How did this happen? Russia, long opposed to the Council of Europe’s 2001 Budapest Convention on cybercrime, began this process in 2017. Then, in 2019, Russia, along with China, North Korea, Myanmar, Nicaragua, Syria, Cambodia, Venezuela, and Belarus, presented a resolution to develop a global treaty. Despite strong opposition from the United States and European states, the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution in December 2019, by a vote of seventy-nine in favor and sixty against (with thirty abstentions), that officially began the process. Already, it was clear that the member states did not share one vision. Indeed, they could not even agree on a name for the convention until last week. What they ended up with is a mouthful: “Draft United Nations convention against cybercrime: Strengthening international cooperation for combating certain crimes committed by means of information and communications technology systems and for the sharing of evidence in electronic form of serious crimes.”

This exceedingly long name reveals one of the biggest problems with this convention: its scope. At its heart, this convention is intended to allow law enforcement from different countries to cooperate to prevent, investigate, and prosecute cybercrime, which costs trillions of dollars globally each year. However, the convention covers much more than the typical cybercrimes that come to mind, such as ransomware, and includes crimes committed using technology, which reflects the different views as to what constitutes cybercrime. As if that were not broad enough, Russia, China, and other states succeeded in pushing for negotiations on an additional protocol that would expand the list of crimes even further. Additionally, under the convention, states parties are to cooperate on “collecting, obtaining, preserving, and sharing of evidence in electronic form of any serious crime”—which in the text is defined as a crime that is punishable by a maximum of four years or more in prison or a “more serious penalty,” such as the death penalty.

In Russia, for example, association with the “international LGBT movement” can lead to extremism charges, such as the crime of displaying “extremist group symbols,” like the rainbow flag. A first conviction carries a penalty of up to fifteen days in detention, but a repeat offense carries a penalty of up to four years. That means a repeat offense would qualify as a “serious crime” under the cybercrime convention and be eligible for assistance from law enforcement in other jurisdictions that may possess electronic evidence relevant to the investigation—including traffic, subscriber, and even content data. Considering how much of modern life is carried out digitally, there will be some kind of electronic evidence for almost every serious crime under any domestic legislation. Even the UN’s own human rights experts cautioned against this broad definition.

Further, under the convention, states parties are obligated to establish laws in their domestic system to “compel” service providers to “collect or record” real-time traffic or content data. Many of the states behind the original drive to establish this convention have long sought this power over private firms. At the same time, states parties are free to adopt laws that keep requests to compel traffic and content data confidential—cloaking these actions in secrecy. Meanwhile, grounds for a country to refuse a cooperation request are limited to instances such as where it would be against that country’s “sovereignty,” security, or other “essential” interest, or if it would be against that country’s own laws. The convention contains a vague caveat that nothing in it should be interpreted as an obligation to cooperate if a country “has substantial grounds” to believe the request is made to prosecute or punish someone for their “sex, race, language, religion, nationality, ethnic origin, or political opinions.”

Russia claimed that such basic safeguards, which do offer some protection in the example regarding LGBT activity as “extremist,” were merely an opportunity for some countries to “abuse” the opportunity to reject cooperation requests. Those safeguards, conversely, could also be abused by the very same states that opposed them. The Iranian delegation, for its part, proposed a vote to delete that provision, as well as all other human rights safeguards and references to gender, on the day the text was adopted. These provisions had already been weakened significantly throughout the negotiation process and only survived thanks to the firm stance taken by Australia, Canada, Colombia, Iceland, the European Union, Mexico, and others that drew a red line and refused to accept any more changes.

The possible negative consequences of this convention are not limited to human rights but can seriously threaten global cybersecurity and national security. The International Chamber of Commerce, a global business organization representing millions of companies, warned during negotiations that “people who have access to or otherwise possess the knowledge and skills necessary” could be forced “to break or circumvent security systems.” Worse, they could even be compelled to disclose “previously unknown vulnerabilities, private encryption keys, or proprietary information like source code.” Microsoft agreed. Its representative, Nemanja Malisevic, added that this treaty will allow “for unauthorized disclosure of sensitive data and classified information to third states” and for “malicious actors” to use a UN treaty to “force individuals with knowledge of how a system functions to reveal proprietary or sensitive information,” which could “expose the critical infrastructure of a state to cyberattacks or lead to the theft of state secrets. Malisevic concluded that this “should terrify us all.”

Similarly, independent media organizations called for states to reject the convention, which the International Press Institute has called a “surveillance treaty.” Civil society organizations including Electronic Frontier Foundation, Access Now, Human Rights Watch, and many others have also long been ringing the alarm bell. They continue to do so as the final version of the convention adopted by the committee has failed to adequately address their concerns.

Given the extent and cross-border nature of cybercrime, it is evident that a global treaty is both necessary and urgent—on that, the international community is in complete agreement. Unfortunately, this treaty, perhaps a product of sunk-cost fallacy thinking or agreed to under duress for fear of an even worse version, does not solve the problems the international community faces. If the UN General Assembly adopts the text and the required forty member states ratify it so that it comes into force, experts are right to warn that governments intent on engaging in surveillance will have the veneer of UN legitimacy stamped on their actions. Rights-respecting states should not allow themselves to be co-opted into assisting abusive practices under the guise of cooperation. Nor should they willingly open the door to weakening their own national security or global cybersecurity.

Lisandra Novo is a staff lawyer for the Strategic Litigation Project at the Atlantic Council specializing in law and technology.

The post The UN finally advances a convention on cybercrime . . . and no one is happy about it appeared first on Atlantic Council.

What do the 2024 Paris Olympic Games mean for France? What is the overall impression of the Paris Olympics so far? What sort of values and principles does France want to showcase to the world by hosting? And how will France pass the torch to the United States for the 2028 Los Angeles Olympics?

On this episode of #AtlanticDebrief, Visiting Fellow Léonie Allard sits down with the French Ambassador for Sport Samuel Ducroquet to discuss his impressions of the Paris Olympics and the role of the Olympics in international diplomacy. 

You can watch #AtlanticDebrief on YouTube and as a podcast.

Fellow

Léonie Allard

Visiting Fellow

Europe Center

Africa Chinese

The post #AtlanticDebrief – What do the 2024 Paris Olympic Games mean for France? | A debrief from Amb. Samuel Ducroquet appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Kharlan’s Olympic victory has additional significance for Ukraine as she almost missed out on participating in Paris altogether due to her principled stand over the Russian invasion of her homeland. During the 2023 World Fencing Championship, Kharlan refused to shake hands with a Russian opponent in protest over the war, offering instead to tap blades. The Russian declined this offer and staged a protest of her own, leading to Kharlan’s disqualification and making it virtually impossible for her to take part in the 2024 Olympic Games.

The incident sparked a heated debate over the role of politics in sport and the continued participation of Russian athletes in international events at a time when Russia is conducting Europe’s largest military invasion since World War II. Following a considerable outcry, Kharlan was reinstated and received the personal backing of International Olympic Committee President Thomas Bach, himself a former fencer. Meanwhile, Kharlan’s gesture made her a hero to millions of Ukrainians.

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

The controversy over Kharlan’s refusal to shake hands with her Russian opponent has been mirrored elsewhere in the sporting arena, highlighting the complex moral issues facing Ukrainian athletes as they compete internationally while their country is fighting for national survival. Ukrainian tennis star Elina Svitolina in particular has attracted headlines for her decision to avoid handshakes with Russian and Belarusian players.

Some critics have accused Ukrainians of politicizing sport, and have argued against holding individual Russians accountable for crimes committed by the Kremlin. Meanwhile, supporters of Ukrainian protest efforts have noted the Kremlin’s frequent use of sport as a propaganda tool, and have also pointed to the often close links between some Russian athletes and the Putin regime.

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For Ukraine’s Olympic team, participation in this year’s Summer Games is an opportunity to provide their war weary compatriots back home with something to cheer, while also reminding the world of Russia’s ongoing invasion. Since the start of the full-scale invasion in February 2022, many of Ukraine’s Olympic athletes have had to train in exceptionally difficult conditions. Some have been forced to relocate from areas that have fallen under Russian occupation, while all have grown used to the daily trauma of the war and the regular disruption caused by Russian air raids.

Ahead of the Paris Olympics, Olga Kharlan was widely seen as one of Ukraine’s best medal hopes. Born in Mykolaiv, she has been fencing since the age of ten. Prior to the 2024 Olympics, she had already amassed four Olympic medals in a glittering career that has also seen her win six world titles. The thirty-three-year-old Ukrainian star demonstrated her mental strength during the third place playoff in Paris, overcoming South Korea’s Choi Sebin in a dramatic comeback win.

Thanks to her new bronze medal, Kharlan now shares top spot among Ukraine’s leading Olympians with a total of five medals. She claimed her first medal at the Beijing Olympics in 2008 before securing further honors in 2012 and 2016. However, the Ukrainian star says her success in the French capital stands out. “This medal is totally different,” commented Kharlan in Paris this week. “It’s special because it’s for my country. This is a message to all the world that Ukraine will never give up.”

Mark Temnycky is a nonresident fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

Further reading

UkraineAlert Jul 25, 2024

Putin is convinced he can outlast the West and win in Ukraine

By Mykola Bielieskov

The West’s collective fear of escalation and reluctance to commit to Ukrainian victory have convinced Putin that he can outlast his opponents and achieve an historic triumph in Ukraine, writes Mykola Bielieskov.

Conflict Defense Industry

UkraineAlert Jul 22, 2024

Andriy Yermak: Ukraine and NATO are restoring Europe’s security architecture

By Andriy Yermak

Together with the country’s allies, Ukraine has set out on the path to restore the European security architecture, writes the head of Ukraine’s Office of the President Andriy Yermak.

Conflict Defense Industry

UkraineAlert Jun 12, 2024

Ukraine is making the Russian occupation of Crimea untenable

By Olivia Yanchik

Ukraine’s growing air strike capabilities are decimating Russian air defenses in Crimea and making the occupation of the peninsula increasingly untenable, writes Olivia Yanchik.

Conflict Defense Technologies

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

Read more from UkraineAlert

UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia and Central Asia in the East.

Learn more

The post Paris Olympics: Ukrainian dedicates medal to athletes killed by Russia appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The statement released by G7 leaders after their summit last week garnered ample attention for its strong language on China’s unfair economic practices and ongoing support for Russia’s war on Ukraine, and triggered a predictably sharp Chinese response. The back-and-forth is another reminder of China’s worsened relations with developed democracies over the past few years.

Beijing is by no means abandoning those relationships – Premier Li Qiang’s visit to Australia and New Zealand this week, not to mention President Xi’s trip to Europe last month, underscore a drive to mend damaged ties. But the incident is another piece of evidence confirming that Beijing’s positions on global and economic issues receive a more welcoming reception in the developing world, where China’s economic and political ties are growing by the day.

China’s strategic shift toward greater focus on the so-called Global South is unmistakable. One need only look at where China is spending diplomatic attention and propaganda dollars.

As colleagues at the Digital Forensics Research Lab explore in a new report on China’s messaging in Africa, China is increasingly promoting pro-Russian narratives about Ukraine in sub-Saharan Africa using its media platforms, commentators, social media, and broadcasting infrastructure. The effort aims to portray China as a force for peace while the United States prolongs the war, in line with Beijing’s drive to enhance its reputation relative to Washington across the developing world.

This effort to shape perceptions of China’s responsible global role in contrast to the United States is now routinely reflected in the content of high-level diplomatic engagements with developing countries.

In his speech just last week at the BRICS Dialogue with Developing Countries in Russia, Foreign Minister Wang Yi not only underscored China’s leadership of the Global South as the “largest developing country” but also called for the convening of “a true international peace conference” on the Ukraine war that involves Russia – after Beijing pulled out all the stops to try to scuttle the Swiss-organized conference earlier this month – and threw in some choice words on US efforts to “maintain its unipolar hegemony” for good measure.

As I and the Global China Hub team discovered on a trip to Brazil, Colombia, and Honduras earlier this month, China is also ramping up diplomatic, economic, and technological engagement across Latin America, and pairing those efforts with a push to shape understanding of China across the region. Our editor-in-chief Tiff Roberts dives into that and much more in this issue of Global China – take it away, Tiff!

-David O. Shullman, Senior Director, Atlantic Council Global China Hub

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Dexter Tiff Roberts

Nonresident Senior Fellow

Global China Hub Indo-Pacific Security Initiative

China Chinese

Latin American officials flood Beijing revealing China’s global priorities

Want to know one key region of the Global South China is now focusing on? Take a look at who visited Beijing in early June. Before the first week of the month was even over, Brazil’s Vice President Geraldo Alckmin, Venezuela’s Foreign Minister Yván Gil, and special envoy of Cuban President Miguel Díaz-Canel and Minister of Foreign Affairs Bruno Rodríguez Parrilla had all passed through China’s capital (the Brazilian vice president met with Xi Jinping and secured $4.49 billion in credit concessions. Brazil has been a key market for China too, as evidenced by an eighteen-fold surge in Chinese EV sales by value).

Latin America, with its rich resources, is a key target as China expands its global economic and political reach, and that’s a concern for the US. Testifying before the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission hearing “Key Economic Strategies for Leveling the U.S.-China Playing Field: Trade, Investment, and Technology,” Pepe Zhang of the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center called for a development-focused economic partnership with LAC that would make the Western Hemisphere more competitive, resilient, and better integrated with the US.

Economics used to bolster authoritarian power in Global South training

China’s commerce ministry isn’t just fretting about EU tariffs (see below). It has also spearheaded an effort to train officials in countries across the Global South. And perhaps not surprisingly, the instruction is about more than trade and economics: “This effort is integral to the PRC’s drive to transform a global order currently predicated on the centrality of democracy and individual rights to one more “values-agnostic” and thus suited to China’s rise under authoritarian CCP rule,” writes the Global China Hub’s Niva Yau in a June 12 report called “A Global South with Chinese Characteristics” (watch the launch event here). The 795 training descriptions reviewed by Yau show “how the PRC marries economics and politics in its trainings, revealing that Chinese economic achievements are used to support authoritarian ideals.”

The report certainly got the PRC’s attention. The Chinese Embassy responded, saying the report is “full of Cold War mentality and ideological prejudice,” with the Foreign Ministry adding that “China has always respected the peoples of all countries in independently choosing their development paths and social systems,” which is very reassuring.

A new, coordinated transatlantic response to China emerges on trade?

In a widely expected move, the European Union announced new tariffs on Chinese electric vehicles on June 12, up as much 38.1% on top of existing taxes of 10% before, affecting companies including BYD, SAIC, and NIO. Also to no surprise was the heated response from Beijing: the move by the EU “undermines the legitimate rights and interests of China’s EV industry,” and is “blatant protectionism,” Ministry of Commerce spokesperson He Yadong said in a press briefing. On June 17, Beijing officially launched an anti-dumping probe on imported pork and its by-products from the EU in response.

With the EU action coming just over a month after US President Joe Biden imposed tariffs on EVs of 100%, is a new, more coordinated transatlantic response to the Chinese trade juggernaut emerging? On June 3rd, in an ACFrontPage conversation with United States Trade Representative Katherine Tai, she did not mince words on how the US and the EU should adapt the transatlantic trade relationship to reflect the realities of China’s economic system, saying “Capitalism with Chinese characteristics… I haven’t heard that term used in many, many years. At this point, I think it’s less diplomatic than just sort of ahistorical. The China that we’re dealing with now, the PRC, is not a democracy. It’s not a capitalist, market-based economy.”

In an Econographics article exploring a similar theme entitled “Biden’s electric vehicle tariff strategy needs a united front,” the GeoEconomics Center’s Sophia Busch and Josh Lipsky write, “tariffs, working in isolation, can’t fully achieve all the objectives—no matter how high they go. It’s only when tariffs are relatively aligned across countries… that the trajectory could change.”

And it’s not just EVs that pose a threat to global industries. Without tariffs, the EU faces a flood of Chinese imports of the “new three” clean tech exports—lithium-ion batteries, solar panels, and, of course, electric cars (along with the action against EVs, the White House also raised tariffs simultaneously on lithium-ion batteries and solar cells to 25%.) “Imports of the new-three cleantech export categories have skyrocketed in recent years. Over the course of 2023, China’s exports to the EU totaled $23.3 billion for lithium-ion batteries, $19.1 billion in solar panels, and $14.5 billion for electric vehicles,” the Global Energy Center’s Joseph Webster wrote in a piece for EnergySource.

• Beginning on June 17, Atlantic Council President and CEO Fred Kempe and former President of Latvia Egils Levits have co-led the Atlantic Council’s annual delegation trip to Taiwan, hosted by the Taiwanese government. Joined by former Czech Minister of Foreign Affairs Tomáš Petříček, they will meet with Taiwan government leaders, including President Lai, think tanks, and business representatives to discuss security and economic issues facing Taiwan and the Indo-Pacific.
• The Global China Hub hosted a public conversation on allied solutions to de-risking tech supply chains from Chinese investment to spur collective action between the United States and government and private sector partners in Europe and the Indo-Pacific. The event was a continuation of the Hub’s work on tech competition and China’s drive to dominate emerging technologies and relevant supply chains.
• China’s trade with Russia has risen substantially since the Kremlin’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, significantly bolstering Moscow’s war aims, according to new research by the Global Energy Center’s Joseph Webster.
• Xi Jinping’s recent visit to Europe was in part intended to divide it as the EU increasingly hardens its stance on China. The Global China Hub’s Zoltán Fehér explores the degree to which Xi was successful in these efforts in a New Atlanticist piece.

Global China Hub

The Global China Hub researches and devises allied solutions to the global challenges posed by China’s rise, leveraging and amplifying the Atlantic Council’s work on China across its 16 programs and centers.

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The post Global China Newsletter – Sharp words, sharper tools: Beijing hones its approach to the Global South appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On June 18, IPSI nonresident senior fellow Ryo Hinata-Yamaguchi was quoted in a South China Morning Post article, discussing potential new conflict flashpoints in the East China Sea due to a new Chinese coastguard law. 

Fellow

Ryo Hinata-Yamaguchi

Nonresident Senior Fellow

Indo-Pacific Security Initiative Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Defense Policy Indo-Pacific

The post Hinata-Yamaguchi quoted in South China Morning Post on East China Sea tensions appeared first on Atlantic Council.

While the event produced some encouraging signals and shone a light on how Russia’s invasion affects the broader international community, it did not produce any major diplomatic breakthroughs. Instead, the summit represented a small but significant step forward in what looks set to be a far longer peace process.

The absence of many leading nations from the Global South did much to weaken the summit’s potential impact, suggesting that Ukrainian diplomats still have much work to do at the bilateral level. Significantly, key participating countries including Brazil, India, South Africa, and Saudi Arabia chose not to sign the official summit communique supporting Ukraine’s territorial integrity. Since 2022, these countries have all been hesitant to back Ukraine or openly condemn Russia’s invasion.

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

The event in Switzerland came during a period of intense diplomatic activity for Ukraine. On the eve of the peace summit, G7 leaders agreed to provide Ukraine with a $50 billion loan financed by interest on Russian assets that remain frozen in Europe and the US. On the sidelines of the G7 meeting, the US and Ukraine signed a landmark ten-year bilateral security agreement. During the peace summit itself, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy was also able to hold bilateral meetings with a number of leaders from Global South nations including Argentina, Chile, and Côte d’Ivoire.

Ukraine came to the summit hoping to galvanize international support for President Zelenskyy’s ten-point peace plan. In particular, Kyiv officials sought to emphasize the importance of advancing nuclear safety, protecting food security, releasing prisoners of war, and returning Ukrainian children abducted by Russia since the start of the full-scale invasion. In a broader sense, the event also aimed to keep ongoing Russian aggression against Ukraine in the international spotlight.

Ultimately, seventy-eight countries signed the final communique recognizing that respect for Ukraine’s territorial integrity and sovereignty must serve as the basis for any future peace agreement. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen sought to downplay expectations regarding the event, noting that peace could not be achieved in a single step. The summit was not a peace negotiation because Putin is not serious about ending the war, she commented. “He is insisting on capitulation. He is insisting on ceding Ukrainian territory, even territory that today is not occupied by him. He is insisting on disarming Ukraine, leaving it vulnerable to future aggression. No country would ever accept these outrageous terms,” stated von der Leyen in reference to a rival peace plan unveiled by Russian President Vladimir Putin on the eve of the Swiss summit.

Eurasia Center events

Online Event Thu, August 15, 2024 • 9:00 am ET

Ukraine’s advance in Kursk: What’s next and implications

Conflict Russia Security & Defense Ukraine

Russia did not receive an invitation to participate in the peace summit. Crucially, China also chose not to attend. US National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan suggested Putin had asked China to turn down Ukraine’s invitation. In the build-up to the event, President Zelenskyy also accused Beijing of working to discourage others from attending Ukraine’s peace initiative. Meanwhile, a number of participating countries from the Global South spoke in Switzerland of the need to involve Russia in any future peace process.

While the Kremlin’s apparent spoiling tactics failed to derail Ukraine’s peace initiative entirely, Russian influence did nevertheless loom large over the Swiss summit and is clearly still a significant factor. China’s decision not to back the event was arguably even more important, with many observers arguing that Beijing’s stance succeeded in preventing the emergence of a more global consensus on the path toward peace in Ukraine.

Nevertheless, the participation of numerous countries regarded as being on good terms with the Kremlin underlined the potential of this peace initiative, with the likes of Qatar, Hungary, and Serbia all signing the final communique. While some had hoped for a more meaningful outcome, this modest progress should be enough to convince Kyiv officials and the country’s partners that additional diplomatic efforts in this direction are worthwhile and may yet produce results.

Mercedes Sapuppo is a program assistant at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

Further reading

UkraineAlert Jun 12, 2024

Ukraine is making the Russian occupation of Crimea untenable

By Olivia Yanchik

Ukraine’s growing air strike capabilities are decimating Russian air defenses in Crimea and making the occupation of the peninsula increasingly untenable, writes Olivia Yanchik.

Conflict Defense Technologies

UkraineAlert Jun 4, 2024

Vladimir Putin just tacitly admitted Crimea is not really part of Russia

By Peter Dickinson

Russia claims to have annexed five Ukrainian provinces but refuses to extend security red lines to these regions. This highlights the pragmatic political realities behind Putin’s talk of historic conquests, writes Peter Dickinson.

Conflict Disinformation

UkraineAlert May 30, 2024

If the West wants a sustainable peace it must commit to Ukrainian victory

By Hanna Hopko, Andrius Kubilius

Since 2022, Western policies of escalation management have failed to appease Putin and have only emboldened the Kremlin. If the West wants peace, it must help Ukraine win, write Hanna Hopko and Andrius Kubilius.

Civil Society Conflict

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

Read more from UkraineAlert

UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia and Central Asia in the East.

Learn more

The post Ukraine’s peace summit offers solidarity but no breakthroughs appeared first on Atlantic Council.

In early June, new developments in The Hague served as a reminder to key Russian propagandists, including one of Russia’s former presidents, that they may one day face similar charges. As allowed by Article 15 of the Rome Statute, a coalition of non-government organizations jointly submitted a formal Communication to the Office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC) requesting an investigation into six Russian nationals involved in state propaganda. Notably, this coalition included international and Ukrainian groups, as well as one Russian NGO.

The Communication urged the ICC to investigate the Russians for criminal hate speech. The accused include Dmitry Medvedev, former Russian president and current Security Council Deputy Chairman; Vladimir Solovyov, a popular host on Russian state-owned television channel Rossiya-1; Margarita Simonyan, editor-in-chief of Russia Today; Dmitry Kiselyov, head of the state-owned media consortium Rossiya Segodnya; and Sergey Mardan, a popular television and radio host. The Communication also named Alexey Gromov, First Deputy to the Presidential Executive Office’s Chief of Staff, stating his role in ordering or failing to prevent over 300 examples of criminal incitement to violence from February 24, 2022 to February 24, 2024. 

This initiative is arguably long overdue. Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine began more than two years ago, Russian state and state-aligned actors are accused of committing a daily litany of horrific atrocities against Ukrainians. In such a context, it is tempting to overlook the rhetoric behind these actions, but the Russia-Ukraine War illustrates the dangers of ignoring the threats made by powerful Russian media figures. Many in the Russian media have openly telegraphed eliminationist rhetoric against Ukrainians for years, setting the stage for the largest military attack in Europe since World War II. Their continuing threats against the existence of Ukraine, and against other Western countries, pose a direct threat to international security.  

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

Since 2022, it has become increasingly apparent that Russia’s highly sophisticated propaganda machine requires novel legal and policy responses. New dangerous and diffuse platforms for Russia’s inciting language and other disinformation continue to emerge. In addition to the kind of conventional propaganda most are familiar with, Russian actors now spread public incitement and more subtle disinformation through social media, bot farms, video games, movies, and manipulated content (including deepfakes). International law does not yet cover each of these categories, as older legal frameworks concentrate on historical understandings of propaganda in legacy media formats.

These realities pose serious challenges for anyone seeking to protect victimized groups from atrocity crimes. International law, including the United Nations Genocide Convention, prohibits all means of disseminating direct and public incitement. Still, Russia’s sophisticated networks of propaganda platforms make upholding these provisions difficult. As these challenges increase, Russian techniques of shaping subconscious dehumanization continue to evolve. This fostering of cascading radicalization within Russian society may prove even more impactful than one-time calls for violence, while being more difficult to trace and prosecute.

Some Russian efforts to stay ahead of judicial accountability are clear. Even the Russian authorities felt compelled to respond to Russian journalist Anton Kravosky’s call to drown Ukrainian children in a river (he was suspended from RT for these comments, although an investigative committee later stated he had committed no crime). After these events, some Russian propagandists became noticeably more careful, cloaking their rhetoric through allusions and metaphors. Still, even this “hidden rhetoric” often meets legal requirements for incitement and other criminal propaganda. 

Eurasia Center events

Online Event Thu, August 15, 2024 • 9:00 am ET

Ukraine’s advance in Kursk: What’s next and implications

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The gravity of alleged Russian atrocities against Ukrainians compels international urgency to disrupt Moscow’s escalation in direct violence and associated inciting propaganda to destroy Ukraine and Ukrainians. Days after posting a profanity-filled acknowledgement of the NGO-led Communication to the ICC, Dmitry Medvedev followed up with a video showing all of Ukraine as “belonging” to Russia. This complete obliteration of Ukraine from world maps was the first time a top Kremlin official had overtly claimed the entirety of Ukraine as a stated goal, showing a link between words and projected actions.

The international community now faces a critical moment. It also has a unique chance to create a legal framework and enforcement mechanism capable of implementation through international cooperation. Beginning at home, Ukraine’s legal system requires amendments to systematize prosecutions in absentia for genocidal incitement. International partners must support these efforts by surging law enforcement resources to monitor the flood of calls for violence emanating from Russian media and from more shadowy Kremlin-backed propaganda platforms.

For Russian propagandists to face the criminal consequences of their conduct, international arrest warrants are indispensable. Bolstering political will for judicial accountability and opening criminal proceedings should be the two major areas of focus. To ensure accountability, Ukraine and its partners must now plan for realistic enforcement mechanisms that implement trial verdicts and deny safe havens of non-extradition. The words and actions of Kremlin propagandists have combined to fuel unimaginable atrocities in Ukraine. To protect Ukrainians and other victims, and to prevent further armed conflicts fuelled by propaganda, the international community must break the cycle of Russia’s real or imagined impunity.

Kristina Hook is assistant professor of conflict management at Kennesaw State University and a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center. Anna Vyshniakova is a war crimes lawyer and a legal consultant, head of legal NGO LingvaLexa, and author of the book “Incitement to Genocide: How to Bring Propagandists to Justice.”

Further reading

UkraineAlert Jun 12, 2024

Ukraine is making the Russian occupation of Crimea untenable

By Olivia Yanchik

Ukraine’s growing air strike capabilities are decimating Russian air defenses in Crimea and making the occupation of the peninsula increasingly untenable, writes Olivia Yanchik.

Conflict Defense Technologies

UkraineAlert Jun 4, 2024

Vladimir Putin just tacitly admitted Crimea is not really part of Russia

By Peter Dickinson

Russia claims to have annexed five Ukrainian provinces but refuses to extend security red lines to these regions. This highlights the pragmatic political realities behind Putin’s talk of historic conquests, writes Peter Dickinson.

Conflict Disinformation

UkraineAlert May 30, 2024

If the West wants a sustainable peace it must commit to Ukrainian victory

By Hanna Hopko, Andrius Kubilius

Since 2022, Western policies of escalation management have failed to appease Putin and have only emboldened the Kremlin. If the West wants peace, it must help Ukraine win, write Hanna Hopko and Andrius Kubilius.

Civil Society Conflict

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

Read more from UkraineAlert

UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia and Central Asia in the East.

Learn more

The post Holding Putin’s propagandists accountable for crimes in Ukraine appeared first on Atlantic Council.

• Introduction
• Training future authoritarians
• Party governance as the root of all success
• Global implications and recommendations
• Dataset of Chinese government files

Introduction

At the peak of China’s economic growth toward the end of the 2010s, Beijing began to advocate for an alternative model of governance that prioritizes economic development and rejects the centrality of the protection of individual rights and “Western” democratic processes. At the heart of this new push to legitimize authoritarian governance was the example of China’s own remarkably rapid economic development under Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leadership and an implicit assertion that such successful growth legitimizes not only China’s own autocratic system, but also other non-democratic political systems. The global implications of this development have grown clearer as Beijing has embarked on a steadily expanding mission to promote its political system alongside its economic success in countries across the Global South.

As early as 1985, Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping explained, in plain language, that the Chinese political system would resist changes despite economic integration with the world. He told the Tanzanian president at the time, “Our reform is an experiment not only in China but also internationally, and we believe it will be successful. If we are successful, it can provide some experience for developing countries.”¹ In 2017, a new Chinese leader, Xi Jinping, repeated this sentiment using similar language.

The path, the theory, the system, and the culture of socialism with Chinese characteristics have kept developing, blazing a new trail for other developing countries to achieve modernization. It offers a new option for other countries and nations who want to speed up their development while preserving their independence; and it offers Chinese wisdom and a Chinese approach to solving the problems facing mankind.”

Source: “Full Text of Xi Jinping’s Report at 19th CPC National Congress,” Xinhua, November 4, 2017, https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/19thcpcnationalcongress/2017-11/04/content_34115212.htm.

The People’s Republic of China (PRC) has long pursued foreign acceptance of Chinese political narratives and encouraged their adoption to further China’s interests.² However, China typically does not need to cajole countries into accepting its messaging about successful development. Many developing country leaders, having witnessed the Chinese “economic miracle” in which it developed at a remarkable pace after first opening its economy to the world in the late 1970s, take seriously China’s narrative about the benefits of a more authoritarian system and are willing to consider the calculated risk of experimenting with what Beijing is offering. Even as China’s economic growth has slowed significantly and its political system has grown more repressive under Xi, the number of countries welcoming Chinese governance lessons continues to grow, enhancing Beijing’s global influence. This has significant implications for the future of democracy, the protection of individual rights, and the nature of the global order.

Training future authoritarians

One of the most direct ways that Beijing promotes authoritarian governance is through training programs for foreign government officials on Chinese governance practices. This report investigates a new dataset of Chinese government files on such trainings, uncovering how Beijing uses these sessions to directly promote ideas and practices that marry economics and politics to make a case for its authoritarian capitalism model. Beyond encouraging sympathy for Chinese narratives among officials across the Global South, the programs also provide practical assistance for host countries to fast-track adaptation of Chinese practices. The sessions also appear to serve intelligence-collection purposes by requiring each participant to submit reports detailing their prior exchanges and engagements with other foreign countries on specific training subjects. This report outlines the content Beijing teaches officials in various developing countries and the anticipated benefits to Beijing from these programs. It also explains how these initiatives fit into China’s broader ambitions to undermine the liberal democratic norms that currently underpin the global order.

The author obtained 1,691 files from the Chinese Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) containing descriptions of 795 governmental training programs delivered (presumably online) in 2021 and 2022 during the pandemic. Each program description contains a title indicating the subject of training; the name of the Chinese entity subcontracted to deliver the training; the timing and language of instruction; invited countries and regions; group size; the professional background and demographic requirements for trainees; and training program objectives. Additionally, each description included an outline of the training content, including names of instructors and contact information for subcontracted entities.

In 1981, Beijing began delivering training programs, first branded as foreign assistance, in coordination with the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) as part of an effort to provide aid and basic skills to developing countries.³ In 1998, the Chinese government broke away from that cooperation arrangement and began offering its own centrally planned training programs directly to governmental officials from countries across the Global South. Beijing reportedly hosted 120,000 trainees from the Global South between 1981 and 2009, with 4,000 programs across twenty fixed areas. With initial success, the programs expanded from their original objective and the number of trainees increased in the next decade, with 49,148 trainees in 1,951 programs between 2010 and 2012, and more than 200,000 trainees in around 7,000 programs between 2013 and 2018.⁴

Evidence in the newly obtained 2021 and 2022 files indicates that the objectives of Chinese governmental training programs for foreign officials have changed significantly. Trainings are no longer foreign assistance programs with primarily humanitarian assistance aims, but clearly serve to directly inject narratives that marry authoritarian governance with economic development—in other words, to promote an autocratic approach to governance.

According to a cross reference of public releases, the current protocol of governmental training programs involves receiving foreign officials sent to mainland China in accordance with bilateral agreements.⁵ These training programs focus on specific areas, and are centrally planned by the Chinese government with designated regional quotas.⁶ A review of these ”specific areas“ also shows that these programs differ from trainings on humanitarian aid, foreign assistance, and basic skills that Beijing delivered in cooperation with UNDP in the 1980s and 1990s. Rather, the trainings offer authoritarian principles in areas such as law enforcement, journalism, legal issues, space technologies, and many other topics. Given that in China, law enforcement is designed to protect the state and the Party rather than the people, journalism is prescribed to create national unity rather than act as a check against the system, and the law is intended to protect the regime rather than its citizenry, these training programs naturally offer foreign officials different lessons than they would receive from democratic countries.

According to the files obtained, the Chinese embassy in a country identified for training typically is notified roughly three months before a training program is expected to be hosted, and the relevant desk at the Chinese embassy is tasked with selecting and inviting targeted individuals in the host country. For example, the Chinese Ministry of Public Security attaché at the embassy would be responsible for inviting local law-enforcement representatives to join programs organized by the Chinese Ministry of Public Security. At least eleven Chinese government ministries and Party departments have delivered training programs to foreign government officials in the past three years, including the Ministry of Commerce, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Science and Technology, Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Ecology and Environment, Ministry of Culture and Tourism, National Health Commission, Ministry of Emergency Management, International Liaison Department, and Ministry of Public Security.⁷ According to the files, within each of these Chinese ministries and departments, an “international cooperation and exchange” office then coordinates to subcontract the delivery of the training program to a hosting entity, often with a quasi-civilian Chinese entity with extensive ties to the government. The MOFCOM files show that the 795 training programs were subcontracted to 111 hosting entities in 2021 and 2022.

Given the vast number of Chinese ministries and departments found to have provided trainings to foreign government officials in the past few years, it is reasonable to conclude that these programs were not paused during the pandemic but simply moved to an online format. A review of the 795 descriptions shows that 21,123 individuals participated in online training programs that were provided by MOFCOM in 2021 and 2022. These programs were centered on lectures and included relevant virtual site visits. They ranged from one to 60 days in length: 42 percent of all programs were between twelve and fourteen days, and 34 percent were between 19 and 21 days. Program size was between 15 and 60 participants, and 68 percent of the programs were designed for 25 participants. Based on the training description, nearly all the programs targeted developing countries.

Because this research dataset was limited to program-description files from the MOFCOM, there remain obvious blind spots to understanding the full scope and depth of Chinese governance-export training programs for foreign governmental officials. However, precisely because the dataset here concerns those trainings delivered by the MOFCOM, examination of the files permits unique insights into how the PRC marries economics and politics in its trainings, revealing that Chinese economic achievements are used to support authoritarian ideals.

This report maps the governance practices Beijing is promoting in countries across the Global South. It does not attempt to examine the effectiveness of these efforts, which is outside the scope of this project. Follow-on research endeavors involving local experts will be necessary for exploration of individual governments’ receptivity to PRC narratives and practices, which is likely determined by a mix of local interests and political contexts.

Party governance as the root of all success

Chinese training programs focused specifically on governance practices have traditionally been implemented by the International Liaison Department (ILD), an agency under the Central Committee of the CCP whose core function is party-to-party diplomacy. In its political engagement with other countries’ political parties, the ILD has long conducted training sessions on Chinese governance to promote CCP ideology, with the stated intent to conduct “state governance experience exchange [治国理政经验交流].” Initially such trainings were held exclusively between the CCP and countries with one-party rule or corresponding Leninist party structures, such as Vietnam.⁸ This is no longer the case. The ILD training sessions have expanded to include sessions in non-communist and non-authoritarian countries. At the same time, other entities in the Chinese government have begun conducting their own “state governance experience exchanges.” In the late 2000s, similar language on “state governance experience exchange” began to surface in foreign policy documents describing engagements with developing regions and countries, including Latin America in 2008, Kazakhstan in 2009, Laos and Myanmar in 2010, and Mongolia in 2011,⁹ demonstrating the expanded reach of Chinese governance training sessions.

Since then, each training, no matter the subject, has contained language on CCP ideology and organization and related contributions to the PRC’s achievements in that subject area. In this way, authoritarian governance choices are being promoted even in the most niche of subject areas.

Even programs on seemingly innocuous topics like beekeeping, bamboo forestry, meteorology, or low-carbon development all begin by briefing participants about the Chinese reform and guiding management principles raised at the latest plenary sessions of the Party committee. The programs highlight where successful tactics for poverty alleviation or pandemic management originated, and then relate these principles to the technical subject areas being covered. This approach is employed to maintain consistency of narrative delivery to a variety of audiences. In the program descriptions obtained, targeted foreign government officials range from the highest political level to the technocratic level, and from senior-level directorships to junior staff members of departments working on political affairs, the economy, education, agriculture, science, and more.

According to a review of the 795 training descriptions obtained in the course of this research project, MOFCOM trainings cover a vast variety of topics, including trade-related areas such as port management, international application of BeiDou (the Chinese global navigation satellite system), and blockchain and information security technologies. However, despite MOFCOM’s remit, it also provides training on topics that do not seem immediately related to trade, such as the role of think tanks for implementing the Belt and Road Initiative, national policy on ethnic minorities, new-media affairs, population management and development, university management, governance practices for presidential advisers, urban governance, social security and welfare, and smart cities.¹⁰

For the purpose of this research, the 795 training programs were reviewed and categorized into six groups based on their reported activities as outlined in the files. The following group labels were created by the author.

1. Clearly authoritarian: The first group describes training programs which include explicit lessons on PRC practices that are widely regarded in liberal democracies as direct infringements on personal freedom. This includes PRC endorsement of non-democratic regime practices in political, government, and legal affairs, including administrative control over the media, information, and population.

2. Potentially authoritarian: These training programs contain lessons on PRC practices which have, in some cases, infringed on personal freedom or indirectly aided infringement of personal freedoms and individual rights. This includes, for example, training on dual-purpose technologies that could be exploited to access individuals’ data in ways that expand state surveillance and control over citizens’ personal lives.

3. Infrastructure and resource access: These training programs are centered on setting standards and imparting industrial technical skills for various aspects of infrastructure and resource extraction, which may further PRC access to critical resources. This includes, for example, renewable energy application, mechanization of the agricultural sector, and technologies in mining, copper processing, and biotechnology.

4. Information operation access: These training programs are centered on activities that might further PRC access for its information operations, such as programs on Chinese culture and Mandarin-language promotion for foreign officials.

5. Security access: The fifth group involves and describes training programs centered on activities that may further PRC access to the sensitive security infrastructure of a foreign country, such as programs on aviation emergency, satellite imagery, and geochemical mapping.

6. Others: The sixth group includes all other training programs that do not fit into the above categories, such as pest control, climate change, soybean production, tourism development, and preschool-education sector capacity building.

Among the 795 training courses offered by MOFCOM between 2021 and 2022, about 25 percent of the programs were categorized as clearly authoritarian, 10 percent as potentially authoritarian, 22 percent as related to infrastructure and resource access, five percent as related to security access, two percent as information-operation access, and 35 percent as “others.”

Based on this categorization, the research then focused on examining files of training programs that were not categorized as clearly authoritarian or potentially authoritarian. This revealed the extent to which Beijing used potentially authoritarian means to influence governance choices by injecting narratives that marry authoritarianism with various successes related to the economy. It further demonstrates that PRC training programs that appear to be focused on trade, infrastructure, and other nominally non-political topics are also efforts to promote China’s governance model.

The following are just two examples out of the hundreds of files in which the same pattern can be observed. In one file entitled “Seminar on international application of BeiDou and remote sensing,” and in another, “Seminar on port management for Central and Eastern European countries,” the training content specifies ten and fifteen sub-categories, respectively. At least two or three sub-categories are completely unrelated to the training subject, instead focusing on China’s reform and opening-up process, poverty-alleviation programs, and management of the COVID-19 pandemic, highlighting the success of China’s particular governance model in handling these challenges. The training programs consistently and repeatedly remind trainees across the Global South that all of China’s achievements are attributed to its political choices and authoritarian governance practices.

Despite the lack of access to the exact lecture materials used in these programs, a review of the list of instructors yields insights into the kind of narratives the lecturers delivered to foreign governments. For example, Dr. Ding Yifan (丁一凡) was one of six instructors for the 13-day training on port management. A researcher at the state-backed Development Research Center of the State Council, Ding has written in support of internationalizing China’s currency to bypass “Western control” over financial mechanisms and setting up overseas Chinese economic zones to relocate parts of Chinese production to developing countries before commodities are finalized for export to Europe and North America, ensuring China’s stake in the global supply chain and embedding Chinese assets abroad.¹¹ These are positions commonly held by many Chinese academics and experts.

Ding, however, also has a more distinctive track record as an advocate for China’s authoritarian system. For example, in a lengthy 2017 online lecture titled “Advantages of the Chinese system of governance” (“中国的制度优势”)¹², Ding explicitly explained that the Chinese economic miracle is a result of “a good democratic system of socialist governance with Chinese characteristics, our democracy is the real democracy” (“是因为中国特色社会主义民主制度好，我们的民主是真正的民主”) and that “sometimes people don’t know how their own society should develop, and they need to be guided by strong leaders to show the way.”( “有时候民众并不知道他们希望社会朝哪个方向发展，需要强有力的领导人去指明方向.”) Ding’s online lecture details flaws in voting-based democratic systems, pointing to the constant change of governments and party politics as inefficient and a waste of resources. Ding makes the case that one-party authoritarian politics is the only feasible system for China: “We are a multi-ethnic, multi-cultural country. If we have multi-party politics, then our country will break apart and fall into civil war, destroying all we have built.” (中国是一个多民族、多文化国家，如果实行多党政治，那么，一定会四分五裂，陷入严重的内战，毁掉我们建国以来所做的一切努力.) Ding has also fueled disinformation against Japan and the United States, claiming Japan dared “to release nuclear-contaminated water because it has the backing of the United States” (日本胆敢排核污水底气在于背后老板是美国人) when Tokyo released wastewater from the Fukushima nuclear plant that was hit by a tsunami in 2011 after receiving approval to do so from the International Atomic Energy Agency.“¹³

Global implications and recommendations

The findings catalogued in this report underscore that the PRC is engaged in a concerted effort to promote authoritarian governance across the developing world, using its own economic success as the primary argument for why countries need not adopt “Western” democratic practices to achieve their development goals. This is occurring across Chinese training programs in Global South countries, regardless of the often-unrelated subjects purportedly addressed. While Beijing often suggests that countries should pursue approaches specific to their own local contexts, rather than adopting the Chinese model completely, PRC trainings clearly highlight aspects of its authoritarian model as central to the blueprint of successful development that others can emulate.

China is likely to continue expanding training efforts to promote autocratic governance. Numerous training programs currently conducted in China for foreign government officials are already being moved to countries across the Global South, with new Chinese institutions set up to deliver programs that are both longer term and more sophisticated. In 2022, a Chinese political leadership school was opened in Tanzania, delivering the same type of governance training program outlined above that marries authoritarianism with economic success.¹⁴ If successful, this kind of setup is likely to be recreated elsewhere. For example, Luban Workshops were introduced in 2016 as a vocational equivalent of the Confucius Institutes and there are now 27 workshops worldwide, an increase from 18 in 2021.¹⁵ Where Confucius Institutes are state-sponsored centers teaching Chinese language and culture, Luban Workshops are state-sponsored classrooms teaching Chinese industrial skills and standards. Given the findings in this report, it is reasonable to assume these workshops will weave lessons on the benefits of China’s authoritarian model into vocational classes.

Beijing’s growing drive to promote its model appears unaffected by the marked slowdown in China’s economic growth and the well documented structural challenges facing China’s economy, many of which are a result of an authoritarian system under the CCP that increasingly prioritizes political control and absolute security over unleashing the power of market innovation and consumer demand.¹⁶ In other words, the very example at the heart of China’s promotion of authoritarian governance—its own remarkable development since the late 1970s into the world’s second largest economy—may be falling apart.

Many developing countries, however, are not attuned to the mounting challenges China is facing and still value the lessons of the country’s success under authoritarian rule, presenting ample opportunities for the PRC to expand and deepen its training programs across the Global South. The potential implications of these continued efforts are significant and wide ranging.

First, more countries may entertain and potentially adopt authoritarian governance practices shared by Beijing as they seek the potential benefits of economic engagement with China. More research is needed to determine the ultimate impact of China’s governance trainings abroad on recipient countries’ political practices. However, foreign leaders already routinely accept and endorse Beijing’s perspective on Chinese domestic issues and international positions in the hopes of maintaining or increasing Chinese investment and contributions to their nation’s domestic development.¹⁷ As China’s combined economic and political influence mounts, more countries dependent on China will likely welcome its lessons and may even sacrifice their own immediate interests in return for the long-term promises that Beijing offers. In some cases, China’s success in “elite capture”—the extensive corruption of a country’s key political and business leaders, resulting in their serving China’s interests above those of their own citizens—will likely contribute to local officials’ willingness to welcome Chinese trainings. The elite capture dynamic may also increase the likelihood that lessons learned in these trainings will be incorporated into their country’s governance practices.

Second, China’s clear propaganda effort through these trainings will combine with the CCP’s broader effort to shape narratives in countries around the world regarding China’s successes and the benefits of engagement with the PRC to advance Beijing’s preferred messaging. Beijing is engaged in a global propaganda effort to “tell China’s story well,”¹⁸ as Xi has put it, and counter decades of perceived dominance of the global information space by the United States and other developed democracies, including regarding the legitimacy of non-democratic governance systems such as its own. Included in this endeavor are efforts to train and cultivate local journalists to write positive stories about China, insert official Chinese propaganda in local media outlets, deliver tailored disinformation regarding the United States and the failings of democratic governance¹⁹, and deploy United Front groups²⁰ to co-opt local elites.²¹ Across these efforts, Beijing’s messaging consistently underscores its development successes while ignoring inconvenient statistics about China’s more recent economic downturn, reinforcing the notion that countries in the Global South might benefit from following China’s developmental path.

Third, China’s expanding promotion of authoritarian practices may foster greater ideological and political polarization globally as democracy’s presumed status as the ideal form of government is thrown into greater doubt. Even if most countries exposed to CCP trainings do not adopt a wholesale authoritarian approach to governance, the selective adoption of aspects of China’s system will mean that more countries choose not to align with the United States and other democracies on a range of policy choices that will shape global governance and connectivity. For example, a number of countries have been inspired to adopt aspects of China’s top-down regulatory policies on the internet.²² This dynamic is complicating efforts to maintain a more united approach to internet management, potentially fragmenting the internet into competing technospheres. More fundamentally, potential PRC success in encouraging more sympathetic views of autocratic methods—and critical views of democracy—across the Global South would gradually undermine the ability of the United States and other democracies to credibly speak of a common future and interests among countries bonded by democratic values and aspirations.

The first step in addressing these dynamics is to recognize the extent of the problem, conducting further studies such as this one on the nature of various PRC efforts to promote its model and then, most critically, determining the actual impact of these efforts in increasing developing countries’ acceptance, adaptation, and implementation of authoritarian governance practices.

Local interests, political context, and feasibility of adaptation are all reasonable major factors that determine whether a government will ultimately import authoritarian practices and narratives. Only once the effectiveness of various PRC activities has been determined should significant effort be directed at developing tailored measures to counter them, thereby avoiding unnecessary expenditure of very limited resources on addressing the large and expanding number of CCP efforts across countries.

Even as such studies are undertaken, the United States and other democracies should increase efforts to address the relative paucity of knowledge and objective information about China and its approach to governance at home in the majority of developing countries. This lack of reliable, home-grown information on China is perhaps the PRC’s greatest asset in its efforts to promote its authoritarian model because it allows Beijing to set the dominant narrative in many countries regarding China’s rapid economic development and the role of its governance system in that achievement.

As noted, in PRC training programs, foreign government officials are fed disproportionally positive economic stories about China in an environment where Beijing is able to censor as it pleases, creating an illusion of near perfect implementation. This bolsters the strong impressions still held by many across the Global South about the Chinese economic miracle from decades ago and the discourse around authoritarian performance legitimacy.²³ It is essential that more developing countries have access to objective information on current realities in China, including the country’s economic downturn, particularly given concurrent PRC efforts to shape media ecosystems and narratives on China and leverage coopted elites.²⁴

Relatedly, it is necessary to assist countries across the Global South in cultivating and promoting authoritative expertise on China, to ensure that local voices are offering objective analysis of China’s domestic affairs, governance practices, and engagement abroad. This local expertise is also critical for broadening public and elite understanding of PRC policies and affairs that is not accessible through simply translating Chinese government documents that may be unintelligible to the uninformed. For decades, the Chinese government has tried to influence the development of authoritative foreign voices on PRC affairs, relying on PRC-educated China experts as elite proxies to distribute its narratives, set agendas, and influence foreign policymakers and the public alike. In the Global South, Beijing often controls who can study and develop an authoritative voice on PRC affairs by monopolizing the means to visit and research China, study Chinese language, and access research materials through PRC institutions.

One crucial step toward addressing this problem in the medium to long term is fostering more opportunities for independent research on PRC issues, providing alternatives to PRC-sponsored education. Countries with vast non-PRC-sponsored expertise on China should expand their global outreach, including programs for students from countries across the Global South who may wish to undertake professional Chinese studies outside of the PRC. Such independent expertise is essential to fostering objective discussions on China and competing perspectives that allow the public and their leaders to make informed judgments about the kind of Chinese success they want to replicate.

Lastly, at the basic level, countries across the Global South must be encouraged to create a debriefing process for all returning officials who take part in a PRC training program to determine and catalog the level of effort to shape perceptions and decision-making in different policy areas, including regarding authoritarian governance practices, as well as the extent to which related reporting serves China’s intelligence collection efforts.

China’s promotion of authoritarian governance and undermining of support for democratic practices and principles is likely to increase across the Global South, with Beijing further scaling up the type of trainings documented in this report. This effort is integral to the PRC’s drive to transform a global order currently predicated on the centrality of democracy and individual rights to one more “values-agnostic” and thus suited to China’s rise under authoritarian CCP rule. To counter this effort, countries across the Global South should be encouraged to make independent, informed decisions about their own development path, with access to objective information about China’s political system, domestic affairs, and economic trajectory. Despite democracy’s evident flaws, it remains the system of governance overwhelmingly preferred by publics around the world.²⁵ Beijing’s revisionist efforts to popularize autocracy will fail if citizens in the Global South have the freedom and information to determine the sort of government under which they want to live.

About the author

Fellow

Niva Yau

Nonresident Fellow

Global China Hub

Africa Central Asia

Acknowledgement

The author thanks Rana Siu Inboden and other participants at a May 2024 workshop Understanding China’s Authoritarian Projection: Training and Normative Propaganda with Other States, organized by the Robert Strauss Center for International Security and Law at the University of Texas at Austin, for feedback and review of an earlier draft.

Dataset of Chinese government files

These are 14 training program description files from the full dataset of 795, with personal identifying information removed, but remaining available upon requests for research purposes. The English-language text following the Chinese text is entirely written by the program description planner, not the author, and may consist of broken translation. We are currently planning to release all 795 of the remaining training program descriptions and the other administrative files related to their logistics.

• Marine geologic survey and coastal protection training class
• Seminar on blockchain and information security technology for developing countries
• Seminar on enhancing university governance for developing countries (online)
• Seminar on ethnic policies and practices for Belt and Road countries
• Seminar on international application of Beidou and remote sensing
• Seminar on inviting heads of foreign volunteer organizations to China
• Seminar on planning capability of safe city for African countries
• Seminar on population and development program for developing countries
• Seminar on port management for Central and Eastern European countries
• Seminar on national governance for presidential advisers of developing countries
• Seminar on new-developing urban governance for developing countries
• Seminar on new media for Belt and Road countries
• Seminar on social security and social welfare for developing countries
• Seminar for think tank scholars of the Belt and Road countries

The Global China Hub researches and devises allied solutions to the global challenges posed by China’s rise, leveraging and amplifying the Atlantic Council’s work on China across its fifteen other programs and centers.

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The post A Global South with Chinese characteristics appeared first on Atlantic Council.

In line with this legislation, a wide range of Ukrainian government officials will now be expected to reach a degree of English language fluency, while various state services will be made available in English. The law also envisages expanded English language educational opportunities, and support for the screening of English language movies featuring subtitles rather than dubbing.

Ukraine’s recent decision to grant the English language elevated official status reflects a much broader national transformation that has been underway since the country first regained independence more than three decades ago. This historic process has helped transform the Ukrainian linguistic landscape.

In 1991, Ukrainian was officially recognized as the only state language of the newly independent country. In practice, however, Ukraine remained deeply embedded within a Russian language culture inherited from the Soviet era. This informal empire extended from schools to popular culture, with generations of post-independence Ukrainians growing up in an information space that was still dominated by Moscow.

While old imperial ties remained strong, only the privileged few could afford to travel to most Western countries. Strict visa regimes acted as an additional barrier to engagement with the Western world until Ukrainians finally secured visa-free travel to the EU in 2017. Despite these obstacles, the popularity of English language studies in the decades following 1991 reflected Ukraine’s growing openness to the outside world.

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Research indicates that demand for English language learning has increased significantly since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022. This interest in language skills may at first glance appear somewhat unexpected, given the enormous challenges facing Ukrainian society over the past two years. For many Ukrainians it makes perfect sense. In wartime Ukraine, studying English is an attractive route toward greater personal development that can also provide opportunities to boost the country’s defense and support integration into the wider European community.

The war with Russia has dramatically underlined the importance of the English language as a tool for international communication. At the most immediate and practical level, knowledge of English has been a huge asset for Ukrainian soldiers and commanders learning new skills and encountering new weapons systems for the first time. Indeed, it was striking to see English language fluency specifically cited as a key requirement during discussions with Western partners over plans to train Ukrainian pilots.

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The same linguistic logic has applied to non-military engagement with international partners at the governmental and nongovernmental levels. As Ukrainians have sought to develop new relationships and address complex wartime issues with officials and volunteers from dozens of different countries, English language skills have proven absolutely crucial.

This deepening dialog is very much a two-way street. While greater English language proficiency is proving important for Ukrainians in their engagement with the international community, it is also allowing foreign partners to learn more from the Ukrainian side. In the military sphere, for example, no other country is currently able to match Ukraine’s experience in modern warfare. Speaking the same language makes it far easier to share this experience and pass on important lessons to allies.

As Ukraine moves closer to the rest of Europe and continues to make progress toward the goal of EU membership, the role of the English language within Ukrainian society will only increase. The recently adopted law on the status of English reflects this reality, and should help create an environment that supports the country’s broader Euro-Atlantic integration aspirations.

For centuries, Russia has used language as a tool to suppress Ukrainian independence and impose an artificial imperial identity on Ukrainians. By officially embracing English as the language of international communication, Ukrainians now aim to support their country’s historic pivot away from Moscow and return to the European community of nations.

Oleksiy Goncharenko is a Ukrainian member of parliament with the European Solidarity party.

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The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

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The post Ukraine officially embraces English as historic westward pivot continues appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Historically, chemical weapons have been used to break a stalemate, weakening an enemy’s front line troops and providing an opening to push forward. Russia’s use of chemical weapons might suggest that strategists consider the invasion of Ukraine to be a stalemate, or are desperate to avoid one. As fears of a stalemate persist across Ukraine, Russia, and the West, it isn’t difficult to predict a scenario in which Russia could use chemical weapons more widely to achieve a breakthrough.

Chloropicrin, a chemical agent frequently used for riot control, is banned for use in a warfare setting under the Chemical Weapons Convention, which Russia has been a signatory to since its inception. Over the past two years, Ukraine has reported some 1,400 cases of chemical weapons use, but these claims had not been confirmed by third parties until the May 1 statement released by the US State Department.

If Putin has no qualms about using banned weapons, why choose chloropicrin? As far as chemical weapons go, chloropicrin is less lethal than other weapons suspected to be in Russia’s arsenal. By using a weaker agent, Putin’s goal does not seem to be maximum death and destruction in this case. Rather, he may be testing the waters to gauge the international response and determine just how far he can go. A strong reaction from the international community is therefore vital to make clear that widespread use of chemical weapons is completely unacceptable and will not be tolerated.

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

Russia’s previous uses of chemical weapons outside of Ukraine have been met with a tepid response at best. For example, after Sergei Skripal was poisoned in the UK with a Novichok agent (a class of nerve agents developed in the Soviet Union) in 2018, the US and a handful of its European partners released a statement condemning the attack, expelled diplomats, and the US levied sanctions under the Chemical and Biological Weapons Control and Warfare Elimination Act. Did this rein in Russia’s chemical weapons tactics? Alexey Navalny’s subsequent poisoning with Novichok in 2020 would suggest not.

In response to the latest allegations, the United States has so far announced sanctions on seven Russian government programs and companies associated with the Kremlin’s chemical and biological weapons programs. These measures are an attempt to reduce Moscow’s ability to wage chemical warfare. More must now be done. Failing to curb the use of chemical weapons in Ukraine would have potentially catastrophic consequences, both for Ukrainians and for international security more broadly. The United States and its partners therefore cannot afford to wait and see whether current sanctions measures are effective.

In the early phases of Russia’s full-scale invasion, US President Joe Biden pledged that “Russia will pay a severe price if they use chemical weapons.” Do sanctions alone constitute a severe response? If such measures have not convinced Putin that he cannot use chemical weapons after recent assassination attempts, can we expect them to work when his back is against a wall trying to win a major war?

Eurasia Center events

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Ukraine’s advance in Kursk: What’s next and implications

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Looking to the past provides little clarity on possible actions available to Ukraine’s partners. After the Bashar al-Assad regime used chemical weapons in Syria in 2013, the United States and Russia worked together to force Syria to join the Chemical Weapons Convention and destroy its stockpiles. Without Russia’s participation and considering its veto on the United Nations Security Council, something similar on this occasion looks impossible. When Syria continued to use chemical weapons, the United States, United Kingdom, and France targeted chemical weapons facilities with missiles, another option Western leaders have seemingly taken off the table in relation to Russia.

The best option available to the United States and its allies might be to deny Russia the opportunity to use banned weapons. If Putin’s strategy would dictate using chemical weapons in the case of a stalemate, then Ukraine’s partners must ensure it gets the military aid needed to avoid such a situation. While the United States might be unable to strike inside Russia as it did in Syria, providing Ukraine long-range weapons and the intelligence support to carry out strikes against chemical weapons facilities could take away Russia’s chemical capabilities while sending a strong message against using banned weapons.

This is not to say the United States should not explore options for international cooperation. At the end of the day, Russia using chemical weapons endangers more than Ukraine. Galvanizing broader support from around the world can help preserve critical norms and is a necessary step to protect against chemical weapons proliferation globally. While the West has struggled to work with China or partners in the Global South on Ukraine, a coalition rejecting the use of chemical weapons presents an opportunity to protect Ukrainian lives while reinforcing international norms and building trust that chemical weapons are unacceptable in all contexts.

Emma Nix is an assistant director with the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center.

Further reading

UkraineAlert Apr 29, 2024

Bombs and disinformation: Russia’s campaign to depopulate Kharkiv

By Maria Avdeeva

Russia is deploying disinformation alongside bombs as it seeks to demoralize Kharkiv residents and depopulate Ukraine’s second city, writes Maria Avdeeva.

Civil Society Conflict

UkraineAlert May 3, 2024

UK gives Ukraine green light to use British weapons inside Russia

By Peter Dickinson

UK Foreign Secretary David Cameron has confirmed that Ukraine can use British weapons to attack Russia as Western leaders continue to overcome their fear of provoking Putin, writes Peter Dickinson.

Conflict Defense Policy

UkraineAlert May 2, 2024

Ukraine’s new mobilization law leaves demobilization issue unresolved

By Elena Davlikanova, Kateryna Odarchenko

Ukraine urgently needs to replenish the ranks of the country’s depleted military, but the recently adopted mobilization law fails to address the key issue of demobilization, write Elena Davlikanova and Kateryna Odarchenko.

Civil Society Conflict

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

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UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia and Central Asia in the East.

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The post Putin cannot be allowed to use chemical weapons in Ukraine with impunity appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Despite initial promises of moderation and a pledge to the United Nations (UN) when the group seized power in 2021, the Taliban has swiftly restored oppressive policies reminiscent of its previous rule in the late 1990s.

In less than three years, the Taliban has issued more than fifty edicts and directives imposing strict measures to bar women from participation in public and political life. These measures include restricting women’s access to education, employment, freedom of speech, freedom of movement, access to public spaces, health care, and access to justice.

A UN experts report said the situation may amount to “gender apartheid,” with the Taliban “governing by systemic discrimination with the intention to subject women and girls to total domination.” 

Violations of international law

As reported by the UN Human Rights Council, the Taliban significantly restricts women’s participation in society and denies them avenues for seeking justice and redress. Women who speak out against these restrictions or advocate for their rights face severe consequences, including harassment, violence, imprisonment, and death. The Taliban also targets women activists, professionals, and both men and women who are supporters of women’s rights, viewing them as threats to their authority. The situation has deteriorated further in the past few months, as evidenced by recent extrajudicial arrests and forced disappearances. There has also been an alarming increase in gender-related killings (femicide).

The Taliban’s gender apartheid policies deliberately violate international legal frameworks to which Afghanistan is still bound, perpetuating a cycle of gender-based discrimination and brutality. International law on the protection of women’s rights is unequivocal. It emphasizes the fundamental responsibility of governing authorities to promote and safeguard the rights of women in all aspects of their lives.

The International Bill of Human Rights—which is comprised of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights—guarantees the right to equality and nondiscrimination. The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women explicitly prohibits gender-based discrimination, obligating state parties to ensure gender equality in all spheres of life. The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) criminalizes gender persecution as a crime against humanity under article 7. 

The ICC’s 2022 Policy on the Crime of Gender Persecution broadens the scope of targeted individuals beyond direct members of a particular group to include that group’s sympathizers and affiliates. This inclusive stance is particularly relevant for Afghanistan. In schools that ban girls, staff—including male teachers—who teach girls can also be targeted. Similarly, journalists are targeted and face persecution for their coverage of violations of women’s basic human rights. Such incidents, which fall under the ICC’s purview, highlight the interconnectedness of gender-related issues and the diverse ways individuals can be affected by gender-based persecution.

The Taliban’s capital and corporal punishments target women more often than men. Despite Afghanistan’s ratification of the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, the Taliban persists in brutally treating and punishing women. Taliban punishments, ranging from public floggings to executions, demonstrate a deliberate effort to instill fear and maintain control over women’s lives, flagrantly violating the Convention against Torture.

When the Taliban shields perpetrators from accountability, including insulating its own system, it further perpetuates a cycle of violence. Under the current regime, documentation of human rights abuses has become nearly impossible. The Taliban’s restrictions on international and local human rights organizations and media, including censorship and intimidation tactics, have severely hindered their ability to document and report these violations. The absence of comprehensive reporting on human rights abuses under the Taliban not only obscures the true extent of the violations but also allows perpetrators to act with impunity.

The broader international significance

The ongoing violations perpetrated by the Taliban in Afghanistan, particularly on women, have sparked diplomatic condemnation from the international community. However, this condemnation exposes a deeper issue: the weakening consensus among members of the international community on how to effectively respond to such crises. One of the primary risks associated with this trend is the normalization of the extremists. Engaging with the Taliban and normalizing relations without meaningful concessions on human rights encourages the Taliban and other repressive regimes, signaling that they can flout international norms with impunity.

This impunity gravely undermines more than two decades’ worth of efforts to achieve justice, reconciliation, and sustainable peace in Afghanistan. The Taliban has not only refused to acknowledge its past atrocities but also enjoys impunity for its current actions.

The continued impunity not only denies justice to women survivors but also sends a dangerous message that violence against women can be tolerated and even condoned, with far-reaching implications. The denial of education and participation in public life hinders the development and empowerment of women and girls, perpetuating cycles of poverty, inequality, and marginalization. It also undermines fundamental principles of justice and human rights, eroding trust in the ability of international institutions to provide justice and accountability. This lack of accountability also enables the Taliban to spread extremist ideologies, creating a nurturing environment for conflict and terrorism, with dire implications for regional stability.

What the international community can do

Considering the dire situation in Afghanistan, the UN should take a lead role in establishing robust accountability mechanisms. This may entail creating an independent investigative body to monitor and document human rights abuses and violations of international law.

The UN should also change its approach to the Taliban. Instead of engaging with the regime without conditions, the UN should work with regional and global partners and directly with the Afghan people, including civil society, to develop a unified strategy that prioritizes women, human rights, and security, rather than legitimizing a regime that promotes oppression and instability. Taliban leaders’ rigid ideology means dialogue with them is futile. Moreover, targeted sanctions and travel bans on Taliban leaders should be imposed. The UN can leverage its authority and resources to coordinate efforts among member states and ensure a unified approach to the crisis within the organization.

At the same time, the international community can use diplomatic engagement to exert pressure on the Taliban to respect international human rights standards. Diplomatic recognition, aid, and other forms of cooperation should be conditioned on tangible improvements in human rights and accountability.

Human rights organizations outside Afghanistan play a crucial role in amplifying the voices of Afghan women and advocating for their rights. These organizations should mobilize support for Afghan civil society groups and grassroots organizations, particularly those championing human rights and women’s rights. By collaborating with local activists and providing resources, these organizations can help promote accountability and protect vulnerable populations—particularly women.

Samira Abrar is human rights activist currently working in the field of immigration law in the United States.

The post Don’t look away: The Taliban’s mistreatment of women has global ramifications appeared first on Atlantic Council.

While most attention has so far focused on the military aspects of this new US aid package, the bill passed in Washington DC also includes an important step toward holding Russia financially accountable for the invasion of Ukraine. The Rebuilding Economic Prosperity and Opportunities for Ukrainians Act, or REPO Act, paves the way for seizures of Russian Central Bank holdings that have been frozen in the United States for more than two years, while also setting the stage for a more global approach to confiscating Russian assets.

Western countries froze approximately $300 billion in Russian assets following the onset of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. The Kremlin has been unable to access these assets ever since, but they still technically belong to Russia. The REPO Act could now make it possible to seize Russian assets and use them for the benefit of Ukraine. Only around $5 billion of the overall $300 billion is located in the US, but the United States is setting an important precedent by taking a leadership position in the confiscation of Russian state funds.

We should not expect any immediate action. The REPO Act obliges the White House and US Treasury Department to identify Russian assets in the US within a 90-day period and report back to Congress in 180 days. After a further month, the president is then authorized to “seize, confiscate, transfer, or vest” any Russian state sovereign assets located within the United States.

The US is unlikely to act unilaterally. Instead, United States officials have indicated they wish to move forward in conjunction with other Western governments. The issue is set to be high on the agenda during the next G7 summit, which is scheduled to take place in Italy in June. “The ideal is that we all move together,” commented US National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan on April 24. This would send a message to Moscow that the democratic world is united in its commitment to make Russia pay for the largest European invasion since World War II.

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

In order to appreciate the significance of the REPO Act, it is helpful to track Russia’s reaction. Since the aid bill passed, there has been plenty of outrage in Moscow. Former Russian President Dmitry Medvedev expressed his wish for the United States to be “plunged into a new civil war,” and threatened to seize the assets of US citizens in Russia. Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov warned that Russia would make the United States answer for the confiscation of frozen assets.

Meanwhile, Russian Duma Speaker Vyacheslav Volodin said Russia could now pass “symmetrical” legislation allowing Moscow to confiscate Western assets located inside the Russian Federation. Volodin was one of many Russian officials to claim that the US step was intended to “provoke” the adoption of parallel measures in EU countries. He predicted that this would be “devastating” for the European economy.

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Ukraine’s advance in Kursk: What’s next and implications

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Skeptics in the West have voiced concerns that the seizure of Russian assets could undermine the global financial system and weaken Western economies. European Central Bank President Christine Lagarde is one of numerous senior figures in Europe to express unease over the confiscation of Russian assets, arguing that it could mean “breaking the international legal order that you want to protect, that you would want Russia and all countries around the world to respect.”

This caution ignores the fact that Russian state assets in Western jurisdictions have now been frozen for more than two years without sparking any noticeable negative consequences for the international financial system. If measures against Russian assets were sufficient reason to trigger a loss of confidence in the existing financial system among other authoritarian states, they have already had ample time to react.

The statements coming out of Moscow over the past week underline the sensitivity within the Kremlin to the confiscation of frozen Russian money. While the REPO Act represents a meaningful milestone in the debate over Russian assets, it is not decisive. Nevertheless, this aspect of the aid package has attracted almost as much attention as the very significant additional military support that is now being sent to Ukraine.

It would certainly seem that members of Russia’s ruling elite are more concerned about the security of their own financial resources than the safety of the Russian soldiers fighting in Ukraine. Indeed, many observers have long argued that Putin’s top priority is safeguarding his own ill-gotten wealth and that of his inner circle. If the West is serious about defeating Russia in Ukraine, it should seek to exploit this apparent vulnerability.

Following the adoption of the REPO Act, the next stage in the process should be the promotion of similar draft laws by the European Union and G7 countries. The recent US decision on Russian assets can provide the impetus others have been waiting for. Russia only understands the language of strength, and views hesitation as an invitation to go further. Western leaders can now demonstrate their resolve by acting together to make Russia pay for its criminal invasion of Ukraine.

Kira Rudik is leader of the Golos party, member of the Ukrainian parliament, and Vice President of the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE).

Further reading

UkraineAlert Mar 12, 2024

Mood darkens in Odesa amid Russian bombardment and Western hesitancy

By Michael Bociurkiw

The mood in Ukrainian Black Sea port city Odesa has darkened in recent weeks amid a surge in Russian bombing attacks and growing doubts over the future of Western military aid, writes Michael Bociurkiw.

Conflict Drones

UkraineAlert Apr 25, 2024

New US aid package is not enough to prevent Russian victory in Ukraine

By Peter Dickinson

This week’s US aid package for Ukraine provides the country with a vital lifeline in the fight against Russia but Western leaders must adopt a more long-term approach if they want to stop Putin, writes Peter Dickinson.

Conflict Drones

UkraineAlert Mar 31, 2024

Ukraine urgently needs air defenses as Russia decimates power grid

By Suriya Evans-Pritchard Jayanti

A new Russian air offensive has destroyed much of Ukraine’s civilian energy infrastructure in a matter of days and threatens to spark a humanitarian catastrophe if Ukraine does not urgently receive enhanced air defenses, writes Suriya Evans-Pritchard Jayanti.

Conflict Defense Technologies

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

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UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia and Central Asia in the East.

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In a closely watched second-round presidential race, Slovaks cast their ballots in what evolved into a tight face-off between Ivan Korčok, a career diplomat advocating pro-Western ideals and staunch support for Ukraine, and Peter Pellegrini, who has echoed pro-Kremlin rhetoric and is aligned with the current Slovak government led by Prime Minister Robert Fico. Fico, who took office last October, has caused alarm among NATO allies for opposing aid to Kyiv during his campaign, parroting Kremlin talking points on the war in Ukraine, and threatening his country’s independent judiciary.

While the presidency wields limited powers, the race earlier this month was broadly seen as a poignant battleground between political factions harboring opposing views on domestic rule-of-law issues and Russia’s war on Ukraine.

The president has the authority to veto laws—albeit subject to potential override by parliament with a simple majority—and can dispute them at the constitutional court. The president also appoints constitutional court judges, selects the prime minister, swears in the new government after parliamentary elections, and can pardon convicts. With Pellegrini’s victory, Fico and his allies’ control extends not just over the legislative and executive branches, but also over these presidential authorities.

Initially expected to be a tight race, Pellegrini won with an unexpected 6 percent lead and 53 percent of the total vote. Despite Korčok’s commendable efforts to rally support against the incumbent administration’s policies, Pellegrini emerged victorious, leaving many pondering the implications for Slovakia’s future.

While each candidate garnered more than one million votes for the first time ever in a Slovak presidential race, Pellegrini’s success can be attributed to several key factors. He adeptly tapped into widespread anti-Western and anti-liberal sentiments across the nation, especially in areas where the ruling, populist coalition parties had previously performed well. Moreover, he consolidated support from voters who backed candidates eliminated in the initial round. A historic voter turnout in the second round exceeding 60 percent further bolstered his campaign, as he successfully mobilized new constituencies.

During the campaign, Pellegrini painted Korčok as a harbinger of war—asserting that Korčok’s victory would drag the country into a war with Russia—while he positioned himself as a proponent of peace. This narrative was bolstered by misleading social media posts, which were spread on the social media accounts of prominent government officials—including Slovakia’s ministers of economy, European Union (EU) funds, and regional development—which swayed public opinion and contributed to Korčok’s defeat.

Korčok did triumph in the capital region, Bratislava, which also boasted the highest election turnout nationwide with over 71 percent. He also won the support of younger voters, who were able to see through the disinformation campaign against him.

With Pellegrini’s victory, concerns have been mounting regarding the unchecked advancement of the government’s antidemocratic agenda and closer ties with Russia. The outgoing president, Zuzana Čaputová, habitually exercised her presidential powers to limit the executive arm, both with the current and previous administrations.

The election of a president who is unlikely to check the prime minister’s executive power leaves Fico’s administration in a new position. It might now feel emboldened to accelerate efforts to undermine judicial independence, media autonomy, and democratic oversight—unless it is restrained by external forces, notably Brussels.

The European Commission has warned Bratislava that it could face penalties over concerns that the Fico administration’s judicial reforms—particularly those shielding politicians from prosecution—were incompatible with the EU’s democratic standards. This would place Slovakia alongside Poland and Hungary, both of which have been embroiled in prolonged disputes with the EU over the rule of law. The potential withholding of EU funds constitutes significant leverage, particularly as Slovakia faces the eurozone’s biggest budget deficit, projected at over 6 percent of the country’s gross domestic product this year.

Slovakia’s geopolitical realignment is equally likely to reverberate on the international stage. Bratislava’s continued drift into the Russian orbit of influence is sure to pose fresh challenges for regional stability, European unity on support for Kyiv, and transatlantic relations.

Korčok’s defeat represents more than a missed opportunity for principled leadership in a geopolitically crucial region. It signifies a worrisome shift in Slovakia’s democratic trajectory away from Western norms, raising alarms not just about the country’s future course but also Europe’s internal stability, cohesion, and decision making.

Soňa Muzikárová is a political economist focused on Central and Eastern Europe and a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center.

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Watch the event

Online Event Tue, April 9, 2024 • 2:00 pm ET

2024 Chuck Hagel Forum in Global Leadership

Secretary Chuck Hagel and Former United States Attorney General Eric H. Holder Jr. will discuss the role of US leadership in a changing world, hosted in partnership with the University of Nebraska at Omaha.

Politics & Diplomacy

To grapple with today’s headline-making global turmoil, policymakers must have a strong grasp of history, argued former US Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel and former US Attorney General Eric H. Holder, Jr.

The two former officials reflected on the history of the United States’ leadership in the world on April 4 at the 2024 Chuck Hagel Forum in Global Leadership, hosted by the Atlantic Council and the University of Nebraska at Omaha (UNO).

“There is a reason why the United States led in organizing a post-World War II world order,” Hagel explained, pointing to a postwar realization that isolationism wouldn’t secure the country—and to the US network of allies and partners. “If we did not have those relationships, we couldn’t have our bases; we couldn’t have our troops in certain areas of the world.”

While the United States has led in creating today’s world order, Holder warned Americans that “our democracy is at risk.” Below are highlights from the conversation—moderated by Jody Neathery-Castro, associate vice chancellor for global engagement at UNO—which touched upon the war in Ukraine, the Israel-Hamas war, and racial justice in the United States.

Risks in Ukraine

• Holder explained that the United States winning the Cold War has led to an era of “unparalleled prosperity and peace,” but “that is all at risk by not coming to the support of Ukraine.”
• “How we react in this matter is being observed by despots and strongmen and dictators,” Holder warned. Hagel agreed, saying that the war in Ukraine poses a security threat for countries far beyond Europe, as China and North Korea continue to watch and learn—and evaluate whether the West can hold its resolve.
• Hagel said that some Americans don’t seem to understand the danger of letting Russian President Vladimir Putin exert his will and argued that the consequences of failing to support Ukraine are dangerous. “It will force all nations of the world, especially our partners . . . not to trust us.” Holder agreed, saying that sowing doubt in the minds of allies will allow dictators to “probe” and find new capitals from which they can “extend their influence.”
• In national security, “there cannot be politics,” Hagel said.

The urgency for peace in the Middle East

• Holder said that Hamas needs to be held accountable for its October 7 terrorist attack in Israel, and the group must release the hostages it took. At the same time, while Israel has the right to defend itself, he said “the tactics” being used by the Netanyahu government are “extremely disturbing” and do not “serve the interests of Israel in the long term.”
• Hagel argued that the course Israel is on now “can’t continue,” and he warned that the way the war is unfolding is engendering global criticism not only of Israel but also of the United States. He said regional and outside partners need to facilitate peace between Israel and the Palestinian territories. “You’ve got to start it somewhere, and the United States is the only country that can help do that.”

Katherine Walla is an associate director on the editorial team at the Atlantic Council.

Watch the full event

The post Chuck Hagel and Eric Holder on Ukraine, Israel, and the US-led world order appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On March 18, 2024, the Atlantic Council’s Syria Project, the Middle East Institute’s Syria Program, the European Institute of Peace, and Madaniya Civil Society Network launched the Syria Strategy, an intensive process of engagement with subject matter experts and policymakers in the United States, Europe, and the Middle East to develop a holistic strategy to sustainably resolve the Syrian crisis. This process will incorporate Syrian experts, Syrian civil society, and Syrian stakeholders at every step. The launch event coincided with the anniversary of the Syrian uprising and included three panels, featuring Special Envoys for Syria from three governments, notable scholars working on the country, and the Syria Strategy project leadership.

Welcome remarks 

William Wechsler, senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center & Middle East Programs, kicked off the event with the opening remarks, noting that Syria does not receive enough attention given the country’s importance to the region and the continued suffering under President Bashar al-Assad’s regime. The partnership between the Atlantic Council, Middle East Institute, European Institute of Peace, and Madaniya therefore aims to produce a realistic, implementable strategy for the United States and its allies to address the country’s current crises, explained Wechsler. 

Ayman Asfari, chairman of Madaniya Civil Society Network, then discussed the network’s goals and the continued need for strategic engagement to promote a sustainable solution to Syria’s challenges. Madaniya seeks to harness the vibrant civil society developed during the initial uprising in 2011 by providing a platform for over 200 Syrian civil society organizations to reclaim political agency over the Syrian civic space, noted Asfari. In this way, he said, Syrian civil society is at the forefront of mitigating the impacts of the protracted conflict. The United States and its European partners must work with Syrians to pave the way for principled policy solutions along the lines of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2254, he added. 

Barbara Leaf, Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern Affairs at the US Department of State, concluded the opening remarks with a recorded address. The situation in Syria is deteriorating, as deadly bombardment campaigns continue in the country’s north, human rights abuses continue, and over 155,000 people remain arbitrarily detained or forcibly disappeared, according to Leaf. “With the war in Gaza, [the United States] is committed to ensuring Syria itself does not get pulled into a regional conflict that only increases human suffering,” Leaf said. Furthermore, “despite Russian and regime intransigence,” the United States still supports political solution along the lines of UNSCR 2254 as well as the work of the Constitutional Committee to achieve these goals for Syria. However, the Assistant secretary warned that the Arab League’s decision to normalize relations with Syria threatens any potential progress, as the United States hopes to use normalization as an incentive for credible steps toward protecting human rights and improving humanitarian conditions in the country. “The United States remains committed to expanding humanitarian access, ensuring the enduring defeat of ISIS, and promoting accountability for the Assad regime’s human rights abuses.” Leaf also emphasized that initiatives like the Syria Strategy Project are essential to these goals, informing the administration’s decision-making and policy direction while searching for a path toward peace. 

Panel one: High-level panel discussion 

The first panel focused on specific governmental approaches to engaging with Bashar al-Assad’s regime in pursuit of political and humanitarian solutions to Syria’s current crises. Elizabeth Hagedorn, State Department correspondent for Al-Monitor, moderated the discussion between Ethan Goldrich, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern Affairs with the US Department of State; Brigitte Curmi, Special Envoy for Syria with the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs; and Stefan Schneck, Special Envoy for Syria with the German Federal Foreign Office. 

A transactional approach to peace 

Goldrich began the conversation by discussing the status quo in Syria’s political landscape as well as the importance of a unified approach to pressuring the Assad regime to the negotiating table. Currently, the regime is looking to rehabilitate its image and normalize relations with Arab neighbors without engaging in any meaningful reform. Indeed, the Arab League’s decision to normalize with Syria complicates efforts to force concessions from Damascus, he stated. However, he explained that the United States remains committed to working with partners like France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the European Union to hold Assad’s regime accountable while reaching a path toward peace and stability. 

Curmi emphasized that this approach must include concrete steps toward reform in line with UNSCR 2254. She stressed the importance of directing the regime toward meaningful reform to ensure the international community’s ability to solve Syria’s political crisis. Schneck agreed on these points, adding that internal support for the regime is very weak, forcing Assad to rely on untrustworthy partners like Iran and Russia. The international community must be prepared for a sudden change to the status quo and any accompanying opportunity to enable political reform in Syria. 

While a sudden shift in events is always possible given Syria’s volatile history, a slower process toward political reform is much more likely. Goldrich explained that the United States has placed stock in such an approach, designing flexible sanctions and executive orders to accommodate any progress the Syrian government makes in addressing concerns over human rights abuses. Curmi and Schneck likewise noted that French and German opposition to the regime was not purely ideological. A step-for-step approach has been on the table for years, but substantive change will only come about after Syria legitimately alters its behavior, they concluded. Such changes are unfortunately less likely after the recent rapprochement between Syria and the Arab League. 

Roadblocks to reform 

Goldrich also pointed to Russian behavior as a challenge in making progress in Syria. Over the past two years, Russia has prevented the Constitutional Committee, which aims to make progress toward UNSCR 2254, from convening. Therefore, according to Schneck, the issue is not the peace process itself but rather the actors’ unwillingness to enter the negotiations. Curmi said this behavior should not discourage the parties from advocating for greater efforts to connect Syrians in different regions of the country as well as in the diaspora. 

While not a perfect solution, the panelists agreed that pursuing UNSCR 2254 is a better approach to improving the current humanitarian situation in Syria than normalization. Arab states opting to normalize relations have benefited little from the decision, and the situation has encouraged the Syrian government to maintain its strategy of extracting concessions while offering none in return, they added. 

Sanctions and humanitarian aid 

The panelists aligned on the need to maintain sanctions. They acknowledged that their sanctions programs are having negative effects on the people of Syria and reiterated the need for measures targeting only the regime and its enablers. The envoys affirmed that sanctions must avoid hampering humanitarian efforts. However, the delegates stressed that the regime will not likely change its treatment of Syrians without outside pressure. Furthermore, the regime’s frequent complaints about Western sanctions demonstrate that the measures are having an effect, explained the speakers.  

On humanitarian aid, the panelists did diverge slightly in their approaches to the crisis. According to UN estimates, 16.7 million people in Syria require humanitarian aid, due to both the Syrian civil war and the devastating earthquake that hit northwestern Syria in 2023. Goldrich highlighted the more than $1 billion in aid delivered to the region in response to the earthquake, in addition to the $16.8 billion spent by the United States since the onset of the political crisis. He also invoked the Office of Foreign Assets Control’s Syria General License 22, which authorized large amounts of aid to be delivered to liberated and non-regime-controlled areas of Syria, concomitantly bringing American investment to the region. 

Curmi noted a difference between the French and American approaches responding to Goldrich’s last point. France has a fixed annual budget for Syria, and this funding goes toward work in all areas of the country in contrast to the US focus on non-regime areas. Curmi explained that this approach is to ensure Syrians do not suffer unnecessarily for Assad’s actions. Similarly, Schneck affirmed the need to continue early recovery aid to lay the groundwork for sustainable solutions in the region. 

Panel two: 13 years of conflict: A regional and international perspective

The second panel contextualized the Syrian situation amid regional and global developments and explored why the crisis remains relevant today. Mona Yacoubian, Vice President of the Middle East and North Africa Center at the United States Institute of Peace, moderated the discussion between Natasha Hall, Senior Fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies; Brian Katulis, Senior Fellow at the Middle East Institute;and Vali Nasr, Nonresident Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council.

“A festering wound”

Hall led off by observing that Syria is routinely neglected by the international community at its own peril. She compared the crisis in the country to a festering wound that can become septic at any time, and stressed negative developments there rarely remain within Syrian borders. President Bashar al-Assad benefits from this chaos by perpetuating the narrative that he is the only one who can solve the problems at hand—problems for which he is also responsible. The regime now utilizes humanitarian aid and refugees as policy levers to negotiate with its neighbors and the West, all while collecting billions of dollars each year through the Captagon trade, according to the panelist. Hall asserted that Assad has created a successful playbook for other authoritarians, who have adopted the model of securing a great power protector and then shattering norms with impunity. The United States remains staunch in its use of aid and sanctions in lieu of a more robust strategy for addressing the regime. The situation remains volatile, but Washington should not miss its current chance to provide preventative care to the wound, she added.

Nasr followed by explaining Iran’s evolving role in the crisis and how the effects of the war in Gaza are reverberating in Syria. He affirmed that Iran continues to play a central role in the country’s set of interrelated conflicts and that Iranian involvement in the wider region also elevates Syria’s importance. Beyond protecting Assad, Tehran understands that Syria is an additional front to pressure the United States and Israel. Iran and Hezbollah have moved to fill the vacuum left by Russia as it focuses on Ukraine, and by gaining a foothold in Latakia they can now project influence into the Mediterranean, according to him. Nasr also highlighted that the risk of an Israeli-Iranian escalation would rise if Tehran’s succeeded in its efforts to dislodge the United States. Syria is also a theater for US-Turkey and US-Russia confrontations; the country is more integrated into global issues than is generally acknowledged. Consequently, Washington requires a strategy for navigating its engagement in Syria and preventing the country from becoming the epicenter of a regional war, he explained.

Katulis then spoke on the evolution of geostrategic threats surrounding Syria. He listed several global impacts that originated from the Syrian conflict: authoritarian leaders mimicking tactics used by the Assad regime; worsening violence against civilians in other conflicts; the weaponization of refugees; rampant use of disinformation; and growing disillusionment with proactive foreign policy among elements of the American left and right. Katulis noted that the current project pushes back on the indifference toward Syria that has settled over some policy circles, as well as the notion that the United States cannot constructively shape the situation any longer. He expressed hope that the project will generate new ideas to turn negative trends in a new direction.

Correcting course and deepening engagement

Hall then gave her thoughts on how policymakers and scholars in Washington can reframe discussions about Syria and develop new solutions. The United States and its partners are currently “treading water” rather than acting proactively and missing opportunities to negotiate with individual actors while the wider conflict is gridlocked. Other neglected areas that could benefit from more engagement include promoting resilience in non-regime areas and mitigating water insecurity in the northeast. Hall concluded by spotlighting regional efforts to advance negotiations on Gaza and predicted that a similarly unified attempt at step-for-step with Syria could bring about progress.

Nasr underscored the need for Washington to identify its interests in Syria and pinpoint why the outcome of the war matters; a pivot toward a new mission could redefine the US footprint there altogether. Meanwhile, if the United States continues to neglect the situation it could very well be pulled back in the future. Katulis suggested a more diplomacy-forward US strategy for the crisis to ameliorate regional frustration at American inaction. Deeper discussions are especially needed with countries bordering Syria. He cited US leadership on the Ukraine conflict as an example of how attentive engagement can build coalitions.

Hall agreed with her co-panelists on the need for more multilateral cooperation on Syria policy, pointing to energy and water as issues where the United States and its partners could do more. Nasr felt that the disproportionate US effort spent countering Iranian influence in Syria is evidence of a disconnect between Washington’s stated aims in countering ISIS and its priorities on the ground. He reiterated that there is a legitimate argument for an American presence in the Middle East but that it must be properly translated into action. Katulis added that as think tank analysts approach Syria with a fresh perspective, even touchy topics regime change or other forms of power transition should be reevaluated.

Panel three: The Syria Strategy: Outlining the way forward

The final panel served as an introduction to the mission and goals of the Syria Strategy Project. Sawsan Abou Zainedin, CEO of Madaniya Civil Society Network, moderated the conversation between Qutaiba Idlbi, Director of the Syria Project at Atlantic Council; Charles Lister, Director of the Syria and Counter-Terrorism Programs at the Middle East Institute; and Marie Forestier, Senior Advisor at the European Institute of Peace.

Building a new strategy

Idlbi recounted how the project arose from Western, regional, and Syrian stakeholders’ frequent inquiries about the US strategy for Syria, and a pervasive sentiment among American policymakers that they had tried everything they could. The Syria Strategy project seeks to form a realistic and implementable strategy to both improve conditions in Syria in the short term and shape a sustainable solution to the crisis in line with UNSCR 2254. He went on to explain how the project will bring together experts, policymakers, and stakeholders to work on a series of subproblems in hopes of producing a workable, holistic proposal by March 2025. Another goal is for the project to function as a sounding board for policymakers to test ideas and offer their own feedback, he explained.

Lister addressed the project’s emphasis on Washington as its intended audience. American buy-in is needed in order to make progress on the Syrian crisis; US involvement galvanizes European support and is a remedy to Arab states’ frustration with their own engagement efforts. There is currently no shortage of ideas on Syria, but the actors proposing them lack unity of purpose, or at least the perception of unity, according to him. Lister also explained that Syrian experts and activists form the core of the Syria Strategy and Washington will be just one of many governments involved in the project. The process is designed to be highly consultative and responsive to feedback, creating a “living” project.

Forestier underscored the need for European involvement as well. The project is necessarily transatlantic, as while US leadership on Syria remains critical, Washington cannot be expected to lead alone. Aligning Europe and the United States increases the chances of success of the wider project and will revitalize Syria policy in European foreign policy circles as well. The European Union (EU) remains a significant donor of humanitarian aid in Syria but has not updated its strategy since 2017, resulting in recent dissent among member states. A common strategy born from a Syrian-owned process could be the common ground needed for the EU to rebuild consensus, she said.

Lister then unpacked the duality of the project’s mission, under which Syrians must own and drive the process but ultimately produce a strategy that external actors will buy into. The project leadership realizes that any plan assembled by the international community but not agreeable to Syrians will be dead on arrival, creating an impetus to engage with de facto authorities throughout the country—including interlocutors from the regime. The leadership also recognizes that resolution will not come quickly and thus envision two timelines for the project: a shorter-term one predicated on improving day-to-day conditions across all of Syria, and a longer-term one producing a sustainable resolution to the crisis. Critical to both is the reestablishment of connectivity among the different parts of Syria, such as by official trade and transit.

Challenges and opportunities

Idlbi contextualized the project’s efforts within wider regional developments, such as Arab states’ normalization efforts with the regime. Diplomatic engagement remains one of the only remaining policy levers for regional states to work with Syria. However, the readmission of Syria to the Arab League is widely considered to be a failure owing to a lack of better behavior by Assad. He reiterated that US involvement on the Syria file is not only crucial to effecting change but also a necessity if Washington wants to avoid being dragged back into Syria on worse terms in the future. The United States spent billions of dollars to stop ISIS, and the investment needed to curb another crisis may well be even more. Working toward a solution to the conflict also requires treating its symptoms as well, such as restoring basic services and returning children to school, according to him.

Forestier differentiated the Syria Strategy from other consultative projects by the extremely wide scope of stakeholders it hopes to engage. Throughout the process, the project leads intend to solicit feedback from all major players in Syria, regional governments, and global powers, ensuring that policy recommendations are vetted by different actors. Lister acknowledged that not all issues lend themselves to consensus, with sanctions expected to be an especially contentious topic. However, the goal remains to take in a range of different perspectives and approach disparate ideas with an open mind.

Regarding the recent anti-normalization bill passed by the US House of Representatives, Idlbi stressed that the most impactful sanctions regime placed on Syria is the Syria Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty Restoration Act passed in 2003. Sanctions should comprise just one of many tools to form a strategy for shaping conditions in the country. He also recentered the importance of UN involvement and the project’s engagement with the UN Special Envoy for Syria. Lister then outlined the limitations of Syria’s allies and the opportunities they create to change the status quo. He asserted that while Assad could fall back on Russian and Iranian military support from the outset of the civil war, neither government is willing to bail Syria out of its worsening economic situation; a unified approach by the international community to engaging with Syria could thus leverage Damascus’s predicament to pressure it toward constructive reforms.

The post Launching the Syria Strategy Project appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Executive summary

As the geopolitical relevance of the Pacific Islands has grown, so too has the attention paid to them by the outside world—including an influx of diplomatic attention, development assistance, and more as external powers seek to curry favor with the sixteen countries. Australia, India, Japan, and the United States—which collectively comprise the Quadrilateral Dialogue (known as the Quad)—have independently and collectively scaled up their engagement with the Pacific Islands.

In doing so, the Quad has sought to pursue a positive, practical agenda that aligns with the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF)’s 2050 Strategy for the Blue Pacific Continent.

Broadly speaking, the PIF members welcome the Quad, but some are critical of the “free and open Indo-Pacific” narrative that undergirds it. As the Quad seeks to bolster its engagement in the Pacific Islands, it should ensure that it accounts for the unique challenges facing this vast maritime region, which relies heavily on foreign assistance.

In 2023, the Quad announced a range of programmatic initiatives intended to address key regional issues, including climate, connectivity, economic development, and maritime security. The bloc is currently standing on solid ground, but the group is still finding its footing as a new player in the complex multilateral architecture in the Pacific Islands.

Looking forward, it should embrace four broad-based, cross-cutting policy recommendations that align with the stated priorities of the Quad, its member states, and Pacific Island countries:

1. Prioritize programs that bolster physical and digital connectivity, such as the Quad Partnership for Cable Connectivity and Resilience that was announced at the 2023 Quad Leaders’ Summit.

2. Emphasize maritime domain awareness and enforcement by providing partners with tools to facilitate greater enforcement capacity and enhanced monitoring.

3. Implement positive, practical programs in areas of strategic advantage that fit into an already-complex regional donor landscape and meet Pacific needs.

4. Take a forward-leaning approach to public diplomacy, including through elevated branding that proactively communicates intent, emphasizes shared values, and does not overemphasize geopolitics.

Introduction

As the geopolitical relevance of the Pacific Islands has grown, so too has the attention paid to it by the outside world. Other issues, from climate change to fisheries, drive engagement as well—but geopolitics is what has drawn the lion’s share of international media coverage and interest from decision-makers in foreign capitals who do not focus on the region day-to-day.

This, in turn, has brought an influx of diplomatic attention, development assistance, and more as external powers seek to curry favor with the sixteen Pacific Island countries.¹ As the most aid-dependent region in the world, this recognition is welcomed, but Pacific Islanders remain leery about geopolitical competition and the detrimental impact it could have on their sovereignty and well-being.

Australia, India, Japan, and the United States have independently and collectively scaled up their engagement with these Pacific Islands. In 2007, the four countries formed the Quadrilateral Dialogue (the Quad), which has become an increasingly important element of the Indo-Pacific’s growing multilateral architecture. It serves as a forum for addressing shared challenges across the Indo-Pacific, including in the Pacific Islands.

In February and March 2024, the Indo-Pacific Security Initiative (IPSI) of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security convened public and private discussions with governmental and nongovernmental experts from Quad member states and Pacific Island countries to formulate policy recommendations for the bloc as it expands activities in the region.

The collective output of those discussions, in turn, is the basis for this policy brief, which provides an overview of the relationship between the Quad and the Pacific Islands as it stands today, followed by a series of policy recommendations for the former as it seeks to bolster its engagement with the latter over the coming years.

The Quad and the Pacific Islands: An overview

It is no coincidence that the Quad’s revival in 2017 came at a time of heightened geopolitical competition in the Indo-Pacific. As noted in the 2023 Joint Leaders’ Statement, its members are committed to ensuring “a free and open Indo-Pacific that is inclusive and resilient” and one where “all countries are free from coercion, and can exercise their agency to determine their futures.”

Alongside other fora, the Quad has become an increasingly important node in the Indo-Pacific’s growing “minilateral” architecture. Cooperation within it focuses on six key areas—climate, critical and emerging technology, cyber, health security, infrastructure, and space—that are reflected by the bloc’s formal leader-level working groups.

While they may skate around thornier issues that could divide the bloc, these agreed-upon priority areas have helped the Quad formulate a positive, practical agenda that will benefit not just the four Quad countries but also partner nations. Leaders’ meetings have become an annual occurrence and overall cohesion in the bloc has increased—no small feat, considering how quickly it went dormant after being first conceived in 2007.

Along with its thematic focus areas, the Quad has emphasized cooperation with countries in three key Indo-Pacific subregions—Southeast Asia, the Pacific Islands, and Indian Ocean rim—and expressly acknowledged the centrality of their respective multilateral forums: the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), Pacific Islands Forum (PIF), and the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA).

In the Pacific Islands, the Quad has sought to align itself with the objectives of the 2050 Strategy for the Blue Pacific Continent (2050 Blue Pacific Strategy), a long-term road map for addressing key regional issues that were agreed upon by PIF members in 2022. The PIF strongly encourages external partners to work within this framework, and the Quad’s commitment to supporting its objectives is an important sign of respect for regional institutions.

It should be noted that the PIF is not the only regional institution in the mix; others, such as the Melanesian Spearhead Group (MSG), cater to subregions and may deviate from the PIF at times and contend with it for influence. Furthermore, each of the sixteen Pacific Island countries have unique cultures, histories, and interests. It is therefore important that the Quad members build bilateral relationships with each country rather than opting for the easier route of painting the region with a monolithic brush.

Regional footprint of Quad members

Outside of the Quad framework, Canberra, New Delhi, Tokyo, and Washington also independently maintain regional presences that reflect each country’s unique priorities and interests. The added value of the bloc is its ability to capitalize on members’ regional initiatives to maximize the efficiency and impact of joint initiatives.

Of the four, Australia has historically been the most engaged in the region. It is a PIF member, maintains a comprehensive diplomatic footprint with missions in all sixteen Pacific Island countries, and is by far the single largest aid donor to the region. Canberra possesses unmatched levels of deep and long-term engagements with the Pacific Island countries, but, as with any long-standing bilateral relationship, this inevitably comes with areas of tension.

India has long maintained an interest in Fiji due to the latter’s large Indo-Fijian population but remains a relatively new player in the Pacific Islands region. Its amplified Pacific Islands engagement flows from a broader effort by Prime Minister Narendra Modi to enhance India’s global footprint. For instance, Modi’s 2023 visit to Papua New Guinea included the announcement of a strategic action plan to expand cooperation on a diverse issue set with Pacific Island countries.

Japan has a long history in the region and ramped up its modern-day engagement in the late 1990s, initiating the Japan-Pacific Islands Leaders Meeting (PALM) mechanism in 1997. It is the region’s second-largest provider of overseas development assistance and well-known for its focus on infrastructure and fisheries. As the originator of the “free and open Indo-Pacific” concept, it has been a leading voice for increasing regional cooperation through mechanisms like the Quad.

The United States has deep regional roots due to its ties with the three freely associated states² (FAS) and the geographic location of the US State of Hawaii within Polynesia. The United States significantly scaled back its regional presence in the early 1990s and only truly returned to previous levels of engagement in the late 2010s due to rising geopolitical competition. Since then, it has reestablished itself as a regional player by amplifying development aid, opening new embassies, and more—but questions linger about its long-term reliability and staying power.

All four countries have broadened their engagement in the region. Although Australia is the only full member of the PIF, India, Japan, and the United States hold observer status. They also maintain their own dialogue mechanisms with Pacific Island countries—for example, India’s Forum for India-Pacific Islands Cooperation and the now-annual US-Pacific Island Forum Leader’s Summit. Additionally, Australia, Japan, and the United States are members of the Partners in the Blue Pacific (PBP) mechanism.

The view from the Pacific Islands

With a collective exclusive economic zone (EEZ) of over sixteen million square kilometers, the Pacific Islands occupy nearly 10 percent of the world’s maritime space. In recent years, Pacific Island countries have sought to define themselves as “large ocean states” instead of the more common moniker of “small island states.” Their maritime nature is a defining, cross-cutting feature of the region.

Broadly speaking, the Quad has been welcomed, albeit not universally. Some are critical of the “free and open Indo-Pacific” narrative that undergirds it, arguing among other things that it is incompatible with the 2050 Blue Pacific Strategy and could “funnel resources away from investment in Blue Pacific interests and objectives.” Others contend that the Quad is an unnecessary addition to an already complex multilateral landscape.

As the Quad expands its engagement with the Pacific Island countries, it is important to consider how regional actors define and view key international challenges, especially when such definitions and views may differ from those espoused by Quad members. The PIF’s 2018 Boe Declaration, which incorporates traditional and nontraditional security issues into a single definition of security, is perhaps the most pertinent example.

Climate change, which Pacific Island countries see as their single greatest threat, is central to their definition of security. Quad members, in the 2023 Joint Leaders’ Statement, did expressly acknowledge the significance of climate change as it pertains to global security. However, their words have not always aligned with actions taken on the issue at home, which in turn has periodically strained relations due to perceptions that Quad members’ climate rhetoric is more talk than action.

There are diverging views on geopolitics, but a general through line is a desire to maintain peace, stability, and positive relations with external parties. This is exemplified by Fijian Prime Minister Sitiveni Rabuka’s Zone of Peace concept, which is “deeply rooted in Pacific ideas of family and relationships,” and was welcomed by many Pacific Island leaders at their 2023 PIF retreat.

The development and economic challenges facing Pacific Island countries may be similar to those faced by other developing countries, but they are exacerbated by the region’s vast maritime nature and imminent challenges stemming from climate change. Although there are notable variances between the individual countries, the common priorities include but are by no means limited to disaster management, fisheries, labor mobility, infrastructure, public health, and regional connectivity.

Current Quad-Pacific Islands initiatives

Although the Pacific Islands were briefly referenced in the 2021 Joint Statement of Quad Leaders, the focus on this expansive subregion has grown exponentially since then. A range of programmatic announcements, many of which pertain to the Pacific Islands, were made at the 2023 Leaders’ Summit, including:

• Climate: Quad Climate Change Adaptation and Mitigation Package to accelerate regional cooperation on climate resilience.

• Critical and Emerging Technology (CET): Establishment of an Open Radio Access Network (Open RAN) with Palau, the first of its kind in the Pacific Islands.

• Cyber: Quad Joint Principles for Cybersecurity Partnership to strengthen defenses against cyber threats to critical infrastructure and services.

• Health Security: Quad Health Security Partnershipto strengthen coordination and collaboration in support of health security in the Indo-Pacific.

• Infrastructure: Quad Partnership for Cable Connectivity and Resilience to strengthen cable systems in the Indo-Pacific.

• Space: Exploring avenues to deliver Earth observation data and other space-based applications to assist nations across the Indo-Pacific in strengthening climate early warning systems.

The Joint Leaders’ Statement positively signals the Quad’s intent to work in partnership with the Pacific Islands region and to align programs with the 2050 Blue Pacific Strategy, stating that, “In these efforts, Quad Leaders will listen to and be guided at every step by Pacific priorities.” These programs are only in the preliminary stages of implementation, though, and successful delivery will be crucial to achieving long-term goals.

Policy recommendations

As the Quad looks ahead this year and beyond, it is both standing on solid ground and still finding its footing in the Pacific Islands. Moving forward, the bloc should continue to pursue achievable, practical policies that deliver on Pacific needs while ensuring the Quad is not stretched too thin. In addition, the Quad should take a forward-leaning public diplomacy approach that helps it win over public opinion and build stronger ties with Pacific Island countries.

To support these efforts, IPSI convened a February 2024 public panel discussion, “Bolstering Cooperation among Quad and Pacific Island Countries,” that featured speakers from all four Quad members and the Pacific Islands, including His Excellency David Panuelo, the former president of the Federated States of Micronesia (FSM). IPSI also convened a private track 1.5 workshop, which was attended by thirty-three government and nongovernment experts.

What resulted from the panel discussion and workshop are four broad-based, cross-cutting policy recommendations. These are by no means exhaustive; rather, they reflect the themes most frequently raised and are intended to align with the stated goals of the Quad, its member states, and the Pacific Island countries.

1.  Prioritize programs that bolster physical and digital connectivity

As noted previously, the region’s expansive maritime scale cuts across every issue facing it. Pacific Island countries are geographically isolated, and their isolation is further exacerbated by limited physical connectivity. Physical infrastructure is an issue that is frequently raised in the region, and there are urgent needs for the construction and refurbishment of new and existing facilities: ports, highways, airports, and the like.

Digital connectivity presents a crucial opportunity to circumvent geographic barriers, but most Pacific Island countries are not adequately connected to transnational undersea cable systems. Furthermore, they face challenges with building sufficient telecommunications networks within their own borders. That is why technology and connectivity emerge as one of the seven thematic areas of the 2050 Blue Pacific Strategy

Improving physical and digital connectivity would unlock opportunity across the region, especially on the economic front. The Quad has acknowledged the issue’s centrality in joint statements and laid out concrete programs to improve it throughout the Indo-Pacific. For the Pacific Islands region, this includes the Quad Partnership for Cable Connectivity and Resilience initiative (noted above), and at a country-level includes the Palau Open RAN program (also noted above).

In this and coming years, the Quad should maintain its focus on programs that improve connectivity, especially in the digital realm. The CET and infrastructure working groups are well positioned to continue their work on cables. As the digital realm increases in complexity, the Quad should consider how the space working group can help deliver satellite-based internet coverage—which is in high demand in the Pacific Islands.

It should be noted that this is an area where the Quad can capitalize on existing programs initiated by one or more member states. One example is Australian and US support for incorporating eight Pacific Island countries into US-based Google’s plans for a trans-Pacific subsea cable. Through such a mechanism, the Quad can build upon existing work rather than start from scratch. It also demonstrates the value of bringing private-sector partners into the fold to maximize impact.

2. Emphasize maritime domain awareness and enforcement

Maintaining the territorial integrity of their maritime space is a daunting task for Pacific Island countries. To illustrate, the FSM has an EEZ of almost three million square kilometers and the Solomon Islands has an EEZ of one and a half million square kilometers. Both countries face acute difficulties when seeking to monitor and enforce these EEZs owing to a wide range of resource limitations, from patrol boats to human capital.

The significance of this issue is noted in the 2050 Blue Pacific Strategy, which calls to protect “sovereignty and jurisdiction over our maritime zones and resources” and to “strengthen our ownership and management of our resources.” Yet the ability to do so is under imminent threat from foreign state and nonstate actors on matters ranging from narcotics trafficking to illegal fishing, both of which have increased in recent years.

Echoing this, the Quad announced the Indo-Pacific Partnership for Maritime Domain Awareness (IPMDA) initiative at the 2022 Leaders’ Summit, which aims to “provide near-real-time, integrated and cost-effective maritime domain data to maritime agencies in Southeast Asia and the Pacific.” This, in turn, provides each country with useful tools to help navigate responses to natural disasters and monitoring of climate patterns.

Looking forward, the Quad should consider how the resources it offers can facilitate greater enforcement capacity and enhanced monitoring for Pacific Island countries. One area worth exploring is coordinating the provision of patrol boats, which individual members have historically provided on a bilateral basis. The Quad should not duplicate existing programs; instead, it should serve as a coordination hub to ensure maximally beneficial allocation across the region.

3. Implement positive, practical programs in areas of strategic advantage

While the Quad holds a lot of promise, it should be careful to not overextend itself and become another flashy diplomatic initiative that overpromises and underdelivers. To do so, the Quad can align its strategic advantages with priorities identified by the Pacific Island countries themselves.

As outlined earlier, individual Quad members have unique histories with specific Pacific Island countries. However, the Quad itself is viewed with some skepticism due to its relatively new advent, collapse, and reemergence onto the scene. Australia, India, Japan, and the United States seem to be cognizant of this issue, and their emphasis on positive, practical programs with tangible outcomes will help allay skepticism.

In addition, Quad members should clearly and consistently communicate what they can and cannot do, and how they envision Quad-driven initiatives fitting into an already-complex donor landscape. Doing so will help manage inevitable misunderstandings that tend to come with new initiatives and allow it to focus on producing results that earn credibility and trust from Pacific Islanders.

The bloc has been met with fanfare and gained staunch support in Canberra, New Delhi, Tokyo, and Washington. However, the attention of and priorities for these capitals are becoming split in multiple directions as increasing threats across the world lead to limit the resources and time that can be devoted to the Pacific Islands. Quad and Pacific Island countries alike should be careful not to place all their bets on the Quad, lest it collapse under its own weight.

4. Take a forward-leaning approach to public diplomacy

Globally, the information domain has become more competitive, fast-moving, and fragmented. At both a regional and country level, the Pacific Islands region has a particularly unique information space due to limited digital connectivity and a geographic location that any external actor must fully comprehend in order to seek engagement with local populations.

The Quad may have started off on the right foot, but there is still much to be accomplished to maintain an advantage in the information space, especially as it becomes increasingly contested due to geopolitical competition. Ultimately, Quad members’ status as the partners of choice for many Pacific Island countries is at risk if a forward-leaning approach to public diplomacy is not implemented.

Specific recommendations for implementing this approach include the following:

• Proactively communicate intent: Stress that the Quad is meant to complement, not supersede or replace, the existing regional architecture. Building upon the shift in its official name from the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue to the Quadrilateral Dialogue, it should make a more concerted effort to expand its focus beyond just traditional security issues. Doing so will quell apprehensions from the region regarding the true nature of the Quad’s intentions for the region.

• Emphasize shared values: Quad and Pacific Island countries share democratic values—democracy, rule of law, freedom of speech, and more—that should be actively highlighted. But doing so requires that Quad members practice what they preach at home, lest they open themselves up to charges of hypocrisy.

• Do not overemphasize geopolitics: Pacific Islanders are well aware of the growing geopolitical competition in the Indo-Pacific and the impact it may have on their region. Overly aggressive rhetoric about it may resonate in the capitals of Quad member states, but much less so in the Pacific Islands. It certainly should be discussed at times, but it should not be the overarching crux of public interactions.

• Elevate branding: If the Quad is to achieve its goals, it must back up its rhetoric with concrete evidence of successful implementation of initiatives on the ground. One of the best ways to do so is through physical and digital branding that clearly indicates that the Quad or one of its member states is delivering and working with Pacific Island countries to implement a project. Although Australia and the United States have sometimes been reluctant to elevate branding alongside their individual development programs, the Quad presents an opportunity for a fresh approach.

Parker Novak, the primary author of this issue brief, is a nonresident fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Global China Hub and Indo-Pacific Security Initiative, where he specializes in Southeast Asia, the Pacific Islands, Indo-Pacific geopolitics, and US foreign policy. He previously served as the Indonesia and Timor-Leste country director for an international non-governmental organization.

Kyoko Imai, the project lead and contributor to this issue brief, is the associate director for the Indo-Pacific Security Initiative (IPSI) of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. She spearheads IPSI’s work on US-ROK-Japan, Quad, AUKUS, and other multilateral frameworks, in addition to the Japan, Southeast Asia, and Pacific Islands portfolios. Imai’s functional expertise centers on non-traditional security including but not limited to economic security, human rights, climate security, and migration.

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The post Bolstering cooperation among Quad and Pacific Island countries appeared first on Atlantic Council.

One such project is our effort to establish an intergovernmental Syria Victims Fund. Over the past year, we and our Syrian partners have conducted dozens of consultations with Syrian civil society to develop a framework for the fund, which were used to draft a white paper on the concept for decision makers in country capitals and within international organizations. In February, we were thrilled to see the framework implemented into the European Parliament’s report recommending that the European Council, European Commission, and European External Action Service work to establish such a fund.

We have also seen promising progress in the ongoing campaign to codify the crime of gender apartheid in the United Nations (UN) Sixth Committee’s draft crimes against humanity treaty. On March 8, International Women’s Day, we cohosted a high-level panel event in New York City about gender apartheid in Afghanistan and the momentum behind efforts to codify the crime under international law. The event featured a remarkable line-up of experts, including Nobel Peace Laureate Malala Yousafzai and UN Working Group on Discrimination against Women and Girls Chair Dorothy Estrada-Tanck. In the week leading up to the event, I joined a delegation of our team members in traveling to several country capitals in Latin America to gather support for the campaign. You can read more details about the trip and other campaign efforts below.

Additionally, the Fact-Finding Mission on the Islamic Republic of Iran released a report to the UN Human Rights Council which found that security forces committed crimes against humanity during the Woman, Life, Freedom protests. To support future accountability for these violations, we partnered with Mnemonic to launch the Iranian Archive, which has preserved open-source digital information identifying these violations. 

As always, we at the SLP are incredibly grateful for your continued support. If you have any ideas about what we should be working on or thoughts on our initiatives, we welcome your feedback.

Kind regards,

Staff

Gissou Nia

Director, Strategic Litigation Project

Rafik Hariri Center & Middle East programs

Civil Society Corruption

Send Feedback Support our work

Our team, in partnership with Syrian civil society and SLP Nonresident Senior Fellow Joumana Seif, has been working to establish an intergovernmental Syria Victims Fund. Over the past year, the SLP team and its Syrian partners have conducted dozens of consultations with civil society to develop a framework for a victims fund and met with representatives of governments and international organizations to brief them on the concept.

The proposed framework for the Syria Victims Fund would rely on significant monetary judgments and fines that states are collecting linked to violations in Syria—fines, penalties, and forfeitures for sanctions violations and international crimes committed in Syria. Rather than retaining those funds and essentially profiting off violations in Syria, States should deposit Syria-linked funds into a central location and direct the funds to better support victims of international law violations in Syria.

In February, the European Parliament adopted a report recommending that the European Council, European Commission, and European External Action Service work to establish such a fund for victims of international law violations in Syria, financed by “monetary judgments, sanctions, fines and penalties, forfeiture orders . . . and other revenue.” The report further recommends that European Union (EU) member states then carefully design a fund “in full cooperation with the families of the victims.”

Learn more about the Syria Victims Fund

Just Security has launched a blog series discussing the concept of a Syria victims fund. Read our experts’ contributions:

Joumana Seif: “It’s Time to Establish a Syria Victims Fund”

Elise Baker and Nushin Sarkarati: “No State Should Profit from Violations in Syria. Instead, Direct Monetary Recovery to Victims.”

Celeste Kmiotek and Sameer Saboungi: “The US Recovered Over $600 Million in ISIS-Linked Funds–They Should Go to Syrian and Iraqi Victims”

Ambassador Stephen J. Rapp and Alyssa Yamamoto: “Applying Ukraine Precedent, DOJ Should Use Funds Forfeited from Lawbreakers in Syria to Assist Victims”

International Women’s Day panel event

On March 8, the SLP, in partnership with the International Peace Institute and the Malala Fund, hosted a high-level panel event in New York City about the urgent need for legal recognition of gender apartheid in Afghanistan. The discussion addressed the deteriorating rights of girls, women, and individuals of diverse sexual orientations and gender identities in Afghanistan and the momentum around efforts to codify the crime of gender apartheid under international law, including in the potential UN crimes against humanity treaty. This event was cosponsored by the Global Justice Center, Rawadari, Georgetown Institute of Women, Peace & Security, and the Permanent Missions of Malta and Mexico.

The panel featured Nobel Peace Laureate Malala Yousafzai, Afghan activist and expert Nayera Kohistani, New York Law School Professor and anti-apartheid jurist Penelope Andrews, and UN Working Group on Discrimination against Women and Girls Chair Dorothy Estrada-Tanck, and was moderated by CNN International Correspondent Jomana Karadsheh.

If you were unable to join us live, you can watch the event playback here. 

Briefings in New York City and Washington, DC

In January, the SLP hosted a series of briefings on the gender apartheid codification effort in New York City and Washington, DC, during which the SLP’s Senior Legal and Policy Advisor Alyssa Yamamoto and Strategic Legal Advisor for Gender Justice Akila Radhakrishnan were joined by a panel of experts including the SLP Senior Legal Advisor Sareta Ashraph, Penelope Andrews, Christina Hioureas, SLP Gender and Policy Advisor Metra Mehran, and Paloma van Groll. In Washington, the group met with representatives of several think tanks, US government bodies, and EU embassies. In New York, the delegation hosted closed regional briefings for Latin American and Caribbean countries and EU and other Western countries.

Advocacy in Latin America

Earlier this month, Gissou Nia, along with Akila Radhakrishnan and SLP Nonresident Senior Fellow Nizar El Fakih, traveled to country capitals in Latin America to discuss human rights, gender justice, and other issues impacting Iran and Afghanistan. The group met with high-level representatives of the governments of Chile, Argentina, Brazil, and Colombia to urge their support for both codifying gender apartheid in the UN Sixth Committee’s draft crimes against humanity treaty and extending the mandate of the UN Fact-Finding Mission on Iran by voting in favor of an upcoming UN Human Rights Council resolution.

Chile’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs produced a press release about the group’s meeting with Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs Gloria de la Fuente, which you can read here.

Following the release of the UN Fact-Finding Mission on the Islamic Republic of Iran’s report to the UN Human Rights Council finding crimes against humanity, including for gender persecution committed over the course of the protests following the death of Mahsa Jina Amini, the SLP and Mnemonic in partnership with a coalition of international organizations announced the launch of the Iranian Archive. The archive preserved over one million vulnerable digital artifacts recording serious human rights violations committed by the Islamic Republic of Iran against Woman, Life, Freedom movement protestors.

The Iranian Archive is intended to support future investigations and accountability proceedings. The SLP and Mnemonic are partnered with The Promise Institute for Human Rights at UCLA Law, UC Berkeley’s Human Rights Center, Amnesty International‘s Digital Verification Corps, the Iran Human Rights Documentation Center, and the Azadi Archive. 

In January, SLP Nonresident Senior Fellow and Uyghur human rights lawyer Rayhan Asat traveled to Geneva to attend the interactive dialogue for China’s 2024 Universal Periodic Review (UPR), a process through which the UN Human Rights Council assesses the human rights records of all UN member states according to a rotating schedule of cycles.

Since the UPR takes place only every five years, its interactive dialogue presents a significant opportunity for member states to make specific and measurable recommendations to China in light of the ongoing repression of the Uyghur community and the Chinese government’s disregard for previous critiques of its human rights record. In July, Asat submitted a comprehensive report to the UPR Working Group on the human rights situation in Xinjiang, followed by a New Atlanticist piece about the contents of the report and the need for member states and US officials to hold China accountable for its abuses.

While in Geneva, Asat met with representatives of twenty-two member states to encourage their participation in the interactive dialogue. In the meetings, she presented them with a briefing paper outlining China’s violations against the Uyghurs, the findings of relevant UN human rights bodies, and suggested recommendations to be made to China during its review. Ultimately, more than twenty member states took a strong stance against China’s human rights record during the session.

In February, the SLP published its latest report, “The far reach of justice: Holding the Islamic Republic of Iran Accountable in European courts.” The report explores the options available to hold the Islamic Republic of Iran accountable through the national judicial systems of seven European states by using their universal jurisdiction frameworks.

Report

Dec 22, 2023

How to hold the Islamic Republic of Iran accountable in European courts

By Gissou Nia, Celeste Kmiotek, Lisandra Novo, Alyssa T. Yamamoto

While there are no viable domestic routes toward accountability within Iran, national judicial systems in other states present an alternative path to justice. This report examines prospects for initiating prosecutions against IRI perpetrators in European jurisdictions.

Human Rights International Norms

Throughout Europe, states have adopted universal jurisdiction provisions, which allow them to prosecute acts that constitute core international crimes—genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity—even if the crime was committed in a different state by and against foreign nationals. The countries covered in the report—Belgium, England and Wales, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden, and Switzerland—were selected due to several factors, including the strength of their universal jurisdiction frameworks and frequency of use; their robust caselaw and policies for prosecuting atrocity crimes committed extraterritorially; the size of Iranian expatriate communities in these countries, especially those fleeing persecution and violence; and the possibility of travel by Iranian officials to these jurisdictions.

This report details what each country’s universal jurisdiction provisions entail, how proceedings are initiated, and what victims’ rights are protected. It also gives an overview of each state’s relevant jurisprudence to date, analyzing the legal, practical, and political viability of future cases involving Islamic Republic of Iran violations, including in light of the country’s diplomatic relationship with Iran. Finally, it provides regional and country-specific recommendations to facilitate more cases against Islamic Republic of Iran perpetrators and to strengthen universal jurisdiction frameworks more broadly.

On February 14, the SLP hosted a hybrid event about the crucial role women and their testimonies play in pursuit of justice and accountability in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). The panel featured Dalal Mawad, award-winning Lebanese journalist and author of All She Lost: The Explosion in Lebanon, the Collapse of a Nation and the Women Who Survive; Mai El-Sadany, executive director of the Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy; and Haydee Dijkstal, an international human rights lawyer and SLP nonresident senior fellow.

The discussion was moderated by Patricia Karam, a nonresident senior fellow at Arab Center Washington DC, and touched on a variety of issues, including possible responses to gender-based and sexual violence, the role of independent media in accountability efforts, and legal mechanisms protecting the rights of women and girls.

Public Event Wed, February 14, 2024 • 1:00 pm ET

Justice and accountability in the MENA region: The importance of women’s stories

A panel discussion about the crucial role women and their testimonies play in the pursuit of justice in accountability in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA).

Human Rights International Norms

Watch the Event Read the Recap

Fellow

Metra Mehran

Gender and Policy Advisor

Rafik Hariri Center & Middle East programs

Afghanistan Civil Society

Fellow

Azadah Raz Mohammad

Legal Advisor

Rafik Hariri Center & Middle East programs

Afghanistan Civil Society

Fellow

Mark Klamberg

Nonresident Senior Fellow

Rafik Hariri Center & Middle East programs

English European Union

Fellow

Ivan Horodyskyy

Nonresident Senior Fellow

Rafik Hariri Center & Middle East programs

Eastern Europe English

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The post Strategic Litigation Quarterly Newsletter: It’s time for a Syria Victims Fund. appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Yet, the international community, defined loosely as the collection of United Nations (UN) member states, finds itself unable to emerge as a powerful and unified voice for the women of Afghanistan despite its stated commitments to gender equality. For years, international conventions and declarations have served as inspirations of hope and offered guidelines and principles aimed at safeguarding the rights of women worldwide. Now the people who wrote and advocated for these international standards must translate them into concrete actions to address the world’s most severe women’s rights crisis. These efforts should include codifying gender apartheid as a crime against humanity and prosecuting Afghanistan at the International Criminal Court. Moreover, any international engagement with the Taliban regime must prioritize ensuring its compliance with international law in its treatment of women.

International legal frameworks

Despite critical reports by prominent international organizations such as Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and the UN special rapporteur on the human rights situation in Afghanistan, the standing of women and girls in the country continues to deteriorate rapidly. Women inside Afghanistan have bravely taken to the streets, and their counterparts outside the country have advocated for them in numerous international meetings, conferences, and private roundtable discussions. But these demands and protests have so far failed to garner a robust response from existing international legal mechanisms, obligations, or conventions.  

Bridging the gap

The fundamental human rights that the women of Afghanistan are demanding are clearly defined in the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and elsewhere. These pivotal frameworks mandate governments and international institutions to actively address women’s needs and provide robust protection against any violations, especially in the complex landscapes of conflict and post-conflict situations.

UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325 on Women, Peace, and Security, while nonbinding, expands upon binding conventions by clarifying women’s rights standards, even in states experiencing conflict or those not party to conventions such as CEDAW. The resolution extends its reach beyond governments and states to all parties participating in conflicts.

While UNSCR 1325 does not have direct legal enforcement mechanisms, it carries significant political weight. The resolution “calls upon all parties to armed conflict to respect fully international law applicable to the rights and protection of women and girls” under the relevant conventions and to “bear in mind the relevant provisions of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.” The resolution further calls upon all parties to armed conflicts to “take special measures to protect women and girls from gender-based violence, particularly rape and other forms of sexual abuse, and all other forms of violence in situations of armed conflict.” The resolution has promoted actions at the national, regional, and international levels. Civil society organizations, international actors, and UN bodies regularly monitor and assess progress on the implementation of the resolution and call for greater accountability mechanisms to ensure that commitments are translated into action.

As a United Nations member, Afghanistan ratified CEDAW in 2003 and adopted UNSCR 1325 in 2015, affirming its commitment to international legal obligations and the promotion of the rule of law. The Islamic Republic of Afghanistan successfully submitted its periodic reports to the CEDAW committee and its status reports on the implementation of the national action plan on UNSCR 1325. Under the Taliban’s rule, Afghanistan has disregarded such established international mechanisms and is no longer abiding by any of these international obligations. 

The group’s continued enforcement of oppressive policies and the lack of international accountability has reduced international standards aimed at protecting women’s rights to nothing more than empty rhetoric. Consequently, Afghan women and girls turn to the international community for robust advocacy and support, urging for their voices to be heard and for the use of all available international mechanisms on their behalf.

To date, the international community has failed to deliver. Countries with feminist foreign policies have sought to exert pressure on the Taliban regime and demand the protection of Afghan women’s rights through soft diplomatic meetings and statements. The recent statement issued by the foreign ministers of the Feminist Foreign Policy Network regarding the plight of women in Afghanistan, for example, employed significantly stronger language than their previous statements since August 2021, as they called on the international community to redouble its efforts to leverage all available legal instruments to end the systematic and egregious violations of international law against women. This call has not yet led to meaningful action.

The way forward

To effectively protect and promote women’s rights, it is imperative that members of the international community first agree to refrain from any form of engagement with the Taliban that contradicts their commitments and obligations under international law. This requires a coherent and unified approach, as well as proactive accountability measurements, to avoid contradictory behavior that would undermine the objectives of promoting women’s rights and ending violence against women in Afghanistan. Nevertheless, expecting an illegitimate group such as the Taliban to adhere to international frameworks concerning women’s rights is unlikely to yield significant results.

But the international community, in collaboration with civil society organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and human rights groups, can take proactive measures toward ensuring accountability. One significant step would be to codify gender apartheid as a crime against humanity. By leveraging the instruments provided by binding conventions such as CEDAW, the international community could establish legal frameworks that explicitly recognize and condemn systematic gender-based discrimination and persecution. Over the past three years, there has been significant documentation of gender-based persecution in Afghanistan, including last month’s report from the UN special rapporteur on the human rights situation in Afghanistan. The next step would be for state parties to CEDAW to pursue a case against Afghanistan at the International Court of Justice, either individually or through joint initiatives.

The CEDAW committee should support the re-establishment of Afghanistan’s CEDAW steering committee, technical committee, and drafting committee, both within the country and among Afghan communities in exile. While the current authorities of Afghanistan refuse to provide periodic reports, the committees of experts should be tasked with providing shadow reports.

Moreover, it is imperative for the International Criminal Court to collaborate closely with relevant states and international organizations such as UN bodies, as well as civil society organizations and other stakeholders, to garner support for its investigation into the Taliban’s treatment of women, particularly regarding crimes against humanity such as gender persecution.

The United Nations must adhere to fundamental principle before considering any form of “structured engagement” with the Taliban—a form of cooperation recommended in the independent report by UN Special Coordinator Feridun Sinirlioğlu. The UN should first prioritize the implementation of UNSCR 1325 and other relevant resolutions, ensuring that the rights and needs of women are fully integrated into its strategies and initiatives, including by facilitating direct discussions between women and the Taliban.  

UN Women, in close collaboration with relevant states, must prioritize the revitalization of the focal points in Afghanistan’s UNSCR 1325 national action plan, which was established in 2017. These focal points, people who represented the relevant ministries and civil society organizations before the Taliban takeover, play a pivotal role in guaranteeing the participation of Afghan women in all dialogues. New focal points could be established under the auspices of the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, UN Women, or even the European Union delegation in Afghanistan. The international community must prioritize Afghanistan as a paramount concern in its policy agenda and cease engaging in actions and diplomatic meetings that inadvertently bolster the Taliban’s sense of superiority and embolden similar fundamentalist groups worldwide. The future of Afghan women and the international commitment to gender equality hangs in the balance.

Parwana Paikan is the minister counsellor of the embassy of Afghanistan in France and co-founder of Conseil des Femmes Franco-Afghan. She previously served as deputy director general of human rights and women’s international affairs at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Afghanistan.

The post Afghan women’s rights are not a lost cause. Here’s what the international community can do. appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Medvedev was referring to former Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma’s 2003 book, “Ukraine Is Not Russia.” However, Russia’s imperial ambitions in Ukraine are far older and can be traced back hundreds of years. Beginning in the early decades of the eighteenth century, generations of Russian rulers have sought to erase the entire notion of a separate Ukrainian nation. They have employed a range of tools including settler colonialism, blanket russification, artificial famine, and the ruthless suppression of Ukrainian national identity.

The 1991 breakup of the Soviet Union led to a brief pause in this campaign. However, since the early years of his reign, Vladimir Putin has resurrected Russia’s historic claims to Ukraine. When Russian military aggression against Ukraine first erupted in spring 2014, the Kremlin soon began referring to southern and eastern Ukraine by the Tsarist era colonial name of “Novorossiya” (“New Russia”). Eight years later following the launch of Russia’s full-scale invasion, Putin announced the annexation of these Ukrainian regions while labeling them “historically Russian lands.”

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

Putin initially sought to portray the full-scale invasion of Ukraine as a crusade against “Ukrainian Nazis” and a response to decades of NATO expansion. However, as the war has unfolded, he has become increasingly open about the true nature of his imperial agenda in Ukraine. Putin has directly compared the current invasion to the eighteenth century imperial conquests of Russian ruler Peter the Great, and spent much of his recent high-profile interview with American media personality Tucker Carlson attempting to justify today’s war by arguing that Ukraine was historically part of Russia.

Dmitry Medvedev, who currently serves as deputy chairman of Russia’s influential Security Council, is notorious for echoing Putin’s imperialistic language toward Ukraine. Indeed, he has frequently been even more outspoken than Putin in his denial of Ukrainian statehood and his attacks on Ukraine’s allies. In recent months, Medvedev has warned of possible nuclear attacks on Washington, Berlin, and London, and has vowed to seize more Ukrainian territory including Kyiv.

All this is a far cry from Medvedev’s public persona in 2008 when he replaced Putin as Russian President. At the time, many in the West saw Medvedev as a liberal reformer who would steer Russia toward closer partnership with the West. In fact, the entire Medvedev presidency was a ploy designed to help Putin navigate a two-term constitutional limit before resuming his reign in 2012.

As his political star has waned, Medvedev has sought to reinvent himself as a Russian nationalist hawk. Although often derided as a somewhat buffoonish figure, the former head of state actually plays an important part in Russia’s carefully choreographed political theater. Following the death of Russian nationalist firebrand Vladimir Zhirinovsky in 2022, Medvedev has largely replaced Zhirinovsky as the Kremlin’s unofficial “court clown.”

In this role, Medvedev often makes outrageous statements and voices extremist opinions. This allows the Kremlin to gauge Russian public opinion and test international reaction, while also making Putin himself appear moderate in comparison. With Russia now actively seeking to deter international support for Ukraine by playing on Western fears of escalation, Medvedev’s often colorful threats have become a key element of the Kremlin’s information operations.

Eurasia Center events

Online Event Thu, August 15, 2024 • 9:00 am ET

Ukraine’s advance in Kursk: What’s next and implications

Conflict Russia Security & Defense Ukraine

Medvedev’s latest outburst is nothing new, of course. Indeed, senior Russian officials have been publicly questioning Ukraine’s territorial integrity since the early years of the post-Soviet era. This undercurrent of unapologetic imperialism was one of the main reasons why independent Ukraine’s second president, Leonid Kuchma, chose to write a book debunking Russia’s claims to his country. The publication of “Ukraine Is Not Russia” in 2003 directly challenged the Kremlin’s attempts to portray Ukrainians and Russians as indivisible, and was widely viewed in Moscow as a hostile act. Clearly, many within the Russian elite have not forgotten this very public rejection by a country they condescendingly regard as a younger sibling.

In the years following the appearance of Kuchma’s book, Ukraine underwent two pro-democracy revolutions, while Russia grew increasingly authoritarian. For the past decade, Russia’s escalating military aggression against Ukraine has served to further deepen the divide separating the two countries. As Ukrainian society has turned away from the Russian past and sought to embrace a European future, Russian public opinion toward Ukraine has become increasingly radicalized. Genocidal anti-Ukrainian rhetoric is now an everyday feature of the country’s political discourse and has been completely normalized throughout the Kremlin-controlled Russian media.

By declaring that “Ukraine is definitely Russia” and referring to the country as “an integral part of Russia’s strategic and historical borders,” Medvedev has made a mockery of international calls for a negotiated settlement to end the war. His unambiguous comments should be more than enough to remove any lingering doubts that Russia is committed to the destruction of Ukraine as a state and as a nation.

In such circumstances, any talk of a peace deal without Ukrainian victory is delusional. There can be no meaningful middle ground between Russia’s genocidal goal and Ukraine’s national survival. Instead, attempts to compromise with the Kremlin would be perceived in Moscow as an opportunity to rearm and regroup before launching the next phase of the invasion.

Many people like to laugh at Dmitry Medvedev. On social media, he is routinely depicted as an angry little man whose absurd antics are a symptom of Russia’s dysfunctional politics and his own personal struggle to remain relevant. However, there is nothing funny about the message he is now delivering. Medvedev’s comments confirm the imperialistic aims of the 2022 invasion and signal Moscow’s intention to wipe Ukraine off the map. With hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians already feared dead and dozens of Ukrainian cities reduced to rubble, his threats must be treated as deadly serious.

Dr. Taras Kuzio is professor of political science at the National University of Kyiv Mohyla Academy and Associate Research Fellow at the Henry Jackson Society. He was awarded the Peterson Literary Prize for his book “Russian Nationalism and the Russian-Ukrainian War: Autocracy-Orthodoxy-Nationality” (Routledge, 2022).

Further reading

UkraineAlert Feb 22, 2024

Ukrainian long-range drones target Putin’s war machine inside Russia

By Victoria Vdovychenko, Alexander Khara

Ukraine is hoping a new campaign of long-range drone strikes against Russia’s strategically vital oil and gas industry can help weaken Putin’s war machine, write Victoria Vdovychenko and Alexander Khara.

Conflict Defense Technologies

UkraineAlert Feb 20, 2024

Outgunned Ukraine bets on drones as Russian invasion enters third year

By Mykola Bielieskov

As Putin’s invasion passes the two-year mark, tech-savvy Ukraine is betting on drones as the best way to overcome Russia’s increasingly overwhelming advantage in traditional firepower, writes Mykola Bielieskov.

Civil Society Conflict

UkraineAlert Feb 12, 2024

Putin’s history lecture reveals his dreams of a new Russian Empire

By Peter Dickinson

Vladimir Putin turned his hotly anticipated interview with Tucker Carlson into a history lecture that laid bare the dangerous delusions and imperial ambitions driving the invasion of Ukraine, writes Peter Dickinson.

Conflict Disinformation

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

Read more from UkraineAlert

UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia and Central Asia in the East.

Learn more

The post “Ukraine is Russia”: Medvedev reveals imperial ambitions fueling invasion appeared first on Atlantic Council.

It is impossible to put a price on this death and destruction, of course. Nevertheless, there is no escaping the financial dimension of Russia’s invasion. Every single month, Ukraine requires billions of dollars from partners to fund the war effort, balance the state budget, and keep its economy afloat. In the coming years, the bill for the reconstruction of the country is expected to be in excess of $500 billion. These are truly staggering sums. Making Russia pay would be the most sensible solution, from both a moral and practical perspective.

There is believed to be at least $300 billion in Russian assets currently frozen in the West. Discussions have been underway since the early stages of the invasion over possible mechanisms for handing these assets over to Ukraine. In recent months, the idea of using Russian funds to finance international support for Ukraine has gained momentum, with a range of parallel initiatives unfolding in the US, the EU (which holds the biggest share of frozen Russian assets), and among the G7 group of leading industrialized nations. Multiple different options are currently being explored, from directly transferring funds to Ukraine, to using frozen Russian assets as collateral for bonds.

It is now vital for individual countries to draw up and implement the necessary legislation at the national level, while also coordinating with global initiatives to create legally solid foundations for the transfer of frozen Russian assets to Ukraine. This task must be approached with a sense of urgency that reflects the scale of the challenges facing Ukraine, while also underlining Russia’s criminal responsibility for what is by far the largest and bloodiest European invasion since World War II.

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

Critics of asset seizures have argued that any attempt to hand over Russia’s frozen assets to Ukraine could undermine faith in the international financial system while potentially deterring state bodies and private investors from the Global South from putting their money in the West. However, these concerns are overblown.

Much as the Kremlin would like to make this an issue of global confidence in Western financial institutions, any autocrats with major concerns would have been more likely to withdraw their money from Western jurisdictions in early 2022 when Russian assets were first frozen. That did not happen, in part due to recognition of the exceptional circumstances, and partly as there were no viable alternatives to Western currencies and assets. This remains the case, despite very public discussions over the possible seizure of Russia’s frozen assets.

Others have warned that Russia would almost certainly retaliate by confiscating assets belonging to Western governments and businesses. This, too, is not a serious argument against using Russia’s frozen assets to help Ukraine. The Kremlin is already applying a range of tools to seize Western businesses and assets located inside Russia, without any apparent need to justify such actions by pointing to the loss of its own frozen assets in the West. Companies that chose to invest in Putin’s Russia did so knowing this involved a high degree of risk. They cannot now realistically expect the international community to frame its response to Russia’s invasion around their narrow commercial interests, especially in light of the obvious ethical issues involved.

Eurasia Center events

Online Event Thu, August 15, 2024 • 9:00 am ET

Ukraine’s advance in Kursk: What’s next and implications

Conflict Russia Security & Defense Ukraine

From a pragmatic perspective, the argument in favor of seizing Russian assets and transferring them to Ukraine is compelling. Western support for Ukraine is expensive, with the international coalition of countries backing the Ukrainian war effort already contributing hundreds of billions of dollars over the past two years. As Ukrainian officials have rightly noted, this is not charity. On the contrary, Ukraine is fighting to defend the security and values of the entire Western world. If Russia is not defeated in Ukraine, the cost of stopping Putin will rise dramatically. It is therefore entirely reasonable to expect Western countries to back Ukraine financially.

At the same time, the very large sums involved are perhaps inevitably making Ukrainian aid an increasingly contentious domestic issue in countries across the West. Amid a widespread cost of living crisis and sluggish economic growth, many Western taxpayers are uncomfortable seeing so much money being sent to Ukraine. Kremlin allies are already seeking to exploit this mood, as are opponents of further Western aid to Ukraine. Using confiscated Russian assets would ease the burden on Western countries and silence critics who complain of paying the price for the Kremlin’s war.

Crucially, the seizure of Russia’s frozen assets is morally justified. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is widely acknowledged as a war of aggression and has been condemned in numerous UN votes. International investigators have documented evidence indicating thousands of individual Russian war crimes, while Vladimir Putin himself has been indicted for war crimes by the International Criminal Court in the Hague. Failing to hold Russia financially accountable for the invasion would make a mockery of the entire notion of a rules-based international order.

Those expressing concerns over the legality of asset seizures or the possible implications for financial stability must recognize that time is running out. Their navel gazing is already preventing Ukraine from being able to defend itself properly and is costing Ukrainian lives on a daily basis. Urgent progress is particularly necessary as we are now approaching a period of geopolitical uncertainty, with an unprecedented number of elections set to take place around the world in the coming months.

Finding the right formula to fund Ukraine with Russia’s frozen assets should be an international priority. This will reduce the financial pressure on Western countries and undermine economic arguments against continued international support for Ukraine. Most of all, it should be pursued on moral grounds. Bringing Russians to justice for their crimes in Ukraine and transferring Russian assets located in the West to Ukraine are two very concrete steps to support Ukraine’s victory. States guilty of violating international law should be punished and held financially accountable. This would bolster the rules-based international order and send a clear message that any country embarking on wars of aggression can expect to pay a very high price for doing so.

Paul Grod is President of the Ukrainian World Congress.

Further reading

UkraineAlert Feb 15, 2024

Ukraine’s Black Sea success offers hope as Russian invasion enters third year

By Peter Dickinson

Ukraine’s remarkable success in the Battle of the Black Sea exposes the emptiness of Russia’s red lines and provides a road map for victory over Putin, writes Peter Dickinson.

Conflict Defense Technologies

UkraineAlert Feb 22, 2024

Putin’s unpunished Crimean crime set the stage for Russia’s 2022 invasion

By Mercedes Sapuppo

The West’s inadequate response to Russia’s 2014 invasion of Crimea was a major blunder that emboldened Putin and set the stage for the biggest European invasion since World War II, writes Mercedes Sapuppo.

Conflict Disinformation

UkraineAlert Feb 20, 2024

Outgunned Ukraine bets on drones as Russian invasion enters third year

By Mykola Bielieskov

As Putin’s invasion passes the two-year mark, tech-savvy Ukraine is betting on drones as the best way to overcome Russia’s increasingly overwhelming advantage in traditional firepower, writes Mykola Bielieskov.

Civil Society Conflict

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

Read more from UkraineAlert

UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia and Central Asia in the East.

Learn more

The post Making Russia pay for the invasion of Ukraine appeared first on Atlantic Council.

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During more than two hours of what a European Commission spokesperson called “old lies, distortions, and manipulations, and . . . hostility towards the West,” Putin demonstrated a morbid obsession with Russian imperial grandeur, justified the invasion of neighboring states, and showed zero respect for international law and peace treaties.

As a country that has spent more years in wars with Russia than with any other rival and that has competed for dominance in the Black Sea and Mediterranean Sea over centuries, Turkey should not take the Russian threat lightly.

Watch Russia’s claims on “Constantinople”

In February 2023, while Turkey was still recovering from a devastating earthquake, Russian State Duma Member Semyon Bagdasarov issued a call to attack Turkey and annex Istanbul: “Turkey is the historical lands of Russia. Turkey is now in a dire situation. Let’s take advantage of this and return our lands. Let’s squeeze it out of the Central Asia, undermine its influence in Ukraine, drive it out of the South Caucasus, raise certain forces in Turkey and return what historically belonged to us—Constantinople.” He went as far as to suggest that “the crisis in Turkey must end up in its collapse” and in Russia’s return to Istanbul: “We will erect a cross over the Church of Hagia Sophia and reveal frescoes that are now hidden from people. And we’ll put on music—a prayer in Aramaic or perhaps in Russian.”

References to “Constantinople”—a name now seen only in history textbooks in most other countries—are still frequently seen in Russian modern political rhetoric. In fact, Aleksandr Dugin (the ideologue, sometimes referred to as Putin’s philosopher, behind the ultranationalist Eurasianism movement in Russia and one of the most agile agitators and propagandists of Eurasianism globally) for years was running a popular TV channel called Telekanal Constantinople. Later, he became a mastermind of the Russian Orthodox TV channel Tsargrad, which is owned by Russian oligarch Konstantin Malofeyev (currently on the European Union sanctions list for his support of the 2014 invasion of Ukraine). Tsargrad is another name used within Russia for contemporary Istanbul, meaning “the city of the emperor”—another reminder of Russia’s imperial nostalgia for control over the Black Sea

Some Russian opinion leaders have not abandoned the idea of conquering Istanbul when the opportunity arises. For example, Alexey Vladimirovich Oleynikov (a professor at a Russian public university) argued in 2020 that over the course of the twentieth century, Russia missed two opportunities to “decide the fate of” the Turkish straits—the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus—and that Moscow should not miss its “third chance”: “At the present stage of history Russia has the third one. It is obvious that at present the most acceptable option for Russia is the internationalization of Constantinople and the straits.”

Oleynikov writes that “Constantinople could well receive the status of a free self-governing city. This would be natural: After all, Turkey already has a capital—Ankara.” And later, he elaborates that “historically, Constantinople should be controlled by Russia but owned by Greece.” If that is not to happen, the professor suggests that the internationalization of Constantinople and the straits could be maintained “under the control of great powers with a special status for Russia—a great power in the Black Sea.” His ideas resonate with Bagdasarov’s calls to take advantage of a weakened Turkey: “Turkey itself, torn apart by problems and contradictions, is finding it increasingly difficult to single-handedly control the fate of the strategic region of Europe.” Of course, Russia is always eager to offer help.

Be wary of historical justifications

It isn’t only Istanbul that has been contested. For example, a blogger with nearly 140,000 subscribers on the popular Russian media platform Dzen wrote that Russians “quickly forget about” their “rich imperial past, in comparison with which the achievements of the USSR already seem like awkward attempts to restore the status quo.” He continues, “today we will talk only about part of . . . eastern Turkey, which, after the end of the Russian-Turkish War in 1878, was added to the Russian Empire, namely the Kars region, located on the modern territory of three Turkish regions: Kars, Ardahan, and Erzurum.” Later, the blogger blames the “Bolsheviks of the young Soviet state” for “mediocrely transferring these territories to Turkey in exchange for assistance in consolidating Soviet power in Transcaucasia” under the Moscow Treaty of 1921.

Russian historical grievances have become particularly evident in times of crisis. For instance, in December 2015, a Russian Sukhoi Su-24 tactical bomber violated Turkish air space and was downed by the Turkish air forces. As BBC Russia put it at the time, the event “brings to mind the long and dramatic history of the Black Sea straits”—including Russia’s past claims on Turkish territories. In November 1940, then-Premier of the Soviet Union Joseph Stalin reportedly told the head of the Communist International that the USSR “will drive the Turks out to Asia. What kind of Turkey is this? There are two million Georgians, one and a half million Armenians, one million Kurds. They are only 6-7 million Turks.” And according to Russian historian Alexander Goryanin, Stalin planned to invade Turkey from the Caucasus and Bulgaria at the end of World War II, but that plan went down the drain with Ankara’s joining the anti-Hitler coalition in February 1945.

At the 1945 Potsdam Conference, Stalin expressed his desire to obtain the eastern Turkish provinces of Kars and Lazistan (in northeastern Turkey), and a naval base in the Dardanelles. The partners at the conference responded that Turkey did not fight on Hitler’s side and that there was nothing to punish it for. After the end of the war, it was Soviet demands for joint control over the straits and territorial claims over the eastern regions of Turkey that became a driving force behind Turkey’s decision to seek NATO membership.

Given Putin’s ardent passion for the restoration of Stalin’s legacy, Ankara should carefully take note of this history.

Resist efforts to divide NATO

The Russian threat to Turkey might seem exaggerated, as the country is now a NATO member with the second-largest military in the Alliance.

However, before Russia attacks with armies of tanks, it attacks with armies of bots and trolls. In Russia’s way of war, cognitive warfare unfolds first—paving the way for a kinetic war effort. And in the battle for hearts and minds, with the Russian news agency Sputnik, the television network RT, and the Rossotrudnichestvo (a cultural agency under the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs) still operational in Turkey, the country remains highly vulnerable to Russian penetrations.

A RAND study on Russia’s use of media and information operations in Turkey outlined the goals of Russia’s media efforts in Turkey: 1) to undermine NATO unity and instigate suspicion between Turkey and its Western allies; 2) to enlist Turkey’s support in and erode its opposition to Russian activity in Eurasia and the Middle East; and 3) to influence Turkey’s politics and make Ankara a more “compliant” partner. It also highlighted that in Turkey, Russian media is primarily focused on fueling anti-US discourse, which could help push Ankara into Russia’s embrace.

Back in 2007, Dugin had explicitly outlined this aim in a book he wrote (and published only in Turkish) on what he called the Moscow-Ankara axis: “It is important that anti-Americanism unites three morally different, sometimes antagonistic forces in Turkish society: leftists, nationalists, and representatives of religious circles. Such a wide range shows that Eurasianism in Turkey has great prospects, far beyond the level of any single political force or party.” This message has been amplified by Turkish Eurasianists who have relentlessly promoted a narrative that Ankara should always support Russia, because—as one Turkish proponent put it—“if Russia falls, Turkey will be the next one to be divided by NATO.”

As Putin continues his efforts to restore the Russian empire, Ankara must remain clear-eyed about the real threats to its national security. It’s not a risk of being divided by NATO, but a risk of a divided NATO that would leave Turkey most vulnerable to Russian revisionism in the region.

Yevgeniya Gaber is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council IN TURKEY and a professor at the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies. Follow her on X, formerly known as Twitter, @GaberYevgeniya.

The opinions expressed here are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, the US Department of Defense, or the US government.

The post Listen closely to Putin: His imperial ambitions could include Turkey appeared first on Atlantic Council.

It was then that British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain, meeting with Nazi leader Adolf Hitler and their French Republican and Italian fascist counterparts, signed off on the Third Reich’s annexation of the Western part of Czechoslovakia (which the Germans called Sudetenland), naively hoping that would allow them to avoid a larger European war.

With the two-year mark of Russian dictator Vladimir Putin’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine coming up this week—and with his ongoing war and occupation of sovereign Ukrainian territory—it’s worth reflecting on the dynamics behind the 1938 Munich Agreement and Chamberlain’s subsequent “Peace for Our Time” speech, as they may hold lessons for US lawmakers in the House of Representatives who continue to balk at approving urgently needed support for Ukraine after four months of dithering in Congress.

Hitler had threatened to unleash a European war unless the leaders of Britain, France, and Italy agreed to German annexation of the Sudetenland, a border region with an ethnic German majority. “My good friends,” Chamberlain said in a statement in front of 10 Downing Street, “for the second time in our history, a British prime minister has returned from Germany bringing peace with honor. I believe it is a peace for our time . . . Go home and get a nice quiet sleep.”

Echoes of history

There are plenty of differences between then and now, but one shouldn’t overlook the striking similarities.

First, Hitler had annexed German-speaking Austria in March 1938, and he was determined to swallow up the German-speaking Sudeten region of Czechoslovakia next. Today, Putin has already occupied and annexed portions of Ukraine with sizable numbers of Russian speakers—areas that he considers to be his property: Crimea, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia, Kherson, and Donetsk. 

Hitler wrote at length about his warped historic, genetic, and anti-Semitic notions in Mein Kampf, providing a copy of his national best-seller to every young marrying couple in Third Reich Germany. By comparison, Putin most recently shared his own twisted justifications for denying Ukrainian statehood, dating back to the ninth century, with American media personality Tucker Carlson—not such a bizarre vehicle if one considers Carlson’s influence on a Republican minority in the House that is currently standing in the way of approving additional aid for Ukraine.

And just as in 1938, when the focus of debate was on the future of Czechoslovakia and when commentaries praised the country’s bravery and resilience, so too now is the focus on Ukraine. Back then, the more appropriate focus should have been on the dictator responsible for the threat and on how to stop him. Today, the more appropriate focus is no different.

One more similarity between 1938 and today is the gradual alignment of authoritarian powers. Shortly after Chamberlain’s infamous Munich Agreement, a fascist-nationalist German-Italian-Japanese axis of nations emerged. Today, European and US leaders alike have observed an increasingly close alignment among Russian, Chinese, Iranian, and North Korean authoritarian leaders.

A morose Munich

The Munich Security Conference this week, which marked the convening’s sixtieth anniversary, is as good a measure of the transatlantic zeitgeist as any.

Yet four news events that unfolded outside of Munich soured the mood: Former US President Donald Trump’s campaign trail statement that he would let Russians “do whatever the hell they want” to NATO allies not paying enough for defense; the death in prison of Russian opposition leader Alexei Navalny; the biggest Russian battlefield victory in months in the Ukrainian city of Avdiivka; and leaked reports of Moscow’s plans to develop a nuclear space weapon, which the Atlantic Council’s John Cookson suggested could be a “Sputnuke” moment.  

On Trump’s statement, a range of Republican supporters of Trump in Munich were at pains to explain why their presidential candidate should be taken seriously but not literally, as US military support for Ukraine, Poland, and NATO increased during his administration. Their argument that Trump simply wants Europeans to carry more of their own defense still left allies worried that they are in for a long period of US unpredictability.

Regarding Navalny, his wife Yulia (who was in Munich to speak on his behalf) provided a courageous first response to reports of his death, accusing Putin of killing him and vowing that the Russian dictator would pay for it. Some long-time Munich conference participants, who heard Putin’s initial declaration of war on the West there in 2007, speculated that he might well have timed Navalny’s death with the Munich gathering to send an unmistakable message of the West’s powerlessness to stop such outrages.

“It sounds like Putin might have done it for our benefit,” said Polish Foreign Minister Radek Sikorski. “I’m not prone to conspiracy theory, but I understand conspiracy practice.”

It is impossible not to link Russian advances in Ukraine with the long delay in US congressional support for new weapons deliveries, as the outgunned and outmanned Ukrainians struggle to hold the line against Russian forces commanded by Putin, who is willing to suffer outsized casualties. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said that in the battle for Avdiivka, Russia’s losses were seven times those of Ukraine.

If “Ukraine is left alone, Russia will destroy us,” Zelenskyy told the Munich conference. “If we don’t act now, Putin will succeed in turning the next few years into a catastrophe—not only for Ukraine but for others as well.”

On “Sputnuke,” the consensus in Munich was a resigned European shrug as Russia marches on, develops asymmetric advanced weaponry that could take down European communications in space, and shifts to a war footing that Europe’s democracies will never match.

Writing for the Washington Post, David Ignatius pointed out Russia’s motivation for developing such weaponry: “Ironically, it’s the Ukraine conflict—and the role of space systems in helping Kyiv survive the initial Russian onslaught in 2022—that likely triggered Russia to rush development of its new space tactics.”

Four causes for concern

The concerns and fears at Munich this year, which far overwhelmed rare voices of optimism, broke down into four mutually reinforcing categories.  

The first fear was about Russia’s resilience and Putin’s increasing confidence, which contributed to a growing conviction that Russia will remain a problem for the West for some years to come.

The second concern stemmed from the possibility that Ukraine might lose the war, with a growing danger that it could be overwhelmed by Russian military mass, and from an assessment of the repercussions of that scenario most immediately for other former Soviet bloc states, from Poland to the Baltics, but also globally, from the United States to the Middle East and Asia.

The third concern, one that pervaded almost every conversation at the conference this weekend, was about the potential for a reduced US commitment not only to Ukraine but also to the nearly eighty-year-old transatlantic bond, particularly should Trump be elected in November.

The fourth fear, closely connected to the third, was that Europe still lacks the military industrial capacity and the political will to defend itself, let alone defend Ukraine. Though Europe is ramping up its defense industrial production and increasing its spending, it would take years for European countries to replace US capacity, if they ever could.

The past three Munich Security Conferences have all focused on Ukraine, and each year the conventional wisdom has missed the mark. One can only hope that is true again.

In 2022, there were growing concerns that Putin would invade Ukraine, which did happen, but there was also a consensus that Ukraine would be overrun within days by such a military offensive. In 2023, the mood was more positive, with many voices believing that Ukraine’s remarkable performance in the previous year could lead to a stunning counteroffensive that would help Kyiv regain territory occupied by Russia.  

The collective view is that 2024 will be a moment of truth in Ukraine. Without US congressional approval for additional support soon, the thinking goes, the odds are that Russia will continue to make gains and that some could be dramatic by the time of the seventy-fifth NATO Summit in July in Washington, DC—just ahead of US elections.

It is worth remembering the calls of “shame” from the House of Commons galleries, as Chamberlain defended his Munich arrangements in 1938. “I have nothing to be ashamed of,” he answered back. “Let those who have hang their heads.”

Not too late—yet

It’s worth reading what Chamberlain said after returning from Munich as a warning to all who are tempted to sell Ukraine short, underestimate Putin and other emerging despots, and retreat into the most dangerous of all responses: naive complacency.

“The path which leads to appeasement is long and bristles with obstacles,” said Chamberlain. “The question of Czechoslovakia is the latest and perhaps the most dangerous. Now that we have got past it, I feel it may be possible to make further progress along the road to sanity.”

There is an oft-repeated quote that says “insanity is doing the same thing over and over again and expecting different results.” 

It’s not too late for the US House of Representatives to change course, to bring a vote on a Senate bill providing Ukraine aid to the floor, and to provide Ukraine the support it urgently needs to do the free world’s bidding against Putin. Should this fail, Europe would need to greatly accelerate its ramp-up of defense production and its support for Ukraine.

The lesson of Munich, then and now, is that the cost of countering a despot will only grow the longer democracies wait to do so. As Sikorski said in Munich, “I have more doubts about us than the Ukrainians.” If the United States fails to step up to the moment this year, he said, “it could affect the national-security calculations of every country on Earth. We are at a dramatic moment, one of terrible foreboding.”

Frederick Kempe is president and chief executive officer of the Atlantic Council. You can follow him on Twitter @FredKempe.

THE WEEK’S TOP READS

#1 Why Russia Killed Navalny

Anne Applebaum | THE ATLANTIC

In this powerful reflection on Alexei Navalny’s life, Anne Applebaum argues that the specific details of his death “don’t matter,” whether he was murdered or died from months of ill health, because “the Russian state killed him,” she writes. “Putin killed him—because of his political success, because of his ability to reach people with the truth, and because of his talent for breaking through the fog of propaganda that now blinds his countrymen, and some of ours as well.”

Despite Navalny’s death, Applebaum remains optimistic. “Even behind bars Navalny was a real threat to Putin because he was living proof that courage is possible, that truth exists, that Russia could be a different kind of country,” she writes. “For a dictator who survives thanks to lies and violence, that kind of challenge was intolerable. Now Putin will be forced to fight against Navalny’s memory, and that is a battle he will never win.” Read more →

#2 Opinion: Is This a Sputnik Moment?

Kari A. Bingen and Heather W. Williams | NEW YORK TIMES

In this compelling analysis, Kari Bingen and Heather Williams evaluate the parallels between Thursday’s announcement of a new Russian antisatellite capability, suspected of being a space-based nuclear weapon, and the 1957 launch of Soviet satellite Sputnik.

“If it is what the White House suggests, we may now find ourselves facing this generation’s Sputnik moment,” they write. “In 1957, when the former Soviet Union launched the world’s first satellite and shocked Americans, the Eisenhower administration had known about the Soviets’ satellite capabilities for almost two years. Now that we know what Russia is planning, the United States cannot afford to be slow to act.” Read more →

#3 ‘The war has become the background of life’—Andrey Kurkov on Ukraine two years on

Andrey Kurkov | FINANCIAL TIMES

Writing in the Financial Times, Ukrainian novelist Andrey Kurkov presents a striking portrait of Ukrainian life as Russia’s war continues.  

“Ukrainians may be responding to journalists less optimistically than they did a year ago, but there is no pessimism either,” Kurkov writes. “The time has come for realism—an understanding that this war will last for a long time, that we must learn to live with it. The effort to keep on ‘keeping on’ that has been a form of resistance for civilians since the all-out invasion now requires a little more energy. For those Ukrainians who are not at the front, the war has become the background of life, and the daily air raid alerts are noted alongside the weather forecast.”

Kurkov’s piece also serves as a warning that if Western support does not come through, life in Ukraine may stop altogether. Read more →

#4 The Arsenal of Autocracy

Jonathan Corrado and Markus Garlauskas | FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Read every word of this smart analysis by the Korea Society’s Jonathan Corrado and the Atlantic Council’s Markus Garlauskas on why North Korea continues to be a massive threat to the United States and global security, especially in moments of global upheaval.

“As wars rage in the Middle East, Europe, and Africa, Pyongyang has seized its opportunity to spread death and destruction through arms sales,” Corrado and Garlauskas write. “Although the Kim regime has been systematically isolated from the international community, regularly denies that it is supplying weapons overseas, and is prohibited by UN Security Council resolutions from buying or selling various arms, it has nonetheless become a de facto arsenal for the United States’ adversaries.”

To stop this trade, they argue, “the United States must mobilize a coalition to increase international awareness of the scale of the problem, and strengthen detection, oversight, and sanctions compliance. If these steps are not taken, then North Korea will be able to finance further weapons testing and development, gain access to dangerous new technologies, launder its ill-gotten profits, and spread mayhem and destruction.” Read more →

#5 Remarks by President Biden on the Reported Death of Aleksey Navalny

Joe Biden | THE WHITE HOUSE

Speaking shortly after reports of Alexei Navalny’s death, US President Joe Biden linked the brutality Navalny faced to Russia’s continued assault on Ukraine and the United States’ continuing failure to provide urgently needed military and financial support. 

“What has happened to Navalny is yet more proof of Putin’s brutality,” Biden said. “No one should be fooled—not in Russia, not at home, not anywhere in the world. Putin does not only target [the] citizens of other countries, as we’ve seen what’s going on in Ukraine right now, he also inflicts terrible crimes on his own people.”

Biden addressed US responsibility to continue Navalny’s fight: “This tragedy reminds us of the stakes of this moment. We have to provide the funding so Ukraine can keep defending itself against Putin’s vicious onslaughts and war crimes.” Read more →

Atlantic Council top reads

The post Dispatch from Munich: The lessons of appeasement for US lawmakers withholding support for Ukraine appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On February 6, IPSI nonresident senior fellow Josh Cartin co-authored a piece published through Brookings, titled, “Is the US-China relationship the most consequential relationship for America in the world?” He argues that although “China is and will be negatively consequential for the United States,” the US-China relationship is not the United States’ most consequential relationship.

Fellow

Josh M. Cartin

Nonresident Senior Fellow

Indo-Pacific Security Initiative Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

China Chinese

The post Cartin published via Brookings on US-China relationship appeared first on Atlantic Council.

What I’ve tried to do in this column is find the best ways to understand the perils and (where possible) provide the best ideas for solutions. If you’re in search of more works of diagnosis—especially ones with rich historical perspective—read every word of Hal Brands’s “The Next Global War,” hot off the press at Foreign Affairs.

He usefully looks back on the runup to World War II, long before US involvement in that conflict, which saw the “aggregation of three regional crises: Japan’s rampage in China and the Asia-Pacific; Italy’s bid for empire in Africa and the Mediterranean; and Germany’s push for hegemony in Europe and beyond.”

Fast forward to today.

We also face three perilous regional challenges and autocratic powers who are growing dangerously close to each other, also unified mostly by their determination to blow up the status quo. China wants to replace the United States as the leading global power and push it out of the western Pacific; meanwhile, Russia wants to retake territory and influence lost with Soviet collapse, most immediately in Ukraine. In the Middle East, Iran and its proxies (among them Hamas, the Houthis, and Hezbollah) are bent on the annihilation of Israel and are struggling for regional dominance against Gulf monarchies and the United States. This struggle was on display most recently when an Iran-backed militant group launched a drone attack on a US base in Jordan this weekend, killing three US troops and injuring dozens.

“Beijing, Moscow, and Tehran,” writes Brands, “are the new ‘have not’ powers, struggling against the ‘haves’: Washington and its allies.”

Also in an echo of the present, the fascist countries that eventually teamed up as the Axis powers during World War II at first “had little in common except illiberal governance and a desire to shatter the status quo.” In 1937, US President Franklin D. Roosevelt called what was unfolding, long before Washington joined the war, an “epidemic of world lawlessness.”

Brands is a sophisticated thinker, and he draws nuanced comparisons—instead of leaping to conclusions. “But thinking through the nightmare scenario is still worthwhile,” he writes, “since the world could be as little as one mishandled crisis away from pervasive Eurasian conflict—and because the United States is so unprepared for this eventuality.”

Frederick Kempe is president and chief executive officer of the Atlantic Council. You can follow him on Twitter: @FredKempe.

This edition is part of Frederick Kempe’s Inflection Points Today newsletter, a column of quick-hit insights on a world in transition. To receive this newsletter throughout the week, sign up here.

The post The United States is unprepared for this nightmare scenario appeared first on Atlantic Council.

“Some foreign governments are increasingly factoring into their relationship with the United States what may come to be known as the ‘Trump put’—delaying choices in the expectation they will be able to negotiate better deals with Washington a year from now because Trump will effectively establish a floor on how bad things can get for them,” writes Allison in the latest issue of Foreign Affairs.

At the top of this list of foreign officials strategically watching the upcoming US election is Russian President Vladimir Putin, who is calculating that his chances in the Ukraine war (which Trump has promised to end “in one day”) could improve dramatically. That expectation drives Putin to play for stalemate this year while wagering on European and American fatigue in addition to Trump’s election, which might set the Russian leader up for victory thereafter.

“Others, by contrast,” writes Allison, “are beginning to search for what might be called a ‘Trump hedge’—analyzing the ways in which his return will likely leave them with worse options and preparing accordingly.”

Count in this camp Ukraine and its European NATO supporters. There’s a healthy side to this, as European countries are looking for better ways to defend Ukraine and themselves.

The downside? Trump’s campaign website calls for “fundamentally reevaluating NATO’s purpose and NATO’s mission,” so existing NATO members and new ones—Finland and soon Sweden—may find alliance security guarantees less secure.

Look around the world, and you’ll find dozens of examples of the Trump hedge and put—from climate-related issues to trade matters, where the former president describes himself as “the Tariff Man,” promising to impose a ten percent duty on all imports.

“This year promises to be a year of danger as countries around the world watch US politics with a combination of disbelief, fascination, horror, and hope,” writes Allison.

What he doesn’t write is that perhaps never in the past have the United States’ allies and adversaries begun to hedge and put this far ahead of our elections. The consistency of US foreign policy across the Cold War years is becoming a thing of the past.

What one national leader in Davos told me he misses most regarding relations with the United States is the degree of predictability needed to make his country’s own policies. “It’s not good or bad,” he said, “it’s just the reality that is our starting point.”

Frederick Kempe is president and chief executive officer of the Atlantic Council. You can follow him on Twitter: @FredKempe.

This edition is part of Frederick Kempe’s Inflection Points Today newsletter, a column of quick-hit insights on a world in transition. To receive this newsletter throughout the week, sign up here.

The post How the prospect of a second Trump presidency is already shaping geopolitics appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Gissou Nia, Strategic Litigation Project director, testified before the House Committee on Homeland Security, and subcommittee on Counterterrorism, Law Enforcement & Intelligence. Below are her prepared remarks on addressing transnational repression threats to homeland security.

Hello Mr. Chairman, Mr. Ranking Member, members of the House Committee on Homeland Security, and subcommittee on Counterterrorism, Law Enforcement & Intelligence, thank you for inviting me to testify today on the problem of transnational repression and the threat it poses to the United States and Americans wherever they may be in the world.

I am a lawyer specialized in international criminal law and human rights law who is the founder and director of the Strategic Litigation Project at the Atlantic Council. I founded the Strategic Litigation Project in 2019 to seek redress for victims and survivors of human rights violations, atrocity crimes, terrorism, and corruption. Part of the work of our team focuses on cross-border crimes and the risk that authoritarian states pose to dissidents around the world. In assessing these threats, we work closely with activists and impacted communities to understand patterns and the nature of these threats—which can often be context and country specific. Our team includes lawyers from the Uyghur community, Venezuela, Cuba, Afghanistan, Iran, and other regions of the world. We are often consulted by governments, UN experts, private practitioners, and targets of transnational repression on what legal and policy options are available to address this growing problem. My testimony today is informed by that work, as well as my experience over the past two decades working with civil society from oppressive regimes around the world and understanding the unique threats that activists, journalists, human rights defenders, and others who speak truth to power face.

**

First, I am going to discuss gaps in the law here in the US and new legal tools that can address the problem of transnational repression. Then, I will touch on a few themes I have observed in interacting with communities impacted by this problem and how this can help better inform law enforcement.

1- Congress should pass better criminal and civil legal tools to combat transnational repression.

Fighting transnational repression should start with defining, in clear legal terms, exactly what it is.

Currently, there is legislation pending before Congress that will help define transnational repression and formulate a strong foreign policy response to this phenomenon. The Transnational Repression Policy Act, introduced by a bipartisan group of Senators and building on a provision Congress passed in the NDAA for 2022 which focused on the abuse of INTERPOL by authoritarian regimes, seeks to do this.

However we also have a need for a robust criminal legal approach to address the problem of transnational repression that can better synthesize the crime and its penalties.

A comprehensive definition introduced through legislation could allow prosecutors to target perpetrators more directly. For example, in the criminal indictment against the perpetrators who attempted to kidnap Iranian-American dissident Masih Alinejad, there was a reliance on charges such as conspiracy to commit bank and wire fraud and conspiracy to commit money laundering. While the first paragraph of that indictment identified the problem as one of transnational repression, the lack of a specific provision in the US Code meant the defendants needed to face a range of other charges.

In that indictment, the four Iran-based defendants were charged in federal court because they hired a private investigative firm based in the United States and used the US financial system, which is prohibited to agents of the Islamic Republic. But many other acts leading up to the kidnapping plot encompassed transnational repression. For example, Islamic Republic of Iran officials pressured Ms. Alinejad’s family with offers of payment to lure Ms. Alinejad to meet them in a third country, where she could be more easily abducted. They also imprisoned her brother on unfounded national-security charges, simply to exert pressure on Ms. Alinejad.

These are all acts of transnational repression intended to target a US person, but they do not fall neatly within existing US criminal law.

A survey of DOJ indictments against PRC actors engaging in transnational repression reveals a similar pattern of charging.

A new legal definition could specifically outline what types of acts will constitute harassment and persecution—including crimes like murder, torture, and kidnapping, as well as cyberattacks and the spread of disinformation.

As lawmakers consider legislative proposals to criminalize transnational repression, jurisdictional reach should also be a key consideration. Title 18 of the US Code already provides jurisdiction outside the United States over a broad range of international crimes such as torture, genocide, war crimes, recruitment of child soldiers, trafficking, piracy, and terrorism.

But jurisdiction must be expansive enough to protect victims. If a bill only allows for the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction when the perpetrator or victim is a US national, it would leave an accountability gap. For example, prosecutors would be hindered from bringing a case if foreign family members of a political dissident are being targeted by a foreign state and that political dissident has recently arrived in the United States as a refugee or asylum seeker.

Short of a federal criminal statute specifically addressing transnational repression, other proposals that might help enforce accountability include an extraterritorial federal criminal statute for extrajudicial killings, which could provide accountability if a US-based dissident’s family members are killed.

Then there are civil litigation tools that could provide remedies for transnational repression.

Under the “terrorism exception” to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, individuals can sue US-designated state sponsors of terrorism—currently Iran, Syria, North Korea, and Cuba—for extraterritorial acts including torture, extrajudicial killing, and hostage-taking. But that is only possible if the plaintiffs were US nationals at the time the act occurred.

Congress could amend the statute to allow individuals to sue if they are US nationals or lawful permanent residents at the time the claim is brought, allowing newly arrived dissidents who are the target of transnational repression to hold the governments of their origin countries accountable.

Staying on the topic of exceptions to the FSIA, the Homeland and Cyber Threat (HACT) Act has been introduced and re-introduced before the House since 2019 and would partly address transnational repression by allowing dissidents who are US nationals to sue foreign states that launch cyberattacks against them.

However, this would not address the problem of accountability against private companies—who facilitate the sale of spyware used against dissidents. A series of judgments from the US Supreme Court have restricted the possibilities for corporate liability and this negatively impacts the ability of US-based non-citizen dissidents to sue companies involved in surveillance. These barriers to accountability in US domestic law must be removed.

2- How to address transnational repression from US allies versus from US adversaries.

Another critical aspect of this problem is to how to identify and address threats posed to US citizens and residents by US allies, not adversaries. A quick glance at the FBI website to report instances of transnational repression shows a list of DOJ indictments against individuals from China, Russia, and Iran but there is nothing to indicate that these threats can also come from Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the UAE, Rwanda, and even India.

Transnational repression is not only carried out by US adversaries, it is also carried out by authoritarian governments with strategic partnerships with the US conditioned on aid packages, arms deals, political support, and trade relationships. These authoritarian states have the same interest other authoritarian states do in silencing dissidents abroad, and their friendly relationship with the US does not deter them from targeting dissidents on US soil.

The nature of the relationship between governments does however affect how confident the victims and impacted communities feel in coming forward to law enforcement here in the US to inform authorities of the problem. In consultations I have had with dissidents from countries friendly with the US, they have expressed fear or reluctance in approaching US authorities to detail the threats they face. There is a pervasive feeling that US authorities may not defend their interests in the same way they would if the perpetrators were from an “adversary” country like Russia, China, or Iran—where US foreign policy has taken a clear position in defending the interests of Americans with no trade-offs.

The efforts that the FBI has taken to encourage impacted communities to report incidents of transnational repression is admirable, but it will only be as strong as the willingness of communities to come forward. Similarly, the Transnational Repression Policy Act instructs DHS to create a tip line for victims and witnesses of transnational repression to share information with the US government—but again, these communities need to trust that this information will be acted on in a beneficial, not harmful, way and this will require trust.

This touches on a last point. The strategy to combat transnational repression domestically will be strengthened with improved global coordination to tackle bad actors. Given the cross-border nature of this crime, the repression may begin in the origin country, but it can touch other countries along the way, in a chain of repression that ultimately can impact US interests. For example, both Saudi Arabia and Egypt have consented to China’s requests that Uyghur dissidents be repatriated to China—despite the risks that those dissidents will be imprisoned and sent to “reeducation” centers. And multiple US residents who are dissidents from authoritarian regimes have been detained or abducted while traveling through the UAE and sent to their origin country. US law enforcement should work with their counterparts in allied countries to assess why this is happening and undertake efforts to better protect dissidents.

** *
Mr. Chairman, Mr. Ranking Member, and Members of the Committee, thank you again. I look

forward to your questions.

The post Gissou Nia testifies to House Committee on Homeland Security, and subcommittee on Counterterrorism, Law Enforcement & Intelligence appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Following Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022, Ukraine’s State Customs Service moved to a war footing. Initially, the top priorities were maintaining control over the country’s customs service amid Europe’s largest invasion since World War II, and ensuring the physical safety of staff members. Many employees had to be evacuated from front line areas or regions under Russian occupation. Meanwhile, around five percent of customs service personnel joined the Ukrainian Armed Forces.

Despite these unprecedented challenges, customs services in areas unaffected by hostilities continued to operate with minimal disruption. Staff were redeployed to western and southern Ukraine to address rising demand, while clearance procedures were streamlined. With Russia blockading Ukraine’s Black Sea ports, cargoes were increasingly transported to the EU via road and rail.

In response to the wartime conditions in Ukraine, new measures were introduced making it possible to process customs declarations for humanitarian aid online. Steps were also taken making it easier to import items for military use such as radios, binoculars, body armor, and drones. Customs service officials continued to operate in southern Ukraine’s Black Sea ports in the Odesa region, despite the dangers posed by regular Russian missile and drone strikes.

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

Even with these adjustments in place, customs revenues in 2022 inevitably reflected the wider damage done to the Ukrainian economy by Russia’s invasion, with total revenues representing just 56.9 percent of the annual target. This led to a sharp decline in State Customs Service contributions to the national budget, which fell by 32.7 percent, a figure that was more or less in line with the overall drop in Ukraine’s GDP during the first year of the invasion.

Amid the destruction of Russia’s full-scale invasion, Ukraine continues to invest in customs infrastructure upgrades that are designed help facilitate international trade and improve the country’s economic outlook. During the past year, construction work on two border crossings with Romania has been completed. Ukraine is also currently expanding join control projects along the border with Moldova, while aligning procedures with European standards.

These initiatives are part of the Ukrainian State Customs Service’s broader European integration efforts. Ukraine was officially recognized as an EU candidate country in summer 2022, with EU leaders confirming the decision to begin membership talks in December 2023. The reform of the customs service will be integral to Ukraine’s further integration into what remains the world’s wealthiest trading bloc.

Eurasia Center events

Online Event Thu, August 15, 2024 • 9:00 am ET

Ukraine’s advance in Kursk: What’s next and implications

Conflict Russia Security & Defense Ukraine

As part of the assessment process prior to the recent decision on EU membership talks, the European Commission positively assessed Ukraine’s customs reform progress so far. The Ukrainian Customs Code now largely aligns with the European Union’s own Customs Code, including in key areas such as transit, guarantees, and intellectual property rights.

During the wartime period, Ukraine has ratified the Convention on Common Transit Procedure, a crucial step toward EU membership. The country has also launched a national node of Europe’s Common Communication Network, connected to the New Computerized Transit System (NCTS), and linked up to the Joint Telecommunications Network of EU member states within the European Transit System.

The adoption of a new Ukrainian Customs Code, fully aligned with the EU’s own Customs Code, aims to expedite trade by implementing customs simplifications while establishing a robust defense against smuggling. Implementation will strengthen the law enforcement role of the State Customs Service and enhance cooperation with European colleagues.

The ongoing reform of Ukraine’s customs service and the implementation of EU standards are fundamental for the country’s further European integration. These parallel processes will also strengthen Ukraine’s credentials as a natural customs partner on the EU’s eastern frontier. As Ukraine progresses toward membership of the European Union in the years ahead, the country will be increasingly well positioned to build on its geographical location and play a more prominent role as an eastern customs hub for EU markets.

Vladyslav Suvorov is Deputy Chief of Ukraine’s State Customs Service.

Further reading

UkraineAlert Dec 17, 2023

2024 preview: The West must decide if it wants Ukraine to win

By Richard D. Hooker, Jr.

If Western leaders fail to provide Ukraine with the weapons to defeat Putin in 2024, this will significantly increase the likelihood of a direct military confrontation between Russia and NATO, writes Richard D. Hooker Jr.

Conflict Defense Technologies

UkraineAlert Jan 2, 2024

Ukraine needs urgent air defense aid as Putin launches bombing campaign

By Peter Dickinson

As Russia launches a long-awaited new bombing campaign against Ukrainian cities, fears are mounting that deadlock over continued US and EU military aid may soon leave Ukraine facing critical air defense shortages, writes Peter Dickinson.

Conflict Defense Technologies

UkraineAlert Jan 4, 2024

To defeat Putin in a long war, Ukraine must switch to active defense in 2024

By Mykola Bielieskov

By embracing a strategy of active defense in 2024, Kyiv can achieve the twin goals of preventing any major Russian advances and creating conditions that strongly favor Ukraine in what is increasingly a war of attrition, writes Mykola Bielieskov.

Conflict Defense Policy

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

Read more from UkraineAlert

UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia and Central Asia in the East.

Learn more

The post Ukraine seeks future role as EU’s eastern customs hub appeared first on Atlantic Council.

With the invasion now fast approaching the two-year mark, the Russian dictator apparently no longer feels the need to dress up his true intentions. Buoyed by a very visible recent weakening in Western resolve, Putin is now openly embracing the language of imperialism and referring to Russian “conquests” in Ukraine.

Speaking at a January 16 meeting of municipal authorities in the Moscow region, Putin dismissed Ukraine’s Peace Formula and expressed his unwillingness to discuss the status of the Ukrainian regions currently under Russian occupation. “As for the negotiation process, this is an attempt to encourage us to abandon the conquests we have made over the past one-and-a-half years. Everyone understands that this is impossible,” he commented.

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

Putin’s revealing reference to conquered Ukrainian lands underlines the imperialistic ambitions at the heart of Russia’s Ukraine invasion. It also further discredits Russian efforts to blame the invasion on imaginary Nazis and a non-existent NATO threat.

On the eve of the invasion, Putin made much of NATO’s post-1991 enlargement and was highly critical of the alliance’s decision to accept former Warsaw Pact countries as members. While Ukraine itself had no realistic prospects of joining the alliance in 2022, Putin claimed the prospect of deepening cooperation between NATO and Kyiv posed an intolerable security threat to Russia.

Putin’s protestations were undermined by his own subsequent lack of concern over Finnish NATO membership. When the Finns responded to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine by abandoning decades of neutrality and joining the alliance, Putin reacted by demilitarizing Russia’s entire 1300 kilometer border with Finland. “If we were a threat, they would certainly not have moved their troops away, even in a situation where they are engaged somewhere else,” commented Finnish Foreign Minister Elina Valtonen in August 2023.

While Russia’s NATO claims do not stand up to scrutiny, Moscow’s entire anti-Nazi narrative is even less convincing. During Putin’s reign, the Kremlin has revived and dramatically amplified lingering Soviet propaganda labeling Ukrainians as Nazis. This has helped to dehumanize Ukrainians in the eyes of the Russian population and generate grassroots support for the current war.

Putin himself has been at the heart of this process, regularly equating expressions of Ukrainian identity with Nazism while insisting Ukrainians are actually Russians (“one people”). Unsurprisingly, when Putin announced his invasion in February 2022, he declared the “de-Nazification” of Ukraine as his main war aim. This was widely understood to mean the eradication of a separate Ukrainian national identity and the imposition of a Russian imperial identity.

The Kremlin’s attempts to portray Ukraine as some kind of fascist threat have played well within the Russian information bubble but have failed to convince international audiences, due largely to the absence of any actual Ukrainian Nazis. Indeed, Ukraine’s far right parties are so unpopular that they actually formed a coalition ahead of the country’s last parliamentary elections in 2019 in a bid to end decades of ballot box failure, but still only managed to secure 2.16 percent of the vote.

Russian propagandists have also been unable to explain how “Nazi” Ukraine could be led by Jewish President Volodymyr Zelenskyy. When quizzed about this obvious inconsistency on Italian TV in May 2022, a clearly flustered Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov declared that Zelenskyy’s Jewishness was irrelevant as “Hitler also had Jewish blood.” This shameful episode highlighted the absurdity of Russia’s attempts to portray democratic Ukraine as a hotbed of Nazism.

Eurasia Center events

Online Event Thu, August 15, 2024 • 9:00 am ET

Ukraine’s advance in Kursk: What’s next and implications

Conflict Russia Security & Defense Ukraine

It should now be clear to any objective observer that the Russian invasion of Ukraine has always been an exercise in old-fashioned imperialism. Putin’s most recent statement about Russian “conquests” in Ukraine is not the first time he has adopted the swagger of the conqueror. In summer 2022, he compared his invasion to the eighteenth century imperial conquests of Russian Czar Peter the Great. He has repeatedly claimed to be fighting for “historic Russian lands,” while denying Ukraine’s right to exist.

Putin’s increasingly open imperialism raises serious doubts over the possibility of reaching any kind of compromise agreement to end the war. Recent reports in the international media have suggested that he is “quietly signaling” his readiness for a ceasefire, but it is difficult to see how this could work without legitimizing a land grab that would have profound negative connotations for European stability and international security.

The most obvious question is how far Putin’s imperial ambitions extend. The man himself has proclaimed much of unoccupied Ukraine to be historically Russian, including the country’s main Black Sea port city, Odesa, and the entire southern coastline. This alone is reason enough to believe that any ceasefire along the current front lines of the conflict would merely provide Russia with a pause to rearm and regroup before renewing hostilities.

There are also mounting concerns that if Putin succeeds in Ukraine, he will go further. He has repeatedly stated that the entire Soviet Union was “historical Russia,” while the borders of the old Russian Empire stretched even further. If Putin chooses to apply his weaponized version of Russian imperial history in its broadest sense, the list of potential targets would include Finland, Poland, Belarus, the Baltic states, Moldova, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Armenia, Alaska, and the whole of Central Asia.

Putin’s use of unambiguously imperialistic language is an indication of his growing confidence amid mounting signs of Western weakness. With vital Ukrainian aid packages currently held up in both the US and EU, Putin clearly believes he can outlast the democratic world and achieve his goals in Ukraine. If he is proved right, Ukrainians are highly unlikely to be the last victims of Russian imperial aggression.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

Further reading

UkraineAlert Jan 4, 2024

To defeat Putin in a long war, Ukraine must switch to active defense in 2024

By Mykola Bielieskov

By embracing a strategy of active defense in 2024, Kyiv can achieve the twin goals of preventing any major Russian advances and creating conditions that strongly favor Ukraine in what is increasingly a war of attrition, writes Mykola Bielieskov.

Conflict Defense Policy

UkraineAlert Jan 2, 2024

Ukraine needs urgent air defense aid as Putin launches bombing campaign

By Peter Dickinson

As Russia launches a long-awaited new bombing campaign against Ukrainian cities, fears are mounting that deadlock over continued US and EU military aid may soon leave Ukraine facing critical air defense shortages, writes Peter Dickinson.

Conflict Defense Technologies

UkraineAlert Dec 17, 2023

2024 preview: The West must decide if it wants Ukraine to win

By Richard D. Hooker, Jr.

If Western leaders fail to provide Ukraine with the weapons to defeat Putin in 2024, this will significantly increase the likelihood of a direct military confrontation between Russia and NATO, writes Richard D. Hooker Jr.

Conflict Defense Technologies

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

Read more from UkraineAlert

UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia and Central Asia in the East.

Learn more

The post Confident Putin boasts of Russian “conquests” in Ukraine appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On the flight to Davos, my thoughts turned to Taiwan’s elections, which took place on January 13. As these elections approached, many wrote about Chinese leader Xi Jinping’s growing threats to Taiwan’s vibrant, free-market democracy. But I had been struck by how these elections have exposed Xi’s greater concern: authoritarian failure at home.

If Chinese Communist Party leadership was working, Xi would have had a more benign view of Taiwan’s elections, shrugging his shoulders at the race rather than his government calling it “a choice between war and peace.”

What goes unsaid is that China faces some of the lowest growth and highest youth unemployment since Xi took over as paramount leader in 2012. At the same time, Xi is purging the People’s Liberation Army, ostensibly over corruption but always about control. Just as China’s economy is sputtering, Taiwan—through semiconductor manufacturing and beyond—is now a global economic power player.

Xi has made the purpose of his leadership that of national revival, which was at the core of his New Year’s speech. The harder that looks to achieve at home, the more tempting it may become to force Taiwan, with its population of about 24 million people, into China’s embrace, with its population of 1.4 billion.

Despite the risks, Xi may lose patience with the failed conviction that China’s economic miracle over time would be the irresistible force for Taiwan’s unification. The Wall Street Journal’s Lingling Wei, in a compelling slideshow previewing the election, argues that Beijing’s rising pressure on Taiwan “indicates its strong desire to change the status quo—even as polls on the island say that the status quo is exactly what people there desire.”

Beijing has made no secret of its opposition to the election’s winner, the physician Lai Ching-te, also known as William Lai. He’s the current vice president, representing the independence-minded Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), but his smart approach is that Taiwan’s de facto independence requires no further declaration. A son of a coalminer, who died when he was little, he has a master’s degree in public health from Harvard and a passion for the disadvantaged.

But regardless of who is Taiwan’s president, writes Lingling Wei, “the uneasy coexistence between China and Taiwan for more than seven decades is likely to get more unstable in the months and years to come.”

That’s because the danger to Xi isn’t Taiwan but himself. Taiwan’s free vote that took place this weekend is an uncomfortable reminder that Xi will never enjoy democratic legitimacy. His legacy thus rests on delivering greater prosperity (increasingly difficult) or on whether he achieves—or fosters a perception that he achieved—a forced unification (heaven forbid).

Xi’s destructive policies at home—choking the private sector and silencing free speech—and his evisceration of Hong Kong’s autonomy have taught the Taiwanese that any form of unification would end their democratic freedoms.

One thing is certain as I approach the World Economic Forum in Davos. Taiwan’s status will remain the primary flashpoint in US-China relations, and one of the greatest global risks, for the foreseeable future.

Frederick Kempe is president and chief executive officer of the Atlantic Council. You can follow him on Twitter: @FredKempe.

This edition is part of Frederick Kempe’s Inflection Points Today newsletter, a column of quick-hit insights on a world in transition. To receive this newsletter throughout the week, sign up here.

The post Xi’s biggest problem isn’t Taiwan appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Following global trend lines, significant shifts in Latin America and the Caribbean—including presidential elections in Ecuador, Guatemala, and Argentina, unprecedented agreements with the Venezuelan government, a worsening security situation in many countries, and a pressing focus on climate change—set the stage for even more change to come in 2024.

Join the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center as we explore top questions that may shape this upcoming year in the hemisphere.

What will the region’s newest presidents accomplish? How might Latin America’s ties with countries such as China and Russia evolve? What might be the role of the United States in an election year? Will the Caribbean see new, international attention to the specific threats faced by major climatic events?

Take our quiz to find out if you agree with what we’re predicting!

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New Atlanticist Jan 10, 2024

Ecuador has declared ‘internal armed conflict’ against criminal gangs. What’s next?

By Isabel Chiriboga

Ecuadorian President Daniel Noboa has mobilized the military to fight criminal groups in his country, following two notorious criminal leaders’ escape from prison.

Civil Society Conflict

Report Nov 30, 2023

Advancing US-Colombia cooperation on drug policy and law enforcement

By Atlantic Council US-Colombia Advisory Group

Consumption and price of the drug has remained stable in the United States in recent years. However, the current trend of falling coca leaf and cocaine prices in Colombia present a natural incentive for coca growers to find alternative forms of income, which could mean a higher rate of success for alternative development programs.

Civil Society Colombia

Issue Brief Sep 26, 2023

A roadmap for the Caribbean’s energy transition

By David Goldwyn, Eugene Tiah, and Wazim Mowla

Caribbean countries are in desperate need of an energy transition. Disproportionately high electricity costs impede economic development, stress public finance budgets, and harm the competitiveness of tourism and other industries.

Americas Caribbean

The post 2024 predictions: How ten issues could shape the year in Latin America and the Caribbean appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On December 6, 2023, invoking Article 99 for the first time since he took office, Secretary-General António Guterres called on the Security Council to adopt a resolution designed to put pressure on Israel to adopt a total ceasefire in Gaza to avert a humanitarian catastrophe.

Why did Guterres invoke Article 99 in the case of Gaza but not in the case of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine? The intention here is not to compare the appalling suffering endured in both cases by blameless civilians, even if it would be interesting to recall the respective causes and instigators of the two conflicts. Rather, what deserves to be compared is which of the two conflicts is more dangerous to the “maintenance of international peace and security,” which is the subject of Article 99.

The Russian nuclear threat in Ukraine

From the outset of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Moscow irresponsibly brandished the threat of nuclear fire to try to force Ukraine to capitulate to its demands and to dissuade NATO countries from aiding Kyiv.

Russian political scientist Sergey Karaganov, a close associate of Russian President Vladimir Putin who heads the Council for Foreign and Defense Policy, wrote on June 13, 2023: “The enemy must know that we are ready to deliver a pre-emptive strike in retaliation for all of its current and past acts of aggression in order to prevent a slide into global thermonuclear war.”

Similarly, Dmitri Trenin, a former Russian military intelligence colonel, also a member of Russia’s Council for Foreign and Defense Policy, wrote a few days later: “The possibility of using nuclear weapons during the current conflict should not be hushed up. Such a perspective, real not theoretical, should serve as an incentive to curb and stop conflict escalation and ultimately pave the way for a strategic equilibrium in Europe that suits us.”

The aim of these statements is clear: to frighten the leaders and citizens of NATO member countries into giving up their support for the Ukrainian defense and counterattack effort. Even if Putin is unlikely to risk the ramifications of using a low-yield tactical nuclear weapon in Ukraine, the potential consequences of such folly are well worth Guterres’s concern.

In addition to Moscow’s threats of nuclear strikes against Ukraine, the Russian army is occupying and using Ukraine’s Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant for military purposes, endangering its operation.

A resolution against nuclear threats

Given the threat to global security posed by Russia’s threats to use nuclear weapons, Guterres should once again use Article 99 of the UN Charter to request that the Security Council adopt a generic, legally binding resolution under Chapter VII of the charter:

• deciding that any withdrawal from the Non-Proliferation Treaty constitutes a threat to international peace and security;
• deciding that any test of a nuclear explosive device is a threat to international peace and security;
• deciding that the use of nuclear weapons against a country that does not possess them is a crime against humanity;
• deciding that any attack on or seizure of an operating nuclear power plant for military purposes is a war crime.

The adoption by the Security Council of such a generic resolution, which would be non-discriminatory in nature, would represent a significant step forward in the fight against the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Russia will certainly exercise its right of veto against such a resolution. Even so, putting it to a vote would at least have the merit of showing the world who is threatening international peace and security, and forcing China to clarify its position on the use of nuclear weapons.

For Guterres, the stakes are high, and he risks political retribution from Moscow. But applying the double standard of invoking Article 99 in the case of Gaza but not Ukraine would undermine his credibility.

Few things “threaten the maintenance of international peace and security” more than a potential nuclear attack. Guterres should therefore force the issue onto the Security Council’s agenda before it is too late.

We should not always have to wait for disasters to occur before moving national and international institutions toward systems more capable of guaranteeing peace between nations.

Pierre Goldschmidt is a former deputy director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency and head of the Department of Safeguards.

The post Why is the UN secretary-general so worried about Gaza but not Ukraine? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The past year has witnessed increased and sustained calls to secure accountability for the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI)’s atrocity crimes and gross human rights violations, particularly in response to the protests triggered by Mahsa Jina Amini’s death at the hands of the IRI’s morality police in September 2022. Accountability efforts have primarily focused on securing justice for victims and survivors of extrajudicial killings, mass arbitrary detention, torture, and other grave abuses committed by the IRI in response to peaceful protests. However, these efforts have also sought to hold IRI authorities to account for unpunished crimes during prior decades, including the IRI’s brutal crackdowns on protestors in November 2019 and the 1988 summary executions of thousands of Iranian political prisoners.

Because the judicial system in Iran is neither independent nor impartial—and is, in fact, responsible for unjust imprisonments and complicit in serious abuses in Iranian prisons—there are no viable domestic routes for accountability. However, there are paths available through national judicial systems in other states.

This report from the Atlantic Council’s Strategic Litigation Project explores accountability options that European states in particular can pursue, with the help of civil society. Throughout Europe, states have adopted universal jurisdiction provisions, which allow them to prosecute acts that constitute core international crimes—genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity—even if the crime was committed in a different state by and against foreign nationals. Sweden used these provisions to convict former IRI official Hamid Noury for murder and war crimes committed during the 1988 prison massacres, but so far no other IRI official has been tried under universal jurisdiction provisions for crimes committed in Iran, despite newfound opportunities to pursue these cases.

For decades, IRI officials have traveled throughout Europe, often owning assets and even reportedly receiving healthcare in different countries.  At the same time, many victims and survivors of the IRI’s brutality have sought refuge in Europe—making the presence of IRI officials with no accountability all the more egregious, yet providing an opportunity for these victims and survivors to support investigations with eyewitness accounts and further information.

The countries included in this report—Belgium, England and Wales, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden, and Switzerland—are just seven jurisdictions out of 148 United Nations member states worldwide that have laws allowing for the investigation and prosecution of some or all core international crimes, even when those crimes are committed beyond their own borders.  These seven jurisdictions were selected as a focus of this report due to several factors including: the strength of their universal jurisdiction frameworks and frequency of use; their robust caselaw and policies for prosecuting atrocity crimes committed extraterritorially; the size of Iranian expatriate communities in these countries, especially those fleeing persecution and violence; and the possibility of travel by IRI officials to these jurisdictions.

This report details what each country’s universal jurisdiction provisions entail, how proceedings are initiated, and what victims’ rights are protected. It also gives an overview of each state’s relevant jurisprudence to date, analyzing the legal, practical, and political viability of future cases involving IRI violations, including in light of the country’s diplomatic relationship with Iran.  Finally, it provides regional and country-specific recommendations to facilitate more cases against IRI perpetrators and to strengthen universal jurisdiction frameworks more broadly.

For media inquiries, please contact press@atlanticcouncil.org.

Strategic Litigation Project

The Atlantic Council’s Strategic Litigation Project injects fresh thinking into how governments and practitioners can apply legal tools to advance human rights and accountability around the world.

Related content

Report Oct 5, 2023

International avenues to hold the Islamic Republic of Iran accountable for human rights violations

By Lisandra Novo, Celeste Kmiotek, Elise Baker, Gissou Nia

The Islamic Republic of Iran’s discriminatory domestic legal framework and brutal suppression of dissent have left Iranians looking for international responses to their plight. This report aims to provide an overview of and recommendations relating to international avenues for accountability for atrocity crimes and human-rights violations committed in Iran.

Human Rights International Norms

Report Dec 10, 2020

Closing the accountability gap on human rights violators in the Islamic Republic of Iran through global litigation strategies

By Gissou Nia

Gissou Nia presents recommendations for new laws, amendments to existing laws, and the creation of enforcement mechanisms to aid in the effort to combat impunity for the IRI’s human rights violations and atrocity crimes.

Human Rights International Norms

Issue Brief Apr 19, 2023

Holding the Islamic Republic of Iran accountable for atrocity crimes

By Celeste Kmiotek, Alana Mitias, Nushin Sarkarati

Under the principle of universal jurisdiction, certain domestic justice systems allow prosecutions in national courts for crimes committed abroad, regardless of the victim’s or perpetrator’s nationality. This manual outlines the universal jurisdiction process in selected European states for those pursuing prosecutions of crimes committed by the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Human Rights International Norms

The post How to hold the Islamic Republic of Iran accountable in European courts appeared first on Atlantic Council.

In the aftermath of the Biden-Xi meeting last month, China watchers are debating how to characterize this moment in bilateral relations after a roller coaster 2023 – a temporary relaxation in tensions? A meaningful recalibration toward “managed competition”? A full reset?

The answer remains to be seen (I’m betting on #1), but meanwhile less attention has been paid to how our oft-referenced allies and partners are viewing the US-China roller coaster.

I’m just back from India, where I engaged a wide variety of China experts and officials on Delhi’s approach to Beijing. I heard much about India’s bid to contest China’s claimed leadership of the Global South and China’s hardline position on the countries’ border dispute and drive to transform global governance.

But I also heard a concern not typically voiced among Washington’s other friends: that the United States might return to a more conciliatory approach to Beijing even as India sheds inhibitions against engaging in “fierce competition” with China – now almost universally viewed as India’s top strategic threat.

Unlike in Europe, where allies worry aggressive U.S. policies will outpace their more measured responses to the “systemic challenge” posed by China – and many were reassured by the San Francisco meeting – some in India fret that Washington may be tempering competition with Beijing, reviving fears of a “G2” that leaves Delhi out in the cold.

Bottom line – “aligning” with allies and partners is a very complex dance. The natural undulations in Washington’s “managed competition” approach to China – variously announcing tough trade measures or offering Xi the red-carpet treatment that is a requirement of such high-level diplomacy – already necessitates consistent efforts to allay confusion in European and Asian capitals. Add in the fact that our partners differ on how strenuously to compete with China across an array of issues and you get a difficult diplomatic landscape that US administrations will need to navigate for years to come.

And, as our editor-in-chief Tiff Roberts outlines in this edition of Global China, there is no shortage of contentious issues on which the US and its allies need to better align on China, from Taiwan, to internet governance, to economic coercion.

Take it away, Tiff!

-Dave Shullman, Senior Director, Global China Hub

Fellow

Dexter Tiff Roberts

Nonresident Senior Fellow

Global China Hub Indo-Pacific Security Initiative

China Chinese

Taiwan’s election: the high stakes for both China and Taiwan

Hsiao Bi-khim struck a somber note when I interviewed her in Taipei in April 2000 just after the historic first win by the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). “We did not open the champagne bottles or cut the cake the night of the victory,” she said, then an advisor to new president Chen Shui-bian. “Most of us are having difficulty even smiling today.”

When Taiwan goes to the polls for another presidential election on January 13, 2024 Hsiao will be running as vice president with presidential candidate William Lai. If the DDP wins—and the odds aren’t clear yet—the celebrations may again be muted. That’s because the same existential question faces Taiwan today as it did then: how to maintain its independent status from China while avoiding military conflict.

As Lev Nachman and Wen-Ti Sung, nonresident fellows at the Atlantic Council’s Global China Hub, write: “What makes Taiwan different… is that the fundamental political question is not about social issues, redistribution, or traditional left-right issues. Instead, voters care most about Taiwan’s future, its relationship to China, and which candidate is going to keep Taiwan safe” — the other two presidential candidates are Hou Yu-ih of the Kuomintang (KMT) and Ko Wen-je of the Taiwan People’s Party (TPP). (Check out “Taiwan: A Contested Democracy Under Threat,” a new book by Lev Nachman and Jonathan Sullivan.)

When China’s economic coercion backfires

But China too has much to lose in a war. While Taiwan’s economic reliance on China is widely known, fewer know how much the reverse is true. “An uneasy economic equilibrium [has] constrained Beijing’s worst impulses,” write the Geoeconomics Center’s Jeremy Mark and Niels Graham in a new report “Relying on old enemies: The challenge of Taiwan’s economic ties to China.”

One tends to hear about other countries’ over-reliance on the Chinese economy. But in this case, the authors also explored Beijing’s deep economic vulnerabilities and profound dependencies on Taiwan. “Cross-strait relations are anchored in global supply chains built around Taiwan-made semiconductors and Taiwanese electronics manufacturers’ investments on the mainland.”

As part of its strategy to shift the Indo-Pacific region in its favor, Beijing is more than willing to threaten Taiwan and a range of countries in the region with coercive economic measures. How significant are these threats to Taiwan and the broader interests of the United States and its allies and partners? Check out this December 20 discussion on how to counter Beijing’s economic coercion, hosted by the Indo-Pacific Security Initiative and Global China Hub.

China promotes its own censored and surveilled internet globally

Meanwhile, China is trying to strengthen its position around the world by promoting the concept of cyber sovereignty and its own censored and surveilled version of the internet. “China contends that it is a state’s right to protect its political system, determine what content is appropriate within its borders, create its own standards for cybersecurity, and govern access to the infrastructure of the internet,” writes the Hub’s Dakota Cary in a new report “Community Watch: China’s Vision for the Future of the Internet,” launched on December 4.

China also wants to sell its internet surveillance technology to the world. That isn’t just about turning a profit from a fast-growing market. China has an interest in promoting the resilience of other authoritarian states, many of which are its allies. “By providing political security to a state through censorship, surveillance, and hacking of dissidents, China improves its chances of maintaining access to strategic plots of land for military bases or critical manufacturing inputs. A government that perceives itself to be dependent on China for political security is in no position to oppose it,” writes Cary.

We are already seeing the effects of China’s drive to advance its authoritarian cyber capabilities globally. Countries across the Global South are lining up to acquire the same surveillance technology used within China to suppress minority groups, namely Uyghurs and other Muslim minorities. Companies such Hikvision, Huawei, and Alibaba provide facial recognition technology, advanced analytic tools, intelligent video surveillance systems, and telecommunications infrastructure to countries worldwide. “To stem the proliferation of Chinese surveillance tools, US policy must understand demand and accordingly help address local priorities,” says a May 2023 report by the Council’s DFR Lab.

Just what role is China trying to play in the Israel-Palestine conflict?

That’s the question discussed by Jonathan Fulton, nonresident senior fellow at the Middle East Programs, and Reichman University Asia Policy Program head Gedaliah Afterman, in the podcast, “China and the Israel-Hamas War: A View from Tel Aviv.” While China may want to present itself as a “balanced player,” as it has tried to do in Ukraine, it’s really about what’s best for China. “[China] doesn’t think about the Israelis or the Palestinians. It either thinks about its position in the region – in the Middle East or about its relationship with the United States,” says Afterman.

So while an economic relationship focused on trade in technology between China and Israel has been growing rapidly, since the war began there has been a surge in anti-Israel content aired in China’s state and social media. “[It’s] part of a domestic campaign in China, to create a very anti-American, anti-Western narrative. But using Israel… as an instrument to achieve that.” The other aim for China: “positioning itself… in the Global South, in the developing world, in the Arab world” and “using the Palestinian issue as a currency… to counter Western criticism of its policies over Xinjiang,” says Afterman.

For more on the issue of rising antisemitism being amplified by official Chinese sources, check out Hub nonresident senior fellow Tuvia Gering’s recent Discourse Power post, “ With China’s Help, Antisemites of the World Unite.”

• Global China Hub fellows Lev Nachman and Wen-Ti Sung’s latest “Taiwan Election Watch” blogpost explores Beijing’s ongoing campaign to influence Taiwan’s elections through the spread of misinformation, which tend to attempt to “sway Taiwanese voters away from the DPP, who the PRC views as emphatically unacceptable as a ruling party in Taiwan.”

• According to GeoEconomics Center’s Niels Graham, Chinese lending is undergoing a deep, structural transition away from the property sector to support manufacturing. The shift is generating serious fears of overcapacity and will likely accelerate the fractionalization of the global trading system as countries.

• The Global China Hub hosted Pulitzer Prize winning journalist Ian Johnson to discuss his new book, which documents how a network of independent Chinese writers, artists, and filmmakers have challenged Xi Jinping’s drive to control China’s historical narratives.   

• The first episode of the Scowcroft Center’s new “So What’s the Strategy” video series focused on China, featuring Kurt Campbell, the nominee for Deputy Secretary of State; Republican congressman Mike Gallagher; and British ambassador to the United States Karen Pierce. 

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Although history properly credits former First Lady Eleanor Roosevelt with exercising political influence to accomplish the passage of the UDHR in 1948, it was Malik who had the pen and wrestled with the game-changing ideas. December 10, 2023, is the seventy-fifth anniversary of the UDHR, a perfect opportunity to measure its impact and acknowledge that some declared rights are still only aspirational for many. The UDHR calls countries to what they are becoming and offers a clear standard by which we can measure nations.

Here are seven lessons to consider from this remarkable document on its seventy-fifth anniversary:

1. The world can find uncommon agreement on a controversial idea

Due to perpetual manufactured outrage and legitimate global conflicts, the world feels more divided than ever. During this current season of discord, it is encouraging to remember that all 192 member states of the United Nations have signed on to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. This stunning display of unanimity is rare and particularly uncommon among controversial ideas. Malik took on big ideas and the UDHR picked sides in many contentious worldview battles. People and governments should find shade and comfort under the agreed principles of the UDHR and expand its common ground for the common good.

2. “Inherent” and “inalienable” are powerful concepts

The UDHR’s preamble deems all thirty of the articulated rights “inherent” and “inalienable.” Although most people do not use these terms regularly, they are solemn and meaningful. “Inherent” conveys the idea that an individual’s rights are not dependent on their performance, accomplishments, ability, wealth, or status. Neither governments nor cultures bestow or grant our rights. Likewise, we cannot be “alienated” or separated from our rights. The UDHR even states that the will of these inherently valuable people “shall be the basis of the authority of government.” In the aftermath of two world wars, Malik led the drafters with these twin concepts of “inherent” and “inalienable” that elevate the value of individuals over governments, cultures, and traditions.

3. The UDHR was the foundation of future anti-discrimination laws

The UDHR took aim at the classifications that historically provided the foundation of state-sanctioned discrimination:

“Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.”

This was a direct attack on the caste system in India, Jim Crow laws in the United States, and the genocide of Armenians, among many other injustices. Malik drew inspiration from the concept of imago Dei and believed that if God’s image was in every person, then one cannot allow racism, gender discrimination, and xenophobia to exist. Sixteen years after its adoption, the UDHR’s language and structure influenced the United States Civil Rights Act, which prohibits discrimination with a similar refrain: on the basis of “race, color, religion, sex or national origin.”

4. The legal consensus against human trafficking still needs stronger enforcement

The UDHR’s Article 4 demands that governments stop enslaving people and move to prohibit human trafficking. The good news is that legislatures around the world have passed laws prohibiting coercing people to work or engage in commercial sex acts. Since 2000, every country in the world has passed some sort of law against modern slavery. The world should celebrate this legal consensus for freedom.

Yet, the United Nations estimates that traffickers are currently enslaving 27.6 million people and raking in $150.2 billion annually from their crimes. Even more troubling, the US State Department has determined that eleven governments (that have ratified the UDHR) are trafficking their own people, including China, North Korea, and Cuba. Malik’s declaration of freedom resulted in much better national laws that governments inconsistently implement.

5. Both religious expression and conversion deserve protection

Malik also elevated the right to “thought, conscience, and religion.” Not only does the UDHR specifically embrace a right to individual and corporate religious expression, it also highlights the right to change religions. Inquisitions, faith-based tests, and anti-conversion laws stand in stark relief to the towering religious freedom protections of the UDHR.

Meanwhile, the US State Department’s most recent International Religious Freedom Report designates twelve governments as “Countries of Particular Concern” because they “engaged in or tolerated ‘particularly severe violations of religious freedom.’”

6. Families are central to a free, rights-driven society

Across continents and cultures, the UDHR declares that the “fundamental group unit of society” is the family. Marriages require consent of both adult spouses, and both have equal rights when marriages dissolve. The UDHR even directs that parents have the right to determine how their children are educated. Malik’s emphasis on uniquely valuable people connected in intermediate institutions, such as the family and community structures, won the day over two competing philosophies: 1) the communist’s government-centric and anti-family construction; and 2) an emerging Western society of individuals prioritizing their own self-interest.

Yet today, twelve million girls under eighteen years old are married every year. That means twenty-eight girls every minute become child brides. Some advocates argue that governments that do not provide equal legal rights for both spouses lead to increased “marital rape, forced pregnancy, and domestic violence.” In many nations, the declared “fundamental group unit of society” needs additional practical protections.

7. The freedom to choose one’s leaders is a human right—one that needs more vigilance than ever

Drawing from a democratic tradition and the Enlightenment, Malik and the drafters included a litany of political rights in the UDHR. These include the right to assemble, freedom of expression, a free press, public impartial trials, and a presumption of innocence. Arbitrary arrest and torture are prohibited. The UDHR even weighed in on the necessary form of government, with a dramatic embrace of democracy. Article 21 states:

“The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government; this will shall be expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret vote or by equivalent free voting procedures.”

Despite the UDHR’s clarity, Freedom House’s most recent Freedom in the World report found that 80 percent of the world’s population does not live in a free country.

The rights declared in the UDHR have stood the test of time and are as meaningful today as ever before. Kudos to Malik and his fellow diplomats, who laid down a clear statement that continues to guide the flawed nations of Earth like a north star as they navigate the complicated intersections of human rights, national security, and economic prosperity. We must keep declaring these noble ideas to make them real.

John Cotton Richmond is a nonresident senior fellow at the Scowcroft Strategy Initiative of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. He served as the US ambassador to monitor and combat trafficking in persons from 2018 to 2021. Follow him on X, formerly Twitter, @JohnRichmond1.

The post Declaring things to make them real: 75 years of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights appeared first on Atlantic Council.

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Executive summary
Introduction
The core of China’s approach
Case studies in China’s “shared future”

Executive summary

China recognizes that many nondemocratic and illiberal developing nations need internet connectivity for economic development. These countries aim to digitize trade, government services, and social interactions, but interconnectivity risks better communication and coordination among political dissidents. China understands this problem and is trying to build global norms that facilitate the provision of its censorship and surveillance tools to other countries. This so-called Community with a Shared Future in Cyberspace, is based around the idea of cyber sovereignty. China contends that it is a state’s right to protect its political system, determine what content is appropriate within its borders, create its own standards for cybersecurity, and govern access to the infrastructure of the internet. 

Jointly Building a Community with a Shared Future in Cyberspace, a white paper from the government of the People’s Republic of China (most recently released in 2022 but reissued periodically since 2015), is a continuation of diplomatic efforts to rally the international community around China’s concept of cyber sovereignty.¹ By extending the concept of sovereignty to cyberspace, China makes the argument that the state decides the content, operations, and norms of its internet; that each state is entitled to such determinations as a de facto right of its existence; that all states should have equal say in the administration of the global internet; and that it is the role of the state to balance claims of citizens and the international community (businesses, mostly, but also other states and governing bodies). 

But making the world safe for authoritarian governments is only part of China’s motivation. As the key provider of censorship-ready internet equipment and surveillance tools, China’s concept of cyber sovereignty offers political security to other illiberal governments. Case studies in this report demonstrate how such technologies may play a role in keeping China’s friends in power.

The PRC supports other authoritarian governments for good reason. Many countries in which Chinese state-owned enterprises and PRC-based companies own mineral drawing rights or have significant investments are governed by authoritarians. Political instability threatens these investments, and, in some cases, China’s access to critical mineral inputs to its high-tech manufacturing sector. Without a globally capable navy to compel governments to keep their word on contracts, China is at the mercy of democratic revolutions and elite power struggles in these countries. By providing political security to a state through censorship, surveillance, and hacking of dissidents, China improves its chances of maintaining access to strategic plots of land for military bases or critical manufacturing inputs. A government that perceives itself to be dependent on China for political security is in no position to oppose it.

Outside of China’s strategic objectives, the push for a Community with a Shared Future in Cyberspace may also have an operational impact on state-backed hacking teams.  

As China’s cybersecurity companies earn more customers, their defenders gain access to more endpoints, better telemetry, and a more complete view of global cyber events. Leveraged appropriately, a larger customer base improves defenses. The Ministry of Industry and Information Technology’s Cybersecurity Threat and Vulnerability Information Sharing Platform, which collects information about software vulnerabilities, also collects voluntary incident response reports from Chinese firms responding to breaches of their customers.² Disclosure of incidents and the vulnerabilities of overseas clients of Chinese cybersecurity firms would significantly increase the PRC’s visibility into global cyber operations by other nations or transnational criminal groups. China’s own defensive posture should also improve as its companies attract more global clients. 

China’s offensive teams could benefit, too. Many cybersecurity firms often allow their own country’s security services to operate unimpeded in their customers’ networks.³ Therefore, it is likely that more companies protected by Chinese cybersecurity companies means fewer networks where China’s offensive hacking teams must worry about evading defenses. 

This report uses cases studies from the Solomon Islands, Russia, and beyond to show how China is operationalizing its view of cyber sovereignty. 

Introduction

A long black slate wall covered in dark hexagonal tiles runs along the side of Nuhong Street in Wuzhen, China, eighty miles southwest of Shanghai. A gap in the middle of the wall leads visitors to the entrance of the Waterside Resort that, for the last nine years, has hosted China’s World Internet Conference, a premier event for Chinese Communist Party (CCP) cyber policymakers.

The inaugural conference didn’t seem like a foreign policy forum. The thousand or so attendees from a handful of countries and dozens of companies listened to a speaker circuit asserting that 5G is the future, big data was changing the world, and the internet was great for economic development—hardly groundbreaking topics in 2014.⁴ But the internet conference was more than a platform for platitudes about the internet: it also served as China’s soft launch for its international strategy on internet governance.

By the last evening of the conference, some of the attendees had already left, choosing the red-eye flight home over another night by the glass-encased pool on the waterfront. Around 11 p.m., papers slid under doorways up and down the hotel halls. Conference organizers went room by room distributing a proclamation they hoped attendees would endorse just nine hours later.⁵ Attendees were stunned. The document said: “During the conference, many speakers and participants suggest [sic] that a Wuzhen declaration be released at the closing ceremony.” The papers, stapled and stuffed under doors, outlined Beijing’s views of the internet. The conference attendees—many of whom were members of the China-friendly Shanghai Cooperation Organization—balked at the last-minute, tone-deaf approach to getting an endorsement of Beijing’s thoughts on the internet. The document went unsigned, and the inaugural Wuzhen internet conference wrapped without a sweeping declaration. It was clear China needed the big guns, and perhaps less shady diplomatic tactics, to persuade foreigners of the merits of their views of the internet. 

President Xi Jinping headlined China’s second World Internet Conference in 2015.⁶ This time the organizers skipped the late-night antics. On stage and reportedly in front of representatives from more than 120 countries and many more technology firm CEOs, Xi outlined a vision that is now enshrined in text as “Jointly Building a Community with a Shared Future in Cyberspace.”⁷ The four principles and five proposals President Xi laid out in his speech, which generally increase the power of the state and aim to model the global internet in China’s image, remain a constant theme in China’s diplomatic strategy on internet governance.⁸ In doing so, Xi fired the starting gun on an era of global technology competition that may well lead to blocs of countries aligned by shared censorship and cybersecurity standards. China has reissued the document many times since Xi’s speech, with the latest coming in 2022. 

Xi’s 2015 speech came at a pivotal moment in history for China and many other authoritarian regimes. The Arab Spring shook authoritarian governments around the world just years earlier.⁹ Social media-fueled revolutions saw some autocrats overthrown or civil wars started in just a few months. China shared the autocrats’ paranoia. A think tank under the purview of the Cyberspace Administration of China acutely summarized the issue of internet governance, stating: “If our party cannot traverse the hurdle represented by the Internet, it cannot traverse the hurdle of remaining in power for the long term.”¹⁰ Another PRC government agency report went even further: blaming the US Central Intelligence Agency for no fewer than eleven “color revolutions” since 2003: the National Computer Virus Emergency Response Center claimed that the United States was providing critical technical support to pro-democracy protestors.¹¹ Specifically, the center blamed the CIA for five technologies—ranging from encrypted communications to “anti-jamming” WiFi that helped connect protestors—that played into the success of color revolutions. Exuberance in Washington over the internet leveling the playing field between dictators and their oppressed citizens was matched in conviction, if not in tone, by leaders from Beijing to Islamabad.

But China and other repressive regimes could not eschew the internet. The internet was digitizing everything, from social relationships and political affiliations to commerce and trade. Authoritarians needed a way to reap the benefits of the digital economy without introducing unacceptable risks to their political systems. China’s approach, called a Community with a Shared Future in Cyberspace,¹² responds to these threats as a call to action for authoritarian governments and a path toward more amenable global internet governance for authoritarian regimes. It is, as one expert put it, China switching from defense to offense.¹³

The core of China’s approach

The PRC considers four principles key to structuring the future of cyberspace. These principles lay the conceptual groundwork for the five proposals, which reflect the collective tasks to build this new system. Table 1 shows the principles, which were drawn from Xi’s 2015 speech.¹⁴

The four principles are not of equal importance. “Respecting cyber sovereignty” is the cornerstone of China’s vision for global cyber governance. China introduced and argued for the concept in its first internet white paper in 2010.¹⁵ But cyber sovereignty is not itself controversial. The idea that a government can regulate things within its borders is nearly synonymous with what it means to be a state. Issues arise with the prescriptive and hypocritical nature of the three following principles. 

Under the “maintenance of peace and security principle,” China—a country with a famously effective and persistent ability to steal and commercialize foreign intellectual property¹⁶—suggests that all countries should abhor cyberattacks that lead to IP theft or government spying. Xi’s statement establishes equivalency between two things held separate in Western capitalist societies: intellectual property rights and trade secrets versus espionage against other governments. China holds what the US prizes but cannot defend well, IP and trade secrets, next to what China prizes but cannot guarantee for itself, the confidentiality of state secrets. The juxtaposition was an implicit bargain and one that neither would accept. In considering China’s proposition, the US continuation of traditional intelligence-collection activities contravenes China’s “peace and security principle,” providing the Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson a reason to blame the United States when China is caught conducting economic espionage. 

“Promotion of openness and cooperation” is mundane enough to garner support until users read the fine print or ask China to act on this principle. Asking other countries to throw off a zero-sum mentality and view the internet as a place for mutual benefit, Xi unironically asks states to pursue win-win benefits. This argument blatantly ignores the clear differences in market access between foreign tech companies in the PRC and Chinese firms’ access to foreign markets. Of course, if a country allows a foreign firm into its market, by Xi’s argumentation, the country must have decided it was a win-win decision. It’s unclear if refusing market access to a Chinese company would be acceptable or if that would fall under zero-sum mentality and contravene the value of openness. Again, China’s rhetoric misrepresents the conditions it would likely accept. 

Cultivating “good order” in cyberspace, at least as Xi conceptualizes it, is impossible for democratic countries with freedom of speech. Entreaties that “order” be the guarantor of freedom of speech won’t pass muster in many nations, at least not the “order” sought by China’s policymakers. A report from the Institute for a Community with a Shared Future shines light onto what type of content might upset the “good order.” In its Governing the Phenomenon of Online Violence Report, analysts identify political scandals like a deadly 2018 bus crush in Chongqing or the 2020 “Wuhan virus leak rumor” as examples of online violence, alongside a case where a woman was bullied to suicide.¹⁷ Viewing political issues as “online violence” associated with good order is not just a one-off report. Staff at the Institute argue that rumors spread at the start of the pandemic in 2020 “highlight the necessity and urgency of building a community with a shared future in cyberspace.”¹⁸ For China, “online violence” is a euphemism for speech deemed politically sensitive by the government. If “making [the internet] better, cleaner and safer is the common responsibility of the international community,”¹⁹ as Xi argues, how will China treat countries it sees as abrogating its responsibility to combat such online violence? Will countries whose internet service providers rely on Chinese cloud companies or network devices be able to decide that criticizing China is acceptable within its own borders?

China’s five proposals 

The five proposals used to construct China’s Community with a Shared Future in Cyberspace carry less weight and importance than its four principles. The proposals are not apparently attached to specific funding or policy initiatives, and did not receive attention from China’s foreign ministry. They are, at most, way stations along the path to a shared future. The proposals are:

1. Speeding up the construction of a global internet infrastructure and promoting interconnectivity.
2. Building an online platform for cultural exchange and mutual learning.
3. Promoting the innovative development of the cyber economy and common prosperity. 
4. Maintaining cyber security and promoting orderly development. 
5. Building an internet governance system and promoting equity and justice.

Implications and the future of the global internet

China’s argument for its view of global internet governance and the role of the state rests on solid ground. The PRC frequently points to the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) in the European Union as a leading example of the state’s role in internet regulation. The GDPR allows EU citizens to have their data deleted, forces businesses to disclose data breaches, and requires websites to give users a choice to accept or reject cookies (and what kind) each time they visit a new website. China points to concerns in the United States over foreign interference on social media as evidence of US buy-in on China’s view of cyber sovereignty. Even banal regulations like the US “know your customer” rule—which requires some businesses to collect identifying personal information about users, usually for tax purposes—fit into Beijing’s bucket of evidence. But the alleged convergence between the views of China and democratic nations stops there.

Divergent values between liberal democracies and the coterie of PRC-aligned autocracies belie our very different interpretations of the meaning of cyber sovereignty. A paper published in the CCP’s top theoretical journal mentions both the need to regulate internet content and “promote positive energy,” a Paltrowesque euphemism for party-boosting propaganda, alongside 

endorsements of the cyber sovereignty principle.²⁰ The article extrapolates on what Xi made clear in his 2015 speech. For the CCP, censorship and sovereignty are inextricably linked. 

These differences are not new. Experts dedicate significant coverage to ongoing policy arguments at the UN, where China repeatedly pushes to classify the dissemination of unwanted content—read politically intolerable—as a crime.²¹ As recently as January 2023, China offered an amendment to a UN treaty attempting to make sharing false information online illegal.²² A knock-on effect of media coverage related to disinformation campaigns from China and Russia—despite their poor performance²³—means policymakers, pundits, and journalists make China’s point that narratives promoted by other nations is an issue to be solved. What counts as disinformation can be meted out on a country-by-country basis. The tension between the desire to protect democracy from foreign influence and the liberal value of promoting free speech and truth in authoritarian systems is palpable. 
The United States has fueled the CCP’s concern with its public statements. China’s internet regulators criticized the United States’ Declaration for the Future of the Internet.²⁴ The CCP, which is paranoid about foreign attempts to support “color revolutions” or foment regime change, is rightfully concerned. The United States’ second stated principle for digital technologies is to promote “democracy,” a value antithetical to continuing CCP rule over the PRC. The universal value democratic governments subscribe to—the consent of the governed—drives the US position on the benefits of connectedness. That same value scares authoritarian governments. 

Operationalizing our shared future

Jointly Build a Community with a Shared Future in Cyberspace alludes to the pathways the CCP will use to act on its vision. The document includes detailed statistics about the rollout of IPv6—a protocol for issuing internet-connected device addresses that could ease surveillance—use of the Beidou Satellite Navigation system within China and elsewhere, the domestic and international use of 5G, development of transformational technologies like artificial intelligence and Internet of Things devices, and the increasingly widespread use of internet-connected industrial devices.²⁵ The value of different markets, like that of e-commerce or trade enabled by any of the preceding systems, are repeated many times over the course of the document. It’s clear that policymakers see the fabric of the internet—its devices, markets, and economic value—as expanding. Owning the avenues of expansion, then, is key to spreading the CCP’s values as much as it is about making money.  

Authoritarian and nondemocratic developing countries provide a bountiful market for China’s goods. Plenty of developing nations and authoritarian governments want to tighten control over the internet in their countries. Recent research demonstrates an increasing number of incidents when governments shut off the internet in their countries—a good proxy for their interest in censorship.²⁶ These governments need the technology and tools to finely tune their control over the internet. Owing to the political environment inside the PRC, Chinese tech firms already build their products to facilitate censorship and surveillance.²⁷ Some countries are having luck rolling out these services. The Australian Strategic Policy Institute found that “with technical support from China, local governments in East Africa are escalating censorship on social media platforms and the internet.”²⁸ These findings are mirrored by reporting from Censys, a network data company, that found, among other things, a significant footprint for PRC-made network equipment in four African countries.²⁹ In fact, there is no public list of countries that acknowledge supporting the Community with a Shared Future in Cyberspace approach, but there are good indicators for which nations are mostly likely to participate. 

A 2017 policy paper entitled International Strategy of Cooperation on Cyberspace indicated that China would carry out “cybersecurity cooperation” with “the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA), Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), China-Arab States Cooperation Forum, Forum of China and the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States and Asian-African Legal Consultative Organization.”³⁰ But an international strategy document stating the intent to cooperate with most of the Global South is not the same as actually doing so. The 2017 strategy document is, at most, aspirational.

Instead, bilateral agreements and technical agreements between government agencies to work together on cybersecurity or internet governance are better indicators of who is part of China’s “community with a shared future.” For example, Cuba and the PRC signed a comprehensive partnership agreement on cybersecurity in early 2023, though the content of the deal remains secret.³¹ China has made few public announcements about other such agreements. In their place, the China National Computer Emergency Response Center (CNCERT) has “established partnerships with 274 CERTs in 81 countries and territories and signed cybersecurity cooperation memorandums with 33 of them.”³² But even these countries are not publicly identified.³³ A few nations or groups are regularly mentioned around the claims of CNCERT’s international partnerships, however. Thailand, Cambodia, Laos, Malaysia, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Brazil, South Africa, Benin, and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization are frequently mentioned. The paper on jointly building a community also mentions the establishment of the China-ASEAN Cybersecurity Exchange and Training Center, the utility of which may be questioned given China’s track record of state-backed hacking campaigns against its members.³⁴

Along with the identity of their signatories, the contents of these agreements and their benefits also remain private. Without access to any of these agreements, one can only speculate about their benefits. There are also no countries especially competent at cyber operations or cybersecurity mentioned in the list above. The result may be that CNCERT and its certified private-sector partners receive “first dibs” when government agencies or other entities in these countries need incident response services; receiving favorable terms or financing from the Export-Import Bank of China to facilitate the purchase of PRC tech also aligns with other observed behavior.³⁵

Besides favorable terms of trade for PRC tech and cybersecurity firms, some of the CNCERT international partners may also be subject to intelligence-sharing agreements. CNCERT operates a software vulnerability database called China National Information Security Vulnerability Sharing Platform, which accepts submissions from the public and partners with at least three other vulnerability databases.³⁶ CNCERT’s international partnerships could add another valuable pipeline of software vulnerability information into China’s ecosystem. Moreover, under a 2021 regulation, Chinese firms conducting incident response for clients can voluntarily disclose those incidents to the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology’s “Cybersecurity Threat and Vulnerability Information Sharing Platform,” which has a separate system for collecting information about breaches.³⁷ The voluntary disclosure of incidents and mandatory disclosure of vulnerabilities observed in overseas clients of Chinese cybersecurity firms would significantly increase the PRC’s visibility into global cyber operations by other nations or transnational criminal groups. 

Offensive capabilities, not just global cybersecurity, might be on CCP policymakers’ minds, too, when other countries agree to partner with China. Cybersecurity firms frequently allow their own country’s offensive teams to work unimpeded on their customers’ networks: with each new client China’s cybersecurity companies add to their rosters, China’s state-backed hackers may well gain another network where they can work without worrying about defenders.³⁸ In this vein, Chen Yixin, the head of the Ministry of State Security, attended a July 2023 meeting of the Cyberspace Administration of China that underlined the importance of the Community with a Shared Future in Cyberspace.³⁹ In September 2023, Chen published commentary in the magazine of the Cyberspace Administration of China arguing that supporting the Shared Future in Cyberspace was important work.⁴⁰ Researchers from one cybersecurity firm found that the PRC has been conducting persistent, offensive operations against many African and Latin American states, even launching a special cross-industry working group to monitor PRC activities in the Global South.⁴¹ Chinese cybersecurity companies operating in those markets have not drawn similar attention to those operations. 

But China’s network devices and cybersecurity companies don’t just facilitate surveillance, collect data for better defense, or offer a potential offensive advantage, they can also be used to shore up relationships between governments and provide Beijing an avenue for influence. The Wall Street Journal exposed how Huawei technicians were involved in helping Ugandan security services track political opponents of the government.⁴² China’s government and its companies support such operations elsewhere, too. One source alleged that PRC intelligence officers were involved in cybersecurity programs of the UAE government, including offensive hacking and collection for the security services.⁴³ The closeness of the relationship is apparent in other ways, too. The UAE is reportedly allowing China’s military to build a naval facility, jeopardizing the longevity of US facilities in the area, and tarnishing the UAE’s relationship with the United States.⁴⁴

Providing other nondemocratic governments with offensive services and capabilities allows China to form close relationships with other regimes whose primary goal, like the CCP, is to maintain the current government’s hold on power. In illiberal democracies, such cooperation helps Beijing expand its influence and provides backsliding governments capabilities they would not otherwise have. 

China is plainly invested in the success of many other nondemocratic governments. Around the world, state-owned enterprises and private companies have inked deals in extractive industries that total billions of dollars. Many of these deals, say for mining copper or rare earth elements, provide critical inputs to China’s manufacturing capacity—they are the lifeblood of many industries, from batteries to semiconductors.⁴⁵ In countries without strong rule of law, continued access to mining rights may depend on the governments that signed and approved those operations staying in power. China is already suffering from such abrogation of agreements in Mexico after the country’s president renationalized the country’s lithium deposits.⁴⁶ Countries where China has significant interests, like the Democratic Republic of the Congo, are also considering nationalizing such assets.⁴⁷ Close relationships with political elites, bolstered by agreements that provide political security, make it more difficult for those elites to renege on their contracts—or lose power to someone else who might. 

China cannot currently project military power around the world to enforce contracts or compel other governments. In lieu of a blue-water navy, China offers what essentially amounts to political security services by censoring internet content, monitoring dissidents, and hacking political opponents—and a way to align the interests of other authoritarian governments with its own. If a political leader feels that China is a guarantor of their own rule, they are much more likely to side with Beijing on matters big and small. A recent series of events in the Solomon Islands provide a portrait of what this can look like. 

Case studies in China’s “shared future”

The saga surrounding the Solomon Islands provides a good example of China’s model for internet governance and the reasons for its adoption. 

Over the course of 2022, the international community watched as the Solomon Islands vacillated on its course and in statements, and prevaricated about secret commitments to build a naval base for China. After a draft agreement for the Solomon Islands to host the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN), the navy of the CCP’s military, was leaked to the press in March 2022, representatives of the Solomon Islands stated the agreement would not allow PLA military bases.⁴⁸ Senior delegations from both Australia and the United States rushed to meet with representatives of the Pacific Island nation.⁴⁹ Even opposition leaders in the Solomon Islands—who were surprised by the leaked documents—agreed that claims of PLA military bases should not be taken at face value.⁵⁰ The back and forth by the Solomon Islands’ political parties worried China. In May 2022, a Chinese hacking team breached the Solomon Islands’ government systems, likely to assess the future of their agreement in the face of the island nation’s denials.⁵¹

But the denials only bought Solomon Islands Prime Minister Manasseh Sogavare more time. In August, the ruling party introduced a bill to delay elections from May 2023 to December of that year.⁵² Shortly thereafter, the Solomon Islands announced a deal to purchase 161 Huawei telecoms towers financed by the Export-Import Bank of China.⁵³ (The deal came just four years after Australia had successfully prevented the Solomon Islands from partnering with Huawei to lay undersea cables to provide internet access to the island nation.)⁵⁴ Months later, the foreign press reported in October 2022 that the Solomon Islands had sent police to China for training.⁵⁵ Local contacts in the security services may be useful for the PRC. A provision of the drafted deal leaked in March 2022 allows PLA service members to travel off base in the event of “social unrest.”⁵⁶ Such contacts could facilitate interventions in a political crisis on behalf of PM Sogavare or his successor. In the summer of 2023, China and the Solomon Islands signed an agreement expanding cooperation on cybersecurity and policing.⁵⁷

To recap, in a single year the Solomon Islands agreed to host a PLAN base, delayed an election for Beijing’s friend, sent security services to train in the PRC, and rolled out PRC-made telecommunications equipment that can facilitate surveillance of political opponents. In the international system the CCP seeks, one that makes normal the censorship of political opponents and makes it a crime to disseminate information critical of authoritarian regimes, the sale of censorship as a service directly translates into the power to influence domestic politics in other nations. If there was a case study to sell China’s version of internet governance to nascent authoritarian regimes around the world, it would be the Solomon Islands.

For countries with established authoritarian regimes, buying into China’s vision of internet governance and control is less about delaying elections and buying Huawei cell towers, and more about the transfer of expertise and knowledge of how to repress more effectively. Already convinced on the merits of China’s vision, these governments lack the expertise and technical capabilities to implement their shared vision of control over the internet. 

Despite its capable but sometimes blunder-prone intelligence services, Russia was recently found to be soliciting technical expertise and training from China on how to better control its domestic internet content.⁵⁸Documents obtained by Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty detailed how Russian government officials met with teams from the Cyberspace Administration of China in 2017 and 2019 to discuss how to crack down on virtual private networks, messaging apps, and online content. Russian officials even went so far as to request that a Russian team visit China to better understand how China’s Great Firewall works and how to “form a positive image” of Russia on the domestic and foreign internet.⁵⁹ The leaked documents align with what the PRC’s policy document details already. 

Since 2016, they have co-hosted five China-Russia Internet Media Forum[s] to strengthen new media exchanges and cooperation between the two sides. Through the Sino-Russian Information Security Consultation Mechanism, they have constantly enhanced their coordination and cooperation on information security.

The two countries formalized the agreement that served as the basis for their cooperation on the sidelines of the World Internet Conference in 2019.⁶⁰ They could not have picked a better venue to signify what China’s Community with a Shared Future in Cyberspace policy would mean for the world. 

The Solomon Islands and Russia neatly capture the spectrum of countries that might be most interested in China’s vision for the global internet. At each step along the spectrum, China has technical capabilities, software, services, and training it can offer to regimes from Borneo to Benin. 

In conclusion, the chart below provides a visualization of the spectrum of countries that could be the most interested in implementing China’s Community for a Shared Future in Cyberspace.⁶¹

Figure 1: PRC tech influence vs. democracy index score

By combining data from The Economist Democracy Index (a proxy for a country’s adherence to democratic norms and institutions) and Doublethink Lab’s China Index for PRC Technology Influence (limited to eighty countries and a proxy for a country’s exposure to, and integration of, PRC technology in its networks and services), this chart represents countries with low scores on democracy and significant PRC technology influence in the bottom right. Based on this chart, Pakistan in the most likely to support the Shared Future concept. Indeed, Pakistan has its own research center on the “Community for a Shared Future” concept.⁶²The research center is hosted by the Communications University of China, which works closely with the CCP’s International Liaison Department responsible for keeping good relationships with foreign political parties. 

Internet conference goes prime time

The 2022 Wuzhen World Internet Conference got an upgrade and name change: the annual conference became an organization based in Beijing and the summit continues as its event, now called the World Internet Conference (WIC). The content from all previous Wuzhen conferences plasters the new organization’s website.⁶³

An odd collection of six entities founded the new WIC organization: Groupe Speciale Mobile Association (GSMA), a mobile device industry organization; China Internet Network Information Center (CNNIC), which is responsible for China’s top-level .cn domain and IPv6 rollout, among others functions; ChinaCERT, mentioned above; Alibaba; Tencent; and Zhejiang Labs.⁶⁴ Another report by the author connects the last organization, Zhejiang Labs, to research on AI for cybersecurity and some oversight by members of the PLA defense establishment.⁶⁵

Though the Wuzhen iteration of the conference also included components of competition for technical innovation and research, the new collection of organizations overseeing WIC suggests it will focus more on promoting the fabric of the internet—hardware, software, and services—made by PRC firms. China’s largest tech companies including Alibaba and Tencent stand to benefit from China’s vision for global internet governance if the PRC can convince other countries to support its aims (and choose PRC firms to host their data in the process). Any policy changes tied to the elevation of the conference will become apparent over the coming years. For now, WIC will maintain the mission and goals of the Wuzhen conference.

Conclusion

China’s vision for the internet is really a vision for global norms around political speech, political oppression, and the proliferation of tools and capabilities that facilitate surveillance. Publications written by current and former PRC government officials on China’s “Shared Future for Humanity in Cyberspace” argue that the role of the state has been ignored until now, that each state can determine what is allowed on its internet—through the idea of cyber sovereignty, and that the political interests of the state are the core value that drives decision-making. Dressed up in language about the future of humanity, China’s vision for the internet is one safe for authoritarians to extract value from the interconnectedness of today’s economy while limiting risk to their regime’s stability. 

China is likely to pursue agreements on cybersecurity and internet content control in regimes where it stands to lose most if the government changed hands. China’s grip on the critical minerals market is only as strong as its partners’ grip on power. In many authoritarian, resource-rich countries, a change of government could mean the renegotiation of contracts for access to natural resources or their outright nationalization—jeopardizing China’s access to important industrial inputs. Although internet censorship and domestic surveillance capabilities do not guarantee an authoritarian government will stay in power, it does improve their odds. China lacks a globally capable navy to project power and enforce contracts negotiated with former governments, so keeping current signatories in power is China’s best bet. 

China will not have to work hard to promote its vision for internet governance in much of the world. Instead of China advocating for a new system that countries agree to use, then implement, the causality is reversed. Authoritarian regimes that seek economic benefits of widespread internet access are more apt to deploy PRC-made systems that facilitate mass surveillance, thus reducing the risks posed by increased connectivity. China’s tech companies are well-positioned to sell these goods, as their domestic market has forced them to perfect the capabilities of oppression.⁶⁶ The example of Russia’s cooperation and learning from China demonstrates what the demand signal from other countries might look like. Elsewhere, secret agreements between national CERTs could facilitate access that allows for greater intelligence collection and visibility. Many Arabian Gulf countries already deploy PRC-made telecoms kit and hire PRC cybersecurity firms to do sensitive work. As the world’s autocrats roll out China’s technology, their countries will be added to the brochures of firms advertising internet connectivity, surveillance, and censorship services to their peers. Each nation buying into China’s Community for a Shared Future may well be a case study on the successful use of internet connectivity without increasing political risks: a world with fewer Arab Springs or “color revolutions.” 

About the author

Dakota Cary is a nonresident fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Global China Hub and a consultant at SentinelOne. He focuses on China’s efforts to develop its hacking capabilities.

The author extends special thanks to Nadège Rolland, Tuvia Gering, Tom Hegel, Kenton Thibaut, and Kitsch Liao for their edits and contributions. 

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Table of contents

Introduction
Corporate entities in Chinese economic statecraft
Methodology
Exploring Chinese corporate entities and links to influence
Policy recommendations

Introduction

China’s economic statecraft has expanded in line with Beijing’s vision for an international environment that is more conducive to its interests. Chinese President Xi Jinping and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) are willing to use every means at their disposal to achieve this goal, bringing the full force of the party-state to bear in support of Xi’s objectives abroad and against perceived enemies of the Chinese government. Economic statecraft—the use of economic means to pursue foreign policy goals—has been a consistent feature of Xi’s dealings with CCP competitors and adversaries. Intensifying US-China strategic competition and Beijing’s increasingly overt attempts to assert its preferences only further emphasize the importance of confronting China’s use of economic coercion and influence and understanding the reach of Chinese companies.

The deliberate use of economic ties to achieve geopolitical objectives is underpinned by corporate entities that facilitate trade, investment, and financial flows.¹ Beijing’s preference for plausible deniability and nontransparency in theory makes corporate entities an attractive mechanism through which to signal its displeasure and to achieve strategic goals. Understanding the reach and role of such entities is, therefore, key to identifying where Beijing might be best positioned to advance its economic statecraft. To that end, this report explores avenues through which researchers can investigate these issues, considers industries that could be vulnerable to future coercion and influence, and offers policy recommendations to counter China’s economic statecraft.²

Corporate entities in Chinese economic statecraft

Despite its recent economic difficulties, China’s size ensures that it will remain a center of economic activity for the foreseeable future. Corporate entities based in China play an essential role in expanding the country’s economic engagement.³ As Chinese firms seek to—and are encouraged by the government to—expand into foreign markets, the unique structure of China’s party-state apparatus offers Beijing the levers to wield significant influence over Chinese corporate entities and, through the potential manipulation of these entities, the policies of the target country.

The connection between Chinese companies and the CCP is fundamentally different from that of Western companies and their governments. There are numerous high-profile examples of Beijing directing corporate entities to meet the strategic demands of the party-state—such as ZTE selling technology to sanctioned countries or China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) moving an oil rig into Vietnam’s exclusive economic zone.⁴ Experts have coined the term “CCP Inc.” to describe this Chinese state-capitalist ecosystem of financing and corporate entities, building off the previously used “China Inc.” label.⁵ They highlight the CCP’s influence over state-owned enterprises (SOEs), but also its increasing penetration of private firms through mixed-ownership structures.⁶

China’s state-capitalist system gives the CCP the opportunity to orchestrate the economic activity of state-run financial institutions, SOEs, and even private corporate entities through a number of control mechanisms.⁷ The State-Owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC) administers state firms owned by China’s central government, which are concentrated in strategically important sectors; provincial corporations are guided by similar entities.⁸ CCP governance mechanisms include requirements to create party cells to monitor and provide guidance for following CCP goals, and party committees are involved in all major strategic decisions, appointments, and projects.⁹ The government has instituted several national security laws, including the 2017 National Intelligence Law, that compel firms to provide information or support to the Chinese state if asked.

However, even as the party-state solidifies control mechanisms over corporate entities, the CCP’s command over China-based firms is not ironclad. US policy makers should not assume that the CCP is intent on or effective in its use of economic statecraft, nor that Chinese corporate entities are willing participants.¹⁰ Chinese corporate entities pursue commercial ties abroad for many reasons, and many are made without the CCP’s foreign policy goals in mind—and even the party-state can have multiple or conflicting aspirations for this economic engagement.¹¹ Scholarship on the topic highlights significant principal-agent problems in the Chinese state’s relationship with firms and their differing interests and goals.¹² Research on the State Grid Corporation of China, for example, shows how this SOE has been able to push party-state policy in its favor.¹³ Even projects that are ostensibly driven by the Chinese state can simply be preexisting commercial pursuits that are rebranded in line with state goals (such as Xi’s ubiquitous Belt and Road Initiative, or BRI)—suggesting that Chinese companies, not the CCP, are the primary force behind these investments and projects.¹⁴

Those caveats aside, Beijing has several mechanisms through which to use the reach of China-based corporate entities to influence the policy behavior of other actors. The most direct of these are economic ties as a source of bargaining power, and growing dependence on China can potentially increase vulnerability to Chinese economic coercion.¹⁵ The market share of Chinese companies can allow Beijing—through the reach of these entities—to threaten, impose costs on, or otherwise influence policy in a target country through national-level policies, such as informal trade restrictions, administrative measures, or other means. A large share of a market can also enable China to alter trade flows and supply chains to its benefit or in ways that disadvantage other countries or companies—one of the fundamental challenges of contending with a state-capitalist system like CCP Inc.¹⁶

Recent studies of Chinese economic coercion indicate that China’s overt attempts have increased in the past few years and provide important insights into the current state of China’s economic statecraft.¹⁷ First, Beijing’s coercive economic actions fall into a few broad categories—among them, popular boycotts, administrative discrimination, empty threats, legal defensive trade measures, informal trade restrictions, investment restrictions, and limitations on tourism. Second, the targets of public coercion are somewhat predictable. Economically, they are most often small, democratic countries. Within these countries, Beijing’s coercive measures are aimed at strategic industries with a strong political lobby in the targeted country. At the same time, China often avoids targeting industries that are integral to strategically important sectors of the Chinese economy.¹⁸ Third, the proximate triggers of Beijing’s exertion of economic coercion are most often related to national sovereignty, national security issues, political legitimacy, and territorial disputes; however, these perceived provocations are evolving to include issues such as China’s international image, treatment of Chinese companies overseas, and countries’ imposition of broader perceived anti-China policies.¹⁹

This report was created alongside a series of videos on the actions of Chinese corporate entities abroad. Watch the full series here:

Methodology

This report uses publicly available information to investigate the reach of Chinese corporate entities abroad and to uncover their role in Beijing’s economic coercion and influence attempts. It seeks to advance future research in this area by identifying important means and techniques through which to assess the reach and role of Chinese corporate entities. A further focus is the impact of China’s economic statecraft on US interests and the ways in which the United States and its partners can counter these efforts.

The report endeavors to distinguish between economic coercion and influence, which are not synonymous. Economic coercion involves one actor’s use of threats or actions against economic engagement (i.e., trade, investment, or financing) to force another actor to do something it would not otherwise do. By contrast, economic influence encompasses a much larger range of actions and does not necessarily involve a threat or coercive attempt, making the link between action and outcome all the more important.²⁰

Evaluating Sources of Information on Chinese Corporate Entities

The first challenge of this research involved sifting through large amounts of data to identify Chinese corporate entities, their networks of ownership and acquisitions, and their upstream beneficiaries. This project has drawn on a wide range of resources to uncover the economic relationships between actors. The depth and breadth of information varies widely across jurisdictions, languages, and industries, making a factual investigation a time-consuming and complex process.

• Company websites and social media: There is a significant amount of information on Chinese corporate websites, in English, Chinese, and local languages. In conducting business abroad with many different actors, these entities have incentives to produce flashy websites and publicize their deals, just like other corporations. Some SOEs emphasize their deep ties in the Chinese market and even go so far as to brag about connections to the government and the ability to conduct business easily. While this public information should be consumed with caution and skepticism, it gives insight into the reach of these companies and reveals the extent of relationships.

• Corporate records: While the quality of such records varies widely between countries, they allow researchers to find connections that were not necessarily obvious before. Large databases—such as Sayari Graph, which was deployed in support of this project—can help aggregate vast volumes of data, and they can be used to reveal direct ownership links between entities and deployed alongside trade, shipping, and geospatial data to offer further insights into connections between and across jurisdictions. While subject to some of the same data and translation challenges as other research methods, they offer another significant avenue through which to investigate the reach of Chinese entities.

• Local knowledge: Conversations with locally based experts proved key to uncovering less-advertised Chinese economic activity and opening investigations into the entrenched role of China-based corporate entities in various industries and countries.

• National agencies: This data is not always reliable—particularly when dealing with numbers from Chinese agencies—but it still offers a starting point into connections and can highlight patterns of trade and investment. The Chinese Ministry of Commerce, for example, has a list of entities with overseas investments. In other countries, trade or investment data, while variable in quality and accessibility, can help reveal vulnerabilities and dependencies.

• Contracts and memoranda of understanding (MOUs): When publicly available, contracts and MOUs can reveal previously unknown relationships, including legal connections, between companies, states, and individuals. These documents are not always in the public domain and can be difficult to obtain.

Chinese Corporate Entities as Vehicles for Coercion and Influence

Connecting Chinese corporate entities to the exertion of coercion or influence was a second and potentially greater challenge of this research. Attempts at coercion or influence are not clear-cut, and Beijing—like other actors—has incentives to hide its efforts. Without a smoking gun, it is easy to jump to the conclusion that China-based actors are working at the party-state’s behest, but policy makers should be skeptical of the ability or willingness of Chinese corporate entities to hurt their own business prospects.

Importantly, obvious coercive attempts represent, to some degree, a failure.²¹ The most oft-cited cases of Chinese economic coercion are in countries that are largely democratic and are already aligned with the United States and the West—e.g., Lithuania, South Korea, Japan, and Australia. These countries often have options to blunt Chinese economic coercion and alternative partners willing to assist them in avoiding the repercussions associated with resisting Beijing’s policy demands. But even publicized failure—when coercion or influence does not cause the target state to alter its policies in line with the coercing actor’s preferences—can succeed in other ways. For example, it can help protect China’s domestic economy, impose significant costs to punish the target, or serve as a deterrent signal to third-party actors from taking certain actions by increasing the perceived costs of that behavior.

In past cases of Chinese economic coercion, Beijing most often leveraged the reach of Chinese corporate entities through restrictions imposed by national-level agencies. These coercive measures abuse established links between these Chinese companies and the target country. For example, China’s customs authorities have raised non-tariff barriers to trade; the Chinese Ministry of Culture and Tourism, the China National Tourism Administration, or Chinese embassies have imposed tourism restrictions; and China’s Ministry of Commerce has instigated anti-dumping investigations against target industries.²² In select cases, Beijing has sent orders to China-based corporate entities to restrict economic exchange with targeted countries, highlighting an even more direct and focused attempt at coercion.²³ These measures often supplement other, more formal restrictions. Tourism restrictions can be funneled through specific travel agencies to halt or restrict bookings in a particular country.²⁴ Against Australia, Chinese agencies directed companies to restrict the import of specific goods, including coal, cotton, and liquified natural gas.²⁵ Beijing’s coercive actions against Lithuania in late 2021 included reports that a state-owned Chinese railway operator informed Lithuanian customers that the direct freight link between the two countries would be put on hold.²⁶

Looking outside well-publicized cases, countries in the Global South have fewer alternatives to Chinese engagement and generally garner less attention and investment from the West, which makes China’s domineering economic position harder to resist—Beijing’s success in drawing Taiwan’s few remaining diplomatic partners through inducements provides one such example.²⁷ Such cases are more likely to fall under the category of influence than coercion, because there is less need for an overt threat—whether in public or private—to limit economic interaction. Either way, the target is incentivized to hide that it has been influenced successfully. Moreover, asymmetry in market size introduces the challenge of anticipated reactions, in which one actor (smaller state) might conform its behavior to what it believes are the desires of another (China).²⁸ This type of influence is even more difficult to identify, as a clear policy request has not necessarily been made.

Assessing Vulnerability

Building off of previous studies, this report emphasizes five factors in assessing vulnerability to Chinese economic coercion and influence in a prospective target country:

²⁹

The first four factors are heavily determined by the presence of Chinese corporate entities, which collectively ensure the importance of China as a trading partner, source of investment, and/or market for multinational corporations.

Of these, dependence demands additional attention—it is key in determining vulnerability to China’s economic coercion and influence, but dependence and vulnerability are often considered equivalent.³⁰ However, asymmetric dependence in China’s favor does not necessarily mean that Beijing can successfully deploy economic statecraft measures.³¹ Likewise, negligible levels of dependence do not always shield a potential target from Chinese economic coercion. In short, dependence is important but is one of several factors that must be accounted for in assessing vulnerability to Chinese economic coercion and influence. In particular, when looking at China’s past coercive economic attempts—which are predominantly against democratic and more developed countries with diverse sets of trading partners—many of Beijing’s measures are aimed not at industries that are dependent on China, but at politically influential or symbolic industries in the target country, and they do not necessarily impose significant economy-wide costs on the target.³²

Not all countries, however, have a sufficiently diverse set of industries or alternatives to resist China’s measures. What if the politically influential or symbolic industry targeted by Chinese measures (or in which Chinese companies have a large market share) makes up a large share of a country’s exports, gross domestic product, inbound investment, or another economic indicator? Such a scenario is more likely in the Global South, where China—through the reach of Chinese corporate entities—can use its centrality to influence policy behavior in the target country without the use of explicit threats or coercion. Couple this with a perceived lack of alternatives in these countries, and China’s strong position in just one industry could make resisting Beijing’s policy preferences costly to a country’s overall economic health and development.

Exploring Chinese corporate entities and links to influence

This report presents three case studies illustrating possible channels of coercion and influence and explores variability in their prospective effectiveness. The first two cases—related to the tuna fishing industry in Kiribati and state-owned China Oil and Foodstuffs Corporation’s (COFCO’s; 中国粮油食品集团有限公司) ownership of a grain logistics network in Romania—highlight the difficulties in investigating the reach of Chinese corporate entities and the various factors linking these entities to coercive potential or influence. In Kiribati, all factors made the country vulnerable to Beijing’s economic statecraft, but in Romania, they pull in different directions, and COFCO’s commercial dealings have yet to yield evidence of attempted political influence.

The third case study, on container transport and logistics networks in Southeastern Europe, is borne of an investigation into China’s previous coercive attempts, which skew heavily toward threats or actions against established trade relations. The operations of China COSCO Shipping Corporation Limited (COSCO; 中国远洋海运集团有限公司)—a leading Chinese SOE for ocean shipping and port operations—and its subsidiaries offer China both a dominant market share in the region and the ability to affect the flow of goods as leverage. Through these connections, COSCO and the Chinese party-state have the potential to coerce or influence policy behaviors in the region, though the costs of jeopardizing COSCO’s model BRI efforts in Greece and the region are potentially prohibitive.

Case Study 1: Tuna Fishing in Kiribati

The challenges of investigating the impact of Chinese corporate entities are made apparent in Kiribati, where President Taneti Maamau has overseen a pro-China shift since his election in 2016 and reelection in 2020. Lured by promises of aid and commercial opportunity, Maamau switched diplomatic recognition from Taiwan to China in 2019.³³ The government of Kiribati opened the Phoenix Islands Protected Area (PIPA)—previously a United Nations World Heritage Site—to commercial fishing to boost revenue from fishing permits, with Chinese encouragement; signed onto multiple agreements with China, including the BRI; and left the Pacific Islands Forum in 2022, reportedly with Beijing’s support.³⁴ Rumors persist around possible Chinese military use of an old runway on the island of Kanton, just 3,000 kilometers southwest of Hawaii; the Kiribati government has asserted that the upgraded airstrip is a nonmilitary project to improve tourism and transport links.³⁵

The Kiribati government’s decision to switch diplomatic recognition—and the subsequent opening of PIPA—is reportedly related to China’s influence over the fishing industry.³⁶ Tuna fishing licenses and access fee revenues for the island nation’s 3.5 million square kilometer exclusive economic zone made up 70 percent of the island nation’s fiscal revenues in 2020 and hovered between 60 percent and 90 percent from 2014 to 2018.³⁷ Fish, primarily skipjack tuna, are one of the country’s main exports, along with crude coconut oil and unprocessed copra (coconut), though Kiribati’s key export markets include Australia, Japan, the United States, and Australia—not China.³⁸

Chinese investment in the Kiribati fishing industry is longstanding but accelerated in the year prior to the diplomatic switch. The Kiribati Fish Limited (KFL), formed in 2010, is jointly owned by the Kiribati government (40 percent), Shanghai-government-owned Shanghai Deep Sea Fishing (上海远洋渔业有限公司; 20 percent), and Golden Ocean Fisheries of Fiji (40 percent)—in which Shanghai Fisheries (上海水产), the parent company of Shanghai Deep Sea Fishing, has a 20 percent stake.³⁹ KFL began operations at a newly constructed fish processing facility in 2012 with a reported investment of $11 million, and Chinese-language media reports highlight Shanghai Fisheries’ role in supporting KFL’s profitability and ongoing tuna fishing initiatives, such as a tuna transshipment hub.⁴⁰

More immediate to the Maamau administration’s decision to switch diplomatic recognition, a private Chinese company, Zhejiang Ocean Family Company (浙江大洋世家股份有限公司), invested 4.5 million Australian dollars (approximately $3 million) in two companies, Kiritimati Island Fish Limited (圣诞岛渔业有限公司) and Kiribati Tuna Fishing Company Limited (基里巴斯金枪鱼捕捞有限公司). Ocean Family holds a 40 percent stake in Kiritimati Island Fish Limited but has a joint voting agreement with Golden Ocean (30 percent) that affords the Chinese company a 70 percent controlling stake. The Kiribati government owns the remaining 30 percent. Kiribati Tuna Fishing is a straightforward joint venture between Ocean Family and the government, with Ocean Family holding a 51 percent share.⁴¹

Though Ocean Family is privately owned, its parent company has long-standing ties to the CCP. Ocean Family is part of the Wanxiang Group (万向集团), a Chinese conglomerate that primarily manufactures automotive components. Wanxiang Group is led by Lu Weiding, a CCP representative of the National People’s Congress and the company’s secretary of the party committee.⁴² Ocean Family also benefitted from a 2016 deal negotiated by the Chinese Ministry of Agriculture with Kiribati, which increased fishery access for Chinese fishing companies.⁴³

The significance of KFL and the Ocean Family investments in Kiribati’s tuna fishing industry was first revealed through contemporaneous, confidential conversations with Taiwanese and local officials. Chinese companies hold a significant position in Kiribati’s most important industry, from which the government receives the majority of its revenue. Other factors highlighted in this analysis also trend in Beijing’s direction: tuna can be sourced from other countries and is not a strategic good, investment from other countries was not forthcoming, and domestic politics favored Beijing. Together, these factors resulted in apparent influence over policy behavior, without the need for economic coercion.

Case Study 2: Grain Transport in Romania

Not all acquisitions or ownership by China-based entities around the world have resulted in influence, though they demand attention and deep scrutiny. For example, as part of a larger push to challenge the dominant position of Western grain traders in the global market, the state-owned food trade and distribution conglomerate COFCO International acquired 51 percent of Nidera, a Netherlands-based grain trader, in 2014.⁴⁴ Soon after, this company in turn acquired a Romanian grain terminal in the port of Constanța on the Black Sea, operated by United Shipping Agency SRL.⁴⁵ Still operating under the United Shipping Agency name, this terminal has served as the hub for COFCO’s operations in Romania and the region.

COFCO International has since developed into a top grain trader and exporter in Romania, where the company was the third-largest exporter in the first quarter of 2023.⁴⁶ According to its website, COFCO International has nine silos, located either inland or along the Danube River, to facilitate the flow of grain from countries along the Danube to its terminal in Constanța, which has heightened importance as a major hub for Ukrainian grain exports following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.⁴⁷ COFCO’s position in Romania has been further supported by other Chinese entities that have integrated into the country’s transport logistics network, including the China-Central and Eastern Europe Investment Cooperation Fund, a state-owned investment fund that purchased a Romanian network of sixteen grain silos and logistics hubs, and COSCO, which has established freight transport routes in the Black Sea and within Romania.⁴⁸

This integration of Chinese firms into Romanian and European grain transport and logistics networks raises the prospect that Beijing could use its connections to threaten, coerce, or influence policy in Bucharest and, through Romania, the European Union (EU), or the steady transport of foodstuffs from the Black Sea region. Yet despite COFCO’s position in Romania, there is no evidence to suggest Beijing has gained influence in Romania. Indeed, under conservative President Klaus Iohannis, Bucharest remains a staunch member of the EU and has resisted Chinese involvement in several significant projects and initiatives.⁴⁹

Several factors help explain why COFCO’s holdings in Romania have not resulted in the exertion of Chinese influence, coercive or otherwise. First, the presence of other major players in the grain market and Romania’s close alignment with Europe suggest that any attempt by China at coercion would likely fail to change Bucharest’s policies in Beijing’s favor. Romanian grain producers and traders have access to alternative traders and would be able to pivot away from COFCO, especially with EU support. If coercive success is in doubt, the costs of potentially losing COFCO’s operations in a major grain hub would likely exceed the benefits of punishing Romania or signaling Beijing’s displeasure over a specific policy issue.⁵⁰

Second, while grain exported through Romania is substitutable for China, domestic food security and the ability to fill any gaps through imports is an important issue for Beijing, and it is unlikely to risk losing access to global or regional markets.⁵¹ Only if China could secure its own supply through other means and create negligible movement in global markets would COFCO’s position in the Romanian grain market be used as leverage in China’s economic statecraft. Moreover, a threat by China or COFCO to restrict global food supplies or otherwise create fluctuations in prices would go against Beijing’s declared commitment to South-South cooperation.⁵²

Still, there are reasons for concern. China is by no means dependent on Romanian grain or regional grain exports through COFCO’s terminal in Constanța to guarantee its domestic supply. If Beijing felt secure in its ability to replace these foodstuffs, it is possible China could use COFCO’s position to make a coercive attempt to change Romanian policy. Such an attempt, likely through the slowing or suspension of imports, would leverage COFCO’s market share in a move similar to China’s informal measures against Australian exports. At the same time, the Romanian government’s resistance to past Chinese initiatives and its alignment with EU and Western preferences are policy positions that are similar to past targets of China’s economic coercion attempts.⁵³ Through this lens, a theoretical coercive attempt by Beijing could seek not only a change in policy, but also to punish Romania for taking a policy position counter to China’s preferences or signal to other countries China’s willingness to use economic coercion.

The case of COFCO in Romania suggests that not all Chinese ownership abroad has resulted in coercion and influence or should be viewed only through this lens, even as the possibility very much exists. A number of variables come together to determine Beijing’s strategic interests in and ability to use these levers of influence, and they can either encourage or dissuade China from attempting coercion or influence. In Kiribati, these factors largely operated in China’s favor, but in the Romanian grain trade—at least to date—the potential costs of using COFCO’s connections for economic coercion have outweighed the benefits. Policy makers in Bucharest—and the EU—should remain wary of this possible vulnerability and continually assess the factors that expose Romania to the risk of Chinese economic statecraft.

Case Study 3: Container Transport and Logistics in Southeastern Europe and the Balkans

China’s past attempts at economic coercion vary widely, but trade is a common lever for Beijing to pursue its strategic goals. In these attempts, China either leveraged the strong market share of Chinese companies to pressure a target or instructed specific corporate entities to restrict economic exchange with the target.⁵⁴ With this in mind, the strong and growing role of China’s shipping and logistics companies—much of it supported by BRI investment—represents a potential vulnerability for countries dependent on Chinese companies for freight transport. While Chinese investment and establishment of these logistics and trade routes thus far appear to be driven largely by commercial interests and a desire to secure China’s own supply chain security, they offer Beijing a ready-made mechanism through which it could seek to coerce or influence the policies of target countries.

As the leading Chinese SOE in shipping, COSCO deserves particular attention. The company’s growing share of global ocean shipping and port ownership is itself a worrisome development, with headlines focused on the possible security implications of COSCO’s expansive holdings.⁵⁵ Most recently, there was much concern over its minority investment in the Tollerort terminal in Hamburg, Germany.⁵⁶ While significant, companies using the ports of northern Europe have plentiful substitutes to quickly pivot to the services of non-Chinese companies should China choose to use COSCO’s port holdings or its larger market share as tools of economic coercion.⁵⁷

In Southeastern Europe, however, COSCO’s control of the Greek port of Piraeus and its port authority—as well as its intermodal rail connections through the region—affords the Chinese SOE a dominant role in the region’s freight transportation routes and the overall flow of goods.⁵⁸ COSCO’s foray into Mediterranean shipping ports began in 2009, when a predecessor company (Cosco Pacific) won a bid to upgrade and operate one terminal at the Port of Piraeus through a thirty-year concession. COSCO subsequently bought a 51 percent controlling stake in the Piraeus Port Authority in 2016.⁵⁹ This purchase included a provision allowing the SOE the right to purchase an additional 16 percent on the condition it completes a promised €300 million investment program within five years.⁶⁰ Despite failing to reach its promised investment goals by the 2021 deadline, the Greek state and parliament allowed the sale to go through.⁶¹

COSCO has since made notable investments in rail transport and is a vital operator in Southeastern Europe. The connections emanating from Piraeus—the port is now among the top six in Europe by cargo throughput—are part of the China-Europe Land-Sea Express Line (中欧路海快线), which coincides with the pan-European Corridor X running through Macedonia, Serbia, and Hungary.⁶² Through its subsidiary Ocean Rail Logistics (established in 2017), COSCO acquired a 60 percent stake in the Greek railway company Piraeus-Europe-Asia Rail Logistics (PEARL) in 2020.⁶³ In addition to its Greek network, PEARL operates in Bulgaria, Serbia, and North Macedonia.⁶⁴ According to Ocean Rail’s website, PEARL is the only rail operator running freight trains from Piraeus via North Macedonia and Serbia to Central and Eastern Europe.⁶⁵ In North Macedonia, PEARL accounted for around a third of total cargo volume transported by Macedonian Railways Transport, the public enterprise that operates all domestic lines, from 2019 to 2021 and 68 percent of total throughput in 2021.⁶⁶

Ocean Rail also serves as an intermodal operator for Rijeka, a deepwater port in Croatia. In 2019, COSCO established a direct vessel shuttle between Piraeus and Croatia’s Adriatic Gate Container Terminal (owned by Filipino port operator ICTSI), and Ocean Rail has since introduced the Rijeka Land Sea Express, providing freight services to the hinterland markets of Hungary, Serbia, and others.⁶⁷ Croatia, however, has expressed concern about Chinese involvement in Rijeka, ultimately cancelling a (non-COSCO) Chinese bid for the planned construction and operation of a new terminal for fear that China did not plan to actively use the facility and instead merely hoped to prevent others from doing so.⁶⁸ While Croatia has clear reasons for concern, the larger shipping picture in Southeastern Europe and the Balkans also demands attention. Future deals affecting the region’s container logistics networks should be met with equal scrutiny and clear guidelines for contractual obligations to ensure that COSCO or other Chinese entities do not gain undue influence.

Even without preferential access to Rijeka, Chinese companies—and COSCO specifically—hold a significant position in logistics networks in Southeastern Europe. COSCO’s controlling position in Piraeus and intermodal connections in Rijeka and throughout the region offer the conglomerate alternative shipping routes into Central and Eastern Europe. Not only are these countries increasingly dependent on COSCO for the shipment of goods and at risk of losing business associated with their transport, but COSCO then gains the credible ability to threaten to switch shipping routes and potentially allows China to hide strategic intent in commercial decisions. For example, COSCO could scale up shipping volumes through the Rijeka Land Sea Express at the expense of the countries in the overland PEARL connections.

This intertwining network—particularly if including COSCO’s connections in northern Europe—offers the SOE an increasing market share through which COSCO can manage trade flows through preferred channels. This growing dependence on COSCO could prove a significant pressure point for countries in Southeastern Europe and even the EU more broadly, and these logistics networks would not be easily replaced. Still, COSCO—and the Chinese party-state—have invested much in developing these logistics networks and would likely hesitate to risk them in a coercive attempt. The costs of exposing the China-Europe Land-Sea Express Line—an important success story in BRI connectivity efforts—could outweigh the benefits of using them as leverage to extract a policy concession. Yet as a means of influence, these networks could prove useful for Beijing and demand continued scrutiny.

Policy recommendations

These case studies offer a glimpse at the difficulty and importance of a full accounting of the reach and role of Chinese corporate entities in Beijing’s economic coercion and influence attempts. US policy makers can bolster their ability to counter Beijing through: 1) a nuanced understanding of the risks associated with Chinese engagement and the entities involved, 2) consistent communication with allies and partners to develop joint and complementary approaches to the challenge, 3) an appreciation for the concerns of countries most vulnerable to Chinese influence, and 4) a forward-thinking assessment of China’s future economic statecraft.

1) Investigate the economic involvement of Chinese entities around the world to better understand the associated risks and identify which projects may or may not pose a threat. Assessing the threat and responding appropriately requires a nuanced and comprehensive understanding of Chinese corporate entities, their acquisitions and subsidiaries, and their role in Beijing’s economic statecraft. Evidence that Chinese projects and investments can be harmful across a wide spectrum of issue areas is clear, as is the Chinese government’s willingness—if not always ability—to use the reach of China-based companies to pursue Beijing’s political goals around the world.

• Invest in long-term, in-depth investigations using varied data sources to make clear the extent of Chinese economic involvement. Open-source investigations into Chinese ownership, communication with the private sector, and local investigative journalism are critical sources of information regarding Chinese economic activities and their ties to the CCP. These efforts can bolster US governmental efforts, such as those of the Countering Economic Coercion Task Force established by the National Defense Authorization Act for 2023.⁶⁹ Even with comprehensive data, links between Chinese corporate ownership and CCP influence, and the difference between commercial deals and strategic maneuvering, can be intentionally opaque. China often deploys economic influence that lacks transparency and verifiability, and many of the issue areas investigated here began with tips from experts on the ground. Expanding and cultivating local knowledge of Chinese financing and corporate practices, through education of community advocates, politicians, and investigators, will increase awareness of the costs (and benefits) of Chinese projects and empower these actors to more effectively engage and negotiate with Chinese institutions.

• Focus narrowly on economic activity that offers a channel for exerting influence. Deep skepticism is warranted of Chinese corporate ownership, even more so if the companies involved have verified ties to the CCP. At the same time, a healthy suspicion of Chinese companies and their business incentives should not equate to a vilification of all Chinese involvement. Even SOEs have incentives outside the political goals of the CCP. The challenge then is to identify areas in which the reach of Chinese companies offers Beijing the ability to alter policy decisions in targeted countries. This requires identification not only of the relevant companies and their relationships with various Chinese government entities, but also of their ability to use their market position to coerce or influence the target country’s policies. While this recommendation sets a high bar, the hope is to focus the expenditure of US and Western attention and resources on combatting Chinese corporate reach in industries and countries that are most vulnerable.

2) Coordinate with partners, most notably the EU and the Group of Seven. The United States is most likely to succeed in uncovering and countering Chinese economic coercion if it works closely with likeminded countries. Both the EU and the Group of Seven (G7) have expressed their concerns over Chinese coercion and influence,⁷⁰ and efforts at information sharing, supply chain resilience, and trade diversification should be pursued and implemented further.

• Share information on China’s use of economic coercion. China intentionally obfuscates aspects of its coercive measures and influence efforts to maintain plausible deniability. The web of Chinese entities is complex and multifaceted, and no single actor can readily piece together a complete picture. Among other agreements, the G7 Coordination Platform on Economic Coercion establishes a mechanism to collect this information under one entity and plan appropriate responses.⁷¹ This should include information sharing on specific Chinese corporate entities, their subsidiaries, and their role in coercive attempts to help identify future vulnerability, as well as transparency in contracts and MOUs. A more inclusive version of the platform could include EU and NATO members and US treaty allies; ideally, any country should be able to share their experiences with Chinese economic coercion, though, undoubtedly, political differences would make such a proposal unwieldy.

• Enact and expand de-risking measures, such as trade diversification and supply chain security. China has used trade ties, both large and small, in its coercive attempts. Given the country’s economic heft, trade with Chinese companies is unavoidable, but diversification reduces the potential effects of economic coercion. Likewise, reshoring and “friend-shoring” supply chains can help reduce dependence on China;⁷² part of these efforts should include scrutiny of Chinese corporate entities to help reveal economic security vulnerabilities.

• Reduce the impact of economic coercion through targeted support for allies and partners. After Lithuania’s experience with Chinese economic coercion, the United States offered economic assistance and diplomatic backing in support of Vilnius. In the past year, bills were introduced in both the US House of Representatives and the Senate in support of increased aid, decreased duties, and trade facilitation to foreign partners that are subject to economic coercion.⁷³

3) Take into account the interests and needs of emerging and developing economies when formulating US policies aimed at countering Chinese influence. Without sacrificing its foreign policy and economic interests, the United States should invest more time and energy in considering the needs of the countries over which it fears CCP influence. These countries—largely emerging and developing economies—are eager for greater engagement with the West; at the same time, they are uninterested in great-power competition and less receptive to Western messaging to avoid working with Chinese companies. Indeed, China is often meeting needs left unfilled by Western financiers and infrastructure developers. Without alternatives, these countries perceive a choice between accepting Chinese financing and forgoing needed infrastructure or development.

• Engage proactively with vulnerable states. The United States has been caught flat-footed on several occasions in the past few years. For example, Washington and its allies were left scrambling to react to Chinese influence in the Solomon Islands in 2021 and Panama in 2019. A robust, consistent, and fully funded US diplomatic presence is a (relatively) low-cost means through which to learn of these developments before they happen and consider US measures to counter Chinese influence.⁷⁴

• Offer alternatives and make the most of comparative advantages in areas such as transparency, due diligence, and environmental, social, and governance (ESG) assistance. Discussions as part of this report consistently revealed a desire for alternatives to Chinese financing and development, highlighting the degree to which emerging and developing economies perceive few options emanating from Western countries and institutions. The United States and its partners should work to provide competitive and sustainable offerings through enduring initiatives. The G7 Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment, for example, could prove significant, if given sufficient time and resources. Initiatives in support of transparency in contracts, due diligence of projects, and ESG—all areas in which the United States and its allies have experience—would help reinforce the benefits of working with Western partners.

• Emphasize trade and investment diversification to avoid undue vulnerability. For all countries wary of Chinese coercion or influence, there must be an emphasis on diversification. A key factor in vulnerability to coercion and influence is industry dominance within a country or region. Even in areas where China does not have superiority in some aspects of the production or transport process, Beijing has been willing to sacrifice its market share to punish, coerce, or threaten. It is unrealistic to expect countries to forgo economic relations with the Chinese market, but encouraging and helping these countries identify alternatives can help convince them to reorient their economies away at least partly from China.

4) Prepare for evolving Chinese economic statecraft. Economic links developed by Chinese corporate entities have been leveraged to enact coercive strategies—through collective market position in an industry and directives from the Chinese party-state to cut ties with specific corporations or countries. Beijing’s tactics, however, are continuously evolving. Informal secondary sanctions, as were used against Lithuania, are likely to be used to persuade other countries to apply pressure on the target country. The United States was an active supporter of Lithuania after China’s coercive attempts, and the lessons from that episode should be readied to be deployed elsewhere. Beijing is installing more formal mechanisms of economic coercion as well. For example, two US defense contractors have been placed on China’s Unreliable Entities List, setting up its possible use more broadly.⁷⁵ The Unreliable Entities List, along with an Export Control Law, are two measures where China’s extensive shipping interests could play a major role in future attempts at coercion or influence.⁷⁶

William Piekos is a nonresident fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Global China Hub. His research focuses on US-China competition for influence, Chinese economic statecraft, and alignment policies in developing countries.

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William Piekos

Nonresident Fellow

Global China Hub

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The arrest and detention of two American journalists represents a further escalation in Russia’s confrontation with the West. While the Putin regime has long since muzzled the Russian media, measures against accredited international journalists operating in the country or foreign media representatives had previously been comparatively rare and were typically limited to entry bans or deportation orders. However, following the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Russia now clearly views foreign correspondents as legitimate targets.

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Since the launch of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the Kremlin has introduced a range of restrictions that have further tightened state control over the Russian information space. Large numbers of outlets have been forced to shut down entirely, while others have left Russia to continue their media activities in exile.

Those remaining in Russia have found themselves forced to operate in an increasingly suffocating environment where any negative coverage of the war in Ukraine could potentially lead to prosecution for “discrediting the Russian military.” In one particularly Orwellian move, Russian journalists have been forbidden from calling the invasion of Ukraine a “war,” and are instead obliged to employ the government’s euphemistic “special military operation” terminology.

It is not hard to imagine why Kurmasheva might have been targeted by the Russian authorities. Her work for RFE/RL reporting on ethnic minorities in Tatarstan and Bashkortostan, along with her coverage of the Russian anti-war movement, has challenged the Kremlin’s own carefully curated narrative of national unity and widespread public support for the invasion of Ukraine.

Kurmasheva was initially detained in June 2023 at Kazan airport as she was preparing to leave Russia following a family visit. Her US and Russian passports were confiscated and she was fined for failing to register her US passport. Kurmasheva was awaiting the return of her documents when new charges were announced in October 18. Five days later, a Russian court extended her detention until December 2023.

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Russia has frequently been accused of using its foreign agent legislation to launch politically motivated prosecutions. Russia’s foreign agent laws were first introduced in 2012 and were widely seen as a hard line turn following Putin’s return to the presidency. These laws were then significantly expanded in early 2022 after the onset of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine as part of an escalating crackdown on anti-war sentiment.

Critics say the legal definition of foreign agent has been kept deliberately vague and can be applied to any group or individual deemed to be “under foreign influence.” Kurmasheva is the first journalist to be arrested under a specific portion of the criminal code that punishes failure to register officially as a foreign agent. She has also been accused of “carrying out targeted collection of information in the field of military activities of the Russian Federation.”

The detention of US citizens Kurmasheva and Gershkovich has had a chilling effect on the dwindling international correspondent community working in Putin’s Russia. Many leading international media outlets are now reluctant to maintain fully-staffed bureaus in Moscow due to the apparent risk of arrest, with individual journalists also no longer confident about their personal security. This is making it all the more difficult to report on Russia at a time when accurate international coverage of the country has never been so important.

As the Washington Post’s write-up on Kurmasheva notes, her arrest marks an “ominous new phase in Russia’s repression of journalists.” As well as making it far harder for the media to cover Russia, some fear the arrest of two American journalists may also be part of Kremlin efforts to imprison US citizens in order to then exchange them at a later date for Russian nationals detained in the West. As Reporters Without Borders/Reporters sans Frontiers Eastern Europe and Central Asia desk head Janne Cavelier has stated, “journalists must not be used as bargaining chips in Moscow’s war against Kyiv.” Unless the international community reacts strongly to this latest arrest, it is likely more foreign journalists working or traveling in Russia will face a similar fate.

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Five days after the ICRC statement, the situation stands as follows: the last working seawater desalination plant in the Gaza Strip shut down on October 17 from lack of fuel. Hospitals in Gaza have entered a state of collapse, running out of fuel, basic supplies, and even painkillers. The United Nations (UN) warned that water shortages have now “become a matter of life and death,” with civilians in Gaza drinking contaminated water from the only aquifer that exists in the Gaza Strip. 

This dire situation exacerbates the precarity that already existed in Gaza, where more than sixty percent of the population faced food insecurity. The ICRC has mobilized sixty tons of humanitarian aid but says safe access is urgently needed. The UN World Food Programme said that 300 tons of food are either already at the Egyptian border in Rafah or on their way. Countries like Turkey, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates have already sent various planes with supplies to Egypt. Ursula von der Leyen, President of the European Commission, announced that the European Union (EU) is launching an EU Humanitarian Bridge operation with several flights to Egypt, beginning this week, to deliver supplies to verified humanitarian organizations on the ground.

Yet, despite urgent appeals for aid and multiple deliveries to Egypt, no outside aid appears to have made it into Gaza. Until October 18, Egyptian officials alleged that Israel was not cooperating with humanitarian assistance delivery efforts at the Rafah crossing and that air strikes nearby further stalled aid efforts. The Rafah crossing is located on the border between Gaza and Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula and is the only border crossing from Gaza not controlled by Israel and the only exit not leading into Israeli territory. 

Earlier, the head of Israel’s National Security Council, Tzachi Hanegbi, indicated that any aid efforts must broach the issue of the hostages taken by Hamas on October 7, saying that the “issue of returning the hostages… must be a central component of any humanitarian effort.” A senior adviser to Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu explained that Israel wants guarantees that humanitarian aid will not end up with Hamas. Secretary of State Antony Blinken noted that the US shares “Israel’s concern that Hamas may seize or destroy aid entering Gaza or otherwise preventing it from reaching the people who need it.”

On October 18, the Israeli military announced that humanitarian aid would be made available “if necessary” in Al-Mawasi, south of Gaza City, again urging residents of northern Gaza to evacuate. Following Biden’s visit to Israel on the same day, Netanyahu’s office said it would allow Egypt to deliver limited quantities of humanitarian aid to the Gaza Strip—the first concrete indication during a ten-day siege that aid would be allowed in. Once again, few details were shared. The statement only said that Israel would not “thwart” humanitarian assistance deliveries, limited to food, water, or medicine, but no mention of fuel, which is critical for hospitals and water treatment. Additionally, the aid will only be allowed into the southern part of Gaza, and the statement did not say when aid would begin to be allowed in. The statement also made clear that Israel would not allow any humanitarian assistance from its territory into Gaza “as long as our hostages are not returned.” President Biden indicated that the assistance would be subject to inspections and could only go to civilians. 

Given the ongoing humanitarian crisis and humanitarian aid piling up, it’s necessary to understand the legal obligations at issue. Specifically, international humanitarian law provisions regarding humanitarian assistance vary based on the classification of the conflict. This is a complicated question on which much disagreement exists, especially regarding Gaza and the conflict between Israel and Hamas. Many in the international community argue Israel’s role in the West Bank and Gaza Strip constitutes an occupation. Others instead view the current conflict with Hamas, a non-state actor, as a non-international armed conflict, arguing that Israel’s withdrawal of troops from Gaza in 2005 meant it was no longer in “effective control” of the territory such that even if it had been an occupying power before, it ceased to be one. Israel’s Foreign Ministry released a report in 2009 where it stated that the “Gaza Strip is neither a State nor a territory occupied or controlled by Israel” and that “as a matter of policy,” Israel “applies to its military operations in Gaza the rules of armed conflict governing both international and non-international armed conflicts.”

Regardless of the legal classification of the conflict, there is, at a minimum, an obligation to allow humanitarian assistance to be delivered to the civilian population by an impartial and non-discriminatory humanitarian organization if refusal to do so would result in mass starvation. The law of occupation, for example, imposes a positive obligation on the occupying party to provide humanitarian aid itself or, if unable, to facilitate its delivery to the occupied territory. 

Under Article 55 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, the occupying power “has the duty of ensuring the food and medical supplies of the population,” and “it should, in particular, bring in the necessary foodstuffs, medical stores and other articles if the resources of the occupied territory are inadequate.” Under Article 56, it also “has the duty of ensuring and maintaining, with the cooperation of national and local authorities, the medical and hospital establishments and services, public health and hygiene in the occupied territory.” Additionally, Article 59 establishes that if the “whole or part of the population of an occupied territory is inadequately supplied, the Occupying Power shall agree to relief schemes on behalf of the said population, and shall facilitate them by all the means at its disposal,” adding that all parties “shall permit the free passage” of humanitarian assistance provided by other states of impartial humanitarian organizations.

However, Israel does not consider itself the occupying power in the Gaza Strip. While its self-assessment does not determine whether it is an occupying power, it does govern Israel’s policy and conduct. A legal classification of the current conflict is beyond the scope of this post for the reasons mentioned above. And, ultimately, no matter how the conflict is classified, there is an obligation to allow humanitarian assistance for civilians in extreme situations where refusal to do so would result in mass starvation. In this sense, it is crucial to note that the obligations regarding humanitarian assistance apply to all parties to the conflict, that is, equally to Hamas and Israel. 

The ICRC notes that the rule is that, subject to the right of control, all parties to a conflict must allow humanitarian relief for civilians, impartial and conducted without adverse distinction. This is a norm of customary international law and applies in international and non-international armed conflicts. Customary international law norms apply universally, regardless of whether states have ratified certain treaties. Additionally, non-state armed groups, like Hamas, are bound by customary international law and certain treaty provisions.

But what does “subject to the right of control” mean? It means that the consent of the belligerent parties is required for impartial humanitarian organizations to deliver assistance to civilians in the territory under their control. However, consent cannot be arbitrarily denied or founded on unlawful reasons. 

Nevertheless, Article 23 of the Fourth Geneva Convention (governing international armed conflicts but instructive for the interpretation of the customary norm) subjects the free passage of humanitarian aid to the condition that the party allowing for it “is satisfied that there are no serious reasons for fearing… that the consignments may be diverted from their destination.” This speaks directly to the fears expressed by Israel and shared by the United States that Hamas may divert or seize the aid intended for civilians for its purposes. 

The commentary for Article 23, however, explains that a “doubt as to the destination of consignments would not be sufficient reason for refusing them free passage” and that, instead, “the fears of the Power imposing the blockade must be based on serious grounds, i.e. they must have been inspired by the knowledge of certain definite facts.” It adds that “supervision by a neutral intermediary,” like the ICRC, “should afford the blockading Power adequate assurances.” 

While concerns that Hamas may divert or seize aid are clearly relevant in assessing Israel’s obligation to allow entry of assistance, conditioning this entry on the release of hostages is not supported by the law. It is generally accepted that a party’s consent may be withheld for reasons of military necessity, however, the withholding cannot itself result in a violation of humanitarian law and must be necessary and proportionate. Ultimately, the ICRC has observed that if “a civilian population is threatened with starvation and a humanitarian organization which provides relief on an impartial and non-discriminatory basis is able to remedy the situation, a party is obliged to give consent.” Lastly, the ICRC has also clarified that a party conducting a siege must allow the free entry of food and other essential items for the civilian population. 

Given the clearly deteriorating situation in the Gaza Strip and the extremely rare statement issued by the ICRC that the denial of food, water, and electricity to civilians, crucial for their survival, is not compatible with international humanitarian law, it is evident that humanitarian assistance delivered by impartial and non-discriminatory humanitarian organizations must be allowed to enter Gaza. Israel’s October 18 approval of entry of humanitarian aid to Gaza from Egypt, following an hour-long meeting with President Biden, is a step in the right direction. At the same time, it is also essential to ensure that this life-saving aid makes it to the intended recipients: civilians. As the commentary to Article 23 notes, “constant surveillance is necessary to ensure that the articles are in actual fact received by those for whom they are intended and that any illegal trafficking is made impossible.” But even that cannot be done if the aid cannot enter as soon as possible. The survival of civilians depends on it.

Lisandra Novo is a staff lawyer for the Strategic Litigation Project at the Atlantic Council. She was previously a judicial fellow at the International Court of Justice, a Fulbright scholar in Spain researching post-conflict transitional justice, and a visiting professional at the Inter-American Court of Human Rights.

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The tragic death of twenty-two-year-old Mahsa Jina Amini—a Kurdish-Iranian woman arrested by the Islamic Republic of Iran’s (IRI) infamous morality police in September 2022 for allegedly defying the state’s mandatory hijab laws—has brought the brutality of the IRI’s discriminatory legal framework against women, girls, and other marginalized populations into clear focus for the global community. Amini’s death sparked waves of massive protests throughout Iran, animated by the slogan “woman, life, freedom,” serving as a rallying cry for Iranians inside Iran and in the diaspora. It is a cry of resistance against the state and of a desire to hold IRI officials accountable for atrocity crimes and human rights violations.

The IRI response to dissent has been a brutal crackdown on peaceful protesters, including internet shutdowns, excessive use of force, arbitrary arrests and detentions, sexual and gender-based violence, torture, enforced disappearances, summary trials, and even executions. These abuses of the state have left Iranians looking for internationalized responses to their plight, as domestic avenues for accountability in the Islamic Republic’s courts are not reliable for victims. Countries around the world have responded in a range of ways, including via diplomatic channels and through the issuance of targeted sanctions against individuals and entities for gross human rights violations in Iran. However, many options for justice remain underused or unexplored.

International forums and mechanisms can be used to pursue accountability for these violations. To put these mechanisms and avenues into context and to shed light on how they may apply to Iran, as well as to illustrate any limitations, the Atlantic Council Strategic Litigation Project has authored this report, which aims to provide an overview of and recommendations relating to international options that can be used to pursue accountability for human rights violations committed in Iran.

The different avenues covered in this report were selected by considering the treaties that have been ratified by Iran, international courts that do or could have jurisdiction over the IRI or relating to violations that take place in Iran, different mechanisms available in which the IRI participates under the United Nations (UN) and other international organizations, and mechanisms designed specifically to address issues in Iran. Lastly, this report ends by looking to the future and highlighting current developments in international law that, if successful, could provide new avenues for accountability.

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Under the principle of universal jurisdiction, certain domestic justice systems allow prosecutions in national courts for crimes committed abroad, regardless of the victim’s or perpetrator’s nationality. This manual outlines the universal jurisdiction process in selected European states for those pursuing prosecutions of crimes committed by the Islamic Republic of Iran.

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On October 5, the Atlantic Council’s Strategic Litigation Project, together with the Global Justice Center, issued a joint letter and legal brief urging the international community to codify the crime of gender apartheid in the UN’s crimes against humanity treaty. The letter and legal brief were endorsed by dozens of prominent jurists, scholars, and civil society representatives. This includes Afghan women’s rights defender Shaharzad Akbar and Nobel laureates Shirin Ebadi, Malala Yousafzai, and Nadia Murad. It also includes South African jurists Justice Richard Goldstone and Navi Pillay, former US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, former Irish President Mary Robinson, former International Criminal Court Chief Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda, and renowned global feminist Gloria Steinem. Former Executive Director of Human Rights Watch Kenneth Roth, former Mongolian President Tsakhiagiin Elbegdorj, and Baroness Helena Kennedy endorsed the letter and legal brief as well. 

The prominence and diversity of this group speak to the high stakes of this issue. Some people might be encountering this term for the first time, however, so it is worth exploring the crime of gender apartheid in greater detail.

1. What is gender apartheid?

Gender apartheid occurs when perpetrators seek to maintain a form of governance designed to systematically oppress and dominate another gender group or groups so that the dominant group may live alongside them and benefit from their subjugation. 

In Afghanistan, gender apartheid is seen in the Taliban banning women and girls from education and almost all employment, and from traveling long distances without a male guardian, all while having to abide by a severe dress code. Women in Afghanistan are banned from almost all public spaces including public parks, gyms, and most recently beauty salons.

In Iran, gender apartheid is seen in the Islamic Republic not allowing a woman the right to divorce her husband or to gain custody of her children, and in banning women from obtaining a passport and traveling outside the country without the permission of a male guardian. Women in Iran are banned from many fields of study and are not permitted into sports stadiums. Their lives and their testimony are worth half a man’s under the law, and they are forced to wear compulsory hijab.

Gender apartheid in these countries is seen in a series of policies and daily abuses that bar women and girls from engaging in public life and having hopes of any financial autonomy. It is in all these measures designed and enacted by the Taliban and the Islamic Republic as a system of governance that aims to compress and relegate Afghan and Iranian women and girls into narrow roles: as child-bearers, child-rearers, and sources of unremunerated domestic labor.

Although it has not yet been codified as a crime under international law, gender apartheid has long been recognized as a concept. It dates back at least to the Taliban’s first takeover of Afghanistan in 1996. In our letter to UN member states, we’ve defined the crime of gender apartheid as the commission of inhuman acts with the intent to maintain an institutionalized regime of systematic oppression and domination of one gender group over another. This amends the existing definition of the crime of race-based apartheid under the Rome Statute—the animating document of the International Criminal Court—to encompass the same act and mental element, but with regard to domination of gender groups rather than racial groups.

2. Why should gender apartheid be recognized under international law?

The addition of the crime of gender apartheid under international law will give victims and survivors a clear legal avenue to hold perpetrators—whether state or individual—to account for the totality of crimes being perpetrated against them. The situations of women and girls living under the Taliban and Islamic Republic of Iran, for example, demonstrate just what’s at stake. As these regimes continue to tighten their grip, aiming to entrench a system of governance that eviscerates any semblance of women and girls’ autonomy and agency, every available option is needed to prevent and punish the full scale of their conduct. Codifying gender apartheid would equip the international community with a new and powerful tool for accountability to mobilize against these deteriorating situations.

3. Who supports the codification of gender apartheid? 

On March 8, 2023 a group of prominent Afghan and Iranian human rights defenders, international jurists, and civil society leaders launched the End Gender Apartheid Campaign, which calls for the global recognition of the crime of gender apartheid. Their demands were powered by the deteriorating situation for women and girls in Afghanistan with each successive Taliban decree and the rise of the “Woman, Life, Freedom” movement in Iran capturing global attention in support of women’s rights in these countries. 

The campaign builds upon a long history of work on this issue. For decades, international officials, lawyers, scholars, and activists have increasingly recognized the commission of gender apartheid and sought to codify it. Over the last year, UN Secretary-General António Guterres and other UN experts specifically recognized the deteriorating situation for women and girls in Afghanistan as gender apartheid. UN experts have also come together to caution against laws in Iran that are a form of gender apartheid. Just last month, UN Women’s Executive Director Sima Bahous called on the international community to explicitly codify gender apartheid under international law.

4. What can the international community do to recognize gender apartheid?

The United Nations has a unique opportunity to codify gender apartheid as a crime under international criminal law because the draft crimes against humanity treaty—the first major global treaty on core international crimes since the 1998 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court—is moving forward. However, the International Law Commission’s draft articles, the starting point for the treaty, replicate the twenty-five-year-old definition of apartheid from the Rome Statute, which focuses on race-based apartheid only. The Rome Statute’s focus is not surprising given the recent memories of apartheid-era South Africa when it was written, but the definition of apartheid can and should be expanded today.

The letter we issued to UN member states—endorsed by dozens of leading jurists and rights defenders, including those who worked to dismantle the apartheid regime in South Africa—urges states to amend the draft definition of the crime of apartheid to encompass gender-based apartheid, too. UN member states will have an opportunity to debate next steps for the draft treaty on October 11-12 during the ongoing UN Sixth Committee session. They can then submit written comments by the end of this year and debate the draft treaty provisions in substance in April 2024.

5. How is gender apartheid distinct from the international crime of gender persecution?

The crime of apartheid is different from what is on the books now because of its distinguishing intent and animating context. This means gender apartheid requires the commission of an inhuman act of requisite character with the intent to maintain an institutionalized regime of systematic oppression and domination. The crime of gender persecution requires neither such context nor intent. Rather, it concerns itself with the “severe deprivation of fundamental rights” where the victim or victims have been targeted “by reason of the identity of a group or collectivity or targeted the group or collectivity as such.” 

The intent to maintain an institutionalized regime of systematic oppression and domination of one group over others is markedly different in scope and dystopian ambition from the crime of persecution, as serious and significant as the latter is. This is already recognized, without controversy, given that the current definition of race-based apartheid sits neatly alongside the crime of persecution on the ground of race in the Rome Statute’s 1998 codification of international crimes. To the extent that the two crimes involve overlapping facts, it is also well-settled under international law that courts can charge perpetrators with cumulative crimes in order to capture the full extent of criminal conduct.

6. How would prosecution work?

Accountability against governmental actors in Afghanistan and Iran has been tough. The proposed codification would open new avenues to hold perpetrators—both state and individual—to account.

If the crimes against humanity treaty is adopted and the crime of gender apartheid is included, countries that are party to the treaty would be obligated to criminalize gender apartheid and take other measures to prevent and punish crimes against humanity under their domestic laws. This could potentially open the pathway to prosecutions under the principle of universal jurisdiction, which essentially means that some crimes are so heinous that they can be prosecuted in courts anywhere, even if the perpetrator is from a different country, the victims are from a different country, or the acts occurred in a different country. 

Iranian officials responsible for the architecture of gender apartheid do travel outside of Iran and into countries with universal jurisdiction laws—so this could expand options for prosecution of officials, much in the same way a former Iranian official was convicted by a Swedish district court in July 2022 for the executions of thousands of political prisoners in Iran’s jails. With respect to the Taliban, similar approaches may apply. 

Codification of the crime of gender apartheid in the crimes against humanity treaty would also affirm the obligations of states and international organizations to prevent and punish gender apartheid, even if they’re not direct parties to the treaty. In this way, the hope is that codification will mobilize diplomatic, legal, and social movements of resistance, including in the contexts of Afghanistan and Iran, and also in similar crisis situations now and in the future.

Gissou Nia is the founder and director of the Strategic Litigation Project at the Atlantic Council and advisor to the End Gender Apartheid Campaign.

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Flagship Event September 28, 2023

2023 Global Citizen Awards

This year’s Global Citizen Awards honor world leaders, US officials, and others who embody global citizenship.

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Event transcript

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JOHN F.W. ROGERS: Ladies and gentlemen, if I can just have your attention for a moment. Good evening, your excellencies, ladies, and gentlemen.

Each year, we gather during the United Nations General Assembly week to underscore the Atlantic Council’s commitment to promoting constructive global leadership, both to meet the world’s most pressing challenges and to ensure that freedom and opportunity and prosperity can be more widely realized across nations. In navigating the increasingly intertwined social, economic, and political challenges that define the twenty-first century, it is critical that we are guided by leaders whose intellect, their experience, and their single-minded resolve can be galvanized in the face of a myriad of obstacles to continue the collective march towards a safer and a more secure world order.

To this end, tonight we honor such leaders and luminaries who have taken up the call to serve a purpose greater than oneself, who are beacons of the Atlantic Council’s principles, and who together comprise this truly remarkable group and gathering of our 2023 Global Citizens. We are fortunate to have them and to be able to celebrate them this evening in New York. We convene, however, at a pivotal time for the Atlantic Council in the broader global community, as we endure an era of uncommon, if not disconcerting, geopolitical uncertainty.

As the unprovoked war against the people of Ukraine continues, we bear witness to the unshakable resilience of the Ukrainian people as they defend their country and a fundamental way of life, underpinned by the principles of peace, stability, and the basic right to determine their future. For our part, at the Council, our efforts demand a rigorous focus on deploying and delivering upon our expanded global mission, helping US leadership work in tandem with our long-term partners and allies to respond strategically, appropriately to these recent events, and to advance the broader cause of democracy across the global stage.

Despite the challenges, I say, with optimism and great confidence, that the Atlantic Council has never been more robust operationally, substantively, or financially. And in the face of such complex, daunting, and worldwide challenges—including economic, societal, and political dislocation—the Council’s formidable strength comes at a time when our work has never been more integral or imperative for a relative world order.

Our venue here tonight is a New York landmark which houses such institutions as the New York Stock Exchange. It is in many ways an ideal setting which to recognize our honorees tonight, because standing before you this architectural triumph of Greek Revival, the style was historically considered to be an expression of civic virtue, a symbol of the moral duty to put the common good above self-interest in a society. And in this way and in this setting, tonight we pay tribute to individuals who have in turn made selfless and enduring impacts on the world, who have themselves been expressions of civic virtue, symbols of self-regard giving way to the common good. And in so doing, we are in awe of their achievements, inspired by their character, and humbled by their presence.

Ladies and gentlemen, it is now my distinct honor and privilege to recognize the five recipients who join the roles of the Council’s Distinguished Citizen. Born in West Germany to parents in the textile industry, our first honoree would someday earn a law degree, eventually find his way into politics as a member of parliament, and ultimately become the ninth chancellor of Germany. A staunch advocate for governance and society, moored in mutual respect and consensus building, he continues to work at home and abroad with international partners towards securing a peaceful and stable European continent, and beyond.

Tonight we also honor the child of a Japanese government official who attended elementary school in New York, where his coming-of-age experiences would ignite and inspire his interest in justice and politics. Following an earlier career in law and finance, he was elected to the house of representatives, eventually becoming Prime Minister of Japan. Today, as the president of the G7, his transformative leadership has strengthened the Global South and promoted worldwide cooperation and democratic values across regions and borders.

Time magazine’s Person of the Year, and also lesser-known winner of Ukraine’s Dancing with the Stars. He met his wife in high school, he dated her in university, and would eventually marry and have two children. The actor, the comedian, the entrepreneur, he founded his country’s most successful and prolific entertainment company and he would go on to a history-altering career change with his landslide victory election as the sixth president of Ukraine.

Soon after he would confront unspeakable Russian aggression and atrocities but lead a tenacious defense of his people that would earn him the admiration of the world.

We pay tribute to our fourth honoree, the first woman US Treasury secretary, and is featured in the Hamilton musical mixtape. She’s the inspiration for the indie hip-hop song “Who’s Yellen Now.” Born to elementary school teacher and a family physician who worked from the ground floor of their family home over her more than forty-year career as an economist and policy maker, she has helped to build a more resilient and inclusive US and global economy, including greater focus on poverty and inequality and wages. But I think it’s expressed more appropriately by the artist Dessa and her single about her, about her triple crown, about her three-sided coin that always comes up heads.

Ladies and gentlemen, watch yourself. There’s busted glass. She broke another ceiling. She’s the first that led the Council of Economic Advisers, the Treasury, and the Fed, and most appropriate for tonight, ladies and gentlemen, lift up your mojitos because she’s managing the Mint.

And, finally, we had the great honor of bestowing on one of our own family the Distinguished Service Award on Victor L. L. Chu, the chairman and CEO of First Eastern Investment Group, for his contributions as co-founder of the Global Citizens Award and as a member of the council’s International Advisory Board. We are not only immensely appreciative of Victor’s generous support but laud his dedication to improving the state of the world, which has earned him numerous awards and accolades including the Global Economy Prize. Tonight’s celebration would not exist without Victor’s innovative vision and his commitment to extraordinary public and humanitarian service.

On that befitting note, ladies and gentlemen, this evening we raise our hands to say salute to these truly distinguished honorees and the Council’s overarching mission. Thank you.

And so now let’s take a look at tonight’s first honoree.

VOICEOVER: Chancellor Olaf Scholz’s leadership shines particularly as he has spearheaded efforts to fortify European unity. His clear and strategic vision is an example not only to his European counterparts but to countries around the world.

As a leader who places diplomacy and dialogue at the forefront, Chancellor Olaf Scholz has emerged as a beacon of hope. His unwavering commitment to creating peace and confronting threats to global democracy cements his legacy as a remarkable global citizen and a great leader for our times.

The Atlantic Council is pleased to honor him for his efforts tonight.

NGOZI OKONJO-IWEALA: Good evening, everyone. Excellencies, ladies and gentlemen, distinguished guests, I would like to thank John Rogers, Fred Kempe, and the Atlantic Council for giving me the honor and the opportunity to present the 2023 Global Citizen Award to Chancellor Olaf Scholz of Germany.

Let me take a moment to recognize and congratulate this year’s other awardees: Prime Minister Kishida, US Secretary Treasury Janet Yellen, a good friend, Victor Chu, and President Zelenskyy.

I’m really delighted to say a few words about Chancellor Scholz, a giant in Germany and Europe who is doing so much to foster the international cooperation and solidarity we need to meet challenges, even as he remains clear-eyed about the threats that confront global peace and security.

Chancellor Scholz has been on the global stage for years with earlier stints as finance minister and labor minister. His passion for social justice started as early as when he was seventeen and has never wavered. This passion has infused his political career and underpinned his achievements. His understanding of the complexities that shape our interconnected world was shaped by his roots in Hamburg, a port city open to the world, but also one where heavy industries have struggled with economic transition.

Chancellor Scholz is a powerful advocate for global trade that is open, free, and fair, but when there are dislocations, he also knows how and when to complement open markets with domestic policies that provide appropriate safety nets to cushion workers and enable them to take advantage of new opportunities. His commitment to fostering a more equitable global economic framework is visible in the instrumental role he plays in the G7 and G20, advocating for a global minimum tax for multinational corporations and championing digital taxation.

Chancellor Scholz is a great advocate for getting the world to net zero carbon emissions by 2050 or earlier. His concept of a climate club or alliance has broken new ground in finding ways to incentivize our economies at different levels of development to collectively take ambitious climate action that protects our planet. Chancellor Scholz’s strong support for developing nations stands as a testament to his commitment to equity and inclusivity.

He has been a leading voice in calling for global resilience through the diversification of global production networks for key goods by bringing in countries on the margins of global markets. Increasing the production of fertilizer or rare earths and minerals in developing countries and empowering those nations to add value to these commodities instead of exporting unprocessed raw materials will promote development and job creation while making global supplies more resilient to climate or geopolitical shocks.

This is what we call a reimagined globalization or re-globalization at the WTO, a word I want all of you to take away with you tonight. I’m personally inspired by Chancellor Scholz’s dedication to fostering greater global understanding in a world that seems increasingly and frighteningly divided.

Distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen, it is with the utmost admiration and respect that we welcome Chancellor Scholz here tonight in presenting this year’s Global Citizens Award. Thank you.

OLAF SCHOLZ: President Zelenskyy, Prime Minister Kishida, Secretary Yellen, Director-General Okonjo-Iweala, dear Mr. Kempe, excellencies, ladies and gentlemen, first of all, thank you for your kind words, dear Ngozi. I’m always very happy to exchange ideas with you, not only because we are friends but also because we share the same convictions on many issues. We are, for instance, both determined advocates for free trade. Free trade: That has led to unprecedented economic growth and helped lift hundreds of millions of people in Africa, and Asia, and in Latin America out of poverty. That is why I share your conviction, Ngozi, that decoupling, reducing trade to just friends, or ever higher trade barriers are not the answer. On the contrary, you put it perfectly in your essay, “Why the World Still Needs Trade,” that was published in June, and I highly recommend.

Deconcentrated and more diversified global supply chains offer a route to interdependence without overdependence. And they offer a way in for countries and communities that have so far been excluded from global value chains. However, being free traders puts us into a category of species that seems to be increasingly endangered, even in its natural habitat here in the United States. So I’m glad to have you by my side as we work towards the preservation and recovery of that particular species.

When I first learned that the Atlantic Council wanted to honor me with the Global Citizen Award, I was hesitant to accept. In my German hometown of Hamburg, there is a tradition that forbids citizens to accept declarations from foreign powers. The reason lies in this city’s past. Hamburg was a free republic long before that became fashionable, located between empires and kingdoms all craving for power, staying free and independent of foreign influence was the survival strategy for small city-state. To accept a declaration, so the tradition holds, meant placing oneself above others, which was not in line with the ideal of a society of equals trading with other independent cities and countries.

Nevertheless, as the Global Citizen Award is clearly not a declaration, I’m very honored to accept it today. Because this award emphasizes precisely what I just said, that we strive for an interconnected world whose citizens cooperate with each other to protect our global common goods and to create growth in a way that benefits all. This belief is also embodied in the UN Charter. That charter is the backbone of an international order of equals, equal in their sovereignty and equal in their duty not to violate the borders of their neighbors.

President Zelenskyy, it is a privilege to receive this award together with you as the representative of the brave people of Ukraine. Your courage inspires us all, and the suffering of your people breaks our hearts. Russia’s brutal war of aggression against Ukraine is being fought in Europe, but it is at the same time an attack against fundamental principles of our international order. That is why I called it a watershed moment, a Zeitenwende. There is a before and an after.

In Germany, we overcame long-standing certainties. Second only to the United States, we are the biggest supporter of Ukraine economically, in terms of humanitarian aid, as well as military training and heavy weapons. We are investing more in our own security and defense, and that of our friends and allies. For instance, by decisively increasing our military presence in the Baltic states. Within months, we have become independent from Russian energy. And last, but truly not least, Russia’s war against Ukraine has also led to a historic deepening of our transatlantic alliance. I’m proud to say today our relations with the United States are stronger than ever.

Ladies and gentlemen, Russia’s war has failed utterly because of the courage of the Ukrainians and because of the unity of all those who stand for an international order of equals. But the suffering is not over. Russia continues its brutal aggression against the people of Ukraine and against the very foundation of international law. And that is why we, too, will continue steadfast in our support for Ukraine for as long as it takes.

Danke schön.

VOICEOVER: With a steadfast commitment to fairness, equality, and peace, Prime Minister Fumio Kishida utilizes his extensive diplomatic experience to shape global policies that benefit not only Japan but also the entire global community. As the G7 president, he worked tirelessly to foster dialogue among the world’s leading economies, uniting them to address pressing issues such as climate change, global health, and economic inequality. The Atlantic Council salutes Prime Minister Kishida for his transformative leadership to strengthen the Global South and promote worldwide cooperation.

URSULA VON DER LEYEN: Good evening. It’s a pleasure and an honor to be here tonight and speak at this esteemed gathering about an ally and a friend and a most deserving recipient of this award, Prime Minister Fumio Kishida.

I could tell the audience about our amazing cooperation of these years, dear Prime Minister, about how we coordinated our actions in the wake and in the aftermath of Russia’s full-scale aggression of Ukraine, or how you hosted an incredibly successful G7 at Hiroshima, but there is another moment that is even more telling of your courage and your leadership. I’m talking about your visit to the small Ukrainian town of Bucha, a symbol of Russia’s brutality and of Ukraine’s resistance.

Bucha was liberated by Ukraine’s brave soldiers in the early weeks of the war, but Russian troops left a trail of blood and death and destruction. They executed dozens of civilians in cold blood in one of the worst war crimes since the start of Russia’s brutal war. And you, dear Fumio, decided to make the long and difficult trip to Bucha to see with your own eyes the horror that Russia left behind, but also Ukraine’s determination to resist and to fight for its freedom.

For the first time since World War II, a Japanese prime minister visited a country at war, and you brought with you Japan’s solidarity in words and deeds. From the very beginning of this war, you opened your country to Ukrainian refugees, you joined us in sanctioning Russia for its crimes, and you stood at our side when Putin tried to blackmail Europe with gas. Ukraine, and the whole of Europe, will be forever grateful to you for this. Arigatou, dear Fumio.

You have done this because you know that although Ukrainians are paying the highest price, this war is not only about Ukraine. And it is not only about European security. This is about the basic principles of the UN Charter, which have protected global peace since the end of World War Two. It is about the simple, yet vital, rule that borders cannot be changed by force and that every country should be free to chart its own path. You, dear Fumio, understood this from day one. You understood that we must all contribute to upholding the UN Charter, because in a lawless world, any country might face the same fate as Ukraine.

In your words, you said, “Ukraine today, maybe East Asia tomorrow,” end of quote. European security and Indo-Pacific security are one and the same. Your vision of a free and open Indo-Pacific is also our vision. So we are bound to work together. And in these two years, Prime Minister, you have forged ever-stronger ties between Japan and your like-minded friends, near and far, from East Asia to Europe and North America. You have reconnected Japan to its most trusted partners and built new bridges across the world. Thanks to your leadership, today our three continents are closer than ever before.

Distinguished guests, there is a Japanese proverb that tells a lot about the country and about its prime minister. It says onkochishin and it means “explore the past to learn new things.” You, dear Prime Minister, showed me the meaning of this proverb during the G7 summit in Japan last year. You brought us to your hometown of Hiroshima, the place where you have your roots and which has deeply shaped your life and leadership. Many of your relatives lost their life when the atomic bomb razed Hiroshima to the ground. You have grown up with the stories of the survivors. And you wanted us to listen to the same stories, to face the past, and learn something about the future.

It was a sobering start to the G7, and one that I will not forget, especially at a time when Russia threatens to use nuclear weapons once again. It is heinous. It is dangerous. And in the shadow of Hiroshima, it is unforgivable. No one is better poised than Japan to warn us of the extreme danger and of this recklessness. Right from the beginning of this war, Japan’s position was clear. As the only country that has suffered from atomic bombings, you have made the whole world listen. Today, Russia’s nuclear saber-rattling has been condemned not only by our like-minded partners in the G7, but by the whole world. And your diplomatic efforts have been crucial to reach this outcome.

This is true leadership—the kind of leadership that the world needs in these troubled days, leadership that is not afraid to learn from the past to shape a different future. So it is a pleasure to be with you today to celebrate your work and your vision.

Distinguished guests, please join me in congratulating Prime Minister Kishida on earning the 2023 Atlantic Council Award.

FUMIO KISHIDA: Thank you for your kind introduction. We’re good friends for long and it makes me especially happy that you talk only good things about me tonight. Thank you very much.

And thank you, President Kempe and the Atlantic Council, for this prestigious award. I’m very much honored to receive this.

In May I hosted the G7 summit in Hiroshima, a symbol itself of the place for peace. At the summit the G7 leaders and many other leaders from around the world had the opportunity to directly listen to the experiences, stories, and wishes of hibakusha, the survivors of the atomic bombings, as well as to learn firsthand the devastation through their visit to the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Park. There we shared in a renewed determination to work together towards a world without nuclear weapons and to pass on the same conviction and resolve to the generation that will follow.

Ladies and gentlemen, here in Manhattan there is a large statue of a Buddhist monk. This statue stood in Hiroshima seventy-eight years ago and it survived the atomic bomb. Every year on August 6, citizens here in New York gather in front of this statue and pray for peace and a world without nuclear weapons.

Hibakusha and the citizens of Hiroshima and Nagasaki have devoted their lives to sharing their stories and prayers. Many others too have dedicated their lives to promoting nuclear disarmament or advancing radiological sciences.

Today let us remember those who gave their lives and sacrificed everything for peace. All of us here are standing on the shoulders of those unsung heroes. We should never let their efforts and sacrifices end as a mere dream. It is the responsibility of every political leader to find [a] pathway to overcome the harsh realities of the world and take the lead to achieve such peace. I humbly accept this award on their behalf as prime minister of Japan and as a citizen of Hiroshima. Thank you very much.

ADRIENNE ARSHT: Good evening. I wanted to take a brief moment to acknowledge the Ukrainian artwork that is being displayed around the room. If you look around, and when the lights come back up take another look, the exhibition gives a glimpse of the scope and diversity of the creativity of Ukrainian and Ukrainian-American artists over the past century.

What a special evening, and congratulations to all our honorees this evening. As many of you know, I feel a deep connection to music and to all of the arts. It’s after experiencing moments like this that I feel it is particularly appropriate that we look to music. Music is a universal language, and I cannot think of any song more fitting than this one to pay tribute to President Zelenskyy. This song is also an anthem for each and every one of us.

So, from the Metropolitan Opera, please welcome soprano Maureen McKay to sing the 1955 classic “Let The Be Peace On Earth.”

FREDERICK KEMPE: As my daughter would say, OMG. Tonight, we celebrate remarkable global citizens. And, by doing so, we hope to inspire others to great accomplishments.

However, I’d like to start this part of the evening, heading into our very special guests in a couple of minutes and then the dinner break, by saluting the courage and resilience of an individual who cannot be with us tonight. That’s Evan Gershkovich, the Wall Street Journal reporter who’s been detained in Moscow since March 29, falsely and cynically accused of espionage.

Having, myself, spent more than twenty-five years as a foreign correspondent and editor at the Wall Street Journal before coming to the Atlantic Council, I perhaps have stronger feelings than many in this room about the need to free Evan as soon as humanly possible. Any of us who’ve been journalists in war zones or troubled situations know it could easily be us, and we don’t know whether we might have his courage or his resilience.

Tonight, however, we’re joined by two individuals who have experienced this on an even more personal level. They are Evan’s parents, Mikhail Gershkovich and Ella Milman. Mikhail and Ella, please rise and let us applaud you and Evan. We stand with you and we are prepared to do whatever we can as a global community to bring Evan home as soon as is humanely possible. Thank you for everyone to support this cause.

The Atlantic Council’s mission simply stated is shaping the global future together—shaping the global future together. This is only five words, but they powerfully express who we are and why so many of you are here tonight to support that mission and our work behind it. The first word is shaping. We don’t just publish, convene, or advocate—though we do a lot of all those things in a nonpartisan internationalist bipartisan, but incredibly response-oriented, results-oriented way. We aspire to shape a better world through our actions, projects, and advocacy across our sixteen programs and centers and across the world.

The second term: the global future. We are at the beginning—not in the middle, not at the end—of a new era. The fourth inflection point since World War I and the global future is up for grabs again, as it was after World War I, after World War II, and the Cold War. We got it tragically wrong after World War I, better after World War II, somewhere in between after the end of the Cold War, where we expanded the European Union, NATO, the area of free markets and free peoples, but there was so much work left undone.

And the fourth inflection point will have to do with the outcome of the war in Ukraine—Russia’s war in Ukraine—and how we handle this now and how we handle this not just now, but into the future, and you’ve heard that from our awardees so far. The coming months and years will determine what values, what institutions, [and] what set of countries will forge what sort of future. These are consequential times as you’ll hear from our next awardee.

Third, together—the word, together—shaping the global future together. This is perhaps the most important of these five words—not America alone, not America from behind, not America first, but alongside partners and allies—and together with all the six hundred of you, from more than thirty countries, including several of our previous award honorees, including President Ursula von der Leyen, Former Prime Minister Magdalena Andersson, Dr. Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala, Klaus Schwab. These are previous awardees all in the room.

And previous awardees of our distinguished service award, Adrienne Arsht, General Jim Jones, Bahaa Hariri. You’ll also be introduced soon to Victor Chu, who will be the fifth person ever to win this award. It was those three—Victor Chu, Henry Kissinger—that’s five people in the sixty-year history of the Atlantic Council to have been recognized for this award.

For more than six decades, we’ve worked across borders, across the aisle, on a wide set of defining issues that have shaped the twentieth and twenty-first [centuries]. Last night we gathered at Gracie Mansion, the official home of the mayor of New York City, for a dinner with the Global Citizen Award co-chair partners, and it was hosted by Mayor Eric Adams. I think the mayor is in the audience, is that right?

Mr. Mayor? Where are you? Could you please stand so we can salute you?

Mr. Mayor, you’ve got a pretty cool home. Thank you for sharing it with us. And thank you for your gracious hospitality.

I am fortunate here tonight among the—to be among the largest number of Global Citizen Award co-chairs and partners in our history for this dinner. It’s a great problem to have. I want to salute these individuals who make tonight’s dinner and so much of our work possible.

Please stand as I call your name. I ask the audience to hold its applause until we get to the end of this list. It’s a pretty long list, which my finance chair is incredibly happy about. And here are the names. Please stand. Please hold your applause.

Robert J. Abernethy. AEVEX Aerospace, represented by Brian Raduenz. African Rainbow Minerals, represented by my friend Patrice Motsepe. Air Products, represented by Seifi Ghasemi. ANA Holdings, represented by Yoji Ohashi. Adrienne Arsht. Atlas Technologies Group, represented by Guang Yang. Bank of America, represented by Larry Di Rita. Sarah Beshar. Blackstone Charitable Foundation represented by Stephen A. Schwarzman. Bradley, represented by Karl Hopkins. David L. Kaplan. Chopivsky Family Foundation, represented by George Chopivsky, Jr. DAI, represented by James Boomgard. Edelman, represented by Richard Edelman. Eni, Claudio Descalzi. First Eastern Investment Group, represented by Victor L. L. Chu. HIF Global, represented by Meg Gentle. Laurel strategies, represented by Alan H. Fleischmann and Dafna Tapiero. Mapa Group, represented by Mehmet Nazif Gunal. William Marron. Nomura Holdings, Inc, represented by Kentaro Okuda. One American Bank, represented by George Lund. Ahmet M. Oren. Palm Drive Capital, represented by Seamon Chan. Pfizer, Inc, represented by Dr. Albert Bourla. John F. W. Rogers. RTX Corporation, represented by Gregory J. Hayes. S&P Global, represented by Douglas L. Peterson. SICPA Holding, represented by Philippe Amon. SK, represented by Chairman Tae-won Chey. Sumitomo Mitsui Banking Corporation, represented by Makoto Takashima. Sustainable Development Capital, represented by Jonathan Maxwell. Nader Tavakoli. Broad Capital, represented by Danladi Verheijen. Zurich Insurance Group, represented by John Diaz.

A huge round of applause for this incredible set of individuals.

Without you, this dinner doesn’t happen. Without many of you, the work we do every year doesn’t happen. As General Jones, our two-time chairman—our chairman emeritus says to me, vision without resources is hallucination. We are not going to hallucinate. We’re going to continue to exercise our vision. And thanks to you, we can do that.

This is a moment that is the most favorite moment, where I ask you to—a few people to rise and for you to really give a round of applause. I am lucky to work with people that allow this dinner to happen, to be executed with such detail, to have so much care about what they do, to open—I wake up every morning, wanting to be relevant. I tell them, don’t be so naive to think you can change the world every day. But don’t work at the Atlantic Council if you don’t want to give it a try. You shouldn’t be here.

So, Atlantic Council staff, board, international advisory board, please stand for applause. What a pleasure it is to work with you all. Ladies and gentlemen, please turn your attention to the screens for our next honoree.

VOICEOVER: In May of 2023, Atlantic Council Chairman John F.W. Rogers and President and CEO Frederick Kempe traveled to Kyiv, Ukraine, to present President Volodymyr Zelenskyy with the Global Citizen Award. While meeting with Ukrainian Cabinet members, the Atlantic Council staff experienced Zelenskyy’s leadership firsthand and witnessed all that he continues to do for the people of Ukraine.

We are pleased to honor him tonight and to salute his ongoing commitment to defending an independent and democratic nation. We are honored to continue our commitment to Ukraine’s future, building on last year’s Distinguished Leadership Award to the people of Ukraine as we honor President Zelenskyy tonight.

JOHN F. W. ROGERS: Ladies and gentlemen, it’s my great honor to formally recognize Ukrainian President Zelenskyy for his fortitude and leadership, for his country’s heroic fight against authoritarian aggression, for his unyielding defense of the sanctity and the solidarity for democracies everywhere. The bravery and the resolve exhibited by Ukraine’s soldiers and citizens alike has been nothing short of an inspiration to the world.

It is something that I have witnessed firsthand. I had the privilege to meet with the president and his team on two separate occasions spanning the many months of this war. It was important that we went and signaled to Russia and other nations that we are committed to a free and independent Ukraine. And on these journeys, we had an opportunity to engage with many officials and leaders to discuss the situation on the ground and its ramifications globally.

But due to the threats in the land and the air, the airport is closed. So, consequently, months after the war began I went by train from the Polish border to Kyiv. And for the first time since the fall of the Soviet Union, I was there. The windows of the train were taped to avoid shattered glass in the event of an explosion. And on that train, I saw many Ukrainian women and children who had fled but they were returning to visit husbands and fathers and brothers.

I shared a compartment with a family, a Ukrainian woman and her three-year-old son and her mother. And they were eager to reunite the boys—with the boy’s father, who had just received a few days of leave from fighting on the frontlines.

I also met an elderly couple, Ludmila and Viktor. They were visiting their young daughter in Poland, whom they had not seen since the war started in February. They themselves would not leave their country. They said: If my president stays, I stay.

I also met a young woman who was returning back to her hometown to see her only brother. He had recently been called up to serve in the army. She was filled with tears, worried about her brother—not about her own safety, only about her brother.

Now, these and other tearful conversations set the tone for the rest of my trip. And as I stayed there thinking about the future, I was assured by what I saw in these people’s eyes—hope and courage and sacrifice.

The human side and the toll of this war is captured in these everyday realities. We are living through the greatest period of uncertainty and unrest in more than two decades, driven in a significant way by the worldwide reverberations from the Russian war. As we navigate through, it is even more critical that we understand those moments, where it may lead, and each of our roles within it.

At such a formidable time, there is no better example of the right leader at the right time rising to meet the moment than President Zelenskyy and his unwavering resolve. He has won the trust and the hearts of nearly every Ukrainian and much of the world, delivering a master class in communication and advocacy for a modern nation under primeval siege. Even as we present him with this award and honor his courage, we know that he accepts these accolades on behalf of and for the benefit of his people and his country.

And when you think of the themes of civic virtue and the common good above self-interest, as I reflect upon the two leaders of these nations at war, the contrast could not be more glaring, the differences more stark. In Ukraine, everyday images of the reckless and unnecessary loss of life persist as Putin targets innocent civilians. His persona even ventures into the bizarre, with art forms comparing him to Hercules. Our mythical monsters are replaced with modern adversaries such as a multiheaded hydra of Western sanctions.

And in a contrasting worldview, President Zelenskyy at his inauguration instructed I do not want my picture in your offices. The president is not an icon. He’s not an idol or a portrait. Hang your kids’ photos instead and look at them each time you’re making a decision.

Ladies and gentlemen, it’s my honor and privilege to present to all of you the president of Ukraine and this year’s recipient of the Global Citizens Award.

VOLODYMYR ZELENSKYY: Thank you very much. A great honor to be here.

Thank you very much, a great honor to be here. I didn’t prepare a long speech. Sorry, too much for one day. And tomorrow, I’ll be in [the] White House, so I have to save energy. I’m not alone here; I’m with my wife, I just want to see her somewhere… And our team, you there. Thank you so much that you invited us. Really, I don’t have, in real life, I don’t have, often, I don’t have time to be near with my wife, together, so thank you so much. Yes, if you want to applause, please. Thank you very much.

Really, to be serious and to be very honest, this is not my award, and I address this award to all Ukrainian men and women in uniform. I address this award to all our sweet children who have been killed by Russian terrorists—I will never forget them. I address this award to our fathers [and] mothers who brought up [such] brave Ukrainian soldiers. And to all teachers and to all doctors who didn’t leave the Ukraine from [the] first days of full-scale war, have been together with us, taught our clever boys and girls; even under Russian missiles, taking Russian missiles and Iranian drones. And of course, I address this award to all the partners: United States, EU, all brave countries who have been with us and supported us. Thank you so much.

And, of course, I address this award to all the people in the world who fight for freedom and democracy like we, we Ukrainians. Slava Ukraini.

JOHN F. W. ROGERS: I would now like to ask our guests to remain seated and ask for each of our honorees to join us onstage so we all have a photograph together with President Zelenskyy.

VOICEOVER: Victor L.L. Chu is the reason we are here tonight. Mr. Chu’s involvement in the annual Atlantic Council Global Citizen Awards has solidified his dedication to recognizing and celebrating individuals who are actively driving positive change on a global scale.

In 2010, Victor and Atlantic Council President and CEO Fred Kempe co-founded the annual Atlantic Council Global Citizen Awards Dinner, which takes place alongside the UN General Assembly. The Atlantic Council salutes Victor with a special Distinguished Service Award for his contributions to the Atlantic Council and to forging a better world.

KLAUS SCHWAB: Distinguished participants, I would like to start with a personal remark. My earliest memory dates back to World War II, where I was sitting in a bomb shelter having my teddy bear in the arms and hearing the bombs coming down. And that was, let’s say, the start of never war again in Europe. President Zelensky, you are a hero. And we have to make sure that the brutal aggression never succeeds.  

Now, it’s my great pleasure to introduce Victor L.L. Chu, who is being honored this evening with the Distinguished Service Award, an honor only given a few times previously for extraordinary service to the Atlantic Council. We have honored this evening outstanding political leaders. But there are also statesman business leaders, and many of you are also here in the room—business leaders which do not only create prosperity, but really serve the people and society.

Victor, I must admit it’s quite a challenge trying to do justice to your accomplishments in such a limited time. In some way, it feels a bit like capturing the essence of a symphony in one single note. Victor, you are not only an accomplished professional with a long and distinguished career as an entrepreneur, financier, and philanthropist. You are also an exceptional human being and a dear friend since three decades. Your life journey has nothing been short of extraordinary achievements. You embarked in many ways to serve society already as a young—as a young person. You became actually the youngest governor of the Hong Kong Stock Exchange, at the age of thirty-one. And the World Economic Forum had the pleasure to nominate you a global leader for tomorrow thirty years ago. And you fulfilled our expectations.

Victor’s history of public service is prodigious. His contributions to numerous boards and advisory boards of highly reputed organizations demonstrate his unwavering commitment to addressing global challenges from a holistic perspective. What sets you really apart, my dear Victor, is the multidisciplinary nature of your service. You have tirelessly championed, in business, investments, policy, education, and philanthropy. Your role in the international advisory councils of the mayors of London, New York, and Rome, coupled with your leadership as chair of both the Hong Kong-Europe Business Council and the Hong Kong-US Business Council demonstrates your ability to navigate this intricate nexus between policy and business with great sophistication and, I should add, humility.

Moreover, your contribution to education as the council chair at University College London, and your involvement with many other prestigious universities, highlight your commitment to shape the next generation of leaders. Perhaps the most remarkable aspect of your career is your dedication to improving understanding between the East and the West. And here, I particularly acknowledge your extraordinary engagement with the Atlantic Council over so many years.

Your global vision and tireless efforts have made you a true ambassador of cultural and economic exchange, fostering understanding and collaboration on an international scale. On behalf of all of us, I want to congratulate you, Victor, on this much-deserved recognition. We honor not only your achievements, but also the enduring legacy you leave for future generations—one characterized by a commitment to service, a spirit of unity, and an unwavering belief in the power of bridging divides. We wish you all the best for continuous success in every way, and we look forward to many years of your magic to continue to work.

Victor, please join me, and please celebrate a great business statesman.

VICTOR L. L. CHU: Thank you so much, Klaus. You and Hilde have been a mentor and role model for Irene and myself for more than thirty years to which we are eternally grateful. So thank you again, Klaus, for your generous words.

Distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen, I’d like to start by thanking the leadership of the Atlantic Council for this exceptional honor, which I feel extremely humbled. I want to thank in particular John and Deborah, Fred and Pam, Adrienne, Steve, amongst many other good friends.

I want to thank my family who are here en masse. Quite a few of them are here. And particularly my first cousin, Albert Chu, who is also celebrating his sixtieth birthday today. Happy birthday, Albert

I want to thank so many of my good friends who are here. Without your support and encouragement, we would not have such a wonderful success at the Global Citizen Award. Many of you have come from overseas to join us this evening.

I would particularly like to thank Chairman Ohashi of ANA and also President Inoue of ANA. The three of us are, I suppose, the original partners in the creation of Peach Airline, which is the leading low-cost carrier in Asia, and thank you, Ohashi-san and Inoue-san, for joining us today.

I also want to mention my dear friend Robbie Lyle from London, who has been a friend and a mentor of mine again for forty years, and he’s here with Lizanne (ph). So thank you, Robbie, for your really great friendship over many years.

Ladies and gentlemen, I was very blessed that at a very young age, I was instilled by my parents the value of dedication and public service. Sadly they are no longer with us, but I was wondering that if my mother is here tonight she will be completely thrilled and delighted. My father would have been pleased, but he would say that Victor, this is not good enough. Yeah, I can hear that. And in many ways, he was right for those of us who have been brought up in the last sixty, seventy years, in a period of peace, stability, and strong economic growth. In my father’s words, we have never weathered the storm.

However, the world has become a lot more complicated. And as I’ve said almost every year for the last twelve years, the challenges to society today [are] unprecedented. Last time we talked about cyber, climate, food security and conflicts in Europe. And this year we’ve added the challenges of ChatGPT and the threat of advanced AI.

So multifaceted problems require a cross-disciplinary approach and also global collaboration. I remember, as a young man, every morning at school in Hong Kong we were asked to remember the instructions of St. Paul—faith, hope, love. And the greatest of the three is love.

Love in today’s terminology is really an extension of tolerance and kindness. And here we are today, faced with these extremely complicated problems. Let me call upon all of us to rise to the occasion. We need to have more compassion. We need to communicate constructively. We need to engage more frequently. And, where necessary, a little bit of constructive ambiguity would do no wrong.

So as a Liverpool Football Club fan for more than fifty-one years, let me conclude by saying we have to remember we never walk alone.

Thank you, ladies and gentlemen.

VOICEOVER: US Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen stands as a distinguished economist and policy leader who has made remarkable contributions to building a more resilient US and global economy. Her extensive expertise and commitment to economic justice have shaped her career and policy agenda. Her dedication to evidence-based policymaking and her commitment to addressing economic disparities make her a pivotal figure in shaping a more equitable and fruitful future for all.

Yellen’s legacy will undoubtedly leave a lasting impact on economic policy and the pursuit of a fairer, more prosperous world. The Atlantic Council is honored to celebrate her and her illustrious career tonight.

MINISTER CHRYSTIA FREELAND: Bonjour mes amis. C’est un très très grand plaisir, c’est une très honneur, d’être ici avec vous ce soir pour célébrer mon amie, l’excellente secrétaire du trésor des États-Unis, madame Janet Yellen.

We are today living through the most consequential moment in world history since the fall of the Berlin Wall. Brutal war has returned to Europe. People around the world are struggling with higher prices and elevated interest rates after a once-in-a-generation pandemic. Democracies are grappling with the clean energy transition, which is the most significant economic transformation since the industrial revolution itself. And it was Chancellor Scholz, actually, who used that term in a meeting of finance ministers that Secretary Yellen and I were at when he was still a humble finance minister.

At this profound historical inflection point for the global economy and for democracy itself, there is no person—and for sure, there is no woman—more uniquely suited for the truly essential role she occupies, than Secretary Janet Yellen. Now, why is Janet such a formidable leader for the world right now? First, because Secretary Yellen is a champion of economic policy that works for working people. As President Zelensky said, you can applause if you like. The approach she cleverly described as “modern supply-side economics,” a belief that investing in people and building an economy from the middle out is the path to strong steady growth—that approach will stand the test of time as the progressive response to the tried and failed plutocrat-enriching policy of trickle-down economics.

Second, we need Janet because Secretary Yellen has led and delivered a return of US economic leadership in the world. She has been a real visionary in driving closer economic cooperation between partners, in what she has called friend-shoring our economies. Now for a lot of people, for a lot of countries, a tempting response to Russia’s illegal and immoral invasion of Ukraine, and to the economic vulnerabilities it exposed, could have been autarky. Instead, thanks significantly to the work of Secretary Yellen, the United States, Canada, and democracies around the world—including many in this room—are working more closely together than ever before, building our supply chains through each other’s economies, creating good careers for working people, and ensuring that democracies depend on democracies rather than on dictators.

Third, Secretary Yellen’s leadership has been critical in our response to Putin’s illegal war in Ukraine. Before Putin invaded, Secretary Yellen was there in meeting after meeting, rallying the world to create a sanctions package which was historic in scale, and which would snap into place if and when Putin’s tanks crossed Ukraine’s border. We all hoped—we hoped so much—that deterrence would work. But when it didn’t, we were prepared. Since that very, very dark morning, Secretary Yellen has been leading the fight to hold Putin and his henchmen accountable and to squeeze their revenues for war. With measures like the freeze on the assets of the Russian Central Bank, an excellent idea, and the oil price cap. You can also applause if you’d like.

Now, Secretary Yellen understands that, as she sometimes puts it at meetings of our allies, there are two fronts in this war—the military front and the economic front. She knows that we need to supply Ukraine with weapons and we need to supply Ukraine with money. And that is an effort Secretary Yellen has spearheaded. And let me just add Canada has, of course, been there too, providing the highest level of per capita financial support to Ukraine of any G7 country. So at this pivotal moment for Ukraine, for democracy itself, we are all so fortunate to have Secretary Yellen leading this most consequential of efforts.

Now, let me conclude where you may have expected me to start, with the glass ceiling. In his “Life of Samuel Johnson,” Boswell quotes Johnson as saying, “Sir, a woman’s preaching is like a dog walking on his hind legs. It is not well done, but you are surprised to find it done at all.” Now, an echo of that swaggering contempt is something I am sure every single woman in this room has heard probably quite a few times when she’s been praised as the first woman to do whatever job she now holds. And that’s why I didn’t start by lauding Secretary Yellen as the first woman chair of the Federal Reserve and as the first woman secretary of the treasury, because the most important point about her is that she was an outstanding Federal Reserve chair and she is a formidable treasury secretary.

But it is also unfortunately still true that her gender matters and that it makes a difference. It matters to women in the United States who are pursuing careers in economics and finance, women—fields where women are still vastly outnumbered. It matters to me and to every other woman in the room. We find it easier to speak up and we find it a heck of a lot easier to be heard when we are in a meeting where the secretary of the treasury, Janet Yellen, is speaking as well. Usually, they let her talk first, by the way. And it matters to the billions of women around the world who see in Secretary Yellen their own rightful place at the head table of global leadership.

In the nearly three years we’ve worked together Secretary Yellen has been an incredibly important colleague, and she has also become a valued mentor and a friend. As an extra bonus, we make each other look tall in photos.

And so I am really, really honored and really happy to introduce a remarkable leader—a champion for working people, a champion for democracy, a champion for Ukraine, and, let’s face it, a role model for every single woman in this room, in this country, and in the room, my friend, the secretary of the treasury of the United States, Janet Yellen.

JANET L. YELLEN: Thank you. Thank you, everyone.

Thank you, Chrystia, for your kind words and for your leadership.

And thank you to the Atlantic Council. I’m honored to receive this award and to be among such distinguished fellow recipients.

When I was born, the world was still recovering from the devastation of the Great Depression and the Second World War. From the rubble of these crises, the United States and many other countries charted a postwar course premised on a conviction that each nation’s stability and growth depended on our collective security and prosperity.

This is equally, if not more, true today. I took office in the depths of the COVID-19 pandemic, which underscored just how interconnected we all are. From the beginning of the administration, we made clear that American isolation and retrenchment were over. And we set forth a new guiding principle. America is strongest when we engage with the world. As my nation’s chief economic diplomat, I have since worked to faithfully apply that principle.

When Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022, we witnessed the determination of the Ukrainian people as they fought for their lives and their freedom and for the values we all share. And we knew we had to support them with a decisive response.

As we look back on the past year and a half of the war, it’s clear that many of our actions so far would have been impossible to undertake if any country were attempting them alone. Our unprecedented multilateral sanctions regime and novel price cap on Russian oil exports are effective in pressuring Russia only because we acted as a global coalition. And I believe the global economy is in a better place than many of us would have thought possible a year ago due to our collective actions.

This commitment to multilateralism should drive our continued efforts to exert more pressure on Russia to end its unjust war and to support the Ukrainian people. And it should shape our actions in crises to come.

Robust engagement with the world is not confined to moments of crisis, however. It’s required, for example, to hold off the steady march of climate change, which is affecting communities across America and around the world; to invest in the global-health system that can prevent and withstand the next pandemic, avoiding the immense human toll and economic damage like that we saw from COVID-19; to create a fairer international tax system that ends a race to the bottom and benefits working people around the world.

So we have helped lead efforts to establish a pandemic fund and to align over 130 countries on a global minimum tax. We’ve put forward a new vision for development in the twenty-first century focused on global challenges, and we’ve collaborated with others to evolve the multilateral development banks to make good on it.

We’re also working to stabilize relations with China by seeking a healthy economic relationship that benefits both sides and enables cooperation on global challenges while protecting our vital national-security interests.

In sum, we’ve engaged with the world, including through committed coalition building and with a view to building the global economy we need for the long term. In today’s world, we’re in it together. And we have to go at it together if we want to make our nations and the world safer, healthier, and more prosperous.

Thank you again for this honor. I look forward to the collective work ahead of us. Thank you so much.

FREDERICK KEMPE: I’ll say just a couple of things before you get a very special treat to take you all home. So, first of all, we’d like to thank Edelman for in-kind event support for tonight. We’d like to recognize Foreign Policy and The Wall Street Journal Barron’s Group, my friend Almar Latour as the official media sponsors of the 2023 Global Citizen Awards. We thank the Ukrainian Institute of America for curating the collection of art played at our reception this year. And now, please give it up for Luke Frazier of American Pops, Robert Pullen and Nouveau Productions, for just remarkable in-house band for us, all the time. And Nouveau Productions is really best in class. So thanks to all of you.

We always like—we always like to send you home with something special. In honor of the extraordinary accomplishments of each of our honorees this evening, we dedicate this final moment to each of you, every one of you, in every seat, at every table, all over the room. To sing a piece from Disney’s “Hercules,” please welcome the extraordinary Broadway star, Nic Rouleau. And if you don’t know him already, and many of you already do, you’re going to know him after this. So, Nic, over to you.

The post Full transcript: The 2023 Global Citizen Awards honor leaders who build bridges in the face of unprecedented crises appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On Wednesday, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy accepted an Atlantic Council 2023 Global Citizen Award for leading the Ukrainian people in the fight to protect his country’s sovereignty. Read his moving address to the gala dinner in New York in the transcript below.

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Flagship Event September 28, 2023

2023 Global Citizen Awards

This year’s Global Citizen Awards honor world leaders, US officials, and others who embody global citizenship.

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Thank you very much, a great honor to be here. I didn’t prepare a long speech. Sorry, too much for one day. And tomorrow, I’ll be in [the] White House, so I have to save energy. I’m not alone here; I’m with my wife, I just want to see her somewhere… And our team, you there. Thank you so much that you invited us. Really, I don’t have, in real life, I don’t have, often, I don’t have time to be near with my wife, together, so thank you so much. Yes, if you want to applause, please. Thank you very much. 

Really, to be serious and to be very honest, this is not my award, and I address this award to all Ukrainian men and women in uniform. I address this award to all our sweet children who have been killed by Russian terrorists—I will never forget them. I address this award to our fathers [and] mothers who brought up [such] brave Ukrainian soldiers. And to all teachers and to all doctors who didn’t leave the Ukraine from [the] first days of full-scale war, have been together with us, taught our clever boys and girls; even under Russian missiles, taking Russian missiles and Iranian drones. And of course, I address this award to all the partners: United States, EU, all brave countries who have been with us and supported us. Thank you so much. 

And, of course, I address this award to all the people in the world who fight for freedom and democracy like we, we Ukrainians. Slava Ukraini.

Watch the full remarks

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Zelenskyy’s words made headlines, but it is not clear if UN officials were listening. Two weeks earlier, United Nations investigators in Kyiv confirmed that they had not yet conclusively established whether Russia is committing genocide in Ukraine. Erik Mose, who heads the UN’s Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine, informed journalists in the Ukrainian capital that while his investigation was ongoing, “as of now, we do not have sufficient evidence to meet the legal qualifications of the Genocide Convention.”

The cautious approach adopted by United Nations investigators sparked considerable anger and exasperation, but it is not entirely surprising. After all, the legal bar for determining genocide is necessarily high. Crucially, in order to confirm that a genocide is taking place, evidence of the relevant war crimes must be supported by conclusive proof of genocidal intent. In this case, efforts to demonstrate Russia’s genocidal intent will be bolstered by the unprecedented amount of genocidal rhetoric coming from senior Kremlin officials and regime propagandists in Moscow over a period stretching back at least fifteen years.

Russian President Vladimir Putin has set the tone for Russia’s viciously anti-Ukrainian public dialogue and has frequently engaged in what could be classed as genocidal language. He routinely asserts that Ukrainians are actually Russians (“one people”), and has repeatedly denied Ukraine’s right to exist while insisting the country is guilty of occupying “historical Russian lands.” In one particularly chilling recent outburst in September 2023, Putin denounced the “anti-human essence” of the modern Ukrainian state. Such dehumanization is widely recognized as an important indicator of genocidal intent.

Others throughout the Russian establishment have enthusiastically echoed Putin. According to research conducted by the Washington-based New Lines Institute and the Raoul Wallenberg Centre for Human Rights in Montreal, Russia’s state-orchestrated incitement to genocide includes “the denial of the existence of a Ukrainian identity” by senior Russian officials and state media.

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

The UN defines genocide as “the intent to destroy a national, ethnic, racial, or religious group, in whole or in part.” The five acts internationally defined as genocide include killings, causing serious harm, deliberately inflicting physically destructive conditions of life, imposing birth prevention measures, and forcibly transferring children to another group. Russia stands accused of committing all five acts against Ukrainians.

Evidence of Russian war crimes in Ukraine is extensive. An array of state and non-state international organizations have documented a vast amount of Russian crimes in Ukraine including the torture and execution of civilians and POWs, forced deportations, and the targeting of Ukrainian cultural, historical, and religious sites. Tens of thousands of Ukrainian civilians were killed during the Russian attack on Mariupol in spring 2022. Dozens of other Ukrainian towns and cities have since suffered similar fates.

The Kremlin began setting the stage for these crimes many years before the onset of the full-scale invasion in February 2022. According to the Just Security forum at the New York University School of Law, this process dates back to at least 2008 or 2009, and has been marked by “increasingly hostile language laying the groundwork for rejecting Ukraine’s existence as a state, a national group, and a culture.”

Even casual consumers of Russia’s mainstream media will be immediately familiar with this poisonous anti-Ukrainian agenda. Indeed, the demonization of Ukraine has long since become totally normalized throughout the Russian information space, with the Ukrainian authorities groundlessly portrayed as fascists and symbols of Ukrainian national identity routinely equated with Nazism. Russian television hosts and invited “experts” regularly talk of the need to destroy Ukraine.

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For more than a decade, Putin’s powerful propaganda machine has prepared the Russian public for the genocide they are now committing in Ukraine. This process has included the coordinated promotion of anti-Ukrainian messaging designed to rob the country of legitimacy and position it as an existential threat to Russia. Ukraine has consistently been portrayed as a failed state, an anti-Russian project devised by the West, and a puppet of anti-Russian forces. Meanwhile, the Ukrainian language and all other expressions of Ukrainian national identity have been derided as artificial and historically illegitimate.

This relentless flood of anti-Ukrainian propaganda appears to have conditioned the majority of Russians to accept the current invasion. Independent polls indicate overwhelming levels of public support for the war, despite widespread awareness of atrocities such as the destruction of entire Ukrainian cities and the deliberate bombing of Ukraine’s essential civilian infrastructure.

President Zelenskyy is not the only prominent figure to accuse Russia of committing genocide in Ukraine. Indeed, US President Joe Biden and his rival Donald Trump both did so during the early months of the invasion. More recently, US lawmakers visiting The Hague in September 2023 said Putin had “tried to erase a culture, a people, and a religion, and that is the definition of genocide.” They join a growing chorus of experts and academics who unambiguously state that Russia’s actions in Ukraine represent a genocide.

It will be some time before the United Nations and other relevant international bodies arrive at a definitive legal verdict on the genocide question. At this relatively early stage in the investigation process, the International Criminal Court has already issued an arrest warrant for Putin over the mass abduction of Ukrainian children, which itself likely qualifies as an act of genocide. As investigations progress, the role of Russia’s propaganda machine and the genocidal intent displayed by Kremlin officials including Putin himself will be closely scrutinized.

Dr. Taras Kuzio is a professor in the Department of Political Science at the National University of Kyiv Mohyla Academy and an associate research fellow at the Henry Jackson Society. His latest book “Fascism and Genocide. Russia’s War Against Ukrainians” was published by Columbia University Press this year.

Further reading

UkraineAlert Aug 3, 2023

Russian Orthodox leader Patriarch Kirill’s unholy war against Ukraine

By Borys Gudziak

Russia’s Unholy War: Russian Orthodox Church leader Patriarch Kirill has provided the ideological justification for Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine and Russian efforts to eliminate Ukrainian national identity.

Civil Society Conflict

UkraineAlert Sep 19, 2023

Putin “knows very well” NATO poses no security threat to Russia

By Peter Dickinson

Russia’s recent demilitarization of its NATO borders proves that Putin does not view alliance as a genuine security threat and makes a complete mockery of Kremlin propaganda blaming the invasion of Ukraine on NATO, writes Peter Dickinson.

Conflict Defense Policy

UkraineAlert Sep 14, 2023

It is still far too early to write off Ukraine’s counteroffensive

By Dennis Soltys

The slow pace of Ukraine’s much hyped counteroffensive is sparking fresh calls for a negotiated peace, but the Ukrainian military may yet achieve its goals as long as international support continues, writes Dennis Soltys.

Conflict Disinformation

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

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On September 17, IPSI nonresident senior fellow Thomas Cynkin was quoted in Yonhap News. Cynkin suggested that the United States may benefit from declassifying and disclosing more information related to trade activity between North Korea and Russia, as it did with intelligence on Russian military action prior to the invasion of Ukraine. He explained that this approach could help prevent North Korea from acquiring Russian military technology by creating international pressure on Russia to uphold international nonproliferation laws. 

Fellow

Thomas Cynkin

Nonresident Senior Fellow

Indo-Pacific Security Initiative Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Indo-Pacific Japan

The post Cynkin interviewed by Yonhap News on intelligence approaches to Russia-North Korea partnership appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Much ink has already been spilled on questions coming out of US Commerce Secretary Gina Raimondo’s trip last month to China – Will the visit build momentum towards a Biden-Xi summit at APEC this November? How meaningful are newly proposed bilateral dialogues on export controls and commercial relations? Was Beijing trolling Secretary Raimondo by releasing a new Huawei phone containing advanced chip technology during her visit?

Good questions, all. But perhaps the most critical question out of the visit is whether a growing number of U.S. and foreign companies are, as the Secretary put it, starting to view China as “uninvestable”. Beijing has been trying to convince the world to continue investing in China while, at the same time, raiding U.S. companies, imposing arbitrary fines, and placing limits on access to information critical to making informed bets on the China market.

As if there were not enough complications for businesses operating in China, Dakota Cary and Kristin Del Rosso document in a new Atlantic Council report, “Sleight of Hand”, how China’s 2021 Data Security Law requires foreign companies operating in China to divulge sensitive cyber vulnerabilities directly to the Ministry of State Security. As Andy Greenberg of Wired writes , the law forces foreign businesses to make a harsh choice: “Either leave China or give sensitive descriptions of vulnerabilities in the company’s products to a government that may well use that information for offensive hacking.”

The law has also raised the risk of cyber attacks. As the chart below demonstrates, the requirement that all sensitive cyber vulnerabilities be funneled to the MSS has given the spy agency the final say on whether to make them public, producing a dramatic reduction in the public dissemination of vulnerabilities which used to afford companies the opportunity to patch them up.

The combination of such directives for foreign companies to divulge proprietary information at the potential cost of their own security with mounting government secrecy around data critical to investors’ ability to make informed decisions about China risks is disrupting operations and, indeed, adding fuel to the burning question of whether it’s now worth the trouble to invest in China.

Our Editor in Chief Tiff Roberts covers this growing culture of secrecy and much more below. Over to You, Tiff!

-Dave Shullman, Senior Director, Global China Hub

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Dexter Tiff Roberts

Nonresident Senior Fellow

Global China Hub Indo-Pacific Security Initiative

China Chinese

Thank you, Dave! As the new editor-in-chief of the Global China newsletter, I aim to provide my readers with some of the most important China news and analysis every month. My take is informed by my earlier experience working as a journalist in China for almost a quarter century and the research and writing I do on China today. I hope you find our newsletter valuable.

The Year of Living Secretly
When I was a foreign correspondent in China, it was an open secret that one could not trust the economic numbers published by Beijing. But in the years following China’s entry into the World Trade Organization in 2001 it seemed as if real effort was being made to improve their reliability, as Beijing sought to draw more foreign investors. As I wrote in 2012, policymakers were “trying to address the government’s statistical shortcomings.” No longer…

Call it ‘The Year of Living Secretly‘: Beijing has chosen opacity over openness. It is doubling down on more state control over the economy under Xi Jinping and restricting access to all kinds of information. Everything from land sales, currency reserves, bond transactions, official biographies, academic information, COVID deaths, and most recently soaring youth unemployment, is being treated as akin to a state secret.

What is behind the trend? The economy is rapidly deteriorating and Beijing has no desire to publicize that fact. As GeoEconomics Center associate director Niels Graham points out in “ The Chinese economy’s moment of macro weakness—in charts”, property, manufacturing, employment, and trade are all rapidly declining while deflation worrisomely grows. “Taken together they point to serious, structural issues within China’s economy that go well beyond the cyclical problem caused by COVID,” Graham warns.

And there is the mystery surrounding the disappearance of former foreign minister Qin Gang that I wrote about in our last newsletter (it now appears that Li Shangfu, China’s Minister of National Defense, may experience a similar fate). Global China Hub nonresident senior fellow Michael Schuman recently explained in an article in The Atlantic why this obfuscation matters: Beijing’s policies affect the “welfare of billions of people, the health of the planet, and war and peace itself. Yet policymakers and diplomats around the world are too often left guessing.”

Taiwan and a two-front war
Speaking of war and peace, a delegation led by the Atlantic Council travelled last month to the place probably most likely to be at the center of any future US-China conflict – Taiwan. The group, which included former president of Lithuania Dalia Grybauskaitė and former US defense secretary Mark Esper, met with President Tsai Ing-wen, her National Security Council leadership, and visited Taiwan’s largest naval base. Tensions across the Strait are continuing to rise, with a record 103 PLA warplanes operating near the Island in just a 24-hour period between September 17 and 18. Europe Center visiting fellow Petr Tuma wrote about the rising challenge and similarities he saw while there, between Taipei and pre-2022 Kyiv.

In a report from the Indo-Pacific Security Initiative, “The United States and its allies must be ready to deter a two-front war and nuclear attacks in East Asia,” director Markus Garlauskas argues that the US could have to face China and North Korea simultaneously: a US and South Korean counteroffensive against aggression by Pyongyang would “likely prompt the PRC to intervene to protect its interests,” while “any major US-PRC conflict—for example, if the PRC attacks Taiwan—is likely to escalate horizontally and engulf Korea” and could prompt “preemptive aggression from North Korea—particularly because the conflict’s outcome would have immense implications for Pyongyang.”

Shift towards the Global South
While a host of senior US officials have trooped to Beijing (Hub nonresident senior fellow Gabriel “Gabo” Alvarado wrote about the late August visit by Commerce Secretary Gina Raimondo, the fourth cabinet official in recent months), China’s top leader has shown a shifting political calculus when choosing where he travels: emphasizing the Global South rather than the wealthier developed west.

So, while Xi skipped the G20 meeting, bringing the heads of the world’s largest economies including the US, Japan and the EU to New Delhi, India in early September–he went to every other G20 since becoming top leader—in late August he attended the BRICS Summit in Johannesburg, South Africa. Taking it a step further, Xi hosted Zambian President Hakainde Hichilema and Venezuela’s Nicolás Maduro in Beijing – two nations heavily in debt to China – shortly after snubbing the G20 (The Johannesburg meeting is discussed by Atlantic Council experts here).

The expanding BRICS is trying to “cement its position as a platform for and champion of the Global South. This aligns particularly closely with Beijing’s vision,” writes Global China Hub deputy director Colleen Cottle, who was also featured in the German Marshall Fund’s China Global Podcast. The role of Africa in the new geopolitical landscape was discussed by experts brought together by the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center, following the meeting in Johannesburg.

And China has made abundantly clear its intent to revise the current system of global governance with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ release on September 13, “ Proposal of the People’s Republic of China on the Reform and Development of Global Governance.” This intent is explained in a new China-MENA podcast episode, with the Hub’s Tuvia Gering and Michael Schuman along with Middle East Program’s Jonathan Fulton (also covered in their report from June), in which they describe how China paints the Global Development Initiative, Global Security Initiative, and Global Citizen Initiative as the solutions to a “world of uncertainty” created by the US-led West. Further, China made clear at the G77 + China Summit that China aims to present itself as the champion of this changing world order by claiming that it will “always be part of the developing world and a member of the Global South.”

Whether it’s growing secrecy or the turn to the Global South, China’s latest moves – and US pushback – are reverberating around the world.

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The Global China Hub researches and devises allied solutions to the global challenges posed by China’s rise, leveraging and amplifying the Atlantic Council’s work on China across its 15 other programs and centers.

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The post Global China Newsletter: Xi stiffs the G20, turns to the Global South appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On September 15, Markus Garlauskas spoke on an episode of Brussels Sprouts, a transatlantic security-focused podcast. In this episode, titled “The New Authoritarian Axis: Russian Relations with North Korea and Iran,” Garlauskas discussed the recent Putin-Kim summit and the concerning implications of this developing relationship for containing North Korea’s WMD programs. He also addressed the larger strategic ramifications of this new axis, particularly the danger of underestimating the degree of cooperation and synergies between the authoritarian challengers to the international order.

Staff

Markus Garlauskas

Director

Indo-Pacific Security Initiative Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Crisis Management Indo-Pacific

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