Syrians voted in 8,151 polling stations that opened across the country, with the exception of areas not controlled by the Assad regime. To cater to residents displaced from opposition-held areas, the government established special polling stations scattered throughout the country. For example, stations were set up for Raqqa residents in the Hama, Damascus, Hasakah, Homs, Latakia, and Tartous governorates. For Quneitra residents, more than 111 out of 175 stations were located outside the governorate.

In northeastern Syria, the Kurdish-dominated Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) prevented elections by establishing a security cordon around the Qamishli “government quarter,” in which the Assad regime provides administrative services to the residents of the area. SDF-affiliated social media and news outlets broadcasted warnings that the election sites might be subject to unspecified terrorist attacks. In Idlib and northern Aleppo, areas controlled by the Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and the Syrian National Army (SNA), there were no electoral activities.

Of all the areas under governmental control, the most disruptions were reported in the southern areas of Sweida. Before the polls, and continuing into Election Day, demonstrators protesting against the elections entered several polling centers, took away ballot boxes, and set election materials on fire. The anti-election protests were a continuation of the anti-regime protests that have been regularly occurring for the past year. On Election Day, demonstrators in Sweida’s al-Karama Square came under fire by security forces, and a civilian was injured. It’s worth noting that protests were not limited to Sweida—violence and demonstrations were reported across the governorate, as well as in the towns of Qarya and Mazraa and the villages of Melh, Slim, and Koraya. In Daraa governorate, protests and threats of violence forced the government to relocate twenty-five polling stations. For example, stations in the town of Mahja were moved to the city of Izraa, stations from al-Karak were moved to al-Musayfrah, and those in the city of Jasem were relocated to a safer part of the city.

Where the polls were conducted without disruption, the process unfolded identically to the 2020 election. Because the election authorities neither register voters nor compile the voters list in advance of elections, the first step at the polling station was to register a voter using the blank forms used to write in voters. This way, the voters list was compiled on Election Day rather than being available to the committees before the elections.

Voters would then be handed a ballot and needed to choose to either use ballots pre-filled with the Baath Party-sponsored candidates on the National Unity (NU) list or, if they dared, a blank ballot. Those who opted for a blank ballot had to write in the names of the candidates by hand, ranging from five names in al-Quentra to thirty-two names in rural Aleppo, which is a burdensome process. In some areas, the non-NU candidates would also distribute pre-printed ballots, such as the “Sham” list in Damascus, which features the incumbent Mohamed Hamsho (sanctioned by the European Union and the United States). The practice is fully permitted by law.

To ensure high turnout, public institutions, companies, committees, factories, banks, and unions were instructed by the government not to give employees a day off, which prevented them from ignoring the polls, and to compel them to vote en masse, likely under supervision. Many polling stations were set up in or near their workplaces—like factories and universities—to boost turnout. However, in contrast with the previous elections, there was no information on turnout either during the day or immediately after the close of the polls. According to our research, the Supreme Judicial Election Committee (SJEC), governors, and heads of polling committees used vague language to describe the turnout in the media, with statements like “turnout was good,” “nice,” “high,” “not bad,” and “it got better in the afternoon” being used throughout the day. During a live interview on state television with the polling station committee in rural Damascus, the reporter abruptly changed the subject and asked the polling station president not to share any information about the number of voters or the station’s results.

There is little to be said about the credibility of the polling process itself. As described in a previous article on electoral administration, the process did not meet fundamental standards for impartial management of elections nor the standards of transparency. There were no independent national or international observers, and there were no systematic, evidence-based reports of the polling process. For what it is worth, there is plenty of anecdotal evidence of mass proxy voting, underage voting, voting without secrecy, and voting in military barracks without a chance for supervision.

The same lack of transparency shrouds the process for resolving election disputes. The president of the Supreme Constitutional Court, Jihad Lahham, announced on July 28 that all forty-seven appeals were rejected for “not meeting the conditions stipulated in the laws” and “not supported by any document or evidence.” Nothing is known about the nature of the appeals or those filing them.

The Syrian opposition was campaigning against the legitimacy of the elections. These efforts were led by the Syrian Negotiation Committee, several Syrian nongovernmental organizations, and the media. The key slogan of the campaign was “No to Assad and his elections” alongside “Resolution 2254,” which also appeared as hashtags on X (formerly Twitter). The campaign messages were of a general anti-elections character, pointing out that they were against the framework set by the United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSC) 2254. The campaign was launched late and was effectively active only on Election Day. It does not appear to have gained any significant traction.

The Baath Party endorsed NU lists that included 185 candidates across the country. As expected, the electoral system ensured that all of them were elected, making the partisan composition of the assembly identical to the previous one: 67 percent for the Baathists (a total of 74 percent for all the NU candidates) and 26 percent for those elected to seats not contested by the NU. The number of seats not contested by the NU candidates, a maximum of sixty-five, is not random; it is by design. It avoids the perception of single-party rule and allows for a semblance of diversity, but protects the regime by securing a two-thirds majority needed to fend off legislative challenges, enact constitutional amendments, or accuse the president of treason. This golden ratio has been the formula in place since the 2016 legislative elections held in the aftermath of the 2012 constitutional reforms.

Are there any other conclusions besides the predictable 100 percent victory for all of the NU candidates? Detailed analysis is difficult because of the lack of transparency; there is simply not enough data published for a granular view of the results. If elections were ever to be held under the framework of the UNSC Resolution 2254 and within international standards, the authorities would be obliged to publish the complete election results, including turnout with gender breakdown, numbers of invalid ballots, registered voters, and votes for all the candidates. Currently, the results published by the SJEC present only the votes of the winning candidates, not all the candidates. This makes election analysis impossible, as by how much the election losers lost will never be known.

Because the voting data are missing, and because the competition was, in practice, resolved before Election Day through internal elections and the primaries, the analysis is reduced to levels of participation. The SJEC only announced an overall number of voters in elections: 7,325,844 out of 19,200,325 claimed by the government to be eligible, which results in a turnout of 38.16 percent, about a 5 percent increase since the 2020 elections. This overall number says nothing about regional differences.

Voting patterns are even harder to analyze because of elections used a block vote system with multiple candidates. The workaround is to consider the top candidate on the list as representative of the support received by the list. Employing this method reveals a pattern of some voting shifts between the governorates and between the 2020 and 2024 elections. Countrywide, the NU lists received 5 percent fewer votes than in 2024. Some drops in the votes were dramatic, such as in Damascus, where NU lost 49 percent of the votes, followed by Hasaka with 43 percent. On the other hand, votes for NU in rural Aleppo, Deir ez-Zor, and Hama dramatically increased (42 percent, 51 percent, and 71 percent, respectively.)

It will take some time to understand the cause of these changes. They could be simply the result of the redeployment of the military and the return of internally displaced persons, especially to Damascus. The only solid conclusion at this point is that the actual increase in the total number of those who voted by 1.1 million has not resulted in increased support for the NU lists, as they lost two hundred thousand votes compared to the 2020 elections. And, when compared with the 2016 elections, the increase in 2.2 million voters led to a decrease in support for the NU by 1.2 million votes.

Shifts in support for the NU lists do not seem to be related to whether the candidates on the lists were incumbents. As in the previous elections, the rates of turnover were high. Out of the 250 elected to the new parliament, ninety-three are incumbents, which is only 37.2 percent of the total—and almost exactly the same as in the 2020 elections, when 37.6 percent of incumbents were re-elected.

However, turnover is not uniform across the country. The variations between the regions are significant. In Idlib, Tartous, Deir ez-Zor, Raqqa, and Damascus, more than 80 percent of representatives were replaced. On the other side of the spectrum is Sweida with only 33 percent, followed by Daraa at 40 percent, and Hassaka at 42 percent.

Besides analysis of the turnout and the turnover in the parliament, what are the election results saying about the structure and political dynamics of the newly elected assembly? On an individual level, it might be of interest that six of the eight members serving in the governmental delegation to the UN-sponsored Constitutional Committee were not re-elected, including Ahmed Kuzbari, the co-chair. In Damascus, the “Sham” list led by Hamsho, a sanctioned businessman closely affiliated with Maher al-Assad, the president’s brother, won twelve seats that were not contested by the National Unity list. One of the new independent members of parliament from Aleppo, Mohammed al-Ruslan, is a former leader of a militia faction reportedly affiliated with the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS). Madoul al-Aziz, a former leader of a militia affiliated to al-Nusra, was re-elected as an independent candidate for Deir ez-Zor.

But, as explained in the previous article on candidates, if there was any political competition, it played out in advance to general elections, in the intra-Baath Party elections and primaries. The conclusion from observing those processes is that the new parliament might be rejuvenated with significant turnover, but will likely remain in the service of the top Baath leadership.

Vladimir Pran advises electoral authorities, governments, and political leaders on transitional, electoral, and political processes.

Maroun Sfeir advises international and local civil society organizations, political groups, and electoral authorities on electoral and political processes.

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Below, experts from the Atlantic Council and its Venezuela Solutions Group answer five pressing questions about the country’s ongoing political crisis.

1. What is the situation in Venezuela since the election?

Venezuela is experiencing a deepening of its crisis. The lack of transparency in the electoral process and the failure of the CNE to present the electoral bulletins have led the country into a chaotic situation. Repression is increasing by the day, reaching levels that exceed anything previously seen in Venezuela. Respect for the right to demonstrate and for the popular will of the people are fundamental pillars of any government that calls itself democratic. The world cannot remain silent in the face of the systematic and violent repression of opponents and dissidents in Venezuela.

—María Ángela Holguín is a former foreign minister of Colombia and a senior advisor to the Atlantic Council’s Venezuela Solutions Group. 

The situation in Venezuela is deeply alarming, especially given the fact that the government has not presented detailed results for each polling station to back up its figures. Transparency in the process of counting votes is essential. A thorough verification of the election results must be carried out to ensure that they faithfully reflect the will of the Venezuelan people. This verification must include a complete count of all tally sheets, which the CNE must provide without further delay.

—Miguel Vargas is a former foreign minister of the Dominican Republic and a senior advisor to the Venezuela Solutions Group.

2. What exactly is the issue with the election results?

The voting, counting, and tallying system used in Venezuela includes a mechanism for verifying its operation and auditing its results through what is known as the “paper trail.” This paper trail consists of physical records and voting receipts that verify whether the results announced by the CNE reflect the valid will of the voters. The paper trail includes several components, such as the receipt given to each voter after casting their ballot. This receipt allows voters to confirm that it contains the candidate’s name and the organization they supported. This is the first step in the verification process. Voters then place this receipt into a secure box.

At the end of the voting process, the machine immediately prints out the voting record. For the presidential election on July 28, 30,026 voting machines were deployed for the CNE, each corresponding to a separate voting table. Consequently, 30,026 original voting records were printed and kept in the custody of the Plan República military personnel. Once the machine transmits the results, copies of the voting records are printed for all witnesses. These witnesses must verify that these copies are accurate reproductions of the original records printed by the system.

Additionally, each voting record features a QR code summarizing the data printed on the record. Following the transmission, up to 54 percent of the machines are audited by manually opening the boxes containing the printed voting receipts to ensure that the data on the records is accurate.

Starting on Monday, July 29, the opposition began publishing digitized images of the voting records collected by its witnesses. It is important to note that in many cases, Plan República agents prevented opposition witnesses from accessing this material. As of the time of this report, the opposition has managed to collect, validate, and digitize 83 percent of the election records.

However, the CNE has reported hacking of the 30,026 private transmission lines for the machines (one encrypted line per machine) and has refused to disclose the results broken down by center and table. This has made it impossible to compare the opposition’s copies with the results released by the CNE. Additionally, the telecommunications audit and phase II verification, scheduled for July 29 and August 2, respectively, were suspended. These reviews are crucial for assessing the consistency of the announced results.

Trust in an automated voting system is not a matter of faith. Trust is built through auditability, and to date, the Venezuelan government has obstructed the auditability of the results. After more than two weeks, there are also reasonable concerns about the custody of physical electoral materials and databases. The initial international request to present the voting records is proving to be inadequate.

—Eugenio Martínez is the director of Votoscopio, a Venezuela elections specialist, and a member of the Venezuela Solutions Group. 

3. What role can other countries in the region play? 

Latin American countries have a crucial responsibility at this moment. It is necessary to support efforts to promote credible negotiations that will lead to a peaceful and democratic solution in Venezuela. However, it is imperative that any negotiations incorporate the desire of both the Venezuelan people and all of Latin America to respect the rule of law and democratic order in Venezuela. Only through a firm commitment to these principles can we move toward a solution that reflects the will of the Venezuelan people.

—Miguel Vargas

Faced with this reality, it is imperative that Latin American countries continue to demand electoral transparency and condemn repression and the violation of human rights. It is essential to increase diplomatic coordination and demand transparency, independent auditing, and respect for the popular vote. Only with a firm and coordinated position in the region will we be able to engender a way out of the deep crisis in Venezuela, which must occur through a credible and realistic negotiation process with the accompaniment of guarantor countries. 

—María Ángela Holguín

4. Is there any hope the Maduro regime will negotiate a transfer of power?

We must start from the premise that Maduro’s government made a political decision in ignoring the results of the presidential election. This implies a radical break with popular sovereignty, which Chavismo proclaimed as the foundation of its legitimacy. The cost of this rupture is as high as the associated costs of international isolation and of reversing steps taken toward economic stabilization, because it enshrines the divorce between the ruling coalition and its popular bases. However, the dominant coalition perceives that it can stay in power if it manages to deflate the strong feeling of change and, above all, unity, through the weakening of the leadership of María Corina Machado and González, in a kind of repetition of the resistance-attrition strategy it used to address the 2019 crisis with the interim government of Juan Guaidó.  

The ruling coalition tries to do so through repression and self-isolation. It is attempting to prevent an internationally supported negotiation from forcing it to recognize the opposition’s victory. And it is doing so with a degree of open, articulate, and express support from the military that had not been necessary to exhibit in the past. The efforts of Colombian President Gustavo Petro and Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva are geared toward opening a crack to move Maduro from his position, which at this time is completely insensitive to the usual list of incentives. Thus, it is not foreseeable that in the short term an effective negotiating body can be built to ensure the verification of results. Perhaps it is necessary to start, as in serious armed conflicts, with more basic areas of agreement, such as advancing mutual guarantees and respect for human rights.

—Colette Capriles is an associate professor and researcher in philosophy, politics, and social sciences at Simón Bolívar University and a member of the Venezuela Solutions Group.

5. How is the US working to advance a democratic transition?

On August 11, the Wall Street Journal reported that Washington is engaged in secret talks with Maduro, and may be offering him and those around him an amnesty from US narcoterrorism charges in exchange for a democratic transition. This news may be a sign that the Biden administration is trying to preserve space for negotiations behind the scenes. However, Maduro is a serial abuser of dialogue and, should these efforts fail, it is likely that the White House’s patience will run out. The good news is that the United States still holds considerable leverage, which can be used to shape elite interests and maximize opportunities for a democratic solution. 

For the Biden administration, the challenge lies in finding a balance between applying targeted, effective pressure on elites and preventing Venezuela from drifting further into Russia’s and China’s spheres of influence. Some in Washington fear that a return to “maximum pressure” could drive Maduro closer to the United States’ geopolitical rivals. Individual sanctions may be a more appealing strategy, but it will be crucial to focus this pressure on fostering a democratic opening while avoiding actions that strengthen regime unity. More than 160 regime members have already been sanctioned—many of whom have been celebrated in public ceremonies and awarded replica swords of Venezuela’s liberator, Simón Bolívar. Bringing pressure to bear while avoiding anything that helps unify Maduro’s coalition at his weakest moment in years will be absolutely crucial.

—Geoff Ramsey is a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center.

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At least two hundred people have been killed and thousands more injured in protests that included law enforcement firing on protesters, as Bangladeshi Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina and her government face the most serious popular challenge of the past decade. Many Bangladeshis have been arrested, and cases against thousands of people have been filed.

Two weeks of heightened violence has left visible damage to property in cities across the country. Burned buildings stand as testimonies to anger and mayhem, but what remains unknown is the exact number of deaths, injuries, and missing. The extent of the lethal force used by members of law enforcement agencies is unprecedented in the history of the country, which has all too often experienced bouts of political violence since its inception in 1971.

Despite the claim of a gradual return to normalcy, an overwhelming number of police and soldiers are patrolling the streets of major cities, and a shoot-on-sight order is still in place for curfew violators. The government is on edge, economic activity has stalled, and many citizens are in a state of shock and uncertain about what will come next. For Bangladesh watchers, the question is whether Hasina has weathered the political storm or if the current situation is a larger tempest in the making.

How did it begin?

This episode of protest began in early July as peaceful student demonstrations demanding reform of the quota system in public service. This quota system, which reserved 56 percent of government jobs to various categories, was widely considered by students to be discriminatory and was allegedly used by the government as a means of patronage dispensation. The system was scrapped in 2018 after students launched a movement against it, but it was reinstated by Bangladesh’s High Court in June 2024. The government appealed, and the Supreme Court suspended the verdict, scheduling a hearing for August 6. However, students demanded that the system be reformed by enacting a law. The government insisted that there was nothing it could do while the issue is being litigated. The students felt that this was a stealthy way of reinstating the system.

The situation took an ominous turn after activists aligned with the ruling party swooped in on the demonstrators as they protested Hasina’s comments at a press conference on July 14. In that press conference, Hasina likened the demonstrators with collaborators of the Pakistani army during the war of independence in 1971. As the quota system reserves a percentage of government jobs for the descendants of war of independence veterans, Hasina portrayed opposition to the policy as demeaning to veterans. In the following days, the students organized street protests and called for a general strike, which was confronted with force by police and ruling party activists, leading to the deaths of some students. On July 16, the government closed all educational institutions for an indefinite period.

The situation further deteriorated on July 18, as thousands of protesters joined the students on the street; at least twenty-five people died throughout the country and various public buildings were set ablaze in the capital and elsewhere. The government stopped services. Then the government backtracked and offered to negotiate, but by then the protests had transcended the quota issue.

On July 19, demonstrations engulfed the entire country. The number of deaths, the extent of the spread of protests, and the ferocity of police response made it one of the worst days in the history of the country. Curfew was imposed, the military was called in, a shoot-on-sight order was issued, and internet and broadband services were completely shut down. Yet the violence continued for days, and the death toll continued to mount. 

In the meantime, the government met a delegation of the agitating students, and the Supreme Court voided the High Court verdict, issuing guidance to drastically reduce the quota to only 7 percent. However, the government resorted to heavy-handed measures, including allegedly abducting six student leaders of the movement and detaining them without charges. While detained, the student leaders issued a video message on July 28 calling off the movement, but other leaders continued the organize protests.

A perfect storm?

The peaceful student protest transformed into an antigovernment upsurge because of simmering discontent among younger Bangladeshis, as well as in a large segment of the wider society. Economic and political disenfranchisement drove the youth. The economic growth they have heard about for a long time seems to have left them behind. They see very little prospect of a decent job while they witness unbridled corruption and the extravagant lifestyle of a new wealthy class. According to official accounts, unemployment among youth is 15.74 percent and at least 41 percent of youth between the ages of fifteen and twenty-four are not in school, employed, or engaged in job training.

Bangladeshi youth were supposed to be the kingmakers in a free and fair electoral process, the role their predecessors played in the election of 2008. But that opportunity was taken away through fraudulent elections. The government’s disregard for their demands regarding quota reform was symptomatic of a system that cares little for them. Violence perpetrated by the student wing of the ruling party was the instigation that unleashed the anger within the student community.

As for the larger population, resentments originating from rampant corruption by the cronies of the ruling party, impunity enjoyed by party henchmen, utter disregard to the sufferings of the common people, and concentration of power at the hands of one person—Hasina—all came together.

While the regime has a support base, it is bereft of moral legitimacy due to rigged elections. Increasingly, the government also lacked performance legitimacy as the development narrative has been unraveling since summer 2022. Skyrocketing inflation and dwindling foreign reserves have put the government in a precarious situation. In the past decade, Hasina has increasingly relied on force, leading many international organizations, including the Varieties of Democracy Institute, to describe Bangladesh as an autocracy.

What is next for Hasina?

This week, the city streets in Dhaka were filled with cars and buses, and shops and offices are being opened once again. A semblance of normalcy may return in the short run. But the political ground has shifted, and the possibility of a return to the status quo is unlikely. As such, the country is standing at a crossroads.

The number of deaths and the extent of police actions have laid bare the fact that the ruling party and Hasina are entirely dependent on brute force. The upheaval appears to have shaken the regime’s sense of invincibility.

By creating a narrative that her government is facing “terrorists,” Hasina is trying to gain sympathy and tacit support from the international community, or at least their silence. The international community, however, should see through this charade and raise its voice against the gross violations of human rights by a regime that wants to stay in power without a popular mandate.

So, what’s next? Dubbed “Asia’s Iron Lady,” Hasina may double down on more persecution and arrests in an attempt to stem further unrest. This may lead to a closed autocracy in Bangladesh. Alternatively, as discontent continues to grow and demands for her resignation become louder, the country may erupt. 

Ali Riaz is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council South Asia Center and a distinguished professor at Illinois State University.

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Established political parties are now taking steps to win back support. Policymakers around the world should take note of these efforts, such as the use of citizens’ assemblies in Germany, as one way to counter this polarizing environment and rebuild trust in democratic systems.

Growing disillusionment and persistent divides

Germany is a compelling case study for the rise of populist ideology. Nearly thirty-five years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the East-West divide in the country persists. To this day, people in eastern Germany often face fewer economic opportunities, underrepresentation in elite professions, power imbalances, and an aging population. As recently as 2019, 60 percent of Germans in the east perceived themselves as second-class citizens. While on the rise throughout Germany, it is in large part for these reasons that the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) party resonates in the eastern part of the country, in states such as Brandenburg, Saxony, and Thuringia. Elections in all three in September see the AfD polling in first place.

The AfD was formed in 2013 in reaction to eurozone bailouts for other countries, but the 2015 refugee crisis transformed its platform into the extreme one it has today. When nearly one million migrants entered Germany, a majority of citizens called for an immigration cap. The AfD, weaponizing both economic and social grievances, built itself on and instigated this cultural discontent. The party trademarked “Islam does not belong to Germany” in its 2016 manifesto, and has taken aim at costly climate action to spur discontent with the center and fuel its own base. This approach propelled the AfD to ninety-two opposition seats in the Bundestag in 2017, and in the years since it has established itself as a formidable populist alternative to Germany’s traditional parties closer to the political center.

The AfD’s 2024 manifesto paints a worrying picture of its vision for Germany. The AfD proposes to reduce the net number of annual immigrants to zero and oppose all major climate actions, arguing such government encroachments threaten to unravel the cultural fabric and stability of German society. These extreme stances threaten to endanger the unity of Germany and could hamper international cooperation. The party is largely Euroskeptic, anti-American, and pro-Russian, which drives its urge to scale back on Ukraine aid. Notably, the far-right Identity and Democracy group in the European Parliament kicked out the AfD in May of this year, following scandals surrounding its extreme statements and potential connections to China and Russia.

Nevertheless, the party remains relatively popular in Germany. It scored second among German parties in the European Parliament elections in June and could well secure more than a quarter of seats in state elections this fall. The AfD’s success has inspired other upstart parties on the left. The newly founded left-wing populist Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance (BSW), for example, is expected to secure around 20 percent of seats across the three states, appealing to voters that are dissatisfied with the state of Germany’s economy and support for Ukraine.

The populist phenomenon is not exclusive to Germany. It is symptomatic of a general trend in the West. From gains in the European Parliament to momentum heading into the US presidential election, populism does not bode well for the liberal international order, especially at a time when intensifying global challenges demand collective solutions.

The long road to rebuilding trust

One strategy to counter illiberal tendencies and reengage citizens is the establishment of citizens’ assemblies: representative groups of randomly selected constituents that develop policy recommendations on a given issue based on expert briefings and discussions. The assemblies can be implemented at all political levels.

Citizens’ assemblies have been tried before. In various forms, they have been tested by several countries, including Canada, the United Kingdom, and France. They all share the goals of bringing participatory democracy to the public and reconnecting with voters who have lost trust in democracy.

These citizens’ assemblies have led to big changes before. In Ireland, the successful 2018 referendum to remove the Eighth Amendment banning most abortions stemmed from a recommendation from a ninety-nine-person-strong citizens’ assembly and helped end years of deadlock over the issue. A similar Convention on the Constitution in the country helped lead the way to the 2015 referendum on marriage equality.

In Germany, ten nationwide citizens’ assemblies have been convened since 2019, covering topics such as “Germany’s role in the world,” “climate action,” and “countering disinformation.” While the practical policy proposals are not binding, they do provide policymakers with valuable insights on current positions, possible compromises, and existing sticking points. Within just five years, the German citizens’ assemblies have grown from being independently organized by a nonprofit to being implemented by the Bundestag—an indication of the growing hope and trust politicians are placing on these fora.

The German approach isn’t perfect. Commentators have identified several challenges facing Germany’s citizens’ assemblies, including the representative selection of participants, the neutrality of moderators and experts, the optimal format and institutionalization of the assemblies, and the effect on participants and nonparticipating citizens.

And in truth, so far, it is too soon to see the impact of these assemblies in Germany. Mostly experimental in design, few concrete recommendations were implemented by policymakers. Some people believe the concept’s success hinges on the assembly on nutrition, food labeling, and food waste, the first citizens’ assembly instituted directly by the German Bundestag, which met in January 2024. The outcomes of this assembly included recommendations on school lunches and new regulations on energy drinks.

The participatory idea behind citizens’ assemblies cannot replace the parliamentary process. To avoid conflicts of legitimacy between participatory and representative democracy, the Konrad Adenauer Foundation recommends that parliaments initiate and mandate the process. It is crucial that the fora are not influenced externally and provide some flexibility regarding approach and outcome. They cannot be expected to arrive at predetermined conclusions and, depending on topic, composition, and mandate, every citizens’ assembly will be unique. To sustainably strengthen democracy and rebuild trust in political processes, it is important to complement the assembly with a broader public campaign. Linking the citizens’ assemblies with parliamentary institutions through the involvement of parliamentarians in the expert briefings could further improve the current system. Alternatively, an assembly could be followed by a referendum, giving citizens beyond those randomly chosen participatory power.

No easy fixes

Citizens’ assemblies alone are not sufficient to head off the rise of populists in Germany anytime soon: The AfD and BSW parties, for example, will very likely make gains in the eastern German elections this fall. Instead, the assemblies should be seen as part of a long-term strategy to address the root causes of voter dissatisfaction. 

It is imperative to see citizens’ assemblies for what they are. Policymakers should not expect a panacea for polarization. Instead, the fora are a piece of a bigger puzzle. Implementing citizens’ assemblies in tandem with regional structural policies can start the process of rebuilding trust in government. Until more citizens feel like they have a real voice in politics, the seeds of populism will likely continue to find fertile ground—in Germany, in the United States, and beyond.

Moritz Ludwig is a young global professional at the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center.

Joely Virzi is a young global professional at the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center.

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On July 30, 2024, Vice President and Senior Director of the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center Jason Marczak was interviewed on BBC Newshour about the results of Venezuela’s presidential election.

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Jason Marczak

Vice President and Senior Director

Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center

Americas Caribbean

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On July 30, 2024, Senior Fellow Geoff Ramsey of the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center was quoted in The New York Times about the Venezuelan election.

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Geoff Ramsey

Senior Fellow

Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center

Civil Society Democratic Transitions

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On July 30, 2024, Senior Fellow Geoff Ramsey of the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center was interviewed on BBC’s World Business Report about the Atlantic Council’s Memo to the President outlining scenarios and paths forward for Venezuela.

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Geoff Ramsey

Senior Fellow

Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center

Civil Society Democratic Transitions

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On July 28, 2024, Senior Fellow Geoff Ramsey of the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center was quoted on NPR’s All Things Considered about Venezuela’s contested election.

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Geoff Ramsey

Senior Fellow

Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center

Civil Society Democratic Transitions

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On July 29, 2024, Vice President and Senior Director Jason Marczak of the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center was quoted by The Hill about Venezuela’s contested election.

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Jason Marczak

Vice President and Senior Director

Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center

Americas Caribbean

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On July 29, 2024, Senior Fellow Geoff Ramsey of the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center was interviewed on DW’s The Day (broadcast on PBS in the United States) about the evolving situation following Venezuela’s presidential election.

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Geoff Ramsey

Senior Fellow

Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center

Civil Society Democratic Transitions

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On July 29, 2024, Vice President and Senior Director Jason Marczak of the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center was quoted by AP about Venezuela’s contested election.

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He’s not giving up without a fight. Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro’s election commission declared him the winner in Sunday’s vote, despite ample evidence of fraud and intimidation. Opposition candidate Edmundo González declared victory as the United States and other countries expressed concerns about the results. What will be the opposition’s next move? How will Maduro respond? And what role will regional and global powers play? We polled our experts for the answers.

• Jason Marczak (@jmarczak): Vice president and senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center
• Iria Puyosa (@NSC): Senior research fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Digital Forensic Research Lab
• Geoff Ramsey (@GRamsey_LatAm): Senior fellow at the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center

How to steal an election

• The stage was set for this moment in the months leading up to the vote, when the regime banned opposition leader María Corina Machado, with González ending up on the ballot. Then, as Jason points out, only small delegations from the United Nations and the Carter Center were allowed to monitor the vote, meaning “the González campaign could only count on its own observers to verify results.” 
• The González camp said he won about 70 percent of the votes that his team was able to verify—while Venezuela’s National Electoral Council claimed that González won 44 percent of the vote, with Maduro earning 51 percent. Jason notes that “it would be a mathematical miracle for Maduro to prevail” based on how the opposition has described the votes that it has seen.
• The public isn’t fooled, Iria tells us, noting the “outpouring of messages and videos on social media” from witnesses on the ground indicating their certainty that González won. “This is strengthening the opposition’s unity and determination to continue its fight for the restoration of democracy,” she adds.
• As of this afternoon, those voters are mobilizing in the streets, creating a new test for the regime. “Maduro has to convince the ruling elite that he can keep things under control, but both he and the military know that he can’t govern a country in flames,” Geoff says. “He’s effectively inviting the biggest loyalty test he’s faced in years.”

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Pressure from abroad

• In addition to the “serious concerns” expressed by US Secretary of State Antony Blinken, several countries throughout the region called for more transparency around the vote count—including neighboring Colombia, where, as Jason notes, “President Gustavo Petro has maintained a close relationship with Maduro.”
• Without full results and an independent audit, “the international community has no choice but to respond with swift condemnation and diplomatic pressure,” Geoff says, with the United States and its allies in Latin America and Europe playing a crucial role.
• That international pressure will be important to uphold the will of Venezuelans, but there are self-interested reasons for regional and international powers to push for change. Jason says another six years of Maduro will lead to “new outward migration flows and new transnational criminal activity that will extend far beyond Venezuela’s borders.”

Crackdown at home?

• The major point of contention will be sanctions, which the United States reimposed in April after the Maduro government didn’t uphold its end of last year’s deal to hold free and fair elections. “I doubt Venezuelan elites are eager for six more years of repression, sanctions, and economic catastrophe,” Geoff says.
• The opposition, therefore, should “exploit divisions within the ruling coalition,” Iria says. At the same time, opposition leaders should “find ways to address public discontent without exposing the population to the violent repression experienced in 2017.”
• And if Maduro were to return to the bargaining table, it would look very different from the negotiations between the government and the opposition, Iria tells us. Now, she says, negotiations would no longer be about electoral conditions “but rather on Chavismo’s exit from power after its defeat in the voting booths. The next six months will be a crucial period of intense conflict in Venezuela.”

The post Can Maduro hold onto power? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Click to jump to an expert analysis:

Jason Marczak: The international community must apply pressure for a full, transparent vote count

Geoff Ramsey: Maduro is inviting the biggest loyalty test he’s faced in years

Iria Puyosa: A new cycle of heightened political turmoil looms over Venezuela

Diego Area: The world must stand with Venezuelans in their fight for free elections

The international community must apply pressure for a full, transparent vote count

The day after Venezuelans voted in massive numbers, it’s crystal clear that Maduro, a deeply unpopular authoritarian leader, was always going to claim electoral victory whether by hook or by crook. With most international observers banned from coming to the country to monitor the vote (except small United Nations and Carter Center delegations), the González campaign could only count on its own observers to verify results. The voting tabulations that opposition observers could verify (about 40 percent of the tabulations) showed González receiving 70 percent of the vote—a far cry from the 44 percent of votes that the country’s National Electoral Council claimed that González won.

It is important that the votes of the Venezuelan people are not an exercise in futility. Votes must be credibly counted. Here, it is imperative that the international community of democracies continue to resoundingly denounce fraud and take appropriate action. US Secretary of State Antony Blinken noted “serious concerns that the result announced does not reflect the will or the votes of the Venezuelan people.” Similar concerns have been raised in nearby Argentina, Chile, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, Ecuador, and the Dominican Republic. European partners have also raised concerns. Even in Colombia, where President Gustavo Petro has maintained a close relationship with Maduro, Foreign Minister Luis Gilberto Murillo made a “call for the total vote count, its verification, and independent audit to be carried out as soon as possible.”

The international community must continue to exact pressure so that the will of the Venezuelan people can ultimately prevail. Not doing so would mean being complicit in the disenfranchisement of the Venezuelan people. But another six years of Maduro will also have reverberations, including new outward migration flows and new transnational criminal activity that will extend far beyond Venezuela’s borders.

—Jason Marczak is the vice president and senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center.

Maduro is inviting the biggest loyalty test he’s faced in years

More than twelve hours after polls closed, the fact that authorities still haven’t released the full vote count tells you everything you need to know about yesterday’s election. It seems that Maduro has decided to condemn Venezuela to six more years of conflict and isolation. Unless the government backs up its claim of victory with the full results and opens the count up to audits from observers, the international community has no choice but to respond with swift condemnation and diplomatic pressure.

This isn’t over yet. Maduro has to convince the ruling elite that he can keep things under control, but both he and the military know that he can’t govern a country in flames. He’s effectively inviting the biggest loyalty test he’s faced in years. I doubt Venezuelan elites are eager for six more years of repression, sanctions, and economic catastrophe. The opposition, under María Corina Machado’s leadership, has maintained unity and message discipline, and has the evidence in hand to document fraud and mobilize the public against Maduro’s blatant power grab. The role of the United States and its allies in Latin America and Europe will be crucial. It’s time for greater multilateral coordination in order to push the government to respect the will of the people and restore Venezuelans’ fundamental right to elect their leaders.

—Geoff Ramsey is a senior fellow at the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center.

A new cycle of heightened political turmoil looms over Venezuela

The presidential elections in Venezuela turned out as forecasted: a high voter turnout, what appeared to be a decisive electoral win for the democratic opposition, and a blatant fraud that disregarded the will of the voters. 

Due to the relatively small voting centers and the presence of witnesses from local communities, the population is convinced—as we’ve seen in an outpouring of messages and videos on social media—that González won in all electoral districts. This is strengthening the opposition’s unity and determination to continue its fight for the restoration of democracy. 

Maduro’s loss of political legitimacy has left the ruling coalition vulnerable to increased instability. It will likely resort to further repression against the political opposition and organized civil society. The increase in information censorship in the week leading up to the elections is a clear sign of the severe restriction of civic space. 

The democratic opposition, led by Machado, must aim to exploit divisions within the ruling coalition to weaken its power base. The Unitary Platform must also find ways to address public discontent without exposing the population to the violent repression experienced in 2017. 

On the international front, Maduro is facing isolation from Latin American democracies, the United States, and Europe. Former allies, such as Brazil under President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva and Colombia under Petro, were among the first to demand transparency in the election results. It now falls upon the United States to reevaluate the Qatar agreements. The negotiations would no longer be centered on electoral coexistence but rather on Chavismo’s exit from power after its defeat in the voting booths. The next six months will be a crucial period of intense conflict in Venezuela. 

—Iria Puyosa is a senior research fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Digital Forensic Research Lab.

The world must stand with Venezuelans in their fight for free elections

No one thought it would be easy to remove an autocrat from power, but yesterday marked a new height in the Venezuelan government’s abuses to impede the will of the people. The people of Venezuela and their leadership have endured an epic journey to overcome obstacles and unite around the ideal of change. The disqualification of candidates like Machado and Corina Yoris, who represented genuine alternatives, and the subsequent voter suppression efforts and significant irregularities in the process, illustrate the regime’s determination to retain power at any cost.

Maduro’s actions to undermine the democratic process and steal this election pose grave consequences for the future of the country and have a direct impact on Latin America, the Caribbean, and the United States. By stifling free choice, the regime is not only eroding democratic institutions but also exacerbating the country’s humanitarian crisis. As a result, Venezuelans will continue to flee in search of opportunities and freedoms denied at home, contributing to an already critical migration crisis.

The world must stand with Venezuelans in their fight for a future where elections are not merely symbolic but are actual pathways to change. The integrity of the democratic process is crucial not only for Venezuela’s stability but also for the prosperity of the entire region.

—Diego Area is a deputy director at the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center.

The post Experts react: Maduro is clinging to power after a disputed election. What’s next for Venezuela? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On July 28, 2024, Senior Fellow Geoff Ramsey of the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center was quoted by the Washington Post about Venezuela’s contested election.

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Civil Society Democratic Transitions

The post Ramsey quoted in the Washington Post on Venezuelan election appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On July 28, 2024, Senior Fellow Geoff Ramsey of the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center was interviewed by BBC News about the Venezuelan presidential election taking place that day.

Venezuela is STILL waiting for results in its presidential election.

An exit poll predicts an opposition victory but both sides sound confident.

"If the ruling socialist party actually has the results then the electoral authorities should be able to prove it."@GRamsey_LatAm pic.twitter.com/wtG4DOO9U4

— Carl Nasman (@CarlNasman) July 29, 2024

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On July 28, 2024, Senior Fellow Geoff Ramsey of the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center was quoted by Bloomberg about Venezuela’s contested election.

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Civil Society Democratic Transitions

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On July 28, 2024, Senior Fellow Geoff Ramsey of the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center was quoted on NPR’s Weekend Edition Sunday about Venezuela’s election.

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On July 26, 2024, Senior Fellow Geoff Ramsey of the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center was quoted by the Los Angeles Times about Venezuela’s election.

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Civil Society Democratic Transitions

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Mere moments after the announcement, Macron declared that he would not name a prime minister until after the conclusion of the Olympic Games in August. Until then, a caretaker government under Prime Minister Gabriel Attal will remain in place. Still, the potential of an NFP prime minister spooked the markets, as the party’s economic policies would trigger even more deficit spending. The spread of France’s ten-year bond yield against Germany’s increased by five basis points, reflecting a loss in confidence in the French government’s finances. 

But even after the Olympics, Castets is unlikely to be tapped to form a government. Instead, the parties of the center, center right, and center left will have to endure a tedious drill from which France’s constitution has spared them for decades: negotiations. 

The moderate “Republican Right” (DR) appears ready to play ball and recently put forward a set of policy proposals complete with two red lines that will inform the negotiations. But a deal including the Republicans would not be enough: The centrists would need the more moderate forces from the NFP (read: excluding the far left) to support—or at least not oppose—a government for the time being.

The negotiations behind an arrangement that would bring Communists, Gaullist Republicans, Greens, and centrists under the same banner is likely to be every bit as complicated as one would imagine. But in the likely case that the NFP fails to clear the bar for government formation, this would become the only option. The question then becomes: What could this political hodgepodge compromise on? 

Synchronized steering

Despite having lost the legislative election, the Macron-supporting center block will not concede much on any of its policy laurels. Reversing the controversial and hard-won increase of the retirement age from sixty-two to sixty-four, for example, will be off the table. 

The center right has also set explicit red lines: that there be no tax increases and that fiscal reform not hurt pensioners. 

Taking into account these constraints and the need to manage France’s strained fiscal situation, there is not much negotiating flexibility left. Nevertheless, the centrist coalition must consider some concessions and secure certain inducements if they hope to bring the Republicans, Socialists, and Greens onside. 

1. Green reindustrialization

The adoption of the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) in the United States prompted pushback from many European states. French Finance Minister Bruno Le Maire and his German counterpart Robert Habeck claimed the legislation was not compatible with World Trade Organization principles and called for the “defense” and green reindustrialization of the European Union (EU). 

In July 2023 the French National Assembly unanimously agreed on the creation of a “national strategy” for green industry, which lays out a plan for the 2023-2030 period. One week later, a Green Industry Law was approved at first reading and later adopted in October 2023. Like the IRA, France’s Green Industry Law seeks to meet environmental objectives (reducing forty-one million tons of CO2 by 2030, or 1 percent of France’s total footprint) and economic ones (positioning France as a leader in green and strategic technologies, while reindustrializing the country). As part of the law, the Green Industry Investment Tax Credit (C31V) was established to encourage companies to carry out industrial projects involving batteries, wind power, solar panels, and heat pumps. The C31V is expected to generate €23 billion in investment and directly create forty thousand jobs by 2030. 

While in opposition, the Socialists and Greens voted against the law and other left parties abstained. All cited the lack of specificity and actual green commitments in the industrialization-centered bill. However, if the centrist bloc offered to revisit the bill or introduce new, more targeted standards and legislation, it could serve as a powerful inducement to win the Greens and Socialists’ support. Given that this French counter to the IRA involves private-sector mobilization and promises reindustrialization, it has the added benefit of being (just about) fiscally feasible and acceptable to the right. 

2. Rewarding effort

The thirty-five-hour work week was first introduced into French law by Lionel Jospin’s Socialist-led government in 2000, and it has since become a cornerstone of the left’s platform. However, the fact that most employees still work above the legal thirty-five-hour limit has led to a system where they can take half days or full days off to compensate for extra hours. 

In August of 2022, Macron’s government successfully passed an amendment that allowed firms to buy these hours back from their employees, essentially transforming them into paid overtime. 

As part of the center right’s current proposal, the group is seeking additional flexibility in the thirty-five-hour work week by reducing taxation on overtime, on top of cutting overall social charges paid by employees. The center right has been fairly nonspecific about how much these would be cut, most likely to avoid alienating the left. However, the main way the Republicans propose to fund this—a cap on unemployment benefits at 70 percent of the minimum wage—would be a red flag for the parties which could otherwise be lured out of the NFP.

3. Balancing budgets

France’s large budget deficit, which in 2023 soared to 5.5 percent of gross domestic product (GDP), raises the stakes. In May, S&P Global Ratings downgraded the country’s long-term credit rating from “AA” to “AA-” and the European Commission reprimanded France for exceeding the EU’s deficit cap of 3 percent of GDP. Today, the Commission formally opened proceedings against France and six other violating countries, directing them to immediately take corrective measures to rectify their fiscal deficits or else face financial sanctions from Brussels. 

Both S&P and the Commission forecast positive economic growth, but emphasize the urgent need for France to address its public finances. Growth alone will not be enough to overcome the fiscal hurdles ahead. 

Reconciling the center right’s rejection of any tax hikes and the need to provide parties of the left with guarantees on social spending for them to abandon the NFP will be very challenging indeed. But there is some room for compromise. 

Shortly after Macron’s arrival at the Élysée Palace for his first mandate in 2017, he moved to slash France’s contentious wealth tax, replacing it with a real estate tax. A flat tax of 30 percent on capital gains was also introduced. The decision came as part of Macron’s pro-business platform in a bid to curb the flight of French millionaires from the country, and it drew sharp criticism from political opponents who labeled him “president of the rich.”

The centrist bloc could offer to reintroduce a progressive taxation scheme on capital gains. In the spirit of France’s goal of green reindustrialization, the centrists could move to keep the favorable 30 percent flat tax for green technologies to encourage investment, while introducing a progressive scheme in other sectors. If they do decide to favor green industrial investment, the tax benefit would have to apply to capital gains accrued throughout the EU—not only France—so as to not violate single market rules. 

Sticking the landing

Negotiations will be more of a marathon than a sprint. Macron is unable to call for new elections for at least the next twelve months, so until then, this parliament will have to find a way to work together. 

After the formation of a government—which Macron has indicated will not begin until after the Olympics—the next major challenge facing French policymakers is to pass the yearly budget by December. This grueling event will be made all the more difficult by today’s unprecedentedly divided National Assembly.

Whichever government emerges from current negotiations will risk having its spending plan voted down immediately. Fortunately for France, the constitution contains a proviso that would allow the state to carry on. Essentially, if the Assembly cannot agree on a new budget, the plan approved for the previous fiscal year will roll over. 

However, recycling this year’s budget would still create a projected deficit of 4.4 percent. This would again violate the EU’s 3 percent cap and fall well short of the deficit reduction the markets—the ultimate referees of how France is faring—are hoping to see. 

Charles Lichfield is the deputy director and C. Boyden Gray senior fellow of the Atlantic Council’s GeoEconomics Center

Gustavo Romero is an intern with the Atlantic Council’s GeoEconomics Center.

At the intersection of economics, finance, and foreign policy, the GeoEconomics Center is a translation hub with the goal of helping shape a better global economic future.

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The post What French economic policy may look like after the Olympics appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The turbulence of the current political climate cannot be overstated. Netanyahu’s schedule has been plagued by constant turmoil. Biden’s recent bout with COVID-19, the campaign obligations of Vice President Kamala Harris and former President Donald Trump, and confusion about who would preside over—or even attend—the joint session of Congress convened in the prime minister’s honor have all complicated logistics. This, at a time when the upcoming US elections in November are already absorbing the vast share of America’s attention. None of this commotion detracts from the importance of high-level engagement at this critical juncture.  

In his face-to-face encounter with Biden, Netanyahu had a pivotal opportunity—which one hopes that he didn’t squander—to synchronize Israeli and American objectives for the remaining six months of the Biden presidency. He would have done wisely to move beyond pithy slogans and platitudes and, instead, provide detailed outlines of his plans for the future of the Gaza Strip and West Bank, the festering conflicts with Lebanon and Iran, and the drive to further Israel’s integration into the Middle East. Coordination with the United States is a force multiplier for Israel. Discord weakens its hand.

Netanyahu is advocating what his aides have dubbed a “new way” of confronting Iran—the same country that featured prominently in his previous, and no less controversial, appearance on Capitol Hill in 2015. Summoning memories of Pearl Harbor and Winston Churchill to draw parallels between World War II and the present moment, he appealed to Congress on July 24 for the United States to take a more aggressive approach toward combatting the Islamic Republic by bolstering support for Israel’s war on Hamas and helping to craft a new Abraham Alliance to “counter the growing Iranian threat.” That plea comes on the heels of Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s July 19 warning that Iran is “probably one or two weeks away” from producing enough fissile material to manufacture a nuclear weapon.

The general themes of the prime minister’s case will undoubtedly resonate with the president. But significant gaps endure. The pace of ongoing negotiations to facilitate freedom for the captives in Hamas custody and an end to the fighting in Gaza has fallen short of Biden’s expectations. The US has also been known to encourage Israel toward restraint when responding to the provocations of Iran and its regional proxies.

When Netanyahu and Biden met privately in the Oval Office, both leaders came armed assuredly with extensive wish lists. The prime minister will have beseeched the president to continue having Israel’s back for as long as it takes the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) to defeat its enemies resoundingly. (They likely disagreed on what that actually entails.) More specifically, Netanyahu will have repeated his request for unimpeded access to American weaponry and asked that the Biden administration remain steadfast as a bulwark to prevent the imposition of international sanctions against Israel. He will have sought US backing for his vision of a demilitarized and deradicalized Gaza—one where Israel will maintain security oversight while Palestinians who favor coexistence with their Israeli neighbors exercise civilian control—and for Israeli measures to defend against threats from Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Houthis in Yemen. Above all else, he will have implored Biden to leverage the full weight of America’s power in order to halt Iran’s malign influence and thwart its nuclear ambitions.

The president will have pushed the prime minister to line up behind US-sponsored efforts to achieve a ceasefire in Gaza and win the release of all those being held hostage. He will also have pressed Netanyahu to contribute to de-escalating rising tensions across the region. In that context, Biden will have reiterated his call for Israel’s government to articulate a pathway that can lead to eventual Palestinian statehood as a prerequisite to the creation of a broader multinational framework—analogous to the “Abraham Alliance” which Netanyahu previewed before Congress—that can function as a means to counter Iranian belligerence decisively.

Echoes of Biden’s words to Netanyahu would have surfaced in the prime minister’s subsequent conversation with Harris, who has now stepped further into the limelight as the senior-most administration figure to deliver public comment on the discussions with the Israeli leader. That said, the White House readout of her meeting with Netanyahu included a pointed reference to “extremist settler violence and settlement expansion” as destabilizing elements in the West Bank. Where the vice president appears also to have deviated from Biden is in the intensity of her reaction to Gaza’s humanitarian predicament, about which she intoned on July 25 that “we cannot allow ourselves to become numb to the suffering and I will not be silent”—prompting a senior Israeli official to express concern that her remarks could “be interpreted by Hamas as daylight between the US and Israel, thereby making a deal harder to secure.”

The clock is ticking. Biden, no longer inhibited by the constraints of a re-election bid, is primed to make legacy moves and determined, by his admission, to “keep working to end the war in Gaza, bring home all the hostages, and bring peace and security to the Middle East and end this war.” Caveats notwithstanding, these are all objectives that Israelis can embrace wholeheartedly. Given the uncertainty of what may transpire after January 20, Netanyahu—whose political legacy hangs in the balance—should hasten to roll up his sleeves, attach Israel’s wagon to Biden’s train, and pray it reaches that destination.

Shalom Lipner is a nonresident senior fellow for Middle East Programs at the Atlantic Council. From 1990 to 2016, he served seven consecutive premiers at the Prime Minister’s Office in Jerusalem. Follow him on X: @ShalomLipner.

The post Netanyahu comes to Washington on a ‘wing’ and a prayer appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On July 18, former US President Donald Trump accepted his party’s nomination as the Republican presidential nominee for the November election together with his running mate, J.D. Vance. Both politicians share an isolationist vision for US foreign policy that could have serious implications for European security.

What might a potential Republican presidency mean for Europe, especially regarding support for Ukraine? Which lessons might China take from a weakened transatlantic security partnership? Should Europeans be more prepared for a potential second term of former president Trump?

On this episode of #AtlanticDebrief, Rachel Rizzo sits down with Nico Lange, Senior Fellow at the Munich Security Conference and the Center for European Policy Analysis, to discuss his impressions from the Republican National Convention and implications of a potential Trump presidency on European security.

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The post #AtlanticDebrief – What did the RNC mean for Europe? | A Debrief from Nico Lange appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The absence of an independent electoral administration in Syria is not news to anyone. The electoral authorities are deeply embedded within the judicial and executive structure and operate as extensions of the ruling party’s apparatus, rather than as impartial overseers of the electoral process. This integration ensures that electoral commissions at all levels, from national to regional, strictly adhere to the governing party’s agenda.

The administration is not a centralized system under a single hierarchical institution. Instead, it involves multiple governmental and judicial bodies. At the top of this system is the Supreme Judicial Elections Committee (SJEC), which in practice is appointed by presidential decree instead of by the Supreme Judicial Council (SJC) as required by the law. The SJEC is neither equipped nor mandated to implement elections, as it does not have staff or offices for election operations.

Below the SJEC are the governorate-level subcommittees. Nominally, these should be the key institutions in managing election operations other than the candidacy process, which is managed by the nomination committees that work independently from the governorate subcommittee.

Both committees are staffed by judges who approach their work by focusing on providing legal cover for processes implemented by other institutions, rather than actively managing electoral operations.

These committees suffer from the same lack of independence as the rest of the judicial system in Syria, as the president wields significant control over the judicial system overall. He is a member of the SJC and appoints the Supreme Constitutional Court, which handles election appeals.

However, even if the judicial committees were more independent, they would have little control over the process: the Ministry of Interior (MoI) is the key operational entity. It is tasked with various matters, such as managing the voters register, custody over all the electoral documents, procurement and management of sensitive election materials, and logistics.

At the local level, election day operations are managed by election committees composed of civil servants appointed by governors. These committees are part of the governmental structure and do not report to the SJEC, further eroding the processes’ independence. The committees are hardly trained, as their training consists of oath-taking ceremonies with little focus on the actual procedures.

The lack of comprehensive regulations that are supposed to operationalize the election law exacerbates these issues. With judicial commissions reduced to issuing appointments and loose guidance, many aspects of the elections remain unregulated. This regulatory vacuum gives the MoI and election committees significant discretion in implementing electoral procedures.

In conclusion, the Syrian electoral administration system is designed to centralize control under the president through the judicial system, governors, and the MoI. This structure eliminates any meaningful chance for truly independent elections, as every key aspect of the electoral process can be traced back to presidential influence or control.

All this raises the question: what are the options for credible management of elections in Syria? Can the system be reformed by focusing on key problematic aspects? That said, the system is so deeply flawed that it needs to be rebuilt entirely for elections to enjoy any credibility. The standards required are familiar and often used in post-conflict settings, such as establishing a new independent electoral management body with authority to both regulate and implement elections and whose leadership is appointed through a consensual process. Until that is possible, United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 2254 attempts to provide a transitional fix, stating that elections should be “administered under supervision of the United Nations.”

However, the term “supervision” has various forms and definitions, even within the UN framework, and the UN’s role has ranged from approving steps in the management of the process to “conducting” elections as part of the peace process, as it did in Cambodia, Eastern Slavonia, or East Timor. Yet, such deep involvement of the UN in Syrian elections would require a high degree of political consensus among the UNSC members, which is hard to envision.

On the other hand, when examining the system and the candidacy process, it is apparent that the laws and procedures—or lack thereof—are tools serving a single purpose: eliminating candidates not endorsed by the Baath Party.

The constitution neither protects nor restricts the right to run in assembly elections. Instead, candidacy is entirely regulated by an election law adopted in 2014 by presidential decree. This law introduces several unfair limits on this right. Some restrictions, like the ten-year Syrian nationality requirement, seem minor but impact those with unregularized status (except for Hasakah’s Kurds, who were designated as foreigners or “ajanib”) and potentially up to 4 million Syrians living overseas.

There are a few more restrictions of particular concern for those who opposed the Assad regime, such as the exclusion of those who have been sentenced for a “felony or misdemeanor that is dishonorable and shakes the public trust.” These offenses are defined by the decree of the justice minister and disqualify all those sentenced for political reasons. However, even if the offense does not fall into this category, all criminally convicted individuals automatically lose their civil and political rights, including the right to stand for office, for ten years after serving their prison sentence.

Those eligible to apply for candidacy must navigate a process that is only vaguely regulated, giving judge-led committees considerable flexibility in deciding on nominations. For example, committees may request an “accredited certificate” proving literacy even when candidates present university degrees. Another quirk requires candidates who wish to contest a “worker or famer” seat to prove they are not listed in industrial or commercial registers.

As presented in the electoral system article, candidates not running on the Baath-endorsed National Unity (NU) List have minuscule chances of being elected. What, then, explains the large number of candidates for the 250 seats in the assembly? For example, in the SJEC accepted 11,341 applications in the 2016 elections, 8,735 in 2020, and 9,194 in 2024. The answer is that the Baath Party encourages members to apply in massive numbers as an indicator of vigorous and credible political competition. Registering for candidacy with the SJEC is only the first prerequisite for becoming a Baath candidate. The second step is the Baath Party process, in which the aspirants compete for the endorsement. This is colloquially called “primaries,” but “consultation” would be a more accurate term.

Without a real election campaign—as a case in point, the NU lists of candidates were only published six days before the polls—hyping up the primaries is essential for the illusion of choice. And, because the Baathists not featured on the NU lists have little chance of winning a seat, the primaries are more important than the polling. Most of the aspirants not included in the list withdrew before election day, so only 1,516 candidates are heading to the polls.

Despite being central to elections, the primaries are still just theatrics rather than a genuine competition. While they look like a proper election process on the surface, their results are not binding. The participation of Baathists is wide and includes an “electronic voting system” that could be easily manipulated and does not guarantee secrecy, and “the party independent election commission” oversees the process. Yet, the result of voting is only advisory. The final say remains with the top Baath Party body, the Central Command, which regularly tweaks the results, claiming to have taken into consideration the “opinion of the general public.” That outcome is regularly criticized on social media.

The Baathists on the NU List were announced, with a delay of two days, on July 9 and for unclear reasons. Baath-affiliated media justified the delay by arguing it was to “ensure fair representation, support the democratic process, and respect the voters’ will in a balanced manner.” But the concurrent news of the dismissal of the nineteen incumbent members of the assembly for “low ideological awareness,” and the lifting of the immunity of another seven members due to corruption, attracted interest and was a matter of debate in social media.

A cursory review of the NU lists reveals that the number of incumbents (fifty-eight) is somewhat lower than in the 2020 elections (sixty-eight), which might reflect the above-mentioned renewed party leadership. The Baath strategy appears to be the promotion of lower-tier loyalists to rebuild party discipline. A deeper analysis of that trend is warranted and should examine why the governorates with the highest turnover are Damascus, Deir ez-Zor, Idlib, Tartous, and Raqqa. On the other hand, Daraa (where five out of eight candidates are incumbents) and al-Hasakah (with six incumbents out of eleven) seem to have only a few replacements.

The number of women in the assembly is consistently trending downward—in 2020, it dropped from thirty-three to twenty-eight—and this year’s elections did not reverse that trend. Twenty-two female candidates are now on the NU list (12 percent), even fewer than in 2020 when NU featured twenty-five women. The Baath Party could easily endorse more women if it wanted to promote women’s participation, as the 2020 elections show that women have minimal chances to be elected outside of the NU lists (only 1.5 percent of the non-NU candidates are women), so the Syrian parliament will likely remain one among those with the lowest representation of women in the world.

The candidates running for the uncontested seats are colloquially called “independents.” More than one thousand of those remaining in the race competed for the sixty-five seats. They sometimes formed “independent candidate lists,” mostly in urban governorates like Damascus and Aleppo. These are often businessmen or militiamen closely affiliated with the regime, supporting the facade of diversity. In some cases, they feature prominent personalities, such as the Damascus list “From Damascus For You Syria,” which includes Mohamed Hammam Miswati and Bilal Naal, assembly incumbents with close ties to the Assad regime. Another Damascene list is “Sham List,” which features the incumbent Mohamed Hamsho (sanctioned by the European Union and the United States). Others, like Wael Melhem from Homs, ran without forming a list and count on personal prominence.

And while the polls were held on July 15, the elections were effectively over at the end of the primaries. The candidates on the National Unity list will sit in the assembly. If there was hope for even a minor opening of political space, the regime sent a clear message: there was no interest in political reforms. Elections are only an aspect of internal Baath consolidation, and the assembly will have free rein for constitutional amendments needed to allow Bashar al-Assad to stay in office beyond 2028.

Vladimir Pran advises electoral authorities, governments, and political leaders on transitional, electoral, and political processes.

Maroun Sfeir advises international and local civil society organizations, political groups, and electoral authorities on electoral and political processes.

The post Syrian elections are decided before election day appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Since US President Joe Biden dropped out of the presidential race and endorsed Harris on Sunday, she has emerged as the likely Democratic nominee. So what might US foreign policy look like if she wins the presidency? For Harris, the daughter of Jamaican and Indian immigrants, there are ample clues in her work in the Americas over the past three-and-a-half years. Her approach: Listen to a broad array of stakeholders, act, follow up, and then adjust tactics as needed. This approach can take time to implement, but it also proves adaptive to unexpected challenges.

Although the United States’ southern border was not specifically part of the portfolio handed to her, Harris’s indirect involvement—through her role in seeking to reduce migratory push factors in northern Central America—has received considerable scrutiny, especially among those who criticize the Biden administration’s approach to migration. The data at this point indicate that the Biden administration has made progress in reducing the number of migrants arriving at the US border from Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador to levels last seen toward the end of the Trump administration, even as increased migration from other countries has contributed to a high level of overall encounters at the border.

At the same time, more work is clearly needed to ensure that migration levels from northern Central America do not jump back up. It is imperative that the efforts undertaken as part of the ongoing “root causes” strategy carry forward no matter who wins the US election in November. This means ensuring that local organizations have the technical and financial resources to improve opportunities for job creation and human-capital development and also to combat often-endemic corruption. These and other conditions are needed not just to dampen the drive to migrate but also to create longer-term economic security that ultimately benefits the national security of the United States and partner countries.

In one example of her “listen, act, then follow up” approach, Harris traveled to Guatemala and Mexico in June 2021. A month later, she rolled out a five-pillar strategy that revolved around working with in-country partners to address the root causes of Central American migration, noting that “migration to our border is also a symptom of much larger issues” and admitting from the start that “progress will not be instantaneous.” She subsequently visited Honduras in January 2022. In March 2024, she welcomed Guatemala’s new president, Bernardo Arévalo, to the White House for more discussions. This approach suggests that Harris could govern in a manner where decisions are carefully thought out and where a multitude of factors are taken into account before acting.

In its three years, the five-pillar strategy has produced more than $5.2 billion in commitments from companies and organizations to invest in the region while supporting local development in areas of high emigration. And there are signs that migration from the region is now slowing. The number of Guatemalans encountered at the southwestern border last month (11,485) was the second-lowest since November 2020. The number of Hondurans (8,896) was the lowest over the same period. Overall, the proportion of migrants encountered at the US border who are citizens of Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador has dropped from 49 percent (March 2021) to 18 percent (June 2024).

Still, reflecting the shift in migrant patterns, including new or growing countries of origin, the overall number of migrant encounters by border authorities remains high (130,419 in June) as compared to the last full month of the previous administration (73,994 encounters in December 2020).

Though it has been less high-profile than her Central America work, Harris has also given substantial attention to addressing the many significant challenges facing the United States’ Caribbean neighbors. As she has explained it, doing so is a US national security priority that cannot be overlooked.

In June 2023, just over a year after virtually hosting leaders of fifteen Caribbean nations, Harris became the highest-ranking US official to visit The Bahamas, where she co-hosted the US-Caribbean Leaders Meeting. That meeting—and her overall engagement—has been focused on establishing a greater US presence in the Caribbean at a time in which it’s becoming increasingly apparent that Caribbean prosperity yields benefits for the United States too. The region’s geographic proximity also means that there is a national security imperative for the United States to be more fully engaged in a partnership with the Caribbean.

In keeping with her typical approach, Harris met with Caribbean leaders first to hear their priorities before crafting a strategy. Her priorities started with climate change and the energy transition, expanded to food security, and then extended to security and arms trafficking. At that June 2023 meeting, she announced $100 million of US assistance to address these issues, including Haiti’s ongoing humanitarian crisis. (In parallel with these efforts, the Atlantic Council organized the PACC 2030 Climate Resilient Clean Energy Summit on the sidelines of her Bahamas trip.) Still, as with her Central America portfolio, substantial progress will not happen overnight.  

Over the coming days and weeks, Harris will set about defining what her foreign policy might look like. In the course of her work as vice president with Central America and the Caribbean, at least, she has taken on tough issues that don’t lend themselves to easy, quick solutions. And she has followed through on implementation, adjusting tactics along the way as the situation on the ground evolves. As she seeks to become commander-in-chief at a time of deep global instability, she will have no shortage of complicated challenges to confront.

Jason Marczak is the vice president and senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center.

The post What Kamala Harris’s record in Central America and the Caribbean reveals about her foreign policy approach appeared first on Atlantic Council.

It’s often easy to spot where repression and hardship are severe. Parts of Europe and the Middle East are now entrenched in brutal war, and Russia and China are promoting autocratic models of governance around the world. Yet it would be a mistake to overlook some of the less visible efforts to advance democracy, freedom, and prosperity in response to these challenges. In particular, the Biden administration has made several important strides to adjust and adapt how the United States engages in international development.

US President Joe Biden, who announced on Sunday that he would not seek reelection, and his administration have sought greater inclusion of developing nations in addressing economic, social, and climate-related issues. Not only rooted in a battle for soft power against China and Russia, these efforts are also advancing global prosperity. They define how the United States interacts with the developing world, and they help shape how the United States is perceived abroad.

Shortly after Biden came into office in January 2021, his administration reengaged with international organizations. The administration has, for example, viewed the United Nations (UN) as an important venue for realizing US foreign policy goals and demonstrating global leadership. While US contributions to the UN have remained steady, the Trump administration sought to reduce or eliminate voluntary contributions to some UN programs, targeting peacekeeping operations and several specialized agencies. Biden restored funding to agencies that faced cuts under Trump, and he halted the planned US exit from the World Health Organization, allowing US contributions to continue uninterrupted. Biden also restarted funding for the UN Population Fund to support its work on ending preventable maternal death, reducing the unmet need for family planning, and ending gender-based violence. Under Biden, the United States contributed nearly $100 million to this fund in 2021, and more than $160 million in both 2022 and 2023, making it the largest single country contributor.

But international organizations are only part of the equation when dealing with the developing world. A more consequential legacy for Biden will be the Group of Seven (G7) Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (PGI), the rebrand of his “Build Back Better World” initiative.

Over the past two decades, China has shifted its international development strategy, building influence through traditional global organizations and launching initiatives such as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the Global Development Initiative. China’s expanding influence through these initiatives has raised concerns about its impact on the developing world. While allegations of debt-trap diplomacy might be wrong, Beijing’s approach of decoupling human rights from governance risks fueling the rise of autocratic societies.

The BRI, now a one-trillion-dollar endeavor, has prompted the United States and its G7 partners to create their own alternative, the PGI. The PGI aims to counter the BRI’s influence by boosting investments in sustainable infrastructure around the world and driving transparent investment in quality infrastructure.

At the 2024 G7 summit in Italy, Biden and other G7 leaders reaffirmed their commitment to the PGI, emphasizing sustainable infrastructure investment. Biden highlighted historic progress, including mobilizing more than sixty billion dollars toward the PGI through federal financing, grants, and leveraged private-sector investments over the past three years—in effect doubling the contributions announced at the previous year’s G7 summit. The Biden administration’s stated goal is to mobilize $200 billion by 2027 to support the G7 target of $600 billion.

Successful implementation of the PGI will be essential to regaining the trust of developing countries by providing much-needed investment in social infrastructure. There is hope that the effort will continue beyond 2025 no matter who the next president is. A sister initiative, the Blue Dot Network, which aims to advance robust standards for global infrastructure, was launched in 2019 by the Trump administration and is rooted in the same principles as the PGI. The Biden administration continued this initiative and officially launched it in April of this year, at the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) headquarters in Paris.

By securing support from the G7 and the OECD, Biden’s PGI might not only endure but significantly improve how other nations view the United States. The initiative has the potential to foster a win-win relationship in development finance, something that the United States and the West have been failing at over the past ten years.

Joseph Lemoine is the director of the Atlantic Council’s Freedom and Prosperity Center. Previously, he was a private sector specialist at the World Bank.

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Three years ago, Brian Deese, then the director of the National Economic Council at the White House, came to the Atlantic Council to announce the Biden administration’s new “industrial policy.” Considering that the term had largely been taboo in economic orthodoxy in recent decades, the announcement took many of us at the Council—and throughout Washington—by surprise. But what Deese outlined that day will turn out to be one of the enduring legacies of the Biden administration: coordinated policy to steer public and private capital toward revitalizing domestic manufacturing and prioritizing the technologies needed to compete with China.

The legislation that made up the backbone of this industrial policy will have ripple effects for the rest of the decade: the Inflation Reduction Act, the CHIPS and Science Act, and the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law. In total, the legislation authorized more than two trillion dollars in spending and tax incentives over ten years. But it wasn’t just the money; it was also the fact that major subsidies were directed to US companies producing semiconductors, clean energy, and electric-vehicle batteries. The Biden administration will point to the eight hundred thousand manufacturing jobs and fifteen million total jobs created in the past four years as proof of the success of these policies. Critics will say that the spending was misallocated, fueled the deficit, and contributed to inflation.

The final verdict will come in the years ahead, when all the investments finally pay off—or don’t. But already, the legacy of the decision is clear: There is a bipartisan consensus now on investing in domestic manufacturing. Whether former President Donald Trump or Vice President Kamala Harris becomes the next president—and even if the sectors he or she chooses to focus on are different—that kind of economic policymaking is not going away.

Of course, the rest of the world took notice of the world’s largest economy making a major macroeconomic shift. The Inflation Reduction Act in particular alarmed European allies who saw their own companies racing to set up US subsidiaries and take advantage of the new law’s incentives to manufacture in the United States. 

The administration tried to explain that this new economic approach wasn’t about the United States going it alone. Two years ago, Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen announced the administration’s “friendshoring” strategy at the Atlantic Council. She spoke in detail about how one of the lessons of the COVID-19 pandemic was the need to rethink supply chains and work more closely with partners and allies to achieve economic security and resilience, not just maximize speed and reduce cost. Her choice of the term “friends” was intentional. It was meant to be an outstretched hand to countries such as Vietnam and Indonesia, not just traditional US allies.

Being a friend didn’t mean being a full partner—at least in the ways other countries had come to expect during the previous decades. The Biden administration has remained unwilling to open the US market to allies and other countries any further and has instead pursued trade-facilitation dialogues through plurilateral arrangements, in particular the Trade and Technology Council with the European Union and the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity with the Asia-Pacific. While these were welcome steps, officials from several countries who met with the Atlantic Council’s GeoEconomics Center team over the years said privately that it wasn’t enough. 

What motivated the Biden administration’s economic framework wasn’t only creating jobs at home, although that certainly was a goal. The equally important ambition was competing with China. Biden maintained Trump’s unprecedented tariffs on Chinese goods and added to them earlier this year. The lines between economic policymaking and national security continued to intertwine—and will be impossible to disconnect in the years to come.

Commerce Secretary Gina Raimondo best encapsulated this dynamic when she discussed Chinese electric vehicles at the Atlantic Council in January. Raimondo pointed to the unfair trade distortions created by Chinese subsidies, which could hurt US automakers. (That’s the domestic part of the Biden administration’s economic policy.) Then she pointed out that sensors in those cars could be used for surveillance; Chinese authorities, in fact, are worried enough about US surveillance that they do not allow Tesla cars near secure facilities. (That’s the national security argument.) 

It would be a mistake to say that Biden created a new paradigm in economic policymaking. Instead, he helped rediscover an old idea—one that was part of the founding of the Bretton Woods institutions in 1944, but that the United States largely had the luxury of forgetting in recent decades: Economic security and national security are deeply interconnected. Whatever policies come next, that lesson won’t be forgotten again anytime soon.

Josh Lipsky is the senior director of the Atlantic Council’s GeoEconomics Center and a former adviser at the International Monetary Fund.

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That legacy, however, depends importantly on something he can no longer control: Ukraine’s ability over time to prevail against Russia’s criminal war.

That includes the inextricably linked question of whether the US president has contributed decisively to the United States’ ability, alongside its allies, to counter an emerging “axis of resistance” consisting of China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea.

Those countries are determined to prevent Ukraine’s success. More to the point, they seem to view Russia’s subjugation of Ukraine as a crucial step in remaking the global system of rules and institutions that the United States and its partners forged after World War II.

Biden, who on Sunday announced his decision to abandon his presidential campaign, will likely be remembered by historians for defining the enormous stakes of the era we’re entering. He called it an “inflection point,” which I’ve been doing in this space since 2018, having previously been introduced to the term through the US intelligence community.

“We’re facing an inflection point in history—one of those moments where the decisions we make today are going to determine the future for decades to come,” Biden declared this past October, in only his second speech to the nation from behind the Resolute Desk in the Oval Office.

Significantly, in that speech he connected the dots between Russia’s war in Ukraine and Hamas’s terrorist attack on Israel, which was only possible with the support of Iran. “Hamas and Putin represent different threats, but they share this in common,” he said. “They both want to completely annihilate a neighboring democracy—completely annihilate it.”

Historians may praise Biden for defining the historic stakes in such unmistakable terms. However, the coming months and years will determine whether he fell short in delivering the remedies by too cautiously supporting Ukraine due to his fears of Russian nuclear escalation.

The result was self-deterrence, where the United States provided Kyiv the weaponry it most urgently requested too slowly and in insufficient numbers. The Biden administration also worsened the situation by restricting Kyiv’s freedom to use US weapons, particularly longer-range fires, against military targets in Russia, from which deadly attacks on Ukrainians were being launched. When the US Congress held up aid for Ukraine last year and into this one, it made Ukraine’s challenges far more dangerous.

Many Republican leaders agree that Biden was mistaken in holding back crucial support and permissions for Ukraine, but they weren’t the ones nominated for president or vice president at the Republican National Convention last week. For the moment, the gathering in Milwaukee indicated the party’s desire to do less for Ukraine.

Many Republicans have wanted to meld former President Donald Trump’s populism with former President Ronald Reagan’s larger global purpose, which contributed to the United States’ Cold War victory against the Soviet Union without a shot being fired. That seems to be the furthest thing from the intentions of the Trump-Vance ticket, though Trump has been known to change direction on a dime, as he did to free up congressional funding for Ukraine.

John Bolton, who was Trump’s national security advisor from 2018 to 2019, wrote in the Telegraph that both Trump and his running mate JD Vance “are disinterested, or openly disdainful, of assisting Kyiv’s defense against Russia’s unprovoked aggression. For Vance, the US lacks both the military assets and the defense-industrial base to be a global power, meaning it must concentrate its resources to defend against China.”

My own view is that the best way to “defend against China” would be to counter Beijing’s unflinching and even increasing support for Russia’s war in Ukraine. At their seventy-fifth anniversary summit in Washington, NATO leaders called China a “decisive enabler” of that war by providing the wherewithal without which Moscow could not continue to wage it.

If the Republican Party truly believes Democratic leaders have provided inadequate defense budgets to address emerging challenges, “Trump should work to correct these deficiencies, not treat them as excuses for further reductions, thereby abandoning even more international positions of strength,” writes Bolton.

Instead, in a recent interview with Bloomberg Businessweek, Trump signaled that he may not be willing to defend Taiwan, likely the first place to fall next if Ukraine falters. “Taiwan doesn’t give us anything,” Trump said, noting that the island is 9,500 miles away from the United States and less than a hundred miles from China. “Taiwan should pay us for defense. You know, we’re no different than an insurance company.”

Where the Trump administration better understood the dynamics of this emerging autocratic axis was in its “maximum pressure” approach to Iran. The Biden administration, by contrast, at first hoped to resume nuclear talks with Iran and work over time to manage its threats to the region. Tehran then demonstrated its determination to disrupt the Middle East and threaten Israel, not with nuclear weaponry but through its proxies, including Hamas, the Houthis, and Hezbollah.

Where the Trump administration fell short, and where the Trump campaign seems to be doing so again, is in its underestimation of the advantages provided to the United States through alliances and common cause at a moment of such significant and historic challenge.

At the NATO Summit in Washington, I had the chance to speak with officials from across the Alliance, as well as those from Indo-Pacific partner states Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and South Korea. I found that there is consensus about one matter: They miss the certainty of the Cold War years, from the end of World War II to the fall of the Berlin Wall, when US foreign policy remained relatively consistent through Republican and Democratic administrations. During that period, US leaders were resolute in the belief that they faced a long-term struggle against Soviet communism and its confederates.  

Without US agreement in diagnosing the emerging autocratic challenge, which Biden has done well, and without US prescriptions for an allied and global response to address it, which he has done less well, the officials I spoke with expect a period of testing by US adversaries and hedging by US allies.

Biden defined the emerging geopolitical contest confronting the United States. He still has six months to give Ukraine the best chance of victory, including by removing restrictions on Ukrainian forces striking military targets in Russia. The outcome of the war and the larger contest, however, will increasingly be determined by forces that he can’t control, both within his own party and among Republicans, and among allies and adversaries around the world.

Frederick Kempe is president and chief executive officer of the Atlantic Council. You can follow him on Twitter @FredKempe.

This edition is part of Frederick Kempe’s Inflection Points newsletter, a column of dispatches from a world in transition. To receive this newsletter throughout the week, sign up here.

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What can be expected from a von der Leyen 2.0? Ahead of her confirmation, she laid out a raft of proposals in her political guidelines for the next Commission term—a combined effort to outline her vision and win over votes. The guidelines prioritize:

1. Building a more competitive Europe that balances regulation and innovation that facilitates Europe’s green transition, 
2. Boosting the EU’s defense ambitions, 
3. Pushing social and economic policies such as affordable housing, 
4. Sustaining agriculture and environmental policies, 
5. Protecting Europe’s democracy, and 
6. Standing up for Europe’s global and geopolitical interests.

In practice, this means her next term will mean more of a central and active role for the Commission—and for von der Leyen. But there will also likely be more roadblocks from the European Council and Parliament.

Start with her leadership style. In her first term, von der Leyen turned the Commission into the most important arm inside the EU at a time when crises came new and often. She served as the EU’s chief decision maker and negotiator during the COVID-19 crisis, helped coordinate Europe’s response to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, and shaped the EU’s economic de-risking strategy and general hawkishness toward China, serving as Europe’s “bad cop” standing up to Beijing’s coercive and unfair trade practices. The grumblings of an overstepping and power-hungry Commission president from other arms of the EU and national capitals aside, European leaders still looked to the Commission and von der Leyen to take action.

The Commission’s role was boosted by its policy successes too. Her first term oversaw the adoption of major rules on the digital and green transitions. The EU pushed through world-leading digital regulations on artificial intelligence, online content moderation, and platform competition, and it incentivized semiconductor manufacturing. She also prioritized green policies to reduce emissions, including the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism and setting new emission reduction targets for cars, shipping, and factories.

For her second term, von der Leyen will seek to pick up where she left off. The Commission will also look to build itself a stronger role in the traditional defense and the economic security agendas, with an eye to boosting Europe’s defense capabilities against Russia and de-risking from China. Von der Leyen’s focus on a competitiveness agenda will push for greater innovation and industrial support while furthering the green transition. On Thursday, von der Leyen promised a “European competitiveness fund” and a “clean industrial deal” within the first hundred days of the Commission’s next mandate, along with greater investment in energy infrastructure and technologies. This will all come with a price tag, and more responsibility for the Commission.

As a consequence of a busy 2019-2024 legislative cycle, von der Leyen and her Commission must now see through a raft of new rules. On digital policy alone, the to-do list is a tall order. The EU is standing up new offices and hiring a new army of competition lawyers, boosting the already massive size and scope of the Commission.

But there will be limits to von der Leyen’s ambition as member states and the parliament will look to exercise their own power.

Europe’s political center is not what it was in 2019, and EU members will want their influence felt. Von der Leyen will have to contend with a growing number of populist leaders around the table at Council meetings. More far-right governments may pop up over the next five years, including in major countries such as France as Marine Le Pen’s National Rally gets ever closer to power. And as the Commission tries to take on a bigger role in traditional member-state driven policies, such as security and defense, von der Leyen will need to deal with more engaged member states looking to exact concessions or carveouts, or to wield their own influence at the EU level.

Far- and hard-right groups in the European Parliament are also on the rise, and they are looking to make a mark. In a shift from her first term, emboldened hard-right politicians are more eager to influence EU policy rather than just play spoiler to it. The growing number and influence of far-right and hard-right groups will likely add extra complexity to the legislative process, and legislation may need to pass with ad hoc coalitions rather than the tradition of grand coalitions of parliaments past.

Greater influence on the right may hamper the Commission’s regulatory ambition. Von der Leyen promised she would continue the green transition, but the EU’s green rules have already become a political target. The platforms of the center-right European People’s Party (EPP), von der Leyen’s own group, and the further right European Conservatives and Reformists, both have peppered in objections to onerous new regulations, especially those associated with the green transition. And the competitiveness debate is in large part spurred on by this backlash to the Commission’s regulatory appetite. This may be difficult for the Commission. Institutionally, the Commission is designed to present new regulations and proposals. It is the only arm inside the EU that can. But that desire will be a point of friction with the aversion among member states and Parliament to new, seemingly onerous, rules.

Von der Leyen will face challenges from beyond Europe, too. “We have entered an age of geostrategic rivalries,” notes the policy guidelines. To the east, Beijing will continue to try to split Europe and poison the EU’s de-risking agenda just as it is starting to take off. And supporting Ukraine against Russia’s full-scale invasion will require sustained attention and funds.

To the west, von der Leyen cannot ignore the upcoming US elections. A transatlanticist at heart, she pushed the EU closer together with the United States in her first term—in large part benefiting from a new EU-friendly US administration. She will likely face an uphill battle in strengthening transatlantic ties in the event of a second Trump administration. “They treat us very badly,” former President Donald Trump said to Bloomberg News when asked about the European Union on June 25.

Von der Leyen’s confirmation this week goes a long way already to set up the EU for success and avoids an own goal for team Europe. Rejecting her would have forced the European Council back to the drawing board to pick a new—and likely weaker—appointee, wasting more time on internal bickering and politicking when predictability, not chaos, is critical. It’s not hard to picture the jubilee from Beijing, taunts from Moscow, and even snide comments from Washington about EU dysfunction in the face of a no vote. In the words of Greek Commissioner Margaritis Schinas (and von der Leyen ally) on her appointment, “There is no plan B.” It is a good thing plan A worked.

James Batchik is an associate director at the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center.

The post What to expect from Ursula von der Leyen’s second term appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Elected on an anti-corruption platform in 2019, President Saied initiated consolidating powers in 2021 by unilaterally dismissing then Prime Minister Hichem Mechichi and freezing parliament with military support. Saeid subsequently rewrote Tunisia’s constitution to extend his presidential powers and granted himself the authority to unilaterally dismiss magistrates after he dissolved the Supreme Judicial Council. Parliamentary elections he called for had a turnout of just 11.2 percent after opposition parties boycotted them, resulting in the election of mostly unaffiliated politicians close to him. In 2022, Saied extended his control over the Independent High Authority for Elections (ISIE) by granting himself the power to appoint and dismiss its members, nullifying the ISIE’s independence from the executive. With virtually all branches of government now under his direct or indirect control, President Saied has eliminated internal obstacles and monopolized all checks and balances, paving the way for an unchallenged run in October. Consequently, Freedom House downgraded Tunisia’s score from “free” to “partially free,” indicating there is broad consensus among members of the international community that Saied’s actions are illegitimate.

In addition to controlling all branches of government directly or indirectly, Saied is cementing his power grab by clamping down on opposition party members, critics, independent media outlets, and civil society. Over the past year, Saied has imprisoned and threatened most opposition candidates. Two of the ten presidential candidates are currently behind bars, while four face prosecution, including Rached Gannouchi—the leader of the main opposition party, Ennahda—who was imprisoned last year on charges of “conspiring against the state” and will remain in prison for at least another three years. Civil society is also facing unprecedented repression, with a draft law currently under revision by Tunisia’s parliament to limit foreign funding streams into the country. Critics and journalists are jailed daily over dissenting opinions, escalating a clampdown on the country’s freedom of expression and emanating fear among critics, enabling the president to run uncontested.

Saied’s legitimacy is also hindered by his continued mistreatment of minorities—including black African migrants and Jews—which has drawn international criticism and led to the violation of international norms. A mass grave with the bodies of sixty-five migrants was recently discovered on the border between Tunisia and Libya, sparking condemnations of Tunisia’s mishandling of sub-Saharan migrants arriving in the country. Saied publicly showcased his antagonism toward black African migrants when, in March 2023, he claimed migrants were threatening Tunisia’s demographic composition, citing the highly controversial “great replacement” theory. A wave of violence against migrants ensued, with many of them losing their jobs and risking their lives. Reports of unlawful mass expulsions toward Algeria and Libya began to emerge, showcasing a well-thought-out strategy by state apparatuses in direct violation of international law, hindering the nascent democracy and Saied’s overall legitimacy.

The local Jewish community, now comprising only 1,500 people, has also felt uneasy and under threat after Saied claimed the devastating floods that hit Libya in September 2023 were a product of the “Zionist movement.” His comments came only months after a terrorist attack occurred in the city of Djerba, each year visited by thousands of Jewish pilgrims, that was believed to have antisemitic motives. More recently, with the outbreak of the Gaza war, several synagogues were lit on fire in signs of protest, elevating the Jewish community’s concerns about its safety. There is little indication of the government taking any action to safeguard the rights of Tunisia’s remaining Jews, raising questions about Saied’s overall motives and his willingness to safeguard minorities.  

Saied’s continued clampdown on opposition, his mistreatment of minorities, and his overall control over the three branches of government will allow him to run unopposed in the upcoming polls. While the elections may seem like a legitimate democratic exercise, the context in which they are held is nothing short of an authoritarian regime, whose control over the state apparatuses is becoming more and more evident. This erosion of democratic norms undermines Tunisia’s hard-won democratic gains and is pushing the country further into autocracy.

Alissa Pavia is the associate director of the North Africa Program at the Atlantic Council.

The post How Tunisia’s upcoming presidential elections will erode its democracy appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The post Mezran in Institute for Global Studies: Abdelmajid Tebboune lifts reservations and announces his candidacy for the presidential election appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On July 15, Andrew Michta, director and senior fellow in the Scowcroft Strategy Initiative, was quoted in the print edition of Le Figaro on the lack of compromise within current US politics.

Staff

Andrew A. Michta

Director and Senior Fellow, Scowcroft Strategy Initiative

Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security Scowcroft Strategy Initiative

Central Europe Eastern Europe

The post Michta quoted in Le Figaro on the lack of compromise in US politics appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The post Charai in National Interest: The Assassination Attempt on Donald Trump and the Threat to Democracy appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On June 25, Andrew Michta, director and senior fellow in the Scowcroft Strategy Initiative, was published in the German Council on Foreign Relations and RealClearWorld about Germany’s defense policy and how it may be impacted by the US presidential election. He underscored that Germany must commit to significantly expanding its defense industrial base so that it will be well-positioned to collaborate with whichever candidate wins in November.

Staff

Andrew A. Michta

Director and Senior Fellow, Scowcroft Strategy Initiative

Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security Scowcroft Strategy Initiative

Central Europe Eastern Europe

The post Michta in German Council on Foriegn Relations and RealClearWorld on Germany’s defense policy and the US presidential election appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On June 5, Atlantic Council Senior Advisor Harlan Ullman published an op-ed for United Press International that reflects on the 80th anniversary of the invasion of Normandy, the blockbuster movie Saving Private Ryan, and the upcoming US presidential election. 

International Advisory Board member

Harlan Ullman

Senior Advisor

The Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security works to develop sustainable, nonpartisan strategies to address the most important security challenges facing the United States and the world.

Learn more

The post Ullman in United Press International on the invasion of Normandy and the US presidential election appeared first on Atlantic Council.

This article presents the structure of the Syrian electorate: who the voters are, how many voters are there, and why credible projections are so elusive. In theory, the constitution guarantees all Syrian citizens voting rights—with consequential caveats built into the electoral and nationality laws.

Syrian citizens obtain their status through their father, as defined by the Nationality Law of 1969, but cannot obtain it through their mothers. Syrian women also cannot pass citizenship to their husbands. Yet, there are shortcuts to Syrian citizenship—the Syrian interior minister has significant authority to grant citizenship through facilitated or exceptional naturalization processes.

The Syrian opposition claims the government is altering demographics and voting preferences by granting citizenship to foreigners fighting in the conflict. There are no reliable reports about the number of foreigners granted citizenship since 2011, but the issue is politically significant and Syrians are keenly aware of the Lebanese case. This matter is especially relevant for ethnic Kurds, who have historically been denied their citizenship rights. On the opposite side, the right to vote in assembly elections has been extended to the military since 2016, but this has only fueled suspicions of vote manipulations.

The laws include a few other categories of potentially problematic restrictions, but it is unclear whether they significantly impact the electorate’s structure. For example, those convicted of a “felony or dishonorable misdemeanor or that which shakes public trust” and those “mentally ill in a manner that affects his eligibility” are excluded from the electorate. However, the Syrian diaspora is the largest group of Syrians excluded from the elections. While the diaspora has the right to vote in the presidential election, that right is not extended to the assembly elections. This is contrary to the provisions of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 2254, which recommends diaspora participation in elections.

If given the right, how many Syrians in the diaspora could vote? For that matter, how many Syrians in total would have the right to vote? Unfortunately, it is impossible to answer that question credibly. The underlying reason for the speculative nature of the electorate’s size is that, despite being legally required to do so, the government does not register voters. Nor does it compile the voter lists. Evidence from previous elections clearly confirms that voter registration is nonexistent. In the 2020 and 2021 elections, there was no voter registration, polling committees did not have a voter list, instead they had blank forms to register voters as they approached the polls. Similarly, there was no evidence of voter-registration activities before this year’s elections.

So, where do the data about voters published by the government come from? According to statements by governmental officials, they come from the civil registry. However, in Syria this cannot be considered an accurate record of citizens. While the Assad regime used the administrative apparatus to control the population, it failed to create an orderly civil registry, even before the conflict. Since the conflict began in 2011, maintenance of the civil registry has been disrupted. Efforts by nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to preserve records might be crucial for those who will need to prove their civil status in the future, but these records are not reflected in the current version of the civil registry.

Official voter data are extremely scarce. Historically, the Supreme Judicial Election Commission only publishes overall voter numbers. These are virtually impossible to analyze, as no details are provided, and data are not even broken down by governorate. Governors or governorate-level commissions sometimes provide these randomly, but they are often rounded up by commissions without explanation.

The significant increase in the number of reported registered voters in 2020 is likely due to the change in how the number is calculated. In the pre-2020 elections, the election committees received a preliminary voters list extracted from the civil registry. They would then audit the list by removing and adding voters. Since the 2020 election, that process has been abandoned, and the number of registered voters simply reflects all the civil registry adult records.

When it comes to diaspora voters, the numbers are difficult to crunch. The Syrian population is estimated to range between 24–27 million, with 16–20 million Syrians in the country and 5–6.7 million outside the country. Turkey, Lebanon, and Jordan alone are hosting more than 5 million Syrian refugees. Using a conservative estimate, the Syrian voting-age population is about 60 percent, which would imply 14–16 million voters in the country and 3–4 million outside the country. That would be within the range of the 18 million voters claimed by the government. However, it is unclear how many live in the government-controlled areas, as the estimate of 9.5 million might not be reliable.

In contrast to the previous election, the government has not issued a single statement about the size of the electorate, no matter how incredible the numbers may be. A comparison of reports from various sources regarding the eight rounds of assembly elections starting in 1990 shows that turnout varies between 50–60 percent. Extrapolating this and applying it to the number of voters who voted in the 2020 elections, in theory, suggests that the total number of voters should not be more than 10 million, which is much smaller than the previously announced 18 million.

Is it possible that, in the pre-2020 elections, almost half of the Syrian electorate was missing from the voter lists? Or are the post-2020 election figures enormously inflated? The confusion over the true size of the electorate will certainly not be resolved in these elections. The Assad government is not investing in even minimal efforts to sort out the voter registry. If there is ever a chance to hold elections according to the standards set by UNSC Resolution 2254, voter-registration reform will be one of the most technically and logistically challenging aspects. Such reform would need to protect the right of Syrians inside and outside the country to vote, while also infusing a basic transparency standard into the electoral process.

Vladimir Pran advises electoral authorities, governments, and political leaders on transitional, electoral, and political processes.

Maroun Sfeir advises international and local civil society organizations, political groups, and electoral authorities on electoral and political processes.

The post Syria’s inflated electorate is caused by phantom voters appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Read up on the events shaping the democratic world order.

Reshaping the order

This month’s topline events

Tensions mount within the Israeli government as conflict grinds on. As June ended, Israel and Hamas still had not agreed on a cease-fire, despite hopes earlier in the month that both sides would sign onto a previously floated three-phase plan. Although the United States assured that Israel accepted, it is unclear whether Israel declined the latest three phase. Yet Hamas requested some unworkable changes after all the parties alleged acceptance. Even as the two sides haggled over cease-fire terms, Israeli military operations in Gaza slowed due to operational tempo, but there remained an increase in intensity in the continued tit-for-tat exchanges between Israel and Iran-backed Hezbollah, driving global concern over a potential war between them that could evolve into a broader regional conflict. Netanyahu dissolved his war cabinet, the unit established to bring a unified approach to Israel’s fight against Hamas. The decision came following the resignation of former military chief Benny Gantz from the cabinet. Gantz resigned amidst protests over the continued lack of a strategic plan to defeat Hamas. Illustrating further divisions within the Israeli government over war aims, the Israeli army’s chief spokesman publicly questioned the government’s articulated goal of destroying Hamas, noting, “Hamas is an idea, Hamas is a party. It’s rooted in the hearts of the people—whoever thinks we can eliminate Hamas is wrong.” Tens of thousands of Israeli people protested in Tel Aviv to demand a cease-fire and the return of hostages.

• Shaping the order. Tensions within the Israeli government, between Netanyahu and his military leadership, came to a head as the two sides seemed at odds over end goals for Israel’s military operations. There remains limited consensus on the way forward. In February, Netanyahu presented a post-war plan aiming for local officials to govern Gaza, with Israel preparing to test the experimental model with “humanitarian bubbles.” Allies have collectively strategized various pathways and there remains widespread skepticism of the plan. Yet the Israeli government continues to struggle to advance a post-conflict plan and receive sufficient buy-in from the United States, Arab states, and others, which remains a key priority for regional stability and US interests.
• What to do. The Biden administration should continue to work with allies in Doha and Cairo to pursue a path to a temporary cease-fire and hostage-for-Palestinian-prisoners deal—that would also enable a flood of humanitarian relief in Gaza—despite the low probability of success.

The United States and its allies step up support for Ukraine. The United States expanded its policy to allow Ukraine to use US-provided weapons to strike “anywhere that Russian forces are coming across the border from the Russian side to the Ukrainian side to try to take additional Ukrainian territory,” according to US National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan. This builds on its May decision to allow Ukraine to use US-provided weapons to strike a limited set of targets, largely across the border from Kharkiv.

The Biden administration, following the G7 meeting in Italy, announced it would rush the delivery of air-defense interceptors to Ukraine by delaying the delivery of them to most other nations. The G7 also agreed to use interest on immobilized Russian sovereign assets to collateralize a fifty-billion-dollar loan to Ukraine. The United States added new and strong US sanctions against Russia and finalized a US-Ukraine ten-year memorandum of understanding on security cooperation.

As US munitions began to reach the front lines in Ukraine, the Russian offensive against Kharkiv lost momentum. Although Russian attacks on Ukrainian energy generation did considerable damage (taking down almost half of Ukrainian electric generation), the US decision to rush delivery of air-defense interceptors may help further mitigate such attacks, as will Romania’s decision to send to Ukraine one of its Patriot batteries. Meanwhile, Ukrainian attacks on Russian military infrastructure in Crimea were taking an increasing toll, and Russian President Vladimir Putin visited North Korea to shore up his relationship with dictator Kim Jong Un and ensure Pyongyang continues providing munitions and arms to Moscow for the war in Ukraine.

On the diplomatic front, Russia escalated its demands for a cease-fire in an unrealistic fashion, insisting that Ukraine must first abandon territory it currently holds in the four provinces partly occupied by Russia, land that Russia has been unable to take by force. Days after that, from June 15 to 16, ninety-three countries attended a peace conference in Switzerland to discuss Ukrainian terms (its ten-point plan) for a settlement and seventy-eight countries signed a document that called for the restoration of Ukraine’s territorial integrity, a key Ukrainian point (more countries have signed on since). China did not attend, however, and some key countries in the Global South such as South Africa, India, Brazil, and Mexico did not sign the conference document.

• Shaping the order. The Biden administration’s decision to allow Ukraine to use US-provided weapons to strike inside Russia, beyond initial restrictions on targets near Kharkiv, is a significant, positive step in Western support for Ukraine. Using frozen Russian assets to collateralize a loan for Ukraine is another positive step, but the United States and its allies may find they need to go further, using said assets themselves rather than continuing to use their own funds exclusively.
• Hitting home. Some US experts argue that Ukraine is a strategic liability and that US focus there diverts resources better used in the Indo-Pacific. Russian victory in the war, which is likely to result from a US withdrawal, would cause cascading security problems in Europe that would draw on even more US resources.
• What to do. The United States and its allies must marshal continued military assistance for Ukraine, including air defense and weapons that support Kyiv’s attacks on Russian military targets in occupied Ukraine, especially Crimea. The United States has the means to intensify pressure on the Russian economy and should use such tools. Washington should consider enforcing sanctions to hit smugglers of technology subcomponents utilized for Russian weapons and evaders of the oil price cap (the latter missing from the otherwise strong June 12 US sanctions package). A successful Ukrainian land offensive may not be possible in the near term. 

The center holds, but the right makes gains, in European Parliament elections. Across the EU’s twenty-seven member states, voters cast ballots to select their representatives to the European parliament. The election saw gains for the center-right and right, but it was a disappointing showing for French President Emmanuel Macron’s centrist Renew party. The European People’s Party, the European Conservatives and Reformists Group (of Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni), and Identity and Democracy—the hard right—were the main beneficiaries of the elections. These results were overshadowed by Macron calling for a snap parliamentary election after his party’s incredibly poor performance in the European Parliament election (garnering less than half the votes of their far-right rivals, the National Rally): The snap election resulted in the left-wing New Popular Front on top, Macron’s  centrist alliance placed second, and  Marine Le Pen’s far-right National Rally, which finished third. Yet, the right did not do well in Scandinavia, Spain, and Romania, and had only a modest uptick in Poland, where the ruling Civic Platform came in first place. The parties in Germany’s ruling coalition—the Social Democrats, the Free Democrats, and the Greens—all lost ground in Germany, but the center-right alliance between the Christian Democratic Union and the Christian Social Union did well.

• Shaping the order. Snap elections in France overshadowed the fact that the center mostly held its ground in the EU elections. The far right’s marginal gains will matter, however, if said forces can unite and if center-right parties are willing to engage with the far-right. Even so, the incoming parliament is likely to be more fragmented and polarized than its predecessor. And the French elections, the first round having wrapped, are pointing to a major defeat for Macron and a surge of the right, which is both nationalist and wary about the extent of French support to Ukraine.
• Hitting home. Even though the center largely held in the European Parliament elections, the increased fragmentation will likely mean less clarity on policy issues that impact US companies.
• What to do. The United States should constructively engage the European Parliament, encouraging it to hold firm to its moderate stances and not bend to the far right’s proposals.

Quote of the Month

“The votes cast put the far-right forces at almost 40 percent and the extremes [on the right and left] at almost 50 percent. This is a political fact that cannot be ignored.“
—French President Emmanuel Macron, speaking after the European Parliament elections.

State of the Order this month: Unchanged

Assessing the five core pillars of the democratic world order

Democracy ()

• On June 30, the far-right National Rally won in the first round of the parliamentary elections, although it’s unclear whether they will get a majority with the second-round vote upcoming on July 7. Many French citizens have been protesting against the National Rally out of concern for women’s rights and minority rights, where thousands of women marched in dozens of French cities, including Paris, to protest against Marine Le Pen’s far-right National Rally.
• Mexico elected Claudia Sheinbaum, its first female president, in the country’s largest election in history with 98 million registered voters. As Mexico City’s former mayor and the favored successor of outgoing President Andrés Manuel López Obrador, Sheinbaum was favored to win. Promising to continue López Obrador’s policies, she believes the government has a strong responsibility to address economic inequality and establish robust social security.
• On balance, the democracy pillar was unchanged.

Security ()

• Chinese forces seized Philippine small boats that were attempting to resupply a Philippine military outpost at Second Thomas Shoal. Multiple Philippine vessels were damaged, and sailors were injured in the incident. One US official called China’s actions “deeply destabilizing.”
• Houthi rebels launched an aerial drone, striking and damaging the Transworld Navigator in the Red Sea, one of more than sixty attacks targeting specific vessels. The attack comes after United States recalled its USS Dwight D. Eisenhower after an eight-month deployment. Shipping in the corridor—crucial for connecting Europe, the Middle East, and Asia—has slowed significantly. The Houthis said they would continue the attacks as long as the Israel-Hamas war continues.
• On balance, the democracy pillar was unchanged.

Trade ()

• Amid the European Commission’s anti-subsidy investigations into electric vehicles (EVs) coming from China , the European Union announced additional tariffs on  imported Chinese EVs. The tariffs range from 17.4 to 38.1 percent—and that’s on top of the 10 percent duty already in place. As a result, Chinese car companies may consider raising prices or establishing factories in Europe, as the continent recently became China’s largest EV export market.
• On balance, the democracy pillar was unchanged.

Commons (↓)

• The United Nations conducted a worldwide poll that revealed 80 percent of people want governments to take more action on addressing climate change. The survey noted majority support for stronger climate action in twenty of the world’s biggest greenhouse gas emitters and majority support globally a quicker transition away from fossil fuels. Despite the increasing state of global conflict and rise of nationalism, the desire to set aside geopolitical differences and work together on climate change is expanding.
• Record-breaking heat, fueled by climate change, affected millions around the globe, scorching four continents and surpassing last summer as the warmest in two thousand years. There were more than forty thousand suspected heat stroke cases in India between March 1 and June 18, and in Saudi Arabia, over one thousand people died participating in the Hajj pilgrimage amid soaring temperatures. Devastating forest fires spread in Europe and northern Africa, and a heat dome trapped large regions of the United States, preventing cool air from getting in.
• On balance, the commons pillar was weakened.

Alliances (↑)

• For the first time in twenty-four years, Russian President Vladimir Putin and dictator Kim Jong Un met in North Korea, reinforcing their commitment to cooperate and protect each other’s interests. As part of the meeting, they signed a mutual military-assistance treaty, with Putin announcing that Russia could provide weapons to North Korea—with potentially destabilizing effects for the democratic world order.
• The leaders of the G7 convened in Apulia, Italy, for the 2024 G7 Summit to discuss supporting Ukraine, pushing back on unfair economic practices, combating climate change, addressing food and health insecurity, leveraging critical technologies, and partnering with like-minded countries around the globe.
• On balance, the alliances pillar was strengthened.

Strengthened (↑)________Unchanged ()________Weakened (↓)

What is the democratic world order? Also known as the liberal order, the rules-based order, or simply the free world, the democratic world order encompasses the rules, norms, alliances, and institutions created and supported by leading democracies over the past seven decades to foster security, democracy, prosperity, and a healthy planet.

This month’s top reads

Three must-read commentaries on the democratic order

• Michael Doyle, in Foreign Affairs, argues that democratic peace is back in vogue and great powers can prevent the tensions between democracies and autocracies from escalating into full-blown global cold war.
• Robert C. O’Brien, in Foreign Affairs, outlines a Trump administration foreign policy centered on the return of peace through strength.
• Célia Belin and Mathieu Droin explore in Foreign Policy what a far-right victory would mean for French foreign policy.

Action and analysis by the Atlantic Council

Our experts weight in on this month’s events

• Niva Yau, in an  Atlantic Council report, shows how China is training future authoritarians overseas in order to secure its interests in Global South countries and beyond.
• Matthew Kroenig and Dan Negrea, in Foreign Policy, explain that the United States’ competition with China should be focused on weakening and defeating the Chinese Communist Party regime.
• Daniel Fried, in the New Atlanticist, offers seven ways to reboot G7 sanctions on Russia, stating that United States and its allies must commit to dedicating resources to identifying targets for taking economic steps against Russia.
• Andrew Michta, in a piece for the German Council on Foreign Relations, contends that Germany must commit to significantly expanding its defense industrial base so that it will be well positioned to establish strong cooperation with whichever candidate wins the next US presidential election.

__________________________________________________

The Democratic Order Initiative is an Atlantic Council initiative aimed at reenergizing American global leadership and strengthening cooperation among the world’s democracies in support of a rules-based democratic order. Sign on to the Council’s Declaration of Principles for Freedom, Prosperity, and Peace by clicking here.

Patrick Quirk – Nonresident Senior Fellow
Dan Fried – Distinguished Fellow
Ginger Matchett – Project Assistant

If you would like to be added to our email list for future publications and events, or to learn more about the Democratic Order Initiative, please email pquirk@atlanticcouncil.org.

The post State of the Order: In June, the world’s alliances strengthened—but concerning risks for the democratic order remain appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On July 7, French voters headed to the polls in the second round of the French elections. The results showed the left and green party alliance winning the most votes, Macron’s Ensemble Party coming in second, and Le Pen’s far-right National Rally coming in a surprise third. No election contender was able to win a clear-cut majority, however. What does the result of the election mean for the political landscape in France and the ability of President Macron to govern?

On this episode of #AtlanticDebrief, Jörn Fleck sits down with Amb. Gérard Araud, Distinguished Fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center, to unpack the implications of the French election results and the emerging power struggles in French politics.

Staff

Jörn Fleck

Senior Director

Europe Center Transform Europe Initiative

Digital Policy Economy & Business

The post #AtlanticDebrief – What are the biggest takeaways from the French election? | A Debrief from Amb. Gérard Araud appeared first on Atlantic Council.

It’s a tale of two “fronts.” In a surprise turnaround, the left-wing New Popular Front came out on top in France’s parliamentary elections on Sunday, with voters coalescing around alternatives to Marine Le Pen’s far-right National Rally, which finished third. President Emmanuel Macron, whose centrist alliance placed second, did not attain his hoped-for parliamentary majority, but his move did reinforce the tendency of French voters to come together as a “republican front” to keep the far right out of power. We turned to our experts working at the front lines of this story to explain the results and what to expect next.

• Gérard Araud (@gerardaraud): Distinguished fellow at the Europe Center and former French ambassador to the United States
• Rama Yade (@ramayade): Senior director of the Africa Center and former French cabinet minister
• Jörn Fleck (@JornFleck): Senior director of the Europe Center and former European Parliament staffer

Right in reverse

• Macron called the snap parliamentary election to seek “clarification” from the electorate after National Rally finished first in European Parliament elections last month. Then National Rally earned the most votes in the first round of this election a week ago. So Sunday’s result, Gérard tells us, is “a total surprise. The anti-far-right bulwark has worked,” thanks in large part to third-place finishers from the left and center dropping out ahead of the second round to consolidate the anti-far-right vote.
• “Great relief dominates in the country, which had come to the brink of an abyss,” Rama says. “But the aftermath will be difficult.”
• What does that aftermath look like? “A long crisis full of uncertainties and political instability,” Gérard predicts. “Macron has lost his bet for clarification from the electorate. He is weakened, but resignation and realism are not his strong points.” 

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Coalition chaos

• Coalition governments, which are common in other European countries, are foreign to France. Macron will nominate a new prime minister (the incumbent, Gabriel Attal, said he will step down) but what happens after that is anyone’s guess. “While on paper and in media speculation, a coalition of the anti-[National Rally] forces is possible, in practice this will be hard to achieve,” Jörn tells us, particularly given the “maximalist demands” from far-left New Popular Front leader Jean-Luc Mélenchon.
• “The coming weeks will indeed be a test to determine whether the left and the center are able to cooperate,” Gérard says. That would likely require a split in the New Popular Front, “which has shown its fragility,” he adds. Macron’s centrists could work with the center-left Socialist party, leaving out Mélenchon’s La France Insoumise.
• And even after a coalition government forms, it will have “to avoid falling prey to a no-confidence vote,” Rama says. “The center of gravity of French politics will shift from the executive to parliament,” she forecasts, and “there is a possibility of permanent instability if the opposition parties unite.”
• And it’s worth noting that National Rally and its allies still got the most votes of any group on Sunday, even if they won only the third-most seats. Le Pen remains focused on the presidency when Macron’s term ends in 2027, stating on Sunday that “our victory has only been delayed.” Adds Rama: “The new French government has less than three years to succeed and refute this prediction.”

European earthquake

• While the European Union (EU) avoided the “worst-case outcome” of a National Rally government wreaking “budgetary and procedural havoc on France’s EU policies,” Jörn says the political chaos to come “will still weaken France’s position in Europe—and Europe itself.”
• France will face “uncertainty, paralysis, and a self-consumed political leadership,” Jörn tells us. Meanwhile, Macron’s “credibility and political capital have been sapped in the eyes of Europe’s leaders by his brinkmanship and unforced strategic mistake of calling the snap elections in the first place.”
• What does it all mean for Brussels? A diminished Macron “will weaken an important voice for forward-leaning, more ambitious EU positions,” Jörn predicts, on matters ranging “from internal reform to defense cooperation, support for Ukraine, and a tougher course on China.”

The post The far right suffers a shocking defeat in France appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Click to jump to an expert reaction:

Gérard Araud: The anti-far-right bulwark worked, but Macron lost his bet

Rama Yade: After a sigh of relief comes instability, with 2027 still looming

Jörn Fleck: The European Union will now worry about uncertainty and paralysis in Paris

Léonie Allard: Coalition building will be messy, but expect some continuity on security and defense issues

Jean-Loup Samaan: French recognition of a Palestinian state may be more likely now, but don’t expect much change in Middle East policy

The anti-far-right bulwark worked, but Macron lost his bet

The first round of the French parliamentary elections was seen as a success for the National Rally. The far-right party seemed on its way to get a majority in the French National Assembly that would have allowed it to govern the country with the support of some conservatives.   

But the first surprise was the number of candidates—more than two hundred—from either the left or the center who announced before the second round that they were stepping aside in favor of another centrist or leftist to prevent the far right from winning in their constituency. The question was whether the voters would follow their call. Pollsters were doubtful. Apparently, they were wrong.

The second round is indeed a total surprise. The anti-far-right bulwark has worked. Not only is the leftist coalition, New Popular Front, the first-place party in the National Assembly, but the Macron-aligned party is the second, and the National Rally is only the third. France has clearly said “Non” to the prospect of a far-right government.

Having said that, there is no potential majority in the new parliament, which is divided in three unequal blocs. The far-left leader, Jean-Luc Mélenchon, has already claimed that the New Popular Front should get the power and fully implement its program, while a centrist representative has answered that the National Assembly composition means compromises are unavoidable.

The coming weeks will indeed be a test to determine whether the left and the center are able to cooperate. This would probably entail a break-up of the New Popular Front, which has shown its fragility during the electoral campaign between the far-left La France Insoumise party and the center-left Socialist party.

France is entering a long crisis full of uncertainties and political instability. Macron has lost his bet for clarification from the electorate. He is weakened, but resignation and realism are not his strong points. 

—Gérard Araud is a distinguished fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center and a former ambassador of France to the United States.

After a sigh of relief comes instability, with 2027 still looming

There are three key observations to draw from the second round of the French legislative election:

1. The National Rally did not win; it only came in third: The “republican front” that was said to be dead worked perfectly.
2. The left, with the New Popular Front, is in the lead, even though no poll had predicted it.
3. No party won an absolute majority.

France is entering an era of coalition politics, a practice to which the country is not accustomed. Macron, who was looking for clarification, did not get it. The relative majority he had in 2022 has disappeared, and his party is now in the minority in the National Assembly. He will have to choose a prime minister who will appoint a government whose first task will be to be strong enough to avoid falling prey to a no-confidence vote. The center of gravity of French politics will shift from the executive to parliament. There is a possibility of permanent instability if the opposition parties unite.

Within the victorious left, the far left of Mélenchon came out ahead of the other left-wing parties. As of Sunday evening, we can already sense little agreement on who should lead the government. Although many of their members of parliament have been elected thanks to the left, some within Macron’s party are beginning to hope that they can build a coalition of the minorities that includes politicians from the right and the left. In the meantime current Prime Minister Gabriel Attal announced, in accordance with the logic of the institutions, that he will resign Monday morning—while saying he is available to manage current affairs during the upcoming Olympic Games.

Great relief dominates in the country, which had come to the brink of an abyss. But the aftermath will be difficult. The ten million French citizens who voted for Marine Le Pen’s party have not disappeared. The National Rally has become the leading opposition force, and it will now focus on embodying the alternative in the only battle that is worth fighting in France, the 2027 presidential election. As the results came in on Sunday night Le Pen announced, “Our victory has only been delayed.” The new French government has less than three years to succeed and refute this prediction.

—Rama Yade is the senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center and a senior fellow with the Europe Center. She was the first woman of African descent to become a member of the French cabinet, serving as France’s deputy minister of foreign affairs and human rights, deputy minister of sports, and ambassador to the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) under French President Nicolas Sarkozy (2007-2012).

The European Union will now worry about uncertainty and paralysis in Paris

Europe is collectively breathing a sigh of relief at the outcome of the second round of the French parliamentary elections. The worst-case outcome for the European Union—that of a majority for the National Rally, which could have wreaked budgetary and procedural havoc on France’s European Union (EU) policies from behind the scenes—has not come to pass. But even so, one main takeaway already for European partners will be uncertainty, paralysis, and a self-consumed political leadership in Paris. There are no clear winners, even if the leftist coalition of the New Popular Front claimed first place by surprise and Macron’s party edged out a second place over the populist, anti-EU nationalists of the National Rally in third. 

A hung parliament and a diverse, if not unstable, left-wing coalition as the improbable election winner will still weaken France’s position in Europe—and Europe itself. It will likely mean at least a year of political gridlock in Paris—and lots of “it’s complicated” for the EU’s second-largest member in Brussels’s decision-making. France has no recent tradition of coalition or technical expert governments. While on paper and in media speculation, a coalition of the anti-National Rally forces is possible, in practice this will be hard to achieve. The hard left of France Unbowed (LFI) under its firebrand leader Mélenchon dominates the New Popular Front and has already staked out maximalist demands vis-à-vis Macron. LFI’s election platform of domestic reform reversals, exits from trade agreements, and a leftist reform of the EU won’t give anyone in Brussels or capitals around the EU much relief. Center-left forces in the New Popular Front alone won’t bring enough votes and heft to form a stable centrist coalition with Macron’s “Ensemble” and the center-right Republicans, if the latter are even reliable partners for such a coalition.

Whatever the exact domestic dynamics, Paris will likely be largely consumed by its own affairs for the foreseeable future. At the same time, even if the worst outcome has been averted, Macron’s credibility and political capital have been sapped in the eyes of Europe’s leaders by his brinkmanship and unforced strategic mistake of calling the snap elections in the first place. That will weaken an important voice for forward-leaning, more ambitious EU positions and postures, from internal reform to defense cooperation, support for Ukraine, and a tougher course on China.

—Jörn Fleck is the senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center.

Coalition building will be messy, but expect some continuity on security and defense issues

Current predictions show that a far-right dominated scenario is out of the picture, even if the verdict is still not in across all of the 577 French districts. Given the absence of any clear-cut majority between the three groups dominating the second round—the left, the presidential party, and the far right—the question is: On what terms will Macron designate the prime minister to form a government? Given that the Fifth Republic institutional set-up is built around a bipartisan system, in the current deadlock, coalition building seems to be the way forward. However, because there is no such customary practice in France, unlike in other European democracies, this could prove arduous. Macron is unable to call another parliamentary election for a year, therefore the governability of France could be a major issue. 

On foreign and defense policy, it’s likely that Macron will attempt to carve out specific prerogatives for the executive, provided by the constitution or by custom, as opposed to economic or internal affairs, on which the parliament will likely weigh in more strongly. 

It will be important to follow how the left clarifies its hastily assembled program, as the final election count will influence the internal equilibrium within the bloc. No specific candidate has been designated by the left bloc for the prime minister role yet. If the New Popular Front is confirmed as the most powerful group, it would be the driving force in coalescing others around a project. So far, the recently unveiled program provides very little information on defense issues, including on NATO. Nevertheless, the left-wing group’s platform calls for “unfailing defense of the Ukrainian people’s sovereignty and freedom, including the integrity of Ukraine’s borders, through the necessary arms transfers” and taking the necessary steps to ensure Russian President Vladimir Putin will “fail in his war of aggression.”

France has rejected once again the prospect of the far right in power, but this legislative election will likely have repercussions beyond those regarding the Fifth Republic’s governance model and party system. The results might also affect whether Macron’s party has a future beyond 2027.

—Léonie Allard is a visiting fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center, previously serving at the French Ministry of Armed Forces.

French recognition of a Palestinian state may be more likely now, but don’t expect much change in Middle East policy

As of Sunday evening, France’s left-wing coalition will represent the biggest bloc in the new National Assembly. But in the absence of an absolute majority, compromises will be unavoidable to form a stable government.

Foreign policy had not been a major issue of the three-week campaign, but the program of the left coalition and its leaders did specify some aspects of their Middle East policy, especially on Gaza and Lebanon. In both cases, there is actually no major disagreement between the left and Macron’s centrist Ensemble party.

The left coalition calls for a ceasefire in Gaza, but the outgoing government has already called for one for several months now. On Lebanon and the looming fears of a new conflict between Israel and Hezbollah, the French left were vague and merely promised to empower the Lebanese Armed Forces. This is again not a point of friction with the policy led by Macron. That is reassuring. Given the important role Paris plays, in close coordination with Washington, in preventing the opening of a new front between Israel and Hezbollah, continuity between French governments would be good news.

Perhaps the only major change would be a symbolic one: The left coalition has been very vocal in demanding the recognition of a Palestinian state, following the example of several other European governments in the past months. Macron himself contemplated the idea and said that doing so “is not a taboo for France.” Apart from irritating the current Israeli government, such a decision would have no major consequence on the ground (which might be one reason why Macron would be open to it in a coalition government with left parties). But beyond this, one should not expect a major shift in French policy toward the Middle East.

—Jean-Loup Samaan is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative and a senior fellow at the Middle East Institute of the National University of Singapore.

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Click to jump to an expert reaction:

Philippe Dickinson: Expect continuity on major foreign and defense policies

Livia Godaert: Watch for economic reforms and a power-sharing shift

Nicole Lawler: The UK will get closer (but not too close) with Europe

John M. Roberts: Starmer’s first act toward national renewal is ensuring stability

Expect continuity on major foreign and defense policies

After fourteen years of Conservative government, Labour’s one-word campaign slogan said it all: “Change.” But when it comes to the major foreign and defense policy issues of the day, “continuity” might be more appropriate.

The United Kingdom has been one of the strongest supporters of Ukraine since Russia’s illegal full-scale invasion in 2022 and spends more on defense than any other European NATO member. These are consensus issues in mainstream British politics. If anything, on the campaign trail, Labour and the Conservatives sought to outdo each other in the resoluteness of their support for Ukraine and the urgency of their plans to increase defense spending to 2.5 percent of gross domestic product (GDP).

This is central to Starmer’s political project. When he became Labour Party leader in 2020, Starmer took over a party that had just suffered its worst electoral defeat since 1935 under the leadership of Jeremy Corbyn, a figure from the party’s pre-Tony Blair left. Restoring Labour’s credibility on national security and defense was an early priority for Starmer. He firmly declared Labour’s support for NATO—pointing out that Labour Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin was one of the Alliance’s founding fathers in 1949—and re-committed to the United Kingdom’s nuclear deterrence (known as “trident”).

This worldview permeates the party’s election manifesto, which describes its commitment to trident as “absolute” and promises to apply a “NATO test to major defense programmes” to meet obligations. The new government will conduct a Strategic Defence Review in its first year, setting out the path to spending 2.5 percent of GDP on defense and the ways in which a proposed UK-EU security pact could strengthen NATO. On Ukraine, the incoming government has pledged “steadfast” support. It has backed calls to repurpose frozen Russian assets in support of Ukraine, and it intends to play a “leading role in providing Ukraine with a clear path to NATO membership.”

For the incoming government, there will be no time to waste. After six weeks of talking the talk on the campaign trail, week one in office coincides with the Washington NATO Summit—an ideal opportunity for the new prime minister to walk the walk on the world stage.

—Philippe Dickinson is a deputy director with the Atlantic Council’s Transatlantic Security Initiative, within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. He previously served on the political team at the British Embassy in Washington, DC.

Watch for economic reforms and a power-sharing shift

Labour’s landslide victory in the general elections follows years of political instability and chaos. The postmortem of the last few governments reads like a rejected political satire, but the most important takeaway from the absolute drubbing the Conservatives have just received is that Labour has now inherited an angry and impatient electorate ready to see their lives improve under the new government.

Starmer is not a particularly radical Labour leader. Under the former crown prosecutor, Labour has committed to maintaining the status quo on tax rates and has pledged to reduce net migration—policies that represent a rather conservative ethos. Nevertheless, the party has laid out a big vision for Britain’s economic future: setting up Great British Energy (a publically owned clean energy company), renationalizing the railways as contracts expire, and implementing a new industrial strategy, to name a few major policies. These are lofty goals, but not impossible to achieve with the mandate that Labour has received. The previous government got caught up in its own machinations, leaving it directionless, and the Labour government must maintain its discipline to achieve its ambitions.

On foreign policy and defense, there won’t be major shifts. The United Kingdom will still be an active NATO member, and it will push to raise defense spending to 2.5 percent of gross domestic product (as the Conservatives also pledged). However, Labour has made clear that a closer relationship with the EU is a priority. Another key difference with the Conservatives is that in its manifesto, Labour commits to pushing for an immediate ceasefire in Gaza, with unimpeded aid access to Gaza and recognition of a Palestinian state as part of a two-state solution and future peace process with Israel.

Labour has also made proposals with constitutional implications for the United Kingdom. In its manifesto, Labour says it will reset the relationship between Westminster and the devolved governments in Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland. The manifesto also outlines a new Council of the Nations and Regions, which would include the prime minister, leaders of the devolved national governments, and mayors of major regions across the United Kingdom. This power-sharing shift—which would also be evident in changes to transportation, employment, planning, and housing—is a departure from Westminster’s strict hold over the regions and is worth watching in the coming years.

The second area to watch is matters of democratic representation, a contrast to the illiberal moves seen across democracies in recent years. Labour outlines significant reforms—and the eventual replacement—of the unelected House of Lords, as well as stricter rules around the conduct of ministers and members of parliament. Its manifesto also includes lowering the voting age to sixteen in all elections and fixes to uneven voter identification requirements. This expansion of representation is a welcome change given the threats to democracy across the world, and the United Kingdom could emerge as a leader in this regard if Labour manages to implement this agenda. 

To be clear, this is the Labour win through rose-colored glasses. The new government has an uphill battle to fight after the last several years of chaos. Its biggest challenge will be to maintain its will and focus amid both local and global crises. By solving immediate cost-of-living and economic concerns, Labour can establish trust with a jaded electorate and then tackle the major changes the party has campaigned on. But its members have to fend off political distraction to do so.

—Livia Godaert is a nonresident fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center.

The UK will get closer (but not too close) with Europe

Labour’s victory in this election sends a clear signal to the European Union (EU): The United Kingdom is willing to improve its relationship with Europe. How far relations between the two partners develop will depend on the Labour government’s ambitions and what the EU is willing (or unwilling) to accept when it comes to trade. While Labour has expressed its intentions to restore relations with Europe after eight years of strained ties resulting from Brexit, it has not been very specific about its goals. If anything, what Labour has been clear about is not rejoining the EU’s single market or customs union, or allowing for the free movement of people between the UK’s borders with the EU.

Nonetheless, Labour has campaigned as the pro-business choice for Britain and will likely seek to remove remaining trade barriers with Europe for the benefit of Britain’s small and medium-sized enterprises. The EU, however, is unlikely to accept these terms if it means the United Kingdom will “cherry-pick” access to its single market. This poses a problem for Labour’s intentions to revisit the Brexit deal, which Starmer in the past has referred to as “botched.” With little appetite to renegotiate a Brexit trade deal, the EU won’t accept any new deal without receiving some concessions. The EU likely will push on the free movement of people (particularly a youth mobility scheme) as a quid pro quo. It will be important for the Labour government to strike the right balance in its trade relationship with the EU, which remains the United Kingdom’s largest trading partner. Labour at minimum has agreed to recognize certain professional qualifications and negotiate a veterinary agreement with the EU to avoid extra checks on animal products, which could be beneficial for both parties. The latter would inevitably invite at least some level of oversight by the European Court of Justice, however, which Conservatives argue could “unravel” Brexit and undermine British sovereignty. 

If the United Kingdom seeks to build trust and make the EU-UK relationship more productive, it will need to look beyond trade deals and market access. Labour’s plans for a joint EU-UK defense pact, which would formalize bilateral security cooperation, could be a step in the right direction. If successful, it may open the door for further cooperation between the two partners, particularly at a time when Europe is becoming more isolated under geopolitical pressures.

—Nicole Lawler is an assistant director at the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center.

Starmer’s first act toward national renewal is ensuring stability

Change means stability. That’s the paradox at the heart of Starmer’s accession to office as prime minister of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. To the rest of the world, stability is the key. There will be no change to UK policies regarding its belief in the importance of a strong relationship with the United States, its role in NATO, and its support for Ukraine. But change means stability precisely because the last several years of Conservative rule have been so erratic, including five changes of prime minister in the last nine years. 

With an electoral mandate backed by 412 seats in the 650-seat House of Commons, and with none of the personal foibles that destroyed the premiership of Boris Johnson, Starmer can likely look forward to five years in office before calling the United Kingdom’s next general election. And if the precedent of Tony Blair, the last Labour leader to take his party from opposition to government, is any guide, Starmer has a good prospect of winning the next election, too. All of this prepares the ground for the Labour government to deliver what Starmer has termed “a decade of national renewal.”

Starmer inherits a Treasury that has almost certainly no spare cash whatsoever for ambitious programs to boost welfare or invest in new infrastructure or enterprises. So he will need to focus his economic policy on promoting economic growth in order to secure the funds necessary to rebuild Britain’s stretched and crumbling services and infrastructure without resorting to the imposition of tax increases on working people. 

As for climate change, Starmer remains committed to the United Kingdom’s legally mandated task of delivering net-zero carbon emissions by 2050. The difference with his predecessors is that Starmer’s team appears committed to promoting the primacy of reliance on renewable energy sources and energy efficiency, whereas recent Conservative governments have sought to include fresh production of oil and gas from Britain’s offshore fields—and even a new coal mine—while backtracking on environmental regulations.

Upon taking office on Friday, Starmer said that his mission is to deliver “a calm and patient rebuilding,” carried out by a government of service “for a mission of national renewal.” It won’t be easy. But he has already reassured the markets, with the arrival of this first Labour government in fourteen years prompting small but healthy boosts to the stock market and to the pound sterling in currency markets.

—John M. Roberts is a nonresident senior fellow at Atlantic Council’s Global Energy Center and a resident of Jedburgh, Scotland, United Kingdom.

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This week, three of the Western world’s most significant leaders are suffering from self-inflicted wounds that are likely to have long-term political and economic consequences.

They are US President Joe Biden, French President Emmanuel Macron, and outgoing British Prime Minister Rishi Sunak, and this is no small story as their countries are all nuclear powers that represent the world’s first-, sixth-, and seventh-largest economies.

What I mean by self-inflicted is that Macron took a gamble on staging snap parliamentary elections, whose second and final round is on Sunday, in hopes of getting a fresh mandate after his party’s humiliating drubbing in European Parliament elections. He’ll pay a price with, at best, a hung parliament. At worst, he will enter into what the French call “cohabitation” with a far-right prime minister.

Sunak had until the end of the year to call elections in the United Kingdom, but picked July 4. He and his party have now been ousted, ending fourteen years of Conservative rule that has brought Brexit, historically low productivity gains, and growth levels below the European Union (EU) average.

Some Biden allies have been saying quietly since this time last year that he could best cement his legacy by stepping aside and letting a younger candidate take on former President Donald Trump. Instead, Biden has gambled on being able to arrest his own aging process—and then convince voters he has done so—a far more difficult prospect following last week’s debate.

It’s telling that these stories are coming together in a single week, with Western democracies all in anti-incumbent moods, often despite their own economic interests, which is especially the case in France.

Macron’s decision to hold these elections three years earlier than was necessary was based on the convoluted logic that voters would come to their senses and give him a fresh mandate rather than face the prospect of extreme-right rule.

Instead, the far-right National Rally is likely to produce the largest percentage of the vote in the second round of parliamentary voting on Sunday, closely followed by the newly united, left-wing New Popular Front, which includes everyone from center-left socialists to La France Insoumise, led by a former Trotskyite.

This week, more than two hundred candidates dropped out of the second round of French elections as Macron’s camp and the left are coordinating to stop National Rally from winning an absolute majority and thus the right to put in place a prime minister for three years of uncomfortable cohabitation with Macron, whose term doesn’t end until 2027. The most likely outcome on Sunday is a hung parliament, but one with a great deal of far-left and far-right leverage.

That puts at risk seven years of economic progress under Macron, during which France has cut business and wealth taxes, reformed employment and pensions to encourage hiring, and thus created two million new jobs and six million new businesses.

“The market could see both the extreme right and the extreme left promising to reverse cost-saving measures taken by the incumbent government (such as pension reform) without offsetting these with new sources of income,” write Sophia Busch and Charles Lichfield at the Atlantic Council.

This comes at a time when France’s finances are already fragile, with an annual budget deficit above 5 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) and public debt worth some 110 percent of GDP. In June, the European Commission named France as one of seven EU members states in violation of its new fiscal rules. The Paris Olympics starting later this month, with the sparkling new venues and train lines, might be less a celebration than a denouement.

The British Labour Party’s sweeping victory, which left the Conservative Party with its lowest number of seats in Parliament in nearly 200 years, is less an endorsement of Keir Starmer’s leadership than it is a condemnation of fourteen years of Conservative rule. The Economist, hardly a fan of the British left’s proclivity for state intervention, endorsed Labour because “it has the greatest chance of tackling the biggest problem that Britain faces: a chronic and debilitating lack of economic growth.”

Starmer’s biggest success has been to quickly change course from predecessor Jeremy Corbyn’s leftist dogma to make the party electable. However, if he can’t address the country’s stagnant productivity, find new growth through investments and trade, and steer away from his party’s statist instincts, he won’t succeed.

The stakes are highest in the United States for November’s elections, as capital markets continue to shrug off the country’s dysfunctional domestic politics and growing geopolitical risks with yet another record high NASDAQ result this week.

Biden must decide within the next month whether to say in the race, and he’ll have to mull over the choice while his presidential duties carry on. Next week, the seventy-fifth NATO Summit kicks off. He will host heads of state and government from the Alliance’s thirty-one other members in Washington, DC, amid wars in Europe and the Middle East and tensions in Asia. The stakes have seldom been higher.

Frederick Kempe is president and chief executive officer of the Atlantic Council. You can follow him on Twitter: @FredKempe.

This edition is part of Frederick Kempe’s Inflection Points Today newsletter, a column of quick-hit insights on a world in transition. To receive this newsletter throughout the week, sign up here.

The post What do Biden, Macron, and Sunak have in common? They brought it on themselves.  appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The high rate of dropouts ahead of the second round make the number of three-way races favoring National Rally much lower and a hung parliament more likely. An absolute majority for National Rally cannot be fully ruled out yet, but an absolute majority for the New Popular Front already can. This shift in probabilities has led to diverging reactions in bond yields, which have remained slightly higher than before the first round, and stock prices, which have rallied.  

Following Macron’s announcement of the snap election on June 9, French ten-year bond yields increased more than in any other week since 2011. In other words, it was the worst week for the rate at which France borrows from markets since the heart of the eurozone crisis. 

While he was admittedly in campaign mode, French Finance Minister Bruno Le Maire’s warning of a possible “Liz Truss-style” event if National Rally wins—referring to the 2022 bond market meltdown in the United Kingdom that forced the then-prime minister to reverse course on her fiscal plans—was more than a mere talking point. Increased yields arise from falling demand for government loans, reflecting a diminished faith in a government’s finances. The market could see both the extreme right and the extreme left promising to reverse cost-saving measures taken by the incumbent government (such as pensions reform) without offsetting these with new sources of income. 

This graph shows that the “spread” with German bonds has yet to fall significantly despite the greater likelihood of a hung parliament. Why? 

France’s finances are already fragile. Two weeks ago, the European Commission named France as one of seven countries in violation of its new fiscal rules due to high debt levels and no expected reduction in spending. With no tradition of broad coalitions in France, the assumption at this point is that no government will be able to conduct more cost-cutting or efficiency measures. 

Still, France’s bond yield increases thus far remain far less severe than the UK gilt crisis in 2022. 

On the other hand, the results of the first round prompted stock market prices to rally from their initial steep drop following the announcement of the snap election. France’s private sector seems to have taken comfort from the central scenario of a hung parliament and the elimination of a New Popular Front majority scenario. The likelihood of punitive taxes and other major economic changes businesses would need to contend with is now much lower, but not gone.

While France’s CAC 40 index noticeably increased on Monday and Tuesday, it hasn’t fully recovered the losses made following Macron’s decision to dissolve parliament. Clearly, investors are still waiting to see how the second round and its aftermath play out. In a hung parliament scenario, Macron’s party would have to negotiate with all parties that reject the far right. The strongest bloc among these will be the left. This is enough for investors to remain in wait-and-see mode for now.

Charles Lichfield is the deputy director and C. Boyden Gray senior fellow of the Atlantic Council’s GeoEconomics Center

Sophia Busch is an assistant director with the Atlantic Council GeoEconomics Center.

Clara Falkenek contributed research to this piece.

This post is adapted from the GeoEconomics Center’s weekly Guide to the Global Economy newsletter. If you are interested in getting the newsletter, email
SBusch@atlanticcouncil.org.

At the intersection of economics, finance, and foreign policy, the GeoEconomics Center is a translation hub with the goal of helping shape a better global economic future.

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On July 4, Britons head to the polls to elect a new parliament. If the polls are correct, this election could bring an end to 14 consecutive years of Conservative Party rule. The Labour Party is expected to win big, and the Liberal Democrats and Green Party are expected to make electoral gains. What is behind these electoral dynamics and trends? What are the key issues driving voter sentiment? What is the future of the UK’s right-wing politics?

Jörn Fleck sits down Ed Owen, founder of the Power Test podcast and senior communications and strategy advisor to several members of the Labor Shadow Cabinet, to preview the election and discuss implications for UK politics, policymaking and transatlantic cooperation.  

Staff

Jörn Fleck

Senior Director

Europe Center Transform Europe Initiative

Digital Policy Economy & Business

The post #AtlanticDebrief – What can we expect from the UK elections? | A Debrief from Ed Owen appeared first on Atlantic Council.

What are the key takeaways from the first round of the French parliamentary elections? Why was voter turnout so high? Will the left and center blocs be able to form tactical alliances in the upcoming runoff elections? What are the implications of a hung Parliament for France’s foreign policy agenda? What would the dynamics between President Macron and National Rally look like?

On this episode of #AtlanticDebrief, Jörn Fleck sits down with Ambassador Gérard Araud, Distinguished Fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center, to unpack the first round of the French Parliamentary elections.

Staff

Jörn Fleck

Senior Director

Europe Center Transform Europe Initiative

Digital Policy Economy & Business

The post #AtlanticDebrief – What happened in the first round of the French snap elections? | A Debrief with Amb. Gérard Araud appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Given the two-round run-off electoral system, much will depend on whether Macron and his challengers outside of Le Pen’s party can mobilize the traditional “republican front” and agree to tactical withdrawals of third-place candidates to boost the chances of non-National Rally candidates. The initial signs from Macron, Prime Minister Gabriel Attal, and the political left give some hope. As Raphaël Glucksmann, a left-wing member of the European Parliament, put it in calling for a united front: “We have seven days for France to avoid a catastrophe.” But the center-right Republicans seem less willing to stand down. An absolute majority for the National Rally is within reach but still looks unlikely.

For France and Europe, the two most likely outcomes are both a fundamental challenge. At best, Paris could be mired in political chaos, gridlock, and uncertainty if no clear majority—relative or absolute—emerges after the second round. That would also mean a paralyzed, absent France at the European level where—think what you like of his vision statements—Macron was one of the few leaders who sparked major European debates and challenged the European Union (EU) to act, even if his framing, wording, and timing often left much to be desired. Whatever the precise impact of a hung parliament might be, Macron’s freedom of action and his legitimacy in the eyes of other EU leaders will be seriously curtailed.

At worst, an absolute majority for the National Rally would give Macron little option but to allow the National Rally’s Jordan Bardella to form a government in what would be cohabitation in one of its most incompatible forms. Abroad, at the European level, a National Rally government might not only challenge the president’s “reserved domain” in foreign and defense policy but also use its budgetary powers to undercut France’s support for the single market, the EU budget, and key initiatives from support to Ukraine to enlargement and institutional reforms. The longer-term result could be a challenge to the EU as formidable as the United Kingdom’s Brexit vote in 2016—this time not as one big-bang Brexit-like withdrawal, but rather a creeping, piecemeal attempt at a partial “Frexit” and a Europe of nations from within.

For those trying to see some commonalities with the United States’ own leadership contest this fall, the lesson might be that it’s not good enough to be the perfect democrat. Macron’s previously successful strategy to mobilize the center by scaring voters about the potential of the right and left fell flat this time, despite a record turnout. As electorates are coping with cost-of-living crises, growth that has not benefited the many, and migration pressures, merely invoking the principles of the republic—American or French—to mobilize voters for centrist candidates might not be sufficient any longer.

Jörn Fleck is the senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center.

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Is the election result a foregone conclusion?

If the latest polling data provides any real indication, this election will give the ruling Conservative Party its biggest loss in more than a century, with the party set to potentially lose more than two thirds of its seats.

Labour, on the other hand, is currently projected to win by a 280-seat majority. Rishi Sunak may even lose his seat—which would be a first for a sitting prime minister during a general election.

The Tories have seen a lot in their fourteen years of uninterrupted rule: the “golden era” of relations with China under former Prime Minister David Cameron, the Brexit vote in June 2016, the COVID-19 pandemic that started in 2020, and the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022—have all unfolded under a Conservative prime minister.

Britons appear tired of Conservative rule. Mismanagement of the pandemic, a sputtering economy with a cost-of-living crisis, and a general unease with the country’s evolution have contributed to the Conservative Party’s deep unpopularity. Sunak’s record has not been able to sway voters, and his performance at the debates and grilling on BBC’s Question Time have not convinced many, either.

The Conservative Party’s ideological ambiguity hasn’t helped. During Tory rule, the party has swung back and forth between center-right mainstream conservatives such as David Cameron, Theresa May, and Rishi Sunak to more populist-tinged firebrands such as Boris Johnson and Liz Truss, leaving voters uncertain of where the party actually stands. The party’s challengers from the populist right, under the charge of Nigel Farage, have picked up on this feeling, further pulling votes away from the Conservatives.

Tory ineptitude has given Labour almost an assured victory. Labour leader Keir Starmer has run a meticulously careful campaign (bringing fresh seriousness to the party following the disastrous electoral showing under the steer of former Labour leader Jeremy Corbyn) that several have dubbed as the “Ming vase” strategy. Careful not to lose momentum and potential voters, Labour has taken the approach of staying largely mum about its commitments. Voters may not be particularly enthusiastic about a future Labour government but instead may be more determined to bring about an end to Tory rule.

What are the key issues?

What do these elections mean for the UK’s foreign policy?

Though this will not be an election driven by foreign-policy issues, the major international concerns in the UK are similar to the concerns in other European countries: Ukraine, the Israel-Hamas war, NATO, and foreign aid funding. The left to center-left groups (the Labour Party, Liberal Democrats, and the Green Party) are also keenly focused on improving relationships with the European Union (EU), compared to the Conservatives, who do not mention the EU at all in their manifestos, and Reform UK, which seeks to remove the UK from the post-Brexit Windsor Framework. NATO commitments are seen all across the board in some form for the major players, though the specifics change—it’s likely that no matter the winner, the UK will continue to push to spend at least 2.5 percent of its gross domestic product on defense. All the major party manifestos call for support for Ukraine. On the Israel-Hamas war and the crisis in Gaza, there appears to be more of an ideological divide among the parties. The Liberal Democrats, the Green Party, and the Labour Party have all called for an immediate cease-fire—albeit Labour has moved comparably slower on this issue. On the other hand, the Conservatives have not called for a permanent cease-fire, preferring to back an “immediate humanitarian pause” instead.

What about relations with the EU?

The Windsor Framework agreement, signed seven years after the Brexit referendum, marked a turning point for the EU-UK relationship. It put in place joint solutions to address the lingering issues from Brexit, including challenges facing Northern Ireland’s access to the UK’s internal market, and signaled a willingness from both parties to move on from tensions spurred by Brexit and negotiations around the EU-UK Withdrawal Agreement. While the Conservatives under Sunak initiated the process of reconciliation under the Windsor Framework, the outcome of the UK elections could make way for a deepening and widening of cooperation between the UK and the EU, particularly on security and defense, financial services, and support for Ukraine. A potential Labour government would seek to rebuild ties with Europe, but it’s unclear how far Labour’s proposals may go (such as a politically costly bid to rejoin the EU), fearing criticism from Conservatives and pro-Brexit media.

What about transatlantic relations?

The “special relationship” between the United States and UK is strong but not necessarily privileged. London is no longer the gateway to Europe, and the Biden administration has long prioritized its relationship with the EU. The future of US-UK cooperation is less contingent on who occupies 10 Downing Street and more on who occupies the White House. Ever since 2020, when the UK formally exited the EU, the government has sought a trade agreement with the United States to offset the benefits of unfettered access to the EU’s market. Regardless of the outcome of the US election, it is likely that any future UK government will continue to push for trade negotiations and a deal with the United States. Currently, negotiations around the US-UK free trade agreement have been at a standstill for years, particularly since the United States and UK have diverged on labor standards and agriculture. What’s more, US lawmakers would see little utility in an agreement with the UK that would not (or only marginally) benefit US workers. Regardless, how much the US-UK free trade agreement progresses largely depends on the composition of the US Congress, which will need to greenlight the agreement.

Nicole Lawler is an assistant director at the Europe Center.

Livia Godaert is a nonresident fellow at the Europe Center.

The Europe Center promotes leadership, strategies, and analysis to ensure a strong, ambitious, and forward-looking transatlantic relationship.

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The post Your primer on the United Kingdom’s general elections appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Click to jump to an entry on an EU leader:

Ursula von der Leyen: A welcome sign of stability, but parliamentary approval is no sure thing

António Costa: The skilled negotiator will be a major contrast to Charles Michel

Kaja Kallas: The first EU foreign policy chief from the east takes a stronger stance against Russia

Ursula von der Leyen: A welcome sign of stability, but parliamentary approval is no sure thing

Von der Leyen’s nomination for a second term at the helm of the European Commission is a much-needed signal for stability following the fallout from the European elections in early June. Despite much hyperbolic media speculation to the contrary, it also hardly comes as a surprise. Paris and Berlin, which otherwise could have tried to block von der Leyen, are mired in their own domestic post-election instability—and in the case of French President Emmanuel Macron, lost their political capital to seriously influence decision making at the EU level. All eyes were on Rome to see what Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni might do as one of the few winners among major EU leaders from the June 6-9 ballot. However, Meloni’s moment doesn’t seem to have materialized (yet) as her political family was shut out from negotiations on the EU’s top jobs by the old guard of pro-EU traditionalists from the center-right, center-left, and liberal wings.       

Von der Leyen should not celebrate yet, though, as she faces a tough confirmation vote from the European Parliament. Getting to the magic number of 361 votes could prove a tall order. In 2019 von der Leyen got only a slim majority for her first term. Now an even more difficult road to confirmation lies ahead in the new European Parliament. Von der Leyen will need all her political skill to assemble a new majority in a legislature that includes a much-reduced, less reliable mainstream coalition at her back, with some old and more than a few new detractors. Then there are the hard-right critics who feel emboldened by their performance at the ballot box, and they are irritated by their exclusion from her nomination process. The two options that could push her safely over the finish line—adding Meloni’s political group on the right or the Greens on the left to the pro-EU coalition at the center—are mutually exclusive, as neither wants to be part of a von der Leyen bloc that involves the respective other. But that’s not the only problem. Reaching out to those wings would also risk undercutting the existing coalition, as von der Leyen’s center-right allies are wary of the Greens, while the center-left has warned von der Leyen not to even talk to Meloni’s hard-right group.      

Von der Leyen is still more likely than not to go on to win confirmation for a second term. She has the skill and experience to put together a winning policy agenda with just enough on offer for just enough of the key players. The election outcome helps further converge the agenda for Europe’s next political cycle around themes in part shaped under von der Leyen 1.0—from economic competitiveness and economic security to greater defense industrial cooperation and a Europe that gets tougher on migration. And the combination of Macron’s election gamble at home, the instability that could emanate from a hung parliament in France, and the leadership vacuum from Paris to Berlin more generally will act as disciplining force on some that may have second thoughts about von der Leyen. Many in her existing coalition may not want to risk adding another political crisis at the EU level by rejecting her in the current situation.          

For many in Washington, a second term for von der Leyen would be welcome. Von der Leyen and the European Union played an important role in US President Joe Biden’s “America is back” narrative of reaffirming key alliances. She and her team not only helped keep Europe united on sanctions and energy diversification in the face of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, but also led creative efforts to see the EU step up in major ways from military to macro-financial assistance to Kyiv—without which the administration’s political challenges at home on Ukraine could have been significantly worse. Most importantly, however, the Commission president started building an economic security agenda and toolbox for the EU that led to much greater convergence with the United States on what really matters to Washington—the long-term strategic competition with China. On that front, the United States would probably continue to have a major ally in von der Leyen, especially with the debate among member states on the right course vis-à-vis Beijing likely to heat up in the coming months and years. A second Donald Trump administration could again put all of von der Leyen’s political skills and flexibility to the test of having to both be the “tough negotiator” on behalf of the EU that Trump lauded when they first met in 2020, and also build a rapport anywhere close to the one she enjoys with the Biden White House.               

—Jörn Fleck is the senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center.

António Costa: The skilled negotiator will be a major contrast to Charles Michel 

Costa is a safe and smart choice to be the next president of the European Council, succeeding Charles Michel. Costa, who served as the Portuguese prime minister from 2015 to 2024, is expected to be a more selfless convener for the Council and the entire EU, in contrast with Michel, who has irked leaders with his self-promotion. 

Costa is a master negotiator who excels at striking deals behind the scenes. He made his mark forming a unique coalition of left-wing parties (geringonça, in Portuguese) to initially govern in 2015, and he was just as comfortable making deals with the opposition as prime minister. These skills will serve Costa well as European Council president, as he will have to navigate the twenty-seven personalities and priorities of the EU’s heads of state to move policy along, especially given what is expected to be a bold agenda for the next Commission.

Costa brings socialist/center-left and southern European equities to the position. He won the presidency over Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen despite an ongoing investigation in Portugal involving allegations of corruption within Costa’s former inner circle that caused him to resign. The fact that the EU went forward with Costa as the next Council president shows that the bloc is comfortable with the status of the ongoing investigation, one in which Costa has not been formally charged. Costa is expected to have a strong working relationship with von der Leyen in her second term as European Commission president and is also well-respected among other national leaders such as Macron. To be effective in his new role, however, Costa will need to become more hawkish on defense and migration issues, areas that were not his strengths domestically in Portugal.

—Andrew Bernard is a retired US Air Force Colonel and a visiting fellow in the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center.

Kaja Kallas: The first EU foreign policy chief from the east takes a stronger stance against Russia

If Kallas is confirmed as high representative for foreign affairs and security policy, this will be the first time a leader from Europe’s east will take the EU’s top diplomatic post. While this is a major milestone for the bloc, her appointment is also concerning for some allies. Kallas, one of the EU’s staunchest Russia hawks, has been a leading voice in supporting Ukraine with military and financial aid, and ramping up the dial on sanctions against Russia. She’s even a “wanted person” in Russia in connection with her efforts to remove Soviet-era World War II monuments in Estonia, which the Kremlin decried as the “desecration of historical memory.” Kallas’s highly critical stance toward Russia has made some leaders worry that handing her this post may be seen as too provocative.

Kallas has also faced difficulty on the home front, with her approval rating among Estonians plunging to 16 percent earlier this year after the news broke that her husband had stakes in a logistics company that continued to operate in Russia after its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Further, EU diplomats accused Kallas’s government of inflating reimbursements for equipment sent to Ukraine under the European Peace Facility, an accusation she has denied. 

Overall, however, with her reputation as a pragmatic leader, Kallas is a good choice for high representative, though she will perhaps have some work to do when it comes to ensuring that the EU is seen as a respected authority in regions such as the Middle East and the Global South.

—Rachel Rizzo is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center.

The post Experts react: What to expect from the European Union’s new leadership appeared first on Atlantic Council.

What did we learn from the June 30 first-round results, and what do they tell us about what’s to come in the July 7 second round?

The first round of the French parliamentary elections has been an unmitigated disaster for Macron. As foreseen by the polls, his party has been crushed between the far right and the coalition of the left. Macron’s Ensemble alliance only got a bit more than 20 percent on June 30, while National Rally is the winner of the day. The only question is whether National Rally, along with its conservative allies, will get a relative or an absolute majority on July 7—the second scenario being quite possible. It will depend on the way centrist and leftist voters will rally in the second round to defeat the far right.

In any case, France is entering a long crisis. If the far right governs, it will sooner or later enter into a confrontation with Macron. If the parliament is ungovernable, France will be totally self-centered and unable to act. It’s a sad day for France and for Europe. 

—Gérard Araud is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center and a former ambassador of France to the United States.

Macron’s gamble in calling a snap legislative election already appears to have backfired, but things still remain very uncertain ahead of the next round on July 7. Marine Le Pen’s far-right National Rally party is in the lead with 33 percent of the vote, but that does not suggest the party will be able to achieve an absolute majority in the second round to control the parliament. The left-wing alliance came not far behind, with 28 percent. Macron’s centrists came third with 20 percent—a dramatic decrease from their position before, but not low enough to be knocked out of the second round in most constituencies. 

High turnout and fewer candidates will mean an unprecedented number of three-way contests in the second round. It is therefore now up to the center and the left to decide if they join forces to stand down candidates in specific constituencies to prevent the far right from taking power. But this may be difficult because there are huge divisions between them, especially with far-left frontman Jean-Luc Mélenchon continuing to provoke Macron and presenting himself as the head of the left-wing alliance.  

—Dave Keating is a nonresident senior fellow at the Europe Center and Brussels correspondent for France24.

The first round has been a punishment for Macron. His party is in third place with 20 percent of the vote. He has lost the (relative) majority he got in 2022 after his election as president. He will face a cohabitation in which his power will be shared with a government from another political party.

The National Rally is in first place, with 29 percent alone and 33 percent when grouped with its far-right allies. The New Popular Front obtained nearly 28 percent, while other small parties accumulated scores that may help the left when it comes to building coalitions. Whereas some polls had anticipated the National Rally would win as much as 37 percent, the official results indicate their victory wound up being smaller than those polls expected. There could be a slight sense of disappointment in the National Rally headquarters. The left has not lost yet; if the various member parties of the coalition stick with each other and, more importantly, if the “front republicain” joins together with the center, that would work perfectly to block the National Rally. Macron’s message is not very clear on whether he is calling on his voters to do that or not. A lot will depend on his candidates that did not qualify for the second round: Will they vote for the far right or the left? Despite the president’s weak situation, a lot will depend on Macron and his voters. Whether the far right will get an absolute or a relative majority depends on the level of the center’s mobilization.

As soon as the first results were published Sunday evening, thousands and thousands of French gathered in the streets to protest against the National Rally and remind the world that, despite the doublespeak, the far right will remain the far right—steeped in anti-immigration, Euroskeptic, and racist rhetoric that has defined it for decades. 

—Rama Yade is the senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center and a senior fellow with the Europe Center. She was the first woman of African descent to become a member of the French cabinet, serving as France’s deputy minister of foreign affairs and human rights, deputy minister of sports, and ambassador to the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) under French President Nicolas Sarkozy (2007-2012).

The below responses were compiled before the June 30 first round of elections.

What are the stakes?

Never, in the last fifty years, have the stakes in a French election been so high. This electoral campaign has been unprecedentedly short, dramatic, intense, and uncertain. The country has been totally surprised by Macron’s decision to call snap elections. The defeat of the president’s party in the European elections was expected and didn’t have any direct consequence in domestic politics. It wasn’t necessary to rush to elections at such short notice. And there is no assurance that the election’s outcome will take France on a stable path.

The opposite is the most likely scenario. Some are saying that Macron has thrown the country under the bus. Polls show increasing bitterness toward him.

Suddenly, France is facing the prospect of a government led by the far right or far left, considering that the president’s centrist party is generally expected to lose ground. A government led by the far right or far left would face domestic and international backlash. In the best-case scenario (or more accurately in the least-bad scenario), the elections could lead to a hung parliament and therefore an essentially ungovernable country. In any case, France has been stepping into a prolonged political crisis with unpredictable consequences. Some opponents even suggested that in the event of political deadlock, the president would need to resign to avoid political crisis.

No matter what Macron will try to assert, France will be much weakened in international affairs. That will particularly be the case on two issues. The first is Ukraine, where the far right and far left have advocated for more engagement and negotiation with Russia. The second is the European Union (EU), where the two extremes of the political spectrum share similar Euroskepticism. With the United Kingdom drifting away and Germany facing its own crisis, there will be a vacuum in the European leadership at a moment when the continent can hardly afford it.

—Gerard Araud, distinguished fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center and former ambassador of France to the United States.

What are Macron’s goals and ambitions in calling this election now?

There are numerous theories as to why Macron called early parliamentary elections, especially with his party lagging so far behind in the polls. Macron has described the move as the “most responsible” decision following his party’s disastrous showing in the recent European Parliament elections. It could be that the French president is simply respecting the electorate’s overwhelming decision. But more realistically, Macron’s calculation is more complicated. Among the going theories as to why he called for elections, a handful stand out:

1. Macron could be hoping to catch his competitors by surprise, forcing them to pull together last-minute campaigns, while spurring action among his base with the memory of the far right’s gains fresh in their minds. The move could also be a bet that the French public would not actually double down on their protest vote, a vote often exercised in European elections, and would rather choose unpopular prudence in Macron’s party over the populist anger of protest parties on the far right and far left. This move assumes that the public’s vote in June was, in fact, just a protest vote and not a deeper shift within France to the extremes.
2. Macron might be making a tactical retreat. Marine Le Pen’s National Rally is in a strong position to win the most seats in the National Assembly and thus has the best shot at forming a government with Le Pen’s protégé, Jordan Bardella, at the helm. A far-right government could demonstrate the potential failures of far-right leadership. The move could grant the public its desire for change while presenting a sobering reality ahead of the vastly more critical presidential elections in 2027. However, this thinking assumes that the far right—when handed the keys to the government—will fail and that any dysfunction would fall at their feet, not at Macron’s.
3. Macron could be looking to carve out a new place for himself. In the wake of Macron’s announcement, a number of left-leaning parties—including the Socialist Party, the Ecologists, La France Insoumise, and the Communist Party—united to form the New Popular Front, which is now polling second behind the far right. With both the left and right having the potential to emerge victorious from the elections, Macron can present himself as the savior of the center, potentially swaying some less radically inclined voters to his camp, similar to what he did when he first ran for office. However, this approach assumes that the ground hasn’t shifted under Macron’s feet and risks another electoral disaster for the second time in a month.
4. Finally, and most simply, Macron might just be hoping that his party can pull off a miracle. Prior to dissolving the parliament, Renaissance did not have an absolute majority in the National Assembly and had to build coalitions on a case-by-case basis for every piece of legislation. If he thinks Renaissance has a shot to regain its majority through snap elections, Macron could avoid serving the rest of his term as a lame duck. But looking at the polls, and barring any major changes or shocks, this is the least likely scenario of them all.

—Emma Nix, assistant director with the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center.

What do the polls say and what might their results mean for the rest of Macron’s term?

At first glance, the polls spell trouble for Macron. The far right leads with a healthy margin (34 percent for the National Rally, 29 percent for the left, and 22 percent for Renaissance).

However, because of how France votes, it isn’t clear just how bad the situation really is for the French president’s party. Candidates must get at least 12.5 percent of the registered voters in their district to even continue to the second-round election. While the polls appear decidedly in favor of the National Rally, turnout has the potential to impact how many candidates make it to the second round. In general, high turnout is expected to bolster Renaissance’s chances of making it out of the first round, and Renaissance competes better against the far right (though still not great) than the left does in polls regarding the second round. Further adding to Macron’s glimmer of hope is a recent boost in the polls after the first week of campaigning. Even so, the National Rally appears poised to win the most seats in the National Assembly, which would hamper Macron’s agenda and legacy.

The polls are hinting that some of Macron’s policies are at risk. The French system assigns the president significant influence over foreign and defense policy, while domestic policy is implemented by the prime minister and the government, which controls the budget and other key levers of power and could spell trouble for Macron. For example, both the left and far right have expressed interest in overturning Macron’s controversial pension reforms and have pledged to spend more despite France’s precarious budgetary position. For Macron, implementing his vision for France hasn’t been easy. Renaissance already lacks an absolute majority in the National Assembly, making the passage of Macron’s agenda difficult. But in any event of “cohabitation,” or a president and prime minister of different parties, paralysis in government is a likely outcome for the rest of Macron’s term.

—Emma Nix

What are the key drivers impacting voters in this election?

Ahead of the European elections held earlier in June, French voters indicated that their top concerns were poverty and social exclusion, climate change, and public health. French constituents cared for these issues up to 10 percentage points more than the European average. Inflation and purchasing power also ranked among the most pertinent issues and are expected to similarly drive voter dynamics in the upcoming snap election. Current polls point to immigration, social protection, and security as other issues driving voter preferences, laying the groundwork for a shift to the right.

For many, this election will be personality-driven. Dissatisfaction with Macron’s leadership seems to be fueling anti-elite sentiments among voters. Only 28 percent of the French public is favorable towards the president, ranking lower than right-wing figures such as Bardella and Le Pen and also lower than current Prime Minister Gabriel Attal, a member of Renaissance.

France’s political blocs have moved in the past to cater to voter priorities. Macron’s Renaissance announced an unemployment insurance reform decree between the two voting rounds, and the National Rally promises to reduce energy prices drastically and to toughen immigration laws. During this campaign, left-wing parties have attempted to appeal to voters in part by promising to repeal Macron’s controversial 2023 pension reform.

—Moritz Ludwig, young global professional with the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center.

What might the election outcomes mean for France’s foreign policy approach?

Whatever the actual results of the snap election, its implications for France’s foreign policy might actually take a long time to be felt. This has to do with the practices of the country’s institutions and with the goals a new government would actually pursue (assuming Renaissance will not pull off a victory).

On the first point, the French constitution does not provide clear guidelines on the roles assumed by the president and the prime minister. The president traditionally has domaine réservé (“reserved domain”) on foreign and defense policies. If the polls prove true, the president will have to govern with a majority from the opposition. This isn’t the first time the president would need to do so, but two features make today’s case exceptional: It could be the first time that a far-right party such as the National Rally would rule, and there seems to be less potential for consensus on foreign policy between parties than in the past.

What has worked in the past is no guarantee for the future, and the foreign-policy role of the prime minister (and the government he or she oversees) remains a question mark. Paralyzed domestically, Macron may be tempted to spend more energy on the international stage. Or, on the contrary, he might need to get much more involved domestically on issues he prioritizes, such as the budget law. In both cases, there are effects to be felt. Should he focus abroad, he would likely be undermined by his government should it have conflicting foreign-policy priorities. Should he focus inward, France would risk its credibility on the international stage, and there would be an increasing likelihood that many French voices push their own contradictory proposals.

What’s more, French domestic politics could spill into the international scene. If there is no majority in the National Assembly, delivering on promises made to the voters may prove to be increasingly difficult. The necessity for political wins might encourage a new government to be more active in foreign policy. Because of the greater difficulty in reaching consensus, both the president and the governing party will have to prioritize which political battles to fight. Foreign policy might well be collateral.

The specific foreign-policy aims that will actually be pursued remain uncertain. Here, the personnel may well determine policy. The political party of the minister of defense or the minister for Europe and foreign affairs will be much more critical now in determining France’s foreign-policy direction than in the past few years. On the left, despite remarkable differences, the New Popular Front succeeded in finding consensus on issues that initially split them (Hamas’ October 7 terrorist attack on Israel had a major impact in dissolving the left coalition in the National Assembly, for instance). However, foreign policy is definitely one of the areas in which the parties have the least in common. As for the far right, the ever-changing positions on key foreign-policy issues—like France’s leadership in the European Union, support to Ukraine, and France’s approach to NATO—indicates more about what it would not do (at least for now) and less about the issues it would realistically pursue.

Foreign policy has rarely been a key issue for French voters in elections, and these snap elections are no exception. Yet, the belief that French foreign policy would be preserved from the turmoil of the domestic scene is, at best, wishful thinking.

—Marie Jourdain, nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center.

What might the election outcomes specifically mean for…

Further reading

New Atlanticist Jun 25, 2024

How will France’s snap elections play out? Here are four scenarios.

By Rama Yade

The far-right National Rally party is dominating the French political landscape ahead of elections on June 30 and July 7, but its victory is just one of several possibilities.

Elections France

Inflection Points Today Jun 11, 2024

Macron rolls the dice on France’s future

By Frederick Kempe

The French president could have responded in many ways to Sunday’s humiliation in European elections. He took perhaps the riskiest course available.

Elections Europe & Eurasia

New Atlanticist Jun 5, 2024

After honoring D-Day, Macron and Biden embark on a diplomatic sprint for Europe’s security

By Léonie Allard

The commemoration in Normandy will be followed by the Group of Seven summit in Italy, the Switzerland peace summit for Ukraine, and the NATO Summit in Washington.

France NATO

The Europe Center promotes leadership, strategies, and analysis to ensure a strong, ambitious, and forward-looking transatlantic relationship.

Learn more

The post Your primer on France’s snap elections appeared first on Atlantic Council.

But now, climate-skeptic voices and opposition to climate efforts are gaining political weight, as shown by recent trends in the European Parliament election results earlier this month. While Europeans still see climate change as a major challenge, discontent with financial developments and concerns about defense and security rank even higher in their priorities, according to the latest Eurobarometer polling.

With the changing composition of the European Parliament, some of the biggest implications will concern climate policy. A weakened EU climate agenda could result in the continent falling short of decarbonization targets. It could also influence partners abroad to mirror more lax climate policies. In the face of these shifts, Europe’s policymakers need a resilient environmental policy profile that endures political shifts and builds trust in the longevity of EU climate action among voters and international partners. 

The legacy of a climate consensus

In the 2019 European Parliament elections, climate change was a decisive topic for voters. Following the vote, the then nominee for European Commission president, Ursula von der Leyen, promptly pledged a strong focus on climate action as part of her eventually successful bid to secure the approval by the European Parliament. The Commission turned her pledge into action with the European Green Deal, which comprised numerous ambitious decarbonization policies. Von der Leyen called it Europe’s “man on the moon” moment.

To align EU legislation with the intermediate goal of reducing net greenhouse gas emissions by at least 55 percent by 2030, the Fit for 55 package expanded the EU emissions trading system, introduced the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism for carbon-intensive imports, and set new standards for the land use, transportation, and energy sectors, among other policies. Furthermore, at least 30 percent of the European recovery package funding was allocated for climate action.

Despite the initial progress, the wind in the sails of the EU’s green agenda now appears diminished. A sluggish economic recovery, stubbornly persistent inflation, and rising energy costs—in part, a downstream effect of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022—have resulted in the green agenda as a target for farmers’ protests and rallies.

Interest group pressure and conservative opposition to climate action have hampered green policies at the national level, too. A watered down German climate change law, climate-skepticism among Italian political leadership, and French President Emmanuel Macron calling in May of last year for a “pause” of EU environmental regulations exemplify the simultaneous nature of developments on the member state and the EU level.

Green parties lost in this year’s European Parliament elections, greatly diminishing their political weight in the body. Some commentators have already written the obituary of the bloc’s green agenda, arguing that “Europe’s green moment is over.” 

What’s next for the Green Deal?

The center-right European People’s Party (EPP), von der Leyen’s party group and the largest in the European Parliament, reaffirmed Europe’s leading role in global climate action in its 2024 party platform. At the same time, it advocates for technological neutral approaches and distances itself from the Greens and Socialists, whose position the EPP calls “ideological” in their manifesto. The rejection of a contentious bill on pesticide use in 2023 demonstrates the group’s ambiguous stance on environmental legislation as it restrained von der Leyen’s Green Deal objectives to foster sustainability in the agricultural sector. Newly and reelected EPP members are “completely divided on where to go with the Green Deal,” according to Greens/EFA co-president Terry Reintke, emphasizing the limbo in which the project currently hangs.

In the incoming European Parliament, support for the Green Deal will continue to come from the center-left Socialists and Democrats (S&D) group, which highlights the social aspects of a just climate transition, and the liberal Renew Europe group, which emphasizes the need for pragmatic implementation. While the Greens proposed an even more ambitious Green and Social Deal as a major investment plan, other left groups are more critical of the bloc’s approach to decarbonization.

Further to the right, the green backlash has become a rallying cry for conservative and far-right political groups, such as the European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) and the populist Identity and Democracy (ID), which oppose the Green Deal, advocate for local climate strategies, and call decarbonization targets unrealistic. A more prominent role of the ECR and ID in the European Parliament, following their gains in the European elections could slow down the already insufficient emissions reduction and impede the effective implementation of Green Deal policies.

However, it’s too soon to declare the death of the green agenda. It will, instead, likely be deprioritized, contending with competing policy interests. While the overlapping crises of climate change, pandemic recovery, the war in Ukraine, and the resulting inflationary trends have drawn away the electorate’s focus on climate issues, environmental concerns remained salient for voters. It is unlikely that the European Green Deal will be abandoned, especially if von der Leyen stays on as European Commission president.

The new distribution of the parliamentary seats opens possibilities for a more conservative majority but also for coalitions with center-left parties. While the three main centrist groups have reportedly reached an agreement on top European Union posts with von der Leyen as Commission president, it is not a given that she will gather enough votes in parliament. Given the new distribution of parliament seats, Green parties might therefore be the key to securing von der Leyen a second term and thus exert influence on climate protection to remain prioritized.

Regardless, even a weakened climate agenda would be a mistake. Both for political and strategic reasons, European policymakers cannot abandon the green transition. Other priorities may, rightly, deserve attention, but the climate crisis must not be ignored. Europe is, after all, the fastest-warming continent, according a recent report by the United Nations and EU. Temperatures there are rising at around twice the global average.

To ensure the viability and centrality of the Green Deal in the new European parliament, officials will need to link policy issues and make the case that the green transition can help the competitiveness agenda. A focus on implementation rather than new legislation is likely. In this consideration, a nonpartisan commitment to technologically sound and ecologically just climate action is necessary to accommodate voters’ demands and bridge party gaps. This will require political leadership, especially from von der Leyen and her EPP party group, which has yet to find a common line regarding the future of the European Green Deal.

Moritz Ludwig is a young global professional with the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center.

The post Green Deal fatigue? How the European Parliament elections could affect EU climate policies. appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The United States is outperforming all of its advanced economy peers in post-COVID growth, and it is not particularly close. As we’ll surely hear from Biden on Thursday, fiscal policy has played a role. The major infrastructure investments through the Inflation Reduction Act and CHIPS and Science Act, have started to create new jobs in the manufacturing sector. The Federal Reserve also played a key role by keeping interest rates near zero for twenty-two months and pumping trillions in liquidity and backstops into the US economy after the crisis. But there are other factors at play as well, including the rise of homegrown artificial intelligence companies and producers such as NVIDIA that make those machines hum, boosting the United States ahead of its fellow Group of Seven (G7) countries. Combined with increased productivity growth, you have the recipe for an unexpected surge in the US economy. 

—Josh Lipsky is the senior director of the Atlantic Council’s GeoEconomics Center and a former adviser at the International Monetary Fund.

How does inflation in the United States compare to the G7? It’s falling, but not as fast as in Europe. The tradeoff with higher growth has been somewhat sticky inflation in the United States and a struggle to get back to the Fed’s 2 percent target range for price growth. It’s the surge in inflation during the pandemic and the still-elevated price levels that have generated so much discontent domestically about the US economy. Voters can’t feel that they may be doing better than citizens in Japan or Germany—what they can feel is how much it costs them to go to the grocery store this year compared to last. 

—Josh Lipsky

One of the biggest points of contention during the debate will be about job creation. Biden will say Trump was the first president since Herbert Hoover to leave office with the United States having lost jobs during his presidency. If there’s one rule in US economic history, it’s to try not to be compared to Herbert Hoover. Of course, the reason for that fact was the COVID-19 pandemic. What’s most surprising, though, is what happened after. Unlike previous recoveries, the US labor market rebounded swiftly and within twenty-nine months had recovered all the jobs lost during the crisis. As of May 2024, over fifteen million jobs have been created during the Biden administration. The numbers are the numbers. The big debate that we will see play out Thursday is which factors drove which parts of the crash and recovery, and who gets the credit or blame. 

—Josh Lipsky

One issue on which both sides of the aisle seem to agree is taking a strong stance on economic competition with China. The question of how strong will be up for debate, with Trump suggesting a 60 percent tariff on Chinese goods and Biden following a more targeted approach in his recent tariff increases on electric vehicles, steel, and other goods. Biden likely won’t mention that most of the Trump-era tariffs remain in place, and Trump won’t want to admit that the share of US imports coming from China is lower now than at any point in the last decade. Two of the driving forces—China’s economic slowdown and zero-COVID policies—probably won’t be part of the discussion. But they should be. 

—Sophia Busch is an assistant director at the GeoEconomics Center.

The US economy continues to show declining emissions intensity of gross domestic product (GDP), meaning the amount of carbon emissions per unit of GDP. Crucially, the United States is cutting emissions while continuing to grow the economy. The Rhodium Group projects that emissions fell 1.9 percent even as the economy expanded by 2.4 percent in 2023. Accordingly, US emissions intensity of real GDP continues to decline even though the US economy is larger than it has ever been. 

—Joseph Webster is a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Global Energy Center.

US energy production stands at an all-time high because of the country’s higher output of oil, gas, and renewable energy sources such as solar and wind. Energy from oil production in 2023 rose by 5 percent compared to pre-COVID times in 2019, while natural gas output increased by 32 percent. Solar energy production has soared by a whopping 104 percent, as wind energy output grew by 44 percent. These developments have put pressure on coal output, which has fallen by 17 percent and is poised to decline further. Crucially, solar generation outpaced coal consumption for the first time in March 2024 in Texas, the country’s largest coal-consuming state. The US energy production mix is changing. Energy production—including for clean energy sources such as solar, wind, and nuclear energy—seems poised to surge if onerous permitting roadblocks, such as for siting transmission lines, are lifted. 

—Joseph Webster

While the United States outperforms other G7 nations in economic growth, it falls behind in broader measures of well-being. Over the past decade, the United States has seen a decline on the Atlantic Council’s Prosperity Index, the only G7 country to experience a decline. More striking is the fact that even in the prosperity components in which the country has experienced improvements, such as education, these gains have been smaller than its peers’. As a result, the United States’ ranking has fallen in virtually all categories of the Prosperity Index since 1995. Yet this decline must be put in perspective, as the United States remains well established among the top countries on the Prosperity Index—ranking thirty-sixth out of 164 countries.

—Joseph Lemoine is the director of the Atlantic Council’s Freedom and Prosperity Center.

Life expectancy, an important health indicator, remains a challenge for the United States. Not only does it lag behind other G7 nations, but it also experienced the worst decline among G7 nations during the COVID-19 pandemic. Furthermore, the United States is one of only two G7 countries, alongside Germany, that hasn’t fully recovered from the pandemic’s impact on life expectancy.

—Joseph Lemoine

Income inequality has been a persistent problem in the United States for decades. While there might be temporary fluctuations, the overall trend shows minimal improvement. There has been some progress made in the last five years, but the United States remains worse off compared to 2010 when it comes to income inequality.

—Joseph Lemoine

Alisha Chhangani, Clara Falkenek, Gustavo Romero, and Konstantinos Mitsotakis of the GeoEconomics Center contributed to the data visualizations in this article.

The post Your presidential debate prep on the US economy, in charts appeared first on Atlantic Council.

In a twenty-day campaign—the shortest period allowed by the French constitution—candidates are competing across 577 legislative constituencies during two rounds of elections on June 30 and July 7. The political landscape is dominated by the far-right National Rally party, which came out on top in the European Parliament elections with 31.4 percent of the vote. It was the highest vote share in the party’s history and twice as much as Macron’s party received. National Rally—an anti-immigration, Euroskeptic, and extremist party co-founded in 1972 in part by a former Waffen SS member—was the leading political force in 93 percent of French towns.

The prospect now on everyone’s mind is “cohabitation,” featuring a president and prime minister from opposing parties and a far-right or left party at the head of the French government. But cohabitation is just one of several potential outcomes.

Based on my experience as a former French minister and ambassador, I can envision at least four political scenarios that could play out in the coming weeks. Until this month, nobody could imagine that such scenarios might happen in a country like France. A lot will depend on the “front républicain” (the past tendency of French voters, in the name of moral principles, to vote en masse against the far right to keep it from power) and on voter turnout. In almost any scenario, France will face an unprecedented constitutional crisis and have to fight to preserve its influence in the European Union (EU) and on the international stage.

SCENARIO 1

A majority for the far right

SCENARIO 2

A majority for the united left

SCENARIO 3

The absence of a majority

SCENARIO 4

A victory for Macron’s party

Scenario 1: A majority for the far right

In this scenario, the twenty-eight-year-old president of National Rally, Jordan Bardella, would likely become prime minister in a historic cohabitation with Macron, who would remain president.

Four new elements are combining in ways that indicate this outcome is quite possible.

First, polls for the legislative elections suggest that the far right might receive between 33 percent and 35 percent of the vote, earning between 235 and 265 seats in the new assembly, roughly triple its current number.

Second, a vote for National Rally is no longer viewed as shameful, and the party is no longer a niche interest. Increasingly, pensioners and high earners, who have traditionally not voted for the far right, are joining the working-class vote for National Rally.

Third, many French now credit the far right with an ability to govern better than the country’s traditional parties. In several cities run by far-right mayors, National Rally got larger shares in the recent European Parliament elections than the party did in the nation overall (31.4 percent). This includes Henin-Beaumont (61.4 percent), Frejus (47.4 percent), Beziers (40.5 percent), and Perpignan (36.8 percent).

Fourth, while the far right has never been able to secure enough votes or allies to hold a majority in the legislature, it is now finding support among traditional parties, as demonstrated by the unexpected backing of Éric Ciotti, president of France’s conservative party, the Republicans, who recently spoke about forming an “alliance” with National Rally and is fielding sixty-two National Rally/Republican candidates. Even though Ciotti was expelled from his own party following the incident, a coalition of Republicans and Macron’s former voters could join together to support the “alliance” to push back against the widely demonized far left. These additional supporters may help National Rally reach an absolute majority of 289 seats in France’s National Assembly.

This cohabitation would have a deep impact internationally. It would not be the first cohabitation in the Fifth Republic’s history—the arrangement happened in 1988 under then President Francois Mitterrand and in 1995 under then President Jacques Chirac. But it would be the first cohabitation with a party not previously known for governing. France would be represented by Bardella and Macron, together, at European summits. Even if large parts of National Rally’s international program have disappeared from its published materials and public discussions (such as a “Frexit” from the EU and an exit from NATO’s integrated military command for now) because there is no consensus on these topics among National Rally voters, the far right has long been more friendly toward Russia and less supportive of NATO. This position dates back to Jean-Marie Le Pen, the father of former party president Marine Le Pen.

It’s clear that a National Rally parliamentary majority would question France’s long-term financial commitments to Ukraine and would not prioritize the containment of Russia’s disinformation activities in France. The relationship between National Rally and President Vladimir Putin’s Russia, where Marine Le Pen found financial support for her political campaigns, has been at the heart of many controversies, including legal cases. In Brussels, the party will be able to count on a larger group of thirty French members of the European Parliament, including the controversial former head of the EU border agency Frontex, Fabrice Leggeri, as well as European allies such as Italy’s Lega and Hungary’s Fidesz.

Finally, National Rally, usually known for its anti-Semitic background, has used the tragedy of the Gaza war to serve its domestic agenda by joining demonstrations against anti-Semitism after the October 7 attacks in Israel. So far, National Rally has received the support of several respected Jewish figures, who announced that they may vote for the party in the event of a matchup against the far left.

Scenario 2: A majority for the united left

In this scenario, the left, against all odds, could unite around the New Popular Front, which brings together La France Insoumise, the Communist Party, the Socialist Party, the Ecologists, and the New Anticapitalist Party. Mathematically, the left’s chances of leading the country have increased to the point that polls suggest it could win 25 to 32 percent of the vote.

But since politics is not always a matter of numbers, it is unclear whether the left will transform this promising start into electoral success. Doing so will depend on the ability of these left-wing parties to remain united amid both internal pressures (with allies on the left hesitant to back the hard-left Jean-Luc Mélenchon in his bid to be prime minister) and external pressures (La France Insoumise is facing accusations of anti-Semitism in the context of the war in Gaza).

Yet, if it leads the French government, the New Popular Front says it will “defend Ukraine and peace on the European continent,” in particular “through the delivery of the necessary weapons.” It also advocates for “the release of Israeli hostages held by Hamas and Palestinian political prisoners.” In addition, the left-wing parties call on the French government to “immediately recognize the State of Palestine alongside the State of Israel,” and to “break with the French government’s guilty support for the far-right supremacist government” of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. The new Popular Front wants to “impose an immediate ceasefire in Gaza and enforce the [International Court of Justice] order which unambiguously evokes a risk of genocide.”

At the EU level, the New Popular Front is calling for the “end of free trade agreements” and a “reform of the EU common agricultural policy.” It also proposes to “tax the richest at the European level.”

A Macron cohabitation government would only be stable if its partner wins an absolute majority in the National Assembly. In scenario one or two, if the far right or united left win only a relative majority—meaning they are the largest group but hold less than 289 seats—they will face a powerful opposition and repeated threats of no-confidence votes. Their hold on power would be shaky at best.

On the international stage, Macron won’t be alone in defining French foreign policy, including the country’s approach toward Ukraine and Israel. Even though he would remain the “commander in chief,” chairing France’s defense councils and trying to carve out a domaine réservé (“reserved domain”) in foreign policy areas, Macron would be challenged by the National Assembly, which votes on the defense budget, and by the prime minister, who is in charge of the general defense organization.

Scenario 3: The absence of a majority

According to the latest polls, it is possible that no majority will emerge on July 7. In such a scenario, Macron would be unable to call the leader of a winning party to Matignon, the residence of the prime minister. This is a Belgium-like scenario of total blockage. A political crisis would turn into a regime crisis. In that case, the number of options is limited.

First, Macron could appoint an external respected figure and ask that person to build a coalition. In the meantime the current prime minister, Gabriel Attal, would likely remain in power to manage affairs until a majority is formed, but he would be unable to pass any laws. Given that French foreign policy occupies a domaine réservé dominated by the president’s decisions, Macron could continue to operate as he has on the world stage. But with no majority in the National Assembly and the constitutional impossibility to dissolve it before the next year, the president will be so weak politically that his legitimacy will be questioned every day by his international peers in Brussels and elsewhere. This situation cannot last long.

That is why Macron may have no choice other than to resign, as Marine Le Pen and Pierre Mazeaud, former president of the Constitutional Council, noted recently. According to the French constitution, the president of the Senate would then be the acting president of the country and a presidential election should be organized between twenty and thirty-five days after the resignation. To preempt the critics who might question his legitimacy after two defeats in one month, Macron has already vowed that he will stay at the Élysée “until May 2027.”

In this scenario, would his resignation allow him to run in a new presidential election and win?

According to constitutional experts, the French constitution would not allow Macron to run for a third term. Article 6 of the Constitution says that “the President of the Republic is elected for five years by direct universal suffrage. No one can serve more than two consecutive terms.” The Constitutional Council would have the last word on this matter.

Scenario 4: A victory for Macron’s party

Although nobody—not even his supporters—mentions this possibility at this point, an outright win is what Macron, the architect of the current chaos, is hoping for. In this short legislative campaign, he intends to find allies in other political parties who reject the far left and the so-called “devil’s pact” between the head of the conservatives and National Rally. Macron is betting that the two-round system will provide “clarification” from French voters on National Rally’s win in the European Parliament elections. With a majority of seats, a decisive win for Macron might reveal National Rally’s victory earlier this month as an aberration. It could even enable Macron to obtain the majority that he was unable to secure in 2022, when he was reelected to a second term. It might then allow him to make more progress on his agenda in the National Assembly, where he has been threatened by a motion of censure as part of a budget vote.

Even if it is not clear why the French would vote differently in twenty days, a victory would mean that Macron was able to make up the difference thanks to an incredibly efficient campaign. For the EU, such an outcome would mean a return to normal business with a strong French interlocutor who has survived a major test and emerged stronger (and with a reshuffled cabinet).

. . .

Even if French institutions are strong, the divisions in society and French citizens’ pessimistic mood make the political context very volatile. If one side wins without a clear and absolute majority, they will face a strong opposition and threats of being turned out by a no-confidence vote in the parliament.

Any majority is likely to be so tight or nonexistent that the scenario of the president’s resignation and the organization of a new presidential election is already being discussed. Markets are reacting poorly to the instability.

Since 2017, Macron has built his political success on crushing the traditional governing parties of the left and the right, without building anything strong to replace them. He is now facing his fiercest opposition and is reduced to anticipating a “civil war” if the “extremes” win. He chose the battle, but at this moment the president appears to be outgunned.

Rama Yade is the senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center and a senior fellow with the Europe Center. She was the first woman of African descent to become a member of the French cabinet, serving as France’s deputy minister of foreign affairs and human rights, deputy minister of sports, and ambassador to the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) under French President Nicolas Sarkozy (2007-2012).

The post How will France’s snap elections play out? Here are four scenarios. appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The first article of the series discussed the outline of the election process and its significance.

This article examines the system of representation, which determines how many candidates will be elected for a four-year term from each of the electoral districts and how the voters will vote for candidates in these districts. Variations of these elements can produce vastly different results. In Syria, the system guarantees three effects: overrepresentation of regime strongholds in parliament, manipulation of candidates through a quota system that reserves seats for workers and farmers, and prevention of effective multi-party competition.

There are no criteria for the number of members of parliament allocated from each governorate, with allocation decided purely at the president’s discretion. The allocation remains the same as it was in the 2012, 2016, and 2020 elections, failing to consider any demographic changes seen in Syria since 2011. Based on the most recent official data, Syria’s population is 30 million (compared to a United Nations estimate of 23 million), and there has been no census since 2004.

Even a cursory look reveals how unfair the allocation of seats to constituencies is, and that it leads to significantly disproportional values of the vote. The allocation directly discriminates against the voters of the Raqqa, Al-Hasakah, Daraa, Aleppo, and Damascus City governorates—historically associated with opposition—while it favors voters in Quneitra, Latakia, Tartus, and Damascus governorates. The chart shows clearly the “value of the vote.” As an example, comparison of the official population data reveals that Damascus City governorate is represented in the assembly double than Rural Damascus and three times more than al-Hassakah. In another example, only 85,000 residents are needed for one member representing Lataka, while it takes 150,000 residents of Dara for a seat in the assembly.  This is contrary to the international electoral standard of equality of the vote.

While districting defines the inequality of the vote, the quota for farmers and workers defines inequality between the candidates. Of the 250 seats in parliament, the presidential decree assigned 127 to farmers or workers and 123 to “other sectors of society,” but the law does not elaborate on what “other sectors” means.

Nominally, the quota for farmers and workers introduced in 1973 was supposed to reflect socialist values and secure representation for working-class Syrians. In practice, the lack of criteria for candidacy in this category allows for manipulation, and many businessmen opted to run for these seats. In the 2020 elections, only 27.5 percent of the candidates (456 of the total 1,658) registered to run as farmers or workers, making those seats far less competitive. Also, while the system has a quota for farmers and workers, it does not include a quota for women. While far from the only method for protecting the representation of women, such a quota could counter the extraordinary and historically low representation of women; in the 2020 elections, only twenty-eight women were elected (11 percent of members).

But of all the stifling elements of the system, the ballot structure is the most damaging. On its face, the system appears simple: voters vote for as many candidates as there are seats in the district. Candidates run as individuals and, after the votes are tallied, are ranked simply by the number of votes. Those with the highest rankings win the seats. Yet this simplicity masks the extraordinary effect of this system, which is somewhat deceptively called the “block vote” system. In theory, it allows voters to vote for individual candidates, but in practice voters almost exclusively give all the votes to a block of candidates, often using a ballot with already selected candidates rather than voting on a blank “write-in” ballot.

Even when a block gains only a slight advantage, this translates into winning all the seats in the district. Those familiar with the Palestinian elections will remember that this system produced an overwhelming parliamentary majority for Hamas in 2005. In Lebanon, it guaranteed the pro-Syrian composition of the parliament in the post-civil war elections from 1992 to 2005. The Palestinian Authority, Lebanon, and Jordan abandoned this system, so Syria remains the only country in the world using it for the national elections. This is not by coincidence—the system is designed to disincentivize competition between political parties. The results of the 2020 elections demonstrate its effect, as the candidates nominated by the Baath-dominated National Unity list won all the seats for which they competed, while those who were not on the list had no chance to be elected. This will remain the case as long as there is no well-organized, disciplined, and unified opposition with a single list of candidates, as the effect of vote splitting between the individual candidates is tremendously damaging to all that campaign as individuals.  

It is virtually impossible to estimate outcomes if Syrian elections were held under a different electoral system. Because each voter votes for multiple candidates, their votes cannot simply be re-calculated to present how much each party would receive under a putative proportional representation system. Besides vote tallying, the block vote system has far-reaching implications for political competition as well. Because it assumes competition between individual candidates, undermining options for political organizing and competition between political parties, it all but ensures fragmentation of the opposition. The framework of the block vote is so advantageous to the Baath Party that, even if the opposition were welcome to compete in elections with guarantees that their candidates would not be disqualified or harassed, in practice, opposition parties would not stand a chance to win a significant number of seats.

Vladimir Pran advises electoral authorities, governments, and political leaders on transitional, electoral, and political processes.

Maroun Sfeir advises international and local civil society organizations, political groups, and electoral authorities on electoral and political processes.

The post The Syrian electoral system guarantees inequality appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The reformist faction has controlled major power centers in Iran, such as the presidency and parliament. However, despite their promises of “reform” and increased civil liberties, their rule was marked by bloody crackdowns, and Iranians are no longer fooled by such undeliverable and false promises.

Just months prior to Raisi’s death, Khatami—whose name and face have been blacked out from appearing in state media for supporting the 2009 post-election protests known as the Green Movement—boycotted the March parliamentary election. That election was described by the Iranian Reformist Front, a coalition of reformist factions, as “meaningless, noncompetitive, and ineffective” because all reformists had effectively been disqualified. Yet, Khatami, the face of the bygone reformist era that aimed to democratize the country, still placed faith in a system and role he once described as no more than a “footman” to maintain the status quo that most Iranians—especially Iranian Gen Z—are disillusioned by and want gone, as evidenced by a poll conducted by Netherlands-based GAMAAN in February.

The reformist movement in the Islamic Republic has long been dead. Activist Bahareh Hedayat, who spent her life advocating for gradual change, confirmed it in a letter from Evin prison—where she continues to languish—at the height of the 2022 Women, Life, Freedom uprising. Former Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif stated in a March audio leak that the clerical establishment sought the movement’s “erasure.” (Despite his leaked comments, Zarif has now joined Pezeshkian’s campaign team because he believes in overriding loyalty to the Islamic Republic.)

The trajectory of the Islamic Republic in recent years makes it abundantly clear that there is no room for reform under Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, with principalists—up until Raisi’s death—leading all government branches: the presidency, parliament, and judiciary. This was no accident and engineered by Khamenei, who, with the help of the Guardian Council—a twelve-member vetting body in which six are appointed by him directly—is making every calculation with the Islamic Republic post-mortem in mind. The supreme leader’s vision is an Islamic Revolution 2.0, in which relatively young ultraconservatives take the helm of the country—a new cohort nicknamed the “super revolutionaries.” 

The Islamic Republic had two historically low-turnout elections: the 2021 presidential election—or “selection,” as many described it at the time—which was engineered to hand the presidency to Raisi with 48.8 percent turnout and the March 2024 parliamentary election, which gave 233 out of 290 seats to the principalists with 41 percent turnout, an outcome not much different from the 2020 election. Khamenei has always emphasized that the regime’s legitimacy stemmed from its popularity and always encourages citizens to vote to show that popular support.

Since the December 2017–January 2018 protests, protesters have vocalized that all factions are irredeemable, as evident by the chant: “Reformists, principalists, the game is over.” This is likely why one reformist was allowed to run: to stimulate a higher voter turnout to give the clerical establishment legitimacy, which it lacks domestically. However, the Islamic Republic does not lack legitimacy on the international stage, as it recommenced ties with its Persian Gulf Arab neighbors including Saudi Arabia, has joined the economic grouping known as BRICS and the more security-focused Shanghai Cooperation Organization, and has continued to attend international conferences such as the World Economic Forum in Davos.

Iranian elections are unpredictable, though Pezeshkian could slightly move the election needle, leading to a second round. Still, the average Iranian is not stirred by a man who uses Khamenei’s formal title and claims that he intends to follow “the general policies of the exalted supreme leader” —language not commonly used by reformists.

And while he seems to be hitting all the buzz-worthy topics such as reviving the defunct nuclear deal and speaking out against the so-called morality police’s latest crackdown on women and girls, the Nour initiative, Pezeshkian has not moved the public, as evidenced by one interview that was described as “boring.”

Pezeshkian has also co-opted the de facto Women, Life, Freedom protest anthem “Baraye” (For the sake of) by singer Shervin Hajipour in his campaign, using “For the sake of wanting a normal life” in an election poster and “For the sake of Iran” as a campaign hashtag. The song reference has angered many Iranians who haven’t forgotten how more than 550 protesters—including sixty-eight children—were killed during the uprising (and the more than 1,500 others in previous protests), as shown by the slogan, “A sea of blood divides us,” referring to the people and the clerical establishment. To many, Pezeshkian and other candidates are merely puppets, which was best highlighted by a viral meme of candidates’ faces superimposed on Khamenei. I’ve been repeatedly told that Iranians are so unenthusiastic about the upcoming election that boycotting is not even a serious topic of conversation, because many assume that is what the majority will do. Even a poll conducted by the Iranian Students Polling Agency (ISPA) noted that 73 percent of Iranians didn’t follow the first presidential debate.

Elections aside, Iranians are drowning in hopelessness, prompted by multiple unsuccessful cycles of protests aimed at ending the Islamic Republic; a dire economic situation caused by systemic mismanagement, corruption, and, in part, US sanctions; and the brutal clampdowns on dissent. The June 15 prisoner swap of two Swedish nationals for Hamid Nouri, an Iranian official who was convicted of war crimes for his role in the 1988 massacre of five thousand political prisoners, was just another instance that demonstrated to Iranians that they could not rely on the West to hold the Islamic Republic accountable. The only way out of this conundrum is if Iranians take their destiny into their own hands. And if one thing is certain, it’s that their destinies will not be determined by the ballot box.

Holly Dagres is a nonresident senior fellow in the Atlantic Council’s Middle East programs and editor of the Atlantic Council’s IranSource blog. She is also the author of the “Iranians on #SocialMedia” report. Follow her on X: @hdagres.

The post Don’t be fooled by the ‘reformist.’ Iran’s presidential election won’t bring fundamental change. appeared first on Atlantic Council.

There have been two key trends in the Islamic Republic’s elections. Inside Iran, one is known as shol kon, seft kon (loosen, tighten). It refers to eight-year intervals of conservative administration followed by eight years of a reformist or pragmatist one. For eight years, the regime increases domestic oppression and hostility toward the free world to rally its conservative base. For the next eight years, marginal social freedoms would give hope for gradual reform, and rhetorical softening of foreign policy would release foreign pressure, through sanctions relief. Until recently, this policy recovered the political capital the regime had spent at home and abroad during the previous eight years of conservative administrations.

This has been the norm since Ayatollah Ali Khamenei became the supreme leader, with conservative Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani (1989-1997) followed by reformist Mohammad Khatami (1997-2005), conservative Mahmoud Ahmadinejad (2005-2013), pragmatist Hassan Rouhani (2013-2021), and conservative Ebrahim Raisi (2021-2024).

Raisi’s sudden death in a helicopter crash nearly three years into the job broke this trend. On the other hand, the Islamic Republic feels less of a need to play the same game. Domestically, reformists and moderates cannot rally the people any longer. On the international stage, it’s well-known that the presidency is not a policymaking office. Also, Democratic US administrations give the regime breathing room even if there is a conservative in office—the nuclear negotiations began when Barack Obama and Ahmadinejad were in office in March 2013—and Republicans will increase pressure even if a moderate governs—the Donald Trump administration’s “maximum pressure” strategy began under Rouhani’s presidency in 2018.

The second trend has been that known commodities never get the presidential job. The last president widely known inside and outside Iran was Rafsanjani, who was a prominent revolutionary and the commander in chief of the armed forces during the Iran–Iraq War. Khatami, Ahmadinejad, Rouhani, and Raisi became famous after running for president. The Islamic Republic limits presidents to two consecutive terms. Rafsanjani made two further attempts, but both failed—he lost in 2005, likely because of election fraud, and was disqualified during his 2013 run. Reformist Mir Hossein Mousavi, a former prime minister and already a prominent figure, was also cheated out of office during the 2009 election, which prompted the post-election protests known as the Green Movement.

Khamenei worries that established figures can create movements within the regime structure that, combined with their knowledge of how the system works, can challenge him. Therefore, he has preferred unknown, uncharismatic figures, especially when it comes to reformists. Indeed, Ahmadinejad proved to be a formidable foe who freelanced too much. This was due, in part, to the fraudulent outcome of the 2009 election and the subsequent Green Movement. The widespread protests rallied the regime’s base behind Ahmadinejad as almost a martyr, metaphorically speaking. This elevated his stature to unprecedented heights and provided him with immunity from Khamenei’s wrath, which protects him to this day.

The president’s function

Elected offices in the Islamic Republic could be compared to the US civil service. In Iran, things are upside down. The policymaking class is unelected and forms the permanent state, while bureaucrats run in elections to implement this permanent state’s policies. Khatami once described his office as “the system’s footman.” Like all bureaucrats, elected officials can cause headaches for the policymakers through incompetence or mischief. Presidents can also use their bully pulpit to promote a cause. In Ahmadinejad’s case, that cause was himself, a mistake that can never be repeated in Khamenei’s eyes.

Khamenei needs an economic manager to address the economic crisis that ails the Islamic Republic. Khamenei’s hand is relatively light in economics. Sanctions have taught him that he needs self-sufficiency, or economic nationalism, wherein everything is produced at home and science and research are elevated, a concept he termed a “resistance economy.” He also ensures wealth is distributed among all important regime subsidiaries—particularly the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Beyond that, he leaves the details to his elected bureaucrats to figure out. More than ever, Khamenei needs a president who executes this imperative. Whether this is possible is a different question, but Raisi failed to satisfy the need.

Perhaps more than competence, Khamenei needs someone to rally his conservative base. Economic indicators, support for the system, confidence in institutions, and all other measurable and immeasurable political values in Iran are in decline. The supreme leader is not someone who fires up the base. He needs a president who can boost morale among the hardliner youth and motivate them ideologically to beat up protesters in the streets and fight in Syria and Iraq—and elsewhere if Iran expands its direct presence.

Considering these different trends and necessities, the six approved candidates require further scrutiny.

Candidate gallery

The only reformist among the six candidates is the amusingly named Masoud Pezeshkian—his last name means “of physician lineage,” and he lives up to his name as a surgeon and former health minister. Pezeshkian was Khatami’s health minister during his second term and has been a member of parliament since 2008. While there once were sincere reformists in Iran, many rounds of purges and eliminations have left only the insincere and slavish ones in office, including Pezeshkian. However, he checks an essential box for Khamenei: he has no charisma, popular base, or following within the regime structure. His competence and economic management are untested, but he will not rally any base for anyone. That Khamenei has yet to send a signal of support to rally the security forces behind a conservative is potentially a tacit sign that he favors Pezeshkian.

The second category of candidates is the fringe conservative. Amir-Hossein Ghazizadeh Hashemi is one of the dozen vice presidents—better described as deputy presidents—and oversees the Foundation of Martyrs and Veterans portfolio. It is a fairly obscure position that oversees benefits for veterans and the families of war casualties. Despite its obscurity, this is an important position. The beneficiaries have been the regime’s foot soldiers, on whose shoulders it has stood for decades, but they are increasingly abandoning the regime. In his current role, Ghazizadeh Hashemi is tasked with using ideological and financial incentives to mobilize veterans. With his experience as the incumbent food distributor among the regime’s base, combined with his hardline politics, Ghazizadeh Hashemi could be the wildcard in this race for his capacity to rally support.

Tehran Mayor Alireza Zakani is the other member of the fringe-conservative category and a former member of parliament. He has a low profile and provides no value to Khamenei’s needs. Zakani is the typical supporting character who will be forgotten as a candidate, so a detailed look is unnecessary.

The last category is the known conservative. Mohammad Baqer Ghalibaf is a former IRGC unit commander and mayor of Tehran, and is currently the speaker of parliament. He is always a feature of presidential elections, but never a threat. He is also uncharismatic and not particularly popular among the regime’s base. Ghalibaf’s extreme corruption came to light in recent years, which makes him unappealing among the regime’s populist base. But he clears one box: loyalty to Khamenei. He could even be credibly accused of competence, which the regime needs in a president more than ever. But he has been around for too long and is a known commodity—not something Khamenei typically wants. If Khamenei opts to support him, it will be due to the extraordinary circumstances under which this election is being held, and the fact that there has not been enough time to choose and elevate a lesser-known figure.

Saeed Jalili is the other member of the known-conservative category. A war veteran with a missing leg, and as ideologically rigid as they come, he has the bragging right that he did not give an inch when he was the nuclear negotiator. The base loves him already, but he is the one candidate who could be another Ahmadinejad. It is also a problem that his ideological rigidity comes at the cost of competence. His understanding of politics could be summarized as, “Everything will work out if people pray harder and believe more in the system.” Unlike Raisi, who had the wisdom to avoid fiery statements about foreign matters, Jalili carries the risk of public remarks that would jeopardize the current loosening of sanctions. Like Ahmadinejad, he is a candidate who comes with significant risks but potentially big rewards.

The last candidate is Mostafa Pourmohammadi. Raisi was infamous for the 1988 massacre of political prisoners, and Pourmohammadi was a key actor in it. Though Raisi kept somewhat of a low profile after 1988 until he ran for president in 2017, Pourmohammadi has been a feature of every oppression campaign as a member of the security apparatus with close ties to the IRGC. As Ahmadinejad’s interior minister responsible for law enforcement, he set up the morality police and enforced an extreme religious code in public, and occasionally in private. Ahmadinejad sacked him in 2008 for being Khamenei’s mole in his cabinet. He returned to the security apparatus and played a leading role in cracking down on the 2009 protests. As Rouhani’s justice minister, he oversaw a spike in executions. He might prove to be a better economic manager than Raisi, can rally the base, and is not a risk to abuse the bully pulpit against Khamenei or sabotage sanctions relief.

Pourmohammadi is the ideal candidate except for two issues. First, he is a known commodity, which Khamenei does not like. He has been a prominent figure within the system and is shrewd enough to get his way. Second, he is the only cleric in the field. So far, Khamenei’s only civilian president has been Ahmadinejad, which gives Pourmohammadi another advantage. However, a hardliner cleric could immediately become a contender for supreme leadership, which might raise objections from Khamenei’s son, Mojtaba, who is allegedly gearing up for the position.

Pourmohammadi’s work at the security apparatus in intelligence, secret-police, law-enforcement, and prosecution capacities means that he is in a perfect position to challenge Khamenei from within, but this does not mean that he will. Unlike Ahmadinejad, the cautionary tale, Pourmohammadi has known Khamenei since the 1980s. This could mean that the supreme leader knows the candidate enough to trust him—or enough not to. But if the elder Khamenei finds him trustworthy, Pourmohammadi is his ideal president, even though the younger Khamenei might object.

The question of Iran’s next president has swung from one misunderstanding to another in Washington. Once upon a time, Americans hoped that a new president would effect reform and change. Now, they ignore elections as entirely irrelevant.

The president of Iran matters in two ways. First, like the US civil service, the Islamic Republic’s administrations cannot make policies, but they have nontrivial influence in implementing them. Whether due to incompetence, disagreement, or corruption, the president can become an obstacle to the permanent state. Second, who Khamenei wants to become president tells us about the internal state of the system and what Khamenei believes to be his regime’s vulnerabilities for a new president to address.

Many crises consume the Islamic Republic, and most of these candidates are a patch for some of these problems. Whoever becomes president will be a hint as to which of these crises Khamenei believes to be the most urgent. It also will tell us where he wants to take Iran next.

Shay Khatiri is the vice president of development and a senior fellow at the Yorktown Institute.

The post There are several Iranian presidential candidates, but only one Khamenei might want appeared first on Atlantic Council.

There is a clear interest among the right to figure out ways to make their gains felt in Brussels. Leaders, including France’s Marine Le Pen and Italy’s Matteo Salvini, recently met in Brussels to discuss uniting the fractured right wing, giving oxygen to persistent rumors of merging or shuffling the existing European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) group with the Identity and Democracy (ID) group to form a far-right supergroup. ECR has already picked up enough new members to overtake the centrist Renew Europe group as the third largest group in the Parliament. 

Membership in these groups matters. Members of the European Parliament are elected nationally but sit within pan-European party groups, in which votes are whipped and decisions shaped. Membership and the size of party groups also carries implications for funding, staffing, and even speaking time in Parliament debates, making membership a calculated decision.

But uniting the far right is easier said than done. Ideological differences and internal divisions present obstacles. For instance, ECR largely holds a pro-Ukraine stance, while parties in ID can be more sympathetic toward Russia. As these coalitions undergo reshuffling, the influence of the right in the European Parliament remains in flux. The answers to three questions will shape this influence going forward: How will the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) party align in the Parliament? How will Hungary’s Fidesz party align? And will the Brothers of Italy party work more with centrist or more radical partners?

AfD searches for a new home

Germany’s far-right AfD, currently unaffiliated in the Parliament after being tossed from ID, is one to watch. After then-lead candidate Maximilian Krah made a controversial statement about the Schutzstaffel, the elite guard of the Nazi regime also known as the SS, AfD was dismissed from the ID group. Krah has since been expelled from the AfD delegation in the Parliament.

The AfD still had a strong second-place showing in the elections, finishing ahead of all three member parties of Germany’s government coalition and increasing its membership in the Parliament from nine to fifteen. AfD’s likely ambition is to rejoin ID. If it fails, then its members of parliament face a dilemma: find a new group or form an alternative one. AfD’s fifteen votes would be an enticing get for the Parliament’s existing groups, but the party is arguably the most high-profile and toxic bunch in Parliament, making its adoption by ECR almost impossible. Its reabsorption into ID is also uncertain. Even if it does eventually rejoin, it is unlikely to do so before the national elections in France in late June and early July, in which Le Pen’s National Rally, a leading voice in ID, is leading in the polls.

Forming an alternative group isn’t easy either. To be officially recognized as a group in the European Parliament, there must be at least twenty-three members of parliament with representation from at least seven member states. Should AfD try to form an alternative group, it would likely seek out other dissenting parties with a pro-Russia stance from countries such as Poland, Lithuania, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Slovakia. AfD’s exile from any existing group won’t stop it from voting along hard-right lines, but it is worth watching how AfD will try to use its leverage inside the Parliament—or risk obscurity on its sidelines.

Fidesz looks beyond ECR

Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s Fidesz party, having secured eleven of Hungary’s twenty-one seats, is another prominent party currently unaffiliated, after being kicked out of the center-right European People’s Party (EPP). Remaining unaffiliated would limit Orbán’s power in the European Parliament, so Fidesz was thought to be considering joining ECR or another new grouping.

Joining ECR would have made strategic sense for Fidesz, but just days after Orbán posed for photos with ECR bigwigs, including Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni and former Polish Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki, news broke that his party would not find a home in ECR. Fidesz cited the “extreme anti-Hungarian stance” of new ECR members from Romania’s Alliance for the Union of Romanians party—once again highlighting the contradictions of far-right, nationalist groups forming a coherent pan-European grouping. Other reporting suggested Meloni herself rejected Orbán’s efforts. 

Barring any reversal, the news of Fidesz’s failed would-be relationship with ECR leaves Orbán with few options. Fidesz could try to join ID, but the group’s ideology may limit Fidesz’s reach at a time Orbán is looking to strengthen it, especially as Fidesz just had its worst election performance in two decades. Orbán has also been keen on forming a far-right bloc, one that could potentially unite or create a de facto alliance among the far right in the Parliament. With the door to ECR closed, he may bet on some new constellation of the far right, with Fidesz in the middle.

Meloni becomes Europe’s biggest player

Meloni and her dominant Brothers of Italy party are currently some of the most influential actors in the new European Parliament. A leader in ECR decision making, Meloni and her party have become widely sought after, with both Le Pen and European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen reaching out to discuss cooperation. For Le Pen, a pact with the Brothers of Italy and ECR more broadly would give the far right enough members to become the second-largest bloc in the European Parliament, even if unofficially. Similarly, von der Leyen has left open the possibility of working with Meloni in hopes of first securing her confirmation from the Parliament to continue as European Commission president.

Meloni and the Brothers will not leave the ECR, and, unlike AfD or Fidesz, they are in a strong position. Still, Meloni will need to choose her alliances carefully. Working with von der Leyen would allow her party to use the leverage it has collected to influence the Parliament’s actions, but it could dull her nationalist credentials. Working with ID would likely close the door to cooperation with von der Leyen’s EPP and leave Brothers of Italy on the outside looking in. How well Le Pen’s National Rally does in the upcoming French parliamentary elections may factor into decision making in Rome.

The evolving landscape of the European Parliament

The realignment of political groups is crucial for the future of the European Parliament, but also important will be how the new Parliament will operate with more dynamic policy-specific coalitions. Meloni’s Brothers of Italy is a case in point. Narrower margins mean centrist groups will likely need to rely on partners further along the ideological spectrum to pass legislation on specific issues. With the reshuffling of coalitions, tight margins, and major national developments, important European Union issues—defense, climate change, immigration, and economic policy—hang in the balance.

Joely Virzi is a young global professional at the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center.

The post How the far right could shape the future of the European Parliament appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Masoud Pezeshkian was born on September 29, 1954, in Mahabad, a city in West Azerbaijan province known for having a large population from the Azeri and Kurdish ethnic minorities. Despite being part of the 2 percent Azeri-speaking minority in a predominantly Sunni Kurdish city, Pezeshkian has always been proud of his Azeri heritage.

At nineteen, during Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi’s reign, he served his conscription duty in Zabul, one of the most deprived cities in Sistan and Baluchistan province. After completing his service, he returned to his home province, where he entered medical school and graduated with a degree in general medicine.

During the Iran-Iraq War (1980–1988), Pezeshkian frequently visited the front lines, where he was responsible for sending medical teams and working as a fighter and doctor. After the war, he continued his education, specializing in general surgery at Tabriz University of Medical Sciences. He later became a specialist in heart surgery, leading him to become president of Tabriz University of Medical Sciences in 1994, a position he held for five years.

That same year, Pezeshkian lost his wife and one of his children in a car accident. He raised his remaining two sons and daughter alone and has never remarried. This personal story of loss and dedication has garnered sympathy and respect from many in Iranian society who view him as a compassionate and resilient figure.

Years later, Pezeshkian’s political journey began when he joined reformist Mohammad Khatami’s administration as deputy health minister in 1997. He was appointed health minister four years later, serving from 2001 to 2005. Since then, he has been elected to the Iranian parliament five times, representing Tabriz, and served as the first vice president of the parliament from 2016 to 2020.

Known for his reformist stance, Pezeshkian has criticized the government’s handling of political dissent. After the controversial 2009 post-election protests known as the Green Movement, he delivered a speech in parliament criticizing the security forces’ brutal response. This speech caused significant tension from conservative members, who attempted to interrupt.

During pragmatist Hassan Rouhani’s presidency, Pezeshkian strongly supported the 2015 nuclear deal, frequently speaking in its favor in parliament. In a rare state television interview during the nationwide anti-establishment protests following Mahsa Jina Amini’s death at the hands of the so-called morality police, Pezeshkian questioned the official narrative, citing his medical background when disputing the government’s explanation of her death. His call for an independent evaluation team highlighted his commitment to transparency and accountability.

Pezeshkian’s candidacy is significant for several reasons. Unlike many Iranian politicians, he did not rise to power through influential family connections or corruption. His unblemished record and tragic personal history distinguish him from his rivals. Moreover, he has the potential to attract votes from supporters of populist Mahmoud Ahmadinejad due to his simple Persian language and anti-corruption stance.

Despite these strengths, Pezeshkian faces significant challenges. He lacks clear and documented plans for running the country, particularly in foreign policy, where he defers to Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. When mentioning Khamenei, he uses the respectful title “exalted supreme leader,” which is common among conservatives, while reformists prefer to address him with the title of “leader.” Pezeshkian’s loyalty to Khamenei may have secured his candidacy, but it might not be sufficient to win over the electorate, especially the middle class yearning for change.

Pezeshkian has been endorsed by the reformists, including former President Mohammad Khatami. The parties and key figures of this political faction have mobilized their efforts to ensure Pezeshkian’s victory in the presidential election. Additionally, Mohammad Javad Zarif, the former foreign minister, has been chosen as Pezeshkian’s foreign policy adviser and is actively participating in his election campaign.

His ability to appeal to ethnic minorities, particularly Azeris, could be a crucial factor in Pezeshkian’s campaign. Azeris form the majority population in the provinces of East Azerbaijan, West Azerbaijan, Ardabil, and Zanjan. According to the last census in 2016, the combined population of these provinces is less than ten million, representing about one-eighth of Iran’s total population. His hometown of Mahabad, with its mixed Kurdish and Azeri population, and his advocacy for minority rights position him as a unifying figure.

At the same time, this issue could become his Achilles’ heel. Pezeshkian’s strong emphasis on supporting minority rights in the country has raised concerns among some about the potential rise and expansion of pan-Azeri sentiments in Iran.

In the first election debate, held on June 17, Pezeshkian struggled to persuade undecided voters to participate. Some social media users argued that Mostafa Pourmohammadi, a moderate cleric with decades of experience in security, was more effective at influencing public opinion than Pezeshkian.

Pezeshkian has the potential to be a game changer in the upcoming presidential election, but he faces significant hurdles. To succeed, he must address the concerns of reformists and the broader electorate, who are still disillusioned and angry about the suppression of protests and the current state of the Islamic Republic. His record of public service, personal resilience, and advocacy for transparency and accountability will be key factors in his campaign.

Although many are still unsure how the Guardian Council allowed him to participate in the election, it is widely believed that the council was confident Pezeshkian would not win. By approving his candidacy, it appears that the council aimed to boost voter turnout.

Pezeshkian’s candidacy offers a glimmer of hope for those seeking change in Iran, but his path to victory is fraught with challenges. To truly change the game in the 2024 presidential election, he must navigate the complex political landscape, appeal to a diverse electorate, and present a clear vision for the future.

Saeid Jafari is a Middle East analyst based in Europe. Follow him on X: @jafariysaeid.

The post Masoud Pezeshkian is a possible game changer in the upcoming Iranian presidential election appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Saeed Jalili

Saeed Jalili (born 1965) is the son of a high school teacher. At 21, he lost his right leg in the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988) and served as a member of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC). He joined the foreign ministry in 1987, eventually becoming the deputy head of the Europe and America Bureau. In 2002, he earned a doctorate in political science from Imam Sadiq University, a training ground for the political elite of the Islamic Republic. Jalili has held several significant positions, including being a member of the Office of the Supreme Leader (2000-2007), Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, and Iran’s chief nuclear negotiator (2007-2013). Known for lacking a charismatic personality, Jalili’s tirades during the nuclear talks significantly contributed to the impasse in the negotiations. He has also served since 2013 on the Expediency Council, a body comprising three dozen senior regime members that is the final arbiter between the Guardian Council and the parliament. In the 2013 presidential elections, he finished third with 11 percent of the vote. Disputes with other conservatives led him to sit out the 2017 presidential race. Although he was one of the seven candidates approved by the Guardian Council for the 2021 presidential election, he withdrew two days before the election in favor of Raisi, the eventual winner. Jalili is reportedly close to Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, and his brother, Vahid Jalili, has served as the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting Organization (IRIB) chief for cultural affairs and policy evolution.

Mohammad Baqer Ghalibaf

Mohammad Baqer Ghalibaf (born 1961) has held several prominent positions in Iran, including commander of Khatam al-Anbia construction headquarters (1994-1997), commander of the IRGC air force (1997-2000), chief of law enforcement forces (2000-2005), mayor of Tehran (2005-2017), member of the Expediency Council (2017-present), and speaker of parliament (2020-present). The son of a baker, Ghalibaf joined the IRGC at 19, trained as a pilot, became a brigadier general, lost a brother in the Iran-Iraq War, and earned a doctorate in geography. In July 1999, he played a significant role in suppressing the student uprising in Tehran and contributed to drafting a threatening ultimatum letter. This letter, signed by 24 high-ranking IRGC commanders, was addressed to President Mohammad Khatami, demanding a decisive response to the protests. Accusations of financial impropriety have followed him from his tenure as Tehran’s longest-serving mayor. Ghalibaf ran for president in the 2005 elections, finishing fourth with 14 percent of the vote. In the 2013 election, he was the first runner-up with 16.5 percent of the votes. In the 2017 presidential election, he was approved by the Guardian Council as one of the six candidates positively vetted but withdrew a few days before election day in favor of Raisi. For the upcoming 2024 presidential election, Ghalibaf has hired Ali Nikzad, who managed Raisi’s 2017 and successful 2021 campaigns, as his campaign manager. Many in Iran believe that the 2024 presidential election is Ghalibaf’s to lose, given his extensive political experience.

Amirhossein Ghazizadeh Hashemi

Amirhossein Ghazizadeh Hashemi (born 1971) was born in Khorasan Razavi province, which is also the birthplace of Ayatollah Khamenei. He hails from a politically prominent family, with brothers and cousins who have served as members of parliament or ministers. He was wounded in the Iran-Iraq War and became an ear, nose, and throat surgeon in 2002. Ghazizadeh Hashemi has also been a faculty member and university rector and served as a four-term member of parliament (2008-2021). In the 2021 presidential election, he finished fourth with 3.5 percent of the vote. President-elect Raisi appointed him Vice President and Head of the Foundation of Martyrs and Veterans Affairs (2021-2024). Ghazizadeh Hashemi is the youngest of the six candidates competing.

Masoud Pezeshkiyan

Masoud Pezeshkiyan (born 1954) is the oldest of the six candidates at 70 years of age. Born into a civil servant family in West Azerbaijan, he is a veteran of the Iran-Iraq War. Pezeshkiyan trained as a heart surgeon at Tabriz and Tehran universities and has held several prominent positions. He was the dean of Tabriz University of Medical Sciences (1994-2000), deputy health minister (2000-2001), minister of health under reformist president Mohammad Khatami (2001-2005), a member of the High Council for Cultural Revolution, and a five-term member of parliament (2008-present), also serving as its deputy speaker for one term. Pezeshkiyan registered to run in the 2013 presidential election but withdrew from the race. In 2021, the Guardian Council disqualified him from running in the presidential election. As the only Azeri in the race and the candidate closest to the reformist-moderate camp, Pezeshkiyan has the potential to garner substantial votes and finish strongly.

Mostafa Pourmohammadi

Mostafa Pourmohammadi (born 1960) is the only clerical candidate among the six and the second oldest (64). Son of a tailor, he underwent theological training at the Qom Seminary and became a revolutionary prosecutor at the age of twenty. During his tenure as head of the counterintelligence directorate of the ministry of intelligence and its representative in the notorious Evin Pison (1987-1990), Pourmohammadi was a member of a committee nicknamed the “death committee” that oversaw the extrajudicial execution of thousands of political prisoners following Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini’s edict in 1988, which became known as the 1988 massacre. He was head of the social-political bureau in the Office of the Supreme Leader (2002-2005), interior minister (2005-2008), head of the state general inspectorate organization (2008-2013), and justice minister (2013-2017). Pourmohammadi has been the secretary-general of the conservative Society of Combatant Clergy since 2018. He declared his candidacy for the 2013 presidential election but did not actually run. He was disqualified by the Guardian Council from running in the 2015 elections for the Assembly of Experts.

Alireza Zakani

Alireza Zakani (born 1965) is the son of an athlete and wrestling referee from Tehran province. He joined the Iran-Iraq War at the age of 15, serving for sixty-two months, and sustained injuries in battle. Zakani earned his MD from Tehran University of Medical Sciences in 1997 and trained in nuclear medicine there. He has held several significant roles, including nationwide director of the student Basij (affiliated with the IRGC), proprietor of the conservative website Jahan News, and secretary-general of the conservative Jameyat-e Rahpoyan-e Enqelab Islami (Alliance of the Wayfarers of the Islamic Revolution) formed in 2008. Zakani served as a four-term member of parliament (2004-2016; 2020-2021) and is currently the mayor of Tehran (2021-present). Although disqualified from running in the 2013 and 2017 presidential elections, he was among the final seven candidates approved for the 2021 presidential election. However, he withdrew a few days before the election in support of Raisi.

Mehrzad Boroujerdi is Vice Provost and Dean of the College of Arts, Sciences, and Education at Missouri University of Science and Technology. He is the author of Iranian Intellectuals and the West: Tormented Triumph of Nativism, and co-author of Post-revolutionary Iran: A Political Handbook.

The post Everything you need to know about the six candidates in Iran’s presidential election appeared first on Atlantic Council.

What prompted President Macron’s decision to resolve parliament and initiate snap elections? Would a cohabitation with a far-right Prime Minister be a likely scenario? How might the potential political change affect France’s foreign policy, in particular regarding the support for Ukraine? What do these developments mean for Macron’s support of European Commission President von der Leyen?

On this episode of #AtlanticDebrief, Ilva Tare sits down with Ambassador Gérard Araud, Distinguished Fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center, to discuss the implications of the dissolution of the French National Assembly and the call for a parliamentary snap election.

Fellow

Ilva Tare

Resident Senior Fellow

Europe Center

Albanian English

The post #AtlanticDebrief – What’s behind President Macron’s snap election decision? | A Debrief from Amb. Gérard Araud appeared first on Atlantic Council.

This paper is the first in the Freedom and Prosperity Center’s “State of the Parties” series analyzing the strength of multi-party systems in different regions of the world.

In 2024, as many as seventeen countries across Africa, with a total population of nearly 300 million people, will hold national elections. These electoral processes are consequential because whether they are free, fair, and transparent will help determine if the troubling trend in several countries across the continent of democratic regression, military coups, or political instability worsens—or ebbs and begins to reverse, as was recently demonstrated in Senegal.

The stakes are clearly high in these contests, which will occur in the so-called year of elections wherein more than four billion people globally are eligible to cast ballots. While the elections are important to Africa’s democratic trajectory, they are not single-handedly determinative of it.

Strong and institutionalized political parties are also key to the future of democracy on the continent; however, policymakers have not afforded this key institution much attention or associated resources. For example, the US’s national security strategy for Sub-Saharan Africa does not reference strengthening political parties despite the document’s emphasis on democracy promotion. Further, the Biden administration’s Summits for Democracy—the third of which took place in March 2024—have not included commitments from participating governments (the United States included) to strengthen political parties.

Robust political parties inform whether a political system delivers for citizens, provide a key link between citizens and their government, and foster measurable resilience against democratic erosion. For these and other reasons, therefore, political parties as a core institution of democracy will help chart the continent’s future, both in terms of freedom and prosperity.

This piece analyzes the state of political parties in sub-Saharan Africa and uses Atlantic Council Freedom and Prosperity Indexes data and other sources to show why parties are essential to democratic progress. It examines this argument through four case studies and concludes with a path forward for re-centering democracy assistance work in Africa to shore up this critical component.

Issue Brief Sep 19, 2023

Less freedom, weaker states, more conflict: can that cycle be broken?

By Patrick W. Quirk and Owen L. Myers

Why and how advancing freedom (political, economic, and judicial components) is the surest way to advance sustainable stability and associated prosperity.

Democratic Transitions Freedom and Prosperity

New Atlanticist Jan 2, 2024

Six ways for the US to put democracy back on the global agenda in 2024

By Patrick Quirk

As 2024 begins, the Biden administration must take urgent steps to put its pro-democracy rhetoric into action in key theaters around the world.

Africa Americas

New Atlanticist Mar 22, 2024

Ahead of its presidential election, Senegal shows that democracy requires the rule of law

By James Storen, Annie (Yu-Lin) Lee

For Senegal to cement its status as a haven of democracy, the country must prioritize judicial independence and the rule of law.

Elections Politics & Diplomacy

The Freedom and Prosperity Center aims to increase the prosperity of the poor and marginalized in developing countries and to explore the nature of the relationship between freedom and prosperity in both developing and developed nations.

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The post The missing piece: Political parties are critical to democracy in Africa appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The center-right European People’s Party (EPP), not the far- and hard-right parties, was the biggest winner of the elections. The EPP came in first and performed better than in the last European election in 2019. It is projected to hold 186 seats, a touch over 25 percent of the European Parliament’s total, and up from around 24 percent in 2019. It also came first in twelve countries across the European Union (EU).

This victory is welcome news for the EPP’s Ursula von der Leyen, the current and likely next European Commission president. The party’s performance does not guarantee an easy nomination or approval for von der Leyen, who will need the nod from the EU’s heads of government at the European Council and then a majority of Parliament members to back her. But the results set her up as best as she could realistically hope for another five-year stint in the Berlaymont.

The two biggest losers are, first, French President Emmanuel Macron and his liberal Renew group and, second, the Greens. Renew is projected to get seventy-nine seats, down to 11 percent of the total from over 14 percent in 2019. Macron’s bad night prompted him to dissolve the French parliament and call for new elections. It is the gamble of his political life as he once again tries to head off Marine Le Pen’s far-right populism. The Greens also fared badly, winning just over 7 percent of the seats and going from the fourth-largest group to the sixth in the Parliament.

Breaking down the right’s options

Most attention on the elections went to the gains made by the far and hard right. The European Conservatives and Reformists group (ECR) of Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni sits in fourth place with just over 10 percent of the seats. The more radical Identity and Democracy (ID) group follows up in fifth with just over 8 percent. Both ECR and ID stand to gain new members if currently nonaligned members join their ranks, such as members from Hungary’s Fidesz and Bulgaria’s Revival party.

ECR and ID performed well, but their boost was not uniform. In places such as Italy and Austria, leading hard-right parties topped the polls, as expected. Elsewhere, far- and hard-right parties will enter the European Parliament with somewhat more power. For example, Portugal’s Chega picked up two seats, Spain’s Vox took six seats, and Geert Wilders’ Party for Freedom in the Netherlands won six seats. However, note that many of these far-right parties, including those in Spain and Portugal, performed worse in the latest European Parliament election than they did in their national or regional elections in recent months. This cuts against the narrative of an inexorably rising far right.

Most of the hard right’s gains came from France, with National Rally demolishing Macron’s Renew coalition by 31 percent to just over 14.5 percent, and to a lesser degree from the AfD in Germany, which came in second behind the EPP’s Christian Democrats but ahead of Germany’s governing coalition parties.

The results in Germany and France serve as an important reminder that these elections are in large part national referenda. They are an opportunity for citizens to punish member state governments over domestic issues.

And voters in Germany and France were in a punishing mood. In Macron, France has a president who is unpopular, with approval ratings hovering around 35 percent. He is an apparent lame duck, with his party already ruling with a minority government in a difficult political system. Germany did not fare much better, with a deeply unpopular, seemingly absent chancellor at the helm of a dysfunctional coalition that cannot get Europe’s largest economy going and which seems allergic to political leadership.

The far- and hard-right groups could have an impact—if they can use their leverage. Taken together, the ECR and ID groups can challenge the center-left Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats (S&D) group as the second-largest grouping if they coalesce in a so-called “supergroup.” Such a group would include the likes of Meloni’s Brothers of Italy, Le Pen’s National Rally, and far-right parties from across the EU advancing a generally nationalist, Euroskeptic vision for the bloc. However, the prospect of such a group overlooks the very real and wide divergences among these groups on issues key to their identities. There remains distrust among parties, which are divided over the West’s support for Ukraine, for example, and there are persistent national grievances, the likes of which notably led to the AfD’s unceremonious departure from ID.

And yet, too narrow of a focus on the far right’s gains risks missing perhaps that the center held. Not only did the EPP do well, but the S&D avoided major bloodletting, keeping its second-place position with only small losses. Despite a rough showing, Renew currently can claim to be the third-largest group in Parliament, and the Greens’ losses look more like a correction following a massive overperformance in 2019.

Furthermore, the pro-European parties of EPP, S&D, and Renew still together form a majority—a smaller one than in 2019 but a majority nonetheless. Von der Leyen has already pledged to work with S&D and Renew to form a working majority. She may raise eyebrows with her attempts to win over the likes of Meloni, but has stressed that any partner must be “pro-European, pro-Ukraine, and pro-rule of law.” The Greens may also have a role to play as another pro-European party.

What’s on the agenda now?

It is still early, but when it comes to the agenda, the election outcome will likely see a reinforcement of trends that have been well underway for much of the last year: toward a greater focus on competitiveness and economic security measures, a tougher approach on migration that is already baked into the recent New Pact on Migration and Asylum, and a Europe that offers greater protection of its citizens from a more treacherous geopolitical and geoeconomic environment. Support for these issues does not just come from the hard right, but from the political right in all its gradations.

Given the nationalist and protectionist tendencies of many on the far right, the prospects for major EU trade agreements seem to have dimmed further. Single market reforms and progress on enlargement will have to rely on tighter majorities, too. Meanwhile, continued political, military, and financial support for Ukraine seems safe in the short to medium term given national governments’ predominant role in these areas—at least until the next long-term EU budget negotiations start in earnest.

The far-right parties in the Parliament can try to be spoilers on some of these issues. Or they can try to shape them in their own image. But whether they will be able to articulate an alternative political agenda for the EU, let alone get down to exercising their potential power by taking on serious lawmaking, master the skillful manipulation of parliamentary procedures, and secure the committee roles that come with group status is a big question. Their prior track record and persistent divisions suggest the answer remains a likely no, non, and nein.

Jörn Fleck is the senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center.

James Batchik is an associate director in the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center.

The post Setting the European Parliament elections in the ‘right’ context appeared first on Atlantic Council.

To refresh memories: Cameron promised voters in January 2013 that if they brought Conservatives back to power, then he would give them a referendum on the United Kingdom’s European Union membership. He lost the referendum for a host of reasons, not least of them because he failed to convince his own party faithful and underestimated the Leave campaign’s ability to mobilize supporters.

Cameron was willing to take a high-stakes, long-term political gamble, one that would shape the very nature of his country and the European Union, to achieve what he had concluded was a short-term political necessity. Macron is doing the same today.

The French president appears to be betting on one of two outcomes:

1. For Macron, the best outcome would be if snap election voters reverse their votes of last Sunday, which gave Marine Le Pen’s far-right National Rally 31.37 percent of the vote, more than twice the share that voted for Macron’s party (14.6 percent). This is also the least likely outcome. Macron’s own supporters consider a victory in either the first round, on June 30, or the second round, on July 7, doubtful. Macron is unpopular, France’s unemployment rate is high, immigration concerns have mobilized many citizens to support opposition parties, and there is growing estrangement between voters and France’s political leadership.
2. The more likely outcome is that throughout the rest of his presidential term, which runs until 2027, Macron will have to govern with a National Rally prime minister in what the French call “co-habitation.” Though National Rally is unlikely to win an absolute majority of the 577-seat National Assembly, it quite likely could emerge as the strongest party. Le Pen, who has her eye on succeeding Macron as president in 2027, would put forward as prime minister her protégé, the twenty-eight-year-old Jordan Bardella. Bardella, the popular son of an Italian immigrant, led the European Parliament campaign and has rallied the anti-immigrant vote with the slogan, “France is disappearing.”
   

Writes Roger Cohen in a must-read analysis in the New York Times, “France would then be confronted with the consecration through high political office of the extreme right, an idea held unthinkable ever since the Vichy government ruled France in collaboration with the Nazis between 1940 and 1944.”

Why is Macron willing to throw the dice on France’s future in this manner, shocking the country, its stock market, the French media, and his own party just six weeks before Paris hosts the Olympic Games? Cohen quoted Paris Mayor Anne Hidalgo as being “stunned” by the “unsettling” decision. 

Macron is gambling that National Rally will perform so badly in office over the next three years that voters will reject any notion of Marine Le Pen as president in 2027. French voters could then put to rest the notion that the far right can run France. (Macron himself is term limited and will be unable to run.)

Macron could have responded in many ways to Sunday’s humiliation in European elections. His options ranged from toughening immigration policies to shaking up his government.

He’s taken perhaps the riskiest course available. “The rise of nationalists, of demagogues, is a danger for our nation,” Macron said on Sunday. “And also for Europe, for France’s position in Europe and in the world.” He portrayed himself as a leader rising to the demands of his times, rather than being history’s victim.

Time will determine whether Macron’s response this week is visionary or reckless. If the Cameron experience has any lesson, it is that the gambler has limited control of the outcome.

Frederick Kempe is president and chief executive officer of the Atlantic Council. You can follow him on Twitter: @FredKempe.

This edition is part of Frederick Kempe’s Inflection Points Today newsletter, a column of quick-hit insights on a world in transition. To receive this newsletter throughout the week, sign up here.

The post Macron rolls the dice on France’s future appeared first on Atlantic Council.

While all eyes were on the government-formation disputes, a terrorist group calling itself the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) raided the city of Mosul in Nineveh province on June 10, 2014. It captured the entire territory in a matter of hours, with a brazen goal of establishing an Islamist caliphate that included Iraq, Syria, and eventually the entire region, and ruling under its version of Islam. The complete meltdown of three divisions of the Iraqi Army emboldened the terrorists and allowed them to take most of Salahuddin province. With most of Anbar province already in its hands since January 2014, ISIS secured complete control over one-third of Iraq’s territory within a few days.

The Iraqi government became paralyzed by the lack of progress in the post-election political negotiations, the continued meltdown of the armed forces, and the lack of military support from the international community. On June 13, 2014, as ISIS was about to close in on Baghdad, Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, the highest Shia religious scholar, issued a rare fatwa calling on Iraqi “citizens to defend the country, its people, the honor of its citizens, and its sacred places.” Tens of thousands volunteered to defend the country and help the government fight the most existential threat Iraq faced since its founding in 1920.

Fighting and defeating ISIS was one of the most important accomplishments of the Iraqi population, showcasing the resilience of people who stood up for their national dignity and defended their liberty at a time when no one else was ready or willing to defend them, including their government. Although other countries were involved—Iran supplied weapons to Baghdad shortly after the ISIS invasion, and the United States formed a coalition to provide advice, logistics, and air support starting in August 2014—none of these efforts would have mattered if Iraqis had not risen to defend their nascent, albeit flawed and uncertain, democracy.

Had Iraqis given up in the critical moments after June 10, 2014, as their armed forces had, their democratic dreams would have witnessed a catastrophic end much like what occurred in Afghanistan under similar circumstances in 2021. Self-organized ordinary Iraqis refused to see their country delivered to a terrorist organization or leave themselves at the mercy of religious extremists. Their acts of valor in the early days of the crisis restored morale to the Iraqi armed forces and revived the international community’s faith in the future of Iraq. What followed was a matter of time to plan and manage the battle of liberating the territories that ISIS captured and stop its rule of systemic civilian oppression and mass murder.

In the years following the 2017 defeat of ISIS, Iraq has progressed positively despite serious challenges. Having endured the painful lessons of 2014, it reorganized its armed forces to prevent a similar security collapse. Those forces stand today among the most confident and combat ready in the region, and some of their components, such as the counterterrorism force, perform at par with elite international peers. Iraqi leaders and their counterparts in allied countries, the United States in particular, have gained confidence in the efficiency and performance of the Iraqi armed forces, prompting discussions to transition the Global Coalition To Defeat ISIS, which is led by the United States and includes eighty-four other nations, into bilateral agreements between Iraq and coalition members, focusing on continued security cooperation and capacity building for the Iraqi security forces.

In January, Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani announced “the commencement of the first round of bilateral dialogue between Iraq and the United States of America to end the mission of the Coalition in Iraq.” The Iraqi government also requested that the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) terminate the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) mandate by the end of 2025, arguing that Iraq now has mature institutions to cooperate directly with international organizations like other nations do. On May 31, the UNSC voted unanimously to approve the Iraqi request. The Iraqi government described these developments as the end of contingency relations and the inauguration of a new era of normal cooperation with the international community while leaving internal Iraqi governance to its institutions, which have acquired adequate maturity and competence.

What Iraq needs to ensure its success on the path of security and self-governance is to tackle the two most pressing challenges: economic uncertainty and corruption. Iraq continues to depend on a rentier economy, fully dependent on oil revenues, which fall short of supporting the governmental operational cost or leaving extra funds to invest in building a robust economy. Iraq’s only way out of the current economic quagmire is a diversified economy that encourages investment and a private sector. The Iraqi government must move away from the old philosophy and practice of a state-controlled economy to a new direction where its role is to create a healthy environment in which private businesses can thrive. In contrast, the Iraqi government is a regulator in most sectors where governments have not traditionally performed adequately.

The same attention needs to be given to the malignant threat of corruption.

After two decades of political change, the Iraqi political elites have coexisted with a deeply entrenched culture of corruption, and many high-level officials have contributed to it. Normalized and systemic financial, political, and administrative corruption has denied the Iraqi people the opportunity to build a functional state and heal a society that was traumatized by five decades of wars, international economic sanctions, and terrorism. Efforts to combat corruption continue to be limited in scope and target only insignificant perpetrators. To secure a permanent defeat of ISIS and prevent its return, or the emergence of a similar threat, it is important to eliminate conditions that helped such a group thrive to begin with. The pervasive culture of corruption and a poor economy have been among the leading conditions that contributed to the rise of ISIS in Iraq. Now is the time to address those conditions.

Dr. Abbas Kadhim is director of the Atlantic Council’s Iraq Initiative. Follow him on X: @DrAbbasKadhim.

The post ISIS fell, but the conditions that created the terrorist group still exist in Iraq appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Right is up, left is down, and the center remains. European Parliament elections across the European Union’s twenty-seven member states concluded today with gains for far-right parties but the centrist “grand coalition” nevertheless projected to emerge largely intact. Meanwhile, after his centrist party was trounced, French President Emmanuel Macron dissolved the National Assembly in a surprise move that will lead to yet more elections in the coming weeks. We turned to our Europe experts to make sense of it all and forecast what comes next.

• Jörn Fleck (@JornFleck): Senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center and former European Parliament staffer
• Dave Keating (@DaveKeating): Nonresident senior fellow at the Europe Center and Brussels correspondent for France24
• Carol Schaeffer (@thencarolsaid): Nonresident senior fellow at the Europe Center

The right way to think about the right

• The first-place showing for the center-right European People’s Party (EPP) was coupled with “modest gains” for far-right parties, Jörn tells us, while “voters punished green and liberal parties.” The upshot? “Expect more complexity and protraction, but hardly a revolution in parliamentary business.”
• The big win for Marine Le Pen’s far-right National Rally party in France, which led Macron to call snap elections, generated the most headlines. But Dave points out that “there was no far-right surge overall.” In fact, he adds, “the gains were in line with the trajectory of the far right’s growth over the past two decades.”
• Digging deeper into the results, Carol notes that the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) “performed worse than expected,” following a scandal sparked by reports that party members had discussed deporting German citizens en masse. Meanwhile, Viktor Orbán’s party in Hungary lost ground and the Netherlands’ Party for Freedom gained seats but did not win outright—as it did in last year’s national elections. “So while the far-right made significant gains across the EU, their sweep is hardly uncontested,” she points out.

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Divisions or a ‘supergroup’?

• There are also many divisions within the right-wing Identity and Democracy (ID) group—which includes National Rally but recently kicked out AfD—and between ID and the less radical European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) group, which includes Poland’s Law and Justice Party and Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni’s Brothers of Italy. “It’s far from certain the political right can really act in unison in parliament to leave a significant imprint on policies from the green transition to migration and economic competitiveness,” Jörn says.
• Still, Dave predicts that when members of the European Parliament form groups in the coming weeks, “many of the new undeclared or nonaligned MEPs are likely to join ECR and ID, which may unite into a far-right supergroup if Le Pen has her way.”
• Le Pen could further cement her influence in France and beyond during the country’s snap elections, which will take place on June 30 and July 7. A victory for the Euroskeptic National Rally “would most certainly mean a deep institutional crisis for the EU,” Jörn argues. “Much will depend on developments in France and how much certainty, consensus, and stability European leaders can project at their upcoming summits in mid and late June.”

The wild card to watch

• Where does this all leave European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen as she seeks a second five-year term? She would need to be appointed by EU national leaders and confirmed by the parliament, where her coalition has been stable. “The [von der Leyen-affiliated] EPP emerged the big winner of the 2024 election, just like they have been the big winner of every EU election for the past twenty-five years,” Dave notes. “The worst fears of the centrists . . . have not come to pass.” 
• But there is “more uncertainty” now for von der Leyen’s bid, Jörn says, “because of the wild-card element” of the French snap elections, which will take place during the period when the Commission president is typically nominated and confirmed.
• It “seems unlikely” that “Macron, at the helm of the second-largest EU member state, will drive forward that process before this do-or-die campaign for his party and legacy is settled,” Jörn says.

The post As the far right rises in Europe, can the center hold? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Between June 6 and 9, EU voters head to the polls to elect 720 members of the European parliament, who will play a key role in shaping the EU’s politics and policies for the next five years. What are the key issues driving voters in these European elections? What parties are expected to make the most gains and losses? And how will Europe’s far-right parties perform? How might the results of these elections impact the future of the EU’s policymaking agenda?

On this episode of #AtlanticDebrief, Ilva Tare sits down with Dave Keating, Brussels correspondent with France 24, to preview the outcome of the European parliament elections and discuss potential implications.

Fellow

Ilva Tare

Resident Senior Fellow

Europe Center

Albanian English

The post #AtlanticDebrief – What can we expect from the European Parliament elections? | A Debrief from Dave Keating appeared first on Atlantic Council.

A recent survey by the Yale Program on Climate Change shows that Indians are highly aware of climate change and its impact on India’s future: A staggering 86 percent “favor the Indian government’s commitment to reduce India’s carbon pollution to nearly zero by 2070.” According to the survey, 85 percent agree that “transitioning from coal to wind and solar energy to produce electricity will reduce air pollution,” and 82 percent say “doing so would reduce global warming.” Surprisingly, the survey revealed that 84 percent “favor banning the construction of new coal power plants, closing existing ones, and replacing them with solar and wind energy.”

At the same time, Indians are concerned about the unintended consequences of climate change policies. The Yale survey showed that 61 percent say transitioning from coal to wind and solar energy to produce electricity “will increase unemployment in India,” 58 percent say “it will cause electricity outages,” and 57 percent say “it will increase electricity prices.” 

Indians are aware that they are among the world’s top emitters of greenhouse gases, including carbon dioxide (CO2). India’s CO2 emissions are relatively low per capita, ranking just sixteenth in Asia and ninety-ninth globally. But India’s burgeoning population, need for economic and job growth, and role in the global digital and technology ecosystem mean that India will need multiple power sources, including coal and other fossil fuels, for the near future. In fact, the International Energy Agency’s 2021 India Energy Outlook notes that the country needs to add a power system the size of the entire European Union grid to meet its energy requirements over the next twenty years. A blend of energy sources that moves swiftly toward green energy is the only viable option.

Indian leaders have committed to lowering their country’s dependence on coal and other fossil fuels, reduce its carbon intensity by 45 percent, and achieve 50 percent cumulative electric power from renewables by 2030. Equally ambitious, India would like to achieve net-zero carbon emissions by 2070. A 2023 report by the International Energy Agency stated that India is expected to produce over half of the world’s new capacity for renewable energy over the next three years. Much of this should be credited to India’s aggressive renewable energy policies.

Three opportunities for Modi to boost clean energy

But with Prime Minister Narendra Modi winning a historic third consecutive term, leading a coalition government, he has the mandate to go beyond issuing regulations and providing government financing. There are three opportunities that the Modi government could take right away to further support and strengthen its clean energy agenda.

First, businesses require certainty. Indian laws and regulations are not required to have sunset provisions and can be revoked or terminated at any time. This discourages large-scale private sector commitments and investments. Defined regulatory and legislative terms articulate the government’s commitment to its policies and allow businesses to accurately assess its financial commitments. Similar to the United States’ 2022 Inflation Reduction Act, the Modi government could commit to a ten-year sunset for its clean energy programs. After ten years, when the regulations need to be reauthorized, the laws can be updated to meet current demands.

Second, to help support clean energy businesses, the government needs to expand its institutional capacity at the state level and properly invest in education systems to produce a skilled workforce.

Third, with the increase in power generation, India must ensure that its electrical grids can receive and transmit the power to customers (the last mile). Failure to do so could cause India to miss its clean energy targets and lead to a slowdown in economic and job growth.

Over the past three decades, more than 3,500 climate policies have been announced by nations around the world, according to the World Economic Forum. From 2010 to 2015, China issued the highest number of climate policies. But from 2015 to 2022, India took the lead by issuing more than fifty climate change policies. These ranged from production-linked incentive schemes to policies that encourage the use of clean energy products such as rooftop solar energy. This multifaceted approach is backed with the objective of reducing India’s carbon intensity by 45 percent compared with 2005 levels and generating 50 percent of electric power from renewable sources by 2030.

What the private sector is already doing

The private sector has positively responded to India’s ambitious goals. For example, in 2022 the Adani Group* started developing the world’s largest renewable energy park. Through an ecosystem of manufacturing, generation, and transmission, the Khavda renewable energy park, located in the deserts of Gujarat, is combining wind and solar power to generate 30 gigawatts of energy for the national grid. When completed in 2029, the park will power 16.1 million homes and eliminate 58 million tons of CO2 emissions annually, the developers say. To put that in perspective, it is the equivalent of planting more than two billion trees or not burning 60,300 tons of coal each year. Another massive Indian conglomerate, Tata Group, recently completed India’s largest solar and battery energy storage system via its Tata Power Solar Systems subsidiary. Tata says that the facility, which is in Chhattisgarh, combines a 100 megawatt solar photovoltaic project combined with a 120 megawatt hour battery storage system. The developers expect the project to reduce India’s carbon footprint by 4.87 million tons of CO2 over twenty-five years.

However, more is needed. The Adani Group has the size and diversity of businesses to marshal the necessary resources to build something like Khavda. It was able to develop the basic infrastructure—including the roads and telecommunications systems, an airstrip, a self-sustaining ecosystem for a workforce of more than eight thousand, and the transmission lines—within twelve months of launching the project. But Adani, Tata, and other major Indian conglomerates are the exception more than the rule in terms of ability to marshal resources.

To encourage even more private capital and participation, public-private partnerships (PPPs) will be needed. For example, earlier this year, First Solar inaugurated India’s first fully vertically integrated solar manufacturing plant in Tamil Nadu. Buoyed by a $500 million loan from the US International Development Finance Corporation, the First Solar facility will produce its Series 7 photovoltaic solar modules supported by an annual capacity of 3.3 gigawatts while employing approximately one thousand people. This can be a model for future PPPs.

India’s emissions will continue to grow before they peak and fall. The question is, can a third Modi administration continue creative policies that fulfill India’s ambitious climate goals—and will the rest of the world meet India both where it is today and can be tomorrow?

Kapil Sharma is the acting senior director and a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s South Asia Center.

Note: The Adani Group is a donor to the Atlantic Council’s South Asia Center.

The post Modi should make India’s energy transition his third-term legacy appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Ahead of the election, the Europe Center is answering the big questions about the vote, leading parties, and top issues on the ballot.

Why does this election matter?

The most eye-catching—and perhaps slightly hyperbolic—reason these elections matter is that the future of the Belgian state may hang in the balance. Pro-separatist parties in Belgium’s northern, Dutch-speaking Flanders region are poised to take the largest share of votes. These parties have advocated for the independence of Belgium’s northern province, ending an unhappy marriage with French-speaking Wallonia to the south. But don’t rush to throw away your maps just yet: Belgium is likely not splitting up anytime soon. The country is notoriously difficult to govern, and divvying up the country has been a much-discussed idea for decades. It’ll come down to what the new government in Belgium looks like—and whether it has any separatist involvement.

The election holds implications beyond the future of the Belgian state. The majority of the frozen Russian assets in Europe sit in Belgium’s jurisdiction, and Belgium is working out how to best manage and implement the various ideas being mooted regarding what to do with the funds. Belgium, with a new government—if it can form one in any timely fashion, never a given—plays an outsized role in the use of the funds and will continue to face pressure from Washington and others inside Europe. These elections will also be part of any success or failure of a rightward shift across the continent. Far-right parties are on the rise, and Belgium is no outlier as its mainstream parties have been losing their vote share to more fringe elements in recent years. How these parties do in Belgium will matter in determining whether or not there is a pattern of any significant shift to the right for Europe.

How does Belgium’s regional division play into the government’s formation?

Regional divides play an overwhelming role in the country. Almost all the country’s actual governance sits with devolved regional parliaments and authorities. In the north, the Dutch-speaking Flemish are represented. To the south, it’s the French-speaking Walloons. (A small German-language community to the east of the country also has its own parliament, and the Brussels-Capital Region has its own regional representation too.) For the federal elections, parties are also split by region. Walloons will get a choice from French-speaking parties, and Flanders will choose their own Dutch-speaking parties—with only few exceptions. All parties will meet in Brussels to hash out some sort of coalition agreement. This means the federal parliament has an immense number of parties represented and further complicates the government formation at the federal level. There are, for instance, twelve parties represented in the current federal parliament (seven of which are in the current governing coalition). Negotiations over the formation of the government in the country are notoriously tedious—and infamously long. Belgium went 652 days before inagurating the current government, and it took 541 for a government to form following Belgium’s 2010 elections.

What are voters’ top priorities in the election?

It varies by region, but the federal election maps trends seen across Europe. Flanders has a strong tinge of separatism. Voters there also have a focus on migration, where the far right is expected to make gains. The far-right Vlaams Belang party is leading the polls in Flanders, followed by the right-wing and separatist New Flemish Alliance party. Voters in Wallonia to the south are traditionally more left leaning than their northern counterparts. The Socialist Party leads polls in the region, but the centrist Reformist Movement is making up ground. This contradictory trend adds an extra layor of complication in coalition negotiations.

Can the far right win? How would that impact the independence discussion?

It’s difficult to tell whether the far right can enter government. Belgium fits within the larger European trend in which the right and far right are making gains. But in Belgium, a party winning in elections does not necessarily mean that party will win in negotiations. Success at the ballot box and ending up in power are two very separate discussions. After the elections, the various parties will have to come up with some sort of governing pact. The matter of who takes the prime minister post is uncertain and subject to negotiations. The party of current Belgian Prime Minister Alexander De Croo came nowhere near the top of the polls in the last election, but De Croo found himself at the helm. Moreover, it will be difficult for the far right to find its way into power. Belgium has kept the far right out of any governing coalition in the past with its cordon sanitaire. The future of keeping the far right out of power is another key detail to watch both in Belgium and at the European Union-level, as European parties grapple with exactly how to govern (or how to avoid governing) with rising far-right parties across the bloc.

James Batchik is an associate director at the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center.

Further reading

New Atlanticist May 9, 2024

The European Parliament is still learning its lesson from corruption scandals

By Sophia Athan

With European Parliament elections upcoming, EU institutions should codify stricter definitions of foreign influence and interference, and they should pass additional reforms to ensure transparency.

Corruption European Union

New Atlanticist Apr 30, 2024

The case for Mario Draghi as the next European Council president

By Mario De Pizzo

As European Council president, Draghi could help enact his proposals to make the European Union more integrated and competitive.

Economy & Business European Union

New Atlanticist Mar 26, 2024

In this year of elections, the US-EU Trade and Technology Council should get strategic

By Frances Burwell

On April 4-5, US and EU officials will meet in Leuven, Belgium, where they will need to chart a bolder way forward for the US-EU Trade and Technology Council.

Economy & Business Europe & Eurasia

The post Your primer on Belgium’s elections appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On June 4, 2024, Deputy Director of the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center María Fernanda Bozmoski was interviewed on Bloomberg’s Balance of Power radio show and podcast about President Joe Biden’s executive order slashing asylum claims in the US.

More about our expert

Staff

María Fernanda Bozmoski

Deputy Director, Operations and Finance

Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center

Northern Triangle

The post Bozmoski interviewed on Bloomberg Balance of Power appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Click to jump to an expert analysis:

Kapil Sharma: A Modi-led coalition government is good news for India’s economic growth

Seema Sirohi: The BJP came into the election overconfident. It leaves humbled.

Ratan Shrivastava: After surprise results, Modi will need to govern more cautiously to keep his coalition together

Shék Jain: Expect Modi to keep pushing back against the West on climate policy, while making changes at the local level

Srujan Palkar: Factionalism split India’s political parties—and their voters

Adnan Ahmad Ansari: India’s democracy is alive and kicking

Jeff Lande: The BJP won, but uncertainty has been introduced to the picture

Nish Acharya: Indian voters just proved the axiom that “all politics is local”

Atman Trivedi: A surprising election verdict puts the BJP on notice

A Modi-led coalition government is good news for India’s economic growth

The Indian electorate handed Modi and the BJP a historic third consecutive five-year term. After an election supported by more than 642 million voters, 312 million of whom were women, Modi, the BJP, and their coalition members have secured a mandate to continue their ambitious political and economic agenda—albeit with a bit more political maneuvering and a much stronger opposition.  

Modi’s win was not a surprise, although it was not expected to be under a coalition government. Still, he is prepared to hit the ground running. Modi’s agenda will likely be executed by a new and younger coalition cabinet, though the exact portfolios and officials are yet to be announced. Even under a coalition government, this is good news for India’s economic growth and business environment. The agenda will continue to include reforms for industrial manufacturing, infrastructure, digitization, regional trade, supply chain agreements, and even land reform—with a coalition government even more likely to emphasize economics. While the Indian equities markets have not reacted favorably to the news of a coalition government, businesses will welcome continued certainty. But as the results have shown, the voters need to feel the success of these policies on the ground with jobs and economic growth.

The BJP has many challenges going forward. The party’s popularity rides on Modi—he polls twice as popular as the BJP as a party and drives a third of its votes. Looking to the future, Modi is seventy-three years old and does not have a clear successor. This is likely his last national election. His popularity and a weaker national opposition party have allowed the BJP to paper over its weaknesses—especially at the state and local levels.

Indian voters have shown that they have taken their vote seriously with the Congress party and other regional parties taking seats in traditional BJP strongholds in the north and west (specifically in Uttar Pradesh and Maharashtra). As former US House Speaker Tip O’Neill famously said, “all politics is local,” and that has never been truer in India.

At this stage, there are three big takeaways from this election: 1) Democracy is alive and well in India; 2) Indians want jobs, jobs, and jobs; and 3) the Indian voter will hold the government to growing the economy over religion. On the third point, it’s worth noting that the BJP is losing in Ayodhya, the site of the Ram Mandir, a temple the BJP fulfilled a campaign promise to build to replace a sixteenth-century Mughal-era mosque razed by Hindu groups in 1992. The site is considered to be one of Hinduism’s holiest sites and has been the center of Indian politics for decades.

The BJP struggled to translate its economic policies and benefits to the average voter. Coupled with a stronger anti-incumbency mood and operating under a coalition government, the BJP will need to work hard to maintain its position as India’s largest party. The BJP and its coalition government are now operating in a “now or never” moment.

—Kapil Sharma is the acting senior director of the Atlantic Council’s South Asia Center.

The BJP came into the election overconfident. It leaves humbled.

The Indian elections were long, spread over six weeks, but they proved to be a thriller in the end. Early results show that the Indian voter decided to humble the mighty and restore balance. The ruling party has done worse than projected and the opposition alliance much better than expected. 

As vote tallies come in, it appears Modi’s BJP may not secure on its own the 272 seats needed for a majority in the 543-member Lok Sabha, the governing lower house. The BJP will be beholden to its allies, something the party has been able to avoid since Modi first came to power in 2014.

The reduced numbers are a far cry from an overconfident projection of four hundred seats by the BJP and its allies and a campaign centered around Modi’s personal appeal. In the end, a host of real issues—inflation, unemployment, rural distress, caste divides—mattered more than a slick message designed to project Modi not just as an Indian leader but as a global statesman. 

The opposition Congress party under Rahul Gandhi has made a spirited comeback with a campaign that emphasized economic issues over religious divides. Gandhi’s two yatras, or journeys, through huge parts of India listening to people and learning about their problems seemed to have resonated with voters. The performance is all the more significant given the uneven playing field—the Modi government is accused of using various ploys to hobble the opposition.

Shrunken and humbled, the BJP will still be able to form a government with Modi as prime minister for the third time, but the party’s allies will extract a bigger price for coming along. 

—Seema Sirohi is a columnist for the Economic Times.

After surprise results, Modi will need to govern more cautiously to keep his coalition together

Heading into his third term as prime minister, this election was marred for Modi by the unrealistic expectations that he set for himself—a target of four hundred parliamentary seats for the ruling National Democratic Alliance (NDA). NDA’s numbers have been diminished, as some parties have left the alliance—including Shiromani Akali Dal, which could have helped the NDA in Punjab, and the Shiv Sena, which could have added eleven more members of parliament (MPs).

This election has seen a close contest in Uttar Pradesh, a state that sends eighty MPs to the parliament. It witnessed the consolidation of minority voters and support for affirmative action, based on the opposition INDIA coalition’s narrative that the ruling NDA would change the constitution and end the reservation system, under which historically disadvantaged castes and communities receive quota-based jobs and educational opportunities.

The election also saw candidates intelligently align themselves in key constituencies, where the Samajwadi Party and Indian National Congress avoided direct clashes and made the BJP/NDA candidates sweat, especially in the eastern Uttar Pradesh and western Uttar Pradesh belt of Jats, which had substantial opposition to the NDA and BJP because of the controversial farm law proposals.

The BJP is still the single largest political party in the parliament, and the NDA coalition will return to power, as it has comfortably crossed the required majority of 272 seats in parliament. But Modi’s administration will be weakened by the pressures of running a coalition government and catering to demands based on regional mandates, which makes bold economic or political decisions long in the making. This may impact policy formulation and the financial investments by big corporations as well as the stock market, in the near term.

Modi may not be seriously impacted by the election results, nor is his image in the international arena likely to suffer. He will still be the prime minister and thus represent the government and India in international fora, but he will need to tread with caution to keep his coalition together.

—Ratan Shrivastava is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s South Asia Center and managing director at Bower Group Asia. He previously served in the Indian Ministry of Defense.

Expect Modi to keep pushing back against the West on climate policy, while making changes at the local level

Modi and the BJP will garner another five years to implement their vision of Bharat with the assistance of coalition partners. Modi’s support appears firm, while the BJP experienced stronger regional challenges than expected.  

Voters seem satisfied with Modi’s efforts to elevate India on the global stage and with many of his policies for national economic growth. Viewed from the lens of climate change, the electorate appears content with Modi’s performance at the COP26 climate change summit in 2021—where Modi committed to reducing India’s carbon emissions to net-zero by 2070—and as president of the Group of Twenty (G20) last year. Constituents largely agree with Modi’s position that India needs balance in solving climate change and deserves an opportunity to develop like Western nations. I expect to see Modi double down on this position and work with the developing nations grouping known as the BRICS to deflate pressure from the West. Modi will flex more on global climate change, arguing that sustainability encompasses poverty alleviation and economic opportunity as much as environmental stewardship.

But Modi cannot ignore the fact that his party lost ground in this election. Modi’s support as a strongman facing the rest of the world may be intact, but the BJP’s strong-arm approach domestically seems to have made the electorate wary. The climate corollary is that, while India’s international stance on climate change is popular, the BJP’s approach at the local level has been less effective (notwithstanding the borderless nature of most pollution). Constituents do not seem to be able to connect the dots on how BJP climate policies benefit them. The air is still polluted, clean water remains scarce, heat is reaching unlivable levels, and climate catastrophes keep occurring. To shore up his party, Modi likely will start connecting these dots by promoting new, farmer-friendly alternatives to burning crop residues, doing more on water recycling and floodwater detention/retention, and making lower-carbon cooking fuels more accessible. Look for new programs, or revamping of existing programs, in these areas.

—Shék Jain is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s South Asia Center and chairman of the Pura Terra Foundation.

Factionalism split India’s political parties—and their voters

Despite India’s massive scale, Indian national elections are largely local. More accurately, these elections are contested on a regional level. Recognizing these regional issues is crucial to understanding the national result. For example, the increasing political factionalism at the regional level split the loyalty of politicians and voters alike. In various regions, political parties from across the ideological spectrum have split into opposing factions or allied with ideologically unaligned parties—running with the BJP to hold onto power or teaming up with the rest of the opposition to topple the BJP. Amid the factionalism, the BJP has relied largely on Modi to sway voters.

To understand the complexity, consider just one state, Maharashtra. Maharashtra’s politics since the state’s formation in 1960 have been eccentric and eclectic to say the least—with only one chief minister (the equivalent of a governor in the United States) having completed a full five-year term. Four major parties ran in Maharashtra in the 2019 elections. Over the years, two of these parties split, resulting in different factions of them being simultaneously in government and opposition. As the results come in, the BJP and the Congress party are leading in Maharashtra, but in third and fourth place are the surviving factions of the broken parties running against the BJP. In Maharashtra and several other states, factionalism worked to secure power for the BJP by bringing together diametrically opposed right-wing and left-wing parties, but this method has not received validation from the Indian voters in Maharashtra as the results of this election cycle show. 

Maharashtra is only one example, and political factionalism is only one topic that has trended in India in the last five years. The results show that Indian citizens have paid attention to the regional issues affecting tens and hundreds of millions—political factionalism, women’s rights, employment, government employment in all sectors including the military, communal strife, controversial legislation, caste discrimination, and regional discrimination. 

—Srujan Palkar is a program assistant at the Atlantic Council’s South Asia Center.

India’s democracy is alive and kicking

India’s election results held a surprise that very few expected. Modi is expected to become the prime minister for a third consecutive term, unless there are any last-minute surprises or changes in coalitions, which cannot be ruled out—stranger things have happened in Indian democracy. Yet, this victory should feel like a setback for Modi. He gave a clarion call for his coalition to get four hundred seats. However, his coalition is struggling to gain even three hundred seats and his party is falling short of an absolute majority. The BJP has won, but it’s a victory of a different kind. The Congress party is celebrating, despite winning only around one hundred seats in the parliament. But for them, it’s a defeat that must feel like a victory, since they performed much better than expected. 

However, the key takeaway from this election is that India’s democracy is alive and kicking. It is a myth that the Indian economy and polity thrives under especially strong majority governments. Some of India’s biggest economic reforms happened under the coalition governments of the 1990s and 2000s. This result, in which the BJP will need to form a coalition to govern, should give us hope.

India has a parliamentary form of government, which some say was slowly turning into a “prime ministerial” form of government (with power concentrated in the executive). These election results will give back some of the power to the legislature. 

We can expect India’s parliament and parliamentary committees to become more active, with more bills being debated and deliberated. This is also a vote that shows that the Indian electorate does not cast its votes based on singular issues. Regional issues cannot be neglected, every vote needs to be earned, and overconfidence can be lethal. The best politics is building an economy that works for everyone—these elections have reminded us of this fact. The country will see policy continuity, but with checks. India will have the strongest opposition it has had in the past ten years, but a decisive leader still at the top.

Both sides may claim victory based on these surprising election results. But India’s democracy has been the biggest winner in these elections. And that is the best outcome we may have asked for.

—Adnan Ahmad Ansari is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s South Asia Center and associate vice president at the Asia Group.

The BJP won, but uncertainty has been introduced to the picture

The election results are a surprise given the predictions going into the vote count. The results reinforce the difficulty of gathering such polling data around the world. Exit polls and media reports from across the country had set the expectation of a massive win—and perhaps even an absolute majority—for Modi and his ruling BJP.

The BJP did win, but by a significantly smaller margin than many predicted. Instead of looking at an absolute-majority rule, the BJP appears headed for a return to coalition politics. This surprise creates political and policy uncertainties that will have at least short-term consequences. A reversal of the sort of investments and capital expenditure that the government has advanced in recent years, in favor of a return to subsidies, protectionism, and welfare programs, is unlikely. But uncertainty has been introduced into the picture. Policy and political decisions will likely be delayed. Industry, particularly multinational corporations, and partner governments may hold off on some decisions as they wait and see how the new government develops.

Among the sectors least affected could be the technology sector, particularly software and services. This is because the ruling parties, throughout the past several decades, have all seen the tech sector as a growth engine for the economy, exports, and jobs. In contrast, infrastructure, agriculture, and large banks are among those that face questions about the shape and impact of potential policy changes.

—Jeff Lande is a nonresident fellow at the Atlantic Council’s South Asia Center, president of the Lande Group, and senior advisor to Conlon Public Strategies.

Indian voters just proved the axiom that “all politics is local”

Listening to the speakers at a recent business conference in India, as I did recently, one would never have predicted the election results announced today in India. Business and government leaders spoke about export-driven growth, artificial intelligence, advanced manufacturing, and ambitious visions for India over the next twenty-five years. But every so often, election results prove that voters are not necessarily as monolithic or unsophisticated as elites may think them to be. Clearly, it was what the chief executive officers and ministers did not speak of—income inequality, local development, and the fabric of society—that was on the minds of voters.

India is at an important transition point that will make life difficult for any leader. The prime minister, MPs, and business leaders should be speaking about India’s emerging role on the global stage. They should be positioning India in the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue as a leader on climate change and investing in emerging technologies.

And the BJP was rewarded for strong stewardship of the economy over the past ten years. India’s hard infrastructure—roads, bridges, and airports—have all improved significantly. Electricity and clean water are far more accessible than before. And the tough implementation of economic reforms, such as the goods and services tax and digital public infrastructure, are rapidly bringing millions of people into the formal economy.

But, as the US politician Tip O’Neill famously said, “all politics is local.” Despite strong overall economic growth, the real numbers are more complex. After subsidy adjustments, the growth rate is really closer to 6 percent. Growth remains concentrated in the south and west. Pollution and extreme heat are unbearable for large portions of the year in Delhi. And India still has nearly two hundred million people living below the global poverty line of $1.25 a day. 

This wasn’t a Hindutva election. It was not an embrace or rejection of the BJP’s majoritarian agenda. Instead, it was the type of pushback that voters around the world often provide when politicians and business leaders lose sight of the important issues in front of them.   

 —Nish Acharya is a nonresident fellow at the Atlantic Council’s South Asia Center.

A surprising election verdict puts the BJP on notice

While vote counting is ongoing, the BJP has won significantly fewer seats than expected. This national poll was, first and foremost, a referendum on Modi and his populist policies. After all, the BJP ran a presidential-style campaign with its charismatic leader front and center.

The party is still on track to remain by far the largest in the lower house, but its results fall well short of expectations. Nevertheless, voters seem comfortable with Modi and much of his agenda—the BJP’s vote share may prove to be comparable to 2019. Indians also appear keen to voice their concerns over economic distress and rising inequality.

Under Modi’s reign, the country has begun to witness robust economic growth after uneven progress during the pandemic. The economy grew at 8.2 percent in the fiscal year ending March 31, and the International Monetary Fund forecasts that it will grow by 6.8 percent in 2024 and 6.5 percent in 2025. India’s hard and digital infrastructure has improved, as well.

The problem is most Indians have not adequately participated in the fruits of an economy with gaudy headline numbers. Growth is unequal, and jobs are few and far between. Unemployment was the top concern for 27 percent of respondents in a recent poll. Against this backdrop, it’s not difficult to understand why both domestic consumption and investment are tepid.

In these elections, the BJP appealed to the religious identity of India’s Hindu majority, while Congress cautioned that a BJP landslide would result in changes to the constitution, removing exceptions afforded to the historically marginalized. Building temples, no matter how grand, doesn’t put food on tables. To address everyday concerns, Modi has accelerated welfare support, but at the cost of reducing already low public investment in education and health.

The surprising partial results begin to puncture Modi’s aura of invincibility, chip away at the BJP’s dominance, and breathe new life into Congress. The BJP still casts a large shadow over Indian politics, but it lacks a policy mandate. 

Coalition governments require compromises. That reality could complicate any plans for ambitious structural reforms on land, labor, or opening India’s markets to unfinished and intermediate inputs. 

Despite the skittish reaction from equity markets, a governing coalition could lead to a sustained period of strong economic growth, like in the 1990s and 2000s. Additional consultation, while perhaps slowing reforms, promises to strengthen the health of India’s democracy. 

Until now, most questions about succession and party leadership have been pointedly directed at Gandhi, the sometimes-reluctant leader of India’s most storied political family. While it is hard to imagine anyone filling Modi’s shoes, there will likely be more open discussion about who in the BJP succeeds the seventy-three-year-old. 

Voters have once again defied expectations and, once more, confirmed the resiliency of India’s democracy. So close to solidifying his status atop the list of the world’s most popular democratically elected leaders, Modi must now rely on kingmakers to help determine the BJP’s future.

—Atman Trivedi is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s South Asia Center and partner at Albright Stonebridge Group, where he leads the firm’s South Asia Practice. He previously worked on US-India affairs in the US Commerce Department, the US State Department, and for then US Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman John Kerry.

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On June 4, 2024, Deputy Director of the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center María Fernanda Bozmoski was interviewed on Bloomberg Markets about expectations around the Claudia Sheinbaum presidency in Mexico.

The segment starts approximately 34 minutes into the video.

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A former mayor of Mexico City, Sheinbaum has a strong foundation in addressing urban challenges, governance, and social policies. Like her predecessor, outgoing President Andrés Manuel López Obrador, Sheinbaum will likely coordinate her policies under a narrative of addressing social injustice and advocating for Mexico’s most vulnerable. But unlike her predecessor, Sheinbaum is an environmental engineer and climate scientist by training. She appears poised to place environmental issues, including climate-change mitigation and adaptation, high among her social justice concerns. This would likely include seeking to advance issues ranging from sustainable agriculture to renewable energy.

At first glance, this may sound odd. Mexico is a major oil producer—the second largest exporter in Latin America after Brazil—and Sheinbaum has all but guaranteed that she will continue funding the state-owned oil company PEMEX, which suffers from a range of inefficiencies and carries debt of more than one hundred billion dollars. However, her scientific background and previous initiatives indicate a potential for balancing economic development with environmental sustainability. For example, during her time as mayor of Mexico City, Sheinbaum spearheaded the installment of solar power panels on top of a major market. Furthermore, she campaigned for president on a promise to address, early on in her administration, the water issues affecting Mexico City. Already during her first speech since the election, and probably in an effort to differentiate herself from López Obrador, Sheinbaum spoke about an upcoming renewable energy program for Mexico. Calibrating this balance will be crucial, as will working with regional partners. After all, Mexico and its neighbor Guatemala, for instance, face similar challenges of environmental degradation and the impacts of climate change, from flooding to droughts and a lack of access to water.

Another way in which Sheinbaum could partner with her Central American neighbors is by working together to seize nearshoring opportunities. Specifically, she and her regional counterparts could promote a mechanism whereby Central American economies would be able to join the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA). Nearshoring, or bringing international supply chains and production closer to the US market, can provide significant economic benefits, creating jobs and fostering economic stability in Mexico and throughout Central America. Promoting economic integration through the USMCA could provide a structured framework for this cooperation. The idea has been floated for a couple of years now, first by Costa Rica in 2022. This move would enhance the competitive edge of Central American economies, which in many ways are too small to make a difference on their own but together could create economies of scale. Bringing other Central American countries into the USMCA would allow these nations to benefit from the same trade advantages enjoyed by Mexico. It could also reduce many of the economic pressures that drive migration, namely a lack of jobs and insufficient wages.

Furthermore, Sheinbaum’s administration could adopt a more humanitarian approach to migration, focusing on protecting migrant rights and providing humanitarian assistance. While López Obrador touted his tree-planting “Sembrando Vida” program, Sheinbaum could take the programs a step further. This approach aligns with her broader progressive values—she is a self-described humanist—and can enhance Mexico’s role as a regional leader in addressing the migration crisis. During the campaign, Sheinbaum repeatedly mentioned increased investments in social and youth programs in Central America, which, if designed holistically and sustainably, could effectively curb migration from Mexico’s neighbors. This is particularly important now, as US President Joe Biden prepares to roll out an executive order that would allow the United States to temporarily close its southern border if a threshold of encounters with migrants at the border is reached—reportedly, an average of five thousand crossings in a week or 2,500 in a day.

Regional security is another area in which Sheinbaum could make a big difference. Almost three dozen candidates were assassinated during the current electoral campaign, and record-breaking violence in the country is resulting in more than thirty thousand homicides each year. Improved and increased intelligence-sharing between Mexico and Central American countries can help combat organized crime and violence, which are significant push factors for migration. This is also an area in which the United States and Mexico may look to double down on their cooperation. Sheinbaum has pledged to address the rampant impunity in Mexico—less than five percent of criminal investigations are solved and many crimes go unreported. While Sheinbaum is unlikely to approach the security issue in the severe manner of President Nayib Bukele in El Salvador, she has recognized the urgency of this issue for the livelihood of millions of Mexicans.

Sheinbaum’s presidency could bring about significant positive change in Mexico and its relations with Central America. Her administration’s policies on energy and environmental sustainability, economic integration, and migration will have an important impact on the future of the region. The first female president of Mexico has the opportunity to redefine her country’s role in Central America, address the root causes of migration, and promote a more stable and prosperous region. In this new chapter for Mexico and the region, the Aztec nation could very well be a strong and stable partner for Central American nations.

María Fernanda Bozmoski is deputy director, operations and finance at the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center, where she leads the center’s work on Mexico and Central America.

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On June 4, 2024, Vice President and Senior Director of the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center Jason Marczak was interviewed on El Heraldo Radio about the priorities for Claudia Sheinbaum’s administration.

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On June 3, 2024, Deputy Director of the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center María Fernanda Bozmoski was interviewed by Caitriona Perry on BBC News about Mexico’s new president-elect, Claudia Sheinbaum.

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Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center

Northern Triangle

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The numbers show an incoming administration with a strong mandate. With 58.3 to 60.7 percent of the vote, according to the National Electoral Institute’s Quick Count, Sheinbaum will enter office on October 1 even surpassing the share obtained by the current president, Andrés Manuel López Obrador, who won in 2018 with 53.2 percent of the votes. Her margin of victory over the second-place finisher could range from 29.7 to 34.1 percentage points—on track to likely surpass López Obrador’s margin (30.9 percentage points) as well. 

Beyond the surprise in outperforming even some of the most generous polls, her party, MORENA, and its allies received a mandate in Congress that also surpassed expectations. In the Chamber of Deputies, the new Congress will convene in September with the MORENA coalition holding a supermajority (at least two-thirds of the seats), and it is within striking range to do the same in the Senate. Early signs indicate that the MORENA coalition will hold a minimum of 346 seats in the 500-person lower House and could hold anywhere from 76 to 88 seats in the 128-person Senate, with 85 seats required for a supermajority.

The significance here cannot be overstated. A supermajority allows for constitutional changes—from the direct election of judges to the independence of regulatory agencies—which could not be obtained thus far by the López Obrador administration. Explicit campaign pledges can now be advanced. This means a potential acceleration of the Fourth Transformation of the Mexican state as ushered in by López Obrador, especially if the outgoing president prioritizes constitutional changes once the new Congress convenes on September 1.

As López Obrador’s hand-picked successor, Sheinbaum will certainly continue with her predecessor’s policies, but she will also be her own president. A scientist by training and a former secretary of the environment, she will bring new technical expertise and pragmatism to the presidency. That was evident in her time as head of government of Mexico City, where she developed and then continuously followed up on the implementation status of her 220-page government plan.

Expect to see several of her priorities during her term running Mexico City to carry over to her presidential administration. For example, speaking with the Atlantic Council on the sidelines of the Cities Summit of the Americas last year, Sheinbaum showed an in-depth, technical perspective on sustainability—not simply as stewardship of natural resources, but also as an issue interconnected with education, social justice, healthcare, housing, and infrastructure. 

Sheinbaum mentioned throughout her campaign the need to move forward with the energy transition, comments that reflect her background in energy engineering. There will inevitably be a role for the private sector to play in this transition, but as with her broader perspectives, the view of the Sheinbaum camp is that the government should lead the charge. The public-private partnerships that Sheinbaum moved forward during her leadership in Mexico City could be a model she brings to her new administration to advance, for example, more renewable energy projects in Mexico.

Infrastructure will also likely be a priority for the incoming administration. In her acceptance speech early Monday morning, Sheinbaum spoke about the need for new highways, trains, airports, and ports. All of these strategic projects are critical for Mexico to take advantage of the investment opportunities related to nearshoring with the United States. But given the tight government budget conditions that the new government will face, completing these projects will not be easy. Here, too, watch to see if the new administration turns to public-private partnerships to move these projects forward.

Finally, Sheinbaum will assume office in October with not only a sizable domestic mandate, but also with an opportunity to deepen Mexico’s engagement beyond its borders. López Obrador rarely traveled abroad, and Sheinbaum followed suit as head of government in Mexico City. Even though she took office in 2018, her trip to Denver for the Cities Summit of the Americas last year was rarity. But if and when she goes abroad, she will generate much interest given the potentially transformative moment she will oversee in Mexico and her place in history as Mexico’s first female president.

Jason Marczak is vice president and senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center. He leads work on the economic and security impacts of greater efficiencies and reduced wait times at the US-Mexico border including presenting findings before the Mexican Congress.

Bosco Martí is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center and is the global director of institutional affairs and communications for Aleatica. He previously served as executive director for Mexico and the Dominican Republic at the Inter-American Development Bank.

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On June 3, 2024, Vice President and Senior Director of the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center Jason Marczak was interviewed on DW News about the mandate for Mexico’s next president, Claudia Sheinbaum.

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On June 3, 2024, Vice President and Senior Director of the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center Jason Marczak was interviewed on CNN’s Isa Soares Tonight about the mandate for Mexico President-elect Claudia Sheinbaum.

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Americas Caribbean

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In March, the presence of at least twenty thousand Afghan migrants at a state-run event in Tehran to commemorate the birth of the third Shia saint, Imam Hassan—and support the Resistance Axis—caused a significant stir among Iranians.

Some Iranians have also ridiculed the Islamic Republic’s reliance on Afghan migrants to pack Tehran’s eighty-thousand-seat Azadi stadium at a state-run ideological parade, mocking the move as further evidence of the regime’s shrinking support base.

The topic of mass Afghan migration is virtually unavoidable on Iranian streets. The past year has seen a significant influx of Shia Afghans to Iran—something that is visible across every city and even in the most obscure rural areas, such as Khomein, the hometown of Islamic Republic founder Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini

On the surface, there appear to be two explanations for this sudden surge in migration from Iran’s eastern border: the Taliban takeover in 2021, which caused mass displacement, and the fact that Iran has lost control over its borders—with an Afghan refugee increase of 338 percent since 2021, equivalent to 3.41 million people in just three years.

But the unusual pace with which Afghan refugees have been legally incorporated into Iranian society, despite severe backlash, suggests something greater and more coordinated is at play.

Historically, Afghans have faced state and societal discrimination in Iran. This discrimination prevented Afghans from owning homes, opening bank accounts, or buying cell phones, and Afghans also faced marriage restrictions. However, multiple reports have recently revealed that Afghan refugees en masse have been granted Iranian passports, national identity cards, and full citizenship rights—including the rights to work, vote, and own homes.

While many Afghans have used this avenue, others have taken advantage of recent changes to Iran’s migration laws, which grant immediate “special permanent residence” to foreign nationals “interested in the Islamic Revolution” or who support “the ideals and securing the interests of the Islamic Republic.”

In recent months, the mass participation of Shia Afghans at regime-organized events—including speeches made by the president and supreme leader, state-run Shia Islamist processions, and even rubber-stamp “elections”—sheds light on how the Islamic Republic is proactively using Afghan migrants to foster a loyal constituency and fill the widening gap between the state and Iranian society. As one Shia Afghan migrant declared on state television during the highly engineered March parliamentary elections, which were boycotted overwhelmingly by the Iranian population, “It’s my great honor to come to the ballot box and vote for the Islamic Republic.”

This resembles the clerical establishment’s demographic engineering abroad—repopulating Sunni and Christian neighborhoods in places like Syria and Iraq—where Shia migration, mainly from Afghanistan, has been used to facilitate Tehran’s ideological and security needs. This model not only consolidates the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ (IRGC) suppressive security apparatus but serves to Islamize societies and change their identities according to Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s grand ideological project.   

Against this backdrop, the pace at which Afghan Shia migrants have been incorporated into the Islamic Republic’s ideological and propaganda pillars raises serious questions. Is the regime deliberately manufacturing demographic changes in Iran through migration to engineer the supreme leader’s long-held objective of achieving a so-called “Islamic society”?    

As Khamenei has repeatedly argued, creating an “Islamic society” can only be achieved after creating a “true” Islamic government. The de facto appointment of hardline Islamist cleric and Khamenei protégé Ebrahim Raisi in the 2021 presidential elections was designed to complete that first step so the regime could move toward an Islamic society, as noted by the supreme leader’s representative to the IRGC.

From the start of the revolution in 1979, the Islamic Republic has taken two approaches to Islamizing Iranian society: from above, through top-down imposition, and from below, focusing on grassroots projects such as establishing Basij militias and mosques in every neighborhood.

Despite all these efforts, Iranian society today is anything but Islamic. A leaked poll conducted by the Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance from 2023 revealed that 73 percent of Iranians seek a secular state, contrary to regime propaganda. The Woman, Life, Freedom uprising in 2022 following the killing of Mahsa Jina Amini for “improper hijab” brought these data to life.

Videos of women and men burning the compulsory Islamic veil and the Quran, the torching of mosques and Shia eulogy centers, and the new trend of “turban tossing” to mock the Shia clergy revealed the extent of secularization in Iranian society.

In many ways, the uprising was the final nail in the coffin for Khamenei and his hardline followers’ attempts to achieve an Islamic society among Iranians.

Having tried and failed to Islamize society from above and below, the clerical establishment and the IRGC adopted a new approach to the creation of their ideal Islamic society—Islamization from outside.

Migrants from Afghanistan and other shia communities are, in many ways, the perfect candidates for Khamenei to exploit to implement his project of Islamization. The Shia Afghan community is undoubtedly more religiously conservative and observant than the increasingly secular Iranian population—and Tehran is awarding full privileges to committed Shias from Afghanistan.

The current migration figures from Afghanistan underscore that engineering demographic changes in Iran is not a pipe dream for the supreme leader, but a genuine possibility that is within reach.

These figures reveal that there are as many as 6 million Afghan migrants in Iran. However, according to Seyed Hadi Kasai-Zadeh, editor of the journal Meydan-e Azad, if the current trajectory of migration continues, this figure could increase to “20 million in the next three years.” Today, as many as ten thousand Shia Afghans are crossing the border into Iran. These numbers, coupled with mass Iranian emigration—with as many as 2.2 million Iranians leaving the country in 2023 alone—and the country’s historically low birthrate reveal its population will be very different in the coming years.

Iran’s birthrate—which has dropped from 6.4 percent in 1980 to 1.66 percent in 2022—has been a significant cause of concern for the aging ayatollah. In 2013, the supreme leader demanded that Iran’s population increase to 150 million—which he deemed necessary for the establishment of a new Islamic civilization. To achieve this, the regime has employed both incentives for “baby making”—such as providing free housing or high-speed internet to married couples—and forced impositions, such as banning contraception for men and women. An anonymous IRGC official told us that all members of the IRGC must have at least two children or provide medical reasons why they cannot.

In the conspiratorial worldview of Khamenei and the clerical establishment, Iran’s low birthrate is part of a Western plot to decrease the global Shia population and incapacitate the workforce the regime needs to establish its new Islamic civilization. Many in Iran have interpreted the influx of Shia Afghan migrants as Khamenei’s attempt to remedy this. In 2023, the state-run Islamic Republic newspaper reported that, in the fall of 2022, out of 300 births in a hospital in Fars province, 294 were Afghan. These statistics simply cannot be ignored.

But how will Shia Afghan migrants contribute toward achieving Khamenei’s so-called ideal “Islamic society”? One way relates to Islamizing public life in Iran. The regime has long sought to increase attendance at mosques, Shia Islamist eulogy centers (heyats), and public ideological processions—attendance which has been significantly declining among Iranians. For example, during this year’s Nowruz holiday, while large numbers of Iranians opted to celebrate New Year festivities at pre-Islamic, secular historical sites, a reported  thirty thousand foreign migrants—the overwhelming majority of whom were Afghan—gathered in Mashhad at the holy shrine of eighth Shia saint, Imam Reza.

Islamic morality policing is another example. As more and more Iranian women and men resist Islamic dress codes, the regime is seeking to actively incorporate Shia Afghan migrants in its efforts to enforce its Islamist “enjoining good, forbidding evil” doctrine, which underpins its morality policing codes.  

The final—and perhaps most important—example relates to bolstering the IRGC’s security and paramilitary apparatus. Reports have revealed that the IRGC has been encouraging Shia Afghan migration in Iran to bolster its Shia Afghan proxy, the Fatemiyoun Brigade. This paramilitary force—known as the IRGC’s Afghan Hezbollah—is actively participating in the Iranian regime’s militancy and terrorism abroad, including against Israel and US forces. Regime affiliates have also alluded to using Afghan migrants to suppress future anti-regime protests in Iran. 

In the short term, Khamenei might be able to use Islamization from outside to fill the increasing gap between the regime and its people, and to expand his shrinking social constituency. In the medium to long term, however, such demographic manufacturing will inevitably inflame domestic tensions in Iran, further increasing the gap between the Iranian people and the regime and resulting in societal conflict between Iranians and Afghan migrants.

If Khamenei and the IRGC can control this, then they will have a better chance of preserving the Islamic Republic, undercutting the widely held belief that the modernization and secularization of society will inevitably lead to the collapse of the regime. On the other hand, if the regime’s project unravels, it could increase the frequency of mass protests and violent resistance against the regime’s suppression. Either way, domestic instability in Iran is about to get a lot worse.

Saeid Golkar is a senior adviser at United Against Nuclear Iran and UC Foundation associate professor in the department of political science at the University of Tennessee at Chattanooga.

Kasra Aarabi is the director of IRGC research at United Against Nuclear Iran. Follow him on X: @KasraAarabi.

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On June 3, 2024, Vice President and Senior Director of the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center Jason Marczak was quoted by Reuters about Mexico President-elect Claudia Sheinbaum.

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Jason Marczak

Vice President and Senior Director

Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center

Americas Caribbean

The post Marczak quoted by Reuters about Mexico’s president-elect appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On June 2, 2024, Vice President and Senior Director of the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center Jason Marczak was interviewed by Helena Humphreys of BBC News about the elections in Mexico.

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Jason Marczak

Vice President and Senior Director

Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center

Americas Caribbean

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On June 1, 2024, Vice President and Senior Director of the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center Jason Marczak was interviewed on CNN Newsroom about the June 2 elections in Mexico.

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Jason Marczak

Vice President and Senior Director

Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center

Americas Caribbean

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The consequences of the vote—and the future horse-trading for a regional governing coalition and president in the Catalan parliament before August—will extend far beyond the regional level. Given the weight that Catalonia carries in Spanish and European Union (EU) politics, the results and fallout of the May 12 elections will have massive implications for Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez’s national coalition government, which includes Catalan separatist parties; the upcoming European Parliament elections in June; and the EU’s foreign policy agenda going forward.

A setback for Catalan separatism?

The election results pose a political conundrum for Sánchez. The victory of the PSC, a direct affiliate of Sánchez’s national-level Socialist Party (PSOE), should by all logic be cause for celebration in the Moncloa Palace. Some have called the PSC’s victory a vindication of the prime minister’s strategy to pacify separatist forces in Catalonia and “turn the page” for the region’s politics by taking a more conciliatory approach toward the Catalan independence movement.

Indeed, Illa and the PSC won on a popular platform that prioritized issues such as the cost of living, housing availability, and drought in the region, rather than the longstanding debate over secession from Spain. However, despite their electoral defeat, the separatist bloc in Catalonia will still likely be a source of sustained headaches for Sánchez in Madrid as well as the next Catalan government in Barcelona.

At the national level, Sánchez has staked his minority coalition on the support of numerous small regional parties from across Spain, including the Basque Country’s own pro-independence party, EH Bildu. From Catalonia, Sánchez’s national coalition includes both the Republican Left (ERC) and Together for Catalonia (Junts), which are the region’s largest separatist parties, each holding seven seats in Spain’s lower house of parliament.

Bringing these parties into the coalition government has proven a tumultuous gamble for Sánchez. To secure their support in parliament after the 2023 general elections and form a majority over the center-right People’s Party (PP), which won the most seats, Sánchez passed a controversial amnesty law in 2023 to pardon hundreds of individuals involved in the illegal Catalan independence referendum of 2017—possibly including Junts leader Carles Puigdemont, who has been living in Belgium to avoid prosecution. On May 30, after months of deliberations, Spain’s parliament approved the amnesty law in its final form by a margin of five votes, which Sánchez and the PSOE celebrated as a milestone for “political, social, and institutional normalization” in Catalonia.

And, in an otherwise unprompted move while seeking coalition partners in September 2023, Sánchez went to Brussels and proposed that Catalan, Gallego, and Euskara—minority languages with co-official status in their respective regions in Spain—be granted official legal status in EU institutions. The proposal was shot down by member states, at least temporarily, but Sánchez’s message to regional nationalist parties at home was clear.

Despite these concessions, however, Sánchez was rebuked when Junts refused to support the PSOE’s legislative package in January 2024, which included measures to combat inflation and access ten billion euros of EU funds for Spain. Junts ultimately lifted its opposition to the legislation—through abstention, not approval—only after Catalonia was granted “comprehensive” authority over the region’s immigration policy. Junts even voted against earlier iterations of Sánchez’s Catalan amnesty bill, arguing it did not go far enough to protect Catalans indicted for terrorism in the 2017 referendum.

The defeat of Junts and the ERC in Catalonia’s elections could trigger further coalition infighting at the national level in Spain, which could cause pro-independence parties to barter for greater regional autonomy by blocking future PSOE legislative proposals. And, importantly, now with the amnesty law’s passage through parliament on May 30, the ERC and Junts have already indicated the possibility of a new referendum on independence, which would be the ultimate backfire for Sánchez.

Rightward shift in Barcelona, Madrid, and Brussels

Another revelation of the May 12 elections in Catalonia is the momentum of Spain’s right-wing politics. The PP performed historically well in the Catalan region, winning fifteen seats—up from just three seats held in the previous legislature and its best results since 2012.

At the national level, as well, PP leader Alberto Núñez Feijóo has become a prominent anti-Sánchez voice for many centrist and conservative voters in Spain. He repeatedly criticizes the prime minister’s coalition politics with Junts and ERC as being cynical and politically motivated. He also participated personally in the widespread protests in Madrid against the amnesty bill in November 2023 and called on Brussels to take action against the legislation, claiming it breaches EU norms for the rule of law.

Mirroring trends across Europe, far-right parties Catalan Alliance and Vox also performed well on May 12, which will surely cause problems for Illa and the PSC in the region’s parliament. Ahead of the European Parliament elections in June, Vox in particular is enjoying a surge in support beyond its base in Andalucía, polling nationally at 11 percent—a significant boost compared to the 6.2 percent of votes won in 2019’s EU contest.

Vox has recently joined the center stage of the European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) group in the European Parliament, pushing for a rightward paradigm shift in Brussels alongside Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni’s Brothers of Italy and Poland’s Law and Justice Party. Ahead of the EU elections starting on June 6, current polls predict that Spain’s left-wing parties belonging to the Renew Europe and Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats groups will lose substantial ground, while Spanish members of the European Parliament (MEP) from the ECR and especially the European People’s Party, which includes Spain’s PP, could nearly double their seat count.

What next for Catalonia and Europe?

Puigdemont claimed that an electoral defeat for the party on May 12 would signal his withdrawal from politics altogether and that he had “a right to get some rest after these very difficult years.” However, Catalonia could yet see another round of elections in October if the PSC is unable to form a majority coalition of sixty-eight seats in the Catalan parliament and vote for a new president by August 25, which is the deadline set by the outgoing president, Pere Aragonès of the ERC. To meet this deadline, the PSC will require the backing of either the opposition-minded ERC or an unlikely mix of the far-left Sumar alliance alongside the PP and Vox on the opposite side of the aisle.

While another round of elections would be cumbersome for Catalans, whose low voter turnout of 57.9 percent on May 12 indicates little electoral appetite, this could see a return of Puigdemont to the podium—perhaps even on Catalan soil, following the approval of the amnesty law on May 30.

There could yet be more distant reverberations in Europe following Catalonia’s election results. The removal of Catalan pro-independence parties from power in the region could influence EU foreign policy and, specifically, enlargement.

With renewed wind behind its sails since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, European enlargement could see new progress from the EU if Spain lifts its official nonrecognition of Kosovo, which is largely born out Madrid’s concern over the Catalan separatist movement. Madrid’s official recognition of the Palestinian state on May 28 should logically also open new doors for the recognition of Kosovo, whose political institutions, regional relations, and territorial integrity have, despite recent shortcomings, long been ready for such a move by Madrid.

For the EU to make progress on its enlargement goals, Spain and the four other holdout member states will need to recognize Kosovo’s independence. It was a step in the right direction for Spain to recognize Kosovo passports in January this year, allowing Kosovars to travel throughout the EU’s Schengen area visa-free. Spain should build on this progress by extending recognition to Kosovo’s state sovereignty, as it did for Palestine, to move the ball forward on this critical priority for European and transatlantic foreign policy.

The full implications of the PSC’s victory and the seeming defeat of Catalan separatist political forces on May 12 are still uncertain. Nationally, a recalcitrant Junts and ERC could render Sánchez “a prisoner of his own associates,” as Vox MEP Jorge Buxadé Villalba has described him and as the separatist parties have already proven capable of doing. A worst-case scenario for Sánchez would be a collapse of his coalition and a call for new general elections in Spain, as Feijóo advocated after the May 30 amnesty law approval.

In Catalonia, despite the amnesty law’s passage, the process of coalition-building and king-making in Barcelona could yet prove fruitless and result in fresh regional elections come October. By then, with a new EU administration after June’s European Parliament elections, Catalonia’s “new era” could look just as tumultuous as before.

Stuart Jones is a program assistant at the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center.

The post ‘A new era’: What Catalonia’s regional elections mean for Spain and the European Union appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The reshuffle comes at the height of an upsurge in the securitarian clampdown imposed by the president on opposition and civil society organizations. Over the past two weeks, dozens of human rights organization activists, journalists, and lawyers have been arrested. The arrests are a response to the increasingly frequent protests against the government, especially against President Saied’s authoritarian turn in Tunisian politics since July 2021, when the president arbitrarily shut down parliament and progressively began a process of centralization of power.

On May 24, a demonstration was held in the capital, Tunis, where protesters loudly chanted slogans against the president. They described Saied as a dictator and called for the revocation of a recent decree, which allowed the government to crack down on political dissent and facilitate the arrests of those protesting against the line President Saied has imprinted on Tunisian politics and the economy.

Other measures have led to concern from the European Union and the United States. Both have expressly called for restraint by the Tunisian government in its crackdown on dissent, which President Saied has since described as intolerable foreign interference in the internal affairs of the Tunisian government.

The Tunisian Journalists’ Union (SNJT) has also denounced the government’s gradual authoritarian turn and the judiciary’s tendency to indict many journalists for criticizing the government’s line. SNJT claimed that more than fifty journalists have been detained over the past year for expressing views critical of government policy and have been accused of spreading fake news aimed at disrupting the constitutional order.

The government reshuffle also resulted in the appointment of Khaled Nouri as the head of the Interior Ministry, replacing Kamel Feki. Kamel Madouri, head of the Ministry of Social Affairs, replaced Malek Ezzahi. At the same time, Sufyan bin Sadiq was appointed under secretary of the Interior Ministry and was responsible for the new director of national security post. All three officials are considered very close and loyal to Saied. The president has since to comment on the decision behind this reshuffle or his reason for establishing a new post for national security within the Interior Ministry.

It seems quite clear that the cabinet reshuffle was brought about by the president’s dissatisfaction with the management of national security and the containment of the ongoing protests in the country, particularly in the capital, where the tone of accusations toward the government is becoming more serious by the day. The replacement of Feki with Nouri is most likely motivated by the intention to implement a more aggressive policy against opposition forces and to reduce the scale of protests. This is likely also behind the establishment of the new post of under secretary for national security, now chaired by Sufyan bin Sadiq, who will be specifically tasked with managing the growing phenomenon of dissent.

Despite the growing number of protests, however, President Saied’s popularity appears to be solid. Meanwhile, the opposition—however vocal and persistent in expressing its opposition to the government’s authoritarian drift—appears disorganized, divided, and seemingly unable to counter the government’s pervasive action in suppressing dissent.

President Saied succeeded in arresting the leaders of the Islamic Ennahda Party and the Free Desturian Party in 2023, considerably reducing the capacity of the main opposition parties. This, in turn, has paved the way for him to compete with a greater chance of success in the presidential elections scheduled for later this year.

Thus, at this stage the main force of opposition to the Tunisian government remains the National Salvation Front coalition, led by Ahmed Nejib Chebbi, which includes many of the smaller political groups opposed to the government’s authoritarian drift. Members of the front include the Islamist Ennahda party, the Al Amal party, Islamist parties Al Irada and Al Karama, and other minor groups of different ideological backgrounds united by a shared condemnation of President Saied’s policies.

Aware of his weakness, and in an attempt to fuel further critical debate of the government, Chebbi declared in March 2023 that he does not intend to run in the presidential elections unless authorities meet at least some basic conditions, including the reopening of Ennahda headquarters, the release of political prisoners, and, above all, the guarantee of the independence of the electoral commission that will monitor the elections. This last point is especially complex, as the constitutional amendments promoted by Saied have given the president the power to appoint the members of the electoral commission, making it somewhat unlikely that guarantees of transparency and impartiality will be provided.

What emerges from these latest events in Tunisia is a progressive increase in President Saied’s repression of all opposition to his role and, as a consequence, further opposition to him. The events in Tunisia are taking place in front of the international community, including Western democracies, which once again show their inability to uphold actions that they support in theory: human rights and democracy.

Karim Mezran is a resident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center and Middle East Programs.

Nicola Pedde is director of the Institute for Global Studies.

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Following the official three-month presidential campaign, polling indicates that one candidate has a firm lead. Assuming former Mexico City Head of Government Claudia Sheinbaum performs on par with expectations—the latest Reforma poll gives her a 20 percentage point lead over former Senator Xóchitl Gálvez—the candidate of the governing MORENA party will become Mexico’s first female president on October 1. The lack of movement in this poll since the campaign season began on March 1 is noteworthy. Sheinbaum has only dropped 3 percentage points (to 55 percent support) in the last three months. Other polls give Sheinbaum a lead of anywhere from 11 to 22 percentage points, with voter turnout one of the major factors to watch on Sunday.

More uncertain is what will happen in Mexico’s Congress. What has scuttled attempts by the current Mexican president, Andrés Manuel López Obrador, to fully carry out some elements of his government’s plan has been the checks provided by Congress. With a simple majority of seats—rather than the supermajority of two-thirds of the seats—the MORENA coalition rallied to pass some important pieces of legislation, but it has been impeded from making major constitutional changes, including controversial proposals for the popular election of Supreme Court judges and eliminating independent regulators.

Thus, this Sunday’s vote will determine whether López Obrador’s hand-picked successor, Sheinbaum, could advance the outgoing president’s stymied constitutional proposals. Polls—although less numerous and harder to calculate given the sheer number of candidates up for election (628 combined senators and deputies)—indicate continuity in Congress. Polls by the newspaper El Financiero, for example, predict that the MORENA coalition will secure 49 percent of the seats in the Chamber of Deputies with opposition parties taking 40 percent. The check on power provided by Congress in this scenario, in which MORENA would lack a supermajority, would likely give assurance to international markets, since uncertainty around such reforms and their repercussions can generate anxiety for investors.

Counting the ways to count

How does Mexico’s unique vote-counting work? While the final congressional breakdown will take some time to determine, expect declarations on the presidential winner on Sunday night. Hours after polls close, results will begin to be shared from two different systems that count votes: the quick count and the preliminary electoral results program (PREP).

The quick count takes a predetermined, statistically representative sample of polling stations, and then it gives a minimum and maximum possible vote percentage for each candidate. Results are expected to be announced around 11:00 p.m. (CST), with all eyes on whether the margin of possible votes indicates a clear winner. The PREP, which is operational beginning at 8:00 p.m. (CST), reports results in real time from all polling stations as transmitted, which means that urban votes are likely to be accounted for earlier in the process. And to make things even more complicated, the official counting does not begin until June 5, thus the importance of the earlier vote-counting methods to give more timely results.

The other election

The next Mexican president will also have a keen interest in the vote-counting on November 5. The US election, and in particular how Mexico figures into the campaign leading up to election day, will set the stage for the coming years of bilateral ties. A newly inaugurated Mexican president may be forced to immediately respond to US campaign rhetoric.

Security and migration are top issues both north and south of the Rio Grande. While Sheinbaum has pledged to continue the current government’s focus on social and educational programs to reduce violence, Gálvez favors a strategy that puts greater emphasis on the security apparatus to combat crime. On migration policy, both candidates would continue to take a human-centered approach that recognizes and seeks to find solutions to the high demand for labor. A third important bilateral issue will be the review period of the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement, also known as USMCA, as the 2026 sunset clause approaches. This is all the more important now that Mexico is the United States’ number one trade partner. Here, a new Atlantic Council report suggests several ways that the next Mexican administration can unlock even greater border commercial efficiencies and new trade and investment.

Amid a fast-changing global order, a prosperous Mexico and strong US-Mexico ties will be increasingly important for the United States. US and Mexican security and economic concerns are deeply intertwined, as are their people. Sunday’s vote will set a crucial marker for how the relationship develops for the rest of the 2020s.

Jason Marczak is vice president and senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center.

The post What to watch in Mexico’s elections: A supermajority and a superpower appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The strength of India’s economy is one reason for the BJP’s favorable position in the polls. When Modi became prime minister in 2014, India had the tenth largest economy in the world. Today, it has the fifth. So what might the world expect from a “Modi 3.0” in terms of economic priorities if the elections pan out as expected? And would this political stability mean an end to policy uncertainty?

The administration appeared to be sprinting in the lead-up to March 16, when the election’s model code of conduct came into effect to discourage policy announcements that could influence voters before the contest. On March 10, the government signed a free trade agreement with the European Free Trade Association, and on March 15 it announced a new policy to open the Indian market to the world’s leading electric vehicle companies. It also approved three new semiconductor projects, revised prices for liquefied petroleum gas, and formalized rules to implement the Citizenship Amendment Act before the March 16 deadline.

This flurry of activity could continue after the election. Modi has reportedly asked his cabinet to develop an ambitious hundred-day agenda for a third term. Assessing the BJP’s election manifesto and other signals, the following are some of the likely economic priorities for Modi 3.0.

Intensified efforts to grow India’s footprint in global value chains, including in pharmaceuticals, medical devices, electric vehicles, green energy, and electronics. The government will likely refine its incentives—including the flagship production-linked incentives—based on the experience gained in their design and implementation. Policymakers are also likely to continue their trade push, with a free trade agreement with Oman reportedly awaiting signature after the elections, and talks with the United Kingdom, the Gulf Cooperation Council, and the European Union, among others, at different stages of progress.

A third term could also involve efforts toward factor market reforms, including a revived push to see through the labor market reforms initiated in 2019. However, such reforms will require substantial political capital. Their progress will therefore be contingent on the size of the BJP’s majority in parliament and on support from state governments, which have substantial mandates over their implementation.

Continued emphasis on physical and digital infrastructure and on the energy transition. The government will likely maintain a high budgetary allocation toward initiatives to expand and modernize its infrastructure, including Gati Shakti and the National Logistics Policy. These initiatives will involve the accelerated development and modernization of highways, railways, airports, and ports.

The government will also continue building digital public infrastructure (DPI) based on the India Stack. The DPI approach for payments has enabled a rapid increase in financial inclusion. The government might next prioritize access to credit for individuals and small businesses.

While petroleum will remain a key part of the energy mix, the government is likely to maintain its goal of using green energy sources for much of India’s growing energy requirements. Policymakers will seek to continue prioritizing solar—including a massive effort to increase the use of rooftop solar in homes—as well as “green molecules” (hydrogen, ammonia, and methanol), batteries, and electric vehicles. Nuclear energy, especially small modular reactors, could be a new area of focus.

Safeguarding and empowering groups most vulnerable to economic shocks. The administration could deploy a mix of current and new programs—involving benefits, credit, skilling, and employment guarantees—aimed at women, the youth, the poor, farmers, and small-business owners. Such groups are simultaneously the most vulnerable to economic shocks, especially given global technological trends and the ongoing transformation of India’s economy, and among the most electorally powerful.

The administration has already asked the International Labor Organization to help develop a living wage framework to replace the current minimum wage approach. The government is also looking into widening social safety nets to better cover informal workers.

Further growing India’s global profile and leadership. The government will likely redouble its efforts to represent the voices and interests of the Global South and to obtain a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council. While this might seem to be a purely geopolitical goal, there are associated economic factors as well. The government will continue to partner with like-minded nations in areas such as security, diversifying supply chains, and critical and emerging technology. Closer to home, the administration will look to build on its relationships with the governments of Bangladesh, Bhutan, Nepal, and Sri Lanka to continue growing connectivity, commerce, and other linkages in South Asia.

India’s economy is expected to become the third largest in the world in the coming years. However, the administration will likely face challenges both abroad and at home as it seeks to keep its economy growing at around 7 percent of gross domestic product per year. To name just one example, the United States and Europe ramping up their industrial policies could dampen manufacturing growth in India by limiting foreign direct investment and exports.

Domestically, even if the Modi administration returns to power with a strong mandate, there will be times of policy uncertainty. For instance, some policymakers support a more open approach to trade and others favor protectionism. Some policymakers might even modulate at times between openness and protectionism.

Such seeming confusion is natural in a large and diverse democracy with a myriad of interest groups but it nonetheless will present challenges. Additionally, perspectives and priorities will vary across different arms of government, depending on the specific constellation of stakeholders each represents. But observers would do well to focus on the overall trajectory rather than be distracted by temporary fluctuations.

Taken together, if the election manifesto and ongoing policy discussions are any indication, Modi 3.0 has the makings of a transformative term for India and the world.

Gopal Nadadur is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s South Asia Center and is also vice president for South Asia at The Asia Group.

The post What India and the world could expect from a Modi 3.0 appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The April 16 resignation of the head of the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL), Abdullah Batili, demonstrated the failure of international efforts to resolve the crisis, exacerbating divisions within Libya. Thus, the path to elections remains uncertain.

For the Libyan people, elections are crucial to establishing legitimate governance and resolving the political crisis. While Libya faces significant hurdles in organizing elections, concerted efforts toward political dialogue, security stabilization, and electoral-law reforms are vital for progress.

Tahani Elmogrbi, a Libya expert, interviewed the High National Election Commission chairman, Dr. Emad al-Sayah, on May 14 for the Atlantic Council’s North Africa Initiative, to get his perspective on the elections in the current environment after Batili’s resignation.

TAHANI ELMOGRBI: Will the elections ever happen in Libya?

EMAD AL-SAYAH: The stakeholders involved in the current Libyan political crisis, including the international community, led by the UNSMIL, consider elections as an objective rather than a tool. Everyone knows that elections serve as a tool for the peaceful devolution of power, necessitating their implementation within a consensual political environment and a cultural framework fostering a minimum level of security and stability. Unfortunately, these conditions are currently absent in the Libyan political landscape. As long as this perspective dominates, the pathway toward elections and a peaceful devolution of power in Libya will face significant constraints, potentially delaying or even preventing the conduct of elections in the short term.

TAHANI ELMOGRBI: What are the current main reasons behind its delay?

EMAD AL-SAYAH: The Libyan political environment has become hostile toward democratic principles, particularly elections. This phenomenon can be attributed to some factors that have produced negative outcomes and shaped the environment over the past twelve years. The most prominent of these factors include the absence of a culture of democracy and peaceful devolution of power within Libyan society; lack of a constitution to regulate the process of power devolution; negative foreign interference aimed at preserving its interests and maintaining the status quo; and ineffective performance of most of the United Nations secretary-general’s special envoys.

TAHANI ELMOGRBI: Is it possible to amend the electoral law?

EMAD AL-SAYAH: Due to the absence of a permanent constitution establishing the primary legislative rules for the electoral process in Libya, political parties involved in the crisis have not accepted specific articles and provisions, particularly those related to candidate qualifications and the electoral system. In Libyan elections, it is common for some political parties to obstruct any electoral process that could potentially end their political careers. Therefore, amending electoral laws in Libya is much more challenging than drafting them initially.

TAHANI ELMOGRBI: Will Batili’s resignation affect the possibility of holding elections?

EMAD AL-SAYAH: During the twelve years of dealing with the Libyan crisis, the United Nations mission did not have any strategic vision for moving the Libyan state from the transitional phase to the phase of permanent stability. Each UN envoy adopted a different vision for resolving the political crisis based on his/her convictions and perceptions, which would undoubtedly be affected by his/her personal behavior on the one hand, and by the constant and changing political facts in the local and foreign arenas on the other hand. Most of them failed in their missions, and those who would have succeeded found themselves facing challenges that they could not overcome without having international support, which is also divided. Analyzing the briefings they presented to the United Nations Security Council, which primarily reported on Libya’s political, economic, and security situations, reveals that the resignation of any special envoy and their replacement will not have a significant impact without a coherent strategy in place.

TAHANI ELMOGRBI: Is it beneficial to focus on military and economic dialogues rather than political dialogue?

EMAD AL-SAYAH: The central issue in the Libyan crisis is the political dimension, which serves as its primary source and cannot be disregarded. Addressing other aspects, such as economic or security concerns, requires a political solution that results in an elected authority possessing the legitimacy to effectively manage other crises transparently and prioritize national interests above all else. Currently, there is a trend of leveraging foreign interests and ambitions to maintain power, which hinders progress toward resolving the crisis. Continuing with this approach, in the absence of unified and conscientious political leadership, will exacerbate political conflicts and deepen internal divisions. It will also safeguard the interests of foreign countries involved in the conflict and their local allies, preventing any political changes that may threaten their interests.

Tahani Elmogrbi is a Libya expert and international development specialist.

The post Libya’s special envoy resigned. What’s next for the country? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On April 27, 1994, nearly twenty million South Africans voted in the country’s first-ever democratic election, electing Nelson Mandela of the African National Congress (ANC) as the country’s president. Propelled into a new era, South Africa ushered in a new constitution, formed a multiparty National Assembly, and officially ended the policy of racial apartheid that had plagued the country for much of the twentieth century.

Thirty years later, up to twenty-eight million South Africans will cast ballots in the country’s seventh national election, one that could be the most consequential since the 1994 vote. The ANC, the party that pushed for the end of apartheid and has led South Africa’s government since 1994, has undoubtedly been responsible for many of the country’s accomplishments. But with growing concern among South Africans about issues such as corruption and inequality, the ANC risks losing its majority.

With South Africa’s political landscape poised to shift once again, it provides a perfect opportunity to examine how the country has fared in the thirty years since overcoming apartheid and becoming a democratic state. Data from the Freedom and Prosperity Indexes, two separate indexes measuring 164 countries around the world according to nineteen different indicators of freedom and prosperity, provide a snapshot into the progress made, the progress lost, and the ongoing challenges and opportunities facing the rainbow nation.

Women’s economic freedom, one of the thirteen indicators in the Freedom Index, stands out as one of South Africa’s most successful accomplishments. Between 1995 and 2022, women’s economic freedom in the country rose from 63.9 to 94.4 out of one hundred, jumping eighteen points between 1995 and 1999 and improving incrementally since. South Africa outpaces its neighbors Botswana and Namibia, two other countries that achieved independence from colonial rule and have since maintained democracy, scoring eighteen points above Namibia and forty-seven above Botswana in 2022.

Notably, women’s economic freedom in South Africa surpassed the average of the world’s freest countries in 1999. Today, South Africa scores just as highly as Switzerland and the United Kingdom, and higher than the United States and Singapore. While disparities in legislation still exist, South Africa has made impressive strides in strengthening women’s economic freedom through numerous reforms. These include the Employment Equity Act of 1998, which prohibits gender-based discrimination in the workplace, the increase of paid maternity leave to fourteen weeks in 2003, and legislation protecting women from sexual harassment in the workplace in 2013. Transitioning from an apartheid state that heavily discriminated on the basis of both race and gender to a democratic country with one of the highest women’s economic freedom scores on the globe, South Africa can serve as an example of progress in this metric.

At the opposite end of the spectrum is inequality, one of the six indicators in the Prosperity Index. In the Index, inequality is measured through the share of a country’s pretax income accrued to the top ten percent of earners. With ten percent of the population owning more than 80 percent of wealth, South Africa suffers from significant income inequality, with wide disparities owing to one’s race, education level, and land ownership. With a score of just 13.3 in 2022, South Africa ranks last worldwide in inequality. As the graph below shows, both Botswana and Namibia struggle with inequality as well. In fact, all three countries ranked in the bottom eight in 2022 and are more than forty-five points behind the free country average. Yet South Africa stands alone in that inequality has worsened rather than improved. In 1995, South Africa’s inequality score stood at 50, twenty-six points below the score of free countries and over forty-five points above Botswana and Namibia. By 2022, South Africa’s score had plummeted by nearly 37 points, while Botswana and Namibia saw improvements and the free country average remained relatively the same.

While the nature of the apartheid system actively fostered inequality with a minority of the population controlling the country’s government and wealth, South Africa’s democratic era exacerbated rather than remedied the issue. The country may be more equal politically, but from an income standpoint, power is more concentrated and unequal than ever.

In the middle lies education. Another of the Prosperity Index’s six indicators, education is measured through both expected and mean years of schooling. South Africa’s education score has improved in the past thirty years, increasing from 37.2 in 1995 to 54.5 in 2022. Additionally, the country scores higher than its neighbors; however, its score remains well below that of free countries.

As the data show, South African education has undoubtedly come a long way since the country became a democracy. South Africa has achieved universal enrollment for primary school students, now has fully integrated schools after decades of segregation, and has established a unified department of education. But numerous challenges persist that keep South Africa’s education from reaching the level of the freest countries; while nearly all South Africans enroll in primary school, just 54 percent pass matric (the equivalent of graduating high school). In addition, many schools suffer from a lack of adequate building and sanitation facilities, and transportation to and from school for students is nonexistent in a number of both rural and urban areas. South Africa’s education trajectory is particularly important as about a third of the population is under the age of eighteen.

As South Africans prepare to cast their ballots on May 29, they will not only decide on who will best represent their interests in the future but have the chance to reflect on how their country has changed since transitioning to democracy in 1994. Overall, freedom and prosperity have seen little fluctuation—South Africa’s freedom saw a slight decrease from 72.5 in 1995 to 70 in 2022, and prosperity remained essentially the same, changing from 60.1 to 60. But this data also points to several important areas that the next administration will likely need to address, especially education and inequality.

James Storen is the program assistant at the Freedom and Prosperity Center.

Nina Dannaoui is the associate director at the Freedom and Prosperity Center.

The post Thirty years of South African democracy, visualized appeared first on Atlantic Council.

• Foreword
• Explainer video
• Related events

Foreword

Countries representing half the world’s population are voting in 2024. On June 2, just over five months before Election Day in the United States, Mexican voters will set a historic milestone with the election of the country’s first female president. Over the course of her six-year term, Mexico’s new president will face enormous challenges—internally and in the country’s relationship with the United States. But, like never before, there is also a unique opportunity to strengthen the commercial and economic ties that bind the two countries and reimagine how our shared border could better serve our shared interests.

Although the United States and Mexico have long been economically intertwined, in 2023, Mexico became the United States’ most important trading partner. Now more than ever,  with great geopolitical headwinds, the commercial ties that bind our two countries will be increasingly critical to advancing US economic interests globally. Here, greater border efficiency will yield economic gains alongside improvements in our shared security.

The Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center, in partnership with internal and external colleagues and partners, sought to envision the future of two key aspects of the US-Mexico relationship: commercial flows and investment. With extensive feedback and numerous consultations with border stakeholders, including business owners, truck drivers, port operators, civilians, and local and federal elected officials, we sought out fresh perspectives and actionable recommendations. Our goal with this report is to spark dialogue among policymakers, business leaders, and civil society in both countries on the urgent need to address the immediate challenges of border efficiency and investment attraction over the next Mexican president’s term while paving the way for a more prosperous and secure future in our countries.

The Rio Grande and its surrounding towns are more than a physical barrier separating the United States and Mexico. Rather, they are a vibrant artery of commerce, migration, and cultural exchange. Livelihoods depend on our border, but inefficiencies prevent us from maximizing the possible economic opportunities and achieving the necessary security gains. The pages that follow build on previous center findings and emphasize the need for a nuanced approach to foreign investment, infrastructure development, and security measures that prioritize efficiency and our national interests.

This publication also seeks to bring the human dimension to the forefront. Public policy, after all, should reflect how to improve everyday lives. We consolidate the stories of real people affected by the US-Mexico border daily. The combined stories we have gathered over the last two years remind us of the impact of policy decisions. That reminder is particularly poignant with the 2024 elections on both sides of the border. Indeed, we stand on the cusp of a new chapter in our shared history.

This report is a call to action for visionary leadership and bold, pragmatic solutions to the complex issues facing the United States and Mexico. We urge policymakers to embrace policies and strategies that address immediate challenges while laying the groundwork for both an even more inclusive and prosperous future. Let’s seize this unique moment in time.

Jason Marczak
Vice President and Senior Director
Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center

Online Event Thu, May 23, 2024 • 1:00 pm ET

Mexico’s path forward: A conversation with Ildefonso Guajardo

Ildefonso Guajardo discusses Xóchitl Gálvez’s view on a more efficient US-Mexico border and increased opportunities of economic investment.

Economy & Business Elections Latin America Mexico

Online Event Thu, May 23, 2024 • 2:30 pm ET

Mexico’s path forward: A conversation with Diana Alarcón

Diana Alarcón discusses Claudia Sheinbaum’s view on a more efficient US-Mexico border and increased opportunities of economic investment.

Economy & Business Elections Inclusive Growth Latin America

The Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center broadens understanding of regional transformations and delivers constructive, results-oriented solutions to inform how the public and private sectors can advance hemispheric prosperity.

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The post With the 2024 Mexican election looming, here are two major recommendations for the next president appeared first on Atlantic Council.

In the years following the start of Russian military aggression against Ukraine in 2014, the Ukrainian authorities were able to conduct multiple presidential and parliamentary elections that were consistently rated as free and fair by international democracy watchdogs. Following the onset of Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022, this is no longer possible.

The key issue is security. In order for any election to take place in Ukraine, the authorities must be able to ensure the safety of millions of voters and thousands of election officials at polling stations and election commissions across the country. That is clearly out of the question at present, particularly in light of Russia’s record for repeatedly targeting civilians. This also rules out the presence of international election observers.

It is even more difficult to imagine how the hundreds of thousands of Ukrainian men and women currently serving in the armed forces could participate in a wartime ballot, both as voters and as candidates. Russia would certainly view any gatherings of voting soldiers as priority targets. “It would be unfair if those defending our land were denied the opportunity to vote,” commented President Zelenskyy in March.

Security concerns are also one of the key factors that make it impossible to stage anything resembling a normal election campaign. With election rallies and public meetings of any kind at high risk of being bombed by Russia, the campaign would largely have to take place online. This would fall well short of Ukraine’s established democratic standards, while also creating an inviting environment for Russian interference.

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

It is hard to see how Ukraine could hope to overcome the huge administrative challenges created by the displacement of millions of Ukrainian citizens following the Russian invasion. There are currently believed to be approximately six million internally displaced people in Ukraine. Enabling them to vote would require a huge effort to update voter registers. This would likely raise all manner of additional questions regarding issues such as official and temporary addresses.

Meanwhile, at least five million Ukrainians are currently residing outside Ukraine as refugees, half of whom are eligible to vote. Existing voter registration procedures for Ukrainians living abroad are not designed to accommodate such large numbers, while Ukraine’s embassies and consulates would be unable to cope with so many voters. Without the participation of Ukrainian refugees, any wartime election would fail to meet basic democratic standards.

Eurasia Center events

Online Event Thu, August 15, 2024 • 9:00 am ET

Ukraine’s advance in Kursk: What’s next and implications

Conflict Russia Security & Defense Ukraine

Recent research indicates that Ukrainian society recognizes the impracticality of wartime elections and is broadly supportive of the government’s decision to postpone any national votes until the security situation improves. A February 2024 poll conducted by the Rating Sociological Group on behalf of the International Republican Institute found that 67 percent of Ukrainians opposed holding presidential elections amid Russia’s ongoing invasion.

There is also a consensus among Ukraine’s rival political parties that elections should wait until after the war. In November 2023, all parliamentary factions endorsed a memorandum backing the postponement of presidential and parliamentary votes until the end of hostilities. Ukraine’s vibrant civil society agrees, with more than 100 organizations releasing a joint statement in September 2023 rejecting the idea of wartime elections.

While there is virtually no indication of any appetite for wartime elections inside Ukraine itself, Russia and its allies are expected to continue pushing the notion of Zelenskyy’s alleged illegitimacy in the coming months. Indeed, some of the most prominent Kremlin-friendly figures in Congress have already begun promoting this narrative as part of ongoing efforts to argue against further US support for Ukraine.

Ukraine is not the first country to delay elections due to wartime conditions, of course. For example, During World War II, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill repeatedly postponed the country’s scheduled general election, but nobody accused him of undermining the democratic legitimacy of the British parliament.

Ukrainians have impeccable democratic instincts, having staged two separate pro-democracy revolutions in the past twenty years. Indeed, the current war is in part a struggle to defend the country’s democratic identity against Putin’s authoritarian imperialism. At the same time, Ukrainians are sufficiently sensible to understand that the idea of holding elections amid the largest European invasion since World War II is absurd.

Dr. Elena Davlikanova is a Democracy Fellow at the Center for European Policy Analysis and an associate professor at Sumy State University in Ukraine.

Further reading

UkraineAlert May 16, 2024

Anger and defiance in Kharkiv as advancing Russian troops draw closer

By Maria Avdeeva

The mood in Kharkiv is a mix of anger, anxiety, and defiance as Ukraine’s second city prepares to defend itself against a new Russian offensive, writes Maria Avdeeva.

Conflict Drones

UkraineAlert May 21, 2024

Ukraine’s Western allies should fear Russian victory not Russian defeat

By Peter Dickinson

Ukrainian President Zelenskyy says his country’s allies fear the potential geopolitical consequences of Russian defeat, but Russian victory is a far more realistic and alarming prospect, writes Peter Dickinson.

Conflict Defense Industry

UkraineAlert May 21, 2024

Ukraine’s soccer stars aim for Euro 2024 glory amid Russian invasion

By Mark Temnycky

The Ukrainian national soccer team heads to Euro 2024 in Germany this summer hoping to provide their war-weary compatriots with a much-needed morale boost, writes Mark Temnycky.

Conflict Freedom and Prosperity

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

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UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia and Central Asia in the East.

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The post President Zelenskyy’s term is over but he’s still a legitimate wartime leader appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The emir’s move certainly did not evoke a strong public reaction from Kuwaitis themselves. They are not known for manning the barricades in political protest, and some of them are likely just as frustrated as their emir with the lack of progress in the country—a country that is simultaneously wonderfully rich and utterly unable to diversify its economy away from producing oil and managing the cash that oil sales produce. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) projects that Kuwait’s real gross domestic product will actually decline by 1.4 percent in 2024, lagging behind its Gulf partners. Partly because of opposition in parliament, Kuwait has not been a welcoming destination for foreign investment. Kuwaitis and foreign investors still recall the 2008 cancellation of a $17-billion Dow Chemical investment in petrochemicals as emblematic of the difficult environment for major foreign investment.

Other Kuwaitis are likely waiting to see how strong the repression will be. A well-known Islamist and former member of parliament, Walid al-Tabtabaie, was arrested a day after the suspension on May 11, reportedly for a tweet suggesting foreign interference in Kuwaiti affairs—in other words, Gulf state support for the emir’s actions. Although Tabtabaie will likely consider his arrest a badge of honor, it will also serve as a warning to others who might consider publicly opining on their leadership’s actions. However, Kuwaitis will not abandon their tradition of having a say in their politics. They can be expected to find ways over time to express themselves and demand accountability from the ruling Sabah family.

Regional reaction has also been muted. Uniquely, Emirati President Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed quickly called his Kuwaiti counterpart to offer his support, noting the utmost value of stability. The sultan of Oman, Haithan bin Tariq, was in Kuwait for a previously scheduled state visit ending May 14. He did not comment on internal Kuwaiti matters, but there was some press spin that the visit was a show of support for Sabah’s moves. Other Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and regional leaders have been silent, perhaps quietly pleased that Kuwait’s longtime experience with a parliament with some genuine power has been quashed for the moment.

And what about the United States’ reaction to the backsliding of democratic norms in Kuwait? No public statements emerged from the White House or the US Department of State. An anonymous State Department official told me, “We are aware of the developments regarding the Kuwaiti parliament suspension and are monitoring the situation closely.”

In other words, this is not a fight the United States will pick. The reasons for this reticence could range from a simple lack of bandwidth to deal with what is considered a relatively minor matter in the Middle East to a more serious weighing of current priorities. Sabah is known as a reliable security partner, and Kuwait has been a generous and flexible host for US military installations. Thousands of US Army personnel have served at or passed through Camp Arifjan, and Ali al-Salem Air Base has provided a key hub for US aircraft.

Although Kuwait and Bahrain reportedly asked the United States not to use bases located on their soil for any attacks on Iran in reaction to its April 13 retaliation against Israel—which came in response to the killing of senior members of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) at  Iran’s embassy compound in Syria—these bases remain extremely useful.

But it is not impossible to balance concerns for security and stability with support for political liberalization. On April 15, Kuwait celebrated the nineteenth anniversary of Kuwaiti women achieving the right to vote, prompted by the George W. Bush administration’s “freedom agenda” in the Middle East. That very year, the United States was also pursuing a major war in Iraq, with Kuwait as the critical entry point for US forces. At the time, President Bush was instrumental in convincing Emir Sheikh Sabah to push this measure through the Kuwait parliament. Liz Cheney, a State Department official at that time, came to Kuwait to celebrate the granting of female suffrage.

Democracy mattered then. It still matters now. 

Ambassador (ret) Richard LeBaron is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council. He served as US Ambassador to Kuwait and in a number of other senior diplomatic positions in the Middle East and Washington. He is a member of the Advisory Council of Global Ties US. Follow him on X: @RBLeBaron.

The post Parliament was dissolved in Kuwait and hardly anyone noticed appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On May 13, Daniel Calingaert, Nonresident Senior Fellow with the Scowcroft Strategy Initiative, was published in the Liberal Patriot on the risks to free and fair elections. He examines the global landscape of elections in 2024, noting both the bright spots and backsliding, and offers suggestions for how democracy advocates can defend it.

Fellow

Daniel Calingaert

Nonresident Senior Fellow

Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security Scowcroft Strategy Initiative

Democratic Transitions Politics & Diplomacy

The post Calingaert in the Liberal Patriot on defending democratic elections appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Electoral advantage

Georgian Dream stands to benefit from the adoption of the foreign agent law ahead of parliamentary elections in October. Civil society in Georgia has historically exerted a significant influence on the country’s politics. For example, it played a pivotal role in the 2012 elections by contributing to voter education and election monitoring.

However, the main vulnerability that Georgian nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and civil society organizations face is financial reliance on international donors. Civil society organizations in Georgia receive more than 90 percent of funding from foreign sources, according to a 2020 report. Targeting their funding streams right before the elections seems to be a logical step for a ruling party that intends to eliminate influential and potentially opposing voices before the elections.

But many argue that Georgian Dream could win the October parliamentary elections without this legislation. After all, the ruling party is ahead in the polls and there have been reports that Georgian Dream has been leveraging administrative power to influence the elections. Extreme divisions have made it almost impossible for the Georgian opposition parties to form a coalition that could counter Georgian Dream. If anything, by introducing the foreign agent bill, Georgian Dream has united the opposition as well as the broader population in defense of Georgia’s European future.

Why, then, did Georgian Dream decide to move forward with this unpopular bill, knowing all too well it would trigger protests and antigovernment narratives just a few months before the elections?

Ivanishvili’s influence

Bidzina Ivanishvili, the richest man in Georgia and the founder and honorary chairman of Georgian Dream, could be key to understanding why the party took this self-destructive step. He exerts exceptional influence on the government’s decisions and actions.

Ivanishvili delivered a speech on April 29, during which he defined NGOs as agents nurtured by a global force that, in his telling, is responsible for getting Georgia and Ukraine into wars with Russia. He believes that the introduction of the foreign agent law ahead of the elections was necessary because NGOs were trying to change electoral laws, acting in the interest of the “global party of war,” which, he believes, intends to engineer a revolution in Georgia.

The combination of Ivanishvili’s views and a ruling party that executes his every decision with no questions asked is putting the Georgian people’s safety and future at risk. A sensible and nuanced Western response is needed to support the Georgian people.

The regional trend

The adoption of the Russian-style foreign agent law seems to be a regional trend, not just a Georgian phenomenon. Hungary, Kyrgyzstan, and Georgia all started actively pushing for foreign agent laws in 2023. Hungary implemented foreign agent legislation in December 2023, and Kyrgyzstan adopted its own in April 2024.

Three states in Eastern Europe and Eurasia pushing to adopt Russian-style foreign agent laws almost at the same time might not be a coincidence. It is possible Russia is inspiring or even pressuring the ruling parties. After all, Moscow’s influence in these countries would likely increase if the NGOs and civil society organizations in these countries were to lose funding from international donors.

Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov has defended Georgian Dream’s reintroduction of the foreign agent law and stated that it is in Moscow’s interests that the situation in Georgia is “stable and predictable.” Russian President Vladimir Putin has also reaffirmed ties with Hungary’s nationalist Prime Minister Viktor Orbán and claimed that Russian-Kyrgyz relations are developing in all directions.

The European Union (EU) has already launched legal action against Hungary in response to the introduction of this law. But Georgia and Kyrgyzstan are not EU member states, and so the same legal route is not available.

What the West should and should not do

It is crucial for the international community—especially the EU, the United States, and the United Kingdom—to support the will of the Georgian people. This means aiding Georgia’s pro-European president in her challenge to the ruling party’s actions. It also means seeking accountability for the ruling class that defies the will of its people and is impeding Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic integration, a goal that is written into Georgia’s constitution.

The EU should reconsider measures that could harm the Georgian population, such as the potential suspension of current visa-free travel. It would not help the situation to punish the wider Georgian population for the ruling party’s actions.

The international community and donors must continue their support for civil society organizations in Georgia, especially in the lead-up to the October elections. Despite the legal ramifications of the new bill and the anticipated crackdown on the civil society sector, sustaining funding streams is crucial for bolstering civil society’s monitoring capacity. This is vital for ensuring transparent and fair electoral processes in October and providing Georgia with an opportunity for another peaceful transition of power.

The many EU and Georgian flags carried through the streets of Tbilisi in recent weeks make clear where most Georgians’ view their future. The West must do what it can to help keep them headed in that direction.