Click to jump to an expert analysis:

Jason Marczak: The international community must apply pressure for a full, transparent vote count

Geoff Ramsey: Maduro is inviting the biggest loyalty test he’s faced in years

Iria Puyosa: A new cycle of heightened political turmoil looms over Venezuela

Diego Area: The world must stand with Venezuelans in their fight for free elections

The international community must apply pressure for a full, transparent vote count

The day after Venezuelans voted in massive numbers, it’s crystal clear that Maduro, a deeply unpopular authoritarian leader, was always going to claim electoral victory whether by hook or by crook. With most international observers banned from coming to the country to monitor the vote (except small United Nations and Carter Center delegations), the González campaign could only count on its own observers to verify results. The voting tabulations that opposition observers could verify (about 40 percent of the tabulations) showed González receiving 70 percent of the vote—a far cry from the 44 percent of votes that the country’s National Electoral Council claimed that González won.

It is important that the votes of the Venezuelan people are not an exercise in futility. Votes must be credibly counted. Here, it is imperative that the international community of democracies continue to resoundingly denounce fraud and take appropriate action. US Secretary of State Antony Blinken noted “serious concerns that the result announced does not reflect the will or the votes of the Venezuelan people.” Similar concerns have been raised in nearby Argentina, Chile, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, Ecuador, and the Dominican Republic. European partners have also raised concerns. Even in Colombia, where President Gustavo Petro has maintained a close relationship with Maduro, Foreign Minister Luis Gilberto Murillo made a “call for the total vote count, its verification, and independent audit to be carried out as soon as possible.”

The international community must continue to exact pressure so that the will of the Venezuelan people can ultimately prevail. Not doing so would mean being complicit in the disenfranchisement of the Venezuelan people. But another six years of Maduro will also have reverberations, including new outward migration flows and new transnational criminal activity that will extend far beyond Venezuela’s borders.

—Jason Marczak is the vice president and senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center.

Maduro is inviting the biggest loyalty test he’s faced in years

More than twelve hours after polls closed, the fact that authorities still haven’t released the full vote count tells you everything you need to know about yesterday’s election. It seems that Maduro has decided to condemn Venezuela to six more years of conflict and isolation. Unless the government backs up its claim of victory with the full results and opens the count up to audits from observers, the international community has no choice but to respond with swift condemnation and diplomatic pressure.

This isn’t over yet. Maduro has to convince the ruling elite that he can keep things under control, but both he and the military know that he can’t govern a country in flames. He’s effectively inviting the biggest loyalty test he’s faced in years. I doubt Venezuelan elites are eager for six more years of repression, sanctions, and economic catastrophe. The opposition, under María Corina Machado’s leadership, has maintained unity and message discipline, and has the evidence in hand to document fraud and mobilize the public against Maduro’s blatant power grab. The role of the United States and its allies in Latin America and Europe will be crucial. It’s time for greater multilateral coordination in order to push the government to respect the will of the people and restore Venezuelans’ fundamental right to elect their leaders.

—Geoff Ramsey is a senior fellow at the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center.

A new cycle of heightened political turmoil looms over Venezuela

The presidential elections in Venezuela turned out as forecasted: a high voter turnout, what appeared to be a decisive electoral win for the democratic opposition, and a blatant fraud that disregarded the will of the voters. 

Due to the relatively small voting centers and the presence of witnesses from local communities, the population is convinced—as we’ve seen in an outpouring of messages and videos on social media—that González won in all electoral districts. This is strengthening the opposition’s unity and determination to continue its fight for the restoration of democracy. 

Maduro’s loss of political legitimacy has left the ruling coalition vulnerable to increased instability. It will likely resort to further repression against the political opposition and organized civil society. The increase in information censorship in the week leading up to the elections is a clear sign of the severe restriction of civic space. 

The democratic opposition, led by Machado, must aim to exploit divisions within the ruling coalition to weaken its power base. The Unitary Platform must also find ways to address public discontent without exposing the population to the violent repression experienced in 2017. 

On the international front, Maduro is facing isolation from Latin American democracies, the United States, and Europe. Former allies, such as Brazil under President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva and Colombia under Petro, were among the first to demand transparency in the election results. It now falls upon the United States to reevaluate the Qatar agreements. The negotiations would no longer be centered on electoral coexistence but rather on Chavismo’s exit from power after its defeat in the voting booths. The next six months will be a crucial period of intense conflict in Venezuela. 

—Iria Puyosa is a senior research fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Digital Forensic Research Lab.

The world must stand with Venezuelans in their fight for free elections

No one thought it would be easy to remove an autocrat from power, but yesterday marked a new height in the Venezuelan government’s abuses to impede the will of the people. The people of Venezuela and their leadership have endured an epic journey to overcome obstacles and unite around the ideal of change. The disqualification of candidates like Machado and Corina Yoris, who represented genuine alternatives, and the subsequent voter suppression efforts and significant irregularities in the process, illustrate the regime’s determination to retain power at any cost.

Maduro’s actions to undermine the democratic process and steal this election pose grave consequences for the future of the country and have a direct impact on Latin America, the Caribbean, and the United States. By stifling free choice, the regime is not only eroding democratic institutions but also exacerbating the country’s humanitarian crisis. As a result, Venezuelans will continue to flee in search of opportunities and freedoms denied at home, contributing to an already critical migration crisis.

The world must stand with Venezuelans in their fight for a future where elections are not merely symbolic but are actual pathways to change. The integrity of the democratic process is crucial not only for Venezuela’s stability but also for the prosperity of the entire region.

—Diego Area is a deputy director at the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center.

The post Experts react: Maduro is clinging to power after a disputed election. What’s next for Venezuela? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The absence of an independent electoral administration in Syria is not news to anyone. The electoral authorities are deeply embedded within the judicial and executive structure and operate as extensions of the ruling party’s apparatus, rather than as impartial overseers of the electoral process. This integration ensures that electoral commissions at all levels, from national to regional, strictly adhere to the governing party’s agenda.

The administration is not a centralized system under a single hierarchical institution. Instead, it involves multiple governmental and judicial bodies. At the top of this system is the Supreme Judicial Elections Committee (SJEC), which in practice is appointed by presidential decree instead of by the Supreme Judicial Council (SJC) as required by the law. The SJEC is neither equipped nor mandated to implement elections, as it does not have staff or offices for election operations.

Below the SJEC are the governorate-level subcommittees. Nominally, these should be the key institutions in managing election operations other than the candidacy process, which is managed by the nomination committees that work independently from the governorate subcommittee.

Both committees are staffed by judges who approach their work by focusing on providing legal cover for processes implemented by other institutions, rather than actively managing electoral operations.

These committees suffer from the same lack of independence as the rest of the judicial system in Syria, as the president wields significant control over the judicial system overall. He is a member of the SJC and appoints the Supreme Constitutional Court, which handles election appeals.

However, even if the judicial committees were more independent, they would have little control over the process: the Ministry of Interior (MoI) is the key operational entity. It is tasked with various matters, such as managing the voters register, custody over all the electoral documents, procurement and management of sensitive election materials, and logistics.

At the local level, election day operations are managed by election committees composed of civil servants appointed by governors. These committees are part of the governmental structure and do not report to the SJEC, further eroding the processes’ independence. The committees are hardly trained, as their training consists of oath-taking ceremonies with little focus on the actual procedures.

The lack of comprehensive regulations that are supposed to operationalize the election law exacerbates these issues. With judicial commissions reduced to issuing appointments and loose guidance, many aspects of the elections remain unregulated. This regulatory vacuum gives the MoI and election committees significant discretion in implementing electoral procedures.

In conclusion, the Syrian electoral administration system is designed to centralize control under the president through the judicial system, governors, and the MoI. This structure eliminates any meaningful chance for truly independent elections, as every key aspect of the electoral process can be traced back to presidential influence or control.

All this raises the question: what are the options for credible management of elections in Syria? Can the system be reformed by focusing on key problematic aspects? That said, the system is so deeply flawed that it needs to be rebuilt entirely for elections to enjoy any credibility. The standards required are familiar and often used in post-conflict settings, such as establishing a new independent electoral management body with authority to both regulate and implement elections and whose leadership is appointed through a consensual process. Until that is possible, United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 2254 attempts to provide a transitional fix, stating that elections should be “administered under supervision of the United Nations.”

However, the term “supervision” has various forms and definitions, even within the UN framework, and the UN’s role has ranged from approving steps in the management of the process to “conducting” elections as part of the peace process, as it did in Cambodia, Eastern Slavonia, or East Timor. Yet, such deep involvement of the UN in Syrian elections would require a high degree of political consensus among the UNSC members, which is hard to envision.

On the other hand, when examining the system and the candidacy process, it is apparent that the laws and procedures—or lack thereof—are tools serving a single purpose: eliminating candidates not endorsed by the Baath Party.

The constitution neither protects nor restricts the right to run in assembly elections. Instead, candidacy is entirely regulated by an election law adopted in 2014 by presidential decree. This law introduces several unfair limits on this right. Some restrictions, like the ten-year Syrian nationality requirement, seem minor but impact those with unregularized status (except for Hasakah’s Kurds, who were designated as foreigners or “ajanib”) and potentially up to 4 million Syrians living overseas.

There are a few more restrictions of particular concern for those who opposed the Assad regime, such as the exclusion of those who have been sentenced for a “felony or misdemeanor that is dishonorable and shakes the public trust.” These offenses are defined by the decree of the justice minister and disqualify all those sentenced for political reasons. However, even if the offense does not fall into this category, all criminally convicted individuals automatically lose their civil and political rights, including the right to stand for office, for ten years after serving their prison sentence.

Those eligible to apply for candidacy must navigate a process that is only vaguely regulated, giving judge-led committees considerable flexibility in deciding on nominations. For example, committees may request an “accredited certificate” proving literacy even when candidates present university degrees. Another quirk requires candidates who wish to contest a “worker or famer” seat to prove they are not listed in industrial or commercial registers.

As presented in the electoral system article, candidates not running on the Baath-endorsed National Unity (NU) List have minuscule chances of being elected. What, then, explains the large number of candidates for the 250 seats in the assembly? For example, in the SJEC accepted 11,341 applications in the 2016 elections, 8,735 in 2020, and 9,194 in 2024. The answer is that the Baath Party encourages members to apply in massive numbers as an indicator of vigorous and credible political competition. Registering for candidacy with the SJEC is only the first prerequisite for becoming a Baath candidate. The second step is the Baath Party process, in which the aspirants compete for the endorsement. This is colloquially called “primaries,” but “consultation” would be a more accurate term.

Without a real election campaign—as a case in point, the NU lists of candidates were only published six days before the polls—hyping up the primaries is essential for the illusion of choice. And, because the Baathists not featured on the NU lists have little chance of winning a seat, the primaries are more important than the polling. Most of the aspirants not included in the list withdrew before election day, so only 1,516 candidates are heading to the polls.

Despite being central to elections, the primaries are still just theatrics rather than a genuine competition. While they look like a proper election process on the surface, their results are not binding. The participation of Baathists is wide and includes an “electronic voting system” that could be easily manipulated and does not guarantee secrecy, and “the party independent election commission” oversees the process. Yet, the result of voting is only advisory. The final say remains with the top Baath Party body, the Central Command, which regularly tweaks the results, claiming to have taken into consideration the “opinion of the general public.” That outcome is regularly criticized on social media.

The Baathists on the NU List were announced, with a delay of two days, on July 9 and for unclear reasons. Baath-affiliated media justified the delay by arguing it was to “ensure fair representation, support the democratic process, and respect the voters’ will in a balanced manner.” But the concurrent news of the dismissal of the nineteen incumbent members of the assembly for “low ideological awareness,” and the lifting of the immunity of another seven members due to corruption, attracted interest and was a matter of debate in social media.

A cursory review of the NU lists reveals that the number of incumbents (fifty-eight) is somewhat lower than in the 2020 elections (sixty-eight), which might reflect the above-mentioned renewed party leadership. The Baath strategy appears to be the promotion of lower-tier loyalists to rebuild party discipline. A deeper analysis of that trend is warranted and should examine why the governorates with the highest turnover are Damascus, Deir ez-Zor, Idlib, Tartous, and Raqqa. On the other hand, Daraa (where five out of eight candidates are incumbents) and al-Hasakah (with six incumbents out of eleven) seem to have only a few replacements.

The number of women in the assembly is consistently trending downward—in 2020, it dropped from thirty-three to twenty-eight—and this year’s elections did not reverse that trend. Twenty-two female candidates are now on the NU list (12 percent), even fewer than in 2020 when NU featured twenty-five women. The Baath Party could easily endorse more women if it wanted to promote women’s participation, as the 2020 elections show that women have minimal chances to be elected outside of the NU lists (only 1.5 percent of the non-NU candidates are women), so the Syrian parliament will likely remain one among those with the lowest representation of women in the world.

The candidates running for the uncontested seats are colloquially called “independents.” More than one thousand of those remaining in the race competed for the sixty-five seats. They sometimes formed “independent candidate lists,” mostly in urban governorates like Damascus and Aleppo. These are often businessmen or militiamen closely affiliated with the regime, supporting the facade of diversity. In some cases, they feature prominent personalities, such as the Damascus list “From Damascus For You Syria,” which includes Mohamed Hammam Miswati and Bilal Naal, assembly incumbents with close ties to the Assad regime. Another Damascene list is “Sham List,” which features the incumbent Mohamed Hamsho (sanctioned by the European Union and the United States). Others, like Wael Melhem from Homs, ran without forming a list and count on personal prominence.

And while the polls were held on July 15, the elections were effectively over at the end of the primaries. The candidates on the National Unity list will sit in the assembly. If there was hope for even a minor opening of political space, the regime sent a clear message: there was no interest in political reforms. Elections are only an aspect of internal Baath consolidation, and the assembly will have free rein for constitutional amendments needed to allow Bashar al-Assad to stay in office beyond 2028.

Vladimir Pran advises electoral authorities, governments, and political leaders on transitional, electoral, and political processes.

Maroun Sfeir advises international and local civil society organizations, political groups, and electoral authorities on electoral and political processes.

The post Syrian elections are decided before election day appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Once the most vigorous democracy in Latin America, Venezuela started down a slow path toward autocracy twenty-five years ago. It also became a model for digital authoritarianism and an exporter of democratic backsliding to the rest of the Americas. Control of the information space, widespread surveillance, and digital repression are significant pillars of the current regime’s survival. Incumbent Nicolás Maduro is counting on this, along with electoral manipulation and judicial control, to remain in power as Venezuela holds a presidential election on July 28. Nonetheless, a cohesive democratic coalition mobilizing the population across the country has a serious chance of making this election the starting point for a transition toward re-democratization.

The media landscape in Venezuela is fragmented and marked by censorship. The rise of government-run media and state control through ownership changes or censorship mechanisms led independent journalists to migrate to small internet outlets. Venezuela’s media ecosystem shrank further when the country’s economy collapsed after 2015. The aftermath of the 2017 cycle of protests saw another significant shift in the media landscape, with surviving newscasts characterized by censorship and heavily biased coverage in favor of the ruling party. In addition, censorship has caused the closure of many radio stations, leaving many areas without access to local or regional news. The National Telecommunications Commission in Venezuela routinely censors the use of certain topics and words during programming, and also bans interviews with democratic opposition leaders. It prohibits public coverage of corruption allegations or human rights violations attributed to state officials or their family members, coverage of citizen protests or demonstrations against the regime, and discussion of international courts and other human rights entities.

In their new report, “Venezuela: A playbook for digital repression,” Iria Puyosa, Andrés Azpúrua, and Daniel Suárez Pérez dive deep into the state of media in Venezuela, the role it played in the country’s slide toward authoritarianism, and whether other Latin American countries will adopt Venezuela’s model of digital repression.

Additional contributions by Marco Ruíz and Valentina Aguana

Edited by Iain Robertson and Andy Carvin

New Atlanticist Mar 13, 2024

Venezuela’s opposition is challenging Maduro in the next election. The only question is how.

By Geoff Ramsey

With leading candidate María Corina Machado barred from Venezuela’s July 28 presidential election, who will the opposition to Nicolás Maduro support?

Civil Society Elections

New Atlanticist Apr 18, 2024

Experts react: The US just reimposed sanctions on Venezuela. What does this mean for energy markets and Venezuela’s election?

By Atlantic Council experts

The United States will reimpose oil sanctions on Venezuela, faulting Nicolás Maduro’s government for failing to uphold the October 2023 Barbados Agreement.

Economic Sanctions Economy & Business

Report Aug 14, 2023

Protecting point-to-point messaging apps: Understanding Telegram, WeChat, and WhatsApp in the United States

By Iria Puyosa

A year-long project on protecting users’ data and privacy that analyzes the growing use of point-to-point messaging platforms in the United States and the implications their design and governing policies have for user privacy and free speech.

Civil Society Digital Policy

The Atlantic Council’s Digital Forensic Research Lab (DFRLab) has operationalized the study of disinformation by exposing falsehoods and fake news, documenting human rights abuses, and building digital resilience worldwide.

learn more

This report was made possible with support from the government of Canada.

The post How Venezuela became a model for digital authoritarianism appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Women and civil society are indispensable as first responders in the ongoing war. They must also be central to the planning, distribution, and oversight of funds in reconstruction efforts. As the German and Ukrainian governments recognized, the physical reconstruction of Ukraine needs to be paired with a comprehensive social, human-centered recovery. Women, who represent the majority of the highly educated and skilled workforce in Ukraine, are well-positioned to strengthen anti-corruption measures, modernize the energy sector, and drive Ukraine’s reform agenda. All of these components are essential for an effective recovery. In addition, these efforts can help Ukraine meet the conditions for its accession to the European Union (EU).

The record to date for women’s inclusion in recovery efforts has not been what it needs to be. Policymakers must continue to ensure that Ukrainian women leaders will have the opportunity to meaningfully and fully participate in Ukraine’s recovery. Ukraine can only recover if women and civil society are fully involved in its reconstruction.

Where do women fit in the Ukraine recovery agenda?

Held in Lugano, Switzerland, in July 2022, the first recovery conference resulted in the adoption of the “Lugano Declaration,” which includes guiding principles for Ukraine’s recovery process. At the 2023 conference in London, the EU announced the creation of a new Ukrainian facility that would provide a total of fifty billion euros to Ukraine over four years. From this total amount, thirty-nine billion euros will be allocated to the state budget to support macroeconomic stability. Another eight billion euros will go toward a special investment instrument that will cover risks in priority sectors. This year’s conference in Berlin aimed to attract private-sector investment in Ukraine, including in human capital. The agenda included the explicit goal of investing in women and youth. This was a positive development and should encourage international financial institutions and private donors to continue to invest in women-owned and -led businesses in Ukraine, as well as to train Ukrainian women to take on jobs in Ukraine’s critical sectors.

How to unleash Ukrainian women’s economic potential

Invest, train, and enable Ukrainian women. Women in Ukraine and elsewhere have traditionally had limited access to credit, markets, and training opportunities. They have also struggled to balance responsibilities in the workplace and their primary caregiver responsibilities. These challenges must be overcome if women are to fulfill their economic potential.

The World Economic Forum notes that one solution for improving women’s access to credit is to not necessarily demand collateral, because women often do not own private property. Moreover, many women (as well as men) in Ukraine have lost their homes and properties to the war, so providing property as collateral is not likely to be an option for them. Therefore, adopting alternative ways to determine women’s creditworthiness could encourage more women to apply for business loans.

Ukrainian women, with the support of Western companies and institutions, have already stepped up to launch their own startups. These should be scaled up. Since the start of Russia’s invasion, an increasing number of Ukrainian women have founded tech startups, benefitting from improved access to investors outside Ukraine, as well as programs sponsored by the EU, international organizations, and private companies. For example, VISA launched its “She’s Next” program in Ukraine in 2020, and it has since hosted gatherings where Ukrainian women presented their business proposals and received funding and training at business schools. More Western companies should team up with women-led Ukrainian nonprofits to create opportunities for funding female-led startups and give them access to education and training.

Train Ukrainian women to fill workforce gaps in critical sectors. Now is an important time to train Ukrainian women in two critical sectors that will play a key role in rebuilding Ukraine’s economy: finance and cybersecurity. Ukraine has consistently ranked as one of the most corrupt countries in Europe in Transparency International’s global Corruption Perceptions Index. Although Ukraine has made significant progress in the fight against corruption since 2014, it remains a problem and a concern for the United States and other foreign partners. The cost of complete reconstruction is currently estimated to be around $750 billion, but international donors are concerned about the potential misappropriation of funds put toward reconstruction.

Reform of its financial sector is essential for Ukraine to secure financial aid for reconstruction, as well as to meet the requirements for joining the EU. The urgent need for financial system reform coincides with women playing a much larger role in the financial system, both within the government and private sector. By transferring the knowledge of, for example, the best anti-money laundering (AML) practices to Ukrainian women, the West would create a generation of AML experts in Ukraine who are capable of detecting suspicious money flows and preventing corruption and money laundering within the Ukrainian financial system.

At the same time, equipping Ukrainian women with cybersecurity skills would help them defend Ukrainian banks and the financial system from Russian intrusions. Ukrainian banks were one of the primary targets of the cyberattacks that Russia initiated right before launching its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. More recently, at the end of 2023, Monobank, one of the largest Ukrainian banks, reported a massive hacker attack. While the bank has not publicly attributed this attack to any specific threat actor, Russia has been suspected due to its history of backing cybercrime groups attacking Ukraine. The persistent threat of Russian cyberattacks against Ukrainian banks should be countered by training Ukrainian women in cybersecurity and digital forensics.

Ukraine’s partners and allies can learn from and build on existing work to train Ukrainian women in cybersecurity. For example, the United Nations Institute for Training and Research organized a project that trained Ukrainian women evacuees in Poland in cybersecurity and data analytics. The project was held from October 2023 to March 2024 and was funded by the government and people of Japan. Private companies have also launched similar initiatives. For example, Microsoft is working with nonprofit organizations in Poland to train Ukrainian women refugees to enter the workforce in cybersecurity. Such projects need to expand to include more partners and reach more Ukrainian women.

Investing in Ukrainian women is smart economics

Leveraging Ukraine recovery conferences and other global convenings to encourage Western investment in Ukrainian women corresponds with the United States’ existing strategy of providing economic incentives to allies—also known as positive economic statecraft. The EU, United Kingdom, and other Group of Seven (G7) members are already heavily invested in Ukraine’s success. Directing investment toward the female workforce will strengthen an already existing strategy of ensuring Ukraine has the resources to minimize economic dependence on Russia. Investment in Ukrainian women will create a multiplier effect for the economy. It is well-known that women often spend their income on education, healthcare, and nutrition—all of which raise the standard of living. This is a force that moves economies forward but is often sidelined.

Finally, Ukrainian women can fill in global workforce gaps, too. Training Ukrainian women in cybersecurity would help address the global cybersecurity skills crisis. Private companies and policymakers often note that the world does not have enough cybersecurity professionals. Meanwhile, Ukraine has a highly educated population, especially in technical subjects. Cyber-trained Ukrainian women could defend not only Ukrainian banks but also businesses and governments around the world.

As policymakers and private sector actors adopt strategies for Ukraine’s reconstruction, it is crucial that they fully leverage the potential of Ukrainian women and help establish the groundwork for an inclusive and sustainable recovery.

Melanne Verveer is the executive director of the Georgetown Institute for Women, Peace and Security and a former United States ambassador-at-large for global women’s issues at the US Department of State.

Kimberly Donovan is the director of the Economic Statecraft Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s GeoEconomics Center and a former senior US Treasury official.

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While all eyes were on the government-formation disputes, a terrorist group calling itself the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) raided the city of Mosul in Nineveh province on June 10, 2014. It captured the entire territory in a matter of hours, with a brazen goal of establishing an Islamist caliphate that included Iraq, Syria, and eventually the entire region, and ruling under its version of Islam. The complete meltdown of three divisions of the Iraqi Army emboldened the terrorists and allowed them to take most of Salahuddin province. With most of Anbar province already in its hands since January 2014, ISIS secured complete control over one-third of Iraq’s territory within a few days.

The Iraqi government became paralyzed by the lack of progress in the post-election political negotiations, the continued meltdown of the armed forces, and the lack of military support from the international community. On June 13, 2014, as ISIS was about to close in on Baghdad, Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, the highest Shia religious scholar, issued a rare fatwa calling on Iraqi “citizens to defend the country, its people, the honor of its citizens, and its sacred places.” Tens of thousands volunteered to defend the country and help the government fight the most existential threat Iraq faced since its founding in 1920.

Fighting and defeating ISIS was one of the most important accomplishments of the Iraqi population, showcasing the resilience of people who stood up for their national dignity and defended their liberty at a time when no one else was ready or willing to defend them, including their government. Although other countries were involved—Iran supplied weapons to Baghdad shortly after the ISIS invasion, and the United States formed a coalition to provide advice, logistics, and air support starting in August 2014—none of these efforts would have mattered if Iraqis had not risen to defend their nascent, albeit flawed and uncertain, democracy.

Had Iraqis given up in the critical moments after June 10, 2014, as their armed forces had, their democratic dreams would have witnessed a catastrophic end much like what occurred in Afghanistan under similar circumstances in 2021. Self-organized ordinary Iraqis refused to see their country delivered to a terrorist organization or leave themselves at the mercy of religious extremists. Their acts of valor in the early days of the crisis restored morale to the Iraqi armed forces and revived the international community’s faith in the future of Iraq. What followed was a matter of time to plan and manage the battle of liberating the territories that ISIS captured and stop its rule of systemic civilian oppression and mass murder.

In the years following the 2017 defeat of ISIS, Iraq has progressed positively despite serious challenges. Having endured the painful lessons of 2014, it reorganized its armed forces to prevent a similar security collapse. Those forces stand today among the most confident and combat ready in the region, and some of their components, such as the counterterrorism force, perform at par with elite international peers. Iraqi leaders and their counterparts in allied countries, the United States in particular, have gained confidence in the efficiency and performance of the Iraqi armed forces, prompting discussions to transition the Global Coalition To Defeat ISIS, which is led by the United States and includes eighty-four other nations, into bilateral agreements between Iraq and coalition members, focusing on continued security cooperation and capacity building for the Iraqi security forces.

In January, Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani announced “the commencement of the first round of bilateral dialogue between Iraq and the United States of America to end the mission of the Coalition in Iraq.” The Iraqi government also requested that the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) terminate the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) mandate by the end of 2025, arguing that Iraq now has mature institutions to cooperate directly with international organizations like other nations do. On May 31, the UNSC voted unanimously to approve the Iraqi request. The Iraqi government described these developments as the end of contingency relations and the inauguration of a new era of normal cooperation with the international community while leaving internal Iraqi governance to its institutions, which have acquired adequate maturity and competence.

What Iraq needs to ensure its success on the path of security and self-governance is to tackle the two most pressing challenges: economic uncertainty and corruption. Iraq continues to depend on a rentier economy, fully dependent on oil revenues, which fall short of supporting the governmental operational cost or leaving extra funds to invest in building a robust economy. Iraq’s only way out of the current economic quagmire is a diversified economy that encourages investment and a private sector. The Iraqi government must move away from the old philosophy and practice of a state-controlled economy to a new direction where its role is to create a healthy environment in which private businesses can thrive. In contrast, the Iraqi government is a regulator in most sectors where governments have not traditionally performed adequately.

The same attention needs to be given to the malignant threat of corruption.

After two decades of political change, the Iraqi political elites have coexisted with a deeply entrenched culture of corruption, and many high-level officials have contributed to it. Normalized and systemic financial, political, and administrative corruption has denied the Iraqi people the opportunity to build a functional state and heal a society that was traumatized by five decades of wars, international economic sanctions, and terrorism. Efforts to combat corruption continue to be limited in scope and target only insignificant perpetrators. To secure a permanent defeat of ISIS and prevent its return, or the emergence of a similar threat, it is important to eliminate conditions that helped such a group thrive to begin with. The pervasive culture of corruption and a poor economy have been among the leading conditions that contributed to the rise of ISIS in Iraq. Now is the time to address those conditions.

Dr. Abbas Kadhim is director of the Atlantic Council’s Iraq Initiative. Follow him on X: @DrAbbasKadhim.

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In 2017, the Trump administration imposed sanctions on Gertler, accusing him of “opaque and corrupt mining and oil deals” that cost the DRC more than $1.36 billion in revenues from 2010 to 2012 alone. Gertler has repeatedly denied any wrongdoing and, through a representative, said that he would abide by sanctions. The news that the Biden administration may ease these sanctions should be viewed positively, as an indication that US sanctions can achieve both economic and geopolitical goals.

Eased sanctions, whether a formal delisting or the issuing of a general license to Gertler, would allow for the sale of currently sanctioned entities. Following the easing of sanctions in this case, US firms could gain access to new investment opportunities by investing in mining projects that currently have links to Gertler, leading to economic growth in the United States and the DRC. In addition, the DRC has an opportunity to showcase the improvements that the country is making in the fight against money laundering and terrorist financing. While some senior officials, human-rights defenders, and anticorruption fighters have valid concerns about easing sanctions on Gertler, the decision could be a win for the DRC and the United States.

The choice—and the history behind it

Both the Trump and Biden administrations have gone back and forth over the tightening and easing of sanctions on Gertler. That has drawn much attention, but what hasn’t is the fact that the United States has quietly used sanctions effectively in this case to get its way.

In 2019, The Sentry—an investigative organization that aims to hold to account predatory networks that benefit from violent conflict, repression, and kleptocracy—conducted a six-month-long study on the effectiveness of sanctions in Africa in the twenty-first century. The study found that better strategies for achieving identified goals in each sanctions program must be developed if sanctions effectiveness was to improve. The Sentry study set the stage for the Treasury 2021 Sanctions Review, which drew conclusions on how to modernize US sanctions and make them more effective. Treasury recommended a “structured policy framework” that “links sanctions to a clear policy objective.” The Biden administration has made no secret of its desire to improve access to critical minerals, diversify its supply chains, and work with US partners to achieve those goals. Since 80 percent of the DRC’s cobalt output is owned by Chinese companies, US policymakers should be seeking ways to reduce barriers to entry in the DRC’s mining sector and to actively promote investment there. 

As the United States seeks to gain greater access to critical minerals and diversify its supply chains away from Chinese influence, Biden administration officials hope that granting Gertler a general license to sell his holdings in the DRC would increase US or Western firms’ willingness to invest in the country. That’s because those firms have been largely boxed out as Gertler, according to the US Treasury, used his closeness with government officials to secure below-market rates for mining concessions for his companies. Beyond Gertler, the business environment of the DRC ranks 183 out of 190 on the World Bank’s Doing Business indicators. Easing sanctions, through a coordinated US government effort that seeks to maximize this move, could send an important signal to Western investors that the DRC is open for business. Western firms could lift their bottom lines while stimulating the DRC economy by paying market rates.

The potential delisting of Gertler and his companies is a good example of an instance in which sanctions—or, in this case, the easing of sanctions—are being used in support of a specific policy objective.

Delisting would be good—but more must be done

Building on a potential delisting, the Biden administration should work with Congress to expeditiously pass the bipartisan BRIDGE to DRC Act—which helps the United States secure access to critical-mineral supply chains and sets human-rights and democracy benchmarks for strengthening the US-DRC relationship. These moves could be further timed or calculated to magnify the impact of ongoing foreign assistance programs led by the United States Agency for International Development or other US government agencies.

The United States should coordinate additional moves to support the DRC. In October 2022, the Financial Action Task Force, the standard-setting international organization that seeks to strengthen the global financial system, placed the DRC on its list of jurisdictions under increased monitoring—also known as the “grey list”—for the country’s dismal record in fighting money laundering and terrorist financing. While many African countries are on the grey list, the impact is considerable, as it limits capital inflows, makes investors wary of doing business, and leads to reputational damage and a reduction of correspondent banking relationships, among other consequences. The US Treasury should look to bolster the DRC government’s approach to anti-money laundering and combating the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) by equipping the country with the knowledge, know-how, and capacity that it needs.  

Regardless of whether the delisting happens or whether the BRIDGE Act becomes law, the DRC must do more to help itself. News of a failed coup attempt in Kinshasa on May 19 certainly does not help, especially since—according to local reports—the assailants were linked to exiled DRC politician and US citizen Christian Malanga, who was killed by the country’s security forces in a firefight. Three US nationals were allegedly also involved in the attempt to overthrow the government of President Felix Tshisekedi.

The DRC must continue to take concrete steps to improve the business environment and reduce its political and economic risk factors. Since 2022, the DRC built on its high-level political commitments to improve its AML/CFT regime, finalize its three-year national AML/CFT strategy, and improve its macroeconomic performance—boosting its credit rating. The DRC has an opportunity to continue to make progress in its fight against corruption, money laundering, and terrorist financing that threaten the stability of the country from Matadi on the Atlantic seaboard to Goma in the Great Rift Valley.

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A win in the heart of Africa

Delisting Gertler would not only help the United States get its way, but it would show that its sanctions policy in Africa can be effective; its industrial and national security policies can be successfully implemented; and that all of this can be done in a manner that can help an African partner generate greater economic growth, jobs, and the foreign investment it seeks.

The United States can’t do it alone. It must also partner with the DRC in a serious manner to help strengthen the DRC’s framework to combat money laundering and terrorist financing, improve Kinshasa’s image, and reduce barriers to investment such as perceived political and economic risk.

The DRC occupies a central role on the African continent and with its economic potential could serve as a future hub for transportation, logistics, mineral processing, and more. If the DRC wins, all of Africa benefits—as do the United States and the West.

Benjamin Mossberg is the deputy director of the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center. He previously served in the US Treasury Department and US State Department with a focus on Africa policy.

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The Western Balkans stand at a pivotal moment. Regional stability, security, and prosperity require a more robust US engagement. EU accession remains the goal but simmering ethnic tensions and resurgent nationalism demand a comprehensive US strategy that includes specific and actionable commitments.

In the light of Russia’s brutal invasion of Ukraine that has shaken European security foundations, how can the US enhance its collaboration with the EU to develop a unified approach regarding the future of the Western Balkans?

Ilva Tare, Nonresident Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center, discusses with outgoing US Deputy Assistant Secretary and Special Representative for the Western Balkans Gabriel Escobar, at the end of his term, the most pressing issues for the region’s EU prospects, the challenges with corruption and economic growth, and the main concerns for increased tension and risks for stability.

Tare asks DAS Escobar if prioritizing the Association of Serb-Majority Municipalities on the normalization dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia was the most effective strategy, and what is the path forward on this issue?

Is the US considering alternative approaches towards Serbia to achieve progress on EU alignment, especially after the composition of the new government? 

Can the US prevent a fracturing of the fragile peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina?

How concerning is Russian influence in the Western Balkans? Specific questions on Montenegro, North Macedonia and Albania will also be covered in this #BalkansDebrief episode.

#BalkansDebrief is an online interview series presented by the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center and hosted by journalist Ilva Tare. The program offers a fresh look at the Western Balkans and examines the region’s people, culture, challenges, and opportunities.

Watch #BalkansDebrief on YouTube and listen to it as a Podcast.

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So, it was a poignant moment at the PEN America Literary Gala, which I attended Thursday evening in New York, when Almar Latour, Dow Jones CEO and Wall Street Journal publisher, spoke about how the long-sought release of his reporter Evan Gershkovich from Russia’s dreaded Lefortovo Prison matters “on a macro level.”

“The grim reality is that there are Evans everywhere,” said Latour, who is also an Atlantic Council board member. “Journalists around the world face increasing resistance and hostility for just trying to do their jobs.”

More than a hundred journalists and photojournalists were killed in the past year, mostly in Gaza and Ukraine, and more than three hundred others were imprisoned for their work by one autocratic regime or another. Through our “Reporters at Risk” events, the Atlantic Council has worked to raise these issues for policymakers and the public. So too has Latour, who listed the names of many of the journalists behind bars, and he included Jimmy Lai, the Hong Kong media tycoon and pro-democracy advocate charged with endangering Chinese national security with his weapon of truth. One of the evening’s awardees sits in a Vietnamese prison for her critiques of state repression, the writer Pham Doan Trang.

It would have been easy in an evening that honored the music legend Paul Simon—who played his “American Tune” on acoustic guitar just a few feet away from me—to lose the singular and symbolic importance of one reporter’s imprisonment. 

With talk show host Seth Meyers as MC, with Malcolm Gladwell and other authors as presenters and speakers, and with PEN America at the center of controversies over whether Israeli and Palestinian free speech are created equal, one might, for a moment, forget Evan.

Amid the noise and glitter and controversy, however, there was a bigger story to be told. I scribbled down on my napkin Latour’s closing quote: “Russia may be an ocean and a continent away, but the distance between authoritarianism and a free society is measured by the strength of a free press.”

Frederick Kempe is president and chief executive officer of the Atlantic Council. You can follow him on Twitter: @FredKempe.

This edition is part of Frederick Kempe’s Inflection Points Today newsletter, a column of quick-hit insights on a world in transition. To receive this newsletter throughout the week, sign up here.

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Electoral advantage

Georgian Dream stands to benefit from the adoption of the foreign agent law ahead of parliamentary elections in October. Civil society in Georgia has historically exerted a significant influence on the country’s politics. For example, it played a pivotal role in the 2012 elections by contributing to voter education and election monitoring.

However, the main vulnerability that Georgian nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and civil society organizations face is financial reliance on international donors. Civil society organizations in Georgia receive more than 90 percent of funding from foreign sources, according to a 2020 report. Targeting their funding streams right before the elections seems to be a logical step for a ruling party that intends to eliminate influential and potentially opposing voices before the elections.

But many argue that Georgian Dream could win the October parliamentary elections without this legislation. After all, the ruling party is ahead in the polls and there have been reports that Georgian Dream has been leveraging administrative power to influence the elections. Extreme divisions have made it almost impossible for the Georgian opposition parties to form a coalition that could counter Georgian Dream. If anything, by introducing the foreign agent bill, Georgian Dream has united the opposition as well as the broader population in defense of Georgia’s European future.

Why, then, did Georgian Dream decide to move forward with this unpopular bill, knowing all too well it would trigger protests and antigovernment narratives just a few months before the elections?

Ivanishvili’s influence

Bidzina Ivanishvili, the richest man in Georgia and the founder and honorary chairman of Georgian Dream, could be key to understanding why the party took this self-destructive step. He exerts exceptional influence on the government’s decisions and actions.

Ivanishvili delivered a speech on April 29, during which he defined NGOs as agents nurtured by a global force that, in his telling, is responsible for getting Georgia and Ukraine into wars with Russia. He believes that the introduction of the foreign agent law ahead of the elections was necessary because NGOs were trying to change electoral laws, acting in the interest of the “global party of war,” which, he believes, intends to engineer a revolution in Georgia.

The combination of Ivanishvili’s views and a ruling party that executes his every decision with no questions asked is putting the Georgian people’s safety and future at risk. A sensible and nuanced Western response is needed to support the Georgian people.

The regional trend

The adoption of the Russian-style foreign agent law seems to be a regional trend, not just a Georgian phenomenon. Hungary, Kyrgyzstan, and Georgia all started actively pushing for foreign agent laws in 2023. Hungary implemented foreign agent legislation in December 2023, and Kyrgyzstan adopted its own in April 2024.

Three states in Eastern Europe and Eurasia pushing to adopt Russian-style foreign agent laws almost at the same time might not be a coincidence. It is possible Russia is inspiring or even pressuring the ruling parties. After all, Moscow’s influence in these countries would likely increase if the NGOs and civil society organizations in these countries were to lose funding from international donors.

Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov has defended Georgian Dream’s reintroduction of the foreign agent law and stated that it is in Moscow’s interests that the situation in Georgia is “stable and predictable.” Russian President Vladimir Putin has also reaffirmed ties with Hungary’s nationalist Prime Minister Viktor Orbán and claimed that Russian-Kyrgyz relations are developing in all directions.

The European Union (EU) has already launched legal action against Hungary in response to the introduction of this law. But Georgia and Kyrgyzstan are not EU member states, and so the same legal route is not available.

What the West should and should not do

It is crucial for the international community—especially the EU, the United States, and the United Kingdom—to support the will of the Georgian people. This means aiding Georgia’s pro-European president in her challenge to the ruling party’s actions. It also means seeking accountability for the ruling class that defies the will of its people and is impeding Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic integration, a goal that is written into Georgia’s constitution.

The EU should reconsider measures that could harm the Georgian population, such as the potential suspension of current visa-free travel. It would not help the situation to punish the wider Georgian population for the ruling party’s actions.

The international community and donors must continue their support for civil society organizations in Georgia, especially in the lead-up to the October elections. Despite the legal ramifications of the new bill and the anticipated crackdown on the civil society sector, sustaining funding streams is crucial for bolstering civil society’s monitoring capacity. This is vital for ensuring transparent and fair electoral processes in October and providing Georgia with an opportunity for another peaceful transition of power.

The many EU and Georgian flags carried through the streets of Tbilisi in recent weeks make clear where most Georgians’ view their future. The West must do what it can to help keep them headed in that direction.

Maia Nikoladze is the assistant director at the Economic Statecraft Initiative within the Atlantic Council’s GeoEconomics Center. Follow her at @Mai_Nikoladze.

Ana Lejava is a policy associate at the Georgetown Institute for Women, Peace and Security and a former Young Ambassador of Georgia to the United States. Follow her at @AnaLejava. 

The post Why Georgia’s ruling party is pushing for the foreign agent law—and how the West should respond appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The report includes the now-infamous Qatargate scandal, in which several sitting and former MEPs were arrested in December 2022 for a cash-for-influence operation. But the report also includes lesser-known cases, such as a privately funded trip for two Irish MEPs to the headquarters of Hashd al-Shaabi, an Iranian-backed, Russian-allied militant organization in Iraq, to criticize US and European military action in Iraq.

The upcoming European Parliament elections in June amplify the urgency of defending the institution against foreign meddling. To accomplish this, EU institutions should codify stricter definitions of foreign influence and interference, and they should pass future reforms as legally binding EU regulations. At the same time, EU officials must ensure that the organization’s transparency and anti-corruption reforms are crafted so that they don’t infringe on member states’ civil society organizations.

It’s not just Qatargate

Qatargate was the most prominent recent scandal to plague the European Parliament. The scheme’s primary goal was to rehabilitate Qatar’s image before the 2022 FIFA World Cup by stifling European Parliament resolutions critical of Doha and drafting speeches for Qatari ministers at EU hearings in exchange for under-the-table payments.

The case came to a head on December 9, 2022, when authorities conducted nineteen raids with eight arrests in Belgium and Italy, complete with the seizure of more than one million euros in cash. The highest-profile arrest was Greek MEP and then Parliament Vice President Eva Kaili. Her partner, Francesco Giorgi, and his boss, former Italian MEP Antonio Panzeri, were both arrested and confessed to involvement in the scandal. Throughout the investigation, authorities uncovered evidence of three hundred alleged attempts to manipulate the European Parliament, with Qatar at the center of the influence deal, which was purportedly worth four million euros.

The Parliament continues to find its current, former, and prospective MEPs embroiled in scandals with foreign governments, often involving Russia or China, especially during election years. In March, the Parliament opened an investigation into Latvian MEP Tatjana Ždanoka, who faces accusations of operating as a Russian agent since 2004. Regional news sites published numerous emails linking Ždanoka to a handler in the Russian Federal Security Service.

Additionally, the far-right Euroskeptic party Alternative for Germany, currently polling second among German voters, has made headlines for major scandals involving its top two candidates for the European elections, Petr Bystron and Maximilian Krah.

In March, reports emerged that Bystron was linked to the Russian-backed propaganda outlet “Voice of Europe,” a platform that spreads disinformation and provides financial support to pro-Russian politicians in the EU. Czech intelligence authorities claim that Bystron received “about 20,000 euros” from the site’s Kremlin-connected operator. The Munich Public Prosecutor’s Office has announced preliminary investigations against Bystron for “possible bribery of elected officials.”

Voice of Europe’s news reports would blend in with typical Russian propaganda if not for the political legitimacy they gained by featuring sitting MEPs. Additionally, some Voice of Europe videos appear to have been filmed at VoxBox, the Parliament’s in-house studio, using the heart of the institution’s broadcast system to disseminate Kremlin talking points, including arguments against Ukraine’s accession to the EU and in favor of peace talks with Russia.

In addition to the investigation against Bystron, Krah has been involved in multiple scandals. In April, German police arrested Jian Guo, an aide for Krah, over accusations that he used his proximity to Krah to spy for China. That same week, the Dresden Public Prosecutor’s Office announced two preliminary investigations against Krah over alleged payments from Russia and China for his work as an MEP.

Can the EU defend its own democracy?

In the wake of Qatargate, the European Parliament and European Commission moved to tighten rules to protect the EU’s democratic process. Last September, the Parliament adopted new rules requiring detailed declarations on MEP private interests, reporting on external income over five thousand euros per year, and bans on engagement with paid lobbying activity that could directly impact the EU’s decision-making processes.

The EU’s executive, the European Commission, adopted the Defense of Democracy package in December 2023 in tandem with the Parliament’s reforms to prepare for the 2024 European elections. The plan includes rules designed to increase transparency and safeguard European institutions from corruption. This rollout is the most significant package of reforms at the EU level since Qatargate, but it could benefit from stronger and stricter definitions to maximize its impact.

The road to reform

First, the EU should provide stronger definitions for the most basic terms in the defense toolkit. Chapter I, Article 2 of the Directive on Transparency of Interest Representation on behalf of Third Countries (2023/0463) fails to provide working definitions for foreign “influence” versus “interference,” a critical debate in the field, nor for the concept of “transparency.” The absence of these definitions is detrimental to the EU’s enforcement efforts, as there is little consensus across the bloc on what these categories include and exclude, or whether they can be used interchangeably. This lack of clarity is understandable in the short term. Creating a narrow definition related only to commonly used tactics may be too restrictive. At the same time, creating too broad a definition could inhibit political participation. In the long term, however, the EU must stop relying on a principle akin to US Supreme Court Justice Potter Stewart’s nondefinition of obscenity—“I know it when I see it”—and instead create specific, workable definitions for the member states to enforce.

Second, the EU must keep legal precedent in mind when creating legislation relating to civil society. In 2020, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) struck down a Hungarian transparency law on nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). The law mandated that NGOs listed as recipients of foreign funding by the Hungarian government must declare their income each year to the state and include disclaimers in all publications noting their designation. The ECJ ruled that the law taken in totality had a “deterring effect” on NGOs. The decision noted that while increasing transparency is a legitimate aim, states must establish how their additional regulations contribute to increasing transparency, which Hungary failed to do. The ECJ decision demonstrates that the EU must balance its necessity for transparency legislation without overregulating, which could lead to the inhibition of civil society.

Third, the EU should pass future reforms as legally binding EU regulations, rather than as directives, which only require member states to create legislation at the national level. The Defense of Democracy package, for instance, issued directives, meaning member states have flexibility in how they interpret and enforce each of its provisions, which increases the likelihood that it will be enforced in a variety of ways throughout the bloc. Thus, to ensure that future transparency and anti-corruption polices are equitably enforced EU-wide, it is important that they be legally binding regulations.

Taken together, these reforms to corruption-fighting legislation will help the EU’s institutions defend their reputation, integrity, and accountability, particularly in an election year.

Sophia Athan is a young global professional with the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center.

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Czech and Belgian law enforcement agencies reported in late March 2024 that Kremlin-linked Ukrainian oligarch Viktor Medvedchuk was behind a Prague-based Russian propaganda network centered around the Voice of Europe outlet. Medvedchuk is accused of masterminding the distribution of anti-Ukrainian narratives in the European media and paying European Parliament members to promote Russian interests in their legislative activities.

This latest corruption scandal is a painful reminder that the EU and US remain at significant risk of Russian electoral interference in the lead-up to elections later this year. For the EU specifically, the scandal further demonstrates that it must put its own house in order if it is to credibly demand Ukraine do the same during the latter’s ongoing EU accession negotiations.

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

The oligarch at the center of the scandal, Viktor Medvedchuk, has close ties to Russian President Vladimir Putin, who is godfather to Medvedchuk’s daughter. Throughout the three decades following Ukrainian independence in 1991, Medvedchuk was a prominent figure in the country’s political life and a vocal advocate of Russian interests.

Medvedchuk’s personal relationship with Putin helped earn him a reputation as the Kremlin’s unofficial representative in Ukraine. This led US intelligence agencies to identify Medvedchuk as one of Moscow’s top choices to head a puppet Ukrainian administration in the event of a successful invasion.

When Russian troops crossed the border in February 2022, Medvedchuk initially went into hiding. However, he was detained by the Ukrainian authorities two months later, and was eventually traded for a large number of Ukrainian POWs in one of the most controversial prisoner exchanges of the war.

Regardless of his exile and loss of Ukrainian citizenship, Medvedchuk remains an important ally to Putin. His leadership of the Voice of Europe influence operation indicates Europe’s continued vulnerability to the Kremlin’s weaponized corruption. Whereas Ukraine, the US, UK, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand all imposed sanctions on Medvedchuk and his associates some time ago, the European Union did not do so. As a result, Medvedchuk was still able to do business in Europe.

As a result of this apparent oversight, several of Medvedchuk’s EU-based assets are thought to have remained untouched until his involvement with Voice of Europe was uncovered. This gave him a degree of maneuverability with his EU-based financial assets that appears to have facilitated his allegedly illicit activities.

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In the wake of the recent revelations, the Czech authorities have imposed sanctions on Medvedchuk and other Kremlin-linked associates. Meanwhile, Belgian law enforcement agencies have opened probes into alleged bribes paid to serving MEPs from France, Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, Poland, and Hungary, with the Polish authorities also launching an investigation.

While these measures are welcome, it is not clear why EU authorities did not act earlier to counter the Kremlin’s weaponized corruption. Many now fear the current scandal is just the tip of the iceberg in terms of Russian efforts to infiltrate democratic institutions and the media throughout the Western world. Looming elections on both sides of the Atlantic have added a sense of urgency to this debate.

In theory, the European Commission’s “freeze and seize” task force is meant to coordinate with the rest of the Russian Elites, Proxies, and Oligarchs (REPO) task force, which features the relevant national sanctions authorities from G7 member states and Australia. The fact that the EU’s sanctions listings still do not fully align with that of its REPO allies, especially on somebody as prominent as Medvedchuk, raises serious concerns over the effectiveness of this coordination.

The European Union should be setting an example when it comes to combating corruption. When recommending that the European Council open official EU accession negotiations with Ukraine in late November 2023, Commission Vice President Věra Jourová cautioned that Ukraine still had a long way to go in developing anti-corruption regulations, even as she praised the significant progress made by the Ukrainian authorities so far. Inevitably, questions are now being asked about the credibility of the EU’s own anti-corruption policies.

Recent claims of a major Russian influence operation operating in the heart of the EU should serve as a wake-up call for policymakers throughout the West. With the Kremlin clearly preparing for a long-term geopolitical confrontation, the need for vigilance will only grow. In response to this threat, transatlantic institutions should prioritize bolstering their ability to resist Russia’s weaponized corruption, while making sure the Kremlin’s agents are subject to the maximum available restrictions.

Francis Shin is a Research Assistant at the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center.

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The second victimization, which started just as the fire was being put out, comes in how the Russian people will be denied the truth from Russian President Vladimir Putin’s government. The attack strikes at Putin’s claim to legitimacy as a strongman—so someone else has to be found to blame: Ukraine, which the Ukrainian government, the US government, and others have said was not involved. Even ISIS-K’s quick claim of responsibility was obscured from the Russian people. On Monday, Putin finally acknowledged that “radical Islamists” were responsible—but he still falsely claimed Ukraine was somehow ultimately responsible.

This deception has consequences, most notably in the road not taken by Russia after Friday’s terrorist attack. Consider what a truly responsible Russian government would have done: It would have taken better precautions after the early March warning from US intelligence that an attack was imminent. It appears senior Russian officials, including Putin, downplayed the intelligence warning, perhaps thinking it part of a US plot to disrupt Putin’s reelection. Even if the attack could not have been prevented, a responsible Russian government would now call for international solidarity and joint action against a deadly terrorist group responsible for thousands of deaths in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran, Russia, and elsewhere. A responsible Russian government would convene an honest accounting of its security failure to detect the plot and disrupt it.

And, of course, a responsible Russian government would not be embroiled in a destructive war in Ukraine that may have left Moscow distracted, overstretched, and therefore vulnerable. Nor would a responsible Russian government have embarked on the security crackdown (largely unnoticed in the Western media, with some exceptions) against Central Asian workers that fueled grievances that may have allowed ISIS-K to recruit terrorist killers among people already in Russia—though the details at this time remain unclear.

But Putin’s government is not a responsible government, and the Russian people are likely to be denied all these reasonable steps. This means the Russian people will continue to be vulnerable to future ISIS-K attacks, even after the security crackdown that is no doubt coming inside Russia. Nor is there likely to be a change of Russian support for the Taliban in Afghanistan, the Assad regime in Syria, or the regime in Iran—all of which factor into anti-Russian animus among Muslims in Central Asia and the Caucasus that ISIS-K uses for terrorist recruiting.

Russia’s aggression against Ukraine and the return of great power competition to the world stage have not ended the threat of terrorism from ISIS-K and other terrorist groups. The fact that they get less attention in the Western press does not mean those threats have vanished. Terrorism is still a threat that deserves international cooperation, as the Biden administration showed by warning Russia of the threat in early March.

Russia’s intelligence failure that made March 22 possible shows that terrorism’s danger is not past, even while Russia’s irresponsibility makes the world and its own citizens less secure.

Thomas S. Warrick is a senior fellow and director of the Future of DHS Project at the Atlantic Council. He served in the Department of State from 1997-2007 and as deputy assistant secretary for counterterrorism policy at the US Department of Homeland Security from 2008 to 2019.

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North Macedonia, a small nation of 2 million, in the Western Balkans, gained international attention in 2019, when it agreed to the seemingly impossible: changing its name in exchange for EU negotiations and NATO membership. While NATO membership was secured, EU accession talks have stalled for years. This is largely due to Bulgaria’s demand for Constitutional changes recognizing a Bulgarian minority.

For North Macedonians, Sofia’s veto was a bitter pill to swallow resulting in public support for the EU dropping sharply, according to surveys. On May 8, the country faces critical elections that will decide its future in relation to the EU.

Nonresident Senior Fellow Ilva Tare sits down will Marko Troshanovski, President of the Institute for Democracy, to discuss the importance of the elections and the key issues debated by the main two opposing political camps.

Can the North Macedonian public regain trust in the EU accession process? What do the surveys suggest about the winner of the political elections? How will a potential victory by the center-right VRMNO-DPMNE opposition affect the country’s foreign policy and its EU path? What role will Albanian parties play in the winning coalition? How should the new government address the problem of corruption?

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Since the onset of Russia’s full-scale invasion two years ago, one of the key catalysts driving Ukraine’s reform agenda has been the June 2022 move to grant the country EU candidate status. When announcing this decision, the European Commission set Ukraine seven key reform goals to meet before official EU membership negotiations could begin. Priorities included reforms related to the rule of law, particularly the reform of crucial judicial bodies such as the High Council of Justice (HCJ) and the High Qualification Commission of Judges (HQCJ).

While significant progress has been made toward implementing these reforms, major challenges persist. For example, although new procedures have been introduced governing the selection of judges to the country’s Constitutional Court, there are still concerns regarding the appointment of politically compromised candidates. As Ukraine continues its judicial reform efforts, it is imperative to infuse these endeavors with renewed energy.

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

Looking ahead, a primary focus should be on reforming Ukraine’s Supreme Court, which plays a crucial role in the country’s judiciary. In spring 2023, the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine and the Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office uncovered evidence of a $2.7 million bribe involving the president of the Supreme Court. However, in the wake of this corruption scandal, three-quarters of Supreme Court judges appointed another judge as the new president of the court despite serious integrity concerns.

NGOs and members of the Ukrainian judiciary have proposed a two-step approach to Supreme Court reform featuring the vetting of sitting judges and implementation of a new selection process with the involvement of international experts. This format has been endorsed by the European Commission. Reforming the Supreme Court is widely recognized as an essential step toward strengthening the rule of law, combating corruption, and enhancing protection for investors.

Another reform priority is establishing the High Administrative Court (HACU), following the liquidation of the District Administrative Court of Kyiv (DACK) in December 2022. The DACK was widely accused of judicial misconduct. It wielded substantial power, overseeing cases involving municipal authorities and central executive bodies in the Ukrainian capital, but had become tainted by successive corruption scandals. To safeguard the integrity of HACU judges and prevent future allegations of corruption, it is vital to implement a selection process with the meaningful involvement of independent international experts, similar to the successful model used to establish the High Anti-Corruption Court.

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Reform of Ukraine’s legal education system is also indispensable for the success of the country’s judicial reforms. The judicial system currently suffers from a significant shortage of personnel, underscoring the need for a robust legal education system. Detrimental practices include the training of lawyers by traditional universities and law enforcement institutions. These institutions educate one-third of all legal professionals and receive about half of state funding allocated for legal education. However, rather than promoting critical thinking, students often encounter a curriculum and environment that stresses obedience.

Critics argue that this approach fails to instill the necessary professional skills. Additionally, graduates from law enforcement academies typically exhibit lower levels of specialist knowledge compared to university graduates. The EU highlighted its concerns regarding legal education in the Ukraine Accession Report 2023, stressing the necessity of addressing this issue by separating the training of lawyers in universities and law enforcement academies. G7 countries have also raised this issue.

Ukraine’s ability to defend itself against Russian aggression depends heavily on continued international support. Kyiv’s partners therefore have considerable leverage when it comes to maintaining the country’s reform momentum. With this in mind, it is crucial for Ukraine’s international allies to link continued financial assistance with the implementation of reforms. The effectiveness of this approach can be seen in the progress made between summer 2022 and late 2023 on the reform goals identified by the EU.

The EU has already outlined its additional reform recommendations. It would also be helpful to establish concrete reform requirements from G7 countries and connect these directly to aid. By linking financial support to specific reform targets, Ukraine’s international allies can make sure critical reforms are implemented and the country continues to move in the right direction. The need to maintain Ukraine’s reform momentum is another strong argument in favor of confirming further direct US budget support as part of future aid. This will provide vital leverage while bolstering Ukraine’s resilience and encouraging the authorities in Kyiv to implement the necessary reforms.

The road ahead is extremely challenging, but Ukraine can still emerge as a regional beacon of democracy, Euro-Atlantic security, and the rule of law. This will require the unwavering support of the country’s Western partners. To achieve this goal, future aid should be tied to a steadfast Ukrainian commitment to advance reforms without concessions. This can help shape the kind of future Ukrainians are currently fighting for.

Mykhailo Zhernakov is chair of the board of the DEJURE Foundation. Nestor Barchuk is international relations manager of the DEJURE Foundation.

Further reading

UkraineAlert Feb 20, 2024

Outgunned Ukraine bets on drones as Russian invasion enters third year

By Mykola Bielieskov

As Putin’s invasion passes the two-year mark, tech-savvy Ukraine is betting on drones as the best way to overcome Russia’s increasingly overwhelming advantage in traditional firepower, writes Mykola Bielieskov.

Civil Society Conflict

UkraineAlert Mar 14, 2024

Ukraine’s Security Council Secretary: The West is still in denial over Russia

By Peter Dickinson

Western leaders have yet to grasp the true scale of the threat posed by Putin’s Russia and are in danger of suffering an history defeat, warns the Secretary of Ukraine’s Security and Defense Council Oleksiy Danilov.

Conflict Disinformation

UkraineAlert Feb 22, 2024

Ukrainian long-range drones target Putin’s war machine inside Russia

By Victoria Vdovychenko, Alexander Khara

Ukraine is hoping a new campaign of long-range drone strikes against Russia’s strategically vital oil and gas industry can help weaken Putin’s war machine, write Victoria Vdovychenko and Alexander Khara.

Conflict Defense Technologies

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

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UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

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The circumstances of Navalny’s death remain unclear, but whatever details may be revealed, there can be no question that responsibility lies squarely with the regime that unjustly imprisoned him and with Putin personally. The Russian state’s intention to murder Navalny slowly was apparent as it held him prisoner for the last three years: It tortured him and denied him adequate medical care, even as his health deteriorated from the brutal conditions of his incarceration and from the side effects of his exposure to a deadly nerve agent during a 2020 assassination attempt by Russian security services.

Navalny’s rise to public prominence was a result of his insight that the Putin regime’s pervasive and massive corruption posed a major political liability. His skill as a corruption investigator enabled him to expose the eye-catching, gaudy excesses on which Russia’s political elites frittered away the enormous wealth they stole from the Russian people. His skill as a political communicator—the clear charisma that shone through the clever, entertaining videos he produced—brought the results of his investigations to mass audiences in Russia and around the world. As his political career developed, his critiques of the Putin regime broadened to include its widespread human rights abuses and its brutal military interventions in Ukraine and Syria.

Navalny emerged as an important political leader during Russia’s “Bolotnaya” protests of 2011-2012, as Russians took to the street over Putin’s return to a third term as president. This year, on the cusp of a fifth Putin term, Russia’s rapid descent into repression and militarism could make Navalny’s vision for a democratic and peaceful Russia seem further than ever from realization. Yet Navalny’s activism since 2011 has also contributed to the development of a broader democratic movement capable of continuing without him.

While Navalny’s personal popularity at times drew criticism of a personalistic style of politics, in truth his political strategy always centered on movement-building. In 2013, his highly competitive campaign for Moscow mayor attracted thousands of volunteers and launched the political careers of several other oppositionists who have gone on to become important figures in their own right. In 2018, his shadow “campaign” for president (which he continued even after being denied access to the ballot) built a nationwide network of dozens of local offices spanning Russia’s huge territory that continued after the election to serve as incubators of local political and civic activism. The Anti-Corruption Foundation (FBK)—the nongovernmental organization Navalny founded to carry out corruption investigations and raise public awareness of how Putin’s elite have looted Russia for decades—has continued to produce high-impact investigations during his imprisonment. Despite a 2021 “extremist” designation that forced FBK into exile as several staff were jailed, the organization remains one of the most important in Russian civil society. FBK’s “Navalny Live” YouTube channel is one of Russia’s most popular, reaching millions of Russians each month. Beyond those with direct connections to Navalny are thousands more (overwhelmingly young) Russian activists who were inspired by Navalny’s work to make their own efforts to build the better future for their country. He built a movement that was bigger than himself.

This is the legacy Navalny leaves for Russian society. His vision, his political skills, and his personal courage helped sustain Russia’s democratic movement through a period of sharply intensifying repression. Perhaps his most important political insight was his recognition of how his own moral leadership—the sacrifices of his health and freedom he was willing to make on behalf of his cause—could cut through the cynicism that so often dominates Russian political life. His martyrdom magnifies that moral leadership immeasurably. 

In an interview shown in the 2022 Oscar-winning documentary about his work, Navalny is asked what message he would want to send in the event that he is killed. His message, he responds, is a simple one: “You are not allowed to give up. If they [decide to kill me], it means that we are incredibly strong. We need to use this power . . . All that is needed for the triumph of evil is for good people to do nothing.” This simple but powerful sentiment that has guided Navalny’s life has become an even more powerful message in his death—one capable of inspiring Russians to even greater efforts to build a better future.

Dylan Myles-Primakoff is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center and a senior manager for Eurasia Programs at the National Endowment for Democracy.

The post Russia’s democracy movement will survive the death of Navalny appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The face of genuine anti-Putin opposition in Russia, the former lawyer, blogger, anticorruption investigator, presidential candidate, and prisoner offered, for many, the best democratic alternative to Putinism. While most Russians viewed him with apathy, Navalny built a national movement based on exposing the rampant corruption and gangsterism of Putin’s system. Even if he never had any hope of winning the rigged Russian elections or sparking some sudden popular uprising to overthrow Russia’s leadership, Putin still saw Navalny and his team as a mortal threat.

In the lead-up to Russia’s February 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Putin set about eviscerating Russian civil society and free media, including Navalny’s Anti-Corruption Foundation (FBK). This crackdown, in effect, disbanded or neutralized any organizations or popular figures that the Russian people could rally around in opposition to the war in Ukraine.

After recovering in Germany from an assassination attempt, Navalny returned to Russia in 2021 to face certain imprisonment and a likely death sentence for opposing Putin. Shortly thereafter, his FBK was declared an “extremist” organization and forcibly liquidated. Its offices across the country were shuttered, and those not imprisoned were shunted out of the country.

During Russia’s parliamentary elections in fall 2021, the Kremlin coerced Google and Apple into removing from their online stores the app associated with FBK’s “Smart Voting” program, which encouraged voters to coalesce around individual candidates to deny Putin’s United Russia party seats in the Duma—or at least force the authorities to be even more brazen in their stealing of the election.

Navalny and his team had a talent for breaking through the dry bleakness of Putinism. His investigations into Russia’s kleptocracy were filled with Navalny’s sense of authenticity and humor. For example, a 2016 exposé about former Russian President Dmitry Medvedev’s special building just for ducks at one of his lavish houses became a viral meme and turned rubber ducks into a symbol of protest in Russia. Navalny’s own blue underwear, on which the deadly nerve agent Novichok was smeared by his would-be assassins, became another such resistance meme.

More than most, Navalny was skilled at finding the issues and language that could activate Russians in a system designed to convince individuals that acquiescence is preferable to resistance. In his early years in opposition politics, this included the employment of racist and anti-immigrant tropes, as well as association with particularly unsavory groups.

This history—along with Navalny’s opposition to the war in Ukraine less because of its criminal and genocidal nature and more because it was disastrous for Russia—means that Navalny wasn’t viewed with particular favor among Putin’s other victims in Ukraine and elsewhere.

Navalny’s murder, nevertheless, is an important reminder of two key facts.

First, the violence inherent to Putin’s blood-soaked reign will continue unabated until he and his thugs—as well as the relative indifference in Russian society that allows it to happen—are stopped. Most immediately, that can and must happen in Ukraine. Members of Congress, in their sixth month of debating whether to approve aid to Ukraine, are at this moment rightly being reminded of the urgency with which Russia must be stopped.

Second, Navalny’s murder is like dousing the last flame of hope inside Russia of a positive vision for the country. Stabilizing Putin’s hold on power in the immediate run-up to his invasion of Ukraine meant destroying many of the brightest parts of the freer Russia that emerged from the Soviet Union. Free media is once again censored and civil society organizations like Memorial—Russia’s oldest nongovernmental organization, which was dedicated to the memory of Soviet repressions and the quest to keep them from being repeated—liquidated and banned.

The system crafted by Putin and his allies over the last quarter century relies on manufacturing a sense of inevitability and invincibility. Putin must be a larger-than-life figure and his state must be all-powerful. But the fact that this system can feel so threatened not only by a man such as Navalny, but even by someone on the street holding a blank sign in protest, shows that there is nothing inevitable or invincible about Putinism. The coming “re-election” of Putin next month is intended as a ritual of reaffirming his power, but Navalny’s murder will stand as a stark reminder of the extraordinary lengths to which Putin must go to maintain that power.

With Navalny killed, Putin has left no real alternatives to his rule in Russia, and the chance of change is closed off just a bit more. The best and perhaps only real hope for creating a new opening for change in Russia is by unambiguously defeating Putin’s greatest act of violence—Russia’s war to annihilate Ukraine.

Doug Klain is a nonresident fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center and a policy analyst at Razom for Ukraine, a nonprofit humanitarian aid and advocacy organization.

The post Navalny’s life and death show Putinism isn’t inevitable appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Moreover, Egypt is renowned for its rich cultural heritage, boasting seven UNESCO World Heritage Sites. These treasures include the Great Pyramid of Giza, one of the seven wonders of the ancient world. The allure of Egypt’s cultural legacy, coupled with competitive travel costs due to the substantial devaluation of the Egyptian pound (LE), positions the country as a pivotal travel destination with immense potential for tourism revenues.

In addition to its cultural wealth, Egypt possesses a substantial human capital base, with a population of about 115 million people, representing approximately 1.4 percent of the global population. Notably, 60 percent of Egypt’s population is under thirty, highlighting a sizable workforce poised to enter the job market. Egypt also benefits from abundant sunlight and elevated wind speeds, positioning the country as an optimal site for renewable energy sources. The burgeoning renewable energy market in Egypt holds significant economic potential, amounting to billions of dollars.

However, despite all its inherent advantages, the economy has been grappling with persistent challenges for nearly seventy-five years. High poverty rates continue to plague the nation, with World Bank statistics indicating a rise in the poverty rate, with the proportion of the population below the poverty line increasing from 25.2 percent in 2010 to 32.5 percent in 2017–2018.

Egypt’s tourism revenues have also remained modest, averaging around $8–$9 billion annually between 2014 and 2022, despite the country’s potential as a premier tourist destination. In comparison, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) has consistently generated higher tourism income, averaging around $30 billion annually during the same period, and is projected to reach $60 billion by 2028.

Additionally, Egypt’s foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows have been relatively modest, amounting to $11 billion in 2020. This figure pales in comparison to that of other middle-income countries that have attracted significantly higher FDI inflows for the same year, such as India ($50 billion), Brazil ($70 billion), or South Africa ($90 billion). Egypt also has a chronic trade deficit, which registered $37 billion by the end of 2023, down from $48 billion in 2022. 

Moreover, Egypt has grappled with fiscal deficits, averaging 9.5 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) over the past decade. As a result, the government has accumulated a substantial public debt, with external debt stocks, including International Monetary Fund (IMF) credit, rising from an average of $40 billion post-Arab Spring to $130 billion in 2020, comprising nearly 70 percent long-term debt, which poses significant challenges for the economy.

The economy’s vulnerability is further compounded by its reliance on volatile revenue sources, including tourism, the Suez Canal, and foreign remittances. Therefore, external shocks—such as the pandemic, the Ukraine war, the Gaza war, and the recent Red Sea attacks—have exerted additional economic pressure on Egypt. As a result, the current account, which closed with an average surplus of $2 billion between 2002 and 2007, reversed to a significant deficit of $16 billion by the end of 2022 and is projected to settle at $9 billion by the end of 2024.

Consequently, the Egyptian pound has experienced substantial depreciation, losing more than 70 percent of its value since early 2022, making it the sixth worst-performing currency globally since the beginning of this year. Delayed adjustments to the foreign exchange policy have resulted in the emergence of a parallel market, with the Egyptian pound plunging to LE 68–70 per US dollar, compared to a fixed rate of LE 30–31 per US dollar in the formal banking sector, where the supply of foreign currency is minimal. Central bank reserves of foreign currencies have also dwindled, declining from $44.6 billion in 2019 to $32 billion by the end of 2022.

But why does Egypt, despite its considerable potential, encounter such notable economic hurdles? While many mainstream economists attribute the crisis to macroeconomic mismanagement, acknowledging the importance of macroeconomic stability for growth, this explanation does not capture the full complexity of the issue. Instead, Egypt’s sluggish, and relatively modest, economic transformation can be better understood through the lens of the “political economy of ideas.” This theory, elucidated by Harvard economist Dany Rodrick in his paper “Ideas Versus Interests in Policymaking,” underscores the pivotal role of ideology as a catalyst for shaping public policy and institutional change.

The concept of “ideology” or the “influence of ideas” is a fundamental tenet in political economy, offering insights into why some nations progress more rapidly than others and, conversely, why some lag behind.

Historically, Egypt’s economic ideology long adhered to an inward-looking, import-substitution approach under the Gamal Abdel Nasser regime (1950–1970), a trend common among developing economies during the decolonization era. Key features of the Nasser regime included the nationalization of private assets, management of state enterprises, import substitution, and restrictions on exports.

Later, the Anwar Sadat regime (1970–1981) sought to reverse this trend by introducing a new pro-market investment legislation known as the “open door” policy. However, his ideology was rejected widely, as evidenced by the 1977 Bread Riots. In 1981, Hosni Mubarak came to power in the wake of these riots, which prevented him from initiating similar fundamental reforms. Instead, his government used a mixed approach, implementing partial, piecemeal pro-market policies while relying on strong remnants from the Nasser era. This pattern persists to this day. This mixed ideology has been manifesting, for example, in the slow progress of the public asset-management (privatization) program, and the relatively large size of the public sector in the economy.

However, for a nation to fully embrace a pro-market stance, it must possess a strong ideological commitment to pro-market policies and clear political incentives to foster this ideology. For instance, the adoption of South Korea’s export-driven Industrialization Program (1962–1980) was guided by a long-term vision of joining the ranks of the most industrialized nations, culminating in the country’s successful accession to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) in 1996. Similarly, Turkey’s aspirations to join the European Union drove its pro-market economic reform and overall economic progress in the 1980s and 1990s. At the same time, economic reforms in post-apartheid South Africa have been predominantly driven by a strong commitment to business competitiveness and economic equity.

In comparison, Egypt has never fully embraced a long-term, target-driven, pro-market ideology. The economy continues to operate using piecemeal economic reforms, which are hindered by strong Nasser-era remnants, resulting in a slow and inconsistent pattern of implementation. This mixed approach has led to heightened economic uncertainties, posing challenges for both local and global investors. While investors may navigate political instability, economic policy uncertainty deters firms from hiring, investing, and accessing markets. Therefore, to address the fundamental challenges facing Egypt’s economy, it is imperative to assess and address the political economy prerequisites, not just focus on macroeconomic fundamentals. Without fostering a more robust pro-market ideology, both within the government and among the public, economic reforms in Egypt will remain trapped in a cycle of stagnation for years to come.

Racha Helwa is the director of the empowerME Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East.

The post Unraveling Egypt’s political economy puzzle: It’s more than just economics appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Ukraine’s strong performance in the authoritative anti-corruption ranking places the country alongside Brazil and ahead of fellow EU candidate nations Bosnia and Herzegovina and Turkey. Meanwhile, Russia continues to lag far behind, having dropped down a further two places in the 2023 index to occupy 141th position with just 26 points.

This year’s result is recognition for Ukraine’s ongoing anti-corruption efforts since the 2014 Revolution of Dignity. On the eve of Ukraine’s landmark pro-democracy uprising, the country languished in 144th place in Transparency International’s annual ranking. Following the Revolution of Dignity, the Ukrainian authorities have taken a number of steps against corruption including establishing a new anti-corruption architecture, embracing digitalization, and conducting ambitious reforms in key sectors such as government procurement, banking, and energy. Success has often been patchy, but the overall picture is one of unmistakable improvement that has allowed Ukraine to climb forty places in the anti-corruption index over the past decade.

Ukraine’s most recent progress is all the more notable as it has taken place amid the existential challenges of Russia’s ongoing invasion. While this has necessitated a range of wartime governance and security measures, anti-corruption efforts have continued. “The active work of Ukraine’s anti-corruption and other public authorities resulted in a growth in the 2023 Corruption Perceptions Index even during the full-scale war,” Transparency International acknowledged.

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Transparency International is not the only international body to positively assess wartime Ukraine’s anti-corruption credentials. The fight against corruption has long been a key issue in relations between Kyiv and Brussels, and has traditionally been viewed as an obstacle to further European integration. However, Ukraine’s reform efforts since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion have helped convince European leaders to grant the country EU candidate status and begin official negotiations on future membership.

Speaking last summer, European Union Commission President Ursula von der Leyen singled out Ukraine’s efforts to advance the country’s anti-corruption agenda despite facing a uniquely challenging wartime environment. “I must say it is amazing to see how fast and determined Ukraine is implementing these reforms despite the war,” she commented. “They are defending their country and reforming.”

These positive appraisals by Transparency International and the European Union undermine the credibility of attempts by Russia and others to portray Ukraine as hopelessly corrupt. For many years, Kremlin officials and regime propagandists have routinely depicted Ukraine as plagued by endemic corruption. This has been an important element of Moscow’s efforts to discredit Ukraine’s democratic transition, deter international support, and even mute criticism of Russian intervention.

Since the start of the full-scale invasion, Vladimir Putin himself has often referenced the alleged excesses of Ukrainian corruption in his public speeches. In November 2023, he declared that “corruption in Ukraine is unmatched anywhere in the world.” This ignores the inconvenient reality that Transparency International actually rates Putin’s Russia as significantly more corrupt than Ukraine.

The argument that Ukraine is simply too corrupt to support has also entered the mainstream in the United States, where it is often repeated by opponents of further US military aid. These objections continue, despite unprecedented levels of institutional oversight and successive Pentagon probes confirming no evidence of corruption or the misuse of weapons.

Across the Atlantic, Russia’s few remaining friends in the EU have made strikingly similar claims regarding Ukrainian corruption. In December 2023, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban branded Ukraine as “one of the most corrupt countries in the world” while arguing against Kyiv’s further EU integration. Orban, who is regarded as Putin’s closest European ally, certainly speaks with authority when it comes to corruption. His own country, Hungary, occupied last place among EU member states in this year’s Transparency International ranking.

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In a sense, Ukraine is currently paying the price for the unenviable reputation it earned during the first few decades of independence, when corruption throughout state institutions was a far more pervasive problem than it is today. It is no accident that Ukraine’s two post-Soviet revolutions in 2004 and 2014 were both driven largely by public exasperation over widespread corruption, with millions of Ukrainians taking to the streets to vent their anger. Despite undeniable signs of progress over the past ten years, examples of institutional corruption continue to emerge, keeping the old cliches alive.

With Ukrainians now fighting for national survival and heavily reliant on international support, attitudes toward corruption have hardened further. This is fueling a climate of heightened scrutiny that has led to a series of high-profile scandals since the onset of Russia’s full-scale invasion. In summer 2023, President Zelenskyy dismissed dozens of regional military enlistment officials on charges of bribery. Perhaps the most prominent scandal involved former Ukrainian Defense Minister Oleksiy Reznikov, who was forced to resign following claims of corruption within the ministry. Most recently, Ukraine’s State Security Service detained five people accused of conspiring with Defense Ministry officials to embezzle $40 million meant for the purchase of arms.

While these recent corruption scandals demonstrate that Ukraine still has a long way to go, it is worth emphasizing that they only came to light thanks to the investigative efforts of Ukraine’s own state organs and the country’s vibrant civil society. This vigilance should come as no surprise. After all, nobody is more conscious of their country’s corruption problems than Ukrainians themselves.

There is no doubt that today’s Ukraine continues to face serious corruption challenges. However, depictions of the country as irredeemably corrupt are false and misleading. The real story here is of a nation steadily emerging from centuries of imperial oppression and decades of dysfunction, with the current generation of Ukrainians determined to rid themselves of a corruption culture that is one of the most unwelcome legacies of this troubled past. Indeed, the fight against corruption is widely recognized by Ukrainians as an essential element of their country’s transformation toward a European future.

This year’s Transparency International ranking is a timely reminder that Ukraine is actually making meaningful progress in its historic struggle against corruption. While much remains to be done, the country is clearly moving in the right direction. Ukraine’s international partners are right to expect maximum accountability, but there are currently no grounds for abandoning Ukraine based on claims of corruption that are both exaggerated and outdated.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

Further reading

UkraineAlert Dec 17, 2023

2024 preview: The West must decide if it wants Ukraine to win

By Richard D. Hooker, Jr.

If Western leaders fail to provide Ukraine with the weapons to defeat Putin in 2024, this will significantly increase the likelihood of a direct military confrontation between Russia and NATO, writes Richard D. Hooker Jr.

Conflict Defense Technologies

UkraineAlert Jan 22, 2024

Ukraine’s Black Sea success exposes folly of West’s “don’t escalate” mantra

By Peter Dickinson

Ukraine’s remarkable success during 2023 in the Battle of the Black Sea can serve as a blueprint for victory over Putin’s Russia, writes Peter Dickinson.

Conflict Defense Policy

UkraineAlert Jan 4, 2024

To defeat Putin in a long war, Ukraine must switch to active defense in 2024

By Mykola Bielieskov

By embracing a strategy of active defense in 2024, Kyiv can achieve the twin goals of preventing any major Russian advances and creating conditions that strongly favor Ukraine in what is increasingly a war of attrition, writes Mykola Bielieskov.

Conflict Defense Policy

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

Read more from UkraineAlert

UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia and Central Asia in the East.

Learn more

The post Wartime Ukraine ranks among world’s top performers in anti-corruption index appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The post Rich Outzen joins WION TV to discuss Israeli supreme court ruling appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Ukraine’s EU story is a decade in the making. Ukraine’s European aspirations were a driving factor behind the 2013-14 Revolution of Dignity. Since Russia’s full-scale invasion began in February 2022, Ukraine’s EU integration has received a much-needed push, with both Ukrainian and EU leaders treating the country’s EU bid with fresh seriousness. The European Council’s green light for the opening of accession negotiations means Ukraine has now taken a major step closer to realizing its EU ambitions.

The coming negotiations to bring Ukraine into line with EU standards and regulations will be a technocratic and political feat. The European Commission, the EU’s executive, will be the contact throughout this process. The European Council, made up of the EU’s twenty-seven member states, must formally approve Ukraine’s progress.

Membership in the EU is not a foregone conclusion for Ukraine. On the contrary, Kyiv will now have its work cut out. Ukraine has already implemented a series of reforms including to its judiciary, minority rights, and anti-corruption legislation to meet European Commission conditions before the opening of membership talks, but that was just the beginning. Ukraine will now need to align with the EU’s vast body of rules and procedures, known as the acquis communautaire or acquis for short. These cover everything from economic and trade policies, public finances, rule of law, education, and tax policies to energy infrastructure and agriculture rules.

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

Following the recent Council Summit, and once Ukraine fulfills the final measures set out in the Commission’s recommendations, the European Commission will draft a framework for negotiations for approval by the Council. Negotiations are broken down into thirty-five distinct categories or “Chapters.” These chapters make up the EU’s acquis from judiciary and fundamental rights to the free movement of goods and intellectual property, energy and transport policy, and so on.

Once the Commission and Council are satisfied Ukraine has implemented the necessary reforms to close each chapter one by one, the Commission will generate a final recommendation for Ukraine to become a member. The Council and the European Parliament must then approve, with the final step coming when all existing member states sign and ratify a treaty welcoming Ukraine to the EU.

While tedious, these rules are critical to the EU’s basic functioning. The building blocks of the EU, such as the single market, require shared rules across all members to function and ensure a level playing field. The EU must be able to facilitate seamless cross-border trade and movement, for example. The same logic applies to rule of law and political stability, which impact the integrated economies and societies of other EU members.

If the process sounds long and burdensome, that’s because it is. Membership negotiations have usually taken around a decade for successful candidates in the past. Croatia, the last successful candidate to join the bloc, took ten years. Ukraine’s case is new territory. There has never been a candidate that is fighting a war for survival as it pursues these reforms, which brings up questions about how enlargement will work.

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Ukraine’s advance in Kursk: What’s next and implications

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There is also a political element that adds uncertainty to Ukraine’s accession process. All decisions by the European Council during this process require unanimity, thereby giving each member state a veto at any stage. Should any member feel dissatisfied for any reason, even for issues not related to a candidate country’s reform efforts, they may unilaterally block the process.

Politicking around enlargement has happened before. Greece and Bulgaria have both separately used vetoes on North Macedonia’s accession due to domestic politics and bilateral spats. Countries have also delayed enlargement before due to concerns over the EU’s internal functioning. For Ukraine, this was already on full display as leaders dreamed up a theatrical solution around Hungary’s veto of Ukraine’s accession negotiations. There are also concerns over the implications of Ukrainian membership for domestic priorities including Poland’s agricultural sector. The politics of enlargement have contributed to recent enlargement fatigue, which has specifically plagued candidates from the Western Balkans, who have been relegated to the EU’s waiting room for decades.

The earlier reluctance of EU members to embrace further enlargement also speaks to another potential wrinkle in Ukraine’s EU bid: Internal EU reform. EU member states are hotly debating the future functioning of the EU including, for example, the use of unanimity in critical decision-making. This reform process will directly impact Ukraine’s accession. With some members pushing for internal reform before taking on new members including Ukraine, Kyiv’s bid looks to be increasingly vulnerable to political factors not related to its own reforms.

Finally, without reforms, Ukraine’s size and level of development also risks capsizing the EU’s internal transfer system of agricultural and structural subsidies. This could transform member states that currently benefit from EU funds into net contributors to the budget of a union that includes Ukraine.

The timeline of Ukraine’s EU integration will depend both on Ukraine and the EU’s ambitions. Ukraine will fundamentally control the pace and seriousness of its reforms. The EU for its part will have to find a way to square the circle of maintaining momentum on Ukraine’s enlargement effort while not letting Ukraine’s EU aspirations get bogged down in internal squabbles or caught up in debates about EU reform.

Despite these challenges, Ukraine’s EU progress remains hugely significant. It is inspirational for the people of Ukraine, who remain determined to chart their country’s free and democratic trajectory, and for Europe as a geopolitical actor, pushing to secure Ukraine’s place in the West. Getting there will be a tall, but necessary, order.

James Batchik is an assistant director with the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center.

Further reading

UkraineAlert Nov 28, 2023

Putin debunks his own propaganda by disarming Russia’s NATO borders

By Peter Dickinson

Putin publicly blames NATO for provoking the invasion of Ukraine, but Russia’s recent demilitarization of the country’s borders with neighboring NATO members makes a mockery of such claims, writes Peter Dickinson.

Conflict Democratic Transitions

UkraineAlert Dec 17, 2023

2024 preview: The West must decide if it wants Ukraine to win

By Richard D. Hooker, Jr.

If Western leaders fail to provide Ukraine with the weapons to defeat Putin in 2024, this will significantly increase the likelihood of a direct military confrontation between Russia and NATO, writes Richard D. Hooker Jr.

Conflict Defense Technologies

UkraineAlert Dec 18, 2023

Support Ukraine today or fight Russia tomorrow

By Oleksandr Zavitnevych

The threat posed by Vladimir Putin’s revisionist agenda can no longer be downplayed or denied. Instead, the choice facing Western leaders is simple: Support Ukraine today or fight Russia tomorrow, writes Oleksandr Zavitnevych.

Conflict Defense Policy

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

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UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia and Central Asia in the East.

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With Russia’s invasion now approaching the two-year mark, it is increasingly clear that the outcome of the war will shape the geopolitical climate for decades to come. Ukraine is set to play a key role not only in the stability of Eastern Europe, but also in terms of global food and energy security.

If it is to meet the historic challenges that lie ahead, Ukraine must be able to defend itself. This will require substantial and sustained military aid from the country’s partners. In addition to this immediate focus on strengthening security, it is also vital for Ukraine to continue pursuing reforms in order to counter corruption, bolster national institutions, and consolidate the country’s democracy.

Nothing on Ukraine’s reform agenda is more important than judicial reform. Indeed, it is no exaggeration to say that Ukraine’s future prosperity and international position depend on the effective reform of the country’s legal system. This is well understood in Kyiv’s corridors of power. Against the backdrop of Russia’s ongoing invasion, Ukraine continues to work with international partners to implement effective rule of law reforms.

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

Judicial reform has been consistently close to the top of the government’s agenda ever since President Zelenskyy was first elected in 2019, and has remained so in the current wartime environment. Progress has included fulfilling the conditions set by the European Commission regarding the composition of the High Council of Justice and the High Qualification Commission of Judges. Changes have also been introduced to the selection procedure for Constitutional Court judges in line with Venice Commission recommendations.

As part of efforts to counter the threat of politically motivated appointments within the Ukrainian justice system, Ukraine has taken the unprecedented step of involving the country’s international partners in the selection of members to serve on reformed judicial bodies. For example, selection committees have featured the participation of senior British and American officials with extensive experience in the UK and US justice systems. Following months of consultations and negotiations with the Venice Commission and the European Commission, legislation has also been adopted to create an advisory group of experts including international representatives charged with selecting potential judges for Ukraine’s Constitutional Court.

Advancing Ukraine’s unprecedented judicial reform agenda requires a careful balance between achieving meaningful change, protecting the rights of every Ukrainian citizen, and maintaining maximum transparency. Measures are in place to ensure Ukraine’s international partners are informed of any new initiatives, with the G7 group of ambassadors paying particularly close attention to developments and offering positive assessments of recent progress.

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While wartime advances in Ukraine’s judicial reform agenda are encouraging, many major challenges remain. For example, there are currently almost two thousand vacancies for judges in Ukraine. It is absolutely critical to fill these vacancies with the best candidates, who must be subjected to rigorous and competitive selection procedures that scrutinize both their professionalism and their integrity. The future of Ukraine’s judicial system depends on it.

As they defend their statehood and national identity, Ukrainians are acutely aware that they are writing a fresh chapter in the country’s history. Together with an international coalition of partner countries, they are building a new Ukraine that is already emerging as a trusted and valued member of the democratic world. A firm commitment to establishing the rule of law is absolutely foundational to this process.

Despite the uniquely challenging circumstances created by Russia’s ongoing invasion, there is currently reason for cautious optimism regarding the further reform of the Ukrainian legal system. For arguably the first time in the history of independent Ukraine, all the necessary elements are now in place to achieve lasting judicial reform. These include the requisite political will on the part of both president and parliament, along with the active participation of Ukrainian civil society and expert support from the country’s international partners. This helps make continued reform progress possible, even amid Europe’s biggest armed conflict since World War II.

Denys Maslov is a member of the Ukrainian Parliament with the Servant of the People party and head of the Ukrainian Parliament’s Committee on Legal Policy. Oleksandr Vasiuk is a member of the Ukrainian Parliament with the Servant of the People party and a member of the Ukrainian Parliament’s Committee on Legal Policy.

Further reading

UkraineAlert Nov 28, 2023

Putin debunks his own propaganda by disarming Russia’s NATO borders

By Peter Dickinson

Putin publicly blames NATO for provoking the invasion of Ukraine, but Russia’s recent demilitarization of the country’s borders with neighboring NATO members makes a mockery of such claims, writes Peter Dickinson.

Conflict Democratic Transitions

UkraineAlert Dec 5, 2023

2023 review: Ukraine scores key victories in the Battle of the Black Sea

By Oleksiy Goncharenko

The front lines of the Russian invasion in Ukraine have barely moved in 2023, but Ukraine has had far more success in the Black Sea, where it has broken Russia’s blockade and forced Putin’s fleet to retreat from Crimea, writes Oleksiy Goncharenko.

Conflict Drones

UkraineAlert Nov 30, 2023

Western leaders must choose: Arm Ukraine or enable Putin’s genocide

By Taras Kuzio

Western leaders must decide whether they are finally prepared to arm Ukraine adequately or face the consequences of a Russian victory which would lead to genocide in the heart of Europe, writes Taras Kuzio.

Conflict Disinformation

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

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UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia and Central Asia in the East.

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The post Russia’s invasion cannot derail Ukraine’s rule of law reforms appeared first on Atlantic Council.

In the last week of November, Ukraine marked ten years since the start of protests in late 2013 over then president Viktor Yanukovych’s decision to turn away from an association agreement with the European Union. When thousands of Ukrainians flooded into central Kyiv’s Independence Square (“Maidan Nezalezhnosti”) to oppose this sudden U-turn, Yanukovych responded with a heavy-handed crackdown that transformed a protest movement into a revolution. By the time the Euromaidan Revolution was over three months later, dozens of protesters had been killed and Yanukovych had fled to Russia.  

In the immediate aftermath of the revolution, Russia launched a military operation to seize control of Ukraine’s Crimean peninsula. This was to prove the first act in ten years of escalating Russian military aggression against Ukraine that would eventually lead to the full-scale invasion of February 2022.

Russia’s use of force has caused untold suffering but it has failed to reverse Ukraine’s historic pivot toward Europe. On the contrary, Ukrainian public support for European integration has surged over the past decade to record highs, while enthusiasm for closer ties with Moscow has evaporated.

Political developments have mirrored this historic shift in Ukrainian public opinion. In summer 2014, new Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko reversed his predecessor’s rejection and signed a landmark association agreement with the EU. Following the successful implementation of anti-corruption reforms and other measures to bring Ukrainian legislation more into line with European Union norms, Ukraine secured visa-free EU travel in 2017.  

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

In the first days of Russia’s full-scale invasion, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy officially applied for EU membership. The move was a clever piece of political theater that drew attention to Russia’s war aim of derailing Ukraine’s Euro-Atlantic integration and robbing the country of its independence. European leaders certainly seemed to recognize the significance of the moment. Four months later, they officially granted Ukraine EU candidate nation status.

Candidate status was accompanied by a list of seven recommendations Ukraine needed to address before it could be considered for full EU membership. Tasks included judicial reform and progress in the fight against corruption along with measures to tame the influence of oligarchs, improve press freedoms, and protect national minorities.

Ukraine’s progress over the past year on these seven points was deemed sufficient by the European Commission to recommend the opening of official membership talks. This progress included steps to reform appointments within the judiciary and measures targeting graft. Meanwhile, new legislation has imposed restrictions on the ability of oligarchs to influence Ukrainian politics. The European Commission responded by stating that Ukraine had implemented “important measures to curb the oligarchs’ grip on public life.”

Significant challenges remain. The recent European Commission report recommending membership talks called on Ukraine to further revise existing legislation protecting the rights of national minorities. This has long been a point of contention, particularly as EU member state Hungary has stated its determination to block Ukraine’s EU integration until its demands regarding Ukraine’s Hungarian minority are met.

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While multiple obstacles lie ahead, Ukraine’s reform efforts have drawn praise from senior EU officials in Brussels. “Ukrainians are deeply reforming their country, even as they are fighting a war that is existential for them,” European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen said in a recent address. “Ukraine has completed well over 90 percent of the necessary steps that the Commission set out last year in its report.”

Ukrainians are now looking forward to the next EU summit in December and are optimistic that European leaders will back the opening of official accession negotiations. This would be a genuine geopolitical breakthrough for the country, although it would not guarantee Ukraine’s future place among EU member states. Advancing toward membership would still take time, but the start of talks would provide some very welcome momentum to Ukraine’s European integration drive, while also acknowledging the considerable progress the country has made toward meeting the reform requirements set out by the European Union in summer 2022. 

Ukraine has defied expectations by implementing ambitious and comprehensive reform measures in the most extreme of wartime conditions. This reflects Ukraine’s commitment to a European future and underlines the importance of EU integration for Ukrainians at a time when they are fighting for their country’s survival.

The Ukrainian authorities have made clear that they view EU membership as a strategic priority and are fully committed to pursuing this goal, even while defending themselves against Russia’s ongoing invasion. It is now up to EU leaders to make history in the coming weeks by officially opening accession negotiations.   

Mark Temnycky is a nonresident fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

Further reading

UkraineAlert Nov 16, 2023

Vladimir Putin’s anti-colonial posturing should not fool the Global South

By Taras Kuzio

The countries of the Global South may have many good reasons for pursuing closer ties with Putin’s Russia, but a shared opposition to imperialism is most certainly not one of them, writes Taras Kuzio.

Africa Conflict

UkraineAlert Nov 14, 2023

Why Ukraine refuses to negotiate with “habitual liar” Vladimir Putin

By Peter Dickinson

Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba has dismissed mounting calls for a negotiated peace deal with Russia, arguing that Vladimir Putin is a “habitual liar” who cannot be trusted to keep his word, writes Peter Dickinson.

Conflict Disinformation

UkraineAlert Nov 7, 2023

Peace is impossible while Vladimir Putin denies Ukraine’s right to exist

By Taras Kuzio

While calls to end the bloodshed in Ukraine are perfectly understandable, anyone advocating a compromise peace deal with Vladimir Putin must first reckon with the genocidal reality of Russia’s invasion, writes Taras Kuzio.

Conflict Democratic Transitions

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

Read more from UkraineAlert

UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia and Central Asia in the East.

Learn more

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With the first opportunity for approval coming up as soon as next month, a united and undivided “yes” from EU leaders would be a boost to Ukraine going into what is shaping up to be a pivotal 2024.

What are the results of the report?

The EU decided to grant candidate status to Ukraine in June 2022, shortly after the beginning of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. This decision galvanized the Ukrainian government to meet the initial steps outlined in the membership application adjacent to approving candidate status.

The Commission report published as part of the overall Enlargement Package outlined Kyiv’s considerable efforts to address the initial application criteria. Ukraine has, for example, cracked down on several high-profile officials accused of bribery and embezzlement and expanded specialized anti-corruption agencies. It has also moved forward on judicial selection and governance reform, and it has made progress in aligning Ukrainian law to the full body of EU law, or the acquis.

Regarding the progress Ukraine has made, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen said that “Ukraine has completed well over 90 percent of the necessary steps that [the Commission] set out last year.”

While formally recommending that Ukraine advance to accession negotiations, the report also outlined several areas that require improvement. Though Ukraine has made great strides on decentralization, public administration reform, and laws ensuring freedom of expression and fundamental human rights, there is still a long way to go in reforming the courts, tackling systematic corruption, and preparing to integrate into the EU common market.

What’s next?

Though the report outlined areas that need continued improvement, the Commission recommended that the European Council, the second executive arm consisting of the heads of state of the twenty-seven EU member states, formally open accession negotiations.  

The first opportunity for the Council to back the Commission’s plan toward Ukraine’s accession will be at an upcoming summit of EU leaders in Brussels on December 14 and 15. Following unanimous approval from the European Council, the EU will formally open negotiations.

Even as the Commission signaled that it is ready to begin preparatory work on Ukraine’s accession following the Council’s approval in December, it is worth noting that the actual start of the negotiations is dependent on Kyiv’s progress on key measures outlined in the report. These include steps toward limiting oligarch influence and establishing the legal framework and implementation of laws protecting the rights of national minorities, media, and education. The Commission would then report on the progress of these measures in March 2024 and finalize the negotiating framework pending satisfactory development.

Though some consider a smooth approval to open these negotiations in December nearly inevitable, concerns remain over continued resistance from Hungary to greenlighting accession negotiations amid a deepening divide between Budapest and Brussels. There is also concern about the extent to which EU and international attention has shifted from Ukraine to the Israel-Hamas conflict.

What are the stakes?

Failure to open negotiations as expected in December risks putting Ukraine in uncertain territory heading into 2024 and into the third year of Russia’s full-scale invasion.

The symbolism of 2024 is also important—it will mark a decade since the beginning of Russia’s invasion of eastern Ukraine and the February 2014 Revolution of Dignity that saw the ousting of pro-Russia former President Viktor Yanukovych. Hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians marched throughout Ukraine from November 2013 to February 2014 in the Euromaidan protests against Yanukovych’s turn toward Russia and sudden withdrawal from closer integration with the EU.

Many Ukrainians—hoping for a prosperous, free, and independent country—marched draped not only in the blue and yellow of the Ukrainian flag, but also in the flag of the EU.

More than 90 percent of Ukrainians support their country’s membership in the EU by 2030, according to a poll earlier this year by the National Democratic Institute.

Ukraine’s continued commitment toward reform—even as significant portions of the country remain under continuous attack or occupation by Russian forces—has more than proved Ukraine’s dedication and will in aligning itself with the EU and the West.

A decision this December would not only represent an important vindication of Kyiv’s decade-long effort to join the EU, but also cement the EU’s continued commitment to Ukraine’s rightful place in Europe.

Aleksander Cwalina is a program assistant for the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

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The European Commission’s decision was welcomed in Kyiv as a major milestone in Ukraine’s bid to join the European Union. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy toasted the news as “a strong and historic step that paves the way to a stronger EU with Ukraine as its member.” Meanwhile, the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry posted that the country was now returning to its European roots.

The start of accession negotiations does not mean Ukraine is now guaranteed EU membership, of course. On the contrary, a long road lies ahead marked by numerous bureaucratic obstacles and demands regarding Ukraine’s continued adoption of EU norms. Nevertheless, this week’s green light for membership talks represents genuinely historic progress at a time when Ukrainians are fighting to defend their independence and their right to choose a European future.

The ongoing Russian invasion of Ukraine began in February 2014 in the immediate aftermath of Ukraine’s Euromaidan Revolution, which saw millions of Ukrainians protest against a Kremlin-backed turn away from European integration. Since the onset of Russian aggression almost ten years ago, Ukrainian public support for EU membership has surged to unprecedented highs, while enthusiasm for a return to the Russian sphere of influence has dwindled to negligible levels.

The Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service asked a range of Ukrainian politicians and academics for their thoughts on what the European Commission’s recommendation means for today’s Ukraine and for the country’s future.

Yulia Svyrydenko, Ukraine’s First Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Economy: We consider ourselves part of the European Union family and are sincerely grateful for this week’s European Commission decision to recommend accession talks. This is just one of many important steps, but it is a significant signal which gives us hope.

There is still a lot of joint work ahead to confirm Ukraine’s position as a fully-fledged member of the European family and to make the Ukrainian economy part of the single European market. To achieve this, we will continue working on a wide range of reforms. This includes the reform of public administration, justice systems, the fight against corruption, and economic reforms. Ukraine is on a path toward great improvements in the coming years that I hope will deepen the country’s EU integration.

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

Kira Rudik, Ukrainian MP, leader of Golos party: The European Commission’s recommendation to open EU accession negotiations with Ukraine is not just a formal green light for our path toward EU membership. It is also of huge importance for every Ukrainian. This decision is a source of motivation for our defenders; it is essential for them to know that while fighting continues along the front lines of the war with Russia, many people in the rear are actively working to bring us closer to our goal as a nation.

This is a chance to secure a democratic European future for our children, many of whom have become used to studying and sleeping in bomb shelters. Ultimately, this is an opportunity and at the same time a challenge for all of us as a state. When I am asked what the journey toward EU membership means for Ukrainians, I usually say that we are on our way home.

Lisa Yasko, Ukrainian MP, Servant of the People party: The European Commission decision is a crucial step that confirms the EU is serious when it speaks of Ukraine as a future member. I believe this decision is also highly significant for the EU itself, as Ukraine’s European integration has the potential to become a success story that will strengthen the image of the entire bloc.

The allocation of 50 billion euros is a further clear signal that Europe is ready to partner with Ukraine right now to achieve the country’s European future. I am particularly happy to see that our European partners are objective in their approach toward Ukraine and recognize our achievements including progress in constitutional justice, anti-corruption efforts, and the fight against money laundering.

It is important to stress that the European Commission’s report also contains recommendations for further steps in the reform process, such as rebooting the Bureau of Economic Security, developing a new Customs Code, and criminalizing smuggling. This is not just a question of having the requisite political will to continue these reforms; it is an existential issue for all Ukrainians. We must now keep working to bring EU membership closer, because Europe without Ukraine is unthinkable and Ukraine is unthinkable without Europe.

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Oleksiy Goncharenko, Ukrainian MP, European Solidarity party: It has now been almost 10 years since the Revolution of Dignity when Ukrainians first declared that Ukraine belongs in Europe. We have already proven ourselves by protecting democratic values on the battlefield. We are paying the highest price possible for our right to be a democratic and free country.

Support for EU integration within Ukrainian society has never been stronger than it is today. We are grateful that the European Commission recognizes our efforts and recommends the start of accession talks. This decision has sent an extremely valuable signal that Ukraine is part of Europe. The European Commission has confirmed that it is not a question of “if” but “when” Ukraine will join the EU.

At the same time, we understand that there is still much work to be done on the path toward future membership. Upcoming EU summits in December 2023 and next year will provide a better understanding of what the next steps will be. We have already demonstrated that we are capable of carrying out reforms in wartime conditions and have no intention of stopping. On the contrary, we will proceed with reforms for the sake of our country’s future development and will continue to advance toward the goal of EU membership.

Volodymyr Dubovyk, associate professor, Odesa Mechnikov National University: The European Commission’s recommendation is good news for Ukrainians in general. It confirms that Ukraine belongs in the European family of nations.

This decision is important feedback that recognizes Ukraine’s strenuous efforts to meet key EU membership criteria, including requirements that have been outlined during the extreme wartime circumstances of the past twenty months. It directs Ukraine to conduct further reforms while offering the clear incentive of a realistic EU membership perspective rather the vague talk of future integration. This should give new impetus to meaningful change in Ukraine.

The start of accession talks will deepen ties between the EU and Ukraine, including in terms of trade relations. This might help resolve certain tensions with some of Ukraine’s neighbors. EU security assistance will also be enhanced, with the EU becoming an even more important partner in this sphere than at present. In other words, this is a sign of deepening commitment by both sides. Crucially, it is also a very welcome development for Ukrainians living with the reality of an existential war, which proves that their fight is not in vain.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

Further reading

UkraineAlert Oct 24, 2023

Battle of Avdiivka: Putin’s new offensive continues despite heavy Russian losses

By Olivia Yanchik

Russia has returned to the offensive in Ukraine in recent weeks with a major assault on the town of Avdiivka. The Russian offensive continues despite reports of catastrophic losses, underlining Putin’s determination to secure victory at any price in Ukraine, writes Olivia Yanchik.

Conflict Defense Policy

UkraineAlert Nov 2, 2023

Putin will win unless the West finally commits to Ukrainian victory

By Ivan Verstyuk

Russian dictator Vladimir Putin is more confident than ever that time is on his side in Ukraine and believes the Western world ultimately lacks the political will to oppose him, writes Ivan Verstyuk.

Conflict Defense Industry

UkraineAlert Nov 7, 2023

Ukraine reports fresh success in the Battle of the Black Sea

By Peter Dickinson

Ukraine’s success in the Battle of the Black Sea should convince the country’s Western partners to finally abandon their cautious approach and provide the Ukrainian military with the weapons they need to defeat Russia, writes Peter Dickinson.

Conflict Defense Policy

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

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UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia and Central Asia in the East.

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On September 28, 2023, the Atlantic Council’s Syria Program hosted a hybrid event on “Addressing the captagon Crisis in MENA: Strategies & Challenges” with an array of experts to discuss the evolving captagon trade in the MENA region and beyond. The panel focused on the current captagon landscape in Syria, captagon’s place within the global illicit supply chain, the importance of captagon for the United States (US), the Syrian American advocacy efforts against captagon, and the available tools to press for accountability.  

The event featured opening remarks by Nour Dabboussi, Program Assistant for the Rafik Harris & Middle East programs, keynotes remarks by Ethan Goldrich, US Deputy Assistant Secretary (DAS) for Near Eastern Affairs, and was moderated by Qutaiba Idibi, Project Manager of the Syria Program at the Atlantic Council. The panelist are Caroline Rose, Director of the Strategic Blind Spots Portfolio at New Lines Institute; Annette Idler, Director of the Minerva Global Security Program, and Associate Professor in Global Security at University of Oxford; Betsy Dribben, Head of Advocacy for Multifaith Alliance; Yasser Tabbara is an international human rights attorney who, as Co-founder and Chief Strategist at the Syrian Forum and Chairman of the American Relief Coalition for Syria, and Dylan Frost, Deputy Chief of Staff and Legislative Director for Representative James French Hill.

Opening remarks 

In its pursuit of sustaining financial stability after years of enduring years of diplomatic and economic isolation, the Assad regime has transformed many war-torn areas into the world’s cardinal captagon laboratories. Nour highlighted how this psychoactive drug, estimated as a multibillion-dollar chain, has, on one hand, empowered the Assad regime to maintain access over foreign current assets amidst international sanctions, and on the other, bolster its smuggling network which operates across 17 countries to guarantee the drugs’ export throughout Europe and the Gulf. Moreover, the Iran-backed Hezbollah has proved as a successful partner for the Assad regime, as it oversees both local production and packaging of captagon. Notably, unchecked corruption facilitates the exploitation of public infrastructure, such as the port of Beirut, for exporting captagon without government surveillance. 

Furthermore, the Assad regime’s narcotic distribution infrastructure has become a top health and security threat to neighboring Arab states but also a growing concern to the United States. In an attempt to curtail this threat, Arab states have resorted to diplomatic reproachment by readmitting the Assad regime into the Arab League earlier in May. However, the United States is pursuing a distinct approach through an inter-agency strategy that aims to disrupt and dismantle narcotics production and trafficking, along with affiliated networks connected to the Assad regime. 

Keynote remarks

In June, the US unveiled its interagency strategy for combating captagon trafficking. In his speech, Goldrich emphasized this strategy’s overarching lines of efforts:

• i. To support law enforcement agencies involved in investigating captagon-related activities 
• ii. To utilize economic sanctions and other tools to disrupt and dismantle captagon networks.
• iii. To aid regional partners in combating drug trafficking and consumption. The United States is providing security assistance to Jordan and Lebanon 
• iv. To build coordinated approaches with multilateral institutions in order to strengthen the global response against captagon 

Although captagon is neither produced nor widely available in the US, Goldrich highlighted the deep concern about its impact on the health, economy, and social welfare of communities in the Middle East. In July, Secretary Blinken initiated a global coalition aimed at combating the rising threat of synthetic drugs, which pose a critical threat, not only as a leading cause of mortality among Americans aged 18 to 49, but also a significant concern in regions like Africa, the Middle East and Asia. 

Regional impact, challenges, and trends 

The captagon trade should not be considered in isolation when assessing its ramifications on local security, public health, and the economic landscape in Syria. Rather, Rose emphasized the transnational and transregional threat of the drug. The captagon trade targets established markets in the Gulf, while concurrently attempting to create novel consumption and destination markets. Rose mentioned that there has been credible evidence of captagon trafficking and production that extends beyond Syria into countries such as Libya, Chad, Nigeria, Netherlands, and Germany.  

Rose highlighted two challenges in addressing the captagon crisis. The first consists of the lack of a precise definition of captagon’s composition. The latter has evolved over time, departing from its original formula prevalent in illicit markets during the 1960s to 1980s. Presently, it is comprised of a mélange of interpretations of a synthetic amphetamine-type stimulant, sometimes devoid of any amphetamine. In April 2022, the New Lines Institute reported that captagon typically contains amphetamine, sometimes in minuscule quantities, and occasionally comprising a substantial portion of up to 45-47% in the form of amphetamine metabolites per pill.  Also, captagon may encompass caffeine, quinine, and sometimes toxic levels of metals such as copper and zinc. 

Notably, there is a burgeoning trend of pseudoephedrine potentially being used in captagon production. Rose noted Syria’s consistent demand for pseudoephedrine since the onset of the Syrian war, underlining the paramount role this precursor material plays in the context of captagon production. She also acknowledged that there may be other various reasons to account for this, yet Syria remains one of the largest importers of pseudoephedrine, despite the pharmaceutical industry’s collapse. Although this does not definitively establish pseudoephedrine as the primary input of captagon production, the mounting evidence does lend credence to the notion that it plays a significant role. This confluence of factors strongly indicates a substantial and intricate link between pseudoephedrine and the mass production of captagon by the Assad regime. 

Secondly, the participation of the Syrian regime in discussions regarding the containment and prevention of captagon production and trafficking, particularly in the context of Interpol’s efforts, warrants scrutiny. Interpol plays a pivotal role in combating illicit trade including captagon. Operation Lionfish, as highlighted by Rose, focuses on regular seizures of captagon, meth, crystal, and cocaine. Interpol also actively fosters the exchange of regional information and intelligence among stakeholders. However, as of June 2021, Interpol’s persistent attempts to incorporate the Syrian regime within regional discussions – despite evidence of the regime’s involvement in captagon production and trafficking — has compromised Interpol’s creditability and ability to address interdiction. As Rose succinctly phrased it, “It’s like giving the cartel a seat at the table.” 

A global supply chain network 

Idler outlined five key points through which captagon is intricately embedded within the global illicit supply chain networks. First, captagon does not exist within a vacuum; it intricately intersects with a diverse array of illicit flows, including the trafficking of weapons, humans, and various narcotics. This interconnection is exemplified by the case of precursor chemicals vital for captagon production, as previously noted by Rose. Second, the management of these supply chains is multifaceted. At each stage, from material sourcing to production, transportation, trafficking, and the final market distribution is overseen by distinct actors that are globally connected. The third aspect reveals the instrumental role played by intermediaries or brokers, who operate at the local, regional, and global levels. They facilitate the coordination and unification of all the different phases of the supply chain. Fourth, the routes utilized for captagon trafficking are not confined to physical locations; they also encompass the requisite expertise and knowledge needed to execute these operations. Also, these trafficking nodes are not limited to one commodity. Lastly, illicit markets are interconnected, irrespective of the varying priorities given to different substances in different countries. Meaning, that a shock to one market can reverberate globally across other markets, prompting shifts in production strategies. For instance, while the United States places greater emphasis on fentanyl, a shock in the fentanyl market can lead consumers to seek alternatives, thereby increasing the demand for other markets, including captagon. Idler anticipates that captagon could be the next substance to be exploited by organizations like the Mexican cartels, furthering their endeavors to consolidate power and exacerbating the security risks already present.

A Global Health Crisis

For her part, Dribben explained an often under-researched and under-reported perspective: global health. Captagon should be an American priority because it can easily become a prominent drug in America causing major health implications. Like Fentanyl and Oxycontin, of which America already has a serious addiction problem, captagon is a synthetic drug that requires little knowledge and equipment to produce. She noted that even if captagon trade was halted and addicts were cut off, there is no protocol for dealing with the addiction. In Saudi Arabia, an estimated 40% of youth are addicted to captagon but the region’s medical treatment facilities are not well-equipped to treat drug addiction due to the way it is stigmatized as a criminal problem and not a health one. The American medical community is beginning to take note of captagon, and this attention will hopefully drive greater constituent interest in Congress. There is also increased global engagement, especially from the United Kingdom and the European Union, which is a promising step forward.

Finding Accountability

Tabbara focused on accountability methods for the Syrian Assad Regime. He explained that the captagon crisis is just one piece in the larger puzzle of the Assad Regime’s human and legal rights abuses, but that it can perhaps offer an entry way into taking accountability measures for other crimes. Trials over the illegality of captagon production and export in the International Criminal Court are one possible avenue for accountability. The Syrian Forum’s legal team has also researched existing legislative frameworks that can hold individuals and companies with associations and dealings with the captagon trade accountable here in the United States. The research found that the existing legal frameworks fall short of providing the opportunity for criminal prosecution of those who are involved in the captagon criminal networks. This type of accountability is also greatly important for US national security. Research has shown that both Hezbollah and Iran are directly involved in the captagon trade. A major faciliatory player in captagon trade is the 4th division, an Iran sponsored division of Syria’s military led by Bashar Al Assad’s brother, Maher Al Assad. Tabbara also explained that the Arab world already lost one avenue for accountability when they decided to pursue normalization with the Assad regime and re-admit it into the Arab League. This was a very important negotiating card that was given away for empty promises. The Arab world is now realizing that it is not a question of willingness for Assad to stop captagon and other illicit activities, but that Assad is unable to deliver and to keep order in his country.

The Role of Congress and the Executive Branch

Frost explained that Hill has been at the forefront of the United States’ legislative fight against captagon as he has introduced two important Acts on the topic: the Illicit Captagon Trafficking Suppression Act to sanction those involved in the production and trafficking of the drug, and the Countering Assad’s Proliferation Trafficking And Garnering of Narcotics (CAPTAGON) Act. The latter will allow the State Department and Treasury to sanction other actors in this trade, and it also grants power to the administration to designate political organizations, militias, and state/non-state actors involved in drug trafficking. Frost explained that these important bills were only possible because of the grass–roots support Representative French Hill receives from his district on this issue. The current administration is also supportive of fighting captagon trade as evident by Secretary Blinken’s recent speech in front of the House Foreign Affairs Committee on captagon and normalization with Assad.

Takeaways and Recommendations 

• 1. Goldrich recommends seeking innovative strategies to address drug demand and consumption, emphasizing that Global Reduction Programs could also benefit US partners in the region.  
• 2. Moving forward, Betsy urges educating and fostering support from the medical community at a grassroots level. Their involvement is integral to developing medical protocols for captagon addiction that can be used throughout the world, but especially in the region. The United States must also designate and recognize the actors involved in captagon trade as those are not always obvious. 
• 3. Goldrich urges sustained coordination on sanctions with the United Kingdom and European partners to exert pressure for accountability regarding the Assad regime’s abuses, and to constrain the regime’s ability to profit from the conflict in Syria. 
• 4. Rose underscores the critical importance of understanding the composition of captagon for law enforcement, intelligence, and the healthcare sector.
• 5. Idler proposes that the United States proactively takes measures to prevent the exploitation of captagon by organizations like the Mexican cartel. Therefore, it is imperative to channel international efforts toward disrupting the captagon trade network and the associated power dynamics to safeguard global security interests.
• 6. Yasser recommends filling the research gaps that could allow for the creation of stronger legal frameworks under which US based companies and individuals can be held accountable for their involvement in illicit captagon trade and networks.  Before any legislation is written, there needs to be an analysis of the jurisdictional limitations of the United States on captagon including money laundering operations, supply chain operations, the use of the US dollar in captagon trade, and extradition of foreign nationals. Research on the role and extent of involvement of Hezbollah, Iran, and Iranian militias in captagon trade also must be greatly expanded upon. In order for this research to be effective, there must be open communication between the United States and its allies like Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. When those make arrests related to captagon, it is extremely important for them to hold public prosecutions, so that the public is aware of the risk and consequences of involving themselves with captagon.
• 7. Dylan suggests that the next step for Congress should focus on passing an anti-normalization act with the Assad regime, which would help hold corporations accountable for illicit interactions with the Syrian government – noting the exemptions provided for humanitarian aid. Congress can also find ways to hold individuals involved with captagon who are outside of Syria accountable through existing laws and extradition treaties.

The post Addressing the captagon crisis in MENA: Strategies & Challenges appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The recent removals suggest that Xi has approved prosecutions of several discrete pockets of corruption and misconduct rather than a repeat of the sweeping and interconnected purges of his first term. The senior officials involved had crucial roles within their respective military and civilian bureaucracies, but none was part of Xi’s core apparatus of political control.

Interpreting patterns among ousted officials

The reshuffles in the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) constitute its most significant internal upheaval since 2017. Recent anti-corruption investigations appear to be radiating outward from the traditional locus of military corruption: procurement and logistics. In the last two months, investigators have reportedly detained Minister of National Defense Li Shangfu, Rocket Force Commander Li Yuchao, Rocket Force Political Commissar Xu Zhongbo, and several of their deputies. Li Shangfu served from 2017 to 2022 as chief of the PLA’s armaments and procurement department and the Rocket Force is an extremely capital-intensive service that has expanded rapidly in the past decade, likely affording numerous opportunities for graft. Xu also previously served as political commissar of the Joint Logistics Department and is the latest in a long line of its former leaders to fall under suspicion. The new Rocket Force leaders have no prior experience with the force and its incoming political commissar significantly outranks the new commander in the CCP hierarchy, signaling Xi’s determination to uproot their predecessors’ personal networks and reimpose discipline.

By targeting procurement-related organs, Xi has launched a fresh campaign against one of the two military institutions most susceptible to corruption; the other is the political work system and the network of political commissars embedded at every level of the PLA. If prosecutions were to expand beyond procurement-linked officers to implicate broader networks within the Central Military Commission (CMC) Political Work Department, then the disruptive impact would likely spread across the PLA.

The circumstances of Foreign Minister Qin Gang’s removal remain unclear, but they are more likely to stem from personal misconduct and idiosyncratic factors that have a narrower impact on the national security establishment. Qin’s own network within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) may be somewhat narrow because of his unusual and rapid ascent. MFA officials also have limited influence over major contracts and assets, so presumably less direct opportunity for large-scale graft. If Xi decides to publicly charge Qin with a broad range of offenses, however, investigators may find grist in his prior service in the MFA Protocol Department, where he would have been responsible for the disposition of official gifts, travel, and hosting functions. One of the few senior Chinese diplomats charged with corruption in recent years was former Assistant Minister of Foreign Affairs Zhang Kunsheng, who also led protocol functions and was dismissed from his position in 2015.  

Alongside these high-profile removals, the internal investigations apparatus continues to churn through the middle ranks of the civilian sector under the new secretary of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, Li Xi. Some of the targets this year have been significant, such as the former Guizhou party secretary, former secretary of the Bank of China’s party committee, and a raft of mid-level officials from the discipline inspection system itself. However, there is no clear thread that links these investigations to top leaders.

Removals point to vetting missteps and misjudgments

Xi’s management of the CCP’s personnel system is vital to his political position and to the functioning of the party-state. At the same time, the identity of the recently removed officials along with their brief tenures suggest that he has committed unforced errors. 

High-level prosecutions are not in and of themselves a sign of misjudgment, because there is a powerful rationale for Xi to periodically prosecute officials in politically sensitive positions. Working as a senior official in the Ministry of Public Security’s headquarters, for example, is likely to remain a high-risk occupation as long as Xi is in office. Xi has an incentive to selectively undermine ties and trust between officials who are in a position to affect his political security. Indeed, he has already demonstrated his willingness to use members of the security establishment against one another. Xi very likely recognizes that internal investigations can also promote paralysis and degrade organizational cohesion, but views this as a small price to pay for protecting his position.

However, there does not appear to be a clear political rationale behind the most recent removals that would offset the disruption to China’s national security apparatus. The officials who have been targeted played peripheral roles, at best, in the maintenance of Xi’s and the CCP’s political power. The minister of defense is not in the chain of command, and although the Rocket Force is crucial to the PLA’s military capacity, it is probably the most insular service. It plays little role in internal stability operations. The abrupt removals of Qin and senior military leaders so soon after they were put in office therefore exacts a cost to their organizations and to China’s image with little redeeming political value. This suggests shortcomings in the personnel vetting and monitoring systems—and perhaps Xi’s own judgment—that should have highlighted disqualifying factors before they were elevated to positions of prominence.

Implications for Xi’s political and strategic calculus

The recent personnel tumult suggests a variety of implications for Xi and China. First, the clean sweep of the Rocket Force’s leadership team and the imposition of outsiders to replace them indicate that Xi probably does not anticipate fighting a large-scale conflict soon. If he foresaw an imminent likelihood of war, then he probably would not have uprooted the Rocket Force’s entire leadership, or he at least would have chosen replacements more familiar with the force.

The nature of the removals is also a fresh demonstration that the imperatives of secrecy and compartmentalization in party governance are far more important to Xi than assuaging foreign concerns about the CCP’s opaque and seemingly capricious decisionmaking. The silence accompanying the mysterious disappearances of Qin and Li will fuel rumors about other potential targets. It substantiates concerns among foreign officials that their interlocutors are “nowhere near within a hundred miles” of Xi’s inner circle, as US Coordinator for the Indo-Pacific Kurt Campbell described in 2021.

Finally, the extent of the reshuffle will also be a marker of Xi’s broader approach to political control over the elite as he enters a new phase of his tenure. The ebb and flow of investigations over the past eleven years has tracked Xi’s overall political position and priorities. In his first term as general secretary from 2012 to 2017, Xi was consumed by his campaign to target the personal and institutional power bases of his rivals while elevating his allies. After Xi completed his consolidation of power in 2017, the broad purges and reorganizations slowed significantly as he shifted from disruption to construction. Since then, he has focused on rationalizing and strengthening the party apparatus.

The investigations that have come to light recently in Xi’s third term probably reveal cracks in Xi’s personnel management system. However, they do not yet imply a departure from his overall approach to controlling the CCP apparatus or a threat to his power. Xi maintains personal control over the key organs of political power within the party. He relies on a very small circle of trusted subordinates to run those organs and on regular but contained internal investigations into senior officials outside that circle. It would, however, signal a more disruptive and unpredictable approach to governance if leaders and officials at the heart of Xi’s political control apparatus were targeted. Those key organs include the Central Committee’s General Office and Organization Department and the CMC’s General Office. For now, the churn within the upper ranks of the PLA and MFA reflects a familiar, if flawed, playbook for enforcing discipline within the CCP.

Mark Parker Young is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Global China Hub and a principal analyst at Mandiant. The views expressed in this article are solely those of the author.

The post The political factors behind China’s disappearing leaders appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The idea that it is more profitable to trade than fight works well in Europe and has helped secure an unprecedented period of peace across much of the continent. Unfortunately, many European political leaders drew the wrong conclusion from this success story and assumed the same principle could be applied to relations with Russia. Germany in particular spent years expanding energy sector ties with Russia in the mistaken belief that this lucrative trade would serve to moderate Russia’s more aggressive instincts.

Nor was Germany alone in such thinking. Many European countries were happy to ignore Russia’s steady turn toward authoritarianism under Vladimir Putin as long as they could secure cheap energy supplies and other financial benefits. Most were primarily concerned with making money, but many also saw deepening economic ties as an insurance policy against any revival of Russian imperialism. It is now clear that this was a disastrous miscalculation.

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While the Western world was busy repeating the “never again” mantra, Putin’s Russia was increasingly embracing a very different sentiment. From the early years of his reign, Putin actively revived lingering Cold War era antagonism toward the West within Russian society. He also transformed traditional reverence for the Soviet role in the defeat of Nazi Germany into something akin to a state religion, complete with its own dogmas, heretics, rituals, and feast days. People across Russia soon began to repeat the menacing slogan, “we can do it again.” Whereas Soviet troops had once marched to Berlin and occupied half Europe, today’s Russia was now threatening defeat the West through a combination of economic, informational, cyber, and if necessary, military tools.

In this confrontational climate, Europe’s faith in the moderating impact of international trade was perceived by Russia as a fundamental weakness. When viewed from the Kremlin, the profitability of Europe’s growing economic ties with Russia was actually seen as a green light for Moscow to pursue policies of aggression against third parties without fear of consequences.

Members of the Russian establishment remained convinced that while their Western counterparts enjoyed making idealistic speeches, they were ultimately driven by a far baser hunger for money. This Russian contempt for so-called Western values was further strengthened by experience, particularly the indecently rapid clamor for a return to business-as-usual following Moscow’s 2008 invasion of Georgia. The same was true in the wake of Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea and invasion of eastern Ukraine.

Russian perceptions of Western weakness and hypocrisy directly paved the way for the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Moscow expected the West to loudly protect the invasion before meekly accepting the new geopolitical realities and resuming economic cooperation with Russia. Based on prior experience, this was an entirely reasonable expectation. It appears to have taken the Kremlin completely by surprise when Western leaders imposed unprecedented sanctions, and when European nations began working to drastically reduce their reliance on Russian energy imports. For Ukraine, however, this show of resolve came too late to avert the devastating consequences of the invasion.

The tragedy of Russia’s criminal invasion could have been avoided if the West had sent an unambiguous message to Moscow indicating that the days of imperial aggression were over. Instead, too much trust was placed in the ability of deepening economic ties to deter international aggression, while modern Russia’s retreat into old-style imperialism was not taken sufficiently seriously.

The failure of trade-based diplomacy is also relevant in relation to China. Economic ties between Beijing and the West are often characterized as being mutually dependent, with some arguing that this makes any serious deterioration in relations unlikely. The same argument is sometimes applied to China and Taiwan, which have a robust economic relationship despite political tensions. However, this flawed logic has already been exposed by the West’s failed Russia policies.

Publicly, at least, China has declared a neutral position toward the Russian invasion of Ukraine. In practice, China is reaping the benefits of closer ties with an isolated Russia, while at the same time avoiding any sanctions pressure from the West. Regardless of the outcome in Ukraine, Beijing stands to benefit; a Russian victory would strengthen China, while a Russian defeat would increase Moscow’s dependency on Beijing.

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If Russia is able to achieve even a partial victory in Ukraine, the consequences for global security would be catastrophic. Western leaders must escalate their support for Ukraine to prevent this outcome and make sure Putin’s invasion ends in decisive defeat.

Looking ahead, it is clear that while economic inter-dependency can help maintain peace among like-minded democracies such as EU member states, it is utterly ineffective in terms of authoritarian regimes like Putin’s Russia. Instead, new approaches are needed that prioritize human values over trade balances or financial interests. Above all, the West must rid itself of the naive illusions that set the stage for today’s Russian war in Ukraine.

It is also vital to speak to dictators in the language of strength. After all, this is the only language that leaders like Vladimir Putin truly understand. To Putin and his fellow dictators, any talk of win-win situations and mutually beneficial cooperation is interpreted as a sign of weakness. Instead, today’s world requires institutions capable of imposing powerful sanctions on countries that break international law.

This process should begin with Ukraine. As Western leaders continue to shape their response to Russia’s ongoing invasion of Ukraine, they have an opportunity to build a new system of international relations capable of deterring future dictators from embracing aggressive foreign policies. Immediate priorities should include tougher sanctions against Russia, dramatically increased military aid for Ukraine, and the confiscation of Russian assets to finance the Ukrainian recovery process. Ultimately, Ukrainian victory and Russian defeat will be the greatest deterrent of all for any authoritarian rulers contemplating their own wars of aggression.

Kira Rudik is leader of the Golos party, member of the Ukrainian parliament, and Vice President of the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE).

Further reading

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The unprecedented removal of Kevin McCarthy as House speaker has thrust US politics into uncharted territory while also sparking alarm across the Atlantic as Ukrainians fear for the future of vital American military aid, writes Peter Dickinson.

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The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

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This is in sharp contrast to Egypt, where reactions to the bribery accusations leveled at the Egyptian leadership have been largely subdued. Egypt’s predominantly pro-government media has chosen to either dismiss altogether or downplay the allegations. This comes as no surprise in a country where the state largely controls the media. Most Egyptian journalists do not dare question nor uncover the corruption within higher power echelons. Doing so would put journalists at risk of earning the wrath of the authoritarian regime.  

Tens of journalists languish behind bars for far smaller “crimes,” such as publishing posts that are critical of the government on their social media platforms or expressing alternative viewpoints that run counter to views accepted by the mainstream. The situation has become even more restrictive with Egypt’s 2024 presidential election scheduled for December 10-12. Recently, Ahmed Bendary, the Head of the Egyptian Elections Authority, warned that those who doubt the upcoming elections’ integrity will be punished.  

That is precisely why there’s been a near-total blackout in Egypt on the Menendez case, in which US federal prosecutors are probing the possible involvement of high-ranking officials from within the country’s intelligence services. Coverage of the case has been restricted to a news show broadcast on the state-owned “Al Qahera News Channel.” On September 23, the show’s presenter stated that Reuters had alleged that Senator Menendez and his wife were being accused of receiving bribes from three New Jersey businessmen to enrich the latter and benefit Egypt.      

Not only did the news anchor avoid any mention of the alleged involvement of the Egyptian leadership in the bribery case, but she also failed to make any reference to the fact that one of the businessmen, Wael Hana—a co-defendant in the case—was an Egyptian-American Coptic Christian with a lucrative monopoly over the certification of halal meat—imported by Egypt from the US—granted to him by the Egyptian authorities.  

Meanwhile, Ramy Gabr, Al Qahera’s correspondent in Washington, downplayed the bribery allegations, portraying them as part of the power struggle between Democrats and Republicans ahead of US Congressional elections. Gabr asked Joel Rubin, the former Deputy Assistant US Secretary of House Affairs for the State Department, about the rivalry ahead of the US Congressional elections and whether Rubin saw a connection between the elections and the Menendez corruption case. By focusing on the elections rather than the case itself, Gabr tactically steered the conversation away from Egypt and the US prosecutors’ accusations of bribery.  

 Rubin replied, “Right now, we are in the silly season in the United States with electoral campaigns underway in full throttle; anything can happen in US politics.” He went on to explain that it was a tight race and added that, with US presidential elections due next year, failure by the Democrats to garner majority seats in the Senate would have catastrophic implications for them. As a result, Republicans were stopping at nothing in their quest to attain power, Rubin added.

Egyptian analysts interviewed by the Middle East News Agency (MENA) also dismissed the case as “a US internal political matter” and “part of the wider power struggle between Democrats and Republicans ahead of the US presidential elections slated for November 2024. 

Some officials lamented that it was a deliberate attempt to defame the Egyptian leadership amid tensions between the US and its once-staunch ally. 

In comments to MENA on September 23, Ambassador Mohamed El-Orabi, Egypt’s former foreign minister and current chairman of the Egyptian Foreign Relations Council, cautioned that the accusations leveled at Senator Menendez were still under investigation. 

“It would be inappropriate to comment on the case at this early stage,” he said. Orabi urged Egyptians to reject and resist attempts to tarnish Egypt’s image and drag the country into an internal political dispute between opposing parties in the US, noting that “there has been no official statement from the Biden administration on the case so far,” he told MENA.  

Tarek Fahmy, a professor of Political Science at Cairo University, also downplayed the bribery accusations. He explained that such allegations against senators and other US politicians are common in US politics.”

“Involving Egypt in a case that is still under investigation may be linked to recent calls by certain pressure groups within the US Congress to withhold military aid to Egypt,” Fahmy said, in an apparent reference to demands by lobbyists in Washington and rights groups that US lawmakers withhold a further $235 million in military aid to Egypt.      

In mid-September, the Biden administration announced it would withhold $85 million from the $1.3 billion the US designates for US security assistance to Cairo yearly, citing human rights concerns.

Some rights groups, such as Democracy for the Arab World Now (DAWN), have gone further, calling for a temporary freeze on all aid to Egypt until the investigations are completed. 

Ironically, despite the tight restrictions on Egyptian media and heavy censorship, it was an article published in the Egyptian independent news site,, Mada Masr, in 2019 that questioned the monopoly of the New Jersey-based IS EG Halal Certified—a hitherto little-known company—over the multi-million dollar business of halal meat certification in the US, that may have been the first spark that ignited suspicion and paved the way for the Menendez probe. 

Nada Arafat, the reporter who authored the piece, wrote that “the Egyptian government licenses several certifiers around the world whose job is to ensure that exporting slaughterhouses comply with halal (Sharia law) requirements. She continued, “In May 2019, the Egyptian Agriculture Ministry abruptly disqualified all halal certifiers eligible to operate in the United States, except for one newly licensed company—IS EG Halal Certified.”      

Through her investigative reporting, Arafat discovered that the company had been established just two years earlier and had no prior experience in halal certification nor any pre-existing ties to the US beef industry. Arafat further noted that days after it became the exclusive certifier, the company raised certification fees in North America, translating into millions of dollars of extra revenue, according to calculations made by Mada Masr. 

It is worth noting that Mada Masr is one of hundreds of news sites blocked by the Egyptian government since 2016. In other words, Arafat’s piece was off-limits to most Egyptians, but tech-savvy readers could use circumvention tools like VPNs to access blocked news sites.  

The investigation by Mada Masr also revealed that IS EG operates alongside another private business with close links to a sovereign entity—a term often used in Egypt to refer to high-level security institutions.

Despite the low-key coverage of the shocking corruption scheme by the mainstream Egyptian media, the bribery case stirred controversy on Egyptian social media platforms. Government supporters perceived the alleged recruitment of a senior US official to further Egypt’s interests as “a win” for the Egyptian government. Meanwhile, an opposition activist lamented that “we (Egyptians) learn about the (leadership’s) scandals from the international press.” He cited as one example the recent Zambian plane saga in which the country’s notorious security agencies were suspected of implication in a botched attempt to smuggle hundreds of thousands of dollars and gold bars out of the country. Zambian authorities seized the plane on arrival at Lusaka Airport, and the suspects were arrested.

Another activist lamented via his X account, formerly known as Twitter, that “corruption and bribery have become so normalized in our psyche, they are not shocking anymore.”  

Others, however, questioned the timing of Menendez’s indictment with Egypt’s presidential elections scheduled for December 10-12. They suspect the US administration may use the case to pressure President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi to hold free and democratic elections. But, with the bulk of Egyptians left in the dark about the case—particularly Cairo’s alleged involvement in the corruption scheme—it appears highly unlikely that the Menendez case will cast a pall over the upcoming presidential election in Egypt.

Shahira Amin is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative and an independent journalist based in Cairo. A former contributor to CNN’s Inside Africa, Amin has been covering the development in post-revolution Egypt for several outlets, including Index on Censorship and Al-Monitor. Follow her on X: @sherryamin13.

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Moldova, one of the world’s most energy insecure countries, has been relying on foreign assistance to meet its energy needs since gaining independence in 1991. Entirely reliant on oil and gas imports, and upon a single power plant problematically situated in the Kremlin-controlled separatist region of Transnistria, the country has been plagued by energy sector corruption, vulnerability, and structural impediments.

Russia has long been accused of taking advantage of this predicament, most recently in September 2023 with targeted cyberattacks against Moldovan energy companies. Russia’s majority ownership, via Gazprom, of Moldova’s state-owned gas monopoly Moldovagaz, has also certainly not helped Chisinau steady itself. But neither has Moldovan leadership shown a consistent commitment to energy sector reforms.

Under the country’s Western-supported President Maia Sandu, there have been some signs of long-awaited energy sector improvements. This is much to the relief of Western stakeholders, such as the European Energy Community Secretariat (ECS) and US government agencies including the US Agency for International Development (USAID). Western governments collectively donated over $1 billion to Moldova in 2022 alone and would like to see a return on their investment.

Positive developments include progress on the unbundling of Moldovagaz, which Moldova first agreed to complete 13 years ago when it acceded to the EU Energy Community Treaty in 2010. This process was to be completed in 2016, but the original deadline was subsequently extended to January 2020 and then February 2021. In 2021, the ECS brought infringement proceedings against Chisinau because the unbundling of Moldovagaz still hadn’t taken place.

Some recent progress has been made on unbundling, leading the ECS to “commend” Moldova for approving a Lease Agreement between Moldovatransgaz, the country’s largest transmission system operator, and Vestmoldtransgaz, to operate the transmission networks owned by Moldovatransgaz and Moldovagaz. However, this move was criticized by some as merely swapping Russia’s Gazprom out for an equivalent Romanian foreign controller, as Vestmoldtransgaz is 75% owned by Transgaz Romania, with the remaining 25% owned by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). However, it does constitute a significant step toward unbundling Moldova’s gas sector.

Chisinau also recently completed an audit of Moldovagaz to assess whether $800 million of purported debts claimed by Gazprom had any basis. The audit concluded that the alleged debts were the result of bogus accounting shenanigans by the Russians. For a country widely regarded as among the poorest in Europe, wiping clean a $800 million debt is a very important development that could allow for gas market restructuring and reform.

Another promising sign is Chisinau’s recent courtship of renewables investors. Handicapped by its reliance on a lone power plant in Transnistria, Moldova desperately needs alternate power generation capacity or green electricity. The country has good wind and good enough solar potential to supplement its energy mix with renewables; the necessary amendments to its power sector laws should soon be enacted that will permit the construction of grid-scale battery storage capacity with which to regularize the use of renewables generation.

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There are a number of troubling recent developments in Moldova’s energy profile that leave observers in Western governments and think tanks, as well as private investors in the energy sector, wondering whether the country is actually de-liberalizing its energy sector.

Emergency orders instituted after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine and the resulting global energy crisis have made it possible to allow for continued Russian natural gas imports, to restrict broader market access, to consolidate all gas supply in Moldovagaz, and most recently, to sign a gas import contract with Turkish suppliers of Russian gas. Many observers are concerned that this last development is at the very least an opportunity for corruption, if not in fact a kickback scheme.

Undermining Moldova’s claim to have stopped using Russian gas, the new Turkish supply from BOTAS will be coming from Russia through the Turkstream pipeline. BOTAS, which signed an agreement with brand new Moldovan company East Gas Energy Trading, has begun supplying two million cubic meters of gas per day from October 1, 2023. At the same time, Moldovan Energy Minister Parlicov announced on September 21 that Chisinau will not stop importing Russian gas for Transnistria.

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When pressed about these apparent steps backward, Moldovan Energy Ministry officials have cited the need for energy security. However, they have been unable to explain how favoring Russian gas sold through Turkey or directly from Gazprom was necessary when Western supply companies already operating in the region, in some cases even in Moldova itself, were ready to import through Romania or Ukraine.

One company, Energy Resources of Ukraine (ERU), a well established US gas trader in Eastern Europe, has been waiting over a year for Moldova’s energy regulator, the National Agency for Energy Regulation (ANRE), to allow it to apply for a license to import gas. When contrasted with the BOTAS contract and its justification, examples like ERU’s situation have raised concerns over possible corruption in the energy sector.

With questionable logic, “energy security” was also cited as the explanation for why Western companies are being frozen out of the Moldovan energy market. Six out of ten interested private suppliers have walked away recently because ANRE is accused of undercutting the viability of commercial operations by imposing a Public Service Obligation to supply below cost.

Some companies say they are facing bankruptcy because of ANRE’s anti-competitive decisions. The largest company, Rotalin Gas Trading, announced this week that it can no longer supply gas because ANRE has set tariffs so low. With a 3% market share, Rotalin Gas Trading had been the only supplier of gas other than Moldovagaz and was about to take on a broader industrial customer base when, in May 2023, Moldova instituted so-called “equity contributions,” meaning penalties for any customers trying to switch away from Moldovagaz. ANRE this week started the process of revoking Rotalin Gas Trading’s license, which critics say will reduce both Moldova’s energy security and market competition.

The result of these measures is the strong appearance of an effort to consolidate the entire gas sector into a single state-owned entity, Moldovagaz, supplied with Russian natural gas through state-owned Energocom. It is unclear how reducing competition and diversity of supply helps achieve energy security, reduces prices for Moldovans, or complies with the liberalization commitments Chisinau made when it began to seek greater integration with the EU. Western government stakeholders are paying attention, as are investors.

Moldova is at a crossroads. It could use abundant foreign assistance, the political license afforded by the war in Ukraine, and energy transition momentum to reform its energy sector. This will not be an easy task, to be sure. But today’s “one step forward, one step back” situation risks undermining the overall reform agenda while weakening Moldova’s energy independence, the goodwill of the West, the likelihood of Moldova being admitted to the EU any time soon, and the quality of life for individual Moldovans.

Suriya Jayanti is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

Further reading

UkraineAlert Aug 3, 2023

Russian Orthodox leader Patriarch Kirill’s unholy war against Ukraine

By Borys Gudziak

Russia’s Unholy War: Russian Orthodox Church leader Patriarch Kirill has provided the ideological justification for Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine and Russian efforts to eliminate Ukrainian national identity.

Civil Society Conflict

UkraineAlert Sep 27, 2023

Ukraine’s counteroffensive is making real progress on the Crimean front

By Peter Dickinson

Ukraine’s escalating attacks in Crimea are steadily undermining Russia’s invasion and are a reminder that the Ukrainian counteroffensive is not limited to the relatively static front lines of the war, writes Peter Dickinson.

Conflict Defense Policy

UkraineAlert Sep 14, 2023

It is still far too early to write off Ukraine’s counteroffensive

By Dennis Soltys

The slow pace of Ukraine’s much hyped counteroffensive is sparking fresh calls for a negotiated peace, but the Ukrainian military may yet achieve its goals as long as international support continues, writes Dennis Soltys.

Conflict Disinformation

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

Read more from UkraineAlert

UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia and Central Asia in the East.

Learn more

The post Mixed messaging from Moldova on energy sector reforms appeared first on Atlantic Council.

In the midst of Ukraine’s current fight for national survival, the country’s government continues to implement ambitious anti-corruption policies to strengthen the integrity of its public institutions and maintain a strong trajectory amid recovery and reconstruction. Meanwhile, Moldova is proceeding with its own ambitious anti-corruption agenda as the country champions comprehensive reforms and builds locally-led efforts on transparency and oversight.

Anti-corruption reforms are crucial for both countries as they seek to meet the conditions for EU membership. Ahead of next month’s European Commission evaluations on the progress of both countries, the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center and USAID hosted a panel moderated by Ambassador John Herbst with senior government officials and civil society representatives from Moldova, Ukraine, and the European Union to discuss key anti-corruption reforms in both countries and the role of the international donor community in supporting these reform efforts.

In advancing these initiatives, USAID has been a key partner in supporting anti-corruption in Ukraine and Moldova. Isobel Coleman, Deputy Administrator for Policy and Programming at USAID, explained, “One approach we are taking is really trying to constrain the opportunities in the first place for corruption, and secondly, when corruption occurs, to raise the cost of corruption.” According to Coleman, costs can be raised by “investing in the institutions of anti-corruption, so that there can be more robust prosecution of corruption when it occurs.”

Coleman also underlined the importance of robust civil society engagement, so civil society actors can track procurement contracts and other processes vulnerable to corruption. She underlined the importance of “strong, vetted, qualified leadership able to prosecute crimes and deal with corruption when it arises.”

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Nicu Popescu, Moldova’s Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs and European Integration, cited the malign influence of corruption on the development of the wider region. “Corruption over the last 30 years in our part of the world has been one of the factors facilitating and actually driving our region to this moment in our tragic history,” he said.

Popescu cited the pre-vetting of judges as an area where his country is now making progress. Working with Moldova’s partners, they have returned an important airport to public control as part of their de-oligarchization initiatives, and have also introduced sanctions against corrupt individuals accused of trying to destabilize the country.

Ukraine’s Minister of Justice Denys Maliuska highlighted the importance of transparency within Ukrainian society and noted that his country presently has many initiatives to streamline reforms and make recovery as transparent as possible. Maliuska cited digitalization and privatization as key means of decreasing state influence over resources and reducing the market share of state-owned enterprises in Ukraine, which he views as a route to decreasing corruption and optimizing the country’s civil service. “Anti-corruption efforts are a huge priority for our country in line with EU accession,” he said.

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Alongside state reforms, the role of civil society remains paramount. Moldova’s civil society is active in contributing to maintaining government accountability at the central and local levels. “Civil society organizations in my country are involved in policy processes, in decision-making processes, in contributing with expertise, and supporting reform efforts,” said Iulian Groza, Director at the Institute for European Policies and Reforms. “We know how corruption is affecting or has affected our country’s institutions, and how it makes us more vulnerable to malign aggression,” he commented.

Amid efforts to rebuild the Moldovan justice system and other anti-corruption institutions, Groza cited the importance of civil society in facing the challenges presented by the lingering influence of loyalists from previous kleptocratic regimes, arguing that civil society plays an important role in bridging gaps of understanding and reaching out to communities. “It’s very important to understand that the justice system in my country has been made vulnerable for years,” he states.

Groza described how crucial it was for international stakeholders, including the EU and the US, to reinforce anti-corruption institutions to combat security threats, as corruption within the country continues to be used as a tool of hybrid aggression. It is very important to ensure a balance “between preserving democratic values, rule of law, and efficient anti-corruption efforts, while at the same time addressing security concerns,” he said.

Andriy Borovyk, Executive Director for Transparency International Ukraine, stated that “fighting corruption and building good governance is always a process.” Commenting on the rise of technological solutions to increase transparency and accountability, Borovyk noted that technology was only one piece of a broader puzzle to eliminate corruption. “Behind every IT solution are people,” he observed.

USAID’s Coleman spoke to the need for continued assistance to Ukraine, even as it confronts the scourge of corruption. “There are huge flows of money, but we know that they are going directly to pay teachers, to pay healthcare workers, to pay first responders,” she said. “These are funds that are actually going to help keep the government of Ukraine intact as it wages this war for survival.”

In her concluding remarks, Ylva Johansson, European Commissioner for Home Affairs, stressed the importance of the anti-corruption reforms taking place in both countries and underlined the EU’s commitment to further support. “The fight against corruption is a life or death struggle for Ukraine,” she noted, as Putin exploits corruption to advance his interests. “One day, both Ukraine and Moldova will become EU member states.”

Olivia Yanchik is a program assistant at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

Further reading

UkraineAlert Aug 3, 2023

Russian Orthodox leader Patriarch Kirill’s unholy war against Ukraine

By Borys Gudziak

Russia’s Unholy War: Russian Orthodox Church leader Patriarch Kirill has provided the ideological justification for Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine and Russian efforts to eliminate Ukrainian national identity.

Civil Society Conflict

UkraineAlert Sep 19, 2023

Putin “knows very well” NATO poses no security threat to Russia

By Peter Dickinson

Russia’s recent demilitarization of its NATO borders proves that Putin does not view alliance as a genuine security threat and makes a complete mockery of Kremlin propaganda blaming the invasion of Ukraine on NATO, writes Peter Dickinson.

Conflict Defense Policy

UkraineAlert Sep 20, 2023

Zelenskyy tells United Nations: Russia is committing genocide in Ukraine

By Taras Kuzio

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy told the UN this week that Russia is committing genocide in Ukraine. Efforts to legally prove genocidal intent will likely focus on the genocidal rhetoric of Putin and other Russian leaders, writes Taras Kuzio.

Conflict Disinformation

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

Read more from UkraineAlert

UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia and Central Asia in the East.

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The post Anti-corruption progress in Ukraine and Moldova is vital for EU integration appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The post Nusairat joins the Arab Center Washington DC to discuss Jordan’s reform process appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The post Brahimi quoted in The Middle East Eye on meaning of Prigozhin’s death for North Africa appeared first on Atlantic Council.

So what gives? There have simply been too many scandals on his watch. In January 2023, egg-gate broke when it emerged that the defense ministry had been procuring eggs for its soldiers above market prices. This may not sound like a career-ending scandal, but critics worried about what else might be lurking in defense contracts if the ministry had overlooked graft in food contracts. If insiders were already stealing from the army after less than a year of full-scale war, what else would they find once more serious arms contracts were declassified? Plus, there was widespread awareness that Ukraine couldn’t afford any corruption scandals if it wanted vital Western military and financial aid to continue uninterrupted.

Reznikov snapped into action and promised a crackdown. He appointed a tenacious but low-profile reformer, Arsen Zhumadilov, who had previously rooted out corruption in prescription drug procurement after Ukraine’s 2014 Euromaidan Revolution. Kyiv insiders spoke highly of his competence and integrity, but the effort never really gained momentum and nobody in the West seemed to notice.

Fast forward to August. Ukraine’s mighty anti-corruption activists accused the defense ministry of overlooking graft once again. The ministry had purchased winter jackets from Turkey for $20 million, and the price began to skyrocket, sparking outrage and demands for the defense minister’s head. Reznikov played for time, urging journalists to wait for the results of the investigation before jumping to conclusions. However, President Zelenskyy is under intense pressure to root out corruption, both large and small. Ultimately, Reznikov was asked to resign.

“Reznikov was not good enough at external communication with a number of extremely emotional and sometimes aggressive public activists, which all resulted in a pretty bad flavor around the ministry of defense and the minister. Most of the corruption scandals were extremely marginal, manipulative, and mostly artificial,” one current member of parliament told me off the record.

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

Zelenskyy will appoint 41-year-old Crimean Tatar Rustem Umerov, who most recently led Ukraine’s State Property Fund, to replace Reznikov. The anointing of Umerov, a former member of parliament from the opposition Holos Party, signals two things: First, Crimea is Ukraine and Kyiv will not enter into any negotiations over the status of the occupied peninsula. Many people, especially in Berlin and Paris, would love for Kyiv to abandon Crimea. They argue that Ukraine’s ownership of Crimea is an historical accident and claim the peninsula is really Russia’s after all. Trading away Crimea will never happen on Umerov’s watch.

Second, Umerov’s appointment underlines how much perceptions of what it means to be Ukrainian have changed. Jews, Muslims, and ethnic Russians are all Ukrainians now. Modern Ukrainian identity is a civic construct, not an ethnic one, something Olga Onuch and Henry E. Hale have found in their remarkable new book The Zelensky Effect. A Jewish president appointing a Muslim defense minister is a notable achievement that reflects Ukraine’s nation-building progress.

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Ukraine’s advance in Kursk: What’s next and implications

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Umerov couldn’t be more right for the job of Ukraine’s next defense minister. He speaks fluent English and Turkish, and has extensive negotiation experience with Turkey and the Middle East, which could prove particularly important as the war continues. He has negotiated prisoner exchanges between Ukraine and Russia with the help of Saudi Arabia, and helped negotiate the Black Sea Grain Initiative.

For Umerov, human rights aren’t an afterthought. As a member of Ukraine’s Crimean Tatar minority who was born in Uzbekistan following the Stalin-era deportation of the Crimean Tatar population, he understands the importance of home and one’s ties to their ancestral land. “I survived the resettlement back home to my historical land in Crimea. I know what reintegration is, and I know what temporary occupation is,” Umerov told Forbes.

I was lucky enough to meet Umerov in 2019 at a Kyiv restaurant; in typical Crimean Tatar fashion, he plied me with more food than I could possibly eat and came across as a genial host. His intelligence was obvious from miles away. Umerov is the right man for the job, and Ukraine will be well served by having a Crimean Tatar in one of the country’s top positions.

Melinda Haring is a non-resident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center. She tweets @melindaharing.

Further reading

UkraineAlert Aug 3, 2023

Russian Orthodox leader Patriarch Kirill’s unholy war against Ukraine

By Borys Gudziak

Russia’s Unholy War: Russian Orthodox Church leader Patriarch Kirill has provided the ideological justification for Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine and Russian efforts to eliminate Ukrainian national identity.

Civil Society Conflict

UkraineAlert Jul 31, 2023

Zelenskyy advisor: Defeat in Ukraine will spark collapse of Putin regime

By Peter Dickinson

Ukrainian presidential advisor Mykhailo Podolyak says the Wagner mutiny has exposed Russia’s internal weakness and predicts battlefield defeats in Ukraine will spark the collapse of the Putin regime, writes Peter Dickinson.

Conflict Defense Policy

UkraineAlert Aug 22, 2023

Putin weaponizes history with new textbook justifying Ukraine invasion

By Taras Kuzio

A new Kremlin-approved history textbook for Russian schoolchildren offers an unapologetically imperialistic view of Russia’s past while attempting to justify the current invasion of Ukraine, writes Taras Kuzio.

Conflict Democratic Transitions

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

Read more from UkraineAlert

UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia and Central Asia in the East.

Learn more

The post Removal of defense minister shows wartime Ukraine is changing appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Whether it’s keynote speakers, panel participants, or coffee break companions, Ukrainian business people are sharing stories of how they shed not only old facilities that ended up occupied or destroyed, but also old habits and suddenly outdated mental frameworks. Ukrainian-owned companies that had been content to stay within the confines of Ukraine or their home region found themselves scrambling to relocate westward (either within Ukraine or beyond), and having to both Europeanize and globalize their sales and support networks. Whether it was a Kyiv-based security systems manufacturer setting up an additional production base in Turkey, or a logistics market leader following its displaced customer base into Central and Eastern Europe, setting up to succeed abroad forced a hard look at home base operations and adaptation to a wider world.

Meanwhile, more than 90% of multinationals working in Ukraine have opted to stay on, while facilitating international mobility for their staff. Many employees were integrated into European networks during the early months of conflict displacement, before returning to Ukraine as conditions in much of the country stabilized. At this corporate level, and in the much bigger ebb and flow of millions seeking refuge and security, we have seen the world’s largest crash course of EU 101 for Ukrainians, and mass familiarization with Ukrainians and their capabilities on the part of Europeans. Years of Euro-integration and “Stronger Together” rhetoric suddenly became very real.

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

The Ukrainian government has also reacted by prioritizing the war and rooting out security threats, including residual Russian leverage in the business sector. However, after a few months of deregulation and tax breaks to help business withstand the initial shock of war, a return to regular policies was initiated in late summer 2022. Driven by expectations on the part of the IMF and other international financial institutions that Ukraine should shoulder its fair share of the financial burden, and by the need to fund the direct military expenditures that partners would not cover, this summoned up some of the old familiar demons that have bedeviled Ukraine’s business climate for decades. These included unpredictable and selective tax and customs administration enforcement, ill-founded criminal prosecutions sweeping up what are really civil or commercial law disputes, and a reductively literal application of the law to punish senior officials who showed business-friendly initiative.

This back-tracking is at odds with the Ukrainian authorities’ proclaimed economic policy goals and does not help to make the country fit for national renewal. Spare capacity in agencies that should no longer be handling economic issues generates spurious cases that do not go to trial but waste thousands of hours of management time spent responding to document subpoenas and attending interrogations. The new Bureau for Economic Security, designed to be a center of expertise on business-relevant enforcement, remains underfunded and adrift, with its acting management on holiday or sick leave. Poor administrative modeling leads to tax clampdowns that hurt legitimate business more than fraudsters. Senior officials who implemented legislatively approved public-private partnerships or corporate governance models are on trial for ostensibly harming the state by “exceeding their competencies,” sending a distinctly chilling message to would-be reformers already in office or thinking of joining the government.

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Online Event Thu, August 15, 2024 • 9:00 am ET

Ukraine’s advance in Kursk: What’s next and implications

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Business leaders shared these and related concerns with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy at a meeting on June 29. An ad hoc committee bringing senior presidential advisors on both the business and law enforcement sides of things has been meeting weekly to get a handle on why reforms in these fields so far have not meshed. As Ukraine’s Business Ombudsman, I’ve offered the support of our experienced legal team in working out the contradictions and disconnects.

Tackling problems together is all the more important as Ukraine’s European Union integration agenda is about to get very real. A €50 billion Ukraine Support Package is to be accompanied by a rigorous pre-accession plan linking quarterly payments to reform results achieved. Gone are the days when hundreds, indeed thousands, of pages of airy strategies could be generated, safe in the knowledge that they would never face the test of contact with reality. Every Ukrainian ministry and every agency will need to not only align formal documents with EU rules, but start acting in ways that make them fully interoperable with counterparts from the 27 current EU member states.

To achieve individual, business, and national goals of renewal, Ukrainians need their government to be just as nimble and adaptive as the country’s private sector. Getting there means not only enabling the new, but also letting go of the old by building down the country’s excess capacity to stop change and change-makers in their tracks. Beyond the existential security challenges created by Russia’s ongoing invasion, this will be the principal task for Ukraine’s business environment in the months and years ahead. Finding the right solutions will prove decisive for the emergence of a new Ukraine as a competitive EU member state.

Roman Waschuk is Ukraine’s Business Ombudsman.

Further reading

UkraineAlert Aug 17, 2023

Putin must not be allowed to turn the Black Sea into a Russian lake

By Melinda Haring

Western countries must take urgent action to prevent Vladimir Putin from turning the Black Sea into a Russian lake, warns Melinda Haring.

Conflict European Union

UkraineAlert Jul 31, 2023

Zelenskyy advisor: Defeat in Ukraine will spark collapse of Putin regime

By Peter Dickinson

Ukrainian presidential advisor Mykhailo Podolyak says the Wagner mutiny has exposed Russia’s internal weakness and predicts battlefield defeats in Ukraine will spark the collapse of the Putin regime, writes Peter Dickinson.

Conflict Defense Policy

UkraineAlert Aug 7, 2023

Ukraine’s slow counteroffensive is a wake-up call for the West

By Maksym Skrypchenko

Ukraine’s lack of counteroffensive progress over the past two months should serve as a wake-up call for Western leaders. Their response will shape the geopolitical landscape for decades to come, writes Maksym Skrypchenko.

Conflict Defense Policy

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

Read more from UkraineAlert

UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia and Central Asia in the East.

Learn more

The post Ukraine’s state authorities must follow private sector in unlearning old habits appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Putting an end to foreign interests—as reflected in the slogan of esteghlal or “independence”—and creating a moral society were advocated as the primary motivations of the 1979 revolution. However, despite the dwindling foreign presence in the nascent Islamic Republic post-1979, which preached a more ethically centered society, corruption has reached new heights and has been ubiquitous from the first days of the regime. The ever-increasing amounts of money and elaborate schemes that routinely involve the closest regime insiders dwarf any pre-1979 reports of corruption. 

So, just how bad is corruption in Iran today?

Corruption is a complex issue that exists in various forms and degrees in any society. It normally refers to the abuse of power for personal gains and the diversion of public resources for private use. As it is done behind closed doors, it is difficult to observe as it happens. Transparency International has developed the Corruption Perception Index (CPI), a widely used measure that is based on how experts and the private sector perceive corruption in the public sector. It draws on data collected by leading organizations through a range of regular surveys and assessments of different sectors of society, including politics, the economy, and the judiciary.

While even the best performer, Denmark, achieves only a score of ninety out of one hundred, Iran hovers around twenty-five, which ranks it as 147th out of 180 countries in 2022. Interestingly, its score improved between 2013-2017—when Iran became relatively more open to the outside world—but has sunk sharply since and not improved after hardliners consolidated their power and control over all branches of the regime—thus, validating the saying, “absolute power corrupts absolutely.”

Consensus exists among governance experts that opaque power structures, lack of transparency and accountability, and a weak rule of law are the primary causes of the persistence of corruption in any country. These conditions exist in Iran and have been exacerbated by the decades-long efforts to circumvent international sanctions, even though some steps have been taken to address corruption.

Most notably, Iran signed and ratified the United Nations’ Convention against Corruption. Additionally, high-profile public-sector bribery or fraud cases receive ample media coverage, ranging from vast embezzlement in state-controlled enterprises, such as the $21 billion fraud in Mobarakeh Steel Complex, the $3 billion in Sarmayeh Bank, or in the intricate web of bribery and fraud in the judiciary, as in the case of Akbar Tabari, the deputy to the long-time head of the Judiciary, Ayatollah Sadegh Larijani. These are just a few of the high-profile cases in recent years that have seen the light of day.

In one way or the other, all cases point to the prolific involvement of regime insiders. Some perpetrators have fled and now live comfortably in the West, like Bank Melli General Manager Mohammad Reza Khavari, who presumably embezzled $2.6 billion and reportedly lives in Canada. The perpetrators that were caught have received heavy sentences, while some were executed and others fled. In one instance, one faced a suspicious death in exile for fear of whistleblowing.

These cases have demonstrated the extent of power networks of patronage within the regime and its various factions, often linked to high-level clergy. The very big fish that were caught continue to benefit from protection—even inside prison. In late June, the head of Iran’s prisons revealed that, despite his thirty-one-year sentence, Tabari is no longer in prison and has been set free by the highest judicial authority.

Unfortunately, systemic corruption is likely to get worse. The fragility of the regime and the erosion of its supporters in the wake of the ongoing anti-establishment protests due to Mahsa Jina Amini’s murder, the shifting loyalties within the inner circles, and the uncertainty of the post-Ayatollah Ali Khamenei succession are among some of the factors that create an environment of instability in which those who have an opportunity to steal are likely to do so while they can.

Do sanctions promote corruption?

Some Iranians point fingers for the ever-deepening corruption at the layers and layers of economic sanctions that have been imposed on the country since 1979. Sanctions do create economic distortions that are meant to disrupt normal economic activity, mostly through blocking trade and financial channels. But according to Hashem Pesaran, a prominent Iranian economist, only 20 percent of the economic malaise over a thirty-year period was caused by sanctions, and eighty percent is due to domestic policies.

Nonetheless, efforts to bypass these barriers lead to the emergence of informal or black markets, where corruption can thrive as individuals seek alternative ways to bypass sanctions and obtain necessary goods or services. One such instance is the case of Babak Zanjani—a businessman who, with the consent of officials during the presidency of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad (2005-2013), was tasked to export Iranian oil by evading internationally imposed sanctions and, in the process, siphoned off vast amounts. When the winds of fortune turned, he was arrested for embezzlement. Though initially sentenced to death, he was commuted to a life sentence and there are reports that he had been quietly pardoned since.     

There is considerable debate about the role and effectiveness of international sanctions. Corruption and sanctions were among the topics discussed during an Atlantic Council panel on June 13. There are two opposing views. Some believe that more sanctions are needed to force the Islamic Republic to adopt acceptable behavior, be it in the realm of a nuclear deal, regional relations, human rights, or even bring about regime change. Others contend that regime insiders only benefit from sanctions—that they actually welcome it—while ordinary Iranians bear the brunt. There is evidence that sanction-busting mafias, known as sanction traders, derail any agreement with the West that may lead to sanctions relief as this would erode their economic interests.

Countries that impose sanctions insist that they are targeted toward specific individuals and activities and will not impact average citizens, particularly in the areas of food and medicine. However, the anemic economy combined with the difficulty of repatriating Iran’s foreign exchange earnings has resulted in an ever-weakening rial and high inflation, which Iranians feel daily.

Nevertheless, while there is a plethora of stories on how sanctions hurt the people, there are also daily examples of how sanctions have had little impact on limiting the access of officials to Western luxury goods and lifestyles. Sightings of officials with expensive watches, the latest iPhones, and designer clothes have become routine and questioned in the media. Indeed, a recent report argues that Iranian decision-makers have successfully shielded themselves from the adverse effects of sanctions. In reality, sanctions largely impact those that do not influence the regime’s actions.

Iranians inside and outside the country have long complained that foreign powers are not serious or consistent in applying sanctions. On the one hand, the average Iranian cannot open bank accounts abroad, and often many who opened accounts decades ago were asked to close them for fear of violating sanctions rules. On the other hand, visible trades, such as luxury goods (like a fleet of Porsches or Maseratis) and their payments, slip safely through the sanctions’ walls, and access to them is used as a reward for loyalty to the regime.

The inconsistency leads to suspicions that, contrary to oft-stated objectives that sanctions are not designed to hurt the people of Iran, the West not only knows what it is doing, but is, in fact, a facilitator for the regime against the people, as evident when a German IT firm helped the regime filter and block Internet during the height of the ongoing protests. Recently, it was reported that the infamous Hossein-Ali Nayyeri, one of the four judges who executed several thousand political prisoners in 1988—known as the 1988 massacre—was being treated at a leading neurological center in Germany. It is unimaginable to contend that German officials were unaware of who he is or through what channels the payment was made to cover his exorbitant treatment costs. The United States and Europe must do a better job of walking the talk to ensure that their maximum pressure measures are indeed punishing the ones whose decisions have caused the state in which Iranians find themselves.

A common thread

The frequently publicized cases of bribery, embezzlement, or diversion of funds have become routine. Hence, only the ever-increasing amounts of money and elaborate schemes can temporarily attract people’s attention until the next outrageous corruption case emerges.

A common thread among these cases is their link to the vast politically and ideologically loyal networks of patronage and rent-seeking interests, often including prominent members of the clergy. It is yet another area that the Islamic Republic has failed in making good on its promise of establishing an ethical society. The presence of an elaborate sanctions scheme does not seem to deter these networks. In fact, they seem to thrive more from the resulting opaqueness while the public at large suffers the consequences.

There is a considerable consensus among Iranians inside and outside the country that the regime must be punished for its egregious human rights conduct. Sanctions seem to be the only instrument in the toolbox to bring about behavioral change within the mullahcracy. There is a widely held view that the actions of the US and other Western governments have blocked the access of average Iranians. Yet, the door remains wide open for regime insiders to travel freely, access their oft ill-gotten funds with ease, and whose children live comfortably in the West. Sanctions need to be better targeted and better enforced instead of the West looking the other way.

Nadereh Chamlou is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s empowerME initiative and an international development advisor.

The post Corruption reigns supreme in Iran—and it’s getting worse  appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On August 4, Foreign Policy published its biweekly “It’s Debatable” column featuring Scowcroft Center Vice President and Senior Director Matthew Kroenig and Emma Ashford assessing the latest news in international affairs.

In their latest article, Kroenig and Ashford debate the impetus of coups in fragile states, using the recent 2023 Niger coup as an emblematic case study. Does US military training of foreign officials inflate the tendency for coups, and other instances of state-based violence? Or are underlying economic and institutional concerns the catalyzing factor?

Staff

Matthew Kroenig

Vice President and Senior Director, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

China Defense Policy

The post Kroenig and Ashford debate the impetus of the Niger coup appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The multiple anti-corruption agencies established by Ukraine following the country’s 2014 Euromaidan Revolution have yet to bring any high-ranking corrupt officials or oligarchs to justice. Instead, critics claim these agencies are frequently manipulated and weaponized in order to target reformers. While there have been no landmark breakthroughs in the battle against corruption within state organs, numerous reformers have had their reputations damaged.

For example, Ukraine’s Supreme Court finally acquitted former Ukrainian Transportation Minister Volodymyr Omelyan in March 2023 over charges brought by the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine (NABU) that he illegally ordered the reduction of all port fees by 20 percent while in office. It took this former minister with strong reformist credentials six years and significant legal fees to clear his name and get the charges dismissed.

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

Concerns are now growing over the wartime performance of Ukraine’s anti-corruption agencies. In December 2022, courts in Chernihiv suspended the mayor of the city over a supposed conflict of interest. Vladyslav Atroshchenko had been a fixture in local politics in the city for 20 years, serving as governor and member of parliament before finally becoming mayor. The court ruling to suspend him from office has raised questions over the role of Ukraine’s anti-corruption bodies.

What was the reason for Atroshchenko’s removal? With Chernihiv on the front lines in the first days of the Russian invasion, the mayor used a car belonging to the municipal authorities to send his wife to safety in Poland while he stayed to help with the defense of the city. The car was later returned, but the National Agency for the Prevention of Corruption (NAPC) issued an administrative protocol claiming the mayor had failed to report this alleged “conflict of interest.” A Ukrainian court then ruled to remove the mayor from office on this technicality.

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There are similar concerns in Rivne, where a judge recently suspended the city’s 36-year-old mayor Oleksandr Tretyak on the grounds that he also failed to disclose an alleged conflict of interest. Once again, Ukraine’s anti-corruption agencies are involved. In February 2023, the NAPC issued an administrative protocol against the mayor for a technical “conflict of interest” related to the payment of a bonus to an employee who had made a donation to Tretyak’s election campaign some years earlier while working as a campaign volunteer.

This charge is particularly contentious because bonuses are widely used throughout the Ukrainian government to retain key staff, reward hard work, and discourage the taking of bribes as public officials typically receive low salaries. Nevertheless, the NAPC accused the mayor of failing to inform them of a “conflict of interest.” Critics have alleged that this as an example of unreformed courts working together with anti-corruption agencies to secure politically motivated verdicts. The case is on appeal with an uncertain outcome.

With so many Ukrainians currently making huge sacrifices to ensure the country’s survival, accusations that anti-corruption agencies are being misused to target reformers and political opponents could have a significant negative impact on morale. This alarming trend risks undoing the progress of the past nine years and undermining Ukraine’s chances of achieving further Euro-Atlantic integration. If it remains unaddressed, it could see Ukraine trapped in the geopolitical gray zone and vulnerable to further Russian aggression.

Corruption has long been seen as a critical element of Russian efforts to retain control over Ukraine and prevent the country from decisively exiting the Kremlin orbit. In other words, Russia wins when Ukrainian corruption continues, regardless of the outcome on the battlefield. Ukrainian victory will only come when both Russia and corruption are decisively defeated.

Brian Mefford is the Director of Wooden Horse Strategies, LLC, a governmental-relations and strategic communications firm based in Kyiv. He is a senior nonresident fellow at the Atlantic Council and has lived and worked in Ukraine since 1999.

Further reading

UkraineAlert Jul 13, 2023

After Wagner: Could the Russian army now turn against Putin?

By Mercedes Sapuppo

With dozens of senior Russian officers reportedly detained following the Wagner revolt and a senior commander dismissed this week for criticizing the conduct of the Ukraine invasion, could Putin face a mutiny within the Russian army?

Conflict Crisis Management

UkraineAlert Jun 12, 2023

Beyond the counteroffensive: 84% of Ukrainians are ready for a long war

By Peter Dickinson

84% of Ukrainians reject any compromise with Russia and are ready for a long war if necessary in order to fully de-occupy their country. Most simply see no middle ground between genocide and national survival, writes Peter Dickinson.

Civil Society Conflict

UkraineAlert Jun 21, 2023

Putin’s nuclear threats will escalate as Ukraine’s counteroffensive unfolds

By Diane Francis

As Ukraine’s long-awaited counteroffensive gets underway, there are fears that Russia’s deteriorating military predicament could lead to an escalation in Vladimir Putin’s nuclear threats, writes Diane Francis.

Conflict Disinformation

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

Read more from UkraineAlert

UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia and Central Asia in the East.

Learn more

The post Ukraine must not forget fight against corruption while battling Russia appeared first on Atlantic Council.

This vague wording represented modest progress but fell far short of Ukrainian expectations. In the run-up to the summit, Ukraine and many of the country’s international allies had been calling for a clear signal from NATO regarding future Ukrainian membership. However, while a number of countries have publicly backed Ukraine’s bid to join NATO, there is no unanimity on the issue among the 31-nation alliance. On the eve of this week’s meeting in Lithuania, US President Joe Biden said Ukraine was not ready for membership and claimed it was “premature” to start the accession process in the middle of a war.

Supporters of Ukraine’s bid to join NATO see it as the only way to end Russian aggression against the country and achieve a sustainable peace in Eastern Europe. Anything less, they say, will merely result in a pause before a new Russian invasion as Moscow seeks to achieve its overriding foreign policy goal of extinguishing Ukrainian statehood and returning the country permanently to the Kremlin orbit. Skeptics have responded by noting that the promise of fast-track Ukrainian NATO membership after the war would be likely to convince Putin of the need to prolong hostilities indefinitely. This lack of consensus resulted in what was an underwhelming NATO summit outcome in Vilnius.

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy traveled personally to Lithuania on Tuesday, but his last-minute intervention was unable to sway the doubters and secure the kind of unambiguous membership commitment Ukraine has long sought. “Today I embarked on a trip here with faith in decisions, with faith in partners, with faith in a strong NATO. In a NATO that does not hesitate, does not waste time, and does not look back at any aggressor,” he wrote in a carefully worded but emotionally charged post following publication of the summit declaration. “I would like this faith to become confidence; confidence in the decisions that all of us deserve and every warrior, every citizen, every mother, every child expects. Is that too much to expect?” In a social media commentary posted earlier on Tuesday, he was significantly more outspoken, criticizing NATO’s failure to state a specific membership timeline as “unprecedented and absurd.”

Others were in even less diplomatic mood. “No amount of spin will turn this into a “great” or “historic” summit. Best not even to start,” posted former Estonian President Toomas Hendrik Ilves. Some fellow politicians in the Baltic region clearly agreed. “This is not leadership,” tweeted Lithuanian MP Zygimantas Pavilionis. “This is appeasement that normally leads to final defeat.” In Kyiv, Ukrainian Ambassador for Strategic Communications Olexander Scherba questioned the logic behind the apparent fear among some NATO members of provoking Putin. “The strategy of “not provoking Russia” is in reality a strategy of provoking Russia,” he wrote. “That’s how it goes with bullies. Will the West ever see it?”

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Meanwhile, many in Ukraine expressed anger at the apparent lack of urgency among the country’s international partners. These feelings of frustration were summed up in a powerful post by veteran Ukrainian anti-corruption activist Daria Kaleniuk: “Ukraine needs “strategic patience”. Should I patiently wait until a Russian missile strikes my apartment in Kyiv with my kids inside? Or should I patiently wait for my son to turn eighteen and go to fight in a war against the largest threat to NATO? Delays cost lives!”

Despite the undeniable mood of anti-climax in Ukraine, the country’s famed wartime spirit of resilience was also on display as Ukrainians reacted to news from Lithuania. “Disappointment but not discouragement. Next stop, Washington DC,” posted Alyona Getmanchuk, director of the Kyiv-based New Europe Center think tank and nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center, in reference to next year’s NATO summit, which is scheduled to take place in the US capital.

Ukrainian MP Oleksiy Goncharenko echoed this sentiment regarding the need to focus on securing a firm membership commitment at the 2024 summit, but warned that further delays could have grave consequences for public opinion in Ukraine. If there is no progress toward joining NATO by this time next year, he wrote, Ukrainians will ask: “So we are good enough to die for democracy and not good enough to live together with other free nations in one alliance?”

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

Further reading

UkraineAlert Jun 29, 2023

Putin’s Wagner weakness is a signal to support Ukraine’s counteroffensive

By Taras Kuzio

With the short-lived Wagner mutiny exposing Vladimir Putin’s weakness for all to see, the time has come for Ukraine’s Western partners to provide the country with everything it needs to secure victory, writes Taras Kuzio.

Conflict Freedom and Prosperity

UkraineAlert Jun 12, 2023

Beyond the counteroffensive: 84% of Ukrainians are ready for a long war

By Peter Dickinson

84% of Ukrainians reject any compromise with Russia and are ready for a long war if necessary in order to fully de-occupy their country. Most simply see no middle ground between genocide and national survival, writes Peter Dickinson.

Civil Society Conflict

UkraineAlert Jun 21, 2023

Putin’s nuclear threats will escalate as Ukraine’s counteroffensive unfolds

By Diane Francis

As Ukraine’s long-awaited counteroffensive gets underway, there are fears that Russia’s deteriorating military predicament could lead to an escalation in Vladimir Putin’s nuclear threats, writes Diane Francis.

Conflict Disinformation

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

Read more from UkraineAlert

UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia and Central Asia in the East.

Learn more

The post NATO summit leaves Ukrainians frustrated appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The questions surrounding the June 23-24 events—which, were it not for the nuclear warheads and the casualties, would easily merit the qualification of vaudevillian—have multiplied. One is particularly relevant: What are the consequences for the war in Ukraine? More specifically, how does this plot twist affect Europe’s security? 

If one imagines matryoshka dolls (Russian stacking dolls) as a symbol of Russian politics, the Wagner organization has existed because of—and for—Russian President Vladimir Putin. It depended—with all the ambiguity the term implies in the context of the whims of an all-powerful tsar and the personalistic nature of power—on three institutions also apparently controlled by the president: the Russian armed forces, its military intelligence (GRU), and the Federal Security Service (FSB). Notably, the intervention of these institutions in the rebellion—if any—was unclear. 

The structure built by Putin has become a snake pit. Perhaps a “house of cards” is a more fitting term. Having previously refrained from sanctioning Yevgeniy Prigozhin, the ruthless leader of the Wagner paramilitary group, Putin spoke following the mutiny of punishing his enemies, even if such efforts are complicated by Wagner’s penetration into the Russian elite. The first arrest related to these consequences (still unconfirmed) appears to be that of Russian General Sergey Surovikin. 

Prigozhin had been engaged in a power struggle with the military leadership for some time. Specifically, his attacks have targeted Russian Minister of Defense Sergei Shoigu and Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov. The confrontation was exacerbated after last February’s invasion by the increasing relevance that the head mercenary and his followers have gained. Their relative effectiveness compared to the regular Russian army—which collapsed in the early onslaught of the war—brought Wagner into the spotlight inside and outside of Russia. In addition to its military actions, the group’s cruelty went viral on social media, as did its sermons in the courtyards of the prisons Wagner forces toured, recruiting convicted criminals of all kinds.

The mercenary leader’s strong connection with the great leader—a connection forged during the murky stage of the president’s public debut in Saint Petersburg in the 1990s—seemed to give Prigozhin a blank check. He first emerged on the scene as “Putin’s chef,” a nickname earned from managing the catering service of someone well acquainted with the dangers at the table, himself being a master in the use of poison as a political weapon. 

Before the insurrection, the outspoken warrior had been making accusations of all kinds of irregularities, misconduct, and mistreatment against his two enemies: that they had claimed credit for Wagner’s victory in Bakhmut, that men were dying so they could “get fat in their mahogany offices,” and that they had denied his fighters necessary ammunition and support. And, most importantly, that they had deceived Putin about the progress of the military campaign. 

The speech that kicked off the mutiny goes even further. No one had dared to question Putin’s justification of the invasion based on a victim mentality incessantly fed to the Russian people. The few in Russia who dared to dissent, such as Vladimir Kara-Murza, immediately found themselves behind bars. 

Thus, Prigozhin’s words should be considered inflammatory: a qualified member of the establishment dared to openly and boldly denounce the falsehood of “the story that there was insane aggression on the part of Ukraine, and they were going to attack [Russia] together with the entire NATO bloc.” Careful not to mention the president by name, he stated that, contrary to Kremlin messaging, the war served “not to demilitarize and de-Nazify Ukraine,” but rather “it was launched for completely different reasons.” He implied that the disaster was orchestrated by high-ranking military officials (driven by economic greed and vanity), in combination with “some oligarchs.”

Putin’s response was not long in coming. In his televised address on June 24, he labeled the uprising as “a stab in the back of [the] country and [the] people.” His references to the Russian Empire—a frequent topic of his outdated musings—were to be expected, but his implicit identification with the ill-fated Tsar Nicholas II was surprising. 

He equated the situation triggered by Prigozhin to the prelude of the upheaval of 1917, which led to the collapse of the system. Was he seeking, in his association with the tragic figure, a symbolic reincarnation of the tsar—in his case, having made the right decisions to avoid falling into the black hole of violence that characterized those years when “Russians killed Russians, brothers killed brothers”? It was a diatribe made with his citizens in mind, who retain a collective memory of that terrible period and who found their livelihoods crushed during the 1990s following the dissolution of the Soviet Union. 

During the uprising, the lack of response was salient, both from the siloviki (the economic and political elite) and the common people. There was no notable support of—or clear opposition to—Putin, who exploits the fact that people cling to the status quo out of fear of the unknown. 

Prigozhin has nonetheless proven to be a torpedo aimed at Putin’s narrative. He punctured the myth of a war of necessity, of an inevitable war for historical justice. He undermined Putin’s explanation of an existential struggle against US aggression disguised as NATO. Furthermore, the turmoil has shattered the thesis that the Euro-Atlantic community must not humiliate Putin for fear of provoking him, with the unpredictable consequences regarding the use of nuclear weapons that doing so would entail. This thesis has justified the countries’ stinginess in sending to Ukraine certain equipment classified as offensive and the West’s delay in accepting stark realities, such as the urgent need for full operational readiness in the air. 

The Euro-Atlantic community must move away from the habit of delaying decisions based on speculation about the consequences of its actions for third parties. It needs to look beyond the pipe dream of an immediate peace negotiation based on the stalemate on the front or a Kremlin-asserted “right” to subjugated areas. NATO allies’ opportunity to demonstrate determination when facing Russia will come soon—on July 11 in Vilnius at the NATO Summit. 

Ana Palacio is a former minister of foreign affairs of Spain (2002-2004) and former senior vice president and general counsel of the World Bank Group. She is also a member of the Atlantic Council’s Board of Directors.

A version of this article originally appeared in El Mundo. It has been translated from Spanish by the staff of Palacio y Asociados and is reprinted here with the author’s and publisher’s permission.

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On June 13, the Atlantic Council’s Iran Strategy Project hosted a virtual event, “The Mechanisms of Corruption in Iran” to discuss the nature of corruption and sanctions in Iran as well as the social, economic, and political implications of these issues.

The Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative Director, Jonathan Panikoff conducted opening remarks, stating that discussions of Iran’s current economic situation must also address the corruption that exists within the country given its rampant nature. This was emphasized by Atlantic Council nonresident senior fellow Nadereh Chamlou who served as the moderator for the session.

In order to discuss the complexities of corruption within Iran, it is first important to define corruption. Associate Professor of Finance at the University of Dallas, Ali Dadpay, explained that corruption is the use of a public position for personal gain. Dadpay shared how this phenomenon manifests in situations such as the importation of luxury vehicles into the Islamic Republic. He recalled how foreign made vehicles were banned from Iran, however, members of Parliament were able to import foreign made luxury vehicles due to their positions of power.

Causes of Sanctions and Corruption

The beginning of the conversation included a review of the causes of corruption in Iran and specifically analyzed the role that sanctions play in its prevalence. To initiate the discussion, Chamlou mentioned a study by one of Iran’s top economists that found only 20% of corruption can be traced back to sanctions, whereas 80% is attributed to other factors. This begs the question, what could that something else be?

Entrepreneur Majid Zamani claimed that while sanctions are not the only cause of this corruption, they have created a plethora of opportunities for rent-seeking, which only those who are ideologically connected to the regime have access to.

Within Iran specifically, Zamani discussed the existence of a theocratic system, stating that because people are selected for leadership based on their loyalty to ideology, rather than merit, the political system is poorly organized and thus more susceptible to corruption. Furthermore, Dadpay argued that because Iran has a nationalized economy with extensive regulations, as opposed to a globalized economy, the government benefits from corruption and monopolization. Zamani added that the banking system epitomizes this vulnerability to corruption due to the interest rates, corrupting all loans.

Impact of Corruption & Sanctions

The panel then moved to the discussion of how corruption and sanctions have manifested in Iranian society. Given the US Government’s prioritization of US interests, as opposed to those of the Iranian community, Atlantic Council’s nonresident senior fellow Brian O’Toole and Dadpay both recognized that even though these sanctions are targeted, they will ultimately influence all Iranians, by creating a demand for sanctions evasion and a market that avoids financial responsibility. When asked whether Iranians could avoid corruption in the private sector and still succeed, Zamani claimed that the entire private sector in Iran is impacted by its relationship to the government. However, there is a spectrum of involvement, with one end including those who are loyal to the government and comfortable with the corruption and the other end comprising of individuals trying to avoid engaging in corrupt behaviors but ultimately having to comply at times in order to survive. He also clarified that although they do not make up the majority of the GPD, the Iranian private sector includes small market owners and medical professionals, occupations that comprise the bulk of society.

How to address it

After discussing the causes and effects of corruption in Iranian society, the panelists moved to their recommendations as to how to address it. O’Toole said that it takes time, so patience and persistence are crucial, and tackling corruption begins by addressing root problems. While pursuing flashy cases of corruption may be more alluring, it often only targets a single perpetrator rather than the source. To tackle the wider system would require transparency at every stage, even the more mundane. Dadpay agreed with O’Toole, advocating for a clear and transparent legal framework and stating that accountability in corruption cannot be achieved without an explicit and independent judiciary branch. In order to achieve transparency and accountability, according to Zamani, civil society must demand it from the government, through civil disobedience and outward refusal to engage in a corrupt system of governance. Lastly, moderator Chamlou included her own belief that tackling corruption in Iran would require dismantling networks of patronage and government insiders.

Masoud Mostajabi is a Deputy Director at the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs.

Britt Gronemeyer is a Young Global Professional with the Middle East Programs at the Atlantic Council. 

The post The mechanisms of corruption in Iran appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Sandra Torres, a well-known but polarizing figure in her third bid for the presidency, and Bernardo Arevalo, a congressman, first-time presidential hopeful, and former diplomat with a strong anti-graft message, have advanced to the second round, which will be held on August 20. The low voter turnout of 60 percent and high percentage of null votes—four times as high as in the last elections, making up nearly a quarter of all votes—reflect a prevailing sense of apathy among Guatemalan voters and an erosion of confidence in an electoral process that, to date, has been marred by seemingly arbitrary court decisions on candidates’ eligibility to run. For this cycle, political parties brought a record number of legal actions against each other, with at least three presidential candidates and other candidates for congress barred from running.

Nonetheless, Guatemala’s runoff election to replace term-limited Alejandro Giammattei will have far-reaching implications, both for the region and beyond. For one, Guatemala’s next president will be less ideologically conservative than the last three administrations in Central America’s most populous country. The emergence of more left-leaning governments is in line with trends from other recent elections in the region (Honduras, Chile, Colombia, and Brazil, for example).

The next president’s decision to align with China or maintain relations with Taiwan will reverberate beyond Guatemala’s borders. The outcome could determine whether the Biden administration has a reliable partner for its strategy in Central America—which is designed to help quell the surge of migrants on the US-Mexico border and to combat graft and corruption. And the economic challenges facing the country, including poverty, inequality, and fiscal deficits will require comprehensive policy measures and hard reforms from whoever takes office in 2024. That’s a tall order when considering the two candidates for the August runoff.

Geopolitical implications

Guatemala is host to one of the last two Taiwanese embassies in Central America (the other is in Belize), and one of only seven in Latin America and the Caribbean. The outcome of the runoff election has the potential to tip the region’s balance toward China once and for all, thus shaping the future trajectory of not just Guatemala but also the broader interests of the United States and the rest of the Western Hemisphere. China has been calling on Guatemala to make the “right choice” and has overtly increased its footprint in the region in the last few months—first through Honduras’ decision to break off ties with Taiwan in March and then with reports of late-stage talks for the establishment of a Chinese military training facility in Cuba. Despite this, leading candidate Torres has vowed to maintain diplomatic ties with Taiwan. Arevalo’s position is less clear. He has stated that Guatemala’s sovereignty and interests are most important and that there is no reason to “jump trains.” After all, China is Guatemala’s second-biggest commercial partner, behind the United States.

Closer to home, the runoff election results may determine the extent to which the next Guatemalan government is willing to collaborate with the United States to address matters such as irregular migration, corruption, and transnational crime. As a political insider whose party has been embroiled in several corruption investigations, Torres is seen as unlikely to take strong measures against suspected corruption within the party system. On the other hand, Arevalo is known as the anti-corruption congressman. His party—Movimiento Semilla—is all but a symbol of the 2015 “Guatemalan Spring,” which resulted in the resignation and arrest of then-president Otto Perez Molina. Arevalo announced on Monday that if he were to win the election, he would convene former judges and prosecutors to create a national anti-corruption advisory group. With increasingly unreliable allies across the region, the Biden-Harris administration’s ability to carry out its strategy toward Central America hinges upon the election of a trustworthy and dependable leader in Guatemala.

Economic implications

Guatemala is the largest economy in Central America, but with some of the highest rates of poverty and inequality in the region, as well as the lowest rate of tax collection in Latin America. While Torres would likely continue with a more conservative economic agenda focused on macroeconomic stability, market-oriented reforms, attraction of foreign investment, and fiscal discipline, less is known about Arevalo’s plan. The next president will also have to deal with a growing fiscal deficit and continued social demands. The president will need to work with a split Congress to pass budgets—the country failed to do so in 2020 and 2021, when protestors set the Capitol on fire—to support the population’s needs and continue to improve the country’s basic infrastructure. To address the low rates of tax revenue in relation to the size of the economy, the next administration will also have to undertake important reforms on the fiscal front.  

Should Torres win in August, she would likely pursue a robust social domestic agenda—she’s already promised bags of basic food items for the most vulnerable and cuts in taxes on basic foods. Meanwhile, Arevalo has floated the idea of a public hospital for cancer treatment and a state-owned enterprise that would create a network of pharmacies with medicines at “fair prices.” But his economic plan, which will need some refinement over the next six weeks, depends on the creation of “jobs, jobs, jobs”—the lack of which is a main driver of migration in Guatemala. Arevalo has laid out plans to bring Guatemala’s citizens into the formal economy while vowing to eradicate poverty and boost quality education. With increasingly few resources to finance the robust social programs these center-left candidates are proposing, breaking ties with Taiwan in favor of China could just make economic sense. This would be especially attractive if a landmark infrastructure project accompanied the announcement. For example, Costa Rica received a national stadium in 2011. More recently, El Salvador received a stadium and a library in 2019, and, following President Xiomara Castro’s announcement of breaking diplomatic ties with Taiwan this year, Honduras received a pledge for Chinese investment in a major hydroelectric dam project.

Guatemala’s voters will likely be most concerned with their pocketbooks when they head to the ballot box in August. Urban centers want a leader who will work to root out corruption—which could give Arevalo an edge. But their choice will reverberate far beyond the country’s borders and could reshape the geopolitical map in the hemisphere.  

María Fernanda Bozmoski is the deputy director of programs at the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center.

Eva Lardizábal is an assistant director at the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center.

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As Wagner forces turned toward Moscow, Putin called Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev to brief him on the situation. Kazakhstan’s readout of the call was brief but called the rebellion “an internal affair of Russia.” This seemingly mundane bit of diplomat-speak carried an outsized amount of geopolitical weight—it implied that Kazakhstan would not help Russia in its “internal affair.” Just eighteen months ago, Tokayev had called the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) to help shore up his own mandate when popular protests spun into an armed uprising. Hours later, 2,500 mostly Russian CSTO troops entered Kazakhstan, violently put down the unrest, and exited the country six days later. Now, with Putin facing a similarly fast-moving threat, Tokayev signaled that Kazakhstan wouldn’t be there to help. 

Tokayev’s indifference is even more interesting in the context of his Eurasian Economic Union (EEAU) speech on May 24 chiding Putin for his ultra-close relations with Belarus at the expense of the other members of the EEAU, including Kazakhstan. Kazakhstan and Russia share the world’s longest land border, but Tokayev may continue to seek diplomatic space between Astana and Moscow.

Almost 750 kilometers south of Rostov-on-Don, Georgia’s borders remained open even as President Salome Zourabichvili called on Prime Minister Irakli Garibashvili to convene the country’s security council and urged authorities to secure its border crossings with Russia. Garibashvili opted not to call the security council together and appeared to take no measures at all to prepare for any potential ripple effects of instability in Rostov-on-Don and beyond. Both the president and prime minister belong to the anti-Western Georgian Dream (GD) party, which has sought closer ties with Moscow as a means of ensuring “stability” for Georgia. The Prigozhin rebellion undermines some of GD’s talking points as it looks to consolidate power ahead of hotly contested parliamentary elections in October 2024.

Putin’s calls to Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev and Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan yielded relatively neutral readouts, though Pashinyan asked to stay apprised of further developments. While Pashinyan has expressed anger at the fecklessness of the CSTO to support Armenia’s defense against Azerbaijan, Russia remains the nominal guarantor of stability in the disputed region of Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia’s key backer. A weaker Russia would further strengthen Azerbaijan’s hand in peace negotiations.

While the mutiny was ongoing, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan declared Ankara’s readiness to play a role ensuring “peace and harmony” in Russia. Iran’s foreign ministry spokesperson emphasized support for “rule of law.” Both countries already maintain commercial and military ties with Moscow but don’t depend on the Kremlin for legitimacy or as a power backstop. Each could seek to leverage Kremlin weakness and extract further concessions.

The end of the immediate crisis came via Russia’s closest neighbor and ally: Belarusian dictator Alyaksandr Lukashenka won credibility with Putin for brokering the agreement that halted Prigozhin’s march on Moscow. For years, Putin has financially backed Lukashenka’s grip on power with billions of dollars and more recently has moved to integrate Belarus into a “union state” with Russia. The Prigozhin agreement turned the tables on Putin, making the oft-bumbling Lukashenka look competent, decisive, and more useful to the Kremlin—at least for now.

But Lukashenka may soon face his own problems at home. The Kastus Kalinouski Regiment, which currently fights on the side of the Ukrainian army, issued a call to take up arms against the Lukashenka regime. The democratic forces of Belarus, led by Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, also reinvigorated opposition efforts to oust the longstanding dictator.

And the war in next-door Ukraine carried on. There, observers watched with glee as Russian authorities squirmed and flailed to try to maintain order in four Russian regions. Ukrainian memes mocked and cheered on Russian infighting, while Ukraine’s armed forces liberated a village that had been under Moscow’s occupation since 2014. 

When Prigozhin agreed to halt Wagner’s advance, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy took a more serious tone; he acknowledged the chaos but appealed to the West for more support: “Ukrainian soldiers, Ukrainian guns, Ukrainian tanks, Ukrainian missiles are all that protect Europe from such marches as we see today on Russian territory.” Prigozhin’s march toward Moscow began not over Russia’s maximalist goals in Ukraine, but over the methods by which they should achieve them. Kyiv is gearing up for the war to continue, despite turmoil in Russia. Even amid the confusion, Russian forces fired rockets at civilian apartment blocks in Kyiv, killing three people.

Prigozhin’s Wagner insurrection exposed the brittle nature of the Putin regime and the limits to the power it can project even within Russian borders. Russia’s preeminence in Eurasia was once taken as a given, but the specter of Russian power may now be waning, with major implications for the region. Leaders and elites across Eurasia will now be closely tuned in to Moscow for further signs of weakness. Declining Kremlin power could usher in a new era of more independent foreign policies in Central Asia and the South Caucasus, as countries look to grow relations with the US-led West, China, and Turkey.

Andrew D’Anieri is assistant director at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center. Follow him on Twitter at @andrew_danieri.

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Imran Khan, Pakistan’s former prime minister, has been on the warpath in the streets of Pakistan against the military-led establishment ever since he was voted out by parliament last year. Once seen as the military’s darling and reportedly assisted by the military and its intelligence agencies in the elections that brought him to power in 2018, he has now turned on the army and its chief. In an interview with the Atlantic Council this week, he also claimed that the former army chief General Qamar Javed Bajwa told him “frequently” that the army was not equipped or prepared for a war with India.

In the interview, conducted June 18, Khan confirmed that there was indeed an opening for peace with India—despite New Delhi’s rescinding of disputed Jammu and Kashmir’s semi-autonomous status in 2019—and the Pakistani army chief favored it. (Bajwa had previously revealed this plan to reporters.) Normalizing trade between the two nuclear-armed countries was reportedly one of the steps that was to be taken before Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi could visit Pakistan.

Watch the full interview

However, despite successfully deescalating a military standoff in 2019, Khan couldn’t explain why he faltered on trade normalization with New Delhi after India changed its relationship with the disputed territory of Kashmir by removing its special status in the Indian union. Khan responded to India’s Kashmir move by closing the border for trade with India.

“I don’t remember the trade talks,” Khan said. “All I know is that there was supposed to be a quid pro quo. India was supposed to give some concession, give some sort of a roadmap to Kashmir, and I was going to then host Prime Minister Modi in Pakistan. But it never materialized.”

Bajwa’s plan, which included a ceasefire with Indian forces on the Line of Control in Kashmir, was a lost opportunity for establishing long-term peace with Pakistan’s archrival. “I tried everything, but I came across this brick wall,” Khan said. “And I realized it’s something to do with the RSS-BJP [the Modi-aligned ideological movement and political party] mentality where they’ve cashed in on hostility with Pakistan. That’s all.”

Transcript

Jun 20, 2023

Read Imran Khan’s full Atlantic Council interview on failed peace with India, Pakistan’s plight, and his own fate

By Atlantic Council

In an Atlantic Council conversation, former Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan shared details about a potential peace plan with India and discussed the future economic and political prospects for Pakistan.

Economy & Business Elections

Currently, Khan says he is facing nearly 160 legal cases, ranging from terrorism to corruption to conspiracy against the state—a roster that keeps him busy court-hopping to secure bail or relief. The seventy-year-old former cricket champion-turned-populist firebrand spends his weekdays commuting from city to city in protective gear to attend court hearings. Every evening, he addresses his followers on YouTube from his residence in Lahore, which just last month was surrounded by security forces.

Khan said he fears that he may be incarcerated over the next two weeks but admitted that he’s “prepared for everything,” including the prospect of being assassinated. (Khan was wounded in an assassination attempt last November and claims to have survived another plot in March.)

Reviewing his performance as premier, Khan admitted to political blunders during his tenure, including granting an extension of service to Bajwa, who Khan claims was responsible for engineering his ouster. He did not elaborate on the exact reasons for their break-up.

Khan confessed that he was dependent on the military’s clout to push his reforms through parliament because he had a weak coalition government with a razor-thin majority. But this admission—needing the military to remain in power—runs counter to his claim that he didn’t need or get the military’s support to achieve power in the 2018 general elections.

“If you want a reform program and to take on the big mafias, you cannot do it if you have a coalition with government, with a thin majority, you can’t do it,” Khan said. “So that is the mistake I made. And that’s why I became more and more dependent on the army chief, because he could get a budget passed because they have the clout. It’s exactly what’s happening right now. If the military withdraws support, this coalition would fall apart in days.”

Crucially, Khan also said he sacked the current army chief, General Asim Munir, from his previous position as the director-general of the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) because he “couldn’t work with him.” He did not explain why. Yet he went on to declare his willingness to talk to the all-powerful chief of army staff now—but not to his civilian counterparts—an unsustainable position in a multi-party parliamentary democracy that he wants to lead again. Claims by former members of Khan’s own party suggest that Khan sacked Munir because he had alleged that Khan’s wife was involved in corruption; Khan has denied these allegations.

While Khan defended his economic and foreign policy record and claimed that his Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI, or Movement for Justice) is the most popular party in the country’s history, he also claimed that ceding further space to Pakistan’s all-powerful military while he was in power was the right thing to do—until it wasn’t.

But as Pakistan faces the prospect of economic default, and his quest for an immediate election seems to be waning, Khan stands isolated. Over one hundred of his party leaders, including many senior deputies, have left the PTI, through what he claims is coercion by the military. Thousands of party workers face trials over the riots of May 9, when many Pakistanis took to the streets to attack government and military installations while protesting what Khan says was his provocative detention, designed to trigger mass outrage.

“The country is going into a black hole,” he said. “The only policy is to get rid of Imran Khan. That’s no policy. I mean, what is the future of Pakistan?”

Meanwhile, the military-backed regime continues its legal and information crackdown against sections of the press and public who dare to support Khan on mainstream and social media. Also, as the military claims that Khan and the PTI leadership tried to sow dissent in the rank and file of the all-powerful army—treason by definition and law—Khan has denied that he has any active links to senior military leadership.

None of Pakistan’s foreign friends and allies have issued any statements in favor of Khan. The US State Department said last week that it would refrain from comment as Khan is a “private citizen”—a categorization that he shrugged off without expressing regrets about his bashing of the United States following his ouster. Khan continued to blame a senior US official for, as Khan claims, making his removal as prime minister a condition for US assistance and goodwill—a claim that he watered down earlier this year while blaming Bajwa for poisoning the US view of Khan through Husain Haqqani, Pakistan’s former ambassador to Washington. (Haqqani has rejected Khan’s allegations as baseless and his attorney has issued a cease-and-desist notice to Khan, threatening legal action if Khan keeps on alleging Haqqani’s involvement in the former premier’s ouster. The US State Department has said that “there is not and there has never been a truth to” Khan’s claims that the United States was involved in removing him from power, adding that “we will not let propaganda, misinformation, and disinformation get in the way of any bilateral relationship, including our valued bilateral [partnership] with Pakistan.”)*

Further evidence of Khan’s shifting position is his party’s active support for lobbying efforts inside the United States, including letters from members of the US Congress admonishing the Pakistani military’s crackdown. Furthermore, not a single influential member of the fifty-seven-state Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), a grouping that Khan claims to have galvanized, has come out in support of him.

Khan has responded by saying that as long as he has the people of Pakistan behind him, he doesn’t need foreign help. How he will do this now is unclear considering that many of his party’s senior leaders have deserted him after having been arrested and released by the authorities. Khan claims they were coerced and has named new, younger members to replace them. He believes strongly that he is still the most popular political leader in Pakistan and this will help him yet again in the elections that currently are expected to be held in October or November.

Khan said that popularity is the reason why his enemies have tried to kill him. “As long as that reason is there, they could try again,” he said. “So, in that sense, mentally, I mean I have overcome the fear of dying. I feel that I should be prepared for everything.”

Wajahat S. Khan is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s South Asia Center and an Emmy-nominated journalist and author. He is the former bureau chief in Kabul and Islamabad for NBC News.

This article was updated to include the US State Department’s denials of Khan’s allegations about US involvement in his ouster.

The post Imran Khan on the failed India-Pakistan thaw and why he’s ‘prepared for everything’—even death appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The recent destruction of the Kakhovka dam is one of over 90,000 suspected Russian war crimes in Ukraine. Clearly, no reconstruction of Ukraine can succeed unless Russia is completely deprived of the resources to continue its invasion. The international community cannot have a meaningful conversation on recovery or reconstruction unless international companies that continue to feed Putin’s war chest cease their business operations in Russia entirely.

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When Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine first began in February 2022, some Western businesses demonstrated swift and early exits from the Russian market, putting values over profit. While these often high profile departures generated a lot of media coverage, in reality the majority of Western firms have chosen to remain in Russia.

According to data from the Kyiv School of Economics (KSE), out of 1,361 Western companies with Russian subsidiaries at the start of the full-scale invasion, only 241 (17%) have completely exited Russia. The remaining Western companies generated $136 billion in revenues during 2022, thus helping the Kremlin to finance the war in Ukraine.

Perhaps even more staggering than these numbers are the excuses used by the leadership of Western multinationals to justify their continued presence in Russia. The most common justifications for persisting with “business as usual” in Putin’s Russia primarily revolve around the provision of essential goods. This argument is widely cited despite the fact that it is rarely supported by the nature of the businesses in question.

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It should be crystal clear by now: All western companies that have not left the Russian market since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine began almost seventeen months ago are complicit in the Putin regime’s war crimes and crimes against humanity. In a very real sense, Western businesses that refuse to leave Russia are silent enablers of Putin’s invasion. Any meaningful conversation about Ukraine’s recovery and reconstruction should start by shedding a bright light on the issue of corporate complicity.

Ukraine’s true recovery can only happen when international businesses realize this is not just a war against Ukraine. They must acknowledge that this is a Russian war against the entire rules-based international order. It is a very deliberate Russian attack on the peace and stability that Western businesses have greatly benefited from over the years.

International efforts to advance Ukraine’s recovery are absolutely vital. Priorities should include rebuilding Ukrainian human capital and upgrading Ukraine’s energy infrastructure to set the country firmly on the path toward a green energy future. International companies have a tremendously important role to play in this process, but actions and values must also align.  

By countering Russia, Ukraine is providing an invaluable service to the entire free world. Ukrainians who are risking their lives want to deal with international businesses that are ready to sacrifice part of their profit. We do not want to deal with war profiteers, but with those who understand that there is more at stake than just the bottom line. This is what the new era of corporate social responsibility is all about. In Ukraine, any company’s commitment to corporate social responsibility is measured by its willingness to accept a drop in revenues in order to disable the Russian war machine.

The flooding that resulted from the recent dam destruction in southern Ukraine is flushing down the reputation of companies still doing business with and in Russia. Western businesses carry an important responsibility in places where they operate, especially in conflict-ridden areas. Such companies can no longer afford to sit on two sides of the same fence. Either they are part of Ukraine’s reconstruction and recovery efforts, or continue to support the destruction of its physical and human capital by feeding the Kremlin’s war chest.

Nataliya Popovych is a co-founder and steering committee member of B4Ukraine and the founder and president of One Philosophy. 

Further reading

UkraineAlert Jun 12, 2023

Beyond the counteroffensive: 84% of Ukrainians are ready for a long war

By Peter Dickinson

84% of Ukrainians reject any compromise with Russia and are ready for a long war if necessary in order to fully de-occupy their country. Most simply see no middle ground between genocide and national survival, writes Peter Dickinson.

Civil Society Conflict

Fast Thinking Jun 7, 2023

Has Ukraine’s counteroffensive really begun?

By Atlantic Council

Atlantic Council experts share their insights on the intensifying war in Ukraine.

Conflict Europe & Eurasia

UkraineAlert Jun 19, 2023

Beyond the battlefield: Why we should invest in Ukraine’s democratic future

By Peter Erben, Gio Kobakhidze

Western military aid has helped Ukraine defend itself against Russia’s full-scale invasion, but the West must also support Ukraine’s efforts to consolidate the country’s democracy, argue Peter Erben and Gio Kobakhidze.

Civil Society Conflict

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

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The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia and Central Asia in the East.

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The post Western companies are still financing the Russian invasion of Ukraine appeared first on Atlantic Council.

However, the core issues in Iraq lie not within the country’s political structure but rather in the quality of its leadership. Effective governance and stability require democratic leaders and a robust civil society. The international community, particularly the United States and Europe, must play a constructive role in guiding Iraqi civil society toward a more democratic and stable future.

Iraq faced immense challenges during its monarchy era, from 1924 to 1958. Political instability, limited representation, socioeconomic inequality, regional tensions, foreign interference, and inadequate development plagued the country. The monarchy’s dominance hindered democracy, while socioeconomic disparities and regional divisions fueled unrest. Insufficient infrastructure, education, and healthcare further impeded progress. 

In 1958, public discontent led to the monarchy’s overthrow. During the subsequent republic era, from 1958 to 2003 and under leaders like Saddam Hussein, Iraq witnessed a transition to a presidential republic. Divisions, instability, foreign conflicts, and crippling sanctions revealed the limitations of both systems. Iraq’s journey towards stability and effective governance remains an ongoing struggle.

The US-led invasion in 2003 brought about a new constitution and transformed Iraq’s political system into a federal parliamentary republic. The parliament emerged as the most powerful government branch, with the authority to vote in or out the president and prime minister, pass the budget bill, ratify international conventions, and approve cabinet and ambassadorship positions. The parliament, which is known as the Council of Representatives, is one of the most diverse elected councils in the Middle East; Iraqi groups, particularly women and minorities, are represented proportionally. Despite obstacles and the influence of money and weapons, Iraq has managed to hold national elections regularly every four years. This has resulted in peaceful transitions of power, a significant achievement that was lacking in Iraq prior to 2003. 

Recently, in his Foreign Policy article, former Iraqi President Barham Salih called for what is essentially a presidential system. This call harkened back to the message of the Tishreen protest movement, made up of Iraqis taking to the streets in October 2019 to demand political reform. Multiple Shia political figures have also expressed their support for a presidential system. 

While some argue that a shift to a presidential system—with a balanced legislative branch and a president elected through popular vote—could help overcome Iraq’s sectarian divide and facilitate reforms, what really matters is the quality of leadership and the resilience of civil society. There is a misperception among the Iraqi youth as well as the elite that only a strongman can fix Iraq’s many problems while the issues are way more complex than that. The current constitution, despite its shortcomings, provides the necessary tools that Iraqi leaders need to establish a stable, prosperous, and democratic country. For example, the Iraqi Political Party Law of 2015 provides legal tools to establish new parties—currently, there are hundreds of new parties registered in Iraq. This may lead to chaos, but it defuses political disagreement among various groups. Additionally, the constitution gave significant executive power to a prime minister to rule the country, while giving the parliament strong oversight. 

What Iraq truly needs are democratic leaders who prioritize the nation’s interests over personal gain. For example, Iraq needs leaders that will prioritize job-creation reforms, rather than channeling public wealth to buy votes. Iraq also needs a strong civil society capable of uniting Iraqis on crucial matters. Leaders must be willing to make necessary compromises, embrace diversity, and treat citizens based on democratic principles rather than sectarian or ethnic identities. The achievement of democracy and stability relies on democratic leadership and a vibrant civil society that effectively mobilizes people towards shared national goals. 

Unfortunately, Iraq currently lacks a robust civil society capable of nationwide mobilization and unity. Furthermore, the existing political party structure fails to embrace Iraq’s diversity, favoring specific sects, ethnicities, or religious groups. Although the October 2019 demonstrations showed promise in uniting Iraqi youth across ethnic and sectarian lines on economic and justice issues, their aspirations were not fully realized in reshaping the political landscape.

How the international community plays a role

Iraq’s current parliamentary system faces significant obstacles, such as sectarianism, ethnic division, political fragmentation, corruption, weakness in its institutions, security concerns, and socioeconomic and development issues. Tackling these issues requires a concerted effort to strengthen institutions and, in those institutions, promote inclusivity, combat corruption, foster reconciliation, and ensure effective governance. But efforts to take on these challenges shouldn’t focus solely on institutional change—they should also focus on investing in the current and future leaders of the country. 

The international community, particularly the United States and Europe, has made significant investments in Iraq’s democratic system. Unfortunately, corruption and sectarianism have undermined these investments over time, highlighting that it’ll take an extensive and holistic strategy to improve democracy in Iraq. 

That strategy should first include investments in Iraqi youth, as they will ultimately shape the country’s future. The United States and European Union should specifically prioritize empowering Iraqi youth, developing their leadership abilities, and creating a sense of national unity. By investing in education, creating opportunities for civic participation, and providing platforms for dialogue and cooperation among the diverse communities within Iraq’s borders, international support could foster a new generation of democratic leaders that prioritize all Iraqis’ interests over individual interests.

Additionally, the international community should increase its financial support for civil-society organizations in Iraq, as these play an instrumental role in reconciling ethnic divisions while promoting democratic principles among younger people.

By supporting the development of Iraqi youth and promoting a robust civil society, the international community can help invest in Iraq’s democratic future, unify all Iraqis, and lead the country towards peace, prosperity, and democratic stability.

Sarkawt Shamsulddin is a nonresident fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs and was a member of the Iraqi Parliament from 2018 to 2021.

The post How the international community can help Iraq on a path toward democratic stability appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The post Younus in Al Jazeera: Who is Imran Khan? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

In the early 1990s, I encountered Putin several times at international meetings in St. Petersburg, but I never really met him. I talked to the city’s friendly mayor, Anatoly Sobchak, and his first deputy Alexei Kudrin, but Putin, whose background in the KGB was well known, hid on the sidelines and did not really talk to anybody. He was perceived as a secretive nuisance.

Based on this early impression of Putin, I have always been surprised by his remarkable rise to the pinnacle of Russian politics. My view is that he was simply lucky and owed his many promotions to a handful of people close to Russia’s first post-Soviet president, Boris Yeltsin. Putin’s main benefactors were Yeltsin’s daughter Tatyana and last two chiefs of staff, Valentin Yumashev and Alexander Voloshin, along with oligarchs Boris Berezovsky and Roman Abramovich, who trusted his loyalty while Yeltsin was too sick to rule in 1998-99.

Putin arrived at a table of increasing abundance laid by Yeltsin and his reformers; he was further helped by an extended period of rising global oil prices. He has had a surprisingly long run, but nobody can expect to be lucky forever. For more than two decades, Putin thrived on personal loyalty and relied on his slow, deliberate approach to decision-making. However, as the invasion of Ukraine continues to unravel, his many flaws and weaknesses are now coming to the fore.

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Despite being in power for more than two decades, Putin has never broadened his expert base. Instead, he has stuck to his former KGB colleagues and old St. Petersburg technocrats along with a small number of economists and lawyers. How can anybody seriously listen to Nikolai Patrushev or Yuri and Mikhail Kovalchuk? They are considered among Putin’s closest advisers but they are full of old-style Soviet conspiracy theories.

Putin himself has consistently refused to rely on any sources of information other than his own intelligence agencies. In his big media events, he has repeatedly shown that he believes in all manner of conspiracy theories. In other words, he has consciously chosen to remain poorly informed.

He has never been a fast decision maker or crisis manager and has always taken his time. For much of his reign this has not been a major issue, but that is no longer true in the current wartime environment. Putin’s obvious lack of skill as a crisis manager is presumably one of the reasons why so many important decisions related to the war in Ukraine are late and inconsistent.

Putin is also a micromanager who is reluctant to delegate and prone to over-centralizing. He has persistently gone far too deep into details. Much of the failure of the war in Ukraine seems to have been caused by Putin insisting on deciding too much himself, just like Hitler during World War II. Military decisions require detailed knowledge which Putin simply does not possess. He is also physically far from the battlefield due to his lack of personal courage.

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Since 2000, Putin has systematically destroyed Russia’s state institutions and imposed extreme repression. One consequence is that his regime has very little capacity to generate, receive, or utilize negative feedback. Everybody around him has learned that he only wants to hear good news. As a result, neither he nor his administration learn much from their mistakes.

Many biographers of Putin have been reluctant to discuss allegations that he has been deeply involved in organized crime and kleptocracy for much of his political career. Nevertheless, awareness of this kleptocracy is vital for anyone seeking to understand today’s Russia. Far-reaching criminal influence has made the Russian state rot from within. It can neither manage processes nor produce things effectively.

A peculiarity of the Putin regime is that the ruler actually offers two-way loyalty, unlike Stalin. Putin recognizes only one crime, disloyalty. If one of his underlings happens to steal a billion or two, it is not typically seen as a problem. Nor does Putin fire anybody because of incompetence. Instead, incompetent senior officials are forgiven for their frequent blunders as long as they remain personally loyal to Putin.

The invasion of Ukraine has exposed widespread corruption and incompetence throughout the Russian military and defense sector, but Putin’s old friends and allies remain in their posts. Rather than dismissing the many incompetent Russian generals, Putin prefers to circulate them. The most outstanding failures, Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu and Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov, have not lost their jobs despite their obvious and costly mistakes.

With the invasion of Ukraine now in its sixteenth month, Putin’s limitations as a leader have left Russia heading for an historic defeat. During the early years of his reign, he benefited from the hard work done before him by 1990s reformers and enjoyed favorable international conditions, but his many sins and shortcomings are now clearly catching up with him.

Anders Åslund is a senior fellow at the Stockholm Free World Forum and author of “Russia’s Crony Capitalism: The Path from Market Economy to Kleptocracy.”

Further reading

UkraineAlert Jun 8, 2023

Could Russia be held accountable for the destruction of the Kakhovka dam?

By Danielle Johnson

Initial analysis indicates that Russia deliberately destroyed the Kakhovka dam in what would qualify as one of Moscow’s worst war crimes in Ukraine, but holding the Kremlin accountable will prove extremely difficult, writes Danielle Johnson.

Civil Society Conflict

UkraineAlert Jun 7, 2023

Ukraine’s summer counteroffensive will aim to keep the Russians guessing

By Peter Dickinson

Speculation is mounting that Ukraine’s hotly anticipated summer counteroffensive may be underway but initial stages are likely to feature probes and diversionary attacks rather than a big push, writes Peter Dickinson.

Conflict Drones

UkraineAlert Jun 6, 2023

Ukraine’s summer counteroffensive is a key moment but long-term resolve remains crucial

By Tennyson Dearing

Ukraine’s summer counteroffensive is an important moment in the war with Russia but it is critical to maintain a sense of perspective and underline the need for long-term Western backing, writes Tennyson Dearing.

Conflict Freedom and Prosperity

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

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UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia and Central Asia in the East.

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The post Russia’s failing Ukraine invasion is exposing Putin’s many weaknesses appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The charges against Kniaziev are not entirely unprecedented. In the three-and-a-half years since the creation of Ukraine’s High Anti-Corruption Court, 23 judges have been convicted. Anti-corruption investigations have also led to changes in Ukraine’s judicial infrastructure, such as the liquidation of the controversial Kyiv District Administrative Court, which had long been a focus of major anti-corruption probes.

In summer 2022, Ukraine’s anti-corruption efforts received a boost with the appointment of Oleksandr Klymenko as new head of the Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office in line with Ukraine’s obligations regarding EU candidate country status. Klymenko’s appointment was widely seen as a watershed moment that signaled an end to the collective sense of impunity within the Ukrainian establishment. The recent arrest of the Supreme Court head has confirmed that earlier reform failures are not irreversible. It is now important to draw the right conclusions as Ukraine looks to finalize the reform of judicial governance bodies and repair the country’s Constitutional Court.

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The relaunch of Ukraine’s Supreme Court was one of the initial efforts to reform the country’s widely discredited judiciary in the initial aftermath of the 2014 Revolution of Dignity. However, it did not produce the desired results as a number of factors robbed the court of true independence. Unreformed judicial governance bodies were tasked with hiring Supreme Court judges, with civil society offered a superficial role in the selection process and Ukraine’s international partners largely standing aside. As a result, civil society observers assessed that around a quarter of all selected candidates were questionable.

The creation of the High Anti-Corruption Court in 2017-2019 was a more positive experience, with all candidates scrutinized by an independent panel composed of international experts. This paved the way for the cleansing of two judicial governance bodies, the High Council of Justice and the High Qualification Commission of Judges, with foreign experts once more playing a crucial role.

In January 2023, Ukraine appointed eight new members to the country’s key judicial governance body, the High Council of Justice (HCJ), thereby enabling it to resume its work. On June 1, the HCJ appointed new members to the High Qualification Commission of Judges (HQCJ), which is another significant step forward. However, it is important to highlight that no agents of change from civil society were appointed, while two of the new members have questionable reputations. The next challenge is for the HQCJ to finish qualification assessments and hire judges to fill more than 2,500 vacancies. In addition, further measures are also expected in order to restore public trust in the Supreme Court.

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The next big issue on the path toward rule of law and EU accession is the selection procedure of Constitutional Court judges. EU candidate country status has opened up an historic opportunity to repair the Constitutional Court, which has long wielded effective veto power over any reform efforts in Ukraine. Reforming the Constitutional Court is widely seen as the most politically challenging element of judicial reform for the Ukrainian government to implement.

Additionally, some anti-corruption initiatives that were justifiably put on hold following the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion must now be revived. This includes asset declarations for all state officials. The recent bribery charges brought against the head of the Supreme Court underline the urgency of a return to the asset declaration submission and verification process. Concerns regarding this issue have recently been voiced by the International Monetary Fund and EU Ambassador to Ukraine Matti Maasikas.

An independent judiciary and the rule of law have long been recognized as vital pillars for Ukraine’s future success. As the country looks toward the post-war recovery period, these factors are now more important than ever. During the rebuilding process, Ukraine’s partners will demand transparency and security for all state and private sector investments. Additionally, judicial reform has a central role to play in Ukraine’s further EU integration. Crucially, creating a fair legal environment free from corruption is also a key demand of Ukrainian society, including the hundreds of thousands currently defending the country against Russian invasion.

Olena Halushka is a board member at AntAC and co-founder of the International Center for Ukrainian Victory.

Further reading

UkraineAlert Apr 8, 2023

Human wave tactics are demoralizing the Russian army in Ukraine

By Olivia Yanchik

Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine has not gone according to plan but he still hopes to win a long war of attrition. However, Russia’s reliance on human wave tactics risks undermining morale within his invading army, writes Olivia Yanchik.

Conflict Defense Policy

UkraineAlert May 30, 2023

Russia’s new reality: Less Peter the Great, more Putin the Pariah

By Peter Dickinson

The invasion of Ukraine has left Russia greatly diminished on the world stage and earned Putin a place in infamy alongside history’s greatest criminals. Instead of emulating Peter the Great, he has become Putin the Pariah, writes Peter Dickinson.

Conflict Disinformation

UkraineAlert May 30, 2023

Ukraine’s Diia platform sets the global gold standard for e-government

By Anatoly Motkin

Ukraine’s Diia app is widely seen as the world’s first next-generation e-government platform, and is credited with implementing what many see as a more human-centric government service model, writes Anatoly Motkin.

Civil Society Conflict

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

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UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia and Central Asia in the East.

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The post The fight against courtroom corruption continues in wartime Ukraine appeared first on Atlantic Council.

According to Power, users of Diia can digitally access the kinds of state services that US citizens can only dream of, including crossing the border using a smartphone application as a legal ID, obtaining a building permit, and starting a new business. The platform also reduces the potential for corruption by removing redundant bureaucracy, and helps the Ukrainian government respond to crises such as the Covid pandemic and the Russian invasion.

Since February 2022, the Diia platform has played a particularly important part in Ukraine’s response to Russia’s full-scale invasion. According to Ukraine’s Minister of Digital Transformation Mykhailo Fedorov, in the first days of the invasion the platform made it possible to provide evacuation documents along with the ability to report property damage. Other features have since been added. The e-enemy function allows any resident of Ukraine to report the location and movement of Russian troops. Radio and TV functions help to inform people who find themselves cut off from traditional media in areas where broadcasting infrastructure has been damaged or destroyed.

Today, the Diia ecosystem offers the world’s first digital passport and access to 14 other digital documents along with 25 public services. It is used by more than half the Ukrainian adult population. In addition to consumer-oriented functions, the system collects information for the national statistical office and serves as a digital platform for officials. Diia is widely seen as the world’s first next-generation e-government platform, and is credited with implementing what many see as a more human-centric government service model.

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In today’s increasingly digital environment, governments may find that they have a lot of siloed systems in place, with each system based on its own separate data, infrastructure, and even principles. As a result, people typically suffer from additional bureaucracy and need to deal repeatedly with different official organizations. Most e-government initiatives are characterized by the same problems worldwide, such as technical disparity of state systems, inappropriate data security and data protection systems, absence of unified interoperability, and inefficient interaction between different elements. Ukraine is pioneering efforts to identify more human-centric solutions to these common problems.

One of the main challenges on the path to building sustainable e-government is to combine user friendliness with a high level of cyber security. If we look at the corresponding indices such as the Online Services Index and Baseline Cyber Security Index, we see that only a handful of European countries have so far managed to achieve the right balance: Estonia, Denmark, France, Spain, and Lithuania. Beyond Europe, only Singapore and Malaysia currently meet the necessary standards.

Ukraine has a strong record in terms of security. Since the onset of the Russian invasion, the Diia system has repeatedly been attacked by Russian cyber forces and has been able to successfully resist these attacks. This is an indication that the Ukrainian platform has the necessary reserve of cyber security along with a robust and secure digital public infrastructure.

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The success of the IT industry in Ukraine over the past decade has already changed international perceptions of the country. Instead of being primarily seen as an exporter of metals and agricultural products, Ukraine is now increasingly viewed as a trusted provider of tech solutions. The Ministry of Digital Transformation is now working to make Diia the global role model for human-centric GovTech. According to Samantha Power, the Ukrainian authorities are interested in sharing their experience with the international community so that others can build digital infrastructure for their citizens based on the same human-centric principles.

USAID has announced a special program to support countries that, inspired by Diia, will develop their own e-government systems on its basis. This initiative will be launched initially in Colombia, Kosovo, and Zambia. Ukraine’s Diia system could soon be serving as a model throughout the transitional world.

As they develop their own e-government systems based on Ukraine’s experience and innovations, participating governments should be able to significantly reduce corruption tied to bureaucratic obstacles. By deploying local versions of Diia, transitional countries will also develop a large number of their own high-level IT specialists with expertise in e-government. This is an important initiative that other global development agencies may also see value in supporting.

Anatoly Motkin is president of the StrategEast Center for a New Economy, a non-profit organization with offices in the United States, Ukraine, Georgia, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan.

Further reading

UkraineAlert May 23, 2023

Ukraine’s coming counteroffensive has a good chance of succeeding

By Richard D. Hooker, Jr.

Ukraine’s coming counteroffensive has a great chance of succeeding due to a number of factors including superior leadership, equipment upgrades, and strong morale, writes Richard D. Hooker, Jr.

Conflict Defense Technologies

UkraineAlert May 23, 2023

Belgorod raid sparks border alarm for Russia ahead of Ukrainian offensive

By Peter Dickinson

This week’s unprecedented cross-border raid into Russia’s Belgorod Oblast could be part of Ukrainian shaping operations designed to stretch the Russian military ahead of a coming counteroffensive, writes Peter Dickinson.

Conflict Defense Policy

UkraineAlert Apr 12, 2023

Poland and Ukraine: The emerging alliance that could reshape Europe

By Taras Kuzio

Poland’s leading role in the European response to Russia’s Ukraine invasion is fueling talk of a eastward shift in Europe’s geopolitical center of gravity with the Polish-Ukrainian alliance set to become increasingly influential.

Conflict Defense Industry

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

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UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia and Central Asia in the East.

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The post Ukraine’s Diia platform sets the global gold standard for e-government appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Moreover, the report makes clear that Ukraine’s fate remains, to a significant extent, in its own hands. Even in the face of ongoing Russian aggression, the country can begin reconstruction and make strides toward the goal of EU membership provided it is willing, finally, to confront problems of internal reform and governance that have held Ukraine back since independence.

The Commission forecast identifies a number of specific reform goals including reducing the much-increased role of the state in the economy, solving the endemic issue of corruption, improving the efficiency of the judiciary, and strengthening the enforceability of property rights. As anyone with experience of Ukraine’s previous reform efforts knows, these problems are deeply interconnected. The organized misappropriation of public resources for private gain is the product of a state that is simultaneously too pervasive in its reach, yet too institutionally weak to exercise its powers of regulatory and judicial oversight effectively and in the national interest. A successful reform program would be one that enabled the state to do less but do it better.

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

To attract the huge volumes of investment, especially private capital, needed to kick start reconstruction and get the economy back on its feet, Ukraine will need to pivot away from war economy measures toward a strategy of private sector growth. The numerous emergency nationalizations that took place last year were understandable at a time when arms production and energy supply were the most urgent priorities. But in the battles that lie ahead, Ukraine’s survival will be determined as much by its economic strength as by its military prowess.

The role of the state was already outsized before Russia’s invasion, with more than 3,500 state-owned enterprises accounting for one-tenth of Ukraine’s output and about 18% of employment. The demands of war mobilization have created a public sector that is now far larger than in any existing EU member state. In the banking sector alone, the state’s share has reached nearly 60%, stifling competition to the point where the Ministry of Finance has been forced to acknowledge that there is currently no functioning financial services market.

Although the prewar target of reducing the state’s share to less than a quarter remains, the Ukrainian parliament is now debating a draft law intended to permit the nationalization of even more banks. The law is designed to deal with a single case, the proposed nationalization of the Sens Bank. However, it is drawn so broadly that critics fear it will give the state discretionary powers to take over almost any bank it wishes. This includes not only those banks that have been targeted with official state sanctions, but also those included on the “shame list” of businesses that continue to trade with Russia.

While it is perfectly understandable that Ukraine should wish to penalize businesses that have failed to cut their ties to Russia, the satisfaction of seizing their assets may come at a high cost if market confidence is undermined by the weakening of property rights. Some legal experts have also questioned whether these widely drawn powers are in line with the Ukrainian Constitution, and have argued that only the National Bank of Ukraine is empowered to approve the nationalization of a bank in cases of insolvency. Nationalizations pushed through by the government for political reasons are likely to be challenged successfully in the courts, according to legal observers.

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An additional consideration is that any increase in the state’s control of the economy is likely to fuel concern about corruption, which remains one of the main obstacles on the path to EU accession. The boundaries between political and economic power, which too often remain blurred in the characteristically post-Soviet style, need to be much more sharply delineated. As numerous scandals have shown, state-controlled banks and enterprises create huge opportunities for self-enrichment and abuses of power by those who control them ostensibly on the nation’s behalf, including kickbacks, nepotism, excessive salaries, and favoritism in the awarding of public contracts.

Instead of considering new measures to extend the state’s reach into the economy, the Ukrainian government should be thinking about how the state can divest itself of assets it has already acquired in a way that is fair, transparent, and most likely to foster the economic growth Ukraine badly needs.

If one of the few beneficial effects of the war has been to accelerate Ukraine’s deoligarchization, one of the emerging risks in its aftermath will be the danger of reoligarchization via privatizations that are opaque and marred by favoritism. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy must resist the temptation to use patronage to create a business class loyal to him. That would leave Ukraine looking less like an EU member-in-waiting and more like a miniature version of Putin’s crony capitalism. There would be no victory in such an outcome.

David Clark was Special Adviser on Europe at the UK Foreign Office 1997-2001 and now works as an independent analyst specializing in foreign policy and European affairs.

Further reading

UkraineAlert May 23, 2023

Ukraine’s coming counteroffensive has a good chance of succeeding

By Richard D. Hooker, Jr.

Ukraine’s coming counteroffensive has a great chance of succeeding due to a number of factors including superior leadership, equipment upgrades, and strong morale, writes Richard D. Hooker, Jr.

Conflict Defense Technologies

UkraineAlert May 23, 2023

Belgorod raid sparks border alarm for Russia ahead of Ukrainian offensive

By Peter Dickinson

This week’s unprecedented cross-border raid into Russia’s Belgorod Oblast could be part of Ukrainian shaping operations designed to stretch the Russian military ahead of a coming counteroffensive, writes Peter Dickinson.

Conflict Defense Policy

UkraineAlert Mar 8, 2023

Ukrainians will never surrender. How long can they count on the West?

By Serhiy Prytula

Ukraine’s remarkable resistance during the first days of the Russian invasion convinced the democratic world to back the country but with Putin now preparing for a long war, continued Western resolve is vital writes Serhiy Prytula.

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The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

Read more from UkraineAlert

UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia and Central Asia in the East.

Learn more

The post Ukraine must reduce role of state in the economy to boost EU integration appeared first on Atlantic Council.

This latest step in normalizing ties with Assad was met with protests in northern Syria and feelings of disgust and anger among Syrians who fled the country and the Assad regime’s crimes. Many are left with questions about whether Assad and his regime will ever face justice. 

There are many reasons to think that countries’ moves to normalize relations with Assad could make it more difficult to hold him and his regime accountable for their war crimes and crimes against humanity. But there still remains a slate of accountability tools for Syria. In fact, certain avenues for seeking accountability may be expanding with normalization.

Universal jurisdiction trials

One of the few accountability tools currently employed for Syria is the framework of universal jurisdiction, which enables domestic courts to try atrocity crimes committed outside of their borders based on the premise that the crime is so grave that it threatens the international community as a whole. Many countries only allow cases to proceed if a suspect is present within their borders, and thus there have been a limited number of cases on Syria. Many of these cases have focused on terrorism charges and only a few have been against Assad regime–linked perpetrators.

With normalization, Assad and his regime’s senior leadership may increasingly travel outside of Syria and the region. Any country wanting to support Syrians’ demands for accountability should ensure they have the laws and resources available to arrest, investigate, and prosecute any suspected war criminal who ends up on their soil. 

Most perpetrators will likely avoid traveling to countries in Western Europe that oppose normalization and are known for bringing universal jurisdiction cases, such as Germany and France. However, universal jurisdiction laws extend outside of Western Europe, to Eastern Europe, Asia, South America, Africa, and even some countries in the Middle East. While most of these countries have rarely or even never used their universal jurisdiction laws, concerted advocacy by civil society in Syria and the relevant country, combined with support or resources from countries with more practice on universal jurisdiction cases, could help change the tide. 

Where perpetrators are found in countries that fail to try them under universal jurisdiction frameworks, countries could also follow the example set by Belgium in seeking to prosecute former Chadian dictator Hissène Habré for war crimes, crimes against humanity, and torture. This could include issuing arrest warrants under their universal jurisdiction laws, following up with extradition requests wherever perpetrators are found, and bringing cases at the International Court of Justice or other international tribunals to ultimately ensure trials.

Trials of senior leadership in national courts

While universal jurisdiction trials typically require the presence of a perpetrator, some civil law countries allow for certain trials to proceed in absentia, provided there are sufficient safeguards to protect a defendant’s fair trial rights. For example, France can hold in absentia trials when the victim is a national of that country. French authorities are using these laws to try three architects of the Assad regime’s detention and torture apparatus—Ali Mamlouk, Jamil Hassan, and Abdel Salam Mahmoud—for their alleged role in arbitrarily detaining, torturing, and killing a father and son who were French-Syrian dual nationals. This trial will not result in the imprisonment of the accused if they are found guilty, at least for now. It will, however, serve as a powerful moment for Syrian victims and lawyers to present evidence against those responsible for designing and ordering atrocity crimes in Syria. 

To help close the justice gap for Syria, countries with authority to hold in absentia trials should explore opportunities that may be available and fill strategic gaps in the Syria accountability space. For example, this might include cases against high-level perpetrators who may be less likely to travel to countries with universal jurisdiction trials but whose cases may have significant symbolic importance for victims.

Expanding universal jurisdiction trials related to Ukraine

While universal jurisdiction trials are proceeding slowly for Syria, many countries have been eager to bring universal jurisdiction cases related to Ukraine. In the past year, Germany, Canada, and other countries have opened structural investigations to begin building universal jurisdiction cases against Russian perpetrators. These countries should proactively investigate links between the conflicts in Ukraine and Syria to ensure that any future trials related to Ukraine also incorporate relevant links to Syria. For example, a Russian commander responsible for atrocity crimes in Ukraine may have committed those same crimes in Syria. Officials liable for the use of Iranian drones to facilitate atrocity crimes in Ukraine may have done the same in Syria. Or Syrian soldiers reportedly recruited to Ukraine may have committed atrocity crimes in Syria.

Whenever an apprehended perpetrator is suspected of committing crimes in both Ukraine and Syria, both sets of crimes should feature in a universal jurisdiction trial.

Ensuring reparations for Syrian victims

One element of justice, in addition to trials determining legal responsibility for crimes, is reparations for victims to help them recover and rebuild their lives. Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine last year, countries have eagerly explored legal avenues to seize Russian assets and use the proceeds to ensure reparations and reconstruction in Ukraine. As recently as May 17, the Council of Europe established a register of damages for Ukraine as a first step toward ensuring compensation for Ukrainian victims. Lest countries want to support selective justice, they should explore the application of these legal tools to ensure that Syrian victims also receive reparations for the harm they have suffered.

Normalization will ensure that individuals connected to the Assad regime have increasing access to global financial markets. These perpetrators could attempt to purchase properties overseas or place their money in foreign banks. This, in turn, would increase legal pathways to seize assets and repurpose them as reparations for Syrian victims.

Countries could also fund reparations for Syrian victims using existing pools of funding obtained as a result of violations in Syria—for example, the $778 million judgment against the French industrial company Lafarge for violations in Syria, or proceeds from sanctions violations, or the assets of Bashar al-Assad’s uncle Rifaat al-Assad, which France seized after finding him guilty of corruption.

Cases at the International Criminal Court

The International Criminal Court (ICC) is not investigating crimes committed in Syria because Syria is not a member state of the ICC and because Russia and China vetoed a United Nations Security Council referral to the ICC. However, Syria does not fall entirely outside of the ICC’s jurisdiction. Using the precedent established for Myanmar in 2019, ICC Prosecutor Karim Khan could open an investigation into crimes committed in Syria that resulted in forced deportation to Jordan, an ICC member state. 

The ICC is a particularly important accountability avenue to activate for Syria. An ICC investigation would, for example, make available additional resources to investigate and build cases. It would also send a message to Assad because the ICC can issue arrest warrants for and try sitting heads of state. National courts do not have this authority under international law. Thus, while Assad is still in power, the ICC is virtually the only avenue to secure his arrest and subsequent trial. And the modern era of accountability has seen relatively high success for ensuring that heads of state or major military forces who are subject to arrest warrants or indictments face accountability.

Khan has received multiple requests to open an investigation into Syria but has thus far failed to do so. A referral of Syria by an ICC member state would significantly increase the likelihood of an investigation. Dozens of countries were motivated last year to refer Ukraine to the ICC and should consider doing the same for Syria.

Cases at the International Court of Justice

The International Court of Justice (ICJ) also can ensure accountability for Syria by hearing a case against the state (in contrast, the ICC tries cases against individual perpetrators). The Netherlands and Canada are preparing to bring the first ICJ case against Syria for violations of the Convention Against Torture. 

Countries could bring other cases against Syria at the ICJ, for example, for violations of the Chemical Weapons Convention. Since Syria acceded to the convention in September 2013—a month after carrying out a sarin gas attack near Damascus that reportedly killed 1,300 people—the Assad regime has been accused of hundreds of chemical weapons attacks. Any member state of the Chemical Weapons Convention that wishes to support accountability could bring a case against Syria at the ICJ.

The trend towards normalizing relations with Assad was not inevitable. Normalization is happening now because states have failed to use existing accountability tools to bring Assad and his regime to justice. But the tools are still available, and some opportunities to use them may be increasing. Justice for the horrors experienced by millions of Syrians is long overdue, and more concerted efforts by countries to pursue justice may help counter the trend in normalization.

Elise Baker is a staff lawyer with the Atlantic Council’s Strategic Litigation Project. Previously, she worked at the United Nations International, Impartial and Independent Mechanism on Syria and led Physicians for Human Rights’ Syria Mapping Project, which documented attacks on Syria’s health care system.

The post How to hold the Assad regime accountable, even as countries normalize relations with Syria appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Earlier this month, Khan was arrested by Pakistan’s paramilitary Rangers during a hearing for a corruption case at the Islamabad High Court. This came after the country’s anti-corruption watchdog issued warrants for his arrest related to the case. Moments later, Khan’s supporters took to the streets in protest, setting ablaze public and private property. Amidst their anger, the violent protesters did something that no political party has done in decades: they set ablaze the official residence of a three-star general in the eastern city of Lahore, with some going so far as to enter military headquarters in Rawalpindi to vent their frustration.

Imran Khan and his political party (the Pakistan Tehreek-i-Insaf, or PTI) have denied that their supporters were behind the violent protests, instead alleging that it was a conspiracy to squash the party and its followers. The former prime minister—now out on bail by the country’s Supreme Court—claims that General Asim Munir, Pakistan’s army chief, is leading a crackdown against Khan and his party.

However, the attacks on military installations brought a perhaps unintended but serious consequence—they gave Khan’s opponents a golden opportunity to dismantle the PTI. The military suggested that those who staged violent protests be tried under the Pakistan Army Act and the Official Secrets Act, a suggestion that has been approved by current Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif’s civilian government.

Thousands of Khan’s party workers have been arrested across Pakistan and over a dozen leaders and former lawmakers have left the party. Those who still remain loyal to the former prime minister are either in jail or on the run. The political turmoil that Pakistan has been going through since last year could further dent the country’s turbulent democracy, and Khan’s opponents are not the only ones behind it.

Imran Khan, unlike other politicians, does not believe in talks with his rivals to settle political disputes. Instead, he stages rallies and calls opponents “thieves” and “looters” in front of thousands of supporters. His arrogance and refusal to engage in political dialogue with rivals has brought Pakistan’s political scene to a point of no return.

As a result, the situation is unlikely to improve anytime soon.

Khan’s main rivals—the parties of former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and former President Asif Ali Zardari—have been long active in the country’s politics. They, too, have experienced the wrath of the military establishment currently faced by the Pakistan Tehreek-i-Insaf. Their governments were either thrown out of power or weakened because of the establishment’s meddling. In the end, though, their parties still exist and remain key civilian players in Pakistan’s politics. Likewise, attempting to dismantle Khan’s political party will not simply make his support base and influence disappear.

Democracy is about not the politicians, but the voters who send these men and women into the corridors of power. There is no denying that Imran Khan and the PTI have a support base in almost every city of the country. If his party is dismantled, his supporters may lose interest in politics and serve to strengthen undemocratic forces in Pakistan, a trend which has long plagued its political landscape.

Imran Khan, with all his faults, is a popular leader and should face the law as would any other politician. That said, attempts to break his party should not only be opposed by all the political parties, but especially by those who are in the current government. If Khan and his military backers’ undemocratic sidelining of former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and former President Shehbaz Sharif’s party before the 2018 elections was indeed wrong, then the same rule must apply to the equally undemocratic crackdown against the PTI.

Democracy remains the only system that can save Pakistan from plunging into darkness. To strengthen it, all political parties need to come together and agree to the earliest date possible to hold countrywide elections in hopes of alleviating the political crisis. This fight is about power. Power comes from the people, and elections remain the only way to have their voice heard in government.

Roohan Ahmed is an independent journalist based in Islamabad covering politics and extremist groups in the region.

The South Asia Center is the hub for the Atlantic Council’s analysis of the political, social, geographical, and cultural diversity of the region. ​At the intersection of South Asia and its geopolitics, SAC cultivates dialogue to shape policy and forge ties between the region and the global community.

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SouthAsiaSource May 10, 2023

Experts react: Former Prime Minister Imran Khan’s arrest and implications for Pakistan

By South Asia Center and other experts

On March 9, 2023, former Prime Minister of Pakistan Imran Khan was arrested over corruption charges. We asked experts to react to this decision.

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SouthAsiaSource May 3, 2023

How Pakistani women use technology solutions to overcome barriers to entrepreneurship

By Fatimata Ndiaye, Ishani Srivastava, Estelle Thomas, and Yiran Zha

A field study of women entrepreneurs in urban Pakistan, commissioned by the South Asia Center in conjunction with Johns Hopkins University and the American Pakistan Foundation, revealed how technology solutions can support women to jumpstart their entrepreneurial ventures.

Entrepreneurship Pakistan

SouthAsiaSource May 3, 2023

A conversation with Fawad Chaudhry, senior member of Pakistan Tehreek-i-Insaf

By Fawad Chaudhry and Wajahat Khan

South Asia Center non-resident senior fellow Wajahat Khan interviewed Pakistan’s former Federal Information Minister for Broadcasting and senior member of Pakistan Tehreek-i-Insaf Fawad Chaudhry.

Crisis Management Economy & Business

The post <strong>In Pakistan, populist Imran Khan faces the biggest challenge of his political career</strong> appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On May 17, Scowcroft Strategy Initiative Nonresident Senior Fellow Patrick Quirk co-authored a piece for Just Security on the importance of developing a US strategy towards hybrid regimes that promotes US interests whilst remaining steadfast in the US’ commitments to democratic values.

The authors go on to posit that prolonged engagements with hybrid regimes, in the long term, risks impeding upon the US’ global interests, as non-democratic regimes are less likely to uphold the US’ interests on the global stage, and may prove detrimental to the US’ posture in its strategic competition with China.

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The post Quirk in Just Security on adapting the US strategy towards hybrid regimes appeared first on Atlantic Council.

To offer insights about the implications of Khan’s arrest for Pakistan, the Atlantic Council’s Pakistan Initiative asked experts to react to recent developments below.

Shuja Nawaz: Pakistan’s self-created vortex

Kalsoom Lakhani: Pakistan has already been impacted by increasing political and economic instability, which will continue to exacerbate the funding challenges for startups

Ali Hasanain: Pakistan needs to finalize an IMF deal and sort out external financing if the country is to avoid default beyond June

Amber Rahim Shamsi: A Pakistani journalist’s guide to survival

To learn more about the arrest, tune in below with Pakistan Initiative Director Uzair Younus.

Pakistan’s self-created vortex

Just when one imagined Pakistan could not sink further into an economic and political morass, its leaders, civil and military, appear to have come up with yet another unnecessary crisis. The use of the military to arrest former Prime Minister Imran Khan in the sacrosanct confines of the Islamabad High Court reflects the inability of Pakistani political leaders to provide a coherent strategy to fight its economic and political woes. It also represents the inability of its military leaders to resist political engineering.

If the ultimate aim is to rid Pakistani politics of Imran Khan, then the storm that appears to have been unleashed may produce unintended and unmanageable consequences. The military’s calculations appear to hinge on expectations of a declining trend of Khan’s popularity and an inflated view of its own ability to ride out street unrest. What it may not have calculated is the cumulative effect of unrest on the national economy, currently gasping for air and heading toward hyperinflation and default, as well on its own rank and file. Will schisms emerge within the military? Or, will the unrest and mayhem serve as an excuse to postpone, perhaps indefinitely, the provincial and national elections ordained by the Constitution? Pakistan can ill afford a coup on the Egyptian model. If that were to occur, the country would struggle to survive an extended period of chaos as an economic and political pariah.

A fascinating picture of absences from Pakistan emerged this week. The prime minister had repaired to London for a coronation and extended his stay while Pakistan was burning. He returned to Pakistan and addressed the nation on May 10, 2023. The army chief was in the Gulf, if one could believe the information on FlightAware for his personal aircraft. The caretaker chief minister of the powerful Punjab province was also abroad when the drama unfolded.

Who was in charge? Who took the decision to allow a relatively small rampaging mob to break into and torch the Corps Commander House and the Governor’s House in Lahore? Where did their guards go? And where were the military guards that abandoned the gate leading to the army headquarters in Rawalpindi to the mob? Who allowed the mob to “liberate” the headquarters of the Frontier Corps at the Bala Hissar fort in Peshawar? Some pundits opined that this was a master plan of subterfuge that has yet to unfold. Social media had a field day adding to the confusion with colorful conspiracy theories till the pulling of the plug on the internet slowed their dissemination. But the images shared by hundreds of participants in the rioting created the impression that the military was being challenged with impunity by mobs of youth and angry women. Abandoned military check posts in some military cantonment areas remained a puzzle. Only a day later did the provincial authorities in Punjab and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa seek military assistance in aid of civil power.

In one fell swoop, Pakistan has managed to hurt its stability more than any enemy action could have achieved. Will its leaders speak out now and take responsibility for the shambolic mess that unfolded on May 9, 2023? The silent majority of Pakistan that is suffering the effects of poor governance and secretive decision making deserves some quick and clear answers. So do Pakistan’s friends abroad, who want it to return to a path of stability and development.

Shuja Nawaz is a distinguished fellow and the founding director of the South Asia Center of the Atlantic Council, Washington DC. His latest book is The Battle for Pakistan: The Bitter US Friendship and a Tough Neighbourhood. Website: www.shujanawaz.com. On Twitter: @ShujaNawaz.

Pakistan has already been impacted by increasing political and economic instability, which will continue to exacerbate the funding challenges for startups

In the wake of the recent developments in Pakistan, the suspension of mobile broadband usage “indefinitely” by the Pakistan Telecommunications Authority as well as the restriction and blocking of social media platforms like Twitter, Facebook, and YouTube has an immediate and adverse effect on the country’s technology sector and startup ecosystem. Not only are Pakistani startups reliant on these platforms for new user acquisition and growth of their companies, but many Pakistanis are mobile first in how they engage with the digital economy, meaning their ability to leverage technology to access startups solutions for financial services, mobility, food, commerce, and other areas has been hindered and halted. Moreover, given that international perceptions of Pakistan have already been impacted by the country’s increasing political and economic instability, this will continue to drive a negative narrative of the country in the minds of investors globally, which will only exacerbate funding challenges for startups in Pakistan.

Kalsoom Lakhani is a non-resident senior fellow at the South Asia Center and co-founder and general partner of i2i Ventures. On Twitter: @kalsoom82.

Pakistan needs to finalize an IMF deal and sort out external financing if the country is to avoid default beyond June

Over the past eighteen months, every major power player in Pakistan has demonstrated a willingness to disregard the rule of law and national interest to strengthen its claim to power. This ugly fight has looked uglier as it has played out in lockstep with an economic meltdown that has led to 40 percent inflation this year. The country is seeing an endemic of personal tragedies played out over and over, triggered by normal citizens descending rapidly and seemingly hopelessly into poverty—from fathers killing children they cannot feed before taking their own lives, to stampedes in food lines.

Pakistan needs to finalize an International Monetary Fund (IMF) deal and sort out external financing if the country is to avoid default beyond June. For months, it has suffered not only from gross internal mismanagement, but a lack of coordination between its most important creditors—the IMF, the Chinese government, and its allies in the Middle East.

On May 6, 2023, Chinese Foreign Minister Qin Gang put it bluntly while he was in Islamabad: “We sincerely hope the political forces in Pakistan will build consensus, uphold stability, and more effectively address domestic and external challenges so it can focus on growing the economy.”

Two days later, the wildly popular former Prime Minister Imran Khan has been jailed, bringing his followers into direct and physical conflict with Pakistan’s powerful military, which is seen as being behind Khan’s fall from office.

One can only wonder what Pakistan’s creditors in Beijing, Washington, Riyadh, and elsewhere must be thinking about this latest chapter in a sordid tale of economic mismanagement and intemperance in managing the country’s affairs.

Put bluntly, default appears near certain unless unprecedented corrections are embarked on over the next few days.

Ali Hasanain is an Associate Professor of Economics at the Lahore University of Management Sciences (LUMS) and a non-resident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s South Asia Center. On Twitter: @AliHasanain

A Pakistani journalist’s guide to survival

Spare a thought for the journalist. Not the Whatsapp-as-a-source, vlog-from-the-basement kind of journalist, but the reporters, camerapersons, producers assignment editors, and desk editors who just want a normal country. It’s been a year since politics in Pakistan have been high on amphetamines with a generous sprinkling of LSD. They are exhausted, they are underpaid, and their stories are shaped by everything other than news value.

Just last Sunday, Sindh-based reporters were deployed to cover the local bodies elections. The stakes are high, particularly since these could offer control over Pakistan’s largest and richest city—Karachi—and as a bellwether for general elections. The local body polls have already been subject to intense legal contestation for several months. One reporter told me how his story on irregularities during polling in one station was dropped by his channel because it did not suit that channel’s agenda. Sometimes, reporters are asked to find evidence to fit a pre-determined verdict.

But what is a journalist to do when the biggest story after Khan’s arrest isn’t his first photograph in detention (yes, that’s a scoop, but a transient one), but the protests and riots that have erupted across Pakistan targeting military-owned property? I keep hearing the word “unprecedented” on international channels and social media, but only condemnation rather than nuanced context on local media. More glaringly, the visuals of protestors breaking into General Headquarters or marauding the guest house of the Lahore corps commander (that came to symbolize the post-Khan arrest reaction from his supporters) cannot be broadcasted.

I met a media manager the day after, his phone buzzing with calls from one of his bureau chiefs. “I asked him to divert the calls pressuring him to stop coverage to me,” he said, without naming who, although we both knew who he was referring to. It’s a code that doesn’t need deciphering any more. “We find ways to slip coverage into a show or a bulletin, and then run with it.”

Journalists have gotten really good at finding ways to cover the unnamed and unnameable in the last five years. For example, when one anchor couldn’t play clips of former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif accusing the former army and intelligence chiefs of political manipulation, he read a carefully curated transcript on his show. Others have found solace, and subsequently legal and physical threats, through social media.

But the pockets of resistance are still small, given that political allegiance is safer and more lucrative than independent reporting. By and large, mainstream television—and to a lesser extent newspapers—have learned their lessons the hard way. On the day the press wing of the armed forces released a statement condemning Imran Khan’s accusation against a serving military officer, I was on a television show with other analysts. Two of the analysts knew their over-the-top sparring in favor of their preferred political parties would be great for ratings, so they kept at it for the bulk of the show. As soon as they were asked to comment on the military’s press statement, there was a pause, and suddenly it was hard to tell the two apart. 

Amber Rahim Shamsi is the director of the Centre for Excellence in Journalism at IBA Karachi. On Twitter: @AmberRShamsi

The South Asia Center is the hub for the Atlantic Council’s analysis of the political, social, geographical, and cultural diversity of the region. ​At the intersection of South Asia and its geopolitics, SAC cultivates dialogue to shape policy and forge ties between the region and the global community.

Learn more

Related content

SouthAsiaSource May 3, 2023

A conversation with Fawad Chaudhry, senior member of Pakistan Tehreek-i-Insaf

By Fawad Chaudhry and Wajahat Khan

South Asia Center non-resident senior fellow Wajahat Khan interviewed Pakistan’s former Federal Information Minister for Broadcasting and senior member of Pakistan Tehreek-i-Insaf Fawad Chaudhry.

Crisis Management Economy & Business

SouthAsiaSource Mar 22, 2023

Experts react: Elections postponed in Pakistan’s Punjab province

By South Asia Center and other experts

On March 22, 2023, the Election Commission of Pakistan announced a decision to delay elections in Punjab, the country’s most populous province. We asked experts to react to this decision.

Elections Pakistan

SouthAsiaSource Mar 6, 2023

Amid Pakistan’s political and economic turmoil, risks to curbs on digital freedoms grow

By Uzair Younus

Growing polarization and instability in Pakistan have increased the likelihood that as elections draw near, curbs on speech, largely limited thus far to television channels, may extend to internet platforms like YouTube, Facebook, and Twitter.

Civil Society Elections

The post Experts react: Former Prime Minister Imran Khan’s arrest and implications for Pakistan appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On April 13, IPSI Nonresident Senior Fellow Dexter Tiff Roberts spoke on a CNBC special report on “Why China’s Billionaires Keep Disappearing.” For the full episode, watch here.

Fellow

Dexter Tiff Roberts

Nonresident Senior Fellow

Global China Hub Indo-Pacific Security Initiative

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The post Nawaz in Dawn: <a href="https://www.dawn.com/news/1746219/for-pakistan-to-prosper-it-must-invest-in-its-children">For Pakistan to prosper, it must invest in its children</a> appeared first on Atlantic Council.

A joint March 2023 International Partnership for Human Rights and Independent Anti-Corruption Commission (NAKO) report found Western components critical in the construction and maintenance of drones, missiles, and communications complexes in weapons used by Russia in Ukraine. Also in March, the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center convened a panel of experts for a virtual event to discuss how to stem the flow of dual-use technology to Russia. Moderated by Ambassador John Herbst, panelists described how sanctioned Western tech gets to Russia and offered concrete recommendations to better implement and enforce export bans on Moscow.

Panelists noted that companies and manufacturers could simply be unaware their products are entering the Russian market. Though distributors may believe they are selling dual-use components to non-sanctioned consumer markets, many components are resold through secondary markets such as Hong Kong or Turkey and end up in Russia. Urging more due diligence, Olena Tregub, executive director of NAKO, explained, “if a company has a client from Turkey, for example, it should ask if the product is for Russia. They should study the supply chain.”

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While the West should be lauded for the speed and breadth of sanctions and export controls imposed on Moscow, compliance offices are still catching up. “Western companies and countries still seem to be finding their footing when it comes to compliance, implementation, and maintenance of these restrictions,” said Jack Crawford, research analyst at the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI). According to Crawford, Western governments lack the capacity to effectively monitor and act against Russian sanctions evasion. This results in delays, not only in dealing with sanctions breaches but also in terms of identifying them in the first place.

As for the private sector, Sam Jones, president and co-founder of the Heartland Initiative, noted that investors and companies have increased responsibility when conducting business in respect to conflict-affected areas such as Ukraine. Jones said companies should be more diligent in determining the end use of their products, as outlined in the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, and argued that “companies would be well advised to take the findings in these reports seriously and consider the potential material risk in terms of future investments.”

Western companies and investors also do not always appear to recognize dual-use components as belonging to the same category as other heavily restricted military technology, such as cluster munitions and anti-personnel landmines. This puts dual-use components in a sanctions gray area. Jones suggested that future steps could include increased restrictions on dual-use components through conduct-based exclusion, which would target repurposed components in terms of how they are actually used and not through their intended use.

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Another key element in efforts to successfully control Russian access to critical Western tech is effective monitoring and enforcement of sanctions. This is an area in which governments can cooperate effectively with civil society, NGOs, and think tanks.

Benjamin Schmitt, senior fellow at the University of Pennsylvania Department of Physics and Astronomy and Kleinman Center for Energy Policy, noted that Western companies and NGOs “have easily available open-source intelligence tools at their fingertips, whether they’re commodity trading platforms or automatic identification system-based vessel tracking websites.” These tools empower watchdog organizations and risk assessment committees in governmental and non-governmental organizations to monitor malign transfers of products and technologies that would undermine sanctions efficacy.

Panelists pointed out that the implementation of sanctions oversight depends in large part on increased interoperability between business, government, and civil society powered by information exchange, open dialogue, and cooperation with emerging intelligence technology and organizations.

Schmitt cautioned that Western hesitancy toward sanctioning Western-based entities could be a real threat to an effective sanctions regime. He pointed out that Nord Stream AG, the company behind the Nord Stream 2 pipeline from Russia to Germany, evaded Western sanctions despite majority ownership by Russian state-owned Gazprom, because the company was based in Switzerland. Considering that Russia’s brutal war against Ukraine aims to fracture Western political and financial stability, it is key that Western countries work in concert and take every step possible to slow the Kremlin’s efforts to control Ukraine and threaten European security.

Tregub put it more bluntly: “War crimes are a Russian strategy. To implement this strategy, Russia needs to build weapons. Without Western components, Russia wouldn’t be able to accomplish its war aims.”

Aleksander Cwalina is a program assistant at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

Disclaimer: The purpose of the International Partnership for Human Rights and NAKO report is to explain and illustrate how Western-made components are used by Russia to commit suspected war crimes in Ukraine. To achieve this, the report identifies several companies and governments who are believed to be involved in the manufacturing of components which have been acquired by the Russian military and are used in their military hardware. For the avoidance of doubt, the authors of the report do not allege any legal wrongdoing on the part of the companies who manufacture the components and do not suggest that they have any involvement in any sanctions evasion-related activity. Furthermore, the authors of the report do not impute that the companies which make the components are involved in directly or indirectly supplying the Russian military and/or Russian military customers in breach of any international (or their own domestic) laws or regulations restricting or prohibiting such action. Where a link is drawn between manufacturers and the weapons being used in suspected war crimes, this is done solely to highlight ethical and moral concerns. The existence of counterfeit components is a recognized global problem. The authors of the report recognize the possibility that components featuring the logos and/or branding of named entities may not have indeed been manufactured by said entities. However, given a) leaked Russian “shopping lists” showing the intent to acquire components manufactured by such companies in order to support its military, and b) the history of Soviet and Russian military procurement efforts targeting leading global technology companies, the authors of the report have worked on the assumption that the components they and third parties have identified are genuine.

Further reading

UkraineAlert Feb 20, 2023

‘You cannot outlast us’: Biden’s Kyiv visit sends strong message to Moscow

By Peter Dickinson

US President Joe Biden’s bold surprise visit to wartime Kyiv sent a strong message to Moscow that time is not on Putin’s side and Russia should not pin its hopes on a weakening of Western resolve to stand with Ukraine.

Conflict Freedom and Prosperity

UkraineAlert Mar 19, 2023

Putin the Pariah: War crimes arrest warrant deepens Russia’s isolation

By Anders Åslund

The ICC decision to indict Putin for war crimes is a highly consequential step that will deepen Russia’s international isolation while weakening Putin’s personal position both at home and abroad, writes Anders Åslund.

Conflict Human Rights

UkraineAlert Mar 8, 2023

Ukrainians will never surrender. How long can they count on the West?

By Serhiy Prytula

Ukraine’s remarkable resistance during the first days of the Russian invasion convinced the democratic world to back the country but with Putin now preparing for a long war, continued Western resolve is vital writes Serhiy Prytula.

Civil Society Conflict

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

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Strengthening democratic institutions is critical to reversing the trend of democratic decline across the region. While these democracies struggle, international partners can help. That’s because the assistance these partners are already sending has an impact on each country’s democratic health. All aid either hinders or helps democratic development, and donors should be intentional about aligning all forms of assistance to make sure that the assistance supports countries’ democratic development. Thus, the United States and other democracies that send aid to Latin America and the Caribbean have a vital role to play in the region’s future. They must make a renewed push for assistance to the region.

Recently updated indexes and projects that summarize countless social, institutional, and political metrics across countries—including the World Justice Project’s Rule of Law Index, the Human Rights Watch’s World Report 2023, and the Economist Intelligence Unit’s Democracy Index 2022—convey a clear message. The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance’s Kevin Casas-Zamora sums it up best in the organization’s 2022 Global State of Democracy Report: “Democracy is under both literal and figurative assault around the world.”

As this week’s Summit for Democracy—which the United States is co-hosting with Costa Rica, the Netherlands, South Korea, and Zambia— gets underway, these reports highlight in increasingly urgent terms the regression of democratic governance around the world, including in most of Latin America.

For example, Colombia held three broadly free and fair electoral processes last year, and the rule of law is relatively strong. Many in Bogotá and other big cities have access to judicial, health, law-enforcement, and other state institutions. However, elsewhere in the country, the situation is different: Rural municipalities do not have the resources to provide the same level of education or health care as capital cities, and basic infrastructure is lacking. Public safety is even weaker. With its unequal application of democratic norms and protections, Colombia has been labeled a “flawed democracy” by the Economist Intelligence Unit. It’s not alone: Two-thirds of countries in the region (including Brazil and Mexico) qualify as flawed democracies or “hybrid regimes.” Only three are full democracies and the remaining four of the countries scored are fully authoritarian.

Across Latin America, weak institutions perpetuate corruption, inequality, poverty, and insecurity, and they standardize illicit economies. This provides a breeding ground for populist leaders on both the left and right to turn the situation to their advantage by exacerbating political polarization and popular distrust of the government. Weak rule of law is a constant trait of fragile democracies or hybrid regimes. Populist El Salvadoran President Nayib Bukele, for example, suspended civil liberties and arrested thousands of suspected gangsters with no due process. In the presence of weak institutions, criminals and corrupt officials can buy their way out of accountability. Gangs can shake down business owners with impunity. A lack of leadership and inclusion, including political parties’ own undemocratic behavior, is also a constant regionwide.

The factors contributing to the region’s democratic decline are well-known. What is less acknowledged is how these democratic deficits undermine the quality of life for millions of citizens and how they hinder government responses to new challenges and crises. From COVID-19 to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, shocks have already tested the region’s governments, and they were found wanting. Three threats in particular have the potential to further destabilize Latin America’s democratic progress:

• Climate change and natural disasters have already started to upend economic and social conditions. Much of southern South America has suffered from record heat waves this year, fueling record forest fires in parts of Chile. A heavy rainy season has exacerbated a major Dengue fever outbreak in eastern Bolivia and caused devastating floods in Brazil. Meanwhile, the Paraná River—a major transportation artery and irrigation source—has fallen to such a low level that shipping has struggled; and Uruguay declared a national emergency in October last year due to crop failures caused by drought. Poor environmental governance both contributes to these phenomena and hinders mitigation and adaptation efforts. Governments’ inabilities to respond effectively contribute to poverty, dislocation, and migration across the region. To strengthen their democracies, governments must be able to channel citizen demands more nimbly and mobilize resources to mitigate these environmental or climate shocks .
• Latin America and the Caribbean struggle with food insecurity and price shocks. Energy prices and inflation add to severe cost-of-living pressures for many across the region. A new report from the Pan American Health Organization shows that over 22 percent of the Latin American and Caribbean population cannot afford a healthy diet, with rates reaching over 50 percent in the Caribbean. Many governments provide subsidies for certain foodstuffs, fuel, and other critical imports, but high inflation and soaring debt payments will challenge governments’ abilities to keep this up. This can rapidly lead to popular unrest: For example, in 2019, a simple public transportation fare hike triggered massive protests in Chile. A similar increase in gas prices in Panama resulted in over a week of protests over fuel, food, and medicine, and Suriname saw protests this month after the government announced it would cut electricity and fuel subsidies.
• Most regional governments throughout Latin America and the Caribbean are also under extreme financial stress, which limits their abilities to respond to new crises. The resource boom—fueled by Chinese growth and consumption—that propelled massive social spending and slashed poverty around the region ended years ago. As budgets were tightening, COVID-19 struck the region harder than most others and forced governments to expand deficit spending as economies closed for months at a time. Several states ended the pandemic with bulging debts and lower credit ratings, meaning that they now have less flexibility when it comes to confronting the next shock. And while Latin America’s economy grew nearly 4 percent in 2022, that growth is projected to slow in 2023 as the US Federal Reserve continues to hike interest rates and the value of the dollar continues to rise, with damaging spillover effects for regional economies.

The most effective way to prepare for and mitigate against these external shocks is by strengthening democratic institutions—ensuring greater transparency, democratic participation, and government responsiveness. The United States and other democracies that help the region in dealing with these external shocks have a vital role to play in helping Latin America reverse the trend of democratic decline and prepare for coming challenges that could exacerbate democratic decay. This role extends to the diplomatic, development, and private sectors, which should support partners with best practices and resources that incentivize transparency, civic participation, free trade, and countering the influence of malign foreign actors such as China, Iran, and Russia. As US Agency for International Development Administrator Samantha Power recently wrote, “everywhere they provide assistance, democratic countries must be guided by and seek to promote democratic principles—including human rights, norms that counter corruption, and environmental and social safeguards.”

Voters have delivered major course corrections in Brazil, Colombia, and elsewhere in the past year, with newly installed leaders vowing to tackle inequality. But beyond these democratic processes, there’s more that governments will need to do to fully shore up vulnerable institutions. Investing in initiatives that strengthen civil society, political party systems, and open government will help give citizens a stake in the system, improve the function of institutions, and reduce the space for incursion by would-be autocrats.

Power has rightly called for a development strategy that “addresses the economic grievances that populists have so effectively exploited, that defangs so-called digital authoritarianism, and that reorients traditional democracy assistance to grapple with modern challenges.” As the United States and its partners convene for the Summit for Democracy, creating a vision for strengthening democracy in all US assistance to Latin America should figure among the Biden administration’s highest priorities.  

Antonio Garrastazu is the senior director for Latin America and the Caribbean at the International Republican Institute.

Casey Cagley is a resident program director at the International Republican Institute.

The post How can Latin America halt its democratic backsliding? And how can the US help? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

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This past year, the situation of women in Iran has increasingly come under international scrutiny. In September 2022, Mahsa Amini died from injuries sustained by the regime’s “morality police,” triggering a women-led protest movement that quickly transitioned from protests against compulsory hijab rules to protesting the Islamic Republic of Iran itself. Since then, more than five hundred protesters have been killed and almost twenty thousand arrested, among them many female journalists. Alarming reports of gender-based crimes, including sexual abuse and torture of protesters at the hands of Iranian security forces, have also come to light. As the journalist and activist Masih Alinejad and others have described it, women in Iran live under a severe and systematic form of oppression akin to “gender apartheid.”  Now, schoolgirls across the country are falling ill in what many believe are deliberate poisonings to close girls’ schools in retaliation for their participation in the protests.

One of the principal institutions behind this systematic oppression of women is the Supreme Council of the Cultural Revolution (SCCR), an unelected body answerable only to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. Indeed, it was the SCCR, under former President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, that created the morality police in the first place. Months before Amini’s death, President Ebrahim Raisi, who was himself sanctioned by the United States in 2019 and who now heads the SCCR, ordered the morality police and government agencies across the country to enforce more strictly the compulsory hijab rules, a policy enacted and designed by the SCCR. Despite mounting evidence of abuses in the context of the protests, the SCCR reiterated its support for the compulsory hijab in January. That same month, a new secretary of the SCCR was appointed—one who personally used to fire a slingshot at women who he considered to be wearing their hijab improperly and, more recently, insisted that protesters should be shown “no mercy” and crucified.

Unfortunately, it is difficult to hold the SCCR accountable. It is an unelected body in a country that is beyond the reach of traditional accountability mechanisms such as international courts and routinely refuses to cooperate with specialized human rights mechanisms. The UN Human Rights Council recently established a fact-finding mission on Iran with a mandate to collect, consolidate, and analyze evidence of human rights violations stemming from the protests, but it does not have the power to initiate any legal proceedings itself. Given these limitations, sanctions—and specifically targeted sanctions—offer a way forward to address the ongoing gender persecution. 

Governments use targeted sanctions to freeze perpetrators’ assets and ban them from obtaining visas. They are primarily used as a tool to incentivize behavior changes under the theory that perpetrators will abandon the sanctionable activities in order to reclaim their assets and ability to travel. 

Targeted sanctions have been used since the 1990s. However, using them to target human rights violations and corruption first began in 2012 in response to the death of Russian whistleblower and tax lawyer Sergei Magnitsky in 2009. Magnitsky was tortured and died in Russian prison after uncovering an instance of massive Russian corruption. After Magnitsky’s death, his client Bill Browder began advocating for justice on his behalf. While Browder could not find paths for criminal accountability in Russia or overseas, he recognized the link between corruption and human rights abuses, and he noted that many architects of both spent their ill-gotten gains in Western countries. Jurisdictions including the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, the European Union (EU), and Australia adopted measures, often referred to as Magnitsky-style sanctions, to prevent perpetrators of these crimes from enjoying those luxuries—even if they were otherwise untouchable.

Ideally, the United States, likeminded countries, and regional blocs such as the EU will all designate both the SCCR and its members. While entities often do not have overseas assets and, naturally, cannot receive visas, their members often do have international connections. Designations on entities do not automatically result in designations on members, but the relevant legislation is often worded such that any members would additionally meet the criteria.

Iranian regime officials are known to have considerable overseas wealth, as well as international connections (such as immediate family members living overseas) that would suggest they would want to maintain the ability to spend money and obtain visas in those locations. The children of high-ranking officials, sometimes called “aghazadehs,” are frequently criticized for their luxurious lifestyles, even prompting a hit television series in Iran focused on them. Targeted sanctions would freeze all assets in the officials’ names and would, in general, prevent them from engaging with banking systems based in the sanctioning countries (for example, to send money to family members) or from obtaining a visa (for example, to visit family members). Especially in light of reports of mass resignations among certain regime officials and members of the security forces, sanctions might incentivize SCCR members to resign from government positions, at the least. 

Even if executed perfectly, targeted sanctions will not end gender persecution. Despite existing global sanctions (targeted and otherwise), the Iranian regime has not yet meaningfully changed its behavior. Designating an entity like the SCCR without known overseas assets and without designating individual members would have limited material effect. However, as recognized by the Netherlands, the symbolic value cannot be overlooked. The limited benefits are worth the effort—especially when it comes to gender-based crimes. First, it puts the SCCR’s members on notice that the international community is aware of their complicity and is paying attention. Second, it offers support to the victims of the SCCR’s policies—in this instance, women. Such support has been lacking in targeted sanctions to date, and groups such as Human Rights First have analyzed designations and found that in most instances jurisdictions did not recognize the gender of the victims, but when they did, they were more likely to identify men than women. 

The United States has designated hundreds of Iranian officials across more than a dozen Iran-focused sanctions regimes. So far, the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and the EU have imposed targeted sanctions on the morality police and on the security forces—but not yet on the SCCR. While the designations thus far have been a positive and welcome step to address the behaviors stemming from the SCCR’s policies, they fail to acknowledge the specific harms the SCCR has committed in building the architecture of Iran’s gender apartheid.

Experts from the Strategic Litigation Project have previously recommended that authorities designate the SCCR under relevant targeted sanctions regimes and have submitted supporting evidence and legal arguments. As important as designating human-rights-violating institutions such as the morality police has been, designating the SCCR is also critical for identifying and condemning the bodies responsible for facilitating the ongoing gender-related crimes and would add additional weight in support of their many victims. International Women’s Day offers an opportunity for countries and other jurisdictions with human rights sanctions regimes to designate those responsible for upholding regimes that discriminate against women and implement the policies designed to violate women’s rights—including the SCCR and its members.

Celeste Kmiotek is a staff lawyer for the Strategic Litigation Project at the Atlantic Council. 

Lisandra Novo is a staff lawyer for the Strategic Litigation Project at the Atlantic Council.

The Strategic Litigation Project works on accountability efforts for atrocity crimes, human rights violations, and corruption offenses around the world.

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Security

Failed Russian push on Vuhledar results in losses as Moscow increases troops in the area

Heavy fighting across Luhansk as Ukraine warns of new Russian offensive

International response

Moldova reacts to alleged Russian plot against its pro-Europe government

Kremlin-linked group arranged bribes for European politicians to support the annexation of Crimea

Failed Russian push on Vuhledar results in losses as Moscow increases troops in the area

While Wagner Group soldiers concentrate their efforts around Bakhmut, Mariinka, Ivanivske, and Chasiv Yar, Russian forces have made minimal progress on the southern flank. The town of Vuhledar is viewed as a strategic stronghold lying in between the northern and southern fronts. The Russian army has spent two weeks unsuccessfully attempting to seize the town, likely in an effort to maintain its early offensive successes ahead of the one-year anniversary of the Ukraine invasion on February 24.  

The DFRLab analyzed the composition of the Russian brigades leading the assault on Vuhledar. Russia’s strategy appears to be storming the city with infantry backed by artillery fire. The plan has not proven successful, as nearly all soldiers of the Russian 155th Naval Infantry Brigade were reportedly either killed or taken prisoner. Footage posted by the Ukrainian Telegram channels НЕ ЖДИ меня из Украины (“Don’t wait for my return from Ukraine”) and Ищи своих (“Look for your own”) provides evidence of the increasing Russian losses and reveals that the Russian army has indeed sent a significant part of its brigades to fight on this front. 

OSINT analysis based on Project Owl’s Ukraine Control Map indicates that most of the fifteen brigades engaged in the southern offensive are based out of Russia’s remote Eastern Military District and beyond the Lake Baikal military bases. The Russian infantry groups also include special units like the 14th Spetsnaz Brigade, which was originally supposed to focus on counterterrorism.

Other brigades and regiments deployed to the area belong to newer Russian army formations, like the 3rd Army Corps, which includes the Atal battalion from the Republic of Chuvashya and the Alga battalion from Tatarstan. Also present were forces from the 7th Akhmat-North Regiment, located in Chechnya and comprised of soldiers under Ramzan Kadyrov’s supervision. Geographic analysis of Russian brigades located within twenty-five kilometers of Vuhledar reveals that most of the Russian soldiers are coming from Siberia, including Buryatia, Primorsky Krai, and the Pacific fleet.

In a now-deleted February 10 TikTok video preserved in a tweet by Igor Girkin, the DFRLab identified fifteen armored class vehicles, including T-80 tanks, BTR-82 APCs, and KaMAZ military class trucks. One of these, a KamAZ 6350 truck with a registration plate ending with region code 87, suggests technical equipment from the Siberian Military District had deployed more than 5,000 kilometers across Russian territory to back the Vuhledar offensive operation. 

Another BMP-80 tank bearing the name of the city of Kazan, Tatarstan, reveals that the Russian General Staff deployed servicemen from the Volga region. Locals from the region are said to belong to the Alga volunteer battalion as part of the 3rd Army Corps, created by the Russian General Staff in June 2022 before the declaration of “partial mobilization” by Russian President Vladimir Putin. According to the highest estimates, the Alga battalion amounts to around 500 men.

Russia will likely continue its offensive on Vuhledar in the upcoming week. However, with no tactical advantage besides occasional Lancet drone strikes, it does not seem likely that the territory will be overturned soon.

—Valentin Châtelet, Research Associate, Brussels, Belgium

Heavy fighting across Luhansk as Ukraine warns of new Russian offensive

As previously noted, the Russian army continues to place pressure on Bakhmut. On February 16, five people were killed and nine wounded in the shelling of Bakhmut, according to the Ukrainian prosecutor general’s office, which added that it had received reports of shells hitting the residential quarter of the city. Nearby, the Russian army also shelled Spirne, Vyimka, Rozdolivka, Fedorivka, Vasyukivka, Bilohorivka, Paraskoviivka, Klishchiivka, Ivanivske, Chasiv Yar, Stupochky, Predtechyne, and Kurdumivka. Due to the intensifying fighting and shelling, civilians are reportedly fleeing Chasiv Yar to escape the Russian attacks. The Russian army is attempting to advance in Hryanykivka, Avdiivka, and Mariinka. Russian attacks were also reported in the direction of Kherson.

Serhiy Haidai, the current head of the Luhansk Regional Military–Civil Administration, reported intense Russian shelling in the crucial towns of Kreminna and Bilohorivka. Ukraine said it had repelled some of these attacks. This comes amid a warning from Ukrainian presidential advisor Mykhailo Podolyak that Russia’s new large-scale offensive is already under way. The DFRLab is closely following the events and movements on the frontlines related to the offensive, which is taking place despite Russia’s recent losses on the battlefields and significant losses in equipment and armored vehicles.

Due to the heavy fighting, the Ukrainian army will require a secure flow of military equipment and ammunition, which is among the top requests of Ukrainian officials to allied countries. According to US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin, the Ukraine Defense Contact Group will continue to support Kyiv. The Ukraine Defense Contact Group is a coalition of fifty-four countries supporting Ukraine’s defense efforts. The Washington Post also reported on February 13 that the US is planning a new aid package for Ukraine. US intelligence has assessed that Ukraine’s army would not be able to simultaneously defend Bakhmut and launch a spring counteroffensive, allies have reportedly urged Ukraine to prioritize the spring counteroffensive over defending Bakhmut.

As fighting continues in eastern Ukraine, new signals are emerging of Iran’s involvement in the war. A recent investigation by The Guardian found that Iran has used boats and a state-owned airline to smuggle advanced long-range armed drones to Russia. Meanwhile, Ukrainian military intelligence reportedly intercepted audio on February 10 of two Shahed drone operators coordinating targets. Ukraine’s military intelligence claimed the operators spoke in a Kurdish dialect mixed with Farsi words, suggesting the operators could be from Iran’s Kurdistan region. Iran has previously deployed forces organized by ethnicity; for example, the Fatemiyoun Division is composed mainly of Hazaras, an ethnic Afghan minority, which fought in Syria under the umbrella of Iran. 

—Ruslan Trad, Resident Fellow for Security Research, Sofia, Bulgaria

Moldova reacts to alleged Russian plot against its pro-Europe government

The Moldovan government was quick to respond after Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy accused Russia of planning to destabilize Moldova. The first to react was the Information and Security Service of Moldova (SIS), which confirmed on February 9 that it had received intel from Ukrainian partners identifying subversive activities that aimed “to undermine the Republic of Moldova, destabilize, and violate public order.” 

The following day, a missile reportedly launched by Russia over Ukraine entered Moldovan airspace. Hours later, Prime Minister Natalia Gavrilita announced her resignation. In her final speech, Gavrilita stated “Moldova is entering a new phase, one in which security is our priority.” Later, Moldovan President Maia Sandu appointed defense and security adviser Dorin Recean as prime minister. While there is no evidence connecting the missile incident with Gavrilita’s resignation, as the government reshuffle has been a topic of discussion since November, security concerns may have accelerated the process.

On Monday, President Sandu organized a press conference in which she provided further details of the alleged plot, accusing Russia of trying to overthrow Moldova’s pro-Europe government. “The operation involved saboteurs with military training posing as civilians to carry out violent acts, assault on government institutions, and hostage-taking,” she said. Sandu added that the intel received from Ukraine included “good documentation of the locations and logistical aspects of the organization of such subversive activities,” and warned that citizens of Russia, Montenegro, Belarus, and Serbia could be among those involved.

These concerns about subversive Russian activity in Moldova are playing out in the sports world as well. On February 14, twelve fans of the Serbian football team Partizan Belgrade were banned from entering Moldova ahead of a match with Sheriff Tiraspol. The Moldovan Football Federation said that authorities decided the Europa League match would be played without spectators. Elsewhere, on February 15, authorities at Chisinau airport stopped a group of boxers from the Budva club in Montenegro and ordered them to leave Moldova. In a Facebook post, the club noted that they were given no explanation from Moldovan authorities.

Russia vehemently denied accusations that it wants to destabilize Moldova, accusing Ukraine of trying to draw Moldova into a confrontation with Russia. “The actual purpose of Kyiv, which disseminated the disinformation, is to drag Chisinau into a tough confrontation with Moscow,” said Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Spokesperson Maria Zakharova. Echoing false and misleading narratives previously used to justify the invasion of Ukraine, Russia has claimed that the West is inciting a conflict in Moldova. In early February, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov told Russian media that the West is considering turning Moldova into “another Ukraine.”

Due to its proximity to Ukraine, Moldova faces serious security challenges. Russian rockets regularly breach the country’s airspace. Several days after the February 10 incident, airspace over Moldova was temporarily shut down on February 14 after reports of a balloon-like object flying over the country. On February 16, the Border Police of Moldova discovered the remains of a rocket. This marks the fourth time that missile remnants have fallen on Moldovan territory.

—Victoria Olari, Research Assistant, Moldova

Kremlin-linked group arranged bribes for European politicians to support the annexation of Crimea

Leaked emails released in an investigation on February 3 revealed that a covert organization run from inside Russian parliament interfered with European policies on occupied Crimea by offering cash and benefits to European politicians to propose pro-Russian motions in their local legislatures. The actions also included paying far-right activists to publish pro-Kremlin articles in European media outlets and arranging trips to occupied Crimea for European politicians and businesspeople.

The joint investigation, conducted by the Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project (OCCRP), Estonia’s Eesti Ekspress, Italy’s IrpiMedia, Austria’s Profil, and Russia’s iStories, focused on Russian parliamentary staffer Sargis Mirzakhanian, who previously ran the International Agency for Current Policy in the years following Russia’s annexation of Crimea. The investigation found that Mirzakhanian was working with several European politicians and activists, including Robert Stelzl, a pro-Russia political activist from Austria; Manuel Ochsenreiter of Germany’s right-wing Alternative for Germany (AfD) party; Mateusz Piskorski, a Polish political activist arrested in 2016 for spying for Russia; and Piskorski’s wife, Marina Klebanovich, who reportedly assisted with the coordination of the agency’s activities in Europe.

Mirzakhanian’s group allegedly drafted pro-Russian resolutions and paid politicians to put them forward in European legislatures. According to the investigation, the group planned for Italian Senator Paolo Tosato and Austrian Member of Parliament Johannes Hübner, both from far-right parties, to put forward resolutions to lift sanctions against Russia. A submitted resolution was valued at 20,000 Euros ($21,000 USD), with a further bonus of 15,000 Euros ($15,900 USD) for “successful voting.” The document in the leaked emails does not specify whether the money was intended to be paid directly to the two politicians or budgeted for the entire project.

Hübner and Tosato both presented resolutions against Russian sanctions on their respective parliament floors, but legislators did not adopt them. Both denied receiving money from Russia.

In 2016, a local council in Veneto, Italy, adopted a motion recognizing the Russian annexation of Crimea and calling to suspend European Union sanctions against Russia. Councils in the regions of Liguria and Lombardy followed Veneto’s example; soon after, Cyprus adopted a similar resolution.

The leaked emails reveal how Mirzakhanian worked with Russian politicians to bring European observers to local elections in Russia in 2017, violating the code of conduct for international election observers. The invitations were arranged through an NGO led by Kremlin-aligned politician Leonid Slutsky, and at least 68,000 Euros ($72,000 USD) was spent on the observation project. Politicians with ties to Mirzakhanian’s International Agency for Current Policy observed other Russian elections, and some allegedly sought to monetize their Kremlin connections by organizing promising contacts for business ventures.

Despite Mirzakhanyan’s disappearance from the public eye, his group’s European allies continue to make pro-Moscow statements and agitate for Russian interests. AfD’s Markus Frohnmaier criticized Germany for helping Ukraine. Austria’s Stelzl was photographed at a pro-Russian rally in Vienna in November of 2022 wearing a t-shirt with the pro-war Russian “Z” symbol, while Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ) member Axel Kassegger demanded in September 2022 that Austria review its position on sanctions against Russia. 

—Ani Mejlumyan, Research Assistant, Armenia

The post Russian War Report: Failed Russian push on Vuhledar results in losses as Moscow increases troops appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Alarm over potential corruption reflects Ukraine’s often troubling prior record, despite the country’s reform progress since the 2014 Revolution of Dignity. Such scandals sow doubt among Ukraine’s international partners and could help convince some to hesitate before providing desperately needed financial support.

The problem with all of this, of course, is that Ukraine depends heavily on the continued support of Western governments and donors, who understandably tend to look askance at the mere suggestion that their donations could be misappropriated. Even if the current flurry of corruption allegations prove to be entirely or at least partially unfounded, the mere perception of corruption risk could alienate the very entities upon which Ukraine’s future recovery will hinge.

This is not a new problem. Ukraine has long been regarded as one of the world’s more corrupt countries and ranked 122nd of 180 countries on Transparency International’s 2021 Corruption Perception Index. In the present circumstances, Ukraine simply cannot afford to be seen as corrupt and must do everything possible to counter such negative perceptions.

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While confidence remains low in Ukraine’s state institutions, the country’s private sector does not appear to suffer from the same problem. On the contrary, Ukrainian businesses enjoy a growing international reputation as resilient, innovative, and cost-competitive. Many are noted for their skilled, modern, savvy, and hard-working talent. The uniquely challenging circumstances of the Russian invasion have served to highlight these positive characteristics.

Although the Russian invasion is now entering its second year, international companies have continued to look for investment opportunities in Ukraine. Even in the midst of Russia’s late 2022 bombing campaign against Ukrainian energy infrastructure, Sergiy Tsivkach of UkraineInvest, the country’s state investment promotion agency, reported that $5 billion of foreign private investment was in the pipeline for Ukraine’s manufacturing sector alone. “There are billions more across other sectors,” he noted. “Private investment in industry is the most important way to restore the Ukrainian economy and create new jobs.”

In a January 17 interview, Uber CEO Dara Khosrowshahi summed up why some foreign companies are excited about Ukraine despite the ongoing invasion. “I’m very optimistic,” he commented. “You really do see the spirit of the Ukrainian people here, the resilience. But even beyond that, you see the entrepreneurial energy here.”

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The contrast could hardly be starker between the global optimism surrounding Ukraine’s private sector and the spectacle of the United States sending inspectors to the country early this year to investigate whether foreign assistance funds are being misused or misplaced. This is a hint, a strong one, about the best way to approach the country’s future reconstruction.

Private companies seeking Western investment have to meet Western standards, requirements, and anti-corruption norms. Major international companies simply won’t invest unless they are comfortable that they are not exposing themselves to unnecessary risk, including the financial, criminal, and reputational risk of corruption scandals. Similarly, Ukrainian companies cannot reliably attract foreign investment unless they can demonstrate that these risks are at a minimum.

Even where there may not be specific legal consequences for corruption, there are certainly reputational and financial risks. This means private companies have obvious incentives to operate cleanly and transparently that are often limited or absent in the public sector.

International confidence in Ukraine’s private sector and its ability to weather the storms of the Russian invasion is pronounced. Ukraine should capitalize on this and seek to minimize concerns about public sector corruption by letting the private sector take the lead on national reconstruction.

This approach would make the West a shareholder in Ukraine’s future. Leaving the private sector to lead the way would also introduce numerous checks on corruption as each individual contract is signed, executed, and monitored with the Western oversight of foreign investors. Even if the government officials in question are doing absolutely nothing wrong, it seems beyond dispute that the international community would sooner trust Ukraine’s private sector than its scandal-plagued public sector. Trust, in turn, begets investment.

Suriya Evans-Pritchard Jayanti is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council.

Further reading

UkraineAlert Jan 28, 2023

Poland is leading Europe’s response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine

By Diane Francis

Poland was the unsung hero of the recent landmark decision by Berlin and Washington to provide Ukraine with tanks as Polish leadership continues to shape the European response to Russia’s genocidal invasion.

Conflict Economic Sanctions

UkraineAlert Feb 14, 2023

Russia’s new offensive will test the morale of Putin’s mobilized masses

By Peter Dickinson

Vladimir Putin’s desperation to regain the military initiative in Ukraine is leading to suicidal tactics that are undermining morale among hundreds of thousands of recently mobilized Russian troops, writes Peter Dickinson.

Civil Society Conflict

UkraineAlert Feb 1, 2023

Europe’s last empire: Putin’s Ukraine war exposes Russia’s imperial identity

By Botakoz Kassymbekova

Vladimir Putin’s genocidal invasion of Ukraine has exposed modern Russia’s unapologetically imperial identity but could yet lead to the collapse of the Kremlin’s broader imperial ambitions, writes Botakoz Kassymbekova.

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The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

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