit Iranian Archive to preemptively capture, store, catalog, and tag digital content in a way that can be used by researchers, lawyers, and human rights defenders in the future.

The birth of this global archival coalition signals to Iranian activists and citizen journalists that their sacrifice to share information with the world will not be erased online. It also upholds the best that the internet has to offer, despite increasing “enshittification,” and makes a meaningful contribution to social justice and human rights online and offline.

It’s been fifteen years since the international community realized the importance of digital activism due to the 2009 Green Movement. It must not wait another fifteen years before it develops a robust and comprehensive approach to archiving and preserving video to support justice and human rights movements across the world.

Cameran Ashraf is co-founder of international human rights and technology organization AccessNow, human rights scholar, and NGO human rights leader.

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Putin is weaponizing corruption to weaken Europe from within

Francis Shin — Tue, 02 Apr 2024 19:09:02 +0000

Corruption has long been a favorite weapon in Vladimir Putin’s arsenal. He used it extensively against Ukraine over a number of years to help prepare the ground for the full-scale invasion of February 2022. The Russian leader now appears to be employing the same weaponized corruption tactics honed earlier in Ukraine to undermine Europe and weaken the continent’s democratic institutions from within.

Czech and Belgian law enforcement agencies reported in late March 2024 that Kremlin-linked Ukrainian oligarch Viktor Medvedchuk was behind a Prague-based Russian propaganda network centered around the Voice of Europe outlet. Medvedchuk is accused of masterminding the distribution of anti-Ukrainian narratives in the European media and paying European Parliament members to promote Russian interests in their legislative activities.

This latest corruption scandal is a painful reminder that the EU and US remain at significant risk of Russian electoral interference in the lead-up to elections later this year. For the EU specifically, the scandal further demonstrates that it must put its own house in order if it is to credibly demand Ukraine do the same during the latter’s ongoing EU accession negotiations.

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The oligarch at the center of the scandal, Viktor Medvedchuk, has close ties to Russian President Vladimir Putin, who is godfather to Medvedchuk’s daughter. Throughout the three decades following Ukrainian independence in 1991, Medvedchuk was a prominent figure in the country’s political life and a vocal advocate of Russian interests.

Medvedchuk’s personal relationship with Putin helped earn him a reputation as the Kremlin’s unofficial representative in Ukraine. This led US intelligence agencies to identify Medvedchuk as one of Moscow’s top choices to head a puppet Ukrainian administration in the event of a successful invasion.

When Russian troops crossed the border in February 2022, Medvedchuk initially went into hiding. However, he was detained by the Ukrainian authorities two months later, and was eventually traded for a large number of Ukrainian POWs in one of the most controversial prisoner exchanges of the war.

Regardless of his exile and loss of Ukrainian citizenship, Medvedchuk remains an important ally to Putin. His leadership of the Voice of Europe influence operation indicates Europe’s continued vulnerability to the Kremlin’s weaponized corruption. Whereas Ukraine, the US, UK, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand all imposed sanctions on Medvedchuk and his associates some time ago, the European Union did not do so. As a result, Medvedchuk was still able to do business in Europe.

As a result of this apparent oversight, several of Medvedchuk’s EU-based assets are thought to have remained untouched until his involvement with Voice of Europe was uncovered. This gave him a degree of maneuverability with his EU-based financial assets that appears to have facilitated his allegedly illicit activities.

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In the wake of the recent revelations, the Czech authorities have imposed sanctions on Medvedchuk and other Kremlin-linked associates. Meanwhile, Belgian law enforcement agencies have opened probes into alleged bribes paid to serving MEPs from France, Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, Poland, and Hungary, with the Polish authorities also launching an investigation.

While these measures are welcome, it is not clear why EU authorities did not act earlier to counter the Kremlin’s weaponized corruption. Many now fear the current scandal is just the tip of the iceberg in terms of Russian efforts to infiltrate democratic institutions and the media throughout the Western world. Looming elections on both sides of the Atlantic have added a sense of urgency to this debate.

In theory, the European Commission’s “freeze and seize” task force is meant to coordinate with the rest of the Russian Elites, Proxies, and Oligarchs (REPO) task force, which features the relevant national sanctions authorities from G7 member states and Australia. The fact that the EU’s sanctions listings still do not fully align with that of its REPO allies, especially on somebody as prominent as Medvedchuk, raises serious concerns over the effectiveness of this coordination.

The European Union should be setting an example when it comes to combating corruption. When recommending that the European Council open official EU accession negotiations with Ukraine in late November 2023, Commission Vice President Věra Jourová cautioned that Ukraine still had a long way to go in developing anti-corruption regulations, even as she praised the significant progress made by the Ukrainian authorities so far. Inevitably, questions are now being asked about the credibility of the EU’s own anti-corruption policies.

Recent claims of a major Russian influence operation operating in the heart of the EU should serve as a wake-up call for policymakers throughout the West. With the Kremlin clearly preparing for a long-term geopolitical confrontation, the need for vigilance will only grow. In response to this threat, transatlantic institutions should prioritize bolstering their ability to resist Russia’s weaponized corruption, while making sure the Kremlin’s agents are subject to the maximum available restrictions.

Francis Shin is a Research Assistant at the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center.

A year in detention: Russia must release Evan Gershkovich

Mercedes Sapuppo — Fri, 29 Mar 2024 14:20:21 +0000

Today marks one year since Wall Street Journal reporter Evan Gershkovich was wrongfully detained in Russia on falsified espionage charges. He is currently weathering a blatantly unjust detention in Russia’s notorious Lefortovo prison in anticipation of a trial date that has yet to come. Gershkovich’s pretrial detention has so far been extended five times, including in a ruling just this week, condemning him to another three months behind bars.

Gershkovich’s year in captivity is an important reminder of the Kremlin’s still-escalating disregard for humanitarian and political norms at home and beyond its borders. US Ambassador to Russia Lynne M. Tracy called the extension of Gershkovich’s detention this week “particularly painful,” no doubt referring to the double hit of the blatant falsehood of Russia’s accusations against him and the future this portends for a journalist described by his friends and colleagues as “a great person” and a “great journalist” with an undeniable and inspiring passion for his profession.

Journalism is not a crime, and Putin cannot be allowed to collect foreign citizens as blackmail to support his ongoing violence in Ukraine.

Gershkovich’s calling, his colleagues have explained, is ensuring that the world is informed of the realities of Russia under President Vladimir Putin. He felt a particular responsibility to tell the stories left unpublished by other journalists forcibly silenced by the Russian government through detention or exile. As conditions for reporting from Russia continued to deteriorate under the Kremlin’s years-long efforts to shroud reality under its own propaganda, Gershkovich persevered. He was motivated by an understanding of the importance of his work and his commitment to “get the story right,” as he would tell his friends and colleagues.

Gershkovich embodies what Putin apparently fears: He is a journalist working to uncover the truth, to show the world for what it really is.

In his countless acts to deform the Russian judiciary, legislature, security forces, and other instruments of the state to his will, Putin has made it clear that he has little regard for the truth or for the rules and strictures that create a free society. He continues to exercise unimaginable levels of violence against Ukraine in his ongoing war of aggression, murdering its people, targeting its critical infrastructure and cultural heritage, and forcibly deporting its children. Within Russia, he has honed tactics for silencing critics and amassing power, including his use of the foreign agents and “undesirable organizations” laws that have impaired countless independent media outlets and civil society organizations. These same laws have been used to throw activists and members of the free press behind bars.

Gershkovich exemplifies what has largely motivated the Kremlin’s use of restrictive legislation with impunity: He is a journalist who works to bring light to the truth, one with global connections and a passion for freedom and justice. Thus, without gaining something significant from the United States or its allies, Putin and his government will likely have little intention of setting Gershkovich free, despite his clear innocence and the absurd nature of the charges against him.

Gershkovich is also not alone as a foreign citizen suffering at the hands of the Kremlin. Others detained in Russia include Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) journalist Alsu Kurmasheva, who has been in pre-trial detention since October 18, and Paul Whelan, who has been in Russian custody since 2018 serving a sixteen-year sentence. Los Angeles resident and dual US-Russian citizen Ksenia Karelina was detained in Yekaterinburg on January 28, and a Russian court denied her appeal on February 29.

The Wall Street Journal has done extraordinary work to bring attention to Gershkovich’s plight—and to his resilience. Other organizations, such as the Washington Post through its Press Freedom Partnership, have raised awareness both of Gershkovich’s detention and of other members of the press who remain in captivity. In advocating for Kurmasheva’s release, RFE/RL has also called attention to other journalists in prison in Russia, including Gershkovich.

Russia should release Gershkovich and others unjustly held without cause at once. While it is unlikely the Kremlin will do what is right any time soon, Gershkovich’s struggle for freedom reminds us that he and the free press have a remarkable ability to persevere. This in itself undermines the Kremlin’s intentions to silence the truth forever and gives us hope for the improbable. In the context of Russia’s war, it is also important to remember that, as Jeane Cavelier of Reporters without Borders has stated, “journalists must not be used as bargaining chips in Moscow’s war against Kyiv.” Journalism is not a crime, and Putin cannot be allowed to collect foreign citizens as blackmail to support his ongoing violence in Ukraine. Gershkovich’s tenacity and resilience should motivate the global community to act with urgency and intention to secure his release.

Mercedes Sapuppo is a program assistant at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center. Follow her on Twitter @MKSapuppo.

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Putin has repeatedly used terror attacks to tighten his grip on Russia

Olivia Yanchik — Thu, 28 Mar 2024 21:33:38 +0000

The March 22 terror attack on a Moscow concert hall was the deadliest in Russia for almost two decades. While the official investigation into the attack is still underway, it is already becoming increasingly clear that the Kremlin intends to ignore overwhelming evidence of Islamic State responsibility in order to accuse the Ukrainian authorities and their Western partners of orchestrating the killings.

This opportunistic attempt to blame Ukraine is fueling widespread speculation that the attack will lead to an escalation in Russia’s ongoing invasion. Based on past experience throughout Vladimir Putin’s 24-year reign, many also anticipate that the Russian dictator will use the atrocity to launch a further domestic crackdown.

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Putin first emerged on Russia’s political stage against a backdrop of terrorist attacks. When he was appointed Prime Minister in August 1999, Putin was largely unknown to the wider Russian public. Weeks later, the country was rocked by a series of apartment bombings in Moscow and southern Russia.

Putin’s hard-line response to these attacks saw him rise to national prominence. This paved the way for his presidential election win in early 2000, while also serving as justification for the Second Chechen War. Putin’s use of macho street slang was welcomed by many, including his famous pledge to flush terrorists “down the toilet.”

In October 2002, armed militants seized a theater in the center of Moscow and held almost one thousand audience members hostage. The ensuing standoff ended in tragedy when a botched intervention by Russian security forces led to the deaths of more than 100 hostages. This incident was to become another key turning point in the Putin era.

In the wake of the theater siege, Putin passed a series of anti-terrorism laws restricting civil liberties. He also significantly strengthened Kremlin control over the Russian media, making it far more difficult for journalists to report critically on the authorities. Crucially, Putin sought to frame the theater attack as an act of “international terrorism.” This played an important role in transforming international perceptions of Russia’s fight against Chechen separatism by equating it with the US-led “War on Terror.”

The largest terrorist attack of the Putin era came in September 2004, when militants stormed a school in Beslan during traditional ceremonies to mark the first day of the new academic year. This high-profile crisis ended in carnage and the deaths of more than 300 hostages. The Beslan massacre transformed the political landscape in Russia. In the wake of the tragedy, Putin moved to end the direct election of regional governors and return to a system of appointment by the Kremlin. This reversed what was widely regarded as one of the main democratic achievements of the Yeltsin era.

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Throughout the 2010s, Russia experienced sporadic suicide bombings across the country. In 2017, an attack on the St. Petersburg metro system led to new restrictions imposed on the popular Telegram messaging app, after an investigation concluded that the platform had been used by terrorists to coordinate their activities.

With today’s Russia already an increasingly authoritarian state, it is not clear what measures remain available to the Kremlin in response to the recent Moscow attack. Following the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the last vestiges of an independent press and civil society have been largely extinguished, while draconian legislation has criminalized any criticism of the war.

Some fear that the Moscow attack may spark a backlash against Russia’s large community of labor migrants, many of whom are Muslims from Central Asia. Meanwhile, some officials are already calling for the reintroduction of the death penalty. Given the scale of the attack and the rhetoric currently coming out of the Kremlin, most expect the response to be severe.

The March 22 attack in Moscow has seriously damaged Putin’s carefully crafted public image as a strongman ruler who offers his subjects security in exchange for restrictions on their personal freedoms. In order to reestablish his credentials, Putin is likely to target his enemies in Ukraine and the West. In line with past practice, he will also look to tighten his grip inside Russia itself.

Olivia Yanchik is a program assistant at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

Putin adds Islamist terror to the list of absurd excuses for Ukraine invasion

Peter Dickinson — Thu, 28 Mar 2024 21:09:13 +0000

Over the past week, representatives of the Islamic State have gone to considerable lengths to confirm they were behind the March 22 attack on a Moscow concert hall that left more than 140 people dead. In the immediate aftermath of the killings, the radical Islamist group issued a series of statements claiming responsibility. They then went even further, circulating visual proof including graphic bodycam video footage filmed by one of the assailants.

Despite overwhelming evidence pointing to Islamic State terrorists, Vladimir Putin seems intent on blaming Ukraine. While the Russian dictator has acknowledged the atrocity was carried out by Islamist militants, he has repeatedly indicated that Ukraine and the country’s Western partners are the real culprits.

The first clear sign that Putin would seek to implicate Ukraine came on the day after the attack. In an official address to the nation, Putin announced that four suspects had been caught while attempting to reach Ukraine, before accusing the Ukrainian authorities of “preparing a window” for them to cross the border.

This version of events made little sense, given the massive military presence along Russia’s wartime border with Ukraine and the intense security spotlight on the wider region. Putin’s far-fetched story of a Ukrainian escape plan has subsequently been further undermined by his closest ally, Belarusian dictator Alyaksandr Lukashenka, who has stated that the terror suspects initially attempted to flee across the border into Belarus and not Ukraine.

None of this has deterred Putin. On the contrary, the campaign to blame Ukraine has continued to gain momentum in the wake of the Moscow massacre. The Kremlin-controlled Russian state media has openly questioned the claims of responsibility made by Islamic State, and has directly accused Ukraine of being behind the terror attack.

Russian officials have followed suit, with Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev stating that Ukraine was “of course” responsible for the attack and Russian Parliamentary Speaker Vyacheslav Volodin naming “the bloody regime of Ukraine” along with Washington and Brussels as the organizers of the atrocity. Meanwhile, Putin himself has doubled down on his earlier accusations, and has attempted to position the Moscow terrorist attack as part of a ten-year conflict between Russia and Ukraine.

Ukrainian officials have rejected Russia’s groundless accusations, suggesting instead that Putin is seeking to exploit the tragedy in order to provide further false justification for the invasion of Ukraine. “Do not let Putin and his henchmen dupe you,” commented Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba. “Their only goal is to motivate more Russians to die in their senseless and criminal war against Ukraine, as well as to instill even more hatred for other nations, not just Ukrainians, but the entire West.”

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Russia has yet to produce any credible evidence supporting its claims of a Ukrainian role in the Moscow terror attack. Instead, the Kremlin appears content to rely on a combination of unfounded allegations, conspiracy theories, and innuendo. This is entirely in keeping with the cynical information strategy that has accompanied the Russian invasion of Ukraine, which has been based on deceit and distraction from the very beginning.

When Putin first launched the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2014, he did so with a lie so large and so transparent that in retrospect it is difficult to believe it actually happened. As his troops methodically seized control of Ukraine’s Crimean peninsula, the Kremlin dictator appeared before global audiences and repeatedly denied any Russian military involvement whatsoever. Instead, he insisted that the thousands of well-armed and disciplined troops involved in the operation were actually local militias.

This astonishing duplicity set the tone for the following eight years as Putin expanded the war by occupying much of eastern Ukraine’s Donbas region. Throughout this period, the Kremlin refused to acknowledge any direct role in hostilities and maintained an official policy of blanket denials, despite the fact that the presence of the Russian army in eastern Ukraine was the world’s worst kept secret. In addition to denying Russia’s obvious involvement, the Kremlin also waged an unprecedented information war to discredit and dehumanize Ukrainians.

For the past decade, the most consistent element of Russia’s anti-Ukrainian disinformation offensive has been the depiction of modern Ukraine as a “Nazi” state. This has been a Kremlin propaganda trope for many decades and was a prominent element of Soviet attempts to demonize Ukraine’s statehood ambitions during the Cold War. Putin has enthusiastically revived this tradition and has used it to justify his quest to extinguish Ukrainian independence. Few were surprised in February 2022 when he cited “de-Nazification” as the main goal of Russia’s full-scale invasion.

Putin’s “Nazi Ukraine” propaganda resonates well with Russian audiences drenched in the Kremlin’s World War II mythology, but has been significantly less effective internationally. It is not hard to see why. After all, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy is Jewish, while support for far-right political parties in Ukraine is lower than in most other European countries, with a coalition of Ukrainian nationalist parties receiving just 2% of the vote in the country’s most recent parliamentary election in 2019. Indeed, the entire “Nazi Ukraine” narrative is so ridiculous that even US media personality Tucker Carlson, who can usually be relied upon to echo Kremlin talking points, recently admitted it was “one of the dumbest things I’d ever heard.”

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The Kremlin’s attempts to blame the war on NATO expansion have proved far more persuasive among international audiences, but even this seemingly rational explanation has been undermined by Russia’s own recent actions. Putin has frequently stated that NATO enlargement since 1991 poses an intolerable security threat to Russia, but when neighboring Finland and nearby Sweden responded to the invasion of Ukraine by joining the alliance, he reacted with almost complete indifference and made no effort to obstruct the process.

The contrast between Putin’s evident lack of interest in NATO’s Nordic enlargement and his bellicose denunciations of Ukraine’s far flimsier ties to the alliance could hardly be starker. Far from threatening a military response, the Russian ruler actually downplayed the entire issue of Finnish and Swedish membership, and even withdrew the bulk of his troops from the border with Finland. Clearly, Putin understands perfectly well that NATO poses no security threat to Russia itself, and only objects to the alliance if it prevents Russia from bullying its neighbors.

In addition to imaginary NATO threats and phantom fascists, Putin has now added Islamist terrorism to the expanding list of absurd excuses for the invasion of Ukraine. This relentless flood of disinformation is designed to cloud perceptions and disguise the naked imperialism driving Russia’s war in Ukraine.

As the invasion has unfolded, Putin has become increasingly frank about his true motivations, especially when addressing domestic audiences. In summer 2022, he compared his invasion to the imperial conquests of eighteenth century Russian Czar Peter the Great. Months later, he announced the annexation of four partially occupied Ukrainian provinces while claiming they would now be part of Russia “forever.” With increasing frequency, Putin denies Ukraine’s right to exist and characterizes the war as a crusade to reclaim “historically Russian lands.”

Ukrainians are painfully aware of Russia’s genocidal goals and have long since grown used to the shameless disinformation being pushed by the Kremlin to justify the invasion of their country. In recent days, many Ukrainians have responded to allegations of their alleged involvement in the Moscow terror attack with typical gallows humor, quipping that according to Putin, “Ukraine is a Nazi Islamist state headed by a Jewish President.”

The Kremlin’s ludicrous conspiracy theories certainly deserve to be ridiculed, but the implications for millions of Ukrainians are no laughing matter. As Russian dissident Garry Kasparov noted this week, “mocking the absurdities of authoritarians is a worthy endeavor, as long as we never lose sight of how dictatorships like Russia use their laughable lies to justify oppression and murder.”

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

Vladimir Putin’s history obsession is a threat to world peace

Nicholas Chkhaidze — Tue, 19 Mar 2024 20:29:14 +0000

History has always served as an ideological battlefield, but few rulers in the modern era have weaponized the past quite as ruthlessly as Vladimir Putin. For more than two years, the Russian dictator has sought to justify Europe’s largest invasion since World War II by portraying it as a sacred mission to reclaim “historically Russian lands.”

Putin’s preoccupation with history has become increasingly evident as his reign has progressed, and is closely linked to his deep-seated resentment over the perceived historical injustice of the 1991 Soviet collapse. As early as 2005, Putin was lamenting the breakup of the USSR as “the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the century.”

This sense of injustice has helped fuel Putin’s obsession with Ukraine, a neighboring country that many Russians still regard as a core part of their own nation’s historical heartlands. The existence of an independent Ukraine has long been resented by Putin as a symbol of modern Russia’s retreat from empire. Since the early years of his reign, he has made the subjugation of Ukraine one of his foreign policy priorities.

During the initial stages of the Kremlin campaign to reassert Russian authority over independent Ukraine, considerable effort was made to undermine the historical legitimacy of the Ukrainian state among Russian audiences and inside Ukraine itself. As Russian aggression against Ukraine escalated, the Kremlin’s war on Ukrainian history also expanded, with Ukrainians demonized as “Nazis” and dismissed as an “artificial nation.”

Years of increasingly hostile rhetoric paved the way for military aggression. When Putin launched the invasion of Ukraine in spring 2014 with the seizure of Crimea, he began referring to southern and eastern Ukraine as “Novorossiya” (“New Russia”). His decision to revive long-forgotten imperial terminology from the Czarist era was the clearest indication yet that Putin intended to extinguish Ukrainian statehood and reverse more than a century of European history.

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Putin formalized his denial of Ukrainian statehood in a controversial history essay published in July 2021. Entitled “On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians,” this remarkable document laid out Putin’s rejection of Ukraine’s right to exist, while arguing at length that Ukrainians are actually Russians (“one people”). Putin’s essay laid the ideological groundwork for the full-scale invasion that commenced months later.

Over the past two years, history has remained a key front in the struggle to justify the Russian invasion of Ukraine. During the first summer of the war, Putin directly compared himself to Peter the Great and likened the invasion of Ukraine to the eighteenth century Russian Czar’s wars of imperial conquest.

A year later, Putin ordered the launch of new history textbooks for Russian schoolchildren along with curriculum changes with the apparent aim of legitimizing the ongoing military campaign to destroy the Ukrainian state and nation. This was part of a broader trend within Russia to bring the country’s official historical narrative into line with Putin’s increasingly radical brand of revisionism.

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Strikingly, Putin chose to use his high-profile February 2024 interview with US media personality Tucker Carlson as a platform to frame the war in Ukraine as a quest for historical justice. While Carlson clearly wanted Putin to blame NATO and the US for the invasion, Putin himself preferred to embark on a rambling half-hour history lecture explaining the ancient roots of Russia’s claim to Ukraine.

Other senior Russian officials have taken their lead from Putin’s weaponized version of history. The most prominent example of this trend is former Russian President Dmitry Medvedev, who regularly employs historical references in his frequent attacks on Ukraine and the wider Western world. “One of Ukraine’s former leaders once said Ukraine is not Russia. That concept needs to disappear forever. Ukraine is definitely Russia,” he declared in March 2024.

With the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine now in its third year, Putin’s historical motivations are becoming more and more apparent. He regularly declares that major Ukrainian cities such as Odesa and entire regions of Ukraine are “historically Russian,” indicating that his imperial ambitions are still far from satisfied.

Many are now asking how far Putin intends to go. He has often expressed his belief that the Soviet Union was the Russian Empire under a different name. If Putin takes his crusade to reclaim “historically Russian lands” further and expands the definition to include all of the former Czarist domains, this would place more than a dozen additional countries at risk of suffering the same fate as Ukraine.

Putin has weaponized history to justify the genocidal invasion of Ukraine and dehumanize the entire Ukrainian nation. Unless he is stopped in Ukraine, the Russian dictator will use the same bogus historical arguments to launch new imperial adventures.

Nicholas Chkhaidze is a Research Fellow at the Baku-based Topchubashov Center.

If these punishing terms had been implemented in spring 2022, It would surely only have been a matter of time before a disarmed and isolated Ukraine found itself facing a fresh Russian invasion with little hope of defending itself. In other words, Putin’s widely touted peace proposal was in fact an attempt to secure the surrender of the Ukrainian state.

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The publication of Putin’s punitive peace plan did not deter Pope Francis from entering the debate in early March with his own controversial call for Ukraine to “have the courage to raise the white flag” and negotiate with Russia. The Pope’s comments sparked outrage in Ukraine and across Europe, with a number of senior officials condemning the religious leader. Days later, the Vatican was forced to backtrack, with Cardinal Pietro Parolin clarifying that the onus in any future peace process should be on Russia as the “aggressor” country.

The most ominous recent contribution to the debate over possible future negotiations has come from Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban. Following his meeting with former US President Donald Trump in Florida, Orban announced that if re-elected in November, Trump plans to cut all US support for Ukraine. “If the Americans don’t give money, the Europeans alone are unable to finance this war. And then the war is over,” commented the Hungarian leader.

These revelations were not entirely unexpected. Indeed, the current deadlock in Congress over US military aid for Ukraine is widely seen as a reflection of Donald Trump’s personal position. Nevertheless, Ukrainians were dismayed by Orban’s claims that Trump’s vision for peace amounts to abandoning Ukraine and letting Russia win. Far from ending the war, this approach would mean the end of Ukraine.

Putin himself has since underlined the obvious flaws in Trump’s strategy. In a March 13 interview, the Kremlin dictator dismissed the idea of peace talks at a time when his army has regained the battlefield initiative thanks in large part to Ukraine’s mounting weapons shortages. “It would be ridiculous for us to start negotiating with Ukraine just because it’s running out of ammunition,” Putin stated.

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At present, the potential negotiating positions of Russia and Ukraine remain poles apart. While Kyiv insists on a complete end to the Russian occupation of Ukrainian territory and the payment of reparations for war damage, the Russian leadership is becoming more and more maximalist in its demands. Putin and other senior officials have long insisted Ukraine cede five partially occupied provinces to Russia. With Russia’s military prospects improving and international support for Ukraine wavering, the Kremlin now appears to embracing even more ambitious goals.

Putin used his high-profile February 2024 interview with US media personality Tucker Carlson to position the war as an historic mission to reclaim “Russian lands.” Meanwhile, former Russian President Dmitry Medvedev has gone even further, declaring in early March that “Ukraine is definitely Russia.”

These maximalist statements tally with the Kremlin’s increasingly vitriolic anti-Ukrainian propaganda, which portrays Ukraine as an enemy of Russia and an instrument of the West’s anti-Russian policy. For the past two years, the invasion of Ukraine has been depicted by the Kremlin as an existential struggle, with Russia’s national survival dependent on the total subjugation of Ukraine.

This framing makes it difficult to see how any kind of negotiated settlement could prove enduring. On the contrary, while Moscow may seek to temporarily pause hostilities for strategic reasons, it is now obvious that the Putin regime has committed Russia to a long-term war of aggression with the clear goal of destroying Ukraine.

Ukrainians are well aware of Russia’s genocidal agenda. They see the daily incitement to genocide on Kremlin TV, and are regularly confronted with fresh evidence of efforts to eradicate Ukrainian identity throughout occupied regions of Ukraine. Understandably, the vast majority of Ukrainians see no room for compromise between Russian genocide and their own survival. Instead, they are committed to fighting on until Ukraine can achieve the basis for long-term national security.

There are indications that Ukraine’s partners are increasingly recognizing the need for comprehensive security guarantees. Since January 2024, Ukraine has signed a series of bilateral security agreements with partner countries including Britain, France, and Germany. While these documents do not qualify as military alliances, they do formalize current cooperation while outlining avenues for future defense sector partnership.

In recent weeks, French President Emmanuel Macron has raised the stakes further by refusing to rule out the deployment of Western troops to Ukraine. Macron’s suggestion has sparked considerable alarm among European leaders, but supporters have noted that the West gains nothing by signalling its own red lines to the Kremlin. Bilateral security agreements and the French President’s increasingly bold rhetoric cannot replace the unrivaled security provided by NATO membership, but these recent developments do indicate growing recognition in Western capitals that European peace depends on a secure Ukraine.

With Russia’s invasion now in its third year, factors such as Ukraine’s failed 2023 counteroffensive and creeping Ukraine fatigue among the country’s Western partners are contributing to calls for a compromise settlement to end the war. At the same time, Putin appears more confident than ever that he can achieve his expansionist goals and is clearly in no hurry to return to the negotiating table.

In the current circumstances, the best way to secure a lasting peace is by demonstrating to the Kremlin that Russia’s hopes of extinguishing Ukrainian statehood are futile. Putin only understands the language of strength. With this in mind, Ukraine’s international partners must send an unambiguous message to Moscow by ditching their “as long as it takes” mantra and deploying the full weight of their overwhelming economic and technological superiority. This would be more than enough to give Ukraine a decisive battlefield advantage and set the stage for victory over Russia.

Nobody wants peace more than the Ukrainians themselves, but they also recognize that a premature peace with Putin would only lead to more war. Advocates of a negotiated settlement would be wise to listen to these Ukrainian concerns before calling on Kyiv to compromise with the Kremlin. As Winston Churchill observed, meeting jaw to jaw is better than war. However, in this particular case, it should be evident to all that there can be no durable peace in Europe until Ukraine is safe from Russian aggression.

Together with colleagues Evgeniy Maloletka and Vasilisa Stepanenko, Chernov is credited with informing the outside world of the horrors unfolding inside the besieged city. “Those shots that went out were very important. They went on the Associated Press and then to thousands of news outlets,” Chernov would later recall. “However, I thought I should do something more with the 30 hours of footage I had.” The Ukrainian director explained that he wanted to tell the bigger story of the siege and bring home to international audiences the scale of the death and destruction following Russia’s invasion.

The resulting documentary has met with considerable critical success. Chernov’s film first made its debut at the Sundance Film Festival, where it won an audience award. Prior to receiving Oscar recognition, “20 Days in Mariupol” was also named best documentary by the Directors Guild and BAFTA. This recognition makes the film an important contribution to international understanding of Russia’s invasion.

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Russia’s spring 2022 destruction of Mariupol is widely seen as one of the worst war crimes of the twenty-first century. A thriving Ukrainian port city with a prewar population of around half a million, Mariupol was surrounded by Russian forces during the first days of the invasion. What followed was a siege marked by barely imaginable levels of suffering and destruction.

While there is currently no way of independently determining the overall death toll in Mariupol, conservative estimates indicate tens of thousands of Ukrainian civilians were killed. Satellite footage has identified thousands of new graves in an around Mariupol, while many more victims were buried in makeshift plots throughout the ruined city or trapped beneath the rubble of destroyed buildings. The situation has been further complicated by the large-scale forced deportation of residents by the Russian occupation authorities.

Difficulties in identifying the victims of Mariupol reflect broader obstacles to calculating Ukrainian civilian losses from Russia’s invasion. With international aid organizations barred from areas under Kremlin control, it is impossible to accurately assess the number of civilians killed by the Russian military. As a result, official figures for confirmed Ukrainian civilian losses are comparatively low. Human rights groups say this presents a misleading picture of the invasion that fails to reflect the true scale of the carnage. While UN officials have reported over 10,000 civilian deaths, they also acknowledge that the real toll is likely to be “significantly higher.”

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Chronicling the destruction of Mariupol is particularly important in light of a comprehensive Kremlin campaign to cover up evidence of Russian war crimes. Following the end of the siege in spring 2022, the Russian occupation authorities immediately began demolishing damaged residential districts and cordoning off atrocity sites such as the city’s drama theater, where hundreds are thought to have died in a targeted Russian air strike. Efforts were soon underway to rebuild Mariupol as a Russian city and repopulate it with new arrivals from Russia.

Although dozens of other Ukrainian towns and cities have been similarly devastated and remain in a state of near complete ruin, Moscow has clearly singled out Mariupol as a reconstruction priority and is seeking to transform the occupied city into a showpiece for the invasion. Meanwhile, Kremlin officials have shamelessly sought to blame Ukraine for the deaths of so many Mariupol residents. Speaking in February 2024, Russian Ambassador to Britain Andrei Kelin claimed Ukraine “could have surrendered much earlier.”

The Oscar success of “20 Days in Mariupol” should now help to undermine the Kremlin’s disinformation efforts and increase awareness about Russian war crimes in Ukraine. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy highlighted the importance of the award, calling it a timely reminder of Russia’s destructive goals and the need to maintain international support for Ukraine. “The horrors of Mariupol must never be forgotten,” he stated. “The entire world must see and remember what the inhumane Russian invasion brought to our people.”

Following his Oscar win, documentary maker Mstyslav Chernov echoed this sentiment. Speaking after Sunday’s ceremony, the Ukrainian director complained that Ukraine has recently become a “bargaining chip” for politicians around the world. Instead, he stressed that international attention should be firmly focused on protecting the Ukrainian civilians who are being attacked and killed. “This is not a political question. This is a humanitarian catastrophe.”

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

The Democracy and Governance commitment at the Ninth Summit of the Americas marked an imperative platform for strengthening the region’s democratic values and institutions. As the experts deliberated how to incorporate those values into practice, they stressed the importance of good governance for the advancement of human rights,
anticorruption practices, sustainable development, and citizen inclusion. Partnering with regional stakeholders will be imperative for crucial issues like civic engagement, transparency, adherence to international order, and the rule of law, encouraging Latin American and Caribbean countries to continue to prioritize their work in democratic renewal.

Recommendations for advancing and institutionalizing democratic practices in the Americas:

Strengthen institutional mechanisms for democratic oversight and accountability

Establish a mechanism to monitor the state of democracy in the region. A systematic reporting system would provide a regular assessment of the health of democracy in the Americas and identify areas where progress is needed.
Create a voluntary peer review process. This would allow countries to voluntarily subject themselves to review by peer countries, providing a mechanism for feedback and accountability in a pluralistic matter.
Appoint an independent special reporter of democracy. This would create a dedicated position within the Organization of American States (OAS) to monitor and report on the state of democracy in the Americas.
Reinvigorate the Inter-American system’s programming on education, an example being the current Inter-American Education Agenda. This would provide support for education programs that promote democratic values and civic engagement.

Empower civil society and foster inclusive participation

Engage academics, civil society groups, and the private sector in efforts to advance democracy. These groups can play a valuable role in providing expertise, advocating for change, and holding governments accountable.
Develop a shared definition of what constitutes a breach of the democratic order. This would provide a clearer framework for responding to anti-democratic actions.
Invest in training for youth and marginalized people to become effective civil society actors. This would empower these groups to advocate for their rights and participate in the democratic process.
Create a mechanism for informal dialogue among legislators from across the Americas. This would provide a platform for legislators to share ideas and build relationships, which could help to advance democracy in the region.

Enhance preventive measures for backsliding and expand support for democratic initiatives

Make the Democratic Charter more preventive in nature. This would allow the OAS to take proactive steps to address threats to democracy before they escalate.
Increase funding for the OAS and related initiatives to support democracy in the Americas. This would provide the resources needed to carry out these recommendations to promote democracy.
Promote regional collaboration on democratic initiatives to share best practices, provide mutual support, and strengthen collective responses to challenges. This could include establishing regional working groups, fostering knowledge exchange, and coordinating joint initiatives.

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Putin’s history lecture reveals his dreams of a new Russian Empire

Peter Dickinson — Tue, 13 Feb 2024 02:46:45 +0000

US media personality Tucker Carlson’s hotly anticipated interview with Vladimir Putin was billed as a unique opportunity to challenge Western perceptions of the war in Ukraine and hear Russia’s side of the story. Instead, Putin hijacked the spectacle to underline his status as the world’s most dangerous amateur historian.

The interview began in predictable fashion with Carlson inviting Putin to blame NATO and the US for the ongoing invasion. However, it was soon apparent that the Russian leader had something very different in mind.

Sidestepping Carlson’s opening question, Putin launched into a rambling half-hour lecture covering more than a thousand years of Russian and Ukrainian history that placed the roots of today’s war firmly in the distant past. His core message was chillingly simple: Ukraine has no right to exist and he is fully justified in waging a war of aggression to reclaim historically Russian lands.

Carlson admitted to being initially shocked and annoyed by this monologue, but eventually concluded that Putin’s insistence on articulating his historic claims to Ukraine was actually “a sincere expression of what he thinks.” This seems a fair assessment. Putin’s obsession with history is well known, as is his conviction that Ukrainians are in fact Russians. Indeed, anyone who has listened to Putin’s many public statements on the topic of Ukraine or read his 2021 essay on the “historical unity” of Russians and Ukrainians will have been more than familiar with the content of his latest lecture.

While Putin has often been accused of weaponizing history, it was nonetheless revealing that he should choose to prioritize his historical grievances in such a setting. After all, this was the Russian president’s first major interaction with the Western press since the start of the Ukraine invasion almost two years ago. Tucker Carlson had been handpicked for the occasion, having won the trust of Moscow officials via years of pro-Kremlin messaging in the US media.

The interview was viewed by many within the Putin regime as a rare chance for Russia to make its case on its own terms to a truly global audience. Unfortunately for the Kremlin, things did not go according to plan. Rather than coming away convinced by the rationality of Putin’s arguments, many viewers were left bewildered by his arcane references to medieval princes and seventeenth century diplomatic correspondence.

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Needless to say, much of Putin’s lecture was complete nonsense that echoed longstanding Russian imperial myths while conveniently overlooking Ukraine’s centuries of documented history. In his traditional manner, Putin ridiculed Ukraine as an illegitimate and artificial state. He dismissed the entire notion of a separate Ukrainian nation, calling it an anti-Russian conspiracy involving everyone from the Poles and the Pope to the Austrian General Staff.

These claims owe more to Kremlin propaganda than any actual academic rigor. In reality, the term “Ukraine” first appeared in the twelfth century, while Ukraine’s statehood struggle can be traced back more than three hundred years. As long ago as 1731, French thinker Voltaire was moved to write, “Ukraine has always aspired to be free.”

Putin’s insistence that southern and eastern Ukraine are historically Russian is similarly unsupported by the available evidence. The 1897 census conducted by the Czarist authorities, which provides the most reliable guide to the demographic makeup of the Russian Empire, identified Ukrainian-speaking majorities throughout much of today’s southern and eastern Ukraine, as well as in a number of regions that are now part of Russia.

Likewise, Putin’s assertion that Lenin and Stalin created modern Ukraine ignores the inconvenient fact that the short-lived Ukrainian People’s Republic had already existed for a number of years before the early Bolsheviks were finally able to extinguish this fledgling Ukrainian state and impose Soviet rule.

Many more of Putin’s statements have since been comprehensively debunked by everyone from the BBC and TIME magazine to the diplomats of the Polish Foreign Ministry, who were understandably outraged by the Russian leader’s attempt to justify Adolf Hitler’s 1939 invasion of Poland. As Carlson himself showed little interest in challenging Putin, these fact-checking efforts are particularly important.

At the same time, the real takeaway from the interview was Putin’s apparently genuine belief that his antiquated historical arguments could serve as plausible justification for a major war in twenty-first century Europe. This is perhaps the clearest indication yet of the dangerous delusions and imperial ambitions that led Putin to invade Ukraine.

Putin is no stranger to openly imperialistic rhetoric, of course. For years, he has subjected domestic audiences to long sermons detailing Russia’s historic grievances and the injustices of the post-Soviet settlement. Ukraine has always been the main focus of this revanchist zeal.

As his grip on power has tightened, Putin has grown increasingly fixated with the idea of reasserting Russian authority over Ukraine, and has come to view this as his historic mission. On the eve of the full-scale invasion two years ago, he described Ukraine as “an inalienable part of our own history, culture, and spiritual space.” In summer 2022, Putin directly compared the current war to the imperial conquests of eighteenth century Russian Czar Peter the Great and claimed to be “returning” historically Russian lands.

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Unless Putin is defeated in Ukraine, it is fanciful to imagine that he will voluntarily abandon his increasingly aggressive brand of historical revisionism. On the contrary, it is far more likely that other countries will also fall victim to the Russian ruler’s expanding imperial ambitions. Naturally, Putin assured Tucker Carlson that he has no such intentions, but he has issued similar denials prior to each new stage of his escalating Ukraine invasion. At this point, the most logical conclusion is that he will not stop until he is stopped.

How far could Putin go? Throughout his reign, he has consistently lamented the fall of the USSR, which he has referred to as the demise of “historical Russia.” After the events of the past two years, it should be painfully apparent that anywhere Putin regards as “historical Russia” is potentially at risk.

In theory, at least, the same bogus historical arguments that have been used to justify the invasion of Ukraine could easily be applied to other parts of the former Soviet Union, or to the Russian Empire of the Czarist era. This would create an array of possible targets for Russian aggression including Finland, Poland, the Baltic states, Belarus, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Alaska, and the whole of Central Asia. A maximalist interpretation could even see all of Central Europe’s former Soviet satellite states besides Poland added to the list.

In today’s increasingly unstable geopolitical climate, talk of further Russian invasions can no longer be dismissed as alarmist. Mounting signs of Western weakness in Ukraine have visibly emboldened Putin, and may yet tempt him to test NATO’s resolve in a more direct manner. He has already succeeded in shifting the Russian economy onto a war footing, and is cranking up arms manufacturing at a rate that far outpaces the West. Even now, with the Russian invasion of Ukraine still very much undecided, it is all-too-easy to imagine waking up to social media posts labeling Kazakhstan an “artificial country” or proclaiming Estonia “historically Russian” as Putin’s tanks roll across the border.

As the tenth anniversary of Russia’s war in Ukraine draws close, Putin’s interview with Tucker Carlson should serve as a wake-up call for the collective West. A decade ago, Putin began his attack on Ukraine by occupying Crimea. At first, he acted with a degree of caution, officially denying any role in the military takeover of the Ukrainian peninsula and orchestrating a fig leaf referendum to disguise the crime. Ten years on, Putin now feels confident enough to sit down with one of the world’s most famous journalists and defend the invasion of a major European country by claiming it is rightfully his. Anyone who still believes he would not dare attack NATO is only fooling themselves.

Putin’s history obsession would be comical if the consequences were not so tragic. Using ancient dynasties and long forgotten treaties to justify the biggest European conflict since World War II is indeed farcical, and has duly inspired a flood of memes mocking the Kremlin dictator as a man completed detached from reality. But as we chuckle at Putin the ultimate history bore, he will continue distorting the past to shape the future. At present, there is a very real danger he will have the last laugh.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

The case against Alsynov stems from the testimony of a single person, Kremlin-appointed governor Radiy Khabirov, who is accused of attempting to paint Alsynov as a separatist traitor masquerading as an innocent eco-activist. Supporters say Alsynov has been a thorn in governor’s side because he’s successfully advocated against big business projects that would endanger the well-being of local people and enrich the elite.

Alsynov has more than fifteen years of experience advocating for Bashkortostan’s regional sovereignty and against several invasive mining projects that threatened to destroy environmental landmarks, pollute local water systems, disrupt agriculture, and whisk away profits. He made his mark in 2020, leading the Kushtau protests against an attempt to mine Bashkortostan’s sacred limestone hills. Alsynov made local headlines again in 2023, when he and his fellow activists campaigned against gold mining in the Indyk mountains. For this, he has earned the trust of many local people who complain of feeling like second-class citizens in their own ethnic republics.

During Alysnov’s trial in December 2023, around 200 people gathered at the courthouse in Baymak to demand his release and the governor’s resignation. They made a video appeal to Vladimir Putin, complaining that due to Khabirov’s mismanagement, Bashkortostan had seen demographic decline, worsening corruption, insufficient development in infrastructure, and a fall in living standards. “Instead of solving problems, Radiy Khabirov refuses to listen to the opinions of citizens and is persecuting public figures and activists, considering them enemies of the state,” said the authors of the video.

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The political response from the Russian government has been to paint this appeal for better local governance as a radical separatist movement. Without providing any evidence, member of the Russian Parliament Dinar Gilmutdinov attempted to blame the demonstrations on “elements related to the special services of foreign governments, operating from the territory of Ukraine and the Baltic states.”

Meanwhile, regional governor Khabirov defended his decision to denounce Alsynov, writing, “You can put on the mask of a good eco-activist, a patriot, but in fact the situation is not like that. A group of people, some of whom are abroad, essentially traitors, are calling for the separation of Bashkortostan from Russia. They’re calling for guerrilla warfare here.”

False accusations of extremism are a frequently used Kremlin tool for discrediting opposition movements. The most prominent example was the long-running propaganda campaign to portray Alexey Navalny as a far-right or Nazi figure, which culminated in the 2021 designation of Navalny’s Anti-Corruption Foundation as an “extremist organization” and criminal charges of extremism against many in the movement.

This approach yields multiple political dividends and provides justification for harsh crackdown measures. That is certainly what followed the recent accusations of separatism against the protest movement in Bashkortostan. In addition to a police crackdown and legal measures deployed against protesters, authorities imposed an information blackout that included the jamming of mobile phone signals and the blocking of popular messaging and social media apps including WhatsApp and Telegram.

Beyond justifying repressive measures, false accusations of extremism also play another important political role in today’s Russia. When effective, they can alienate an opposition movement from potential allies within the broader political opposition and the public at large. Indeed, this seems to have happened with the Bashkortostan protests, with some opposition figures quick to echo Kremlin charges of separatism. This is particularly important to the regime in terms of containing the risk posed by local protests.

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In recent years, protest movements organized around local issues and in support of local civic and political leaders have proven some of the most broad-based and durable in Russia. When regional official Sergey Furgal was arrested on murder charges in 2020, citizens in the Russian Far East city of Khabarovsk took to the streets in protests that raged for months. A similar nationwide wave of protests broke out the year before when prominent journalist Ivan Golunov was arrested on falsified drug charges, apparently in retaliation for his investigations into corruption. These movements attest to a pattern in which Russian citizens repeatedly take to the streets in defense of those who many feel truly represent their interests.

Local protests also occur in Russia’s ethnic minority regions. Here, there are often longstanding grievances like those around resource extraction and ecological damage, the ultimate source of the recent protests in Bashkortostan. There are also newer grievances like the disproportionate enlistment of young men from these regions in the high casualty full-scale invasion of Ukraine, which motivated mass protests in Dagestan in response to the general mobilization order in September 2022.

The root causes of all these protests, however, are the same: A total lack of voice for Russia’s citizens in their government’s decisions, even as those decisions cause increasing amounts of harm to the public at large. The periphery has myriad reasons to resent the center. For the most part, major protest movements like the ones in Khabarovsk, Dagestan, or now Bashkortostan have been contained locally. But the naked imperialism driving Russia’s war in Ukraine has raised consciousness across the former Soviet space among formerly colonized groups.

While these groups have their own grievances specific to their colonial experience, they share with the Russian public as a whole a history of violence, repression, neglect, and exploitation at the hands of the Russian state. The real risk to the Putin regime is unity and solidarity across regions among Russians protesting these shared forms of mistreatment at the hands of the state. It is precisely this sort of unity and solidarity that false accusations of separatism are intended to undermine.

Dylan Myles-Primakoff is Senior Program Manager for Eurasia at the National Endowment for Democracy and a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council. Lillian Posner is Assistant Program Officer for Eurasia at the National Endowment for Democracy.

As a result of this crackdown, international social media platforms and communication technologies became just about the only way to deliver factual information to Russians inside the country, and to inform the international public on the situation in Russia.

Western tech companies initially took steps to comply with international sanctions against Russia and to mitigate the spread of Kremlin-backed disinformation. However, new research suggests this effort has had the unintended consequence of significantly hindering independent media and civil society efforts inside Russia.

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Out of a group of 16 independent Russian media and civil society organizations (CSO) featured in recent research, all experienced negative impacts to their online presence after the Russian invasion of Ukraine, with 14 reporting periodical sharp decreases in traffic and social media engagement.

These organizations saw an abrupt fall or lack of change in viewership, followers, subscribers, and engagements on some platforms, all while growing on others. Suddenly, content that generated substantial interest in the past was not getting any attention, while posts, videos, or even entire channels that were attracting significant engagement suddenly vanished from recommendation features.

Researchers believe that independent Russian media websites may have been deprioritized or omitted in Google search results and the Google Discover service, which inadvertently led to the amplification of Kremlin propaganda by directing millions of Russians to anti-Ukrainian and anti-Western messaging every day. This aligns with data recently published by Lev Gershenzon, one of the former heads of Yandex News, Russia’s largest search engine, now fully controlled by the state.

According to Gershenzon, Google Discover’s content recommendation system features Kremlin-affiliated sources high up in its recommendations. Close to 90 percent of Russian smartphones operate with Android, with Google products pre-installed by default,so Google has unprecedented influence over the content Russians view every day.

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Eleven of the 16 groups cited claim to have lost access to essential Western software, tools, and equipment, and experienced restricted access to certain online advertising services. After their outlets were outlawed and Russian providers canceled their services, four of these groups said they could not find a Western hosting service, and several noted that one mass email service abruptly closed all of its Russian accounts. As a result, many Russian independent media and CSOs lost entire databases of readers, supporters, and donors.

Meanwhile, the online collaboration platform Slack shut down while Adobe, Windows, and Microsoft Office also left Russia. The resulting lack of access to basic online tools has proven challenging for Russia’s already-embattled independent voices.

While most of these groups attempted to contact companies to find solutions to their lack of access, few cases were resolved. No matter the outcome, the circuitous and demoralizing process of even getting an answer from decision makers at Western tech companies has proven to be a significant obstacle to addressing these issues.

The resulting status quo has, albeit unintentionally, reinforced the power imbalance between Russia’s pro-democracy actors and the country’s authoritarian government by depriving an increasingly isolated society of its few remaining independent sources of information. To overcome this impasse, there is an urgent need for dialogue between Western tech companies, Russian media, and civil society.

Joanna Nowakowska, Anna Kuznetsova, and Marta Bilska from the International Republican Institute are co-authors of the recent report “Can Big Tech Contribute to Breaking Putin’s Censorship?”

Russia faces fresh accusations of targeting journalists in Ukraine

Mercedes Sapuppo — Tue, 16 Jan 2024 15:07:05 +0000

US-based international press freedom NGO the Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ) is calling for an investigation into a series of recent Russian air strikes in Ukraine that injured journalists covering the war. The missile attacks in late December targeted a number of hotels known for hosting visiting international correspondents and representatives of international aid organizations.

Allegations that the Russian military may be purposely attacking locations used by members of the press and international aid workers are not new. In September 2023, Harvard University’s Nieman Journalism Lab published an article entitled “Evidence suggests Russia has been deliberately targeting journalists in Ukraine.” Ukraine’s National Union of Journalists has accused Russia of bombing sites frequented by journalists in order to intimidate correspondents and “limit coverage of the war in the international media.”

Numerous journalists covering the Russian invasion of Ukraine have voiced their concerns over Russian air strikes. The chief foreign affairs correspondent at the Wall Street Journal, Yaroslav Trofimov, noted recently that seven of the Ukrainian hotels he had stayed in had been struck by Russian missiles. “Russia is routinely bombing hotels in the east and the south, in part to make it more dangerous for journalists and NGOs to operate,” he posted on December 31, 2023.

Svitlana Dolbysheva, a Ukrainian translator working for German TV channel ZDF, was among those wounded on December 30 in a Russian air strike that partially destroyed Kharkiv’s Palace Hotel. “This is another Russian attack on the free press,” commented ZDF chief editor Bettina Schausten in the aftermath of the bombing. “ZDF will continue to report on the war against the Ukrainian civilian population.”

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Anton Skyba, who works as a freelance journalist and risk assessment trainer with Ukraine’s 2402 Fund NGO, argues that Russia’s attacks are meant “to disrupt and seed panic among journalists, media workers, aid workers, and different international counterparts.” He believes the Russian objective is to sew chaos and disorder, which will in the long run shield the Russian military from media scrutiny by making the work of journalists as difficult and dangerous as possible. In this context, he says, the terror tactics being employed are “quite pragmatic.”

The recent flurry of attacks on hotels has refocused attention on the safety of international media representatives in Ukraine. In summer 2023, a series of Russian air strikes behind the front lines in eastern Ukraine including an attack on a hotel in Pokrovsk sparked similar accusations that the Kremlin was attempting to distrupt international media coverage. At the time, the International Federation of Journalists responded by condemning “the targeting of facilities frequented by journalists,” while Peter Beaumont of the UK’s Guardian newspaper noted that the targeted locations were all used by journalists and said the bombings were “very much not a coincidence.” The Pokrovsk attack also prompted a coalition of 24 international civil society organizations to express alarm “at the continued targeting of media workers in Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.”

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Despite multiple examples of Russian air strikes against hotels and other venues known for hosting international correspondents, Moscow has consistently rejected allegations of any deliberate policy to target journalists in Ukraine. On numerous occasions, Kremlin officials have sought to justify specific attacks by claiming venues were being used by members of the Ukrainian military and were therefore legitimate targets.

Demonstrating the intent behind individual bombings amid Europe’s largest invasion since World War II would be extremely challenging. Any such efforts would also likely take a considerable amount of time and investigative resources. Nevertheless, many within the international media and civil society communities currently appear determined to hold Russia accountable.

As the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine approaches the two-year mark, the Russian army stands accused of committing a vast array of crimes. The list includes everything from summary executions and the widespread use of torture, to the bombardment of Ukraine’s civilian infrastructure and the destruction of entire towns and cities. Meanwhile, Vladimir Putin himself has been indicted for war crimes by the International Criminal Court in The Hague for his role in the mass abduction of Ukrainian children.

The allegedly deliberate targeting of journalists in Ukraine by the Russian military is particularly alarming, as it suggests an attempt by the Kremlin to restrict media coverage of the invasion and prevent international audiences from learning about possible war crimes. It is important to thoroughly investigate these claims, both in order to make sure the crimes of the current war do not go unpunished, and to prevent such practices from becoming routine features of twenty-first century warfare.

Mercedes Sapuppo is a program assistant at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

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While polling data in an authoritarian society such as Putin’s Russia must be treated with caution, recent trends identified by Levada and Russian Field are confirmed by a source close to the Kremlin. Valery Fedorov is director of Kremlin-loyal pollster WCIOM and an official advisor to the first deputy chairman of Russia’s presidential administration. In a September 2023 interview with Russia’s RBC, Fedorov reluctantly acknowledged that the number of Russians who actively and enthusiastically support Putin’s decision to invade Ukraine is not more than 10-15 percent of the population. “The majority of Russians do not want to seize Kyiv or Odesa,” he commented. ‘If it was up to them whether to the start the “special military operation,” they probably would not have done it.”

Recent WCIOM research also acknowledges a sharp decline in both viewership and audience trust toward Russia’s state propaganda television channels. In 2023, just 40 percent of Russians cited state TV as their main source of information, down from 53 percent five years earlier. Since 2016, trust in Russian state channels as “objective” sources of information has almost halved, plunging from 46 percent to 26 percent.

Interestingly, only five percent of Russians under the age of 25 regard state TV as an objective source of information, compared to 51 percent of those aged 60 and over. This age breakdown is important if one wants to predict future trends. The patterns evident in media consumption match broader attitudes toward the war, with Levada finding that 56 percent of those aged 65 and above unconditionally back the invasion, with this figure shrinking to just 30 percent for those aged below 25.

Clearly, demography is against Putin, with younger Russians far more skeptical about the war. Indeed, a selective analysis of polling data excluding Russians over the age of 50, who were most traumatized by the Soviet and early post-Soviet experience and are therefore most easily susceptible to propaganda, would present a strikingly different picture of current attitudes toward the invasion of Ukraine.

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Based on the findings of different pollsters and non-polling criteria, a picture emerges of conscious support for the invasion of Ukraine among a significant number of Russians representing 30 percent to 40 percent of the population. This is not an unusual figure for totalitarian societies that run on fear and propaganda. Nevertheless, it is not a majority position. The available evidence indicates that the majority of Russians want the war to end, with support for the invasion fading over time and increasingly concentrated among older generations.

Similar trends can be seen in relation to military service. A range of polls show that between 50 and 60 percent of Russians reject a second wave of mobilization. This is a key reason why Putin has been reluctant to announce further mobilization over the past year or so, despite the obvious need to do so. As a result, soldiers mobilized in the final months of 2022 are stuck on the front lines of the war with little chance of any break in their service, prompting protests from family members. Polling indicates that a majority of Russians support calls from the wives of mobilized soldiers for their demobilization.

This is particularly bad news for Putin. It reveals that during almost two years of full-scale war, he has been unable to induce Russians to volunteer for combat in sufficient numbers. There are no lines at army recruitment points in the central squares of Russian cities. Instead, according to the Conflict Intelligence Team and other independent analysis, official numbers of “volunteer recruits” are wildly exaggerated. Russians may be prepared to “support” the war verbally, but they are clearly not rushing to fight themselves.

The most recent indication that Putin may be worried about waning public enthusiasm for the war against Ukraine came in his 2024 New Year address. One year earlier, Putin filmed his annual address alongside soldiers in uniform, with his speech focusing largely on the invasion of Ukraine. This year, however, he opted for a more familiar Kremlin backdrop and only mentioned the war in passing before switching to more mundane topics.

Putin understands the mood in Russia better than many Western commentators, and he appears to sense a declining public appetite for the invasion he unleashed almost two years ago. If this trend continues, it could further constrain Putin and his actions.

Vladimir Milov is Vice President for International Advocacy at the Free Russia Foundation.

Russia’s invasion aims to erase Ukrainian cultural identity

Martha Holder — Thu, 04 Jan 2024 21:11:22 +0000

As Ukrainians fight for their country’s survival amid Russia’s ongoing invasion, defending Ukraine’s culture has never been more important. With Russia openly seeking to extinguish Ukrainian statehood and erase Ukrainian identity, safeguarding Ukrainian culture should be recognized as a national priority. This could be highlighted in Ukraine’s National Recovery Plan at both the national and local levels, reflecting the key role cultural identity has played in sustaining the country during the barely conceivable horrors of the invasion unleashed almost two years ago by Vladimir Putin.

Ukraine has already achieved what many regard as a decisive moral victory in the war against Russia. While Kremlin propagandists deny Ukraine’s right to exist and Putin insists Ukrainians are actually Russians (“one people”), the outpouring of Ukrainian national pride since February 2022 has been instrumental in fueling the country’s remarkable resilience and spirit of resistance.

As the invasion approaches the two-year mark, it is now obvious that Putin and other Russian leaders seriously underestimated the strength of Ukrainian national identity. Nevertheless, there is ample evidence that eradicating all traces of Ukrainian identity remains a core Russian war aim. Speaking to the New York Times in December 2022, UN rapporteur for cultural rights Alexandra Xanthaki explained that Russia sought not merely to capture Ukrainian territory, but to achieve the gradual destruction of Ukraine’s cultural life. “One of the justifications of the war is that Ukrainians don’t have a distinct cultural identity,” she noted.

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Russia’s assault on Ukrainian cultural identity can be seen in everything from the widespread looting of national treasures to the targeted destruction of historic sites including museums, theaters, libraries, and monuments. These attacks are evidence of an intentional Kremlin campaign to eradicate Ukraine’s distinct culture and heritage.

Prominent targets have included a museum dedicated to Ukrainian folk artist Maria Prymachenko in Kyiv region, the Sviatohirsk Monastery in eastern Ukraine’s Donetsk region, the Transfiguration Cathedral within the UNESCO-listed historic city center of Odesa in southern Ukraine, and a Kharkiv museum dedicated to eighteenth century Ukrainian philosopher Hryhorii Skovoroda. In recognition of the growing threat posed to Ukraine’s cultural heritage, UNESCO has placed a number of historic Ukrainian landmarks on its list of endangered sites.

Russia’s invasion is not only destroying the physical manifestations of Ukraine’s cultural heritage. It is also claiming the lives of Ukrainians at the forefront of shaping the country’s contemporary cultural landscape. One prominent victim was Victoria Amelina, an award-winning 37-year-old novelist and poet who was killed by a Russian missile in July 2023 while dining in a restaurant in eastern Ukraine.

At the time of her death, Amelina was attempting to preserve the works of other Ukrainian artists and poets killed or exiled during Russia’s invasion. “My worst fear is coming true: I’m inside a new Executed Renaissance. As in the 1930s, Ukrainian artists are killed, their manuscripts disappear, and their memory is erased,” she wrote in the foreword to the published diary of another author, Volodymyr Vakulenko, who was murdered during the 2022 Russian occupation of Izium.

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The Putin regime’s attempts to suppress Ukrainian national culture and identity are part of a Russian imperial tradition stretching back hundreds of years. This is most immediately apparent in the long history of restrictions imposed on the use of the Ukrainian language. Russian attempts to ban the Ukrainian language began in the early seventeenth century and include over 100 separate measures adopted by successive imperial administrations throughout the Tsarist and Soviet eras. The chilling end goal of this linguistic imperialism can be seen in a mid-nineteenth century Tsarist decree stating that the Ukrainian language “never existed, does not exist, and shall not exist.”

So far, the Putin regime’s efforts to erase Ukraine’s cultural identity appear to be backfiring. Indeed, amid the death and destruction of Russia’s full-scale invasion, Ukrainians are embracing their culture, history, and identity in unprecedented ways.

Since February 2022, millions of Ukrainians have adopted the Ukrainian language in their everyday lives. Ukrainian historical narratives that were suppressed for generations by the forces of Russian imperialism are now being rediscovered and are transforming perceptions of what it means to be Ukrainian. From poetry to pop music, contemporary Ukrainian culture is experiencing a golden age.

It is imperative that this consolidation of Ukrainian identity is embedded in the country’s recovery agenda, both at the ministerial level and via the National Council for the Recovery of Ukraine. While numerous similar heritage preservation initiatives are currently underway, it makes sense to prioritize the protection of cultural identity within broader national recovery efforts. Supporting individuals and institutions as they continue to engage with the essence of “being Ukrainian” is vital for the country’s future. It is also the perfect response to Russia’s dreams of wiping Ukraine off the map altogether.

Martha Holder is a board member at the Foundation to Preserve Ukraine’s Sacral Arts and a member of the Ukrainian National Women’s League of America. She previously worked in international development at the World Bank (1994-2016).

What is art? Plato held that art is imitation. Indian philosopher Bharata described rasa (flavor) in art. In contemporary philosophy, there are numerous aesthetic definitions, which define qualities inherent to the art, as well as disjunctive definitions, such as where art is a product of the aesthetic of its time or is part of a recognized tradition or institution. In other words, there is no one definition of art, leading some proponents of AI art to argue that anything we deem to be art becomes art.

However, can something be art if there is no artist? Critics and proponents of AI art agree on one thing—there needs to be a human holding the brush. As computer scientist Joseph Weizenbaum famously wrote in 1976: “No other organism, and certainly no computer, can be made to confront genuine human problems in human terms.” Last year an AI-generated entry won the Colorado state fair’s fine arts competition in the “digitally manipulated art” category. The winner, who had never dabbled in art before the advent of generative AI, said that AI “is a tool, just like the paintbrush is a tool. Without the person, there is no creative force.”

Neurons and code

The principles published by the G7 after its May 2023 meeting in Hiroshima began with this preface: “Different jurisdictions may take their own unique approaches to implementing these actions in different ways.” Indeed, countries’ approaches to the emerging question of “authorship” where human beings are not necessarily involved fall along a bewildering spectrum. The US Copyright Office only grants copyright to “works created by human beings.” Famously, in the 2018 case of a selfie taken by a crested macaque named Naruto using the camera of photographer David Slater, a US court declared that non-humans do not have statutory standing under the Copyright Act. However, according to the Copyright Office, works created through text prompts and lacking any further creative input by the human user, as in the case of generative AI tools, would not be copyrightable because “these prompts function more like instructions to a commissioned artist.”

China’s draft rules on generative AI, released in April, require that these services and products respect intellectual property rights, both at a commercial and personal level. The wording is broad—perhaps excessively so. It requires generative AI service providers to ensure their models meet legal requirements and would likely require a new licensing architecture for data mining. Chinese copyright law recognizes individuals and organizations (leaning heavily toward companies), but not “entities” like AI models, as copyright holders. It recognizes the rights of adaptation and compilation—the right to transform a work and arrange existing ones—but also requires publishers of such adapted work to compensate the authors of the original. As in the US case, this approach leaves some gray area for generative AI systems, depending on whether a generated work is viewed as an adaptation with sufficient original input. Interestingly, in 2020, a Shenzhen court ruled that an AI-generated news article qualified for copyright protection, as it met the threshold for originality.

According to India’s Copyright Act, the “author” of a copyrightable work is, “in relation to any literary, dramatic, musical or artistic work which is computer-generated, the person who causes the work to be created.” According to a July 2023 report by New Delhi law firm Ikigai Law, “In India, a work must involve a minimum degree of creativity and not be a product of only skill and labor. Output produced by AI tools may not satisfy the requirement of ‘creativity’ required for copyright protection, if they are viewed as a collection of data compiled from already existing sources without any infusion of creativity.” In this sense, Indian and US copyright law agree that a certain class of AI-generated works would not qualify for copyright.

Japan is tackling the gray area generated by foundational models as well. In July and September, the Japanese Agency for Cultural Affairs convened panels to deliberate the required threshold for “creative contributions” of human authors. At the same time, the government has stated that Japanese copyright will not protect holders/creators of data used for AI training.

All these regulatory measures are grappling with the fact that, counterintuitively, generative AI is not always a “tool,” and there can be cases where the AI is doing most of the creative “labor,” albeit by drawing upon the creative output of hundreds of thousands of human artists. On top of that, the sheer size of datasets used to train image generators makes it difficult for individuals to prove copyright infringement (not to mention that many artists who post their work online do not register copyright). In a recent federal court ruling in California, the presiding judge dismissed a class action lawsuit by three artists against DeviantArt, an online art community, and MidJourney. The ruling stated that it would be impossible for the defendants to audit every single image in the database for potential copyright infringement (complicated by the fact that the database in question, LAION, is open-source), and it is difficult for an artist to prove a generated image is derived from their work, absent “substantial similarity.”

Unregulatable AI?

Generative AI is certainly unlike any paintbrush humans have used before. It is only as “creative” as the artists whose works were fed into the model, but also, as some countries’ positions imply, reflects the creative vision of the person who uses it.

Scrolling through the nearly ten thousand public comments received by the Copyright Office as part of its AI study (a task for which an AI assistant would have been welcome), the common themes that emerge are consent and compensation. As one commenter states: “As an artist, I never gave permission for AI to regurgitate my work. I was never asked if it would be all right with me.”

What further complicates copyright is that these laws are national in scope, whereas datasets are not. And as the analysis above has shown, different jurisdictions are approaching this issue in divergent ways (if they are at all). Therefore, it is wholly possible that if certain countries impose rules that are seen as harsh by companies, they can relocate their operations to safer havens.

Copyright collectives or copyright societies offer one potential lifeline for artists. This has been a model for collective negotiation of multiple works, where the collective negotiates copyright and compensation on behalf of a group. However, in the internet age, such collectives would need to be international in scope, or part of a network of collectives. They would also need to lower their membership fees, which many artists—who publish their works online in good faith and with no expectation of remuneration—would not be able to afford.

Another potential pathway is the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, which 181 countries have signed onto. While the convention is limited by the copyright laws of the nations that are party to it, it can serve as a forum for countries to agree to a baseline set of protections for artists with regard to companies building generative AI models.

As generative AI becomes more advanced and widely accessible, and is applied in unexpected ways, it has become quite evident that current copyright law—which often places undue onus on those whose work is being used without their consent—offers inadequate solutions. Any tenable resolution to the challenge posed by generative AI to copyright would need collective bargaining and international buy-in.

Trisha Ray is an associate director and resident fellow at the Atlantic Council’s GeoTech Center.

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Damon’s article mentioned in Dawn accurate reporting

Atlantic Council — Thu, 07 Dec 2023 18:59:28 +0000

original source

The post Damon’s article mentioned in Dawn accurate reporting appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Fake history is a crucial weapon in Vladimir Putin’s bid to destroy Ukraine

Ihor Smeshko — Tue, 05 Dec 2023 20:46:15 +0000

It is doubtful Vladimir Putin actually believes much of the anti-Ukrainian propaganda coming from the Kremlin’s echo chamber. After all, few educated people would. Still, he and his colleagues have little choice but to vigorously counter Ukraine’s compelling national narrative of a country emerging from centuries of imperial subjugation and reclaiming its place among the European family of nations. Russia’s response has focused on denying Ukraine’s right to exist. The Kremlin’s use of false historical narratives delegitimizing Ukraine is a key element of Russia’s broader campaign to destroy the Ukrainian state and nation. As such, it is worthy of far more international attention than it currently receives.

Ukraine’s story is straightforward, unlike the tall tales promoted by the Russian authorities. Contrary to the Kremlin’s claims, Ukraine is a democratic, unified nation with a distinct and varied history stretching back more than a thousand years. In no way is modern Ukraine Russia’s “younger sibling.” In fact, it could easily be argued that the opposite is true. According to its own origin story, Russia emerged from the medieval Kyivan Rus state centered on the Ukrainian capital city. Christianity and European culture came to Russia via Ukraine.

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The many different puzzle pieces that make up Putin’s official version of the deeply troubled historical relationship between Russia and Ukraine simply don’t add up. His claims of a common past and shared identity conveniently ignore centuries of oppressive policies and forced russification imposed on Ukrainians by the Russian imperial authorities throughout the Tsarist and Soviet eras.

Nevertheless, Putin has deployed his distorted vision to argue that the two countries are one nation and that, in essence, there is a civil conflict currently underway among the people of Ukraine. This is a people that voted 92 percent in favor of independence in 1991, with majorities in every single region of the country. It is also a people that staged two revolutions since becoming independent in order to remain both free and democratic.

Recent polls consistently indicate that Ukrainians do not want to surrender a single inch of occupied land to Russia in exchange for an end to what Putin euphemistically calls his “special military operation.” Ukrainians and global audiences overwhelmingly recognize this “operation” as a war of aggression that has cost hundreds of thousands of lives over the past twenty-one months, in addition to the thousands killed during the previous eight years of hostilities following Russia’s 2014 invasion of Crimea and eastern Ukraine’s Donbas region.

Despite Putin’s insistence that Ukrainians are actually Russians (“one people”), the differences between the two countries are now more immediately apparent than ever. Today’s Ukraine is a democracy, though at times a messy one. In stark contrast, Putin’s Russia is a dictatorship, a top-to-bottom power vertical led by one man.

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The invading Russian army is not the only enemy Ukraine faces; the Russian propaganda that drives and justifies the invasion is arguably just as deadly. Moscow does everything it can to silence Ukrainian voices and make sure that the history of Ukraine is viewed through Russia’s very selective and murky prism. These indoctrination efforts target Russians, Ukrainians, and also international audiences in different ways but with equal gusto.

For many years, it has been apparent that Western politicians, policymakers, and commentators are particularly susceptible to Russian’s anti-Ukrainian propaganda due to their often limited knowledge of the relevant regional history. Today, it has become more important than ever to counter Russia’s false historical narratives, as international support for Ukraine could very well determine the outcome of the war.

If Russian propaganda is not blunted, the average voter in Western countries will be left face-to-face with the fake Ukrainian history disseminated internationally by the Kremlin and its networks of allies and agents. These falsehoods include the central message that there is no separate Ukrainian people or Ukrainian state. Instead, there is only Russia.

This twisted logic allows Putin to claim, with a poker face, that Russia is not waging war against the Ukrainian people, despite the unprecedented bloodshed since February 2022. It forms the basis of his claim that Russia’s full-scale invasion is really an attempt to liberate Ukraine from “Nazis.” According to Putin, Ukraine is part of Russia, so the Western world has no right to interfere in what is essentially an internal affair.

The Kremlin’s weaponized version of history has helped garner high levels of domestic support for Putin and his invasion of Ukraine within Russia itself, if one is to take as gospel the integrity of opinion polls conducted in a dictatorship. Whether these surveys are genuinely representative or not, it is clear that there is no meaningful anti-war movement in today’s Russia.

Little can realistically be done at present about the state of public opinion inside Russia. The real danger is that Russian disinformation regarding Ukrainian history will be allowed to further influence opinion throughout the West and raise doubts over the legitimacy of Ukraine’s fight for survival. This could diminish the supply of military and other support at a time of Ukraine’s greatest need. That would be a tragedy for Ukraine and a disaster for the wider Western world, with grave consequences for the future of international security.

Ihor Smeshko is a Ukrainian politician and former head of Ukraine’s Defense Intelligence and Security Service.

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Debate has raged for the past twenty-one months over the true extent of Russian public support for the invasion of Ukraine. Many continue to question the validity of polls conducted in wartime Russia, with skeptics arguing that very few members of the public would be comfortable expressing anti-regime opinions to strangers. Indeed, given the draconian legislation adopted in Russia since February 2022 criminalizing criticism of the invasion, there is good reason to treat all research data coming out of the country with caution.

While there are legitimate doubts over the credibility of polling data, the findings detailed in this new report and the Levada Center’s more regular monitoring both closely mirror the available anecdotal evidence, which indicates high levels of public acceptance for the ongoing invasion. Perhaps the most compelling evidence has come from personal interactions between Ukrainians and their Russian relatives. With family ties connecting millions on both sides of the border, there has been ample opportunity for Ukrainians to get a sense of how ordinary Russians feel about the war. This has led to countless painful conversations, with Ukrainians frequently finding that people they have known all their lives now parrot Kremlin propaganda, blame Ukraine for the war, or deny core aspects of the invasion altogether.

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The almost complete absence of any meaningful anti-war activity in Russia is a further indication of public support, or at least acceptance, of the invasion. During the first weeks of hostilities, there were some attempts to hold anti-war rallies in a number of Russian cities, but these modest efforts soon ran out of steam. Some commentators have since argued that it is simply too dangerous to protest. However, wartime restrictions have not prevented Russians from freely voicing their opposition to various specific aspects of the invasion.

Since Putin first announced mobilization in September 2022, Russian soldiers and their family members have recorded and published hundreds of individual protest videos complaining about everything from poor conditions and lack of equipment to heavy losses and suicidal tactics. These publicly available addresses have often been highly critical of the Russian authorities, raising obvious questions about the validity of claims that Russians are afraid to oppose the state. Tellingly, there have been almost no videos of soldiers condemning the war itself or refusing to follow criminal orders, despite an apparent readiness to go public with their often explosive grievances.

The more than one million Russians who are believed to have fled the country following the full-scale invasion of Ukraine have also proven largely unwilling to voice their opposition to the war, despite not facing any of the restrictions in place inside Russia itself. While there are large Russian diasporas in multiple cities across Europe, there have been very few anti-war rallies since February 2022 or any other attempts by Russian citizens to protest against the invasion being carried out in their name. When Russians in Finland did recently mobilize to protest, it was to complain against the temporary closure of some border crossings with Russia.

All this is very good news for Vladimir Putin. The Russian dictator had initially hoped to secure a rapid military victory in Ukraine, but he is now actively preparing his country for a long war. He has already moved much of the Russian economy onto a war footing, and seems to have succeeded in convincing the vast majority of his compatriots that they are engaged in a struggle with the West that is both existential and unavoidable. With his home front looking remarkably stable and no sign of any domestic challenges on the horizon, Putin can look ahead to 2024 with a degree of confidence.

These latest indications of continued Russian public support for the war will further dampen any lingering hopes in Western capitals that internal opposition could yet derail the Russian invasion. The timing is particularly unfortunate, with talk of a battlefield stalemate in Ukraine already fueling doubts over the future of Western military aid. For now, Western leaders remain adamant that they will continue to stand with Ukraine for as long as it takes. However, they are extremely unlikely to be aided by any kind of anti-war uprising inside Russia itself.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

Putin debunks his own propaganda by disarming Russia’s NATO borders

Peter Dickinson — Tue, 28 Nov 2023 20:34:23 +0000

For the past twenty-one months, Vladimir Putin has consistently blamed NATO for provoking the invasion of Ukraine. According to the Kremlin dictator, years of NATO expansion posed an escalating security threat to Russia that eventually left the country with no choice but to defend itself. This NATO narrative has proven far more persuasive among international audiences than Russia’s more outlandish propaganda about “Ukrainian Nazis” and “Western Satanists.” However, it is now being debunked by Russia’s own actions. From Norway in the Arctic north to Kaliningrad in the west, Russia is making a mockery of Putin’s claims by dramatically reducing its military presence along the country’s borders with the NATO Alliance. If Putin genuinely believed NATO posed a threat to Russia, would he voluntarily disarm his entire front line?

This rather obvious flaw in the Kremlin’s logic was thrust into the spotlight on November 26 when Britain’s Ministry of Defense reported that Russia had likely withdrawn vital air defense systems from its Baltic Sea enclave of Kaliningrad to cover mounting losses in Ukraine. Many saw this as a particularly significant development as Kaliningrad is Russia’s most westerly outpost and is bordered on three sides by NATO member states. If Russian leaders were remotely serious about the possibility of a military confrontation with NATO, Kaliningrad is the last place they would want to leave undefended.

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The weakening of Kaliningrad’s air defenses is the latest in a series of steps that have revealed the reality behind Moscow’s frequent anti-NATO rhetoric. The first major indication that Russia was being less than honest about its NATO fears came in May 2022, when Sweden and Finland announced plans to abandon decades of neutrality and join the Alliance. Just a few months earlier, the Kremlin had paraded its NATO grievances in a bid to justify the bloodiest European invasion since World War II. In stark contrast, Russia now responded to the news from Stockholm and Helsinki with a shrug.

The complete lack of concern on display in Moscow was all the more remarkable given the fact that Finnish NATO accession would more than double Russia’s existing border with the Alliance, while Swedish membership would transform the Baltic Sea into a NATO lake. Nevertheless, Putin insisted Russia had “no problem” with this dramatic transformation of the geopolitical landscape in Northern Europe. He actively sought to downplay the issue, declining even to deploy the dark arts of Russian hybrid warfare or otherwise attempt to interfere in the accession process.

The Kremlin response to NATO’s recent Nordic expansion has extended beyond mere indifference. In the eighteen months since Finland’s announcement of impending NATO membership, Moscow has actively demilitarized the Finnish frontier and withdrawn the bulk of its troops away from the border zone for redeployment to the killing fields of Ukraine. Speaking in August 2023, Finnish Foreign Minister Elina Valtonen confirmed that the border area was now “pretty empty” of Russian troops. “If we were a threat, they would certainly not have moved their troops away, even in a situation where they are engaged somewhere else,” she noted.

A similar process has been underway since February 2022 on Russia’s nearby border with NATO member Norway. Norwegian army chief General Eirik Kristoffersen revealed in September 2023 that Russia had withdrawn approximately 80% of its troops from the border zone. “Vladimir Putin knows very well that NATO is not a threat against Russia,” commented Kristoffersen. “If he believed we were threatening Russia, he couldn’t have moved all his troops to Ukraine.”

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Putin’s readiness to demilitarize his country’s borders with neighboring NATO members is damning evidence that the decision to invade Ukraine had nothing to do with an alleged NATO threat to Russia itself. This does not mean his attacks on the Alliance are entirely insincere, of course. The vitriol Putin frequently displays toward NATO is real enough, but it does not reflect any legitimate security concerns. Instead, Putin resents NATO because it thwarts his revanchist agenda and prevents Russia from bullying its neighbors in the traditional manner. In other words, NATO presents no danger whatsoever to Russian national security, but it does pose a very serious threat to Russian imperialism.

This has long been apparent to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, who clamored to join NATO following the fall of the USSR precisely because they sought protection against what was widely seen as the inevitable revival of Russian aggression. Indeed, while Putin equates NATO enlargement with Western expansionism, the post-1991 growth of the Alliance was in fact almost exclusively driven by fear of Russia among the many countries queuing up to join. Their concerns were shaped by decades and in some cases centuries of brutal subjugation at the hands of the Russian Empire in its Tsarist and Soviet forms. If Russians want somebody to blame for the current NATO presence on their doorstep, they would be well advised to look in the mirror.

The full-scale invasion of Ukraine has now confirmed that these earlier fears of resurgent Russian imperialism were more than justified. Putin himself has openly compared the current invasion to Russian Tsar Peter the Great’s eighteenth century wars of imperial conquest, and has referred to occupied Ukrainian regions as “historical Russian lands.” He routinely denies Ukraine’s right to exist, while insisting Ukrainians are Russians (“one people”). Meanwhile, incitement to genocide has become completely normalized on Russian state television, with Russian soldiers in Ukraine acting on this genocidal rhetoric. The entire NATO narrative has served as a convenient smokescreen for what is a classic campaign of colonial conquest to destroy independent Ukraine.

The Kremlin knows very well that it has nothing to fear from NATO, and is evidently comfortable leaving its borders with the Alliance unguarded. Despite his anti-NATO posturing, Putin is actually motivated by a rising sense of alarm over the emergence of a democratic Ukraine, which he sees as an existential threat to his own authoritarian regime and a hated symbol of Russia’s post-1991 retreat from empire. As Ukraine has gradually slipped further and further away from the Kremlin orbit during Putin’s reign, his responses have become increasingly extreme, evolving from political interference in the 2000s to escalating military aggression since 2014. We have now reached the stage of open genocide.

With the invasion of Ukraine set to enter a third year, too many Western commentators and politicians are still laboring under the delusion that some kind of compromise with the Kremlin remains possible. This assumes the invasion of Ukraine is a conventional war with limited geopolitical objectives, which is clearly not the case. Instead, Putin is a messianic leader convinced of his own historic mission, who has staked everything on the destruction of the Ukrainian state and the reversal of Russia’s Cold War defeat. By pointing the finger of blame at NATO, Putin has sought to distract attention from this chilling reality, but a brief look at Russia’s recently demilitarized NATO borders should be enough to dismiss such claims.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

Kuleba has now elaborated further, listing a series of broken Russian promises to illustrate why Kyiv has no faith whatsoever in negotiations with Moscow. The Ukrainian Foreign Minister referenced a number of international agreements that were subsequently broken by Russia, beginning with the 1994 Budapest Memorandum and ending with the 2022 Black Sea Grain Initiative. On multiple occasions, he pointed out, Russia had committed to respecting Ukraine’s territorial integrity, but this did not prevent Putin from launching the largest European war of aggression since World War II. “Russia’s tactics have remained consistent in its many wars over the last three decades: Kill, grab, lie, and deny,” he wrote. “Why would anyone genuinely believe that Russia in 2023 is any different from Russia in 1994, 1997, 1999, 2008, 2014, 2015, and 2022?”

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Ukraine’s leaders are not alone in questioning the sincerity of Russian diplomacy. Indeed, Moscow’s credibility on the international stage has been seriously undermined by almost a decade of aggression against Ukraine that has been accompanied by a relentless flood of often transparent disinformation. When Russian soldiers without insignia first seized control of Ukraine’s Crimean peninsula in February 2014, Putin initially denied any Russian involvement, only to later admit that he had in fact personally given the order to invade. This naked deceit set the tone for Russia’s escalating attack on Ukraine.

Weeks after the military takeover of Crimea, Putin made similarly implausible claims of innocence as the same so-called “little green men” sparked a war in eastern Ukraine’s Donbas region. For the next eight years, Moscow officials would continue to stubbornly insist Russia was not involved in eastern Ukraine, despite mountains of evidence clearly demonstrating the presence of the Russian military and the Kremlin’s direct control over the entire invasion. Russia’s policy of blanket denials made it virtually impossible to establish a viable ceasefire or move forward toward a sustainable settlement of the war in eastern Ukraine. Instead, Moscow made sure the conflict remained unresolved and continued to simmer, setting the stage for the full-scale invasion of February 2022.

The build-up to the current invasion was marked by a further increase in Russian disinformation. For months prior to the outbreak of hostilities, Putin and other leading Russian officials loudly proclaimed that they had no intention of invading Ukraine and accused the West of warmongering. Some senior Kremlin figures even mocked international alarm over the possibility of a major European war. “February 15, 2022 will go down in history as the day of the failure of Western war propaganda. Humiliated and destroyed without firing a shot,” commented Russian foreign ministry spokesperson Maria Zakharova just days before columns of Russian tanks crossed the border into Ukraine.

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Given Russia’s long record of broken treaties and barefaced lies, it is little wonder the Ukrainian authorities insist negotiations can only begin after the Russian army has been beaten on the battlefield and forced to withdraw from Ukraine. Nor is there any indication that Putin himself is ready to negotiate. On the contrary, the Russian dictator is openly preparing his country for a long war and appears to be more convinced than ever that time is on his side.

Putin faces no real anti-war movement at home and has largely weathered the economic storms created by imperfectly implemented Western sanctions. While Russian military losses in Ukraine have been exceptionally high, the Kremlin has been careful to recruit cannon fodder from perceived low-risk groups such as convicted criminals, members of Russia’s ethnic minorities, and military-age males conscripted from occupied regions of Ukraine. This has made it possible to insulate the Russian middle classes from the horrors of the conflict unfolding in neighboring Ukraine.

With international resolve to oppose the invasion now beginning to visibly weaken and Western leaders distracted by events in Israel, Putin is also confident of outlasting the democratic world in Ukraine. He has always believed the West ultimately lacks the stomach for a prolonged confrontation with Russia, and is prepared to wait as long as necessary until international support for Ukraine wanes.

In the present circumstances, any attempts to pressure Ukraine into negotiating a compromise peace with Russia would have disastrous consequences for the future of international security. Unless Russia is decisively defeated, there is almost no chance of the Kremlin honoring any commitments made during negotiations. Instead, a messy peace deal would reward Putin for his decision to invade Ukraine and fuel Russia’s sense of impunity, paving the way for the next phase of Moscow’s campaign to extinguish Ukrainian statehood and revive the Russian Empire.

The Ukrainians understand this perfectly well. They have learned from bitter experience that Putin’s Russia cannot be trusted, which is why they are now so adamantly opposed to premature peace talks and recognize that making concessions to the Kremlin will only prolong their country’s agony. Anyone calling for a return to the negotiating table needs to be similarly realistic about the true nature of the Putin regime. A ceasefire may seem like the quickest way to end the bloodshed, but this is wishful thinking. In order to secure a lasting peace, Ukraine must win.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

International response

Ramped-up Russian propaganda machine targets the Armenian government

Russian forces suffer losses in attempt to break through Ukrainian line at Avdiivka

During a press briefing on October 26, John Kirby, coordinator for strategic communications at the National Security Council in the White House, confirmed that, according to US reports, Russian army officers are shooting soldiers for refusing to obey orders to attack. He also confirmed high losses for the Russian troops at Avdiivka, although he added that the Russian Armed Forces retain offensive capabilities and can achieve tactical successes. Though largely in ruins because of the fighting, Avdiivka is a strategically important town, and it could open the way to the southern parts of Donetsk Oblast for Ukrainian forces.

In a Telegram post on October 28, the commander of Ukraine’s Tavria operational-strategic group, Oleksandr Tarnavskyi, said that Russian losses had increased. Also, on October 28, British intelligence said it believed the Russian command threw at least eight brigades into the assaults on Avdiivka. This resulted in the most significant losses for the Russian Armed Forces in a single battle in 2023 so far. At the same time, the Russian army launched four Iskander-K cruise missiles at Ukrainian territory. The Ukrainian Air Force intercepted three of them, while the fourth missile reportedly missed its target.

On October 29, the Ukrainian army reported that the Russian army continued its offensive actions in the area around Kupiansk, Avdiivka, and Marinka and tried to regain lost positions near Andriivka and Robotyne. A resumption of Russian attacks in all regions except Lyman, where the regrouping of Russian Armed Forces units is underway, was reported by Ukraine’s army on October 28. The most intense fighting took place in the region around Avdiivka and Marinka.

In the evening of October 30, the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) noted a reduction in the intensity of Russian attacks compared to the previous days. In particular, there had been no attacks in the regions of Lyman or Zaporizhzhia, though five battles took place near Avdiivka and ten near Marinka.

The AFU Air Force has reported the shooting down of all twelve Shahed drones, as well as both Kh-59 missiles fired at Ukraine on October 29–30. On October 30, the Russian army hit the Odesa region with Onyx anti-ship missiles. According to the regional administration, a ship repair plant was damaged, and two enterprise employees were wounded.

Elsewhere, the commander of Ukraine’s Eastern Group troops, Oleksandr Syrskyi, said that Russian forces had brought reinforcements to the Bakhmut region and had transitioned from defense to offense, trying to regain lost positions. In particular, Russian airborne troops and the so-called “Storm Z” units, which are made up of former prisoners recruited in lieu of imprisonment, are being actively used.

The situation is also complicated in the region of Kupiansk, where Russian units are trying to advance in several directions simultaneously. On October 30, locals reported that explosions were heard and smoke seen overhead in occupied Sevastopol after missiles flew over. The occupation authorities reported that the strikes were carried out with Storm Shadow cruise missiles. On its Telegram channel, the Strategic Communications Directorate of the Ukrainian Armed Forces Commander-in-Chief’s Office confirmed that an air defense facility of the Russian occupation forces in Crimea was hit on October 30. In the same Telegram post, the department also confirmed that, on October 25, it had destroyed an S-400 air defense missile system in occupied Luhansk, which had only been rumored up to that point.

Meanwhile, on the international engagement front, Ukrainian officials continued to engage with officials from allied countries, including the United States and the United Kingdom. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy met with a bipartisan US congressional delegation on October 30, when he briefed them on the situation at the front and discussed further assistance needed for the Ukrainian armed forces. A few days earlier, on October 28, the New York Times reported that US experts had modified a Soviet-made Ukrainian Surface-to-Air Missile (SAM) system to fire Patriot missiles. Such “hybrid” SAMs will assist Ukraine in defending itself against Russian missile strikes.

Elsewhere, on October 26, the commander-in-chief of the AFU, Valerii Zaluzhnyi, held a meeting with Commander of NATO in Europe General Christopher Cavoli, as well as with Admiral Tony Radakin, chief of the British defense staff. Together, they discussed the situation on the front, supplies of ammunition, and air defense equipment for Ukraine. A few days later on October 30, the British defense secretary said that his government would provide more military aid to Ukraine and would not let other countries forget about the war.

Finally, Azerbaijan sent a large shipment of humanitarian aid to Ukraine, including cables to repair the power grid, a critical need before winter arrives.

—Ruslan Trad, resident fellow for security research, Sofia, Bulgaria

Ramped-up Russian propaganda machine targets the Armenian government

In an October 25 interview with the Wall Street Journal, two days after signing defense cooperation agreement with France, including an unprecedented agreement on buying French weapons, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan made a resounding call for diversifying Armenia’s security alliances, shaking the traditional (i.e., Russia-favored) balance of power in the region.

The Wall Street Journal quoted Pashinyan as saying the post factum realities of Nagorno-Karabakh following Azerbaijan’s seizure of the territory brought the Armenian government to a decision to diversify relationships in the security sector. Notably, Pashinyan also said he sees no benefits in maintaining Russian military bases in Armenia. Officially, there are no procedures aimed at the closure of the sizable Russian military base on the country’s border with Turkey.

As Armenia increasingly moves away from Russia due to Moscow’s continuous failures to fulfill its contractual obligations and the loss of its biggest leverage over Armenia, Nagorno-Karabakh, Russia’s influence has softened significantly. This diminishing influence has prompted Kremlin propaganda to become more aggressive in its efforts to maintain its influence on Armenia.

In early October, against all of Russia’s warnings, Armenia ratified the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, which has issued an arrest warrant for Russian President Vladimir Putin. These recent events, combined with the failure of Russia’s peacekeeping mission in Nagorno-Karabakh that led to the complete depopulation of Armenians from the territory, prompted Kremlin propagandists to call more openly and intensively for the overthrow of the Armenian government.

Russian state TV channel Channel 1 dedicated an hour-long program to attacking Pashinyan, portraying him as a Western puppet and a traitor. Specifically, the October 23 broadcast of the show “Heir Tutti’s Dolls” included a segment titled “Nikol Pashinyan: a harbinger of disaster,” during which the hosts claimed that Pashinyan was mentally ill, among other things.

In the opening of the program, a reporter addressed Pashinyan’s October 17 speech before the European Parliament, in which he openly called out Russia and stated that Armenia is ready for closer ties with the EU. In the segment, the report declared “allies, partners, and his own people were thrown at the feet of the Borrels and all sorts of Ursulas,” referencing High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Josep Borrell and President of the European Commission Ursula von der Leyen. The reporter further editorialized that, while Pashinyan “was crawling under the puppets of the Anglo-Saxons, his wife, Anna Hakobyan, was driving around Kyiv, whispering with [US Secretary of State Antony] Blinken, cozying up to Zelenskyy, and, on behalf of her husband, even agreed to send humanitarian aid to Ukraine.”

The program also made unfavorable comparisons between Pashinyan, Zelenskyy, and former Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili, portraying all of them as Western puppets. The DFRLab previously reported on Russia’s greater propaganda efforts to push conspiracy theories that the West has appointed unfit leaders to bring disastrous outcomes to these countries.

The next day, Armenia delivered a note of protest to the Russian ambassador to Armenia over the TV program. Russia responded quickly. On October 26, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) summoned the Armenian charge d’affaires in Moscow. According to the Russian state agency RIA Novosti, MFA spokesperson Maria Zakharova added that the Armenian diplomat was told about the “unacceptability” of the ongoing “unbridled anti-Russian campaign” in Armenia, including on public television and other government-controlled media and through Telegram channels. Regarding the Wall Street Journal interview, Zakharova said that Pashinyan fell for provocative questions aimed at causing maximum damage to their respective countries’ relations and added, “unfortunately, in the current Armenian realities, such incitements work.”

On October 29, Armenia Public TV aired an episode of the program “Public Discussion” titled “the falsity and manipulation about Armenia on the Russian air” that focused on discussing the “Heir Tutti’s Dolls” episode. Civil society members and Western-aligned political figures participating in the program speculated that Russia is possibly preparing a “disaster,” such as cutting the gas supply, that it would pin on the Armenian government through messaging and that perhaps worse actions beyond subversive activities (such as information operations) could be taken against Armenia, given Russia’s aggression against Georgia and Ukraine.

—Ani Mejlumyan, research assistant, Yerevan, Armenia

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Alsu Kurmasheva arrest: Russia has detained two US journalists this year

Mercedes Sapuppo — Mon, 23 Oct 2023 23:52:13 +0000

The Russian authorities detained Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty journalist Alsu Kurmasheva on October 18 for failing to register as a foreign agent. Kurmasheva holds both US and Russian citizenship, making her the second American journalist to be arrested in Russia so far this year. Kurmasheva’s detention comes following the arrest of Wall Street Journal reporter Evan Gershkovich in spring 2023. Gershkovich was detained in Russia on March 29 while on a reporting trip. He has been accused of espionage, making him the first American journalist detained in Russia on such charges since the Cold War.

The arrest and detention of two American journalists represents a further escalation in Russia’s confrontation with the West. While the Putin regime has long since muzzled the Russian media, measures against accredited international journalists operating in the country or foreign media representatives had previously been comparatively rare and were typically limited to entry bans or deportation orders. However, following the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Russia now clearly views foreign correspondents as legitimate targets.

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Since the launch of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the Kremlin has introduced a range of restrictions that have further tightened state control over the Russian information space. Large numbers of outlets have been forced to shut down entirely, while others have left Russia to continue their media activities in exile.

Those remaining in Russia have found themselves forced to operate in an increasingly suffocating environment where any negative coverage of the war in Ukraine could potentially lead to prosecution for “discrediting the Russian military.” In one particularly Orwellian move, Russian journalists have been forbidden from calling the invasion of Ukraine a “war,” and are instead obliged to employ the government’s euphemistic “special military operation” terminology.

It is not hard to imagine why Kurmasheva might have been targeted by the Russian authorities. Her work for RFE/RL reporting on ethnic minorities in Tatarstan and Bashkortostan, along with her coverage of the Russian anti-war movement, has challenged the Kremlin’s own carefully curated narrative of national unity and widespread public support for the invasion of Ukraine.

Kurmasheva was initially detained in June 2023 at Kazan airport as she was preparing to leave Russia following a family visit. Her US and Russian passports were confiscated and she was fined for failing to register her US passport. Kurmasheva was awaiting the return of her documents when new charges were announced in October 18. Five days later, a Russian court extended her detention until December 2023.

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Russia has frequently been accused of using its foreign agent legislation to launch politically motivated prosecutions. Russia’s foreign agent laws were first introduced in 2012 and were widely seen as a hard line turn following Putin’s return to the presidency. These laws were then significantly expanded in early 2022 after the onset of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine as part of an escalating crackdown on anti-war sentiment.

Critics say the legal definition of foreign agent has been kept deliberately vague and can be applied to any group or individual deemed to be “under foreign influence.” Kurmasheva is the first journalist to be arrested under a specific portion of the criminal code that punishes failure to register officially as a foreign agent. She has also been accused of “carrying out targeted collection of information in the field of military activities of the Russian Federation.”

The detention of US citizens Kurmasheva and Gershkovich has had a chilling effect on the dwindling international correspondent community working in Putin’s Russia. Many leading international media outlets are now reluctant to maintain fully-staffed bureaus in Moscow due to the apparent risk of arrest, with individual journalists also no longer confident about their personal security. This is making it all the more difficult to report on Russia at a time when accurate international coverage of the country has never been so important.

As the Washington Post’s write-up on Kurmasheva notes, her arrest marks an “ominous new phase in Russia’s repression of journalists.” As well as making it far harder for the media to cover Russia, some fear the arrest of two American journalists may also be part of Kremlin efforts to imprison US citizens in order to then exchange them at a later date for Russian nationals detained in the West. As Reporters Without Borders/Reporters sans Frontiers Eastern Europe and Central Asia desk head Janne Cavelier has stated, “journalists must not be used as bargaining chips in Moscow’s war against Kyiv.” Unless the international community reacts strongly to this latest arrest, it is likely more foreign journalists working or traveling in Russia will face a similar fate.

Mercedes Sapuppo is a program assistant at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

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In the West, it has become common to explain this pro-war sentiment by arguing that Russians have been brainwashed by the Kremlin-controlled state media. Some commentators also mention widespread Russian apathy and disengagement from politics. However, these explanations risk infantilizing Russian society and stereotyping Russians as passive conformists with no agency of their own.

Most Western observers struggle to perceive Russian support for the war as a conscious choice because they are unable to accept that supporting a genocidal war could ever be seen as rational. Nevertheless, studies of past wars of aggression and authoritarianism tell us that the protagonists of evil typically regard their actions as both reasonable and justifiable. In Russia’s case, it is the country’s imperial past and the imperial intimacy of the Russian relationship with Ukraine that serve to justify the current war.

This imperial intimacy reflects deeply rooted historical ideas of kinship and fraternity that have encouraged generations of Russians to view Ukrainians as part of their nation. It is a hierarchical intimacy, with Ukrainians cast in the role of “little brothers” in need of protection and tutelage. This encompasses the necessity of “disciplining” Ukrainians for their own good. Such thinking is a central pillar of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s “Russian World” ideology.

Putin’s notorious July 2021 essay “On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians” was a manifesto of imperial intimacy that openly questioned Ukraine’s right to statehood while denying the existence of a separate Ukrainian nation. Instead, Putin argued, Ukrainians were really Russians (“one people”). On the eve of the full-scale invasion, he declared that Ukraine was “an inalienable part of our own history, culture, and spiritual space.”

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Officially, the Kremlin has sought to justify the war by pointing to decades of post-Cold War NATO expansion while portraying Ukraine as a far-right threat to Russia itself. However, when addressing domestic audiences, Putin has often been more open about his imperial agenda. Speaking in summer 2022, he compared the current invasion to the eighteenth century imperial conquests of Russian Czar Peter the Great and claimed it was now his turn to “return” Russian lands. A few months later, Putin oversaw a lavish Kremlin ceremony marking the “annexation” of four Ukrainian provinces. Amid the unmistakable trappings of empire, he declared that these partially occupied Ukrainian regions had returned to Russia “forever.”

Such imperial posturing in relation to Ukraine resonates widely with the Russian public. Many Russians see today’s war as an historic mission to overcome the injustice of the Soviet collapse and reunite their country with Ukraine following decades of “artificial separation.” The imperial intimacy underpinning their attitudes toward Ukraine allows them to overlook the obvious opposition of the Ukrainian people to this reunion.

Over the past twenty months of full-scale warfare, denial of Ukrainian statehood and talk of imperial revival have become prominent features of Russia’s heavily censored and carefully choreographed information space. Ukrainians are routinely dehumanized and Ukraine itself is dismissed as an intolerable “anti-Russia.” Meanwhile, pundits on Russian state TV regularly discuss the need to exile or annihilate large numbers of Ukrainians. This genocidal rhetoric is typically framed as the inevitable price of achieving historical justice and saving Ukrainians from themselves.

While it is convenient to blame today’s war on Vladimir Putin and view it as the product of one man’s criminal fantasies, the problem of Russian imperialism is far bigger than Putin alone. Many millions of ordinary Russians support the war because they continue to view Ukraine through the distorting prism of imperial intimacy.

The situation is unlikely to change until a majority of Russians recognize that true patriotism means acknowledging past injustices bestowed by empire on Russians, Ukrainians, Georgians, Lithuanians, Chechens, and many others. This would open the way for the emergence of a new Russia with the potential to live in peace with its neighbors while finally realizing its vast potential. Unless this change occurs, Russian imperialism will remain a major destabilizing factor in global security.

Neringa Klumbytė is director of the Lithuania Program at Miami University’s Havighurst Center for Russian and Post-Soviet Studies.

Website impersonating Ukrainian news agency spreads narratives aimed at undermining Ukrainian morale

Media policy

Russia increasingly using criminal charges for online activities, says digital rights group

Russia’s federal budget draft indicates a funding boost for state media

International affairs

Putin meets South Sudanese President Salva Kiir

Strike on Ukrainian cafe leaves more than forty dead

An attack on the village of Hroza in northeast Ukraine left more than four dozen people dead, according to a Telegram statement from Ukraine’s Office of the General Prosecutor. According to the statement, the attack occurred around 1:25 p.m. local time on October 5, destroying a local cafe shop. It also noted local prosecutors have launched a pre-trial investigation. In a separate Telegram post, which included graphic imagery, Ukrainian presidential adviser Oleksiy Kuleba blamed Russia for the attack, stating, “A terrorist country deliberately kills peaceful Ukrainians. The world needs to see what true evil is.”

The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA) also condemned the attack. “Intentionally directing an attack against civilians or civilian objects is a war crime,” UN OCHA Humanitarian Coordinator for Ukraine Denise Brown stated. “Intentionally launching an attack knowing that it would be disproportionate is a war crime.”

Meanwhile, a Reuters report published on October 3 claimed that the Russian army has embedded so-called “Storm-Z” units within conventional Russian units to conduct counterattacks against Ukrainian gains in crucial front sectors. Reuters reported that the Storm-Z units comprise 100-150 personnel, including civilian penal recruits and Russian soldiers under punishment. The Russian army and defense ministry have not confirmed the existence of the Storm-Z units.

—Andy Carvin, managing editor, Washington DC

—Ruslan Trad, resident fellow for security research, Sofia, Bulgaria

Website impersonating Ukrainian news agency spreads narratives aimed at undermining Ukrainian morale

The DFRLab has identified at least one Facebook ad promoting a website impersonating a Ukrainian news agency. The now-defunct Facebook page “Onaqaq online shop” published the ad. It accused Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and Ukrainian leadership of corruption and misusing aid provided by the United States. The ad featured a caricature of the president alongside text noting the creation of a US team to monitor how aid to Ukraine is being used. The ad declared that all of Ukraine’s elite are corrupt and shared a debunked claim about a former “commander-in-chief,” likely a reference to Oleksii Reznikov, buying a villa for his daughter.

Screenshot of an ad from a now-defunct Facebook page. (Source: Facebook)

The ad included a link to the website thumbra.com, which when accessed by the DFRLab redirected to unian.in, a page masquerading as the website for the Ukrainian Independent Information Agency, unian.ua. At the time of writing, the website no longer redirected to the copycat website. Much of the content on the copycat website links back to UNIAN’s actual website, including share buttons. The link in the ad led to a forged story regarding Ukraine’s allies becoming skeptical of its ability to succeed in the war against Russia. The article cited decreased military aid as an indicator that allies are abandoning Ukraine.

Screenshots of a real UNIAN story (left) compared to the forgery page promoted by the Facebook ad (right). (Sources: Unian, left; Unian.in/archive, right)

Multiple aspects of the forgery point to it likely being of Russian origin. The strongest indicator is that the URL address includes “skepsis-i-podozritelnost,” which is transliterated from Russian, not Ukrainian. Second, the article is written in Ukrainian, but the tone and style differ from that of the information agency. Third, the faux article’s banner image, a stock photo, does not have a caption, as is standard for UNIAN. The image was also edited to include a text overlay, which reads “Allies don’t believe in us anymore?” UNIAN does not edit the stock photography it uses for banner images.

These types of forgeries are not unique. On September 18, a Ukrainian researcher found a similar forgery replicating the UNIAN website, which spread a narrative claiming that Ukraine’s allies are decreasing weapons shipments to Ukraine to force it to negotiate with Russia. The article stated that Ukraine’s losses were “in vain” as its allies plan to “sacrifice” the country for their own self-interest.

Campaigns such as this are likely intended to decrease the morale of Ukrainians. The DFRLab has previously covered similar attempts by Russia to impersonate media, including Operation Doppelganger, in which Russian assets impersonated prominent European news outlets.

—Roman Osadchuk, research associate

Russia increasingly using criminal charges for online activities, says digital rights group

In its latest monthly digest, Russian digital rights organization Roskomsvoboda examined high-profile cases in which Russian politicians or activists were punished, via administrative or criminal charges, for their online activities. According to Roskomsvoboda, the cases illustrate an increasing use of criminal charges rather than administrative ones, a reversal of what it observed in 2022.

The report also noted instances of Russians being punished for Telegram posts that “disrespect” or “discredit” Russian authorities or the army. One person was criminally charged for giving an interview to Ukrainian media, while another was charged for “participating in an extremist community.”

—Eto Buziashvili, research associate, Tbilisi, Georgia

Russia’s federal budget draft indicates a funding boost for state media

On September 29, the Kremlin submitted the 2024-2026 draft federal budget to the State Duma. According to the independent Russian news outlet Verstka, the Kremlin plans to increase funding for its state-run platforms, which are known to sow disinformation and propaganda. The increase coincides with Russia’s 2024 presidential elections.

The budget reportedly allocates 315 billion rubles ($3 billion) to support Russian media for the next three years. The budget assigns 121.3 billion rubles ($1.2 billion) for 2024, 94.1 billion rubles ($945 million) for 2025, and 99.5 billion rubles ($1 billion) for 2026. Overall, the draft media budget represents a decrease of 20 billion rubles ($200 million) from the previous budget; according to Verstka, the draft indicates that state-owned media will receive the largest funding stream in the election year, after which funds will decrease.

The report also noted that in 2024, RT will receive 1.8 billion rubles ($18 million) more than it received last year, and Vladimir Solovyov’s channel Solovyov LIVE will receive 750 million rubles ($7.5 million).

—Eto Buziashvili, research associate, Tbilisi, Georgia

Putin meets South Sudanese President Salva Kiir

South Sudanese President Salva Kiir travelled to Moscow to meet with Russian President Vladimir Putin on Thursday, September 28, where the two reportedly agreed to strengthen the relationship between the two countries, particularly focusing on trade, energy, and oil.

According to a transcript posted by the Kremlin, Putin told Kiir, “This is only the beginning. We have many good opportunities in a variety of fields, including energy.”

Oil-rich South Sudan seceded from Sudan in 2011 with Kiir at the country’s helm. South Sudan was admitted to the United Nations in the same year. The country has had a tenuous relationship with the international body, however, which extended an arms embargo against South Sudan in 2022; Russia abstained from that vote. Given that Russia is a permanent member of the UN Security Council, Kiir may look to Russia as an ally in his bid to have the embargo lifted. Notably, Kiir told Putin that Russia was a “strong friend” of South Sudan.

In his statement, Putin claimed Russia would also support South Sudan on the domestic front. Kiir is facing mounting pressure from the international community to move forward with a peace deal signed in 2018 and prepare for elections in 2024.

Putin’s meeting with Kiir comes off the back of the July 2023 Russia-Africa summit, in which Russia attempted to strengthen and solidify its relationships with African countries. In May 2023, the African Union warned that African countries should “resist all forms of instrumentalization” in a conflict that threatens to “transform Africa into a geostrategic battleground,” adding that it would come at the detriment of the continent.

—Tessa Knight, research associate, London, United Kingdom

The post Russian War Report: Civilian cafe attacked and a fake Ukrainian news site is exposed appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Ukraine’s soccer stars help to keep Russia’s invasion in global spotlight

Renat Zihanshyn, Oleksandra Gaidai — Sat, 30 Sep 2023 22:37:25 +0000

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy named Ukrainian soccer legend Andriy Shevchenko as an official advisor on September 26. This appointment reflects the contribution Shevchenko and other high-profile footballers have made toward keeping Ukraine’s struggle against Russian aggression in the international spotlight. At a time when many in Kyiv are alarmed by the prospect of mounting “Ukraine fatigue,” the country’s soccer stars have the ability to reach global audiences numbering hundreds of millions. For example, according to research conducted by Brand Ukraine, the Ukrainian national team is among the most popular Ukraine-related searches on Google.

Former Ukrainian national team captain and coach Shevchenko has been particularly prominent in efforts to raise international awareness about Russia’s ongoing invasion. As an ambassador for Ukraine’s UNITED24 platform since spring 2022, he has done much to highlight the wartime experience of Ukraine’s civilian population and the humanitarian cost of the war.

Shevchenko was instrumental in organizing the Game4Ukraine initiative, an all-star charity match that took place in August 2023 at Stamford Bridge, the home ground of English Premier League side Chelsea, where Shevchenko spent three seasons as a player during the twilight years of his career. The Game4Ukraine charity match raised funds to rebuild a Ukrainian school destroyed during the Russian invasion. Crucially, the event also attracted considerable media attention and helped keep Ukraine in the headlines.

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As a former Ballon d’Or winner and AC Milan hero who is widely regarded as one of the greatest strikers of his generation, Shevchenko is a natural ambassador. However, he is far from the only Ukrainian soccer player to speak out on behalf of their country since the onset of Russia’s full-scale invasion nineteen months ago. Many Ukrainian footballers currently playing for teams in Europe’s top leagues have been active since February 2022 in efforts to promote awareness of their country’s plight.

In England, Arsenal’s Oleksandr Zinchenko has been particularly vocal, while Everton’s Vitaliy Mykolenko has been outspoken in his criticism of the conflict and the failure of Russian sports stars to condemn the invasion. Other Ukrainian footballers including Ruslan Malinovskyi, who plays for Italian side Genoa, and national team captain Andriy Yarmolenko have been similarly supportive of their country. In Ukraine itself, famous footballers have also been involved in numerous fundraising initiatives.

Recently appointed Ukrainian national team coach Serhiy Rebrov is another prominent figure from Ukraine’s footballing fraternity who has championed the country’s struggle against Russia’s invasion. Rebrov was one of the driving forces behind the creation of the Ukrainian Army Support Fund, and has spoken publicly about his family’s decision to switch from Russian to the Ukrainian language in their daily lives. Rebrov has stated that he has received numerous offers to take on lucrative coaching roles in Russia since 2014 but has rejected them all. “My position is unequivocal,” he stated in summer 2022. “No contact with the country that attacked my people.”

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The prominent role being played by Ukraine’s footballers in the information space reflects the country’s rich footballing tradition. During the Cold War, Ukrainian clubs dominated the domestic soccer scene inside the Soviet Union, with standout team Dynamo Kyiv twice winning UEFA’s European Cup Winners Cup. Meanwhile, the Soviet national team relied heavily on Ukrainian talent, with more than half of the squad that reached the European Championship Final in 1988 hailing from Ukraine. The most celebrated football trainer in Soviet history, Valeriy Lobanovskiy, was also Ukrainian.

The Ukrainian national team has struggled to build on this remarkable legacy during the post-Soviet era, but Ukrainian club teams remain among the strongest in Eastern Europe. A swashbuckling Dynamo Kyiv side featuring a young Andriy Shevchenko famously reached the semi-finals of the Champions League in 1999, while bitter domestic rivals Shakhtar Donetsk won the UEFA Cup in 2009 and regularly feature in the knockout stages of European competition. Since the start of the war, both Dynamo Kyiv and Shakhtar Donetsk have played multiple charity games against teams throughout Europe to help raise money for the victims of Russian aggression.

Ukraine’s primary footballing ambassadors remain the country’s national team. After narrowly failing to reach the 2022 World Cup in Qatar, Ukraine is now hoping to qualify for the 2024 European Championship, with the last matches of the qualifying stage scheduled for October and November 2023. The decisive tie is likely to be Ukraine’s match against Italy on November 20.

The security challenges created by the ongoing war with Russia mean that Ukraine’s national team must play its home ties in nearby Poland, where the presence of a large Ukrainian community guarantees packed stadiums and strong support. Each qualification match also provides millions of Ukrainians back home with a welcome distraction from the horrors of Russia’s invasion, while also serving as a reminder to global audiences of Ukraine’s remarkable resilience.

Renat Zihanshyn is a digital marketing strategist, author, and content manager of the R/Z FOOTBALL YouTube channel. Oleksandra Gaidai is a Department of History postdoctoral fellow at American University.

Russian President Vladimir Putin has set the tone for Russia’s viciously anti-Ukrainian public dialogue and has frequently engaged in what could be classed as genocidal language. He routinely asserts that Ukrainians are actually Russians (“one people”), and has repeatedly denied Ukraine’s right to exist while insisting the country is guilty of occupying “historical Russian lands.” In one particularly chilling recent outburst in September 2023, Putin denounced the “anti-human essence” of the modern Ukrainian state. Such dehumanization is widely recognized as an important indicator of genocidal intent.

Others throughout the Russian establishment have enthusiastically echoed Putin. According to research conducted by the Washington-based New Lines Institute and the Raoul Wallenberg Centre for Human Rights in Montreal, Russia’s state-orchestrated incitement to genocide includes “the denial of the existence of a Ukrainian identity” by senior Russian officials and state media.

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The UN defines genocide as “the intent to destroy a national, ethnic, racial, or religious group, in whole or in part.” The five acts internationally defined as genocide include killings, causing serious harm, deliberately inflicting physically destructive conditions of life, imposing birth prevention measures, and forcibly transferring children to another group. Russia stands accused of committing all five acts against Ukrainians.

Evidence of Russian war crimes in Ukraine is extensive. An array of state and non-state international organizations have documented a vast amount of Russian crimes in Ukraine including the torture and execution of civilians and POWs, forced deportations, and the targeting of Ukrainian cultural, historical, and religious sites. Tens of thousands of Ukrainian civilians were killed during the Russian attack on Mariupol in spring 2022. Dozens of other Ukrainian towns and cities have since suffered similar fates.

The Kremlin began setting the stage for these crimes many years before the onset of the full-scale invasion in February 2022. According to the Just Security forum at the New York University School of Law, this process dates back to at least 2008 or 2009, and has been marked by “increasingly hostile language laying the groundwork for rejecting Ukraine’s existence as a state, a national group, and a culture.”

Even casual consumers of Russia’s mainstream media will be immediately familiar with this poisonous anti-Ukrainian agenda. Indeed, the demonization of Ukraine has long since become totally normalized throughout the Russian information space, with the Ukrainian authorities groundlessly portrayed as fascists and symbols of Ukrainian national identity routinely equated with Nazism. Russian television hosts and invited “experts” regularly talk of the need to destroy Ukraine.

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For more than a decade, Putin’s powerful propaganda machine has prepared the Russian public for the genocide they are now committing in Ukraine. This process has included the coordinated promotion of anti-Ukrainian messaging designed to rob the country of legitimacy and position it as an existential threat to Russia. Ukraine has consistently been portrayed as a failed state, an anti-Russian project devised by the West, and a puppet of anti-Russian forces. Meanwhile, the Ukrainian language and all other expressions of Ukrainian national identity have been derided as artificial and historically illegitimate.

This relentless flood of anti-Ukrainian propaganda appears to have conditioned the majority of Russians to accept the current invasion. Independent polls indicate overwhelming levels of public support for the war, despite widespread awareness of atrocities such as the destruction of entire Ukrainian cities and the deliberate bombing of Ukraine’s essential civilian infrastructure.

President Zelenskyy is not the only prominent figure to accuse Russia of committing genocide in Ukraine. Indeed, US President Joe Biden and his rival Donald Trump both did so during the early months of the invasion. More recently, US lawmakers visiting The Hague in September 2023 said Putin had “tried to erase a culture, a people, and a religion, and that is the definition of genocide.” They join a growing chorus of experts and academics who unambiguously state that Russia’s actions in Ukraine represent a genocide.

It will be some time before the United Nations and other relevant international bodies arrive at a definitive legal verdict on the genocide question. At this relatively early stage in the investigation process, the International Criminal Court has already issued an arrest warrant for Putin over the mass abduction of Ukrainian children, which itself likely qualifies as an act of genocide. As investigations progress, the role of Russia’s propaganda machine and the genocidal intent displayed by Kremlin officials including Putin himself will be closely scrutinized.

Dr. Taras Kuzio is a professor in the Department of Political Science at the National University of Kyiv Mohyla Academy and an associate research fellow at the Henry Jackson Society. His latest book “Fascism and Genocide. Russia’s War Against Ukrainians” was published by Columbia University Press this year.

Reporters Without Borders (RSF, by its Spanish acronym) defines press freedom as “the ability of journalists, as individuals and collectives, to select, produce and disseminate news in the public interest independent of political, economic, legal and social interference and in the absence of threats to their physical and mental safety.”

Press freedom is included in the Atlantic Council’s Freedom and Prosperity Indexes, as part of the civil liberties indicator in the Political Freedom Index. Mexico, considered Mostly Free, ranks 82nd of 174 countries included in the overall Freedom Index, with a score of 58.2 out of 100. Regarding Political Freedom specifically, it ranked 88th, scoring 60.8 out of 100.

Mexico is very different to its neighbors to the north: the United States had an overall score of 79.2 and Canada 87.8, ranking them at 29th and 11th respectively in the Freedom Index. One southern neighbor, Belize, also outperforms Mexico on this Index, scoring 61.9 in 2021, although Mexico came out slightly ahead of Guatemala, which scored 54.3 in the same year.¹

In this chapter, we analyze press freedom in Mexico, considering the socio-territorial particularities and political landscape of the country. Specifically, our analysis includes the presence of drug cartels and transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) throughout the territory, the levels of marginalization, and the Mexican president’s stance on the press.

Another objective of this chapter is to examine the outcomes of the Protection Mechanism for Human Rights Defenders and Journalists that the Mexican government implemented to confront violence against those who seek to uncover the truth and uphold human rights. In addition to the diagnosis made by the Office in Mexico of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights,² an anonymous interview was conducted for this research with a journalist who requested protection under the Mechanism and experienced, first-hand, its advantages and limitations.

According to the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), fifty-five journalists were murdered worldwide in 2021, seven of them in Mexico.³ Journalists work to strengthen public interests, including freedom of expression, but unfortunately their integrity is often violated in different countries and under different circumstances. The past decade has revealed new trends. Long ago, murders of journalists occurred mostly in countries experiencing armed conflicts; but now, they are regularly committed in countries at peace, in two regions in particular: Asia-Pacific and Latin America. Most of these murders are committed in countries with large social inequalities and/or high rates of violence and crime.

Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights established that everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression.⁴ This right includes the freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive, and impart information and ideas through any media, regardless of frontiers.

In Mexico, press freedom has been recognized by law since 1917 when the current constitution was enacted; nonetheless, censorship comes in the shape of threats and direct attacks from both sides: organized crime and the authorities. Also, new technologies add a different dimension: on one hand, they offer the possibility of a broad and rapid distribution of information, but on the other, journalists are exposed to online threats and harassment—and even to surveillance, making them and their informants more vulnerable. The low cost and high quality of surveillance technology mean these tactics are very easy and cheap to implement.

It is also worth noting that most of the media in Mexico are in the hands of big national companies, which makes it difficult to rely on the quality of the news. But not only that, since the election of President Andrés Manuel López Obrador (AMLO) in 2018, he has started a campaign against journalists, whom he accuses of supporting the political opposition, calling them “biased,” “unfair,” and “the scum of journalism.”

Mexico is considered one of the deadliest and most dangerous countries for journalists; a correlation between levels of organized crime and violence perpetrated against journalists is evident. From 2000 to 2022, 163 journalists were murdered in Mexico, thirty-eight of those during President AMLO’s tenure.⁵ Moreover, most of the killings occurred in states where some of the most prominent drug cartels operate.

To protect journalists and human rights defenders from continued violence, the Mexican government launched a program in 2012 called the Protection Mechanism for Human Rights Defenders and Journalists.⁶ Although the Mechanism was deployed ten years ago, 2022 became the deadliest year for journalists in that period, proving that it has not been enough to safeguard journalists’ lives. In the following section we will describe the context of Mexican journalism, and discuss the Mechanism’s impact, ten years after its implementation.

Mexico and its press, in context

Mexico is a country of 126 million people, with 43.9 percent living in conditions of poverty. Twelve of Mexico’s thirty-two states have more than 50 percent of their population living in poverty.⁷ Also, Mexico is multicultural, with seventy-one indigenous groups representing more than seven million people who speak an indigenous language. Social, cultural, and economic inequalities are, as expected, concentrated in those indigenous groups, and disproportionate numbers live in states where illegal drugs are either produced or transported. Also, it is well known that corruption is a major problem in the country. Even though the current federal government declared it to be one of its top priorities, results show that actions have been too weak. The Mexican Institute for Competitiveness (IMCO), a non-partisan, nonprofit public policy research center, created its own Corruption Risk Index, focusing on public procurement by analyzing 260 institutions from 2018 to 2021. IMCO’s key findings included that federal institutions do not prioritize public bidding processes, that contract documents are often unavailable, and that contracts are frequently awarded to risky suppliers.⁸

Along with poverty and corruption, Mexico has another major problem: transnational criminal organizations (TCOs), commonly referred to as “drug cartels” and “drug trafficking organizations” (DTOs). In 2006 the federal government launched a war against DTOs, fragmenting the larger and more stable organizations and sparking greater violence. TCOs are not limited to producing and/or transporting drugs; instead, or in addition, they are responsible for kidnappings, extortion, and inflicting terror on communities.

With prevailing poverty, corruption, and organized crime, national, regional, and local governance is poor. The press, thus, plays a central role in bringing relevant information on the most important local and/or national issues to public attention. Whether those issues include corruption in some government office or illegal activities of organized groups in a village, journalists are exposed to a very volatile, highly dangerous environment.

Television is the most important format for news media in Mexico, but there is also radio, journals, magazines, blogs, and social media. There are dozens of national news media outlets, but broadcasting is controlled by Televisa, which in 2021 merged with US-based Spanish-language network Univision. There are seventy daily newspapers, twenty-four radio stations, and forty-four websites, all of them led by the Mexican Editorial Organization.⁹ Grupo Imagen is also an important multimedia conglomerate; other actors include newspapers such as El Universal, Reforma, and Milenio, and the news portal Latinus. There is also Azteca Noticias group.

Source: Nic Newman, Richard Fletcher, Craig T. Robertson, Kirsten Eddy, and Rasmus Kleis Nielsen, Reuters Institute Digital News Report 2022, (Oxford: Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism and University of Oxford, 2022).

In Mexico, a privately owned commercial broadcasting system was developed over the years through the concession of a public good to a handful of private individuals—a flawed structure common to most Latin American countries. This concession system permits the federal government to apply pressure and influence over the press, and in some cases dictate what the press is to say.

The relationship between the press and the government in Mexico has changed over the centuries. During the colonial period, the first press publications were conceived as an instrument of propaganda for the Spanish monarchy and ecclesiastical elites. Then, in the post-independence period in the nineteenth century, the press was a weapon that helped impose ideologies of groups that contended for power. Different media were controlled through newspaper closures, restricting access to paper, and, of course, censorship. Also, journalists were jailed or tortured. In the twentieth century, government strategies changed—at least on paper—especially after the revolution of the 1910s and the 1917 constitution, when press freedom began to be seen as a synonym for democracy.

While Mexico’s constitutions of 1824, 1857, and 1917 showed progress in terms of citizenship and democracy, they also made it clear that the existence of laws did not guarantee citizens access to principles, rights, and freedoms. Undeniably, one of the revolution’s main causes and slogans was an electoral demand: “real democracy, no reelection.” However, the Mexican political system for many years was far from democratic.

For much of the twentieth century, Mexican politics and public institutions were under the quasi-dictatorship of the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI). While the PRI allowed the opposition to participate in elections, they retained control over the media, which helped to ensure that the opposition had no chance of reaching any elected office. The PRI dominated for more than seventy years, from the end of the revolution in 1917 until the 1990s, and it maintained a regime that controlled municipalities, governorships, congress and the presidency. The latter office concentrated many constitutional powers, making the holder the central figure of the political system.

During this period of presidential authoritarianism, the government changed its strategy toward the press and kept journalists close, at least those of them willing to support the regime. Some were even on the payroll of public bodies. As a result, the press became economically dependent on the government, and government influence over the content of the press was very large.

In 1968 the government demonstrated that there was no freedom of the press nor freedom of expression, after former president Gustavo Díaz Ordaz ordered a brutal repression of the students’ movement, whose most urgent demands were freedom for political prisoners, public dialogue, and full freedom of expression.¹⁰ But, instead of negotiating or acceding to these demands, the result was the Tlatelolco Massacre, in which “hundreds of people were killed.”¹¹ The press, subjugated to the will of the government, stigmatized the students’ movement from the beginning, labeling them as “strikers,” “agitators,” and “terrorists.”¹²

After this dark episode in Mexican history—and confronted with the anger of the people and the loss of credibility—the national press began a period of professionalization that created space for independent and critical publications. However, it should be understood that professional, autonomous, free, and critical journalism has had to develop despite the media system and its elite owners and not because of them.

The twenty-first century brought major commercial competition and political democratization. New electoral laws stated that political parties must be provided with resources to advertise themselves and the media was obliged to cover campaigns fairly and free of costs. But this just meant that media owners and publishers simply benefited from having a more diverse range of patrons. Social media has also provided cost-free opportunities to be informed, and this has become a challenge for the government-supported press, very often criticized for its bias and lack of objectivity.

Despite some improvements, critical journalism has always had to paddle upstream to sustain its dissident model. Of course, this kind of press tends to face threats and violence, with aggressions coming from two sides: the government and organized crime.

Press freedom and violence

RSF present the annual World Press Freedom Index to compare the level of press freedom enjoyed by journalists and media in 180 countries and territories.¹³ The 2022 index, which comprises the period from January to December 2021, ranks Mexico at 127th with a score of 47.57 out of 100, thus classifying the situation for journalists as “difficult.” This did, however, represent an improvement on the 2021 index, in which Mexico ranked 143rd. Considering the events that took place in 2022, it seems very likely that the country will slide back down the rankings in the 2023 index.

Source: “2022 Press Freedom Index,” Reporters Without Borders (RSF), https://rsf.org/ en/index.

Physical threats and intimidation are the most widespread form of attacks against journalists, followed by physical assaults and kidnappings.¹⁴ Also, among the most recent and alarming challenges are digital attacks against journalists and their sources, harassment through social media, and unmonitored covert surveillance. As the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights says, the most extreme and violent method of curtailing the right to freedom of expression is the murder of journalists. This annuls the victim’s right to life, and entails other consequences besides: it has an intimidating and silencing effect on journalists’ peers; it affects the rights of the victims’ families to psychological and moral integrity; and it violates the rights of individuals and soci-eties to seek and receive information.¹⁵

The World Press Freedom Index comprises five indicators: political context, legal framework, economic context, socio-cultural context, and safety. What should be noted is that in the 2022 index, Mexico was ranked 179th out of 180 in the safety index—unsurprising, given that Mexico was the deadliest country for journalists for four consecutive years.¹⁶

From the year 2000 to 2022, 163 journalists have been murdered, most of them men.¹⁷ In addition, twenty-seven journalists are registered missing as of January 2023,¹⁸ including Cándida Cristal Vázquez, who disappeared on July 21, 2022 and who worked as a reporter and radio newscaster in Mazatlán, Sinaloa.¹⁹ Between AMLO becoming president in December 2018 and the end of 2022, thirty-eight murders and five disappearances have been counted; in 2022 alone eighteen journalists were murdered.²⁰

Source: Authors’ own data; for the full data set, click here

Also, the Press Emblem Campaign (PEC)—an international, independent nongovernmental organization dedicated to media safety and rights—found in its 2022 annual report that, along with Ukraine, Mexico was the most dangerous country in 2022 for journalists.²¹

In Mexico, as in most parts of the world, no one is held accountable for journalists’ murders. The Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ) in its 2022 Global Impunity Index says that the vast majority of journalists’ killers continue to get away with murder. The index ranked Mexico in sixth place for impunity, and it would be even higher but for the index calculation factoring in Mexico’s relatively large population. Despite this, the CPJ considers Mexico to be the western hemisphere’s most dangerous country for journalists as it has the most unsolved journalist murders in the past ten years with twenty-eight cases.²²

Political violence

It is true that the news media has lost people’s confidence and that we live in the era of “fake news.” Young people now opt for social media as their main source of news, replacing journalists with influencers. But in Mexico, the connection between journalism and the public has weakened even further with the president’s daily attacks.

Every morning, from Monday to Friday at 7 a.m., AMLO gives press briefings known as the mañaneras where he speaks about what he considers are some of the most relevant issues concerning Mexico.²³ He includes sections regarding security, impunity, and others, including fake news in a segment called “Who’s Who.” In this section, the president and the web content coordinator at La Jornada de Oriente, Ana Elizabeth García Vilchis, point out journalists and publications that they consider unprofessional and articles they consider untrue.

Some of the journalists who have been name-checked in these briefings have indicated that they have been harassed online after being criticized by the president. In response, they accuse the president of using his briefings as a way to silence the independent press. But the president has his own point of view and classifies the media into two groups: the “good,” the media who cherish his pol-icies; and the “bad,” who he labels as neoliberal, corrupt, and elitist.

President López Obrador has singled out several journalists and media outlets for particular criticism, most frequently the Reforma newspaper. He has even labeled foreign press like the New York Times and the Washington Post as “unethical.”²⁴ Some journalists interviewed by the CPJ in 2019 agreed that AMLO fosters a hostile atmosphere and that his comments seem like aggression or threats. Another freelance journalist said that AMLO, even if “he has always been somewhat authoritarian,” is better than previous governments, especially in terms that “he respects what the media can publish.”²⁵

On December 15, 2022, after the attempted murder of renowned Grupo Imagen journalist Ciro Gómez Leyva, a group of 180 journalists, reporters, editors, and other media professionals signed a letter accusing the president of being “politically responsible” for the crime and demanding an end to the harassment of their profession.²⁶ The journalists that signed the letter are mostly from Grupo Imagen, TV Azteca, Latinus, El País, Reforma, El Universal, ADN, and Foro TV and identify themselves as critical journalists, but some others—including the president—consider them old servants of the PRI regime. So when AMLO responded to their letter during the mañanera, he accused the signatories of being “spokespeople for conservatism” who served special interests, and criticized them for their lack of balance regarding AMLO and his regime.²⁷ He even took the chance to point out that there is a fierce campaign against his government, and that the attempted murder may have been a bid to try to destabilize the government.²⁸ He also commented that information should not be left in the hands of journalists, and assured viewers that he was not involved in the attack, and that he does not lead an oppressive state.

Some of what AMLO says is true: the press does sometimes serve the interests of elites and powerful groups. But two days prior to the attempt on Gómez Leyva’s life, AMLO said that listening to Gómez Leyva’s program was “bad for the health” and that “if you listen to them too much, you may even get a tumor in your brain.”²⁹ At the time of writing (January 2023), no arrests have been made relating to this crime but the Attorney General’s Office of Justice of Mexico City is working on the case. Anyways, the message for the entire press after this attempt is that prominence does not guarantee security.

Mexican authorities tend to say that the aggressions against journalists are not related to their work. However, President López Obrador launched in 2021 an open attack not just on journalists, but on ARTICLE 19, an international organization created to docu-ment censorship, to defeat the censors, and to help the censored. López Obrador said during a mañanera that the organization—and other “conservative” groups—was waging a “conservative” campaign against him. ARTICLE 19 responded with an article saying that the attack highlights his “grim record on impunity,” with 98 percent of journalist killings going unsolved.³⁰ It should be noted that the term “conservative” is, for AMLO, any person or policy that opposes or differs from his goal of “transformation.” It does not relate to any political or economic stance.

Violence and electoral violence related to transnational crime organizations and drug-trafficking organizations

Mexican transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) are present in 70 percent of the country and participate in a wide range of criminal activities beyond drug trafficking.³¹ Before 2006, there were only four dominant drug-trafficking organizations (DTOs), but after former president Felipe Calderón Hinojosa’s war on drugs, they fragmented into nine major groups:

Beltrán Leyva Organization
Cartel Jalisco New Generation (CJNG)
Gulf Cartel
Juárez/Carrillo Fuentes Organization
La Familia Michoacana (The Mexican Family)
Los Rojos (The Reds)
Los Zetas and Cartel del Noreste
Sinaloa Cartel
Tijuana/Arellano Félix Organization

The CJNG is the group with the most presence and fastest growth in the country. It controls various demarcations in the east and west, and is increasing its influence in northern and southern states. The current criminal landscape in Mexico is dominated by the battle between the emerging CJNG, which bases its operations on the trafficking of synthetic drugs, and the Sinaloa Cartel, historically the dominant organization in Mexico.

These groups also act as umbrella organizations for many smaller local criminal groups; counting all of these, the number of TCOs grows into the hundreds. Many of them are involved in extortion, human smuggling, arms trafficking, oil theft, kidnapping, and homicide, among other crimes. These smaller crime groups are part of the big cartels’ strategy, dubbed “proxy war,” through which the national cartels control the distribution of drugs in various parts of the country.

Organized crime is characterized by the fact that it seeks to neutralize governments and the state through corruption, preventing the investigation, arrest, prosecution, and detention of its members or their profits. For this reason, part of the DTOs’ profits is used to coerce public servants, intimidate politicians, and influence elections; criminal organizations are responsible for most of the political violence at the local level.

During the 2017–18 federal and local electoral process, when more than 3,400 positions at the local and federal level were being contested, including the presidency, a total of 1,203 aggressions against politicians and non-elected officials took place. These resulted in 523 murders: 152 politicians and 371 public employees. This was the most violent electoral process in Mexico’s recent history.³²

The second most violent electoral process occurred just a few years later, during the 2020–21 electoral process: 1,066 aggressions resulted in 265 murders, most of them public servants and politicians, and in some cases their colleagues and relatives. It is worth noting that 75 percent of the candidates and contenders attacked were competing for municipal offices, and that 75 percent were candidates of the opposition to the state government. The state of Veracruz experienced the worst aggression of all, with 117 cases.³³

DTOs have sought to influence elections in a number of ways, including violence at polling places, intimidation and coercion of voters, and control of candidate selection—for instance, via campaign financing. This last point is a major problem, and includes issues such as unreported donations and the use of illicit resources to finance political campaigns, to mention just two avenues for corruption. This contributes to Mexico’s ranking of 64th in the Perception of Electoral Integrity Index.³⁴ By controlling municipal government DTOs can access privileged information and public resources and obtain protection from the municipal police.

On election day in 2015, ARTICLE 19 registered twenty-seven aggressions against journalists covering the electoral process in different Mexican states.³⁵ These aggressions included equipment theft, reporters being illegitimately asked to delete their photos, threats, physical aggressions, identity theft on social media, information blackout, arbitrary detentions, and cyber-attacks on news portals. The five states with the most cases were Oaxaca (five), Puebla (five),³⁶ Veracruz (four), Guerrero (three), and Campeche (two).

Also, on the 2016 election day, the same organization documented nineteen aggressions that included harassment, arbitrary detentions, intimidation, threats, and physical assault. The states where the aggressions occurred were Chihuahua (five), Mexico City (four), Sinaloa (four), Aguascalientes (three), Puebla (two), and Veracruz (one). In Veracruz, the day prior to the election, journalist Jorge Sánchez, director of the local newspaper La Unión de Medellín, received a call with a death threat. Sánchez is part of the Protection Mechanism for Human Rights Defenders and Journalists and the son of journalist Moisés Sánchez, who was murdered in 2015 in Medellín de Bravo municipality in Veracruz.³⁷

Other media outlets whose staff were attacked during the 2015 and 2016 electoral processes included La Unión de Medellín (Veracruz); El Sol de Puebla, Status, and e-consulta (Puebla); Yradiamos, Notimex, and El Heraldo de Aguascalientes (Aguascalientes); La Revista NCG, El Diario del Noroeste, Akronoticias, and Más Noticias (Chihuahua); Noroeste (Sinaloa); and Reforma (Mexico City).

In the 2015 electoral process, four aggression cases were perpetrated by political party personnel or activists, and in 2016 journalists were harassed and intimidated, also by political party employees or members. On election day 2021 (June 6), sixteen aggressions were registered against journalists and a total of fifty-five since April 19,when ARTICLE 19’s hashtag to document such incidents was activated: #RedRompeElMiedo.³⁸ Again, most of the aggressors (50.9 percent) came from political parties, and their actions included harassment, intimidation, threats, physical aggressions, and information blackout.³⁹ This time, the abuses were registered in Baja California (six), Aguascalientes (five), Jalisco (five), Guanajuato (five), Guerrero (four), Sinaloa (four), and Yucatán (four).

Many local journalists report the crimes of these DTOs, as well as corruption, and the links between politicians and criminals. Thus, it is not surprising that violence against journalists increases during electoral processes, nor that there exists a direct correlation between this violence and the presence of drug cartels in a territory.

Also, we can see that the states with the highest rates of journalist murders are among the poorest in the country. Take the example of Veracruz, which, during Javier Duarte’s governorship (December 2010–November 2016), was the most lethal for communicators with eighteen journalists killed.⁴⁰ These are the territories where TCOs tend to settle, due to geostrategic characteristics.

The following table presents the five states in which most murders of journalists took place between 2000 and 2022.

Sources: Cartel information from Congressional Research Service (CRS), Mexico: Organized Crime and Drug Trafficking Organizations, CRS, June 7, 2022, https://sgp.fas.org/crs/row/R41576.pdf. Deaths data from Article 19, “Periodistas Asesinadas/os en México,” ARTICLE 19, https://articulo19.org/periodistasasesinados; and Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ), “Las Periodistas Mexicanas Yessenia Mollinedo y Johana García Mueren Asesinadas en Veracruz,” May 17, 2022, https://cpj.org/es/2022/05/las-periodistas-mexicanas-yessenia-mollinedo-y-johana-garcia-mueren-asesinadas-en-veracruz.

The Mexican government and Mexican media outlets often tally homicides differently due to restrictions placed on reporting, and crime groups’ attempts to cover up the numbers and identities of their victims (although other times they show off their crimes as a strategy to intimidate or to incriminate another group). Also, there are the so-called “silent zones” that neither the government nor journalists can reach. With impunity being the norm after journalists are killed, the result is silencing and self-censorship of communicators.

At this point, there is something that we should highlight: most of the journalists killed in recent years worked in local news. Similar to the rest of Latin America, 95 percent of journalist killings are committed in small cities, rural areas, transit areas, or border zones.⁴¹ Many of those murdered were covering security and political subjects and were the victims of organized crime. Sometimes journalists receive death threats before being killed, like Lourdes Maldonado López, who was killed in January 2022 and had even used a presidential mañanera in 2019 to appeal for the government’s help with protection.⁴²

As we can see, there is a fine line between the two “sides” that exercise violence against journalists and communicators. Corruption makes it hard to know what comes first, but what is a fact is that most of the recent murders, disappearances, and kidnappings of journalists are concentrated in states where organized crime has a strong presence. As noted by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, the journalists who are targeted most often are those covering local news on corruption, drug trafficking, organized crime, public safety, and related affairs.⁴³

Some of the journalists who are subject to violence and intimidation may opt to align with one powerful interest or another, which sometimes means failing to report or remaining silent. But, for those willing to keep covering sensitive news after receiving threats, the Protection Mechanism for Human Rights Defenders and Journalists was developed. This mechanism is discussed in the following section.

The Protection Mechanism for Human Rights Defenders and Journalists

As the state (i.e., the Mexican federal government) has failed to implement an effective response to criminal organizations, and as it is responsible for protecting, promoting, and guaranteeing human rights, including journalists’ rights, in 2012, it created the Protection Mechanism for Human Rights Defenders and Journalists. The Mechanism is a federal agency under the Ministry of the Interior backed by the Law for the Protection of Human Rights Defenders and Journalists, issued in the same year.

Although it protects journalists and human rights defenders, this chapter will focus only on journalists. The Mechanism recognizes a journalist to be:

Individuals, as well as public, community, private, independent, university, experimental, or any other type of communication and dissemination media, whose work consists of collecting, generating, processing, editing, commenting, expressing opinions, disseminating, publishing, or providing information, through any means of dissemination and communication that may be printed, radio, digital or image.⁴⁴

The Mechanism pledges to guarantee the life, safety, and personal integrity of journalists and human rights defenders through three types of measures:

Urgent Protection Measures: actions and means to immediately safeguard the life, integrity, freedom, and security of people, to be implemented within nine hours of the request.
Protection Measures: actions to protect from risks and safeguard the life, integrity, freedom, and security of people, but are not required to be implemented in a defined period.
Preventive Measures: actions and means to prevent the completion of the aggression.

When a journalist reports an aggression or threat, the Mechanism evaluates the risk and designs a protection plan. Until 2019, when the Office in Mexico of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, at the request of the Undersecretariat for Human Rights of the Ministry of the Interior, published its diagnosis and recommendations to strengthen the Mechanism, 903 people were under its protection.⁴⁵ This number included both human rights defenders and journalists.

In summary, the recommendations from the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights included the following:

The President’s Office and the Ministry of the Interior must serve as examples for state governments by fully adopting the recommendations.
The Mexican state and the state governments must ensure personnel and financial resources for the protection measures and the daily operation of the Mechanism.
It would be desirable to have an effective system to monitor the correct implementation of the protection plans and promote relevant sanctions when it detects non-compliance with the corresponding obligations.

As the principal approach of the Mechanism is avoiding the realization of aggression or damage, it is expected that 2,400 people would need protection from the Mechanism by 2024. This number may be untenable and will make the Mechanism more inefficient; there is already insufficient personnel to process the files of those that currently have protection.

Noting that the Mechanism did not address the root causes of risk, the UN High Commissioner also recommended that a new paradigm be adopted: a prevention approach. Also, the report recommended that the causes of risk should be eliminated, as the Mechanism cannot be the sole response to violence against human rights defenders and journalists.

For the development of this chapter, we interviewed a journalist who joined the Protection Mechanism after receiving death threats in 2017 and 2019. This journalist sees the Mechanism as a positive—but small and reactive—response to a complex situation. In his view, it was created by the federal government to serve a privileged few, considering the general state of violence that the whole country lives in.

He says his life changed entirely during the “five years, one month, and four days” that he lived under protection of the Mechanism. He was accompanied by security escorts, although this was “a daily reminder that you are at risk,” and meant that there was no privacy in his life. He added: “Even to go with a lady to the hotel, you go with an escort.”⁴⁶

The interviewee told us that, to protect their lives, some colleagues were transferred from different parts of Mexico to safe houses in Mexico City, under the protection of the Mechanism, although many had lost their jobs as journalists as a result. However, in spite of the Mechanism’s limitations identified by this interviewee, and despite the difficulties that protection imposes on one’s personal and professional life, he is clear that many of his colleagues would be dead without its protection.

Another limitation this interviewee finds in Mexico is that, despite the risky situation in which journalists live, the media sector itself is not prepared to respond. There are no protection protocols or psychological assistance, no courses are provided, and they do not know where to go or what to do in case of imminent danger. He also says that sometimes media organizations promise support, but it never reaches the journalists.

Even if there are many limitations due to lack of funding and other operative deficiencies, the interviewee recognizes the Mechanism as an important measure to protect journalists and human rights defenders. He directs most of his complaints against the prosecuting authorities, specifically the Special Prosecutor’s Office for Attention to Crimes Committed against Freedom of Expression, which has not only failed to advance investigations in his own case, but has even attempted to close it. The interviewee says that the Mechanism should not exist and instead, the government should provide access to justice: “It should be legislated so that threats become a serious crime. Without justice, there is no way the Mechanism can protect all human rights defenders and journalists.”

It seems ironic that López Obrador’s political strategy against DTOs is “hugs, not bullets,” which means he would not pursue a war against the TCOs but would instead target the social conditions that allow criminal groups to thrive. But in the first days of 2023, two violent encounters with mafia leaders left more than a dozen dead and the city of Culiacán (Sinaloa) as a war zone for a second time. Even more ironic is that AMLO’s morning press conferences are regularly used to single out journalists instead of criminal leaders.

Journalists are victims of violence from both the government and the DTOs. As our interviewee and the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights stated, there must be a focus on addressing the root causes of violence and, in the meantime, the Protection Mechanism must be strengthened so that freedom of expression agents can remain alive.

Final thoughts

Mexico is experiencing a grave human rights crisis. Violence faced by human rights defenders and journalists on a daily basis, which takes place in a context of practically absolute impunity that incentivizes its systematic reproduction, is one expression of the critical situation. Violence against journalists and its consequent impact on freedom of the press has been studied primarily as the result of two major underlying problems in Mexico: impunity, and the failed strategy against violence, mainly exerted by TCOs.

A way to put an end to impunity is to build greater capacities—in quantity and quality—in law enforcement agencies, with better investigative capacities. Such capacity development involves political will and capital, large sums of public funds, as well as time and patience. But these kinds of actions are not enough when active impunity also exists, that is, a series of actions carried out with the explicit purpose of undermining investigations and not generating results, in which case it can be useful to implement an international mechanism for supervising the administration of justice in Mexico.

Concerning the failed strategy against violence, the security measures adopted by the administration of Andrés Manuel López Obrador, despite the assurances that his strategy was to address the root causes of violence, have been to keep the armed forces as the main tool of public security in the country. It is necessary to strengthen the local police and leave national security challenges to federal bodies, removing the army from its current function. As long as these issues are not solved, violence against journalists will be a matter of statistics: Which year was worse? Which electoral period was more violent? Strengthening local police corps requires better salaries and social security nets, more—and more modern—equipment and weapons, continuous physical and use-of-force training, among others. Such investment of resources will pay in the long run through more secure communities. Therefore, politicians and decision makers must explain to society at large about the time needed for objective improvements to appear. But, since it seems hard to get to a point where the human rights violations crisis in Mexico—in which violence against journalists is immersed—is fully addressed, or that deep reforms are made to the prosecutorial system, it is necessary to keep and strengthen the Protection Mechanism to prevent greater damage. As the Mechanism is based on voluntary adherence, it cannot realistically cover the entire at-risk population. The Mechanism should have a strategic, proactive component coming from the secretary of the interior: if, through a risk analysis, it is found that a journalist or group is at high risk, the Mechanism would be automatically activated.

But measures also need to become more sensitive so that the people under protection do not lose their jobs, their privacy can be respected, and their mental health is taken care of. Media companies need to be ready to act in case of risk: they must have their own protection protocols and provide training that allows journalists and media workers to develop their roles in safer conditions. And, when things become risky, media companies ought to do whatever is necessary to protect their colleagues and collaborators.

It should be pointed out that a system of concessions and awards has deformed the performance of the media in Mexico. Suffice it to say that many media outlets cover the morning news briefings, no matter how absurd they may be, and no matter how much their own journalists are singled out in AMLO’s “Who’s Who” segment; not to do so would risk losing the concession. Journalists and human rights organizations have said that these mañaneras by the president and his spokespeople aggravate journalists’ situation and heighten their risk.

Indeed, the widespread use of social networks and the constant bombardment of information makes it more difficult to filter content. As we have seen, fake news and disinformation have multiplied during the pandemic, and in similar crises like the 2017 earthquakes. But there are professional tools like Verificado—with no ideological bias—for citizens to discriminate real news from fake news.

Freedom of expression is not complete without freedom of the press. As long as journalists and human rights defenders are subject to violence, we can conclude that neither freedom nor prosperity can be fully attained.

Sergio M. Alcocer is president of the Mexican Council on Foreign Relations (COMEXI); former undersecretary for North America in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; professor at the National Autonomous University of Mexico (UNAM) and part-time professor at the University of Texas at San Antonio.

Jeziret S. González is a member of COMEXI and columnist with MVS News.

1 Dan Negrea and Matthew Kroenig, “Do Countries Need Freedom to Achieve Prosperity? Introducing the Atlantic Council Freedom and Prosperity Indexes,” Atlantic Council, accessed February 9, 2023, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/do-countries-need-freedom-to-achieve-prosperity.

2 Office in Mexico of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Diagnóstico Sobre el Funcionamiento del Mecanismo, OHCHR, July 2019, https://hchr.org.mx/wp/wp-content/themes/hchr/images/doc_pub/190725-Diagnostico-Mecanismo-FINAL.pdf

3 UNESCO, “Journalist Killings Decline in 2021 But Alarming Threats Remain,” press release, last updated April 21, 2022, https://www.unesco.org/en/articles/journalist-killings-decline-2021-alarming-threats-remain.

4 UN, “Universal Declaration of Human Rights,” accessed February 28, 2023, https://www.un.org/en/about-us/universal-declaration-of-human-rights.

5 Data from ARTICLE 19 lists 157 journalist killings between 2000 and 2022, 37 of which occurred during AMLO’s presidency: “Periodistas Asesinadas/os en México,” ARTICLE 19, accessed February 28, 2023, https://articulo19.org/periodistasasesinados. Our own research gives a slightly higher figure of 163 killings, with 38 of those in AMLO’s term. For instance, the murder of Diego García Corona (December 2018) is not included in the ARTICLE 19 list: “Gobierno de AMLO Trabaja en un Plan Para Proteger a Periodistas,” El Universal, December 6, 2018, https://www.eluniversal.com.mx/nacion/sociedad/gobierno-de-amlo-trabaja-en-un-plan-para-proteger-periodistas. For the authors’ full data set, see the digital version of this chapter on the Atlantic Council website.

6 Ley para la Protección de Personas Defensoras de Derechos Humanos y Periodistas, (June 25, 2012) https://www.cedhnl.org.mx/somos/legislacion/Ley-para-la-proteccion-de-personas-defensoras-de-derechos-humanos-y-periodistas.pdf.

7 “Medición Multidimensional de la Pobreza,” Consejo Nacional de Evaluación de la Política de Desarrollo Social (CONEVAL), accessed February 28, 2023, https://www.coneval.org.mx/Medicion/MP/Paginas/Pobreza_2020.aspx, Cuadro 1. Medición multidimensional de la pobreza.

8 Instituto Mexicano para la Competitividad (IMCO), Índice de Riesgos de Corrupción: Compras públicas en México 2018–2021 (Mexico City: IMCO, 2022).

9 “Mexico,” Reporters Without Borders (RSF), accessed February 28, 2023, https://rsf.org/en/country/mexico.

10 Museo Universitario Arte Contemporaneo (MUAC), “Imágenes y Revuelta: La Gráfica del 68,” accessed March 8, 2023, https://muac.unam.mx/exposicion/imagenes-y-revuelta-la-grafica-del-68?lang=en.

11 “Matanza de Tlatelolco,” National Human Rights Commission (CNDH), accessed March 3, 2023, https://www.cndh.org.mx/noticia/matanza-de-tlatelolco.

12 “Así Amanecieron las Portadas el Día Después del 2 de Octubre de 1968,” Forbes, October 2, 2018, https://www.forbes.com.mx/asi-amanecieron-las-portadas-tras-el-2-de-octubre-de-1968; Carlos Reyna, “¿Cómo Reportó la Prensa la Masacre del 2 de Octubre de 1968?” Gatopardo, October 3, 2018, https://gatopardo.com/arte-y-cultura/titulares-del-3-de-octubre.

13 The index’s methodology can be found at: https://rsf.org/en/index-methodologie-2022?year=2022.

14 Comisión Interamericana de Derechos Humanos (CIDH) and Relatoría Especial para la Libertad de Expresión, Informe Especial sobre la Situación de la Libertad de Expresión en México, Organizacion de los Estados Americanos (OAS), June 2018, https://www.oas.org/es/cidh/expresion/docs/2018_06_18%20CIDH-UN_FINAL_MX_report_SPA.pdf.

15 Comisión Interamericana de Derechos Humanos (CIDH) and Relatoría Especial para la Libertad de Expresión, Estudio Especial Sobre Asesinato de Periodistas por Motivos que Pudieran Estar Relacionados Con la Actividad Periodística: Periodo 1995-2005, Organizacion de los Estados Americanos (OAS), June 2018, https://www.cidh.oas.org/relatoria/section/Asesinato%20de%20Periodsitas.pdf.

16 “This is Already the Deadliest Year Ever for Mexico’s Media,” Reporters Without Borders (RSF), August 25, 2022, https://rsf.org/es/2022-es-ya-el-a%C3%B1o-m%C3%A1s-mort%C3%ADfero-para-los-periodistas-en-la-historia-de-m%C3%A9xico.

17 For the full data set, see the digital version of this chapter on the Atlantic Council website.

18 “Abduction of Three Men Highlights Climate of Terror for Local Reporters in Mexico,” Reporters Without Borders (RSF), January 13, 2023, https://rsf.org/en/abduction-three-men-highlights-climate-terror-local-reporters-mexico.

19 Carlos Velázquez, “Cándida Cristal Vázquez: Cuerpo Hallado no Corresponde a la Periodista, Dice Fiscalía,” El Financiero, August 30, 2022, https://www.elfinanciero.com.mx/estados/2022/08/30/candida-cristal-vazquez-cuerpo-hallado-no-corresponde-a-la-periodista-dice-fiscalia.

20 For the full data set, see the digital version of this chapter on the Atlantic Council website. Sources include: “Periodistas Asesinadas/os en México,” ARTICLE 19; “This is Already the Deadliest Year Ever . . .,” RSF, 2022; Jon Martín Cullell, “México Vive Su Momento Más Letal Para los Periodistas Desde Que Hay Registros,” El País, December 17, 2022, https://elpais.com/mexico/2022-12-18/mexico-vive-su-momento-mas-letal-para-los-periodistas-desde-que-hay-registros.html; Almudena Barragán, “Yesenia Mollinedo y Johana García: La Pareja de Periodistas Asesinadas en Veracruz que Pone Cara al Terror de Todo un Gremio,” El País, May 12, 2022, https://elpais.com/mexico/2022-05-12/yesenia-y-johana-la-pareja-de-periodistas-asesinadas-en-veracruz-que-pone-cara-al-terror-de-todo-un-gremio.html; “The Journalist Pedro Pablo Kumul is Assassinated in Xalapa, Veracruz,” November 22, 2022, https://www.animalpolitico.com/seguridad/asesinan-al-periodista-pedro-pablo-kumul-en-xalapa-veracruz.

21 Press Emblem Campaign (PEC), “14.12.2022. PEC Annual Report. Ukraine and Mexico Most Dangerous Countries in 2022 for Journalists,” press release, PEC, December 14, 2022, https://pressemblem.ch/pec-news.

22 Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ), Killing With Impunity: Vast Majority of Journalists’ Murderers Go Free. 2022 Global Impunity Index. New York: CPJ, November 1, 2022, https://cpj.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/CPJ_2022-Global-Impunity-Index.pdf.

23 “AMLO Mañanera,” accessed March 8, 2023, https://lopezobrador.org.mx/temas/amlo-mananera.

24 President AMLO, in his morning press conference on Wednesday, December 14, 2022, pointed out that these are “unethical newspapers that serve powerful interests and governments.” https://lopezobrador.org.mx/2022/12/14/version-estenografica-de-la-conferencia-de-prensa-matutina-del-presidente-andres-manuel-lopez-obrador-871.

25 Jan-Albert Hootsen, “López Obrador’s Anti-Press Rhetoric Leaves Mexico’s Journalists Feeling Exposed,” Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ), May 6, 2019, https://cpj.org/2019/05/mexico-president-lopez-obrador-press-rhetoric-threatened.

26 Mario Andres Landeros, “Tras Atentado a Ciro, 180 periodistas Exigen a AMLO Cesar Hostigamiento,” El Universal, 20 December, 2022, https://www.eluniversal.com.mx/nacion/tras-atentado-ciro-177-periodistas-exigen-amlo-cesar-hostigamiento.

27 Eduardo Dina, “‘Puro Periodista del Régimen’: AMLO Se Lanza Contra Comunicadores Que Se Solidarizaron Con Ciro Gómez Leyva,” El Universal, December 21, 2020, https://www.eluniversal.com.mx/nacion/amlo-se-lanza-contra-quienes-se-solidarizaron-con-ciro-gomez-leyva-puro-periodista-del-regimen; Eduardo Dina, “La Mañanera de AMLO, 21 de Diciembre, Minuto a Minuto,” El Universal, December 21, 2022, https://www.eluniversal.com.mx/nacion/la-mananera-de-amlo-21-de-diciembre-minuto-minuto-0.

28 Natalie Kitroeff, “Ciro Gómez Leyva Recibió Disparos. El Presidente de México Dijo Que no Descartaba Que Fuera un Atentado Para ‘Afectarnos a Nosotros’,” New York Times, December 21, 2022, https://www.nytimes.com/es/2022/12/21/espanol/ciro-gomez-leyva-amlo.html

29 Ariana Paredes, “AMLO: Es Dañino Escuchar a Gómez Leyva, Loret y Sarmiento, Hasta Puede Salir un Tumor en el Cerebro,” El Universal, December 14, 2022, https://www.eluniversal.com.mx/nacion/amlo-es-danino-escuchar-gomez-leyva-loret-y-sarmiento-hasta-puede-salir-un-tumor-en-el-cerebro.

30 “Mexico: Attack on ARTICLE 19 by President López Obrador Highlights his Grim Record on Impunity,” ARTICLE 19, March 31, 2021, https://www.article19.org/resources/mexico-attack-on-article-19-by-president-lopez-obrador-highlights-his-grim-record-on-impunity.

31 Instituto Nacional Electoral (INE), “Violencia Criminal Impacta el Trabajo Periodístico y las Elecciones, Coinciden Especialistas,” November 23, 2022, https://centralelectoral.ine.mx/2022/11/23/violencia-criminal-impacta-el-trabajo-periodistico-y-las-elecciones-coinciden-especialistas.

32 Etellekt Consultores, Séptimo Informe de Violencia Política en México 2018, Etellekt Consultores, July 9, 2018, https://www.etellekt.com/reporte/septimo-informe-de-violencia-politica-en-mexico.html.

33 Etellekt Consultores, Cuarto Informe de Violencia Política en México 2021, Etellekt Consultores, May 5, 2021, https://www.etellekt.com/informe-de-violencia-politica-en-mexico-2021-A30-etellekt.html.

34 The Perception of Electoral Integrity Index covers the national presidential and parliamentary elections from July 1, 2012, to December 31, 2021. Experts measure each country one month after polls close and are asked to assess the quality of national elections on eleven sub-dimensions: electoral laws, electoral procedures, district boundaries, voter registration, party registration, media coverage, campaign finance, voting process, vote count, results, and electoral authorities. These items sum to an overall Electoral Integrity Index score from 0 to 100. For the index data set see: Holly Ann Garnett, Toby S. James, and Madison MacGregor, Perceptions of Electoral Integrity (PEI-8.0), (2022), Harvard Dataverse, https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/YSNYXD.

35 Juan Vázquez, “Durante Jornada Electoral, 27 Agresiones Contra la Prensa,” ARTICLE 19, June 7, 2015, https://articulo19.org/durante-jornada-electoral-27-agresiones-contra-la-prensa

36 Juan Vázquez, “En Contexto Electoral, Cuatro Casos de Agresiones Contra Directores de Medios y Periodistas en Puebla,” ARTICLE 19, June 2, 2016, https://articulo19.org/en-contexto-electoral-cuatro-casos-de-agresiones-contra-directores-de-medios-y-periodistas-en-puebla.

37 Juan Vazquez, “Durante Elecciones, 19 Agresiones Contra la Prensa en México,” ARTICLE 19, June 8, 2016, https://articulo19.org/durante-elecciones-19-agresiones-contra-la-prensa-en-mexico.

38 “Red Rompe El Miedo” (RRM), meaning Break the Fear Network, is a hashtag created by ARTICLE 19 in 2013 to track aggressions against journalists while covering high-risk events in Mexico, such as social protests and electoral processes. See https://informaterompeelmiedo.mx.

39 “La Red Rompe el Miedo Documenta Agresiones Contra la Prensa en un Clima de Violencia Política Durante las Elecciones,” ARTICLE 19, June 8, 2021, https://articulo19.org/la-red-rompe-el-miedo-documenta-agresiones-contra-la-prensa-en-un-clima-de-violencia-politica-durante-las-elecciones.

40 “Periodistas Asesinadas/os en México,” ARTICLE 19.

41 Comisión Interamericana de Derechos Humanos (CIDH) and Relatoría Especial para la Libertad de Expresión, Zonas Silenciadas: Regiones de alta peligrosidad para ejercer la libertad, Organizacion de los Estados Americanos (OAS), March 15, 2017, http://www.oas.org/es/cidh/expresion/docs/publicaciones/zonas_silenciadas_esp.pdf.

42 Nic Newman, Richard Fletcher, Craig T. Robertson, Kirsten Eddy, and Rasmus Kleis Nielsen, Reuters Institute Digital News Report 2022, (Oxford: Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism and University of Oxford, 2022).

43 CIDH and Relatoría Especial para la Libertad de Expresión, Zonas Silenciadas . . ., 2017.

44 Secretariat for Home Affairs (SEGOB), “Mecanismo de Protección para Personas Defensoras de Derechos Humanos y Periodistas,” Government of México, May 3, 2016, https://www.gob.mx/segob/acciones-y-programas/mecanismo-de-proteccion-para-personas-defensoras-de-derechos-humanos-y-periodistas-81609.

45 OHCHR, Diagnóstico Sobre el Funcionamiento del Mecanismo.

46 Interview with anonymous journalist, January 7, 2023, (interviewer: J. S. González Gallardo).

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Jewish president picks Muslim defense minister: Ukraine’s diverse leadership debunks Russia’s “Nazi” slurs

Peter Dickinson — Mon, 04 Sep 2023 23:52:04 +0000

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy announced the removal of Defense Minister Oleksii Reznikov on September 3 in what was the biggest change among the country’s political leaders since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion more than eighteen months ago. Reznikov’s departure comes following weeks of speculation over allegations of financial improprieties at the Ministry of Defense, and reflects Ukraine’s desire to demonstrate a zero tolerance approach toward allegations of corruption.

Reznikov is set to be replaced by Rustem Umerov (pictured), who currently chairs Ukraine’s State Property Fund and has previously played key roles as a negotiator in prisoner exchanges with Russia and the UN-brokered Black Sea Grain Initiative. While Umerov is a strong candidate in his own right, his status as a member of Ukraine’s Muslim Crimean Tatar minority makes his anticipated appointment particularly significant on a symbolic level. Once Umerov is confirmed, Ukraine will have a Jewish President and a Muslim Minister of Defense, underlining the diversity of the country’s leadership while exposing the absurdity of Russia’s “Nazi Ukraine” propaganda.

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When Russian President Vladimir Putin first launched the full-scale invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, he identified the “de-Nazification” of the country as one of his two key war aims, alongside the complete demilitarization of Ukraine. In doing so, he was building on decades of similar disinformation. Indeed, the Putin regime’s degrading depictions of Ukrainians as fascists can be traced all the way back to the Stalin era.

Throughout the Cold War, Moscow propagandists sought to discredit Ukraine’s centuries-long independence struggle by associating it with Nazi collaboration. In the post-Soviet era, Russian officials have actively sought to revive these slurs, and have argued consistently that Ukraine’s pro-democracy 2014 Euromaidan Revolution was in fact a far-right coup that transformed the country into a hotbed of fascism. By the time of last year’s full-scale invasion, references to “Nazi Ukraine” had become completely normalized throughout Russia’s carefully choreographed and heavily censored mainstream media.

This Nazi narrative has played predictably well among domestic Russian audiences conditioned to view contemporary politics through the distorting prism of the Soviet Union’s cataclysmic World War II experience. Perhaps more surprisingly, it has also been embraced beyond Russia by some leftists and opponents of America’s dominant role in international affairs. Crucially, however, nobody has been able to provide any convincing evidence to support the Kremlin’s lurid claims.

While Russian propagandists insist today’s Ukraine is overrun with Nazis, Ukrainian far-right groups are actually confined to the margins of the country’s political landscape. During Ukraine’s 2014 presidential election, which took place just a few months after a popular uprising that Russia had characterized as a fascist putsch, the two leading far-right candidates were backed by less than 2% of the Ukrainian electorate. Five years later, Ukraine’s main nationalist parties sought to overcome a long record of ballot box rejection by forming a coalition to contest the country’s parliamentary elections. They received just 2.15% of the vote. These pathetic results are a reminder that contrary to the Kremlin’s wild assertions, support for far-right politicians in today’s Ukraine is lower than in virtually any other European country.

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The election of Volodymyr Zelenskyy as president of Ukraine in spring 2019 served as a further blow to Russia’s fact-free fantasies about “fascist Ukraine.” Zelenskyy’s Jewish roots and high-profile showbiz career as a Russian-speaking comic should theoretically have made him the archetypal enemy of the allegedly nationalistic Ukrainian population; instead, Zelenskyy’s Jewish identity was never an issue among Ukrainian voters, who elected him by a landslide margin of over 73%.

Russian officials and propagandists have twisted themselves into all sorts of knots in their desperate attempts to explain how a supposedly Nazi country could so overwhelmingly support a Jewish leader. Most notoriously, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov declared during a spring 2022 interview on Italian television that Zelenskyy’s Jewish roots meant nothing as Adolf Hitler “also had Jewish blood.” The fallout from Lavrov’s disgraceful comments was predictably severe. Following a chorus of international condemnation led by Israel, Putin was obliged to intervene and personally apologized to the Israeli PM on behalf of his foreign minister.

The Kremlin must now also explain how their nightmarish vision of xenophobic, intolerant Ukraine tallies with the appointment of an ethnic minority Muslim as defense minister during arguably the most important war in the country’s entire history. Rustem Umerov has not been chosen on the basis of his ethnicity or faith, of course; he has been picked to succeed Oleksii Reznikov because he is viewed as the best person for the job. Nevertheless, his selection would have been unthinkable if Ukraine even vaguely resembled the far-right dystopia of Russian propaganda.

All this is just one more reminder that Putin’s whole invasion has been based on shameless lies. In an effort to disguise its illegal war of aggression, Russia has sought to cynically exploit some of Europe’s most painful historical wounds, and has attempted to dehumanize its Ukrainian victims by baselessly branding them as modern-day successors to Nazi Germany. In reality, the only fascists in Ukraine are the Russian troops sent by Putin to extinguish Ukrainian statehood and erase Ukrainian identity. These soldiers of authoritarian empire are fighting a brutal but ultimately losing battle against an increasingly self-confident Ukraine that is comfortable in its diversity and united by its European identity.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

Prigozhin reportedly dies in plane crash

Tracking narratives

Russian media and Telegram channels debate Prigozhin’s status

Rumors swirl on the nature of the crash

Prigozhin reportedly dies in plane crash

On Wednesday, August 23, an Embraer ERJ-135 business jet with tail number RA-02795 crashed in the Tver region of Russia. The Russian Federal Air Transport Agency later announced that Wagner Group founder Yevgeny Prigozhin was among those killed in the crash.

The incident was first reported at approximately 7:20 pm local time on Telegram channel 112. About thirty minutes later, the Ministry of Emergency Situations of the Russian Federation (MChS) posted on its Telegram channel an official statement indicating that there were ten people on board, including three crew members. MChS stated that the incident occurred near the village of Kuzhenkino in Tver Oblast while the plane was flying from Moscow to St. Petersburg. According to flight tracking service FlightRadar24, the plane experienced a series of rapid descents and ascents thirty-six minutes after takeoff before losing its data signal.

Video footage of the plane’s descent and subsequent debris field appeared on multiple Telegram channels shortly after the incident. News outlet Izvestia published a video showing tail debris featuring the digits “795,” adding to rampant speculation at the time suggesting the crash had indeed involved RA-02795.

Photo of the Embraer jet, tail number RA-02795. (Source: Flightradar24)

Tail debris displaying the partial number “795.” (Sources: Izvestia)

Soon after the crash, TASS and RIA Novosti reported that Yevgeny Prigozhin was among the passengers on the plane, based on a manifest filed with the Federal Air Transport Agency. These reports of Prigozhin’s presence on the plane came remarkably swiftly; as noted by the Vyorstka Telegram channel, it usually takes the agency a few hours to reveal such information. According to Vyorstka, reports of Prigozhin’s presence based on the manifest appeared just three minutes after the initial report of the jet crash from the Ministry of Emergency Situations. Not long afterward, the Wagner-affiliated Telegram channel VChK-OGPU reported that Wagner commander and co-founder Dmitry Utkin was also on board the crashed plane.

As rumors about the crash spread across Telegram, Wagner Group-affiliated Telegram channel Grey Zone published information about a second private aircraft, also allegedly owned by Prigozhin, that was seen “circling” over Moscow, generating speculation that Prigozhin could have been on board the second craft. According to the Readovka Telegram channel, Prigozhin often checked in as a passenger on one plane but would then board the other plane for security reasons. The aircraft in question eventually landed at Moscow’s Ostafyovo airport, without any additional information concerning Prigozhin.

Just before 11:00 pm local time, the Federal Air Transport Agency published a list of people it said had been flying on the Embraer that crashed in the Tver region, including Prigozhin and Utkin.

—Victoria Olari, research assistant, Moldova

Russian media and Telegram channels debate Prigozhin’s status

On Telegram, the BRIEF channel reported that Prighozhin’s body was identified a few hours after the crash, citing Tsargrad TV and an unnamed source. Just prior to midnight local time, Meduza cited an Interfax report that the remains had yet to be identified. A report from Al Jazeera suggested that Prigozhin’s smartphone had been found at the crash site; following that, RBC, Moscow Times, and other Telegram channels amplified the claim.

Russian media later reported that two black vans had collected human remains at the site and transported them to a local morgue for identification. The pro-Wagner channel VChK-OGPU initially noted that investigators could not find passenger documents, so a combination of visual and genetic identification would be required to identify the remains. By early afternoon on August 24, though, VChK-OGPU claimed that Prigozhin had been identified due to a pre-existing physical condition—a partial missing finger on his left hand—while Dmitri Utkin’s remains were matched with his tattoos. At the time of publishing, however, officials had not confirmed this report, as they continue to examine the remains. On August 24, Russian President Vladimir Putin, in a televised address, gave his condolences to the families of those killed in the crash and said Prigozhin was a “talented businessman,” suggesting that the Wagner Group leader was in fact killed.

In contrast, Tsargrad claimed that Prigozhin was alive in Mali, vaguely citing “African media.” Meanwhile, Russian regional media Prufy noted that Prigozhin had been reported dead on previous occasions. “Many journalists and political scientists believe that Prigozhin really could have simply disappeared,” it claimed without citing any sources.

—Roman Osadchuk, research associate

Rumors swirl on the nature of the crash

Russian Telegram channels also continue to speculate on what led to the crash. Initial claims suggested that the plane had been shot down by Russian air defenses. According to Wagner channel Grey Zone, “local residents heard two explosions typical of air defense systems before the plane’s crash, and this is supported by the contrail patterns in the sky in one of the videos, along with the testimony of direct witnesses.”

The Rybar Telegram channel voiced similar reports. Alongside a video of the crash, it wrote, “according to the [camera] operator, initially there were two explosions heard, indicating the work of air defense systems. Against the backdrop of constant flights of Ukrainian drones over Moscow, the possibility of a mistaken launch of an anti-aircraft missile system might be adopted as the primary theory.” Later, Rybar published photographs of fuselage parts documented by locals at the crash site. The channel also claimed there were no visible traces of missile damage. “Regarding a potential hit by S-300 or Buk missiles, the damage [visible] is clearly small,” the channel wrote.

Another hypothesis gaining increasing attention alleges an explosion from within the aircraft. According to the Mash and Baza Telegram channels, investigators are considering the possibility of a “terrorist attack.” The SHOT channel, citing anonymous sources, claimed that a “bomb device” was allegedly hidden within the plane’s undercarriage compartment. This would explain why the tail section of the plane fell five kilometers away from the fuselage, the channel added.

In an interview with Fontanka, aviation expert Vladimir Popov outlined three possible reasons for the crash. “My initial assumption is that something happened with the automated control system; perhaps the control system malfunctioned,” he said. “The second theoretical reason is a drop in speed triggered by engine stall. The third potential reason is an explosion.”

In an interview with the website Moscow Komsomolets, military expert Yuri Knutov appeared to rule out the theory involving Russian air defense systems. Instead, he speculated without providing evidence that Ukrainian intelligence agencies might be responsible for the plane’s destruction. “I don’t rule it out,” he said. “Considering the threats from Budanov, the head of Ukraine’s Main Intelligence Directorate (GUR), their attempts to sabotage the Crimean Bridge, the assassinations of Darya Dugina and Maxim Fomin, and the assassination attempt on Prilepin, all of this indicates that such an operation could have been planned and carried out by Ukrainian intelligence agencies.” Tsargrad TV circulated a similar theory, citing an unnamed aviation agency source who stated, “Prigozhin’s plane was blown up. And behind this is the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine.”

Independent Russian outlet Meduza attempted to analyze footage of the incident. The article noted that video documented the plane descending erratically, its wings and tail section falling separately, with the audio suggesting that at least one engine remained operational. The author deduced that these observations indicate that the crash was preceded by an explosion.

Russian law enforcement continues to investigate the reasons for the crash, with one source telling RBC that the investigation is focusing on “external influence,” technical problems, and pilot error. Russian media have studiously avoided speculating that Putin, in an attempt to avenge Prigozhin’s attempted mutiny exactly two months prior to the crash, was behind the incident.

—Victoria Olari, research assistant, Moldova

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Putin’s Russia is trapped in genocidal denial over Ukrainian independence

Mercedes Sapuppo — Thu, 24 Aug 2023 02:20:36 +0000

The first line of the Ukrainian national anthem is perhaps best translated as “Ukraine’s glory has not yet perished.” Written in the middle of the nineteenth century at a time when the Russian imperial authorities were attempting to suppress all expressions of Ukrainian national identity, the anthem remains highly relevant and perfectly captures the determination of today’s Ukrainians as they resist a new Russian attempt to subjugate their country.

Ukraine’s sense of national identity has only strengthened since the onset of Russia’s current full-scale invasion. This was demonstrated recently when the Ukrainian government replaced the Soviet crest featured on the shield of Kyiv’s Motherland statue with the Ukrainian trident. Similar efforts to remove the symbols of Soviet and Russian imperialism are underway across the country.

The strengthening of Ukraine’s national identity and the consolidation of Ukrainian independence since 1991 is regarded by Vladimir Putin and many within the Russian establishment as an existential threat to Russia itself. Rather than acknowledge the existence of an independent and sovereign Ukraine, Putin remains in denial, and continues to insist that Ukrainians are really Russians (“one people”). Nor is Putin alone; many Russian leaders routinely question the legitimacy of Ukrainian statehood. Former Russian President Dmitry Medvedev is a particularly prominent Ukraine denier, proclaiming recently that the Ukrainian nation was established “by accident in the twentieth century.”

This refusal to recognize Ukraine as an independent nation is a longstanding Russian tradition stretching back hundreds of years. From the eighteenth century onward, successive Russian rulers have viewed any expression of a separate Ukrainian identity as direct challenge to Russia’s imperial identity and a potential catalyst for the breakup of the Russian state. In the modern era, independent Ukraine’s gradual embrace of European democratic values has added an ideological dimension to this Russian opposition, with Kremlin leaders fearful that Ukrainian democracy could prove contagious and spell doom for their own authoritarian regime.

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Ukraine’s first push for statehood came in the seventeenth century, when Ukrainian cossacks rose up in an ultimately failed attempt to establish a state of their own. The modern independence movement gained ground throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, leading to the declaration of Ukrainian independence in 1918 during the chaotic aftermath of the Russian Revolution. The Ukrainian People’s Republic proved to be short-lived, but in many ways it paved the way for the independent state that would emerge from the wreckage of the Soviet Union in 1991.

Russia’s denial of Ukrainian identity and refusal to accept the reality of Ukrainian independence are now fueling an invasion that many view as genocidal in nature. According to the UN, a crucial indicator of genocide is the “denial of the existence of protected groups or of recognition of elements of their identity.” A very large number of public statements by Russian officials including Putin would seem to meet this definition. Russia’s efforts to destroy Ukraine’s cultural heritage, along with the relentless barrage of genocidal anti-Ukrainian rhetoric in Russia’s heavily censored and carefully choreographed mainstream media, strongly indicate genocidal intent.

In areas of Ukraine under Russian control, local populations are being subjected to a range of genocidal policies including summary executions and mass deportations, along with the abduction and anti-Ukrainian indoctrination of children. Those who remain are being forced to accept Russian citizenship. Meanwhile, all symbols of Ukrainian national identity are being systematically removed. An international investigation into alleged war crimes committed by Russian forces during the occupation of Kherson found that “Putin’s plan to extinguish Ukrainian identity includes a range of crimes evocative of genocide.”

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So far, Putin’s invasion is failing to achieve its imperial objectives. Indeed, the war he unleashed in February 2022 appears to have greatly consolidated Ukrainian national identity and confirmed the finality of the country’s historic departure from the Russian sphere of influence. Last year, as Ukrainians marked Independence Day for the first time since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion, President Zelenskyy stressed the impact of the war on Ukrainian national identity, commenting that Ukraine had been “not born but reborn.”

Evidence of this rebirth can be seen in villages, towns, and cities across Ukraine. Millions of people who initially fled the Russian invasion have since returned home. Many are choosing to switch to the Ukrainian language in their everyday lives, while interest in Ukrainian history and culture has risen to unprecedented highs. Despite the horrors of the ongoing invasion, national pride is soaring, while polls consistently indicate overwhelming opposition to any kind of compromise peace that would cede Ukrainian land to Russia.

Ukrainian historian Serhii Plokhy, the Mykhailo Hrushevsky professor of Ukrainian history at Harvard University, echoes President Zelenskyy’s comments on the profound impact of the Russian invasion on Ukrainian identity. “What you see today in Ukraine is really something that many other nations experienced. It is a war for independence. And the war for independence is very much about the formation of this new identity,” he commented during an interview with NPR.

In February 2022, Vladimir Putin set out to extinguish Ukrainian statehood and erase Ukrainian identity. In doing so, he was pursuing a genocidal agenda that has deep roots in Russian imperial history. However, the Russian invasion has backfired disastrously for the Kremlin, greatly strengthening Ukrainian national identity while poisoning bilateral ties and shattering historic links that had once bound the two countries closely together. Russians may still be in denial over Ukrainian identity, but sooner or later they will have to face up to the reality of living next door to a strong and independent Ukraine.

Mercedes Sapuppo is a program assistant at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

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Throughout his 23-year reign, Vladimir Putin has enthusiastically embraced this imperial identity. Soon after taking office, he signaled his intentions by reintroducing the Soviet national anthem and consciously reviving the gold-plated splendor of the Czarist court. More recently, he has emphasized the continuity between the imperial past and his own regime by lamenting the fall of the USSR as the “disintegration of historical Russia” and vowing to reclaim “historically Russian lands” from Ukraine.

Putin’s bitterness over the break-up of the Soviet Union has fueled an unhealthy obsession with Ukraine that has come to symbolize his increasingly messianic brand of Russian imperialism. Among the many perceived injustices of the Soviet collapse, it is the emergence of an independent Ukraine that rankles Putin most. He insists Ukrainians are really Russians (“one people”), and claims the entire notion of a separate Ukrainian national identity is an anti-Russian plot hatched by foreign agents. During the build-up to the current war, the Russian dictator published a 5,000-word essay questioning Ukraine’s right to exist, and described Ukraine as “an inalienable part of our own history, culture, and spiritual space.”

Such posturing is nothing new. Russian rulers have been denying Ukrainian national identity and suppressing Ukraine’s statehood ambitions for more than three hundred years. This grim history of oppression is studded with atrocities such as the 1708 Baturyn Massacre and the artificially engineered famine in 1930s Soviet Ukraine, which left millions dead and is now recognized by more than 30 countries as an act of genocide against the Ukrainian nation. These unpunished crimes helped fuel a sense of imperial impunity that laid the ideological foundations for the current invasion. Almost a century after the horrors of the Holodomor famine, Russia is once again accused of committing genocide in Ukraine.

Throughout the Czarist and Soviet eras, Russia’s many landmark crimes in Ukraine were accompanied by relentless waves of russification in every sphere of Ukrainian life. This took place alongside the slow but steady suffocation of Ukraine’s national aspirations under layer upon layer of restrictions and bureaucratic bans. Perhaps the single most succinct example of Russia’s pathological refusal to acknowledge the existence of a separate Ukrainian identity remains the Valuev Circular. This 1863 Czarist decree banning the publication of Ukrainian-language literature declares: “a separate Ukrainian (“Little Russian”) language never existed, does not exist, and shall not exist.”

Disinformation has always played an important part in Russian efforts to suppress Ukrainian identity. Long before the era of social media fakes and Kremlin troll farms, Russian agents were actively destroying or rewriting ancient chronicles to fit imperial orthodoxies and remove anything that could strengthen Ukrainian claims to a national narrative of their own. Indeed, it is somewhat fitting that the term “Potemkin Village,” which is used to denote acts of shameless political deception, can be traced back to the artificial villages allegedly erected by Czarist officials in the Ukrainian countryside for the benefit of visiting Russian Empress Catherine the Great.

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The dawn of Ukrainian independence did little to dampen Russia’s imperial ambitions, with Moscow continuing to treat post-Soviet Ukraine as a vassal state. The turning point came in late 2004, when attempts to rig Ukraine’s presidential election in favor of a Kremlin-friendly candidate sparked massive street protests in Kyiv that came to be known as the Orange Revolution. This was to prove a watershed moment in Putin’s reign. The Orange Revolution sparked painful memories of his own experience as a young KGB officer in East Germany as the Berlin Wall fell and the Soviet Empire in Central Europe crumbled. Putin became convinced the West was plotting a similar pro-democracy uprising in Russia itself, and began to view Ukraine not just as an accident of history but as an existential threat to his own regime.

After the Orange Revolution, Putin’s policies toward Ukraine grew increasingly aggressive while his rhetoric became openly imperialistic. When years of energy cutoffs, trade embargoes, and attempts to subvert domestic Ukrainian politics all failed to force the country back into the Russian orbit, he eventually resorted to military force with the 2014 occupation of Crimea and invasion of eastern Ukraine’s Donbas region. This proved counter-productive, fueling a surge in Ukrainian patriotic sentiment and dramatically accelerating the nation-building processes that had been underway in Ukraine since the early 1990s. Faced with the prospect of losing Ukraine entirely, Putin made the fateful decision to launch the full-scale invasion of February 2022.

Amid the horrors of the ongoing war in Ukraine, Russia’s imperialistic objectives have become increasingly obvious. Kremlin officials routinely deny the legitimacy of the Ukrainian state, while genocidal anti-Ukrainian outbursts have become completely normalized on Russian state TV channels. Meanwhile, Putin himself has proudly compared his invasion to the eighteenth century imperial conquests of Peter the Great.

The actions of Russian forces inside Ukraine more than mirror this imperialistic rhetoric. Tens of thousands of Ukrainians have been killed, with millions more subjected to forced deportation. Those who remain in occupied regions are being pressured into accepting Russian passports as part of a ruthless russification campaign. Time and again, survivors of Russian captivity have recounted the especially brutal treatment reserved for anyone considered a Ukrainian patriot.

None of this is entirely surprising to Ukrainians, who have spent much of their lives in the shadow of Russia’s imperial pretensions and are painfully aware of their colossal neighbor’s longstanding disdain for Ukrainian statehood. While many Ukrainians were admittedly taken aback by the ferocity of the Russian onslaught, few were genuinely shocked to witness yet another manifestation of the imperial aggression that has shaped their country’s history for generations. This familiarity helps to explain why an overwhelming majority of Ukrainians are so determined to fight on until their country is fully liberated. They understand the futility of trying to compromise with the Kremlin and recognize that any attempt to strike a deal would be interpreted by Putin as an invitation to go further.

As Ukrainians defend their statehood on the battlefield, they are also attempting to remove any remaining symbols of Russian imperialism from the country. In the past year, high profile departures have included Odesa’s Catherine the Great monument and the giant Soviet crest adorning the shield of Kyiv’s iconic motherland monument. In everyday life, more and more Ukrainians are opting to switch to the Ukrainian language, exploring different aspects of Ukrainian culture, and expressing an interest in Ukrainian history. A war of independence is taking place along an 800-mile front and in the minds of millions of individual Ukrainians.

An understanding of Russian imperialism in Ukraine is essential for anyone seeking to make sense of today’s war. Putin has attempted to blame the invasion on everything from nonexistent Nazis to imaginary NATO security threats, but at heart it is an old-fashioned colonial war of extermination. In words and deeds, Russia has made clear that it seeks to destroy the Ukrainian state and erase Ukrainian identity. Asking Ukrainians to negotiate with this genocidal agenda is absurd and grotesque. Instead, the goal must be a decisive Ukrainian victory over Russian imperialism. Until Europe’s longest independence struggle reaches a successful conclusion, a sustainable peace will remain elusive.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

CNN ran two headlines in its own analysis of the poll: that “most Americans” oppose additional congressional funding to support Ukraine and that half of Americans say the United States has “done enough” to help Ukraine. But their data paint a more complex picture. On additional funding, the people being surveyed were asked, “Do you think Congress should or should not authorize additional funding to support Ukraine in the war with Russia?” In response, 45 percent said yes and 55 percent said no. That relatively small margin begs the inverse analysis: After eighteen months of the Russian war on Ukraine and tens of billions of dollars in US support to Kyiv, nearly half of Americans want Congress to spend more money to help Ukraine defend its sovereignty and freedom.

When pollsters asked if the United States should do more to stop the Russian military in Ukraine, or if Washington had already done enough, they got a statistical tie: 48 percent of respondents said the United States should do more, while 51 percent said that the United States had done enough, well within the 3.7 percent margin of error. That statistical tie is down somewhat from the result of an earlier CNN-SRSS poll, in which 62 percent of respondents said the United States should do more to support Ukraine. But that figure is from a snap survey taken February 25-26, 2022, just days after Russia’s full-scale invasion began, when US aid to Ukraine was less than half a billion dollars. Americans were right on the money then and their support has remained impressively steadfast into 2023.

Americans remain remarkably positive about US aid to Ukraine . . . This realization should embolden US politicians to advocate for Ukraine’s victory over Russia.

Even so, some analysts have highlighted the July 2023 poll’s crosstabs and suggested that Republicans are driving down US support for Ukraine. But that doesn’t tell the full story either.

Republican respondents in the latest CNN-SRSS poll did support more congressionally mandated aid for Ukraine at a lower clip than Democrats (28 percent versus 62 percent of Democrats), but their answers to the poll’s other questions reveal far more about Republican attitudes toward US policy in Ukraine. According to the poll, 40 percent of Republicans say the United States should do more to support Ukraine (compared to 61 percent of Democrats), while just 19 percent approve of US President Joe Biden’s “handling of the situation in Ukraine” (77 percent of Democrats approve). The fact that support for more aid to Ukraine polls higher among Republicans than Biden’s handling of the war may indicate that some Republicans want to see the White House act more boldly than it has so far.

While US public support for military aid to Ukraine has fallen since February 2022, the sky is certainly not falling. The picture of US support is far more complex than the cheerleaders for ending US support to Ukraine might want to believe.

Republicans—and Americans writ large—may in fact be more willing to send aid to Ukraine than anywhere else in the world. In a Reagan Foundation poll taken May 30-June 6 of this year, 75 percent of respondents (71 percent of Republicans and 86 percent of Democrats) said that it was “important to the United States that Ukraine win the war.” Significantly, 39 percent of Republicans said it was “very important” that Ukraine wins, compared to just 11 percent who said Ukrainian victory was “not at all important.” In general terms, this polling suggests that a significant share of Americans see Ukraine’s victory over the Russian invasion as in the interest of the United States.

Americans also appear willing to do what it takes to help Ukraine win. The Reagan Foundation poll shows 59 percent of respondents support military aid to Ukraine (75 percent of Democrats; 50 percent of Republicans) and half said US aid so far had been worth the cost (65 percent of Democrats; 41 percent of Republicans). But after pollsters told respondents that the United States had spent the equivalent of 3 percent of the annual US military budget on direct military aid and that Ukraine had “severely degraded Russia’s military power,” support jumped to 65 percent in favor, including 77 percent of Democrats and 59 percent of Republicans.

This level of support for aid makes Ukraine an exceptional case. When asked whether they favored or opposed different kinds of federal government expenditure, just 37 percent of respondents said they favored foreign aid in general (53 percent of Democrats and 21 percent of Republicans). Americans of all political stripes appear more in favor of continued US military support to Ukraine than many commentators seem to realize, especially when compared to baseline support for foreign aid.

Americans also appear very receptive to strong arguments in favor of support for Ukraine—if they are given enough context about the support. A June 15-28 poll from the University of Maryland presented respondents with the argument that US support for Ukraine was an effort to “uphold international law”; 92.3 percent of Democrats and 75.6 percent of Republicans found the point “convincing.” Slightly smaller majorities were convinced by the argument that the United States should help Ukraine to deter Russia from attacking NATO countries (87.6 percent of Democrats; 70.1 percent of Republicans). Interestingly, respondents were far less convinced by arguments against US support for Ukraine. Just 32.7 percent of Democrats and 55 percent of Republicans were swayed by the suggestion that US military aid could escalate into nuclear war with Russia.

Public polling suggests that Americans remain remarkably positive about US aid to Ukraine, despite eighteen months of Russia’s brutal war and already robust US support for Kyiv. This realization should embolden US politicians to advocate for Ukraine’s victory over Russia.

Even though US public support for Ukraine is strong, that enthusiasm cannot not be taken for granted. To keep this support going, US government officials and candidates for office should catch up to Americans by funding US support to Ukraine and articulating more clearly why Ukraine’s victory is in the United States’ interest. US voters want to see Ukraine win. It’s time their representatives followed suit.

Andrew D’Anieri is assistant director at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center. Find him on X, the platform formerly known as Twitter, at @andrew_danieri.

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Russia accused of deliberately targeting journalists in Ukraine

Mercedes Sapuppo — Thu, 10 Aug 2023 21:25:14 +0000

A deadly Russian airstrike close to a Ukrainian hotel and restaurant frequented by international journalists is fueling accusations that the Kremlin is deliberately targeting international media representatives in Ukraine. The August 7 bombing in east Ukrainian city Pokrovsk that killed nine people and wounded nearly 90 was the latest in a series of attacks on civilian targets known to be popular among journalists covering the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

This week’s Pokrovsk bombing shared many similarities with a June 2023 attack in nearby Kramatorsk, which struck civilian targets in the city center including a restaurant used by visiting journalists and international aid workers. Victims included prominent Ukrainian writer and journalist Victoria Amelina.

Allegations regarding the deliberate targeting of journalists are not new and first surfaced in the early months of the Russian invasion. In April 2022, the Institute for War & Peace Reporting published a dispatch entitled Ukraine: Journalists “Are Russia’s First Target,” which detailed the deaths of journalists in Ukraine during the first weeks of the war.

In February 2023, International media watchdog Reporters Without Borders and the Institute of Mass Information found that at least 26 journalists were deliberately targeted with rifle or artillery fire during the first year of the war. Reporters Without Borders has since filed multiple war crimes complaints against Russia with the International Criminal Court concerning 44 alleged acts of abuse and violence involving over 100 journalists and journalistic infrastructure.

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The targeting of international journalists in Ukraine would certainly be in line with the hard line media policies adopted by the Kremlin within Russia itself. One of Vladimir Putin’s first major steps during the early years of his reign was to assert Kremlin control over the Russian mainstream media. For the past two decades, dissenting voices inside Russia have been steadily silenced, while independent media outlets have been taken over by loyalists or forced to close down. Meanwhile, a number of individual journalists have suffered violent or otherwise suspicious deaths.

The Putin regime’s efforts to suppress free speech have intensified over the past eighteen months following the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. In today’s Russia, merely referring to the invasion as a “war” is a criminal offense, with media outlets instead obliged to use the Kremlin’s preferred euphemism of “Special Military Operation.”

Critics allege the Putin regime’s efforts to muzzle the media also extend to deliberate attacks on international journalists attempting to report on the invasion from Ukraine. “For the Russians, the press is the enemy. They do not want their crimes to be recorded and known to the whole world,” commented Oksana Romanyuk, executive director of the Kyiv-based Mass Media Institute.

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In response to Monday’s Russian attack in Pokrovsk, the International Federation of Journalists tweeted out a statement condemning “in the strongest terms the targeting of facilities frequented by journalists. Enough is enough.”

Many international correspondents covering the war in Ukraine have also suggested that the Pokrovsk airstrike deliberately targeted journalists. Financial Times reporter Christopher Miller underlined the popularity of the Pokrovsk hotel and restaurant among correspondents. “I and so many others stayed at Druzhba, conducted interviews at Corleone, and filed stories from both countless times over the years. They are among the few places operating near the front line. No doubt they were targeted by Russia because journalists and military have frequented them,” he tweeted.

Numerous other international reporters expressed similar opinions. The chief international correspondent of Britain’s Independent newspaper, Bel Trew, noted that the hotel and restaurant targeted in Monday’s bombing were well known for hosting journalists and humanitarian aid workers, and claimed the attack “looks like a pattern.” Meanwhile, senior Guardian correspondent Peter Beaumont declared the strikes “very much not a coincidence.”

While it will be extremely difficult to prove conclusively that Russia is engaged in the deliberate targeting of journalists in Ukraine, this is certainly the impression shared by international media watchdog organizations and many of the correspondents working on the front lines of the war. Moscow has an obvious motive for seeking to intimidate international reporters; over the past eighteen months, courageous on-the-spot coverage has frequently highlighted the brutality of Russia’s invasion and exposed the war crimes being committed by the Russian military in Ukraine.

Attempts to prevent reporters from chronicling Russia’s invasion cannot be allowed to succeed. The war unleashed by Vladimir Putin in February 2022 is already widely recognized as a major milestone in the evolution of war reporting, with correspondents able to share updates on a minute-by-minute basis via social media. In this new information reality, it is vital to demonstrate that authoritarian regimes can no longer hope to silence the international media.

Mercedes Sapuppo is a program assistant at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

New report highlights evidence of escalating Russian genocide in Ukraine

Kristina Hook — Thu, 10 Aug 2023 20:08:58 +0000

The brutality of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine has shocked many, even as Ukrainians and regional experts have noted that today’s war crimes fit broader patterns of Russian aggression against Ukrainians stretching back centuries. As evidence of atrocities continues to accumulate, the international legal community is closely monitoring the situation.

In May 2022, the New Lines Institute and Raoul Wallenberg Centre for Human Rights issued an independent legal inquiry that found the Russian Federation in breach of the United Nations Genocide Convention’s prohibition on direct and public incitement to genocide. The report identified a serious risk of genocide. In other words, the first few months of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine provided ample evidence to trigger the central duty of the United Nations Genocide Convention, namely to prevent genocide in Ukraine.

The UN Genocide Convention legally obligates its 152 signatories, including Russia, to act as soon as they become aware (or should have become aware) of genocide risks. All forms of violence should be condemned everywhere, but genocides have been declared the “crime of crimes” in international law, as they target a community’s most basic right to exist.

The horrors of genocidal violence sometimes obscure a crucial point in analyses of Russia’s egregious actions against Ukrainians. While the Genocide Convention forbids genocidal violence itself (“the commission of genocide”), it also prohibits four other related actions: Conspiracy to commit genocide, attempts to commit genocide, complicity in genocide, and direct and public incitement to genocide (Article III). The inciting language of Russian state actors has long met the “direct and public” standard and is a crime with no statute of limitations.

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I am the principal author of a new report by the New Lines Institute and Raoul Wallenberg Centre for Human Rights, an updated legal analysis into the evidence of Russia’s breaches of the UN Genocide Convention in Ukraine. This report features nearly sixty pages of verifiable, open-source information.

To begin, we reviewed Russian state actors’ direct and public incitement to genocide since they were formally put on notice regarding these breaches of the Genocide Convention in May 2022. Organizing verifiable examples through an expert framework on the five “D’s” of incitement (demonization, delegitimization, dehumanization, denial, and disinformation), we found durable genocidal incitement across all levels of Russian state authority.

Over the past year, direct and public incitement to genocide by Russian state actors neither decreased in tone or in volume. In fact, we demonstrate that this specific breach of the Genocide Convention escalated. New dehumanizing tropes, such as “de-Satanizing” Ukrainians, have even been introduced through powerful, state-endorsed platforms. In legal language, there are reasonable grounds to believe that Russia is responsible for direct and public incitement to genocide against Ukrainians.

This inciting language is horrifying on its own, as it calls for the erasure and destruction of Ukrainians through graphic slurs and threats. However, Russia’s actions in Ukraine have mirrored the violence of the rhetoric coming out of Moscow.

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Over the past year, we have identified evidence of a surge in systematic and coordinated genocidal tactics against Ukrainians. Our legal analysis found reasonable grounds to believe that Russia is responsible for the commission of genocide. This position is supported both by actions prohibited in the Genocide Convention and an underlying pattern of atrocities indicating that Russia aims to destroy the Ukrainian national group in part.

While Russia’s direct orchestration and participation in actions prohibited under the Genocide Convention are undeniable, such as the forcible transfer of Ukrainian children, our report breaks new ground by linking these actions of genocide with evidence of its mental element, the motive to destroy a national group in whole or in part.

We invite others to engage with the sheer volume of evidence captured in our report and avoid allowing Russia’s daily atrocities to cloud our vision. When Russian state actors’ words and actions are analyzed systematically and across the timeline of the full-scale invasion, abundant evidence indicates that Russia’s genocidal tactics are escalating. The Genocide Convention compels the international community to proactively meet the challenges posed by Russia’s clear and evolving genocidal tactics, halting this genocide in motion.

In addition, our report reveals singular aspects of Russia’s genocide, including documented evidence of all five acts prohibited in the Genocide Convention’s Article II: Killing, serious bodily and mental harm, inflicting conditions of life calculated to bring about the victims’ physical destruction, measures to prevent births, and the forcible transfer of children. The Genocide Convention does not require evidence of all five prohibited acts to meet the legal standard. Russia’s violation of all five acts of genocide is therefore particularly heinous and adds to the overall portrait of their escalating attempts to commit genocide in Ukraine.

Looking ahead, many atrocity prevention policy and legal precedents will be set by the international community’s response to Russia’s escalating genocide in Ukraine. Genocide reports can make for harrowing reading, but nothing can compare to the horrors Ukrainians face each day. We hope our report will galvanize both policy and public action to advocate for the millions of Ukrainians whose lives have been forever changed by Russia’s genocide, and whose safety is not yet secured.

Kristina Hook is assistant professor of conflict management at Kennesaw State University and a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center. She is the lead author of the expert report The Russian Federation’s Escalating Commission of Genocide in Ukraine: A Legal Analysis.

Russian War Report: Co-founder of Russia’s most popular search engine condemns war in Ukraine

Digital Forensic Research Lab — Thu, 10 Aug 2023 19:24:08 +0000

As Russia continues its assault on Ukraine, the Atlantic Council’s Digital Forensic Research Lab (DFRLab) is keeping a close eye on Russia’s movements across the military, cyber, and information domains. With more than seven years of experience monitoring the situation in Ukraine—as well as Russia’s use of propaganda and disinformation to undermine the United States, NATO, and the European Union—the DFRLab’s global team presents the latest installment of the Russian War Report.

Security

Russian oil tanker struck as Ukrainian general alleges chemical weapons use

Satellite imagery supports report of depleted armored vehicles in Russian military storage facility

Tracking narratives

Yandex co-founder condemns Russia’s war in Ukraine

Russian independent outlet ties Investigative Committee of Russia to forced deportations of Ukrainian children

Russian oil tanker struck as Ukrainian general alleges chemical weapons use

Russia accused Ukraine of striking a Russian oil tanker on August 4 with a naval drone. The vessel was identified by the Moscow Times as the chemical tanker SIG, currently under US sanctions for supplying jet fuel to Russian forces in Syria. Ukrainian media outlet Suspilne, citing unnamed Ukrainian security officials, reported that the Ukrainian navy struck the ship near the Kerch Strait Bridge using a naval drone. Ukrainian forces have long targeted the Kerch Bridge in an attempt to cut off Russian military logistics in southern Ukraine. On the night of August 3, Ukrainian troops conducted a series of aerial and naval drone strikes against Russian logistics and seaside infrastructure in occupied Crimea and Russia’s Krasnodar region, reportedly striking the Russian Ropucha-class landing ship Olenegorsky Gornyak.

The General Staff of the Ukrainian Armed Forces announced on August 7 that it conducted offensive operations in the direction of the Russian-occupied cities of Berdyansk and Melitopol. Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Maliar said that fighting is ongoing south of Bakhmut. The Ukrainian army is making progress on this front, albeit slowly. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy acknowledged in an interview published on August 6 with Argentine newspaper La Nacion that counteroffensive operations are progressing slower than expected and mentioned the need for patience.

Meanwhile, Ukrainian General Oleksandr Tarnavskyi alleged on August 6 that Russian forces used chemical weapons in Ukraine, violating international conventions. According to a post on Tarnavskyi’s Telegram channel, Russian troops fired two artillery barrages with munitions containing the toxic compound chloropicrin in Novodanylivka. Tarnavskyi did not include evidence to back up his claim, nor has it been independently verified.

On the evening of August 7, Russian forces reportedly dropped four guided aerial bombs on the village of Kruhliakivka, located twenty-five kilometers southeast of Kupiansk. According to Governor Oleh Syniehubov, the attack killed two civilians; and Russia struck the village again when first responders arrived on the scene. That same day, Head of the Office of the President of Ukraine Andriy Yermak said that Russia struck a house in the town of Kucherivka, Kharkiv Oblast, killing two people. In addition, a man was reportedly killed during a Russian attack in Nikopol, located across the Dnipro River from Russian-controlled Enerhodar in Zaporizhzhia Oblast.

On August 6, Zelenskyy said that over the past week, Russian forces had launched sixty-five missiles against Ukraine and 178 combat drones, including eighty-seven Iranian-made Shahed drones. Meanwhile, the Ukrainian air force reported that Russian troops used Kinzhal ballistic missiles against Ukraine on August 5, targeting central and western regions.

According to Ukraine’s Ministry of Culture and Information Policy, Russia has damaged at least 763 cultural heritage sites in unoccupied regions of Ukraine since February 24, 2022. The most damage has been recorded in Kharkiv, Donetsk, Kherson, Kyiv, and Odesa. At least 255 architectural landmarks, 185 historical sites, nineteen monumental art sites, and eighteen sites of archeological significance are reportedly among the damaged locations.

—Ruslan Trad, resident fellow for security research, Sofia, Bulgaria

Satellite imagery supports report of depleted armored vehicles in Russian military storage facility

In an August 8 article, the Moscow Times claimed that a Russian open-air storage facility dedicated to tanks and armored vehicles in the Vagzhanova district of Buryatia’s capital city, Ulan-Ude, had been depleted of almost 40 percent of its units since June 2022. The outlet based its claims on Google Earth imagery, with the May 2023 update showing empty spots where tanks used to be located. The DFRLab compared the Google imagery to Capella Space satellite aperture radar (SAR) imagery, which also appears to show that many armored vehicles and tanks in storage at the Vagzhanova facility had been relocated. The SAR imagery only covers the area from June to November 2022.

Animated SAR imagery of the Vagzhanova military storage facility in Russia; imagery taken on June 28, 2022, and November 27, 2022. (Source: DFRLab via Capella Space)

According to the Moscow Times’ estimates, in September 2021, the storage facility stored 3,840 armored vehicles. The figure shrank to around 2,600 units in November 2022, and the latest Google Earth imagery points to around 2,270 remaining units. The Moscow Times also indicated that around 1,570 units were missing from the storage facility, with the most significant departures observed after the enforcement of the partial mobilization in late May 2022.

Using measurement tools on satellite imagery, the DFRLab can infer that based on the length and width of the vehicles in the imagery, the tanks could be identified as the BTR-RD, BMD-4M or BMD-3, and BTR-MD (codename: “Rakushka”). The Moscow Times reported that military units 4428 and 46108 are deployed to the Vagzhanova military facility.

The armored vehicles cited above also appear consistent with losses reported by open-source researcher Oryx during the February 2023 battle of Vuhledar, which saw heavy Russian losses. According to Oryx’s estimates, twenty-one BTR-MD tanks were destroyed or captured during the failed offensive. The DFRLab also monitored the failed Russian push on Vuhledar, which highlighted the presence of Russian soldiers from Russia’s far-east regions, including Primorsky Krai and Buryatia. Both regions have suffered heavy fatalities since the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

At the time of writing, the DFRLab cannot confirm that these units were equipped with the vehicles presented in the satellite imagery dating back to November 2022.

Citing Russian defense ministry instructions, the Moscow Times also reported that armored vehicles stored in open-air facilities are typically part of the least valuable units, as more modern vehicles are stored in protected facilities or under tents.

—Valentin Châtelet, research associate, Brussels, Belgium

Yandex co-founder condemns Russia’s war in Ukraine

After independent Russian news outlet Agenstvo reported that Arkady Volozh, co-founder of the search engine and tech company Yandex, did not describe himself as Russian in his official website bio, Volozh reportedly issued a statement voicing opposition to the war in Ukraine and acknowledged his “share of responsibility.”

“I am categorically against Russia’s barbaric invasion of Ukraine, where I, like many, have friends and relatives,” the statement noted. “I am horrified by the fact that every day bombs fly into the homes of Ukrainians. Despite the fact that I have not lived in Russia since 2014, I understand that I also have a share of responsibility for the actions of the country.”

Independent outlets, including Meduza and Proekt, have previously published articles critical of Volozh and Yandex, alleging that both have been complicit in Russia’s crackdowns on internet freedoms. “Over time, it became clear that Russia was in no hurry to become part of the global world,” the statement added. “At the same time, the pressure on the company grew. But we did not give up, we did our best despite the external conditions. Has it always been possible to find the right balance? Now, looking back, it is clear that something could have been done differently.”

On August 7, Agenstvo raised questions about how Volozh presented himself to the world, noting that his official bio describes him as a “Kazakhstan-born, Israeli tech entrepreneur, computer scientist, investor, and philanthropist.” Agenstvo also noted a back-and-forth series of edits on his Wikipedia page in which an IP address located in Israel had removed the phrase “Russian billionaire.”

“There were many reasons why I had to remain silent,” the statement concluded. “You can argue about the timeliness of my statement, but not about its substance. I am against war.”

—Andy Carvin, DFRLab managing edtior, Washington, DC

Russian independent outlet ties Investigative Committee of Russia to forced deportations of Ukrainian children

Russian independent media outlet Verstka reported that the Investigative Committee of Russia and its head, Alexander Bastrykin, are allegedly involved in the forced deportation of Ukrainian children to Russia. In a special report published on August 6, Verstka claimed that the Investigative Committee of Russia took patronage over the Ukrainian children living in Russia and sent its employees to homes with toys, clothes, and school materials.

Verstka also claimed that the Investigative Committee previously advertised the cadet corps to Ukrainian children from eastern Ukraine. According to data published in an Investigative Committee magazine, at least seventy-eight Ukrainian children entered Russian educational institutions, including the cadet corps and academies affiliated with the Investigative Committee, between February 2022 and March 2023.

Bastrykin does not appear to have commented on the allegation; the Russian War Report will continue to keep an eye on this story in case he issues a statement.

—Ruslan Trad, resident fellow for security research, Sofia, Bulgaria

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Sudan’s precarious information environment and the fight for democracy

Tessa Knight, Lujain Alsedeg — Tue, 08 Aug 2023 04:00:00 +0000

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Executive summary

In recent years, Sudan has seen significant political upheaval, from the 2019 ouster of autocratic ruler Omar al-Bashir and the October 2021 military coup that unseated the transitional government, to the outbreak of violent conflict between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) in April 2023. The result is a country—and its hopes for a democratic transition—now derailed, despite years of civil protests that themselves were disrupted by police maneuvering and the threat of full-blown civil war. This societal discord is manifested not just in real life but also in the country’s online information environment. This report examines the state of digital affairs in Sudan in the lead-up to the current conflict, focusing on the period from the October 2021 coup through December 2022.

While online networks played a crucial role in exposing brutalities committed by al-Bashir’s security apparatus and in organizing protests, almost 70 percent of the Sudanese population remained offline as of January 2022.

Despite less than a third of the country having access to the internet, both the al-Bashir regime and the subsequent ruling councils viewed online communication as a potentially dangerous tool in the hands of protesting citizens. Between December 2018 and December 2022, Sudanese citizens were subjected to 138 days of internet disruptions.

Overall, the legal infrastructure was typical of autocratic regimes in that it was designed to limit free speech and enable punitive actions against dissenters and opposition figures. Authorities used deliberately vague laws to enforce internet disruptions and confiscate protesters’ cell phones. For example, the Criminal Act of 1991 criminalized the spreading of false information, while the 2020 amendment to the Cybercrimes Law, which was passed in secret, made the spread of disinformation punishable with up to four years in prison, flogging, or both. While many laws from al-Bashir’s time remain in place, there have also been tangible improvements to Sudan’s legal infrastructure since his removal. Independent citizens took to the courts to fight against internet shutdowns, and journalists defied the Press and Publications Act to create a media union.

Sudan’s National Intelligence and Security Service formed a Cyber Jihad Unit to monitor online dissent and spread disinformation. During the 2018–19 protests that led to al-Bashir’s ouster, internal disinformation from the regime painted protesters as violent. After al-Bashir’s removal, internal campaigns worked to promote the military apparatus and target the transitional government.

Yet activists who spoke to the authors indicated they were primarily concerned with being identified by intelligence agents for sharing legitimate evidence of violence committed against protesters. Despite the danger, activists used Facebook Live to stream evidence of the regime’s brutality and ensured the evidence could not be easily dismissed as old or fake by including the time, date, and location of incriminating incidents in social media posts.

An important form of online resistance took place on women-only Facebook groups. Previously used to identify cheating men, the groups turned into investigative platforms where women posted images of suspected plain-clothed members of the intelligence services accused of abusing protesters. The groups were so successful at unearthing personal information about undercover intelligence officers that many officers took to wearing masks to hide their identities.

Foreign entities orchestrating disinformation campaigns primarily focused on promoting their relationship with Sudan or pushing Sudanese politics in a way to their own benefit. Yevgeny Prigozhin, who oversees Russian private military company the Wagner Group, told al-Bashir to spread disinformation depicting protesters as violent, while later Russian campaigns focused on promoting Russia’s own interests around a naval base in Port Sudan. Public relations firms from Gulf states that were supportive of the coup that toppled al-Bashir spent thousands of dollars promoting the military, seeing a greater opportunity of a beneficial relationship with the latter.

Meanwhile, rumors spread offline posed a threat to grassroots organizations that struggled to combat false information shared via word of mouth. Sudan’s unique information environment features a combination of a media ecosystem attempting to build a trustworthy reputation after years of censorship, a legal system designed to limit it further, and, despite these things, a populace striving toward greater governmental representation and democracy in spite of the autocratic rivalries that have violently hijacked it. In light of the ongoing conflict, with Sudanese civil society caught in the middle, the near horizon remains bleak, but in the long term, only greater transparency and accountability around the free flow of information in conjunction with a cessation in violence will provide the stepping stones necessary to build a resilient democracy in Sudan.

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الملخص التنفيذي

ﻓﻲ اﻟﺴﻨﻮات اﻷﺧﻴﺮة، ﺷﻬﺪ اﻟﺴﻮدان اﺿﻄﺮاﺑﺎت ﺳﻴﺎﺳﻴﺔ ﻛﺒﻴﺮة، ﻣﻦ اﻹﻃﺎﺣﺔ ﺑﺎﻟﺤﺎﻛﻢ اﻻﺳﺘﺒﺪادي ﻋﻤﺮ اﻟﺒﺸﻴﺮ ﻓﻲ ﻋﺎم ،٢٠١٩واﻧﻘﻼب ٢٠٢١اﻟﺬي أﻃﺎح ﺑﺎﻟﺤﻜﻮﻣﺔ اﻻﻧﺘﻘﺎﻟﻴﺔ، ﻹﻧﺪﻻع اﻟﺼﺮاع اﻟﻌﻨﻴﻒ ﺑﻴﻦ اﻟﻘﻮات اﻟﻤﺴﻠﺤﺔ اﻟﺴﻮداﻧﻴﺔ وﻗﻮات اﻟﺪﻋﻢ اﻟﺴﺮﻳﻊ اﻟﺸﺒﻪ ﻋﺴﻜﺮﻳﺔ ﻓﻲ اﺑﺮﻳﻞ .٢٠٢٣ﻣﻤﺎ أﺛﻤﺮ ﻋﻦ ﺧﺮوج اﻟﺪوﻟﺔ ﻋﻦ ﻣﺴﺎرﻫﺎ وآﻣﺎﻟﻬﺎ ﻓﻲ اﻟﺘﺤﻮل اﻟﺪﻳﻤﻘﺮاﻃﻲ، ﻋﲆ اﻟﺮﻏﻢ ﻣﻦ ﺳﻨﻮات ﻣﻦ اﻻﺣﺘﺠﺎﺟﺎت اﻟﻤﺪﻧﻴﺔ اﻟﺘﻲ ﺗﻌﻄﻠﺖ ﻫﻲ ﻧﻔﺴﻬﺎ ﺑﺴﺒﺐ ﻣﻨﺎورات اﻟﺸﺮﻃﺔ واﻟﺘﻬﺪﻳﺪ ﺑﺤﺮب أﻫﻠﻴﺔ ﺷﺎﻣﻠﺔ. ﻻ ﺗﻨﺤﺴﺮ اﻧﻌﻜﺎﺳﺎت ﻫﺬا اﻟﺨﻼف اﻟﻤﺠﺘﻤﻌﻲ ﻋﲆ اﻟﺤﻴﺎة اﻟﻮاﻗﻌﻴﺔ ﻓﺤﺴﺐ، ﺑﻞ أﻳﻀً ﺎ ﻋﲆ ﺑﻴﺌﺔ اﻟﻤﻌﻠﻮﻣﺎت ﻋﺒﺮ اﻹﻧﺘﺮﻧﺖ ﻓﻲ اﻟﺪوﻟﺔ. ﻳﺘﻨﺎول ﻫﺬا اﻟﺘﻘﺮﻳﺮ ﺣﺎﻟﺔ اﻟﻤﺠﺎل اﻟﺮﻗﻤﻲ ﻓﻲ اﻟﺴﻮدان ﻓﻲ اﻟﻔﺘﺮة اﻟﺘﻲ ﺳﺒﻘﺖ اﻟﺼﺮاع اﻟﺤﺎﻟﻲ، ﻣﻊ اﻟﺘﺮﻛﻴﺰ ﻋﲆ اﻟﻔﺘﺮة ﻣﻦ اﻧﻘﻼب أﻛﺘﻮﺑﺮ ٢٠٢١ﺣﺘﻰ دﻳﺴﻤﺒﺮ ٢٠٢٢.

ﻓﻲ اﻟﻮﻗﺖ اﻟﺬي ﻟﻌﺒﺖ ﻓﻴﻪ ﺷﺒﻜﺎت اﻹﻧﺘﺮﻧﺖ دورا ًﺣﺎﺳﻤًﺎ ﻓﻲ ﺗﻨﻈﻴﻢ اﻻﺣﺘﺠﺎﺟﺎت واﻟﻜﺸﻒ ﻋﻦ اﻷﻋﻤﺎل اﻟﻮﺣﺸﻴﺔ اﻟﺘﻲ ارﺗﻜﺒﻬﺎ ﺟﻬﺎز أﻣﻦ اﻟﺒﺸﻴﺮ، ﻇﻞ ﻣﺎ ﻳﻘﺮب ﻣﻦ ٪٧٠ ﻣﻦ ﺳﻜﺎن اﻟﺴﻮدان ﻣﻨﻘﻄﻌﻴﻦ ﻋﻦ اﻻﻧﺘﺮﻧﺖ اﻋﺘﺒﺎرًا ﻣﻦ ﻳﻨﺎﻳﺮ ٢٠٢٢.

ﻋﲆ اﻟﺮﻏﻢ ﻣﻦ أن أﻗﻞ ﻣﻦ ﺛﻠﺚ اﻟﺴﻜﺎن ﻳﻤﻠﻜﻮن إﻣﻜﺎﻧﻴﺔ اﻟﻮﺻﻮل إﱃ اﻹﻧﺘﺮﻧﺖ، اﻋﺘﺒﺮ ﻛﻞ ﻣﻦ ﻧﻈﺎم اﻟﺒﺸﻴﺮ واﻟﻨﻈﻢ اﻟﺤﺎﻛﻤﺔ اﻟﻼﺣﻘﺔ أن اﻻﺗﺼﺎل ﻋﺒﺮ اﻹﻧﺘﺮﻧﺖ أداة ﺧﻄﺮة ﻓﻲ أﻳﺪي اﻟﻤﻮاﻃﻨﻴﻦ اﻟﻤﺤﺘﺠﻴﻦ. ﺑﻴﻦ دﻳﺴﻤﺒﺮ ٢٠١٨ ودﻳﺴﻤﺒﺮ ،٢٠٢٢ﺗﻌﺮض اﻟﻤﻮاﻃﻨﻮن اﻟﺴﻮداﻧﻴﻮن إﱃ ١٣٨ﻳﻮﻣًﺎ ﻣﻦ اﻧﻘﻄﺎع اﻹﻧﺘﺮﻧﺖ.

ﻋﻤﻮﻣﺎً، ﻛﺎﻧﺖ اﻟﺒﻨﻴﺔ اﻟﺘﺤﺘﻴﺔ اﻟﻘﺎﻧﻮﻧﻴﺔ ﻧﻤﻮذﺟﻴﺔ ﻟﺨﺪﻣﺔ اﻷﻧﻈﻤﺔ اﻻﺳﺘﺒﺪادﻳﺔ ﻣﻦ ﺣﻴﺚ أﻧﻬﺎ ﻣﺼﻤﻤﺔ ﻟﻠﺤﺪ ﻣﻦ ﺣﺮﻳﺔ اﻟﺘﻌﺒﻴﺮ وﺗﻤﻜﻴﻦ اﻹﺟﺮاءات اﻟﻌﻘﺎﺑﻴﺔ ﺿﺪ اﻟﻤﻌﺎرﺿﻴﻦ. ﺣﻴﺚ وﻇﻔﺖ اﻟﺴﻠﻄﺎت ﻗﻮاﻧﻴﻨﺎً ﻏﺎﻣﻀﺔ ﻋﻦ ﻋﻤﺪ ﻟﻔﺮض ﺗﻌﻄﻴﻞ اﻹﻧﺘﺮﻧﺖ وﻣﺼﺎدرة اﻟﻬﻮاﺗﻒ اﻟﻤﺤﻤﻮﻟﺔ ﻟﻠﻤﺘﻈﺎﻫﺮﻳﻦ. ﻋﲆ ﺳﺒﻴﻞ اﻟﻤﺜﺎل، ﻳﺠﺮّم اﻟﻘﺎﻧﻮن اﻟﺠﻨﺎﺋﻲ ﻟﻌﺎم ١٩٩١ﻧﺸﺮ اﻟﻤﻌﻠﻮﻣﺎت اﻟﻜﺎذﺑﺔ، ﻓﻲ ﺣﻴﻦ أن ﺗﻌﺪﻳﻞ ﻋﺎم ٢٠٢٠ ﻟﻘﺎﻧﻮن اﻟﺠﺮاﺋﻢ اﻹﻟﻜﺘﺮوﻧﻴﺔ، واﻟﺬي ﺗﻢ إﻗﺮاره ﺳﺮاً، أﻗﺮ أن ﻋﻘﺎب ﻧﺸﺮ اﻟﻤﻌﻠﻮﻣﺎت اﻟﻤﻀﻠﻠﺔ ﻫﻮ اﻟﺴﺠﻦ ﻟﻤﺪة ﺗﺼﻞ إﱃ أرﺑﻊ ﺳﻨﻮات أو اﻟﺠﻠﺪ أو ﻛﻠﻴﻬﻤﺎ. ﻓﻲ ﺣﻴﻦ أن اﻟﻌﺪﻳﺪ ﻣﻦ اﻟﻘﻮاﻧﻴﻦ ﻣﻦ ﻋﻬﺪ اﻟﺒﺸﻴﺮ ﻻ ﺗﺰال ﺳﺎرﻳﺔ، ﻛﺎﻧﺖ ﻫﻨﺎك أﻳﻀًﺎ ﺗﺤﺴﻴﻨﺎت ﻣﻠﻤﻮﺳﺔ ﻋﲆ اﻟﺒﻨﻴﺔ اﻟﺘﺤﺘﻴﺔ اﻟﻘﺎﻧﻮﻧﻴﺔ ﻓﻲ اﻟﺴﻮدان ﻣﻨﺬ إﻗﺎﻟﺘﻪ. ﻟﺠﺄ ﻣﻮاﻃﻨﻮن ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻠﻮن إﱃ اﻟﻤﺤﺎﻛﻢ ﻟﻤﺤﺎرﺑﺔ ﻗﻄﻊ اﻹﻧﺘﺮﻧﺖ، ﻛﻤﺎ ﺗﺤﺪى اﻟﺼﺤﻔﻴﻮن ﻗﺎﻧﻮن اﻟﺼﺤﺎﻓﺔ واﻟﻤﻄﺒﻮﻋﺎت ﻹﻧﺸﺎء ﻧﻘﺎﺑﺔ إﻋﻼﻣﻴﺔ.

ﺷﻜﻞ ﺟﻬﺎز اﻷﻣﻦ واﻟﻤﺨﺎﺑﺮات اﻟﻮﻃﻨﻲ اﻟﺴﻮداﻧﻲ وﺣﺪة ﻟﻠﺠﻬﺎد اﻹﻟﻜﺘﺮوﻧﻲ ﻟﻤﺮاﻗﺒﺔ اﻟﻤﻌﺎرﺿﺔ ﻋﺒﺮ اﻹﻧﺘﺮﻧﺖ وﻧﺸﺮ اﻟﻤﻌﻠﻮﻣﺎت اﻟﻤﻀﻠﻠﺔ. ﺧﻼل اﺣﺘﺠﺎﺟﺎت ٢٠١٩-٢٠١٨اﻟﺘﻲ أدت إﱃ اﻹﻃﺎﺣﺔ ﺑﺎﻟﺒﺸﻴﺮ، وﺻﻔﺖ اﻟﻤﻌﻠﻮﻣﺎت اﻟﻤﻀﻠﻠﺔ اﻟﺪاﺧﻠﻴﺔ ﻟﻠﻨﻈﺎم اﻟﻤﺘﻈﺎﻫﺮﻳﻦ ﺑﺎﻟﻌﻨﻒ. وﺑﻌﺪ إﻗﺎﻟﺔ اﻟﺒﺸﻴﺮ، ﻋﻤﻠﺖ اﻟﺤﻤﻼت اﻟﺪاﺧﻠﻴﺔ ﻋﲆ اﻟﺘﺮوﻳﺞ ﻟﻠﺠﻬﺎز اﻟﻌﺴﻜﺮي واﺳﺘﻬﺪاف اﻟﺤﻜﻮﻣﺔ اﻻﻧﺘﻘﺎﻟﻴﺔ.

أﺷﺎر اﻟﻨﺸﻄﺎء اﻟﺬﻳﻦ ﺗﺤﺪﺛﻮا إﱃ ﻣﺆﻟﻔﻲ اﻟﺘﻘﺮﻳﺮ إﱃ أﻧﻬﻢ ﻛﺎﻧﻮا ﺣﺬرﻳﻦ ﻓﻲ اﻟﻤﻘﺎم اﻷول ﻣﻦ ﺗﻤﻜﻦ ﻋﻤﻼء اﻟﻤﺨﺎﺑﺮات ﻣﻦ ﺗﺤﺪﻳﺪ ﻫﻮﻳﺎﺗﻬﻢ ﺑﻌﺪ ﻣﺸﺎرﻛﺘﻬﻢ أدﻟﺔ ﻣﺸﺮوﻋﺔ ﻋﲆ اﻟﻌﻨﻒ اﻟﻤﺮﺗﻜﺐ ﺿﺪ اﻟﻤﺘﻈﺎﻫﺮﻳﻦ. ﻋﲆ اﻟﺮﻏﻢ ﻣﻦ اﻟﺨﻄﺮ، اﺳﺘﺨﺪم اﻟﻨﺸﻄﺎء Facebook Live ﻟﺒﺚ أدﻟﺔ ﻋﲆ وﺣﺸﻴﺔ اﻟﻨﻈﺎم وﺗﺄﻛﺪوا ﻣﻦ أﻻ ﻳﻤﻜﻦ ﺗﻜﺬﻳﺒﻬﺎ ﺑﺴﻬﻮﻟﺔ ﺑﺎدّﻋﺎء أﻧﻬﺎ ﻗﺪﻳﻤﺔ أو ﻣﺰﻳﻔﺔ ﻣﻦ ﺧﻼل ﺗﻀﻤﻴﻦ وذﻛﺮ وﻗﺖ وﺗﺎرﻳﺦ وﻣﻮﻗﻊ ﺣﻮادث ﻫﺬه اﻟﺠﺮاﺋﻢ ﻓﻲ ﻣﻨﺸﻮرات وﺳﺎﺋﻞ اﻟﺘﻮاﺻﻞ اﻻﺟﺘﻤﺎﻋﻲ.

ﻇﻬﺮ ﺷﻜﻞ ﻣﻬﻢ ﻣﻦ أﺷﻜﺎل اﻟﻤﻘﺎوﻣﺔ ﻋﺒﺮ اﻹﻧﺘﺮﻧﺖ ﻓﻲ ﻣﺠﻤﻮﻋﺎت ﻓﻴﺴﺒﻮك اﻟﻤﺨﺼﺼﺔ ﻟﻠﻨﺴﺎء ﻓﻘﻂ. ﻛﺎﻧﺖ ﻫﺬه اﻟﻤﺠﻤﻮﻋﺎت ﺗُﺴﺘﺨﺪم ﺳﺎﺑﻘًﺎ ﺑﻐﺮض اﻟﺘﻌﺮف ﻋﲆ اﻟﺮﺟﺎل اﻟﺨﺎﺋﻨﻴﻦ ﻟﺰوﺟﺎﺗﻬﻢ، ﺛﻢ ﺗﺤﻮﻟﺖ إﱃ ﻣﻨﺼﺎت ﺗﺤﻘﻴﻖ ﺗﻨﺸﺮ ﻓﻴﻬﺎ اﻟﻨﺴﺎء ﺻﻮرًا ﻟﻠﻤﺸﺘﺒﻬﻴﻦ ﺑﺄﻧﻬﻢ أﻋﻀﺎء ﺟﻬﺎز اﻷﻣﻦ ﻣﺮﺗﺪﻳﻦ ﻣﻼﺑﺴﺎً ﻣﺪﻧﻴﺔ وﻣﺘﻬﻤﻴﻦ ﺑﺈﺳﺎءة ﻣﻌﺎﻣﻠﺔ اﻟﻤﺘﻈﺎﻫﺮﻳﻦ. ﻛﺎﻧﺖ اﻟﻤﺠﻤﻮﻋﺎت ﻧﺎﺟﺤﺔ ﻟﻠﻐﺎﻳﺔ ﻓﻲ اﻟﻜﺸﻒ ﻋﻦ ﻣﻌﻠﻮﻣﺎت ﺷﺨﺼﻴﺔ ﻋﻦ ﺿﺒﺎط اﻟﻤﺨﺎﺑﺮات اﻟﺴﺮﻳﻴﻦ ﻟﺪرﺟﺔ أن اﻟﻌﺪﻳﺪ ﻣﻦ اﻟﻀﺒﺎط ﺑﺪأوا ﺑﺎرﺗﺪاء اﻷﻗﻨﻌﺔ ﻹﺧﻔﺎء ﻫﻮﻳﺎﺗﻬﻢ.

رﻛﺰت اﻟﻜﻴﺎﻧﺎت اﻷﺟﻨﺒﻴﺔ اﻟﺘﻲ ﺗﻨﻈﻢ ﺣﻤﻼت اﻟﺘﻀﻠﻴﻞ ﻓﻲ اﻟﻤﻘﺎم اﻷول ﻋﲆ ﺗﻌﺰﻳﺰ ﻋﻼﻗﺘﻬﺎ ﻣﻊ اﻟﺴﻮدان أو دﻓﻊ اﻟﺴﻴﺎﺳﺔ اﻟﺴﻮداﻧﻴﺔ ﺑﺎﻻﺗﺠﺎه اﻟﺬي ﻳﺨﺪم ﻣﺼﺎﻟﺤﻬﺎ. ﻗﺎم ﻳﻔﻐﻴﻨﻲ ﺑﺮﻳﻐﻮزﻳﻦ، اﻟﻤﺸﺮف ﻋﲆ ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺴﻜﺮﻳﺔ روﺳﻴﺔ ﺧﺎﺻﺔ ﺗﺴﻤﻰ ﻣﺠﻤﻮﻋﺔ ﻓﺎﻏﻨﺮ، ﺑﺈﺧﺒﺎر اﻟﺒﺸﻴﺮ أن ﻳﻨﺸﺮ ﻣﻌﻠﻮﻣﺎت ﻣﻀﻠﻠﺔ ﺗﺼﻮر اﻟﻤﺘﻈﺎﻫﺮﻳﻦ ﻋﲆ أﻧﻬﻢ ﻋﻨﻴﻔﻮن، ﺑﻴﻨﻤﺎ رﻛﺰت اﻟﺤﻤﻼت اﻟﺮوﺳﻴﺔ ﻻﺣﻘًﺎ ﻋﲆ اﻟﺘﺮوﻳﺞ ﻟﻤﺼﺎﻟﺢ روﺳﻴﺎ اﻟﺨﺎﺻﺔ ﺣﻮل ﺑﻨﺎء ﻗﺎﻋﺪة ﺑﺤﺮﻳﺔ ﻓﻲ ﺑﻮرﺗﺴﻮدان. ﻛﻤﺎ أﻧﻔﻘﺖ ﺷﺮﻛﺎت اﻟﻌﻼﻗﺎت اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ ﻣﻦ دول اﻟﺨﻠﻴﺞ اﻟﺘﻲ ﻛﺎﻧﺖ داﻋﻤﺔ ﻟﻼﻧﻘﻼب اﻟﺬي أﻃﺎح ﺑﺎﻟﺒﺸﻴﺮ آﻻف اﻟﺪوﻻرات ﻋﲆ اﻟﺘﺮوﻳﺞ ﻟﻠﺠﻴﺶ، ذﻟﻚ ﻋﻨﺪﻣﺎ رأت اﻟﻔﺮص اﻟﻤﺤﺘﻤﻠﺔ ﻣﻦ ﺑﻨﺎء ﻋﻼﻗﺔ ﻣﻔﻴﺪة ﻣﻌﻪ.

ﻓﻲ ﻫﺬه اﻷﺛﻨﺎء، ﺷﻜّﻠﺖ اﻟﺸﺎﺋﻌﺎت اﻟﻤﻨﺘﺸﺮة ﻓﻲ ﻇﻞ اﻧﻘﻄﺎع اﻹﻧﺘﺮﻧﺖ ﺗﻬﺪﻳﺪًا ﻟﻠﻤﻨﻈﻤﺎت اﻟﺸﻌﺒﻴﺔ اﻟﺘﻲ ﺗﻜﺎﻓﺢ ﻣﻦ أﺟﻞ ﻣﺤﺎرﺑﺔ اﻟﻤﻌﻠﻮﻣﺎت اﻟﻜﺎذﺑﺔ اﻟﺘﻲ ﻳﺘﻢ ﺗﻨﺎﻗﻠﻬﺎ ﺷﻔﻬﻴﺎً.

ﺗﺘﻤﻴﺰ ﺑﻴﺌﺔ اﻟﻤﻌﻠﻮﻣﺎت اﻟﻔﺮﻳﺪة ﻓﻲ اﻟﺴﻮدان ﺑﻤﺰﻳﺞ ﻳﺠﻤﻊ ﻧﻈﺎم إﻋﻼﻣﻲ ﻳﺤﺎول ﺑﻨﺎء ﺳﻤﻌﺔ ﺟﺪﻳﺮة ﺑﺎﻟﺜﻘﺔ ﺑﻌﺪ ﺳﻨﻮات ﻣﻦ اﻟﺮﻗﺎﺑﺔ، وﻧﻈﺎم ﻗﺎﻧﻮﻧﻲ ﻣﺼﻤﻢ ﻟﻠﺤﺪ ﻣﻦ ﻣﺴﺎﻋﻲ اﻟﻨﻈﺎم اﻹﻋﻼﻣﻲ ﺗﻠﻚ، ﺑﺎﻹﺿﺎﻓﺔ إﱃ ﺷﻌﺐ ﻳﺴﻌﻰ إﱃ زﻳﺎدة اﻟﺪﻳﻤﻘﺮاﻃﻴﺔ واﻟﺘﻤﺜﻴﻞ اﻟﺤﻜﻮﻣﻲ. ﻓﻲ ﺿﻮء اﻟﺼﺮاع اﻟﻤﺴﺘﻤﺮ، ﻻ ﻳﺰال اﻷﻓﻖ اﻟﻘﺮﻳﺐ ﻗﺎﺗﻤﺎ. وﻟﻜﻦ ﻋﲆ اﻟﻤﺪى اﻟﻄﻮﻳﻞ، ﻟﻦ ﺗﺘﻮﻓﺮ ﻧﻘﺎط اﻻﻧﻄﻼق اﻟﻼزﻣﺔ ﻟﺒﻨﺎء دﻳﻤﻘﺮاﻃﻴﺔ ﻣﺮﻧﺔ ﻓﻲ اﻟﺴﻮدان إﻻ ﻣﻦ ﺧﻼل ﺗﺤﻘﻴﻖ أﻛﺒﺮ ﻗﺪر ﻣﻦ اﻟﺸﻔﺎﻓﻴﺔ واﻟﻤﺴﺎءﻟﺔ ﺣﻮل اﻟﺘﺪﻓﻖ اﻟﺤﺮ ﻟﻠﻤﻌﻠﻮﻣﺎت ﺑﺎﻟﺘﺰاﻣﻦ ﻣﻊ وﻗﻒ اﻟﻌﻨﻒ.

Issue Brief

Aug 8, 2023

A US agenda for action in Sudan’s information environment

By Cameron Hudson

A brief on how the United States and Sudan can collaborate on combatting disinformation and building up the African nation’s democratic potential.

Africa Disinformation

Report launch

Online Event Tue, August 8, 2023 • 8:00 am ET

Democracy derailed: Sudan’s precarious information environment

The DFRLab hosts the launch of its newest report, Democracy Derailed: Sudan’s Precarious Information Environment. The report looks at the intricacies of Sudan’s information and media ecosystem between 2019 and 2022 in light of the current conflict.

Africa Digital Policy Disinformation East Africa

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The post Sudan’s precarious information environment and the fight for democracy appeared first on Atlantic Council.

A US agenda for action in Sudan’s information environment

Cameron Hudson — Tue, 08 Aug 2023 04:00:00 +0000

These recommendations were compiled in the second half of 2022, well ahead of the start of the April 2023 violence. As such, they reflect the earlier reality of the pre-April time period.

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Lessons learned for improving the timeliness and effectiveness of combatting disinformation and supporting civilian rule

There are few African countries that have received the same degree of high-level and sustained attention from the US government, during the administrations of both Donald Trump and Joe Biden, as the Republic of Sudan. While this engagement stems in large part from a long history of Washington leading diplomatic efforts to isolate the Sudanese government for its support for terrorism during the 1990s, advance the peace process in the country’s north-south civil war, and eventually punish the government for the Darfur genocide, Washington’s renewed diplomatic engagement at the time of Sudan’s 2018 popular uprising reflected a sense of opportunity that real change was potentially coming to the country.

The historic events during the spring and summer of 2019, beginning with longtime dictator Omar al-Bashir’s arrest and removal by senior army officers and the brokering of a civilian-military hybrid government, created both an opportunity and what many in Washington saw as an obligation to help Sudan’s transition succeed. After decades of economic sanctions and diplomatic isolation, the installation of a civilian-led government created the minimal condition that allowed Washington and Western allied governments to begin the task of providing a trusted local partner with the assistance to begin reforming the political system, stabilizing the economy, and transforming the armed forces that would eventually enable a full transition to democracy, one of the popular demands of the revolution.

By late 2019, during a historic visit to Washington by Sudan’s newly named prime minister, Abdallah Hamdok, the Trump administration announced a process to normalize diplomatic relations with Sudan through an exchange of ambassadors, among other steps. Privately, the Trump administration also set about the task of constructing an assistance package that would meet the moment and provide the technical, financial, and development assistance needed to demonstrate a true “democracy dividend” to the vast majority of average Sudanese who were by this time struggling under the weight of financial collapse brought on by the one-two punch of regime neglect and, soon, COVID-19 shutdowns.

Washington, however, was both ill-postured and slow to foresee the monumental political opening occurring in the early days of the revolution and then further delayed by an interlocking web of restrictions and prohibitions, some of them self-imposed and some imposed by the US Congress, that limited its ability to scale up resources in a timely manner. In addition to the challenges of having to undo more than twenty-five years of bureaucratic restrictions and red tape, Washington also needed to scale up its human resources inside Sudan that had largely dwindled over the years.

Many of those we spoke with both inside and outside the US government and on the ground in Sudan acknowledged that the speed of change in late 2018 and early 2019, leading to the April 2019 arrest and removal of al-Bashir from office, was so dizzying that Washington was forced into a “wait-and-see” approach. As such, it was more inclined to stand back and assess events as they unfolded and only act to prevent what many feared could result in a mass atrocity against civilian protesters instead of actually trying to shape an outcome that would more immediately deliver on the aims of the protesters. This posture was aided by the fact that the US government had no recent history of partners and programming around the kind of democracy and governance issues that were needed in the early days of the revolution. Nor was the US government postured to provide other forms of assistance owing to its own existing restrictions on the al-Bashir regime.

Many of these issues were exacerbated by the lack of an ambassador at post; the state sponsor of terrorism label that until December 14, 2020, still applied; and the personal restrictions imposed on US diplomats in Khartoum that meant critical positions were left unfilled at the time of the revolution, leaving them to be filled by an acting junior officer or those who did not have a deep understanding of the unique challenges in countries seeking to transition from autocracy to democracy. Illustrating the severity of this point, through the popular wave of protests until six months after a civilian government was installed in September 2019, the US government remained unable to initiate any new Democracy, Human Rights, and Governance (DRG) programming related to ongoing restrictions from the al-Bashir era, a lack of policy direction from Washington, and a dearth of programmatic staff in the field.

One observer noted in testimony to the US Senate in February 2022, “While assistance opportunities may have been limited in post-secession Sudan, there has not been adequate staffing up [of the embassy] since the 2019 revolution…. More personnel could be devoted to messaging and public affairs outreach, both in person in Sudan and on social media.”

This problem persisted until early 2020 when, after Hamdok’s visit to Washington in December 2019, US officials accelerated their efforts to shore up the new prime minister’s standing vis-à-vis the security services, which remained the dominant force in the country, while helping Hamdok deliver some early wins to his government that could be passed on to the Sudanese people. In fact, some of Washington’s caution was well-intended, if not well-founded, as it struggled to ensure that the civilian component was in fact functioning as an independent and responsible arm of the Sudanese government and was not operating under duress or influence of the military. In retrospect, however, that delay in programming ultimately provided Russia and other malign external influencers more time to cement their operational and influential roles with Sudan’s security services, giving the other powers an advantage in setting and controlling the narrative around the new government, as was only later evident.

Comfortable in the view that the West could work with the civilian government, by November 2019, the first assessment team from the US Agency for International Development’s (USAID’s) Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) was on the ground in Sudan identifying needs and opportunities. According to its website, OTI “provides fast, flexible, short-term assistance targeted at key political transition and stabilization needs. Strategically designed for each unique situation, OTI has laid the foundation for long-term development by promoting reconciliation, supporting emerging independent media, and fostering peace and democracy through innovative programming. In countries transitioning from authoritarianism to democracy, from violence to peace, or following a fragile peace, OTI’s programs serve as catalysts for positive political change.” Starting with the OTI team’s arrival in February 2020, it would lead all US government programmatic activity around these areas, including the growing concern around disinformation.

During its time in Sudan, the OTI team took its programmatic direction from the prime minister’s office in the belief that, as the central reformist figure and symbol of the change brought about by the revolution, those around the prime minister would know how best to design and manage the technical resources that OTI provided. However, as one USAID employee said, echoing a point made by several colleagues in interviews, “our programming needed to be sensitive to the politics of the country, but the cabinet of technocrats were themselves not sensitive to the politics of their own country, especially the PM.” Themes quickly emerged as a large impediment to effective US programming and messaging, specifically those of government leaders being divorced from the politics and public opinions in Sudan and, therefore, unable to tailor messages to them or adequately respond to active disinformation campaigns led by the security services and their foreign backers.

Nearly six months after OTI’s engagement began, a United Kingdom-based contractor was engaged via a US contract to provide the prime minister’s office, as well as the US government, a window into the kinds of disinformation, public attitudes, and trending news items that were circulating on a daily basis across Sudanese social media networks. The project also aimed to identify which ministries and ministers were being particularly targeted with disinformation campaigns so that efforts could be made to counter those stories, prepare ministers to get ahead of trending news events, and empower individual social media influencers with accurate information for dissemination. Through the firm’s weekly social media monitoring reports and more frequent spot reports, civilian leaders and those inside the US Embassy with access to the reports had a real-time view as to which issues were trending among local social media users, a measure of evolving public attitudes toward those issues, and which local and foreign accounts were responsible for driving these narratives.

While these efforts to share and disseminate this “intelligence” were viewed inside of USAID as having mixed levels of success inside the prime minister’s office and with other ministries, depending on the quality of the people on the inside responsible for acting on and sharing these reports, it was nonetheless viewed as critical that these efforts and this contract transition to a wholly owned and operated program of the civilian government. By mid-2021, efforts were being made to create a disinformation unit inside of the Ministry of Information and Culture that would move the center of gravity on this issue away from the prime minister’s office, which was often inundated with reports and visitors and had difficulty making decisions in a timely way, to a central command center where information could be more effectively disseminated across the cabinet in a more timely manner and where policy questions could perhaps get a decision faster.

In talks with representatives of the British contractor, on many occasions civilian government officials were presented with data on manipulated content emanating from collections of accounts driven by, inter alia, pro-Islamist, pro-military, and pro-Hemedti accounts and given options that the contractor could pursue on the government’s behalf, including notifying Facebook to shut the accounts down and offering counter-messaging. [Gen. Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, leader of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and commonly known as Hemedti, served as deputy chairman of the Transitional Military Council after al-Bashir’s ouster in 2019.] In many instances, “decision-making paralysis” often meant that timely decisions on fast-moving messaging issues went unaddressed. However, in one instance, the contractor was able to notify Facebook of the inauthentic behavior, prompting the platform to shut down more than one thousand accounts. Several months later, Facebook shut down an additional tranche of inauthentic accounts without prompting from the Sudanese or their contractor, suggesting to the contractor at least that Sudan had been “put on the map” for Facebook as a place of concern that they should continue to monitor. In response, however, one former OTI staffer noted that “shutting down Facebook accounts is great, but they keep churning out new ones. It only helps if it is in service of a larger strategy, which we didn’t have.”

Beyond these efforts, with the help of outside contractors, the government was able to train journalists, including citizen journalists, to identify misinformation and perform their own investigative work to push back against false narratives circulating about the civilian government. Contractors also compiled a list of the most influential social media voices in the country and worked with government officials to ensure those influencers were engaged with regularly to ensure they had access to accurate information and could promote it. These efforts also included financial support to a Sudanese-operated nongovernmental organization that actively fact-checked news reports and published deep-dive analyses behind military and foreign-backed disinformation campaigns. One policy request, not acted upon, was the creation of a network of “500 or more newly trained journalists who could sit inside the Ministry of Information and push out factual information, reasoning that if the Islamists and military had troll farms churning out fake news why couldn’t the government counter that with its own team pushing out real news?”What the government routinely failed to realize was that it had the power to defuse these narratives and their accounts if it only used the tools and took their contractor’s advice.

However, just as these nascent efforts were beginning to take hold, two simultaneous events derailed those efforts: the October 25, 2021, military coup in which Hamdok was detained and the civilian cabinet dissolved and the simultaneous internet shut down, which not only halted most of the information sharing but also limited pro-democracy groups’ ability to use online tools to organize and coordinate their activities. And since the US government programming came well after the internet shutdowns that defined the early days of the popular revolution, its efforts to empower online activism were immediately and completely undermined by the military’s renewed control over the internet after the coup.

According to several USAID employees at the US Embassy in Khartoum at the time, there was initially serious consideration and effort given to bringing in internet hardware from outside the country to create a parallel, albeit temporary, internet infrastructure that would get around the junta’s shutdown of the service. One former OTI official interviewed noted “there were three to four weeks of intense effort given to identify the technology, the resources, and the requirements of the system,” but that Washington ultimately decided that it would be too difficult to procure and to get into the country without being discovered.

But while some on the USAID side felt that the risk to reward was worth it, more conservative voices within the US Department of State worried that, if their efforts were discovered by the military, it could result in the expulsion of US diplomats and a worsening of the military’s response against protesters. The effort was ultimately abandoned with no other serious conversation beginning that could help to empower civilian protesters with virtual private networks (VPNs), burner phones—sometimes call “protest phones”—or other means of circumventing the junta’s control over private communications.

Indeed, as the internet controls became more widespread post-coup, resistance committees and others reverted to previous, decidedly low-tech communication and organization efforts, including the use of printed pamphlets and flyers or word-of-mouth organization. Here, too, there was little the United States or others could offer in the way of support to these efforts.

Recommendations

Washington was caught flat-footed in 2019 when al-Bashir was removed from office after nearly thirty years in power. No day-after plan existed for supporting a transition, nor had any efforts been foreseen to untie the hands of US policy so that the full diplomatic toolkit of rewards, incentives, and punitive measures could be deployed in a timely manner. This was as true in efforts to push back against online disinformation efforts as it was in providing technical assistance to ministries or direct financial and organizational support to pro-democracy organizations still on the frontlines. In the ten months from the fall of the National Congress Party regime to the first deployment of OTI advisers to Sudan, Russia and other malign actors demonstrated an ability to build relations, become operational, and begin to influence the media and political environment in favor of their allies in the security services. This left the United States and its Western allies playing an even bigger game of catch-up when their staffing was in place and when their programs were finally ready to be rolled out.

In watching the events in Sudan unfold through the revolution and speaking to Sudanese stakeholders and US government officials on the ground since that time, a number of important insights and recommendations, specifically around countering online influence from malicious actors, have emerged:

Invest in resources, strategies, and lessons learned for combatting disinformation. The United States needs a specific strategy for combatting disinformation. The United States has never had a strategy for pushing back against online content that is intended to weaken civilian and pro-democracy governance and empower security actors. Both Sudanese actors, working closely with the United States, along with US staff-level officers from across USAID variously described US efforts as “ad hoc,” “inconsistent,” and “haphazard,” in some cases responding to requests from the prime minister’s office and in some cases surmising what was needed. While one former OTI staffer noted that, while OTI was still “brand new to the communications and disinformation space, there must have been some case studies or resident knowledge somewhere in the US government that could have served as a kind of playbook.” Given the explosive growth in the use of disinformation and online authoritarianism and the shrinking of internet freedom in Sudan and across the region, the United States would be well-served to invest in further developing its expertise in this space, while at the same time conducting a lessons-learned process of what worked and what did not in Sudan and other analogous settings for future use.
Do not just detect misinformation, respond and combat it. The United States must make better use of the information that it collects about online disinformation and get it into the hands of those who need it in time to be useful. In particular, many in USAID noted that US diplomats did not know how to make use of the information and insights in the reports they were generating, viewing the information merely as “interesting data points” rather than intelligence that could better inform policy choices or programmatic efforts. One former OTI staffer sounded a similar note that “the products were useful and provided us with ongoing sentiment analysis of the protest movement, but we could never operationalize what we were learning.” Interviewees mentioned similar arguments regarding Sudan’s civilian government, which had difficulty deciding what it should do since acting on advice to shut down, for example, pro-Islamist accounts could have unleashed a backlash those officials could not foresee. In those cases, the United States would be well advised to consider its own ability to act in support of its allies in the civilian government and authorize action against inauthentic networks in a bid to “decontaminate the information space for the sake of civilian rule and democracy.”
Shine a light on disinformation. The United States should make public its findings and research on the information space in Sudan. While the training of journalists, promotion of media freedom, and advocacy around free speech is important, the speed at which fake accounts and fake news can be put up, taken down, and spread, to paraphrase Mark Twain, happens before the truth can put on its boots. Part of an offensive would be the more immediate and regular release of disinformation reporting that is being collected to shine a light on bad actors in real time. To a large extent, this requires treating that information not as intelligence, with a limited and tightly controlled distribution, but simply as public information. Creating a stand-alone website or dashboard or sharing that information in real time with a trusted Sudanese source for posting and dissemination would have compelled not just governments to act, but empowered civil society, including many young people, who might have made better use of the information.
Improve working relationships with Sudanese civil society. The United States needs to develop more effective ways of working with local civil society organizations. This holds true in regard to both US efforts in the counter-disinformation space and its entire engagement in support of pro-democracy forces throughout the revolution. It is clear that government-to-government ties and assistance relationships are the most natural and comfortable way for the United States to engage, but in circumstances like in Sudan, where civilian leaders were either too constrained or too paralyzed to act, empowering civil society actors must become a more available alternative. While some of that was accomplished through the sharing of disinformation reporting with local influencer and fact-checking organizations, more could have been done to creatively support their efforts to circumvent military shutdowns of the internet or the near continuous churn of new disinformation campaigns that actively sought to undermine civilian rule and the popular revolution.

Report

Aug 8, 2023

Sudan’s precarious information environment and the fight for democracy

By Tessa Knight, Lujain Alsedeg

An examination of the time from December 2018, when protests against then-president Omar al-Bashir first broke out, and December 2022, when a framework agreement between civilian and military leaders came into play.

Africa Civil Society

Report launch

Online Event Tue, August 8, 2023 • 8:00 am ET

Democracy derailed: Sudan’s precarious information environment

Africa Digital Policy Disinformation East Africa

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The post A US agenda for action in Sudan’s information environment appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Chinese discourse power: Capabilities and impact

Kenton Thibaut — Wed, 02 Aug 2023 16:30:58 +0000

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Executive summary

This report is part of the Digital Forensic Research Lab’s (DFRLab’s) “discourse power” series, which outlines the strategy, capabilities, impacts, and responses to China’s attempts to shape the global information environment. The series argues that China’s leaders believe the country can gain the geopolitical power necessary to establish itself as a world leader, to spread its norms and values, and to decenter US power in the international system by gaining “discourse power” (话语权). In concept, discourse power is a narrative agenda-setting ability focused on reshaping global governance, values, and norms to legitimize and facilitate the expression of state power.

Whereas the first report introduced China’s discourse power strategy, this second report examines its efforts to date. This report assesses this through a frame of “media convergence” (融媒体), a Chinese term that refers to the integration of internal and external Chinese Communist Party (CCP) propaganda, the online and offline channels for its dissemination, and the mechanisms of oversight on which communications systems rely.

More specifically, this report examines “media convergence” across three vectors: channel expansion, content innovation, and governance of technological infrastructure and digital connectivity.

The first vector, channel expansion, refers to creating or better leveraging delivery vehicles for China’s messaging across different media platforms. The aim is to expose a growing international audience to Chinese narratives and norms in the hopes of eroding the global “discourse dominance” of the West. This report examines this trend through both traditional and social media. As for traditional media, China has spent over $1.5 billion annually since 2008 on propaganda, with much of that going toward initiatives in the Global South. This is especially obvious in the strategies of China’s flagship news organization, Xinhua, which describes itself as “light cavalry” in China’s global public opinion war. Xinhua has described its media strategy as using a combination of “shipbuilding to go out to sea” and “borrowing a boat to go out to sea” (“造船出海”与”借船出海”相结合)—that is, building up China’s own capacity to effectively disseminate its message internationally, while using foreign social media platforms to disseminate propaganda. As part of these efforts, Xinhua has over the years greatly expanded its networks to now have the largest number of foreign correspondents of any news agency in the world. Other strategies include both coercing and incentivizing journalists abroad to engage in more favorable coverage of China.

Chinese state entities have greatly expanded their presence on social media as well. As of January 2021, Xinhua distributed on average seven thousand three hundred articles, photos, videos, and other media content in fifteen languages daily, garnering over 200 million overseas social media followers across various platforms (including Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube). Indeed, China-based Twitter account creation skyrocketed by over 6,000 percent over a period of just three months in 2017, following reports on the situation in Xinjiang in the Western press. At the same time, however, there is a balancing act that the party-state faces when seeking to portray China as a confident leader to global audiences while also being subject to popular nationalism and domestic discontent in its actions.

As an example, tensions between different bureaucratic departments belie the official sanctioning of the assertive “wolf warrior” style of coercive diplomacy. In some instances, it appears that different elements responsible for external messaging within the Chinese government have initially contradicted each other, sometimes going as far as refuting each other’s public statements, before consolidating around a single message. One such example occurred between the Central Propaganda Department and wolf warrior diplomat Zhao Lijian around the origins of the COVID-19 virus.

Self-censorship can be a nefarious side effect of the editorial pressures that Chinese state news agencies bring—not just in China’s favor but also for authoritarian governments with which it is aligned. With regard to China’s efforts in shaping public opinion, most studies have found that China’s messaging at a general level is not especially resonant with local audiences; however, some initial studies have shown that Chinese propaganda can be effective at persuading audiences that the “China model” is superior to that of democratic political systems in delivering growth and stability. On social media platforms, Chinese officials have often engaged in coordinated influence and information campaigns, including those spreading disinformation on the origin of the COVID-19 pandemic.

The second “prong” of China’s strategy of media convergence is content innovation, which includes tailoring content (and the narratives baked into it) in a way that best resonates with a particular audience, otherwise known as “precise communication” (精准传播). China sees access to public opinion data abroad as essential to enhancing its ability to tailor content. As the party secretary and president of the online arm of the CCP’s flagship People’s Daily stated in a 2022 address, the internet “houses a vast amount of…data and is able to accurately reflect social sentiments…. Using big data [analytics] and artificial intelligence (AI), the internet can be a tool for strengthening the Party’s leadership.” To this end, China recently launched four State Key Laboratories dedicated to using big data to better tailor content to specific audiences, as well as spread “positive energy” through digital and social media.

In addition to shaping content, another tactic is to obscure the fact that the content originates from Chinese state sources. This is a phenomenon known as “political native advertising,” in which Chinese state-run media organizations purchase space in news outlets abroad to publish state-sanctioned content “camouflaged” as neutral news articles. In a 2020 report, Freedom House highlighted that, especially in digital versions of local newspapers, “China Observer”—an English-language column produced by Chinese state media outlet China Daily—often goes unlabeled as being state sponsored.

Lastly, a related strategy involves China’s attempts to control local media environments via content-sharing agreements, which in some cases end up flooding local media environments with free or low-cost pro-CCP content. A huge part of this push is to countries within China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), a majority of which are in the Global South.

The last frame for examining China’s digital discourse power strategy is governance. This includes ensuring China-sponsored standards, norms, and governance protocols in prioritized industries are widely adopted, especially in the Global South. China has, for instance, been active in shaping information and communications technologies standards in the International Telecommunication Union through a “flooding the zone” strategy in which all China-affiliated members, be they from academia, private industry, or government, vote as a bloc. This ensures that standards proposals from Chinese entities end up receiving the number of votes needed to be adopted by the standards-setting body.

These exchanges serve to spread Chinese cyber norms, such as “cyber sovereignty” (网络主权), which is China’s vision for internet governance that upholds a government’s sovereign right to control the internet within its borders. The party-state spreads this norm by advising governments on how to shape laws and policies to govern the technologies (often Chinese-provided, Chinese-standard-compliant) in their own societies. This process becomes a positive feedback loop, creating a degree of both technical and policy lock-in via China-provided technical infrastructure, the standards through which it operates, and know-how and data governance frameworks. At the same time, China leverages its media relationships to flood local environments with stories of the benefits of China’s investment in developing countries’ futures.

These relationships also allow China to gain access to vast data resources. One Chinese firm outlined in this report, Nebula, uses its big data and cloud computing technologies to obtain vast amounts of data related to international public opinion on news topics related to China. It uses a variety of analysis methods, including semantics and clustering, to understand public preferences and “evaluate the difference between this understanding and media expectations…helping Chinese media build top international discourse power and influence.” The Chinese state can then use this data to hone its messages further and enhance its censorship and propaganda apparatus. It can deploy these improved tools and technologies in banal ways, like helping the tourism bureau craft a compelling narrative of “Beautiful China.” However, it can also use Nebula’s sentiment data to help the People’s Liberation Army engage in more targeted information operations and psychological warfare campaigns against countries like Taiwan.

This report finds that, anecdotally, China’s efforts gain larger ground in countries where civic freedoms are already limited and where winning the support of a small coalition of political elites matters over winning public support. In the rather extreme case of Zimbabwe, China is openly and actively antagonizing and targeting journalists and civil society activists. These findings cast doubt on assessments of Chinese influence that look solely at public opinion data. Such research may miss the fact that in some domestic contexts, China sees elite capture as much more important than winning hearts and minds.

In short, China’s discourse power efforts are uneven. While the popularity of its state and traditional media lags behind that of Western countries, its efforts to shape the environments within media and information spaces are much more effective—and are in fact the focus of China’s discourse power strategy. China is creating an alternative order in the Global South, and any effort to make meaningful progress on technological governance will need to stem from an understanding of the ecosystem that China has created, the push and pull factors facing the countries that engage with it, and on clearly messaging what the advantages of a democratic approach to such issues offers to the global majority.

In-Depth Research & Reports Aug 24, 2022

Chinese discourse power: Ambitions and reality in the digital domain

By Kenton Thibaut

The CCP has embarked on a concerted strategy to gain control over the global digital and information environment. Its goal: create an alternative global order with China at its heart.

China Digital Policy

In-Depth Research & Reports Dec 17, 2020

Countering Chinese disinformation reports

By Digital Forensic Research Lab

A series of reports on countering Chinese disinformation campaigns around the globe from the Digital Forensic Research Lab and Asia Security Initiative, housed in the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

China Digital Policy

Report Apr 20, 2022

China’s discourse power operations in the Global South

By Kenton Thibaut

An overview of China’s discourse power activities in the Global South, including the regions of Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America, and the Middle East. It outlines the processes through which China leverages its diplomatic, media, and political positions in these regions to gain influence, and assesses the impacts of these activities for democratic resilience worldwide.

Africa China

learn more

The post Chinese discourse power: Capabilities and impact appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Ukraine’s digital revolution is proving vital for the country’s war effort

Mykhailo Fedorov — Thu, 27 Jul 2023 19:47:05 +0000

What is it like living through the nightmare of war in the twenty-first century? For most people, this would conjure up images of devastated cities, collapsing economies, and a desperate rush for survival. However, Ukraine’s experience over the past year-and-a-half is proof that life can go on, even in the most challenging of circumstances. Despite suffering the horrors and trauma of Russia’s ongoing invasion, Ukrainians continue to open new businesses, get married, pay taxes, and apply for financial assistance from the state. This remarkable resilience has been possible in large part thanks to Ukraine’s digital revolution.

Digital tools like Uber and Booking have long since become part of our everyday lives, providing basic services with maximum convenience. Imagine if all your interactions with the state could be as efficient and unintrusive; imagine if you could pay taxes or register a business in a matter of seconds via your smartphone. In Ukraine, this is already reality.

Launched in September 2019, Ukraine’s Diia app is a core element of the country’s digital infrastructure that has dramatically enhanced Ukrainian society’s ability to withstand the Russian invasion. More than 19.2 million Ukrainians currently use Diia, which is installed on approximately 70% of the smartphones in the country. In regions of Ukraine under Russian occupation, it is often the only way for Ukrainians to receive assistance or access services provided by the Ukrainian government.

International audiences have already noticed the effectiveness of Diia. Estonia, which has long been a global leader in the field of digital government, is currently implementing a similar app based on Diia. Countries in Latin America and Africa are next in line to develop their own versions. This recognition for Ukraine’s innovative e-governance app should come as no surprise; after all, it has now proven itself in the toughest of wartime conditions.

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Diia is not just a wartime success story, of course. In the almost four years since it was first launched, the app has managed to slowly but surely transform Ukrainian attitudes toward innovation while shaping perceptions regarding the role of digital technologies in daily life. Following the introduction of digital passport and driver’s license functions, Diia became a routine tool for millions of Ukrainians. The realities of the Russian invasion have now further embedded the app into the country’s everyday existence.

This familiarity has helped build growing levels of public trust in the digital state. Indeed, most Ukrainians have overcome any initial fears related to the pace of digitalization in the country and now openly embrace Ukraine’s digital revolution. People are no longer paranoid about the possibility of personal data leakages and have stopped worrying about how elderly relatives will cope with smartphone technologies.

It has also been some time since I last encountered by personal favorite: What will happen if the state has all my personal information? In reality, of course, the state has always had access to the information that is now digitally available via Diia. The only difference is users can finally access this information themselves in a highly convenient and transparent manner.

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Since 2019, Ukrainians have learned that digital tools can offer high levels of security in addition to efficiency. Indeed, security has always been at the heart of Ukraine’s digital transformation. A number of important decisions were made on the eve of Russia’s full-scale invasion that underlined this commitment to prioritizing the safety of users and their data, including steps to move the entire Diia infrastructure to cloud format.

We created our own in-house team of hackers to probe the Ukrainian government’s digital systems for weaknesses, and also worked with partners to engage hackers around world with the task of penetrating the Diia platform. They found no security vulnerabilities. Security has been further enhanced by the introduction of the Diia.Signature function, which provides an extra layer of protection for particularly sensitive e-services such as changing place of residence or registering a car.

One of the last remaining arguments against digitalization is the claim that an over-reliance on digital technologies will backfire in the event of restricted access to electricity or the internet. Ukrainians have now debunked this myth by maintaining high degrees of digital connectivity throughout the fall and winter months of the past year, despite the blackout conditions created by Russia’s large-scale bombing campaign against Ukraine’s civilian energy infrastructure. Businesses continued to operate and online services remained available as the nation adapted from October 2022 onward to the uncertainty of regular power cuts. Satellite internet, Starlink, and power generators all played crucial roles in this process, proving that digital solutions do not require perfect conditions in order to improve quality of life.

For the past eighteen months, Ukrainians have demonstrated that the digital state is both safe and convenient. They have done so in incredibly testing conditions amid the largest European war since World War II, which is also widely recognized as the world’s first full-scale cyberwar. This achievement should dispel any lingering doubts that governments across the world will all eventually go digital. As they embrace digitalization, other countries can look to Ukraine as a model and as a source of inspiration.

Mykhailo Fedorov is Ukraine’s Vice Prime Minister for Innovations and Development of Education, Science, and Technologies, and Minister of Digital Transformation.

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Ukrainian civil society, which powered the country’s democratic progress throughout the first three decades of independence, has been hard-hit by the war. Around a third of Ukrainian civil society organizations (CSOs) paused their operations or completely shut down following Russia’s invasion, according to a nationwide CSO survey. Meanwhile, three-quarters of organizations that did continue operating refocused away from their usual fields and switched to humanitarian and defense initiatives. Around 80% of CSOs say they will need new skills to effectively participate in Ukraine’s reconstruction.

The suspension of politics-as-usual during wartime could also have a negative impact on the democratic system in post-war Ukraine. With many political parties in disarray and nationwide networks disrupted as a result of the invasion, it will likely take some time before the country’s political climate can regain the structure and competitiveness of the prewar years. The relationship between parliament and the presidency will also need to be revised. This must include a reappraisal of wartime measures which have handed some powers from parliament to the executive.

Similar challenges face Ukraine’s independent media, which will have a crucial role to play as the forum for much-needed public debate about the country’s reconstruction. As a mandatory wartime measure, most of Ukraine’s major TV channels have ceased independent broadcasting and joined the government-run “United News” platform. During the postwar period, these channels will need to undergo the time-consuming work of reintegrating journalists, training new reporters, and adapting their brands to the new realities in the country.

In postwar Ukraine, local government authorities across the country will need to reclaim some of the powers devolved to central authorities on national security grounds in the wake of the Russian invasion. Centralization is an especially acute issue in front line municipalities, where reconstruction is most urgent. Although local governments have generally performed well during the war, they will need to have the necessary authority to lead rebuilding efforts. It will be even more difficult to restore local governance in areas currently occupied by Russia. With Russian occupation forces systematically murdering, imprisoning, or deporting local Ukrainian officials, there will be major personnel challenges to face.

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Ukraine’s advance in Kursk: What’s next and implications

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Despite the horrors of the Russian invasion, there is every reason to believe that the key pillars of Ukraine’s democracy can emerge stronger than ever in the postwar period. Throughout more than three decades of independence, Ukrainians have repeatedly demonstrated their readiness to fight tenaciously for a democratic future. Milestones like the 2004 Orange Revolution and 2014 Euromaidan Revolution stand out as symbols of this commitment to building a modern democratic state. In 2014, Ukraine’s democracy survived the initial shocks of Russian aggression with the invasion of Crimea and eastern Ukraine; the country’s democratic foundations have likewise remained intact since the full-scale invasion of February 2022.

Ukraine’s international partners will have a critical role to play in safeguarding the country’s postwar revival and the consolidation of Ukrainian democracy. Many of Western non-governmental organizations that will be at the forefront of these efforts have already been supporting the development of Ukrainian party politics, local government, civil society, and an independent media for many years.

All of these elements will be vital in the coming years as Ukraine looks to advance toward accession to the European Union. Ukraine secured official EU candidate nation status in summer 2022; it will be important to demonstrate the necessary institutional capacity if Ukraine is to meet the EU’s stringent accession criteria.

Rebuilding Ukraine brick-by-brick will be a Herculean task, but it may not be the biggest challenge facing the country once the war is over. Even with sufficient investment and creativity, the physical reconstruction of towns and cities will not be enough to secure the kind of European future Ukrainians are fighting for. This can only be achieved by focusing on the institutions underpinning Ukrainian democracy.

Oleksii Antoniuk is a global affairs and economics student at Yale University, born and raised in Ukraine. He currently interns at the International Republican Institute. Find him on Twitter at @OleksiiAntoniuk.

Russian War Report: Wagner is still in business in Africa

Digital Forensic Research Lab — Thu, 20 Jul 2023 20:22:35 +0000

As Russia continues its assault on Ukraine, the Atlantic Council’s Digital Forensic Research Lab (DFRLab) is keeping a close eye on Russia’s movements across the military, cyber, and information domains. With more than seven years of experience monitoring the situation in Ukraine—as well as Russia’s use of propaganda and disinformation to undermine the United States, NATO, and the European Union—the DFRLab’s global team presents the latest installment of the Russian War Report.

Ukrainian attack damages Kerch Bridge

Russia accused Ukraine of conducting a drone strike against the Kerch Strait Bridge on July 17. The bridge, also known as the Crimean Bridge, connects Ukraine’s Crimean Peninsula with Russia’s Krasnodar region. The bridge is used for civilian movement and as an essential logistical route for the Russian army.

Explosions were reported at around 3:00 a.m. local time. Footage of the aftermath indicates that a span of the bridge’s road had collapsed while another suffered damage but remained intact. Traffic reportedly resumed several hours after the explosion, but in the interim, occupation authorities asked civilians to consider alternate evacuation routes. Russian Telegram channels reported extensive traffic jams in Crimea’s Dzhankoi area and in the occupied Kherson region towards Melitopol.

Ukraine defense intelligence spokesperson Andrii Yusov told Suspilne News that damage to the bridge could create logistical difficulties for Russian forces, but said Kyiv would not comment on the cause of the explosion. CNN, citing a source in the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU), reported that the attack on the bridge was a joint operation of the SBU and Ukrainian naval forces. Ukrainian media outlet LIGA also reported that the SBU and Ukrainian naval forces were responsible for the attack, citing sources in the SBU. LIGA also noted that the strike was likely conducted with surface drones. The SBU said that information about the incident would only be revealed once the war ended. Some Russian military bloggers, including former Russian officer and pro-war nationalist Igor Girkin, stated that Russian authorities had focused too heavily on road security and not enough on maritime security. Alexander Kots, another prominent blogger and Kremlin-appointed Russian Human Rights Council member, also blamed Russian authorities for focusing too much on land security.

Natalia Humeniuk, a spokesperson for Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command, speculated without evidence that the attack may have been a provocation by Russia amid talks on prolonging the Black Sea Grain Initiative. The grain deal, brokered by Turkey and the United Nations in July 2022, has been essential for stemming a global surge in food prices. The agreement, necessitated after the Russian navy blocked all Ukrainian ports, permits Ukraine to export products. It has has been prolonged several times, with the last extension expiring on July 17. The Kremlin announced on July 17 that it had suspended its participation in the initiative but claimed that the decision was unrelated to the bridge attack.

Meanwhile, about twenty-four hours after the attack on the Kerch Bridge, explosions were heard in Odesa in southern Ukraine. Unconfirmed reports claimed the explosions were a response from Russia. The attack on Odesa continued for a second night on July 19, described by Ukrainian officials as “hellish.” Odesa is an essential port for Ukrainian exports and was allowed to remain open under the conditions of the grain deal.

—Ruslan Trad, resident fellow for security research, Sofia, Bulgaria

Wagner moves soldiers to Belarus following apparent disbandment in Russia

The Wagner Group appears to have disbanded its operations in Russia and relocated to Belarus, according to footage reviewed by the DFRLab documenting the movements of Wagner military columns in the days following the mutiny through July 18. Additionally, satellite imagery captured the entry of troops and equipment at the Tsel military camp, located near the Belarusian town of Asipovichy.

On July 17, a video shared on Telegram depicted Wagner soldiers taking down the Russian flag and the Wagner flag at the group’s original military base in Molkino, Krasnodar Krai, Russia. In another video published on July 19, Prigozhin addressed Wagner fighters as they left the Molkino base, describing the situation on the front as “a shame.” In addition, he declared that the group is relocating to Belarus and will focus on its activities in Africa. For the time being, he said, Wagner soldiers are no longer participating in Russia’s special military operation in Ukraine, although they “will perhaps return to the special military operation at the moment when [they] are sure [they] will not be forced to shame ourselves.”

Russian "military correspondent" published a video of the flags taken down in a Wagner PMC camp in Molkino, Ryazan region.

The base is now officially closed. pic.twitter.com/d3tqVXzqr0
— Anton Gerashchenko (@Gerashchenko_en) July 17, 2023

Shortly after the mutiny ended, Russian authorities conducted raids on Wagner’s accounting divisions in Saint Petersburg, according to information purportedly shared by the wives and mothers of Wagner fighters in an online forum. Additional raids took place on Prigozhin’s residence. The movements of Prigozhin’s private jet also indicate frequent travel to Belarus over the past three weeks.

An investigation by Belarusian opposition media outlet Motolko.help revealed a photograph of a man resembling Prigozhin in his undergarments allegedly at the Tsel military base, where he reportedly spent the night on July 12. According to flight data posted on the online portal Radarbox, Prigozhin’s personal Embraer Legacy 600 jet, registration number RA-02795, completed four round-trip flights between Belarus’ Machulishchy air base and Russia.

Radar imagery acquired on July 17 also shows the tents where Wagner fighters appear to be housed and several places for vehicles parked inside the military base.

SAR imagery of Tsel military camp in Belarus, taken on July 17, 2023. (Source: DFRLab via Capella Space)

—Valentin Châtelet, research associate, Brussels, Belgium

Wagner vehicle columns are seen driving from Voronezh to Belarus

On July 16, several videos emerged on Telegram documenting Wagner vehicles departing Voronezh Oblast along Russia’s M-4 Don highway. Utilizing social media footage, the DFRLab determined the location of the vehicles and identified forty registration plates. At least two-thirds of these vehicles displayed military registration plates from the self-proclaimed Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republic. However, the Belarusian monitoring project Belaruski Hajun reported that many other vehicles used tape to cover their registration plates.

The columns are composed of various buses and trucks, of which only a few could transfer construction equipment. Most of the convoys consist of UAZ Patriot pickup trucks, Ural vans, and Lada cars. No heavy military equipment was observed at the time of writing.

Screenshots show a UAZ Patriot pickup truck (top) and a Mitsubishi pickup truck (bottom) bearing military registration plates from the Luhansk People’s Republic. A police car escorted the trucks one hundred kilometers south of Voronezh on July 14, 2023. (Source: Telegram/archive)

Another video shared on the Russian Telegram channel VChK-OPGU revealed a Wagner convoy of soldiers entering Belarusian territory. According to a post by Belaruski Hajun, at least sixty vehicles entered Belarus through Mogilev Oblast in the early hours of June 15 using the R-43 and M-5 roads. A photograph on Telegram showed the Russian and Wagner Group flags flying at a border outpost.

According to Belaruski Hajun, since July 14, nine distinct military convoys have entered Belarusian territory. They are likely located at the Tsel military camp near Asipovichy. The camp is home to military unit 61732 and was previously identified by Verstka Media as a potential site to accommodate Wagner soldiers. Further, the Belarusian military TV channel VoyenTV posted a video on July 14 showing Wagner soldiers arriving in Belarus and training local forces. According to updated estimates from Belaruski Hajun, as many as 2,500 Wagner members may have relocated to the Tsel military camp since last week.

—Valentin Châtelet, research associate, Brussels, Belgium

Russian officials and state media change their tune about the Kerch Bridge attack after Kremlin announces terror investigation

In the immediate aftermath of the July 17 attack on the Kerch Bridge, Russian officials and state media were relatively mild in their initial language addressing the incident, referring to it as an “emergency.” However, once Kremlin agencies began referring to the attack as a “terror act,” state media and officials began changing their language to follow the Kremlin.

“Traffic was stopped on the Crimean bridge: an emergency occurred in the area of the 145th support from the Krasnodar territory,” Sergei Aksenov, the Russian-installed head of occupied Crimea, wrote on his Telegram channel at 4:21 a.m. local time. Notably, Aksenov did not use the words “explosion,” “attack,” or “terror” to describe the destruction of the bridge. Two subsequent posts, made at 5:03 a.m. and 6:59 a.m., also avoided these terms. It wasn’t until 1:51 p.m. that Aksenov used the phrase “terror act” to describe the attack.

In between Aksenov’s posts, Russia’s National Antiterrorism Committee reported at 10:04 a.m. that they had assessed the Kerch Bridge explosion as a “terror act,” according to Kremlin-owned news agency TASS. Several minutes later at 10:07 a.m., Russia’s Investigative Committee announced that it would open a criminal case investigating the “terror act” on the Kerch Bridge.

Several Kremlin-owned Russian media outlets, including RIA Novosti and TASS, also used the term “emergency” (“чрезвычайное прошествие” or ЧП) to first describe the bridge explosion before later pivoting to using “terror act.” Neither outlet referred to the destruction of the Kerch Bridge as a “terror act” prior to the official announcements from the Investigative Committee and Antiterrorism Committee. In the case of RIA Novosti, they published a story using the word “emergency” in the headline at 11:41 a.m., more than ninety minutes after the terror investigation announcement, while TASS used the term as late as 7:31 p.m., even though it had already published a report on the investigation. Similarly, many other Kremlin-controlled media outlets, like Komsomolskaya Pravda, Gazeta.ru, RBC, Lenta.ru, and Izvestiya used both “emergency” and “terror act” in their publications throughout the day interchangeably.

—Nika Aleksejeva, resident fellow, Riga, Latvia

FSB colonel alleged to be behind popular Telegram channel detained for extortion

According to Russian media outlet RBC, former Federal Security Service (FSB) Colonel Mikhail Polyakov, the purported administrator of the Telegram channel Kremlevskaya Prachka (“Kremlin Laundress”), was detained for suspected extortion. The press office for the Moscow court released a statement that said Polyakov is “suspected of extorting 40 million rubles [around $440,000] from JSC Lanit, the leader of the Russian industry of information technology.”

“According to the prosecution, from 2020 to 2023, Polyakov received a large sum of money from a group of IT companies for not publishing information (the so-called ‘negative block’) that could cause significant harm to the rights and legitimate interests of Lanit JSC and the management of Lanit JSC,” the Moscow court continued. The “negative block” is a guarantee that a channel will not mention a particular person or a company in a negative light in exchange for money; this is reportedly a popular practice among Russian Telegram channels.

The independent Russian media outlet Vazhnyye Istorii (“Important Stories”), citing a source close to Russian intelligence services, reported that Polyakov was behind the Kremlevskaya Prachka Telegram channel. According to the outlet, Polyakov supervised an unnamed service at the FSB’s Office for the Protection of the Constitutional Order. In addition, he reportedly oversaw pro-government Telegram channels and was engaged in promoting the Kremlin’s agenda via media and social networks. According to Important Stories, he worked in coordination with Vladimir Putin’s deputy chief of staff, Sergey Kiriyenko.

Important Stories noted that the Telegram channel 112 also named Polyakov as Kremlevskaya Prachka’s administrator, along with the Telegram channels Siloviki, Nezigar, and Brief, which are not as staunchly pro-govern cited by Kremlin propagandists and proxies.

Kremlevskaya Prachka has not posted since the evening of July 13, corresponding with the reported detainment of Polyakov.

—Eto Buziashvili, research associate, Tbilisi, Georgia

Wagner continues to advertise its services in Africa

On July 16, the Wagner-affiliated Telegram channel REVERSE SIDE OF THE MEDAL posted an advertisement offering Wagner’s services to African states. The post included an image from the Prigozhin-funded film, Granite, as well as an email address, seemingly for interested African countries to communicate with Wagner.

In French, the advertisement reads: “PMC Wagner offers its services to ensure the sovereignty of states and protect the people of African from militants and terrorists.” The fine print emphasizes that “various forms of cooperation are possible,” as long as the cooperation does not “contradict Russia’s interests.” Russia’s interests are not specified.

While the Telegram channel claimed the advertisement was replicated on African social media channels, the DFRLab has not found additional evidence to support this claim.

Wagner-affiliated Telegram channel shared an advertisement for Wagner’s services in Africa, claiming it was widely circulated on the continent. (Source: rsotmdivision)

—Tessa Knight, research associate, London, United Kingdom

Wagner troops arrive in Central African Republic ahead of critical referendum

Alexander Ivanov, director of the Officer’s Union for International Security (COSI), released a statement on COSI’s Telegram channel regarding the recent arrival of dozens of Wagner operatives in Central African Republic. According to US authorities, COSI is a front company for the Wagner Group in Central African Republic.

In the statement, Ivanov confirmed the Wagner troop rotation while stressing that the new personnel have no contract with Russia’s Ministry of Defense. He reiterated that both in CAR and across the continent, “security work is carried out by private companies that enter into contracts directly with the governments of sovereign states,” and that these private companies have nothing to do with official Russian state entities. Ivanov also indicated that this staff rotation should not impact the activities of Russia in Ukraine, and he claimed to have been in contact with Yevgeny Prigozhin.

Notably, Ivanov stated that despite the recent changes in the structure of Wagner’s “African business,” Prigozhin “intends not to curtail, but to expand his presence in Africa.” This is somehow consistent with what some analysts are observing: Wagner appears to be trying to expand its presence in West African coastal states increasingly threatened by a spillover of the jihadist insurgency from the Sahel, or possibly taking advantage of upcoming elections in several fragile African countries.

Although Ivanov has often remarked on Wagner activities in CAR and Africa in the past, this statement, coupled with other recent comments, suggest that the COSI director might be now exercising a wider role as spokesman for all Wagner activity in Africa, as Wagner reorganizes its structure in the wake of last month’s failed mutiny.

The statement comes as a U-turn in recent communications over Wagner’s presence in CAR. In past weeks both CAR and Russian officials stated that the African republic had an agreement with Russia and not with a private military company. Ivanov seems to be returning to earlier narratives in which Wagner claimed that the CAR government signed an agreement with the PMC and not the Russian government. This narrative seems to confirm DFRLab reporting in the June 30 edition of the Russian War Report, in which we noted that denying direct links to Wagner’s actions in Africa has become more difficult for the Kremlin after recent events damaged the principle of plausible deniability, which had previously been a key aspect of Wagner’s success in Africa. However, Russia does not want to waste the network of influence built by its state proxy forces and is now attempting to reorganize, rebrand and develop a new narrative around Wagner and the Kremlin’s ability to conduct hybrid warfare.

The arrival of dozens of troops from Russia’s Wagner in CAR comes at a critical time as the country prepares to hold a constitutional referendum on July 30 that would eliminate presidential term limits and allow President Faustin-Archange Touadéra to extend his term. The CAR government stated earlier this month that Wagner operatives will help in securing the referendum. This could be seen as a strong signal from Moscow to reiterate the strategic importance of its influence in CAR and reassure local partners of its continued support, while sending a message of continuity and strength to other countries in the region where Wagner operates.

—Mattia Caniglia, associate director, Brussels, Belgium

Lavrov to replace Putin at BRICS summit

The Office of South Africa’s Presidency announced on July 19 that Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov would replace President Vladimir Putin at the upcoming Summit of BRICS Nations (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) “by mutual agreement.”

In Russian media, pro-Kremlin and opposition news outlets alike posted articles claiming that Russia had refused South Africa’s proposal to send Lavrov as head of the country’s delegation on July 14. Quoting an interview with South Africa’s deputy president, the Russian pro-Kremlin news outlet RTVI suggested that “negotiations are still ongoing.”

Putin is wanted by the International Criminal Court (ICC) for alleged war crimes committed during Russia’s war in Ukraine. A warrant for the arrest of both the Russian president and Presidential Commissioner for Children’s Rights Maria Lvova-Belova alleges that they were involved in organizing and participating in the deportation of Ukrainian children. As a signatory to the Rome Statute, which established the ICC, South Africa would have been obligated to arrest Putin had he attended the BRICS Summit in August.

South Africa’s largest opposition party, the Democratic Alliance, took to court in a petition to force the government to arrest Putin if he did attend. In a responding affidavit, South African President Cyril Ramaphosa stated that Russia would view South Africa arresting Putin as a “declaration of war.”

The Kremlin denied claims that Moscow had threatened South African authorities. However, Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov said on July 19 that “it is clear to everyone in the world what an attempt to encroach on the head of the Russian Federation means.”

—Tessa Knight, Research Associate, London, United Kingdom and Valentin Châtelet, Research Associate, Brussels, Belgium

The post Russian War Report: Wagner is still in business in Africa appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Russian War Report: Russian airstrike hits humanitarian aid station

Digital Forensic Research Lab — Thu, 13 Jul 2023 19:08:09 +0000

As Russia continues its assault on Ukraine, the Atlantic Council’s Digital Forensic Research Lab (DFRLab) is keeping a close eye on Russia’s movements across the military, cyber, and information domains. With more than seven years of experience monitoring the situation in Ukraine—as well as Russia’s use of propaganda and disinformation to undermine the United States, NATO, and the European Union—the DFRLab’s global team presents the latest installment of the Russian War Report.

Security

Russian military chief makes first public appearance since Wagner’s attempted mutiny

War crimes and human rights abuses

Russia strikes humanitarian aid delivery point in Zaporizhzhia Oblast

Russian military chief makes first public appearance since Wagner’s attempted mutiny

Russian forces continue to conduct offensive actions in Donetsk and Luhansk, with Ukrainian armed forces reporting thirty combat engagements between July 10 and 11 near Hryhorivka, Syeverne, Marinka, Krasnohorivka, and Novomykhailivka. According to the same report, Russian forces shelled villages and towns in the direction of Zaporizhzhia, Lyman, Kupiansk, and Kherson. Ukrainian Telegram channels also reported explosions on the morning of July 11 in Novooleksiivka, Kherson Oblast.

The Ukrainian counteroffensive advanced slowly amid heavy fighting along well-fortified Russian positions. On July 8, a video posted by RFE/RL’s Ukraine service showed how fighters from the 47th Separate Mechanized “Magura” Brigade, alongside soldiers from the Zaporizhzhia Brigade of the Territorial Defense Forces, occupied elevated Russian army positions in the direction of Zaporizhzhia near Novodarivka. However, Russia’s use of remote-controlled landmines has made it difficult for Ukraine to advance. Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Maliar announced on July 10 that Ukrainian forces had taken control of elevated positions around Bakhmut, allowing them to establish fire control over Bakhmut. Russian military bloggers have expressed fears that Ukrainian forces could encircle Russian forces in Bakhmut.

The Russian Ministry of Defense published footage on July 10 of Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov, his first public appearance since Wagner’s attempted mutiny. In the footage, Gerasimov receives reports about alleged Ukrainian attempts to strike Russian targets in occupied Crimea, Rostov, and Kaluga. The ministry published the footage the same day the Kremlin acknowledged President Vladimir Putin’s June 29 meeting with Wagner financier Yevgeny Prigozhin.

On July 11, the Russian Telegram channel Military Informant reported that Ukraine had used British-made Storm Shadow cruise missiles to strike a Russian army post near Berdyansk. The strike killed Oleg Tsokov, deputy commander of the Southern Military District. On the same day, explosions were reported in occupied Tokmak, Skadovsk, and Berdyansk. Also that day, the Russian army shelled Sofiivka, Kherson Oblast, with Grad multiple rocket launcher systems, killing at least one person and wounding another.

Meanwhile, the Ukrainian army is increasingly using equipment created by volunteers and local engineers in an attempt to diversify its supplies. On July 9, a team of Ukrainian engineers known as Immaterium reported that a first-person view (FPV) drone destroyed a Russian observation tower located nine kilometers from the departure point. Immaterium also claimed that the drone strike set a distance record for an FPV drone developed and produced locally.

Elsewhere, Armin Papperger, head of the German defense company Rheinmetall, said on July 10 that an armored vehicle repair plant would open in Ukraine within twelve weeks. Papperger added that he hopes to increase Rheinmetall’s production of shells within one year so the company can provide Ukrainian forces with up to 60 percent of their needs. Meanwhile, Ukrainian Minister for Strategic Industries Oleksandr Kamyshin said construction was underway on a new plant to produce Bayraktar drones in Ukraine.

Ukraine’s defense ministry announced on July 8 that five former Azov commanders who fought in the battle over Mariupol were released from Turkey and returning to Ukraine alongside Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy. Ukraine’s ambassador to Turkey, Vasily Bodnar, said that Turkey did not put any conditions on Ukraine for the return of the Azov commanders. Bodnar added that their release was preceded by months of detailed diplomatic work. The commanders ended up in Turkey as a result of a prisoner swap brokered by Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. The commanders participated in the Azovstal steelworks plant siege, regarded by Ukrainians as a heroic effort to resist Russian advancements. Russian forces eventually captured the commanders, among the highest-profile fighters to be captured. The commanders have vowed to return to the battlefield. Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed that Ukraine and Turkey had “violated” the prisoner exchange agreement.

—Ruslan Trad, resident fellow for security research, Sofia, Bulgaria

Russia strikes humanitarian aid delivery point in Zaporizhzhia Oblast

On June 9, Ukraine’s interior ministry posted footage on Telegram showing the aftermath of a Russian air strike on a humanitarian aid delivery point in Orikhiv, Zaporizhzhia Oblast. The attack reportedly killed at least seven people and injured thirteen. Cross-referencing the shared footage with images posted on Google Maps, the DFRLab determined the location of the incident to be Communal School No. 3, located on the corner of Myru Street and Pokrovska Street. Initial damage analysis, via the images, indicates that the strike destroyed two-thirds of the school’s facilities.

A picture posted by Karyna Ola on Google Maps shows the rear of the school compound, left. A picture posted by the Russian opposition Telegram channel Sota shows the same rear staircase, top right. A picture posted by Ukraine’s interior ministry shows another part of the school compound, bottom right. (Source: Google Maps, left; Telegram/archive, top right; Telegram/archive, bottom right)

Reports from several Russian-speaking news outlets on Telegram confirmed that the school was converted into a humanitarian aid delivery point. Russian opposition media outlet Doxa indicated that a Russian jet may have dropped two guided bombs to attack the delivery point, though this information is not confirmed. According to the office of the prosecutor-general of Ukraine, the attack occurred around 1:30 pm local time.

The following morning, Zaporizhzhia Regional Military Administration head Yurii Malashko shared additional photos from the incident, including one featuring what appears to be a damaged canvas sign featuring the logo for the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).

(Screenshot of Telegram post, including an image featuring torn canvas with the UNHCR logo clearly visible. Source: zoda_gov_ua/archive)

The Zaporizhzhia Regional Prosecutor’s Office has launched an investigation into the “violation of the laws and customs of war, combined with intentional murder.”

—Valentin Châtelet, research associate, Brussels, Belgium

The post Russian War Report: Russian airstrike hits humanitarian aid station appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Russian War Report: Russian conspiracy alleges false flag at Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant

Digital Forensic Research Lab — Fri, 07 Jul 2023 18:02:29 +0000

As Russia continues its assault on Ukraine, the Atlantic Council’s Digital Forensic Research Lab (DFRLab) is keeping a close eye on Russia’s movements across the military, cyber, and information domains. With more than seven years of experience monitoring the situation in Ukraine—as well as Russia’s use of propaganda and disinformation to undermine the United States, NATO, and the European Union—the DFRLab’s global team presents the latest installment of the Russian War Report.

Security

Russian missile strike in Lviv kills ten civilians, injures dozens

Tracking narratives

New narrative accuses US and Ukraine of planning false flag attack on Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant

Media policy

Former employees share details about Prigozhin’s media group and troll farms

Kremlin-owned RT offers jobs to former employees of Prigozhin’s troll factory

Russian missile strike in Lviv kills ten civilians, injures dozens

At least ten people were killed and thirty-seven injured in Russia’s July 6 attack on Lviv, in western Ukraine. Regional Governor Maksym Kozytskyy said that a Russian missile struck a residential building in the city, destroying more than fifty apartments.

Meanwhile, Russian forces continue to launch offensive actions in Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts. Ukrainian forces reported thirty-eight combat engagements against Russian troops near Novoselivske, Novohryhorivka, Berkhivka, Bohdanivka, Bakhmut, Avdiivka, and Marinka. In the direction of Lyman, Russian forces shelled Nevske, Bilohorivka, Torske, Verkhnokamyanske, and Rozdolivka in Donetsk. Russian aviation conducted an airstrike in Bilohorivka. Russia also attacked villages in Zaporizhzhia and Kherson oblasts, including Levadne, Olhivske, Malynivka, Huliaipole, and Bilohirka. On July 6, Russian troops shelled Chervonohryhorivka and Nikopol, damaging civilian infrastructure.

On July 5, reports from Russian military bloggers suggested that Ukrainian forces had advanced southwest of Berkhivka, west of Yahidne, and southwest of Bakhmut. The Ukrainian army said it conducted offensive operations south and north of Bakhmut and is moving on Bakhmut’s southern flank. The Russian Ministry of Defense claimed that the Ukrainian army conducted offensive operations near Lyman, Bakhmut, along the Avdiivka front, on the border between Zaporizhzhia and Donetsk, and in western Zaporizhzhia.

The Ukrainian army appears to have launched a coordinated attack on Russian army logistical and communications hubs. On July 4, Ukrainian forces reportedly struck an ammunition depot in occupied Makiivka, Donetsk. Russian sources claimed without evidence that Ukraine had struck a hospital. Former Russian army commander Igor Strelkov, also known as Igor Girkin, said the attack demonstrates how Ukraine regularly launches missile strikes against Russian rear targets. Other unconfirmed reports from July 5 indicate Ukraine may have struck Russian positions near Debaltseve. Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces hit Russian positions near Yakymivka in the Melitopol area and attempted to strike Berdyansk in the Zaporizhzhia region.

—Ruslan Trad, resident fellow for security research, Sofia, Bulgaria

New narrative accuses US and Ukraine of planning false flag attack on Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant

Ahead of next week’s NATO Summit in Vilnius, Lithuania, allegations that the United States and Ukraine will launch a false flag operation on the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant are spreading on various platforms, including Twitter, 4chan, and Instagram. The allegations seemingly aim to create panic and, in the event of a future attack on the plant, establish a narrative the West and Ukraine are to blame.

On July 3, a post appeared on 4chan from an anonymous user who introduced himself as a US Marine Corps veteran now working for the government in electronic espionage. The user claimed that the Ukrainian and US governments are working together to bomb the Zaporizhzhia power plant. According to the conspiracy theory, after the false flag operation, the United States will be able to use “nuclear warheads” against Russia. At the time of writing, the post had been deleted from 4chan. However, similar posts remain on the platform.

Screencap of an anonymous 4chan post claiming the US and Ukraine are planning a false flag attack. (Source: 4chan)

However, the false flag claims did not originate on 4chan. Russian Twitter accounts posted similar claims building the false flag narrative. After the 4chan post, the claim circulated again on Twitter.

A similar narrative was also shared by Renat Karchaa, an adviser to Rosenergoatom, a subsidiary of the Russian state nuclear agency Rosatom. Karchaa claimed on Russian state television channel Russia-24 that on the night of July 5, the Ukrainian army would attempt an attack on the Zaporizhzhia plant. Without evidence, he accused the United States and the West of planning a false flag incident to damage Russia’s reputation. The claims were further amplified by Russian state media outlets.

The allegations escalated on social media after July 4, when Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy repeated Ukraine’s concerns about the status of the nuclear power plant. In an address, Zelenskyy restated that Russia plans to attack the plant and that Russian troops have placed explosive-like objects on the building’s roof. In June, Ukrainian military intelligence made similar claims when it reported that the plant’s cooling pond had been mined by Russian troops.

On July 5, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) said that it was aware of reports that mines and other explosives had been placed around the plant. The IAEA said their experts inspected parts of the facility and did not observe any visible indications of mines or explosives. IAEA Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi added, “The IAEA experts requested additional access that is necessary to confirm the absence of mines or explosives at the site.” On July 7, the IAEA announced that Russia had granted its experts further access, “without – so far – observing any visible indications of mines or explosives.”

—Sayyara Mammadova, research assistant, Warsaw, Poland

Former employees share details about Prigozhin’s media group and troll farms

Several independent Russian media outlets published stories this week interviewing former employees of Yevgeny Prigozhin’s Patriot Media Group, which dissolved on June 30.

In a video published on Telegram, Yevgeny Zubarev, director of Patriot Media Group’s RIA FAN, said the goal was to “work against the opposition, such as Alexei Navalny and others who wanted to destroy our country.” Zubarev confirmed key details previously reported by independent Russian journalists at Novaya Gazeta in 2013 and the now-Kremlin-controlled RBC in 2017 about the existence of paid commentators and the creation of Prigozhin-affiliated media outlets. Zubarev added that, after Russian President Vladimir Putin’s 2018 re-election, the group hired “foreign affairs observers.” The timing corresponds with attempts by Prigozhin’s Internet Research Agency to meddle in the 2020 US presidential election.

Further, independent Russian media outlets Sever.Realii, Bumaga, and Novaya Gazeta interviewed former employees of Prigozhin’s media group. Speaking on the condition of anonymity, the former employees confirmed that Prigozhin’s “troll factory” and “media factory” conducted coordinated information attacks on opposition leaders, published fabricated or purchased news “exclusives,” praised Putin, and deliberately ignored particular individuals who criticized Wagner Group. Bumaga and Sever.Realii described a smear campaign against Saint Petersburg Governor Alexander Beglov. In 2019, Prigozhin’s media group supported and promoted Beglov, but in 2021, Prigozhin reportedly launched a smear campaign, as Beglov allegedly prevented him from developing a waste collection business in the city. Novaya Gazeta’s report also provided evidence that Prigozhin’s troll farm activities extended beyond Russia, with employees portraying skinheads and fascists in the Baltic region, specifically in Lithuania.

In recent years, additional revelations about Prigozhin’s media group have come to light. For example, Bumaga reported that prospective hires had to pass a “lie detector test” in which “security service specialists” asked candidates about their attitudes toward the opposition and Alexei Navalny in particular. Once hired, employees were closely surveilled. One former employee Bumaga interviewed characterized the atmosphere as being in a “closed military company.” Both Bumaga and Novaya Gazeta’s interviewees said that most of the employees did not believe in the mission. In one example, an employee left after refusing to launch a smear campaign against Ivan Golunov, a journalist at the independent news outlet Meduza who was detained in 2019 under false pretenses. Bumaga, citing an unnamed former employee, also reported that at one point an employee had hacked the system, erased a database, and fled to Poland. The same interviewee claimed they employed two Telegram administrators who also administered pro-Ukraine channels.

—Nika Aleksejeva, resident fellow, Riga, Latvia

Kremlin-owned RT offers jobs to former employees of Prigozhin’s troll factory

RT Editor-in-Chief Margarita Simonyan offered to hire employees of Yevgeny Prigozhin’s Patriot Media Group, which reportedly housed his troll factories. In the latest episode of the program Keosayan Daily, Simonyan praised the work of “Wagner’s media empire.” She said their work “was super professional” and that anyone left without a job can join “them,” referring to Russian propaganda outlets. She added, “We know you as professional colleagues of ours.”

The fate of Patriot’s former employees is being actively discussed in Russia. According to Russian outlet Novie Izverstia, Pavel Gusev, editor-in-chief of the pro-Kremlin outlet MK.ru, volunteered to help find jobs for former employees of Patriot. In addition, the chairman of the Saint Petersburg branch of the Union of Journalists of Russia stated that the union would contact the heads of media outlets to help find opportunities for dismissed employees and would provide additional informational support.

—Eto Buziashvili, research associate, Tbilisi, Georgia

The post Russian War Report: Russian conspiracy alleges false flag at Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Peterson on the Silicon Curtain: Countering Russian propaganda narratives

Atlantic Council — Fri, 07 Jul 2023 15:33:20 +0000

original source

The post Peterson on the Silicon Curtain: Countering Russian propaganda narratives appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Wagner putsch is symptomatic of Russia’s ongoing imperial decline

Richard Cashman, Lesia Ogryzko — Thu, 06 Jul 2023 20:14:43 +0000

The attempted putsch by Yevgeniy Prigozhin and his Wagner troops in late June is perhaps best understood as a symptom of Russia’s ongoing imperial decline. Much like the invasion of Ukraine itself, it is part of a broader historical process that can be traced back to 1989 and the fall of the Soviet incarnation of the Russian Empire in Central and Eastern Europe.

Anyone looking to make sense of recent events in Russia should begin by noting that Prigozhin’s dramatic actions were not aimed at ending the war in Ukraine or steering Russia away from its increasingly totalitarian course. On the contrary, he sought to correct mistakes in the conduct of the invasion by effecting changes in the country’s military leadership.

This should come as no surprise. The vast majority of Prigozhin’s public statements about the invasion of Ukraine align him with prominent ultranationalists, which in the Russian context translates into imperial reactionaries. This group is demanding a fuller commitment to the war against Ukraine which, with Belarus, it sees as the core of Russia’s imperial heartlands. Ideally, this group wants to see full mobilization of Russia’s citizens and the country’s productive capacity for the war effort.

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Prigozhin is not generally regarded as a member of Putin’s inner circle, but he is believed to have supporters within the Kremlin elite, some of whom may have backed or sympathized with his uprising. This support reflects widespread demands among members of the Russian establishment for national leadership that can arrest and reverse the process of imperial retreat which began in 1989.

It is also clear that Prigozhin enjoyed significant backing from ordinary Russians and, probably, ordinary soldiers. Support for Prigozhin amongst the Russian public is rooted in anger over the mismanagement of the invasion and endemic state corruption along with dissatisfaction over the prospect of increasing costs without identifiable gains in Ukraine.

The scale of public sympathy for the putsch could be seen in videos of Rostov-on-Don residents congratulating Wagner troops on capturing the city while bringing them food and water. It was also striking that Rostov-on-Don and its Southern Military District headquarters were seized without a fight, while Wagner troops were able to advance to within two hundred kilometers of Moscow virtually unopposed, despite passing close to numerous Russian army bases. Prigozhin’s tough rhetoric and hawkish attacks on Russia’s military leadership clearly resonate widely among large numbers of ordinary Russians.

Prigozhin’s abruptly abandoned putsch reinforces the lesson that coups are relatively common in Russia, whereas genuine revolutions are not. Vladimir Putin and the clan which took control of Russia at the turn of the millennium in many ways see themselves as the heirs to the 1991 coup plotters who attempted but failed to prevent the unravelling of the USSR. Their own vulnerability to being overthrown in similar fashion has now been laid bare before the Russian public and the wider world.

The course of the war to date, including cross-border incursions by Ukrainian-backed Russian militias into Russia’s Belgorod and Bryansk regions, had already fractured the facade of monolithic strength so carefully projected by the Kremlin throughout Putin’s twenty-three-year reign. Prigozhin’s putsch has further exposed the brittleness of the regime and of the Russian state. It has highlighted the very real possibility of turmoil and transformation within the country, which so many observers previously thought impossible.

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Policymakers around the world must now prepare for a range of dramatic scenarios in Putin’s Russia. This planning should involve studying the more than 100 nationalities within the Russian Federation, their cultures and political aspirations, as well as possible fracture lines between regional and business interests.

More specifically, governments must begin to plan for a post-Putin Russia. Putin’s elderly clan represents the last of the Soviet-era elites and their distinct embrace of Russia’s imperial consciousness. That imperial identity will not disappear overnight, but Putin’s obvious overreach in Ukraine and events like Prigozhin’s putsch are likely to engender a less certain sense of imperial destiny.

Putin has emerged from the Wagner putsch a significantly weakened figure, especially among members of the Russian establishment who once saw him as a guarantor of stability. He has also been embarrassed internationally and now looks a far less reliable partner for countries such as China, India, and Brazil that have so far sought to remain neutral over the invasion of Ukraine.

Moving forward, there will be considerable paranoia within the Russian establishment as suspicion swirls regarding potentially shifting loyalties. Rumors continue to circulate regarding measures targeting military and security service personnel who failed to oppose the Wagner uprising. The invasion of Ukraine has already seriously eroded trust within Russian society; Prigozhin’s actions and Putin’s timid response will intensify this negative trend.

Ukraine’s partners cannot control the processes set in train by the Wagner episode, but they can surge military support for Ukraine and embrace bolder policies that reflect the revealed weakness of the Putin regime. The fact that Putin was apparently prepared to strike a deal with Prigozhin further demonstrates that the Russian dictator is inclined to back down rather than escalate when confronted by a resolute opponent or faced with the prospect of possible defeat.

Prigozhin’s putsch was a brief but revealing event in modern Russian history. It hinted at deep-seated dissatisfaction among both the elite and the Russian public over the country’s inability to reclaim what it perceives as its imperial heartlands, and served as a reminder that the imperial Russian state is still collapsing.

The Russian decline that began with the fall of the Berlin Wall is ongoing, with Putin and his clan seeking but failing to reverse the settlement of 1991. This path has led to a war based on imperial fantasies that may now hasten the real end of empire. The Wagner putsch did not bring down Putin’s regime which seeks to maintain empire, but it may come to be seen as the beginning of its end.

Richard Cashman and Lesia Ogryzko are fellows at the Centre for Defence Strategies.

Tracking narratives

Pro-Kremlin sources spreading disinformation to justify missile strike in Kramatorsk

Kremlin blames Colombian victims for the injuries they sustained in the Kramatorsk attack

Media policy

Prigozhin’s online assets reportedly blocked in Russia

International Response

Questions abound over the future of Wagner contracts and Prigozhin-linked businesses in Africa

Analysis: With Wagner mutiny, Russia’s loses plausible deniability about its involvement in Africa

Investigation sheds light on how Putin’s childhood friends allegedly evade sanctions

Military camps for Wagner reportedly under construction in Belarus

Russian independent outlet Verstka reported on the construction of camps for Wagner forces near Asipovichi, Mogilev Oblast, located in Belarus approximately two hundred kilometers from the Ukraine border. According to Verstka’s local forestry source, the area will cover 2.4 hectares (5.9 acres) and accommodate eight thousand Wagner fighters. The source also claimed that there will be additional camps constructed. Family members of Wagner fighters also confirmed to Verstka that they were deploying to Belarus.

Radio Svaboda, the Belarusian-language edition of Radio Liberty, reviewed satellite imagery from Planet Labs that suggested signs of expansion at the Unit 61732 military camp adjacent to the village of Tsel, twenty kilometers northwest of Asipovichi. The outlet interviewed Ukrainian military analyst Oleg Zhdanov, who suggested it was “too early to tell” as to whether the military camp’s expansion is specifically for Wagner forces. “Very little time has passed to start building a camp specifically for the Wagnerites—it’s unreal,” Zhdanov told Radio Svaboda.

Location of possible construction at the Unit 61732 military camp in Tsel, Belarus. (Source: Planet Labs)

On June 27, in his first speech after the Wagner mutiny, Russian President Vladimir Putin reaffirmed the deal that ended the rebellion on June 24 in which Yevgeniy Prigozhin would relocate to Belarus. Putin praised those Wagner fighters who did not participate in the revolt and said they could sign a contract with the Russian Ministry of Defense of other services. He added that other mercenaries who do not want to join could go either home or follow Prigozhin to Belarus.

—Eto Buziashvili, research associate, Tbilisi, Georgia

Pro-Kremlin sources spreading disinformation to justify missile strike in Kramatorsk

Pro-Kremlin sources denied Russia targeted civilians when a missile struck a crowded pizza restaurant in Kramatorsk, killing at least twelve civilians and injuring more than fifty others. According to this narrative, RIA Pizza was actually a military base hosting US and Ukrainian soldiers. To support the claims, pictures taken after the strike were published on Telegram and Twitter.

To support the claim that soldiers of 101st Airborne Division were located at the pizza “military base,” pro-Kremlin sources circulated grisly footage of the attack aftermath recorded by freelance journalist Arnaud De Decker. The clip shows a man wearing a morale patch of a US flag with the words “Always Be Ready: 5.11 Tactical.” 5.11 Tactical is a military apparel company that sells branded merchandise, including morale patches, worn to offer support to various causes and slogans but not used official unit patches. Various types of 5.11 Tactical’s “Always Be Ready” patches are readily available for purchase online.

Top: A 5.11 Tactical morale patch for sale on its website. Bottom: Image taken during the aftermath of the Kramatorsk attack showing a man wearing the same morale patch on his helmet. (Source: 5.11 Tactical/archive, top; @arnaud.dedecker/archive, bottom)

Similarly, another post from Aleksandr Simonov’s Telegram channel that a man wearing an 101^st Airborne t-shirt was a member of the US Army division. These t-shirts are also readily available from online retailers.

Montage of three screenshots from online retail websites selling 101^st Airborne t-shirts. (Sources: top left, Etsy/archive; bottom left, Predathor/archive; right, Allegro/archive)

Montage of three screenshots from online retail websites selling 101st Airborne t-shirts. (Sources: top left, Etsy/archive; bottom left, Predathor/archive; right, Allegro)

—Sayyara Mammadova, research assistant, Warsaw, Poland

Kremlin blames Colombian victims for the injuries they sustained in the Kramatorsk attack

In addition to pro-Kremlin accusations that the Kramatorsk attack targeted a base housing US Army soldiers, Kremlin influencers also targeted citizens of Colombia, three of whom were injured in the attack, for being at the site of the incident. Colombian President Gustavo Petro said the attack targeted “three defenseless Colombian civilians” in violation of the protocols of war and called for the Colombian Foreign Ministry to submit a note of diplomatic protest to Russia. While the Kremlin acknowledged launching the attack, it insisted the assault struck military personnel rather than civilians.

The three Colombian citizens injured in the attack include acclaimed Colombian writer Hector Abad Faciolince; Sergio Jaramillo Caro, who previously led Colombia’s peace negotiations with FARC rebels; and Ukrainian-based journalist Catalina Gomez. According to the New York Times, Abad and Jaramillo were in Kramatorsk “collecting material” in support of their initiative, ¡Aguanta Ucrania! (“Hang On Ukraine!”), which seeks to garner support for Ukraine in Latin America.

Following the attack, Colombian influencers and officials criticized the attack through media outlets and social media accounts in Spanish. Danilo Rueda, Colombia’s current high commissioner for peace, issued a statement expressing support for the victims without mentioning Russia, while the Ministry of Foreign Affairs expressed its “strongest condemnation of the unacceptable attack by Russian forces on a civilian target.”

Gomez, who was injured in the attack, broadcast a video for France 24 from the site of the explosion. Meanwhile, Abad and Jaramillo conducted interviews with Colombian media outlets such as El Tiempo in which they described the incident.

Actualidad RT, a Russian media outlets with enormous reach in the Spanish-speaking world, insisted that the victims of the attack were mercenaries and instructors of NATO and Ukraine rather than civilians. Actualidad RT quoted statements from Igor Konashenkov, spokesperson for the Russian Ministry of Defense, and Kremlin spokesperson Dmitri Peskov, who said the attack struck “military targets” and that “Russia does not attack civilian infrastructure.” Actualidad RT promoted its claims via Twitter and Facebook multiple times on June 28.

Colombian radio station WRadio interviewed Kremlin foreign policy spokesperson Maria Zakharova on the morning of June 28. Zakharova stated that the restaurant was a Russian military target and called for an investigation into Victoria Amelina, a Ukrainian writer who was gravely injured while purportedly hosting the Colombians at the restaurant, claiming without evidence that Amelina had prior knowledge that the restaurant was a military target. Zakharova reiterated this statement after a WRadio journalist asked her to confirm the accusation. In contrast, Abad stated that it was Gomez who suggested they visit the restaurant, and that she apologized for doing so after the attack.

The Russian embassy in Colombia amplified Zakharova’s narrative later that same afternoon and evening. On Twitter, the embassy insisted that the city was “an operational and logistical-military hub, not a suitable place to enjoy Ukrainian cuisine dishes.” It also seemed to celebrate that the “reckless trip [of the Colombians] did not turn into an irreparable tragedy.”

—Daniel Suárez Pére z, research associate, Bogota, Colombia

Prigozhin’s online assets reportedly blocked in Russia

Over the course of the thirty-six-hour Wagner mutiny, the Kremlin attempted to limit information about Yevgeniy Prigozin on Russian social media and search engines, eventually blocking websites affiliated with Prigozhin. On June 24, the Telegram channel of Russian state-owned propaganda outlet RT reported that several Prigozhin-controlled media outlets including RIA FAN, People’s News, and Patriot Media Group were no longer accessible in parts of Russia. RT added that the reason for their disappearance was unknown. Similar reports appeared in Mediazona and several Telegram channels.

The DFRLab used the Internet censorship measurement platform OONI to verify the claim and check the accessibility of RIA FAN within Russia. OONI detected signs that riafan.ru was blocked in the country.

Internet censorship measurement platform OONI detected the apparent blocking of Prigozhin-owned media outlet RIA FAN. (Source: OONI)

On June 29, independent Russian outlet The Bell claimed the Kremlin was searching for a new owner for Patriot Media Group, which includes media assets associated with Prigozhin. The following day, multiple Russian outlets reported that Prigozhin had dissolved Patriot Media Group.

—Eto Buziashvili, research associate, Tbilisi, Georgia

Questions abound over the future of Wagner contracts and Prigozhin-linked businesses in Africa

For years, Wagner has acted as Russia’s primary form of influence in Africa—spreading disinformation and propaganda, securing military contracts, and exporting natural resources to support Putin’s war effort. Following Prigozhin’s attempted mutiny, the future of Wagner’s operations on the continent has come into question. While it is highly unlikely the Kremlin would willingly abandon its influence in Africa, if Wagner is retired or its troops absorbed into the Ministry of Defense, it is uncertain who would maintain the group’s operations on the continent.

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov confirmed that Russia’s work in Africa will continue. In a TV interview with Russia Today, Lavrov said, “In addition to relations with this PMC the governments of CAR and Mali have official contacts with our leadership. At their request, several hundred soldiers are working in CAR as instructors.”

A top advisor to Central African Republic President Faustin-Archange Touadéra appeared unconcerned about the weekend’s events. Speaking of Wagner’s military instructors, Fidèle Gouandjika said, “If Moscow decides to withdraw them and send us the Beethovens or the Mozarts rather than Wagners, we will have them.” In a statement released to its Telegram channel, the Officer’s Union for International Security—a US-sanctioned Wagner front company operating in CAR—claimed CAR’s defense minister had apologized for Gouandjika’s remarks. It quoted Defense Minister Claude Rameaux Bireau as saying, “The people of the CAR are grateful to the Russian instructors of Wagner, ask any Central African on the streets of Bangui or in the village of the CAR—he will confirm my words.”

In Mali, where Wagner forces have taken over responsibility for pushing back jihadists after the departure of French forces, the online outlet Mali Actu reported that the situation could dramatically impact Mali. “This situation raises major concerns about the security, stability and sovereignty of Mali, as well as the impact on the local population and counter-terrorism efforts,” it wrote.

—Tessa Knight, research associate, London, United Kingdom

Analysis: With Wagner mutiny, Russia loses plausible deniability about its involvement in Africa

While Wagner’s future in Africa remains uncertain, it is important to consider that the Wagner Group not just a paramilitary force. It is also a conglomerate of companies active in different sectors, from mining and logistics to political warfare and moviemaking, able to travel the spectrum between private entrepreneurism to state proxy. This flexibility has previously allowed Moscow to deploy Wagner to act as a force multiplier in Africa while simultaneously denying Russia’s direct presence on the continent. In Africa, Russia has used Wagner multiple times as part of a strategy to help authoritarian leaders stay in power and gain a pro-Russian military presence on the ground, all while maintaining plausible deniability. Until now, the positive outcomes of this strategy have far exceeded the costs for the Kremlin, as Russia has built a strong network of African influence with relatively little effort, securing concessions in strategic extractive industries, and expanding military-to-military relations on the continent.

However, this principle of plausible deniability, which made Wagner so successful and so useful for Moscow as an extension of its foreign policy and influence, is now damaged. As previously noted, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, as well as Putin, publicly confirmed direct links between Wagner and the Russian state apparatus.

Africa is intimately linked to Wagner: In the wake of Wagner’s involvement in Syria, Africa became the scene of the group’s expansion. Engaging in Sudan, the Central African Republic, Libya, Mozambique, Madagascar, and Mali, Wagner employed an opportunistic strategy of supplying security while taking concessions to mine natural resources. While its forces were in most cases invited to stabilize fragile states, its actions actively invited further instability, creating more opportunities and a greater demand signal for its services, ultimately granting renewing opportunities to Moscow to reinforce its footprint in the continent.

While denying direct links to Wagner’s actions in Africa might have become more difficult for the Kremlin, Russia is unlikely to waste the network of influence built by the group in recent years. Instead, Moscow will likely continue to deploy hybrid tools such as Wagner, although organized in different shapes and forms, so Russia can continue displacing Western influence, exploiting natural resources, and evading sanctions through dozens of front companies.

—Mattia Caniglia, associate director, Brussels, Belgium

Investigation sheds light on how Putin’s childhood friends allegedly evade sanctions

On June 20, the Organized Crime and Corruption reporting project (OCCRP) published a series of investigations titled “The Rotenberg Files” that shed light on the business dealings and alleged sanctions evasion attempts of Boris and Arkady Rotenberg, close friends of Russian President Vladimir Putin. The report is based on fifty thousand leaked emails and documents, examined by journalists from seventeen outlets. The OCCRP said the leak came from a source who worked for the brothers at a Russian management firm. The OCCRP investigation was conducted in partnership with the Times of London, Le Monde, and Forbes, among others.

Boris and Arkady Rotenberg are childhood friends of Putin. The billionaire brothers faced Western sanctions amid Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea, but their lavish lifestyles do not appear to have been impacted.

According to the OCCRP, the leaked documents demonstrate how the Rotenberg brothers allegedly used Western lawyers, bankers, corporate service providers, and proxies to evade sanctions.

One of the report’s findings also alleges the brothers maintain business links to Prince Michael of Kent, a cousin of the late Queen Elizabeth II who was previously accused by the Sunday Times and Channel 4 of profiting off close access to the Kremlin. According to the latest investigation, “Prince Michael distanced himself from earlier ties to the Putin regime in the wake of the 2022 invasion of Ukraine. But leaked emails and corporate records show he co-owns a company with two Russian businessmen who helped billionaire oligarch and Putin ally Boris Rotenberg dodge Western sanctions.”

Another investigation from the Rotenberg files reported that Putin’s eldest daughter regularly visited a holiday property financed by Arkady Rotenberg in an exclusive Austrian skiing destination. Documents reviewed by the OCCRP suggest that the house was purchased by a Cypriot company in 2013 with a loan from a bank then owned by Arkady, using funds invested by another company he owned. Other records suggested that the former romantic partner of Putin’s daughter is connected to the company that owns the Austrian property. Residents claim to have seen Putin himself at the Kitzbühel residence, though this has not been confirmed.

The Rotenberg brothers and Prince Michael declined to comment to the OCCRP investigative consortium.

—Ani Mejlumyan, research assistant, Yerevan, Armenia

The post Russian War Report: Kremlin denies that it targeted civilians in a missile attack on a pizza restaurant appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Russian War Report Special Edition: Prigozhin and Wagner forces mutiny against Moscow

Digital Forensic Research Lab — Sat, 24 Jun 2023 17:04:28 +0000

On the evening of Friday, June 23, Wagner Group founder Yevgeny Prigozhin effectively broke ties with Moscow and initiated a mutiny against the Russian military, successfully occupying Rostov. Russian President Vladimir Putin condemned Prigozhin’s actions in an address to the nation as Russian authorities secured Moscow and reportedly engaged Wagner forces around Rostov. At the time of writing on the afternoon of Saturday, June 24, Prigozhin appears to have accepted a pause in further escalation, stating that Wagner forces will return to base. Today’s special edition of the Russian War Report provides an overview of the last thirty-six hours, including details on how Prigozhin’s rhetoric escalated into open conflict, open-source analysis of the latest footage, and a review of some of the competing narratives on Telegram and across the Russian information ecosystem.

Tracking narratives

How Prigozhin used Telegram to declare war on the Russian Ministry of Defense – and then suddenly pull back

Putin calls Prigozhin’s “criminal adventure” an “armed mutiny” and “treason”

Security

Wagner forces enter Rostov, occupy Russian Southern Military District headquarters

Wagner forces emerge south of Moscow in Lipetsk

Explosion at oil depot in Russian city of Voronezh

Media policy

Amid chaos in the Russian information space the Kremlin attempts to limit information on Prigozhin

How Prigozhin used Telegram to declare war on the Russian Ministry of Defense – and then suddenly pull back

The Russian-founded messaging platform Telegram, which became a primary tool circulating pro-Kremlin narratives throughout Russia’s war in Ukraine, achieved an unprecedented level of influence on June 23, with Prigozhin wielding it to vent his rage at the Russian defense establishment and launch a mercenary mutiny. For months, Prigozhin has engaged in rhetorical warfare against his rivals in the Kremlin, in particular Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu and Armed Forces Chief of Staff Gen. Valery Gerasimov. The Wagner founder blamed them for ineptitude over the course of the war in Ukraine, including a months-long public argument about supplying his forces with adequate munitions during its siege of Bakhmut.

Prigozhin’s one-man war against the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) reached new heights in a series of Telegram posts that began on Friday, June 23, and continued into Saturday. At 10:50 am Moscow time, he posted a thirty-minute video to his Prigozhin Press Service Telegram channel excoriating the MoD, accusing its leadership of deceiving Putin and the Russian public in early 2022 into believing that Ukrainian aggression was imminent, and that Russia had no choice but to invade Ukraine.

Sitting in a chair in front of a Wagner Group flag pinned to an otherwise blank wall, Prigozhin proceeded to make his case against the MoD and its entire war effort. “Right now, the [MoD] is trying to deceive society and the president and tell a story that there was insane aggression from the Ukrainian side and they were going to attack us together with the whole NATO bloc,” Prigozhin said effectively undermining the Kremlin’s entire case for war. “Therefore, on February 24, the so-called special operation was launched for completely different reasons.” He described Russia’s invasion of Ukraine as a “monstrous shame show” and an “incompetently planned operation” conducted by “a bunch of creatures” and “mentally ill scum” who “don’t have the balls” to fight aggressively with the necessary decisiveness to win the war, including their unwillingness to use tactical nuclear weapons. “The grandfathers are rather weak. They cannot get out of their comfort zone,” he added.

“A handful of dipshits decided for some reason that they were so cunning that no one would realize what they were doing with their military exercises, and nobody would stop them when they went to Kyiv,” Prigozhin said. He went on to blame Shoigu for killing thousands of capable Russian soldiers, and he directed his ire at Russian oligarchs enriching themselves on the war while seeking to return former Russian President Dmitry Medvedev to power. “Our sacred war against those who wrong the Russian people has turned into racketeering, into theft,” he said.

Prigozhin later added that he would follow up the video with a second “interview,” but this would turn out to be a gross understatement, as the initial video was merely the first of more than a dozen messages he would post to his Prigozhin Press Service Telegram channel over the next thirty-six hours.

Later in the day at 5:10 pm Moscow time, Prigozhin amped up his criticism of the MoD even further with a Telegram audio post in which he accused it of committing “genocide” against Russians. Calling out Shoigu and Gerasimov directly, Prigozhin said “they should be held responsible for the genocide of the Russian people, the murder of tens of thousands of Russian citizens, and the transfer of Russian territories to the enemy.”

As angry audio clips of Prigozhin continued to appear into the evening, multiple pro-Wagner Telegram channels circulated a video around 9:00 pm Moscow time purporting to document the aftermath of a Russian airstrike on a Wagner encampment. The video shows scenes of a wooded area lined with stone paths subjected to a moderate amount debris and several fires burning in trenches; a body is briefly seen towards the end of the clip. It is unclear where or when the footage was filmed, and it brought to mind similar suspicious footage contextually devoid footage circulated prior to the February 2022 invasion accusing Ukraine of engaging in sabotage and other aggression against Russia.

The drama continues. Prigozhin publishes a video which he claims shows the aftermath of a rocket attack by the Russian ministry of defence on a Wagner camp. “Many of our guys died…We will make a decision how to respond to this evil. The next move is ours” pic.twitter.com/o7l14yVBMX
— Pjotr Sauer (@PjotrSauer) June 23, 2023

Within ten minutes, Prigozhin posted another angry statement, this time accusing the MoD of attacking his forces at the camp. “Today, seeing that we aren’t broken, they decided to launch rocket attacks on our rear camps,” he exclaimed. “A huge number of fighters were killed, our comrades in arms. We’ll decide how to respond to this atrocity. The ball’s in our court.”

Approximately fifteen minutes later, Prigozhin effectively declared war against the MoD in another Telegram audio clip. “The Wagner Group commanders’ council has made a decision,” he announced. “The evil that the country’s military leadership is carrying out must be stopped. They neglect soldiers’ lives. They’ve forgotten the word ‘justice’ and we’re bringing it back. Those who destroyed our guys today, those who destroyed many tens of thousands of Russian soldiers’ lives will be punished.” Later, he described his forces as “25,000 strong,” adding, “We’re going to get to the bottom of the lawlessness in this country.”

As Prigozhin continued posting additional threats and taunts on Telegram, the MoD described the alleged footage circulated on pro-Wagner channels as fake, while Russia’s National Anti-Terrorism Committee announced that the Federal Security Service, or FSB, would initiate a criminal case against Prigozhin “on the fact of calling for an armed rebellion.”

Prigozhin continued posting on and off throughout Saturday as his forces advanced north in the direction of Moscow. Then just before 8:30pm local time, he uploaded another message, stating he would return Wagner forces to their camps. It remains unclear whether he intends to keep that promise.

Prigozhin just now: "They wanted to disband Wagner. We set out on June 23 for the "March of Justice". In a day we marched just short of 200 km from Moscow. During this time, we have not shed a single drop of the blood of our fighters. Now is the moment when blood can be shed.…
— Mary Ilyushina (@maryilyushina) June 24, 2023

—Andy Carvin, managing editor, Washington, DC

Putin calls Prigozhin’s “criminal adventure” an “armed mutiny” and “treason”

After spending Friday night away from cameras, Putin released a televised statement late Saturday morning. Addressing the Russian public as well as the armed forces and security personnel “who are now fighting in their combat positions, repulsing enemy attacks,” Putin described Prigozhin’s actions as a “criminal adventure” and an “armed mutiny.”

“Today, Russia is waging a tough struggle for its future, repelling the aggression of neo-Nazis and their patrons,” he stated. “The entire military, economic, and informational machine of the West is directed against us. We are fighting for the lives and security of our people, for our sovereignty and independence, for the right to be and remain Russia, a state with a thousand-year history.”

“This battle, when the fate of our nation is being decided, requires consolidation of all forces,” Putin continued. “It requires unity, consolidation, and a sense of responsibility, and everything that weakens us, any strife that our external enemies can use and do so to subvert us from within, must be discarded. Therefore, any actions that split our nation are essentially a betrayal of our people, of our comrades-in-arms who are now fighting at the frontline. This is a knife in the back of our country and our people.”

Comparing the mutiny to 1917, when “Russians were killing Russians and brothers were killing brothers,” Putin declared, “We will not allow this to happen again. We will protect our people and our statehood from any threats, including from internal betrayal…. Inflated ambitions and personal interests have led to treason—treason against our country, our people and the common cause which Wagner Group soldiers, and commanders were fighting and dying for.”

“Once again, any internal revolt is a deadly threat to our statehood and our nation. It is a blow to Russia, to our people,” he continued. “Our actions to defend the fatherland from this threat will be harsh. All those who have consciously chosen the path of betrayal, planned an armed mutiny, and taken the path of blackmail and terrorism, will inevitably be punished and will answer before the law and our people…. Those who staged the mutiny and took up arms against their comrades—they have betrayed Russia and will be brought to account. I urge those who are being dragged into this crime not to make a fatal and tragic mistake but make the only right choice: to stop taking part in criminal actions.”

“I am certain that we will preserve and defend what we hold dear and sacred, and together with our motherland we will overcome any hardships and become even stronger,” Putin concluded.

—Andy Carvin, managing editor, Washington, DC

Wagner forces enter Rostov, occupy Russian Southern Military District headquarters

Over the course of Prigozhin’s Telegram posts, he boasted that his “25,000 strong” Wagner forces had marched across the border from Ukraine into Russia before claiming they had shot down a Russian armed forces helicopter before entering the city of Rostov. For many hours overnight, he provided no evidence to back his claims. This finally began to change as footage emerged on Russian Telegram, ultimately confirming that Prigozhin had indeed occupied Rostov.

At 3:47 am Moscow time, the pro-Wagner channel VChK-OGPU posted a video in which a helicopter can be heard circling over Rostov at night. The channel noted, however, “No one has yet seen the video of the Wagner PMC column and the battles with the Ministry of Defense.” Two minutes later, the channel changed its tune by sharing a second video appearing to show rocket fire and bursts of assault rifles, describing it as the “first video reportedly showing fighting between PMC Wagner and Ministry of Defense units.” The footage circulated widely on Telegram but remained unverified.

Less than twenty minutes later, at 4:09 am, VChK-OGPU shared a third clip showing what appeared to be a convoy of Wagner tanks, trucks, and other vehicles crossing a checkpoint without any opposition. Unlike the previous clips, however, the footage was easily visible, as it appeared to have been recorded during the pre-dawn twilight. According to open-source sun-tracking data, the sun rose in Rostov this morning at 4:25 am, with twilight commencing at 3:50 am, putting the video’s release squarely in the middle of pre-dawn twilight. The exact location of the footage is still under review and cannot be confirmed.

At 5:01 am, not long after sunrise, the Verum Regnum Telegram channel circulated video clips of what appeared to show Wagner forces arriving in central Rostov, just outside the MoD’s Southern Military District headquarters at the intersection of Pushkinskaya Ulitsa and Budonnovskiy Prospekt. One of the videos appeared to show forces beginning to set up a perimeter around the MoD building.

Telegram footage allegedly of Wagner forces in central Rostov. (Source: Verum Regnum/archive)

Top: Highlights from the video showing a tank in front of the southwest corner of Pushkinskaya Ulitsa and Budonnovskiy Prospekt (top left) and a man recording footage on his phone in front of the intersection’s northwest corner in front of the MoD’s Southern Military District building (top right). Bottom: Google Street View of the same intersection facing westward, where both corners are visible. (Source: Verum Regnum/archive, top left and top right; Google Street View/archive, bottom)

A second clip showed how that presence had expanded with the placement of additional armored vehicles blocking the entire intersection from vehicle traffic.

Wagner soldiers (left) and armored vehicles (center and right) block the intersection in front of the Southern Military District building in Rostov. (Source: Verum Regnum/archive)

Around 7:30 am Moscow time, a pair of videos appeared on the WAGNER Z GROUP/Z PMC WAGNER’Z Telegram channel and Prigozhin’s press channel respectively. The first video showed Prigozhin and his entourage entering the inner courtyard of the Southern Military District building. Prigozhin is later seen bragging about his successes with Deputy Defense Minister Yunus-bek Yevkurov while demanding that Yevkurov speak to him respectfully. In the second video, he addressed the camera and bragged that he had captured Rostov without firing a single shot.

Just wow. A video has surfaced showing Prigozhin at the Southern Military District HQ in Rostov-on-Don talking to (and HUMILIATING) Deputy Defense Minister Yunus-bek Yevkurov. He threatens to blockade Rostov and head for Moscow!

I have extreme trouble understanding Yevkurov and… pic.twitter.com/jGr9gaLB1i
— Kevin Rothrock (@KevinRothrock) June 24, 2023

#UPDATE Wagner chief Yevgeny Prigozhin, leading a mutiny to bring down Moscow's top brass, said Saturday his fighters captured the army HQ in Russia's Rostov-on-Don "without firing a single shot" and claimed to have the support of locals. pic.twitter.com/5F0uC0pDFQ
— AFP News Agency (@AFP) June 24, 2023

Later, prior to 2:00 pm Moscow time, new footage emerged showing people running from the neighborhood of the MoD building. Initial reports suggested it was a Russian Armed Forces attack within the vicinity, but this has not been confirmed.

https://twitter.com/maria_drutska/status/1672560729256329216

The many civilians running from the sound of an explosion were likely due to the crowds that came out to observe Wagner’s occupation of the MoD building. In one video, people can be seen chatting with Wagner soldiers and thanking them.

Rostov – people approaching the mercenaries to thank them and shake hands. pic.twitter.com/teLqMGtMWh
— WarTranslated (Dmitri) (@wartranslated) June 24, 2023

—Andy Carvin, managing editor, Washington, DC

Wagner forces emerge south of Moscow in Lipetsk

The governor of Lipetsk, Igor Artamonov, announced Saturday afternoon that Wagner forces had entered the region, approximately 400 km south of Moscow. The Associated Press noted that the governor added, “The situation is under control.” Meanwhile, footage emerged that appeared to show excavators destroying the highway between Lipetsk and Moscow.

Digging up the road to make roadblocks. Lipetsk. pic.twitter.com/ObDcEHFPOo
— Michael Weiss (@michaeldweiss) June 24, 2023

At the time of writing there were conflicting reports as to whether the Wagner convoy had traveled from Rostov or was comprised of defectors from the Russian Armed Forces.

—Andy Carvin, managing editor, Washington, DC

Explosion at oil depot in Russian city of Voronezh

On June 24, videos depicting an explosion at an oil depot in the region of Voronezh were widely circulated online. The DFRLab identified the precise location of the explosion and confirmed the videos as authentic.

The video published online was captured from buildings in close proximity to the Leroy Merlin store in Voronezh, as clearly observed in the footage. The DFRLab also corroborated the location of the oil depot Red Flag Oil Combine (Комбинат Красное знамя) and identified approximate coordinates for the area where the video was recorded. Below, the screenshot on the left is extracted from the video, while the image on the right is from Google Maps, illustrating the precise positions of the oil depot, store, and the recorded video.

Photo shows the locations of oil depot, store, recorded video, marked as blue, yellow, red respectively. (Source: Left Twitter/archive, Right Google Maps/archive)

Additional footage documented the shelling of a residential area in Voronezh. The footage reveals visible damage to cars. In order to verify the location of the building, the DFRLab utilized reverse image search via Google and Yandex, then cross-referenced the results with Google Maps, verifying the location of the shelling.

Imagery from Google Maps (left) shows the location of residential area in Voronezh (center and right). (Source: Google Maps/archive left; RtrDonetsk/archive, center; @christogrozev/archive, right)

The location of residential area as seen on Yandex Maps. (Source: Yandex/archive)

—Sayyara Mammadova, research associate, Warsaw, Poland

—Valentin Châtelet, research associate, Brussels, Belgium

Amid chaos in the Russian information space the Kremlin attempts to limit information on Prigozhin

According to TASS, Russian social network VKontakte (VK) and search engine Yandex are blocking content related to Prigozhin. Reportedly, instead of Prigozhin’s statement that was published on June 23 at 9:52 pm Moscow time, a VK page for Prigozhin’s Concord company displayed a message that the material was blocked on the territory of Russia on the basis of the decision of the Prosecutor General’s Office. At the time of the writing, Prigozhin’s posts on Concord VK page were available, though none of them correspond to 9:52 pm Moscow time. TASS added that the Yandex search results for Prigozhin notifies a reader that some of the search results are hidden in accordance with federal law. Using a virtual private network (VPN), the DFRLab replicated the search of the content mentioned by TASS and found that they are accessible from other locations. The restrictions seem to be geofenced to Russia.

Separately, TASS reported that there are Telegram-access disruptions detected in various Russian cities, including Moscow, St. Petersburg, Voronezh, and Volgograd Oblasts.

Russia’s internet regulator Roskomnadzor warned that the government can place internet performance restrictions in locations where counter-terrorist operations might take place, such as Moscow, Voronezh, or Rostov. Roskomnadzor also added that the use of Telegram is not limited for now.

Meanwhile, the Telegram channel Faridaily reported that residents of Moscow and the surrounding region are receiving calls from unknown mobile numbers with messages from Wagner. According to the Telegram post, one person received a call on their Viber messenger with a recording of Prigozhin’s appeal about “restoring justice.” Another person received a call on behalf of Wagner with an automated voice encouraging them to join Wagner when their units move toward Moscow.

Meanwhile, footage from Russian state media Rossiya 24 surfaced online showing a confused news anchor. Apparently lacking instructions from the Kremlin on how to report about the armed insurrection in Russia, they said, “Next we are going for short commercial and then… commercial.”

—Eto Buziashvili, research associate, Tbilisi, Georgia

The post Russian War Report Special Edition: Prigozhin and Wagner forces mutiny against Moscow appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Russian War Report: Wagner attempts to draft gamers as drone pilots

Digital Forensic Research Lab — Thu, 22 Jun 2023 18:12:27 +0000

As Russia continues its assault on Ukraine, the Atlantic Council’s Digital Forensic Research Lab (DFRLab) is keeping a close eye on Russia’s movements across the military, cyber, and information domains. With more than seven years of experience monitoring the situation in Ukraine—as well as Russia’s use of propaganda and disinformation to undermine the United States, NATO, and the European Union—the DFRLab’s global team presents the latest installment of the Russian War Report.

Security

Ukrainian counteroffensive sees advances in Zaporizhzhia and eastern Ukraine

Wagner attempts to draft gamers as UAV pilots

Tracking narratives

Deripaska blames hackers after his website briefly takes credit for potential war crime

Rumors of alleged death of popular pro-Kremlin war correspondent gain traction on Twitter

Ukrainian counteroffensive sees advances in Zaporizhzhia and eastern Ukraine

On June 19, Ukrainian forces launched counteroffensive actions in at least three areas and appear to have made gains in Zaporizhzhia and eastern Ukraine. The Telegram channel of Russian military blogger WarGonzo reported that Ukrainian forces continued attacks northwest, northeast, and southwest of Bakhmut and advanced near Krasnopolivka. Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Maliar announced that over the past week Ukrainian troops advanced up to seven kilometers in the direction of Zaporizhzhia and retook 113 square kilometers of territory. Russian Telegram channels also reported that fighting was ongoing south and southwest of Orikhiv on June 19. Zaporizhzhia and Donetsk oblasts continue to be the most active areas of the frontline, as the Ukrainian army attempts to advance in the directions of Novodarivka, Pryutne, Makarivka, Rivnopil, Novodanylivka, and Robotyne.

On June 17, the Russian Ministry of Defense claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted ground attacks west and south of Kreminna. It also stated that the Russian army had repelled Ukrainian attacks on the Avdiivka-Donetsk sector. Meanwhile, Ukrainian forces continued operations around Velyka Novosilka near the border between Donetsk and Zaporizhzhia oblasts.

According to Ukrainian forces, Russian forces conducted offensive actions in Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts. The Ukrainian military reported forty-five combat engagements with Russian forces near Yampolivka, Torske, Hryhorivka, Spirne, Avdiyivka, Krasnohorivka, Marinka, Pobieda, Novomykhailivka, and Donetsk’s Dibrova and Orikhovo-Vasylivka. According to Ukraine, the Russian army continued to shell villages in the direction of Marinka, Zaporizhzhia, Kherson, Lyman, and Kupiansk. Ukraine also alleged that Russian forces launched Kalibr cruise missiles from a submarine in the Black Sea and Shahed drones from the eastern coast of the Sea of Azov.

On June 20, Kyrylo Budanov, chief of the Main Directorate of Intelligence for the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, alleged that Russian troops mined the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant’s cooling pond, which is necessary for the safe operation of the plant. According to Budanov, if Russia triggers an explosion, there is a “high probability that there will be significant problems.” Budanov did not provide any evidence to support the allegation, and the statement cannot be independently verified at this time. If true, however, it would put the nuclear plant at greater risk of a significant accident. The power plant complex, Europe’s largest, has been under occupation since February 2022.

On January 22, the governor of Russian-occupied Crimea accused Ukraine of targeting a bridge that connects the peninsula to Kherson Oblast, near the village of Chonhar. In a Telegram post, Vladimir Sal’do alleged that Ukraine struck the bridge with “British Storm Shadow missiles,” creating a hole in the middle of the bridge.

As fierce hostilities continue in eastern and southern Ukraine, there are signs of a new wave of arrests in Russia, including of people with ties to Ukraine. On June 20, Russian state media outlet RIA Novosti announced that a woman of Ukrainian origin was detained in Saransk and charged with treason.

—Ruslan Trad, resident fellow for security research, Sofia, Bulgaria

Wagner attempts to draft gamers as UAV pilots

A June 19 Telegram post from Russian opposition news outlet Verstka claimed that Wagner Group is encouraging gamers to apply to serve as unmanned aerial vehicle pilots in the war against Ukraine. The media outlet reported that no prior military experience was required to apply for the position. Posts from Wagner emerged on Vkontakte the same day, inviting gamers with experience in “manipulating joysticks in flight simulators” to enroll.

Wagner ad recruiting gamers as UAV pilots. (Source: VK)

Verstka, which contacted a Wagner recruiter as part of its reporting, stated that the campaign aims to recruit soldiers to pilot “copters and more serious machines.” In this particular context, “copters” (коптеры) is a reference to commercial drones that are sold to the public and have been widely used in the war against Ukraine. A May 19 investigation published by the Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project found that Chinese manufacturers have reportedly continued to provide Russian armed forces with DJI drones through third parties in Kazakhstan.

Verstka also noted that in 2022, the Russian defense ministry attempted to recruit gamers with a targeted ad campaign that invited them to play “with real rules, with no cheat codes or saves.”

—Valentin Châtelet, research associate, Brussels, Belgium

Deripaska blames hackers after his website briefly takes credit for potential war crime

The Russian-language website of Russian industrialist and US-sanctioned oligarch Oleg Deripaska briefly displayed an article appearing to take credit for deporting Ukrainian children to Russian-occupied Crimea in partnership with Kremlin official Maria Lvova-Belova, who is already facing an International Criminal Court arrest warrant for allegedly deporting children.

Yaroslav Trofimov, chief foreign affairs correspondent at the Wall Street Journal, noted the article’s appearance and disappearance in a June 15 tweet. Trofimov shared screengrabs of the article, which by that time had already been deleted from Deripaska’s Russian-language website, deripaska.ru. A complete copy of the article can be found at the Internet Archive.

Later in the article, it added, “Separately, the Fund and personally Oleg Vladimirovich [Deripaska] express their gratitude to Maria Lvova-Belova and her project ‘In Hands to Children,’ which not only provided methodological materials, but also found an opportunity to send employees for psychological work with affected babies.” In March 2023, the ICC issued an arrest warrant for Lvova-Belova and Russian President Vladimir Putin, alleging they are responsible for unlawful deportation and transport of children from Russian-occupied parts of Ukraine to the Russian Federation.

In a response to Russian independent news outlet Meduza, which also covered the incident, a team of representatives for Deripaska called the article a “gross fake press-release” and blamed hackers for the article’s appearance. “The team added that Deripaska ‘unequivocally condemns the separation of children from their parents’ and that he is ‘one of the very few prominent Russian industrialists who openly criticizes the fratricidal war and consistently advocates for peace in Ukraine, as well as a reduction in global military spending,’” Meduza noted.

—Eto Buziashvili, research associate, Tbilisi, Georgia

Rumors of alleged death of popular pro-Kremlin war correspondent gain traction on Twitter

Rumors are spreading online that claim Ukrainian forces killed pro-Kremlin war correspondent Semyon Pegov, who operates an influential group of social media accounts under the name Wargonzo. The rumor first spread on Twitter on June 19 following the release of a graphic video from the 73rd Naval Center of Operations documenting how Ukrainian special forces unit had shot Russian soldiers in trenches. On June 19, Pegov’s Twitter account disregarded the allegations as fake. Wargonzo’s Telegram account has continued to operate as usual.

DFRLab analysis conducted with the social media monitoring software Meltwater Explore revealed that the most retweeted tweet came from the pro-Ukraine Twitter account @GloOouD, which stated, “LOOKS LIKE RUSSIAN TERRORISTS AND WAR REPORTER SEMEN PEGOV WAS KILLED BY UKRAINIAN SPECIAL FORCES.” The account shared a screenshot of a low-quality video frame depicting a red-bearded man that bears resemblance to Pegov.

Screenshot of @GloOouD’s tweet suggesting that Semyon Pegov was killed by Ukrainian special forces. (Source: @GloOouD/archive)

The DFRLab confirmed that the video frame depicting Pegov’s look-alike was extracted from the graphic video posted posted by the 73rd Naval Center of Operations. The video’s metadata indicates the clip was created on June 18, 2023, at 22:16:07 GMT+0300. However, the video shows events occurring in daylight.

Pegov’s most recent public appearance was on June 13 during a meeting between Putin and Russian war correspondents. The Kremlin-controlled Channel One Russia broadcast the meeting on June 18.

Comparison of the red-bearded man from the 73rd Naval Center of Operations’ video and Pegov talking at a press conference. (Source: @ukr_sof/archive, top; Perviy Kanal/archive, bottom)

—Nika Aleksejeva, resident fellow, Riga, Latvia

The post Russian War Report: Wagner attempts to draft gamers as drone pilots appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Ukraine’s counteroffensive is a marathon not a blitzkrieg

Peter Dickinson — Thu, 22 Jun 2023 17:44:48 +0000

Less than two weeks since he first confirmed that Ukraine’s long-awaited counteroffensive was finally underway, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy already finds himself forced to hit back at criticism over the pace of military operations. “Some people believe this is a Hollywood movie and expect results now. It’s not,” he told the BBC on June 21. “Whatever some might want, including attempts to pressure us, with all due respect, we will advance on the battlefield the way we deem best.”

Zelenskyy’s comments reflect frustration in Kyiv over reports in the mainstream international media and widespread claims on social media platforms suggesting Ukraine’s counteroffensive is already floundering. Ukrainian presidential advisor Mykhailo Podolyak was one of many Ukrainian commentators to suggest this trend is part of a coordinated Kremlin disinformation operation. In a June 20 post, he accused Moscow of fueling media hysteria about the alleged failure of Ukraine’s counteroffensive in order to secure a ceasefire and “freeze the conflict at any cost.”

Kremlin-tied or Russia-friendly sources are likely to be behind at least some of the recent criticism over the initial pace of Ukraine’s counteroffensive. At the same time, negative assessments are also a consequence of the unrealistically high expectations that built up in the half-year period prior to the start of the campaign.

In the final months of 2022, the Ukrainian military stunned the watching world by liberating large areas of the country from Russian occupation. A lightning September offensive saw most of northeastern Ukraine’s Kharkiv region de-occupied, while a more methodical push in the south eventually resulted in the liberation of Kherson. These successes encouraged many to expect similarly rapid progress during the current campaign. In reality, Ukraine’s summer 2023 counteroffensive represents a far greater challenge in almost every sense.

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Ukraine must overcome a vast Russian invasion force strengthened by 300,000 mobilized troops that is dug in behind successive lines of sophisticated defensive fortifications stretching for over one thousand kilometers. They must do so without air superiority and while outgunned by Russian artillery at many points along the front. Nor can they count on the element of surprise. This incredibly ambitious task would challenge the world’s most powerful militaries. Understandably, Ukrainian commanders are adopting a methodical approach to the campaign.

Progress so far has been very slow but steady. During the first few weeks of the counteroffensive, Ukraine claims to have liberated at least eight settlements. While most represent sparsely populated frontline villages with little strategic value, the sight of the Ukrainian flag raised in liberated communities provides all Ukrainians with a massive morale boost. Meanwhile, the big battles still lie ahead.

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For now, the Ukrainian military is focusing on probing attacks at numerous points along the front in order to identify weaknesses and thin out Russian defenses. Ukraine is also carrying out a comprehensive campaign of airstrikes against Russian military and logistical targets deep inside occupied territory. Britain’s May 2023 decision to provide Ukraine with long-range Storm Shadow cruise missiles is playing an important role in these air attacks, making it possible to hit targets virtually anywhere in occupied Ukraine. For example, Storm Shadow missiles are believed to have been used in the June 22 attack on a strategically important bridge connecting Crimea with Russian-occupied southern Ukraine.

These tactics are reminiscent of the early stages of last year’s ultimately triumphant Ukrainian campaign to liberate Kherson. At the beginning of August 2022, Ukraine very publicly signaled the start of a counteroffensive to free the southern port city and surrounding region. Progress was initially slow, leading to widespread criticism and pessimistic forecasts. However, Ukraine’s strategy of systematically targeting key bridges across the Dnipro River which Russian troops relied upon for resupply eventually paid off. Hemmed in and cut off, Russian commanders ordered a humiliating retreat in early November.

While the Kherson counteroffensive was on a far smaller scale than the current operation, it offers perhaps the best guide to Ukraine’s current objectives and envisioned timeline. The campaign to liberate Kherson involved tens of thousands of troops and took approximately three months to complete. Today’s counteroffensive involves hundreds of thousands of troops on both sides, with an area equal to a medium-sized European country at stake. It may be months before Ukraine’s commanders feel the conditions are right to attempt a major push to achieve a comprehensive breakthrough.

Ukraine’s international partners seem to appreciate the need for patience and are now emphasizing a long-term commitment to Ukraine that goes far beyond the current counteroffensive. At the Ukraine Recovery Conference in London on June 21, British Prime Minister Rishi Sunak reiterated his promise to “stand with Ukraine for as long as it takes.” Other Western leaders have made similar pledges in recent weeks.

These statements are particularly important at a time when Russian hopes of rescuing their faltering invasion increasingly hinge on a weakening of Western resolve and a reduction in support for Ukraine. Despite the many setbacks of the past sixteen months, Putin and other senior regime figures in Moscow are apparently still convinced they can ultimately outlast the democratic world in Ukraine. European and American leaders are attempting to dampen such expectations by signaling the strength of their commitment to Ukrainian victory.

As international anxiety grows over the perceived lack of progress in Ukraine’s big summer counteroffensive, it is vital that this message of Western unity and resolution remains clear and unambiguous. The campaign to defeat Russia’s invasion is a marathon not a blitzkrieg, but it has every chance of success as long as Ukraine and the country’s partners are unwavering in their commitment.

Peter Dickinson is the editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

Ukraine’s counteroffensive will likely create new reintegration challenges

Lesia Dubenko — Sun, 11 Jun 2023 23:58:10 +0000

As Ukraine’s long anticipated counteroffensive gets underway, international attention is firmly fixed on military developments. If the Ukrainian Armed Forces are able to achieve significant advances, the authorities in Kyiv will also be faced with the challenge of reintegrating communities that have lived for more than a year, and in some cases over nine years, under Russian occupation.

The obstacles to successful reintegration should not be underestimated. Since the Russian invasion of Ukraine first began in 2014, Moscow has prioritized control of the information space and has subjected the population in occupied regions of Ukraine to relentless propaganda. Nevertheless, there is good reason to believe that the communities living in occupied Ukraine can be successfully reintegrated following liberation if the right policies are adopted.

Much to the Kremlin’s disbelief, Ukrainian national identity has proven far stronger than anyone in Moscow anticipated in 2014. Similarly, it should now be abundantly clear that the percentage of Ukrainian citizens who speak Russian in their daily lives or embrace aspects of Russian popular culture is in no way indicative of political loyalty to the Kremlin.

Even in regions of Ukraine where the Russian language remained dominant in everyday life following the Soviet collapse, and where cultural connections to post-Soviet Russia appeared strongest, there has also been significant exposure to Ukrainian culture, language, and national identity since the 1990s. For many years, everything from TV advertising to movies have been broadcast in Ukrainian, while education has predominantly been in Ukrainian as the official state language. An entire generation of Russian-speaking Ukrainians grew up and reached adulthood with an awareness of their Ukrainian identity prior to the initial Russian invasion of 2014.

Policymakers in the Kremlin appear to have bet that historic ties to Russia would trump any emerging sense of Ukrainian identity. This confidence was no doubt reinforced by Russia’s prominence in Ukrainian popular culture, with Russian pop singers, film stars, comedians, and literary figures all enjoying widespread popularity. However, the rapid decline since 2014 of Russian cultural influence in parts of Ukraine not subject to direct Kremlin control has illustrated the fragility of Russia’s informal empire.

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Since the full-scale invasion began in February 2022, Ukraine has consistently stated that it will settle for nothing less than the liberation of the entire country within the international borders recognized in 1991. This is a massive military undertaking that will involve defeating a Russian invasion force numbering in excess of 300,000 soldiers. Beyond that, Ukraine must also reintegrate perhaps five million people who have spent an extended period living under Russian occupation.

While millions of Ukrainians fled Russia’s initial invasion in 2014 and the subsequent full-scale invasion of 2022, many more remained behind. They have been fed a diet of Kremlin propaganda portraying Ukraine as both a Nazi state and a puppet of the West. Russia has focused particular attention on indoctrinating young Ukrainians to convince them that their future lies with Moscow.

Despite these challenges, there is reason to believe that Russia’s efforts will ultimately fail. Ukrainians as a whole have been subjected to many decades of russification but have demonstrated in recent years that they are not convinced by the Kremlin’s anti-Ukrainian messaging. Indeed, the past nine years of Russian aggression have sparked a sharp rise in Ukrainian patriotism across the country, particularly in regions previously regarded as being highly russified. The shared sense of Ukrainian identity forged since 1991 has proven far stronger than the Kremlin had anticipated, while Russian aggression has had a powerful unifying impact on Ukrainian society.

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Ukraine’s advance in Kursk: What’s next and implications

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Crucially, none of the Russian-occupied regions of Ukraine has been fully cut off from the rest of Ukraine since 2014. Until the launch of the full-scale invasion in February 2022, regular interaction across the front lines in Crimea and eastern Ukraine was the norm. Even the intensification of hostilities over the past 16 months has not led to a complete breakdown in communication.

Victims of Russian aggression will have a key role to play in the reintegration process. In every region liberated from Russian occupation, Ukrainian officials have uncovered evidence of widespread war crimes including summary executions, torture, sexual violence, abductions, and mass deportations. It is vital that survivors share their experiences with their wider communities to underline the horrors of the Russian occupation. Local residents will be seen as far more credible than government officials.

It will also be important to communicate in Russian as well as Ukrainian. While growing numbers of Ukrainians are embracing the Ukrainian language, many communities in southern and eastern Ukraine remain predominantly Russian-speaking and have been cut off from the Ukrainian language by Russia’s invasion. They will likely be far more receptive to Russian-language messaging, especially during the initial period following de-occupation, regardless of their personal attitudes toward issues of national identity.

It goes without saying that Ukraine’s top priority is to win the war. At the same time, military victories will prove hollow if the Kyiv authorities are unable to successfully reintegrate millions of Ukrainian citizens who have spent extended periods living under Russian occupation. In order to win hearts and minds, it is vital to underline to liberated communities that they are coming home to a nation that values and embraces them.

Lesia Dubenko is a Ukrainian analyst and journalist. Her articles have appeared in the Financial Times, Politico Europe, New Eastern Europe, and the Atlantic Council.

Fighting between Russian volunteers and Russian army escalates in Belgorod Oblast

Interference on satellite imagery points to enhanced military activity on the border between Belgorod and Kharkiv prior to saboteur raid

Tracking narratives

Pro-Kremlin sources contradict each other in laying blame for Nova Kakhovka dam destruction

Deepfake impersonating Putin ‘declares’ martial law in Russian regions bordering Ukraine

Russia recycles false narrative that Ukraine plans to use a ‘dirty bomb’

Nova Kakhovka dam rupture floods acres of civilian settlements in Kherson Oblast

On June 6, satellite imagery published by Maxar confirmed the collapse of the Nova Kakhovka dam in Ukraine. The dam is located downstream of the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant, and upstream of the city of Kherson, in southeast Ukraine. Ukraine and Russia continue to blame each other for its destruction.

For months, Russian and Ukrainian armed forces have been facing each other on either side of the riverbank, as Ukraine retook the city of Kherson after Russia claimed to have evacuated the city as “a gesture of good will.” The contents of the Kakhovka reservoir have been flowing downstream into the Kherson region ever since the dam’s rupture, resulting in the flooding of acres of civilian settlements stretching from near the dam down to the mouth of the river along the Black Sea.

The DFRLab collected data from MapZen using Sentinel’s EOBrowser platform. The imagery notably contains a digital elevation model enabling the DFRLab to model high risk areas subject to floods. Using geographic analysis relying on raster calculations, a technique for mapping individual pixels to altitude data, the DFRLab assessed two scenarios of potential flooding downstream of Nova Kakhovka. This information was cross-referenced with other data posted by Russian opposition Telegram channel Agentstvo to assess the extent of the flood.

An animated map showing potential locations subjected to flooding hazards as a result of the rupture of the Nova Kakhovka dam. (Source: MapZen via ESA/Sentinel EOBrowser, annotations: DFRLab)

Agentstvo geolocated footage taken by civilians on either side of the river. The DFRLab added these locations to the above map in an attempt to compare the modeled area to the actual reported locations of flooding. As of June 6, the mapped locations are consistent with areas that would flood if the river rose by just two meters. Footage shows parts of Kherson also subjected to inundation.

Additionally, security concerns are growing as mines located on both sides of the riverbank are at risk of exploding as a result of the rising water level. The Ukrainian Independent Information Agency reported that some Russian mines had already detonated. Villagers and inhabitants on alluvial islands and in Kherson were forced to leave their homes. Furthermore, Russia and Ukraine are blaming one another for the destruction of the dam. While Ukrainian officials accused Russia of bombing the Kakhovka dam to undermine Ukraine’s counteroffensive efforts, Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu said Ukraine committed a “terrorist attack” to “prevent a Russian attack.”

—Valentin Châtelet, research associate, security, Brussels, Belgium

Fighting between Russian volunteers and Russian army escalates in Belgorod Oblast

The fighting continues in Russia’s Belgorod Oblast, a short distance from Ukraine’s northeastern border, but details about the situation remain murky. The Russian Volunteer Corps, an anti-Putin military unit made of Russian pro-Ukrainian partisans, and the Freedom of Russia Legion said they carried out a number of attacks in the region, while Moscow claims to have repelled several attacks.

The Freedom of Russia Legion announced it had destroyed two Russian army tanks, one BMP infantry fighting vehicle, and one BRDM armored vehicle near the Shebekino border crossing in Belgorod on the night of June 4. The veracity of the claim has not been independently verified, however. On June 4, another unconfirmed report appeared on the Telegram channel of Ukrainian journalist Andrii Tsaplienko, citing an unnamed military officer, claiming the Russian army shelled a settlement in the Belgorod region. There have been signs of fighters from the Russian Volunteer Corps being active in Belgorod, so shelling the region could signal an escalation. In addition, the Russian Telegram channel Brief reported that the Ukrainian army shelled Novaya Tavolzhanka in Belgorod Oblast on June 5; this too has not been confirmed. Another Russian Telegram channel reported explosions in Grayvoron, Belgorod Oblast that same day.

One day earlier, the Russian Volunteer Corps said on Telegram that a Polish volunteer unit has been fighting “shoulder-to-shoulder for the freedom and independence of Ukraine for several months.” According to the statement, Russian and Polish fighters jointly carried out “a number of operations” in the areas of Orikhiv, Zaporizhzhia, and Bakhmut. The Polish unit, known as the Polish Volunteer Corps (Polski Korpus Ochotniczy), has published videos of its operations in Bakhmut and Zaporizhzhia on their Telegram channel, which was created in February 2023. According to the Russian Volunteer Corps, the Polish fighters are providing military and medical logistics only within the state borders of Ukraine. The information published by the two military units on Telegram have not been verified independently.

The Polish government has denied it has any involvement with Polish volunteer units. Stanisław Żaryn, the secretary of state for the chancellery of the prime minister of Poland, said on Twitter that the Polish Volunteer Corps are “in no way associated with the Polish Armed Forces or any Polish institution.” According to Polish media outlet Defence 24, the Polish Volunteer Corps was created in February 2023 and operates as part of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. The Polish Volunteer Corps reportedly posted on its Telegram channel that they participated in the combat mission in Belgorod alongside the Russian Volunteer Corps. The Telegram post reportedly argued that “all returned from the mission safely. The task was completed successfully.” However, it appears that the post was later removed, as there are currently no posts in the Telegram channel containing information about the participation of Polish units in the Belgorod raid.

Russian Volunteer Corps fighters also claimed to be holding captive Russian soldiers who were handed over to Ukrainian forces because authorities in Belgorod had shown no desire to retrieve them. At the 1:26 mark in a video posted on June 4 to the Telegram channel of the Russian Volunteer Corps, a dozen men in Russian uniforms are seen. It is possible the men were captured during fighting between the militants and the Russian army in the village of Novaya Tavolzhanka in Belgorod Oblast, though this is unconfirmed. According to The New Voice of Ukraine, the volunteer fighters reached out to Belgorod Governor Vyacheslav Gladkov with an offer to return the captured soldiers as a goodwill gesture. In return, they asked for a private audience with the governor to discuss the present state of the region. The governor has reportedly not responded to the request. Previously, Gladkov described the fighters as “those fascists,” and said they were responsible for “daily civilian deaths.” The Freedom of Russia Legion also claimed to be holding Russian soldiers captive in a video published on their Telegram channel on June 5.

Meanwhile, the Armed Forces of Ukraine stated that Russian forces on June 4 and 5 conducted offensive actions in the Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts, with the Ukrainian military fighting the Russian army near Novoselivske and Bilohorivka in Luhansk and Ivanivske and Marinka in Donetsk. Ukrainian forces also alleged that a Russian saboteur group attempted to infiltrate the border near Zelene in Kharkiv Oblast. Ukraine added that settlements in Kharkiv, Chernihiv, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson were shelled by Russia, including a building belonging to Kherson State University.

Meanwhile, Sky News obtained a purported arms contract detailing a purchase agreement between Russia and Iran. According to the contract, Iran supplies Russia with tank and artillery ammunition, as well as barrels for T-72 tanks and howitzers. The sixteen-page document, which has not been independently verified, is dated September 14, 2022, and presents samples of variously sized artillery and tank shells and rockets worth just more than one million dollars.

—Ruslan Trad, resident fellow for security research, Sofia, Bulgaria

—Givi Gigitashivili, research associate, Warsaw, Poland

Interference on satellite imagery points to enhanced military activity on the border between Belgorod and Kharkiv prior to saboteur raid

A map showing interference patterns caught on SAR Imagery by Sentinel-1 on May 18, 2023 (Source: ESA/Sentinel-1, annotations: DFRLab)

Satellite Aperture Radar (SAR) imagery from May 18 released by the European Space Agency’s Sentinel-1 satellite shows massive levels of interference in Russia’s Belgorod Oblast. The DFRLab previously reported on similar interference patterns observed in the Black Sea and in Belgorod throughout April 2023. The May 18 imagery indicates that more prominent interference activity took place in Belgorod Oblast, with patterns stretching several hundred kilometers. The imagery was obtained just after midnight local time that morning as the satellite was flying over the border with Kharkiv.

Simultaneously, consistent reports of aerial activity in Belgorod, including missile launches, emerged on Telegram. These patterns were observed nearly one week prior to the Russian Volunteer Corps’ raids in Russia’s border outposts of Shebekino and Grayvoron.

Several smaller interference patterns also stretch east of Kharkiv in Ukraine. These could also be consistent with reports from the Telegram channel Kharkiv Live which indicated Russian aviation raids and artillery rocket launches between 11:58 pm and 12:31 am local time. Local authorities issued an air raid alert between 12:31 and 1:01 am.

—Valentin Châtelet, research associate, Brussels, Belgium

Pro-Kremlin sources contradict each other in laying blame for Nova Kakhovka dam destruction

Pro-Russian Telegram channels, sometimes referred to as “Z channels,” began reporting on the Nova Kakhovka dam around 3:00 am Moscow time, stating that the shelling of the Kakhovka hydroelectric power plant occurred at 2:35 am. Initially, Vladimir Leontev, the Russian-installed mayor of occupied Novaya Kahovka, denied any explosion, shelling, or damage to the dam. In an interview with Kremlin-owned RIA Novosti, Leontev said, “That’s bullshit! Everything is fine, everything is fine everywhere; I just got on the [police] radio. Everywhere everything is normal in the city; everything is quiet and calm.” Further, Kremlin-owned TASS quoted an unnamed source from the Russian authorities as saying, “It was quiet at night. There was no shelling. The dam could not stand, one support collapsed, and flooding began.”

Later, the narrative changed. In a video, Leontev said, “At about 2:00 am there was shelling on Kahovka dam and its valves were destroyed.” RIA Novosti blamed the Armed Forces of Ukraine for the damage that caused the “unregulated discharge of water.” The pro-Kremlin Telegram channel Swodki commented, “Russian positions are located on the lower Dnipro riverbank. The flow of water can erode the line of [Russian] defense on the coast and prevent and repel a potential boat landing of an aircraft of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.” In addition, former Russian commander Igor “Strelkov” Girkin, who played a crucial role in forming the separatist movement in the Donbas, suggested that the dam’s destruction helped Ukrainian forces advance militarily.

The exact cause of its destruction remains unknown. The New York Times reported that some experts believe it was “probably breached” by an “internal blast,” but acknowledged this assessment should be treated “cautiously.” Pro-Ukraine social media pointed fingers at Russia causing the breach, but at times the debate was muddled due to sharing of old footage capturing the explosion of a bridge adjacent to the facility in November 2022.

Meanwhile, some social media posts from pro-Kremlin fighters suggested the dam’s destruction benefits Russia. For example, Russian solider Yegor Guzenko suggested on his Telegram channel Separ13_13 that the destruction of the dam was in Russia’s favor. In one video, he said, “Whoever did it, it is good if no Russian Army soldier suffers. Then it does not matter who did it even if it were [Ukrainians] themselves.” Later, he posted about why the destruction might have been in Ukraine’s favor.

—Nika Aleksejeva, resident fellow, Riga, Latvia

Deepfake impersonating Putin ‘declares’ martial law in Russian regions bordering Ukraine

On June 5, Russian television and radio stations broadcast a clip featuring a deepfake of President Vladimir Putin. In the fabricated “emergency address,” the impersonated Russian president reportedly declared, “Ukrainian troops, armed by the NATO bloc with the consent and support of Washington, invaded the territories of the Kursk, Belgorod, and Bryansk regions.” The Putin deepfake then “announced” martial law in these regions and said that he plans to sign an executive order declaring a general mobilization throughout the country.

The incident was reported in the Russian oblasts of Voronezh, Bryansk, and Belgorod. These regions sit along the border with Ukraine, where frequent drone attacks are reported and armed group incursions forced some to evacuate in May. Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov declared that Putin did not address the nation and confirmed that “a hack occurred in several regions.” According to Peskov and information posted on the Telegram channel Ukraine Informer, radio stations also broadcast the same message.

Russian State Duma members of parliament have set out to draft a law enforcing the labeling of content created by neural networks.

—Valentin Châtelet, research associate, Brussels, Belgium

Russia recycles false narrative that Ukraine plans to use a ‘dirty bomb’

On June 6, the same day the Novo Kakhovka dam was destroyed, Russia shared a new iteration of its narrative that accuses Ukraine of planning to use a “dirty bomb” against Russia.

Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB) published a statement in which the agency claimed to have “received additional information on the involvement of the Ukrainian special services in the planning and preparation of acts of international terrorism.” The FSB claimed that Ukraine created an air unit to supply “sabotage and reconnaissance groups on Russian territory” with “dirty bombs.” The statement alleged that Ukraine planned to place dirty bombs in various places, detonate them simultaneously, and “make areas [in Russia] unsuitable for human habitation.”

The DFRLab has previously covered Russian attempts to spread similar disinformation in order to prime audiences for the February 2022 invasion of Ukraine and justify the war. Since then, the DFRLab have observed multiple instances of Russian officials accusing Kyiv of plotting to use a “dirty bomb.”

— Eto Buziashvili, research associate, Tbilisi, Georgia

The post Russian War Report: Satellite imagery analysis captures flood threat after dam’s destruction appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Russian War Report: Belgorod incursion brings deluge of online mockery of Russia’s defenses

Digital Forensic Research Lab — Thu, 25 May 2023 19:09:42 +0000

As Russia continues its assault on Ukraine, the Atlantic Council’s Digital Forensic Research Lab (DFRLab) is keeping a close eye on Russia’s movements across the military, cyber, and information domains. With more than seven years of experience monitoring the situation in Ukraine—as well as Russia’s use of propaganda and disinformation to undermine the United States, NATO, and the European Union—the DFRLab’s global team presents the latest installment of the Russian War Report.

Tracking narratives

Belgorod raid sparks trolling activity on social media

Russian pro-war military bloggers criticize the handling of Belgorod incursion

Russian media spins Australian solidarity rally for Julian Assange as an anti-NATO event

International response

US sanctions Armenian company for helping Russia evade sanctions

Belgorod raid sparks trolling activity on social media

Drone imagery from a burning border control outpost in the Russian region of Belgorod sparked a frenzy on social media this week. According to Riga-based Russian news outlet Meduza, members of the Russian Volunteer Corps and other Russian nationals crossed from Ukraine into Belgorod Oblast and attacked a border outpost in Grayvoron. The Russian Volunteer Corps, an anti-Putin military unit made of Russian pro-Ukrainian partisans, claimed responsibility for the attack; the Free Russia Legion also claimed responsibility.

An assessment by Russian news outlet RBC regarding the broader situation in Belgorod indicated an armed incursion, with shelling and artillery fire reported. On the evening of May 22, Russian government declared a state of counterterrorist emergency in Belgorod Oblast. Although the governor of the oblast did not officially issue an order to evacuate the civilian population immediately, footage and photographs posted on social media indicated that at least some residents evacuated to other areas in the region. Meduza also reported several drone strikes on the city of Belgorod itself.

Conflicting reports emerged on May 23 after Russian officials lifted the counterterrorist alert. While the Russian Ministry of Defense claimed to have “liquidated” around seventy “saboteurs,” reporting from the news outlet Mash indicated the deployment of additional Russian law enforcement in nearby Bryansk Oblast. In an effort to support their assertions of having eliminated the insurgency, Russian news outlets also released photos of military-class vehicles allegedly used by the insurgents stuck in the mud; some open-source analysts, however, questioned the authenticity of the photos. Russian media chased these reports with claims of destroyed Ukrainian tanks, while the Russian Volunteer Corps posted footage to Telegram seemingly showing intact military equipment.

Shortly after the news broke out, footage of a drone attack on the local Russian border outpost, APP Grayvoron, appeared on the outpost’s Google Maps profile, though it was later deleted. At the time of writing, it had been replaced with footage showing a convoy of vehicles, one flying the flag of the Russian Volunteer Corps.

The Google Maps profile for a Russian border outpost in Belgorod featured a video of a mechanized convoy flying the flag of the Russian Volunteer Corps. (Source: Google Maps/archive)

Simultaneously, trolling reviews appeared on the border outpost’s Google Maps profile, calling the border guards “friendly” and the facilities “understaffed.” These too have been deleted, though not before they were documented by the Saint Javelin Twitter account and other Twitter users.

Trolls post mocking reviews of Russia’s Belgorod border post. (Source: @SaintJavelin/archive)

Other trolls took to Twitter, where members of the NAFO meme movement, a pro-NATO and pro-Ukrainian community on the platform, renamed their account to “Government of The Bilhorod’s Peoples Republic” as a joking reference to the self-proclaimed Donetsk and Luhansk Peoples Republics. “Bilhorod” is the Ukrainian name for Belgorod.

NAFO meme account @nitro19820 changes its Twitter name and bio to joke that it now represented a new “People’s Republic” in Belgorod. (Source: @nitro19820/archive)

—Valentin Châtelet, research associate, Security, Brussels, Belgium

Russian pro-war military bloggers criticize the handling of Belgorod incursion

Following the apparent border incursion into Belgorod Oblast and subsequent attacks on the region, pro-war military bloggers condemned Moscow’s handling of the war in Ukraine, including its border defenses.

Telegram channel Vоенкор Котенок Z (“Milblogger Kitten Z”) criticized the Kremlin for being late in declaring a counterterrorism operation in Belgorod and not knowing how to fight “for real.” “There is a war, and in Russia … they are afraid to call the war a war,” stated the Telegram post.

The channel ДШРГ Русич (“DShRG Rusich”) questioned “commanders of all levels” on how the incursion happened. It also blamed Russia’s intelligence services for failing to reveal “plans of an enemy.” The channel added that as long as there is no photographic evidence of corpses or burned equipment, “the enemy has no losses, and the [Russian] propagandists crapped themselves a little, saying that everything is fine.”

The Kotsnews Telegram channel addressed pro-Kremlin pundits who dismissed military blogger concerns as “hysteria” by insisting that the threat to Russian territory is real and that there are uncomfortable questions around Russia’s defensive capabilities that nobody wants to ask. “What is happening with our technical equipment at the border, surveillance systems, tracking, motion detection?” the channel asked. “What about the mining of potentially dangerous areas? What about anti-tank weapons? Why did the enemy armored group calmly penetrate deep into our territory?”

As Russia’s war against Ukraine has dragged on, the frequency and intensity of pro-war military bloggers’ criticism have increased and become bolder. The DFRLab has previously covered how Russian military bloggers criticized Russian President Vladimir Putin and the Ministry of Defense.

—Eto Buziashvili, research associate, Tbilisi, Georgia

Russian media spins Australian solidarity rally for Julian Assange as an anti-NATO event

On May 20, a series of so-called “World Wide Freedom Rallies” took place in many cities around the world. The Telegram account for Simeon Boikov, a pro-Kremlin activist and blogger in Australia, claimed to have organized the Sydney edition of the rally, part of a decentralized movement that originated in 2021 to express dissatisfaction with COVID security measures. Boikov promoted a poster for the event on April 6, a day before the event announcement on the movement’s official Telegram channel.

The rally ostensibly focused on demanding the release of WikiLeaks founder Julian Assange, who is currently being held in London facing potential extradition to the United States. After the event, however, Boikov highlighted a speech by Assange’s father, John Shipton, in a video showing scenes from the rally and emphasized that Shipton was wearing a “double headed eagle and St George’s ribbons,” both of which are Russian symbols. Additional videos and images from the rally showed many people carrying Russian flags and wearing pro-Kremlin symbols.

Kremlin-controlled media outlets emphasized in their headlines not just the pro-Russia nature of the event, but also claims of anti-NATO sentiment, which appear to have been exaggerated. Reviewing footage from the event, the DFRLab identified only one instance of someone sporting anti-NATO messaging. Nonetheless, Russian media embraced the event as specifically anti-NATO, including state outlets Gazeta.ru, TASS, RIA Novosti, and Komsomolyskaya Pravda, and pro-Kremlin media such as News Front, Inforeactor, Ekonomika Segodnya. Additionally, The Eastern Herald, an Indian media outlet, and Belarus state-controlled television both framed the event as anti-NATO in their English-language publications.

—Nika Aleksejeva, resident fellow, Riga, Latvia

US sanctions Armenian company for helping Russia evade sanctions

On May 22, the US Department of Commerce announced that it had amended its list of sanctioned entities and individuals by adding seventy-one entities that the US government had determined to be acting “contrary to [US] national security or foreign policy interests.” Alongside Russian companies, one Kyrgyz company, Tro.Ya LLC, and one Armenian company, Medisar LLC, were included in the amended list. According to the Department of Commerce, both companies engaged in conduct that “prevented the successful accomplishment of an end-use check.” In other words, the Department of Commerce suspected that the final destination for the products was Russia but the companies themselves had obfuscated this information.

Medisar LLC, which was registered in Armenia in 2001, is an importer of chemicals and laboratory equipment. The company is one of the thousand largest taxpayers in Armenia, paying about one million dollars in taxes in 2022. It also has a longstanding trade history with Russian companies. On its website, Medisar indicates that one of its trading partners, dating back to 2011, is Russian company Minimed.

Screenshot from the Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project’s (OCCRP) Aleph database, made available through Friends of OCCRP access, about Medisar’s trade. The third and fourth companies on the list are both OOO Minimed, a Russian company with a long-term trading relationship with Medisar. (Source: DFRLab via OCCRP)

On May 20, Armenian investigative website Hetq reported that data obtained from the country’s customs service showed that in 2022, Medisar exported equipment from Armenia to Russia, including electronic integrated circuits, diodes, transistors, and similar semiconductor devices.

A company executive who did not want to be identified acknowledged to RFE/RL that Medisar imported chemicals and laboratory equipment from the United States and the European Union and re-exported them to Russia.

Medisar is the second-largest company registered in Armenia to be sanctioned by the United States. The US Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned the other firm, TAKO, in April. The company is in the wholesale of electronic and telecommunications equipment and parts. TAKO, spelled TACO in Armenia’s legal entities register, was registered in May 2022 in Armenia and is fully owned by a Russian citizen, according to public registry records.

On April 18, the New York Times reported that in 2022, Armenia imported 515 percent more chips and processors from the United States and 212 percent more from the European Union than in 2021, and that Armenia exported 97 percent of those same products to Russia.

During a May 22 press conference, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan said that despite Armenia’s “strategic” relationship with Russia and membership in the Russian-led Eurasian Economic Union, the country “cannot afford to come under Western sanctions.” Pashinyan underscored that if Armenia faced sanctions, “it wouldn’t be good for any of our allies, while we would ruin our relations with our Western partners.”

A joint “compliance note” issued on March 2 by the US Departments of the Treasury, Justice, and Commerce, titled “Cracking Down on Third-Party Intermediaries Used to Evade Russia-Related Sanctions and Export Controls,” mentioned Armenia, along with China, Turkey, and Uzbekistan, as “transshipment points commonly used to illegally redirect restricted items to Russia or Belarus.”

According to the Statistical Committee of the Republic of Armenia, Russian-Armenian trade soared in 2022, including exports to Russia, which nearly tripled to $2.4 billion.

—Ani Mejlumyan, research assistant, Yerevan, Armenia

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New Bernard Henri-Lévy documentary challenges Ukraine fatigue

Melinda Haring, Jacob Heilbrunn — Thu, 18 May 2023 16:06:51 +0000

For anyone seeking to make sense of Russia’s war in Ukraine, viewing French public intellectual Bernard Henri-Lévy’s new feature-length documentary “Slava Ukraini” (“Glory to Ukraine”) isn’t an option. It’s a must. A gritty, intense, and probing examination of the impact of the war, it offers what is surely the ultimate antidote to Ukraine fatigue.

As he pondered the course of the war, Henri-Lévy came to the conclusion that the best way to combat the West’s mounting impatience with the 15-month war and counter the push for preliminary negotiations was to show rather than tell. Instead of writing an essay, the 74-year-old French filmmaker and philosopher took to the road to illuminate the bravery of ordinary Ukrainians against what he calls the “master terrorist” in the Kremlin.

The film, which carefully traces Henri-Lévy’s journey across Ukraine, is about far more than jerky shots of the Frenchman and his crew dodging bullets and drone attacks. It is about Ukraine’s defiance of Putin’s attempt not simply to wage a war of territorial conquest, but to efface the idea of Ukrainian nationhood itself. “If I dare to give a certain logic to this crazy war, it is in the logic of the denial of Ukrainian identity,” he says. “This barbarity matches the logic of denying the very existence of Ukraine.”

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As he journeys from Ukraine’s capital to the east, Henri-Lévy captures the dignity of the Ukrainian people through short vignettes that remain with you long after the credits roll. The Frenchman focuses on ordinary Ukrainians like the elderly woman who appears in the documentary engaged in the quotidian task of stirring a steaming pot of borscht and pleads for an end to the constant violence that has upended her life. She hopes to make it to her seventieth birthday, she says.

In Kyiv, after another Russian air strike hits a woman’s apartment, she apologizes profusely to Henri-Lévy for wearing a dirty black coat. Her kitchen is unusable after the bombing and her crockery is battered, but she’s more focused on the state of her appearance. She takes the French filmmaker to her makeshift bed, a chair inside a bathroom tub where she waited out the aerial assault, and smiles with pride at her ability to snatch a few hours of sleep.

Another scene captures everyday life for those who couldn’t leave cities and towns that Russia has pounded relentlessly in the east. A man who appears to be approaching pension age tries to chop wood with an axe, complaining that it’s warmer outside than inside.

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In Pavlograd, the French filmmaker dons a hard helmet and overalls to cover his black designer suit and spotless white shirt as he descends below ground to watch Ukrainian miners drill iron ore. The precious ore is eventually made into bullet-proof vests for soldiers at the front. After the steel miners are done for the day, they carry on packing care boxes of food and medicine for displaced families.

Henri-Lévy observes that every steelworker is a hero, just like the brave men and women on the front lines. In one of his characteristic meditative asides, he observes that the Greeks and Romans admired heroes in part because they were so rare. “In Ukraine, heroes are everywhere,” he says. The Frenchman confesses that he keeps coming back to Ukraine because it is rare in history to see so many people embody heroism in one place.

The documentary also features moments of exhilaration. Henri-Lévy captures joyous scenes from recently liberated Kherson, where hundreds mill in the main square, some searching for power to recharge their phones and tell their loved ones they are still alive. Perhaps the hardest and most powerful scene comes when Henri-Lévy visits a torture cell that still has fresh blood on the floor. The Russians never actually appear on film, but their depraved conduct casts a dark shadow over the documentary.

This film is anything but neutral and Henri-Lévy makes no attempt to disguise his sympathies. “I am partisan. I don’t give five minutes to the Jews and five minutes to the Nazis,” he says.

The Frenchman has consistently refused to engage in bogus moral hand-wringing when it comes to the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Instead, he is clear about which side he’s on, as viewers of “Slava Ukraini” will no doubt recognize. “I want the Ukrainians to win,” he commented on May 11 at a screening of the documentary at the E Street Cinema in Washington, DC.

Melinda Haring is director of stakeholder relations and social impact at the Superhumans Center. Jacob Heilbrunn is Editor of the National Interest. Haring and Heilbrunn are both non-resident senior fellows at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center. “Slava Ukraini” was shown at a series of screenings in May organized with the Ukrainian American charity Razom. It can be viewed on Apple TV and YouTube.

In his many video addresses, Prigozhin has sought to burnish his own credentials as a straight-talking military man while attacking members of the Russian military establishment. Speaking in the wake of recent Russian retreats from the flanks around Bakhmut, he declared: “Soldiers should not die because of the absolute stupidity of their leadership.”

He also raised eyebrows last week by referring mockingly to a “happy grandpa,” which many assumed was a reference to Putin himself. This was clearly too much even for Prigozhin, who quickly released a new statement clarifying that the “grandpa” in question may have been a number of military leaders including chief of the Russian general staff Valery Gerasimov, but was most certainly not Putin.

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Prigozhin’s public attacks on Russia’s military leadership reflect his rising profile and growing swagger. The Wagner mercenary group he leads first came into being nine years ago during the initial stages of Russia’s military invasion of eastern Ukraine, at a time when the Kremlin was eager to maintain a degree of plausible deniability. Subsequent roles in Syria and Africa allowed Wagner to expand significantly, but it was the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 that transformed the fortunes of the mercenary force and thrust it into the international limelight.

Over the past fifteen months of the Ukraine invasion, Wagner has emerged as the only group within the Russian military to meet or surpass expectations. While units of the regular army have been decimated and forced into a series of humiliating retreats, Wagner has achieved numerous grinding advances in eastern Ukraine. This has given Prigozhin the confidence and the clout to name and shame his superiors for their alleged shortcomings. Such attacks have only added to his popularity among Russian audiences.

Prigozhin’s criticisms are in a sense hypocritical, given the notoriously high casualty rates among his own soldiers. Indeed, the brutal tactics adopted by Wagner forces in the Battle of Bakhmut have led many to describe the battle as a “meat grinder.” According to US officials, around half of the estimated 20,000 Russian soldiers killed in Ukraine since December 2022 have been Wagner troops fighting in and around Bakhmut.

Ukrainian sources have also questioned the credibility of Prigozhin’s efforts to praise the valor of his Wagner forces while accusing regular Russian troops of abandoning their positions. “The first soldiers to flee were Wagner,” a Ukrainian commander who took part in early May engagements near Bakhmut told CNN. This and other similar accounts may indicate that Prigozhin is lashing out at the army high command from a position of weakness as Wagner’s earlier exploits risk being overshadowed by more recent setbacks.

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Why has Putin not intervened to end the increasingly bitter public feud between Prigozhin and Russia’s military leadership? Some see it as a sign of the Russian dictator’s own growing weakness, while others argue that it may be a deliberate ploy to position the likes of Defense Minister Shoigu and army chief Gerasimov as scapegoats for a coming defeat. At the very least, Prigozhin’s attacks on military commanders serve to deflect the blame for the failing invasion away from Putin himself.

While Prigozhin’s headline-grabbing rants may help to protect Putin from criticism on the domestic front, they also risk further undermining morale among Russian forces in Ukraine. The issue of demoralization is already posing major challenges for Russian commanders, with more cases of desertion recorded in Russian military courts in the first four months of the current year than during the whole of 2022. Recent months have also seen a sharp rise in video addresses posted to social media by Russian soldiers complaining of suicidal “human wave” tactics and catastrophic battlefield losses.

With Ukraine expected to launch a major counteroffensive in the coming weeks, Russian military morale will likely soon face its stiffest test since the invasion began in February 2022. Major question marks remain over the ability of Russian troops to stand their ground, particularly given the Kremlin’s growing reliance on poorly trained conscripts drafted into the military late last year as part of Russia’s first mobilization since World War II.

These mobilized troops proved highly ineffective during Russia’s failed winter offensive, suffering high casualties while making almost no progress. They must now prepare for defensive operations against a Ukrainian force that has been training for the coming offensive for the past six months. Russia has also been digging in and preparing sophisticated defenses, but morale will be a huge factor during what many observers predict will be some of the most intense battles of the entire war. Prigozhin’s frequent public criticism of Russian troops and commanders is unlikely to boost fighting spirit at this critical moment for Putin’s invasion.

Olivia Yanchik is a program assistant at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

This absence of anti-war activity is perhaps unsurprising. The Kremlin has adopted a series of draconian laws in the wake of the invasion that criminalize any criticism while outlawing use of the word “war” in favor of the euphemistic “Special Military Operation.” As a result of these legislative changes, numerous high-profile opposition figures have been given long prison sentences for their anti-war stances. At the same time, it is important to note that although more than one million Russians have fled the country in response to the invasion of Ukraine, very few have taken advantage of their newfound freedoms to stage anti-war rallies outside Russia.

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Public support for the invasion can be seen in the many examples of ordinary Russians mobilizing to back the war effort. Across the country, large numbers of fundraising initiatives have emerged to help supply Russian soldiers with everything from drones and radios to food and warm clothing. These grassroots efforts are entirely voluntary and point to high levels of public sympathy for the Russian soldiers currently serving in Ukraine.

A further indication of pro-war sentiment within Russia is the revival of Stalin-era denunciations targeting anyone seen as critical of the war. There have been numerous high-profile instances of colleagues, teachers, and even family members reporting people to the authorities for voicing anti-war opinions. During the first half of 2022 alone, Russian media and information space regulator Roskomnadzor reportedly received 144,835 individual denunciations.

Social media remains comparatively free in today’s Russia and provides important insights into the public mood. Young supporters of the war have largely congregated on TikTok, where they often form pro-war groups and post messages celebrating the Russian army.

Telegram has emerged as a key platform for Russian audiences seeking to follow the invasion. There are a substantial number of military-themed accounts offering some of the most credible coverage of the war, often including remarkably frank criticism of the Russian establishment. These pro-war accounts have gained considerably in status since February 2022 and have attracted millions of followers.

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Research conducted by Ukraine’s Open Minds Institute has identified widespread pro-war sentiment on Russian social media. While it is important to acknowledge that the Kremlin is believed to invest heavily in bot farms and troll armies, the vast majority of the accounts studied by the Open Minds think tank appear to represent real people with their own wide-ranging interests and long histories of posting on different topics.

Support for the war on Russian social media tends to be expressed in abstract terms relating to national pride rather than any concrete benefits deriving from the invasion. Accounts based in Moscow demonstrate the lowest levels of interest in the war, while regions closest to Ukraine are the most negative. Meanwhile, areas of Russia furthest from the conflict tend to be more positive. Posts and comments closely mirror changing events on the ground and typically reflect the latest developments in Ukraine, indicating high levels of awareness regarding the current status of the invasion.

While it is impossible to determine exact levels of pro-war sentiment within Russian society, it is clear that the invasion of Ukraine enjoys considerable backing. What is fueling these positive attitudes toward a war that has horrified global audiences?

A combination of factors have shaped Russian public opinion in favor of the invasion. Propaganda has played a central role in this process, with Russian audiences subjected to years of relentless messaging throughout the Kremlin-controlled mainstream media preparing the population for war with Ukraine.

Many Russians appear to be driven by feelings of faith and obedience toward the authorities. Other factors include notions of national identity rooted in the imperial past and a strong desire to belong. Many Russians may be choosing to adopt pro-war positions in order to associate with like-minded people and demonstrate their own patriotism. Others may be motivated primarily by a desire to avoid accusations of disloyalty.

Unfortunately, such conformity often comes at the expense of critical thinking or moral constraints. This has made it possible for millions of otherwise unremarkable people to support the largest European war of aggression since the days of Hitler and Stalin. Some observers speculate that much of this support is insincere and would soon evaporate if circumstances within Russia changed. Nevertheless, the currently available evidence indicates overwhelming acceptance of the invasion, at the very least.

Sviatoslav Hnizdovskyi is founder and CEO of the Kyiv-based Open Minds Institute.

In preparation for the full-scale invasion of 2022, Russia sought to access Ukraine’s government IT platforms. One of the goals was to obtain the personal information of Ukrainians, particularly those working in military and law enforcement. These efforts, which peaked in January 2022 in the weeks prior to the invasion, failed to seriously disrupt Ukraine’s state institutions but provided the country’s cyber security specialists with further important experience. “With their nonstop attacks, Russia has effectively been training us since 2014. So by February 2022, we were ready and knew everything about their capabilities,” commented one Ukrainian cyber security specialist involved in defending critical infrastructure who was speaking anonymously as they were not authorized to discuss details.

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Ukrainian specialists say that while Russian hackers previously tried to disguise their origins, many now no longer even attempt to hide their IP addresses. Instead, attacks have become far larger in scale and more indiscriminate in nature, with the apparent goal of seeking to infiltrate as many systems as possible. However, the defenders of Ukraine’s cyberspace claim Russia’s reliance on the same malware and tactics makes it easier to detect them.

The growing importance of digital technologies within the Ukrainian military has presented Russia with a expanding range of high-value targets. However, efforts to access platforms like Ukraine’s Delta situational awareness system have so far proved unsuccessful. Speaking off the record, Ukrainian specialists charged with protecting Delta say Russian hackers have used a variety of different methods. “They tried phishing attacks, but this only resulted in our colleagues having to work two extra hours to block them. They have also created fake interfaces to gain passwords and login details.”

Ukrainian security measures that immediately detect and block unauthorized users requesting information have proved effective for the Delta system and similar platforms. Russian hackers have had more success targeting the messaging platforms and situation reports of various individual Ukrainian military units. However, due to the fast-changing nature of the situation along the front lines, this information tends to become outdated very quickly and therefore is not regarded as a major security threat.

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Ukraine’s cyber efforts are not exclusively focused on defending the country against Russian attack. Ukrainians have also been conducting counterattacks of their own against Russian targets. One of the challenges they have encountered is the comparatively low level of digitalization in modern Russian society compared to Ukraine. “We could hack into Russia’s railway IT systems, for example, but what information would this give us? We would be able to access train timetables and that’s all. Everything else is still done with paper and pens,” notes one Ukrainian hacker.

This has limited the scope of Ukrainian cyber attacks. Targets have included the financial data of Russian military personnel via Russian banks, while hackers have penetrated cartographic and geographic information systems that serve as important infrastructure elements of the Ukraine invasion. Ukrainian cyber attacks have also played a role in psychological warfare efforts, with Russian television and radio broadcasts hacked and replaced with content revealing suppressed details of the invasion including Russian military casualties and war crimes against Ukrainian civilians.

While Ukraine’s partners throughout the democratic world have provided the country with significant military aid, the international community has also played a role on the cyber front. Many individual foreign volunteers have joined the IT Army of Ukraine initiative, which counts more than 200,000 participants. Foreign hacker groups are credited with conducting a number of offensive operations against Russian targets. However, the large number of people involved also poses significant security challenges. Some critics argue that the practice of making Russian targets public globally provides advance warning and undermines the effectiveness of cyber attacks.

Russia has attempted to replicate Ukraine’s IT Army initiative with what they have called the Cyber Army of Russia, but this is believed to have attracted fewer international recruits. Nevertheless, Russia’s volunteer cyber force is thought to have been behind a number of attacks on diverse targets including Ukrainian government platforms and sites representing the country’s sexual minorities and cultural institutions.

The cyber front of the Russo-Ukrainian War is highly dynamic and continues to evolve. With a combination of state and non-state actors, it is a vast and complex battlefield full of gray zones and new frontiers. Both combatant countries have powerful domestic IT industries and strong reputations as hacker hubs, making the cyber front a particularly fascinating aspect of the wider war. The lessons learned are already informing our knowledge of cyber warfare and are likely to remain a key subject of study in the coming decades for anyone interested in cyber security.

Vera Mironova is an associate fellow at Harvard University’s Davis Center and author of Conflict Field Notes. You can follow her on Twitter at @vera_mironov.

Human wave tactics are demoralizing the Russian army in Ukraine

Olivia Yanchik — Sat, 08 Apr 2023 20:41:38 +0000

It is no secret that the Russian invasion of Ukraine has not gone according to plan. Nevertheless, with the conflict now in its second year, Vladimir Putin still hopes to break Ukrainian resistance in a long war of attrition.

This may be easier said than done. While Russia enjoys significant demographic, industrial, and economic advantages over Ukraine, questions remain over the ability of the once-vaunted Russian military to achieve the Kremlin’s goals. Crucially, an apparent reliance on human wave tactics during Russia’s recent winter offensive has led to catastrophic losses which threaten to undermine morale within the ranks of Putin’s invading army.

There is currently no confirmed data regarding losses on either side of the Russo-Ukrainian War. At the same time, most independent sources agree that fighting in recent months has resulted in some of the worst carnage of the entire war. In mid-February, Britain’s Ministry of Defence reported that during the previous two weeks, Russia had likely suffered its highest rate of casualties since the initial stages of the invasion almost one year earlier.

Russia’s heaviest losses in recent months are believed to have occurred in battles for control over strategic towns in eastern Ukraine such as Bakhmut and Vuhledar, with Ukraine claiming to have killed or wounded tens of thousands of Russian soldiers. While unconfirmed, these figures are supported by extensive battlefield footage, much of which appears to show Russian troops engaged in reckless frontal assaults on entrenched defensive positions.

The human wave tactics on display in eastern Ukraine reflect Russia’s narrowing military options following a year of embarrassing battlefield setbacks. The Russian military entered the current war with a reputation as the world’s number two army, but has performed remarkably poorly in Ukraine. With many of his most experienced units and elite regiments decimated, Putin now hopes to grind down Ukraine’s resources and outlast the country’s Western backers by relying on superior numbers. In the final months of 2022, he bolstered his invasion force with an additional 300,000 troops via Russia’s first mobilization since World War II.

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Human wave tactics are not new and typically involve soldiers conducting direct attacks in large numbers with the objective of overwhelming an opposing force. Such troops are often regarded as “single-use soldiers,” with each wave suffering heavy casualties as it attempts to move the front lines further forward. This is not the first time Russian troops have been called upon to conduct such attacks. During WWII, Soviet commanders often ordered Red Army soldiers into frontal assaults that resulted in exceptionally high death tolls.

In the present war against Ukraine, the Kremlin may see human wave tactics as an effective way of overcoming determined Ukrainian resistance. It allows Russia to wear down Ukraine’s numerically fewer but battle-hardened troops, and can be implemented using a combination of easily replaced forces including recently mobilized soldiers and former convicts serving in the Wagner private military company.

This approach allows Russia’s more experienced soldiers to be held in reserve and used to exploit emerging weak points in the Ukrainian defenses. So-called “blocking units” are also reportedly being deployed behind the front lines to ensure Russian troops do not try to flee. According to numerous battlefield accounts, any Russian soldier who attempts to retreat from a human wave attack faces the prospect of being shot by their own side.

Although grisly, Russia’s human wave tactics are producing results. However, any advances during the past three months in Bakhmut and at other points along the 600-mile front line have been modest in scale and have come at a high cost. In an interview with Current Time on the front lines of Bakhmut, one Ukrainian soldier described the horrors of Russia’s frontal assaults. “The Russian soldiers face certain death in these attacks, but they are not retreating,” he commented. “You can shoot his head off, but his comrade will keep coming. Their own commanders will kill them if they don’t attack.”

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The brutality of Russia’s human wave attacks is leading to growing signs of demoralization among front line troops. Since the beginning of 2023, dozens of video appeals have been posted to social media featuring Russian soldiers in Ukraine complaining to Putin or other state officials about human wave tactics and high death tolls. Russian media outlet Verstka reported that since early February, Russian soldiers from at least 16 different regions of the country have recorded video messages in which they criticize their military commanders for using them as cannon fodder.

Footage has also emerged of Russian soldiers refusing to follow orders after suffering heavy losses during the recent winter offensive in eastern Ukraine. While details remain unconfirmed, most of these incidents appear to have involved recently mobilized Russian troops who found themselves rushed into battle, often after having received minimal training.

In a further worrying sign for the Kremlin, Ukrainian officials have reported a record number of calls in March 2023 to the country’s “I Want to Live” initiative, which helps Russian troops surrender to the Ukrainian military. All this points to the conclusion that human wave attacks could be compounding Russian morale issues and further accelerating the buckling of front line offensives.

At this stage, there appears to be little prospect of a sudden collapse throughout the Russian military comparable to the disintegration of Afghanistan’s security forces during the 2021 US withdrawal. While the demoralization issues facing the Russian army appear significant, recent steps to introduce draconian penalties for Russian soldiers found guilty of disobedience, desertion, or surrender represent a powerful deterrent. The continued domestic strength of the Putin regime and its control over the information space also serve to hold Russia’s army together in Ukraine.

The Kremlin may now have recognized that it must address widespread anger and alarm over the military’s use of human waves. In early April, Russian General Rustam Muradov was reportedly dismissed from his post as commander of the Eastern Group of Forces in Ukraine following his disastrous handling of the recent failed assault on Vuhledar, which resulted in “exceptionally heavy casualties.” Muradov had been widely criticized by his own troops along with many members of Russia’s vocal pro-war blogger community, making him an unofficial symbol of the army’s human wave tactics.

If confirmed, Muradov’s departure may indicate a coming change in tactics. This would arguably be long overdue. If Russia is hoping to outlast Ukraine in a war of attrition, Putin’s generals will need to move beyond a reliance on costly human waves and demoralizing frontal assaults.

Olivia Yanchik is a program assistant at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

These figures point to strong levels of public support for the war but they must be viewed in context. Critics question the validity of any public opinion polling in a dictatorship such as Putin’s Russia, where people are legally obliged to call the invasion a “Special Military Operation” and can face criminal prosecution for social media posts. This is worth keeping in mind when analyzing surveys of Russian opinion.

Many poll respondents may be inclined to demonstrate their patriotism and their support for the Russian military while being less enthusiastic about the invasion itself or the Kremlin’s war aims. Others may have become swept up in the relentless flow of pro-war propaganda or cut off from alternative sources of information. It is also important to acknowledge that a large majority of people refuse to participate in polling of this nature. They may choose to decline for a wide range of reasons, but it is possible that many simply prefer not to share anti-war opinions with strangers.

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What evidence is there of anti-war sentiment in today’s Russia? When the invasion of Ukraine began in February 2022, efforts to claim strong public backing for the war were hampered by a series of protests in cities across the country involving mainly young Russians. However, these public demonstrations failed to reach any kind of critical mass and were fairly rapidly suppressed by the authorities with large numbers of detentions.

Other Russians have voted with their feet. A mass exodus of Russian nationals began during the first weeks of the war, with a second wave starting in September 2022 in the wake of Russia’s first mobilization since World War II. Hundreds of thousands of military-age Russian men fled to neighboring countries in the last four months of the year, leading in some cases to massive queues at border crossings.

This outflow of people has had a considerable negative demographic impact on Russia, but it would not be accurate to claim that everyone who has left the country during the past year holds anti-war views. Many chose to leave in order to avoid military service, while others feared the inconvenience of wartime conditions. Thousands of wealthy Russians have relocated to destinations like Dubai, where they can manage their Russian businesses while distancing themselves physically and psychologically from the war.

For those who remain in Russia, it is still possible to live a fairly normal life despite the imposition of sanctions and the departure of many high-profile Western brands. Meanwhile, some members of Russia’s billionaire elite are believed to oppose the war, but most see their fortunes as tied to Putin and are fearful of the consequences if they break with the regime publicly.

There are indications that the war is becoming less and less popular among the very troops charged with leading the invasion. The refusal of many contract soldiers to extend their service has forced the Russian authorities to introduce legislative changes, while in recent months there has been a sharp increase in video addresses on social media featuring mobilized Russian soldiers complaining about suicidal tactics and high death tolls. At the same time, there is little indication yet that mounting demoralization on the front lines is shaping the public mood back in Russia itself.

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What of Russia’s beleaguered political opposition? For more than twenty years, the Putin regime has sought to silence any genuine opposition forces via increasingly direct means. These efforts have intensified since the onset of the Ukraine invasion, with independent media outlets shut down and many of the country’s relatively few remaining opposition figures either jailed or forced to flee. Some have attempted to speak out against the war while in exile, with others who left Russia in previous years such as Gary Kasparov and Mikhail Khodorkovsky serving as vocal opponents of the invasion.

The most prominent opposition figure in today’s Russia, Alexei Navalny, remains in prison. Navalny has managed to issue a number of statements from jail condemning the war. In February 2023, he published a fifteen-point plan calling for the Russian military to withdraw completely from Ukraine and arguing that Russia must accept Ukraine’s internationally recognized borders. While many have welcomed Navalny’s unambiguous opposition to the invasion, others remain wary due to his ties to Russian nationalism and earlier reluctance to back the return of Crimea to Ukraine.

At this point, extreme Russian nationalism appears to pose a far greater threat to the Putin regime than liberal anti-war sentiment. A new class of pro-war bloggers has emerged over the past year and has become a powerful force within the more active segments of Russian society. Hardliners such as Wagner chief Yevgeny Prigozhin and Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov have gained in stature thanks to their prominent roles in the invasion and have engaged in rare public criticism of key establishment figures.

The authoritarian nature of the Putin regime makes it almost impossible to accurately gauge levels of anti-war sentiment in today’s Russia. It may take a decisive military defeat before many of those who oppose the war dare to speak up and demand change. In a sense, this is exactly what Putin is fighting against. He invaded Ukraine primarily because he feared Ukrainian democracy would serve as a catalyst for similar demands inside Russia itself. So far, he has managed to prevent anti-war or pro-democracy movements from gaining momentum. However, if his invading army’s battlefield fortunes continue to deteriorate in Ukraine, those who dream of a different Russia may finally find their voices.

Christopher Isajiw is an international relations commentator and business development consultant to private, governmental, and non-governmental organizations.

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Russian forces continue their attempts to break through Ukrainian army defenses in several directions. Russian units attacked Ukrainian positions in Pervomaisk, and conducted strikes on Zaporizhzhia and Kharkiv. On March 30, at least ten Iranian-made Shahed drones targeted Ukrainian territory as Russian aviation dropped guided bombs on Lvove village in Kherson Oblast.

The Russian army continues to pressure Ukrainian forces in the direction of Avdiivka, where fighting has recently escalated. Ukraine’s 36th Marine Brigade, active in Avdiivka, has been successful in countering Russian attacks. However, Russian Telegram channels claimed that incendiary shells struck Ukrainian positions around the Avdiivka Coke and Chemical Plant.

On March 29, Russia claimed that Ukraine had struck a railway depot in the Russian-occupied city of Melitopol, located deep behind the front line, knocking out power. Ukraine’s exiled mayor of the city also confirmed the explosions. Footage published online shows explosions lighting up the night sky. Melitopol is located on the edge of the range of Ukraine’s HIMARS multiple rocket launchers but is within reach of newer weapons, including air-launched joint direct attack munitions and ground-launched small-diameter bombs (GLSDB). The strike could disturb Moscow’s logistics at a time when Kyiv has suggested it could soon launch a counterattack.

On March 28, Russia reported for the first time that it had shot down a GLSDB. The Russian Ministry of Defense also claimed that air defenses had shot down a new Ukrainian Hrim-2 ballistic missile in the area of Novoandriivka, Donetsk Oblast.

Meanwhile, the Kremlin-installed head of occupied Crimea, Sergey Aksyonov, has created his own Wagner-like military unit. To lead the group, dubbed “Convoy” (Конвой), Aksyonov has recruited Konstantin Pikalov, a former Wagner commander who served in Africa. The mercenary unit is said to be composed of three hundred fighters and has reportedly already deployed to occupied parts of Kherson Oblast. On March 16, Aksyonov spoke about the “professional military unit” on Crimean television. “The guys who have gone through everything that is possible,” he said, discussing military honors they had received. “The leaders have several Orders of Courage; the chief of staff is a Hero of Russia.”

A video published on the Convoy Telegram channel showed Aksyonov inspecting the positions of the new unit. The channel was created last November and heavily features Russian Orthodox imagery and icons. It also refers to Ukrainians as “satanists.”

Vladimir Osechkin, the founder of the Russian human-rights organization Gulagu, said the new private military contractors are designed to replace Wagner units on the frontlines. He said the new unit could be expected to operate alongside the Russian army in Zaporizhzhia, Donetsk, and areas just north of Crimea.

Convoy’s training grounds are located in the village of Perevalne, southeast of Simferopol, according to the independent Russian news outlet Important Stories. This village has existing military infrastructure from the Cold War era, including the 165th Training Center, used for the training of foreign military personnel. A January 2023 Convoy ad recruiting snipers on Telegram offered room and board at the training center, as well as clothing, equipment, and a scholarship worth 100,000 rubles ($1,286).

Convoy sniper recruitment poster circulated on Telegram, January 17, 2023. (Source: @lobaev_vlad/archive)

The ad included a contact email address with the domain conwoy.org; according to a WHOIS search, the domain was registered on June 15, 2022, by “’Military Security Company Convoy’ Limited Liability Company” in Leningrad Oblast.

—Ruslan Trad, resident fellow for security research, Sofia, Bulgaria

Russia and its political allies in Moldova continue to inflame information space around Transnistria

In an interview with the Russian state-owned news outlet TASS, Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov alleged Ukrainian interference in the unrecognized breakaway region of Transnistria, saying Ukrainian leadership “[demonstrates] in every way its readiness to interfere in this process, including with the use of force.” Lavrov accused Ukraine of playing an “extremely negative, subversive role” in the “5+2” negotiation format, a diplomatic platform designed to settle the Transnistria conflict. The minister said that by clearly siding with Chisinau, “Kyiv authorities support its belligerent, destructive policy towards Transnistria.” Lavrov also emphasized Russia’s responsibility for the security of Transnistria, which according to him, is “in full accordance” with the mandate of Russian troops.

Earlier, Marina Tauber, vice president of the pro-Russian Moldovan opposition party Sor, claimed that Moldovan authorities were preparing a military provocation near the border of Transnistria, scheduled for April 17, after the Easter holidays. “[Moldovan President] Maia Sandu and [Moldovan Prime Minister] Dorin Recean are preparing a military provocation on the border with Transnistria,” Tauber claimed, citing “international intelligence services.” Tauber further asserted that Moldova had sent ten thousand uniforms to Romania for the Romanian security forces, with the goal of involving them in a military conflict. She also claimed that authorities had ordered three thousand coffins.

Moldovan government spokesperson Daniel Voda dismissed Tauber’s claims, saying, “Tauber’s statements are false and are part of a constant discourse promoting fear and division in society.”

The Russian Defense Ministry had previously alleged that Kyiv was preparing an armed provocation against Transnistria, which Kyiv and Moldova have denied.

—Victoria Olari, research assistant, Chisinau, Moldova

Putin and Lukashenka announce plans to deploy tactical nuclear weapons to Belarus after news of UK uranium-depleted ammo transfer

The Kremlin may be exploiting a March 20 announcement by the United Kingdom concerning the transfer of depleted uranium armor-piercing rounds to Ukraine, using it as an excuse to allegedly deploy tactical nuclear weapons to Belarus.

Despite the fact that depleted uranium rounds do not actually contact radioactive elements, state-owned Russian news outlets claimed the ammunition could indeed contain radioactive uranium, which fueled a Kremlin-led narrative advocating for deploying tactical nuclear weapons to Belarus as retaliation. Putin said the transfer of weapons by the West containing “nuclear components” called for “an adequate answer.” State-owned news outlet TASS reported that Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov called the transfer of these rounds a further escalation of the conflict, and claimed without evidence that the use of them would contaminate Ukraine’s food supply.

In a March 23 video on the Russian military TV station Zvezda News, Belarusian President Alyaksandr Lukashenka said that if Russian forces are targeted by Ukrainian depleted rounds, “the response will be terrifying, it will be a lesson for the whole planet.” On his personal Telegram channel, Lukashenka noted that discussions about the transfer of nuclear weapons took place in November 2021.

In a March 25 interview on Rossiya 1, Putin announced plans to relocate tactical nuclear weapons to Belarusian territory. He said that Belarus was already equipped with ten bomber aircrafts as well as Iskander systems compatible with nuclear-class weapons. The Russian president insisted the weapons would be deployed to Belarusian “territory.” Using this wording indicates that Putin is trying to avoid being accused of nuclear proliferation to a neighboring country.

According to a report by the Belarusian website Motolko Help citing Putin’s interview, Russia will reportedly build storage facilities for tactical nuclear weapons in Belarus by June 1. Citing a video posted on the Belarusian YouTube channel ONT, Motolko also assessed that the 465th Missile Brigade in Osipovichi district—the only missile brigade in Belarus—was likely already equipped with Iskander missile systems. This claim has not been independently verified.

Motolko also reported that Lukashenka recently announced that additional SU-25 fighter jets would undergo “reequipment” to adapt their technical capabilities to carry nuclear payloads. However, the Belarusian president also made similar claims in June and August 2022.

—Valentin Châtelet, research associate, security, Brussels, Belgium

Secretary of Kremlin Security Council accuses NATO of being “party to the conflict” in Ukraine

On March 27, Nikolai Patrushev, secretary of the Kremlin Security Council, said that NATO is a party to the war in Ukraine. The government newspaper Rossiyskaya Gazeta quoted Patrushev saying, “in fact, NATO countries are a party to the conflict. They made Ukraine one big military camp. They send weapons and ammunition to the Ukrainian troops, provide them with intelligence.”

On March 21, at a meeting in Ulyanovsk, Russia, Patrushev said that foreign intelligence agencies are trying to “stir up protest and separatist sentiments in Russia,” with the support of “pseudo-political structures” located abroad and foreign nongovernmental organizations. The remarks were made amid ongoing military setbacks by the Russian military in eastern Ukraine and internal problems within the officer corps fueled by a power struggle in the Kremlin that has been on display since the early months of the full-scale invasion.

Patrushev, a close ally of Putin, previously served as the head of the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB). He has served in the powerful role of secretary of the Kremlin Security Council since 2008. The anti-NATO remarks are the latest in an ongoing campaign of narratives that the Kremlin has utilized to justify its war on Ukraine.

—Ruslan Trad, resident fellow for security research, Sofia, Bulgaria

New audio allegedly documents Russian elites criticizing Putin for war in Ukraine

On March 7, audio emerged online purporting to capture a phone call between Russian music producer Iosif Prigozhin and Farhad Akhmedov, the Azerbaijan-born billionaire and former Russian senator, in which they criticized Putin for the war in Ukraine. The audio did not gain traction until March 24, when Ukraine’s Channel 5 published the conversation.

During the alleged call, Prigozhin seems to refer to Kremlin leaders as “criminals.” He then appears to claim that former Russian Prime Minister Igor Sechin, Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, and National Guard Director Viktor Zolotov are “united” and “blame everything” on Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu. “Putin is pinning everyone against each other to save himself,” Prigozhin allegedly added. Akhmedov, in turn, appears to say that Putin would not be able to save himself and would be held accountable for his actions.

The independent Russian media outlet Important Stories reported that the audio was genuine, citing an anonymous source in Russian intelligence services. According to the source, “the leadership of the FSB recently held a meeting and instructed subordinates to take action.”

When the audio first gained attention, Prigozhin shared a video on his Telegram channel insisting the audio was fake. “This recording is a symbiosis of spoken phrases and those that were generated, they were never spoken,” he insisted.

Wagner Group founder Yevgenzy Prigozhin, who bears no relation to the music producer, called Iosef Prigozhin “impudent, aggressive, and quick-tempered.” He speculated that whoever recorded the call may have thought that they had been recording the Wagner Group leader instead of the music producer.

—Ani Mejlumyan, research assistant, Yerevan, Armenia

The post Russian War Report: A new private military company emerges in Crimea appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Putin’s plan for a new Russian Empire includes both Ukraine and Belarus

Taras Kuzio — Wed, 29 Mar 2023 14:45:58 +0000

Over the past year, Vladimir Putin has compared himself to empire-building eighteenth century Russian Czar Peter the Great, and has attempted to annex entire regions of Ukraine while declaring that he is “returning historically Russian lands.” A recently leaked document purportedly detailing Russian plans to absorb neighboring Belarus now provides further insight into the imperial ambitions that are also driving the invasion of Ukraine.

Allegedly produced by Putin’s Presidential Administration with input from the Russian intelligence services and armed forces, the 17-page internal strategy paper was made public in early 2023 by an international consortium of journalists. It serves as a comprehensive guide to the unofficial annexation of Belarus via a combination of economic, military, political, and social measures, with the objective of full absorption into a so-called “Union State” with Russia by 2030.

The Russian takeover of Belarus as outlined in the document appears to closely mirror Moscow’s plans for Ukraine, albeit by less direct means. “Russia’s goals with regard to Belarus are the same as with Ukraine. Only in Belarus, Russia relies on coercion rather than war. Its end goal is still wholesale incorporation,” commented Michael Carpenter, the US Ambassador to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, following publication of the leaked document.

The strategy document for Belarus envisions the comprehensive russification of Belarusian society along with a sharp reduction in the influence of nationalist and pro-Western forces, which are viewed by Russia as virtually indistinguishable in relation to both Belarus and Ukraine. The Belarusian political, financial, business, and education systems would be fully integrated into Russia, with a network of pro-Russian media, NGOs, and cultural institutions established to aid this integration process.

In the military sphere, the Belarusian army would become de facto part of the Russian military, with Belarus increasing the number of Russian bases in the country and allowing Moscow to dramatically expand its military presence. Putin’s recently announced intention to base Russian tactical nuclear weapons in Belarus are an indication that this plan is already advancing.

The publication date of this alleged Russian blueprint for the takeover of Belarus is particularly interesting. It was reportedly produced in summer 2021 at a time when Putin’s mind seems to have been turning toward grand visions of imperial conquest. Increasingly isolated due to the Covid pandemic and surrounded by a shrinking circle of imperial hardliners and sycophants, Putin appears to have made the fateful decision in mid 2021 to extinguish Belarusian and Ukrainian independence once and for all.

Efforts to unofficially annex Belarus were well underway by this point. Belarusian dictator Alyaksandr Lukashenka was already heavily reliant on Russia following a Kremlin intervention to prop up his tottering regime in the wake of nationwide protests over the country’s rigged August 2020 presidential election.

As Kremlin officials were busy drawing up plans to incorporate Belarus, Putin himself was penning a 6000-word treatise outlining his denial of Ukraine’s right to statehood and his insistence that Ukrainians were really Russians (“one people”). Putin’s July 2021 essay was widely seen as a declaration of war against Ukrainian independence. His lengthy article laid the ideological foundations for Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, which began seven months later.

Putin’s plans for a subjugated Ukraine share many common features with his vision for the takeover of Belarus. Following the anticipated military conquest of Ukraine, Russia intended to install a puppet ruler in Kyiv who would replace Zelenskyy and play the same role as Lukashenka in Belarus. For both countries, Moscow’s ultimate goal is the same: Complete absorption into a new Russian Empire.

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Putin’s dreams of a new Russian Empire have been evident since his first term in office but became more obvious following his formal return to the presidency in 2012. From this point onward, Putin began to openly embrace an imperialistic brand of nationalism that positioned him as the latest in a long line of Kremlin rulers celebrated as “gatherers of Russian lands.” In the contemporary context, this meant incorporating fellow East Slavic states Belarus and Ukraine into a new Russia-led union.

The idea of a union between Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine was not new and first gained prominence during the collapse of the USSR when promoted by Soviet dissident Alexander Solzhenitsyn. East Slavic unity had both ideological and practical appeal for Putin. It would secure his place in Russian history while also creating a solid basis for the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU), Putin’s alternative to the EU.

Initially, Putin hoped to absorb Ukraine without a fight. Indeed, in 2012 and 2013, the Kremlin adopted many of the same tactics later used in Belarus to strengthen Russia’s grip on the country. However, post-Soviet Ukraine had a far stronger sense of national identity than Belarus, with a majority of Ukrainians seeing themselves as Europeans and embracing the country’s fledgling democratic traditions. This was to prove a major obstacle for Putin’s imperial project.

As Ukraine prepared to sign a long-anticipated Association Agreement with the European Union in last 2013, Moscow unleashed a trade war and began pressuring Ukraine’s pro-Kremlin president Viktor Yanukovych to reject Brussels in favor of Moscow. When Yanukovych attempted to do so, mass protests erupted in Ukraine that escalated into a full-scale revolution in support of democracy and European integration. Within three months, Yanukovych found himself deserted by his allies and escaped to Russia.

Russia responded to the success of the Euromaidan Revolution by occupying Crimea and attempting to orchestrate uprisings throughout southern and eastern Ukraine. Targeted regions of Ukraine were rebranded by the Kremlin using the old Czarist-era imperial term of “Novorossiya” or “New Russia.” This strategy was only partially successful, with Kremlin-backed uprisings defeated in most major Ukrainian cities except for Donetsk and Luhansk in eastern Ukraine’s Donbas region, where Kremlin control was secured with the assistance of the invading Russian army.

Over the next eight years, Putin attempted to rebuild Russia’s political influence inside Ukraine while pressuring the country to accept a Kremlin-friendly interpretation of the February 2015 Minsk Accords, which had brought the worst of the fighting to an end in eastern Ukraine without establishing a durable peace. Moscow’s vision for the implementation of the Minsk Accords would have transformed Ukraine into a dysfunctional Russian satellite, but this outcome met with resistance from successive Ukrainian presidents.

By early 2021, Putin had come to the conclusion that his strategy was failing and appears to have recognized that Ukraine was slipping irreparably out of the Russian orbit. At this point, he and other Kremlin leaders began referring to Ukraine as an “anti-Russia” and portraying the country as an intolerable outpost of NATO and US interests on Russia’s borders. The available evidence suggests that by the time Putin published his notorious essay in summer 2021, he was already fully committed to crushing Ukrainian independence by military means.

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In a clear echo of the strategy adopted for Belarus, Russia’s FSB security service was tasked in 2021 with preparing plans for the military occupation and pacification of Ukraine. However, a combination of FSB corruption, wishful thinking, and misplaced stereotypes about modern Ukraine resulted in a series of disastrous miscalculations.

Collaborators within the Ukrainian government told FSB agents what they wanted to hear with no regard for the realities on the ground, while the Kremlin’s networks of Ukrainian informants, NGOs, and other “experts” assured their Russian colleagues that the invading Russian army would be welcomed. Meanwhile, FSB officers confidently predicted that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy would soon be captured or forced to flee, with organized Ukrainian resistance unlikely to last longer than a few days.

These intelligence failures persuaded Putin to embark on the biggest gamble of his presidency with a wholly inadequate force of less than 200,000 troops. This was regarded as sufficient to install a pro-Russian regime and place Ukraine on the same path as Belarus toward absorption into the Russian Federation.

Captured documents, prisoner accounts, and the actions of the Russian occupation forces in regions of Ukraine under Kremlin control now make it possible to produce a comprehensive picture of Russia’s plans for the subjugation of the country. These plans share many features with Moscow’s approach to the creeping annexation of Belarus, while employing infinitely more direct and brutal methods.

The events of the past year make clear that Russia’s stated invasion objective of “de-Nazification” actually means the execution, imprisonment, deportation, or otherwise silencing of anyone deemed to be a Ukrainian patriot. Those targeted since the invasion began in February 2022 have included elected officials, civil society activists, educators, journalists, army veterans, and cultural figures.

The systematic suppression of Ukrainian national identity has been undertaken alongside intensive russification efforts, including the introduction of a Kremlin-approved Russian school curriculum and the promotion of an imperial identity. In parallel, local businesses have been forced to integrate into the Russian economy, with the wider population in occupied Ukraine obliged to accept Russian citizenship.

The obvious similarities between the Kremlin’s long-term Belarus strategy and the tactics being employed in occupied Ukraine undermine Russian efforts to portray the ongoing invasion as a defensive measure driven by valid security concerns. Instead, a picture emerges of Vladimir Putin’s overriding ambition to absorb both countries and secure his place in history as a “gatherer of Russian lands.”

While his approach to each country may currently differ in the details, Putin clearly aims to bring both Ukrainian and Belarusian independence to an end, and has placed these imperial ambitions at the heart of his entire reign. This makes a mockery of calls for a compromise with the Kremlin. Instead, Western leaders must recognize that peace in Europe will remain elusive until the Russian dictator is forced to abandon his dreams of empire.

Taras Kuzio is professor of political science at the National University of Kyiv Mohyla Academy and author of the newly published “Fascism and Genocide. Russia’s War Against Ukrainians.”

Russian War Report: Kremlin edits footage of Mariupol visit to remove women shouting at Putin

Digital Forensic Research Lab — Fri, 24 Mar 2023 15:57:24 +0000

As Russia continues its assault on Ukraine, the Atlantic Council’s Digital Forensic Research Lab (DFRLab) is keeping a close eye on Russia’s movements across the military, cyber, and information domains. With more than seven years of experience monitoring the situation in Ukraine—as well as Russia’s use of propaganda and disinformation to undermine the United States, NATO, and the European Union—the DFRLab’s global team presents the latest installment of the Russian War Report.

Security

Ukraine likely preparing counteroffensive as Russia diverts forces from Bakhmut

Missile strike on residential building in Zaporizhzhia caught on camera

Tracking narratives

Kremlin edits footage of Mariupol visit to remove women shouting at Putin

Russian ministry reports 5,000 offenses related to the spread of “fakes” about the Russian Army

New poll suggests support for the war in Ukraine remains high among Russians

International response

Armenia ratifies Rome Statute in the wake of Putin’s ICC arrest warrant

Ukraine likely preparing counteroffensive as Russia diverts forces from Bakhmut

After months of heavy fighting in which Russian forces failed to fully capture Bakhmut, the Ukrainian army is likely preparing its counteroffensive. Ukrainian ground forces commander Oleksandr Syrskyi said on his Telegram channel that Russian forces “are losing considerable strength and are running out of steam” and “very soon we will take advantage of this opportunity.” The DFRLab has observed indications of a Ukrainian counterattack and is closely monitoring the developments.

Meanwhile, Russian forces continue to exert pressure on Ukraine. Ukrainian military intelligence reported that Russian troops will likely focus on targets of military importance in their next missile strikes. Particular attention is being paid to areas with troop concentration, oil depots, airfields, supply routes for military equipment from allied countries, and other logistical facilities. In addition, the possibility of repeated attacks against energy infrastructure or other objects of significant economic importance for Ukraine cannot be ruled out.

A Russian slowdown in Bakhmut could mean that Moscow is diverting its troops and resources to other regions. Russian troops have made gains further north, partially regaining control over the axis to the town of Kreminna. Intense battles have also been underway in the south. Further, Russian forces have become more active in the regions of Kharkiv, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson. Russian troops are conducting offensives in the direction of Avdiivka with the aim of establishing control over Avdiivka and Marinka.

In the occupied Crimean town of Dzhankoi, an explosion reportedly destroyed cruise missiles utilized by Russia’s Black Sea navy to target Ukraine, according to a March 21 statement from Ukrainian military intelligence. The strike appeared to have originated from a drone. A video of the explosion published on March 20 shows the blast was immediately preceded by a loudly buzzing engine which bears audio similarities to the sound made by Iranian-made drones. The DFRLab cannot confirm whether an Iranian drone caused the blast.

—Ruslan Trad, Resident Fellow for Security Research, Sofia, Bulgaria

Missile strike on residential building in Zaporizhzhia caught on camera

Video footage of a missile strike against a nine-story residential building in the center of Zaporizhzhia emerged on Telegram on March 29. The DFRLab identified the location of the missile strike and the apartment complex it struck using geolocation and geospatial analysis. As Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy described in a tweet, the strike occurred near a residential area near a mall.

Geolocated images of the residential apartment building in Zaporizhzhia struck by a Russian missile. (Source: Valentin Châtelet)

A photograph shared online indicates that an S-300 missile system fired the missile from the Russian-occupied southern bank of the Dnipro River. This location was corroborated by other open-source investigators, including the GeoConfirmed project, which reported that the missile likely came from the southeast direction. Reports claimed the attack caused the death of seven people.

Later that same day, counternarratives emerged on the pro-Kremlin English-language Telegram channel Slavyangrad and spread to a French-language channel. The narrative claimed that the strike resulted from a Ukrainian S-300 system failure while attempting to intercept a Russian missile. Russian news outlets and pro-Kremlin amplification channels have repeatedly used similar narratives to obfuscate Russian culpability in incidents involving civilians.

—Roman Osadchuk, Research Associate

—Valentin Châtelet, Research Associate, Security, Brussels, Belgium

Kremlin edits footage of Mariupol visit to remove women shouting at Putin

Following the International Criminal Court issuing an arrest warrant for Russian President Vladimir Putin, the Kremlin leader paid a defiant visit to the occupied Ukrainian city of Mariupol. The Kremlin shared a thirty-minute video of the visit, which reportedly took place on March 18. During the visit, Putin reportedly examined restoration work under way in the city. Approximately twenty minutes into the footage, Putin has a short conversation with individuals described as residents of Mariupol.

Footage of the visit published by state-owned news outlet RIA included frames cut out of the Kremlin video. The RIA footage includes an extended version of Putin’s interactions with alleged residents. During the filmed conversation, an unidentified female voice can be heard in the background shouting at Putin, approximately eighteen seconds into the clip. Meduza reported that the woman yelled, “This all is not true! It’s all for a show!” While the women’s comments do sound similar to Meduza’s interpretation, the voice is muffled and difficult to interpret with certainty. Immediately after the woman shouts, the officials accompanying Putin react and begin to look around the streets. The Kremlin version of the video cuts away approximately four seconds earlier, switching to another woman speaking with Putin.

A woman can be heard yelling in the background eighteen seconds into this video clip, causing Putin’s entourage to look around for her. (Source: RIA Novosti)

The Kremlin version of the video cuts away approximately four seconds before the woman starts yelling. (Source: Kremlin.ru)

According to Meduza, a Russian journalist described the district visited by Putin as “virtually the only one rebuilt” in the city destroyed by Russia.

—Eto Buziashvili, Research Associate, Tbilisi, Georgia

Russian ministry reports 5,000 offenses related to the spread of “fakes” about the Russian Army

On March 20, Vladimir Kolokoltsev, the head of Russia’s interior ministry, said that in 2022, “Particular attention was paid to preventing the discreditation of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.” The ministry reported that last year police documented five thousand offenses and forty-one crimes related to the spread of “fakes” about the Russian Army. In addition, they documented almost ninety cases of “deliberate false publications” about the Russian military.

“In cooperation with Roskomnadzor, the dissemination of about 160,000 false and other prohibited information was stopped,” Kolokoltsev added.

The DFRLab has previously reported on Russian attempts to tighten control of the internet in order to prevent the spread of content the Kremlin considers undesirable.

—Eto Buziashvili, Research Associate, Tbilisi, Georgia

New poll suggests support for the war in Ukraine remains high among Russians

According to independent Russian pollster Levada, 77 percent of Russians supported the war in February 2023, the highest level of public support since March 2022. Only 17 percent of Russians currently disapprove the war, Levada reported.

The number of people supporting the continuation of hostilities has steadily increased since October 2022 “as the shock of the announcement of partial mobilization passed,” Levada concluded.

Seventy-one percent of Russians perceive the return of Luhansk and Donetsk to Ukraine as unacceptable conditions for a peace treaty, while 67 percent see the return of Zaporizhzhia and Kherson regions as unacceptable. In addition, 76 percent of respondents perceive Ukraine’s accession to NATO as unacceptable.

Since November 2022, the share of respondents who believe that the “special military operation” is advancing successfully increased from 54 to 65 percent.

The Levada research center, labeled a foreign agent by Russia, published its assessment on March 13. Russia has cracked down on public dissent since the start of the war; it remains unclear whether this crackdown impacted Levada’s poll results.

—Eto Buziashvili, Research Associate, Tbilisi, Georgia

Armenia ratifies Rome Statute in the wake of Putin’s ICC arrest warrant

On March 24, the Armenian Constitutional Court gave its blessing to the parliament’s ratification of the Rome Statute, noting that the country’s obligations to the International Criminal Court do not contradict the national constitution. The decision is final and went into effect immediately.

Armenia’s plans to ratify the Rome Statute had been complicated by the International Criminal Court’s recent decision to issue an arrest warrant for Vladimir Putin. On December 29, 2022, Armenian parliament approved the draft law, “On Ratifying the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court,” which then made its way to the constitutional court. Armenia signed the statute in 1999 but did not ratify it at the time.

Armenia’s recent push to ratify the ICC charter appears motivated by the ongoing conflict with Azerbaijan. Armenia initiated the ratification to take Azerbaijan to the ICC over alleged war crimes committed by Azerbaijani troops during the September 2022 invasion, but some observers thought the constitutional court would rule against it due to the Putin arrest warrant.

Human rights defender Artur Sakunts told Caucasus news outlet Jam News that Armenia would end up in a “miserable position” if it did not continue on course to ratify the statute. “We will remain in the status of an ally of a fascist regime – where Belarus is now,” Sakunts added. “And such regimes have no allies, they only have subordinates, colonies, zones of influence.”

Armenia’s Speaker of Parliament, Alen Simonyan, told reporters on March 20 that Armenia had begun the ratification process months before the ICC decision. When asked about the possibility of arresting Putin on a visit to Armenia, Simonyan said, “First, let’s ratify the Rome Statute for now, and then we’ll decide what to do next. I wonder what they will do in other countries in case of his arrival. I just physically can’t imagine it [the arrest].”

—Ani Mejlumyan, Research Assistant, Yerevan, Armenia

The post Russian War Report: Kremlin edits footage of Mariupol visit to remove women shouting at Putin appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Shahid quoted in Article 14: How Indian media mainstreamed the ‘Land Jihad’ propaganda

Atlantic Council — Fri, 17 Mar 2023 16:59:00 +0000

ORIGINAL SOURCE

The post Shahid quoted in Article 14: How Indian media mainstreamed the ‘Land Jihad’ propaganda appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Russian War Report: DFRLab confirms aerial strikes on industrial plants north of Bakhmut

Digital Forensic Research Lab — Fri, 17 Mar 2023 14:07:42 +0000

As Russia continues its assault on Ukraine, the Atlantic Council’s Digital Forensic Research Lab (DFRLab) is keeping a close eye on Russia’s movements across the military, cyber, and information domains. With more than seven years of experience monitoring the situation in Ukraine—as well as Russia’s use of propaganda and disinformation to undermine the United States, NATO, and the European Union—the DFRLab’s global team presents the latest installment of the Russian War Report.

Security

DFRLab confirms aerial strikes on industrial plants north of Bakhmut

Battle for Vuhledar highlights tensions between Wagner and Russian defense ministry

Tracking narratives

Russian channels amplify Quran desecration video

International response

European allies train Ukrainian forces on tank operation

DFRLab confirms aerial strikes on industrial plants north of Bakhmut

Russian armed forces continue their offensive inside the contested city of Bakhmut. At the time of writing, the western part of Bakhmut remained under Ukrainian control, with the Bakhmutka River acting as a buffer zone between the artillery and infantry forces deployed on either side of the waterway. Russian missile and aerial strikes targeted intermediary positions to push back Ukrainian armed forces, from Yahidne in the north towards Bakhmut industrial plants.

The DFRLab collected open-source satellite imagery dating back to the first two weeks of March to document missile strikes on an industrial plant in the north of Bakhmut. The imagery was collected from the European Space Agency’s Sentinel hub using images provided by satellite constellation Sentinel-2.

Analysis of the damage inflicted on buildings in the area reveals that potential missiles struck buildings belonging to two different industrial plants. The easternmost plant is the Bakhmut non-ferrous metals factory.

Satellite imagery showed the factory’s main building was destroyed, with a second building damaged. Traces of burns on the roof of the building can be seen from an explosion. This building belongs to the Makiivka metal construction plant.

Sentinel-2 satellite imagery north of Bakhmut released on March 4, 2023, annotated by the DFRLab. (Source: DFRLab via ESA/Sentinel-2, Ukraine Control Map)

Sentinel-2 satellite imagery north of Bakhmut released on March 14, 2023, with DFRLab annotations. Dark spots on the bottom show a damaged building belonging to the metal construction factory. Destroyed houses seen in the top left part of the image are where the non-ferrous metal factory once stood. (Source: DFRLab via ESA/Sentinel-2, Ukraine Control Map)

—Valentin Châtelet, Research Associate, Security, Brussels, Belgium

Battle for Vuhledar highlights tensions between Wagner and Russian defense ministry

Eastern Ukraine continues to be a key arena for clashes as Russian forces attempt to advance in the directions of Vuhledar and Bakhmut. Ukrainian forces are using remote mining near Vuhledar, according to a March 16 report from UK defense intelligence. The remote anti-armor mine system (RAAMS) makes it possible to create an anti-tank minefield up to seventeen kilometers away from the firing unit. The United Kingdom reported that Ukraine was also firing the mines behind advancing Russian forces, leading to additional losses in the event of a retreat. The United Kingdom also reported that there is a “realistic possibility” that Russia’s push for Vuhledar is driven by the Russian defense ministry’s desire to produce better results than Wagner, who are driving Russia’s tactical progress towards Bakhmut.

The UK report supports the DFRLab’s analysis that the ongoing offensive operations in eastern Ukraine are provoking a competition between the different military units, particularly Wagner and the Russian defense ministry. In the direction of Bakhmut, Wagner’s forces continue to be the primary units fighting within the city. However, the combat has been difficult, and the urban environment makes progress challenging. In addition, Chechen forces in Bakhmut continue to fight alongside the Ukrainian army against Russian positions.

Russian forces are also having issues restoring tanks, according to a report published by Ukrainian outlet Defense Express. The 103rd armored repair plant in Russia has reportedly not been able to restore T-62 tanks under the terms originally contracted, which would have required the plant to restore twenty-two to twenty-three tanks per month. According to Defense Express, however, the real capacity of the plant is likely around seven tanks per month. On March 6, UK defense intelligence reported that Russia was deploying outdated T-62 tanks to the battlefield due to major losses in armored equipment.

Acts of sabotage against occupying Russian forces continue in the direction of Kherson. On March 11, the Telegram channel of the pro-Ukraine resistance movement Atesh reported that its members blew up a railway line in the Kherson region, between Radensk and Abrykosivka. This appears to be an attempt by Atesh partisans to impede logistics for the Russian troops deployed in the area.

Ukraine has also reported new arrests of alleged Russian infiltrators. On March 16, the Security Service of Ukraine reported the detention of two women accused of tracking the movement of Ukrainian equipment in the interest of Russian intelligence. The women also allegedly photographed the results of attacks on Ukrainian facilities. One of the women reportedly worked as a nurse in Ukraine’s territorial defense combat unit.

—Ruslan Trad, Resident Fellow for Security Research, Sofia, Bulgaria

Russian channels amplify Quran desecration video

Footage emerged online on March 15 showing the burning of the Islamic holy book, the Quran. Russian social media channels shared the one minute and six second video, accusing Ukrainian soldiers of being behind the desecration. The video sparked a wave of reactions on social media, particularly on Twitter, where a TikTok version of the video went viral. The TikTok video has since been removed.

The video is difficult to analyze and cannot be verified. It does not show the faces of the alleged Ukrainian soldiers. The people in the video are speaking broken Ukrainian and use a Russian military knife, said Oleg Nikolenko, a spokesperson for Ukraine’s foreign ministry.

A screenshot of the video, published in the Readovka Telegram channel on March 15, shows a knife allegedly used by the Russian army. (Source: Readovkanews/archive)

The video was denounced as a provocation by Said Imagilov, Mufti of the Spiritual Administration of Ukraine’s Muslims, as well as the Ukrainian military and Ukrainian officials.

Ukraine’s army has Muslim soldiers in its ranks, and Imagilov is an active participant on the frontlines defending Kyiv. The Ukrainian army is also supported by several Chechen units, the most well-known of which are the two volunteer battalions, the Dzhokhar Dudayev Battalion and the Sheikh Mansur Battalion. Chechens are among the most active defenders of Bakhmut, with their Adam special unit operating behind Russian army defense lines.

The provenance of the video remains unknown.

—Ruslan Trad, Resident Fellow for Security Research, Sofia, Bulgaria

European allies train Ukrainian forces on tank operation

Ukraine’s Western allies are continuing to help strengthen Kyiv’s defense against Russia by training Ukrainian troops on tank operation and trench warfare. Thierry Breton, European Commissioner for Internal Market, is visiting EU countries in a bid to shore up more ammunition for Ukraine. His first visit was to Bulgaria. This visit came as the Slovak news outlet Pravda published data on March 15 showing that, in the year since the February 2022 invasion of Ukraine, Slovakia has doubled its ammunition production and plans to double it again from current levels.

Meanwhile, Greece and the United States agreed to a deal that will see the US transfer 300 M2 Bradley fighting vehicles to the Greek army as part of a modernization program, according to Greek media reports on March 10. Greece is expected to send Ukraine BMP-1 vehicles and M113 armored carriers in exchange for the purchase of the Bradleys.

On March 13, Spain’s Ministry of Defense announced that ten Ukrainian crews completed training in Spain on operating Leopard 2 tanks. Along with fifty-five servicemen, fifteen Ukrainian technicians also received training. According to El Periódico, “These fifty-five soldiers – some professionals and other reservists – were already on the front line, and their four-week training lasted twelve hours a day.”

In addition, the German army announced it was training Ukrainian troops on the Leopard 2 tanks in Germany. “Training on the weapon systems is not just about how to use it, but also about tactics so that the Ukrainians can achieve the greatest possible effect against their opponents,” said Colonel Heiko Diehl.

Ukrainian servicemen in the United Kingdom also completed training in conducting trench combat in realistic conditions. The program was led by the 5th Battalion of the Royal Australian Regiment of the 1st Brigade of the Australian Defense Forces.

Earlier this week, Polish President Andrzej Duda announced that his country would send Ukraine thirty MiG 29 fighter jets. These are essential as Russia strives to achieve air dominance and has increased its aerial strikes throughout Ukraine. On March 14, a video emerged on Twitter showing Ukrainian soldiers taking part in trainings in the French military camp of Canjuers in the south of the country. The soldiers were reportedly training with the AMX-10RC armored personnel carriers. Minister of the Armed Forces of France Sebastien Lecornu confirmed during a defense commission hearing on March 15 that the carriers are already being delivered to Ukraine.

On March 15, the Israeli government approved licenses to export electronic warfare equipment to Ukraine that will help counter Iranian drones.

—Valentin Châtelet, Research Associate, Security, Brussels, Belgium

—Ruslan Trad, Resident Fellow for Security Research, Sofia, Bulgaria

The post Russian War Report: DFRLab confirms aerial strikes on industrial plants north of Bakhmut appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Ukraine must do more to counter Russian narratives in the Global South

Mitchell Polman — Tue, 14 Mar 2023 19:24:38 +0000

More than one year since Vladimir Putin launched the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, international reaction to the war remains sharply divided. While much has been made of Western unity in support of Ukraine, the rest of the world has been largely unwilling to oppose or even condemn Russia in any meaningful way.

This is not just a matter of winning UN votes and scoring political points at international forums. The reluctance of countries throughout the Global South to join Western sanctions significantly undermines efforts to isolate Russia, while providing Moscow with the financial and material lifelines to maintain the war in Ukraine indefinitely.

Attitudes in the Global South toward Russia’s Ukraine invasion are being shaped by a range of factors including economic and geopolitical interests along with widespread suspicion of American foreign policy and historic anti-Western sentiment dating back to the colonial era. Russia has skillfully exploited this post-colonial perspective by framing the invasion of Ukraine as a reaction to what it terms as yet more expansionist Western interference. As the war enters its second year, Ukraine should be doing much more to engage these non-Western audiences and make its voice heard.

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Ukraine has limited experience of rallying international support and has previously focused its efforts almost exclusively on the West. In the three decades since the country regained independence, Ukrainian politicians, activists, and journalists have spent comparatively little time communicating with people in Latin America, Africa, and Asia, where awareness of Ukraine is still often minimal. Ukraine now needs to develop a strategy that can rally the nations of the non-Western world to its side.

First of all, it is absolutely crucial to keep Ukraine at the heart of the debate. Across the Global South, it is common to witness public discussions about the Russian invasion that barely address Ukraine at all. Instead, the focus is frequently on Western colonialism, globalization, and other broad geopolitical themes. Ukrainians should not hesitate to insist that conversations about their country’s plight not get sidetracked by extraneous historical grievances.

Over the past year, Ukraine’s limited efforts to influence opinion in the Global South have concentrated on highlighting the imperial ambitions underpinning Putin’s current invasion while raising awareness of Russia’s own long history of colonialism as a major European empire. This approach certainly makes some sense, but too much emphasis on Russia’s colonial past risks shifting the conversation away from today’s Ukraine.

Another important ingredient shaping the debate in the Global South is the role played by the Soviet Union as a supporter of anti-colonial liberation movements during the second half of the twentieth century. Putin’s Russia has made much use of this favorable Soviet legacy, using it to garner goodwill and to emphasize its own anti-Western credentials. This ignores the obvious imperialism of the USSR itself, and overlooks the fact that Soviet-era Ukraine also contributed significantly to liberation movements throughout Africa and Asia.

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Ukraine’s advance in Kursk: What’s next and implications

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While it is essential for Ukrainians to correct the historical record regarding Russian imperialism, it is also vital to stress Ukraine’s current importance for the Global South. First and foremost, this means highlighting Ukraine’s status as one of the world’s emerging agricultural superpowers and a major prewar contributor to global food security.

As Ukraine seeks to influence opinion among non-Western audiences, the country must make maximum use of its limited resources. For example, officials in Kyiv should be doing much more to engage with the thousands of professionals throughout Africa, Asia, and Latin America who studied at Ukrainian universities before going on to have careers in their homelands. This pool of alumni is a potentially significant but largely untapped resource that could bring a degree of authenticity to the debate due to their personal experience of Ukraine.

Ukrainian nationals with family ties to the Global South can also contribute to greater international understanding of the issues at stake in today’s Ukraine. As one of the most prominent members of the Afro-Ukrainian community, politician and Olympic champion wrestler Zhan Beleniuk traveled to Africa in late 2022 as part of Ukraine’s fledgling outreach efforts. Others with similar backgrounds should be encouraged to speak up on behalf of Ukraine.

Ukraine’s success in shaping opinion throughout the Global South will hinge largely on the country’s ability to engage with the media. This is one area where the Kremlin enjoys overwhelming advantages. While Russia’s RT and Sputnik platforms have limited reach and minimal credibility among Western audiences, they enjoy considerable prominence and are often well-received in much of Asia, Africa, and Latin America.

Ukraine cannot hope to compete with the Kremlin’s billion dollar media budgets and must instead build relationships with existing local mainstream media. Brazil’s TV Globo is the second-largest commercial TV network in the world and can bring Ukrainian perspectives to huge domestic Brazilian audiences. Likewise, engagement with Spanish-language channels can help reach millions across Latin America. A comprehensive media strategy is needed in order to close the information gap and counter the current dominance of Russia’s narratives in the non-Western information space.

Ultimately, the truth is on Ukraine’s side. The good news it that there is very little evidence of actively anti-Ukrainian sentiment in today’s Global South. It should be entirely possible to persuade far more people that Ukraine’s cause is righteous and worthy of support. However, this will require a concerted effort that is currently lacking. Simply telling non-Western audiences that the Russians are also imperialists may be satisfying, but it is not nearly enough.

Mitchell Polman is a public diplomacy and international relations commentator.

Growing polarization and instability in the country have increased the likelihood that as elections draw near, curbs on speech, largely limited thus far to television channels, may extend to internet platforms like YouTube, Facebook, and Twitter.

For example, on September 6, 2022, YouTube encountered disruptions across Pakistan ahead of Khan’s speech at a rally. This was not the first such disruption—NetBlocks confirmed that a similar disruption also occurred on August 21, 2022, when Imran Khan was making another public speech. In addition, Wikipedia was blocked (and subsequently unblocked) by the Pakistan Telecommunications Authority (PTA) a few weeks ago for its failure to “remove or block allegedly sacrilegious content.”

Other notable examples in the recent past include TikTok, which has been banned and unbanned on numerous occasions, and YouTube, which was blocked in the country back in 2012 and was only unblocked by the PTA more than three years later.

These developments make clear that the PTA indeed has the capability to disrupt internet services across Pakistan on a whim, something that journalist Abid Hussain pointed out as far back as April 2021 on Twitter. To further control access to the internet, the PTA has also been seeking to limit the use of virtual private networks in the country.

As the conflict between the current government, the military establishment, and Imran Khan’s Pakistan Tehreek-i-Insaf party sharpens ahead of elections—Punjab, Pakistan’s most populous province, is expected to go to elections on April 30—further curbs on expression and disruptions to the internet, especially platforms like YouTube, Twitter, WhatsApp, and Facebook, cannot be ruled out.

In recent months, US companies and US government stakeholders have often chosen not to react to these developments, preferring to adopt a wait-and-watch approach. In addition, they have followed a strategy to engage privately and discreetly, hoping to positively influence government stakeholders through private conversations.

As the crisis in Pakistan deepens, it is time for diplomatic and business stakeholders with an interest in strengthening its democracy and maintaining a largely open internet in the country to shift their approach.

Given the evolving situation, these stakeholders should consider the following steps to proactively deter further curbs on expression on the internet in Pakistan:

Enhance level of engagement with domestic civil society: Recent weeks have seen a flurry of concerning developments in Pakistan, with the recent PEMRA order being the key development. US companies and diplomats must deepen conversations with civil society stakeholders, especially the digital rights community that has been voicing these concerns for years.

Proactively communicate concerns to Pakistani government officials: Ongoing diplomatic conversations between Islamabad and Washington have focused on the potential for deepening investment in the country’s technology sector. The PTA’s recent and past actions, however, undermine confidence in Pakistan’s internet economy and it is important that the negative economic impact of arbitrary bans and disruptions to the internet is clearly communicated to Pakistani stakeholders.

Build new alliances with the technology and content creator ecosystem: In private conversations, members of Pakistan’s burgeoning technology and content creation ecosystem continue to express growing concern over curbs on freedom of expression. These stakeholders are domestic allies for companies like Meta, Google, and Twitter. However, limited interactions and collaboration with these stakeholders mean that more often than not, a united front is not presented to deter Pakistani government stakeholders from taking adverse actions that curb expression, undermine democracy, and hurt confidence in the country’s digital economy.

The coming months will be a challenging period for Pakistan’s flawed and floundering democracy. This challenge will be compounded by the state’s own capabilities and predilections to curb expression both in the traditional media and the internet.

With the PTI and Imran Khan possessing a strong advantage in their ability to digitally percolate party messaging through Pakistani society, the government and its institutions may be incentivized to take drastic measures to disrupt internet services and platforms that allow Khan to bypass television channels who may not air his speeches. As elections draw near, the likelihood of such actions is increasing. For this reason, it is important for US stakeholders—including private sector companies—to proactively monitor the evolving situation and develop strategies to deter such actions.

Doing so may perhaps safeguard Pakistan’s internet economy, its democracy, and the global reputation of internet platforms that are vital to public discourse within and outside Pakistan.

Uzair Younus is director of the Pakistan Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s South Asia Center. He also is the Vice President at The Asia Group.

The South Asia Center is the hub for the Atlantic Council’s analysis of the political, social, geographical, and cultural diversity of the region. At the intersection of South Asia and its geopolitics, SAC cultivates dialogue to shape policy and forge ties between the region and the global community.

Learn more

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Russia’s invasion one year on: Ukraine is stronger than ever

Vitaly Sych — Tue, 28 Feb 2023 13:32:38 +0000

When my family and I left Kyiv on the first morning of Russia’s full-scale invasion last February, we had no idea if we would ever be able to return home or whether Ukraine itself would survive. In the following days, as the biggest European conflict since World War II continued to unfold, this sense of dread only deepened.

One year on, I can now look back with slightly less emotion and a sense of cautious optimism that is rooted in the remarkable resilience of the Ukrainian nation. Ukraine has not only survived, but has actually achieved a number of landmark battlefield victories over Putin’s invading army and has proven to international audiences that Russia can be beaten.

On the personal front, I have been back in Kyiv since May 2022, although my wife and two children remain among the millions of Ukrainians currently living in exile. Thankfully, they are able to visit.

Life in wartime Ukraine can be extremely stressful but Ukrainians have proven themselves far tougher and more resourceful than almost anyone could have imagined. For those living in Kyiv and other Ukrainian cities far from the front lines, the greatest threat has come from frequent Russian missile and drone attacks. This airstrike campaign began on October 10 and has since become a feature of daily life.

During those initial October air raids, I found myself in our makeshift neighborhood bomb shelter for the first time, huddled in an underground car park together with 100 other people and their assorted pets. More recently, if I am at home when an attack takes place, I can often see explosions from my apartment window and feel the impact of incoming missiles through the shaking walls of the building.

Russia’s air campaign brought the war closer for millions of Ukrainians, creating a sense of heightened physical danger along with frequent blackouts. The whole of Ukraine spent the winter season with severely limited access to light, electricity, heating, water, and internet. I often had to walk up 20 flights of stairs just to reach my apartment. For people with mobility issues or families with small children, that is simply not an option.

Despite these hardships, Russia’s air attacks have failed to break Ukraine’s spirit. While everyone inevitably talks about the many inconveniences these attacks bring, nobody really complains. Instead, there is an understanding that this is part of the price we must pay for finally saying goodbye to Russia, and a determination to get on with our lives. After the first major attacks, people were shocked and discussed the implications for days on end. But after a few weeks, cafes and restaurants would fill up again within hours of each new bombardment.

Over the past five months, Ukrainians have acquired vast quantities of generators to provide power for businesses, homes, and public services. Each time a blackout begins, an orchestra of generators starts to play. This rumbling of engines has served as the background soundtrack to the winter season in wartime Ukraine. Meanwhile, we have all learned to keep our gadgets fully charged and to have power banks at the ready, just in case. Life goes on.

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Winter is now coming to an end and Ukrainians have not been frozen into submission. Indeed, there have been very few blackouts in recent weeks as Ukraine’s heroic air defense forces and power sector professionals continue to perform miracles. Putin’s bombing campaign is the latest in a long line of unsuccessful Russian efforts to undermine Ukrainian morale.

Surprisingly, the Kremlin-controlled Russian media openly boasted of targeting civilian infrastructure in Ukraine. Prior to the onset of the air attacks in late 2022, Kremlin propagandists had consistently insisted that the Russian army only struck military targets. However, it seems that a series of embarrassing military defeats in Ukraine left the Putin regime in desperate need of victories. It says much about the state of Russia’s war effort that the only victory Moscow could hope to deliver was news that Ukrainian civilians were being plunged into freezing darkness in the depths of winter.

The defiant Ukrainian response to Moscow’s terror-bombing tactics reflects the mood in the country as the war enters its second year. It also underlines the counter-productive nature of Putin’s invasion. The Russian dictator wanted to wipe out Ukrainian identity entirely. Instead, he has achieved the exact opposite.

Eurasia Center events

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Ukraine’s advance in Kursk: What’s next and implications

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Throughout the country, Ukrainian national identity is visibly strengthening. Many people are switching from Russian to the Ukrainian language in their everyday lives. Monuments to Soviet figures are being removed from public spaces, and streets honoring Russian writers are being renamed. After decades of domestic geopolitical divisions, Ukrainian support for EU and NATO membership has rocketed to over 80% and is backed by strong majorities in every part of the country.

Whereas Ukrainian public anger following the initial Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2014 was largely directed against the Russian political leadership in the Kremlin, we are now witnessing demands for the wholesale de-russification of Ukraine. Most Ukrainians have been sickened by the atrocities of the Russian army and horrified by the obvious popularity of the war among the Russian public. They no longer wish to have anything in common with a nation that destroys entire cities and commits countless war crimes.

Ukrainians also understand perfectly well that when Russians talk about “Ukrainian Nazis” and call for the “de-Nazification” of Ukraine, they actually mean the de-Ukrainianization of Ukraine and the permanent return of the country to Russian control. The atrocities committed by Russian forces in occupied areas of Ukraine have brought home the horrors that would await the rest of the country if Ukrainian resistance were to crumble.

This has helped fuel a national outpouring of volunteerism as everyone has sought to contribute to victory. Ordinary Ukrainians have donated billions of dollars to help fund the country’s defense. People give whatever they can, with some contributing large sums and others handing over their last pennies. One day recently, three young boys approached my car selling home-made bracelets to raise funds for the army. Similar scenes can be encountered in towns and cities across Ukraine every day.

I recently attended a press conference in Kyiv to mark US President Joe Biden’s surprise visit to the Ukrainian capital. Biden made a point of expressing his admiration for Ukraine’s astounding resilience. The reason is simple: we know that our country is currently engaged in an existential fight for survival. If we stop fighting, we will simply disappear. If the Russians stop fighting, the war will end.

As things currently stand, the invasion is far from over. The military situation is complex and unpredictable. Ukraine enjoys strong morale following a series of battlefield successes and is also benefiting from a steady flow of modern weapons from the country’s Western partners. Meanwhile, Russia has strength in numbers thanks to the country’s first mobilization since World War II, while Putin appears to be preparing domestic audiences and the Russian economy for a long war. Ukrainians remain confident of ultimate victory, but there is also widespread recognition that the journey will be long and difficult.

Despite this uncertainty, there are reasons to look ahead with a sense of confidence. One year ago, Kyiv was supposed to fall within a matter of days. Instead, the Ukrainian capital has become a global symbol of courage and freedom. Over the past year, Ukraine has earned the respect of the watching world. Indeed, no country has ever undergone such a complete image transformation in such a short space of time. Once known primarily for corruption and poverty, Ukraine is now a byword for bravery.

For the first time in my life, I firmly believe Ukraine has a realistic change of joining the European Union. When this finally happens, it will confirm a civilizational shift that has been underway for the past few decades as Ukraine has struggled to shake off the shackles of empire and shed the country’s post-Soviet legacy. Despite the horrors of Russia’s ongoing invasion, I am convinced Ukraine is now moving toward better times. Most of all, I am absolutely sure this bright future is thoroughly deserved.

Vitaly Sych is Chief Editor of NV media house which includes a weekly magazine, national talk radio station, and news site NV.ua.

Putin reshares narratives used to justify war of aggression in anniversary speech

Russia accuses Ukraine of plotting an invasion on Transnistria

Security

Ukraine prepares for Russian offensive on Vuhledar as Prigozhin accuses Russian command of lying

Prigozhin’s verbal attacks on Russian army leadership shed light on how Russian authorities supported Wagner Group

DFRLab releases investigations on Russian information operations before and after the invasion

This week, our team at the DFRLab released two investigative reports on how Russia employed information operations before and after its invasion of Ukraine one year ago today. The first report, Narrative Warfare: How the Kremlin and Russian news outlets justified a war of aggression against Ukraine, examines how the Kremlin and its media proxies employed false and misleading narratives to justify military action against Ukraine, mask the Kremlin’s operational planning, and deny any responsibility for the coming war. Collectively, these narratives served as Vladimir Putin’s casus belli to engage in a war of aggression against Ukraine.

To research this report, we reviewed more than 350 fact-checks of pro-Kremlin disinformation published from 2014 to 2021 to identify recurring anti-Ukraine rhetoric, then collected more than ten thousand examples of false and misleading narratives published by fourteen pro-Kremlin outlets in the ten weeks leading up to the invasion. This allowed us to produce a timeline showing how Russia weaponized these narratives as its actions on the ground escalated toward war. When Vladimir Putin announced the invasion one year ago today, these narratives effectively served as his talking points, recurring more than 200 times during his remarks.

In our new reports, the @DFRLab analyzed 10,000+ narrative examples from Russian sources before the invasion that contained false and misleading narratives used later to justify the war. In his speech announcing the invasion, Putin used such narratives 200+ times in one speech. pic.twitter.com/bgjzSbzqnp
— DFRLab – @dfrlab.bsky.social (@DFRLab) February 22, 2023

The second report, Undermining Ukraine: How the Kremlin employs information operations to erode global confidence in Ukraine, compiles some of our most important findings on Russian information operations identified over the last year in our Russian War Report. Once the war began in earnest, Russia expanded its information strategy with an additional emphasis on undermining Ukraine’s ability to resist in hopes of forcing the country to surrender or enter negotiations on Russia’s terms. This strategic expansion included efforts to maintain control of information and support for the war effort at home, undercut Ukrainian resistance, derail support for Ukrainian resistance among allies and partners, especially in the immediate region, and engage in aggressive information operations internationally to shape public opinion about Russia’s war of aggression, including in Africa and Latin America.

We will continue marking the first anniversary of the war next week with the publication of the DFRLab Cyber Statecraft Initiative report, A Parallel Terrain: Public-Private Defense of the Ukrainian Information Environment. A Parallel Terrain analyzes Russia’s continuous assaults against the Ukrainian information environment, not only striking though but attempting to contest and claim this environment in parallel with its conventional invasion. It examines how Russian offensives and Ukrainian defense move through this largely privately owned and operated environment, and how this war has highlighted the growing role that private companies play in conflict. This report will be published February 27. 

—Andy Carvin, Managing Editor, Washington, DC

Putin reshares narratives used to justify war of aggression in anniversary speech

On February 21, Vladimir Putin delivered an address to the Russian parliament that regurgitated many of the same narratives previously used to justify the invasion of Ukraine, which we explored in our Narrative Warfare report. The speech attempted to depict Putin as innocent of the bloodshed he started one year ago today. Putin spoke of a self-sufficient Russia and urged entrepreneurs to give up investments from overseas. Putin also urged Russian parents to protect their children from the “degradation and degeneration” of the West, one of the recurring themes we documented in Undermining Ukraine. Putin also said that the Sea of Azov “again became Russia’s landlocked sea” and added that Russia would develop the ports and cities in the area; he did not provide a timeline for this endeavor, however.

Putin also announced the creation of a special fund to compensate and assist those involved in the war and the relatives of the dead and wounded, as well as an additional fourteen days of annual leave for combatants to be with family and loved ones.

Putin delivered his speech just hours before US President Joe Biden delivered an address in Warsaw.

—Ruslan Trad, Resident Fellow for Security Research, Sofia, Bulgaria

Russia accuses Ukraine of plotting an invasion on Transnistria

On February 23, the Russian defense ministry claimed that Ukrainian armed forces were planning a provocation against the breakaway Moldovan region of Transnistria “with the involvement of the nationalist Azov battalion.” The ministry added that Ukraine plans to stage an attack by Russian forces in Transnistria as a “pretext to invade.” To accomplish this, Ukrainian soldiers would allegedly dress in Russian military uniforms. Several pro-Russian Telegram channels circulated pictures alleged to show military equipment along the border of Transnistria. These accusations are eerily similar to ones made by leaders the breakaway Ukrainian regions of Donetsk and Luhansk, which Putin used as a pretext for Russia’s February 2022 invasion of Ukraine.

In light of these allegations, the Moldovan government issued a statement on February 23 denying the Russian defense ministry’s claims and urged the population to remain calm and follow credible sources.

Later that evening, the Russian defense ministry released another statement claiming there was “a significant accumulation of personnel and military equipment of Ukrainian units near the Ukrainian-Pridnestrovian border, the deployment of artillery at firing positions, as well as an unprecedented increase in flights of unmanned aircraft of the Armed Forces of Ukraine over the territory of the PMR [Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic].” These claims were shared without any evidence. According to the statement, these purported plans represent a direct threat to the “Russian peacekeeping contingent legally deployed in Transnistria,” and Russia will “adequately respond to the impending provocation of the Ukrainian side.”

It should be noted that both statements referred to the unrecognized Transnistria region as the “Pridnestrovian Moldovan Republic,” the pro-Russia separatist name for Transnistria. Russian authorities previously referred to the area as Pridnestrov’ye, the Russian word for Transnistria, which tacitly acknowledged it was a part of Moldova, while “Pridnestrovian Moldovan Republic” implies it is an independent entity.

On February 22, Putin revoked a 2012 decree that contained a clause stipulating Russia’s commitment to search for ways to settle the Transnistrian conflict “with respect to Moldova’s sovereignty, territorial integrity, and neutral status.” The Kremlin warned that relations between Russia and Moldova are “extremely tense,” accusing the Moldovan government of having an anti-Russian agenda. Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov recommended that Moldovan authorities “be cautious” in their assessments of the Transnistrian settlement.

—Victoria Olari, Research Assistant, Moldova

Ukraine prepares for Russian offensive on Vuhledar as Prigozhin accuses Russian command of lying

Ukrainian intelligence reported on the movement of Russian convoys not bearing identification marks headed toward the Chernihiv region. The troops reportedly wore uniforms resembling those of the Ukrainian army. Ukrainian military bloggers also reported that a Russian reconnaissance drone was detected in the Sumy region. Low-res satellite imagery indicates there may be renewed activity at the Zyabrovka airfield in Belarus, located north of Chernihiv, as movement was detected on February 18. In February 2022, before the invasion, Zyabrovka served as the site of joint air drills with Russia. Poland-based Rochan Consulting also reported that S-300 systems facing Chernihiv were deployed last month.

On February 21, Vadym Skibitsky, deputy head of Ukrainian military intelligence, said that Russia intensified its operations earlier this month in the directions of Luhansk, Donetsk, and Zaporizhzhia. Skibitsky said Russia is concentrating military efforts on capturing Kupyansk, Lyman, Bakhmut, Marinka, Avdiivka, and Vuhledar. On February 23, the United Kingdom’s Ministry of Defense also reported on heavy fighting near Bakhmut, but said Ukrainian forces have managed to keep a key supply route in the western direction open despite Russia’s attempts at encirclement over the last six weeks. The UK ministry confirmed Vuhledar is under heavy shelling and said there is a “real possibility that Russia is preparing for another offensive in this area.”

On February 17, the Russian Ministry of Defense announced new commander roles, with Andrey Mordvichev leading the Central Military District (TsVO), Sergey Kuzovlev leading the Southern District (YuVO), Yevgeny Nikiforov leading the Western District (ZVO), and Rustam Muradov maintaining command of the Eastern District (VVO), which is responsible for operations in Vuhledar. Muradov is the commander who ordered the frontal assault on Vuhledar from February 8 to 10, which resulted in the defeat of the 155th Marine Corps of the Russian Navy. On February 20, Russian Minister of Defense Sergei Shoigu presented epaulets to senior officers at the National Center of Defense Management in Moscow.

Meanwhile, the internal power struggle between Russian defense officials and Wagner Group founder Yevgeny Prigozhin continues. In a series of audio clips, he accused the Russian defense ministry of lying about supplying Wagner troops with requested artillery munitions, claiming soldiers received only twenty percent of the artillery ammunition promised to them. Prigozhin urged the ministry to fulfill its promises instead of “lying” to the Russian public. Russian military bloggers defended and amplified Prigozhin’s claims, accusing the defense ministry of failing to support Russia’s most effective forces.

On February 23, the Russian army shelled Liubotyn in Kharkiv oblast with a Tornado-S multiple-launch rocket system, resulting in damaged buildings. Damage was also reported in Lemishchyne and Morozova Dolyna, also in Kharkiv oblast, due to Russian artillery shelling. In Kupiansk, two people were reportedly buried under rubble after a Russian S-300 missile strike. Observers also reported explosions in Kramatorsk.

That same day, Polish Defense Minister Mariusz Błaszczak announced the “preventive expansion of security measures” along the country’s borders with Belarus and the Russian territory of Kaliningrad, where the first fortifications are already underway.

According to a Reuters report, the European Union will develop and implement a program for the joint purchase of artillery shells for Ukraine. This will enhance coordination and facilitate investment in new production facilities.

—Ruslan Trad, Resident Fellow for Security Research, Sofia, Bulgaria

Prigozhin’s verbal attacks on Russian army leadership shed light on how Russian authorities supported Wagner Group

As previously noted, Wagner Group founder Yevgeny Prigozhin published multiple audio recordings lashing out at Russian military leadership for not adequately supplying a Wagner Group division with artillery munitions. The audio recordings revealed the model of collaboration between the Wagner Group and Russian Army according to Prigozhin.

On February 20, in reply to a media inquiry by RT correspondent Konstantin Pridybaylo about insufficient ammunition supplies, Prigozhin said that “there is ammunition in the country” and “the industry is producing as much as needed, even with oversupply,” but “no decisions are made” to supply the Wagner Group. “No one understands where alleged limits are coming from, where procedures to receive [ammunition] are coming from, no one knows the ways one or the other documents are signed,” he added. “Everyone is showing me upwards saying: ‘You know, Yevgeny Viktorovich, you have complicated relationships up there….You need to go, apologize, and obey. Then your fighters will receive ammunition.’”

In another audio recording on February 21, Prigozhin went further, stating “The Chief of General Staff [Valery Gerasimov] and the Minister of Defense [Sergei Shoigu] are handing out commands to the right and left not only to not give ammunition to the Wagner Group, but also to not provide help via air transport….This is direct opposition that is nothing short of an attempt to destroy the Wagner Group. It can be equated to treason.” In another audio recording that day, Prigozhin said that “other divisions are in constant undersupply of ammunition.” He claimed that “a bunch of near-the-war functionaries” are “trying to twist intrigues” by “calling Telegram channels and telling them, ‘Do not publish Prigozhin. Write that he – I don’t know – eats ammunition or sells it to Americans.'” By the end of the day, the Russian Ministry of Defense denied that it was blocking ammunition supply to “voluntary assault squads.” In return, Prigozhin accused the ministry of lying about ammunition supplies to Wagner Group forces fighting near Bahkmut.

The next day, on February 22, Prigozin continued to pressure defense ministry decisionmakers to supply Wagner Group with ammunition by forwarding a graphic image showing dozens of dead men lying on the snowy ground, as well as a screenshot of an ammunition request dated February 17 addressed to Chief of Staff Gerasimov. In an audio recording posted around the same time, Prigozhin stated, “The final signature needs to be made by either Gerasimov or Shoigu. None of them want to make the decision. I’ll explain. The Wagner Group allegedly does not exist. Previously, we received ammunition via some military divisions that are allegedly taking Bakhmut instead of us. But there is no one else and everyone knows about it by now.”

He also mentioned that a call to “give shells to the Wagners” (“Дайте снаряды Вагнерам”) had been “launched on social media.” Wagner accounts on VKontakte and pro-war Telegram channels amplified variants of the slogan.

Wagner campaign image using a variant of Prigozhin’s slogan, “give shells to the Wagners” (“Дайте снаряды Вагнерам”). It warns that not supplying Wagner forces with sufficient ammunition is “criminal” and either “a mistake or a betrayal.” (Source: VK/archive)

The DFRLab also identified a petition on Change.org with the slogan; it was deleted by February 24.

Screenshot of Google Search result showing the now-deleted Change.org petition. (Source: Change.org/archive)

Finally, in an audio recording on February 23, Prigozhin announced, “Ammunition shipment begins…on paper for now, but the most relevant papers are already signed.”

—Nika Aleksejeva, Resident Fellow, Riga, Latvia

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Aziz in Dawn: Banistan: Ignorant leaders, absurd regulation

Atlantic Council — Fri, 10 Feb 2023 19:50:00 +0000

original source

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Russian War Report: DFRLab confirms Russia’s push to encircle Bakhmut

Valentin Châtelet, Ruslan Trad, Kateryna Halstead, Nika Aleksejeva — Fri, 10 Feb 2023 17:38:29 +0000

As Russia continues its assault on Ukraine, the Atlantic Council’s Digital Forensic Research Lab (DFRLab) is keeping a close eye on Russia’s movements across the military, cyber, and information domains. With more than seven years of experience monitoring the situation in Ukraine—as well as Russia’s use of propaganda and disinformation to undermine the United States, NATO, and the European Union—the DFRLab’s global team presents the latest installment of the Russian War Report.

Security

Wagner forces attempt to encircle Bakhmut and cut off vital Ukrainian supply routes

Alleged Russian agent captured as Moscow restarts offensives on the Kreminna-Svatove line

Tracking narratives

Russia claims ‘panicked West’ sent tanks to Ukraine

Media policy

New Russian maps redraw borders to include eastern Ukraine

Wagner forces attempt to encircle Bakhmut and cut off vital Ukrainian supply routes

After gaining control over Soledar in mid-January, Wagner Group soldiers are attempting to encircle Bakhmut. The DFRLab confirmed the progression of a bloc of forces that includes Wagner, the People’s Militia of the Donetsk People’s Republic, and Russian armed forces. At the end of January, Wagner shared a photo of its soldiers standing in front of a sign reading “Blahodatne” as evidence they had seized the village of the same name. On February 7, the Russian MoD also stated that it had seized Blahodatne. The small village is strategically located on the key Ukrainian E40 highway, which serves as a supply route to Krasna Hora and Bakhmut. A photo of a burning Russian tank geolocated by OSINT researcher @Neonhandrail suggests that attempts to cut off the supply route have thus far been unsuccessful.

Meanwhile on the southern flank, Russian armed forces are trying to consolidate their progression towards Ivanivske. Only one division of the Ukrainian army, the 30th Mechanized Brigade, has had to repel a Russian incursion on the road between Bakhmut and Sloviansk.

On Telegram, a post by WarDonbass speculated that Wagner could have gained control over two southern supply routes to Bakhmut. However, there is no evidence to support this claim. Inside the city of Bakhmut, footage released by the Georgian legion of the Ukrainian army indicates that Ukraine is strengthening its defensive positions.

Further south, the DFRLab geolocated footage published by the Telegram channel ColonelCassad, which was then reposted on Wagner’s own Telegram channel. Videos of drone strikes on the northern and eastern part of Marinka indicate a violent escalation on the southern flank. The footage also shows rubble where a hospital once stood.

Geolocated footage of Russian strikes on World War II Veteran Hospital (purple square) near the Osykova River, Mariinka, Donetsk oblast. Additional polygons identify ground features appearing in each image. (Source: ColonelCassad, left; Valentin Châtelet,/Google Earth, right)

—Valentin Châtelet, Research Associate, Brussels, Belgium

Alleged Russian agent captured as Moscow restarts offensives on the Kreminna-Svatove line

Ukrainian military intelligence announced on February 6 the capture of a Russian agent who allegedly leaked information about Ukrainian military operations in “a strategically important sector of the front.” The suspect was an official in a Ukrainian military unit. He was allegedly recruited by Russia after the start of the invasion.

Elsewhere, the Russian army launched limited offensives on February 7 along the Kreminna-Svatove line. Russian forces have made gains in the Dvorichna area, northwest of Svatove. Units that have been spotted on this front include regular units, special intelligence units, regiments from the 144th and 3rd Motor Rifle Division, a regiment from the 90th Tank Division, and the 76th Airborne Division. On February 9, Ukrainian forces appear to have destroyed a Russian BMPT Terminator armored vehicle near Kreminna, according to a visual report published by the UNIAN Telegram channel. If confirmed, this would be the first documented loss of such a vehicle, which is only available in limited supply. Days earlier, on February 6, Russian pro-government media published footage showing how Russian units in the area used these vehicles in a local counter-offensive in Kreminna.

Russian forces continue to attack towns across Ukraine, with Russian channels reporting missile attacks in Kramatorsk and Sloviansk. On February 9, Ukrainian media reported that drones over Dnipro were downed.

Ukrainian parliament voted in favor of bills N8360 and N8361-d, which provide an exemption from taxes and duties for drones, thermal imagers, collimators, walkie-talkies, and night vision devices. Yaroslav Zhelezniak, deputy head of the Verkhovna Rada Committee on Tax and Customs Policy, clarified on his Telegram channel that radios were added to the bills after appeals from volunteer organizations. The adopted bills will remove import restrictions, allowing for the express shipment of some military equipment.

—Ruslan Trad, Resident Fellow for Security Research, Sofia, Bulgaria

Russia claims ‘panicked West’ sent tanks to Ukraine

Following the decision from Western allies to provide armored tanks to Ukraine, there has been an increase in Russian narratives opposing the decision. The state-owned news outlet RIA Novosti published an article aimed at ridiculing Ukrainian Defense Minister Oleksiy Reznikov. The article’s banner photo depicts Reznikov holding a model tank with the accompanying headline, “Germany handed over toy Leopard 2 to Ukraine.” The narrative appears aimed at casting doubt on the efficacy of Germany’s Leopard 2 tanks.

RIA NOVOSTI depicting Ukrainian Defense Minister Oleksiy Reznikov holding a model tank (right) alongside German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius (left) under the headline “Germany handed over toy Leopard 2 to Ukraine.” (Source: RIA Novosti/archive)

Along with the heightened focus from Russian media on the transfer of tanks, other narratives presented the latest military aid package as a reaction from a panicked West due to the successes of the Russian “special military operation.” The pro-Kremlin journal International Affairs referred to Germany’s decision to send in tanks as capitulation to external pressure and a rash political decision arising from the tensions caused by Russia’s military successes. In addition, Ukraine’s latest round of anti-corruption measures resulted in speculation about the possible resignation or dismissal of Defense Minister Reznikov. Major Kremlin-backed publications, including TASS, have directly followed the developments, highlighting corruption problems in Kyiv. Other narratives have outlined Reznikov’s alleged refusal to resign amid the corruption charges as a result of his purported blackmail capabilities against the top echelons of the Ukrainian military and defense leadership, while also casting into doubt Ukraine’s entire leadership and ability to function as a government.

—Kateryna Halstead, Research Assistant, Bologna, Italy

New Russian maps redraw borders to include eastern Ukraine

The Kremlin-approved media outlet RBC reported on February 8 that Russian bookstores are selling new maps that include Crimea, Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson oblasts as part of Russia. The DFRLab found a version of this map for sale on the website of the Russian publishing company Atlas Print.

Atlas Print selling a “big wall map of Russia with new territories 3.00 x 1.60 m, laminated” for approximately USD $47. (Source: Atlas Print/archive)

Atlas Print Director Yuri Sukhanov spoke to RBC about how a bill in the Russian Duma “on countering extremist activity” prevented retailers from selling previous maps. The bill, which passed its first reading on December 20, 2022, stipulated that “extremist materials will include cartographic and other documents and images intended for distribution and public demonstration that dispute the territorial integrity of Russia.” The new maps appear to have been printed in response to the bill. According to Sukhanov, “There are large retail chains that are ready to sell only updated maps with the new borders of Russia.”

On September 23, 2022, Russia launched rigged referendums in Ukraine’s Luhansk, Donetsk, Kherson, and Zaporizhzhia oblasts. Russian President Vladimir Putin then signed decrees to recognize Kherson and Zaporizhzhia as independent and held a ceremony to incorporate all four oblasts into Russian territory. The newly printed maps do not correspond with the reality on the ground. On November 12, 2022, Ukraine forced Russian troops out of Kherson as it regained control over the area.

—Nika Aleksejeva, Research Fellow, Riga, Latvia

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Karatnycky in the American Spectator: Tucker Carlson and Ukraine: Undoing the Reagan Legacy

Atlantic Council — Mon, 30 Jan 2023 18:49:58 +0000

ORIGINAL SOURCE

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Nawaz honored with Columbia Journalism School 2023 alumni award

South Asia Center — Thu, 26 Jan 2023 17:40:34 +0000

Original Source

Shuja Nawaz was honored with the Columbia Journalism school’s 2023 alumni award. He is the founding director of the Atlantic Council’s South Asia Center in Washington, D.C. He now serves as a Distinguished Fellow at the Center.

Mr. Nawaz has worked with leading think tanks on projects dealing with Pakistan and the Middle East. He has also advised or briefed senior government and military officials and parliamentarians in the US, Europe, and Pakistan.

Mr. Nawaz was a newscaster and news and current affairs producer for Pakistan Television from 1967 to 1972 and covered the western front of the 1971 war between Pakistan and India. He has worked for The New York Times, the World Health Organization, and has headed three separate divisions at the International Monetary Fund. He was also a director at the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna 1999-2001, while on leave from the IMF.

He is the author of a new book The Battle for Pakistan: The Bitter US Friendship and a Tough Neighbourhood (Penguin Random House, and Liberty Books, Pakistan 2019 and Rowman & Littlefield 2020), and Crossed Swords: Pakistan, its Army, and the Wars Within (Oxford University Press 2008 and 2018).

I am delighted to be honored by my fellow alumni of the Columbia J School and to be in such august company. At heart, I remain a journalist. Asking questions and questioning authority. All for the public good. That’s what Columbia taught me.

Shuja Nawaz

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By South Asia Center experts

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Back to the future in Pakistan?

By Shuja Nawaz

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Elections Pakistan

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Putin is facing defeat in the information war

Peter Dickinson — Tue, 24 Jan 2023 21:36:06 +0000

As the world prepares to mark International Holocaust Remembrance Day on January 27, the European Union has accused Russia of “trampling on the memory” of the six million Jews who perished in the Holocaust. This rebuke came following controversial recent comments by Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, who compared Western support for Ukraine to the Nazi genocide of European Jewry.

Speaking on January 18, Lavrov claimed a coalition of Western countries led by the United States was following in the footsteps of Napoleon and Hitler with the goal of destroying Russia. “They are waging war against our country with the same task: the final solution of the Russian question,” he said in direct reference to Hitler’s infamous “final solution” of the Jewish question.

Lavrov’s Holocaust comparison was met with widespread international criticism. In a strongly worded statement, EU foreign policy chief Josep Borrell said his Russian counterpart’s comments were “entirely misplaced, disrespectful, and trample on the memory of the six million Jewish people, and other victims, who were systematically murdered in the Holocaust. The Russian regime’s manipulation of the truth to justify their illegal war of aggression against Ukraine has reached another unacceptable and despicable low point.”

The Israeli Foreign Ministry branded Lavrov’s remarks “unacceptable,” while French diplomats said the Russian foreign minister’s attempt to compare international opposition to the invasion of Ukraine with the Holocaust was “outrageous and disgraceful.” Meanwhile, UK Foreign Secretary James Cleverly called Lavrov’s comments “totally abhorrent” while noting, “Russia is not the victim. Russia is the aggressor.”

In the US, national security spokesperson John Kirby expressed indignation at Lavrov’s attempt to draw parallels between the Nazi genocide and the response to Russia’s attack on Ukraine. “How dare he compare anything to the Holocaust, let alone a war that they started,” he told reporters at the White House. “It’s almost so absurd that it’s not worth responding to, other than the truly offensive manner in which he tried to cast us in terms of Hitler and the Holocaust.”

This was not Lavrov’s first flirtation with anti-Semitic historical distortions. During an appearance on Italian TV in spring 2022, Russia’s top diplomat sparked outrage by repeating the notorious anti-Semitic trope that Hitler was Jewish. When asked why Russia insists on calling Ukraine a “Nazi state” despite the fact that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy is Jewish, Lavrov replied that Nazi leader Adolf Hitler “also had Jewish blood.”

The fallout from Lavrov’s very public descent into the squalid world of anti-Semitic conspiracy theories was predictably severe. Following a chorus of international condemnation led by Israel, Vladimir Putin was eventually obliged to intervene. In early May, the Russian dictator called the Israeli Prime Minister to personally apologize on behalf of his foreign minister.

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The international backlash over Lavrov’s blunders illustrates the limitations of the propaganda narratives developed by Moscow to justify the invasion of Ukraine. While captive audiences inside Russia have been largely convinced by attempts to blame hostilities on “Ukrainian Nazis” and the “Russophobic West,” these unsubstantiated arguments have proven far less persuasive internationally and have served to further undermine the Kremlin’s dwindling credibility.

Russian attempts to portray Ukrainians as Nazis are nothing new and can be traced back to Soviet wartime propaganda. The tactic has been enthusiastically revived by the Kremlin in recent years to dehumanize Ukrainians and legitimize attempts to extinguish Ukrainian independence. This plays well in modern Russia, where the Putin regime has fostered a cult-like reverence for the Soviet role in World War II that includes the demonizing of all opponents as “fascists.” However, the lack of any actual evidence to support these poisonous allegations has left outside observers deeply skeptical.

As Lavrov himself discovered during last year’s disastrous Italian TV interview, most people living beyond the suffocating confines of the Kremlin propaganda bubble regard the election of Ukraine’s Russian-speaking Jewish President Volodymyr Zelenskyy as convincing proof that Ukraine is anything but a Nazi state. Likewise, the consistent failure of Ukraine’s far right parties to secure more than 2% of the vote in national ballots makes a mockery of Moscow’s entire “Nazi Ukraine” narrative. In the eleven months since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine began, Russia has yet to identify any of the “Nazis” it claims to be fighting or define exactly what the stated war aim of “de-Nazification” means in practice.

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Lavrov’s lurid allegations of anti-Russian plots suffer from similar problems. While domestic audiences in Russia have been conditioned for decades to view their country as a blameless victim of irrational Western Russophobia, there is a growing consensus in the wider world that the international community has actually been much too slow to react to the mounting threats posed by Putin’s Russia.

Far from pursuing the destruction of Russia, the West responded to Moscow’s wars of aggression in Georgia and Ukraine with a series of misguided resets and endless policies of appeasement. Indeed, it was not until Putin launched the biggest European conflict since World War II last February that Western leaders finally and reluctantly acknowledged the necessity of countering the Kremlin. Even now, as Russia’s invasion approaches the one-year mark, the debate over Western support for Ukraine remains dominated by excessive caution and a debilitating desire to avoid escalation. These are self-evidently not the actions of an international coalition seeking “the final solution to the Russian question,” as Lavrov so absurdly claims.

It is still far too early for Ukraine to declare victory in the information war. Russian disinformation narratives continue to resonate on the vocal fringes of Western society while also appealing to widespread anti-Western sentiment in much of Asia, Africa, and South America. Nevertheless, the wholesale revulsion over Lavrov’s recent Holocaust remarks is a timely reminder of the increasingly unbridgeable gap separating Russia’s alternative reality from the real world.

Almost one year since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine began, only a handful of fellow pariah states are still prepared to stand with Russia on the global stage as international audiences reject Kremlin claims of phantom fascists and anti-Russian conspiracies. Instead, there is growing recognition that the war in Ukraine is an act of naked imperial aggression that threatens to destabilize the wider world.

Russia’s attack on Ukraine has been built on an unprecedented web of deceit and distortion. As these lies lose their power and the reality of Putin’s genocidal agenda becomes impossible to ignore, a consensus is emerging that the war in Ukraine will only end when Russia is decisively defeated.

Peter Dickinson is Editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert Service.

Tracking narratives

Russian hacker wanted by the FBI reportedly wins Wagner hackathon prize

Frenzy befalls French company accused of feeding Russian forces on New Year’s Eve

Former head of Russian space agency injured in Donetsk, mails shell fragment to French ambassador

Sputnik Lithuania’s former chief editor arrested

International response

New year brings new military aid for Ukraine

Ukrainian envoy to Georgia discusses deteriorating relations between nations

Russian forces claim control of strategic Soledar

Russia said on January 13 that its forces had taken control of the contested city of Soledar. Recent fighting has been concentrated in Soledar and Bakhmut, two cities in the Donetsk region that are strategically important to Ukrainian and Russian forces. Moscow has been trying to take control of the two cities since last summer. Over the past week, Russia has increased its presence on the fronts with the support of Wagner units. Russia wants control of the Soledar-Bakhmut axis to cut supply lines to the Ukrainian armed forces.

On January 10, Russian sources claimed that Wagner forces had advanced into Soledar. Interestingly, Wagner financier Yevgeny Prigozhin denied the claim and said the forces were still engaged in fighting. Wagner’s presence was established in a camp near Bakhmut. Soldiers from the Wagner Group and other special forces deployed to Bakhmut after other military units had failed to break through the Ukrainian defense.

On January 11, Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Anna Malyar said that heavy fighting was taking place in Soledar and that Russian forces had replaced the unit operating in the city with fresh troops and increased the number of Wagner soldiers among them. The same day, Prigozhin claimed that Wagner forces had taken control of Soledar. The Ukrainian defense ministry denied the allegation. On January 12, Ukrainian sources shared unconfirmed footage of soldiers driving on the main road connecting Bakhmut and Soledar with Sloviansk and Kostyantynivka to as evidence that the area remained under Ukrainian control.

Elsewhere, on January 11, the Kremlin announced that Valery Gerasimov would replace Sergei Surovikin as commander of Russian forces in Ukraine. The unexpected move could be interpreted as evidence of a struggle for influence in Russian military circles. Surovikin is considered close to Prigozhin’s entourage, which has criticized senior officers recently, including Gerasimov. Some analysts believe that the change signals a possible military escalation from Russia.

Furthermore, on January 8, Ukrainian forces repelled a Russian offensive the vicinity of Makiyivka and Stelmakhivka. Further north of Lysychansk, on January 11, Ukraine also repelled an attack on the city of Kreminna. In the neighboring Kharkiv region, aerial threats remain high. On the southern front, the city of Kherson and several cities across the Zaporizhzhia region remain targets of Russian attacks.

Lastly, a new Maxar satellite image from nearby Bakhmut exemplifies the brutality of war on the frontline in Donetsk. The image shows thousands of craters, indicating the intensity of the artillery shelling and exchange of fire between Ukrainian and Russian forces.

—Valentin Châtelet, Research Associate, Brussels, Belgium

—Ruslan Trad, Resident Fellow for Security Research, Sofia, Bulgaria

Russian hacker wanted by the FBI reportedly wins Wagner hackathon prize

In December 2022, the Wagner Group organized a hackathon at its recently opened headquarters in St. Petersburg, for students, developers, analysts, and IT professionals. Wagner announced the hackathon on social media earlier that month. Organizers created the promotional website hakaton.wagnercentr.ru, but the website went offline soon after. A December 8 archive of the website, accessed via the Internet Archive Wayback Machine, revealed that the objective of the hackathon was to “create UAV [unmanned aerial vehicle] positioning systems using video recognition, searching for waypoints by landmarks in the absence of satellite navigation systems and external control.” Hackathon participants were asked to complete the following tasks: display the position of the UAV on the map at any time during the flight; direct the UAV to a point on the map indicated by the operator; provide a search for landmarks, in case of loss of visual reference points during the flight and returning the UAV to the point of departure, in case of a complete loss of communication with the operator.  

On December 9, Ukrainian programmers noticed that hakaton.wagnercentr.ru was hosted by Amazon Web Services and asked users to report the website to Amazon. Calls to report the channel also spread on Telegram, where the channel Empire Burns asked subscribers to report the website and provided instructions on how to do so. Empire Burns claims hakaton.wagnercentr.ru first went offline on December 9, which tallies with archival posts. However, there is no evidence that reporting the website to Amazon resulted in it being taken offline.  

Snapshots of hakaton.wagnercentr.ru from the Wayback Machine show the website was created in a Bitrix24 online workspace. A snapshot captured on December 13 shows an HTTP 301 status, which redirects visitors to Wagner’s main website, wagnercentr.ru. The Wagner website appears to be geo-restricted for visitors outside Russia.

On December 23, a Wagner Telegram channel posted about the hackathon, claiming more than 100 people applied. In the end, forty-three people divided into twelve teams attended. The two-person team GrAILab Development won first place, the team SR Data-Iskander won second place, and a team from the company Artistrazh received third place. Notably, one of Artistrazh’s co-founders is Igor Turashev, who is wanted by the FBI for his connection to computer malware that the bureau claims infected “tens of thousands of computers, in both North America and Europe, resulting in financial losses in the tens of millions of dollars.” Artistrazh’s team comprised four people who won 200,000 Russian rubles (USD $3,000). OSINT investigators at Molfar confirmed that the Igor Turashev who works at Artistrazh is the same one wanted by the FBI.

Wagner said that one of the key objectives of the hackathon was the development of IT projects to protect the interests of the Russian army, adding that the knowledge gained during the hackathon could already be applied to clear mines. Wagner said it had also invited some participants to collaborate further. The Wagner Center opened in St. Petersburg in early November 2022; the center’s mission is “to provide a comfortable environment for generating new ideas in order to improve Russia’s defense capability, including information.”

– Givi Gigitashvili, DFRLab Research Associate, Warsaw, Poland

Frenzy befalls French company accused of feeding Russian forces on New Year’s Eve

A VKontakte post showing baskets of canned goods produced by the French company Bonduelle being distributed to Russian soldiers on New Year’s Eve has sparked a media frenzy in France. The post alleges that Bonduelle sent Russian soldiers a congratulatory package, telling them to “come back with a win.” The post quotes Ekaterina Eliseeva, the head of Bonduelle’s EurAsia markets. According to a 2019 Forbes article, Eliseeva studied interpretation at an Russian state security academy. 

Bonduelle has issued several statements denying the social media post and calling it fake. However, Bonduelle does maintain operations in Russia “to ensure that the population has access to essential foodstuff.” 

French broadcaster TV 5 Monde discovered that Bonduelle’s Russia division participated in a non-profit effort called Basket of Kindness, sponsored by the Fund of Presidential Grants of Russia. Food and supplies were gathered by food banks to be delivered to vulnerable segments of the population. However, during the collection drive, Dmitry Zharikov, governor of the Russian city of Podolsk, posted on Telegram that the collections would also serve military families.  

The story was shared on national television in France and across several international outlets. The Ukrainian embassy in France criticized Bonduelle for continuing to operate in Russia, claiming it was “making profits in a terrorist country which kills Ukrainians.”

—Valentin Châtelet, Research Associate, Brussels, Belgium

Former head of Russian space agency injured in Donetsk, mails shell fragment to French ambassador

Dmitry Rogozin, former head of the Russian space agency Roscosmos, said he was wounded in Ukrainian shelling on December 21, 2022, at the Shesh hotel in Donetsk while “celebrating his birthday.” In response, Rogozin sent a letter to Pierre Lévy, the French ambassador to Russia, with a fragment of the shell.  

In the letter, Rogozin accused the French government of “betraying [Charles] De Gaulle’s cause and becoming a bloodthirsty state in Europe.” The shell fragment was extracted from Rogozin’s spine during surgery and allegedly came from a French CAESAR howitzer. Rogozin requested the fragment be sent to French President Emmanuel Macron. His message was relayed by Russian news agencies, and on Telegram by pro-Russian and French-speaking conspiracy channels. 

At the time of the attack, Rogozin was accompanied by two members of his voluntary unit, “Tsar’s wolves,” who were killed in the attack, according to reporting from RT, RIA Novosti, and others. 

– Valentin Châtelet, Research Associate, Brussels, Belgium

Sputnik Lithuania’s former chief editor arrested

On January 6, Marat Kasem, the former chief editor of Sputnik Lithuania, was arrested in Riga, Latvia, on suspicion of “providing economic resources” to a Kremlin propaganda resource under EU sanctions.

The following day, pro-Kremlin journalists held a small demonstration in support of Kasem in front of the Latvian embassy in Moscow. Russian journalist Dmitry Kiselyov and politician Maria Butina attended the event.

The demonstration was filmed by Sputnik and amplified with the Russian hashtag #свободуМаратуКасему (#freedomForMaratKasem) on Telegram channels operating in the Baltic states, including the pro-Russian BALTNEWS, Своих не бросаем! | Свободная Балтика!, and on Butina’s personal channel. The news of Kasem’s arrest also reached the Russian Duma’s Telegram channel, which re-shared Butina’s post.

– Valentin Châtelet, Research Associate, Brussels, Belgium

New year brings new military aid for Ukraine

International efforts in support of Ukraine are continuing in full force in 2023. On January 4, Norway announced it had sent Ukraine another 10,000 155mm artillery shells. These shells can be used in several types of artillery units, including the M109 self-propelled howitzer. On January 5, Germany confirmed it would provide Ukraine with Marder fighting vehicles and a Patriot anti-aircraft missile battery. German news outlet Spiegel also reported that talks are underway to supply Ukraine with additional Gepard anti-aircraft guns and ammunition.

In addition, UK Foreign Secretary James Cleverly said the British government would supply Ukraine with military equipment capable of delivering a “decisive” strike from a distance. At the end of 2022, UK Defense Secretary Ben Wallace discussed the possibility of transferring Storm Shadow cruise missiles, with a range of up to 250 kilometers. Finland also reported that it is preparing its twelfth package of military assistance to Ukraine.

US aid to Ukraine is also being reaffirmed with a $2.85 billion package on top of weapon deliveries. Additionally, the US plans to deliver fourteen vehicles equipped with anti-drone systems as part of its security assistance package. The company L3Harris is part of the Pentagon’s contract to develop anti-drone kits. This equipment would help protect Ukrainian civil infrastructure, which has been a frequent Russian target since October 2022.

On January 6, French President Emmanuel Macron announced that France would supply Ukraine with units of the light AMX-10RC armored reconnaissance vehicle. These vehicles were produced in 1970 and have been used in Afghanistan, the Gulf War, Mali, Kosovo, and Ivory Coast. The French defense ministry also announced that the country was to deliver twenty units of ACMAT Bastion armored personnel carriers.

On January 11, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy met with Presidents Andrzej Duda of Poland and Gitanas Nauseda of Lithuania in Lviv. During the visit, Duda announced that Poland would deliver fourteen units of the much-awaited German Leopard combat tanks, and Nauseda announced that his country would provide Ukraine with Zenit anti-aircraft systems.

Meanwhile, the largest manufacturer of containers for the transport of liquified natural gas has ceased operations in Russia. French engineering group Gaztransport & Technigaz (GTT) said it ended operations in Russia after reviewing the latest European sanctions package, which included a ban on engineering services for Russian firms. The group said its contract with Russian shipbuilding company Zvezda to supply fifteen icebreakers to transport liquefied natural gas was suspended effective January 8.

—Valentin Châtelet, Research Associate, Brussels, Belgium

—Ruslan Trad, Resident Fellow for Security Research, Sofia, Bulgaria

Ukrainian envoy to Georgia discusses deteriorating relations between nations

On January 9, Andrii Kasianov, the Ukrainian Chargé d’Affaires in Georgia, published an article discussing the deteriorating relationship between the two countries. The article stated that the top issues affecting relations were military aid to Ukraine, bilateral sanctions against Russia, visa policies for fleeing Russians, and the legal rights of Mikheil Saakashvili, the imprisoned third president of Georgia, who is also a Ukrainian citizen.

Kasianov noted that Tbilisi declined Kyiv’s request for military help, specifically for BUK missile systems, which were given to Georgia by Ukraine during Russia’s 2008 invasion. The diplomat said that the weapons request also included Javelin anti-tank systems supplied to Georgia by the United States.

“Despite the fact that the Georgian government categorically refused to provide military aid, Ukraine opposes the use of this issue in internal political disputes and rejects any accusations of attempts to draw Georgia into a war with the Russian Federation,” Kasianov said.

Since the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the Georgian Dream-led government has accused Ukraine, the US, and the EU of attempting to drag Georgia into a war with Russia.

—Eto Buziashvili, Research Associate, Tbilisi, Georgia

The post Russian War Report: Russian hacker wanted by the FBI reportedly wins Wagner hackathon prize appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Putin’s faltering Ukraine invasion exposes limits of Russian propaganda

Victor Tregubov — Tue, 10 Jan 2023 21:10:33 +0000

As the Russian attack on Ukraine approaches the one-year mark, it is increasingly clear that Vladimir Putin’s decision to invade was one of the biggest geopolitical blunders of the modern era. The Russian dictator initially expected a short and victorious war. Instead, Putin’s faltering invasion has transformed him into an international pariah and shattered Russia’s reputation as a military superpower. How could he have got it so wrong?

The scale of the miscalculations that led to the invasion was laid bare in a recent New York Times article entitled: “How Putin’s war in Ukraine became a catastrophe for Russia.” This lengthy report featured details of the often wildly unrealistic objectives set for the invading Russian army, with specific units expected to advance hundreds of kilometers through hostile country and occupy towns deep inside Ukraine within a matter of days.

The orders handed out on the eve of the invasion confirm that Russian military planners dangerously underestimated Ukraine’s ability to fight back. At first glance, this makes little sense. By early 2022, Ukraine had already been at war with Russia for eight years and boasted a battle-hardened army of more than 200,000 personnel along with hundreds of thousands of highly motivated reservists with combat experience. This force was also relatively well-armed and led by an emerging generation of generals who had absorbed the lessons of the simmering conflict in eastern Ukraine.

And yet we now know from leaked and captured documents that Russia’s military and political elite anticipated only minimal organized resistance in Ukraine. Rather than preparing for a major war, they genuinely believed a large proportion of the Ukrainian population would greet them as liberators. Strikingly, they also doubted whether the country’s military had the stomach for a serious fight.

These absurd expectations were shaped by decades of misleading Kremlin propaganda. For generations, the Russian state has denied Ukraine’s right to exist and questioned the existence of a separate Ukrainian national identity. Putin has been a particularly prominent advocate of such arguments and has frequently claimed that Ukrainians are in fact Russians (“one people”). In the years between the 2014 occupation of Crimea and the full-scale invasion of February 2022, he repeatedly branded Ukraine an artificial country that had been unjustly separated from its rightful place as part of historical Russia.

Russian state propagandists have also long sought to discredit Ukraine’s post-Soviet transition toward Euro-Atlantic integration by dismissing it as a foreign plot. Rather than acknowledge the Ukrainian people’s right to determine their own future, the Kremlin has consistently insisted that the vast majority of Ukrainians see themselves as Russians but are victims of an extremist fringe acting in the interests of outsiders.

Such delusions seem to have penetrated the upper echelons of the Russian leadership. At no point in the lead-up to the war does anyone in the Kremlin appear to have taken the idea of Ukrainian agency seriously. Instead, they assumed the 2022 invasion would be a repeat of the spring 2014 takeover of Crimea, which saw Russian troops rapidly seize the Ukrainian peninsula amid post-revolutionary political paralysis in Kyiv. This was to prove an extremely costly mistake.

From the very first hours of the invasion, Russian troops ran into fierce Ukrainian resistance and began suffering heavy losses. Just over a month after the first columns of Russian tanks had crossed the border, Putin was forced to admit defeat in the Battle of Kyiv and withdraw from northern Ukraine entirely. His army has yet to regain the initiative, and has since retreated from Kharkiv region in eastern Ukraine and Right Bank Kherson in the south.

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As well as fatally underestimating Ukraine’s military capabilities, Putin also wildly overestimated the strength of his own army. Like many senior figures in Moscow, he took Russia’s military superpower status for granted and did not seriously consider the possibility of defeat at the hands of a minor state such as Ukraine. This confidence was shared by most Russians, who have traditionally embraced notions of their country’s military might with the zeal of religious dogma.

Despite a series of embarrassing setbacks in Ukraine, large numbers of Russians remain in denial and cling to the hope that Russia has yet to deploy its full military potential. Putin himself has fueled such wishful thinking by declaring that he has “not yet begun” to wage a real war in Ukraine. However, this bravado cannot disguise the significantly less imposing reality of a depleted and demoralized Russian army that is increasingly dependent on mobilized troops, outdated armor, and Iranian drones.

Putin has recently adopted a somewhat strange war strategy that appears primarily designed to appease domestic audiences. Since early October, Russia has been focusing on the mass aerial bombardment of Ukrainian cities and civilian infrastructure. This air war is hugely expensive and offers minimal military advantages. However, it is psychologically effective in convincing Russian audiences that their cause is not yet lost.

The Kremlin’s carefully curated propaganda machine works hard to amplify the impact of these airstrikes while exaggerating the hardships experienced by the Ukrainian civilian population. Likewise, state media also trumpets every minor gain achieved by Russian troops on the ground in eastern Ukraine, even when these advances are measured in meters. This creates the impression that Russia has stopped trying to win the war and is merely attempting to demonstrate that it is not losing.

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The war is far from over, of course. In September 2022, Putin demonstrated his resolve by ordering Russia’s first mobilization since World War II. Many international observers expect him to mobilize a further 500,000 troops in the coming weeks. This massive increase in Russian military manpower is already reducing Ukraine’s ability to advance and could allow Moscow to regain the initiative in the months ahead.

At the same time, the damage to Russia’s reputation has already been done. Russia’s global standing has always relied heavily on international perceptions of the country as a major military power. This myth has now been ruthlessly exposed on the battlefields of Ukraine. Countries which had earlier felt obliged to remain on good terms with Russia now understandably feel they have little to fear, while those who previously saw Moscow as a powerful partner have been forced to rethink this relationship.

Domestically, the consequences may be even more critical for Putin. Belief in Russia’s military strength served as the foundation stone of the country’s modern national identity. It was a source of patriotic pride that helped justify the often harsh living conditions and limited individual rights that all Russian citizens are forced to accept. This entire facade is now in danger of collapsing.

The failing invasion of Ukraine is not only exposing the relative weakness of the Russian military; it is revealing the rot at the heart of the Russian state and the emptiness of the Kremlin’s imperial posturing. This raises a number of grave questions about the future of the Russian Federation that Putin is unable to answer. For the past 22 years, he has succeeded in creating a parallel propaganda universe, but reality is now rapidly closing in.

Victor Tregubov is a Ukrainian political activist and commentator.

Russian military bloggers criticize Putin’s Orthodox Christmas ceasefire announcement

Russia admits losses in Makiivka attack, retaliates by striking empty Ukrainian ice rink

Ukraine’s first days of 2023 saw Russian shelling of civilian infrastructure and Ukrainian precision attacks on Russian positions.

Just prior to the new year, Russian forces launched sixty-nine cruise missiles and twenty-three drones, of which Ukrainian air defenses reportedly shot down fifty-four missiles and at least eleven drones. The attacks primarily struck infrastructure facilities in Lviv, Kyiv, Odesa, Kharkiv, and Donetsk, causing widespread disruptions to energy, heating, and water supplies. Russian forces also hit targets across Ukraine, including Sumy, Chernihiv, Zhytomyr, Vinnytsia, Khmelnytskyi, Ternopil, Ivano-Frankivsk, Poltava, Dnipro, and Zaporizhzhia. The Ukrainian Air Force Command claimed that Russian forces launched sixteen Shahed-131 and -136 drones on the night of December 29.

On New Year’s Eve, Ukraine’s army attacked Russian army headquarters in the occupied village of Makiivka, Donetsk. In a rare admission of casualties, the Russian Ministry of Defense confirmed eighty-nine soldiers were killed in the strike. Ukrainian armed forces, in contrast, reported 400 killed and 300 wounded. Ukrainian forces also shared a graphic video showing the aftermath of the shelling. On the evening of January 1, pro-Russia military blogger Vladimir Romanov reported that Ukraine had struck nineteen vocational schools, which commanders had “compactly populated” with recruits mobilized from the Saratov region. Romanov claimed 200 soldiers died in the attacks. On January 4, the Russian defense ministry stated, “It is already obvious that the main reason for what happened was the inclusion and massive use, contrary to the ban, by personnel of mobile phones in the reach of enemy weapons.” British intelligence assessed that someone placed ammunition inside the building, the detonation of which led to destruction and deaths.

In the Donetsk region, the Russian military is fighting for the ground between Bakhmut and Soledar, with Russian forces positioned to possibly encircle Soledar. A Wagner Group unit remains heavily active in the fighting across the zone around the Bakhmut frontline. To the northeast of the city, their forces advanced along the Svitlodarsk-Sloviansk highway and reached the southern outskirts of Pidhorodne. Ukrainian officers and British military intelligence stated that Russia is no longer hitting Bakhmut with the same ferocity as it had during the previous month, instead repositioning armored vehicles and artillery fire toward the nearby town of Soledar. Meanwhile in Bakhmut, Russian sources claim that units including Wagner detachments are advancing simultaneously in several directions.

To curb the backlash after Ukraine’s strike on Makiivka, Russia claimed it had killed “many” soldiers and foreign mercenaries “from Ukraine and NATO” in a January 3 strike on an ice rink in Druzhkivka, Donetsk. A French journalist witnessed the attack during a live report. The Ice Hockey Federation of Ukraine later stated the facility “was completely empty.”

On January 2, the village of Vyazovoe in the Belgorod region of Russia came under fire. On January 4, the Ukrainian army targeted the military commandant’s building in Vasylivka, Zaporizhzhia, used by the Russian armed forces to house personnel. Five people were killed and fifteen injured, according to Yevgeny Balitsky, acting governor of the occupied territory.

Against this background, Russia is trying to fill the losses in its arsenal. According to Ukrainian intelligence, Russia can produce about thirty Kh-101 cruise missiles and about twenty Kalibr missiles per month. Russian stockpiles of these missiles are extremely depleted, so in subsequent strikes, the Russian military may try to combine attacks using precision cruise missiles, S-300 anti-aircraft missiles against ground targets, Iranian kamikaze drones, and Soviet Kh-22 missiles. According to some estimates, Russian forces have about 160 Kh-22 missiles, but their range is only 350 kilometers. Russia has already used about 660 of the 1,750 Shahed drones ordered from Iran, but Iran is expected to send another batch of 250 to 300 units, along with improved drones and ballistic missiles.

According to Ukrainian military intelligence, six sabotage actions against Russian railways caused logistical problems in the first four days of 2023. In 2022, there were about forty railway sabotage actions reported in Russia.

On January 4, a fire was reported in a tent camp for mobilized units in the Siberian region of Tomsk. The Russian army uses tents to accommodate mobilized soldiers in an area of Siberia where, at this time of year, the temperature is between -10 and -20 degrees Celsius. Many units use heaters that can be dangerous and unstable in such conditions.

—Ruslan Trad, Resident Fellow for Security Research, Sofia, Bulgaria

Russian military bloggers criticize Putin’s Orthodox Christmas ceasefire announcement

On January 5, Russian President Vladimir Putin called for a thirty-six-hour ceasefire in Ukraine to observe Orthodox Christmas. Kyiv rejected Putin’s proposal, stating that Moscow’s aim was to stop Ukrainian advances in the Donbas. Putin’s ceasefire announcement was met with criticism from Russian military bloggers, with some even calling the proposal “madness.”

The pro-Kremlin Telegram channel Rybar called Putin’s suggestion “a beautiful political gesture” that “nobody cares about” and said that Russians want to rapidly end the war “with at least some logical conclusion.” Another military blog, Военный Осведомитель (“Military Informant”), called the decision “madness,” adding that Ukraine would not accept the offer.

Boris Rozhin, a pro-war military blogger, accused Russian officials of not learning any lessons from eight years of Minsk agreements “that nobody was fulfilling.” Rozhin added, “The decision is obviously unlikely to be very popular, even despite the efforts of official propaganda on this matter.” The post was amplified by multiple pro-war Telegram channels.

Igor Girkin, a former Russian Colonel turned ultranationalist, sarcastically stated on his Telegram channel that Putin took “a bold and decisive step towards defeat and surrender.” He added, “The Hague applauds and begins to prepare the camera.”

Criticism from pro-war military bloggers has increased in recent months in both scale and boldness. Military bloggers slammed the Kremlin for military failures, incompetence, and for rejoining the Ukraine grain deal.

—Eto Buziashvili, Research Associate, Tbilisi, Georgia

The post Russian War Report: Russian military bloggers criticize Putin’s Orthodox Christmas ceasefire announcement appeared first on Atlantic Council.

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